1
500
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Kigali, Rwanda
Color
The color of the photograph
Black and White
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ceremony to honor the Rwandan Genocide Survivors in Kigali
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ralph Alswang
White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
03/25/1998
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P61485-16
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton participates in a ceremony to honor the Rwandan Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda. A sculpture is dedicated to honor the victims of genocide.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Africa
billclinton
Genocide
Kigali
Rwanda
Survivors
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/b614047b2482018a89f8daaa9548f088.pdf
f66aef4c7c8a2a450ee771400608a797
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0656-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
3/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the genocide in the former Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1995. Materials include cables, emails, memorandum to the Secretary of Defense regarding a meeting in London on the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia, July 16, 1995.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
NSC European Affairs Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/18/2020
Genocide
War Crimes
Yugoslavia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e328f9f6fdfaccb9122f7af6be70672f.pdf
802d342d7db1c5af7b38c3848c3e9d5c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0831-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
3/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific records closed under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 1 in Clinton Library case 2006-0647-F. FOIA case 2006-0647-f was for all records related to genocide in the Former Yugoslavia from 1993-1995.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
1/27/2020
Bosnia War
Genocide
Yugoslavia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7a7bc263a115406227c326c194650822.pdf
096445f33d3a33cdeb9864bede903b5c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2012-0800-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
3/3/2020
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific records closed under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 1 in Clinton Library case 2006-0647-F. FOIA case 2006-0647-f was for all records related to genocide in the Former Yugoslavia from 1993-1995.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
NSC European Affairs Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/3/2020
Genocide
War Crimes
Yugoslavia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d9facdc50a21e1b6155645dca2f8c678.pdf
3b3153e1702675d36ca64b14d724ac02
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Trip to Rwanda on March 25, 1998 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2019-0175-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consist of photographs related to the Clinton’s visit to Kigali, Rwanda on March 25, 1998. (All events are from March 25, 1998) Events include: President Clinton’s statement to reporters on the tarmac at Entebbe, Uganda regarding a school shooting in Jonesboro, Arkansas; President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton departure from Uganda and travel to Kigali, Rwanda; President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton arrival at Kiglai Airport in Rwanda; Meeting with President Bizimungu of Rwanda at the Rigali Airport; U.S. Delegation discussion with Genocide survivors and future builders at Kigali Airport (Members of the U.S. Delegation include: President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sandy Berger, Rep. Maxine Waters, Rep. Charles Rangel, Susan Rice and others); Remarks honoring Rwandan Genocide Survivors at Kigali Airport; Sculpture Dedication at the Kigali Airport
<b>Please Note: No items in this collection have yet been scanned nor made available online. For access to the collection please visit the Clinton Library's research room.</b>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Africa
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Finding Aid
Genocide
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Jesse Jackson
meetings
Photograph Contact Sheets
Rwanda
Survivors
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1592251cee946540d58326f0d1a25bb7.pdf
d252c4189923fd0b6c8118ce7d6b466a
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (c) of E.O. 13526.
�-SECRET
UNAMIR II
5 AUGUST 1994
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/18/15"
xm
CLINTON LIBRAJRY PHOTOCOPY
�UNAMIR II
COMBAT UNIT
PARTICIPANTS
COUNTRY
UNIT
DEPLOY
ETHIOPIA
GHANA
FR AFRICAN
MALAWI
MALI
NIGERIA
TUNISIA
BN
BN
BN(-)
CO
CO
CO
BN
BY 19 AUG
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ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
BN
BN
BY MID-AUGUST; AWAITING EQUIP
APPROX 15-31 AUG
BY MID-AUGUST
BY 30 AUG; AWAITING UN DECISION
ON EQUIPMENT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�UNAMIR II
SUPPORT UNIT
PARTICIPANTS
COUNTRY
TYPE UNIT
DEPLOY
ISSUES
AUSTRALIA
FIELD HOSP
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ADV PARTY
6 AUG
MAIN BODY
TBD
NOTCRIT; UK UNIT
HAS MED CAPABILITY
CANADA
COMMO UNIT MAIN BODY ( )
IN PLACE
UK
LOG BN
ADV PARTY
IN PLACE
MAIN BODY
15 AUG
UK TRANSPORTS
US TRANSPORTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�UN REQUEST FOR
ASSISTANCE
A CONTRIBUTING NATION OR UN CDR
REQUEST A CAPABILITY OR SERVICE
UN REQUESTS A DONOR NATION FOR
PRICE AND AVAILABILITY (P&A) DATA
DONOR NATION PROVIDES P&A DATA
UN ACCEPTS P&A DATA AND ISSUES A
LETTER OF ASSIST (LOA)
DONOR NATION EXECUTES
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�AIRLIFT
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•
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUr,
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NOTE: HIGHEST PRIORITY IS
50 X 2-1/2 - 5 TON TRUCKS
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�UNAMIR UNIT
REQUIREMENTS
• ENGINEER UNIT CAPABLE OF GRADING
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHO l ULUr.
�TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
13 August 1994
RWANDA:
New Exodus Under Way
Thousands of Rwandan Hutus in the French-protected
humanitarian zone may be moving west on foot and bv car on
the road toward Zaire, according to press reports
these people are headed toward Bukavu, an area
crammed with more than 300,000 refugees.
-- French military officers told relief officials that some
600 refugees per hour were reaching an area 20 km west
of Gikongoro yesterday, 80 km from the Zairian border,
press reports say.
The flow may be the beginning of a larger, catastrophic
migration into Zaire of up to 3 million people, spurred by fear
of Tutsi reprisals after the impending withdrawal of French
forces by 22 August.
— Press reports say that those fleeing are some of the nearly
2 million residents of the zone, but the more than 1
million displaced people also in the area-including
500,000 around Gikongoro alone-had not begun
leaving their camps.
The sight of thousands leaving is likely to panic others into
joining the migration. Some 14,000 Tutsis sheltered at a
poorly protected camp at Cyangugu could be at risk if a tide of
Hutus sweeps through the area. Another large influx would
overwhelm the already strained relief capabilities in Zaire
\
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
no new volcanic activity since
Wednesday,
8/l8/»5-
K8H
TOP ccenET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
�TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
Press reports say the UN relief agency is making contingency
plans to evacuate people.
-- The 1977, lava flow stopped approximately 100 meters
from Kibumba, the region's largest refugee site. The
road from Goma to Kibumba and Katale a so traverses
the 1977 lava fields.
TOP GCGnCT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents on Rwanda
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0295-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the genocide in Rwanda. Materials include a report on Rwandan refugees and a Joints Chief of Staff briefing paper.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Leonard Hawley
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2014-0295-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Genocide
Rwanda
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/55598a60e16613847f7d33c1d33dd2a9.pdf
3a3c2c050afe2858b55b629511c83535
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c), (d), and 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526 and (b)(3) of
the FOIA.
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C L I
;:
; I B R A R Y P H O T O C O P Y
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Page 2 of 5
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Page 3 of 5
EO 13526 1.4c
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF]
EO 13526 1.4c
I 23 APRIL 1994.
CONTENTS
1. TAJIKISTAN: PEACE TALKS HAVE SOME SUCCESS 1.4c
2. RWANDA: REBELS ADVANCING | 1.4c [
3. LESOTHO: PRIME MINISTER ANTICIPATES COUP ATTEMPT ] 1,4c
4. EGYPT: MUBARAK TIGHTENING POLITICAL CONTROL 1.4c
EURASIA
1. TAJIKISTAN: PEACE TALKS HAVE SOME SUCCESS
1.4c
IN THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS, WHICH ENDED WEDNESDAY IN M S O ,
OCW
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVES AGREED ON AN AGENDA,
ISSUED A JOINT APPEAL FOR AN END TO MILITARY AND "OTHER HOSTILE"
ACTIONS, AND FORMED A JOINT COMMISSION ON REFUGEES,f EO 13526 1.4c I
//ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO DISCUSS THE COUNTRY'S
FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE, THE TAJIKS HAVE MADE MORE PROGRESS THAN
MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED FROM THEIR OPENING POSITIONS.//
//FOREIGN PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY FROM RUSSIA, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND
AFGHANISTAN, PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR THE COMPROMISES.// (C NF)
THE TWO TOP OPPOSITION LEADERS JOINED THEIR DELEGATION ON SUNDAY BUT
DID NOT OFFICIALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS; THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED
THAT THEY WILL DO SO IN THE NEXT ROUND, WHICH IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR
ISLAMABAD LATE NEXT MONTH, I F THE REGIME UPGRADES THE LEVEL OF ITS
DELEGATION.
1.4c
AFRICA
2. RWANDA: REBELS ADVANCING 1.4c
THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PUBLICLY CLAIMING VICTORIES IN THE
NORTH AND NEAR KIGALI.
FO 13526 1 4r.
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
THE RPF WILL
BROADCASTS INDICATE THAT THEY STILL REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
HUTU INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
-- //THEY MAY BE WILLING TO MEET WITH MILITARY OFFICERS AND
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, HOWEVER, IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE GENOCIDE,
WHICH RELIEF WORKERS SAY IS SPREADING SOUTH.//
-- //THE RPF PROBABLY HOPES IT CAN PERSUADE OFFICERS AND MODERATE
HUTU POLITICIANS TO SUPPORT AN RPF-DOMINATED COALITION GOVERNMENT•//
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD006\APR94\MSGS\M1011392.htm]
Page 4 of 5
4. EGYPT: MUBARAK TIGHTENING POLITICAL CONTROL 1.4c
CAIRO RECENTLY ABOLISHED LOCAL ELECTION OF 3,500 VILLAGE MAYORS AND
THEIR 20,000 ASSISTANTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT MANY OF THEM WERE EITHER
AIDING OR WERE FAILING TO ACT FORCEFULLY AGAINST ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS,
ACCORDING TO I
EO 13526 1.4c
I LOCAL PRESS REPORTS.
-- THE GOVERNMENT WILL N W APPOINT THESE OFFICIALS SUBJECT TO
O
APPROVAL BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. [ 1.4c
THE LEGISLATURE RECENTLY EXTENDED THE COUNTRY'S EMERGENCY LAW FOR
ANOTHER THREE YEARS ON THE BASIS OF THE DOMESTIC SECURITY SITUATION.
THE LAW--IN EFFECT SINCE THE SADAT ASSASSINATION IN 1981--ALLOWS THE
SECURITY SERVICES TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE SUSPECTS FOR PROLONGED
PERIODS WITHOUT FORMALLY CHARGING THEM. I 1.4c
I
EO 13526 1.4c
|THE GOVERNMENT LAST MONTH ARRESTED SEVERAL
PROMINENT FUNDAMENTALIST CLERICS WHO, LIKE THE EXTREMISTS, ADVOCATE
AN ISLAMIC STATE. A LEADING SECULAR OPPOSITION PAPER CALLED THE
ARRESTS UNPRECEDENTED, AND OTHERS CLAIM PRESIDENT MUBARAK PERSONALLY
CECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
FINAL SECTION OF 2
EO 13526 1.4c
ORDERED THE MEASURES. CAIRO HAS ALSO W N LAWSUITS AGAINST ISLAMIC
O
SCHOLARS WHO HAVE CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE MUFTI, WHO IS THE
COUNTRY'S MOST SENIOR RELIGIOUS FIGURE AND A GOVERNMENT APPOINTEE.
-- IN A HIGHLY UNUSUAL MOVE, CAIRO THIS MONTH SUED A COLUMNIST OF A
LEADING PROGOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER FOR RELATIVELY MODERATE CRITICISM OF
THE JUDICIARY. | 1.4c I
POTENTIAL FOR MISSTEPS
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S
EO 13526 1.4c
ANTITERRORIST EFFORTS IS STRONG AND WILL OVERRIDE ANY CONCERN ABOUT
THE LIMITS THE NEW RESTRICTIONS IMPOSE ON THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY.
NEVERTHELESS, PUBLIC TOLERANCE FOR RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL MEASURES IN
THE NAME OF SECURITY MIGHT ERODE I F THE GOVERNMENT IS PERCEIVED TO
BE MOVING PRECIPITATELY AGAINST THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OR POPULAR
INDEPENDENT CLERICS.
-- THE MORE THAN 2 MILLION NONVIOLENT ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS IN EGYPT
COMMAND CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FROM A PUBLIC WHOSE PIETY AND ISLAMIC
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD006\APR94\MSGS\Ml011392.html
IDENTITY CONTINUE TO G O
RW
DV
RW
23 APRIL 2014.
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
EO 13526 1.4c
Page 5 of 5
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Page 1 of3
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
PRIORITY
SECRET
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7399 1 440556-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKMEA T CG I I MEF
RUEKJCS
231907Z MAY 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
(b)(3)
INFO: * * * *
SUBJ: THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT OFFENSIVE--DEVELOPMENTS AND
TEXT:
S E C R E T
PASS:
NOFORN
.MIL
-Mat
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
(b)(3)
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
(b)(3)
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
_(bK3L
SUBJ: THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT OFFENSIVE--DEVELOPMENTS AND
OUTLOOK. (U)
DOI: 23 MAY 94 (AS OF 1500 EDT)
TEXT: 1. e&) THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL
TRANSLATE ITS MILITARY SUCCESS INTO POLITICAL P W R BY DEMANDING A
OE
LARGER ROLE FOR ITS TUTSI MINORITY. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OFFENSIVE
WAS TO STOP THE SLAUGHTER OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS BY
PROGOVERNMENT FORCES. AN OFFENSIVE BY THE HUTU-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT
FORCES PROBABLY WOULD PREVENT THE REBELS FROM TAKING TOTAL CONTROL OF
RWANDA, BUT GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE SOUTH, WITH
THE REBELS CONTROLLING THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. BOTH SIDES ARE
EXPECTED EVENTUALLY TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
2. ffr) BIRTH OF A CRISIS. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA SUPPORTED A
RECONCILIATION BUT DELAYED FORMING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HUTU
HARDLINERS OPPOSED THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, AND THE ARMED FORCES RESISTED
INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION. THE INCLUSION OF TUTSIS IN THE N W
E
MILITARY CAUSED INCREASED RESENTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AMONG HARD-LINE
MILITARY ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. THE AIR CRASH
THAT KILLED THE RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN PRESIDENTS WAS PROBABLY AN
ASSASSINATION CONDUCTED BY HUTU MILITARY HARDLINERS.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
3. (U) KEY POINTS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.
-- CREATION OF HUTU AND TUTSI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.
-- MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS IN 1995.
-- INTEGRATION OF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT INTO AND AN OVERALL
REDUCTION IN THE ARMED FORCES.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD007\MAY94\MSGS\M1062347.html
Page 2 of 3
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
4. fS4 ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER RWANDAN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA WAS
KILLED, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN KIGALI BEGAN SYSTEMATICALLY
EXECUTING PROMINENT TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS SYMPATHETIC TO
RECONCILIATION. THE VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD
AND VARIOUS YOUTH MILITIAS WAS NOT SPONTANEOUS BUT WAS DIRECTED BY
HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS WITHIN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO MANY
SOURCES. IN ADDITION TO THE RANDOM MASSACRES OF TUTSIS BY HUTU
MILITIAS AND INDIVIDUALS, AN ORGANIZED, PARALLEL GENOCIDE CAMPAIGN BY
THE ARMY APPARENTLY IS UNDER WAY TO DESTROY THE LEADERS IN THE TUTSI
COMMUNITY. THE ORIGINAL INTENT WAS TO KILL ONLY THE POLITICAL ELITE
SUPPORTING RECONCILIATION. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, LOST CONTROL OF
THE MILITIAS, AND THE MASSACRE SPREAD LIKE A WILDFIRE THAT CONTINUES
TO RAGE OUT OF CONTROL.
5. (S/NF) THE RPF TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. TWO DAYS AFTER PRESIDENT
HABYARIMANA'S DEATH, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) LAUNCHED AN
OFFENSIVE TO REINFORCE ITS BATTALION IN KIGALI, WHICH CAME UNDER
ATTACK WHILE IN THE CAPITAL TO PROTECT RPF NEGOTIATORS, AND TO STOP
THE MASSACRE OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS. THE RPF ATTACKED THE
ENTIRE FRONT TO PENETRATE GOVERNMENT LINES AND THEN TO INFILTRATE
TROOPS SOUTH INTO KIGALI. THE FORCE IN KIGALI ATTACKED TO EXPAND ITS
POSITION AND TIE D W GOVERNMENT FORCES TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENTS
ON
FROM MOVING NORTH. SINCE THE ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT FORCE DISPOSITION
PREVENTED A DEFENSE IN DEPTH, THE RPF MOVED QUICKLY TO KIGALI AFTER
PENETRATING THE FRONTLINE.
6. (S/NF) BY 12 APRIL, RPF FORCES HAD SUBDUED MOST OF MUTARA PROVINCE
AND POSITIONED A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE 12 KILOMETERS FROM KIGALI. TWO
DAYS LATER, THIS FORCE HAD JOINED RPF TROOPS IN KIGALI. MORE REBEL
UNITS ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND ISOLATED THE AIRPORT FROM THE
CAPITAL. MOST GOVERNMENT FORCES WITHDREW FROM THE CAPITAL TOWARD
GITARAMA, THE SEAT OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
7. (S/NF) BOTH SIDES DECLARED CEASE-FIRES EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 26
APRIL AND BEGAN POSTURING FOR THE FINAL BATTLE FOR KIGALI. THE
FIGHTING APPARENTLY RESUMED ON 6 MAY AS THE RPF SEIZED ADDITIONAL
AREAS SURROUNDING KIGALI. T O DAYS LATER, RPF FORCES HAD TAKEN THE
W
HIGH GROUND NORTHEAST OF THE AIRPORT AND ATTACKED KANOMBE BARRACKS,
KEY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE OF THE AIRPORT. N W THE RPF MUST
O,
ELIMINATE THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WITHOUT HITTING UN TROOPS NEARBY O
R
DESTROYING THE AIRPORT, WHICH IS CRITICAL FOR HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE.
8. (S/NF) BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE, RPF-CONTROLLED AREAS REPORTEDLY WERE
DEVOID OF CIVILIANS BECAUSE OF HUTU DISTRUST AND FEAR. THIS HUTU
PERCEPTION OF THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT APPARENTLY IS CHANGING,
BECAUSE DISPLACED PERSONS HAVE BEEN MOVING INTO REBEL TERRITORY. AS
THE RPF MOVES INTO AN AREA, THE MASSACRES STOP.
9. (S/NF) IMPLICATIONS. EVEN IF THE RPF FAILS TO CAPTURE KIGALI, ITS
CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE ALLOWS IT TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF
STRENGTH AT THE INEVITABLE PEACE TALKS. THE INITIAL RPF DEMANDS WILL
BE FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS BEGUN BY THE ARUSHA
ACCORDS, AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING AND PUNISHING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE MASSACRES.
10. (S/NF) THE COUNTRY'S DEEPLY ROOTED ETHNIC ANIMOSITY AND TENUOUS
SECURITY CONDITIONS MAKE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GOVERN BY ITSELF, DESPITE ITS MILITARY VICTORIES.
BEING A MINORITY PARTY MAKES THE RPF DEPENDENT ON COALITION POLITICS
IF IT WANTS TO ADHERE TO ITS STATED POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY.
THE RPF IS MAKING AN EFFORT TO EXPAND ITS P W R BASE AMONG THE HUTUS
OE
AND HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE THE HUTU PERCEPTION THAT IT WILL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD007\MAY94\MSGS\M 1062347.html
Page 3 of 3
MASSACRE THEM. ANY NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HOPING TO REESTABLISH ORDER
AND TO OBTAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES MUST BE
ETHNICALLY BROAD-BASED AND INCLUDE A MAJORITY OF HUTUS.
11. (S/NF) WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF RWANDAN POLITICS, THE
RPF'S ROLE IN A REORGANIZED ARMED FORCES IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC, YET
THIS CRITICAL ISSUE SPARKED THE CURRENT CRISIS AND MUST BE ADDRESSED
IN ANY MEANINGFUL PEACE ACCORD. BECAUSE OF ITS MILITARY DOMINANCE,
THE RPF WILL QUITE NATURALLY EXPECT WIDER REPRESENTATION--ESPECIALLY
IN KEY COMMAND POSITIONS—IN THE NEW RWANDAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.
IN THIS WAY, THE RPF COULD ENSURE ITS SAFETY AND PREEMPT HUTU
PLOTTING. THE MILITARY ISSUE PROBABLY WILL BE THE BIGGEST HURDLE FOR
ACHIEVING A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT TO THE RWANDAN PROBLEM.
DIA/NMJIC, AND DIA/NMIPC RWANDA SUPPORT GROUP,
(b)(3)
DISTS 960-4356
DECL: OADR
BT
#7399
NNNN
SECT
SSN
TOR
SECTION: 01 OF 01
L(b).(3)J
940524033237 M1062347
DIST
SIT: VAX
•
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD007\JUN94\MSGS\Ml 104675.html
Page I of2
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
PRIORITY
SECRET
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS66<30 168 054 3-SSSS--RHEHWSR .
ZNY SSSSS
RUCBLFJ T CG I I MEF
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUEKJCS
162204Z JUN 94
JMD.
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
RWANDA: POSSIBLE HUTU BASTION. (U)
S E C R E T
PASS:
NOFORN
(b)(3)
MIS)-
) ) )
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORTf
-tO.
tUX
I THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
JM2)THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
) ) )
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST 1
(b)(3)
1
SUBJ: RWANDA: POSSIBLE HUTU BASTION. (U)
DOI: 16 JUN 94 (AS OF 1530 EDT)
TEXT: 1. ^ ALTHOUGH TEMPORARILY SLOWED BY LAST WEEK S GOVERNMENT
COUNTERATTACKS, THE REBELS HAVE NOT LOST THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. AS
THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT RESUMES ITS OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH, THE
NORTHWEST COULD WELL BECOME A HUTU ENCLAVE.
2.
GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAR) LAUNCHED A COUNTEROFFENSIVE LAST WEEK
TO REOPEN THE KIGALI-BUJUMBURA HIGHWAY, RECENTLY CUT BY THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF). FAR TROOPS APPARENTLY ATTACKED IN THE NORTH IN
A EFFORT TO RELIEVE THE BESIEGED RUHENGERI GARRISON. THE PRIMARY
ATTACKS TOOK PLACE IN THE VICINITY OF GITARAMA, LOCATED AT KEY
CROSSROADS LINKING THE NORTHWEST WITH THE SOUTH AND WEST. OF THE
SHORT-LIVED COUNTEROFFENSIVE'S TWO THRUSTS, ALONG AN AXIS NORTH TO
KIGALI AND SOUTH TO BUTARE, THE ASSAULT TOWARD BUTARE SEEMED THE
PRINCIPAL EFFORT. ULTIMATELY, THE GUERRILLAS HELD THEIR POSITIONS
AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF HARD FIGHTING.
3.
EARLY THIS WEEK, RPF FORCES ATTACKED ALONG THREE FRONTS,
SURROUNDED GITARAMA, AND CUT OFF GOVERNMENT TROOPS, WHICH
SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW. THEIR TACTIC WAS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND KEPT
REBEL LOSSES TO A MINIMUM. AS THE GUERRILLAS SEIZED GITARAMA, THE
INTERIM GOVERNMENT SHIFTED ITS HEADQUARTERS TO GISENYI, WHICH LIES IN
THE HUTU ETHNIC HEARTLAND IN THE NORTHWEST AND IS THE BIRTHPLACE OF
SLAIN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA.
4. (S/NF) THE RPF WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE MILITARY ADVANCES TO
GAIN POLITICAL LEVERAGE. OVER THE PAST 3 WEEKS, THE RPF REPORTEDLY
HAS STOCKPILED ENOUGH MUNITIONS TO SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS FOR A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD007\JUN94\MSGS\Ml 104675.html
SECT
SSN
TOR
Page 2 of 2
YEAR, AND ABOUT 5,000 REBEL RECRUITS ARE BEING TRAINED IN THE GABIRO
AREA. ALTHOUGH REBEL FORCES SEEM TO BE APPROACHING THE LIMIT OF THEIR
PERSONNEL AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES, THEY HAVE INCREASED THE PRESSURE ON
THE FAR IN THE SOUTH AND IN CENTRAL KIGALI IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE
SYSTEMATIC SLAUGHTER OF CIVILIANS.
5. fS-) COMMENT: THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT MAY BE PREPARING FOR THE FINAL
PHASE OF THE WAR, SINCE IT HAS NO PLACE TO G FROM GISENYI. MANY
O
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD COME
FROM GISENYI, AND GOMA, THE SITE OF ZAIRIAN RESUPPLY OPERATIONS TO
THE FAR, LIES JUST ACROSS THE ZAIRIAN BORDER FROM THE TOWN. THIS N W
E
POSITION IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE HARD-LINE
GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT IS OUT OF THE WAY OF A POSSIBLE RPF DRIVE SOUTH
AND WEST. THE REBELS WOULD GAIN LITTLE BY ATTACKING THIS HARD-LINE
HUTU BASTION, SINCE VIRTUALLY NO TUTSIS ARE LEFT IN THIS REGION.
6. fS-) MOREOVER, THE RPF PROBABLY WILL CONSOLIDATE ITS GAINS QUICKLY
BY REPOSITIONING ITS RESOURCES AS THE FRONT RESUMES ITS DRIVE TO
SEIZE CYANGUGU AND BUTARE, TWO TOWNS THAT CONTAIN LARGE NUMBERS OF
TUTSIS. I F THE RPF SEIZES THESE OBJECTIVES AND ENDS THE GENOCIDAL
KILLING, THE NORTHWEST IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL BECOME A HARD-LINE HUTU
ENCLAVE, GIVING THE GOVERNMENT AT LEAST THREE POLITICAL-MILITARY
OPTIONS: ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CONDUCT A
LOW-LEVEL GUERRILLA INSURGENCY, OR DECLARE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE
SIMILAR TO THAT OF SOMALI LAND. IN ANY CASE, THE RPF MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO IGNORE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND PROBABLY WILL DEMAND THAT THOSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.
~ \ DISTS 981-2491
USA, DIA/NMIPC,
(b)(3)
DECL: OADR
BT
#664 0
NNNN
SECTION: 01 OF 01
umi
940617015559
DIST
SIT: VAX NSC
•
M1104675
�Page 1 of 3
F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD007\JUN94\MSGS\M 1110083.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
PRIORITY
SECRBT
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5311 172065'! -SSSS--RHEHWSR .
ZNY SSSSS
RHFTAAA T 4350SS RHEIN MAIN AB GE
RUCBLFJ T CG I I MEF
RUEKJCS
202340Z JUN 94
JhMl
AIG
AIG
AIG
7031
7033
7034
Mm.
FRANCE-RWANDA:
POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION. (U)
NOFORN SECTION 01 OF 02
S E C R E T
PASS:
(b)(3)
J(b)(3)
) ))
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
JM3L
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
mat
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID:
(b)(3)
SUBJ: FRANCE-RWANDA: POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION. (U
DOI:
20 JUN 94 (AS OF 1800 EDT)
TEXT: 1. (C/NF) PARIS IS FORMALIZING PLANS TO INTERVENE IN RWANDA AND
WILL ACT WITHIN DAYS, THOUGH THE MISSION, TIMING, AND NATURE OF THE
INTERVENTION ARE YET TO BE DETERMINED. LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PLANNED ACTION IS QUESTIONABLE.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
2. (C/NF) FRENCH HISTORY IN RWANDA. RWANDA IS A FORMER BELGIAN
COLONY. UP TO 700 FRENCH TROOPS SERVED THERE FROM OCTOBER 1990 TO
DECEMBER 1993,
AND THE MINORITY TUTSI-LED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
BELIEVES ITS MOVEMENT TO OVERTURN THE HUTU AUTHORITIES IN 1990 WOULD
HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR FRENCH INTERVENTION. THE
FRENCH TRAINED AND ARMED THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES AND HUTU MILITIAS,
AND MITTERRAND'S SON IS ALLEGED BY SOME TO BE STILL INVOLVED IN ARMS
SMUGGLING TO THE HUTUS. MITTERRAND HAD A CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH
MURDERED RWANDAN PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA AND CLAIMS FRANCE
NEVER SUPPORTED ONE TRIBE AGAINST ANOTHER BUT RATHER SUPPORTED
HABYARIMANA. AS LEADER OF THE ETHNIC MAJORITY, HE SEEMED TO THE
FRENCH THE MOST CAPABLE OF APPLYING THE 4 AUGUST 1993
ARUSHA ACCORDS,
WHICH MANDATE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, P W R SHARING AND FRENCH TROOP
OE
WITHDRAWAL. THIS CLAIM OF NEUTRALITY RUNS COUNTER TO REPORTS THAT
FRANCE EVACUATED MEMBERS OF HABYARIMANA'S FAMILY IN MAY 1994 BUT LEFT
BEHIND TUTSI EMPLOYEES--WHO SUBSEQUENTLY DISAPPEARED AND MAY HAVE
BEEN KILLED.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
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3. (C/NF) FRANCE HAS A LONG HISTORY OF RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND ON
MANY OCCASIONS HAS BECOME INVOLVED THERE IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE
MISSIONS. UNRELENTING PRESS COVERAGE OF THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA HAS
HEIGHTENED FRENCH PUBLIC INTEREST IN WHAT PARIS ALREADY REALIZES IS A
CRITICAL TEST OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA. DISTRESSED ABOUT
THE CARNAGE AND LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT,
PARIS ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE INABILITY OF THE NEWLY MANDATED UN
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) I I TO DEPLOY (UNAMIR I I LACKS
FUNDS AND HAS LIMITED EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH THE 50
US-SUPPLIED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS PROJECTED TO BE IN ENTEBBE BY
29 JUNE WILL PROVIDE SOME TRANSPORT CAPABILITY). FOREIGN MINISTER
ALAIN JUPPE ANNOUNCED ON 15 JUNE THAT FRANCE HAS A "GENUINE DUTY TO
INTERVENE" IF THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA CONTINUE, SEEMINGLY
CONTRADICTING AN APRIL STATEMENT IN WHICH HE REMARKED THAT PARIS
COULD NOT BE THE POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD.
4. (C/NF) THE FRENCH SAY THE MISSION WOULD BE STRICTLY
HUMAN ITARIAN--TO EVACUATE TRAPPED CIVILIANS FROM KIGALI AND OTHER
AREAS AND NOT TO OCCUPY TERRITORY OR TARGET SPECIFIC PARTIES--AND
WOULD LAST NO MORE THAN 2 MONTHS. PARIS ORIGINALLY STATED THAT ITS
DECISION WAS CONTINGENT ON FINDING A EUROPEAN PARTNER AND ON UN
APPROVAL, THOUGH NOT CONTROL, OF THE OPERATION. THESE CONDITIONS,
HOWEVER, ARE NOT SET IN STONE. CURRENT COMMITMENTS INCLUDE FRENCH
TROOPS FROM THE RAPID ACTION FORCE'S 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT,
WHICH HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN RWANDA BUT ARE N W STATIONED IN THE
O
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SMALL SENEGALESE AND GHANAIAN CONTINGENTS,
US FUNDS, BRITISH TRUCKS, AND MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES FROM THE UN
OPERATION IN SOMALIA. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE RAPID ACTION FORCE
ARE AVAILABLE, BUT THEIR DEPLOYMENT FROM FRANCE IS UNLIKELY WITHOUT
US ASSISTANCE.
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))>))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
5. (C/NF) RWANDAN RESPONSE. THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)
OPENLY
OPPOSES FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S PAST
LINKS WITH THE HUTU GOVERNMENT, IS SUSPICIOUS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS.
ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, THE RPF MIGHT SUPPORT INTERVENTION WITHIN A
STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN FRAMEWORK. CONVERSELY, IT MAY ATTACK THE FRENCH
RPF LEADERS BELIEVE THE INTERVENTION FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT.
NEVERTHELESS, REBEL FORCES WILL PROBABLY OFFER LITTLE RESISTANCE OUT
OF FEAR OF FRENCH RETALIATION.
6. (C/NF) THE RWANDA MILITARY AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT
COMMENTED DIRECTLY ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY PROBABLY
WILL WELCOME THE OPERATION, VIEWING IT AS A SIGN OF SUPPORT. THE
INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS MET FREQUENTLY WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS
SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN, MOST LIKELY WILL SEEK TO GAIN FRENCH SUPPORT
FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AND TO
COUNTER CHARGES OF GENOCIDE.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
7. (C/NF) OTHER EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS TO HELP HAVE BEEN LIMITED.
DESPITE ITALY'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE PERSONNEL ONLY I F
THERE IS INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS, R M MIGHT D SO TO ENHANCE ITALIAN
OE
O
PRESTIGE AND ITALIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS. BELGIUM AND THE UK ALREADY
HAVE REFUSED TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL. SUCH FACTORS AS EXTENSIVE
WORLDWIDE COMMITMENTS; DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGETS; THE LACK OF SUCCESS
AND HIGH COSTS OF PREVIOUS MISSIONS IN SOMALIA, BOSNIA, AND RWANDA;
AND THE FACT THAT RWANDA IS NOT A DIRECT SECURITY CONCERN MAKE IT
UNLIKELY ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL COMMITMENTS WILL BE MADE BY OTHER
EUROPEAN NATIONS.
8. (C/NF) COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT ANY OTHER EUROPEAN NATION DECIDES
TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL, MITTERRAND FACES INCREASING PRESSURE TO ACT.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Sourcc\Cablcs\CD007\JUN94\MSGS\Ml 110083.html
Page 3 of 3
AFRICAN NAT IONS--MANY WITH WHICH FRANCE HAS SIGNED SECURITY
AGREEMENTS--WILL BE WATCHING TO SEE H W FRANCE RESPONDS TO THE
O
CRISIS. ANYTHING LESS THAN A DECISIVE INTERVENTION TO SAVE THE
CIVILIAN POPULATION WILL BE VIEWED AS EVIDENCE OF DIMINISHED FRENCH
CONCERN FOR THE REGION.
9. (C/NF) MITTERRAND EXPECTS AT LEAST SOME US MEDICAL AND LOGISTIC
SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO US APPEALS IN 1992 FOR
PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA. FRANCE PROBABLY WILL DEPLOY THROUGH GOMA,
ZAIRE, AND CYANGUGU, RWANDA (WHICH BORDERS SOUTHEASTERN ZAIRE). THIS
COULD DEEPEN RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT SUSPICIONS OF FRENCH MOTIVES,
PARTICULARLY AS ZAIRE IS K O N TO BE FUNNELING ARMS TO THE RWANDAN
NW
GOVERNMENT FORCES. BECAUSE TRANSIT THROUGH BURUNDI WOULD ONLY BE
POSSIBLE IF BOTH COMBATANTS IN RWANDA ALLOWED IT, ONLY HUMANITARIAN
SUPPLIES ARE LIKELY TO G THROUGH BUJUMBURA AIRPORT.
O
10. (C/NF) FRENCH CAPABILITIES AND INFLUENCE IN RWANDA SHOULD NOT BE
UNDERESTIMATED. TWO OF THE COMPANIES IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
WERE STATIONED IN RWANDA AS PART OF THE ORIGINAL FRENCH EFFORT FROM
1990 TO 1993. THE LIGHTLY ARMED RWANDAN FACTIONS HAVE LITTLE
CAPABILITY TO STAND UP TO THE FRENCH MILITARILY. PARIS HAS INDICATED
A READINESS TO "FIGHT ITS WAY IN" TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE UN. THE
SECRET
NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF 02
FRENCH OFFENSIVE PROBABLY WILL START WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. KEY TO
A SUCCESSFUL MISSION WILL BE FRANCE'S ABILITY TO CONVINCE THE TUTSIS
THAT THE FRENCH-LED EFFORT WILL BE NONPARTISAN AND WILL NOT INTERFERE
IN THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION EXCEPT AS NECESSARY TO PREVENT
FURTHER MASSACRES.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
11. (S/NF) 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT EQUIPMENT (1)
6 VAB'S WITH 120-MM TOWED MORTARS
12 VAB'S WITH MILANS
62 VAB'S
9 VAB COMMAND POSTS
(1) EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT, ONLY SOME
OF WHICH IS POSITIONED WITH THE FRENCH TROOPS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
(b)(3)
DECL: OADR
BT
#5312
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<' SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
s
SSN:
(b)(3)
TOR: 940621030528 M1110083
<"TOR>940621030529 M1110084
DIST:
SIT: VAX NSC
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 155319.html
Page 1 of 8
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
ROUTINE
SECRET
RAASZYUW RUEAIIA9158 1990705-SSSS--RHEHAAA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 180701Z JUL 94
FM CIA
RUEAIIA
180701Z JUL 94
CIA
RUWMEFA/15AF TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIPGA/3250SS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/4 360SS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUWMEFE/702AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIBBA/9TH AF S A AFB
HW
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHDC/DI
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUCKMEA/CG I I MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND M W
A
RUCBLFA/CGFMFLANT
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN SUITLAND MD
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPNDA/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUQSZIW/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUFRMHA/CTF SIX ONE
RUFRMKA/CTF SIX TWO
RUFRMDA/CTF SIX ZERO
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHDC
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 155319.html
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
RUEANHQ/FAA NATIONAL HQ
RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RUEADWD/HQ DA
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
RHHMMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUDOMJA/NRJOIC KOLSAAS NO
RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
RHHMMCY/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
SUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB I L
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION R O
OM
INPO:
SUBJ:
EUROPEAN BRIEF |
CONTENTS
EO 13526 1.4c
jFOR 18 JULY 1994
TEXT:
EO 13526 1.4c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
H N A V Y WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
1.4c
FOR STATE REP
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFB
ivic
ICOMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
Page 2 of 8
�F:\Cablc\Data Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 155319.html
Page 3 of 8
VA//DCI REP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
ll8 JULY 1994.
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF|
CONTENTS
1 . RWANDA: EXPANDING WAR DEEPENS CRISIS 1.4c
2, EU: SHIFTING ATTENTION TO ASIA
1.4c
3. BALKAN CRISIS
1.4c
4 .HAITI: MILITARY ESCALATING INTIMIDATION
1.4c
5. RUSSIA: DUMA BLOCKS PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
1.4c
6. GREECE: CRUSHING DEBT BURDEN | 1,4
7 .EU: BOOSTING TIES TO LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ESTONIA
1.4c
1. RWANDA: EXPANDING WAR DEEPENS CRISIS | 1,4c |
TROOPS OF THE MOSTLY TUTSI RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT SHELLED G M
OA
AIRPORT IN ZAIRE YESTERDAY, SHUTTING D W THE AIRLIFT OF FOOD AND
ON
OTHER SUPPLIES FOR MORE THAN 1 MILLION RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES,
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. //FIGHTING IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ALONG
THE BORDER, FURTHER DISRUPTING INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE
REFUGEES' SUFFERING.//
— TROOPS LOYAL TO THE RWANDAN HUTU REGIME REPORTEDLY HAVE DEPLOYED
HEAVY WEAPONS IN GOMA. 1.4c
//THE RPF'S THREAT TO INVADE THE FRENCH-PATROLLED HUMANITARIAN SAFE
ZONE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA COULD TRIGGER ANOTHER 2.8 MILLION HUTUS
THERE TO SEEK REFUGE NEAR THE ZAIRIAN TOWN OF BUKAVU--WHERE THE
INADEQUATE AIRPORT AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD MAKE DELIVERING
HUMANITARIAN AID EVEN HARDER THAN AROUND GOMA.// THE RPF SAYS IT
WANTS PARIS TO SURRENDER HUTU REGIME LEADERS, ACCUSED OF
ORCHESTRATING ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE, W O HAVE FLED TO THE FRENCH
H
ZONE.
-- //CONTINUED RPF SHELLING OF GOMA--THE LOGISTIC HUB FOR FRANCE'S
RWANDA OPERATION--WOULD ISOLATE FRENCH TROOPS AND INCREASE THEIR
VULNERABILITY TO RPF ATTACKS.// 1.4c
1.4c
THAT THEY
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF OFFICIALS YESTERDAY TOLD
FEAR A FURTHER FLOW OF REFUGEES INTO ZAIRE WILL BRING A TOTAL
BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE REGION//, PUTTING AID WORKERS,
FRENCH TROOPS, AND OTHER FOREIGNERS AT RISK.// | 1,4c 1
PRESS REPORTS SAY BONN AGREED YESTERDAY TO A UN REQUEST TO FLY
RELIEF SUPPLIES TO ZAIRE FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES BUT LIMITED ITS
PARTICIPATION TO ONE MONTH. A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SPOKESMAN TOLD
THE PRESS THAT THE PROPOSED OPERATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED ON FRIDAY
DURING AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE BUNDESTAG, CALLED TO APPROVE
GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN UN OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA RETROACTIVELY. 1,4c
C
i
2. EU: SHIFTING ATTENTION TO ASIA
1.4c
//GERMANY PROBABLY WILL USE THE ASIA POLICY PAPER THAT THE
COMMISSION RELEASED ON FRIDAY TO PUSH THE USE OF EU RESOURCES TO
EXPAND TRADE RELATIONS WITH ASIA DURING ITS CURRENT EU PRESIDENCY.//
CHANCELLOR KOHL'S EMPHASIS ON ASIA IS POPULAR WITH GERMAN BUSINESS
EXECUTIVES, AND EFFORTS TO CEMENT RELATIONS WITH CHINA LED TO BIG
CONTRACTS FOR GERMAN FIRMS DURING CHINESE PREMIER LI'S RECENT VISIT
REPORTS.// OTHER KEY
TO GERMANY, ACCORDING TO PRESS|_
1.4c
EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE"THRUST OF THE
COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND ALSO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO RAISE
THEIR COUNTRIES' PROFILES IN ASIA.//
-- THE DOCUMENT CALLS FOR MORE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION,
FOR GREATER EFFORTS TO PERSUADE ASIAN GOVERNMENTS TO OPEN THEIR
MARKETS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND FOR AN INCREASED EU PRESENCE IN
ASIA THROUGH BUSINESS COUNCILS IN CHINA, INDOCHINA, AND PAKISTAN AND
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 155319.html
Page 4 of 8
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY CENTERS.
-- THE COMMISSION PAPER SUGGESTS THAT FAILURE TO ADOPT A PROACTIVE
POLICY TOWARD THE REGION WILL HURT EU EXPORTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
AND CREATE PRESSURE IN THE EU FOR GREATER USE OF DEFENSIVE TRADE
MEASURES.
1.4c
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, SUCH AS THE 1991 EAST TIMOR MASSACRE BY
INDONESIAN TROOPS, CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE RELATIONSHIP, AND
PROTESTS OVER THE CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION PLAGUED LI'S GERMAN
VISIT, //BUT TRADE INTERESTS WILL ULTIMATELY TAKE PRECEDENCE AS
S O N BY THE EU'S DISMANTLING OF TIANANMEN-RELATED SANCTIONS.// 1.4c
HW
BOX
DEEPENING CHINESE ECONOMIC TIES TO EUROPE
PREMIER LI SIGNED NEARLY $600 MILLION IN CONTRACTS, LETTERS OF
INTENT, AND AGREEMENTS IN AUSTRIA AND CLOSE TO $4.5 BILLION IN
BUSINESS DOCUMENTS WHILE IN GERMANY, CHINESE PRESS REPORTS SAY;
EO 13526 1.4c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
1 4n
I NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
FOR STATE REPl
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; H TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
Q
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFB
1.4c
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\Ml 155319.html
Page 5 of 8
END BOX
3. BALKAN CRISIS
1.4c
SERBS STILL CALLING FOR REJECTION OF PEACE PLAN
BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC TOLD A MEETING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS ON
SATURDAY THAT SERBS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE TERRITORIAL LOSSES
CONTAINED IN THE CONTACT GROUP'S PLAN AND WERE READY FOR A BLOODY
WAR. BOSNIAN SERB ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT KRAJISNIK SAID THE SERBS ARE
NOT AFRAID OF NATO THREATS. KRAJINA SERB "PRESIDENT" MARTIC,
ADDRESSING THE SAME MEETING, SAID KRAJINA SERBS WERE STANDING BY THE
BOSNIAN SERBS.
-- //MARTIC'S PRESENCE IN BOSNIA STRONGLY MAY BE A HARBINGER OF EVEN
CLOSER POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TRY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS.//
-- //KARADZIC'S FAILURE TO MENTION "CONSTITUTIONAL" SSUES SUGGESTS
THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS HAVE DECIDED AGAINST APPROVING THE PLAN I F
THEY WERE GRANTED THE PROSPECT OF SOME KIND OF INDEPENDENCE.// 1.4c
MEANWHILE, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO LINK THEIR
SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN TO THE PRESERVATION OF BOSNIA'S INTERNATIONAL
BORDERS. | 1,4 |
SUMMIT OF CROATIAN, BOSNIAN, AND TURKISH PRESIDENTS
AT A MEETING ON THE CROATIAN ISLAND OF BRIONI YESTERDAY, CROATIAN
PRESIDENT TUDJMAN, BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, AND TURKISH
PRESIDENT DEMIREL CALLED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTACT
GROUP'S PLAN AND DEMANDED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP TAKE FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLAN'S ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION. I F THE
SERBS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE PLAN, THEY URGED THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT FUTURE
AGGRESSION AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE FOR THOSE W O HAVE
H
BEEN SUBJECTED TO AGGRESSION.
1.4c
FIGHTING PICKS UP
GOVERNMENT FORCES ATTACKED UN TROOPS NEAR VISOKO IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
WITH MACHINE-GUN FIRE AND ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES LATE ON FRIDAY
AND SATURDAYF
1.4c
| O CASUALTIES WERE
N
REPORTED, BUT THE UN TROOPS WITHDREW FROM THEIR OBSERVATION POST. ON
SATURDAY, BOSNIAN SERB TROOPS SHELLED TUZLA AIRFIELD, WHI (H IS UNDER
UN CONTROL. ACCORDING TO PRESSl
1.4c
I ONE SHELL
LANDED ON THE RUNWAY AND UN ENGINEERS ARE ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF
THE DAMAGE.
1.4c
UN MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT THAT FIGHTING BETWEEN BOSNIAN SERB AND
GOVERNMENT TROOPS INCREASED IN THE BIHAC ENCLAVE AND IN THE NORTHERN
CORRIDOR REGION OVER THE WEEKEND, ACCORDING TO PRESSl
1.4c
C
-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO EXCHANGED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE ON
SATURDAY NEAR GRADACAC, RIBNICA, AND THE AREA EAST OF TUZLA.
ALTHOUGH NO MAJOR OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED, BOTH SIDES ARE
CONTINUING LOW-LEVEL ATTACKS AS THE DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
CONTACT GROUP'S PLAN APPROACHES.
1.4c
BOSNIAN SERBS RAID UN WEAPONS SITE
BOSNIAN SERB TROOPS TRIED TO RECLAIM FOUR T-55 TANKS ON SATURDAY
FROM A UN-MONITORED WEAPONS COLLECTION POINT NEAR SARAJEVO,
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. ONE TANK LEFT THE FACILITY BUT RETURNED
WITHIN THE HOUR.
1.4c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\JUL94\MSGS\M 1155319.html
Page 6 of 8
FOR STATE REP
NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
1.4c
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFE
1 4c
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22 D HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
;
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
1.4c
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF OCPAS EUR 94/165 FOR IB JULY 1994.
-- THERE WERE TWO SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE PAST WEEK. IN ONE, THE
SERBS REMOVED A TANK AND ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN FROM ONE SITE.
1.4c
AMERICAS
4. HAITI: MILITARY ESCALATING INTIMIDATION | 1.4c
THE CLERGY AND DIPLOMATS WHOSE GOVERNMENTS REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE
DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE CAMPAIGN.
-- LAST WEEK TROOPS ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH CANADIAN AND FRENCH
DIPLOMATIC POUCHESj
1.4c
I
THE HEAD OF
AIRPORT SECURITY SAID THAT DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY NO LONGER APPLIED
SINCE FOREIGN MISSIONS D NOT RECOGNIZE THE JONASSANT REGIME.
O
ONE MILITARY COMMANDER ORDERED THE
1.4c
SEIZURE OF SHORTWAVE RECEIVERS FROM AT LEAST THREE CHURCHES.
AUTHORITIES ALSO TRIED TO ARREST A PRIEST IN DESSALINE, WHO NARROWLY
ESCAPED.
--I
i.4c
ITHE MILITARY HAS INCREASED ROADBLOCKS
IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. I 1.4c I
//MILITARY AUTHORITIES MAY TRY TO CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
HUMANITARIAN FUEL SHIPMENT ARRIVING TODAY AND POSSIBLY WITHHOLD A
PORTION FOR THEMSELVES.// //THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE REGIME WILL
EXPEL SOME DIPLOMATS IS ALSO INCREASING.// | 1.4c I
EURASIA
5. RUSSIA: DUMA BLOCKS PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM | 1.4c |
BY AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN, THE LEGISLATURE HAS SENT BACK TO
COMMITTEE THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL TO SELL STOCK IN ENTERPRISES FOR
CASH RATHER THAN THE VOUCHERS USED PREVIOUSLY, ACCORDING TO PRESS
REPORTS. OPPONENTS SAID THE LEGISLATION WOULD OPEN THE DOOR FOR
FOREIGNERS AND CRIMINAL ELEMENTS TO GAIN CONTROLLING INTEREST IN
RUSSIA'S MOST IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES. DUMA CHAIRMAN RYBKIN
SAYS THE COMMITTEE MAY BE ABLE TO SUBMIT AN AMENDED PROPOSAL LATER
THIS WEEK.
-- I F THE DEPUTIES FAIL TO ACT QUICKLY OR I F THEY ATTACH BURDENSOME
PROVISIONS SUCH AS ALLOWING WORKERS TO BUY SHARES CHEAPLY O
R
EXEMPTING ATTRACTIVE ENERGY OR DEFENSE FIRMS, PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST
YEL'TSIN WOULD INITIATE THE PROGRAM BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE //WHICH
COULD EXACERBATE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE TENSION.//
1.4c
EUROPE
6. GREECE: CRUSHING DEBT BURDEN
1.4c
I
EO 13526 1.4c
1 ECONOMICS MINISTER PAPANTONIOU WILL SEEK
MEETINGS WITH US OFFICIALS DURING BRETTON W O S CEREMONIES IN
OD
WASHINGTON THIS WEEK IN AN EFFORT TO REFUTE WIDESPREAD PRESS AND IMF
A
N
D
f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 7 of 8
CRITICISM THAT ATHENS IS DOING LITTLE TO ADDRESS ITS HUGE FISCAL
IMBALANCES. AT ABOUT 150 PERCENT OF GDP, GREECE'S GOVERNMENT DEBT IS
THE HIGHEST IN THE OECD.
-- BECAUSE OF THE HIGH INTEREST RATES RESULTING FROM YEARS OF
DOUBLE-DIGIT INFLATION, ATHENS THIS YEAR WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE AN
EXTRAORDINARY 17 PERCENT OF GDP AND ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL
GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR INTEREST SERVICING, ACCORDING TO DEPUTY
FINANCE MINISTER KYRIAZIDIS.
-- THE PUBLIC-SECTOR DEFICIT WILL ALSO BE ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF GDP
THIS YEAR. FINANCING REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ESPECIALLY HIGH THROUGH
NEXT MONTH, W E ATHENS WILL HAVE TO BORROW FUNDS EQUAL TO 12
HN
PERCENT OF GDP. | 1.4c
//BECAUSE IT FACES LOCAL ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER, PRIME MINISTER
PAPANDREOU'S GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE DEBT AND
DEFICIT PROBLEM. REDUCED SPENDING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE OR GOVERNMENT
SALARIES WOULD ALIENATE MANY VOTERS, AND TO BOOST TAX REVENUE IS
DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF INEFFICIENT TAX COLLECTION AND THE HUGE
UNDERGROUND ECONOMY.//
1.4c
7. EU: BOOSTING TIES TO LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ESTONIA
1.4c
THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL SIGN FREE TRADE ACCORDS WITH THE BALTIC
REPUBLICS EARLY THIS WEEK. THE TREATIES WILL TAKE EFFECT NEXT YEAR,
BUT LATVIA AND LITHUANIA WILL HAVE FOUR AND SIX YEARS, RESPECTIVELY,
1.4c
PRESS
TO PHASE IN THE PROVISIONS
REPORTS. SEPARATE AGREEMENTS GRANT CONCESSIONS IN AREAS THE EU
CONSIDERS SENSITIVE, SUCH AS TEXTILES, AGRICULTURE, AND FISHING, AND
PROVIDE SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR GOODS FROM NEWLY ESTABLISHED COMPANIES
IN THE BALTIC STATES.
-- //THE ACCORDS PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EU TO BEGIN TALKS--PROBABLY
NEXT YEAR--ON ASSOCIATE STATUS FOR THE BALTIC STATES.//
1.4c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
I NAVY W R COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
A
FOR STATE REP
JAc_
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFB
1.4c
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; H DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
Q
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
BT
#9161
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Page 8 of 8
�I
1.4c
Intelligence Report
Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology
28 July 1994
Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Activity in Humanitarian Relief Zone
Although volcanic events are difficult to predict, American and Japanese
volcanologists analyzing recent seismic events in Nord-Kivu, Zaire, judge that there
is a solid basis for concern that a damaging eruption--with both ash plumes and lava
flow-could occur there in the near term. 1.4c
A series of events indicate that the Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira volcanoes, 20
kilometers north of Goma, have become more active in recent weeks and may
present a threat to residents and refugees in the area. Both volcanoes have been
active frequently in this century.
EO 13526 1.4c
Ash plumes extending to 100 meters above the western slope of the
Nyamulagira volcano-connected by subsurface channels to Nyiragongo-were
also reported recently by a relief worker. Japanese seismologists report data
indicating ground swelling that could lead to a larger explosive ash plume.
1.4c
A major outflow of lava from Nyirangongo could occur with only minutes of
warning
EO 13526 1.4c
The last major eruption there took place in January 1977 when a lake of
molten lava-that had been smoldering in the crater for half a century-burst
through the mountain's north and south flanks through at leastfivefissures
simultaneously, according to Japanese seismologists. The resultant flow
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
8
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY****
�Secret
1.4c
moved rapidly-over 50 km per hour-and covered the countryside in the
south for a distance of 10 km from the base of the mountain; some farmers
were killed.
• The magma that feed both volcanoes is unusually fluid
EO 13526 1.4c
Although there is a sparse seismic network operated by Zairian and Japanese
seismologists, the data is not radioed to a central facility in real-time, and
cannot provide warning of the increased activity that generally precedes
volcanic events. 1.4c
Refugee camps at the base of the Nyirogongo volcano are partially on the site of the
1977 lava fields, according to American and Japanese volcanologists. Nevertheless,
because the regional cluster of volcanoes that includes Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira
have subterranean interconnections, lava could emerge from any of manyfissuresin
the region. 1.4c
In the meantime, ash plumes from the volcanoes could threaten aircraft
delivering relief supplies.
• In 1991, a South African aircraft lost two of its four engines when it flew
through an undetected ash plume from these volcanoes.
• If ash plumes occur, estimated wind speeds and directions for the next two
days suggest that aircraft flying above 5,500 meters and to the east of the
volcano would be vulnerable, f i~4c
Secret
�EO 13526 1.4c
�Rwanda: Refugee Situation Worsening
tllif
UGANDA
Entebbe
ZTOKHonNtere
ZAIRE
Rutshuru
1.2 MILUON REFUGEES
IN CAMP AREA
FRENCH DESIGNATED SAFEHAVEN
..Kamanyola
RPF CONTROLED AREA
j
800,000 REFUGEES NEAR
BORDER REGION
%
REFUGEE CONCENTRATION
REFUGEE FLOW
mmmmm
1
Uvira
76 Kilom«t«r8
iiilBi
Cuilfldeiitlal | EO 13526 3.5c
UP TO 200,000 REFUGEES
IN NORTHERN BURUNDI
20 KHoRMtors
PREPARED 21 JULY 94
DECLASSIFIED
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY PER E.0.13526
�AFRICA
ZAIRE: UN spokesman reports government troops expelled 200 Rwandan refugees from camps near Goma
yesterday and are preparing to expel 1,000 refugees today, according to press...refugees taken to Rwandan
border yesterday and released despite UNHCR appeal to Kinshasa to halt expulsions. |
EO 13526 1.4c
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
HAITI: U.S. Coast Guard and Bahamian Defense Force yesterday interdicted 406 Haitian migrants,
including five reported dead, from 80 foot vessel near Nassau...migrants transported to Nassau...largest
interdiction since return of President Aristide.
EO 13526 1.4c
TOP SEGRETl EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Page 2
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
3.5c
NOCONTRACT
3.5c
WNINTEL
4 August
1994
ZAIRE: Weapons, Location, and Capabilities of the Former
Rwandan Army 3.5c
Background. In late July, some 10,000 soldiers of the
Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army (FAR) and another 10,000 Hutu
militiamen crossed into Zaire along with some 1.7 million
Rwandan refugees. The suddenness of the Rwandan exodus and
Zaire's porous and poorly monitored border allowed a large
number of these soldiers to enter Zaire with their weapons.
While some of these arms--especially larger crew serviced
weaponshave been confiscated by Zairian authorities, we
believe that a number of small arms remain in FAR hands and
that the heavier weapons may not be secure. I 3.5c 1
EO 13526 1 4
.c
I. *
O
2. Who controls thesg weapons? We judge that troops
from the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) probably control these
depots, although we have no specific reporting to confirm
this.
o
6
There has been no reported FAR presence in the area
100 km north of Goma where the FAZ military camp i s
located.
o
In addition, FAR forces are reportedly camped several
km away from the other two depots on the outskirts of
Goma and Bukavu.
3.5c
3. In our view, Zairian President Mobutu and his
senior military commanders in Kinshasa probably exert l i c t l e
control over confiscated FAR weapons, which local commanders
SECRET
3.5c
NOCONTRACT
3.5c
WWINTEL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�SECRET
3 5 NOCONTRACT
.c
3 5 WNINTDL
.c
and i n d i v i d u a l FAZ s o l d i e r s are probably tempted t o s e l l to
survive, especially smaller, portable weapons.
o The 2,000-2,500 Z a i r i a n troops i n Kivu-- including as
many as 1,000 of Mobutu's r e l a t i v e l y more r e l i a b l e
security forces--are stretched t h i n , lack rudimentary
m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , and s u f f e r severe economic
hardship.
35
.c
4. Can Mobutu gain control of the heavy weapons?
Mobutu is anxious to gamer additional Western goodwill and
he would likely respond favorably to a Western request that
he confiscate and dispose of heavy FAR weapons. Mobutu
likely would have to deploy additional units of his more
reliable security units to the Kivu area along with a number
of senior officers to gain control of the weapons, however.
He would prpbably request that the West pay the salaries and
logistical;: fees associated with such a deployment to ensure ..
troop discipline. .Once in his control, Mobutu would likely,^
be willing to tum the weapons over to Western hands, but he
probably would demand some diplomatic or financial quid jpro
quo.
35
.c
5. How much are the confiscated FAR weapons worth? W
e
estimate that the FAR's helicopters and armored cars could
probably fetch several hundred thousand d o l l a r s on t h ^ gray
arms market, depending on t h e i r condition. The a r t i l l e r y
and mortar pieces could also be worth a few hundred thousand
dollars, f 35
.c
6. What weapons do the FAR forces i n Zaire have? I n
both Goma and Bukavu, we judge that there may be 5,000 t o
7,000 armed FAR troops who pose a s e c u r i t y threat to US
forces and Western r e l i e f workers, and who--although t h e i r
ammunition i s i n short supply--threaten t o r e s t a r t
h o s t i l i t i e s inside Rwanda.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
In Goma, there are numerous reports that as many as
5,000 FAR troops may be anr.ad. The defense attache
reported e a r l i e r t h i s week that he observed FAR troops
i n company and b a t t a l i o n size formations i n t h e i r camps
northwest of Goma. FAR forces had a 37 m a n t i m
a i r r r a f L gun, as well as numerous buses, 2.5 ten •
trucks, and two command jeeps. Most of tne F R senior
A
leadership i s reportedly i n Goma.
SECRET
35
.c
tTQrrtatrrn.ftrT
3.5c
T.TVTT V T T P P T
f 1 A* ^ 1 1 A X7Z9
�SECRET
35
.c
NOCONTRACT
35
.c
WNINTEL
FAR f o r c e s may have access t o a d d i t i o n a l weapons i n
Z a i r e . A cache of FAR e x p l o s i v e s was discovered near
Bukavu l a s t week and t h e a t t a c h e r e p o r t s t h a t p i l e s o f
c o n f i s c a t e d weapons remain unguarded i n Goma. 1 EO 13526 3 5
.c
EO 13526 1 4
.c
CECRET
35
.c
NOCONTRAgF
35
.c
WNINTEL
�Page 1 of 2
F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\Ml 197425.html
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CONFIDENTIAL
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9631 2230526-CCCC--RHEHWSR.
ZNY CCCCC
RUCBLFJ T CG I I MEF
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUEKJCS
102303Z AUG 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
(b)(3)INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
BURUNDI: RENEWED ETHNIC VIOLENCE. (U)
r******-Jr ++* ++++
* INCOMPLETE MESSAGE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
C O N F I D E N T I A L
PASS:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
ib).(3L
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
)) )
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) (b)(3) |
SUBJ: BURUNDI: RENEWED ETHNIC VIOLENCE. (U)
DOI:
10 AUG 94 (AS OF 1900 EDT)
TEXT: 1. (€4 THE BREAKDOWN OF TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
OPPOSITION PARTIES HAS LED TO DEMONSTRATIONS BY TUTSI STUDENTS AND
OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES THAT SHUT D W BUJUMBURA ON 8 AND 9
ON
AUGUST. MOREOVER, THE SECURITY SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE DETERIORATED
ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY AS ETHNIC VIOLENCE HAS INCREASED. THESE
DEVELOPMENTS WORSEN AN ALREADY FRAGILE POLITICAL SITUATION THAT
ULTIMATELY COULD LEAD TO A LARGE-SCALE EXODUS OF REFUGEES.
2. ffr) TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT
STALLED ON 28 JULY OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF SEVERAL HARD-LINE HUTUS TO
HEAD THE REORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. THIS
BREAKDOWN IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS SPARKED THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN
BUJUMBURA, AS PROTESTERS SOUGHT TO CLOSE D W THE CAPITAL. STUDENTS
ON
W O HAS GATHERED AT KEY POINTS IN THE CITY MENACED PASSERSBY AND
H
TRIED TO PREVENT WORKERS FROM GOING TO W R BY THROWING STONES AT
OK
THEM. WHEN SECURITY FORCES INTERVENED TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS,
THE UNREST LED TO A NEARLY COMPLETE SHUTDOWN OF THE CITY.
3. fG-) ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS
DETERIORATED, ESPECIALLY IN SEVERAL NORTHERN PROVINCES. CLASHES
BETWEEN THE ARMY AND ARMED GANGS HAVE INCREASED, AS HAVE REPORTS OF
EXTREMIST HUTU GROUPS ATTACKING BURUNDIAN AND RWANDAN TUTSIS.
MOREOVER, RWANDAN HUTUS REPORTEDLY ARE BEING KILLED BY AN
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cablc\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\Ml 197425.html
Page 2 of 2
UNIDENTIFIED UNIFORMED GROUP--EITHER TUTSI RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY OR
BURUNDI ARMY TROOPS. THIS RISE IN VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY IS LINKED TO
THE SLOW PACE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROCESS, AN UPSURGE IN
HUTU EXTREMISM, AND THE ARMY'S POSSIBLE INTENT TO S O RWANDAN HUTUS
HW
THAT THEY ARE NOT WELCOME IN BURUNDI.
4. H^) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH BURUNDI IS INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE, A REPLAY
OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR--WITH ITS GENOCIDE AND COLLAPSE OF THE
GOVERNMENT--IS UNLIKELY. SEVERAL KEY DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES. IN BURUNDI, THE TUTSIS CONTROL THE MILITARY, WHILE THE
HUTUS CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT--A FRAGILE SHARING OF P W R THAT
OE
ENCOURAGES COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RIVAL ETHNIC GROUPS. IN ADDITION,
NEITHER THE HUTU GOVERNMENT NOR THE TUTSI MILITARY IS PURSUING A
POLICY OF GENOCIDE, AS WAS DONE BY THE FORMER HUTU LEADERSHIP IN
RWANDA. MODERATES IN P W R IN BURUNDI ARE COUNTERING RADICALS ON BOTH
OE
SIDES, THEREBY AVOIDING A DISASTER SIMILAR TO THAT IN RWANDA.
MOREOVER, INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE REGION'S PROBLEMS DISCOURAGES
EXTREMISTS FROM PROMOTING WIDESPREAD ETHNIC CONFLICT.
5. f&) BURUNDI'S CURRENT SITUATION HAS AT LEAST THREE POSSIBLE
OUTCOMES' THE MOST LIKELY ONE IS THE CONTINUED SLOW ESCALATION OF
ETHNIC VIOLENCE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND
BURUNDIAN REFUGEES FLEEING TO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. SUCH AN EXODUS
WOULD FURTHER STRAIN REGIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS.
6. kGJ ANOTHER POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS FOR THE SITUATION TO REMAIN
UNCHANGED, WITH THE HUTUS RETAINING CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
TUTSIS, THE MILITARY. EVEN IN THIS SCENARIO, USE OF FORCE BY THE
MILITARY WOULD LIKELY CREATE REFUGEES, BUT ON A SMALLER SCALE,
PERHAPS IN THE TENS OF THOUSANDS. THIS REFUGEE FLOW ALSO WOULD
OVERTAX THE HIGHLY STRESSED REGIONAL RELIEF EFFORT.
7. f&) THE LEAST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD SEE THE TUTSI-LED ARMY
RETURNING TO P W R IN A SUCCESSFUL COUP. THIS SCENARIO PROBABLY WOULD
OE
RESULT FROM THE MILITARY'S INABILITY TO CONTAIN ESCALATING VIOLENCE
BECAUSE OF MORE BROAD-BASED AND SUBSTANTIAL ARMED OPPOSITION. THIS
COUP WOULD, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, BE LED BY JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE
JOINED TUTSI EXTREMISTS IN THE ARMY AND WHO HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED
WITH THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THIS SCENARIO PROBABLY WOULD
RESULT IN THOUSANDS BEING KILLED--MOSTLY HUTUS--AND CAUSE ALMOST 1
MILLION REFUGEES TO ESCAPE TO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, POSSIBLY CREATING
ANOTHER REGIONAL REFUGEE DISASTER SIMILAR TO THAT EXPERIENCED BY
RWANDA.
(b)(3)
SECT
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BT
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940811014108 M1197425
DIST
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•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET EO 13526 1.4<:
Central Intdligpnce Agpncy
Vteshli^on.D.C.20S0S
15 August 1994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Activity Endangers Refugees
1. The potential of a major eruption continues to threaten refugee and local
EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d
populations located in the shadow of two active volcanoes. US
volcanologists analyzing recent volcanic events—including ash and steam plumes, lava
flows, and tremors—are concerned that these events are precursors to a major eruption.
1.4c
2. According to seismic data, the most recent volcanic events began on 23 June
with an eruption in the central cone of Nyiragongo crater followed by a small lava flow
from the northwestern flank of Nyamulagira on 4 July. Since then, the volcanoesconnected by subsurface channels—have emitted ash and steam plumes on several
occasions. On 8 August tremors were felt in the Goma area, and two days later lava
flowed from a fissure on the southern slope of Nyiragongo, according to eyewitnesses.
Various satellite systems continue to detect thermal signatures, indicating molten lava.
1.4c
3. Several refugee sites are within a few kilometers of lavafieldsformed by earlier
activity. Those near the flows from the 1977 eruption are in greatest jeopardy,
according to| EO 13526 1.4c, l .4d |experts. Relief workers are unlikely to receive
much warning if a major flow occurs, because of the unusual liquidity of the lava from
both volcanoes. I TAC
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY SECRET'EQ 13526
1.4c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Ac
EO 13526 1.4c
LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�;'."].. ,[ • ,
11$ iBmmmsims im ixm m
ity in Refugee Area
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
l
J
M U K - s u r f ' f f ? r . M - - ! ; r , ; i . , 1 « i r f l i i i i f , , ™ * - : ; ^ ! Ii '* iiii f .""fli. JS,;
/
1
�TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
13 August 1994
EO 13526 1.4c
RWANDA:
New Exodus Under Way
Thousands of Rwandan Hutus in the French-protected
humanitarian zone may be moving west on foot and by car on
the road toward Zaire, according to press reports. 1.4c
1.4c say these people are headed toward Bukavu, an area
crammed with more than 300,000 refugees.
- French military officers told relief officials that some
600 refugees per hour were reaching an area 20 km west
of Gikongoro yesterday, 80 km from the Zairian border,
press reports say.
EO 13526 1.4c
The flow may be the beginning of a larger, catastrophic
migration into Zaire of up to 3 million people, spurred by fear
of Tutsi reprisals after the impending withdrawal of French
forces by 22 August.
- Press reports say that those fleeing are some of the nearly
2 million residents of the zone, but the more than 1
million displaced people also in the area—including
500,000 around Gikongoro alone-had not begun
leaving their camps.
The sight of thousands leaving is likely to panic others into
joining the migration. Some 14,000 Tutsis sheltered at a
poorly protected camp at Cyangugu could be at risk if a tide of
Hutus sweeps through the area. Another large influx would^
overwhelm the already strained relief capabilities in Zaire.
1.4c
1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Wednesday
no new volcanic activity since
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Press reports say the UN relief agency is making contingency
plans to evacuate people.
- The 1977, lava flow stopped approximately 100 meters
from Kibumba, the region's largest refugee site. The
road from Goma to Kibumba and Katale also traverses
the 1977 lava fields." EO 13526 1.4c
___________
TOP SECRET
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213551 .html
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RUCIPGA/3250SS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
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RHFIAAA/7220SS/IN
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RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
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RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
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RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUWDCAA/CG I MEF
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A
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RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEAUSA/CNGB WASHINGTON DC
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON D
C
RUEPNDA/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RHCGSRA/COMUSARGENT FT MCPER
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUCIBBA/COMUSCENTAF S A AFB
HW
RUDOIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 1 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213551 .html
Page 2 of 5
RUHGSNN/CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT SEVEN
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERVWASHDC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQ
RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB
RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RUEADWD/HQ DA
RUETITH/HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
RHHMMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUFTWSA/JTF PROVIDE COMFORT
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDOIDE/MSA RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMPOSP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
RUYNJYF/NAVSCITECHGRUFE YOKOSUKA JA
RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS P
M
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB I L
RULYVGA/USCOMSOLANT
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION R O
OM
INFO:
SUBJ:
MIDDLE EAST BRIEF
CONTENTS
EO 13526 3.5c
22 AUGUST 1994
TEXT:
EO 13526 3.5c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN
3.5c
MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT
COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS;
BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR
INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD
FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
���F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213551 .html
Page 5 of 5
SUPPORTERS OF THE 16-MONTH-OLD ELECTED GOVERNMENT REPLACED BY A
PALACE COUP LAST WEEK HAVE CALLED A GENERAL STRIKE TODAY. THE
SECURITY FORCES ARE SUPPORTING THE COUP, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT
APPEARS TO BE CONSOLIDATING" POWER.
[THE SECURITY FORCES MAY USE THE
EO 13526 1.4c
PROTESTS TO JUSTIFY A VIOLENT CRACKDOWN AGAINST ITS OPPONENTS.
-- THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS APPEALED FOR INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT AND CALLED ON SOUTH AFRICA TO CLOSE ITS BORDER WITH LESOTHO,
IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE OPPOSING THE COUPl
I^C
I
I 35 I
.c
DV
R W 22 AUGUST 2014 .
