1
500
16
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a755517ee1644ffda2a55107c471c34f.pdf
01e6727569da5ed30905339808f9cac5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2020-0082-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
11/20/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains a Department of State cable regarding NATO intervention in Kosovo and two cables from Ambassador Alexander Vershbow summarizing meetings with NATO Defense Ministers and Russian Ambassador to NATO Sergei Kislyak.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/100518">2019-0337-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Kosovo
NATO
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5460118614e7f60e155c5ecacfc1acc7.pdf
2e2133a4310b8ed952c8057c34a67ba0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2020-0080-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
11/20/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains two Department of State cables regarding NATO strikes in Kosovo and allegations of U.S. KFOR [Kosovo Force] problems in Vitina.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/100519">2019-0340-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Kosovo
NATO
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ecec4a8d53f63a1cb3c14974b5f1243c.pdf
87366073bb0a223e11ac16e1d7891e84
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning the National Security Council
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-0983-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This record was declassified in response to an appeal of a mandatory declassification review denial. The document being released was prepared for a January 15, 1999 Principal's Committee Meeting on Kosovo. The document discusses our objectives, negotiation policies, and future goals concerning foreign policy in Kosovo.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/2/2023
Kosovo
Principals Committee
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/379a7baca94ca5cc521d2517fc7807cd.pdf
a048c57109b35456684bda26c8040676
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2019-0824-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
04/12/2022
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains National Security Council email for Samuel Berger and Jim Steinberg regarding meetings on Kosovo from May 1999.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/94695">2019-0307-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Emails
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
03/17/2022
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2019-0824-M.pdf
Kosovo
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/57b5cd94a72e923310eb72ade289c400.pdf
b2aed98b61c641855bcff6af21d2745a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Principals Committee Meetings on Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0920-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
02/04/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains summary of conclusions for National Security Council Principals Committee meetings on Kosovo from April through July 1999. Also included are agendas, NSC profile sheets, transmittal forms, and cover memoranda.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
1/9/2020
Kosovo
Kosovo War
PC
Principals Committee
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b4859e4533358017c70a8f51e07066b4.jpg
503030c2b16b9da724df4aac3912bb2e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
White House
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kosovo Phone Calls
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sharon Farmer
White House Photograph Office
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
02/13/1999
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P70117-02_13Feb1999
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton talks on the telephone regarding Kosovo in the Oval Office Dining Room
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P70117-02_13Feb1999
594653
Bill Clinton
Kosovo
Telephone
White House
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ae3138749d368071368e896d05b836e4.jpg
cda49f2e133508b689d6ce0026d3e787
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Kosovo
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Camp Bondsteel
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
11/23/1999
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P77828-17_23Nov1999
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton poses with a soldier from Task Force Falcon during his visit to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P77828-17_23Nov1999
594653
Bill Clinton
Kosovo
Military
Soldiers
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6568705c9890c310fa67c3075ffc9233.pdf
532ce21f62466e0a97db9c45973d20bd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Kosovo
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0547-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Kosovo from 1999 from the National Security Council's Records Management System. Materials include two memoranda from Richard Holbrooke, one regarding Slobodan Milosevic and the other regarding options for our next steps in Kosovo. Also included is a paper on Kosovo diplomatic strategy.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0547-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Kosovo
Kosovo War
Milosevic
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2c60641004e15b16694efdefdb9c11d1.jpg
45146627153c49854e8fac5a17dc58fa
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Skopje, Macedonia
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stenkovic 1 Refugee Camp
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
William Vasta
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
6/22/1999
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P73667-25
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton walk through Stenkovic 1 Refugee Camp with young Kosovar refugees near Skopje, Macedonia
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P73667_25_22JUN1999_H
594653
Bill Clinton
Camps
Children
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Kosovo
Kosvar
Macedonia
Refugees
Stenkovic
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c35b5696485284555b534d1758be9d34.jpg
ef4de89bd9023b5879e6df5111375e3f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Skopje, Macedonia
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stenkovic 1 Refugee Camp
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
William Vasta
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
06/22/1999
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P73638-32
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton comforts a young Kosovar refugee at Stenkovic 1 Refugee Camp near Skopje, Macedonia
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P73638_32_22JUN1999_H
594653
Bill Clinton
Camps
Children
Kosovo
Kosvar
Macedonia
Refugees
Stenkovic
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5aa4876f138a60330e869d23b372880d.pdf
81087b5ee20e37b1803873db43bc5c51
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�3087
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1.0 I
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATICN
SUBJECT:
Telcon with ~abour Party Leader and Prime
Minister-elect Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Mr. Blair
Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Marc Koehler
and Marian~a Papadimitriou
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May I, 1997, 11:25-11:27 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Hello.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
. Hello?
Tony?
Congratulations.
Thanks very much indeed.
The President:
What are you doing, making a round of parties?
Mr. Blair: Yes we are just off. There's a big celebration by
the banks of the Thames. I'm just heading off there now. We're
slowing duwn through the night. It's a stunning result, really.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Yes, it's amazing, isn't it?
The President:
Mr. Blair:
That was amazing.
I'm really happy for you.
Yes, well you showed the way.
The President:
I'm sorry you got so much grief from the press.
Mr. Blair: That's right.
Left don't defend you.
.
Always the Right attack you and the
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 1
'~' ·~_f'''~';;' DECLASSI~ICATION ~ATE: October 14,2015
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President: Well, the people voted for you. That's the main
thing.
I wish you well and look forward to working with you.
I
guess I'll see you soon, at that NATO meeting, if not. sooner.
Mr. Blair: Yes, that's right.
I would love to do that. We have
a chance to do something now.
I look forward to meeting with
you. We have a good and strong relationship.
The President: See you soon. Go on back to your people now.
just wanted to wish you congratulations.
Mr. Blair:
Thanks, thank you very much indeed.
The P.resident:
Mr. Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
End of Conversation
I
�CONFlOENriAL
GOHFIDji;NTIAI..
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Private Meeting with Prime Minister Blair and
British Cabinet (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Daley, Secretary of Commerce
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, NSC (Noteta~ec)
Prime Minister Blair
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister for Overseas Affairs
Members of the British Cabinet
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 11:40 a.m. - 12 noon
The Cabinet Room, No. 10 Downing Street
Prime Minister Blair:
(Following introductions of Cabinet
members)
Parliament is in recess; we are having a hell of a time
getting underway -- the honeymoon doesn't last long.
The second
term is what we need; to take nothing for granted and not rely on
the other side's unpopularity. »Ci
The President:
I am delighted to be here.
I admire what you did
for the party; it is important to have the freedom to capture the
center and move into tomorrow. -f€t
Prime Minister Blair:
The truth is we took part of what we did
from you;
I am happy that these issues are on the agenda in the
rest of Europe now. ~
The President:
There are some leaders like the prime ministers
of the Netherlands and Portugal who have the same ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
other examples.
~
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
Reason:
1.5 (b) ,
Declassify On, , 6/
And Sweden -- it is helpful to look at
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 2
5€;~;iiooiE]' O:"hff 14, 2015
�CONFIDtNTlAL
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
2
The President:
Kok was talking about France; they are not ready
yet to do what is needed.
~he UK, the Netherlands and the Uniterl
states have good social compacts that make the country work; in
the United States we need to maintain competitiveness while
looking out for people. Millions can't cope with work and
family; and these are the people who face education and safe
streets and health care challenges.
If you succeed, and I think.
you will, constructive change will have to take place.
France
and Germany need to balance social programs and global realities;
a different version of that problem faces us all. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is why it is so important to exchange
ideas; we have learned from the best and worst of experiences;
there. must .be structural change.
It could well be premature to
. introduce the euro without it. ;e1
The President:
It is interesting how a currency acquires a life
of its own -- it has become the litmus test for France and
Germany, though the underlying changes have not taken place.
yz(
(Cabinet meeting adjourned, discussion continued with Chancellor
of Exchequer Brown.)
Mr. Brown:
There is a need for a flexible labor market, which
you faced up to in the United States. You have 50 percent more
consumption per head than France and Germany because they have
not liberalized shopping hours, and 50 percent more computer
work.
If possible, we should make the G-7 the forum for
discussion of flexible labor forces so others can learn from the
U.s. experience.
The debate needs to go forward in Europe.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't mean giving up the social
compact but it is. a new world.
The role of government is not
about hostilities with business but to equip people with the
skills and technology they need and help families. ~
The President:
I agree with that.
k81
Mr. Brown:
In Great Britain, the long-term unemployed make up 40
percent of our unemployed, compared with 10 percent in the United
States. We have no way to get them back to work. There will
have to be huge changes; France is the best example because their
public sectqr is huge. We need to demonstrate that growth and
social programs can work together -- you do not have to sacrifice.
one for the other.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Jospin that he was attacking the
right for the wrong reasons -- he should be doing it because they
are not going far enough. Je7
CONFIDENTIAL
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3
The President:
We cut government employment by 300,000.
It is
now the smallest since the Kennedy Administration and, on a per
capita basis, the smallest it has been since 1933. We have
direct transfers to social security and to state and local
governments. You could be helpful with the difficulties within
France and Germany with regard to social spending. At least in
Germany they spend the money better, on long-terr:. training i in
France people are paid to stay unemployed for very long periods.
],Kf
Mr. Brown:
The system can only work if there is mobility,
flexibility and la~ge transfers. Right now, none of these three
exists. 0
.The President:
There is one thing to look at.
I know the United
states are different than EU member nations, but you would be
interested in how far big states can go in having different
financial policies. New Jersey is an example - - i t proved you
can raise the minimum wage and create more low-wage jobs.
I used
this experience to justify our rc:ising the minimum wage. But
unemployment will go up if the rise is too big. Your
unemployment rate is lower than other Europeans' because of your
f1exible system. -+-er
.
Mr. Brown:
Since they are not required to work, no long-term
unemployed single parents are included in our statistics.
That means unemployment is really closer to 20 percent in some
cases. We have the biggest single-parent population in Europe.
-+-er
The President:
If the culture says it is no longer necessary to
have a marriage to have children, then that means single parents
should have to work. ~
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
�6EGRE"T
SECRET
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
.
I.
o
~~
WASHINGTON
o~
('>0
Ir)ECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
i iNTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
I E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 3
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
Restricted Meeting with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Anthony Blair, Prime Minister
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff to the
Prime Minister
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:00-12:30 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
Prime Minister Blair:
Should we work through our cards?
(U)
The President: If you see me with all the cards they give me,
you know it is going to be ~ long meeting because I have not done
my homework. If I .do it, I reduce it to this one card.
(U)
With regard to Northern Ireland, ,I would like to tell you that
when it comes time that you think it would be helpful for us to
say something about a cease-fire or decommissioning, let me know.
We may have to wait for the Irish election. I have some pull and
can call in chits; just let me know. --i-E"t"'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
3ECRE'f
Reason: 1.5 (b,l
Declassify On:;
,
�SECRE'l'
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I will think about the parade problem.
The
conflict reminds me of the Middle East. Do yuu have a resolution
in mind? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One problem is that the people are farther along
than the leaders.
For people like Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley, the
conflict is their whole life. ~
Ambassador Crowe: At Drumcree, however, all those peace-loving
people went indoors and shut their blinds.
(U)
The President:
Those were the same people in the streets
cheering us -- they need leadership. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Some of my rich yuppie friends cancelled trips to
Belfast to play golf. J21
Ambassador Crowe:
The President has been strongly supportive of
investment in Northern Ireland.
K)
SE(gET
�6EGf<E~r
SECRET
3
The President:
You need a place for the politicians to go to be
relevant.
They have to have a life
"
other than
their ability to stop the process.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You've got it right with a
guaran ee 0
some connection to Ire:and.
I have listened to them
talk and I think that if there were no political leaders, we
could get the people to agree. -fer
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~------------------------~I
I
Mr. Holmes: /
The President:
Sinn Fein needs to be on board with the substance
·of the resolution, whatever the details of the relationship to
Ireland. What is the role for the DUP and Paisley? If we leave
the extremes out, they can undermine the solution.
I was struck
by that when I met Paisley.
I didn't get a word in edgewise for
20 minutes, but I didn't care. ~
Mr. Holmes:
/r~I=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(=~~1------------------11
I
The President:
You mean if you give them a meaningful devolved
government? .JB1
Mr. Berger:
We are maintaining contact with the unionists -- I
called Trimble recently. ~
The President:
He is impressive.
~
Ambassador Crowe: But not at Drumcree. And the SDLP needs Sinn
Fein.in the talks so they cannot criticize the compromises Hume
makes.
(S)
The President:
You know where we are.
can do, let me know at the right time.
If there is anything I
(.e)
Mr. Berger: Mo Mowlam was over last week and we had a great
meeting. .Jce)
The President:
She is good, great on TV. Her happy face
inspires confidence. She seems soiid and not full of herself;
you don't need another person over there posturing like a
peacock.
-\-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I will tell her that.
End of Conversation
SECRE'!'
~
�CmJFI DEN''fIAL
CONfiDENTIAL
'/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Luncheon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
John Podesta, Deputy Chief of Staff
Daniel Tarullo, Head of the National
Economic Council
James Steincerg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
E. Anthony Wayne, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, ~ational Security Council
(Notetaker)
Prime Minister Blair
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
Alistair Darling, Chief Secretary, Treasury
Colin Budd, Cabinet Office
Alex Allan, Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff
Philip Barton, Assistant Private Secretary
for the Prime Minister
John Holmes, Private Secretary for Overseas
Affairs
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:30-3 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
The President:
We should talk about NATO.
I have the impression
that most leaders in Paris are in favor of a group of five,
adding Romania and Slovenia to the other three. We have
reservations about that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1.S(b)i
Declass:lfy On: ,:
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
. COHFI DEN'fIJltL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~I Our first concern is that the first shall not be the
last -- we have said that all along.
That is why we need
aggressively to build on PFP for future members.
If there are
five, no one will believe in a second round and we will be under
greater pressure to reassure them publicly.
This could lead
Russia to think tha~ we are committed to Baltic membership.
We
don't want any grey zones, but the open door must be credible.
That may not be as satisfying, but it may be the proper thing to
do. Ael
L -______
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(1) I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Ambassador Kerr:
Mr. Berger:
They're shifting because of Slovenia and because
they are grateful for Romania's deal with Hungary. ~
The President:
I see Kohl next week; he should know where you
are on this.
JkM
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
We need to be reassuring and embracing in our
language; perhaps not using the example of waiting room. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
E.O. 13526, section 1.
One way is to emphasize self-selection.
~
The President:
We are working on it and thinking of the package
we can put forward.
Bill just whispered, "Are Romania and
Slovenia ready? This is a military alliance." ~
Ambassador Crowe:
context. J.e1
You need to make the judgment in the military
The President:
We have a disagreement with our partners on the
continent but I am sure a larger group would turn up the heat on
the Baltic issue and we are not prepared to handle that yet.
This is a problem that needs time to sort itself out; we need to
give it a few years.
If you give it away now, you have nothing
to fill the time. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFiDENTIAL
,CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr, Holmes:
The President:
Mr. Holmes:
What argument did they make?
'l'hat they are not ready.
j)21
~
Ambassador. Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I would have thought that, but the republican
caucus actually favors letting in more countries.
I don't want
to misrepresent the Hill; I think the republicans will follow
their leadership on this. Some are against enlargement because
of the fear of provoking a nationalist response in Russia -- that
is a silly argument. )ef
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
Je1
Mr. Berger:
New polling data shows that NATO is just not a
grass-roots issue in Russia.
ket
they are just being
Prime Minister Blair: What a surprise
normal and caring more about the economy. --+er
The President:
What do you think about the Iranian election?
.(..e')
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
The President:
That is where we are. We hope things will get
better.
It concerns me that we are getting to the point that
there are no Western-educated politicians in the government.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFI WENTIAL
_ CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We have made an attempt to address this within
NATO -- the European Security and Defense Identity. Except for
AFSOUTH we are happy with that. And we are trying to work out
AFSOUTH. -ter
On the Middle East, Saddam has literally violated the no-fly
zone. We would be stupid to take action against those flights
that 99 percent of the world think are okay. But the UN
resolutions- are at stake; we have to do something about his
challenge of the no-fly zone. Our idea is that he can have as
many humanitarian flights as he wants but we need to-have advance
notice.
The only problem is that if you tell him that and he
does not comply, you have to respond.
That puts a burden on us.
But if we believe in the UN resolutions, it is the best we can
do. ....(..G1Ambassador Crowe:
Shoot them down?
P?i
The President: No. We want to avoid deaths and especially
deaths of civilians.
I don't want to comment because we have not
,defined it yet.
We will get credit with world opinion for
permitting humanitarian flights and it is reasonable to demand
notification. ~
Prime
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
There has been a refinement in our thinking. A
conversation between our two militaries produced a range of
options. -tet
The PresideDt:
This is not a question cf how to win, but how to
avoid a loss.
There is no way to win with world public opinion
but we are not prepared to let Saddam walk away from the
resolutions. We are not looking for a victory; this is not like
our response to the attempt on President Bush's life. There is a
sanctions committee in the UN but we don't trust them.
We don't
want him to think he can sucker punch us into shooting down
innocent civilians. ~
:'
.
�CONFIDENTIAL
. CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Holmes.:
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
If he knocks and a door opens, he will knock again
next time . .~
The President:
together. ::fC)
Whatever we do, even if it is less, we must do it
Ambassador Crowe:
I wonder what his lawyers are telling him?
fof'
The President:
I concur with your analysis on Iran.
It is
imperative we stay together.
I want to discuss it on its merits,
not in terms of money. Others are saying that all is well as
long as they don't blow up our people, and we can all make money.
But we have a larger responsibility. You know about terrorism
because of the IRA. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
We need to hold firm.
~
The President:
In terms of yesterday's NATO conference, there is
less than meets the eye.
I think what we are really doing is
reorganizing ourselves to face the new challenges, getting rid of
the intellectual clutter to free ourselves for the future.
If
you believe we need to combat proliferation, ethnic hatred and
terrorism and that we need a common policy on the environment,
then we have to be organized to deal with these transnational
problems. The world looks to us to be honest about these
problemsi we may not always be right but we have to be honest.
The pressure to go for the commercial benefits is enormous. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Can we discuss China and Hong Kong?
We are with you oh that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COWFIPEWTIAL
~
�CONFI DEH'fIAL
6
The President:
Under the terms of the 1984 agreement, the UK and
China made a deal that you asked us to endorse.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Have you heard about this
movie that is to released on July I? It is the story of how the
British got Hong Kongi you do not come off well. They are doing
what we did in Germany after the war, in reverse.
That won't
make much difference since Hong Kong is one of the most open
places in the world, but it is a metaphor for how they are going
to play it. ;ef
We want to be helpful.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have more leverage with Russia because of IFI programs
and denuclearization funding. We have some leverage with China
through the WTO, but Hong Kong is unique and we will support you.
)e(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Mr. Berger:
It would be useful to come up with agreed benchmarks
such as early elections under fair conditions, civil liberties.
If we are all sending the same message, it will be more
effective. We are not there yet. ~
Prime Minister Bla'
Mr. Steinberg:
Mr. Holmes:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
It depends what that means.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
I
)I)
�.CONFIDE~TTIAL
7
The President: We will be doing our best to stick with you -you have a big dog in this hunt.
jZ(
Ambassador·· Crowe:
The President:
once.
(U)
That is an Arkansas expression.
They hunt with dogs here too;
(U)
I went beagling
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
The President:
Red Army. ....ke1'"
So our officials will be sitting in front of the
Mr. Holmes:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We don't want to put them in a box publicly, but
privately we can try to persuade them. ~
Mr. Berger:
There will be 25,000 reporters there.
The danger is
that you set the bar too high with a press that wants a
confrontation, as do some people in Hong Kong.
If our benchmarks
are not clear, we could be drawn into a confrontation. +eJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The press tried to get me to comment yesterday.
I ducked the question because it is not our business.
I know
Kohl and Chirac are for it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
�COHFI DEN'!' IM
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But it
e good to un erstan w at t e consequences and
alternatives are.
It is usually discussed at the theological
level rath~~than in practical terms.
That is what I would want
to know.
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Tarullo:
It is difficult for us to say anything because they
think we are concerned about the euro displacing the dollar as a
reserve currency. ~
The President:
If it leads to lower growth, it will not be good
for us or the rest of the world. At Denver we are going to talk
about an Africa initiative; but if we, you and Japan don't have
economic growth, we cannot help Latin America or Africa.
Your position is principled; the Tories' is ideological. Yours
is the best way to go forward since the theological arguments are
hard to understand. ).R1
Mr. Alan: What is lacking is a strategy for job creation and
structural adjustment. ~
The President:
Our labor ministers held a conference in Detroit,
but it didn't accomplish much because of economic conditions.
Delors put out a white paper at the time but nothing happened.
I
think we should acknowledge we tried it a few years ago; it is a
grea t idea.
(,e')
I'd like you to come to Washington soon on an official visit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
York.
(U)
I'd like to as long as I can visit New
The President: You can. You know I ~m giving the commencement
speech at Chelsea's school. Dan Tarullo's daughter goes there
too; Chelsea says she is frighteningly smart but still nice.
Seniors finish a month early so they can do a special project.
Chelsea is going to be a doctor so she is at Georgetown Hospital
with a surgeon.
She watched a heart valve implant operation and
said it was too interesting to be queasy about the sight of
blood.
(U)
Dan, what is your daughter's project?
(U)
Mr. Tarullo:
She is teaching English, but I think she is going
to be a psychologist.
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
�c;mIFIDEN1'I}'rL
Ambassador Kerr:
It is amazing the extent to which his daughter
has a private life.
(U)
The President:
The press has been wonderful in honoring the
request Hillary and I made to them, with one or two exceptions.
Children deserve a chance to grew up in private.
I think the
press respected this because we did not put Chelsea in the
poli tical spotlight.
(U)
We will see each other in Denver. We are staying at an old
cowboy hotel.
Do you know where you are staying?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am not sure.
(U)
The President:
We are arranging a dinner at a place called The
Fort that specializes in buffalo meat, which is low fat.
When I
had lunch with Boris, he served roast pig and told me real men
hack off the ears and eat them. And once he served 24 courses,
including moose lips.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
conference.
(U)
It is time to get ready for the press
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 5
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Bricish Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
John Smith, Tony Campanile,
Lyle Harrison, Marc Koehler, Marianna
Papadimitriou and Mary Ann Peters
DATEr TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June lOr 1997, 1458-1517
The Oval Office
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello.
The President:
(U)
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill?
The President:
(U)
(U)
Fine.
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much
through.
I 'ust want a uick word with
for comin
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What can I do to help?
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DBNTIl'rL
Reason:
1. 5 (b)/
Declassify on: ;
(U)
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
GOHFIDE~J'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll be happy to do that.
immediately.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That's great
We'll contact them
~
The President:
This is crazy.
I don't know why they're doing
this now, when you're trying to put all this together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that. We'll get in touch with
them today and convey this in the strongest possible terms.
If
they are thinking about proceeding like this while you are
working in good faith, it makes no sense, it's crazy. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
That's what I think.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I've got it and I'll get on it.
doing otherwise? ~
How are you
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. There are pretty turbulent waters
here about European monetary union, with Jospin's victory.
~
The President:
It might give you a little more room, though.
+G+Prime Minister Blair:
I
Yeah, maybe it will give me more room.
>:'0. 13526,
~,ti'n
1.4(b)(d)
_.:Ai:':-"'_h~;';'"\.....--':;""':;---:...o::--:.--~--~-~...
cmlFIDEN'FIAL
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-'1'
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-,_
.
,~
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�COHFIDEN'PIAL
CONFlfJENllAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I thought the Econoflist this week had some
interesting suggestions on how to proceed with the currency but
change some of the Maastricht requirements.
They argue that
France cannot make it anyway with 12 percent unemployment; but
they acknowledge that the Bundesbank would not agree to such
changes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's just pretty hard to ask a Socialist
government -- it was hard to ask Chirac's government -- to do
nothing except cut spending when you have 13 percent
unemployment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, and if you're doing it
while kee
the franc hi h
ou're reall
the
econom .
The President:
Well, I don't believe they can solve their
economic and unemployment problems through the budget anyway.
They need structural reform. Maybe Socialist governments can
actually do this better than Conservative governments. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFJ DENTIAL
CONF IDEN'PIAL
The President:
Is he coming to Denver.or not?
Prime Minister Blair:
He must be?
(U)
(U)
The President: Well the way their constitution works, Chirac has
foreign policy and he has economic policy, so they normally bot~
come.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I suppose he will, won't he?·
should be interesting. Have you met him?
It
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
there? :Jef
"You guys have to help me."
Tell me who was
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president: Well I'm looking forward to it.
I'm glad to see
the debate being carried on our side of the field, but there
could be a huge backlash if the left fails to deliver.
Ultimately, in a democracy the poor rely upon the social judgment
of the middle class. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
that we will fail.
Absolutelyri ht.
There's a real risk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That nearly happened to us, you know, when the
Congress in '94 didn't pass my plan.
I fended it off and we now
have agreement in the budget to repair it.
I think we saved it,
but you don't want to miss those chances when they come along.
~
CONFI DEN1'IPrL
�CONFiDENTIAL
CONFIDEN''fH\:L
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, there's a huge mood of
uncertainty in Europe at the moment.
It's almost impossible to
overstate it. %
The President: Well, they keep trying to draw me into
discussions on details and I keep trying to stay out of it.
)Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I think where you could have an impact is
that people look across the Atlantic, they see the American
economy and see that it works. ~
The President: What I try to do is to avoid getting drawn into
discussions of issues such as:
"If the European currency is
delayed, does that mean it is dead. N What I need to do is stay
'on my general theme that you can't create jobs without reform,
but you don't have to cut out the social safety net.
That is
what your election showed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think they are afraid that global corporations
and global money movers will take away the capacity of the
nation-state to preserve the social contract, but I don't think
that's true.
There was a fascinating piece in the Economist on
how the Czech experiment failed.
The market outran the capacity
of the regulators and they have negative growth now. You ought
to have somebody pull that for you, just because it makes the
case for reform without the Thatcher/Reagan idea of getting rid
of government. A little article on how the Czech economy, the
jewel of the post-communist period, could be in all this trouble
ironically because there was not enough regulation.
l-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Economist?
(U)
Not in this edition, but in the last one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will look for it. We've got to provide
people with a way through this problem, so it's not a choice
between dismantlement and corporatism. This is a very European
problem, born out of the ideological clash between socialism and
capitalism . . You do not have it in the same way in the United
States.
(U)
CON"PI DEW!' IAL
�LUf'U /BENT/At
CONPIDEN'fIAL
6
The President:
The problem here is that because union membership
is declining, even if you have more jobs, people worry that
their families are vulnerable, especially because there is no
universal h.ealth care. But without growth and lower unemployment
it's hard to get these things done.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, that's right. You could have a more"
universal system of health care in your country without wrecking
the system.
(U)
The President:
Of course we could. We'd save money. But we're
going to take another pop at it this time, at least for the
children. Anyway, I can't wait to see you in Denver and I'll
call the appropriate people and send the message publicly and
privately.
kef
Prime Minister Blair: That would be very kind, Bill; it would
really help.
It will be great to see you in Denver.
(U)
The President:
Have you talked Bertie Ahern?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
kef
Do you think he'll be Okay?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I like him,
Y21
I
-1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have to have a
unified position or it doesn't mean a thing. So I'll stick with
you as far as I can and see you in Denver. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, Bill, many, many thanks indeed.
(U)"
The President:" Once again, give my best to your wi fe. We had a
great time, and let's follow up on that project about philosophy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we are; it was great to see you and
Hillary. One of my few moments of real enjoyment.
(U)
The President: Well, you get to be a real person.
Denver. Bye-bye.
(U)
COHFIDEN'I'IM
See you in
�Luhl
CONFIDEWPIAL
Prime Minister Blair;
uJLJ'ijj iHL
7
,
See you in Denver.
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 6
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
-
The President
Prime Minister, Tony Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Wylma Robinson,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie Glick
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 27, 1997, 12:41 - 1:02 p.m. EDT
Private Residence, Los Angeles, California
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
Very well, indeed.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am sitting here outside Chequers having
a cup of tea with a friend of yours, Steven Spielberg.
(U)
The President: Steven Spielberg? You are? You tell Mr.
Spielberg that you may be drinking tea with him, but I am here
on the beach in Santa Monica having coffee with Ron Burkle,
which shows California has more influence than either the
British or the U.S. Government.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You are?
(U)
The President:
Yes.
I am looking at people skateboarding at
the beautiful beaches of Santa Monica.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
then?
(U)
CONFIl3EH'FIAL
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On:
You lucky man.
This is your vacation,
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONPIDEN'PIl's:L
2
The President: No, no.
I am out here working, but it is a
Sunday morning and you wanted to talk. And Ron Burkle is a
friend of mine who bought a house very close to the hotel where
I was last night.
I interrupted coffee to speak with you.
Congratulations again on the ceasefire. I think we have a
chance now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we have a chance now.
to fill ou in on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help you with
Trimble? Probably not. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
one more time.
You know that is a well I can only go back to
I am certainly willing to try to do that though.
).e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I could try to come on over to see you or
something. -+e1
cmlFI DEN'E' L"rL
�CONFIDEN'PIAL
CONFIOENTIAL
3
Prime Minister Blair: What I think, the reason why I think
there is some hope in the situation is that the ordinary people
in Northern Ireland are desperate for peace. ~
The President:
Oh God yes. This is the place in the world
where there is the largest disconnect between the leaders and
what the ordinary people want. Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And we will do that.
I got your letter on the
Middle East and I basically agree with the letter.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
And I am
really glad you are going to become EU president in January
because my sense is that we can get some grudging progress for
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
I
the rest of the year, and if there is going to be a
breakthrough, then we will need everyone's help to close next
year. I don't think the present situation can be maintained.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I
(JZ)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The_President:
point.
Well, first of all, a flashpoint or meltdown
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That's right.
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'll give you an example, here you are trying to do this
Northern Ireland and one day the IRA has the whole thing in its
power and the next day, Paisley does.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFIDEN'fIAL
5
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
That may be somet lng you cou
the Europeans examine -- because it is very important -you want to provide economic assistance to Jordan. With
parliamentary elections coming, we would be in a tough situation
without any real power if the people he is backing, who have
stable relations with Israel, lose ground because of economic
difficulties. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One of the things that would help is to raise
the economic fortune of the Palestinians.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
there.
(U)
Hello?
You are getting a bit faint
The President:
I know that you can't come to us on September 9
because of the Scottish devolution and 13-15 doesn't work for
CGHFIDEN'fIl's:L
�CONFIDEN'f'IAL
,
CONFIDENTIAL
6
.'
me, but we need to set up some time.
we find the time.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
We will keep working till
September is really difficult?
The President:
Just those two days for me.
out another time.
(V)
(V)
I think I can work
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it probably is a bit difficult
for me because if something starts to go wrong.
(V)
The President:
How are the English reacting?
pretty well? jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Is it going down
It is okay for the minute.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Are most of the Scots in the Westminster
parliament in your party? .J.0r
Prime Minister Blair:
We are going to give up a few seats.
)£1
The President:
You may have some to spare now, but you can
never tell what you'll need in five years.
JK)
Prime Minister Blair: However, it has not always been like this
in Scotland.
In the 50's it was mostly Tory. What I am trying
to do is build ,new bases of support, one of the most difficult
things to do.
There are two referendums, one in Scotland and
one in Wales.
yM
The President:
So you stay there and handle it. Your
preference is to get the visit done in the month of September.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
(V)
The President:
That is my strong preference.
people and we'll get it done.
(V)
I will talk to my
Prime Minister Blair: Let us do that, Bill, and I also had a
note from Hillary about the other thing we talked about and we
will work on that. You have a good time in Santa Monica.
(V)
CONFI DEH'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
cown DEl?ITIAL
7
The President:
Tell Steven Spielberg I hate coming all the way
out here and not get to see him because he is hanging out in
Chequers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will certainly.
(U)
The President:
I always suspected that beneath that ruffled,
intelle-ctual demeanor was a real Tory aristocrat working.
(UrPrime Minister Blair:
He is out here making a movie.
(U)
The President:
I know.
I told you before that he really wants
to help rebuild the movie industry in Great Britain because he
is so grateful for its influence. He got a lot of- input from
early Br{tish film makers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Lots of possibilities here, but also
important to them that the U.S. and the British work closely,
especially because some of the other countries and some of the
stuff from the EU is not very sensible. The French and the
Italians have weird rules and prescriptions on film making.
It
would help if we can get some decent British movies.
(U)
The President:
You can do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Tell him I said hello.
All the best.
We'll be in touch.
(U)
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cown DEWT Il'.L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH J NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Bonnie Glick,
Sean Rice and Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September I, 1997, 11:29 - 11:54 a.m.
Martha's Vineyard
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
grim business.
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill.
It's a grim business, a very
The President:
It's awful, it's really awful. We're up here on
Martha's Vineyard vacationing, and we're with a lot of people
who knew her.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We saw her again just weeks ago when we
hosted her for lunch with Prince William, he's a great kid. ~
The President:
Yeah, I worry a lot about those kids now.
le1
Prime Minister Blair: She was such a rock of stability in the
sense she connected them with the outside world. The eldest
boy, William, is quite like her in a way, he is very "feet on
the ground," he does things kids his age do. j..Q-t'
The President: Well, I just feel so bad for her.
basically getting a hold of her life.
~
She was just
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for your telegram yesterday and
your kind words.
The problem was the way she lived, in a press
frenzy.
It's impossible to contemplate how intrusive it was,
into every single aspect of her life. The last time I spoke
COMFI DEH'f' IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�CONFIPENTfAL
CONFI DEN'FIAL
with her, she said that were it not for the boys, she'd be off
the board.
The country is stunned.
(.et'
The President:
They liked her a lot, didn't they.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
She was not the royal family but .she was
liked by ordinary people, it gave her problems with the royal
establishment.
{.Q1"
The President: Well, I know it's a difficult time for you.
just wanted to let you know I was thinking of you.
yx
I
Prime Hinister Blair:
I will personally miss her, it's like a
She was a star for them.
j..e}
star falling.
The President:
What do they know? Is the British security
guard who was with her still alive?
%
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he is. And he may be able to offer
some more information. There has been some talk this afternoon.
They went to the hotel and thought they would be left alone.
The Embassy and the French government did not know they were
there. The media turned up, SQ they decided to go to dinner
then on to one of al-Fayed's houses. When they got to their
car, it did not start. They called someone from the hotel and
the hotel provided a car and driver. Apparently he'd been
drinking. yc)
The President:
That's what I was afraid of. Those guys were
chasing them? Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
Jumped on them as they left the hotel,
yet I can't believe some of the reports of how fast they were
going though.
It's just not possible they were going 100 mph
They wouldn't have to be going that fast
I mean, I know Paris.
in those tunnels, though. They must have hit a rim in the road
and turned over and smashed into a wall.
j..e}
The President:
It's a sad thing, I tell you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, someone we knew and liked. She had
a remarkable gift. She was beginning to get her life together.
j..e}
The President:
Yes, Hillary had a nice visit with her a few
weeks ago when she was here. We liked her a lot.
I just think
that anything you can do for those boys, I don't know how
CONFIDEN'fIl'rL
........ ~,i". -.
taNfl DtNTIAt~~;
~~~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ;'i;
..
"-~..
.
.
~
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
CONFIDEN'fIAL
~~____~~I_E_.~O~._13_5_2~6~,s~e~ct_io_n 1._4(~d~)~____~~~__~I in a situation like
__
this, about the challenges they will face.
Prime Minister Blair:
over.
~
I'll try to keep in touch and have them
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~I
______________
What about her sisters? What are they like?
~I~E=.O==.1=3=52=6~,s=ec=ti=on==1.4d(~d)~__________________~I jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Hillary and I just wanted to tell you all we were thinking of
you. .-keI
Prime Minister Blair: Your words yesterday were greatly
appreciated.
Thank you. So you are on holiday now?
(U)
The President:
I'm having a good holiday.
It's the longest
vacation we have had in ten years. We're getting ready to send
Chelsea: off to university.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you looking forward to that?
(U)
The President: She is, but that's all part of it, it's what you
raise them for.
(U)
cmlFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFI DEN'fIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
there, then?
(U)
You're going straight to California from
The president: No, we have one more week here, then we go back
to Washington for a week to ten days, then we will go to
California to take her out there.
(U)
You're doing well in Northern Ireland, no?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
tha t . -+-c+-
The Sinn Fein shouldn't have a problem with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
circumstances.
He's actually been good about this, under the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you think there is anything we can do to
Trimble to stroke him? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
cm~PIDEH'3'IM
f~"~' --'OONF!HENTlAE~->
'~L~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President:
I think they're worried about being rendered
irrelevant in 20 years, given the way the demographics are
going, it's better to make a deal now rather than later. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you look at it, their popular majority is
eroding over time with the increasing birth rates, so now is the
time.
You'll have to come up with some sort of creative dual
relationship.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's consistent with what you are doing in
Scotland and Wales, anyway. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The.President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
No one wants to get up and put a sandwich in a
lunch tin to go to the factory if you have this going on.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
with you?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So all is well
You're getting re-engaged in the Middle East? kef
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFl DEHT L'\L
�CONFIDENHAL
CONFIDENTlhL
6
We're in a
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
difficult position'L-~.~==================______~ but we don't
want to be someone on the outside just seen as complaining.
We've got a good set of ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's your actual estimate?
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now
progress.
or some
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO}IFIDJ1::HTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIUENTfAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Things are getting a little better in Bosnia. Plavsic is
showing some get up and go. You've got a decision coming your
way that we can't discuss on this line, but I think things are
going in -the right direction over the last weeks, no the last
couple of months, after a bad year.
I feel good about this.
We've got a shot to move it forward.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to you today.
Tell Cherie I said hello.
I just wanted to talk
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
calling about Diana.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Give our love to Hillary.
(U)
Take care, friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye Bill.
Bye.
(U)
All the best.
End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'PIAL
Thanks for·
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 8
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, Larry Wright, Tom
Crowell, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 9, 1997, 9:18 - 9:40 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hi, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill. How are you? I am in good
form; I just got my party conference out of the way.
(U)
The President:
here.
(U)
It went great, didn't it?
It got great press
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I feel like a man who is facing an
inevitable collapse, but in good shape, actually. How are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great, thanks.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw a great picture of you and Hillary
taking Chelsea to Stanford.
It was marvelous.
(U)
The President:
Well, it looked better than it felt.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
It looks like she's having a good time.
(U)
The President: She's very happy. She called last night and we
had a good talk.
It's a three-hour difference, so she always
calls late, but she knows I'm always up late. She had her first
:'lECRE't'
Reason:
1.5{b;d)
Declassify On';
....
___ .__ c- .• --F--;"
l0~::_
_
Yl
. ~.::,~:~~ Y:::.:(_L~;J-,.>·~i
�.sECRET
chemistry test.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Look, Bill, the reason I called was to
mention
couple of things:
I went to Moscow early in the week,
and also I have some thoughts on Northern Ireland. ~
a
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did he give any hint of whether he would run for
another term? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�bt:br"{c i
SECRE'f'
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will do that.
I was very encouraged by my
visit with Trimble, he's trying to be a part of this, more
upbeat than in the past. ~
Prime-Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did Yeltsin mention the START II treaty?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
How about Iran?
+&t
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I believe that a lot of things do happen without
his knowledge.
When they changed their economy, they did not
have the intermediate controls in place that a normal economy
has. We have a process going with the Vice President,
Chernomyrdin, Wisner and Koptev, that I think will work. They
say they're cracking down, but he is careful about what he says
in public, maybe because he doesn't want to be seen to be
SECRE'f
�3ECREf
4
dancing to our tune.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Oh God, I'm really worried about it.
so strongly opposed to any of that stuff that I'm
about how they'd react to it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I appreciate
your help in keeping the issue over the French oil company Total
from becoming a bigger problem. We need to work the twin tracks
of an EU waiver and the Total-Gazprom case. I know that a lot
of Europeans don't agree with us, but I'm still concerned about
Iran becoming an industrial and military giant, given their
philosophy. I'm hoping that the new leadership in time will
have enough influence to change things, but there are no
indications of this yet. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I'd appreciate anything you can do to help.
don't want to get crossways with the French and EU. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
---~
.
":
r
·l
I
�5
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
'---_--'I yJ
The President:
The Iranians -- and I sometimes think the
Chinese ar.ethis way, too -- think we're so motivated by money
that we'll eventually cave in.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
to do. .k51.
It took a long time, but it was the right thing
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
So, we're with you on that
entirely.
People are very supportive of your efforts to bring
people around on the environmental issue. ~
The President:
The problem is, the u.s. Senate won't ratify
anything I sign. They're in the Dark Ages on this -- mostly the
Republicans, but Democrats, too.
They're being told against all
evidence that you can't do this without wrecking the economy.
We had a big conference here this week with energy experts,
people who are making a living implementing changes. But with
everything going on in Washington, it didn't break through as
I'd hoped.
It may have moved things a little.
I'm chipping
away, trying to do everything I can to get us in decent shape,
and the Japanese are trying to get us together.
+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
One thing we ought to do is to some way get the
developing countries involved in a regime -- where they don't
have the same controls as we -- to develop an alternate energy
future.
There are things they can do now that won't hamper
growth, but they can do it now so that when they become
developed, they'll already have a different energy structure.
The trick is to get them involved without their thinking that
we're trying to choke off their growth; we need their growth for
our own sake. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that totall
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�SECRE'f
The President: We need to find some formula to participate.
If
we gamble and take this on, but by the time you get halfway
through the. century, we're no better because we've been replaced
by China and India, still worse off, nothing has happened to
lower the global temperature. Get them to talk to us, find a
formula to benefit from, build a different energy structure.
The Indians are open, they're doing some big alternative
projects, more open than the Chinese. China is giving us grief
about criticism of their big Three Gorges hydropower project,
which is their biggest greenhouse gas project. Because it will
displace a million people and change the ecosystem, all the
environmentalists who are fighting global warming are fighting
the dam. Biggest dilemma. ~
.
Prime Minister Blair:
I a ree with the same basic
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, we will.
Well, carry
Thank you for calling.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm looking forward to seeing Hillary
when she is here. Everything ok with you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
She is thrilled, looking forward to it,
and we are working on a time for you to come here.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
It will be great to see you.
Bye.
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'l'
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Peter Huggins,
Lyle Harrison, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 22, 1997, 3:53-4:00 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
How's it going?
(U)
The President:
The speech went over pretty well, and we've
gotten some reasonable press. Some environmental groups are
pretty positive, some said we should have tighter deadlines.
We've gotten more business support than I thought, but the
traditional industries have dumped on it. The best we can hope
for right now.
I tried to leave open the language on developing
nations.
I was pretty explicit about the kind of joint projects
I think we ought to have, but using the language you gave me, I
was general on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO~TnDENTIl'rL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:
lCJA,>~,3j.9.ki;.r'. .--..
- - -- --.~'~;
te~N LIBRARY PHO~OCOPYl
�2
CON'PIDEN'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
here. )J21
Well, I don't know.
We'll have to see how we do
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you know when he'll be here?
Prime Minister Blair:
think.
+et
The President:
~
I'm not sure; in the next few days, I
Have him check in with Sandy Berger.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
do. )Cl
Good, we will work with John and see what we can
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPIDEN'l'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
�3
• COHPIBENl'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, I'm really encouraged.
I guess you know
this, we had a plane crash over here and a British pilot was
killed. An F-16 and a T-38 were on a photo chase mission and
collided over Edwards Air Force Base. There was an American
pilot, but there was also a British pilot, Flight Lieutenant
Leigh Alexander Fox. His wife is there with him at Edwards, and
it is just awful. No one has figured out how it happened.
Somehow the F-16 was able to land, but the pilots of the T-38
ejected. Both were found dead.
I'll send you the information
on it. ~
-
-
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks, Bill.
~
The President: We will work on this other thing and see John
Prescott when he gets here. Thanks for working with me on this,
man.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Not at all.
OK, bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll be in touch.
(U)
Alright, Bill, speak to you soon.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
�• CONFIDEH'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[1
'.".
10
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, David Higgins,
Anthony Campanella, Peter Huggins, James
Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 21, 1997,
The Oval Office
Hey,
~Jny.
3:23~3:32
p.m. EDT
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, hello. Tony here.
I'm sorry·this
has to be ... I'm in the middle of a big dinner, but I thought I
would come out and speak to you about what we spoke about
yesterday.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I am due to speak to Wim Kok tomorrow.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPI DENT IM
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reas 0 n : 1 . 5 (b ; d) .. "~'h.ft'7.i~;:'-"~"'~-=~~--~"'\:
Declassify On:
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%?:;;:;:;~~~:~>,,~.;c ~?\~=;'~~;"k'o-:-;;;:::,:.:'~;~_}_:-:<:. !:~,~r,.~,
•
�2
COUFIDEN'fL'lL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
On joint implementation?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
kef
~
The President:
What 1 can say there is we know we need to leave
some room on language for implementing on how developing
countries would participate, but what about targets? That's
what I am really worried about. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The big problem we have here is that I not only
talked to you, Kohl and Hashimoto -- and I want you to talk to
as many as you can -- but I also briefed Senate leaders this
afternoon and I will brief the House on what I am trying to do.
It will raise more questions than it will answer if I cancel the
speech tomorrow.
I see what you're doing, what you want me to
do:
say what I have to say, but leave as much wiggle room as
possible for you.
jef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Alright, I will work on it as well as I can.
What I want you to do is to welcome the fact that we are clearly
committed to binding targets and clearly committed to
participa}ion.
If you give negotiations a chance, that would
help. fCl
CONFIDEN'fIAL
"
�3
cmrFIDEHTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Very haoov to do that.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
I have been saying that for months.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
The problem is I will lose all credibility if I
don't give some target range.
I have to say what our position
will be.
I will try to figure out a way to give it flexibility,
and, on jotnt implementation, I think I can do precisely what
. you want. ...{-et'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Alright.
Thank you very much.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, we are going to get out there and do the
best we can.
I will try to leave you as much wiggle room as
possible. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
(U)
(U)
All the very best.
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
-- End of Conversation --
cmlFI DENT IAL
'.
�cmrn DENT lAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, J. Laurence
Wright II, Jeff Rathke, Anthony Campanella,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 15, 1997, 12:40-12:50 p.m. EST
Air Force One, en route Las Vegas to
Sacramento
The President: Hello?
connection.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
We still don't have a good
(U)
The President:
Tony, can you hear me?
last time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
No problem.
I'm so serry about the
(U)
The President:
I am on the airplane and usually it works, but
sometimes it doesn't.
Thank you for the letter you sent me
earlier this week.
I want to talk throu h what I am thinkin
about this issue.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
CONFI DEN'±' L'\L
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(b
Declassify on:
�CONFI DEN'£' lAb
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We all see this looking back through the prism of the
Gulf War, but I want to see this looking forward through the
prism of the future. My goal in this and my definition of
victory, is that this is not a macho contest of getting him to
back down, but to reestablish the inspections regime, which I
think was a smashing success. Jef
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I am in total agreement with
everything you saif~d~.__~I~w~a~n~t~~y~o~u~t~o__k_n_o~w~w~e~w~i~l~l~s~t~i~c~k~w~i~t~h~y~ou
throughout this.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think this is very important.
Jacques Chirac
is in Vietnam right now, and I am trying to call him.
I will
talk to Yeltsin and several others over the next two days.
If
there is anything you can do to promote unity among the allies,
I would appreciate it.
I understand their position and the
popular sympathy in the Middle East for the people of Iraq.
I
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�3
COHFIDEN'fIAL
think we need to get people in your country, in France, and
elsewhere, to see what UNSCOM has destroyed. Tpey need to see
how successful the program of eliminating weap'ons of mass
destruction has been. But there is one thing going on in our
country and also in the UN, and that is that the only time Iraq
gets attention is when Saddam creates a crisis.
If people knew
how many weapons UNSCOM inspectors have exposed, they would
understand why this is so important.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We may need to talk again several times over the
next week, but I won't bother you unless I have to. We will
have to work together on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, absolutely right. And the more that
can be done to publicize the work that UNSCOM has done over the
last six years, the better. )e1
The President:
Did you see Netanyahu in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I know what you mean.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will sen
meetings, I'm not sure
over the weekend.
+et
Let's
in touch
The President:
Thank you for the meeting and the time you spent
with Hillary.
She just loved it. It looked like it was very
successful.
(U)
CONTIDE1H:' IAL
�4
COHFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it was great.
form. All right then, all the best.
(U)
The President:
Okay, I will talk to you later.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CmJFIDEH'i'IAL
She was in fantastic
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFTDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 12
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: George Chastain, Tony
Campanella, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 9, 1997, 3:19-3:24 p.m. EST
The Map Room
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great. I know it's later there, but I
wanted to check in with you.
I've been on the phone a lot the
last three or four days.
I think we've made a lot of progress
in Kyoto and John Prescott has been very helpful. We have made
quite an effort to come to a common posjtion, and I've
1""------,
authorized our negotiators to show more flexibility.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
to move to the European position on
based on some variation of the proposal
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
They're getting closer.
If we can get all the
big I Annex I countri es to agree, mC' ·jb<:o~· get the developing
cOtqFI DElffIAL
Reason:
1.S(d)
Declassify On::
�LUNtO'!UtN IIAL
CONFIDEN'fI:AL
2
countries to do more.
They agree on joint implementation
projects, but they're still resisting Article 10~
They seem to
think that we'll coerce them into joining. fe1'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Really?
in~Jrmation than I do.
You may have more up to date
y6
~
" Prime - Minis"ter Blair: /
'------~/
The President:
That's pretty good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we will get a lot of abuse, and I'm going
to get a lot of abuse at home. And I can't get it ratified
unless we get commitments under Article 10 from developing
countries. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------~/
The President:
I do, too. We have one more day, and maybe we
can talk tomorrow, if we need to. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I hope it is okay. /
I
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
CONFIElEH'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Thank you.
This is good news.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
l'he President:
Pr~me
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Me, too . ..J,12r
Minister Blair:
The president:
Fine.
Is everything fine
~ith
you?
IU)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will try to find out exactly what
is happening on Kyoto and we can talk again tomorrow if there is
(U)
a continuing problem.
The President: Okay, I'll be available.
Goodbye, my friend.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFI DEW!' IJlcL
Let's bring it horne.
�,-.--- .. ----... ~---...", ... ,,---,---.---.
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
CONFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PART I C'I PANTS :
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, George Chastain,
Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell, Larry Wright,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 27, 1998, 10:30 - 10:41 a.m. EST
The Oval Office
Hello
Prime Minister Blair: Hello
The President:
Tony!
Prime Minister Blair:
about you.
How are you doing?
Bill!
I'm doing fine, and I'm thinking
The President:
I'm doing alright, I'm slogging on.
i t ' l l be alright.
I think
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to say that anything that
You have my 100
you want me to do or say, I'm happy to do.
percent support, and Cherie sends her love.
The President: When you're here, we can talk about it. One or
two things might actually make a difference, and we will talk
about it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, anything you want, we'll do it.
The President:
I wanted to talk to you a little bit about Iraq
and Northern Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section I.4( d) I
�~. ".,
. CONl!"IVI!:M"fIAL
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I really appreciate your saying that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
. "LiNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOpy1!
i':~~\:':'~'-'-_.c:-~~::":';;__ .-'~j,/r .
�CeNFIBEM!IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I generally agree with that, but there's not a
lot of time left, we waited a long time, until the end of the
Muslim holy period.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President: /
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Ok.
Prime Minister Blair:
this? ...RJ
(U)
What is your sense about the timing of
The President:
It's going to take a couple of weeks to get
together, but not much longer. I would imagine we will be ready
to move with it not.J.,o;.ng__ ii!l.~t~H?-ybll'-r~ner::e~, .~
.
(i~lNTO~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY'
CONFIDENTIAL
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•
I'
.
�GONFIDEU'fIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
it when .. ,(Z) .
So we should have a chance to talk about
The President: We are on an open line, so I will have Sandy get
with your 2eo~le. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
r------------------~
~
Prime Minister Blair, /
The President:
violence? -tet
Where are we on Northern Ireland, Loyalist
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
right? j.e}
So we need to work to keep them from doing that,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
CO~TFIDENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Well, I worked like hell on the Middle East last
week, but I didn't get very far. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Thank you so much for what you said.
little about it when you arrive. ye(
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
The President:
Yes.
Anyway, we're thinking of you,
Take care man.
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, bye.
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
We'll talk a
�SEeKEr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Tony Blair, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European
Affairs, Notetaker
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Holmes, Principal Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
John Sawers, Notetaker
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 5, 1998, 11:00 a.m.-12:40 p.m.
Oval Office
The President: We're off to a good start, Tony. Shall we turn
to Northern Ireland? How do you see the prospects for peace and
how can I help?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
I agree, and some others do as well, but not
everyone thinks the ceasefire,w~~~LUL--LUL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
SECRET
Reason:
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,
Declassify On:; .
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 14
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
�2
SECRE'3'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Samuel Berger: Your efforts to develop the equality agenda seem
to us a key in the effort to keep the Republicans in the
process.
V1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree. We will continue our contacts and
dialogue with Sinn Fein.
I also intend to keep seeing Trimble
and the other key Unionist leaders when they come to town.
Y21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you again for your continuing help on this critical
dimension of the peace process.
(U)
The President: Let's turn now to Iraq.
after your trip, Madeleine?
(rU)
Secretary Albright:
The trip worked rather well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRE'f
What is your assessment
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
I agree that their willingness to open eight
sites is interesting and offers some hope that our approach
could lead to an acceptable formula.' ~.
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, that might be acceptable if a few political
people were there in addition to the essential UNSCOM team. ~
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRET
�4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Vice President:
In the meantime, we are getting new
pressures, especially from Capitol Hill, to go after Saddam's
head.
l21
The President:
That's right, Tony, and you just heard our press
making exactly that point. But that approach is nowhere near as
simple as it sounds on the surface. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what is working and will work.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRE'f'
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�SECRET
5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'F
�SECRE'l'
6
Prime Minister Blair: Our public opinion is not the same as
yours, but we are working hard to educate the public. We put
out a white paper yesterday on Iraq's WMD programs.
(U)
The President:
I heard it is an outstanding document.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We have to educate international opinion
so they see the real threat and choices we face.
(U)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
, Secretary Albright:
panicky reaction.
If we doa white paper, it could create a
~
The President:
But such a paper could also give us a margin of
maneuver.
It would show how much UNSCOM has accomplished in
reducing his stocks and capacity -- but not his future
potential. .J..!Cf'
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
The President:
AI, what do you think?
The Vice President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
:3ECRET
(U)
�aECRET
7
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)( d)
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as part of the materials in this appeal because it could not be
found.
�£ECRET
9
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
End of Conversation
SECRE!
�COMPIDEN'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: K.C. Brown, Cindy Lawrence,
Anthony Campanella, Joel Schrader and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 16, 1998, 5:14 - 5:41 p.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hey, Tony.
I saw you on the Prime Minister's
question time on C-SPAN yesterday.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
What a treat for you!
(U)
The President:
You got one hateful comment on Iraq from one of
your back benchers, and one hit you on welfare reform.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't much matter which row they
come from, they're very often stingers.
(U)
The President:
here.
J..e1
It kind of reminds me of Paul Wellstone over
Prime Minister Blair: Well you know, it is from a very usual
suspect. On Iraq, they are pretty good on the whole so it
doesn't much matter. So you watched? What did you think of my
opposite number there?
~
The President:
I didn't see him. I only saw the last 10
(Z)
minutes of you answering questions.
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
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�2
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It is the sort of thing you would do
really well, but frankly I could do without it every Wednesday .
.-ter
The President:
Well they just replayed it on C-SPAN last night.
So, how are you doing? }e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
We have two big problems
to take care of at the moment: Northern Ireland and Iraq.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah. He was very good.
told me to and he was very good. +&r'
I called him after you
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)(d)
The President:
You're doing right. Absolutely right.
I'll
support you on this. Even our Irish guys have been great.
Kennedy and Dodd say there is no choice and they promised to get
in touch with Adams to say [gap]. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let's hope they behave while they are out.
That's the key, isn't it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. On Iraq, I just talked to
Sandy Berger. We have an agreed upon proposal to take to Kofi
Annan about how to do this. The Russians keep saying... can you
wait a second? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Taking care of Buddy are you?
(U)
The President:
Yes, he's got to go outside.
I have a door
right here.
I will let him out. (Pause)
Sorry. Hillary is at
another place working. We are not together. We're at Camp
David. Here's the problem we all have to watch. Because of
European public opinion and Arab public opinion, we don't want
to look blood thirsty and have to go the last mile. Saddam
needs a face saver. Kofi Annan would love to go in and save the
day, which is fine with me. The problem from my point of view
is, we can give them some sort of change in appearance here on
how to deal with the presidential palaces but it can't undermine
the integrity of the inspections and turn it from a professional
process to fundamentally a political one. We are trying to
arrive at language, whereby they open Presidential sites to
UNSCOM but palaces would be treated differently. Palaces would
be open to diplomats and political personages.
I think we are
agreed, at least that is what Sandy said. Apparently the actual
palaces would be subject to UNSCOM and then Annan could name
diplomats to go with them. But if you take UNSCOM out of the
decision making and let Annan make all the decisions, the
pressures on him would be enormous for a different standard.
Annan is talking about taking Ekeus with him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
He's Swedish, right?
(U)
The President: Yes. He was Butler's predecessor. He's now the
ambassador to the United States as fate would have it. But that
CONFH)ENTIAL
�4
COHFIDENTIAL
might not be all bad, even though Ekeus is viewed as softer than
Butler because he didn't put heat on the presidential sites.
The truth is Ekeus was there at the beginning and he had so damn
much work ,to do on other places that it was an acceptable
compromise at the time. He wasn't really at the point because,
he was full up on other sites.
It might work out all right. My,
worst nightmare is being isolated because we can't agree to
something that looks perfectly all right on the surface. We
simply have to insist on technically qualified inspectors.
Look, I wouldn't know a chemical lab from a football field.
We
have a good opening position but the trouble is there is no
place to go after the opening. You and I have to work closely
together on this.
I called King Hassan and had a long talk with
him. He has been a good friend of the United States and of
mine.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him to go to
Saddam, call him and tell him that I have no interest in killing
him or hunting him down.
I'm not fooling with him.
I just
don't want his chemical and biological program going forward.
By the way, the memo you put out on the web is phenomenally
successful. But you must know that.
Everybody wants it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair: My view, very clearly indeed, is that the
bottom line all the way through is that the inspectors have got
to be able to do their job uninhibited.
I don't care who
accompanies the inspectors provided they are not interfering
with the inspectors.
That doesn't trouble me.
~
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I agree.
(U)
�CONFIDENl'IAb
5
Prime Minister Blair: Where Saddam is at the moment is that he
will let us in to the presidential sites, but onl once and
Annan into the presidential palaces.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It puts him in a terrible position.
It looks
good to him because he gets to be a peacemaker and the real
issues are technical. Let me go back to the history a bit. The
history is that UNSCOM originally was set up answerable to the
Security Council and not to him, and he doesn't particularly
like that. There was a working group and an oversight board.
But there is a permanent staff at UNSCOM.
The real problem is,
for example, that if it were put under the Secretary General and
out from under UNSCOM, all decisions would come to him:
it
would be up to him to determine which site to inspect, where and
when.
They would have to go back to him and he would decide
when the files got closed, and which sites need future
monitoring. What we tried to do is say, look we don't want to
make those decisions either. We only care that independent,
making the inspections.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
Politically, the idea of letting these
inspectors decide when to inspect and where to inspect and when
to close files and which sites most likely require future
monitoring is very important. You can dress it up in a lot of
different ways. Our opening position, which Sandy said your
guys signed off on, we can take to Kofi and the French and the
Russians, but then what? It is hard to think of a fallback
position if the French and Russians push us on this.
I have
enormous regard for Kofi Annan.
I think he is a heck of a man,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
a
ave oun out dealing with this is that most
people, even in our own country, have not thought much about the
facts of chemical and biological weapons and how little space it
takes to produce them and their capacity for delivering this
stuff now.
That is what basically concerns me. They say in the
Middle East we are hypocrites. They say there are others who
CONFIDEH'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
have this, they say the Israelis, but no one else has shown a
willingness to use them or share them with anyone else. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
tell me this because I don't quite understand it, where is
Saddam Hussein on this, where does he corne down on this? My
people have been unable to tell me. ~
The President: . We. don't know either. The only outstanding
issue is who is in charge of the presidential site inspections.
He even tried to get Newt Gingrich to bring a congressional
delegation to the presidential sites. Newt was smart enough to
-know that one site has nearly 100 buildings that could be
warehousing these chemicals, labs, and stuff.
t€t
Prime Minister Blair:
A huge complex.
~
The President:
On biological agents, you hardly need a room the
size of a photographer's darkroom to do it. 121
Prime Minister Blair: That's right.
Is he now saying the only
outstanding issue is not the presidential sites but simply who
authorizes inspections? +e1
The President:
It is my understanding ... I've had so damn many
conversations today, I am not sure I remember.
I'm not sure I
know the answer on monitoring and corning back again. My
understanding is what he says is the outstanding issue is who
gets to come into the presidential sites. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sites or palaces?
Jef
The President:
Both, I think. He has a higher standard for
palaces than sites, but he is basically saying he will let
someone corne in and look at both categories.
;zi
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
Yes and basically he thinks Kofi will be
responsive to political pressures if he does that and will take
us off line.
Saddam thinks Butler is a stooge of America, but
hell, I never even talk to Butler. He is a tough guy and I like
what he is doing.
I've reached the conclusion after eliminating
CONFIDEN'F Hili
�CONFI DEN'fIAL
7
all possible alternatives that Saddam still has the makings of a
chemical and biological program he doesn't want to give up.
+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes.
I'm
and will call you back to
together on this.
If our
he wants Kofi to make all
construct a good argument
I
looking at some other things we can do
talk about it. We'll need to stay
two staffs are together and if he says
of the calls, then we need to
why that is not a good thing.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Je1
Awful.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
L -_ _~~~~~~~~~~_ _ _ _~
The President:
I am going to talk to him tomorrow-or maybe
tonight.
If I get any clUe, I'll let you know. Listen Tony,
what's the most direct contact you have had with Iraq since
1991? For instance, has the British Foreign Minister talked to
Tariq Aziz?
.JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
I honestly don't know.
check and get back to you. Jer
I'll have to
The President:
If I weren't constrained by the press, I would
pick up the phone and call the son of a bitch. But that is such
a heavy-laden decision in America.
I can't do that and I don't
think you can. ..J..e"}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�8
CONFIDENI IAL
'Phe PresidepL:
I agree.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
Prime Minister Blair:J
The President:
I can't tell you how critical it is.
It costs
us a hell of a lot of money to do all this moving around we are
. doing, not counting the political costs. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Agree, but I will have a hard time selling
anything here short of military action, but I can do that if I
~
know it is real.
IPrime Minister Blair,
The President:
~
I
Can't allow that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
I can't agree more.
~
�,
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
9
-
Prime Minister Blair:
If we stay in close contact tomorrow,
when will we send him off to Baghdad? ~
The President:
I don't know. He wants to go Wednesday or
Thursday.
I will let you know. Let's keep in close touch on
this.
If you want to talk about this, I don't care if you get
me up in the middle of the night if you want to. There is
hardly anything more important. le1
Pr-ime Minister Blair:
If I have more thoughts tomorrow, I'll
just give you a call, shall I? ~
The President:
Yes, I'm not doing much more.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye, Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
ke1
(u)
�CONi luCNT AL
COHFIDEN1'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telecon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
President Clinton
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Tony Campanella,
Bob Ford, Tom Crowell, Jim Smith, Peter
Huggins
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
FEBRUARY 12, 1998, 4:05 - 4:20 p.m. EST Oval
Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you?
The President: All right. We had a wonderful time with you
here.
I hope you enjoyed it half as much as we did.
Prime Minister Blair: We had an absolutely fantastic time.
especially enjoyed Friday night and Saturday morning.
We
The President: You've turned me into an icon for everyone at
the State dinner.
Prime Minister Blair: We had a great time. We are so pleased
at all the time you and Hillary spent with us; we really enjoyed
it.
I hope it wasn't too fraught or difficult for you.
The president: Everything is going okay from what we can see
here; we had a great time and wanted to thank you for that.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I have a problem now.
CONFIDE~lTIAL
Reason:
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The President:
2
I know you do.
Prime Minister Blair: I spoke with Bertie Ahern this evening
and here is how the land lies. There have been two murders
carried out.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
What were they thinking about?
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
President Clinton:
they?
They haven't protested their innocence, have
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~---~
President Clinton: What are they thinking?
is payback for what happened before?
Do you think this
Prime Minister Blair:~r__________________________________________~
President Clinton:
Within the IRA?
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
ever you do?
Can you get Bertie to go along with what
Prime Minister Blair: /
COHFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
�CONE IDEN'fIAL
4
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I The only thing
we've done so far, because we thought it would be what you
wanted, is we got in touch with Sinn Fein and told them they
have to make a statement and have the IRA make a statement.
Prime-Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We have said that.
I want to do whatever I
can to be helpful, really helpful, it's important for me to keep
this thing going. I don't want to get in the position of you
and me against Ireland. I want some influence over those
people ...
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Let me call him. Give me one more chance to
hit these people, to get them to make a tough statement because
you can't be caught in the middle of this:
you are in a hell of
a pickle.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Me too. It's so damned stupid unless they
have a spli t between them and their bad guys ...
CONFI DENT L'tL
�eONPI DEN9:' IAL
5
Prime Minister Blair: IIE.o.13526, section IH(b)(d)
President Clinton: ... and their.bad guys got out of hand and
their good guys don't think they have the strength to kick them
publicly.
It doesn't make a lick of sense.
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
are lucky
No, I agree with that.
You are the best friend they have and they
there.
This is so stupid,
this.
Let me get
in touch wLth Bertie and we'll get back together.
I want to do
·it in a way that's possible to keep this going.
Prime Minister Blair:
I just want to tell
ou Bill.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
President Clinton:
I agree.
Let me get on this and we will be
back in touch.
I am really sorry Tony this happened to you.
Prime Minister Blair:
the way through this.
President Clinton:
Well, there have been ups and downs all
We just have to make sure this works.
Thanks, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's get back in touch.
End of Conversation
COlqPIDEH'f TAL
�3E C!<:E 'I'
THE: WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Bonnie Glick,
Tom Crowell, Lawrence Butler, Gwenyth
Todd and Joe Marty
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 1:15 - 1:26 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello Bill.
Fine, thank you.
How are you?
(U)
Have you talked to Kofi?
Prime Minister Blair:
I talked to him
toda. He said he was going to call me.
~
but not
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The Pr"esident: Well, I'll tell you what I heard.
a little intelli ence this morning.
We picked up
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
to wait.
Now I don't know all the facts, we just have
The main thing I wanted to say is that it is really
�2
important to stay in close contact and stay determined on this.
1'&)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: All I got is secondhand rumor. All Madeleine
has is a cryptic call saying all the elements are in place. Who
knows what that means? ~
Prime Minister Blair: . Who does Butler work under anyway?
·The President:
He works for the Security Council.
the Security Council.
1G1
UNSCOM is
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree with that.
The President:
This is twice he's done this.·
again, it's our fault, not his. Jer
ke1
If it happens
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Here's the thing. We need to make sure, in
fairness to him and to us, we need to make sure we are speaking
in the same terminology. CNN had some damn fool of a reporter
saying these sites are smaller than I had led the American
public to believe.
If you're talking about the palaces, that's
one thing.
If you are talking about the grounds, that is quite
another.
If we ask Kofi to revisit where someone is living,
some house with a lab in the basement that's one thing. But
some of those sites have a hundred warehouse-sized buildings.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
£ECRET
I
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We have got to have another resolution so we
don't have to go through this again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, if Kofi calls you before me, call me.
if he calls me, I will contact you.
I am just going to be
hanging around here today_
(~
And
Prime Minister Blair:
I have to travel for 45 minutes today,
but other than that I am in Chequers or Downing Street. You're
at Camp David? ~
The President:
No, I stayed at the White House this weekend
because I think this thing is going to break. OK, we're totally
agreed on this situation, then, how do you feel on this Northern
Ireland thing?
tet
SECRET
�SECRE'l:'
4
KO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams is not coming here, which is good news.
--<-e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll do that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I want to work with you.
I don't want to
undercut you.
I'm pleased. Youfre doing well so far, we will
just stay in touch. This Iraqi thing might break in the next
six hours. -te1'""
Prime Minister Blair:
whatever time...
(e)
The President:
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bill, obviously itfs earlier for you, but
(U)
Goodbye.
Thank you.
(U)
Goodbye friend.
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'P
(U)
�C ONFI DENT L"rL
THE: WH ITE HOUSE:
WASnl~GTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 18
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Torn Crowell,
Jeff Rathke, Lawrence Butler and Gwenyth
Todd
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 4:38 - 4:49 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hi, Tony.
prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
You're faint.
Can you hear me now?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I've spoken with Kofi and I gather he's
spoken to Madeleine as well.
~
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
But I'm not sure.
detail?
Have you been able to glean any more
-k-e"}
The President:
Well, I haven't.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
�2
CONFI DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, I don't think he wanted to talk on the
phone, and our guys are guessing on it, too. i€t
Prime Minister Blair:
,The Preside'nt:
sure. -teT-
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Well, I hope he hasn't either, but I'm just not
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
e Just have to wait and see what
happens.
If there is another violation we need to seriously
consider funding opposition groups and giving whatever help we
can and just cut the umbilical cord. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, and it's weird, because Kofi is not coming
back until Tuesday.
It's going to leak. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It's bound to.
ke1
The President:, It would put poor old Butler in a terrible
situation. Madeleine talked to him today, but couldn't say
much. We don't want him to spout off without knowing what kind
of deal it is. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
bloke is he? teT
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
of him? .fE7
~
C~IFIP£H'I'L'\L
I've never come across him.
What kind of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Madeleine couldn't get the details out
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
3
No, she doesn't know much more than
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He said he's going to have a press
conference tomorrow morning. What's he going to say then?
The President: We don't know.
I think
tomorrow morning that he has a'deal but
about it until he comes back and briefs
in Paris and give Chirac his plane back
What else can I tell you? I just don't
Prime Minister Blair:
Paris? l€1
The President:
he's going to say
he can't really talk
us. Then he will stop
and come on over here.
know.
~
And there's no one he's going to see in
Yeah, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
Y21
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yep, it's a very tenuous situation, and maybe
when he gets to Paris, we can figure something out.
It's a
really raw deal to sit for a day and a half, not knowing what
the deal is.
fCT
Prime Minister Blair:
If he just lands and takes off again ...
-f€t"
The President:
I don't know, I just heard he will stop in Paris
and then fly on to New York City.
~
Prime Minister Blair: He may say he won't talk or speak to
anybody, but on the other hand, we have got to know what is
happening.
(-eJ
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPIDENTIAL
�eONFI15EM'fIAL
4
The President:
That's what I worry about -- I talked to
Madeleine and Sandy before I talked to you. Let me see what I
can find out -- they think it can work if it is strictly
administered by Kofi, but we need to know what Butler's going to
say about it.
J,.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
]
Prime Minister Blair:
_
The President: Apparently he did that, but maybe Kofi gets to
decide who goes back, and when. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Yep, uh-huh.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep, but if we can't get it, we have to say what
we were going to say anyway.
(0
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we'd better get working on that
right away.
I hate being in this position for the next thirtysix hours.
~
The President:
That's really bad. Let me call my crowd back
and see what they say, what we can work out.
I don't like being
in this position. -+etPrime Minister Blair:
I can try to contact Kofi and tell him
that when he gets to Paris he needs to call us right away, that
we really need to know what is going on.
I think I will try
that. -fer
The President:
Okay.
~
)
L-________________- - - - - - Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�5
cmlFIDEN'PIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'll get John Weston to start
working On the Security Council thing right away.
I'll try to find out some more from Baghdad.
The President:
Okay.
And in the meantime,
)k1
(U)
:_I___________________________________
_iL_p_r_i_m_e__
M_i_n_i_s_t_e_r B_l_a_l_.r
__
__
The President:
Yeah.
----~:J
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a curious way of doing business.
(C)
The President:
Yes, it's a weird deal.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: That bothers me. Kofi's wait gives him a chance
to spin it, and I don't like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------~
The President: Yes, Madeleine does.
there, too. ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'll see what we can do
~
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - - - - - - - -
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay. Right, Bill--I am here all night
if you need to get a hold of me... f€t
CONFIDEH'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
6
I'll do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you.
(U)
Thanks, Bill.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFI Dg~IT L1\d,
�CONP1DEN'PL"rL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHLNGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 19
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie
Glick, Tom Crowell, Jeff Rathke, Lawrence
Butler and Don Bandler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 23, 1998, 8:57 - 9:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
we, then?
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
The President:
Let me tell you what I
document.
First of all, the ood thin
How stand
been told about the
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think we
have to study this document and listen carefully to what Kofi
says tomorrow.
je}
.
It is important that the commission rush a group of qualified
experts -- I think that we have to test the agreement soon. You
know, we have to get whatever the agreement is:
show up at one
of these sites and start looking around.
I'd like to do it
before I have to move the whole U.S~ Navy around again. Now,
COHFI DEN'l' 1M
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (bi; d) - _ ;;..ri,---_ ~~sr'-' ~~~ .----~--------"',.
Declassify On:! 2/~80 - . _ ]
; __-<~ .-'~:r~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ).
.<?:..~::,-::;~-::~ __._,,_~ . c-';';:;";~_~"-' "->""..::___ ~ __/:;~-';'/
�eOMFIBEM'I'IAL
2
Baghdad has done this before with weapons of mass destruction.
-+et-"
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
First of all, you need to get this thing and look at it. What I
would like is to be in a position in the next two or three hours
to talk to Yeltsin and Chirac. ~
I want to compliment Kofi and say we understand they have agreed
to free and unfettered access,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You guys get this document. He is going to make it
widely available in an hour. Let's go through it. ~
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONn DEH'I'IAL
�CONFIDEU'fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Exactly, my view is that we may have another
twenty-four to thirty-six hours of word wrangling.
We just have
to see. )Q1
- Prime- Minis-ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, apparently, he has some leeway over how
the UN structures itself for this special team. He has to know
that we want this done correctl , we don't want this to be a
bunch of olitical B.S.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We very much hope this will work out.
approach.
That's my
-ret
Prime Minister Blair:
are you, Bill? ~
You're going to say something publicly,
The President:
I'm not going to say anything for three or four
hours -- I may not be able to, but I'm going to try.
The trick
is to embrace the effort, pocket his commitment, and thank Kofi
for getting it, and he has never done this before.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
or four hours,
gOlng
flesh
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'3'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
three
�4
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Tony, I don't know the answer to that.
We
haven't studied the agreement closely, and Kofi isn't here, so
.we can' t cail him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No one has spoken to Kofi?
~
The President: He told me he'd call me from Paris.
I don't
know if he will or not.
I talked to him late last night.
You
know, he clearly thinks he has a good deal, the question is
whether his definition of a good deal is the same as ours. Jef
Pr ime Minis ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
You and I don't want to rain on it, because if
we hadn't been tough, we wouldn't have had the damned deal. We
can't completely embrace it until we see the details.
We don't
want to be in the position of buying a pig in a poke and then
say, "Holy cow -- we don't know what happened to it." ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely.
message is, "Yes, if." ~
Sandy says we ought to say our
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�5
eONPIDEN'FIAL
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Miniiter Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's why I just have to leave everyone where
they are, because we have to have a test.
I have to leave our
troops in place. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We're having a vigorous agreement here.· Any
time in the next two hours you want to talk, after you have seen
it, let me know.
)4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wish you would.
I understand Yeltsin can take
my call in one hour. Chirac said he can't take my call for twoand-a-half hours.
That's a long time. He called here earlier,
while I was still in bed, and said he didn't want them to wake
me.
I don't think it's evasion, I think it's just the schedule.
It may be better not to talk to them right away. You get the
document and parse it a little, and see if there are any holes
in the road.
I'll try to call you before I talk to Yeltsin and
Chirac. Otherwise, I'll just talk to Yeltsin. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The moment I get the document I will look
at it carefully. And we can talk later. je1
The President:
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Thanks, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDaFfIAL
�CON FI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 20
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: James Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy,
Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke,
Nancy McEldowney, Rexon Ryu
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 23, 1998, 12:28-12:42 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, I'm fine.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Hold on.
Here's one, go on.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
CONF'IDE1H 1AL
Classified by; Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,., d) ~ ~."Cc-<--.-'.-'-···-·.---·~~'
.
... ,,-.
Declassify On:' 2/·· /mf~··" -""..
,\
"",
:
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY "
-'~_':'_;::~~~~ _..!.-~~_;-..." -~"
~_~___.:.,~~/.r-----/.'
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~
�COWFIl)EHTIPrL
2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Who's the commissioner?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. We believe he'll appoint
a guy with technical expertise, who will have credibility with
Butler, but it certainly needs to be. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. You've identified the
same things I'm worried about. Sandy suggested a
which
is quite good; our position on this shoul b to
and
test. We need to clarif , then test.
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIPrL
Yes, I agree with that entirely.
;ef
�3
COl>TFI DEN'FIAI:;
The President:
One thing that we thought of doing, is to get
Butler back in the ballgame, because we don't want him out; Kofi
is supposed to consult with Butler and the head of the IAEA, and
presumably that will keep him from underminin the inte rit .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
he can get a team In there until
What is today, the 23 rd , so that's
He doesn't think he can get a good team in
there, but I think that having someone say, "we're UNSCOM and we
want to check the Ministry of Defense" would be a good way to
check in a hurry.
te1
~rime ~inis~er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I understand. We need to ask all these
questions, but no matter how good his answers, we need an early
test.
kcJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: It will take me a few weeks to withdraw troops
from the Gulf, so we will sit tight.
I think we need to test,
as you said, test under 4 but also 5, because there are
sensitive sites that aren't presidential sites. Also it will
take longer under Para 4 to get started.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Has
anyone spoken to Kofi?
The President:
I spoke to him last night at 8:30 my time, which
was 4:30 his time. He was a little groggy, but he wanted to
demonstrate to us that the agreement would fully meet the P-5
instructions he took to Baghdad.
I said that's great, but at
that time I hadn't seen the agreement. He promised to call me
when he got to Paris.
I don't know if he's in Paris, but I
CONFI DEN'l'IAL
�COHFIDEH'FIAL
4
understood that he did not want to talk in enormous detail over
Iraqi phones. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, quite smart.
~
The President: Now, let me tell you some good news,
potentially.
I spoke with Yeltsin, and went over m concerns,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
.Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
That's pretty good.
That's pretty damn good.
.(.e-)-
Jer
The President: My relationship with Yeltsin is such that all
his hard-liners believe I could talk to Yeltsin and get him to
sell the oil wells for three dollars and a half, but that's not
true.
He's just more far-sighted and progressive than they are.
Half the time they go to work on him, and I have no doubt that
they'll make some effort to undermine this. He was quick and
unambiguous, and one thing about Yeltsin, he doesn't like for
people to take advantage of him.
If Saddam Hussein doesn't do
it, Yeltsin would take it as a personal insult to him.
I think
he wants to do right, so if he can stay hitched,
rea y e leve
a s
have that he'll observe the agreement.
If you talk to Yeltsin,
I would appreciate it if you would reinforce this. ~.
Prime Minister Blair: I
The President:
with me,
to.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
II tel
You should say you've talked to me and you agree
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right.
spoken to Chirac, Bill? Aer
Did you say you've
The President:
I'll talk to him after I talk to you . And i f I
get anything, I may talk to you after I talk to him. .....(-e1
CONFIDEN'f'IlW
�i
5
CONI"IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
(C)
The President:
That's it, you got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CCMFIDEN'l'IAL
~
�cmrFI DEf<l''f IAt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell,
Joel Schrader, Jeff Rathke, James Smith
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 9, 1998, 5:38 - 6:05 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Great.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'm sorry to trouble you.
There
are a couple of things I wanted to discuss with ou.
First of
all, the Middle East Peace Process.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me tell you where we are and we may be able
to do something together. You mean you have aid to facilitate
some of these things? ~
COHFIDEN'P IAL
Classified by: ,-Glyn T, Davies, ''_~~-~~
Reason:
l. 5 (Jj, d) :--""''''''' -----ffi.""',;,.,-:'-----"'\:
Declassify On: f
3/~~'rON LIBRARyR~91()c()pyl
'-
>:::::::::::.~~.,::::~;" .~_:'-~;''- ':-'7,,::~~~. . :" :~_.~.~;;_.._.:..~~-. ~ ."..,-{;-\
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.. '
.
GO~JFIDEHTIAL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
about it.
Let me tell
ou where we are and then we'll talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think they're really ready to go now on the airport and the
industrial park, but they keep messing around with each other.
I think they're afraid, each for different reasons, to go ahead.
I had to put this off until the Iraq thing was resolved,
temporarily, at least. What I'd like to do is give them this
proposal and coordinate with you.
Part of the proposal is that
we want them to go ahead and finish the industrial park and get
on to safe passage. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
proposal? -t€t-
When do you think you will put forth your
The President: As soon as I can.
two weeks.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
This month; within the next
Right.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Arafat is afraid to take a redeployment now and
go to final status talks without a guaranteed third one; my view
is he can always make a final deal, and more is better than
less. ..(..et
CONn DEN'fIAL
�'~.'
': .. ,.,
.
:
3
CONFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think there might be a way to do that. What
I'd like to do ... if I could give them the overall proposal
first, then we could get together and put this to them.
I think
if we could coordinate that way, it would give them a way to get
started on it. By putting more money on the table, it would
create a
if they're looking for a reason -- an excuse to go
forward, it would be good. k€1
Prime Minister Blair: Right. You reckon you will put your
proposal forward in the next couple of weeks? ~
The President:
Absolutely.
j€f
Prime Minister Blair: Some sort of redeployment package
including the other issues as well? Jer
The President:
Yes.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
Then we could help by having some sort of
quadrilateral summit afterwards. 1e1
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes. We're ready to go back to them and I think
we have some chance of getting them to move.
~
cmlFImmTIAL
�CONPIDEH'PIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm set to go to the Middle East in
April, early April. Obviously it would help to have something
fairly concrete up and running before then.
(~
The President:
We'll have something by then.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We had a good day yesterday.
They were able to
go into the Ministry of Defense and get some records out which I
am hopeful will resolve something one way or another.
The fact
that ~hey ~ere able to get into ministry buildings is a real
reaffirmation of UNSCOM's ability to fulfill the understanding
Kofi says they got. Now we have to continue to test compliance
on sensitive sites, which will happen near the end of the month,
but my own view is we should leave our forces there to monitor
compliance and keep the integrity of UNSCOM strong.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
~~I~E~.~O~.1_3~52~6~,s~e~ct~io_n_l~.4~(b.)(~d~)__~1 ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I thought we ought to fight if off. My own
view is that Saddam got what he asked and we got what we asked
for, and not to politicize UNSCOM.
~
,--_____--'7
-J/
L -______________________________
The President:
Jer
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's right.
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
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The President:
So far I'm feeling pretty good about it.
keeping my fingers crossed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'm
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President: Oh yeah.
I saw him.
I'll call him
few days. He doesn't want me to make this
the next
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
be down. ...(..e1""
They're really down, and they've got reason to
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the Palestinians are coupling
redeployment with some of these other issues. By all means, if
you guys in the United states can put together a big package,
that's fine.
Since we have so much aid tied up in this, we
should try to move on smaller stuff, as well.
~
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
move on all three things.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
leaded for a
ear to
I
Let us put our proposal to them and let's see if we can get
together and meet and we can push ahead. That can give them the
boost to move to permanent status talks.
s,e1
Prime Minister Blair: Right, okay, Bill, just one other thing
on Northern Ireland. ...(-e1""'
The President:
Where are we on that?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
We're getting along, basically.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
You do?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~------------------~I
The President:
We'll do that.
Prime Minister Blair:
them all.
Mo's coming too, isn't she?
Yeah, I think she is.
~
So you can see
The President:
Let me ask you this: have you gotten a good
reaction to Straw's extradition decision?
»cr
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, I mean we got a good reaction in
certain quarters
as usual, it was a good reaction in certain
quarters and not so ood in others and that's 'ust the wa it
is.
The President:
I will do my best to bang their heads together
and caution them on good conduct, but attacks are likely to come
from quarters none of us can control.
J,.e)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
You really think you can go back to the original
timeframe and get something done by May?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I do.
ke1
When will the referendum be?
Prime Minister Blair:
In May.
The President:
fCl
.~
When?
ke(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Then they think they'll get a bigger turnout for
their referendum, too? ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
A bit of that,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So there it is, really, Bill.
just have to keep pushing on . ....(.eY
We
The President: Alright. We'll be in touch. We'll coordinate
with your people on the peace process in the next two weeks,
we'll hang around in Iraq to see what happens, and I'll do what
you ask on St. Patrick's Day. That's just a week from tomorrow.
I'll report back if I hear anything interesting. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
COI?lFIDENTIAL
Yeah, okay.
~
�CONf'IDEN''fIAL
The President:
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President;
along. -ter
(U)
I'm fine, actually.
(U)
It looks like your economy's still pumping
Prime Minister Blair:
It is, I remember you telling me once
that once the guys start coming in with good news, there are
other guys telling you that it's not good news. ~
The President:
Wall Street used to go down every time the
·economy would grow. Now it doesn't go down as much, now that
there's been such a long period without inflation.
I think if
you have the same experience, then soon investors and ordinary
folks begin to agree, and that's good news.
There's a guy at
Stanford who is an economist, and who COincidentally is the son
of DNC Chairman Roy Roemer. He's a bit of a libertarian, but he
argues that in the technological era, in countries with open
markets, the constraints of the business cycle have been
considerably loosened, and you can grow more and longer. All of
us are essentially underestimating productivity and the most
important economic policy is not to limit the ability of
technology to prod the economy.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well, I hope to goodness he's right.
Me, too.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair: We keep looking across the Atlantic
hoping it will happen . .-JRr
The President:
Well, I think it will.
I think it's coming to
you, and unemployment is way down, and you've got to stick with
it. ..{.e-jPrime Minister Blair: We have a very tough battle ahead on
welfare, there are a lot of things to do there.
~
The President:
you? jQ1'
Are the Tories going to vote against you or with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�9
C ONFI DEt<f'f lAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And with the parliamentary system, it really
pays off.
If I could have waited another year for elections,
I'd still have a majority.
I think you're doing the right
thing:
as long as you have the muscle and juice, go ahead and
go. ;e{ ..
Prime Minister Blair: Well that's what I reckon.
are testing this theory to destruction!
~
The President:
Ha!
Birmingham.
ke1
You'll be alright.
Anyway, we
I'm looking forward to
Prime Minister Blair: Well, that'll be great.
forward to having you.
Is Hillary well? ~
We are looking
The President:
She's great. You need to decide, we all do, if
anything would be served by me going to Ireland after
Birmingham. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We'll know that in the next few weeks, if
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It is a mess.
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
COMFIDEN''f'IAL
�10
CONFI DEN'FIl'rL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
. Yes, alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
End of Conversation --
CONP ID'EH'fIAL
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'P
!i2v
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA.'" 1-1 ,"-, "TO N
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
KO. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 22
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Sean Rice,
Tony Campanella, Jim Smith and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 20, 1998, 5:18 - 5:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Tony. How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
day in Germany.
(U)
The President:
Fine, thank you very much.
Where are you in Germany, Berlin?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bonn.
(U)
The President:
(U)
I went to see Helmut Kohl.
I like Bonn.
Prime Minister Blair:
I spent the
(U)
I went to
It's a sweet little town.
I like i t as well.
(U)
The President: What is your take on the elections and on
Schroeder? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5"!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
(U)
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Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, he's a wonderful man.
)81
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's interesting, but remember, Tony, he was
18 points down in the last election, but I'm afraid in this last
term they haven't been able to restore any growth. He looked
good in the beginning.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
£ECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3EC~El'
The President:
3
Scharping?
Prime M.inister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister
~
Yes, Scharping.
I
¢
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~B11~ali~r~:~=;~;=;i~~~~~~~~~~============~~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~hat kept us going in 1992.
~
That is
Prime Minister Blair: There was a sort of buzz about the place.
We .had a good time. Bill, thanks for everything you've done on
Ireland.
(.21
The President:
J.&'r
I tried to do exactly what you asked me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
can't tell you how much.
ou did. I dee 1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime·Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
bECRET
reciated it.
I
�SECRET
§ECRE'F
4
The President:
I tried to use public and private meetings.
met with all of them. Well almost all of them.
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I see something else relevant in my observation
·of the Middle East, and Bosnia where we sent in an occupying
army.
If we didn't, the peace would have led to more violence.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d
One problem is there are always enemies of peace out
there. The people that killed Rabin and blew up the bombs knew
exactly what they were doing. They were each other's best
friends. As part of this peace deal, we have to make the deal
first, but you have to have someone you trust thinking about the
next steps.
It is not too soon to start thinking about what you
want me to do and speculate what kind of outbursts or problems
you envision in the next few years.
I am prepared to make
whatever reasonable investment I can.
I'm worried that some
enemy of peace will gum it up, stop the investment coming in
there and torment people . . You have to have somebody thinking
about it, someone you trust but who's not involved: don't take
your eye off the ball. Churchill and Roosevelt were thinking
about the UN in 1943 and 1944. It's not too soon to start
thinking about this. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minist.er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you off to Africa,
Bill ?
JZl
The President:
Sunday.
Prime Minister Blair:
We're very excited.
(U)
It's quite a big trip.
(U)
The President:
Yes, for the United States. No American
president has even been to Africa. Carter went to Nigeria and
Liberia and Roosevelt and Reagan stopped over there.
It's
unconscionable what we. haven't done in Africa.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a fascinating continent.
I'm really excited for you.
(U)
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: All the best to you.
I see you have been
defeating your enemies as usual. Keep it up. ~
The President:
They've got a lot of money out there to get
people to say a lot of stuff. We're doing extremely well, but
it's a weird way to live.
~
Prime Minister Blair: We'll talk more the next time we meet.
Every time we see another one fall, we cheer.
~
The President:
Take care, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Okay, Bill and lots of love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
(U)
End of Conversation --
£EGRE'P
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION S.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 23
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Anthony
Sampanella, Robert Ford, Karen Harris and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
AprilS, 1998, 2:08 - 2:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Hey Tony.
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine, absolutely fine. You had a
successful trip over there. The crowd scenes were amazing.
(U)
The President: Unbelievable! It was my first time. We really
had a great time. We did some things that most people don't do
in South Africa. We got into the townships and little villages.
They were very good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It looked fantastic.
You really made an
impact on them.
It was a big boost to those countries. I t will
(U)
be a bigger boost to the people than to the government.
The President:
Well, I hope so.
How are we doing in Ireland?
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
3ECRET
�2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything else that you want me to do?
.-fCf
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think at the moment.
-+G+
The President:
I had a good round on Saint Patrick's Day.
really got to know each of them. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair: ri===================~------------------~
The President:
There is something else I would like to discuss:
the meeting I had with Mandela when Bandar magically showed up .
....f-B-r
II
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I
I knew him before I became President.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that.
We need to know things;
1~________________-tl=E~.O~.~1~35=2=6,~s=ec:t=io=n~l=.4~(d~)~I____________________~I~)
Prime Minister Blair:
II E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's my theory.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you going out there'?
Prime Minister Blair:
...(-et"
I'm going in a couple of weeks time.
~
The President:
ah good. By then we should have a clear path on
what to do by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister I:lair:
The President:
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It's touch and go all the time.
ke)
Let me know i f you want me to do anything.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Good.
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
))21".
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Prime Minister Blair:
bye.
(U)
The President:
Bye.
Alright, Bill.
~ay
hello to Hillary,
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
�3EeRE'!'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 24
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Joseph Wright,
James Smith, Anthony Campanella and Robert
Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 24, 1998, 11:36-11:52 a.m.
The Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
EDT
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. Bill, I thought we should have a
word to bring you up to date on Northern Ireland and the Middle
~~~--~==~~~~~
I East. I
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yeah, I saw some of Trimble's guys made a big
show when you voted. )Qf
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wonder if there is anything I can do from this
end.
I will have some announcements when I go to Birmingham;
there are a number of things we can do, even if they don't want
me to go to Ireland.
One of the things we could do is have
SECRET
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Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (b!, d)
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Bertie come down to Birmingham and make a 10 to 15 minute
presentation to the G-B, and you and I could go out and make
some statements that there are some goodies on the horizon.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In terms of my going there, I have no feelings
at all on it.
I just want to win the vote.
This thing could be
a parochial vote and those unionists could say, "this is our
lives and our futures, we have to decide." .k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why don't we do an informal poll at the end of
the first week in May, see where the undecided voters are by
religion, and see if that would help.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister Blair: /
.(.G-1-
~------------~I
I
The President:
It's a weird world, isn't it?
J81
Prime Minister Blair:
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The President:
here. -ter
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
If you want to talk more about it, I will be
Prime Minister Blair:
Ireland. -+er
Thanks again, you were a real
he~p
with
The President:
It will be a great victory.
You know, it will
be interesting to see where the splits are between the
Protestants and Catholics.
I know you must have someone up
there working the polls. We ought to be able to calibrate
everything.
The important thing is just to win the referendum.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:· This thing is bigger than foreign policy.
You're better at campaigning than the rest of them and have a
more sophisticated insight; you should just treat it like
another election and do whatever is necessary to win the
election. ..(-e1"
Prime Minister Blair:
to Hillary.· (U)
The President:
Bye.
Right.
Thanks Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Love
�cmlFIDENTIlrL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(UP
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, James Smith, David
Higgins, Marianna Papadimitriou, Jeffrey
Rathke
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 8, 1998, 1:50 - 2:12 p.m.
Dover, Delaware
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm great, I'm just, actually,L---------in my local workman's club doing constituent surgery in county
Durham.
(U)
The President:
Are you in Durham?
I love the Durham Cathedral.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just came out of a bar where the old
blokes were telling me about their troubles; from that to you.
(U)
The President:
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
love Durham.
Did you come here?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I did.
I liked it so well I brought Hillary
back to see the cathedral and walk around the town.
I took her
to York and Durham on one of our trips.
(U)
COHFI DEN'I'IAL
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Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b(d)
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2
Prime Minister Blair: Oh, well.
I was a choirboy at the
cathedral in Durham, if you can believe that.
(U)
'The President:
You still have that choirboy look.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I'm doing wonderful.
I'm looking forward to
being with you.
I'm glad you and Major went up there together.
It was good.
(U)
Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I hope it helped.
You know it did help some.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
right to take the decision you did.
I know Jim
there and took the temperature of the unionist
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
was
I
The President:
I think they didn't want to give Paisley and his
crowd a new pretext -- "that's the guy that gave Gerry Adams a
visa and broke the eggs," and all that stuff. j.Q-'(
Prime Minister Blair:
That's true, but it's the right decision
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'd like that. We released a few things
yesterday that we will do, and maybe we could pony it up some.
,ke)
Prime Minister Blair:
this thin and runnin
Yes, well, I'm now taking a real grip
i t like a oli tical
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: So you think we ought to do some sort of joint
announcement while we are there?
~
COH"FIDEN'FIAL
�3
cmIFIDEH'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we can do that
comin down to one point.
it's all
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
And they can't be in government if they don't ...
.JKf
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It wouldn't just be me, but it would mess them
up here in America. Almost all Irish guys here, including guys
who gave them money under questionable circumstances, would bail
out on them if the vote went positive and if they reneged.
You'd see major abandonment of them by Irish-Americans. That's
something they can't afford. They know they can't.
I'm not so
worried anymore -- I was worried some of the IRA offshoots might
take action against Gerry, but the mainstream crowd knows they
can't violate the agreement or the Americans will go berserk on
them. ..keJ
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think for that to be said is very
important. That's reassuring. ~
The President: That's the only reason I wanted to go.
under the illusion that all those Protestants love me.
Prime Minister Blair:
I was keen
I'm not
()21
Well, you're absolutely right, that's why
�~E~.O~.~1~35~2~6~,s~ec~t=io=n~1~.4~(b~)~(d~)~I________________~I
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
If we say it in Birmingham, it might still have
enough echo to get there.
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I agree.
It certainly would. And
the stuff you've been saying today, or someone in the White
House has been saying today, about money and investment -there's something leading the news now about that. ~
The President:
That's something we put out yesterday.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
It shows you, though, that anything you
say will be carried and given prominence. What Paisley keeps
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COWFIDEN'HA::b
doing is putting out posters saying that Gerry Adams will be
Minister of Health.
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I Jj2f
I I
The President:
The old guy is good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What will the vote be?
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
Sinn Fein, you mean?
~
The President: Will three-quarters of Sinn Fein vote for the
referendum?
j,.ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know.
I suspect yes, about that .
.ke!
The President:
It seems like a pro forma thing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think Gerry Adams would say he'll
win the vote unless he is going to win the vote. So I think it
will be pretty resounding. They're prepared to lose some of
their folks.
Prisoners is a big issue for them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. Yesterday, I had a group in
to see me that I think is called WAVE.
It's a group of victims
who lost children, brothers, and parents. They were mostly, but
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
CONFIlSEN'fIAL
not entirely, Protestants. A group that really wants the IRA to
decommission.
They're a militant peace group.
They want to
deal with thousands of people in their inner and physical pain.
I agree with you. ~
We've all taken our licks for Gerry, so if they want a role in
the government, they have got to have some demonstration of good
faith on this violence issue.
These women gave me an idea
yesterday. Your people could vet it for practicality. Maybe
you and Bertie and I could ask for it. ~
They say that there is a some relatively small number of people,
like 2D -- people in the police or otherwise hated by the IRA,
whose remains have never been recovered.
They say if there's
not immediate decommissioning, right after the vote, if you
could work out the legalities so that people would not be
prosecuted and the IRA could somehow direct people to the
remains, so their families could give them a sanctified burial,
that would have a huge psychological impact over there.
I told
them I'd try to help, but I'd talk to you about it. They don't
want vengeance, they just want their people back.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
will. )ef
Yeah, I think that would be good.
I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
look into that \
The President:
Yeah, I think that's a great idea, we'11
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I will do it,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
I
�CONFIDEl1''l?IM
6
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~--------------~
The President:
Yes, it could give them some breathing space .
....(.ef"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, I'll look into that, Bill.
~
The President:
In terms of you and me making another economic
statement, I will do whatever you think is best for the vote.
If you want to do it in Birmingham or down in London.
yc(
'Prime Minister Blair: Well, I think there are two sorts of
stories from your angle: one is investments; the other is a firm
message to the IRA. ~
The President:
I'm glad to do that, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
very good.
.(R)
J€f
I think those two in combination would be
The President: See, by the time I get there, we are only a week
from the vote.
So it probably is good to do it sooner rather
than later so it does not seem like some desperate election
move.
tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll have our guys get in touch with you. Maybe
we could do two separate announcements -- a Sinn Fein one and an
economic one. You organize it, and I will read whatever script
you want me to read. .+eI
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
L - - - - -_
_
_
The President:
That's all it is. What did you make of
Netanyahu? Madeleine said you were very good.
J£1
Prime Minister Blair:/
COHFIDEN'FIlrL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�7
CONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I spent a lot of time with him in the last year.
After Madeleine's first session, I thought he was a hard
negotiator and not a no-negotiator.
Then he called and asked
Dennis to come over, and I thought that was a good sign. And
now Dennis is there and his spokesman put out a statement saying
he is not coming Monday. I never thought he would, but I
thought he would come once I got back from Europe.
I don't know
yet what's going on, but I may want to call you again once I
find out. Je}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
be a place where we could do a reverse goo
Europe could bump him a little harder.
ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President; .. .And then it vanishes.
CONFIDEN'fL"iL
}e1
This may
cop, where
�COMFIDEH'fIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
It vanishes. ~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But, when I see you, we can wor
on It more.
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, well I'll do the same.
pretty regularly at the moment.
He calls me
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"The President:
You know they will.
)R1'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's exactly where the Israelis are.
percent of them want that.
(e)
Eighty
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
comes". -\-&r
The President:
Aef
~
We'll stay in touch and talk when the G-8
I agree.
You just let me know what you want.
Prime Minister Blair: And, as ever, many thanks for all your
help. Love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
CONFIDENT lAL
Yes.
(U)
�9
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Yes, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'3'IAL
�tONFIDElif'i'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 26
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (C)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick, Pat
O'Shaughnessy, James Smith, Peter Huggins,
Jenny McGee, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 21, 1998, 4:31 - 4:42 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine.
hours in Northern Ireland.
(U)
The President:
(U)
(U)
I just spent the last 48
I hear it is turning around a little bit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so. I did a complete blitz of
the place, really. Every single kind of radio show, TV show,
audience participation program -- sort of a two-day election
campaign.
It's coming around a bit.
(U)
The President:
I did a radio Bpot yesterday that they are
replaying today.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 b d
The President:
What were the best lines?
;z1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
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Declassify On:.! 5/~98- "
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�CONFIDENTIAL
2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
He has come along, hasn't he?
JWf
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. They had a U2 concert last night
that was great.
Instead of having speeches, Bono told them to
"have a minute of silence for the victims, which was very clever .
..(..G7-
The President: He's a smart man. I met him by accident in 1992
in Chicago, he helped me out and we've stayed in touch ever
since. He's a very smart man. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we'll have to keep our fingers
crossed. Thanks for what ou did last weekend' it
tremendousl helpful;
The President: Good.
I've just been thinking about you.
I
couldn't think of anything else. I did a big plug for it during
a NATO expansion event.
I talked about Indonesia and Northern
Ireland at our NATO expansion ratification event. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It has
layed ver
well here.
The President: Yes, but you have to follow the locals. You've
done all you can.
I was glad to see in my morning intelligence
that there is movement in the polls your way.
I think the
undecided may break your way. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
It is possible.
I
But it sure was the
I literally have spent the last 48 hours
L-~______________________________________~I
right thing to advise.
cmlFIDEN'l:'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4{b)(d)
�3
CONFIDEN'FL"<L
there blitzing the place, everywhere, doing everything.
I
stayed on longer today to visit a hospital, visit a regiment,
saw the police, did a walk-about in the street. And as I got
back into my car, the last person's hand I shook was
(indistinct) McCartney.
~
The President:
Paul McCartney?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The President:
No, Bob McCartney.
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J!2:'J
(Y1'
fer
He started haranguing me.
Did he really?
j.C1-
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. And after I left, he accused some
of the people around of being a rent-a-mob for us.
This old
lady turned on him and gave him a real'earwigging on television.
She said that she was out to vote Yes and that she was not
anyone's rent-a-mob.
She thought he was
disgrace. J.:ei
a
The President: Sometimes, something like that can be more of a
benefit than anything else.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's keep our fingers crossed.
Put it
this way:
last weekend it was well that we did what we did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'FIAL
�4
C'ONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Well, let me tell you also that Hillary and I
had a wonderful time at Chequers.
It was wonderful for us.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Oh Bill, I can't tell you how great it
was to have you. And for the kids, Euan's friend went back to
school the next day in a daze.
I told my people that it was a
real tribute to you that you were prepared to sit down and spend
·time with them in that way. We loved having you and had a great
time, we really did.
(U)
The President: Even in the darkest days back in '94 and early
'95, when people thought we were finished, you can always spend
time with kids and you'll never know how you'll have an impact
on a young person that will change everything for them. A
little extra time is the best investment you can make.
Besides
that, it's interesting for me.
And in the work we do, you can
lose contact with people younger than you. A year'younger is a
year younger than you.
You don't even think about it, and then
you turn around and find out it's been a year since you've
.talked to anyone who is 25.
I liked it:
they were delightful
young men.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I'm glad you did.
are still on cloud nine.
(U)
For them, they
The President:
You ought to be proud of yourself. You've done
every damn thing you COUld. When the vote happens, we'll be on
pins and needles over here.
I guess we should know something by
mid-day our time tomorrow. What kind of vote counting operation
do they have over there? lei
Prime Minister Blair: Well, this is Northern Ireland.
Everything is done differently.
They won't start counting until
Saturday morning. We will know Saturday afternoon some time.
(C)
The President:
They will do exit polls, won't they?
yef
Prime Minister Blair:
In Northern Ireland, they've never done
an exit poll.
But you can never tell.
If you are in the wrong
part of town, you'll get completely skewed results.
I think we
~~~~~~~~~~--
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
ce)HFI DEN'? IM
will know by this time tomorrow evening. We will let you know,
and when the result comes through, let's just hope it is the
right one .. ---f.€-r
The President:
thing.
(C)
Well, keep your chin up.
Prime Minister Blair:
All right.
You did the right
(U)
The President: Okay, you've done a heck of a job turning this
thing around.
Take care my friend.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill.
The President:
a
We had
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
great time.
(U)
(U)
We had a great time too.
Goodbye.
(U)
'-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN:fIAL
!
Goodbye.
(U)
�GOJ?rFr'DE~JT IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair ~
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 23, 1998, 1:36
1:46 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, thank goodness.
The President:
You got 71 percent.
Protestant vote was yet?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Do you know what the
I think it was 55 percent.
(U)
The President:
Do you think it was as high as that? I just
talked to Trimble and he was still moaning about the vote. He
sounded upbeat but he said he lost in his constituency.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair: Overall, the most accurate poll was 55
percent. Yes, it was about five percent of the nationalist vote
that went no as well,so that brought figures down a bit. ~
The President:
I just did the math and it seems the vote is 53
percent of the nationalists and 49 percent for the Unionists.
Is that about right? ).G1'
emU'I ElENl'IAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
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CON'FIDEN'PIFtL
Prime Minister Blair: Roughly, possibly a little higher on the
Unionist side but they reckoned that probably about five or six
percent of the non-Unionist voted "No" so that brought the
figure down.
Of the 28 or 29 percent, that will probably bring
it down to about 24 percent or 23 percent. The Unionists voted
"No" 23 percent, see what I mean? It probably means just the
majority of the Unionists went with the resolution. ke1
The President:
That is great though.
God, it's great.
I'm so
happy.
You must be ecstatic. You turned all those undecided
¢)
voters -- almost 100 percent.
Prime Minister Blair: Again, a million thanks for what you did.
It began with the interview on Sunday.
From then on it began to
turn. We were at one point considerably behind, although we
were looking at under 60 percent. Jeffery Donaldson, who is a
reasonable part of the no vote, is on TV now saying he wants to
work with Trimble now. ~
The President:
I don't think Paisley can maintain the level of
support. You are going to have a significant share of those
people from the 25-30 percent who think the thing ought to be
given a chance to go, and that will give you three out of four,
or four out of five of the Unionist voters who want to see
peace. -tel
The process will play out -- but we ought to get Gerry and his
crowd to do a thing or two to get this off on a good footing.
He's going to be hereon Thursday for reasons unrelated to me to
make some speeches. But he always seems to pop into the White
House.
If you want to have your guys tell us in the next three.
or four days what you want me to say I would appreciate it.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you going to see him yourself?
JGr
The President:
I don't know.
I was just calling to
congratulate a few of the guys and he told me about it.
I have
to check my schedule on whether I see him or not but we can
always have the message delivered. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
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�'CONF'IDEN'I'IAL
The President:
shouldn't he?
3
He ought to chunk in some weapons pretty soon,
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, let me ask you something else. We had a
group touring the United states and I met with them for 10-15
minutes. I am embarrassed that I can't remember their name -- I
think maybe it was Waves. It was a group who had relatives
killed. I think it would help if the IRA indicated where the
remains are -- without exposing them. Would that help? Is
there some way to do that without exposing them to criminal
l i ab i l i t y? J.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President: If by Wednesday somebody can call Sandy or
Steinberg to let me know what kind of presentation I can make to
them if they tell where remains are and that they would not be
subject to criminal prosecution. That's a human touch that
might have a big psychological impact -- differentiate them from
the IRA. ...(..e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I will get right on that.
Je1
�4
€OHFI DENT HlcL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll hammer it hard.
I thought if I can advance
a specific agenda -- I will work on getting a Sinn Fein person
to work on decommissioning. You just let me know if I can say
to him, "I want you to tell where those remains are and whoever
tells won't be subj ect to criminal liability." ~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will get someone to come back to
your guys in the next few days.
~
The President:
Have a great celebration.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I offered him a helluva deal to see if he will
do it.
I scraped together every penny, every pop gun I could in
72 hours.
I still think there is "a chance he won't do it.
f/2:)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right Bill, all the best.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFI DENT lAL
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
PRESIDENT CLINTON
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
LOCATION:
EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK
NOTE TAKERS:
LARRY WRIGHT, TOM CROWELL, MATT SIBLEY, JOEL
SCHRADER, JAMES SMITH, STEVE SIMON
DATEmME:
31 JULY 1998/1609-1642 EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Tony?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Hi, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: Hey, how are you?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm looking forward to my holiday. I start tomorrow. I've been
reshuffling my cabinet this week.
THE PRESIDENT: You have? Who'd you change?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Quite a loti
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I'm doing fine. How are things with youl;;?;---L......;;;;';';;;';;";:;;;====-';;';";':";;':';=...J......_-_....J
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm really looking forward to your visit to Ireland.
THE PRESIDENT: We are trying to work out the final schedule. You and Cherie are
coming up to see us, we'll be there together, right?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That is right. We're still trying -we came through the
Drumcree situation, got through a terrible thing. The tragedy of the kidsc-THE PRESIDENT: It sobered them up though, didn't it?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, it did. We still have a lot of problems.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
,
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Let me tell you where we are. We are having terrible trouble with
Janet Reno. I think the FBI must be working on her. If you know anything about this
Starr business, you know law enforcement agencies are not really under direction of the
President. What she is saying is that this is coddling terrorists and making concessions
to get a trial. That is a policy statement and not her call, and I can disagree. Then she
raised all these questions as to whether it was legally sufficient. If you say there is no
British or Scottish objection to the character or legality of the trial, it is your law; it's not
our judgment to make. What I am trying to get her to do is give me an opinion saying
she disagrees as a matter of policy, but Justice can find no fault from the point of view of
the law. Then I think we are OK.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Ri ht.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b (d)
THE PRESIDENT: You got it. That is where I am trying to go.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Bill, a cou Ie of other things. Kosovo.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I agree.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
i·
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3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE. PRESIDENT: The KLA has put us in a tough position.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes.
fr,
==E;.::::O=.1::::3::::5:;:26=,=se=c=ti=on=1=.=4(:;:b=)(::::d)::::;------,
THE PRESIDENT: Alright.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: One other thing, on the Middle East peace process.
THE PRESIDENT: It's ve
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Right. Good. OK, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: What else do you know?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Not much. I can't wait to go on holiday. I have got the flu this
week and am a bit under the weather. Basically, I'm fine and looking forward to my
holiday. But I have reshuffled my cabinet and done my spending plan. We will have an
economic downturn this next year, and we have to be careful about that. I called Stan
Greenberg today.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, he did some polling for us.
THE PRESIDENT: You know, the funny thing is our growth was down to 1.4 percent this
quarter. It was 5.4 percent last quarter, but we lost ~ painton the GM strike and a full
point off the Asian downturn already. We have got to do something about Japan. I am
very discouraged about what Obuchi and Miyazawa have said. Miyazawa, when he was
Prime Minister, he was already about 72 or 68.
PRIME MINISTE,R BLAIR:
,
I E.O. 13526, section l.P}{4:-k
.~ . . ~:·~~~~~RAR1'PBbTbCOPY· ;~;:;
J )~i~~l-~__ ~.,.~oL~~~ ~'U'_L/:J'! t·
�4
THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
What they are worried about is not being
able to stimulate growth in their economy with tax cuts because they put these curlicues
in them and people in Japan take the money and save it, because they don't think they
are permanent or adequate. They think if they do all this bank restructuring, in the
absence of increased demand and demand for exports, a" it will do is just contract the
economy and further deflation. What we have to do is try to work with them to get the
necessary mix. I have been prepared to eat lower growth this year just to sop up some
of their exports so they wouldn't go down, but this whole thing is going to slow what I
think would be a boom in Europe and it is going to brake our expansion unless we can
turn Japan around. I don't think there is enough money to move Asia there
. independently, without Japan coming back in Indonesia and all the other places. I just
don't see it.
L...,--_--,-_ _ _ _---,_--:_ _ _ _ _- '
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: What do you think we have to do?
THE PRESIDENT: What we have to do is find a way to be supportive of them without
pushing, nudging them along and not humiliating them so they don't hunker down and
turn inward. It's a funny little balance we have to strike but we need a coherent strategy.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b) d)
but if I get an opening may press 1m an may e
ca you an w
something. We have to get the Europeans involved. What's going on in Germany?
Schroeder is going to win isn't he?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Stan polling for Schroeder?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think he's doing some work along those lines.
THE PRESIDENT: When I was there before I didn't see any --I think Kohl is where
Churchill was at the end of World War II: the people are grateful but ready for a change.
PRIME MINSITER BLAIR: "'=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)(=d=): : : ; - - - - - - - - - l
,THE PRESIDENT:!
. -_ _hIE~.~O~.~13~5~2~6,~s~ec~ti~o~n~1.~4~(d~)~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I'
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
!
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)td)
�CONFJDENTML
5
THE PRESIDENT: How long has Helmut been in, 16 years? That's a hell of a long
time.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That's right.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Very clever.
RIME MIN ISTER BLlAR: IrI=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)=( :::;--------1
d=)
THE PRESIDENT: If the vote is close enough, he should do that. I still think Netanyahu
would have been better off doing that.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Me, too.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: You ought to tell him what I told you.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I agree with you. Just today we had the announcement of
job losses here as a result of Asia. It's the first time it's been brought home.
THE PRESIDENT: I am really very concerned about it. The first place it hit us was in
agriculture. We export about half our grain and about 40 percent goes to Asia and we
are down 30 percent this year.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Gee. Thirty percent.
THE PRESIDENT: And we can't get new markets because of bumper crops and the
. climate change caused by el Nino. I think with 1.4 percent growth, unemployment will go
up a little. I just don't see any set of scenarios where we do better unless we get Japan
turned around. I would guess that you're seeing increased flows to Latin America like we
are. Thank God for Latin America, they are doing quite well.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Absolutely right.
PRESIDENT CLINTON:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTE~ BLAIR:,I!10pe~t.,..... _~<=-----='-",:'.'i'
;,.' ~!; ---,,~~.~.- .~~ -
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�GONFIOENTb\L DRAFT
6
THE PRESIDENT: Anyway, I think our first order of business should be to deal with the
Japanese government. The Chinese are hanging in there and have not devalued, but
their target was revised downward. I feel I they will hang in there several more months.
There is a limit to the pounding they can take, expectations have been raised. You can
see, it is so palpable, they are proud as hell they have stayed strong and have not had to
devalue. But at some point, they'll have a hard time hanging on. I think the quicker we
could have some sort of EU-US initiative - This was this huge real estate boom, but the
Japanese stock market lost 50 percent of its value in the last five years. We're just not
getting any reinvestment in growth. The way they have done all tax changes to date,
people are saving the money, and they're spending all this money on a world-class big
infrastructure that hasn't done anything. I know they are frustrated because, basically,
they-have taken a whole series of half-measures and it has not helped them. They have
dragged Asia down.
THE PRESIDENT: Talk to Prodi. They've been very good at working with us, by the
way. Bob Rubin sent a/l our best people over there, but their political mechanism is
inadequate.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
II E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
THE PRESIDENT: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
1
I
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: "----;:=E==.=O=.==13==5=26=,=se=c=ti=on=1.=4(::::b=(==d)::::,-----i
THE PRESIDENT:
L I_ _ _
---"-I=E.=O=.=13=5=26;,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4~(d",",)='.I_ _ _.....l
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, the reform movement had a false birth under Hosokawa. Did
you ever meet him?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: No.
THE PRESIDENT:
1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, and maybe not the last. Jospin was here last week. He
really loved his time in Washington.
�CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT
7
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:\-;========::::;-------~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's good. France and Brazil are two countries that have
permanent governments, for good or bad, but have inbred an anti-Americanism that
colors the atmosphere and the left in France had a lot of that, as well as the Gaullist
crowd, but! always admired the guy so much from a distance. You had a big influence
on him, too.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I will follow up on Kosovo and get you a briefing on the Middle East.
It's a little more ambiguous than the last time we talked. Netanyahu has moved on some
issues and there is a chance we can break through. I didn't think he was bargaining in
good faith, but now I have seen some change and we might have a shot at it. We'll work
out Irish schedule and get the Attorney General to sign off on the legal adequacy as
soon as possible.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Again Bill, 101 percent support.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, I appreciate it, goodbye.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Goodbye.
�CONFIDEN'f'IhL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Robert Ford,
Cindy Lawrence, Sean Tarver, Matthew Sibley
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 6, 1998, 4:46 p.m. - 5:06 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing? (U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm fine, enjoying my holiday.
Are you in Tuscany?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
God I'm jealous.
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been to Sienna?
We're going there next week.
The President: Oh, that is a great place.
beautiful little town?
(U)
Yes, it is.
The President: When I
four star restaurant.
sign of a fish, like a
three-hour lunch there
was there about ten years ago,
I can't remember its name, but
peace symbol, or something.
I
and they had to carry me out.
Declassify On:
i
,
(U)
(U)
Isn't that a
Prime Minister Blair:
COMFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
(U)
(U)
I ate at a
it had a
had a
(U)
�2
cm:rFIDE~H'IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good place to be carried out from.
(U)
Are you on holiday?
The President:
The House is here for another month, one more
day actually and so we are all working here.
I am going to go
on holiday in ten or eleven days.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Weren't you up with Steven Spielberg?
(U)
The President:
I spent the weekend up in Long Island with him.
We talked about you. He and Tom Hanks came here last month and
showed me their movie "Saving Private Ryan," about Normandy,
before it was in the theater.
It's an enormous film, really
. good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you're back in your office.
(U)
The President: Yes, I'm sitting here in my office.
It's a
beautiful day outside.
I'm concerned about the Japanese
situation, really worried. But that is not why I called.
Gerhard Schroeder was here yesterday and we had a long talk.
He's apparently still leading the polls by a solid 5-8 points.
You think he is going to win don't you? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He just thinks it's time for a change?
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
je1
You can never tell for sure.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know, it's the second time we've met;
it was much more relaxed this time.
The first time was in
Germany and I was on a campaign swing for Kohl
ou can
ima ine, but we had a good talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
GOHFIDEH'f IAL
�COHFIDEHTIAL
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
The longer you hang
around this business, it becomes apparent that very few people
make it this far by accident. They don't just give these jobs
away.
J.Ri
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I think that's true.
(U)
The President:
I called you to talk about Kosovo.
It is
getting worse. The headlines show that, but Milosevic is going
for a military solution. Serb security forces are not only
suppressing Albanian militants, but are also engaging in a
systematic campaign against the civilian population.
I think we
are getting closer to a major humanitarian disaster. ~
Milosevic has a sense of doing this under the threshold for NATO
military response because he believes that NATO will respond
only with a UN resolution, but Russia guarantees to block it.
My view is, at a minimum, we need to make him think again. We
need to finalize planning that we started, identify forces and
think about some sort of ultimatum to get him to stop the
offensive and restore autonomy for Kosovo.
~
I believe we ought to make it clear that, while we would like to
get UN authority, we can do it without it.
I know you differ
here, and Albright talked to Cook about asking the UN Security
Council for the necessary authority.
U21
Let me tell you we are headed to a collision on Kosovo and what
is going on in Russia.
I talk to Bob Rubin about every day.
I
am still quite concerned about their economy and about the
stability of the Yeltsin government. His health is
deteriorating and a lot of noise is being made about controls on
freedoms to get order in society. ..(.e)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�.4
CONFI DEN'I' IAL
What I'm afraid of is, if things get worse in Kosovo, a lot of
civilians will be dying and others turning into refugees.
If we
put Yeltsin into this box, he will be forced to abstain because
it is so bad and would really hurt him at home politically with
the economy the way it is, or he can keep with Primakov and veto
it and run the risk of alienating the rest of the world at the
very time he needs the most support from the international
community. While it is better to have UN support, I am very
worried about bringing this to a vote right now.
(C)
Milosevic thinks he has a free hand.
I talked to you and John
Major and I understand you have different system to decide legal
authority there.
One thing I had our guys do -- there is a
.basis:- there have been a number of cross-border incursions and
threats to international observers, which could be a trigger for
self-defense. Also, there is Milosevic's record of threat to
international peace and security and then the humanitarian
atrocities.
I think we could construct a legal case, but if I
can't convince you about it, we don't have a chance with Chirac
and Kohl. ).ef
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this then. Shouldn't we try to
get Chirac and Kohl to sign off on ultimatums we would give
Milosevic? Word of planning would be somewhat helpful.
Convince Chirac and Kohl that a UN resolution is not legally
necessary.
I know how Chirac is on this, but it will hurt
Yeltsin if we put him in a position of having to sign off or
block now. .J.e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
/J
[------------------The President:
We can nose around it. His economic problems
are horrible and his internal political problems are awful.
I'm
very worried about this.
Yeltsin was going to go on vacation in
COMPI DEN'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COWFIDEN'fIAL
5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
August, but then he had to come early, even though his health
needs the rest.
I am going over there and meet with him for a
few days in September, but I'm very worried about this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
].
'------------/
The President:
I don't know, we have to work on that.
We have
to work through another option, apart from a Security Council
resolution.
They would have to raise holy hell, but, in the
end, if we handle it in the right way, it would be the best of
three bad alternatives. Better than forcing them to veto it .
. Better than forcing him to eat it. My problem is I am afraid
what happens if we let it deteriorate more. There is a rumor,
news story, of 500 people in a mass grave.
It may not be true,
but the other side is trying to force us in, too. We have all
those problems you and I discussed before. People want us to be
their air force to get independence. But I think the near term
problem is we went through all this with the Bosnian civil war
and I don't want to replay it with another Muslim population .
