1
500
15
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/75216b5a9c3675cf8ce80396951e3b92.pdf
78c4a27b7fb519ef4c6a33ef89c7aeb4
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�CONFIDENTIAL
4683
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HIN GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
B i l a t e r a l Meeting w i t h President Jacques
Chirac o f France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary o f State
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Pamela Harriman, Ambassador t o France
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , Notetaker
France
Jacques Chirac, President
Herve De Charette, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Jacques Andreani, Ambassador t o the U.S.
Jean-David L e v i t t e , Diplomatic Adviser
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1995, 2:45 p.m. - 3:37 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
President Chirac: Thank you f o r r e c e i v i n g me. I would l i k e t o
ask one q u e s t i o n . We received i n f o r m a t i o n a few hours ago about
a massing o f Bosnian government troops i n Sarajevo. We are
w o r r i e d by t h a t . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : You should be w o r r i e d . Let me t e l l you what we
know. I wanted t o r a i s e t h i s i n our discussions on Bosnia. The
Bosnian government has been improving the s t r e n g t h o f i t s f o r c e s .
They b e l i e v e they are q u i t e strong now and are i n t e r e s t e d i n
launching an o f f e n s i v e t o open the road t o Sarajevo.
Secretary
C h r i s t o p h e r has cautioned Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c very s t r o n g l y
about the p o s s i b l e adverse consequences. We have t o l d them t h a t
they c o u l d l o s e , t h a t they could put the peacekeepers i n more
danger, t h a t t h i s could lead t o more s h e l l i n g o f Sarajevo, t h a t
i t c o u l d endanger the continued existence o f UNPROFOR. We don't
know i f t h i s message had any impact on S i l a j d z i c o r others i n h i s
government. They are g e t t i n g a l o t o f encouragement here from
the new Republicans i n Congress who are pushing f o r a u n i l a t e r a l
IfSfffff^LLMJON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
Co
En W
u ^
u
Q
�CONFIDENTIAL
l i f t i n g o f the arms embargo. They know I i n t e n d t o veto t h a t and
t h a t they cannot o v e r r i d e my veto — a t l e a s t i n the Senate. But
we are v e r y concerned about the o f f e n s i v e .
We don't know i f i t
w i l l go forward, b u t we are t r y i n g t o discourage i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y
as i t c o u l d occur d u r i n g the G-7 Summit. fe)
President Chirac:
U.S.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
h e l c t o D r e v e n t t h e d e f e a t o f thm R n s n i s n s .
The P r e s i d e n t : We w i l l do whatever we can. They h o n e s t l y
b e l i e v e t h a t they can defeat the Serbs and t h a t they can f o r c e a
l i f t i n g o f the arms embargo. They b e l i e v e t h a t i f they can get
heavy weapons and get t r a i n e d on them, they could use them before
the Bosnian Serbs are able t o overwhelm them w i t h t h e i r
a r t i l l e r y . Our m i l i t a r y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s i s a b s o l u t e l y wrong
and we have t o l d them so repeatedly. But r i g h t now they are
l i f t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t they have improved t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y over
the past months. f&)
President Chirac: This means t h a t they have been g e t t i n g arms
and t h a t the embargo i s n ' t working. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : They are also emboldened by a l l the t a l k i n
Congress about u n i l a t e r a l l i f t .
But we have t o l d them r e p e a t e d l y
t h a t they can't win and t h a t I w i l l veto u n i l a t e r a l l i f t .
We
have t o l d them t h a t we support the UN mission and t h a t we are
determined t o work i n p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h our a l l i e s — e s p e c i a l l y
the UK and France — t o strengthen UNPROFOR. Maybe they b e l i e v e
t h a t they can open the road w i t h o u t any o t h e r consequences.
Maybe they t h i n k t h a t t h i s w i l l speed the day o f l i f t i n g the arms
embargo. But we are doing what we can t o discourage t h i s . fG4
President Chirac:
Summit.
They may launch the o f f e n s i v e d u r i n g the G-7
The P r e s i d e n t : We t h i n k they may do t h i s i n order t o focus the
a t t e n t i o n o f t h e w o r l d on Bosnia, and t o p u t t h e heat on a l l o f
us d u r i n g t h e G-7. Of course, i t would be good t o get the road
opened. But i f they launch the o f f e n s i v e , t h e Serbs w i l l n o t be
seen by t h e Russians and others as i n the wrong when they r e a c t .
COHriDDNTIMi
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
Secretary Christopher: Our l a t e s t i n t e l l i g e n c e i s t h a t t h e
Bosnians are not q u i t e ready t o launch t h e o f f e n s i v e and may w a i t
u n t i l t h e 20th o r 21st, b u t they could go e a r l i e r than t h i s . I
t o l d S i l a j d z i c t h a t i f they do, they w i l l be on t h e i r own. We
w i l l n o t come t o t h e i r rescue i f they s t a r t something and then
get a b l a c k eye. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s r i g h t and they aren't
going t o be ready d u r i n g the G-7, i t w i l l give us more time t o
work on them. fe)
President Chirac: We have the same i n f o r m a t i o n as you. I was
informed t h a t a few hours ago the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f forces was
g e t t i n g b i g g e r and b i g g e r as we speak. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : I suggest we p u t the issue o f the Bosnian
o f f e n s i v e t o t h e side and come back t o i t l a t e r . I would l i k e t o
t a l k about t h e s t a t u s o f the Rapid Reaction Force. I w i l l do a l l
I can t o deal w i t h the o f f e n s i v e , b u t every day more and more
members o f Congress want t o f o r c e t h e u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f the
arms embargo. You may have had an impact i n your d i s c u s s i o n w i t h
the Senators and Congressmen over lunch. I understand you t o l d
them what I have been saying f o r months. f&)
President Chirac:
I doubt I had much e f f e c t .
fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : You are there on the ground and have a f i r s t - h a n d
appreciation of the s i t u a t i o n .
^
President Chirac: I can only say, before l e a v i n g t h e s u b j e c t o f
the o f f e n s i v e , t h a t i n the c u r r e n t circumstances i t would be good
to have t h e UN S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n on the Rapid Reaction
Force enacted tomorrow. They are ready i n New York.f
1 4b 1 4
.d
] The
Russians w i l l support i t . We j u s t need the "yes" vote o f the
United S t a t e s .
We should do t h i s before t h e G-7. I t w i l l be a
major s i g n a l , even though I know you have problems w i t h the
Congress. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : The main issue w i t h t h e Congress i s t h e f a c t
t h a t , under t h e proposal, we would be o b l i g e d t o fund 30 percent
of the Rapid Reaction Force, and Congress would have t o
a p p r o p r i a t e t h e funds. This new Congress i s t h e most
i s o l a t i o n i s t Congress since the 1930s. Last n i g h t I sent them
another budget w i t h a c l e a r plan t o balance t h e budget over 10
years. I t would p r o v i d e f o r cuts i n o v e r a l l spending — except
f o r defense, r e t i r e m e n t and healthcare f o r t h e e l d e r l y — by 20%
across t h e board i n r e a l d o l l a r s (or 40% w i t h o u t i n f l a t i o n ) . I t
would h o l d on t o a l l o f our f o r e i g n a f f a i r s investments and
increase spending on education. You must see t h i s issue i n t h a t
™ ^ C L I N T 0 N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
c o n t e x t . I would vote l i k e t h i s [snapping h i s f i n g e r s ] i f I
d i d n ' t have t o get the money. I f we voted tomorrow, i t c o u l d
undermine our a b i l i t y t o keep the word o f the United States on
f u n d i n g o f the Rapid Reaction Force, and i t could cause more
t r o u b l e . That i s the o n l y issue.
The head o f the House Foreign A f f a i r s Committee, Ben Oilman — a
p r e t t y good guy, not a r e a c t i o n a r y — has w r i t t e n t o me on t h i s .
A l o t o f people i n the Senate are good on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and
they want t o see us m a i n t a i n our commitments. But we haven't
f i g u r e d out a s t r a t e g y t h a t would enable us t o vote tomorrow i n
f a v o r o f the Rapid Reaction Force. There has been some change i n
the m i s s i o n o f the f o r c e since the o r i g i n a l d i s c u s s i o n a t the
P a r i s meeting.
I f I could f i g u r e out a way not t o make t h i n g s
worse w i t h the Congress, I would vote tomorrow. Our request f o r
a delay i s so t h a t we can f u l l y b r i e f the Congress on why we
support the Force and why the U.S. should finance p a r t o f i t .
Ambassador Harriman knows w e l l t h a t every Senator b e l i e v e s he or
she should be P r e s i d e n t . I f we voted f o r the Rapid Reaction
Force w i t h o u t t e l l i n g them, they would almost c e r t a i n l y deny me
the funds.
fG}
I f you s a i d t o me t h a t i t would be worth r i s k i n g the funds, then
I would consider v o t i n g tomorrow. But i f you can give me two
days t o a l l o w the Congress t o beat up on the Secretary and the
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Adviser, t o t e l l us how t e r r i b l e Bosnia i s , and
t o make speeches, i t would increase the chances t h a t I c o u l d fund
the f o r c e .
{G)
-But again, i f i n your judgment, you need the vote tomorrow
because something bad could happen, and you are ready t o increase
the r i s k t h a t I can't pay, then t e l l me.
You have stuck your
neck out time and time again. I support the Rapid Reaction Force
and want t o do the r i g h t t h i n g . I f we have an agreement, I want
t o h e l p . But i f we go t o a vote tomorrow, i t would reduce the
chances s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h a t I can persuade Congress t o fund i t .
President Chirac: There are two problems, p o l i t i c a l and
f i n a n c i a l . P o l i t i c a l l y , everyone i n c l u d i n g the Russians i s ready
t o vote f o r the r e s o l u t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia being what
i t i s , I t h i n k we should approve the r e s o l u t i o n tomorrow ~ t h a t
i s , b e f o r e the G-7 Summit. On the f i n a n c i a l problem, maybe you
cannot get the funds from the Congress t o pay the U.S. share.
We
w i l l see.
The P r e s i d e n t : Ours i s a p r e t t y b i g share —
do i t , I would l i k e t o do i t r i g h t .
•COMriDENTIAL,
31 p e r c e n t .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
I f we
�CONFIDENTIAL
President Chirac: But we are in such a situation that I will
take the risk. ^Gj
The P r e s i d e n t : So you would choose the p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t now,
even w i t h an increased f i n a n c i a l r i s k ? fe)
President Chirac: Yes, I ' l l take the f i n a n c i a l r i s k , although I
know you w i l l do your utmost t o get funding. fe)
Secretary Christopher: I t h i n k t h a t i f we go ahead w i t h o u t
c o n s u l t i n g t h e Congress, we r i s k i n c u r r i n g great outrage on t h e
Hill.
I r e c e i v e d the most angry l e t t e r I have ever r e c e i v e d from
Oilman. He was outraged t h a t we would go ahead w i t h t h e
r e s o l u t i o n w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g Congress. I t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o
get support i n t h e best o f circumstances.
You helped a l o t w i t h
your e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e Rapid Reaction Force a t today's lunch
w i t h t h e Congressional leaders. But i f , on t o p o f the normal
d i f f i c u l t i e s we face, we added the d i s c o u r t e s y o f f a i l i n g t o
c o n s u l t , i t would almost guarantee the f a i l u r e t o secure f u n d i n g ,
coupled w i t h the r i s k o f a negative Congressional r e s o l u t i o n .
The President:
Hill?
Chris, what consultations are planned on the
m
Secretary Christopher: We w i l l t a l k t o a l l t h e committee
chairmen, t h e l e a d e r s h i p , and t h e chairmen o f the A p p r o p r i a t i o n
and Foreign A f f a i r s Committees. fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I s there any chance t h a t we could c o n s u l t on an
emergency b a s i s , b u i l d i n g on t h e d i s c u s s i o n a t the lunch today?
Secretary Christopher: I would l i k e t o assess t h a t
recommendation. President Chirac made some progress a t lunch
w i t h Lugar, Nunn, McCain and others — many o f t h e key Senators
were t h e r e . We should see how they f e e l i n t h e wake o f t h a t
d i s c u s s i o n . I know t h a t President Chirac s a i d t h a t he and John
Major don't understand t h e need f o r delay. But t h e r e has been
great c o n f u s i o n engendered by two f a c t o r s . F i r s t , we o r i g i n a l l y
thought t h a t the Rapid Reaction Force would i n v o l v e n a t i o n a l
f o r c e s ; t h i s was our understanding a t the Paris Defense
M i n i s t e r s ' meeting.
Second, there were statements by t h e UN l a s t
weekend — e s p e c i a l l y by Akashi — which drove our Congress up
the w a l l . Those statements spoke of not doing a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t
the consent o f t h e Bosnian Serbs. Your c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e
Congressmen helped c l a r i f y t h a t and I understand you w i l l be
seeing Dole and G i n g r i c h t h i s a f t e r n o o n . These two issues have
added t o our f i n a n c i a l problems, so we need t o c o n s u l t c a r e f u l l y
and l e t i t s e t t l e i n . (€)
^ ^ C L I N T O N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
President Chirac: Dole asked t o meet me t h i s a f t e r n o o n and I
w i l l see what I can do.
The P r e s i d e n t : Very good. From t h e day I took o f f i c e . Dole has
been encouraging t h e Bosnian government t o ignore what I want t o
do and pushing f o r an independent s t r a t e g y t o l i f t t h e arms
embargo. When you see him, you should t e l l him your p o s i t i o n on
the arms embargo. On the issue o f the Rapid Reaction Force, you
should t e l l Dole t h a t whatever he may t h i n k about t h e arms
embargo and UNPROFOR, we need the Rapid Reaction Force and we
should never be i n a p o s i t i o n where our f o r c e s can be taken
hostage... f&)
President Chirac:
...or h u m i l i a t e d . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I am going t o say t h a t I support President
Chirac's e f f o r t s and back the Rapid Reaction Force, and t h a t I
b e l i e v e we should pay a p a r t i a l share o f t h e cost because, as
long as our A l l i e s are t h e r e , we have t o p r o t e c t our people. We
need t o separate the Rapid Reaction Force i n Dole's mind from h i s
d e s i r e t o l i f t t h e arms embargo. I f we p l a y on t h e n a t i o n a l
honor i s s u e , on the importance o f not having our people captured,
we have a chance o f persuading him. G i n g r i c h has been g e n e r a l l y
more s u p p o r t i v e o f our f o r e i g n p o l i c y . He i s not an
i s o l a t i o n i s t , b u t he i s l o o k i n g f o r ways t o please h i s p a r t y on
c e r t a i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues. So I would make t h e same
arguments t o G i n g r i c h . He w i l l be very moved by t h e argument
r e g a r d i n g p r o t e c t i n g the p r i d e o f French and B r i t i s h f o r c e s . . .
President Chirac:
...and t h a t o f other UNPROFOR c o n t r i b u t o r s . . .
The P r e s i d e n t :
...and t h e i n t e g r i t y o f the UN presence, as w e l l
as t h e s a f e t y o f the t r o o p s . This w i l l resonate w i t h them.
A f t e r your meeting, we w i l l take soundings. When you r e t u r n t o
dinner t o n i g h t , you can r e p o r t on your t a l k s and we can assess
where we are. Okay?
President Chirac:
Okay. (U)
The President: I understand what you are saying about how good
it would be to have a vote before the G-7 Summit. (£J
President Chirac: I t w i l l be very u s e f u l v i s - a - v i s t h e Serbs.
I t w i l l p u t b i g pressure on M i l o s e v i c .
rnOTTn
,Tm
" CLINTQN LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�QONriDDHTIAL
1.4b,.1.4d
, When we
decided on t h e Rapid Reaction Force, I c a l l e d M i l o s e v i c and t o l d
him t h a t i t wasn't designed t o a t t a c k anyone, b u t t o p r o t e c t
UNPROFOR.'
i
^Mr. Frasure had almost
succeeded i n g e t t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f Bosnia. This could have been
a very i m p o r t a n t step toward peace b u t he d i d n ' t get t h e r e .
^ e have persuaded Y e l t s i n t o agree. I f t h e U.S.
W
slows t h e pace a t the UN, i t w i l l give Y e l t s i n and M i l o s e v i c more
oxygen. I understand your problems w i t h t h e Congress. We c o u l d
vote tomorrow and then Congress wouldn't fund i t . That would be
too bad. I understand the argument o f Secretary Christopher
about t h e d i s c o u r t e s y and the p o l i t i c a l consequences o f n o t
c o n s u l t i n g . Only you can judge the importance o f t h i s . I f I say
to Dole and G i n g r i c h as I d i d a t lunch t h a t t h e i r behavior i s
h e l p i n g t h e Serbs and not the Bosnians, maybe t h i s w i l l h e l p .