BT
#6313
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
A
DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: NSC SUM SUM2 VAX
•
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M1213567.html
Page 1 of 8
Cable
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: SECRET
LIKE!: RAASZYUW RUEAIIA6318 2340604-SSSS--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
LINE3: R 220602Z AUG 94
LINE4 : FM CIA
OSRI: RUEAIIA
DTG: 220602Z AUG 94
ORIG: CIA
TO: RUWMEFA/15AF TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIPGA/32SOSS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/4 360SS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUWMEFE/702AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIBBA/9TH AF S A AFB
HW
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHDC/DI
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUCKMEA/CG I I MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND M W
A
RUCKMAB/CGFMFLANT
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPNDA/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUDOIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUFRMHA/CTF SIX ONE
RUFRMKA/CTF SIX TWO
RUFRMDA/CTF SIX ZERO
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHDC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213567.html
Page 2 of 8
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQ
RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RUEADWD/HQ DA
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
RHHMMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
RHHMMCY/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS P
M
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB I L
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION R O
OM
INFO: ****
SUBJ:
EUROPEAN BRIEF
CONTENTS
EO 13526 3.5c
22 AUGUST 1994
TEXT:
EO 13526 3.5c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
FOR STATE REP|
3,5c
I NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFBl
| COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB COTTNTtL/1 NOVINA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
VA//DC I REP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213567.html
Page 3 of 8
3.5c
22 AUGUST 1994.
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF |
3.5c
CONTENTS
1. BALKAN CRISIS [ 3.5
2, RWANDA: EXODUS CONTINUES
3.5c
3. RUSSIA: TIGHTENING THE VISE AROUND CHECHENIA
3.5c
4 . UKRAINE: KUCHMA TO PUSH FOR NPT ACCESSION JL5c_
E
5. UZBEKISTAN: N W FOREIGN MINISTER LATEST IN SHAKEUPS
35 I
.c
6. BOSNIA: LEVELING THE BATTLEFIELD | 3,5c
1 . BALKAN CRISIS | 3,5c |
THOUSANDS FLEE VELIKA KLADUSA
AS MANY AS 20,000 REFUGEES FROM THE CITY HAVE FLED INTO KRAJINA
SERB-CONTROLLED TERRITORY OVER THE WEEKEND, ACCORDING TO UN
SPOKESMEN. THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL NOT ALLOW
THE REFUGEES TO ENTER ITS TERRITORY AND HAS ALLOWED ONLY 50 ETHNIC
CROATS TO CROSS CHECKPOINTS, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS. SOME 2,000
TO 3,000 REFUGEES ARE REPORTEDLY TRAPPED IN A NO MAN'S LAND BETWEEN
KRAJINA SERB AND CROATIAN GOVERNMENT LINES NEAR KARLOVAC; OTHERS ARE
CONGREGATED AT VOJNIC, STARO SELO, AND TOPUSKO.
-- UN OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE REFUGEES SHOULD RETURN TO BOSNIA
AND ARE NOT PRESSING CROATIA TO ACCEPT THEM, ACCORDING TO PRESS
REPORTS. MEANWHILE, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE CALLED FOR THE
REFUGEES' RETURN, PROMISING THAT THEY WILL NOT BE HARMED.
-- //THE REFUGEES--MOST OF W O ARE MUSLIM--WILL LIKELY RETURN
HM
W E THEY LEARN THAT FIGHTING AROUND THE CITY HAS CEASED AND THAT
HN
THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE TREATING INHABITANTS FAIRLY.// I 3 5 I
.C
C
FIGHTING ELSEWHERE
ACCORDING TO BELGRADE RADIO, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES RESUMED
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON SATURDAY MAKING STRONG PUSHES IN THE BRCKO
AREA, TESLIC AREA, AND THE BRGULE SALIENT. SARAJEVO RADIO CONFIRMED
THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE ADVANCING TOWARD TESLIC. BOSNIAN
GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY SHELLED DOBOJ ON SATURDAY, ACCORDING TO
PRESS REPORTS.
3.5c
SITUATION IN SARAJEVO
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AND SERB FORCES CONTINUE TO FIRE HEAVY WEAPONS
INSIDE THE SARAJEVO HEAVY-WEAPON EXCLUSION ZONE, ACCORDING TO A UN
SPOKESMAN.
-- LATE FRIDAY NIGHT, BOSNIAN SERB FORCES ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER
A 122-MM ARTILLERY WEAPON FROM THE POLJINE WEAPONS COLLECTION SITE
IN THE EXCLUSION ZONE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS.
-- INCREASED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE WERE REPORTED IN THE
FO 13526 1 4c
G V . N F N FORCES. ACCORDING TO A UN SPOKESMAN.
OFRM.T
EO 13526 1.4c
BOSNIAN, KRAJINA SERBS PROPOSE UNIFIED SERB STATE
BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC AND KRAJINA SERB PRESIDENT MARTIC
SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION IN KNIN ON SATURDAY, CALLING FOR A
UNIFIED SERB STATE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. KARADZIC SAID THAT A
SERB STATE IN THE BALKANS WOULD BE A STABILIZING FACTOR AND THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO ENGAGE IN A COSTLY WAR AGAINST
THE SERBS I F IT DID NOT ACCEPT THE STATE.
-- MARTIC CAUTIONED THAT UNIFYING WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD
NOT BE REALISTIC AT THE MOMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE CROATIA AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR AGGRESSION TOWARD SERB-HELD REGIONS. | 3,5c |
SERBIAN OFFICIAL TO VISIT M S O
OCW
SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER MARJANOVIC IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT M S O EARLY
OCW
THIS WEEK AND REPORTEDLY WILL MEET WITH RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213567.html
Page 4 of 8
CHERNOMYRDIN, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS.
3.5c 1
MACEDONIA BORDER INCIDENT
A MACEDONIAN ARMY PATROL KILLED A SERBIAN SMUGGLER ON 20 AUGUST,
APPROXIMATELY 80 TO 100 METERS INSIDE THE MACEDONIAN BORDER,
ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC REPORTING. THE MACEDONIAN MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE SAYS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME A MACEDONIAN SOLDIER HAD
KILLED A SERB AND THAT IT EXPECTS SOME KIND OF SERB REACTION TO THE
INCIDENT WITHIN 48 HOURS. 3.5c
2. RWANDA: EXODUS CONTINUES | 3,5c
KINSHASA OPENED THE RUZIZI-II BRIDGE YESTERDAY AFTER NEGOTIATIONS
WITH UN OFFICIALS OVER THE CLOSURE OF THE FOOT BRIDGE AT BUKAVU.
SOME 25,000 REFUGEES REACHED BUKAVU OVER THE WEEKEND, AND TENS OF
3.5c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
I NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
FOR STATE REP
3.5c
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT A F B [
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
3.5c
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
3.5c
EO 13526 1.4c
THOUSANDS CONTINUE TO STREAM TOWARD THE BORDER
1.4c
-- OF THE MORE THAN 300,000 HUTU REFUGEES ALREADY IN THE BUKAVU
AREA, ABOUT A THIRD--CONCENTRATED IN BUKAVU TOWN--ARE COMING D W
ON
WITH DYSENTERY, AND ANOTHER 50,000 REQUIRE RELIEF ASSISTANCE.
MEANWHILE, 35,000 IN 12 REFUGEE CAMPS ARE BEING AIDED, AND ANOTHER
115,000 HUTUS HAVE EITHER FRIENDS OR MONEY TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. 3.5c
//RELIEF AGENCIES SAY THEY CAN HANDLE THE CURRENT FLOW OF REFUGEES,
BUT THE EXHAUSTED AND MALNOURISHED CONDITION OF NEW ARRIVALS, MADE
WORSE BY DYSENTERY AND RAINS, IS LIKELY TO STRAIN THEIR
RESOURCES.//
-- EVEN RECENT VISITS BY RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT MINISTERS TO
THE FRENCH-PROTECTED ZONE IN WHICH THE MINISTERS VOWED TO PUNISH
HUTUS GUILTY OF GENOCIDE, FAILED TO PERSUADE HUTUS TO REMAIN,
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M 1213567.html
Page 5 of 8
FEARING ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN NEIGHBORING BURUNDI, U SECRETARY GENERAL
N
BOUTROS-GHALI HAS PROPOSED THAT U PEACEKEEPERS BE SENT TO ZAIRE,
N
READY TO INTERVENE. POWER-SHARING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE HUTU-LED
.GOVERNMENT AND TUTSI OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE MAKING LITTLE PROGRESS
WITH THE TUTSIS RECENTLY DEMANDING CONTROL OF A FOUR-YEAR INTERIM
GOVERNMENT.
-- O SATURDAY, A HARDLINE HUTU POLITICIAN FROM THE RULING
N
PARTY W S ASSASSINATED.
A
EO 13526 1.4c
//THE COMBINATION OF THE APPROACHING DEADLINE FOR INSTALLING A N W
E
PRESIDENT BY FRIDAY AND BOUTROS-GHALI'S PROPOSAL MAY PUSH EXTREMISTS
ON EITHER SIDE TO PREEMPT A POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT.// 3.5c
3. RUSSIA: TIGHTENING THE VISE AROUND CHECHENIA
3.5c I
M S O HAS TOUGHENED ITS POLICY TOWARD SECESSIONIST CHECHEN REPUBLIC
OCW
PRESIDENT DUDAYEV SINCE LATE LAST MONTH BY DECLARING ITS SUPPORT FOR
A N W RIVAL GOVERNMENT IN CHECHENIA, K O N AS THE PROVISIONAL
E
NW
COUNCIL, AND BY STEPPING UP MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE
INTRVENTION. THE CHANGE CAME AFTER THE FAILURE OF RUSSIAN EFFORTS
TO NEGOTIATE A POWER-SHARING TREATY WITH DUDAYEV'S REGIME AND AFTER
A BLOODY HIJACKING BY CHECHENS--THE FOURTH IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN
THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS--IN WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, DUDAYEV REFUSED
TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES.
-- ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT YEL'TSIN HAS PUBLICLY DISAVOWED THE USE
OF FORCE TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, M S O HAS TWICE PUBLICLY RESERVED
OCW
THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS CITIZENS THERE, HAS MADE EXTENSIVE MILITARY
PREPARATION IN THE REGION, AND HAS RECENTLY IMPOSED AN AIR BLOCKADE
OF THE REPUBLIC.
-- ACCORDING TO RUSSIAN PRESS REPORTS, M S O HAS SENT ARMS AND
OCW
AT LEAST 2 BILLION RUBLES TO THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL, BASED IN THE
NADTERECHNYY REGION OF CHECHENIA, IN THE HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL
BE ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC AS A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT. IT
FAVORS CHECHEN AUTONOMY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. I 3.5c I
DESPITE M S O ' SUPPORT, THE COUNCIL HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO UNITE THE
OCWS
VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS, MOST OF WHICH SHARE DUDAYEV'S
FORMER
SECESSIONIST SENTIMENTS
EO 13526 1.4c
RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN KHASBULATOV, AN ETHNIC CHECHEN, HAS
BEEN CRITICAL OF THE COUNCIL, IS INDEPENDENTLY TRYING TO RALLY
OPPOSITION GROUPS, AND HAS CALLED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
3.5c
//THE PRESSURE O M S O TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS
N OCW
CONSIDERABLE.// RESPONDENTS TO RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND
EDITORIAL WRITERS HAVE STRONGLY OPPOSED THE USE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY
FORCE IN CHECHENIA.
-- //REGIONAL LEADERS IN RUSSIA'S NORTH CAUCASUS ARE CONCERNED
THAT FULL-SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD ENABLE DUDAYEV TO RALLY
POLITICAL EXTREMISTS ACROSS THE REGION, WHICH IS A POTENTIAL
TINDERBOX BECAUSE OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENT IN THE POPULACE.//
-- //NEVERTHELESS, RUSSIA MIGHT INTERVENE IN ANY OF SEVERAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, MOST NOTABLY AN ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DUDAYEV,
W O IS MOBILIZING FORCES, AND THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL.//
H
3.5c
BOX
3.5c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD008\AUG94\MSGS\M1213567.html
Page 6 of 8
FOR STATE REP|
3.5c
I NAVY W R COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
A
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFBl
3.5C I COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
JL5c_
OPTIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE WOULD LET IT PURSUE ANY OF
THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION BUT D NOT POINT TO A PARTICULAR
O
OPTION; OTHER OPTIONS MAY ALSO BE UNDER CONSIDERATION, j 3,5c |
//SUPPORTING AN INSURRECTION.// M S O COULD CHOOSE TO MINIMIZE ITS
OCW
CASUALTIES BY ARMING AND PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
PROVISIONAL COUNCIL FORCES WITHOUT ANY DIRECT RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT DUDAYEV. RUSSIAN
RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY AND COMMAND POST AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITY
RECENTLY OBSERVED IN THE MOZDOK AREA, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE ARMS
DELIVERY TO CHECHEN OPPOSITION FORCES BY A RUSSIAN HELICOPTER,
SUPPORT THIS SCENARIO.
3.5c
//LIMITED INVOLVEMENT--THE ABKHAZIA SCENARIO.// M S O COULD SUPPORT
OCW
AN INSURRECTION AGAINST DUDAYEV AND ENGAGE IN LIMITED MILITARY O
R
COVERT ACTIVITY AGAINST CHECHEN GOVERNMENT FORCES, INCLUDING
ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS AND AIRSTRIKES DIRECTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS, GARRISONS, AND AIRFIELDS. MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE
SUGGEST THAT THIS OPTION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON RELATIVELY SHORT
NOTICE. 3.5c
//MASSIVE INTERVENTION.// AFTER MAKING ADDITIONAL PREPARATIONS,
M S O COULD INTERVENE MASSIVELY TO DESTROY THE CHECHEN ARMED FORCES
OCW
AND OCCUPY CHECHENIA BY LAUNCHING A COMBINED-ARMS OFFENSIVE,
SUPPORTED BY OVERWHELMING AIRPOWER. RUSSIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY TROOPS
ALSO WOULD BE USED TO KEEP TIGHT CONTROL OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.
RUSSIAN FORCES CARRIED OUT A SIMILAR OPERATION IN NORTH OSSETIA IN
1992, WHEN THEY INTERVENED TO STOP FIGHTING BETWEEN ETHNIC INGUSH
AND NORTH OSSETIANS. MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE SUGGEST THAT
RUSSIAN FORCES NEED AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE DAYS OF PREPARATION BEFORE
THEY COULD CARRY OUT THIS OPTION. 3.5c
END BOX
EURASIA
4. UKRAINE: KUCHMA TO PUSH FOR NPT ACCESSION | 3.5c I
PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAS TOLD THE UKRAINIAN PRESS THAT HE WILL RAISE THE
ISSUE OF ACCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WITH THE
LEGISLATURE IN OCTOBER AND THAT HE EXPECTS THE LEGISLATURE WILL
APPROVE THE MEASURE. KUCHMA REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE BELIEVES NPT
ACCESSION WOULD HASTEN WESTERN AID TO UKRAINE; //HE ALMOST CERTAINLY
WANTS TO ACHIEVE ACCESSION BEFORE HE VISITS WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER
TO PRESS HIS CASE FOR THE DELIVERY OF PROMISED AID.//
-- //HE MAY, HOWEVER, BE OVERESTIMATING HIS SUPPORT. KUCHMA AND
LEFTISTS IN THE LEGISLATURE ARE LIKELY TO CLASH ON SUCH ISSUES AS
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Page 7 of 8
ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE DIVISION OF POWERS NEXT MONTH.// MOST
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS HAVE BEEN AMBIVALENT ON ACCESSION,// AND THE
BODY MAY USE THE NPT ISSUE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EMBARRASS KUCHMA AND
ASSERT ITS INDEPENDENCE.//
-- //A COALITION BETWEEN THE LEFTISTS AND UKRAINIAN
NATIONALISTS--WHO OPPOSE DENUCLEARIZATION--COULD MUSTER ENOUGH VOTES
TO BLOCK ACCESSION, BUT KUCHMA MAY COMPROMISE ON SOME OTHER ISSUES
TO SWAY LEFTIST DEPUTIES.// | 35c
5. UZBEKISTAN: N W FOREIGN MINISTER LATEST IN SHAKEUPS 3.5c
E
PRESIDENT KARIMOV ON THURSDAY PROMOTED FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ABDULAZIZ KAMILOV TO FOREIGN MINISTER. KAMILOV WAS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE BETWEEN 1992 AND 1994 AND IS AT
LEAST THE THIRD NSS OFFICIAL TO BE PROMOTED SINCE JUNE TO A SENIOR
POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT OR PRESIDENTIAL APPARATUS. HE ALSO HAS
SERVED IN SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA.
EO 13526 1.4c
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
6. BOSNIA: LEVELING THE BATTLEFIELD
3.5c
IF THE ARMS EMBARGO IS LIFTED, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES PROBABLY
WILL REQUIRE SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR TO INTEGRATE N W EQUIPMENT, TRAIN
E
PERSONNEL, CONSTRUCT A SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEVELOP AN
ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN ORDER TO "LEVEL THE
BATTLEFIELD." THEY ALSO WOULD NEED AT LEAST THE TACIT COOPERATION OF
CROATIA, WHICH CONTROLS ALL FEASIBLE LAND ROUTES INTO BOSNIA BUT
WHICH DISTRUSTS THE SARAJEVO GOVERNMENT DESPITE THE FEDERATION
AGREEMENT.
3.5c
PRINCIPAL NEEDS
BOSNIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN
ORGANIZING, TRAINING, AND CONTROLLING THEIR FORCES IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS. THEY STILL FACE A 6-TO-l DEFICIT IN ARTILLERY AND A 20-TO-l
DEFICIT IN TANKS.
-- THEY HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF INTERNAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION,
HOWEVER, AND THEIR STRONG MORALE PROBABLY MEANS THAT THE ADDITION OF
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
FOR STATE REP
3.5c
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
HW
PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFfif
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
3.5c
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
STEWART.
3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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A RELATIVELY MODEST AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO REACH
ROUGH MILITARY PARITY WITH THE SERBS. | 3.5 |
EQUIPMENT TO ARM SIX TO 10 BRIGADES--SOME 15,000 TO 25,000 TROOPS,
OR ABOUT A QUARTER OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT MANPOWER--PROBABLY WOULD
GIVE THE GOVERNMENT A FORCE SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS
ON ONE OR TWO FRONTS. SUCH A FORCE WOULD NEED 120 TO 200 TANKS, 60
TO 100 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, 200 TO 350 HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES
AND MORTARS MORE THAN 100 MM, AND 35 TO 40 MULTIPLE ROCKET
LAUNCHERS.
-- IN ADDITION, IT WOULD REQUIRE ROUGHLY 2,000 TRUCKS,
SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNICATIONS GEAR, AND A STEADY SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION,
FUEL, AND SPARE PARTS.
C
EO 13526 1.4d
TRAINING AND SUPPORT
TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT
FORCES WOULD NEED EXTENSIVE TRAINING. ASSIMILATION WOULD BE EASIER
IF THE EQUIPMENT WERE OF RUSSIAN DESIGN, LIKE THE MAJORITY OF THEIR
CURRENT EQUIPMENT.
-- THE MUSLIM AND CROAT FEDERATION AGREEMENT PROVIDES A
RELATIVELY SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THIS TRAINING.
-- OUTSIDE AIR SUPPORT, HOWEVER, PROBABLY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
DETER THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM LAUNCHING A MAJOR OFFENSIVE INTENDED TO
PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT FROM MAKING USE OF ITS N W WEAPONS.
E
35 I
.c
DV
R W 22 AUGUST 2014.
BT
#6321
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
<"SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
<' SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
s
DIST:
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.X
L:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
PRIORITY
SECR&F
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS1622 2441723-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
RUCBLFJ T CG I I MEF
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUEKJCS
010054Z SEP 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE SIX
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE EIGHT
RHJAAFA/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE ENTEBBE UG
RUSNJTF/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE MOEHRINGEN GE
(b)(3)
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
BURUNDI:
S E C R E T
PASS: 1
ON THE EDGE. (U)
NOFORN SECTION 01 OF 02
(b)(3)
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
(b)(3)
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
(b)(3)
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
SERIAL: [
(b)(3)
SUBJ: BURUNDI: ON THE EDGE. (U)
DOI:
1 SEP 94
)) )
KEY JUDGMENTS
1. (S/NF) A FRAGILE BALANCE OF P W R EXISTS IN BURUNDI, WHERE THE
OE
MAJORITY HUTU TRIBE CONTROLS THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE MINORITY TUTSI
TRIBE CONTROLS THE MILITARY.
2. fS/NF) TENSIONS WILL PERSIST WHILE THE TWO GROUPS NEGOTIATE FUTURE
POWER- SHARING ARRANGEMENTS AND AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TRIES TO
MAINTAIN THE PEACE.
3. (-S/NF) THE HUTUS, WHO WON THE COUNTRY'S FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION
(1993), HAVE ELEVATED POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS; I F THWARTED, THEY MIGHT
RESORT TO ESCALATING VIOLENCE.
4. (-S/NF) THE TUTSIS, W O FEEL THEIR SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON CONTROLLING
H
THE ARMY, WILL RESIST SHARING MILITARY POWER; I F THREATENED, THEY TOO
MIGHT RESORT TO INCREASING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE.
5. (-S/NF) THIS VOLATILE SITUATION COULD ERUPT INTO WIDESPREAD
VIOLENCE RESULTING IN THOUSANDS (OF MAINLY HUTU) DEATHS; HOWEVER, A
CIVIL WAR LIKE RWANDA'S IS UNLIKELY.
6. fg/NF) REGARDLESS OF BURUNDI'S INTERNAL P W R STRUGGLE, THE TUTSI
OE
MILITARY WILL INCREASINGLY SEEK CLOSER TIES WITH THEIR TUTSI BRETHREN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 2 of 4
IN RWANDA. EVENTUALLY, A FORMAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS
SEEMS INEVITABLE.
) ) )
DISCUSSION
) ) )
7. f&) BACKGROUND. BURUNDI'S POPULATION IS COMPRISED OF TWO MAJOR
ETHNIC GROUPS - THE HUTUS (WHO MAKE UP 85 PERCENT) AND THE TUTSIS
(WHO MAKE UP 15 PERCENT). BEFORE COLONIZATION, THESE TWO GROUPS
FORMED SEPARATE CASTES, BUT WEALTH RATHER THAN ETHNICITY WAS THE
DEFINING FEATURE. THE WEALTHY OF EITHER GROUP CAME TO BE CALLED
TUTSIS, AND THOSE DEPENDENT ON OTHERS WERE CALLED HUTUS, EVEN THOUGH
THESE ARE TWO COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS SHARING A C M O
OMN
LANGUAGE. THE ARRIVAL OF THE EUROPEAN COLONIALISTS, HOWEVER, LED TO
FURTHER DIVISIONS. THE BELGIANS, AND LATER THE GERMANS, USED THE
TERMS "TUTSI" AND "HUTU" TO D A ETHNIC DISTINCTIONS. MOREOVER, THEY
RW
RULED THROUGH THE TUTSIS, WHILE KEEPING THE HUTUS IN A FEUDAL STATE.
THE TUTSIS WERE ALSO GIVEN FAVORABLE ACCESS TO EDUCATION, JOBS, AND
PROPERTY. THIS HIERARCHY WAS EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE BURUNDIANS,
W O BEGAN TO SEE THEMSELVES IN TERMS OF "NATURAL" MASTERS AND SERFS.
H
8. fG} AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1962, BURUNDI'S FIRST GOVERNMENTS WERE
ETHNICALLY MIXED. BUT FROM 1965, THE TUTSIS WIELDED INCREASING
CONTROL, AND BY MID-1972, THEIR DOMINANCE WAS ABSOLUTE. BURUNDI'S
TUTSIS, HOWEVER, WERE HAUNTED BY THE SPECTER OF NEIGHBORING RWANDA,
WHERE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS WERE KILLED, 100,000 WERE PUSHED
INTO EXILE, AND THE REMAINDER WERE EXCLUDED FROM POLITICS WHEN THE
MONARCHY WAS OVERTHROWN 3Y THE HUTUS IN 1959. (RWANDA SHARES
BURUNDI'S 85 PERCENT HUTU, 15 PERCENT TUTSI COMPOSITION.) MANY TUTSIS
IN BURUNDI, THEREFORE, TOOK HARSH ACTIONS AGAINST HUTUS, PARTICULARLY
EDUCATED HUTUS, TO ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT SUFFER THE SAME FATE.
9. fG-) LARGE-SCALE MASSACRES OF HUTUS OCCURRED IN BURUNDI IN 1965,
1969, 1972, 1988, 1991, AND 1993, WHEN THE TUTSIS BECAME FEARFUL FOR
THEIR CONTINUED SAFETY AS MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY. THESE PERIODIC
MASSACRES SERVED TO DEEPLY ENTRENCH THE SUBJUGATION OF THE HUTUS.
10. f&) REFORMIST PRESIDENT PIERRE BUYOYA (1987-1993) BROUGHT
BURUNDIANS MODEST CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION OF ETHNIC RECONCILIATION
AND PREPARED THE WAY FOR BURUNDI'S FIRST-EVER MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS
ON 1 JUNE, 1993. THE INCUMBENT MINORITY TUTSI PARTY, THE PARTY OF
NATIONAL PROGRESS (UPRONA), WAS ROUNDLY DEFEATED BY THE HUTU FRONT
FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURUNDI (FRODEBU). THOUGH BUYOYA ACCEPTED HIS
DEFEAT, AND THE TUTS I-DOMINATED ARMY FOLLOWED SUIT, MANY HUTUS FEARED
SABOTAGE BY TUTSIS IN KEY POSITIONS OR AN ARMY COUP THE MOMENT THE
N W GOVERNMENT DISTURBED ENTRENCHED TUTSI INTERESTS.
E
11.
A MILITARY COUP ATTEMPT IN OCTOBER 1993 RESULTED IN THE DEATH
OF BURUNDI'S FIRST HUTU PRESIDENT, MELCHIOR NDADAYE, AND ONCE AGAIN
GAVE RISE TO ETHNIC MASSACRES. THE TUTSI ARMY, HOWEVER, SUCCUMBED TO
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AND RETURNED THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT TO HUTU
CIVILIANS. THEIR CENSURE MADE THE TUTSIS REALIZE THAT A COMPLETE
TAKEOVER BY MILITARY MEANS WOULD NEVER BE REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE BY
THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THIS REALIZATION WAS CRUCIAL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE TENUOUS BALANCE OF P W R THAT IS CURRENTLY HOLDING BURUNDI'S
OE
ETHNIC HATREDS AT BAY.
12. f&) TRANSITION CRISIS. THE VIOLENCE ABATED IN BURUNDI, AND THE
REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE HUTU GOVERNMENT APPOINTED CYPRIEN
NTARYAMIRA, A HUTU, AS INTERIM PRESIDENT. NTARYAMIRA, HOWEVER, WAS
KILLED IN THE MYSTERIOUS DOWNING OF THE RWANDAN PRESIDENT'S PLANE ON
6 APRIL, (WHICH SPARKED THE RENEWAL OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR).
SYLVESTRE NTIBANTUNGANYA, ANOTHER HUTU, WAS SELECTED AS INTERIM
PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE NTARYAMIRA'S EFFORTS TO BRING ETHNIC
CLiNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 3 of 4
POWERSHARING TO BURUNDI. HE WAS ONLY INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT, HOWEVER,
AFTER THE HUTUS AGREED TO A NUMBER OF TUTSI DEMANDS, INCLUDING
ALLOCATING 40 PERCENT OF CABINET POSITIONS TO THE TUTSI MINORITY.
13. (U) BURUNDI'S POLITICAL PARTIES.
- FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURUNDI (FRODEBU)--THE RULING HUTU PARTY
WITH A MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT.
- NATIONAL PARTY FOR UNITY AND PROGRESS (UPRONA)--THE LARGEST, MOST
MODERATE TUTSI OPPOSITION GROUP.
- THE PARTY FOR NATIONAL REDRESS (PARENA)--NEW TUTSI HARD-LINE PARTY
LIKELY TO D A SUPPORT FROM SMALLER HARD-LINE TUTSI PARTIES.
RW
14. f€-) AS THEY DID AFTER NTARYAMIRA'S DEATH, THE TUTSIS ARE AGAIN
USING THEIR OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THEIR DOMINANCE OF THE MILITARY TO
FORCE THE HUTUS TO MAKE POLITICAL CONCESSIONS BEFORE THE TUTSIS WILL
ALLOW HUTUS TO SEAT A N W PRESIDENT. IN JULY THE TWO SIDES MADE
E
PROGRESS, SIGNING AGREEMENTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY, PROVINCIAL AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS, DISARMAMENT, AND THE TREATMENT OF
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS. BUT NEGOTIATIONS STALLED IN LATE JULY
OVER THE NOMINATION OF TWO HARD-LINE HUTU OFFICIALS. THE TUTSIS WERE
EVENTUALLY ABLE TO FORCE THE HUTUS TO WITHDRAW THOSE NOMINATIONS, AND
TALKS HAVE SINCE RESUMED.
SECRET
NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF 02
15. (U) TUTSI DEMANDS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION DEBATE.
- SHARING OF POSTS BETWEEN FRODEBU AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
INTELLIGENCE, POLICE, PROVINCIAL AND COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATION, AND THE
FOREIGN SERVICE.
- REDISTRIBUTION OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS EQUALLY BETWEEN
HUTUS AND TUTSIS.
- SUSPENSION OF LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS IMPLICATED IN LAST
FALL'S ETHNIC BLOODLETTING AND IN ARMING HUTU CIVILIANS.
- RENUNCIATION OF PLANS FOR A 1,100-MAN HUTU-DOMINATED PRESIDENTIAL
GUARD.
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A RIGOROUS SCHEDULE FOR THE DISARMAMENT OF
CIVILIANS.
- GIVING OPPOSITION PARTIES EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RADIO AND TELEVISION.
16. fei THE TUTSIS CONTINUE TO FEAR BEING STRIPPED OF THEIR ABILITY
TO DEFEND AGAINST HUTU REPRISALS FOR PAST ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION. IN
THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, THE TUTSIS STRIVE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF
THE ARMY, WHICH THEY BELIEVE HAS THUS FAR SPARED THEM FROM GENOCIDE.
AT THE SAME TIME, HUTU TOLERANCE FOR BEING DISCRIMINATED AGAINST HAS
ENDED. THE HUTUS WANT REAL P W R AND HAVE GREATLY ELEVATED
OE
EXPECTATIONS SINCE THE ELECTION OF A HUTU PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY IN 1993. A PERCEIVED OBSTRUCTION OF THESE GOALS COULD
PROVOKE HUTUS TO VIOLENCE. THE TRANSFER OF POWER, HOWEVER, CANNOT
THREATEN TUTSI PREROGATIVE TOO GREATLY NOR TOO QUICKLY IF THE TENUOUS
PEACE IS TO HOLD.
17. fe-) BURUNDI'S N W AND INSECURE HUTU LEADERSHIP IS VERY COGNIZANT
E
OF THE TUTSIS' POWER, AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO ALLAY TUTSI FEARS.
JOCKEYING FOR POSITION AND SLOW PROGRESS, THEREFORE, CONTINUES TO
CHARACTERIZE THE TRANSITION IN BURUNDI.
) ) )
OUTLOOK
) ) )
18. (S/NF) THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI IS VOLATILE AND COULD RESULT IN
THOUSANDS OF MAINLY HUTU DEATHS, HOWEVER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A CIVIL
W R LIKE RWANDA'S WILL BREAK OUT IN BURUNDI. IN RWANDA, THE HUTUS
A
CONTROLLED THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY; IN BURUNDI, THE TUTSIS
CONTROL THE MILITARY, CREATING A FRAGILE BALANCE OF POWER. THE HUTU
LEADERSHIP HERE IS ALSO FAR MORE MODERATE THAN IT WAS IN RWANDA.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1231675.html
SECT:
WHILE HUTU LEADERS IN RWANDA, IN P W R SINCE INDEPENDENCE, ACTIVELY
OE
PROMOTED GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSIS, THE HUTU LEADERS IN BURUNDI
K O THAT THEIR SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON ASSUAGING TUTSI FEARS. FURTHER,
NW
TUTSI LEADERS IN THE ARMY ALSO N W FAVOR A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN A
O
MILITARY, SOLUTION TO BURUNDI'S PROBLEMS, HAVING REALIZED AFTER LAST
OCTOBER'S COUP ATTEMPT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT
ABIDE A MILITARY TAKEOVER. THE TUTSI ARMY EVEN BACKED THE FLEDGLING
HUTU GOVERNMENT AGAINST AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY ROGUE MILITARY ELEMENTS
IN APRIL. MOREOVER, THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH SIDES HAVE WITNESSED THE
HORROR WROUGHT BY HUTU-TUTSI VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, AND THEY ARE
INCREASINGLY WILLING TO PURSUE MODERATION TO PREVENT SUCH CARNAGE IN
BURUNDI. FINALLY, THE HEIGHTENED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION BEING PAID
TO THE REGION, AND TO HUTU-TUTSI ETHNIC RIVALRY IN PARTICULAR, WILL
ENCOURAGE EACH SIDE TO KEEP EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN CHECK.
19. (S/NF) THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR BURUNDI INVOLVING A RENEWAL
OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE WOULD BE FOR THE MILITARY TO CONDUCT A COUP IN
RESPONSE TO A HEIGHTENED PERCEIVED THREAT TO TUTSI SECURITY UNDER THE
HUTU REGIME. WERE A COUP TO OCCUR, THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE HUTU
ATTACKS AGAINST TUTSIS, ESPECIALLY TARGETING ELEMENTS OF THE
MILITARY. THESE ATTACKS WOULD BE MET BY YET ANOTHER TUTSI ARMY
MASSACRE OF HUTUS, PROBABLY KILLING THOUSANDS. PROGRESS TOWARD
INTEGRATION WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE, WITH A SIMILAR POWER- BALANCE TO
THE PRESENT ONE EVENTUALLY EMERGING. THE HUTUS, HAVING ONCE TAKEN
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, WILL NOT
SUBMIT TO A RETURN TO TUTSI DOMINATION FOR LONG, AND ANY REVERSIONS
TO TUTSI RULE WILL BE MET WITH INCREASING FORCE ON THE PART OF THE
HUTU '
20. (S/NF) ALTHOUGH THIS CONFLICT IS PLAYING OUT IN BURUNDI, IT SEEMS
INEVITABLE THAT ELEMENTS OF BURUNDI'S TUTSI MILITARY WILL
INCREASINGLY START REACHING OUT TO THEIR TUTSI BRETHREN IN THE RWANDA
GOVERNMENT. SUCH CONTACTS WILL INITIALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED QUIETLY,
PERHAPS EVOLVING INTO MORE OPEN COOPERATION AS TUTSI SELF-CONFIDENCE
IN BOTH COUNTRIES INCREASES. THESE DEVELOPING BONDS WILL STRENGTHEN
THE TUTSI REGIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND WILL REINFORCE TUTSI CONTROL OF
THE MILITARY IN BOTH STATES. EVENTUALLY--PERHAPS NOT SOON, BUT
CERTAINLY WITHIN A YEAR--SOME SORT OF FORMAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE
TUTSIS OF BURUNDI AND THOSE IN RWANDA SEEMS INEVITABLE, AND THE
CHANCE FOR THIS ALLIANCE FORMING WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY
A TUTSI COUP IN BURUNDI THAT WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE HUTU P W R AND
OE
AUTHORITY.
RWANDA WORKING GROUP,
(b)(3)
DECL: OADR
BT
#1623
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SECTION: 01 OF 02
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PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LIbfE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
ROUTINE
SECRET
RAASZYUW RUEAIIA0855 2580652-SSSS--RHEHAAA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 150644Z SEP 94
FM CIA
RUEAIIA
150644Z SEP 94
CIA
RUVHTRA/15AF TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCUDFI/319ARW GRAND FORKS AFB ND/IN
RUCIPGA/3250SS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/4 360SS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUVMBSA/50SS MINOT AFB ND/IN/
RUVHTRA/615AMOG TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RHFIAAA/7220SS/IN
RUCIBBA/9TH AF S A AFB
HW
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RUCIBBA/AFOSI DIST 21 OL-C S
RUETITH/AFOSI DIST 69 ANKARA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUWDCAA/CG I MEF
RUCKMEA/CG I I MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND M W
A
RUCKMAB/CGFMFLANT
RUETITH/CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEAUSA/CNGB WASHINGTON D
C
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPNDA/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1253452.html
RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RHCGSRA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPER
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUCIBBA/COMUSCENTAF S A AFB
HW
RUDOIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUHGSNN/CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT SEVEN
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHDC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL H
Q
RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB
RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RUEADWD/HQ DA
RUETITH/HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
RHHMMCY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUFTWSA/JTF PROVIDE COMFORT
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDOIDE/MSA RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMPOSP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
RUYNJYF/NAVSCITECHGRUFE YOKOSUKA JA
RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS P
M
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB I L
RULYVGA/USCOMSOLANT
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN N W YORK
E
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION R O
OM
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
////
MIDDLE EAST BRIEF
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
15 SEPTEMBER 1994.
Page 2 of 7
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Page 3 of 7
EO 13526 3.5c
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
I
3.5c
I NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN
MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT
COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS;
BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR
INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD
FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN/7; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO
CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; I L FOR CDRUSAITAC
WASHDC FOR GIPD; 2 4 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 2 6AD LUKE AFB
ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON
HW
GA//; COMUSCENTAF S A AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON
HW
CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN;
CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE
COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFBj
3ST" I CHJUSMMAT
ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; H TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR
Q
KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU;
H DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD
Q
INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS
CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.
3.5c
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF
15 SEPTEMBER 1994.
3.5c
CONTENTS
1. SOMALIA: A DANGEROUS UN WITHDRAWAL j 3.5c |
2. RWANDA: RPF ASSERTING CONTROL OVER SAFE ZONE | 3.5c I
3. CONGO: ETHNIC UNREST ERUPTS IN CAPITAL [~ 3.5 |
C
4. LESOTHO: ELECTED GOVERNMENT RESTORED
3.5c
5. ISRAEL: MODEST ANTI-INFLATION PACKAGE UNVEILED | 3.5c
DEVELOPMENTS
1. SOMALIA: A DANGEROUS UN WITHDRAWAL
3.5c
THE UN AND ITS FORCE IN SOMALIA APPEAR INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT
THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT A SAFE AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL.[I
THE UN FORCE IN SOMALIA IS NOT YET ENGAGED IN
EO 13526 1.4c
SERIOUS PLANNING FOR AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL. THE ONLY TWO
KNOWLEDGEABLE WITHDRAWAL PLANNERS IN THE FORCE REPORTEDLY INTEND TO
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1253452.html
Page 4 of 7
LEAVE SOMALIA NEXT MONTH.
--// SOMALI GUNMEN AND MILITIA ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF A DISORGANIZED WITHDRAWAL TO INTENSIFY ATTACKS ON UN TROOPS AND
LOOT THEIR EQUIPMENT AND COULD INCITE A CHAOTIC SCRAMBLE TO LEAVE BY
INDIVIDUAL TROOP CONTINGENTS.// 3.5c
SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL UN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE KEY INDIAN
AND PAKISTANI CONTINGENTS, ARE ALREADY PREPARING THEIR O N
W
WITHDRAWAL PLANS //IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID BEING STRANDED.// //SOME
OF THEIR PLANNING APPEARS AT ODDS WITH THE RUDIMENTARY UN PLAN.//
-- PAKISTAN MAY HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS ROUGHLY 7,000
THE UN
TROOPS BY YEAREND
EO 13526 1.4c
REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN COUNTING ON PAKISTAN'S TROOPS, WHICH HAVE MOST
OF THE UN FORCE'S ARMOR AND ITS US-SUPPLIED COBRA HELICOPTER
GUNSHIPS, TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OTHER CONTINGENTS.
-- INDIA ALSO HAS PREPARED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A UNILATERAL
WITHDRAWAL I
EO 13526 1.4c
//THE DEPARTURE OF INDIAN TROOPS FROM
1.4c
THE "COUNTRYSIDE, WHETHER UNILATERALLY O WITH THE REST OF THE UN
R
FORCE, WOULD AT LEAST TEMPORARILY END THE UN'S ONCE-AMBITIOUS EFFORT
TO SECURE THE FLOW OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE INTERIOR.//
3.5c
SOMALI GUNMEN ALREADY ARE ATTACKING UN TROOPS AS THEY VACATE
GARRISONS I N THE INTERIOR. LAST FRIDAY, AS MANY AS 200 MILITIA
ATTACKED A CONTINGENT OF ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS I N BALAD, JUST 30 KM
NORTH OF MOGADISHU, I N AN EFFORT TO CAPTURE UN ARMS, AMMUNITION,
ITHE ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS AND
EQUIPMENT!
EQ 13526 1 4
.c
AND
PAKISTANI-MANNED HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS WERE ABLE TO DRIVE OFF THE
ATTACKING SOMALIS. | 3,5 |
C
CURRENT NOTES
AFRICA
2. RWANDA: RPF ASSERTING CONTROL OVER SAFE ZONE
EO 13526 1.4c
3.5c
UN OFFICIALS SAY THAT ABOUT
1,000 RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS HAVE ENTERED THE UN-MONITORED
SAFE ZONE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA IN THE PAST F W DAYS, AFTER
E
REFUSING TO STOP AT UN CHECKPOINTS. //THE ARRIVAL OF THE RPF, WHICH
IS APPARENTLY ASSERTING ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA,
HAS NOT PROVOKED A HUTU EXODUS, BUT A CRACKDOWN ON CIVILIANS
COULD.//
-- RPF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH
DELAYS IN INVESTIGATING HUTUS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE,
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS PUBLICLY
WARNED THAT TUTSI SURVIVORS CAN NO LONGER CONTROL THEIR DESIRE FOR
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1253452.html
REVENGE.
Page 5 of?
3.5c
EXPATRIATES N W QUESTION THE UN'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN
O
THE ZONE|
EO 13526 1.4c
|
AID WORKER WAS
KILLED ONLY 300 METERS FROM A UN HEADQUARTERS ON 30 AUGUST. UN
TROOPS REPORTEDLY ARE DISARMING INDIVIDUAL HUTUS THEY ENCOUNTER IN
THE SAFE ZONE //BUT PROBABLY WILL AVOID ENGAGING EITHER RPF TROOPS
OR THE 4,500 HUTU FIGHTERS W O REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE AREA.// I 3 5
H
A
S
A
N
C
AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
I
3.5c
I NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN
MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT
COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS;
BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR
INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD
FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO
CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; I L FOR CDRUSAITAC
WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING H W R AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB
OAD
ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ;
INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB S A SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON
HW
GA//; COMUSCENTAF S A AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON
HW
CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN;
CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE
COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT A F ^
CHJUSMMAT
3.5c
ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR
KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; H AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU;
Q
HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD
INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS
CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.
3.5c
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF
15 SEPTEMBER 1994.
3.5c
3. CONGO: ETHNIC UNREST ERUPTS IN CAPITAL
3.5
C
UNPAID MILITIA FROM PRESIDENT LISSOUBA'S
EO 13526 1.4c
ETHNIC GROUP LOOTED STORES, KILLING TWO CIVILIANS, AND BLOCKED ROADS
TUESDAY IN BRAZZAVILLE, AN AREA THAT PREVIOUSLY HAS BEEN FREE FROM
ETHNIC UNREST AND IS H M TO MOST OF THE WESTERNERS IN THE COUNTRY.
OE
LISSOUBA REPORTEDLY HAS PROMISED TO DEPLOY 6,000 POLICE TO GUARD A
TWO-DAY MEETING OF FRENCH AND AFRICAN FINANCE MINISTERS THAT OPENED
THERE YESTERDAY. | 3.5c I
4. LESOTHO: ELECTED GOVERNMENT RESTORED | 3.5c
KING LETSIE I I I
I
YESTERDAY FORMALLY RESCINDED HIS ORDER THAT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 6 of 7
1
DISSOLVED PRIME MINISTER MOKHEHLE S ELECTED GOVERNMENT LATE LAST
MONTH AFTER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM SOUTH AFRICAN, ZIMBABWEAN, AND
BATSWANA MEDIATORS, W O HAD THREATENED TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
H
I
EQ 13526 1.4c
I //MOKHEHLE WILL STILL FACE SERIOUS
PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE UNDISCIPLINED SECURITY FORCES AND WITH
HARDLINERS IN THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY--WHICH HOLDS N SEATS IN THE
O
LEGISLATURE--INTENT ON SECURING A ROLE IN GOVERNMENT.// | 3 5 |
C
EAR EAST
5. ISRAEL: MODEST ANTI-INFLATION PACKAGE UNVEILED
3.5c
THE CABINET HAS APPROVED A WATERED-DOWN VERSION OF AN ANTI-INFLATION
PACKAGE PREPARED BY FINANCE MINISTER SHOHAT AND BANK OF ISRAEL
GOVERNOR FRENKEL, ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY. THE PLAN REPORTEDLY
RELIES ON REDUCTIONS IN SALES TAXES AND EMPLOYER SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTRIBUTIONS ANNOUNCED LAST MONTH; IT SETS A TARGET INFLATION RATE
OF 8 TO 10 PERCENT FOR NEXT YEAR.
-- OTHER PROVISIONS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE CUTTING REDTAPE TO SPUR
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, ELIMINATING SOME IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON
CERTAIN FOODS, COOPERATING WITH THE HISTRADRUT LABOR FEDERATION TO
REDUCE LABOR COSTS, AND CAPPING GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AT THE
INFLATION RATE. 3.5c
ISRAEL HAS BLAMED PRICE INCREASES--RUNNING AT AN ANNUALIZED RATE OF
ABOUT 14.5 PERCENT THIS YEAR, WELL ABOVE THE 8-PERCENT TARGET--ON
SURGING HOUSING PRICES, WHICH ARE PROJECTED BY THE BANK TO RISE 35
PERCENT THIS YEAR.
EO13526 1.4c
HOWEVER, PRICES FOR
CLOTHING, HEALTH CARE, TRANSPORTATION, AND ENTERTAINMENT HAVE RISEN
RAPIDLY SINCE MAY. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE A
RAPID INCREASE IN PRIVATE DEBT TO THE GENEROUS PUBLIC-SECTOR WAGE
AGREEMENTS AND REDUCED UNEMPLOYMENT.
-- //WITH VESTED INTERESTS HOBBLING THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-INFLATION
EFFORT, INFLATION MAY REACH THE 16-TO-20-PERCENT RANGE.// I 3 Rc I
DV
R W 15 SEPTEMBER 2014.
BT
#0856
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1253452.html
DIST:
S I T : VAX NSC
•
Page 7 of?
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1273886.html
Page 1 of 7
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE 3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
PRIORITY
SECRET
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4 998 2700531-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
RUCBLFJ T CG I I MEF
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUEKJCS
270117Z SEP 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE SIX
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE EIGHT
RHJAAFA/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE ENTEBBE UG
RUSNJTF/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE MOEHRINGEN GE
-01)0)INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
1111
RWANDA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE N W GOVERNMENT (U)
E
S E C R E T
PASS:
NOFORN WNINTEL SECTION 01 OF 03
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
) )
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
(b)(3)
| H CONTENTS
TE
(b)(3)
REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATIONS AND MAY NOT
REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
)) )
SERIAL:
(b)(3)
SUBJ: RWANDA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE N W GOVERNMENT (U)
E
DOI:
27 SEP 94
)) )
KEY JUDGMENTS
)) )
1. f&) THE N W GOVERNMENT, DOMINATED BY THE MINORITY TUTSIS, WILL
E
REMAIN IN P W R FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ITS LONG-TERM SURVIVAL,
OE
HOWEVER, WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE TUTSIS CAN WIN THE SUPPORT AND
CONFIDENCE OF THE COUNTRY'S HUTU MAJORITY.
2. fG-) THE N W REGIME, WHICH HAS F W FUNDS AND LIMITED TRAINED
E
E
MANPOWER, MUST COPE WITH MAJOR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
AN INSURGENCY BEING MOUNTED BY MEMBERS OF THE EX-FAR.
3. (C) THE TUTSI LEADERSHIP--HAVING JUST SURVIVED A GENOCIDE-- WILL
BE INCLINED TO FOCUS ON SECURITY CONCERNS. SUCH AN EMPHASIS WILL TEND
TO HEIGHTEN ETHNIC TENSIONS AND TO DETRACT FROM EFFORTS AIMED AT
PROMOTING REPATRIATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.
DISCUSSION
)) )
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
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4 .
Page 2 of?
POLITICAL CLIMATE. THE N W GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS DOMINATED
E
BY TUTSI MEMBERS OF THE VICTORIOUS RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF).
ALTHOUGH MODERATE HUTUS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO OCCUPY PROMINENT
POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE POSTS OF PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER, THE
REAL P W R BEHIND-THE-SCENES IS THE TUTSI RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA)
OE
COMMANDER, MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME, WHO WAS APPOINTED VICE PRESIDENT AND
DEFENSE MINISTER. THE PRO-WESTERN KAGAME IS PRAGMATIC, ADMITTING HE
WILL ACCEPT MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ANY SOURCE.
5. fG) THE HUTU PRIME MINISTER, FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU, HAS BEEN
STRUGGLING WITH RPF LEADERS TO PROMOTE PARTY BALANCE AND POWERSHARING
IN THE GOVERNMENT. IN THIS REGARD, HE HAS BEEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL.
THE N W GOVERNMENT IS REPRESENTATIVE OF REGIONS AND INCLUDES A
E
COMBINATION OF OPPOSITION HUTUS, RPF HUTUS, INLAND TUTSIS, AND EXILED
TUTSIS •
EO 13526 1.4c
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1273886.html
EO 13526 1.4c
10. f&MF) EVOLUTION OF ETHNIC STRIFE IN RWANDA
- LONGSTANDING ETHNIC TENSIONS BETWEEN HUTU MAJORITY (85
PERCENT) AND TUTSI MINORITY (14 PERCENT)
-- ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN HUTUS AND TUTSIS OCCASIONALLY
ERUPTED INTO VIOLENCE, BUT NEVER ON SCALE OF LATEST
CRISIS
-- PERHAPS HALF A MILLION TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS
KILLED DURING RECENT HOSTILITIES
- TUTSIS WERE TRADITIONAL RULERS, DESPITE BEING MINORITY
-- TUTSIS LOST CONTROL TO HUTUS AT TIME OF INDEPENDENCE
IN 1962
-- SEVERAL ETHNIC PURGES OCCURRED BETWEEN 1959 AND 1962
-- MANY TUTSIS FLED TO NEARBY COUNTRIES
-- HUTU MILITARY OFFICER SEIZED P W R IN 1973
OE
-- ONE-PARTY STATE ESTABLISHED
-- SOME TUTSIS W O WENT NORTH FOUGHT IN UGANDA'S CIVIL
H
WAR DURING EARLY 1980S
-- JOINED VICTORIOUS SIDE LED BY UGANDA'S PRESIDENT
MUSEVENI
- TUTSI REBELS (RPF) INVADED NORTHERN RWANDA FROM UGANDA IN
OCTOBER 1990
-- MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME ASSUMED COMMAND; PREVIOUS LEADER
SECRET
NOFORN WNINTEL SECTION 02 OF 03
-- ONE-PARTY STATE ESTABLISHED
-- SOME TUTSIS W O WENT NORTH FOUGHT IN UGANDA'S CIVIL
H
W R DURING EARLY 1980S
A
-- JOINED VICTORIOUS SIDE LED BY UGANDA'S PRESIDENT
MUSEVENI
- TUTSI REBELS (RPF) INVADED NORTHERN RWANDA FROM UGANDA IN
OCTOBER 1990
-- MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME ASSUMED COMMAND; PREVIOUS LEADER
KILLED IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR
-- RPF OFFENSIVE STALLED
-- MILITARY SITUATION DEADLOCKED
-- POLITICAL PRESSURES INCREASED IN KIGALI
-- HUTU MODERATES G E INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF OLD
RW
REGIME
-- FORMER RWANDAN PRESIDENT FINALLY MADE CONCESSIONS
--- TO END CIVIL WAR
TO SHARE P W R WITH RPF AND INTERNAL
OE
OPPOSITION
- POWERSHARING AGREEMENT (ARUSHU ACCORD) SIGNED IN 1993
Page 3 of 7
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Page 4 of?
-- TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED
-- MILITARY DEMOBILIZED AND INTEGRATED
- BOTH RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN PRESIDENTS KILLED IN MYSTERIOUS
PLANE CRASH ON 6 APRIL 1994 NEAR KIGALI, RE-IGNITING CIVIL
WR
A
-- AIRCRAFT PROBABLY SHOT D W BY HARDLINE HUTU
ON
ELEMENTS
-- HUTU EXTREMISTS LAUNCHED CAMPAIGN OF GENOCIDE
AGAINST TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS
-- RPF GRADUALLY TOOK CONTROL OF COUNTRY BETWEEN APRIL
AND JULY 1994
11. f€4 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. ENORMOUS ECONOMIC CHALLENGES LIE AHEAD.
THE COUNTRY'S BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE SURVIVED THE WAR, BUT ITS CAPITAL
ASSETS--IN BOTH THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS--HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE
DAMAGE IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN KIGALI. WHEN THE MILITARY WING OF
THE RPF, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA), SEIZED THE CITY, MANY OF
ITS TROOPS WENT ON A SPREE-- LOOTING, DRINKING, AND REPORTEDLY RAPING
AT WILL. MOREOVER, WHEN THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES FLED THE
CAPITAL, THEY TOOK THE GOVERNMENT'S FUNDS WITH THEM. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, KIGALI IS GENERALLY IN POOR CONDITION, ALTHOUGH LOOTING
HAS DIMINISHED AND DISCIPLINE IS GRADUALLY BEING RESTORED TO RPA
RANKS. OTHER CITIES SUFFERED A SIMILAR FATE.
12. f&) IN THE RUR'AL AREAS, FARMERS HAVE LARGELY ABANDONED THEIR
FIELDS. MANY WERE HUTUS, W O JOINED THE FLOOD OF REFUGEES INTO
H
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WHERE A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM REMAIN. THE HUTUS
FEAR GOING BACK BECAUSE THEY THINK THEY MIGHT FACE RPF RETALIATION
FOR THE RECENT GENOCIDE. THEY ALSO FEAR BEING INTERCEPTED BY HUTU
EXTREMISTS. MEMBERS OF THE EX-RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (EX-FAR) AND
ALLIED HUTU MILITIAS HAVE ENGAGED IN INTIMIDATION TACTICS TO KEEP THE
REFUGEES IN PLACE. UNLESS THE FARMERS CAN BE PERSUADED TO RETURN,
THIS YEAR'S HARVEST--AND NEXT SEASON'S SEED--WILL BE LOST.
13. (C/NF) SECURITY CHALLENGES. IN ANTICIPATION OF SECURITY PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTINUING SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY, THE RPF IS
REORGANIZING AND EXPANDING ITS MILITARY AND IS CONSOLIDATING THE
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN MID-JUNE, THE REBEL
ARMY HAD ABOUT 35,000 SOLDIERS. RECENT RECRUITING HAS ENLARGED THE
FORCE TO ROUGHLY 50,000, BUT MANY OF THESE N W RECRUITS PROBABLY WILL
E
BE ASSIGNED TO POLICE DUTY. THUS, THE MILITARY'S STRENGTH IS LIKELY
TO REMAIN AT THE MID-JUNE FIGURE OF 35,000, OF WHICH ONLY ABOUT
20,000 ARE COMBAT- EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL.
14. (G/NF/WN) MEANWHILE, THE DEFEATED REMNANTS OF THE EX-FAR HAVE
BEGUN A SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY INVOLVING PLATOON AND COMPANY-SIZE
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST, SOUTHWEST, AND SOUTHEAST FROM THEIR
POSITIONS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. EX-FAR AND FORMER GOVERNMENT
LEADERS HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE TO INCREASE THE SCOPE OF THE
INSURGENCY TO INCLUDE COORDINATED MULTIFRONT AND UP TO BRIGADE-SIZE
ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THEY LACK SUFFICIENT STOCKS OF AMMUNITION AND
WEAPONS FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS.
15. (S/NF/WN) MOST OF THE EX-FAR ARE CONCENTRATED IN EASTERN ZAIRE,
SPECIFICALLY IN THE REGIONS OF G M AND BUKAVU. AN ESTIMATED 15,000
OA
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1273886.html
Page 5 of 7
TO 20,000 TROOPS ARE IN GOMA, AND 5,000 TO 7,000 ARE IN BUKAVU. THOSE
IN THE G M AREA ARE THOUGHT TO BE BETTER ORGANIZED AND BETTER
OA
EQUIPPED THAN OTHER EX-FAR ELEMENTS. IN ADDITION, ABOUT 3,000 EX-FAR
SOLDIERS ARE IN WESTERN TANZANIA, AND 5,000 ARMED HUTU ELEMENTS,
INCLUDING HUTU MILITIA, ARE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA.
16. f&) THE EX-FAR IN THE G M AREA SEEM PARTICULARLY WELL ARMED AND
OA
DANGEROUS. MANY OF EX-FAR MEMBERS BLAME THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY--ESPECIALLY THE US--FOR THEIR DEFEAT, WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTE
TO THE UN-IMPOSED ARMS EMBARGO RATHER THAN TO THEIR O N SHORTCOMINGS.
W
MOREOVER, THE EX-FAR IS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGING THE RWANDAN REFUGEE
POPULATION THERE FROM RETURNING HOME, BOTH THROUGH INTIMIDATION
TACTICS AND DISINFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE THAT AWAITS THEM I F THEY G
O
BACK, CLAIMING THAT THE RPF WILL KILL HUTU REFUGEES IN RETALIATION
FOR THE EARLIER GENOCIDE.
17. fG^ THE RECENT CROSS-BORDER RAIDS BY EX-FAR ELEMENTS INTO
NORTHWESTERN RWANDA PROMPTED THE RPA TO MOVE TROOPS AND ARTILLERY
TOWARD THE AREA OF GISENYI, WHICH IS JUST OPPOSITE THE BORDER FROM
GOMA. THIS ACTION PLACES MOST OF THE EX-FAR CAMPS IN THE G M AREA
OA
WITHIN RPA ARTILLERY RANGE. ALTHOUGH NO CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED THUS
FAR, THIRD PARTIES IN THE AREA--SUCH AS REFUGEES, RELIEF WORKERS, AND
ANY UN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS--COULD BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE I F
HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT.
18. (U) AFTER THE EX-FAR FORCES FLED INTO EASTERN ZAIRE, THAT
COUNTRY'S LEADER--PRESI DENT MOBUTU--PLEDGED THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW
THE RWANDANS TO SET UP A GOVERNMENT-IN-EX ILE. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT
THE EX-FAR WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO LAUNCH CROSS- BORDER RAIDS FROM
ZAIRIAN SOIL.
19. (S/NF) TO COPE WITH THE SUDDEN INFLUX OF RWANDANS, MOBUTU
DEPLOYED ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE EASTERN BORDER AREA. HOWEVER, SINCE
MANY OF THESE SOLDIERS ARE CORRUPT AND INEFFECTIVE, THEIR PRESENCE
TENDED TO CONTRIBUTE TO TENSIONS RATHER THAN IMPROVE SECURITY. SOME
OF THE NEWLY DEPLOYED FORCES ALREADY HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE G M
OA
AREA BECAUSE OF THE TROUBLE THEY CAUSED THERE. ZAIRE'S MILITARY IS
UNABLE TO FULLY CONTROL OR CONTAIN THE EX-FAR, AS EVIDENCED BY THE
RECENT CROSS-BORDER RAIDS THAT EX-FAR SOLDIERS LAUNCHED INTO
NORTHWESTERN RWANDA.
20. <r&j AS FOR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A UN PRESENCE THERE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO INTERNAL STABILITY. THE UN
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA, K O N AS UNAMIR, HAS AN AUTHORIZED
NW
STRENGTH OF 5,500 PERSONNEL. AS OF MID- SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, ONLY
CECRET
NOFORN WNINTEL FINAL SECTION OF 03
ABOUT 3,566 HAD ACTUALLY DEPLOYED.
21. (S/NF) THE MOST SENSITIVE AREA OF UN DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN IN THE
SOUTHWEST, WHERE UN ELEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY
RECENTLY DEPARTED FRENCH FORCES. THE FRENCH PRESENCE HAD TEMPORARILY
DENIED THE RPA ACCESS TO THIS LAST SECTOR OF THE COUNTRY, BUT KIGALI
IS N W DEPLOYING TROOPS THERE TO ASSERT ITS SOVEREIGNTY. AT LEAST
O
THREE RPA BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE SOUTHWEST TO OPERATE
ALONGSIDE THE THREE AFRICAN BATTALIONS THAT THE UN ALREADY HAS
DEPLOYED TO THE SECTOR. THUS FAR, THE ARRIVAL OF TUTSI MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTHWEST HAS NOT TRIGGERED A LARGE HUTU MIGRATION
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1273886.html
Page 6 of 7
INTO NEIGHBORING ZAIRE, AS MANY HAD FEARED.
22. (U) THE N W GOVERNMENT IS COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
E
TO COPE WITH THE REFUGEE CRISIS. IT IS PERMITTING RELIEF SUPPLIES TO
ENTER AND TRANSIT RWANDA, AND IT IS CONDUCTING A RADIO CAMPAIGN TO
ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO REPATRIATE. RPF LEADERS HAVE ASSURED MOST HUTU
REFUGEES THEY WILL BE SAFE UPON THEIR RETURN, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO
EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT.
23. f&) SOME OF THE RETURNING HUTUS REPORTEDLY HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO
INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF REVENGE BY RPA PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO
FIRM EVIDENCE THAT LEADERS IN KIGALI CONDONE SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS OR THAT THEY PLAN TO ENGAGE IN GENOCIDE AS A MATTER OF
POLICY LIKE THE PREVIOUS RULERS.
24. f&) IN ADDITION, RPA COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE
ASSOCIATED KILLING OF HUTU MILITIAMEN AND EX-FAR SOLDIERS IN
SOUTHEAST VERY LIKELY ARE THE SOURCE OF NUMEROUS REPORTS BY FLEEING
REFUGEES ABOUT THE RPA'S SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF HUTUS. THE RPA APPEARS
TO BE CLEARING THIS REGION OF HUTU MILITIA THROUGH WELL-ORGANIZED
OPERATIONS BASED ON G O INTELLIGENCE. THOSE KILLED REPORTEDLY ARE
OD
MEN OF MILITARY AGE, NOT W M N AND CHILDREN. A GOVERNMENT POLICY OF
OE
GENOCIDE AGAINST HUTUS WOULD NOT DISCRIMINATE IN ITS TARGETS.
MOREOVER, THE RPA IS USING ITS O N CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ALTHOUGH
W
DRACONIAN, AGAINST CAPTURED INSURGENTS. THE RPA OFTEN INVESTIGATES
CRIMES AND THEN SUMMARILY EXECUTES THOSE FOUND GUILTY. UP TO 62 RPA
SOLDIERS FOUND GUILTY OF REPRISAL MURDERS HAVE BEEN SHOT.
) ) )
OUTLOOK
) ) )
25. f&) THE RPF WILL REMAIN IN CONTROL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NO
SERIOUS DOMESTIC OPPOSITION HAS DEVELOPED THUS FAR. IN ADDITION,
MODERATE HUTU LEADERS--THOSE W O SURVIVED THE RECENT GENOCIDE--HAVE
H
BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE RPF, EVEN SERVING IN HIGHLY VISIBLE
POSITIONS IN THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED POLITICAL SYSTEM. I F THE HUTUS D
O
NOT RECEIVE GREATER FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES OF THEIR OWN,
HOWEVER, THEIR DISCONTENT WILL INCREASE, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL
BECOME LESS COOPERATIVE.
26. ( & THE RPF'S MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM WILL BE THE INSURGENCY WAGED
-)
BY DEFEATED FORMER ARMY ELEMENTS. EX-FAR ACTIONS IN THE BORDER AREAS
COULD INVITE PREEMPTIVE OR RETALIATORY STRIKES INTO NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES BY THE RPA. RELIEF WORKERS, REFUGEES, AND OTHERS MIGHT THEN
BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE. ALSO DANGEROUS ARE THE REMNANTS OF YOUNG
HUTU MILITIAS USED BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT MUCH OF THE
SLAUGHTER INSIDE RWANDA.
27. (S/NF) OVER THE LONG TERM, THE SUCCESS OF THE EX-FAR IN STAGING A
COMEBACK WILL DEPEND ON ITS ABILITY TO RE-GROUP AND GAIN MILITARY
SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. THE RPA SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE
INSURGENCY THREAT, BUT NEIGHBORING MILITARIES PROBABLY WILL BE OF
LITTLE OR NO HELP IN CONTROLLING EX-FAR ELEMENTS INFILTRATING INTO
RWANDA.
28. fG^ MEANWHILE, THE HUTU REFUGEES ARE UNLIKELY TO RETURN VERY
SOON. THE INSURGENCY AND RPA OPERATIONS TO COMBAT IT WILL FUEL HUTU
FEARS OF GOVERNMENT REPRISALS. ALSO, REPORTS OF APPARENTLY SYSTEMATIC
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\SEP94\MSGS\M1273886.html
Page 7 of 7
KILLING AND REFUGEE OUTFLOWS WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE INSURGENCY
RAGES. MOREOVER, I F REFUGEES ARE TO RETURN HOME, THEY MUST FIRST BE
CONVINCED THAT THE RPF MEANS THEM NO HARM. OVERCOMING FEARS ROOTED IN
LONGSTANDING ETHNIC HATREDS AND REINFORCED BY RECENT EX-FAR
PROPAGANDA WILL NOT BE EASY. THE REFUGEES' LINGERING PRESENCE IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES PROBABLY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS
IN THOSE AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN BURUNDI, WHERE THE ETHNIC MIX AND
TRIBAL SUSPICIONS ARE SIMILAR. IN ADDITION, RWANDAN REFUGEES WILL
REMAIN A REGIONALLY DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT CENTRAL
AFRICA.
29' (S/NF) DESPITE ITS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION, THE
RPA--HAVING JUST SURVIVED A GENOCIDE--IS LIKELY TO BE LESS CONCERNED
WITH WELCOMING BACK HUTUS, THAN IT IS WITH MAINTAINING CONTROL AND
ENSURING TUTSI SURVIVAL. KIGALI'S EFFORTS ALONG THESE LINES, SUCH AS
EXPANDING THE SECURITY FORCES, REINFORCING THE GISENYI BORDER AREA,
AND DEPLOYING UNITS INTO THE SOUTHWEST, WILL TEND TO HEIGHTEN ETHNIC
TENSIONS AND DISCOURAGE REPATRIATION. THE HUTU REACTION, HOWEVER,
WILL DEPEND ON H W AGGRESSIVELY THE RPA CONDUCTS ITS
O
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND ON WHETHER MANY OF THE DISPLACED
HUTUS ARE INADVERTENTLY CAUGHT UP IN THE HOSTILITIES. I F THEY FEEL
THREATENED, THE HUTUS WILL NOT RETURN TO RWANDA IN SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS OR PROVIDE THE N W REGIME WITH THE CRITICAL SUPPORT IT NEEDS
E
TO OVERCOME INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AND REBUILD THE ECONOMY.
I
(b)(3)
DECL:
BT
#5000
OADR
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<' SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
s
A
SSN:
(b)(3)
TOR:
940927013808 M1273886
<' TOR>940927013811 M1273888
<'TOR>940927013815 M1273889
S
DIST:
SIT:
VAX
NSC
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\OCT94\MSGS\M1321205.html
Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE 1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
PRIORITY
CECRET
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6256 2970158-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
P 232144Z OCT 94
(b)(3)
RUEKJCS
232144Z OCT 94
_M3L
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//Q331//
AIG 7011
INFO: ////
DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT \~ (b)(3) | OCT 94 (U)
SUBJ:
)) )
(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
(b)(3) | O RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS)
FR
(b)(3)
TEXT:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02
1106A
SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT
(b)(3)
OCT 94 .
(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED [
_
(h)(3) ~lFOR RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS)
(b)(3)
DIA DEFENSE WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST.
(U)
(U) PART I : WARNING ASSESSMENTS — THIS SECTION IS INTENDED TO ALERT
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD IMPACT
ON WESTERN INTERESTS.
NIGERIA:
1. W ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA IS
REMOTE, A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FACTORS ARE GROWING IN
IMPORTANCE. ECONOMIC CHAOS, N W FRACTURES IN THE MILITARY, AND RISING
E
ETHNIC TENSIONS COULD BE AN EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION.
-- NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE IS ACCELERATING. ABACHA HAS
ABANDONED MARKET REFORMS, MEMBERS OF ABACHA'S INNER CIRCLE ARE
ENGAGED IN CURRENCY SCAMS, AND INFLATION IS MORE THAN 100 PERCENT.
-- REPORTS OF SMUGGLING OF SMALL ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY ARE
INCREASING.
-- YOUNG OFFICERS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO TRY A
MOVE AGAINST A REGIME THAT THEY BELIEVE HAS UNDERMINED THE MILITARY'S
CREDIBILITY.
-- NEWLY FORCIBLY RETIRED OFFICERS MAY JOIN THE RANKS OF
FORMER SENIOR OFFICERS W O ARE ALREADY PLOTTING AGAINST THE REGIME.
H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD009\OCT94\MSGS\M1321205.htnil
Page 2 of 4
-- ETHNIC YORUBA AND IBO OFEICERS COULD BE SPURRED TO
CONCERTED ACTION I F THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE BEING FURTHER
MARGINALIZED BY THE ABACHA REGIME.
2. f&4 ECONOMICS-BASED UNREST -- MORE LIKELY AS THE ECONOMY CONTINUES
TO DETERIORATE -- WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY TRIGGER FOR INCREASED
TURMOIL IN NIGERIA. ECONOMIC UNREST COULD QUICKLY DEGENERATE INTO
ETHNIC CONFLICT, CONSIDERING THE VOLATILE SITUATION.
) ) )
TANZANIA:
1. fG) THE IMPENDING RAINY SEASON IN TANZANIA PROBABLY WILL WORSEN
THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION FOR REFUGEES THERE. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE
SECURITY SITUATION FOR BOTH REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS IN THE AREA ALSO
WILL DETERIORATE.
-- THE NUMBER OF RWANDAN HUTUS IN TANZANIA HAS BEEN GROWING BY
1,000 A DAY SINCE EARLY LAST MONTH.
-- SUPPLIES OF FOOD, WATER, AND OTHER NECESSITIES ARE GROSSLY
INADEQUATE FOR THE 540,000 REFUGEES THERE.
-- THESE SITUATIONS ARE ALREADY UNDERMINING SECURITY FOR
REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS AND STRENGTHENING HUTU EXTREMISTS.
2. (^) UNLESS THE N W RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS
E
ABLE TO ASSUAGE HUTU FEARS OF TUTSI REPRISALS FOR THE GENOCIDE OF
TUTSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN TANZANIA WILL
CONTINUE TO G O AND THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY SITUATIONS WILL
RW
CONTINUE TO DECLINE.
MOZAMBIQUE:
1. fG) RHETORIC CONCERNING THE NATIONAL ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 27 AND
28 OCTOBER IS HEATING UP AS OPPOSITION LEADERS DENOUNCE ALLEGED
FRAUDULENT ELECTORAL PRACTICES AND RESULTS. AFONSO DHLAKAMA, LEADER
OF THE MAIN OPPOSITION GROUP-THE MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE
(RENAMO), WARNS THAT THE SITUATION COULD MIRROR WHAT HAPPENED IN
ANGOLA. DHLAKAMA CHARGES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PARTY-MOZAMBIQUE
LIBERATION FRONT ( FRELIMO)-WILL:
-- BUY VOTES AND RIG ELECTIONRESULTS.
-- USE ILLICIT FUNDS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING.
-- BRING IN THOUSANDS OF ZIMBABWEANS TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT
CHISSANO.
-- USE A 9,000 MAN FORCE TO FIGHT RENAMO, I F RENAMO WINS THE
ELECTION.
2. fG) WHILE SOME OF THE CHARGES MAY SIMPLY BE CAMPAIGN RHETORIC,
DHLAKAMA AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
DISGRUNTLED OVER PERCEIVED INEQUITIES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING. THESE
INEQUITIES WILL PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES TO
CONTEST THE ELECTION RESULTS. REGARDLESS OF WHICH PARTY WINS THE
ELECTION, THE N W GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE OPPOSITION
E
IN ORDER TO FOSTER RECONCILIATION AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL STABILITY.
FAILURE TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN FURTHER FRACTIONALIZATION IN A
COUNTRY BESET BY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES.