..+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, that is exactly what's doing it and
Primakov gave it to him. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
down. Kinkel's
impact on their
basically it is
I'm going to call Helmut first and nail him
been aware of where the French are. Given the
election, but might help him electorally. But
a domestic election, so my guess is no effect.
J,e)
Prime Minister Blair:
COWFIDENTL"rL
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
• COHFIDEHTI1'.L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will nose around some more.
They may decide
to shape this and go along with us, but right now I don't see
it. ..J!Cr
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Maybe they will want to try to go along with us
on a resolution, but I doubt it. Let me mention a couple of
.other-things.
The Security Council had a discussion about Iraq
today with Kofi.
I think we have to playa measured game here.
I think this is a reaction by Iraq to the fact the IAEA says
they couldn't recommend ending the inspection regime and going
to monitoring on the nuclear issue.
~
This was a serious report that we had nothing to do with, on
very specific issues.
It could be they simply overacted, but my
instinct right now is to not come out with a bellicose reaction
at this point. We ought to be relaxed and work with the
Secretary General and focus on inspection requirements. We will
just say that we will postpone sanctions reviews until Iraq
achieves compliance. ~
Butler was very upfront.
I think the Iraqis may have been
showing a little leg about it. About every six months they try
to provoke us with their rhetoric, but they may come back. With
all these other problems in the world we should give Kofi a
chance to work through this.
If not, then we can say to hell
with them and we leave the sanctions on indefinitely. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What about these. reviews?
~
The President:
I think they over read the IAEA refusal to
recommend ending the inspection regime and going to monitoring
on nuclear.
The IAEA said they had just a few more things to do
here.
It would have been reviewed in August for monitoring in
October but, for whatever reason, they reacted the way they did.
Now is not the time for us to overact.
They probably hope we
will do that and spend a lot of money moving the fleet back in,
but I don't want to do that right now.
We'll monitor it
closely, but, on the other hand, don't let them think they can
wish this away. ~
CONF'I DEN1'L"xL
�7
• CONFHlEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think we might, but hopefully we'll have our
course on Kosovo by then. Two other things.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I talked to'you about Lockerbie. I have the decision memo in
front of me and I will work through it as quickly as I can and
get back to you on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-----1:1=E=.O=,=1=35=2::6=,s:=ec=:ti=:o=n=1.::4(:::;b::::)(=d)"==!.._ _ _.......J1
The President:
1)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minster Blair:
Yes.
keJ
The President: You have more riding on it than I do.
The
Scottish regime has enough restrictions as it is. Go back to
your holiday, tell Cheri I said hi, have a wonderful time, and
drink a glass of wine for me tonight. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All the best to you.
(U)
We are thinking of you.
We're doing fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
(U)
�CO!<fPIDCN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Tony Campanella,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee, Chris Jansen
and Ralph Sigler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:'
August 16, 1998, 7:51-8:04 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Tony. Well, I just called to tell you I was
thinking about you.
You've had a miserable day.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, it's pretty grim.
What the hell happened?
(U)
Who did it?
Aer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you believe the person who gave the warning
made a mistake or did it deliberately? )Q7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The truth is, we don't know.
Jer
Do you still want me to come?
CG}{fI DE,HT 1AL
Classified by:. Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
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Declassify On: ! 8/1~~~ ". 1
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TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' :
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COlifl"IDElif'f IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
---ll (,0'
Prime Minister Blair:
L . . -_ _ _ _
The President:
It is probably more important now than before.
You need to decide as time goes by if we need to visit the site
and make a stop.
(.t')
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely.
I've visited some of the
victims and families tonight.
It was pretty harrowing. kef
Pretty tough, isn't it? ~
The President:
Prime _Minister Blair:
-helpless. ~
Yes, it's an awful feeling -- completely
The President:
I just had to sit with all those people, with
their families, who got murdered in Africa.
There's nothing you
can say, but it matters to them to know the leader of their
country came to see them, so you did a good thing. Even if you
felt like you have five thumbs. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
C~----The President:
Can Gerry Adams help you get these people?
Prime Minister Blair:
Je'(
I
~--------------~
The President:
Do you think they will? They could do more good
in less time by helping you get these guys.
tGt
//J
prime Minister Blra_i_r_:___________________________________________
I
1
/
1.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
The President:
Did they condemn it at all?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~I____________________~
The President: Not just Gerry Adams, but did the IRA condemn
it?
What do you want them to say? --fE-)Prime Minister Blair:
~
'--------~/
CONl"IDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COHPIDEH'PIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If who proposes?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: And they will agree? Both will agree? You
would like the IRA to say, look, what happened is a part of the
past, it's allover, and if the chief constables can agree on
new security measures, they will support them? I'll see what I
can do.
(Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
L-______________________________________________------------------
The President:
~
I think this is an opportunity for him, too.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I've got it.
I will get on this right away.
I
guess I'll have to wait until morning to call them, but I'll be
up late tonight. ~
\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
name?
(R)
Ninety people, 15 hardcore.
Do they have a
Prime Minister Blair: \
com IDEN"fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�4
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
All right I'll get on this .
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
...(..G-J-
I
Okay, got it.
Prime Mini.ster Blair:
yz)
Bill, how are you?
yzr
The President:
I've been up to my ass in this Africa bombing,
because there's a lot more than meets the eye on what happened
in Africa.
If we were on a secure line, I could tell you more.
But I'll see what I can do.
I'll put Sandy on this tomorrow.
I'll make some calls tomorrow. )e(
'-------------Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Damn right.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If Sinn Fein really forms an alliance with the
Unionists, that leaves the other group out. You'll have a
localized version of what's happened around the world, where
terrorists are not associated with or funded by governments.
In
this case, what you've got is a cell.
~
I don't know who's giving them money, but we're going to
increasingly have to deal with terrorists with no ties to any
nation-state, including Iran, if the precedent there keeps on
track. But in the case of a lot of Middle East and African
countries, we could be dealing with these people, like in those
old James Bond movies with SPECTRE and Dr. No. We're going to
have a twenty-first century version of those.
ycr
We're already dealing with drug cartels. The Colombian Army has
been defeated in battle four times in the last year with narcodealers.
They do not have the physical capacity to extract
these people.
They don't engage in terrorism; they just kill
people who get in the way of people making money.
If you can
CON rlfJEN'I' IAL
�CQ~JFIPEN'PIAL
5
get somebody worth about 200 or 300 million bucks to operate
this and earn enough money per year through stock earnings and
interest accounts, and if you're prepared to spend it building
an internati.onal network. -ter
Some of these guys earn enough money in terrorism and think,
compared to whatever they get paid, it's more than they were
making before. My worry is for all these IRA offshooots,
isolated cells who were kept apart and were kept isolated from
centralized control, that psychologically they may not be able
to handle it.
If what their real prospect is that they could
lay down their arms and not go to jail and take low-paying jobs
instead of terrorism, a lot of them may not be able to
·psychologically handle going to work everyday and carrying a
1 unchbox . )ef
What kind of psychological message are you sending to them?
What kind of economic message? Have you had someone working on
getting them college payments or job help? My worry is these
people will think, "I cannot imagine leading this deadly dull
life. ff I may be wrong, but I think these people personally
cannot imagine living in a different way.
If you're only
dealing with 15 killers and 75 others in a support system, what
thought can you give to offering them an interesting life? But
I'm all into dull these days.
I'm all for a little more dull.
This really is a problem, Tony.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely, and infused with meaning.
You ought
to have a really smart person think about the psychological and
economic dynamics about how they would spend their days, and do
a concerted effort on persuading them how else they could spend
their days.
It may be B.S., but I think it's part of the
problem and is worth thinking about.
You've got a lot of
brilliant people over there that could figure out a
psychological campaign to deal with them specifically. You
don't have much to lose and you might have some benefit from it.
I will do these things you asked.
I'm really sorry, Tony.
I'm
so sorry this happened.
You know, I was afraid this would
happen before the vote.
I was afraid they might try to kill
Gerry or David.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DENT L'\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
CQNFIDEN'P IAL
The President:
If you could bust these guys in a hurry, even
pick up just one or a couple of these guys.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We will try to do that.
I'll get on this.
~
Best of luck to you, too.
Thanks, man.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEU'PIAL
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Lyle Harrison,
Cindy Lawrence, Liz Rogers, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 20, 1998, 4:52 - 4;59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hi, Tony.
I am sorry the other phone was not
working.
Thank you for your statement.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Not at all.
It is important it is done.
~~~~~
The President;
Yes. We thought they were having a big meeting
there today, but we won't know for sure for a few hours.
This
place we hit is maybe the biggest terrorist camp in the world,
with 500-600 people there at a time. We thought we had good
intelligence that the leaders planned to meet there, but
unfortunately i t was reported in the international press; there
was no hint in our press of any consideration of an attack. l81
There was a report yesterday of rumors, and more than rumors,
that we were concerned that they planned to attack a third
embassy.
We also took down one of their cells in the Balkans,
so they are annoyed at us anyway. I'm sure you know this guy
signed a Fatwa and said that he would kill thousands of our
people.
J.81.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�SECRET
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I am very grateful for
your statement.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Not at all.
happened tonight? ~
So, what has actually
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So
got in Afghanistan,
training facility.
the worst case, it
Yeah.
~
that is where we are. We don't know what we
but in the worst case we took out his
So we have to hope for the best, but even in
was worth doing.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(c)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
�SECRET
The President :
3
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me tell you, I need to speak to the
Pakistani Prime Minister before I go on TV, but I need to call
you next week to talk to you about Ireland before I come. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
-The President:
All right, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
All the very best to you.
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
SECRE'f
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 27, 1998, 4:32 - 4:54 p.m. EDT
Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are things?
(U)
The President: Oh, fine.
I just interrupted my vacation a
little bit today.
I went into Massachusetts and did an event.
It was great.
I got to work a line and speak to a cheering
crowd.
It wasn't something organized.
It was just put together
in two days.
There were thousands.
It was amazing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Good, I'm pleased.
(U)
The President:
This is my best state. You know, if I'd been in
Wyoming, they probably would have been shooting at me. You
never can tell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Good, I'm pleased about that.
you had all this stuff with the hurricane, too.
(U)
The President:
That's all right.
a lot worse.
(U)
It could have been a hell of
cmlFI DENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b,Q)
Decla"ify On, .
I'm sorry
8/2t;;-;;;::::;:::':oPY~1
-f._:':-"!-:;'~-_ .~~ -__ ,_,:_,-;---.-:..~:~~~.:.._~..-_~ ..........._._,;. __ ,,:;:;--__ -,::._./.,,:.:,,:,~-
�COHFIDEHTIPrL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
holiday.· (U)
The President:
I'm really sorry to interrupt your
Go ahead.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to raise a couple of
things.
The first is Ireland.
I know that my eople have
talked to your people today.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONTI DENT IAb
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll do it. When do you want me to call him?
Today, tomorrow, as quickly as I can?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, Bill.
yC)
The President: What's your view of the timetable? What's your
preferred timetable where all the leaders meet face-to-face?
o
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That would be great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you this. What's the date that Gerry
does the actual decommissioning? When does the IRA actually
have to turn some guns over? A week after that?
~
CONE IEJEN'l'I1'l:L
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
4
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask, what kind of understanding are you
trying to reach on the volume of weapons and type of ammunition?
$)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So it's something de Chastelain can say is
sUbstantial and must be significant.
I got it.
I'll call him .
.Je)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, that would be fantastic.
~
The President: Now, what the hell do you think is going on over
in Russia? I've got Strobe Talbott, my Deputy Secretary of
State, over there in Russia. We're watching it closely. Our
stock market took a big hit with this rumor that he would
resign. Yeltsin's in the dacha, Chernomyrdin's working on
confirmation.
There are rumors that Yeltsin would resign once
Chernomyrdin is confirmed.
I don't know, but I know this:
They
are absolutely insistent that I come.
I can't initiate my not
going.
It's kind of a mess. That could sink their economy or
politics sure enough.
kCl
Their economy is still rapidly deteriorating. The Central Bank
is still under pressure to inject liquidity into the banking
sector.
The problem is when they do, the banks turn around and
take the money out of the country, and so there's no control
over that money.
There's no clear economic policy, and I think
they've got this new Trilateral Duma Commission, talking about
renationalizing industries and price controls. ~
What I think they have to do is bite the bullet and pass a
decent regulatory system and tax system and a decent bank and a
decent social welfare system~
I think there's alienation among
the people because social welfare has always been a fraud in
CmJFIDEN'fIlrL
�CONFIDEHTL~iL
5
Russia.
The Economist a couple of weeks ago had a great little
piece on the missing social agenda. The charities are taking
over a lot of it, but the reason ordinary people felt so totally
insecure was they really don't think there's any social safety
net. --fC!
I think it's worth going over to try to work through this.
We've got to reassert our commitment and reassert the importance
of the weapons agreements we can still make, but tell them
they've still got to embrace democracy and free markets and have
tough Russian solutions to tough Russian problems.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
You can make money out of that under any circumstances,
even when it's screwed up, and God knows, it was screwed up.
It's a cash cow.
f,.e')
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
These social pressures, nationalism, retrograde
socialism, were present in Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser
extent, the Czech Republic.
For all kinds of reasons, they were
able to make the transition with a lot less fallout.
Russia is
a big country that could basically suck in a lot of stuff from
Warsaw Pact nations.
I am appalled to the extent there are not
'the functioning intermediary institutions without which neither
a democracy nor market economy can succeed.
I'm quite concerned
now that a working majority of the populace is for the
suspension of some democratic freedom just to have a strong
leader who'll get the damn show on the road again and make the
trains run on time.
They're disappointed in the executive but
also disappointed in the Duma going too much the other way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you think about it, it's quite interesting
how many places in the world there are -- including in your
discussion. with me -- where, at least to outsiders, the econom~c
answer or the political answer seems clear. And if you could
eOMFlDEWf lAL
�COlU'IElENl'IAL
6
just get over the hard knock of doing it, i t ' l l be better on the
other side, but the political system is unable to cross the
hurdle.
Both of us have been rather fortunate that our
political systems are still functioning well enough to do what
has to be done. ~
The biggest economic tragedy is not Russia, but Japan. Even
with their massive infrastructure and understanding of the
modern economy, they still can't put together the political
decisions that are manifestly in their interest.
I don't know
if Europe is on the upsurge of growth.
There's still some
internal growth that could be generated by France and Germany by
internal changes. ~
I don't know how much longer we can s'ustain our growth without
some more growth in Japan. We're absorbing 30 percent of
Chinese exports now, 50 percent more than our world GDP share,
and there's a huge increase in Japanese exports.
They can't buy
our imports, and the Chinese can take a lot more but they have
certain controls.
I'm worried that if we have three quarters
rather than one quarter of economic slowdown, there'll be an
increase in the trade deficit. We'll see a whole round of
protectionist pressure build up again, which will affect Europe,
if only indirectly. jQt
I think the Japanese issue is still the biggest economic issue.
The Russia issue is a political issue.
If they get a
dictatorial leader, they'll be much harder to deal with on
Kosovo and other things, I'm afraid.
I think it's worth my
going over there.
I'll meet with the Duma leaders from other
parties and have a little no-BS conversation about what's going
on here and hopefully reduce a little of their paranoia about
America and the West.
It may not be a conventional success, but
I'll go as long as they want me to come -- unless Yeltsin
resigns in the next two days -- if nothing else but to talk to
Chernomyrdin, who is physically and mentally quite alert and
strong, personally. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm worried about with Yeltsin is -- in my
last conversation I had with him, he said all the right things,
even on the things we disagree on, he said all the right things,
at least from his point of view, but he really seemed profoundly
tired in a way I had never heard him before.
I am afraid his
energy, his will to go on may be sapped.
~
COHFI DgNT ll'd,
�COHFID£HTIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I'm afraid so.
~
But there's nothing I can do about it.
yz)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: One thing, we've got to do everything we can to
keep their IMF program going. You know, they've only gotten,
what, $7 billion out of $21 billion. There may be some other
"little thin"gs we could do, which I'm working on. But the hard
truth is we will be pouring good money after bad if the banks
keep taking the money and putting it in Europe. I'm worried
about Russia becoming like Africa.
It's bad enough the market
takes the pipe, but the citizens of the country who ought to be
putting their own wealth in there are shipping it out, and you
have massive capital outflows instead of internally generated
growth. We've got to talk through all that with them.
They
think they've been taken for a ride on an economic theory that
they were not able to embrace.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
Bill?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I can barely hear you.
It sounds like
four other people are having a conversation on the same line.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You were saying?
(U)
The President: No, that's it. Look, if I find out anything
about Russia in the next few days before I come, I'll call you .
..kef
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I got it. And I'll get to work on it.
Honestly, I think politically for him, for Gerry, it might be
easier for him to do the decommissioning if it comes about with
me being there.
There's a perception in Northern Ireland, and
I've tried not to do this, but there's a perception that I've
tilted more toward him than Trimble.
In that case, it could be
CONFIDEN'l?IAL
�8
• COHFIDEH'FIAL.
an advantage and could make it a little easier, if it all goes
around this issue. )Xi
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me get on it, and I'll give you a report.
-*'t
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime-Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEHTIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAE=iH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 33
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE,· TIME
AND PLACE:
August 30, 1998, 2:29
The Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
with the Queen.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
Yes.
Well, good.
~
2:38 p.m. EDT
(U)
How are you?
I'm up at Balmoral
Lucky for you.
Is it still light?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
doing?
(U)
It is a beautiful evening.
How are you
The President:
I bet it is.
I'm doing fine, working.
I just
got off the phone with Kohl on Russia. How are we doing on
Ireland? -+er
Prim€ Minister.Blair: Many, many thanks indeed for speakin
with Gerr Adams. Where we are?
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what he told me.
~
COHFIDEH'fIAL
Reason: 1.5(b,-d)
. _ . _ ..~ ______ ---,.---::----",.'
Declassify On:! 8 / ~~. -j"';'>~
~~
:
,
'f,:;
~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ..
~-.:::~_:.. ~:~~'.
. __ ~ _~, ~_~.-'-...:.. ' . ~
i
~_l-!.<'._r.-,
�· CONFIDEN'fI1II:L
2
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know do you think we can get them to
meet next week, while I am there? )J2f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's possible you know.
Not impossible.
je(
The President:
It would be huge and help me enormously here
with what I am dealing with.
Prime Minister Blair:
You are here on Thursday?
The President:
They could obviously do it in Belfast, or they
could go to Omagh with us.
It would be profoundly symbolic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
C@JFIDEN'l'IAL
�3
COUFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
I'm not asking you to promise.
I had a tough
talk with Gerry Adams.
It was probably worth doing even though
he didn't say yes on five and six.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
-The President: When I see you, I really hope we have some time
to talk about Russia and Kosovo too. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that.
do is get him confirmed, and
The first thing we have to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is rea
frustrating; all the money t a wen In as gone back out
$7.5 billion.
I'll see what I can do over there and work like
hell to influence the Duma people. Keep your fingers crossed.
When I see you we'll get a chance to talk about it.
I can't
wait to see you. J...G1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, likewise.
See you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
~
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
cmfFI DEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IPtL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 34
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Robin Rickarad,
Matt Sibley, Joel Schrader, James Smith, Don
Bandler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
September 11, 1998, 4:33 p.m.-4:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
I'm fine.
(V)
I'm fine.
How are things?
(V)
The President:
anyway.
(V)
We're doing pretty good here.
That's my gut,
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw you on television; I thought you
were pretty good, actually.
(U)
The President:
This morning?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(V)
(U)
Yes, it was pretty good.
It's coming together.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right really.
(U)
we're thinking of you.
The President:
Thanks.
What's up?
Anyway,
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
Two things.
I wanted to update you on
the Northern Ireland situation.
~
CONFIDElf'PlkL
Reason:
1.5{b,d)
Declassify On:
9/2lL.!;l:8' ___f"~~,,--~<~~·-_c.---~-·L\
r·
~:'~T~NLmRA~Y PHOTOCOPY
J
~,?~..: ._~~~_~'-.:..,--~..;-.,...J. '<=';~~~_ .\,-.:...~.--:A_-.-:·<-·'- .'
�2
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Tell me where we are.
y1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In theory that is what they agreed to.
willing to do any kind of schedule? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are they
~
I
What is the main Sinn Fein argument against it?
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The IRA never disarmed and it can't look like
the Unionists forcing them to do so? yc)
]
Prime Minister Blair:!
The President:
Well, they made a deal, though.
+Gt
Prime Minister Blair: /
GONF! DEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
�IE.o.
3
COHFIDE1H' IAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The fact is there is a very
good feeling in Northern Ireland right now.
Your visit went
very well. -tel
The President:
It was wonderful.
-f€+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Everybody is so up. The
trip to the Irish Republic was unbelievable.
There were 50,000
in Limerick.
Bertie is in a strong position to weigh in with
Sinn Fein.
ter
=-oJ
Prime Minister Blair:
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
--~
The President:
Let me ask you something.
I've been thinkin
about all the possible permutations and angles.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I understand why the schedule is not enough.
Then he is giving them something concrete that he can't take
back and he is gettin something symbolic.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
COHFI DEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President:
Let me ask, I understand you announced that you
will leave your army in the barracks while your police do the
actual patrols. Are they putting any pressure on you to make a
symbolic withdrawal of British forces? fer
Prime Minister Blair:
1L-____~IE=.=O=.=13=5=26=,=s=ec=t=io=n=1=.4=(b=)=~=)~I______~
The President:
Would that matter to Gerry? Jim Steinberg
doesn't think you could work a deal with him.
I tried to
him to ex lain to me what the roblem was
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is a big hang-up and they are not ready to
cross the psychological divide.
I understand and sympathize
with them; I am kind of an expert in that.
But they did make a
deal.
I wonder, it seems to me the biggest barrier was they
have talked themselves into this position that is linguistically
accurate, but politically unrealistic. ~
The deal said they would get in the Executive branch when they
get the votes, and they would decommission in two years.
They
never disarmed, but here they would be disarmed to get something
they are legally entitled to anyway.
What if we could get the
schedule out and there was a symbolic decommissioning, for
something outside the agreement, so they would not look like
they were coerced by the Unionists? +er
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Do you want me to raise this with him in a whatif way? I won't tell him I talked to you about this. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
~~:,~.f'':'"':~~~~~-:'c-~ ~-~'--- "--~.~,
C~~T~~ LIBIU.RY PHOTOCOPY'
J
'';-'.:'_~ ,---~_:,-,::,._<-;;~-,:-",~::...~~",_;"--<-t.'";~""-_._::~..". r.~_
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
5
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\~--------------~
The President: Are there any other sort of permutations or
circumstances that might permit them to do it? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: When I talked to Bertie he thought he could take
those guys down that did the Omagh bombing. I thought it would
be sooner. I had the impression it was imminent when I left
Ireland. ~
LP_r_~_.m_e
__M
__
i_n_i_s_t_e_r Bl_a_i_r_:______________
____
/
The President:
------------------------~
Of course they do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President: An actual arrest, even if it only just one
person -- you've got 29 dead people there. It would be a real
coup for Trimble.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
argument you could make.
J&r
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
Do you want me to raise that with him?
yn
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll get on it.
(;tl
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
I agree. The chemistry is a lot better than
what I thought. We cOincidentally have a big Irish celebration
here in about 30 minutes. They are applauding George Mitchell.
I might nose around with some of the Sinn Fein supporters to see
what I can do to nudge them a bit. These Americans still have a
littl:e bit-of influence because they have money. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
The President:
schedule. Jc.ef
Let's explore this idea -- arrests -- plus a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I bet you anything, if you explain that the arms
thing is not a big deal because they have a stash, and they are
easily replaced.
Whereas, the arrest of people who murdered 29
folks in a country that is so small would be a tangible act of
good faith.
I think disbanding the Real IRA was an act of good
faith, but I am trying to work Trimble's politics around
Gerry's. +er
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree. From Trimble's point of view, he is
not asking for much. He is asking for something symbolic in
return for something tangible.
From Adams point of view, it is
not such a good deal since he gets a year and a half in return
for something he has a legal right to right now. Either you
have to get Trimble to change by getting a different good deal,
or get Adams to change. Jim Steinberg says we tried that latter
course, and he didn't seem very excited about it.
It might be
worth going back to Adams and Bertie to see if they can't figure
out how to identify who has done this. ~
Just because they disbanded, I don't think it is enough for
those 29 people, that beautiful teenaged girl who was blinded,
COUFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
7
and the other people. They need to arrest somebody anyway.
Unless whoever did this left the country, but Bertie didn't
think that was the case. Let us raise this with Sinn Fein, and
I will have Jim Steinberg nose around with three to four of the
most influential here today. -+eT
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Let me say a word about Russia.
is they have a government,
The
ood news
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I am glad
that you are hosting this G-7 meeting and Russia will be able to
be part of it.
It think it would be a good idea to talk to them
practically about the lessons learned from other countries with
financial problems.
I am
to call Yeltsin now that he has
Primakov in place.
The fundamental problem
was they
proper y Wl
putting in place the
building
that created a vacuum. All the oligarchs
and mafia are shipping money out of the country. They want to
come back with a solution that they can put old Humpty Dumpty
back together again and they can't do that. ~
On the other hand, it is equally true that there are
international dimensions here. We have to rethink the IMF deal.
It seems to me that we need to develop some sort of pro-growth
strategy for the rest of the world. You have 40 percent of the
world in recession now.
In the end, you and I can't keep our
growth going.
I just want you to do anything you can to walk
the Russians through this and maybe cut them a little slack on
some of these macro issues, but hey, you have to build a
skeleton before you can have the body of an economic power. You
might want to call Yeltsin after this meeting. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
~
The President: But, I think we just have to get their attention
on what they have to do, before it ever gets better there. We
need to look at it in the context of a larger settlement. We
have even considered paying for their space program for a year
so their scientists don't go build rockets for someone else.
The scientists on the board of the space program have not been
paid for six months.
It is unbelievable.
I know you have more
than you can say grace over, but to whatever extent you can tone
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
8
up that G-7 meeting and to call Yeltsin or Primakov when it is
over. %
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I am going to give a speech in New York on
Monday on the general outline of what we see. Deputy Finance
Ministers in the G-21 have been working for over a year. We
have the basis for some work. Maybe I can talk to you when you
get here on the 21 st • My instinct is that the G~7 should call
for them to at least present recommendations to us and to get
heads of state together and show some leg here. Bob Rubin
continually cautions me that we don't want to unrealistically
raise expectations if we don't know where we are going.
¢
The fundamental difficulty is that you can't get out of the fact
that these countries have to do certain things. On the one
hand, there is incredible fluidity in capital movements, while
on the other hand there is a pro-growth strategy.
If they are
not willing to have the infrastructure, all this pro-growth
strategy won't matter.
If we get them juiced up again, the
money will flow out and be in somebody's Swiss bank account.
It's a tough knot to untie.
The IMF tried to modify their
approach in Indonesia, but it doesn't necessarily work in the
context of massive, breathtakingly rapid capital flow.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've reviewed what the G-21 people are working
on. A lot of it is technical and arcane, but in aggregate it's
pretty good stuff.
It can make a big difference.
It will
remain arcane and complex and dense to the world as long as it
is operating at the level of deputy finance ministers. My
instinct is maybe we ought to talk next week before you corne to
New York and we do this conference, because maybe while we are
CONE'IDEN'HAL
�9
CONfIDEN'f'IAL
there we can make decisions and some scenario to elevate the
visibility of this and to get world leaders involved. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IIE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~1
...+-e-r
·The President:
It might help. Cardoso is cratering and is
facing reelection in October.
I am just sick about that.
I
think he will get reelected, but it will be tough.
Let me do
the Irish thing and you can chew on all of this.
I think you
should call Yeltsin after the meeting. Let's try to talk again
on this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
time.
(U)
Thanks again.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hillary and I had a wonderful
All the best.
(U)
(U)
Bye, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFIDEN'l'IAL
.. ,·r
�COHF'IDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with ~ritish Prime Minister Blair
SUBJECT:
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Mariana Papadimitriou, Doug
Bayley, Matt Sibley, Joe Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 6, 1998, 9:44 - 10:05 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hey Tony how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello Bill.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in China.
Are you having a good time?
(U)
Is it hot there?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was until we got here, but we brought
some British weather with us.
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Kosovo.
Yeltsin called me yesterday, as he called you, to say Milosevic
got the OSeE to come in and now everything is going to be all
right.
I think it would be a real mistake for us to take the
pressure off now. Kofi's report is going to be filed today and
it is a graphic account of Milosevic's continued defiance of the
UN and the International Community. »Cr
I believe we have to maintain momentum and keep building a
consensus for the NATO decision to authorize force.
Dick
Holbrooke is there and is still meeting either in Belgrade or
Pristina.
Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days,
COHFIDENTIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:i 10/QJ4,Q.~_.j,'_;';;~--'~"'~---·-~----:-~.,·
t::INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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but Milosevic hasn't withdrawn or agreed to measures that would
make the end of hostilities verifiable or durable.
(C)
I would like to find some way to get the Russians on
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We can't force Yeltsin
into a veto.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
We have got to tell Yeltsin, look, if you are
right and we are wrong then Milosevic will be in full
compliance.
If he lied to you one more time, then we are going
to do it. This is an issue that to me seems to be a real
mistake to let pressure up now.
U?(
- Let me mention one other thing.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
That may be necessary but
it is a terrible time for me to deal with it with this Congress
of mine. They are always willing to give more money to the
military and then do not want to do anything with it. There is
a really strong block in the Republican party that wants to do
that and I have worked to get them to continue to support SFOR
in Bosnia. And we really do have a readiness problem. ~
Keep in mind this is the same group that took eight months to
approve IMF funding.
If we have to do this publicly, it will be
a real problem for me.
I don't want to do anything to undermine
my ability or encourage them to try some eleventh hour measure
to stop these air strikes. They will be gone in a week.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand that Bill.
first point I am in complete agreement.
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'l'IM
On the
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
3
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I completely agree with that. I am just saying
injecting that now into the public debate would be a problem .
.Y:!
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: It also might create problems with some other
NATO allies and get them to vote against it and we don't want to
complicate our business with .NATO. ~
By the way, Gordon Brown did a hell of a job here yesterday.
met with the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers about
international finance issues. I went over and met with him.
was terrific, you would have been really proud of him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bloody bright, isn't he?
Yes, he is great.
He
He
(-C)
~
Prime Minister Blair: I will tell him today when I go to talk
to him. How are we going to go on this now Bill. ;e(
The President: I hope we can get support for the G7
G7 met after we talked last time to endorse the idea
the crisis from spreading to Latin America. We will
funding by the end of next week and can proceed with
emergency plan·. ..J,.e'(
plan. The
of keeping
have IMF
the
Gordon said what I have been saying all along. We have got to
modify the Bretton Woods convention and implement some sort of
bank regulatory system that has the effect of doing what bank
regulation does in each of our countries and the stock market
regulatory systems do, so that we can control the boom and bust
cmIFIDEN'FIAL
�CONFrDEN'I'IAL
4
cycles on an international scale. Bretton Woods dealt with how
to have sufficient money to deal with trade and services but
didn't anticipate independent financial forces, which leveraged
financial instruments, and that trading in money itself would
have an effect on the global economy. ~
Bretton Woods assumed 50 years ago that no matter what, the
issue would be to find enough money to facilitate trade and
investment -- not that money flows themselves would become a
greater force of nature in the global economy. We have got to
find a way to set up systems to replicate national systems that
prevent depressions by limiting boom and bust cycles. There are
two ways to do it.
You can do it outright or have some sort of
oversight. mechanism that requires countries to make those
. changes. .ke"1
r think that is where we are going, but we still have to decide.
r tried last night, but had a little wrinkle. I tried to get
this group of 22 -- I counted 25 around the table -- to
accelerate the reporting process. The working group of the
deputy finance ministers reports in December/January after which
we would have a meeting of world leaders. Aef
I think we can do one of two things.
If you and Prodi and I
want to have a meeting earlier than that they can accelerate the
reporting process, which we can meet and validate. Or the
alternative, based on this meeting, we could have a larger
meeting, or a G7 meeting, and endorse this central idea, that is
precisely I
I
1-)
There is another wrinkle. /
Europe is
The big three
doing quite well and the forecast is for growth.
countries in Europe are going to do well also. ~
I didn't want to confuse people and scare them about a worldwide
recession, but I wanted to say that Europe has a bigger stake in
Latin America than the United States does right now. We have
seen bigger credit strictures and a tightening of credit here
because of so many bad loans in the global economy.
Regulators
are cutting off good credit risks because of problems our banks
are having elsewhere.
~
COHFIDEN'l'IAD
�CmJFIDEN'fIA'b
5
I can understand it, but I did not place a lot of stock
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
But they did not disagree with the central idea that
was succinctly put in Gordon's comments, which is what we have
all been trying to say.
I think there is still a chance we can
do something more quickly if we want.
The big front line test
now is what happens to Brazil. Cardoso won the election but he
has a lot of people in the run-off elections, three weeks from
Sunday, or whenever.
They have less than $40 billion in cash
reserves now, and I don't think he can stall for three weeks
without saying what his reform proposal is.
If. Brazil goes
south we are all going to suck eggs big time.
~
-r
want to go give my speech today -- it is consistent with what
you and Gordon said -- and then see what the status of the group
is.
Then, we'll see if we should have the G7 or some other
group meeting where everybody gets together and endorses the
idea.
The developing countries were there and not one spoke
against it.
The Thais were there and they're doing quite well.
They seem to be in harness on interim measures and suffering
contractions because of it. ~
They need a dramatic increase in World Bank investment to build
a social safety net, but the problem is financial institutions
are running short of money, not just the IMF.
The World Bank is
worried about having so many bad investments out and that its
credit rating will go down. The longer we wait to get
consensus, the worse it will be. We can have consensus in the
long term.
I don't know enough yet, but my instinct is to move
sooner rather than later. But I need to let today pass to see
where we are and get back to you. You should ask the Chinese
where they stand.
They have been champs in not devaluing their
currency. They have taken some hits for it, but the benefits
outweigh the burden. Anyway, I wanted to say that's where we
are.
In 48 hours we will be in a place to decide whether to get
the leaders together sooner rather than later.
I am for it but
my Treasury department is against it. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think we will get any grief for not
having the Russians there? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
But they would probably go along?
rfl
Vl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree. That is why I want to go in there
today and be very aggressive.
If Europe and Japan will support
this and we have a united G7 front, we will be in pretty good
I
'hape.
I
I KO. 13526, ,octioo 1.4(d)
]
Prime Minister Blair:/
I
The President:
They might like it if we could put outside
pressure on them without appearing to.
That would be the best
of all possible worlds.
I need to go over now and give a talk.
I will be back to you within 48 hours to let you know where we
go from here.
How long are you going to be in China? kef
CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�CONtIDEN'PIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
J..ef
A few days here and then in Hong Kong.
The President:
Back on Kosovo, we will be in touch with the
French.
If the Contact Group meets Thursday we have to go
forward with the ACTORD no matter what the Russians say. We
will tell them we won't have to do this if your deal works.
This guy, all he understands is pressure and he lied before, and
pressure will increase the chances that the deal will work. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
couple of days.
(U)
The President:
I agree Bill, I'll talk to you in a
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
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�CON'f'rO~N'nAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Liz Rogers,
Robin Rickard, George Chastain, Jim Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 14, 1998, 2:38 - 2:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hey, Tony, how are you?
(UD)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine, how are you?
The President:
It's nice to hear your voice.
Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It's good to hear you, too.
Arafat on his way to you. ~
The President:
..
'"
I saw Mr.
How did you find him?
Prime Minister Blair:
deal.
(C)
§
(U)
He still thinks it is possible to do a
;::
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~T~h~e~=p=r=e=s=i=d~e=n=t~:__~I~t~h~ink
'.6'.~
~
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~
I
it is.
He wants it, I think.
In a way,
I What we have to do is keep them from
falling into these old habits. I keep telling them if we don't
make this deal now, we've got May 1999 staring us straight in
the face and I think it will be a disaster. It will be
impossible to avoid a bad outcome unless we get this interim
agreement now and get into final status talks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
.
Declassify On: i 10/1J~9~~.;,.;::'--~·-c------~~~···.
~~~~~c~~::~~:,~~~:~:~~:,J~
,."i
�2
COliFI DEN'F IAL
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
The President:
first.
Maybe.
I think he wants to see how it plays,
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
lS lS aggrava e
y the fact that their economic
situation is worse than when they signed on to peace. The
Israelis close borders at the drop of a hat and they never
concluded all these economic things, the roads and airport and
industrial park, they have been on the verge of doing for months
and months.
~
Somehow we have to convince them they have to resolve all that
crap.
There is a train wreck facing them in May 1999 unless we
somehow can give them some breathing room, some progress and
confidence in one another's work.
If I were in their position,
the one interest they have in cornmon is finding some way to live
together before they have this horrible train wreck in 1999.
Ul)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think it might be important, depending on what
each side asks for.
During the next four days I might need to
call you again a time or two. Where will you be? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be here and anything I can do to
be helpful I will, just give me a call anytime.
I will speak to
the Europeans or anything. ~
The President:
Adams and Trimble are both over here, you know.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: My deputy labor secretary participated in the
opening of the road show last week and I think it's going pretty
COHFIDEH'FIAL
�CONFIDElfl'L"tL
3
well.
I understand de Chastelain's group got the lead on the
decommissioning issue, but I heard you think it will have to
wait until next spring.
If there's anything I can do to help .
.)-e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I am going to speak to McGuinness
and Trimble in the next few days.
It's tricky stuff. Sinn Fein
is saying we will decommission, but not just yet.
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
At the moment, we're working on it.
If it
comes to It, an
think you need to speak to people, I will
just give you a call.
J.G-r
The President:
I will do anything you want.
I don't know how
you are going to solve it, they both seem so dug in.
If you can
figure out anything I can do, I will. ~
I just cannot thank you enough for the strength you showed on
Kosovo.
It was fascinating to watch that NAC meeting unfold,
compared to where we were three months ago.
They all acted as
if they were disappointed Milosevic caved.
I told my folks here
that it bore some of the similarities to Bosnia, where we worked
for two years to get everybody off the dime. But it happened a
lot quicker, in no small measure because we were in lockstep
from the get-go. )£1
Parenthetically, we have to do the same on this global financial
thing; maybe we can talk about it in the next few days. ~
It was amazing to see how that happened. Here is where our next
problem in Kosovo is.
I think right now we are in a position
where we passed the ACTORD -- this action order -- and are
sus endin it as we see if he complies.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
And as soon as
happens, he
start cheating, but they'll argue it's not enough.
~
We really need to carefully coordinate our positions to keep
maximum pressure on him so we don't have to take military
action. We don't want to look weak three months from now.
It
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COHFIDEHTL''xL
looks so good right now, just the right thing being done in the
right way. We really, really need to coordinate our positions;
I'm convinced we can avoid military action if it is always
hanging there.
But it would take 3-4 months to try to get
everybody where they were. And all the forces of the last 3
months will reassert themselves. Milosevic will cheat a little
here and there and undermine the integrity of this thing.
That
is my only sort of yellow caution light, but otherwise it's
terrific.
It's good to have some good news. -+et
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: We have to figure out a posture. Some guys will
say you can't keep granting 96-hour extensions, and then they
will say we ought to say, okay, let's go to one-week extensions,
two-week extensions. The point is, we don't want to let them
put us in a position where we have to do this allover again.
The minute we do that, he will start cheating.
(BT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one thing I want to raise on the
global economic stuff.
I've got a little bit to reportj-.___ _...,
I
think Gordon has done brilliant work on the Europeans.
GOHFIDEN'fI}'rL
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COHFIDEN'l'IAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
the seed issue I a ree. On an of these
finance problems,
E.O.13526, section 1.4 d
they could
have done this for a pittance of what they have to. We have two
different issues here. The longer we wait, given the amount of
leveraged money that is out there,.the greater chance of a more
serious collapse that will take more money to fix.
I do believe
we need to have a hardcore bright line to help Brazil and keep
Latin America from getting into this. The risks of our not
being successful are greater than when we helped Mexico. But
the risk will be minimized if simultaneously we have a
comprehensive short-term strategy, including these countries but
not limited to these countries.
~
At least have a framework agreement that in the long run wiil
sort of stabilize confidence and make people think this can be
made to work.
I believe the global version of what we're trying
to do in our respective countries is riding on this.
If this
comes apart at the seams, we'll have hell putting this back
together and putting in a coherent social component.
That is
what I believe. I think it is very, very serious. Much more
than what I say in my public remarks, because I have to keep
people jollied up here. ~
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�CGNFIDEN'PIAL
6
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
read this personally.
I would like to follow up on the
suggestion you made to me before. Let's assume pretty good
accord among G-7 treasury and central bank people.
There should
be some meeting of the G-7, and sooner rather than later to
realize some momentum here; even the Wall street crowd, who hategovernment interference. Every time .1 give a talk, the market
goes up a bit, and they're disappointed we're not doing more.
There is an openness to action here in the market community that
I think is important.
I don't want to meet if we don't have
an thin to say, but I think you ought to think about it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime-Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Let me read this.
I may call you
in a day or so. There's some urgency in timing.
If you look at
the amount of unregulated, leveraged cash out there and the fact
that people on their own are trying to reduce their exposure
within emerging markets and in the EU and U.S. already, we
already have a liquidity crisis that will affect our economies
in less than a year. But simultaneously the amount of risk is
so great that the two trends could run head on into each other
and cause an even bigger problem.
I hope Gordon will come
tomorrow, but if there is some problem at Treasury, let me look
into that.
I don't know about that. Let me have a little time
to look over this stuff, but I can't imagine not having him
here. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sure they will be happy to see him.
The President:
If you have gotten Tietmeyer and the French
central bank moved off where they were at the meeting of 25
countries (G-22) over here where Gordon spoke so well -- it
sounded like we'd read the same book just before speaking, we
don't want to give them a chance to change again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
COUFIDEN'FIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�-
7
GGHFI DEN'fIkL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes. Let me read this stuff and get back to
you, and over the next few days we may have to talk again on the
Middle East.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
it with him.
je1
I'll get Gordon and get him to go through
The President: Tell.you what. Let me call Rubin and let
everybody read it.
They need time to talk about it and they
need digestion time.
I've been talking to them and pushing them
. every- day; . I feel the same sense of urgency you do, and I will
be back in touch.
(..e')
Prime Minister Blair:
In the meantime, just get someone to let
Gordon or us know about -~
The President:
-- the timing.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I will.
Okay, that is great.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEnTIAL .
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFI DEN'l' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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SUBJECT:
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Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
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PARTICIPANTS:
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Prime Minister Blair
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DATE, TIME
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The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
-z'"
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Tony, how are you doing?
I am doing great.
00,",'"
(U)
(U)
Things are going well here.
Prime Minister Blair:
You seem to be routing your enemies and
we're all happy about that. Where are you? Are you in a car or
something? kel
The President:
I'm doing fine.
I am in a plane.
I wanted to
say one thing to you.
I really believe we've got to do
something about this financial situation. I liked what you
outlined -- your speech was good. G-7 finance ministers are
meeting here this weekend.
I think we need to come up with some
sort of emergency coordinated set of bilateral credit lines.
The Germans are against it, but the French are moving toward it.
Some central banks are reluctant. We'll need to then get the
cooperation from private lenders to stem the tide.
I'm very
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Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
convention this week so I just got that out of the way.
The President:
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CONFIDENTIAL
worried about it affecting Latin America, particularly Brazil.
European bankers have so much exposure on these hedge loans that
we have a real risk of a world-wide recession here.
I think
that it is very important we get these guys to reach some kind
of agreemen i:: •
(£'!
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement. We have got to·
act.
I don't think we have seen the worst of this thing by any
means.
J9f
The President: No, but if we move in quick we could keep it
from taking down Brazil.
I think it would be really important
if you could tell your folks that.
I am going to see them on
_ Monda-y and -do my best to bring them around, as well.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair: Certainly, I will speak to our folks and
I think they will, in principle, be in favor of concerted
action.
I have just read the outline of the comments ou made
earlier today,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Exactly.
i€T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree with you more.
I have not
mentioned the prospect of using our exchange rate stabilization
fund.
I wanted to get IMF funding through Congress, and the
Germans are not yet for it.
I keep thinking that if we work at
this, we can get a lot done, but I have to figure out a way to
get them into it. We got to do it, and the central bank is
notoriously independent.
Prime Minister Blair:
issues really.
I agree with you.
I think there are two
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDEN1'L\L
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Cot1FIlJEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with everything you said.
If you could
urge your people to be forward leaning. Maybe we could talk on
Monday before I talk to the IMF. The other thing I wanted to
mention was Kosovo. We have begun to prepare Congress and the
people for the possibility of air strikes. We wanted to ask
NATO to authorize operations next Wednesday.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I agree with that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I told Chirac I would talk to him on Tuesday
after the UN report is released. Our guys can lead this
economic thing, we can say we want a short-term solution and a
long-term structural solution that will help.
~
Prime Minister Blair: What do you think about a summit of some
sort at some stage?
(e)
The President:
I am in favor of it.
If we can get anything
like remote consensus, I think we should do it by the end of the
(C)
year and before the final report toward the end of October.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Like the G-8 summit or something.
Yep, maybe even the G-22.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
Well, I'm all for it.
;ef
If we've
Let's see how far we get on Monday.
The President:
(.Q1
got something to say. How are you doing on Ireland?
It will be helpful i f you can intervene
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm seeing de Chastelain, who is
some time in the near future.
CONFIJ3EM'l'IAL
�4
CONfIDENTIAL
the bloke in charge of decommissioning on Monday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I gather you made good progress as well on the Middle
Eas t .
).,Q1
The President:
Yes, I think so.
I would say we have a better
than 50-50 chance to get a deal, to get them into final status
talks. Well, take care.
~
Prim~
MiniSter Blair:
Take care.
(U)
The President:
That would be good.
We will speak again soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEloiT 1AL
All the best, Bill.
Goodbye man.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 38
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
Elizabeth Rogers and Robin Rickard
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 25, 1998,2:14 -2:42 p.m. EST
San Francisco, California
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations.
It was terrible.
(U)
+e!
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I was going home every morning at two or three.
The last go around dragged on for 36 hours, like the Irish
thing. But to be fair, the difference was you were integrating
both into one political system. Here we were dealing with two
diverging political systems.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEH'fL"tL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
De cl ass i f y On:':· 1 0/2 ~,O 8ioo?"""'~~~_O"-'-~--~~"'~,
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CONFIDEN'fIlltL
,.
When you were doing the Irish thing, you were actually in it
with them -- you had some leverage. All I can do is give them
money and my time. Here I just had to talk them through it and
wait it out.
It took 85 hours.
In the end, everybody pats me
on the back; but they have to take all the flak; Arafat took
some too. -t€+If it works, I think we have a chance to break the whole thing
open.
If this is faithfully implemented, this mra~k~e~s~t~h~e~______,
ultimate resolution of bilateral issues easier.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
e
Israe-lis know in the end they have to have an agreement.
good, but we still have along way to go. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I know exactly how you feel.
I feel
~
The President:
It is a lot like the Irish thing, there are a
lot of similarities. But you are in it with them. You have
more moral authority.
You have to make a decision to release
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I I t is an
prisoners.
I don't. I
interesting thing.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I was absolutely fascinated watching this
on the news.
It was a real roller coaster, wasn't it? ~
The President:
It was amazing. We had the agreement, then it
got undone. We had a deal. You see there were two prisoners.
Most can't understand, but ou know what symbolic significance
prisoners have in Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFIDEN'fIAL
I can imagine.
~
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
The beautiful thing about it was Hussein, who
looks l.ike he is at death's door. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
He is an amazing man.
~
The President: Hussein kept telling them to think about their
children.
It was a thing of beauty.
I would fly him down and
he would wait in his house for 30 to 40 minutes for them to come
down. Then he would lecture them in a fatherly way.
It was
bizarre. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought this would be an extraordinary
To-have done it is a tremendous achievement. Even
- making all allowances, it wouldn't have happened unless you had
been there and done it yourself. ~
thin~.
The President: There was no way.
For you it is the same. But
there is a limit to how many times you can do this.
I had to
just get there and listen to them for hours and hours. ~
Prime Minister Blair: We end up being part negotiator, part
therapist, and part leader.
~
I
The President:
Someday we should write a book together about
these two things, about our role as shrinks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I could tell when I saw the signing
ceremony.
I could just tell what must have been going on -- the
nightmares to not let it disintegrate. You see they needed a
figure there.
This is what you will have done. You will have
brought them to see in the end that both of them had to do the
deal. -t€-)The President:
I don't have any question that I did the right
thing, but it was tough for them.
I tell
is one
thing I would like you tOrrd=o~.~~I~w~i~s~h~~o~u~~~~~~~o~f~f~a~____,
letter to both of them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~~==~====~------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am supposed to phone him, but I will
write him a letter.
I will definitely do that. Aef
The President: Call him, but if you write a letter, it can be
released.
I know we need to talk about finances and Kosovo a
bit, but, the other thin;
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CQNn DENT IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Mi ni s t e r BI air: / r:::-::o--:-:-::-:--:----:--:-:-:::-:-~
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
f
~~~~__~~__~--:---:-__~~~~~~~________~__~~~I
Okay,
Bill, I will certainly do that. And once again, well done. It
was a real personal triumph. ~
. The Presiderit:
Thank you.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We had Arafat out to the EU get together
-- this informal European summit we just had. He told us a bit
about it. I will try to gear up the other Europeans to do the
same.
The President: Okay, let's talk about Kosovo briefly and then
go back to finances. What is your sense of where we are on
Kosovo? )Z1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I got it. Last night Wes Clark literally stayed
up all night working on him. Milosevic agreed to a specific set
of things that most reasonable people would conclude if he did
between now and the day of the ACTORD, the 27 th , he would be in
compliance. The one thing that is most important is that
nothing we and the French say between now and then should look
like anything other than that we are prepared to put the planes
in the air. We are on the same wavelength. {et
I think that he will do enough to comply for us all to agree
that he's done what he has to do. In the last several days, he
has done a lot of things to comply but also some backsliding.
We just have to hang in there. -+etcmlFIDKNTIAL
�CONFIDEH'FL7I,L
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
5
I agree absolutel.
We are at one with
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That is good enough right now. I don't want to
give him mixed messages. Based on his meeting last night with
Wes, he will stick on compliance enough that we will not have to
use violence, but only if he thinks we are prepared to do it.
t,.ef -
Prime Minister Blair:
We are absolutely agreed on that.
+e1
The President: On the financial issues, I have a couple of
things. I got your letters last week and Bob talked to Gordon
Brown. There is a lot of good stuff in there. I would like to
propose that we try to put this in context of the heads of state
of the G-7 statement. ~
I would like to give you my view of this and let you respond.
First of all, I think we should be looking for -- without
raining on what Gordon has done so far -- I think we should be
looking for a G-7 statement from the leaders themselves
addressing long term reforms and the short term crisis as well
as the banking legislation in Japan and what we did with the IMF
here. ~
What I would hope we could do, because I think Rubin has a good
sense of how the markets will react, is ideally to get a
statement out next week, with or without a conference call with
our G-7 colleagues. It's your call as G-7 leader what you would
like. Then we would have a statement and it would have the
existing consensus on the promise for reform, on a detailed
agenda and procedure for achieving consensus. JR1
It would be good if we can get others to agree on this and on a
financial architecture. And I would also like to see, and Bob
thinks this is really important, an agreement on the proposal
for precautionary financing facility. In addition, we could
then or later also endorse the package for Brazil that the
finance ministers are working on. We know the shape it will be
in and who will pony up the money. ;e1
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'VlrL
6
It is okay for the finance ministers to announce it, but we need
to ratify it in the context of our statement next week -- or
when w~ get it done.
If Gordon and Bob Rubin could work to
build consensus around these elements, we could then have two
complementary statements.
First, a leaders' statement
describing key elements with consensus on long term reform,
endorsing the precautionary financing facility and also
endorsing the Brazilian thing.
Then the finance ministers and
central bank governors could lay it all out in greater detail.
I think if you have the finance ministers do something without
the leaders at this time, it doesn't break through with the
necessary force.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One thing I can't figure out how to do, is to
find a device that all of us can live with directly or
indirectly to put limits on the degree of speculation while
leaving markets open to trade, investment, and even appropriate
hedging against currency reevaluation up or down. We can't have
over a trillion dollars a day changing hands without some
regulatory limits. We car.'t afford to have hundreds of millions
of dollars moving on a 90 percent leverage where they only have
to put up 10 percent. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We need prudent rules.
~
The President:
You just can't have 90 percent leverage -- the
compounding is devastating. You also have to have some way to
buy the private sector into this to stop hemorrhaging outflows
from these countries.
Some don't feel this way, but these
capital credit controls for the short term can work -- just like
if the market drops more than 10 percent in a day, we can
suspend trading. But they don't work over the long or medium
COl?lFIDEH'fIAL
�7
COHFI DEN'l? IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
term. Malaysia
cas h res e rve s. r---""--O.";",;""==,,;:,,::,,,=-==--,-,-='--..C::,=::,,::,,--=,,:::,,:::,,:::,,:::,:::,,,:=-=::::.r.-=.:=::..:::...--.:::.:.;
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. These ~re other things we need
to look at.
If we do a leaders' statement and finance
ministers' statement, it obviates the need for a summit now.
.JK}
The President:
One thing
particularly if there are
that our absolute outside
meeting, leaving open the
or Ja-nuary _or if we think
we should leave in reserve,
adverse reactions in the market, is
deadline should be the next G-7
possibility of a meeting in December
we have something else to say. j£'(
But let me say, this is more about your European political
situation than mine.
Two things: number one, it is important
to have the leaders' statement and let the finance ministers
fill in the blanks because you have a new leader in Germany
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
~
And we have a new leader in Italy
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
~
The President:
It will empower them and makes them members of
the club. I think it is very good politics. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is why I am anxious to do it.
s otted it absolutel .
You
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Alright.
Have you talked to Prodi?
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�COtilfIElEHlIAL
8
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he is.
You probably don't
know D'Alema, do you?
The President:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
:J
L-____________________- - - - The President:
He did a good job.
got a chance to call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm just sick.
I haven't
He would like that.
The President:
There are center left governments in every
country in Europe now.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is interesting with its possibilities,
but it also poses problems.
(e)
The President: Now that we have the responsibilities we have to
bear the burdens of the consequences. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The summit was quite interesting -- the
(Q')
The President:
I'll have Rubin follow up with Gordon Brown. We
may want to do a conference call next week. We can put out our
general statement on architecture of the precautionary financing
facility and ratify it when it is done.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be great.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
us greater credibility.
)£1
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
Absolutely.
~
i t will give
�9
_ COMf'IDEliffTAL
,'
The President;
We also need to show we are serious on Brazil.
!z')
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill.
(U)
again congratulations.
The President:
Okay, goodbye.
All the very best'and once
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�COHFIDEN'PIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 3, 1998, 3:29 - 3:37 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Fine, how are you doing? It's election day, so
I am just sitting around. Essentially, the elections are going
well.
These are good times, but the Republicans are in the
majority and have more money than we do. Not since 1922 has the
president's party gained seats, but we are doing well and the
exit polls look good.
They have outspent us, but we essentially
have a good message going.
(U)
I understand that you have been briefed on Bill Cohen's message
on Iraq.
I really appreciate all that you have said publicly,
but I still think that we have to take decisive action this time
to respond to Saddam's challenge. It is clear to me that Saddam
really wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without
giving up his weapons of mass destruction and missile program.
The Vice President talked to Crown Prince Abdallah today in
Saud'i Arabia, and he promised the support that we need. Bill is
discussing the details with him tonight in Riyadh.
~
We are working on a resolution for the Council, and I hope that
it can be finished in a couple of days. But it seems to me that
we need to be in a position to act soon, rather than drag it
out. We need to be in touch with Chirac.
I still have
questions about what they would say about the use of force.
The
COHFI DENT IA1
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1/5(b,d)
... '
Declassify On: _. 1l/0Y~-GB~,J'7C:'';;':''-~-'O-~~"-~'-~--'-~""'\.
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�2
COPlFIDENTIAl
French have been great in their public comments -- they have
been tough on Iraq -- but anything that you can do to keep
Chirac .on board.
I will call him tomorrow. -tetPrime Minister Blair:
The President:
Maybe I should call him.
I think you should.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I actually made my comments in a press
conference with Schroeder yesterday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
next day to see where we stand.
I will talk to Chirac in the
~
The President: As far as the Russians are concerned, they seem
pretty angry, too. jQ(
Prime Minister Blair:
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
The President:
I agree with you. Kofi seems to be keeping his
distance since Saddam shafted him. What do you think about
sooner rather than later?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
COIU'I15EWf IAL
�3
'CONTI DEN'!' TAt
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
How soon were you thinking of, Bill?
The President:
I don't know. I was thinking of over the next
several days.
It will take time to set things up and to develop
a case against him.
I've got to know who is dancing with us and
who is not.
I just wanted to check your temperature on it and
ask you to call Chirac. On the details, we need to be in very
close touch and work together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed for us tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
(U)
The President:
Thanks.
All right.
Goodbye.
All the very best to you,
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 20l3-090, document no. 40
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
NOTE -TAKERS:
Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David
Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 11, 1998 -- 1:00 p.m. - 1:15 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
I am at the EU summit in Vienna.
(U)
The President:
Is it cold in Vienna?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It is absolutely freezing.
cold, but a beautiful city.
(U)
Amazingly
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Iraq and
Ireland before I go to the Middle East this weekend. On
November 15, we said we would hold off on any strike while we
test Saddam's promise to cooperate with UNSCOM. So far, the
results have been mixed. There has been a lot of monitoring,
which is easy for the Iraqis to accept. But, UNSCOM was blocked
at Ba'ath party headquarters this week. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
_______________________
___
�2
~he
President: And they've received only 1 of 10 documents they
asked for, and Iraq is making inspections harder than they have
to be.
I can't tell if they are trying to get some concession
on sanctions review, or if they think we can't do anything at
this time of year.
If Iraq blocks another inspection this
weekend and if Butler finds that they are not cooperating as
they are required to do under the October 30 Security Council
letter -- if he actually says that -- I am inclined to think
that we should take the action that we suspended in November.
But, if he isn't significantly undercutting UNSCOM's ability to
do its job and Butler says that, I think he will simply have
slipped the disarmament noose forever. Now, we have a very
narrow window to operate with because of Ramadan and my going to
Israel this weekend. We will need to talk, and I will have to
find you wherever you are.
If the inspections are not blocked,
then we have to figure out how to handle the comprehensive
review issue.
Do we delay it or go forward? If we delay it,
there will almost certainly be a crisis, and out of respect for
their faith, we can't hit them during Ramadan. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We don't have much, I don't think.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
No.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
It's
The President: We think we can get them out in 24 hours.
a much quicker turn-around. This may be part of what he is
miscalculating. He may think he will have more notice than he
would.
yt'll
/
TQf
.sECRE'f
�3
Prime Minister Blair: Right. What happens if we start to take
action and Shen Ramadan starts, as it were? Ramadan starts next
Friday?
(j'1)
The President:
If we start on Wednesday, we have enough time.
They assure me we do.
(jl) .
Prime Minister Blair:
Ramadan?
ifj)
The President:
We can do it.
(l~s,
Then, we can go in and get out by
we have four days.
That's plenty of time.
~)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So, Butler is going to try to get more access
tomorrow? ..k8'f
The President:
says. ~
He has two more days, and then say whatever he
Prime Minister Blair:
say? -+&r
Right.
Do we know what he is going to
The President:
No, we don't. My gut is that he most likely is
going to say that he got some cooperation, but not full.
This
will make us think really hard on whether we can in good
conscience vote for this comprehensive review, and if we don't,
he will provoke a crisis over that.
It seems to me that it is
pretty substantial that he didn't let them go into Ba'ath party
headq~arters.
Anyway, you will have to talk to your folks, and
we may have to talk again in a few days when I am in the
Mideast. -+&JPrime Minister Blair:
Okay.
~
The President: Anyway, the other thing I wanted to tell you was
that I talked to Trimble and Adams on Tuesday.
I missed Hume
because he had to leave for Oslo.
I made it clear privately and
publicly in a speech that decommissioning is essential,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
What do you think is happening?
J.Z!
�4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I did all I could.
can do, just let me know. ~
If there is anything else I
Prime Minister Blair:
There may be a time to speak to Adams
again, but, for now, it is for us to sort out.
~
The President:
Okay, I agree with that.
I just wanted to
mention very briefly that I am going to make a real push to
resolve the Cyprus issue next year. But, before that, we have
to avert this missile problem next month.
I hope when you see
Clerides on Saturday that you persuade him to stop delivery to
Cyprus.
It would be terrible.
I hope you will do what you can.
You really tried to get the ED to soften its stance on Turkey.
I don't know if the coming of Schroeder helps at all. Maybe,
you can et a little better Ian ua e in our statement in
Vienna.
I think this missile deal
rea ly bothers me because of the Russian connection, and I see
so much in Russia going south on us.
Their space scientists
haven't received a check in eight months, and they could be
making' a fortune on missile launches from us.
I
~ 3ECRE'I'
/'
I
�5
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you could make headway,
Prime Minister Blair:
tomorrow.
Oka, Bill.
I would appreciate it.
I will speak to Clerides
The President: After the first of the year, after I get all
this crap behind me, I would like to talk to you about this.
?-f
Prime Minister Blair:
I'd like to talk to you about a bunch of
things because there is a lot going on here in Europe.
yei
The President:
How is Schroeder working out?
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
~----------------The President:
I had impressions watching his campaigning that
they adopted rhetoric similar to ours, but they didn't think it
through. You had a program to implement and so did I, and
that's a big difference. ~
prime Minister Blair:
Actually, I like him very much.
The president:
I do, too. The reason I mentioned this is
because I had a good talk with him on Turkey.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now,
ere are other prob
Turkey, such
as human rights. Anyway, you might nose around Vienna and see
if you can send him help. +eT
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure, I
opportunity at dinner tonight.
The President:
There rna
be an
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Tp('eECRE'P
/
�TOSE,CRET
'7-
6
T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: As Christians, we are supposed to help whether
people appreciate it or not and it's the season for it. See you
soon.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
All the best.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
Bye.
See you soon.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
/
~SECRE!
(U)
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 21, 1999, 2:26-2:53 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
Kosovo.
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
'-" >9-J~"-'''''''--"~-=~-~-'--''-''''~'--':''>~~' ,
Declassify on:! 1 /~'
l'
'f i .." ,- 'i~()NJJB~RYPHo;rocOPY' '1
I
-
.~.:~::::~::::":=~~=-_ ~;;;:";'',!'~-=:;' _.,'~
--.k :
~:~L-:~_-.. __..L~..-,..:~.-:-'
�cmrn DEHT IP.L
2
be determined not to let him undermine the KVM and work over
Walker. I don't want to be slow or indecisive. I will try to
get Congress to go along with me and not stop it.
(R:')
Domestic politics aside, my problem about ground forces is that
if we send them in without some type of agreement beforehand -it doesn't have to be as detailed as Dayton --
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I really think we have to do somet ing, but I know
if we do military action without a political plan we will have a
problem. ...(.GtPrime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I agree with that. On the other hand, this is
likely to be one of ·!:JieSe things where we can't see completely
to the end.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
eave 0 eep
working on it. We are in a much different situation than we
were legally and politically in Bosnia because the world has
said these people deserve autonomy but not independence. I
don't want to get into a pickle, but now that 45 people have
been slaughtered and Milosevic is trying to throw the KVM out,
we don't have any choice but to do something.
~
CONPIDEN''fIAL
�· COHFI DElff' IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
One thing is to go to them and say, "Look, if
you want us to do any more you have to help, too.
They
probably have as many violations of cease-fires as Milosevic,
though his are more egregious.
"For a long-term resolution you
have to come to the table too, you can't have it both ways, and
you never take any responsibility.
J,K1
U
/I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's important we do that.
~
They may ignore it but we have to try.
Prime Minister Blair:
we may get somewhere.
~
If we do that in a really concerted way,
I think it very important we do that,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That makes a lot more sense.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister
Blair·~~s.
(U)
The President:
It is a very difficult problem and I don't
pretend to have all the answers. We have to be careful not to
be weak and move decisively with NATO now, knowing it won't
solve the problem without a political resolution.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
to sell
COMn OEM! IAL
ln an lmposslble posltlon.
I may not be able
time with Congress, but I certainly can't do
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
it unless there is an appropriate environment.
I think we
r - -.....
we have to keep working and go full speed ahead with NATO
E.O. 13526 section 1.4 d
Prime Mihister Blair:
The President:
I think that is exactly right.
I agree with that.
That is good.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_ _-------------~
The President:
I agree.
That is what we need to do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
GONFIDEH'f'IM.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch on that.
Can I do anything?
Can I help at all?
(U)
�5
• C3HFI DEN':' L,\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I'm really worried. Gerry Adams was here not
long ago, and I had a firm talk with him. I am really getting
kind of frustrated by them not doing anything. yel
.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You just let me know.
have not hit a lick of this.
ye)
I am concerned that they
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
),Q1
Yes, it does.
I don't know how .. just bizarre.
LP r_i_ffi_e__
__
M_i_n_l_.s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_.r : ____________________________________==:::>
__
I
r::IE-.O-.-c-':-35::":2-::-6,-s-ec-ti=-o-n-1.-4(-b:-)(--'d)I
1
CONFIDENTIAL
�, CONFIDEHTL'I:L
The President:
6
All right.
What else? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Let me tell you what we're going on and what the
lay of the land is. We tried to negotiate to get a solution to
the EU restrictions in '92.
I would still like to do it. The
problem now for me is, I don't have any flexibility for
delaying.
Congress was going to impose them by statute, and
that-was trouble that I headed off. But the only way I could do
it was by sending them a letter that said I would do it, and
basically there is a little time left.
February 1 plus 10 days,
then there is probably another week after that before customs
could enforce it.
If there is any way you think your guys have
flexibility and work out a solution I would like to do it, but
one operation here lost nearly a billion dollars since this all
happened.
The law is pretty clear.
I don't want to do anything
to cause you problems.
In principle, I don't want Congress
legislating in the trade area. We had to send a letter that we
would do it, and now time has run out. So if there is anything
we can do, I will do it.
I don't want to cause you any trouble
but we're sort of stuck on it. Jer
Pr ime Mini ster Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I know it does.
I've been fooling with it a
long time and also some people who are pushing it have enormous
influence in Congress and I know them well.
We sort of delayed
this for years and if there is any way we can resolve it, it
would be a good thing.
yef
Let me ask you another thing.
another year in office,
Menem was here and he said he has
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He has a great economic policy. We're trying to stave off the
financial crisis from reaching Latin America, and Brazil is
shaky" He asked i f you might be able to do something on it.
The thing he mentioned the most was travel.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIfJ,
I~.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
(C)
�7
.C ON F I DEIfy I f.L
The President: It's something you might think about.
He would
like to work out some accommodation.
The thing he mentioned
three different times was travel restrictions. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
He was here last week.L-~~~--~~==~~~~==~====~----------~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There was a war, which they lost, and he understands that.
But
there are Argentines with relatives there, or relatives buried
there, and if they could get some across, to get access to do
things.
Whatever happens, if you could look into it, without
raising the fundamental questions from the war, it would be
positive for you and him.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
speak soon. ~
Okay.
Okay.
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
The President:
I will look at that.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
..- :;
CONE'IDElfrIAL
Bill, we.' 11
�cm;rFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 42
DECLASSIFICATION DATE; October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
David Higgins, Matthew Sibley, Elizabeth
Rodgers, Robin Rickard, Michael Manning,
Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
time.
(U)
February 4, 1999, 2:13-2:30 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Nice to hear your voice.
Al had a wonderful
Prime Minister Blair:
It was great. He went down well. He was
fantastic with all the New Deal programs. He met with all those
business people.
The unemployment program was really
impressive.
I thought it was a good visit and he was fantastic
on it.
(U)
The President:
He also liked when he went into Prescott's
office and the only decoration was a bowl of bananas.
I heard
(U)
all about it. He was very happy.
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope we get all that sorted out.
(U)
The President: My staff won't let me talk to you unless I have
a banana at hand.
I'm sitting here with a banana; it's a big,
ugly, brownish one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
about Kosovo.
~
COHFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Now Bill, I thought we should have a word
�2
CONFIDEH'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
Let me tell you, the Prime Ministers of
both Macedonia and Albania were here today and they make .us look
like old men.
They are 31 and 33 years old.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I think Robin and Madeleine did a reall~
good job and we got a plan.
The parties are coming on Saturday
and the KLA are involved, as well.
That is all good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree.
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
First of all, I agree with everything you say
about maintaining pressure on Belgrade and the Kosovars on the
interim settlement.
I'm encouraged by Saturday's talks.
There
is no other way it works over the long run unless we can get a
peace agreement and troops on the ground. -tc+-
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is a hard sell in Congress. They still lecture me on Bosnia
and how we didn't pay for it in advance.
I tell them Bosnia is
a great success story and they ought to be proud of it and keep
it going, and not let it be wiped out.
I gather there is a
general feeling that a lot of European countries are willing to
make troop contributions. That will help me to get Congress to
support participation. You know I always want to be part of
these things.
~
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFI DENT IA L
I just gave a speech today.
I basically said we were
considering our participation and talking to Congress about it.
I will make the strongest case I can, but our system is that
they have to come up with money for it. The more European
countries that are willing to participate and the greater
extent, the better luck I will have with the Republican
Congress. .J.I21
Ironically, all the business with me might help us get something
done here.
I think the announcement of substantial British
participation, which I gather is your decision, will help us a
lot.
I want to help and I made my first big public pitch today.
We will work with Congress and stay in close touch. Our
military people are in contact and are simultaneously designing
this concerning who contributes what.
I will do the best that I
can.
I wish I could give you a number now, but I don't know
what level yet.
I am working it and I'll do the best I can .
..k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, Bill, that is great.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Great. Let me say, there's one other thing that
would help me.
If you put out that we talked, say that we have
this under active consideration. That is what I just said
publicly.
If you could not say that I have made a definite
decision. Because the Congress is Republican, at every public
hearing we have, they start moping and saying that I expect them
to fall in line afterward because they never refuse to support
the troops.
If you could say I haven't made a decision, that
would give me another day to massage the congressional psyche
and break it loose here. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
Don't worry, that is absolutely fine.
That is very good indeed. Thanks, as ever.
~
The President:
Well, you are doing great.
press in the New York Times.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFI DEH'l? IAb
Well,
You even got good
it cost a lot of money.
(U)
�4
The President:
You got good press in the New York Times and I
got a good editorial in the Guardian.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Guardian. ·(U)
Yes, you got an editorial in the
The Pres iden t : They said I was more 1 iberal than you.
know if that is good or bad.
(U)
I don't··
Prime Minister Blair: Well, it's good for you. Your state of
the Union, as I suspected, had a big impact around Europe.
I
was in Vienna last week with center-left leaders.
It made a big
impact there.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We need to think about our next steps.
thought that NYU conference was good.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
They (the Center-left leaders) are
absolutely desperate for it. They now buy entirely the argument
that we can learn from America. The State of the Union did
help. The leader of the United states was talking about
building a cohesive, peaceful society and the rest of it.
It
was language they can understand.
JR7
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we certainly should do some more.
They are desperate. ~
The President: One thing I think you should have your guys
thinking about. What is our response to tough challenges?
Like, is there a third way response to financial crises? How do
we stop the reversal of trade liberalization and take it up
again? With all these troubles in Asia, the temptations to
close down the movement for trade liberalization will be great.
-i-et"
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is absolutel
to be a big part of our discussions.
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEH'FL"rL
. ~-;~--.ft~F'c'=~~c~~~-"'~!
'~~INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
. ~~~_:~~~.-..::_ ;~"~~.!~~,",,-_';_:::::~~~J...."""
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right.
It has
�5
CONFIDEHT L,\L
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The president:
I agree with that.
I think when we do the next
G-8 meeting we really ought to give some thought to setting up
our trade position and also think about what wrinkles need to be
in the finance system position as well. We will have a lot to
talk about in advance, but the G-8 will give you a forum and me
a forum and our crowd a forum to elevate some of these issues.
J..&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree completely.
vtI
The President: We will be in constant touch the next few days
to wrap it up and nail down what to do.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair: King Hussein.
I'm really sorry. Je1
What a terrible thing.
The President:
Yes, he just left here. He is going home on
life support. You know he did his best, but I will be surprised
if he pulls out of this. -+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I just saw him a couple of days ago and
thought he was looking better.
(e)
The President: He had a severe relapse. Noor brought him over
here.
I just think that this is the way these conditions are.
They overwhelm your system and you have nothing left.
Y1
Prime Minister Blair:
other thing.
CONFI DEN'±' lAL
It's a shame for the guy.
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
(,,~~?-ffi;~~i""~-,-,..·=~p~,-·-..-c;""1
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' . t
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.
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,;
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Bill, just one
�.IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
6
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: Any time, day ar night.
It is my awn private
passian . . I have been warried far yau. To. the peaple an the
autside, it seems idiatic that we wauld allaw these elements to.
disrupt progress. You are where you are and whatever I can do
to. disladge it, let me know.
If you have something specific for
me to come at them with, let me know that, too. -tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
1
Is Bertie going to be all right?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I hope so.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need him.
(C)
Really, we do need him.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
matters. -+&lThe President:
Let us keep in touch on Kosovo and other
All right, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll see you soon.
All the best.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COUFIDEN'l'IAL
,-
(U)
(U)
�CONFI DEN'P VeL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony Blair
Of the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
British Prime Minister Blair
Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, David Higgins,
Robin Richard, Joel Schrader, James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 19, 1999, 10:59 a.m. - 11:24 a.m. EST
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Kosovo
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Chlrac lS with you today?
The President: He is here and I will meet with him in a few
~m~iEn~U!t~e~s~.~==~--~~~~~~======~~~~--~--~--~----~-----\
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
_
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let's make sure we are on the same
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:i
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_.
-.
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�CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
2
I
Prime Minister Blair:
'I
The President: Well, I agree with that.
The trick is to give
him some chance to come around and not seem lik
unlimitedly.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
agree with that.
you?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DEN'!' lAL
--,
€,~fi~'~~~;(,
'r~: ,!~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY'
f
t-;.=...~~~~~~.::~:...." ..~--:_._.-.~,: -'-''':'.h._ L':'~~;:'_"" -~-:-o- r;~r,·.,:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�· CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
The President:
I agree with that. That is good.
I think we are
doing all right on getting the enabling force together.
I don't
know if Milosevic is playing brinkmanship or not. He seems to
believe he loses Serbia if he lets NATO in there. ke1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
]
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - -
The President: Let me ask you a couple of questions. What is
your sense on KVM? I know the EU is interested in a n w
structure,
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
accomplished by tFh~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----,
implementation.
been so forthcoming, and I
want to screw it up. je)
Prime Mi nister Blaic
I
)
IL--_ _ _ ______
The President:
That's right.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is there anything else?
(U)
The President: No, I don't think so. What about Northern
Ireland? Jim Steinberg had a good meeting with Ambassador
Christopher Meyer yesterday on the outlook for the next two
months. We are working on some ideas to complement your strategy
for a push by the first anniversary of the Good FridayAgree~ent.
I am ready to do my part around st. Patrick's day here and look
forward to seeing Mo Mowlam. You have made a lot of progress and
seem to have gotten it back on track. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CO~jFI DENT' 1AL
�· COh'PIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm with you.
have no choice.
~
It could boomerang on us but we
Prime MinioterBlair:
- I . - - I_
The President:
_
)
_
I agree.
_
_
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Obviously you and I should speak before St. Patrick's day.
The President:
I think that's right.
yt)
Prime Minister Blair: So there it is, I think.
keep in close touch on things. I
CGNF I DEN'3?IAL
~)
So Bill, let's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�· conFIDENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The P:r:e,sident:
Six months o:r: so ago
when I spoke to you, I was in a big flght with my T:r:easu:r:y guys'
about the need to have leade:r:s get togethe:r: on it and cha:r:t a
cou:r:se whe:r:e we change the o:r:ientation of the IMF a little bit
and get into the necessity fo:r: inte:r:national standa:r:ds fo:r:
banking. We :r:eally a:r:e moving in steps, in increments towa:r:ds a
B:r:etton Woods II arrangement. I think we realized we :r:ushed into
getting money into them without them having the internal
protection'they needed. But a lot of T:r:easu:r:y folks treat this
like Einstein looking for the theory of relativity or biologists
looking for the cure for cancer: when they find it they will
tell us. I felt our Treasury kept resisting a big meeting six
months ago because markets we:r:e so shaky that if we met and did
not come up with an answer it would foster instability. They
don't feel that way anymore.
(Q1
We have to find a wa
thing kicked off.
around the G-7 or otherwise try to get this
We do need some
forum in which leaders can clearly articulate where we are, what
we have done, and where we are going.
o 0 peop e are upse
the composltion of
the commlt ee of the 25 nations (G-22) meeting because they are
not a sanctioned IMF type group. Maybe the G-7 cuts a lot of
people out of the loop and a lot of those nations think Europe is
over-represented. I am not hung up on that myself but, we do
need to find a way to have higher visibility to let the world
know we are working toward a more stable position. We ou ht to
tr to resolve this when the G-7 meets in Germany.
P:r:ime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFI moNT L",L
.§
~
~
'"
~
~
......
�CONFIDEHl'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
say?
yt)
Yes,
I like that.
What do you think Chirac will
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I got
track, but we need to
you back after I talk
right frame of mind.
).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
it.
I'm with you.
I think we are on same
figure out how to keep going.
I may call
to him, but I will try to get him in the
I
~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~/
The President:
I am worried about Russia as well.
have spent some quite intense discussion time on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Russians have no tax
system.
I don't know what to do about all that either, but we
should talk about it.
Its almost like a psychological problem,
in part, as well as the obvious political problem. We may need
to put a little more money on the table for them to do that.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
i You and I
can talk about it later~.----------------------------~ ~=-~~--~----~~
IE.O. 13526, section
The President: All right, I'll follow up.
with Jacques right now.
+e1
--End of Conversation--
CONFI D£NTI}U
I'm going to meet
1.4(b)(d)i
�COpFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bayley,
Frank Jarosinski, Matthew Sibley, Roger
Merletti, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 4, 1999, 4:40 - 5:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, how are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm fine, I guess.
I just got a bunch of stuff
going on here, but everything is all right. How are you doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am fine.
you about this damn thing.
I'm really sorry to bother
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
When is the election, May 6?
Prime Minister Blair:
Jef
Yes, May 6.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what.
I have to be a little
careful about how I say this. Most of our people think that the
WTO panel may approve a smaller aggregate amount.
If they
will try to do what I can to be helpful.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
i
�CONFIDENT 13\L
2
we do this, it will presumably be well in advance of the
election. Anything you can do through Leon to get the WTO panel
to make their decision would be very helpful.
The only way we
can get nailed is if they approve the exact amount, but I assume
it will be lower, then we'll have an opportunity. -teT
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minlster Blair:
The President:
They are significant.
One of the things I've
tried to do before, and I hope this year will pass, is a new
initiative to get more money through trade and investment.
They're extremely vulnerable to drug lords, and bananas will be
essentially a holding action.
I think that maybe this is
something the European Union and United States can do together
and get them more help down there.
I am worried about both
Caribbean and Central America because of this storm.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I think it is a legitimate serious issue, not just
about two Central American countries going broke.
It's a deeper
thing on all sides.
I would be prepared to work on that.
The
main thing between now and May is to get these guys to talk.
If
you could get the WTO panel to make a rapid decision, maybe we
could work something through on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
(..e)
The President: What they could do, what I am worried about, is
they may be sympathetic to you, and maybe rule against you on
the merits.
If they keep kicking the can down the road, that
would be the worst for you politically. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with you.
I'm trying to pass a billion
dollar trade initiative and all the right-wing Republicans
bailed out on me yesterday.
They spent all that money, billions
Ir.: 0;::-".-:17
E:-:.
35==2:-::6-,
s-ec-'-tl:-' 71."':-4(7b7":)(-:7ld)I
o-n
�COHFIDEN'fIPrL
3
'JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
and billions, supporting dictatorships and taking sides in civil
wars, but they won't help me get them back on their feet.
They're trying to keep me from getting it before I go down there
next week,
..(-et
~rime
Minister Blair:
The President:
I got it. Look, basically what is at stake here
is I've had to fight back 80 percent of both parties in Congress
who want to legislate something worse than what I did. The
whole credibility of the WTO is at issue here. But what is
important, in order for me to do anything, is for the WTO to
decide sooner rather than later.
I should have some flexibility
if they decide that it should be X million dollars less. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be very helpful.
~
The President:
That is why it's important not to talk about it.
Because if we do I will have everybody allover me.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
Can I ask you another quick question.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
The President: What do you want me to say on
over here? Where will we be by then? ~
st.
Patrick's Day
Prime Minister Blair:
CmJFIDENTIAL
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
1
'----_ _ _--'--_-----'1
The President: Let me ask you this.
Is there some way to
manifest the commitment by something they say to you or me?
Then a week later, some big declaration on decommissioning.
there some way to do it that way? le1
Is
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
'------~~
The President:
Right now, they're saying trust me.
could make these statements, then dick around. Jk1
But they
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J,R:}
How do they justify the Good Friday accords?
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
GOHFI DEWl'Ilffi
�5
CGNFIDENnAL
• IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
The President:
I completely agree. If you have any more
instructions or advice between now and st. Patrick's Day, I'll be glad to have it. But, I got it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I think we have a chance to get the Kosovars to
all right on the Kosovo agreement. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really?
(C)
(91
That would be great.
~
The President: Bob Dole went over there today for me. He's
been a champion of theirs.
I'd say we have a pretty goud
chance.
I'm worried about the possibility of the Kosovars
saying yes, Milosevic saying no, and NATO will blink.
I'm
really worried. We need to suck it up. You and I may have to
do another round of calls. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
stuff,
j)2')
All right.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me know about all this other
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Thanks a lot.
(U)
The President:
I'll see you.
If you have anything more on the
other issues, let me know, directly or indirectly, through our
channels.
(U)
CONFlDEN'i'IAL
�6
C~FIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Again, sorry to trouble you.
(U)
The President: That's okay.
I may have to start ordering 50
_percent of my bananas from the Caribbean and Central America.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
See you.
(U)
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good-bye.
All the very best to you.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�., ..' ••..:...!....
COHFI DEN}' IAL
lil{l
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Matt Sibley, Lawrence Butler
and Miriam Sapiro
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 14, 1999, 1:55-2:12 p.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President: Hi, Tony.
I had a really good trip down to
Central America.
I am a bit tired.
It was a good trip.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you just get back?
(U)
The President:
I got back a couple of days ago and then had to
turn around and go to Arkansas. But it was a good trip.
The
thing I found interesting was that despite all the horrible
problems they have had with the hurricane and the legacy of all
of the civil wars, those places are very well governed, with
enormous potential.
They're all very poor, except for Costa
Rica, but they're very well governed. The biggest problem is in
the aftermath of all the civil wars a lot of guns were left
there, something that you know about. There are also a lot of
criminal gangs in the rural areas that make them less than safe
so it is hard to get tourism going there.
In El Salvador there
were former rebels and soldiers in suits listening to my speech.
It was quite nice.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought we could have a quick word on
Northern Ir'eland before they all get there.
(U)
The President:
I agree.
(U)
COUFIDEN'1'IAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On: 13/1~{.Ji~~,.;.{,,-~~-~-:--~-----,:\'
~~1NTO~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY, 'f'
'.
~:~~..:;~.-,:,,:,.~:,".<;';~j_.~..:::+; .>__ :~_;'~:~.r.-.~.t.~.:. ~r'"
�CotfPIDEN'fIAL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
First, I completely agree with that. George
Mitchell believes that there can't be very much time between
what Trimble does and the movement on decommissioning. They
need to give some sort of private assurances that they can
pocket. If they can't give i t to Bertie or DeChastelain, to you
or someone.
I am beginning to get a little concerned. )k1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do whatever I can to help get
this done.
We will just have to see, but I am quite hopeful.
(,e'(
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DE~lT L""L
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�3
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's fine.
I don't mind.
I am determined not
to let this. get away_
We need this badly, and I would like to
resolve this in the first half of this year, if we can. This
will give us the momentum while all the other things are going
on.
I will do whatever you want me to.
I will do whatever it
takes. )ef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes, I told D'Alema you can do whatever you
should. We have never had a problem with the EU having a
different position than the United States. EVen going back
before my presidency, we were sponsors of the resolution leading
to the Oslo accords.
We have to sa those issues will have to
be resolved in the last phase.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
principle.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Exactl.
That is m
osition as a matter of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
Okay, thanks.
I think you are right where you
The President:
If not, then don't
need to be.
If you think it helps, do it.
do it. ..(-e)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFI LiEN T 1AL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: I
~
The President:
~----------------------------------~
That is my conclusion. -fer
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
When is the G-7 meeting in Germany?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
In the middle of June.
The President:
You are going to do something here with the DLC,
aren't you?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, in April.
~
The President:
Our guys are worried about it raining on NATO's
parade. We got huge press coverage here yesterday. They went
to Harry Truman's home to sign the documents for the NATO event
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. +et
Prime Minister Blair:/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let me have a look at my schedule.
In the first
half of the year it would be extremely difficult to make a
separate trip, but if I am in Germany, maybe I can add a day
onto my trip. Where does he want me to do it, in Florence? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
ke1
The President: That would be a real burden, would it not?
Someone has to shoulder the responsibility.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been there before?
(Q1
The President:
Yes, Hillary and I spent a wonderful week there.
As a matter of fact, it was ten years ago this week.
Y21
I love it. It is one of my favorite
Prime Minister Blair:
cities in the world.
I will think about it and get back to you.
JKJ
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�COHPIDEN'PIAL
5
The President: Good.
I think that we are in sync on the other
two matters.
I won a big vote in Congress on Kosovo.
I think
it's interesting because when the Republicans pushed for it,
they didn't think I would win it. Our guys worked very hard on
it and won a big vote with explicit authorization to deploy,
consistent with the conditions I've stated.
I feel good about
it. But I don't think there is any way that Milosevic will take
this deal.
But we believe the Kosovars will take it and then .
we will be right back
and I.
KO. 13526, section 1.4 d
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
If the Kosovars say yes, and they have been
difficult, we may even get Milosevic to the point where he will
say yes -- if we stay tough and if we are prepared to use force.
But if not, he will jerk us around. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah, I will do that. Do you want me to buy a
cashmere sweater from him with duties? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
bananas.
.(.e)
You don't have to do that or give him
The President:
I wish we could get this resolved before your
elections, you know.
IZ5
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We got a really rough column that said this is
not what the new world order was meant to be. Kosovo goes to
hell, and we have a war over this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPI DEN'fIAL
Do shake hands with him.
(91
�courT BEtH' L"tL
6
The President:
I thought I could have my whole wardrobe of
Scottish cashmere brought down to him.
The Irish wouldn't like
it.
Hell, I think even the Irish sweaters I have are Scotti~h.
Okay, I will see you.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, all the best to you.
End of Conversation --
COUPI DEWPIAL
(U)
�SECR]!;T
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 46
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 21, 1999, 12:50.- 1:12 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
How are yoU?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
I'm fine.
How were things last week?
(U)
The President:
What do you mean, last week?
Prime Minister Blair:
and everything.
jet
(U)
With the Irish -- Gerry Adams, Trimble
The President:
I'm sorry; I have been through all kinds of hell
with this Kosovo thing. You ought to get a transcript of George
Mitchell's comments to them.
I gave him a Medal of Freedom
here. He said, "I don't want to talk about what I did, but what
needs to be done." He said, "I hope that about a thousand
people will ignore me while I make these remarks to the
parties." It was devastating. He was great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I heard he was brilliant.
~
The President:
I did exactly what you asked me to. Hell, I
don't know.
It looks to me like Gerry needs some sort of cover
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�8ECRET
2
for demilitiariztion and then can give cover to Trimble to do
what he needs to do. ,It is important to keep pushing it
forward.
(.Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, that's what we will do.
J.Gt
The President: Anyway, I did the very best I could.
I had
chills running up and down my spine yesterday.
There is a new
book here by Daniel Silva who is a former Washington journalist.
The book is called "The Marching Season" and you are in it.
For
some reason he uses a fictitious President, but the real you.
There is an ultrasecret Protestant group and they are out there
acting against everybody -- Protestants, Catholics.
It's purely
fictional,-but it gave me the chills about what could happen if
we don't keep doing this.
I was frustrated, and I know you are,
but I don't know what else I can do.
I will do whatever.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, thanks anyway for last week .
..(-e)
The President:
You have to table some fix for this and let us
pressure Adams to take it.
I don't think there is anything else
we can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Can we talk Kosovo? Milosevic has agreed to
meet Holbrooke. He will go over there tomorrow and tell him he
will bear the full responsibility for consequences for NATO
military action unless he does what he is told to do.
I got
reports this morning of one village of 13,000 people that has
been completely evacuated.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRE'I'
3
Primakov is supposed to come here next week, and I need to give
him a heads up so if he wants to cancel he can. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely . .....fBi
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There are one "or two issues
that I want to talk to you about'before going on, but we can
talk in the next day or two on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
I had a meeting with a lot
of members of congress and several Republicans said that it
sounds bad -- if he were out there practicing ethnic cleansing
again we would support it, but if we take the initiative and he
moves against the people it will look like we caused it.
(S)
Sr:CIZEI
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President:
The reason we did not take any other action is
because the peace process was going on. ~
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
That is what my critics here are going to say .
......l-51
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Let me ask you this. How
are the Tories reacting at home? Are they supporting you? .-\-B1
,prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Our right wing isolationists certainly would if
they thought they could get public opinion on their side and
since they have the parliamentary majority they would cause a
problem.
The Republicans fluctuate between isolationism and
unilateral action. They want the biggest possible military and
want to spend money on only the military and concrete, but never
want to use it on anything.
I think that in the near term I am
in need of a stronger presentational argument than you are.
I
am hoping that it will be fine, I couldn't agree more that we
3ECRE'f'
�SECREr
5
need to get a strong presentation.
If the others are going with
us, we need Chirac and Schroeder saying the same thing. ~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President: Yes, I will call them when I get off the phone
with you.
I understand they are even chiding us a little bit
about whether we are moving quickly enough.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I have to call and tell him the
truth and let him stay home if he wants to. But he still needs
to come here because he needs the money and the IMF agreement
worked out.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
(S)
The President:
I am still very worried about it. And I am
worried about them because the Duma seems incapable of doing
anything positive to help themselves along.
We could save them
a lot of money if they could ratify START II.
Then I could go
immediately to START III. And then I could pass this bill to
accelerate threat reduction with the nuclear stockpile that
could occupy as many as 20,000 or half the military scientists
over the next two years. But the Duma seems incapable of doing
a lot of this stuff.
I don't think we have any choice
whatsoever. We don't want to polarize them further, but we need
to take some form of action. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You got it. One thing we have to figure out is
a strategy that will keep the money there that we pump in. All
the money disappeared in 48 hours the last time. ..(..et
Prime Minister Blair:
SEeRE'!'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
6
The President:
Why don't we plan on talking tomorrow or the
next day and we will work on Kosovo right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair.
Okay, we will be in a position to
discuss it again tomorrow. ~
The President:
Okay man. Sorry I didn't do more on Ireland,
but I tried.
I even got Trimble and Adams to sit in my private
office alone for a while.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Well it went off very well here.
kef
The President:
I think the public vibes were very good indeed,
but I didn't have the feeling that I helped you move the ball
forward on the substance of it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Prime MInIs er Blair:
.~I
________________________________------------~
The President:
I don't think Gerry wants it to get off the
tracks and that is heartening.
I know damn well Trimble does
not, but he wants his leadership position as well.
(e)
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~/
The President:
If you could have a referendum on this, the
people could come up with 15 permutations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's another thing I thought about.
I think
the IRA people with personal history have a lot more ideology on
this whole decommissioning issue than the facts warrant. They
seem to think that if they unilaterally do this, it is like
saying that what the struggle is all about and what they said
all those years is illegitimate. They are loading a lot of crap
that does not need to be loaded. The only way to get off the
psychological hook is to make it part of a bigger disarmament or
find some proposal people could ratify and let their reps off
the hook.
The atmospherics seem great, but I didn't have any
specifics that I could glean.
I don't see Trimble having a
viable option.
I did not mean to be so negative but I don't
SECRE'F
�7
3ECREl'
think Sinn Fein thinks they can say different words and make it
happen. I don't think words alone will do it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All right man.
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
The President:
I agree. If there is a problem with Chirac or
Schroeder I will have to call you back.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am here.
Bye, Tony.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE:
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph Sigler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 23, 1999, 5:11-5:22 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm in Berlin.
(U)
The President:
I know, Gerhard just told me you were there.
Holbrooke is on his way back. Milosevic stiffed him. He
wouldn't agree to a cease-fire. He was belligerent and it seems
to me he's strongly poised to unleash reater violence in
Kosovo.
I want to talk about two things: first, Pri~akov has postponed
his visit to Washington. I think that's the best outcome given
the circumstances. Maybe you can call him in the next day or
two and tell him you understand why he didn't come to
Washington.
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
SECl":t!:T
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
3/23/0_9~,c~~,~ __~---~(
r"...A,?.::-.----,"~- .. ~;::--,:.
.
,'
J
'~:r~~LffiRA~~ PtlO:OCOPy__
"----:~ ;-~-:.:..:;-,-=- ;; ..--.,...'~ .-,:",~: -': '-.... --,.-~---."-,:;----'-~-.---.' -
,""
�2
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: \
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
/
The President:
Yes, we sat around the room today saying, "Geez,
this is re~11y bad. We could lose what we did in Bosnia but we
have no option." If we don't, he will just clean them out, kill
a bunch of people and do bad things.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
L-~IE=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(::::d)::!....I_...J1 ~
Is Jacques there with you, or is Jospin there?
( C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The
~resident:
They are both in Berlin, yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did it go over well in Europe?
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it went over very well.
said it was ver effective.
Our media
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I am completely there and knew you would be too.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I "0.13526,
""'0" 1.4(d)
Okay, I will speak to him about that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRf:T
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree more.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
There have never been any natural boundaries.
couldn't agree more. ~
I
. Prime Minister Blair: We will make strong points and I will
speak to D'Alema and Chirac tomorrow. ~
The President:
Great, if you want to call me any time of the
day or night, call me.
I don't expect to sleep much tonight.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Tougher than Iraq isn't it?
~
The President: Yeah. They have better air defenses and we have
people in the vicinity that are vulnerable. The stakes are high
but the potential benefits are enormous. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I hope Milosevic can find a way out. He
compares it to the Ottoman Empire and how they stopped them In
Bosnia, and now he stands up to the Empire of the West.
It is
crazy.
()21
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
(U)
�.
.
SECRE'f
.'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 30, 1999, 6:12 - 6;24 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey Tony.
(U)
How are you doing?
Are you sleepy?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
doesn' t it?
yzi
Not much sleep in Northern Ireland.
(U)
Kind of makes you long for the Albanians,
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty much.
How is it going there?
The President:
I think your statements have been
seem to have a real consensus.
reat.
We
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, I agree with that. They're all saying
maybe we didn't think it through, but we didn't have all the
time in the world.
,sECElli:T
Reason:
1 . 5 ( a, b, d)-
Declaosify On"
1
' . , ._" ___ 0~·--~~""
4/~~::::~CPHO:OCOPY
,t_:=~3.:.~i;'i~;;C~.:"-:~;,j"~·"7""~~:"":"'. .:.-.:.:,~~ ..~,...:::-,-/;o.:;-'"
fC)
�2
SECR!!:!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I urge you to keep briefed on this issue on particulars, in part
because we are being nickeled and dimed on some of the details
by the Allies. My instinct is to go on for maximum
effectiveness. ~
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need them over here.
The President:
Where? -+€T
ye)
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
L - - I_
Who were they?
_
_
---:----~
Are they living in London now, or Albania?
Prime Minister Blair:
]
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Can you have your people send the names to our
people so we know who they are? I want to stage a meeting here
to give them some American publicity. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
I will put that in train.
Alright, where are we on Ireland?
-+er~
�SECRE'!'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why?
What is their argument?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is the IRA excuse for not doing it?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
\
The President:
How can it be surrender when the war is over?
-teT
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
'--------_--..1
The President:
3ECRE'!'
And they don't buy that?
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�gECRE'f
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Do you want me to caI1 Gerry?
-+e-r
I
~
\~--------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to call Adams?
Prime Minister Blair:
time is it now?
I think it's worth calling him.
(91
The President:
there? ..ke7
ye1
It's getting late.
Prime Minister Blair:
even now. j.eJ
What
What is it, twelve-thirty
It's probably not too late to call him
The President: But in no case no later than tomorrow.
see what I can do. k€1
OK, I'll
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
~--------------~
The President: All he ever wanted was an aggravated bonfire.
To all of us linear thinkers it doesn't seem like much of a big
deal. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It doesn't look like surrender if you have all
these people involved being let out of prison and all the others
are involved. It's crazy. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I.
£EGRET
, \\
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY •L
i.
'k-:;:2~~~?~~~~~::;':,-:"j~c.::~\':·~;:;. ~).:~,_~~~.:;" __·:?-:.:_<fF.......::1t: _,"
�5
SECRE't'
, iE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) i
The President:
What are you offering?
What is Bertie offering?
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's got to be harder for them.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, I will follow up and give you a
have to call you tomorrow anyway.
Thanks, Tony. )K1
Okay, thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation --
SECRET
~:"~_~~::'--~_ -~O~~--~--·~:~\
';<~~~~~,LIB~YPHOTOCO,PY,_J
-..:.....,-.-.~-z~<...--,- "-.-,:,"_-:-":0>- .,-;-.:,.,._J._-t...r.'-"-_......:o_~.:-.• __ ._,~ .,
•
I
E=-.0:::".-:1:-:::3-=52=-=6:-,-se-"C:"io-n-l=-.47:(:-b)c-:(d-:-:-)
ct
1':1
Prime Minister Blair:
report~
1
�· GONFIDEHTIAJ:j
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair arid
Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Prime Minister Ahern
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Bob Ford and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 6:32 - 6:38 a.m. EST
The Residence
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DEN'f IAL
Reason: 1.5(d
Declassify On
�COUFIDEN1'IAL
2
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Ahern:
\
Prime Minister Blair:
I
Prime Minister Ahern: /
The President:
It's naIve for them to beiieve you can have a
break or a pause or wait for Easter without this thing getting
out. It's not possible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Prime Minister Ahern:
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
night?
(U)
No, no, It's all right.
Prime Minister Blair:
up.
(U)
You have problems.
Have you been up all
I gather you've been
The President:
Tony, what are you going to do the rest of the
day?
Are you going to bed?
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
,-
�'CO~IFIDEN'fViL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: ,r may want to talk to you on a secure line later
to tell you where I think things got off track a bit and what we
need to do now.
I don't have it all sorted out but would really
like to talk to you, because we really cannot afford to be
defeated on it. Let me talk to Gerry. 'The main thing is to let
you publish this thing if you pause for reflection. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Let me call him back.
Prime Minister Ahern:
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFI DEN'fIAL
�3EeRE'!'
I,S2-THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April I, 1999, 7:03 - 7:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, hi Bill.
(U)
Have you talked to Adams since I talked to you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
No.
(U)
IL____~I=E=.O==.1=3=5=26=,=se=c=ti=on==1.=4=(d=)=_________~1(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Well done, Bill.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: A week from Tuesday we'll have a celebration,
but we'll probably need it by then.
I never thought I'd ever be
longing for the problems of Northern Ireland. ~
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
Reason: 1.5(a.b,d)
Declassify On
4~~_~--' ~_O' ~,
-i -~T~~ L;~RARY PHOTOCOPY' '}.
~':o'~~.-~~-:-_~_.:_ -...';.. =-.:-__~ '__ -..-:,;- _'_, '. ,,- ~
•
�2
We had another bad night weather-wise. I should go out a little
more. There was a good article in the New York Times. I don't
know if you saw it but it talked about what a good job you've
done making the case in Britain. Although we're at about 58
percent, but having these guys arrested and beat up may not be
so ood.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime
Blair:
/
~--------------------~
The
the
hit
hit
our
President: The press today has got this big article saying
CIA tried to tell us he would accelerate his attacks if we
him. Hell, we knew that but that's an argument for having
him 30 -day s earlier. I t
;::.-,-,h""i~n,""k,--"w:..;:e=-'-,r"-,e",--"-",o~n",n",a,--,h.:.:a=-v"-e",--",t""o---->t,-,,a,-,l,-,k-,--,,,",,,-_--,
allies on where we are.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Are you having to run all these targets by your
Attorney General? k8f
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------------)
The President: Holbrooke believes strongly we should be hitting
the media, power grids, and oil stuff with little collateral
damage. Shutting down the TV networks will have an impact.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECREl'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
The President:
The refineries. I approved all that stuff.
There is some chance of collateral damage, but it seems to me
really.remote. }81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We may need to examine if anything can be done
in the daytime, too. k8f
Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Tell you what I'll do. I have a meeting on this
in about two hours time, and will fly down to Norfolk to see the
troops, which I certainly need to do now that three of our guys
have been apprehended.
We are torn between doing something to
keep the alliance unified or do something that works.
I will
check back in and ca 1 1 you 1 ater today. You and I have to talk
this thing through. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:!
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
(U)
I'm around anytime you want, Bill.
Thanks, Tony.
(U)
(U)
�4
3ECRE'±
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
(U)
Alright Tony, we'll talk.
-- End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�£ECRE'l'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Sean Tarver, James
Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 3:54 - 4;04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
get any sleep?
Hi, Bill.
Hi and excuse me.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
Did you
Prime Minister Blair: Not yet, but hoping to.
God, these
negotiations are a nightmare, but thanks so much for the help.
(U)
The President:
I hope I did help and Sinn Fein will start
negotiations.
The initial spin on it was okay. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like we got permission tonight from all
the NATO guys to do most of what we wanted to do, but I wanted
to say that I think we need better procedures here.
They tell
me Wes Clark is spending half or more than half his time every
day trying to schmooze the Allies. There should be'a mor
orderly way to pick the targets and vet them.
don't think we want to be in a position where every
I have to make six phone calls to ramp things up . ,r
,sECRET
Reason:
1.5(a.b,~l
, " ..
Declassify On:!
' .
<
. ' --=------ ---_. ""
<
_
<
4/~,..-~q-:,--~. ~ .•.
. ' .''','
,~";.' . ' 1m-ON LLBRARY PHOTOCOPY .,' i,
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':.,
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and
--"--'-'L--=-';;'
�2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
j81
The President: A lot of people knew what they were going to be
and were preparing for the~, so one of our fighter groups had to
turn around and come back. j81
Prime Minister Blair:
My God.
}21
The President:
That's why we keep this close.
I am not
accusing anybody, these are just the facts.
But the more people
that know, you increase exponentially the potential for leaks or
intercepted conversations, anything of that kind. So we need to
try to keep this closehold.
(5)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�3
3ECRE'f'
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I will have Sandy follow up with your guys and
we will figure out who contacts whom. We'll talk to Solana and
get a new·procedure approved. We need to approve targets
quickly and hit them. We need to be relaxed about this,
determined but relaxed. We're not in a panic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If it looks like we're afraid someone is going
to wimp out on us, we would never get a decent deal.
~
Prime-Minigter Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We've unsettled him some. We've had some
substantial strikes. We're not where we need to be yet, but we
need to keep after it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes. And it would be very well received here;
we cannot act like we're bombing timidly and making a plea for
peace.
That's not a position we can afford to be in. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That we have to hit them harder.
In fact, a
couple of senators have come out in favor of ground troops.
Though that could be a Trojan Horse. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We'll have our people come up with a strategy
for who you and I should call.
I will call Schroeder to see if
he will agree to a new procedure on target setting.
This is too
slow; we are encumbered by weather now, but as a practical
measure you will have more influence with Europeans than I will.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
I
We can't afford to have Clark spending half his day, every day
trying to get approval to do his job rather than doing his job.
DEeRE'!'
�SE'CRE'F
4
e re on an open l~ne, so I don't want to
get into details, but we have gotten in a position now where we
can really, with the weather cooperating, do some more things
and get some more results.
I think it is quite important, and
it's an acceptable agreement if we don't have to keep slashing
awa. We've got to show real strength and impact here. )...S1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
\
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
Thanks.
121
I
I
~-------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am happy to do it.
It's lasted so long that I
yz)
may miss it when it's gone. But I doubt it.
Prime Minister Blair:/
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Goodbye. -tel
We'll have our people work out strategy.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
agCRET
�§E:CRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matthew Sibley, James Smith, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 5, 1999, 1:50 - 2:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
The President:
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'm okay. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
this is important, it helps with the efficacy issue.
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:! 4/91J),§>,,-_~,;.;:"·--'~-·-• ~ ...
__
-.
_
_
.
. . . . .---'--'--:..~ _ _ -7-'".~_
'.'- - -~I
C~~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' -
·t
'~~~:":>~~,,:::~"-~-.-3-·~.h_>~.~~~;::_ -.~:-.__ ._\~).",,~).
~
�SECRET
Presentationally,
2
I think you are right.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that, but I don't think we are
quite ready to say it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree. You can be sure all these offers he
makes will not meet that standard. More and more of the
Europeans are of the mind that we may have some definitional
problems down the road.
I'd like to talk about two things that
are related.
One is the refugee issue.
It seems to me we are
doing a little bit better, with NATO taking the lead organizing
with Macedonia and Albania. But we have got to do more and
quickly in finding places to resettle them and the conditions of
their return.
Different countries have different conditions,
camps. J.&r
I don't know, but I know we have to create a release valve to
take the pressure off Albania and Macedonia.
We're increasing economic assistance to
countries bearing the greatest burden.
I hope we
others as we can, but the
offers out now. We don't
their borders and cause a
SECRE'f
can get as many concrete offers from
most important thing is to get those
want Albania and Macedonia to close
worse situation.
~
�4
3ECRE'f
The other thing I wanted to mention is I am quite concerned
about Russia's growing involvement,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We have to make it clear we understand this is a
political problem for them, and we don't mind them jumping on
us, but they shouldn't have military support that will put our
pilots and our forces at risk. We can't act as if there are no
consequences to that. -k81
Another issue that we're trying to work on is that surrounding
countries need to thoroughly inspect all the Russian shipments
going into Kosovo to make sure they are not violating the arms
. embargo.
I am concerned about that.
I think the military
situation is in pretty good shape,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is an open line; we have to be careful what
we say. You and I have discussed this before. _ (£)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that. The problem we are having
here is whether we're taking people in Guantamano or the
continental United States, then they like it and say they don't
SECRE'l'
f·
�SECRE'l'
5
Will they want to go home, once they've seen
Blair:
The President:
I understand the problem. On the other hand, we
have to take enough pressure off Macedonia and Albania so they
don't close the borders to keep their countries from coming
apart. Talk to your folks.
On one level, I'd like to take 100
thousand and put them in America tomorrow and run the risk of
saying people don't want to go home. On another level/ I don't
want any. They might like it here and not want to leave.
(ef
Prime-Minister Blair:
J
The President:
I agree with that.
I wonder if our public
affairs people should talk specifically to each other.
ke1
Prime Minister Blair.:
]
The President:
Let's see if we can get this organized.
would make a huge difference. ~
It
Prime Minister Blair:/
~
L - - - -_
_
~
_
The President:
Let's have our own media people talking. We can
offer to have all 19 join the conference call.
If not, we ought
to have the major countries agreed.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
5ECRE1'
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'r--------------------------------------------
I couldn't agree more.
7
okay, that's good.
)91
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SgCRgT
6
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I do, too, but we have a ways to go.
People can
say to us you don't have a clear strategy, but we have had clear
goals, but you have got to have the proper mix of long-term
goals and enough flexibility to deal with day-to-day realities.
Getting our presentation a little better has helped some, with the clearing of the weather, the targeting process being worked
out.
I thought your memo was terrific, by the way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Absolutely. We've got that here.
They would be
calling people traitors, now they all join in. Everybody is a
Monday morning quarterback.
The right is saying you should have
ground forces in there. Some people think I'm on the receiving
end of a Trojan horse, that it's a.deliberate set-up. But we
have to take it as it comes and be determined we will not be
defeated, that we will run this strategy out. But under no
circumstances are we going to be defeated.
If you tell me that,
and I tell you that, and we hold hands. ~
Now, let me say one other thing. We had good news on Lockerbie,
with the suspects arriving in the Netherlands.
Thanks for
everything you did on that.
This is great. We got the
sanctions lifted, suspended for 90 days, but Libya will have to
do more to get them lifted permanently. But this is a pretty
good day for us since last August; it's a good argument for
staying the course against terrorism in the long run. You going
to follow up on the NATO PR thing and get back to us -- to Sandy
or someone else -- to see how we coordinate our daily message?
-+BY
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'¥
�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with British Prime
Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley,
Robert Ford, Robin Rickard, Lawrence Butler
and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 10, 1999, 1:31 -- 1:S0 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Are you still in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, I am back in Chequers now.
(U)
with Jose Maria Aznar.
The President:
days.
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
wishes.
(U)
The President:
I am
He is coming to see me in a couple of
He was telling me to send you his best
Are they happy in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, a lot happier in Scotland and you
will be getting any amount of cashmere that you want.
(U)
The President:
What I want, is that when I am done here to be
made an honorary UK citizen and give me a seat from Scotland
next door to a good golf course. The daily papers today are
filled with China being pissed off and Russia threatening war.
SECRET
Reason: 1.S(a,b,d)
.
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If you want, you can give me citizenship and make me a Brit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You are one very popular man there.
I hope that it helps in the elections.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It has helped, Thanks for seeing Donald
Leu as well.
What it has done is to emphasize to the people
that sometimes it is useful to be part of something bigger. ~
The President:
Yes, I believe that.
We don't have time to talk
about this today, but when you are here -- I want you to think
about something between now and then -- we have to figure out
how to resolve this stupid banana thing. But the real thing is
that the Caribbean is in. bad shape economically.
I would like
to get a bill through that would treat them like Mexico in
exports.
It would help them a lot if the United states, and if
not the entire EU, then the French, Dutch, and British and
everybody that had some presence there could think about setting
up a joint effort for the long-term development strategy . . We
all have limited money, but if we coordinate it we could
leverage it.
Think about what we could do to help them
diversify their economies. We could try to improve their
economies, increase tourism and personal income, and reduce
their vulnerabilities to the narco-traffickers. Get them to
where they are not completely dependent on bananas. Anyway,
there has never been anything like this in this part of the
world where all the countries with ownership or colonization of
these islands coordinated together.
I think that this is a
third way deal, and I bet we could get some other Europeans
interested.
I don't know if the French would help. The Dutch
might be interested. Some of the Europeans might be interested.
We might think about doing something like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
That's right. The EU is wrong on the trade
issue but right on the general concern for the Caribbean. The
EU is in the right on the larger economic well being, on the
longer-term interests of the Caribbean. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
SEeRE'!'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
In Central America they are all concerned, I
was just down there and talked to all these guys. They are
sensitive because of the hurricane. What few bananas they have,
they want to sell.
I told them we will help them get through
this, but that we would have to diversify their economies too .
.J.Zi
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Central Americans. and the Caribbeans sound
like a boys school argument. They ought to be thinking about
making common cause and not pissing down each others' leg to see
who has the biggest bananas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
____________~1
~
The President:
OK, on Kosovo, just want to check in and
reconnoiter where we are. We had greater military impact with
the air actions.
I think if we could do a couple more weeks I
think that we could really have it. The G-8 statement is good.
Have you received the report on the G-8 ministers? We are
hoping to get a statement here involving the Russians.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Ll_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The President:
That was good. Madeleine is going to see Ivanov
on Tuesday or Wednesday.
I also think that Kofi gave a good
statement.
k81
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: He is a little miffed, though maybe that's too
strong a word, disappointed maybe or concerned that neither of
us have put out a statement on it.
I told him that you were in
Scotland and that I was preoccupied with the Chinese. I think
that we ought to put one out now because he is out in Europe
now.
There are two things we need to think about.
One is
whether any economic pressures could be put on Milosevic that
don't hurt the Macedonians and the Montenegrens too badly.
I
have a list of things, maybe cutting down on their money
laundering in Cyprus and putting the squeeze on their London
accounts.
I don't want to cause the Montenegrins any trouble.
I will get that list to you today and let you guys look at it
�· SECRET
4
and respond to it. Any time that I try to get our banks to do
something the Treasury Department gets squirrelly on me.
It is
always a fight with those guys.
I would like to send you this
list and let you evaluate it. ~
We have to decide whether we want to have a more aggressive
diplomatic initiative and if so, how to intensify the military
action to enhance the likelihood that diplomatic efforts will
succeed, assuming we can achieve all our ob'ectives that Kofi
signed off on and bring Russia into it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
It may turn
out to be, a bigger problem for me than you.
It assumes that we
can achieve our political objectives because Milosevic doesn't
want to get the hell bombed out of him and have Apaches on top
of his tanks.
If you assume -- the one downside is that we are
facing a lot of hurdles -- if you assume that all of our stated
objectives are achievable if we intensify our bombing campaign
without actually toppling Milosevic. Then it seems to me that
there will be some kind of diplomatic agreement for an
international force that will include Russian participation.
They will push Milosevic back when he says who can and cannot be
part of it.
I think that it will be difficult to have NATO as
NATO participate.
The problem this creates for us is Somalia.
J.8J
I don't want to take too much time going over this now but this
is a big problem for us. We went through this in Somalia when
the UN took over command and control. We had a messy deal
during the first part of the Administration. We stayed on in
Somalia when the UN took it over and it was a messy deal.
I
lost some American boys over there and one of them was dragged
naked through the streets of Mogadishu. We made some mistakes
there in what we did and did not do. We basically had serious
command and control problems where the Americans were supposed
to do two things -- the same things we'd have to do if it were a
non-NATO force in Kosovo -- in Somalia we were supposed to be
there doing humanitarian relief and act as a mUltinational peace
force.
One of the factional leaders who since has died, killed
a bunch of Pakistani peacekeepers -- something like 15-20. We
were the only presence there that had the capabilities to figure
out who did it and to go and get him. So the UN wanted us and
tasked us to go and get him, Aideed. The UN tasked us to do
that while doing humanitarian relief. They tasked our guys to
go'into a hotel and get him. Our guys landed on the top of a
hotel in the middle of the day -- he got away and then all of a
SECRS'!'
�5
GECRE'P
sudden more than 300 Somalis started shooting at them.
It is
the sort of thing that if NATO had been doing it, it would have
been totally different:
there would have been different command
and control arrangements, armor and artillery.
So there is
still a lingering bad taste.
I have a lot of support in
. Congress right now.
There is even more than before the Gulf
War. More and more in Congress are saying that they are in
favor of ground troops if we had to put them in there. And I am
telling you this in advance, if you could help me on this
because it is your guys' necks, too.
If they say NATO can
participate, but not as NATO, instead as the UN, we have this
awful memory of Somalia. We would also need the serious command
and control issues to be worked out. We did not have these
problems in Bosnia.
It worked like a charm once NATO went in
and the Russians came in with us. We only had to make an
amendment to the NATO issue.
Does that make sense? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This was the lowest point of my presidency.
It
was a goddamned nightmare.
I felt personally responsible for
that kid's body being dragged through the streets. So I see
this as a practical measure about k2.eping people alive. We were
prepared to take risks. We had all these glitches because of
the command and control problems. The Russians are allergic to
NATO and Milosevic is allergic to NATO. Keep in mind Tony, I
know you know this, if we go in, we can't go in with one foot.
If we get a multi-national force we have to go in at least with
the commitment to protect the Serbs in Kosovo at a minimum as
well as the Kosovar Albanians. There is enormous grass roots
support right now for the freedom fighters.
This will be a big
force protection issue -- command and control will be critical
with huge political implications. We may have all kinds of
problems where we have both sides pissed at us.
They will be
politically important as well in any country.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will send you the list of economic sanctions. We
will look like assholes at the garden party if we don't make
SECRE'f
,i·
�SECRE'l'
6
sure that everybody understands that NATO means keeping our
people alive.
i&1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
The President:
It is horrible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We need to talk on a secure line or talk when
you get here.
There are arguments both for it and arguments
against it.
We will need to look at in the context of where it
is going to be five years from now. We need to keep our crowd
together and keep at him and get a diplomatic solution with a
mechanism that includes the UN and Russia.
I will follow up on
this.
I am in the country all next week and will get that
economic list out to you. Tell Jose Maria I said hello. Did
you show him Napoleon's pistol and Charles' sword? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I took him to Rothschild House today to
see the most amazing works of art.
(U)
The President:
I want to get there.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You must come back.
(U)
The President:
I will come back to t'he Scottish golf course.
You were the best first-timer that I ever saw play.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
keep in touch.
(U)
The President:
Joking apart, thanks for cashmere.
Thank you, find me a safe seat in a golf cart.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, good-bye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'E'
Let's
�£ECREf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski, James Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME:
The President:
April 14, 1999, 1:56 - 2:14 p.m. EDT,
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
fortunately.
Go on.
(U)
Hi, Bill .
This is a secure line,
.JRl"
The President:
Yes.
First of all, I didn't mean to take you
out of a meeting there, but I thought it was important I talk to
you as soon as possible. Aznar was here last night and he was
really good, and I know he is there.
181
Wes Clark asked for another 300 airplanes, and we've got these
Apaches corning in, but the truth is we're just going to have
more and more planes filling the air and restriking old targets
or hoping the weather gets better so we can hit tanks and
soldiers, unless we can get into Phase III targets. We have got
to make these people start paying a higher price. ~
~
was hoping while you're there, you and Aznar could convince
~____~Ito give Clarke and Solana the authority to strike a wider
range of targets.
That would require hitting national level
headquarters, military-industrial targets, the TV towers (which
he has resisted), some of the presidential targets, the power
plants, the Socialist Party headquarters, which also has a
radio-TV broadcasting facility there.
I really believe we are
making a mistake not .turning the heat up on these guys. )-21
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Reason:
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I have also been urged by our people to look at preventative
action against some targets in Montenegro.
I know I
I
doesn't want to hit there, but even I
Isaid there were
some things we ought to be hitting. Let me give you an example
or two:
there are several facilities where we think they are
moving in to take their missiles out; in and around the ports in
Montenegro; there's one critical bridge we need to take out,
before they start moving their military units.
So we're quite
worried about their ability to use these facilities.
There are
not a lot of targets and not a lot of risk of civilian damage,
But it's even more important we get to Phase I I I targets within
Serbia.
I know there'll be collateral damage and some
controversy, but if we want any chance of a solution soon, we
have to turn the heat up. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
SECRE'f'
That's what I want to do.
~
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I completely agree.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECREr
�I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
:SECRE!
4
The President:
Let's talk about all the points you've made.
First of all, we're agreed on targets.
On fuel and other
things, we are now banning Yugoslav ships from our ports and the
export and reexport of goods to Yugoslavia.
I hope you can
succeed in tightening EU exports, freezing government and
private projects and the assets of the leadership. You and I
should propose NATO search ships going into Yugoslav ports to
make sure there's no arms or fuel. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Agreed.
(U)
On presentation, Solana is not there, is he?
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
~
'-------~
The President:
Do you want to send someone in? I think there
would be some resentment if I sent an American over there.
Maybe we should talk to Solana and have him ask for more help on
presentation? Do you have someone you can deputize? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We've had to start doing a lot more of our
briefings, because they are so ineffective.
(.8f
Prime Minister Blair:
They start off every day at 3 or 4 o'clock, and the press
conference sometimes goes on for an hour or an hour and a half,
literally answering all their questions.
k&t
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
£ECRET
�3ECRE't'
The
him
5
Shouldn't we talk to Solana personally and get
how do we get this done? What's your
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I would support that strongly, and then he could
do the conference call every day, your guy.
keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
I am completely agreed.
Should we call
Solana separately or together. Separately.
I will tell him we
discussed this, I think your take is right and ask him to work
with you on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is great, Bill.
(U)
Call me after you talk to Chirac and Schroeder.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I will call
ou back.
The President:
That's why I agreed to do this. With all the
problems, I figured you wouldn't have 19 elected officials with
their asses hanging out to dry. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
\L-_ _ _ _ _~~
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
SECRE'P
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The President:
You've got a deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President.:
(U)
Alright, Bill.
(U)
And on the economic things,
you support them?
.Aef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
Alright.
One hundred percent.
I will get on it.
-- End of Conversation --
3ECRE'l'
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PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
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DATE, TIME
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Riqht.
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Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
straight ahead. fer
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I'll call him tomorrow.
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We'll get clearance on that and go
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Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: On presentation and structure. I will
speak to Solana tomorrow, and I think it would be good if you
did, too. J81
The President:
Do you want to call first?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'd be happy to do that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
It's a deal. After you talk to him, have
someone c~11our office and then I'll call him. That's great.
J,e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We'll speak soon.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
��2
COMFI DEN!'!:' IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
\~~
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__~~~~~~~~~__~~~~r-I-t
was a terrible thing, but in the Gulf War, we had soldiers
killed by friendly fire where the Americans and British were.
So even in a relatively small conflict, these kinds of things
happen. We can't lose the forest for the trees.
(£1
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what I said yesterday.
I was very strong
with the newspaper editors -- you know I completely agree with
you. We're on the same page. We'll get the briefing sorted out
there.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll tell you what I have done.
I have
done a note, which is longish, which sets out all my thoughts,
concerns, suggestions on this, on everything we are doing.
If
it's okay with you, I will fax it over to you on a secure fax .
.ket
The President:
Good.
Are we going to get together on Thursday?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think.
(U)
The President:
Do you want to spend the night at the White
House? Or at Blair House, if you want.
I won't get in until 1
a.m., and you may want to be in bed by then, but it's your
option. You can sleep in the same bed Churchill did. +&T
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope it's appropriate.
(U)
The Presiden-t: As long as you don't parade around naked before
the bath. You're too young and too trim.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm getting older in this bloody job.
Bill, that is great, and then we can meet Thursday mornin .
will get this information over to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
there Tuesday to tal k
CONFIDEN'fLAL
�3
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
to people, and to SACEUR as well, to get a real fix on what is
happening before the summit.