The P r e s i d e n t :
and we can see
t e l l them t h a t
Rapid Reaction
w i l l play into
Yes, say t h a t t o Dole. I w i l l c a l l both o f them
where we are t o n i g h t . Maybe we can do i t . I f you
i f the U.S. i s n ' t able t o vote tomorrow f o r the
Force (which i n v o l v e s no U.S. ground f o r c e s ) , i t
t h e hands of the Serbs, t h a t c o u l d h e l p . fG-)
Secretary C h r i s t o p h e r :
argument. fG^
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
They w i l l be very impressed by t h a t
Plus i t i s t r u e .
We w i l l work on t h i s
I have c a l l e d M i l o s e v i c
today.
President Chirac: I know we have l i t t l e time l e f t and President
Santer i s w a i t i n g around the corner, b u t I wanted t o t a l k about
U.S. disengagement from a i d t o the developing c o u n t r i e s . We are
very w o r r i e d about t h i s . We are t a l k i n g about c o u n t r i e s who need
assistance and whose p o p u l a t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g f a s t . I f we don't
GOMn DDHT I M J ,
'CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
c r e a t e t h e means o f keeping t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e i r own
c o u n t r i e s , we w i l l have a r e a l problem. Today t h e European
Union, which has roughly t h e same GNP as t h e United States, i s
making t h r e e times t h e e f f o r t i n f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e . Our
impression i s t h a t you are moving backwards based on the present
behavior o f t h e Republicans.
We f i n d t h i s very w o r r y i n g and w i l l
raise t h i s at Halifax.
There i s a q u e s t i o n o f r e p l e n i s h i n g t h e funds f o r the World
Bank's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n (IDA). We should
support t h e r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f the IDA. They do a b e a u t i f u l j o b ,
I t would not be moral o r acceptable
1.4b, 1.4d
i n h u m a n i t a r i a n terms t o allow people t o d i e o f hunger. I t would
also be p o l i t i c a l l y very dangerous. There too, I know you have
problems w i t h t h e Congress.
The P r e s i d e n t : I've been t r y i n g f o r months t o send a c l e a r
message t h a t i f t h e c u r r e n t l e g i s l a t i o n passes the House, I w i l l
veto i t . This l e g i s l a t i o n i s very r e s t r i c t i v e on f o r e i g n
a s s i s t a n c e . I sent up a budget t h a t would f u l f i l l our
obligations t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n f u l l .
The new budget, while- making l a r g e r c u t s , w i l l s t i l l m a i n t a i n our
commitments. I want you t o know t h a t when we come t o the end o f
the process — i n August or September — I w i l l be very f i r m i n
h o l d i n g on t o these programs. I n t h e U.S. t h e r e i s now no
p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c y f o r f o r e i g n a i d , b u t I agree t h a t i t i s
m o r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y t h e r i g h t t h i n g t o do. I w i l l be f i r m
and I t h i n k i t i s a b a t t l e t h a t I w i l l win. You should hammer
anyone you see on C a p i t o l H i l l on t h i s . Congress i s very s h o r t s i g h t e d . The American people want t o balance the budget and c u t
f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e because they b e l i e v e we spend 15 percent on
f o r e i g n a i d . The r e a l i t y i s t h a t we o n l y spend one-tenth o f t h a t
amount. fe-)
President Chirac:
I understand it's 1.5 percent.
{G)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s about one percent o f our budget. I f you ask
the people what we should be spending they say about t h r e e
percent o f the budget. People don't know the f a c t s , and Congress
shouldn't be g i v i n g i n t o i s o l a t i o n i s m .
I am determine t o f i g h t
and b e l i e v e I w i l l win. You should say e x a c t l y what you t o l d me
t o Congressional leaders. They know i t i s t r u e . Dole and
G i n g r i c h know t h e importance of t h i s i s s u e .
^
President Chirac: The cuts would be very bad f o r the U.S. image
i n the w o r l d . fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Dole wants t o be President. How does he expect
t o r e s t o r e t h e cuts i f he becomes President? But I b e l i e v e I
""""CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
w i l l win, although i t i s good f o r you t o help press on t h i s
issue.
President Chirac: There are some other s u b j e c t s we c o u l d
discuss. Perhaps we can discuss European s e c u r i t y a r c h i t e c t u r e
i n the meeting w i t h Santer. f€-)
Secretary Christopher: There i s a danger t h a t Bosnia w i l l h i j a c k
the H a l i f a x Summit. The way f o r us t o a v o i d t h i s i s t o stay very
close t o g e t h e r and not a l l o w the press t o p u l l us a p a r t . One o f
the keys i s saying t h a t we have agreed t h a t UNPROFOR should s t a y
and t h a t i t would be t r a g i c i f UNPROFOR were t o leave. We should
say t h a t the Rapid Reaction Force i s the best insurance t h a t
UNPROFOR w i l l s t a y . f € j
President Chirac: That i s a b s o l u t e l y t r u e and i t i s best t o
speak the t r u t h . (U)
Secretary Christopher: That's r i g h t . We have t o keep our
s t o r i e s s t r a i g h t . We also can say t h a t we are c o n t i n u i n g t o seek
a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n w i t h the new assistance of C a r l B i l d t . The
t h r e e p o i n t s are: UNPROFOR remains, we are s t r e n g t h e n i n g
UNPROFOR w i t h the Rapid Reaction Force, and we are seeking a
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . I f we can m a i n t a i n t h i s consensus, we can
keep the Summit from becoming a Bosnian Summit. KH
President Chirac:
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, but we do want t o help i f i t becomes
necessary. (€)
-President
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : I support what Secretary Christopher j u s t s a i d .
When you won the e l e c t i o n , I was very pleased because I b e l i e v e
t h a t you would b r i n g energy and g r e a t e r u n i t y t o the European
position.
I have done what I could here t o move our system t o
the p o i n t t h a t we would be c l e a r l y committed i f there had t o be
w i t h d r a w a l , o r i f UN forces were i s o l a t e d and needed our help
s h o r t o f w i t h d r a w a l . My decisions caused a b i g s t i r .
I had t o
make c l e a r we are not o f f e r i n g a t a x i s e r v i c e , but t h a t we are
m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o help i f c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e a s s i s t i n g our
a l l i e s . f&)
I t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r us t o send ground f o r c e s , but I can't t e l l
you how i m p o r t a n t i t i s t h a t we t r y t o m a i n t a i n a u n i t e d f r o n t —
not o n l y p u b l i c l y , but i n what our advisers say to the media.
"""""CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
10
The press i s f u l l o f s t o r i e s i n which Europeans are saying t h a t
the Americans are weak and d i v i d e d . I am t r y i n g t o get money f o r
the Rapid Reaction Force and t o do what I can so t h a t you w i l l
have g r e a t e r confidence. This task w i l l be harder i f t h e r e are
s t o r i e s coming out o f other governments c r i t i c i z i n g our p o s i t i o n .
Our press i s out o f step w i t h our people on t h i s i s s u e . They are
offended by the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a h o r r i b l e problem i n t h e
h e a r t o f Europe and i t i s n o t being solved. Never mind t h a t
Northern I r e l a n d took 25 years t o solve, and the Middle East was
deadlocked f o r f i v e decades. The press b e l i e v e s t h a t we c o u l d
j u s t snap our f i n g e r s and the Bosnian problem would go away. The
press i s l o o k i n g a l l t h e time t o d i v i d e us from our a l l i e s . So
we need t o stay t o g e t h e r both o f f i c i a l l y and on background. fe)
President
Chirac:
I n speaking t o one of
the Senators a t lunch, he asked whether t h i s f o r c e was t o p e r m i t
UNPROFOR t o withdraw.
I s a i d no, i t was p r e c i s e l y t h e o p p o s i t e ,
and he had a complete misunderstanding o f our p o l i c y . We are
sending t h e Rapid Reaction Force t o ensure t h a t we are respected.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Santer? f€^
What are our o b j e c t i v e s f o r our next meeting w i t h
President Chirac:
a n i c e chat. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Union.
This i s the Euro-American summit.
We can have
We want t o help w i t h Turkey and the Customs
President Chirac: I am very f a v o r a b l e toward the Turks.
the Customs Union i s under c o n t r o l .
End o f Conversation
CONflDENTIAL/
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
I think
�CONFIDENTIAL
5422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Chancellor Helmut Kohl o f Germany
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony
Gardner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 13, 1995, 6:15-6:35 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Bosnia. (U)
Hello? (U)
Hello, B i l l ?
Yes, Helmut.
(U)
I ' d l i k e t o t a l k t o you about
Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I can w e l l imagine your
s i t u a t i o n i s c a t a s t r o p h i c . (U)
concern,
The
The P r e s i d e n t : We need t o decide what we are going t o do about
UNPROFOR. Jacques Chirac j u s t c a l l e d me w i t h a r a d i c a l p r o p o s a l :
e i t h e r we r e t a k e Srebrenica by m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w i t h U.S., French,
UK and German ground t r o o p s , o r we withdraw immediately because
o t h e r w i s e we can't defend the honor o f t h e UN. I t o l d him t h a t
t h i s wasn't a good idea. Even i f we r e t o o k Srebrenica, what
would we do t o defend i t ? We couldn't be sure t h a t t h e Muslims
would be any more ready t o defend i t than b e f o r e . We agreed t o
t a l k t o our Chiefs o f S t a f f and t h a t they would f o l l o w up.
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i spoke t o Admiral Lanxade. The French
m i l i t a r y agrees t h a t r e t a k i n g Srebrenica would be a b i g r i s k f o r
l i t t l e g a i n . They are focusing on r e i n f o r c i n g Gorazde w i t h 1,000
French peacekeepers and reopening the Mount Igman road t o
Sarajevo w i t h t h e Rapid Reaction Force. We t h i n k t h a t i s more
r e a l i s t i c . I know you spoke t o him e a r l i e r today. What do you
t h i n k ? Does Chirac e a r n e s t l y want t o p u l l out UNPROFOR i f we
don't agree? f^)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
D e c l a s s i f y o0|_ J N ^ f Q ^
LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
Let me j u s t say one t h i n g before t u r n i n g t o you: here i n the
U.S., t h e Congress i s saying t h a t the f a l l o f Srebrenica proves
t h a t UNPROFOR i s no good and t h a t we should l i f t the embargo
unilaterally.
I'm s t i l l opposing t h a t . I t h i n k I can defeat i t ,
but I may have t o veto i t . I wanted t o t a l k t o you about the
s i t u a t i o n and get your o p i n i o n . <€)
-Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, B i l l .
I was n o t able t o t a l k t o
Chirac h i m s e l f , b u t spoke t o Juppe. I spoke w i t h Chirac
yesterday and the day b e f o r e . I n my o p i n i o n , he i s , c o r r e c t l y ,
extremely upset by the whole s i t u a t i o n . However, I t h i n k we need
t o c l a r i f y a few t h i n g s before we go any f u r t h e r . F i r s t ,
Chirac's proposal would r e q u i r e UN S e c u r i t y Council approval.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
Absolutely.
(U)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The t h i r d problem which we should explore i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i s
p r e v e n t i n g the other "safe areas" from being taken. This i s one
of Chirac's other ideas. We need t o f i n d out i f we can r a l l y
Major's support since t h a t i s where he has h i s s o l d i e r s . Troops
from s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s are also on the ground; we shouldn't
overlook t h a t . f&)
I would f a v o r one more d i s c u s s i o n between the Chiefs o f
S t a f f w i t h B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n . As you know, we don't have
troops on the ground and don't p l a n t o . What do you t h i n k ?
The President: I think you have made some good points. I agree
that the Chiefs of Staff need to talk again. We can't do
something stupid. Defending Gorazde and opening the Mount Igman
road is a better course. It is still better to keep UNPROFOR
there than to withdraw it. tG)
CONFIDENTIAIJ
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
Chancellor Kohl: I agree completely: UNPROFOR should stay. On
the o t h e r hand, we need to recognize t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s
i n e x t r i c a b l e , even impossible. How can we avoid the f a c t t h a t
UNPROFOR troops may be taken hostage? The s i t u a t i o n i s
c a t a s t r o p h i c i n the eyes of world o p i n i o n .
1 4h 1 4d
In that
|
respect, Chirac i s c o r r e c t . (ۥ
The President:
Perhaps he meant the Bosnians? f6-)
Chancellor Kohl:
p e r s o n a l l y . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Whatever the case, the Dutch took i t
That's not good. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: No, i t ' s not. The whole s i t u a t i o n i s
c a t a s t r o p h i c . The p i c t u r e s we see of refugees are t e r r i b l e .
B i l l , t h i s i s what I would suggest we do. I would be a v a i l a b l e
f o r f u r t h e r t a l k s Friday, Saturday o r Sunday between 2000 and
2400 our time, t h a t i s 1400 and 1800 Washington time. I ' l l be a t
home i n Ludwigshafen, so your side should provide an i n t e r p r e t e r .
(U)
The President: We need to stay together on t h i s .
you on Friday, Saturday o r Sunday. (U)
I will
call
Chancellor Kohl: You can count on my e n t i r e support. You can
t a l k very f r a n k l y w i t h me.
I know what the U.S. Congress might
p l a n . The l a s t t h i n g I want i s f o r you to be maneuvered i n t o a
dead end. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chancellor Kohl:
The President:
Chancellor Kohl:
I understand
and agree.
(U)
My best t o your w i f e .
(U)
And t o yours. Good-bye. (U)
Good-bye. (U)
—
End of Conversation
—
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�300AF032.FIN
Page 1 of 4
MSMai
DATE-TIME
17 July 95 16:19
FROM
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
SUBJECT
Options Paper for breakfasl-fGECRET]"
TO
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT BODY
Since we've added some new material, we'd like TL to review one more time
before we send to the Principals.
[[ GORAZDE.DOC : 4145 in GORAZDE.DOC ]]
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME
17 July 95 16:18
GORAZDE.DOC
-SECRET July 17, 1995
-SECRET
Options Paper: Position on French Request For Assistance in Defense of Gorazde
Background: The French and British remain far apart following Sunday's meeting
ofC
HODS in London on their
approach to the issue of reinforcing Gorazde against potential Bosnian Serb
attack:
The French have portrayed the
survival of Gorazde as a litmus test of UNPROFOR's future viability; they are
prepar
ed to support our proposals
for robust use of air power to protect Gorazde, but have tied this to their proposal
to reinforce the peacekeepers
on the ground as a deterrent to Serb aggression; moreover, they insist that only a
v
isible commitment of additional
U.S. support in Gorazde, i.e. helicopter airlift, will satisfy Chirac and head off a
French decision to withdraw. The
UK argues against anything that would change the nature of the existing
UNPROFOR mis
sion, is skeptical about
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y PERE.O.0526
HTCP
�300AF032.FIN
Page 2 of 4
robust use of air power, and has indicated it does not see the survival of Gorazde
a
s essential to the continuation
of UNPROFOR. The British have indicated, however, that they may be willing to
consi
der the option of a
"private" warning to the Bosnian Serbs that if they attack Gorazde, NATO will
retali
ate with a massive air
campaign (similar to the UK/U.S./French warning delivered in early June with
respect
to the hostages).
Our own military analysis (and that of Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey) is that
a
truly robust air campaign would
be far more critical to the defense of Gorazde than the addition of French troops;
b
ut it may be difficult to
persuade the French to delink this from the deployment of additional ground
forces.
The challenge is to find a
means of satisfying the French concerns over Gorazde that will not be blocked by
the
UK, while at the same time
bolstering UNPROFOR for the more critical task of protecting Sarajevo and
central Bo
snia and avoiding making
the fall of Gorazde the trigger for UNPROFOR withdrawal.
Options: There are two basic options for a U.S. response to the French in
preparati
on for the Foreign and Defense
Ministers' meeting scheduled for London on Friday, July 21.
u Option 1 "Yes, but..." Tell the French that we are prepared to support their req
uest, but that we view the
reinforcement of UNPROFOR in Gorazde as mainly symbolic (as they have
implied). The
numbers and
mission therefore could be scaled back, with emphasis on enhancing the ability to
co
ordinate NATO air
support for the enforcement of the exclusion zone and for the Bosnian
Government's d
efense of the enclave.
We would make clear that there can be no compromise on insisting that
preemptive SE
AD and a robust air
campaign, without the existing dual key, are the preconditions for U.S. support in
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�300AF032.FIN
Page 3 of 4
1
ifting the troops: we do not
intend to take part in flying troops into harm's way if there is no additional reali
stic capability to defend their
positions once they are in place. We would also stress that we are not committing
t
o participation in any
resupply effort. And we would state that, while we are in favor of making a
determi
ned effort to deter a
Serb offensive against Gorazde, we would still favor maintaining UNPROFOR in
Sarajev
o and Central Bosnia
in the event Gorazde falls.
u Option 2 "No, because..." Tell the French that, absent their ability to present
a realistic mission for the forces
they are proposing to send to Gorazde, the troops could be more effectively
employed
around Sarajevo, and
that therefore we could not justify providing helicopters to move them. However,
ag
ree with the French that
a major change in UNPROFOR credibility must be signaled at Gorazde, and
encourage th
em to join us in
persuading the British to support a robust air campaign, supported by preemptive
SEA
D, to enforce the
exclusion zone and assist the Bosnian forces in protecting the Gorazde Safe Area.