) ) )
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Page 3 of4
F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\OCT94\MSGS\M1321205.html
PART I I : fS-} DIA WATCH CONDITION STATUS:
WARNING PROBLEM
WATCHCON
8
15
28
15
1
10
6
13
23
21
15
15
15
IRAQ REGIONAL
HAITI (INTERNAL)
YUGOSLAVIA/UNITED NATIONS
YUGOSLAVIA REGIONAL
SOMALIA (INTERNAL)
ALGERIA (INTERNAL)
IRAQ (INTERNAL)
RWANDA (INTERNAL)
CUBA (INTERNAL)
IRAN REGIONAL
ANGOLA (INTERNAL)
SOUTH AFRICA (INTERNAL)
YEMEN (INTERNAL)
NIGERIA/CAMEROON
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA
UKRAINE (INTERNAL)
GEORGIA (INTERNAL)
BURUNDI (INERNAL)
RUSSIA (INTERNAL)
SUDAN (INTERNAL)
ISRAEL REGIONAL
ZAIRE (INTERNAL)
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
TAJIKISTAN REGIONAL
ISRAEL/ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SRI LANKA
SPRATLY ISLANDS/SOUTH CHINA SEA
SAUDI ARABIA-YEMEN
CAMBODIA (INTERNAL)
PAKISTAN (INTERNAL)
MOLDOVA REGIONAL
CONGO (INTERNAL)
S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02
EGYPT/SUDAN
CHINA (INTERNAL)
SURINAME (INTERNAL)
LEBANON (INTERNAL)
MALAWI (INTERNAL)
KENYA (INTERNAL)
LIBYA
EGYPT (INTERNAL)
INDIA/PAKISTAN
CIS NUCLEAR PROBLEM
LIBYA
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA
(DECL OADR)
BT
AS OF
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
OCT 94
SEP 94
JAN 93
MAY 92
DEC 92
DEC 93
AUG 93
OCT 94
SEP 94
JUL 94
JUL 94
JUL 94
JUL 94
2 4 MAR 94
15 FEB 94
2 6 JAN 94
3 DEC 93
22 OCT 93
14 OCT 93
24 AUG 93
2 AUG 93
9 JUL 93
14 JAN 93
25 OCT 92
26 SEP 92
11 FEB 92
23 AUG 94
29 JUL 94
8 JUL 94
30 JUN 94
29 APR 94
8 MAR 94
23 DEC 93
16
2
8
3
22
13
2
10
20
4
2
12
AUG 93
AUG 93
JUN 93
MAY 93
JAN 93
JAN 93
FEB 89
AUG 92
NOV 92
JUN 92
FEB 8 9
JUL 88
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD009\OCT94\MSGS\M1321205.html
#6257
NNNN
SECT:
SECTION: 01 OF 02
<~SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN:
TOR:
(b)(3)
941023221343 M1321205
<' TOR>941023221342 M1321204
1
DIST:
SIT:
VAX NSC
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 4 of 4
�JRwanda: Refugees and Displaced Persons, Early November 1994
Population
1 April 1994
Conndentia|
EQ
^525 3 5c
Total
Hutu
Tutsi
Twa
Deaths
Net Refugee
Flow a
Population
1 November 1994
7,657
6.998(91.4%)
628(8.2%)
31 (0.4%)
585
195
375
15
-1,625
-2.023
+403
-5
5,447
4.780(87.8%)
656(12%)
11 (0.2%)
PREPARED 8 NOVEMBER M
Figures in thousands.
"A negative number represents a refugee outflow; a positive number an injlo*:
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\NOV94\MSGS\M1356974.html
Page 1 of 5
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
ROUTINE
SECRET
RAASZYUW RUEAIIA2267 3150653-SSSS—RHEHAAA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 110651Z NOV 94
FM CIA
RUEAIIA
110651Z NOV 94
CIA
RUCUDFI/319ARW GRAND FORKS AFB ND/IN
RUCIPGA/3250SS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/4 3 60SS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUVMBSA/50SS MINOT AFB ND/OSI/
RUVHTRA/615AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RHFIAAA/7220SS/IN
RUEOADA/9TH AF S A AFB
HW
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RUCIBBA/AFOSI 24 F1S S A AFB SC/CENT
HW
RUETITH/AFOSI 52 INVESTIGATIONS SQ ANKARA
RUCIBBA/AFOSI DIST 21 OL-C S
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AU MAXWELL AFB AL/IN
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
INFO: ////
H W SUPPORT CABLE FOR MIDDLE EAST BRIEF
/
SUBJ:
FOR 11 NOVEMBER 1994
EO 13526 3.5c
TEXT:
EO 13526 3.5c
PASS: AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA
FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR
NAVY W R COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
A
UNIVERSITY
3.5c
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//;
COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG
NC//ASOF POG//; I L FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 10\NOV94\MSGS\M 1356974.html
Page 2 of 5
HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB
WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB S A
HW
SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF S A AFB
HW
SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE
AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI
GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS
INTELCEN SCOTT AFB|
3.5
|CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ
TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO;
MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN
WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO
GENERAL STEWART
C
EO 13526 3.5c
1. ANGOLA: PEACE ACCORD HANGING IN BALANCE
2. IRAQ: KUWAIT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED I
35
C
3.5c
3. SRI LANKA: N W PRESIDENT TAKES OFFICE
E
3.5c
4. RWANDA: UN MISSION FACES DIFFICULTIES
3.5c
1. ANGOLA: PEACE ACCORD HANGING IN BALANCE
3.5c
UNITA LEADER SAVIMBI YESTERDAY TOLD 1
EO 13526 1.4c
I THAT HE
IS PREPARED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO LUSAKA TO ATTEND MILITARY
TALKS AND ASKED FOR UN ASSISTANCE IN TRANSPORTING THE REBEL
DELEGATION. THE TALKS WERE TO BEGIN YESTERDAY.
-- //UNITA'S ATTENDANCE WOULD DENY LUANDA THE OPPORTUNITY TO BLAME
THE REBELS FOR SLOWING THE PEACE PROCESS.//
EO 13526 1.4d
PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAVE ENTERED HUAMBO BUT
THAT UNITA CONTINUES TO HOLD AT LEAST PART OF THE CITY.| EQ 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 10\NOV94\MSGS\M 1356974.html
EO 13526 1.4c
SOUTH AFRICAN DEPUTY PRESIDENT MBEKI SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE FRONT
LINE STATES WOULD DECIDE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE I F UNITA AND LUANDA
FAIL TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. THEIR MOST PALATABLE OPTIONS WOULD BE A
JOINT DEMARCHE OR AN OFFER TO MEDIATE, SINCE NONE OF THE FRONT
LINE STATES HAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. 3.5c
NEAR EAST
2. IRAQ: KUWAIT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED
3.5c
THE DECISIONS OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND REVOLUTIONARY
COMMAND COUNCIL OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ACCEPT THE IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER AS DEMARCATED
BY THE UN, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE BORDER.
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE DECREES WERE SIGNED BY SADDAM
HUSAYN AND WERE TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE IRAQI PRESS YESTERDAY; A UN
SANCTIONS REVIEW MEETING IS SET FOR MONDAY. //STATEMENTS BY IRAQI
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS AND SADDAM'S HISTORY OF ABROGATING
AGREEMENTS THAT NO LONGER SUIT HIM SUGGEST IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO
KUWAIT IS A MANEUVER TO GET A TIMETABLE ESTABLISHED FOR THE
LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.//
EO 13526 1.4d
3. SRI LANKA: N W PRESIDENT TAKES OFFICE
E
3.5c
PRIME MINISTER KUMARATUNGA WILL BE S O N IN TODAY AS PRESIDENT.
WR
LIKE ALL HER PREDECESSORS, SHE WILL ALSO SERVE AS DEFENSE MINISTER
AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHILE KUMARATUNGA'S
PARTY WAS IN OPPOSITION, IT CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENCY FOR WIELDING
TOO MUCH P W R OVER THE PARLIAMENT; SHE HAS PLEDGED TO BALANCE
OE
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
PASS: AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA
FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR
UNIVERSITY I
3^
I NAVY W R COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
A
Page 3 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\NOV94\MSGS\M1356974.html
Page 4 of 5
TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//;
COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG
NC//ASOF POG//; I L FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING
HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB
WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR I N I ; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB S A
HW
SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF S A AFB
HW
SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE
AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG I I MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI
GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF.PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS
CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ
INTELCEN SCOTT AFB
3.5c
TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO;
MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN
WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO
GENERAL STEWART
KUMARATUNGA IS LIKELY TO PRESS HARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR
ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND AGAINST GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION| EO 13526 1 4c 1
I
14C
-._
I
-- //HER GREATEST CHALLENGE, HOWEVER, WILL BE TO RESUME THE PEACE
OVERTURES TOWARD TAMIL SEPARATISTS WITHOUT ALIENATING THE
SINHALESE MAJORITY OR THE MILITARY.// I 3 5c I
AFRICA
4. RWANDA: UN MISSION FACES DIFFICULTIES 1 3.5c I
DESPITE THE ARRIVAL THIS MONTH OF INDIAN AND ZAMBIAN CONTINGENTS,
WHICH BRINGS THE UN FORCE TO ITS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 5,500, THE
PEACEKEEPERS INCREASINGLY ARE HAVING TROUBLE PROTECTING DISPLACED
PERSONS, HUMANITARIAN ZONES, AND RELIEF SUPPLIES. TO DATE, UN
FORCES HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO CONFRONT OR DISARM THE HUTU MILITIAS
W O ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE SECURITY INCIDENTS.
H
AID WORKERS HAVE CRITICIZED THE UN
EO 13526 1.4c
FOR BEING SLOW TO INVESTIGATE SUCH INCIDENTS; //UN FORCES HAVE
BEEN RELUCTANT TO APPREHEND HUTUS W O MAY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE
H
GENOCIDE, IN PART, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
UN'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AMONG THE VARIOUS TROOP CONTINGENTS.// RTSc
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\NOV94\MSGS\M1356974.html
THE UN FORCES HAVE ALSO ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTY DEFINING THEIR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT. IN SEPTEMBER, THE
UN FORCE COMMANDER SAID THE RPF WOULD GRADUALLY ASSUME CONTROL
OVER THE SOUTHWEST, WHERE FRENCH FORCES HAD DEPLOYED IN JUNE TO
PROTECT TUTSIS FROM FURTHER SLAUGHTER. THE COMMANDER RECENTLY
THREATENED, HOWEVER, TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IF THE RPF CONTINUES
TO FORCIBLY MOVE HUTUS OUT OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS THERE,
EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d
//THE FORCES' IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STEMMING THE MASSIVE
REFUGEE OUTFLOW FROM RWANDA IN AUGUST IS OF DECREASING IMPORTANCE
TO KIGALI AS IT FOCUSES ON SECURING AND GOVERNING RWANDA.//
//DEFENSE MINISTER KAGAME'S RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF UN
ARMORED VEHICLES// //COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A UNILATERAL
DECISION TO EXPEL UN TROOPS IF THE RPF BELIEVES THEY ARE
INFRINGING ON THE TUTSI-LED GOVERNMENT'S SOVEREIGNTY.//
3.5c
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
A
DIST:
SIT: VAX NSC
•
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�F:\Cable\Data Source\CabIes\CDO 10\NOV94\MSGS\M 1387420.html
Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC
CLASS
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OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
PRIORITY
SECRET
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0514 3340427-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
ZNY SSSSS
P 302255Z NOV 94
(b)(3)
RUEKJCS
302255Z NOV 94
(b)(3)
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//Q331//
AIG 7011
INFO: ////
DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT 72-94/30 NOV 94. (U)
SUBJ:
)) )
(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
1
(b)(3)
| O RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS)
FR
JbKlL
TEXT:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02
1106A
SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT 72-94/30 NOV 94. (U)
)) )
(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
(h)i3\
IFQJL RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS)
(b)(3)
DIA DEFENSE WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST. (U)
)) )
(U) PART I : WARNING ASSESSMENTS -- THIS SECTION IS INTENDED TO ALERT
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD IMPACT
ON WESTERN INTERESTS.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
CROATIA: THE FAILED CROAT I AN-KRAJINA SERB DIPLOMACY HAS
INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF CROATIA'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF
THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE USE OF FORCE TO REESTABLISH ZAGREB'S
AUTHORITY OVER SERB-CONTROLLED KRAJINA.
2. fG) RWANDA: VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO ESCALATE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE
ZAIRIAN ARMY AND THE RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA IN EASTERN
ZAIRE. NGOS AND REFUGEES COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE AND MORE
NGOS MAY BE FORCED TO EVACUATE.
EO 13526 1.4c
4. fGj INDONESIA: A NEW CYCLE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR
UNDERSCORES THE COMPLEX POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 10\NOV94\MSGS\M 1387420.html
Page 2 of 4
THAT WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE JAKARTA'S EFFORTS TO PACIFY THE
PROVINCE.
)) )
WARNING ASSESSMENTS
CROATIA:
1. f - THE FAILED CROATIAN-KRAJINA SERB DIPLOMACY HAS INCREASED THE
£>
LIKELIHOOD OF CROATIA'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF THE UNPROFOR
MANDATE AND THE USE OF FORCE TO REESTABLISH ZAGREB'S AUTHORITY OVER
SERB-CONTROLLED KRAJINA.
-- CROATIA'S PRESIDENT TUDJMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT UNLESS THERE
IS PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA INTO CROATIA BY NEXT MONTH,
CROATIA WILL NOT RENEW THE UNPROFOR MANDATE.
-- THE KRAJINA SERB REJECTION OF ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES HAS REMOVED ONE OF THE LAST OBSTACLES THAT HAVE PREVENTED
CROATIAN PRESIDENT TUDJMAN FROM APPROVING MILITARY ACTION. IN THE
EVENT OF A CROATIAN ATTACK, THE CROATIAN-KRAJINA CONFLICT COULD
RAPIDLY DETERIORATE INTO GENERAL WARFARE.
2. f&4 SINCE CROATIA'S INDEPENDENCE, NO PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE
KRAJINA HAS BEEN MADE, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR. CROATIA HAS
REPEATEDLY BEEN CAUTIONED TO AVOID MILITARY ACTION AND HAS BEEN
ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE DIPLOMACY IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA. THE
EMERGING KRAJINA SERB-BOSNIAN SERB ALLIANCE WILL FURTHER CIRCUMSCRIBE
ZAGREB'S ABILITY TO FORCIBLY REUNIFY THE COUNTRY. ZAGREB MAY JUDGE
TIME IS N W ITS ENEMY, AND FEEL COMPELLED TO ACT MILITARILY WHILE THE
O
SERBS STILL HAVE A BOSNIAN MUSLIM ENEMY TO DEAL WITH.
)) )
RWANDA:
1. ^ VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO ESCALATE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRIAN
ARMY AND THE RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA IN EASTERN ZAIRE. NGOS
AND REFUGEES COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE AND MORE NGOS MAY BE
FORCED TO EVACUATE.
-- LAST WEEK, THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES (FAZ) FIRED INTO A C O D OF
RW
RWANDAN REFUGEES IN KATALE CAMP AFTER A ZAIRIAN NATIONAL WAS ROBBED
BY REFUGEES. SEVERAL, INCLUDING W M N AND CHILDREN, WERE KILLED.
OE
-- FAZ TROOPS ALSO HANDED OVER 37 HUTU MILITIAMEN TO OFFICIALS OF THE
KIGALI REGIME. THE EXILED HUTUS FEAR THEY WILL BE KILLED BY THE
TUTSIS IN RETRIBUTION FOR THE GENOCIDE THEY CONDUCTED EARLIER THIS
YEAR.
2. f€-) THE HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT,
MANY OF W O ARE ARMED, ARE CERTAIN TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE FAZ FOR
HM
THE KILLINGS AND FOR TURNING HUTUS OVER TO THE CURRENT TUTSI-LED
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.
NORTH KOREA:
EO 13526 1.4c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD010\NOV94\MSGS\M1387420.html
Page 3 of 4
EO 13526 1.4c
NEVERTHELESS, AT THEIR MAXIMUM RANGE OF 70KM, NORTH
KOREA N W HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DELIVERING FROG-7S TO THE NORTHERN
O
OUTSKIRTS OF SEOUL WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.
INDONESIA:
f&) A N W CYCLE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR UNDERSCORES THE
E
COMPLEX POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS THAT WILL CONTINUE
TO COMPLICATE JAKARTA'S EFFORTS TO PACIFY THE PROVINCE. MOREOVER,
THIS MONTH'S ETHNIC VIOLENCE WILL ALSO PROBABLY DELAY ADDITIONAL
TROOP REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA. A MANIFESTATION OF THE LONG-STANDING
TIMORESE RESENTMENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL, THE MILITARY
OCCUPATION, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE MIGRANTS TO THE PROVINCE,
THE ETHNIC VIOLENCE IS BEING FANNED BY DISAFFECTED URBAN UNEMPLOYED
AND STUDENTS. AN OVER-REACT ION, THUS FAR CAREFULLY AVOIDED BY THE
MILITARY, WOULD BROADEN ETHNIC TENSIONS TO A WIDER SEGMENT OF THE
TIMORESE POPULATION.
) ) )
PART I I : (S) DIA WATCH CONDITION STATUS:
-WATCHCON
WARNING PROBLEM
YUGOSLAVIA/UNITED NATIONS
YUGOSLAVIA REGIONAL
SOMALIA (INTERNAL)
HAITI (INTERNAL)
IRAQ REGIONAL
ALGERIA (INTERNAL)
IRAQ (INTERNAL)
RWANDA (INTERNAL)
CUBA (INTERNAL)
IRAN REGIONAL
ANGOLA (INTERNAL)
SOUTH AFRICA (INTERNAL)
NIGERIA/CAMEROON
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA
UKRAINE (INTERNAL)
S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02
GEORGIA (INTERNAL)
BURUNDI (INERNAL)
RUSSIA (INTERNAL)
SUDAN (INTERNAL)
ISRAEL REGIONAL
ZAIRE (INTERNAL)
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
TAJIKISTAN REGIONAL
ISRAEL/ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SRI LANKA (INTERNAL)
YEMEN (INTERNAL)
SPRATLY ISLANDS/SOUTH CHINA SEA
CAMBODIA (INTERNAL)
PAKISTAN (INTERNAL)
AS OF
I
I
I
II
II
II
II
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
28
15
1
27
24
10
6
13
23
21
15
15
24
15
26
JAN
MAY
DEC
OCT
OCT
DEC
AUG
OCT
SEP
JUL
JUL
JUL
MAR
FEB
JAN
93
92
92
94
94
93
93
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
94
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
IV
IV
IV
IV
3
22
14
24
2
9
14
25
26
11
23
3
29
30
DEC
OCT
OCT
AUG
AUG
JUL
JAN
OCT
SEP
FEB
NOV
NOV
JUL
JUN
93
93
93
93
93
93
93
92
92
92
94
94
94
94
IV
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
29 APR 94
�Page 4 of 4
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MOLDOVA REGIONAL
CONGO (INTERNAL)
EGYPT/SUDAN
CHINA (INTERNAL)
LEBANON (INTERNAL)
MALAWI (INTERNAL)
KENYA (INTERNAL)
INDIA/PAKISTAN
EGYPT (INTERNAL)
CIS NUCLEAR PROBLEM
LIBYA
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
IV
(DECL OADR)
BT
#0515
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<''SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN:
(b)(3)
TOR: 941130000256 M1387420
<-TOR>941130000510 M1387426
DIST:
SIT: NSC
•
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
8 MAR 91
23 DEC 93
16 AUG 93
2 AUG 93
3 MAY 93
2 2 JAN 9 3
13 JAN 93
20 NOV 92
10 AUG 92
4 JUN 92
2 FEB 8 9
12 JUL 88
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PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS84 4 5 34 60521-CCCC--RHEHWSR.
ZNY CCCCC
P 092019Z DEC 94
_(b)(3)
RUEKJCS
092019Z DEC 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
////
RWANDA-ZAIRE: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION EXPANSION PLANS.
C O N F - i D E N T I A L
PASS: I
(b)(3)
NOFORN
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
THE VI EWS OF THE ORIGINATINGORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDI NATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
)) )
(b)(3)
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID)
SERIAL
SUBJ: RWANDA-ZAIRE: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION EXPANSION PLANS. (U)
DOI : 9 DEC 94 (AS OF 1100 EST)
TEXT : 1. (€-) THE UN IS SEEKING TROOPS FROM 57 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
INCLUD ING THE US, TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN
ZAIRE. POTENTIAL DONORS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO OFFER TROOPS FOR THIS
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS OPERATION, AND THE UN WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY
FIELDING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
2. (€-) THIS PROPOSAL AIMS TO ALLOW THE ESTIMATED 1.2 MILLION HUTU
REFUGEES IN ZAIRE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WITHOUT FEAR OF
INTIMIDATION FROM HUTU EXTREMISTS. IT IS THE BROADEST PEACEKEEPING
REQUEST THE UN HAS EVER UNDERTAKEN FOR A NEW OPERATION.
3. ffr) THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UNPKO) IS
SEEKING A SELF-CONTAINED INFANTRY BRIGADE OF TWO MECHANIZED
BATTALIONS, ONE MOTORIZED BATTALION, AND HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTICS
UNITS. IT WILL ACCEPT ONLY WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED UNITS,
DEPLOYING WHEELED OR TRACKED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. IDEALLY, THE
UN WOULD LIKE A SINGLE COUNTRY TO PROVIDE THE ENTIRE BRIGADE, BUT I F
NO ONE NATION STEPS FORWARD, THE UN WILL ACCEPT CONTINGENTS FROM MORE
THAN ONE COUNTRY.
4. (U) AUTHORITY FOR THE ACTION DERIVES FROM THE RECENTLY PASSED UN
SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) RESOLUTION 965. THIS RESOLUTION ALLOWS THE
SECRETARY GENERAL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UNSC, TO INCREASE THE
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA
(UNAMIR) AND TO EXPLORE OPTIONS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE ZAIRIAN
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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CAMPS.
5. (C/NF) COMMENT: DESPITE ITS INTENTIONS, THE UN WILL HAVE
DIFFICULTY FIELDING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE UNPKO HAS NOT DEFINED
THE MISSION OR THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT UNDER WHICH THE FORCE WOULD
OPERATE. MOREOVER, DONORS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO OFFER TROOPS FOR AN
OPERATION WHOSE OBJECTIVE PROBABLY WILL INCLUDE DISARMING THE
SOLDIERS OF THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) AND THE HUTU
MILITIAS AND RELOCATING THEM AWAY FROM THE ZAIRE-RWANDA BORDER. THESE
GROUPS, WHICH ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF A HALF
MILLION TUTSIS IN RWANDA, QUITE LIKELY WILL RESIST DISARMAMENT AND
RELOCATION, MAKING THE UN OPERATION A DANGEROUS EFFORT.
6. (C/NF) DIFFERENTIATING MILITIA MEMBERS FROM THE GENERAL REFUGEES
WILL BE DIFFICULT, AND REFUGEES PROBABLY WILL BE UNWILLING TO
IDENTIFY EXTREMISTS FOR FEAR OF RETALIATION. LIKEWISE, MANY EX-FAR
PERSONNEL WILL SIMPLY SHED THEIR UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHING AND
BLEND WITH THE REFUGEES TO AVOID RELOCATION.
7. ^ THE BEST OUTCOME THE UN CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF
PEACEKEEPERS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS WILL PERMIT THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION
TO RUN MORE EQUITABLY AND THAT THEY WILL PROVIDE GREATER SAFETY TO
REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS. EVEN IF SOME COUNTRIES D CONTRIBUTE
O
TROOPS TO THIS OPERATION, ARRANGING THEIR ARRIVAL AND GETTING THEM TO
FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY WILL TAKE MONTHS. MOREOVER, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF
THE REFUGEES PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE AND WILL NOT RETURN TO
RWANDA FOR FEAR OF STANDING TRIAL.
_(b).(3)_
DECL:
BT
#8445
OADR
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941212023114 M1409171
SIT: NSC
n
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DTG:
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INFO
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PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS2594 3550844-CCCC--RHEHWSR.
ZNY CCCCC
RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKMEA T CG I I MEF
RUEKJCS
202218Z DEC 94
(b)(3)
AIG 7031
AIG 7033
////
RWANDA: KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF WASHINGTON TRIP. (U)
NOFORN
(b)(3)
PASS: |
(b)(3)
)) )
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT
(b)(3)
THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
(b)(3)
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
(b)(3)
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID)
SUBJ: RWANDA: KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF WASHINGTON TRIP. (U)
DOI: 20 DEC 94 (AS OF 1700 EST)
TEXT: 1. (€-} WHILE VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME RECEIVED LITTLE MORE THAN
PROMISES DURING HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK, HE VIEWS THE VISIT
AS A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STEP IN OBTAINING TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE
US. NONETHELESS, KIGALI FACES THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER VIOLENCE IN THE
REFUGEE CAMPS OWING TO THE PRESENCE OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS,
THE EX-FAR, AND MILITIA MEMBERS.
2. (C/NF) MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME, RWANDA'S VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE
MINISTER, VISITED WASHINGTON FROM 10 THROUGH 14 DECEMBER. THE GENERAL
STATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND THE
REGION AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO KEY US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
SELECTED AMERICAN NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S). THE ULTIMATE
GOAL WAS TO ACQUIRE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID AND TO ENSURE THAT
RWANDA REMAINS A PRIORITY ISSUE WITH INFLUENTIAL HUMANITARIAN
AGENCIES AND PRIVATE THINK TANKS. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO
RECEIVE ANY FINANCIAL AID FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
3. (C/NF) KAGAME'S VIEWS ON THE REGIONAL REFUGEE PROBLEM. ACCORDING
TO RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME, RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
OUTSIDE RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE, REQUIRES INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION. KAGAME HAS SAID THAT LITTLE MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE
REQUIRED BECAUSE EX-FAR AND MILITIA PERSONNEL WOULD FLEE THE REGION
WHEN FACED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL OR ZAIRIAN FORCE.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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KAGAME BELIEVES THAT WHILE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU MAY NOT EXERCISE
DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE, HE CAN CLEARLY
INFLUENCE EVENTS IF HE DESIRES TO ACT.
AN EXAMPLE OF THE ZAIRIANS'
ABILITY TO ACT IS THE RECEWT ARREST AND TURNOVER OF MORE THAN 30
FORMER RWANDAN MILITIA MEMBERS TO THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY.
NONETHELESS, KAGAME DECRIED MOBUTU'S FAILURE TO DETAIN THE GROUP'S
TOP LEADERS.
I))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
4. (C/NF) ANOTHER OBJECTIVE OF KAGAME'S VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE US
TO SUPPORT LIFTING THE UN ARMS EMBARGO O RWANDA. KAGAME BELIEVES HE
N
RECEIVED BACKING FOR THIS MOVE, AT LEAST FROM DEFENSE SECRETARY
PERRY. THE RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT ALSO TRIED TO CONVINCE THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. HE THINKS THAT SUCH ACTION IS
CRITICAL TO OBTAINING PROMISED US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE
TRANSITION OF THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY FROM A GUERRILLA FORCE TO A
CONVENTIONAL ARMY.
5. (C/MF) SPECIFICALLY, KAGAME WANTS TRAINING ASSISTANCE. HE STATED
THAT INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TRAINING PROGRAM AID AND MOBILE
TRAINING TEAMS WOULD HELP RWANDAN ARMY LEADERS INSTILL A HIGHER
DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PERSONNEL AND IMPROVE THEIR TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE. THE RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT DOD HAS PROMISED TO
PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IF THE ARMS EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED.
6. (C/NF) KAGAME ALSO MET WITH CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS, NGO
OFFICIALS, AND OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE HOPES THESE GROUPS
WILL PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR REBUILDING HIS RESOURCESTRAPPED COUNTRY AND ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION. ACCORDING TO KAGAME, THE REFUGEE ISSUE RECEIVES MORE
EMPHASIS THAN BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE,
WHICH IN HIS VIEW, IS A CRITICAL STEP IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IN
ADDITION, KAGAME URGED THAT AID BE GIVEN TO THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT
RWANDANS COULD HELP THEMSELVES AND BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
ACTIONS.
7. (C/NF) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KAGAME REPEATEDLY THANKED THE US
GOVERNMENT FOR PAST ASSISTANCE, HE CRITICIZED THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, SPECIFICALLY NGO'S, FOR THEIR LACK OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO
HIS GOVERNMENT. THIS PROBABLY WAS IN RETALIATION AGAINST LECTURES BY
WESTERN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AMERICANS.
8. (C/NF) KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION SEEMS
ACCURATE. KIGALI CAN D LITTLE SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION TO
O
ELIMINATE THE SECURITY THREAT POSED BY FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS,
EX-ARMED FORCES OF RWANDA (FAR)
TROOPS, AND MILITIA IN THE REFUGEE
CAMPS. KAGAME MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE SUCH ACTION IF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS
ESCALATE OR A MAJOR MILITARY THREAT DEVELOPS. EVEN SO, GOVERNMENT
FORCES ARE UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE MUCH SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE BECAUSE
THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY S O LITTLE WILLINGNESS TO
HW
INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE CAMPS. MOREOVER, THE INTERVENING FORCE,
ALONG WITH REFUGEES AND MEMBERS OF THE EX-FAR AND THE MILITIA,
PROBABLY WOULD SUFFER CASUALTIES.
9. (C/NF) THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT, MEANWHILE, HAS STATED THAT IT MAY
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Page 3 of 3
SEEK INTERNATIONAL HELP TO REMOVE FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EXFAR TROOPS, AND MILITIAS FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER,
THE ZAIRIANS HAVE MADE ONLY TOKEN EFFORTS TO EASE THE SITUATION. I F
ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU IS SERIOUS ABOUT MOVING AGAINST THE REFUGEE
CAMPS, HE COULD DEPLOY HIS PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. THESE ARE TROOPS THAT
HE CONTROLS DIRECTLY AND W O ARE LOYAL TO HIM. UNLESS INTERNATIONAL
H
ACTION OCCURS SOON, THE REGION VERY LIKELY WILL EXPLODE AS THE
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL AVENUES AND ABANDONED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, USES MILITARY FORCE IN NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES.
(b)(3)
DECL:
BT
#2594
SECT
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SECTION: 01 OF 01
LM31
941221034948 M1426553
SIT: NSC
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Rwanda
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2014-0295-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on the genocide in Rwanda. Included are reports, papers, cables on the military, political, and humanitarian situation in Rwanda and the neighboring countries in 1994.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Mulilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Leonard Hawley
Eric Schwartz
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
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2014-0295-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Genocide
Rwanda
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/73b22b5c7ee25c3e663318d3e0881212.pdf
bc80a8a659e04a945fea2c3b41684648
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD014\AUG95\MSGS\Ml818724.html
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Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE!
LINE2
LINE3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OAACZYUW RUEHGVA6384 2331310-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 211310Z AUG 95
FM USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHGV
2113102 AUG 95
USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5598
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0981
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RUSNSTC/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD
ICRC FOLLOW-UP ON MISSING DETAINEES IN BOSNIA:
SUBJ:
GROWING CONCERN
TEXT:
& Q N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 006384
USCINCEUR ECJ2 ECJ3 ECJ4 ECJ5 POLAD
E.O. 12356: 8/21/96
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, UN, BK, HR
SUBJECT: ICRC FOLLOW-UP ON MISSING DETAINEES IN BOSNIA:
GROWING CONCERN
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
EO 13526 1.4d
3. REFCOUNS DELIVERED ON AUGUST 18 TO ICRC DEPUTY
DELEGATE GENERAL FOR EUROPE, CHRISTOPHE GIROD, COPIES OF
U.S. SATELLITE IMAGERY OF POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE SITES IN
BOSNIA. WE PLAN TO PROVIDE THE SAME TO UN HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AYALA LASSO. THE
SANITIZED IMAGERY, PROVIDED BY DEPARTMENT, WAS THAT
WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS AND SHARED WITHIN
THE U.Nj
E0 13S7fi1.4ri
EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 14\AUG95\MSGS\M 1818724.html
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EO 13526 1.4d
5. COMMENT. THE ICRC VIEWPOINT ON SREBENICA AND ZEPA
HAS SHIFTED PERCEPTIBLY.[
IF WE CAN GIVE THEM
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY
WILL FOLLOW IT UP IN THE FIELD.GERSON
BT
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RW
SUM2 VERSHBOW
•
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Cable
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: -OONriDDHI'IAIr
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA7727 2432101-CCCC—RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 P 312059Z AUG 95
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 312059Z AUG 95
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6694
INFO: RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 3338
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 1697
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SUBJ:
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TEXT:
1
«C 0 H T I t T E W T I A f e
STATE 207727
GENEVA FOR RMA
E.O. 12356: DECL: 990831
TAGS: PREF PHUM BK SR HR ICRC
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO ICRC ON ACCESS TO MISSING PERSONS FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA; REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GORAZDE
REF: (A) 95 STATE 203532, (B) 95 STATE 194772, (C) 95 STATE 191010
1.
GOHriDDUTIffL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE -- PLEASE SEE PARAS 4-5.
THE LACK OF ACCESS TO AND INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING
PERSONS FROM THE FORMER UN SAFE AREAS OF SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA CONTINUES TO BE A CAUSE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO US. W
E
ARE AWARE THAT THE ICRC HAS ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP
INFORMATION ABOUT THE NUMBER, LOCATION AND CONDITION OF
DETAINEES AND OTHER PERSONS MISSING FROM THE SREBRENICA
AND ZEPA AREAS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, I T APPEARS THAT A
LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS -- FOR THE MOST PART DRAFT-AGED
MEN -- REMAINS UNACCOUNTED FOR.
3. WE ARE SIMILARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF
INFORMATION ON NUMBERS OF PERSONS AND PREVAILING
CONDITIONS IN THE REMAINING SAFE AREA OF GORAZDE. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT ICRC HAS (OR AT LEAST HAD) A PRESENCE IN
THE GORAZDE AREA. I F THIS IS THE CASE, ICRC COULD BE A
USEFUL SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT CONDITIONS IN THE
GORAZDE ENCLAVE.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: RMA GENEVA IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH APPROPRIATE ICRC OFFICIALS TO REITERATE OUR
CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT THE FATE OF MISSING PERSONS FROM
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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Page 2 of2
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA, AND TO ASK FOR ANY UPDATED
INFORMATION WHICH ICRC MAY HAVE DEVELOPED. ADDITIONALLY,
RMA SHOULD INQUIRE OF ICRC OFFICIALS WHETHER, IN THEIR.
VIEW, THE USG COULD ASSIST THEIR EFFORTS IN OBTAINING
INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING PERSONS AND ACCESS TO DETAINEES.
5. CONCERNING GORAZDE, RMA SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY THE
STATUS OF THE ICRC PRESENCE THERE AND REQUEST THAT ICRC
SHARE WITH US ANY NEW INFORMATION I T DEVELOPS REGARDING
ACTUAL NUMBERS OF PERSONS REMAINING IN THE GORAZDE SAFE
AREA AND THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS IN THE ENCLAVE.
6. SARAJEVO -- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT
BT
#7727
SECT
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SECTION: 01 OF 01
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950831170318 M1835149
SIT: BELL BREMNER CLARKER DAALDER FLANAGAN NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ
SESTAK VERSHBOW
•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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Cable
PREC
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ORIG
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SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
CQHriDEMTIAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA3368 24 90011-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 060011Z SEP 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
060011Z SEP 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7139
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0241
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RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0893
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8917
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RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
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BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
TEXT:
•€ O ' 'P-I D D H f I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
N
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
i.
coHriDDHTinr -
ENTIRE
TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD015\SEP95\MSGS\M1840784.html
2. COUNSELORS FROM THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET
AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 5 TO DISCUSS A GERMAN DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RESPONDING TO THE SYG'S AUGUST
30 REPORT REGARDING THE FATE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
OF ZEPA AND SREBRENICA. (THE GERMAN DRAFT CIRCULATED
DURING THE MEETING ALREADY CONTAINED U.S. PROPOSED
LANGUAGE THAT STATES GIVE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
ACCESS TO SITES I T DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS
INVESTIGATIONS.) ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP AGREED THAT
THE COUNCIL SHOULD RESPOND TO THE REPORT BY ADOPTING A
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE UK, FRENCH, ITALIAN AND
RUSSIAN DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT
BE SEEN AS GIVING DIRECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL WHICH WAS AN AUTONOMOUS BODY. THEY THEREFORE
SUGGESTED THE DELETION OF THE SENTENCE IN THE ORIGINAL
DRAFT WHICH EXPRESSED THE COUNCIL'S HOPE THAT THE
TRIBUNAL'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED
IN THE SYG'S REPORT BE INTENSIFIED. THE GERMAN
REPRESENTATIVE AGREED TO THE DELETION.
3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE STATEMENT
SHOULD ALSO REFLECT CONCERNS ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROATIA THAT HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THE SYG'S
AUGUST 23 REPORT ON UNCRO. HE CIRCULATED TWO
PARAGRAPHS CONTAINING SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. ALL OTHER
DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL TAKE UP THE
QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SECTORS NORTH
AND SOUTH IN A SEPARATE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE
RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE AGREED THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD
ACCEPT THE PRINCIPAL OF TWO PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS
WHICH WERE ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
4. COUNSELORS WENT THROUGH THE GERMAN TEXT PARAGRAPH
BY PARAGRAPH AND AGREED TO SEND THE TEXT FOUND BELOW TO
CAPITALS. THEY ALSO WENT THROUGH THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS
AND TURNED THEM INTO A FREE STANDING STATEMENT THAT
WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO CAPITALS. THE BRITISH
REPRESENTATIVE RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT THE REFERRENCE
TO "SECTORS" NORTH, SOUTH ANP WEST, AND THE USE OF THE
TERM "KRAJINA SERB" POPULATION IN THE RUSSIAN
STATEMENT. THE GROUP AGREED THAT I T WILL RECONVENE AT
1100 SEPTEMBER 6 TO CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION OF THE TWO
TEXTS.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
ON ZEPA AND SREBRENICA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST (S/1995/755) SUBMITTED
PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 OF 10 AUGUST 1995.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF
THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS
CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT
RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT
THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA
BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR
P O M E T P H >HT I A-fe SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHO ARE WITHIN THE
AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER
THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL
SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE
THEM.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993) . THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND
ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE
TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO
LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT
INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.
6.
BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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ON CROATIA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE
GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED FROM
THEIR HOMES AS A RESULT OF THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE IN
SECTORS WEST, SOUTH AND NORTH IN CROATIA AND AT REPORTS
OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS
DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23
AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE
KRAJINA SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO
CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INCLUDING THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY
AND KILLINGS IN SECTORS SOUTH AND NORTH AND DEMANDS
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY TAKES
APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. ITS CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER
STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND
ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
C Q t U r i - D D t l T I
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J 5 ,
ft-Ii
SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON
CROATIA.
7.
SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
GNEHM
BT
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SECT:
SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
A
A
SSN:
3368
TOR:
< SSN>3368
< SSN>3368
950905204830 M1840784
< TOR>950905204832 M1840785
< TOR>950905204834 M1840786
A
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: BELL BREMNER CLARKER DAALDER FETIG FLANAGAN MITCHELL NSC PETERS
SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK S M SUM2 VERSHBOW
U
•
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Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
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OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
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SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
OOMriDCHTIMs
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA3401 2510016-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 080016Z SEP 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
080016Z SEP 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7175
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0251
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2813
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1569
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2867
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1570
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8930
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4070
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2083
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 27 99
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0901
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3012
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 37 58
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBSAA/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
TEXT:
0- O
. I D D H ' l ft L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401
I T
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
1.
OONFIDDNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED TWO PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
BOSNIAN AND CROATIA.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD015\SEP95\MSGS\M1844669.html
3. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, THE
DELEGATION OF OMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE STATEMENT ON
BOSNIA INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
BOSNIAN SERBS FROM THE SAFE AREAS OF ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA. THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP RESPONDED
THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE
DELEGATION OF OMAN WITHDREW ITS PROPOSAL.
4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA:
THE SEURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/755)
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) OF 10
AUGUST 1995.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF
THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS
CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) ANE THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT
BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT
RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT
THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA
BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO SUCH PERSONS WHO ARE WITHIN
THE AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL
SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE
THEM.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993). THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND
ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE
TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO
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LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT
INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
o o w ^ * ^ E » T I f t ^ L ^ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401
l
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
MATTER.
END TEXT
5.
BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON CROATIA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730)
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1009 OF 10 AUGUST
1995 ON CROATIA AND IN PARTICULAR THE HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED THEREIN.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE
GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED
DURING THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE AND AT REPORTS OF
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DESCRIBED
IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST
1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE LOCAL
SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF
SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO CONCERNED
BY REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE
BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS AND
DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY
INVESTIGATE ALL SUCH REPORTS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE
MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE
RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR
RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN TO SAFETY.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. IT CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER
STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND
ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE W O
H
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS. THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
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ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND ITS ORGANS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT
6.
SAREJEVO MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.
GNEHM
BT
#3401
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 3401
< SSN>3401
TOR: 950907205424 M1844669
OTOR>950907205528 M1844671
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BELL BREMNER CLARKER DAALDER FLANAGAN HALPERIN LORIN MALLEY NSC
PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK VERSHBOW VERVILLE
•
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Cable
ROUTINE
PREC
•^UNL'lUELUllAi:
CLASS
RAACZYUW RUEHGVA7023 2581118-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE1
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE 2
R 151118Z SEP 95
LINE3
LINE 4 FM USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHGV
OSRI
DTG
151118Z SEP 95
USMISSION GENEVA
ORIG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6268
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
INFO
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9374
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1010
RUSNSTC/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/J3/J4/J5/EC/POLAD//
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3841
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0125
REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
SUBJ:
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
TEXT:
• COW
R I B P N T I A L - SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 007023
E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
REF: STATE 207727
1.
UOHgJPBHTIAb - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: ICRC PRESIDENT
SOMMARUGA MADE A REQUEST TO AMB. SPIEGEL THAT ANY PEACE
AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA INCLUDE AN
EXPRESS REFERENCE TO THE ICRC AS THE ENTITY THROUGH
WHICH THE ISSUES OF DETAINEES AND THE MISSING SHOULD BE
PURSUED. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT I T WOULD BE A
MISTAKE TO LINK THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES THEMSELVES
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE SREBRENICA
MISSING, SOMMARUGA TOLD AMB. SPIEGEL THAT HE IS SENDING
A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC DEMANDING AN
EXPLANATION. ICRC INTERVIEWS OF SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN
TUZLA INDICATE THAT 3,000 ARRESTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS
IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI ARE MISSING AND THAT ANOTHER
1,000 - 2,000 OF THOSE WHO FLED SREBRENICA ARE STILL
UNACCOUNTED FOR. ICRC'S DEMANDS FOR ACCESS TO ALL
DETAINEES HAS SO FAR RESULTED IN VISITS TO ONLY 164.
DECLASSIFIED
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ICRC WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT THE
MASS GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA DEPICTED IN THE
DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS ACTUALLY CONTAIN
CORPSES. ICRC REPORTS THAT THE EVACUATION FROM ZEPA WAS
M C CLEANER IN COMPARISON AND THAT THE NUMBER OF
UH
MISSING IS A G O DEAL LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED. THEY ALSO
OD
INDICTATE THAT GORAZDE HAS AN ESTIMATED POPULATION OF
30,000 - 40,000 WITH OVERCROWDED LIVING CONDITIONS IN
GORAZDE CITY, BUT WITH ADEQUATE FOODS WATER AND MEDICAL
SUPPLIES UNTIL THE BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE W R
EE
RECENTLY DESTROYED. END S M A Y AND ACTION REQUEST.
UMR
3. AMB SPIEGEL BRIEFED ICRC PRESIDENT S M A U A ON
OMRG
SEPTEMBER 13 O THE OUTCOME OF THE YUGOSLAVIA PEACE
N
TALKS HELD IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8. S M A U A IN TURN
OMRG
REQUESTED THAT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT INCLUDE A PROVISION
EXPRESSLY IDENTIFYING ICRC AS THE ORGANIZATION THROUGH
WHICH THE ISSUES RELATING TO DETAINEES AND MISSING
PERSONS SHOULD BE PURSUED. IN SOMMARUGA'S VIEW THE
PROVISION IN THE TEXT SHOULD G N FURTHER THAN STATING
O O
THAT ICRC WILL W R WITH THE PARTIES ON THESE ISSUES.
OK
IT SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISSUES LEST THEY BECOME ENTANGLED WITH POLITICAL ISSUES.
4. S M A U A NOTED THAT ICRC HAS ALREADY BEEN THE
OMRG
FACILITATOR FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THESE
TOPICS. IT IS PRESENT AT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE
AND ZAGREB AND PLAYS THE SUPPORTING ROLE AT THE THREE
PARTIES' REGULAR DISCUSSIONS AT THE SARAJEVO AIRPORT
CONCERNING DETAINEES AND MISSING.
5. AMB. SPIEGEL UNDERTOOK TO PASS O SOMMARUGA'S
N
REQUEST. HE NOTED THAT PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES MIGHT
SERVE AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. S M A U A AGREED, BUT CAUTIONED THAT W R ON
OMRG
OK
THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN
DISCUSSIONS OF POLITICAL ISSUES. OTHERWISE PROGRESS ON
BOTH COULD BE SLOWED.
THE SREBRENICA MISSING
6. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. SPIEGEL'S INQUIRY, S M A U A
OMRG
SAID THAT HE WILL SEND A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC
O THE SREBRENICA MISSING. ICRC HAS REPORTS F O
N
RM
SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA OF APPROXIMATELY 8000
MISSING. OF THESE, ABOUT THREE THOUSAND W R REPORTED
EE
TO BE IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI W E SREBRENICA FELL AND
HN
W R ARRESTED BY THE SERBS. THE OTHER FIVE THOUSAND
EE
REPORTEDLY FLED SREBRENICA BEFORE THE ENCLAVE FELL.
7. S M A U A SAID THAT ICRC HAS BEEN TOLD BY SERBIAN
OMRG
AUTHORITIES THAT IT MAY HAVE A
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CCESS TO ALL THE
DETAINEES, BUT SO FAR IT HAS BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO ONLY
164 HELD AT FIVE POINTS OF DETENTION- ICRC DOES NOT
K O WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER DETENTION LOCATIONS.
NW
SOMMARUGA'S LETTER TO KARADZIC WILL CONTAIN NAMES OF THE
MISSING, STATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT A MASSACRE HAS TAKEN
-G O MH> I D D 1 T I-A IT-SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 007023
1
E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
PLACE AND ASK IN POINTED TERMS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE
MISSING THREE THOUSAND WHO WERE ARRESTED. (ICRC TOLD US
THAT WHEN THEY RAISED THE ISSUE WITH BOSNIAN SERB VICE
PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHEN HE WAS IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8, HE
DID NOT DENY THE ALLEGATIONS OF A MASSACRE BUT SIMPLY
SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THEM.)
8. WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES, SOMMARUGA SAID THAT ICRC
IS AWARE OF ABOUT 2000 IN ALL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
- 800 HELD BY THE CROATS, 600-800 BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS
AND 300 BY THE BOSNIACS AND HVO.
9. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC OFFICIALS IN
RESPONSE TO REFTEL WE WERE TOLD THAT THE 164 VISITED ARE
HELD IN FIVE LOCATIONS NEAR BATKOVIC AND PRESUMABLY ARE
IN THE GROUP OF FIVE THOUSAND WHO FLED FROM SREBRENICA.
THERE ARE VARYING ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN
THIS GROUP WHO HAVE SAFELY ESCAPED BOSNIAN SERB
TERRITORY. BOSNIAN MINISTER MURATOVIC TOLD ICRC THAT IT
IS BETWEEN THREE AND FOUR THOUSAND, LEAVING ANOTHER ONE
TO TWO THOUSAND MISSING. ICRC IS WORKING ON COMPILING
THE NAMES OF THE MISSING IN THIS GROUP AND ASKING THE
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FOR WHATEVER INFORMATION IT HAS ON
THEM.
10. WE ALSO PASSED TO ICRC, UNHCR AND THE UN HUMAN
RIGHTS CENTER DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS OF MASS
GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA. ICRC ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY
FURTHER INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT THE SITES ACTUALLY
CONTAINED CORPSES. BOTH ICRC AND UNHCR HAVE TOLD US
THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE
SITES. ICRC, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT I T IS NOT PRESSING THE
ISSUE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS. IT DOES NOT VIEW ITS ROLE
AS THAT OF AN INVESTIGATOR" IT WILL RECITE THE
ALLEGATIONS TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS, BUT IT IS UP TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH ANSWERS.
ZEPA
11. ICRC ALSO TOLD US THAT THE EVACUATION OF ZEPA WAS A
MUCH CLEANER OPERATION. ICRC IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF
TRACING THE MISSING AND HAVE VISITED 796 WHO FLED ZEPA
TO SERBIA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER OF ZEPA MISSING
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WILL TURN OUT TO BE A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN A HUNDRED.
GORAZDE
12. IN GORAZDE, ICRC HAS TWO EXPATS AND 10 LOCAL
STAFF. THEY ESTIMATE THAT THE POPULATION OF THE GORAZDE
ENCLAVE IS 30,000 - 40,000. GORAZDE CITY IS OVERCROWDED
AND LIVING CONDITIONS ARE POOR. UNTIL VERY RECENTLY,
HOWEVER, FOOD SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE, HELPED BY AN
ACTIVE BLACK MARKET. MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE ALSO BEEN
ADEQUATE UNTIL RECENTLY, SUPPLIED BY MSF. LOCAL WELLS
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WATER. HOWEVER, WITH THE RECENT
DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE, FOOD AND
MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE RAPIDLY DWINDLING"
13. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SPIEGEL
BT
#7023
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 7023
< SSN>7023
TOR: 950915072553 M1856690
< TOR>950915072555 M1856691
A
A
/v
DIST:
SIT: NSC
•
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Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
GOmriPBHTIM,
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA3936 284 0105-CCCC—RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 110105Z OCT 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
110105Z OCT 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 034 0
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2918
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 167 0
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2960
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0981
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3095
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3867
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9158
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2254
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1652
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2896
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4210
BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
TEXT:
• O M F . H F J^I 1 TftT SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003936
C
T
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
DECLASSIFIED
RE 0 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPf - -
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1.
OONroDDHTIMr ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN INFORMALS ON 10 OCTOBER, THE COUNCIL
WELCOMED THE 29 SEPTEMBER REPORT OF THE SYG ON UNCRO
AND APPROVED A DRAFT LETTER FROM THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT
TO THE SYG AGREEING WITH THE REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS.
AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE SYG'S
DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR. GHAREKHAN REPORTED ON
UNPROFOR'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO GAIN ACCESS TO
CIVILIANS FROM ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINED BY THE
BOSNIAN SERBS. HE ALSO BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON THE
STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BROKERED BY HOLBROOKE ON 5
OCTOBER. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE
SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UNCRO BATTALIONS FROM
SECTORS NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST. INDERFURTH STRESSED
THAT THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT MUST DO MORE TO ENSURE THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE SERB MINORITIES AND UNDERLINED US
SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION TEAMS
TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN THOSE AREAS.
4. COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATION
REDUCING UNCRO TO 2,500 BY THE END OF OCTOBER. MEMBERS
AGREED TO ISSUE A LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNCIL NOTING THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE SYG'S REPORT.
TEXT FOLLOWS PARA 10. MEMBERS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
THE CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
BURNING/LOOTING OF HOUSES IN KRAJINA. ITALIAN DEP
PERMREP FERRARIN STATED THAT THE GOC "SHOULD INTERVENE
AND BRING THE CULPRITS TO JUSTICE."
5. AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE
SYG'S DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR BY 9,000 TROOPS
LEAVING 21,000 TROOPS IN THEATER. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT
SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING THE FALL OF ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA, THE HV/HVO AND BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT RECENT
OFFENSIVES, AND THE CREATION OF THE RRF WARRANTED THE
REDUCTION IN UNPROFOR PERSONEL. RECONFIGURATION OF
UNPROFOR WILL ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY BY
CREATING "GENERALIZED BATTALIONS" WITH FLEXIBLE
OPERATION CAPABILITIES. THE REDUCTION WILL HELP
ALLEVIATE SOME PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARIAT TO REDUCE
COSTS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE UN.
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE US
DID NOT QUESTION THE AUTHORITY OF THE SYG, THE COUNCIL
SHOULD BE INFORMED BEFORE AN ALTERATION TO A MANDATE IS
MADE. INDERFURTH SAID A SC MANDATE ESTABLISHES A LINK
BETWEEN THE OPERATION AND ITS SIZE WHICH USUALLY
REQUIRES A SC DECISION TO ALTER.
RUSSIAN DEP PERMREP
FEDOTOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE "PROCEDURE OF
INFORMATION" WHICH ALLOWED CNN ACCESS TO INFORMATION
BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS NOTIFIED. FRENCH PERMREP
DEJAMAIS URGED THE SYG TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN
WITHDRAWING UNPROFOR SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN SUCH
A DELICATE STAGE.
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7. GHAREKHAN REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON THE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA AS CALLED
FOR IN SCR 1010. UNHCR AND ICRC ARE STILL BEING DENIED
ACCESS TO DETAINEES. THE BOSNIAN SERBS W R DENYING
EE
UNPROFOR'ACCESS TO THAT AREA, CONSEQUENTLY, NO
INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES WAS
POSSIBLE. OF THE 8,000 PERSONS REPORTED AS MISSING
G O U r i ' D D H T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN N W YORK 003936
E
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
_
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
AFTER THE BSA OFFENSIVE IN SREBRENICA, 3,000 HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS BEING DETAINED, THE OTHER 5,000 HAVE
"SIMPLY DISAPPEARED".
8. MANY DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE
RESTRICTED ACCESS OF UNPROFOR TO THE SITES OF THE
ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED
THAT THE RESTRICTION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT " U FEARS
OR
W R WELL-FOUNDED".
EE
9. GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT OF 5 OCTOBER WAS NOT YET IN EFFECT BECAUSE
GAS AND ELECTRICITY HAD NOT BEEN RESTORED TO SARAJEVO.
ELECTRICITY WAS PREDICTED TO RESUME 10 OCTOBER AND GAS
WOULD BE FORTHCOMING PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. WITHOUT A CEASE-FIRE, FIGHTING
CONTINUED. BOSNIAN ARMY LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AT MT.
VLUK SUPPORTED BY ARTILLERY SOUTH OF TUZLA. THE ATTACK
ELICITED A BSA RESPONSE WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF
ONE NORWEGIAN PEACEKEEPER. FIGHTING WAS INTENSE IN
DOBOJ AND MAGLAI. A REFUGEE CAMP IN ZEVENICA WAS HIT
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF 10 CIVILIANS AND THE INJURY
OF 34 OTHERS.
10. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNCRO:
--THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED
Y U REPORT OF 2 9 SEPTEMBER PURSUANT TO SECURITY
OR
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1009 (1995) (S/1995/835). THE
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREE WITH THE
ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN THAT REPORT FOR THE REMAINDER
OF THE CURRENT MANDATE OF U C O PENDING, IN THE CASE OF
NR
EASTERN SLAVONIA, THE OUTCOME OF THE ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.
END TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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0 111609Z OCT 95
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHBW
111609Z OCT 95
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7367
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1847
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0480
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0750
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 2696
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1473
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0216
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4111
DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING
TEXT:
»-lH -P. I ft B M T I A h 'BELGRADE 005004
E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PRE, PGOV, PHUM, SR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING
REF:
1.
HILL-PERINA TELCON 10/10/95
COHFIDfiMTIftfr - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REFTELCON, I CALLED FRY FOREIGN MINISTER
MILUTINOVIC TO REGISTER WASHINGTON'S STRONG ANGER ABOUT
RENEWED REPORTS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE BANJA LUKA
AREA.
3. I SIAD THAT UN REPORTS OF NEW BOSNIAN SERB
ATROCITIES IN THE REGION WERE BEING PICKED UP BY
ALL THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, INCLUDING A FRONT-PAGE
STORY THAT WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK
TIMES. THIS INCLUDED CHARGES THAT UP TO FIVE
THOUSAND CIVILIAN MUSLIM MEN WERE MISSING AND
UNACCOUNTED FOR. I F TRUE, THIS COULD NOT HELP BUT
EVOKE IMAGES OF NEW MASSACRES SUCH AS HAD TAKEN
PLACE IN SREBRENICA. IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUED
EXPULSION OF THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM CIVILIANS WAS
UNDENIABLE AND DOCUMENTED ON TELEVISION ALMOST
EVERY EVENING. SUCH ACTIONS WERE VICIOUS AND
TOTALLY CONTRARY TO OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO INITIATE
PEACE TALKS. INDEED, THEY COULD ENDANGER THE PEACE
PER E.0.13526
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PROCESS I F NEW MASSACRES WERE DOCUMENTED.
4. MILUTINOVIC PROFESSED SHOCK AND DISMAY AT THE
REPORTS AND SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST HE HAD
HEARD OF THEM. "WHAT SHOULD WE DO?" HE ASKED. I
SAID THAT BELGRADE MUST INSIST THAT BOSNIAN SERB
AUTHORITIES STOP SUCH ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY, ARREST
ANY PARAMILITARY FORCES THAT MAY BE RESPONSIBLE,
AND COOPERATE WITH UN INVESTIGATION OF MISSING
INDIVIDUALS. MILUTINOVIC AGREED THAT THIS WAS A
VERY NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND
SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MILOSEVIC.
(NOTE: I PLAN ALSO TO SEND BOTH MILUTINOVIC AND
MILOSEVIC A COPY OF THE NYT ARTICh, WHEN RECEIVED.)
5. IN A SIDE DISCUSSION OF THE CEASEFIRE,
MILUTINOVIC SAID I T WAS "INCREDIBLY STUPID" OF "RSK
FOREIGN MINISTER" BUHA TO HAVE REJECTED AGREEMENT
TO A DELAYED CEASEFIRE, ALTHOUGH THE BOSNIAN
GOVERNMENT SIDE BORE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SEEKING ARTIFICIAL DELAYS. MILUTINOVIC CALLED ME
BACK AT MIDDAY OCTOBER 11 TO SAY THAT BUHA HAD JUST
SIGNED A DOCUMENT AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO
FURTHER DELAYS FROM EITHER SIDE AND THE CEASEFIRE
COULD GO INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. PERINA
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OOHriDDHTiAL
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 122307Z OCT 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
122307Z OCT 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 804 6
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 034 6
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 167 6
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2 924
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2966
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2273
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2905
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0987
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9178
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3880
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4218
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUEHTHAMEMBASSY ATHENS 1658
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3101
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
TEXT:
0 & t D > D D-H T I h b SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003981
-»
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
1. GOHFIDIJHTIJWJ ENTIRE TEXT.
PER E.(X 13526
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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ADOPTED
2. AMBASSADORS F O THE CONTACT G O P PLUS ITALY MET
RM
RU
MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 12 TO DISCUSS A FRENCH REVISION OF
THE GERMAN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT O BOSNIAN SERB
N
"ETHNIC CLEANSING." THE FRENCH DRAFT WAS BASED O THE
N
GERMAN TEXT OF OCTOBER 12, BUT INCLUDED LANGUAGE
WELCOMING THE FACT THAT THE OCTOBER 5 CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE, AND DEMANDING THAT
BOTH SIDES COMPLY WITH THE CEASE FIRE. IN AN EFFORT TO
ACCOMODATE THE RUSSIAN CONCERNS THE TEXT EXPRESSED DEEP
CONCERN ABOUT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE SCALE
MOVEMENTS OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.
3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE PRESSED CONTACT GROUP
MEMBERS TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE RECENT
MILITARY OFFENSIVES BY THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AS A W Y
A
TO "BALANCE" THE TEXT. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THE
SUGGESTION W S NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG. SHE POINTED
A
OUT THAT THE PRACTICE OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" W S NOT
A
AKIN TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE, DID NOT
DESERVE EQUAL CONDEMNATION BY THE COUNCIL.
4. IN INFORMALS, THE COUNCIL WELCOMED THE DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND AGREED THAT THE URGENT
NATURE OF THE SITUATION CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE
RESPONSE. OMANI, ARGENTIN AND INDONESIAN AMENDMENTS
W R ADDED TO THE TEXT.
EE
5. AFTER ADDITIONAL DEBATE THE COUNCIL ADOPTED O
N
OCTOBER 12 THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOUND BELOW.
BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARIAT
6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL RIZA BRIEFED THE
COUNCIL O CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE CEASE-FIRE IN
N
BOSNIA TOOK EFFECT ON 11 OCTOBER AT 0001 LOCAL TIME.
LIMITED ACCESS TO FRONT LINES PREVENTED UNPROFOR F O
RM
MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE. RIZA SAID THAT
BOSNIAN SERB ETHNIC CLEANSING IN WESTERN BOSNIA WAS
CONTINUING. THE BOSNIAN SERBS GAVE 1,200 MUSLIMS AND
CROATS 2 MINUTES TO LEAVE THEIR H M S IN THE BANJA LUKA
OE
AREA. UNHCR REPORTS INDICATED WIDE SPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN NORTHERN ?!BERY. A LARGE NUMBER OF DRAFT-AGE MEN W R
EE
SEPARATED F O THE EXPELLED PERSONS AND ARE CURRENTLY
RM
UNACCOUNTED FOR. UNHCR FEARS THAT IF THE BOSNIAN SERB
EXPULSION CAMPAIGN CONTINUED AS MANY AS 20,000 MAY S O
ON
BE DISPLACED.
7.
BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:
DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES THE ENTRY INTO FORCE
OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN PARTIES
OF 5 OCTOBER 1995.
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE W O NEGOTIATED THE
H
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE AND OTHERS WHO, OFTEN AT RISK TO THEIR
O N LIVES, HAVE MADE POSSIBLE, WITH THE COOPERATION OF
W
- f e O H l l U l L N l l A l j SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN N W YORK 003981
E
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
1. ^eOllFTDEWTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
ALL THE PARTIES, THE RESTORATION OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY
SUPPLIES TO THE INHABITANTS OF SARAJEVO ENABLING THEM TO
LIVE IN M R DECENT CONDITIONS.
OE
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
AND REFRAIN F O ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT COULD
RM
JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS. IT EXPRESSES ITS DEEPEST
CONCERN AT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE-SCALE
MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS
AND A FINAL AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE COUNCIL IS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT N W REPORTS RELATED TO THE
E
MOVEMENTS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN THE AREAS OF
SANSKI MOST AND MRKONJIC GRAD.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS STRONG
CONDEMNATION OF ALL PRACTICES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING
WHEREVER THEY OCCUR AND BY W O S E E COMMITTED. IT
HMOVR
DEMANDS THEIR IMMEDIATE CESSATION AND UNDERLINES THE
NEED TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS CAUSED BY THESE ACTS.
THE COUNCIL URGES ALL BOSNIAN PARTIES TO RESPECT FULLY
THE RIGHTS OF ALL COMMUNITIES INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO
REMAIN W E E THEY ARE OR TO RETURN TO THEIR H M S IN
HR
OE
SAFETY.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS IN PARTICULAR DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT N W REPORTS CONCERNING ACTS OF ETHNIC
E
CLEANSING COMMITTED IN THE BANJA LUKA AND PRIJEDOR
AREAS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT REPORTS, INCLUDING THOSE BY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, THAT NON-SERB
MEN AND BOYS OF DRAFT AGE ARE BEING TAKEN A A BY
WY
BOSNIAN SERB AND OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES. THE COUNCIL
DEMANDS THAT THESE PERSONS BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY GRANTS IMMEDIATE AND UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR UNITED
NATIONS PERSONNEL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO ALL THE
AREAS OF CONCERN. IT ALSO DEMANDS THAT ICRC
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REPRESENTATIVES BE ALLOWED TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL. THE COUNCIL
REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THE DEMANDS SET OUT IN
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND IN THE STATEMENT OF ITS
PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 ON SREBRENICA AND ZEPA.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THAT THOSE WHO HAVE
COMMITTED OR HAVE ORDERED THE COMMISSION OF VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD
INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THE COUNCIL.RECALLS
IN THIS CONTEXT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827 (1993) AND
REITERATES THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH
THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF
THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
8.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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SOMriDDHTIM;
OAACZYUW RUEHTCA5512 2861654-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUEHTC
131654Z OCT 95
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
TEXT:
C 0»-H B I B E M ' T I f t L
SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
REFS:
1.
A) THE HAGUE 54 52
GOHMDWPIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. THE OFFICIAL MOD REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING
AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA IS LIKELY TO OFFER
SOME GRIST FOR BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH
ACTIONS, ACCORDING TO AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH
THE REPORT. THE MOD BELIEVES THE REPORT -- SCHEDULED
FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 23 -- WILL CLARIFY A NUMBER OF
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING DUTCH ACTIONS THAT HAVE
APPEARED BOTH IN THE DUTCH AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN
RECENT WEEKS. IN PARTICULAR, THE REPORT WILL
HIGHLIGHT THE MILITARY LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE
DUTCH OPERATED AND THE RISKS TO REFUGEES AND BLUE
HELMETS ALIKE I F THE DUTCH RESPONSE HAD BEEN MORE
AGGRESSIVE. ON THE DOWNSIDE FOR THE MOD AND GON, THE
REPORT WILL CONTAIN REFERENCES TO MISBEHAVIOR ON THE
PER E.0.13526
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PART OF DUTCH TROOPS, INCLUDING SELLING OF WEAPONS,
RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN
THAT WILL NOT HELP THE ARMY'S EMBATTLED IMAGE.
3. ALTHOUGH THE REPORT COULD BE DAMAGING POLITICALLY
TO DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE, MOD OBSERVERS DO NOT
SEE A HIGH RISK OF HIS BEING FORCED TO RESIGN. AS
SEPTEL WILL ELABORATE, THE REPORT IS LIKELY TO HAVE
AN IMPACT ON THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS RELATING TO
PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT
SEE, EXCEPT IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, ANY SIGNS OF REDUCED
DUTCH WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MISSIONS
GENERALLY. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS ALSO MOTIVATED DUTCH
EFFORTS WITH THEIR EU COLLEAGUES TO GET SOMETHING IN
A BOSNIA PEACE SETTLEMENT REQUIRING AN ACCOUNTING OF
THE MEN TAKEN AWAY IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. END
SUMMARY.
REPORT NOT TO PULL PUNCHES
4. AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFENSE
MINISTRY'S SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED REPORT ON DUTCH
ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA SAFE
AREA INDICATED THAT THE REPORTWOULD CONTAIN
INFORMATION THAT COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER THE
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH
ACTIONS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE REPORT
WOULD OFFER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY
ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA, PARTICULARLY
THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE TROOPS OPERATED AND
THE RISKS OF ALTERNATIVE, TOUGHER ACTIONS. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE REPORT POINTS OUT THAT DUTCH FORCES
LINED UP OBSERVING REFUGEES BOARD A BUS — A
PHOTOGRAPH OF WHICH HAS BEEN USED TO DEPICT THE DUTCH
AS HAVING COLLUDED IN ETHNIC CLEANSING — HAD IN FACT
FORMED A COLUMN TO PREVENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM
BEING TRAMPLED IN THE RUSH FOR THE BUSES.
IN DEFENSE OF DUTCH ACTIONS
5. AMONG THE KEY POINTS THE REPORT WILL EMPHASIZE TO
BACK UP DUTCH ACTIONS ARE:
-- THE DUTCH TROOPS DID UNDERTAKE MILITARY MANEUVERS
PRIOR TO AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SERB ATTACK TO
PREVENT THE TAKEOVER OF THE SAFE AREA.
— FOLLOWING THE TAKEOVER, THE DUTCH TROOPS' FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT WAS SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED, LIMITING THEIR
ABILITY TO WITNESS EVENTS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.
-- GIVEN THIS RESTRICTED MOVEMENT, THE TROOPS HAD NO
MEANS OF KNOWING THAT MASS EXECUTIONS WERE TAKING
PLACE.
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-- ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE TO THE SERBS WOULD NOT
HAVE PREVENTED THE SERB TAKEOVER, AND COULD HAVE
RESULTED IN HIGH CASUALTIES A O G REFUGEES. THE
MN
REPORT NOTES THAT THE POTOCARI COMPOUND, W E E THE
HR
DUTCH AND MUSLIM REFUGEES W R CONCENTRATED, WAS
EE
0 0 H F i P S H T I A fr-SECTION 02 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
.
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
SURROUNDED BY SERB ARTILLERY. ANY USE OF THAT
ARTILLERY COULD HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF REFUGEES.
POTENTIALLY DAMAGING REVELATIONS
6. ON THE DOWNSIDE OF THE LEDGER, THERE ARE A NUMBER
OF FACTS THAT COULD CAUSE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE
MOD. ALTHOUGH S M REVELATIONS RELATING TO THE
OE
PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE DUTCH DID ALL
THEY COULD TO AVERT HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES, THEY ARE
LIKELY TO BECOME INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH PUBLIC
AND PARLIAMENTARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE DUTCH ROLE IN
SREBRENICA. THESE INCLUDE:
-- THE DUTCH DID NOT REPORT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF
ATROCITIES TO THE U.N. UNTIL THEY W R DEBRIEFED IN
EE
ZAGREB JULY 22 OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE
SERBS AND ENDANGER THE SAFETY AND SAFE DEPARTURE OF
THE TROOPS.
-- THERE W R DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS A O G THE DUTCH
EE
MN
FORCES THAT INCLUDED SELLING EQUIPMENT, EXTREME
RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND P O TREATMENT OF W M N
OR
OE,
SPECIFICALLY W M N WITHIN THEIR O N UNITS.
OE
W
COMPREHENSIVE AND UNJUDGMENTAL
7. THE FINAL REPORT, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED
FOLLOWING CABINET REVIEW OCTOBER 23, IS BASED O
N
INTERVIEWS WITH 4 90 OF THE 4 99 SOLDIERS IN SREBRENICA
CONDUCTED BY 189 DEBRIEFERS. EACH INTERVIEW TOOK AN
AVERAGE OF.FOUR HOURS, WITH S M LASTING UP TO TEN
OE
HOURS. ACCORDING TO THE MOD, THE REPORT DOES NOT
PRESCRIBE A JUDGEMENT, BUT IS DESIGNED TO LET PEOPLE
C M TO THEIR O N -- BUT BETTER INFORMED — OPINIONS,
OE
W
WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO A M R NUANCED
OE
PERSPECTIVE OF DUTCH ACTIONS.
IMPLICATIONS FOR IFOR
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8. NEITHER MOD NOR MFA OFFICIALS EXPECT THE REPORT
WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN IFOR.
IN FACT, THE MOD SAID THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO POINT
TO IFOR'S MORE ROBUST APPROACH AND BETTER COMMAND AND
CONTROL MECHANISMS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DRAWN THE LESSONS OF
THE FAILURE OF SREBRENICA AND HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO
ENSURE SUCH EVENTS DO NOT OCCUR AGAIN. NEVERTHELESS,
ALL FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING IFOR, WILL BE MORE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND HIGHLY POLITICIZED.
SEEKING AN ACCOUNTING IN PEACE ACCORD
9. AS THE DEPARTMENT MAY BE AWARE, MFA OFFICIALS
HAVE INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS BEEN WORKING
WITHIN THE EU TO SEEK TO BUILD INTO AN EVENTUAL PEACE
SETTLEMENT A REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN
WHO WERETAKEN AWAY OR OTHERWISE MISSING FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. THEY FEAR THAT I F NOTHING IS
WRITTEN INTO THE SETTLEMENT NOW, THERE WILL NEVER BE
AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING.