)Q1
The President:
That's a very good idea. When you come here,
I'd like to develop a strategy on how to work with the others,
including some of the smaller countries.
I think a little
effort on the side could get us a strong voice in making those
folks feel included. Between the two of
I think we can
touch most people . . ,.all of that ... I
E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I probably need to call him.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That is what I think.
In Detroit, we had 40,000
Albanians and a whole bunch of Serbs. The Albanians were
outside demonstrating, and I said we have no fight with the
Serbian people; they were our allies in World War II and most
don't have a clue what Milosevic has done in their name in
Kosovo.
I said that was the proper way to express disagreement,
not by killing. We have to be upbeat and resolute.
It is
important to be determined, but not too damned grim, either. We
have to keep spirits up. We're in this world where people
expect instantaneous results. We need to act like this started
the day before yesterday and not twenty years ago. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you want me to do any more, like talking to
I thought it would be less
Solana or Wes Clark, let me know.
abrasive to everybody if I didn't lead the charge, and it seems
to have worked out well; but I'll be happy to follow up. +eY
COlQ'FIDEH'I'IAL
�4
COlH'IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure that's right. There's no reason to
believe these people are trained to deal with this situation.
J..0"
Prime Minister Blair: That's totally right.
This is a
situation they haven't dealt with before. ~
The President:
We will plan on being together on Thursday.
You
decide whether Blair House is more convenient.
It probably will
be fQr your retinue, but you can stay here and put another aide
upstairs if you want.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is really kind, Bill.
I will get
this note to you on secure fax, and probably we should have a
word over the weekend on the secure phone. ~
The President: Alright, we'll do that.
I understand we made a
little progress on those operational changes you and I wanted
and I am a little encouraged by that.
k8t
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we really work we can
unblock any obstacles there. We still know where the difficult
points are. ~
The President: We're finally getting some indication they're
feeling it and there's a lot of internal debate within the high
councils. That is important and we need to bear down.
I will
get your fax, and we will talk over the weekend. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Best of luck in Detroit.IU)
I'll see you next week.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
IU)
IU)
End of Conversation
COHFIDEN'PH'W
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
...
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Miles Murphy,
James Smith, Lawrence Butler and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 29, 1999, 5:22 - 5:43 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
I thought your trip went very well, and
everyone loved the DLC event we did later.
So I think your trip
went great.
I called to follow up a little bit on the memo you
gave me and what we're doing here.
Let me make three or four
points to respond to your memo and tell you what we are doing,
then we can talk about whatever else we need to. ~
First, on your statement I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
We've got a small group working to develop an integrated
strategic plan that will merge our military and strategic
objectives and focus on putting pressure on Milosevic,' his
cronies, integrating military targets, covert action,
psychological operations and public affairs. And it is my
understanding we're already in touch with you. We'll have a
detailed plan ready sometime this weekend and share it with your
people. We will coordinate two to three times a week in a
telephone conference with people in a group led by John Sawers
and Sandy Berger.
So, we'll deal with that issue.
J81
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
Reason:
1.5 (a, b, d)
Declassi fy On,: .. ' 41 3U~9__:r"2~:'-·"~~.o;--'-'·-'~:--"
.
'~I~TO~UBRARYPHbTbCOPY·,·l·
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�51WRET
2
affairs thing is in much better shape now; the war room you and
I set up has a 24-hour capability and a rapid-response element,
and I think Joe and Alistair are talking two or three times a
day, including~ith the people in Brussels.
I think that's good
and we're trying to bring in the guy who used to work as my
communications director to work our operation here for 30 days
to make sure we've melded our political and diplomatic efforts
together. On all those areas, we're doing pretty well. JBf
Prime Minister Blair:
That sounds great.
(U)
The President:
The last item you raised is the need to do joint
planning on the ground force option.
I personally believe it
can be done under the umbrella of the assessment. As I told
you, we're working with our guys; they're so afraid it will
leak. We have to work through it, because there's no point in
doing this in detail unless we know how it will mesh together.
I will keep working on that, but I think we've made reasonable
progress on what we discussed and I wanted to see where you are
on that.
.k51
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If he means we won't assassinate him
or bomb him or extract him from Serbia, I think we can make that
commitment.
I don't think we can make a public commitment on
war crimes, because that is an independent body. Louise Arbour
is here, by the way. ~
I said we're cooperating with the tribunal, so that is a more
difficult issue. He's looking for some assurance, but that's a
pretty dicey thing.
So, that's all I have to report.
I do
think Chernomyrdin has the bit in his teeth to do something, but
whether he can, I don't know.
They are very anxious to playa
role in a diplomatic settlement and go in with their troops.
~
�SECRET
3
One other point:
the Russians might want to be in an area of
Kosovowhere the Serbs are dominant in population.
I said I
personally had'-no problems, as long as the Russians had a hard
and fast commitment to protect the Kosovars.
I had never
discussed this with the American people, not one time, without
saying that if the United States has a role, it will be
providing protection to the Serb minority as well as the
Kosovar/Albanian majority.
vn
The second thing -- and Sandy raised the red flag on this -- I
asked him to make it clear to Chernomyrdin that having Russians
and Greeks, Ukrainians, or other Orthodox denominations could
not become a de facto partition, because the EU has taken a
strong position on this, as has the United States and as has
NATO. As long as there's no partition, I think we could work
that out. Basically, that's a read-out of what D'Alema said.
ft}
Prime Minister Blair: Right. That is very helpful, Bill.
First, I think on the bit with the press side, and NATO and
SHAPE working together, we have a lot of people working well
with your people. That is working better and will get better
still. On the military side, I think that is great, to help
SACEUR with what he is doing. On the video conferencing, I
think that's fine.
The thing to do is have a constant updating
of all the different issues so they know exactly where we are,
feeding through the information we are getting to your guys, and
vice versa. ~
The President:
I agree.
j,21
Prime Minister Blair: On the ground troop thing:
I understand
all the problems, and we don't want this to start running in the
press and everything. We have done some work we are fairly
confident of, ~a~n~d~~~~~u~s~w~i~l~l~h~a~v~e~t~o~~e~t~i~n~t~o~u~c~h~a~s~~o~u~__,
want, reall .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So that is my only worry, is
not to get caught by the winter.
~
The President: Yes, I'm watching the calendar pretty closely.
We're back to the efficacy argument here.
The public in
America, in the latest survey yesterday, is against ground
troops; it supports bombing, but doesn't think it will work.
I
think whatever I decide is right, we can go forward with.
I
03ECRE'f
�SECRE'f
4
think what we don't want to do is not do what we need to do in
terms of planning. They're asking when this will be over.
I
looked at the weather map and said, "May is better than April,
and June is be'Eter than May, and July is better than June."
That had the right effect. It wasn't lost on them, to talk
about how the weather is getting better.
(81
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it is important, also.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I don't know. I just don't know. We have to
wait and see.
We may have to talk again before the weekend is
over, when we see how he does.
We'll have to wait and see.
My guess is Milosevic will offer a little more tomorrow, but not
enough, and then come back and say, "How about a pause in
bombing?" He's still trying to stiff the Alliance. ~
I want you to think about two things with your planners, if
you've got a pretty good military plan now on the ground troop
option. There are two things. Life is not perfect~ but I
basically had three objectives going in:
one is to win in
Kosovo, to have the people come back to a protected area and
give them autonomy and then to have the larger approach to
southeastern Europe that we discussed.
k5i
The second thing is, to get from beginning to end with the NATO
alliance intact. When you think about it, this is the first
thing NATO has had to do in 50 years.
In Bosnia, we had a lot
of help on the ground from Croatian and Muslim forces; we didn't
have to do as much as we do here. ~
The third thing is, I was so happy about Chernomyrdin being back
in harness.
In talking to all our people, I've said that I want
this to come out in a way that enhances Russia's diplomatic role
and strategic partnership with us. That would be a real boost
SECRE'f
�SECRET
5
to the forces of progress and those who want a partnership with
us, rather than those who want to go off by themselves angry,
hurt and humiliated.
;zl
....
One thing you need to have your best Russia people dealing with:
if it comes to a troop option, what the hell are we going to do
with Russia if it leads to the collapse of our relationship.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
My view on this is,!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
are you? .ke7
I agree with that.
How about Ireland?
Where
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think the IRA has decided they are never
going to decommission? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECI<ET
�•
6
3ECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
The poll shows more people are in favor of the
Good Friday agreement than at the time of the referendum.
People just want this damn thing to happen.
Je1
'--,::_-,-;::;--;-,--_ _ _....11
The President:
...+GY
They're tired of screwing with it, aren't they?
Prime Minister Blair:
Anyway, we will keep on it.
I
think the next two wee s lS pretty crucial and I am just
thinking about what big thing we can do.
I am going to
Macedonia and Romania for a few days next week to visit our
troops and also to address the Romanians. When I come back,
will do a couple of days on the Irish thing.
JG1
I
The President:
Great.
I go to Germany next week.
Germany is
the one country where we have people flying and doing
humanitarian operations and there are refugees, and Schroeder
has the EU Presidency. My guys asked me not to go down to
Aviano because it,would be too disruptive, so I'll honor that.
J,Z)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think Germany is just the right
place to go next week.
If you give a message of public support,
it will be very important.
J21
The President:
Yes,
He's been good to stay with us.
There's a
big article in the paper today, "Germans Seek to Separate Serb
Leader From support." It's in The New York Times.
I can't
tell, but it looks like they're trying to set him up for war
crimes.
I want to talk to Gerhard about it.
I'll have somebody
fax that to you.
k&t
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
Just before we go.
our people should think about. I
Three things
1
£gCRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�7
SECRE'f'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
I will get on all of them and talk to ..
you.
If you want to talk over the weekend, I'm available.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for the weekend.
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�3ECRE'f
THE WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
..s
z
""
-<e
Telcon with Biitish Prime Minister Blair
(U)
~
[fj
PARTICIPANTS:
...:l
-<e
The President
Prime Minister Blair
""
~
Notetakers: Doug Bayler, Bonnie Glick,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 4, 1999, 1:29 - 1:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
-<e
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The President:
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How did you do on your trip?
(U)
(U)
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How are you?
~
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Prime Minister Blair: It was good. It was extraordinary,
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really. They've got a lot of problems in the refugee camps, and . .:l "" ~ -<e...:l
I am trying to help them set up another in Macedonia. Things
~~q ~~
c:l ..... "" ..... c:l
are pretty difficult there, because the refugees keep coming in. ~________~
But no, it was good. And the thing with the Romanian parliament
went well. It was good. We have also got good contacts with
the Kosovar people now. I met some leading people there, and
they've got quite a formidable network there, so we tapped into
all that.- How are you doing? How are you getting on? -\-&r
The President: Fine. I met yesterday with Chernomyrdin for a
long time, theu he met for an even longer time with Al Gore last
night, and Sandy, and then they met again this morning. I think
that Chernomyrdin's involvement is a chance to move Belgrade
toward our position, but we need to get Moscow moving in that
direction. I
I
/ I explained
to him what was necessary for this to be a success.
I told him we need a timetable on
withdrawal, as well as a commitment to an international security
SECRE'I'
Reason: 1.5 (a,j.:>,d)
~_
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
force.
I
We sald he has to
commit to get all his forces out, then we can talk about a
presence symbo}ic of Serbian sovereignty. )21
We had a long talk about the rationale for an international
security force with NATO at its core and the rapid deployment
capability, to keep the Serbs and Albanians from clashing. I do
think he understands that if we are not in there, the peaceful
Albanians won't go back and the guerrillas will, and we'll all
be back where we are in six to eight months. I think he
understands. I
I
The only other thing is, the G8 political directors yesterday
was pretty good, except they talked about an international
authorized by the UN.
u
e1ne 1S trY1ng to have it redrafted to avoid
any 1mp 1cation that we're undermining the common requirements
of NATO. That is kind of where the diplomacy is. Sandy and the
rest of the Foreign Policy Team will review this 30-day
strategic campaign plan -- and I got your message the other day
-- and we'll share it with you. And we're making the
arrangements for the secure video teleconferencing between our
teams. So, we're kind of rocking along here. But I'm concerned
with Milosevi9's peace initiative and his release of the POWs
and the collateral damage, which is getting publicity. I'm
worried about Allied unity. I feel good about continuing this
for months, if necessary, but we've got to keep everybody else
in harness. Milosevic is in more trouble than we think, or he
wouldn't be going to all this trouble to stop the bombing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
Yes.
+SJ
What do you think? -\-&t
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�3ECRE'l'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree entirely.
First, the military
campaign is going a bit better, and I think it's beginning to do
real damage.
Taking out the power stations and blacking out
Belgrade .real19 made a difference.
The President:
They were too wimpy on the NATO thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
+Bt
You've just got to be careful.J
I I thlnk It's necessary to have constantly -~a~n~d"I~am~-tr=r~y7l~n~g~t~o get it sorted at this end -- people who go up
and talk to those refugees -- everyone has a horror story to
tell.
The most horrible things have been going on in there.
I
don't know whether public opinion in other countries is
different -- ours is pretty solid -- but most people, if they
think the campaign is beginning to work, will hold with it.
k5i
The President:- Also, there is going back, and there is going
back.
If they don't think it's strong and reliable and gives
them autonomy, even if you and I were there, we would have a
problem with the military elements.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. But, Bill, what is your frank
assessment about how much damage we are prepared to do in the
next month to two months? Ir--~--------~~~--------------------)~
I
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SEC'tl::E'f
;-
�4
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
.
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
J2f
I
The President:
I think we should stick where we are.
The
Europeans feel strongly about it.
I don't feel strongly, I
could go either way, but I have been publicly strong about
leaving it in the country, because I don't want to be accused of
having a campaign for a greater Albania and disrupt the frontline states.
I think we ought to hang in there. The rest of
the EU have been pretty adamant against independence and we
ought to hang in there with them on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
True. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
First of all, I strongly agree with that, and we
hammered Chernomyrdin on that. Let me tell you how I look at
this; I think it might also be helpful on the presentational
aspect in Europe.
I rarely talk about Kosovo now that I don't
talk about Bosnia.
It took us almost four years to get that
together and get Dayton. We defeated ethnic cleansing, but we
did not reverse it, because so many refugees were not going
home. The Kosovars have to be able to go home. We not only
have to defeat. it, we have to reverse it. When I remind people
of our work in Bosnia, I think it reinforces it.
I've got a
full-time person now doing nothing but Kosovo public affairs and
getting these stories out. What I think we need to look at is,
either we should have some more of those people -- should we put·
more people on it? It's delicate; it's in other countries where
this problem exits.
I don't want to mess on people's turf.
Maybe talk to D'Alema and others about it.
It would help if
there were more of these people in the Italian press and other
3Ee~ET
�SECRET
5
countries that are getting a lot of pressure, in the Spanish and
Portuguese press and others.
k81
Prime Minister-Blair:
Is your thinking that public opinion is
going soft in those countries? ~
The President:
I think it's softer in those than ours and I
don't know if they have a strategy for dealing with it.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I
o
lng
campaign, one thing I hope will happen, now
we have hit and
taken out most of the bridges, I think we may be able to focus
more on power systems. And, looking at all hours at more
military targets, that will reduce further horror stories about
collateral damage, like the bus that got hit on the bridge.
That is, we can do more, more freely and with fewer civilian
problems.
f.-81
One thing I said here that sends a good message, that shows our
resolve:
I just comment on the weather, that the weather is
better in June than in May and July is better than June. All
you've got to do is say that. Psychologically, it's a very good
thing to say, and I've said it a couple of times.
(S)
One or two other things -- we're going to open another camp in
Albania, like you are in Macedonia.
If it appears we've been
too reluctant here and we haven't done enough there, this thing
could spin out of control on us and collapse our timetable. We
don't want opponents to be able to say we didn't do enough
there, so we've got to bring them here. We just have to work on
it.
I leave this afternoon for Belgium and Germany, so I'll
check with you when I get back, or maybe while I'm there.
I'll
see Dehaene and Schroeder. )Z!
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, the Macedonian situation with the
refugees is ve~y worrying. We're trying to get unblocked some
European money.
I talked to Michel Camdessus about the IMF
position on Macedonia.
I'm trying to get Macedonia to agree to
a big transit camp to drain off the problem, and we're also
taking some more ourselves. But I think we really have to watch
Macedonia. ,~
The President:
I do, too.
I'm worried about the politics of
Macedonia. The government could collapse and consensus could
SECRE'P
�3ECRET
6
disappear. The countr~ is so small and so poor.
could chan e that. ~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister-Blair:
The president:
I
]
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
this. /
These numbers
~
We've got to just manage them through
I
\
"J
Kosovo 1S about
that is, it's
it's not unimaginably large. ,-----.
L..,t;:-h=e--:::s"'l-;:z;-::e""-;o""t"-"'t't::h-:::e"-;:c::-::o~u;-;n"'t"..y:-;--::::o-':f""""yr.:'"'r::"1k""'s"'h""l::-r=e--::"l-=nc-rE""n:-:g=-rra
"'n::ld,
o
not small, -but it's not vast:
The President:
I agree, there is a chance of that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's bullshit, and we know it. We want,
obviously if we could, to get out where Russia plays a bigger
role and a pos1tive role. That will reinforce the position of
the progressives within Russia and s-tabilize the situation and
have a good lead into the 2000 elections. I also think it will
help us keep the Alliance together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If we can achieve our objectives of having
defeated and reversed ethnic cleansing and kept the Alliance
together -- with the ties between Russia and the West stronger,
not weaker. That might be too much to hope for.
(~
SECRET
�7
:3EGRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be a full hand.
great thing to achieve. I
It would be a
----'I That's where the people are on tnlS. ,)$)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
I agree.
xei
Prime Minister Blair: Hillary is going to the camps, is she?
..(-87-
The President:
Yes.
.J.G-'J
Prime Minister Blair: Her presence and the pictures that will
come out of that -- all the time, we've got to repersuade
people, remind them, really. You know the public attention
span. We had a terrible nail bomb thing going off in London
ut for four ays,
Kosovo ceased to be in people's minds. We have to persuade them
about it. Littleton happened and obviously the whole of America
s tar t s to ref 0 cus .
.4-Gt"
=--:::------:---------.1
~.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
rl
The President: We didn't want Jesse to be able to bring out
those soldiers, because people would feel we had to do a good
turn.
I mean, we got three guys going home, but a million can't
go home. -f€-T
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a constant, constant business. Her
going to the camps will make a big difference. When you go and
talk to them, then you realize what you have to do.
~
The President:
Alright, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
you soon.
(U)
The President:
(U)
Have a good time in Germany.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation.
·SECRB'P
Speak to
�THE WHITE HOUSE
.
WASHINGTON'
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcen with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 8, 1999, 3:26 - 3:46 p.m. EDT
Air Force One
Tony, can you hear me?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Yes, you're on Air Force One are you?
This was a "great" day wasn't it?
I
am afraid these things happen.
That's what I said too.
...(-e}
J.Q-'r
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I t is bad, but we have just got to steady
our nerves on it, really. ..f.Et
The President:
Yes, that's what I did.
I just went out and
made a statement saying that we hit several important command
and contreltargets, and that the damage to the' Chinese Embassy
and the death~ and injuries were completely inadvertent.
I
extended deep regrets to the people and the leaders of China but
said it is important to remember why the strikes were necessary
and how to put an end to them. -k8r
They asked about the Chinese and Russian r.eactions and whether
it could derail the diplomatic efforts we're making toward a
peace deal.
I said I hoped not because that was the quickest
way to get it over with and I restated the conditions and
pointed out that we'd done over 10,000 sorties and because TV is
8ECRE'f
Reason:
1. 5 Ca, b, dL ' .
.
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:~~T~~LIB:\~Y PHOTOCO,~Y_J.
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2
in Belgrade, they could cite every time there's unintended
consequences, but our pilots have literally risked their lives
to avoid hitting innocent civilians in Serbia -- shot at from
rooftops and in the middle of civilian areas, they have not
responded.
They have done everything they could to dodge the
weapons and go on. We have to remember what caused these
strikes and what could end them, but our conditions have to be
met. No one would like to stop them more than me. Jei
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is absolutely right.
The TV cameras
are not in Kosovo but if they were, they would be seeing people
killed every day by Serbs, by Milosevic.
~
The President: Yes.
If we had one TV picture of the 15 men
being roped together and burned alive, they would be demanding
that we bomb the hell out of them, people would be wondering why
we haven't leveled the place, but our people need to be telling
that to the media all the time. ~
Prime Minister Blair: What I'did today was to get the NATO
conference to go through all the atrocities in the last two weeks in Kosovo. We did a press conference on the same theme.
I understand when something like this happens, people get very
nervous about it, but day after day after day, things are
happening without any cameras and no one reports a bit of it.
Milosevic can take the cameras to wherever he likes and point to
these things.
But in Kosovo this is a daily happening, as a
result of deliberate policy, not as an accident. J.e1"
The President:
I am with you.
I just wanted to check in to
make sure we're on the same page. -0?r
Prime Minister Blair:
ri ht thing.
No doubt, Bill.
I'm sure you've said the
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I am with you.
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
,
"
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRET
3
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
That is right.
They asked, 'What about the
Russians and Chinese saying this was barbaric?#
I said it was
not barbaric but a tragedy.
We ought to take that word and turn
it on them. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
You are absolutely right.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Let me ask a couple of questions.
In Germany, I
did what you suggested.
I did an hour interview with the press
people from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Macedonia and
Albania. Did it get press coverage? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
AbsDlutely, it got a lot of coverage.
-t-etThe President:
I think we all need to do more of that, reaching
into other countries.
One other thing, when I was there, I did
a lot of spade work with our people working on humanitarian
stuff about Macedonia, with the view as quickly as possible of
turning Maedonia into a way-station and you know telling them we
would move all of the refugees through there.
We would need to
get Turkey to~gree to take about 100,000, get safe passage for
them to Turkey.
I believe we have enough money to do this.
If
my supplemental passes the Senate this coming week, and I think
it will, what we would like to do is go to Turkey, with whatever
help we get from Europe, and build these camps.
We could build
camps for 20,000 which are quite comfortable with public space,
schools. They are tents, but nice tents. Also, if worse comes
to worse, they can be winterized with wooden floors and heaters.
They would be quite adequate.
Obviously, it would be better to
get them to Turkey anyway because the climate is better. )£1
SECRE'l.'
f.
�4
SECRE'f
Then we could build a couple of camps in Macedonia; it would be
easier to secure a throughway if we could get them direct cash
...
to the government in a hurry -- which you could do quicker than
me through the EU -- then tell them we want to make Macedonia a
throughway, not permanent stops for refugees. We will be able
to get the numbers manageable and stabilize this thing in the
next few weeks.
If they know where we were going, they'd do a
lot better to hold and fend off domestic opponents. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree. That is an excellent
idea and I will do everything to facilitate it.
I spoke to
Santer about getting European money released.
The critical
priority is to get money as quickly as possible that will buy
their goodwill for forward transit to Turkey. We need to talk
to Greece as well, but that is an excellent idea and eXactly
what we need to be doing. ~
The President:
When' does Prodi take over? ...l8f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's not quite clear, not for a couple of
months.
I should think we need to get santer to work on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
necessary, we
from the EU.
Santer in the next
The President:
too.
W
If
money ourselves and then get it back
need money quickly.
I will speak to
of days. ~
If I get my money this week; I will ship some
Prime Minister Blair:
If I get the money there, we'll have the
goodwill to facilitate all of this.
I totally agree this is the
right thing to do if Turkey is willing to do it. ~
The President: We can put these camps up in a hurry for 20,000
people for about $20 million by the time you clear the land,
work sewage, water and all that. That is $1,000 a person,
that's not aIr that much. ..(..&1Prime Minister Blair: When you consider weapons and everything,
it is a pretty sensible investment. ~
The President:
I will work on this and get your guys in touch
with our guys.
We have to get money to Macedonia and Turkey to
take 100,000, build transit camps in Macedonia that are
physically separate and secure a commitment to build camps in
Turkey and then get safe passage. We also need to get money to
SECRE'f
�8ECRET
Albania.
5
They've taken a lot in homes now, but we need better
(.£-1-"
Prime Minister Blair: Right. We need to watch in Albania,
particularly because a lot of refugees are living with families
and are not getting any support. /
L......,,...,,_:::;-_ _ _ _---;-~;----...JI
I f necessary we can CiO 1 t ourse.L ves
with Germany and France and get it back from the EU. ~
The President:
Does -it? .~
The EU Parliament doesn't have to vote on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: What if you got a letter from every EU member to
Santer saying release it tomorrow? Would it help? J81
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it would help. In the end, we
should probably just give them the money ourselves and then get
it back from the EU.
LM
The President: Do we need to call anyone else about this
incident with China to buck them up? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I was going to speak to D'Alema anyway.
(S)
The President:
Okay, I will call Jacques.
US)
Prime Minister Blair: I still think that in the end, the public
understands t~at in war these things happen. We have this
operation in NATO and SHAPE workin better now.
e medla is just bored with picttires of refugees. We
need actual pictures of what is happening in KoSovo. ~~~~~~_~_~~~
The President: Okay, I will work on that.
great ideas but I'll work on it. ~
3ECREI
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I don't have any
�£ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair: There are ways we could do it. We are
looking at, but I think people, all the time, need to be
J>
reminded of the basic principles. When I went to Macedonia and
saw those people, any doubt immediately leaves you. What has
happened to these people is just dreadful.
We need to make all_
the right diplomatic moves, but just carryon. ~
The President:
I'm with you. Where are we on Ireland? kG1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnls er B alr:
We got a little bit of a breakthrough
last week, because Sein Fein came up with far more positive
language. .1
1 I have a totally
different proposition which is based on words rather than
product and now I have to say to them you may not get product,
but you may get better words.
~
Sinn Fein may say, ~you've got better words, we want an answer
tomorrow."
For six months, we've been trying to get better
words. You can't rush. We actually had a good series of
meetings at Downin on Thursda and there is some possibilty
there.
But we're not quite
~y~e~t~a~tZ-~a~n~a~b~s~~~u~t~e~~c~r~i't~l~c~a~~~~~--~~e~n~it is at a critical
moment, if you are willing to do so, to help.
It may take in
the end,· a high profile intervention in this.
j.ZJ I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes.
I will do whatever you want me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
I know Bill. You've been fantastic on
this.
I will try to bring this to a boil next week and will
keep in touch.
(eJ
SECREt
.(.e)
�7
13gCRE'J:'
The President:
I'll keep working on all of this and if I need
to call you again I will.
yn
Prime Minister"'Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
SECRE'f
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Joel Schrader,
Miles Murphy, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti,
James Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 1999, 10;10 - 10:22 a.m. EDT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
I am fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
What's happening?
(U)
How's the indictment going down over there?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
So, anyway, I sent
you a note setting out my thoughts.
I don't know whether it's
reached you yet, I just finished it this morning, but I think
the situation is, we are doing a lot of damage, but I think
�2
we're right to be stepping up the pressure.
We've got to be.
%
The President:
This planning process has got to proceed,
because we only have a few days before deciding what else to do
but I think 45,000 troops for KFOR is quite good. The more
people we have deployed in the area, the more quickly we can
move.
I agree entirely with you; we· obviously can't afford to
lose and have to keep doing everything necessary to make him
think that we're ready to intervene and no matter what we can't
afford ,to lose. But the combination of the impact of last
week's strikes and the fact that the NAC has voted to let NATO
increase the number of targets that will be hit and the nature
of them and the buildup will give us maximum pressure.
I agree
with you, I don't care what happens to him, whether he stays
there or goes someplace as you've said, like Belarus, it's all
right with me if we get our objectives met. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Because you save lives by doing that.
I
think we are in just about the right frame and it probably
hasn't reached you yet, but I have set out in a note what I
think you can do if we have to go a step further -- how you
would explain that and how you would take people with you. You
can set it in
er vision for the Balkans and how it's good
for people.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That may be.
wouldn't do that.
E.O.13526 section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think he would.
J&r
He has been very tough on this so far. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he has and I think they will come
along with us.
The problem is, until you see a real plan,
3ECRE'f
�SECRET
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
you're a bit in the dark on this.
So, I think if we get a
clear military consensus, I think people would go with that.
yr
The President:
The military consensus is 175,000 to 200,000
troops, at least that's what our people say, so we could
probably do it with less. But one thing we've found out is the
more we send in, the fewer will die. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
i81
The Fresident:
So the more unattractive we make it, the safer
it is for everyone. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
That is a big problem.
They're reeling around.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I think we need to let this
thing percolate for a day or two and see what the reaction in
Serbia is.
There's some chance it will be helpful, and there is
a chance that it will be harmful; I would be surprised if it had
no impact.
So I think we'll see something fairly soon.
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
The President:
I agree with that.
J21
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
.3ECRE'f
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes, I agree with that. Hillary and I are
taking a couple of days off, and I am mulling that over right
now. My gut feeling is that I have to give something sooner
rather that later. Unless it cracks in two or three days, it's'
better to say something very strong, that we have no intention
of losing this. Now the good news about the indictment, Tony,
is that is makes it less forgiveable for us to lose it. No one
can say, 'Oh well, they're just nationalists." I think it is
interesting that apparently the whole indictment is premised on
Kosovo and shows a systematic government policy. I thought in
the beginn:i..ng that if she (Louise Arbour) did do this, some
might be based on his role in the Bosnia slaughters. But
apparently it's all based on Kosovo. It's quite interesting.
And apparently -- I haven't seen it, but apparently it says that
it's more than chain of command, it's specific personal things
he ordered, not that he was just the head of the apparatus.
This will be quite helpful in makin that case. I a ree with
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
away and
lS ma lng lt lmpossible for everyone
see people are not going to walk away.
Prime Minister Blair: I th~k that is right.
haven't got this yet -- ()n
The President:
second. ..(-B-1
I just got it.
I just read it.
walk
V1
As I say, you
Just this
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Good. Well, I will be back in a few days and
get back with you on that, and we'll keep our fingers crossed.
I think the NAC did the right thing by approving a new range of
targets. JZ1'
SECRET
�PECRE!
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think it has been a good few days.
%
The President:
Alright, I will talk to you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
:;,gCRE'f
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, George Chastain,
Frank Jarosinski, Miles Murphy, Don Cheramie
and Lawrence Butler
June 3, 1999, 6:42 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Let's hope it sticks.
The President:
Yes, I hope it will.
best answer.
(U)
(U)
I think you and I gave the
Prime Minister Blair: Here (Cologne) it's like trying to stamp
down a bush fire.
(U)
The President:
There are a lot of unanswered questions. Maybe
72 hours from now we can celebrate, but we will all look stupid
if it turns into a red herring by Milosevic. My response today
was 'welcome, but cautious." ).81'"
Prime Minister Blair: As I said tonight, of course, the fact
that we got an agreement was great news,but it has to be done,
it has to be implemented and some trick questions have to be
answered in the right way.
I E.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
Academy speech. +eI
I turned up the heat at my Air Force
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5 (a;b, d ) .
.
.~~~ __
'_-~'?-."'
Declassify on:! 61!::~r "'J'·:-,.;.r~· - - - ,
.
Ii
!".
I~:r?N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1-
~:'..'-::.::~.,...::~!~~_:....;,. .-:-c~--..,:--~~L. ~" ,:'"c.;-;>-~, __~./·"';(-.;
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2
Prime Minister Blair:
you've been dotn .
Absolutely, I think its critical what
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We have a new problem, but we should be careful··
on this line.
Sometime in the next 72 hours I need to talk to
you about the planning process. Do you think over the next 72
hours we can talk about this? Do you think we could talk secure
over the weekend? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President:
Just tell them they can dance around a Maypole - you'll hold it up for them while they dance. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
should only rejoice when
We
The President: He's been a champ. Chernomyrdin has been good
too and for the Russians this is good too.
They have come out
well. ..(-et"
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think it is a good thing for
Russia.
They came out extremely well. ~
The President:
It makes them look like a world leader. They
don't want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. This
should help them with their economic stabilization.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He is getting a lot of
criticism at home.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I mostly agree with that. Absolutely
right, people tonight are talking far more positively about them
and asking what we can do to help the Russians in economic
terms.
It really changes the atmosphere there, doesn't it? ~
The President: Yes, it certainly does. The other thing that
they and the Serbs should think about is that this saves us a
hell of a lot of money that can be used on development, the
money we would save from putting in a ground force. Also, the
main thing we need to do is look like we remain determined.
~
SECRET
��4
3ECRE'f
The President: Apparently, they are meeting on Saturday. He
wanted to wait-until Sunday probably to find out how much wiggle
factor, wiggle room he had. They pushed for Sunday and we
pushed him back to Saturday. ,.ke)
Prime Minister Blair: There is no reason they can't meet
tomorrow from NATO's point of view.
~
The President: Saturday is the earliest day we can get Wes to
meet them.
(i)
Prime Minister Blair:
Serbs to meet.
(-e1
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
This is the quickest we could get the
Un
I don't like that very much.
+et
The President: We may know Sunday or Monday where we are.
Maybe you and I could talk on Sunday. I need to talk to you
~
about the other option. There is good news and bad news.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�8ECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Pr.ime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 12:32 - 12:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
tied down.
(V)
How are you?
(U)
I'm anxious until this thing is properly
The President:
This is exactly what I was afraid of. A bombing
pause and then they would try to steal the peace now that we
have won the war. The position is that the Russians and Chinese
won't let a Security Council Resolution go through until there
is a bombing pause, but we won't pause unless there is clear
evidence of withdrawal.
Funny, but I understand the Serb
position; they don't want a vacuum so when their withdrawal
starts, they want us to come in. Yesterday, our guys said ~you
begin withdrawal, we will pause and try for one day to get a
Security Council Resolution.
If the Chinese and Russians won't,
we'll get a NATO accord and move in immediately." .k81
That was our position yesterday. Today, the Serbs came back and
said they couldn't live with this.
They want a Security Council
Resolution that links the authority to deploy and the authority
to run the country under the UN; if there is a delay, we'll
return to our pre-conflict force levels before we invaded until
the Security Council works it out. That's a nightmare and we
can't let that happen.
They're trying to steal the peace after
we won the conflict.
I know you agree with that.
I am going to
3ECRE':P
Reason:
1.S(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
6();'{9!!.fl~:-:----~---·-- -------~-,<, .
i~b~NLI~RARY PHOTOCOPY '-'s~~ ."
�SECRET
2
call D'Alema.
I don't know what to do except tell our guys to
hang tough. Ahtisaari delayed his China trip.
I)t)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I just talked to Ahtisaari.
What did he say?
J31
yi)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: !
I
The President:
I'm not against that.
+&r
Prime Minister Blair: I said I wanted to think about
talk to ou.
If we ask him he would 0 do that toni
The President:
Good for him.
and
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
I
The President:
Yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: What do we lose? My guy down there,
Michael Jackson, is a good bloke, but he is a general not a
negotiator. J$t
The President:
I think Ahtisaari made a good impression on
Milosevic.
I haven't talked to Sandy, Madeleine or anyone about
him going down. But I worry about this thing dragging on.
I'm
not worried about sending a signal; we need to get this going
while the iron is hot. 1St
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
M
The President:
SECREr
Absolutely, I'm in total agreement on
You talk to your guys.
I'll talk to mine.
)Sf
�3
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Martti I'd get back to him in an
hour.
If we want to have a chat to our folks and have them
chat..
The President:
I agree.
nervous as hell all da .
from us.
I've been waiting for this.
I've been
We can't let him take the eace away
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree 100 percent.
The President: We owe it to these people (the Kosovars), and
don't forget that they (the Serbs) are asking us to eat a hell
of a lot of shit. Now that they want us to sweep out Thaqi and
the KLA and give this Authority five years to work, our crowd is
going to be at some physical risk too. We have to think down
the road here.
Look at Bosnia four years later. We're taking
on a lot of water here.
If we can spring some money from the
IMF and the World Bank ... but there are all kinds of hurdles
with that.
Well, you and I are in the same place. We can't let
our folks get weak on this.
If the Europeans stay hitched on
this, we should be okay in a day or two.
I might give Chretien
a call too.
He has a lot of friends over there in Europe.
I
know he agrees with us. We may have to do some hand holding on
this.
1.21
Prime Minister Blair:
[
I agree.
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'll tell you what I'll do.
I'll call Sandy now
and talk to our guys and then I'll try to call D'Alema, and
decide who else I should call.
If there is any other problem,
I'll be available.
It's sunny here.
I may go out, but I'll
have phones with me. ~
SECREg:}
�SECRE~
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I have some people I really trust out
there at the negotiations. Okay, our people will be in touch .
.J.&tThe President:
If this thing is going to be drug out for
another 72 hours or so, we may also need a story about how our
planning is continuing. We have to put a squeeze on and we
can't let them get the peace. Okay, we have a vigorous
agreement going here, so we don't need to waste time.
I'll talk
to Sandy and we'll be in touch. Goodbye. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
"'~""'--~~------.-
--- ----
•• - -
:~~",~N LIBRARY PHO:OCOPY
~ ........ !
I
�SECRET·
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H 11\1 (:iTO 1\1
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 63
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony C~mpanella, Michael
Manning, Robin Rickard, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
June 7, 1999, 9:55 - 10:06 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
what I know? . (U)
The President:
Yep.
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi Bill.
Now do you want me to tell you
(U)
The talks broke off.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Do you see
what I mean?
k81
�2
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes.
I completely agree with everything you've
said.
The key here is where the Russians are on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
just have to be tough as hell with them.
accord with where you are. )<r,(
We
I am completely in
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECl\E:T
�8ECRE'P
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yep. We are in the same place Tony, and we've
got to tough it out and get a good UN draft. Ma be I am
sensitive, but let me say something.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
OK?
Prime Minister Blair:
)-51
OK Bill. /
I
The President:
with you.
?l
I am going to call Yeltsin as soon as I hang up
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I agree to that.
hold to it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
morning.
aECRET
Yes.
Do you think the Allies will
I spoke with Schroeder this
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Alright. Let's hang ip there.
develops tonight I might call you.
kS)
If anything
Prime Minister Blair: I might trouble you again if I get a firm
readout on the Russians. If there is something we need to talk
about then we can talk again.
(S)
The President:
Thank you.
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye
(U)
The President:
(U)
Alright.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
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�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 9:09 - 9:27 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hey, I just called to say thanks, it's been a
good run.
Life's greatest curse is the answer to our prayers;
now we have to figure out how to get all those people back in,
without getting blown up by all those landmines.
I had Elie
Wiesel here -- do you know him?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President:
He's a Holocaust survivor, and an advisor.
I
sent him to some of the camps, and he said, ~boy, there is so
much anger there.
Every Kosovar believes he knows the Serb who
ousted him."
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, it's going to be tough, isn't it?
tell you what, it could be a lot worse.
(U)
The President:
Well, it's quite wonderful.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: At least now it will be a problem of
construction instead of destruction.
(U)
The President: We've just got to hold everybody together and
keep working on it.
(U)
SECRET
I
�SECRET
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
~~~~~~~~~-'__-nvr________________________~[line drops, and
is reestablished.
The President:
Hey, Tony, I'm sorry.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, no, it's our fault.
person who dropped the line executed.
(U)
I'll have the
[Laughs]
The President:
We're trying to think through the
obvious questions, about how fast we can get people back in and
clear out the landmines, and we need to flush out Macedonia
first. -1-e:I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, we have to keep working on that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am, too.
There are not a lot of places he can
go, given his indictment by the war crimes tribunal. Maybe
Russia or Belarus would take him, or maybe he'd get a Pinochet
deal and leave him in Serbia. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
/~--------~-------------------~==~~~~I
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
L -_ _ _ _ _.
The President:
Yeah, we can't do that.
We need to look at
basic humanitarian conditions, and make sure the lights are on
by winter,/
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
\ ______~============~/
L
SECRE'P
.~
,
I
�3
SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have to do that, too. Frankly, I don't know
what else I can do. I've been reading about it all through
this, because my daughter just happens to be doing a paper on
Adams. I don't know what the real deal is between him and the
IRA. It'phard to put pressure on him when you don't know
. what's going on. It's just bizarre.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We've got to keep working on it, and I'll do whatever
you want me to do.
yr:).
Let me say this: we sent out our top people to NATO for Kosovo,
we need to do the same thing with getting the refugees back and
setting up a government. Whatever the formal structure, we have
to put our best people in to set up the mechanics and make this
thing work. There are literally thousands of detail questions
that we have to answer. ~
Prime Minister Blair: \
~
'----------~/
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)
The major concern I have about the
person on top is I want someone with confidence and energy to do
this thing.· I want someone to go there and stay. --fG+Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: The commander of the overall military is going
to be British, isn't h.e? I think he's good. I haven't met him,
but I've seen him on TV. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
2ECRET
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
SECRET
The President: Anyway, this won't require our obsession like
the battle, but it will require our attention for the next 10
days.
(Z).
Prime Minister Blair:
Cologne meeting? JRr
Right, well, Bill, you'll be over for the
The President:
Yeah, when we come to Cologne, we should have
major questions to answer as a body. We need to boost Yeltsin
and his pro-reform forces.
I wish we could resuscitate
Chernomyrdin, and I realize this may be more water than we can
carry.
J,.e1
I'd like to have him and Ahtisaari there to receive our thanks.
We may want to think about this.
They did a hell of a job for
us.
I think we also ought to think about some other things at
Cologne. We need to have good positions coming out of Cologne
for debt relief, and because of compound interest and falling
incomes, I think it will be a big deal there. We also need to
do more on the AIDS issue. According to our people, one percent
of the people in the world have AIDS.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
In Africa the numbers are staggering, and
in a country like South Africa it's just massive.
(ei
The President: And you've got 60 million people more or less,
and 35 million in Africa, and the number is going to double in
the next four years. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Yeah, let's see where they are with the World
Bank. Russia collapsed politically and economically after .1995.
It also deteriorated with Yeltsin's health problems even though
he was reelected in 1996. )Qt
[Line drops and is reestablished.]
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Solana is on TV.
(U)
You need to go to the press now.
Prime Minister Blair: Right, I'm sorry about that.
Let's speak before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Yeah we need to talk.
(U)
Okay, yes.
�~ECRE'P
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Right, let's talk again before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
aEGRE'f
�CON'FIlJEM'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 65
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Joel Ehrendreich, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti
June 21, 1999, 2:26 - 2:33 p.m. EDT
Ljubljana, Slovenia
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
your soldiers.
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, I called to tell you I'm sorry about
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much.
It's very kind of you
to call. We're still trying to find out the details.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
(U)
[Call dropped and reestablished.]
The President:
You're still trying to get the news?
seen is what's on CNN.
(U)
All I've
Prime Minister Blair: We don't know how much more than that at
the moment.
It appears one of them was a sergeant, and they
were trying to demine a school, and a mine went off.
I'm afraid
we're going to see quite a bit of this before it's all through.
(U)
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on:;
J.
�2
COl,PIDEfi"'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
They said it might have been more like a
booby trap than a traditional mine.
It's difficult to tell
whether they're deactivated.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: And it was in a school, I think. Well,
they're pretty sick, actually. As more comes out about these
Serb soldiers, it really is unbelievable.
(U)
~~~~~~~~~~~
The President:
There was a show
are at America and me. Our guys
interviewed with yesterday seems
close to showing the truth about
They're going to have to come to
. Prime Minister Blair:
on CNN on how mad the Russians
told me this TV station I
to be the only one that came
what Milosevic was up to.
grips with it.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think in the near term we have to check the
schedule by which our people are moving in. There was also a
special about the French troops trying to separate the Serbs and
the Kosovars. JR1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President: Well, I won't keep you.
I feel like we had a
good G-8.
I just wanted you to know I'm sorry about your men.
(U)
That's kind of you, Bill.
I thought we
Prime Minister Blair:
had a good G-8, too.
So you're off to Macedonia tomorrow?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I'm going to a state dinner in Macedonia
[n.b., the President meant Slovenia] tonight, and Djukanovic,
I'll give you a readout in
the Montenegrin President, is here.
a couple of days. )ei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Goodbye, Tony.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CmtFIDEHTL".L
(U)
�CONFIDBNTL"tL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Joel Ehrendreich,
Rob Williams, Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3D, 1999, 3:14 - 3:22 p.m. EDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty grim.
(U)
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(qJ
Declassify On:!
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
do now? j...G-Y
What exactly do the unionists want Sinn Fein to
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~
L - - - -_ _ _ _
The President:
That way the IRA doesn't look like it's
surrendering to the unionists? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONn DEN'!' IAL
�3
COktFI DENT IAb
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like you could manage this marching
thing if you could solve the bigger problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Which means i f they meet all the local people's
conditions, they could march. JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
J
I
I
The President:
Are you going back to the meeting now?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
J,e1
~
The president:
Do you want me to call them in a couple of hours
-- Adams and Trimble? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
Right now?
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-----------------~/
The President:
Why don't I monitor it from here?
~
IrE-.O-.1"C":3-52-6-,-se-c-ti-on-1,-4(-b-)(---'d)l
CONFI DEN''l'IAL
�4
CGNF I DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I will check in where I am in 20 minutes to see
if they're through. JBr
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President:
If they're in a meeting, I will wait until they
finish to call them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
They, the unionists?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J&r
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Okay, I'm on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks, Bill.
Goodbye.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
(U)
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CO~IFIDEN'fIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
I
'I
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 67
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM~-F-TELEPHONE-C:ONVERSATI~O~N~--------------~
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999, 9:25 - 9:38 p.m. CDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
You are where you were last time we talked,
aren't you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
"'===:;======~:;;""'=~--":"----'
The President:
I know.
take my call now? .Jrf?'r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
It's just terrible.
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Make a counterproposal?
Prime Minister Blair:
Will Trimble even
~
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
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Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is that their counterproposal one?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is Gerry Adams saying in response?
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You mean put that through Parliament?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
!
What did he say?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President: Do you think keeping them up all night will get
them weary and make them give in? ~
cmlFI DENT L'\L
�3
CONFI DENT L",L
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
You mean let them get a little sleep . ...+8-
Prime Minister Blair:
\
Yes . \
[
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Is there anything I
can say to Gerry Adams? Anyth~ng
e
states can offer
them to help them politically to move closer to where Trimble
is? You know I actually have far more popularity within the
Catholic community than the Protestant community. Most of the
Protestants think I am a turncoat.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You offered him an act of Parliament, right?
.JR!I
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDE~lTIAL
�cmIFIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
So, they are not a judge of it?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
____________________________~I .ye1
I
Do you think Trimble will take that?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~I
God, I think that is the best deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
I
But Gerry thinks that is like crying uncle.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Especially if Great Britain can be the guarantor
of both sides.
If you have legal authority; they won't
understand that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes. So I should tell Adams that Trimble will
help him work through that? ~
�5
COHFI DEN'fIPrL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this.
a halt until tomorrow morning?
(Z)
Are you going back to call
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I have a little fiddling around to
do, but probably in the next quarter hour. ~
The President:
Do you believe I should call in the next half
hour or let them sleep first? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I would call them now.
~
The President:
Okay, I will start to call them. My national
security people are in if you need to call me in the middle of
the night.
I know what to say now. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will try to call them now.
~
The President: You think I might be able to get them in the
next ten minutes?
yc)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
)X'r
The President:
Okay, I am getting ready to get on the plane, so
(U)
let me see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Amy Swarm and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:26 - 7:58 a.m. EDT
The Residence
Hello Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Sorry, it must be early morning for you.
(U)
The President:
It's fine.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFI DEH'l'IAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Glyn T. Davies
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I talked to Adams about that for a long time.
I
spent the better part of a year trying to convince him that
ought to be his position without success. And last night I do
believe, rightly or wrongly, his belief is that he made some
significant commitments esterday about what he is
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: L-__~I=E=.O=.=13=5=26=,=se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(b=)(=d)~I____~I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CGNFIDEN'PIAb
Yes.
~
~
.,
~ '-.'~
�CON'FIDEN''fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Did they commit to follow Chastelain's
timetable? ..)-e}
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CQNFI DEN'l' IA!7
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�4
Cotifr'I Il:l!:l<f'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
that. JGt
There is no question -- I think Adams believes
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: What about the argument they can all take the
government down later, and we will all support it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFIDEH'fL'\L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�c mr FI DEN'J'IAL
5
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
My view is that is what you ought to work on.
Is there anything you can do, any stick or carrot, to shore
Trimble up? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
I do believe they are trying to help on that; I
think Gerry was open to it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that an argument
The President: Well let me ask you this.
for you to go back to a hard deadline?
(Yl"
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------------/
CGNPI DENT IAL
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
CONFIDgNTIAl,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It's crazy. The whole thing is just nuts, but I
think your·best chance is to get, based on what you say, I do
think they will accelerate the timetable.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I have talked until I am blue in
the face.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
For one thing, there has to be some
definitiveness to the commitment.
I didn't know they weren't
.{.et
more definite.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
tGr
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: But the one thing that I am now persuaded on is,
after one year of trying to make a case,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DENT 1M
�7
CONFIDEN'flt,L
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
I think that is what we need to work on, and
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
!E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)!
The President:
(U)
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�cmlFIDEHTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robin Rickard, Joel Schrader,
Don Cheremie and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:25 - 7:34 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium
Hey, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill.
finally getting somewhere. I
Hello.
Well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEWfIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (dJ
Declassify On:' 7 / !~"~' _fic~i;.,:'------ ------.--~~~.
f<.~T6N LIBl0-RY PHOTOCOPY
'"';.~~--:--'.:.~:~:-::- ..--$'-....~..~ . .:.(.,:....>--_...
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. .,'~
I think we're
�CONPIDEH'fIAL
2
The President:
Yes.
of October? ~
They say they can't do it before the end
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, they can't do it earlier.
~
The President:
It would be interesting to see if they would do
it earlier if they can get in earlier.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I can see that, actually.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm happy to. Do you want me to call tonight?
Do they know about the proposal? JZ}
CO~tFI DENTIAL
�3
CONn lJ!!:N'f IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call Trimble tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Gerry tonight?
~.
j
I
~--------------~
The President:
Because Bertie's gone back to Dublin, right?
.-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he has.
Jim can check.
;e1
The President:
I will have Jim check to see if the Irish have
talked to Gerry.
If they have, I will call him.
In any event,
I'll talk to David. When I call him, what should I say? That I
hope he takes this deal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, that's right.
I
~
'--------------~
The President:
Yes. And you will make this agreement public
tomorrow? This proposal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.}
The President: At what point tomorrow will you publicly float
this? So I could make a public comment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Our people will coordinate with
folks. Hang on just a second.
our
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes, I shouldn't talk to Gerry before the Irish.
That would be usurping. )J21'
cm1FIDE~f'l'IAL
�"
4
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Get some sleep.
~
Prime Minister Blair: You, too. I'm sorry.
It was very
helpful when you talked to them yesterday.
je1
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CQI>IFI P8HTIAL
�_CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
I
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Miles Murphy, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheremie, Doug Bayley and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 2, 1999, 6:39 - 6:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~========~----------~
The President: Yes, but old Trimble was in a good frame of
He was
mind. I was stunned. I
I ~3¥~e D l m . I J,R:)
ttc~"n ~4(d)
pretty proud of himself when
a
I
F?
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you talk to him?
JQr
The President: Yeah, I talked to him an hour ago, 30 minutes
ago. He was really upbeat, saying it's bad and it'll get worse,
but it'll get better. He went through a laundry list of who was
with him, who was against him, who was on the fence. I told him
I would call them if he wanted. I told him what we always
agreed I'd tell him. I was very encouraged to see how upbeat he
was.
vJ
Prime Minister Blair: When I left a couple of hours ago, I was
I a bit down. /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
]
I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1/5 (d,)
Declassify on:!
�CONFIDEN'l'IltL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think it is and I think he may be there now.
-+etPrime Minister Blair:
Do you mean that?/
The President: Absolutely.
I told him, give me a list; I will
call every damn one of them.
J.&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I had no idea.
~--------------------------~/
The President:
i t . ...J!C(
He said Taylor was with him, but I'm glad to do
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams was in a good humor, too.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
J
The president:
I'll keep doing it. Trimble said it will be a
real hard sell, but I think I could do it. He was really in a
very good place. That is all I know.
~
[The line dropped and was reestablished.]
The President:
Sorry.
Prime Minister Blair:
airport.
(U)
The President:
My fault.
Are you in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
CmlFIDg~ITL"<L
We got cut off.
(U)
I'm on my way back from the
(U)
Yes, I just landed.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
The President: Well, I don't know what else to say, but I think
this is great. You did great. We've just got to nurse them
now, to get them there. Gerry was happy
clam. He said he
had to make Trimble look good, one thing
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him if he wanted me to call anybody,
would call.
I
j)21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I made a statement.
I said you had issued this
proposal as a way forward and I thought it was a very good
thing, it gave them a chance to shape their own destiny and
their own government and to get rid of guns and violence for
everybody.
The United States expects everybody to comply and we
support you strongly and expect everyone who benefits to fully
comply. J,..eI
Prime Minister Blair:
And you said that on screen, did you?
JR5
The President:
Right.
Prime Minister Blair:
k€1
That will be good.
~
The President: We already got some feedback from Ireland.
was already beamed over there on CNN or something.
U?)
CONn j,)~NT H! L
It
�4
CONPIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Bl . .
The President:
Yes, even the ones who are mad at me for being
too pro-Sinn Fein, my dumping allover them will give them a
little confidence. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yeas, I will see about that. You have your
people call me back with a list. Talk to Trimble; whoever he
wants me to call, I will call.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Get yourself some sleep, you've earned it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Many, many thanks.
Thanks, I will.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'fL".L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
5298
,.13
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 71
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Ralph Sigler, Liz Rogers,
Michael Manning, Rob Williams, Joel
Ehrendreich and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 12, 1999, 10:01 - 10:14 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony, I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
P~ime Minister Blair:
I keep seeing these great pictures over
here of you in the press from your trip.
You are doing some
great sweeping tours.
(U)
The President:
I've been going through the poorest parts of
America.
People have got to realize that not everyone here is
rich.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
can say so.
(U)
It is really effective campaigning if I
The President:
I don't know exactly what kind of financing you
do to encourage British investment.
I've gotten quite a bit of
stearn behind the idea of offering the same incentives to "invest
in poor -- really poor -- neighborhoods that I've given them to
invest in developing economies overseas.
So it turns around the
argument that people gripe about giving incentives for overseas
but not giving them the same incentives to invest in our own
CONFI DEHT L1l,d;,
Classified by;
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:j 7 ;iJ~'9" ~",r",~__----"-"'"--~;"\
;t::~:~~":~RARY PHOTOCOPY ,I
>,
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reservations.
Prime Minister Blair:
here's where we are.
The President:
Interesting.
Yes, I agree.
It's getting a
Now, on the Irish issue
)<1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
CG~TF IDEN'l'IAL
�3
CGHFIDEHTI}\L
The President:
What does the Good Friday Accord say on the
timing of prisoner releases?
(~
e
Prime Minister Blair:
It says that it's in the hands of the
body thatd~als with prisoner releases and shbuld run up to
May 2000. But it also says that decommissioning should run to
May 2000 as well.
"""
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The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I got nowhere with Hume on SDLP after I talked
The President:
with you. So I don't know if I can nose around there again.
LQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Adams is still holding out the position that
nobody else should be in the executive even if it is all their
fault. .JGt"
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DEN':FIAL
�COHPIDEN''l.'IAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
. The President:
Yes, I agree with that but I don't know what
that does for you on the other side. 1er
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know either for the minute.
I
The President:
Yes, well I'll look at what is ... I think the IRA
might give some kind of commitment that there would be a
statement after July 15. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CQWFIDg~ITL'lrL
I R.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COWFWENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
tf)
Yes, alright, let me see what I can do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, Bill, I'll be around anytime.
think the next two days. are pretty crucial, really.
~)
The President:
Well, I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
then.
(U)
. The President:
Thanks, Bill, I'll speak to you soon
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'i'IAL
~
I
�CQNFIDEfi'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 72
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Liz Rogers, Michael Manning,
Rob Williams, Joel Ehrendreich and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 12, 1999, 1:56 - 2:01 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill, sorry to trouble you again.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, McGuinness is here.
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d);
,
Declassify On:
JR1
�2
CQNFIDENTIAL
-IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Won't the IRA say this is just changing the
sequencing again. Basically they have a matter of mistrust.
They still think they're going to get jacked around on the
executive on this, don't they? Jei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this. What about the legislation
itself? I hear the SDLP has problems with it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
But do you think the legislation problems would
go away if you had any statement from the IRA?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think s
The President: Could you change the legislation to overcome
directives if you get the IRA statement? -H=T
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L - I_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
/
The President:
Let me call you back. When are you going to
bed? It must be getting pretty late there now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's only 7 o'clock now.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
cmlFIDEHTIJ'IJ,
;
�3
CQNFIDEN'T lAL
Tte President:
Let me see what I can do.
I'll call you back.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, thanks, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
GO~lFIDEH'fIAL
(U)
�COHrI Dg~IT III L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
Robin Rickard, Bob Ford, James Smith and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 16, 1999, 10:09-10:33 a.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair;
The President;
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, today is not as bad as yesterday, is it?
J;if
Prime Minister Blair:
I
think that is the right analysis.
(f)
The President:
I just had Barak here, and he said how much you
had done to help.
He admires you so much. We had a great talk.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
seeing Massimo D'Alema on Monday.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)D
.J.e1
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDElffIAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5 (d!)
Declassify On:i
(IZ)
I
am
�CeitH'IB~M'fIA:L
Prime Minister Blair:
is he? .(.e)
2
He's quite optimistic on the peace stuff,
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
That is a bit of hope, then . . ~
The President:
The other nice trivial thing is that the British
Open is humiliating every golfer in the world. The average
score yesterday was 79.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's the bloody weather, is it?
(U)
The President:
Yes. They have made i t has hard as they could.
They enjoy making people miserable.
It's quite good, though.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
We must get you up there playing someday.
(U)
The President:
Where are we? I hope I gave a helpful statement
yesterday.
I said that I had failed to persuade them to work it
out, too, and we should just go on from here. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
GONFIDENTIM
�COHFIDEH'fIAL
3
'1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
There's nothing to do now, is there?
Mitchell going to do something to help a bit? .,.kef
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be helpful, Bill.
Is George
I
The President:
COHFIDE~J'l'VrL
Yes.
ye1
1E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONnDK~JTPL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: They can't have it both ways. So many of them,
I believe, there are so very many of them who are having a hard
time,- whatever they say, in letting go of it. It's like their
security blanket. Imagine what their lives are like, a certain
amount of romance, danger, drama
fe1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: -- power. You're asking them to put a little
white bread sandwich in a lunchbox and go off to work at the
factory. It'll be hard for them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: You mentioned this once before, I don't
know if you recall. I have put some people to work on that. I
The President: Sinn Fein proper can imagine themselves running
social services agencies or political services, but somebody
ought to talk to Gerry about what are their people going to do
with their lives when this is over. I think it's a big problem.
It plays on their psychology. I just -- I've been thinking a
lot of what I'm going to do when I leave here, but -- this may
be a big postulate -- but what if I had been a romantic
terrorist, especially lately, when it wasn't a lot of work and
you didn't have to set off more than one bomb every two years,
you know? I think you really have to think about what we can do
not only to guarantee their security and safety, but to give
some meaning to their lives, some way that they can participate
in the new Ireland. I may be wrong, but I think it's a huge
problem for Gerry Adams, even if most are not aware of what the
real problem is. )£1
Prime Minister Blair: I agree. I have some people working on
that. ~J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
C O~IFI DEHT IAL
J E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)J
�5
CONFI DEHTIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
They should be asked whether they have ever
actually talked to these people about what they would do with
their lives when this is over. They may have some ideas, but I
can't help but believe that is a big problem here.
If Gerry
thinks it's silly, at least you've opened it with him and he
should consider doing something. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weekend, too.
We will do that.
I'll call some of our Irish guys over the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
COHFIDENTIJ'.L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEN'1'L",L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
6
The President:
Do you think I should come over there?
what you were going to say?
rer
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that
I was going to say it is not a bad idea .
.....(.ff
The President:
day trip.
JQ1
Okay, I'll do it.
I can do an overnight or a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call George and some of our congressmen
over the weekend.
I'll get on that. Maybe I can do that, if
George can come up with something different.
It wouldn't be
very different, but it could look different. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one other thin
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, we have to have something there.
see George Soros' article? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, I didn't.
Did you
~
The President:
It's what you're arguing, but on a faster
timetable. He is arguing for a customs union within the Balkans
and some provision where you put them on a clear path to EU
membership as a region. Even if Serbia gets rid of Milosevic,
you can't deal with them on a nation-by-nation basis, because of
the inter-ethnic problems. He basically said they need to come
up with a regional currency to force them together.
It's quite
COWFIDE~l'TIl'.L
�7
• CQNFIDKNTL",L
a clever piece. Soros is not always right, but he's a genuine
visionary.
I will get someone to fax it over to you. And I'11
see what we can say on the 30 th • )Zl
./
Prime Minister Blair: Maybe our people should talk.
I think we
have to have an impact beyond just holding a conference.
J,Q-)"
I agree with that. We sure as hell can't go
The President:
just have a conference. Alright, man. Keep your
over there and
chin up. .kef
Prime Minister Blair:
All the best.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�. CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 74
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Bilateral Meeting Between The President and
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Steven Ricchetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy and Director of
the National Economic Council
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
European Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Great Britain
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Sawers, Diplomatic Advisor
Allistar Campbell, Press Secretary
Private Secretary
-
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 1:40 - 2:35 p.m.
Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany
The President:
Tony, you did a very good job on the debt issue.
If we can make it work, that will mean almost 2/3 debt
forgiveness for the poorest countries. This would be a real
step forward.
The Jubilee has enormous appeal -- getting rid of
all the debt for the millennium. But it also has real problems
that we would need to access before we embrace the concept.
For
example, Bob Rubin points out that for countries that may want
to borrow more who get 100 percent forgiveness, wiping out their
debt will be much harder for them because it will effect their
credit rating. Maybe we should look at adding rescheduling
CONFI±:lE~JTIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (~)..
Decla"ify OU,(
.
. _ .
JUIE~'-'2- _~u-'c-~
e:"., '. mTON LiBRARY PHOTOCOpy
~~~_:2.~~~~::.
t
"}_._-__:::--):,", . ,'
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�COHFI D£HTIAL
2
without taking them out of the credit market. Rubin feels very
strongly about this. But anyway, what we need to do is focus on
the fact that we are doing a huge deal here. This is a major
achievement. We must not let what we are not doing become the
s or. It's what we are doing that's important. je1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
'-
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I fully agree with that.)
I
Jim Steinberg:
The problem is specifying who. That is, who are
the 1,000 companies and why are we choosing them.
I think it
woul~be better to callan the private sector as a whole.
kef
The President: That's true but on the other hand this needs to
be organized. We can't just calion companies to act.
~
Jim Steinberg: Well there is a legal question when asking
specific companies.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Gene Sperling:
The problem of asking specific companies is that
there could be a feeling of coercion. )£1
The President:
I think the thing to do would be to designate a
lead person in the business community to do this. That's what
we did on welfare.
I asked Eli Segal to run a voluntary
program.
ter
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Gene Sperling:
It would be a real political challenge to
support. And also I think there would be concern that we have
opened the door at the last moment. ~
The President:
The problem frankly is Congress. It is a
different party and not likely to do me any favors and so I do
not think we would get support. The way it works is that there
is an allocation to each committee. It is always less for
foreign affairs. So we are forced to choose among programs.
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CQl)IFIDEN'FIJrL
3
There is a real weakness of commitment to foreign aid,
especially since the end of the Cold War. We have a big
surplus.
If I take the caps off, the Republicans will push for
a tax cut.
We have made a commitment to save Social Security.
So it wouidbe hard to do this without opening a Pandora's Box.
We need to wait to see if we get an omnibus deal. So I am
reluctant to look like we are urging this and then be in a
position where we can'tdelivet. But if we can quietly see that
there is a consensus on this, I can say to Congress this is what
the whole world wants to do.
It is a good idea on the merits.
But it would be better to forge a consensus here than for us to
lead on this issue given the politics. Also, we will have
another shot over the next couple of years. J21
Tony, do you want to talk about Kosovo? I have one big point to
make:
you had a huge impact on the execution of this campaign
and on our ability to sell what we needed to do. You realized
the need to improve our communications. Now, the big decision
we have to face is making sure that this works.
There is a huge
effort in bringing people back, in rebuilding lives, in spite of
the magnitude of the crisis. There is a mental health crisis.
I sent Elie Wiesel to the region to talk to the refugees.
I
talked to Jesse Jackson about this. All of us agree that we
need some kind of systematic, organized effort maybe working
through faith groups. We need to start. But before even all of
that, the UN must pick someone we would hire to oversee the
civilian implementation. Nationality doesn't matter to me. All
that counts is confidence, energy, and organization skills.
Those are the ke s.
The Economist had a uff eace on Bildt.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I fully agJee.
decision. Who are the candidates?
~)
This is a critical
Samuel Berger: No one has emerged that I am aware of. The
selection seems to focus on former Foreign Ministers or defeated
Prime Ministers. With all respect, that is the wrong mind-set.
We need a CEO-type. Je1
The President: There must be a terrific European business
person who has worked in the Balkans, for example. Someone with
imagination and executive ability. Je1
CONFIDEN"i'IAL
�4
CotilPIDEN'f'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
European.
J.e1
Yes he is, but of course, the Europeans want a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weeks.
r...e1
Well I am happy with an American.
I am afraid that the UN will dither on this for
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
Samuel Berger:
If I could just raise one idea. You both should
lay down a marker with the Secretary General on how you see the
job. You should imply a veto right.
In other words, you
together would expect he would not appoint someone without your
approval.
t,.e)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Anyway, I don't
know your politics in Europe. But I do know that this is our
deal.
If it fails, it will be our failure. My have no
preconceived notions and no conditions on nationality. My only
concern is confidence. ~
Jacques Klein is tough and good. But I keep coming back to the
bottom line -- whoever it is has to be up to the job. ~
John Sawers:
.....(.Gt-
Allister Campbell:
I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN:t'IAL
5
The President:
I don't think the Secretary General is thinking
ask who is the
and Europe. Who
Y POSl lon lS on
00
navigated the shoals of partisan politics and never
anything.
This requires special additional skills.
have loved to have the job myself.
(x1
Prime Minister Blair:
from scratch.
(U)
I would
Yes, it really is rebuilding a country
If I were the head of a company, I'd love this
Prime Minister Blair: We should start di
least there is a good choice.
The President:
for names so at
This must not be about politics.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
The President:
I KO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
In the end, this really is a unique
position.
It's like being the procounsel of a country. You
need communication skills, executive skills.
John Sawers:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: On the issue of relief we've got $1 billion
earmarked for the short-term. On long-term reconstruction, I
guess we have this conference in the Fall. On the EU's
Stability Pact, we want to contribute but since most of the
money is European, it's hard for us to shape it.
I think we
need to take a step back and look at the Marshall Plan, and also
think about what we want this to look like in ten years. We
CONFIDENTIAl.
�6
COHFI DEN l' 1M
need a prosperous Balkans so there is less temptation for
conflict. We want it to be more integrated with Europe. With
the EU, with NATO.
The first thing we need to do is to define
the universe: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, ~acedonia, Albania,
Montenegro, Kosovo. And Serbia if we can get rid of Milosevic.
I think we need to apply one of the central ideas of the
Marshall plan which is to get the beneficiaries to meet together
and define their own vision of the Balkans, how they would use
the money, how they would apportion it. We need to force them
to assume responsibility for their own future.
They need to
have a real plan and develop themselves with our help.
There
are some real smart u s there that can do this,
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's true. We all need to think about what
more we can do. We, in the United States, need to think about
whether we should say to Congress that we should accelerate
accession for some of the Balkan countries into NATO. You might
consider the same thing for the European Union. Should there be
a customs Union with the EU, like Turkey. Should you accelerate
the session process? If you think we, should push the envelope,
we can push Schroeder, Chirac and D'Alema to think about this~
j.Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree we should push the envelope.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We need direct aid too. We've already got some
going for Albania and Macedonia.
I think we need to structure
our assistance in Kosovo in a way that is helpful to the Front
Line States.
For example, using their construction companies.
We need to get people on the ground to start turning our roadrnap
for the Balkans into reality. We need the person, we need the
plan, we need an approach that takes into account the whole
region. What I think we should do on the Stability Pact is for
us and Prodi to convene a meeting in the Balkans maybe in
Sophia. Bring all the people together, the U.S., the EU, the
CONP! DEN'!' IAL
�7
cmIFHlEN'I'IAb
concerned countries, and the international financial
institutions.
We need to forge a common vision and get their
buy in. We need to start a process for them to meet and to plan
their own future.
It's not like these people are not smart.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
way to proceed.
Jet
Yes, I agree that would be a very good
The President: Similarly, we need to decide whatever we can do
with NATO, the EU, and with aid. We need to get to work.
If we
can get the people in the region bought in, it will change the
d namics and sychology of people and the region. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnlster B air:
I agree very strongly.
Samuel Berger: We also have to solve this problem with the
Russians.
I think we are almost there.
(U)
I
I
1'===~--------------------~
John Sawers:
Samuel Berger: Actually, that's been sorted out. The real
problem that still needs to be resolved is that Yelstin
continues to want a sector. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me make clear my view:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I think we all need to watch them.
If we have
something that we can live with, I don't mind letting them
declare victory so we can just get this out of the headlines and
move on. Right now they are in the way and we need to resolve
this.
I want to nail this Russian thing down. The other reason
is that I am truly worried that Yeltsin might make a dangerous
decision. He thinks we are trying to extend our sphere of
influence. He just doesn't understand we are trying to make a
more peaceful Europe and reverse ethnic cleansing. But I think
he wili do the right thing at the end.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIPEN'I'IAlJ
We need to close on this today.
(U)
�CONTI DEN'I' IAL
8
The President:
Yeltsin is the only Russian leader who truly
hates communism, believes in freedom and integration with the
west.
vz!
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
In addition, we need a huge
effort to move the center of Russian politics.
I think one way
to do that is for us to get more parliamentarians there.
It's a
huge effort to go to them and to bring them to us in a more
. systematic way but I think it's worth it.
That will really help
to educate politicians there and move them to the center. We
need to combat their insularity.
02f
Prime Minister Blair:
I know we have run out of time but at
some point I would like to have a few words about Northern
Ireland.
tel'
The President:
Yes, I've got some ideas that we should discuss.
Let's try to find some time this afternoon. -+et
End of Conversation
GONFI QEHTIM
�cor,nSENTIAl
CONFIDEH'fIAL
/,11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 75
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SVBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(V)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Deana Sutliff,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and Richard
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September 8, 1999, 5:13 - 5:32 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(V)
Hi, Bill.
(V)
Tony, how are you?
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Fine, I'm great.
holiday and I'm feeling good.
(V)
The President:
Did you go to Italy?
I've had a very good
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I went to Italy and France and had a
good" time. ," Where were you now? (V)
The President: I was in Martha's Vineyard and then New York,
but I'm about to go off to New Zealand for a week, and I wanted
to talk to you before I left. I've been talking to everybody
about this East Timor situation and the rumor mill is rife that
Habibie might be deposed or they're sending some military leader
out there who says he will never give East Timor up. I believe
we all need to put as much pressure as possible on Indonesia to
accept a force and then figure out who'll make it up. The
Aussies are ready to go, they want to send 2,000 or 3,000 people
cmrn DEU'fIAL
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:!
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
there; they don't think it will (take very many people. And, if
the UN approved it, the Chinese might even send some people.
But I think it would be a very embarrassing comparison to Kosovo
if Indonesia runs all the Timorese out of the country or if they
reverse it and we don't do anything. We've got to do something,
it seems to me, so anything you can do to put the heat on
Indonesia would be helpful. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Guterres is
going to table a
motion even if Indonesia won't support it. He's got to. He
said there was a lO-km human chain demonstrating against him.
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Absolutely right.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
JCr
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
would
Prime Minister Blair:
CONTIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. I think -- I don't think the Chinese wili
allow the resolution to go through if they don't accept it,
because of this whole sovereignty thing.
tef
I_p_r_i_m_e__M_i_n_l_.s t_e_r__B_l_a_l_.r : _____________________________________~
~
__
__ I
The Bresident:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J.e-rI haven't, either.
~
The President: The reason I haven't -- there's a rumor he's
being deposed now -- the reason I haven't called is, every time
I put pressure on him, he gets unmerciful grief there that he's
toad in to the United states.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_______________________________- ~-----
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
wan e
0 say a word a out
the Balkans.
I got your letter and I understand the pressure
you're under to cut deployment in order to increase readiness
and retention, but I hope you can maintain your position as a
lead nation in both Bosnia and Kosovo, because our partnership
there has been a bedrock of success and the Russians, I believe,
are working out better than we'd hoped. I think the Kosovo
thing is settling down, if we can just hang on. Your letter
indicated you're talking to allies about making contributions to
backfill your forces.
I don't know how that's going, but I hope
we can maintain a good level of cooperation and ability with
whoever goes in there. ~
LP_r_i_ID_e M_l_'n_l_._s_t_e_r__
__
B_l_a_i_r_:_/
_________________________________________
CONFIDEWl'IAL
~j)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEH'fIAL
4
.The President: Me, too.
I think we shouldn't get too soft on
these sanctions against Serbia.
I think we ought to tighten the
sanctions on Milosevic and his crowd.
I hope you'll get the
other
~
(C)
The President:
setback? 18
Have you talked to Schroeder since his
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
weeks.
¢
ele~tion
No.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'm due to see him in the next couple of
The President:
I'll try to call him before I leave for Asia.
There's not much I can do, but I can encourage him.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
cmiFIDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�5
CONFIDEN':PIAL
How are we doing on Northern Ireland?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
George is doing fine.
The Catholic?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
It was unanimous, wasn't it?
Americans? )..e1
Including the two
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Don't you think it will just get worse if we
don't resolve the politics of it? ..+-e-r
CONFIDENTIAL
;.
�6
CONFIDEWfL"do
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You don't think there's any chance the Mitchell
talks will produce a breakthrough? Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
I think there's some chance, but it's
pretty slim at the moment.
The President:
when. Jct
I'm ready any time.
You just have to tell me
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
CONFIDBN''fL'lL
�7
The President:
So, the main thing you, want me to do now is say
something nice about the Patten report? )X1
Prime Minister Blair:
/kj
For us, now, that is the critical thing.
The President:
I'll be down in New Zealand, but there's a hellof a lot going on in the world at the moment, and we can always
talk.
I just wanted you to know I'll be out of pocket for the
next week or 10 days.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: When am I going to see you?
doing the Third Way thing in Florence?
(U)
The President:
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you
(U)
They're all very excited.
(U)
The President: You shouldn't be the only guy speaking English
who gets to go to Italy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Italian.
(U)
The President:
You did?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Pr~me M~n~s er Blair:
The President:
When I was in Italy I learned a little
(U)
,-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
Enough to get by. /
Is he one of ours?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, he's one of ours.
The President: Gosh, I thought I had had him in here.
check it out. .J&r
Let me
Prime Minister Blair:!
l
I
The President:
GG~TFI DENT 1hL
Got it.
When are his elections?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
j.G-f
�8
GOHFIDEHI'IAb
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Okay, I'll do it.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Zealand. (U)
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
Have a good time in New
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'FIAL
Je1
�SECREr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INCHON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
Joel Ehrendreich, Elizabeth Rogers,
Roger Merletti and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 1999, 10:38 - 11:29 a.m.
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
The President:
I haven't talked to you in a while and I wanted
to check in on a few things.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm great.
I've been fighting reactionaries in
Congress, we're winning with the people.
I thought your speech
to your party group was great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks. We've got an interesting
situation here at the moment because the conservatives have
really moved off to a very far right position.
(U)
The President:
That's what our guys are doing here. One reason
Bush is doing so well is because he criticized one thing on the
right. He is making people think he is saving them from the
right. But, it's a fraud because he is really for them on
everything else.
I have to figure out how to expose the fraud
that Bush is the new Clinton, establishing a new Republican
party like I made a new Democratic party.
It's helping Bush but
it is killing AI. They asked me what I thought, and I said it
SECRE'f
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(c,~d)
~~.'
_~~ ___,__ ~~_~-~,
Declassify On:! 10/~9~J~'<'''~' ---c~;
0';, .' ~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY . i'
. 'p! ~~~:.;.__ .__ .;.:---._..~ ..:.,..c..:,_",~~~_~~.~
~
:.. -<-:J._----'-, '. ,'-' -:-;~" ,."
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2
was terrible how the right wing was treating him. After all, he
was for them, and his lobbyists organized them to kill our
patients' bill ·of rights. He was for school vouchers and for
the NRAtrying to kill our handgun measures.
Why were they
being so mean to him? I thought it was terrible how mean they
were being, but they wouldn't give what I said that much press
-- it wasn't what they wanted to say.
That is what we've got to
do. Al has to position himself between Bush and Bradley. Now
it's very interesting. We are at a point where the perceptioos
of major players are at variance with their positions.
It's a
terrible thing and there'~ a limit to how much I can do because,
in our political culture, I can say what I think but it will
hurt if it appears I'm trying to control the outcome of another
election.
I've got to be careful not to tell people how to
vote.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
it?
(U)
Yes.
Policy is the way to do it, isn't
The President:
Yes, you're right, it is . . What I am doing -the results speak for themselves. The question is not whether
we are going to change, but how we change -- a u-turn or hold on
to what we're doing. Here are the new ideas for the 21 st
century. That is the argument I am making, and the argument
Gore has to make.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think he's got to really.
If it comes
down to general positioning, it will get more difficult.
(U)
The President:
The people still don't know what a VP does in
our country.
It's not an accident we've elected only two in our
history. But it's still the best way to become president -someone dies or something happens in the interim.
The Vice
President has become more important in modern American history.
That's how Nixon got to come back as President. Nixon barely
lost, and Bush won when Dukakis collapsed.
It's not such a bad
thing to be a Vice President now.
It's not the handicap it once
was, but you have to capitalize on it. So far we haven't been
able to capitalize on it even though our ratings are slightly
higher than Eisenhower's and Reagan's were at this point. He
ought to be able to do that, I think he is getting it sorted out
now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
SECRET
It's really about definition, I think.
�3
The President: It always is, isn't it? I have half a dozen
things I'd like to discuss. How did your government change play
Prime Minister
The President:
I really like him.
He is such a bright man.
+&l-
Prime Minister Blair:
-The President:
I saw him recently.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
He told me that. /
I
The President:
It was probably time for Mo to get out.
;e1
~_p_r_i_m_e M_~_'n
__
__
i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:____________________________________________
__ __
~~
The President: She served you well and worked very hard. She
made people laugh when she pissed them off, and that's a great
thing. ).e}
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you want me to do anything, let me know.
know that Ian Paisley got mad at what I said last week, but
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
~
I I'll try
'-n-o-t:---;-t-=-o--=o"";f::-f::-e""':r::--=-a-=n-=-ym=-o-=r-:e=-u":"n=-h;--::-e'l-=p""f;:'u::-il;--a-:n-a-l'o-:--:-g"i-e-=s-:.---'I'i"-:w:-::-:"r':-o-':t-=e--:It::-:o:---lh im t ha t I
will try to stay out of the analysis business.
~)
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
aECRET
J
/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�:>ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've always found that if someone's offended by
a remark, it is better to apologize immediately because people
who agree with what you said won't hold it against you. Anyway,.
ring the bell if you want me to do anything. They just have to
finally decide whether to cut a deal ·or not.
I think in the end
they have to decide.
It has dragged on so long I don't expect
either side to eat the whole thing. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
The President:
One thing Gerry said, I've never talked to you
about it, Gerry told me they trusted de Chastelain and would
stay on it if he promulgated a schedule. ~
]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You could even have de Chastelain promulgate a
schedule for decommissioning starting on a date that was ten
days after they got in the executive. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Pr ime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
What if de Chastelain promulgated a schedule for
decommissioning and then you said to Trimble that he'd better
:>ECRE'I'
,
,.
�5
let Sinn Fein in the government before then so he doesn't give
them an excuse for slipping that date. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: And then Trimble lets them in and says if they
sli , we'll walk out. What about that?
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
What about Adams? -tet
. Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
\
The President:
Anyway, that is best idea I've got.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
LI_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
The President:
It sort of takes it away from them.
If you
could let de Chastelain offer the schedule, they could say
something nice about how they respect de Chastelain. But
they've got to be in the government to fulfill this obligation,
then if this date slips then Trimble says I'm walking. And then
it is allan them.
They both have what they asked for, they are
in the executive and then have this date staring them in the
face -- only ten days away.
It seems that would help Trimble
with his constituents if he has a deal in advance and not three
months away. Everybody's used to wandering around their offices
and getting to know each other and trying not to look like the
biggest asshole at the garden party.
This has to happen fairly
quickly.
(.G+Prime Minister Blair:
]
\====~----------------------~
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
SECRE'P
The President: Why don't we call Mitchell and run it by him if
ou think it ml ht have some merit. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
]
-
The President:
That way Adams doesn't have to say anything to
get into the government but they are screwed immediately and
quickly if they don't deliver. Let me run it by Mitchell. ~
Prime Minister Blair:~
\
The President:
Okay. There a couple of other things I'd like
to run through.
First, thank you and Jacques and Gerhard for
running that piece on CTBT in the New York Times. Here's the
problem. My Senate agreed to a truncated schedule. Half of the
Republicans are against this on its merit.
For the others it's
just politics. They are out to screw me because they don't want
to help me and don't want to help AI. But a bunch are genuine
isolationists.
They just say 'piss on our allies n and "to hell
with what they thinki screw anybody who screws with us. n
It's
just sick what a world we are living in here. But I'm trying to
work a deal so this is not voted down.
I'm trying to work on a
schedule.
If they start hearings, we will get them involved in
the process.
Even if they don't ratify while I am president,
it'll be obvious to the world that they are strengthening the
treaty. They will if they are working on safeguards. But it is
just silly intellectually, just awful what they are doing. And
they are hurting themselves. They are giving us a good issue in
the elections.
It is terrible what they have done. But your
piece was very helpful and I wanted to thank you for it. The
problem is that under the-rules of the Senate they are in a
position where a small majority can prevent the vote from being
delayed now. We may get it put off by one vote. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right.
~
Whatever happens, we'll bang them pretty good.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -__________________
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President: Thank you.
I don't think this is the end of
American leadership on arms control, just parliamentary
�SECRET
7
maneuvers.
out there.
It's just a rightwing group and they are just way
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President:
It's stupid. They won't pay UN dues and they
don't want an aid budget. They want a big military that never
does anything.
They spend more money on defense than I do, but
don't want them to do anything, and I'm the most pro-defense
Democrat President that we've had; They want a bunch of bombs
and missile.s and a defense system, and then they just cut
·everybody's taxes. They want to put rich people behind gates so
the starving can't get at them. They basically want an upscale
Brazil for America.
It is awful, but I think we can beat them
back.
I want to say a word about Florence, and then I've got
two other things.
I'm glad we let Cardoso come, but can you
explain to me, in a European context, why we didn't invite Wim
Kok or Guterres from Portugal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The other guy I thought should have been
invited, who has been a wonderful ally to all of us is Chretien.
r=~~~~~~~~I~E~.O~.=1=3=52=6~,~se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(d~)~I~~~~=-~~~~~I
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm afraid it will undercut the whole idea of a
global movement.
I will not be in office to work with these
people more than another 15 months, but you and Chretien may be
around another five ears. The other guy in Latin America is
Zedillo,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
But if I were doing it and I were
European, I would want Guterres and Kok and I don't know about
Austria, I don't know him. Chretien, every time we need him, he
shows up and raises the flag.
~
al!:CRgT
�8
SECRET'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
I am in complete agreement.
Are you going to sing the Marseillaise?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
I do too. And it is also a way for Europe to
get more influence over him in a positive way. )Zl
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~~
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help him?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Maybe one thing that could come out of Italy is
some sort of statement that will help him.
~
)
Prime Minister Blair: \
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President:
The thing that bot~ers me is that he has the
worst of both worlds.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
At least for all the horrible
�SECRE'f
9
bloodshed in '94 we had policies in place that turned the
country around by '96, congressional gains in '96 and '98, and
we rna be able 't get Congress back in 2000. -+erE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
]
The President:
Yeah.
I'll take some guidance from you, and I
will talk to him about it.
I think he's trying to do the right
thing but he's been a little foggy about it.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do what I can.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Ye·s. Okay, we need to think about that. Let me
mention a couple of other things. The WTO ministerial will be
held in Seattle in Washington State in December and preparations
are in full swing.
I think this is a major opportunity for the
third way agenda to put a human face on the global economy. We
have to come out for more open trade and the legitimate
interests of labor and environment. I've been to Geneva twice
to talk about this and the child labor convention. We think it
would be a very good thing to have a WTO working group on trade
and strategy analysis, not on negotiations. We have been in
touch with your people, and I hope we can work together on this.
A lot of people are afraid to discuss the two things in the same
breath. But the whole pitch here has to be we can't turn our
backs on integrating the global economy. But I want to do it in
a way that takes everybody along. ~
�10
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~--------------~
The President: Yes, it is. We're going to have every NGO and
labor union demonstrating against us and we have to have
something that answers what they are saying.
I see rising
protectionism in this country.
In the last two years, we took
on a huge amount of the shortfall of the Asian economy by
increasing imports and running a trade deficit which is unusual
in conventional terms, but the world has changed quite a lot.
For example, in '97 and '98 we bought ten times more steel from
. Japan; China, and Russia than Europe did.
Protectionism is
rising among Republicans and Democrats, and I see it manifesting
itself in other countries. We have to find a way to turn back
the tide of it. We have to try to find mechanisms where we can
discuss all these things together.
Europe is in better shape on
this than we are.
I'm not trying to impose standards on other
countries, but there's got to be a way to work our way through
this. -+e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--J~
The President:
I wish you would. We have to see how this plays
out against the media story in America to see if there is more
coverage given to the people demonstrating than to the fact that
we are going to meet.
Two others issues I would like raise.
President Frei of Chile raised Pinochet with me in New Zealand.
He said Pinochet's presence in London is a big problem for the
Chilean government. He thought they had worked out a solution
to get rid of him by putting him in the Senate. They are very
concerned now.
Our position has got to be that this is a legal
matter and whatever you do, we will be in agreement. But Chile
has twice the per capita income of any other in Latin America,
they have had this immense success, and they thought they had
put this nightmare behind them.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRBT
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�£ECRE'f
11
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
The real thing we need to do is get more victims
to say ~send him home and let us handle it here. n
I got it .
.Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I won't say this to anybody.
I'm also aware
what a problem this is for you. My take on where they are is
they thought they had done their version of Mandela's Truth
Commission -- put it in a box and store it there, not live
forever. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: A final point -- Iraq.
I am afraid we're in a
different place in the Security Council. We worked all these
years on negotiations and before that, and I hope we don't get
divided here.
The language your people worked out with the
French crosses a red line because it suspends sanctions on
Saddam Hussein before disarmament. When I took office, the Bush
position was, I thought, unfair. We wouldn't ever lift
sanctions until Saddam Hussein complied with his disarmament
obligations and with obligations on all other UN resolutions,
human rights and all that. Now I am prepared to say that if he
meets his disarmament obligations and puts a system in place
where he's complying, I would be prepared to suspend sanctions
and liberalize the oil-for-food program -- especially with the
price of oil going up, we should be better off. But I think if
we say to this guy, ~If you start to comply, we will lift
sanctions,n he will quickly reestablish the weapons of mass
destruction program, and it will become known in two years that
he has.
It may not happen "rhile I'm in office,
1
you.
It could become a real ni htmare for
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I understand where the French are and we are prepared
to move from our former position aspecially on oil-for-food
SECRE'f
�gECREP
things.
12
I know everyone is getting sanctions fatigue,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Would it end the suspension because any country
could vote to veto continuing it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
13
The President: Our guys here in Congress, even the Democrats,
are attacking me because I haven't. done enough to get rid of
him. I think they will eat me alive if I agree to lift
sanctions while he has his weapons program going on. f6+
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: But it looks like the UN has finally given in to
him if you have no sanctions without disarmament.
I
LP_r i_m_e__
__
M_i_n_l_'s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_'r : __________________________________________
__
~/:).
The President: Have you worked out the differences between
"certain" and "all"? ye;)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I don't know, I am very skeptical.
at the specifics.
~
SECRE'f
I will look
�SECRET
14
Prime Minister Blair:
Look Bill.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President: There may be a solution here in the details, but
I am genuinely quite skeptical.
I've been dealing with this guy
for a long time. )J21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
We've been criticized for not bein
condemning of the coup.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
£ECRE'f'-
more
�oS EeRE'!'
15
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Two
strong people can do the sensible thing.
I think our objective
ought to be to get them to do the sensible' thing. J&r
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
We will stay in touch.
(U)
Bill, when will we see you then?
(U)
The President:
I will see you in Italy and probably at the OSCE
thing in Turkey.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
talk with you.
(U)
Yeah.
It will be good to have a proper
The President:
Yeah.
You are in a position, as you get more
influence in Europe, I believe we've got a shot now, because of
the two earthquakes, to resolve the conflict between Greece and
Turkey. To accept Turkey into the EU will lock Turkey into the
West for the next fifty years and that would help solve some
problems if east of there goes sour.
Two areas that I have
wanted to make progress on -- the Aegean and India/Pakistan. We
need to talk again, maybe before the OSCE, and I will tell you
what I have been doing on it. But I think we've got a shot in
the Aegean now.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
�16
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The president:
The Turks and Greeks are getting along better.
The earthquakes made them see. each other as human beings again.
The problem is Cyprus. The Greeks think they were uprooted and
can't go to visit their relatives' graves.
It's got to be a
strictly cold-blooded deal. We've done our part with military
coope~atio~.
We've got to get something that leads them on the
-path to Europe.
Otherwise, they'll never do it because they
think they need to ~get alonif' like the Irish.
tGt
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is what we need.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Okay Bill.
~
(U)
I will see you soon and thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�tONFI DEt.'!' IM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
..s
'~
"
~
...l
'"
<
'"
~
~
<
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Joel Ehrendreich,
Robert Ford, Hoyt Yee and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
I ~~
~~
""<
Ou
November 26, 1999, 11:55 a.m.-12:02 p.m. EST ~5
Penn National Golf Course, Maryland
; ~
0<
:t...l
"'U~
The President: Can you hear me? I am celebrating Thanksgiving
with my entire family.
The wind is blowing and the rain is
going like crazy.
I might as well be in England.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Where are you?
(U)
The President:
I am up at Camp David.
I am out playing golf
and it is raining like hell, and the wind is blowing.
(U)
;;;,>-c,
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Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Can I help in any way?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
conFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
do that and put a statement out
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Sounds to me like you got some pretty good
language with Chirac on the European Security issue. Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I just don't want to give the isolationists here
any encouragement.
~
Prime Hinister Blair:
The President:
am behind you.
I appreciate that.
I agree.
You are doing the right thing, and I
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair: I think it might be helpful, if at some
stage, I came over and saw some of the people on the Hill and
made a speech.
.(-e)
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
j£l
[Gap)!
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I hear Chirac
wouldn't go along with the position you wanted to take on
Cyprus.
{.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
-tetcmiFI DEN'!' lAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
CWNFI DEH'I'IAL
The President: No, I just heard something and it may not be
right. The main thing, I know what Simitis wants you to say.
But it would be good if it didn't leak until as close to the loth
as possible. That would give us a week to get these talks,
(with Denktash)-, in New York, and I don't want to give him any
excuse to leave.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
[GAP]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
That's good news.
(I)
Prime Minister Blair: Incidentally, I thought you did
brilliantly in Florence.
(U)
The President:
Oh, thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You made a big impression on Jospin.
je1
The President: I tried to make him see that you and I were not
threatening everything he believes in. ye7
Prime Minister Blair: It would be really good to get together
in the next few months. I have so much that I would like to go
through with you. -+e-r
The President:
than February?
When would be good?
Is January better for you
~
Prime Minister Blair: We will see what we can arrange. If it's
not a summit in Bermuda, we can try something else. --t€+The President: I will look for something on the calendar. We
will do a statement on devolution and will clear it with you in
advance. ..+eY
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill, all the best.
Okay, bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
COHFIDEHTIAL
(U)
�~
COHF'IDEH'fIAL
(~ I, ~ 0 \~
<
THE WHITE HOUSE
,-----------------------------------------------~~
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
~
I>
~)
I
S,»--O,/
. 'f,-/.LN3 0 \
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 78
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
. NOTE TAKERS:
Michael Manning,' Frank Jarosinski, Miguel
Aguilo, and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 16, 1999, 5:01 - 5:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
How are you getting on?
(U)
I'm fine.
\
I Prodi will be
';':h-:e-:r::-e--:t;:-o::-m:-:-o-::r-:-r-:o-:-w:--a-:n::-d:;--:;=I-:-w:-:;i'l""l~s:::p::-e::-n:::-:;d-=s-=o-=m-:e~t:::l;-:'m::-e::--w""""'i""t-;:h""'h:-:l~'m---1.
I t h ink the r e
will be some investments needed, and we'll carry a lot of it, but
we may need EU help~1~------~--~--~~-------:-~--71 If things.
get resolved, it might come to a head in a couple of months. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
jQ1
That would be unbelievable, wouldn't it?
Prime Minister Blair:
he?
(U)
The president:
That would be marvelous.
Yes.
When is Prodi getting there?
j£i
Tomorrow, is
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: So they are going to come back in early
January, and you think you can pull it together then? ~
The President:
Yes, I do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That would be fantastic. If you can put
this and Northern Ireland together, it would be pretty good.
yz(
CONFIDEN"fIAL
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on
�IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
2
The President:
Yes.
That would be a good deal. Trimble is
coming in the next few days and I will see him. And we are doing
what we can with Sinn Fein on the issue of IRA guns. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good. The only other thing I wanted to
mention is that I think it is important to bring this Iraq
resolutioh-to a vote tomorrow.
I know the French are going to
abstain, but we've got to get something moving -- this thing is
stuck on idle. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You _mean with Iraq?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
I don't know.
(JZ')
Je1
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We played around with this for so long, we
should go for it. ~
The President:
next. .J..C+
I think it will give us an idea of where to go
Prime Minister Blair:
If we let it go much longer, it will get
complicated for everybody,1
I
The President:
I agree.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
Prime Minister Blair:
It is sad for the people in Iraq.
everything all right with you apart from this? ~
So is
The President:
Yes.
11m doing fine and I am delighted things
are going well. We have to just keep working .at it -- chippin~
!':I.t.f::::l U
Lf?1::
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~------The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
preparing to be a father again? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
selves. ...(-e}
It was so unexpected.
Yes, they have their good selves and their bad
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are you
I
Yes, we have to keep working at it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you getting any golf in?
The President: No, but I'll play soon.
out of the way first.
(V)
~
(U)
I have to get this work
I am really thrilled about the Helsinki decisions. The Turkey-EU
thing is a big move and it will be a big help.
It will bring
resolution to other issues. The ESDI decision was good, too.
-f€+Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~------------~/
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
)k1
He's really good.
~p_r_l_'m
____
e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________
__
The President:
Yep,
~
~
__________________
I am quite worried about it, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
]e1
I
L ____________________________________________
~
The President:
The in-crowd is making a lot of votes on
Chechnya. Maybe it will change when people start seeing a lot of
body bags, but as long as they keep getting the votes, they'll
keep'doing'it . ..J...e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Larry Summers came through here the other
day.
I had a good chat with him. Jef
The President:
He's a good man.
Prime Minister Blair:
rest of it.
(C)
The President:
keJ
We talked about the IMF job and all the
We've got to get somebody good.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really good.
~
~
The President: You take care of yourself.
I will keep you
posted on the Middle East stuff. It will take a little money.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President: Not yet.
we'll see.
.\Zl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
I will say something to Prodi, then
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All the best to you Bill.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
(U)
�co'iH'IDEN'FIAL
L «) I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(u)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Rob Williams,
Roger Merletti,James Smith, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 11, 2000, 4:22 to 4:45 p.m. EST
Air Force One
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi,
B~ll.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
.How are you?
Same to you.
Happy New Year.
a'm fine.
(U)
You getting ready for fatherhood?
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, I'm psyched up.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
'-------'
The President:
I'm doing great. We're moving into our new home
and staying busy.
I've just been out to the Grand Canyon,
protecting another million acres of land, and Al's doing better.
So I'm feeling pretty good about things right now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He seems to be picking up.
That's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes, I'm going to see him tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
-- a difficult situation --
Hello, Tony?
(U)
(U)
I can't hear a word you're saying.
(U)
Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on,!:
"-----"
!{:. _: .•.I~~~~~:RARYPH6T6COPY .t
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I
�2
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is this any better?
I can hear you fine, now.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright.
(U)
(U)
Good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: For one thing, he will. We've worked very hard
this, and I want them to give de Chastelain something credible
wi h.
d n't hink the hav re'e ted it out of hand,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It's very helpful
de Chastelain and Mandelson have minimized the sense of a
·deadline," certainly publicly, because I think we need to frame
the issue for January not as meeting Trimble's deadline, but as
the need for concrete steps for de Chastelain to say the IRA is
on the way to meeting the timetable in the Good Friday agreement.
I know that Adams is trying to keep everybody together, but one
of the possibilities might be if they could be seen as responding
to you, rather than a unionist deadline. If something could be
done on the Patten report or something -- I want to make the
argument he's doing this in response to that, in addition to the
Good Friday Accord. .(.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
COWHDiWTIU
�·
3
CONFIDSN1'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
The President:
giving? .-tel
What is their reasoning?
What reason are they
Prime Minister Blair: /
J
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONE IDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
��5
"OMFIfJE1<f'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. Well, I think we have to keep reaching out
toward them and just do our best. But I'm glad you saw him. Let
me say very briefly, we had a good week here with the Israelis
and the Syrians. There's a lot of tough work to go but when they
come back, I think you will see a break one way or another. I
just hope and pray it works. I think we have some chance to
achieve it, but we are not there by a long shot. jQt
Prime Minister Blair: Best of luck on it.
you're putting into it. ~
The President:
It's a great effort
I think we'll make'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, and Bill, I think we will see each
other in Davos. You're making a speech? (V)
The President: Yes. So, I will see ~ou there, but I will call
you as soon as I know something on tnis.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's great.
okay, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(V)
(V)
(V)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEH1'IAL
.~~~._fl... ~;,.:,--·----
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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
0777
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 80
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
James Smith, Roger Merletti and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND. PLACE:
The President:
January 31, 2000, 2:29-2:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am really sorry to trouble you, but I
thought I should bring you up to date on the Irish front.
(U)
The President:
It's okay.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
3ECRET
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5d
Declassify on
tA(b)(d)
�2
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The President:
What do you think is really going on in the IRA?
J.81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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The President:
Everyone else has made compromises
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Everybody else already delivered first.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
So you want me to call Gerry and take one
more whack at him?
(jf)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a
IE.o. 13526, section
ood idea.
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So this statement they were willing to make about
the IRA, they can't even make that public? ~
SECRET
�3ECRE'l'
,
3
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Do you know what I mean?
The President:
language.
(..81
Yes,
I agree with you.
This is very conditional
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: No, no, I think the IRA may not care if America
withdraws its support, but I think Sinn Fein will be in a lot
worse condition if its friends in Congress lay it all on them.
He may not be able to do anything about it, ma be he even wants
it in some manner. He can't say this,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That is the thing.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'l'
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
I agree.
I'll call Adams and do the best I can.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRE'l'
5
I E.O: 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
'11---_ _ _ _ _---'
The President: Yes. Even that is silly because they could
always get more if they had any grounds. The radical Irish could
get more. J.£-Y
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
--t3"I
That is what I think.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course they could tomorrow.
I
They are being pig-headed.
Yes.
-r-n-
NO, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, Bill.
(U)
I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
Many thanks.
Goodbye.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
(U)
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
/. C3,
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Frank Jarosinski, Deana
Sutliff, Miguel Aguilo, RO'ger Merletti, Don
Gentile and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Februa~y 8, 2000, 11:15 to 11:42 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm all right.
(U)
I'm having a pretty good time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You just presented the budget.
The President:
I did it yesterday.
the Senate in New York.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
interesting.
(U)
(U)
Hillary just declared for
Your presidential race is very
The President: Yes, it is.
I can't tell where it's going yet.
It's got a few turns left in the road. We have got to see if
Bush has anything inside him to pull himself back up and respond
to McCain. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Al seems to be running pretty well.
-SEO,Er
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: - 2/9/10 _
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The President:
2
He is doing fine.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the State of the Union stuff and
what I have read about the budget seems very interesting indeed.
Well, I'm glad you're having a good time.
(U)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, let me tell
is where you can help me a bit.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
£EC~ET
ou about mine.
Here
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: What's your reaction to the argument that they
ought to be given more time since there was a such a delay in
setting up the government? .kf5}
SECRET
~.
�4
SECRE'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course I do.
I'm just trying to think about
how to keep this thing together.
JZI
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you something. Do you think any
argument they use is looking for a pretext for doing this and
they wanted to make it clear they did not support such things
and wanted to do it partly because of the terrorist incident in
the north? \
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
2iECR£'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, did Adams give you any -kind of opening
when you asked for an act of reconciliation? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you, you and Bertie have agreed on
~hat you've asked Adams to do? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to Trimble?
vn
Right.
y()
And if he does it, do you think you can sell it
�3ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Trimble is coming over here in a couple of days
-- a week or 10 days, but it will be done by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah it will be done by then.
need is a two-week breathing space. ~
The President:
you two weeks?
What we
Exactly what do you think it will take to get
+&t-
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Okay. I'll get in touch with Gerry and Martin
and see what we can do.
I'll let you know.
(S)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sorry to lay this on you.
~
The President:
No, no.
I think about this more than anything
else, besides the screw-ups in the Middle East. Let me ask you
3ECRE'£'
�7
BECRE':F
something on a much more mundane issue. Yesterday, I met with
some cabinet members and Rodney Slater said we put some more
ideas down to resolve the airport dispute we have with British
Airways, USAIR and American Airlines. Would you take another
look at that and see if we can get it done?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm not completely familiar with that.
(C)
The President:
I know you're up to your ears in other things
but we've been dealing with this for years and it's sort of a
big deal here. Rodney told me he put some more stuff down on
the table.
In a political season, it would be big over here to
_ get this open sore resolved.
If you could have somebody take a
look at it.
I have never seen him more agitated about anything.
He is just trying to get it resolved. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sure, I will have a look.
Okay, I will get on this.
~
How is mother doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. She's getting pretty large.
you going to come oV,er incidentally?
(U)
Are
The President: Let me tell you what we are trying to work out.
You want me to come, don't you? -fC+Prime Minister Blair:
proper talk with you.
I'm desperate to sit down and have a
-+G-l-
The President: I'm trying to figure out what the best time is
because we have to do this Third Way thing in Germany and there
might be time to run to Russia. We're trying to resolve
bilateral issues with Russia and kind of get this Chechnya thing
resolved.
Putin has enormous potential, I think.
I think he's
very smart and thoughtful.
I think we can do a lot of good with
him.
I'm trying to figure how to do all these things and come
to London because Cherie's time is coming close.
I want to come
when it would cause you the least problems and try to leave open
the option, if you need me to, to go to Ireland.
I want to come
and do you the most good.
(£)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good idea in any sort of
circumstances. They would be delighted to see you. Well,
(U)
Cherie is due on May 20.
I mean, anytime is good.
BECKE'!'
�8
SECI'tc';r
The President: Obviously, I hav~ to leave you a couple of weeks
on the front.
If we decided to do it, afterward, how much time
do you need for paternity leave?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know that I would need much time,
more than a ~eek, on either end of it. We'd love for you to
come over and there is lots to discuss.
(U)
The President:
Fathers get that in Britain.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I don't know if I'll do too much of it.
(U)
The President:
I just don't want to screw it up.
Prime Minister Blair:
and see them.
(U)
(U)
It would be quite nice for you to come
The President:
I would love to come afterwards and get to see
the baby. Let me see what I can do.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill, we will be in touch.
love to see you come over.
(U)
The President:
Okay, see you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'1'
I would
�SF·eRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with
SUBJECT:
B~itish
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard, Don
Cheramie, Roger Merletti, Don Gentile and
Dick Norland
February 11, 2000, 12:38 - 12:49 p.m. EST
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm okay.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, sorry to trouble you again but I
thought I would bring you up to date with what .has happened.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
3ECRE'f
Yes.
Y0
�£pCRE'l'
.1
2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What about Trimble?
Where is he on this?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5t-
But if you haven't announced it, can't you ...
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you ought to go to Trimble and try to
work it out. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
Can't you go to Trimble today?
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
3ECRE'f'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
If you can get Trimble to say okay...
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
If we could get to him today you could have this
all resolved by Monday.
(.,g-)
Prime Minister Blair:
~I________________________________~
The President: We can't run the risk of this thing unraveling
over the weekend just because of the timing of it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
If we don't have some move by you and Trimble
today or tomorrow, this thing could unravel over the weekend.
How much does Trimble know about this?
~
)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm suggesting is we tell him what they
said and get him to make some noise in tomorrow's papers saying,
you know, there is movement here, something where he can reach
out to them.
Or call Adams or something. You need them to
connect before they go to bed tonight.
I just think that
something has to be done before the papers corne out and all hell
breaks loose...
t&}
Prime Minister Blair:
3:ECr<:EI
Okay.
~
�4
~ECRE'f
·1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
... at least the IRA got off their backsides and
did something half reasonable.
u()
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President: Yes, I think to make that really work we need
some sort of signal from Trimble that he believes this is all
possible. .J...91
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree, but my problem is that if he waits
until next week ...
k&r
Prime Minister Blair: ~I______________________________~
The President:
.keI
I don't want this thing to get away from you .
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you could get it tonight that would be
wonderful.
I know it is a pain in the rear end, but I'm scared
that if this thing drifts for three days ... yn
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree with that, but if Trimble can give them
an excuse to do that it would be great. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�5
oSgCRgT
The President: We will go to work on our side. Have someone
call us to let us know what Trimble said. We need to know what
we are going to say to Adams when we call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, thanks Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Fine.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRi;T
Bye.
(U)
�·CONFIDENTIAL
/1<6 S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana sutliff,
Frank Jarosinski, Sean Tarver, Don Gentile
. DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 6, 2000, 12:56 - 1:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Look, Bill, I've got to do this live
television thing in five minutes?
(U)
The President:
Okay,
just talk.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what I told Schroeder this
morning.
I talked to him for forty minutes this morning. The
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:,
Robert A. Bradtke
�2
· CONFIDENTIAL
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE-O. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d) I
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
This is a really important job.
jQ1
The President:
It is really important.
It's not just
political.
You need to talk to him. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
He's in that frame of mind, is he?
~
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section
L4(b)(d) I
The President:
There are a couple of Germans who are qualified,
but he can't get them to accept the job.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: Absolutely. I can't afford to be the skunk at
the garden party.
I have got to have some help. jQf
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3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: He is going to call you. He is calling
Kwasniewski first.
I told him "this is going to look bad for
you.
It can't look like you and I made a deal and gagged Europe
and infuriated all of the developing countries." ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I
Prime Minister Blair:
check with you. JQ1
E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will say that to him.
I just wanted to
The President:
I E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONTI DElif'l'IAL
Go.
Look, Bill, I've got to go.
(U)
We also need to talk about Kosovo.
ket
�4
-COHFIDEN'FIhL
Prime Minister Blair: We need to talk about Kosovo and we need
to talk about Northern Ireland as well.
+er
The President:
Call me in the next couple of days.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Good Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFIDE11!Il'tL
~
�SECRE'l'
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
1820
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 84
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
united Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
("
Notetakers: Don Gentile, Joel Ehrendreich,
Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 14, 2000, 1:05-1:29 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Can we talk about Kosovo a little bit?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, sure.
feI
~
The President:
Let me give you my thoughts. We've got violence
everyday, KFOR attrition, UN operations too slow, and;:.-w.:..:..:::e'--'-"ro..:e"--_ _---.
corning up on spring which is a most dangerous time.
I KO. 13526, section l.4(d) I
Basically, you and I gave it a lot of highlevel attention during the air campaign. NOW, you're worried
about elections, I'm worried about elections and the Middle East.
Somehow, we have got to get this operation on a sounder footing
before Milosevic challenges us. ~)
I think three things have to be done.
We have the biggest stake
in this because we believed in it. You'll be around after I'm
gone and this will come back and bite you in the behind.
First
of all, we've got to make sure KFOR has enough forces to counter
the threat and then we've got to make sure the UN gets funding to
do the job and then get enough police there to take pressure off
KFOR. KFOR is getting weaker when it should be getting stronger.
We have to look at our pledged force levels and have a smooth
transition when the new KFOR commander takes over.
If not, I
think Milosevic, who seems to be getting stronger in Serbia, will
take it as a sign of weakness and then we'll be back in conflict.
3ECl3:E!
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.S(d)
i
Declassify on;
�2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
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Ls--e-c-o-n-d~t~h~i-n-g--~i-s~t'h-a-t~-w-e~h-a-v--e~t-o--r-e-d'-o-u'b~l~e--o--u-r--e-f~f-o-r~t-s--w-l~'~t~h~the
Kosovar Albanians. We sent the two best people with connections
there this week to deliver that message. Then, we've got to send
We're sending more police this month, from 490 to.
Blair:
The President: That's good. Let's talk about DNMIK. They are
crippled by the funding shortage. I'm trying to do what we can
to increase our contributions to improve the infrastructure, and
I hope you can give some sort of concrete pledge as well.
If you
and I won't do it, nobody will. We can give up to $500 million
if other people kick in some money. I've got Republicans in the
Senate trying to pass some bill saying that we can't give more
money until the Europeans do. We need some help. We have given
out 100 percent of the money we promised to give but I think the
ED has only given 40 percent of what was committed. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: At some
with this Kosovo status
mine together and get a
deal
ind of muscle this up
a bit.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes. I
And a lot more money.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
/
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
glbCRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"E.O.
The President:
Let me ask you.
13526, section 1.4(d) I J
h' k
J
I
I t In the
trick is and the problem is that authority is too dispersed.
Is
there any way we can get Kofi to somehow empower them? The
problem is that Kouchner works for the UN, KFOR is a UN force,
and we're here not wanting to get in the way, but not wanting to
I
~
I
13526, section 1.4(d)
~
s_c r_e_w__ __________________________________________________
__
u_p_. I
E.O.
L..
Prime Minis
The President:
I think the other. You know, my sense is the
Stability Pact, because you're putting up the money, would be no
problem there.
What is Kouchner's relationship with the French?
If they tell him what to do, will he do it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, yes.
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that. We will work on it from our
side and can talk about it.
I just think this is so important.
I think this is part of the calls you'll make next week in
Lisbon. We need to have our people gaming out what we will or
won't do if Milosevic sends people into the northern part of
Kosovo allegedly to protect the Serbs. What are we going to do
if there is a real battle in southern Serbia and what are we
going to do about Montenegro if he invades them?
(~
�SECRET
4
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely. Okay. I agree.
The President: Everyone of them is
wants to do anything, including us.
have an aggressive response in these
not only minimize these problems but
anything out of line in Montenegro.
~
a tough problem. No one
On the other hand, if we
other three areas early, we
also minimize him doing
J..&t
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I believe that the window of
opportunity is starting to close.
J.Zl
The President:
I real 1
like this idea.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Did you have a good trip to Russia?
it was very good. J€1
The press on
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I don't know.
(S)
Absolutel.
What does he think about Chechnya?
Prime Minister Blair:
J,.21
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
It's a really rough situation over there and in a"
lot of Central Asian countries bordering there.
It was so
typically Russian ham-handed. -HHPrime Minister Blair:
SECREr
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�5
,3ECRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: We had a good joint statement on the Genome
project -- thank you for that. Go see the Queen.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SJ;:CRET
See you
soon~
�3ECP.£'f'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of The
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguila, Don Gentile, Rob Hargis and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 19, 2000, 1:05-1:40 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
(U)
Hello, Wdad," how are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
I am preparing.
(U)
(U)
The President: You know, after January I'm available for
babysitting duties.
(U)
The President: You said you wanted to continue my work with the
Third Way, and this is it: helping Blair balance work and
family.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I could do with a bit of help, I tell you.
Cherie is in great form but just keeps getting bigger and bigger.
I tell you, just the thought and I feel as if my life's about to
begin again.
(U)
The President:
It is going to be interesting. Given the way the
world is changing, it'll be a completely different childhood than'
the one your others had. Anyway, it is a great thing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Right, Bill, we'll put you down on the
babysitting list now, mate.
(U)
The President:
3ECRE'f'
Reason:
1.5(ct)
Declassify on;,
You've got a deal.
(U)
�Sl!;CRl!;'f
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
LIF_r_l_'____
m e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________________________________
__
The President: Yes, I really want to hear about that.
to see him. ~
~~
I'm going
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have a lot to discuss. I agree with that. I
think we'll get more out of this guy since he just started his
term and if he thinks we're trying to help him achieve his
obj ecti ves.
I..e:J
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'P
That's right.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�IE.O.
fjECRE'f
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
3
The President:
I think to get there we have to somehow
demonstrate, number one, that it is only useful as a defense,
even assuming it works and assuming it meets the criteria I set
out. Basically it's a defense against people who can lob a few
missiles at you rather than a lot. We need to show that those
cooperating in the nonproliferation movement are actually
benefiting, and I need to keep working on it. There's got to be
a way to do that.
I think there is a way to make sure all the
countries that are cooperating on this do benefit.
I need to
keep working on it . .J.8l
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I know.
I used to have these arguments with
Yeltsin all the time when we were looking at expanding NATO.
I
asked him once, ~Do you really believe that if we got a foothold
in Poland we would bomb western Russia?" He said, ~No, I don't,
but there are a lot of old ladies out in the country who do." He
was dead serious.
I think it's important to understand their
mentality on this.
They are still affected by Napoleon, Hitler,
and the way the Cold War .came to end, and about the way the
SECRE'l?
�SECRET
4
Soviet Empire collapsed.
Yeltsin was much more enthusiastic
about this in some ways than his progressive successors.
He
wound up mortally hating communism, but still believing in Mother
Russia. All these guys do, and we've got to be sensitive about
that. -+£+.
But we can't walk away from something that can keep a lot of usalive.
I want to talk to you about it in greater detail, maybe
before I go to see him. We can't get this done without serious
adverse implications unless both Russia and Europe believe this
can be something that benefits all of us.
Since it's a defense
system, I'm committed to that.
I think there might be some way
to plug him into that.
(8)
I am still formulating my ideas on it, but let's talk one more
time.
Let's do that first before my meeting with him.
I'll
really read up on it.
I will talk to you about it one more time
before I leave. ~
Another thing I was going to say about the tax system is that
they have to keep working on it. Before I became president, I
was there in 1990 when Boris Yeltsin was elected president when
it was still nominally the Soviet Union and then he got reelected head of the whole deal.
I knew a guy who ran a
McDonald's restaurant there, and we were talking about this tax
problem.
He said ~Look, by the time we pay our taxes -- federal,
local, etc. -- our effective tax rate is 85 percent.
Because
it's McDonalds, I can still end up making a hell of a lot of
money here.
However, my nominal Russian competitor pays an
effective tax rate of 5 percent. But there's almost no other
kind of economic activity you can imagine, except maybe for the
energy sector, that can sustain that kind of tax burden."
1%
He wasn't pleading for help.
I was just a governor at the time.
But later, after I was President, we talked again.
If they want
to get a huge amount of foreign investment, they need to
rationalize their tax system and treat everybody the same.
Otherwise, they are never going to be competitive. That is
essentially the problem with the tax system and their regulatory
problems. J..e-r
I think all the internal energy problems they've got have caused
and cost untold billions of dollars of investment.
Their whole
view of energy is caught up in the notion of sovereignty, and
we've had trouble cracking that nut. Al Gore couldn't move
Chernomyrdin very far on that stuff, but I still think they've
got just staggering potential.
1Gr
The other thing I think would be helpful to do without being
patronizing is to do something about their health system.
SECRET
�5ECREl'
5
They're the only country in the world where their life expectancy
is declining because of unsanitary conditions, not because of
doctors~
They still have a fairly large number of good doctors
over there.
It's so embarrassing that it's difficult to talk
about.
I'm convinced it's one of the things that really
demoralizes the country. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lair:
I agree.
The President:
I might be completely wrong, but my gut tells me
he could do wonders with his popularity if he could make some
progress on the health care problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure you're right.
Yes, God, yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
6
The President:
Let me ask you this.
Is there any way to link
the d~comm~ssioning with the Good Friday accord in a concrete way
- that doesn't stick them on the date? Are there any up-front
confidence building measures they can take, short of a bonfire,
which they still see~ reluctant to do?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We did something like that in Bosnia, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
un
Exactly. «1
Are they going to do it?
+&T-
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�aECRET
7
The President: Well, I'm ready to do it. Do you think that
Gerry and Martin realize that after this last vote, Trimble can't
=-~::i.1.L.!....lI...l...l.l.E....-LL-.l..,Lll:!.),c,don' t do something more?
.+etPrime Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Not only that, I just can't conceive
how anybodY thinks this thing could go forward without the
- unionists. Gerry Adams told me in private he thought there was
no way forward without Trimble. They've got to know. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It's inconceivable. The whole premise of the
Good Friday Accord was consent. It's a fraud if you get rid of
them. )Z1
)
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-____________________________________- - The President:
What are they going to give back?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
3ECRE'I'
Really?
;e1
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�'SECRET
8
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
LT_h_e_pr_e_Sl_'d_en_t_:I
___
I
~========================~~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
You can't make that dog hunt.
Prime- Minister Blair:
JQ1
+G+-
It isn't realistic.
The President:
I think you're onto some good ideas. We'll keep
talking to them. We have our channels open and when you want me
to do something, I will. I
~~______~__~____~__~~~~____~__~~__~~~~~Ithe same
thing may be happening in Northern Ireland.
It might not happen
again, there is so much prosperity, but it's one hell of a gamble
to take over basically, what are you going to do with a few arms?
You're not asking them to give them all up right now and they can
always replace what they lose. They can always go back.
It's so
bizarre.
Jj::1'
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
IE.a.
Prime Minister Blair:
It is.
~
The President:
I know you offered to meet with the IRA and they
said no. My only other suggestion is whether you or someone on
your behalf could open a channel of communication with others in
Sinn Fein/IRA besides.
In a way, at some point, it gets hard for
the leadership to make a case, and I have the feeling that the
rank and file read the newspapers and are sophisticated on one
level but in the absence of personally engaging with someone who
can explain what's going on out there, it's pretty tough.
I know
I have told you before, I think a lot of these guys can't imagine
how their lives are going to be different if this thing works
out.
I don't know how to do it, and I don't know if I can help
you, but that's the only suggestion I have.
It's a pretty narrow
funnel you're pouring all this in, and Gerry and Martin have a
heavy load.
Some may think, well, Martin is the Minister of
Education and Martin has a nice life, what/s in it for us? Maybe
3ECRE'f
'", "
_
rE
;/J,?~.i" ~ .. - -~---'-~-'-:""\,
,\
{:,~,•.. ~~:~.N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY j;
{?,.~.;.. -""'-:':~;---. ~~\ --=',' -.~.~~ - - :.--~..:;-'" ---,,::-. -<': <".:"'-
.
I
�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section
9
1.4(b)(d) I
there's nothing to this, but I think you should keep thinking
about this. .+-e1
~
I
L_p_r_i_m_e M_1_"n i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:_____________________________________________
__ __
__ __
The President: If I had your blessing, I'd be happy to do it. I
don't know if they~w~OU~l~d~d~O~i~t~-=-==i=f==t=h~e~y~w~o~U=l=d=-=t=a=l~k~t=o~a=n~__~
American either. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
ere 1S a uge gap, you
. Prime Minister Blair:
I
j
The President: Give some thought to it. I'll have our people
talk to your people about how to establish some sort of dialog
through a British or American contact and talk these things
through and give some thought to what this will be like -- what
are they going to do with their lives, how will it be different?
I may be overstating this, but it strikes me that if we just
could get them to think about how their lives would be different
if this worked out. I now believe Gerry and Martin want this to
work. But, if they brought it to a vote and jammed the vote and
caused half of them to bolt to some other faction -- we don't
want that. It's worth some leakage, but not much. It's easy for
me to say this, because I don't have to deal with the aftermath
of the bombs, but you would be right back in the soup. -8?r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
J£f
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�10
8ECRE1'
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President:
You know how badly I want this to work.
I really
think it's important. You have a good economy and good social
reform. And, if you could get a breakthrough here, I think you
would secure your place and your party's place for a long time to
come. You could help New Labor in ways we can't even evaluate.
I just want to do whatever I can for you before I have to leave
here.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
When are we going to see you?
y1
The P~esident:
I'll see you for sure in Berlin. 1'd like to
come to the UK and to Ireland before I go, but I want to be
flexible on timing.
I want to come see you when I can do the
mos t good.
JZI
/J
Prime Minister Blair:!
L-__________________- - - - - -
The President:
I've got a lot of things to talk to you about.
The main thing I don't want to do is something harmful to the
peace process, and it's not too good for me to look like I'm
taking a sentimental journey. I want to come and do something .
.....(..Gt""
Prime Minister Blair:
I
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President: God if you could do that, that'd be great. Let
me know when you want us to weigh in the next couple of weeks.
y(
Prime Minister Blair:
How is Hillary?
(U)
The President: She's doing well. I think she's going to win!
She is starting to sound like a real politician. She's always
been a good speaker, but now she's got to where she can get up
and give a real political speech and sound like a politician.
I'm beginning to sound like a meandering old man.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
well, too? ~
Not quite.
And Al?
He's doing pretty
The President: God, yes. He's doing much better. I expect him
to win. We have a big problem here. The cultural aversion of
white, married, Protestants to voting Democratic is a real
3gCRE'P
�SECRET
11
problem -- and one we have to overcome. Bush is a skilled
politician, but he is not ready to be president, maybe not ever,
certainly not now. But they want it real bad and they've got
lots of money and lots of media access and they are not freshly
discredited. And in this level of economic performance some tend
to believe it's automatic and nobody's going to screw it up, a
lot of people expect it -- think it is automatic.
