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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified records concerning Latvia
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2016-0314-M-1
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9/21/2023
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These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific documents from FOIA Case 2011-1037-F (Records related to the Republic of Latvia) withheld under FOIA exemption 1. This request, 2016-0314-M, was split into two segments because of the number of records requested for declassification. This is the first of two segments. Open records include memcons, letters, briefing papers, cables, and emails. Much of the record to be opened in this segment relates to a July 1994 trip that President Clinton took to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland. Included in this collection are records related to Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia.
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47925">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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WHORM-Subject File-General
NSC Office of Communications
Russell Horowitz
First Lady's Press Office
Lisa Caputo
National Security Council
NSC Central and Eastern European Affairs Office
Flanagan, Stephen
Daniel Fried
NSC European Affairs Office
Keirn Brown
Richard Norland
NSC Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
NSC Records Management
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Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
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8/2/2023
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d8ff813517e76389bf00d7dd22cd3893.pdf
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Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
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National Security Council
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1994-2000
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<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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262 folders in 25 boxes
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South Korea
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NSC Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
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Box 16
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/42219743" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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7585648
42-t-7585648-20090528F-Seg2-016-007-2016
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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11/25/2016
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/98e180c7af3f041a929bb886277ec0a0.pdf
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Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
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National Security Council
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1994-2000
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<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
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This collection consists of records relating to the Republic of Korea (ROK), commonly called South Korea; and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly called North Korea. This segment contains material from the files of National Security Council staff. It includes articles, briefing material, cables, drafts, letters, memos, notes, reports, routing slips, speech transcripts, staff summary sheets, and testimony. Topics span the entire eight years of the Clinton Administration and include the Agreed Framework of 1994, diplomacy, investigation of No Gun Ri (a Korean War incident), North Korean drought, humanitarian food aid, light water reactor negotiations, the 1994 helicopter intrusion incident, Team Spirit, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korean refugees, Korean War MIA (Missing in Action) remains, Korean reunification, and the Korean War Memorial.
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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262 folders in 25 boxes
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South Korea
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National Security Council
NSC Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
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Box 16
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/42219742" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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7585648
42-t-7585648-20090528F-Seg2-016-006-2016
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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11/25/2016
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/145e522cf9b9aa247031eac400d804a8.pdf
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Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
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National Security Council
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1994-2000
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<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
Description
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This collection consists of records relating to the Republic of Korea (ROK), commonly called South Korea; and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly called North Korea. This segment contains material from the files of National Security Council staff. It includes articles, briefing material, cables, drafts, letters, memos, notes, reports, routing slips, speech transcripts, staff summary sheets, and testimony. Topics span the entire eight years of the Clinton Administration and include the Agreed Framework of 1994, diplomacy, investigation of No Gun Ri (a Korean War incident), North Korean drought, humanitarian food aid, light water reactor negotiations, the 1994 helicopter intrusion incident, Team Spirit, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korean refugees, Korean War MIA (Missing in Action) remains, Korean reunification, and the Korean War Memorial.
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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262 folders in 25 boxes
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DPRK - North Korea
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National Security Council
NSC Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
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2009-0528-F Segment 2
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Box 16
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/42219741" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48811">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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7585648
42-t-7585648-20090528F-Seg2-016-005-2016
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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Republic of Latvia
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White House Office of Records Management
Advance Office
Communications
Counsel’s Office
First Lady’s Office
Management and Administration
National Security Council
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the US
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Public Liaison
Scheduling Office
Speechwriting
National Security Council Cable, Email and Records Management System
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47925">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2011-1037-F
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This collection consists of records related to the Baltic country of Latvia. The records include correspondence, scheduling material, trip books, memoranda, reports, cables, and press materials. The President and First Lady traveled from July 6 - 12, 1994 to Latvia, Poland, Italy, and Germany. They were in Riga, Latvia for 1 day: July 6, 1994.
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Clinton Presidential Records: WHORM: Subject Files
Clinton Presidential Records: WHORM: Subject Files CF
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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306 folders in 13 boxes
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Paper
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Latvia
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National Security Council
Mulilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Steven Naplan
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2011-1037-F
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Box 8
<a href="%E2%80%9Chttps%3A//catalog.archives.gov/id/7585648">National Archives Collection Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47925">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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7585648
42-t-7585648-20111037F-008-008-2015
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Clinton Presidential Records: Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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9/30/2015
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e5841bcd30b33d45fb6a0b5d5353c845.pdf
4ba38ba63f39762fc41dbd200d9811c2
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�rHOM U. S'. INFORMATION AGENCY
(THU) 8. 27' 98 1 5 : 1 2/ST. 15 : 12/NO. 3760669400 P
3
United States
Infonnation
Agency
Washington, D C. 20S47
USIA
MEMORANDUM FOR:
NSC - Jamie Metzl
(phone: 456-9361; room 302)
FROM:
USIA/EEN - Rot
SUBJECT:
IPI Planning for Kosovo
Earthy
As requested at your August 25 meeting, attached is a draft public-diplomacy plan for supporting
NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a)
getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite
support before and after the action.
You also asked for thoughts on specific action to be taken now. Given the centrality of NATO to
success, we recommend you immediately propose to NATO coordinated planning on an
information campaign to support military action in Kosovo. We must engage them early if our
IPI effort is to be coherent. Because external broadcasting is so important for SerbiaMontenegro, especially for Kosovo, we also recommend you invite a representativefromUSIA's
International Broadcasting Bureau to attend our next meeting. We would be happy to identify the
right person.
Finally, please note the attached plan does not address specific programs and activities. USIA has
the full range of public-diplomacy tools available, from electronic information transmission to well
connected representatives in the field. Once a strategy is approved, we are prepared to move
forward with dispatch.
Attachment: as stated
JL
^
-J-
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPV
ti l t u L i !
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
4013 - 083O - n
S/A/15 K8V1
�FHOM U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY
(THU) 8. 2V 98 1 5 : 1 2/ST. 1 5 : 1 2/NO. 3760669400 P 4
A KOSOVO IPI STRATEGY
CONTEXT:
West Europe/NATO Members: International public support, especiallyfromNATO allies, is
critical to success of military action in Kosovo. A unilateral American step, or one that is
perceived as mainly American with only grudging allied backing, would engender anti-American
antipathy-the "hegemony factor." Allied support cannot be assumed, but it is obtainable.