COMMENT
10. THERE HAS BEEN SOME LIMITED SPECULATION THAT
ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT COULD DAMAGE DEFENSE MINISTER
VOORHOEVE POLITICALLY, AND POTENTIALLY FORCE HIS
RESIGNATION. GIVEN THE REPORT'S MIXTURE OF GOOD AND
BAD NEWS, THE KEY FACTOR WILL BE WHAT USE PARLIAMENT
CHOOSES TO MAKE OF THE REPORT. I F THEY ARE LOOKING
TO PUT THE ISSUE TO REST, THE REPORT WILL GIVE THEM
THE MEANS TO DO SO; CONVERSELY, I F THEY WANT A
SCAPEGOAT, THEY COULD FIND ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO
DAMAGE VOORHOEVE. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS (INCLUDING IN
THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, MFA, AND MOD) DOUBT
•0 0 t F 1- DfrH T I - L SECTION 03 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
»
A
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DuFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
VOORHOEVE IS AT RISK. THEY BELIEVE PARLIAMENT IS
INCREASINGLY COGNIZANT OF THE DAMAGE THEIR CONTINUED
FOCUS ON THE ISSUE IS DOING TO THE DUTCH REPUTATION
INTERNATIONALLY, AND WILL LIKELY LET THE ISSUE GO
AFTER A THOROUGH AIRING OF THE REPORT.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
DORNBUSH
BT
#5512
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SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF
A
A
03
03
SSN:
5512
TOR:
< SSN>5512
< SSN>5512
951013125546 M1900625
< TOR>951013125550 M1900628
< TOR>951013125555 M1900629
A
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW
•
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•fiffllirinffNTTM.
OAACZYUW RUEHBWA5248 2972354-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
0 242354Z OCT 95 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHBW
242354Z OCT 95
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7 504
////
MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
TEXT:
- 0 tl F l''U I I 1 1 J L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248
C
L T
L
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE FROM A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05
TAGS: PREL, BK, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
1.
(U) CLASSIFIED BY RUDOLF V. PERINA, CHIEF OF MISSION
PER 1.5(B). NIACT PRECEDENCE AS REQUESTED BY A/S
HOLBROOKE.
2. -(C)- SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH SERBIAN
PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC ON OCTOBER 24, A/S SHATTUCK RAISED
ISSUES OF ICRC, NGO AND PRESS ACCESS TO AREAS OF BOSNIA
AND CROATIA WHERE GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES OR ETHNIC
CLEANSING ARE TAKING OR HAVE TAKEN PLACE. MILOSEVIC
PROMISED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO INSIST ON ACCESS
AND TO PRESS FOR THE ARREST OF THE GUILTY. A/S SHATTUCK
URGED IMMEDIATE ACTION BY SERBIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS
TO SAVE THE LIVES OF MISSING MUSLIMS FROM THE BANJA LUKA
AREA, SAYING THAT WORDS ON THIS ISSUE ARE WELCOME BUT
ACTIONS ARE CRITICAL AND THE TEST OF ANY REAL PROGRESS.
A/S SHATTUCK ASKED FOR FULL AND ONGOING FRY COOPERATION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC
AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE," BUT NOTED THAT THE LEGAL ISSUES
WERE "COMPLICATED." HE AGREED TO MEETINGS BETWEEN
SERBIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE TRIBUNAL TO DISCUSS MEANS OF
COOPERATION. MILOSEVIC AGREED TO A/S SHATTUCK'S
SUGGESTION THAT THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE BE
ALLOWED TO ADD STAFF TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA
SERBS WHO WISHED TO RETURN. LATER A PRESS STATEMENT
FROM MILOSEVIC'S OFFICE, AIRED ON THE STATE-CONTROLLED
PER E.0.13526
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TELEVISION CALLED FOR ACCESS BY HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PRESS TO ANY LOCATIONS WHERE
ALLEGED WAR CRIMES HAD TAKEN PLACE (SEPTEL). END
SUMMARY.
3. -fO) • ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LABOR JOHN SHATTUCK, ACCOMPANIED BY COM PERINA, MET
OCTOBER 24 IN BELGRADE WITH SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
AND FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC. PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
GREETED SHATTUCK AND TOLD HIM HE ESPECIALLY WANTED TO
STRESS WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO ETHNIC SERBS IN CROATIA. NO
ONE, HE SAID, UNDERSTOOD THE WORLD'S PASSIVE RESPONSE.
THIS WAS THE THIRD GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SERBS IN
EUROPE AND THE LARGEST GENOCIDE IN EUROPE SINCE WORLD
WAR TWO. HE ESTIMATED A HALF MILLION SERBS HAD BEEN
DRIVEN OUT OF CROATIA.
4.
SHATTUCK OPENED HIS STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT
HIS VISIT WAS NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT HE
WAS SENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE WITH A
TWO-PART MESSAGE CONCERNING BANJA LUKA AND THE KRAJINA.j(NT ACCESS
IMMEDIATELY FOR THE ICRC, NGOS AND THE PRESS TO THE
BANJA LUKA AREA BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE AND URGENT
ACTION TO SAVE THEM IS ESSENTIAL. HE ALSO APPEALED TO
THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. TO USE HIS
INFLUENCE TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS
TO LOCATE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN SEPARATED FROM THEIR
FAMILIES, INCLUDING THOSE LISTED BY ICRC AS MISSING.
5. -W- MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND IN THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA (RS) BUT WOULD DO HIS
BEST TO SECURE THE ARREST OF THOSE GUILTY OF ETHNIC
CLEANSING. HE CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE RS THAT
INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS HAD BEEN GUILTY OF EXCESSES BUT HE
DID NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT THIS POINT OF VIEW AND WOULD
SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH. HE WOULD INSIST ON ACCESS FOR THE
PRESS AND NGOS AND WOULD INSTRUCT FM MILUTINOVIC
"TONIGHT" TO SEE THAT THE PEOPLE ON THE ICRC LIST WERE
FOUND. MILOSEVIC ALSO CONFIDED THAT HIS "SPECIAL
POLICE" WERE LOOKING FOR THE TWO FRENCH PILOTS MISSING
SINCE THEIR PLANE WAS SHOT D W OVER BOSNIA.
ON
6. -fe) A/S SHATTUCK POINTED OUT THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. SHATTUCK URGED
MILOSEVIC TO REQUIRE SERBIA'S FULL AND ONGOING
COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED
THAT HE AGREED AND WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE "ALL CRIMINALS
WOULD BE ARRESTED," THE CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA
PROHIBITED THE EXTRADITION OF ITS CITIZENS.
NEVERTHELESS, SERBIAN LAWS AGAINST "HATE CRIMES"
WERE STRONGER THAN INTERNATIONAL LAWS. MILUTINOVIC
ADDED THAT THE CORRECT LEGAL PROCEDURE IN THE FRY
WAS TO ASK LOCAL COURTS TO MAKE INITIAL
INVESTIGATIONS.
7. -fS-)- WHEN A/S SHATTUCK BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION
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OF INVESTIGATING THE GRAVES NEAR SREBRENICA,
MILOSEVIC RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WOULD RAISE
THE ISSUE THE NEXT DAY AND S W N REASON W Y ACCESS
A O
H
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. HE W N ON TO SAY HE WOULD'
ET
ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE CALLING FOR BANJA LUKA TO BE
OPEN TO PRESS AND NGOS.
- - V F' 1 - E N 1 1 A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248
C 0 i
U
"
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE F O A/S SHATTUCK
RM
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05
TAGS: PREL, BK, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
8. 4 * ) - W E A/S SHATTUCK URGED THAT COOPERATION
HN
WITH THE W R CRIMES TRIBUNAL BE INCLUDED IN THE
A
PRESIDENT'S PRESS STATEMENT, MILOSEVIC RESPONDED
THAT HE MUST FIRST LOOK INTO THE LEGAL ISSUES,
WHICH W R "COMPLICATED." SHATTUCK SUGGESTED THAT
EE
TRIBUNAL REPRESENTATIVES GET IN TOUCH WITH THE
PROPER FRY AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE FULL COOPERATION
CONSISTENT WITH FRY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THAT W S A
A
REASONABLE PROPOSAL.
9. -f&h A/S SHATTUCK NOTED THAT THERE W R MANY
EE
OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES OF CONCERN RAISED IN THE
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT INCLUDING
KOSOVO, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND MINORITY RIGHTS.
MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT ALL HE ASKED WAS THAT
SHATTUCK BE "OBJECTIVE." HE ASSERTED THERE W S
A
M R FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE FRY THAN IN
OE
SURROUNDING COUNTRIES AND COMPLAINED THAT THERE
W R 20 NEWSPAPERS IN KOSOVO, ALL OF WHICH ATTACKED
EE
HIM.
10. 4 f i i . TURNING TO THE PROBLEM OF SERB REFUGEES
F O THE KRAJINA, SHATTUCK TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT THE
RM
U.S. TOOK THIS PROBLEM VERY SERIOUSLY, AS EVIDENCED
BY HIS THREE TRIPS TO CROATIA WITHIN THE LAST SIX
WEEKS. OUR EMBASSY IN ZAGREB HAD JUST TURNED OVER
TO CROATIAN AUTHORITIES A LIST OF 3,000 SERBS W O
H
WISHED TO RETURN TO KRAJINA. W W U D CONTINUE TO
E OL
PRESS ON THIS.
11. Jr&^ SHATTUCK ASKED IF THE FRY WOULD SUPPORT
ADDING STAFF TO THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE TO
PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA SERB REFUGEES W O
H
WISHED TO RETURN. MILOSEVIC AGREED AND MILUTINOVIC
ADDED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM W S THE CROATIAN
A
PROPERTY L W WHICH SET A LIMIT ON TIME FOR PEOPLE
A
TO CLAIM PROPERTY.
12. OC)- MILOSEVIC SEVERAL TIMES PROMISED A PRESS
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RELEASE FROM THE MEETING WHICH WOULD ADVOCATE NGO
AND PRESS ACCESS TO BANJA LUKA, THE KRAJINA, AND
THE SREBRENICA AREA. COM PERINA NOTED THAT
QUESTIONS OF ACCESS HAD BEEN RAISED PREVIOUSLY WITH
BOSNIAN VICE PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHO SEEMED TO BE
PROCRASTINATING. A/S SHATTUCK CONCLUDED THAT THE
PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL BUT THAT
ACTION ON GRANTING ACCESS WAS MOST IMPERATIVE
BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE. ACTIONS BY SERBIA AND
THE BOSNIAN SERB WOULD BE CAREFULLY MONITORED, AND
REAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL
THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN.
13.
A MILOSEVIC OFFICE PRESS STATEMENT,
SUBSEQUENTLY AIRED OVER STATE-RUN TV EVENING NEWS,
CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE BANJA LUKA REGION AND
URGED FULL ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS
AND PRESS TO LOCATIONS WHERE ALLEGED WAR CRIMES
WERE COMMITTED (FULL STATEMENT FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)
14. -46+- COMMENT: MILOSEVIC WAS OPEN AND
EXPANSIVE; HE WAS CLEARLY ATTEMPTING TO PROJECT AN
IMAGE OF COOPERATION. HIS STATEMENTS ON ACCESS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY — ALTHOUGH TEMPERED SLIGHTLY BY
DISCLAIMERS THAT HE WAS NOT DIRECTLY IN THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND -- WERE NEVERTHELESS POSITIVE. HIS
WILLINGNESS TO GO PUBLIC WITH THIS POSITION- IS
CONSTRUCTIVE. THAT SAID, THE TEST LIES IN
IMPLEMENTATION RATHER THAN STATEMENTS OF INTENT,
AND REAL PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE MEASURED BY THAT
STANDARD. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP PROMPTLY TO
DISCOVER WHETHER THESE STATEMENTS ARE TRANSLATED
INTO CONCRETE ACTIONS TO SAVE LIVES AND TO BRING
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATIONS TO ACCOUNT.
PERINA
BT
#5248
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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< SSN>5248
TOR: 951024192530 M1918014
< TOR>951024192532 M1918015
A
A
A
DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK SUM
SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL
•
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IMMEDIATE
CQMriDDHTIAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4265 304 0135-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 310135Z OCT 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
310135Z OCT 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8562
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0382
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2954
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1715
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2993
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9401
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4364
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2342
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2969
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1020
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3135
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 030
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1692
BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
TEXT:
C Q N P i . D B . M T i A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
BOSNIAN UPDATE
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD015\OCT95\MSGS\M1927451.html
1.
IN SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS ON 30 OCTOBER,
USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION.
GHAREKHAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH MILITARY
ACTIVITY IN BOSNIA EXCEPT FOR A FEW SMALL ARMS FIRINGS
IN SAREJEVO. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT FEDERATION TROOPS
WERE STILL RESTRICTING UNPROFOR'S MOVEMENT IN N
W
BOSNIA.
NATO AIR STRIKES AND NATO PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
2. 4 0 IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION ON DAMAGE ASSESMENTS OF NATO AIR OPERATION
GHAREKHAN STATED THAT 816 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AGAINST
BOSNIAN SERB INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FIXED
MILITARY TARGETS, AND HEAVY WEAPONS. MOST OF THESE
STRIKES WERE SUCCESSFUL ALTHOUGH BAD WEATHER
PERIODICALLY LIMITED OPERATIONS. THE BSA RESPONDED
QUICKLY TO THESE ATTACKS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NUMBER OF
HEAVY WEAPONS AROUND SARAJEVO WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY
REDUCED. BSA AIR DEFENSES REMAINED FUNCTIONAL. AFTER
THE RESUMPTION OF THE AIR STRIKES 14 SEPTEMBER, NATO
ASSESSED THAT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEMS AROUND BANJA LUKA WERE DISABLED AND
COMMUNICATIONS SEVERELY DEGRADED. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT
NATO DID NOT INCLUDE ANY REPORTS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE
IN ITS REPORT TO THE SYG.
3. t e t " IN RESPONSE TO A RUSSIAN QUESTION ABOUT THE
PRESENCE OF NATO PERSONNEL IN ZAGREB, GHAREKHAN SAID
THAT THIS WAS NOT A "FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF NATO."
GHAREKHAN SAID THAT A LIMITED NUMBER OF NATO
SPECIALISTS COMMISSIONED TO DEVISE NATO DEPLOYMENT FOR
AN UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL UNDER HOSTILE CIRCUMSTANCES
REMAINED IN THEATER WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYG AND
THE GOC.
4. -f&h RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV ASSERTED THAT
COMPLIANCE BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS WITH THE CONDITIONS SET
OUT BY THE 3 SEPTEMBER''UN FORCE COMMANDER'S LETTER
TERMINATED THE NATO AIR OPERATION. A RESUMPTION OF AIR
STRIKES WOULD
REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF BOTH NATO AND THE UN. GHAREKHAN
ANSWERED THAT UN AND NATO AGREED ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT A
RESUMPTION OF AIR STRIKES WAS NOT NEEDED AT THAT TIME.
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THAT, WHILE WE HOPE THERE IS
NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA, I T IS CLEAR
THAT THE AIR STRIKES WERE SUSPENDED, NOT TERMINATED.
PENDING FATE OF NON-SERB DRAFT-AGED MEN IN
SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA AREA
5. t e f GERMAN PERMREP EITEL EXPRESSED
THE NON-SERB, DRAFT-AGED MEN ROUNDED UP
SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA, EITEL
COUNCIL TO REACT IN LIGHT OF THE "WORST
CONCERN ABOUT
BY THE BSA IN
URGED THE
WAR CRIME IN
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EUROPE SINCE WWII, THE SUMMARY KILLING OF 6,000 MEN."
EITEL UNDERLINED THAT THE COUNCIL CANNOT ACT ON
UNSUBSTANTIATED NEWSPAPER REPORTS AND THEREFORE
REQUESTED A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT BY THE SYG. EITEL
SUGGESTED THAT THE REPORT INCLUDE 5 ELEMENTS:
(1) HOW
MANY MEN ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR? (2) ARE THE REPORTS OF
• O O N D I D B H T T A H SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
£.0.12956: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
BOSNIAN SERB SUMMARY KILL
INGS PROBABLE?
(3) ARE THERE
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF BOSNIAN SERB HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES?
(4) TO WHAT EXTENT WERE FRY PARAMILITARY
FORCES INVOLVED? (5) WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR BOSNIAN SERB ACTIONS?
6. - f G f MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN
URGENT NEED TO ESTABLISH THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN.
OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY REGRETTED THAT THE COUNCIL
HAD FAILED TO TAKE ACTION EARLIER. HE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN SUGGESTION FOR A REPORT BY THE SYG AND APPEALED
TO THE COUNCIL TO TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST THE
BOSNIAN SERBS. ARGENTINE PERMREP CARDENAS CAUTIONED
THE COUNCIL AGAINST TAKING ON THE INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY; PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS SHOULD BE
HANDLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. RUSSIAN PERMREP
LAVROV QUESTIONED HOW THE COUNCIL WOULD PROCEED AFTER
THE FACTS WERE ESTABLISHED. HE REMINDED THE COUNCIL
THAT THE KILLING OF SERBS IN THE KRAJINA WAS DENOUNCED
BY THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES AS BEING CARRIED OUT BY
GROUPS OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN STOLEN
GOVERNMENT UNIFORMS.
7. ^GQ AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT
TO GET INFORMATION FROM THE SYG. SHE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARIAT PREPARE A REPORT
TO THE COUNCIL CONTAINING ALL IT KNEW ABOUT HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA.
ALBRIGHT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOME EVIDENCE OF THE
ABUSES HAS BEEN DESTROYED AND SHE CALLED ON ALL PARTIES
TO TURN OVER EVIDENCE TO THE TRIBUNAL.
8. J & r COUNCIL AGREED TO HAVE THE SYG PROVIDE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN. HOW TO
PROCEED AFTER SUCH FACTS ARE KNOWN IS TO BE DECIDED
LATER.
9. -f-et- USUN PLANS TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
--DEMANDING THAT ALL STATES COOPERATE WITH THE WAR
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CRIMES TRIBUNAL;
--DEMANDING THAT THE PARTIES NOT DISTURB ANY EVIDENCE
OF WAR CRIMES;
—DEMANDING THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS GRANT ACCESS TO THE
DETAINEES OR ALLEGED SITES OF MASS GRAVES TO
APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES INCLUDING THE
TRIBUNAL;
--REQUESTING THE SECRETARIAT TO ISSUE A WRITTEN REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND
BANJA LUKA AREAS.
10. -fSf* I F THE DEPARTMENT APPROVES THE DRAFT WE WILL
CIRCULATE I T IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND AMONG MEMBERS OF
THE COUNCIL.
ALBRIGHT
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IMMEDIATE
'COHPIPGWPIM,
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4313 3060128-CCCC—RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 020128Z NOV 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
020128Z NOV 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATK 8648
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1723
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0390
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2962
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3004
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 94 36
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4398
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2368
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2980
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1028
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3143
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 060
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1700
BOSNIA:
CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
C O W F I D C tl T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313
'
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:11/01/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
1. -fe}- ON NOV 1, CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET AT THE
COUNSELOR LEVEL TO DISCUSS US DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMANITARIAN ABUSES IN SREBRENICA, SANSKI MOST AND
AREAS AROUND BANJA LUKA.
PER E.0.13526
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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2. 4 0 _ MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT
TO THE 31 OCTOBER TEXT (REF A)
DRAFTING REVISIONS. THE GROUP
PROPOSALS TO ADD ONE OPERATIVE
PARAGRAPH AS FOLLOWS:
GROUP PLUS ITALY AGREED
WITH A FEW MINOR
ACCEPTED FRENCH
AND ONE PREAMBULAR
— PREAMBULAR 5: "COMMENDING THE EFFORTS BY THE
UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IN PARTICULAR IN THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DESPITE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES,"
--OPERATIVE 6: "REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE
ACTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN
PERSONNEL, STRESSES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE OF THEIR
CONTRIBUTION, AND DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY ENSURE
THEIR SAFETY AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM."
3. •(•€•)- THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT GOR
COULD SUPPORT THE US DRAFT BUT URGED THE GROUP TO ALSO
CONSIDER A RUSSIAN DRAFT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN CROATIA, SO AS TO NOT IMPLY A DOUBLE STANDARD. THE
RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE WAS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE NEXT STEP
WITH THE DRAFT. HE SUGGESTED EITHER INCORPORATING
ELEMENTS OF THE DRAFT INTO THE US TEXT OR ADOPTING TWO
SEPARATE DRAFTS.
4. 4&). OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SAID THAT THEY WOULD
SEND THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TO THEIR CAPITALS, BUT DID NOT
ENVISION ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS. MOST INDICATED THAT THEY
WOULD LIKELY PREFER A SINGLE DRAFT INCORPORATING
ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN TEXT.
5. -fSf USUN RECOMMENDS THAT WE INCORPORATE PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPH 2 AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, AND 4 INTO
THE U.S. TEXT. SUCH A TEXT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE
COUNCIL CONDEMNED ALL VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
EQUALLY. WE NOTE THAT THE RUSSIAN TEXT DOES NOT TRY TO
EQUATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF CROATIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS WITH THOSE COMMITTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS.
WE BELIEVE THAT A MERGED TEXT WOULD FIND CONSENSUS IN
THE CONTACT GROUP AND COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY BE
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE,
WE INTEND TO PROCEED ALONG THOSE LINES WHEN THE CONTACT
GROUP PLUS ITALY MEETS ON NOVEMBER 2.
6., BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CROATIA:
RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1009 (1995) OF 10 AUGUST
1995, AND THE STATEMENTS OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7
SEPTEMBER 1995 (S/PRST/1995/44
, AND OF 3 OCTOBER 1995
(S/PRST/1995/49),.
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY UNCRO AND UN
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF
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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN KRAJINA, INCLUDING
THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS
OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION,
G O-H r i D D H T I A L
SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O. 12958 : DECL:11/01/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS
RESOLUTION 827,
-1.
CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA BY WHOMEVER
COMMITTED;
--2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS THAT CROATIA TAKES URGENT
MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND
INVESTIGATES ALL REPORTS OF SUCH VIOLATIONS SO THAT
THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS BE JUDGED AND
PUNISHED;
--3. REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB
POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN IN
SAFETY;
--4. REITERATES ITS CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA TO LIFT ANY TIME LIMITS PLACED ON THE RETURN OF
REFUGEES TO CROATIA TO RECLAIM THEIR PROPERTY;
--5. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATES FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OF ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;
--6. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
INTENDED TO DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE ANY EVIDENCE OF
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
--7.
DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 010034Z NOV 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
010034Z NOV 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8598
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1717
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0384
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2956
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2995
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4373
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9412
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2352
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2 971
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1022
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3137
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 037
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1694
BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
SUBJ:
TEXT:
0 O W F I-D H tl T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285
*
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
REF:
1.
USUN/IO-UNP TELECONS
PER E.0.13526
- f e f USUN CONVENED A COUNSELORS' LEVEL MEETING OF
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY TO GIVE OTHER CONTACT
GROUP DELEGATIONS COPIES OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOUND
8ELOW. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT THE DRAFT
FOLLOWS UP ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S OCTOBER 30
DISCUSSION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 8Y BOSNIAN SERB FORCES IN THE AREAS OF
SREBRENICA, ZEPA, SANSKI MOST, AND BANJA LUKA. HE
EXPLAINED THAT THE TEXT IS TIGHTLY FOCUSED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND IS BASED ON EXISTING LANGUAGE IN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1010 AND 827. HE ADDED THAT W
E
W U D CIRCULATE THE TEXT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
OL
COUNCIL DURING THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 31, THAT CONTACT
G O P AMBASSADORS SHOULD DISCUSS IT ON NOVEMBER 1, AND
RU
THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL'S NEXT
INFORMAL SESSION.
2. -fe)-WE ALSO S O E THE TEXT TO BOSNIAN FOREIGN
HWD
MINISTER SACIRBEY W O TOLD US THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED
H
IT. OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY (THE INCOMING COUNCIL
PRESIDENT) SAID SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS OVERDUE AND THAT
HE WOULD PUT IT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE FIRST INFORMAL
SESSION DURING HIS PRESIDENCY. AL-KHUSSAIBY SAID THAT
HE WOULD DISCUSS THE DRAFT DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1 ROUND
OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS,
AND I F IT APPEARED TO ENJOY BROAD SUPPORT HE MIGHT
CONVENE AN INFORMAL SESSION FOR THE AFTERNOON OF
NOVEMBER 1. (THUS, W
E MIGHT NEED AN EOV BY AS EARLY
AS LATE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 1.)
3.
4 0 " BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1004 (1995) OF 12 JULY
1995, AND 1010 OF (1995) OF 10 AUGUST 1995, AND THE
STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995
(S/PRST/1995/43), AND DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT DESPITE
REPEATED CALLS THAT IT D SO, THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY
O
HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE DEMANDS CONTAINED THEREIN,
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN AND AROUND
SREBRENICA, AND IN THE AREAS OF BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI
MOST, INCLUDING REPORTS OF MASS MURDER, FORCED
DETENTION, AND RAPE, OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION,
REITERATING ITS EXPRESSION OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE
EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
(ICRC) IN SEEKING ACCESS TO DISPLACED PERSONS AND
CONDEMNING IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE FAILURE
OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THEIR
COMMITMENTS TO THE ICRC IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACCESS,
EXPRESSING ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE W R OF THE
OK
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS
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RESOLUTION 827,
-- 1. CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
C 0
r t D D H T"! 'ft L' SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285
1
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA;
-- 2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND, THAT THE BOSNIAN S
ERB
PARTY GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE ICRC
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED
FROM SREBRENCIA, ZEPA, AND THE REGIONS OF BANJA LUKA
AND SANSKI MOST WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN
SERB FORCES AND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL, INCLUDING ANY
MEMBERS OF THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA;
—
3.
REAFFIRMS ALSO ITS DEMAND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS AND
ENSURE THEIR SAFETY, AND TO RELEASE THEM;
-- 4. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OR ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;
— 5. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY, REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION INTENDED TO
DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE, ANY EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
-- 6. REQUESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SUBMIT TO
THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A WRITTEN REPORT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONTAINING ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL CONCERNING RECENT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE AREAS OF SREBRENICA, ZEPA,
BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI MOST;
—
7.
DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION.
4.
(U) SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on genocide in the former Yugoslavia. Material includes Department of State cables on the international response after the Srebrenica massacre, U.N. discussions and reports on Bosnia, and a demarche to a Serbian foreign minister.
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Bosnia
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in fiill or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), (d), and 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526 or (b)(3)
of the FOIA.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
24-Aug-1993 18:58 EDT
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
CAL LUNCH: GLOBAL'S ITEMS
1. Funding UN Peacekeeping Operations
Issue: State has refused t o supply the d r a f t r u l e s f o r
interagency clearance f o r UN votes on peacekeeping.
EO 13526 1.4d
This issue takes on increased importance i n l i g h t of four new
PKO now under c o n s i d e r a t i o n (Rwanda, L i b e r i a , Abkhazia, and
Haiti).
2. Sudan: D e t e r r i n g and Responding t o T e r r o r i s m
EO 13526 1.4d
3. Somalia:
Issue:
The Next Phase
Who should give a major speech on Somalia?
Background: Both State and Defense are working on speeches
on Somalia f o r t h e i r S e c r e t a r i e s . You may want t o suggest
t h a t both of them give such speeches. I n a d d i t i o n t o n o t i n g
the progress we have made i n Somalia, the speeches could t a l k
about peacekeeping more g e n e r a l l y as p a r t o f the Funding
Peacekeeping Strategy.
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4. A i r l i f t i n g
Musicians
from Bosnia:
Wilson/Schwartz p r o v i d i n g s e p a r a t e l y
5. DOD's G l o b a l I n i t i a t i v e Money:
Global w i l l p r o v i d e a separate memo w i t h Rosner.
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James W Reed
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
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Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Slusan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
27-Sep-1993 16:55
EDT
-eOHriDDNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SEE BELOW
FROM:
N i c h o l a s J. Rasmussen
(RASMUSSEN)
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Peacekeeping O p e r a t i o n
Mr.
Lake/Mr. Berger
--
Susan Rice asked t h a t I b r i n g t o your a t t e n t i o n the f a c t t h a t
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l appears t o be moving v e r y q u i c k l y toward
a v o t e on a r e s o l u t i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a UN peacekeeping
o p e r a t i o n i n Rwanda. I n f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s have a l r e a d y
begun on the SYG's r e p o r t ( r e l e a s e d Monday).
I n keeping w i t h our d e s i r e t o precede more d e l i b e r a t e l y
b e f o r e v o t i n g yea or nay on new UN o p e r a t i o n s , S t a t e i s
a s k i n g USUN t o slow the process so t h a t we can take a c l o s e
l o o k a t the SYG's r e p o r t , as w e l l as a t the c o s t a n a l y s i s
( s t i l l pending) from the UN budget people.
Nonetheless, we
w i l l p r o b a b l y need t o have a USG p o s i t i o n by the b e g i n n i n g of
next week.
We recommend t h a t a Deputies Committee meeting be scheduled
on Thursday or F r i d a y t o c o n s i d e r the i s s u e . A number of
issues should be discussed by Deputies, i n c l u d i n g f u n d i n g of
the U.S. share of an o p e r a t i o n , French a t t e m p t s t o l i n k the
o p e r a t i o n w i t h a L i b e r i a PKO, and how the o p e r a t i o n stacks up
a g a i n s t the PRD-13 c r i t e r i a .
State/AF i s p r o v i d i n g us w i t h
i n p u t which we w i l l t u r n i n t o a DC d i s c u s s i o n paper. We can
have a paper ready by mid-week. I f a DC can be scheduled, we
w i l l c o o r d i n a t e the paper and agenda w i t h J e n n i f e r Ward.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we can prepare a d e c i s i o n memorandum f o r Mr.
Lake.
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Sean J. Darragh
N i c h o l a s J. Rasmussen
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT
coNn DDNTIAITMEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA UPDATE
Sandy-I have sent up t o you a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f the P r e s i d e n t ' s
l e t t e r t o M i t t e r a n d t a k i n g i n t o account t h e concerns t h a t I
u n d e r s t a n d you expressed t o Dick.
I am assuming t h a t
mission, despite a
a f t e r l o o k i n g more
Please l e t us know
we s t i l l p l a n t o support the Rwanda
rumor t h a t Frank Wisner was r e c o n s i d e r i n g
c l o s e l y a t the l a t e s t French r e s o l u t i o n .
i f our p o s i t i o n has changed.
Late y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n we had a working l e v e l i n t e r a g e n c y
v i d e o c o n f e r e n c e t o t r y t o respond t o widespread concerns
about the m i l i t a r y concept o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r the Rwanda
m i s s i o n and t o reach consensus on a U.S. p o s i t i o n on the
draft resolution.
While much common ground was found on the
o u t l i n e o f the r e s o l u t i o n , you should know t h a t JCS and t o a
somewhat l e s s e r e x t e n t OSD have v e r y s e r i o u s concerns about
the m i s s i o n as c u r r e n t l y conceived.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , they b e l i e v e t h a t s i n c e the m i s s i o n i s a
t r a d i t i o n a l CH. V I i n a supposedly c o m p l e t e l y p e r m i s s i v e
environment, the o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be conducted by unarmed
m i l i t a r y observers (or a t most v e r y l i g h t l y armed observers)
r a t h e r t h a n the planned 2 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s . As the
m i s s i o n now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly
opposed f o r t h i s reason.
S t a t e supports the 2 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s .
I tend t o agree
w i t h JCS t h a t t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e dissonance between the
concept o f o p e r a t i o n s and the supposed p e r m i s s i v e
environment.
We ought t o be a b l e t o achieve the same goals
w i t h observers i f the p a r t i e s t r u l y want peace. However, i t
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o move the French, t h e UN and the Rwandan
p a r t i e s i n the s h o r t time we have b e f o r e a v o t e . JCS and/or
OSD may r a i s e t h i s a t your l e v e l .
I t h i n k we ought t o t a l k t o the French and the UN i n New York
t o address these i s s u e s , p r e f e r a b l y b e f o r e a v o t e , i f JCS
insists.
Distribution:
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BERGER )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
0 4 - O c t - 1 9 9 3 1 4 : 3 4 EDT
-COHriDCNTI/tt
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA
Sandy-I t seems t h a t S t a t e and DOD/JCS have managed t o come t o
agreement on i n s t r u c t i o n s t o USUN t o support the Rwanda
resolution.
I n s h o r t , JCS walked back from the c l i f f and
agreed t o more open-ended language about the c o m p o s i t i o n o f
the f o r c e (armed b a t t a l i o n s vs. unarmed m i l i t a r y observers)
i n exchange f o r a b s o l u t e c l a r i t y t h a t t h i s i s meant t o be a
t r a d i t i o n a l ( p a c i f i c ) Chapter VI o p e r a t i o n .
T h i s i s a good compromise. We are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o r a p i d l y
c l e a r i n g the x-hatched i n s t r u c t i o n c a b l e .
I have t r i e d t o t r a c k down the message from the President t o
M i t t e r r a n d . As f a r as we can t e l l , the package went t o the
P r e s i d e n t on Saturday evening, b u t has not y e t been signed
out.
Kathy M i l l i s o n i s checking f u r t h e r f o r us.
Susan
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James W Reed
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W i l l i a m H. I t o h
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
09-Nov-1993 12:57 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
Meeting With Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, Tues. a t 6:30 pm
Memorandum
November 9, 1993
To:
Samuel Berger
Through: Richard Clarke
Fr:
E r i c Schwartz
Concurrences by: Jane H o l l , J e n n i f e r Ward, L a r r y Rossin
Subject:
Meeting t h i s evening w i t h Mrs. Sadako Ogata o f UNHCR
We expect Mrs. Ogata w i l l r a i s e UNHCR a c t i v i t i e s i n Bosnia, t h e
s i t u a t i o n i n H a i t i and, p o s s i b l y , the s i t u a t i o n i n Burundi.
I n a d d i t i o n t o d i s c u s s i n g these issues w i t h her, you w i l l want t o
c o n g r a t u l a t e her on her recent r e e l e c t i o n t o a f i v e year term and
express strong U.S. support f o r her l e a d e r s h i p at UNHCR.
I.
BOSNIA
Background: Mrs. Ogata's v i s i t comes a t an i n c r e a s i n g l y
d i f f i c u l t time f o r agency operations i n Bosnia.
Security
c o n d i t i o n s continue t o d e t e r i o r a t e f o r humanitarian r e l i e f
workers!
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
POINTS TO MAKE/QUESTIONS TO RAISE:
UNHCR i n Bosnia: Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r continued UNHCR
e f f o r t s i n the r e g i o n .
W i n t e r i z a t i o n Plans: What i s Mrs. Ogata view o f
p r e p a r a t i o n s and c o o r d i n a t i o n between agencies?
EC I n i t i a t i v e t o Encourage P a r t i e s t o Guarantee Supply
Routes: How does Mrs. Ogata assess the prospects f o r t h i s
initiative?
Tuzla: Reports i n d i c a t e serious shortages i n the Tuzla
area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening o f Tuzla
a i r p o r t and under what scenario does she t h i n k t h i s might be
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accomplished?
[Note: UNHCR continues t o b e l i e v e the opening of the
airport i sv i t a l .
Before the a i r p o r t were opened, Bosnian
forces would probably have t o abandon many o f the b u i l d i n g s
at the a i r p o r t , which they have thus f a r refused t o do.
State suggests t h a t the Europeans could handle the t e c h n i c a l
aspects o f opening the a i r p o r t . I
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Other issues t h a t might come up:
•
UNHCR APPEAL FOR BOSNIA: we are now p r e p a r i n g a response,
which should be ready w i t h i n the next seven days.
PERMITTING UNHCR TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO
REFUGEES IN SERBIA: The refugee p o p u l a t i o n i n Serbia i s
d i s t r e s s e d , and the Serbs are using t h i s p u b l i c l y as claimed
evidence of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y treatment o f refugees. UNHCR
urges a i d t o these p o p u l a t i o n s , as w e l l as t o other
v u l n e r a b l e groups i n Serbia. We have not taken a formal
p o s i t i o n , though Warren Zimmerman a t State supports a
c a r e f u l l y monitored and c o n t r o l l e d a i d program. Jane and I
agree w i t h Warren.
II.
HAITI -- ISSUES MRS. OGATA MAY RAISE
Background: As you know, UNHCR opposes d i r e c t r e t u r n . With
other c o u n t r i e s s u p p o r t i n g the embargo w i t h t h e i r own ships, t h e
question o f t h e i r p o l i c i e s on r e t u r n may a r i s e . As a r e s u l t , t h e
UNHCR Americas D i r e c t o r a t e has requested a t e c h n i c a l meeting i n
Geneva t o discuss t h e treatment of H a i t i a n boat people by ships
of c o u n t r i e s e n f o r c i n g t h e embargo.
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
I f r a i s e d , you may want t o p o i n t out t h a t -Based on our own experience, we are very d o u b t f u l t h a t a
UNHCR meeting w i l l come up w i t h v i a b l e t h i r d country
options.
We continue t o monitor the s i t u a t i o n i n H a i t i and see no
signs o f a imminent exodus o f large numbers.
Our three refugee processing centers are o p e r a t i n g i n H a i t i
and U.S. o f f i c i a l s continue t o meet r e t u r n i n g H a i t i a n s t o
a s s i s t those who wish t o apply f o r refugee s t a t u s .
III.
BURUNDI
Background: As you know, elements of the Burundi m i l i t a r y
r e c e n t l y launched an attempted coup d'etat against the
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d government o f President Ndadaye, r e s u l t i n g
i n t h e death o f the President and several members o f h i s Cabinet,
as w e l l as i n t e r - e t h n i c violence p r i m a r i l y i n the c o u n t r y s i d e .
We have no estimates o f the number k i l l e d . Some 650,000 new
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refugees have f l e d to- n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , p r i m a r i l y Rwanda,
Tanzania and Z a i r e . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s c r i s i s , UNHCR has
d e p l e t e d i t s emergency fund and has now borrowed $5 m i l l i o n from
the UN's C e n t r a l Emergency Revolving Fund. UNHCR has made an
appeal f o r $17 m i l l i o n t o meet the needs o f the refugees over the
next t h r e e months. S t a t e R/P i s p r e p a r i n g an ERMA ( A f r i c a )
drawdown p r o p o s a l f o r the P r e s i d e n t f o r $20 m i l l i o n , o f which
$4.25 m i l l i o n would go t o the UNHCR f o r Burundian refugees.
POINTS TO MAKE:
We want t o be as h e l p f u l as p o s s i b l e i n t h i s h u m a n i t a r i a n
c r i s i s and encourage UNHCR's e f f o r t s as w e l l as those o f the
ICRC and WFP;
•
AID's O f f i c e o f D i s a s t e r A s s i s t a n c e has a l r e a d y approved
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f $50,000 as a r e s u l t o f our Ambassadors'
having d e c l a r e d d i s a s t e r s i n Rwanda and B u r u n d i ;
We are working on a drawdown o f monies from the P r e s i d e n t ' s
emergency fund t o p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l f u n d i n g f o r your
appeal.
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Page 1 of 3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT
CQWTIDEMTIAti
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Upcoming Issues i n UNSC
OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail
INFORMATION:
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i s expected w i t h i n the next week t o
renew r o u t i n e l y a number o f peacekeeping mandates:
Cyprus
The UNSC w i l l vote t h i s week another 6 month renewal o f
UNFICYP. The l a s t renewal came i n the summer as the
Canadians were l e a v i n g and a f t e r the Russians i n i t i a l l y
vetoed the r e s o l u t i o n f o r p r o c e d u r a l reasons.
Today, t h e
A r g e n t i n e s have r e p l a c e d the Canadians, and the Russians seem
s a t i s f i e d on the i s s u e . The U.S. and a l l i e s have a l s o
succeeded i n g e t t i n g Greece and Cyprus t o p i c k up over 50% o f
the cost o f the o p e r a t i o n , thus r e d u c i n g the U.S. share t o
r o u g h l y $7 m i l l i o n / p a .
This week's vote should be an easy, pro forma e x t e n s i o n . The
d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n i s a good one, s t a t i n g t h a t the s t a t u s quo
i s unacceptable and c a l l s f o r a thorough review o f the f u t u r e
r o l e o f the UN i n Cyprus i n February.
Angola
The UNSC w i l l vote by the 15th t o extend UNAVEM's mandate a t
c u r r e n t s t r e n g t h f o r 3 months. As J e n n i f e r has informed you,
the U.S t a b l e d a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n t h a t has been c o n s i d e r e d by
the P-5. USUN i s t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t i t remains balanced
to put a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l pressure on b o t h s i d e s .
Liberia
We are a t the 3 month stage when the UNSC must decide t o
c o n t i n u e the m i s s i o n i n L i b e r i a f o r the d u r a t i o n o f i t s seven
month mandate. This i s v e r y s i m i l a r .to the p r o c e d u r a l issue
we faced l a s t week on H a i t i .
Again, t h i s c o n t i n u a t i o n can be
achieved w i t h o u t any f o r m a l r e s o l u t i o n , o n l y a l e t t e r from
UNSC Pres. t o SYG or a statement. Not expected t o be a b i g
deal.
Rwanda
There are 2 Rwanda m i s s i o n s - - 80 border m o n i t o r s l o o k i n g f o r
arms t r a f f i c on the Rwanda/Uganda border and-a.^larger
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peacekeeping f o r c e i n K i g a l i .
The upcoming renewal ( r e q u i r e d
by the 22nd) w i l l g i v e the Ugandan border m i s s i o n i t s second
6-month mandate. H a p p i l y , t h e two m i s s i o n s , w h i l e f o r m a l l y
separate f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, are w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d i n terms
of command. B e t t e r y e t , a f t e r Dec. 22 they w i l l have a
s i n g l e budget, a l l o w i n g us t o c a p t u r e a l l p o s s i b l e economies
of s c a l e .
ACTION:
South A f r i c a : How t o a u t h o r i z e and fund t h e a n t i c i p a t e d UN
e l e c t i o n monitoring mission.
Normally, s t r a i g h t e l e c t i o n m o n i t o r i n g (w/o peacekeepers) i s
a UNGA a c t i v i t y p a i d f o r on the r e g u l a r budget, f o r which US
pays 25%. But a c c o r d i n g t o USUN, the South A f r i c a n p a r t i e s ,
the F r o n t l i n e S t a t e s and many o t h e r s want the UNSC t o mandate
the South A f r i c a m i s s i o n , because the UNGA can't move q u i c k l y
and doesn't c a r r y the same p o l i t i c a l w e i g h t .
The problem i s t h a t i f the UNSC mandates i t , the UNGA (which
c o n t r o l s the UN purse s t r i n g s ) i s l i k e l y t o i n s i s t t h a t i t be
p a i d f o r on the peacekeeping budget (we pay 31.7%). Funding
non-peacekeeping on the Peacekeeping budget would set a
t e r r i b l e precedent.
ISSUE: I f you agree, J e n n i f e r and I w i l l ask S t a t e t o d r a f t
a cable t o USUN, i n s t r u c t i n g them t o submit q u i c k l y a
s t r a t e g y f o r speedy UN a c t i o n on South A f r i c a p a i d f o r on the
r e g u l a r budget. We propose t o g i v e them a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t
time frame i n which t o implement t h a t s t r a t e g y .
I f USUN f a i l s , I t h i n k we w i l l need a DC i n e a r l y Jan. t o
decide whether the U.S. wants t o work t h r o u g h the UNGA, which
may be opposed by the p a r t i e s and slow down deployment, o r ;
whether we want t o pay f o r t h i s on the peacekeeping budget,
which c o u l d r a i s e s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s on t h e H i l l and would set
a dangerous precedent.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
08-Apr-1994
1 0 : 2 4 EDT
- I J U I I L ' I U L N I IJ'iL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.
I r e p o r t e d t o you yesterday t h a t Monique Mujawamariya, t h e
Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t , appeared t o
have been k i l l e d .
I c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e p o r t as unconfirmed.
(The r e p o r t was based on t h e f a c t t h a t Monique had been t a l k i n g
by phone w i t h a f r i e n d i n t h e U.S. when s o l d i e r s who were k i l l i n g
her neighbors approached her home. The phone went dead and
f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s t o reach Monique were u n s u c c e s s f u l , w i t h men
answering t h e phone and hanging up.
[There i s a Washington Post
account o f these events on today's Op Ed page.])
T h a n k f u l l y , Monique appears not t o have been k i l l e d . She
a p p a r e n t l y f l e d her home and h i d i n t h e bush. She i s now back a t
her home and our Embassy i f t r y i n g t o f i g u r e out how we might
h e l p i n g e t t i n g her t o a safe p l a c e .
THIS NEW INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.
Our Embassy's Task Force i n K i g a l i b e l i e v e s s t r o n g l y t h a t
Monique's chances o f s u r v i v a l w i l l be i n c r e a s e d i f she i s
b e l i e v e d t o be dead, as Rwandan s o l d i e r s c o n t i n u e t o l o o k f o r
her.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
09-Apr-1994 16:38 EDT
•OECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FO"
RM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA: NEXT STEPS, FOR SUNDAY AND BEYOND
With dawn.on Sunday, convoys two and t h r e e w i l l leave t h e
Danish M i s s i o n 2 kms from the border and d r i v e i n t o Burundi.
During t h e n i t e t h e USMC f o r c e i n Buj w i l l r u n h o u r l y r a d i o
checks on t h e s t a t u s o f t h e convoys. That w i l l leave us w i t h
the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s :
— h o w do we g e t t h e remaining Americans out?
--do we h e l p the Belgians get i n ? ( n o t e : The Rwandan
r e b e l s are r e p o r t e d l y r p t r e p o r t e d l y moving toward K i g a l i . )
--do
1.
we p u l l t h e UN f o r c e out?
G e t t i n g the Americans o u t
The embassy may p u t t o g e t h e r another convoy or may p u t t h e
Americans o u t t h e French f l i g h t s o u t . The f i r s t French f l i g h t
out l e f t l a t e on Saturday.
2. G e t t i n g t h e Belgians i n
There a r e 2000 B e l g i a n c i t i z e n s s t i l l a t r i s k . F i g h t i n g i s
l i k e l y t o e s c a l a t e . Thus, once we know t h a t our c i t i z e n s are
safe, we should work w i t h the French t o see i f t h e y can
insure the safety of f l i g h t s i n t o K i g a l i .
I f t h e French do
secure t h e a i r b a s e area, we p r o b a b l y s h o u l d f l y the Belgians
in.
3. T e r m i n a t i n g t h e UN Force
We make a l o t o f noise about t e r m i n a t i n g UN f o r c e s t h a t
a r e n ' t w o r k i n g . W e l l , few c o u l d be as c l e a r l y n o t w o r k i n g .
We should work w i t h t h e Frecnh t o g a i n a consensus t o
t e r m i n a t e t h e UN m i s s i o n .
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT
-OOlfTIDDNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
According t o H o l l y B u r k h a l t e r o f Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- t h e
Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t -- i s now safe and i n
Nairobi.
More d e t a i l s t o come as I r e c e i v e them.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 12:45 EDT
r r n n IT T
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. C l a r k e
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED
T ' TL/S.RB
O:
FM: RAC
RE: RWANDA
The UN i s p l a n n i n g t o p u l l o u t t h e UN peacekeeping f o r c e ,
a c c o r d i n g t o USUN.
The UN may r p t may ask f o r US a i r l i f t
fast.
t o get the force out
Meanwhile, t h e French are b e g i n n i n g t o p u l l t h e i r f o r c e o u t
and t h e Belgians a r e c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s e r t t r o o p s .
I f t h e UN asks f o r h e l p g e t t i n g o u t , USAF t r a n s p o r t s s t a n d i n g
by i n Kenya c o u l d be a v a i l a b l e .
ACTION REQUESTED:
Do you have any guidance f o r us on how we should respond t o a
UN request?
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REED )
WOLIN )
RECORDS )
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CANAS )
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BEERS )
SCHWARTZ • )..
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cc
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Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 15:03 EDT
GOHFIDEMTIAb
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA: FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE
3^
Regarding t h e a t t a c h e d E m a i l on Monique Mujawamariya (which you should have
already received):
PLEASE DO NOT REVEAL THE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT MONIQUE TO THE PRESS OR TO THE
PUBLIC AT THIS POINT.
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James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. Clarke
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
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Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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RECORDS )
STEINBERG )
DESHAZER )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
CLARKER )
CANAS )
LINDSEY )
BEERS )
SCHWARTZ )
WILSON )
RICE )
NORMAN )
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•
•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 14:41 EDT
CQMFIDEMTIMJ
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA
a
According t o H o l l y B u r k h a l t e r o f Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya - Rwandan human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t who met t h e P r e s i d e n t -- i s now safe and i n
Nairobi.
More d e t a i l s t o come as I r e c e i v e them.
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M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. W i l s o n I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
( LAKE )
( RECORDS )
( RECORDS )
( HALPERIN )
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( HALL )
( CICIO )
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( MILLISON )
( REED )
( WOLIN )
( CLARKER )
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( BEERS )
( SCHWARTZ )
( WILSON )
( RICE )
( NORMAN )
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( DARRAGH )
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCORY . :
the
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 17:22 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Mary C. Emery
(EMERY)
SUBJECT:
RE: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED
Tony Lake has read e-mail and responded as f o l l o w s :
Next t o A c t i o n Requested:
. should go t o P r i n c i p a l s . "
" I n c l i n e d t o help.
But d e c i s i o n
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Marcia G. Norman
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Records
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( CANAS )
( CLARKER )
( RECORDS )
( WOLIN )
( REED )
( MILLISON )
( DARBY )
( KENNEY )
( ITOH )
( VEIT )
( CICIO )
( HALL )
( DESHAZER )
( STEINBERG )
( RECORDS )
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�RWANDA:
Tutsi Military Poised To Attack
The Rwandan military and Tutsi forces from the Rwandan Patriotic Front
apparently are adhering to a cease-fire as the evacuation of foreign nationals
proceeds, but at least 4,000 heavily armed RPF rebels continue to advance
on the capital. Leaders of the RPF say they will let French and Belgian
forces assist in removing their nationals but have threatened to attack the
French forces if they intervene for the government's side. Rebel leaders also
rejected talks with the new Hutu interim government, which they accuse of
killing Tutsis and undermining ethnic reconciliation.
— The RPF almost certainly intends to seize Kigali but is holding
back until most expatriates are evacuated. It would be hard
pressed to control the city, however, because armed militias and
Hutu hardliners there vehemently oppose any sharing of power
with Tutsis. (€ NP)
The Hutu-dominated security forces are divided regionally between
southerners and northerners, and clashes have been reported between Army
and Gendarmerie forces, according to a foreign government service. Armed
Hutu militias continue to rampage throughout the city and to threaten
Belgian and French citizens. Neither Paris nor Brussels wants to be drawn
into Rwanda's civil war, and they probably will withdraw their troops as
soon as the evacuation is complete.
— A senior UN official privately has told Belgian, French, and US
officials that the Secretary General believes the lightly armed UN
force of 2,500, which already has suffered 16 killed, must be
evacuated unless there is an effective cease-fire. It probably will
continue to be attacked if it remains in Kigali after the evacuation.
(S-NF)
A revived civil war in Rwanda could intensify the volatility of Burundi,
where up to 150,000 people reportedly were killed after the Hutu president
was assassinated last fall. In a move to support Tutsis in Rwanda, the
Tutsi military could try to take over the Hutu-dominated government.
(€-NF) -CM6.0.13526.Iia)
DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
<p Secret
SC 01677/94
-./"4"-W.
^
>
S
LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCC»?Y . i
11 April 1994
�Top Secret
[EQjl52ejLSc]
Balance of Military Forces in Rwanda
Rwandan Security Forces
Army: 31,000 troops . .. about 4,000 in Kigali. . . troubled by low morale, poor combat
record, has depended on French forces and logistics.
EO 13526 1.4c
Interim Armv Chief of Staff: Colonel Gatsinzi. . . commander of noncommissioned
officers training school.
Gendarmerie (paramilitary police): 7,200 . . . 2,000 in Kigali.
II
EO 13526 1.4c
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Forces: 20,000 nationwide .. . has controlled northern territory since 1990 invasion
from Uganda . . . UN escorted 600-man RPF security force to Kigali in December . .
highly motivated . . . effectively uses artillery, heavy mortars, recoilless rifles.
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 3.5c
Top Secret
SC 01677/04
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-Apr-1994 09:10 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( HOLL )
Jane E. H o l l
FROM:
James W Reed
.
(REED)
SUBJECT:
S t r i k e Two
This i s t h e second erroneous r e p o r t on t h i s (TL was PO'd when he
passed t h e f i r s t r e p o r t t o t h e Pres, o n l y t o f i n d o u t i t was
wrong) . . .
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
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•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
l l - A p r - 1 9 9 4 20:26 EDT
CONFIDCNTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIA:
CORRECTED INFORMATION
I r e p o r t e d t o you today t h a t Human Rights Watch had been i n f o r m e d t h a t
Monique was safe and i n N a i r o b i . State had a l s o r e c e i v e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n
from Human R i g h t s Watch, which was based on a r e p o r t p r o v i d e d i n f o r m a l l y by
a UN o f f i c i a l i n New York.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y PERM.
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was i n a c c u r a t e -- t h e UN o f f i c i a l a p p a r e n t l y
confused Monique w i t h another Rwandan.
We do n o t have c u r r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n about Monique. We b e l i e v e our Embassy's
l a s t c o n t a c t w i t h her was e a r l y Sunday morning i n Rwanda. According t o
S t a t e , our DCM gave i n f o r m a t i o n on Monique's whereabouts t o t h e ICRC and
asked t h a t t h e y c o o r d i n a t e w i t h UNAMIR i n t r y i n g t o g e t her t o a p l a c e o f
safety.
I'm t e r r i b l y s o r r y f o r t h e c o n f u s i o n on t h i s .
with State.
I w i l l c o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w up
Under these circumstances, Monique's s a f e t y i n Rwanda i s again enhanced by
the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t she has been k i l l e d (as t h i s p e r c e p t i o n w i l l discourage
s o l d i e r s from l o o k i n g f o r h e r ) . Thus news o f her b e i n g a l i v e should not be
d i s c u s s e d p u b l i c l y o r w i t h t h e press.
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.
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Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
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Ernest J. Wilson I I I
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Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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LAKE )
RECORDS )
DESHAZER )
STEINBERG )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
CLARKER )
CANAS )
LINDSEY )
BEERS )
SCHWARTZ )
WILSON )
RICE )
NORMAN )
STALCUP )
DARRAGH )
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12-Apr-1994 18:48 EDT
•6DCRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Neal S. Wolin
(WOLIN)
SUBJECT:
C-P-L
l u n c h agenda —
13 A p r i l
Below i s a t e n t a t i v e agenda f o r tomorrow's C-P-L l u n c h . Where
i n d i c a t e d , please p r o v i d e me, by not l a t e r than 10:15 a.m.
Wednesday., a s h o r t background paper ( v i a e-mail) f o r Tony's use.
Lake:
o Update on E f f o r t s t o Defeat Exon-Grassley -- w i l l discuss next
steps on s t r a t e g y f o r FY 95 budget conference.
(Jeremy Rosner/Bob
B e l l please p r o v i d e background.)
o Bosnia A u t h o r i z a t i o n R e s o l u t i o n -- w i l l d i s c u s s a d v i s a b i l i t y o f
seeking c o n g r e s s i o n a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r use o f f o r c e i n Bosnia.
(Alan Kreczko/Jeremy Rosner please p r o v i d e background.)
Christopher:
o R e v i t a l i z i n g Nunn-Lugar -- w i l l ask S e c r e t a r y Perry t o become
more engaged i n seeking a d d i t i o n a l Nunn-Lugar funds.
(Rose
G o t t e m o e l l e r please p r o v i d e background.)
o Bosnia Update -- w i l l c o n s u l t on where we are on Gorazde,
d i s c u s s i o n s i n Sarajevo, e t c . (Jenonne Walker/Jane H o l l please
p r o v i d e background.)
o Skrunda -- w i l l answer some o f S e c r e t a r y Perry's q u e s t i o n s from
l a s t week's lunch r e g a r d i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y o f S t a t e funds f o r
Skrunda dismantlement.
(John B e y r l e please p r o v i d e background.)
Perry:
o Peacekeeping Funding -- w i l l d i s c u s s next steps on d e a l i n g w i t h
a r r e a r a g e s and PDD-13 f u n d i n g issues a f t e r Monday's meeting w i t h
the P r e s i d e n t . (Dick Clarke/Susan Rice please p r o v i d e background
as a p p r o p r i a t e . )
o U.S. Support f o r Evacuation o f A l l i e s ' N a t i o n a l s from Rwanda -w i l l ask what support the USG ought t o g i v e the French and
Belgians i n e v a c u a t i n g t h e i r n a t i o n a l s from Rwanda. (Dick
Clarke/Don S t e i n b e r g please p r o v i d e background.)
o North Korea — w i l l discuss plans f o r h i s impending t r i p t o
Asia.
(Dan Poneman/Stanley Roth please p r o v i d e background.)
Distribution:
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Jane E. H o l l
Daniel F r i e d
MacArthur DeShazer
Rose E. G o t t e m o e l l e r
Randy R. Beers
Susan E. Rice
John R. B e y r l e
Robert G. B e l l
Richard E. Feinberg
R. Nicholas Burns
M a r t i n S. Indyk
George J. Tenet
Jenonne R. Walker
E i l e e n B. Claussen
Richard A. C l a r k e
Kent M. Wiedemann
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
Alan J. Kreczko
Jeremy D. Rosner
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
Daniel B. Poneman
Richard S c h i f t e r
Records
Nancy Soderberg
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
James W Reed
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HOLL )
FRIED )
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GOTTEMOELLER
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BURNS )
INDYK )
TENET )
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CLARKER )
WIEDEMANN )
WARD )
KRECZKO )
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SODERBERG )
ITOH )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
19-Apr-1994 13:27 EDT
-GONFI.&ENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( RICE )
( STEINBERG )
Susan E. Rice
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
FROM:
E r i c P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT:
PULL-OUT OF UNAMIR
I j u s t heard from Human Rights Watch, p l e a d i n g t h a t we oppose a q u i c k UNAMIR
p u l l - o u t from Rwanda. Human Rights Watch seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t UNAMIR i s
p r o t e c t i n g thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and i f t h e y p u l l o u t , t h e Rwandans w i l l
q u i c k l y become v i c t i m s o f genocide.
Is t h i s t r u e ? I f so, s h o u l d n ' t i t be a major f a c t o r i n f o r m i n g h i g h - l e v e l
decision-making on t h i s issue?
Has i t been?
I am e x p e c t i n g t o r e c e i v e a f a x on t h i s s h o r t l y and w i l l
see t h a t you g e t i t .
Eric
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
25-Apr-1994 10:51 EDT
oonriDCMTinr
M M R N U FOR: SEE BELOW
EOADM
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
USG A c t i o n s on Rwanda
S t o r i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e weekend seem t o suggest t h a t we are s i t t i n g
on our hands w h i l e t h e b l o o d - l e t t i n g i n Rwanda rages.
I t i s true
t h a t our c a p a c i t y t o end t h e k i l l i n g i s p a i n f u l l y l i m i t e d , b u t we
are: u n d e r t a k i n g a s e r i e s o f measures.
I t was our i n i t i a t i v e t o ask r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s i n Tanzania and
Uganda (now supported by t h e UN and OAU S e c r e t a r y General
Salim Salim) t o draw t o g e t h e r t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e Rwandan army
and t h e RPF t o seek a cease f i r e and r e - a s s e r t t h e Arusha
process.
Our Ambassadors i n Tanzania (De Vos) and Uganda
(Carson) have been deeply i n v o l v e d i n these s o - f a r l a r g e l y
u n s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s . We expect t o send Ambassador Rawson
back o u t t o t h e r e g i o n s h o r t l y t o f a c i l i t a t e t h i s process.
Whereas we s t r o n g l y supported e f f o r t s t o safeguard t h e l i v e s
of t h e U.N. peacekeepers, we a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e draw-down
o f t h e peacekeepers n o t be accomplished i n a way t h a t p u t a t
r i s k t h e l i v e s o f Rwandans under t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n .
F o l l o w i n g Tony's meeting on F r i d a y w i t h Rwandan human r i g h t s
m o n i t o r Monique Mujawamarija, we i s s u e d a tough statement
( a t t a c h e d ) condemning t h e c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e and c a l l i n g on
b o t h s i d e s t o stop t h e k i l l i n g , w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c mention o f
names o f t h e leaders o f Rwandan armed f o r c e s ( t o p u t them on
n o t i c e t h a t we are watching them).
We i n s t r u c t e d our envoy t o
the Arusha t a l k s t o read t h e statement t o t h e Government and
RPF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e r e . He says t h a t when he read t h e
statement, t h e RPF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s m i l e d , t h e Government
representatives "blinked."
We are about t o announce new h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e
($15 m i l l i o n ) f o r Burundi and Rwanda.
funds
We have c o n t a c t e d DOD t o see i f any o f t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y
t r a i n e r s who worked w i t h Rwandan government f o r c e s i n t h e past
b e l i e v e t h e y have c o n t a c t s w i t h i n Rwanda t h a t may be o f use.
These e f f o r t s , o f course, are n o t enough. I hope t o s i t down today
w i t h Ambassador Rawson t o discuss o t h e r p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s ,
e s p e c i a l l y i n terms o f g r e a t e r involvement f o r o t h e r A f r i c a n
l e a d e r s i n t h e process.
We w i l l a l s o d i s c u s s what we might do i n
Burundi t o keep i t from going t h e same r o u t e , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t
of t h i s morning's f a i l e d coup. State i s h o l d i n g a working group on
Rwanda/Burundi tomorrow a f t e r n o o n . I ' l l keep you posted.
•
M S N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY -I
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
26-Apr-1994 18:10 EDT
•DCRCT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
RWANDA AND THE UN
We f l o a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g idea w i t h S t r o b , Peter T a r n o f f ,
. Madeleine A l b r i g h t and some S t a t e bureaus (AF, 10) :
- - t h e P r e s i d e n t announces a $15m ERMA drawdown
— w e have t h e UNSC c a l l upon t h e UNSYG t o d i r e c t UNHCR
t o arrange cross border a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e 500,000 i n c o u n t r y
r e f u g e s s c o n c e n t r a t e d along t h e borders w i t h Tanzania,
Uganda, Burundi, and Z a i r e
- - t h e UNSC c a l l s upon those border c o u n t r i e s t o take
steps i m m e d i a t e l y t o engage i n cross border
feeding/assistance
--we a u t h o r i z e UNAMIR t o s t a t i o n UN C i v P o l ( p o l i c e )
i n t h e UNHCR camps t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y .
So f a r everyone l i k e s t h e idea. USUN i s e x p l o r i n g how t o p u t
i t into a draft.
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Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
MacArthur DeShazer
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
( STEINBERG
{ DESHAZER )
( EMERY )
( HALL )
( CICIO )
( VEIT )
( ITOH )
( KENNEY )
( DARBY )
( MILLISON )
( REED )
( WOLIN )
( CLARKER )
( CANAS )
( LINDSEY )
( BEERS )
( SCHWARTZ )
( WILSON )
( RICE )
( NORMAN )
( STALCUP ..).._
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCORY :
•(3NJ^B.R^RY PHOTOCORY.
. _
•
PEREoO. 13526
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FOR: Sean J. Darragh
CC: Records
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' mTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY J
*&RAjW- RHOTOGORY^! ^
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
27-Apr-1994 14:19 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
R i c h a r d A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
FOR BERGER: ADD RWANDA TO SOMALIA DC?
Sandy,
There i s h i g h l e v e l i n t e r e s t i n S t a t e and here on Rwanda.
I recommend t h a t you add a 15 minute s e c t i o n t o t h e Somalia
DC on F r i d a y t o here from S t a t e , AID, and USUN on what we are
doing on Rwanda.
Dick
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Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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STEINBERG [
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
CLARKER )
CANAS )
LINDSEY )
BEERS )
SCHWARTZ )
WILSON )
RICE )
NORMAN )
STALCUP )
DARRAGH )
RECORDS )
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X
£ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ;
K ^ I W T O N ^ i B R A R Y, P.( lOTOf ^OP V
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
28-Apr-1994 17:52 EDT
— OECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
R i c h a r d A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
***FOR CLEARANCE: RWANDA DC PAPER
Deputies Committee D i s c u s s i o n Paper
RWANDA
Background
The UN r e p o r t s t h a t i n excess o f 100,000 Rwandans have been
killed.
F i g h t i n g between the government and r e b e l f o r c e s
c o n t i n u e s . M i l i t i a l e d massacres are a l s o c o n t i n u i n g , urged on
by r a d i o s t a t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r more k i l l i n g .
UNAMIR has drawndown t o 270 t r o o p s and i s a t t e m p t i n g t o
arrange f o r the s a f e t y of Rwandans under i t s p r o t e c t i o n a t the
K i g a l i Amahoro stadium.
About 500,000 i n - c o u n t r y refugees have f l e d t o the border
areas w i t h Tanzania, Uganda, and Z a i r e . They are b e i n g prevented
from c r o s s i n g the borders and are i n need of h u m a n i t a r i a n
assistance.
The White House issued a statement l a s t F r i d a y , m e n t i o n i n g
s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who human r i g h t s groups b e l i e v e have
been i m p l i c a t e d i n the s l a u g h t e r s ( t a b 1 ) .
Objectives
The
IWG has i d e n t i f i e d s i x s h o r t - t e r m p o l i c y
objectives:
1.
t o stop the on-going massacres as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e
through c o n t a c t s w i t h GOR and RPF l e a d e r s and demarches f o r
s i m i l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i t h n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , France, Belgium,
and o t h e r s .
2. t o support the UN and o t h e r s i n a t t e m p t s t o achieve a
ceasefire.
3. t o encourage Tanzanian and o t h e r a t t e m p t s t o resume
n e g o t i a t i o n s under the Arusha Framework.
4.
t o seek t o prevent the v i o l e n c e from spreading o u t s i d e
Rwanda t h r o u g h c o n t a c t s w^Ltl^ n e i g h b p r v i a g l s l t a t ^ . . .
_ mmmmsmH'
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5. t o push i n t h e UN t o launch an immediate expanded
humanitarian assistance e f f o r t .
6. t o p r e v e n t a s i m i l a r round o f s l a u g h t e r and d i s o r d e r i n
Burundi by c l o s e l y m o n i t o r i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e r e and s t a y i n g i n
touch w i t h t h e v a r i o u s elements i n t h e c o u n t r y t o dissuade.
•
- 2-
Issues f o r D i s c u s s i o n
The Deputies should p r o v i d e d i r e c t i o n t o t h e IWG on t h e
degree o f a c t i v i s m t h a t they wish t o encourage on f u r t h e r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l steps aimed a t addressing t h e s l a u g h t e r and
a s s i s t i n g refugees.
A new UNSC r e s o l u t i o n i s being c o - d r a f t e d by the Czechs and
A r g e n t i n e s . Among t h e p o s s i b l e elements i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n c o u l d
be a genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a c a l l f o r UNHCR and border
c o u n t r i e s t o engage i n cross border a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e t r a p p e d i n
c o u n t r y refugees, l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e refugees, and an
arms embargo. I n t h e new UNSCR debate, s h o u l d the US s u p p o r t :
1. Genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n : language t h a t c a l l s f o r an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f human r i g h t s abuses and p o s s i b l e
v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e genocide convention?
2. I n Country P r o t e c t i o n o f Refugees: language t h a t
a u t h o r i z e s t h e use o f UNAMIR m i l i t a r y o r c i v i l i a n p o l i c e t o
p r o t e c t i n - c o u n t r y refugee camps r e c i e v i n g UNHCR o r ICRC r e l i e f ?
3. Arms embargo: language banning arms e x p o r t s t o Rwanda and
would, i n t e r a l i a , s a n c t i o n the on going Ugandan a i d t o t h e
rebels?
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e UNSCR, are t h e r e a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s t h a t
should be e x p l o r e d aimed a t s t o p p i n g t h e k i l l i n g , o r p u n i s h i n g
those who may have planned i t , o r a t l e a s t be seen t o be
p r e s s u r i n g t h e Rwandan government t o have i t punish them.
4. Counter-propaganda: should the US engage i n a d d i t i o n a l
propaganda a c t i v i t i e s t o g e t a message i n t o Rwanda t o counter t h e
radio s t a t i o n s that are urging k i l l i n g ?
�F:\Email\Data_Source\A 1 \Record\CDOO 1 \apr94\03 8113 .html
5.
Pressure t o Punish Organizers o f K i l l i n g : should the US
work w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s t o e x p l o r e d i r e c t e d s a n c t i o n s (no
admission on t r a v e l s t a t u s , assets s e i z u r e s , e t c . ) aimed a t those
who may have engineered t h e s l a u g h t e r ? and/or d i p l o m a t i c
s a n c t i o n s (down g r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s , t e r m i n a t i o n o f non-emergency
a s s i s t a n c e ) a g a i n s t Rwanda u n t i l those r e s p o n s i b l e are t r i e d ?
-GECRDf"
•
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Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
MacArthur DeShazer
Richard A. C l a r k e
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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STEINBERG )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
29-Apr-1994 16:36 EDT
DDCRfif
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)
SUBJECT:
FOR SANDY'S APPROVAL: DRAFT DC SUMMARY
format:
DC Summary
S u b j e c t : Somalia and Rwanda
The
Deputies Committee decided
that:
1. C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f T e r m i n a t i n g UNOSOM: The US should n o t
be seen as t a k i n g t h e l e a d t o t h r e a t e n t e r m i n a t i o n o f UNOSOM, b u t
should make c l e a r t o the Somalis t h a t donor and t r o o p
c o n t r i b u t o r s may w e l l decide t o t e r m i n a t e o p e r a t i o n s soon because
of t h e c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e and f a i l u r e t o achieve a p o l i t i c a l
solution.
Donors/Troop C o n t r i b u t o r s : S t a t e , AID, and DOD should
c o n s u l t w i t h t h e donors and major t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s about t h e i r
views on c o n t i n u i n g the o p e r a t i o n . We should urge them t o make
the r i s k o f t e r m i n a t i o n c l e a r t o the Somalis.
S p e c i a l Envoy: S t a t e should c o n s u l t w i t h t h e UN
( s p e c i f i c a l l y the a c t i n g SRSG) and r e g i o n a l s t a t e s ( E t h i o p i a ,
E r i t r e a , Uganda) t o determine whether and when a t r i p t o t h e
r e g i o n by a s p e c i a l US envoy would be h e l p f u l i n r e d u c i n g
f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g and promoting a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . I f
t h e r e i s a consensus t h a t such a t r i p should occur, then Amb.
Oakley o r some o t h e r envoy should head a team t o the r e g i o n .
Mandate Review Guidance: When t h e UNSC c o n s i d e r s t h e
UNOSOM mandate e x t e n s i o n , USUN w i l l support a 30 o r 45 day
e x t e n s i o n o n l y . I t w i l l support C o u n c i l a c t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t
t h e r e i s a review toward the end o f t h a t p e r i o d o f t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t e r m i n a t i n g o r s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c i n g the mandate
and UN presence, unless f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g has stopped and t h e r e
has been s i g n i f i c a n t progress toward a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
2. P r o t e c t i o n o f USLO: The c u r r e n t US Marine F l e e t Area
S e c u r i t y Team (FAST) i s scheduled t o d e p a r t Mogadishu on June 30.
Senior S t a t e and Defense o f f i c i a l s should c o n s u l t immediately
about S t a t e ' s plans f o r s e c u r i t y o f USLO a f t e r t h a t date. I f t h e
departments have not reached consensus, t h e i s s u e w i l l be decided
at h i g h e r l e v e l s no l 3 t e r ^ t h a n _ 15 . May . j . : ; . ^ . ^ : ^ " ^ •
[:
,4f^'~'. '.'"' C""'-~ ' " '
\
PER E,0 13526
o
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3. Contingency Evacuation o f UNOSOM: JCS and CINCENT s h o u l d
e v a l u a t e the UN p l a n f o r p e r m i s s i v e and emergency e v a c u a t i o n .
They s h o u l d determine t o what degree the UN i s p l a n n i n g t o r e l y
upon t h e US, what US c a p a b i l i t i e s would be r e q u i r e d , and what
would be necessary t o have those c a p a b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n a
t i m e l y manner. The Deputies decided t o d e f e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the p r o p o s a l t o c o n s u l t w i t h Congress on t h i s c o n t i n g e n c y pending
review o f t h e JCS e v a l u a t i o n .
•
4. UNOSOM Personnel:
Agencies w i l l r e p o r t immediately on
candidates t o f i l l p o s i t i o n s on the UNOSOM s t a f f : Development
O f f i c e (AID), J u d i c i a l s e c t i o n (State/INM and J u s t i c e ) , p o l i t i c a l
o f f i c e ( S t a t e ) , and Demining/Disarmament/and D e m o b i l i z a t i o n (OSD
and ACDA).