It is going to
take a lot of discipline -- but I think Al will win. God knows
I'm doing everything I can to get it done without being
counter roductive. )R1
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d,
!
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
~
The President: Whew. Well, yes. We're making a little progress
on the Africa trade bill.
(gap) I may run over to Nigeria in a
few months.
(,e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
But better gay than sad.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
But I think we've given a lot of evidence.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\L---=~====~-------------r~~~~~
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you are, you've;got a hell of a cover-up!
are doing the best you can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Thank you, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
8CCRC'P
You
�DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
SECRET
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 86
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Ehrendreich, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguilo, and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE.:
May 4, 2000, 6:26-6:34 p.m. EDT
Columbus, Ohio
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
me.
Hi.
(U)
(U)
Thanks for callin
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Sounds like what we did in Bosnia.
Prime Minister Blair: .. [gap]
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECREi'
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: i
~
�·
SECRET
2
The President:
I heard it all. It sounded good to me.
I like
this idea of third-party verification. That way the IRA keeps
the nominal title to their weapons, so they didn't decommission,
but they did. ~)
Prime Minister Blair:
Exactly.
kB1
I like it.
If the IRA will take it, it's a good
put the government back up as soon as
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How about "Formerly Royal Police Service?"
s,.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You don't want me to call Gerry or Martin now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good.
Prime Minister Blair:
f€t
There we are.
We're trying our best.
I
The President: Well, I like this very much.
I always thought
the only way around this conundrum was something like secure
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
storage with third-party verification.
I think that's about the
best we can do right now.
It is going to come down to whether
both believe it would be a crying shame to let May come and go
and basical~y junk the Good Friday Accord.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: You'll find a way, and I'll be glad to call them.
We've kept in touch with their people. You've got a really good
proposal. -I don't see how you could make it better than it is.
f-Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Anything else?
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
(U)
I will keep in close touch, if I may.
).QY
The President: You can call me in the middle of the night if you
want, if this thing gets hot. You know I care deeply about it.
I will do what I can. ~
.Prime Minister Blair:
If you don't mind, I may have to do that.
~
The President:
bye.
(U)
Okay, I'm eagerly looking forward to it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Okay,
�CONFIJ;lENl'f'IAL
3363
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
~ONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTLCIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Ehrendreich, Matthew Sibley, Don
Gentile, Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 15, 2000, 5:20 - 5:34 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sellers movie.
Hello.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
I'm great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
I'm watching the end of an old Peter
Which one?
(U)
The President:
I can't tell.
I've only seen about five minutes.
But Herbert Long just disappeared along with a castle.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Pink Panther, I think.
I think it's the second one.
(U)
It's funny as hell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He was so funny, Peter Sellers.
Anyway ...
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to put you in good humor since
you're dealing with Northern Ireland.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to bring you up to date.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Reason: 1. 5d'
Declassify on
�CONFIDEHTlhL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
2
What does your legislation say right now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you have to move on this?
+G+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Weren't they saying before -- when you and I were
talking, I had a copy of the other legislation -- weren't they
claiming that they ... ~
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
L - - -_ _ _ _
----~
The President: But weren't the republicans saying if you did
that, unionists would just say that all time, and, therefore, the
Catholics wouldn't join? ;e1
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CON"FIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDg~nIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-~_ _-------------~
The President:
But the real fact is you would take it off.
Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Let me see what I can do.
I'll mull it over a
bit. Let me ask you this. What do you think should be done in
Sierra Leone? Your guys have done a good job there. .Jret
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We're talking about it here. My take on this is
that we could strengthen the UN hand if the Nigerians go in, and
you and whoever can stay in the coastal areas and the city, but
you don't want to be subjected to being picked off in those
jungles by those crazy people. They've got all these young kids
they've brutalized, hopped up on drugs.
I think if we can defeat
that kind of thing, it would be a good thing to do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH1'IAL
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDENTIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
4
I
Yes.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we're taking them in.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you're doing fine.
I'm just worried
about whether we're doing enough and how to do it.
I think
having you there and securing the airport is about what you
should be doing. You don't have enough people to venture out,
and I would hate to see you go out and be shot into fodder.
I
think we need more troops. They will be scared if the Nigerians
come in there in full force and the Indians are willing to do so.
I may want to call you again if you think there is something else
we should do.
Let me know if we can hel . ou. You've done a
good thing.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. You keep chewing on that.
I'll get back to you on that and on the Irish thing.
~
\E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) \
CONPIDEIJ'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
5
,.=p",r=i=m=e==M=~=·n=~='s=t~e=r=B=l=a=i=r:..::~_O:...:k..::.:a::::y,-,~B::..~::..·1::..::..1.:..J'
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: It's too bad the unionists won't let you kick the
can down the road a bit. If you could, the issue would become
relatively less important to both sides once things are up and
running. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How's mama Cherie doing?
Prim~ Minister Blair:
producing.
(U)
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Fine.
(U)
She's about a week away from
Is she in a bad humor about being big?
Prime Minister Blair:
She's okay.
(U)
She's been in court today.
(U)
The President:
Good!
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: She's going to court to take on the
government over parental leave. Don't even talk to me about it.
She is great, but she could produce at any time.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Alright, I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
Bye.
(u).
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'1'IAL
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Prime Minister Blair
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Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
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Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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May 27, 2000, 12:27-12:44 p.m. EDT
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Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
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I talked to Adams this morning. He is a
little bit peeved about Trimble talking about house-training him,
but, I said, "Oh hell, it's part of the deal to get the
government back up."
I told him, "Look Gerry, I will support
you. You've got to get the Patten thing, but you also have to do
those CBMs."
(.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
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IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is exactly what the republicans are
thinking, so you have go to talk to them. There is no question··
they will completely, once they move forward with their CBM, cut
the ·ground from under the "no" unionists.
(.e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"he President:
How's fatherhood coming?
·.,me Minister Blair:
It's different.
(U)
(U)
The President: You're not coming to Berlin?
to be on family leave.
(U)
Are you still going
I really wanted to come,
Prime Minister Blair: It's difficult.
but it is difficult to leave Cherie home alone on weekends
without anyone.
(U)
The President:
I think that is the right thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
to Russia?
(U)
(U)
It should be a good do and then you go on
I guess you saw
The President: Yes. What I am trying to do.
the sort of crazy speech Bush gave last week. . .(..G1Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I did.
~
The President:
[gap]
He didn't promise to unilaterally reduce
below START III levels. He just promised to cut them below START
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONP'IDEM'fIAL
3
II levels. Hell, I've already done that. This is just crazy.
am terrified these guys will get in and say Reagan was right
about Star Wars. And then you'll get the Chinese building a
thousand weapons, after all the work I did passing China
Permanent Normal Trade Relations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations, that was brilliant.
I
(91
The President:
It was a great thing, but too hard. The only
problem we have in this country is that our business community
always kills legislation. Anyway, I am just so afraid that all
the benefits will be squandered if Bush wins the elections.
I
still think we have a 50 percent or better chance to win.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Quite close, isn't it?
~
The President:
It shouldn't be. White married'Protestants don't
think they should be voting for Democrats, partly because of the
gun issue that Al and I are taking on. All the specifics people
agree with. [gap] it is crazy. You can take a poll about
loopholes.
Sixty-five percent to 30 percent say yes, but even in
New York where it is more liberal than the rest of the country,
if Hillary were endorsed by this group that did the Million Mom
March, it's like 40 to 40 percent. A lot of the country likes it
when we are in, but they have a hard time admitting it. My job
approval was like 65 percent. Bush is really smart. The
campaign against McCain was the most vicious in modern memory.
He has these right wing foot soldiers do his dirty work, so he
can be nice.
I think Al had not the best couple of months, but
now he is in good form and doing well. And we have the record
and the people.
I think he'll do fine in debates, but I still
think he has a better than 50 percent chance of winning this
thing.
If he doesn't, then you will have to do a lot of heavy
lifting.
I think Al is sort of where I am on this stuff. Of
course, if Bush wins, whatever I do with Putin, they can reverse.
If we just came out and said we are not going to do this now and
we are not going to do it until we have technology everybody buys
into and believes in, but we have to do research -- if I did
that, all I would do is make Al vulnerable. There is an article
by Hugo somebody in one of your papers, saying he thought we were
nuts. ....(.et"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hugo Young?
j£1
Did you see the piece?
Prime Minister Blair:
yn
No, but I had it summarized for me.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
The President:
It would be a good thing if national missile
defense worked on a broader basis.
If it gives people the
impression that it would work, people would believe that we could
use the thirig and they would be less likely to attack. But
you've got to figure out if you deploy and if you got beyond the
second phase and it could stop 50 or 60 warheads, what position ..
would that put the· Chinese in.
I don't think a lot of people say
let's go full tilt on this thing. The goal ought to be to get
rid of these damn offensive weapons and direct our energies
toward that.
In the meantime, we must not do anything in the
interim to increase the chances these weapons would be used.
j£1
Prime- Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President: The main thing is, the United States should take
a position that we have got to do this in the context of our
larger objectives.
I am working with Al in an effort to preserve
the arms control regime.
If we could do it, it would be good.
The problem I have with the Republican approach is they would
deploy this big Star Wars in the sky system and an adversary can
get under it if they want. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The President: One thing Republicans say is that nobody believes
we can have bad intentions, but we are the only people who have
ever dropped one of these weapons. My objective is to try and
leave office with the thing in the best possible state in terms
of a decent outcome.
I am trying to do this deal with Putin to
foreclose the possibility of going to any bigger system which
would undermine arms control.
It might not work. We might not
be able to do it. But I still think we are going to win this
thing. We might not.
It might be close.
I always believed Al
is going to win.
I am going to try to make it difficult for Bush
to go off half-cocked on this Star Wars deal. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
Any chance of seeing you?
(~
The President:
I hope so.
I would still like to come over
there. Now that we have the Northern Irelaqd government back up,
maybe I can go by Ireland again.
yeJ
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it would be good.
I have some
ideas on this stuff.
It would be nice to sit down and talk in
detail.
It would also be nice to see you in Ireland. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�COHFIDENTI."lL
5
The President:
I didn't want to go until it makes sense all
around in terms of the peace process and your schedule. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
arranged. J.G-r
Why don't we see what dates could be
The President:
I want to see your baby.
babies, you know.
(U)
I am quite good with
Prime Minister Blair: He is a great guy.
So good. A little
star, really.
And Cherie is doing great. We are going off to
mass now on Saturday night, to try to avoid the media.
If it is
not too mUGh of a hassle, to meet quite soon would be good and we
could use Ireland as the reason and have a proper talk at the
same time. Thanks for all your help again. When do you leave?
+c+The President:
I depart the Uni ted States on Monday.. I have an
EU thing in Portugal, then on to Russia, and then a brief stop in
the Ukraine.
I go to Portugal, Berlin, Russia, Ukraine, and then
home.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you leave next week?
(U)
It is a
The President: Yes. All right, tell Cherie hello.
great day for you. The way you keep everybody talking is amazing
to me.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Occasionally it is amazing to me, too.
One day at a time.
~
The President:
All right man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
All the best.
(Ul
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
...i'
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
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PARTICIPANTS:
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Prime Minister Blair
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Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
Where are you?
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Really?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, Cherie is coming with me and making
a speech in New York at some lawyer thing, so we have to bring
the baby with us.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Where are you staying?
(U)
I hope I get to see your baby.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
�2
CONFIDBlffIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Here's the problem we've got.
First of all, I
won't do anything until I see you.
I don't want to jam you in
public. Our guys tell me that Lott .will basically shut down the
Senate and not even do China if we don't do something, and now
our Foreign Sales Corporation plan was rejected.
It is not a
political thing with me.
I am not running for election, and I
don't want to do anything to hurt you, but, on the other hand, I
can't take the risk they will shut the Senate down.
The real
damage will be if they walk away from the China issue.
That is
my p~oblem, We ought to talk tomorrow. We are going to. have
dinner tomorrow, right? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(u)
The President:
Why don't we talk a little and see if there is
any reasonable prospect.
If I could just get either one of
these things resolved.
They are killing me on the FSC and the
other thing.
They know, or at least I know, you tried to help
us on both of these things.
I just can'.t let them shut the
thing down on me. JR1'
Prime Minister Blair: /
L -__________
~------------------------------~/
The President:
There might be.
don't we talk again tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me talk to our people.
Je1
Why
Okay.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: The real problem on the banana issue is a
feeling over here that there is an Anglo-Irish company that is
the main beneficiary of not resolving the issue. That is adding
to the heat.
But the issue isn't a political one for me. We
were able to avoid putting cashmere on the list last time.
You
had those elections in Scotland, and I took a lot of crap the
last time.
It is not a political thing with me, it's just that
I've got to do business with these people for the next six
weeks.
I can't run the risk of having this blamed on me or
being accused of acting on the basis of a personal relationship,
and I can't do anything to hurt Al.
I think he is going to win,
but it is tight as a tick.
(p1
CONFIJ;;BNTIAL
�@OHFIDBHTIAL
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(gap)
(U)
The President:
So when we tried to run it by them that you were
trying to help us, they said how can that be, this Anglo-Irish
company is the main beneficiary? Normally I do what I want but
Congress has a big oar in the water.
(gap)
Why don't you talk"
to your folks, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.
Maybe it will be
alright to call Lott, what the hell.
This has been dragging on
so long.
(gap) about as long as I can, and I can't run the risk
they would use that as a pretext against something as profoundly
important as China. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay,
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is quite possible.
I know the heat
they are getting, and I know where it is coming from.
But it
might be helpful, if we could have any indication we could get
that or the FSC thing resolved. Both are hanging out there
feeding on each other. And, in the Senate, it is not totally
confined to the Republicans either.
ye1
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand, okay.~
The President:
Okay, so I get to see your baby?
will see you tomorrow.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
Alright, I
(U)
�..
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SECRET
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13S26, SECTION s.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 90
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October ]4, 20]5
TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
l.4L--
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Rob Hargis, Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt
Van der Walde, and Don Cheramie
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
October 12, 2000, 9:11 - 9:19 a.m. EDT
Chappaqua, NY
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello .Bill?
Hey, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a terrible situation.
It's terrible
what happened to your servicemen.
I want to express my
sympathies.
If there is anything I can do, I am glad to.
It
looks like it is spinning out of control.
je1
The President:
I tried for days.
We had two
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now, we don't know who blew up our ship.
We know there have been terrorist elements trainin for
something like this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now you have these
�SECRET
2
instabilities working against each other.
t
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
Let me te
you w at my pans are.
I'm In
New Yor , we Just celebrated our 25 th anniversary. What a
romantic background.
I'm on my way back to the· off;Lce.
It will
take about 2 hours.
I will call you back when I get there.
I've tried to put something concrete together for two days.
I '11 get back to you when I get to. Washington. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Biarritz.
I'm going off to the EU Council in
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
t
Prime Minister Blair:
it to me.
J.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you need anything from us, please pass
The President:
I will.
Right now what we need is a nonjudgmental break. For God's sake, let's get past this and start
talking.
I'll know more later.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'Let us know what we can do.
).e1
The President: Hell, in a 100 days you can call me to go to
places like Biarritz to go skiing. God really doesn't want me
to ease my way out. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
Take care Bill.
(U)
�3
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
+er
Bye.
~
End of Conversation
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robert Hargis, Don Cheramie,
Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt Van der Walde, and Dick
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 2000, 3:36-3:59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi Bill.
How are you?
(U)
The President: Well, we haven't been sleeping much, but we've
been on the phone for the ast two days. We may be near putting
something together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
for two days now, and I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
to work on the
�SECRBT
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lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
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IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d) I
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IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The presirjent:Okay.
Good-bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
i3BCRBT
�eONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Rob Hargis, Dianne
Ruschaupt, Jill Sandler and Dick Norland,
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 10, 2000, 3:40 - 3:54 p.m. EDT
Army-NaVy Country Club
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CU)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Hi, Tony.' How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliantly.
(U)
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
Hillary just did
The Pre.sident:
She did great. And it looks tome like Al' s got
the votes, but we don't know if theY'll get counted. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, what's going to happen?
+et
The President:
I don't know. They still have to count
5,000 overseas ballots.
It's a very confusing situation. There
was an illegal ballot in Florida, where they use a punch card
system. The Bush people are trying to bully him.
Some votes
went to Buchanan and there are 19,000 ballots for him that were
disqualified, and they were African-Americans. Usually, you'd
just say "tough," but here you've got a situation where Gore won
the popular vote. He picked up five points in five days and
also pulled out a huge minority vote, I just hope he can pull it
out. Last night we had former Presidents Ford, Bush, Carter, and
Lyndon Johnson's widow, and we all made reassuring sounds to the
public. --tel
CONFIDENtpIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 ($1)
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2
Prime Minister Blair:
Where is public opinion?
~
The President: Most want it settled but they don't understand
the issue. They do not understand how clearly these votes were
for Gore. They cite Nixon not challenging in Illinois. The
dif·ference is that i f Nixon had won Illinois, he still would not
have won the electoral vote. It's really bogus. Hillary is
doing great, happy as a clam.
I am really proud of her. -+eJ
Prime Minister Blair: Well, Hillary did wonderful. Give her
our love. She was just fantastic during the campaign. She was
so strong and brave.
I thought she was just great.
J,M.
The President:
She was . . Je(
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliant.
(..et'
Well, Cheri sends her love.
Hillary was
The President: Yeah, she was the "Little Engine That Could."
I
wish you were with me, I'm playing golf. The three guys with me
are on the green right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair: The thing I wanted to say to you was on
Northern Ireland.
I think if you still want and are able to
come over, I think you could playa part in putting this
together. We had a bit of a breakdown, but it should not be
terminal because both sides want this to happen now. There are
certain thin s we have to do and certain thin s the re ublicans
have to do.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Trimble is really getting it done in the government as
the government is working well. ~
The President:
I saw what he said about no North-South
cooperation before they reengage. But the problem now is that
( C)
the IRA can't appear to be caving in to a unionist demand.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CGHPI8ENTIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
I think it ·would be great if you came over, and people
really welcome it.
I had a word with Trimble, and I think
he is keen about it as well.
He is desperate to make this work·
and so is McGuinness. We need something new, something
different to come in and sort it out a bit. ~
The President:
What's your thought?
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to come?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Sometime in early December.
~
The President: We are working on this agreement with North
Korea to try to get them to end their missile program, and I
leave this weekend for Vietnam. It sounds weird but it will be
hard for me to take two more trips but I might be able to do
them both. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
here? J...e7
Do you want us to leave some of those deportees
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
In the end it would be up to you if you cando this, but I
think it is possible to put together a deal, and you wouldn't
just be visiting, but you would actually be helping to get the
deal done.
)£1
The President:
if I can come?
.
Do you want me to do some work on this and see
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
We can meet the Irish in the next
two or three days to try to get a common position with them, and
we will brief your guys on it.
I can send you a note with the
elements of the deal 'on it. je}
The President:
That would be wonderful.
You know I want to if
I can.
I realiy want to get this m.issile deal in Korea done, it
will make us all a lot safer.
I'll tell Hillary that you
called. .-k€1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDBN'3'IAL
(U)
He's perfect, just great.
Wonderful.
The Prime Minister:
(U)
The President:
(U)
How is your baby doing?
The Prime Minister:
The President:
Thank you.
(U)
I'll get to work on this.
Bye-bye.
(U)
(U) .
All the best.
�5
COUP IDBNT L"soL
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with the British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Frank Jarosinski,
Jill Sandler, Clark Lystra, Dick Norland and
Ian Bowles
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 23, 2000, 9:10-10:06 a.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, How. are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
you?
(U)
I'm fine.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in good form, but how are
The President:. I'm doing great. I had a good trip to Vietnam.
I'm still jet lagged.
I guess it's just old age.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was a great visit.
(U)
The President:
It was great for us.and generally for
encouraging a force for change within Vietnam. They tried to
discourage the people, but they came out in droves. Sixty
percent of the country is under thirty years old, so they are
all kids. Most of them are thinking about tomorrow and there
are not a lot of elderly people. The Chairman of the party in
Saigon was talking. up private sector activity -- he sounded like
the mayor of a big mid-western city.
It was like a chamber of
commerce speech. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIAL
That's good.
�.CONFIDEN1'IAL
2
The President:
On the other side, the General Secretary said
first we have to get what happened in the war straight. He said
I'm glad you were against it. Your visit has· helped us a lot.
Our Ambassador, Pete Peterson, was in the Hanoi Hilton for six
years.
I said we were debating the nature of the conflict, but .
let's get one thing straight: we were not friends.
Now ~hat
you have a united country, we are still having the same debate
about how much of these things are eternal questions and how you
have to join the debate. )e}
Prime Minister Blair:
returned to.?
(J27
It looks fascinating -- but what have you .
The President: Between you and me, here's the problem. We
always knew this could happen where someone could win the
popular vote but lose the electoral college. You have electoral
votes that correspond to representation in the House and then
you get two more for your Senators, so it gives more influence
to smaller states. The other argument in the old days was that
we didn't have the telegraph, so we needed honest people to come
and say how the people voted.and now that is obviously
unnecessary.
This happened only twice before where nobody could
get a majority.
In 1876 and 1888 we had a case where the winner
of the popular vote lost the electoral college.
In both times,
the results were clouded and controversial, but largely the
South was still solidly democratic.
It was against the people
who won the Civil War so you had fluky results. This is just a
case where it just happened that 40,000 votes out of 200 million
people is what the dispute in Florida is about.
Gore has said
he will not challenge the electoral college, but he wants to
make sure that if Bush is given Florida that the people who
showed up got their vote counted. The truth is, Tony, everybody
knows Florida had complicated procedures.. They used a ballot a
lot of older people couldn't read, and more people intended to
vote for Gore than Bush. You still have ten thousands blacks in
one precinct.
They were going to vote for Gore. Ten thousand
uncounted votes in one county and six thousand in another. You
have nineteen thousand predominately blacks in Palm Beach County
who punched Buchanan and then punched Gore.
That is another
sixteen thousand votes for Gore. Then you had thirty two
hundred Jewish people who voted for Buchanan and we had a
statistician say it was a trillion to one shot that Buchanan
could have gotten that many votes. The real question is:. can
Gore re-enfranchise enough people to win the elections instead
of the Republicans? The Secretary of State was Bush's campaign
chairman and now the Republican House is threatening to make him
CONP IDEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
President if the electoral votes go to Gore or not.
The Florida
constitution says if you can divine the intention of the voter,
the vote should be counted and ironically, everything Bush is
fighting in Florida in the recount is precisely what the law he
signed in Texas requires. Any indentation at all these voters
make is supposed to count. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
So what's your bet?
~
The President:
I don't know. On the merits, Gore should win,
if we can re-enfranchise enough voters, but even the Florida
Supreme Court, they issued a great decision for Gore but Miami
Dade said· "we can't finish by Sunday, so we are not going to do
·it at all." So now they have to decide whether they can get
their own order by delaying. They don't need to have any of
this done until December 12th, but you know the Florida
Legislature is Republican. The Republican Congress is
threatening to change the law and they would throw it into the
House. But if they do that, he will be destroyed and he never
will recover. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
What ~s your opinion?
jZ1
The President: Right now it's evenly divided because the
process is confusing but generally thought to be fair.
The
Republicans are great spin meisters. They just say it
differently.
It is a power grab. N~w we probably will not get
the ones reenfranchised who double voted on that illegal ballot,
but the truth is, if these people were running for State
Legislature, under the law, those courts would get those votes
to Gore. They just don't have the courage to do it in a
presidential election. You have heard only a slightly biased
opinion.
If I thought Bush won fair and square, I would tell Al
to pack it in, but Gore has on the merits of those who voted,
the stronger claim. So Bush is just trying to run out the
clock. That's why they are desperate to shut it down because
they know Gore lost a lot more votes in those that were thrown
out.
I don't know what. is going to happen. ))2t
Prime Minister Blair:
Really amazing.
jef
The President:
I think we will work it out and be all right.
It is very important to remember that the whole right wing in
America desperately wants this and they still control the
Congress. There are.other things we can talk about when I see
you because Gore carne back 4-5 percent last week and he started
running his campaign on continuing the progress of the last
CONFIDEN''fIAL
r~",::-:~~~AR~P:OIDcO:t _,"
\ <-~~2;~_:_~.~::-,,",;'.:,~~~~.~~~ .. :-_,~- __ '::_-e ..;:--~!,
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
eight years and it was obvious to me in the last 48 hours, I
told one of our people, he might win the popular vote and lose
the electoral college,
I don't think there is any question that
if everybody in Florida had'their vote counted as intended, Gore
would have won by thirty thousand votes. ~
Prime Minister Blair: The right wing press here has just been
desperate for Bush. ~
The President: They are all upset that the military people got
disenfranchised because they came out in force for Governor Bush
so he carried them 2 to 1. But World War II veterans and
holocaust, survivors, they were perfectly fine with having them
disenfranchised. ~
Prime Minister Blair: They are a lot more ruthless than our
folks aren't they? ..(..G1The President: They are. They hate us more than we hate them.
It's all about power to them. They don't care as much about
government, they just want the power.
I will tell you more when
I see you.
I have not said ~ublicly what I just told you.
I
have to be President here. The New York Times finally went
after the Republicans today. They said they are just over
reaching.
I wouldn't even be surprised to see the u.s. Supreme
Court try to overturn the Florida Supreme Court. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Blimey.
JGr
So here we are.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: As I say, I can't wait to see you.
are going to have a good talk about it.
ktJ
We
The President: Yes. Let's talk about that. Did our people
tell you we might be able to come over on the 12th and maybe go
to Belfast and Dublin on the 13 th 'and 14 th? ...(.G)Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Any time.
%
Is that soon enough?
ke1
Prime Minister ~lair:
I've got to go to Zagreb tonight to this
European Balkans thing. ~
The -President:
COMFIDENIIAL
I'm really glad you are going.
jkn'
�5
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
will talk on the plane about
Steinberg will fill you in.
there with Bertie Ahern and we
outlines of an a reement.Jim
r=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
tet
Prime Minister Blair: I am going to go through with Bertie
tonight what are the three more difficult issues:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
What we aim to have by the middle of.
next week is a package we agree on. The right package to go
with. But I would have thought the 12th_14th is about the right
time.
k-e1"
The President: Okay, I will set it up. I can do whatever in
England.
I am coming there basically for you, so I will do
whatever helps you the most.
I can come to Chequers or maybe
give a speech at Oxford.
I thought about talking about five or
six major issues the whole world will face together over the
next ten years.
Something that would keep the Third Way thing
going, but I don't have to give a speech at all.
I am
interested in helping you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is very good of you, Bill. I think
a speech on that theme would be very useful. Why don't I give
some thought to where it should be. We got an inkling, and it's
fine with us, that you preferred outside of London.
(C)
The President: No.
I just thought that if we went to London,
you would have to do a big dinner or something.
I wanted to
help you politically and push our agenda.
If it helps you, I am
happy to do that. J.et
Prime Minister Blair:
on that basis.
J.Q1
The President:
That is really kind of you.
r will work
If you think it is better, r will .go to Oxford.
..keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
through. --+Gt-
CONFIDE~nL'l.L
That is great.
r will think that
�6
,CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
The only caveat might be if we have timing
problems because the 12th is the day all the electors are
supposed to be certified and there might be some reason I have
to wait until the next morning to come. But I went to Brunei
and Vietnam and the best I can do is show the' country that
everything is just chugging along.
If in the next week
something goes haywire, I will call you.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
I certainly think a speech is good and my
instinct is to stay outside of London.
We can get some private
time as well.
That is my instinct. But why don't I go through
it with my folks and we will come back to you with clear
suggestions.
~
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
the 14th?
()
~
So you will be here on the 12 th , through
The President:
Yes. My thought is the 12th'with you and to go
to Belfast on the 13 th . Maybe Dublin too, or on the 14th -- might
'have to allow two days in Be~fast.
If there is actually some
sort of deal cooked that you need me to bless, we might be able
to allocate a whole day to be there to work this.
I am going to
allow for that, but I think I just have to wait and see. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be in a better position once I
speak to Bertie tonight and take the temperature of the people
over the weekend.
I don't want to land you in something where
you only have a half day. fer
The President:
I won't do that.
That's why I left a day open.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
.JR'f
Can we talk about the Hague and climate change?
( C)
Prime Minister Blai'r:
Absolutely.
(..e1"
The President:
You know, first of all, thank you for helping
moderate the EU position so that we can all have agreement.
I
think you and Dutch are key for an agreement. The French and
the Germans aren't there yet.
I have to tell you where the
politics are going to be in,the United States. We have Congress
evenly divided.
We have Republicans ,acknowledging, even Bush,
CONFIDEN'fL~L
~~~Y:H::COPYJ
.
,
'.,::,~2:--' =-~~~~~_~J. ,~~.'~ ;."-:..;<:.}~ . .,: ;,--.;~_J~. _",
�CGNFIDENTL\L
7
that this is a real problem.
Something has to be done. We now
have through this partnership with Detroit on the next
generation of vehicles that Al Gore spearheaded, we got these
cars that will get 80 mpg.
We are trying hard.
The last step
is chemical research, which would help everybody and make your
oil money good for 30 years. Bio-mass fuels can help us get
something like seven or even eight times more efficient gas or
oil than we have today. That is about a third of the problem
with transportation. We are also trying to get this massive
progress to rapidly accelerate the construction industry. We
have another plan for dealing with our utilities and heavy
manufacturing which is the last third.
Finally, after being
treat€d like I was trying to wreck the economy, we are finally
- getting broad acknowledgement.
If we get what we need on the
sinks, forests and all our potential, the gain is something like
300 million tons. We are prepared to go down to less than a
third of that, but we need to get something. We will be
flexible, but we need to get something.
I think we are down to
125. I think it is a mistake to put limits on emission 'trading
because that is a real killer for us politically.
I think it
would be seen for what it is, that Europe wants to try to make
America adopt its tax struct~re and reduce our emissions in the
least efficient way.
It would give us less incenti ve-.
So the
problem may get worse as we get better.
I think it is bad
policy. Even Bush acknowledges it. Right now, about two House
seats left to be decided. The Senate is 50-50 if Bush wins but
51-49 if Al wins because Lieberman would leave his Senate seat
and the Governor of Connecticut is a Republican and would
appoint a Republican. _There are enough Democrats from energy
producing areas that i f this looks like we are getting a bad
deal, that will hurt us.
It also sends the wrong message to
developing countries. What matters is not the results, but how
we achieve it.
I think it is important to get an agreement.
If
we get no agreement, we just give the reactionaries an excuse to
walk away.
>¢)
Prime Minister Blair: Here's my take.
I just spoke with John
who is headin our delegation over there, on the sinks
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
you can
The president: Absolutely. We are prepared to take the overall
number lower than the science indicates.
I think the other
thing is you want to have some encouragement in this document
for sinks. We also need to do something about the rain forests
- an approach that is totally voluntary. ~
CONFIDEM'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'FIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. But the French proposal is to tax itself.
We said, "Let's establish a fund."
I don't think any other
countries have done this as much as we have. We have done it in
two contexts in America with pollutants.
We had quicker
compliance with clean air efforts at lower costs than the people
projected. Every time we did it, it worked faster and cheaper.
I understand why some Europeans want to limit trading in any
way, but it is a big mistake. Developing countries are
important.
They don't have much of a problem, but you have to
give them the incentive to take action. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am totally in agreement with you.
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
emJF IDE~JT L,\L
�,COllfFIBEM'fIAL
9
The President: Yes.
I will push our proposal on a fund more
and make it attractive to the G-77 and you want us to buck up
Aznar and Guterres. jQY
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
And Schroeder.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
We ought to be more for a market solution here.
( e)
Prime-Minister Blair:
Exactly.
02?
The President: The regulation sh9uld be the outcome, but how to
get there should be left to the most efficient means. Let me
ask something else. How did your visit with Putin go?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was fine.
Very interesting . He' feels
that he is not understood about the problems he is facing there.
He was very anxious to impress me. He wanted to see America as
}Q1
a partner, I think.
The President:
I think he does, depending on who wins our
elections, it might take a while to get it going, but the more
time you can spend with him the better. I think he is a guy
with a lot of ability and ambitions for the Russians. His
intentions are generally honorable and straightforward, but he
just hasn't made up his mind yet. He could get squishy on
democracy. -+e7
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Politically, he has got to be with the Arabs on
the Middle East dispute, but I told him one real problem you
have here is that it is not clear how much can be controlled in
CQNFIDi:WTI7\ 1.
�tONFIDEN'PIAL
this situation.
10 .
Violence beqets violence.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If you are the st'ronger person, that is
what you have to do.
It was like (gap) but I think especially
for the next year, whoever is President here, and until we get
organized, the more time you spend with him, the more it will
payoff. jJCJ
L--;--:-_ _--;-_...-----;-_-;----II
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I will carryon with it.
I think
the other thing is he is only now choosing the people around
);lim. That really matters in terms of what is being pumped into
his ears. He is highly intelligent. ~
The President: Yes. A lot of people pour crap in. He wants to
do a good job and he works at.it every day. He is intelligent
and disciplined. The last thing. I know you had a meeting with
Barak, and I know you're worried. I am doing my best. We've
made little headwa toda.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
am doing my best but yqu see what the problem is, don't 'you?
;er
.
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did you tell him
Prime Minister Blair:
speak to him.
CONFIDRN'PIAL
that?~
Yes, I have.
I will follow
E.O.13526,section 1.4(b)(d)
and
�COnFIDEN''fIAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lE.o.
11
I
l . . . - - -_ _ _ _ _
----'I
The President:
It is interesting. The Israelis have good
substantive policies, but the level of misunderstanding between
the two sides is pretty high. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
)
~------The President:
I agree with that. +G+Pr~me
Minister Blair:
We will try.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. We're trying to take another run at him on
that and maybe we'll get some movement today.
I am really glad
you are going to this Balkans conference. Tell all those Balkan
guys I said hello.
I am thrilled about what you are doing.
I
think America will do its part out there, no matter what you're
hearing out of the Bush campaign. ~
Prime Minister. Blair:
Bill. -+er
The President:
Thank you so much.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Ridiculous isn't it.
(U)
How is the Senator?
Happy as a clam.
Happy Thanksgiving,
(U)
Chelsea asked about Leo.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: He is absolutely great and you will see
when you come over.
(U)
The President:
I know Chelsea is coming. Hillary wants to but
she still has to sort out some scheduling things. I hope we see
you on the 12th.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
�12
CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
Good-bye.
(U)
End of conversation
•
CONFHl~lTIAL
�~
• CONFTDE:N1'I"L
•
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime" Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS: "
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
(U)
Michael Manning and Clark Lystra
December 13, 2000, 4:30-4:41 a.m. EST
Belfast, Ireland
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
The President:
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
Did you get some rest?
Yes, a little.
(U)
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It was amazing coverage of your visit
yesterday.
It was unbelievable.
In Northern Ireland, it "looks
( C)
good. Did you speak to Adams and Seamus this morning?
The President: No. Our people have been talking.
what they are going to say to you. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's that?
(gap) I know
(U)
The President: That the Sinn Fein view is that before the
election campaigns in the UK, there ought to be a deal on
demilitarization and decommissioning. They want to delay on
Patten and can't embrace it right now. They will not cooperate
directly on the Real IRA. We need to talk to them on the input
they would do.
There need to be more arrests in Omagh. Anyway,
all they said was that they couldn't do more.
Seamus Mallon is
in a particular situation, you know, and the problem is that he
says he will not agree yet on a police force.
He may agree on
one if arrests are made or something and if we find out more we
will tell you, but I think you have to flush them out.
I will
CONFIDE}lTI."tL
Reason: 1.5 <cp
Declassify on;
---. ,
�.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
JE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) J
work today in our meeting with him.
I'll try to find out more
about\whatever the sequence is. -kef
Prime Minister Blair~
The President:
I
That might cut the mustard with them.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L - - f_
_
The President:
OK.
_
_
_
_
~/
~
Prime Minister Blai
The President:
CONFIDEN'fI.".L
There may be something there.
)Z'5
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
�•
CO~JFIDEN'fIM:.
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: That's why I think that if I were you, I would do
a specific trade-off and if you could make some progress there,
it would be alright (gap).
I have to go and get to my meetings
now. We'll be in touch. J<1
Prime Minister B.lair: We need to decide on how specific we
should be when we meet later.
(91
The President:
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation·
CONFIDEUnAL i
�
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Foreign Policy
Iraq
Kosovo
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Telcon
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/bdbd6434f7161e88865b7d54750a15c9.pdf
daf67eae393f7ee6fa4a69d60d6f3adb
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
May
3,
'S7MftV5AHS:t10
1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
ACTION
xo^- ova- r\
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G E g ^
SUBJECT:
Purpose
8/U/15
Your Trip t o Europe i n May
To approve the o u t l i n e o f your May t r i p t o Europe and decide
whether t o stop i n London f o r a meeting w i t h Tony B l a i r .
Background
You w i l l be making a short t r i p t o Europe i n l a t e May. At t h i s
p o i n t , you w i l l be departing the evening o f Memorial Day, Monday,
May 26 and r e t u r n i n g Thursday, May 29. This t r i p w i l l focus
l a r g e l y on European s e c u r i t y i n the run-up t o the Madrid NATO
Summit i n July.
There are two a l t e r n a t i v e scenarios f o r the t r i p . I f we succeed
i n n e g o t i a t i n g a NATO-Russia agreement w i t h Moscow (and we are
c a u t i o u s l y o p t i m i s t i c ) , then the f i r s t major event o f your t r i p
w i l l be a NATO-Russia Summit May 27 i n Paris. A NATO-Russia
agreement would be a major step toward achieving your v i s i o n o f a
democratic, undivided and prosperous Europe. The Summit and
r e l a t e d events would take v i r t u a l l y a l l day Tuesday.
For May 28, you have accepted the i n v i t a t i o n o f the Dutch
Government t o v i s i t The Hague t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the semiannual
U.S.-EU Summit and d e l i v e r an address commemorating the 50th
anniversary o f the Marshall Plan. We envisage t h a t address as a
major speech t o the people o f Europe l i n k i n g your v i s i o n f o r
Europe's f u t u r e w i t h the generosity and commitment o f the
Marshall Plan. The Dutch have i n v i t e d each o f the 52 OSCE
countries t o send t h e i r heads of state or government and two
youth leaders t o the Marshall event; a t t h i s p o i n t we expect 40
of those leaders, i n c l u d i n g Kohl and p o s s i b l y Y e l t s i n , t o attend.
There w i l l not be time f o r b i l a t e r a l meetings i n the Hague but
Queen B e a t r i x w i l l host a luncheon i n your honor f o r the v i s i t i n g
leaders.
•CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On:
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
5/2/07
-G6NRBENT1AL
CNO LR R POOOY
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The t h i r d major piece o f the t r i p , subject t o your agreement,
would be a short stop i n London t o meet w i t h Tony B l a i r . A stop
i n London would be seen by the B r i t i s h p u b l i c as a compliment t o
B l a i r and would set the stage f o r what we expect t o be an
extremely productive r e l a t i o n s h i p . We would also recommend t h a t
you use an e a r l y meeting w i t h B l a i r t o encourage him t o t r y t o
make progress on Northern I r e l a n d r i g h t away, rather than p u t t i n g
i t on the back burner. I f there i s a NATO-Russia Summit May 27
you could stop i n London on your way back t o Washington May 29;
i f there i s no Summit, you could stop there on your way t o The
Hague May 27.
I w i l l send you a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f the themes and
goals o f the t r i p closer t o the event; a t t h i s p o i n t I would
appreciate your agreement t o the o u t l i n e described above and your
decision on London.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the general o u t l i n e f o r the t r i p described
above.
Approve
Disapprove
That you agree t o stop in-^London t o see Tony B l a i r ,
Approve
Disapprove
-CONFIDENTIAL.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
June 1 0 , 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
61/
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
Your Phone C a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
June 10, 1997, 2:45 p.m.
My c o u n t e r p a r t John Holmes c a l l e d t o ask t h a t you accept a c a l l
from Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t h i s a f t e r n o o n . B l a i r wants t o g i v e
you an update on t h e B r i t i s h response t o t h e f o u r issues Sinn
Fein has s a i d must be s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h e y can go t o t h e IRA f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . We expect B l a i r w i l l a l s o ask t h a t you take a tough
l i n e on t h e resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
I n h i s May 16 speech i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , B l a i r announced t h a t
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s would meet w i t h Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o
d i s c u s s t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r a c e a s e f i r e (the f i r s t such meetings
s i n c e t h e c e a s e f i r e was broken i n February 1996). There have
been two meetings so f a r . Sinn Fein has s a i d i t needs p r o g r e s s
on f o u r p o i n t s : a date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t a l k s once t h e r e
i s a c e a s e f i r e ; assurance t h a t t h e decommissioning i s s u e w i l l n o t
b l o c k m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s ; a timeframe t o ensure t h a t
n e g o t i a t i o n s do h o t go on i n d e f i n i t e l y ; and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g
measures from t h e B r i t i s h Government. Though Sinn Fein has n o t
s a i d so e x p l i c i t l y , i t should a l r e a d y be s a t i s f i e d on two o f
those p o i n t s : t h e timeframe and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures
(e.g. t h e t r a n s f e r o f p r i s o n e r s , acknowledgment o f p a r t i a l
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e Great Famine, and Mo Mowlam's
comments on r e f o r m o f p o l i c e ) .
Sinn Fein has complained t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have n o t y e t s e t a f i r m
date f o r t h e i r e n t r y i n t o t a l k s c o n t i n g e n t on a c e a s e f i r e , b u t
t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h would be w i l l i n g t o do so.. I t
i s t h e decommissioning i s s u e t h a t may prove t h e most i n t r a c t a b l e .
D u b l i n and London are now w o r k i n g o u t t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s over how
t o handle t h i s i s s u e i n t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s , b u t they w i l l have t o
s e l l David T r i m b l e and t h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y on whatever p l a n
t h e y agree on. Up t o t h i s p o i n t , T r i m b l e has remained adamant
t h a t decommissioning must s t a r t b e f o r e t h e t a l k s move i n t o t h e i r
-6QKP-I DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
6/10/07
Nf IDbNTIftL'
CNO LR R POOOY
LT N B A Y HTCP
I
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�j ON FIDEMTI AL
s u b s t a n t i v e phase; t h e governments want t o use M i t c h e l l ' s f o r m u l a
o f decommissioning " i n p a r a l l e l " w i t h progress i n n e g o t i a t i o n s .
About 10 days ago, what had looked l i k e a "de f a c t o " IRA
c e a s e f i r e began t o u n r a v e l when t h e IRA abandoned a van f u l l o f
e x p l o s i v e s ( r e p o r t e d l y n o t primed t o explode) t h a t was p r o b a b l y
on i t s way t o a m i l i t a r y s i t e . Today t h e IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s h o o t i n g a t t a c k on B r i t i s h t r o o p s i n which
no one was i n j u r e d .
The B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t they are deeply concerned about
the renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e , even i f i t has n o t c l a i m e d any
v i c t i m s y e t . B l a i r w i l l want your support i n condemning t h i s
v i o l e n c e and making c l e a r t o t h e IRA t h a t i t i s
c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e , as w e l l as wrong.
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
•CONn DENT IAL
n m i r n r k r IRI
C Ni E ifL
O rD Nll
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�tUNiiUimlnL
CONn DENT IAL
3996
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Northern I r e l a n d
General p o i n t s as a p p r o p r i a t e :
•
As always w i l l do what we can t o h e l p .
•
Renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e deeply u n s e t t l i n g , coming as Sinn
Fein's e l e c t o r a l successes show t h a t they have a f u t u r e i f
they pursue t h e democratic p a t h .
•
With your government, e l e c t i o n o f Ahern, M i t c h e l l i n B e l f a s t
and my own commitment, IRA has best p o s s i b l e c o n s t e l l a t i o n .
I f t h e y do n o t grab o p p o r t u n i t y , agree t h a t t a l k s must move
ahiad w i t h o u t them (though w i t h o u t c l o s i n g door t o Sinn Fein
p a r t i c i p a t i o n on b a s i s o f a c e a s e f i r e . )
I f Blair
says
HMG o f f i c i a l s will
stop
meeting
with
Sinn
Fein:
•
Understand t h a t you f e e l you must do t h i s .
o n l y wrong b u t c o m p l e t e l y i l l o g i c a l .
•
Assume you w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek agreement w i t h D u b l i n on how
to handle decommissioning. S t i l l t h i n k you need t o p u t a l l
p i e c e s i n p l a c e so t h a t t h e r e i s no excuse f o r IRA n o t c a l l i n g
ceasefire.
•
W i l l you s t o p c o n t a c t s w i t h Sinn Fein
I f Blair
asks
for
strong
message
IRA v i o l e n c e n o t
indefinitely?
condemning
IRA
violence:
•
NSC (Jim S t e i n b e r g ) a l r e a d y p l a n s t o d e l i v e r tough message t o
Adams on resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
(Call
w i l l p r o b a b l y take p l a c e Thursday).
•
I f asked: W i l l be happy t o have Mike McCurry make p u b l i c
statement condemning renewed v i o l e n c e .
•
I f appropriate:
I f you are n o t t a l k i n g t o Sinn Fein d i r e c t l y ,
we w i l l be happy t o pass any o t h e r messages you may have.
CONFI BEN'TTEMJ
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/10/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�xtntnijtfttW:
-COMF1 DEMT IAL
If Blair
discusses
progress
on Sinn
Fein's
four
points:
•
You have taken number o f c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g steps -- your
moves on p r i s o n e r s , your comment on t h e famine ( f i r s t B r i t i s h
acknowledgment o f some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . Mo Mowlam's remarks on
need f o r r e f o r m o f p o l i c i n g . A l l have made c l e a r your good
f a i t h , d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o addross a l l aspects o f problem.
•
On timeframe, agree t h a t May 1998 e x p i r a t i o n o f your
l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g t h e Forum i s n a t u r a l p e r i o d t o assess
progress o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
•
Urge you t o press ahead w i t h I r i s h t o reach agreement on how
to handle decommissioning and how t o s e l l i t t o T r i m b l e . I f
t h e r e i s any chance f o r c e a s e f i r e , w i l l o n l y happen i f IRA
assured Sinn Fein w i l l n o t be s t u c k i n t a l k s about
decommissioning.
•
On date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y , have i m p r e s s i o n t h i s can be
worked o u t as l o n g as t a l k s do n o t proceed i n p l e n a r y s e s s i o n
w i t h o u t Sinn Fein a f t e r an IRA c e a s e f i r e .
New I r i s h Government
•
A l t h o u g h new government ( l e d by B e r t i e Ahern) w i l l n o t be
f o r m a l l y i n p l a c e u n t i l June 26, understand t o p I r i s h
o f f i c i a l s expect t o be empowered t o a c t when t h e y meet your
o f f i c i a l s next week t o d i s c u s s decommissioning.
•
Doubt you w i l l see change.in b a s i c I r i s h p o s i t i o n s on peace
p r o c e s s . What do you t h i n k ?
NATO
•
Have been c o n s i d e r i n g f u r t h e r which c o u n t r i e s t o i n v i t e t o
j o i n NATO a t Madrid and w i l l be meeting w i t h C o n g r e s s i o n a l
l e a d e r s tomorrow.
•
W i l l be i n touch w i t h you i n couple o f day t o d i s c u s s how t o
b r i n g t h i s issue t o closure w i t h i n A l l i a n c e — i f p o s s i b l e ,
w i t h o u t messy argument w i t h Jacques C h i r a c .
•
I f asked: S t i l l l e a n i n g toward s m a l l f i r s t group combined
w i t h s t r o n g "open door" t o assure those.not s e l e c t e d t h a t
process w i l l c o n t i n u e . W i l l e l a b o r a t e when we t a l k a g a i n .
•€0NFI DENT TAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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C NDN I L
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SUM2, BASS, BERGER, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, STEINBERG, HOTLINEJN, PETERS,
VERSHBOW
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG: 111 845Z JUN 97
FM: CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:
THE WHITE HOUSE
////
C O N F I D E N T I A L - VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
11 JUNE 1997.
CONriDCHTIAfc AND PERSONAL
DEAR BILL
IT WAS GOOD TO TALK TO YOU ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT, PARTICULARLY
ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR AGREEING TO USE YOUR
INFLUENCE WITH SINN FEIN TO PUT A STOP TO RENEWED IRA VIOLENCE, WHICH
COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES JUST AT THE TIME WHEN WE ARE
TRYING TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. THE KILLING OF A LOYALIST TERRORIST
THIS MORNING FURTHER INCREASES MY FEARS, ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THIS IS NOT YET CLEAR.
AS YOU KNOW, I WANT TO GET SINN FEIN INTO THE TALKS IF I CAN. WE HAVE
HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THEM AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION
ON VARIOUS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND TO SET OUT OUR OWN. I NOW
WANT OFFICIALS TO SEND THEM A SHORT PIECE OF PAPER BY THE END OF THIS
WEEK, SO THAT THEY CAN BE IN NO DOUBT OF WHERE WE STAND. I ATTACH A
COPY OF WHAT WE PROPOSE TO SEND. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD
TREAT THIS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FOR THE MOMENT. WE MAY WANT TO
ARRANGE A FURTHER MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH SINN FEIN EARLY NEXT
WEEK, BUT THAT ITSELF IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY CONTINUING IRA
VIOLENCE.
IN ANY CASE I PLAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT OUR POSITION, PROBABLY
NEXT WEEK. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN AGAIN OUR POSITION ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, DECOMMISSIONING, AND THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SET OUT THAT WE HAVE IN MIND A PERIOD OF
SOME SIX WEEKS TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE. IN OTHER WORDS A CEASEFIRE
IN MID-JUNE WOULD LEAD, IF IT WERE SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, TO
SINN FEINS FORMAL ENTRY INTO THE TALKS BY THE END OF JULY.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
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c
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PER E.O. 13526
• CONriDCNTIAL-
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-CONriDCNTlAb"
I SHOULD ADD THAT I PROPOSE TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL
TALKS GET UNDER WAY IN SEPTEMBER, WHETHER SINN FEIN ARE IN THE TALKS
OR NOT. I AM NOT PRPEARED TO ALLOW FURTHER DELAY. SO SINN FEIN NEED
TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHETHER THEY WANT TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS OR NOT.
I HOPE YOU WILL BE READY TO SUPPORT FULLY THIS APPROACH. I AM
PREPARED TO MAKE A REASONABLE OFFER TO SINN FEIN, DESPITE THE RISKS
THIS ENTAILS. I HOPE THEY WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE POSITION OR MY
DETERMINATION. I WILL NOT TOLERATE AN APPROACH FROM THEM WHICH CLAIMS
TO BE POLITICAL BUT REMAINS UNDERPINNED BY VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF
IT. THEIR CURRENT TWIN-TRACK STRATEGY LEAVES ME GENUINELY ALARMED
ABOUT THEIR SINCERITY.
I WANT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS THIS SUMMER AND WILL DO EVERYTHING I
CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR INFLUENCE TO HELP ME
DO SO.
KINDEST REGARDS TO HILLARY.
YOURS EVER
TONY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AIDE MEMOIRE
MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE WAS
NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN FEINS.
THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON THE
POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN
INTO THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA
CEASEFIRE. NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT
OF VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN INCLUSIVE
BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE SINN FEIN
PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEINS ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE GROUND RULES
FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS LEGALLY
OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN SHE CONSIDERS THOSE
REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD
FAITH.
WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING
THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN
UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE, AND IS SATISFACTORY IN
WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO A PLENARY SESSION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT WOULD BE THE OCCASION
FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL 6
PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESo TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT
SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS OF'
PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR IT SUPPORTS PARALLELDECOMMISSIONING AS RECOMMENDED BY
MITCHELL AND THAT m W A N T ^ T O RESOLVE THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF TH^PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT DOES NOT BLOCK THE START
OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS WORKING
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. THIS CAN ONLY BE ON THE BASIS
OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS CAN
CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS? A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF
THE PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AND A
REVIEW MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW? A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? A
CONriDCNTIAL
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COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET? A
COMMITMENT TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT? AND A
COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE
CAPABLE OF SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A
MORE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY-FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
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FROM:
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CONriDCNTIAL
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: COQ, PETERS, S U M 2 , VERSHBOW, NSC, BASS, BERGER, BRADEN, BROWN, DAVIES,
FUERTH, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, STEINBERG, TRIP
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CQMFIUENTIAL
DTG:1 3 2 1 4 5 Z JUN 97
F M : CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
///////CORRECTED COPY////////
CONriDCNTIAL
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM JOHN HOLMES
TO SANDY BERGER
DEAR SANDY
I WAS GRATEFUL THAT YOUR PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND SO QUICKLY TO
THE DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH WE SENT TO YOU UNDER COVER OF A LETTER
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT. WE HAVE TRIED TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE. I
NOW ENCLOSE A REVISED VERSION OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, WHICH WE ARE
PASSING TO SINN FEIN THIS EVENING.
YOURS EVER
JOHN HOLMES
BEGINS
AIDE MEMOIRE
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE
WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN
FEINS. THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON
THE POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN INTO
THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE.
NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT OF
VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN
INCLUSIVE BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE
SINN FEIN PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEIN'S ENTRY IS GOVERNED
BY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE
GROUND RULES FOR SUBSTANTIVE ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY
OF STATE IS LEGALLY OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN
SHE CONSIDERSTHOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL
JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. Tti!S_PERIOD
SHOULD BE USED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEEDSOFAlT
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PARTIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO
ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH. WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY
MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS
SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE,
AND IS SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO
A PLENARY SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT
WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT
TO THE MITCHELL 6 PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION, AND THAT A
SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS
OF PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR THAILULWANTfi TO RFSOI VF THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT OOFS NOT BfOfflTTHE
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. REALISTICALLY, THIS CAN ONLY BE
ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT.
IT IS WORKING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SECURE AGREEMENT AMONfe
THE PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THIS BASIS. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS
CAN CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS; A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF THE
PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AND A REVIEW
MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE NEGOTIA1 IONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW; A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE; A
COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET; A COMMITMENT
TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT; AND A COMMITMENT TO
IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE CAPABLE OF
SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A MORE
INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM. IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER POINT
OF APPARENT CONCERN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS MADE CLEAR IT HAS
EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE VARIED CULTURAL TRADITIONS OF BOTH
COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING THE IRISH LANGUAGE AND CULTURE. IT ALSO
RECOGNISED THE PARTICULAR SENSITIVITIES OF PRISONER ISSUES ON ALL SIDES.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMEIDEffflAtr
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, AND OTHER
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERE THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
ENDS
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FROM:
Alexander R. Vershbow/National Security Council
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
CONriDENTIAL-
�COIttriDENTIAir
4 1 7 5 REDO
NATIONALSECURITYCOUNC.IL
W A S H I N G T O N . D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW fo
FROM:
MARY ANN PETER^i
SUBJECT:
Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d / R e p l y t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
As you r e c a l l , Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent t h e P r e s i d e n t a message
l a s t week c o v e r i n g t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r t o Sinn
Fein on Sinn Fein's e n t r y i n t o t h e peace t a l k s i f an u n e q u i v o c a l
c e a s e - f i r e i s d e c l a r e d . We had i n t e n d e d t o send a P r e s i d e n t i a l
r e p l y l a t e r t h i s week, f o l l o w i n g Jim's planned c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
Adams t o get Sinn Fein's i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
In l i g h t o f t h e IRA murders today, Jim d i d n o t t a l k t o Adams.
However, a P r e s i d e n t i a l l e t t e r i s needed i n any event t o express
sympathy on t h e l o s s o f t h e policemen. We recommend u s i n g t h e
l e t t e r a l s o t o make c l e a r t h a t we t h i n k t h e o f f e r i s a good one
and t o pass on a message Mary Ann g o t from Sinn Fein today.
The l o c a l F r i e n d s o f Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Mairead Keane,
c a l l e d Mary Ann w i t h a message from Adams. He s a i d t o t e l l us
t h a t he w i l l n o t be d i s t r a c t e d by t h e IRA a t t a c k from t h e t a s k o f
g e t t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e IRA's ongoing campaign.
Adams s a i d Sinn Fein had r e c e i v e d t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r F r i d a y and
Sinn F e i n (read IRA) a r e s t u d y i n g i t ; though t h e r e remains a
problem w i t h decommissioning, t h e d r a f t c o n t a i n s p o s i t i v e
elements.
I f i t would be u s e f u l , Adams s a i d , he i s ready t o t a l k
to J i m about t h i s .
The bottom l i n e appears t o be t h a t today's
a t t a c k was n o t i n t e n d e d as a response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Tab C F i n a l Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Tab D Incoming Correspondence
-CONFIDENTIAfc
Reason:—TTSb
D e c l a s s i f y On:
PER E.O. 13526
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
WMS-O^"?* - H
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417 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. F u t u r e Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
The B r i t i s h government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the B r i t i s h a r e g o i n g t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f the murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
CONFIDENTTm
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
1
6/16/07
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the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
We w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o g e t t o a c e a s e - f i r e on t h e
b a s i s o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r i n s p i t e o f t h e murders o f t h e
policemen. P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o
underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l commitment t o t h e process,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n
early July.
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Gerry Adams today t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders.
However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve
t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r
B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Incoming Message
CITN LBAY P O O O Y
LNO IRR H T C P
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. YOU HAVE MY
SINCERE SYMPATHY AMD HILLARY'S. OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG
FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN. PRIOR TO
HIE ATROCITY ON MONDAY, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JIM
STEINBERG, HAD INTENDED TO TALK TO ADAMS AND TELL HIM THAT WE
BEIrl-EVE-^OUR-OFFSR-^-S FORTHCOMI-NG-AN-B—SER IOU-S—AND—T-HAT THE IRA
SHOULD ACT ON I T WITHOUT DELAY. BECAUSE OF THE MURDERS/ JIM DID
NOT GET I N TOUCH WITH ADAMS, F o l l o w i n g our phone c a l l , my Deputy
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r , Jim S t e i n b e r g , c o n t a c t e d Adams t o pass
on my deep concern about the c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e , and t o urge a
f o r t h c o m i n g response t o y o u i e f f o r t s . We had planned t o f o l l o w
up on Monday, b u t p u t o f f the c a l l f o l l o w i n g t h e murders. BUT
SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF I T WAS THAT
NO^H^NG—SHOULD BE REAB-INTO THE ATTACK BEYON-B-T-H-E-which was t h a t
t h e a t t a c k was n o t i n response t o your p r o p o s a l , b u t r a t h e r a
CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN. WE TAKE THAT TO MEAN THAT
SINN FEIN DOES NOT WANT THE MURDERS TO BE SEEN AS THE
RE-PUBixiGANS-* RBSFQNSS TO YOUR—OFFER-; WHILE I AM NOT REPOSING
ANY CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO
YOU.
SANDY BERGER AND JIM STEINBERG ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR
OFFICIALS AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE
TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE
CRIME. WE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I
LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^OV^ - 0\"72. -
�'•GONFIDENTIAL
4175
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
.To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g the p r o s p e c t s f o r g e t t i n g Sinn F e i n i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by the press s e c r e t a r y warning
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was
p r o b a b l y planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , n o n e t h e l e s s
the IRA c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f the policemen i n t h e face o f
c l e a r warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
.CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/16/07
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�CONFIDENTIAL
23
t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d w i l l r e t u r n t o
the l e v e l s c f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i f t o f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s . Nonetheless, t h e
B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e
r e a s o n a b l y near f u t u r e (perhaps by t h i s f a l l ) t h e y w i l l t r y t o
move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn F e i n . Meanwhile,
t?he o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o c o n t i n u e t o t r y t o p u t t o g e t h e r a
deal f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on
the t a b l e , we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o s u p p o r t them and
the I r i s h a t t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y t i n c . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l
want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l
o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and commitment t o peace and
reconciliation,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e worst o f t h e marching season
approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business,
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are p l a n n e d w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
•CQMJf-lbLiN'l I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDCHTIAL
33
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn Fein
Incoming Message
C
-CONFI DEMT IAL
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T O N I B W ^
O
T
O
C
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P
V
�COHriDDNTIAtr
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU'Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
d e m o c r a t i c process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g t h e prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by t h e press s e c r e t a r y w a r n i n g
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was p r o b a b l y
planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , nonetheless t h e IRA
c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f t h e policemen i n t h e face o f c l e a r
warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d s u g g e s t i o n s
from us and from t h e I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
COMF1 DENT-£ftj=r
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/16/07
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LNO I R R H T C P
CONFIDENTIAh
t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are going t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e reasonably near
f u t u r e ( p r r h n p n b y t h i n f n l l ) t h r y w i l l t r y tc move t h e peace
process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
t o underscore your continusra p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
worst o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim Sfcoinborflp had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his
initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because
of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did
call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does
not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business
of getting a political process going and that we should read
nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA
campaign^ ^BTn . bn ] i
the purpose of the message was to tell us
that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer.*
The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks^
are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair
know that we heard this from Adams. /L
RECOfoM^NDATION
That you
CONFIDENTIAL
the
mes^ctge t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
�COMF1DENTIAL
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime Minister B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONn DENT I A I T
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H I N GTO N
17 .^.'f'J-3
June 17, 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE P E DENT
R'
KBH
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGEI^/
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on Northern I r e l a n d
Purpose
To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who
were murdered by the IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn Fein.
Background
On June 16, two policemen walking a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the Northern I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan. The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the attack w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and Bruton
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were both i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; both issued strong statements condemning the
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern issued a passionate
statement, c l e a r l y intended t o disabuse republicans o f the n o t i o n
that a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy issued h i s strongest denunciation yet of the
republican t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine violence w i t h the
democratic process. The statement we issued i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
Following up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim Steinberg made clear
to Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t the violence i n Northern
I r e l a n d was threatening the prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We also issued a statement by the press secretary warning
against violence a t t h i s juncture. While the a t t a c k was probably
planned w e l l before our message was given, nonetheless the IRA
c a r r i e d out the murder of the policemen i n the face o f clear
warnings from the B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein entry i n t o the Belfast t a l k s on the basis o f
an unequivocal ceasefire. The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d suggestions
from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t the B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
•CONFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: Vice President
Chief- of S t a f f
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DEMTIAL
to handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e r e a s o n a b l y near
f u t u r e t h e y w i l l t r y t o move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t
Sinn Fein ( p r o b a b l y i n September). Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
to underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s i n i t i a l
r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because o f t h e
murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d c a l l an
NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does n o t
i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business o f
g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d r e a d n o t h i n g
i n t o t h e a t t a c k ; t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us t h a t
the a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t
a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e ongoing campaign a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h .
The
B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s are
planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r know
what we heard from Adams. Adams' message i s , o f course,
d i s i n g e n u o u s s i n c e Monday's a t t a c k c o u l d presumably have been
c a l l e d o f f i f t h e IRA l e a d e r s h i p had wanted t o do so. From t h e
r e p u b l i c a n s ' warped p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e v i o l e n c e w i l l c o n t i n u e
unless an a c t u a l d e a l i s reached on a c e a s e f i r e . They may a l s o
be under t h e m i s t a k e n i m p r e s s i o n t h a t c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e w i l l
soften the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n .
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e r e p l y t o B l a i r ' s message t h a t I
a u t h o r i z e d on your b e h a l f .
C 0 1 i r i D E
"
T I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-
CONriDENTIAL
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
�PREC: .
IMMEDIATE
CLASS:
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT: MESSAGE F O THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
RM
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE T O POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. OUR HEARTS G
W
O
OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT W S IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
A
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN.
FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
JIM STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT
THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO
YOUR EFFORTS. W HAD PLANNED TO FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF
E
THE CALL FOLLOWING THE MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE
TO US; THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK W S NOT IN
A
RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S
CAMPAIGN. WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR G O FAITH, I
OD
WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER IS PREPARED TO W R WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND WITH THE
OK
IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE PEACE
PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. W WILL HAVE
E
THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOUR THERE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
(END TEXT)
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
3/fc/iS rtBM
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
C NO LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UT N
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BASS BERGER BRADEN COMM DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: COQ FICKLIN FRIEDRICH MILLISON PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTI-AL
<DTG> 1723 36Z JUN 97
PM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
INFO ////
• C O N F I D E N T I A L
QQQQ
V I A CABINET CHANNELS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S
VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN I N NORTHERN IRELAND.
OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS I N STEP WITH WHAT YOU,
JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR
KENNEDY HAS ALSO ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN
CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T
WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK
FORWARDING THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN
FEIN. FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, J I M STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP
CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A
FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO YOUR EFFORTS. WE HAD PLANNED TO
FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF THE CALL FOLLOWING THE
MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF
WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK WAS NOT I N RESPONSE TO YOUR
PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN.
WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED
TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER I S PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE
PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL
HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SINCERELY,
BILL
CONFIDCNTIAL
�IMMEDIATE
-GONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
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<"SSN>4332
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CONFIDENTIAL
�bOlNl'WElM HAL - PERSONAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
31 July 1997
THE PRIME MINISTER
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
^o\S- OV72.- n
)
When we spoke on the telephone on Sunday, I promised to send you some
more specific thoughts on Northern Ireland and areas where you may be able to
help.
As we agreed, the renewed IRA ceasefire offers a new opportunity to
move to a lasting political settlement and the lasting peace which the people of
Northern Ireland are so desperate to see. Halting violence is a very welcome
move by the republicans. As the word suggests, a ceasefire is not of course the
same as peace. We must all work very hard to turn what may be currently no
more than a tactical move by the republican movement into a permanent
abandonment of violence and commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic
means. Nothing else will do in the end. This means keeping up the pressure on
Sinn Fein to move away from a twin-track strategy of politics and violence to
politics alone. Your influence may be very important here. I hope your
response to Sinn Fein over the next few months will be carefully graduated to
reflect real progress in consolidating the ceasefire and making it permanent.
It is the issue of permanence which gives the vexed question of the
decommissioning of illegally held arms its importance, particularly in Unionist
�-CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
2
- •
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O V
HTCP
eyes but also in our own. Of course decommissioned arms could be replaced,
even if the decommissioning process were complete. But readiness to
decommission implies readiness to give up violence. That is why Sinn Fein
statements that the IRA will not give up a single weapon cause such disquiet, and
are so unhelpful in terms of keeping the Ulster Unionists tied in to the multi-party
process.
We spoke about how you might be able to help influence David Trimble.
As I said, I think it is useful if the Administration keeps in close touch with him,
to show that his effort to stay in the process is both important and appreciated,
and to reinforce that you are even-handed in dealings with both communities (the
Unionists will obviously be watching your contacts with Sinn Fein very closely).
Anything you can say to show understanding of the Ulster Unionist concerns
about decommissioning would also be helpful. I hope that we and the Irish
Government may be able to say a little more in due course about our own desire
to see at least some actual decommissioning during negotiations, in accordance
with George Mitchell's proposals. This may be very important in influencing
David Trimble towards staying in the talks.
I also mentioned to you my desire to do more to harness the strong desire
of the people of Northern Ireland for a settlement, by showing them that this is
now a real prospect with high-level international support. You may be able to
play a key role in this at the right moment, when substantive talks are well under
way. I hope we can be in touch about this in the autumn.
�•GONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
-3CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I am absolutely determined to make progress soon on the substance of the
Northern Ireland issue. That is why I have set a timetable of September-May for
a settlement to come out of negotiations. This is an arbitrary target, but I believe
it can be achieved if all concerned are prepared to put aside old enmities and
prejudices. Our aim must be to create conditions where they can most easily do
so.
(/
The President of the United States of America
�O LIBRARY P O O O Y
N
HTCP
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
2 October 1997
I am pleased to say that in the past couple of weeks we have made progress
in Northern Ireland. As you will have heard, Sinn Fein have joined the talks and
sworn their commitment to the Mitchell principles; we have kept the Ulster
Unionists in play - though only just; we succeeded in finding a procedural way
through the decommissioning problem for now and ultimately got agreement to
move, at last, into the substantive talks.
This is all good news. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists and one of the
other smaller Unionist parties have withdrawn from the discussions but otherwise
the pieces are now in place for us to press on with the real negotiations. As
always, part of the credit must go to George Mitchell and the other independent
chairmen who have skilfully helped to guide the parties round the obstacles.
I also want you to know how grateful I am to you for providing
Ambassador Donald Johns on as a member of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning, which was formally established on
24 September, and to Ambassador Johnson for agreeing to take on this
challenging role. The Commission is now ready to commence work on
decommissioning alongside the substantive negotiations. It marks an important
�LINTON LIBRARY P C P
H OY
-2-
step in our objective to bring about an enduring political settlement in Northern
Ireland by May next year. As before, we have found we can rely on you to give
generous and speedy assistance. I am most grateful.
Both communities will need constant encouragement to make the most of
the opportunity so painstakingly created. I know I can look to you for help over
this. I look forward to staying in close touch.
/
J
(
The President of the United States of America
�CONriDCNTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
57 07 REDO 4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
October 2, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER fP)
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER '• j
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r , Prime M i n i s t e r
of t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
The P r e s i d e n t and B l a i r have kept i n r e g u l a r touch on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d and o t h e r issues. There have been v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t
developments i n B e l f a s t , t h e s u b j e c t o f a B l a i r l e t t e r t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t dated October 2. P r i o r t o t h a t , t h e P r e s i d e n t c a l l e d
the Prime M i n i s t e r September 1. E a r l i e r , B l a i r wrote t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o l l o w i n g t h e i r phone c o n v e r s a t i o n J u l y 27 conveying
h i s thoughts on t h e Northern I r e l a n d peace process, asking t h a t
we f i n d ways t o support t h e U n i o n i s t s . I t would be a p p r o p r i a t e ,
now t h a t t h e t a l k s are due t o s t a r t and Trimble w i l l see t h e
P r e s i d e n t and you October 7, f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o send a
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y l e t t e r . Attached a t Tab I f o r your approval i s
your memorandum t o t h e President f o r w a r d i n g a d r a f t message t o
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r i n b o t h signed o r i g i n a l (TaD A) and cable
format (Tab B ) .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo t o t h e President a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memo
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
t o the President
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Cable v e r s i o n o f l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Incoming Correspondence
•CONFI DEN^Ma
Reason: 1.5d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
09/30/07
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
3/{p/i5" K 8 H
�COMF1DENTIAL
5707
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
Purpose
To c o n g r a t u l a t e Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on recent developments i n
Northern I r e l a n d .
Background
You spoke w i t h B l a i r October 9 b r i e f l y on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
B l a i r w r o t e you October 2 w i t h an update. W i t h t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
t a l k s underway, i t i s w o r t h c o n g r a t u l a t i n g B l a i r f o r t h e
breakthroughs i n B e l f a s t which have made t h i s p o s s i b l e . E a r l i e r
i n t h e summer he conveyed h i s impressions on t h e process ( l e t t e r
a t t a c h e d a t Tab C), and asked t h a t you look f o r ways t o support
David T r i m b l e , who you d i d October 7. A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s your
l e t t e r on these developments.
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Cable V e r s i o n o f L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab C Incoming correspondence
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SI\*llS KBH
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/30/07
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�)
HOUTINE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
"? t 7 ^
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RI£EE SIT
SeBERBfiRG STEINBERG
SIT: BANDLER FICKLIN POOLE RIEDEL SUM2
SIT: HOTLINE_IN
<PREC> ROUTINE
<CLAS> UUNtIDENTIAL" <DTG> 082245Z NOV 97
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO-WHITE HOUSE
INFO / / / /
C O W F I D E M T 1 A L VIA CABINET CHANNELS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
1.0\?> - O ^ T . - H
FM THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ONCE MORE, WE FACE A TEST OF OUR RESOLVE OVER IRAQ AND THE
DANGERS POSED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. I KNOW THIS
WILL BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU, AS I T I S TO ME.
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, AS I N THE PAST, WE MUST STAND ABSOLUTELY
FIRM AND ABSOLUTELY TOGETHER. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN
ACHIEVE THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF UNSCOM RESUMING ITS OPERATIONS
AND COMPLETING ITS WORK I N AN UNFETTERED WAY. CLEARLY OUR
PREFERENCE MUST BE FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION I F ONE CAN BE
FOUND. EQUALLY, I N THE LAST RESORT, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO
CONTEMPLATE OTHER MEANS.
WE WILL FACE A SIGNIFICANT TEST I N THE SECURITY COUNCIL I N
THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
AND PARTICULARLY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, I S ESSENTIAL I F WE
ARE TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM. BUT WE MUST AT THE SAME
TIME WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THIS MESSAGE I S ROBUST ENOUGH
TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT, WHILE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE EVENTUAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE UNSCOM HAS FULLY AND
SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED ITS TASK. THAT WILL NOT BE AN EASY
BALANCE TO STRIKE, GIVEN THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME TO CONTEMPLATE
FURTHER ACTION AGAINST IRAQ.
I AM PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSIONS AT
THE END OF LAST WEEK WITH JACQUES CHIRAC. AS YOU WILL KNOW,
HE HAS STRONG PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.
SO WE WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY HARD TO KEEP THE FRENCH WITH US,
NOT TO MENTION THE RUSSIANS. I N THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MUST
BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THEM, AS FAR AS WE CAN, TO ENSURE
THERE I S NO POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
US BECAUSE OF ALLEGED LACK OF CONSULTATION.
I KNOW OUR PEOPLE ARE I N VERY CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT ALL THIS ALREADY,
BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW PERSONALLY THE STRENGTH OF MY SUPPORT FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�ROUTINE
CONriDENTIALWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
YOU I N THE PRESENT SITUATION. I WILL BE MAKING THIS VERY CLEAR I N A
SPEECH ON MONDAY. I F WE NEED TO TALK BEFORE THEN, I WILL OF COURSE
BE HAPPY TO DO SO.
#0001
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CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�7717
P o i n t s f o r - g f e g i d c a L i a l r ^ l l t o /PM^Tony B l a i r
_ii^r47^
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and n r ^ ^ ^ ^
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York y e s t e r d a y ^ g e t - t t e a
c l e a r statement from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o
s t e p back.
•
Saddam's announcement today t o expel t h e Americans i s a c l e a r
r e p u d i a t i o n o f the S e c u r i t y Council's w i l l .
We s u p p o r t
Ambassador B u t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o withdraw UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from
Iraq.
•
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek d i p l o m a t i c means t o t u r n back I r a q ' s
c h a l l e n g e . S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t w i l l be i n London tomorrow, and
she w i l l l a y o u t t o Robin Cooke our ideas on how t o move
f o r w a r d t o g e t h e r on t h i s c h a l l e n g e , and how t o work t o g e t h e r
w i t h t h e French and Russians.
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me should we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
Once t h e UNSCOM s t a f f e r s are o u t o f I r a q tomorrow, I p l a n t o
announce t h e i n c r e a s e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y assets i n t h e G u l f
region.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s means movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r USS George Washington t o t h e G u l f .
•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g t h e U-2 f l i g h t i n s u p p o r t UNSCOM
t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o c o n s u l t c l o s e l y d u r i n g t h i s . p e r i o d . As ever, I
t a k e s t r e n g t h from t h e c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
DECLASSIFIED
r
.
( l i ^ ^ . I-S.
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
S / L , / ^ KBH
�-eemfclbENllAL
7717
THE WHITE HOUSE
. '97 NOU 14 PMb-3b
f
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1997
TELEPHONE CALL TO
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE F r i d a y , November 14, 1997
LOCATION Oval O f f i c e
TIME TBD
FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER ( M
I.
PURPOSE
Place phone c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t o respond
t o h i s November 8 l e t t e r (Tab B) on t h e I r a q c h a l l e n g e , t o
a d v i s e him o f our deployment o f a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s t o t h e
P e r s i a n G u l f and t o ask t h a t he be w i t h us as we move
forward.
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r ' s l e t t e r was w r i t t e n b e f o r e t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n was passed, and p r i o r t o Thursday's demand t h a t
UNSCOM remove a l l Americans i m m e d i a t e l y . As i n p a s t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h I r a q , t h e B r i t i s h have been b o t h
r e s o l u t e and d e s i r o u s o f f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n . Y o u ' l l want t o
e x p l a i n our planned movement o f t h e USS George Washington
t o t h e r e g i o n , and press f o r h i s support i f and when we
need t o b u i l d t h e case f o r use o f f o r c e . You can commit t o
c l o s e s t c o n s u l t a t i o n s as t h i s c r i s i s u n f o l d s .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
Tab B
Incoming Cable
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENT tA=L-.
Reason:
1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/13/07
S/b/'S" K B H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
i 0 r
�rONFIDEMTIATr
7717
P o i n t s f o r C a l l t o Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
•
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
to Robin Cook.
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and my
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York on t h e r e s o l u t i o n
and on t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l statement produced c l e a r statements
from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o s t e p back.
•
Saddam's e x p u l s i o n o f t h e Americans i s a c l e a r r e p u d i a t i o n o f
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s w i l l . We s u p p o r t Ambassador B u t l e r ' s
d e c i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from I r a q .
•
Madeleine l a i d o u t t o Robin Cook our d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y .
Know t h a t Madeleine made these p o i n t s
•
F i r s t , m a i n t a i n UNSC u n i t y .
•
Second, press French and Russians t o use a l l o f t h e i r
l e v e r a g e t o g e t I r a q t o comply; i f t h e y f a i l , c h a l l e n g e
them t o j o i n us i n r a t c h e t i n g up p r e s s u r e .
•
F i n a l l y , your and my governments should d i s c u s s q u i e t l y
some c r e a t i v e means t o g i v e I r a q some " l i g h t a t t h e end o f
the t u n n e l " t h a t gets UNSCOM back o p e r a t i n g and c o n t i n u e s
our a b i l i t y t o c o n t a i n I r a q .
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me s h o u l d we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
I announced y e s t e r d a y t h e movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r USS
George Washington t o t h e r e g i o n . I may announce f u r t h e r f o r c e
movements as necessary.
Know you have s t a r t e d moving HMS
Invincible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
O-OVi - O V 7 a - W
S/k/iS" K 8 H
11/13/07
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g the U-2 f l i g h t i n support o f
UNSCOM t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o consult closely during t h i s period. As ever, I
take strength from the close working r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
I f Asked:
Q.
Don't we need f i n d i n g of "material breach" t o conduct
m i l i t a r y operations?
A.
I f we can get Council on board t h a t would be e x c e l l e n t .
But we may not be able t o . Shouldn't l e t t h a t stop us from
t a k i n g necessary a c t i o n .
Our lawyers and yours are consulting on how t o handle.
Iraq-Potus-Blair-11-14
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�H e l w e g , M. D i a n a
Courtney, William H.
Thursday, November 20,1997 8:50 AM
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; ©NESASIA - NE/Sou
FW: Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin fOONriDCN
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
High
Importance:
FOR SANDY AND JIM FROM BILL
Embassy Moscow just called to say that a few minutes ago Yeltsin foreign policy aide Prihodkho had informed
them Yeltsin would call the President on Iraq. The call would most likely take place tomorrow, but timing was
unclear. We'll work with NESA on contingency talking points.
The President's doing a short note of the kind proposed below is now less urgent, but it would still be a good
gesture, especially if we could get it out today.
—Original Message
From:
Courtney, William H.
Sent:
Thursday, November 20, 1997 8:34 AM
To:
Malley, Robert; Helweg, M. Diana
Cc:
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject:
Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin [rnMFIDFNTIfll ]
Importance:
High
—
Now might be a good time for the President to write a short note to Yeltsin offering appropriate praise for
Russia's effort on Iraq, for CWC ratification and Yeltsin's China visit, and for the appointment yesterday of the
new, reformist economics minister, which will could help maintain international confidence in Russian economic
policy.
In his call on Sandy two weeks ago, Jim Collins suggested occasional handwritten notes to Yeltsin to bolster his
confidence and augur relations. Sandy agreed.
I would be grateful if you could run this proposal for a note by Sandy and Jim to see if they concur. Thanks.
^
,
.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
no
8/u/iS
r.
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
nirae.
*S>A
�SECRDT
:
" - ?- ';•-?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
07
'97 N0y2lPM8:2
INGTON
November 2 1 , 19 97
ACTION
/•
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
T
^'
FROM:
SAMUEL
BERGE^/
SUBJECT:
Messages t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n a n d ^ b a r t ' d ' ^ "
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r r e I r a q
'
\/
-1 •
'V
Purpose
Approval to send messages on Iraq to Presidents YeltsifcrTa'nd
Chirac and Prime Minister Blair.
^
'-//
;
Background
We have been a t t e m p t i n g t o arrange telephone c a l l s on I r a q from
you t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t Chirac and P r e s i d e n t
Yeltsin.
(We a l s o heard today from Embassy Moscow t h a t Y e l t s i n
wanted t o t a l k t o you and might t r y t o c a l l . )
Unfortunately,
g i v e n t h e time d i f f e r e n c e , no one was a v a i l a b l e t o t a k e a c a l l
y e s t e r d a y . We b e l i e v e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t immediate messages from
you conveying your thanks f o r t h e i r p e r s o n a l e f f o r t s on I r a q and
your t h o u g h t s on next steps w i l l be t h e most e f f e c t i v e way t o
d o u b l e - t r a c k any e v e n t u a l c a l l s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e a t t a c h e d message t o
P r e s i d e n t s Y e l t s i n and Chirac and Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Approve
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Message t o Russian P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n
Tab B Message t o French P r e s i d e n t Chirac
Tab C Message t o B r i t i s h PM B l a i r
-SECRET
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/20/2007
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.qrp.pg^.
�•OCCnCT/NODIC
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM :
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE /OLLOWIN^ MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT TI}E EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THE
RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY TO
ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE REDOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
IRAQ HAS/PROMISED TO COOPERATE
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW
TO TCWTHAT COOPERATION ON THE
WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NE
IOULD EXPECT AN END TO IRAQ'S
GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE
R
ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAM C UNSCOM INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A
CESSATION OF IRAQI THREAT^ AGAINST U-2 FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO ^NCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. I PROPOSE THAT OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES I N NEW
YORK WORK TOCCTIIER T^BRING THIS ABOUT QUICKLY. THE PEOPLE OF
IRAQ DESERVE OUR HE1
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST CHAPTER
OF THIS STORY HA^ NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL NEED TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM PLEASED
THAT STRONGLY /ETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY HIGHLY CREDIBLE
FORCE, APPEAR/ TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED
RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.&/ic/\5
KBVj
�SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�IMMEDIATE
^ ~
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
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SIT: NSC
V
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CECRET
<DTG> 221819Z NOV 97
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
•- E C R E T
S
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5 482 G D G R E T
*
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE
THE RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY
TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE READOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW. IRAQ HAS PROMISED TO
COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NEED TO SEE THAT
COOPERATION ON THE GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE SHOULD EXPECT
AN END TO IRAQ'S ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAMPER UNSCOM
INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A CESSATION OF IRAQI THREATS AGAINST U-2
FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ DESERVE OUR HELP.
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
-SECRET
-OMT31- H
8/t*/l5 KBH
�-fMMEpiATE
CCCnCTWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5 482 • O E C R E T "
CHAPTER OF THIS STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL
NEED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM
PLEASED THAT STRONGLY DETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY
HIGHLY CREDIBLE FORCE, APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A
PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>5482
<MSGID> M3038215
A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�IO D O W N I N G STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
18 February 1998
THE PRIME MINISTER
> - . ,
I am writing to mention one matter I did not have the chance to raise
you during my visit to Washington.
I have recently learnt that the Kuwaitis may be on the point of selecting a
system to meet their requirement for self-propelled artillery, even though they
have given assurances that they would hold an open competition first. I
understand that the only real contenders in any such.competition would be your
M109 and our AS90. There are obviously arguments in favour of both.
Nevertheless, I strongly believe that the AS90 would be much better for the
Kuwaitis. I therefore hope that they will not be rushed into a decision and that
the two systems will be allowed to compete on equal terms.
(fW
The President of the United States of America
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Purpose
To respond t o a l e t t e r from B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Background
/ l - r^
p
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f
!
1 •
•
J
Tony B l a i r wrDte you a-^r&fefee^j-4atod
FGbg^a-]^y----l-8T "btrtr-nert
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his i n t e r e s t i n
f i t J ^ U - J - ~ - ^ 'O
"
irl"~MaTre-h—Ay a - i ^ i i f ^ ^ us
Kttwa-i-t. We—have
•eas-systems --sa-l
e-E-i-€a-Jriy--l-ee-ked—up-t-h-i-s- sa-le^' fo^—a—se-li-ptope4ied--a-rti4-i&r-y
sy&t-enL. Your response acknowledges t h e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t and
notes t h a t i t i s up t o t h e K u w a i t i s t o decide which system i s
b e t t e r f o r them.
CJ
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
�-eeWFIDEMTIAL
1617
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C'. U N C I L
W A S H I N G T O N . D C . ZC
M
March 19, 199
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLE
SUBJECT:
B l a i r L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t on K ^ a i t A r t i l l e r y
Sale
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent a l e t t e r t o t h j ^ P r e s i d e n t , d a t e d
February 18 b u t n o t d e l i v e r e d u n t i l March 4, r e g a r d i n g
c o m p e t i t i o n t o s e l l a s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ^ a r t i l l e r y system t o Kuwait.
We have locked-up t h i s c o n t r a c t f o r /Our s u p e r i o r P a l a d i n system.
The B l a i r l e t t e r appears t o be a p/o forma appeal on b e h a l f o f
the competing B r i t i s h system. Gi/zen t h a t t h i s i s a done deal
f o r us, t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i r / the P r e s i d e n t r e p l y i n g i n
writing toBlair.
I n s t e a d , we/p op°se t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
respond t o t h i s l e t t e r t h e next time he and B l a i r speak on t h e
M i d d l e East; NESA would prepare a t a l k i n g p o i n t .
r
Concurrence by:
and St
Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That t h e P r e s i d e n t us4 h i s n e x t c a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r
t o respond t o t h e I s x t e r .
. .
AprSrove
Blair
„-
.u
Disapprove
/ '
^
h
Attachment
Tab A Incoming correspondence
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
jason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/18/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/fr/i5" K8W
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1617 r e d o
W A S H I N G T O N . D C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 26, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD B A N D L E ^ O
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER ;. ,
.'
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o UK Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on
Kuwait A r t i l l e r y Sale
As a p o s t s c r i p t t o h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t here February 5-7, Prime
Minister/v'wrote t h e P r e s i d e n t w i t h a p r o forma appeal f o r us t o
p u l l back from c l o s i n g an arms s a l e t o Kuwait. Your memorandum
c o v e r i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e p l y i s a t Tab I .
Concurrences by:
Joe Marty and Steve Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o PM B l a i r
Tab B Incoming correspondence
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
�T H E W H I T E H( . S I :
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 6, 19 S
Dear Tony:
Thank you f o r your note on the Kuwaiti s e l f propelled a r t i l l e r y system sale. I can
appreciate your keen i n t e r e s t i n t h i s issue.
I am sure t h a t the U.K. and U.S. systems hot:
have strong merits ana that the Kuwaitis w i i :
face a d i f f i c u l t decision. I know you agree
that, i n the end, i t w i l l be up to the
Kuwaiti government to decide which system
best s u i t s t h e i r needs.
Again, thanks f o r your note.
w i t h you soon.
I hope to t a l k
Sincere i.y,
The Right Honorable Tony B l a i r ,
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
M.P.
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
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n
P'H i QHri
CONriDENTIAL
3311
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
May
8,
1998
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G ^ ^ ^
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
Tony B i a i r has asked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the M i d d l e East
Peace Process and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f o r e the May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22. He met w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t t o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g t h e A p r i l 10 Peace Accord and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were decommissioning, p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response t o a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f approved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes v o t e
enables people t o have a chance, a s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by t h e "no" v o t e campaign. His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k the r e l e a s e o f a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t the most c o n t e n t i o u s marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. This would have g i v e n ammunition t o t h e opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes v o t e on May 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech Wednesday accusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f " r u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are b e i n g c a r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r o f the accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r the accord — a b i t t e r blow t o I a n P a i s l e y .
Sinn Fein members w i l l vote Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n the new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p b u t t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
-60NFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
cc : Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
on?- : r j n n .
ULi^J! i u ' u ;
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMFIDEHTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reports
that they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an armored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-far
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North. B l a i r ' s people now b e l i e v e ,
since the problems w i t h the vote are i n the Unionist community,
a Blair-Ahern-Clinton event i s inadvisable; we w i l l work on
something w i t h you and B l a i r .
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l get you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans t o see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CONriDENTIAL
00^
UUr*
Ll'
8
nL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�n
CONriDDNTIAL
mmm
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
• Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group yesterday - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose father was k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. Their courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
• Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l help w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and t o support establishment o f the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r t h a t .
•
Powerful image of you and John Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you having any luck w i t h the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
Middle East Peace Process
• Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a t were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked f o r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s using t h i s time t o convince them of the need t o move
forward.
• He faces important decision — serious consequences whichever
path he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At B i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
ways t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
• We have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
diplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm not going t o s e l l A r a f a t out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENHftfr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5 / 7 / 0 8
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/1*/ JT K6V1
C Ni E T L
O r NA
D I
�-CONFIDENTIAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, not a
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannot.
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n the peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadership conference;
made clear that while I am best f r i e n d I s r a e l has ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s .
•
Dennis should be back by the time I see you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n depth.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group y e s t e r d a y - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who p o s t
sons, and a M e t h o d i s t preacher whose f a t h e r was k i l L e d .
They
are t h e reason why t h i s peace must work. T h e i r courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames o t h e r s .
•
A l s o announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h e l p w i t h f u n d i n g f o r
S p r i n g v a l e campus and t o support e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e N I
assembly. A l s o , S e c r e t a r y Daley w i l l l e a d Jousiness m i s s i o n
n e x t month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n t h e r e . J i m
Lyons has some g r e a t ideas f o r t h a t .
•
P o w e r f u l image o f you and John Major
B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you h a v i n g any l u c k w i t h t h e Or/mge Order and t h e
undecided U n i o n i s t s ?
yoy^iyiinJeOLt would-be/use]
f a t h e r t l i s ^ o n 1 y(
/for.
WO]
f o r B ^ r t i e i s Sunday.
Middle E a s t Peace Process
•
D e s p i t e media c l a i m s , Madeleine and Dennis made p r o g r e s s .
B i b i and A r a f a t wereyeerious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
•
B i b i asked f o r f e y days t o c o n s u l t w i t h h i s Cabinet.
Hopeful
he i s u s i n g t h i s / t i m e t o convince them o f t h e need t o move
forward.
•
He faces imgJbrtant d e c i s i o n — s e r i o u s consequences
p a t h he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s o u t .
•
A t Bibi^'s r e q u e s t , I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
waysyco make our ideas acceptable t o b o t h p a r t i e s .
•
We/have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y o f c o n f i d e n t i a l
Iiplomacy and "no s u r p r i s e s " w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
'continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm n o t going t o s e l l A r a f a t o u t .
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENS^jU,
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/7/08
whichever
I know we can't l e t him
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�CONriDCNTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There a r e r e p o r t s
t h a t they a r e seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored ca/
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
1
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process. Boopito modia claima t o t h e con)
Madeleine and Dennis made some progress i n London.
Netanyahu and A r a f a t were s e r i o u s and constxuetir^e. Netanyahu
asked f o r a few days t o go back a£ui--etyrfsult w i t h h i s Cabinet.
We a r e h o p e f u l t h a t he_J_s---trrfngthis time t o convince/them o f
the need t^in©ve --Torward i n t h e process. Netanyahu /aces an
i m p o ^ r t a n t d e c i s i o n and we need t o g i v e him t h e time/and space t o
;nnis Ross wont back t-Qleft^.j^
grfe region ie-pursue creative ways to make our requests
acceptable to both parties, ^^j^
^Q^tr^TtT^l^r^^^
r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/u/lS K6H
�CONFIDENTIAL
as evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are r e p o r t s
t h a t t h e y are s e e k i n g t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored/car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e a t t a c k s i n t h e M^t-h fr^v^n i.n i i
t - f n nnlf n.irm r
whethei: he t h i n k s yotr?—AlTum and 1* >• s h o u l d moat a f t e r fe
W f l n
•Bi rm-i n g h n m
.qiirfimi±. n n
flnnriny,.—May
1'
M i d d l e East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately/ We w i l l g e t v6u a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l seer A r a f a t e i t h e r / l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r l u n c h tomorrow w i t h a message o f reassurance t h a t we are
not w a t e r i n g down our i d e a s . Dermis p l a n s t o >see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday b e f o r e th'e c a b i n e t meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has n o t
r e t u r n e d t o I s r a e l f o r t h e cabinjet s e s s i o n / s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t i n g
he i s c o n f i d e n t B i b i w i l l n o t aqcept o u r A d e a s .
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
-CONFIDENTIAL
xmm LlttKARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2 / u / i S KBV1
�COHriDCHTIAfc
3311
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
\
Tony B l a i r has a sked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the Middle
Peace Process and^Northern I r e l a n d .
Proce
v
East
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The\press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f a r e t h e May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22.
He meV w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t r o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g the A p r i l 10 P e a c e V c c o r d and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were d e c o W i s s i o n i n g , p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response\to a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f apWoved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes vote
enables people t o have a chance, \ s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by the "no" v o t e campaign. \ His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k t h e r e l e a s e o^. a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t t h e most contventious marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. T h i s would have g i v e n ammunition t o the opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes vote on Mav 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech WednesdaAaccusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f R u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are being c f e r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r ofVthe accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r t h e accord — a b i t t e r blow t o X
Paisley.
a n
Sinn Fein members w i l l v o t e Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n t h e new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p but t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
CONFIDDNTIAL.
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Reason: 1.5(d)
Chief o f S t a f f
DECLASSIFIED
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eeNUlDhNllALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reporl
t h a t they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an arprored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-fa]
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l gel? you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans/to see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday befoj?4 the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e i ^ i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept/our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s supporlt group yestei?aay - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose f a t h e r vfas k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. jPheir courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h^lp w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speedup j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r / t h a t .
• Powerful image of you and J
* Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week,
Are you having any luck wi
the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
I U ^^T^X f - y,-, ft-t /4<~
Do ^.u^
Do
H
•
totfAild JtSye-*lik^.d» t o hi
K u k i K i [s &<^ieftefleVdo^s4
:
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process
ee B e r t i e 2^herxL--W'ith~Ysii^in
r
London,
pferflfit.
.
^
-Vuc t-~r ^
• Despite media c/aims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a / were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked >r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s usinc t h i s time t o convince them o f the need t o move
forward.
• He faces' important decision — serious consequences whichever
path her chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At R i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
wave t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
liplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
I'm not going t o s e l l Arafat out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENT I Ab
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/7/08
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
K 6 M
SO^A
�neettFI DENT IAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, noi
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannol
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n / t h e peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadersh^j conference;
made clear t h a t while I am best f r i e n d Israelyfias ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s ^
•
Dennis should be back by the time I se( you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n dep,*
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
HINGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B e r t i e
Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 12:13 - 12:16 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t ?
The P r e s i d e n t : B e r t i e , i t ' s a g r e a t day f o r t h e I r i s h . You
must know by name every S.O.B. t h a t v o t e d i n the R e p u b l i c .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The
President:
I t h i n k we g o t 95 p e r c e n t .
They broke 70 p e r c e n t i n t h e N o r t h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Well I headed out t r y i n g t o g e t 80-20
here, b u t I t h i n k i t s going t o be 95-5 on a huge v o t e .
It's
almost as good as our l a s t e l e c t i o n .
I'm r e a l l y happy about
t h a t . Yes, by o u r r e c k o n i n g they g o t 71 p e r c e n t . Four o r f i v e
p e r c e n t o f t h e Republicans would have v o t e d "No," b u t i t i s
c e r t a i n l y a m a j o r i t y o f Republicans by f i v e p e r c e n t . There i s i
m a j o r i t y o f U n i o n i s t s who v o t e d "Yes," b u t even on t h e v e r y
w o r s t case every s i n g l e n a t i o n a l i s t would have t o have v o t e d
a g a i n s t . That c o u l d n ' t have happened, so, c l e a r l y I would say
f i v e o r s i x p e r c e n t more v o t e d "No;" b u t we g o t t h e
N a t i o n a l i s t s , Republicans, I r i s h and t h a t wasn't bad, Mr.
President.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The P r e s i d e n t :
God i t ' s w o n d e r f u l .
I'm happy f o r you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I a p p r e c i a t e your h e l p .
t o g e t t i n g you back soon.
We l o o k
forward
The P r e s i d e n t :
W e l l , i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g we can do t o h e l p ,
you l e t me know. I hope t h e assembly e l e c t i o n s now go as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
P a i s l e y w i l l have t o be n e g a t i v e .
The P r e s i d e n t : W e l l , I b e t a l o t o f people who v o t e d w i t h
P a i s l e y w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed t o come over and work
w i t h t h i s agreement.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: About 85 p e r c e n t o f t h e i s l a n d v o t e d
"Yes." I can't t h i n k o f anywhere i n t h e w o r l d where such a
c l e a r v o t e has been h e l d i n t h e l a s t 50 years.
The P r e s i d e n t :
God, i t ' s so t o u c h i n g .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: We a p p r e c i a t e a l l your e f f o r t Mr.
President.
I f we d i d n ' t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e t h i s , i t would never
have happened Mr. P r e s i d e n t . Without your support we never
would have been able t o s t a y around t h e t a b l e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
celebration.
I can't w a i t t o come because i t w i l l be a g r e a t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
We'll have a good c e l e b r a t i o n .
Keep i n t o u c h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
f o r w a r d t o seeing you g e t back here.
The P r e s i d e n t :
bye.
I l o o k f o r w a r d t o g e t t i n g back.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
We l o o k
Take care,
good
Goodbye.
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h David T r i m b l e , U l s t e r U n i o n i s t
P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 1:01 - 1:04 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
David?
Yes.
Congratulations.
Mr. T r i m b l e : Thank you v e r y much Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Everything
came t h r o u g h i n t h e end w i t h a b i t o f a f i g h t , b u t we g o t t h e r e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm r e a l l y proud o f you. I n t h e l a s t t h r e e days
everyone was r e a l l y pumping hard. You g o t a l l t h e undecided t o
break f o r you.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t took t h e whole r u n o f t h e week, b u t I t h i n k i t
t u r n e d over t h e weekend and more people w i l l come a f t e r t h e
event.
Even some o f those who v o t e d "No" w i l l change.
The P r e s i d e n t : I b e l i e v e t h a t a l s o . I've heard what P a i s l e y i s
s a y i n g , b u t I b e l i e v e a l o t o f people who v o t e d "No" w i l l say
g i v e i t a chance. Do you t h i n k you g o t 52 p e r c e n t i n t h e
Protestant elections?
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP\
�Mr. T r i m b l e :
I don't know i f i t was as good as t h a t . I f i t was
a Westminster e l e c t i o n today, I would have l o s t my s e a t .
I have
a p r o b l e m b u t i t w i l l come r i g h t .
I ' v e g o t a few years.
The P r e s i d e n t : You d i d a h e l l o f a t h i n g and you were v e r y
brave.
I want t o h e l p however I can.
Mr. T r i m b l e : That was one t h i n g I was q u i t e sure o f i n my mind
and I managed t o do i t . I t was t h e r i g h t t h i n g and I knew t h a t
i t would come r i g h t i n t h e end. There were some times l a s t week
when I wondered i f we would a c t u a l l y make i t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t s .
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I am now l o o k i n g f o r Adams t o d i v v y up a b i t .
There a r e a number o f t h i n g s he has g o t t o do and t h e sooner he
s t a r t s d o i n g them t h e b e t t e r .
The P r e s i d e n t :
earned i t .
I w i l l g e t on i t .
Have a w o n d e r f u l day. You
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I'm heading o f f i n 45 o r 50 minutes t i m e f o r t h e
f i r s t m e e t i n g o f our c o n s t i t u e n c y c o u n c i l t o p l a n f o r our f i r s t
assembly e l e c t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
That's g r e a t .
Take care man.
Right.
—
End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
May 23, 1998, 1:28 - 1:32 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry, c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s .
Thank you v e r y much; you are v e r y k i n d
The P r e s i d e n t :
You guys d i d a g r e a t j o b .
Mr. Adams: I have t o l d everyone a l l day t h a t t h i s
b e g i n n i n g and we're moving t o t h e f u t u r e . Thank you f o r keeping
f a i t h i n a l l t h i s . I r e f l e c t sometimes on t h e f i r s t t i m e I went
t h e r e , and I t h i n k you were r i g h t then — w e l l done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
What do you t h i n k t h e f i n a l P r o t e s t a n t v o t e was?
Mr. Adams: I t ' s i m p o s s i b l e t o know. I t ' s c l e a r t h a t t h e
m a j o r i t y v o t e d i n f a v o r o f t h i s , and I t h i n k i t was a v e r y
s o p h i s t i c a t e d v o t e . O b v i o u s l y people from a l l q u a r t e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Republicans had problems. I do b e l i e v e t h i s i s a leap
of f a i t h i n t o t h e f u t u r e .
I was a p p e a l i n g t o t h e "No" v o t e r s
t h a t t h e y were v o t i n g t h r o u g h f e a r and n o t t o t h i n k about i t .
There w i l l be r e s i s t a n c e from t h i s q u a r t e r , b u t we c o n t i n u e t o
s t a y focused and work t h r o u g h i t .
The P r e s i d e n t : That's what I t h i n k . We have t o work a t i t now,
and l o o k a t some ways t o keep everybody's f a i t h and good s p i r i t s
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP j
�up now. We need t o g e t t h e process on t h e r i g h t t r a c k . You a r e
i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n now; w i t h t h i s v o t e ; you have been
validated.
Mr. Adams: 70 p e r c e n t v o t e d i n f a v o r i n t h e n o r t h . I n t h e
south, t h e r e wasn't such a h i g h t u r n o u t , b u t 92 p e r c e n t i n
favor... t o me, i t ' s t h a t they were v o t i n g i n f a v o r o f a whole
r a f t o f f u t u r e issues.
I am going t o t a l k t o B l a i r l a t e r .
I'm
going t o be a t t h e White House next week, Thursday o r Wednesday;
I ' d l i k e t o see you t h e r e . I'm going t o t h e S t a t e s f o r some
speaking engagements.
The
President:
I f I'm i n town, I ' d be g l a d t o see you.
Mr. Adams: My sense o f a l l t h i s i s t h a t t h e people a r e ahead o f
the p o l i t i c i a n s .
The
You
President:
They o f t e n are; n o t j u s t t h e r e , b u t everywhere.
have a good time and enjoy your c e l e b r a t i o n .
Mr. Adams:
The
Please say h e l l o t o my w i f e .
President:
Sure.
[Mr. Adams passes phone t o Mrs. Adams.]
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
good today.
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello.
Yes.
How are you?
I s n ' t i t grand.
You must be f e e l i n g so
I t ' s g r e a t t o t a l k t o you.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you. I'm r e a l l y l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
keeping on w i t h t h i s . You must be v e r y proud.
Mrs.
The
Adams:
W e l l , I'm v e r y proud o f my husband.
President:
Mrs. Adams:
bye.
I t ' s n i c e speaking t o you.
W e l l , i t was n i c e speaking t o you. Thank you; bye
[Mr. Adams back on l i n e . ]
Mr. Adams:
Thanks f o r t h a t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President:
Okay, man.
Mr. Adams: Tomorrow, by the way, my county team, the one my son
plays on, plays Donegal i n Gaelic f o o t b a l l . That w i l l be the
r e a l t e s t ; Antrim hasn't beaten them i n 15 years. That would be
the u l t i m a t e m i r a c l e .
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Well done, and thanks again.
Good bye.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h John Hume, S o c i a l Democratic and
Labour P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
John Hume
Notetakers:
Cindy Lawrence, Anthony
Campanella, Robert Ford, J o e l Schrader
and Lawrence B u t l e r
May 23, 1998, 7:05 - 7:09 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
Mr.
Hume:
John?
Yes. H i t h e r e , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
day was over.
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s b e f o r e t h e
Mr. Hume: Thanks a m i l l i o n .
Thank you f o r your h e l p and
support.
We c o u l d n o t have done i t w i t h o u t you, and we would
not be where we a r e today.
The P r e s i d e n t :
ecstatic.
W e l l , I'm j u s t t h r i l l e d .
Everyone over here i s
Mr. Hume: Very good. I t was t r u l y amazing and q u i t e an
h i s t o r i c day. We had 80 p e r c e n t come o u t t o v o t e and 71 p e r c e n t
voted yes.
The P r e s i d e n t :
d i d n ' t you?
You g o t a s l i g h t m a j o r i t y o f t h e P r o t e s t a n t s ,
Mr. Hume: Oh, yes, r i g h t across t h e board. There i s a g r e a t
mood among t h e people.
I t was marvelous a l l t o g e t h e r . There i s
g r e a t g r a t i t u d e f o r a l l you've done.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�The President: Well, thank you. I t ' s been my pleasure.
have t o keep at i t and I ' l l do my p a r t .
We
Mr. Hume: Absolutely! The months ahead w i l l be very c r u c i a l .
P o l i t i c i a n s are now moving t o work together across our d i v i d e .
The r e a l t h i n g i s working the common ground, which I c a l l
economics. Economically, both sides w i l l be able t o break down
the b a r r i e r s of c e n t u r i e s .
The President: I agree w i t h t h a t . Like I said, I am ready t o
go t o work. I t a l k e d t o B e r t i e and Tony and others.
Mr. Hume: That w i l l be very good and encouraging t o everyone.
I understand that the Secretary o f State ( s i c - Commerce) w i l l
be coming here next month.
The President:
That's what I hear.
Mr. Hume: Funny, the two days he i s here, I am i n New York.
w i l l be l o o k i n g forward t o your next v i s i t .
I
The President: Yes, I ' d l i k e t o come. I t ' s a great day. I t
took years and years. You must f e e l somewhat v i n d i c a t e d today.
Mr. Hume: Ah, yes. I t ' s very good. I t o l d people the problem
has not changed and n e i t h e r should our approach t o solve i t .
You know what i s r e a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i s the mood of the people,
e s p e c i a l l y the mood of the young people. Young people are
generally very c y n i c a l about p o l i t i c s ; but t h e i r p o s i t i v e
response i n the s t r e e t s — I couldn't believe i t . I t was
powerful. We had a special show the other n i g h t w i t h U2, you
know the pop group. Well, a young person got up on stage and
said, "our generation i s the one generation t h a t has l i v e d w i t h
the t r o u b l e s our whole l i f e . And we don't want t o see another
generation l i v e through i t . " The statement made a tremendous
impact.
The President:
Oh great.
Mr. Hume: I am about t o c a l l your Ambassador, Jean Kennedy
Smith. She had a great TV show l a s t n i g h t . I t was on a l l over.
I t ' s a p i t y she's leaving us.
The President:
She's a good soul.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Mr. Hume: She r e a l l y got down t o the grass-root l e v e l i n a way
most ambassadors don't.
The President: Well, I ' l l t r y t o p i c k another good one f o r you
who w i l l do the same.
Mr. Hume:
I look forward t o seeing you.
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Thank you. Goodbye,
Thanks a m i l l i o n .
friend.
A l l the best.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP V
�C NI DNIL
O F ET
A
CONFIDENTIAL
4114
Redo(2)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ROBERT G. BELL
FROM:
ANNE WITKOWSKt
SUBJECT:
Landmines: POTUS L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
At Tab A i s a proposed l e t t e r t o be sent v i a p r i v a c y channels
from t h e P r e s i d e n t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on U.S. APL concerns,
g i v e n UK adherence t o t h e Ottawa Convention.
On A p r i l 27, on
the margins o f a memo from you, t h e P r e s i d e n t agreed t o r a i s e
the i s s u e w i t h B l a i r t h e next time they spoke. However, t h e
press o f o t h e r business has p r e c l u d e d a d i s c u s s i o n on i t .
Though S e c r e t a r i e s A l b r i g h t and Cohen have r a i s e d t h e i s s u e w i t h
t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s , we have been t o l d r e p e a t e d l y by t h e B r i t i s h
Embassy here t h a t B l a i r i s t h e ke^
Concurrence by:
Larry Butle
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I
recommending he send t h e proposed l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Proposed L e t t e r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6 / 0 2 / 0 8
eemftiAt
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�^I.TIDCHTIAb-
598 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
August 27, 1998
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE: August 27, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: 4:15 p.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
g^.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s your v i s i t t o Russia, and the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r , and t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
II.
BACKGROUND
Tony B l a i r w i l l be e i t h e r i n S c o t l a n d o r have j u s t r e t u r n e d
from t h e r e when you speak. He has the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n v e r y much on h i s mind. Your t a l k i n g p o i n t s cover
the main issues t h a t he w i l l cover -- seriousness o f the
f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n and who i s i n power i n Moscow.
Russia.
News r e p o r t s and rumors o f Y e l t s i n ' s death o r
r e s i g n a t i o n have c i r c u l a t e d t h r o u g h o u t Moscow and g l o b a l
f i n a n c i a l markets today. The most s e r i o u s i s t h a t Y e l t s i n
s i g n e d a l e t t e r o f r e s i g n a t i o n , b u t w i l l not date i t u n t i l
Chernomyrdin i s c o n f i r m e d as prime m i n i s t e r ; upon Y e l t s i n ' s
r e s i g n a t i o n , Chernomyrdin would become a c t i n g P r e s i d e n t f o r
90 days, f o l l o w e d by new e l e c t i o n s . We cannot c o n f i r m any
of these r e p o r t s . Y e l t s i n ' s spokesman s a i d e a r l i e r today,
"No r e s i g n a t i o n has been on the agenda."
S t r o b e r e p o r t s from Moscow t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s indeed
s e r i o u s , and events are changing r a p i d l y . B l a i r w i l l a l s o
want t o review your plans f o r t h e Summit and assessment the
Russian economic s i t u a t i o n .
Russia's economic s l i d e
a c c e l e r a t e d again today. Currency markets d i d not reopen
a f t e r y e s t e r d a y ' s r u b l e c r a s h . Stocks c o n t i n u e d t h e i r
plunge, f a l l i n g 17%. P u b l i c concern i s growing; l i n e s f o r
b a s i c goods and a t banks are b e i n g r e p o r t e d i n v a r i o u s
cities.
Work c o n t i n u e d on a d r a f t a n t i - c r i s i s program
j o i n t l y a u t h o r e d by the Duma, F e d e r a t i o n C o u n c i l , and t h e
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 8/27/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
aoiS - OM-?*- n
�CCNFIDLNTIAL
e x e c u t i v e branch; t h e p l a n a p p a r e n t l y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l
r e p u d i a t i o n s o f t h e p r e v i o u s government's s t a b i l i z a t i o n and
r e f o r m measures.
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o review your
schedule and t r i p o b j e c t i v e s and themes, as w e l l as b r i e f
you on h i s s i x s t e p p l a n t o break t h e logjam i n
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord. He and B e r t i e
Ahern have engaged b o t h l e a d e r s i n an i n t e n s i v e s h u t t l e
d i a l o g u e and have a s i x - s t e p p l a n . F i r s t i s g e t t i n g Adams
to make a statement t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t the war i s over.
Second i s f o r a meeting o f a l l t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s . T h i r d i s
an Adams-Trimble b i l a t e r a l .
Fourth i s appointing Martin
McGuinness as Sinn Fein's c o o r d i n a t o r f o r decommissioning.
F i f t h i s some form o f a c t u a l decommissioning. S i x t h i s
T r i m b l e naming t h e E x e c u t i v e ( i n c l u d e s two Sinn Fein
m i n i s t e r s ) . The dominant h u r d l e i s number f i v e ; B l a i r may
suggest (and we concur) t h a t you c a l l Adams t h i s week t o
urge him t o a c t b o l d l y on t h i s unique o p p o r t u n i t y t o
demonstrate t h a t process has momentum.
You should ask B l a i r what c o n c r e t e steps we can t a k e t o
b r i n g Adams on board, i n c l u d i n g any sweeteners t h a t e i t h e r
the UK o r we can p r o v i d e him t o make i t e a s i e r ; however,
you should a l s o e x p l a i n t h a t your experience w i t h Adams t h e
past f o u r years shows we need t o be c a u t i o u s i n i s o l a t i n g
him -- weakening Gerry w i l l n o t advance our common
o b j e c t i v e i n f i n a l l y m a r g i n a l i z i n g the "hard men."
Regarding t h e Real IRA and A n g l o - I r i s h measures t o suppress
i t , you should i n d i c a t e t o B l a i r concern about a backlash
to suspension o f f i r s t and f i f t h amendment r i g h t s i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The UK w i l l enact l e g i s l a t i o n next week
making i t p o s s i b l e f o r a suspected RIRA member t o be
c o n v i c t e d on t h e word o f a s e n i o r RUG o f f i c e r when t h e
i n d i v i d u a l r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t h i m s e l f . This runs
counter t o t h e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n e n v i s i o n e d under t h e Good
F r i d a y Accord, seems t o be a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e response t o
the t h r e a t posed by a v e r y s m a l l group, and (as r e c e n t
h i s t o r y shows) lends i t s e l f t o abuse by s e c u r i t y o f f i c i a l s
w i t h o l d scores t o s e t t l e .
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Schedule. We are l a r g e l y i n sync w i t h t h e
B r i t i s h on your schedule, t h e d e t a i l s o f which were passed
to B l a i r ' s o f f i c e t h i s morning. You a r r i v e mid-morning
from Moscow and go d i r e c t l y t o Stormont f o r a s h o r t
b i l a t e r a l w i t h T r i m b l e and M a l l o n , f o l l o w e d by s e r i e s o f
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHriDCMTIAL
s e m i - p r i v a t e meetings w i t h t h e p a r t i e s a t a r e c e p t i o n w i t h
the assembly. You w i l l then go t o W a t e r f r o n t H a l l , b r i e f l y
m e e t i n g w i t h John Hume upon a r r i v a l , t o d e l i v e r your p o l i c y
speech t o t h e Assembly members and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s s o c i e t y . Your l a s t stop i n B e l f a s t i s
f o r t h e S p r i n g v a l e E d u c a t i o n a l V i l l a g e groundbreaking;
B l a i r i s uncomfortable w i t h t h i s as he has not been seen i n
p u b l i c w i t h Adams y e t . Adams w i l l be present among a group
of VIPs ( i n h i s d i s t r i c t ) b u t he w i l l not be onstage and
has no i n d i v i d u a l r o l e . The B r i t i s h are s l i g h t l y uneasy
w i t h what might seem t o be a reward t o Adams i f t h e r e i s no
p r o g r e s s on democracy, b u t t h e y now seem t o accept our
l o g i c on t h e importance o f S p r i n g v a l e and i t s c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fund f o r I r e l a n d and t h e low key
n a t u r e o f t h e Adams r o l e .
You w i l l then depart f o r Omagh t o meet b r i e f l y w i t h a group
i n c l u d i n g a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f community leaders and f a m i l y
members and l a y a wreath, and c o n t i n u e on t o Armagh f o r
your crowd event. Each o f those events accomplishes your
major o b j e c t i v e s i n s u p p o r t i n g N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s peace and
prosperity:
the peace process and a new p o l i t i c a l
i n s t i t u t e , e d u c a t i o n , help f o r e c o n o m i c a l l y disadvantaged
areas, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and r e d e d i c a t i o n o f American support
f o r t h e N o r t h e r n I r i s h people.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN
Closed
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COMriDCNTIAI,
�JXMEZ DENT IAL
59^5
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
S i t u a t i o n i n Moscow
•
Strobe i s on the ground t a l k i n g t o a l l the major p l a y e r s .
He
says t h e s i t u a t i o n i s o b v i o u s l y s e r i o u s ; some r e p o r t s o f
u n r e s t and d i s o r d e r may be exaggerated. Agrees t h a t we need
t o watch the s i t u a t i o n v e r y c l o s e l y .
•
Key concern: who's i n charge. Seen r e p o r t s o f Y e l t s i n
r e s i g n a t i o n ; cannot c o n f i r m them. Y e l t s i n i n dacha,
Chernomyrdin focused on c o n f i r m a t i o n .
•
Strobe met w i t h Y e l t s i n ' s c h i e f o f s t a f f Yumashev. He
r e a f f i r m e d t h a t Chernomyrdin w i l l lead a r e a l government, n o t
a government o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y .
•
Strobe underscored t h e r i s k o f being o v e r - i n c l u s i v e .
s a i d t h a t they are p r e p a r e d t o r e s i s t .
•
What t h a t means i s u n c l e a r . Yumashev i m p l i e d t h a t new
government c o u l d have members w i t h " d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l
labels."
Yumashev
Economic Issues
•
We a r e e x t r e m e l y concerned about r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e
economy. C e n t r a l Bank i s under tremendous p r e s s u r e t o i n j e c t
l i q u i d i t y i n t o the banking sector.
•
Banks are t a k i n g t h a t money o u t o f t h e c o u n t r y , i n s t e a d o f
meeting t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s .
The Russians need t o send c l e a r e r s i g n a l s about t h e i r economic
p o l i c y . Concerned t h a t we may get c o n f u s i n g messages b e f o r e
t h e r e i s more c l a r i t y .
New t r i l a t e r a l commission (Duma/Federation C o u n c i l / E x e c u t i v e
Branch) f l o a t i n g ideas l i k e p r i c e c o n t r o l s and r e n a t i o n a l i z i n g
key i n d u s t r i e s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
^•iru oHtjjx
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/27/08
*7
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
, Z.
Jau
8/k/»S K8Vt
�:oNriDEMTIAL
•
This k i n d o f t a l k w i l l send p r e c i s e l y t h e wrong s i g n a l s t o
markets, even though i t ' s n o t c l e a r t h e ideas w i l l be
implemented.
•
Russians need t o understand t h a t s t a b i l i z a t i o n depends on t h e
steps t h e y take i n t e r n a l l y . No easy choices or s i l v e r b u l l e t s
available.
Summit
•
As f a r as Strobe can t e l l ,
underway.
Russian summit p r e p a r a t i o n s
•
Know t h a t I'm w a l k i n g i n t o v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d s i t u a t i o n .
agenda:
still
My
-- underscore t h a t engagement w i t h Russia remains v e r y
i m p o r t a n t and has major s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e U.S.
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l community;
-- r e a f f i r m stakes i n Russia's fundamental c h o i c e t o
embrace democracy and f r e e markets and t h e importance o f
Russia s t a y i n g on t h a t p a t h ;
-- s t r e s s t h a t economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n and r e c o v e r y depends
on Russian s o l u t i o n s t o Russian problems; and
-- speak c l e a r l y t o a broad spectrum o f Russian l e a d e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Chernomyrdin, t h e Duma, and r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s ,
about t h e c h a l l e n g e s Russia faces.
Northern
Ireland
•
G r e a t l y impressed by t h e r e a c t i o n t o your v i s i t t o Omagh.
Think t h a t t r a g e d y makes my v i s i t even more i m p o r t a n t t o
peace i m p l e m e n t a t i o n -- remind people t h a t t h e f i r s t b l o o d
shed s i n c e t h e Good F r i d a y Agreement does n o t a f f e c t our
commitment.
•
My i n s t i n c t was t o go t o Omagh from the b e g i n n i n g ; we
wanted t o g i v e t h e community t h e r e b r e a t h i n g space b e f o r e
t h e y g e t caught up i n p r e p a r a t i o n s . I was s u r p r i s e d a t t h e
warmth o f t h e welcome t h e town has extended t o o u r advance
p e o p l e . There, and a f t e r w a r d s i n Armagh, I i n t e n d t o
r e i n f o r c e message i n p r i v a t e and p u b l i c l y t h a t a d e s i r e f o r
.COMF1 DEMEJM.
t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUi .
�ION ITI DENT IAL
peace and t h e promise o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a r e t h e e s s e n t i a l
i n g r e d i e n t s f o r making t h e Good F r i d a y Accord work.
P e r v e r s e l y , Omagh and o t h e r bombings i n t h e w o r l d t h i s
month may have made i t e a s i e r f o r Gerry Adams t o begin
moving on weapons. I am ready t o h e l p w i t h t h e s i x step
p l a n . What do you want me t o do, and how do you e n v i s i o n
an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning? That seems v e r y hard and
we need t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o lose him i n t h e process.
On o t h e r events on t h e schedule, I am l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
w o r k i n g t h e Assembly w i t h you a t Stormont; want t o keep t h e
f o r m a l i t i e s t h e r e b r i e f t o spend more time w i t h t h e
parties.
That w i l l g i v e me a b e t t e r sense f o r how t o
d e l i v e r my p o l i c y address a f t e r w a r d s a t W a t e r f r o n t .
A f t e r w a r d s , S p r i n g v a l e stop i s i m p o r t a n t . I t i s symbol o f
American support f o r t h e I F I and e d u c a t i o n and economic
r e g e n e r a t i o n . Our j o i n t presence underscores t h a t
n o r m a l i t y r e i g n s d e s p i t e Omagh, and t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o
share i n t h e r i s k s Adams, and T r i m b l e , a r e t a k i n g .
CONFIDENTIAL.
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�REVISED
CONFIDEHTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
•
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month.
What do you want me to do?
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d currency,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic experience.
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other parts of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l Y e l t s i n now t h a t Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can preserve h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
•
H i l l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 a t
the NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson
(Sweden), P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are
w a i t i n g f o r Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g
panel d i s c u s s i o n .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
" Jftu
t^mrTKH
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/11/08
�INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES
•
As we discussed when we were together, I am q u i t e concerned
about the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system. Over l a s t month,
c r i s i s i n confidence has taken on global character a f f e c t i n g
a l l emerging markets. Believe i t i s important t o p u b l i c l y
discuss the nature of the c r i s i s and show we are focused on
addresing i t .
Plan t o make a speech on Monday i n New York.
•
I believe i t would be h e l p f u l i f the G-7 finance m i n i s t e r s
and c e n t r a l bank governors made a statement recognizing the
serious s t r a i n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system and
committing t o respond appropriately. Our Treasury has
discussed t h i s idea w i t h your o f f i c i a l s .