Analysis: Either option may be rejected by the British and other troopcontributing
Allies, probably resulting in a
French decision to pull out of UNPROFOR. Option 1 would reduce French
ability to p
ut the blame on us in that
event. If accepted and our questions are satisfactorily answered, Option 1 would
re
quire us to make good on the
offer to provide helicopter air lift. This would prompt Congressional and public
op
position to crossing the "red
line" toward ground involvement -- opposition that could become unmanageable
if one
of our helicopters were
shot down. Moreover, it could commit us to follow-on actions to save Gorazde if
the
Serbs attacked and
threatened to overrun the enclave.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
300AF032.FIN
The robust air campaign envisaged by both options would increase the risk of UN
pers
onnel being taken hostage,
but without this, neither Gorazde nor Sarajevo may prove viable in the long term.
T
he British willingness to issue
a "private" warning (that we would, of course, leak) of a massive air response to
an
attack on Gorazde could be
incorporated into either option. It may not, however, go far enough to satisfy the
French interest in visible action
on the ground, but it may be the means to unlocking the UN key on SEAD and
robust ai
r strikes. If we support
this approach, the authority for single-key SEAD and air strikes must be granted
in
advance, triggered by a
Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde. If also linked to a robust campaign to open land
ro
utes to Sarajevo, this might
be sufficient to bring the French along, but probably not without direct lobbying
by
the President with Chirac.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�C N D NH
ORET
I
CONFIDENTIAL
5597
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow, Nelson Drew,
Katherine O'Loughlin
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 19, 1995
8:20 - 9:00 a.m.
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello B i l l .
(U)
(U)
H e l l o Jacques.
President Chirac: Fine and you?
i n t e r p r e t e r . I t w i l l be e a s i e r .
How are you?
(U)
Do you mind i f we use an
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : That w i l l be f i n e . I would l i k e t o t a l k about
where we are here on t h e Bosnia question. I agree w i t h you t h a t
the s t a t u s quo i s c l e a r l y no longer t o l e r a b l e . You have done
tremendous s e r v i c e i n r a l l y i n g support i n Europe f o r s t r o n g e r
a c t i o n . I agree w i t h you t h a t we need t o draw t h e l i n e a t
Gorazde.
The issue i s how, f i n d i n g the best way t o do t h i s
m i l i t a r i l y . f&)
Our m i l i t a r y advisors here f e e l s t r o n g l y the best t h i n g i s t o be
able t o b r i n g a i r power t o bear i n a d e c i s i v e manner and n o t i n a
t i m i d way as has been done l a t e l y . We propose i s s u i n g a c l e a r
warning t o Bosnian Serbs t h a t any a t t a c k on Gorazde o r Sarajevo
w i l l be met by a sustained a i r campaign t h a t w i l l a c t u a l l y
c r i p p l e t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . Now i f we do t h i s we must a l l
be prepared t o f o l l o w through, w i t h o u t wavering. Of course, we
should b e g i n now, o r soon, t o reduce the exposure o f UN personnel
to keep them from being taken hostage. (€4
Our planners b e l i e v e t h e f i r s t t a r g e t s would have t o be a f u l l
range o f Bosnian Serb a i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s : SAMs, a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y , radar and command centers. They a l s o b e l i e v e
once a i r defenses are n e u t r a l i z e d , we would be able t o a mount a
i-i
in
a*
Co
55 w
CONFIDENTIAL. .-j-p.*
Declassify o(i;[_ ppVV
T
0T0C0PY
3g
�C ND NA
O FE TL
I I
CONFIDENTIAL
major a i r campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces a t t a c k i n g
Gorazde o r Sarajevo or any m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s elsewhere. But t o do
t h i s and make i t work we would have t o have some changes. The
dual key could not be maintained i n i t s present form. Of course
l o c a l ground commanders could r e t a i n a voice i n close a i r support
and c l o s e - p r o x i m i t y a i r s t r i k e s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g t h e i r t r o o p s .
But t h e r e c o u l d be no UN p o l i t i c a l veto over i n d i v i d u a l missions.
Also c u r r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s t r i c t p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y would
a l s o have t o be removed. We would have t o have the a b i l i t y t o
s t r i k e s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t s throughout Bosnia, and t h a t would be a
b i g d e t e r r e n t t o them doing anything t o UN f o r c e s . Now, I have
t a l k e d t o John Major yet, but Warren Christopher met w i t h R i f k i n d
l a s t n i g h t u r g i n g the B r i t i s h t o get on board w i t h t h i s . I n
order t o get t h e r e , we w i l l also need t o get o t h e r A l l i e s and
Boutros Ghali on board.
^
I n a d d i t i o n t o s u p p o r t i n g an e f f e c t i v e Bosnian defense o f
Gorazde, i t i s important t o open secure l a n d access routes t o
Sarajevo.
I b e l i e v e t h i s should be the most p r e s s i n g mission f o r
the RRF.
f€)
With r e g a r d t o the suggestion you made l a s t week r e g a r d i n g
d e p l o y i n g 1,000 o f your troops t o Gorazde — I would l i k e t o t a l k
t o you about t h a t f o r a few minutes.
Our m i l i t a r y people b e l i e v e
t h a t since the primary t h r e a t t o Gorazde i s from a r t i l l e r y
s h e l l s , adding 1,000 troops might increase deterrence but i t
would n o t m a t e r i a l l y change the m i l i t a r y balance, and might
c r e a t e an increased problem o f resupply and reinforcement. They
also say t h a t i f we were t o do i t , we have t o take pre-emptive
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a i r defenses. Otherwise French troops and our
h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l be s i t t i n g ducks and the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t we w i l l
lose h e l i c o p t e r s w i t h your troops on board i s q u i t e s t r o n g .
I agree w i t h you t h a t we cannot abandon Gorazde, b u t we must make
c e r t a i n we have what are the most e f f e c t i v e means we can take t o
defend i t . I know i n sending another 1,000 troops — e s p e c i a l l y
French troops — i t may have a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t on the Serbs.
But i n sending i n troops our m i l i t a r y people b e l i e v e (and I agree
w i t h them) t h a t t h e r e would be considerable r i s k s and t h a t i t
wouldn't change the m i l i t a r y balance i n Gorazde. At any r a t e , I
t h i n k i t ' s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t you and I work t o g e t h e r between now
and F r i d a y . We have t o make sure we have a common approach t h a t
t o g e t h e r we can s e l l t o John Major. I'm sure Kohl w i l l support
us i f we are i n t h i s t o g e t h e r . We can't l e t t h i s go on. I t w i l l
mean d i s a s t e r f o r Bosnia and the West i f i t happens. f&)
Let me make one more p o i n t , and then
I n the two years I have labored w i t h
you became President, the only t h i n g
has been a c l e a r and c r e d i b l e t h r e a t
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIB
I ' d l i k e t o l i s t e n t o you.
t h i s problem, since before
t h a t has made t h i n g s b e t t e r
t h a t the UN w i l l l e t NATO
0T0C0PY
�CONFIDENTIAL
take s t r o n g a i r a c t i o n . I t has always bought us time f o r the
p o l i t i c a l process. I t got t h e peace process back on t r a c k ,
allowed t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e safe areas, t h e end o f t h e s h e l l i n g
of Sarajevo, t h e weapons c o l l e c t i o n p o i n t s , e t c .
I t has worked.
But when the UN has moved away from a p o s i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h , the
Serbs have taken advantage. I b e l i e v e t h i s w i l l work i f we stay
t o g e t h e r behind i t . fe}
President Chirac: B i l l , I understand your p o s i t i o n v e r y w e l l ,
but i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o implement.!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 l.4d
The minute we a t t a c k , and we're n o t sure i f
the s t r i k e s w i l l be e f f e c t i v e , they w i l l r e t a l i a t e by t a k i n g
s o l d i e r s hostage or a t t a c k i n g w i t h the massive a r t i l l e r y they
have. The p l a n proposed by the U.S. m i l i t a r y presupposes the
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR b u t we have UN troops everywhere t h e r e .
I f we want t o adopt i t , we have t o regroup or e x t r a c t our forces,
I t could be a good
s o l u t i o n , b u t time i s necessary t o implement the s o l u t i o n . This
would mean the l o s s o f Gorazde and probably Sarajevo. This i s
the reason we made a compromise s o l u t i o n t h a t i n any case would
m a i n t a i n the r i g h t s o f the UN i n Gorazde and, i n o t h e r words,
guarantee t h e s a f e t y o f 60,000 Muslims i n Gorazde. I n order t o
do t h i s , we t h i n k 1,000 men would be enough.
I realize the
problem i s t r a n s p o r t i n g them t o Gorazde, and t h e r e o n l y U.S.
i n t e r v e n t i o n makes t h e t r a n s p o r t p o s s i b l e , u s i n g a i r power t o
open a c o r r i d o r t o ensure the s a f e t y of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s . I f we
adopt a i r s t r i k e s as t h e o b j e c t i v e , i t ' s a s o l u t i o n b u t n o t an
immediate s o l u t i o n . I t h i n k Gorazde w i l l have f a l l e n by then.
This i s our p o s i t i o n — the l e a s t bad s o l u t i o n would be t o defend
Gorazde.
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me comment on the p o i n t s you have made.
F i r s t , w i t h any s o l u t i o n , greater a c t i o n c a r r i e s a r i s k o f
g r e a t e r danger. I f we p u t 1,000 French troops i n Gorazde as p a r t
of a r e a l defense o f t h e c i t y , t h a t would also go beyond the UN
mandate and past what the B r i t i s h said they would do. I t also
would i n c r e a s e t h e r i s k o f hostage t a k i n g throughout the country.
I f French troops were k i l l e d i n the a c t u a l defense o f Gorazde, I
b e l i e v e we would have t o take r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n . I do n o t agree
w i t h you i f we c a r r y out the p l a n f o r a i r power, we have t o
withdraw UN t r o o p s . But we would have t o concentrate them i n
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
C HO N i
O FEm
l
�mm
CONFIDENTIAL
Gorazde, Sarajevo and C e n t r a l Bosnia i n places the Government
c o n t r o l s . f€H
President Chirac: B i l l , the minute our troops s t a r t t o move, t h e
Serbs w i l l understand t h e maneuver and grab people. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : I understand the p r a c t i c a l problems.
You s a i d
t h a t i f we issue the t h r e a t , i t amounts t o t h e U.S. being w i l l i n g
to go t o war w i t h Serbia. I f you go back t o when we got the
agreement t o e s t a b l i s h the safe areas and p u t a l l Serb heavy
a r t i l l e r y i n c o l l e c t i o n areas, t h i s happened o n l y because two
t h i n g s occurred a t t h e same time: we t h r e a t e n e d s t r o n g a i r
a c t i o n through NATO, and the Russians t o l d t h e Serbs t h a t they
had t o do t h i s and get back t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s . They thought
t h a t t h e a i r a c t i o n would be d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e , not s e l e c t i v e l y
c a l i b r a t e d t o take out one o r two guns o r a s i n g l e tank here o r
t h e r e . f€}
Let me say another t h i n g w i t h regard t o your p r o p o s a l . I t seems
to me t h a t i f we work w i t h you and deploy your f o r c e s and t h e
Serbs shoot down one h e l i c o p t e r , or i f we redeploy f o r c e s and one
of your s o l d i e r s i s k i l l e d , even by d i s t a n t s h e l l i n g , t h a t we
would have t o take the most e f f e c t i v e r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n , which
i s from t h e a i r . We may have t o do some i n advance t o c r e a t e a
s e c u r i t y c o r r i d o r f o r the h e l i c o p t e r s . We w i l l have t o c a r r y out
our o p t i o n one way o r another. Before you became President, our
UN and NATO a l l i e s agreed on two previous occasions t h a t an a i r
t h r e a t i s t h e o n l y way t o save the UN mission w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g
NATO t r o o p s on t h e ground i n combat. f€-)
Let me say two o t h e r t h i n g s and then I w i l l l i s t e n . I want t o
reemphasize t h a t t h i s w i l l not mean war on t h e Serbs i f they
don't a t t a c k . There w i l l be no a i r a c t i o n i f Gorazde i s not h i t
and Sarajevo i s not s h e l l e d . We simply w i l l be r e e s t a b l i s h i n g
the weapons e x c l u s i o n zones t h a t have eroded.
I have also been
handed a note t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are prepared t o keep t h e i r 300
troops i n Gorazde under t h i s proposal and n o t withdraw. f&)
Jacques, I have t o give a speech today, b u t a f t e r t h a t I w i l l be
working on t h i s f o r t h e next 48 hours. Perhaps you would l i k e t o
t a l k t o your m i l i t a r y people some more. You have done a
tremendous j o b p u t t i n g u n i t y i n t o the A l l i e d e f f o r t , but we want
something t h a t works. We don't want t o c o l l a p s e the UN mission.
Those i n Congress who say otherwise are wrong. Based on my
experience over the past two years, t h i s w i l l work. I t i s our
best chance, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f coupled w i t h a new d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e along the l i n e s you have already discussed w i t h me.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON
H0T0C0PY
�CN1 E T
0 FDNA
I
CONFIDENTIAL
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
experts B i l l
O.K.
I have one q u e s t i o n ,
embargo?
Well, I don't mind t a l k i n g t o t h e
1,4h, 1,4ri
W i l l Congress succeed i n l i f t i n g t h e arms
The P r e s i d e n t : They l i k e l y w i l l vote t o l i f t i t i n some form. I
w i l l veto i t and b e l i e v e I can s u s t a i n the veto i f , and o n l y i f ,
a l l o f us are working on an a l t e r n a t e program w i t h some chance o f
success. Otherwise I'm a f r a i d t h a t i f they voted today, they
would o v e r r i d e t h e v e t o . They b e l i e v e t h e UN has f a i l e d and the
embargo denies t h e Bosnian Government t h e a b i l i t y t o defend
themselves.
(€3
Let me ask two questions. First, several months ago when the
safe areas were worked out for the first time, the Serbs had
artillery and they gave it up; and I still believe Milosevic
would like some relief from sanctions. If we put 1,000 French
troops in Gorazde and the Serbs attack the city what will the
French do? Will they shoot back?
m
President Chirac:
Of course, n a t u r a l l y .
The P r e s i d e n t : A l l r i g h t , b u t i f t h a t happens, then you can
argue t h a t t h a t i s as much a change i n the UN mission as dropping
bombs. Mladic i s a smart man. I f you r e p e l him, h e ' l l take
a c t i o n elsewhere.
He w i l l take Ukrainians or Canadians hostage.
I f we f l y you i n t h e r e and they take a c t i o n , shoot down a
h e l i c o p t e r , we both have t o take a c t i o n . So please t h i n k i t
through. E i t h e r our o p t i o n or yours, or t h e two o f them i n
combination, w i l l increase the r i s k they w i l l take UN
peacekeepers hostage.
But we have t o p r o t e c t Gorazde. The
q u e s t i o n i s t h e best way t o do i t . E i t h e r course runs t h e r i s k
of hostages.
We have never i n the past had t o take extreme
a c t i o n when they r e a l l y thought we would f o l l o w through, and n o t
j u s t h i t one o r two tanks. We got Gorazde, Srebrenica, t h e safe
areas. Somehow, we have t o r e c r e a t e those c o n d i t i o n s . We o n l y
have a few months ago get a peace agreement. We can't keep doing
t h i s f o r another t h r e e or f o u r more years. We have t o c r e a t e the
environment i n which we can push f o r a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n . fG-)
President Chirac:
Yes, I understand.
Gorazde w i l l be taken i n 10
GOMEIDENTIAL
CLIN
ON
uimi£
COPY
�co«mi
CONFIDENTIAL
days, and a f t e r t h a t Sarajevo.
Let's ask our Chiefs o f S t a f f .
We need time f o r t h i s s t r a t e g y .
f€4
The Preside nt:
I understand.
I r e a l l y want t o work on t h i s w i t h
you. Here' s the question: Ask your s t a f f i f there i s a g r e a t e r
l i k e l i h o o d of hostage t a k i n g i f a i r power i s used as opposed t o
the chance hostages w i l l be taken i f the French f i g h t back and
k i l l a l o tof Serbs. Our e x p e c t a t i o n i s t h a t Mladic i s very
smart and w i l l go elsewhere. He works the country as one b i g
piece. I f they shoot down a h e l i c o p t e r and k i l l Frenchmen, we
have t o s t ike hard. Talk t o your people.
r
I t h i n k we can s e l l
our proposa 1 t o the B r i t s . They don't want t o p u l l o u t .