RWANDA
S t a t e w i l l prepare a d r a f t a c t i o n p l a n f o r review Monday 3
May. I t w i l l be a v i g o r o u s program and i n c l u d e approaches t o the
UNSYG, the OAU l e a d e r s h i p , concerned European s t a t e s , and
r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s . Among the ideas t h a t we w i l l s o l i c i t r e a c t i o n
to w i l l be an OAU a u t h o r i z e d peacekeeping f o r c e f o r Rwanda, a
p r e v e n t i v e d i p l o m a c y / d e t e r r e n t f o r c e i n Burundi, an arms embargo,
a human r i g h t s / g e n o c i d e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a UN p r o t e c t i v e
o p e r a t i o n f o r Rwandan refugees.
The Deputies w i l l review t h e p l a n and t h e s t a t u s o f the
issue a t a t e l c o n f e r e n c e e a r l y i n the week.
USUN w i l l support S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a c t i o n t o endorse an arms
embargo, a genocide i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a s s i s t a n c e ( i n c l u d i n g
UNHCR) f o r the refugees.
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Richard A. Clarke
Richard L. Canas
Wanda D. Lindsey /
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FOR:
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CC:
Rand R. Beers
E r i c P. Schwartz
Ernest J . Wilson I I I
Susan E. Rice
Marcia G. Norman
0. Ruth S t a l c u p
Sean J. Darragh
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BEERS )
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RECORDS )
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Ol-May-1994 18:31 EDT
GOUriDDtmAL—
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
A d d i t i o n a l A c t i o n s on Rwanda
Tony/Sandy:
J- hope we can meet w i t h Dick e a r l y on Monday t o review where we
are and where we're going w i t h respect t o Rwanda. I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
we need t o review our p o t e n t i a l support f o r OAU and r e g i o n a l
e f f o r t s if/when they act t o p r o t e c t refugees on b o t h sides o f t h e
border o r take more aggressive a c t i o n t o end t h e massacre. I n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e new i n s t r u c t i o n s (State 114636) t o t h e USUN on
a c t i o n s t o pursue w i t h respect t o a r e s o l u t i o n on Rwanda (based
on Dick's s u g g e s t i o n s ) , t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s are being t a k e n :
The P r e s i d e n t ' s message yesterday i s being pumped i n t o
Rwanda through VOA, BBC, Radio France and Radio Beige.
We've a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t i t i s being heard,
i f n o t heeded, by t h e government and RPF l e a d e r s h i p . I t
a l s o r e c e i v e d very heavy press p l a y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
We are c o n t i n u i n g t o work w i t h t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s ,
e s p e c i a l l y P r e s i d e n t s Mwinyi o f Tanzania and Museveni o f
Uganda, t o shore up t h e i r e f f o r t s a t r e s o l v i n g t h e c r i s i s .
New t a l k s are scheduled f o r Tuesday i n Arusha, a l t h o u g h i t
i s u n c e r t a i n whether t h e RPF ( t h i s time) w i l l show up. Our
Ambassador t o Tanzania, Peter De Vos, w i l l a t t e n d and h e l p
f a c i l i t a t e the discussions.
AS John Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson w i l l leave tomorrow
(Monday) n i g h t t o t r a v e l t o the r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g Uganda,
Burundi and Tanzania t o shore up t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s '
e f f o r t s t o achieve peace and p r o t e c t refugees i n Rwanda.
The UN Commission f o r Human Rights i s sending a team t o t h e
r e g i o n t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c u r r e n t abuses.
Senior USG o f f i c i a l s have been c o n t a c t i n g Government and RPF
l e a d e r s on a d a i l y b a s i s t o urge a c e a s e f i r e and renewal o f
negotiations.
For example, DAS Bushnell t a l k e d w i t h General
Bizimungo (RGF) and General Kagame (RPF) today t o r e l a t e t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s message from yesterday. She a l s o t o l d t h e RPF
t h a t t h e r e are r e p o r t s t h e RPF i s impeding t h e f l o w o f
refugees t o Tanzania, which he s t r o n g l y denied.
S t a t e i s assembling a r e v i s e d package o f $15 m i l l i o n i n
emergency r e l i e f a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e r e g i o n . A team o f
refugee o f f i c i a l s from our Embassy i n Tanzania i s going t o
the border w i t h Rwanda t o assess t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n and
make recommendations f o r new a s s i s t a n c e .
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\038358.html
Distribution:
FOR: Mary C. Emery
FOR: Wilma G. H a l l
FOR: K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
FOR: K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
FOR: W i l l i a m H. I t o h
FOR: K r i s t i e A. Kenney
FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FOR: Cathy M i l l i s o n
FOR: James W Reed
.
FOR: Neal S. Wolin
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins
FOR: Richard A. C l a r k e
FOR: Richard L. Canas
FOR: Wanda D. Lindsey
F R : Rand R. Beers
O.FOR: E r i c P. Schwartz
FOR: Ernest J. Wilson I I I
FOR: Susan E. Rice
FOR: Marcia G. Norman
FOR: 0. Ruth S t a l c u p
FOR: Sean J. Darragh
FOR: N a t a l i e S. Wozniak
FOR: C a l v i n A. M i t c h e l l
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine
FOR: Thomas B. Ross
CC
Non Records
CC
Records
CC
Pat A. B a t t e n f i e l d
CC
J e n n i f e r C. Ward
CC
MacArthur DeShazer
CC
Dan W Mozena
.
CC
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
CC
George M. A n d r i c o s
CC
C h r i s t i n a L. Funches
CC
Jeremy D. Rosner
CC
Eric Liu
CC
W i l l i a m C. Danvers
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
C
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Page 2 of2
�SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 2, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP MEMBERS
FROM:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
SUBJECT:
Summary and Conclusions o f 2 May 94
Meeting
GEORGIA
1.
S t a t e (NIS) w i l l engage i n a v a r i e t y o f d i p l o m a t i c
c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e Russians and Georgians t h i s week t o probe
f u r t h e r t h e reasons f o r t h e May 10th " d e a d l i n e " f o r a d e c i s i o n on
peacekeeping.
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
3. S t a t e (10) w i l l prepare an a n a l y s i s o f t h e v a r y i n g
l e v e l s o f UNSC a c t i o n t h a t might be taken w i t h regard t o a CIS
peacekeeping f o r c e (e.g. acknowledgement, endorsement) and what
" p r i c e " o r c o n d i t i o n s might be sought o f t h e CIS i n r e t u r n (e.g.
r e p o r t i n g , m o n i t o r i n g , mandate). The paper should be a v a i l a b l e
t o members o f t h e Core Group by 6 May.
RWANDA
1.
USUN w i l l c i r c u l a t e t o o t h e r concerned d e l e g a t i o n s t h e
elements o f a new r e s o l u t i o n based on t h e guidance t h a t was
agreed on by t h e i n t e r a g e n c y community on A p r i l 30, w i t h a view
t o a p p r o v a l o f such a r e s o l u t i o n l a t e r t h i s week.
2. S t a t e w i l l examine what f u n d i n g a u t h o r i t i e s are
a v a i l a b l e f o r US s u p p o r t t o h u m a n i t a r i a n and peacekeeping
o p e r a t i o n s ( V o l u n t a r y PKO account; FAA s e c t i o n s 506A, 522; ERMA)
NSC w i l l seek a White House announcement o f $15 m i l l i o n i n
emergency refugee a s s i s t a n c e .
EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d
4. S t a t e (AF) w i l l host a d a i l y (M-F) video conference on
Rwanda a t noon, u n t i l f u r t h e r n o t i c e .
fffSsifyoCLWON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�2
SECRET
GENERAL
There was agreement t h a t USAID should be r o u t i n e l y i n v i t e d
t o a l l f u t u r e meetings o f t h e Core Group.
Additional Distribution:
State/NIS - Amb. C o l l i n s
State/AF - Asst Sec Moose
CECRET
CLINTON LI
CP
OY
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
03-May-1994 10:04 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
K o f i Annan B r i e f i n g Memo
May 3, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM:
SUSAN E. RICE
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h K o f i Annan, Tuesday, May 3,
1994, a t 12:15 pm.
K o f i Annan, UN Undersecretary General f o r Peacekeeping, i s i n
Washington f o r meetings w i t h Members of Congress, i n c l u d i n g a
hearing yesterday before the Senate A f r i c a Subcommittee on
peacekeeping i n A f r i c a . Annan i s l i k e l y t o wish t o cover a range
of issues w i t h you i n c l u d i n g : Bosnia, Rwanda, and p o s s i b l y
Somalia, the s t a t u s o f our PDD and peacekeeping funding.
Update on Peacekeeping Reform a t the UN
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which Annan
heads, has made s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n the past year i n
improving i t s c a p a c i t y t o manage peace o p e r a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n
t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and increase i n i t s s t a f f , DPKO
now has a 24-hour s i t u a t i o n room and a stand-by forces planning
team. The l a t t e r i s a the r e s u l t o f a year-long p r o j e c t t o
s o l i c i t v o l u n t a r y , but non-binding commitments o f troops,
equipment, and services from member s t a t e s . This e f f o r t has
y i e l d e d pledges o f over 50,000 troops, which should improve the
UN's force planning and r a p i d deployment c a p a b i l i t i e s measurably.
Consistent w i t h the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges,
but once the PDD i s signed we w i l l o f f e r the UN i n f o r m a t i o n on
p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e U.S. forces or c a p a b i l i t i e s . We w i l l , o f
course, make no commitments t o provide such forces when they are
requested.
Suggested T a l k i n g Points
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C(&P¥
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Bosnia
I appreciate the Secretary-General's expressed concern about
c r i t i c i s m of U.S. p o l i c y by UNPROFOR o f f i c i a l s . These statements
have not been h e l p f u l t o our shared goal o f improved c o o r d i n a t i o n
between the UN and NATO.
•
-- This p u b l i c s n i p i n g has t o stop. What can we do, i n your
view t o improve UN-NATO r e l a t i o n s both on the ground and i n the
press?
We are very concerned t h a t the Serbs continue t o v i o l a t e the
Gorazde and Sarajevo e x c l u s i o n zones,
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Rwanda
We are very concerned about the grave s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
We are hopeful t h a t A f r i c a n nations w i l l respond f a v o r a b l y t o the
SYG's request f o r t r o o p s . What i s your expectation? What r o l e
do you t h i n k peacekeepers could u s e f u l l y play? How many do you
expect are needed?
I f adequate troops are a v a i l a b l e , we w i l l do what we can t o
make v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o deploy and s u s t a i n them. We do
not t h i n k i t would be wise, however, t o fund a non-UN mission
through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.
-- We are also planning t o make a v a i l a b l e $15 m i l l i o n t o support
the refugee and emergency r e l i e f e f f o r t and have dispatched
Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck t o the region t o t r y t o
r e i n v i g o r a t e the peace process.
Somalia
-- We have threatened t o d i s c o n t i n u e support f o r UNOSOM I I i f
the p a r t i e s f a i l t o make s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l progress. We are
c o n s i d e r i n g how t o respond i f t h i s t h r e a t does not b r i n g r e s u l t s .
Do you t h i n k , i f the UNSC threatens t o withdraw the f o r c e and
donors t h r e a t e n t o c u t assistance, t h i s w i l l y i e l d any u s e f u l
r e s u l t ? Do you t h i n k there i s any c o l l e c t i v e w i l l t o c a r r y out
such a t h r e a t ?
How c o n f i d e n t are you t h a t the major troops c o n t r i b u t o r s w i l l
stay beyond May/June? I f they are not l i k e l y t o stay, wouldn't
i t be p r e f e r a b l e f o r the UN t o be seen t o withdraw because the
p a r t i e s have f a i l e d t o cooperate r a t h e r than because the UN
mission crumbled?
Haiti
Do you have any sense of what r o l e a r e c o n f i g u r e d , more
robust UNMIH might play, i n the event t h a t sanctions s o f t e n the
m i l i t a r y regime? Do you t h i n k there would be any a p p e t i t e i n the
UN f o r a peace enforcement mission i n H a i t i ?
Georgia
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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The Russians a r e p r e s s i n g f o r t h e immediate d i s p a t c h o f a UN
m i s s i o n t o Georgia. T h i s seems premature g i v e n t h e f a i l u r e o f
the p a r t i e s t o reach any form o f s e t t l e m e n t . Do you see any r o l e
f o r UN peacekeepers a t t h i s stage? What r o l e might t h e UN p l a y
i f t h e Russians decide t o go i n u n i l a t e r a l l y w i t h a CIS f o r c e ?
Peacekeeping
Funding
(FYI:
A NSC/State/OMB team t r a v e l l e d t o t h e UN l a s t week t o t r y
t o o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e UN's cash f l o w p i c t u r e
f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n t o Congress.
Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met
w i t h House and Senate a p p r o p r i a t o r s . While t h e g e n e r a l mood was
more o r l e s s c o o p e r a t i v e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e
problem, s t a f f expressed s e r i o u s doubt t h a t Congress w i l l be a b l e
t o a c t b e f o r e t h e August recess (when t h e cash f l o w c r i s i s i s
l i k e l y t o become severe) and concern t h a t t h e House Republicans
w i l l t r y t o e x t r a c t a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o r h o l d up t h e
supplemental over UN r e f o r m .
Another t h i n g t h a t was c l e a r from these meetings i s t h e
importance o f s c h e d u l i n g a P r e s i d e n t i a l meeting w i t h t h e Defense
a u t h o r i z e r s / a p p r o p r i a t o r s i m m e d i a t e l y . Many a r e f e e l i n g l e f t o u t
and i n c r e a s i n g l y angry.)
Thank you f o r your h e l p i n p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o
our team t h a t v i s i t e d t h e UN l a s t week. We are w o r k i n g hard w i t h
Congress t o t r y t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t o t h e f u n d i n g problem. The
P r e s i d e n t i s p e r s o n a l l y committed t o t h i s e f f o r t .
We are hoping t o be a b l e t o have some funds t o t h e UN i n
August, b u t t h i s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t g i v e n t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s process t h i s year.
—
One t h i n g i s c l e a r :
I t i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t h a t we o b t a i n
an e f f e c t i v e i n s p e c t o r g e n e r a l . Otherwise, we w i l l never be a b l e
t o pay o f f our debts i n f u l l .
What do you t h i n k we can do t o
press our case more e f f e c t i v e l y b o t h w i t h t h e SYG and t h e
membership?
C o n t a i n i n g UN Peacekeeping
the
Costs
We a p p r e c i a t e t h e e f f o r t s t h e UN has made t o t r y t o reduce
c o s t s o f on-going peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s .
-- We would l i k e t o work w i t h your s t a f f i n a low-key and q u i e t
ways t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y a d d i t i o n a l , r e a d i l y implementable c o s t savings measures.
We would l i k e t o send a s m a l l team t o New York t o work w i t h
DPKO i n t h e same cooperate s p i r i t t h a t our l o g i s t i c s teams d i d
last Fall.
How do you view t h i s p r o p o s a l ?
Concurrences by:
Jenonne Walker
Distribution:
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Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
K a t h e r i n e M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
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Page 1 of4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
03-May-1994 10:08 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
S l i g h t l y Revised K o f i Annan Memo
May 3, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM:
SUSAN E. RICE
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h K o f i Annan, Tuesday, May 3,
1994, a t 12:15 pm.
K o f i Annan, UN Undersecretary General f o r Peacekeeping, i s i n
Washington f o r meetings w i t h Members o f Congress, i n c l u d i n g a
hearing yesterday before the Senate A f r i c a Subcommittee on
peacekeeping i n A f r i c a . Annan i s l i k e l y t o wish t o cover a range
of issues w i t h you i n c l u d i n g : Bosnia, Rwanda, and p o s s i b l y
Somalia, t h e status o f our PDD and peacekeeping funding.
Update on Peacekeeping Reform a t t h e UN
The UN Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) , which Annan
heads, has made s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n the past year i n
improving i t s capacity t o manage peace o p e r a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n
to a s u b s t a n t i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and increase i n i t s s t a f f , DPKO
now has a 24-hour s i t u a t i o n room and a stand-by f o r c e s planning
team. The l a t t e r i s a the r e s u l t o f a year-long p r o j e c t t o
s o l i c i t v o l u n t a r y , but non-binding commitments o f troops,
equipment, and services from member s t a t e s . This e f f o r t has
y i e l d e d pledges o f over 50,000 troops, which should improve the
UN's f o r c e planning and r a p i d deployment c a p a b i l i t i e s measurably.
Consistent w i t h the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges,
but once the PDD i s signed we w i l l o f f e r the UN i n f o r m a t i o n on
p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e U.S. forces or c a p a b i l i t i e s . W w i l l , o f
e
course, make no commitments t o provide such forces when they are.
requested.
Suggested T a l k i n g Points
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
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Bosnia
I a p p r e c i a t e the Secretary-General's expressed concern about
c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. p o l i c y by UNPROFOR o f f i c i a l s .
These statements
have not been h e l p f u l t o our shared goal o f improved c o o r d i n a t i o n
between the UN and NATO.
•
-- This p u b l i c s n i p i n g has t o stop. What can we do, i n your
view t o improve UN-NATO r e l a t i o n s both on t h e ground and i n the
press?
-- We are very concerned t h a t the Serbs continue t o v i o l a t e the
Gorazde and Sarajevo exclusion zones.
E,P..13526. 1.4(d)
Rwanda
W are very concerned about the grave s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
e
W are hopeful t h a t A f r i c a n nations w i l l respond f a v o r a b l y t o the
e
SYG's request f o r troops. What i s your expectation? What r o l e
do you t h i n k peacekeepers could u s e f u l l y play? How many do you
expect are needed?
I f adequate troops are a v a i l a b l e , we w i l l do what we can t o
make v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o deploy and s u s t a i n them. We do
not t h i n k i t would be wise, however, t o fund a non-UN mission
through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.
W are also planning t o make a v a i l a b l e $15 m i l l i o n t o support
e
the refugee and emergency r e l i e f e f f o r t and have dispatched
Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck t o the r e g i o n t o t r y t o
r e i n v i g o r a t e the peace process.
Somalia
We have threatened t o d i s c o n t i n u e support f o r UNOSOM I I i f
the p a r t i e s f a i l t o make s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l progress. We are
c o n s i d e r i n g how t o respond i f t h i s t h r e a t does not b r i n g r e s u l t s .
Do you t h i n k , i f the UNSC threatens t o withdraw the f o r c e and
donors t h r e a t e n t o cut assistance, t h i s w i l l y i e l d any u s e f u l
r e s u l t ? Do you t h i n k there i s any c o l l e c t i v e w i l l t o c a r r y out
such a t h r e a t ?
How c o n f i d e n t are you t h a t the major troops c o n t r i b u t o r s w i l l
stay beyond May/June? I f they are not l i k e l y t o stay, wouldn't
i t be p r e f e r a b l e f o r the UN t o be seen t o withdraw because the
p a r t i e s have f a i l e d t o cooperate r a t h e r than because the UN
mission crumbled?
Haiti
Do you have any sense of what r o l e a r e c o n f i g u r e d , more
robust UNMIH might play, i n the event t h a t sanctions s o f t e n the •
m i l i t a r y regime? Do you t h i n k there would be any a p p e t i t e i n the
UN f o r a peace enforcement mission i n H a i t i ?
Georgia
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The Russians are pressing f o r the immediate d i s p a t c h of a UN
mission t o Georgia. This seems premature g i v e n the f a i l u r e of
the p a r t i e s t o reach any form of s e t t l e m e n t . Do you see any r o l e
for UN peacekeepers at t h i s stage? What r o l e might the UN play
i f the Russians decide t o go i n u n i l a t e r a l l y w i t h a CIS force?
Peacekeeping
Funding
(FYI:
A NSC/State/OMB team t r a v e l l e d t o the UN l a s t week t o t r y
to o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the UN's cash flow p i c t u r e
for p r e s e n t a t i o n t o Congress.
Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met
w i t h House and Senate a p p r o p r i a t o r s . While the general mood was
more o r less c o o p e r a t i v e and understanding o f the s e v e r i t y o f the
problem, s t a f f expressed serious doubt t h a t Congress w i l l be able
to a c t before the August recess (when the cash flow c r i s i s i s
l i k e l y t o become severe) and concern t h a t the House Republicans
w i l l t r y t o e x t r a c t a d d i t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s or hold up the
supplemental over UN reform.
Another t h i n g t h a t was clear from these meetings i s the
importance o f scheduling a P r e s i d e n t i a l meeting w i t h the Defense
a u t h o r i z e r s / a p p r o p r i a t o r s immediately. Many are f e e l i n g l e f t out
and i n c r e a s i n g l y angry.)
Thank you f o r your help i n p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o
our team t h a t v i s i t e d the UN l a s t week. We are working hard w i t h
Congress t o t r y t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t o the funding problem. The
President i s p e r s o n a l l y committed t o t h i s e f f o r t .
We are hoping t o be able t o have some funds t o the UN i n
August, but t h i s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t given the complexity of the
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s process t h i s year.
-- One t h i n g i s c l e a r : I t i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t h a t we o b t a i n
3n e f f e c t i v e i n s p e c t o r general. Otherwise, we w i l l never be able
to pay o f f our debts i n f u l l . What do you t h i n k we can do t o
press our case more e f f e c t i v e l y both w i t h the SYG and the
membe rship?
Containing UN Peacekeeping
-the
Costs
We appreciate the e f f o r t s the UN has made t o t r y t o reduce
costs o f on-going peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s .
We would l i k e t o work w i t h your s t a f f i n a low-key and q u i e t
way t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y a d d i t i o n a l , r e a d i l y implementable costsavings measures.
We would l i k e t o send a small team t o New York t o work w i t h
DPKO i n the same cooperate s p i r i t t h a t our l o g i s t i c s team d i d
l a s t F a l l . How do you view t h i s proposal?
Concurrences by:
Distribution:
Jenonne Walker
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Samuel R. Berger
M.ary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A, Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
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( BERGER )
( EMERY )
( HALL )
( CICIO )
( VEIT )
( ITOH )
( KENNEY )
( DARBY )
( MILLISON
( REED )
( WOLIN )
( HAWKINS )
( RECORDS )
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Page 1 of2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
05-May-1994 13:28
EDT
SECRBTMEMORANDUM FOR:
Susan E. Rice
Randy R. Beers
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Sean J. Darragh
(DARRAGH)
SUBJECT:
( RICE )
( BEERS )
( CLARKER )
RWANDA WORKING GROUP
FALLOUT FROM RWANDA MEETING
RPF IS MAKING A FINAL PUSH TO TAKE KIGALI.
WILL LIKELY SUCCEED.
SHATTUCK MET WITH SALIM SALIM.
POSITION.
THEY
HE IS IN SYNC WITH OUR
GEN'L DALIR (sp?) IS ASKING FOR 16 THOUSAND TROOPS.
USUN HAS ASKED WHETHER WE ARE WILLING TO HELP OUTFIT SOME OF
THEM. OUTFITTING MEANS EVERYTHING FROM WEB GEAR TO APCS.
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS REQUEST IS FOR AN ACCESSED
OPERATION OR NOT. SUSAN ZELLE THINKS THE UN WILL PAY.
BELGIUM'S AMB. TOLD MOOSE THEY WANT US TO TAKE THE
LEAD. EVERYONE ACCEPT THE FRENCH SEEM TO AGREE THAT SOME
TYPE OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATION SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED SOON.
FRENCH WANT TWO SIDES TO AGREE TO AN OPERATION BEFORE THEY
JUMP ON BOARD FOR SUCH A VENTURE.
ALTHOUGH EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE SHYING AWAY FROM A
FORMAL PK OPERATION BECAUSE THE DISPUTANTS SEEM ADVERSE TO I T
AS YET, GEN'L DALIR'S PLAN SEEMS LIKE A PK OPERATION UNDER A
NON-PKO GUISE.
AMB ALBRIGHT WILL GET GUIDANCE TO FIND OUT MORE FROM
BBG BEFORE WE EXPOSE OUR POSITION. THE FACT THAT WE DON'T
HAVE ONE YET HAS A LOT TO DO WITH THAT. STATE IS CALLING FOR
A DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.
STATE IS DRAFTING A PAPER FOR A POTENTIAL DC IN CASE
IT IS NEEDED. EVERYONE AGREES DICK'S CORE GROUP TONIGHT
MIGHT MAKE A DC UNNECESSARYYY
THAT I S ALL
SEAN
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 17:27 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
( STEINBERG
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
VP t a l k e r s on Rwanda
T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g t h e s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
—
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h e tragedy
i n Rwanda. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you
f u r t h e r , as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f concerned A f r i c a n
s t a t e s and our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .
The U.S. has not c a t e g o r i c a l l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response.
-- We do, however, have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about proposals t o
e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which would operate
throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law
and order and p a c i f y t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
I n our view, t h e r e are several problems w i t h t h i s approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This m i s s i o n would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether t h e p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use f o r c e t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount t h e large force r e q u i r e d .
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L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power.
There may, however, be a more l i m i t e d b u t v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t
h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n t h a t t h e UN and/or OAU c o u l d p e r f o r m .
—
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o p r o t e c t those refugees and d i s p l a c e d
persons t h a t a r e i n t h e most immediate d a n g e r — t h a t i s those i n
t h e s o u t h e r n p o r t i o n o f Rwanda.
Such a f o r c e c o u l d n o t o n l y p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n ,
a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e b u t a l s o serve i n a
p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o d e t e r t h e spread o f v i o l e n c e t o
Burundi.
•
This m i s s i o n would r e q u i r e fewer t r o o p s and be l e s s
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y .
I t would a l s o r e q u i r e t h e a c t i v e support o f t h e
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , t h e assent o f t h e
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f t h e t r o o p s were a v a i l a b l e f o r such a m i s s i o n , t h e U.S.
would endeavor t o h e l p by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l resources,
equipment and l i f t as w e l l as h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e .
I f t h e m i s s i o n were mounted i n d e p e n d e n t l y by t h e OAU o r by a
c o l l e c t i o n o f concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g o f t h e UN
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , t h e U.S. would o f f e r some a s s i s t a n c e on a
voluntary basis.
I f t h e m i s s i o n were funded t h r o u g h UN assessments, t h e U.S.
would pay more than 30% o f t h e c o s t and seek t h e normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment o r
services.
I hope t h a t we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o c r a f t a v i a b l e
d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n t o t h i s t r a g e d y and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
( RECORDS )
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A l F o l d e r : MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 06-May-1994 17:27
Forward Flag: YES
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LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of 3
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:49 EDT
CONriDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Revised TPs f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
—
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
—
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process. We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
t o work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y of refugees on both
sides o f the border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o populations i n the southern p o r t i o n of Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a f o r c e could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r the
p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of humanitarian
assistance but also a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and
serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o deter the spread of
v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTC
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039283.html
robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of the
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , the assent of the
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
•
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
voluntary basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of equipment or
services.
At the same time, we
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a
would operate throughout
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and
have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use f o r c e t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount the l a r g e f o r c e r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e force out of K i g a l i , because a l l movement of
troops and supplies would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances of success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a major
m i l i t a r y power.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039283.html
Page 3 of 3
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
RECORDS )
CC: Records
Additional
Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 06-May-1994 21:48
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039283
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE38:ZVFBV6IOY.WPL
A l F o l d e r : MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 06-May-1994 21:48
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST CLASS
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039284.html
Page 1 of 4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:58 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
Sandy,
Attached are suggested t a l k i n g p o i n t s f o r the Vice
President's meeting w i t h Boutros-Ghali e t a l . on Rwanda.
They have been i n f o r m a l l y c l e a r e d by JCS, State and OSD. Don
Steinberg concurs as w e l l .
Once you and your c o u n t e r p a r t s have cleared/commented, I w i l l
forward f o r m a l l y t o the Vice President's o f f i c e .
I w i l l also provide the Vice President's o f f i c e w i t h a c h a r t
being prepared by State t h a t summarizes the FY 94 resources
t h a t may s t i l l be a v a i l a b l e t o support v o l u n t a r y
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a p o t e n t i a l Rwanda mission.
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
CC:
CC:
CC:
CC:
Samuel R. Berger
W Anthony K. Lake
.
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
Records
James A. Carman
Donald K. Steinberg
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
BERGER )
LAKE )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
RECORDS )
RECORDS )
CARMAN )
STEINBERG
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 06-May-1994 21:49
Deletable Flag: Y
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HTC
.
J V
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\A l\Record\CDOO 1 \may94\039284.htm]
Page 2 of4
DOCNUM: 03 9284
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE53:ZVFBVE8H0.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 06-May-1994 21:58
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
06-May-1994 21:49 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
Randy R. Beers
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
( BEERS )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Revised TPs f o r VP's Meeting on Rwanda
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
—
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
—
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
-- There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process. We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
t o work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y of refugees on both
sides of the border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039284.html
Page 3 of 4
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s i n the southern p o r t i o n o f Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a f o r c e could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r the
p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of humanitarian
assistance b u t also a s s i s t i n refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and
serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o deter t h e spread of
v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e
robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of t h e
Burundi government and, p r e f e r a b l y , the assent of the
Rwandan p a r t i e s .
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , t h e U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of t h e UN
S e c u r i t y Council, t h e U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, t h e U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r any a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or
services.
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039284.html
Page 4 of 4
Thus f a r , no c o u n t r y has committed t o send t r o o p s ,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e f o r c e r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done by a i r .
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h o u t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power.
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conf1ict.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\Emai]\Data_Source\A]\Record\CD00l\may94\039286.html
Page 1 of3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 11:46 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
M M R N D M FOR: SEE BELOW
EOA-U
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Updated T a l k i n g Points on Rwanda
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t . a l . on Rwanda
W remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
e
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands prompt i n t e r n a t i o n a l
act i o n .
-- The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number o f proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
W have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
e
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN and
r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha
peace process.
We want t o consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t
to work w i t h the OAU t o ensure the s a f e t y o f refugees on both
sides of t h e border.
W are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
e
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide
s e c u r i t y t o populations i n the southern p o r t i o n o f Rwanda, where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance but also a s s i s t i n refugee
r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y t o
deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The o p e r a t i o n
would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039286.html
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of the
Burundi and/or Tanzanian government and the assent o f
the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be mindful not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t o f the displaced persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
'-- I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, equipment and l i f t as w e l l as humanitarian assistance,
upon agreement o f a c l e a r concept of operations.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned states w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s of equipment or s e r v i c e s .
-- At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a large peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , no country has committed t o send troops,
and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t
pledges t o mount the large force r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
sizeable force out of K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
troops and supplies would have t o be done .by a i r .
Page 2 of 3
�Page 3 of 3
F:\EmaiI\Data_Soiirce\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039286.html
I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances of success appear s l i m ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y without the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a major
m i l i t a r y power,
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work together t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and provide r e l i e f t o the
hundreds of thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t of t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
Dist r i b u t i o n :
FRO:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
FOR:
CC:
CC:
CC:
CC;
CC:
W Anthony K. Lake
.
Samuel R. Berger
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. Veit
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
Records
Donald K. Steinberg
James A. Carman
W i l l i a m M. Wise
Richard A. Clarke
(
(
(
(
(
{
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
LAKE )
BERGER )
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON )
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
RECORDS )
STEINBERG )
CARMAN )
WISE )
CLARKER )
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DOCNUM: 039286
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE51:ZVFCGTKC8.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
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Date Modified: 07-May-1994 11:45
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 13:00 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
James A. Carman
W i l l i a m M. Wise
( CARMAN )
( WISE )
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
Rwanda TP's as agreed by State and JCS
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
-- The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g t h e s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n t h e S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support t h e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y o f displaced persons on both sides o f the
border.
-- We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along the Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
humanitarian assistance but could also a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y
t o deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O.13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039287.html
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s o f engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support of
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t o f the d i s p l a c e d persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and t h e mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support t h e o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement o f a c l e a r concept of o p e r a t i o n s .
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a
c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the b l e s s i n g of the UN
S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would o f f e r some assistance on a
voluntary basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S.
would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal
reimbursement f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s .
-- At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
-- While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are s e v e r a l problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , i t i s unclear t h a t any country has
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 3 of 3
committed t o send t r o o p s , and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e
force required.
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t t h e e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m .
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who a r e s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
•
CC: Records
RECORDS )
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 13:00
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039287
VMS Filename: OA$SHARE18:ZVFCILOJN.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 13:00
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039291.html
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 15:26 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL '
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
F i n a l Rwanda T a l k i n g Points
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and supporting e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n t h e S e c u r i t y Council.
-- We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y o f d i s p l a c e d persons on both sides o f the
border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , there may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along t h e Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance b u t could a l s o a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e c a p a c i t y
t o deter the spread of v i o l e n c e t o Burundi. The
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039291.html
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s of engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support o f
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l
humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must a l s o work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t of the d i s p l a c e d persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support the o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement of a c l e a r concept of operations.
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
[ I F ASKED what d i r e c t support U.S. could provide:
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU
or by a c o l l e c t i o n of concerned s t a t e s w i t h the
b l e s s i n g of the UN S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would
o f f e r some assistance on a v o l u n t a r y basis.
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments,
the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement f o r
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s . ]
—
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end the
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex, perhaps
even more so than Somalia.
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039291.html
Page 3 of3
Thus f a r , i t i s u n c l e a r t h a t any c o u n t r y has
committed t o send t r o o p s , and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
t h e r e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount t h e l a r g e
force required.
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e o u t o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement o f
t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t t h e e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s u n c l e a r p r e c i s e l y what t h e peace enforcement
m i s s i o n would be o r when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , t h e chances o f success appear s l i m .
•
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work t o g e t h e r t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and p r o v i d e r e l i e f t o t h e
hundreds o f thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
RECORDS )
CC: Records
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 15:25
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039291
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Al Folder: MAY94
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Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 15:25
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 16:18 EDT
CONriDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Ernest J. Wilson I I I
FROM :
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
WILSON )
rwanda t a l k i n g p o i n t s
Ernie-Rwanda p o i n t s FYI. Have a great t r i p (and b r i n g me back an
ANC e l e c t i o n or inauguaral T - s h i r t ) ! !
Susan
( RECORDS )
CC: Records
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 07-May-1994 16:17
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039294
VMS Filename: OA$SHAREl3:ZVFCNARRL.WPL
Al Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 07-May-1994 16:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
[:
'
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-1994 15:54 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
F i n a l D r a f t Rwanda T a l k i n g
Points
Attached are f i n a l d r a f t t a l k i n g p o i n t s on Rwanda f o r
p o s s i b l e use by the Vice President.
CLINTON LIBRARY P
H
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r n
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They have the f u l l support o f Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger as w e l l
as NSC s t a f f , State, JCS, USUN. OSD has c l e a r e d at t h e DAS
l e v e l and we expect senior l e v e l concurrence s h o r t l y .
OMB recommends against the Vice President meeting w i t h
Boutros-Ghali and Salim Salim on t h i s s u b j e c t , because OMB
opposes any peacekeeping e f f o r t i n s i d e Rwanda and b e l i e v e s
f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given t o a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s .
However, i f the meeting does take place and t h e r e i s
d i s c u s s i o n o f options f o r p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y t o persons
i n s i d e Rwanda, OMB would not o b j e c t t o the f i n a l v e r s i o n of
the t a l k i n g p o i n t s as d r a f t e d .
Distribution:
FOR:
FOR:
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
W i l l i a m M. Wise
James A. Carman
Records
Donald K. Steinberg
Mary C. Emery
Wilma G. H a l l
K r i s t e n K. C i c i o
Katherine M. V e i t
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
K r i s t i e A. Kenney
M. Brooke Darby
Cathy M i l l i s o n
James W Reed
.
Neal S. Wolin
Ardenia R. Hawkins
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
WISE )
CARMAN )
RECORDS )
STEINBERG
EMERY )
HALL )
CICIO )
VEIT )
ITOH )
KENNEY )
DARBY )
MILLISON
REED )
WOLIN )
HAWKINS )
•
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
07-May-199'5 15:26 EDT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
( STEINBERG )
( CLARKER )
Donald K. Steinberg
Richard A. Clarke
FROM:
Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT:
F i n a l Rwanda T a l k i n g Points
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
Suggested T a l k i n g Points f o r Vice President's Meeting
w i t h Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim e t a l . on Rwanda
We remain extremely concerned about t h e on-going tragedy i n
Rwanda. This i s a problem t h a t demands immediate i n t e r n a t i o n a l
action.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\may94\039294.html
The United States wants t o play a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n
a l l e v i a t i n g the s u f f e r i n g i n Rwanda and s u p p o r t i n g e f f o r t s t o
achieve a l a s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
There have been a number of proposed responses t o t h i s
tragedy. We would l i k e t o explore these ideas w i t h you f u r t h e r ,
as w e l l as w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of concerned A f r i c a n s t a t e s and
our colleagues i n the S e c u r i t y Council.
We have already taken some important steps. We w i l l continue
t o support the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s now underway by the UN, OAU,
the Tanzanian government and r e g i o n a l leaders t o reach a
c e a s e f i r e and r e t u r n t o the Arusha peace process.
We want t o
consider how t o support the UN e f f o r t t o work w i t h the OAU t o
ensure the s a f e t y of d i s p l a c e d persons on both sides of the
border.
We are committed t o provide humanitarian r e l i e f , t o implement
the arms embargo and t o have the UN Human Rights Commission f u l l y
i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda.
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e may be another v i t a l l y important
humanitarian mission t h a t the UN and/or OAU could perform.
We would be i n t e r e s t e d i n e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of
c r e a t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e zone along the Rwandan border w i t h an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t o provide s e c u r i t y t o p o p u l a t i o n s , where
refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons are i n the most immediate danger.
Such a mission could not only provide s e c u r i t y f o r
the p r o t e c t i v e zone and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
humanitarian assistance but could a l s o a s s i s t i n
refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n and serve i n a p r e v e n t i v e capacity
t o deter the spread of violence t o Burundi. The
o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e robust r u l e s o f engagement.
This mission may r e q u i r e fewer troops and be less
complex l o g i s t i c a l l y than some other proposals now
being discussed.
I t would, however, need the a c t i v e support o f
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , such as Burundi and Tanzania,
and the assent of the Rwandan p a r t i e s .
In c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t u a l
humanitarian/peacekeeping
mission i n Rwanda, we must be m i n d f u l not t o upset the
d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l balance t h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s i n
Burundi.
We must also work together t o d e f i n e c l e a r l y
achievable o b j e c t i v e s and an end-state such as
r e s e t t l e m e n t of the displaced persons and refugees
and/or a sunset p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the o p e r a t i o n i n s i x months t o preclude the mission
becoming an open-ended one.
I f capable troops were a v a i l a b l e and the mission considered
v i a b l e , the U.S. would f u l l y support the o p e r a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y
and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and endeavor t o help by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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resources, some l i f t , equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon
agreement o f a c l e a r concept of o p e r a t i o n s .
We would expect t o be j o i n e d i n t h i s e f f o r t by other
concerned n a t i o n s .
[IF ASKED what d i r e c t support U.S. could p r o v i d e :
I f the mission were mounted independently by the OAU
or by a c o l l e c t i o n o f concerned s t a t e s w i t h the
b l e s s i n g o f the UN S e c u r i t y Council, the U.S. would
o f f e r some assistance on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s .
I f the mission were funded through UN assessments,
the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement f o r
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment or s e r v i c e s . ]
At the same time, we have serious r e s e r v a t i o n s about
proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e peace enforcement mission, which
would operate throughout Rwanda w i t h a mandate t o end t h e
f i g h t i n g , r e s t o r e law and order and p a c i f y the p o p u l a t i o n .
While we have not d e f i n i t i v e l y r u l e d i n or out any p a r t i c u l a r
response, i n our view, there are several problems w i t h t h i s
approach:
EO 13526 1.4d
This mission would be p a r t i c u l a r l y complex,
even more so than Somalia.
perhaps
I t remains very unclear whether the p a r t i e s t o the
c o n f l i c t would use force t o oppose such a mission.
Thus f a r , i t i s unclear t h a t any country has
committed t o send troops, and i t appears u n l i k e l y t h a t
there w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t pledges t o mount the l a r g e
force r e q u i r e d .
L o g i s t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o stage a
s i z e a b l e f o r c e out o f K i g a l i , because a l l movement of
troops and s u p p l i e s would have t o be done through an
a i r p o r t a t the e p i c e n t e r o f a c i v i l war.
I t i s unclear p r e c i s e l y what the peace enforcement
mission would be or when i t would end.
F i n a l l y , the chances o f success appear s l i m .
Again, l e t me say t h a t we hope we can work together t o t r y t o
c r a f t a v i a b l e d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and provide r e l i e f t o the
hundreds of thousands who are s u f f e r i n g as r e s u l t o f t h i s t r a g i c
conflict.
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EO 13526 3.5c
8 May 1994
Rwanda:
Comments on State/10 PKO Options Paper
1.
The CIA does not c l e a r p o l i c y papers,
observations on the paper f o l l o w :
That s a i d , a few
The c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s of the FAR, RPF and
m i l i t i a f o r c e s are o m i t t e d from 10's d r a f t paper.
Attached t o t h i s memo i s a b r i e f assessment of the
p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s t o peacekeepers.
The d r a f t options paper understates D a l l a i r e ' s proposal.
He c a l l s f o r a f o r c e t o insure the d e l i v e r y of
humanitarian a i d and " t o prevent c o n t i n u i n g massacres and
to permit the f r e e movement o f people". This mission i s ,
considerably more complex and dangerous than the v e r s i o n
described i n the 10 paper.
The o b j e c t i v e of a PKO o p e r a t i o n , " b r i n g i n g humanitarian
assistance t o the v i c t i m s o f the c o n f l i c t " w i l l almost
c e r t a i n l y be viewed i n Rwanda as a p r o - T u t s i o p e r a t i o n .
"Enclaves" would be l a r g e l y populated by T u t s i s w h i l e the
"hoodlums and r o v i n g gangs" are the Hutu m i l i t i a s who we
b e l i e v e are d i r e c t e d and s u p p l i e d by elements o f the FAR
and Hutu h a r d l i n e o f f i c i a l s . The PKO would t h e r e f o r e be
c o n f r o n t i n g a semi-organized f o r c e t h a t i s backed by key
elements of t h e m i l i t a r y and government. H o s t i l i t y toward
the PKO by many members of the Hutu m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n
could be considerable, e s p e c i a l l y i f the PKO began
disarming Hutu m i l i t i a s . The m i l i t i a s can e a s i l y hide
t h e i r weapons ( AK-47S, grenades and pangas) from the PKO
only t o take them out a t n i g h t t o k i l l c i v i l i a n s or ambush
peacekeepers. House-to-house searches f o r weapons w i l l
t u r n the Hutu p o p u l a t i o n against the PKO, produce very few
weapons, and subject PKO forces t o considerable danger.
The Rwandan m i l i t a r y and Hutu m i l i t i a s have already
demonstrated t h a t they w i l l not h e s i t a t e t o k i l l UN forces
who stand i n t h e i r way.
With so many moderate Hutu p o l i t i c i a n s and Hutu c i v i l
servants who might have been w i l l i n g t o work w i t h T u t s i s
EO 13526 3.5c
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k i l l e d by the m i l i t i a s , Rwandan p o l i t i c s i s l i k e l y t o
become t h e p o l i t i c s o f extremism. A PKO can h a r d l y expect
t o remain n e u t r a l i n an environment o f extremism where
each side w i l l attempt t o t u r n the PKO against the o t h e r
or blame the PKO w i t h t a k i n g s i d e s . For example, what
does the PKO do about the Hutu e x t r e m i s t r a d i o broadcasts?
Does the PKo attempt t o stop arms from c r o s s i n g the
border?.
One lesson from Somalia i s t h a t d e l i v e r i n g humanitarian
a i d i n a v i o l e n t environment i s v e r y "troop i n t e n s i v e " and
i s only the f i r s t step i n a l a r g e r mission. Securing
enclaves and d e l i v e r i n g a i d merely freezes the l a r g e r
p o l i t i c a l and e t h n i c problem i n place. When the troops
e v e n t u a l l y depart--or are f o r c e d t o withdraw as combat
c a s u a l t i e s mount, as i n Somalia--the T u t s i s i n Rwanda w i l l
again be a t r i s k and the refugees w i l l s t i l l be refugees.
What are the e x i t c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e PKO? No massacres
today, no massacres next week, o r no massacres next month?
What p o l i t i c a l steps i n Rwanda need t o be taken before
such e x i t c o n d i t i o n s are met? I s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n l i k e l y
given the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s and c u r r e n t e t h n i c slaughter?
(S NF)
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c I
7 May
1994
Rwanda: Threats to Peacekeeping Forces
l. Rwanda could easily become a dangerous environment f o r
international peacekeepers.
Government and RPF forces, equipped and p r o f i c i e n t i n the
use of l i g h t arms and small a r t i l l e r y , could become deadly
opponents of a peacekeeping force. I n addition, the Hutu
m i l i t i a s armed with automatic weapons and grenades could
attack peacekeepers.
-- The Rwandan m i l i t a r y and Hutu m i l i t i a s have already
demonstrated that they w i l l not hesitate to k i l l UN forces
who stand i n t h e i r way. [ 3.5c
2. Peacekeeping forces i n Rwanda would depend on vulnerable lines
of communication and supply. K i g a l i i s landlocked. Supplies
would need to pass on roads that could easily be closed by h o s t i l e
forces. K i g a l i a i r p o r t i s vulnerable to attack; i t has repeatedly
been closed several times during the l a s t month by mortar f i r e .
The RPF and Rwandan m i l i t a r y posses a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons and i n
early A p r i l elements of government security forces probably f i r e d
the a n t i - a i r c r a f t missiles that downed President Habyarimana's
airplane. This week a Canadian r e l i e f plane was h i t by small arms
f i r e . I 3.5c 1
M i l i t a r y Capabilities:
3. Government m i l i t a r y (FAR). The army has about 25
infantry battalions t o t a l l i n g between 15,000 and 20,000 men.
After a month of f i g h t i n g , DIA estimates that about 10,000
e f f e c t i v e troops remain under government control. Most Western
m i l i t a r y observers believe the FAR performed poorly i n recent
years, but i t s a b i l i t y to withstand the RPF's assault on K i g a l i
suggests that at least some units remain e f f e c t i v e l y organized and
moderately p r o f i c i e n t . I
EO 13526 1 4
.c
|FAR weaponry includes 82
mm mortars and 122 mm howitzers, SA-7 a n t i - a i r c r a f t missiles, 75
mm r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s and panhard armored cars.
3.5c
4. Gendarmerie. Before 6 A p r i l the paramilitary force
t o t a l l e d 7,200 men arrayed i n 10 t e r r i t o r i a l groups. Their
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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SUBJECT:
Rwanda:
Threats t o Peacekeeping Forces
c u r r e n t s t r e n g t h i s unknown. They probably are only l i g h t l y
armed, but some u n i t s may have mortars and machine guns. | 3 5
.c
5. M i l i t i a s . The m i l i t i a of former President Habyarimana's
MRND, the "Interahamwe"--or "Those who a t t a c k together"--was found
i n 1992. The MRND's a l l y , the C o a l i t i o n f o r the Defense of the
Republic (CDR)--which has long c a l l e d f o r the e x t e r m i n a t i o n of
Tutsis--has i t s own m i l i t i a , the "Impuzamugamhi" o r "Those who
have the same g o a l " . We b e l i e v e t h a t the m i l i t i a s were organized,
t r a i n e d , and d i r e c t e d by senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s and Hutu
h a r d l i n e p o l i t i c i a n s . Almost c e r t a i n l y numbering i n the
thousands, t h e l o c a l l y - b a s e d m i l i t i a s have been accused by a i d
workers o f s y s t e m a t i c a l l y k i l l i n g T u t s i s and moderate Hutus under
the d i r e c t i o n of l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and i n cooperation w i t h the
m i l i t a r y . E a r l i e r t h i s year, 1
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Ithe m i l i t i a s
were being t r a i n e d by t h e m i l i t a r y and were r e c e i v i n g modern
weapons, i n c l u d i n g AK-47S and G-3s. M i l i t i a arms caches were
r e p o r t e d l y e s t a b l i s h e d around the country. |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
r e p o r t e d m i l i t i a s working together w i t h the m i l i t a r y i n manning
checkpoints. I 3 5
.c
6. Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF).]
EO 13526 1 4
.c
|the
RPF has 13,000 e f f e c t i v e combat troops out of a f o r c e t h a t had
been estimated as h i g h as 20,000. Although p r i m a r i l y a l i g h t
i n f a n t r y f o r c e , the RPF has 107 m towed rocket launchers, 120 m
m
m
mortars, and SA-7 a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . Highly mobile and
s k i l l e d i n g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s , the RPF i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o
be w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d . I EO 13526 1 4 Isay the RPF has not conducted
.c
mass k i l l i n g s i n t e r r i t o r y i t c o n t r o l s , but the rebels have
executed Hutu m i l i t a r y and m i l i t i a b e l i e v e d t o be responsible f o r
ethnic k i l l i n g s . 1 3 5
.c I
Intentions:
7. RPF. Although the RPF has g e n e r a l l y cooperated w i t h
UNAMIR f o r c e s , i t could t a r g e t peacekeeping forces t h a t i t
b e l i e v e d were s i d i n g w i t h government f o r c e s , were p r o t e c t i n g those
responsible f o r mass k i l l i n g s , o r were t h r e a t e n i n g RPF c o n t r o l l e d
territory. \ 35
.c
8. FAR. FAR f o r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Guard, have
already attacked and k i l l e d UN troops. Ten Belgians and several
Ghanaian and Pakistan s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d and wounded by FAR
forces i n e a r l y A p r i l . E a r l i e r t h i s month, several Ghanaians were
s e r i o u s l y wounded i n what the UN described as a d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k
on UNAMIR f o r c e s , almost c e r t a i n l y by FAR f o r c e s .
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
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SUBJECT:
Rwanda:
Threats t o Peacekeeping Forces
9. The M i l i t i a s . Bands of m i l i t i a s , armed w i t h AK-47's and
roaming the countryside, would pose a serious r i s k t o small
peacekeeping u n i t s posted t o i s o l a t e d towns o r p a t r o l l i n g roads.
The m i l i t i a could evolve i n t o a Hutu-extremist g u e r r i l l a f o r c e .
I f so, t h e r i s k of ambush, sniper a t t a c k s , and d r i v e - b y shooting
would be h i g h . Probably o p e r a t i n g close t o home v i l l a g e s , t h e
m i l i t i a s would have the advantage of knowing the t e r r a i n , e a s i l y
o b t a i n i n g l o c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e on peacekeeping forces, and enjoying
p r o t e c t i o n and resupply from t h e i r f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s .
3.5c
10.
Other Risks t o Peacekeeping Forces
-- Vulnerable Line? o f Communication. Rwanda's h i l l y t e r r a i n
o f f e r s numerous o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o ambush supply convoys or
p a t r o l s . Landmines are common weapons; over 50,000
landmines a r e s t i l l uncleared i n n o r t h e r n Rwanda. The RPF
and FAR have mortars and SA-7s t h a t could shut down n e a r l y
.anv a i r p o r t o r l a n d i n g s t r i p . For example, by m i d - A p r i l ,
EO 13526 1.4c
the roads out of K i g a l i so dangerous
t h a t forces were evacuated by a i r r a t h e r t h a t overland. '
-- Armed C i t i z e n s . The m i l i t i a s , u n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from
unarmed c i v i l i a n s , could e a s i l y stage t e r r o r i s t h i t - a n d run a t t a c k s against i s o l a t e d m i l i t a r y outposts o r o f f - d u t y
soldiers.
-- Cross F i r e . Even i f peacekeepers were not d i r e c t l y
t a r g e t e d by m i l i t a r y forces o r m i l i t i a , resumed f i g h t i n g
between the FAR and RPF would s u b j e c t the peacekeepers t o
the r i s k o f s t r a y rounds. K i g a l i a i r p o r t and other
s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n s occupied by peacekeeping forces would
almost c e r t a i n l y be fought over by the two m i l i t a r i e s ,
endangering peacekeepers and t h r e a t e n i n g t h e i r escape
routes. Several UNAMIR s o l d i e r s have already been k i l l e d
by s t r a y g u n f i r e . | 3 5 I
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
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EO 13526 3.5c
1
Richard i Clarke*
Director for Global Issues and
Multilateral Affairs
National Security Council
Room 302, OEOB
National
I n t e 11 i g e n c e C o u n c i 1 M e m o r a n d u m
Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Key After the slaughter of an estimated 200,000 Rwandans, the tempo of
Points ethnic bloodletting is slowing. Nonetheless, the massacres—of an even
greater magnitude than the killings in Burundi last year—are creating
an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. In both countries,
extremists with access to military power are using ethnic fears to derail
democratic elections and power-sharing negotiations. Continued unrest
has taken a heavy toll on moderates in both ethnic communities.| 3.5c
In Rwanda, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) controls about
half the country; it is contesting the capital and moving toward success.
Should the rebels triumph, they will probably be able to co-opt other
groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The only other way to end the
bloodshed might be a Cyprus-type partition, entailing enormous
population movements given the intermingling of majority Hutus and
minority Tutsis. 3.5c
The disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. Moreover,
financingfromthe large Rwandan and to a lesser extent Burundian
exile communities keeps revanchist movements going. | 3.5c
We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been
displaced within the country to grow into the millions. Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the refugee influx will bring
violence and that the human waves will include military forces. | 3.5c
At the same time, aid donors are fatigued. Given their limited mandate,
UN peacekeepers in Rwanda could not slow the bloodbath, and ethnic
unrest has swept away whatever gains were achieved by the large flows
of economic aid to both countries. 3.5c
This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It is based on
discussions among intelligence community analysts at a teleconference held on 10 May 1994.
It way coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and Army.
NIC 00270/94
13 May 1994
EO 13526 3.5c
SECRET
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Never before in its 131-year history has the International
Committee of the Red Cross seen at first hand such
unmitigated hatred leading to the extermination of a
significant part of the civilian population.
ICRC Aide-Memoire to Governments on the Rwanda
Crisis, 29 April 1994
In both Rwanda and Burundi, the traditional enmity between the
Hutus, who comprise 80-90 percent of the populations, and the
Tutsis, who comprise the minority, will continue to fuel ethnic
conflict—derailing efforts toward peaceful power sharing. Although
the tempo of ethnic bloodletting in Rwanda is slowing, the massacres
are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis.] 3.5"c~
Brutal slaughter of
hundreds of thousands
causes even more
Rwandans to flee
their homes
Following the death of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in a
plane crash on 6 April, hardline Rwandan Hutus, using their control of
the army, unleashed massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to scuttle
the Arusha Accord that was to have given Tutsis greater political
power. Aid agencies fear that more than 200,000 Rwandans—mainly
Tutsis and Hutu moderates—have died and more than 300,000 from
both groups have fled the country. At least 500,000 have been
displaced within Rwanda, a number that couldriseas high as 3
million. 1 iTic
1
Burundi couldfollow The death of the Burundian president has not sparked significant
Rwanda's bloody lead unrest, but renewed violence could erupt in Burundi at any time.
Democratic presidential elections in June 1993—in which Melchior
Ndadaye became the country's first Hutu president—have been
followed by three attempted coups by the Tutsi-controlled military and
the murder of Ndadaye and other leaders. The coup attempt last
October set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000 and
drove another 600,000 or so Burundians into neighboring countries.
Recent developments—including the latest failed coup, disarmament
of Hutu militias and civilians, and a Tutsi-inspired constitutional
1
Out of the 8.4 million population of Rwanda, about 1.3 million, or 15 percent, are
estimated to be Tutsi. The International Committee of the Red Cross says between
100,000 and 500,000 people have been killed. Several international humanitarian
agencies have characterized the situation in Rwanda as genocide, considering that
between 8 percent to a possible 40 percent of the Tutsi population may have been
slaughtered. Burundi's population is 6.1 million, with Tutsis comprising over 15
percent, or some 900,000 people. (U)
2
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challenge to President Ntibantunganya's legitimacy-have added to
tensions. | 3,5c I
. • Rwanda and Burundi to 1993
:
:
"0 C^
Unlike most African states, Rwanda and Burundi were not artificial
creations of colonial rule; their existence as political entities goes back
several centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, Tutsi herders
moved into the areafromEthiopia and established dominance over ;
Hutu farmers. Hutus traditionally were the social inferiors of the Tutsi
nobility, who exchanged cattle for personal services. Both groups
share social structures and the related Kirundi and Kinyarwanda
languages. (U) •.
Rwanda's Tutsi monarchy traditionally was more centralized and
authoritarian than in Burundi, where the king's power rested on a
shifting set of factional alliances. Rwanda also was marked by sharper
social distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus. German and Belgian
rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in both
countries, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to
education and government jobs. (U)
Even before Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus had
gained political power in civil strife marked by widespread ethnic [ \;
•.
violence and theflightof hundreds of thousands of Tutsis into exile.
Two presidents—the southerner Gr^goire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and
the northerner Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994)—ruled over singleparty regimes. The country enjoyed relative stability and ethnic peace
until Tutsi exiles of the Rwandan Patriotic Front invadedfromUganda
in 1990. The Rwandan peace pact in August 1993 (Arusha Accord)
that ended the civil war between the Hutu-led government and the
mainly Tutsi rebels was derailed by Hutu extremists, f 3.5c
In Burundi, Tutsis remained in control until last year. The contrast
between Hutu rule in Rwanda and the group's oppression in Burundi
led to Hutu uprisings—in 1965, 1969,1972, and 1988—that resulted
in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Each Hutu attack fueled Tutsi :
fears of extermination, and each bloody repression reinforced the
Hutus' desire for revenge. Periodic ethnic unrest resulted in three
successful coups d'itat and many failed attempts. The last Tutsi
president, Pierre Buyoya, judged the situation was untenable and
orchestrated last year's election and transfer of power to a Hutu
successor. 3.5c
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Forces For Instability
The traditional enmity between Tutsis and Hutus continues to drive
events in Rwanda and Burundi. Since independence, hardliners—from
both groups and in both countries—have led coups and fueled
massacres to block political and military power sharing and quash their
ethnic rivals. 3.5c
In both countries, political and social institutions are too poorly
developed and too tied to ethnic power bases to allow a peacefiil
transition to multi-ethnic power sharing. The forces for instability
Too many obstacles to have repeatedly overwhelmed efforts at democratic elections, powerreconciliation sharing accords, and ethnic reconciliation: 3.5c
Ethnic Intermingling. Hutus and Tutsis live interspersed across
the two countries. This intensifies episodes of tribal violence,
because ethnically motivated killers manipulated by political elites
frequently know victims and can incite their kinsmen to
participate. Moreover, this demographic pattern makes it difficult
to impose peace by separating the warring groups. 3.5c
Spillover Effects. Disorder in one country feeds unrest in the
other. The most concrete effect is the inter-flow of refugees, who
strain the countries' limited resources and spread ethnic horror
stories among their kinsmen. The cycle of violence strengthens the
perception of duplicity on both sides and convinces each side that
it cannot risk sharing power with the other. 3.5c
Financing the
Tutsi minority
Exile Resources. Many Rwandan Tutsi exiles work as
professionals and businessmen in neighboring states, as well as in
Europe and North America. Contributionsfromthis community
have been an important resource for the RPF and are likely to
continue to be available to support armed Tutsi movements in
Rwanda and perhaps in Burundi. 3.5c
Poverty. With annual per capita GNP of less than $300, Rwanda
and Burundi are among the world's poorest countries; they are also
the two most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Since 1990, moreover, Rwanda's economy has shrunk by more
than 10 percent and Burundi's by about 5 percent, while their
populations have grown about 10 percent. Recent violence has
kept farmersfromtending the coffee crop—the main export of
both countries—further battering rural incomes. In Rwanda, the
RPF's demand for land for returning Tutsi exiles has been a
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sticking point. A lasting solution in Burundi would have to
include a role in the economy for Tutsi soldiers and civil servants
replaced by Hutus. | 3 5
C
Forces Inhibiting Reconciliation
The recent violence has strengthened those elements in the social and
political structure of Rwanda—and to a lesser extent in Burundi—that
tend to block peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict: [ 3.5c
Few moderates left
on either side
Splits within each •
group also growing
Middle Ground Eroded Much of the recent violence has targeted
leaders seeking a common ground between Hutus and Tutsis. In
Rwanda, most moderate Hutu leaders appear to have been
murdered or to have fled, leaving the interim government under the
control of hardliners. The RPF's public statements indicate the
group views all surviving government leaders as complicit in the
slaughter. Until the violence ends, Rwandan moderates will be
unwilling to come forward. In Burundi, the coup attempts and
efforts to disarm civilians appear to be polarizing the political
leadership of both ethnic groups. 3.5c
Factionalism. Continued unrest is increasing the number of
factional fault lines in both countries and is undermining the ability
of local leaders to convince their followers to adhere to a
settlement. In Rwanda, government forces are divided between
northern and southern elements. The rebels seem more unified, but
divisions may develop between the Tutsi military leadership and
Hutus serving as political window dressing or between Tutsis
seeking revenge for the massacre of their kinsmen and others more
disposed to reconciliation with the Hutu majority.[ 3.5c
Similar factionalism is rife in Burundi. Tutsi soldiers' political
loyalties and support for coup attempts derivefromtheir
membership in rival clans. The Hutu community is split between
PALIPEHUTU—which says only a violent uprising can earn
Hutus equality with Tutsis—and the ruling FRODEBU party,
which in tum is split between moderates and radicals. 3 5c
Obstacles to Outside Help. In both countries, manipulation by
contending factions of outside mediators and peacekeepers has
made it much harder for disinterested parties—such as the UN,
OAU, and Western powers—to help find or implement peaceful
solutions. Rwandan government forces, after attacking UN
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peacekeeping troops in early April and accusing the Belgian
contingent of complicity in President Habyarimana's death, now
say they want an expanded multilateral military presence, probably
to block new RPF gains. The RPF has hedged statements that it
would welcome a multilateral force to protect aid deliveries,
probably because the rebels believe they will win in the weeks
needed to deploy such a force. In Burundi, opposition by the
Army's Tutsi hierarchy has sharply restricted the mission and
size—from 200 to 31—of an OAU military observer force that is
intended to build confidence between the regime and the troops.
3.5c
Neighboring states
promoting their
own interests
Meddling Neighbors. Uganda and Zaire will continue to support
their allies in Rwanda and Burundi. Uganda is likely to keep
giving the RPF weaponry, logistical support, and sanctuary, and
could provide some troop support. For Ugandan President
Museveni, this aid repays his debt to the Rwandan rebels' military
cadre, who were his comrades-in-arms during his fight for power.
Museveni probably also judges that only an RPF victory would
induce the estimated 200,000 Tutsi exiles in Uganda—where they
have drawn native Ugandans' resentment—to return to Rwanda. If
asked, Museveni might also aid any Burundian Tutsi group that
allied with the RPF. 3.5c
Zaire's President Mobutu views the crises in Rwanda and Burundi
as a chance to remind Western donors that his regime cannot be
ignored and to burnish his regional and international image by
mediating among the rival factions. At the same time, Mobutu
probably will provide limited support to Rwandan and Burundian
Hutus. The Zairian military intervened against the RPF in 1990
and sent Rwandan government forces some weapons last month.
Kinshasa has not meddled as much in Burundi, but we believe that
Mobutu would seriously consider a request by either an embattled
Hutu government or radical Hutu militias for military help.| 3.5c~
Prospects and Implications for the United States
Rwandan peace Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Disintegrating. The onset of civil
accords not war and massive ethnic slaughter in Rwanda last month sounded the
salvageable death knell for the Arusha accords of August 1993 that promised
power sharing, transition to electoral democracy, and military
demobilization. Renewed fighting and widespread butchery have
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dissipated the limited trust developed between the government and
RPF during a year of negotiations. 3.5c
What if the The RPF controls about half the country, can isolate the capital at will,
rebels win... and is moving toward defeating government forces. Should the rebels
triumph, they will try to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled
regime. The rebels have already spoken of a "national conference" as
a forum for establishing the legitimacy of a new government. 3.5c
Could the RPF Govern? • ' L i ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ ^ .
We believe the RPF, based on its negotiating history, realizes that a
minority Tutsi government would not be viable.- Should the rebels
defeat the interim government, their ability to establish political
control over Rwanda will depend on their ability to co-opt the
surviving moderate Hutu leaders. The RPF's record suggests it
probably would be able to do so if it wins quickly. The group has
installed Hutus in visible political positions—such as RPF Chairman
Kanyarengwe—and worked well with moderate Hutu representatives
during the peace negotiations last year. Another factor in the RPFs
favor is that rebel troops have refrainedfromretaliating on a massive
scale for anti-Tutsi atrocities; their strong discipline leads us to judge
that RPF troops will continue doing so. 3.5c
The ability of the rebels to establish a functioning government would
decline, however, if the war dragged on. Hutus amenable to
cooperation with the RPF would be hunted down by the interim
government's security forces and hardline militias, and continued: i
massacres of Tutsis could reduce the RPF's willingness to cooperate
across ethnic lines. 3.5c
...or could a stalemate On the other hand, if a military stalemate develops, continued fighting
result in a Cyprus-like probably will deepen mistrust even further and preclude a negotiated
partition? political settlement for some time. In this case, a more radical
solution—for example, a de facto, Cyprus-like partition between a
mainly Tutsi, RPF-held sector and a mainly Hutu, governmentcontrolled zone—may be the only way to end the bloodletting.
Partition would require massive shifts of population and would impose
enormous humanitarian and financial costs. The final extent of the
massacres probably would determine whether the RPF would even
consider this option. Such a step would have significant long-term
risks. 3.5c
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In Burundi, the process that led to last year's democratic election and
the transfer of political power to the Hutu majority is under extreme
pressure. We believe the most immediate challenge is that of ensuring
the physical security of each ethnic group. The deaths of two Hutu
presidents within six months highlight the vulnerability of Burundi's
politicians, and extremists could try to massacre moderate leaders in a
power grab. On the other hand, Tutsis suspect that efforts to protect
the political leadership, such as the creation of a separate Presidential
Guard, are steps designed to impose Hutu military dominance over the
minority group and could leave them defenseless against Hutu mobs
and militias. 3.5c
Regional Refugee Situation
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the influx of more than
300,000 Rwandan refugees will be economically costly, lead to
violence, and that the human waves will include military forces: ;
•
At least 250,000 Rwandans have crossed into remote western i
Tanzania and have been moved to an area some 18 kilometers
from the border. International agencies are scrambling for funds,
workers, and relief goods to avert a health catastrophe from
cholera, measles, and other diseases.
•
More than 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis havefledto Burundi, along
with about 200,000 Burundian Hutu refugees who had fled last
fall to escape violence and are now returning. Thefragileethnic
balance in Burundi could easily be upset if local people believe
the recent arrivals are monopolizing relief supplies. Some 60,000
Burundian Hutu refugees remain in Rwanda.
Zaire claims it has received some 8,500 Rwandanrefugees,and
; : another 5,500 Rwandans are in Uganda. Some 22,000 Burundians
have fled into Zairefromrefugeecamps in Rwanda. Although Ae
numbers are relatively small, the remoteness of the border camps
and poor transport systems are straining thereliefeffort. I 3.5c
Massive humanitarian Chronic Humanitarian Crisis. Continued political instability and
crisis will continue ethnic violence will exact a heavy human price. We expect the
number of Rwandans who havefledor have been displaced within the
country—we estimate 800,000—to rise into the millions. Similarly,
the 200,000 Burundians who recently returned from camps in Rwanda
may remain displaced within Burundi. These population
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displacements also have disrupted food production; Rwandan farmers
probably have drastically reduced planting during the current long
rainy season, and last year Burundi lost an estimated two-thirds of the
food crops planted during the short rains. 3.5c
Another blow to UN Donor Fatigue. Rwanda and Burundi's cycle of violence has spun out
peacekeeping efforts... of control despite considerable political and economic aidfromthe
outside. Some donors are reassessing assistance to Africa, especially
for peacekeeping operations. The limited mandate of the 2,500-man
UN contingent in Rwanda prevented it from intervening to halt or slow
the bloodbath:
•
Belgium—which had 10 peacekeepers murdered—is reevaluating
its participation in any future UN military operations.
•
Because of their experiences in other operations, Nigeria and other
African countries say they will participate in a proposed
multilateral force to protect aid deliveries only if they have prior
commitments of logistical and transport support from the United
States and other Western powers. 3.5c
...and to economic The experience of Rwanda and Burundi may also cause donors to
assistance to Africa reconsider economic assistance. Donors disbursed $1.3 billion to
Rwanda and $1.0 billion to Burundi—representing about 20 percent of
their GDPs—between 1986 and 1990, when the World Bank said they
were generally pursuing therighteconomic course. But since then,
ethnic violence has swept away the gains achieved by these resource
transfers. I 3.5c
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Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis
Annex: Military Forces in Rwanda and Burundi
Rwanda
Rwandan Armed Forces (Government):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Combat Effective manpower in Kigali:
Major weapons systems:
Armored cars:
Mortars (60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm)
122 mm howitzers
Air defense machine guns
SA-7 air defense missiles
75 mm recoilless rifles
Helicopters
Hutu Militias (Pro-Government):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Weapons: AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades
10,000
2,500
62
250
6
35
unk
50
6
well over 10,000
Rwandan Patriotic Army (Rebels):
Combat Effective manpower nationwide:
Combat Effective manpower in Kigali:
Major weapons systems (quantities unknown):
107 mm towed multiple rocket launchers
60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm mortars
Towed air defense guns
SA-7 man-portable missiles
13,000
4,500
United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR):
50 military observers in Kigali; authorized strength of 270.
3.5c
10
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Burundi
Burundian Armed Forces
Estimated manpower nationwide:
(includes Army, Gendarmerie, Security Service)
Major weapons systems:
Armored cars:
122-mm howitzers and rocket-launchers
3-inch, 82-mm, 120-mm mortars
75-mm recoilless rifles
40-mm antitank grenade launchers
Air defense artillery
Helicopters (operational)
C-47 Transport (operational)
Trainers (operational)
Light fixed-wing (operational)
13,500
85
22
109
13
69
188
10
2
2
2
Hutu Party Militias
Unknown number of militiamen armed with various light infantry
weapons, possibly including rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
OAU Inter-African Observer Mission in Burundi (MIOB)
31 military observers; authorized strength of 47.
3.5c
11
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�Concentrations of Displaced Rwandans Attempting to Flee Country, Late April 1994
Zaire
Zaire
L_E.O_13.52-6_3.,.5_c.
731911 (H01317) 4-94
�Challenges to Proposed UN Forces
••-.1 Concentration of displaced persons
RPF rebel-controlled area
aOKilomclm
Lake
Tanganyika/,.
732102 (R01317) 5-W
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Military Situation, Early May 1994
EO 13526 3.5c
731980 (R01317) 5-94
�Rwanda: Concentrations Of Displaced Persons And Refugees, 11 May 1994
CONCENTRATIONS OF DISPLACED
PERSONS
[ -/
I
30 MILES
UGANDA
RPF REBEL-DOMINATED AREA
^
REFUGEE FLOW
X
REFUGEE CAMP
M
• /
' L-
y
ZAIRE
800,000 RWANDANS
DISPLACED ACROSS COUNTRY
65,000 STRANDED
BURUNDIAN REFUGEES
iWs^
:•-••
-
TANZANIA
BURUNDI
ZAIRE
Confidential EO 13526 3.5c
PREPARED 11 MAY 94
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EO 13526 3.5c
24 May 1994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Risks t o an Expanded UN Force i n Rwanda
1. The expansion o f UNAMIR--the UN peacekeeping f o r c e
i n Rwanda--to a s t r e n g t h o f 5,500 men i s l i k e l y t o occur
before the c i v i l war between Rwanda's i n t e r i m government
and t h e rebels of the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF) abates
or a f i r m c e a s e - f i r e i s i n place. The two sides have
r a d i c a l l y d i v e r g e n t expectations of t h e mission o f a
m u l t i l a t e r a l f o r c e , and e i t h e r side could q u i c k l y come t o
b e l i e v e t h a t UN troops were n o t n e u t r a l and were f a i r game
f o r a t t a c k . I n any case, supply l i n e s i n mountainous and
landlocked Rwanda w i l l be h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k by
l o c a l forces and t o the p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t i e s and
inadequate i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of neighboring s t a t e s . 1 3 5
.c
D i f f e r e n c e s Over Expanded UNAMIR Mandate
2.