•
S i t u a t i o n i n B r a z i l has d e t e r i o r a t e d s e r i o u s l y . Believe we
may need t o consider bold f i n a n c i a l responses. Finance
o f f i c i a l s are i n touch.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
6252
•COMF1 BENT IAL.
POINTS TO RE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply appreciated your and Cherie's hospitality last Week.
Didn't expect could top the 1995 visit, but think
it/did.
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got,.some Icvorago e-m—.
kijjju What do you want me t o do? W&at i s B e r t i e ' s take-on t h i ^ 3
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k — i n s o l v e n t banks, collapsech-GUxrency,,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic e x p e r i e n c e . Somo rumoi
te-head euunuiuic Learn are from t h e o l d s c h o o l . •
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. Early' i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other p a r t s of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l . Y e l t s i n a f t e r Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can p r e s e r v e h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n , on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
{
a ,
• H i / t l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 aft ( ^ ^ ^ r
t/e NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson/,
P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are w a i t i n g f o r
/Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g panel
/ discussion.
/CONFIDENTIAL.
y/ Reason: 1. 5 (d)
/ D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
s
)
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the,.-Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the-'executive?
/-A
/
e i r meeting y e s t e r d a y Ipo^ed l i k e / ^ t N ^ ^ . ' £ ) \ ^
j m ^ ^ n t ^ a . rplation^hijD,
• [Knpw t h a t packaging s e c u r i t y ' ^ r e s e n c e . r e a c t i o n s and t r o o p
j w i t h d r a w a l s / f o r an\ IRA a c t ' o f c^eeommi'ssioning t r i , c f l c y \ f o r y o y ^
•i
y ^ . ^ v ^ , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s u f f i c i f e n t ^ l i f t foNs^Ad^ms t o s^l-K'to Whe hodmen.
v
4 T r i m b l e l o s t \ t h r e e UUP Assembly members y e s t e r d a y over t h e
l e los-fcv
'•^Adams^b i l / t ; • an he s u r v i v e l e t t i n g /Sirm Fein i n t b N t h e
Executive unde^an^.-c'ircum^ances?.-'' What \qan yje' do u©—bolster
his position?
^
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got some leverage on
him. What do you want me to do? What is Bertie's take on
this?
^
1
R u s s i a
\
• •"'
k
GlXd E o r i s f i n g j ^ y ^ p a m e d a^riirres^Minister
y-
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be
U^. -f pJa-A
-
P-rimakov l i k e l y _
t^ojifirmed-r'''' The^pe-3ritical v o i d - w a - s c i e b i l i t a t i n g .
'
^— .
- — ,
— • -
Pr^-itTakov has a huge task -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d ^~*~)''^Ccur^ency, s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n — and no economic e x p e r i e n c e .
" ''"^
"'"
:me rumored t o head economic team are from t h e o l d s c h o o l .
Real f e ^ r i s t h a t Primak6v m^y apply t o economics t h e same
'.philo'sopny he f o l l o ws-'on f o r e i g n p o l i c y -- . g e t i h t e r n a t i o n a l
ws
o
•I comifiunity\ t o bend ,to Russia' s\views . If.-he f l a u n t s reai-rtTT^H ""
\ oV i n t e r n a .ona. economics, i t ' ^ i l l be^a d i s a s t e r r 5 r Russia.
-
•
1
Glad you a r e h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e
Russians w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good
e a
CONFIDENTIAL
' "'Reason: 1.5(d)
^
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
^
". "
^ C : , \
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DEMT IAL.
6252
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
DATE: September 11, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: 4:15 - 4:35 p.m. .•
.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER/
I.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s f u r t h e r steps i n the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d peace
process t o f o l l o w up your v i s i t , as w e l l as review
developments i n Russia and note t h a t you w i l l see him i n
New York on September 21.
II.
BACKGROUND
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Your v i s i t l a s t week helped unlock a
growing logjam on.Good F r i d a y Accord i m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Adams
statements on v i o l e n c e and t h i s week's f i r s t - e v e r AdamsT r i m b l e meeting) , but the df.commissioning-Shadow e x e c u t i v e
d e a l i s p r o v i n g e l u s i v e . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o o u t l i n e
h i s ideas f o r a second round o f steps t h a t c o u l d get Adams
and T r i m b l e over t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h u r d l e s .
T r i m b l e d e l i v e r e d on h i s premise t o you l a s t week t o meet
w i t h Gerry Adams. He engaged Adams i n d i r e c t d i a l o g u e a t a
m u l t i l a t e r a l event Monday, and then had an one-on-one
y e s t e r d a y . A T i i m b l u p a i d a v,Biee, •thtragh-: Throojj&P
Assembly members q u r t the p ^ t t y , p u t t i n g J T j i i m b T e ' s m a j o r i t y
•at r i s k z / x h e a n t i - a c c o t d \ m i o i n l s X ^ ^ r r 5 u p c a n now t r i g g e r
the s p e c i a l "suf f i c i e n t ^ ^ ^ e n s u s " v o t i n g mechanism.
)le w i l l hav^^t<r^anpeaiNto the p r o - a c c o r d b u t nona l i g n e d Assembly mem^^rs (Womeh<^Coalition and A l l i a n c e )
to^jLsg-rstcr as u n i u n i ^ L ^ fuz L a C l i c d l v u l l u y Iedbuns-r.
\Adams and T r i m b l e agreed t o meet again next week. The next
events are. the September 14-15 meeting o f the new Assembly,
which w i l l be f o l l o w e d by announcement o f a f i n a l round o f
c o n s u l t a t i o n s September 28-29 b e f o r e T r i m b l e moves f o r w a r d
CONriDENTIAL•
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/10/08
DECLASSIFIED
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ao\3- ovtt- n
�CQMriDEHTiAL
2
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
on naming t h e new E x e c u t i v e . This a l l o w s t h r e e weeks t p '
f i n a l i z e a decommissioning d e a l .
/
T r i m b l e c o u l d be t o p p l e d as UUP l e a d e r next month/at t h e
p a r t y c o n v e n t i o n i f he were t o p u t SF i n t o t h e Executive^--- / -W
absent an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning.
However, / ^ I f a r t i n g '
decommissioning i n exchange f o r seats on t h e / E x e c u t i v e i s
^
more than Adams^can s e l l t o IRA h a r d l i n e r s . - As B e r t i e
Ahern o u t l i n e d , he and B l a i r a r e working t o e x p l o i t t h e
RIRA c e a s e - f i r e and lessened s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o s e l l t h e
^(\.C •'
consequent drawdown i n t h e B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y presence as
" d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , " t o secure an IRA u n i l a t e r a l response
( e x p l o s i o n o f Semtex t h a t c o u l d be v e r i f i e d a f t e r w a r d s ) .
C
u
1
L
J
A down payment was made yesterday, when Chief Constable
Flanagan announced that he no longer needs B r i t i s h Army
p a t r o l s to protect the poli.ce i n B e l f a s t , which has been
understood as a prelude to UK.-troop withdrawals .^^gg^gj^^&k
La—the- -Bri t i sh-i s—t-hat--t-hey- ,<^uld'-be^Ccu'sed"of
l e g i t i m i z i n g the IRA i f they were to engage i n a fjbrce
drawdqwn e x e r c i s e with t e r r o r i s t s . This^.will remire-'you,
B l a i r jand Ahern' to engag^ i n very ^ u i e t ; and/per sonal /
diplomp.cy to £;et up the /choreography t h a t gives /Trimble'
cover/to let;'Sinn F e i n / i n t o the Exectitive,/ ailcnt^ th4/lRA
to s p i n to Q & i r f o l k /th^ decoinii^Lssioning,^and p r o t e c t s
B l a i r from accusatipns-"bf appea^iaent.
-
/
S\
ha^ve'some upcoming l e v e r a g e ^ i t h Adams^^AHe i s p l a n n i n g
a; v i s i t t o t h e / j j n i t e d S t a t e s / i n Qctober,/anq w i l l / \
undbubte^dly ^ e e k an Oval O f f i c e meeting'; t h i f e w p u l d
^p^ropriaJug' i f he i s i n t h e E x e c u t i v ^ a n d engaged i n
(^commissioning.
-—
V
Russia. Primakov's nomination i s l i k e l y t o s a i l t h r o u g h
c o n f i r m a t i o n on F r i d a y . E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s about t h e makeup
of t h e Cabinet a r e n o t encouraging. Gorbachev-era f i g u r e s
such
Gerashchenko and Maslyukov have t h e i n s i d e t r a c k
f o r t h e C e n t r a l Bank and macroeconomic czar p o s i t i o n s ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Gerashchenko i s t h e man who t r i e d t o s o l v e
Russia's problems i n 1992 by p r i n t i n g money t o keep
f a c t o r i e s open, s p a r k i n g 25% monthly i n f l a t i o n .
Maslyukov
/has s i m i l a r views. I f t h e downward s p i r a l c o n t i n u e s , i t
w i l l l i k e l y a c c e l e r a t e . The impacts a r e p r e d i c t a b l e : r u n
away i n f l a t i o n , f u r t h e r e r o s i o n o f t h e c u r r e n c y , food
s h o r t a g e s , t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r goes i d l e , b l a c k markets,
crime and c o r r u p t i o n become p e r v a s i v e .
/
/
/
/
• O FI DENT I Ah
SN
�CONTI DGNT IAD.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,Wc have t-wo—obvfrms—aprt-fon-s-:—Hd—ie-fe—the—R-u-s sians—go—the i r
'©iiO_j^y_jjid_no^ge±^t^r-red--wirth-^
o'r~~ ("2") t r y - 1 o
eggage the__Ru_s,sJ-aas-,—at-tempWto.-.educate-P-r-imako-v—on—T--e &CLnnriu^_jLeali.ties---and---t-ry-feo-m-i-fe-igat e - the- • prospects f o r
j±Laas-t-er-r^—We--a4v-i-se-t-he---seeond---r-©ute --.but^_w.e__.ne.e,dLto
~aeeep-t~a-t-the-_ou.t set- t-ha-t- -chances -f or—sueeess--a-r-e-not-"hTgh .
I n your c a l l w i t h B l a i r , you s h o u l d s t r e s s t h e importance
of t h e Monday G-7/G-8 London meeting on Russia and t h e need
t o have a s e r i o u s exchange w i t h t h e Russians on lessons
l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d .
You might a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t you w i l l c a l l Y e l t s i n a f t e r
Primakov i s confirmed t o underscore the,-importance o f
naming a s t r o n g leader on economic r e f o r m t o t h e
government. You might suggest t h a t B l a i r make a s i m i l a r
call.
T
NY event. NYU School o f Law i s h o s t i n g September 21 an
"opening d i a l o g u e " on democracy i n t h e g l o b a l economy. The
format i s a one-day seminar composed o f t h r e e panels. The
f i r s t two w i l l be made up o f ' l e a d i n g w o r l d f i g u r e s and t h e
NYU community and are on c i v i l s o c i e t y , and t h e new economy
and t h e f u t u r e f o r o p p o r t u n i t y . The F i r s t Lady w i l l
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f i r s t panel. You w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n
the t h i r d panel on s t r e n g t h e n i n g democracy.
Participation
of l e a d e r s i s e v o l v i n g p o s i t i v e l y .
I naddition to Blair,
Persson (Sweden), Prodi and Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) . NYU i s
seeking c o n f i r m a t i o n from Mandela. C h r e t i e n , Cardoso,
Havel and Kok were i n v i t e d b u t are unable t o a t t e n d .
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN ,
Closed press.
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD /
Attachment
Tab A ' P o i n t s t o make
'
/
•CONriDENTIAL
/
�c o n n DCI JT IAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
•
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today. F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , nor agreed t o measures t h a t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and d u r a b l e .
•
Know t h a t you've been t h i n k i n g about ways t o g e t Russia on
board.
•
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can
come a t t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
•
A l t h o u g h I have doubts about t h e wisdom, we can agree t o
Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD b u t o n l y i f key
a l l i e s agree i n advance t h a t NATO w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f
what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
•
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f your o f f i c i a l s a r e p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a p p r o v i n g a i r s t r i k e s t o NATO's w i l l i n g n e s s
to commit ground f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l
settlement.
•
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress.
I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to s u s t a i n s u p p o r t f o r SFOR g i v e n Congress's concerns about
r e a d i n e s s and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o r a i s i n g f o r c e s
f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o ensure domestic
support f o r possible a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , t h e n we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^ONFTPFNTT AT.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�•CQNriDENTIAL
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s ,
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we n e e d A o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e pafet few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , n o r agreed t o measures t h / t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and durabl<
I/
Und^r^tand that/^yo^r represent^
po'ssii^yility seeking UN Se i r i t y
1 p e c i f\c a 1 ly/a
u t h o r r^ing^ pz
ce.
New YorkT i s ' c o n s i d e r i n g
more
)uncil Re^oluti
We have all go't4^en a clear signal from Moscow that'they will
not support anoh^a resolution/ Seems to me only harm can come
at this point in forcing Yelzsin
to veto.
, .^
i..
c
;king a^r&w r e s o l u t i o
ild
5m]3\licat(
.so
IIS
;eture NATO CG^nsensu^-^la/er
fek t o ^ a i i t i
strikes.
,
effo]
Rather than purouin)g a UNSCR, w ^ c a n agree t o Contact Group
m e e t i n g p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD/cfs "luny as key a l l i e s agree i n
advance t h a t NATy w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f what Russian
position i s . /
. n^w^j^,
,
i
(IA)
V?'
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d Irnat some o f y o u r / o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n o n / a i r s t r i k e s t o frfre gern
ireff'Of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i / c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to gcit roady f o r SFOR/ and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o
r a c i n g f o r c e s / f o r K o s t n ^ w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
e/sure domesl^lc support f o r ^ p e i s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
5
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/y\5 v e
<n
'c^a
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c V s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c / s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade /nd P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e / p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
,
m i l i t a r y forces^
Understand t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e yh New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g ^ ^
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
\
s p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
/
civ>- ^ .
W
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n / Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n / / o u l d a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus 1 4 t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t /&me o f your o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o l i n k
a d e c i s i o n on a i r / s t r i k e s t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground f o r c e s
to oversee a c e / s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d ki*ow t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r ! ^ w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g / o r c e s f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure d o m e s t i c support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our e f o j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
119B.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i / l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
ifeeded and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t o keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
GONn DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aoi3- o n a - n
�•CONFIDENTIAL
i
\
Can agree t o Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o ACTORD at NATCX as
'long as key a l l i e s agree i n advance that NATO w i l l proceed
regardless of what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
This woul^L-^rVe^ the Russiansj3J3---eppT7rTfuhity to •Coh^dlt and t o
themselves w i i h — e t r r ^ p o s i t i o n .
€ONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-CONFI DEITT IAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
_
K o f i Annan's report i s a graphic account of Milosevic's
defiance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Believe we n^ed t o
maintain momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO decision t o
_ authorize force.
• ' Understand t h a t your representative i n New^York i s considering
p o s s i b i l i t y of seeking UN Security Counc/l Resolution more
s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g force.
• We have a l l gotten a clear s i g n a l f/om Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n . Serfems t o me only harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Yeltsiry to veto.
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n viou/a also complicate our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus l a t e ? t h i s week t o authorize a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Security Council i s considering a
r e s o l u t i o n on use op f o r c e , t h i s w i l l r e i n f o r c e view of some
t h a t a f u r t h e r r e s o l u t i o n may oe necessary. Could also enable
Moscow t o delay NATO a c t i o n by prolonging debate i n New York.
I also understand that some of your o f f i c i a l s are pressing t o
l i n k a decleion on a i r s t r i k e s t o the generation of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You sh*mld know t h a t t h i s i s a very d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l struggle
to / e t ready f o r SFOR and any suggestion t h a t we are also
r a i s i n g forces f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t very d i f f i c u l t t o
isure domestic support f o r possible a i r - s t r i k e s .
Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR
1199.
I f there i s an agreeraen : on a peace settlement, then we
w i l l need t o consider what ( i f any r o l e we w i l l play i n
implementing i t .
j t i ^ d oP
pres«*CA
/i
1
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
Y
oUNTUN LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENTfMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/05/08
1^*4-
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�•CONriDCNTIAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e }/e need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r N^O d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
c
Holbrc^ke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgfade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l fefr t h e past few days, but
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e ecessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y forces.
i
•
I a l s o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f /our o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a i r s t r i k e s / t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground
f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i p e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d kjiow t h a t t h i s / i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
t o g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g f o r c e s f o r Ko/ovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure domestic support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e nov/ i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e / i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and wferat i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t c / keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
I f Ra/sed)
e r s t a n d t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
•/ We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t such a r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
-CONFI DENIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-or?aZ
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY M
XS
K 6 W
�CONFIDEMTIAL
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n would a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t
secure NATO consensus l a t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Securjy^y---Council i s c o n s i d e r i n g
r e s o l u t i o n on use ojU-^tfrce, t h i s w i l l reinfo^ce-^TTe^ o f some
t h a t a further>-ir£solution may be necg^s^r^TT Could/also enable
Moscow t p ^ d ^ l a y NATO a c t i o n by^prSTonging d e b a t e / i n New York.
CONriDENTIAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
7033
)INTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
•
Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps - B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
•
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined - every step
the p a r t i e s must take and every comma thev must agree on i s a
Struggle,
•
Outcome o f the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
•
But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
o
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
o My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l ,
•
Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
•
What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
3 - 0412. -
�COHFIDCWHAfe
7C3 3
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
o Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps — B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined —
the
p a r M p . q Tnnst f a V p anH
PVPI-V
rnmma t h e v m n s t
every step
arrrpp nn—i_s a_
struggle.
•
Outcome of the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
o But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
• My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l .
• Adams i s f r y i n g t p ^ f a i s e money, and keep syp£brters^b€hind the
peace agreement
o Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
• What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/fc/iS" KBH
�TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
DATE: March 21, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To ensure key a l l i e s are ready f o r NATO t o i n i t i a t e a i r
s t r i k e s i f Belgrade continues t o conduct o f f e n s i v e
operations i n Kosovo and t o r e j e c t an i n t e r i m settlement.
II.
BACKGROUND
Several thousand MUP and VJ continue t o conduct operations
i n Kosovo t o secure l i n e s of communication f o r a major
o f f e n s i v e , which could be launched a t short n o t i c e . The
North A t l a n t i c Council i s meeting t o assess the s i t u a t i o n ,
and Secretary General Solana i s c o n s u l t i n g w i t h a l l i e s on
the i n i t i a t i o n o f a i r s t r i k e s . We are pressing f o r Solana
to pass the "key" f o r Phase I a i r s t r i k e s t o SACEUR on
Monday, and f o r the NAC on the same day t o give Solana the
"key" f o r follow-on s t r i k e s so t h a t NATO can respond
q u i c k l y i f Belgrade mounts a major o f f e n s i v e or attacks
NATO forces.
A l l three leaders who you are c a l l i n g seem committed t o
e a r l y NATO a i r s t r i k e s i f there i s no change i n Milosevic's
p o s i t i o n . Over the l a s t several days, senior o f f i c i a l s
from each o f t h e i r governments have issued p u b l i c
statements making clear that the t h r e a t of a i r s t r i k e s i s
r e a l . The three leaders w i l l be aware of Dick Holbrooke's
impending mission t o Belgrade because Madeleine A l b r i g h t
informed t h e i r Foreign M i n i s t e r s yesterday. They may have
questions about U.S. w i l l i n g n e s s t o move t o e a r l y a i r
s t r i k e s i n l i g h t o f the upcoming v i s i t by Primakov.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5 ( b , d )
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3 / 2 1 / 0 9
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
- 0^-73.- H
8/L>/l5
^
K
�-CQNFTDFNTTAL
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENT I AIi
�GONFEBENTIAL
9902006
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
•
The s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e , w i t h several
thousand army and p o l i c e conducting operations against the
Kosovar Albanians. Forty thousand Serb s e c u r i t y forces are i n
and around Kosovo.
•
While M i l o s e v i c has yet not launched an a l l - o u t o f f e n s i v e , he
continues t o augment h i s forces i n Kosovo and i s poised t o do
so a t short n o t i c e .
•
I n the meantime, h i s forces are securing roads, c l e a r i n g
v i l l a g e s i n s t r a t e g i c areas and t e r r o r i z i n g t h e i r Albanian
i n h a b i t a n t s . This i s d i s p l a c i n g thousands of a d d i t i o n a l
Albanians. The town o f Srbica, which had 13,000 i n h a b i t a n t s
when Serb s e c u r i t y forces moved i n yesterday, i s today l a r g e l y
vacant.
•
Through h i s aggression and continued defiance, Milosevic has
c l e a r l y passed the threshold f o r NATO m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . I f he
does not change course i n the next few days, I b e l i e v e NATO
w i l l need t o i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s . And we w i l l need t o
i n i t i a t e these s t r i k e s very q u i c k l y i f he launches a major
offensive.
•
NATO's a i r s t r i k e s w i l l need t o be s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t i c u l a r l y i f
he launches a major o f f e n s i v e , i n order t o achieve t h e i r
o b j e c t i v e o f demonstrating NATO's resolve, d e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r
aggression and damaging Belgrade's a b i l i t y to conduct
repressive operations i n Kosovo.
•
Of course our o b j e c t i v e i s not t o conduct a i r s t r i k e s , but t o
stop the violence and achieve an i n t e r i m settlement. With
t h i s i n mind, we are sending Ambassador Holbrooke tomorrow t o
Belgrade t o give Milosevic one l a s t chance.
•
Dick Holbrooke w i l l emphasize that NATO a i r s t r i k e s are
imminent and that Milosevic faces a stark choice. He can h a l t
aggression against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an i n t e r i m
settlement w i t h a NATO-led implementation force. Or he can
bear f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences of NATO m i l i t a r y
action.
•
Dick i s now scheduled to see Milosevic tomorrow;
•CONFTPFNTJAL
d
£ £ « ; i ^ : ' 3 / 2 i / 0 9 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DPD'P^?^?^^^
E.O. 13526
^ S ^ v T
�•COMriDCNTIMj
•
I n the meantime, we need t o prepare f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
Tomorrow Javier Solana should pass the "key" t o General Clark,
thus s t a r t i n g the countdown to i n i t i a l s t r i k e s . At the same
time, the NATO Council should give Javier the "key" f o r
follow-on s t r i k e s , so that NATO can respond q u i c k l y i f
Milosevic launches a major offensive or attacks our forces i n
Macedonia or Bosnia.
•
We need t o stay f i r m and u n i t e d . And we a l l need t o work w i t h
President Y e l t s i n and Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov t o minimize the
damage to our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia i f Milosevic gives us no
choice but t o proceed w i t h a i r s t r i k e s .
I f asked about Holbrooke's terms of reference:
•
Holbrooke w i l l press Milosevic to p u l l back h i s forces i n
Kosovo and accept the Rambouillet accords, p a r t i c u l a r l y the
establishment of a NATO-led implementation force.
•
He i s not going to re-negotiate the i n t e r i m settlement already
agreed w i t h the-Kosovar Albanians.
•
We w i l l p u l l him out of Belgrade immediately i f Milosevic
launches a major offensive while he i s present.
I f asked about timing and the Primakov v i s i t :
•
We w i l l need to i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s q u i c k l y i f Milosevic
continues h i s aggression and r e j e c t i o n of an i n t e r i m
settlement. The precise timing w i l l depend i n p a r t on the
dynamics i n Kosovo and Belgrade.
•
We have already warned Russia, so t h a t Primakov can draw h i s
own conclusions f o r h i s upcoming t r i p . A l Gore has spoken t o
Primakov personally and Madeline has had numerous phone c a l l s
w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Ivanov.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2100
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 4:57-5:09 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Gerhard?
Chancellor Schroeder:
Miles
EST
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . M i l o s e v i c gave
Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n of being w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e
a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n and refused even t o agree t o a c e a s e - f i r e
and continued t o r e j e c t any i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence. He was
t h r e a t e n i r i g and b e l l i c o s e , and i t ' s c l e a r he intends to unleash
g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo.
Chancellor Schroeder: I was a f r a i d of t h a t , and I q u i t e agree
w i t h your a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 l.4d
The President: Well, I'm glad to hear you say t h a t . I agree
w i t h t h a t and am ready t o support NATO f u l l y .
Two t h i n g s :
f i r s t , Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has postponed h i s t r i p t o
Washington. I t was the best outcome under the circumstances.
We need t o l e t him know we w i l l continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h
him and make i t c l e a r t h a t , number one, t h a t we share the same
o b j e c t i v e he does f o r a peaceful s o l u t i o n and, number two, we
are committed t o Russia's economic recovery. I t might not be a
bad idea i f you could c a l l him i n the next day or so and say
t h a t t o him.
GECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/u/iS"
KBM
�SECRET
Chancellor Schroeder: I w i l l d e f i n i t e l y c a l l him, and I see
t h i n g s the same way you see them. I w i l l make c l e a r t o him
Germany i s committed t o help w i t h Russia's economic development
and p r i v a t e investment, and also we have p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n s t h a t
can be used. I agree t h a t a t t h i s p o i n t i n the game i n
p a r t i c u l a r t h a t we t e l l him these t h i n g s and make sure Russia
does i t s share t o make the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund view the
Russia s i t u a t i o n i n a p o s i t i v e way. But there are t h i n g s we can
do, as w e l l . ffr)
The President: Thank you, but l e t me j u s t mention one o t h e r
t h i n g . I t h i n k t h e r e i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c w i l l a t t a c k the
NATO f o r c e s i n Bosnia w i t h m i s s i l e s .
Chancellor Schroeder: Does he have what it takes to attack NATO
forces in Bosnia? IrSj
The President:
Yes, the FROG m i s s i l e s can do t h a t . ( S
-i
Chancellor Schroeder:
FROGs? fS*
Yes, you're t a l k i n g about the Russian
The President: I b e l i e v e , obviously, we should discourage him
and we should t r y t o get Primakov t o discourage him from doing
t h a t . I t ' s not inconceivable t h a t he w i l l t r y t o use t h i s t o
wreck our success i n Bosnia. We have t o be very, very f i r m on
t h i s , and i f he does i t , we w i l l have t o be prepared t o s t r o n g l y
r e t a l i a t e . fS4
Chancellor Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : He i s a f r a i d , o f course, because he t h i n k s t h a t
his h o l d on Montenegro may be broken by t h i s , j u s t by the
n a t u r a l course of- t h i n g s . So we have t o be prepared f o r a l l
these t h i n g s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . What he may t r y t o do i s
move a g a i n s t Montenegro, although I t h i n k t h a t w i l l b a c k f i r e
against him. ( S
-4
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Chancellor
Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, you know, t h i s whole t h i n g has a c e r t a i n
element o f u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . We don't know how i t w i l l p l a y out
i n Montenegro, o r how i t w i l l p l a y out i n Serbia i t s e l f . We
also have t o prepare f o r him t o t r y t o s t r i k e the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. <S)
-Chancellor
Schroeder:
The President: That i s good news, and we're a l l doing our best
to p r o t e c t the f o r c e s . But we have t o be prepared t h a t he might
be able t o h i t them, and i t has t o s t i f f e n our resolve and not
f o r c e us t o withdraw. (S
-4
Chancellor Schroeder: I see t h i n g s e x a c t l y the way you do, and
i t ' s a l l the more important f o r t h a t reason we stay i n touch and
coordinate what should be done and needs t o be done. You're
aware, o f course, the 15 European heads o f s t a t e and o f
government are i n B e r l i n , and we should, t o the e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ,
coordinate t h i n g s w i t h regard t o tomorrow, f o r instance. fS-)
The President: Thanks. We'll stay "close by and c o o r d i n a t e . I
know t h a t Solana i s also s t a y i n g i n touch w i t h you.
I f e e l much
b e t t e r a f t e r t h i s conversation, and I can't thank you enough.
Thank you, Gerhard. fS-}
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
I f e e l the same way.
Thank you.
—
Best t o you.
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
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CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
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0
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Miles
March 23, 1999, 5:24-5:37 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
How are you?
Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l .
(U)
President Chirac: I'm i n B e r l i n f o r the meeting tomorrow
morning about t h e agenda, b u t we were w i t h Gerhard Schroeder f o r
d i n n e r . And we agree completely w i t h the d e c i s i o n taken by
NATO. f^)
The President: Well, thank you. I agree, too; we don't have
any choice. f^)
President Chirac:
get any progress?
The President:
No, I understand we don't.
fG-)
Nothing.
President Chirac:
Holbrooke d i d n ' t
(U)
Nothing a t a l l ?
fG-)
The President: I wanted t o speak t o you about two issues. The
f i r s t i s Primakov. We t a l k e d about t h i s b e f o r e . He has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington, which i s probably best under
the circumstances.
But I t h i n k i t ' s important we a l l
communicate t o him two t h i n g s . We a l l need h i s help on Kosovo
and we want t o work w i t h him t o get a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o a l l
t h i s , so t h a t whatever he says about us i n p u b l i c , he should be
GECRET
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3/23/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
ao\3- OH1X- n
�3ECRET
working w i t h us i n p r i v a t e t o get M i l o s e v i c t o moderate h i s
r e a c t i o n t o the a i r s t r i k e s . fS-j
The second t h i n g i s , I t h i n k there i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c
w i l l t r y t o a t t a c k w i t h m i s s i l e s the NATO forces i n Bosnia,
which means the French and the Americans are the most exposed.
He may also t r y t o take some a c t i o n against the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. The o n l y t h i n g s I wanted t o say i s t h a t i f he i s
able t o cause some c a s u a l t i e s t o us where we are already working
to keep the peace, I t h i n k we have t o be very f i r m t o not a l l o w
our Bosnia mission t o c o l l a p s e , and not running away from t h e
mission as d e f i n e d i n Kosovo. fS-)
And, Jacques, t h e r e i s only one more p o i n t I wanted t o make.
When we t a l k e d before, we discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y o f having
the f i r s t phase o f t a k i n g out the a i r defense system and having
a pause t o get M i l o s e v i c back t o the peace t a l k s and agreement.
The o n l y p o i n t I wanted t o make about t h i s i s we have t o be very
c a r e f u l n o t t o have a pause so long t h a t i t defeats our purpose.
Because he has 40,000 forces i n o r on the border o f Kosovo and
almost 300 tanks, i f we waited too long, we could lose t h e
o b j e c t i v e f o r which we s t r u c k . So we have t o be very c a r e f u l
about t h a t . We'll o b v i o u s l y be i n d a i l y c o n t a c t , b u t I wanted
to mention t h a t . f&j
President Chirac: B i l l , concerning these three p o i n t s , t h e
f i r s t , Primakov. I had intended t o c a l l him tomorrow and speak
to him e x a c t l y about what you have spoken o f . I say tomorrow,
because i t i s now 12 o'clock a t n i g h t here. fS4
The P r e s i d e n t :
Tomorrow i s p e r f e c t . { &
-)
President Chirac:
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: The only problem I'm w o r r i e d about i s what i f he
j u s t charges ahead. He can d i s p l a c e thousands o f people i n two
days.
President Chirac:
The President:
Good, t h a t ' s p e r f e c t .
President Chirac:
Egypt?
(U)
The President:
tonight.
(U)
Do you have any good news from the l a d i e s i n
Oh, yes, they are l o v i n g i t . I ' l l get a r e p o r t
President Chirac:
lucky.
(U)
The President:
Jacques.
(U)
f^)
Give them my best regards.
Yes, they're lucky.
President Chirac:
A l l right. B i l l .
—
They are very
I ' l l t e l l them.
Goodbye.
End o f Conversation —
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
Thank you,
�SECRET
2100
THE
WHITE H O U S E
W A S H I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
I n t e r p r e t e r : Simm Smiley
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph S i g l e r and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 5:44-5:49 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Hello.
EST
(U)
(U)
The President: Before I get t o more serious matters I wanted to
c o n g r a t u l a t e you on the success of Roberto Benigni a t the
Oscars. I t was great.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you, thank you. That was
important moment f o r our f i l m i n d u s t r y and our country.
a very
(U)
The President: The movie was a great g i f t .
I wanted t o c a l l t o
check i n w i t h you about Kosovo. I'm sure you know M i l o s e v i c
gave Ambassador Holbrooke no room t o b e l i e v e t h a t he would agree
to a c e a s e - f i r e or any terms of the peace agreement and made i t
c l e a r t h a t he intends t o unleash g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo. I
f e e l we have no choice but t o go forward w i t h NATO a c t i o n . I
i n t e n d t o support i t and I hope we can a l l do i t t o g e t h e r . fS^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
1
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
B/u/15" KBH
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I agree w i t h t h a t . I've been t r y i n g t o
t h i n k o f a l l the permutations.
I'd l i k e t o s t a r t w i t h my f i r s t
p o i n t . Russian Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has c a n c e l l e d h i s t r i p
to Washington which I b e l i e v e i s best under the circumstances.
The t h i n g I t h i n k , important f o r us t o do now i s t o f i r s t o f a l l
t e l l Primakov we s t i l l want t o work w i t h him on a p e a c f u l
s o l u t i o n t o t h i s c r i s i s and urge him t o t a l k t o M i l o s e v i c , and
secondly, t h a t Europe and the U.S. very much want Russia t o
recover economically.
That w i l l be my message and I hope i t
w i l l be yours as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There's a p o i n t t h a t I would l i k e t o
r a i s e w i t h you t h a t i s important.
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t but i t depends on what
M i l o s e v i c does. He could immediately r e t a l i a t e against NATO
forces i n Bosnia or Macedonia. He might also redouble h i s
e f f o r t s t o s l a u g h t e r the Kosovars. He has moved 40,000 troops
and 300 tanks on the border o r i n s i d e Kosovo. I t h i n k i t i s
very important t o make i t as b r i e f as p o s s i b l e but i t a l l
depends on what M i l o s e v i c does. (S)
-Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The President: Yes, I t h i n k we can stop unless M i l o s e v i c i s
h u r t l i n g the t r o o p s , v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e . fSi
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
However, a t t h e
moment, a l l o f us have given the green l i g h t t o NATO and Solar
to a c t .
The President: Yes, o f course, we w i l l a l l have t o be i n close
c o n s u l t a t i o n and I thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l and also hope
t h a t you w i l l be i n touch w i t h Primakov and keep working w i t h
him. Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I s h a l l c a l l Mr. Primakov undoubtedly.
Tomorrow, we have a meeting o f the European Council i n B e r l i n so
we w i l l have c o n s u l t a t i o n s among the EU leaders as w e l l . And
p o s s i b l y we could c a l l Primakov together w i t h the other leaders
of t h e Union, w i t h Mr. Schroeder, Mr.Chirac . fS4
The President: That's a p o s s i b i l i t y ,
w i t h them.
fS4
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
work. (U)
The President:
You should discuss i t
Fine, goodbye and best wishes w i t h your
Bye, t o you t o o . (U)
—
End o f Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�CONFIDENTIAL
2395.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:14 - 6:20 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Gerry.
(U)
You're up v e r y e a r l y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I've been b r i e f e d on where you guys a r e now. I
t h i n k t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s a r e v e r y w o r r i e d about a two-week
d e l a y and I j u s t c a l l e d t o ask i f t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g t h a t can be
done t o do i t q u i c k e r . (^)
Mr. Adams: I understand you have been t r y i n g t o g e t i n c o n t a c t .
I was i n w i t h Tony and B e r t i e .
I don't know b u t I t h i n k we may
have an agreement t h a t , even though t h e r e would be a two-week
timeframe, I would p r o b a b l y g e t back an i n d i c a t i o n q u i c k e r than
t h a t ; can't say. (j?*)
I stepped o u t from t h e t a l k s t o make t h i s c a l l .
We a r e a c t u a l l y
a g a i n s t an adjournment. What we have done i s t o l d t h e
government t h a t t h i s i s n o t working t h e way t h a t t h e y wanted.
Nonetheless, we went back i n and gave t h e government o u r b e s t
assessment, and now t h a t t h e y ' r e u n d e r t a k i n g t o t r y i t a g a i n .
We would have p r e f e r r e d more t i m e , b u t t h e y went a g a i n s t our own
a d v i c e . So we have jumped b e f o r e we were shoved. (j?)
We a r e a g a i n s t an adjournment. We need cover.
The t h i n g t h a t
w i l l guarantee t h i s i s t h a t we're n o t ganging up w i t h everyone
e l s e a g a i n s t t h e IRA. We j u s t have t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t ' s g o i n g
-CQMgj-DENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/1/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
xo , o^TX- C\
]Z
�1
jgeWP ! DENT TAL
2
to be managed. We moved from that position to doing what they
wanted us to do. [&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I n o t h e r words you t h i n k t h e r e ' s some way you
can g i v e him some s o r t o f assurance -- (£7
Mr. Adams: Very d e f i n i t e l y assured.
We have t o s o r t t h i s o u t .
We have s u f f e r e d our f i r s t d e f e a t i n terms o f t h e i n t e r n a l
management. Secondly, we cannot guarantee a n y t h i n g e l s e o t h e r
than our v e r y , v e r y b e s t t o g e t back t o them as q u i c k l y as
p o s s i b l e t o l e t them know how we're g e t t i n g i t on and what has
happened. (J?)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. L e t me ask you t h i s , how w i l l i t work i f
p r i v a t e l y you can t e l l them... why do you want t o w a i t two weeks
b e f o r e you go p u b l i c ? (jzf
Mr. Adams: We have a c t u a l l y suggested t h a t t h e y c a l l b i l a t e r a l s
on Tuesday a week from now. We need more t i m e , t h e n , t o g e t
away from any p r e s c r i b e d timeframe which engages people.
O b v i o u s l y , i f we can g e t back t o them w i t h some i n d i c a t i o n i n
f o u r days, t h r e e days, two days. We'll do a l l o f t h a t .
We
don't want t o go t o t h e f a r extreme o f any t i m e t a b l e .
C#T
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay, I g o t i t .
027
Mr. Adams: I s t h a t f a i r enough? We need space and cover t o
make t h i s work, and t h e l a s t t h i n g we want i s p u b l i c
s p e c u l a t i o n . The l a s t t h i n g we want i s t o have Sinn Fein seen
as ganging up on t h e IRA because t h a t w i l l g e t people's backs up
and make o u r j o b s h a r d e r . We w i l l get back w i t h them w i t h
honest soundings and t h a t c l e a r l y w i l l h e l p them w e l l w i t h i n t h e
two weeks. ( p i
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. I understand.
(pi
Mr. Adams: I'm going back i n t o see Tony and B e r t i e
minutes here.
Do you want me t o c a l l you back?
The P r e s i d e n t :
a g a i n . (pf
Mr. Adams:
I w i l l j u s t c a l l you back i f we need t o t a l k
Good l u c k .
The P r e s i d e n t :
within
Thanks.
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
.CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
2 3 95
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:45 - 6:49 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o Gerry.
Good morning.
(U)
(U)
The President: Look, I talked to Tony and Bertie, and they
understand where you are and why, and what they say must be
right. I'm sure there's no way this document is not going to
leak. ijZ)
Mr. Adams:
I told them that when they give it out.
(Stf
The P r e s i d e n t :
What t h e y ' r e s a y i n g i s they t h i n k t h i s document
can be t h e b a s i s f o r agreement b u t they know t h e p a r t i e s need
t i m e t o r e f l e c t on i t and suggest reconvening a week from
Tuesday. Otherwise i t ' l l l o o k k i n d o f c r a z y i f i t j u s t leaks
out t h e r e . (00
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k a l l o f t h a t ' s dead on. What we can't have
them say i s t h e y t h i n k we're going t o agree t o i t . ( "
£)
The P r e s i d e n t :
No, no, I t h i n k they can say t h e y don't know
what y o u ' l l say. 027
Mr. Adams:
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , we t o l d them when they gave o u t t h e
document i t ' l l end up i n t h e p u b l i c arena. There i s no bad
f e e l i n g s — t h e y ' r e d o i n g t h e i r j o b and we understand.
We
-eONFIDENFfftL
D ^ s s i f ^ r
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a c t u a l l y said we couldn't d e l i v e r but then they gave us a l l
sorts of t r o u b l e . I am t r y i n g to manage t h a t and I t h i n k i t ' s
going t o be a p u b l i c issue. At t h i s point I don't t h i n k the
government can do anything except put i t out there as the basis
for agreement. A l l of that's okay?
The President: Yes.
(jzl
Mr. Adams:
And they are t a l k i n g about reconvening
i n a week from Tuesday. C ?
()
bilaterals
The President: Okay. Yeah, I got it. Well, all right, I think
if they can publish and say it could be the basis for an
agreement and give all the parties time to reflect. [tf
Mr. Adams: We were against adjournment and we t o l d the
Government. We t o l d them that we would have t o r e f l e c t our
disappointment.
I t i s more acceptable t o them, but they should
be saying t h e y ' l l adjourn f o r a period of r e f l e c t i o n and then
w e ' l l resume intense discussion on such-and-such a date. (£
.7
The President:
Mr. Adams:
(£7
You happy enough?
The President:
Mr. Adams:
I got i t .
Yes, I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work.
Okay, goodbye.
The President:
(£7
Thank you.
(^T
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
—
aiNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2429
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : B r i g i t t a Richman
Notetakers: Matt S i b l e y , James Smith, Bob
Ford, Sean Tarver and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 4:06 - 4:43 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Gerhard, how are you?
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
I'm f i n e , thank you. (U)
The President: I wanted t o t a l k t o you about where we are on
Kosovo. I t h i n k i n the l a s t couple o f n i g h t s , even though the
weather has been bad, we have s t a r t e d t o h i t some t a r g e t s t h a t
w i l l make some d i f f e r e n c e . I am encouraged t h e A l l i e s have
approved what I consider t o be an a p p r o p r i a t e range o f t a r g e t s
f o r t o n i g h t and maybe the next couple of days because o f the
weather. fS-)
But I t h i n k we have t o f i n d some way o f more e f f i c i e n t l y p i c k i n g
these t a r g e t s and going forward. I t ' s t a k i n g an enormous amount
of time from Solana and Clark, who spends as much time on
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the A l l i e s as he does conducting the
campaign. I t h i n k i f we have any chance o f a d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e working t h a t won't be a defeat f o r Europe and the
United States, we have got t o keep h i t t i n g hard and give the
impression we are w i l l i n g t o do i t f o r some time. fS4
That means t o me some way of having the leaders o f NATO n a t i o n s
approve c a t e g o r i e s o f t a r g e t s and then have Clark p i c k t h e
m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and then have Solana have our leave t o take
some o f f i f he b e l i e v e s the c o l l a t e r a l damage would be too
g r e a t . Because we're already being questioned here about why we
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PERE.O.13526
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are so slow to ramp up the campaign if he is doing these
terrible things. Part of it is the weather, of course, but part
of it is this process of picking targets, which I think has
become cumbersome. t&j
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Can I make a few comments? fSI
Of course.
(S)
--
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:. F i r s t o f a l l , i n general I agree w i t h your
a n a l y s i s and o b v i o u s l y I agree w i t h your p o i n t s . He has t o
withdraw h i s troops and stop h i s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y ; the Kosovars
have t o be able t o r e t u r n i n s e c u r i t y ; and then I t h i n k f o r a
long-term s e t t l e m e n t they have t o have some degree o f the
autonomy t h a t they enjoyed before he took i t away from them. So
i n general, I agree w i t h t h a t . My o n l y concern i s t h a t i f we
were t o o f f e r such a t h i n g tomorrow — I can o n l y say how i t
w i l l be perceived i n t h i s country because o f the press coverage
— i t would look l i k e an o f f e r from the p o s i t i o n o f weakness.
L i k e we d i d n ' t want t o go ahead w i t h the bombing campaign,
t h a t ' s been c a l l e d h a l f - h e a r t e d t o date, and t h a t i n e f f e c t we
were suing f o r peace. That would make i t impossible f o r him t o
accept. I n a way, we would both decrease t h e chance t h a t he
w i l l take a reasonable o f f e r and our being perceived as having
defended the people o f Kosovo. I f we r e a l l y can r a t c h e t t h i s up
and h i t him hard f o r a few days and then discuss the parameters
SECRET
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3
of a s o l u t i o n , I'm a f r a i d i t w i l l be perceived i n the United
States t h a t we are weak and i n d e c i s i v e and haven't h i t him hard.
I'm a f r a i d i f t h a t i s the way he perceived i t , i t would be
impossible f o r him t o accept those terms. He would countero f f e r w i t h something we cannot accept, because he would t h i n k we
are about t o q u i t on him. {S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: F i r s t o f a l l , I don't disagree w i t h a n y t h i n g you
s a i d . Let me put i t another way. Whenever we decide t o go
p u b l i c w i t h an o f f e r o f n e g o t i a t i o n , e i t h e r from one leader l i k e
you o r NATO as a whole, i f we have not impressed upon the p u b l i c
i n Europe and the U n i t e d States, as w e l l as i n Serbia, t h a t we
have done a l o t o f damage and could do a l o t more -- t h a t i s , i f
not a l o t o f damage has already been done and i f we do i t before
t h a t happens, i t i s imperative we have the agreement o f a l l NATO
members t o say he needs t o understand we are prepared t o
continue and escalate t h i s a i r e f f o r t f o r several weeks more, i f
t h a t i s what i t takes. And t h a t we have no s h o r t - t e r m deadline
on t h i s .
And i f we say i t , we have t o be prepared t o do i t .
I f we have a
peace o f f e r on the t a b l e , even i f i t ' s one he can't accept,
before there's been a p e r c e p t i b l e negative impact on h i s
s i t u a t i o n on the ground, then we have t o be even more e x p l i c i t
t h a t we are prepared t o do t h i s f o r weeks and weeks and we have
no s e t t i m e l i n e o r deadline. We have an o b j e c t i v e and we are
going t o achieve i t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
SECRET
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Let me suggest, I t h i n k we need t o c o o r d i n a t e
through our s t a f f people how t o handle t h i s as we go forward on
this.
I know Madeleine i s t a l k i n g t o Fischer. I mentioned t h i s
to Tony B l a i r today, because I thought you had probably
discussed i t w i t h him. I f we three could work i t out, how do
you t h i n k we can do t h i s ? We c e r t a i n l y have t o make i t c l e a r
there are c o n d i t i o n s under which we would be w i l l i n g t o stop the
hostilities.
We're i n there t o stop the h o s t i l i t i e s , so I agree
w i t h t h a t . I want t o ask whether you agree we should e s t a b l i s h
some smoother procedures on the t a r g e t s issue, because I t h i n k
we w i l l be moving p r e t t y q u i c k l y once the weather c l e a r s up.
[The l i n e t o the Chancellor dropped and was r e e s t a b l i s h e d . ]
The President: Gerhard, we got c u t o f f . Maybe ( t h e
i n t e r p r e t e r ) can do the t r a n s l a t i o n again. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes. I have no problem w i t h t h a t . A l l I am
t r y i n g t o do i s f i n d a system t h a t works more r a p i d l y . Maybe we
can have J a v i e r — he's got sense enough t o know what t a r g e t s
are s e n s i t i v e because o f high c o l l a t e r a l damage o r the l o c a t i o n
— maybe we j u s t need t o t e l l him he needs the a b i l i t y t o check
i n on a d a i l y basis a t a c e r t a i n time, and i f they don't present
SECRET
�SECRET
5
c o l l a t e r a l damage problems or break huge new ground, he ought t o
l e t them go. A u t h o r i z i n g him t o do i t might be an e f f i c i e n t
way. f S )
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Let me say t h a t i f we do i t t h a t way, we may
a c t u a l l y lengthen the process. As i t i s now, they b r i n g us
proposed m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and i f one has considerable c o l l a t e r a l
damage o r represent h i s t o r i c a l or s i g n i f i c a n t c u l t u r a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e t o Serbs, they b r i n g i t t o me and say, "maybe we
shouldn't h i t t h i s , " and I say, "okay, maybe we s h o u l d n ' t . "
What I t h i n k i s , i n s t e a d o f announcing t h a t new phases have j u s t
been a u t h o r i z e d , we could a u t h o r i z e m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , but they
could come back t o us w i t h ones t h a t have c o l l a t e r a l damage or
c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , then we could say yes o r no. I f we t h i n k
we are a l l i n c l i n e d t o say yes, but a l l our A l l i e s a r e n ' t , then
we could go t o them. I t h i n k t h a t maybe t h e most e f f i c i e n t way
of doing t h i s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I have no problem w i t h t h a t . ( S
-i
The President: Good. A l r i g h t . We w i l l be i n touch. I t h i n k
your t h i n k i n g on the o u t l i n e o f what we should say i s q u i t e
r i g h t , and w e ' l l work on i t .
We may have t o t a l k again i n a day
or so, but thank you very much. fSi
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, but I t h i n k we have t o s t a r t —
going t o be here t h i s week, I'm not going t o take an Easter
v a c a t i o n , and I t h i n k you aren't, e i t h e r —
SECRET
I am
�JECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
I agree.
tS-)
Chancellor Schroeder: And about the guestion of when we become
a c t i v e , we can discuss t h i s f u r t h e r .
The President: I t h i n k we are on the same page and we j u s t need
to work out the d e t a i l s .
I am sure Madeleine and Fischer can
work out the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
together here. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Easter. (U)
Yes.
Absolutely.
Chancellor Schroeder:
—
GECRET
Perhaps Sandy and S t e i n e r can work
Okay, thank you.
Thank you. Goodbye.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
Happy
�SECRET
2679
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
w i t h United Nations
Secretary General K o f i Annan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Annan
Notetaker: Bonnie C l i c k , Matthew S i b l e y ,
Robin Rickard and Robert Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
A p r i l 10, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
1:01 - 1:08
H e l l o K o f i , how are you?
p.m.
(U)
Secretary General Annan: How are you B i l l ?
these are d i f f i c u l t times f o r us.
(U)
I am f i n e , but
The President: Yes, I thought your statement was very good.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the b i g headline from Russia, I t h i n k we have a
r e a l chance over next week. I t h i n k i t was g r e a t . Even though
the headlines i n the New York Times t h i s morning are d i s t u r b i n g ,
I t h i n k we. have a chance f o r a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t e d f r o n t . What
the Russians need i s t o get back i n t o the ballgame. I f they are
p a r t of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , which I always thought they had
to do, l i k e i n Bosnia. I f the Russians are happy, then the
Chinese w i l l stop what they are saying, and then we can get the
whole t h i n g sanctioned by the UN.
Madeleine i s seeing Ivanov
next week and we are working through the Europeans and I know
you are. I f we could get them to take a common d i p l o m a t i c
p o s i t i o n , where i t i s obvious they would be p a r t o f any
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , there may be a way t o work through t h i s .
I t ' s important t o get a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t . I f we keep t h i s
up f o r another month or two, w e ' l l be able to move i n t h e r e
uncontested.
Then the t h i n g t h a t concerns me i s having Europe
w i t h us and being there f o r e v e r and a day.
Look how long we had
to stay i n Bosnia, w i t h the Russians. I t i s almost a l i c e n s e
f o r Kosovar m i l i t a r y elements to r e c o n s t i t u t e themselves and
s t a r t going the other way.
I t h i n k we have a chance i n the next
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (a),(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: A p r i l 12, 2009
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
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8/<yi5~
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2
couple o f weeks to break the iceberg and get the Russians back
i n the hunt. They're not j u s t coming to Europe and the United
States now, but they're working through a whole range o f t h i n g s .
I f we can get them there sometime over the next couple o f weeks,
then I t h i n k we have a chance to put t h i s together. ( S
-i
Secretary General Annan:
The President: I t h i n k as a p r a c t i c a l matter, what would matter
there i s the l e v e l o f assurance and d e t a i l we have about
acceptance, and a t i m e t a b l e f o r withdrawal and when the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l force w i l l get i n . What B l a i r , Schroeder, and I
are w o r r i e d about i s having him accept i t , having a c e s s a t i o n o f
bombing, and then a reason why he can't get i t across, and the
t r o u b l e then i s having the a l l i e s resume bombing. The problem
w i l l be i n the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Secretary General Annan:
The President:
Yep. I agree w i t h t h a t .
(U)
Secretary General Annan: I w i l l work w i t h you and a l l the
governments concerned t o f i n d a way out o f t h i s and I t h i n k we
may get t o a p o i n t where he w i l l crack, but M i l o s e v i c i s such an
i n c r e d i b l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e character.
The President: Even though there i s a most f r i g h t e n i n g headline
about Y e l t s i n ' s bombast, as near as we can t e l l , t h i s i s an
e f f o r t by Russia to get back i n t o the d i p l o m a t i c hunt. £S4
Secretary General Annan: I t had q u i t e an impact here i n Europe,
but some o f the c l a r i f i c a t i o n s from Moscow seem to have
c l a r i f i e d t h i n g s a b i t . (S)
-The President: Let's stay i n close touch next week t o see what
we can do to put t h i s t h i n g together. I t h i n k you have r e a l l y
done a good t h i n g here. We have got a chance t o get t h i s done.
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOF
�GECRET
Secretary General Annan:
i n i t i a t i v e , then? t€}
Would you say something about my
The President: A b s o l u t e l y .
yesterday. fe)
Secretary General Annan:
I thought I p u t something out
I am i n Europe. (U)
The President: I was t h r i l l e d by what you s a i d .
check. I f we haven't put out a statement, I w i l l .
I will
(G
-4
double-
Secretary General Annan: Thank you very much. I n f a c t , one o f
the European leaders s a i d t o me t h a t France, Germany, e t c . have
s a i d something, but the U n i t e d States and UK have n o t . t&j
The President: Tony B l a i r i s supposed t o c a l l i n the next hour.
When he c a l l s , I w i l l ask him t o say something a l s o . (€-)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Secretary General Annan:
I
f i n d i n these s i t u a t i o n s t h a t when the whole w o r l d comes
t o g e t h e r , we always make progress.
The President:
Okay, I got i t . (U)
Secretary General Annan:
f a m i l y . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I will,
Thank you B i l l and give my best t o the
thank you so much. (U)
Secretary General Annan:
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�JECRET
2679
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation w i t h French President
Chirac
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Alec Toumayan
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , M i l e s Murphy,
Doug Bayley
A p r i l 11, 1999, 1:00 - 1:13
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
H e l l o , Jacques?
President Chirac:
The President:
EDT
(U)
B i l l , how are you?
Fine, how are you?
President Chirac:
p.m.
(U)
(U)
I t i s very good t o hear from you.
(U)
The President: Thank you. I j u s t wanted t o check i n w i t h you
to see where we are on Kosovo. I t h i n k K o f i Annan made a very
good statement on Friday, the way he s t a t e d our c o n d i t i o n s . The
o n l y d i f f e r e n c e , of course, i s t h a t he asked NATO t o suspend
a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o the c o n d i t i o n s . But I
t h i n k we need some s i g n of implementation f i r s t .
I am very
encouraged t h a t the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s ' statement has
Russia i n v o l v e d . I f we can lock t h a t i n a t the h i g h e s t l e v e l s ,
I t h i n k we can get back on the d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k .
f&)
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y share these f e e l i n g s .
t h i n k t h a t K o f i Annan's statement i s p e r f e c t .
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
4/12/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I also
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I t h i n k we are agreed on t h a t .
I just
wanted t o mention one or two other t h i n g s . F i r s t , Hubert, Robin
Cook and Madeleine w i l l meet w i t h t h e i r NATO c o u n t e r p a r t s i n
Brussels on Monday. This i s an important s i g n a l o f our
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and makes sure the smaller A l l i e s not i n the
Contact Group don't f e e l l e f t out. I am going t o c a l l some o f
them, e s p e c i a l l y those c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s . Any t h a t you f e e l
p a r t i c u l a r l y close t o , i f you have the occasion, you could say
something u s e f u l t o them. I t would be h e l p f u l t o spend a l i t t l e
time s h o r i n g them up. f&)
President Chirac: I am i n absolute agreement, and I s h a l l make
my c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s e f f o r t . I also i n t e n d t o ask
Schroeder, as President o f the European Union, t o do so. I
would a l s o l i k e t o add t h a t we have a European Union Council on
Wednesday. There w i l l be 15 heads o f European s t a t e s and
governments present. A t t h i s time we s h a l l consider Kosovo i n
the s p i r i t j u s t i n d i c a t e d , which w i l l a l l o w heads o f smaller
governments t o express t h e i r p o i n t s o f view.
I t i s even
p o s s i b l e K o f i Annan might come, and t h i s i s something t h a t would
g r e a t l y please the German p r e s i d e n t . fe}
The President: That i s very good. Let me mention a couple
other t h i n g s . I r e a l l y appreciate what you have done w i t h the
refugees. The s i t u a t i o n i s beginning t o get i n b e t t e r shape,
but we need t o be s e n s i t i v e t o what i s happening t o the f r o n t
l i n e s t a t e s . We need t o ask our people what we are going t o do
a f t e r t h i s i s over t o help the r e s e t t l e m e n t o f Kosovo and the
l a r g e r recovery e f f o r t s . There may be a way a f t e r t h i s i s over
t o get a l l these c o u n t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n a common economic
endeavor t h a t w i l l reduce e t h n i c s t r i f e .
We need t o s t a r t t o
t h i n k about t h i s now.
We need the best people i n a l l these
c o u n t r i e s t h i n k i n g about what i t w i l l look l i k e f i v e years from
now, assuming we get a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n here. f G)
President Chirac: This i s also my f e e l i n g .
Also, what we wish
to do w i t h the European Union. Also, the s p e c i f i c problem o f
the refugees, but more p r e c i s e l y the d i s p l a c e d persons, who are
s t i l l i n Kosovo and cannot get out. And we know n e i t h e r where
they are, nor what s t a t e they are i n . I t w i l l be necessary t o
consider help by the m i l i t a r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y how t o get more
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i n f o r m a t i o n about the s i t u a t i o n and, i f need be, t o parachute i n
the necessary h e l p . fS4
The President: Yes, t h a t i s very good. One l a s t t h i n g . I got
a couple l e t t e r s from Y e l t s i n l a s t week t h a t I thought were
p r e t t y encouraging, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the r a t h e r inflammatory
p u b l i c comments he made. I n the next week or so, once we get
t h i s G-8 statement n a i l e d down, we ought t o make an e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians back i n t h e game, and t h a t might serve Y e l t s i n
at home where he i s fending o f f a t t a c k s i n t h e Duma.
President Chirac: Yes, I have heard o f a resumption o f dialogue
between Russia and America, and I know Madeleine i s meeting w i t h
Ivanov on Tuesday.
The President: Yes, w e l l , I t h i n k t h a t i f we can j u s t keep the
pressure up, I t h i n k we may get a break i n the next couple o f
weeks, Jacques. I f we can keep t h e pressure up. We j u s t have
to stay a f t e r i t . fS-)
President Chirac: This i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e .
countries i s perfect.
The President:
The u n i t y o f NATO
Yes. (U)
President Chirac:
The President: Yes, i t i s very, very unstable. I am very
w o r r i e d about i t .
But we are t r y i n g t o get them t o take a
higher p r o f i l e i n an attempt t o promote s t a b i l i t y , because on
one hand i t b r i n g s Russia c l o s e r t o Europe, and on t h e o t h e r ,
Y e l t s i n can say t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s he i s t r y i n g t o stop t h e
bombing. (S)
--
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President Chirac: Yes, I completely agree, and we can make use
of the NATO-Russia p a r t n e r s h i p . ( S
-i
The President: Yes, okay, I w i l l see you here p r e t t y soon, b u t
i f we need t o t a l k t h i s week, I w i l l be around a l l week. I may
need t o c a l l you again. f G)
President Chirac: Okay, e v e r y t h i n g i s a b s o l u t e l y c l e a r . As
long as we stay on the K o f i Annan process, I t h i n k we can
achieve success.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t .
President Chirac:
The President:
Okay, B i l l .
f&4
(U)
Thank you, Jacques.
(U)
President Chirac: Please give my regards t o H i l l a r y , and I w i l l
see you soon. (U)
The President:
A l l r i g h t , good bye. (U)
President Chirac:
Bye. (U)
—
End o f Conversation
—
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�'HESRESlC^r HAS SEEN
THE
WHITE
HOUSE ^ "
1
' -~S:9
WA S HI N G T O N
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CECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 17, 1999
TELEPHONE CALLS TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR,
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
\C
V'
FROM: SAMUEL BERG
I.
PURPOSE
B l a i r . Review UK paper. Discuss shoring up A l l i e s on
widening t h e range o f t a r g e t s and the NATO Summit.
Chirac.
Press Chirac t o stay f o r d u r a t i o n o f NATO Summit.
Secure support f o r pressing on w i t h the NATO a i r campaign and
widening the range o f t a r g e t s .
C h r e t i e n . Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r strong support, i n c l u d i n g
d e c i s i o n t o c o n t r i b u t e more f i g h t e r s . Ask him t o buck up
Chirac on the NATO Summit. Get readout o f Zhu's Canada v i s i t .
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r . You spoke t o B l a i r today about moving t o Phase I I I .
Y o u ' l l want t o discuss the paper he i s sending as w e l l as
ways t o p r e v a i l upon Chirac t o stay f o r t h e e n t i r e NATO
Summit. B l a i r may again r a i s e b e t t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n on NATO
communications -- the B r i t i s h press termed the convoy
i n c i d e n t an understandable accident o f war b u t a p u b l i c
r e l a t i o n s d i s a s t e r because o f i n e p t handling by NATO p u b l i c
affairs officials.
Chirac
You should p r e v a i l
upon Chirac t o stay f o r the d u r a t i o n because: ( i ) every
day o f t h e Summit has a Kosovo focus and discussions f o r
which he needs t o be present; ( i i ) l e a v i n g e a r l y would send
SECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
D e c l a s s i f y on:
4/16/09
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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q.q q
a t e r r i b l e message o f A l l i e d d i s u n i t y ; ( i i i ) we have
e l i m i n a t e d o r toned done the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects of the
summit. I f necessary, you can remind Chirac t h a t not o n l y
d i d you a t t e n d the Lyons G-8 i n the wake o f the Khobar
Towers bombing, you kept your promise t o dine w i t h him i n
Paris.
Meanwhile, Chirac continues t o take a s t r o n g p u b l i c l i n e on
Kosovo, speaking t o the French people a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s
t o m a i n t a i n support f o r t h e a i r s t r i k e s . His l e a d e r s h i p has
been e f f e c t i v e f o r NATO and f o r Chirac p e r s o n a l l y — t h e
French p u b l i c ' s support f o r the a i r s t r i k e s (70 percent) i s
topped o n l y by t h e i r support f o r Chirac ( j o b approval
r a t i n g : 79 p e r c e n t ) . Like Schroeder and D'Alema, Chirac
i s convinced t h a t a key t o m a i n t a i n i n g p u b l i c backing i s t o
c o n s t a n t l y take t h e i n i t i a t i v e — i f the p u b l i c senses
s t a g n a t i o n o r b e l i e v e s there i s no end i n s i g h t t o
( i n e f f e c t i v e ) a i r s t r i k e s , t h e i r support could wane. Hence
Chirac's support f o r the Fischer p l a n , h i s c a l l f o r the UN
t o be more i n v o l v e d , h i s p u b l i c e f f o r t s t o woo the Russians
on board, and h i s proposal t h a t t h e EU administer any peace
settlement.
EO 13526 1.4d
You a l s o should know t h a t P h i l i p p e Seguin, the leader o f
Chirac's G a u l l i s t p a r t y but also h i s r i v a l , q u i t Friday as
p a r t y leader and head o f i t s l i s t f o r the European
p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s . That's good news f o r Chirac i n
the long term because i t marginalizes Seguin b u t bad news
i n the s h o r t term, because i t makes the r i g h t ' s already
bleak prospects i n the European e l e c t i o n s even b l e a k e r .
F i n a l l y , Chirac and the French are preoccupied w i t h
A l g e r i a , whose e l e c t i o n Friday was d i s c r e d i t e d by the
w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l but the army-backed candidate.
C h r e t i e n wants t o t a l k about the way ahead i n Kosovo, how
i t w i l l f i t i n t o the Summit and t o give you a readout o f
Zhu's v i s i t t o Canada. He remains s t e a d f a s t l y behind NATO
a c t i o n s i n Kosovo and i s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n favor o f ground
f o r c e i n t e r v e n t i o n . This Monday, he won complete support
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i n Parliament f o r Canada's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A l l i e d Force.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , Ottawa w i l l c o n t r i b u t e another s i x F-18
f i g h t e r s t o the e f f o r t ( b r i n g i n g i t s contingent from 12 t o
18 p l a n e s ) , and has agreed t o take i n up t o 5 Q Q Kosovar
,Q
refugees w i t h p r e - e x i s t i n g t i e s t o Canada.
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r President Chirac
Tab C Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
•
Agree t h a t Summit i s p i v o t a l .
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and show
t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure on M i l o s e v i c . W e ' l l a l s o want
t o work q u i e t l y t o d e a l w i t h any blockages.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept i s b e i n g
q u e s t i o n e d by France and I t a l y i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p
unstick i t .
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
Our s t a f f s h o u l d remain i n c l o s e touch over t h e n e x t few days
as we p r e p a r e f o r t h e Summit. Reserve judgment f o r now on t h e
need f o r them t o come here.
•
Look f o r w a r d t o t a l k i n g w i t h you Thursday morning.
•
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d n o t s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a heavy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've g o t t e n r i d o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe you can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
CECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SM U S
H
K6V1
�•S1LLKLT
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Pleased t h a t you're w i l l i n g t o expand range o f t a r g e t s i n
NATO's a i r campaign. E s s e n t i a l t h a t we i n t e n s i f y the a i r
s t r i k e s and make our d e t e r m i n a t i o n c l e a r t o M i l o s e v i c .
'-- A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and L i o n e l J o s p i n d e l i v e r e d on
n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l Assembly.
/
v
^yNATO Summit p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate
u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n and t o show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up
p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t the Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be able
t o b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t the t i m e o f the Summit. That w i l l send
a strong signal.
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce the NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t your d e l e g a t i o n has
r a i s e d v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move it.
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•
Understand your concerns about not w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i t i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every day has a heavy Kosovo focus
-- you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects.
F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
•
[ I f necessary:
Jacques, I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombing, not o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-8
—- as planned, I kept my d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•SECRET
Reason:
Declassify
1.5(a)
on:
(b) (d)
4/16/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F Ci llOJi*
^
O ia n
M
S/t/is KBH
-
�•OCCRCT
2
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen\;prae o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
t h e FRY, and q u e s t i o n s i o e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e pressure, and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e continues t o mount. Thought K o f i ' s and
t h e G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were s t r o n g .
•
jECRET
-
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�-SECRET
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
\ghu V i s i t
•
Understand you had good meetings w i t h Zhu, and he's now o f f on
a t o u r o f Canada. I n t e r e s t e d i n your readout.
NATO Summit
•
Need t o s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week's t i m e .
Given M i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
ongoing.
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , as o u r
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s d i d e a r l i e r t h i s week. But w e ' l l a l s o want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
•
You may have heard Chirac sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit
as e a r l y as F r i d a y because we f a i l e d t o s h o r t e n i t and focus
e v e r y t h i n g on Kosovo. I n f a c t , we've re-worked summit so thatevery day has a heavy Kosovo focus and we've e l i m i n a t e d t h e
c e l e b r a t o r y aspects. Most i m p o r t a n t , i f Jacques were t o leave
e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d d i s u n i t y .
Maybe you can t a l k t o him.
Kosovo
•
L e t me say f i r s t how much I a p p r e c i a t e your p l a n s t o
c o n t r i b u t e another s i x f i g h t e r s .
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
to b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e time o f t h e Summit. That w i l l send
a s t r o n g s i g n a l . A p p r e c i a t e your sending an a d d i t i o n a l s i x
CF-18s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a i r campaign.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept has r u n i n t o
some o p p o s i t i o n i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
I r ^
Reason:
Declassify
, , , WKWH,
1.5 (a) (b) (d)
on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.0.13526
ao\^
*
3
OWIQ.
JAI'J
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY S/u/iy
^
�-OECRET
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen some o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
the FRY, and q u e s t i o n s b e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e p r e s s u r e , and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2882
POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Nticd Lu b l d i l — L l i i u k i n y dbuuL 1>A'1U bliMuil i n VJCGJC"' • t i m e .
^jr^en M i l o s e v i c ' g atfeitude?—probable NATO airyfcampaign
W e ' l l want to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , aa
our^
Foreign M i n i s t e r s d i d e a i l i c i . — t i l l s wtt]
But w e ' l l a l s o want
show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may l e a v ^ Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d not s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a h^avy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've gotyen r i d o f the c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe vou can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
It's possible t
to b e g i n g
a str
C
e able
u m m i t j ^ — m a t w i l l send
additional six
We c o u l d a l s o a/m t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e /Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t concept Jsss—fcurT'TntQ
ome (»ppoci/ion i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p u n s t i c k i t .
t - , r^-u
F i n a l l y , A t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d the
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n ' M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
7
ng a b o u t d i - S s e n s i o n i n
about MjJrcr^evic's
and make c l e a r t h a t
of f i n d i n g a c r a c k
Reason:
1.5(a (b) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
i n •
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�)£CRC?
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POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
N^TO
< • -•
Summit
0
1
teed Y s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week s . t i m e .
G \ v e n V l i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
X A^
^ —\
oncloinc
1
W-c 11 v^an^/to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m j ^ a t i o n y a-s^-o u r
F n r e i g n Mi n-j 1-p c: H i H o a r - l - j p r t h i s W P P V / R n t - WP ' 1 1
so want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure/on M i l o s e v i c .
ff
r
Understand your concerns about n o t w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i c i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every/day has a heavy Kosovo focus
you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y a s p e c t s . F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a / r e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
[ I f necessary: Jacques^ I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombang, n o t o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-f
as planned, I kept ity/ d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t & a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
t o b e g i n o p e r a r i o n s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e Summit. T h a t _ _ w i l l send
a s t r o n 3 _ s j ^ g ^ a J ^ _ ^ A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and LTone"2r-.
^^^ospTri d e l i v e r e d on n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y ^
We c o u l d Also aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o _ s t e p up
economic/pressure.
I understand that <roncopt has r u n i n t n ^
some o p p o o i t i o f l i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
tt
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugc/slavia. Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•SECRE'T
Reason:
1.5(a)(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o n : 4/16/09
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You've probably seen some of r.he r e p o r t i n g about dissension i n
the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's
/ '
leadership. I f we keep up the pressure, and make clear t h a t /
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , there may be some hope of f i n d i n g a cracj
i n Belgrade's resolve.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure continues t o mount. Thought^f&^fi's and
the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were strono-'
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4 310
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Robin Rickard and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3, 1999, 1:35 - 1:45 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Chancellor Schroeder: H e l l o , B i l l .
This i s Gerd Schroeder. We
have j u s t had the r e p o r t o f Mr. A h t i s a a r i and i t looks t o me,
a f t e r reading i t , l i k e a r e a l breakthrough i n the s i t u a t i o n .
The p a r l i a m e n t has approved t h i s , t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the NATO
proposals, and t h a t approval looks t o me l i k e t h a t i s t h e same
as implementation. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Gerhard, would you ask t h e i n t e p r e t e r t o say
t h a t again? (U)
( I n t e r p r e t e r repeats t h e Chancellor's previous
statement)
The P r e s i d e n t : What the parliament approved i s s l i g h t l y
d i f f e r e n t from NATO's proposal, as they l e f t out the word ' a l l "
i n terms o f t r o o p withdrawal, but i t looks h e l p f u l . We have t o
say, o b v i o u s l y , t h a t we appreciate the work t h a t Chernomyrdin
and A h t i s a a r i have done and we appreciate the vote i n t h e
p a r l i a m e n t , b u t we f e e l t h a t we need t o see some r e s u l t s . We
don't want t o be once again i n the p o s i t i o n o f t h i n k i n g we have
an agreement and then not have i t m a t e r i a l i z e . We w i l l keep
working t h i s b u t want t o see concrete r e s u l t s . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: I understand. Well, i t looks t o us as i f
i t were t r u e . I t speaks o f t h e withdrawal o f a l l Serbian
troops, i t speaks t o t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n o f t h e refugees and i t
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Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
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6/7/09
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2
does speak also to having a NATO core in the peacekeeping force.
Now it also says this will be dealt with in the Security
Council. Now what we have to do is bring about this Security
Council meeting as fast as possible. Already, I believe the
NATO military experts are sitting down with the Yugoslav
military experts. Time is of the essence, we should move this
forward as fast as possible. tS)
The President: I agree t h a t we ought t o move t h i s forward as
f a s t as p o s s i b l e . My r e a l concern today i s only f o r our p u b l i c
r h e t o r i c . I f we are o v e r l y p o s i t i v e and there i s no c a u t i o n i n
our r h e t o r i c , he may not comply. He may get h i s bombing pause
and h e ' l l t u r n e v e r y t h i n g back t o mud. We need t o see r e a l
compliance. I agree we should push forward q u i c k l y b u t my o n l y
concern i s t h a t the NATO A l l i e s be somewhat cautious i n our
p u b l i c statements — so t h a t we don't t h i n k t h a t t h e i r words a r e
as good as t h e i r deeds. He has made a l o t o f deals i n t h e s i x
years t h a t I have been working w i t h him t h a t he has not kept. I
t h i n k t h i s one w i l l be kept i f we show firmness.
Chancellor Schroeder:
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have already worked
a l l t h i s out. I don't t h i n k we need t o t a l k about i t on t h i s
l i n e o r p u b l i c l y , b u t I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have reached a
s o l u t i o n on t h a t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: Okay. I agree, by the way, t h a t i t would
d e f i n i t e l y be wrong t o spread euphoria i n p u b l i c statements. We
are n o t about t o do t h a t . We w i l l do so i n a r a t i o n a l ,
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d manner but also i n d i c a t e t h e r e i s hope. f&}
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I hope we w i l l stay i n touch.
(U)
The President: This could make f o r a b e t t e r G-8 meeting i n
Cologne i f t h i s works out. (U)
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Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Yes. Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
— End of Conversation
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�-SECRET-
4339
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 1:35 - 1:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
(U)
Hello, B i l l ?
Jean, how are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I'm doing great. I am beside my lake,
and I've got a book I'm sure you read by Michener, a book about
Kennedy. I t ' s a good book. There was some r a i n , so I am j u s t
r e s t i n g a t t h i s moment. (U)
The President:
thing settled.
That's good.
(U)
I t looks l i k e we got t h a t salmon
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: Yes. That i s s e t t l e d and we managed
to s e t t l e the magazine t h i n g too, and now I have t o see i f the
war i s s e t t l e d . (U)
The President: That i s what I wanted t o t a l k t o you about,
because we have a l i t t l e danger here w i t h the Serbs. The Serbs
yesterday had three d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . The Russians were
saying we can't approve a UN r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l the bombing pause,
and the Serbs were saying we can't withdraw u n t i l NATO comes i n
because we don't want a vacuum, which I'm sympathetic w i t h . We
said we can't have a pause u n t i l there i s a withdrawal, so we
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LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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o f f e r e d a bombing pause i f they begin withdrawal and then we
would t r y 24 hours f o r a r e s o l u t i o n . We d i d n ' t want the Chinese
and Russians t o have a veto and then get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , which
we could get i n short order. (pf
Now the Serbs are coming back at us; they and the Russians want
to say they need a r e s o l u t i o n before we w i l l deploy and
a u t h o r i t y t o implement these other changes they want. I f there
i s a delay, then the Serbians would stay at the l e v e l s they were
before they invaded. That i s j u s t a way of s t e a l i n g the peace
a f t e r l o s i n g the c o n f l i c t . ^81
As long as we stay together, they w i l l agree today or tomorrow.
They are t r y i n g to give the Russians a veto over everything that
happens a f t e r t h i s i s resolved. I have wanted the Russians t o
be involved, and I'm pleased they are and want t o r e p a i r the
t i e s between NATO and Russia, but not i f i t means he i s going t o
wreck t h i s mission. I f i t were up t o the Russians, they w i l l
screw t h i s r e s o l u t i o n around, watering down what we can do. (pf
The only reason I c a l l e d you i s t h a t I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t a l l o f us s t i c k behind the p o s i t i o n s o f our n e g o t i a t o r s .
We can't l e t the Russians design and d i c t a t e . That's e x a c t l y
what we would be doing i f we said there has t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n . We j u s t can't do t h a t . We would have gone t o a l l
t h i s t r o u b l e f o r nothing and given i t a l l back t o them.
(jgf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: For me, I have no strong view one way
or the other. I t h i n k i t i s over now, and everybody, the
Russians, I t h i n k , and the Serbs want a f i g l e a f . (Pf
The President: I don't mind about a f i g l e a f , but i f i t breaks
down, then, the Kosovars won't come home. (PI
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We have t o make s\.re the Kosovars can
go home s a f e l y and i f there i s no such agreement i t w i l l be very
d i f f i c u l t , because o f the Kosovar freedom f i g h t e r s . (po
The President: Yes, the moderates and the KLA will work with
us, but there will be some risk. The operational integrity in
what we do is very, very important. Thank you for all your
help. I just wanted to say that. (JS)
Prime Minister Chretien: That's a big deal for me. I hope we
stop bombing as soon as possible, but if the bombing takes a few
more days, it is all right with me because it is better to do it
properly. They want a UN resolution first. (JS)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President:
3
As long as we hang on. ( "
P)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
So they want a r e s o l u t i o n f i r s t ?
(#5
The President: Yes, but we can't. That i s f i n e i f we t r y t o
get one but i f we don't get one, we have to go on anyway. We
don't want to give the Russians a veto over the contents o f the
r e s o l u t i o n , because they w i l l be r u t h l e s s and w i l l b a s i c a l l y
undo everything that was done over the l a s t few days. Even
France, who has always been strong on t h i s , has admitted i f we
t r y f o r a day to get a r e s o l u t i o n and can't, we should go i n
under a NATO order. I t h i n k i f everyone stays together on t h i s ,
we should have an agreement w i t h i n the next 4 8 hours. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
Thank you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
OK, no problem.
I w i l l side w i t h you.
(U)
Have you been playing?
(U)
The President: Yes, I played yesterday and may get to play nine
holes today. We are c e l e b r a t i n g my mother-in-law's 80
b i r t h d a y . (U)
th
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I played g o l f yesterday and had my
best game ever. I shot a 79 and had f i v e pars and a b i r d i e on
the back nine. (U)
The President:
Good f o r you.
That i s wonderful.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK, B i l l , we w i l l keep i n touch, and
a l l the other problems are s e t t l e d . I got a l i t t l e b i t o f f l a p
here i n Canada because I was not tough enough on the magazines,
but t h a t i s s e t t l e d . On salmon, we have an agreement f o r 10
years. I t i s always a touchy issue, and your senators and
governors of Washington and Oregon were a l i t t l e much f o r
Canadians, but t h a t i s a l l r i g h t . We put i t i n a d i f f e r e n t
context of conservation more than catching f i s h , and they were a
l i t t l e easier to handle when we talked about conservation.
(jzf
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s important to do, because our b i g
problem i s w i t h the Alaskans. The people i n Washington and
Oregon were closer to Canada. (pf
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Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK. I am happy w i t h t h a t , so I w i l l
see you i n a couple of weeks i n Germany. (U)
The President:
I can't wait.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
-SCCRDT
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4339
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : Sim Smiley
Notetakers: Michael Manning and M i l e s
Murphy
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 6, 1999, 2:15 - 2:36 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello.
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l .
I wanted t o
t a l k t o you a minute about the n e g o t i a t i o n s . fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: And t h a t i s e x a c t l y the same t h i n g I
wanted t o t a l k t o you about. fG}
The President: Yesterday, we had b a s i c a l l y t h r e e p o s i t i o n s .
The Russians wouldn't go t o the UN f o r a r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l there
was a bombing pause. We s a i d we couldn't pause u n t i l t h e r e was
evidence t h a t t h e troops were withdrawing. The Serbs s a i d , and
i t was the o n l y t h i n g t h a t I was sympathetic t o , they d i d n ' t
want t o withdraw and leave a vacuum. They wanted us t o come i n
as they were withdrawing. So we a r r i v e d a t what I thought was a
good s o l u t i o n . We s a i d , okay you s t a r t the w i t h d r a w a l , we w i l l
have a pause and t r y f o r 24 hours t o get a UN R e s o l u t i o n , but i f
we f a i l , we w i l l then go t o NATO and get approval t o go i n . f&)
So I thought we would have an agreement on t h i s b a s i s , b u t today
they came back, t h e Serbs, and s a i d before deployment, before
the mission can be c a r r i e d out, there has t o be a UN R e s o l u t i o n .
The problem w i t h t h a t , o b v i o u s l y , i s they w i l l t r y t o give the
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Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6/7/09
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Russians veto power over the nature and design o f our
deployment, o f t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n , and i f t h a t happens, they
w i l l then t r y t o give back t o the Serbs what they have l o s t i n
the c o n f l i c t . And we w i l l have a s i t u a t i o n where i t would
become unmanageable q u i c k l y , and they w i l l add a l o t o f
requirements t h a t w i l l keep the Kosovars from coming home. I
t h i n k i f we can a l l be f i r m w i t h our p o s i t i o n s we w i l l be f i n e
i n a day o r so, but I wanted t o c a l l t o l e t you know t h a t i s
where I t h i n k t h i n g s are. fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes. I c e r t a i n l y understand we need
guarantees on the composition o f the force and o f the NATO
presence on the f o r c e i t s e l f . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d"
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I n Bosnia, we found
t h a t s o l u t i o n by having them work i n one sector, w i t h the United
States, b u t t h a t wouldn't be acceptable t h i s time because they
blame us f o r the whole t h i n g i n Kosovo. So we have t o f i n d
another s o l u t i o n , but I t h i n k the same basic o u t l i n e w i l l work,
where they work w i t h the l o c a l commander, one f o r c e , b u t not
s t r i c t l y under NATO. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I t h i n k t h a t the most c r u c i a l
p o i n t i n a l l t h i s i s thp t e c h n i c a l - m i l i t a r y ..aareentfiirL. IhaiL
the c r u c i a l p o i n t now.
The President: I am too b u t we cannot give t h e Russians veto
power over the design o f what i s going on. We have t o be
s e n s i t i v e t o them not s e r v i n g under NATO, b u t we cannot l e t them
decide who goes where and i n what numbers, because i f we d i d ,
they would simply i n s t a l l M i l o s e v i c again. That i s what they
would do. We have t o keep working over the next day or so. I
t h i n k we a l l have t o stay together.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Yes. I agree. fS}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I agree. The most important t h i n g i s t o
keep t h e Russians from g e t t i n g a veto. I f we t r y t o get a
R e s o l u t i o n and f a i l , they have t o know we are more than w i l l i n g
to stop the bombing and t h a t we want t h i s t h i n g t o be over.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h you. We s e t c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and
t h a t i s n o t one o f them. We have t o honor t h a t . So i f t h e
agreement i s reached, I w i l l agree w i t h you.
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I t h i n k t h a t when we have peace the
t r u t h w i l l come o u t . Witnesses w i l l come out, the problem w i l l
explode on the p u b l i c scene and t h e p u b l i c w i l l become aware o f
the r e a l M i l o s e v i c , b u t we cannot put i t on the agenda now. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes. I agree w i t h you.
F i r s t things
first,
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There was one l a s t t h i n g I wanted t o
say. We are very close t o agreement on the S i l v i a B a r a l d i n i
case and t h e Ambassador i s aware o f t h i s . Very soon, i n the
next few days, we w i l l be able t o make t h i s announcement, and I
wanted t o thank you very much f o r your help on t h i s matter. f£4
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
4
The President: . Yes. I know how important t h i s was to you. I
asked our people to work hard on i t . I hope i t w i l l be worked
out and that i t w i l l be h e l p f u l to you when i t i s . fe)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes. I think so, and I think i t w i l l
be considered an important signal of the good relations between
the United States and I t a l y . I think that i t w i l l be considered
a sign of goodwill toward I t a l y , and f o r t h i s I thank you. fe)
The President: Thank you. I w i l l be back i n touch i n a few
days. I w i l l see you i n Germany. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema:
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
—
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h NATO Secretary General Solana
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Solana
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The President:
Hello?
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
How are you?
Good morning t o you.
I t r e a l l y i s a good morning.
Secretary General Solana: Good morning, i n a l l the sense of the
phrase. You have done a r e a l l y great job. I t would not have
been done without your leadership. I t succeeded because we
r e a l l y maintained the l i n e t o the l a s t minute. And we were able
to maintain the a l l i e s u n t i l the l a s t minute. I t was f a n t a s t i c .
Thank you very much f o r everything you have done.
The President: We could not have done i t without you. You kept
them a l l together.
Secretary General Solana: When we have forces deployed on the
ground i n the next few days i t w i l l be a memorable p i c t u r e t h a t
w i l l be u n f o r g e t t a b l e . We w i l l see what we have done. We have
established A l l i e d l i n k s of f r i e n d s h i p among ourselves t h a t can
not be broken. We must maintain that forever.
1
The President:
You've got i t .
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
Thanks very much.
Thank you so much.
Have a great day.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO*,
�Secretary General Solana:
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eON P I DENT IAL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : E l i z a b e t a Ullman
N o t e t a k e r s : George C h a s t a i n , M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 10:56 - 10:59 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. I t has been a
g r e a t day f o r a l l o f us. I know what a tremendous burden you
have borne t h r o u g h t h i s whole t h i n g , and I j u s t wanted t o c a l l
and say thank you. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Mr. President, I have gathered around
me all of our military pilots; I have come here to thank them,
and there is also a presence of some Allied officers and an
American general. I will give your regards to everyone here. I
am on one of the most active bases during the conflict. (jtf
The President: I hope you will tell your military people how
grateful I am for their brave and effective performance. I am
very gratified by what they have done. Especially those of you
in Italy, for whom this was a very difficult thing. I am very
grateful. (jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I b e l i e v e t h a t I t a l y has t o g e t
used t o becoming a grown-up c o u n t r y and take up i t s own
CONFI DEN¥-feAL
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D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/11/09
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responsibilities. It was a hard test, but I think we have grown
up a lot. ijt)
The President: Well, you c e r t a i n l y performed i n a magnificent
manner. I cannot wait t o see you i n Cologne. We have a l o t t o
discuss there. (£1
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, we have a meeting there. I t h i n k
i t i s important and u s e f u l t o organize a meeting i n the f a l l . I
t h i n k i t w i l l be an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o come t o I t a l y f o r a
couple of days. (U)
The President: Yes. We are hoping t o work t h a t out.
i t i s important. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
i n Cologne. (U)
The President:
Thank you very much, and I w i l l see you
Thank you very much and goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I think
Arrivederci.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Spanish President Aznar
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Aznar
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Aznar:
The President:
President Aznar:
June 10, 1999, 11:40 - 11:43 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Jose Maria?
How are you?
The President: Fine, thank you. I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you so
much f o r your l o y a l support t o NATO. This i s a good day f o r us.
I j u s t wanted t o say thank you.
President Aznar: I'm very happy that you c a l l e d me. Thank you
so much. I'm very happy w i t h your leadership and the success of
the operation.
The President:
Thank you.
President Aznar: I t h i n k you can also count on Spain continuing
to cooperate i n t h i s new phase. We w i l l cooperate m i l i t a r i l y as
w e l l as p o l i t i c a l l y , of course.
The President: I can't wait.
to do but we can do i t .
There i s s t i l l a l o t of hard work
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Aznar: Well, we've done a very tough job. We have a
tough job ahead, but when a l l of us work together, we achieve
our o b j e c t i v e s .
The President:
And we always w i l l i f we stay together.
President Aznar: Well, you know you can r e l y on me personally
and on Spain. No doubt together we w i l l achieve our goals.
The President:
That's great.
I w i l l see you soon.
Thank you.
President Aznar: L i s t e n , thank you f o r your c a l l and, j u s t one
second, l e t me ask you, how are the cigars doing?
The President: I j u s t smoked the l a s t one yesterday.
Hillary
got mad at me because I stopped chewing them and s t a r t e d smoking
them. They were too good to keep chewing.
President Aznar: I t i s much b e t t e r to smoke them. As I t o l d
you, I am reserving one very special cigar that I ' l l smoke
during H i l l a r y ' s campaign i n New York.
The President:
Thank you.
I ' l l t e l l her t h a t .
President Aznar: I hope to see you soon and thank you f o r the
c a l l . A l l the best.
The President:
Thank you.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 10, 1999, 11:35 - 11:37 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Hello, Jacques?
President Chirac:
you.
The President:
Bill?
You too.
Oh, How are you?
Congratulations t o
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you.
President Chirac: That i s very nice o f you. This i s a r e a l l y
great success, also a great success f o r cooperation between the
United States and France. Also. Not 'only," but 'also."
The President:
Absolutely.
President Chirac: We are very glad, and French p u b l i c opinion
is very s a t i s f i e d .
The President: Now we have t o get the refugees back i n and make
i t work. I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. We can t a l k more i n
Cologne.
President Chirac: Yes, we have, i n a week, a dinner i n a l i t t l e
b i s t r o i n France and we can t a l k a l i t t l e longer, but I t h i n k
everything i s going t o go a l l r i g h t now.
The President:
Well, I can't thank you enough.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Chirac: Oh, we can thank each other.
together and we have been r i g h t .
We have been
The President: Yes, the same as i n Bosnia. Now we have a r e a l
chance f o r Europe t o be put r i g h t and continue t h i s move toward
i n t e g r a t i o n on s e c u r i t y and economic strategy. I t h i n k 20 years
from now t h i s w i l l be looked back on as a great day.
President Chirac: Yes, I think so, too. Public opinion i n
France approved t h i s a l l the time l i k e i n the United States.
The President:
see you.
I can't wait t o see you.
President Chirac:
The President:
H i l l a r y can't wait t o
A l l my love t o H i l l a r y , too. See you soon.
I can't w a i t .
Goodbye.
President Chirac: We w i l l see you i n a French b i s t r o . I can't
wait t o see you. Thank you f o r c a l l i n g . I am moved. Goodbye.
-- End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFI D E I t f j f t L
4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
Notetakers:
George Chastain, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, J i m Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 11:45 - 11:47 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n :
Hello, B i l l ?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Jean, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
good day f o r us. (U)
This i s a
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : Oh, good, I am v e r y happy. I t i s a
g r e a t success you g o t , t h a t we got c o l l e c t i v e l y , t o be able t o
remain t o g e t h e r d u r i n g these d i f f i c u l t t i m e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : We d i d and I t h i n k i t i s a g r e a t t h i n g f o r
Europe t o o . We have t o h e l p them so the m i s s i o n i n Kosovo
doesn't g e t screwed up.
This w i l l g i v e Europe enormous s e l f c o n f i d e n c e because they d i d n ' t w a i t l i k e Bosnia and a l l o w the UN
to u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y r a t i f y the e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . I t h i n k t h i s
w i l l l e a d t o a more u n i f i e d Europe and i s i n the l o n g - t e r m best
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada. Reversing e t h n i c
cleansing i s very important.
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : You can be sure we w i l l do our p a r t .
We haven't decided how many we w i l l send. We know you have
seven t o e i g h t thousand. I a l r e a d y have e i g h t hundred. NATO
wants a thousand more but I don't know i f we can a f f o r d i t . (£1
•CONFI DEtrefrftfc
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/15/09
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The President: Do the best you can. Your guys are so competent
and so good. I know one thing we w i l l have h e l l doing i s t r y i n g
to f i g u r e out how t o prevent the understandable blood l u s t of the
Kosovars from running against the Serbs that want t o stay.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Kosovo? 0^
When do you expect troops t o move i n t o
The President: Tomorrow. I t has t o be tomorrow. We can't wait
long because I am a f r a i d these refugees w i l l pour across the
border l i k e the I s r a e l i t e s out of Egypt. We have t o get the mines
out.
We don't want a bunch of refugees having t h e i r legs blown
o f f t r y i n g t o go home. f^J
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We w i l l be p a r t i c i p a t i n g
Thank you f o r c a l l i n g .
The President:
Okay, I ' l l see you i n Cologne.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Yep. Goodbye.
-- End of Conversation
a l l the way.
(U)
(U)
—
•eONriDENHAfe-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDENTIAL-
4 4 74
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Portuguese Prime M i n i s t e r
Guterres (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Roger
M e r l e t t i and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 1:47 - 1:49 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
b i g day. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
Congratulations, i t i s a
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
Not a t a l l . You have n o t h i n g t o thank
me f o r . We have a l l t o thank you. You d i d t h e r i g h t t h i n g .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t wanted t o say thanks. We had a hard j o b ,
and we have a hard j o b ahead o f us, b u t you were w o n d e r f u l . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
No, I must confess, i n my o p i n i o n a l l
t h i s was p o s s i b l e because o f t h e d e c i s i o n s taken a t t h e
Washington Summit. Your p o s i t i o n was c r i t i c a l .
The o p p o s i t i o n
was a l s o key t o making t h i s happen. I am v e r y happy, b u t now we
have a l o t t o do and many problems t o f a c e . But you can count
on us. We a r e a s m a l l c o u n t r y , b u t our e f f o r t w i l l be
p r o p o r t i o n a l , i f i t i s a t a l l p o s s i b l e . (Pf
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much.
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/16/09
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Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres: I t h i n k i t w i l l be a very hard task
now t o make things move i n Kosovo, but our experience w i t h the
Kosovars i s t h a t they want t o come back. (£7
The President: Yes. We've got t o get them home as q u i c k l y as
possible. I t ' l l be d i f f i c u l t , but i t ' s possible. ( p f
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
The President:
Thanks.
A l l the best.
Goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
—
Fine.
Goodbye.
Thanks.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation --
COIIFI DENT IAL
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�•CONFIDENTIAL
4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Dutch Prime M i n i s t e r Kok (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok
N o t e t a k e r s : George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 2:01 - 2:07 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Wim?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: H e l l o , B i l l .
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
I c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: W e l l , thank you. You d i d i t , t h e
Americans. We gave you a l l t h e support you needed, b u t you d i d
it.
I'm most happy f o r what we r e a l i z e d . (U)
The President: I think it's a great day for Europe. It will be
a great day if we can get most of them to go home now. We'll
have a reverse in the ethnic cleansing in a way that we couldn't
do in Bosnia because it went on so long. [ft]
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: A b s o l u t e l y , i f we can g e t them home b e f o r e
w i n t e r s t a r t s i n November and October o r even September. There
i s a l o t t o be done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k t h e c o n f i d e n c e and t h e p r i d e I sense i n
Europe i s a g r e a t t h i n g . They're so proud. I t a l k e d t o
D'Alema, and i t was v e r y h a r d f o r him, and t h e y a r e so proud,
and now we have t o make t h e peace work. I f we can do t h i s , we
may have stopped a l o t o f t h i s elsewhere. We have been w o r k i n g
q u i e t l y , and h o p e f u l l y can t a l k more l a t e r , b u t we have t r i e d
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/11/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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quietly for four years in Africa to try to prevent another
Rwanda with a rapid reaction force. I think if we can have a
set-up now elsewhere, we can stop this from happening in the
future, it will be a great thing. (j?)
Prime Minister Kok: This will certainly have an effect
elsewhere in Europe. I must tell you, here in the Netherlands
during the last few weeks, there was a growing sentiment that we
needed some kind of pause in the bombing. But I think the way
it was done was the best exercise, facilitating the Chinese to
agree on the UN resolution. (ft)
But I must say, Bill, I was there as you were in the last few
weeks and I am so impressed by what Albania, Macedonia and
others need in terms of logistics support. At the same time, we
have to invest politically and militarily in the future of the
whole region, if not elsewhere. (fS)
With no economic perspective, people tend even more to
nationalistic policies. We are now entering summer but must be
aware of the fact that now is when our responsibility starts.
To rebuild. Reconstruct. (&]
The President: One thing I'd like you to think about. I will
raise all those issues at the G-8 in Cologne next week. I know
the EU already began a partnership relationship with countries
in Southeast Europe, but it seems to me if we could package this
thing structurally the way the Marshall Plan worked, I know it's
an over-used analogy, but if we could say to Macedonia, even to
Montenegro and Albania, but also to Romania and Bulgaria, 'Get
yourselves together as a unit and we will do the following
things that will be very helpful." The United States will help,
but it is important for the EU to take the lead. {{£)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Yes, I have considered t h a t .
c e r t a i n premium on i t now.
There i s a
The President: I t could be a dressed up customs union, I don't
know, whatever we want, but something t o make them say, 'We w i l l
deepen regional i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h Europe based on common
p r i n c i p l e s and, i n r e t u r n f o r t h a t , w i l l depend on the EU f o r
help." The Canadians w i l l p i t c h i n and w e ' l l do our p a r t . (J2f
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: That's a very good idea.
about i t , B i l l . (U)
The President:
Thanks, Wim.
I will
(U)
•CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
think
�GOMFIDENratt.
3
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Goodbye.
The President:
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTS,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDCNTIAL
4 47 4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : G i s e l a Marcuse
Notetakers:
Sean Tarver, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Roger M e r l e t t i , James
Smith and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
June 10, 1999, 4:00 - 4:04 p.m. EDT
Residence
Gerhard, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I have t o thank you. Without America, i t
would have been i m p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r v e n e i n Kosovo. (U)
The
President:
But we d i d a good t h i n g t o g e t h e r .
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder:
(U)
I t h i n k so. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, me t o o . And I t h i n k now we j u s t have t o
keep w o r k i n g , we have t o make i t work. We have t o w i n t h e
peace, now t h a t we've won t h e c o n f l i c t . (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I t h i n k t h e most i m p o r t a n t j o b f o r us i s
t o make sure t h e c o u n t r y gets back on i t s f e e t e c o n o m i c a l l y and
politically.
They have t o i n Macedonia and A l b a n i a and
e s p e c i a l l y i n Montenegro. (pT
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, I agree. I s t r o n g l y support i t and w i l l
h e l p as much as I can. I t h i n k t h e f i r s t t h i n g i s t o make sure
landmines a r e o u t o f t h e way, and g e t t h e refugees o u t o f
Macedonia as soon as we can, then we have t o go t o work on t h e
economy. I t ' s a d e c i s i o n f o r Europe, b u t I would l i k e t o see
some e f f o r t s made i n t h e whole e a s t e r n European r e g i o n f o r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t t h a t w i l l i n v o l v e everyone, p u l l them
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�closer together and closer to Europe. I think there is a model
there in the Marshall Plan, not so much in the money, but in the
way it was done,
($>?)
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree. We can t a l k about the
d e t a i l s , but i t ' s important t o develop the region economically
and t o give i t some prospect of becoming part of Europe. This
whole t h i n g should be done i n step. There are many economic
d i f f e r e n c e s , but i t ' s important they have the prospect
eventually of j o i n i n g . Germany was i n support of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland j o i n i n g the EU. We are also i n
favor o f eastern countries being given the prospect o f
eventually j o i n i n g . That i s something we have t o continue t o
support, t h i s i s not a s h o r t - l i v e d t h i n g . We intend t o work on
it.
(pO
The President: Well, I think we will have a chance to talk more
at the EU, but I think you're going to have a good summit at
Cologne, now. It'll be much happier than it might have been.
We'll have to work on it together. It was nice to hear your
voice. I just wanted to thank you today. \g]
Chancellor Schroeder: I also thank you very much f o r your good
cooperation and I look forward t o seeing you again. (U)
The President:
Okay.
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
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�4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B e l g i a n Prime M i n i s t e r
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene
Dehaene
Notetakers:
George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Jim Smith, Lawrence B u t l e r and Sam Moyn
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 4:10 - 4:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello,
Jean-Luc.
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene:
Hello,
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
job.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Bill.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
Dehaene:
I t h i n k t h a t t o g e t h e r we d i d a good
Yes, I t h i n k we d i d a good t h i n g f o r t h e w o r l d .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i t i s a good agreement, b u t
now i t w i l l be a q u e s t i o n o f p u t t i n g t h e necessary means i n and
h e l p i n g t h e whole area s t a b i l i z e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
The P r e s i d e n t :
We can do t h a t .
Dehaene:
I t h i n k so.
We have t o work on i t .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i f we can work t h e same
way, between you and the EU, we can r e a l i z e i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President: Yes, I am o p t i m i s t i c , but there are a l o t of
operational problems, but I t h i n k we can do i t .
I am looking
forward t o i t and j u s t wanted t o c a l l and say thank you very
much.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I appreciate i t .
NATO and the EU i t was a very good t h i n g .
The President:
Me too.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene:
The President:
I t h i n k t h a t between
Okay, goodbye.
Goodbye.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
B i l a t e r a l Meeting Between the President and
German Chancellor Schroeder (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
John Kornblum, Ambassador t o Germany
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , (notetaker)
Germany
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
Hans Blomeyer, A s s i s t a n t t o the Chancellor
f o r North America
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 2:55 - 3:30 p.m.
Gurzenich, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Well, f i r s t l e t me extend t o you our
warmest welcome. I hope you w i l l get a chance t o enjoy t h e
c i t y . (U)
The President: We went out f o r a wonderful meal l a s t n i g h t —
we had a great time and I c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e l o c a l economy. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Kosovo. (U)
Perhaps we could s t a r t by t a l k i n g about
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
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The President:
we are. (U)
Why don't I l e t Sandy give us a r e p o r t on where
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
I t ' s been an intense two
days. The Russians have kept i n s i s t i n g on t h e i r own s e c t o r .
But now we have j u s t heard t h a t they have f a l l e n o f f t h a t .
Where we are now, i s t h a t they would have two b a t t a l i o n s i n our
s e c t o r , one i n the French sector and one i n yours. The l a s t two
would be contiguous areas, k i n d of l i k e a f i g u r e e i g h t . But the
c o n t i g u i t y would be very small. The remaining issues seemed t o
be f i g u r i n g o u t the a i r p o r t l o g i s t i c s . The Russians want 1500.
The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t i s very excessive. The Russians may
also want a 5 b a t t a l i o n . Secretary Cohen i s going t o say t o
them *you have u n t i l 4:30 t o make a deal."
fe)
th
The President: I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work o u t . I t ' s r e a l l y more
about what i s going on i n s i d e o f Russia. What i s d i s t u r b i n g i s
the b e l i e f even among the Y e l t s i n group t h a t we went t o war i n
Kosovo t o extend our i n f l u e n c e from the Caucasus t o the Caspian.
That we want t o push back the Russians. Of course, t h i s i s n o t
t r u e , b u t we have t o convince them o f t h a t . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: I agree. And t h a t ' s why we have t o be a l i t t l e
b i t f l e x i b l e . But t h e r e d l i n e s are very c l e a r and must not
change. F i r s t , they cannot have t h e i r own s e c t o r . The Kosovar
Albanians would n o t go home. I t would be a r e c i p e f o r carnage.
Second, t h e r e can be no defacto p a r t i t i o n . That would be
tantamount t o l o s i n g t h e peace. But w i t h i n those r e d l i n e s I
t h i n k we can be f l e x i b l e w i t h o u t embarrassing the Russians. I n
a l a r g e r sense, we need them t o understand t h a t t h i s i s not
about t e r r i t o r y , or wealth but t o reverse e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g .
This i s n o t 19th century great power p o l i t i c s . Now given the
unique German r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, I t h i n k you have a
unique a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e them and help t o see what our goals
r e a l l y are. My time i s running out, and so i s Y e l t s i n ' s . I
have done my best t o support them. Now, I j u s t spoke t o B l a i r .
He agrees t h a t we should t a l k about t h i s t o n i g h t . One t h i n g we
discussed was t o t r y and b r i n g more p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s t o Russia
and v i c e versa. What we need t o do i s t o move the center o f
Russian p o l i t i c s . fG)
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Chancellor Schroeder: You know we j u s t had t h i s EU Summit. We
adopted a j o i n t statement and an approach t o Russia. I t goes
beyond government-to-government a f f a i r s . I t i n c l u d e s economic
p o l i t i c a l and youth c o n t a c t s . A more i n t e g r a l approach as you
were saying — t h a t ' s the only way t o reassure t h e i r f e a r s .
They are the younger generation o f Russian p o l i t i c i a n s and
i r o n i c a l l y they have not had the i n t e r n a t i o n a l exposure t h a t the
o l d e r ones have had. We need t o make sure t h a t we work w i t h the
up and coming people as w e l l . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : Can we t a l k about Kosovo? Let's assume the
Russian piece works o u t . Then we've got a huge r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
j o b . We want t o do our p a r t . S e t t i n g aside the q u e s t i o n o f
a s s i s t a n c e , i t seems t o me there are two issues.
First,
r e b u i l d i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y i n Kosovo. Second, the b u i l d i n g o f the
Balkans as a whole w i t h the EU S t a b i l i t y Pact I n i t i a t i v e .
Now,
i t i s v i t a l t h a t we get the r i g h t person t o handle r e b u i l d i n g i n
Kosovo. I don't care about n a t i o n a l i t y . I am w o r r i e d t h a t the
d e c i s i o n w i l l be p o l i t i c a l . Not based on competence and energy.
We need t o approach t h i s as i f we were h i r i n g someone t o do a
job f o r a m i l l i o n Deutch Marks. What would we look f o r ?
Someone w i t h p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , since the people hate each o t h e r .
Someone w i t h human f e e l i n g , we w i l l l i t e r a l l y need t o b r i n g an
army o f p s y c h i a t r i s t s and r e l i g i o u s leaders. Someone who can
handle t h e machinery o f r e b u i l d i n g houses and roads. Someone
w i t h tremendous energy, w i t h r e a l management a b i l i t y , w i t h
i m a g i n a t i o n . Maybe someone who ran a b i g German company. That
would be b e t t e r than a former cabinet m i n i s t e r . We cannot a l l o w
p o l i t i c s t o obscure the need t o do i t r i g h t . Just l i k e our
d e c i s i o n t h a t we could not lose the war i n Kosovo, i t i s a
c r i t i c a l decision.
I f we g e t t h e wrong p e r s o n , i t w i l l be a
d i s a s t e r . We need t o work w i t h K o f i on t h i s .
i s f i n d i n g t h e r i g h t person. fG4
My o n l y i n t e r e s t
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree w i t h t h a t . But I wonder
i f we found a c l a s s i c a l manager, would he or she would have the
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s and f e e l i n g necessary f o r the j o b . My
experience i s t h a t good managers have o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s k i l l s b u t
t h i s i s a h i g h l y complex p o l i t i c a l environment as w e l l . We have
a German expression which i s t h a t we need a e i g h t - l e g g e d warm
m i l k p i g . Obviously t h i s doesn't t r a n s l a t e but I t h i n k you get
the p o i n t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . We need someone w i t h s t r o n g
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , w i t h s t r o n g communications s k i l l s , and, o f
course, w i t h a s t a f f t h a t can do the day-to-day. But again,
t h a t person also needs a s t r o n g w i l l , energy, tremendous
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organizational skills and also the approach to go there and stay
there and let the world media come to him. He has to roll his
sleeves up. To bring people together, to be deeply committed —
I'd love to do this job. It's incredibly challenging and we
just have to find the right person. I understand the Europeans
don't want an American. I don't care about the nationality, I
don't care where he is from. If all of us could say to Kofi —
this is what we want: a strong person, real organizational
skills, don't make a political decision — that would be very
helpful.
m
Chancellor Schroeder: We have also got t o move forward on the
S t a b i l i t y Pact f o r t h e r e g i o n .
The President:
There i s a Donor's Conference next month, r i g h t ?
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, we have t o do t h i s s p e e d i l y ,
p o s s i b l y as e a r l y as next month. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t o t h i n k about something. F i r s t ,
I recognize t h i s i s r e a l l y about what t h e EU wishes t o do. But
there are two t h i n g s I t h i n k i t would be good t o t h i n k about.
F i r s t , we need t o get t h e Balkans more i n t e g r a t e d among
themselves. Then, we need t o push i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o Europe over
time, i n c l u d i n g i n t o our s e c u r i t y system. I went back and
s t u d i e d what we d i d w i t h Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
a f t e r the B e r l i n Wall f e l l . And I also looked back a t the
M a r s h a l l Plan. So l e t me suggest a couple o f ideas — and l e t
me a l s o make c l e a r t h a t w h i l e I t h i n k the lead has t o be w i t h
the EU and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s on the
f i n a n c i a l side we w i l l do our share. fG}
I n the M a r s h a l l Plan, one o f the smartest t h i n g s they d i d was t o
say t h a t the major c o n d i t i o n f o r g e t t i n g money beyond democracy
i s t h a t r e c i p i e n t s have t o get together and d e f i n e t h e i r needs
as a group. They need t o come together t o d e f i n e t h e i r f u t u r e .
So i n a d d i t i o n t o the Donors' Conference, i t s seems t o me t h a t
g e t t i n g t h e leaders o f the Balkans together w i t h us soon, i n the
r e g i o n , and t o say t o them you need t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
t e l l us how you want t o a l l o c a t e funds, and what your p r i o r i t i e s
are — t h i s would be an important t h i n g t o do and r e a l i n c e n t i v e
t o get them t o work more c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r . fG}
Second, we need t o examine whether t h e r e are other t h i n g s we can
put on t h e t a b l e i n terms o f i n t e g r a t i o n . Should we move up
NATO enlargement and EU enlargement? I f n o t , EU enlargement
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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r i g h t away, maybe a customs union. We need t o c r e a t e an
environment i n which t h e people o f the r e g i o n look forward t o
the f u t u r e and create i n c e n t i v e s t o get them moving forward.
Anyway, i f you t h i n k i t i s a good idea, maybe we can t r y and
move forward w i t h a meeting of leaders i n the r e g i o n sometime
d u r i n g t h e next 30-60 days. I ' l l d e f e r t o you, b u t t h i n k about
t h i s , we j u s t cannot a f f o r d t o lose the peace. fe}
Chancellor Schroeder: I very much agree e s p e c i a l l y about
g e t t i n g leaflers. „tO-a£.thex-in_th.e^-r££[i.Q.n-. I t h i n k t h i s i s a ve»rv
good idea.
Now about b r i n g i n g c o u n t r i e s i n t o the EU. I have t o t e l l you
t h e r e i s such a backlog t h a t i t w i l l be hard t o add them t o the
list.
But ideas l i k e a customs union o r a s s o c i a t i o n agreements
are important and we should pursue them. (€}
The President: One t h i n g t o t h i n k about i s t h a t doing i t as a
group, n o t j u s t i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s , can get these c o u n t r i e s t o
work t o g e t h e r , even though, o f course, there are dramatic
d i f f e r e n c e s among them. I t would create a group psychology. We
need t o s e t up a system i n which c o u n t r i e s are rewarded f o r
working t o g e t h e r t o t e l l them w e ' l l work w i t h you i f you work
w i t h each o t h e r . f€}
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, I t h i n k t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g idea
and we should t a l k some more about i t . But f o r now I am a f r a i d
we w i l l have t o end t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o r else t h e two o f us w i l l
be accused o f keeping everyone else w a i t i n g t o s t a r t t h e Summit,
fe}
End o f Conversation
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4760
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Former German C h a n c e l l o r Helmut
Kohl (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl
I n t e r p r e t e r : B i r g i t t a Richman
N o t e t a k e r s : Jenny McGee, George C h a s t a i n ,
Robert Ford, J o e l E h r e n d r e i c h and Roger
Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 2 1 , 1999, 7:30 - 7:34 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H i , Helmut.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say h e l l o .
(U)
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl: W e l l , B i l l , thank you v e r y much. I
hope you're d o i n g w e l l , and please a l s o say h e l l o t o your w i f e .
I hope you had a good t i m e i n Germany. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I had a w o n d e r f u l t i m e . I am so r e l i e v e d we
worked t h r o u g h o u r problems w i t h Y e l t s i n .
He seemed i n a good
frame o f mind. (^f
Former C h a n c e l l o r K o h l : I a l s o had t h a t i m p r e s s i o n . I t a l k e d
t o him and t o l d him over and over t h a t he had t o t o e t h e l i n e
now. You know, B i l l , you have t o d i s c u s s as much as p o s s i b l e
w i t h him. E v e r y t h i n g you can n a i l down now you have s e t t l e d .
You don't know how t h i n g s a r e going t o work o u t w i t h h i s
successor. ( p f
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I t o l d him y e s t e r d a y we have t o f i n i s h
t h i s n u c l e a r work, because he can't a f f o r d t o l e t h i s successor
throw i t a l l away.
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
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Former Chancellor Kohl: Very good. If you think I can do
something from here, let me know, because everything you can do
now is work well done. ytf
The President:
Yes, I understand.
Former Chancellor Kohl:
(U)
Are you going d i r e c t l y home?
(U)
The President: No, I'm on the way t o Slovenia, then Macedonia,
and then I'm going home. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl: That is very good. Say some good
things to the two in Slovenia and Macedonia; they need
encouragement. And I think especially in Slovenia, things are
going to develop well. y£)
The President: I think so, too. (J?)
Former Chancellor Kohl: B i l l , I am going t o get i n touch w i t h
you i n two weeks or so i n Washington. (U)
The President: Oh, that's great. I would love t o hear from
you. I look forward t o hearing from you then, Helmut. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl:
The President:
Thank you very much, and goodbye.
Thank you, Helmut.
—
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
(U)
—
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5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
United States-European Summit — R e s t r i c t e d
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s
European Union
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Jacques Santer, President o f t h e European
Commission
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , European Commissioner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 9:45 - 10:30 a.m.
P a l a i s Schaumberg,
Bonn, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Welcome, Mr. President. I am very
pleased t o see you i n t h i s s p e c i a l place where Adenauer r u l e d
t h i s country. I was happy t o be able t o show you h i s personal
office.
I must say i t i s much a i r i e r and l i g h t e r than the
o f f i c e t h a t I work i n r i g h t now. As you know, we've spent the
l a s t few days d i s c u s s i n g problems between Europe and t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s . I t h i n k we've covered l o t s o f ground. Today, I thought
t h e r e were some p o i n t s t h a t we could discuss f o r f u r t h e r
c o o r d i n a t i o n . Maybe we can s t a r t w i t h the question o f how
Europe and t h e United States should deal w i t h the problem o f
Kosovo. We've o b v i o u s l y seen some very important progress; the
H e l s i n k i Agreement, which continued the G-8 success, and
progress i n d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e UCK. These are important
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Reason:
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D e c l a s s i f y on: 07/29/2009
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achievements. Now, we need t o j o i n t l y address t h e problem o f
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t j u s t f o r Kosovo but f o r a l l o f t h e Balkans,
as the S t a b i l i t y Pact e s t a b l i s h e s . fe)
As t o t h e Leaders' Conference t h a t you have proposed, we a l l
agree on the need t o move forward. I would propose as an
a p p r o p r i a t e venue, Sarajevo, and t h a t we move q u i c k l y as e a r l y
as J u l y . We have t o t h i n k about the contexts depending on who
hosts t h e Conference. I f t h e EU does i t , then the i n v i t a t i o n s
must be extended by the Finns who w i l l assume the Presidency.
I f we p u t i t under a G-8 umbrella, then we can extend t h e
i n v i t a t i o n s . fG-)
S e c u r i t y Advisor Michael S t e i n e r : A h t i s a a r i could issue the
i n v i t a t i o n s . Maybe we can ask him. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, we should. I t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r t o
do t h i s i n J u l y given a l l the f a s t moving events. I t h i n k the
message should be: we're there f o r them b u t also t h a t they need
to work t o g e t h e r and t h e sooner they do so, the b e t t e r . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder: We need t o t a l k t o A h t i s a a r i and organize
t h i s w i t h t h e Finns. fe}
President Santer: With the EU, we are p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n program f o r Kosovo. We are s e t t i n g up an agency
to handle t h i s . We're also p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f
Macedonia and A l b a n i a . I t i s important t o i n v o l v e t h e whole
r e g i o n . A l b a n i a has a longer way t o go because o f the problem
of i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g . But we are working on t h i s — although
we must be c l e a r i t i s n o t f o r tomorrow.
fG-)
The Agency t h a t we are c r e a t i n g would take t h e l e a d f o r Kosovo
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o c o o r d i n a t e humanitarian assistance and
p h y s i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n programs. I t h i n k i t would be good t o
l o c a t e i t i n t h e r e g i o n , i f p o s s i b l e i n P r i s t i n a because the
refugees are coming back and we need t o have t h e presence o f
t h i s agency on t h e ground. I hope t h e Commission w i l l g i v e us a
green l i g h t soon t o e s t a b l i s h the agency. Meanwhile, we are
sending i n 20 c i v i l servants t o a c t as l i a i s o n s . We have t r i e d
to l e a r n from the lessons o f Bosnia. We need t o move s w i f t l y ,
to s i m p l i f y the f i n a n c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s . This agency i s t h e
answer. We w i l l also take a lead i n o r g a n i z i n g the process o f
the Donors' Conferences. (G}
Chancellor Schroeder: There i s one question t o r a i s e again t h a t
we have a l r e a d y discussed and t h a t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
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the European Union and Turkey.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : The f a c t t h a t you made t h i s i n i t i a t i v e i s very
i m p o r t a n t and I s t r o n g l y support i t .
I've always b e l i e v e d t h a t
i f Turkey b e l i e v e d i t had r e a l i s t i c prospects f o r e n t e r i n g the
EU, t h i s would create c r i t i c a l leverage t o help r e s o l v e human
r i g h t problems and i t s d i f f e r e n c e w i t h Greece. So what you've
done i s very h e l p f u l . f€-)
I n t h e end, I t h i n k
we need t o p u t a l l o f t h i s i n t o a l a r g e r c o n t e x t ; t h e Aegean,
human r i g h t s , Cyprus, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Europe. (G)
--
President Santer:
For us, t h i s i s important also because o f the
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Cyprus. I t would be d i f f i c u l t t o have a
d i v i d e d i s l a n d i n the EU. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . I f we can make progress on
Cyprus, I b e l i e v e t h e Greeks would remove t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o
Turkey i n the EU. This week, there was a good s i g n w i t h Turkey
d e c i d i n g t o take the m i l i t a r y judges o f f o f t h e s p e c i a l c o u r t
panels. f&)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: There i s also i n the wider
environment, i n the European Parliament, a vast m a j o r i t y f o r
having t h e human r i g h t s l i n e , e s p e c i a l l y the Scandinavians, b u t
also now I t a l y .
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d
There i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n
p e r c e p t i o n between the United States and Europe r e g a r d i n g the
f i n a l sentence and the death p e n a l t y . fe-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer
I n the end, we need a comprehensive deal t h a t
i n v o l v e s Cyprus, the Aegean, human r i g h t s , the Turks i n Europe.
We need t o work very c l o s e l y w i t h them. We have an i m p o r t a n t
m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Turks so we can p l a y an important
role.
But a t t h e same time, we have c o n s t r a i n t s because o f t h a t
r e l a t i o n s h i p . But together, we might have enough leverage t o
move t h i n g s forward. Now i s a good time because o f Kosovo. As
a r e s u l t , Greece and Turkey are working t o g e t h e r . But the t r i a l
complicates m a t t e r s . We need a sustained e f f o r t . I t ' s crazy t o
have t h i s c o n f l i c t over Cyprus. f&)
Michael S t e i n e r : I l i k e your idea o f a comprehensive approach
and t h e U n i t e d States and Europe working t o g e t h e r . The time
might be r i g h t i n September. I t would a l l o w us t o take a step
forward a t t h e next EU Summit. fG}
The President: I am prepared over the next 18 months t o spend a
l o t o f time on t h i s . And, o f course, I have appointed a number
of s p e c i a l envoys. But I t h i n k n e i t h e r o f us has enough
leverage t o do i t alone. We need t o do i t t o g e t h e r . The bottom
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l i n e i s that I do not believe the Cyprus stalemate i s worth the
cost that i t imposes on either side. fe)
National Security Advisor Berger: I f I can add one thing and
with a l l respect, I have watched the EU f o r six years on Turkey.
Nothing has happened. Now the change i n German views i s a very
important development. But the Greeks are blocking things. I f
Turkey r e a l l y does embrace human r i g h t s requirements, can i t
t r u l y be put i n the queue for the EU, or w i l l i t always be i n
back of the line? f&)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4cl
President Santer:
I t i s important for us to deal w i t h Cyprus on a
poTTtical l e v e l . We w i l l be f i n i s h i n g a Progress report i n
September.
Foreign Minister Fischer: The S t a b i l i t y Pact can help. The
Greeks and Turks realize that thev are neighbors i n a region and
thev have common interests.
Secretary Albright: Of course, Turkey will also be the Chairman
in office of the OSCE. m
Sir Leon B r i t t a n :
i n the queue.
R e a l i s t i c a l l y , we can give them a real place
The President:
Anyway, I think we need to work t h i s i n the f a l l ,
p u t t i n g a l l the cards on the table. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : There are also the confidence-building
measures that Solana i s working on.
The President:
When i s Solana taking his new post?
Security Advisor Michael Steiner:
This f a l l .
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The President:
General.
fG}
Well, we need t o move on a new NATO Secretary
Let me j u s t ask two other t h i n g s about Kosovo. F i r s t , as I have
s a i d t o t h e Chancellor already, i t i s v i t a l l y important t h a t we
p i c k o r t h a t t h e UN p i c k the r i g h t person f o r c i v i l
implementation.
I r a i s e d t h i s w i t h Chirac and w i t h Jospin.
Jospin i s proposing Kouschner. I don't know i f he i s good, but
he sounds l i k e he might be the r i g h t s o r t o f person.
We need
someone w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u r e , who can speak w e l l , b u t most
of a l l who can get t h i n g s done. There must be German business
person.
This should not be a handout f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. We
a l l need t o work K o f i on t h i s . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: The second t h i n g on the agenda i s who i s
the r i g h t person t o be the European Union c o o r d i n a t o r f o r the
S t a b i l i t y Pact? I t h i n k whoever i t i s needs the same q u a l i t i e s
t h a t you described. fG}
The President: Yes, I see we need two d i f f e r e n t people -- one
f o r Kosovo, t h e other f o r the S t a b i l i t y Pact. What i s t h e
t i m e t a b l e ? fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: The United Nations has the
lead on Kosovo, i n p i c k i n g what w i l l amount t o a procounsel who
w i l l be charged w i t h overseeing r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e
economic, p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y and refugee r e t u r n issues. fG}
Michael S t e i n e r : And t h e other i s the S t a b i l i t y Pact, which the
EU w i l l c o n t r o l . fe}
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
Who do you have i n mind?