President Chirac: There are also others beyond us —
and U k r a i n i a n s . f&)
Canadians
The P r e s i d e n t : I know. There's a l o t o f work t o do. We have t o
discuss i t w i t h Canada. We have a close r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e
U k r a i n i a n s . We also need t o work w i t h Russia. I t h i n k I can
convince Y e l t s i n t o go along. f^)
President Chirac: I don't t h i n k Y e l t s i n i s ready t o do a n y t h i n g
because o f h i s domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . { &
-)
The P r e s i d e n t : We don't want t o do anything t h a t would i m p e r i l
him. But l a s t time, Y e l t s i n went t o M i l o s e v i c saying you can't
do t h i s t o y o u r s e l f or me, and you need t o stop the a t t a c k s . He
was h e l p f u l because he d i d n ' t want us t o use force t o p r o t e c t
these areas. We need t o explore whether he i s i n the p o s i t i o n t o
do a n y t h i n g . fG-)
President Chirac:
Let's get back i n touch w i t h i n 48 hours.
^
The P r e s i d e n t : Maybe we should t a l k i n 24 hours. We cannot
a f f o r d t o go t o the London meeting and have i t be a d i s a s t e r .
President Chirac: I agree completely, b u t we must get i n touch
w i t h t h e o t h e r s . fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I have t a l k e d t o C h r e t i e n and Kohl, b u t n o t y e t
to t h e U k r a i n i a n s , Dutch or Y e l t s i n . You and I need t o agree on
a s t r a t e g y , work together, and s e l l i t t o Major and t h e o t h e r s .
We must get close on an agreement. fC-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay, thank you very much.
(U)
Good-bye. (U)
End of Conversation
1
CONFIDENT IAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�GNDNM
DRET L
CONFIDENTIAL
5606
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Major
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine
O'Loughlin, Kenneth Baldwin, A l e j a n d r o
Martinez and Andrew Kerr
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 19, 1995, 9:15 - 9:50 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
The P r e s i d e n t : H e l l o .
t a l k w i t h Chirac. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
(U)
(U)
Hello.
(U)
Hey John, how are you?
I j u s t had a long
What k i n d o f mood i s he i n today.
(U)
The President: He was in a pretty tough mood today. You know,
based on Secretary Christopher's conversation with Foreign
Secretary Rifkind, exactly where we are going. I need to tell
you of my conversation with Chirac. Let me start by saying I am
convinced that the only way I can sustain the position we have
taken is to work, support and cooperate with UNPROFOR and our
allies to take some new action to save Gorazde. I think I can
then sustain a veto of unilateral lift.
^
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
When i s the vote?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : The f i r s t vote could be tomorrow i n t h e Senate.
Then t h e r e ' s t h e vote i n the House, then t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .
They s t a r t r o l l i n g me tomorrow. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
What i s the veto-proof m a j o r i t y ?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t i s 67 Senate members and 290 some-odd House
members. Here's the issue: whatever they pass w i l l pass w i t h a
v e t o - p r o o f m a j o r i t y , b u t some w i l l f a l l o f f i f they b e l i e v e I
have an a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h any chance o f working. The arguments
CONFIDEMHj
DeclassiJ
U O iMERMMHOTOCOP Y
&N
\J
• i i I
— i t < 11 i L .
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�COMFIPENTIAL
C NI B.
O FD P
are t h a t i t would Americanize the c o n f l i c t . I t would undermine
support f o r o t h e r UN embargoes, on I r a n , I r a q and Libya, which
they l i k e . We are being k i l l e d i n the press. A l l the papers,
not j u s t i n Washington and New York, but even the l o c a l paper i n
my hometown of L i t t l e Rock are saying "Why won't the Americans
help us defend o u r s e l v e s . " The whole U.S. press i s s p i n n i n g l i k e
t h a t . I t appears t h a t the UN cannot defend the Muslims and w i l l
not l e t them defend themselves. We have t o do more so I can
p r e v a i l here and also t o t r y t o r e e s t a b l i s h the v i g o r we had i n
the s p r i n g of l a s t year, when we e s t a b l i s h e d the safe areas and
got the heavy weapons out and achieved d i p l o m a t i c progress i n the
peace t a l k s .
fG)
Our p l a n here i s t o come up w i t h a concentrated UN f o r c e and a
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a i r t h r e a t . P r o p o r t i o n a l response does not
work. Chirac i s s t i l l pushing the idea of f l y i n g i n 1,000 troops
to j o i n your guys. You are w o r r i e d about r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t UK
and o t h e r t r o o p s . I asked him d u r i n g our conversation, i f French
troops go i n and Serbs a t t a c k , would the French p l a n on s h o o t i n g
back? He s a i d "yes, these w i l l be r e a l s o l d i e r s , not blue
helmets." Mladic i s a smart man, he w i l l r e t a l i a t e and take
hostages i f he can. I f one U.S. h e l i c o p t e r i s shot down, he
agrees t h a t we would have to r e t a l i a t e . So, i f t h a t i s the end
game, why not get the same b e n e f i t by e s t a b l i s h i n g the d e t e r r e n t
now? I asked him t o work through i t . Our common p a r t n e r s h i p ,
UN, NATO and the s t r e n g t h of the West, depend on us not showing
up F r i d a y w i t h o u t a common p o s i t i o n among the UK, France and the
U.S.
I t h i n k C h r e t i e n w i l l go along, and I can get the Ukraine
to support us. Y e l t s i n w i l l not l i k e i t , but he i s not i n any
p o s i t i o n t o do anything e l s e . We need t o t e l l him t o go back t o
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n February 1994.
f&j
Prime M i n i s t e r Maior:
The P r e s i d e n t : E x a c t l y . I l i k e Chirac because he i s s t r o n g and
smart and wants t o do the r i g h t t h i n g , but he i s very French; he
wants t o make the grand gesture. He c l e a r l y hopes f o r
p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact.
f&)
Primp' M i n i s t p r M a i n r :
The P r e s i d e n t : I t doesn't help the UK troops to have 1,000
French s o l d i e r s w i t h o u t a r t i l l e r y come i n on h e l i c o p t e r s .
(£-)
GOUn DENT IAL
CLINTON
H0T0C0PY
�C N D Wl
ORE T
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Major:
The reverse!
(U)
The President: I f we do take aggressive action, we could t i p the
balance against you. We have to hope the 9,000 Bosnians stay and
f i g h t . f€*
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: On the issue of the 1,000 troops, I don't
rule i t out e n t i r e l y , depending on what other decisions we take.
Let's turn to Gorazde, where we have 300 Welsh f u s i l i e r s and
9,000 government troops who w i l l probably f i g h t , but lose. They
may not f i g h t at a l l l i k e i n Srebrenica. |
1.4b, 1.4d~
The wider issue i s there i s not a shred of doubt that we cannot
stay where we are. Ideally, the objective i s to deter the Serbs
from taking Gorazde.
Our objectives are to deter the Serb seizure
of Gorazde and keep Sarajevo going and to enable the UN to carry
out i t s mission more e f f e c t i v e l y . The UN w i l l be unable to
remain i n Bosnia without an e f f e c t i v e policy. We need a cohesive
U.S./British/French plan and to get others on board. On Gorazde,
we need some f l e x i b i l i t y ; we don't want anyone digging i n t o r i g i d
public positions l i k e l a s t week.
^
The President: I agree. M i l i t a r i l y , t h i s proposal i s not sound;
i t only makes sense f o r i t s psychological value or i f you're
looking f o r a pretext, i f they shoot down a helicopter, to kick
the crap out of them. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
I t ' s a gamble anyway.
CONFI DENT IMJ ,
CLINTO
Where we are coming from
H0T0C0PY
�C N D pL
O R El
CONFIDENTIAL
t o g e t h e r i s t h a t something has t o be done; i t i s not p r a c t i c a l
p o l i t i c s t o do n o t h i n g . Something must be done and i t w i l l
i n v o l v e t h e t h r e a t o f a i r power. I f i t has a chance o f being
e f f e c t i v e , Mladic must b e l i e v e we mean i t .
I n the past, he has
o n l y been slapped on the w r i s t . We need t o give him two messages
— one i n p u b l i c and one i n p r i v a t e . The one i n p r i v a t e must be
very s p e c i f i c on the s i z e and scale o f the response so he knows
we mean i t .
The Serbs have t o see p h y s i c a l movement o f assets,
so they see we're not b l u f f i n g . I f we make the t h r e a t , we must
be prepared t o c a r r y i t out i n spades. I f we do t h i s , s e v e r a l
t h i n g s may f o l l o w : hostages may be taken — c i v i l i a n and
m i l i t a r y personnel who are exposed must be hunkered down before
F r i d a y . We are d e a l i n g w i t h a madman who has a Dutch b a t t a l i o n
i n h i s hands. We can't r u l e out the thought o f Mladic's
s l a u g h t e r o f the Dutch. fG)
Here's a marginal p o i n t t h a t I'm not q u i t e sure o f the answer t o .
I f we use Suppression o f Enemy A i r Defenses o r a i r a t t a c k s ,
arguably t h a t means the end o f the UNPROFOR mission. I t may be a
d e c i s i o n t o be taken immediately, o r n o t . But i f i t i s and we
must leave, t h a t would i n v o l v e the NATO p l a n i n c l u d i n g U.S.
t r o o p s . So we're i n the process o f s e t t i n g i n motion a chain o f
events l e a d i n g t o committing 50,000 NATO troops i n Bosnia t o
b r i n g out UNPROFOR. I'm happy t o consider t h i s as long as we
understand the consequences: the impact o f an a i r a t t a c k ,
p o s s i b l e hostages and the need t o take UNPROFOR out i f necessary.
Once t h e y ' r e o u t , we have t o guard against a wider Balkan war.
You have assets i n Macedonia. We would need t o consider p u t t i n g
assets elsewhere t o prevent a trans-Balkan war from b r e a k i n g out
i f t h e r e i s t r o u b l e i n Kosovo o r elsewhere. f&)
Regarding the a i r t h r e a t , the t h r e a t t o Mladic has t o be
c r e d i b l e . I t i s debatable, depending on the nature o f the
s i t u a t i o n , whether t o go s t r a i g h t t o f u l l a i r a t t a c k o r i f i t
should be gradual r e t a l i a t i o n . We must ensure t h a t UN personnel
are i n r e l a t i v e l y safe places a t the time we issue the t h r e a t .
That's what I t h i n k . I hope you, Chirac and I can agree today o r
tomorrow i n time t o come up w i t h a p o s i t i o n f o r F r i d a y . ( O
The P r e s i d e n t : You've thought i t through w e l l . Two t h i n g s need
to be done. I do not know the exact p o s i t i o n o f a l l the UNPROFOR
troops and associated c i v i l i a n s . And I do not know how long i t
w i l l take them t o get i n t o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are r e l a t i v e l y immune.
Secondly, I agree w i t h your a n a l y s i s t h a t i f we had t o launch a
major a i r campaign, i t might be the end of the UNPROFOR mission.
We have t o c a l c u l a t e what t h a t means. Can we get m u l t i l a t e r a l
l i f t ? Do we do a NATO l i f t i f Russian blocks m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t
i n the UN? Does a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e come i n o r , do we take
a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l forces out? Also, depending on the r e s u l t s o f
the bombing, we must consider the s i t u a t i o n under which i t could
OOHriDDMTIMj
CLINTON
%
JTOCOPY
�mmmt
GOirriDDNTIMi
b r i n g about a c e a s e - f i r e or meaningful movement i n the peace
process. I f we are s u c c e s s f u l , UNPROFOR can s t a y w i t h o u t f e a r o f
hostages being taken; they can continue w i t h humanitarian r e l i e f ,
resume a i r drops and open the Mt. Igman r o u t e . Time i s running
out on us.
I f bombing secures our p o s i t i o n , we would s t i l l have
o n l y a few months t o j u i c e up the peace e f f o r t and reach an
agreement. We need t o see what we could do t o change the
dynamics of the process and hasten an agreement. I b e l i e v e i t ' s
p o s s i b l e i t would work l i k e i t d i d i n 1994 when the safe areas
were e s t a b l i s h e d . Those decisions bought us a few months. This
assumes t h a t you and others want t o stay.
f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
Yes,
we want t o stay. fG-)
The President: We s t i l l need a f a s t t i m e l i n e f o r t h i s e f f o r t or
the Serbs w i l l q u i c k l y b i t e us i n the r e a r .
fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We also have t o consider how they w i l l
r e a c t . They may r e a c t savagely or they may be smart. They may
not a t t a c k but j u s t leave Gorazde b o t t l e d up and a t t a c k Sarajevo.
The President: Yes.
Then we would have t o p u l l out a l l the
stops. I f Sarajevo f a l l s , i t w i l l be a d i s a s t e r f o r a l l of us.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I t h i n k the French w i l l ask i f we are
ready t o add troops i n Sarajevo.
I n p r i n c i p l e , we would.
We
would replace someone else's b a t t a l i o n , because t h e r e i s not
b i l l e t i n g f o r another u n i t . We would replace l e s s e f f e c t i v e
t r o o p s w i t h more e f f e c t i v e t r o o p s . We need cohesion. We need t o
look a t land routes, both summer and w i n t e r . For example, i n
Sarajevo, Mt. Igman i s not a w i n t e r route w i t h o u t a great deal of
.nolirina.l
1.4b. 1.4d
The
President:
They're very a r t f u l at t h a t .
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
CONFIDDNTIAL,
tLINTON
TlHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
m
The P r e s i d e n t : They never ask UNPROFOR t o leave. They want i t
a l l — the embargo l i f t e d and UNPROFOR t h e r e t o boot. fe)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I doubt anyone has been keener t o keep the
UN t h e r e than me. I f i t t u r n s out t o be an a i r o f f e n s i v e , there
w i l l be no c r e d i b l e work f o r the UN, and i t w i l l be p o i n t l e s s and
r i s k y t o leave troops when they could more e f f e c t i v e l y be
s t a t i o n e d i n Macedonia o r elsewhere. W i l l the Congress accept
c o n t r i b u t i n g U.S. troops t o get the UN out? fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. Even Dole has acknowledged t h a t we have a
moral duty t o ensure the safe withdrawal o f our a l l i e s . f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I f we go t h i s r o u t e , I am prepared t o do
something dramatic i n Gorazde. I don't want t o r u l e out l i f t i n g
our boys out. f€-)
The P r e s i d e n t : You and I t h i n k along the same l i n e s . This may
lead t o the c o l l a p s e of UNPROFOR, but i t i s b e t t e r t o go out w i t h
a bang than w i t h a whimper; otherwise we go out w i t h our t a i l
between our l e g s . f G)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I'm not sure whether the Mladic message
should be graduated o r the b i g bang response. I need t o run i t
by my Defense M i n i s t e r , Chief of S t a f f and s o l d i e r s on the
ground. Supposing we go down t h i s r o u t e , we have t o do something
p o l i t i c a l i n tandem. W i l l you e n t e r t a i n i n v i t i n g the Pale Serbs
to a conference at the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r o r head of s t a t e l e v e l ,
which c o u l d discuss land swaps and p o l i t i c a l settlement? We may
be going down the m i l i t a r y route one-legged. fG)
The P r e s i d e n t : I've had no d i s c u s s i o n of the d e t a i l s o f t h i s ,
but i f we make a b o l d m i l i t a r y t h r u s t , we should accompany i t
w i t h a b o l d d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e . We need t o f i n d out where
B i l d t i s , whether t h e r e i s any progress i n h i s t a l k s . Regarding
the message t o Mladic, I w i l l t a l k t o my people who understand
his psychology and h i s way of o p e r a t i n g . f£)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: The b i g question i s what happens on the
ground. I f we issue the ultimatum, i f the Serbs take us up and
we proceed, the UN comes out. The government troops w i l l begin
to be armed but t h a t takes time, and the Serbs w i l l make a great
deal o f advance i n i t i a l l y . I
1.4b. 1.4d
With the UN out, there w i l l be no c r e d i b l e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reason t o i n t e r v e n e unless we enter on the s i d e o f
the government, which would be a de f a c t o d e c l a r a t i o n of war on
Serbia and M i l o s e v i c . Yet, could we s i t on the bench, say we had
done our best and watch on BBC and CNN the slaughter? Or would
we be prepared t o declare war on the Serbs?
CONFI DDNT I JiL
c
B^H T C P
YP O O O Y
�CONFipm
CONFIDENTIAL
The P r e s i d e n t : There i s a t h i r d o p t i o n t h a t would have t o be
done by NATO since Russia would veto a UN r e s o l u t i o n . We could
consider t h e use o f NATO a i r power t o s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n on
the ground pending the development o f some k i n d o f e q u i l i b r i u m i n
artillery.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I have thought o f t h a t , e s t a b l i s h i n g some
e q u i l i b r i u m w i t h a i r power. I'm not sure how t o j u s t i f y i t
l e g a l l y , a l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r i l y . And i t r a i s e s a b i g
problem e s p e c i a l l y f o r the U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t : That i s a d i f f i c u l t t h i n g . The e f f o r t would have
t o be c a r e f u l l y circumscribed. The p o i n t t o make t o the Russians
would be t h a t they supported the Contact Group p l a n and the Serbs
s a i d no, ignored Russian wishes and screwed them.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major:
That might be what i s a t t h e end o f the
y e l l o w b r i c k road.