Opinion polls demonstrate West European publics believe their governments have not responded
adequately to the crisis in Kosovo. Majorities would support NATO moves to ease the
humanitarian crisis but most would stop short at this time of endorsing military action. Most
would prefer that any action have multilateral approval; when asked directly, a narrow plurality
favors a UN mandate for any NATO intervention. Polling results suggest that if political
leaders explain the need and rationale for NATO action, with or without a UN mandate, they
could win broad public approval.
Balkan Region: USIA survey data shows the polarization in the region and also suggests public
diplomacy could be effective. A mid-August poll in Serbia indicates large majorities support
Serb police actions in Kosovo and oppose any significant change in Kosovo's political status.
But a small majority are willing to grant Kosovo some increased autonomy within Serbia.
About four in ten believe the government should comprornise on Kosovo if it meant some lifting
of sanctions (43%) or in response to NATO's stationing troops in neighboring countries (37%).
Yet as many or more oppose concessions. Significantly, nearly half (46%) would support
compromise to end NATO air strikes, but a third (35%) would oppose. Compared to June, fewer
Belgrade residents are now willing to make concessions when presented with these scenarios.
Despite the recent escalation in violence, Serbs are as likely now (35%) as they were in March to
support a family member going tofightto keep Kosovo part of Serbia. About four in ten would
be opposed (44%). Thus, despite their views on Kosovo, fairly substantial numbers of Serbs
appear willing to support changes if they will forestall/end NATO military action, and this group
would be predisposed to our IPI effort. Obviously, opinion trends can be unpredictable; we must
be alert for a hardening of opinion as a result of any military action.
Russia: We should recognize NATO military action in Kosovo will be a hard sell in Russia, and
could have political implications that affect other U.S. interests. Russia's historic cultural and
political association with the Balkan Serbs will make it particularly difficult to convince the
public that military action against the FRY is justified. Moreover, Russians are already
concerned about NATO enlargement and fear it may be directed at them; thus, they are unlikely
to support NATO action in what is acknowledged to be FRY sovereign territory. Military action
might trigger a sharp official reaction or have domestic political implications affecting our
longer-term interests. That having been said, many thoughtful Russians are uncomfortable with
Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. If and when a decision is made to intervene militarily in Kosovo,
NATO must make the strongest possible case that such action is necessary, and let facts speak
for themselves. Significant support for NATO peace keeping in Bosnia (54% of Moscow elites),
in which Russians participate, gives us a solid starting point.
FH
CLINTON LIBRARV 0T0C()${]#H^^
DECLASSIFIED
' -
P
E
R E
0
1 3 5 2 6
2 / y i 5 K6H
�KSOM U ' . INFORMATION AGENCY
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(THU)
8. 27' 98 1 5 : 1 3/ST. 1 5 : 1 2/NO. 3760669400 P' 5
STRATEGY:
This set of circumstances presents several diplomacy challenges. Thefirstis to convince our
NATO allies to take a more activist role by bringing along their publics. We can build public,
and thereby government support for NATO military involvement in Kosovo by targeting major
European media with stories about the growing humanitarian problem and potential refugee
crisis at their doorsteps. Emphasizing the growing humanitarian/refugee crisis will also create a~
sense of urgency and a need to act, out of self-interest as well as humanitarian concern. Rallying
allied support is a job specifically for the United States, until NATO decides to act.
Second, we have to make sure that when NATO does decide on a military course, that there is
no question in the international community that this is a joint action. To do that. Secretary
General Solana must have the lead in announcing NATO intentions and actions. All of the allied
nations should speak in support of the NATO action, drawing on common talking points.
NATO's spokesman, Jamie Shea, should be the primary source for information and explanation
"^Yi
about alliance actions. (Obviously, individual countries would speak about their own specific^
military contributions, in addition to those of the alliance as a whole). USG statements should
follow Secretary Solana's initial announcement, and all USG policies and actions thereafter _ J
should be characterized as support to the NATO-led mission.
To prepare for this secondary course of action, the United States should raise the need for a
Kosovo public diplomacy campaign in the appropriate NATO forum. Our Public Affairs Officer
at NATO HQ in Brussels is positioned to create and present an international public diplomacy
plan, with NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, to the NAC for consideration and joint action. The
NAC and the NATO Information Program (NATIP) are the proper institutional vehicles for
launching an allied international public diplomacy effort. The primary target audiences would be
publics within alliance countries (via their major media outlets), as well as publics and elites in
the Balkans, Russia, and other countries with particular interest in the region, especially current
members of the UN Security Council.
Obviously, the Balkans (and the FRY in particular) would be a special focus for public
diplomacy effort. We should stress the same themes that we employ elsewhere (see below), but
emphasize that NATO military action is designed to bring a quick and peaceful resolution of the
humanitarian crisis and push all parties to find a political accommodation that will restore
stability to the region. Currently we have excellent access to local media, but we must also be
prepared for a Milosevic crackdown. In that event we can reach audiences in Serbia and Kosovo
through 'spillover' effect from broadcasters in neighboring countries and via USG (and other)
external broadcasting. VOA Serbian and Albanian have large audiences and VGA's new TV
program "Open Studio" has a large direct-satellite viewership. If programmatically and
technologically feasible, we can increase air time of VOA Albanian and VOA Serbian
broadcasts. If Serbian authorities curtail local Internet service providers, we can disseminate
USG policy messages by fax to local opinion leaders, NGOs, and political opposition.
mmm
�rSOM Ur g. INFORMATION AGENCY
(THU) 8. 27' 98 1 5 : 1 3/ST. 1 5 : 1 2/NO. 3760669400 P
OPERATING PRINCIPLES
1
The IPI message should emanatefromNATO and allied sources as much as possible to
illustrate broad multinational support, vice unilateral U.S. program. A formal NATO
public diplomacy plan is essential to coordinate allied IPI efforts.
The IPI message should be tailored for each major audience grouping (e.g. NATO allies,
non-NATO countries, Russia, the Balkans, etc.) in order to be effective-one size will not
fit all. It should also help solidify currently lukewarm allied support for a military option.