EO 13526 1.4c say n e i t h e r side has given
u n c o n d i t i o n a l consent t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y
Council has s e t f o r deploying an expanded contingent t o
Rwanda. Rwanda's Ambassador t o the UN--a member of t h e
S e c u r i t y Council--voted i n f a v o r of expanding UNAMIR, a f t e r
pushing f o r a l a r g e r f o r c e t h a t would enforce a c e a s e - f i r e
and back up a p o l i t i c a l settlement. Beleaguered by the
RPF's capture o f K i g a l i ' s a i r p o r t t h i s week, t h e Hutuc o n t r o l l e d i n t e r i m government probably hopes a UN f o r c e
w i l l freeze c u r r e n t b a t t l e l i n e s , block f u r t h e r r e b e l
advances, and r e i n f o r c e i t s domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
l e g i t i m a c y . Leaders o f t h e Tutsi-dominated RPF, however,
say they w i l l n o t be bound by a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t t h e
government voted f o r , and they have demanded " b i l a t e r a l
agreements" w i t h c o u n t r i e s p r o v i d i n g UNAMIR c o n t i n g e n t s .
The RPF wants t h e UN f o r c e t o have no more than 2,500
s o l d i e r s and a mission l i m i t e d t o p r o t e c t i n g c i v i l i a n s - i n c l u d i n g disarmament of suspected mass murderers --and
humanitarian r e l i e f . RPF leaders have r e j e c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n
of a c e a s e - f i r e w i t h regime leaders, c l a i m i n g t h i s would
give p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y t o the regime w i t h o u t ending the
s l a u g h t e r o f t h e r e b e l s ' e t h n i c T u t s i kinsmen i n areas
s t i l l under government c o n t r o l . | 3 5
.c
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Risks From the Factions
3. Any enhanced UNAMIR f o r c e w i l l face considerable
r i s k s from the Rwandan combatants, whether the peacekeepers
are based i n K i g a l i or i n p r o t e c t e d zones along the
borders. Each side suspects the UN of s u p p o r t i n g the
other.
3.5c
4. From the government... S e c u r i t y f o r c e s and
progovernment m i l i t i a s - - r e s p o n s i b l e f o r UNAMIR's 11 combat
deaths since l a s t month, as w e l l as f o r most of the e t h n i c
s l a u g h t e r - - p r o b a b l y would r e s i s t an a c t i v e UN e f f o r t t o
prevent f u r t h e r k i l l i n g s or t o i n v e s t i g a t e past murders.
The Army r e t a i n s a core of some 10,000 c o m b a t - e f f e c t i v e
troops, who are equipped w i t h armored v e h i c l e s , a i r defense
m i s s i l e s and machineguns, RPGs, and o t h e r heavy weapons.
The P r e s i d e n t i a l Guard B a t t a l i o n probably i s the g r e a t e s t
r i s k t o UN f o r c e s . E a r l y l a s t month PGB troops murdered
o p p o s i t i o n leaders-- i n c l u d i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r - - a n d
B e l g i a n peacekeepers t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t them, and
eyewitnesses have t o l d |~EO 13526 1 Ac |that they organized the
onset of e t h n i c butchery m southern Rwanda.
3.5c
5. There are a l s o a t l e a s t 10,000 members of r a d i c a l
Hutu p a r t y m i l i t i a s , who e a r l i e r t h i s year were t r a i n e d and
given r i f l e s by the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . These i r r e g u l a r s - r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s l a u g h t e r i n g c i v i l i a n s and harassing
f o r e i g n a i d workers, according t o press)
EO 13526 1.4c
r e p o r t s - - c o u l d evolve i n t o a g u e r r i l l a f o r c e capable off
t a k i n g on UN t r o o p s . The regime says i t i s r e c r u i t i n g
50,000 new t r o o p s , who probably w i l l r e c e i v e the same
r a d i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , cursory t r a i n i n g , and l i g h t weapons
as the m i l i t i a s .
3.5c
6. The absence of command-and-control c a l l s i n t o
serious q u e s t i o n the government's a b i l i t y t o implement any
agreement i t s commanders or p o l i t i c a l leaders might make
w i t h UN f o r c e s . According t o press]
EO 13526 1.4c
[reports,
Rwandan diplomats o u t s i d e the country and Army commanders
reached by telephone i n K i g a l i say they have no way t o
contact the i n t e r i m government, and they deny having any
c o n t r o l over the m i l i t i a s . Although regime leaders may be
exaggerating communications problems t o d e f l e c t blame f o r
e t h n i c massacres, t h e i r a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o prevent
i s o l a t e d , renegade f o r c e s from a t t a c k i n g UN peacekeepers
w i l l remain problematic f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e . | 3.5c
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7.
...From the r e b e l s . RPF forces t o date have been
more cooperative than government troops w i t h the UN
c o n t i n g e n t and w i t h a i d groups. We estimate t h a t the
r e b e l s have some 13,000 combat-effective t r o o p s , who are
f a r b e t t e r l e d and d i s c i p l i n e d than t h e i r government
c o u n t e r p a r t s . Although mainly a l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e , t h e
RPF has SA-7 a i r defense m i s s i l e s , 107 mm towed rocket
launchers, and 120 mm mortars.
35
.c
8. Although we b e l i e v e the r e b e l s are l e s s l i k e l y t o
seek an open c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h UN f o r c e s !
EO 13526 1.4c
says the RPF would engage any UN f o r c e t h a t , i n i t s
view, was t a k i n g an a c t i v e r o l e i n the c i v i l war. I n
p a r t i c u l a r , a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t UN troops were p r o t e c t i n g
those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r mass k i l l i n g s o r were t h r e a t e n i n g the
r e b e l s ' c o n t r o l o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r y could provoke an RPF
a t t a c k . Moreover, the extended heavy f i g h t i n g and evidence
of the s l a u g h t e r o f RPF f i g h t e r s ' e t h n i c kinsmen appear t o
be f r a y i n g the r e b e l troops' d i s c i p l i n e and i n c r e a s i n g the
r i s k o f i n c i d e n t s w i t h UN peacekeepers.
-
-- The RPF has admitted t h a t i t s troops f i r e d on a convoy
t r a n s p o r t i n g a French a i d o f f i c i a l from Gitarama t o
K i g a l i , blaming the i n c i d e n t on confusion i n a combat
zone.
EO 13526 1.4c
|says r e b e l s
began k i l l i n g c i v i l i a n s when they r e a l i z e d how many of
t h e i r supporters had been k i l l e d , and UN o f f i c i a l s
accuse RPF troops of murdering c i v i l i a n s along the
Tanzanian border.
3.5c
L o g i s t i c Problems i n Rwanda
9. The supply l i n e s of an enhanced UN contingent
based w i t h i n Rwanda would be v u l n e r a b l e t o i n t e r r u p t i o n .
K i g a l i ' s a i r p o r t - - t h e only one i n the country capable o f
r e c e i v i n g l a r g e t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t - - h a s been on the f r o n t
l i n e between government and r e b e l f o r c e s , and UN resupply
f l i g h t s have r e g u l a r l y been prevented from l a n d i n g t h e r e .
Both sides have weapons capable of s h u t t i n g down any
a i r f i e l d i n the country.
35
.c
10. Surface t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a l s o presents a number o f
hazards and r i s k s . Only about 1 percent of Rwanda's 4,885km road network i s paved, and the f i g h t i n g almost c e r t a i n l y
has prevented r e p a i r of c u l v e r t s and shoulders eroder" i n
EO 13526 3.5c
CECRET
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
the c u r r e n t season of heavy r a i n s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e
country's h i l l y t e r r a i n o f f e r s numerous o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o
ambush supply convoys o r p a t r o l s .
R e t r e a t i n g government forces are blowing up highway
b r i d g e s , i n c l u d i n g one about 10 kms west of K i g a l i on
the main road t o Burundi, according t o press r e p o r t s .
-- There are more than 50,000 uncleared mines i n the
north.
3.5c
Problems Along the Borders
11. UNAMIR w i l l a l s o face p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g
l o g i s t i c and p o l i t i c a l problems i f i t deploys along
Rwanda's borders t o p r o t e c t refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons
or t o guard the supply l i n e s of a contingent i n Rwanda. A
f o r c e based i n Burundi t o p r o t e c t v u l n e r a b l e c i v i l i a n
p o p u l a t i o n s i n southern Rwanda r i s k s u p s e t t i n g the already
unstable balance between the Hutu-led government and the
Tutsi-dominated m i l i t a r y . |
EO 13526 1.4c
| the
m i l i t a r y - - e l e m e n t s of which have launched three a b o r t i v e
coup attempts since June 1993--are chary o f any f o r e i g n
m i l i t a r y presence, probably i n p a r t because the s e c u r i t y
forces f e a r t h i s would encourage unrest among the Hutu
m a j o r i t y . Hutu m i l i t a n t s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , could see a UN
f o r c e as a s h i e l d from r e p r i s a l s i f they rose up against
the Army.
-- Unrest has f l a r e d several times i n Bujumbura--which
has Burundi's only a i r f i e l d capable of handling l a r g e
t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t - - a s s e c u r i t y forces have moved t o
disarm Hutu c i v i l i a n s and a n t i - T u t s i m i l i t i a s .
EO 13526 1.4c
(in n o r t h e r n Burundi c o m p e t i t i o n
f o r r e l i e f s u p p l i e s i s sparking unrest between some
60,000 mostly T u t s i Rwandan refugees and an estimated
600,000 Burundian Hutus there who were d i s p l a c e d by
e t h n i c unrest l a t e l a s t year.
I n the Rwandan p r e f e c t u r e s along the Burundi border,
hundreds o f thousands of c i v i l i a n s remain a t r i s k o f
a t t a c k from government forces and p a r t y m i l i t i a s .
Food a i d shipments r e p o r t e d l y are s t r a i n i n g
Bujumbura's p o r t on Lake Tanganyika and, t o a l e s s e r
e x t e n t , i t s a i r p o r t , and s o l d i e r s have harassed t r u c k s
c a r r y i n g r e l i e f supplies t o Rwanda. \ 3 5
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
CECRET
�CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
12. Any a c t i v i t i e s by a UN f o r c e i n Uganda-- through
which Rwanda's most d i r e c t l i n k t o a seaport passes--would
r e q u i r e the f u l l cooperation o f President Museveni, who has
longstanding t i e s t o the RPF. Although Museveni probably
would make a pretense o f cooperating w i t h UNAMIR t o p r o t e c t
h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l image, he i s l i k e l y t o continue c o v e r t l y
g i v i n g the Rwandan r e b e l s s u p p l i e s and sanctuary.
EO 13526 1.4c
most
s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n the Ugandan Army--undoubtedly r e f l e c t i n g
Museveni's views--oppose expanding UNAMIR's r o l e and
b e l i e v e the RPF should be allowed t o gain a m i l i t a r y
victory.
About 10,000 Rwandans have f l e d t o Uganda. N e i t h e r
they nor p o p u l a t i o n s on the Rwandan side of the border
face any immediate s e c u r i t y t h r e a t .
3.5c
13. Z a i r i a n i n t e r e s t s i n the c o n f l i c t a l s o are l i k e l y
t o impede e f f o r t s t o support a UN f o r c e from along Rwanda's
western border. |
EO 13526 1.4c
Although two Z a i r i a n border towns have a i r f i e l d s
capable o f r e c e i v i n g C-130-size a i r c r a f t , eastern
Zaire's road network i s rudimentary, and the
mountainous r e g i o n i s s u b j e c t t o chronic shortages o f
f u e l and o t h e r s u p p l i e s .
We judge t h e r e i s l i t t l e s e c u r i t y r i s k t o the
estimated 10,000 Rwandans and 91,000 Burundian Hutu
refugees from Rwanda who have f l e d t o eastern Z a i r e
since e a r l y A p r i l . Rwandan government troops along
the f r o n t i e r , however, have detained thousands o f
mostly T u t s i c i v i l i a n s , who are s u b j e c t t o a r b i t r a r y
beatings and execution. [ 3 5
.c
14. Tanzania's government i s l i k e l y t o remain
s u p p o r t i v e of a UN e f f o r t anclT
EO 13526 1.4c
b e l i e v e s i t i s the only neighbor i n t e r e s t e d i n
i m p a r t i a l mediation o f the Rwandan c r i s i s . Dar Es Salaam
might even send t r o o p s . The a r r i v a l o f an estimated
340,000 Rwandan refugees i n remote northwestern Tanzania,
however, has severely s t r a i n e d the country's
infrastructure. |
EO 13526 1.4c
Ithe heavy
t r a f f i c o f humanitarian r e l i e f f l i g h t s has stressed the
r
EO 13526 3.5c
CECRET
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
runways a t Mwanza's a i r f i e l d and exhausted f u e l stocks
t h e r e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e region's road network i s
dilapidated.
-- We assess the s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o t h e Rwandan refugees
i n northwestern Tanzania t o be f a i r l y low. Reports of
RPF k i l l i n g s i n rebel-occupied southeastern Rwanda,
however, i n d i c a t e the r i s k s t o c i v i l i a n s a r e r i s i n g
there.
35
.c
I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the United States
15. Many p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t o r s t o UNAMIR are l i k e l y
t o remain r e l u c t a n t t o provide troops f o r t h e f o r c e u n t i l
they are convinced Washington w i l l t a k i n g a l e a d i n g r o l e .
Ghana, f o r example, says an augmentation of the 200 troops
which i t has a l r e a d y deployed t o K i g a l i w i l l depend on t h e
w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e United States and other Western s t a t e s
t o provide m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . A
survey of press|
EO 13526 1.4c
[reporting i n d i c a t e s t h a t
many o t h e r A f r i c a n and non r e g i o n a l s t a t e s share t h i s view.
Although n e i t h e r side i s anti-American, US f o r c e s p r o v i d i n g
l o g i s t i c support would face the same r i s k s as o t h e r UNAMIR
contingents. I 3 5 I
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRAitY PHOTOCOPY
�Regional Dimensions Of The Rwandan Crisis, May 1994
LAKE
EDWARD
CONCENTRATIONS OF DISPLACED
AND AT RISK RWANDANS
CONCENTRATIONS OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
RPF-REBEL DOMINATED AREA
C-5A GALAXY CAPABLE
C-130 CAPABLE
ACCESSIBLE ROADS
Unclassified
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CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
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�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\jun94\043928.html
Page 1 o f 2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
15-Jun-1994 20:21 EDT
-CQUriDCNTIAIT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Susan E. Rice
MacArthur DeShazer
FROM:
Donald K. S t e i n b e r g
(STEINBERG)
SUBJECT:
( RICE )
( DESHAZER )
E-Mail t o Tony on Rwanda
Tony:
Thank you f o r your r a i s i n g t h e Rwandan i s
sue a t t h e CPL l u n c h ,
We worked o u t today a schedule f o r t h e itn o d u c t i o n o f APCs i n t o
r
Rwanda t h a t i n v o l v e s shipment o f t h e f i r s t APCs t h i s Sunday i n t o
Kampala, w i t h t h e shipment o f t h e e n t i r e 50 c o n t i n g e n t t o be
completed by next F r i d a y . This t i m e t a b l e i n v o l v e s shipment by
two C-S's making a t o t a l o f nine runs i n t o Rwanda (each can c a r r y
6 APCs per load) . I t would be p o s s i b l e t o f i n i s h t h e deployment
a few days q u i c k e r i f t h e P r e s i d e n t d e c l a red t h i s our t o p
m i l i t a r y p r i o r i t y , b u t s i n c e t h e U.N. hass a i d they cannot use
them b e f o r e next F r i d a y i n any case, and g i v e n t h e c u r r e n t
s i t u a t i o n s i n N o r t h Korea, H a i t i , Bosnia, etc., we t h i n k i t makes
sense t o s t i c k t o t h i s schedule.
I n a d d i t i o n , t e n more APCs from Somalia are b e i n g shipped today
or tomorrow t o Rwanda, making a t o t a l o f 15 which have been
t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e r e . The UN i s proceeding apace on t h e issues
of t r a i n i n g f o r t h e Ghanaians on t h e APCs (which w i l l l i k e l y
occur i n Somalia).
We are moving r a p i d l y on p r o v i d i n g a d d i t i o n a l
equipment f o r t h i s u n i t .
I n c i d e n t a l l y , our f i g u r e f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e approved f o r
Rwanda/Burundi t h i s f i s c a l year has now reached more than $115
m i l l i o n , i n c l u d i n g $94 m i l l i o n s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c u r r e n t
c r i s i s i n early A p r i l .
Tomorrow, we've g o t a background s e s s i o n w i t h j o u r n a l i s t s and a
c l o s e d - p r e s s r o u n d t a b l e on t h e H i l l where we w i l l walk people
t h r o u g h a l l o f our h u m a n i t a r i a n , peacekeeping and o t h e r a c t i o n s
on Rwanda.
Don/Susan/Mac
CC: Records
RECORDS )
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Date Created:
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23 June 1994
Zaire's Goma Airfields Base for Frencli
Operations i n Rwanda
The French m i l i t a r y has selected Goma a i r f i e l d as the
operational and l o g i s t i c hub f o r i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Rwanda
EO 13526 1.4c
FO 13526 1 4c
rits~9T84"3 - foot - long runway~is~xn gen-erany
good condition, and the f a c i l i t y i s frequently used by IL-76 and
B-707 air-craftt the French plan to operate C-160'B and C-130's to
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Nonetheless, f l i g h t operations i n Goma w i l l face a number of
difficulties:
-- Rwandan Government forces and t h e i r Z a i r i a n a l l i e s have
used the f a c i l i t y f o r weapons shipments and might t r y t o
i n t e r f e r e w i t h a c t i v i t y impeding t h i s a c t i v i t y .
Moreover, these arms d e l i v e r i e s may lead the Rwandan
P a t r i o t i c Front rebels t o consider Goma a l e g i t i m a t e
target.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Provision of other support services w i l l be problematic,
r e f l e c t i n g the region's scant land t r a n s p o r t a t i o n l i n k s
t o the rest of Zaire. Most goods and services are i n
short supply, and vendors t y p i c a l l y demand payment i n
hard currency cash--preferably 1990 series US d o l l a r
banknotes.
M i l i t a r y f l i g h t s w i l l compete f o r landing s l o t s w i t h the
s i x or so humanitarian a i d f l i g h t s that have been
a r r i v i n g each day i n Goma since the Rwanda c r i s i s erupted
in early A p r i l .
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Regional Airfields Supporting French Deployment To Rwanda
1
Confidential EQ 13526 3.5c
PREPARED 23 JUNE 94
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�Transport Aircraft
Country
USA
Model
Payload (in
tons)
C-5
Range (In
thousand
miles)
Ramp for
Loading/
Unloading
Aer
Rel
6.5
Yes
Yes
C-130
19.5
4.9
Yes
Yes
C-141
45.4
2.9
Yes
Yes
DC-8
22.8
7.2
No
No
A-310-300
France
130.5
37.5
5.1
No
No
7.8
3.1
Yes
Yes
45.7
4.3
No
No
165.3
2.8
Yes
No
:OPY
C-160*
B-707
Russia/Ukraine
AN-124
•
o
Q_ internal dimensions as well as weight limitations preclude moving all but France's smallest helicopters and lightest armored vehicles
by C-160 aircraft.
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�0 ONFIDENTfAL
July 27, 1994
Memorandum to: The President
From: Anthony Lake
Subject: Rwandan Relief Operations - An Update
The A i r l i f t : USAF aircraft flew into Goma in Zaire, Kigali in Rwanda,
Entebbe in Uganda, Harare in Zimbabwe, and Nairobi in Kenya today as part of a
multipronged relief effort. The first US water purification machines began
pumping potable water into trucks and storage bladders in Goma. One C-5 flew
non-stop from near San Francisco, refuelled in the air three times, and landed at
Goma 22 hours later carrying water purification devices.
The airlift is hampered by the small size of the airports at Goma and
especially at Bukavu. Strenuous utilization has cracked the apron at Goma,
thereby further limiting flights. As a result, General Joulwan is looking at
increasing flights into other locations and estabhshing road convoys into the
effected area. Another limiting factor may be the availability of aviation fuel in the
few airports that we are using. The solution to that may be to aerial refuel USAF
cargo aircraft with tankers stationed nearby.
On the ground: Although one estimate suggests that 50,000 refugees have
returned into Rwanda, most are settling in to the makeshift camps. Cholera
continues to claim high fatalities, but it is apparently not of the communicable
strain. Thus, the water purification plan and the rehydration program should be
gain the upper hand over the disease in the days ahead. For now, however, dealing
with the dead is a high priority. Burial is difficult in the volcanic soil. A US Armry
Engineer unit with heavy equipment to assist in this task will begin arriving
tomorrow. A US Army Green Beret battalion will begin arriving soon to provide
Special Forces who have paramedic and camp organizaing skills.
Our Plans: Although the press began running the story that we were going
to put 2000 US troops into Rwanda, we were able to correct that impression with
backgrounding and a Bill Perry press conference. The truth is that the Pentagon is
developing options for refugee repatriation programs and an airhead in Rwanda, for
review by the Principals Committee late in the week. The UN and the charitable
groups may be able to do much of what is needed inside Rwanda. A US military
survey team is in Kigali, Rwanda now. Bill Perry and Gen. Joulwan will further
assess these requirements on the ground over the weekend.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
"CP
OOY
�-eONFflDENTIAL
Others' Donations: The Israeli Army is opening a field hospital, flown in
on eight of their C-130s. We Eire flying in German water purification trucks. The
United Kingdom today offered a Royal Engineer battalion to the UN peacekeeping
force in Rwanda, following offers by Canada and Australia to send small technical
units to support that group. Overall, however, the response to the UN's appeals
has been limited. Of the eight "service packages" that the UN asked nations
assume, we have assumed four and no other nation has come forward to accept the
others (such as sanitation, road repair).
Funding: OMB is pulling together a small emergency supplemental for
Defense, State, and AID to cover some of their Rwanda related costs. There is
substantial sympathy among most concerned Members, although it may require
some special work with one or two.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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EO 13526 3.5c
Tanzaniat Dealing With Rwandan Refugees
I n our judgement, t h e Tanzanian government l a c k s t h e resources,
manpower and p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o meet t h e s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s from
refugee camps i n the Ngara and Karagwe areas where up t o 440,000
Rwandan refugees have f l e d since l a t e A p r i l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , Dar
Es Salaam i s probably l e e r y of provoking an armed c o n f l i c t w i t h
former Rwandan Army (FAR) troopsl
EO 13526 l!4c
EO 13526 1 4
.c
jby u s i n g t h e Tanzanian
Peoples Defense Force (TPDF) t o prevent FAR troops from r a i d i n g
Rwanda. The Tanzanians are a l s o r e l u c t a n t t o t a c k l e t h e task of
a r r e s t i n g Hutu m i l i t i a members w i t h o u t c l e a r evidence o f
wrongdoing on Tanzanian s o i l . [ 3 5
.c
So f a r , s e c u r i t y w i t h i n the camps--which DAR t r e a t s as a p o l i c e
r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y issue--has not been a s i g n i f i c a n t problem.
- - V i o l e n t i n c i d e n t s i n the camps are not a t the l e v e l o r
frequency o f those r e p o r t e d i n the Z a i r e camps, according t o
a v a r i e t y of reports.
_Benaco camp--which holds 238,000
EO 13526 1 4
.c
refugees- - has only abouE^one murder a n i g h t and numerous
r e p o r t s of t h e f t .
35
.c
flefugrees Continue to Take
Flight
Reports o f Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF) revenge k i l l i n g s i n
southeastern Rwanda have l e d some 100,000 Hutus t o f l e e t o
Tanzania since mid-July, however, d i s c o u r a g i n g a l l b u t a few
Hutus from r e p a t r i a t i n g t o Rwanda.
new a r r i v a l s say t h e RPF i s
EO 13526 1 4
.c
b u r n i n g Hutu homes and k i l l i n g v i l l a g e r s . Such r e p r i s a l s
are d r i v i n g some 10-12,000 Rwandans per week t o t h e Ngara
camps and another 500 per week t o the Karagwe r e g i o n .
Hutu e x t r e m i s t s r e t a i n c o n t r o l
EO 13526 1 4
.c
over the refugee p o p u l a t i o n , using food d i s t r i b u t i o n and
i n t i m i d a t i o n t a c t i c s t o undermine r e p a t r i a t i o n e f f o r t s .
3.5c
Caflips Remain a Threat
Hutu m i l i t a n t s r e t a i n the c a p a b i l i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o mount
r a i d s i n t o Rwanda t h a t could t r i g g e r e s c a l a t i n g c o n f l i c t w i t h the
RPF.
Hutu refugees s t i l l r e t a i n
EO 13526 1 4
.c
weapons--probably small arms and machetes--and have
continued t h e i r campaign of t e r r o r a g a i n s t T u t s i refugees.
EO 13526 3 5
.c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
�GECRET
EO 13526 3 5
.c
some r e c r u i t i n g by FAR s o l d i e r s
Moreover,
EO 13526 1 4
.c
i s t a k i n g place i n the Benaco camp.
-I
the FAR has
EO 13526 1 4
.c
launched r a i d s from the Karagwe r e g i o n i n t o Rwanda over the
past few weeks, which r i s k s provoking RPF troops t o a t t a c k
FAR f o r c e s i n Tanzania.
|
35
.c
"
Dar Es Salaam T r y i n g t o B o l s t e r S e c u r i t y
The Tanzanian Government i s aware of t h e u n r e s t Hutu m i l i t i a s and
FAR troops can b r i n g t o the camps--in June, t h e d e t e n t i o n of Hutu
h a r d l i n e r and former commune leader Gatete provoked Rwandan
refugees t o r i o t and f o r c e d a i d workers t o withdraw t e m p o r a r i l y
from t h e Benaco camp i n Ngara--and i s t r y i n g t o o b t a i n
i n f o r m a t i o n and b o l s t e r s e c u r i t y . Dar Es Salaam probably w i l l
a l s o t r y t o convince t h e RPF t h a t i t i s not p r o v i d i n g the Hutus
w i t h a base o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r i n c u r s i o n s i n t o Rwanda.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
--Tanzanian p o l i c e f i e l d f o r c e s have been deployed t o help the
TPDF c o n t r o l border crossings i n the Karagwe area, where FAR
forces have conducted raids
EO 13526 1.4c
DAR also promised
EO 13526 1.4c
m i l i t i a members and t o i d e n t i f y those suspected o f war
crimes, but t h e Tanzanians susequently i n d i c a t e d they could
not deploy s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of p o l i c e w i t h o u t o u t s i d e
f i n a n c i a l help. I
35
.c
I
But Lacfcs Commitment and A b i l i t y
Despite these measures, the Karagwe and Ngara areas remain
unsafe, w i t h r i s i n g v i o l e n c e and murders o f suspected T u t s i
sympathizers causing some r e l i e f workers and l o c a l r e s i d e n t s t o
fear f o r t h e i r safety.
--To address s e c u r i t y concerns, t h i s month the UNHCR t r i e d t o
move camps 100-200 k i l o m e t e r s away from t h e border; however
the idea was r e j e c t e d by the Tanzanian government a f t e r the
UN spent. $450, 000 p r e p a r i n g a new s i t e [ _
EO 13526 1 4
.c
o n l y 56 p o l i c e
EO 13526 1 4
.c
o f f i c e r s have been deployed t o t h e camps, d e s p i t e Dar Es
Salaam's mid-June agreement w i t h the UNHCR t o send an
a d d i t i o n a l 300 o f f i c e r s . I
3^
'
FiECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
Moreover, w h i l e Dar Es Salaam's p l a n t o disarm t h e m i l i t i a s and
prevent FAR r a i d s i s ambitious, i t s a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o do
so i s open to doubt. I n our view, exea_i£_addi.ti.onal_B.e.c.ur.i.ty:
f o r c e s are sent t o t h e border area'
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
they w i l l be outmanned and outgunned by armed Hutu troops and
militiamen.
--To deploy a s u b s t a n t i a l TPDF f o r c e t o monitor t h e Rwandan
border and prevent RPF-FAR clashes, DAR would a t a minimum
probably r e q u i r e l o g i s t i c and m a t e r i e l a s s i s t a n c e . | 3 5
.c
SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANJWRITWQ
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
PHOT /VJCHAKu
ING
WASHINGTON
July 29, 1994
MR. PK&IDENT:
The attached memo contains a daily report on the
situation in Rwanda.
Water production and distribution is up to 100,000
gallons per day. Additional production units should
arrive on Thursday, but we remain short of the objective
of 3.4 million gallons per day. Additional water supplies
will begin arriving by ship in Mombassa, Kenya on
Saturday and will be trucked or helcoptered to Goma.
Aircraft sorties have increased, but remain limited by
runway capacity at Goma.
925 US Special Forces troops will arrive over the
weekend, and a US engineering battalion will arrive on
Friday to assist with burials.
Yesterday's briefing with non-governmental organizations
went well, and Tony plans to repeat the briefing today in
the press room.
R. Paul Richard
PER EXL 13526
w
CLINTON LIBRARY P
i . CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CP
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�C ND N I L
O r E TA
i
CONriDENTIAL
m
^ ^ ^
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
July 29, 1994
fi
Q4 JUL 29 l0 • 53
Oiouu.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY L/
SUBJECT:
Rwanda: Daily Report
Situation in Goma
- Water production and distribution was up again today to 100,000 gallons per day.
Trucks for distribution of water remain in short supply, but more vehicles are due to arrive in the
region on the weekend. Additional water production units should arrive Thursday, but we are still
far from the overall objective of 3.4 million gallons per day.
- Aircraft sorties are up, but the runway capacity at Goma continues to be a limiting
factor. We are awaiting the recommendation of the Kigali survey team before making a final
decision on opening that airport to the relief effort. Aviation fuel in theater may also become a
problem. Rapid turn-around of aircraft at forward bases requires forward deployed fuel and
therefore additional aircraft and fuel bladders. EUCOM is working on this problem.
- Additional Water Supplies will also start arriving by ship on Saturday in Mombassa,
Kenya. These supplies include water purification equipment, water pipes, tanker trucks and
general purpose trucks. This equipment will then either be trucked or, possibly, helicopter-lifted
to Goma and elsewhere to avoid taking up valuable runway space.
U.S. Deployment
- 925 U.S. Special Forces Troops will begin arriving in Goma over the weekend to
provide medical, communications and other support as well as to help control refugee flows.
- A full U.S. Engineering Battalion should begin arriving on Friday with bulldozers and
other heavy equipment to assist with burials.
Efforts to Galvanize Support for UNHCR's 8 Requirements
Following your letter last weekend, we have continued to press in foreign capitals for
contributions to fulfill UNHCR's other 4 requirements - those that the U.S. is not addressing.
UNHCR is holding a pledging and coordination meeting in Geneva on Friday.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Chief of Staff
�CONriDCN'ffAL
Political Efforts
Assistant Secretary George Moose will travel with Secretary Perry to Zaire and then continue
on to Kigali to meet with representatives of the new government. He will stress four themes:
— The importance of government support for the humanitarian relief effort;
-- The need to expand the government's political base to ensure that it is adequately
representative;
— The need to respect the rule of law and refrain from reprisals against adversaries;
— The importance of creating a secure and stable environment for the return of refugees.
The NGO Briefing
— Thursday's briefing for NGOs was a great success. Shali's presentation was
excellent. He was applauded by the NGOs. They also had some good ideas about better
coordination, encouraging the UN to do more, etc. We will continue the dialogue here and with
the UN in New York.
— The NGOs went out to the press afterward and praised our effort. Even Lionel
Rosenblatt who has been a frequent critic expressed his support for our efforts. With some
breathing space from some of our critics, we should now have time to produce even more results.
— Given the response to Shali's briefing, we will replicate it today in the White House
Press Room.
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTOMHiill P O O O Y
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"3
�Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2 August 1994
230,ooo Number of refugees
^
Refugee camp
iHi
Refugee concentration
Displaced persons Over 50,000
f
Entebbe
Uganda
Total: 10,500
In Karagwe:
93,000
Zaire
Total: 1.7 million
In Goma: W&rtiba
1.2 million Mg*
Iota/ displaced In east: \
over 700,000
Tanz
ania
In Bukavu:
312,000,4
m Benaco
Lumasi
t A.
, n
Mia™
274,000
Tanzania
Total: 367,000
Zaire
In Kamonyo/a:li'i%
230,000
lif
ToUvir^m
*0Utm
732940 tHOlSlT) a 94
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EO 13526 3.5c
SITE A
CIA
M 5 5 Ml '94
3
ROM
:
3.5c
MSG NBR
OFFICE/DESK:
N I 0
/Africa
ass
TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)
3.5c
PHONF. NUMBER
Paper f o r Friday's 0945 Ad Hoc Mseting on Rwanda
UBJECT:
DELIVER Y INSTR UCTIONS:
PAGES:
(INCLUDING COVER)
•
HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY
AGENCY
INDIVIDUAL (NAME)
Jite N/OSD . Kathleen Hicks
TRANSMIT To:
OFFICE
ROOM NBR
(for John Tv>n+v^) QSDyAfrica
703-697-9753
JCS
JCS
State
John Shpehan
Timothy Wirth
AID
Brian Atwood
NSC
Richard Clarke or Eric Schwartz
O B
M
(/Pres.
PHONE NBR
703-697-3702
. '• .
202-647-6240
202-647-9434
Gordon Adams
SA/Glohal
BB
Nat'1 Security 238, O C
202-395-4657
Leon' Panetta
Chief of Staff West Wino.WH
202-456-6797
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**
\EMARKS:
U, D, B, c
WASHFAX COVER SHEET
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PERE. O. 13526
CLINTON LI
TOP SECRBF
EO 13526 3.5c
trrottrpy
�,TH
TOP SECRET
4 August
J
5.
EO 13526 3.5c
1994
Threats to. Returning Rwandan Refugees
Forces of the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front--motivated by
desire for unchallenged control over Rwanda and for revenge
against mass k i l l e r s of Tutsis--are the greatest threat to
returning Hutu refugees.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
RPF soldiers and other Tutsis have been executing
s u s p e c t e d Hutu mass murderers i n both c e n t r a l
and
northwestern Rwanda. [
EO 13526 1 4
.c
[the RPF i s
sytematically screening refugees returning from Zaire for
"troublemakers.•
EO 13526 1.4c
|RPF
troops
have k i l l e d Hutus and looted property in Butare--Rwanda's
second city--and relief workers have told our Embassy in
Kigali that the RPF has blocked access to the countryside
east of Butare.
-- Relief workers also say that thousands of Hutus continue to
arrive Tanzania from eastern Rwanda; we believe many of
these new refugees may be fleeing RPF violence.
35
.c
We doubt that the RPF attacks on returnees and other Hutus w i l l
reach the genocidal proportions of those carried out by the
ousted Hutu regime. Much of the violence probably stems from
fraying discipline within RPF ranks, which has heavily recruited
to swell i t s early April" strength of some 20,000, and to a lesser
extent, from a calculated effort to quash resistance.
-- The RPF regime's Prime M i n i s t e r — a Hutu--yesterday told a
French newspaper that h i s government wanted to punish some
30,000 suspected mass murderers.
Hutu extremists pose another threat to refugees who may want to
return. |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
Ithe
ousted Hutu leadership views the refugee population as xts power
base.
We cannot rule out the possibility that soldiers or
militiamen w i l l attack returnees, either within or outside
of Rwanda—possibly in the hope their kinsmen and the
international community w i l l blame the RPF.
-- The odds of such intra-Hutu violence w i l l increase over
time, in our view, as wretched conditions for some refugees
make return increasingly attractive.
35
.c
N O LIBRARY PH0TOPY
TN
�3.5c
IT^LUIUKAO'I
3.5c
.WTIIfTBL
4 A u g u s t 1994
ZAIRE: Weapons, Location, and Capabilities of the Former
Rwandan Army
3.5c
Background. I n l a t e July, some 10,000 s o l d i e r s of the
Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army (FAR) and another 10,000 Hutu
militiamen crossed i n t o Zaire along w i t h some 1.7 m i l l i o n
Rwandan refugees. The suddenness of the Rwandan exodus and
Zaire's porous and poorly monitored border allowed a large
number of these soldiers to enter Zaire w i t h t h e i r weapons.
While some of these arms--especially l a r g e r crew serviced
weapons--have been confiscated by Z a i r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s , we
believe that a number of small arms remain i n FAR hapds and
that the heavier weapons may not be secure. 1 3 5
.c
EO 13526 1.4c
2. fflip confcgplg fchegg w^ppnfl? We judge that troops
from the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) probably c o n t r o l these
depots, although we have no specific r e p o r t i n g to confirm
this.
o
There has been no reported FAR presence i n the area
100 km north of Goma where the FAZ m i l i t a r y camp i s
located.
o • I n addition, FAR forces are reportedly camped several
km away from the other two depots on the o u t s k i r t s of
Goma and Bukavu.
3.5c
3. I n our view, Zairian President Mobutu and h i s
senior m i l i t a r y commanders i n Kinshasa probably exert l i t t l e
control over confiscated FAR weapons, which l o c a l commanders
SECRET
RY P
H
�SECRET
3.5c
, IfOCOMTRACT | 3.5c iMUlt'l'Ub
and individual FAZ soldiers are probably tempted to s e l l to
survive, especially smaller, portable weapons.
o The 2,000-2,500 Zairian troops in Kivu-- including as
many as 1,000 of Mobutu's relatively more reliable
security forces--are stretched thin, lack rudimentary
military dis.c.iD.line, and suffer severe economic
hardship.
3.5c
4. Can Mobutu gain control of the heavy weapons?
Mobutu i s anxious to garner additional Western goodwill and
he would l i k e l y respond favorably to a Western request that
he confiscate and dispose of heavy FAR weapons. Mobutu
l i k e l y would have to deploy additional units of his more
reliable security units to the Kivu area along with a number
of senior officers to gain control of the weapons, however.
He would probably request that the West pay the salaries and
l o g i s t i c a l fees associated with such a deployment to ensure
troop discipline. Once in his control, Mobutu would l i k e l y
be w i l l i n g to tum the weapons over to Western hands, but he
probably would demand some diplomatic or financial quid pro
quo.
3.5c '
5. How much are the confiscated FAR weapons worth? We
estimate that the FAR's helicopters and armored cars could
probably fetch several hundred thousand dollars on the gray
arms market, depending on their condition. The a r t i l l e r y
and mortar pieces, could also be worth a few hundred thousand
dollars. [~ 3.5c
6. What weapons do the FAR forces in Zaire have? In
both Goma and Bukavu, we judge that there may be 5,000 to
7,000 armed FAR troops who pose a security threat to US
forces and Western r e l i e f workers, and who--although their
ammunition i s in short supply-- threaten to restart
h o s t i l i t i e s inside Rwanda.
EO 13526 1 4
.c
In Gojna, there are numerous reports that as many as
5,000 FAR troops may be armed. The defense attache
reported e a r l i e r this week that he observed FAR troops
in company and battalion size formations in their camps
northwest of Goma. FAR forces had a 37 mm antia i r c r a f t grun, as well as numerous buses, 2.5 ton
trucks, and two command jeeps. Most of the FAR senior
leadership i s reportedly in Goma.
\\\
DAL
_3.5c-
R PO
Y H
�TH.
SECRBT
3.5c
J
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j
j .
WOeOWTRAOT
3.5c
WHIirrDIi
FAR forces may have access to a d d i t i o n a l weapons i n
Zaire. A cache of FAR explosives was discovered near
Bukavu l a s t week and the attache reports that p i l e s of
confiscated weapons remain uncruarded i n Goma.
EO 13526 1.4c
3.5c
i_ x
HOGOti
3.5c
Y PHOTOC^
�Secret
EO 13526 3.5c
Intelligence Report
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
4 August 1994
Burundi: Ethnic Tensions Reaching Boiling Point
3.5c
Tensions in Burundi, where the ethnic composition mirrors Rwanda's, could boil
over with little warning, and recent developments are raising the temperature. Both
Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, military and the civilian Tutsi opposition—
emboldened by events in Rwanda—appear more opposed than ever to Hutu majority
EO 13526 1.4c
The Hutu-dominated
rule£
government is virtually powerless in the face of Tutsi intransigence. This, in turn, is
strengthening hardline Burundian Hutu leaders, who are increasingly willing to see
conflict as their only means to consolidate their shaky hold on power.
EO 13526 1.4c
(hardline Hutus are rearming and expanding
their militias; they apparendy are trying to recruit Zairians and Rwandan Hutu
refugees in Zaire, as well as local Hutus.
These Hutus' nascent military capabilities may tempt them to provoke
conflict with the Tutsi military in the hope that international peacekeepers
will intervene.
3.5c
These developments are raising the odds of an ethnic explosion in Burundi that
could trigger massive new flows of refugees, overwhelm international
humanitarian capabilities, and add to instability in the region. Fearful of
Rwanda's new Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably
would head instead for Tanzania or Zaire, f 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
ALA 94-40008
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY
DU
•CP
Q OY
�Secret
EO 13526 3.5c
Rwandan Developments Polarizing Burundian Hutus and Tutsis
Although the recent wave of ethnic violence in Rwanda has not yet spread into
Burundi-which shares its neighbor's demographic makeup-the massive bloodletting
and population movements in Rwanda are raising the level of mutual distrust between
Burundian Hutus and Tutsis. Each side is increasingly convinced that it cannot risk
sharing power with the other, which is undercutting the influence of the few
remaining moderates who favor peaceful power sharing. | 3.5c
History of Bloodletting
Recent events in Burundi reflect longstanding tensions. Previous episodes of
massive ethnic violence in Burundi-in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988-began as
Hutu uprisings against oppression by the Tutsi minority. Centuries of Tutsi
dominance seemed to be coming to an end with the democratic presidential
election in June 1993, which Melchior Ndadaye's pro-Hutu FRODEBU party
swept with more than 60 percent of the vote. The election results, however, have
been subverted by the Tutsi-controlled military. A coup attempt last October
resulted in the murder of President Ndadaye-as well as his constitutionally
designated direct successors-and set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as
50,000, drove another 600,000 into neighboring countries, and displaced about 1
million within the country. This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor died in
the plane crash that also killed Rwandan Hutu President Habyarimana, the Tutsi
Army launched another abortive coup, and the Tutsi opposition has blocked
Acting President Ntibantunganya's efforts to gain legitimacy and control the
government. 3.5c
Tutsis Digging In. Burundian Tutsi fears of sharing power with the Hutu majority
have deepened since the massacres of nearly two-thirds of Rwanda's Tutsis between
early April and mid-July, and the group's desire to regain full control of the
the mainly
EO 13526 1.4c
government appears stronger than ever.
Tutsi UPRONA party and other opposition groups fiolcflittle stock in the democratic
process, saying it has been subverted by deep-seated ethnic mistrust and would bring
to power a Hutu majority government that would by definition be repressive.
In early August, UPRONA pulled out of power-sharing talks with
FRODEBU, claiming recent appointments of security and local officials
violated the negotiations' ground rules]
EO 13526 1.4c
iThe
Tutsi opposition has demanded near parity in government jobs and the
creation of the office of vice president, to be filled by a Tutsi. | 3.5c
The 13,000-strong mostly Tutsi security forces remain the Tutsis' insurance policy.
Both officers and rank and file appear as opposed as the Tutsi political opposition to
Hutu majority rule.
EO 13526 1.4c
the current
This report was prepared by
3 5c
|Office of Africa and Latin American Analysis, with
_^LA. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
contributions from
3.5c
directed to the Chief,|
3 5
3.5c
JALA, on'
C
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HT
D
Y
Secret
�i>.c.c.r_e.L
EO 13526 3.5c
Army Chief, the Defense Minister, and other Tutsi military leaders, who were among
the instigators of the bloody coup attempt last October, all adamantly reject the idea
of sharing power with Hutus. Their willingness to revolt and ability to do so with
impunity have highlighted the helplessness of Acting President Ntibantuganya and
intimidated many other Hutu politicians, further emboldening the Tutsis-led
opposition.
• Much of Burundi's recent ethnic violence-in which about 1,000 civilians have
been killed since April-has stemmed from the Tutsi Army's "cleansing"
operations in areas where it suspected Hutus of harboring weapons and party
militiasl
EO 13526 1.4c
Hutus Edging Toward Conflict. Developments in Rwanda have also diminished the
commitment of Burundi's Hutu leaders to finding a peaceful outcome to their
country's crisis. Some Hutu officials view UPRONA's negotiating strategy as the
first step toward a bloodless coup d'etat that would restore Tutsi dominance,
EO 13526 1.4c
|these officials probably are correct.
The widespread Hutu suspicion that the Tutsi Burundian military helped the Tutsi-led
Rwandan Patriotic Front oust the Hutu regime in Kigali, and the weakness of the
Hutu-controlled government in the face of Tutsi intransigence, appear to be making
an armed conflict increasingly attractive to Hutu hardliners.
EO 13526 1.4c
As Burundi's radical Hutus, including Interior Minister Nyangoma, acquire more
military capabilities, they may provoke the Tutsi military into conflict in the hope
that international peacekeepers would deploy to Burundi and disarm the Tutsi
military.
3.5c
Another Humanitarian Disaster Looming
The hardening attitudes of both Hutus and Tutsis appear to be propelling Burundi
toward large-scale ethnic clashes that could spark another humanitarian disaster.
More than 1.3 million displaced persons and former Burundian refugees who have
returned from neighboring countries are already receiving humanitarian assistance.
In addition, nearly 220,000 Burundian refugees remain in Zaire, Tanzania, and
Rwanda. If bloodletting erupts in Burundi, international aid workers in the region
would be overwhelmed by another mass exodus.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Seeret
EO 13526 3.5c
Burundian Hutus would be likely to stay away from their traditional
safehaven in Rwanda, fearing crackdowns by the new Tutsi-dominated
government in Kigali. Fear of the rebels who now control that government
has prompted many of the 300,000 Burundian refugees who fled to Rwanda
last October to return to Burundi; the 53,000 who remain in Rwanda are
mostly in the French-designated safehaven.
New waves of Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head for Tanzania or
Zaire; some 20,000 fled to Zaire last October alone.
Tanzania and Zaire-which already host 60,000 and 106,000 Burundian
refugees, respectively-would be under even more pressure if they had to cope
with a new influx. Both countries face serious security threats as a result of
Hutu irredentist activity in the Rwandan refugees camps. 3.5c
Meanwhile, the arrival of more Rwandan Hutu refugees could overwhelm Burundi's
infrastructure and further aggravate Hutu-Tutsi tensions. Some 373,000 Rwandansmostly Hutus-have already arrived; aid workers say 1 million or more displaced
Rwandans along the border face growing threats from malnutrition and disease, and
they may move with little notice. | 3.5c ~'
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Secret
�Ad Hoc Group on Hwandan Relief
1
Chaired by Mr. Lake
5 August 1994
AGENDA
1.
Introduction
Mr. Lake
2.
Sitreps
CIA/JCS
Status of the four r e l i e f "packages"
A d d i t i o n a l needs
3. Consideration of Phase 2
OSD/JCS
4 . Expanding UNAMIR
OSD
5 . Burundi
State
6.
The Hutu Army i n Zaire/Moroccan troops
7.
...State
Promoting Repatriation
P r i n c i p l e s t o Guide Repatriation E f f o r t
Information Campaign
Promoting Reconciliation i n Rwanda
8. Other business
State
OSD/JCS
State
Mr. Lake
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White Hoiue Gnidelines, September U, 2 0
06
ByiLi_ NARA, DatelZLMl
CLINTON LffiWn*110T0C0PY
�SECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
|
0
10 August 1994
/J.Vtl
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Burundi:
Background t o C r i s i s
Summary
• Recent developments make an e t h n i c e x p l o s i o n i n Burundi l i k e l y
i n the next s i x months. The c r i s i s could begin w i t h l i t t l e
a d d i t i o n a l warning. This would t r i g g e r massive new flows o f
refugees, overwhelm i n t e r n a t i o n a l humanitarian c a p a b i l i t i e s , and
add t o i n s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . F e a r f u l o f Rwanda's new
Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably
would head i n s t e a d f o r Tanzania o r Z a i r e .
-15c.
Both Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, m i l i t a r y and the
c i v i l i a n T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n appear more opposed than ever t o Hutu
m a j o r i t y r u l e . The Hutu-dominated government i s v i r t u a l l y
powerless i n the face of T u t s i i n t r a n s i g e n c e . This, i n t u r n , i s
s t r e n g t h e n i n g h a r d l i n e Burundian Hutu leaders, who i n c r e a s i n g l y
see c o n f l i c t as t h e i r only means t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r shaky hold
on power. | 3 5 '
.c
Rwandan Developments P o l a r i z i n g Burundian Hutus and T u t s i s .
The massive b l o o d l e t t i n g i n Rwanda has r a i s e d t h e l e v e l of mutual
d i s t r u s t between Burundian Hutus and T u t s i s . Each side i s
convinced t h a t i t cannot r i s k s h a r i n g power w i t h t h e other, which
i s u n d e r c u t t i n g the i n f l u e n c e o f t h e few remaining moderates who
f a v o r power sharing.
3.5c
Burundian T u t s i fears o f s h a r i n g power w i t h the Hutu m a j o r i t y
have deepened since the massacres o f n e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s of Rwanda's
T u t s i s between e a r l y A p r i l and mid-July, and t h e group's d e s i r e t o
r e g a i n f u l l c o n t r o l o f the government appears stronger than ever.
The mainly T u t s i UPRONA p a r t y and other o p p o s i t i o n groups place
l i t t l e stock i n the democratic process, saying i t would b r i n g t o
power a Hutu m a j o r i t y government t h a t would by d e f i n i t i o n be
repressive.
•
I n e a r l y August, UPRONA p u l l e d out o f power-sharing t a l k s w i t h
the " r u l i n g " Hutu FRODEBU p a r t y , c l a i m i n g recent appointments
of s e c u r i t y and l o c a l o f f i c i a l s v i o l a t e d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s '
ground r u l e s . The T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n has demanded near p a r i t y
i n government jobs and t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e o f f i c e of v i c e
p r e s i d e n t , t o be f i l l e d by a T u t s i . | 3 5
,c
\
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SECRET
_E.QJ.3.526_3..5.c_
EO 13526 3.5c
�SECRBT I
SUBJECT:
Burundi:
EO 13526 3.5c
Background t o C r i s i s
The 13,000-strong mostly T u t s i s e c u r i t y f o r c e s remain the
T u t s i s insurance p o l i c y . The c u r r e n t Army Chief, the Defense
M i n i s t e r , and other T u t s i m i l i t a r y leaders, who were among the
i n s t i g a t o r s of the bloody coup attempt l a s t October, a l l adamantly
r e j e c t the idea o f sharing power w i t h Hutus. T h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o
r e v o l t and a b i l i t y t o do so w i t h i m p u n i t y have h i g h l i g h t e d the
helplessness of A c t i n g President Ntibantuganya and i n t i m i d a t e d many
o t h e r Hutu p o l i t i c i a n s .
1
•
Much of Burundi's recent e t h n i c v i o l e n c e - - i n which about 1,000
c i v i l i a n s have been k i l l e d since A p r i l - - h a s stemmed from the
T u t s i Army's "cleansing" operations i n areas where i t
suspected Hutu p a r t y m i l i t i a s o f h a r b o r i n g weapons. | 3 5
.c
Hutus Edging Toward C o n f l i c t . Developments i n Rwanda have
a l s o diminished the commitment o f Burundi's Hutu l e a d e r s t o f i n d i n g
a p e a c e f u l outcome t o t h e i r country's c r i s i s . Some Hutu o f f i c i a l s
view UPRONA's n e g o t i a t i n g s t r a t e g y as the f i r s t s t e p toward a
b l o o d l e s s coup d'etat t h a t would r e s t o r e T u t s i dominance; these
o f f i c i a l s probably are c o r r e c t . Consequently, armed c o n f l i c t i s
i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t r a c t i v e t o Hutu h a r d l i n e r s .
•
The r a d i c a l Hutu PALIPEHUTU movement has been r e o r g a n i z i n g and
rearming i t s 5,000 f i g h t e r s since A p r i l .
•
Burundian government o f f i c i a l s have been r e c r u i t i n g Z a i r i a n
n a t i o n a l s and Hutu refugees i n Zaire's South Kivu Region t o
f i g h t the Burundian Army.
35
.c
Another Humanitarian D i s a s t e r Looming. The hardening
a t t i t u d e s o f both Hutus and T u t s i s are p r o p e l l i n g Burundi toward
l a r g e - s c a l e e t h n i c clashes t h a t w i l l create another h u m a n i t a r i a n
d i s a s t e r . More than 1.3 m i l l i o n d i s p l a c e d persons and former
Burundian refugees who have r e t u r n e d from n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s are
a l r e a d y r e c e i v i n g humanitarian assistance. I n a d d i t i o n , n e a r l y
220,000 Burundian refugees remain i n Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda.
•
Burundian Hutus would l i k e l y stay away from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l
safehaven i n Rwanda, f e a r i n g the new Tutsi-dominated
government i n K i g a l i . Fear o f the T u t s i has prompted many o f
the 300,000 Burundian refugees who f l e d t o Rwanda l a s t October
t o r e t u r n t o Burundi; the 53,000 who remain i n Rwanda are
mostly i n the French-designated safehaven.
•
New waves o f Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head f o r
Tanzania o r Z a i r e . | 3 5 1
.c
GECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
APPENDIX
Burundi:
A " C l i f f Notes" History
Unlike most A f r i c a n s t a t e s , Rwanda and Burundi were not
a r t i f i c i a l creations o f c o l o n i a l r u l e ; t h e i r existence as
p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s goes back several c e n t u r i e s . Between the 15th
and 17th c e n t u r i e s , T u t s i herders moved i n t o the area from
Ethiopia and e s t a b l i s h e d dominance over Hutu farmers. Hutus
t r a d i t i o n a l l y were the s o c i a l i n f e r i o r s o f the T u t s i n o b i l i t y ,
who exchanged c a t t l e f o r personal s e r v i c e s . Both groups share
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s and the r e l a t e d K i r u n d i and Kinyarwanda
languages.
3.5c
Rwanda's T u t s i monarchy t r a d i t i o n a l l y was more c e n t r a l i z e d
and a u t h o r i t a r i a n than i n Burundi, where the king's power rested
on a s h i f t i n g set of f a c t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s . Rwanda a l s o was marked
by sharper s o c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between T u t s i s and Hutus. German
and Belgian r u l e i n the 20th century h i g h l i g h t e d e t h n i c
d i f f e r e n c e s i n both c o u n t r i e s , as c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s gave
T u t s i s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e access t o e d u c a t i o n and government jobs.
3.5c
I n Burundi, T u t s i s remained i n c o n t r o l u n t i l l a s t year. The
contrast between Hutu r u l e i n Rwanda and the group's oppression
i n Burundi l e d t o Hutu u p r i s i n g s — i n 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988 —
t h a t r e s u l t e d i n hundreds of thousands o f deaths. Each Hutu
a t t a c k fueled T u t s i f e a r s of e x t e r m i n a t i o n , and each bloody
repression r e i n f o r c e d the Hutus' d e s i r e f o r revenge.
Periodic
ethnic unrest r e s u l t e d i n three successful coups d ' e t a t and many
f a i l e d attempts.
The l a s t T u t s i p r e s i d e n t , P i e r r e Buyoya, judged
the s i t u a t i o n was untenable and o r c h e s t r a t e d l a s t year's e l e c t i o n
and t r a n s f e r of power.
3.5c
In the June 1993 e l e c t i o n , Melchoir Ndadaye's pro-Hutu
FRODEBU p a r t y won w i t h more than 60 percent o f the v o t e . The
e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , however, have been subverted by the T u t s i c o n t r o l l e d m i l i t a r y . A coup attempt l a s t October r e s u l t e d i n the
murder of President Ndadaye--as w e l l as h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
designated d i r e c t successors--and set o f f e t h n i c b l o o d l e t t i n g
t h a t k i l l e d as many as 50,000, drove another 600,000 i n t o
neighboring c o u n t r i e s , and displaced about 1 m i l l i o n w i t h i n the
country.
This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor d i e d i n
the plane crash t h a t also k i l l e d Rwandan Hutu President
Habyarimana, the T u t s i Army launched another a b o r t i v e coup, and
the T u t s i o p p o s i t i o n has blocked A c t i n g President
Ntibantunganya's e f f o r t s t o gain l e g i t i m a c y and c o n t r o l t h e
government.
3.5c
CECRET
EO 13526 3.5c
�Rice, Susan E.
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Priority:
Clarke, Richard A.
Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
,
._
' POTUS for your clearance!
'-'flwsbay, August 11,1994 5:17PM
High
Package as Info Memo to Pres Covered by a Note from me to Lake
TO: Lake
FM: RAC
RE: Rwanda
Attached is the memorandum to the President you requested.
TO: POTUS
FM: LAKE
RE: Rwanda
While we have made progress of the emergency relief situation in and around Goma, three problems
threaten the success of the Rwandan relief operation.
First, the volcano near Goma is emitting ash and may soon erupt with lava that could threaten the
refugees. The US Geological Survey's expert believes that the current activity is an indicator that a major lava
eruption could occur within four weeks. We are providing the UN with all of the information we have on the
volcano's status and are urgently consulting with them, the French, and the Rwandan government about what
should be done with the refugees near the volcano. We may be able to use the volcanic activity as a catalyst to
begin large scale refugee repatriation. Before such repatriation occurs, however, we need to have a relief and
security system in place in Rwanda. The Rwandan government and the UN (both the peacekeepers and the
refugee programs) would have to coooperate quickly and effectively to begin a major repatriation effort soon.
Second, the Hutu dominated former Rwandan army is disrupting relief operations in Zaire and is
intimidating refugees who may want to return. The Zaire Army is not very capable of dealing with security
problems in this remote part of the country. We are consulting with the French and Zaire about what can be done
to insure the disarmament and control of this force. While the solution is likely to require the introduction of some
non-American peacekeeping force in the Goma area, we are examining whether there are things that the US
could do to help address this problem.
CLINTON LIBf&fcY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Third, ethnic tensions in Burundi are increasing. A Hutu/Tutsi massacre there could rival what
happened in Rwanda. We are taking steps to encourage mediation and conciliation. The Organization of African
Unity has deployed human rights observers. Several Deputy Representatives to the UN Security Council will visit
Burundi as a team in the next few days. We are trying to assemble a team of prominent Americans to visit there
soon. Finally, at the UNSYG Boutros-Ghali's request, we have offered to have some US Air Force relief cargo
flights for the Rwandan refugees land in Burundi as a reminder that the international community is watching. We
have declined for now to place a US Air Force airport team there, however, because a larger presence of US
military might be counterproductive and destabilizing.
CLINTON L l M W P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Rwanda Relief Ad Hoc Group
Summary & Conclusions
12 Aug 94 Meeting
1. Volcano: USGC experts will be dispatched to the area around Goma
immediately to do an assessment of the risk of a lava flow or gaseous spread on
Lake Kivu.
EO 13526 1.4d
3. UNAMIR: State will work with USUN to insure that the remaining problems
holding up the Ethiopian deployment are resolved ASAP. State and USUN will
insure that the UN issues an LOI indicating intention to pay for USAF flights
supporting the Tunisian deployment.
State will request Secretary Christopher to send a letter to Secretary Perry
requesting support for UNAMIR under the legal arrangements o£ the United
Rations Participation Act. This formal request will permit DOD to act prior to the
completion of UN contracts to repay DOD.
EO 13526 1.4d
5. Burundi: The US will support Salem-Salem (OAU) in his call for a summit in
Bujumbura. EUCOM will work with UNHCR to identify loads that USAF can fly
in to Bujumbura, to create a periodic USAF presence there. State and NSC will
work to create a high level US Delegation that will visit Burundi soon as a
stabilizing measure.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
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�GECRET EO 13526 3.5c
25 August 1994
Zaire-Rwanda: Moving FAR Units North to Bunia
3.5c
1. What i s the status of the Former Rwandan Army (FAR) i n
eastern Zaire? We believe that there are some 10,000-12,000
soldiers of the FAR i n eastern Zaire who r e t a i n t h e i r personal
weapons. About 10,000 are near Goma i n b a t t a l i o n s i z e camps;
they have retained m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , t r a i n each morning, and
respond to senior command and c o n t r o l . While most of the FAR's
heavy equipment was siezed when they crossed the border l a s t
month, they continue to control a 37-mm a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun and a
few truck mounted mortars. Most of the 7,000-8,000 FAR troops
near Bukavu do not appear to have retained t h e i r weapons and they
are reportedly less disciplined, more disorganized, and less
l o y a l to their o f f i c e r s than t h e i r comrades near Goma. EO 13526 3^5c
2. Can the FAR be persuaded to move? Most of the armed FAR
troops i n Goma probably are committed to remaining an organized
force near the Rwandan border i n order to more e a s i l y resume
h o s t i l i t i e s against the new Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front (RPF)
government. They reportedly have received four months of salary
i n advance, are receiving (partly through t h e f t of r e l i e f
assistance) adequate food, water, and medical supplies, and l i v e
i n m i l i t a r y - s t y l e tents. FAR u n i t s near Bukavu probably would
also resist moving, but many soldiers i n t h i s area are reportedly
s e l l i n g t h e i r weapons to buy food, suggesting that some might be
w i l l i n g to move to new camps that offered b e t t e r l i v i n g
conditions. I 3^5c '
3.
What i s
P r e s i d e n t Mobutu's view?
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Mobutu has
EO 13526 1.4c
publicly
stated
that he w i l l prevent the FAR from resuming h o s t i l i t i e s , but we
have no specific evidence that he i s a c t i v e l y pursuing such an
objective. Mobutu has long-standing p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y t i e s
to the former Hutu regime. | 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�L._35635J
EQ1.2_.c
4. Can Mobutu's m i l i t a r y forces f o r c i b l y move the FAR?
Probably n o t . Even i f Mobutu openly supported such a p o l i c y ,
there a r e o n l y about 2,500 Z a i r i a n troops--perhaps as many as
1,000 from Mobutu's Special P r e s i d e n t i a l D i v i s i o n (DSP)--in Kivu.
Z a i r i a n t r o o p s are deployed p r i m a r i l y i n Goma and Bukavu and
r a r e l y t r a v e l t o FAR camps l o c a t e d outside o f town. These troops
are i l l - d i s c i p l i n e d , p o o r l y t r a i n e d and l e d , and r e c e i v e l i t t l e
l o g i s t i c a l support; Z a i r i a n troops are l i k e l y responsible f o r a t
l e a s t h a l f o f a l l s e c u r i t y i n c i d e n t s near Goma. Z a i r i a n troops
would almost be c e r t a i n l y r e l u c t a n t t o f o r c i b l y attempt t o
redeploy t h e FAR, f e a r i n g - - c o r r e c t l y i n our v i e w - - t h a t they would
be outmanned, outgunned, and outclassed. The FAR senjpc
l e a d e r s h i p does spend considerable time i n Goma and Bukavu.
however, and Z a i r i a n forces would l i k g l y stand a b e t t e r chance of
detaining individual officers.
3.5c
5. Would moving the FAS. t o Bunia s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermine
i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o renew h o s t i l i t i e s ? Yes. Bunia i s over 400
km n o r t h o f Goma on the Ugandan border, s h a r p l y l i m i t i n g t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o conduct operations i n Rwanda. The roads i n the area
are v e r y p o o r - - e s p e c i a l l y during the c u r r e n t r a i n y season--and
the town's a i r p o r t probably cannot handle s i z a b l e t r a n s p o r t
a i r c r a f t . There are few Hutus among the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n ,
denying t h e FAR a n a t u r a l base of support.
3.5c
6. What a r e the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Zaire? P u t t i n g the FAR i n
Bunia would probably have l i t t l e immediate impact on Zaire's
p o l i t i c a l dynamics. Kinshasa would l i k e l y demand t h a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l i e f agencies provide f o r FAR t r o o p w e l f a r e i n
order t o minimize t h e i r t h r e a t t o the l o c a l community. Mobutu
has s c a t t e r e d thousands of i l l - d i s c i p l i n e d , d i s l o y a l r e g u l a r Army
s o l d i e r s throughout Zaire's i n t e r i o r w i t h no obvious means o f
l o g i s t i c support. Although these troops o c c a s i o n a l l y engage i n
v i o l e n t l o o t i n g t o s u r v i v e , the unrest i s u s u a l l y contained t o
the i n d i v i d u a l town and has had no p o l i t i c a l impact.
3.5c
7. The deployment, however, could p o t e n t i a l l y complicate
Zaire's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Uganda, which have o f t e n been tense. The
border area has long hosted numerous armed groups t h a t engage i n
cross-border u n r e s t . The FAR, which views Uganda as an enemy f o r
s u p p o r t i n g t h e RPF, could t r y t o d e s t a b i l i z e President Musevini
as w e l l as l o o k i n g f o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o launch a t t a c k s against
Rwanda. Under such circumstances, Uganda might r e t a l i a t e w i t h
cross border a t t a c k s or support t o a n t i - Z a i r i a n groups.
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.CECaEI.
EO 13526 3.5c
26 August
1994
Human Rights Abuses by the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front
Reports from a range of sources says t h a t forces l o y a l t o
the Rwandan P a t r i o t i c Front are k i l l i n g e t h n i c Hutus, s e i z i n g
p r o p e r t y , and committing other abuses throughout Rwanda. These
r e p o r t s appear p l a u s i b l e t o us. They r e f l e c t both conscious
p o l i c y by the RPF, which dominates the new regime i n K i g a l i , and
serious problems of d i s c i p l i n e and command-and-control among RPF
troops. We estimate t h a t at most s e v e r a l thousand Hutus have
been k i l l e d by RPF troops and s u p p o r t e r s - - f a r short of the
genocide p e r p e t r a t e d by the ousted Hutu regime against e t h n i c
T u t s i s . Nonetheless, whatever the m o t i v a t i o n , the abuses are
aggravating the r e g i o n a l refugee c r i s i s by d r i v i n g more Hutus out
of Rwanda and by b o l s t e r i n g r a d i c a l Hutu leaders' claims t h a t ,
because returnees face slaughter at thq RPF's hands, they should
remain o u t s i d e the country's borders.
3.5c
Evidence of P o l i c i e a Encouraging Abuses
-- Continued f l i g h t o f refugees i n t o Tanzania--some 40,000 have
l e f t t h i s month--suggests a systematic RPF crackdown on the
Hutu p o p u l a t i o n of Kibungo P r e f e c t u r e , which the Front has
c o n t r o l l e d f o r f o u r months.|
EQ 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
[Hutu
refugees' d e s c r i p t i o n s of harsh RPF measures; Tanzanian
a u t h o r i t i e s have been p u l l i n g 20 t o 30 bodies each week from
the Kagera River on the border. Since mid-May we have
JLJLY_
received a steady stream of s i m i l a r r e p o r t s of RPF
EO 13526 1.4c
We b e l i e v e t h i s behavior represents scorched-earth t a c t i c s by
the RPF i n response t o an ongoing armed t h r e a t . f r o m Hutu
elements i n Kibungo. I
E_-..._iC
O13526L.-
-- We believe that s i m i l a r crackdowns--meant to encourage Tutsis
return as w e l l as to punish Hutus—have taken place elsewhere
~~~
Irelief
in Rwanda.
EO 13526 1.4c
agencies were not allowed i n t o "the eastern p o r t i o n s of Butare
and Gitarama Prefectures d u r i n g most of July--a p e r i o d when
d e s t r u c t i o n or s e i z u r e of Hutu p r o p e r t y
EO 13526 1.4c
i n the towns of Butare and Gitarama. This suggests the RPF
wanted no o u t s i d e witnesses of a v i o l e n t r o o t i n g out of
suspected enemies.
3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON
A
in
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�_GEC.REJC_
EO 13526 3.5c
I n K i g a l i , according t o press r e p o r t s , T u t s i e x i l e s r e t u r n i n g
from Uganda say the RPF has given them houses and businesses
seized from Hutus. We view t h i s as evidence t h a t the Front i s
a c t i v e l y working t o t i l t the c a p i t a l ' s e t h n i c balance i n i t s
favor.
3.5c
The above a c t i o n s would be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the RPF's p r a c t i c e
d u r i n g the c i v i l war o f not l e t t i n g c i v i l i a n o r h u m a n i t a r i a n
concerns keep i t from o b t a i n i n g m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s .
The
RPF's remorseless s h e l l i n g of Hutu p o s i t i o n s i n K i g a l i between
May and J u l y i n f l i c t e d heavy c o l l a t e r a l losses, i n c l u d i n g
barrages t h a t damaged Red Cross h o s p i t a l s and UN f a c i l i t i e s .
S i m i l a r l y , an RPF mortar a t t a c k on f l e e i n g Hutu t r o o p s i n
Goma, Zaire, i n mid-July set o f f a deadly panicked stampede
among c i v i l i a n refugees i n the t a r g e t zone.
3.5c
RPF leaders have created an atmosphere conducive to abuses
with public pronouncements on the need for " j u s t i c e " on a
massive s c a l e against the authors of the a n t i - T u t s i genocide.
Some have spoken of the need t o a r r e s t , t r y , and punish up to
40,000 mass murderers, and the RPF has c i r c u l a t e d l i s t s w i t h
hundreds o f names of suspected r i n g l e a d e r s . | 3.5c
'
Evidence of Uncontrollable Armed Groups
the Rwandan
EO 13526 1.4c
P a t r i o t i c Army's control over i t s troops has shrunk as i t s
strength has swollen past 25,000 from an ear y A p r i l l e v e l of
RPF t r o o p s went
10,000.
EO 13526 1.4c
on a spree of r a p i n e and summary executions a f t e r they
captured K i g a l i on 4 J u l y . The RPF regime's announcement t h i s
week of the execution of two s o l d i e r s f o r a t r o c i t i e s and the
a r r e s t of 60 o t h e r s i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s aware i n d i s c i p l i n e i s
a problem.
Prime M i n i s t e r Twagiramungu--not an RPF member-says t h a t the m i l i t a r y ' s d i s c i p l i n e has evaporated and t h a t
Defense M i n i s t e r Kagame may have l o s t c o n t r o l of the f o r c e ,
EO 13526 1.4c
the RPF
has armed r e t u r n i n g T u t s i refugees and g i v e n m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g
to n e a r l y every able-bodied T u t s i t o defend a g a i n s t Hutu
r a i d s . These v i g i l a n t e groups have k i l l e d Hutus who have
f a l l e n under s u s p i c i o n due t o t h e i r education, p u r p o r t e d
p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , or coveted possessions.
3.5c
Outside of "hot" zones such as Kibungo, we b e l i e v e these
v i g i l a n t e s and undisciplined, vengeful soldiers--operating on
t h e i r own-- have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a t r o c i t i e s . This was
almost c e r t a i n l y the case i n the murder of the C a t h o l i c
Archbishop of K i g a l i and other clergymen i n e a r l y June. I t
probably ha a l s o been t r u e of r e p o r t e d massacres of Hutu
v i l l a g e r s a long the edge of the former French s e c u r i t y zone i n
southwester n Rwanda and apparent k i l l i n g s of some r e t u r n i n g
refugees i n Gisenyi P r e f e c t u r e . [ 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
mNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GDCnBT
EO 13526 3.5c
The RPF may l a c k t h e muscle and t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l to r e i n i n
|the dispersal
freelance T u t s i k i l l e r s . |
EO 13526 1 4
.c
of RPF troops across Rwanda has g r e a t l y d i l u t e d the commandand-control exercised by commanders. At t h e same time, as
long as t h e regime f e e l s under t h r e a t o f a t t a c k , i t i s l i k e l y
to be r e l u c t a n t t o r e i n in--much less p u n i s h - - i t s e n t h u s i a s t i c
supporters among the v i g i l a n t e bands and newly r e c r u i t e d
troops. | 3 5 ^
.c
EO 13526 3.5c
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
Wednesday, September 7, 1994
10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
AGENDA
1.
S i t u a t i o n Report
2.
CIA
O p e r a t i o n Support Hope
JCS
--Timetable for U.S. Withdrawal
--Additional USG Contributors
....State/AID
3.
Security in Refugee Camps in
Zaire....State/OSD
4.
UNAMIR Deployment
5.
Radios
OSD
6.
Burundi
State
OSD
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLI NTONdrfBRAftY-^HOTOCOPY
�F:\Email\Data_Source\Al\Record\CD001\sep94\052054.html
Page 1 of 1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
14-Sep-1994 15:58 EDT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RECORDS
( RECORDS@Al@OEOB )
FROM:
Rice, Susan E.