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, we know a l l o f t h a t .
are i n i s untenable. fe)
But the p o s i t i o n we
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: I agree. We have tended t o look down the
road too many times over the past 3-4 years and have crossed our
f i n g e r s l i k e Dickens' Mr. Micawber, hoping something good would
come o f i t .
But l i k e Micawber's benefactor, n o t h i n g turned up.
S t i l l , we have done what we thought was r i g h t . fG)
The President: We bought a year w i t h UNPROFOR i n which no one
was k i l l e d and peace might have been achieved. I t wasn't, b u t i t
might have been. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We have saved l i v e s . Peace was achieved
i n c e n t r a l Bosnia. We have n o t h i n g t o reproach ourselves about.
I j u s t want t o do the r i g h t t h i n g . We may go down t h i s path, t h e
end o f which could lead i n the d i r e c t i o n I have been l a y i n g o u t .
f€)
The President: We w i l l work through a l l the s h o r t - t e r m questions
— where the troops are and how long i t w i l l take t o get them
i n t o s a f e r p o s i t i o n s ; what t o say t o Mladic — and the longerterm issues you have been t a l k i n g about. I suggest we get back
i n touch i n 24 hours. You, I and Chirac need t o be together a t
t h i s meeting on Friday. f€)
CONFIDDNTIAL
r.l TNTnfodriflRAftY PHOTOCOPY
LUINI
luLn IIIIL
�CONFIDENTIAL
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: A b s o l u t e l y . I'm committed t o t h a t .
w i l l speak t o t h e French today. fG)
I
The P r e s i d e n t : Your a n a l y s i s o f the m i l i t a r y wrongheadedness o f
t h e i r p r o p o s a l i s the same as ours, i n c l u d i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r
f a i l u r e . I'm n o t sure i t would do any good b u t i t wouldn't make
i t much worse. And, i f they shoot down one h e l i c o p t e r , t h e
bombing s t a r t s . I don't want t o r u l e i t o u t . We can't a f f o r d t o
r u l e o u t some v e r s i o n o f the French p r o p o s a l . I have t o go g i v e
an i m p o r t a n t speech. I ' l l be a v a i l a b l e t o t a l k w i t h you a f t e r
t h a t . Thank you, John. f€)
Prime M i n i s t e r Major: We a l l have t o g i v e a l i t t l e , I w i l l
t o you tomorrow o r l a t e r today. f&)
End o f Conversation
COMriDEMTIiMj
CLIN'
talk
�CONFIDENTIAL
5670
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l Telephone C a l l w i t h French
President Jacques Chirac, J u l y 20, 1995
PARTICIPANTS;
The President
French President Jacques Chirac
Notetakers: Kenneth Baldwin, Katherine
O'Louglin, Kyle Bakke, Matt M i l l e r , Alexander
Vershbow
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
J u l y 20, 1995, 3:15 p.m. - 4:13 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Hello B i l l ,
Yes, h e l l o .
I'm i n Morocco now.
How i s t h e King?
(U)
(U)
President Chirac: I heard you wanted me t o c a l l .
Majesty and w i l l give him your best. (U)
I am w i t h His
The P r e s i d e n t : T e l l him t h a t I am using the g o l f clubs he gave
me. But I s t i l l want t o come and p l a y on h i s course. He has got
a n i g h t g o l f course.
I understand our m i l i t a r y planners are
coming c l o s e r t o g e t h e r on an agreement. I understand you propose
t o open a road between Sarajevo and Gorazde. fG)
President Chirac:
Yes, b u t n o t h i n g i s c e r t a i n y e t .
fG)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I got my l a s t r e p o r t , about 30 minutes ago, t h a t
our people and yours are c l o s e r t o g e t h e r and we now have t o
persuade t h e B r i t i s h . I f we can, we w i l l have one proposal going
i n t o t h e meeting.
fG)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
And t h e Dutch?
Yes, o f course.
CONFI DENT-^Afe
Declassify o ^ L t w U M
fe)
f€)
n
L l b K A K Y
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
n
U
H
0T0C0PY
�COHriDDNTIAL
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
F i r s t l e t me t e l l you B i l l , I am s t i l l
a g a i n s t a i r s t r i k e s , but I w i l l not oppose them. What i s
e s s e n t i a l i s t o draw a r e d l i n e around Goradze and then make sure
i t i s respected i n order t o enforce i t . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 I 4d
But i f everyone else agrees
w i t h your s o l u t i o n and they a l l agree t o r e j e c t my s o l u t i o n , then
o b v i o u s l y I won't oppose i t because I don't want t o take t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f having tomorrow's conference f a i l . But I could
be wrong.
I f we agree on t h e r e d l i n e and are t o be sure i t won't be
AmexLcan. .solution.
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t , I t h i n k t h a t i f we decide t o draw a l i n e
around Gorazde, we might be able t o do both what you suggest and
what I suggest.
I f we issue an ultimatum, we might n o t have t o
do i t — t h a t i s what happened i n 1994. We might be able t o open
a ground c o r r i d o r from Gorazde t o Sarajevo and then warn t h e
Serbs t h a t we w i l l p r o t e c t both, and i f they a t t a c k Gorazde o r
i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e c o r r i d o r , then t h e r e would be a i r s t r i k e s .
Let me say, we r e c e i v e d some good i n t e l l i g e n c e l a s t n i g h t t h a t
the Serbs b e l i e v e t h e UN w i l l not do anything and they are
t h i n k i n g o f t a k i n g not j u s t Gorazde, b u t Sarajevo as w e l l . ( €
•)
President Chirac:
Absolutely.
4^
The P r e s i d e n t : They also t o l d the source o f t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e
t h a t they d i d n o t want t o pay the p r i c e o f heavy a i r s t r i k e s .
So
what I t h i n k we should look a t doing i s t o open the ground
c o r r i d o r w i t h t h e warning o f heavy a i r s t r i k e s , and w i t h t h e
understanding t h a t t h i s time we w i l l do i t . They w i l l be l a r g e ,
not p r o p o r t i o n a l , s t r i k e s so t h a t whatever they do t o our people,
they w i l l s u f f e r more. fG)
COWFIDEWTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
President Chirac: Yes. I want t o repeat, I won't prevent an
agreement. I f we agree on your proposal then I w i l l accept i t ,
even though I p r e f e r my s o l u t i o n . I would l i k e t o t e l l you one
more t h i n g , Mr. President. I was t a l k i n g t o t h e King o f Morocco
about t h i s i s s u e . He i s c u r r e n t l y t h e President, or Chairman, o f
the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f I s l a m i c Conference and he t o l d me t h a t t h e
OIC Contact Group i s meeting i n Geneva tomorrow a t 4:00 pm, j u s t
a t the end o f t h e meeting i n London. |
1,4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k a l l o f our options are somewhat
dangerous, Jacques. The consequences o f a Serb m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y ,
under t h e w a t c h f u l eye o f t h e UN, are very dangerous. There are
no r i s k - f r e e courses. We need t o f i n d a balanced one. I f a i r
power i s used i n the form o f an ultimatum i n s t e a d o f using i t i n
advance t o c l e a r out the a i r defenses, t h a t way t h e r e w i l l be no
dual-key empty t h r e a t s . We may n o t have t o use i t . But they
have t o know we w i l l do i t . That i s my hope. fG)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac: We s h a l l see. But I agreed i t i s time t o stop
the Serbs. I t i s also time t o speak w i t h Karadzic.
I don't
understand why our f r i e n d Holbrooke i s stopping i t . I t i s a very
grave mistake. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l take t h a t up here today and be prepared t o
say something t o you and your f o l k s tomorrow. (C-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Thank you B i l l .
Good n i g h t .
Good n i g h t .
(U)
Say h e l l o t o His Majesty f o r me.
End o f Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�F:\CabIe\Data Source\CabIes\CDO 14\JUL95\MSGS\M 1774424.html
Page 1 of 3
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
OAASZYUW RUEHCAA4561 2020226-SSSS—RHEHAAX.
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 210226Z JUL 95 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
210226Z JUL 95
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
////
SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FM DE
CHARETTE
TEXT:
S E C R E T
STATE 1 7 4 5 6 1
QQQQ
NODIS
MERCURY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EXEC SEC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BK, FR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FM DE
CHARETTE
1.
SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
NODIS MERCURY
2.
THIS CABLE CONTAINS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF
THE SECRETARY'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH FM DE CHARETTE
ON JULY 19, 1995. THE SECRETARY INITIATED THE CALL. I
ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS
MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU DO NOT DISTRIBUTE I T OUTSIDE OF
THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE. DEPARTMENT RECIPIENTS
SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU'S F RONT OFFICE.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
DATE:
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1995
TIME:
1935 EDT
PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY AND FM DE CHARETTE
SUBJECT:
DE CHARETTE WORRIES ABOUT LACK OF
CONSENSUS AT JULY 21 LONDON MEETING ON
BOSNIA
THE SECRETARY ASKED I F FM DE CHARETTE INTENDS TO BE AT
THE LONDON MEETING.
DE CHARETTE, W O IS ACCOMPANYING
H
CHIRAC IN MORRBCCO, SAID HE WOULD NOT ARRIVE IN LONDON
BEFORE MIDNIGHT, JULY 20. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED I F
C I T N LIBRARY P O O O Y
LN O
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD014\JUL95\MSGS\M1774424.html
DE CHARETTE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE A CONFERENCE CALL FROM
BOTH THE SECRETARY AND FM RIFKIND DURING THE AFTERNOON
OF JULY 20. DE CHARETTE RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME
SUCH A CALL.
DE CHARETTE THEN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE SEVERAL CONCERNS
KNOWN TO THE SECRETARY PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPARTURE
FOR THE AIRPORT.I
THE FRENCH POSITION HAD BEEN MADE VERY
CLEAR DURING THE JULY 19 TELCON BETWEEN PRESIDENTS
CLINTON AND CHIRAC. Tw REITERATE, IT IS ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY TO D A A LINE AT GORAZDE AND UNPROFOR TROOPS
RW
THERE MUST BE REINFORCED.
DE CHARETTE REFERRED TO THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THE GOF
HAS MADE TO REINFORCE GORAZDE AND SAID FRANCE COULD NOT
JOIN IN ANY AGREEMENTS AT THE LONDON MEETING WHICH DID
NOT FOLLOW ALONG THOSE LINES . E O 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(dV
|..
E O 13526, 1.4(b), E O 13526, 1.4(d)
..
..
"IDE CHARETTE THEN ASKED FOR
THE SECRETARY'S READOUT OF THE CLINTON-CHIRAC CALL.
THE SECRETARY CHARACTERIZED THE PRESIDENTIAL CALL AS
POSITIVE. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
THAT THERE MUST BE CHANGES IN THE WEST'S POLICY. NOTING
FRENCH AND U.S. AGREEMENT THAT A LINE MUST BE DRAWN AT
GORAZDE, THE SECRETARY ALSO UNDERSCORED C M O U.S.,U.K.
OMN
AND FRENCH GROUND ON THE NEED FOR A VIGOROUS AIR
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SERBS SHOULD THEY ATTACK GORAZDE.
THE SECRETARY WELCOMED THE CONVERGENCE OF IDEAS AMONG
THE THREE COUNTRIES ON HOLDING THE LINE AT GORAZDE AND
DETERRING THE SERBS WITH THREATS OF A VIGOROUS AIR
CAMPAIGN.
THE SECRETARY SAID U.S. MILITARY LEADERS HAVE STUDIED
THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO REINFORCE THE ENCLAVE WITH 1000
FRENCH TROOPS AND HAVE CONCLUDED IT IS AN UNWISE MOVE.
HE STRESSED THIS IS A MILITARY VIEW, AND NOT A POLITICAL
ONE. HE REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT WARNING THE SERBIAN
LEADERSHIP PUBLIQLY AND PRIVATELY AS TO WHAT AIRSTRIKES
COULD DO TO ANY SERBIAN INCURSION FORCE INTO GORAZDE
WILL DETER SUCH AN ATTACK BETTER THAN REINFORCEMENT.
REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE WITH MORE TROOPS IS A SYMBOLIC
GESTURE THAT WOULD SURELY HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES.
THE SECRETARY TOLD DE CHARETTE THE WORLD IS LOOKING TO
THE PLAYERS AT THE LONDON MEETING TO ACHIEVE A C M O
OMN
POSITION. HE ASKED DE CHARETTE TO CONSIDER THE AIR
CAMPAIGN OPTION AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS OTHER OPTIONS
WITH FM RIFKIND IN THE MORNING.
DE CHARETTE THANKED THE SECRETARY.FOR HIS VIEWS BUT
UNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CDO 14\JUL95\MSGS\M 1774424.html
REPEATED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE MEETING'S PROSPECTS.
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
COURSE HE AND OTHER FRENCH OFFICIALS WILL CONTINUE TO
EXPLORE OPTIONS AND MAINTAIN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
OPEN;!
_E.Q.J.3526...t.4(b.).,E.Q.J.3.526..A.4.(d)-
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
HE REITERATED THAT GROUND
REINFORCEMENT WAS THE ONLY PRACTICAL MILITARY MOVE WHICH
COULD EFFECTIVELY DETER THE SERBS.
THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE SHOULD
THE MEETING NOT PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT. HE URGED DE
CHARETTE TO COMMUNICATE TO HIS POLITICAL AND MILITARY
COLLEAGUES THE NEED FOR A SUCCESS IN LONDON.
THE SECRETARY STRESSED GORAZDE IS A MILITARY PROBLEM;
REINFORCEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN MILITARY, NOT
POLITICAL TERMS.
THE CALL ENDED AT 1927 EDT WITH BOTH PARTIES AGREEING TO
SPEAK THURSDAY, JULY 20 IN A CONFERENCE CALL INCLUDING
THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER.
4. END TEXT
TALBOTT
BT
#4561
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
NNNN
SECTION: 01 OF 01
4561
950721002106 M1774424
PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL CLARKER HARMON LAKEA SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL
•
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
Page 3 of 3
�T E P E I E T HS SE
H R S O N A EM
-CONFIDENTIAL
"ViM/qS
5696
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH IN GTO N
July 22, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSSSlDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY L7
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h Christopher and S h a l i k a s h v i l i on
the London Meeting on Bosnia. (Perry cannot
attend; John White w i l l attend.)
M i l i t a r y Results o f London: We got e s s e n t i a l l y what we wanted i n
London on Gorazde, taking i n t o account the l i m i t s on consensus
created by the composition of the meeting (see press p o i n t s ,
attached). The m i l i t a r y paper agreed by the U.S., UK and France
i s a tremendous advance over previous NATO a i r s t r i k e decisions i n
terms o f broader t a r g e t i n g and m o d i f i c a t i o n of the dual key:
•
a u t h o r i t y t o i n i t i a t e t h e a i r campaign would be i n t h e
hands o f t h e NATO a i r commander, A d m i r a l Smith, and t h e
UNPROFOR f o r c e commander on t h e ground, General Smith.
This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h normal m i l i t a r y p r a c t i c e ;
•
i n a d d i t i o n , once t h e a i r campaign i s i n i t i a t e d , t h e NATO
commander would have s o l e a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t i n u e t h e a i r
s t r i k e s u n t i l t h e Serbs h a l t t h e i r a t t a c k s on Gorazde. The
UN commander c o u l d n ' t t u r n o f f h i s key.
Follow-up: The p l a n w i l l be taken up by NATO's M i l i t a r y
Committee over t h e weekend. The NAG meets today t o endorse
the London r e s u l t s and p r o v i d e t h e necessary t a s k i n g s t o t h e
NATO M i l i t a r y A u t h o r i t i e s , w i t h a view t o NAG a p p r o v a l on
Monday. I n p a r a l l e l , we, t h e B r i t s and French w i l l weigh i n
w i t h B o u t r o s - G h a l i t o delegate h i s key.
We suggest you ask S h a l l :
• whether he sees any l i m i t a t i o n s on t a r g e t i n g ;
• whether we can count on General Smith to turn h i s key; and
• whether NATO needs to deploy any a d d i t i o n a l a i r a s s e t s to
implement the plan.
You should a l s o ask Chris:
>, ^
i,
«
.
T
^T??.??!^
n
u-
v
^
WJC HANDWRITING
• whether Boutros-Ghali w i l l give up h i s key; and
CONFIDENTHIL
cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
.. .
.