The IPI message should be divided into a pre-ops program (initiated immediately) to
build the rationale for potential NATO action as well as a post-ops package (ready to
implement) to justify and explain the operation.
IPI themes should be grounded in publicly stated policy objectives, consistently echoed
throughout the USG and which are consistent with the NATO public affairs effort.
^
THEMES AND OBJECTIVES
PRE-OPERATION PHASE
THEMES
Belgrade's continued use of force in Kosovo is not acceptable and cannot solve the
situation. Nor can force by the UCK lead to anything but more human suffering.
Continued unrest in Kosovo threatens the stability of the entire region. The international
community has a stake in restoring calm and stability in Kosovo.
The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is desperate and getting worse. The coming winter
will bring intolerable humanitarian crisis.
Diplomacy is the preferred tool to resolve the situation. U.S. and NATO will go the extra
mile tofinda peaceful solution which retains Kosovo as a part of the FRY. All the
nations of the Alliance back this effort, and it has broad international support..
NATO military action may be necessary in the face of continued diplomatic failure. The
U.S. will support military action if it becomes necessary.
Violence must be a last resort; however, military action may speed a diplomatic solution,
as it spurred the parties on at Dayton.
Belgrade's offensive military actions and undemocratic policies are largely responsible
for the desperate humanitarian situation in Kosovo; Belgrade must bear responsibility for
any NATO military response.
OBJECTIVES
Make the case that NATO has exhausted every reasonable diplomatic option to resolve
the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Document what has been done.
Rally allied support for NATO military action as a legitimate, useful, option.
Convince all parties to the conflict in Kosovo that NATO will act if they themselves do
not come to a solution.
Explain to non-members of the Alliance the justification of NATO military action.
mmm
CLINTON LIBRARV r
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.
(THU) 8. 2 7 - 9 8
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P S OPERATIONS PHASg
OT
THEMES:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The NATO military option was the only option left to avert further humanitarian disaster.
The U.S., acting in concert with NATO allies, was a full participant in planning and
executing the action.
There can be no military solution to this conflict, but NATO is prepared to use military
action to bring all parties to the table to come to a diplomatic settlement.
European regional stability in general and the huge investment in Bosnian stability in
particular.'are protected by this operation.
Belgrade is largely responsible-its continued offensive in Kosovo made NATO's
military response necessary. However, the UCK also shares responsibility through its
refusal to enter into negotiations.
The NATO operation was lawful, proportionate, and effective in averting further
humanitarian suffering. We can document careful planning to limit casualties/damage
and show how strikes have relieved the humanitarian situation and deterred armed action
against innocent civilians.
NATO and the U.S. are prepared to assist with recovery efforts necessitated by the
operation.
Both Belgrade and the UCK must recognize that further military action by them will not
be tolerated.
OBJECTIVES
•
•
•
•
•
Stop all Serbian and UCK military and security forces' offensive activity.
Make it possible for Kosovo refugees to return to their homes and protect them.
Initiate meaningful negotiations for a peaceful solution.
Preserve regional stability.
Emphasize military operation as a concerted NATO action that has international support.
•mmmt
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EUR/RPM:TGRYAN
09/28/98 79626
DEPUTY SECRETARY:STALBOTT
f
EUR:MGROSSMAN EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICK EUR/SCE:MPALMER
P:ERUBIN D:JBASS EUR/RUS:MYOVANOVITCH IO/UNP:CSTOCKBRIDGE
OSD:TWHELAN JCS:
S/S:
S/S-O:
NSC:
EUR
IMMEDIATE USNATO, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE,
LONDON IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, BONN IMMEDIATE+
IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ANATO IMMEDIATE, BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
NODIS
NOT FOR ADS
E.O. 12 958:
DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR
SUBJECT: ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOSOVO
REF: A) SKOPJE 2543; B) USNATO 2522; C) USNATO 2517;
D) VERSHBOW 9/27/98 FAX
CLASSIFIED BY A/S GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
FOR AMBASSADORS/CHARGES
1.
AS A RESULT OF SUSTAINED AMERICAN EFFORT AND
LEADERSHIP, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS DURING THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 21 TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON FRY PRESIDENT
MILOSEVIC AND TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE NEED
TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE THREE TRACKS OF OUR KOSOVO
STRATEGY: HUMANITARIAN, NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING THE
CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. THE ADOPTION SEPTEMBER 23 OF UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 IS A CONCRETE STEP TOWARD
ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO. ONCE THE UNSCR PASSED, WE
AGREED TO A CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 23
WHICH WAS PRODUCTIVE. NATO REINFORCED THE MESSAGE TO
MILOSEVIC ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY AUTHORIZING SACEUR TO ISSUE AN
SECRET
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ACTIVATION WARNING (ACTWARN) TO GENERATE THE FORCES
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT A LIMITED AIR OPTION AND A PHASED
AIR CAMPAIGN. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN PORTUGAL
HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.
2 . (X) WE HAVE AT LEAST NINE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO MEET
IN THE COMING DAYS I F WE ARE TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO END THE
VIOLENCE, ALLOW ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM HIS
CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY, MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND
MONITOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. WE WILL NEED TO:
— MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE.ACHIEVED IN THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 2 1 .