(U)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Let me add a l s o , t h a t we need someone
f o r Bosnia t o replace Westendorf. We need t o make a l l o f these
d e c i s i o n s q u i c k l y . E s p e c i a l l y w i t h the UCK t r y i n g t o f i l l the
vacuum i n Kosovo. I hope we can s i g n t h e S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Sarajevo a t t h e heads-of-state l e v e l . But before then, we need
t o f i n d t h e r i g h t people o f h i g h q u a l i t y w i t h quick d e c i s i o n s .
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
So what i s your t h i n k i n g ?
Chancellor Schroeder:
at t h e moment. fG}
(U)
We don't r e a l l y have concrete
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Secretary A l b r i g h t : Can I make a p i t c h f o r A h t i s a a r i f o r t h e
S t a b i l i t y Pact. He leaves o f f i c e as President i n January o r
February.
He w i l l be heading the EU. He knows the problems
w e l l because he has been i n Bosnia. I t h i n k he would be very
s t r o n g , b u t I know t h a t Joschka doesn't t h i n k t h i s i s a good
idea.
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: My only concern i s t h a t the f i r s t s i x
months are key and i t would be good t o have the permanent person
i n place r i g h t away. f€-)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : What i f we got someone t o work w i t h him
d u r i n g t h i s time? (U)
Michael S t e i n e r :
anyway. fe)
H e ' l l be deeply i n v o l v e d i n the EU Presidency
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Whoever i t i s must l i v e i n Kosovo.
Or a t l e a s t i n Sarajevo. f G)
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
him. fG}
He i s such an asset, we r e a l l y need t o use
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer:
another name. f G)
I f you don't l i k e B i l d t , we w i l l need
The P r e s i d e n t : My o n l y problem w i t h him i s t h a t he was gone t o o
much i n Bosnia. f G)
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
He had very good d e p u t i e s .
f€J
The P r e s i d e n t :
Michael, do you t h i n k we need B i l d t ?
Michael S t e i n e r : Let's w a i t f o r a week on t h i s .
ourselves a week t o make these d e c i s i o n s . fG-)
fe)
Let's g i v e
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me j u s t emphasize t h i s i s n o t a p u b l i c i t y
job, i t ' s a working j o b , i n place. The media w i l l come t o
whoever t h i s person i s . With the S t a b i l i t y Pact, i t ' s ok t o
have a h i g h . p r o f i l e person and he o r she could work o u t s i d e t h e
area. fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: One o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y i s
Paddy Ashdown, He's very t a l e n t e d . But I recognize i t would be
hard t o have B r i t s i n two j o b s . fe)
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Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think our time has run out on the
r e s t r i c t e d session and I am determined to keep you on schedule.
Why don't we move into the other room to meet with our
ministers.
— End of Conversation
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5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
U.S.-European Union Summit —
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Secretary A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Charlene Barshefsky, Ambassador, United
States Trade Representative
Ambassador John Kornblum, Ambassador t o
Germany
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Ambassador
to the European Union
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economics
David Aaron, Under Secretary o f Commerce
S t u a r t E i z e n s t a t , Under Secretary o f State
Lael Brainard, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President f o r Economics
Antony J. Blinken, Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
Europe, NSC
Lawrence B u t l e r , D i r e c t o r o f European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (notetaker)
Plenary
Germany
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Werner Mueller, Economics M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , Chancellery D i p l o m a t i c
Advisor
Klaus Grestchmann, Chancellery Head f o r
Economics
Uwe-Karsten Heye, Chancellery Spokesperson
Franz K u d l i c h , European Council S e c r e t a r i a t
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. .Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: J u l y 29, 2009
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President Jacques Santer, European
Commission
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , Vice President
Hans-Friedrich Beseler, D i r e c t o r General
Hugo Paemen, Washington EC Delegation head
Ivan Rogers, Head of S i r Leon B r i t t a n ' s
Office
C h r i s t i n e Roger, Counselor t o the President
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 10:40 - 11:10 a.m.
K a b i n e t t s a a l , Schaumburg Palace, Bonn,
Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Let's get s t a r t e d . I would l i k e t o
i n v i t e our m i n i s t e r s t o r e p o r t on t h e i r meeting. (U)
Charlene Barshefsky:
F i r s t , I would l i k e t o say what a pleasure
i t has been working w i t h S i r Leon B r i t t a n .
I have great
personal a f f e c t i o n f o r S i r Leon. (U)
We met over the past hour t o review the progress towards
implementation o f the T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p . We
welcomed the i n i t i a t i v e t o launch a p i l o t p r o j e c t on
b i o t e c h n o l o g y and noted progress on the s e r v i c e s framework
agreement. There we agreed t h a t we should i n c l u d e engineering
and insurance. We spent time t a l k i n g about c o o r d i n a t i n g on
r e g u l a t o r y cooperation and the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f c r e a t i n g a
s c i e n t i f i c panel, i n c l u d i n g consumer NGOs, t o deal w i t h food
s a f e t y issues. fG}
We a l s o discussed the importance o f science f o r the r e g u l a t o r y
process. WTO r u l e s a l l o w f o r p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures when the
science i s u n c e r t a i n , b u t we cannot apply p r e c a u t i o n i n every
i n s t a n c e . f€}
Regarding t h e upcoming S e a t t l e WTO m i n i s t e r i a l , we agreed t o
s t r i v e f o r a three-year round, and make progress on l a b o r and
environmental aspects o f t r a d e . Other c e n t r a l areas w i l l be
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and government
procurement, e l e c t r o n i c commerce, and a c c e l e r a t e d t a r i f f
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . f&)
We noted t h e importance o f i n v o l v i n g the f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s
(Kosovo) i n t h e WTO. We are already p r o v i d i n g t e c h n i c a l
assistance t o A l b a n i a and C r o a t i a i n t h e i r b i d t o j o i n ; should
extend t o Macedonia. fe)
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M i n i s t e r M u e l l e r : Thank you, Charlene and the American
d e l e g a t i o n f o r your e f f o r t s today. Regarding food s a f e t y , i t i s
hard t o separate the s c i e n t i f i c aspects from consumer f e a r s i n
the debate.
Though we s t r i v e f o r transparency, we must expect
to get u n s c i e n t i f i c questions from consumers. I b e l i e v e t h i s
w i l l enable a l l sides t o f i n d agreement.
We do agree l a r g e l y on the goals f o r t h e WTO round, where a
p r i o r i t y i s g r e a t e r transparency. The NGO community w i l l take
i n t o account i n c r e a s i n g l y the o v e r a l l aims o f the trade round.
m
S i r Leon B r i t t a n :
( o f f e r s personal remarks about h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Charlene Barshefsky and o t h e r U.S. o f f i c i a l s )
I t h i n k t h a t the tone on both sides shows understanding on our
mutual t r a d e problems. I t i s a good s i g n t h a t we are reducing
megaphone diplomacy.
(U)
On beef hormones, t h e s o l u t i o n i s on market-opening, n o t marketc l o s i n g measures. Americans should n o t be deprived o f European
commodities.
(U)
The T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p has helped i n t h i s
regard, f o s t e r i n g cooperation t o k i c k - s t a r t the S e a t t l e
m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s . We have a more comprehensive view than you
on the new round. We need t o have more on t h e agenda o r we w i l l
not get t h e developing n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d p o s i t i v e l y . We should
t r y t o g e t an agreement on investment, a v o i d i n g the mistakes o f
the M u l t i l a t e r a l Agreement on Investment (MAI); i n s t e a d we
should seek a more modest agreement on the r u l e s o f c o m p e t i t i o n
— t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important f o r d e a l i n g w i t h Japan. fe}
| I propose
t h a t we make i n f o r m a l c a l l s among the key c o u n t r i e s t o f i n d an
acceptable candidate. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you.
you have undertaken on food
i n t e n s i t y of p u b l i c f e e l i n g
long-term negative impact.
I appreciate the c o n s t r u c t i v e work
issues. The combination o f
and u n c e r t a i n t y has p o t e n t i a l f o r a
fe}
I would l i k e t o echo Charlene's words on S i r Leon. He has been
a worthy adversary.
I w i l l miss harassing him over bananas! (U)
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Chancel lor Schroeder! You still have President Chirac to argue
with.
te)
The President:
(laughs)
Chancellor Schroeder: I would l i k e t o review the proposals on
the t a b l e now, the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n and the D e c l a r a t i o n on
Ukraine.
Regarding Ukraine, we adopt i t w i t h a cautious
f o r m u l a t i o n . We asked f o r t h a t change because o f our p a r l i a m e n t
(Bundestag).
I t u r n t o S i r Leon f o r comments on t h e E a r l y
Warning D e c l a r a t i o n . fG}
S i r Leon B r i t t a n : The E a r l y Warning paper i s an important step
forward. With proper a t t e n t i o n t o e a r l y warning, we can n i p
problems i n the bud. For our p a r t , r e g a r d i n g h u s h k i t s , i f we
had known, we could have defused the issue e a r l i e r . On your
side, r e g a r d i n g ( i n d u s t r i a l ) f a s t e n e r s and the 211 A p p r o p r i a t i o n
b i l l could have been d e a l t w i t h . But, e a r l y warning cannot
solve the problem, but i t can increase the chances o f success.
We are n o t c r e a t i n g a new s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h i s . We w i l l employ
i t a t a l l l e v e l s . We p l a n t o p u t i n t o every piece o f Commission
l e g i s l a t i o n a requirement t o study impact on EU t r a d i n g
p a r t n e r s . R e c i p r o c a l l y , we need t o be aware o f t h i n g s i n
Congress. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : The Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n sets out a v i s i o n f o r
our p a r t n e r s h i p i n t o the 2 1 Century. I t i s not h o r t a t o r y , but
makes a c o n s t r u c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o our r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Separately, may I o f f e r our welcome f o r J a v i e r Solana's
appointment as your High Representative f o r Foreign and S e c u r i t y
Policy? (U)
s t
On e a r l y warning, t h i s i s an important i n i t i a t i v e t o help us
r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s more q u i c k l y . I t i s forward l o o k i n g .
(U)
Ukraine,
E0 13526 1.4d
i s important t o
a l l o f us. They have t o deal w i t h an u n i t e d Europe and
increasing democratization.
] I t i s high on our l i s t o f c o u n t r i e s where we want t o
push democracy. f€-)
The Senior Level Group r e p o r t summarizes, c o r r e c t l y , the
p r i o r i t i e s f o r the coming s i x months. I t i s a t r i b u t e t o Stu
E i z e n s t a t , who i s moving t o Treasury a t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
President. This i s one t h i n g I cannot f o r g i v e t h e President
f o r . (U)
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Under Secretary E i z e n s t a t :
I want t o pay t r i b u t e t o President
Santer.
He has been a t r u e champion o f the t r a n s a t l a n t i c
dialogue these past f i v e years. (U)
I t i s i m p e r a t i v e f o r the coming December U.S.-EU Summit t h a t the
Senior Level Group continue t o be s p e c i f i c about i t s goals. The
next s i x months w i l l be c r i t i c a l t o the S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Southeastern Europe as we attempt t o b r i n g i t i n t o the EuroA t l a n t i c mainstream. No other r e l a t i o n s h i p comes c l o s e . We
a p p r e c i a t e t h e EU load, t a k i n g the l i o n ' s share o f the
a s s i s t a n c e burden. I t i s important how we cooperate i n t h e
s h o r t - t e r m , e s p e c i a l l y on decisions l i k e Serbian s a n c t i o n s . We
won t h e war. Now we have t o win the peace. fe-)
On data p r i v a c y , I c o n g r a t u l a t e t h e important work David Aaron
and John Mogg have done; l i k e w i s e on T h i r d Generation w i r e l e s s
issues. We have some remaining problems. Biotechnology i s a
systemic one. The f e a r i n Europe i s unfounded. You need an
FDA-process t o t e s t products. I t i s c r i t i c a l t h a t Europe
develop mechanism t o calm p u b l i c s . As Charlene s a i d , we must
begin dialogues. fG}
We look forward t o the F i n n i s h presidency and cooperating on
n o r t h e a s t e r n Europe/Northwest Russia. We each have s i m i l a r
i n i t i a t i v e s , which can form the basis f o r recommendations. f G)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: On b e h a l f o f t h e German presidency, I
thank the American side f o r i t s cooperation. The Bonn
D e c l a r a t i o n i s a good p l a t f o r m f o r cooperation. The Kosovo war,
w i t h a l l i t s t e r r i b l e consequences, r e s u l t e d i n more i n t e n s i v e
U.S.-EU c o o p e r a t i o n . I t would be a p o l i t i c a l e r r o r i f i t were
now allowed t o go t o waste. The S t a b i l i t y Pact has i m p l i c a t i o n s
f o r t h e t r a n s a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f we succeed.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The E a r l y Warning i n i t i a t i v e i s t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n on t r a d e
d i s p u t e s . I t i s hard t o e x p l a i n how we can have c o o p e r a t i o n on
war, b u t have c o n f l i c t s on t r a d e . (U)
We i n t e n d t o keep working on Ukraine.
I t i s n o t easy
f o r our Ukraine p a r t n e r s . This i s a chance f o r Kiev and we
cannot r e l a x . The idea i s a b o u t ' i n t e g r a t i o n , change over
t i m i n g . We want t o be t h e i r s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s . fG}
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I wanted t o r a i s e changes i n the Helms-Burton Act. We need
waivers as we c o n f r o n t , together, p o l i t i c a l challenges,
organized crime, s o - c a l l e d c r i m i n a l s t a t e s , e t c . O v e r a l l , we
have t h e c l o s e s t , t r u s t i n g cooperation on Kosovo; t h e war can be
used t o s t r e n g t h e n our e f f o r t s together. fe)
President Santer:
The New T r a n s a t l a n t i c Agenda (NTA), agreed i n
1995, had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a more e f f e c t i v e
p a r t n e r s h i p . Then the EU introduced changes w i t h t h e Amsterdam
Treaty. The NTA f i r s t recognized the EU as a s e c u r i t y p a r t n e r .
Now the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n acknowledges t h e EU's s t a t u s as a f u l l
and equal p a r t n e r . This i s a challenge f o r us t o l i v e up t o .
(U)
Under my presidency, the EU achieved monetary union and a common
European currency. We also began the EU enlargement process.
There are s i x accession candidates. Under t h e F i n n i s h
presidency, there w i l l be progress r e p o r t s as some w i l l be
b e t t e r than others i n t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n s . Each w i l l be
c r i t i c i z e d on i t s own m e r i t s . But, g e n e r a l l y , a l l are on a good
t r a c k . I hope t h a t H e l s i n k i (the semi-annual European Council
meeting) w i l l go a step f u r t h e r ; we have t o solve the
Cyprus/Turkey problem. We need t o enter the new m i l l e n n i u m w i t h
new EU members, reform o f our i n s t i t u t i o n s — we are c u r r e n t l y
at the margin o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h 15; the i n s t i t u t i o n s were
c r e a t e d f o r s i x . This i s an important challenge i f the EU i s t o
remain e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: We are approaching the end o f t h e time
a l l o t t e d f o r t h i s meeting.
I f there i s no more d i s c u s s i o n , I
d e c l a r e t h e t h r e e documents a d o p t e d .
fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I want t o say a f i n a l word. I a p p r e c i a t e t h e
l e a d e r s h i p o f Jacques Santer.
I also want t o welcome our new
Ambassador t o the EU, Dick Morningstar. Thank you, Chancellor
Schroeder, f o r your e f f o r t s d u r i n g the German Presidency.
(U)
—
End o f Conversation --
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
The President:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999 - 11:06 - 11:13 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
David, can you hear me?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
(U)
Yes, I can. (U)
The President: Well, I am glad you have resumed your good
sleeping h a b i t s . (U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
I d i d n ' t hear you c l e a r l y .
(U)
I said you are p u l l i n g another a l l nighter?
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I t i s so l a t e a t n i g h t , but we
are about t o break here and come back l a t e r i n the morning a f t e r
a b i t of r e s t . (U)
The President: Well, I've been b r i e f e d by Tony B l a i r on the
s t a t e o f play. As I understand i t , Adams has said t h a t they
would p u b l i c l y commit t o decommission on DeChastelain's
schedule, which means a f i n i s h by the time described by the Good
Friday agreement and s t a r t by the end of the year. But they
want t o c o n d i t i o n that on going i n t o the government now because
they want t o r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on the sequence i n the Good Friday
Accord; and you say your guys want proof that they are serious,
t h a t you want t o put them i n the shadow government now, and
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achieve devolution only when they s t a r t decommissioning.
t h a t where we are?
Is
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. (pf
The President: And t h a t you now have tabled two possible
a l t e r n a t i v e s , or you got those and w i l l present them i n the
morning. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I w i l l work up some a l t e r n a t i v e s
along those l i n e s and w i l l leave a few o u t l i n e ideas here
t o n i g h t . But, we are going t o have t o get people around when
t h e i r minds are reasonably clear, so they can work through the
d e t a i l s , some of which may involve quick decisions. But I want
to do t h a t i n the morning. This whole t h i n g comes down t o
sequencing, and i n a way, each side i s sure the other w i l l do
i t , which i s our concern. The time i n t e r v a l i s important,
otherwise we didn't t h i n k we could survive p o l i t i c a l l y . (^f
The President: Yes. For one t h i n g , I don't know i f you saw my
BBC i n t e r v i e w , but I said I hope your people would stay w i t h you
i f you made a f a i r agreement. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: We don't intend t o walk away from i t .
The President: No one will be able to understand if it falls
apart on sequencing. But as you go home tonight, you guys can
wake me up in the middle of the night if you can think of
anything I can do or say that will either help you with your own
people by showing the United States will give you the high
ground by completely disavowing the other side, if they don't
keep their word, or if you can think of anything I can do to
persuade Sinn Fein to come closer to you. I will do that. I
know what position you are in. {jtf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: I very much appreciate t h a t .
i s a way, I w i l l come back t o you. (pT
I f there
The President: Let me say one other t h i n g . I spent a^ year, the
b e t t e r p a r t of i t — when wa^the Good Friday Accord'-^adopted —
more than a year, a l o t of time t r y i n g t o persuade Gerry Adams.
You were r i g h t about sequencing because a l l you wanted was t o
get him t o show good f a i t h , and I f a i l e d . And I f a i l e d , not
because of him, so much as because the IRA wants t o be seen as
to be decommissioning because the people they represent
overwhelmingly voted f o r the Good Friday Accord. They don't
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want to be seen as surrendering to you. They want to surrender
to the world or Irish Catholics who voted for the Accord. I
understand that. I think personally, they should do more. I
appreciate Trimble's political position and difficulties you
face. But I can tell you, I have worked harder than you know to
persuade them that the initial going-in position you had was a
right and reasonable position. And I have failed. On the other
hand, I don't think they want you to be deposed.
(g)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
That i s r i g h t .
(JZf
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k he wants you t o p r e v a i l as a l e a d e r and
he wants t h i s t o work. So, i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g you can t h i n k
o f t h a t I can do t o p u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n your c o r n e r , as
most o f your people t h i n k I have been t o o c l o s e t o them, o r
something I can g i v e t o him t o have him come c l o s e r t o you, you
can wake me i n t h e middle o f t h e n i g h t . (j^T
First Minister Trimble: I will try not to disturb your sleep,
but I thank you very much for this call. (Off
The P r e s i d e n t : I r e a l l y admire you, David,
h e l p i f I can. yzf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you v e r y much.
Okay, goodnight.
—
and I j u s t want t o
(U)
Get some s l e e p .
End o f Conversation
(U)
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Jaraosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
June 30, 1999, 11:31 - 11:52 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Sean Tarver and Frank
Gerry?
How are you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I am g l a d t o see you decided t o go back t o
s l e e p i n g twelve hours a day. Do you guys ever go t o bed? You
know, my daughter wrote a paper on you at S t a n f o r d . D i d someone
t e l l you t h a t ? (U)
Mr. Adams:
No, I d i d n ' t know t h a t .
Was i t good?
(U)
The President: Yes, i t was good, but the p r o f e s s o r s a i d i t was
too f a v o r a b l e . However, they s a i d i t was supposed t o be an
academic exercise and should have been more balanced.
(U)
Mr. Adams:
Ask her t o send me a copy, i f you would.
(U)
The President: Okay, I w i l l .
I t was j u s t a s h o r t essay, not a
term paper, l i k e an eight-page paper. She c a l l e d me and I sent
her some s t u f f , and they gave her a l i t t l e g r i e f . The p r o f e s s o r
s a i d w h i l e her f a t h e r i s c e r t a i n l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e , he i s not
r e a l l y an academic source; you need t o be a l i t t l e more
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Reason: 1.5(d)
PER E. O. 13526
D e c l a s s i f y On: 7/8/09
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balanced. So I druituned up some a r t i c l e s , f i n d i n g one m i l d l y
c r i t i c a l o f you; i t was r e a l l y f u n . (U)
Look, I know you need t o get some sleep, but I wanted t o say a
couple o f t h i n g s . A l l o f t h i s you know, o f course, b u t i t took
me a long time t o understand your p o s i t i o n on t h i s sequencing
issue and why the IRA would consider i t wrong t o have t o do
decommissioning f o r Sinn Fein t o get i n the government.
I think
I understand i t now and how they f e e l . I t h i n k i t ' s important
t h a t your people know when you decommission t h a t i t ' s not
s u r r e n d e r i n g t o Unionism b u t t o the people who voted f o r the
Good Friday Accord. We a l l work f o r people we represent. I got
t h a t . fG}
On the o t h e r hand, no one w i l l understand, no one i n the w o r l d
or i n Northern I r e l a n d , i f t h i s comes apart over sequencing.
You and I know what the problem i s . As I understand i t , you
o f f e r e d t o support the process t o be developed by DeChastelain
which would have decommissioning completed by the date o f the
Good Friday Accord and would s t a r t before t h e end o f the year —
i f the r e s t o f the Accord i s implemented and Sinn Fein went i n t o
Executive. I s t h a t accurate? fG}
Mr. Adams:
Yes. fe}
The President: As I understand i t , the r e a l problem f o r Trimble
is —
I t a l k e d t o him — t h a t he would l i k e t o take t h a t , b u t
r i g h t now he i s v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n i f he d i d , he would be
deposed. So we've got t o f i g u r e out how t o move forward; we
don't want t h a t t o happen, we've got t o f i g u r e some way o u t . I
t h i n k i t would be good f o r you t o get some sleep. I t h i n k
tomorrow he w i l l t a b l e a couple o f ideas. Based on my
understanding, I don't t h i n k you can accept e i t h e r one o f them,
but hope t h a t i n saying *no," and i f t h a t i s what you have t o
do, you f i g u r e o u t how t o keep pushing the b a l l forward. And i f
there i s a n y t h i n g I can do t o be h e l p f u l t o you, or him, when
you get up and s t a r t working, even though i t w i l l be the middle
of the n i g h t f o r me, I don't mind waking up. I f t h e r e i s
anything w i t h i n my l e g a l powers t o do, I w i l l do i t . I don't
want t o do i t now. I t h i n k you need t o t h i n k i t through. fG}
Mr. Adams: F i r s t o f a l l , I want t o thank you f o r your c a l l and
f o r your i n t e r e s t , which I know i s very genuine, v e r y emotional,
and r e a l . Secondly, what we put t o these people i s what M a r t i n
McGuinness discussed w i t h Jim Steinberg i n the White House on
May 5. We took t h a t and gave i t t o Tony and B e r t i e . fG}
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rri
We a c t u a l l y got a deal done on the 14 o f May and an agreement
i n my presence.
The B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r gave i t t o us and
Trimble walked away. We came back t o the idea and, we p u t i t t o
them today, i t was i n the general b a l l park you o u t l i n e d , b u t
f u r t h e r they r e j e c t e d i t . They s a i d "No." fe)
David Trimble sent h i s n e g o t i a t i n g team home w i t h o u t t e l l i n g
anyone an hour-and-a-half ago and adjourned the t a l k s . He w i l l
come back tomorrow and p u t together a proposal which we can't
accept. My concern a t the moment i s not David Trimble. My
concern i s Tony B l a i r . He's been very s o l i d i n terms o f a l l
t h i s b u t what Trimble needed today was t o be t o l d by the B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r very v i g o r o u s l y t h a t he had t o do t h i s .
I asked
to t a l k t o h i s team; they refused t o l e t us do i t and t h e i r team
won't go t o t h e i r people. fe}
This i s my p o s i t i o n which M a r t i n worked w i t h Jim and which we
have o u t l i n e d t o the U n i o n i s t s and everybody else i n v o l v e d .
They are going t o cause us t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e w i t h the Republicans
because they w i l l be o u t i n the news i n a day or two. Some say
Republican a c t i v i s t s w i l l not be able t o understand how we d i d
so and n o t get a n y t h i n g i n r e t u r n . I t h i n k t h e problems are
q u i t e worsened as a r e s u l t o f these past couple o f n i g h t s o f
n e g o t i a t i o n s . This i s the best they are going t o get. I j u s t
don't know what we can do, t o t e l l the t r u t h . fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s . I want t o mention two key
thoughts, and t h i s i s something you don't need t o answer but
sleep on i t . One i s , I t h i n k i f B l a i r i s going t o do any good
w i t h them, he has t o get out o f the n e g o t i a t i n g session and and
go see Trimble's p a r t y leaders. fe-)
Mr. Adams:
I agree.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
fe)
EO 13526 1.4d
You are a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t .
fG}
The President: That i s o p t i o n one, o r some v a r i a t i o n o f i t .
Option two, and I know where t h i s i s going, tomorrow, when
Trimble puts something on the t a b l e t h a t changes sequencing i n
ways you can't accept, because you won't accept going i n t o a
shadow executive u n t i l f i r s t decommissioning occurs. B l a i r w i l l
ask i f t h e r e i s something he can do f o r you along these l i n e s i n
a way o f a guarantee; maybe even an a c t o f p a r l i a m e n t , which he
can pass i n no time because o f h i s massive m a j o r i t y , which takes
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the d e c i s i o n away from the U n i o n i s t s i n a sense t h a t Sinn Fein
no longer agrees t o p u t i t s f a i t h i n the hands of the U n i o n i s t s .
The thing I was impressed by in your last offer was your
willingness to be far more explicit than in the past in terms of
decommissioning. You may not be able to take what Tony wants to
do, which is to say, *Can you do these things if I take the
decision away from the Unionists by an act of parliament?" I
understand the difficulty with that, but I ask you to think
whether there is something else he can do by act of parliament.
kG)
..
Mr. Adams: The Good Friday Accord guarantees us, and other
p a r t i e s w i t h mandates, the r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e . You're t a l k i n g
about o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s who pay taxes, who have been denied
t h e i r r i g h t s , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s , and the U n i o n i s t s got away
w i t h t h i s f o r the l a s t twelve months d e s p i t e the governments are
saying t h e r e i s no p r e c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y t h i n g t h a t i s going
t o move the U n i o n i s t s i s by your f i r s t o p t i o n . That i s a very
good o p t i o n . I j u s t don't know of any guarantee.
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : A l l I'm saying i s I'm a f r a i d t h a t Tony b e a t i n g
up on Trimble i s not enough because I t a l k e d t o some of those
guys and I know what t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are and I t h i n k they are
crazy enough t o take him down. I know i t ' s crazy on t h e i r p a r t
and they would be d i s c r e d i t e d by the w o r l d . Here i s what I
thought I could do. I s a i d t o the BBC i n t e r v i e w e r l a s t week
t h a t i t seems t o me t h a t i f B l a i r can f i g u r e out some way t o put
some heat on the guys behind Trimble, t h r e a t e n i n g him every step
of the way, and I make more e x p l i c i t the f a c t t h a t i f a l l t h i s
could be done along the l i n e s you t a l k about and f o r some reason
the IRA walks away from your commitment, then they could b r i n g
the government down and I would support them i n doing so. ' fG}
Mr. Adams:
I think a l l that i s useful.
fG)
The President: I know you and Trimble have both met and
c o n s c i o u s l y avoided mixing t h i s Drumcree business i n t o t h e t a l k s
but I can't help but wonder, given some o f the concessions by
the marchers, i f t h e r e i s something you can do t o help them w i t h
t h a t and whatever. I f you d i d , he might be w i l l i n g t o take more
r i s k h i m s e l f . I n the end, Gerry, no matter what Tony does or
what I say, Trimble, t o get a deal, i s going t o have t o take
some r i s k s . You are going t o take a w o r l d o f crap. We can't
immunize him from a l l t h a t r i s k . You can be n e u t r a l i z e d , but he
can be deposed. I got t o f i g u r e out i f something can be done
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t h a t he could h o l d up as a f l a g , o f h i s bona f i d e s .
don't want t o mix b u t . . . fe)
I know you
Mr. Adams: We a c t u a l l y have experience i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . The
one t h i n g I was very s t r u c k by was what you s a i d no one should
ever be persecuted by r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c background, and I t h i n k
t h a t i s where t h i s i s i n terms o f t h a t . I don't have t h a t much
i n f l u e n c e w i t h the people there b u t we can continue t o t r y . I
w i l l continue wherever I can t o make t h i n g s e a s i e r . The problem
i s David Trimble has brought i n the same people who voted
against t h e Good Friday agreement and oppose i t p u b l i c l y are the
ones we are n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h ; David Trimble t o l e r a t e s them. To
me, t h a t c r y s t a l l i z e s t h e problem. E i t h e r he stands up t o those
people — whatever way he does i s a very important element. We
have stuck our necks out f a r enough now t o hang ourselves. I
w i l l r e f l e c t on what you s a i d . I appreciate your a t t e n t i o n and
the f a c t t h a t you are very much up t o speed, as usual. fe)
The President: Okay, I'm going t o c a l l Tony back and then leave
you guys t o sleep. fe)
Mr. Adams: My sense a t the moment i s t h a t we are a t a very
p r e c a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n and my concern i s t h a t Tony must be very
a s s e r t i v e w i t h these guys. fe}
The President: Just because o f your p o s i t i o n alone, I don't
t h i n k we've got an e x i t s t r a t e g y s h o r t o f an agreement. We have
got t o p r o t e c t everybody concerned u n t i l we hammer through i t .
I f you walk away w i t h n o t h i n g , you might have t o modify your
p o s i t i o n t o come back t h e way he d i d . Two weeks ago, he would
have taken t h i s deal i n a b i r d dog's minute. fe)
so we have t o f i g u r e o u t a way t o somehow
give him some more elbowroom. Whatever you can work on
Drumcree, wave i n h i s face and say, "screw you." You t h i n k
about i t . I w i l l c a l l B l a i r and Ahern back and, i f you need me,
wake me up. fe)
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Mr'. Adams:
Okay.
6
Thanks again.
The President: Thanks, Gerry.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
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�•eOHFI DENT I A L
5061
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
(U)
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheramie and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 1, 1999, 8:08 - 8:13 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium,
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
The President:
Hello, Mr. President.
How are you doing?
B e r t i e , how are you? (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Not too bad at a l l . Thanks f o r a l l your
time over the l a s t few days. I know you have been i n tough
t a l k s w i t h these d i f f i c u l t people.
The President: What about t h i s l a t e s t proposal Tony t a l k e d
about? Have you run i t by Sinn Fein?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes. I was t a l k i n g t o them as of h a l f an
hour ago. I t h i n k the d i f f i c u l t y i s the 12 o f August w i l l not
work f o r them w i t h July and August being the marching season.
They w i l l not be able t o s e l l that t o t h e i r u n i t s but they have
committed themselves now t o decommission. They need t o
strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n a l i t t l e . The statements Tony and I
put out tomorrow should be as strong as possible i n what we can
say, but I don't t h i n k there i s any p o s s i b i l i t y they w i l l say
th
they w i l l do something by the 12
th
The President:
What about moving the whole t h i n g back some?
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Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes, I t h i n k i f we can get some leeway
and move i t back a t b i t . (pi
The President: They need it. Trimble said he can't stand more
than six weeks with no first act. What if you put up the
government in the middle of August? That would give them until
the first of October to decommission. Do you think that
framework might work? (g)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the framework w i l l work but i f we
put up the 15 of August i t might jeopardize s e l l i n g i t t o t h e i r
guys. ( ?
/)
th
The President: Tony wanted me t o c a l l Trimble and push the
generic idea t o n i g h t but I d i d n ' t want t o t a l k t o him u n t i l I
t a l k e d t o you f i r s t and I can't t a l k t o Gerry u n t i l you have put
t h i s t o him. Are you going t o t a l k t o him about i t tomorrow?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
the morning. (pi
I w i l l t a l k to Gerry the f i r s t t h i n g i n
The President: I really should not call him until tomorrow.
&
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: The question w i t h Sinn Fein i s , now they
have i t c l e a r i n t h e i r minds and are going t o convince the IRA
to do an act o f decommissioning before Christmas.
The r e a l
question i s how q u i c k l y they w i l l do t h a t . I t h i n k from t h e i r
p o i n t o f view as soon as they nominate someone t o the Chastelein
Commission the b e t t e r . That i s not as quick as mid-August. At
the same time, we don't want t o put a new date t h a t creates
f r u s t r a t i o n and creates a new deadline. We have t o get
something agreed t h a t automatically happens provided they have
decommissioning. Gerry Adams i s worried about g e t t i n g ahead of
the IRA because there would be more problems than i t i s worth.
I t h i n k John Hume f e e l s , I've spoken t o him, t h a t Sinn Fein has
not got t h a t f a r i n i t s statements. They could push themselves
a b i t f u r t h e r . I t i s the o l d story. How f a r can you push them?
I f they could give us another sentence t h a t would give i t
c r e d i b i l i t y . They r e a l l y have t o give us something. I t h i n k
you could give them another sentence t o make i t t h a t much
f i r m e r . (p')
The President: That it is really going to work.
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3
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Exactly. Otherwise we get i n t o a
d i f f i c u l t marching season again. Did you t a l k to Trimble? 02^
The President: Yes, but I have not t a l k e d to him yet on t h i s .
Maybe I should wait u n t i l morning to t a l k to him and Gerry i n
closer p r o x i m i t y . (pT
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That would be wise. We w i l l meet a t
8 o'clock i n Belfast t o f i n a l i z e the words. So maybe as soon as
we got t h a t done we should get that sent t o your people r i g h t
away. (^)
The President:
8 o'clock a.m.?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(p\
8 o'clock our time.
The President: I w i l l have my guys wake me a t 2 o'clock our
time. I would l i k e t o c a l l them both at the same time. (sound
of cheering i n background) Do you know where I am? I am at the
World Cup Women's Soccer Game and we j u s t scored a goal t o t i e
Germany. ( 0
^
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The President:
OK.
—
"
F I D E
"
I I f i L
(U)
Goodbye. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
C 0
You go and enjoy i t , B i l l .
God Bless.
(U)
End of Conversation —
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , M i l e s Murphy,
M i c h a e l Manning and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:04 - 12:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Hey, B e r t i e .
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: How do you do? Tony w i l l be j o i n i n g us
i n a few m i n u t e s ; he's s t i l l w i t h David and h i s c o l l e a g u e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e t h i n g s a t t h e zoo?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I ' l l f i l l you i n . I t h i n k we're f a i r l y
f a r a l o n g i n g e t t i n g somewhere, b u t we're n o t t h e r e y e t .
It's
never easy i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . But j u s t t o f i l l you i n
b r i e f l y , I t h i n k we've p r a c t i c a l l y agreed t h a t t h e IRA w i l l
nominate someone on t h e 1 5 o f J u l y . That would s e t up t h e
e x e c u t i v e . The d e v o l u t i o n o r d e r would be l a i d b e f o r e t h e
B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t on t h e 1 6 o f J u l y and t a k e e f f e c t on t h e 1 8
of J u l y and t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t o a l l o w a p e r i o d where Sinn F e i n
nominates an IRA person t o s t a r t w o r k i n g on decommissioning w i t h
General de C h a s t e l a i n and t h e o t h e r p e o p l e . What w i l l happen i s
t h a t t h e person nominated by t h e IRA w i l l s t a r t d i s c u s s i o n s i n
the p e r i o d a f t e r t h a t , t a l k i n g about a c t u a l decommissioning t o
s t a r t w i t h i n a s p e c i f i e d t i m e , and t h e decommissioning body w i l l
make p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s i n September and December. We hope t o
s t a r t decommissioning i n September.
(PT
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
P E R E.O. 13526
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The President: But you wouldn't have a Sinn Fein commitment by
a c e r t a i n time? (pj
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
good, President. (pf
The President:
I f we achieve t h a t , i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be
What do you t h i n k they w i l l say? (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k i t ' s looking good at t h i s stage.
We've got a l i t t l e b i t of work t o do and we need a l l the help we
can get. (pf
The President:
I s i t time f o r me t o c a l l now?
(p7
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the problems w i l l be i n t h i s
order. Trimble w i l l be very worried because some of h i s guys
w i l l d e f i n i t e l y get wobbly again. We need t o pump as much
confidence i n him and put as much s t e e l behind him as p o s s i b l e .
This i s the time where the governments, the two t r a d i t i o n s i n
Northern I r e l a n d work today together i n the devolution we've
worked f o r a l l these years and thought we had i n the Good Friday
Agreement but couldn't get i t . And secondly, give us the
decommissioning of the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s i n a reasonable time.
Third, the f a i l - s a f e clause, where the governments undertake
t h a t i f any d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i n regard t o decommissioning,
based on the r e p o r t by the decommissioning body, or a r i s i n g from
devolution, we w i l l automatically i n i t i a t e an immediate review
and suspend the i n s t i t u t i o n . That i s , i f anybody s t a r t s messing
we j u s t stop the whole bloody l o t . (pf
The President: That ought t o at l e a s t convince Trimble that
Sinn Fein w i l l be blamed i f the t h i n g goes down. (jzf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k we need t o have Sinn Fein and the
u n i o n i s t s not go bumping each other, but say t h i s i s the
completion of the h i s t o r i c breakthrough of the Good Friday
Agreement, t h a t the two Northern I r e l a n d t r a d i t i o n s w i l l work
together. This has t o be solved. The two need t o f e e l
confidence, t o see the bigger p i c t u r e because i f we get t h i s
through, B i l l , t h i s procedure nominating on the 15 of July,
t h a t ' s j u s t a f o r t n i g h t . The devolution order would be l a i d
before Parliament i n 2 weeks. I f i t gets through, i t w i l l be
tremendous. These guys have t o have the s t e e l t o go f o r i t i n
the next hour or so, as we t r y t o f i n a l i z e t h i s . I am holding
Sinn Fein's hand and Tony i s holding the u n i o n i s t s ' . I t h i n k i n
terms of where the u n i o n i s t s are, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t and shaky
for Trimble. Tony i s doing a great j o b helping them through i t .
th
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•couriDEMmar
3
The two p a r t i e s need t o have a f e e l i n g that something i s i n t h i s
and they r e a l l y should have a go. I t h i n k i t w i l l be very
h e l p f u l i f you could c a l l and have a word w i t h them. (jzf
The President: I'll call right now. What's the timetable for
this? (Jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: This i s the new order. I'm not j u s t
dumping on the government f o r Northern
Ireland...traditions...selling it and selling it hard, not just
bumping on the other side. Bill. If it shapes up like this,
this will be good. I am reluctant to call it yet. [Jt]
The President: No, I'm happy to call. I got up this morning
ready to call, and they said it wasn't time yet. (&)
Prime Minister Ahern: If you want, Tony has obviously got the
latest, he's still in with the unionists. If you want, we could
get back to your people in the next 15 to 20 minutes and tell
them now is the time to move. (g)
The President: Right. Give us a call when you're ready for me
to call Trimble. (JZ)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the c a l l to Gerry could be made
now, and we could get a message back t o you when i t i s good t o
c a l l David.
The President: B e r t i e , the President of Korea i s coming i n here
for 2 or 3 hours, so I w i l l c a l l Gerry now, and the quicker I
can c a l l Trimble, the b e t t e r . I t ' l l be hard t o walk out of the
meeting. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: What I ' l l do i s check w i t h Tony; he's
s t i l l w i t h him. As soon as he comes out, I w i l l c a l l s t r a i g h t
away. (J2T
The President:
Okay, man.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
.CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDEMT IAL
5061
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Roger
' M e r l e t t i , Miles Murphy, Joel Schrader,
Matt S i b l e y , James smith and Amy Swarm
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:17 - 12:19 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Gerry? (U)
How areyou?
(U)
How are we doing? fG}
I t h i n k we are g e t t i n g t h e r e .
The President: I do, t o o . The l a s t deal sounds p r e t t y
me. We have t o convince Trimble he should take i t . fG}
Mr. Adams:
I t h i n k he w i l l go f o r i t . fG}
The President: I s t h e r e anything t o do t o make sure they don't
t r y t o depose him over i t ? fG}
Mr. Adams:
They w i l l t r y t o do t h a t anyway.
EO 13526 1 4
.b
We need t o get t h i s done i n the
s h o r t e s t p e r i o d p o s s i b l y r e q u i r e d and make sure someone i s
I'm sure Tony w i l l do i t .
h e l p i n g him.
He j u s t needs help g e t t i n g over t h a t p e r i o d .
We w i l l help ease him over i t . We'll be as
magnanimous as p o s s i b l e . f&)
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Reason: 1.5(d)
PERE. O. 13526
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The President:
We don't want anyone claiming v i c t o r y . fe-)
Mr. Adams: No. I already said that to people here. I t i s n ' t a
matter of getting him to do i t . I t ' s j u s t a matter of getting
i t done. I want to galvanize the positive elements w i t h i n the
Unionists.
I think he i s going to do i t . I ' l l bet you a d o l l a r
he goes f o r i t . f&)
The President:
That i s a dollar I would love to pay o f f .
Mr. Adams: Okay. We w i l l be i n there. I t sounds s i l l y and I
couldn't say t o him, l i k e I can to you, but we'll make sure he's
okay. fG)
The President: Okay. I w i l l get on i t . Tony i s s t i l l with him
and as soon as he gets out I'm going to c a l l him. fG)
Mr. Adams:
I look forward to taking your money. f€-)
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY P O O O V
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
M i l e s Murphy, Robin R i c k a r d and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
J u l y 2, 1999, 5:40 - 5:44 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
David?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
(U)
Yes.
(U)
How a r e you keeping?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
w i l l be b e t t e r .
(U)
Are you s t i l l
S t i l l standing.
standing?
Could be worse b u t i t
The President: Look, I wanted first of all to thank you and
second, to say I tried to issue a helpful statement. Thirdly,
to ask what can I do to help? Personally, if they screw us on
this, I will support kicking them out and stand up publicly and
say that you are not to blame and they are. [ f f i
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : R i g h t . The o n l y problem i s I can't
muster enough steam t o g e t i t i n . Whether we w i l l g e t i n over
the course o f t h e n e x t week o r t e n days I don't know. I'm
t r y i n g t o g i v e enough space f o r people.
When I f i r s t p u t t h e
s u g g e s t i o n t o t h e session o f t h e p a r t y , o n l y a couple showed a
f a v o r a b l e response and some were a g a i n s t . Most o f t h e o t h e r s
were o f d i f f e r i n g v i e w p o i n t s . Key members from whom I needed
CONFIDEN'MAL
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
7/8/09 QJNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^ i
DECLASSIFIED
m r n r- r^
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support were unhappy. Maybe we can work something i n t h e next
week o r two t o change aspects o f t h i s scheme. (^T
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you, i f you t h i n k i t w i l l h e l p f o r me
t o c a l l any o f them p e r s o n a l l y . I w i l l do t h a t .
(£7
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : John T a y l o r i s on our s i d e as i s
Maginnis; and Reg Empey i f we leave him alone f o r a couple o f
days. I made a s e r i o u s mistake i n o r g a n i z i n g . I thought i f I
brought J e f f r e y Donaldson onto my team we c o u l d smother some o f
the o p p o s i t i o n . I am a f r a i d i t b a c k f i r e d on me. I need t o g e t
J e f f r e y away f o r a w h i l e t o get t h i n g s b e t t e r . (pf
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. You t h i n k about i t and i f you t h i n k I can
h e l p i n any way. I f you want me t o send somebody over, I w i l l .
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I v e r y much a p p r e c i a t e t h i s ,
Mr. P r e s i d e n t . I r e a l l y do. I don't know how we w i l l work i t
out in the next week or two. If there's any chance I will.
(pj
The President: I know you will. You're a good man, David.
You've made decommissioning real. This decision would really
not have happened if it was not for you. It will work now, I
think. (jt)
First Minister Trimble: I hope so. They have changed their
position. If only I can get my people to see that and take
advantage of it. (j?)
The P r e s i d e n t : There's no doubt they changed t h e i r p o s i t i o n . I
h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e , based on my c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Adams i n t h e
l a s t week, t h a t he knows w i t h o u t you t h a t t h i s i s a dead dog.
You have t o come o u t l o o k i n g l i k e t h e l e a d e r you a r e . Once he
gets h i s ducks i n a row, he w i l l bust h i s ass t o make i t work.
I've a l r e a d y t o l d him t h i s i s i t . (pi
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I went o u t o f my way i n comments t o
throw a l i n e o u t t o them. We now hope t h a t works. ( p i
The President:
can do.
(jt)
All right.
Let me know if there is anything we
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Once again, I r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e your
support and encouragement. You may f i n d me c a l l i n g again next
week. (pf
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHn DENT IALThe President:
Thanks.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
—
(U)
Thanks.
Cheers.
(U)
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENT I A L
50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
F i r s t M i n i s t e r David
Trimble
Notetakers:
Matthew S i b l e y , Sean Tarver and
Frank J a r o s i n s k i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
J u l y 5, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , David.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
W e l l , t h e march went p r e t t y w e l l y e s t e r d a y .
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Yes, i t d i d . I'm v e r y g l a d t h a t i t
went o f f as w e l l as i t d i d . I hope i t doesn't leave them t o o
b i g a problem. I t i s a c r e d i t t o t h e Portadown Orangemen t h a t
t h e y d i d w e l l . They a r e hoping t h a t Tony B l a i r w i l l r e c i p r o c a t e
it.
I'm n o t sure i f he can. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
What can I do f o r you? (U)
First Minister Trimble: There are two things that would be a
great help to me. One which I think you are already doing and
that is to talk to Gerry Adams about a statement from the IRA
about decommissioning. The other thing is the so called "fail
safe" mechanism. It is fairer to exclude Sinn Fein from the
executive, but the problem continues to be John Hume. Seamus
Mallon is trying to persuade him. If John Hume could move, that
would help greatly. [yf
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENrear
PER E.O. 13526
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 7/8/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ClO\3 - OM1 CL^
3/k/l5
�COMF1 DENT lAtr
2
The President: So I'll call John and get back to Gerry about
the other thing. I'll get back to you in a day or so. y?)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Goodbye.
—
(U)
End of Conversation --
• CONFI DENHAfc.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CQWIDEWTIAL
5061
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h SDLP Leader John Hume (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John Hume
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
George Chastain and Joel Ehrendreich
July 5, 1999, 6:50 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, how are you doing, Mr. President?
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, John. (U)
Well, I'm a l r i g h t .
(U)
How are you? (U)
Oh, I'm s u r v i v i n g . (U)
The President: Well, I think we got a pretty good proposal if
we can get them to take it. I've been talking to Trimble and
Adams. Trimble is having a bit of a hard go with Maginnis and
with Empey and others who are being critical of the proposal.
He thinks they can still get blamed if the government comes down
and the IRA doesn't comply. I know Seamus Mallon has a piece in
the paper tomorrow, which will help bring the Unionists on board
for the Blair-Ahern proposal — you know what it says — it
doesn't say outright that Sinn Fein should be expelled but gets
pretty close. I have told Trimble in private and said publicly
if the IRA doesn't live up to its obligations, I would support
Sinn Fein being excluded. The United States would say — it's
not their fault, it's your fault and not the Unionists'.
Similarly, if anybody else doesn't comply. We have to help
Trimble a little. You've been working on this for 30 years now.
I believe Gerry is ready to take the final steps. (jtj
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09 CLINTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
LIBRARY PHOlui^
aovi- 0 - ^ n
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�^UHFI DENT IAL
Mr. Hume: I don't t h i n k i t ' s easy i f he's being seen as being
under p u b l i c pressure. ( Z
J?
The President: I agree with that.
(£)
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k i t ' s b e t t e r done q u i e t l y than w i t h p u b l i c
pressure. (pi
The President:
I do agree.
(pT
Mr. Hume: What I've been saying today on the radio and TV i s
there i s no way my p a r t y would s i t i n government w i t h any p a r t y
i f they were engaged i n violence. I'm convinced from my
experience t h a t Sinn Fein i s committed t o the peace process.
Therefore, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission i s going t o r e p o r t , so
what we should a l l do i s suspend judgment u n t i l we a l l hear the
report and then make our judgment having heard t h a t r e p o r t . (pi
The President: Let me ask you this. How are we going to deal
with Trimble's problem to sell it? (Jt)
Mr. Hume: The time of the year i s the major p a r t o f the
problem.
I t ' s marching season f o r h i s people. Every year the
tensions are very high f o r t h i s time of the year. By the second
h a l f o f July, when we move beyond t h a t , tensions w i l l f a l l , and
i t should be easier f o r him then than now. Do you know what I
mean? (p)
The President: Yes, absolutely. And we had a p r e t t y good day
for t h a t yesterday. (pf
Mr. Hume: Yes. I t was p r e t t y welcome that they behaved very
responsibly. (pf
The President: You know, John, he doesn't have t o lose very
many people before he can't go on. (pT
Mr. Hume: Yes, I know, but the overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f people
voted f o r i t . I n a d d i t i o n , l a s t week we had special messages
from organizations representing the business community, trade
unions, community groups and youth groups a l l t e l l i n g us t o keep
the agreement on the road. There i s very b i g p u b l i c support f o r
the agreement. This can be resolved and w i l l be resolved i n the
coming weeks, but I don't t h i n k we should be p u t t i n g anybody
under pressure. G T
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: Let me ask you t h i s .
t h i n k I can do t o help Trimble? (pf
I s there anything else you
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k one of the things you could do i s make very
clear from your p o i n t o f view that as soon as a new
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s i n place, t h a t ' s when the goodwill o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l world w i l l become evident. That's when the
economic development and investment and marketing w i l l transform
our economy and society. The sooner the two communities s t a r t
working together t o set up the i n s t i t u t i o n s , the b e t t e r . There
needs t o be a c l e a r understanding of the agreement t h a t t o t a l l y
respects both i d e n t i t i e s , therefore no section o f the community
i s under t h r e a t . ( p f
The President: Okay, w e l l , I ' l l j u s t keep plugging along. I
understand what you are saying. I r e a l l y worry about the hard
guys on Trimble's side t a k i n g him out. I f we lose him, we're i n
trouble. (pf
Mr. Hume: I know that. Listen, thanks again for your interest
and support. (pf
The President:
phone. (jzf)
Mr. Hume:
I f you want t o t a l k anymore, I'm as close as the
Okay, thank you. (U)
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
— E n d of Conversation
—
CONFIDEN'HAtr
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^
�Dear Carlos:
I want t o congratulate you on the successful
conclusion of the negotiations w i t h the
United Kingdom regarding the South A t l a n t i c
islands. As you know, during our l a s t meeting
we addressed the challenges facing Argentina
and the United Kingdom, and the (L
a t t a i n i n g diplomatic s o l u t i o n s .
impressed by your determination t o resolve
these matters peacefully^and t o the mutual
b e n e f i t of both countries.
Your work, and t h a t of Piime Minijfedir Tony
B l a i r , greatly contributed to resolving
important i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues and w i l l enhance
the s t a b i l i t y and well-being of the region.
Again, congratulations and I look forward t o
w o r k i a ^ together w i t h you t o advance peace i n
the region.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Carlos Menem
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Dear Tony:
I want t o congr t u l a t e you on t h e s u c c e s s f u l
conclusion of t l negotiations w i t h Argentina
e
regarding the Siuth A t l a n t i c islands.. I
— i
a p p r e c i a t e ^ t h e a - i f f i c u l t y you fooecl ^ ^ m e e t i n g /
the c h a l l e n g e ^ f a c i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and
|
A r g e n t i n a as you b o t h , p e r s i s t e d i n
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y resolv^Jthese important issues.
I was impressed by your d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o
•• «—
these m a t t e r s p e a c e f u l l y . t o t h e mutual
b e n e f i t o f both countries.
^-O—
Your work, and that of ITrbcidenfc"Menem, greatly
contributed to enhancing the stability of the
region and the well-being of its people.
Again, congratulations and I look forward to C^^^^v
ihac. w i t h you t o advance peace i n
worki
the r e g i o n .
Sincerely,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
.
&~
�S a r g e a n t , S t e p h e n T. ( E X S E C )
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
nppr ASWIFn
Thursday, July 22,1999 10:36 AM
p
c T ^ S r L . , « /UN
Schulte, Gregory L. (EUR); vonLipsey, Roderick K. ( D E F E N s f i ? u
' r ^ ^ ' - ^ f t L
©EXECSEC -Executive SecretaiV
^ t e House Guidelines, August 28,1997
FW: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [eONriDENTIAL]
By-^iNARA,
TMaolll*/oJ
n
1 9 0
R
Greg, Rod - Not sure which of you is doing the Blair package, but here are a few points on the NATO Secgen question
that should be included, based on the call that just ended with Schroeder.
-Original MessageFrom:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:33 AM
To:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject:
RE: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair?- [CONFH3CNTIAL]
great, couple of tweaks, pis. work with rod/Greg to get htese in package. Tx.
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, As Amended, Sec. 3i (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28,1997
By^LNARA, DHttuY/^ *
—Original Message—
From:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
,
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 199910:19 AM
/
To:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE-European Affairs
Subject:
Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? fOONriDCNTIAL]
Think we should seek to have the following, or some version thereof, inserted into the Blair telcall package:
Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG
Solana.
Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, provided Germany were willing to put him in the running.
But made clear that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates
mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
p
6^^L,
Schroeder said he was reluctant to put Scharping forward because he is needed at home but, knowing of our
interest, would speak again with Scharping and would make a decision wmin a week -before Sarajevo.
Schroeder also suggested that we chat with you on the margins of the Sarajevo Conference.
Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
0.013- 04-72.- H
8/U/I5" KGH
�-emfi£S6Mq-ra±r
5562
. .... /
"7 - ^ v -q Cf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
J u l y 23, 1999
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGEP^^
GENE S P E R L I N ^ ^
I.
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 Summit i n Sarajevo. S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need t o s u s t a i n
c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t the FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We are w o r k i n g on a s e r i e s o f economic i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e
Sarajevo Summit. You asked us t o f i n d a c r e a t i v e approach,
s i m i l a r t o the one o u t l i n e d by George Soros. A l t h o u g h
i n n o v a t i v e , the Soros p r o p o s a l would not p r o v i d e r e a l l o n g - t e r m
b e n e f i t s ; t h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would come from access t o U.S. and
EU markets.
I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared a comprehensive
s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an investment
compact and a commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO membership. We
want t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a c o n c r e t e
statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend you commit t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o the Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n except Serbia, b u t i n c l u d i n g Kosovo and
Montenegro. These p r e f e r e n c e s should apply u n i f o r m l y and should
be as generous as p o s s i b l e t o spur economic development. We
would n o t r e q u e s t s p e c i a l access r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s .
This would p r o v i d e immediate access t o developed markets and the
g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t . However, i n o r d e r f o r
t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c r i t i c a l .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENT IMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
yLO^- OWX' H
8/G/I5" KBH
�•CUNK IDENTIAL
2
On our s i d e , we are e x p l o r i n g w i t h members o f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l
t r a d e committees l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d i n g a ten-year GSP
commitment, t o i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods,
w i t h the exception o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f
p r o d u c t s from these c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania,
a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y - f r e e under GSP or normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e
U.S. would o f f e r a new program t h a t a l s o i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s (except sugar) and footwear a t l i t t l e
p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . I n a d d i t i o n , a ten-year program
would p r o v i d e much g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y t o i n v e s t o r s than t h e
c u r r e n t GSP program, which i s funded from year t o year. I t
would a l s o encourage r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n by p r o v i d i n g s p e c i a l
access t o p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n i n g i n p u t s from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n
the r e g i o n .
Investment Compact: Because investment and t r a d e w i l l d r i v e
s u s t a i n e d growth, we propose a * compact" between l e a d e r s from
o u t s i d e t h e r e g i o n and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s
to c r e a t e v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g
risk.
I n r e t u r n , t h e r e g i o n a l leaders would commit t o concrete
a c t i o n s t o improve t h e investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e
economic r e f o r m s .
One s p e c i f i c o p t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h i n g an EBRD t r u s t fund w i t h U.S.
funds t o c r e a t e a p o l i c y framework f o r investment and f a c i l i t a t e
debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks. I n a d d i t i o n , we would work
w i t h t h e I F I s t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund would
i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e or p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n ( t o
i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro) and h e l p leverage p r i v a t e
f i n a n c i n g . F i n a l l y , we are d i s c u s s i n g w i t h George Munoz t h e
p o s s i b l e c r e a t i o n o f an OPIC fund f o r t h e Balkans.
WTO Membership: For non-member c o u n t r i e s , we w i l l o f f e r
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards
and work t o f a c i l i t a t e accession on an a c c e l e r a t e d b a s i s . I n
many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e cost t o t h e
U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, which o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
and growth.
An EU commitment on membership i n a reasonable
p e r i o d w i l l be t h e most d i f f i c u l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t
-- p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y .
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP"
�•CONFIDENTIAL
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We a l s o disagree w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e would need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on i n c r e a s e d u n i t y w i t h i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner P r o d i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
•CONFI DENHAL
�rmrTPi^refrftir
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude Serbia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an * investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate.
I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
•
We should work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
IDEHTIAL
CLINTON LUJKm m m J U * .
Reason: 1.5(d)
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•
2
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
Said t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e p r e s s ,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he would delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t
would make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
CONFIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPv
�GONriDEHffcftfe
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you are s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n .
Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
p r e p a r e s Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o o u r markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an '"investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
c l i m a t e . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
COMF1 DENgrEAfe
Reason: 1.5(d)
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•
We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
•
A l s o need t o use Summit t o demonstrate Serbia's i s o l a t i o n
under M i l o s e v i c , w h i l e h o l d i n g o u t t h e p r o s p e c t o f r a p i d
integration after Milosevic.
•
M i l o s e v i c i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window o f
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change t o t h e r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s discussed s a n c t i o n s a t
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked t h e Commission t o l o o k a t
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep s a n c t i o n s f u l l y i n p l a c e .
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be r e l a x e d .
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t i g h t e n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l s a n c t i o n s t a r g e t e d a t M i l o s e v i c and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince i n d i v i d u a l EU c o u n t r i e s t o take
necessary steps, f o l l o w i n g t h e r e c e n t example o f S w i t z e r l a n d .
C
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Milosevic w i l l
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
exploit
�CONFIDENTIAL
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On our s i d e , we^would propooe a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n '
of c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s .
A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from t M s e
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r .dutyf r e e under GSP or, normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U.S. would offfer a
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) .at l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t / W c a r c i n
the process o f I m a k i n g congrcGsional c a l l o - I-Q t t t h e watf^^F .
IF
...
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Q C :
Investment Compact: Because investment and trade will drive oJ"
sustained growth, we propose a * compact" between leaders from ^ '^"^
outside the region and the international fijFlancial institutions -V~^v
to create vehicles for mobilizing private^finance and mitigating
^r^-^
risk. In return, the regional leaders i^uld commit to concrete Cr* P
actions to improve the investment cliradte and accelerate
^j^^ .
economic reforms.
^ ^v—,
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1
t o create t .
One specific option\is establishimg an EBRD trust fund^uo c r e a t e i __
a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance
through local banks. ^ JWe woul^ tl^h work with the IFIs to create
a regional equity fund. They''fund would invest in private or
0^ "
privatizing enterprises in/the region (to include Kosovo and
<*?^ ^ ^
Montenegro)^^ielp leverage'private financing and roaximizc uoc-of
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hy nafi^-nnl i n vp.^tnip.nt •Kjf.iu i H.., .MfTh as'OPTO.
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WTO Membership: For ^on-member countries, we will offer3j t*.J. ^'"
t e c h n i c a l assistance''needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s .
I n many cases, t h i s ' i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e ^
^
the U.S. o r EU governments.
^
^ j ^ ^ M ^ ^ " ^
A ^
S
l
EU statement: ^Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, v^nich o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
*
and growth. /An EU commitment on avontua-i membersh:u3 w i l l be t h e
most d i f f i c m l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t — ^ f f ^ r t o f our
strategy./
,
t***-*^
^
Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)
^ j f
1
^
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece V and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
^
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
^
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
^
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
;~
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f the s a n c t i o n s (the f l i g h t ban and
^
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
x
DECLASSIFIED
coNFiDENTfftfe
CLINTON LibKAKX muiuuo.
PER £ Q 13525
�CONFIDENTIAL
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g Milosevic p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We also disagree w i t h the f e a s i b i l i t y of d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s . We are prepared t o
discuss w i t h a l l i e s the concept of assistance t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such assistance wotild need
to be c a r e f u l l y circumscribed, monitored and coordina'ted, as
w e l l as conditioned on increased u n i t y w i t h i n the o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner Prodi
/
j
i
/
/
CONFIPFNTTAh .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�/
The most meaningful gesture we can make i n the near term i s to
provide u n i l a t e r a l trade access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
help catalyze production and investment i n the region.
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o provide duty-free
access i n t o our market across a range of products, -rflawever,
-can only succeed-In this_£££prt i f - the. EU- makes a s i
-effort.
I understand the EU i s considering s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l countries i n the region. I t - would be more powerful
i f the EU could extend t o the region as a whole(excluding
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g duty free treatment f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as possible.+
/
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E Oo 13526
2.o\3 - oH7a - V\
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�5562
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
PHONE CALLS TO U.K. PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 S t a b i l i t y Pact Summit i n Sarajevo.
To s t r e s s t o P r o d i
t h e need t o s u s t a i n c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY.
Ii.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working w i t h c o u n t i f i e s o f t h e EU and southeast
Europe t o develop a s e r i e s o f i n i t / i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit, i n c l u d i n g i n t h e e c o n o m i o ^ f i e l d . You have asked us t o
f i n d an i n n o v a t i v e approach, s i o a l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. A l t h o u g h i n t e r e / t i n g and i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t p r o v i d e r e f i l l o n g - t e r m b e n e f i t s t o t h e
c o u n t r i e s -of southeast Eurone. T h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would be
access t o U.S,) and EU market^. I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact and a /commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We want ther Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We' recommend c o m m i t t i n g t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r / t o t h e Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n o t h e r than S e r b i a , as w e l l as Kosovo and
Montenegro. These/ p r e f e r e n c e s should be u n i f o r m across t h e
r e g i o n and as generous as p o s s i b l e t o r a p i d l y spur economic
development. We would n o t , i n t u r n , request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S\ o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e s immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e greatest, s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
c r i t i c a l , n o t o n l y t o m o b i l i z e Congressional support here a t
home, b u t a l s o because access t o t h e European market i s an
e s s e n t i a l component t o southeast Europe's economic development.
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
�To e f f e c t t h i s , we would propose a t e n ^ y e ^ r GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e ^ g o o d s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n ^ t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
countries/-/-' except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania.y^ a l r e a d y e n t e r
d u t y - f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s / t h e U.S. would offe
a new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t ^
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e / i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s t o t e s t t h e watei?4.
s
Investment Compact: Because we have underscored t h a t i/ivestment
and t r a d e , and n o t donor a s s i s t a n c e , w i l l d r i v e susta^med
growth, we propose a "compact" under which l e a d e r s firom o u t s i d e
t h e r e g i o n would agree t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o create appropriate vehicles f o r irfobilizing
p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n r e t u r n ^ the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o jjrfprove t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
We ar,g~workdng on s e v e r a l o p t i o n s . T h e / f i r s t i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f ari EBRD/trust fund which would e s t a b l i s h a p o l i c y framework
f o r ^Euzje^tment and f a c i l i t a t e debt fi/fance t h r o u g h l o c a l banks.
Based on our experiences i n c e n t r a l / E u r o p e , we would then work
with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i j f s t i t u t i o n s t o create a
r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund w6uld i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e o r
p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n d j t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and
Montenegro), h e l p leverage p r i v a t e f i n a n c i n g from i n s t i t u t i o n s
and b i l a t e r a l donors, and u t i l i z e guarantees o f f e r e d by n a t i o n a l
investment agencies such as GOPIC.
WTO Membership: For t h o s e / c o u n t r i e s n o t c u r r e n t l y members o f
t h e WTO, we would o f f e r t>ie t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standa/ds. I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e / c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
The most i m p o r t a n t step f o r t h e r e g i o n i s t o be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e S u r o - A t l a n t i c s t r u c t u r e s l i k e t h e EU; t h i s
o f f e r s t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A
commitment by t h e EU on e v e n t u a l EU membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c u l t p a r t o f <6ur s t r a t e g y , b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t t o
show r e a l commitment by t h e Europeans.
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
o p p o s i t i o n - c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s . ' We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
s a n c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y o\
financially.
We a l s o d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t x i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e wouixl need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e l o c a l l e a d e r s t a k i n g steps t o
increase u n i t y w i t h i n the opposition.
Attachments
Tab A
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r PM B l a i r
Tab B
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r EU Commissions
Prodi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l a n d / r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g system.
•
The f i r s t s t e p ta=da. i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f /Our support
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f cours^, exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would anow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i r m i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r ayronomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r Vou, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment / t o t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o conunit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e / I want t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making t h o s e / d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e / c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
/
To do t h i s , w d ' r e l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equjKiy fund.
CLINTON LlBKAKi PHOTOCUi-1
�o
,5
<
•
Would also urge that we work towards g e t t i n g a l l of these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as possible.
• F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
Also need t o use Summit t o demonstrate S e r b i a ' s / i s o l a t i o n
under Milosevic, while holding out the prospejzr of r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n a f t e r Milosevic.
Milosevic i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window of
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change/to the region.
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n ministers/discussed sanctions at
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked th^r Commission t o look at
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep sanctions f u l l y ipf place, Milosevic w i l l e x p l o i t
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be re/axed.
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t/ighten implementation of e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l sanctions targelzed at Milosevic and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince incaividual EU countries t o take
necessary steps, follow/ng the recent example of Switzerland.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from S a r a j e v o ^
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r ^ 5 i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g syster
•
The f i r s t s t e p t o do i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f oufr s u p p o r t
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f course/f exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would snow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i n n i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway^with C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r autonomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r yo/, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment t o / t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
•
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o commit / t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
investment climate.
/ w a n t t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making those d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
•
To do t h i s , we're/ l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equity^/fund.
•
Would a l s o u r g ^ t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g a l l o f these
s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t h e y
need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations,
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•COMriDEMP-frftfi-
55 62
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMI35IONER PRODI
DATE: TBD '
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
/
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
/
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed econoipic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e J u l y
3 0 [ s t a b i l i t y PactjSummit i n S a r a j e v o / S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need
t o s u s t a i n curreffE" EU s a n c t i o n s agaanst t h e FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
/
Economic Initiatives
^
CSJ /
r
>. c c \t- A i HL.
t
/
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working -wijfrh t e n a n t r i e s o f t h e EU-aftd-'-a-era-t-fee^g^:
Euxope-J^o - do v o l op a s e r i e s ^ o f ' i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit^ ifte-luding i n t h o .ci'conomi-G ^icil-d. You faava asked us t o
f i n d v a n — i a n o v a t i v c approach, s i m i l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. Although/ irnter-Qst i.Q^_an.ci. i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t prqpVi-de r e a l long-term b e n e f i t s ^ to- t-fee
•GouRt^ire^--of--sou-t-heaa!4--Eur-f>p«". -Their b i g g e s t g a i n would be- f l i € Ft~'('A L
VI'
access t o U.S. and EO markets. f i r t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t o ^ t e g y which .includes a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact? and a commitnent t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We W^nt t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statemynt r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend c o m m i t t i n g 'to u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o ^ . ^ ^ ^ r i b b e a n Basiix, I n i t i a t ^ v ^ t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n ^-fetiei. tharr Sert^.i.a, c wo-i-i'^ac Kosovo and
Montenegro .^^^Th^s^pref erences should fee u h i f o r ^ a c x a a s - i f e e
I^jg4r&ti a n d ^ s 'generous as p o s s i b l e to_rap-idl-y spur economic
development. We would n o t , -,ifi—t.urnr^request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e ^ ' immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
KBH
�CONFIDENffftL
2
-
r
c r i t i c a l ^ - n-o^—only -txr-mobi-i i-z-e Congr ess ional—s-uppo-r-fe—her-e-at
liome^, hut...al^o-^bee-a-u-se access t o the • European market • i s • arv
e s s e n t i a l component-to- southeast Europe's economic development..
e f f e c t t h i r s ^ w e would propose a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding'the l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h .the e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U S . would o f f e r a
.'
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s . - t o t e s t t h e w a t e r s .
Investment Compact: Because Jate have—und^r-a^oxed-^feh-gfe- investment
and trade,, ^USLMQX^^.Q.UQJ: a^s-ista-n&e^-.will/arive s u s t a i n e d
growth, we propose a * compact" under'which- l e a d e r s from o u t s i d e
t^_reglon_-jfl/ould agree, t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
£
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o c r e a t e appropria^fe v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g
ht;<s- p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n return, the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o improve t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
- c o-re- w o r k i n g ou.. se.vera.1, _optionc-a
W
3 % ^ — f ^ r r r t i f\_ ^ s t n h l i -hmrrHI=an EBRD t r u s t fund 4^1 ^ j f c ^ ^ s ^ d e s t a b i i a h a p o l i c y framework
f o r investment and f a c l l i tale debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks,
fiaocd oil. pur c«pe3?4eftees -in engnfo^jg—Eucope, we would then work
with the^ infcp-r-national/f iiiauuidl ins L'lLuLioi»s' to create a
regional equity fund.. The fund would invest in private or
privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and
Montenegro) , help leverage private financingfrromin-etifrufcimij
and bilat-e-r^l^-dQft&c.s^'a'nd nfrii i Eir^guarantees offered by national
investment agencies such as OPIC. C^/u^i, y.,A,( 2 £ ^X-' Of
c
1
1
1
r
WTO Membership: Forfel'mje.•eountifiGO not.. c - . ; f f l y momborc , o l
urao»ai
the—WTO7 we^woul-d o f f e r *he- t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
the i n t e r n a t i i o n a l standards.
I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t / v e r y l i t t l e c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
^Z^-
M-—-WILL
EU statement:
The m^st i.mportant^i.tpp~,.ft>r t h e r e g i o n -ars^to be
i n t e g r a t e ^ ' i n t o fche-Eggo Afejb-aft-tlg'-ofe&ag^ur.ea ^a^ke. t h e EUj tl-ri-s W t f
o f f e r s thte best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A*J
commitment byj the EU on e v e n t u a l -By^membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c i A t , p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y b u t also t h e m-ost-Impo-rt-aB-fe-^to
s.w...a^Gimtei.„.y-.h..u.paihQ..rel.oiim.it.h.,te.ErQsrsr
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�-COMFTDENTTAI.
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo
Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful, r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our Support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions'! strofteet t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude Serlpia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous/of these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
Vx?fsking r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an 'investment compact" and
Acommit t;o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate'. I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We'j/e c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
•
Vis s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
fMvi
CONFIDENHMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
^OVb-cma-W
S/o/iS" K8M
�CONn DCI ¥¥±tt7
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
S a r a j e v o Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you a r e s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n . Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should try to bring together a trade initiative that
prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into
European and global trade.
f
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions soonest t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous o f these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A s k i n g r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an * investment compact" and
commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e i n v e s t m e n t
c l i m a t e . . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
/ We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g
these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
�CONriDEN¥*ftb
2
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
/'S C L ^1
" "
~
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he'delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t uattiti
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week
b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
eoNFiDEMTiAb
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�CONriDCNTIAL
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit^^/W*^—
>
^ ^tfJJ?t£Z~t
• Looking forward t o the Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n the. remaining days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
• We a l l agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
J - f r ± e e LlidLr-celV
should t r y to b r i n g together a t r a d g _ ^ ^ r f ^ :
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe, f o r <£]^Tlfl»i^xapi^^
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o tfee^European and global tradi^^sy&Eeau-I
=
•
The f i r s t step i s t o show the s i n c e r i t y of our support f o r the
region. The U.S. and EU can agree tag^tker- t o grant/—as ooon—•
as posslbLe; (uolJ-a-t^^ffiv-egre wyj^tiffiae concessions/^o
''"^
countries i n tTTe—tegran,. We would^ nr r o n r m ^ exclude Serbia,
but want to- include Kosovo and^Montenegro.
• We are preparing a package wk4eh would show our commitment,
but I w i l l only havo a cjuud Lihot- crt> winn-iug congressional
support i f the EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t . I know t h a t you
have a range of i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h Central and
Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most
generous of these, the, Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to
the whole region.
• Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful trade concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , f n r ynm—a-o i t w i l l bo f o r uc i ^ u t ^ we
must make the commitment to t r y and announce a r e s u l t at the
Summit.
/
/
•
We are asking/the regional leaders to make an "investment
compact" and/to commit to key reforms that would improve the
investment climate. J-want -to makp sure thaJi/ _£n return for
them making' those difficult reforms, we do our best to
mobilize brivate capital and mitigate /isk to direct
investors/.
/
•
To do tjfiis, we're looking at working w i t h the EBRD t o create a
regiona/l equity fund.
• Would also urge t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g .aJJ—cu£_these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
€eNFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r -arSconcrete and
C O /
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g v ^ '
'
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y
General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schoreder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we"'would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he d e l a y p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t would
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you./in Sarajevo.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•SECRET
07 77
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams o f Sinn Fein
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Sinn Fein P r e s i d e n t Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Deana S u t l i f f , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
James Smith and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 31, 2000, 2:55-3:13 p.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry.
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
How are you?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm a l r i g h t . I j u s t wanted t o c a l l and t a l k t o
you one more time b e f o r e t h i s comes down. I know how hard you've
worked on t h i s decommissioning i s s u e , b u t we've been i n touch
w i t h t h e I r i s h and B r i t i s h governments and I ' v e t a l k e d t o most o f
Sinn Fein's f r i e n d s i n Congress t h e l a s t few days, and no one I
t a l k e d t o b e l i e v e s what t h e IRA i s prepared t o say t o
de C h a s t e l a i n about arms and e x p l o s i v e s and t h e n t o say he can't
say t h a t p u b l i c l y w i l l p r e v e n t t h i s whole t h i n g from going down.
The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be suspended and I don't know how t h e h e l l
w e ' l l ever g e t them up a g a i n . Then i t w i l l be even more
d i f f i c u l t ; t h e IRA w i l l l o o k l i k e t h e y ' r e c r y i n g u n c l e , i n s t e a d
of squeezing o u t t h e l a s t ounce o f good w i l l , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e
B l a i r i s p r e p a r e d t o go f o r w a r d w i t h implementing t h e P a t t e n
Report.
We're j u s t i n a t e r r i b l e s i t u a t i o n .
I don't know i f
t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g you can do t o get a c l e a r commitment on a
timetable.
I am v e r y w o r r i e d about t h i s . I t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n
w i l l have no c h o i c e , and T r i m b l e i s gone i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s are
not suspended. I f t h e y are suspended, we w i l l a l l do our b e s t t o
keep them a l i v e , b u t i t does n o t h e l p t h e IRA a t a l l . (^f
Mr. Adams:
I t w i l l work backward.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t w i l l be even harder f o r them. R i g h t now,
t h e y ' r e i n an admirable p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , s a y i n g , we made
everyone f o r k over b e f o r e we d i d . " We can g e t by w i t h o u t an a c t
i f t h e r e ' s a c l e a r commitment and t i m e t a b l e , b u t w i t h o u t t h a t , I
w
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Reason: 1. 5d
Declassify
on:
Robert Bradtke
02/04/10
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F f l I ' W f i
^ - V H I ^ A
�CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
6-CCRCT
t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n i s going t o i s s u e h i s r e p o r t , i n s t i t u t i o n s
w i l l be suspended and t h e IRA — I agree w i t h you, i t w i l l work
backward. Otherwise, T r i m b l e i s going t o f a l l .
They a r e going
t o g e t him. No one I know t h i n k s he w i l l s u r v i v e . No one w i l l
say, i n v e s t m e n t s a r e coming i n , we j u s t hope t h e IRA does r i g h t
down t h e road."
They j u s t won't do i t . (#]
w
Mr. Adams: I think that there are -- first of all, I agree with
you on the seriousness of the situation. Have you seen the
words? (St)
The President: It says something like they will consider putting
arms beyond use -- (£)
Mr. Adams: Yes, i t a l s o says IRA guns a r e s i l e n t and t h e r e i s no
t h r e a t t o t h e peace process by t h e IRA. (^)
The
President:
But they won't even l e t h i m make t h a t one p u b l i c .
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k David T r i m b l e , i f he r e c e i v e s a p o s i t i v e
r e p o r t from de C h a s t e l a i n and he notes t h e B r i t i s h government
accepts t h a t as p o s i t i v e , then he c l e a r l y has t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l
t o go back. (^5
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h e problem i s , t h e i r view i s they've done
what t h e y ' r e supposed t o do and, h e l l , t h i s c o u l d t a k e p l a c e i n
2010.
(^)
Mr. Adams:
Well, okay.
I mean —
(^
The P r e s i d e n t : Look, we can buy a few days here because t h e
B r i t i s h and I r i s h a r e b o t h committed t o do t h e b e s t t h e y can,
even i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended. The problem i s , t h e
language would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l i f t h e r e were any r e f e r e n c e
t o a t i m e t a b l e . I know t h e IRA view i s t h e y gave f i r s t because
t h e y gave t h e p r i n c i p l e o f consent, b u t everybody e l s e ' s view o f
t h i s i s a l l t h e o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord and even
the P a t t e n Report i s b e i n g implemented and t h a t was d i f f i c u l t f o r
t h e u n i o n i s t s — and d i f f i c u l t i s a m i l d word -- and o l d T r i m b l e
i s s t i l l hanging on, b u t t h e r e i s no c l e a r t i m e t a b l e . I f t h e
language were p u b l i c and t h e r e was a t i m e t a b l e r e f e r e n c e d , i t
would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l , b u t w i t h o u t a t i m e t a b l e t h i s
language seems v e r y c o n d i t i o n a l indeed.
I don't t h i n k t h e r e ' s
any chance o f g e t t i n g a p o s i t i v e r e p o r t o u t o f t h i s .
Mr. Adams: Okay, I am going t o t a l k t o Tony and a l s o go have a
meeting w i t h Peter Mandelson. I don't t h i n k i t i s g o i n g t o be
p o s s i b l e , i n f a c t I know i t won't be p o s s i b l e . We t r i e d t o get a
d e f i n i t i v e t i m e t a b l e . What we g o t was i n t e n t on m o d a l i t i e s and
•SECRET
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
3
on a timetable determined by political developments as opposed to
a calendar timetable. It is going to cause trouble within the
IRA, no matter what people think, trouble within the IRA and its
leadership. The worst possible scenario was failing to get the
IRA to move, because the IRA's position was that not under any
circumstances will they decommission, and now they are saying
they will consider decommissioning, putting weapons beyond use,
which is the exact wording of the legislation, which is a total
change from their previously stated position. Whatever has been
created in terms of public expectation of the IRA, the fact is
this is a unilateral deadline set by the unionists. But that is
not the way to try and make this work. There is perhaps some
room to maneuver in terms of de Chastelain including some of the
statement in his report, if that helps, if there are problems in
not being able to publicize or publicly comment on this. I think
there is a possibility, but only in the context that it would
help stabilize the situation. We won't get it; we tried over the
weekend to get a definitive timetable. For all that is said
about the Patten Report, the reality is it is all promises.
We've seen no legislation from the British. Demilitarization has
not happened; there has been remilitarization. Two children — •
two teenagers -- were killed in my constituency some years ago, a
young girl and boy, killed by British soldiers. They were
joyriding and they were killed. The soldiers perjured
themselves. Today all the charges were dropped. All of this is
playing into what was done. The guns are silent. I don't
believe for a moment that Tony Blair for one moment disagrees
with my analysis of how this can be done. I think he accepts it.
The problem is in the unionists who are dictating this, not in
the Irish government by itself or in the British government. I
think it is in the way this issue has been used to choke the
process. (jifi
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h a l l t h a t b u t l o o k , t h e problem i s
the whole Good F r i d a y Accord and t h e e l e c t i o n s a r e a l l premised
on a l l t h e p i e c e s f a l l i n g i n t o p l a c e a t t h e same t i m e .
[ B r e a k } . . . o f t h e Accord t h a t s e t up t h e t i m e t a b l e f o r
decommissioning. A l l t h e v o t i n g proceeded under t h e assumption
i t would happen. Now, t h e u n i o n i s t s have absorbed t h e f a c t t h a t
i t w i l l n o t a l l u n f o l d as t h e accord p r e d i c t e d , b u t s t i l l t h e r e
i s t h i s process and i t has t o have some i n t e g r i t y t o i t . The IRA
may n o t c a r e , b u t a l l t h e Americans who have n o r m a l l y been so
s u p p o r t i v e o f you w i l l b a s i c a l l y say t h e same t h i n g , t h a t they
d i d n ' t come across. As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , I t h i n k t h a t ' s what
i s going t o happen. The r e a l problem was T r i m b l e g o t those guys
to go a l o t f u r t h e r t h a n I thought he c o u l d . He's eaten a l o t
more t h a n t h e IRA has, he's eaten h i s words f o u r o r f i v e t i m e s ,
and t h e n he j u s t found a way t o g e t o u t o f i t and s u r v i v e . I
j u s t don't t h i n k he can do t h a t now. I f you can work a d e a l w i t h
Mandelson, you need t o go see him. We need t o buy a day o r two.
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�-JECKEI
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CNO URR POOOY
UTN BAY HTCP
If you can get something specific on the Patten Report, maybe you
can use that. Details of how it's going to be implemented and
when. Maybe you can synchronize that with the IRA commitment.
Maybe they'll be willing to do that. (JS)
Mr. Adams: The big problem for the IRA is that the
decommissioning issue will be dictated by political circumstances
that exist, not a timetable which they never signed up to. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : But i f t h a t ' s t h e i s s u e , what i f you worked o u t
w i t h Mandelson and B l a i r a t i m e t a b l e on t h e P a t t e n Report and
agreed t o g e t t h e IRA t o say, " I f they do t h i s and t h i s , w e ' l l do
the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s . " ( g )
jT
Mr. Adams: It wouldn't work in that context. The big problem
for the IRA is the unarmed police service. We can probably get
unionists to buy it, but for the republicans, it is still a
partitionist service. Our whole intent was to get the IRA out of
the game, on the sidelines, so other people could take more
pragmatic positions. So the big thing is to keep the IRA
sidelined and spectating in all this. So I am going to see
Mandelson, because we have to make the best effort to make sure
this situation is rescued. I would mislead you if you left with
the impression that something could be done on Patten which could
help on this, but I'll go and see Mandelson now. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you: i f they want t h e t i m e t a b l e t o be
d i c t a t e d by p o l i t i c a l circumstances, why can't t h e r e be some
statement t h a t i f such and such occurs, we w i l l do something?
Mr. Adams: That's what the statement says. Let me just read it
to you. "The IRA wants a permanent peace in Ireland. IRA guns
are silent. We have contributed in a real and meaningful way to
the search for a durable peace, but for that goal to be reached,
steps taken need to be sustained. British forces and loyalist
militias must be removed. The challenge is to remove the cause
of conflict. In this context, and in the context of the full
implementation of the Good Friday Accord, the leadership of the
IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use. For
our part, we are committed to enhancing our engagements with the
IICD to resolve the conflict and deliver a durable peace. There
is no threat to peace by the IRA." That language is going to
cause trouble within republican ranks. (jrf
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h a t ' s buying t r o u b l e w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t s .
The p o i n t o f view o f t h e o t h e r guys i s , ' A f t e r a l l they've s a i d ,
they've backed o f f . " This w i l l be read by s k e p t i c s as, you know,
"We m i g h t never do t h i s , even though t h i s ^ w a s p a r t o f t h e d e a l ,
even though p a r t s o f t h e p l a n precedent t o t h e a c t o f
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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5
decommissioning have o c c u r r e d . " This goes back t o my t h i n k i n g i n
the b e g i n n i n g .
I s t i l l t h i n k t h e e a s i e s t t h i n g t o have done t o
buy you t h e most and hamper you t h e l e a s t was a symbolic a c t .
Mr. Adams: I agree with you completely, but we tried and failed.
The problem Is Trimble said things and then backed off. He
shouldn't have said them in the first place and we got him off of
them.
(#)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
The f a c t remains, i f he goes, we a r e sunk.
{#7
There's no reason f o r him t o go.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t ' s n o t up t o us i f they depose him. That's t h e
problem, no m a t t e r what t h e r i g h t o r wrong. I t may n o t m a t t e r t o
the IRA, b u t based on what I ' v e heard my view i s everyone w i l l
t r y f o r a s o f t l a n d i n g i f these i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended, b u t
a t l e a s t as o f y e s t e r d a y , when I spoke t o a bunch o f o u r I r i s h
congressmen who have been so s u p p o r t i v e o f you and s t i l l a r e ,
t h e i r u n i v e r s a l view i s they need more. You go t o Mandelson andsee i f you can work i t o u t . We've g o t t o buy a couple o f days.
I don't t h i n k t h i s i s going t o f l y . The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be
suspended and i f we p l e a d w i t h him t o hang on, I t h i n k t h e
chances he w i l l be deposed are about 90 p e r c e n t .
Mr. Adams:
Steinberg.
(S)
L e t me go see Mandelson and g e t back t o Jim
S o r r y t o keep you w a i t i n g ; I wasn't near a l a n d l i n e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Thanks.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
—
•SECRET-
Good l u c k .
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
(U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY
1242
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 24, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
n
FROM:
IAN A. B 0 W L E § J ^ 7
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m fromyGeorge Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t ft VSA Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h j f e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h ^ P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s with^Eover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e q u e s t and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder anc^'Prodi f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e ^ , t h e Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o i NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy
199
Concurrence by:
e s i d e n t ' s weekly r e p o r t on January 10,
r o l i n e Krass, Antony
BlinkenS
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h j f a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachments
Tab I Memo/andum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab A
better t o President Prodi
;r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab B POTUS Note Requesting L e t t e r s
Tab C Reports
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate change. Kribwim^ o-f our
common interest in the subject, I am sending yoyf a copy of a
recent Pew Center on Global Climate Change rep.prt on greenhouse
gas emissions trading.
,f
/
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r y i n g system t h a t i s
g l o b a l i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicati^fh w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance w i t h oirr emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us t o mov^e more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challei^ge. The study b u i l d s on a
l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t ]
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e (includi^
b e n e f i t European countries
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can i i gnii f i rnnj
and other nations f o r whom greenl^use gas abatement i s
r e l a t i v e l y expensive.
•>
the broader, more open,
merous s t u d i e s als^x-tnake c l e & r t h
nd u n r e s t r i c t e d ^ t f i e t r a d i n g J^yarffem, the greater th^--b^nef i t s .
gned under the
you know,^rfie f l e x i b i l i j t y m e c h a n i s m s b e i n g
Kyoto Pro£<5col a l s o hayetefemendous p o t e n t i a l " t o c o n t r i b u t e t o
our b r p ^ d e r e f f o r t s ^ o prapnote energy e f f i c i e n c y and c l e a n e r
enej?4y developmep't: i n d e ^ l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can work t o q ^ t h e r t o address these i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s
and set t h e tone f o r M h a l J—hope w i l l be c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n
between our governmafits i n the l e a d - u p t o the c l i m a t e change
c o n f e r e n c e a t The Uague l a t e r t h i s y e a r .
I look forward t o
d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e j ^ s u e s w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
W i t h best r e g a r d s ,
1
*
Enclosure
The Right Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1820
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema o f I t a l y
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
Interpreter:
E l i s a b e t t a Ullmann
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
Deana S u t l i f f and Hoyt Yee
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:30 - 1:53 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
(U)
How are you?
Fine, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
(U)
How are you?
Good. Thank you.
(U)
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l . I wanted t o t a l k
about Kosovo and my concern about where we're going t h e r e . Over
the past few weeks, I t h i n k we have seen almost d a i l y v i o l e n c e ,
KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a UN o p e r a t i o n t h a t i s going very s l o w l y .
We' re coming i n t o the springtime, which has always been the most
dangerous season i n the Balkans and I'm deeply concerned t h a t
Kosovo could b o i l over and t h a t M i l o s e v i c may s t i r up some
t r o u b l e . During the a i r campaign, we were a l l focused c l o s e l y on
Kosovo and now we have other t h i n g s t o worry about, and I t h i n k
the problem i s n o t g e t t i n g the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n i t needs t o
have success t h e r e . fG-)
As I see i t , there are three c r i t i c a l tasks. F i r s t , ensuring t h a t
KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t ; second,
g e t t i n g UNMIK the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b e f f e c t i v e l y and;
t h i r d , d e p l o y i n g enough p o l i c e t o take pressure o f f o f KFOR. fG^
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 3/16/10
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. 0.13526
8/1,/15
K8M
�CONFIDENTIAL
On the f i r s t issue, KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t should be
g e t t i n g s t r o n g e r . I understand t h a t you are adding troops and
hope t h a t you can add an a d d i t i o n a l f u l l b a t t a l i o n o f troops t o
those you c u r r e n t l y have deployed t o Kosovo. I'm asking a l l o f
us t o look a t our pledged force l e v e l and t r y t o get back up
t h e r e . I w i l l do the same. We also need t o ensure a smooth
t r a n s i t i o n when the new KFOR commander takes over. We must not
send a s i g n a l t o M i l o s e v i c t h a t t h e r e are weaknesses he can
e x p l o i t . And I t h i n k we need t o i n t e n s i f y e f f o r t s w i t h the
Kosovar Albanians t o counter e x t r e m i s t elements. We sent two o f
our people w i t h the best connections there t h i s weekend t o
d e l i v e r t h a t message. I know t h a t Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about the need f o r p o l i c e but t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l i f we are
to take the pressure o f f o f KFOR. We're sending more people and
I hope you w i l l do the same. We've got t o get more people there.
I'm also very concerned about the UN program UNMIK. They have
been unable t o move forward on c r i t i c a l tasks and are c r i p p l e d by
funding shortages. We have t o get them the resources they need
as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . I t h i n k the appointment o f General Nash
i n M i t r o v i c a should help and I'm doing a l l I can from here. We
have a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t e d 100 percent o f what we committed t o , b u t
I hope you can do something t o get the EU t o disperse the money
they have committed more q u i c k l y . fG^
Later t h i s month, we also have a r e g i o n a l conference t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms, and I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t we a l l make a concrete pledge. We're prepared t o pledge
n e a r l y .$500 m i l l i o n i f others are w i l l i n g t o do t h e i r p a r t .
F i n a l l y , I know t h a t w e ' l l have t o address the Kosovo s t a t u s
issue, but I r e a l l y t h i n k our focus now ought t o be on
e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s and developing l o c a l
leaders' sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y so we can have e l e c t i o n s t h i s
fall.
Thank you, Massimo. f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you.
concerns and your suggestions
Generally, I do share your
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
I w i l l ask t h a t d u r i n g the next
"European Council meeting i n Lisooh a r e p o r t should be prepared on
t h i s and a c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n among leaders should take
place on t h i s issue. So, i t i s very important t h a t President
Guterres be f u l l y i n v o l v e d i n your concerns so t h a t we can
discuss t h i s issue together next week. f&)
We have decided t h a t we are sending 150 troops t h a t are not
e x a c t l y p o l i c e but armed forces and t r a i n e d f o r t a k i n g c o n t r o l o f
the t e r r i t o r y . And we also have 350 C a r a b i n i e r i t h e r e . We are
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
not reducing our forces there, on the c o n t r a r y we are i n c r e a s i n g
them. And i f we also include our people i n Albania, we have a
presence o f 6,300 troops a l l over the area. For us, t h i s i s a
very b i g e f f o r t . However, we w i l l focus our a t t e n t i o n on the
p o l i c e and C a r a b i n i e r i and w e ' l l see i f on t h i s issue we can do
more.
^
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I t h i n k i f we are s t r o n g
i n Kosovo, t h i s w i l l discourage M i l o s e v i c from m i s c h i e f i n
Northern Kosovo and also i n d i r e c t l y support Djukanovic and I
agree we have t o help him economically. We have been doing what
we can b u t perhaps we can do more. fG^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
So, t o summarize, I f u l l y share your suggestions and we w i l l
increase our involvement i n p o l i c e forces and m i l i t a r y forces and
i n economic support. I f e e l the need f o r a thorough p o l i t i c a l
a n a l y s i s and f o r t h i s maybe we could put our d i p l o m a t i c advisors
i n touch. And I hope t h a t the European d i s c u s s i o n next week w i l l
help us take steps forward. f&)
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h a l l t h a t , and I look forward t o
working w i t h you on i t . Thank you very much.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Thank you, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I hope t o see you soon.
Good bye. (U)
End of Conversation --
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�CONFI DENHAfe
182 0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h President Jacques Chirac of
France (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Interpreter:
Carol Walter
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i , and
Deana S u t l i f f
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:56 - 2:10 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. President.
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
(U)
How are you? (U)
I am very glad t o hear you. (U)
The President: Thanks f o r t a k i n g the c a l l .
t h i n g s about Kosovo. fG-)
President Chirac:
I want t o say a few
I wanted t o t a l k t o you about t h a t .
(U)
The President: The s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t there w i t h d a i l y
v i o l e n c e and KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a slow moving UN o p e r a t i o n .
Spring has always been the most d i f f i c u l t season i n the Balkans
and I am w o r r i e d t h a t Kosovo could b o i l over or M i l o s o v i c might
t r y t o s t i r up t r o u b l e . For understandable reasons, we have l o s t
the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n we gave t o Kosovo d u r i n g the a i r
campaign. I t h i n k we should put t h i s o p e r a t i o n on a stronger
f o o t i n g . fG^
I t h i n k there are three c r i t i c a l tasks as I see i t . F i r s t ,
ensuring KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t .
Second, g e t t i n g the UN the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: March 16, 2010
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
g/^/iT
Kf5M
�e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i r d , deploying enough p o l i c e t o take the pressure
o f f KFOR to m a i n t a i n s e c u r i t y . KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t
needs t o get stronger. I understand you have o f f e r e d a d d i t i o n a l
forces and I hope you can employ an a d d i t i o n a l b a t t a l i o n t o those
you deployed. I am asking a l l o f us t o look a t our force l e v e l s
to see i f more i s needed. Also, American forces remain a v a i l a b l e
t o support the French sector i n case o f emergency. I know you
have the most d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . fe)
We also need t o ensure t h a t when the new KFOR commander takes
over, the t r a n s i t i o n i s smooth so we don't send a s i g n a l o f
weakness t o M i l o s o v i c .
We need to do more t o counter e x t r e m i s t
elements among Kosovar Albanians. We sent two o f our people w i t h
the best connections there t h i s weekend t o d e l i v e r t h a t message.
We a l s o need more p o l i c e . I know Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about t h a t . We are increasing our c o n t r i b u t i o n by more
than 10 percent and we hope you can do the same. fe)
I am a l s o concerned about the status o f the UN operation, UNMIK.
They have been c r i p p l e d by funding shortages, and we have t o get
the resources there so Kouchner can succeed. I t h i n k the
appointment o f General Nash as the r e g i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n
M i t r o v i c a w i l l help, and I am doing what I can do here t o
increase our c o n t r i b u t i o n . I hope you w i l l t h i n k about whether
there i s more t h a t you can do and we can push the EU t o disburse
the money even f a s t e r .
There i s also a r e g i o n a l conference l a t e r t h i s month t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms. I am ready t o pledge about
$500 m i l l i o n i f a l l the others are ready t o do t h e i r p a r t . Of
course, a t some p o i n t , we need t o address the s t a t u s o f Kosovo,
but r i g h t now our focus should be on g e t t i n g the o p e r a t i o n r i g h t
on e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , and developing
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y among l o c a l leaders so we can have e l e c t i o n s l a t e r
t h i s f a l l . (€J
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y agree w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s . As
concerns the m i l i t a r y means, f i r s t o f a l l we have already__tali
the d e c i s i o n t o r e i n f o r c e our m i l i t a r y presence t h e r e . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
_ As concerns
m a t e r i a l assistance t o the region, we, w i t h i n the framework o f
the EU, are prepared t o face up to our share o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
�An hour ago, we received Prodi, EU Chairman, i n my o f f i c e and
discussed t h i s matter p r e c i s e l y along the l i n e s you hoped f o r ,
From t h i s p o i n t o f view there i s no problem.
is d i f f i c u l t .
Last p o i n t , I t h i n k the Contact Group should meet
r e g u l a r l y once again. fG-)
The President: Well, f i r s t o f
e l e c t i o n s should be f i r s t , and
a l l your a l l i e s recognize t h a t
problem. Everyone should take
President Chirac:
a l l , I agree t h a t municipal
I t h i n k t h a t i t ' s important t h a t
M i t r o v i c a i s not j u s t a French
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . f€-)
That's what you d i d . (U)
The President: And I agree on the Contact Group. I t h i n k we
ought t o i n c l u d e Russia. P u t i n wants t o be a c o n s t r u c t i v e
p l a y e r . We w i l l f o l l o w up on a l l these t h i n g s . fG-)
The President:
Thank you. Hope t o see you soon.
President Chirac:
Good bye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye. (U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1
2
4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
A p r i l 5, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
IAN A. BOWLES/?^)
r
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m from George Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t a Pew Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e economic e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h e P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s w i t h cover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o the P r e s i d e n t ' s request and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder and P r o d i f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t , the Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o f NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
I have r e v i s e d t h e l e t t e r s based on comments from Jim S t e i n b e r g .
The l e t t e r s are not t i m e s e n s i t i v e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy P r e s i d e n t ' s
1999
Concurrence by:
weekly report on January 10,
3 6 fee
*
C a r o l i n e Krass, Antony B l i n k e n *
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum t o the P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
2
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear M r . P
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l clime
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a c i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s M I T best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e gmallenqe o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t my t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i r n ^ e Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i h ^ , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l y g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e cmanqe m i t i g a t i o n .
The s t u d y a l s o b u i l d s on a airowing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e d o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d i ^ ^ i n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatemeiy i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive,
I a p p r e c i a t e your ^ E o r t s , and those o f your
member c o u n t r i e s , Jto b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l /te^ponse t o one o f t h e most
c h a l l e n g i n g i f e s j ^ s o f t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know
our governmejpity can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l .pygress at. the c l i m a t e change
conferenc^''
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s c u s s i h ' g ^ h i s c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you
further..,
Sincerely,
His E x c e l l e n c y
Romano P r o d i
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�T H E W H I T E HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[V— ^ r \ f
Dear Tony:
.
// , - ^ f l
' ^ j ^ ^ ^ — T " t h o u g h t you would be i n t e r e s t e d i n t h ^
e n c l o s e d r e p o r t j o n t h e b e n e f i t s o f grej^ihouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e s t r o n g l y t h a t J g g l o b a l
1
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope -i^S^meetIftg t he c h a l l e n g e JPr c l i m a t e
change.(gost-ef f ect i v e l y j ) T h i a r
r e p o r t by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Center on^Global C l i m a t e
Change s u p p o r t s t h e view t j p t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g s ystem ^ j r l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n ,
Tn a d r i i f i n n , "^he s t u d v w o u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u j f f n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by
the OECD) showing
t trading w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bene 't i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s
f o r whom greenho e gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
n e w
I a p p r e c i a t e Jpour e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o r b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t<y one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g issues
o f t h i s nafw c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can w o r k i c o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s j f a t t h e c l i m a t e change conf erence--iat-e-r..
t i & s - ^ w k r ^ a t £Vie Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s e a s i n g these- c r i t i c a l m a t t e r ^ w i t h you t h i s
spryg.
With best r e g a r d s .
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
/
WASHINGTON
c
Dear Mr. P r e s i d e n t :
I thought you would be i n t e r e s t e d / i n the
enclosed report on the b e n e f i t s j p i greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongl]^(fthat a global
emissions t r a d i n g system rey^resents our best
hope f o r meeting the challiEnge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i s new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Centjrc on Global Climate
Change supports the vi/w t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g syst/m w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of / l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the st^dy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e (inc/uding a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showingfthat t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y benjefit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greentylouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciatefyour e f f o r t s , and those of your
member couiytries, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one of the most
challenging issues of t h i s new century. I know
our govolrnments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i ^ a l progress a t the climate change
conference l a t e r t h i s year at .?he Hague. I
l o o p forward t o discussing these c r i t i c a l
ma/ters w i t h you f u r t h e r .
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I thought you would be i n t e r e s j id i n the
enclosed report on the benefij of greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongiPy t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system Represents our best
hope f o r meeting the challenge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y * * This new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Cen/er on Global Climate
Change supports the v/evi t h a t a f l e x i b l e , well
designed t r a d i n g syyem w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o y c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the sZudy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n / l u d i n g a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showin/ that t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bej/efit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greenl^buse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciata^your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t / b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t d one o f the most challenging issues
of t h i s n/w century. I know our governments
can work/together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progresy a t the climate change conference l a t e r
t h i s y/ar at £he Hague. I look forward t o
discu/sing these c r i t i c a l matters w i t h you t h i s
sprj/g.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global cl#hate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n thM subject, I am
sending you a copy o f a recent/t'ew/Center on
Global Climate Change report dn. g/eenhouse gas
emissions t i ing,
'
/
The r e p o r t emphasfx^s t h a t ^ n / e m i s s i o n s t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s globa^v i n seoj/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l signiMc^inlrly reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change mitigaAiafn. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c/mpSUance w i t h our
emissions r e d u c t i o n t
but w i l l also
allow us t o move more
ress^ively over the
long term t o address
.s chal\enge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing ojdy o f l i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t ye
OECD reports! t h a t shows
t r a d i n g can benefi
iropean countries and
other nations f o r
m greenhouse gasN^batement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex
ive.
I hope we can w^rfe together t o address t h e s ^
important issues/and set the tone f o r close
c o o r d i n a t i o n Weltween our governments i n the
lead-up t o t l ^ /climate change conference a t The
Hague l a t e r A h L s year. I look forward t o
discussing these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic o f Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE W H I T E HOUSE
Lie
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n the apbgect, I am
sending you a^copy o f a recent Pgw/Center on
Global CIimatexchange r e p o r t on^teenhouse gas
emissions tradinc
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t
/emissions t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s global^ i n sdbr/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n r f i c a j i t r l y reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote ccflKm-iance w i t h our
emissions reduction targec^, but w i l l also
allow us t o move more Aggressively over the
long term t o address Jthi/s challenge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing J^ody o f i i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t yeap's/oECD report) that shows
t r a d i n g can benefijC European couiitries and
other nations forfwhfom greenhouse\qas abatement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex/ei/sive.
I hope we can worhi together t o address these
important issjees/ and set the tone f o r close
coordinationAiexween our governments i n the
lead-up t o Ipe climate change conference at The
Hague l a t e y t h i s year.
look forward t o
discussinc/these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
S
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the Europeaii Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP Y
�THE WHITE HOUSE
S
WASHINGTON
J
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate, chanaie. Given our common
interest in the subject,. I am sending you/a copy of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report OJL greenhouse gas
emissions trading.
g
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissiaps t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate changajpnitigation. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c o m p l i a n c e g i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us JLO move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e (irvcluding l a s t year's OECD report)
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
/
Numerous s t i es also makjp clea
and unresj i c t e d the t r a d i n g ^ y s t
'ty
As you Jmow, the flexibjQrlTty mechani
Kyoto^Trotocol also
tremendous
ou^oroader e f f o r
promote e
mergy developi;
i i / developing c o u n t r i e s .
the
I hope we can work/:ogether t o address these important issues
close coordination between our governments
and set the tone
i n the lead-up t$ the climate change conference a t The Hague
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
l a t e r t h i s year
you t h i s sprinc
i
With best regards,
The R i c r f l t H o n o r a b l e
Tony ^ f a i r , M . P .
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate change. G^en our common
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending you a c o t # of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report on greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g .
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicayfon w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change i n i t i a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance with^our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us to vpve more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c i t i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t ^ u r o p e a n countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse g ^ abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
studies also mate/clear t h a t thejaroader, more open,
ricted the tdfac^fng system, tbe greater t h e j ^ n e f i t s .
enow, the f l ^ x i b ^ i t y mechap^ms being des^gfied under the
Protocol a^so have tremen^kms p o t e n t i a l > 0 c o n t r i b u t e t o
broader ef-forts
promote energy e f f i g i ^ n c y and cleaner
Energy development i f developing countries.
I hope we can workAtogether t o address these important issues
and set the tone, .or close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-up
the climate change conference a t The Hague
l a t e r t h i s yeaj
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
EincrlNqsiire
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending
Center on Global Climate Change repoj
emissions t r a d i n g .
Lnge. Given our common
)U a copy o f a recent Pew
on greenhouse gas
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n ^ p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate chadge m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote complianj^ w i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow jfs t o move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h ^ challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e ^ i n c l u d i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e r p f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhoi^jle gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
Numerous st^Klies also
and u n r e s t r i c t e d the
As you/lcnow, the f l e i
Kyoto Protocol alsq.
broader e f f o j
to
'energy developlfientj i n
r
take c l ^ a f ' t h a t the broad
rad^iig syst
i t y mechani
tremendous
promote em
developing c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can WOJ/IC together t o address these important issues
and set the tonw f o r close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-upJto the climate change conference at The Hague
l a t e r t h i s y e ^ . I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s s p r ^
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1242
THE WHITE HOUSE
i 0
^.36
WASH INGTON
A p r i l 10, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRE^IpENT
FROM:
SAMUEL R. BERG
SUBJECT:
Cover L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t
P r o d i and C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder f o r T r a n s m i t t a l o f
Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change Report on
C l i m a t e Change
Purpose
To t r a n s m i t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t P r o d i , and
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder a r e p o r t on greenhouse gas emissions
t r a d i n g by t h e Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change.
Background
You made a m a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t t o
send t h e r e f e r e n c e d r e p o r t t o Tony B l a i r and t h e EU l e a d e r s h i p
w i t h a cover l e t t e r from you. The l e t t e r s you r e q u e s t e d a r e
attached.
The Pew Center r e p o r t a s s e r t s t h a t a worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g program can c u t t h e c o s t s o f r e d u c i n g
greenhouse gas emissions n e a r l y i n h a l f . The r e p o r t found t h a t
w i t h no t r a d i n g , r e t u r n i n g emissions t o 1990 l e v e l s by 2010
would c o s t t h e seven l a r g e s t i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s $111.6
billion.
With t r a d i n g o n l y among t h e seven Western i n d u s t r i a l
c o u n t r i e s and former Eastern b l p c c o u n t r i e s , t h e t o t a l c o s t o f
t h e emissions r e d u c t i o n s f a l l s by $20 b i l l i o n .
I f trading i s
w o r l d w i d e i n scope, t h e savings from t r a d i n g r i s e t o $49
billion.
The EU has proposed a s e t o f "caps" on emissions t r a d i n g
mechanisms (e.g. t h a t o n l y 50 p e r c e n t o f emissions r e d u c t i o n s
c o u l d be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t r a d i n g ) under t h e Kyoto P r o t o c o l t h a t
would d r i v e up t h e c o s t o f a c h i e v i n g emissions r e d u c t i o n s . The
U n i t e d S t a t e s opposes any such caps on t r a d i n g .
Your l e t t e r
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-
S ^ / ™ ^
�h i g h l i g h t s the m e r i t s o f u n r e s t r i c t e d t r a d i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e
r e p o r t ' s f i n d i n g s , and urges c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e EU on these i s s u e s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d l e t t e r s a t Tabs A, B, and C.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
('
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Gerhard:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body of
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one of the most challenging issues
of t h i s new century. I know our governments
can work together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progress a t the climate change conference a t
The Hague. I look forward t o discussing t h i s
c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
I"!
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Romano:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view that a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your
member c o u n t r i e s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one o f the most
challenging issues o f t h i s new century. I know
our governments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l progress a t the climate change
conference a t The Hague. I look forward t o
discussing t h i s c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you
further.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCur
�THE WHITE HOUSE
r
WASHINGTON
i
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Tony:
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l c l i m a t e
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a g l o b a l
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e c h a l l e n g e o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t by t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l Climate Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study a l s o b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I a p p r e c i a t e your e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g i s s u e s
of t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s s a t t h e c l i m a t e change conference a t
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o d i s c u s s i n g t h i s
c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
With best r e g a r d s ,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET
3235
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Michael Manning,
Robert W i l l i a m s , Matthew S i b l e y , Don G e n t i l e ,
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 10, 2000, 5:45 - 6:02 p.m. EDT
Army-Navy Country Club
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hey Tony.
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hi B i l l .
(U)
(U)
We've h i t a snag.
Yes, we sure have.
£6}
f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
This i s as much t o get your thoughts and advice, B i l l .
I'm s o r r y
f o r t r o u b l i n g you. This i s the s i t u a t i o n . When Trimble l a s t
went t o h i s U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Council, they passed a r e s o l u t i o n
t h a t s a i d they couldn't go back i n t o the Executive again unless
he r e t a i n e d the name o f the RUC i n some way.
The President: Yes, I saw i t .
resolution.
fG}
I even got a copy o f t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
GDCRBT
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/11/10
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
�CECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Yes, what I t h i n k , what I'm concerned about and
what t h e SDLP i s a l s o concerned about i s t h a t t h e u n i o n i s t s w i l l
c a l l i t RUC and the C a t h o l i c s won't j o i n i t . I t h i n k t h e SDLP i s
w o r r i e d t h e r e won't be any C a t h o l i c s t o j o i n because t h e
u n i o n i s t s w i l l use t h i s t o r e f e r t o themselves as RUC. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: Let me t e l l you what bothers me about your
difficulties.
I worry t h a t i f you put t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n through
l i k e t h i s and Sinn Fein withdraws t h e i r o f f e r , we are worse o f f
than i f we're i n a stalemate and we j u s t h o l d t h e IRA t o t h e i r
o f f e r . Ever since t h e l a s t impasse, I thought t h e u n i o n i s t s had
the complete h i g h ground. Now i t looks t o me l i k e the IRA and
Sinn Fein have t h e h i g h ground, e s p e c i a l l y i f the SDLP s t i c k s
w i t h them r h e t o r i c a l l y .
I f you can't get t h i s done, the question
i s , what do you want t o give up r i g h t now? I'm very w o r r i e d
about i t . We can t r y again, but we've been working on Sinn Fein
a l l day and we haven't g o t t e n any f u r t h e r than you. Now they
want t o change the Patten r e p o r t , t h a t ' s t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e . I
know what t h e counter-arguments are; i t ' s a lousy deal e i t h e r
way.
E i t h e r way, I f e e l so badly f o r you. The o n l y t h i n g t h a t
bothers me i s the SDLP. No matter what the u n d e r t a k i n g i s , the
u n i o n i s t s would continue t o r e f e r t o i t i n t h a t way i n every nono f f i c i a l channel p o s s i b l e and t h a t would keep the C a t h o l i c s from
joining.
The p r a c t i c a l problem i s they're two hardheaded sides
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O V
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�CECRET
p o u r i n g o l d grudges i n t o l i t t l e words. We can t a l k t o them
again, b u t I have next t o no hope t h e y ' l l change and i f they
don't, what's c o n f r o n t i n g you i s what you're b e t t e r o f f g i v i n g
up. I ' d r e a l l y be w o r r i e d i f these IRA guys withdraw t h e i r o f f e r
before we p u t i t on t h e t a b l e . Would you want something e l s e , a
t i t f o r t a t deal? Any way, can you buy y o u r s e l f another 24 hours
to keep working on t h i s ? ( &
-)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I ' l l keep t h i n k i n g about i t some more t o come up
w i t h a n y t h i n g e l s e . I r e a l l y have only been pondering i t f o r
about 3 0 minutes because I thought i t would g e t worked o u t . Our
guys pounded Sinn Fein today. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
p o s i t i o n . f€4-
They f e e l they're i n a v e r y s t r o n g
The President: Yes, they f i n a l l y got t h e h i g h ground back. I
know t h e I r i s h community here was so r e l i e v e d when t h e IRA s a i d
t h a t they would commit themselves t o p u t arms beyond use; before
t h a t , t h e I r i s h here were i n t h e uncomfortable p o s i t i o n o f
f i n d i n g themselves d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h Sinn Fein. Now they f e e l
they k i n d o f came across and took a huge step forward. I am
sympathetic t o Trimble's p o s i t i o n , but I don't know what t o do
r i g h t now. I sure worry about t a k i n g t h e r i s k t h e IRA w i l l take
the o f f e r o f f t h e t a b l e and I don't know what I would do i f I
were you. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CECRET
The President: That's why you t r y t o buy a l i t t l e time. Do you
t h i n k t h e r e i s any chance i f Trimble and Adams met, they could
work t h i s out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I w i l l t r y t o buy time.
would f i l l you i n on t h e s i t u a t i o n . fe}
I j u s t thought I
The President: Do you t h i n k t h a t i f Trimble and Adams met, they
could work i t out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
them t o do t h a t .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e , and may be worth g e t t i n g
EQ 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
The President: That's why I wondered. The problem i s i f they
had a meeting and i t leaked, then everyone would t r y t o s p i n t h e
crap out o f i t i f t h e r e was no r e s o l u t i o n . I t ' s t h e s o r t o f
t h i n g t h a t might work i f they looked a t each o t h e r face t o face,
assuming- no p r a c t i c a l impact and assuming you can work i t out
w i t h t h e C a t h o l i c s t o n o t refuse t o j o i n , o r even have Hume
t h e r e . They've been a t loggerheads f o r so long and come so f a r .
I t would be t r u l y h e a r t b r e a k i n g , since they made t h i s b i g move on
decommissioning. Maybe you could f i n d a way out o f i t , i f they
sat down and t a l k e d , maybe they could work t h i s out. I don't
know i f t h i s i s t r u e , I'm j u s t t h i n k i n g . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t ' s worth t r y i n g .
anything's worth t r y i n g . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
w i l l i n g ? fG}
To be honest,
Do you t h i n k you ought t o ask t o see i f they were
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I do. fG}
The President: Do you t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r o r worse i f Hume
were there? f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t : Yeah, I know. I f he has t h i s language, he can
say I'm d e c i d i n g the requirement has been s a t i s f i e d , and we are
going t o stand up t h e government. I f t h e language i s n o t i n
t h e r e , then he has t o a c t u a l l y c a l l them a l l back t o g e t h e r and
get another v o t e . fe}
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
E x a c t l y . fe}
The President: Well, l e t me t a l k t o our guys about t h i s and
t h i n k about whether you want t o ask them t o get t o g e t h e r and have
anybody t h e r e , o r j u s t t h e two o f them alone i n a room t a l k i n g .
I t h i n k they b o t h r e a l i z e they have come a long way and they both
have u n r u l y elements i n t h e i r c o a l i t i o n s . I t would be a t r a v e s t y
t o l e t t h i s s l i p away now, and they might be able t o f i n d an
answer among themselves t h a t we haven't thought o f . They know
t h e i r needs b e t t e r than we t h i n k we know t h e i r needs. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Yes. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I can't b e l i e v e there's not a l e g a l way o r
u n d e r t a k i n g capable o f e l i m i n a t i n g t h a t problem. fe}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s -- t h e u n i o n i s t s , when they
passed t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , what d i d they have i n mind? They
b a s i c a l l y d i d n ' t want t o erase t h e r o l e t h e RUC h i s t o r y played,
and pretend t h a t Northern I r e l a n d was independent and not a p a r t
of Great B r i t a i n ? fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I wonder i f there's some way f o r Burhside t o work
out some s o r t o f statement t h a t would be s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a s s u r i n g
t o Sinn Fein, so they would be a b s o l u t e l y sure t h e C a t h o l i c s
would be comfortable j o i n i n g t h i s f o r c e . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
That's a p o s s i b i l i t y .
(£}
The P r e s i d e n t : I f they're not j u s t w o r r i e d about t h e words, b u t
the p r a c t i c a l impact, t h e r e might be some way f o r people t h a t
supported t h i s t o h e l p . That's another t h i n g I t h i n k t h a t works
on them. One o f t h e t h i n g s I learned about Adams and McGuinness,
they were very w o r r i e d t h a t t h e i r requirements would cause
Trimble t o f a l l .
I f you can get some o f these guys who caused
these problems t o help solve i t by some s o r t o f statement o r
CECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�CECRET
something, maybe even something else t h a t c o u l d be adopted t h a t
Trimble, g i v e n t h e support o f these guys, c o u l d take t o h i s
people, t h a t might a l s o work. There's a theology o f t h e words,
which you may not ever be able t o solve, and t h e p r a c t i c a l impact
of them, which you might be able t o solve, o r a t l e a s t some basis
on which Trimble c o u l d t a l k t o Adams and work t h i s o u t . My
i n s t i n c t i s t h i s seems t o be t h e r e a l l a s t straw and a s i t u a t i o n
where Adams might c l a i m t h a t Trimble i s t r y i n g t o change t h e
importance o f t h e Patten r e p o r t . Maybe t h a t ' s t h e answer. Maybe
the sponsors of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n could do something t h a t would
support Trimble and reassure Adams. That and having them meet
t o g e t h e r are t h e o n l y ideas I've got r i g h t now. I've had a
hundred conversations w i t h Gerry Adams and I c o u l d have another
one, b u t based on what my guys say, I t h i n k I ' d be b e t t e r o f f
c a l l i n g him and u r g i n g him t o meet p e r s o n a l l y w i t h Trimble and
u r g i n g t h e same t h i n g on Trimble. There are two t h i n g s t h e r e .
There i s psychology and theology, where Sinn Fein and t h e IRA
t h i n k they have t h e h i g h ground and then t h e r e i s t h e p r a c t i c a l ,
and I t h i n k , understandable f e a r t h a t no matter how you s l i c e
t h i s , t h e people who've been t h e dominant p a r t y w i l l f i n d a way
to use t h i s t o make i t very uncomfortable f o r t h e C a t h o l i c s t o be
a p a r t o f t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n , which w i l l undermine a l l t h e g r i e f
you've taken f o r l e t t i n g people out o f p r i s o n . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t h i n k there may be something i n t h a t .
The P r e s i d e n t : You want t o t h i n k about i t and I ' l l have my
people be i n touch w i t h your guys? I know i t ' s l a t e f o r you, b u t
i t ' s e a r l y here and I w i l l be up l a t e , so I can s t a r t e a r l y i n
the morning, i f you want. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r : That's very h e l p f u l ; t h e r e may be
something i n t h a t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Talk t o your f o l k s and have them get back t o us
and i f you want me t o make c a l l s a t t h e crack o f dawn, I w i l l be
happy t o do t h a t . Get some r e s t . The worst t h i n g we can do i s
having everybody where they can't t h i n k anymore. I t ' s n o t so
l a t e f o r me and I've got a l o t o f work t o do, and I ' l l be happy
to do t h a t , so I can make t h e e a r l y morning c a l l . Let me know,
fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t :
I ' l l l e t you know. (e}
Goodbye, Tony.
(U)
-- End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
3617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y Leader
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
R i c h a r d Norland
May 27, 2000, 11:57-11:59 a.m. EDT
The Residence
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President
Hello.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The
illo.
(U)
(U)
(U)
President
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t
brilliant.
tyt]
Mr. Trimble: It is kind of unfortunate other people were
incensing their delegates, and there was more than a little bit
of dubious practices going on. There were some discrepancies in
the voting figures, and I have to see if we can't give ourselves
a bigger margin next time. (jt)
The
President:
Good.
I ' l l go back t o t h e o t h e r s on t h e CBMs.
t#
Mr.
Trimble:
Good.
I need a success s t o r y q u i c k l y .
(^T
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l go t o work on i t . But you were b r i l l i a n t .
I f o l l o w e d you on BBC and UTV. They may have t o g i v e you a
second Nobel Peace P r i z e .
^
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t was q u i t e a weekend.
CONFIDDNTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/30/10
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDENTIAL
2
The P r e s i d e n t : The w e i r d t h i n g about p o l i t i c s i s t h a t sometimes
you have t o t a k e more g r i e f from y o u r f r i e n d s than y o u r enemies.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes.
W e l l , i t ' s good o f you t o c a l l .
Okay.
Thanks, f r i e n d .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
•GOM-FTPFNTTftTi
--
(U)
�-eONFIDENTEAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn F e i n Leader Gerry Adams (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Sean T a r v e r , Amy Swarm, and
R i c h a r d Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 12:20-12:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H i , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o . (U)
(U)
Gerry, i t ' s been a good day. (U)
Good day, s u r e l y .
Thanks f o r a l l your h e l p .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Glad we c o u l d do i t .
I'm r e a l l y pleased. I
hated t o see T r i m b l e have t o go back t o a l l h i s c r a z i e s , b u t i t
came o u t okay. ^ 0
Mr. Adams: I t c o n t i n u e s t o be. f r u s t r a t i n g and messy. David
T r i m b l e ' s l i n e about " h o u s e - t r a i n i n g " Sinn F e i n doesn't h e l p . I
can l i v e w i t h i t , b u t i t w i l l upset t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u e n c y .
The President: I saw all that, but we've just got to get the
government up and calm everybody down. (j?)
Mr. Adams: You're r i g h t about t h a t . I have a l s o been w o r k i n g on
Downing S t r e e t t o claw back t h e e m a s c u l a t i o n o f t h e P a t t e n
report.