'•
Chief of S t a f f
�•eetpBfftfti:
CONriDEHTIMi
• how to manage the Russians.
Warning to the Serbs: I t was agreed i n London that we, the
B r i t i s h and French would d e l i v e r a p r i v a t e warning to General
Mladic even before the NAG has approved the plan (either
tomorrow or on Monday). The B r i t i s h w i l l send a senior A i r
Force o f f i c e r as t h e i r emissary, along with an Under Secretary
of Defense; the French are doing roughly the same. We should
probably designate an A i r Force General as w e l l .
Other Safe Areas: The London warning applies only to Gorazde;
the other A l l i e s were r e l u c t a n t to extended the new m i l i t a r y
plan to Sarajevo or other safe areas, but agreed t h i s could be
done l a t e r through another NAG d e c i s i o n i f necessary. With
the e s c a l a t i o n i n Bihac and threat of Croatian i n t e r v e n t i o n ,
you might ask whether we should move q u i c k l y to extend the
warning to Bihac and, perhaps, Sarajevo as w e l l .
D i p l o m a t i c Track: The B r i t i s h made a l a s t - m i n u t e push t o have
the London meeting endorse the package t h a t C a r l B i l d t has
worked out w i t h M i l o s e v i c on r e c o g n i t i o n of Bosnia and b o r d e r
closure i n r e t u r n f o r sanctions r e l i e f .
B i l d t threatened t o
r e s i g n i f t h e p l a n wasn't approved, but he was calmed (at
l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y ) by b e i n g given an audience w i t h Contact
Group F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s l a s t n i g h t . We r e f u s e d t o endorse t h e
B i l d t package because:
•
t h e Bosnian Government has problems w i t h the package (and
we have always r e f u s e d t o impose terms on the B o s n i a n s ) ;
•
we s t i l l have problems w i t h the mechanism f o r r e i m p o s i n g
s a n c t i o n s and t h e o v e r l y generous amount o f s a n c t i o n s
r e l i e f p r o v i d e d up f r o n t ; and
•
i t i s d e b a t a b l e whether now i s the r i g h t time t o g i v e any
new rewards t o M i l o s e v i c , a f t e r Srebrenica and Zepa.
You should ask C h r i s to:
•
give h i s view on where we go with the B i l d t package; and
•
whether we should modify our p o s i t i o n on contacts with the
Bosnian Serbs i n order to get d i r e c t t a l k s going among the
p a r t i e s while we have a window of opportunity f o l l o w i n g the
London meeting.
Attachment
Tab A
Press Points on London Meeting
•eesTTDFimnT
CLI NTQWmm P O O O Y
HTCP
�7/22/95
LONDON MEETING ON BOSNIA
We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only
strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore
UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political
settlement.
We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnian
Serbs from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that
measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo.
The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to
translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:
First, there was agreement that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a
"substantial and decisive response." This means a strong and decisive response by
NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs
defy our warning.
-
The U.S., UK and France agreed on a concept of operations that provides for broadgauged strikes against military forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an
attack, against supporting forces and command-and-control and, if necessary, against
military targets elsewhere in Bosnia.
-
It would also modify the "dual key" in a significant way, taking UN political
authorities out of the chain of command and placing authority to initiate the air
campaign in the hands of the NATO air commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, and
the UNPROFOR force commander on the ground, General Rupert Smith. This is
consistent with normal military practice.
-
Moreover, once the air campaign is initiated, the NATO commander would have sole
authority to continue the air strikes until the Serbs halt their attacks on Gorazde.
The NAC will meet today to task work by NATO's military authorities. The plan will
then be discussed by the NATO Military Committee, with a view to a decision by the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) on Monday to put the new approach into effect.
-
I should point out that existing authority for air strikes and close air support is still in
effect should the Serbs move on Gorazde (or other safe areas) before the NAC has
acted.
We have agreed with the British and French that the new approach could be applied to
the other safe areas if necessary. This would require only a decision by the NAC to do
so.
The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to
Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use
of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to
Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to
achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the
Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.
-
The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to
secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border
with Bosnia.
- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with
Milosevic, but that package was not approved; in fact, we see a number of issues that
still need to be satisfactorily resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian
Government on whether the terms for mutual recognition are acceptable.
The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address
Bosnia's humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica
and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the
international community be given immediate access to all detainees still being held by
the Bosnian Serbs.
Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective
UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.
-
We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human
tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.
-
Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo
unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the
London meeting's renewed display of resolve for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with
the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous behavior.
-
We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment it
has committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe
areas.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0517-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Bosnia related documents from the summer of 1995 referenced in the book, The Road to Dayton. A cable summarizing Secretary of State Warren Christopher's conversation with French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette from July 1995 is included.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0517-M
Bosnia
Declassified
Diplomacy
Foreign Policy
France
Warren Christopher
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/802eb45c7ea4e766bb8814f3af68c818.pdf
857378856cdf82f32da00107668a0e0b
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�Subject:
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
•eecRET
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
201823ZAUG 98
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE
2763
980821150149 M3432489
- C I I O R E T STATE 152763
NODIS
E.0.12958: DECL: 8/20/28
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
1. GBJ CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS R. PICKERING FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. (S) AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT
JIANG.
3. (S)BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR PRESIDENT JIANG,
FIRST, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CONDOLENCES FOLLOWING
THE BOMBINGS IN EAST AFRICA.
TODAY I AUTHORIZED OUR MILITARY FORCES TO STRIKE AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN. I AM WRITING,
IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR WORK TOGETHER AND OUR CONTINUING CLOSE
CONTACTS, TO TELL YOU HOW I REACHED THIS IMPORTANT
DECISION.
THE FACILITIES ATTACKED TODAY IN BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BEING
USED BY THE USAMA BIN LADIN NETWORK TO TRAIN AND EQUIP
TERRORISTS FOR WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS. WE HAVE SOLID
EVIDENCE FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT THIS GROUP WAS MOST
RECENTLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND
TANZANIA. EXERCISING OUR RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.WE CARRIED OUT
STRIKES AGAINST TRAINING AND BASE CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
A FACILITY BEING USED TO PRODUCE VX NERVE GAS.
WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE WAS
HELD TO A MINIMUM. ALL STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO
PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM USING THEIR TERRITORY TO COMMIT
ACTS OF TERRORISM. STATES WHICH FAIL TO UPHOLD THAT
OBLIGATION MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THAT FAILURE.
THE HARD TRUTH IS THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT WITH
THE FORCES OF TERRORISM, A CONFLICT WHICH WAS THRUST UPON
US, AND ONE WHICH WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO BRING
T
OTTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7/a>/»5 K8V1
�I URGE YOU TO JOIN US IN TAKING A STRONG PUBLIC STAND
AGAINST TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS. AS A FIRST STEP WE ASK
THAT YOU EXAMINE CAREFULLY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH I HAVE
ASKED OUR EMBASSY TO PRESENT TO YOU BEFORE YOU DECIDE YOUR
OWN POSITION. IF YOU DO SO, I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL JOIN
US IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE IN TAKING ACTIONS TO
DEFEAT TERRORISM AND TO SPEAK OUT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY
AGAINST THOSE WHO PERPETUATE IT. WE ALSO ASK YOU TO RATIFY
ALL ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERROR TREATIES.
OUR SOLIDARITY ON THESE ISSUES IS THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST
THOSE PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT WOULD LAUNCH TERROR
ATTACKS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND INTERESTS.
AS WE DISCUSSED DURING MY VISIT TO CHINA THIS SUMMER, THIS
IS ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH WE CAN REACH A GENUINE DEGREE OF
OPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS
IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND TO HAVING YOUR SUPPORT.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
4. END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�•eONPIDENTIAIf
5930
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y d u r i n g t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know the pressures must be enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. Hope you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
I am sure
t h a t m e e t i n g w i t h him w i l l h e l p b o t h you and me prepare f o r
next week.
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t h e c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you t o l d me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t s t a k e , and t h a t may be t r u e r now than ever.
•
Know you're aware o f the stakes and how i m p o r t a n t i t i s t o
move p r o m p t l y and c o n v i n c i n g l y t o address immediate f i n a n c i a l
crisis.
Even a day or two o f u n c e r t a i n t y c o u l d be dangerous.
•
I am sending one o f my t o p economics e x p e r t s b e f o r e the
meeting; i m p o r t a n t t h a t our teams work t o g e t h e r and t h a t you
and I have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n about economics next week.
Osama bin Ladin
•
I heard your comments about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t I a c t e d because t h e evidence was
overwhelming t h a t more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e . I hope
you know me w e l l enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
•
A t times we have t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
d i s c u s s i t l a t e r . You and I have worked t o g e t h e r on the
problem o f t e r r o r i s m and share a common view o f t h e t h r e a t t o
our people.
I s i m p l y c o u l d not s t a n d by when Americans were
under a t t a c k .
Pause for
Yeltsin
response
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5b,d
Declassify
PER E.O. 13526
^OO^-l^l-H
X i W m LB A Y PHOTOCOPf'^ ^
IRR
�•CONFIDENTIAL
•
B o r i s , I want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o g e t t h i s i s s u e behind us o r t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t t h e summit.
Summit Preparations
•
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o show w o r l d t h a t t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
•
We have made p r o g r e s s on two i m p o r t a n t new i n i t i a t i v e s :
s h a r i n g e a r l y warning data on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e launches and
d i s p o s i n g o f excess p l u t o n i u m f o r n u c l e a r weapons. L e t ' s make
sure these agreements are f i n a l i z e d .
•
A l s o wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you and I can t u r n
i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n p o i n t s o f c o n f l i c t .
Strobe w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iran
•
We've worked on I r a n and have a chance t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people a r e w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program. I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s were announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t tone f o r o u r meeting.
Iraq
•
Saddam i s d e f y i n g t h e MOU he agreed t o w i t h K o f i Annan. I f we
are g o i n g t o s u s t a i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,
we need t o g e t him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings - i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Kosovo
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . Humanitarian s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e he can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commitments he made t o you i n Moscow.
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
• Winter i s coming. There are 200,000 displaced people. Now i s
the time f o r us t o send a clear s i g n a l t h a t he cannot use
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e force against c i v i l i a n s . Strobe w i l l t a l k
about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
•
larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s would be wrong message t o send. Investors looking
now f o r Russian actions t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk of b a i l o u t
could b a c k f i r e and send signal that s i t u a t i o n i s desperate.
I f raised
•
- need
- go together
to Duma?
Need t o reassess t h i s i n l i g h t of changes i n government.
Seeing both of us together may only anger your opponents i n
Duma and complicate matters. Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
•CONFIDENT IAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�^"""""tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
ABCD
V
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y jduring t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know t h e pressures must be/enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. H^jpe you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t/he c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you tefld me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t stake, ar^d t h a t may be t r u e r now t h a n ever.
Know t h a t you're aware o f /the stakes.
I hope you and I can
have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n /bout economics next week.
^saiaa bin Ladin
•
I heard your comment^ about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t A acted because the evidence was
overwhelming t h a t / more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e .
•
A t times we haye t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
discuss i t l a y e r .
I s i m p l y c o u l d not be i d l e .
I hope you
know me well/enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
Pause .for Yelzsin
•
response
B o r i s , I/Want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i / k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o get t h i s i s s u e behind us or t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t the summit.
MaiW c r i t i c s jajh^want t o s e i z e on every d i f f e r e n c e between us
as/an excuse to' b l o c k our c o o p e r a t i o n . We cannot l e t t h i s
Overshadow our meeting.
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o
show w o r l d t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
-CONFIDENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b,d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
8/24/98
\
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
7/^/15"
KSH
�co riDD roim
" ' CLINTON LB A Y P O O l Y
I R R H T gP
•
I n t h a t s p i r i t , wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you anc}/ I
can t u r n i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r / p o i n t s o f
conflict.
S t r o b e w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iraq
•
F i r s t i s I r a q . Saddam i s d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l colnmunity
d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f Primakov and K o f i Annan. /We have t o
get him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings y i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Iran
We've worked on I r a n and have a ch? ice t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people are w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t n I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program.
I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s vfere announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t / t o n e f o r our meeting.
Kosovo
•
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . m i m a n i t a r i a n s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e / h e can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commiments he made t o you i n Moscow.
•
Now i s t h e time f o r us t o send a c l e a r s i g n a l t h a t t h e a t t a c k s
must s t o p .
StrQDe w i l l t a l k about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
- need/larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s y b u l d be wrong message t o send. I n v e s t o r s l o o k i n g
now f o r Russian a c t i o n s t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk o f b a i l o u t
c o u l d b a c l / f i r e and send s i g n a l t h a t s i t u a t i o n i s d e s p e r a t e .
I f raised/-
go together
to Duma?
Need /to reassess t h i s i n l i g h t o f changes i n government.
Seeing b o t h o f us t o g e t h e r may o n l y anger your opponents i n
Duma and c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s . Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
-GeWi'lDLNUAL-
�SECRET
S£€RE?
6 i 5 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 8, 1998, 10:57-11:20 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
The President:
Hello, B i l l .
I'm f i n e .
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
President Chirac: I wanted t o say t h a t we have been traumatized
by the two a t t a c k s against Dar es Salaam and N a i r o b i , and I
wanted t o t e l l you how s o r r y I am and o f f e r a l l my f r i e n d s h i p on
t h i s occasion. (U)
The President: Thank you very much. I appreciate t h a t and a l l
the assistance you o f f e r e d . I t h i n k your embassy i n Dar es
Salaam was damaged as w e l l . (U)
President Chirac: Yes, a little bit. I don't know who these
people are. Do you have any idea? {&)
The President: Only suspicions. We have our bomb team there
now. I have been amazed a t what they can f i n d from t i n y pieces
about how the bombs were put together and sometimes t h a t o f f e r s
c l u e s . We have our suspicions, but we s t i l l don't know. (S)
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/4/08
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
aKfl-iw-n
7/*/15" KBH
�SECRET
President Chirac:
The President:
You don't know s t i l l ?
(S)
I t h i n k we w i l l f i n d o u t . (S)
President Chirac: I was very, very s o r r y and I wrote i t t o you.
But I t e l l you how s o r r y I was, and I f e e l i t from the bottom o f
my h e a r t about the people who were k i l l e d from the United States
and those two c o u n t r i e s . (U)
The President: Thank you. Jacques, f i r s t o f a l l , I want t o
apologize f o r d i s t u r b i n g your v a c a t i o n . I hear you are i n
M a u r i t i u s . I c a l l e d t o t a l k t o you about Kosovo. (€)
President Chirac: B i l l , do you mind going through an
i n t e r p r e t e r ? As you know, my English i s not so good.
(U)
The President: Let's go through an interpreter. I called to
talk to you about Kosovo because I am very concerned that we are
getting close to another humanitarian disaster and am worried
that we are on the verge of another Bosnia. The war in Bosnia
could not have ended in 1995 without your leadership and
determination. {&)
Here i s what I b e l i e v e has happened. I t h i n k M i l o s e v i c has
decided t o go f o r a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . But i n a d d i t i o n t o
f i g h t i n g the armed r e s i s t a n c e , he i s also c l e a n i n g out c i v i l i a n s
from t h e i r homes and v i l l a g e s and innocent c i v i l i a n s are being
h u r t because he b e l i e v e s , a f t e r t a l k i n g t o Primakov, t h a t there
i s not a chance o f a NATO m i l i t a r y response because he t h i n k s
they w i l l a c t o n l y w i t h a UN r e s o l u t i o n and Russia w i l l b l o c k
t h a t . (&)
EO 13526 1 4
.d
t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r w i t h a S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n .
But here i s what I t h i n k i s the problem and why I t h i n k we need
to make i t c l e a r t h a t NATO could a c t w i t h o u t a S e c u r i t y Council
r e s o l u t i o n i f necessary and l e t them go ahead w i t h the p l a n n i n g
they have begun and i n i d e n t i f y i n g forces t h a t could be brought
i n t o p l a y t o stop a m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e i n Kosovo. Here i s what
I b e l i e v e : i f we t r y t o get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , we w i l l p u t
Y e l t s i n i n the worst of a l l p o s i t i o n s because i f they block i t ,
many people i n the w o r l d w i l l c r i t i c i z e Russia, and Russia needs
f r i e n d s now because the government i s i n a bad p o s i t i o n and the
economy i s hanging by a thread. I f they back i t and l e t i t go
through, I t h i n k Y e l t s i n w i l l be i n t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e a t home
w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Duma. I n p r i n c i p l e , I would l i k e a
r e s o l u t i o n t o o , but as a p r a c t i c a l matter we may have t o keep
GECRKT
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
our o p t i o n s open and argue t h a t we can do t h i s i f necessary
because o f the previous a c t i o n s o f M i l o s e v i c . (S)
President Chirac: B i l l , I p e r f e c t l y understand t h a t and t h e r e
i s no need f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but I would l i k e t o speak French,
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: Well, you know M i l o s e v i c b e l i e v e s h e ' l l never
have t o face NATO. That i s why there are 200,000 people d r i v e n
from t h e i r homes. A l l the past evidence suggests t h a t o n l y when
he i s under pressure w i l l he n e g o t i a t e .
my impression i s t h a t he would get k i l l e d i n t h e
Duma i f he voted f o r t h i s . (S)
i
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
�o EC RET
SECRET
President Chirac:
The President:
I agree, i f we can. ( G
-)
President Chi rac :
_
The President: Here i s what I t h i n k . I t h i n k t h a t f i r s t o f
a l l , we are c l e a r l y b e t t e r o f f i f we can get i t .