— READY NATO BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO- CONDUCT
AIR STRIKES WITHOUT A FURTHER UNSCR
— ENSURE THAT THE UNSC IS WELL BRIEFED AND THAT THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNSCR 1199 I S ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNAMBIGUOUS
— CONSULT CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY, AS WELL AS
THROUGH THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE NATO PJC
— ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
PRESENTED BY H I L L AND "IMPOSED" BY THE CONTACT GROUP
— PREPARE OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES TO ASSIST IN
IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
- - LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO LEVERAGE MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING
THROUGH DRIVING WEDGES BETWEEN HIM AND HIS PUBLIC AND
SECURITY FORCES
— FURTHER DEVELOP HUMANITARIAN RELIEF STRATEGIES FOR BOTH
BEST-CASE AND WORST-CASE OUTCOMES
— BUILD SUPPORT I N CONGRESS AND WITH THE PUBLIC
3. (X) WE WANT TO USE THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BRING THE
VARIOUS STRANDS OF OUR POLICY TOGETHER (INCLUDING WORKING
WITH THE RUSSIANS) SO THAT NATO I S READY (SHOULD POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES DECIDE) TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ACTION "AT A TIME
AND PLACE OF NATO'S CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COME
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN, CONTACT GROUP, AND NATO
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REQUIREMENTS. W DO NOT BELIEVE WE NEED ANOTHER UNSCR, NOR
E
SHOULD WE ASSUME THIS IS ATTAINABLE GIVEN THE LIKELY
OPPOSITION OF RUSSIA. WE DO NOT WANT TO TIE NATO'S
DECISION TOO CLOSELY TO THE UNSYG'S CONCLUSIONS. INSTEAD,
WE WANT TO ESTABLISH NATO'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSESS WHETHER
MILOSEVIC HAS OR HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH LONG-STANDING .
INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. SINCE WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD
PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY, WE WISH TO
AVOID ISSUING A FORMAL ULTIMATUM DURING THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO ISSUE A
LATE ULTIMATUM WHICH GIVES MILOSEVIC ANOTHER EXTENDED
PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE AND REQUIRES A FURTHER DECISION BY
EITHER THE NAC OR THE UNSC BEFORE MILITARY ACTION. NATO
SHOULD BE FULLY READY TO ACT, I F NECESSARY, THE WEEK OF
OCTOBER 5 WITH AS FEW ADDITIONAL DECISIONS REQUIRED AS
POSSIBLE. IF, AT THAT TIME, THE NAC DETERMINES THAT
MILOSEVIC REMAINS NON-COMPLIANT IT SHOULD:
— AUTHORIZE SACEUR TO EXECUTE THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AS A
DEMONSTRATION OF NATO DETERMINATION
— SPECIFY THE CONCRETE STEPS THAT NATO EXPECTS BELGRADE TO
TAKE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET NATO/UN/CG REQUIREMENTS
— THREATEN FURTHER STRIKES "AT TIMES AND PLACES OF NATO'S
OWN CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COMPLY
—
ISSUE A STRONG WARNING TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
A.
{tf
ACTIONS REQUESTED:
— FOR USNATO: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION,
WHICH NATO DEMONSTRATED BY MOVING TO ACTWARN, IS VITAL.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD USE THE COMING WEEK TO GIVE ALL
16 ALLIES A SENSE OF CO-OWNERSHIP OF OUR POLITICAL/MILITARY
STRATEGY. HE SHOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE MOVE TO ACTREQ FOR
THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THE
NAC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. NAC AUTHORIZATION
OF ACTREQ ON SEPTEMBER 30, WILL MAKE I T POSSIBLE FOR THE
NAC TO CONSIDER A DECISION TO GO TO ACTORD DURING THE WEEK
OF OCTOBER 5.
WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT NATO'S PRESS LINE AFTER
AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT
FORCES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO POSSIBLE ACTION. SYG SOLANA
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�•ERT
CCESHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE DECISION TO G TO ACTREQ W S BASED
O
A
O THE ALLIANCE'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO
N
COMPLY WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. WHILE
PREVIOUS NATO PRESS GUIDANCE EMPHASIZED THAT ACTWARN WAS
THE LAST STEP IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AND NOT THE FIRST
STEP IN USE OF FORCE, NATO SHOULD N W EMPHASIZE THAT THIS
O
IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. SYG
SOLANA SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NAC PLANS TO AGAIN REVIEW
WHETHER MILOSEVIC AHS COMPLIED WITH THESE DEMANDS W E IT
HN
MEETS NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD D A F O THE FOLLOWING
RW RM
POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESS LINE WITH ALLIES:
-- NATO FORCES ARE N W BEING COMMITTED ACTREQ
O
— MILOSEVIC IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE
~
MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO
CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL
AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1199
~
MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT CEASED HIS OFFENSIVE
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS
SECURITY FORCES
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR
DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS
~
W HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT
E
TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO
—
THE NAC WILL REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE
DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS NEXT
MEETING.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW MAY ALSO USE THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON
SEPTEMBER 29 AND THE NAC MEETING O SEPTEMBER 30 TO GIVE
N
ALLIES A SENSE OF OUR THINKING AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1-3.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD ALSO HAVE NATO CONSULT WITH
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RUSSIA THROUGH THE PJC. WE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD SHARE
SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN
KOSOVO WITH THE RUSSIANS IN BRUSSELS. (FYI: AMBASSADOR
MALLOY REVIEWED OVERHEAD ON DESTRUCTION IN KOSOVO WITH
AMBASSADOR CHIZHOV IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24).
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SECURE NAC AGREEMENT TO TASK
NMAS TO REFINE THEIR CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND
OPTIONS TO INCLUDE A POSSIBLE SMALLER ("LIGHT") OPTION. ON
SEPTEMBER 9 THE NAC NOTED OPLAN 10410 AS A "LIVING
DOCUMENT" REQUIRING FURTHER REFINEMENT. AN ADDITIONAL PLAN
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR NATO FORCES I F REQUIRED TO
IMPLEMENT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT EITHER WITHOUT THE NEED
FOR AN AIR OPTION OR AT THE CONCLUSION OF AIR STRIKES. I N
ADDITION, SACEUR SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO BRIEF THE NAC
DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 ON THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND
COMPLIANCE SITUATION IN KOSOVO.
SACEUR'S BRIEFING SHOULD ASSESS COMPLIANCE IN THE FOLLOWING
AREAS:
— CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY
FRY AND/OR SERBIAN FORCES
— WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO OF VJ AND MUP UNITS NOT NORMALLY
BASED IN KOSOVO
— RETURN OF VJ AND MUP UNITS BASED IN KOSOVO TO THEIR
LOCAL GARRISONS
— LIFTING O? EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND
OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO
— FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVERS, AGENCIES AND NGOS ACCREDITED TO THE FRY
~ RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR
HOMES
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIS
QUAD COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR VERSHBOWS
VIEWS ON H W BEST TO INVOLVE PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE
O
EAPC.