(rices@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)
SUBJECT:
- [COMF1 DSNTlAL'j- Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
Message C r e a t i o n Date was a t 14-SEP-1994 15:36:00
Tony/Nancy—
We had proposed h o l d i n g an Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda on Thursday. Since t h a t
t i m e , S t a t e and DOD have s u b s t a n t i a l l y narrowed t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on t h e key
i s s u e o f t h e e x t e n t o f c o n t i n u e d USG support f o r UNHCR e f f o r t s i n t h e
region.
Given t h i s , and t h e e x c e p t i o n a l l y p r e s s i n g demands on your time t h i s week,
we recommend NOT h o l d i n g an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s week. I n s t e a d , we w i l l
f o r w a r d t o you a memo t o t h e P r e s i d e n t recommending t h a t he approve t h e JCS
w i t h d r a w a l p l a n and t h e p r o v i s i o n o f s p e c i f i c a d d i t i o n a l goods and s e r v i c e s
t o UNHCR. We w i l l a l s o update you on o t h e r developments r e : Rwanda/Burundi.
We w i l l l e t you know when we t h i n k t h e time i s r i p e f o r another Ad Hoc
meeting.
A d d i t i o n a l Header I n f o r m a t i o n Follows
Date Created: 14-Sep-1994 15:36
D e l e t a b l e Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 052054
VMS Filename: OA$SHARA21:ZVKCMTCYM.TXT
A l F o l d e r : SEP94
Message Format:
Message S t a t u s : READ
Date M o d i f i e d : 14-Sep-1994 15:36
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
D e l i v e r y - R e c e i p t Requested: NO
Message P r i o r i t y : FIRST_CLASS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of2
2E8759B2.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
26 September 94 16:27
FROM
Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION -CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: RE: [CONriDCNTIAL]
TO
Richardson, Craig
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
Sounds good. Why don't you run with this. Ask eric for the appropriate
contact person at DOD. It's likely to be someone in Pat Irvin's office, if
not her. She's DAS for humanitarian. I don't know who the JS person would
be. Again try Eric.
We survived the speech. The POTUS plugged Menem by name. All in all,
considering, it's gone well. The BBG meeting was a success, and POTUS had a
nice brief visit to the UN Situation Center, which was rewarding from my
perspective. We had customary speech hell, but in the end, I think it was
ok.
Thanks again for all your tremendous help. Your memo on White HELL is
becoming the gospel on the subject. Congrats.
From: Richardson, Craig V.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A l
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED] More White Helmets
Date: Monday, September 26, 1994 03:38 PM
I just spoke to Chat Blakeman -- really nice guy. He mentioned the line in
the POTUS UNGA speech and suggested that "Looks like we are headed more
toward your guys' view of White Helmets than the Peace Corp-type view." I
agreed.
On Wednesday, Frijiero (Menem's envoy) is essentially meeting with the same
crew that met last Friday at State. Chat proposes that we (1) arrange for a
crisis response person from DOD to show up at that meeting or (2) arrange
for a separate Frijiero visit to the DOD element that does - say - the
Rwanda ops or (3) both. I said I thought this was a good idea, since it
really doesn't make sense to have a Peace Corps type as interlocutor, in
light of the POTUS speech.
Reactions? Suggestions? Who should be call at DOD?
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED)
PER E„0„ 13526
�Page 1 of 3
2E8E544E.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
01 October 94 23:37
FROM
Steinberg, Donald K.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONFIDENTIAL] Update on Mandela
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Darby, Melanie B.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Millison, Cathy L.
Reed, James W.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, NealS.
Wright, Allison M.
CARBON COPY
Anderson, Marjorie
Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Blakeman, Earle C.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Harris, Elisa D.
Jensen-Moran, Jeri L.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rocha, Victor M.
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.
Teraji, Barbara
Marcel T. Thomas
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O )PY
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!
�2E8E544E.FIN
Page 2 of 3
Cathryn, Thorup L.
Turner, Veronica B.
TEXT BODY
Nancy, Will and Others:
I spoke this evening with Hennie de Klerk, the Americas director for the
South African Department of Foreign Affairs and honcho of the Mandela State
Visit. He said that the President, Foreign Minister and others will be
discussing various aspects of the visit tomorrow (Sunday) afternoon in New
York, including the question of the radio address and the walk at the
Lincoln Memorial. He said that the plan is now for Mandela to depart from
Washington on Friday night after the S.A. Embassy's reception, which could
complicate the radio address planning. He stressed there were no hard
feelings over the change in Mandela's overnight plans on Tuesday, although
he implied that Mandela had warmed up to the idea of staying at the White
House and was actually looking forward to it....
We discussed the substance of the visit, including the 14 separate
initiatives we plan to pursue, and he thought all of them were reasonable.
He wanted to look at the language we planned to use and I faxed him a
non-paper describing the initiatives. I
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
left open the possibility of issuing a joint communique on behalf of the two
governments or presidents describing some or all of the new initiatives.
Hennie affirmed that it would be good for the two Presidents to talk about
Africa-wide issues, not just the bilateral relationship. He appreciated
that President Clinton plans to thank Mandela for his initiatives in
Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola. I mentioned some of our new initiatives
vis-a-vis conflict resolution, demobilization of oversized African armies
and debt relief ~ he agreed that these might be good topics for the
Presidents to discuss and to which they could publicly reaffirm their
commitment.!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d"
We talked about the Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund. We agreed
that the best way to handle the announcement of this Southern Africa-wide
program is to have President Clinton announce it at the press availability
on Wednesday with Andy Young (the new board director), Brian Atwood and the
Ambassadors from the Southern African nations present.
(Dick/Larry) I asked about Haiti. He said that he does not yet have an
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 3 of 3
2E8E544E.FIN
answer as to what President Mandela will say.| EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(Elisa) I asked about MTCR. Hennie said he expected the agreement to be
signed in Pretoria on Monday and that a quiet release would be issued there.
He wasn't certain how the South Africans wanted the issue to be address
publicly during the visit -- that is, whether they wanted to be
congratulated on this step. He said he would get back to us on the issue.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
I'll be talking with Hennie again tomorrow afternoon if there's anything
anyone would like me to raise with him.
Don
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Page 1 of 1
MSMail
DATE-TIME
06 October 94 16:16
FROM
Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION
-CONnDCNTIAt
SUBJECT
Subject: [COfrJriDENTfrtiTTtJpdate on Funding for Rwanda's IFI Arrears
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON COPY
Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.
TEXT BODY
NOTE FOR LAKE
State has agreed to provide $2 mill, of the $7.2 mill, required to pay off
Rwanda's IFI arrears. State is demarching Germany and Belgium to make
generous contributions as well. State hopes for responses by mid-late next
week.
At this time, we will need to determine the amount of the remaining
requirement, if any, and State may need to provide the balance. Depending
on the size of the shortfall, State/AID may have to be "encouraged" to find
the funds.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�2E9B296A.FIN
Page 1 of 1
MSMai
DATE-TIME
11 October 94 17:13
FROM
Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONFIDENTIAfc]-
TO
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
CARBON_COPY
Rice, Susan E.
TEXTBODY
Mac:
At the Rwanda SVTS, not much new info today - FYI, there is drawdown
authority for $25M this fiscal year (95) specified for warcrimes tribunals
but not country specific, so. . . the Rwanda portion can be funded from that
too.
Arrears: State has identified $2.5M and is prepping demarches to go out
(maybe tomorrow) to seek other donors. OMB is confirming w/Treas that the
total World Bank arrears is $4.4M and not linked to the African Devt Bank
arrears.
Security issues/UNAMIR mandate will be addressed by the peacekeeping core
group later this week.
No SVTS on friday - next meeting will be next Tues at 1:00 pm.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of 1
2EA00E7F.FIN
MSMai
DATE-TIME
15 October 94 10:18
FROM
Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION -CONriDENTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: [CONTIDENTIAL-f Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal
TO
Simon, Steven N.
CARBON_COPY
Rice, Susan E.
TEXT BODY
hi steve: the war crimes tribunal working group is focusing on putting
together a $3M voluntary contribution to jump start the establishment of the
Rwanda portion of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. So far, they have
identified $1M within the DOS budget that can (and is willing to be)
reprogrammed for this function. Still trying to think of where $2M more can
come from!!???
Once the budget needs are id'd at the UN and approved in december, we will
make our assessment contribution out of the $25M of drawdown funds for war
crimes tribunals.
Any thoughts about the start up contribution????????????????????????
PER E„<a 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�ICT ZT
'94
lij:2bPH
US-rHSSIOrMf.
U N I T E D STATES M I S S I O N
DATE :
P. 1 • 3
TO T H E U N I T E D
^Cdr^tf
NATIONS
CLASSIFICATION
FROM
(Phone Number)
L
SUBJECT
PHONE i
Pf
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(inW7-0l&
tn-tiMl-WlZ
Quzvzptj
(io^yS-^j frsMr-i^
REMARKS!
•ffic«
P o l i t i c a l Military Affairs
us Mission t« the United Natiens
799 UN Plaza
New Yerk, NY
l»tl7
Phoned (212) 415-4333
UnclaasFAX* (212) 415-4154
ClassFax# (212) 1 (b)f7)c
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�OCT
'94
P.I
liZi:Z"PM IJS-I'HSSIC'N-NY
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•CQUVIVURTLAL
UNITED
STATES
M I S S I O N TO T H E U N I T E D
799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017
NATIONS
25 October 1994
TO:
Interagency Group on Rwanda
FROM:
-r
hi
Susan Varisco£j\
i /K->Ti|w---v--«^--^
SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN Options for Security i n the Camps
DPKO has received several reporta i n the last week from the
UN-Zaire Joint Working Group (led by the Deputy Force Commander
of UNAMIR) and from SRSG Khan. USUN has not received copies of
the reports, but has been briefed on t h e i r conclusions.
J t . Working Group Conclusions:
i
UN Report
The initial report submitted by the UN participants concludes
that a 10,000-12,000 size force is required to separate and move /M
the militia, leaders, and the army and contain them thereafter.
It also concludes that the only force capable of accomplishing
this mandate is a strong national force or multinational force
consisting mainly of one strong state.
fert^cih
Z ^ ^ J i
0)
The report also stresses the need t o s t a r t a p o l i t i c a l
dialogue between refugee leaders and the Government of Rwanda as
well as i n i t i a t e s i g n i f i c a n t social and economic reconstruction
inside the country.
The formal report includes Zairian input, but contains a less
substantive discussion of the options, i t proposes three options:
5)^
o
A purely diplomatic approach t o removing m i l i t a r y , m i l i t i a
and leaders from the camps.
r
o
Joint Zairian/UN and Tanzania/UN Ch V I I operations. Zaire
and Tanzania would have the leading role and the UN would
provide l o g i s t i c a l and other support.
The recommended option i s a Ch V I I national operation as
described i n the UN report above.
N
CLIN O LIBW^OTOCOPY
�:
O T 25 '94 10 29PM US-MISSION-NY
C
P. 3.- 3
OONPIDEMTIAL
SRSG Recommendation:
In his i n i t i a l submission the SRSG recommended a smaller U
N
force (size undefined). The force would provide security for
humanitarian operations and attempt to "suppress" the militia
through presence. Ch VII authority was recommended.
J/poUi
Khan also emphasized p o l i t i c a l dialogue and socioeconomic
reconstruction as integral components of the operation.
The S S submitted a second recommendation after DPKO
RG
^•requestecL-acih VI option. He suggested a UN operation that would
g- t r a i n (Zairiari and^Tahzania^ forces t o police the refugee camps
<
2^
and w?ot*ct~humanitarian workers. This option would presumably
include material assistancef as well.
f SYG Report:
•< ^
After t h i s week's interagency meeting, DPKO w i l l develop i t s
own report t o submit t o the Council. I t w i l l probably present a
range of options based on the submissions of the J t . Working .
Group and the SRSG and U G input.
S
'
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�Secret
Intelligence Report
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Rwanda: Reassessing the Demographic Balance
28 October 1994
3.5c
Since the systematic genocide between April and June 1994 of hundreds of thousands
of Tutsis in Rwanda, a large influx of Tutsi exiles from neighboring states and the
massive flight of Hutus appear to have boosted the Tutsi share of the population. We
estimate that about 5.3 million people are now living within Rwanda's borders,
approximately 11 percent of whom are Tutsis.
• More than 2 million Rwandans, mostly Hutus, have become refugees in
neighboring states this year. Nearly as many are displaced within Rwanda,
and Rwandan Patriotic Front threats to forcibly close displaced person
camps could drive many of these Hutus into exile as well.
• The slaughter of an estimated 375,000 Tutsis earlier this year has been largely
offset by the return of some 340,000 longtime Tutsi exiles, mainly from
Burundi and Uganda. Most of Rwanda's surviving Tutsis are settling around
Kigali and in the eastern part of thd country, according to| EO 13526 1.4c
press reports. | 3.5c
We expect this pattern to persist for the next year or two. The RPF, which
dominates the new regime in Kigali, is based in the Tutsi diaspora and undoubtedly
views the new demographic balance as tightening its grip on power and as
protective of Tutsi ethnic interests. Top RPF leaders have publicly stated, for
instance, that they could wait "50 years for the Hutu refugees to return.
• Most Hutu refugees appear unwilling to return home as long as the RPF is
in charge.[^_
EO 13526 1.4C
[individual Hutus
fear retribution by Tutsis, and Hutuleaders want to keep refugees in the
camps, where they form the political base for a self-styled Hutu govemmentin-exile. 3.5c
Over the longer run, however, Hutu refugees are likely to return, restoring a
demographic balance similar to that of early 1994. All the neighboring states say
that the refugees are an unacceptable burden and must be repatriated as soon as
possible, according to EO 13526 1.4c pressi reports.
In particular Zaire-'Which is under the heaviest refugee burden and had
close ties to the ousted Hutu regime—may eventually be tempted to support
an anti-RPF insurgency by the Hutus at least partly as a way of inducing
them to return home. Uganda's President Museveni supported the REEs^
insurgency in part to rid his country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. 3.5c
ALA 94-40021
EO 13526 3.5c
EO 13526 3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
i
�EO 13526 3.5c
"Dead are the dogs and the rats, making way for the cows and the
drum."
-Legend of the Tutsis' arrival in Rwanda, referring to symbols
of wealth and sovereignty
A Look at the Key Variables
Overall Trends. Since the ethnic civil war resumed on 6 April 1994, we calculate
from the admittedly incomplete and at times contradictory information available to us
that the population living within Rwanda has dropped to 5.3 million, or by about
30 percent,fromthe 7.7 million inhabitants estimated by the US Census Bureau on
1 April. This drop is the net effect of three main factors:
1
EO 13526 1.4c
Flight by "new" refugees. According to
US Government agencies, some 2.2 million Rwandans have left the country
since April. Nearly all are ethnic Hutus who fled the Tutsi-dominated RPF as
it gained control and formed a new government Although an estimated
75,000 Tutsis left the country in April aind May, relief agencies report that at
least 60,000 of them have since returned.
Deaths. In June, we estimated that 500,000 Rwandans had died in the
fighdng-about three-quarters of them Tutsis killed in a campaign of genocide
orchestrated by_the_s.u.6!S5fluettUtjoustedregime. Based on information
available from! EO 13526 1.4c press reports, we calculate that since June
another 80,000 or so Rwandans have died; most appear to be Hums-victims
of disease in refugee camps and, to a lesser extent, of Tutsis avenging the
deaths of their kin.
2
Return of "old" refugees. Somewhat offsetting the demographic impact of
deaths and refugeeflight,around 60 percent or the 545,000 longtime
Rw.andan_TutsLrefuKeesresidingin neighboring states have repatriated.
EO 13526 1.4c
]200.000 Tutsis have returned from Burundi alone.
EO 13526 1.4c
Ithcre has also been
iIntelligence Report ALA 9440002 (Confidential! 3.5c [of 23 June 1994.Rwanda: Establishing t
Demographic Baseline, evaluated changes in the country's population between 6 April and 1 June
1994, with a particular focus on the Tutsi minority. W estimated (hen that 125,000 Hutus and
e
375,000 Tutsis-about 60 percent of the 628,000 Tutsis believed to have been in Rwanda on
1 April 1994"had been killed and that another 418,000 Rwandans hadfledto neighboring states.
2
3.5c
In areportissued on 28 June 1994, the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission o
n
H m n Rights found on the basis of available evidence that "h t r ' e o i e should henceforth b
u a
t e e m g n cd *
e
used as regards the Tutsi." | 3.5c
This report was prepared by|
3 5c
|Office of African and Latin American Antfyiit, with a contribution
fromj 3.5c
ALA. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, 3,5c
-
L.3.5.C- lALA.1
1
EO 13526 3.5c
�EO 13526 3.5c
large-scale movement from Uganda and smaller flows from Tanzania and
Zaire. These refugeesfledethnic clashes in Rwanda between 1959 and 1964,
as Hutus ousted Tutsis from their traditional dominance; they and ^heii
children form the core of the RPF's leadership and military forces. 3.5c
Likely Effects on Fertility and Mortality Rates
The massive demographic disruptions this year probably have reversed Rwanda's
progress in reducing fertility rates since the early 1980s. The US Bureau of the
Census says there was a declinefrom8.5 children per woman in 1983 to about 6.2
children in 1994, reflecting both increased use of contraception and arisein the
average age of marriage. |
EO 13526 1.4c
[however, the fighting,
genocide, and refugee flight destroyed most of the country's social infrastructurealmost certainly including the family planning network, whose restoration
probably is not a high priority for the new RPFregime.In the Hutu refugee
camps, contraception is almost completely unavailable, and I
EO 13526 1.4c
up to 90 percent of refugee women of childbearing age are pregnant; this
may also reflect_wjdespread prostitution and rape in the camps' unsettled
conditions. [ 3.5c ]
The mortality rate among Rwandan populations probably also has increased,
reflecting poor nutrition, illness, and other stresses associated with the mass
migrations, as well as the destruction of health care facilities. In addition, these
factors probably have boosted the rate of AIDS infection, which, according to the
Census Bureau, accounted for therisein the crude death rate increased from
almost 17 per 1,000 in 1985 to an estimated 20 or more per 1,000 this year.
3.5c
In combination, these demographic changes, according to our calculations, have
increased the proportion of Tutsis in Rwandafromaround 8 percent to 11 percentdespite Hutu extremists' efforts last spring and summer to eliminate the group.
Various sources report that most of the Tutsi returnees and survivors of the massacres
in Rwanda are concentrating in a sort ofJITutsi;and" around Kigali and in the eastern
prefectures of Kibungo and Byumba. [ 3.5c
3
Tbe Ethnic Angle
Rwanda's new demographic balance reflects deliberate policy choices by the RPF
regime's leaders. L
EO 13526 1.4c
[RPF leaders have
encouraged therepatriationof longtime Tutsi refugeesfromneighboring states-the
constituency that has been the hardest core of the RPFs support-because of fear that
Tutsis were spread too thin within Rwanda.
EO 13526 1.4c
the RPF is encouraging Tutsi repatriates to occupy the houses and"
f T.._.
c
j
. .
.i«
j
.
other property _ofr Huturefugees,despitei the government's public _
denunciatione of such
3
Until this year, according to Rwandan Government census data, the heaviest concentration of Tutsis
was in the four southwestern prefectures, where the g o p accounted for about M percent of (he
ru
population. This was the lastregioncaptured b the RPF, and we believe these Tutsli suffered
y
particularly heavy losses. 3.5c
�EO 13526 3.5c
expropriations. The RPF probably views in a similar light the concentrated
resettlement of Tutsis around Kigali and in the east, which bolsters the minority's
ability to protect itself against future genocide attempts. [ 3.5c "
'
The Hutu exodus appears to be a result of both political manipulation by leaders of
the ousted Hutu regime and the security concerns of Hutu individuals and
communities. Hutu government leaders who had orchestrated the massacre of Tutsis
encouraged the massive flight of Hutusfromthe country-some 460,000 to Tanzania
in April and more than 1 million to Zaire in July--in an apparent effort to deny
legitimacy to the RPF, various reports say. Since mid-July, according to a variety of
reporting, harsh crackdowns and Hutu fears of reprisals by RPF troops and Tutsi
vigilantes-as well as possible threatsfromradical Hutu militiamen-have driven at
least 80,000 into Tanzania, as well as smaller numbers who joined the refugees
already in Zaire. | 3.5c
4
UN agencies estimate that another 2 million Hutus are displaced within Rwanda, with
the largest concentration in the southwest, where they fled to a humanitarian safe
zone established during the French military deployment between July and September
1994. Like the refugees, these displaced persons fear RPF reprisals should they
return home, and aid workers report that they appear resigned to remain in internal
exile indefinitely.
EO 13526 1.4c
_ _ jthe RPF has threatened to close down
camps sheltering some 800;000 displaced Hutus in the southwest because it
views the displaced persons camps as safehavens for radical Hutu militiamen.
Although UN pressure has led the RPF to back downfromthis threat for now,
we judge that even the rumor of an RPF move against the camps CQiUd_Djinic
this skittish population into a mass exodus to Zaiire and Burundi. [ 3.5c '
Victims of a Lesser Genocide
Rwanda's smallest ethnic group-the pygmoid Twa, marginalized hunters and
gatherers who made up only about 0.4 percent of the population in April-appears
to have suffered even greater losses in the fighting than the Tutsis and Hutus.
EO 13526 1.4c [speculates that as many as three-quarters of the Twa population
may have been murdered, and press reports indicate that Hutu refugees in Zaire
are preventing their Twa countrymenfromreceiving food aid. This undoubtedly
reflects Hutus" longstanding disdain for the Twa, who served Rwanda's traditional
^utsLQM3lQrcls_asjfourt jesters, spies, and assassins,!
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
�v ^ ^ i
v»;
EO 13526 3.5c
Prospects and Implications
Trends Likely to Continue for Now... The RPF-dominated regime in Kigali has little
incentive to change its ethnically driven policies. Even after the RPF is satisfied that
all willing Rwandan Tutsis have taken advantage of their newrightto return, the
Front is not likely to encourage a large-scale repatriation of Hutus. Kigali says tens
of thousands of Hutus are guilty of war crimes--which, taking into consideration their
families, casts suspicions on hundreds of thousands of the refugees-and many Tutsis
undoubtedly welcome a chance to give Hutus a taste of exile.
• Vice President iCagame-the regime's apparent strongman-has puhlicly-said
/ j his-govenuTient could wait "50 years" to seek justice againstmasskillers and
/ settle the refugee issue; he says there is no need for ha^eufresoTving the
issue becausg^ftheinternational community's willingness to feed the
refugees.
3.5c
In any case, there are signs that many Hutus will remain unwilling to return to their
homes in Rwanda as long as the RPF controls the government Individual Hutus
probably will continue to fear for their security because of widespread reports of RPF
and Tutsi retribution, as evidenced by the fact that only a trickle have left refugee and
displaced persons camps. Hutu leaders probably will persist in fostering these fearscontinuing to use such tactics as physical threats and propaganda-in order to retain a
political base for a self-styled govemment-in-exile.
^radical Hutu militias control the
EO 13526 1.4c
largest camps LrTZaire and"TanzaniI7wfiichthey use for military training and
as bases for raids into Rwanda.
J
Hutu leaders and rank and file hope to eventually return in force to Rwanda to
oust the RPF, butl
EO 13526 1.4c
•military commanders
recognize that their troops will not be able to do so for some time. | 3.5c
...But Are Unsustainable in the Longer Run. Although the international community
is likely to continue providing enough food aid and other necessities to keep the Hutu
refugees alive, we doubt that so many angry, dispossessed people can be kept in
refugee camps indefinitely. Harsh conditions in the camps undoubtedly will lead
some to overcome their fear of the RPF-and their own Hutu leaders-to repatriate
spontaneously. I 3.5c
Moreover, host governments in the region will become increasingly insistent that the
Rwandans repatriate. The refugees represent an enormous strain on the limited
resources anafragileenvironments of all the host states, and their presence has
worsened chronic ethnic conflicts in Zaire and Burundi.
Kinshasa and Dar Es Salaam have both said they want the refugees gone as
soon as possible, according to press EO 13526 i 4c reports.
EO 13526 1.4c
JBurundi's Tutsi military commanders have
identified the Rwandan Hutu refugees there as the greatest security threat to
the coalition government in Bujumbura.
P
�EO 13526 3.5c
The longer this huge refugee population burdens Rwanda's neighbors, the
greater the chance in our view that at least one of them-particularly Zaire,
which has received the largest group and had closetiesto the ousted Hutu
regime-would support an anti-RPF insurgency at least partly as a way to send
the refugees home. Uganda's President Museveni supported the RPF's
insurgency in part toridhis country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. I 3.5c
LTVVI
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�EQJ352SJL5S
ANNEX 1
I
Rwanda: Tne Demographic Score Card, 1 ApriM October 1994
(Thousands)
Tutsi
Total
Hutu
7,657
100.0%
6,998
91.4%
Less:
Deaths
Deaths through 6/94
Refugee deaths since 7/94
RPF revenge killings
585
510
65
10
195
125
60
10
15
10
5
0
Outflows of "New Refugees"
to: Tanzania
Zaire
Burundi
Uganda
2,155
542
1,332
270
11
2,135
537
1,317
270
11
5
0
5
0
0
339
200
100
19
20
0
0
0
0
0
339
200
100
19
20
0
0
0
0
0
5,256
100.0%
4,668
88.8%
577
11.0%
11
0.2%
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
206
45
Population on 1 April 94
Numbers
Percentage
Plus:
Return of "Old" Refugees
from: Burundi
Uganda
Tanzania
Zaire
Population on 1 October 94
Numbers
Percentage
Memorandum Items:
-Internally displaced
•-"Old" Refugees In Other Countries
-Burundi
-Uganda
-Tanzania
-Zaire
EO 13526 3.5c
628
8.2%
100
31
30
Twa
31
0.4%
�ANNEX 2
Changes in Population Inside Rwanda
1 April -1 October 1994
(in Millions)
10
Twa
Hutu
8 -
6
TutBl
-
4 -
2 -
I
1 April 94
EO 13526 3.5c
I
1 Octob«r94
�Rwandan Population Movements, April-October 1994
ZAIRE
Total: 13 million "new" refugees;
30,000 "old" refugees
UGANDA
148,000 new refugees.
Total; 10,5000 "new" refugees;
100,000 "old" refugees
850,000 new refugees.
(94,000 new refugees. |
Total: 542,000 "new"
refugees; 31,000 "old"
]refugees
ZAIRE
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 1 of 1
REB7D63B.FIN
MSMail
DATE-TIME
02 November 94 09:13
FROM
Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION
-CONriDCNTIAL
SUBJECT
Subject: How I spent my day in New York [CONriDENTIAL] •
TO
Emery, Mary C.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON COPY
Atkin, Timothy J.
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
TEXT BODY
FOR BERGER
Readout of meetings with Kofi Annan et al on Tuesday.
1. On Haiti: Kofi can;t get BBG to focus on the Schroeder appointment while
BBG is travelling. He will return around 11 November. Suggest we recommend
to JCS getting Schroeder over here as a TDY advisor to Shali.
They are thinking of a hand over date in early February. USACOM is also
recommending that date to Shali.
They like the idea of an all day conference on the US/UN transition, which
we would host on or about the 14th.
2. On Somlia: They are pleased with the work being done by the three US
planners. The Council should pass the withdrawal resolution this week. They
NEED a decision soon on the US role in the withdrawal.
3. On Rwanda: I'll submit a detailed report to Tony. Bottom line: they
will propose several options to the Council, while we and they together
recruit someone to send a highly capable battalion plus into the Zaire area
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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PERETK
�9202
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
November 16, 19 94
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
^ ^ — ^ ^ ^
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLPM^^I
FROM:
TIMOTHY J. ATKIN
SUBJECT:
B r i e f i n g by Former UNAMIR Commander
Canadian General Romeo D a l l a i r e , Commander o f UNAMIR f o r c e s u n t i l
l a s t month, gave a b r i e f i n g yesterday a t t h e Canadian Embassy.
He discussed p o t e n t i a l UN reforms and t h e f u t u r e o f Rwanda.
Proposed UN Reforms
1. E s t a b l i s h a S e c r e t a r y General's contingency fund f o r r a p i d
f u n d i n g and procurement i n c r i s e s and r e f o r m t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
and l o g i s t i c s system t o be able t o respond t o emergencies.
2. Develop a course t o t r a i n a m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y s e n i o r c r i s i s
management s t a f f ( f o r c e commanders, c h i e f s - o f - s t a f f , e t c ) . He
p r o j e c t s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a need t o i n t e g r a t e peacekeeping and
humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e f u n c t i o n s i n almost a l l f u t u r e UN
missions.
3. E s t a b l i s h a standby, emergency response m i l i t a r y f o r c e (U.S.
should NOT/NOT be a p a r t o f t h i s f o r c e ) w i t h a d e p l o y a b l e HQ
u n i t . He b e l i e v e s t h e superpowers should n o t be a p a r t o f t h i s
f o r c e but t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t would be a f i n a l threat/hammer should
i t be necessary.
4. Improve i n f o r m a t i o n and i n t e l l i g e n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s . He
r e l a y e d he r e c e i v e d v i r t u a l l y none from t h e UN, i n any c a p a c i t y ,
d u r i n g h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n Rwanda.
5. Have an u m b r e l l a h u m a n i t a r i a n agency c o o r d i n a t e NGOs and
military relief capabilities.
He t a l k e d o f t h e CNN f a c t o r i n
Goma l e a d i n g t o a deluge o f NGO a c t i v i t y u l t i m a t e l y becoming a
resource c e n t e r f o r ex-government o f f i c i a l s .
Meanwhile, o t h e r
camps were n e g l e c t e d l e a d i n g t o worse c o n d i t i o n s i n camps i n s i d e
Rv/anda . Some medical m i l i t a r y support e f f o r t s were shunned by
NGOs t o a v o i d a s s o c i a t i o n .
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�6. Develop an i n t e r n a t i o n a l media agency and be p r o a c t i v e i n t h e
propaganda war. He c r e d i t s t h e r a d i o propaganda e f f o r t by t h e
Hutus as t h e s i n g l e l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e r e s u l t i n g
genocide.
These c o u n t r i e s l i v e by t h e r a d i o and t h e message was
never countered. The Hutus c o n t i n u e t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l a l l
communications w i t h t h e i r r a d i o broadcasts.
7. Give and use t h e a u t h o r i t y and c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct
" o f f e n s i v e " o r d e t e r r e n t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . He noted t h i s can
be done under Chapter V I w i t h p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u c t e d r u l e s o f
engagement. Chapter V I I should be reserved f o r a c t i o n a g a i n s t an
aggressor.
As an example o f a d e t e r r e n t a c t i o n , he b e l i e v e s
f o r c i b l y d e s t r o y i n g t h e r a d i o s t a t i o n s p r o p a g a t i n g messages o f
genocide a t t h e b e g i n n i n g would have helped d r a m a t i c a l l y .
[Items 1, 4, 5 and 6 a r e being addressed,
through PDD 25 i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . ]
w i t h some v a r i a t i o n ,
Rwanda's Future
General D a l l a i r e i s s t i l l o p t i m i s t i c a c o a l i t i o n government i s
p o s s i b l e but o n l y AFTER l e a d e r s o f t h e genocide begin t o end up
in j a i l .
He's concerned t h a t , w o r s t case s c e n a r i o , t h e GOR c o u l d shut i t s
borders a t some p o i n t , l o c k i n g o u t refugees who have n o t
r e t u r n e d , and then t h e r e would be a w a i t i n g game t o see when
Hutus attempt t o r e t a k e a l l o r p a r t o f Rwanda.
He argued s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e GOR needs t h e f i n a n c i a l resources t o
f u n c t i o n as a government. P r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , t o o much a i d i s going
o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y , and t h i s i s causing deep resentment.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Q Y
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�9732
jQIiriDDHTIAE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
December 9, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICH^D CLARKE
DONALD STEINBERG " *
V-
FROM:
SUSAN^TCE/TIMOT^J" J.
SUBJECT:
Update on t h e S i t u a t i o n i n Rwanda and B r i e f i n g f o r
Your Meeting w i t h Rwandan Vice P r e s i d e n t and
Defense M i n i s t e r Paul Kagame
ATKIN
SITUATION UPDATE:
Prime M i n i s t e r Twagiramungu v i s i t e d Washington l a s t week f o r
World Bank meetings. He a l s o met w i t h U/S T a r n o f f , A/S Moose,
A/S Bennet, AID A d m i n i s t r a t o r Atwood, and Don S t e i n b e r g . The GOR
has e s t a b l i s h e d a human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n i n t h e J u s t i c e o f
M i n i s t r y and Twagiramungu i n d i c a t e d a p o i n t person would be named
s h o r t l y t o head t h i s d i v i s i o n . Twagiramungu a l s o s a i d t h e GOR
would c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l , g i v e f r e e access
t o UNAMIR and t h e human r i g h t s m o n i t o r s , and g r a n t b r o a d c a s t
a u t h o r i t y t o UNAMIR r a d i o .
I n p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h DAS B u s h n e l l , she s a i d Twagiramungu
t a l k e d o f H u t u / T u t s i t e n s i o n s w i t h i n t h e GOR and t h e need f o r a
more genuine i n c l u s i o n o f Hutus i n d e c i s i o n making and power
sharing.
UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS
Last week t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l extended UNAMIR's mandate Ja*/
t h r o u g h June 9, 1995. The r e s o l u t i o n i n c l u d e d two "new" t a s k s
which, i n f a c t , UNAMIR has been c o n d u c t i n g f o r some months: (1)
p r o v i s i o n o f s e c u r i t y f o r war crimes i n v e s t i g a t o r s and human
r i g h t s m o n i t o r s ; and, (2) a s s i s t a n c e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g and t r a i n i n g
a new, i n t e g r a t e d n a t i o n a l p o l i c e f o r c e .
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a l s o v o t e d p o s i t i v e l y on a P r e s i d e n t i a l
Statement r e q u e s t i n g more i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e S e c r e t a r y General
on r e f u g e e camp s e c u r i t y . The focus o f camp s e c u r i t y would be t o
c r e a t e an environment f r o m which refugees c o u l d r e p a t r i a t e .
CONFIDENTIAL P
D e c l a s s i f y on:
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DECLASSIFIED
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�CQMFIITlffNTIiAIp
GOR
EFFORTS
Kagame t o l d UNHCR t h e RPA w i l l not use c o e r c i o n t o c l o s e IDP
camps as l o n g as t h e UN works toward camp c l o s u r e .
Recent
r e p o r t s suggest t h e GOR i s now working w i t h t h e UN t o c o o r d i n a t e
and encourage t h e c l o s u r e o f these camps.
While t h e RPA has g r a n t e d UNAMIR/UNHRC m o n i t o r s access i n most
areas, t h e r e are s t i l l l o c a l l e v e l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s from t i m e t o
time.
Human R i g h t s Watch notes t h a t w h i l e p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s i n Rwanda
are g r i m , t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t d e t a i n e e s are b e i n g t o r t u r e d
o r abused.
Embassy K i g a l i p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e f i r s t group o f ex-FAR o f f i c e r s
t o have i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g i s scheduled t o be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e RPA t h i s month. There i s a l s o a GOR/UNICEF
i n i t i a t i v e t o d e m o b i l i z e " c h i l d " s o l d i e r s and e n r o l l them i n
schools.
MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME
On Tuesday, December 13, you w i l l meet w i t h Rwandan V i c e
P r e s i d e n t and Defense M i n i s t e r Paul Kagame a t 2:00 p.m. i n your
office.
The Rwandan d e l e g a t i o n , e s c o r t e d by Vince Kern from OSD,
w i l l i n c l u d e Kagame and two a d v i s o r s . Attendees from t h e NSC
w i l l i n c l u d e Nancy Soderberg, Richard C l a r k e , Donald S t e i n b e r g
and Susan Rice. T a l k i n g p o i n t s are summarized a t Tab I and a
t a b l e o f USG support f o r Rwanda i s a t Tab I I .
Your goal during t h i s meeting i s t o obtain a pledge from
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Kagame t o move forward on s e v e r a l f r o n t s while
pledging U.S. support (as i n d i c a t e d i n b r a c k e t s ) :
1. Name a point person t o head human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n of Ministry
of J u s t i c e and allow UNAMIR/UNCHR monitors complete and unimpeded
access i n s i d e Rwanda. [$2.5M t o the World Bank t o c l e a r a r r e a r s ,
which would produce approximately $50M for governance. Continued
support of n u t r i t i o n , water, seed and s h e l t e r programs -- s e v e r a l
million.]
2. Authorize UNAMIR radio t o operate, cooperate with the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Tribunal, e s t a b l i s h more e f f e c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e among
RPF troops and mechanisms for dealing with land d i s p u t e s .
[ P r o v i s i o n of equipment, t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s and r e b u i l d i n g of
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for the M i n i s t r y of J u s t i c e . Approximately $600K.]
3.
P e r s o n a l l y advocate and i n s t i l l t h r o u g h o u t a l l elements o f
t h e government t h e fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f
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�COMriDEHTIAIi
the m i l i t a r y . [ P r o v i s i o n of t e c h n i c a l m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , i . e . a
demining program.]
4. Continue e f f o r t s t o r e i n t e g r a t e moderate Hutus i n t o the
m i l i t a r y and government and work with the UN t o r e l o c a t e ^ - S
i n t e r n a l l y displaced Rwandans. [ P r o v i s i o n of equipment, t e c h n i c a l
s e r v i c e s and r e b u i l d i n g of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for the M i n i s t r y of
A g r i c u l t u r e , Health, Finance, and Plans/Environment.
Approximately $50OK per m i n i s t r y . ]
5. Encourage and respect the r i g h t s of refugees r e p a t r i a t i n g t o
Rwanda. [ P r o v i s i o n of community based support for n u t r i t i o n ,
water, s h e l t e r and community s e r v i c e s -- r e b u i l d i n g of schools
and c l i n i c s w i t h i n communities t o which refugees r e t u r n . Unable
to f i g u r e d o l l a r amount r i g h t now but e a s i l y w i l l be i n t h e
millions.]
VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME'S AGENDA
There i s p o t e n t i a l f o r Kagame t o seek an end t o t h e UN ban on
e x p o r t i n g arms and m i l i t a r y equipment t o Rwanda. He w i l l l i k e l y
argue t h a t c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f t h e ban i n d i c a t e s t h e U.S.
s u p p o r t s t h e Hutus i n Z a i r e .
I F ASKED: Rwanda has s u f f e r e d enough from war and more arms
are c e r t a i n l y not the answer. The proper focus should be on
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with moderates and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of government
services.
W h i l e c u r r e n t law p r o h i b i t s t h e U.S. from p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e t o Rwanda t h i s year, we c o u l d c o n s i d e r f u t u r e a i d
focused on f o s t e r i n g good c i v i l / m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s ( i . e . a
demining program).
Kagame i s l i k e l y t o r e q u e s t a meeting w i t h V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore as
a t e s t o f the p o l i t i c a l waters.
P r e s i d e n t Bizimungu met w i t h you
and d i d n o t meet w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t d u r i n g h i s v i s i t i n October.
I F ASKED: Not p o s s i b l e i n the Vice President's
during a t t h i s time.
schedule
Kagame hopes t o generate p o s i t i v e media coverage o f h i s t r i p ,
e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e GOR i s d i s c o u r a g i n g r e t r i b u t i o n f o r r e c e n t
genocide and Rwanda i s open t o f o r e i g n business.
Attachments
Tab I T a l k i n g P o i n t s
Tab I I U.S. A s s i s t a n c e t o Rwanda Chart
CONFIDENTIAL
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�Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Kagame
December 13, 1994
2:00
p.m.
SHARED GOALS:
•
I had t h e p l e a s u r e o f meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t Bizimungu when he
came t o Washington i n October.
•
I t i s c l e a r from my c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h him t h a t our governments
share t h e same o b j e c t i v e s o f peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r
Rwanda.
•
I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t many c h a l l e n g e s c o n f r o n t us: e n s u r i n g
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e genccide and o t h e r a t r o c i t i e s , c r e a t i n g
a sense of s e c u r i t y i n and around Rwanda, c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s
f a v o r a b l e f o r refugee r e t u r n , e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o l i t i c a l
d i a l o g u e , and a s s u r i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government.
U.S.
ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA:
•
We are committed t o a s s i s t i n g you w i t h each o f
challenges.
these
•
As you know, we have i d e n t i f i e d $2.5M t o pay o f f your
government's World Bank a r r e a r s . Through an i n f o r m a l
" f r i e n d s " group we have o r g a n i z e d , we a r e encouraging and
c o o r d i n a t i n g o t h e r donor's a s s i s t a n c e .
•
I n a d d i t i o n t o a tremendous amount o f work t h r o u g h
m u l t i l a t e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and w i t h o t h e r donors, we are
p l a n n i n g how t o most e x p e d i t i o u s l y implement a b i l a t e r a l
development a s s i s t a n c e package o f $9M.
This package w i l l h e l p
i n t h e r e f u r b i s h i n g o f key m i n i s t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g equipment,
t e c h n i c a l s e r v i c e s and t h e r e b u i l d i n g o f b a s i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .
•
Much of t h e money t h e U.S. has spent INSIDE Rwanda s i n c e t h e
war ( t e n s o f m i l l i o n s ) has gone t o meet b a s i c human needs as
f o o d , water and s h e l t e r , i n a d d i t i o n t o seeds and t o o l s f o r
your people t o s u s t a i n themselves. As more people l e a v e
d i s p l a c e d and refugee camps, our a s s i s t a n c e w i l l s h i f t t o
h e l p i n g them redevelop t h e ^ r communities (community b u i l d i n g s
and s e r v i c e s ) .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�•
Our a s s i s t a n c e people on t h e ground i n Rwanda are w o r k i n g
c l o s e l y w i t h your M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e t o r e - e s t a b l i s h your
domestic j u d i c i a l system.
NEXT STEPS FOR
THE
GOR
•
Our a b i l i t y t o h e l p Rwanda meet i t s c h a l l e n g e s i s l i m i t e d ;
yours i s more i m p o r t a n t and, a c c o r d i n g l y , e x p e c t a t i o n s are
high.
•
I t i s necessary t o c r e a t e a c l i m a t e o f s e c u r i t y and r e s p e c t
f o r t h e r u l e o f law i n s i d e Rwanda. This i n c l u d e s naming a
p o i n t person as t h e head o f t h e human r i g h t s d i v i s i o n i n t h e
M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e , f i n d i n g e f f e c t i v e mechanisms t o r e s o l v e
p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s , and m a i n t a i n i n g d i s c i p l i n e among your
troops.
•
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o i n s t i l l t h r o u g h o u t a l l elements o f t h e
government t h e fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f
the m i l i t a r y .
You are i n a unique p o s i t i o n t o see t h a t t h i s
message i s heard and f o l l o w e d .
•
We welcome c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n between your government and
t h e UN t o develop a coherent p l a n f o r t h e v o l u n t a r y r e t u r n o f
d i s p l a c e d people from i n t e r n a l camps. F o r c i b l e c l o s u r e of t h e
camps and t h e a s s o c i a t e d v i o l e n c e n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t s
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n e f f o r t s and s u p p o r t from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community. P a r t of communicating these e f f o r t s c o u l d be t h e
use o f UNAMIR r a d i o ; you need t o a u t h o r i z e i t s broadcasts and
i d e n t i f y a frequency immediately.
•
The unimpeded access of UNAMIR and human r i g h t s m o n i t o r s i s
v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n process and t h e
c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community as w e l l .
AREAS OF COOPERATION:
•
As we work t o g e t h e r on t h e c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g your government
we must a l s o d e a l w i t h t h e v e r y r e a l problem of c o n t i n u i n g
v i o l e n c e and i n t i m i d a t i o n i n t h e r e f u g e e camps o u t s i d e Rwanda.
•
We agree some a c t i o n must be t a k e n and are d i s c u s s i n g t h e
i s s u e a t l e n g t h w i t h t h e UN and t h e Rwanda o p e r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t
group. We hope t o have a UN s t r a t e g y soon, one t h a t s u p p o r t s
repatriation.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�We urge continued cooperation w i t h your neighbors and strong
support f o r convening a r e g i o n a l refugee conference t o address
camp s e c u r i t y and other issues.
We are also committed t o ensuring t h a t those responsible f o r
the genocide are brought t o j u s t i c e and welcome your
government's cooperation w i t h the I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r i b u n a l . We
have committed $1M t o help speed up the t r i b u n a l e f f o r t s and
w i l l have 18 USG experts on the ground i n Rwanda very soon.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�OOMFIDBHTIMy
Action Items
APNSA T r i p To Rwanda Dec 94
1. Ensure prompt d e l i v e r y o f $2.5M t o c l e a r World Bank a r r e a r s
and urge r a p i d o b l i g a t i o n o f $50M i n World Bank r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
funds;
2. O b l i g a t e funds t o s u p p o r t Rwandan Government, i n c l u d i n g
f o r N a t i o n a l Assembly, water supply, e l e c t r i c i t y , demining
education;
help
3. Continue t o urge r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n between
Government and moderate ex-government m i n i s t e r s (who have
standing w i t h refugees);
4. Continue U.S. s u p p o r t f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes T r i b u n a l ,
urge appointment o f o t h e r j u s t i c e s ;
5.
Ensure deployment o f 14 7 UN Human R i g h t s M o n i t o r s ;
6. Continue c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f o p t i o n s f o r i m p r o v i n g s e c u r i t y i n
refugee camps, i n c l u d i n g w o r k i n g more c l o s e l y w i t h Z a i r e and
Tanzania, and p o s s i b l y p r o v i d e f o r e i g n t r a i n e r s f o r l o c a l
gendarmerie; e x p l o r e approach t o Z a i r e w i t h , t h r o u g h o r supported
by I s r a e l i s ;
7. Encourage UN and Rwandan government e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e f o r
s e c u r i t y f o r d i s p l a c e d persons r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r v i l l a g e s ;
8. Continue t o ensure human r i g h t s observers
country-wide,•
have f r e e access
9. F i n d more ways t o p u b l i c i z e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o g r e s s , i n camps
and i n Washington;. UNAMIR r a d i o ;
10.
Continue t o press government t o p r o v i d e f o r s a f e r e t u r n and
p r o t e c t r i g h t s o f refugees;
11.
S t a t u s o f Mr. Gacombitsi.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
cotTFiDBNTiAL1 TNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�C NI E T L
O F NI D A
CONFIDENTIAL
0583
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 29,
1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLARKg/Aiy
^
STEINBERG ' > r — ^
FROM:
TIMOTHY J. A T K I N / S U S A N RICE
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
UN Report on Camp S e c u r i t y
The S e c r e t a r y General r e l e a s e d h i s Second Report on S e c u r i t y i n
the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
Mrs. Ogata, t h e S e c r e t a r y General decided t h e q u i c k e s t way t o
improve camp s e c u r i t y would be f o r UNHCR t o make a p p r o p r i a t e
arrangements w i t h Z a i r e .
The r e p o r t notes i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been host c o u n t r y
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o provide s e c u r i t y f o r refugees.
On January 27,
UNHCR and Z a i r i a n government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i g n e d a s e c u r i t y
agreement. The agreement covers f i v e months w i t h t h e o p t i o n f o r
t h r e e month renewals u n t i l December 1995. UNHCR w i l l pay
s o l d i e r s a s a l a r y complement and p r o v i d e u n i f o r m s and equipment
at an e s t i m a t e d c o s t o f $13M ( r a i s e d by v o l u n t a r y d o n a t i o n ) .
UNHCR w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h a l i a i s o n group t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g and
l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t . The p a c t c a l l s f o r 1500 Z a i r i a n t r o o p s t o :
•
m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r i n t h e camps;
•
p r e v e n t i n t i m i d a t i o n o f refugees who wish t o r e t u r n home and
e s c o r t r e t u r n i n g refugees as f a r as t h e Rwandan b o r d e r ; and,
•
p r o t e c t h u m a n i t a r i a n agency i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l .
UNHCR i s r e l y i n g on USG b a c k i n g f o r and f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t o f t h i s
p r o p o s a l . I t would be h e l p f u l , a t an Ad Hoc l e v e l , t o e s t a b l i s h
t h e l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e .
The S e c r e t a r y General r u l e d o u t peacekeeping, c o n t r a c t e d t r a i n i n g
and m o n i t o r s , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e m o n i t o r s / m i l i t a r y
o b s e r v e r s because o f a l a c k o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s and/or '
costs.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y PERRO13526
HTCP
C ON FI DENXmL
D e c l a s s i f y on: OADR
�COMF1DENTIAL
mmm
Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n and the Volcanoes
The l i k e l i h o o d o f a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n near Goma p r o v i d e s an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o press r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n .
The p r e s e n t l e v e l o f
a c t i v i t y seen i n one volcano has been experienced f i v e t i m e s i n
the l a s t 10 y e a r s ; t h e volcano has e r u p t e d each t i m e .
Our new Rwanda c o o r d i n a t o r , Ambassador Townsend Freidman, met
l a s t week w i t h Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, a c u t e l y aware o f t h e p o t e n t i a l
danger, has stepped up m o n i t o r i n g o f the volcanoes' a c t i v i t i e s
and i s d r a w i n g up e v a c u a t i o n c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s . A t the' same
t i m e , UNHCR i s e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moving t h e camps 30
m i l e s n o r t h i n Z a i r e . Friedman urged UNHCR t o use t h e v o l c a n o
t h r e a t t o encourage r e p a t r i a t i o n . While he found some
r e c e p t i v i t y among m i d - l e v e l UNHCR o f f i c i a l s , t h e r e seems t o be
l i t t l e enthusiasm a t h i g h l e v e l s f o r induced r e p a t r i a t i o n .
We c o n t i n u e t o s t r e s s t o Friedman the importance o f r e p a t r i a t i o n
as opposed t o camp r e l o c a t i o n . He and o t h e r s i n S t a t e are
focused on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l
be c u l p a b l e i f the volcano e r u p t s and masses o f Rwandans and
r e l i e f workers are k i l l e d .
Thus, S t a t e i s more concerned w i t h
moving t h e refugees away from Goma i n g e n e r a l r a t h e r t h a n back
i n t o Rwanda i n p a r t i c u l a r .
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an o p t i o n s paper f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y t h e Ad
Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a s t r o n g push on t h i s one. I f
you approve an Ad Hoc Meeting, we w i l l add t h i s t o t h e agenda.
UNAMIR
The E t h i o p i a n s have i n d i c a t e d t h e y may p u l l t h e i r b a t t a l i o n out
of UNAMIR. They are f r u s t r a t e d w i t h the absence o f v i s i o n and
d i r e c t i o n f o r UNAMIR (measured i n p a r t by a l a c k o f r e f u g e e s
r e t u r n i n g ) , and w i t h slow payment by the UN. We have p r e s s e d the
UN and t h e U/SYG Annan has p e r s o n a l l y overseen payment t o t h e
E t h i o p i a n s . We and the UN are s t r e s s i n g t o the E t h i o p i a n s t h e
importance o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s t r o n g l y u r g i n g t r o o p
r o t a t i o n i n mid-February r a t h e r than w i t h d r a w a l .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes Tribunal
J u s t i c e Goldstone has a f o u r member team i n K i g a l i t o f i n a l i z e
arrangements.
We a n t i c i p a t e the permanent seat t o be up and
r u n n i n g around the end o f February i n Arusha w i t h a s m a l l
contingent i n K i g a l i .
The USG has a l r e a d y o r d e r e d computer
equipment f o r the t r i b u n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s .
»,iD»,TiA£LINT0N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
c
o
r
E
�^NFTHTMTIYJ
To h e l p o f f s e t USG agency resource demands o f t h e Rwandan
t r i b u n a l , S t a t e has been p r e s s i n g t h e UN t o reimburse t h e U.S.
f o r some Yugoslav t r i b u n a l d e t a i l e e s and b e l i e v e s we are c l o s e t o
s e c u r i n g t h a t commitment. A t t h i s p o i n t DOJ and FBI have
r e s i s t e d p r o v i d i n g any i n v e s t i g a t o r s f o r t h e Rwandan T r i b u n a l .
I f t h e t r i b u n a l i s t o b e g i n o p e r a t i n g n e x t month we need t o
i d e n t i f y i n v e s t i g a t o r s q u i c k l y . I t would be p r o b l e m a t i c i f t h e
USG were seen as l e s s committed t o i n v e s t i g a t i n g a t r o c i t i e s i n an
A f r i c a n c o u n t r y than i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a .
State believes a
c a l l by you t o A t t o r n e y General Reno i s necessary t o achieve
DOJ/FBI s u p p o r t .
Proposed t a l k i n g p o i n t s a r e a t Tab I .
AID
Efforts
AID i n d i c a t e s t h e K i g a l i m i s s i o n w i l l be o p e r a t i n g t h i s week and
s h o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s . AID has been r e l u c t a n t t o
t a c k l e t h e most c r i t i c a l need i n Rwanda's j u s t i c e system:
•
f u n d i n g f o r e i g n j u r i s t s t o a d j u d i c a t e c r i m i n a l cases; and,
•
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e N a t i o n a l Commission charged w i t h
making a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s
of d e t a i n i n g t h e 10,000+ c r i m i n a l s i n overcrowded p r i s o n s .
AID b e l i e v e s U.S. a s s i s t a n c e i n r e s o l v i n g c r i m i n a l cases i s
p r o b l e m a t i c and c o u l d be a l o s e - l o s e p r o p o s i t i o n . I f t h e
c r i t e r i a f o r r e l e a s e a r e i n t e r p r e t e d t o o s t r i n g e n t l y we c o u l d be
blamed f o r s t a l l i n g r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and i f those r e l e a s e d a r e
p u b l i c i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e c r i m i n a l s we c o u l d be blamed f o r
w a t e r i n g down t h e j u s t i c e system.
Furthermore, AID b e l i e v e s t h e r e may be a l e g i s l a t i v e p r o h i b i t i o n
on h e l p i n g t h e N a t i o n a l Commission ( i f i t ' s deemed as law
enforcement a s s i s t a n c e ) . I f so, we c o u l d use a l e g i s l a t i v e
e x c e p t i o n o r p r e s i d e n t i a l waiver t o p r o v i d e t h e a s s i s t a n c e .
The d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f USG support f o r these
elements o f Rwanda's j u d i c i a l program i s r e p o r t e d l y w i t h B r i a n
Atwood and may need t o be d i s c u s s e d a t an Ad Hoc meeting.
M i l i t a r y Equipment and T r a i n i n g
S t a t e and DOD i n d i c a t e d t h e y a r e moving f o r w a r d on p r o v i d i n g some
i n i t i a l IMET t r a i n i n g i n FY95.
DOD has proposed r e d r a f t i n g t h e UNSC arms embargo t o a u t h o r i z e
t h e p r o v i s i o n o f n o n - l e t h a l support f o r t h e Rwandan m i l i t a r y
(communications and l o g i s t i c s equipment).
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an
i s s u e s paper. This w i l l need t o be r e s o l v e d a t t h e Ad Hoc l e v e l .
-eONriDENTTAy
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�• GOUrIDENTIAL
4
I n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e s around a dozen APCs m i s s i n g from Z a i r i a n
c o n t a i n m e n t areas a r e l i k e l y i n ex-FAR c o n t r o l .
S t a t e has moved
s l o w l y t o have t h e UN press Z a i r e t o c o n t r o l t h e v e h i c l e s , r e t u r n
them t o Rwanda o r d e s t r o y them ( w i t h GOR a p p r o v a l ) . S t a t e i s
d e v e l o p i n g a r e v i e w o f t h e o p t i o n s and t h e impact o f t h e arms
embargo and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
The DATT i n K i g a l i i s scheduled t o d e p a r t n e x t month and no
replacement i s i d e n t i f i e d o r a n t i c i p a t e d . We must have a DATT i n
Kigali.
OSD i s w o r k i n g c l o s e l y w i t h DIA b u t may r e q u i r e h i g h
l e v e l a t t e n t i o n t o break the b u r e a u c r a t i c r o a d b l o c k s .
Next Steps
The l a s t Ad Hoc m e e t i n g was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc m e e t i n g
t h i s week would h e l p r e j u v e n a t e t h e i n t e r a g e n c y process and
c l a r i f y d i r e c t i o n on USG a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e Z a i r i a n s e c u r i t y
f o r c e , r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n , c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system s u p p o r t and
arms embargo s t a t u s . A U.S. d e l e g a t i o n d e p a r t s February 10th f o r
the r e g i o n a l r e f u g e e conference i n Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
That you c o n t a c t t h e A t t o r n e y General and encourage
the War Crimes T r i b u n a l .
Approve
support f o r
Disapprove
That you agree t o an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s Thursday o r F r i d a y w i t h
the agenda a t Tab I I .
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r C a l l t o A t t o r n e y General
Tab I I Agenda f o r Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
co)iriDEiiTtRi£LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Pminnnrmr
�-i—Lui
TTUTTl
my.
Proposed Agenda
Ad Hoc M e e t i n g on Rwanda
I.
S i t u a t i o n Update
II.
Camp S e c u r i t y
- l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e
I I I . Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n
- volcano contingency plans
- camp r e l o c a t i o n v s . r e p a t r i a t i o n
IV. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f J u s t i c e
- s t a t u s o f equipment, m i n i s t r y rehab
- c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e issues
V.
M i l i t a r y Weapons/Training
- IMET s t a t u s
- Arms embargo changes
- Z a i r i a n c o n t r o l l e d APCs
V I . Conclusions
CIA
State
State
AID
State/DOD
NSC
P R a1 3 5 2 6
EE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY -
�0583REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
January 3 1 , 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
RICHARD
DON STEINBERG/jfT
FROM:
TIMOTHY J.^TKIN/SUSAN^^etf
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
UN Report on Camp S e c u r i t y
The S e c r e t a r y General r e l e a s e d h i s Second Report on S e c u r i t y i n
the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
Mrs. Ogata, t h e S e c r e t a r y General decided t h e q u i c k e s t way t o
..^-araprove camp s e c u r i t y would be f o r UNHCR t o make a p p r o p r i a t e
rearrangements w i t h Z a i r e .
The r e p o r t notes i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been host c o u n t r y
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o provide s e c u r i t y f o r refugees.
On January 27,
UNHCR and Z a i r i a n government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i g n e d a s e c u r i t y
agreement. The agreement covers f i v e months w i t h t h e o p t i o n f o r
t h r e e month renewals u n t i l December 1995.
UNHCR w i l l pay
s o l d i e r s a s a l a r y complement and p r o v i d e u n i f o r m s and equipment
at an e s t i m a t e d c o s t o f $13M ( r a i s e d by v o l u n t a r y d o n a t i o n ) .
UNHCR w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h a l i a i s o n group t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g and
l o g i s t i c a l support.
The pact c a l l s f o r 1500 Z a i r i a n t r o o p s t o :
•
m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r i n t h e camps;
•
p r e v e n t i n t i m i d a t i o n o f refugees who wish t o r e t u r n home and
e s c o r t r e t u r n i n g refugees as f a r as t h e Rwandan b o r d e r ; and,
•
p r o t e c t h u m a n i t a r i a n agency i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l .
UNHCR i s r e l y i n g on USG backing f o r and f i n a n c i a l support o f t h i s
p r o p o s a l . I t would be h e l p f u l , a t an Ad Hoc l e v e l , t o e s t a b l i s h
t h e l e v e l o f USG a s s i s t a n c e .
The S e c r e t a r y General r u l e d o u t peacekeeping, c o n t r a c t e d t r a i n i n g
and m o n i t o r s , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e m o n i t o r s / m i l i t a r y
o b s e r v e r s because o f a l a c k o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s and/or
costs.
D
•^^uCLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY S ' n n™
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
P K K K-U. U 5 « .
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Operation Retour
As o f January 26, over 22,000 i n t e r n a l l y d i s p l a c e d persons (IDPs)
have r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r home communes v i a t r a n s p o r t and u n o f f i c i a l
r e p o r t s e s t i m a t e another 20,000 have r e t u r n e d on f o o t .
Open
R e l i e f Centers (ORCs) are s e t up i n t h e communes t o p r o v i d e
temporary a s s i s t a n c e and, i n t h e case o f l a n d t e n u r e d i s p u t e s ,
s h e l t e r . Most ORCs are r e c e i v i n g l i t t l e use as people r e t u r n
home d i r e c t l y and t h e m a j o r i t y o f l a n d t e n u r e cases a r e b e i n g
r e s o l v e d i n a few days.
Refugee R e p a t r i a t i o n
and the Volcanoes
The l i k e l i h o o d o f a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n near Goma i n February o r
March p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o press refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n . The
p r e s e n t l e v e l o f a c t i v i t y seen i n one volcano has been
e x p e r i e n c e d f i v e times i n t h e l a s t 10 years; t h e volcano has
e r u p t e d each t i m e .
Our new Rwanda c o o r d i n a t o r , Ambassador Townsend Fr/^dman, met
l a s t week w i t h Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, a c u t e l y aware o f t h e p o t e n t i a l
danger, has stepped up m o n i t o r i n g o f t h e volcanoes' a c t i v i t i e s
and i s d r a w i n g up e v a c u a t i o n contingency p l a n s . A t t h e same
t i m e , UNHCR i s e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moving t h e camps 30
m i l e s n o r t h i n Z a i r e . Friedman urged UNHCR t o use t h e v o l c a n o
t h r e a t t o encourage r e p a t r i a t i o n . While he found some
r e c e p t i v i t y among m i d - l e v e l UNHCR o f f i c i a l s , t h e r e seems t o be
l i t t l e enthusiasm a t h i g h l e v e l s f o r induced r e p a t r i a t i o n .
We c o n t i n u e t o s t r e s s t o Friedman t h e importance o f r e p a t r i a t i o n
as opposed t o camp r e l o c a t i o n . He and o t h e r s i n S t a t e a r e
focused on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l
be c u l p a b l e i f t h e volcano e r u p t s and masses o f Rwandans and
r e l i e f workers a r e k i l l e d .
Thus, S t a t e i s more concerned w i t h
moving t h e r e f u g e e s away from Goma i n g e n e r a l r a t h e r than back
i n t o Rwanda i n p a r t i c u l a r .
S t a t e w i l l f i n i s h an o p t i o n s paper by noon Thursday f o r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a
s t r o n g push on t h i s one.
UNAMIR
The E t h i o p i a n s i n d i c a t e d they may p u l l t h e i r b a t t a l i o n o u t o f
UNAMIR. They a r e f r u s t r a t e d w i t h t h e absence o f v i s i o n and
d i r e c t i o n f o r UNAMIR (measured i n p a r t by a l a c k o f refugees
r e t u r n i n g ) , and w i t h slow payment by t h e UN. We have pressed t h e
UN and t h e U/SYG Annan has p e r s o n a l l y overseen payment t o t h e
Ethiopians.
We and t h e UN are s t r e s s i n g t o t h e E t h i o p i a n s t h e
-coHriDmTiMfi TNTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMF1DENTIAL
importance o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s t r o n g l y u r g i n g t r o o p
r o t a t i o n i n mid-February r a t h e r than w i t h d r a w a l .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l War Crimes
Tribunal
J u s t i c e Goldstone has a f o u r member team i n K i g a l i t o f i n a l i z e
arrangements. We a n t i c i p a t e t h e permanent seat t o be up and
r u n n i n g around t h e end o f February i n Arusha w i t h a s m a l l
contingent i n K i g a l i .
The USG has a l r e a d y o r d e r e d computer
equipment f o r t h e t r i b u n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s .
While DOJ and FBI have n o t y e t p r o v i d e d any i n v e s t i g a t o r s f o r t h e
Rwandan T r i b u n a l , w h i l e t a l k i n g w i t h Nancy, Jamie G o r e l i c k
assured us DOJ i s s u p p o r t i v e . To address DOJ concerns and h e l p
o f f s e t USG agency resource demands o f t h e Rwandan t r i b u n a l , S t a t e
has been p r e s s i n g t h e UN t o reimburse t h e U.S. f o r some Yugoslav
t r i b u n a l d e t a i l e e s and b e l i e v e s we are c l o s e t o s e c u r i n g t h a t
commitment. A t DOJ's request i n November, we ensured t h a t
s e c u r i t y f o r i n v e s t i g a t o r s was added i n UNAMIR's mandate.
AID
Efforts
AID i n d i c a t e s t h e K i g a l i m i s s i o n w i l l be o p e r a t i n g t h i s week and
s h o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s . AID has been r e l u c t a n t t o
t a c k l e t h e most c r i t i c a l need i n Rwanda's j u s t i c e system:
•
f u n d i n g f o r e i g n j u r i s t s t o a d j u d i c a t e c r i m i n a l cases; and,
•
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e N a t i o n a l Commission charged w i t h
making a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s
of d e t a i n i n g t h e 10,000+ c r i m i n a l s i n overcrowded p r i s o n s .
AID b e l i e v e s U.S. a s s i s t a n c e i n r e s o l v i n g c r i m i n a l cases i s
p r o b l e m a t i c and c o u l d be a l o s e - l o s e p r o p o s i t i o n . I f t h e
c r i t e r i a f o r r e l e a s e are i n t e r p r e t e d t o o s t r i n g e n t l y we c o u l d be
blamed f o r s t a l l i n g r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and i f those r e l e a s e d a r e
p u b l i c i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e c r i m i n a l s we c o u l d be blamed f o r
w a t e r i n g down t h e j u s t i c e system.
Furthermore, AID b e l i e v e s t h e r e may be a l e g i s l a t i v e p r o h i b i t i o n
on h e l p i n g t h e N a t i o n a l Commission ( i f i t ' s deemed law
enforcement a s s i s t a n c e ) . I f so, we c o u l d use a l e g i s l a t i v e
e x c e p t i o n o r p r e s i d e n t i a l waiver t o p r o v i d e t h e a s s i s t a n c e .
The d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f USG support f o r these
elements o f Rwanda's j u d i c i a l program i s r e p o r t e d l y w i t h B r i a n
Atwood and may need t o be discussed a t an Ad Hoc meeting.
GOMriDc»TiAiri TNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMFIDEHTIMT
M i l i t a r y Equipment and T r a i n i n g
S t a t e and OSD a r e r e s e a r c h i n g i f amended l e g i s l a t i o n f o r IMET
t r a i n i n g w i l l g e t t h r o u g h Congress o r whether a P r e s i d e n t i a l
w a i v e r may be r e q u i r e d .
OSD has proposed r e d r a f t i n g the UNSC arms embargo t o a u t h o r i z e
the p r o v i s i o n o f n o n - l e t h a l support f o r the Rwandan m i l i t a r y
(communications and l o g i s t i c s equipment).
S t a t e i s d r a f t i n g an
i s s u e s paper. This w i l l need t o be r e s o l v e d a t the Ad Hoc l e v e l .
I n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e s around a dozen APCs m i s s i n g from Z a i r i a n
containment areas a r e l i k e l y i n ex-FAR c o n t r o l . S t a t e has moved
s l o w l y t o have the UN press Z a i r e t o c o n t r o l the v e h i c l e s , r e t u r n
them t o Rwanda o r d e s t r o y them ( w i t h GOR a p p r o v a l ) . S t a t e i s
d e v e l o p i n g a r e v i e w o f the o p t i o n s and the impact o f t h e arms
embargo and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
The DATT i n K i g a l i i s scheduled t o depart next month and no
replacement i s i d e n t i f i e d o r a n t i c i p a t e d . Walt Slocombe and t h e
DIA A d m i n i s t r a t o r hope t o r e s o l v e t h i s i s s u e Wednesday.
Next Steps
The l a s t Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc m e e t i n g
t h i s week would h e l p r e j u v e n a t e t h e i n t e r a g e n c y process and
c l a r i f y USG d i r e c t i o n r e g a r d i n g a s s i s t a n c e f o r the Z a i r i a n
s e c u r i t y f o r c e , refugee r e p a t r i a t i o n , c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system
s u p p o r t and t h e arms embargo.
A U.S. d e l e g a t i o n d e p a r t s February 10th f o r the r e g i o n a l r e f u g e e
conference i n Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
That you agree t o an Ad Hoc Meeting t h i s F r i d a y w i t h the agenda
at Tab I .
Approve
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Tab I Agenda f o r Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
^CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
CONFIDEMTIA,
�Secret
EQ 13526 3.5c
DCI
I
National Intelligence Council
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
Rwanda-Burundi: Still on the
Brink
3.5c
Summary
More widespread violence between Hutus and the Tutsi minority could
engulf Rwanda and Burundi at any time in the next year. Growing miliancy among Hutus in Zairian and Tanzanian refugee camps poses a security threat to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), relief
workers, and the host countries. Most Hutu refugees are unlikely to return
to Rwanda because they believe that the RPF is killing returnees. The Tutsis view the military as their only protection from another round of Hutuled genocide and will probably continue to use tough security measures
that risk widening the humanitarian crisis and conflict.f 3.5c
In Burundi, hundreds have died in ethnic clashes in the past few months,
while maneuvers by the Hutu ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition
strain a UN-brokered power-sharing accord. Several incendiary issues
could spark a coup or ignite an ethnic conflagration. 3.5c
International mediators have had some effect in moderating conflict, but
Hutus
Hutu and Tutsis alike still believe that they are in a zero-sum game of ethsurvival. Policing the Rwandan refugee camps and negotiating a Hutusettlement enjoy the broadest support from the international commuity, but many Hutus and Tutsis find even these solutions contentious. No
option can succeed if strongly opposed by either the RPF or Hutu leaders.
3.5c
1
gL'j^L-t-'. ...
Secret
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SE 9S-5
January 1995
Cp
oy
OOB
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Rwandan Refugees and Displaced Persons, Late 1994
210,000 Number of refugees
^
Refugee camp
Refugee concentration
HH
Displaced Rwandan Tutsis
The approximately
2 million
internally
displaced Rwandan Hutus are
distributed
throughout
the country.
r-j^q:
rota/-ri-
Bukavu
Cyangugu
/n Bukavu area:_
357,000
Zaire
/n L/v/'ra area:
48,000
^
-
,Lake ••
Tanganyika
'Rwandan Hutu refugees amveO since April 1994.
. Numbera are based on Unried Nations High Commission (or
Refugaes (UNHCR) Infonratton. Country totals may include
refugees tn camps off the map and refugees not in camps.
734J91 lR013::>1-95
EO 13526 3.5c
Secret
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Rwanda: Hutus and the RPF
Digging In Deeper
Hutus Going Nowhere for Now. Most of the
estimated 2 million Hutu refugees in Zaire and
Tanzania are not likely to return to Rwanda
soon, unless compelled to leave the camps by
force or because of major food shortages. At
the same time, they are prevented by force from
moving farther into their host countries. Most
refugees appear to remain loyal to the ousted
Hutu government, which orchestrated the genocide of at least 500,000 Tutsis and moderate
Hutus. This de facto government-in-exile controls the refugee camps and the distribution of
most relief aid and has convinced most Hutus
that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) will kill
them if they return home. 3.5c
Growing Hutu militancy in the camps is a
threat to aid workers and host countries. Some
35,000 Hutu soldiers from the defeated
regime's army and 20,000 militiamen operate
in or near the refugee camps and occasionally
skirmish with Zairian and Tanzanian security
forces. Some conduct cross-border raids, in
hope of provoking an anti-RPF uprising in
Rwanda. The militias also use the displaced
person (DP) camps in Rwanda as bases for
attacks on the RPF and sympathizers. 3.5c
RPF Hanging Tough. The RPF is more concerned about security and seeking justice
against Hutu mass murderers than bringing
Hutu refugees home. RPF troops and Tutsi
civilians have committed some revenge killings
against Hutu civilians accused of murdering
Tutsis, and the regime has jailed some 20,000
suspected participants in the genocide. 3.5c
n
2 million Hutus inside Rwanda. This could trigger a new mass exodus of refunees. Kigali is
also threatening to strike against the Hutu
camps in eastern Zaire if Zairian and international authorities fail to halt Hutu military
operations there. 3.5c
Burundi: Another Flashpoint
Deep-seated differences between the Hutu
ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition are
increasing the likelihood of a major ethnic
flareup in Burundi, as both test a UN-brokered
power-sharing agreement. More than 350
Burundians have died in ethnic clashes since
October 1994, with the incidents spreading into
Bujumbura from the northern border region.