My problem i s
I t h i n k i f we w a i t t o t h e p o i n t where a c l e a r humanitarian
d i s a s t e r i s on us t h i s w i n t e r , we may be too l a t e t o prevent a
mass o u t p o u r i n g o f refugees and there w i l l be a h e l l o f a l o t
more people k i l l e d by then. (ۥ)
President
Chirac:
The President: I understand your s i t u a t i o n , but what bothers me
i s t h a t by then M i l o s e v i c may have won h i s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y by
massive e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
The President: What I want t o do i s avoid the s t i c k , b u t i f he
t h i n k s we've got i t , he may go back t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f NATO a c t i o n w i t h o u t Russian approval t h a t i s a
CECRET
SCCRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
5
deterrent.
I s t h a t what you are you saying, t h a t we can leave
i t unstated?
I would l i k e the p l a n n i n g t o go forward. (C)
President Chirac:
A b s o l u t e l y . (€)
The President: Then we need t o t e l l Y e l t s i n we do n o t want t h i s
to come t o pass. We don't want t o have t o ask f o r a UN
resolution.
I t w i l l give him more i n c e n t i v e t o t r y t o s e t t l e
t h i s t h i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
Yes. (€)
The President: Believe me he does not want us t o ask f o r a
resolution.
I f there i s a r e s o l u t i o n , Y e l t s i n w i l l be weakened
at home no matter what he does. (€)
President Chirac:
The President: He s a i d he would p r e f e r t h e UN, b u t he d i d n ' t
want t o p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o an impossible p o s i t i o n , and i n a
p o s i t i o n where i t looks l i k e Russia has a veto over a n y t h i n g
NATO wants t o do. I t h i n k we want t o avoid t h i s . Kohl s a i d he
wanted t o t a l k t o you again and have Sandy Berger meet w i t h
B i t t e r l i c h and check around and t a l k again i n a couple o f days.
(•
€)
President Chirac:
The President:
I agree w i t h t h a t .
(€)
President Chirac: At t h e same time, b r i n g a l l p o s s i b l e pressure
to bear i n order t o f i n d a s9lu.tJ.s.n^hro-U.a.h_th.e_QQnta.c.t_G.r.QiiD
which should remain u n i t e d .
J
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
DECRET
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: I f t h a t i s your p o s i t i o n , I t h i n k i t i s
important t h a t our p u b l i c p o s i t i o n i s t h a t we should t r y t o be
s i l e n t on the matter and not make a b i g issue out o f the UN
mandate one way or the other. Otherwise we w i l l look t o t a l l y
h y p o c r i t i c a l . There i s a d i s a s t e r and then a veto and then we
have t o a c t . I t h i n k we have t o keep the p u b l i c p o s i t i o n t h a t
we hope we won't have t o a c t , we b e l i e v e there ought t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n , but not close the door. (€)
President Chirac: Yes, I agree completely w i t h you.
close the door. No polemics on t h a t . (e)
Don't
The President: On the other hand, we w i l l be q u i e t t o o . We
won't say o f course we don't need i t . We w i l l say i t would be a
good t h i n g t o have i t . (ۥ)
President Chirac: That i s good.
and a f f e c t i o n t o H i l l a r y . (U)
The President:
I will.
Please say a l l my best
(U)
President Chirac: Thank you very much, B i l l .
The President:
Thank you.
—
regards
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye.
(U)
�5961
/CONriDEl'TTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
September 2 8 ,
?
g8ShP28PMi2:30
1998
INFORMATION
'H^^R^llDENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t J i a n g Zemin on £j£)<^
Afghanistan/Sudan M i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
/use CocJ
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g our
r a t i o n a l e f o r t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against t a r g e t s i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Embassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided.
The most i n t e r e s t i n g element i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response. We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
riang t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A August 26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COUriDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9./-10/0i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
cc:
Vice President
Chief of S t a f f
�1
5961
COITFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t / j i a n g Zemin on
Afghanistan/Sudan m i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g o u r
rationale f o rtaking m i l i t a r y action/against targets i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Erribassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced I n t e r n a t i o n a / c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided nrr f n r m - j n n n a i b l g
• (att-achmont a t Tab ~A)
The most i n t e r e s t i n g elemei/h i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r / s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response/ We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
J i a n g t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachment S
Tab A August/26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFSEE)
PER E.O. 13526
l/X\/rt
GONFIDENTIAL
KehTreth L i ibortherir
(d
1.5(b:
c i d s s l f l e d by:~
Reason:
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/10//08
K6V1
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning Afghanistan and Sudan
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1291-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on documents regarding military operations against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998. Included is head of state correspondence between President Clinton and various world leaders, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and French President Jacques Chirac.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2009-1291-M
7388808
Afghanistan
China
Declassified
Foreign Policy
France
Russia
Sudan
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5d060d0f48772b369e7f2d8f8f4e1e51.pdf
7871096262b4f4bcf933086b731376f9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning French President Francois Mitterrand
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0808-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between President Clinton and French President Francois Mitterrand between January 20, 1995 and May 17, 1995. Materials include a March 19, 1995 cable transmitting a message from Clinton to Mitterrand regarding participation in V-E Day Commemorations.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0808-M
26457815
France
Francois Mitterrand
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/227c20a855bb34f5969840e66a6344f4.pdf
c59f19f7ad52c14497c7c47a5b06bf6b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning French President Francois Mitterrand
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0774-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
7/13/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and President Francois Mitterrand of France, February 15, 1993 through November 24, 1994 . Also included are related memoranda, talking points, letters, and briefing papers.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
7/12/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0774-M.pdf
26457815
France
Francois Mitterrand
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8560629000255e64e59b2740de068983.pdf
307c31ea8feb0eb0c98527b8c863fa56
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning French President Francois Mitterrand
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0808-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
12/14/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains correspondence between President William J. Clinton and French President Francois Mitterrand, April 1993 through May 1995.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
12/7/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0808-M.pdf
26457815
France
Francois Mitterrand
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3987d031c487929cbb46fbd3a688be8d.pdf
553e363cbc4584a12dd10b8c742fd043
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Regarding French Policy Towards Zaire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2017-0240-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
4/6/2023
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains cables from the U.S. Embassy in Paris regarding French policy towards Zaire from December 1996 through May 1997.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
3/10/2023
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
France
Zaire
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/14d92cd4860b06fefccc51dc5ecae5e6.pdf
473df2faf1a1888d23e40d571b18930b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning Rwanda
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0261-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
2/2/2024
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for all exemption 1 closures in Freedom of Information Act case 2006-0186-F (All documents related to Rwanda in the files of Jennifer Ward). Jennifer Ward was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of African Affairs in the National Security Council. The request was for all records related to Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. Topics include the gamut of operations and policy in Rwanda. A significant majority of these records are duplicates of those found in the files of Donald Steinberg (2010-0639-M) and released under that collection.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
1/8/2024
Burundi
France
Francois Mitterand
Jennifer Ward
Rwanda
UNAMIR
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7ec9f20aea4a9c9f9e8b0c15efdac8bb.pdf
b9e31fcb6e3d9d83cf4bf75af65e87e2
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c66d57231f091d187155d7407ed0929b.pdf
5e1b6fe17d233c101a32f0d987d48eef
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/44fcebeba87c94ef552fac6b91cc5ad2.pdf
f62a01d50819841530b26497e8fc8a15
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5d042f83fa58b70074708f14c0127713.pdf
74a34af3e8be1a8ac2ddbc7ee50b6385
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a1ca8fd5b12dddc6a0dd8fc771ea5f7b.pdf
1eb58a7d4a751152d90c5e8fe1646886
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6ab576aa6a1edf42a5162309930cc438.pdf
8a4ed7ba4abc1fc85878550e422d601d
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5c445cc9a557aa99f8e8515a2717a83d.pdf
64db1720c97af87a8eb61dd825e08576
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/89c35d26fa96f87ec734a551ad81cc96.pdf
f1a44d2194c4177f32d08a5fa650f326
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e37a5d48dc7e1489e1571c952f4b60c9.pdf
0e9f8b49bd41d10a0874d7ecf42bbf67
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning Rwanda
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2011-0262-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
2/2/2024
Description
An account of the resource
These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for all exemption 1 closures in Freedom of Information Act case 2006-0192-F (All documents related to Rwanda in the files of MacArthur Deshazer, Jr.). MacArthur Deshazer, Jr. was a Director of African Affairs in the National Security Council. The request was for all records related to Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. The information being released are primarily Department of State cables related to Rwanda and diplomatic initiatives to address the situation. Included are summaries of meetings that Assistant Secretary Richard Moose held with Belgium, Burundi, and Zaire among others. Topics include the gamut of operations and policy in Rwanda.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collections/show/146">2006-0192-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: WHORM Subject File - General
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
01/03/2024
Belgium
Burundi
France
Kenya
MacArthur Deshazer Jr.
Operation Support Hope
Richard Moose
Rwanda
South Africa
uganda
UNAMIR
Zaire
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2aed009bf3663e41e2f3de8653c42732.jpg
07a647f49283d1648e62bd2eed43bf68
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1993-2001
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Description
An account of the resource
<p>The White House Photograph Office was responsible for the official photography of the First Family and the Presidential administration. The primary duty of this office was to document the President, First Lady, and staff in their official capacities. The office handled media and personal requests for photographs of the President and administration.</p>
<p>Official Photographers for the Clinton administration are as follows:<br /> Robert McNeely<br /> Sharon Farmer<br /> Barbara Kinney<br /> Ralph Alswang<br /> David Scull<br /> William Vasta</p>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples include paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type Text to images of textual materials.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Negative
Location
The location of the interview
Normandy, France
Color
The color of the photograph
Color
Physical Dimensions
The actual physical size of the original image
35mm
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
D-Day 50th Anniversary
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Robert McNeely
White House Photograph Office
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
06/06/1994
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
P16462-27a_06Jun1994
Description
An account of the resource
President Clinton delivers remarks at the D-Day 50th Anniversary event at Utah Beach in France
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/594653">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Photographs of the White House Photograph Office
Photographs Relating to the Clinton Administration
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPEG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Unrestricted
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reference
Photographs and Other Graphic Materials
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
P16462-27a_06Jun1994
594653
Bill Clinton
D-Day
France
Military
Normandy
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1b74082bb3d7b70c0d3b661d099db98a.pdf
02eb7d832a61e14aa0dc21381a2fb963
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C.
February 12, 1999
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
...
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Robert E. Rubin
^
SUBJECT:
French President Chirac's Visit
Since international finance is likely to be one of the major themes of your discussion with
President Chirac, I thought it might be helpful to review the major points I expect President
Chirac will make with you on international finance and tell you how I think we should respond.
President Chirac's Objectives
President Chirac apparently has three key objectives: (1) to give a political push to global
financial reforms (he may offer to host a summit of leaders from the emerging market economies
and industrial countries this summer); (2) to make the case that the United States and Europe
have a global responsibility to provide "stability" between the euro and the dollar and to gain
U.S. agreement for greater G-7 cooperation on exchange rates; and (3) to present the euro in a
positive light, and informally position himself as the leading spokesperson at the leaders' level
for the "eurozone." President Chirac also may want to discuss European representation in the G7, French proposals for IMF reform and debt relief.
President Chirac is planning to meet with the IMF's Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, and
the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, the day before he meets you.
International Financial Architecture
President Chirac is reported to have been impressed by your Council on Foreign Relations speech
and is in broad agreement with its main points. However, Chirac may make some specific
proposals which we oppose. You will want to stress the importance we attach to producing a set
of sensible reforms to improve the international financial system. We think the needed reforms
should be centered around building stronger incentives for emerging markets to adopt sound
policies and for getting markets to pay more attention to the risks of certain types of financial
activity, and examining changes in the roles of the IMF and the private sector in crises.
It also important to focus attention on the concrete steps we are taking to reform the financial
architecture. We hope that Chirac will support us in pressing for implementation in existing
areas of G-7 agreement, such as the proposed Contingency Credit Line in the IMF.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Exchange Rate Coordination
President Chirac is likely to call for "a system of enhanced cooperation" among the G-7 to assure
a "satisfactory degree of exchange rate stability among the dollar, euro and yen." This system,
according to the somewhat vague reports we have heard, would include closer international
surveillance of exchange rates, particularly the dollar/euro rate, and strengthened co-operation on
macroeconomic policies. We support strengthening the G-7 process to assure better policies for
coordinated growth in G-7 economies, but agreeing to French proposal for enhanced cooperation
on exchange rates does not make sense, for a number of reasons.
•
Our priority should be the promotion of strong, coordinated policies to promote growth.
Exchange rates are not a particularly effective tool for this — indeed, attempts to constrain
exchange rate movements could force us to adopt pro-cyclical policies at times.
Exchange rate movements are likely to be symptoms, rather than causes, of disparities in
our recent economic performances.
•
Coordination in support of current levels - the obvious benchmark - could help lock in
the trend of increasing U.S. current account deficits. France's desire to stabilize
exchange rates may be linked to a desire to keep the euro "competitive" and facilitate
export-led growth, which is more palatable than the difficult structural reforms needed to
jump-start their economy.
•
Markets might misinterpret any statement about exchange rate coordination as implying
some commitment for U.S. policymakers to act in ways that may not always be beneficial
to the U.S. economy. Markets may (correctly) judge such a commitment to be
non-credible, thereby threatening the credibility that the administration has worked hard
to earn over the past six years.
I would recommend that you respond to Chirac's proposals by arguing that our priority should be
the promotion of strong, coordinated policies to promote growth. The U.S. has long been the
main engine of growth in the world economy, but the current imbalance in growth is not
sustainable. Schemes that focus on exchange rates focus on the symptoms, rather than the cause,
of disparities in economic performance. You might also want to note that inappropriate swings
in exchange rates are best dampened by sound and credible policies in all countries.
Leaders' Summit on Global Financial Reforms
President Chirac previously has suggested a meeting of the heads of state of the countries
represented on the IMF's Interim Committee. He may renew his offer to host such a meeting
later this year to give political impetus to architecture reforms. If he does, you should emphasize
that such a meeting could raise expectations that might not be met and that we need to figure out
what specifically we can do in terms of concrete reform before we delve into the mechanics of a
new summit. We also question whether the Interim Committee brings together the right group of
countries. You could point out that President Chirac's desire for progress on architecture would
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�be best served by focusing on the immediate G-7 process, the next step of which will be "G-7
plus" outreach to involve a broad group of countries.
French Agenda for IMF Reform
President Chirac may raise French proposals to transform the IMF's Interim Committee into a
Council that would provide the IMF with greater "political" guidance. We do not support the
French proposal to create a Council. It is, at best, a solution in search of problem, and at worst,
likely to prove counterproductive. It does not address what we consider to be the core problems
with the Interim Committee: the existing constituency system does not provide for adequate
representation of emerging markets (Europeans, in contrast, are over represented) and Interim
Committee meetings are overly formal, poorly attended and fail to provide opportunities for real
dialogue. Plus, creating a Council risks upsetting the governing structure of the Fund and
undermining the effectiveness of the Fund's current Executive Board. We support reforms to
make the Interim Committee more representative and favor morefrequent,and less formal
meetings at the deputies level rather than morefrequentformal ministerial meetings.
If President Chirac raises the subject, you should emphasize that the U.S. is committed to making
the Interim Committee more effective but does not want to undermine the effectiveness of the
IMF. You should also note that finance ministries are working on this topic.
Debt Relief
German Chancellor Schroeder's recent statements on broadening and deepening the debt relief
initiative for the heavily indebted poorest countries (HIPC) are welcome. They reflect positions
that United States and others have taken for some time. But as it currently stands, this initiative
is under funded. G-7 finance ministries have been tasked to produce concrete proposals for the
Summit. You may want to indicate how important it is for the United States and France to work
together to flesh out realistic debt relief proposals.
Regulation of Capital Movement
President Chirac may push for more transparency and disclosure from "hedge funds" and stricter
regulation of off-shorefinancialcenters. You may want to note that we are working on the
difficult, technical questions raised by "hedge funds" in the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets. France (like many other countries) does not have "hedge funds" although
French banks can and do lend to them, and engage in similar activities.