I a c t u a l l y had t o t a l k t o Number 10 on Thursday n i g h t
because we almost l o s t t h e c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measure on t h i s
i s s u e -- t h e IRA were v e r y c l o s e t o i s s u i n g a statement. Any
k i n d o f f o r m a l meeting and we would have l o s t i t . They a r e v e r y
c l e a r . 0?T
The President: I don't think this whole letter thing amounted to
anything. I think we will be all right. [p)
CONFIDENTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 05/30/10
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
iOl'i - OHTS.S/G/iS"
K6H
�CONriDDNTIAL
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
^5
Tbe President: I wanted t o t a l k t o everyone. The main t h i n g i s
to get the government up and keep moving forward on the Patten
Report and on CBMs. I t h i n k Trimble was j u s t traumatized by
having t o deal w i t h a l l those people. Sometimes i n p o l i t i c s our
f r i e n d s are our biggest problem.
Mr. Adams: I said so p u b l i c l y here, but once again we are at
t h i s p o i n t because of your unique understanding. I have been
saying t o people: l e t ' s make sure we get as much progress as we
can w h i l e you are i n the White House. I t i s no accident t h a t
t h i s has happened during your Presidency. Thanks again.
The President:
i t . (pi
Mr. Adams:
Yes. We've got almost e i g h t months, so we can do
We'll need you every day.
The President:
^
Have you given your commencement speech yet?
Mr. Adams: No, I w i l l be g i v i n g i t tomorrow morning.
again. (U)
The President.
Okay. Good bye.
CONFIDENTIAL
Thanks
Thanks f o r a l l your help.
-- End of Conversation --
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
(U)
�CONriDDNTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern o f I r e l a n d
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean T a r v e r and Amy Swarm
May 27, 2000, 12:45-12:49 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
Hey, B e r t i e . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e you, B i l l ?
Congratulations.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
I t was a good day. (U)
I t was a good day i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
The President: Back on St. Patrick's Day, I was a little
worried, but I feel good now. (jtf
Prime Minister Ahern: Trimble worked hard. He had to rally
troops. But it was a good win, because people are with him.
Public opinion was 80 to 20 with him. We now have to get the
Executive up and make as much progress as we can. We need the
republicans and the IRA to make quick gestures, but the key issue
is the Patten issue. Seamus Mallon has come out strongly in
favor of serious amendments. If we don't get into position soon
where they are recommending Catholics to the RUC, then.... It
brings us forward from where we were. {flfT
The P r e s i d e n t :
We j u s t g o t t o g e t t h e government back up and g e t
those CBMs done t o o . That w i l l change e v e r y t h i n g .
The u n i o n i s t s
w i l l c o m p l e t e l y change t h e i r mood when t h a t happens[gap].
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-coNriDENT^L
DecJassify'on?
DECLASSIFIED
1
5/30/10
^ O ^ ' o ^ n
SA/»5 K6V\
�Prime Minister Ahern: I think that has to happen quickly. The
pressure will be back on Trimble. If out of this he gets a quick
move on the CBMs, that will mean a lot. {£?)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Good.
(£0
Prime Minister Ahern: It is a good move. I don't know if anyone
mentioned it, but Mallon is worried about Patten and RUC, but if
we hold our nerve, we should be okay. (jZ)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'll
call
Mallon.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Cheer him up. He i s g o i n g t o see Tony
B l a i r tomorrow, b u t j u s t t o g e t h i s c o n f i d e n c e up. How i s
e v e r y t h i n g w i t h you?
Campaigning?
The President: Hillary is doing well. I think she is going to
win that race. We've got two big issues this week -- China and
[gap] trying to pass the World AIDS initiative. I'm feeling kind
of good. ty?)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
And Mbeki i s over w i t h you? (>Zl
Yes, he was here.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
Give my regards t o H i l l a r y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l .
She was d o i n g g r e a t a g a i n s t G i u l i a n i and
now we have t o do a d i f f e r e n t race. A l had a good week. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That's g r e a t . Thanks f o r t h e c a l l and a l l
y o u r work and i n t e r e s t .
You [gap] been o u t and we do a p p r e c i a t e
it.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay.
Keep i n t o u c h .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
--
«OONP I DENT IAD
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Assembly Deputy
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Seamus M a l l o n (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Seamus M a l l o n
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 1:20-1:21 p.m.
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
(U).
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Hello.
Seamus, how a r e you?
Very w e l l .
EDT
How a r e you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I'm doing fine. I'm just glad the government is
going back up and this is really important and a good sign. I
think it has been a tough time for you. I talked to Tony Blair
today, and he assured me that they are going to go ahead and
implement the Patten report. I think we need to get on with
work.
ijt)
Mr. M a l l o n :
full,
Yes.
We w i l l have t o make sure he implements i t i n
oe-y
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k he w i l l . There a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r him,
b u t I t h i n k he i s i n t e n t on d o i n g i t . Get t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s back
up and t h e n g e t t h e IRA t o do t h e CBMs as promised. (JZT
Mr. M a l l o n :
P a t t e n i s t h e key f a c t o r now.
The President:
I agree with that.
(pf
[pff
Mr. M a l l o n : I am seeing him tomorrow... s e e i n g B l a i r tomorrow and
I w i l l be g i v i n g him a s t r o n g message on i t . j^T"
wariDDHTiM.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
5/30/10
ffi^"?
2o\3 - C>M7>L - H
8/k/l5
K6H
�•CONF I DEMT I AL'
The President: Good. I will do what I can. I had a good talk
with him today. I told him you guys are worried about him
weakening it more, but he understands and I am hopeful, and just
wanted to say congratulations to you today and whatever I can do
to help, I will certainly do it.
tytf
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . We hope t o see you here
soon. I f you can make i t , you w i l l be v e r y welcome, and b r i n g
the g o l f c l u b s w i t h you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I w i l l do i t . (U)
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you f o r e v e r y t h i n g you have done and we l o o k
f o r w a r d t o seeing you soon. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Thanks, f r i e n d .
Thanks, B i l l .
(U)
W e ' l l be seeing you soon. (U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
• COHF I DENT I Air
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Declassified documents concerning Tony Blair
Identifier
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2013-0472-M
Date Available
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9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Tony Blair, specifically on President Clinton's meetings and correspondence with the Prime Minister from 1997 through 2000. Material includes memos, letters, and talking points on a variety of topics, including Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and the European Union Summit. Telcons between President Clinton and various heads of state, including French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, are included.
Creator
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
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2013-0472-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Gerhard Schroeder
Gerry Adams
Jacques Chirac
Jean Chretien
Kosovo
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/73406cef5d9c9d8262367572e972b58a.pdf
0d3784229238fb9edd22dae1c6b19e63
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Library
1200 President Clinton Avenue
Little Rock, AR 72201
Inventory for FOIA Request 2013-1016-F AV
Photographs and Video Recordings Related to 1998 & 1999 Meetings on Kosovo and the
President’s Trip to Kosovo in 1999
Extent
Approximately 1,954 photographs in color and black & white film processed from 35mm negatives & 4
betacam video tape recordings
Access
Collection is open to all researchers. Access to Clinton Presidential Records is governed by the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552, as amended) and the Presidential Records Act
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. Chapter 22) and therefore records may be restricted in whole or in part in accordance
with legal exemptions.
Copyright
Photographs in this collection that were prepared by officials of the United States government as part of
their official duties are in the public domain. Researchers are advised to consult the copyright law of the
United States (17 U.S.C. Chapter 1) which governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of
copyrighted material.
Provenance
Official records of William Jefferson Clinton’s presidency are housed at the Clinton Presidential Library
and administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of
the Presidential Records Act (PRA).
Processed by
Staff Archivist, 2013
Scope and Content
The material in FOIA 2013-1016-F are a selective, not necessarily all inclusive, body of documents
responsive to the topic of the FOIA. Researchers should consult the archivist about related materials.
FOIA request 2013-1016-F includes four responsive master tape video recordings from the White House
Television Office.
The responsive Clinton Presidential records consist of photographs and video recordings pertaining to
meetings and events on Kosovo for the time period processed (1998-1999).
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-1-
�Photographs from Kosovo related meetings in 1998:
President Clinton meeting with Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova in the Oval Office on May 29,
1998
President Clinton meeting with Jim Steinberg and others in the Oval Office on May 29, 1998
Photographs from Kosovo related meetings & events in 1999:
President Clinton meeting in the Cabinet Room with advisers regarding the situation in Kosovo on
March 19, 1999
President Clinton meeting with members of Congress and Senior Staff in the Yellow Oval Room
regarding Kosovo on March 19, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Gen. Henry “Hugh” Shelton, Sec. William Cohen, Sec.
Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, George Tenet and others in the Oval Office on March 20, 1999
(Foreign Policy team)
President Clinton participating in a Kosovo briefing with his Foreign Policy team in the Residence on
March 23, 1999
President Clinton meeting with members of Congress and his Foreign Policy team regarding Kosovo in
the Yellow Oval Room on March 23, 1999
President Clinton receiving a Kosovo briefing in the Oval Office from Gen. Henry “Hugh” Shelton, Sec.
William Cohen, George Tenet, Gen. Donald Kerrick and others on March 23, 1999
President Clinton meeting with Senior Staff and his Foreign Policy team on Kosovo in the Oval Office
on March 25, 1999
President Clinton meeting with his Foreign Policy team on Kosovo in the Oval Office on March 26,
1999
President Clinton receiving a Kosovo briefing by Gen. Henry Shelton and others in the Oval Office on
March 27, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Sec. Madeleine Albright, Gen. Henry Shelton, Sec. William
Cohen, George Tenet and Sandy Berger in the Oval Office on March 27, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Sec. Madeleine Albright, Gen. Henry Shelton, George Tenet,
Sandy Berger, Sec. William Cohen, John Podesta, Jim Steinberg and Steve Ricchetti in the Oval Office
on March 28, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with VP Gore, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Gen. Henry Shelton,
Sandy Berger, George Tenet, Sec. William Cohen, John Podesta, Doug Sosnik and others in the Oval
Office on March 31, 1999
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-2-
�Photographs from Kosovo related meetings & events in 1999:
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with VP Gore, Gen. Henry Shelton, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Sec.
William Cohen, Sandy Berger, John Podesta and Jim Steinberg in the Oval Office on April 1, 1999
President Clinton meeting in the Cabinet Room with Humanitarian Leaders regarding relief efforts in
Kosovo on April 2, 1999 (Participants: Julia Taft, Gen. John “Mike” McDuffie and Eric Schwartz)
President Clinton meeting with his Foreign Policy team on Kosovo in the Cabinet Room on April 2,
1999
President Clinton meeting with his Foreign Policy team on Kosovo in the Oval Office on April 3, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Gen. Henry Shelton, Sandy Berger, Sec. Madeleine Albright,
George Tenet, Jim Steinberg, Gen. Donald Kerrick, Doug Sosnik, Steve Ricchetti and John Podesta in
the Cabinet Room on April 7, 1999
President Clinton meeting Congressional Leaders, Foreign Policy team and Senior Staff regarding
Kosovo in the Cabinet Room on April 12, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with members of Congress, Foreign Policy team and Senior Staff
in the Yellow Oval Room on April 13, 1999
President Clinton attending a meeting on Kosovo with North Atlantic Council (NAC) Heads of State at
the International Trade Center in Washington, DC on April 23, 1999
President Clinton meeting with his Foreign Policy team on Kosovo in the Cabinet Room on April 28,
1999
President Clinton working with advisers on a statement regarding Kosovo in the Oval Office on April
28, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with members of Congress and his Foreign Policy team in the
Yellow Oval Room on April 28, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with VP Gore, Gen. Henry Shelton, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Sec.
William Cohen, Sandy Berger, Leon Fuerth, Jim Steinberg, John Podesta, General Donald Kerrick and
others in the Oval Office on April 29, 1999
President Clinton meeting with Sec. Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Sec. William Cohen, Gen.
Henry Shelton, John Podesta, Leon Fuerth, Richard Holbrooke, Strobe Talbott and others in the
Situation Room on May 10, 1999
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Sandy Berger, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, Gen.
Henry Shelton, Jack Lew, John Podesta, Steve Ricchetti, Leon Fuerth and others in the Cabinet Room
on May 17, 1999
President Clinton meeting in the Cabinet Room on Kosovo with advisers before delivering après
statement on Kosovo on May 20, 1999
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-3-
�Photographs from Kosovo related meetings & events in 1999:
President Clinton meeting on Kosovo with Sec. William Cohen, Sandy Berger, Gen. Henry Shelton,
Gen. Donald Kerrick, Leon Fuerth, Jim Steinberg and John Podesta in the Oval Office on June 10, 1999
President Clinton meeting with Sandy Berger, Lael Brainard, Gene Sperling, Steve Ricchetti, Joe
Lockhart and Jim Steinberg regarding Kosovo at the Hyatt Hotel in Cologne, Germany on June 18, 1999
President Clinton meeting with the Kosovo Transition Council in Pristina, Kosovo on November 23,
1999
President Clinton meeting with United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative Bernard Kouchner and
German Commander of KFOR, Gen. Klaus Renhardt, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Gen.
Wesley Clark and John Podesta at the Pristina Airport on November 23, 1999
President Clinton addressing the people of Ferizaj, Kosovo at the Sports Pavilion on November 23, 1999
Video recordings related to Kosovo meetings & events in 1998 & 1999:
President Clinton having a photo-op meeting with Kosovo Albanian Leader Ibrahim Rugova in the Oval
Office on May 29, 1998
President Clinton addressing the press on Kosovo in the Oval Office on March 25, 1999
President Clinton meeting with Humanitarian Leaders in the Cabinet Room on April 2, 1999
President Clinton addressing the Opening of the 50th Anniversary of NATO Summit Meeting on Kosovo
at the International Trade Center in Washington, DC on April 23, 1999
System of Arrangement
Records that were responsive to this FOIA request were found in two collection areas and two series—
Clinton Presidential Records: Photographs of the White House Photograph Office, and Video
Recordings of the White House Television Office, and the series therein—Photographs Relating to the
Clinton Administration, Video Recordings Relating to the Clinton Administration. Processing is done at
the Folder/Contact sheet level and Folder/Video tape level.
The following is a list of photograph contact sheets/folders processed in response to FOIA 2013-1016-F
Clinton Presidential Records: Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Series: Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Photograph Contact Sheets:
Book 637 (P63600-P63699)
P63611
May 29, 1998
P63615
May 29, 1998
P63619
May 29, 1998
P63620
May 29, 1998
P63621
May 29, 1998
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-4-
�Book 709 (P70800-P70899)
P70863
March 19, 1999
P70865
March 19, 1999
P70866
March 19, 1999
Book 710 (P70900-P70999)
P70912
March 20, 1999
P70913
March 20, 1999
P70914
March 20, 1999
P70934
March 23, 1999
P70935
March 23, 1999
P70936
March 23, 1999
P70937
March 23, 1999
P70940
March 23, 1999
P70944
March 23, 1999
P70945
March 23, 1999
P70970
March 25, 1999
P70973
March 25, 1999
P70974
March 25, 1999
P70975
March 25, 1999
P70976
March 25, 1999
P70977
March 25, 1999
P70978
March 25, 1999
P70986
March 26, 1999
P70987
March 26, 1999
P70989
March 27, 1999
Book 711 (P71000-P71099)
P71051
March 26, 1999
P71052
March 27, 1999
P71065
March 28, 1999
P71066
March 27, 1999
Book 712 (P71100-P71199)
P71149
March 31, 1999
P71154
April 1, 1999
P71185
March 31, 1999
P71186
March 31, 1999
P71192
March 31, 1999
Book 713 (P71200-P71299)
P71284
April 2, 1999
P71285
April 2, 1999
P71286
April 3, 1999
P71296
April 3, 1999
P71297
April 2, 1999
Book 714 (P71300-P71399)
P71332
April 2, 1999
P71353
April 7, 1999
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-5-
�Book 714 (P71300-P71399)
P71360
April 7, 1999
Book 716 (P71500-P71599)
P71534
April 12, 1999
P71545
April 12, 1999
P71547
April 13, 1999
P71560
April 13, 1999
P71563
April 13, 1999
P71577
April 13, 1999
Book 717 (P71600-P71699)
P71602
April 14, 1999
Book 718 (P71700-P71799)
P71778
April 23, 1999
P71795
April 23, 1999
Book 720 (P71900-P71999)
P71968
April 28, 1999
P71969
April 28, 1999
P71977
April 28, 1999
P71978
April 28, 1999
P71979
April 28, 1999
P71980
April 28, 1999
P71997
April 28, 1999
P71998
April 29, 1999
P71999
April 29, 1999
Book 721 (P72000-P72099)
P72000
April 29, 1999
P72008
April 29, 1999
P72010
April 29, 1999
P72021
April 28, 1999
Book 724 (P72300-P72399)
P72315
May 10, 1999
P72317
May 10, 1999
P72321
May 10, 1999
Book 726 (P72500-P72599)
P72514
May 17, 1999
P72572
May 20, 1999
P72573
May 20, 1999
P72574
May 20, 1999
P72575
May 20, 1999
Book 729 (P72800-P72899)
P72889
June 3, 1999
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-6-
�Book 730 (P72900-P72999)
P72902
June 3, 1999
Book 732 (P73100-P73199)
P73144
June 10, 1999
Book 735 (P73400-P73499)
P73461
June 18, 1999
P73465
June 18, 1999
P73466
June 18, 1999
Book 779 (P77800-P77899)
P77805
November 23, 1999
P77820
November 23, 1999
P77821
November 23, 1999
P77822
November 23, 1999
P77823
November 23, 1999
P77824
November 23, 1999
P77825
November 23, 1999
P77836
November 23, 1999
P77837
November 23, 1999
P77838
November 23, 1999
P77839
November 23, 1999
P77840
November 23, 1999
P77842
November 23, 1999
P77844
November 23, 1999
P77849
November 23, 1999
P77850
November 23, 1999
P77851
November 23, 1999
P77852
November 23, 1999
P77863
November 23, 1999
P77864
November 23, 1999
P77867
November 23, 1999
P77868
November 23, 1999
P77869
November 23, 1999
Book 780 (P77900-P77999)
P77936
November 23, 1999
Digital Book 3 (D200-D299)
D234
November 23, 1999
D243
November 23, 1999
D244
November 23, 1999
D245
November 23, 1999
D246
November 23, 1999
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-7-
�Clinton Presidential Records: Video Recordings of the White House Television Office
Series: Video Recordings Relating to the Clinton Administration
Master Tape #08478 (selection/clip #2, TRT: 33 sec.)
Master Tape #09787 (selection/clip #2, TRT: 5:10)
Master Tape #09809 (selection/clip# 5, TRT: 1:22)
Master Tape #09893 (TRT: 10:51)
May 29, 1998
March 25, 1999
April 2, 1999
April 23, 1999
All video run times are approximate.
2013-1016-F
Clinton Library’s web site is http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-8-
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs and Video Recordings Related to 1998 & 1999 Meetings on Kosovo and the President's Trip to Kosovo in 1999 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-1016-F
Description
An account of the resource
Photographs of President Clinton meeting Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova in 1998 at the White House, meeting with foreign policy team and members of Congress on Kosovo throughout 1998 and 1999. Additional photographs include President Clinton visiting Pristina, Kosovo and Ferizaj, Kosovo in November of 1999. Video recordings related to Kosovo related meetings and events include clips of President Clinton meeting with Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahin Rugova at the White House in 1998, President Clinton addressing the press on Kosovo at the White House in 1999, President Clinton meeting with humanitarian leaders at the White House in 1999 and President Clinton addressing the opening of the 50th Anniversary of NATO Summit Meeting on Kosovo in Washington in 1999.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Finding Aid
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Kosovo War
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7a08c3c0a725fa580ba8fb57cd3f8192.pdf
738207459824b2889af79e85024da7ab
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�Serb Compliance with UN Security Council ResolutionE.o. 13526. 3.5(c)
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance
Complying
Comment
Security forces
operations
continue
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease-fire
Improve the humanitarian
situation
c
Relief centers
established but
people too
frightened to
return
Enter a meaningful dialogue
on a political solution
c
Willing to grant
only limited
autonomy
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Security forces
operations
continue
e
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Some incidents
of interference
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free access
for humanitarian organizations
Some people
returning but
many homes
destroyed; some
interference with
relief convoys
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
r
©
No agreement on
a timetable
Some minor
incidents
Provide security for international
monitors
Cooperate with the war crimes
tribunal
e
Has not turned
over suspects or
allowed
investigators to
work without
hindrance
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved iri
mistreatraent of civilians and
destruction of property
©
No charges made
against any
member of
security forces
Seerglo. 13526. 3.S(fc)
364819P65 8118
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance Complying
Comment
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease fire
Security forces have halted offensive
operations in most areas, but shelling
continued near Suva Reka and
Komorane on 30 September.
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Some military and police forces
withdrawing to barracks. Two alleged
massacres on 26 Sept. KDOM reported
stories of continued Serb repression
against refugees and health providers.
Provide security for international
monitors
KDOM reports security is adequate.
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Access improving; KDOM reports no
restrictions on 29 Sep.
Improve the humanitarian
situation
Government aid centers established
and stocked, but fighting still causing
more IDPs.
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free
access for humanitarian
organizations
Many IDPs reluming, but many unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict areas.
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
Belgrade has expressed willingness to
grant limited autonomy but no
agreement on a timetable.
©
Enter a meaningful dialogue on a
political solution
Belgrade has named a new provisional
government for Kosovo without the
approval or cooperation of the current
shadow government but says it is willing
to work towards elections agreed upon
by all sides.
Cooperate with war crimes
tribunal
Granted visas to one ICTY team member
but denied three others week of 21 Sept.
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians and
destruction of property
No charges reported against any
member of security forces.
e
36SOO0P6S 10-98
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�r .vov. :y.:; c . [ t
iMON'
5E
9. 28 98
! 0 : 5 2 ST. : 0 : 4 b •N'J.
;'5'JOJt>:^r
SECRET
E.D, 13526, 3.5lc)
28 September ]998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Rwlottetfi;'
y P:
2. Cease security forces'
actions affecting civilians
and withdraw forces used
in repression of civilians
mm
X
,•....:.;. •.„•.. ,..
ConimoDt [
Security forces operations continued up until
Sunday.
X
Security forces operations coolinued up until
Sunday.
• No:
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
#01
3. Provide security for
international montiors
X
Some minor incidents
4. AUowfreedom,of
movetnent for international
monitors
X
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
X
Relief centers established but people too
frightened to return.
X
Some people returning but many homes
destroyedvsotne interference with relief
convoys
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permitfreeaccess
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
Some incidents of interference
Has expressed willingness to grant limited
autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
X
Belgrade says will name a new provisional
government for Kosovotoday-astep which
does not bode well for cooperation between
Belgrade and the current shadow
government
Has not turned over suspects or allowed
investigators to work without hindrance
10. Bring to justice
members of the security
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
X
C I T N LIBRARY P O O O Y
LN O
HTCP
EjO. 13526, 3.5(b)
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�FSOM CMM
3ITE 3B
SECRET
d.O. 13526. 3.5ft)
forces involved in
mistreaunent of civilians
and destnjction of property
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
E.O. 13526. 3.5(c)
O tJ*— IVXJ t
�FROM CMN SITE 3A
(THU) 10. I " 98 1 6 : 59/ST. 1 6 : 58/NO. 3760655465 P
0. 13526, 3.5(:)
1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
#04
,
. 5 s l H l | t R W 3 « SBWIWttiUMKi
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
x->
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians:
and withdraw forces used,
in repressioniof civilians
3. Provide security for
international monitors
4. Allow, freedom of
movementfor international
monitors.
KDOM reports security is adequate.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
10. Bring to justice .
members of the security
forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians
and destruction of property.
GeneralfrceJamof movement except in conflict
artasl
[Access improving; KDOM
reports ho restrictions on 29 Sepi(U)
Government aid centers established andJlOiked,
butfightingstill causing more IDPs\
Orahovac mayor claims new governmental aic
center will soon open in Ratkovac, west of
Orahovac. (U).
Many IDPs returning, but rn<tny unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict o/eoif
KDOM reports good freedom of movement for
NGOs and aid organizations on 2? Sep. (U)
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permit free access •
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
KDOM witnessed no fighting on 30 Sept, but
diplomats reported continued shelling near Suva
Reka and Komorane. Inaccessible terrain near
Suva Reka has slowed conclusion of operations.
Militai^aad policeforce's: COTtinu^wtbdrawirig;
lo batracks. Two alleged massacres on 26 Sept.
KDOMreportedstories of continued Serb
repressioniigiainst refugees and health providers.
1
X
Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant
limited autonomy but no agreement on a
limctable.
X
Belgrade has named a new provisional V ,
gbvernment for Kosovo without te approval or
cooperation of the current shadow government
btil says it is willing to work towards Sections
agreed upon by all sides.
Granted visas to one ICTY te»m member but
denied three others week of 21 Sept.
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces.,
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
EjO. 13526, 3 ^ c )
SECRET
4
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SECRET CODEWORD
July 19, 1999
1500 EDT
KOSOVO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY # 199
Diplomatic Developments
Kosovar Albanian officials have developed a plan to cover all of Kosovo with radio-television
transmitters at a cost of $60 millionl
E.O. 13526. 1.4(c)
Jul 99
ythe station would not serve any political party, group or organization. (S€)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Presidential Decision Directive
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d20dd3e8a48b7e084accd4a5f24741de.pdf
77b43e1ec9e6629d26c4da7299817ed3
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�Page 1 of 3
37.80F3B6.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 6:04:35 PM
FROM
Kaufman, Stuart J.
CLASSIFICATION
•SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
Memos for POTUS call [GECRET]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBONCOPY
TEXT BODY
Drafts attached and saved in G:/Documents, under package no. 4523.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth
RECOMMENDATION
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�3780F3B6.FIN
Page 2 of 3
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
-SECRET
•SECRET
9ECRET'4523
SECRET"
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed a
great deal of
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
37S0F3B6.FIN
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, have linked the two tracks, and are using our desire for quick
agreement as
leverage for achieving a better deal on the long-term structure (Track
IDAttachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
-SECRET•SECRET
•SECRET 4523
SECRETClassified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(bXd)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Exchange
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 9:46:44 PM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
FW: URGENT ~ Yeltsin Call Package ESECRETf
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Bartlett, L. June
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Jacobson, Tracey A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Powell, Elliott
Rice, Edward A.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Brody, Richard J.
Saunders, Richard M.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Schulte, Gregory L.
CARBON COPY
TEXT BODY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
Per Mr. Steinberg and Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Pascual made changes in
the
"strobe note" and the "tps" documents. The changes are now reflected
in the attached documents. Also per Mr. Pascual, the Situation Room
will follow the below instructions, using these altered documents.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Saturday, June 12,
1999 6:58 PM
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
D
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA Russia/Ukraine;
Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.;
Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package [SECRET]
Importance: High
1.
SITUATION ROOM -- please secure fax this note and the
attachments
to Sandy, Jim and Leon Fuerth. Please page Greg Schulte and read
them to him if he is not in the office.
2. Sandy, Jim, Leon,
Greg - attached is the Yeltsin call package and a note to Strobe.
Would appreciate your sending any comments to the Sit Room. Please
call if you have questions. If you concur, I recommend that the
Sit Room secure fax to Strobe the attached not to him from Sandy
and the points (and NOT the memos).
3. SITUATION ROOM -- assuming
Sandy et al concur, please fax to Strobe the note from Sandy and
the points once you get comments. Strobe will need these as early
in his day as possible. You will see that we have asked Strobe to
send back comments. If you get these, please insert in "track changes"
mode. If Strobe sends a complete re-write, could you please type
this into the system. Please call me once you get his comments.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4 2 3
5
s r b b o r i s
c a l
l.
d o c
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth (they have not yet cleared)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET 4523
•SECRET.
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 10
5781A14C.FIN
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed
tremendous
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, may link the two tracks together. That, ironically, is Russia's
worst
option since it would create facts on the ground that make Russian
participation
all the harder to work out.
Attachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
2
OECRET
SECRET
SCCRET 4523
•SECRET
Classified by: Pascual
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 6 of 10
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Despite the
difficulties we face now, it is important to remember how far Russia
has come in
seven years and how far we have come in our relationship.
* That very progress makes the current situation in Kosovo all the
more serious.
It would be tragic to jeopardize all we've accomplished bilaterally and
in
bringing peace to Kosovo.
* Have to say that I'm disappointed in so many mixed signals these
past days:
Russia commits not to deploy, then deploys; orders withdrawal then
doesn't; says
it's a mistake, then claims it was authorized.
* I have no interest in blaming anyone, Boris, but these conflicting
signals are
hurting Russia's image, and it is making people question the value of
our work
together.
* But I also said that I would always offer solutions along with citing
problems,
and that is what I want to focus on now.
* Here's my goal: to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia,
allows
it to participate in the international security force, and is consistent
with
unity of command and effectiveness, on which we have all agreed.
* Our teams worked day and night and have come up with a two-track
approach. The
ideas are sound, and I want to authorize our people to finalize the
details and
start to implement.
Track 1
* First, let's agree on the short-term proposal our generals have
worked out to
start to deploy forces together tomorrow.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 7 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
* Second, let's give our people instructions to find a solution as fast as
possible that meets Russia's concerns and ours for an effective
security force
under unified command.
Version A - Offer Neutral and U.S.-Russian Sector
* Strobe and his team have put two options on the table, and your
ministers have
the details.
* One is to create a neutral sector with a Finn commander and a
Russian deputy
commander. When you study this, you'll see we listened carefully to
your
concerns about reporting to NATO.
* I also think that there is tremendous merit in the U.S. and Russia
working
together. So I'm ready to create, Boris, a joint U.S.-Russian sector.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Version B - Offer U.S.-Russian Sector
* In this spirit, Boris, I want to suggest a joint U.S.-Russian sector
where we
would work together.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Closing
* Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the
first track.
Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work
side-by-side
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 8 of 10
to protect the peace.
* The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals
to agree
on the details on the basis of our conversation.
* If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace
settlement work in
Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in
Cologne.
If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2
* There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a
security vacuum
to form that would jeopardize the peace.
* We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia.
So let's use
it.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on
Track 2. My
bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2
* I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay
focused on an
effective force with unified command and control.
2
CONTIDDNTIAfe
jCOMFIDEMTMcfc
COlitHDEUTIAL 4523
JTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
JCQNFIDD
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4533
s t r o b
e note.doc
FAX FOR STROBE TALBOTT FROM JIM STEINBERG
Strobe -
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 9 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
I am sending you a very preliminary draft of talking points for the
President's
call with Yeltsin. As you discussed with Carlos, I think you should
use these
points to preview with Minister Ivanov what the Russians might
accept on Track 1
and Track 2. Sandy still has not seen the points, so they may
obviously change.
On Track 1,1 know your priorities are to get commitment to move
ahead with an
SFOR model and to delink Track 1 from Track 2. That sounds like the
right
approach.
On Track 2, we have given you two models to work with: a neutral
zone and a
U.S.-Russia sector. As you requested, you have authority to explore
both
options. We'll need your advice on how to best play this issue in the
President's call-whether to propose version A or B in the points, or
simply
another variant. While we want to move the agenda forward, we also
want to avoid
overloading the circuits with Yeltsin.
On process, what would be most helpful is if your team could send the
Situation
Room after your meeting with Ivanov either pen and ink changes or a
revised
draft. If that does not work, call Carlos or the Situation Room and
give edits
or suggestions directly to them. If we need a wholesale rethink after
your
meetings, then we should talk. In any case, your report prior to the call
would
be most helpful. (The call is at 9:00 EST; 8:30 pre-brief.)
Regards,
Jim
1
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 10 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
SECRET'
SEeRET
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37820922.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 1:48:14 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
COI'tFIDEHTIAfc'
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin Talking Points [CQETriDENTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37820922.FIN
Page 2 of 4
TEXTBODY
p
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
e r
y
o u r
request...
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37820922.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37820922.FIN
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
R78261F3.FIN
Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:07:13 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin TPs ^CONriDCNTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
I need to addfireproofersfromtoday's call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
J
u n e
14 B N Y call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Pleased to talk again after our good conversation yesterday. Our
hard work
together brought an end to conflict in Kosovo. We made the most of
our
cooperation and friendship and kept our disagreementsfromspoiling
everything.
* We must nOw work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground in Kosovo. Know that's
important to
both of us.
* We agreed yesterday that we'd talk again today to review today's
discussion
between our generals inside Kosovo on how they're going to
cooperate. Also want
to address two other issues.
* We contacted all necessary people on our side, glad their meeting
was
productive and resolved situation at the airport in Pristina. Minister
Ivanov
told us instructions had been given to Zvarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Glad our people got this
CLINTON LIBRARY
"CP
O OY
�R78261F3.FIN
Page 2 of 3
issue
fixed. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. Boris, this is a really
serious
problem. We need to instruct our people to get this done today.
* Want to come back to the other part of our conversation yesterday.
You made
proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal that we need to resolve the
shorter-term issue of cooperation with the Russian troops already
inside Kosovo.
* I would like us to say yes to both proposals. On the Russian
contingent
already in Kosovo, key step now is to fold these forces into KFOR
under unified
command.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov has told us that this approach is acceptable
and that
appropriate orders have been issued. We need to instruct key military
officials
to move forward and implement these proposals.
* Regarding our meeting, I'm looking forward to seeing you on
Sunday in Cologne,
or outskirts of Cologne. For that meeting to be a success, I think it
would be
useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet in next day or two to talk things over and
make some
concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in
Kosovo over
the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By the time of our meeting
in Cologne,
confident that we will have a well defined proposal to review.
2
GONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDCNTIAL
CONriDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
R78261F3.FrN
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
37826A8D.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:43:56 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
CQNEIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(b)(d)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS-YELTSIN CALL (6/13)
[CONriDCMTLtt]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate
you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way
in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another
important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work
together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements,
serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally
hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work
well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear
to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult
moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for
the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world
that we are working together.
* There is one matter I need to
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of3
37826A8D.FIN
raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at
Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN)
to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond
with the following points:
This situation arose because, until
now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions
for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.
As
President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon
as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions
for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest
of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of
the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This
will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security
Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the
short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy
forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have
been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some
promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important,
even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals,
if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne
one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should
intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some
instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
* Let's have
them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other
organizational
issues.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37826A8D.FIN
Page 3 of3
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can
resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the
time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public
statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational
commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM
Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris,
I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything
I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do,
too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's
team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals
on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in
Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and
interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three
things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2)
We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the
perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
* We need
to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
3-7827747.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:38:13 PM
FROM
Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
fyi
Original Message
From: Cheramie, Don E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation
Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points ECOMFIDEMTIAL]
Per your
request...
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT TPnotCS .doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of4
37827747.FIN
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827747.FIN
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827747.FIN
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37827A33.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:50:41 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAfc
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call [COl'TIDEMTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Some suggestions. I hate to be a nudge, but I think the tone is
a little too negative. I've tried to soften. Unless there's sugar-coating,
we risk enraging Yeltsin who's already stirred up about anything
Kosovo-related.
Also, we cannot have the President do technical
issues or even technical terms that don't translate well into Russian
with this guy. It won't work. He'll check out of the call and we'll
get nothing.
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: Points for Yeltsin Call tCONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW - made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires
to adjust based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg would appreciate your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
^ B N Y call tps_.doc
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Y
H CP
�37827A33.FIN
Page 2 of 4
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over the meeting in Cologne. We must instruct our
people to fix
this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827A33.FIN
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deal with the
Russian
forces already in Kosovo. It is based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia.
We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our troops cooperating on
the
ground together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on all these fronts, we can get this issue under
control
and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827A33.FIN
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
into KFRO
because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would
jeopardize the
peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the command
arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFTPfiNTIAL
CONFIDENTjAL
CaNFIDENTIAfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY DU O O Y
CP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 5
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:52:25 PM
FROM
Schulte, Gregory L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call ^^NFTPFNTTATr]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Weiss, Andrew S.
TEXT BODY
Pis see some suggested toughening up. I'll trust you to de-toughen,
if you think my additions would be counterproductive. But I think
we need to tell Boris that what Russia is doing could wreak the peace,
and put his own soldiers at risk. We might also need to add hints
that he needs to get his military under control.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999
9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: Points
for Yeltsin Call ECONTIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW -made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires to adjust
based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg ~ would appreciate
your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT Junel4BNYcalltps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
^CLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
�Page 2 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite - with our forces in the middle.
* There were already report of the KLA preparing to attack Russian
forces, since
the KLA thought that your forces had come in to protect Serb forces.
We've made
clear to the Albanians that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. Minister Ivanov told us you gave instructions to
Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of the
issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious and
potentially
dangerous. It's already cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it
could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break
down. We
must instruct our people to fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Page 3 of 5
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo until we agree on a
plan. But
every day there are more reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo. I
know
that you wouldn't let your military do this - it would be an act
tantamount to
war.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really set us at odds, and it is damaging Russia's
credibility.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the
fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on both these fronts — implementing the
interim proposal
to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our
defense and
foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
week — we can
get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
side-by-side.
CONFIDENTIAL
•CQMFIDENTIAL
-CONFIDENTIAL
•eONriBENTTTtfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 1 of 6
Exchange Mai
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 12:24:04 AM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Schrader, Joel M.
McGee, Jenny A.
CARBON COPY
Chastain, George M.
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Monday,
June 14, 1999 12:18 AM
To: Chastain, George M.
Subject: FW: Draft
TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONriDEl'JTIAL]
Importance: High
George
I
read the Yeltsin talking points to Berger on the Stu III. He dictated
the changes, which I added and e-mailed to all relevenat parties
(as shown below). Based on this, and the late hour, we did not fax
a revised copy to Berger. Called Steinberg. He said he doesn't
need to see the points until morning. We faxed a copy to Talbott.
Berger and Steinberg will get copies in their morning take. Can't
confirm if ExecSec has staffed them to the President's Staff Sec
yet.
Original Message-—
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 11:52 PM
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 6
37829E26.FIN
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl
Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory
L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M ; Davidson, Leslie K.;
@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin
Call [CONnDENTIAl]
Importance: High
Mr. Berger's changes are
reflected in the attached copy.
Original Message
From: Pascual,
Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM
To: @WHSR - WH
Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: ©RUSSIA - RussiaAJkraine;
Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.;
Davidson,
Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Draft TPs for
Yeltsin Call [CONFIDCNTIALj
Importance: High
SIT ROOM
Please
send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.
Attached
is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins
and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg
will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and
Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after
the VP-Stepashin call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
1
4
B
m
call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 3 of 6
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarsin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the
meeting in
Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct
our people to
fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright
yesterday evening.
* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 4 of 6
to resolve
these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further
unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made,
Russia's
credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have
a
serious impact on our relationship.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo.
It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it
works; it's the
fastest way to get ourRussian and American troops cooperating on the
ground
together over the next week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense
and foreign
ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week ~ we
can get this
issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37'829E26.FIN
Page 5 of 6
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are
not part
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 6 of 6
37'829E26.FIN
of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect
Serb forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
•CQMHBENTIAL
CONFIDaffhtfr
CONFIDCNTIAL
CQNriDENTIAE
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 1 of 4
Exchange M a i
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 8:19:41 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
COWIDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONriDENTIAL}
TO
Dames, Victoria J.
Ficklin, John W.
Kaplan, Dean M.
Konrad, Elizabeth M.
Marsh, Thomas S
Porter, Pete
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.(Records)
Starks, Tali T.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13,1999 9:39 PM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW:
June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONFIDENTI AL]
These were the points
actually used for the call.
Original Message
From: Cheramie,
Don E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points
[CONFIDENTIAfc.]
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13S26
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 2 of 4
Per your request.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership - and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of4
37830D9F.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 4 of 4
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 5
•3783179B.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:02:17 AM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)(x6)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2024
SUBJECT
Updated Yeltsin TPs [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
CARBON COPY
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Hurley, C. Michael
Moyn, Samuel A.
Quinn, Mary E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Segal, Jack D.
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Saunders, Richard M.
Brody, Richard J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�.3783179B.FIN
Page 2 of 5
TEXT BODY
PLEASE PASS ASAP TO SANDY AND JIM
Below version incorporates Jim's
fixes as well as VP-Stepashin call. Strobe has cleared.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
June 14 BNY call tps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Vice President and Stepashin had
good call
this morning. Clearly, no issue is more important than Kosovo to
sustaining our
cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will not be under control or
demilitarize, and the
conflict in Kosovo will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the
middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problem at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions
to resolve the
airport problem.
* Your representatives have told us that instructions were given to the
Russian
military to reach agreement on procedures for the airport.
* Despite what we asked for yesterday, problem at airport still isn't
fixed.
This is serious. General Zavarzin said today he was not there to work
things
out, only to listen. And he insisted on Russian control of airport.
* That won't do. Both the Ahtisaari-Chemomyrdin agreement and
UNSCR
specifically call for unity of command. It will be impossible to go on
to other
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 5
.3783179B.FIN
questions while this issue is pending.
* This problem will cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it could
ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down.
We must
instruct our people tofixthis today,
[pause for response]
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Vice President and
Albright
have been told by counterparts that there will be no new Russian
deployments to
Kosovo without mutual agreement. Let me underscore continuing
importance of this
issue. We also believe sending Russian forces to Serbia would be
[provocative
move][very serious matter].
* * Boris, this issue can really become a big stumbling block and will
send a
confusing signal about Russia's goals in Kosovo.
* Appreciate PM Stepashin's and FM Ivanov's assurances on this
issue, even in
past few hours. They have worked hard to resolve these issues.
* However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further unilateral
deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made, Russia's
credibility in the
free world will be greatly diminished and it will have a serious impact
on our
relationship.
[pause for response]
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I think we cansay yes to your proposal and to mine.
* Both Vice President and Stepashin and Albright and Ivanov have
agreed, Boris,
on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo. It is based on
what you and I
worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get
our Russian
and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next
week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 5
3783179B.FIN
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne later this week. For that meeting to be a success, we need to
give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations
to us on how
we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your
people and mine
have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting
there.
Let's have our defense ministers meet there.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams
could present to
you and me a well defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams
meet to
prepare for our meeting ~ we can get this issue under control and help
make
Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3783179B.FIN
Page 5 of 5
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not
part of
KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb
forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
•GQNFIDENTIAb
-CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
378320DC.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:41:46 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2009
SUBJECT
FW: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [CONTIDENTIAL]
TO
Bartlett, L. June
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Taken care of. Saved to G:/EXECSEC as Yeltsin Jun 14.doc
Original
Message
From: Hachigian, Nina L.
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999
9:32 AM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @NSA
- Natl Security Advisor
Subject: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [€QNFiDEWTlAfcj
APPROVED BY JS AND SRB--PLEASE TAKE TO STAFF
SECRETARY ASAP.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT D
o c
l
rfoc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet
and resolve
the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what
they worked
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out.
* I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general
said he was
only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the
commander of KFOR,
General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.
* I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a
good call a
few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have
agreed that
Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree
on a
long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in
this interim
period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good
arrangement, but
it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions
to
implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do
you
agree?
* Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this
weekend;they
can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for
Russian
participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have
the
airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.
* Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached
agreement with
General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will
instruct Cohen
to meet with Sergeyev.
* In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us there will be
no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter.
I hope we
can count on this.
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CONriDEl'JTIAL
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Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
7/8/99 1:14:02 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION
SECRCT
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
07/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON
07/08/2009
SUBJECT
pis put in final, thanks. [OECRET]
TO
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128memcon.doc
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin
<«
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin
INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel
Ehrendreich, Roger
Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office
The President: Hello. (U)
President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)
The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to
instruct our
generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport
and report
back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed ~ p8f
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President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave
instructions
to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement
with regard
to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the
airport of
Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this
group, in
the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be
functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international
peacemaking
force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula, ffl
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the
group,
will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of
coordination
with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already
exchanged
liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the
security of
the personnel of the Russian contingent. {$)
I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for
the joint
operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of
clear-cut
use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia.
However, in
this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. {$]
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three
days,
completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue
of
deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the
peacemaking
operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such
agreement to
Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of
Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me
before the
meeting in Cologne. ^
In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of
Defense to
meet tomorrow or at the latest, the day after tomorrow, at a place
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acceptable for
them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster of Defense
Sergeyev would be
prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. ^
I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such
agreements on the
matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should
enable us
not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that
event, we
would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American
cooperation in
other important areas. ^s
JQ
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another
problem.
If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could
be in
danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions
of the
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the
other
members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted
to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo
could and
would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities.
Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with
the
Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the
peacemakers
in Kosovo, in fact, tum a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of
that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the
Russian
peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats
are
translated into reality. Madam Albright assured Ivanov that
appropriate work has
been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to
ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This
is all
I wanted to say.
The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo
Liberation
Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we
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would not
tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is
important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the
impasse at
the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came
into Kosovo
only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We
made it
clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this
resolved
or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. ^
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it
could be
jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came
out of the
meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what
you have said
to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general
has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today.
President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the
agreement should
be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions.
The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on
this, let me
go through the points, and see if we have agreement,
President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term,
using the
Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport.
Second,
impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there,
but
there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense
ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we
can, you and I , have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that.
^
President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)
The President: I would like to - (U)
President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)
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The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I
might.
First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr.
Stepashin,
and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agree to do it, so
I think
they should meet there,
President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions.
(U)
The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I
will
work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia
in this
united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in
Bosnia, and I
have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work
through this
so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I
think
it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this
mission
will succeed. ^5
Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but
one that will
be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will
ensure an
equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and
capacity to
contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need
you
there. It is very important, ffi
President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to
share
with me? (U)
The President: Absolutely. (U)
President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I
will
issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be
fully carried
into affect. (U)
The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing
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�R7A2F69C.FIN
Page 6 of 7
you in
Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)
President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have
elected
such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner.
(U)
The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)
President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)
The President: Goodbye. (U)
President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)
~ End of Conversation ~
4
-SECRET 5128
•SECRET
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128srb.doc
July 6, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: ANDREW
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin,
June 14, 1999
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14
telephone
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.
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RECOMMENDATION
That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
1
SgCR&T
.SECRET
SECRET XXXX
Classified by: XXXX
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a
long way in seven years under your leadership — and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm
proud to work with you.
I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our
hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have
had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and
so that we can show the world that we are working together.
•
There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the
airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to
work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of
unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping
operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to
the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible
cooperation of our forces in the interest ofpeace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation
in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council
resolution.
•
First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked
out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON^MW^iPHOTOCOPY
�•
This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the
ground together now.
•
Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
•
These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting
in Cologne one week from today.
•
While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would
be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
•
Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.
•
With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
•
At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms
control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice
President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
•
Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can
- and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as
we possibly can in accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how
we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
•
At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
•
We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us
with solutions.
CLINTON
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�.COMFIDEMTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , you and I agreed y e s t e r d a y t o i n s t r u c t our g e n e r a l s t o
meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f command a t t h e a i r p o r t , and
r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked o u t .
•
I was v e r y d i s a p p o i n t e d and concerned t o l e a r n t h a t your
g e n e r a l s a i d he was o n l y t h e r e t o l i s t e n and r e f u s e d t o work
out a p l a n w i t h t h e coinmander o f KFOR, General Jackson. This
i s a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n which must be r e s o l v e d .
•
I was encouraged t o hear from A l Gore t h a t he and S t e p a s h i n
had a good c a l l a few hours ago on t h i s s u b j e c t . S t e p a s h i n
t o l d Gore t h a t you have agreed t h a t Bosnia r u l e s w i l l a p p l y i n
Kosovo i n t h e i n t e r i m u n t i l you and I agree on a l o n g - t e r m
arrangement, and t h a t t h e arrangements f o r your f o r c e s i n t h i s
i n t e r i m p e r i o d w i l l be worked o u t w i t h General Jackson. This
i s a good arrangement, b u t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we g i v e o u r
g e n e r a l s c l e a r and d e c i s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o implement t h i s
today. L e t ' s b o t h do i t as soon as we f i n i s h t h i s c a l l . Do you
agree?
•
S t e p a s h i n and A l a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h e J i f i h a o t Sec Cohen and
M i n i s t e r Sergeyev g e t t i n g t o g e t h e r / t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e meeting
between you and I t h i s weekend; they can make a j o i n t p r o p o s a l
t o us on t h e l o n g - t e r m arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. I t h i n k t h i s i s a good idea, b u t o n l y i f we have t h e
a i r p o r t i s s u e and t h e i n t e r i m arrangements i n p l a c e .
•
Once we have heard t h a t your General i n P r i s t i n a has reached
agreement w i t h General Jackson on t h e Bosnia model f o r t h e
i n t e r i m p e r i o d , I w i l l i n s t r u c t Cohen t o meet w i t h Sergeyev.
•
I n t h e meantime, b o t h PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us t h e r e w i l l be no f u r t h e r deployments t o Kosovo u n t i l you
and I r e s o l v e t h i s m a t t e r . I hope we can count on t h i s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON
D^OTOCOPY
At
�rnMnnriTTTTMr
a success, we need t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o our M i n i s t e r s o f
Defense.
L e t ' s have them meet u r g e n t l y t o develop c o n c r e t e
recommendations t o us on how we can cooperate t o g e t h e r i n
."Kosovo over t h e l o n g e r - t e r m . Your people and mine have
discussed H e l s i n k i .
I support t h a t . You and I had a good
meeting t h e r e . L e t ' s have our defense m i n i s t e r s meet t h e r e .
Our f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s would f o l l o w - u p . By Cologne, our teams
c o u l d p r e s e n t t o you and me a w e l l d e f i n e d p r o p o s a l t o r e v i e w .
B o r i s , i f we can move on these f r o n t s — implementing t h e
i n t e r i m p r o p o s a l t o deploy our f o r c e s i n t h e s h o r t - t e r m , and
a g r e e i n g t o have our teams meet t o prepare f o r our meeting —
we can g e t t h i s i s s u e under c o n t r o l and h e l p make Cologne a
success.
I f Yeltsin
pushes
for (& Russian
sector/commander
•
Boris, I
going t o
Madeleine
possibly
t h i n k I understand your needs and i n t e r e s t s . I'm
do e v e r y t h i n g I can - and w i l l make sure t h a t
and S e c r e t a r y Cohen do, t o o - and go as f a r as we
can i n accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team t h a t was j u s t i n Moscow made some c r e a t i v e
p r o p o s a l s on how we can ensure t h a t Russia has an area o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Kosovo which i s e q u i t a b l e - and t h a t i s
w o r t h y o f Russia's r o l e and i n t e r e s t s .
•
A t t h e same t i m e , we must be c a r e f u l about f o u r t h i n g s :
1) The o p e r a t i o n must be m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e ;
2) We must ensure u n i t y o f command;
3) We must n o t a l l o w e i t h e r t h e p e r c e p t i o n o r t h e r e a l i t y
of a p a r t i t i o n o f Kosovo.
4) Russia must be f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR t o m i n i m i z e
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e KLA w i l l see t h e Russian t r o o p s as
a t a r g e t . We became aware o f a KLA p l o t a g a i n s t Russian
t r o o p s y e s t e r d a y , which we were able t o head o f f .
•
We need t o ask our defense m i n i s t e r s t o develop these ideas
t h i s week and p r e s e n t us w i t h s o l u t i o n s .
I f Yeltsin
links
Track
1 and Track
2
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
I
�T>
rE
_r;nNr *»*ft*T
•
There i s a r e a l urgency about g e t t i n g t h e Russians a l r e a d y i n
Kosovo f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR because we cannot a l l o w a
s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
•
Our people have agreed on an i n t e r i m model t h a t w i l l get t h i s
•problem f i x e d q u i c k l y . We're u s i n g a s i m i l a r approach i n
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t and make i t work.
•
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e on
the l o n g e r - t e r m command arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e ground t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
I f Yeltsin
says
the
KLA is
going
to provoke
Russian
forces
•
We l e a r n e d o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia. B o r i s , i f Russian t r o o p s
are n o t p a r t o f KFOR, t h e KLA w i l l b e l i e v e they came i n t o
Kosovo t o p r o t e c t Serb f o r c e s , and Russian t r o o p s w i l l become
a greater target.
•
We've made c l e a r t h a t we would n o t t o l e r a t e any a t t a c k s on
your f o r c e s , b u t t h i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e importance o f your
f o r c e s coming f u l l y i n t o KFOR w i t h i t s UN mandate.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COtTFIDEMT IAD
G
fQN^t-TBRARY TOOTOCOPY
1
C&WMWfSW^tiSWeWY: :
�r^NFTHFiNTT ATi
•
B o r i s , I hope a t a minimum we can agree now t o go ahead w i t h
the f i r s t t r a c k . Time i s p r e c i o u s , and we need t o show again
t h a t our t r o o p s can work s i d e - b y - s i d e t o p r o t e c t t h e peace.
•
The second t r a c k i s more c o m p l i c a t e d , b u t l e t ' s i n s t r u c t our
-generals t o agree on t h e d e t a i l s on t h e b a s i s o f our
conversation.
•
I f we can do these t h i n g s , n o t o n l y can we make t h e peace
s e t t l ^ i i f i e n t work i n Kosovo, we w i l l have t h e b a s i s f o r a r e a l
r a t i o n when we meet i n Cologne.
Boris
linJfcs Track
1 to
agreement
on Track
2
There i s a r e a l urgency about Track 1 because we cannot a l l o w
a s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
We know t h e i n t e r i m model works.
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t .
We're making i t work i n
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia can
on Track 2. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e g ^ u n d t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
If
Boris
suggest
a one-week
deadline
on T:
•
I am committed t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia as long as we s t a y
focused on an e f f e c t i v e f o r c e w i t h u n i f i e d command and
control.
PHOTOCOPY
. HANDWRITING
)r'MBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
5128
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
WAS H I N GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
Y e l t s i n (/)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, M i l e s Murphy, Matt
S i b l e y , J o e l Ehrendreich, Roger M e r l e t t i , Doug
Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The
President:
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
w i t h Russian P r e s i d e n t
(U)
Good morning. B i l l .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Good morning, B o r i s .
Yesterday, you and I agreed
to i n s t r u c t o u r generals t o meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f
command a t t h e a i r p o r t and r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked
out.
I was q u i t e d i s a p p o i n t e d —
(^0
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Yes, they d i d . They met y e s t e r d a y , and I
gave i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h o l d t h e necessary n e g o t i a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o
come t o an agreement w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e
support team f o r t h e Russian presence a t t h e a i r p o r t o f S l a t i n a
near P r i s t i n a . And we proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h i s
group, i n t h e framework o f t h e f i r s t stage, w i l l remain a t t h e
a i r p o r t and w i l l be f u n c t i o n i n g i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e . And t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e group
w i t h t h e commanders o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacemaking f o r c e w i l l
be p o r t r a y e d i n an accord based on t h e Bosnia f o r m u l a .
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning
of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in
the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals
Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers.
They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the
personnel of the Russian contingent. { j f )
SECRET
Reason:
1.5(b)
Declassify O(;LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.SCCRET
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement p r o v i d i n g
f o r t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e S l a t i n a a i r p o r t . An example o f
such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f
the Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia.
However, i n t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s
of c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by Russia. (^ff
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or
three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the
principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage
of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian
contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or
the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and
me before the meeting in Cologne. [JS)
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , I c o n s i d e r i t v e r y i m p o r t a n t f o r our
M i n i s t e r s o f Defense t o meet tomorrow o r a t t h e l a t e s t t h e day
a f t e r tomorrow a t a p l a c e acceptable f o r them. I f S e c r e t a r y
Cohen i s prepared, then M i n s t e r o f Defense Sergeyev would be
p r e p a r e d t o welcome him i n Moscow and meet him here.
^0
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t , h a v i n g reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t
i n Kosovo, t h a t should enable us n o t t o overburden t h e agenda o f
our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n t h a t event, we would be i n
p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n on Russian-American c o o p e r a t i o n
i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
(/0
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo,
another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken
then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized.
What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo
Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members
of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to
Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives
of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And
the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is
a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in
fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to
threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the
consequences if these threats are translated into reality.
Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been
done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your
personal control. This is all I wanted to say. i f f )
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t o f a l l , l e t me say w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army, we d i d l e a r n o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia,
*CWT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�and we t o l d them we would n o t t o l e r a t e a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s ,
and t h e y agreed n o t t o do i t . But i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o understand
why t h e y wanted t o do i t . They b e l i e v e t h e impasse a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l p r e v e n t an e f f e c t i v e KFOR. They b e l i e v e you came
i n t o Kosovo o n l y t o p r o t e c t t h e Serbs, n o t t o be p a r t o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e . We made i t c l e a r we w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e
a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s . We have t o g e t t h i s r e s o l v e d or we can
expect t r o u b l e .
We have t o r e s o l v e t h e a i r p o r t i s s u e .
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is,
it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this
is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and
your general. So based on what you have said to me and the
conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. {JOf
President Y e l t s i n :
But t h a t was n o t our agreement. F i r s t , t h e
agreement s h o u l d be reached, and then we s h a l l immediately i s s u e
i n s t r u c t i o n s . (^f
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree. So what I am s a y i n g , i f we are a g r e e i n g
on t h i s , l e t me go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f we have
agreement.
President Y e l t s i n :
Okay.
(U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment,
short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian
component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will
be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be
no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and
ratify that.
{^]
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o —
President Y e l t s i n :
agree. (U)
(U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t I
The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two
if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary
Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that
we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to
President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they
should meet there.
(pf
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e the a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t :
That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I wanted t o say
i s t h a t I w i l l work hard on t h i s .
There must be a f a i r and
r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d o p e r a t i o n , and t h e r e
are i s s u e s somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i n Bosnia, and I have some
ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and t r y t o work t h r o u g h
t h i s so you w i l l be pleased and so t h a t the m i s s i o n w i l l be
s u c c e s s f u l . But I t h i n k i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o
terms t h a t w i l l assure us t h a t t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed.
(^f
T h e r e f o r e , we have t o agree on terms f o r the u n i f i e d command, b u t
one t h a t w i l l be acceptable t o you.
I t h i n k we can do t h a t . I
commit t o you we w i l l ensure an e q u i t a b l e and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e of
Russia w o r t h y o f your i n t e r e s t s and c a p a c i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e .
There are t h i n g s t h e r e t h a t no one e l s e can do, and we need you
there.
I t i s very important.
(JST
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Did you set f o r t h a l l your items t h a t
wanted t o share w i t h me?
(U)
The
President:
Absolutely.
you
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y agree,
t h a t I w i l l i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and then those
i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l be a
good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y g l a d
we have e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do not i n f r i n g e on t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f the o t h e r p a r t n e r .
(U)
The
President:
Good.
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
U n t i l we meet.
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
(U)
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�5128
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with
Yeltsin {jfl
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
Joel
r a d e r , M i l e s Murphy,
Matt S i b l e y , J o e l
r e n d r e i c h , Roger
M e r l e t t i , Doug Ba^ .ey and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
issian President
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
06 - 10:32 a.m.
(U)
Good inorning, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Good morning,
Boris. Yesterday, you and I
agreed to instruct our/generals to meet and resolve the
problem of command at/the airport and report back to us on
what they worked out/.
I was quite disappointed -- (Jg)
President Yeltsin^/ Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and
I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in
order to come tc/ an agreement with regard to the regulations
of the support /team for the Russian presence at the airport
of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the
understanding/that this group, in the framework of the first
stage, will /remain at the airport and will be functioning in
the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the
international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an
accord b^sed on the Bosnia formula. (jgfl
The foi/ces t h a t a r e n o t t h e r e y e t , t o ensure t h e f u l l
f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e group, w i l l be deployed upon r e a c h i n g an
agreement and i n t h e framework o f c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h General
JackJon.
Generals Z a v a r z i n and Jackson have a l r e a d y
exchanged l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s .
They have discussed t h e
problems o f e n s u r i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e personnel o f t h e
Russian c o n t i n g e n t .
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement
providing f o r the j o i n t operation of the Slatina a i r p o r t .
An example o f such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e
CECRETReason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f ^ ^ n J [\j7pQ|\j9 L I B R A R Y
Pl~
CP
OY
�j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia. However, i n
t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by
Russia.
And i t i s o f extreme importance t o have, i n t h e coming two
or t h r e e days, completed t h e process o f r e a c h i n g an
agreement on t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e o f deployment i n t h e coarse
o f t h e second stage o f t h e f u l l scope o f t h e peacemakii
o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Russian c o n t i n g e n t under a j o i n t command.
Such agreement t o Track 2, o r t h e second stage, s h o u l d be
reached a t t h e l e v e l o f M i n i s t e r s o f Defense and M i n i s t e r s
of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and r e p o r t e d t o you and me b e f o r e t h e
m e e t i n g i n Cologne. (X)
In this connection, I consider it very important for our
Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at/the latest the
day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If
Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster/of
Defense
Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome h/m in Moscow and meet
him here. (J?)
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h ^ t , having reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n o i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e
s e t t l e m e n t i n Kosovo, t h a t shoulcr enable us n o t t o
overburden t h e agenda o f our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n
t h a t event, we would be i n p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n
on Russian-American cooperat/on i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
I s h o u l d l i k e t o r a i s e f o r your b e n e f i t , w i t h r e g a r d t o
Kosovo, another p r o b l e m / I f measures, t i m e l y measures, a r e
not t a k e n then t h e s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be i n danger, c o u l d be
j e o p a r d i z e d . What is^meant i s t h e p r o v o c a t i v e a c t i o n s o f
the s o - c a l l e d Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. We c o n t i n u o u s l y s a i d ,
and a l l t h e o t h e r members o f t h e G-8 agreed, t h a t such a
s i t u a t i o n cannot/be p e r m i t t e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e i n which t h e
r e t u r n o f t h e A l b a n i a n refugees t o Kosovo c o u l d and would
r e s u l t i n chasing away t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f o t h e r
n a t i o n a l i t i e s - ' . R e g r e t t a b l y , t h a t i s t a k i n g p l a c e . And t h e
main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s w i t h t h e A l b a n i a n m i l i t a n t s .
This i s
a cause of/my disenchantment, t h a t t h e peacemakers i n
Kosovo, / n f a c t , t u r n a b l i n d eye t o t h a t occurrence.
The
r e s u l t / 6 f t h a t , when i t went as f a r as t h i s , i s t h a t t h e
m i l i t a n t s b e g i n t o t h r e a t e n t h e Russian peacekeepers. And
you/fcan imagine t h e consequences i f these t h r e a t s a r e
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r e a l i t y . Madame A l b r i g h t assured Ivanov
t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e work has been done v i s - a - v i s t h e l e a d e r s o f
the Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. I should l i k e t o ask you t o
take t h i s i s s u e and keep i t under your p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l .
This i s a l l I wanted t o say.
aINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The President: First of all, let me say with regard to tl
Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against
Russia, and we told them we would not tolerate attacks /3n
your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is,
important to understand why they wanted to do it. T^ney
believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an/effective
KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to /protect the
Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made
it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your/forces. We
have to get this resolved or we can expect t/ouble. We have
to resolve the airport issue. y£)
Now what you have s a i d about t h e a i r p o r t / t o d a y i s good.
That i s , i t c o u l d be j o i n t l y operated and access be
guaranteed, b u t t h i s i s n o t what came/out o f t h e meeting
between General Jackson and your g e n e r a l . So based on what
you have s a i d t o me and t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n A l Gore and
S t e p a s h i n had, t h e g e n e r a l has t o /get those i n s t r u c t i o n s so
we can r e s o l v e t h a t m a t t e r t o d a y / (^1
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : But t h a t w^s n o t our agreement.
the agreement should be reac d, an^ then we s h a l l
and
immediately issue i n s t r u c t i o n s .
First,
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree.
what I am s a y i n g , i f we a r e
a g r e e i n g on t h i s , l e t me/go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f
we have agreement. ^20
President
Yeltsin:
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r ^ t , t h e r e w i l l be an i n t e r i m deployment,
s h o r t - t e r m , u s i n g t h e Bosnian model t h a t w i l l i n c l u d e a
Russian component/at t h e a i r p o r t .
Second, impasses a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l be /resolved. Russian t r o o p s w i l l s t a y t h e r e ,
b u t t h e r e w i l l /be no more deployments u n t i l we agree.
T h i r d , our defense m i n i s t e r s w i l l meet t o work o u t t h e l o n g term arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n so we can, you
and I , have/a meeting i n Cologne and r a t i f y t h a t . (S)
President/Yeltsin:
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o -- (U)
President Y e l t s i n :
I agree. (U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t
The P r e s i d e n t : Okay, I would l i k e t o make another p o i n t o r
two i f I m i g h t .
F i r s t o f a l l , I would l i k e t o propose t h a t
S e c r e t a r y Cohen and M i n i s t e r Sergeyev meet i n H e l s i n k i
because I know t h a t we have discussed t h a t w i t h ^ c J - ^ \ ^ R ( J j . ^ ^
Stepashin, and I mentioned i t t o P r e s i d e n t A h t i s a a r i , and4ie
has agreed t o do i t , so I t h i n k they should meet t h e r e . (^f
<^-e£lINT0N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t : That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I Wanted t o
say i s t h a t I w i l l work hard cn t h i s .
There must/be a f a i r
and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d -eJperation,
and t h e r e are issues somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i^n Bosnia, and
I have some ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and
t r y t o work t h r o u g h t h i s so you w i l l be p l e a s e d and so t h a t
t h e m i s s i o n w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . But I t j / i n k i t i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o terms t h a t w j / l l assure us t h a t
t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed. (^f
Therefore, we have to agree on terifis for the unified
command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we
can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable
and responsible role of Russia/worthy of your interests and
capacity to contribute. The/e are things there that no one
else can do, and we need yqn there. It is very important.
<fi
President Y e l t s i n :
Did/you s e t f o r t h a l l your items
you wanted t o share w i / h me? (U)
The
President:
Abso/utely.
that
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : / Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y
agree, t h a t I w i l d i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e n
those i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : / Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n ' Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l
be a good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t / Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y
g l a d we h,4ve e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do n o t i n f r i n g e on
the i n t & r e s t s o f t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r . (U)
The
President:
Good.
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
(U)
/
President Y e l t s i n :
U n t i l we meet.
(U)
/'
/
The
President:
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
—
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
(U)
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
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2011-0892-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from June 13-14, 1999. Material includes emails with drafts of proposed talking points, background information on the military and political situation in Kosovo vis-a-vis Russia, and a telcon from June 14.
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National Security Council
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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2/6/2015
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2011-0892-M
7388766
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Russia
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/77129dd12e7c81571baa92fb7678ec94.pdf
9e5e1d4148c5ff9551bfc468d5585714
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) or Section 3.5(c) ofE.O. 13526
or (b)(6) of the FOIA.
�COM f I [) E
NT I A t
\
\~
N.ODIS
. ,~
AMBASSAD.OR .OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE F.OLL.OWING MESSAGE
PRESIDENT CLlNT.ON T'o PRESIDENT YELTSIN. N'o SIGNED .ORIGINAL WILL
BE PR.OVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR B.ORIS:
THE CRISIS IN K.OS.OV.OIS REACHING A CRITICAL P.OINT. A
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS ENVEL.OPED TENS .OF TH.OUSANDS
.OF INN.OCENT PE.OPLE WILL W.ORSEN WITH THE .ONSET .OF WINTER
.ONCE AGAIN THE W.ORLD IS C'oNFR'oNTED BY C.OMPELLING EVIDENCE
.OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY MIL.OSEVIC'S SECURITY F.ORCES .ON
CIVILlANS'AND SENSELESS MASSACRES. WE CANN.OT AFF'oRD T'o
WAtCH IDLY AS MIL.OSEVIC LEADS THE BALKANS INT'o AN'oTHER CYCLE
.OF BL.O.ODSHED, ATR.OCITIES AND MISERY.
THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE W.ORKED CL.OSELY T.OGETHER T'o BRING THE
C.ONFLICT IN K.OS.OV.O T'o AN END. THANKS LARGELY T'o .OUR
SUCCESSFUL DISCUSSI.ONS IN M.OSC.OW, THE UNITED NATI.ONS SECURITY
C.OUNCIL UNANIM.OUSLY AD.OPTED AN IMP.ORTANT RES.OLUTI.ON .ON
K.OS.OV.O .ON SEPTEMBER 23. THAT W.ORK BUILT .ON A L.ONG SERIES .OF
REINF.ORCING EFF.ORTS BY .OUR TW'o C.OUNTRIES. IN MARCH, WE AND
.OTHER C.ONTACT GR.OUP C.OUNTRIES SPELLED .OUT THE PRECISE STEPS
THAT MIL.OSEVIC MUST TAKE T'o REGAIN THE C.ONFIDENCE .OF THE
INTERNATI'oNAL C.OMMUNITY. AT A MEETING WITH Y.OU IN MOSC.OW IN
JUNE, MIL.OSEVIC PR.OMISED Y.OU THAT HE W.OULD TAKE SEVERAL .OF
THESE ACTI.ONS IMMEDIATELY.
IN HIS ACTUALBEHAVI.OR, MIL.OSEVIC HAS BEEN N.OTHING BUT
DEFIANT. F'oR M.ONTHS N.OW, HE HAS IGN.ORED THE INTERNATI'oNAL
C'oMMUNITY'S CLEAR-CUT DEMANDS F'oR AN IMMEDIATE END T'o
ACTI.ON BY SECURITY F.ORCES AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL; ACCESS AND
FREED'oM .OF M.OVEMENT F'oR INTERNATI'oNAL .OBSERVERS; UNIMPEDED
ACCESS F'oR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF .ORGANIZATI.ONS;AND CLEAR
"
PR.OGRESS .ON A P.OLlTICAL S.OLUTI.ON. IVIIL.OSEVIC'S C.OMPLIANCE
WITH THESE DEMANDS REMAINS INADEQUATE.
THE DIPL.OMATIC .OPTI.ONS AT .OUR DISP.OSAL ARE QUICKLY RUNNING
.OUT. AFTER THE UN RES.OLUTI.ON, THE C.ONTACT GR.OUP MET IN NEW
Y.ORK AND GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTI.ONS T'o .OUR AMBASSAD.ORS IN
BELGRADE T'o UNDERSC.ORE .ONCE AGAIN .OUR EXPECTATI.ONS .OF
MIL.OSEVIC. WHEN IVIIL.OSEVIC RECEIVED THEM, HE MADE CLEAR THAT
~'C-:;;;;"':""'
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HE PLANNED TO IGNORE THEIR MESSAGE. THE CONTACT GROUP
POLITICAL DIRECTORS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY IN LONDON. I AM
PLEASED THAT WE AGREED ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT BOTH TO MILOSEVIC AND THE KOSOVAR
ALBANIANS. WE ALL WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT WE MUST
ALSO BE PREPARE'b TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS
REACHED ITS LIMITS.
IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE
TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE
ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH
TO USE FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS URGENT TASK, BUT MILOSEVIC'S
ACTIONS -- THE CEASELESS VIOLENCE AND THE FLOUTING OF THE WILL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- LEAVE US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE.
IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY IN COMING DAYS WITH OUR LONG-STANDING
DEMANDS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND
DECISIVELY.
.
I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR
DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE
BALKANS. WE MUST KEEP UP THE REGULAR AND MEANINGFUL
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TEAMS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES
BETWEEN MADELEINE AND IGOR, OUR IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT
NATO, AND THE CONTACT GROUP'S ATTENTIVE WORK ON A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. MILOSEVIC MUST NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN SPLIT US OR
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE
IS OFF THE TABLE. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STOP THE KILLING IN
KOSOVO, USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, AND SHOW THE ENEMIES OF
PEACE THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED. AS IN BOSNIA, I KNOW THAT I
CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE
OVERCOME THIS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
�eONFIDEWPIPJJs/NODI S
NIACT IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING THE SITUATION
IN KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. A COPY MAY ALSO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER
PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR BORIS:
I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTERS, WHICH I READ VERY
CLOSELY.
I AM GLAD THAT WE HAVE A SHARED RECOGNITION OF THE
NEED TO USE EVERY AVAILABLE MEANS TO END THE ON-GOING TRAGEDY IN
KOSOVO.
AS I WROTE BEFORE, I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO
MAINTAIN A STEADY AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHI,P BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
THE UNITED STATES.
I KNOW THAT DURING THESE POLITICALLY CHARGED
TIMES, RUMORS AND MISSTATEMENTS CAN SPREAD QUICKLY.
I AM
PLEASED THAT YOUR TEAM MADE CLEAR ON FRIDAY THAT RUSSIA HAS NOT
CHANGED THE READINESS OR TARGETTING STATUS OF I
. STRATEGIC
ARSENAL, DEMONSTRATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT .ONE
OF OUR LANDMARK ACCOMPLISHMENTS STILL STANDS. LET ME ASSURE YOU
THAT NONE OF OUR ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS ARE AIMED AGAINST
RUSSIA.
I APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCES THAT RUSSIA WILL, UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES, ALLOW ITSELF TO BE DRAWN INTO MILITARY CONFLICT
IN YUGOSLAVIA.
NEEDLESS TO SAY, LIKE YOU,. I REMAIN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO.
I AGREE THAT WE MUST INTENSIFY
OUR EFFORTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, AND I STRONGLY ENDORSE YOUR
SUGGESTION THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET QUICKLY.
I
UNDERSTAND THAT MADELEINE WILL SEE FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV IN
OSLO ON TUESDAY. THEY.HAVE STAYED IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT BY
TELEPHONE, AND THEI.R DEPUTIES HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY TO
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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EXCHANGE IDEAS AND WORK TOWARD A COMMON APPROACH TO RESOLVE THIS
TRAGEDY.
WE NEED, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO JOINTLY APPLY AMMERICAN AND
RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES TO THE VITAL GOAL OF AN ENDURING
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THIS CRISIS THAT THREATENS THE PEACE AND
SECURITY OF A REGION THAT IS IMPORTANT TO US BOTH.
IT IS SIMPLY
UNACCEPTABLE TO ALLOW BELGRADE'S POLICIES, ESPECIALLY ITS
BARBARIC ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, TO JEAPORDIZE WHAT YOU AND I HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED IN U. S ..-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN SIX AND A HALF. YEARS.
THEY ALSO THREATEN THE HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH THAT YOU ACHIEVED
IN LAYING THE BASIS.FOR A COOPERATIVE, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO.
ON THAT BASIS, I WELCOMED THE STATEMENT RELEASED ON FRIDAY BY UN
SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN AND NOTED THAT THE KEY-TO ITS
SUCCESS WILL BE WHETHER. PRESIDENT
LOSEVIC GOES BEYOND MERE
COMMITMENTS AND IMPLEMENTS KEY PROVISIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT THE
SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THE REALIZATION OF PEACE IN KOSOVO
WHILE KEEPING IT WITHIN THE FRY. KOFI'S STATEMENT IS AN
IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SENTIMENTS
ABOUT THE CRISIS AND OUTLINES A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH TOWARD
ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.
I HOPE YOU CAN EMBRACE THIS
APPROACH, AND THAT MADELEINE AND MINISTER IVANOV CAN FURTHER
DEVELOP THESE IDEAS FOR' WORKING TOGETHER, ESPECIALLY IN THE UN,
OSCE, THE CONTACT GROUP, AND THE G-S.
I KNOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE JOYOUS AT A TIME WHEN HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF FELLOW EUROPEANS ARE SUFFERING. BUT I DO WISH YOU,
YOUR FAMILY AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THE PEACE OF THE EASTER
SEASON.
IT IS MY SINCEREST HOPE, WHICH· I KNOW YOU SHARE, THAT
THIS PEACE WILL COME SOON TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD,
INCLUDING ALL OF THOSE SUFFERING IN THE BALKANS. THE CHANCE OF
THIS HOPE COMING TRUE DEPENDS MUCH ON THE WORK YOU AND I AND OUR
COLLEAGUES DO IN COMING DAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT.
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�CONFIDENTIAL
6724
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS
DATE: October 1, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i j y ^ and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o author/ze m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compl^nt, i n c l u d i n g i n t h e absence
of a f u r t h e r UN r e s o l u t i o n , /
To Bccurc support f o r OUP^G
proposal t o develop a
p r o c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n f a c i l i t y and t o oeck ag-rccmont ere
next otcps on Kosovo.
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Treasury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o^ f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
c r e d i t l i n ^ w i t h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
bilateral/fcommitments/ p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members a"nd
( p o s s i b l / j a private""sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
s t r e n g t h e n our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g "
to governments t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary p o l i c i e s .
. Europoana have been-•BGoisting Troaoury and Fed c f f o r t o
yw dcvolop an approach t h a t would i n c l u d e b i l a t e r a l
f i n a n c i n g as w e l l as v i a IMF. G-7 Deputies are meeting
F r i d a y n i g h t and w i l l discuss the proposal ( w i t h finance
m i n i s t e r s l i k e l y t o take up the t o p i c Saturday).
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations w i t h these deputies have evoked
-They suspect,
r e s i s t a n c e from
EO 13526 1.4d
i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are t r y i n g t o undermine t h e IMF's r o l e
and are l o o k i n g f o r a way t o avoid p r e s s i n g Congress f o r
CONFIDENTIAL
LTassif^tliN/TeW LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�LUM IDENT IAL
the quota increase and New Agreement t o Borrow (NAB) . —G—Ty
DGputico arc mooting tomorrow n i g h t (Friday) and w i l l
diocucG the p r o p o s a l — ( w i t h finance m i n i a t c r a l i k e l y
up t h e t o p i c thcmoclvcG on Saturday). P r e l i m i n a r y
eofiv-eraationa w^nfe-h—t--hp.np Hormt i on—h.
roGistanco from1.4d
- While
been s u p p o r t i v e , they don't want t o get too f a /6ut i n
r
f r o n t o f t h e i r European colleagues. [
likely
share
r e s e r v a t i o n s , but i n t h e end are' l i k e l y t o
participate.
The t y p i c a l IMF program, though i t can hfe formulated and
put i n place q u i c k l y , i s n o t w e l l s u i t e d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n
and a number o f other emerging economies. What
i s needed i s some assurance o f acc&ss t o s u b s t a n t i a l b u t
temporary f o r e i g n exchange resources i f heavy e x t e r n a l
pressures a r i s e . Such assurance/would help t h e c o u n t r y
r e s i s t u n d e s i r a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s ' such as t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s
or t h e k i n d o f d i s r u p t i v e c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s adopted by
P r o v i d i n g l a r g e amounts o f f i n a n c i n g must be done i n a way
t h a t does n o t create unafcceptable l e v e l s o f moral hazard.
We must be sure t h a t t h e e l i g i b l e c o u n t r i e s have s t r o n g
p o l i c i e s i n p l a c e . And we must, when necessary, i n s i s t
t h a t p r i v a t e c r e d i t o r s c o n t r i b u t e i n some f a s h i o n so we are
not f i n a n c i n g t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l .
r e c e n t l y wrote you and
; i f raised]
o t h e r G-7 leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g
i n t e r n a t i o n a / f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y . These ideas i n c l u d e
r e i n f o r c i n g / e c o n o m i c cooperation, which he i s doing wTthin
the EU; b y i l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h t h e IMF s t i l l "
p l a y i n g / c e n t r a l r o l e and a deeper dialogue enhanced by a
strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r t h e IMF's I n t e r i m
Committee; •fee advocate a change i n d e s i g n a t i o n f o r the IMF
I n t e / i m Committee t o t h a t o f a Council increased
transparency and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of w o r l d f i n a n c i a l systems;
i t s a t some form o f c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s ; and, f i n a l l y ,
/ncreased development a s s i s t a n c e . - There are few r a d i c a l
ideas i n the l e t t e r , aside from t h e h i n t a t r e t h i n k i n g
l i b e r a l i z e d c a p i t a l f l o w s . The one s p e c i f i c measure
presented, upgrading t h e I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have
a meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and inThe primary e f f e c t o f
ouch a change would be t o give what i s now an a d v i s o r y body
g-eme-deeioion-maM^g—powers-—The s^abotantivc impact wmri-dr
not •••likely• be • very meaningful the and i n the end we c o u l d
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probably s u p p o r t - ^ t o o a t i o f y |
L4d
| Thio may comei n your c o n v c r g a t i o n . — W h i l e not committing t o agree, Ytfou
should could welcome h i s thoughts g e n e r a l l y as a need;
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a ^ew
f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e . o p o a k i n t h a t context t o
• i n t o r c o t i n e x p l o r i n g new and more expansive mode
dialogue.
Kosovo
A f t e r the recent a t r o c i t i e s ,
i s w i l ^ i us i n moving t o
air strikes.
i s also w i l l i n g to/proceed, i n c l u d i n g
i f necessary i n the"absence of a new ^ s o l u t i o n . However
h i s s e n i o r s t a f f i s c o n s i d e r i n g whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
c l e a r i n g the way f o r the use of f o f c e . I f so, t h i s needs
to happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y s o / t h a t i t does not get i n
the way of our e f f o r t s t o buil4/NAT0 consensus.
The Russians continue to oppose use of force.
is increasingly uncomfortable with serving
as a p o l o g i s t f o r Milosevi/'' s b r u t a l i t y , but the Russians
have not come t o terms y l t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s the
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior^
i n p u b l i c statements,
:iryd
the Russians contiryued t o emphasize t h a t any use o f f o r c e
ir/d
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e apfd r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n . This
o n l y underscored/the importance o f our European p a r t n e r s '
keeping a u n i t g & f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g the
Russians that/we are coming close t o exhausting d i p l o m a t i c
o p t i o n s w i t ] / t h e Serbs. We have proposed a f u r t h e r PJC and
are p l a n n i n g f u r t h e r b i l a t e r a l contacts w i t h Moscow t o help
keep then/on board, w h i l e making c l e a r t h a t we w i l l a c t i f
necessayfr w i t h o u t t h e i r consent.
A f t e r tzlic recent atroci-Mesr]
I i s w i t h uo i n moving t o
r i k c o / i n c l u d i n g i n the absence of a new S e c u r i t y
|io also w i l l i n g t o proceed,
i l resolution.
arc u r g i n g t h a t we f i r s t seek
his senior s t a f f
n^w—resolution c x - p l i c i t l y a u t h o g j ^ a g uoe of fcHree^—Your
o r e i g n p o l i c y team i s c o n t a c t i n g
counterparts to
convince them t h a t t h i s would put Yeltsin-dn'an untenabl-e
s i t u a t i o n v i s - a - v i s the Duma w h i l e reducing the pressure on
Milosevic.
The Russians continue t o oppose use o f f o r c e .
i s i n c r e a s i n g l y uncomfortable w i t h s e r v i n g
as a p o l o g i s t f o r M i l o a c v i c ' o b r u t a l i t y / but the Ruooiang
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have n o t come t o terms w i t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s -fc&e
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s b e h a v i o r
1.4d
i n p u b l i c otatcmcntp-^
the Ruoaiano continued t o emphasize t h a t any use
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e and r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n ,
o n l y underscores the importance o f our European
keeping a u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g
Russians t h a t we are coming close t o exhausting/cliplomatic
o p t i o n s w i t h t h e Serbs-.-
Northern I r e l a n d ( B l a i r only)
Most o f the Northern I r e l a n d playcro/Wcrc i n Blackpool,
England t h i s week f o r t h e Labour Pa-fty's annual conqres;
was immovable i n
Earlier
t a l k i n g t o Jim Steinberg o n / w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider an IRA
gesture on decommissioning/"
showed
•TafuYaay w i t h Jim Steinberg,
l i t t l e w i l l i n g n e s s t o cntcrtailTTcicao t K a t would i n v o l v e
IRA r i s k t a k i n g on weapons decommissioning. I n l i n e w i t h
t j l i s , — S e p a r a t e l y / t h e B r i t i s h arc moving forward wirth
i c m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . — P l a n s wore announced plansyestcrday t o
remove twe-watchtowers from ±fr-Belfast and dismantle a
border checkpoint/ i n a d d i t i o n t o the r e c a l l o f s e v e r a l
hundred personal weapons from B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y personnel
(an oft--rcpoatcd Adams'—goal) .
1
c o w n m r r T M n TNTON
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Both Adams and Trimble w i l l be i n t-ho United States i
October; Trimble w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Northern--Ir,
investment road show w h i l e Adams has a s e r i e s o f
€undraiocro on the East Coast. The c u r r e n t pros
d e a d l i n e fe-r movement on one oi-dc or t h e other Xa
October 31/ when tho f i r s t meeting on the Nor>th-South
Council i s t o occur.
Attachments
Tab A
Points t o Make f o r Prime M i n i s t e r ^
Tab B
Points t o Make f o r President Chi/ac
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7
672 /
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l
Initiative
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
/
/
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
/
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
/
Recognize i t wouldn'tyfaork w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF prograys may n o t be s u i t a b l e , however.
•
Think we need aiy.approach w i t h these
elements:
•
•
Second, /mMay need c o o r d i n a t e d s e t o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such ^s from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side (/f IMF mechanism.
•
•
F i r s t , IMF /shorter-term money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not ,66 permanent; could have sunset clause.
T h i r d , may aAlso want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n
asTnecded.
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
0/ Saturday. Urgent t h a t they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
s u i t a b l e approach.
Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
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Kosovo
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l rary^e o f a i r
/
o p e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
/
•
^si;
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians a r e
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposirig any use o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavipfr.
We shouldn't p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o a box by /Seeking a f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w ^ l l f o r c e t h e Russian"
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NftTO-Russia Founding A c t .
EO 13526 1.4d raises idea of "testing"/Russian
willingness
to
authorize
a UNSC Presidency
statpinent
clearing
the way for
using
force':
/
•
Not convinced Moscow w i l l / a g r e e .
Otherwise there i s ri^sk o f reducing pressure on M i l o s e v i c and
c o m p l i c a t i n g a consensus a t NATO.
•
We've both agreeff t o a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
r e s o l u t i o n . Ne/d t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
gQutearged a t a t r o c i t i e s committed by M i l o s e v i c ' s s e c u r i t y
-forces. B r u t a l t a c t i c s mast stop and occur-irfe-y forces
w-i-thdrawn/—Only a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e
i f n o t t h e use
of f o r c c / i t o c l f
w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply.
1
OWc ve
-ifttc
epe
gun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s . We
to ask NATO Cou'noil t o authorize f u l l range o f a i r
ions next Wednesday.
•Plc/scd t h a t you c a l l e d f o r an emergency S e c u r i t y - C o u n c i l
feefcirEHg-,—but (^-bt—tha^-^u-s^i-a-will agroc t o a r e s o l u t i o n
/authorizing force.
^Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians arc
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any uoe o f f o r c e
end appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
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• Y o l t o i n and Primakov have a d i f f i c u l t •dilemma: c i t h e r a b o t a ^
and f u r t h e r weaken p o o i t i o n a t home, or v e t o — - — f o r c i n g ug t o
go ahead, which docs damage t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n a t home arm t o
what we've t r i e d t o achieve w i t h NATO-Ruooia Founding X c t .
14
.d
we shouldn'JE p u t them
i n t h i s box. Instead,—wo must be prepared t o a d "without
further resolution.
•Also/ need t o use a l l a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h / t h e Russians,
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO/—to make c l e a r t h a t M i l o c o v i e ' •
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us no a l t e r n a t i v e . /Hope t h a t Russia docs
not p u t i t s e l f i n p o o i t i o n t h a t i o o l a t p o i t from r e s t o f G-8.•Need t o make this--clear i n p u b l i c statements,' o t h e r w i s e
M i l o s e v i c w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t promisees and p a r t i a l compliance
w i l l p r o t e c t him from m i l i t a r y roGponoc.
BWc'vc b o t h agreed t o act i f ncceysoary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
jrese-lution. Need t o c o n v i n c / a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.-
• F i n a l l y ^ we need t o ensu/c t h a t our a c t i o n s weaken/ not
s t r e n g t h e n M i l o s e v i c . / C a n n o t t o l e r a t e him as c o n t i n u i n g
source o f c o n f l i c t ^h Balkans.—We should ask ICTY t o pursue
his indictment.
Northern
Irel
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
Understanc
[holding back on executive u n t i l
decommissioning, and
he does
e i n b e r g spoke l a s t weekend
w i t h o u t much success.
on
'terested i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7
Financial Initiative
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways to t a c k l e t h i s was a p^eded c o n t r i b u t i o n
to the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a q^w f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l g i v e i t c a r e f u l / 6 o n s i d e r a t i o n .
c
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of/system i s needed, but -al-se
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging market
economies r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a p a r a g e t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be cen/ered i n IMF, and only f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s ,
•
Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so<
o
T y p i c a l IMF programs may
not be s u i t a b l e , however.
•
Think we n e y o a n approach w i t h these elements:
•
F i r s t , / { M F s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would/not be permanent; could have sunset claus"eT
•
Sepond, may need coordinated set of b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
T/uch as from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
>ide of IMF mechanism.
T h i r d , may
a l s o want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d of
approach.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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Reason: l . S j d )
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• T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e , however. Thinkj.-hg o f
s h o r t e r - t e r m moneys i n l i n e • o f - c r c d i t f o r m a t . — W o u l d njrft be
permanent; c o u l d have sunset clause.
•May need c o o r d i n a t e d set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s /(such as
from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund)—alphg side o f IMF
mechanism.
•Also want t o got p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p c r a t i o i ^ as needed.
•G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday-. Urgent t h a t they reach c^rccmcnt on s u i t a b l e
approach.
/
/
•Need your s t r o n g support t o help m^k'e t h a t happen.
• ( I f r a i s e d ) Received your l e t t e r on the I n t e r i m Committee.
Have asked Bob Rubin t o give I t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I s i n
our i n t e r e s t t o explore new/and more cxpanoi-vc modes o f
dialogue.
Kosovo
BOu-te _
f o r c e s ; These b r u t a l t a c t i c s must stop and s e c u r i t y forces
w i t h d r a w n . — O n l / a credible threat of force
i f not use of
f o r c e i t s e l f -/ w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply^•Wc'vc begun t/6 prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
i n t e n d t o /sic NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range of a i r
epe-ra^i-onc a t i-£-s—meeting nex-t-Wee
We
EO 13526 1.4d
•Conc^ned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians arc
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any use o f f o r c e
a/d—appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Q-Y/e-l-fcs-i-n—an*
and f u r t h e r weaken position—a^-home-rgo ahead/ which docs damage t o t h e i r
what we've t r i e d t o achieve w i t h the
CONFIDENTIAL
i i lemma-! ei^ther—abstain
or veto -•• f o r c i n g us t o
p o o i t i o n a t home and t o
NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
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B
we ohouldn't put them
1.4d
i n t h i o box.
Inotcad/ we must be prepared t o act w i t h o u t Q
y
further resolution.
•Also/ nocd t o use a l l available—eharare-lrs—with the Russi;
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO, t o make c l e a r t h a t M i l o s e v i c ' s
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us no a l t e r n a t i v e . — H o p e that/fcuosia docs
not p u t i t s e l f i n p o o i t i o n t h a t i s o l a t e s i t fromy/cot o f G-8.
•Need t o make t h i o c l e a r i n p u b l i c statements, otehcrwioe
M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l t h a t promises and p a r t i a / compliance
p r o t e c t him from m i l i t a r y response.
will
BFi-nallyv—we need t o ensure t h a t our actiorio weaken,—net
s t r e n g t h e n M i l o s e v i c . — C a n n o t t o l c r a t o / h i m as c o n t i n u i n g
source o f c o n f l i c t i n Balkans.—We should ask ICTY t o pur^tte
his indictment.
• We've begun t o prepare Congress apd p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o / a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
o p e r a t i o n s a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
•
W i l l need your h e l p i n b u i l d i r i g NATO consensus.
•
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o / a corner by opposing any use o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excused/Milosevic's behavior.
•
Seeking a f u r t h e r U l / r e s o l u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e
would o n l y make masters worse. This would face the Russians
w i t h a d i f f i c u l t /filemma: e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken
p o s i t i o n a t hom^ o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russia
Founding Act.
We s h o u l d n ' t put them i n t h i s box. I n s t e a d , we must be
prepared fr6 act w i t h o u t a f u r t h e r r e s o l u t i o n , w h i l e keeping
open a l l / a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h Moscow, i n c l u d i n g a t NATO.
o Not convinced Moscow w i l l
agree.
Otherwise there i s r i s k o f reducing pressure on Milosevic" and
c o m p l i c a t i n g a consensus a t NATO.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADER
DATE: October 2, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING,
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 /proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o auth/Jrize m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compliant, i n c l u d i n g i n the absence
of a f u r t h e r UN resolutiofn
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Tre ury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o f f jancing f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
credit line
h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
b i l a t e r a l co: itments, p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members and
(possibly)
r i v a t e sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
strengthen 'Our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g
to govern n t s t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary
^
fca*K
gators wivv
l l c i e s
i t i e s are meeting Friday i g h t and w i l l discuss the
Sal ^tf&th f i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s Jrarfojfr-y -tee take up t h e
Saturday^.
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations. w i t h these
EO 13526 1.4d
t-ies have evoked r e s i s t a n c e from the |
_
They suspect, i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are trying to
fdermine the IMF's r o l e and are l o o k i n g for a way to avoid
r e s s i n g Congress f o r the quota increase and New Agreement
[has been supportive, they
o Borrow (NAB). While
don't want t o get too far out in front of their European
while sharingl
(reservations,
colleagues.
are likely to participate in the end. pjrr^
Reason: 1.5(d)
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The t y p i c a l IMF prograrrK though
in be f o r m u l a t e d and
put in_P-l.ace q u i c k l y , i s \ n o t w e l l f u i t e d t o the s i t u a t i c
l.4d
m
and a number o f
e r ^ m e r g i n g economies. What
i s needed i s some assuranc
access t o s u b s t a n t i a l /out
temporary f o r e i g n exchange
urces i f heavy e x t e r n a l
pressures a r i s e . Such as
e would help the country
r e s i s t u n d e s i r a b l e a l t e c f i a t ives such as t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s
or t h e k i n d o f disrupt-ive capi taJN c o n t r o l s adojtfted by
P r o v i d i n g l a r g e amounts
t h a t does n o t create unac
We must be sure t h a t the e
p o l i c i e s i n p l a c e . And
that private creditors c
not f i n a n c i n g t h e i r w i
ing must
e levels,
I b l e coun
whe
dorfe i n a way
* r a l hazard,
lave strong
:y, i n s i s t
^on so we are
wrote you and other
leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r
strengthening i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y .
These
ideas include r e i n f o r c i n g economic cooperation, which he i s
doing w i t h i n t h e EU; b u / l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h
the IMF s t i l l p l a y i n g A c e n t r a l r o l e w i t h a deeper dialogue
enhanced by a strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r t h e
IMF's I n t e r i m Committee; increased transparency and
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f / o r l d f i n a n c i a l systems; h i n t s a t some
form o f c a p i t a l oOntrols; and, f i n a l l y , increased
development assistance. There are few r a d i c a l ideas i n the
l e t t e r , aside from the h i n t at r e t h i n k i n g l i b e r a l i z e d
c a p i t a l f l o w s / The one s p e c i f i c measure presented,
upgrading the/ I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have a
meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and i n t h e end we could
p r o b a b l y support. You should welcome h i s thoughts
g e n e r a l l y /as a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c r i t i c a l dialogue
on b u i l d ^ g a new f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e .
Kosovo
i s w i t h us i n moving t o
A f t e r / the recent a t r o c i t i e s ,
i s also' w i i T i n g t o proceed, i n c l u d i n g
air /strikes.
i f yhecessary i n the absence o f a new r e s o l u t i o n . However,
hi/S s e n i o r s t a f f i s considering whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w / l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
l e a r i n g the way f o r the use o f f o r c e .
I f so, t h i s needs
t o happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y so t h a t i t does not get i n
the way o f our e f f o r t s t o b u i l d NATO consensus.
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6724
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7
Financial I n i t i a t i v e
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n of confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways t o t a c k l e t h i s was a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n
t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l give i t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of syatem i s needed, but
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy/femerging market
economies r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a packag^ t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be c e n t e r ^ / i n IMF,
w i t h strong p o l i c i e s .
and o n l y f o r economies
•
Recognize i t wouldn't,work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrpto (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
T y p i c a l IMF prograr / may not be s u i t a b l e , — h e w e v e ^
.th these elements:
need an approach
ss-Think we
•
Second, may need coordinated set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as/from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
s i d e op IMF mechanism.
o
•
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not b f permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
, /
^
T h i r d , also want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation.
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on^turday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
anproach.
Jeed your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify O ^ L I M T Q ^
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
B A Y P OO O Y
RR H T C P
�CONFIDENTIAL
Kosovo
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t a k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l r a n g / o f a i r
o p e r a t i o n s a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
/1
K
Will need your help in building NATO consensus. f ^~
>
"
^ —7—^
Csacexae^U-akettt managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposin'g any use o f force
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Seeking a "fr^rfcfier UN r e s o l u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e
would o n l y Bfc^e matters worse. Russians would face d i f f i c u l t
dilemma: / e i t h e r , a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r v/eaken p o s i t i o n a t home,
or veto/and jeopab^ize t h e NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
/
We should:
prepared
open a l
them i n t h i s boy' I n s t e a d , we must be
w i t h o u t a f u r c h / r r e s o l u t i o n , w h i l e keeping
£ channels wi/h Moscow, i n c l u d i n g a t NATO.
EO 13526 1.4d
o
;
]^t><g rvmH ncnH Mor;r;nw w / l 1 n g r o p ,
/
QfcheirwXse there "Tg/risk e-f r e d u c i i ^ . pressure on M i l o s e v i c
o a m p l i c a t i n g a cgnsonaus a t NATO.
^ j - ^ «Vi e m
v- ^
CONFI DENT IAL
1
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
lO-Z-IQ
THE WHITE HOUSE
6724
'3QrA95
'8C2M:a
WASHINGTON
October 2, 1998
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS
DATE: October 2, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o a u t h o r i z e m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compliant, i n c l u d i n g i n the absence
of a f u r t h e r UN r e s o l u t i o n .
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Treasury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o f f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
c r e d i t l i n e w i t h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
b i l a t e r a l commitments, p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members and
( p o s s i b l y ) a p r i v a t e sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
s t r e n g t h e n our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g
to governments t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary p o l i c i e s .
G-7 Deputies are meeting Friday n i g h t and w i l l discuss the
p r o p o s a l . Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors
w i l l take up the t o p i c Saturday.
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations
w i t h these o f f i c i a l s have evoked r e s i s t a n c e from
EO 13526 1.4d
They suspect, i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are t r y i n g
to undermine the IMF's r o l e and are l o o k i n g f o r a way t o
a v o i d p r e s s i n g Congress f o r the quota increase and New
has been
Agreement t o Borrow (NAB). While
s u p p o r t i v e , they don't want t o get too f a r out i n f r o n t o f
while sharing
t h e i r European colleagues.
r e s e r v a t i o n s , are l i k e l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the end.
The propose o f the c a l l i s to get
to
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
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�CONFIDENTIAL
d i r e c t t h e i r Finance M i n i s t e r s t o be s u p p o r t i v e o f t h i s
proposal.
1.4d
wrote you and other G-7 leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r
s t r e n g t h e n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y . These
ideas i n c l u d e r e i n f o r c i n g economic cooperation, which he i s
doing w i t h i n t h e EU; b u i l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h
the IMF s t i l l p l a y i n g a c e n t r a l r o l e w i t h a deeper dialogue
enhanced by a strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r the
IMF's I n t e r i m Committee; increased transparency and
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f world f i n a n c i a l systems; h i n t s a t some
form o f c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s ; and, f i n a l l y , increased
development assistance. There are few r a d i c a l ideas i n the
l e t t e r , aside from the h i n t a t r e t h i n k i n g l i b e r a l i z e d
c a p i t a l f l o w s . The one s p e c i f i c measure presented,
upgrading t h e I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have a
meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and i n t h e end we could
p r o b a b l y support. You should welcome h i s thoughts
g e n e r a l l y as a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue
on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e .
Kosovo
A f t e r the recent a t r o c i t i e s , I
l i s w i t h us i n moving t o
i s also w i l l i n g t o proceed, i n c l u d i n g
air strikes.
i f necessary i n t h e absence o f a new r e s o l u t i o n . However,
h i s s e n i o r s t a f f i s c o n s i d e r i n g whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
c l e a r i n g t h e way f o r the use o f f o r c e . I f so, t h i s needs
t o happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y so t h a t i t does not g e t i n
the way o f our e f f o r t s t o b u i l d NATO consensus.
The Russians continue t o oppose use o f f o r c e .
i s i n c r e a s i n g l y uncomfortable w i t h s e r v i n g
as a p o l o g i s t f o r M i l o s e v i c ' s b r u t a l i t y , but the Russians
have n o t come t o terms w i t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s the
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
i n p u b l i c statements.
the Russians continued t o emphasize t h a t any use o f f o r c e
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e and r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n .
This
o n l y underscores the importance o f our European p a r t n e r s '
keeping a u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g the
Russians t h a t we are coming close t o exhausting d i p l o m a t i c
o p t i o n s w i t h the Serbs. We have proposed a f u r t h e r PJC and
are p l a n n i n g f u r t h e r b i l a t e r a l contacts w i t h Moscow t o help
™.rTn ,T„r| TNT^N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ro
�CONFIDENTIAL
keep them on board, w h i l e making c l e a r t h a t we w i l l a c t i f
necessary w i t h o u t t h e i r consent.
Northern I r e l a n d ( B l a i r only)
14
.d
Earlier
was immovable m
t a l k i n g t o Jim Steinberg on w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider an IRA
gesture on decommissioning. [
I n l i n e w i t h t h i s , the B r i t i s h announced plans
t o remove watchtowers from B e l f a s t and dismantle a border
checkpoint.
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make f o r President Chirac
Tab B P o i n t s t o Make f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
rnTnFNTTA,,rLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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F
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways t o t a c k l e t h i s was a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n
to t h e c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l give i t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of. system i s needed, b u t need
urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging market economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and only f o r economies
w i t h strong p o l i c i e s .
o Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e .
approach w i t h these elements:
•
Think we need an
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not be permanent; could have sunset clause.
o Second, may need coordinated set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side o f IMF mechanism.
o T h i r d , also want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation.
M
•
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
o Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
CONFI DEN^HAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
10M/08
i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
lO
a*
Co
En W
Ul
Q
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
2
/C-2-%
Kosovo
•
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
operations a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
•
W i l l need your help i n b u i l d i n g NATO consensus and managing
Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a
corner by opposing any use o f force and appearing t o excuse
M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
EO 13526 1 4
.d
POOOY
HTCP
CONFIDENTIAL
^
f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^
WJC HANDWRITING
�THE P E I E T H S SEEN
RSDN A
CONFIDENTIAL
6724
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
o Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
• Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
o Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e .
approach w i t h these elements:
Think we need an
•
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not be permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
Second, may need coordinated s e t of b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as froifi Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side of>**T§&kechanism.
f
o
Third,
ant t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
© G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday. Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
• Need your strong support to help make that happen.
Kosovo
o We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
operations next Wednesday.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
^,
POOOY
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D.ci««try on:
1
L n ) R A R Y p H O T O C O p y
WJC H N W I I G
A D RTN
�CONFIDENTIAL
•
Concerned about managing Russian
reaction.
Do n o t want t o p u t Y e l t s i n i n a box by seeking a f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w i l l f o r c e the Russian
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, or veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
You may wish to raiselEO 13526 l.4d]idea of "testing"
willingness
to authorize
a UNSC Presidency
statement
the way for using force and your thoughts
on it:
Russian
clearing
had idea o f " t e s t i n g ' Russian w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e
a UNSC Presidency statement, As you know, I've been concerned
t h a t t h i s would p u t Y e l t s i n i n a no-win s i t u a t i o n .
I f he goes forward, needs t o do so q u i c k l y so as n o t t o reduce
pressure on M i l o s e v i c .
You and I agreed t o a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
r e s o l u t i o n . Need t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
Northern
•
Ireland
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
Understand
h o l d i n g back on executive u n t i l
decommissioning, and
he does.
Jim S t e i n b e r g spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s w i t h o u t much success.
on
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
t h i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
/
/
/
/
/
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
/
o 'Worried—at ^/(deterioration o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion worrisome.
7
'
•
Ac dioeusood, /onger-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e , o f system i s
needed, b u t also need urgent a c t i o n now t o help w o r t ^ e m e r g i n g
-•markets economies resist contagion.
/'
\P
• We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
•
•
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
/
Recognize i t wouldn't work without quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB) ; working hard t o g e t them i n
next week or so.
T y p i c a l IMF programs may/iot be s u i t a b l e , however. T h i n k i n g
of s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format. Would n o t be
permanent; could have sdnset clause.
/
•
May need coordinated'set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s (such as
from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along side o f IMF
mechanism.
•
Also want t o get' p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation as needed.
•
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent t h a t they reach agreement on s u i t a b l e
approach. /
•
Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
/
/
Kosovo
•
Outraged a t a t r o c i t i e s committed by M i l o s e v i c ' s s e c u r i t y
f o r c e s . B r u t a l t a c t i c s must stop and s e c u r i t y f o r c e s
/
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: l.SJd),..
D/ciassify^LIiN/liSN LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENT-^ftfe
2
withdrawn. Only a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e — i f n o t the us/
of force i t s e l f — w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply.
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i j
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range
air
o p e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
Pleased t h a t you ((pi. c a l l e d f o r an emergency Secur/te^ Council
meeting^-tcrdsy-r—^ut doubt t h a t Russia w i l l agree^to a
resolution authorizing force.
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . -Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposWg any use o f force
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Y e l t s i n and Primakov have a
and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n
go ahead, which does damage
what we've t r i e d t o achieve
d i f f i c u l t dilemma: e i t h e r abstain
a t home, o r veto — f o r c i n g us t o
t o t h e i r / p o s i t i o n a t home and t o
w i t h NA^O-Russia Founding A c t .
EO 13526 1.4d
"in t h i s box. Instead, we must
further resolution.
we shouldn't p u t them
prepared t o a c t w i t h o u t a
Also, need t o use a l l a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h the Russians,
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO, t o make/clear t h a t M i l o s e v i c ' s
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us vtio a l t e r n a t i v e . Hope t h a t Russia does
not p u t i t s e l f i n posityion t h a t i s o l a t e s i t from r e s t o f G-8.
Lv«2_
•
Need t o make t h i ^ c l e ^ r i n p u b l i c statements, otherwise
M i l o s e v i c w i l l / t t e i / z h a t promises and p a r t i a l compliance w i l l
p r o t e c t him from r t y i / i t a r y response.
We've both agrej;
resolution.
to a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
F i n a l l y , / ^ need t o ensure t h a t our actions weaken, n o t
strengthen Milosevic.
Cannot t o l e r a t e him as c o n t i n u i n g
source/of c o n f l i c t i n Balkans. We should ask ICTY t o pursue
his indictment.
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
Northern I r e l a n d
• Understand
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on,
decommissioning,
holding back on executive
he does.
Jim Steinberg spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s w i t h o u t much success.
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about/how t o b r i d g e
t h i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging standoff a t
_ -•Fwwnrrt> How can we help?
4r
tLINTON LIBRARY P O
H
�CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l ma/^ets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy/emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a packag£ t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
© Agree i t should be c e n t e r e / i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
» Recognize i t wouldn't ]4ork w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week o r so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF p r o g r a n ^ may n o t be s u i t a b l e , h o w e v e r y S ^
/^Q^hink
we need an/approach w i t h these elements:
© F i r s t , IMF ^ h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not fie permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
•
•
Second, /may need coordinated s e t o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such afe from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side a f IMF mechanism.
Thi/d,
a l s o want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
G-7 /Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
/eed your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
:ONFIDENTIAL
'Reason: 1. 5/M) T
Declassify Owi-
THN
kwAW
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^
Kosovo
EO 13526 1.4di
w
^
^
^
W e ' v e ^ g u n t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We^itftend t o ask NATO C o u n c i l t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a^
e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians aafe
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any us^r o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
•
We shouldn't p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o a box by seeking a ' f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w i l l f o r c e ^ t h e Russian
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russ^ia Founding A c t .
authorize
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idecf of "testing"
Russia/f willingness
to
a UNSC Presidency
statement
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the way for
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I f you de£i de-tn—ge-^forward, piease do so q u c k y and q u i t l y .
^Otherwise t h o r c i-s/?isk o f reducing pressure ionlM i l o s e v i c e and
c o m p l i c a t i n g # consensus at/NATO.
We
b t h a g r e e d t o act i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
J ^ s o l u t i o n l Need t o ceinvince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
A
Northern I r e l a n d
Understand
decommission!
he does.
•
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
andl
Iholding back on e x e c u t i v e u n t i l
Jim Steiiifcerg spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s wi/hout much success.
on
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
t h i / d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
CONFI DDNT I M J
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
6781
THE WHITE HOUSE
,
WASHINGTON
g8GCr5AMll:27
October 5, 1998
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: October 5, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: 11:45 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE
GENE SPERLIN
I.
PURPOSE
Y e l t s i n has requested t o speak t o you. We expect h i s main
issue w i l l be Kosovo, b u t he c o u l d also appeal f o r economic
support. You have t h r e e key messages:
•
Need t o be prepared t o use f o r c e i f and when diplomacy
f a i l s t o maximize prospects f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
© W i l l review r e p o r t s from Holbrooke, Annan t o determine i f
M i l o s e v i c i s complying.
• Want t o p r o v i d e economic support, b u t need s t r o n g Russian
r e f o r m program t h a t keeps money i n Russia.
II
BACKGROUND
Kosovo. Y e l t s i n dispatched Ivanov and Sergeyev t o Belgrade
yesterday i n an attempt t o head o f f NATO a i r s t r i k e s . A t
the end o f the meeting, the two sides declared t h a t
M i l o s e v i c had made s i g n i f i c a n t " p o s i t i v e steps" toward
compliance w i t h UNSCR 1199 and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n from
M i l o s e v i c ' s June meeting w i t h Y e l t s i n i n Moscow. They
f u r t h e r declared t h a t any use o f f o r c e would be an a c t o f
aggression a g a i n s t the FRY. |
EO 13526 1 4
.d
Dick Holbrooke w i l l be meeting w i t h M i l o s e v i c t h i s evening
i n Belgrade t o impress upon him t h e s t r i c t standards t h a t
we expect from M i l o s e v i c t o comply w i t h UNSCR 1199. The UN
S e c r e t a r y General's r e p o r t on UNSCR 1199 compliance w i l l be
CONFIDENT IAL
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
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issued today. We expect t h a t USUN r e p o r t s w i l l make c l e a r
M i l o s e v i c ' s f a i l u r e t o come i n t o compliance w i t h the
resolution.
No Economic P l a n . Thus f a r , Primakov's most c o n s t r u c t i v e
statement on economics has been t h a t he has no s t r a t e g y —
e s s e n t i a l l y a r e b u f f t o the S o v i e t - s t y l e p l a n d r a f t e d by
f i r s t Deputy PM Maslyukov. Primakov has been unable t o
complete h i s economic team, much less forge consensus on
how t o emerge from t h i s c r i s i s . And even i f he does get
consensus on a reasonable program, i t i s hard t o see how he
w i l l be able t o implement i t w i t h the c u r r e n t team.
Our stance should continue t o be t h a t we want t o support an
economic program t h a t works. But we also need t o recognize
t h a t Primakov and others w i l l be l o o k i n g t o blame continued
f a i l u r e on the West. We need t o be sure t h a t the Russians
take ownership o f t h e i r program and t h a t t h e communists
cannot, i n s i x months, c l a i m t h a t the Russia economic
d i s t r e s s i s due t o i m p o s i t i o n o f Western c o n d i t i o n s .
Even
i f t h e chances are s l i m , a cautious Western response now
w i l l give Russian reformers t h e i r best chance t o e x e r t
g r e a t e r p o l i c y i n f l u e n c e several months down the road.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
Attachments
Tab A
Points t o be Made
Tab B October 5 L e t t e r t o Y e l t s i n
sciiricDirciM.Q|_i[NjQN LIBRARY P O O O Y
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67 81
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
•
Glad t o hear from you. Hope you g o t my l e t t e r on Kosovo
t o d a y . A p p r e c i a t e update t h a t FM Ivanov gave us on h i s t r i p
to B e l g r a d e .
K«\Concerned t h a t M i l o s e v i c i s p l a y i n g h i s c l a s s i c game o f making
— ' r a i s e promises designed t o remove i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e . He
f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l promises t o you a f t e r your meeting i n June.
Y m d i s p a t c h i n g Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade t o emphasize
^
^ ^ " i m p o r t a n c e o f immediate and f u l l compliance w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's demands. Stakes are v e r y h i g h .
\ K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
^ — ^ d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Under c l e a r t h r e a t o f
f o r c e , M i l o s e v i c has now suspended some o p e r a t i o n s , b u t has
not
f u l l y withdrawn h i s f o r c e s . Most d i s p l a c e d persons s t i l l
a f r a i d t o r e t u r n home because t h e r e i s no assurance o f t h e i r
safety.
D i s t u r b i n g t h a t M i l o s e v i c seems determined t o a v o i d s e r i o u s
n e g o t i a t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . He hasn't responded t o
d r a f t s e t t l e m e n t package approved by Contact Group on F r i d a y .
<3
We do n o t w i s h t o use f o r c e . But what happens n e x t depends on
M i l o s e v i c . I m p o r t a n t t o t a k e two t r a c k approach — c o n c e r t e d
d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s backed by c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
0)
M i l o s e v i c ' s compliance w i t h UN requirements must be
v e r i f i a b l e , t a n g i b l e and i r r e v e r s i b l e .
• Madeleine w i l l be a t NATO on Thursday t o work on f i n a l s t e p s .
She's ready t o meet w i t h Ivanov i n PJC o r Contact Group f o r m a t
a f t e r NAC meets on Thursday.
I f Yeltsin
argues
new UNSC resolution
necessary
for
use of
force
•
Don't i n t e n d t o seek another r e s o l u t i o n ; UNSCR 1199 p r o v i d e s
s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s . Don't want t o p u t you i n d i f f i c u l t
p o s i t i o n . Russia would have t o acquiesce on mandate f o r use
of f o r c e o r you'd send w o r l d s i g n a l t h a t Russia i s s h i e l d i n g
Milosevic.
CONFIDENT iftfe
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P E R E
-
a
1 3 5 2 6
�-LUH1 IDLiWl IAL
I f Yeltsin
asks for ministerial-level
Contact
• Need t o t r e a t s i t u a t i o n one day a t a t i m e .
r e q u e s t s e r i o u s l y and g e t back t o you.
I f Yeltsin
Milosevic
•
complains
that Secretary
even if he withdraws
his
Group
meeting
W i l l consider
Cohen threatened
forces
to
strike
Not aware o f any statement along these l i n e s .
Think t h a t key
t o a v o i d i n g use o f f o r c e i s f u l l and immediate compliance w i t h
a l l o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's demands.
Ijf Yeltsin threatens to end NATO-Russia cooperation in response
to NATO use of
force
•
I m p o r t a n t n o t t o l e t disagreement between us undercut b r o a d e r
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Don't t h i n k i t ' s a good idea t o t h r e a t e n t o
p u l l o u t o f i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t we've worked so hard t o b u i l d .
Economic S i t u a t i o n , S t a t u s o f IMF Funds.
•
Have been w a t c h i n g c l o s e l y as Primakov and h i s team p u t
t o g e t h e r economic s t r a t e g y . Our team a t Treasury Department
met y e s t e r d a y w i t h your a d v i s o r s here i n Washington.
•
Want t o r e i t e r a t e what we discussed i n Moscow. Your l e g a c y
c o u l d be a t s t a k e . Concerned t h a t some s t r a t e g i e s b e i n g
d i s c u s s e d c o u l d spark i n f l a t i o n , cause c o l l a p s e o f c u r r e n c y .
•
Want t o s u p p o r t Russian r e f o r m and m o b i l i z e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s u p p o r t . To do t h a t , Russia needs s t r o n g , c r e d i b l e program.
Recognize t h i s needs t o be a Russian s t r a t e g y , b u t i t must
a l s o t a k e i n t o account i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l r e a l i t i e s .
•
Not good f o r Russia o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i f funds end up
i n f o r e i g n bank accounts as they d i d w i t h f i r s t IMF t r a n c h e .
When you have comprehensive p l a n ready, we a r e ready t o
l i s t e n , discuss.
I f Yeltsin
•
mentions
he is
sending
Livshits
as special
envoy
Aware he i s coming; our team ready t o r e c e i v e him; w i l l
carefully.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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listen
�CQMITIDEMTIMr
I f Yeltsin
•
for
quick
release
of
IMF
tranche
I want t h i s t o o B o r i s , b u t f i r s t need s t r o n g economic s t r a t e g y
agreed w i t h IMF. As I s a i d b e f o r e , c a n ' t a f f o r d t o have money
once a g a i n end up i n f o r e i g n accounts.
I f Yeltsin
•
asks
asks
for
restructuring
of
Paris
Club
debt
B o r i s , l a s t r e s c h e d u l i n g o f $40 b i l l i o n i n Russian P a r i s Club
debt was b i g g e s t ever. Great r e s i s t a n c e i n P a r i s Club t o
reopen t h a t agreement. When you have c r e d i b l e economic p l a n ,
want t o c o n s u l t w i t h you on how t o d e a l w i t h payment problem.
L a t v i a Referendum.
•
Glad t h a t L a t v i a n people v o t e d y e s t e r d a y t o change c i t i z e n s h i p
laws as recommended by OSCE. They've done what was necessary
t o meet i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s .
•
A p p r e c i a t e your p o s i t i v e response. We d i d a l o t t o achieve
this result.
I m p o r t a n t now t o improve R u s s i a n - L a t v i a n
d i a l o g u e and c o o p e r a t i o n . Am ready t o h e l p .
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ^
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
Glad t o hear from you. Hope you got my l e t t e r /6n Kosovo
today. A p p r e c i a t e update t h a t FM Ivanov gave ns on,.-his t r i p
to Belgrade.
Concerned t h a t M i l o s e v i c i s p l a y i n g h i s c l a s s i c game o f making
f a l s e promises designed t o remove i n t e r n a t i p h a l p r e s s u r e . He
f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l promises t o you a f t e r your meeting i n June.
Am d i s p a t c h i n g Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade ;to emphasize
importance o f immediate and f u l l compliance w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's demands. Stakes are v e r y h i g h .
/
W-ill l o o k a t r e p o r t s from Holbreoko' and K o f i Ahn^an
Milosevic
e.( M i l o s e v i c has s/jspended^operations,
but has n o t f u l l y withdj-awn^his f o r c e s ^
x
Disturbing that Milosevic/ seems determined to avoid serious
ce^^ ±
n e g o t i a t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . He hasn't responded t o "
d r a f t s e t t l e m e n t package approved by Contact Group on F r i d a y .
J
c
s
/
^y^ll, c
^w'^do^'"'!!-©^ wish t o u'se f o r c e . But what happens n e x t depends on Cc c « y f
\ciyiM i l o s e v i c ^ . I m p o r t a n t t o take two t r a c k approach — c o n c e r t e d
i p l o m a t i c | e f f o r t s backed by c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
I
/
Madeleine j ^ i y i be at NATO on Thursday t o work on f i n a l s t e p s .
She's rea,dy/to meet w i t h Ivanov i n PJC or Contact Group f o r m a t
a f t e r R^C Jneets on Thursday.
, .
M i l o ' s e v i c ' s contpliance w i t h UN requirements must be v e r i f i a b l e ^ ,
- t a n g i b l e / Impm t d i i t LtTaT RTTB^ia n o t provrde—po-l-rtireal
eovey f o r hollow preauses..
I f Yeltsin
argues
new UNSC resolution
necessary
for
use of
force
Don't i n t e n d t o seek another r e s o l u t i o n ; UNSCR 1199 p r o v i d e s
' s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s . Don't want t o p u t you i n d i f f i c u l t
p o s i t i o n . Russia would have t o acquiesce on mandate f o r use
of f o r c e o r you'd send w o r l d s i g n a l t h a t Russia i s s h i e l d i n g
Milosevic.
I f Yeltsin
asks
for ministerial-level
Contact
Group
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6863
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation w i t h Russian
President B o r i s Y e l t s i n
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Russian President Y e l t s i n
Interpreter:
Peter
Afanasenko
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, L i z Rogers,
Robin Rickard, Joel Schrader, Chris B e l l
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
THE PRESIDENT:
October 5, 1998, 12:01 - 12:18 p.m. EDT,
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Boris? (U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
H i , B i l l . (U)
THE PRESIDENT: I am g l a d t o hear from you.
want t o t a l k about Kosovo, and I do t o o .
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
THE PRESIDENT:
No, B o r i s .
I understand you
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
I hear you f i n e .
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
a"
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
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oedwify cgLPNTOfl LIBRARY P O O O Y
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.b .d
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
f o r your e f f o r t s . But l e t me — f e )
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
THE PRESIDENT:
(Interrupting)
F i r s t I want t o thank you
Thank you, B i l l .
Let me say what my concerns are.
(U)
First I —
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: ( I n t e r r u p t i n g ) Yes, and I t h i n k no one
should be allowed t o endanger the cooperation we have
established.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me say I am concerned t h a t what M i l o s e v i c i s
doing i s what he has done so o f t e n before i n making f a l s e
promises. He made a promise t o you i n June, which he d i d n ' t
keep. Perhaps OSCE m o n i t o r i n g w i l l help t h a t . I want t o say
t h a t we don't want t o use f o r c e , and i t i s n o t i n e v i t a b l e . What
happens next i s e n t i r e l y up t o him. Our experience i s t h a t a
c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e i s necessary t o get him t o comply so we
don't have t o use i t . I t h i n k you may have g o t t e n h i s
a t t e n t i o n , along w i t h the pressure b u i l d i n g up here. I am going
to send Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade.
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a
graphic account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s c o n t i n u i n g defiance o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Many d i s p l a c e d persons are a f r a i d t o
r e t u r n home because they have no assurance o f s a f e t y . He has
suspended these operations and made h i s commitment t o you now,
but we simply have t o know he i s going t o comply w i t h UN
requirements, and compliance has t o be v e r i f i a b l e and
i r r e v e r s i b l e . I do not want t o use f o r c e , and f o r c e i s n o t
i n e v i t a b l e . I f he t h i n k s there i s no t h r e a t o f f o r c e , he never
does a n y t h i n g . Your r e p o r t i s encouraging, and the OSCE may
p r o v i d e us a u s e f u l mechanism, b u t he has got t o come through
here, and h i s a c t i o n s are what's important here and w i l l
determine what w i l l happen next. f&)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
goodbye. fG^
Goodbye B i l l .