Tutsi extremists are plotting to murder dozens
more prominent moderate Hutus, and Hutu radicals have targeted President Ntibantunganya—
a Hutu—and other government leaders they
consider traitors. I 3.5c
Powersharing Falters. Despite a power-sharing agreement awarding them virtual veto
power, the Tutsi-led army and opposition hardliners have mounted coup attempts and legal
challenges against the government. Meanwhile,
radical Hutus have demanded an immediate
transfer of all power to the majority. In December, political maneuvering threatened to splinter the multiparty government. Tutsi pressure
forced a Hutu activist to step down as National
Assembly Speaker. The President described
this as an assault on the Hutus' hold on power
and feared that Tutsi hardliners would launch a
civil disorder campaign.f^sc
The RPF has no qualms about deploying its
50,000 troops to quash potential threats. It is
^hutting down the DP camps, which shelter
Secret
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Secret
Scope Note
This Special Estimate assesses the continuing political crisis in Rwanda and
Burundi and the.regional impact. It . ...
assumes that, oyer the next year; the inter-;,
national community will continue to
donate current levels of relief aid but will
not provide the enormous additional mill-.:
tary and economic resources necessary to
stabilize the ethnic conflict or to induce
the refugees to return home. It also '
assumes! that despite 'populationmove.r^jr
ments within and between the affected
countries, local parties are not ready to
consider permanent ethnic partition as a
long-term solution. It does not examine ;
the.ihternationai^coinmunity's response toT
a worsening humanitarian crisis.in the . •
event of widespread violence in Burundi.;
Some agencies believe that recent patterns
of ethnic segregation—especially in
Burundi—will at least dampen any new
outbreak of violence. 3.5c
:
Rwandan refugees. Burundi's Tutsi military
leaders claim that the 200,000 Rwandan Hutu
refugees camped in Burundi who arrived last
year are their country's greatest security
threat. A possible influx of up to 300,000
more—responding to the RPF's threats to
close DP camps in southwestern Rwanda—
would heighten the Tutsi fears. The military
and Tutsi vigilantes are already raiding refugee camps and Burundian Hutu settlements.
Military integration. Ntibantunganya has
publicly stated that the military—now at least
three-fourths Tutsi—must mirror Burundi's
population mix—about 85-percent Hutu. Tutsis, however, view the security forces as their
guarantor of survival and will veto any program to change their ethnic composition. A
program to redress the military's ethnic
imbalance was the proximate cause of the
October 1993 coup attempt.
:
Outstanding Tensions. Even if the current
political crisis cools off, other incendiary issues
remain:
• Coup investigation. A UN proposal to
release its report on the October 1993 coup
attempt—which led to the murder of elected
Hutu President Ndadaye and massive bloodletting—would likely exacerbate tensions if
accepted. This report probably echoes the
conclusion of human rights groups that senior
Tutsi officers and opposition political leaders
instigated the failed coup. If implicated by
the report, these officials may launch another
coup to safeguard their interests.
Secret
Hutu insurrection. The Tutsis' continued
reliance on brute force to suppress Hutus is
strengthening the appeal of Hutu radicals
calling for a violent uprising. Several thousand Hutu militants—some with light infantry weapons—have established contacts with
Rwandan Hutufightersbased in Zaire and are
most active in northwestern Burundi. A Hutu
revolt would spark a brutal response from the
Tutsi-controlled army.[ 3.5c
Regional Impact and Response
Although countries in the region want a quick
resolution to the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi,
none has much leverage or influence over the
warring factions. Zaire and Tanzania are reeling from the massive refugeeflows.In remote
�Secret
EO 13526 1.4c
border regions of both countries, militant refugee communities challenge and at times supplant the national government. Refugee
violence frequently spills into local villages—
particularly in Zaire, where refugees are backing ethnic Hutu Zairians infightingwith the
Bahunde ethnic group. The refugee influx has
ruined forests and topsoil and depleted water
supplies. Meanwhile, prices of essential goods
in the affected areas have skyrocketed with the
presence of the refugees, relief agencies, and
foreign workers.| 3.5c
Officials in Zaire are weighing the benefits of
increased aidflowsand their desire to enhance
their international image against the cost of refugee induced instability. President Mobutu has
strong links to the former Hutu regime and has
on occasion supported Hutu refugee leaders.
Nonetheless, Zaire's security forces—which
have a limited ability to maintain order in the
refugee affected areas—have recently attacked
several refugee camps. Tanzania has essentially
remained neutral throughout the crisis. Uganda
is probably continuing military and political
support to the RPF—many of whose leaders
helped President Museveni fight his way to
power. 3.5c
Limited Opportunity for Outside Influence
Proposals from regional and Western governments, international organizations, and voluntary agencies to defuse the regional crisis by
deploying a force to police the camps face
intense resistance from Hutus and Tutsis, who
have little confidence in international security
measures:
• UNAMIR peacekeepers in Rwanda did not
halt the slaughter of Tutsis last spring. Their
deployment after the RPF's victory has not
convinced Hutu refugees and DPs that they
can safely return home.
Secret
�Scci-ct
Hutu leaders feel threatened by the UN international crimes tribunal and probably view
UN peacekeepers' deployment alongside
RPF troops in recent security sweeps of DP
camps as proof of a UN bias.
A proposal to send an international police
force to maintain security in the Zairian and
Tanzanian refugee camps is foundering on
UN member states' refusal to commit forces.
Moreover, Hutu militants in the camps are
adamantly opposed to disarming or relocating.
The RPF believes a policing operation would
fail to defang the Hutu military.
Burundi's military opposes any international
force, and uncooperative Tutsi soldiers have
sidelined the Organization of African Unity
military observer mission. 3.5c
Outside pressure is not likely to change the
conviction of most Hutus and Tutsis that they
are engaged in a zero-sum game of ethnic survival. The RPF will not even consider negotiations until Rwanda's exiled Hutu leadership
admits to some culpability and regret for the
slaughter. Meanwhile, the Hutus in both countries fear that the RPF's victory will embolden
the Tutsis to reassert their precolonial overlordship. 3.5c
Nonetheless, the attention of international
mediators and Western aid donors may have
some success in reinforcing political moderates
in both countries. In Rwanda, the presence of
human rights monitors undoubtedly has slowed
the pace of retribution against suspected Hutu
murderers. Swifter action and resource commitments by the international community for
Secret
the international crimes tribunal could encourage more RPF restraint against suspected genocide criminals and lessen the Hutu fear of
vigilante justice. Furthermore, Museveni—a
trusted mentor and confidant to Vice President
and Defense Minister Kagame—could help
argue that Rwanda will remain unstable unless
Hutus are given a greater role in governing, but
his influence should not be overestimated.
3.5c
In Burundi, if ethnic violence remains at current levels or subsides, then political moderates
from both the Hutu-majority and Tutsi opposition parties may have an opportunity to salvage
a national consensus. Such mainstream leaders—who have worked closely with the local
UN representative to negotiate the power-sharing accord—have been sidelined but not
removed by extremist elements. The international community can continue to work closely
with such moderates as they try to consolidate a
political middle ground. The longer run negotiating trade-offs in both countries will involve a
complex web of minority political rights guarantees, land-tenure issues, and physical security protections that include representation in
and control of security forces.| 3.5c~
This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the
National Imelligence Officer for Africa and was coordinated
with (he Deputy Director for Imelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency, and the Assistanl Secretary for
Imelligence and Research, Departmenl of Sla(e; the Depuly
Chief of Staff for Imelligence, Departmenl of the Army; (he
Direclor of Naval Intelligence, Department of (he Navy; (he
Assis(am Chief of S(aff, Intelligence, Department of (he Air
Force; and Headquarters, Marine Corps. 3 5
C
�REVISED
Agenda
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
DATE:
Wednesday, February 8, 1995
TIME:
3:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.
PLACE:
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
I.
Introduction
NSC
II.
S i t u a t i o n Update
CIA
III.
USG Support f o r UNHCR Camp S e c u r i t y Program...
State
IV.
Volcano Contingency Plans
State
V.
J u s t i c e Issues
- s t a t u s o f U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f equipment,
support f o r m i n i s t r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n - c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e issues
- USG c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f p e r s o n n e l t o War Crimes
AID
Tribunal
VI.
0
M i l i t a r y Weapons
- Arms embargo
- Z a i r i a n c o n t r o l l e d APCs
- I MET
{L. - K i g a l i DATT
VII.
ALL
Burundi
State
V I I I . Conclusion
NSC
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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P OO O Y
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- ^ ' " ' ^
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C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
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Declassified Documents concerning Rwanda
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2011-0263-M
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A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2011-0263-M
7585536
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Genocide
Peacekeeping
Rwanda
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e6b2e7c32970b59254a162eaac07a988.pdf
ef9ad7152cf1b34f19d69476063542a6
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (b) ofE.O. 13526 or (b)(6) ofthe FOIA.
�CONFIBEN'l'IAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR
Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do
about Gorazde and Sarajevo in the coming weeks.
Status
quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
Need to ensure meeting in London is success.
Must not
result in public discord or become forum for mere posturing
by participants.
Chris will discuss our views on London meeting
detail with Malcolm Rifkind later on tonight.
in more
We have reached defining moment for our policy toward
Bosnia.
We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence
work and avert UN withdrawal.
Issue is finding the best way to do this.
My military advisors feel strongly most important
to be able to bring air power to bear decisively,
timid manner done to date.
thing is
not in
They propose issuing clear warning to Bosnian Serbs:
any
attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air
campaign.
Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian
Serbs.
If they heed warning and do not attack, there will
be no air campaign.
Would have effect of restoring strict enforcement of heavy
weapons exclusion zones, without complication of weapons
collection points.
This means UNPROFOR neutrality is
retained.
However -- cannot be just another empty threat.
If Bosnian
Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared
to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses
or additional hostages are taken.
Will need to begin now to
reduce exposure of UN personnel.
First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb
air defense capabilities:
SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar
and command centers.
DECLASSIFIED
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�CONFIDENTIAL/
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Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign
against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or
Sarajevo.
However, dual key could not apply in its current form.
Local ground commanders would of course retain voice in
Close Air Support role and close-proximity air strikes
directly affecting their troops.
But there could be no UN
political veto over individual missions.
Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality
would
also have to be removed.
Would want ability to strike
strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.
Will need your help in moving
approaching Boutros-Ghali.
this to a NAC decision
and in
In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of
Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to
Sarajevo.
We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
My military advisors agree with your assessment that
deploying 1,000 French troops to Gorazde will diminish the
ability of RRF to act in Sarajevo, without materially
contributing to improved the military balance in Gorazde.
I
have relayed (will relay) this to Jacques.
We will need to work together to arrive at common U.S.-UKFrench approach by Friday, and then bring other allies
along.
I hope we will be able to generate the political
support needed at the London meeting and in the NAC to move
forward together on this.
�-5"l':""C"'R""EI:"''l''r~
20838
THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Response to the Fall of Srebrenica
Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses
to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at
Srebrenica.
Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in
continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.
Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to
carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and
to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military
aggressiveness that has marked the past month.
Failure to
reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves
and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse
of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under
circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO
and our allies.
It will also accelerate passage of unilateral
lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage
relations with our allies.
Deputies
agreed on the following immediate actions:
• To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the
use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe
Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not
now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian
Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to
prevent the fall of Zepa).
• To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic
and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in
the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch
UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with
the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the
evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them
to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.
• To use our public statements and our consultations with allies
to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support
the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for
resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.
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•
To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency
withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light
of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.
Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need
to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to
deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the
UNPROFOR mission:
• At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government
presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain
UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue
maintaining peace where it exists.
•
To this end, we will support robust use of the existing
elements of the RRF to secure overland access, to Sarajevo
using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control
over Sarajevo airport.
•
Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning
all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO
credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons
exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should
include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if
protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.
Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be
critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on
unilateral lift.
The current Dole language, while not requiring
immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S.
action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of
a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal.
Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission
after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of
the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the
trigger.
�THE PRESltENT HAS ~FN
-.-.."_ '\ '-\
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
Calling
about Bosnia
situation
after fall of Srebrenica.
We need to regroup and devise strategy for making
presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness
UN withdrawal.
UN
and avert
Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal:
to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces
of the four major powers.
Jacques posed this as an either/or choice:
large-scale
intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pullout.
I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw,
but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after
Srebrenica.
We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we
could get a better understanding of the proposal and its
implications.
Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that
French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky.
They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with
1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route
into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.
We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish
UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
Understand he spoke to you earlier today.
What is your
interpretation of Chirac's proposal?
Do you think he really
wants to pullout
if we don't agree?
Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so
that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a
realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness
and credibility.
Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for
NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions.
Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift
legislation in Congress.
IfAnLr:Declassify on:
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HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORP~DUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with.French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony
Gardner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
Oval Office
The President:
I
Hello, Jacques?
(U)
President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in
French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we
want you to know.
(Swi tching to French)
First of all, my
congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we
cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are
numbered and that that causes you concern. Our. analysis is the
same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow
and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the
UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on
TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to
be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In m
o inion we can no Ion er .
ust stand b and watch this. ,._- -----. I.~
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Therefore we must restore
Eei"'""Efie l. was guaranteed by the UN. That means
way
situation in the eastern enclaves. ~
Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for.
France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I
don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly
concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I
wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave
Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France
to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to
carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three
enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity
of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today
20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use
military intervention to impose the'will of the UN, which can
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only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France
is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore
the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing.
But if the
option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we
were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by
agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR.
So
the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in
combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these
people fight each other and we go home.
We cannot allow
ourselves to be accomplices! ~
The President:
Let me first say that we appreciate the strong
stance you have taken and your determination to do something.
Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot.
I will take
up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I
wanted to speak with you first.
I would like you to think about
a few things.
Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and
Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact.
The
Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently
are willing to fight.
In Srebrenica there were about 3000
Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of
shelling.
They left without putting up a fight, although I think
they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde,
so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there.
We
all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb
army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo.
Our
military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting
to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR
might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back
eastward dye to the inherent difficulty of defending the area
there.
ye)
The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we
discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has
become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the
rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in
Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde.
You cannot be in a position to
fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules
of engagement.
If there is going to be fighting, it has to be
different than in the past.
Before we provide air power, we have
to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain
on the Serbs in other areas.
Before UNPROFOR gets into a
military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next
move is and what the acceptable military options are under
UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to
do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very
skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially
if the Bosnians won't fight.
I think we should first secure
Gorazde and then Sarajevo.
I will have conversations with them
and get back in touch with you. ~
CONFIB8MTIM.,
�!
CONiIB8N'fI1\L
3
I would like to make two more points. Fi=st, I think your stated
intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important -- a
critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak
with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Cr-=istopher speak with
your foreign minister to talk in detail aoout what you have in
mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims
will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they
come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of
engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances?
Therefore, I believe we should focus on ,Gorazde and press for
ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to
think about. I would like to have a follow up be~een the
generals and foreign ministers on the details. jCl
The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the
abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have
made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the
Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just
because the UN says they are ."safe areas". We can't send the
Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't
�4
defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you
suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms.
Have you had any second thcughts about lifting the arms embargo?
yr
/.Ub1
•
I
The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their
behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open?
UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have
entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when
they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a
mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We
didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit
Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher
action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend
the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's
what worries me. ~
President Chirac:
embargo? JPf
When does the Congress vote on lifting the
The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree
with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they
pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my
veto. )Il1
President Chirac:
Can Congress override the veto?
~)
The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think
they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like
CONFIBSN'f:l:AL
�C9~IHDl>NHAL
5
to confer with my military
rna tt e r .
advisers
and get back in touch on this
.;.e:r
President Chirac:
to contact General
very much. ~
The President:
OK, I quite agree.
I will ask Admiral Lanxade
Shalikashvili as soon as possible.
Thank you
OK. Good-bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFTDEHTIAL
�•
OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TEAM MET THIS MORNING
WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONSIDER MANY OF THE POINTS
ARE DEALING WITH IN YOUR CABINET MEETING.
•
DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISE WILL
HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S SESSION
•
I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR GENERAL THINKING
ISSUES THE PM RAISED IN HIS LETTER.
•
WHILE WE INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF.ANY
UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THERE IS A
REAL CHANCE THAT A VETO COULD BE OVERRIDDEN, ESPECIALLY IF WE
FAIL TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY
•
IF GORAZDE
HILL.
ON MOST OF THE
FALLS, COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT
ON THE
•
I AM MEETING WITH SACIRBEY THIS AFTERNOON, AND WILL PRESS HIM
ON GIVING US A CHANCE TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY.
THIS
MUST INCLUDE ALLOWING UNPROFOR TO REMAIN, AND ASSISTING IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF. BUT AGAIN, WE MUST BE WILLING TO DO
MAKE UNPROFOR MORE CREDIBLE.
THE STATUS QUO WILL NOT SUFFICE.
•
REGARDING THE OPTIONS FOR GORAZDE, YOU ARE RIGHT IN YOUR VIEW
THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF 500015,000 TROOPS TO REPEL A SERB ATTACK ON ITS OWN.
•
WE AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EFFORT TO DEFEND GORAZDE
THE GROUND STILL RESTS WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.
•
WE DO SOME MERIT IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MORE MODEST
REINFORCEMENT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS THERE, AND ARE WEIGHING
THE PROS AND CONS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY LIFT FOR A SMALL
FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
•
ON
SUCH A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE, IF DONE IN PARALLEL WITH
A ROBUST AIR CAMPAIGN, WOULD PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS THAT WAS CLEARLY LACKING AT SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA.
•
YOUR THIRD OPTION, WHICH AMOUNTS TO SIMPLY STAYING WITH THE
STATUS QUO, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.
•
IF UNPROFOR MAKES NO EFFORT TO CHANGE THE CALCULUS OF THE
SITUATION FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ETHNIC CLEANSING OF SREBRENICA:
•
THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY
WITHDRAW,
INDICATED
•
THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE CERTAIN
LIFT BILL OVER A VETO, AND
•
THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT
UNPROFOR'S WITHDRAWAL.
THAT THEY WILL
TO PASS A UNILATERAL
IS INCREASINGLY
LIKELY TO DEMAND
�2
•
REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO LAY DOWN A
MARKER OF CHANGED UNPROFOR RESOLVE AT GORAZDE THAN TO COMMIT
TO HOLDING IT AT ALL COSTS INDEFINITELY.
BUT CLEARLY
SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW
TO KEEP THE FRENCH ON BOARD AND
AVOID ENCOURAGING A SERB ONSLAUGHT NOT'ONLY AGAINST GORAZDE,
BUT SARAJEVO AS WELL.
•
TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER, SINCE THE
BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY USE OF NATO AIR POWER
WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WAR, THEIR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER
CANNOT BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR.
•
THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE UN AS
PART OF THE CHAPTER VII APPROACH TO THE MANDATE TO WHICH
WE HAVE ALL AGREED.
•
THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO APPLY THAT
AIR POWER IN A MANNER THAT MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE AN IMPACT
ON BOSNIAN SERB FORCES VIOLATING UN MANDATES .
• AS A RESULT, THE THREAT TO UN PERSONNEL FROM BOSNIAN
SERBS WILLING TO RESORT TO CRIMINAL TACTICS OF HOSTAGETAKING HAS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.
•
CLEARLY, ANY RENEWED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD NEED UNPROFOR TO
TAKE REALISTIC MEASURES TO REMOVE ITS PERSONNEL FROM HIGH
THREAT AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNNECESSARILY DEPLOYED.
•
WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR GORAZDE IS A MILITARILY SOUND AIR CAMPAIGN
TO RESTORE SERB RESPECT FOR THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE,
AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACK FORCES VIOLATING IT AS PART OF A
SERB OFFENSIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE
SAFE AREA.
•
SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF
THE UN AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL MAINTENANCE OF THE
UN'S ROLE IN SARAJEVO.
�3025660E.FIN
Page lof4
,.
MSMail
DATE-TIME
06 August 95 18:00
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
-€ONFIfJEN HAL
SUBJECT
FW: Bosnia Human Rights Abuses [CONrID~IlAL]
TO
Drew, Samuel N.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
From: Malley, Robert
To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at Al
Subject: Bosnia [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, August 04, 199506:26 PM
[[ 6054.DOC : 4671 in 6054.DOC ]][[ BOSNIA2,DOC : 4672 in
BOSNIA2.DOC ]]
Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities
in Srebrenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package
that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact
sheet from the agency).
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
4 August 95 18:21
6054.DOC
.(J ONi"lDEI'ITiAL
6054
Crn-JfIDliblTIkL
.('ONfIDRNTIAh
CONFmS~ITIAh
August 4, 1995
ACTION
�3025660E.FIN
Page 2 of4
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN
FROM: ROB MALLEY
SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities ih Bosnia
There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the
Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During
a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able
to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and
. intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons
from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for.
Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and
boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are
either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other
brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound.
There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have
been used.
State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian
Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at
large or in detention:
I. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an
international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas
and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade
and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need
for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in
enclaves.
White House action will be needed to support this effort which,
given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost
urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that
condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for
those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these
actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is
attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction
with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached
at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more
forceful action should be considered.
Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric
Schwartz
RECOMMENDATION
�3D25660E.FIN
Page 3 of4
That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and
fact sheet.
Approve __
Disapprove __
Attachments
Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE.
4 August 95 18:25
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
BOSNIA2.DOC
Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed
by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and
Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual
abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from
Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made
clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in
the strongest terms.
Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the
Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of
Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international
access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained.
They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas
whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have
survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate
protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to
make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the
international community to see to it that these basic requirements
are met.
Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There
also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must
be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my
Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what
happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to
the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to
fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already
indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender
them to the Tribunal.
�3.025660E.FIN
Page 4 of4
Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions
constitute the single most important obstacle to a political
solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the
international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They
must not and will not remain unpunished
�30 I 5B9A6.FIN
Page I of3
MSMail
DATE-TIME
25 July 95 20:42
FROM
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
• CmWIDmn'fAL
SUBJECT
Subject: Massacres at Srebrenic/t' fCQNFIDEN'fIAf+.'
TO
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Drew, Samuel N.
Gardner, Anthony
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Peters, Mary A.
Schmidt, John R.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
For TL and SRB:
.
,
Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb
mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS. CQNFIDE?<f'fIAL DTG:251907Z mL 95
FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6565
--..c.G:....Q::UO'N~F~I A L ZAGREB 002788
J:)A-f~r-l!<;T~'I""t"t
~IQDIliE.O. 12356: DECL: 07/25/00
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BK, HR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MASS EXECUTION OF SREBRENICA
MALES IS REASON TO SAVE ZEPA
I. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW
SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE
ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FEL T WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAYE...
MASSACRED MANY IF NOT MOST OF:rHE 5 OOOPLUSUEl:LASSIFIED
)" -A<_r~".
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i
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY:'
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�3015B9A6.FIN
Page 2 aD
MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL
OF SREBRENICA.
2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS
OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS
MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON
DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF
THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA A.1"'lD
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE
RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.
3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE
FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER
ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND
OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A
SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT
THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE
NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN
TRUCKS A1\'D BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTL Y AT
BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS
AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.
4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE
PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN
UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO
HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN
THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE
RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN
WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.
5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO
KONJEVIC POLIE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS,
MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS
REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS .
TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING
LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND
ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE
SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.
6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON
HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE
ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE
MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.
7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE
STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY._(i;)(~
WHO ALSO INTERVIEWED SREBRENICA
REFUGEES IN TUZLA (pLEASE PROTECT), TOLD ME THATlf!b)(6)~
ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT
TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.
�3015B9A6.FIN
Page 3 of3
8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAYBE NO
SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE
SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE
SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.
9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR
TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTL Y CONTINUE
TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT
AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
GALBRAITH
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
• 95
22.' I 1
NO.
1460120825
PAGE
Rer
I.
APPR:
RF
DRAFT:
JC
OTHER:
SB
OTHER:
WFD
OTHER:
ML
~
~
C8I1FIBEMTli'd> -
OTHER:
OTHER:
NIACT
IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12356:
TAGS:
ANATO
USUN, MOSCOW,
KIEV
DECL:OADR
NATO, MARR
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENTIAL
MESSAGE
TO NATO CAPITALS
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECENDENCE
BECAUSE OF ONGOING NAC MEETINGS AND BECAUSE TEXT MUST BE
DELIVERED AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24, AND TOMORROW IS SUNDAY.
2. NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT OOB MONDAY,
JULY 24. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:30
PM THAT DAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN THE NATO MILITARY
COMMITTEE ON FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE LONDON BOSNIA
CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY.
EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS
SHOULD INFORM AUTHORITIES OF THE FACT AND CONTENT OF
THIS MESSAGE.
3.
BEGIN
TEXT.
(FOR BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, BONN, ITALY, THE
HAGUE, OSLO, MADRID, AND ANKARA)
WE WENT TO LONDON
CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE
AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE
eeUF I Qg,~TTT A I ,
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
\1"
lW,\
J
'l-fI
2
Of
lW,-
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
••..
C~e""l~l f1DrTEfClNf1"''Ff II:AirLi:PP-I'
(SA) 07.22.
. 95 22: I J
NO.
1460120825
2
SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR'S
EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD
LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
WE WERE PARTICULARLY
DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE
BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE
AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE
ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO.
THE
LONDON MEETING ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES.
OUR EFFORTS
THERE MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN
ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE
.SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(FOR ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, REYKJAVIK, AND LISBON)
THE
LONDON CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SENDING AN
IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF RESOLVE AND
DETERMINATION.
THAT EFFORT MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN
NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND
TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(CONTINUATION FOR ALL)
LONDON WAS IN OUR VIEW AN
IMPORTANT SUCCESS.
THE CONFERENCE SEIZED THE
INITIATIVE, DESPITE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS REPRESENTED
THERE, AROUND THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OUTLINED IN MALCOLM
RIFKIND'S CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT.
CLARITY OF WILL, AND
EXPEDITIOUS ACTION AT NATO IN THE NEXT DAYS, WILL BE
ESSENTIAL TO AVOIDING ANY CONFUSION IN PALE LEADING TO
MISCALCULATION.
WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MISSTEPS OR
HESITATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE SORT OF ESCALATION OF
CONFLICT WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID.
AT THE SAME TIME, NATO
MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF THE WARNINGS OF
LONDON ARE NOT HEEDED.
IT IS BY MOVING FORWARD RESOLUTELY TOGETHER THAT WE CAN
BEST ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF
UNPROFOR.
BY STANDING TOGETHER AS ALLIES WE PROVIDE THE
STRONGEST DETERRENT TO FURTHER ATTACKS, AND THE BEST
PROTECTION TO UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND.
THE COURAGE OF
THOSE TROOPS, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE NATIONS WHO HAVE
PROVIDED THEM, MERITS NATO'S STRONG SUPPORT.
WE ARE .
CONVINCED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE,
COUPLED WITH A CLEAR AND RAPID DISPLAY OF ALLIANCE
DECISIvENESS, IS THE BEST HOPE FOR TURNING THE BOSNIAN
SERBS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.
SATURDAY'S DISCUSSIONS AT NATO ON FOLLOWUP TO THE LONDON
CONFERENCE WENT WELL AND DEMONSTRATED A CONSIDERABLE
DEGREE OF CONSENSUS.
NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL
NOW EXAMINE THE SPECIFICS OF HOW NATO WILL IMPLEMENT THE
LONDON DECISIONS, AND THE COUNCIL WILL MEET MONDAY
-AeAOI~l:PF~I"'eEtI':!I1'N'T'ITI1rAD'h
PAGE
3
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
. 95
22: I I
NO.
c.
Cg~IFI I:lEM'UAL
3
AFTERNOON TO MOVE FORWARD.
WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON MONDAY
DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN THAT ARE FIRM AND CLEAR IN
SUPPORT OF THE LONDON MEETING.
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
NATO SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ITS AIR
POWER IN A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO ANY
ATTACKS ON GORAZDE.
AS THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN STATED IN LONDON, THE
SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN MISSION IS
NOW AT A TURNING POINT.
THERE ARE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS,
GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE, ABOUT WHETHER WE WILL BE PREPARED
TO FOLLOW THROUGH.
NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS.
END TEXT.
YY
1460120825
PAGE
4
�CQHFIbENTIAL
6886
NAnONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON.
D.C. 20506
September 18, 1995
INFORMATION
.
,MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
"
IU
FROM
RICHARD SCHIFTER
SUBJECT:
A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative
Development Initiative
More Balkanization?
I had a visit last week from a delegation from Sanjak. Sanjak, a
Turkish generic term for district, is the label given to an area
lying immediately east of Bosnia, now divided between Serbia and
Montenegro and populated predominantly by persons who refer to
themselves as Bosniaks. They are Muslims. The delegation was in
Washington to gain support for their effort to establish an
autonomous region of Sanjak within the FRY.
I heard the delegation out, explained that we now sought to end the
fighting and suggested that they could assert their cause at a
later date, when an effort is made to reach an overall settlement.
But before the delegation left, I asked its leader what his native
language was. He said it was Serbo-Croatian. I asked him whether
people who saw him in the street would be able to identify him as a
"Bosniak," as distinct from a Serb. He conceded that most people
think he looked like a German. I asked whether he thought that a
fervent religious belief separated the people in his region from
the Serbs. He said that that was not the case. When I then asked
what this effort at separation was all about, he spoke vaguely
about different cultures. I did not embarrass him by asking him to
spell out the cultural differences forme.
-
A Vision of a Better Regional Order
~----_.-----
-----
-- ..
_
---
The Sanjak delegation's outlook contrasted sharply with the world
view expressed to me over a year ago by one of the leaders of the
ethnic Greeks of Albania. He made the point that he was committed
to the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic identity of
Albania's Greeks but was not interested'in the redrawing of borders
or in autonomy.
He was impressed by the progress made by the
European Union in making borders increasingly irrelevant and was
hopeful that.in twenty years his region will have reached the same
level of political development.
..JC:lOJl~~lFE'Ir:bI":EE:NNTTIIALA1~'
Declassify on:
DECLA ::ILl kFlED
" . ~ PER E.O. 13526
· ~~ l.J"ln
•.. 1-<> \1;- 63 ~ - ".
�It now seems as if the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia is
in sight.
Even if that end does not arrive iImnediately, it is
likely to come about in the foreseeable future. We have begun to
plan the funding of a major construction effort to bind up the
area's wounds. I recommend that without adding to the cost of the
Bosnia reconstruction effort, we try to do more than recreate the
',status quo ante, that we use the opportunity to deal with the
'iregion's underlying problems.
To be specific, I recommend that we embed the Bosnia reconstruction
efforts in a comprehensive regional initiative designed to realize
the dream of my Greek-Albanian interlocutor. The initiative would
seek to bring the countries of Southeastern Europe together in a
joint effort to develop their respective economies, build a
coordinated transportation and communications system, deal jointly
.with the problem of intergroup distrust and hatred, and create a
sturdy democratic infrastructure. This project would contribute to
our objective of enlargement of democratic space and would help
solidify Western ties to countries that might not be early
candidates for NATO and EU membership.
It would also be an
exercise which Russia could not rationally view as threatening.
Under the OSCE Umbrella
The effort could appropriately be undertaken under the umbrella of
the OSCE, with its emphasis on security, economic development, and
human rights. It should encompass Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the
states of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.
The OSCE
should create a Southeastern European Cooperative Development
Initiative (SECD!?), led by a Coordinating Board on which the
countries of the region. and the donors of assistance would be
represented.
(Perhaps we need to find an excuse for giving Russia
a seat as well.)
The Board would plan and recommend development
projects, first and foremost relating to reconstruction and
coordinated regional economic development (giving real meaning to
the OSCE second basket), but also focusing on imprOVing relations
among the countries of the region and among its ethnic groups
(fi~st basket), and creating governmental institutions protective
of human rights ("l;hirdasket).
b
With regard to the latter, the
establishment of OSCE jurisdiction would allow linkage of economic
development with third-basket issues in countries such as Croatia,
the FRY, Albania, and Slovakia.
The Board's role should be to coordinate rather than direct. Each
donor would be free to adopt its own .program and each recipie.nt
would be free to make its own arrangement with any donor. But the
Board, if effectively led, would seek to enlist the cooperation of
all donors and of the relevant international lending agencies and
would from that base be able to urge the regional recipients to
cooperate as well.
G8~lFIBElf'fI1tL
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.....
.
,
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�. CONFIBElU'fI1lL
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.
The Board should not. have a staff of its own.
Secretarial
assistance should be rendered by the OSCE.
Each board members
should be supported by technical staff from the country the member
represents. The Board would seek to work closely with the IMF, the
IBRD, the EBRD, UNHCR, OECD, and COE. The staffs of these agencies
.
,could be enlisted in providing relevant studies.
'j
As distinct from the OSCE coordinating role with regard to economic
development, effective centralized authority will be needed to make
certain that'Helsinki human-rights standards are applied. Problems
posed by the OSCE consensus principle can be overcome by entrusting
application of third-basked standards to the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities and insisting at the outset on a broad grant
of authority to him.
As national minority issues are closely
related to the region's human rights problems, he would be the
logical person to take the-lead regarding third-basket issues.
u.S. Leadership
If we decide to go forward with such an effort and are able to
persuade the donors and the countries of the region to join in it,
we should make a major effort to gear ourselves up for the exercise
of effective leadership. A USG support group for SECDI should be
established by Executive Order.
In contrast to the OSCE
Coordinating Board, which should coordinate by persuasion, the
support group should have directive authority over all USG funds
allocated for economic development and' democracy building in the
region (AID and USIA) and should work closely with such USG-funded
organizations as USIP and NED. It should also coordinate closely
with all Federal agencies which could contribute to this effort
(Treasury and Commerce could play a particularly significant role)
and should seek to enlist the support of the private sector, both
profit and nonprofit. Given the region's great humanitarian needs,
the churches should be involved in a major way.
A high-profile effort of this kind would be right and proper on its
own merits. It would also be appreciated by members of the general
public, because of its humanitarian character, by the churches, by
the ethnic groups. with roots in the region, and by the U.S •
businesses which could be invited to play a constructive role in
this effort. Our leadership in this undertaking, as a follow-up to
our leadership in bringing peace to the region, could overcome the
negative image created by our inability to solve the problem
earlier. It would be an effort with which the White House couJ.d
appropriately identify itself.
.
Can we discuss this idea?
cc: Dan Fried, Mort Halperin, Sandy Vershbow
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
FM: AMEMBASSY
CLASS.' eOI'UFI DEN"fIAI..,
DTG:141622Z
JUL 95
LONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1260
RHEHAAAIWHITEHOUSE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
. RUSNAAA/USEUCOM
VAIHINGEN AB GE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1619
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY
SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0009
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9077
RUFOAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION
US UN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7193
€
Q N ~ I Q E r~ 'f I A"LLONDON
r
009960
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL UK FR BK
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELCON WITH MAJOR:
PROPOSE BOSNIA CONFERENCE
PM LIKELY TO
REF: LONDON 9894
1. COFJFIBErmAC
ENTIRE TEXT.
2. A CONTACT AT NUMBER TEN ADVISES THAT PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR IS LIKELY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MINISTERIAL LEVEL
MEETING ON BOSNIA (REFTEL) DURING HIS TELCON WITH THE
PRESIDENT LATER TODAY. MAJOR IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING
A MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF CONTACT
GROUP AND TROOP CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TAKE
PLACE IN LONDON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JULY 17. THE
MEETING MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A SESSION, A DAY OR TWO
EARLIER, OF SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS.
3. THE BACKDROP TO THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING IS BRITISH
CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF ALLIED COHESION AGAINST A
DANGEROUS, FAST CHANGING SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE
BRITISH OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING
WITH A CONSENSUS ON A WAY FORWARD, INCLUDING ON MILITARY
OPERATIONS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
tJ'I 't(/TlII~
~\v N;o!~
r..
�eOrJrIOEi\J i iAL
ONTACT GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO A
COMMON APPROACH.
4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE FRENCH ARE TELLING LONDON THAT
THE U.S. IS RECEPTIVE TO PARIS' PROPOSAL OF "DRAWING A
LINE IN THE SAND" AT GORAZDE AND THAT WASHINGTON HAS
INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT AND
CAS FOR THEIR FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HMG HAS CONCERNS
ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A
NON-VIABLE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.
CROWE
BT
#9960
NNNN
<'SECT>SECTlON:
01 OF 01
<'SSN>9960
<'TOR> 950714125133
M1764412
FROM:
SITREPRT
�GOPJFlBEIIi IIAl '
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS:66QQ~N~FI~B~EroroTiIIPA~LDTG:141544Z
JUL 95
FM:AMEMBASSYLONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
1251
RUEHV..}/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0006
. RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1616
RUCNDT/USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7190
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW PRIORITY 3874
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9074
CO"
--
J:' I ~E N T I A L LONDON 009948
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL BK UK
SUBJECT: HMG PAUSES TO REFLECT ON BOSNIA POLICY,
REAFFIRMS VALUE OF UNPROFOR
REF: LONDON 9894
1. SONFiElEi'< IIAL AS MARKED.
INFORMATION.
OADR FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
,.
2.
SUMMARY:
THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE
~ Y QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN
BOSNIA, INCLUDING DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE,
DESPITE STRONG FRENCH PRESSURES TO DO SO. SENIOR
OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF ANY OPERATION TO
REINFORCE ZEPA OR GORAZDE, BUT BELIEVE THAT OPENING UP
OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WOULD BE FEASIBLE MILITARILY
AND DESIRABLE IN POLICY TERMS. MEANWHILE, BOTH THE
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REAFFIRMED THE
BRITISH COMMITMENT TO REMAIN IN BOSNIA UNLESS THE
SITUATION DETERIORATES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
PER EoO. 13526
NO HASTY DECISIONS
;:-;;;(~~-~I-~R-LEVEL
lh
CONTACTS AT THE FCO, MOD AND
~~ q 11 l
~oll:6t~hY'
OWNING STREET (CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE CHARLTON,
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�CONFIOEN IIJl.L
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OMAND, AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE
SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS OAKDEN) TOLD US JULY 14
THAT HMG WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON
POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA DESPITE STRONG
PRESSURES FROM PARIS TO DO SO. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT A
DEFINING MOMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON BOSNIA, BUT FOR THIS
VERY REASON THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE A FEW DAYS
TO LOOK QUIETLY AT THE OPTIONS BEFORE TAKING ANY
DECISION. WE ARE TOLD THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP, TO
INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
SECRETARIES) IS TO MEET SHORTLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION.
4. j.ef'PART OF THIS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SNAP DECISIONS
SfEMS FROM UNCERTAINTY IN WHITEHALL AS TO EXACTLY WHAT
THE FR~NCH ARE PROPOSING. WHAT EXACTLY DOES PRESIDENT
· CHIRAC HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPEAKS OF "LIMITED MILITARY
ACTION TO .PROTECT THE OTHER ENCLAVES?" AS NOTED SEPTEL,
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WILL BE CALLING CHIRAC TODAY TO TRY
TO CLARIFY FRENCH INTENTIONS.
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY OPTIONS
5. JJA"'OUR CONTACTS STRESSED TO US THAT THERE ARE FEW
"'ffABLE MILITARY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA. CHARLTON REAFFIRMED
THE BRITISH VIEW THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO
THINK THAT SREBRENICA COULD BE RETAKEN WITH THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE RRF. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN
AIRBORNE DIVISION OR TWO, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM
THE U.S. AS TO ZEPA, CHARLTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH
WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT COULD BE HELD, EVEN WITH
REINFORCEMENT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, AGAINST A BOSNIAN
SERB ATTACK. TO BE AT ALL EFFECTIVE, REINFORCEMENT
WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. ATTACK
. HELICOPTERS. OMAND SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD
TAKE ZEPA TOMORROW IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED
THEY WOULD MOVE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WAS MORE
LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PAUSE TO "DIGEST" SREBRENICA AND
"BEHAVE" FOR A WHILE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE
INTERNATIONAL REACTION. (OMAND NOTED THERE WERESOME
SIGNS OF THIS; THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE AT THE MOMENT
BEING MORE COOPERATIVE ON SARAJEVO CONVOYS.)
s.LJ OMAND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN HMG FOR
PULiiNG OUT OF GORAZDE, BUT EQUALLY MOD SAW NO POINT IN
EINFORCING THE ENCLAVE. (OAK DEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US
THAT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION YET
ON THE ISSUE OF REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE.) THE BRITISH
TROOPS WERE NOT THERE TO FIGHT. HE THOUGHT IT STILL
UNCLEAR WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD MOVE ON GORAZDE;
SURELY THEY RECKONED THEY WOULD BE IN FOR A FIGHT, THE
ASSUMPTION BEING THAT BOSNIAN FORCES, WHO WERE FAR MORE
NUMEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN SREBRENICA, WOULD STAND
RATHER THAN FLEE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE BOSNIAN
SERBS COULD TAKE GORAZDE. WHEN ASKED HOW HMG WOULD
�~L
REACT IF GORAZDE WERE ATTACKED, OMAND COUNTERED THAT
THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT COULD ONLY BE
DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. HIS ASSUMPTION,
HOWEVER, WAS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD BE TOLD TO DEFEND
THEIR POSITIONS AS BEST THEY COULD UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR
THAT THE TOWN WAS LOST, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WOULD ACT
MIJCH AS THE DUTCH HAD IN SREBRENICA, FOCUSING ON HELPING
REFUGEES.
7 jPl'THE
BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE FRENCH FOR
SOME TIME ABOUT SECURING OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO, .
AND THEY REGARD THIS AS A MUCH MORE FEASIBLE MILITARY
OPERATION THAN REINFORCING THE EASTERN ENCLAVES.
CHARLTON SAID THAT THE MORE LOGICAL ROUTE WAS OVER MT .
. IGMAN; ALTHOUGH THE ROAD WAS POOR AND VULNERABLE TO
BOSNIAN SERB ARTILLERY, IT RAN THROUGH GOB-HELD
TERRITORY. TRYING TO PUSH THROUGH FROM KISLEYAK WOULD
BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, IN THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE
CROSSING A LARGE EXPANSE OF BOSNIAN SERB TERRITORY.
CHARLTON THOUGHT THAT OPENING UP AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO
SARAJEVO WAS CRUCIAL IF THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY WAS TO
BE RESTORED. OMAND REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION
TO US THAT GENERAL SMITH HAS AUTHORITY FROM HMG TO MOVE
TO SECURE ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WHENEVER HE IS READY, USING
EITHER ROUTE. HOWEVER, SMITH'S VIEW IS THAT NOW (I.E.
THE NEXT FEW DAYS) IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO DO THIS,
SINCE AT PRESENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BEING MORE
HELPFUL IN ALLOWING CONVOYS THROUGH TO THE CITY.
MOREOVER, SMITH NEEDS THE RRF TO BOLSTER UNPROFOR
POSITIONS ELSEWHERE.
FRANCO-BRITISH
DIFFERENCES
8. JZf CHARLTON SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY PERCEPTION OF
t1BSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON OVER
BOSNIA. ANY DIFFERENCES THERE MIGHT BE WERE MATTERS OF
STYLE RATHER THAN POLICY. IT WAS NOT THE BRITISH
CUSTOM, HE NOTED, TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES WITHOUT
CAREFULLY THINKING THROUGH WHETHER THEY WERE FEASIBLE.
NOR WAS LONDON IN THE HABIT OF GOING AROUND THREATENING
TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS. THIS SAID, CHARLTON
ACKNOWLEDGED A FAIR DEGREE OF IRRITATION IN LONDON OVER
PRECIPITATE FRENCH RHETORIC, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE
SMOOTHED OUT IN TODAY'S PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR
AND CHIRAC. SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST, OMAND AND OAKDEN
ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES, WITH BOTH EXPRESSING CONCERN
OVER FRENCH PRESSURE FOR SOME MILITARY ACTION SUCH AS
DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE. OAKDEN NOTED
THAT THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A
PEACEMAKING OPERATION.
SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED UNPROFOR PRESENCE
�I
,
I
I
I
I
CQPJFlDEi\J HAL
9. (U) MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
SECRETARY HAVE PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT
KEEP BRITISH TROOPS IN BOSNIA UNLESS CONDITIONS
DETERIORATE SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. SPEAKING TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY 13, MAJOR SAID:
TO
i
I
-- "IF UNPROFOR WITHDREW WE WOULD CERTINL Y PUT AT
RISK THE PEACE WHICH REMAINS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, NOT
LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS.
WE MIGHT PUT AT RISK THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF
LIVES THAT HAVE BEEN SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE
PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS."
)
I
-- "ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY I FELT IT RIGHT
TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND
WHY I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO REMOVE THEM UNLESS IT
BECAME IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, IS THE DANGER OF A
WIDER BALKANS WAR. I CONCEDE THE SITUATION IS
SERIOUS AND I HAVE SAID TO THIS HOUSE BEFORE THAT
CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO REMAIN."
-- "BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE,
I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT FOR THEM TO DO SO AND TO
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE WAY THEY HAVE
THUS FAR."
10. (U) SEPARATELY, FOREIGN SECRETARY RIFKIND TOLD THE
PRESS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN BOSNIA IF IT
WAS FELT THAT THEY COULD STILL CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR
MANDATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK. HE POINTED OUT THAT
THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM POPULATION IS
LOCATED IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, WHERE BRITISH AND OTHER
TROOPS CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY.
11,.;erBOTH
OMAND AND CHARLTON CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE
G'fNERAL MOOD AMONG MINISTERS WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF
.
STAYING IN BOSNIA.
12.
SARAJEVO
CROWE
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• SECRET
Piscnggj-QP Paper
Elements o f a Post-UNPROFOR S t r a t e g y ;
Support t h e F e d e r a t i o n ; C o n t a i n t h e C o n f l i c t
Overvj.evf
At t h e May 23 P r i n c i p a l s Committee m e e t i n g t h e r e was a
g e n e r a l consensus t h a t U.S. p o l i c y f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR
w i t h d r a w a l would be t o seek m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t o f t h e arms
embargo, l i m i t e d s u p p o r t f o r arming and t r a i n i n g t h e Bosnian
Army, b u t no commitment t o a i r s t r i k e s . P r i n c i p a l s a l s o agreed
t h a t U.S. s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e s h o u l d be l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f f i n a n c i n g f o r Bosnian arms purchases f r o m o t h e r
s u p p l i e r s and t h a t t r a i n i n g s h o u l d be conducted by a t h i r d
p a r t y , i f p o s s i b l e . There was a l s o agreement t h a t such
p o l i c i e s would have t o be accompanied by enhanced e f f o r t s t o
c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g w i t h i n c u r r e n t bounds, i n c l u d i n g
m a i n t a i n i n g , and p o s s i b l y r e i n f o r c i n g , peacekeepers i n
Macedonia.
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t a l l t h e s e elements o f a p o s s i b l e
post-UNPROFOR s t r a t e g y need f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s , as do s e v e r a l
o t h e r q u e s t i o n s i n c l u d i n g : What r e l i e f and o t h e r m i l i t a r y
o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d o r s h o u l d remain i n p l a c e ? How would we work
w i t h A l l i e s and f r i e n d s t o c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g ? What are
Russia's l i k e l y responses t o our e f f o r t s t o l i f t t h e arms
embargo and b o l s t e r t h e s e c u r i t y o f Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Political/Military
Goals
Our p r i n c i p a l g o a l s f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR's p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l would be t o :
P r e s e r v e ' t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e GOBH over as much o f i t s
t e r r i t o r y as p o s s i b l e ;
We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e b o r d e r s o f t h e
R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina as o f 1992 and n o t
accept t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo c r e a t e d by Serb
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , j u s t as we
d i d w i t h S o v i e t conquest o f t h e B a l t i c s i n t h e 1940s.
•
M a i n t a i n t h e Bosniac-Croat F e d e r a t i o n and good
between Zagreb and S a r a j e v o ;
relations
Whether t h e s e a l l i a n c e s o f convenience can endure
remains t o be seen. The F e d e r a t i o n o f f e r s t h e b e s t
p r o s p e c t f o r d e v e l o p i n g a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o extreme
n a t i o n a l i s m and Serbian r e g i o n a l hegemony. M a i n t a i n i n g
some common sense o f purpose between Zagreb and
Sarajevo i s t h e b e s t way t o s a f e g u a r d t h e GOBH from a
Serb-Croat grand b a r g a i n t h a t c o u l d l e a v e Bosnia a
Balkan P a l e s t i n e i n t h e m i d d l e o f G r e a t e r S e r b i a and
Greater C r o a t i a .
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-2—
•
Croatian support would be e s s e n t i a l t o success o f
e f f o r t s t o arm and t r a i n the Bosnian Army, i f only t o
ensure t r a n s i t o f equipment. But Zagreb would surely
want some s i m i l a r s e c u r i t y assistance and closer t i e s
t o NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
Prevent a widening of the c o n f l i c t and b o l s t e r r e g i o n a l
stability;
This remains our abiding s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . We must
prevent the c o n f l i c t from widening i n t o a general
Balkan War t h a t could engage two NATO a l l i e s (with very
d i f f e r e n t agenda), threaten the s t a b i l i t y of f r a g i l e
new democracies i n the region, and increase the r i s k s
of deeper U.S. engagement.
Deter f u r t h e r aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a l i n e
open t o Milosevic and h i s successors.
Threats t o Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would
have t o be deterred, but moderation of Serb p o l i c i e s i s
the long-term goal.
gegerai Elemeotg of the strategy
Security Assistance
We would seek support o f a l l NATO a l l i e s , PFP Partners, and
moderate Islamic states f o r a s e c u r i t y assistance package f o r
the GOBH. But we should be prepared t o proceed w i t h a
c o a l i t i o n of the w i l l i n g .
A l l i e s would balk at supporting l i f t f o r fear t h a t i t would
prolong the war and exacerbate the r i s k s o f i t s widening. We
would need t o convince them t h a t we only want t o give the GOBH
a chance t o survive and be able t o negotiate a v i a b l e
settlement. A convincing containment s t r a t e g y would also be
e s s e n t i a l t o e n l i s t i n g t h e i r support.
Security assistance t o Bosnian government would be designed
t o give i t s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y capacity t o defend the t e r r i t o r y
s t i l l under i t s c o n t r o l and enhance i t s a b i l i t y t o regain, by
force o r at the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , t e r r i t o r y now c o n t r o l l e d by
the BSA. The magnitude o f assistance could range from what
would be required t o defend the status quo, t o a more robust
package t h a t would allow i t t o make s t r a t e g i c gains, t o an
extensive reequipping t h a t would allow i t t o r e e s t a b l i s h i t s
c o n t r o l over t e r r i t o r y a l l o t t e d i t under the Contact Group
Plan. C l e a r l y cost w i l l be a major f a c t o r here, and past
estimates o f the robust package have exceeded $1 b i l l i o n .
We and the GOBH would have t o balance various goals w i t h
the r i s k s of t r i g g e r i n g engagement o f superior Yugoslav Army
(VJ) and K r a j i n a Serb Army (KSA) forces i n the f i g h t i n g i n ways
t h a t could only be countered by d i r e c t U.S. and/or A l l i e d
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-3m i l i t a r y support. A l l but t h e f i r s t o p t i o n r i s k b r i n g i n g other
Serb f o r c e s t o Pale's defense.
Bosnian/Croat Harmony
Sarajevo has few a l t e r n a t i v e s o t h e r t h a n a l l i a n c e w i t h
Zagreb. Zagreb, on t h e o t h e r hand, may need a d d i t i o n a l
i n c e n t i v e s s t a y w i t h t h e program. We and o t h e r A l l i e s might
o f f e r Zagreb c e r t a i n rewards f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Sarajevo such
as a d d i t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , deeper
b i l a t e r a l economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s , and membership i n PFP.
Dealing With
Serbia
D e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r Serb a g g r e s s i o n would l i k e l y r e q u i r e
r e i n f o r c i n g t h e "Christmas warning" t o M i l o s e v i c about
responding t o S e r b - t r i g g e r e d v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo, and adding
t h r e a t s t o take u n s p e c i f i e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s against Serbia i f
i t e s c a l a t e s i t s support t o t h e Bosnian Serbs o r i n t i m i d a t e s
Macedonia o r o t h e r n e i g h b o r s .
F o r g i n g a n t i - M i l o s e v i c c o a l i t i o n c o u l d cause d i v i s i o n s
w i t h i n t h e A l l i a n c e and t h e EU and r e i n f o r c e Serb n a t i o n a l i s m
u n l e s s we make i t c l e a r o u r e f f o r t s a r e n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
S e r b i a p r o p e r b u t a t t h e a g g r e s s i v e n a t i o n a l i s m sponsored by
t h e c u r r e n t government. A t t h e same t i m e , we c o u l d t a k e steps
t o s u p p o r t o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l groups i n S e r b i a who f a v o r more
moderate r e g i o n a l p o l i c i e s . We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o h o l d o u t t o
M i l o s e v i c t h e promise o f f u r t h e r i n t e g r a t i o n i f he r e a l l y
breaks w i t h Pale and r e s p e c t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l norms.
Regional
Our
Containment
r e g i o n a l containment
e f f o r t s might i n c l u d e :
R e t a i n some r e s i d u a l UNPROFOR o r o t h e r peacekeeping
presence i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n t e r r i t o r y t o m a i n t a i n
Bosniac-Croat harmony.
•
R e t a i n a r o b u s t UNCRO t o p r e v e n t a re-eruption o f t h e
Serb-Croat war and l i m i t KSA support t h e BSA.
KSA support was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e BSA's a b i l i t y
t o beat back t h e Bosnian V Corps o f f e n s i v e i n Bihac
d u r i n g t h e f a l l o f 1994.
—
•
There i s i n t e l l i g e n c e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i f t h e KSA
were d r i v e n o u t o f UN Sectors N o r t h and South by
t h e C r o a t i a n Army, t h e y would move i n t o t h e
Posavina c o r r i d o r and support BSA o p e r a t i o n s
a g a i n s t t h e Gorazde p o c k e t .
M a i n t a i n and p o s s i b l y augment UNPREDEP i n Macedonia t o h e l p
s t a b i l i z e t h a t c o u n t r y and d e t e r a Serb crackdown i n
Kosovo. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f arming t h e Bosnians, we would
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-4have t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o g i v e Kosovar A l b a n i a n s t h e sense
t h a t U.S. o r A l l i e d f o r c e s would come t o t h e a i d o f an
armed u p r i s i n g a g a i n s t Serb a u t h o r i t i e s .
Deploy some o t h e r b o r d e r m o n i t o r i n g f o r c e s l i k e UNPREDEP i n
Hungary and A l b a n i a . This and o t h e r a c t i o n s t o p r e v e n t
s p i l l o v e r c o u l d be o r g a n i z e d by NATO t h r o u g h PFP.
R e i n f o r c e s t a b i l i t y a l o n g t h e p e r i p h e r y by r e d i r e c t i n g
resources c u r r e n t l y used f o r peacekeeping and h u m a n i t a r i a n
a s s i s t a n c e t o promote economic development and c o o p e r a t i o n
among t h e f r o n t - l i n e Balkan s t a t e s .
E f f o r t s g r i p r tQ Withdraw?!
To be e f f e c t i v e , elements o f t h i s s t r a t e g y would need t o be
i n p l a c e w e l l b e f o r e e x t r a c t i o n o f UNPROFOR a c t u a l l y b e g i n s .
The m i l i t a r y imbalance i s such t h a t t h e BSA c o u l d r e a d i l y p u t
p r e s s u r e on t h e enclaves and Sarajevo b e f o r e and d u r i n g
UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l . A l s o , as t h e SNIE 95-7 notes, t h e Bosnian
government would be l i k e l y t o s t r o n g l y r e s i s t a p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR unless t h e U.S. o r NATO commits
t o m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . T h i s commitment would j u s t as s u r e l y
t r i g g e r BSA a c t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e complete w i t h d r a w a l .
We would need t o b u i l d consensus among t h e A l l i e s and o t h e r
p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s and secure a t l e a s t Russian acquiescence
f o r t h e main goals o f t h i s approach.
To g i v e t h e GOBH f o r c e s a chance, we would need t o e x p l o r e
ways t o h e l p t h e Bosnians "creep o u t " o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
of- t h e arms embargo. T h i s might i n c l u d e :
P r o v i d i n g some i n t e l l i g e n c e s u p p o r t t o GOBH t o enhance
t h e i r a b i l i t y t o o r g a n i z e defenses a g a i n s t BSA
a c t i o n s . For example, we might s t a r t p r o v i d i n g t h e
GOBH w i t h data from t h e P r e d a t o r UAV f l i g h t s and o t h e r
sources.
Programs t h a t Gen. Sewell has broached w i t h t h e
F e d e r a t i o n f o r r e a r area o p e r a t i o n s , NCO t r a i n i n g , e t c .
Developing m i l i t a r y - t o - m i l i t a r y c o n t a c t s between t h e
GOBH and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s ( C r o a t i a , Turkey, o r
n o n - f r o n t - l i n e CE s t a t e s such as Poland o r t h e Czech
R e p u b l i c ) , t h a t would enable r a p i d l a u n c h i n g o f t h e
e n v i s i o n e d t r a i n i n g programs.
Reconsider t h e o p t i o n o f a l l o w i n g UNPROFOR u n i t s , on a
n a t i o n a l b a s i s , t o t u r n t h e i r equipment o v e r t h e GOBH
upon w i t h d r a w a l . I n t h i s way t h e Bosnian Army c o u l d
a l s o p r o v i d e some p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e e v a c u a t i o n f o r c e .
Our assumption has been t h a t t h i s would t r i g g e r h o s t i l e
Serb a c t i o n a g a i n s t these f o r c e s , b u t i f t h e e x t r a c t i o n
environment i s h o s t i l e i n any event t h i s may n o t be so
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Multilateral
We would c a l l f o r an end o f t h e arms embargo because i t s
c o n t i n u a t i o n i n t h e absence o f a peacekeeping f o r c e o r o t h e r
UNSC a c t i o n t o p r e s e r v e t h e peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina
i t s r i g h t t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e UN C h a r t e r .
I t would seem d i f f i c u l t f o r Russia o r o t h e r s t a t e s t o j u s t i f y
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e arms embargo i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed,
Russian Rep C h u r k i n proposed l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo l a s t year
as p a r t o f t h e Contact Group's package o f i n c e n t i v e s and
d i s i n c e n t i v e s i f Bosnia accepted t h e CG p l a n and t h e Serbs d i d
not.
S t i l l , one c o u l d expect Russia and even some NATO a l l i e s
t o argue t h a t l i f t i n g t h e embargo would o n l y e s c a l a t e t h e
v i o l e n c e w i t h o u t a l t e r i n g t h e outcome f u n d a m e n t a l l y and r u n t h e
r i s k o f w i d e n i n g o f t h e c o n f l i c t . A l l i e s would a l s o be wary o f
l i f t because o f t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r e s s u r e s t o p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bosnian government.
NATO/Coalition
I f Russia o r some a n o t h e r UNSC member (China) appeared t o
be t h e p r i n c i p a l o b s t a c l e t o m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t , we might press
f o r a N A T O / c o a l i t i o n a c t i o n t o achieve t h e d e s i r e d g o a l . Our
argument would h i n g e on r i g h t s t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51
o f t h e UN C h a r t e r . However, absent a UNSC a c t i o n t o remove t h e
embargo, we would s t i l l be v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e c r i t i c i s m s we have
l e v e l e d a t proponents o f u n i l a t e r a l l i f t and r i s k l o o s i n g
s u p p o r t f o r compliance w i t h o t h e r UN-mandated s a n c t i o n s regimes.
L i f t Only
" L i f t and p r a y " would seem t o be a c o m p l e t e l y i n d e f e n s i b l e
s t r a t e g y b o t h a t home and abroad. Even t h e most i s o l a t i o n i s t
Republicans a r e n o t a d v o c a t i n g t h i s approach. While t h i s would
end t h e stigma o f s u p p o r t i n g UNPROFOR, i t would c r e a t e t h e
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t we had d e c i d e d t o l e a v e t h e Bosnian government
t o f e n d f o r i t s e l f on t h e b l a c k market o r r e l y on I s l a m i c
states.
,
The GOBH m i g h t w e l l r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed, t h e o n l y advantage o f t h i s approach would seem t o be
t h a t i t would decrease t h e BSA's i n c e n t i v e t o c o m p l i c a t e o r
r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l . However, t h e BSA would know t h a t t h e GOBH
would r e c e i v e arms from I s l a m i c and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , even i f
the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments.
T h i s outcome
would p u t p r e s s u r e on t h e F e d e r a t i o n and would r i s k t h e ensuing
c o n f l i c t from becoming a c l a s h between Muslims and C h r i s t i a n s .
Arming and T r a i n i n g
On t h e f a c e o f i t , arming and t r a i n i n g by " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s "
has a number o f b e n e f i t s .
I t would l i m i t t h e e x t e n t o f U.S.
engagement, making i t e a s i e r t o a v o i d t h e " A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n " o f
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-6the post-withdrawal c o n f l i c t . In t u r n , t h i s could help prevent
the s t r u g g l e from becoming a surrogate c o n f l i c t between
Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.
I d e n t i f y i n g l i k e l y " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s " i s more problematic.
As f o r arming, many West European governments might be
r e l u c t a n t t o f u e l the c o n f l i c t due t o fears o f widening. Some
f r o n t l i n e Central European governments might have s i m i l a r
fears, and e n l i s t i n g them i n such an e n t e r p r i s e would run
contrary t o our e f f o r t s t o continue the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f
these s o c i e t i e s . This leaves Turkey, I r a n , and/or other
Islamic c o u n t r i e s , a l l o f whom have l o t s o f capacity and high
m o t i v a t i o n . But i f these states get involved, modulating the
flow w i l l become more complicated, not t o mention the
p o l a r i z i n g impact of making t h i s a clash between Islam and
Christianity.
As f o r t r a i n i n g , i f the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds,
Croatia would o f f e r s p r o x i m i t y , high m o t i v a t i o n , and an
eagerness t o cooperate w i t h NATO. The downside r i s k s are t h a t
e n l i s t i n g Croatia so f r o n t a l l y i n the c o n f l i c t against the
Bosnian Serbs would r i s k reopening the Serb-Croat c o n f l i c t i n a
bigger way.
C l e a r l y , Croatia's cooperation would be e s s e n t i a l
to any arming and t r a i n i n g package f o r Bosnia. However, i t s
use as a t r a n s i t and staging area are d i f f e r e n t than i t s use as
the t r a i n i n g ground and launch pad f o r o f f e n s i v e operations
against Serbs.
Robust L i f t and S t r i k e
Here the assessment i s i n many ways unchanged from the
e a r l y days o f the war i n 1992.
L i f t i n g the arms embargo and
beginning some arming and t r a i n i n g o f the GOBH forces w i l l take
time. During t h a t time they would be very vulnerable t o BSA
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s . The most e f f e c t i v e way t o m i t i g a t e t h i s
would be t o conduct supporting a i r s t r i k e s against BSA heavy
weapons, m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s , and operations. I f l i a i s o n w i t h
the Bosnian Army was established, i t might be possible t o use
Bosnian forces as forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s and t a r g e t
designators. At a minimum, we could argua t h a t NATO's August
1993 decisions t o undertake a i r s t r i k e s t o prevent the
s t r a n g u l a t i o n o f Sarajevo and other safe areas remain v a l i d .
An even more robust option, would be designed t o l i m i t VJ
involvement by t h r e a t e n i n g t o t a r g e t VJ m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s
i n the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other t r a n s i t points
between the FRY and Bosnia i f m i l i t a r y support continues.
This would give the GOBH the best chance f o r s u r v i v a l , but
i t has several s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s . Such strong a c t i o n against
the Serbs might t r i g g e r more d i r e c t Russian support. I t could
also spark an u p r i s i n g i n Kosovo or Vodjvodina provinces t h a t
could t r i g g e r the wider war we seek t o avoid.
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s t r i t e , Np L i f t
T h i s o p t i o n , a l s o c o n s i d e r e d i n l a t e 1992, i s g a i n i n g
s u p p o r t e r s o u t s i d e government once a g a i n f o r d i f f e r e n t
reasons. T h i s approach would seek t o " l e v e l t h e p l a y i n g f i e l d "
by t a r g e t i n g BSA heavy weapons and o t h e r m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
Once UNPROFOR was o u t , i t c o u l d be accomplished w i t h o u t f e a r o f
hostage t a k i n g . Forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s would be r e q u i r e d , b u t
i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o t r a i n Bosnian government f o r c e s t o
p e r f o r m t h a t f u n c t i o n f o r NATO f o r c e s . Most m i l i t a r y
assessments have concluded t h a t a i r s t r i k e s a l o n e would be
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o save t h e enclaves and break a s i e g e o f
S a r a j e v o . However, a i r s t r i k e s m i g h t be s u c c e s s f u l i n
a c h i e v i n g o t h e r , l e s s demanding g o a l s a t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e .
Ruroanitarian R e l i e f : Over t o t h e Bosnians
PRM's paper e x p l a i n s i n g r e a t d e t a i l how t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f
UNPROFOR would d i s r u p t r e l i e f e f f o r t s by i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . However, we need t o e x p l o r e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f
t u r n i n g over management and d e l i v e r y o f r e l i e f e f f o r t s t o t h e
Bosnian government.
Our p r o v i s i o n o f s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e might
f r e e r e s o u r c e s and p e r s o n n e l f o r such e f f o r t s and t h e Bosnians
c o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h o u t c u r r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s on UN and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s . A l s o , i f we can h o l d t h e F e d e r a t i o n
t o g e t h e r , t h e s e r e g i o n s and C r o a t i a c o u l d remain secure s u p p l y
bases.
Assessing/Managing t h e Russian R e a c t i o n
I n Moscow's f r a c t i o u s p o l i t i c a l environment, an expanded
U.S.-NATO r o l e i n Bosnia would appear a t f i r s t g l a n c e t o be a
t e m p t i n g t a r g e t e i t h e r f o r Y e l t s i n ' s opponents o r f o r Y e l t s i n
h i m s e l f and o t h e r s eager t o p o s t u r e i n defense o f Russian
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r u n up t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y and
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . While some s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs and
p o i n t e d c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. moves would be i n e v i t a b l e , t h e
o v e r a l l impact on e l i t e and p o p u l a r s e n t i m e n t may be more
manageable and l e s s e x p l o s i v e t h a n g e n e r a l l y p r e d i c t e d .
How
S t r o n g i s Pan-Slavism? .
U.S. and Russian p o l l i n g d a t a r o u t i n e l y h i g h l i g h t t h e
absence o f any s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a r Russian s u p p o r t f o r S e r b i a
o r i t s agenda i n t h e Balkans. D e s p i t e c o n s t a n t Russian (and
Western) a s s e r t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e Russian view o f S e r b i a
corresponds r o u g h l y w i t h a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d Poland o r Turkey
( i . e . , t h e s e s t a t e s a r e seen as m i l d l y f r i e n d l y t o Russia a t
b e s t ) . L i k e most f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , events i n a
post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would r e s o n a t e f a i n t l y w i t h a Russian
e l e c t o r a t e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h day-to-day socioeconomic concerns.
P o l i t i c i a n s from across t h e p o l i t i c a l spectrum would f i n d i t
d i f f i c u l t t o rouse average Russians o u t o f t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n c e
or t o s t i r up s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Y e l t s i n government f o r
it. — - ^ [ f N ^ r r i f e M l P O O O Y
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-8Moscow has been a c t i v e l y w o r k i n g t o r e t a i n and expand i t s
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Balkans ( i n c l u d i n g w i t h Greece) and
c l e a r l y does n o t -want t o be m a r g i n a l i z e d by Western d e c i s i o n s
on Bosnia. B u t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e West over e f f o r t s t o
save t h e rump Bosnia would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y advance t h o s e
i n t e r e s t s . Moreover, such an stance would a l s o be p e r c e i v e d as
a n t i - M u s l i m and t h e r e f o r e do damage t o Moscow's warming
r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a n and o t h e r I s l a m i c s t a t e s .
Russia's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Balkans, d e s p i t e
Z h i r i n o v s k y ' s r h e t o r i c , a r e f a r from e v i d e n t t o t h e average
Russian. Given t h e l i n g e r i n g o u t r a g e o v e r t h e war i n Chechnya
— much c l o s e r t o home — Moscow would have a h a r d t i m e
j u s t i f y i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t i n S e r b i a , even
a d v i s o r s / t r a i n e r s , t o t h e Russian p u b l i c .
The Duma has gone on r e c o r d as f a v o r i n g m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o
the Serbs i f t h e arms embargo on Bosnia i s l i f t e d .
B u t Russian
arms s a l e s now g e n e r a l l y o p e r a t e on a cash b a s i s . I t i s n o t
c l e a r t h a t Russia has e i t h e r t h e r e s o u r c e s o r t h e p o l i t i c a l
m o t i v a t i o n t o p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e on c r e d i t t o a b a n k r u p t S e r b i a . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f
n o n - o f f i c i a l Russian s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs, i n t h e form o f
v o l u n t e e r s and arms, i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t t h e magnitude
of such s u p p o r t seems u n l i k e l y t o be d e c i s i v e .
Managing Russian E l i t e P e r c e p t i o n s
To be sure, t h e Moscow-based e l i t e i s l i k e l y t o b r i s t l e a t
a more muscular U.S.-NATO p o s t u r e i n Bosnia. A l t h o u g h most
f o r e i g n p o l i c y c i r c l e s have embraced g r e a t power r h e t o r i c and
b l u s t e r on many h i g h - p r o f i l e i s s u e s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e f i r e i n
the b e l l y l e f t f o r t h e Balkans. The e l i t e ' s Bosnia a n x i e t i e s
reached t h e i r h i g h - w a t e r mark more t h a n a year ago and were
sparked l a r g e l y by t h e A p r i l 1994 a i r s t r i k e s around S a r a j e v o .
T h i s g r o w i n g Bosnia f a t i g u e has a l s o been f e d by t h e a c t i o n s o f
the Bosnian Serbs on t h e ground and by Moscow's h i g h - p r o f i l e
d i p l o m a t i c f o r a y s — and f a i l u r e s — i n t h e r e g i o n , t h e Contact
Group, and t h e UNSC. Churkin's u n p r o d u c t i v e v i s i t and gloomy
assessment a r e a n o t h e r example o f t h i s f r u s t r a t i o n .
The steady downgrading o f Russian e f f o r t s i n t h e Balkans
a l s o i s l i n k e d i m p l i c i t l y t o t h e Russian e l i t e ' s g r o w i n g
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h NATO expansion. While Y e l t s i n and Kozyrev
would s t i l l be t h e key p l a y e r s i n how t h e Russian i n t e r n a l
debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, t h e y w i l l need a c l e a r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p o t e n t i a l c o s t s o f opposing i n t e r n a t i o n a l
consensus on t h i s i s s u e . Given t h e Russian l e a d e r s h i p ' s
o v e r r i d i n g s t a k e i n t r y i n g t o h o l d t h e l i n e on NATO expansion
and r e p a i r i n g t h e damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect t h a t
Moscow w i l l be f a r l e s s i n c l i n e d t o f a n a new round o f c r i s i s
i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S. and i t s A l l i e s over Bosnia.
S t i l l , i t w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e U.S. t o
engage d i r e c t l y w i t h Russian o f f i c i a l s e a r l y and t r y t o
CLINTON l i m m P O O O Y
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-9i n f l u e n c e e l i t e opinion as our o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n becomes
c l e a r e r . I n a d d i t i o n t o g i v i n g Russian o f f i c i a l s a sense o f
engagement i n the development of p o l i c y , we should also look a t
face-savers t h a t would make i t easier f o r Moscow t o abstain
from a UNSC vote on l i f t i n g the arms embargo. For example, we
could advance a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n t h a t would l i f t the arms
embargo on a l l the Yugoslav successor s t a t e s . This would have
l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l impact on Serbia's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l .
S h i f t i n g Alignments
In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would l i k e l y have t o
deal w i t h s h i f t i n g alignments among Contact Group members.
While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive o f
e f f o r t s t o i s o l a t e Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French
resistance t o t h i s tack and even c o l l u s i o n t o cut deals w i t h
Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security P o l i c y
would o f f e r countervaling pressures t h a t might l i m i t the depth
of such f i s s u r e s . But maintaining even the l i m i t e d degree o f
Western u n i t y we have today would be d i f f i c u l t as o l d biases
and d i f f e r i n g g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s became more pronounced.
Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169
CLINTON LI
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