France also has emphasized the importance of orderly and gradual capital account liberalization
and proposed allowing emerging markets with a liberalized capital account to employ emergency
"financial safeguards" in the event of severe instability. You should note that we are also
concerned about the boom/bust cycle in emerging market finance. We think the right solution is
improved policies in emerging markets and more disciplined investment decision in industrial
countries (including better regulation), not heavy-handed controls on capital flows.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Global and European Economic Outlook, EMU
January's launch of the European Economic and Monetary Union proceeded smoothly, but we
are concerned about slowing growth in Europe. France's economy grew at 3% in 1998, but is
estimated to slow to 2% in 1999 - too slow to reduce France's 11.5% unemployment rate.
Japan's recession and the increasing U.S. current account deficit have made it more critical that
France and other European countries tackle politically difficult structural reforms to enable
domestic demand led growth to accelerate and support global growth prospects. In addition to
indicating that the priority now in Europe should be on policies to promote growth, you may
want to ask President Chirac to join us in urging that the Government of Japan take aggressive
actions to stimulate its economy.
Euro Representation in the G-7
Following the creation of the euro, the Europeans have proposed including the President of the
European Central Bank, the European Commission and the finance minster in the presidency of
the Euro-11 council in the G-7 process. We have resisted expanding the group's size to preserve
its small, informal working nature. The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve are
working with their European colleagues to identify the appropriate way forward here.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Talking Points on Global Economic Issues
Meeting with French President Chirac
Financial Architecture
•
The United States attaches great importance to producing a set of reforms to improve the
international financial system. We think the needed reforms should be centered around
building stronger incentives for emerging markets to adopt sound policies and for getting
markets to pay more attention to the risks of certain types of financial activity, and
examining changes in the roles of the IMF and the private sector in crises.
•
We strongly support reaching out to other countries in a global dialogue and are looking
for your support on this, through the G-7 plus process.
•
It also important to focus attention on the concrete steps we are taking to reform the
financial architecture. We hope that you will support us in pressing for implementation
in existing areas of G-7 agreement, such as the proposed Contingency Credit Line in the
IMF.
Exchange Rate Coordination
•
Our priority should be the promotion of strong, coordinated policies to promote growth.
Exchange rates are not a particularly effective tool for this - indeed, attempts to constrain
exchange rate movements could force us to adopt pro-cyclical policies at times.
Exchange rate movements are likely to be symptoms, rather than causes, of disparities in
our recent economic performances.
•
Markets are very sensitive to signals about exchange rates. A statement calling for
greater coordination on exchange rates could be viewed as signaling a change in our
policy, which ultimately would not be credible.
•
The experience of Europe shows that tremendous political will and economic
convergence is required for a concerted monetary and exchange rate policy. The current
situation among G-7 countries differs from Europe in this respect.
•
Inappropriate swings in exchange rates are best damped by sound and credible policies in
all countries. The G-7 process is a dialogue in which we hope to learn from each other in
an attempt to reach better policies. We certainly favor strengthening the G-7 process, in
particular, to assure better policies for concerted growth.
•
I understand that Secretary Rubin, Minister Strauss-Kahn, and their G-7 colleagues will
explore these issue further this weekend.
Global Economic Outlook and Japan
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�U.S. economy is still strong. But it is very important that Europe and Japan strengthen
domestic demand.
To date, the United States has bom the entire burden of current account adjustment from
the crisis countries; this cannot continue.
We think the priority now in Europe should be on structural and other policies to bolster
growth and hope you will join us in urging that the Government of Japan take aggressive
actions to stimulate its economy.
f raised: French Proposal for a Leaders' Summit on Global Financial Reform
A meeting of the heads of state on globalfinancialreform could raise expectations that
could not be met. We need tofigureout what specifically we can do in terms of concrete
reform before we delve into the mechanics of a new summit.
We also question whether the Interim Committee brings together the right group of
countries.
Our common desire for progress on architecture would be best served by focusing on the
G-7 process, including the planned G-7 plus outreach to emerging markets.
f raised: IMF/ Elevating the Role of the Interim Committee
The United States is committed to making the Interim Committee more effective but does
not want to undermine the effectiveness of the IMF. Ourfinanceministries are currently
working to do this.
f raised: Speculative Capital Flows/ Capital Controls
I am also concerned about the boonVbust cycle in emerging market finance. We think the
right solution is improved policies in emerging markets and stronger incentives for more
disciplined investment decisions in industrial countries, not heavy-handed controls on
capital flows.
Debt Relief
It is extremely important for the United States and France to work together to flesh out
concrete and realistic proposals. German Chancellor Schroeder's recent statements on
broadening and deepening the debt relief initiative for the heavily indebted poorest
countries (HEPC) are welcome: they reflect a position that United States and others have
taken for some time. The key problem to be resolved now is funding.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Euro
•
Your leadership was critical for the successful launch of the euro. I sincerely believe that
if EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) is good for Europe, it will also be good for the
United States.
If raised: Euro Representation in the G-7
•
Important to find solution to representation issue that is sensitive to Europe's needs, yet
preserves the small, informal nature of the group.
•
Decisions about informal meetings at the ministerial level are best left to the ministers
themselves.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�D E P A R T M E N T OF T H E T R E A S U R Y
WASHINGTON,
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
D.C.
January 29, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Robert E. Rubin $ < v
SUBJECT:
V i s i t o f French President Chirac
-
<
I want t o make you aware of two issues t h a t t h e French President
i s l i k e l y t o press you on i n your meeting on February 1:
F i r s t , President Chirac i s l i k e l y t o seek your support f o r an
i n i t i a t i v e at the Lyon Summit t o improve i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary
s t a b i l i t y . I would advise you t o discourage him from p u t t i n g
commitments t o l i m i t exchange r a t e f l u c t u a t i o n s up f o r
discussion.
Everyone would r a t h e r n o t have b i g exchange r a t e swings l i k e we
saw l a s t spring. Then, the d o l l a r dropped more than 20 percent
against the yen and 14 percent against the German mark before
recovering with help from purchases of d o l l a r s by us and other
major countries. But t h e costs of l i m i t i n g swings i n exchange
r a t e s can be much higher than the costs of l e t t i n g t h e markets
run u n t i l c o n d i t i o n s are favorable f o r t u r n i n g them around. I n
a d d i t i o n , there are times when exchange r a t e adjustment i s
needed. We were n o t w i l l i n g t o have the Fed r a i s e i n t e r e s t r a t e s
and d e r a i l the domestic economy i n order t o keep t h e d o l l a r from
d e c l i n i n g a year ago. Looking t o the f u t u r e , we don't want t o
boost the importance we a t t a c h t o exchange r a t e s f u r t h e r , l e s t we
be faced with a choice between r a i s i n g i n t e r s t r a t e s o r not doing
what we promised on exchange r a t e s .
Buying and s e l l i n g currencies cannot be counted on t o do the j o b
w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t r a t e adjustments. And, as European experience
has shown, even l a r g e i n t e r e s t r a t e increases sometimes f a i l t o
do the job. The French have been through t h i s , most r e c e n t l y i n
1992, and Chirac has consequently been lukewarm about r e - f i x i n g a
t i g h t l i n k between t h e French franc and the German mark. But he
would love t o have others on the hook i n the hope t h a t t h i s would
reduce the cost t o France of maintaining f i x e d p a r i t y w i t h the
mark.
Exchange market developments have been reasonably favorable since
l a s t spring, and t h i s i s not the time t o contemplate a change i n
an approach t h a t has, on t h e whole, served us w e l l .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Chirac may propose an alternative approach to improve monetary
s t a b i l i t y , where we could find more common ground. He i s
concerned about the role of f i n a n c i a l derivatives as a
d e s t a b i l i z i n g force in the market. I think this i s way overdone
by the French — speculative players in these markets are froth
on the massive global f i n a n c i a l market. Moreover, they are not
completely free of supervision. Nonetheless, there are issues
here that merit close attention internationally. I am more
concerned about r i s k s of f a i l u r e s in these markets than i n any
contribution to exchange rate v o l a t i l i t y . Supervision by both
management and the regulators has not kept up with innovation.
I t i s worth giving ample attention to supervision of these crossborder markets, as was agreed at Halifax. Another push to the
regulators at the Lyon Summit would be useful, although the
French would probably go too far in s t i f l i n g innovation i f we l e t
them.
Second, Chirac i s l i k e l y to r a i s e IDA, the World Bank's
concessional lending f a c i l i t y for the poorest developing
countries. He w i l l l i k e l y be extremely c r i t i c a l of our f a i l u r e
to meet our commitments to IDA and the other m u l t i l a t e r a l
development banks, and our i n a b i l i t y to commit to p a r t i c i p a t i n g
in the next IDA replenishment. He may note G-7 commitments made
i n Halifax to support IDA. This i s a serious problem since i t
w i l l take an increase from 1996 appropriated funding l e v e l s j u s t
to make up our outstanding arrears in this f i s c a l year.
Meanwhile, the rest of the world i s ready to go forward with new
commitments of m u l t i l a t e r a l assistance to the poorest countries.
I recommend that you s t r e s s : 1) that you are committed to
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in IDA; 2) that you have made meeting e x i s t i n g U.S.
commitments to IDA a top p r i o r i t y ; and 3) that we are working
hard to be in a position to pledge a new U.S. contribution — at
a credible level with r e a l i s t i c prospects of Congressional
support — at the e a r l i e s t possible date.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning France
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0473-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on France from the White House Office of Records Management Subject Files. Material includes memos and talking points from Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin to President Clinton, regarding a February 1999 meeting with French President Jacques Chirac.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Management
CF Subject Files
CO060
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0473-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
France
Jacques Chirac
Robert Rubin
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/93e7765c9e01164497d86db512d7fb91.pdf
e5644cccbadffb246eedbbcb84f60e52
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) and Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c
Jacques ANDREANI
FRANCE
(Phonetic: ahndrayAHnee)
Ambassador to the United States (since 1989)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador
1.4c, 1.4d
A distinguished diplomat
Jacques Andreani is able to cope with
apparent contradictions in French foreign policy
withouLiosine sight of the big picture
he has strong socialist views!
Ihe keeps his opinions out of his diplomatic
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
duties
Career Data
1955
1955-60
Foreign Policy Views
One of France's most senior diplomats, Andreani
is an expert on the former Soviet Union and is
considered a realist in evaluating France's relations
with the former Soviet republics. He makes no
secret of his sometimes controversial views on the
region, which have at times differed from those of
other Soviet specialists in the Foreign Ministry.
Andreani doubts that the former Soviet republics
can ever integrate into Europe, even if
democrattzaiiap-surrppfk in Russia, an outcome he
questions
3.5c
Andreani is extremely knowledeeable.abouL
CSCE and other European issues]
1.4c, 1.4d
he believes the CSCE is not sufficient to
provide a common European defense system. He
asserts that NATO is an inappropriate forum for
dealing with eastern Europe's security needs, and
he has suggested that the Western European Union
might be the proper institution to deal with this
issue. Andreani has been a strong advocate of
France's proposal forfive-powertalks on nuclear
issues
in December 1992 that
the French Government believes the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France will all "need to
1.4c, 3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Joined the foreign service.
Served in Washington.
1961-64
Assigned to Moscow.
1964-67
Worked on central European issues,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
1967-70
Worked on East European affairs,
MFA. 1970s Served successively as
Deputy Permanent Representative to
NATO, head of the delegation to the
CSCE, and director of European
affairs in the MFA.
1979-81
Ambassador to Egypt.
1981-84
Director for political affairs, MFA.
1984-88
Ambassador to Italy.
1989
Cabinet director under then Foreign
Minister Roland Dumas.
1989-present
Amhassadon io the United States.
3.5c
resume testing at some point" in 1993; he added
that such talks would help address the question of
how the case for resumption of testing coulfLbe.
placed in the wider context of a testing ban
3.5c
(continued)
LDA M 93-11955
�1.4c
Andreani was bom or 22 November 1929
1.4c, 1.4d
he spent thefirstfiveyears
of his life in the United States. He is a graduate of
the renowned National School for Administration.
Andreani is a close confidant of former Foreign
Minister Roland Dumas. Andreani and his wife, the
former Donatella Monterisi, have two children; he
also has two children from an earlier marriage. The
Andreanis both speak English. The Ambassador's
son Gilles is France's Deputy Permanent
Representative to NATO
3.5c
22 April 1993
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1.4c, 3.5c
�FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Jacques CHIRAC
FRANCE
(Phonetic: sheRAHK)
President (since May 1995)
Addressed as: Mr. President
Jacques Chirac was elected President on his third
attempt. He had served as Prime Minister under
then President Valery Giscard d'Estaing during
1974-76. During 1986-88, Chirac again held the
post of Prime Minister in a center-right coalition
that shared power with then President Francois
Mitterrand in an arrangement known as
cohabitation. Chirac entered public service in
1960 and, beginning in 1962, worked on several
staffs until he became Minister of Agriculture and
Rural Development in 1972. He served briefly as
Minister of the Interior from March to May 1974
before his first term as Prime Minister. He also
was mayor of Paris from 1977 to May 1995.
Chirac, who founded the neo-Gaullist Rally for the
Republic in 1976, led the party until late 1994.
Chirac was bom on 29 November 1932 in Paris.
He studied at Harvard during the summer of 1953
and traveled throughout the United States. Chirac
earned a degree at the Institute for Political Studies
before fulfilling his Army duty, which included a
tour in Algeria in the mid-1950s. He graduated
from the prestigious National School for
Administration in 1959. Since June 1994 he has
published two books: A New France and France
for All. Chirac speaks English well.
He is married to the former Bemadette Chodron
de Courcel. The couple has three daughters, one of
whom was adopted in 1979.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
5 January 1996
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents concerning France
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0473-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on France from the White House Office of Records Management Subject Files. Material includes reports on various French political officials.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Management
CF Subject Files
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0473-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
France
Jacques Chirac
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/dc4de7ed08cf4fe6196a5b19680fbf5d.pdf
36ec967c78922f6e4e7cc44ba77c30e6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning France
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0473-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on France from the White House Office of Records Management. Materials include correspondence between President Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac, as well as briefing materials and talking points for meetings with President Chirac and other French officials.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36111">2008-1185-F</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Management
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0473-M
France
Jacques Chirac
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d1db9f9cc70b1b06039f5ab46eee747e.pdf
8fb275faf1e5302d0c77b812a742dc2a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning France
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0473-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material related to France from the White House Office of Records Management. Materials include Department of State memoranda regarding requests for meetings with French officials and a briefing paper regarding a meeting between First Lady Hillary Clinton and Danielle Mitterrand, wife of French President Francois Mitterrand.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36111">2008-1185-F</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1127536">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White House Office of Records Management
Subject Files
CO060
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Office of Records Management
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/30/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0473-M.pdf
1127536
France
Jacques Chirac
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/59722200edcf1f74927c68690eac57e1.pdf
8d1d88832ebf449cce8f7015eba0e136
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Photographs of the Balkan Peace Agreement Ceremony on December 14, 1995 - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2021-0641-F
Description
An account of the resource
The photographs processed in this case relate to the signing of the Balkan Peace Agreement at the Quai D’Orsay (Foreign Ministry) in Paris, France on December 14, 1995. Principals at the signing include: President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, President Clinton, President Jacques Chirac of France, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia, and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain. Ceremony Principals participating in a luncheon with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrooke attending; President Clinton departing the Quai D’Orsay in Paris with President Jacques Chirac presiding.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Balkan Peace Agreement
Balkan Peninsula
Balkans
Bill Clinton
Bosnia
Croatia
Finding Aid
France
Germany
Helmut Kohl
Jacques Chirac
John Major
Paris
peace
Photograph Contact Sheets
President Clinton
Richard Holbrooke
Russia
Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic
Spain
United Kingdom
Warren Christopher
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/309963bf4dcad1a9bff7d279bba5dc0a.pdf
0a140b680becfb22f9cfc1cc598f628e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
All photographs from 6/7/94
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2022-0198-F
Description
An account of the resource
The photographs processed in this segment were created on June 7, 1994. The White House photographers assigned to follow the President on this day include Ralph Alswang, Bob McNeely, and Barbara Kinney. The case contains photographs pertaining to meetings, ceremonies, press briefings, interviews, photo-ops, etc., involving President Clinton, Hillary Rodham Clinton, White House Staff, and others for the date processed.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Ambassador Pamela Harriman
Audio Visual
Audio-visual materials
Bill Clinton
Bruce Lindsey
David Gergen
Finding Aid
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
France
George Stephanopoulos
Jacques Chirac
Jenonne Walker
Mack McLarty
Molly Raiser
Mort Engelberg
Paris
Philippe Seguin
Photograph Contact Sheets
President Clinton
President Francois Mitterrand
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur
Secretary Warren Christopher
Simone Veil
Steven Oxman
Tony Lake