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-SB€RETFINALLY, I N KEEPING WITH OUR STRATEGY OF WORKING CLOSELY
WITH THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THEM ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A
CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SEEK A
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON SEPTEMBER 2 9 .
VERSHBOW
SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE SEPTEMBER 30 NAC WILL CONSIDER THE
NEXT STEP IN FORCE GENERATION, AND I T I S POSSIBLE THAT
ALLIES WILL APPROVE ADDITIONAL STEPS.
THE PJC FOLLOWPNG
THE NAC WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER FRANK DISCUSSION
ON NATO PLANNING. WHILE REMAINING GENERAL, VERSHBOW SHOULD
CONVEY TO KISLYAK OUR COMMITMENT TO PUSH AHEAD AT NATO I N
THE DAYS AHEAD.
MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH ALLIES MEASURES NATO MAY TAKE
TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE
NOTIFIED THAT NATO HAS AUTHORIZED ACTREQ FOR THE AIR
OPTIONS AND INFORMED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTREQ
AUTHORIZATION.
IN ADDITION, WHILE NATO WOULD WISH TO
EXTEND A WARNING TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL ONLY PRIOR TO
COMMENCEMENT OF A NATO MILITARY STRIKE, THESE ORGANIZATIONS
SHOULD PRUDENTLY CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION.
WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN
DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE.
I T I S WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT
ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION.
I N INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH
ALLIES MISSION MAY OBSERVE THAT MILOSEVIC'S VIOLATION OF
TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY
MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO
DEMAND ACTION BY NATO.
- - FOR USUN: W NEED THE UNSYG'S REPORT TO CLEAR THE PATH
E
FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ALL OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SODERBERG TO THE
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 26, INCLUDING TRAVEL BY
DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, RENEWED FOCUS ON WAR CRIMES, AND HUMANITARIAN
BRIEFINGS.
WE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY THAT SHE BE
IN CONTACT WITH THE SYG ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF HIS
REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
FOLLOW-UP WITH THE NONPERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS (WHO SEEMED AT THEIR MEETING WITH
THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 24 TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NEED TO
KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC) WOULD BE USEFUL. WE
WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS FROM USUN ON WAYS TO
•CDCRET
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-SEGRETINFLUENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE SECRETARIAT AND THE
SC.
— FOR SKOPJE: WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR HILL'S AGREEMENT TO
TRAVEL TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 2 TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP
EXPERTS TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR
HILL SHOULD PRESS FOR SERB COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT AND '
CONTINUE HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED
PRESSURE NOW BEING PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. AT THE SAME TIME,
AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE CONTINUING NEED FOR
MILOSEVIC TO PULL BACK SECURITY FORCES FROM KOSOVO AND MAKE
GOOD ON ALL HIS PREVIOUS PROMISES, E.G. ON HUMANITARIAN AND
INTERNATIONAL ACCESS. WITH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS,
AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE GROUND FOR
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
AN END TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE AND BEGINNING OF TALKS ON
STATUS.
— FOR MOSCOW: WE WANT TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD AS WE
CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL, SPECIFIC STEP.S WE CAN TAKE BEYOND
CONSULTATION (AT THE PJC, FOR EXAMPLE) AND INFORMATION
SHARING. WE MUST MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 PJC
TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH COMMONALITY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR
POSITION AND RUSSIA'S. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED
(1) A "COORDINATING MECHANISM" ON THE GROUND IN BELGRADE
(THEY HAVE SUGGESTED CHRIS HILL LEAD THIS GROUP OF LOCAL
AMBASSADORS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY), (2)
POSSIBLE TROIKA (RUSSIAN/EU/US) MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL
DIRECTOR LEVEL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A
CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TWO WEEKS FROM
SEPTEMBER 23. WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH THE
RUSSIANS AND ACCOMMODATE THEM WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WITHOUT
GIVING THEM A VETO ON NATO ACTION THROUGH THE UNSC OR OTHER
MECHANISMS.
— FOR LONDON, PARIS AND BONN: AT QUAD MEETINGS IN NEW YORK
THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF A POLDIR LEVEL QUAD MEETING IN
EUROPE ON OCTOBER 8 TO REVIEW A FORMAL ULTIMATUM. EVENTS
ARE RUNNING AHEAD OF THAT PLAN. GROSSMAN WILL BE IN
CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO REVIEW
OUR THINKING. HE WILL REPORT TO AMBASSADORS/DCMS ON THESE
CONTACTS. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT/NOT APPROACH YOUR HOST
GOVERNMENT I N CAPITALS UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM GROSSMAN. BUT
-SECRET
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�CECRETAMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD/SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE I N CONTACT
WITH HIS QUAD COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OUR
THINKING.
— FOR CONTACT GROUP CAPITALS: WHILE WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT
ATTENDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL
IN TWO WEEKS AS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (AND SUPPORTED BY
MANY OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES), OUR INTENTION I S TO
PROCEED AS WE DID I N ADVANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING
ON SEPTEMBER 24 IN NEW YORK: THAT IS, WE WILL WANT TO CHOSE
SEVERAL SPECIFIC THINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE
ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE/BEFORE WE WOULD ATTEND A CONTACT GROUP
MEETING. I F / I F YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT OUR THINKING ON A
CONTACT GROUP, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE SECRETARY FOUND THE
MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23 TO BE HELPFUL, THAT WE LOOK FORWARD
TO AMBASSADOR HILL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP
ON OCTOBER 2, THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ABOUT ATTENDING
ANOTHER CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, BUT THAT SUCH A
DECISION WOULD NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF
PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC
AND CREATING A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.
5.
WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER
28 TO BUILD SUPPORT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UNSYG ON THE
NEED FOR A CLEAR, TIMELY REPORT TO THE UNSC. WE WILL ALSO
BE EXPLORING FURTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON
MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING ASKING GENERAL CLARK (AS USCINCEUR) TO
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE VJ AS APPROPRIATE. WE WILL ALSO
NEED TO FASHION A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF
SEPARATE MESSAGES.