Thank you f o r t h i s and
End o f Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
STEIN
-TEARRY
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi on Kosovo
Purpose
To urge Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi t o support NATO a c t i o n .
Background
Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi i s i n the midst o f a serious p o l i t i c a l
c r i s i s and a dilemma over the r i g h t course o f a c t i o n i n Kosovo.
Prodi and FM D i n i s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e t h a t a c l e a r e r UN mandate i s
needed.
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
I f France and Germany decide t o proceed w i t h o u t a UN
r e s o l u t i o n , i t would be easier f o r Rome t o agree, although s t i l l
d i f f i c u l t due t o domestic p o l i t i c s .
1.4b, l.4d
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign t h e l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi a t Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi
CONFIDENTIAL
cc: Vice President
1ef o f S t a f f
^ ^ U - d t o m LIBRARY PHOTOCO^
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BANDLER, COQ, FICKLIN, HASMAN, SAPIRO, SUM2, NSC, COMM, SIT{C2}
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: GONriDCNUAL.
DTG:070220Z OCT 98
FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO:
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IT
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
CONriDCNTIAL
QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER PRODI AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR ROMANO:
I'M SO GLAD THAT WE WERE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER IN NEW YORK. I
KNOW THAT YOU ARE IN THE MIDST OF A TREMENDOUS EFFORT TO
MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL
SUCCEED AND ITALY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA0635 C O N r i D C N T I A L ADDRESSING THE MANY CHALLENGES BEFORE US.
ROMANO, WE HAVE COME TO THE DECISIVE MOMENT IN ADDRESSING
THE BRUTAL REPRESSION IN KOSOVO. WE MUST REACH CONSENSUS AT
NATO ON AUTHORIZING AIR OPERATIONS. IT IS NOT AN EASY DECISION
FOR ANY OF US, BUT IT IS THE RIGHT ONE. FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN A
LULL FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS, BUT MILOSEVIC HAS NOT YET
WITHDRAWN SPECIAL POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES, NOR AGREED TO
MEASURES THAT WOULD MAKE THE END OF HOSTILITIES VERIFIABLE
AND DURABLE. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN KOSOVO CONTINUES
TO DETERIORATE AS WINTER APPROACHES. I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE
CONTACT WITH DICK HOLBROOKE, WHO BELIEVES THAT AUTHORIZING
NATO TO ACT PROMPTLY PROVIDES THE ONLY CHANCE OF TURNING
MILOSEVIC AROUND.
DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, YOU, I AND OTHERS HAVE WORKED
HARD TO ADDRESS THE KOSOVO PROBLEM IN THE CONTACT GROUP,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE
NOW NEED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FROM THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR NATO TO ACT TO HELP BRING THIS CRISIS TO AN END.
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MOREOVER, WE HAVE ALL GOTTEN A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM MOSCOW
THAT IT WILL NOT SUPPORT ANOTHER RESOLUTION, AND IT SEEMS
THAT ONLY HARM CAN COME FROM FORCING BORIS INTO A VETO.
IF WE DO NOT ACT TOGETHER, WE WILL RISK CONTINUED INSTABILITY
IN THE HEART OF EUROPE AND DEAL A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE
ALLIANCE'S FUTURE ABILITY TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE PEACE.
UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, ITALY HAS ASSUMED A KEY ROLE IN EUROPE
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, AND I HOPE THAT I CAN
COUNT ON YOU TO JOIN IN AN ALLIED CONSENSUS THIS COMING
WEEKEND AUTHORIZING NATO TO ACT.
SINCERELY,
BILL
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0635
< TOR>981006224302 M3498178
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON L M M L P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
6890
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 7, 19 98
;
U
1
'S
'9 0er7PKg:36
"8
HONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
DATE: October 8, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To ensure French cooperation i n p r e s e n t i n g a c r e d i b l e
m i l i t a r y t h r e a t t o M i l o s e v i c . You w i l l want t o persuade
Chirac t h a t NATO should decide on an A c t i v a t i o n Order
(ACTORD) on Saturday, October 10, even i n t h e absence o f
Russian support.
II.
BACKGROUND
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
In t h a t
call
We now have answers on both counts. Annan's r e p o r t
made c l e a r t h a t M i l o s e v i c continues t o defy the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and i s n o t i n compliance w i t h
r e s o l u t i o n 1199. Russia has made i t very c l e a r t h a t they
w i l l not support e i t h e r a new UNSCR o r a s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l
statement by t h e Contact Group.
CONFI DEN'HrftL
Reason: 1.5 (D)
D e c l a s s i f y On: l 0i7/08
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
l
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r e f f o r t s t o b r i n g Russia on board,
1.4b, 1.4d
Attachment
Tab A
Points t o Be Made
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TNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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6890
•
Since we spoke l a s t week, c l e a r from K o f i Annan's r e p o r t t h a t
M i l o s e v i c s t i l l d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
•
Holbrooke has had three d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n
past few days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and refuses
to comply. He claimed t h a t there were no roadblocks even
though Holbrooke encountered several h i m s e l f . His claims
about s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y misleading.
•
E s s e n t i a l now t h a t we achieve consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
a u t h o r i z e f o r c e . E s s e n t i a l we do t h a t by Saturday. B e l i e v e
t h a t a l l NATO a l l i e s moving t o the same conclusion.
•
Know you've been t h i n k i n g about ways t o get Russia on board
and t h a t you've spoken several times w i t h Y e l t s i n .
However, we have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t
they w i l l n o t support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Don't t h i n k i t
makes any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r a l l i e s t o support.
•
EO 13526 l.4d
I today's
Contact Group meeting. Also unsure how h e l p f u l Russia w i l l be
t h e r e , b u t main p o i n t i s t h a t we agree t h a t NATO w i l l proceed
regardless o f what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
• Also t h i n k i t important t h a t when we g e t ACTORD, i t should
cover t h e f u l l range o f a i r operations.
I f Chirac
action,
o
Contact
Group
meeting
in France
after
NATO
I n p r i n c i p l e , not opposed. Let's have Madeleine and Hubert
discuss i t . Main t h i n g f o r now i s t o convince M i l o s e v i c we
are s e r i o u s .
If asked
•
proposes
about
ground
forces
to verify
compliance,
Believe we can do i t w i t h o u t combat f o r c e s .
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: La/07/08
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
! CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PHOTOCOPY
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6890
POINTS TO BE MADE
IN TELEPHONE CALL TO CHIRAC
Since we spoke l a s t week, c l e a r from K o f i Annan's r e p o r t t h a t
M i l o s e v i c s t i l l d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
Holbrooke has had three d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n
past few days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and refuses
t o comply. He claimed t h a t there were no roadblocks even
though Holbrooke encountered several h i m s e l f . His claims
about s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y misleading.
E s s e n t i a l now t h a t we achieve consensus f o r NATO d e / i s i o n to
a u t h o r i z e f o r c e . E s s e n t i a l we do t h a t by Saturdav^
Know you've been t h i n k i n g about ways to- get Russia on board
and t h a t you've spoken several times w i t h Y e l t s i n .
However, we have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t
^
they w i l l n o t support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Don't t h i n k i t ^» 2^
makes any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r a l l i e s t o support.
l,<
today's
l.4d
Contact Group meeting. Also unsure how h e l p f u l Russia w i l l be
t h e r e , but main p o i n t i s t h a t we agree t h a t NATO w i l l proceed
regardless o f what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
Also t h i n k i t important t h a t when we get ACTORD, i t should
cover t h e f u l l range o f a i r o p e r a t i o n s .
Ijf Chirac proposes Contact Group meeting
action,
•
in France
after
NATO
I n p r i n c i p l e , not opposed. Let's telle abi=mt--rL af t a r TfeWaRB. — » k<w^e
Main t h i n g f o r now i s t o convince M i l o s e v i c we are s e r i o u s .
f\.l|^
Y«c«,
ft Ad
I f asked about ground f o r c e s to v e r i f y compliance,
f^eAl,
•
IAS-
t^c.'f-
i^iii~^
CCL-J^-
b*^*—
Need-to t h i i r k aLu^fe. -Wmild nepd to ensure rnmn"! i anew 4-s
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify ogLMTOW LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONFIDENTIAL
6929
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetaker: Bonnie C l i c k , George Chastain,
Frank J a r o s i n s k i , Sean Tarver, James Smith,
Joel Schrader
October 8, 1998, 12:46p.m.-1:05 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o Jacques.
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o . (U)
Oh B i l l , how are you?
Fine.
President Chirac:
(U)
(U)
I t ' s a pleasure t o hear you. (U)
I t ' s a great pleasure t o hear from you.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you. I t ' s good t o hear your v o i c e . We
s a i d we would check i n today on t h e Kosovo s i t u a t i o n , so I
thought we should t a l k f o r a moment. (U)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello?
Could you repeat
(U)
We agreed t o t a l k a few days ago about Kosovo.
President Chirac:
Bill,
I hear you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : K o f i Annan's r e p o r t makes i t c l e a r M i l o s e v i c i s
s t i l l d e f y i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Dick Holbrooke has
h e l d t h r e e d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n the past few
days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and i s s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o
comply. He claimed there were no roadblocks even though
CONFIDENTIAL
D ^ i f ^ M J / m LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Holbrooke encountered s e v e r a l o f them h i m s e l f . His comments
about t h e s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y m i s l e a d i n g . So I
t h i n k we are s t i l l i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . I t h i n k i t i s very
i m p o r t a n t now t h a t we achieve a consensus on a NATO d e c i s i o n t o
a u t h o r i z e the use o f f o r c e , and t h a t we do i t by Saturday. I
b e l i e v e we are a l l moving i n the same d i r e c t i o n . I know you
were working on ways t o get Russia on board and t h a t you have
spoken w i t h Y e l t s i n several times. I t h i n k the r e a l problem i s
t h a t we have g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . So, I don't t h i n k i t makes
any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r the a l l i e s t o
support. I hope we can also get a s t r o n g statement from today's
Contact Group meeting, and I know you are pushing f o r i t . I am
a l s o unsure how Russia w i l l be t h e r e , b u t the main p o i n t i s t h a t
we should agree, I t h i n k , t h a t NATO w i l l proceed t o a u t h o r i z e
a c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f what the Russian p o s i t i o n i s . I t h i n k i f
we do t h a t we may not have t o use i t . I f M i l o s e v i c t h i n k s f o r c e
w i l l be used, a t l e a s t we may not have t o use i t . (U)
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
President
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Just a moment, I can't hear t h e i n t e r p r e t e r .
Chirac:
GONFIDDNTIAL,
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The President: F i r s t , I thank you f o r your thoughts. I agree
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w i l l not solve the problem alone, i t w i l l only
make i t c l e a r t o M i l o s e v i c t h a t h i s a c t i o n s w i l l n o t be
t o l e r a t e d . I agree also though t h a t i f we make t h i s d e c i s i o n on
Saturday a t t h e NAC committee meeting t o a u t h o r i z e f o r c e we
s t i l l have a chance t o avoid the use o f i t . I
14
^d
n h i n k there i s some m e r i t t o having a meeting a f t e r
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . I am c e r t a i n l y not opposed t o t h a t because we
w i l l have t o get everyone together on a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n .
Perhaps we can have Madeleine and Vedrine agree t o discuss t h a t .
As f o r
J v i l l be here
tomorrow, and I w i l l t a l k
on the phone today and I w i l l
(io_m.v_b_est w i t h them. I don't know e x a c t l y what t o do about the
-- i f you have any ideas I would be g l a d t o hear them.
once on t h i s and w i l l be g l a d t o
I have already spoken t o
speak t o him again. f€4
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay.
President Chirac:
I w i l l see what I can do.
Okay, B i l l .
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me also say I had a very i n t e r e s t i n g t a l k
here w i t h your Finance M i n i s t e r and the head o f your c e n t r a l
bank. fG-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you very much. I w i l l be i n touch on t h a t .
We see some evidence i n America and elsewhere t h a t c r e d i t l i n e s
are t i g h t e n i n g up. I am a f r a i d i t w i l l happen i n Europe and
Japan and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Germany where t h e banks are exposed t o
CONFIDENTIAL
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�"CONFI DENT I AL
Russian loans. We might have t o be more aggressive i n coming
weeks. Things are moving very q u i c k l y and the Japanese
s i t u a t i o n i s s t i l l very bad. f&)
President
Chirac:
The President:
Thank you Jacques.
I w i l l be back i n touch.
m
President Chirac: Thank you very much, B i l l .
regards t o H i l l a r y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you f r i e n d , I w i l l .
President Chirac:
Goodbye.
And give my
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End o f Conversation
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6924
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER PRODI
DATE: October 9, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To urge t h a t I t a l y support NATO
isensus on ACTORD a t t h e
Saturday, October 10, NAC i n Br sels.
A
II
BACKGROUND
We a*e—4©«4«rt%g t o achieve 5TO consensus on ^ n A c t i v a t i o n
Order (ACTORD) f o r l i m i t e
. i r options i n Kosovo bv the end
of t h e weekend.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
We could consider waiting until Monday
as the ujgtimate tailback. But even a two-day delay would
slow momentum and make it more difficult to maintain allied
consensus.
^
t
While we might be able t o
CONFI DEN-HAL
Reason: 1.5 (D)
D e c l a s s i f y Og:^ Jl
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I n a d d i t i o n t o seeking I t a l i a n consensus on^ACTORD, we_
would l i k e approval from Prodi t o use I t a l i a n bases.
Q
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�CONFIDENTIAL
launch the l i m i t e d a i r option without I t a l i a n support, i t
would be much more d i f f i c u l t and send the wrong message^to
Milosevic and other A l l i e s . For the phased a i r campaign,
we would c e r t a i n l y need to move a i r c r a f t into I t a l y ^ r j^Lack
of access could therefore cripple our a b i l i t y to ejrecute
t h i s nptinn f f n h r r H n g u/ .Tfl]
»
#
/
You should be able to t e l l Prodi, a f t e r yourymeetin'g w i t h
Chancellor-elect Schroeder and telephone ca^L with
Chancellor Kohl, that the Germans are on Jsoard for ACTORD
on Saturday. Moreover, whether Prodi jcwnis on Saturday or
Monday should not affect the p o l i t i c a l ^ b s t a c l e s you
understand he must overcome.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o be Made
se«
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�LUNJjlUJLNllAL
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
ITALIAN PRIME MINSTER PRODI
•
C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on s u r v i v i n g vote o f confidence
Knew
you'd make i t .
Efcalicm'ri wou-ld^e-^o-3rirs-hr-t-&-l&
OK. kos^voy
^-ckeuio*
• M i l o s e v i c continues t o defy i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Bolgracte
/f?as- not complied w i t h UNSCR 1199, as K o f i ' s r e p j j r t makes
clear.
•
Holbrooke had several d i f f i c u l t meetings wi^fh M i l o s e v i c over
past f o u r days. M i l o s e v i c i s being evasi^fe and continues t o
s t o n e w a l l . For example, he claimed theEje were no roadblocks
even though Holbrooke encountered s e v ^ a l h i m s e l f .
•
M i l o s e v i c ' s claims about s e c u r i t y
spurious. He hasn't withdrawn t h
p o l i c e . T h e i r presence continue
persons from r e t u r n i n g home. Hi
resume k i l l i n g a t any time.
f ^ t c e s have been e q u a l l y
m i l i t a r y or the special
to intimidate displaced
forces remain poised t o
Contact Group Foreign M i n i s t e r s met i n London yesterday.
Clear t h a t Russia would ve^o a f u r t h e r UNSC r e s o l u t i o n .
Although would have been J f e s i r a b l e , A l l i e s - i n c l u d i n g
1.4d
- agree another UNSCR n q £ easeflt-iiai under circumstances.
E s s e n t i a l t h a t we achi ve consensus now f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
We've b u i l t up c r u c i a l momentum and
a u t h o r i z e use o f for,
Need agreement a t NATO meeting on
can't r i s k l o s i n g
on A c t i v a t i o n Order (ACTORD).
Saturday
yesterday and
A l l o t h e r A l l i e 'are on board.
today. Both agree t h a t
spent time w i t
can j n consensus on ACTORD on Saturday.
Know you' fa^& d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n , r i s k i n g the support o f some
of the Wonuy f o l k s who voted f o r you /oday. Also c o n f i d e n t i n
your leadjttrship a b i l i t y t o persuade'peopie t h a t i t ' s t h e r i g h t
t h i n g t o ^ i o i n face o f M i l o s e v i c ' s b r u t a l r e p r e s s i o n since
February.
•
Decision n o t easy f o r any o f us, b u t o n l y way t o stop tragedy.
Simply can't a l l o w slaughter t o continue on NATO's doorstep.
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (D)
Declassify
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Don't want to see I t a l y out of step with other A l l i e s . Need
I t a l y on board. Your bases and generous support are an
essential component of success.
; i f asked about delay):
A delay of two days would undermine momentu-ny.we've b u i l t — a p r
Holbrooke needs the negotiating leverage^rf ACTORD on
Saturday. Could be just as hard f o r VQjfr on Monday,
1 4 , 14
. b .d
But delay - even of two
*s determination and
days - would create doubts about
credibility.
: i f asked about ground troops:)
Ground troops would be d i f f i c
tfe^fe a i r options, w i l l wur-fe.
M
for many of us. Am confident
1
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�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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prpTfn
lUm lit M
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7307
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
October 26, 1998
PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER MASSIMO D'ALEMA
AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER PRODI
DATE: October 26, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To t e l l Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema how much you a r e l o o k i n g
f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g w i t h him and t o t o u c h base w i t h former
Prime M i n i s t e r P r o d i .
II.
BACKGROUND
A t 4 9, Massimo D'Alema has a r e p u t a t i o n as a smart, shrewd
and s k i l l e d p o l i t i c i a n .
On F r i d a y , he won a v o t e o f
c o n f i d e n c e i n I t a l y ' s lower house by a c o m f o r t a b l e margin
(333-281), and a v o t e i n t h e Senate i s expected on Tuesday.
D'Alema i s b e s t known f o r h e l p i n g t o t r a n s f o r m t h e I t a l i a n
Communist p a r t y i n t o a s o c i a l democratic p a r t y i n 1991, and
i s b e i n g h a i l e d as t h e f i r s t "ex-Communist" t o l e a d I t a l y .
His government i s composed o f s e v e r a l d i v e r s e p a r t i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e c e n t e r r i g h t , t h e moderate l e f t and t h e
moderate communists who broke away t o s u p p o r t P r o d i .
Because o f these d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s and i n t e r e s t s , D'Alema
may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o f o r g e a s t a b l e government,
notwithstanding h i s considerable personal strengths.
We do n o t expect major p o l i c y changes from D'Alema. He has
r e t a i n e d F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r D i n i , who has made c l e a r t h e r e
w i l l be no change o f d i r e c t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
Treasury
M i n i s t e r Ciampi w i l l a l s o remain, which sends a c l e a r
s i g n a l t h a t I t a l y remains f i r m l y committed t o sound
economic p o l i c i e s and a smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o European
Monetary Union. The new M i n i s t e r o f Defense i s C a r l o s
Scognamiglio, a former p r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and member
of t h e Center R i g h t .
-Ge^rLDENllAL
Reason:
Declass:
U ' & N m URRnH T C P
B A YP O O O Y
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�Former Prime M i n i s t e r P r o d i remains a member o f P a r l i a m e n t
and has s a i d he w i l l c o n t i n u e t o work t o support a c e n t e r
l e f t pole i n I t a l i a n p o l i t i c s .
He, a l o n g w i t h Helmut Kohl,
have been mentioned as p o s s i b l e successors t o Jacques
Santer.
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
£LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
OONFI DENT I A]
�COtiriDGN'reftfr
7307
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER MASSIMO D'ALEMA
•
Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , I wanted t o f o l l o w up my l e t t e r o f
c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s by p e r s o n a l l y w i s h i n g you every success i n
your new p o s i t i o n .
•
The U . S . - I t a l y p a r t n e r s h i p i s as s t r o n g as ever, and t h e r e i s
much f o r us t o do t o g e t h e r . I'm t h i n k i n g o f Kosovo i n
p a r t i c u l a r , as w e l l as s u p p o r t i n g t h e M i d d l e East process,
a d d r e s s i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and s o l i d i f y i n g
peace i n Bosnia.
•
I a p p r e c i a t e d your words o f support f o r t h e Wye agreement. I t
was an i n c r e d i b l y d i f f i c u l t n e g o t i a t i o n b u t we've c l e a r l y made
p r o g r e s s . Must keep the momentum g o i n g .
•
On Kosovo, S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o FM D i n i y e s t e r d a y . Am
encouraged c e a s e f i r e i s s t i l l h o l d i n g , d e s p i t e some c o n t i n u e d
minor s k i r m i s h i n g .
•
But v i t a l we keep up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c t o keep agreement
he made w i t h SACEUR over t h e weekend. Need t o remain ready t o
act i f he does n o t . Even i f he does a c t , w e ' l l need t o keep
t h r e a t o f a i r s t r i k e s a l i v e t o ensure s u s t a i n e d compliance and
d e t e r any b a c k s l i d i n g .
•
To keep up p r e s s u r e , w e ' l l a l s o need t o e x p e d i t e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of NATO R e a c t i o n Force and A i r V e r i f i c a t i o n M i s s i o n . I
encourage I t a l y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o R e a c t i o n Force, j u s t as i t
has pledged t o do t o OSCE Kosovo V e r i f i c a t i o n M i s s i o n .
•
I n c l o s i n g , l e t me say how much I'm l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g
t o g e t h e r . Hope t o see you a t NATO Summit next s p r i n g , i f n o t
before.
CONFIDClfffrftSReason: 1.5Ld)
Declassify o^Llwtyp^
P E R E.O. 13526
LIDKAKY
rHU ULUrY
�-GOMn DEI JT IAL
7307
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FORMER PRIME MINISTER ROMANO PRODI
•
Romano, I know i t ' s been a tough few weeks.
I j u s t want you
t o know how much I enjoyed w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r . You l e d I t a l y a t
a c r u c i a l t i m e and d i d much f o r b i l a t e r a l as w e l l as U.S.European r e l a t i o n s .
•
H i l l a r y s t i l l t a l k s about how much we b o t h enjoyed h a v i n g you
and F l a v i a v i s i t us i n May.
•
Want t o s t a y i n c l o s e touch. Hope t h a t you w i l l remain
i n v o l v e d i n b o t h U . S - I t a l i a n and t r a n s a t l a n t i c i s s u e s .
•
Am c e r t a i n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema would welcome your wisdom
and a d v i c e . A l l us w i l l want t o seek your e x p e r t i s e as we
address t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and o t h e r
c h a l l e n g e s b e f o r e us.
TaT
CONFIDENT i _
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o^: J.0/Z
M f t W LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�IMMEDIATE
GOHriDDHTimr
OAACZYUW RHEHAAA2021 0510116-CCCC--RUXXWHX RUEHMO RUEHC.
ZNY CCCCC ZZK RUEHMO
200119Z FEB 99
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SUBJECT:*** NO SUBJECT FOUND ***
BT
•CON F I D E
QQQQ
M T I A f r -
NODIS
AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COPY MAY ALSO BE
PROVIDED TO ROBERT "MARKARYAN I N PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV S OFFICE,
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
1
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2
RHEHAAA2021
C O N F l r D E N T I A ' L
I WAS VERY GLAD THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO COME TO AMMAN, AND I
WAS HAPPY TO SEE YOU THERE. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE LETTER
THAT YOU SENT EARLIER THIS WEEK.
AS YOUR LETTER SUGGESTS, WE ARE REACHING A CRITICAL MOMENT
IN THE CRISIS I N KOSOVO. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT DEPENDS ON THE
PARTIES' WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS THAT WILL
SECURE WHAT YOU CALLED FOR I N YOUR LETTER TO ME -- A SENSIBLE
AND FAIR SETTLEMENT THAT STOPS THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.
AMBASSADORS MAYORSKIY, HILL, AND PETRITSCH HAVE BEEN
WORKING CLOSELY AT RAMBOUILLET TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE
PARTIES TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND' SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FRY WHILE GIVING
THE KOSOVARS THE SELF-RULE THAT THEY DESERVE.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. MADELEINE, IGOR
SERGEYEVICH, AND THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP MINISTERS SET A
DEADLINE, WHICH EXPIRES AT NOON TODAY, FOR THE PARTIES TO
COME TO AGREEMENT. THE SERBIAN SIDE SO FAR HAS CHOSEN TO
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA2 021 - 0 N P I • D E N T I A L
C
REBUFF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO AVOID ENGAGING
SERIOUSLY ON THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. I F THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL, AND SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
FAILS TO ACCEPT THE ^ R S l ^ I U ^ ^.9Y | T H ^ ^ ^ E , |_p ^^J j L ^
^PRESMW J Y THEJffiAPkmE, ^
f j
PER E„(X 13526
�HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE TALKS AND FOR
PROVOKING A N W CYCLE OF CONFLICT AND SUFFERING.
E
THE UNITED STATES JOINS RUSSIA AND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN THE VIEW THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE
KOSOVO ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL AND IN HOPING THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED
WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT MILITARY ACTION
WOULD POSE DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR RUSSIA. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR
THAT WITHOUT A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, THERE IS LITTLE
CHANCE THAT BELGRADE WILL SIGN UP TO AN AGREEMENT THAT ALL
MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP BELIEVE MEETS ITS CORE GOALS.
THE THREAT OF FORCE BROUGHT THE SERBIAN DELEGATION TO
RAMBOUILLET, AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL, IN THE END, MOTIVATE
THEM TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. MILOSEVIC SHOULD HAVE NO
ILLUSIONS THAT NATO STANDS READY TO ACT IF HE DOES NOT.
PAGE 4
RHEHAAA2 0 2 1 C O N ' F I D E
N T I A L
IN THE HOURS REMAINING BEFORE TODAY'S DEADLINE EXPIRES, I HOPE
THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT "WILL USE ALL ITSINFLUENCE "WITH
MILOSEVIC AND TO ENSURE THAT HE K O S PRECISELY WHAT IS AT
NW
STAKE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY WAY TO
PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE FRY.
I APPRECIATED THE COOPERATIVE TONE YOU SET IN YOUR LETTER TO
ME. YOU AND I HAVE PERSONALLY CONTRIBUTED TOO MUCH TO
BUILDING STABILITY IN THE BALKANS TO LET IT BE SQUANDERED BY
SERB DEFIANCE. OUR W R AT THE M S O SUMMIT LAST
OK
OCW
SEPTEMBER WAS CRITICAL TO PUTTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT
WITHIN OUR GRASP. TOGETHER YOU AND I HELPED BRING ABOUT THE
DAYTON ACCORDS, AND FOR THE LAST TWO AND HALF YEARS, OUR
TROOPS HAVE KEPT THE PEACE IN BOSNIA. W CAN AND MUST DO THE
E
SAME IN KOSOVO. N W IS THE TIME TO EMPLOY THE GREATEST
O
PRESSURE SO THAT OUR HARD W R PAYS OFF.
OK
SINCERELY,
BILL
PAGE 5
RHEHAAA2 0 2 1
C O N F I D E N T I A L
END TEXT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�1159
-CQMITIDEMTIMJ
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 19, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
CARLOS PASCU.
FROM:
ANDREW WEISS
SUBJECT:
Reply t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
The memorandum a t Tab I recommends a P r e s i d e n t i a l message t o
P r e s i d e n t B o r i s Y e l t s i n on Kosovo. The message underscores t h e
s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo and t h e need t o a p p l y
maximum p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c t o ensure a s u c c e s s f u l outcome a t
Rambouillet.
Concurrence by:
f-Leon Fuerth, M i r i a m Sapiro^JslJ
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Message t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
-CONFIDENTIAL—'
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o£:[_ J ^ Q ^
PER E„0.13526
LI BRARY
DU
OOY
CP
�CONFIDENTIAL
1159
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Message t o President Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
Purpose
Approve a message t o President Y e l t s i n .
Background
President Y e l t s i n wrote t o you e a r l i e r today about Kosovo,
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Y e l t s i n ' s harsh p u b l i c statement was a spontaneous r e p l a y o f
n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l p u b l i c comments t h a t Y e l t s i n made l a s t October.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the message a t Tab A.
Approved &, Sttg
~
t^C.
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Message t o President Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
0
:
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
Declassify g l_ pf^ff (JpJ LIBRARY DH0T0C0PY
�COMFiriFMTIMj/HODIS
NIACT IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
1.
AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COPY MAY ALSO BE
PROVIDED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV S
OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
I WAS VERY GLAD THAT YOU WERE
HAPPY TO SEE YOU THERE. I AM
YOU SENT EARLIER THIS WEEK.
JE TO COME TO AMMAN, AND I WAS
GRATEFUL FOR THE LETTER THAT
AS YOUR LETTER SUGGESTS, WE ARE REACHING A CRITICAL MOMENT IN
THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO. WRAT HAPPENS NEXT DEPENDS ON THE PARTIES'
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE TH^HARD DECISIONS THAT WILL SECURE WHAT YOU
CALLED FOR IN YOUR LETTER TO ME — A SENSIBLE AND FAIR
SETTLEMENT THAT STOPS THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.
AMBASSADORS
MAYORSKIY, HILL, AND PETRITSCH HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY AT
RAMBOUILLET TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT AN
AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF/THE FRY WHILE GIVING THE KOSOVARS THE SELF-RULE
THAT THEY DESERVE.
^
fa,^
^/WlU** ^
«»!L h*CU^**r
UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE RUNNING/OUT OF TIME. MADELEINE, IGOR
SERGEYEVl/H, AND THE OTHERCONTACT GROUP MINISTERS SET A
DEADLINE^ WHICH EXPIRES AT NOON TODAY, FOR THE PARTIES TO COME
TO AGREEMENT. THE SERBIAN SIDE SO FAR HAS CHOSEN TO REBUFF THE
INTE^ATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO AVOID ENGAGING SERIOUSLY ON THE
DRAFT AGREEMENT. I F •'SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC FAILS TO ACCEPT THE
AGREEMENT BY THE DEADLINE, HE WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE
FAILURE OF THE TALKS AND FOR PROVOKING A NEW CYCLE OF CONFLICT
AND SUFFERING.
THE UNITED STATES JOINS RUSSIA 7vND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY I N THE VIEW THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOSOVO
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HTC
DECLASSIFIED
Dy PERM-13526
�ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL AND IN HOPING THAT I T CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT,
THE USE OF FORCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT MILTARY ACTION WOULD POSE
DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR RUSSIA. HOWEVER, I T IS CLEAR THAT WITHOUT
A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT BELGRADE
WILL SIGN UP TO AN AGREEMENT THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT
GROUP BELIEVE MEETS ITS CORE GOALS.
THE THREAT OF FORCE BROUGHT THE SERBIAN DELEGATION T
C
RAMBOUILLET, AND I HOPE THAT I T WILL, IN THE END, MOTIVATE THEM
TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. MILOSEVIC SHOULD HAVE N O / L L U S I O N S THAT
NATO STANDS READY TO ACT I F HE DOES NOT.
IN THE HOURS REMAINING BEFORE TODAY'S DEADLINE EXPIRES, I HOPE
THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL USE ALL ITS INFLUENCE WITH MILOSEVIC
AND TO ENSURE THAT HE KNOWS PRECISELY WHAT IS AT STAKE. I
BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS THE ONLy/WAY TO PRESERVE rROSmO'
^T-OF^ERBIA. •WTWfm^TT, THF^F. MAY BF. NO WAY
INTEGRITY" OF SERBiA-TU BE PRKbiLRVEIV BECAUSE OF~~THE"
BLE
EHT
HfoSTXLJ^Y
AND ANGER THAT
LDE
UAS^ME.VO£E£i
/
I APPRECIATED THE COOPERATIVE/TONE YOU SET IN YOUR LETTER TO ME,
YOU AND I HAVE PERSONALLY CONTRIBUTED TOO MUCH TO BUILDljlG
STABILITY I N THE BALKANS T^'LET IT BE SQUANDERED BY SERB
DEFIANCE. OUR WORK AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT LAST SEPTEMBER WAS
CRITICAL TO PUTTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITHIN OUR GRA$P.
TOGETHER YOU AND I HELPED BRING ABOUT THE DAYTON ACCORDS AND
FOR THE LAST TWO AND HALF YEARS, OUR TROOPS HAVE KEPT TH PEACE
IN BOSNIA. WE CAN/AND MUST DO THE SAME IN KOSOVO. NOW :s THE
TIME TO EMPLOY THE GREATEST PRESSURE SO THAT OUR HARD W RK PAYS
O
OFF.
7
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
"6M
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
1357
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h Jacques Chirac, President o f
France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Robert Rubin, Secretary o f the Treasury
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
Steve R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
F e l i x Rohatyn, Ambassador t o France
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC (Notetaker)
Lael B r a i n a r d , Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r Economic A f f a i r s (expanded
session and lunch only)
Donald Handler, Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r the NATO Summit (expanded
session only)
K e i r n C. Brown, D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s (expanded session only)
Jacques Chirac, President
Hubert Vedrine, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Finance M i n i s t e r
Jean-David L e v i t t e , D i p l o m a t i c Adviser
Hubert Bujon, Ambassador t o the United
States
Jean-Francois G i r a u l t , Technical Adviser
Catherine Colonna, Spokesperson (expanded
Session and lunch only)
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by:
™
:
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E.O. 13526
Glyn T. Davies
'mmm LB A Y
IRR
Declassi f y
DU
0T0C0PY
�CONFIDENTIAL
Jean-Francois C i r e l l i , Economic Adviser
(expanded session and lunch only)
Renaud V i g n a l , M i n i s t r y o f Foreign A f f a i r s
(expanded session and lunch only)
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 19, 1999, 11:45 a.m. - 2:15 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e ; Cabinet Room; Old Family D i n i n g
Room
Oval O f f i c e Session
The President: S h a l l we discuss Kosovo f i r s t ,
p r e s s i n g issue? (U)
President Chirac:
CONriDDNTIJ
since t h a t ' s t h e
Yes.
tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
on t h i s i s very
t h i n k s he needs
he was " f o r c e d "
brinkmanship.
The f a c t t h a t we have been so s t r o n g l y t o g e t h e r
i m p o r t a n t . I t ' s impossible t o know i f M i l o s e v i c
t o absorb some a i r s t r i k e s so he can make i t seem
t o c a p i t u l a t e or whether t h i s i s simply
There w i l l be a very b r i e f p e r i o d between t h e c o l l a p s e o f t a l k s
and t h e s t a r t o f a i r s t r i k e s . Then, i t might be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r
you t o make a l a s t appeal.
I f we do something now, we could
g i v e M i l o s e v i c an o p p o r t u n i t y t o send t h e t a l k s o f f on a tangent
and f o r c e a delay. f&)
As t o t h e c a r r o t question and sanctions, l e t me l e t Madeleine
address t h a t . fe)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : Yes, there are two l a y e r s o f sanctions.
Those we imposed i n r e l a t i o n t o Kosovo could be discussed b u t
those imposed before — what we c a l l the outer w a l l — we need
to be very c a r e f u l about. They would be hard t o unpack and i n
any event, i t would be premature. But we could do t h e f i r s t
l a y e r . fe}
The P r e s i d e n t : We could present i t as a way t o work the FRY
back i n t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Sanctions make
M i l o s e v i c ' s i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n more d i f f i c u l t . f€-)
Now, through M i l o s e v i c ' s eyes, i f he allows a NATO force t o back
up c i v i l implementation, he w i l l lose Kosovo. We need t o make
him see t h a t t h e o n l y chance he has t o keep Kosovo w i t h i n Serbia
i s t o r e s t o r e autonomy. f&)
Based on past experience, our best course i s t o h o l d a u n i f o r m
l i n e t i l l t h e deadline. There's s t i l l a chance he w i l l come
around. A t t h e same time, we need t o keep t h e Kosovars i n l i n e .
fG-)
President
Chirac:
CONFIDDNT I j
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
1.4b, 1 4
.d
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t :
That's good. fe)
President Chirac:
Secretary A l b r i g h t : With everyone g a t h e r i n g , i t would be hard
not t o meet. But i t must be c l e a r — no squabbling. Also,
a f t e r t h e Contact Group makes a d e c i s i o n , i t would be
s y m b o l i c a l l y important t o go t o Brussels t o hand over t o NATO.
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
Secretary A l b r i g h t : Let's be c l e a r , NATO has made d e c i s i o n s and
Solana has them i n h i s pocket. He must c o n s u l t i n f o r m a l l y -t h e r e i s no formal d e c i s i o n t o be made. fG}
President Chirac: [
~
The P r e s i d e n t :
Has he s a i d t h a t ? f&)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : No, but others have mentioned i t ,
D i n i . I t i s n o t acceptable. f&)
like
Samuel Berger:
I n the s t r i k e scenario, t h e i n i t i a l set o f
s t r i k e s must be s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g and d e c i s i v e so t h a t
M i l o s e v i c understands t h e i r seriousness. I f we p i n p r i c k and
pause, he may t h i n k t h a t he has won. fG)
GONFIDENTIAI
t l INTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : We're t h i n k i n g along s i m i l a r l i n e s . Let NATO do
i t s j o b on the m i l i t a r y side, do the p l a n n i n g f o r more s t r i k e s ,
the number of days and so on. I f d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d , t h e r e i s
an i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t t o b r i n g M i l o s e v i c back, good. We j u s t need
to be sure t h a t we do not pause mor-e than 24 t o 48 hours — i t
should be a n a t u r a l l u l l t h a t we f i l l w i t h intense d i p l o m a t i c
e f f o r t s w i t h o u t g i v i n g M i l o s e v i c a chance t o drag t h i n g s o u t .
I'm encouraged by hearing you say a day or two. Any longer and
our w i l l could d i s s i p a t e and we could l e t M i l o s e v i c e x p l o i t
gaps.
f&)
President
Chirac:
The President: I t would be a b i g mistake. When we met w i t h him
i n P a r i s a f t e r Dayton, we thought we had him going i n the r i g h t
d i r e c t i o n . And then Kosovo. I f I c a l l , he w i l l see an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e w r i t e the terms of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . He must
know t h a t we do not want t o bomb but we w i l l . I don't t h i n k he
t h i n k s we have another agenda — but he wants t o avoid f o r e i g n
troops i n Serbia. f€-)
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President Chirac:
1.4b. 1 4
.d
Secretary A l b r i g h t
The P r e s i d e n t : We can't be naive about t h i s ; non-compliance by
the UCK i s a r e a l problem.
But I'm also w o r r i e d t h a t i f they
t h i n k they are g e t t i n g a bad deal, they w i l l do something t o
f o r c e us t o withdraw, provoke M i l o s e v i c t o commit new
a t r o c i t i e s , and then we'd be faced w i t h a f r e e f o r a l l . We need
to keep d i s c i p l i n e d and keep focused on both sides. And one o f
the reasons we have t o be ready t o take r i s k s i s t h a t t h e r e are
so many o t h e r permutations t h a t would be worse than where we
are.
President Chirac:
1.4b, l.4d
Foreian M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, the f i r s t t h i n g we would have t o do i s t o
keep t h e c o n f l i c t from spreading. S t a b i l i z e Macedonia, see
where A l b a n i a i s , and Bosnia.
So s t a b i l i z i n g the perimeter
would be f i r s t , then focus on the core. We've got t o worry
about a Balkan echo e f f e c t . f£}
By the way, I met b r i e f l y w i t h t h e leaders o f A l b a n i a and
Macedonia a t our Prayer Breakfast. They're young, e n e r g e t i c ,
earnest. And they've been s u p p o r t i n g our e f f o r t s f o r t h e i r own
s t a b i l i t y . (GJ
President Chirac:
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President Clinton:
1.4d
Samuel Berger: I don't want t o c u t t h i s s h o r t b u t I t h i n k i t ' s
time t o move i n t o the expanded session and t o t a l k about some of
the o t h e r items on the agenda. (U)
Expanded Session [Cabinet Room]
The P r e s i d e n t : Jacques, why don't we t a l k about t h e NATO Summit
meeting i n A p r i l , and also about the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
financial
system. We're i n no rush, b u t I would l i k e t o t a l k about Russia
and where you are on t h e Middle East. We saw each other i n
Amman, b u t t h a t was o n l y f o r a b r i e f conversation. I'm happy t o
s t a r t wherever you want. f&)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
President
What would you l i k e t o begin with?
I t ' s your choice.
(U)
Perhaps w i t h NATO? fe)
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me mention a few issues. F i r s t , I s t r o n g l y
support t h e work you and Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r are doing on ESDI,
which should be p a r t of the summit r e s u l t s .
We need t o b u i l d on
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B e r l i n b u t make sure i t ' s p a r t o f NATO. This i s important as a
p r a c t i c a l matter t o keep the U.S. and Congress on board as we
w i t h problems r e q u i r i n g us send troops i n t o problem areas, as we
are p l a n n i n g f o r i n Kosovo. A capable ESDI w i l l be an important
development. We've already taken one step i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n
through t h e way KFOR i s e v o l v i n g — w i t h t h e Europeans p r o v i d i n g
85 percent and t h e United States 15 percent o f the f o r c e . So we
need t o continue t o b u i l d on the Berlin-framework and t o keep
ESDI p a r t o f NATO. But i t ' s also a very important next step i n
terms o f European i n t e g r a t i o n and l e a d e r s h i p . f&)
On mandates, our goal should always be t o a c t w i t h the
endorsement o f t h e UN. The problem i s unusual circumstances.
We have a r e a l problem agreeing i n advance t o a b l a n k e t
requirement when we can't p r e d i c t circumstances.
What we should
do i s proceed i n terms o f the purposes and p r i n c i p l e s o f the UN.
We need a formula t o a l l o w us t o pursue a c t i o n i n consistency
w i t h the UN b u t w i t h o u t g i v i n g Russia and China a veto over
e v e r y t h i n g we do. f G)
On Open Door, I agree i t must remain open.
the Romanians and Slovenes and others.
two.
We need t o encourage
1.4b. 1.4d
That could change i n a year or
I'm s u p p o r t i v e , b u t we need t o w a i t . f G)
g e t t i n g i n i s not so much the
My main problem w i t h
1.4d
f i n a n c i a l burden f o r admission but t h e pressure b u i l d i n g up t o
i n c l u d e t h e B a l t i c area as p a r t o f a second enlargement t i e r .
There's a f i n a n c i a l burden problem,
So what I'm w o r r i e d about
i s how t o manage the B a l t i c issue. I t ' s t h e most
difficult question,
still have tensions with the Russians over minorities rights and
energy. We don't want to complicate our efforts to support
Russia in restoring stability and growth. But over time, the
Baits should be in. {&)
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I'm f r a n k l y also w o r r i e d about the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p l a y : what we
can get through Congress? Which c o u n t r i e s should we be pushing?
What happens i f we create second t i e r s t a t u s f o r others? What
do we do about the Baits?
I hate t a l k i n g about something I don't have an answer t o .
President Chirac:
On the l a s t question o f missions, there i s n o t h i n g major.
(C
-4
The P r e s i d e n t : The OAU argument sounds compelling b u t t h e r e i s
a l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a c t i n g i n
c o n f l i c t w i t h p r i o r UN a c t i o n versus NATO t a k i n g a c t i o n n o t i n
c o n f l i c t w i t h e x i s t i n g UN p o l i c y . They are not p a r a l l e l . {My
S e c r e t a r y of State j u s t handed me a note.} Maybe we can go back
t o something l i k e the '94 Summit language o f f e r i n g t o get i n t o
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peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s 'under the a u t h o r i t y and auspices o f t h e
UN' and read t h a t as a s o r t o f a u t h o r i t y ? fG-)
President Chirac:
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
President
1.4b, 1.4d
Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s no language a t a l l .
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Okay, now maybe we can t u r n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
economy. Should we go t o lunch or continue t o t a l k ? (U)
President Chirac:
You are the host; whatever you p r e f e r .
The P r e s i d e n t : Let's go through i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e before we go t o lunch. I t ' l l improve t h e
digestion.
(U)
.Eresident Chirac:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you f o r a most comprehensive statement.
You r a i s e d s i x issues; I w i l l r u n through each q u i c k l y . (U)
On f i n a n c i a l reform, i t seems t o me the problem i s we had too
much enthusiasm f o r i n v e s t i n g i n Asia and Russia and o t h e r
emerging markets. We a l l were s u f f i c i e n t l y i n s e n s i t i v e t h a t
these o p p o r t u n i t i e s had t o be seen i n context of i n t e r m e d i a t e
systems and s t r u c t u r e s l a c k i n g i n t h e c o u n t r i e s , not j u s t the
investment funds here and the good p r o j e c t s t h e r e :
central
bank, t a x laws, s e c u r i t i e s and exchange commission, and a
banking system, so I t h i n k the f i r s t and most important t h i n g i s
to have good transparency i n the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f market
economy i n those c o u n t r i e s . (G
-4
Second, these problems have been aggravated by hedge funds,
because people can p u t up so l i t t l e and leverage so much. I t i s
a p p r o p r i a t e t o get our experts t o work on t h i s , b u t the o f f shore i s s u e w i l l remain a problem — there's always some place
to h i d e .
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Number t h r e e i s c o n t r a c t i o n . You mentioned the importance o f
the s o c i a l s a f e t y n e t . We agree but we also need t o recognize
t h a t we need some engine t o r e s t o r e growth. The problem i s
those c o u n t r i e s are burdened w i t h debt and debt s e r v i c i n g —
t h e r e are no funds a v a i l a b l e f o r the s a f e t y n e t . The problem o f
c o n t r a c t i o n i s how t o expand economies w i t h budget d e f i c i t s and
debt s e r v i c i n g w i t h o u t pouring good money a f t e r bad and w i t h o u t
adequate i n s t i t u t i o n s ? I n Russia, a l l o f the IMF money has
flowed out o f the country w i t h i n 48 hours.
Traditional
s o l u t i o n s t o a recession, l i k e pumping money i n t o the economy,
i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h debts and d e f i c i t s . f&)
On debt r e l i e f , Schroeder has a good idea. I sent you a l e t t e r .
You r e a l l y s e n s i t i z e d me t o t h i s issue. I am open t o more
suggestions on debt r e l i e f . f&)
I agree w i t h you t h a t Wolfensohn hasn't got the resources t o
deal w i t h the problems he faces. We need t o be honest about
t h i s and concede they don't have enough funding t o do t h e i r j o b .
We need t o f i n d a way t o increase the I F I ' s resources.
fG}
At the G-7, I hope we can have a p r i v a t e , r e l a x e d c o n v e r s a t i o n
about our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o r e s t o r i n g growth. The problem o f
c o n t r a c t i o n i n t h e w o r l d economy i s d i s a s t r o u s f o r poor
c o u n t r i e s . I'm s o l d on the need f o r more debt r e l i e f . But
we're a l s o f a c i n g our l a r g e s t t r a d e d e f i c i t ever. We've been
w i l l i n g t o absorb exports because our economy i s s t r o n g and
unemployment low. I won't get p r o t e c t i o n i s t b u t we can't a l l o w
dumping, l i k e i n the case o f Japanese s t e e l . P r i m a r i l y we t r y
t o keep our markets, b u t also enforce our t r a d e laws. f&)
How can we help r e s t o r e growth i n Japan? I s there any way
Europe can take great Japanese imports and not slow European
growth down? I f you slow down, we've a l l got a problem. We
need a forum t o discuss t h i s t h a t won't f i n d i t s way i n t o the
newspapers the next day. f€4
On the Euro: Since the time I f i r s t ran f o r the presidency,
I've always been s u p p o r t i v e . I don't f e e l we're threatened or
c o m p e t i t i v e . Any t h i n g t h a t c o n t r i b u t e s t o Europe's i n t e g r a t i o n
and helps people improve t h e i r l i v e s i s good f o r us. Anything
t h a t makes democracy stronger i s good f o r us. I f you're
s t r o n g e r and can p l a y a more responsible r o l e , I'm f o r i t .
Don't worry about what you see i n the papers. There are
d i f f e r e n t issues y o u ' l l have t o work out f o r yourselves, l i k e
Spain and P o r t u g a l , b u t I'm f o r i t .
fG)
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F i n a l l y , we need t o f i n d a way f o r leaders t o express ourselves
to t h e p u b l i c on where we're going. Before we do i t , I suggest
we meet f i r s t a t the G-7 t o take stock o f where we are. Here's
why I t h i n k t h a t . When I f i r s t s t a r t e d , I thought o f the need
f o r B r e t t o n Woods I I — a m o d i f i e d r o l e f o r t h e IMF, World Bank,
and new accounting system i n developing c o u n t r i e s . We're doing
i t i n c r e m e n t a l l y . What we're l e f t w i t h i s t h e p i n k elephant i n
the l i v i n g room o f economic c o n t r a c t i o n and market economies and
democracy f a i l i n g m i l l i o n s — w i t h m i l l i o n s f a l l i n g back from
middle c l a s s t o p o v e r t y . The question i s how t o get growth
back, w i t h o u t i n f l a t i o n ? We need an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t o
prevent t h e swing from boom t o bust. We've managed t o do i t a t
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s -- we need t o do i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . (G)
-Robert Rubin: We share the same o b j e c t i v e s . The system needs
to f u n c t i o n b e t t e r . These questions are e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
complicated and there are c o n f l i c t i n g s o l u t i o n s . The most
obvious t h i n g s t o do are not always so c l e a r . (U)
I want t o underscore what the President s a i d about being
p o s i t i v e about the Euro. And also t h a t we need p r i v a t e s e c t o r
c a p i t a l f o r developing c o u n t r i e s t o grow. We should a v o i d doing
a n y t h i n g t h a t would c u t o f f t h a t f l o w . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I was t a l k i n g about the g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l problem
as i f i t were one t h i n g . A c t u a l l y i t i s three b i g t h i n g s . The
g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e . And what t o do about
c o n t r a c t i o n . And how t o coordinate our e f f o r t s . At the end o f
the day, we need t o narrow t h e band of ups and downs and avoid
the pure h e l l o f a South Korea or Indonesian and don't have
c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r a z i l , Argentina and Mexico scared t o death
about what's going t o happen i f the cost of borrowing and
c a p i t a l go through t h e roof and b r i n g down the economy. What we
have are hundreds of m i l l i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s g e t t i n g screwed by
c o n t r a c t i o n s . So i n Germany, we need t o lead w i t h t h e r i g h t
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We need a long meeting, see how t o go forward.
We need t o go t o lunch.
i n d i g e s t i o n . (U)
See, I t o l d you I ' d give you
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Let's go t o lunch.
1.4b, 1.4d
(U)
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Lunch Session
[ A f t e r a c o n v e r s a t i o n i n which the President recounted t h e
h i s t o r y o f the Old Family Dining Room, s t o r i e s about t h e
Roosevelts, and e f f o r t s t o save the American b u f f a l o . ]
President Chirac:
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Any o f the t h r e e can s t i l l w i n . I ' d have t o
give t h e advantage t o B i b i - f
14
.d
So I would see a r u n - o f f between
B i b i and one o f the other two. And the second round i s anyone's
guess. fG-)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The President: If the Europeans were to take that position, it
could give Arafat cover. We can't because we're party to Oslo.
We'll stay with our position but it would be a very positive
development if your plan works. t^)
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t : On the language, i t would be v e r y h e l p f u l
i f you were t o say you w i l l recognize the s t a t e 'that emerges
from permanent s t a t u s n e g o t i a t i o n s . ' That would show your
support f o r t h e process.
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, I see a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e , b u t we
need t o t a l k about t h e s p e c i f i c language. I disagree on
Jerusalem — I t h i n k i t can be solved by a t e r r i t o r i a l f i x
through changing the boundaries. R e l i g i o u s s i t e s w i l l be t h e
toughest p a r t . But the fundamental problem i s t h a t t h e h e a r t o f
B i b i ' s base does not want t o give up land. But on your idea, I
l i k e i t , Europe can take a p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t from t h e U.S. The
p e r i o d from May 4 through May 17 w i l l be h i g h t e n s i o n . We need
to take t h e pressure o f f . f&)
President Chirac:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t :
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Secretary A l b r i g h t :
government. f&)
16
There could also be a n a t i o n a l u n i t y
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, o f course, i f t h e r e i s a r e a l s p l i t i n the
v o t i n g . And then, we could see progress on peace. f e i
President
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : I have more questions than answers. Does the
f a c t t h a t Assad decided t o s t a r t the t r a n s i t i o n make an
agreement w i t h I s r a e l more o r less l i k e l y ? Without one, and
w i t h o u t good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the r e s t o f t h e world, S y r i a can not
have a long term r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a moderately independent
Lebanon nor i s i t l i k e l y t o stop s u p p o r t i n g t e r r o r i s m . I d i d n ' t
r e a l l y t a l k t o Assad i n Amman. fG}
President Chirac:
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The President: You think he is still willing to make a deal
with Israel during this transition? k€}
President Chirac:
1.4b, l.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : I ' l l keep t r y i n g t o get them t o g e t h e r .
I s r a e l i e l e c t i o n s make i t d i f f i c u l t . fe-)
But the
Jacques, t h e r e are a few other important issues we should touch
on. We r e a l l y need t o work out these t r a d e d i s p u t e s — bananas,
beef, h u s h k i t s . I thought I should mention them. And I r a q . I
hope t h i s w i l l n o t continue t o be an i r r i t a n t .
Saddam w i l l
e x p l o i t our d i f f e r e n c e s . We want t o work t o g e t h e r . We're open
to working toward common p o s i t i o n s . fG-)
President Chirac:
On I r a q , we w i l l f i n d a s o l u t i o n . We've made proposals f o r t h e
medium and the long term. For the short term, we need t o get
out o f t h i s c r i s i s . We are open t o s o l u t i o n s . fG-)
On beef, we're very s e n s i t i v e because o f mad cow disease and
because your product i s not n a t u r a l — we have t o be very
prudent. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I n terms of a new WTO round, we would l i k e t o do
something i n terms o f l a b o r standards. f&)
President Chirac:
Let me q u i c k l y mention t h e Sahara, where of course we support
the King o f Morocco. fG}
Samuel Berger: Mr. President, I gave my word of honor t o
Ambassador Bujon t h a t we would release President Chirac by
4:00 p.m. He's h o s t i n g a r e c e p t i o n a t t h e French embassy f o r
1,000 people and I promised the ambassador. We need t o s t a r t
p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e press conference. (U)
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President Chirac:
The President:
1.4b, l.4d
We t h i n k we should work w i t h Primakov. We hope
and a n a t i o n a l i s t .
1.4d
We want a strong Russia.
We're
better off with a strong Russia. We need to bolster him, give
him self-confidence. Primakov's the best we can do — smart,
strong, secure with the Duma. But this is very tricky. ^Q)
Okay, I don't want t o undermine Sandy's commitment t o the
ambassador. (U)
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Hasman, Thomas M.
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Hasman, Thomas M.
Saturday, February 27,1999 2:51 PM
©CROSS - Cross Hatches
RE: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of France
[rrNFIRFNTIfll] .
Changes made, diskette updated.
—Original Message—
From:
Blinken, Antony J.
Sent:
Saturday, February 27, 1999 1:18 PM
To:
Hasman, Thomas M.; Brown, Keirn C
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs; ©CROSS - Cross Hatches; Rice, Edward A.
Subject:
RE: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of Francei[CONriDCHTIAL]
.
Thanks, Tom.
1. "U36pts" should be "its", i.e. let NATO do its job
A bizarre glitch!
2. Should be: "pressure building up to include the Baltic area as part of a second enlargement tier."
Good catches.
-Original MessageFrom:
Hasman, Thomas M.
Sent:
Saturday, February 27,1999 1:10 PM
To:
Brown, Keirn C ; Blinken, Antony J.
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs; ©CROSS - Cross Hatches; Rice, Edward A.
Subject: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of France (CONriDCWIAl]
This memcon is in excellent shape. 2 small questions.
1. Page 5, The first time the President speaks (on this page), 1st to 2nd line it reads, "Let NATO do u36pts job
on the military side, ..."
Is u36pts right?
2. Page 8, third full paragraph (begins with the words "My main problem ..." The third line down seems to have a
missing word(s) -- ("building up to include the ???"). Can you help fill it in?
Thanks.
©Cross - Package is in the hold bin.
« File: 1357ChiracMemCon2.doc
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
O f f i c i a l Working V i s i t w i t h t h e President
and Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema of I t a l y
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f S t a t e
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley, I n t e r p r e t e r
Massimo D'Alema, Prime M i n i s t e r
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o the S t a f f
t o the Prime M i n i s t e r
Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomatic Advisor
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Oval O f f i c e / R e s t r i c t e d Session
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Mr. President, I am very pleased t o
meet you. There are many t h i n g s t o t a l k about. But l e t me
f i r s t say t h a t I am convinced t h a t between I t a l y and Europe and
the U n i t e d States we share a common way of t h i n k i n g and a common
way o f s o l v i n g problems. I heard your San Francisco speech. I
thought i t was a very good foundation f o r our d i s c u s s i o n s . I
a p p r e c i a t e the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the United States t o seek
s o l u t i o n s t o major problems and t o be engaged i n a dialogue w i t h
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and c o u n t r i e s around t h e w o r l d . I
b e l i e v e t h a t more than ever we need a United States t h a t never
considers withdrawing i n t o i t s own power. We need an outward
l o o k i n g America, b u t we i n Europe must assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
too. (U)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Samuel Berger:
And throughout America t o o . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President: Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , you understand t h a t I must
be c a r e f u l i n what I say because there are o t h e r t r i a l s pending.
But I t h i n k t h e most important t h i n g I can say i s what I have
already s a i d : whatever mistakes were made, t h e U n i t e d States i s
r e s p o n s i b l e and we want t o do whatever i s p o s s i b l e t o make
t h i n g s r i g h t . Under our law t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between c i v i l
and c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y .
Some people have already been
d i s c i p l i n e d and dismissed.
I t i s important now t o deal w i t h the
t r i a l s t h a t are s t i l l there and t o see through whatever a c t i o n s
are a p p r o p r i a t e and t o see who i s r e s p o n s i b l e . I n terms o f
Capt. Ashby, t h e f i n d i n g was not t h a t he was not r e s p o n s i b l e b u t
more s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t he was not c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . The
United States must bear r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; when t h e whole process
i s played o u t , you and a l l t h e people concerned must f e e l t h a t
j u s t i c e was done. fG)
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree w i t h you. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree. (G)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
1
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you, b u t l e t me j u s t add I know t h a t i t
has been a r e a l burden f o r you e s p e c i a l l y so e a r l y i n your term.
I f e e l t e r r i b l e about t h i s . fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I n f a c t , my term began w i t h many
unpleasant t h i n g s . We had unexpected v i s i t o r s on our t e r r i t o r y .
And t h e r e was an accident i n Moscow when our a i r c r a f t was
damaged by the Russians. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
the a i r . (U)
On t h e runway?
That's c e r t a i n l y b e t t e r than i n
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Prime Minister D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The P r e s i d e n t : You should be proud. I have spent so much o f my
time a r g u i n g w i t h conservatives here t h a t you can grow the
economy and s t i l l have a strong s o c i a l s a f e t y n e t . These are
not c o n t r a d i c t o r y goals, i n f a c t they are m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g .
We have been t r y i n g t o do here i n the U.S. what you i n I t a l y and
i n Europe take f o r granted. Family and medical leave,
c h i l d c a r e , h e a l t h care. The challenge f o r us has been how t o
preserve t h e s o c i a l s a f e t y net w h i l e g i v i n g the economy
f l e x i b i l i t y t o grow and c r e a t e j o b s . (U)
I spent years as governor t h i n k i n g about t h i s problem. I n f a c t ,
when I was governor I t r a v e l e d t o I t a l y . I wanted t o see how
small manufacturers shared f a c i l i t i e s , p r o d u c t i o n and
d i s t r i b u t i o n — a system t h a t can be t r a c e d t o the medieval
c r a f t g u i l d s — as a way o f sharing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Or take
France and Germany — though o f course t h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t
comparison because o f the enormous costs o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n .
Without them, I expect German growth would be 7-8 p e r c e n t . I n
any event, German labor costs are g r e a t e r than those i n France.
But the way each country spends these costs i s very d i f f e r e n t .
I n France, you get two years unemployment. The Germans focus
t h e i r resources on r e t r a i n i n g . The German system i s more
expensive b u t work o r i e n t e d . I n France, I argued w i t h Chirac
about t h e need t o move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n and he agreed. But
r e a l l y , we on t h e l e f t need t o do i t because the r i g h t i s n o t
t r u s t e d on t h i s . You can't put people on the dole f o r two years
and then complain about unemployment. A t t h e same time, we
can't leave people i n t h e l u r c h . But what we have t o do i s
change psychologies, t o convince people t h a t there i s more
p r o f i t i n working than n o t , more p r o f i t i n t a k i n g r i s k s i n
s t a r t i n g new businesses than n o t . I n s h o r t , how do you b u i l d
s o c i a l cohesion but.make work and e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p a t t r a c t i v e ?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: Only a f o o l would t u r n down an i n v i t a t i o n t o
come t o I t a l y . We d i d have good discussions. I know t h a t many
people i n I t a l y are s t r u g g l i n g w i t h these issues and throughout
Europe t o o . Before me, Wim Kok i n t h e Netherlands.
He managed
a grand b a r g a i n between business leaders and l a b o r unions.
They
now have the highest percentage o f p a r t - t i m e employees. This
has c r e a t e d major f l e x i b i l i t y .
These p a r t - t i m e employees earn
r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s and pro r a t a vacations. And now I t h i n k the
unemployment r a t e i s something l i k e 6-1/2 percent.
I know
Jospin i n France i s t r y i n g t o come t o g r i p s w i t h these issues.
France had a t l e a s t t h r e e years o f growth o f more than 3 percent
but s t i l l t h e i r unemployment i s over 11 percent.
I know t h a t
I t a l i a n s would never t o l e r a t e l i v i n g w i t h o u t h e a l t h insurance
the way so many Americans do. We are not p e r f e c t . So I t h i n k
i t would be good t o have an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a l l o f us t o
continue d i s c u s s i n g how t o promote economic success and s o c i a l
cohesion a t t h e same time. I would love t o do i t i f we can f i n d
the time. I have very good memories o f the time when I t a l y
hosted t h e G-7 then Mr. Berlusconi was the head o f government —
I guess he i s the o n l y one who i s not i n your government now.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
We are f r i e n d s .
(U)
Well, I would l i k e t o pursue t h i s idea. (U)
Samuel Berger: Mr. President we don't want t o leave our
unemployed M i n i s t e r s i n the Cabinet Room too much longer. (U)
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The
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P r e s i d e n t : Okay. Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , why don't we move t o
Cabinet Room f o r our expanded session, b u t as we do l e t me
you one non-business question: Are I t a l i a n s e x c i t e d about
success o f t h e movie " L i f e i s B e a u t i f u l " around the w o r l d
here i n t h e United States? (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, very much so. We were e s p e c i a l l y
e x c i t e d about t h e prospects o f the Oscars. (U)
The President: Well, I have t o t e l l you I love t h a t movie.
laughed, I c r i e d . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I agree.
f r i e n d o f Roberto B e n i g n i . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
I
You know I am a good
Please t e l l him t h a t I am h i s number one f a n .
EXPANDED SESSION/CABINET ROOM
PARTICIPANTS:
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The President
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary o f t h e Treasury
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f State
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
Louis Caldera, A c t i n g Secretary o f Defense
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for Economic A f f a i r s
James Cunningham, Deputy Chief o f Mission
Marc Grossman, A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r
European and Canadian A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Lael Brainard, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Deputy D i r e c t o r NEC
Donald Bandler, Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Counselor t o N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y Adviser f o r the NATO Summit
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
Miriam Sapiro, D i r e c t o r f o r European A f f a i r s
Sim Smiley, I n t e r p r e t e r
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I t a l i a n Participants
Prime M i n i s t e r Massimo D'Alema
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r
Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomataic Advisor
General Giuseppi Cucchi, M i l i t a r y Advisor
Giampiero Massolo, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Pasquale Cascella, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
Claudio Caprara, Press Attache
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 11:00 a.m. - 11:40 a.m.
Cabinet Room
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , l e t me welcome you
again i n a l a r g e r group. We had a good t a l k about a number
issues i n our e a r l i e r session, and now I would l i k e t o t u r n the
f l o o r t o you. We can t a l k about a couple o f issues and then
I ' l l take you t o lunch. (U)
I should say i t won't be anything l i k e an I t a l i a n lunch. I have
to t e l l you I had such a lunch one day i n San Gimignagno,
s i t t i n g i n a square w i t h frescoes a l l around. I loved i t . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I ' d l i k e t o t a l k about my impression on
two issues t h a t I have been studying over a couple o f recent
meetings.
These are r a t h e r important issues. (U)
1.4b, 1.4d
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The President:
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Secretary Rubin:
The
President:
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The P r e s i d e n t : That's a scene you should s c r i p t i n t o your next
I t a l i a n h o r r o r movie. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I ' l l have t o remember t o use t h a t l i n e w i t h
Congress. That might help me i n g e t t i n g money f o r Jordan. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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14, 14
.b .d
The President
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Sorry t o be so long-winded about t h i s , but i t i s so t e r r i b l y
important I wanted t o go i n t o some d e t a i l .
f&)
S h a l l we go on t o lunch and f i n i s h our d i s c u s s i o n there?
(U)
LUNCH
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f State
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
Louis Caldera, A c t i n g Secretary o f Defense
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
James Cunningham, Deputy Chief o f Mission
Marc Grossman, A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r
European and Canadian A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
I t a l i a n Participants
Massimo D'Alema, Prime M i n i s t e r
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o the
Prime M i n i s t e r
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Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomataic Advisor
General Giuseppi Cucchi, M i l i t a r y Advisor
Giampiero Massolo, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Pasquale Cascella, Spokesman f o r t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
Claudio Caprara, Press Attache
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 1999, 11:55 a.m. - 12:55 p.m.
Old Family Dining Room
The President
Now maybe we can t u r n t o Kosovo. Let me f i r s t say t h a t I
a p p r e c i a t e very much what you said and the u n i t y o f t h e
Alliance.
I t h i n k we have a r e a l chance t o get t h e KosovarAlbanians t o agree. I appreciate the commitment you've made t o
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l force i f i n f a c t t h e r e i s one. Now, the b i g
q u e s t i o n before us i s what i f the Kosovars say yes b u t M i l o s e v i c
says no? Under the e x i s t i n g p o l i c y o f NATO, we must be prepared
t o take a i r a c t i o n t o reduce h i s c a p a c i t y t o h u r t t h e KosovarAlbanians. I n t h e end, I t h i n k t h a t M i l o s e v i c w i l l agree b u t
o n l y i f he b e l i e v e s we are prepared t o f o l l o w through w i t h our
t h r e a t s . He's got h i s own tremendous economic problems,
n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment i n Serbia, m i n o r i t y problems.
I've argued
t h a t t h e only way Serbia has a chance t o keep Kosovo w i t h i n i t s
t e r r i t o r y i s t o go back t o the autonomy t h a t was taken away a
decade ago. And the o n l y way t o get back t o t h a t i s f o r t h e r e
t o be a m u l t i n a t i o n a l force t o implement the agreement.
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Milosevic should not see that as a threat. But i n the end, the
fundamental reason he w i l l accept i s i f he concludes that i t
would be too p a i n f u l f o r him i f he doesn't, fe}
Prime Minister D'Alema:
The President:
You d i d too, when you were his age. te)
Prime Minister D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: I n Bosnia, we s a i d no ground f o r c e s u n t i l t h e r e
was an agreement. Now, i f t h e worse happens and t h e scenario
you sketched occurs, I b e l i e v e the Serbs w i l l a t t a c k anyway, no
matter what we do. We need t o s t r i k e because we s a i d t h a t we
would. I f they a t t a c k , we w i l l continue. I b e l i e v e t h a t
M i l o s e v i c w i l l then accept a m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e , te}
The i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g i s t h a t they have b a s i c a l l y agreed on what
Kosovar autonomy should look l i k e over t h e next t h r e e years.
The s t i c k i n g p o i n t i s about NATO. M i l o s e v i c may look f o r a face
saving way out. But i f he refuses, i f he says t h e h e l l w i t h
peace, we w i l l have t o continue t o h i t him — t h e same t h i n g we
d i d i n Bosnia which i s how we got the agreement. t&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Samuel Berger: To underscore what t h e President s a i d , we face
t h i s dilemma e i t h e r way. I f M i l o s e v i c says no, and we say t h e r e
are no consequences, then there i s no deterrence on him, he has
c a l l e d our b l u f f , we walk away, he has a f r e e r i d e t o P r i s t i n a .
The a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o t h r e a t e n him c l e a r l y before t h e r e i s a
f a i l u r e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s and then t o f o l l o w through i f t h e r e
i s one t h a t he's r e s p o n s i b l e f o r . That would make i t more
l i k e l y t o d e t e r him from an assault because he knows t h a t t h e
consequences would be very s e r i o u s . fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: Thank you, Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r — I know we w i l l
a l l keep t a l k i n g about t h i s i n the days ahead. I f I may, l e t me
say a couple o f b r i e f words about NATO. I read your a r t i c l e i n
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Tribune. I thought i t was very good.
I want t o r e s t a t e my strong support f o r ESDI and the open door.
I hope we can f i n d language t o b r i d g e the d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n
w i t h the French on the need f o r a UN sanction o f NATO a c t i o n .
We b e l i e v e i n a c t i n g c o n s i s t e n t w i t h UN p r i n c i p l e s and purposes.
But we don't want t o see i t become a requirement. Keep i n mind
t h a t the Charter says t h a t a t h r e a t to one i s a t h r e a t t o a l l .
Now e s p e c i a l l y w i t h expansion, the t h r e a t t o the s e c u r i t y o f one
NATO member could come even more e a s i l y than before from a t t a c k s
from beyond NATO's borders. I hope and b e l i e v e we can get
around t h i s problem. I b e l i e v e t h a t we w i l l . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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14, 14
.b .d
The President
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
The P r e s i d e n t : Let's t h i n k about t h a t . I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g
idea. Now i f you don't mind a few words about Libya and I r a n .
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me f i r s t say on Libya t h a t we t h i n k we have
an agreement on PAM 103 but the Libyans have y e t t o a c t . I f
they do a c t , we w i l l suspend sanctions. Then t h e r e w i l l be 90
days f o r t h e United Nations t o issue a r e p o r t on f u r t h e r a c t i o n .
We have come along way on t h i s . I hate t o see us f a l l s h o r t ,
e s p e c i a l l y w i t h a l l the other problems i n t h e r e g i o n . I hope
you can help us w i t h t h i s . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
OONPIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONFIDENTIAL
1.4b, 1.4d
Samuel Berger: The b i g problem on the t a b l e i s t h a t t h e Libyans
have t o t u r n over the suspects.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Of course, I understand, fe)
The President: Let me make c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s not a game or
some k i n d o f American obsession. S e t t l i n g t h i s would help
s t a b i l i z e North A f r i c a . I t would be good p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , fe-)
COliriDDNTIAh.
tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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The President: I grew up i n a church where people were n o t
allowed t o d r i n k a l c o h o l . We had communion w i t h grape j u i c e and
so we would wink a t t h e f a c t t h a t Jesus drank wine. You become
an expert a t s o c i a l hypocrisy. f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
GONriDENTIAh
T e l l him we are very e n t h u s i a s t i c about h i s
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONriDDNTIMi
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
I t would be good f o r us t o o .
We agree
1.4b, 1.4d
The President: I hate t h i s . I t has been going on f o r 10 years.
We have won t h i s case f o u r times, twice since I have been
P r e s i d e n t . I know t h a t a major problem i s European
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the Caribbean Islands which are v u l n e r a b l e t o
drug t r a f f i c .
We have t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o o — I j u s t sent
l e g i s l a t i o n t o Congress t o ask them f o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y more money
f o r t h e Caribbean. We have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o these c o u n t r i e s .
We must h e l p them d i v e r s i f y t h e i r economies. And so I t h i n k the
U n i t e d States and c o u n t r i e s l i k e France and others w i t h c o l o n i a l
h i s t o r y should take the lead t o help d i v e r s i f y these economies
and r a i s e t h e standard o f l i v i n g . I t h i n k we can do t h i s w i t h
r e l a t i v e l y small investments. Keep i n mind I have t o f i g h t both
the l e f t and the r i g h t on p r o t e c t i o n i s m i n t h i s country. I f we
don't p r o t e c t the WTO process, we're going t o lose t h a t f i g h t .
f€4
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Mr. President, thank you so much f o r t h i s wonderful lunch.
There i s one matter I also wanted t o r a i s e before we f i n i s h and
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes, I know about the case. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree t h a t t h i s i s an issue f o r our j u s t i c e
m i n i s t e r s and t h a t they should t a l k . f€4
End o f Conversation
CONriDDHTIMj
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�2055
- SEGRET>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HIN GTO N
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
EUROPEAN LEADERS ON KOSOVO
DATE: March 23, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
Secure support f o r next steps on Kosovo.
II.
BACKGROUND
Your c a l l s t o B l a i r , and t o Chirac and Schroeder ( d i n i n g
together i n B e r l i n ) w i l l confirm t h a t , w i t h Ambassador
Holbrooke's departure from Belgrade, we have exhausted
diplomatic e f f o r t s t o f i n d a peaceful s o l u t i o n , and t h e
focus now s h i f t s t o Brussels and NATO a c t i o n . Your c a l l t o
Solana w i l l c o n f i r m t h a t those three key A l l i e s are on
board f o r a i r operations. By the time you speak t o Solana,
Ambassador Holbrooke should already have stopped i n
Brussels t o b r i e f him and NATO Ambassadors on h i s t r i p .
Solana i s prepared t o authorize SACEUR t o execute a i r
s t r i k e s a f t e r your conversation.
I n your c a l l s , you should emphasize t h a t NATO has shown
s t r o n g u n i t y and determination so f a r , and that t h i s
resolve w i l l be even more important i n the days ahead. You
could mention t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has decided t o
postpone h i s v i s i t t o the United States and emphasize t h a t
we hope t o continue t o work closely w i t h Russia, despite
i t s clear o p p o s i t i o n t o NATO s t r i k e s . We share w i t h Russia
the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e — a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o the
crisis.
Attachments
Tab A Points t o make f o r Prime Minister B l a i r and Chancellor
Schroeder
Tab B Points t o make f o r President Chirac
Tab C Points t o make f o r Secretary General Solana
Reason: 1.5(b)(c)
D e c l a s s i f y Or^ 3/23/09
m m
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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OY
�IMMEDIATE
• CL I NTO^M^WWHOTOCOPY
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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PRT: BERGER COMM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT
STEINBERG SUTPHEN
SIT: ALLEN ARVIZU BELL BRADEN BROWN BUTLER CLARKER COQ DAVIDSON FLANAGAN
GUARNIERI HURLEY KAUFMAN KEITH LIEBERTHAL OSIUS PRITCHARD SAPIRO SCHULTE
SUM2 VACCARO
SIT: NSC
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL
<DTG> 242000Z MAR 99
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING//NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC//
C 0 N • F I D E N T I Ji L
QQQQ
FOR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
FOLLOW. PLEASE REPORT TO WHITE HOUSE SITROOM (202/456-9431) WHEN
LETTER I S RECEIVED AND WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
1
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA2 531 G 0 N J I D D H T I A L.
AS YOU WILL HAVE NO DOUBT HEARD DURING YOUR MEETINGS WITH
EUROPEAN LEADERS, FOR MANY WEEKS THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE
AND RUSSIA HAVE BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS I N
KOSOVO. THIS CRISIS WAS BROUGHT ON BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
FRY, WHICH HAS DEPRIVED THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND WAGED A BRUTAL CAMPAIGN OF
REPRESSION; BURNING VILLAGES AND KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS.
THANKS TO OUR WORK TOGETHER AT THE UN, LAST YEAR THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ADOPTED UNSCR 1199, UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE UN CHARTER,
WHICH AFFIRMED THAT THE CRISIS I S A THREAT TO PEACE AND
SECURITY I N THE REGION AND CALLED ON THE FRY TO.CEASE
REPRESSION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, HALT HOSTILITIES,
OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE AND IMPROVE THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION.
ALTHOUGH OUR EFFORTS LED TO A TEMPORARY EASING OF THE CRISIS
I N OCTOBER, REGRETTABLY, THE FRY GOVERNMENT HAS RETURNED TO
ITS OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, THREATENING A HUMAN CATASTROPHE AND
A WIDER INTERNATIONAL WAR.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, GREAT P E R E.O. 13526
-eONRBENTtAL
�IMMEDIATE
' CLINTON^fffl^WiOTOCOPY
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3
RHEHAAA2 531 O O M P I D B N T I
A-L
BRITAIN AND OUR OTHER NATO PARTNERS CONCLUDED THAT WE HAVE
NO CHOICE BUT TO USE CAREFULLY FOCUSED AIRSTRIKES AGAINST
THOSE FORCES OF THE FRY GOVERNMENT THAT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE OFFENSIVE. I AM AWARE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
FAVOR THE USE OF FORCE, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE NO
CHOICE BUT TO ACT NOW TO AVOID A FURTHER, WIDER DISASTER. WE
REMAIN PREPARED AT ALL TIMES TO RETURN TO DIPLOMACY I F THE
FRY GOVERNMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT I T I S PREPARED.TO ACCEPT
PROPOSALS, PRESENTED BY THE CONTACT GROUP DURING THE
NEGOTIATIONS I N FRANCE, OF THE US, EU AND RUSSIA.
I WISH YOU WELL DURING YOUR TRAVEL I N EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD
TO THE V I S I T OF PREMIER ZHU NEXT MONTH AND TO CONTINUING OUR
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON KOSOVO AND THE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES
ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
DECL: X I
PAGE 4 RHEHAAA2 531 C 0 N F I D E •M T I A L
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CONFIDENTIAL
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WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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^
^
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^
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3 - i
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( ; ^ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•
D E C R E T
'
2 0 5 5
THh PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AND CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
M i l o s e v i c gave Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n that he has
any i n t e n t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i n g a peaceful s o l u t i o n to the c r i s i s
i n Kosovo.
He refused even t o agree to a cease-fire and continued t o
r e j e c t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y presence t o implement
agreement, without which i t i s unenforceable.
His posture was threatening and b e l l i g e r e n t . We've concluded
h i s only i n t e n t i o n i s t o unleash greater violence i n Kosovo.
Only course o f a c t i o n now i s NATO preparations f o r a i r
operations. I've j u s t been b r i e f e d by my m i l i t a r y and f o r e i g n
p o l i c y team. I am ready t o support NATO f u l l y and understand
t h a t you are as w e l l .
Also want you t o know that Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington. Best outcome under
circumstances but want t o continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h him.
Share ultimate o b j e c t i v e : a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13S26
.SSCRET-'
Reason:
1.5(b) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
U
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
\
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�—SECRET^
2055
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
M i l o s e v i c gave Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he has
any i n t e n t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i n g a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s
i n Kosovo.
He refused even t o agree t o a cease-fire and continued t o
r e j e c t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y presence t o implement
agreement, without which i t i s unenforceable.
His
his
posture was threatening and b e l l i g e r e n t . We've concluded
o n l y i n t e n t i o n i s t o unleash greater violence i n Kosovo.
Heard your press comments n o t i n g diplomatic s o l u t i o n has
f a i l e d and necessary conclusions w i l l be drawn i n l i g h t o f the
plans t h a t have been prepared.
Only course o f a c t i o n now i s NATO preparations f o r a i r
operations. I've j u s t been b r i e f e d by my m i l i t a r y and f o r e i g n
p o l i c y team. I am ready t o support NATO f u l l y and understand
t h a t you are as w e l l .
Also want you t o know t h a t Prime Minister Primakov has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington. Best outcome under
circumstances b u t want t o continue to work c l o s e l y w i t h him.
Share u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e : a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s .
SECRET '
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify 0
:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
H i f f f d LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�NATIONAL SECURITY
2262
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 29, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
GREG SCHULTE
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l Message t o French P r e s i d e n t C h i r a c
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s a P r e s i d e n t i a l message t o French P r e s i d e n t
C h i r a c p e r your r e q u e s t . A l s o i n c l u d e d i n t h e message i s
o p t i o n a l language on Phase I I I i f you w i s h t o i n c l u d e i t .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e t h e t r a n s m i t t a l o f t h e message a t Tab I .
Approve
( f j l ^ Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I D r a f t P r e s i d e n t i a l message
JDCRET
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
PER E.0.13526
Declassify C^Lr#"F0^ LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-OECRET
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
NIACT
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC RE SITUATION I N KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW. PLEASE REPORT TO
WHITE HOUSE SITROOM (202-456-9431) WHEN MESSAGE IS RECEIVED AND
WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR JACQUES:
I PLANNED TO CALL YOU THIS EVENING BUT DECIDED TO SEND YOU A
NOTE WHEN I LEARNED THAT YOU HAD RETIRED FOR THE EVENING. I
WANT TO SHARE MY THINKING ABOUT KOSOVO, WHERE, AS YOU KNOW,
MILOSEVIC CONTINUES HIS SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AND
EXPULSIONS.
YOUR SPEECH TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE WAS CARRIED LIVE BY CNN. I T
WAS TERRIFIC. I AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO ROOM
IN EUROPE FOR BELGRADE'S POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING, MURDERS AND
MASSACRES. I ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT NATO'S ACTION
NEEDS TIME AND DETERMINATION AND THAT AIR STRIKES MUST BE
SUSTAINED I N ORDER TO REDUCE BELGRADE'S MEANS OF AGGRESSION.
YESTERDAY, I N IMPLEMENTING PHASE I I OF NATO'S OPERATION, ALLIED
AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY HIT SOME OF THE FORCES CARRYING OUT THESE
ATROCITIES.
I HOPE FOR MORE SUCCESS TONIGHT. BUT WE CANNOT
COUNT ON THE TACTICAL USE OF AIRPOWER ALONE TO STOP THE SERB
FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, I THINK WE NOW NEED TO AUTHORIZE PHASE
III.
MILOSEVIC MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HIT HIM
NOT ONLY I N AND AROUND KOSOVO, BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE REST OF
SERBIA AND AGAINST KEY TARGETS I N BELGRADE ITSELF.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE DIPLOMATIC
TRACK AS WELL. I T IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MILOSEVIC WILL OFFER
PRIMAKOV SOME MODEST CONCESSIONS, SUCH AS A CEASE-FIRE I N PLACE
L N O L B A Y P O O O Y PERE.O.
I T N I R R HTCP
�I F NATO AIR STRIKES STOP. OR HE MIGHT OFFER TO RESTART
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CHAPTERS OF THE RAMBOUILLET
ACCORDS. I T WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE REMAIN FIRM AND
UNITED I N WHAT WE EXPECT FROM MILOSEVIC: A PULL-BACK OF HIS
FORCES AND AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE RAMBOUILLET
FRAMEWORK. I F MILOSEVIC REMAINS DEFIANT, NATO'S AIR STRIKES
MUST CONTINUE.
I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH YOU IN THE COMING DAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�-flfiCRET
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC RE SITUATK
NIACT
IN KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC AT THE/EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW 7 PLEASE REPORT TO
WHITE HOUSE SITROOM (202-456-9431 . WHEN MESSAGE IS RECEIVED AND
:
•
WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR JACQUES:
r
WHEN I
P©E&
I PLANNED TO CALL YOU THIS EVENING SUT
THAT YOU HAD RETIRED/FOR THE EVENING.
WANTS©-TO TMSr
ABOUT KOSOVO, WHERE ./MILOSEVIC CON/INUES HIS SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGJ
OF TERROR AND EXPULSIONS.
FLRES ARE BURNING IN TOWNS
ULLAGES THROUGHOUT KOSOVO.
SECURITY TORCES ARE CONDU INQf MASS EXPU; 5IONS ON A SCALE WELL
BEYOND TWAT oV LAST YEAR
THE OSCEAIEPORTED A
T/BS MORNING
RIVER"J/OF RE GEES FLOWING/INTO ALBANIA, A R R I V I N G I A T A RATE OF
,000 AN HOUR. OVER 2^,00/) ETHfJIC AL^ANI . S HAVE FLED ANTO
N
l^IACEDONIA OVER\ THE L^ST
W D A Y ^ A l ^ THOASAND^ MORE ARE COMING
lACiyDAY.
ANoVg^ARE RI EIVING MOUNTING REEORTS OFXAyROCITLES,
J U D I N G THE DELIBERA1
KILLING OF ETHNIC ALBANIAN POLOTIZIANS
AND INTELLIGENTSIA.
YOUR SPEECH TO THE JRENCH PEOPLE WAS CARRIED LIVE BY CNN. I T
WAS TERRIFIC. I AfSREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO ROOM
IN EUROPE FOR BELGRADE'S POLICY CF ETHNIC CLEANSING, MURDERS AND
MASSACRES. I AL^O AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT NATO'S ACTION
NEEDS TIME AND DETERMINATION AND THAT AIR STRIKES MUST BE
SUSTAINED I N Oi^DER TO REDUCE BELGRADE'S MEANS OF AGGRESSION.
OPTIONAL LANGUAGE ON PHASE I I I :
^YESTERDAY, I N IMPLEMENTING
PHASE
OF''NATO'S OPERATION, ALLIED AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY HIT
SOME OF T H ' FORCES CARRYING OUT THESE ATROCITIES.
/E'
I HOPE FOR
iCLASSIFlED
CLINTON LIBRARY P
H COPY PER E.0.13526
�MORE SUCCESS TONIGHT. BUT W CANNOT COUNT ON THE TACTICAL USE
E
OF AIRPOWER ALONE TO STOP THE SERB FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, I
THINK W N W NEED TO AUTHORIZE PHASE I I I . MILOSEVIC MUST
E O
UNDERSTAND THAT W ARE PREPARED TC HIT HIM HARD NOT ONLY IN AND
E
AROUND KOSOVO, BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE REST OF SERBIA AND
AGAINST KEY TARGETS IN BELGRADE ITSELF.f
YOUR OFFICIALS
^T YOU HA\ iPOKEN
W UNDERSTAND FI
E
ER PRU
V iBOUT HIS IMPENDING TRIP TO/BE: 5RADE
Mil
THAT ^ O EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT/MILOSEVIC HAS/GIVEi
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HIM THAT RUSSIA S T I L L RI
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OTHER
1
I ALS0 TRUS :
Yd
i.INS/lMPORTANT TO THE
Jt> ITS MEMBER STATES.
IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MILOSEVIC. JILL OFFER PRIMAKOV SOME
TOKEN CONCESSIONS. HE MIGHT OFFER A CEASE-FIRE/EF NATO AIR
STRIKES STOP. OR^HE MIGHT OFFER TO RESTART NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
POLITICAL CHAPTERS OF THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS. IT WILL BE VERY
IMPORTANT THAT W REMAIN FIRM AND UNITED IN WHAT W EXPECT FROM
E
E
MILOSEVIC: A PULL-BACK OF HIS FORCES AND AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT
BASED ON THE RAMBOUILLET FRAMEWORK. IF MILOSEVIC REMAINS
DEFIANT, NATO'S AIR STRIKES MUST CONTINUE.
PfcEASE CALL ME T M R O IF YOU WISH.TO DI3CU33 THIS FURTHER.
OORW
, I AM-S^B^aAgUWE W L x UL Hi LUK I J J ? IN THE COMING
,
JL.
'WJDAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�THE PRESIDENT HAS S E
EM
D'Alema p o i n t s
A p p r e c i a t e your statements and t h e v o t e o f t h e I t a l i a n
p a r l i a m e n t . Know t h a t t h e r e a r e a l o t o f c o n t e n d i n g v o i c e s f o r
you t o manage.
M i l o s e v i c i s i n t e n s i f y i n g h i s o f f e n s i v e , and t h e r e a r e c r e d i b l e
r e p o r t s o f a t r o c i t i e s . Not a s u r p r i s e ; t h e reason we launch o u r
s t r i k e s i s because we knew he was p o i s e d t o a t t a c k w i t h 40,000
t r o o p s i n and around Kosovo.
I m p o r t a n t t h a t NATO show M i l o s e v i c t h a t our r e s o l v e i s f i r m .
Best way t o assure t h a t we can keep t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s
s h o r t i s f o r h i m t o understand t h a t we w i l l keep up a t i t as
l o n g as necessary. I f he t h i n k s we are wavering, he w i l l w a i t us
out.
C l a r k and Solana b e l i e v e t h a t we need t o t r a n s i t i o n from Phase 1
t o Phase 2. This w i l l a l l o w us t o have a more d i r e c t impact on
the Serb f o r c e s t h a t a r e a t t a c k i n g t h e Kosovars. I n l i g h t o f t h e
i n t e n s i f y i n g o f f e n s i v e , need t o show M i l o s e v i c t h a t we a r e
r e s p o n d i n g t o h i s d e f i a n c e . I s t r o n g l y agree; I b e l i e v e t h a t o u r
NATO c o l l e a g u e s share t h i s view
( i f he says we need a pause between Phase I and Phase I I ) :
I f we pause now, w h i l e he i s e s c a l a t i n g , we w i l l send t h e wrong
message a t a key moment.
I f he says we need more diplomacy
Madeleine w i l l be c o n s u l t i n g w i t h D i n i and o t h e r NATO f o r e i g n
m i n i s t e r s about how t o s u s t a i n t h e diplomacy We a r e c o n t i n u i n g
t o make c l e a r t h a t we p r e f e r a p e a c e f u l outcome. But no s i g n
from M i l o s e v i c t h a t he's prepared t o do a n y t h i n g except c o n t i n u e
the k i l l i n g
P OO OY
HTCP
mO HANDWRITING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
Points f o r Telephone C a l l t o
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
A p r i l 3, 1999
Purpose
To review c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo, s t r e s s need t o s u s t a i n
and i n t e n s i f y a i r operations and ask f o r help i n c o n v i n c i n g EU
c o u n t r i e s t o r e c e i v e refugees c r o s s i n g i n t o Macedonia.
Background
B l a i r today made a s t r o n g statement c a l l i n g f o r sustained airs t r i k e s and making c l e a r t h a t l a s t n i g h t ' s s t r i k e s i n t o Belgrade
set a p a t t e r n f o r f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . He w i l l want t o t a l k
t a r g e t i n g , and how best t o send a s t r o n g s i g n a l t o M i l o s e v i c .
Points to be made
Belgrade has not yet f e l t the f u l l weight of NATO's a i r
s t r i k e s , e i t h e r i n and around Kosovo, or against high-value
t a r g e t s elsewhere, i n c l u d i n g i n Belgrade. C a l l i n g Chirac
today t o s t r e s s need f o r expedited t a r g e t i n g procedures.
Hope you can help convince Chirac and other a l l i e s of need t o
i n t e n s i f y a i r s t r i k e s and widen t a r g e t i n g . Need t o h i t not
o n l y m i l i t a r y forces and a i r defense, but command and c o n t r o l ,
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and broadcast f a c i l i t i e s used f o r d i r e c t i n g ,
s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
Wes Clark would l i k e t o h i t f o l l o w i n g t a r g e t s as soon as
tonight:
f i r s t Army headquarters i n downtown
p r e s i d e n t i a l residence
Belgrade
EO 13526 1 4
.d
army barracks downtown
•
two Belgrade e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n centers
©
S o c i a l i s t Party Headquarters w i t h TV t r a n s m i t t e r downtown.
Hope you can support and convince Chirac and others t o agree.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
^CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Worried M i l o s e v i c w i l l complete e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g campaign i n
next few days, then declare c e a s e - f i r e and make some p a r t i a l
offer.
To head t h i s o f f , we need t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y increase
weight o f a t t a c k s over next few days, and also prepare o t h e r
a l l i e s t o s u s t a i n s t r i k e s beyond a Serb c e a s e - f i r e .
Also w o r r i e d about Macedonia c l o s i n g t h e border. I n t e n d t o
c a l l G l i g o r o v and ask him t o reverse t h i s d e c i s i o n .
Strobe
T a l b o t t i s going there today t o urge a re-opening o f t h e
border and t o o f f e r assistance.
We need t o g i v e G l i g o r o v some assurance t h a t Macedonia w i l l
not be saddled w i t h a l l these refugees i n d e f i n i t e l y and a t
great economic c o s t . Need your help i n g e t t i n g EU c o u n t r i e s
to immediately i n f o r m Macedonia t h a t they w i l l a s s i s t i n t h e
c u r r e n t c r i s i s and accept a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n o f t h e
refugees.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-seeftET-
2422
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
Great a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r what you and your government have s a i d
and done. A l l i a n c e u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s s t r o n g .
Much a t stake f o r Europe, the European Union, the
S t a t e s and NATO. We cannot f a i l .
United
However our m i l i t a r y response i s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d as
i n e f f e c t i v e — not o n l y by our p u b l i c s , b u t a l s o by t h e
l e a d e r s h i p i n Belgrade. Not j u s t the weather — t a r g e t i n g
process has a l s o been broken.
I f we don't h i t hard now, M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l immune from any
p e n a l t y . He w i l l seek t o complete h i s e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g b e f o r e
NATO f u r t h e r e s c a l a t e s .
We a r e s t r i k i n g a few t a r g e t s a n i g h t and not h a v i n g t h e
impact we need.
We need t o c o n t i n u e s t r i k i n g h i g h - v a l u e t a r g e t s , i n c l u d i n g i n
Belgrade -- not o n l y m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and a i r defense b u t
command and c o n t r o l , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and broadcast f a c i l i t i e s
t h a t a r e d i r e c t i n g , s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
S t r i k i n g a wider range o f t a r g e t s w i l l damage Belgrade's
c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct h i s o f f e n s i v e . And by imposing an
i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable c o s t , i t w i l l f o r c e M i l o s e v i c t o
r e c o n s i d e r h i s r e f u s a l o f an agreement.
NATO's p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s cannot micromanage NATO t a r g e t i n g
on a day-to-day b a s i s .
I n s t e a d , we need t o g i v e o u r
commanders a u t h o r i t y t o s t r i k e a broad range o f t a r g e t s as
l o n g as the c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s can be kept low.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t our m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s have d i s c u s s e d a
t a r g e t i n g review process t h a t would e x p e d i t e t a r g e t i n g , w h i l e
e n s u r i n g a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l review o f t a r g e t s t h a t c o u l d
cause a l a r g e number o f c a s u a l t i e s o r t h a t a r e o f n a t i o n a l
significance.
I am s a t i s f i e d w i t h the procedures, and hope
t h a t you can a l s o accept them.
"sifJ-oQMta
IDILBRARY
PHOTOCOP/
ER E.0.13526
�GECRET
Russia
•
C o n t a c t s w i t h Russians mixed. A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o Ivanov.
S a i d we welcome a n y / a l l p r o p o s a l s t o s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y . But b e f o r e any meeting takes p l a c e , need t o
ensure i t has a p r o d u c t i v e outcome.
•
She o u t l i n e d areas o f common ground based on concessions
Russia g o t from Serbs l a s t June and U.S.-Russian agreements:
•
no r e p r e s s i o n o f c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n ; withdraw Serb
s e c u r i t y f o r c e s t o permanent l o c a t i o n s ; u n h i n d e r e d r e t u r n
of refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons; u n h i n d e r e d access by
humanitarian organizations; i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n
implementation force.
•
Areas where we d i s a g r e e a r e use o f f o r c e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y presence.
•
Key p o i n t :
i f we can r e i n f o r c e common p r i n c i p l e s and agree on
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y presence, we might have t h e b a s i s
f o r an e f f e c t i v e meeting.
•
Ivanov seemed i n t r i g u e d , b u t responded F r i d a y w i t h
d i s a p p o i n t i n g nonpaper. A l t h o u g h he backed o f f i n s i s t i n g on
G-8 meeting, he denied M i l o s e v i c i s r e p r e s s i n g c i v i l i a n s and
c a l l e d f o r KLA t o be disarmed.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
2422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC; PRIME MINISTER AZNAR;
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN; PRESIDENT GLIGAROV; HILL LEADERS
DATE: A p r i l 3, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
Chirac, Aznar and C h r e t i e n : Secure t h e i r support f o r an
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h e NATO a i r campaign and t h e widening
of t h e t a r g e t s i n v o l v e d . For Chirac: Ensure h i s support
f o r an expedited t a r g e t approval process.
G l i g a r o v : T© reassure^the—Pre-s^rdent . . U go-ge^v o f our
.G
commitment t o help Macedonia m a i n t a i n t h e i r s e c u r i t y and
deal w i t h enormous refugee problems.
H i l l Leaders:
To update t h e Leaders on s t a t u s o f t h e a i r
campaign, our humanitarian response, and our d e t a i n e d
soldiers.
II.
BACKGROUND
Chirac i s o u t s i d e Paris f o r Easter. He and Jospin continue
to make s t r o n g p u b l i c statements about t h e righteousness o f
NATO's cause and the challenge M i l o s e v i c poses t o t h e
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p e a c e f u l , f r e e and democratic Europe.
[Jospin t h i s week moved s w i f t l y t o keep h i s c o a l i t i o n i n
l i n e , rebuking the Greens, Communists and I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r
f o r q u e s t i o n i n g NATO's campaign i n p u b l i c ] P u b l i c support
f o r NATO i s h o l d i n g steady a t about 50 percent. There i s
deep concern about the humanitarian p l i g h t o f t h e Kosovars;
France announced $15 m i l l i o n i n b i l a t e r a l a i d f o r refugees,
and c o n t r i b u t e d t o a $40 m i l l i o n EU package. I n c r e a s i n g l y ,
French commentators are s p e c u l a t i n g about ground t r o o p s .
Chirac continues t o i n s i s t t h a t i s n o t an o p t i o n .
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.d
Aznar i s spending the Easter Holiday i m S o u t h e r n Spain, He
w i l l t r a v e l on Monday t o Hungary and w i M spend next
weekend w i t h Tony B l a i r a t a country e s t a t e i n t h e UK. He
had planned t o t r a v e l p r i v a t e l y t o the x^s) t h i s week and
had explored t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n f o r m a l v i s i t w i t h you.
His plans changed and he withdrew t h i s request i n midMarch. He w i l l appreciate hearing t h a t you look forward t o
seeing him a t the NATO Summit.
Spain has been a staunch supporter o f Operation A l l i e d
Force. I n a d d i t i o n t o two F-18s and a C-130 tanker
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the a i r campaign, Spain has opened i t s
bases a t Rota and Moron t o us f o r a i r c r a f t beddown and
r e f u e l i n g o p e r a t i o n s . Madrid also has a l l o c a t e d $1 m i l l i o n
i n refugee assistance and dispatched 10 tons o f
humanitarian supplies t o Albania. I n a d d i t i o n , the Spanish
Red Cross has c o n t r i b u t e d 30 tons o f a i d , i n c l u d i n g
b l a n k e t s , f i r s t a i d k i t s and generators.
Aznar has been c o n s i s t e n t l y strong i n h i s p u b l i c statements
on Kosovo. I n a speech t o Parliament t h i s week, he s a i d
Spain's involvement was v i t a l — we cannot s i t i d l y by t o
watch the '"extermination" o f Kosovo's Albanians. Despite a
general a v e r s i o n t o using f o r c e , Spain's major p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g the o p p o s i t i o n S o c i a l i s t s , have given
Aznar t h e i r support.
ore*
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.Chretien asked you t o c a l l him; he f l e w from Canada's
newest t e r r i t o r y , Nunuvak, t o F l o r i d a , t o v i s i t h i s
granddaughter who was b a d l y i n j u r e d t h i s week i n a r i d i n g
a c c i d e n t . The Canadians have "wobble-free" i n s u p p o r t i n g
NATO's a c t i o n s i n Kosovo — you should acknowledge t h i s .
-£hey c o n t r i b u t e d a number o f combat a i r c r a f t — CF-18's,
xey
a n d l c o n s i d e r i n g sending more, i n a d d i t i o n t o $10 m i l l i o n i n
idY
aid.
1.4b, 1.4d
You should be aware t h a t Madeleine
had t o postpone a meeting w i t h Axworthy on the New York-^T"
Canada peace b r i d g e a t Niagara t h a t was t o h i g h l i g h t o u ^ v
extensive border cooperation. Should C h r e t i e n r a i s e , you
should agree t h a t i t be rescheduled as soon as Madeleine's
and Axworthy's schedules a l l o w .
Gligarov is concerned about the huge influx of Kosov^
Albanianxefugees into Macedonia and the impact thax this
is having on Macedonia's fragile economy and unp^Tsy ethnic
balance. (Tft^re are 400,000 ethnic Albanian eltizens in
Macedonia, comprising about 20 percent of the population.)
Gligarov is alscN^/orried that Macedonia p£ght become
engulfed in a wid&c Balkan war. Ambas^ctdor Chris Hill
summarizes the situation as follows ^'Macedonia is in the
fight of its short Irfe, and need^-'every bit of
encouragement we can provide." /
\
You should reassure G l i g a r o v / o f our support f o r Macedonia
as demonstrated by t h e p r o v i s i o n o f increased humanitarian
and economic assistance,/Strode's t r i p , and NATO's
d e c i s i o n t o support the^huinanftarian r e l i e f work t h e r e i n
anyway i t can. Along/with the a d d i t i o n a l $50 m i l l i o n i n
humanitarian r e l i e f / s u p p o r t t o t h ^ r e g i o n , Strobe w i l l
announce a $50 m i l d i o n economic assistance package, o f
which $29 m i l l i o T i w i l l go t o MacedoAda.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Attachments
Tab A Points
Tab B Points
Tab C Points
Tab D Points
Tab E Points
t o be Made to President Chirac
t o be Made to President Aznar
to be Made to Prime Minister Chretien
t o be Made to President Gligorov
to be Made t o the H i l l Leaders
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�"s
L^UO,^
POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
'S
Whc
2422
<£"J
o
lappe;
Jov^Mrnmoral an^/out^ageoja^).
We erannot
in\Kosc
. e r a t e ^ e t h n i c c l e a i b«g t h i s i W t - ^ e a r o f t f i e 20^fe--^ntuty-.
•
Much a t stake f o r Europe, the European Union, the
S t a t e s and NATO. We cannot f a i l .
•
However our m i l i t a r y response i s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d as
i n e f f e c t i v e — n o t o n l y by our p u b l i c s , b u t a l s o by the
l e a d e r s h i p i n Belgrade. Not j u s t the weather — t a r g e t i n g
process has a l s o been broken.
We
United
agreed t o exg^nd\ the range/^f t a r g e t ^ - i p n Tuesday, b u t ^ n l y
y nig
ype o
i c t h i n k twic
^^JJ^^
We need t o c o n t i n u e s t r i k i n g h i g h - v a l u e t a r g e t s , i n c l u d i n g i n
Belgrade — not o n l y m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and a i r defense b u t
VJ^command and c o n t r o l , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and b r o a d c a s t f a c i l i t i e s
<2A<2_ ,
t h a t are d i r e c t i n g , s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
S-HMtwut
S t r i k i n g a wider range o f
c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct h i s
i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable
reconsider his r e f u s a l of
t a r g e t s w i l l damage Belgrade's
o f f e n s i v e . And by imposing an
cost, i t w i l l force Milosevic to
an agreement.
I f we don't h i t h a r d now, M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l immune from any
p e n a l t y . He w i l l seek t o complete h i s e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g b e f o r e
NATO f u r t h e r e s c a l a t e s .
NATO's p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s cannot micromanage NATO t a r g e t i n g
on a day-to-day b a s i s .
I n s t e a d , we need t o g i v e our
commanders a u t h o r i t y t o s t r i k e a broad range o f t a r g e t s as
l o n g as the c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s can be kept t o a minimum.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t our m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s have d i s c u s s e d a
t a r g e t i n g review process t h a t would e x p e d i t e t a r g e t i n g , w h i l e
e n s u r i n g a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l review o f t a r g e t s t h a t c o u l d
cause a l a r g e number of c a s u a l t i e s or t h a t are o f n a t i o n a l
Reason: 1.5 ( a ) , ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y on:, A p r i , ! ^ , . 200^
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
PER E.0.13526
�s i g n i f i c a n c e . I am s a t i s f i e d with the procedures, and hope
t h a t you can also accept them.
i t h Milosevic's thugs packing t r a i
ith
cut the m i l i t a r y and p o l l
operation's. Instead, we must shew our
resolve b \ interisifyingVour s
Albc
is, we must
NBLTO' s
i t i o n anc
Russia
Contacts w i t h Russians mixed. A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o Ivanov.
Said we welcome any/all proposals t o solve the c o n f l i c t
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y . But before any meeting takes place, need t o
ensure i t has a productive outcome.
She o u t l i n e d areas of common ground based on concessions
Russia got from Serbs l a s t June and U.S.-Russian agreements:
no repression o f c i v i l i a n population; withdraw Serb
s e c u r i t y forces t o permanent l o c a t i o n s ; unhindered r e t u r n
of refugees and displaced persons; unhindered access by
humanitarian organizations; i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n
implementation force.
-Si-
Areas where we disagree are use of force and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y presence.
Key p o i n t : i f we can r e i n f o r c e common p r i n c i p l e s and agree on
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y presence, we mightO have the b a s i s - \
f o r an e f f e c t i v e meeting.
Ivanov seemed i n t r i g u e d , but responded Friday w i t h
d i s a p p o i n t i n g nonpaper. Although he backed o f f i n s i s t i n g on
G-8 meeting, he denied Milosevic i s repressing c i v i l i a n s and
c a l l e d f o r KLA t o be disarmed.
Want t o keep Russians
impress, on them tha
cleansinq. They'r
aged d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , but have t o
cannot con-tfiAue t o d e n y ^ t h n i c
ted, l o o k / t e r r i b l e i n t ^ r n a \ t i o n a l l y .
Out f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s c a l l e d f o r
W^dnesday\at p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r
me. Expect Jlussians w i u l
:o stay firm_jfe-hat cease-fi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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c
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
A p r i l 10, 1999
ACTION
\
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
IDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE^J/
SUBJECT:
Message t o President Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
Purpose
Approve a message t o President Y e l t s i n .
Background
President Y e l t s i n wrote t o you twice t h i s week about Kosovo.
Y e l t s i n ' s second l e t t e r was an impassioned plea f o r working
together t o end the c r i s i s . The message reviewed your j o i n t
accomplishments, emphasized Y e l t s i n ' s b e l i e f t h a t NATO w i l l n o t
be able t o f i x the Kosovo problem w i t h one s t r i k e — and then
came t o the underwhelming punchline o f : l e t ' s have our Foreign
M i n i s t e r s meet.
In l i g h t o f the Orthodox Easter holiday and Madeleine's Tuesday
meeting w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Ivanov, i t would be u s e f u l t o send
Y e l t s i n a b r i e f response. The message reviews our concerns
about Milosevic's continued b r u t a l i t y and thanks Y e l t s i n f o r h i s
p u b l i c defense o f the U.S.-Russian r e l a t i o n s h i p and assurances
t h a t Russia w i l l not be drawn m i l i t a r i l y i n t o the Yugoslavia
c o n f l i c t . You also h i g h l i g h t the importance o f K o f i Annan's
statemi^nt on Kosovo and ask Y e l t s i n t o embrace i t as a
c o n s t r u c t i v e approach toward a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
RECOMMENDATXON
the message at Tab A.
That you appr«
Disapprove
Approve
Attachments
Tab A Message t o President Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CONFI DiaiHftfr
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 4/9/09
PER Ei). 13526
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
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^-Ib-^q
2660
THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H iVl G T O N
'39 HPK 10 AMli:4b
A p r i l 10\ 1999
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH SECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN,
PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE: A p r i l 10, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGEjg^.
I.
PURPOSE
Annan: welcome h i s s t r o n g statement on Kosovo; urge him t o
encourage Moscow t o pressure Belgrade and cease a l l support;
e x p l a i n s t r a t e g y ; l a y down markers on I r a q .
B l a i r and Chirac: review the road ahead on Kosovo, i n c l u d i n g
Monday's f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s meeting i n Brussels, i n t r a - a l l i a n c e
r e l a t i o n s , managing Russia and h e l p i n g the f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
With B l a i r , you also should seek support f o r increased economic
pressure on Belgrade.
II.
BACKGROUND
Annan issued a statement on Friday expressing h i s deep d i s t r e s s
at the humanitarian s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo and u r g i n g a resumption
of p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. He
c a l l e d on Belgrade t o make a s e r i e s o f commitments, i n c l u d i n g an
end t o i t s "campaign o f i n t i m i d a t i o n and e x p u l s i o n " , a
withdrawal of forces, u n c o n d i t i o n a l acceptance o f refugee r e t u r n
and t h e deployment o f an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e . " Thanks
t o phone c a l l s from Madeleine and Tom P i c k e r i n g , Annan's
requirements are e s s e n t i a l l y the same as our own. The one major
d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t Annan c a l l s f o r NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s
once Belgrade commits t o these steps, r a t h e r than beginning t o
implement them. We are now t r y i n g t o use Annan's statement i n
our e f f o r t s t o make t h e Russians be a c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t o f our
diplomatic strategy.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CECRET
Reason: 1.S (a), (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: A ^ r i l
CLIN
9,
2009
PHOTOCOPY
MC H N W I I G
A D RTN
�SECRET
Mrs. Ogata, the UN High Commissioner f o r Refugees (UNHCR), and
the l e a d c o o r d i n a t o r o f refugee p r o t e c t i o n and assistance
e f f o r t s , was overwhelmed by the magnitude o f the Kosovo c r i s i s
and slow t o accept a strong NATO r o l e i n a s s i s t i n g w i t h r e l i e f .
She has now acknowledged t h a t the NATO r o l e i s c r i t i c a l , and we
are beginning t o reach most o f the refugees w i t h a s s i s t a n c e .
Mrs. Ogata, i s c u r r e n t l y i n the r e g i o n , v i s i t i n g t h e camps.
Both B l a i r and Chirac remain rock s o l i d on Kosovo, and continue
to enjoy s t r o n g p u b l i c support f o r NATO's a i r s t r i k e s .
Indeed,
as images o f dispossessed Kosovars and r e p o r t s o f a t r o c i t i e s
m u l t i p l y , e d i t o r i a l and even p u b l i c support f o r ground troops i s
growing i n both c o u n t r i e s .
EQ 13526 1 4
.d
You w i l l want t o b r i n g both leaders up t o date on your
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h D'Alema and convey your basic s a t i s f a c t i o n
w i t h K o f i Annan's statement o f c o n d i t i o n s . The NATO m i n i s t e r i a l
on Monday w i l l s i g n a l A l l i e d resolve and o f f e r an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
make smaller a l l i e s f e e l more i n v o l v e d . At the same time, we
must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l there i s no end i n s i g h t i f he
continues t o h o l d o u t . This w i l l r e q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y
resources and increased economic pressure. You might also
compare notes on our common e f f o r t s t o help the refugees, a s s i s t
f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s , and channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s i n p o s i t i v e
directions.
Attachments
Tab A T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h Chirac
Tab B T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h B l a i r
Tab C T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h K o f i Annan
SECRET
�Revised
—^-r-f^r-ir
A/10/99 6:45 pm
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Want t o review where we are on Kosovo; my conversation w i t h
D'Alema; K o f i ' s statement, the m i l i t a r y campaign; the
humanitarian e f f o r t ; and Russia.
D'Alema
•
Spoke t o him Friday. He's doing a great j o b navigating a
d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n a t home and seems s o l i d l y behind
continued a i r operations. No mention o f "pauses" or
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s .
K o f i ' s Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on Friday. His conditions
are i d e n t i c a l t o our conditions. The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s that
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once Milosevic commits t o
the c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs o f implementation f i r s t . But K o f i ' s statement
gives NATO's stance adds a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l legitimacy
to our p o s i t i o n and provides a good hook f o r the Russians.
• Also very encouraged by G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statement
because the Russians signed on. Hope we can lock that i n at
the highest l e v e l s .
•
I hope t h a t we can use his statement t o help i n our e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians t o engage c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on the diplomatic
track.
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
counterparts on Monday i n Brussels. This i s important f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o signal NATO's determination t o stay the
course. And second, t o make a l l the a l l i e s f e e l involved.
There i s some resentment among the smaller a l l i e s about the
r e g u l a r contacts between the Contact Group a l l i e s . The
meeting o f a l l 19 Foreign M i n i s t e r s should help, and I am also
making a p o i n t o f c a l l i n g the leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g forces.
PER E.0.13526
CL I NTO^itffi'RM^'WOTOCOPY
�Next Steps
•
We must make Milosevic f e e l t h a t there i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand that General
Clark w i l l s h o r t l y be asking a l l of us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o look at t h i s very
carefully.
•
We also need t o supplement our m i l i t a r y operations w i t h
increased economic pressure on Milosevic and h i s war machine.
We're encouraging neighboring countries t o stop o i l supplies
to Serbia. This i s also a good moment f o r the EU t o take a
serious look a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s sanctions regime.
Easter Pause [ i f asked]
•
[SACEUR was very c a r e f u l i n h i s t a r g e t s over the past 24
hours. Expect t h a t the NATO spokesman w i l l mention t h i s a t
his b r i e f i n g today.]
Help f o r the Refugees
•
Our estimates are t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars are now
displaced. The world i s now responding but we've got t o do
more.
•
Just formed a n a t i o n a l coordinating c o u n c i l here t o run our
response t o the refugee c r i s i s . We are a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
supplies i n t o the region and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d .
•
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e the pressure by moving some o f the refugees t o
temporary safehavens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
doing. Hope we can increase a i d t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
organizations i n the region.
Assistance for the Frontline States
• Also need t o step up e f f o r t s t o help other f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
• Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . We'll need a
comprehensive plan f o r Kosovo and Yugoslavia — a resettlement
and recovery program.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Russia
Important we a l l stay engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t Milosevic
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and United States and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, but
have too much important work t o do.
Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o stay
out of c o n f l i c t . Have reason t o believe t h a t people i n
M i n i s t r y of Defense and other government e n t i t i e s are
preparing shipments of m i l i t a r y equipment t o Yugoslavia.
Should make sure Boris and Primakov understand t h a t i n t e l
sharing or m i l i t a r y cooperation w i t h Serbs would be a very b i g
mistake.
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden of inspecting humanitarian
shipments. Should help them however we can.
Also ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o get
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; already see some s h i f t s .
CLINTON LIBRARY DN
OOY
CP
�SECRET
2660
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Want t o review where we are on Kosovo, my conversation w i t h
D'Alema, K o f i ' s statement, the m i l i t a r y campaign and the
humanitarian e f f o r t . Also l i k e t o have a word about I r a q .
D'Alema
Spoke t o him
yesterday.
Kofi's Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on Friday. His c o n d i t i o n s
are i d e n t i c a l to our c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o
the c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs of implementation f i r s t .
•
K o f i ' s statement gives NATO's stance t h a t much more
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y . I hope t h a t we can use h i s
statement t o help i n our e f f o r t t o get the Russians t o engage
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on the d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k .
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
c o u n t e r p a r t s on Monday i n Brussels. This i s important f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o s i g n a l NATO's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o stay the
course.
l.4d
I am also
making a p o i n t of c a l l i n g the leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s .
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SECRET
Reason:
l.SAaU
—ss^XnmOU Jl B A Y P O O O Y
f& R R H T C P
�SECRET
Next Steps
•
We must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l t h a t t h e r e i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand t h a t General
Clark w i l l s h o r t l y be asking a l l o f us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o look a t t h i s very
carefully.
•
We a l s o need t o supplement our m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i t h
increased economic pressure on M i l o s e v i c and h i s war machine.
A n y t h i n g t h a t you can do t o b l o c k M i l o s e v i c ' s access t o
o f f s h o r e accounts, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Cyprus, would be most
i m p o r t a n t . We're encouraging neighboring c o u n t r i e s t o stop
o i l s u p p l i e s t o Serbia. This i s also a good moment f o r t h e EU
to take a serious look a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s sanctions regime.
Easter Pause [ i f asked]
•
[SACEUR i s l o o k i n g a t p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t i n g s t r i k e s away
from Belgrade and other urban areas on Saturday n i g h t , d u r i n g
the l a t e n i g h t r e s u r r e c t i o n mass.
• We don't t h i n k NATO needs t o announce t h i s i n advance. But we
c o u l d suggest t h a t the NATO spokesman describe t h i s r e s t r a i n t
at h i s press b r i e f i n g on Sunday.]
Help f o r the Refugees
•
Our estimates are t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars have been
d i s p l a c e d . The w o r l d i s now responding b u t we've got t o do
more.
•
Just formed a n a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l here t o r u n our
response t o the refugee c r i s i s . We are a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
s u p p l i e s i n t o the r e g i o n and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d . H i l l a r y went over Friday t o see t h e
departure o f some humanitarian r a t i o n s .
•
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e the pressure by moving some o f the refugees t o
temporary safe havens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
doing. Hope we can increase a i d t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the r e g i o n .
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Assistance for the Frontline States
•
Also need t o step up e f f o r t s to help other f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
•
Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . We'll need a
comprehensive plan f o r Kosovo and Yugoslavia — a r e s e t t l e m e n t
and recovery program.
Russia
•
Important we a l l stay engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t M i l o s e v i c
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and United States and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, but
have too much important work t o do.
© Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o stay
out of c o n f l i c t . |
iL4d
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden o f i n s p e c t i n g humanitarian
shipments. Should help them however we can.
Also ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o get
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; already see some s h i f t s .
m»m
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Want t o r e v i e w where we are on Kosovo; my c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
D'Alema; K o f i ' s statement, t h e m i l i t a r y campaign; t h e
h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t ; and Russia.
D'Alema
•
Spoke t o him F r i d a y . He's d o i a g a g r e a t j o b n a v i g a t i n g a
d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n a t home and seems s o l i d l y b e h i n d
c o n t i n u e d a i r o p e r a t i o n s . No mention o f "pauses" o r
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s .
K o f i ' s Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on F r i d a y . H i s c o n d i t i o n s
are i d e n t i c a l t o our c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o
t h e c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs o f implementation f i r s t .
But K o f i ' s statement
g i v e s NATO's stance khat .much morp> i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y h>
and p r o v i d e s a good hook f o r the^Russians.
/>D£"
•
A l s o v e r y encouraged by G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statement
because t h e Russians signed on. Hope we can l o c k t h a t i n a t
the highest l e v e l s .
•
I hope t h a t we can use h i s statement t o h e l p i n our e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians t o engage c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on t h e d i p l o m a t i c
track.
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
c o u n t e r p a r t s on Monday i n B r u s s e l s .
This i s i m p o r t a n t f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o s i g n a l NATO's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t a y t h e
course.
And second, t o make a l l t h e a l l i e s f e e l i n v o l v e d .
There i s some resentment among t h e s m a l l e r a l l i e s about t h e
r e g u l a r c o n t a c t s between t h e Contact Group a l l i e s .
The
m e e t i n g o f a l l 19 Foreign M i n i s t e r s should h e l p , and I am a l s o
making a p o i n t o f c a l l i n g t h e leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
-TD o^r
(P S'+io^
0
�Next Steps
•
We must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l t h a t t h e r e i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand t h a t General
C l a r k w i l l s h o r t l y be a s k i n g a l l o f us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o l o o k a t t h i s v e r y
carefully.
We a l s o need t o supplement o u r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i t h
i n c r e a s e d economic pressure on M i l o s e v i c and h i s war machine.
We're encouraging n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s t o s t o p o i l s u p p l i e s
t o S e r b i a . This i s a l s o a good moment f o r t h e EU t o t a k e a
s e r i o u s l o o k a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s s a n c t i o n s regime.
E a s t e r Pause
t u r d a ^ n i V f h t , / d u r irTcrf**'"
-we
nnounco t h i s in-ttdvanutf.
rni.ilid ougge-st—Llldt.—the NATO spokesman d e o c r i b u L h i j i f c i b l i a T n t
at h i s press b r i e f i n g ow Ound^'. ]
L^NXV \M~fe=. •TV. t^,
Help f o r the Refugees
^Of^^pi
IN*'! rWirt^vovN'tViis
Our e s t i m a t e s a r e t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars a r e now
d i s p l a c e d . The w o r l d i s now responding b u t we've g o t t o do
more.
J u s t formed a n a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l here t o r u n our
response t o t h e refugee c r i s i s . We a r e a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
s u p p l i e s i n t o t h e r e g i o n and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d .
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e t h e p r e s s u r e by moving some o f t h e refugees t o
temporary safehavens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
d o i n g . Hope we can i n c r e a s e a i d t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
organizations i n the region.
Assistance
f o r the F r o n t l i n e
States
A l s o need t o step up e f f o r t s t o h e l p o t h e r f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
0
v
e r
�•
Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . W e ' l l need a
comprehensive p l a n f o r Kosovo and Y u g o s l a v i a — a r e s e t t l e m e n t
and r e c o v e r y program.
Russia
•
I m p o r t a n t we a l l s t a y engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t M i l o s e v i c
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and U n i t e d S t a t e s and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, b u t
have t o o much i m p o r t a n t work t o do.
•
Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o s t a y
out o f c o n f l i c t .
Have reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t people i n
M i n i s t r y o f Defense and o t h e r government e n t i t i e s a r e
p r e p a r i n g shipments o f m i l i t a r y equipment t o Y u g o s l a v i a .
Should make sure B o r i s and Primakov u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i n t e l
s h a r i n g o r m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Serbs would be a v e r y b i g
mistake.
•
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden o f i n s p e c t i n g
shipments. Should h e l p them however we can.
•
A l s o ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o g e t
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine o t h e r NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; a l r e a d y see some s h i f t s .
humanitarian
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning Russia
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on communications between President Clinton and various world leaders regarding military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between October 1998 and April 1999. Material includes talking points and telcons with French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime MInister Tony Blair, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi.
Identifier
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2009-1290-M
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Jacques Chirac
Kosovo
Serbia
Tony Blair