YY
ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
SKOPJE IMMEDIATE
M S O IMMEDIATE
OCW
WARSAW IMMEDIATE
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RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES I T
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
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AMERICAN EMBASSY BELGRADE
Kneza Mlloa^O^
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
Phone:
Telex:
U/CFax:
(381) (11)645-655
11529 AMEMBAYU
(381) (11) 645-332
FAX COVER PAGE
DATE
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TO
Jim, as discussed, here is the revised version reflecting changes flowing
from Dick's discussions with Milosevic and Milutinpvic this afternoon. He
welcomes your further comments ASAP. Best probably to phone to the
Palace secure setup.
All brackets are Milosevic's. Per discussion, we will work to retain all this
language. The whole business of the NATO cell in Pristina is especially
tough as I mentioned. In addition, we will try to add language into die
evacuation paragraph that mentions "military means" or "...assets" or as
fallback "all necessary means" or something comparable. I haven't put it
here because I need to discuss with Dick first, and let him work it in.
Larry Rossin
CLINTON LI
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OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission
Preambular Lanzuaze
•
Devoted to therespectof the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the
Helsinki Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris
Charter,
•
Considering ii^ particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting
solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the
equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,
• Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and temtorial integrity of all states in the region.
Willing to contribute to the implementation of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN
Security Council,
•
The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,
•
and, The OSCE, on the other,
•
have reached the following AGREEMENT:
Establishment and Terminaiion
•
The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE
Permanent Council pursuant to aresolutionof the United Nadons Security Council
calling upon OSCE to establish the Mission.
•
The FT^Y government has infonned the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its
endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.
•
OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the
Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.
•
OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem
appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most
effectively.
•
KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its
establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the
Verification Mission.
•
The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the Verification
Mission and all its members.
Tr^Anv n r r m r n n v
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PERE.O. 13526
^v^-n
8/3/15 KGM
�r noirt « n i I t
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(SUN) 10. 1 1 ' 98
1 1 : 3 6 / S T . 1 1 : 32/NO. 37606 1 9376 r
•
In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgment of the
Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the
FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission
members.
•
The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic
entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission
will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its
members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.
•
The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to
work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina andfieldlocations. The
FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide lull cooperation
and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to,
billets,frequencyorfrequencies,visas and documentation, customs facilities,
vehicleregistration,fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and
access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal
procedures.
•
The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, which can
be prolonged upon decision of the UN Security Council.
General Resoonsibilities. Roles and Missions
•
"
^"f" ^
<tf
<
^
To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council ^-<_^X <**j-Gu4Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the <*-—4
OSCE Permanent Council and the United Nations Security Council [and the
Z,^. / / ^ L
NATO Secretary-General). These reports will also be provided to the authorities
of the FRY.
r
•
To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as il
deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities;
•
To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo
authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited
international and non-govemment organizations to assist in fulfilling its
responsibilities;
To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN
Security Council (and the NATO Secretary-General] on areas covered by UN
Security Council Resolution 1199.
Specific Terms of Reference
The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance
of the ceasefire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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< t
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�S I I U A M O J M KUUM A
(SUN) 10. 1 ' 9 8 1 1 :37/ST. 11 -.SZ/NO. 3760619378 ?
Mission personnel will have fullfreedomof movement and access throughout
Kosovo at all times.
[The Verification Mission will be permitted to visit all military/police
cantonments within Kosovo.]
The Verification Mission will receive weekly informationfromrelevant
FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of
forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of
the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to accompany
police within Kosovo.
The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other
emplacements which influence lines of communication erectedforpurposes other
than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant
authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the reasons
for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed
immediately. The Verification Mission will alsoreceivenotification should
emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than
traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the
removal of any roadblock.
The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border
control activity and movements by units with border control responsibilities
through areas of Kosovo awayfromthe border. The Verification Mission, when
invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, -will visit border control units
and accompany them as they perfonn their normal border control roles.
When invited or uponrequest,the Verification Mission will accompany police
units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.
The Verification Mission will verify the return of displaced persons to their homes,
the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the FRY,
Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian organizations and
NGOs, and the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its
entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs in facilitating
proceduralrequirementssuch as issuance of travel documentation, expedited
customs clearance for humanitarian shipments and radiofrequencies.The Mission
will make suchrepresentationsas it deems necessary toresolveproblems it
observes.
^
As the political settlement defining Kosovo's self-government is achieved and
implementation begins, the Mission Director will receivefromthe OSCE
implementation support in areas such as elections oversight, assistance in the
establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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SITUATION ROOM A
(SUN) 10. 1 T 98
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r
r . cl_>
•
The Ivjission Director will receive periodic updatesfromthe relevant authorities
concerning allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status
of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses.
•
The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as
appropriate, Kosoyo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to detained
persons.
•
The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national
communities and authorities to exchange infonnation and provide guidance on
implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.
The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or
lack of full cooperationfromany side to the OSCE [and NATO Secretary
General].
Conwqpition and FacilUies
•
A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification
Mission requirements, to include a liaison unit with [the NATO support element]
[a small multinational military cell] to be established in Pristina.
•
1800 unarmed verifiersfromOSCE member states will be permitted.
Headquarters and support staff included in this total. [OSCE may include armed
•ecurity personnel in its Mission for own-force protection.]
•
A headquarters in Pristina.
Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission
Director.
A small liaison office in Belgrade.
Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired
interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the
performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.
Field Presence
Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each opstina in Kosovo
with specific areas ofresponsibility,under the Mission Director located in Pristina.
Many opstina coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller
towns/villages in the opstina. The number and location of sub-stations will vary
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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6
�- HUM nn i i t. Huust
a 1 1 UAl 1 ON
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A
(SUN) 10. 11' 98 1 1: 3 7/ST. 1 1 : 3 2/NO. 3760619378 r
r-.oo
from opstina to opstina, depending on the verification environment and past
conflict situation.
•
The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the
opstina authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other
communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local
authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.
•
The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and
sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the particular
area.
•
Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured
vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
7
�SECRET
Diplomatic Support of 30 Day S t r a t e g i c Plan
Object: Compel M i l o s e v i c t o accept NATO c o n d i t i o n s by
eroding h i s base and denying him defensive t o o l s .
Means:
•
Reinforce m i l i t a r y operations w i t h diplomacy aimed a t
i s o l a t i n g M i l o s e v i c and Serbia; s u s t a i n A l l i e d support
w h i l e managing Russia and Front L i n e States:
Target M i l o s e v i c ' s comfort zone, convince him NATO w i l l keep
r a i s i n g the pressure and o u t l a s t him, t h a t he w i l l not be
able t o d r i v e wedges e i t h e r i n t o NATO o r between NATO and
Russia.
With A l l i e s :
• M a i n t a i n NAC consensus on expanding a i r o p e r a t i o n s ,
i n c r e a s i n g economic pressure;
• Prevent f r e e l a n c e i n i t i a t i v e s / v i s i t s t o Belgrade
EO 13526 1.4d
Prevent d i l u t i o n o f SACEUR's a u t h o r i t y ;
• Gain approval o f V i s i t and Search OPLAN NLT May 3;
• Press forward ground f o r c e reassessments;
• Work t o close d i s t a n c e between A l l i a n c e and Russia
on UNSCR elements.
With Russia:
• Continue h i g h l e v e l c o n t a c t s , U.S. and A l l y , t o
s u s t a i n Russian understanding o f A l l i e d u n i t y and
resolve;
• A f t e r Chernomyrdin Belgrade v i s i t work t o narrow
d i s t a n c e Russia and NATO (Secstate c a l l s t o Ivanov,
Chernomyrdin, coordinated w i t h Quint c a l l s t o same);
• G-8 P o l d i r s discussions t o determine whether a G-8
M i n i s t e r i a l w i l l advance peace, p o s s i b l e G-8 Sherpa
meeting May 2-3 (need agreed t e x t t o ensure Russians
do not take advantage and produce n o t h i n g ) .
With Front Line States:
• Work f o r FLS leaders' statement — a g a i n s t
M i l o s e v i c , f o r Serb people;
o Relieve pressure from Macedonia t o deny M i l o s e v i c
weapon o f refugees:
• Urge NAC a c t i o n t o b u i l d more t r a n s i t camps i n
Macedonia;
OECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
Ao
,3.0330 - n
�GECRET
•
Announce a c c e l e r a t e d evacuation o f Kosovar
refugees t o U.S.A., increased s i z e o f Camp America
(once b u i l d i n g commenced);
• Urge a l l Europeans t o a c t i v a t e and expand t h e i r
previous commitments t o s h e l t e r refugees;
o Shore up FLS by supporting r e l i e f e f f o r t s :
> May 4 - U.S.-EU i n Brussels;
> May 5 G-24 Donor's conference i n P a r i s ;
> May 6 A l b r i g h t - F i s c h e r meeting i n Washington;
> May 7 Coordination conference w i t h 10s i n
Vienna;
> May 1 U.S.-EU a i d c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n Brussels.
Cronies and Family — sow seeds o f f e a r t h a t they w i l l lose
wealth and i n f l u e n c e a f t e r the c o n f l i c t .
•
P u b l i c announcement o f EU and U.S. sanctions
(planned).
Work FLS, Partners, and others t o support Maritime
V i s i t and Search ( i . e . agree t o a l l o w i n s p e c t i o n o f
their vessels);
Work FLS t o a c t i v e l y support EU and U.S. POL
embargoes ( p o s s i b l e : provide support f o r p o l i c e and
customs i n s p e c t i o n s ) ;
Work Europeans ( e s p e c i a l l y Cyprus) t o freeze a l l
Yugoslav assets;
Repeat message a t U.S.-EU meetings o f FRY i n c l u s i o n
i n SEI i f they come t o terms i n Kosovo.
•
o
•
•
VJ l e a d e r s h i p — sow doubt about M i l o s e v i c as commander i n
c h i e f , generate f e a r about personal w e l l being.
o
Continue naming o f VJ commanders i n areas where
a t r o c i t i e s are r e p o r t e d (NAC r e p o r t t o r e i n f o r c e
this?);
o OSCE, NGO r e p o r t s i n May t o h i g h l i g h t a t r o c i t i e s ;
o Work UN t o f o r e s t a l l negative r e s o l u t i o n s / r e p o r t s
on Kosovo t o deny VJ comfort (push back Russian
mischief);
• Move q u i c k l y t o b u i l d camps and evacuate refugees
from Macedonia — denies M i l o s e v i c and VJ key
weapon intended t o d i s t r a c t the A l l i a n c e .
Serb P u b l i c — generate doubts about the f u t u r e o f Serbia
and i t s i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h c i v i l i z e d Europe.
o
Work FLS-Leaders* statement
(see
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
above);
�SECRET
Work with I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizations {e.g. OSCE) to
publicize impact of Milosevic's wars since 1991;
Work public statements to h i g h l i g h t corruption of
current regime.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRCT
U:\Serbia\Kosovo\04-30-99 30 Day Plan
Drafted: EUR/SCE:GHFrowick
Cleared: S/SA:JDobbins
EUR:JSwigert
EUR/TMS:JPardew
EUR/SCE:CHoh
EUR/RPM:PMoon
S/NIS:GKrol
PRM:ENA:NBibbins
P:ERubin
D:JBass
S/P:DHamilton
GECRET
�SECRET
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Purpose: Assess feasibility and potential effectiveness of
additional military and non-military measures to degrade and
undermine FRY's ability to conduct military operations and to
sustain national defense in the next 30 days.
Tools: Overt - use military and non-military measures to
increase the pressure on Milosevic within the context of
Operation ALLIED FORCE. Unconventional - use non-military
measures to target specific high-value/high-payoff economic
targets, which sustain FRY defense and military capabilities.
Constraints: FRY economy redundant, nearly self-sustaining &
capable of operating on near subsistence. FRY funds held offshore and very difficult to disrupt or freeze.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20 3 - osso - n
.1
1
�-SCCREIT
^TESOf"
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Expand economic target set: Conduct air strikes aimed at
economic targets which are primary means of cash
generation controlled by Milosevic and his cronies:
• Mines/mining equipment (Bor, Majdenpak, Trepca,)
• Sartid 1913 steel plant at smederevo
• Gosa heavy industries
• Timber/wood production & Simpo furniture factory
• Beocin & Novi Popovac cement plants
-CCCRCT
�"SECRET
%^^J
^ ^
0
of
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Milosevic/cronies' targets assets, cont'd.
• Serbia's only newsprint factory
• Beopetrol and Jugopetrol facilities
• Customs warehouses and customs facilities in
Belgrade, major cities, and border areas
• Warehouses of large trading firms
• Banks 6 state banks and influential "private" banks
such as Delta bank, Karic bank, commercial bank
• Cigarette factories (imports would be required)
•SCCRET
�Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Economic measures & actions: Impose economic sanctions
to degrade Milosevic's and the VJ's ability to support and
conduct FRY government, military, and business
transactions, which sustain the war economy.
U.S. will expand current U.S. sanctions which result in
practice to a comprehensive trade & investment ban
(expected entry in force May 1):
• Ban on export and reexport of all U.S. goods, technology,
and services to the FRY, including oil, petroleum
products, strategic materials, and dual-use items; special
consideration for humanitarian goods.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-SECRET
�SCCRET
*?k£j»$
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
(Continued)
• Block on all FRY and Serbian government capital and
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction
• Ban on all trade and export financing
• Ban on all imports from the FRY
• Ban on new investment by U.S. persons in the
territory of Serbia
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1
*
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
EU will also adopt sanctions on May 1, but which are less
comprehensive than U.S. sanctions (expected entry in force
May1):
• Export ban on oil, petroleum products, strategic
materials, dual-use items
• Expanded funds freeze on FRY and Serbian government
officials
• Prohibition of provision of export finance by private
sector to existing government-financed export credits
• Extention of the EU investment ban
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
vjLCRET ~
�•SEGRET-
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Widening of scope of prohibition on export of equipment for
international repression
Comprehensive flight ban between FRY and EU countries
(already in place in U.S.)
• Ban on travel of all senior leadership of the FRY and Serbian
governments, including military officials and Milosevic
business cronies and family members (already in place in
U.S.)
rEGR&F-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Q
WW
\^^/
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Unconventional measures with economic impact: These
actions are directed at specific and discrete economic-military
and economic-psychological targets, which will impede,
disrupt, or complicate Milosevic's and the FRY's ability to
conduct military operations and sustain national defense.
• Hack into FRY and Serbian government and military
computers to disrupt operations of government &
business, including government-economic assets, i.e.,
government command & control links, National Bank of
Yugoslavia, & telephone/fax systems
• Interdict Milosevic's key money managers and disrupt
their travel and ability to transact business
• Discredit Milosevic's money managers, spread rumors of
personal corruption and avarice
0
-SEGRET—
�'SECRET
,<r *
Q
..
WW ,
jflg^/
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Discredit and smear Milosevic's immediate family members,
especially his wife Mira Markovic and her JUL party
• Reduce/eliminate remittances from Serbs living abroad
• Stoke inflation • Spread rumors of inflation & goods shortages
• Print counterfeit dinar
• Swap Montenegrin-held dinars for dollars or deutsch
marks and dump in Serbia
• Artificially increase exchange rate in Republika
Srpska of convertible mark with Yugoslav dinar
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET^
,-::v-,
^
%^jg>^
*>ATES<**
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Suspend or block use of assets abroad of large state firms or
successful smaller ones government does not entirely
control such funds and they buoy production when necessary
• Seize capital equipment abroad, including merchant ships,
JAT aircraft, and other militarily-significant capital assets
• Target and shut down "new" Serbian firms springing up in
neighboring countries, Greece, Cyprus, or even Western
Europe as these will be the sanctions busters following the
pattern of the UN sanctions
• Monitor sanctions-busting routes to consider possible
interdiction of cash and high value goods by air or in
cooperation with neighboring country governments
10
SECRET •
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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Declassified documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information
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2013-0830-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on PDD-68 (Presidential Decision Directive) and International Public Information. Material includes Department of State cables, outlines, and slides on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
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National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Jamie Metzl
Steven Naplan
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7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7a08c3c0a725fa580ba8fb57cd3f8192.pdf
738207459824b2889af79e85024da7ab
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�Serb Compliance with UN Security Council ResolutionE.o. 13526. 3.5(c)
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance
Complying
Comment
Security forces
operations
continue
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease-fire
Improve the humanitarian
situation
c
Relief centers
established but
people too
frightened to
return
Enter a meaningful dialogue
on a political solution
c
Willing to grant
only limited
autonomy
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Security forces
operations
continue
e
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Some incidents
of interference
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free access
for humanitarian organizations
Some people
returning but
many homes
destroyed; some
interference with
relief convoys
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
r
©
No agreement on
a timetable
Some minor
incidents
Provide security for international
monitors
Cooperate with the war crimes
tribunal
e
Has not turned
over suspects or
allowed
investigators to
work without
hindrance
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved iri
mistreatraent of civilians and
destruction of property
©
No charges made
against any
member of
security forces
Seerglo. 13526. 3.S(fc)
364819P65 8118
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance Complying
Comment
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease fire
Security forces have halted offensive
operations in most areas, but shelling
continued near Suva Reka and
Komorane on 30 September.
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Some military and police forces
withdrawing to barracks. Two alleged
massacres on 26 Sept. KDOM reported
stories of continued Serb repression
against refugees and health providers.
Provide security for international
monitors
KDOM reports security is adequate.
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Access improving; KDOM reports no
restrictions on 29 Sep.
Improve the humanitarian
situation
Government aid centers established
and stocked, but fighting still causing
more IDPs.
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free
access for humanitarian
organizations
Many IDPs reluming, but many unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict areas.
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
Belgrade has expressed willingness to
grant limited autonomy but no
agreement on a timetable.
©
Enter a meaningful dialogue on a
political solution
Belgrade has named a new provisional
government for Kosovo without the
approval or cooperation of the current
shadow government but says it is willing
to work towards elections agreed upon
by all sides.
Cooperate with war crimes
tribunal
Granted visas to one ICTY team member
but denied three others week of 21 Sept.
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians and
destruction of property
No charges reported against any
member of security forces.
e
36SOO0P6S 10-98
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�r .vov. :y.:; c . [ t
iMON'
5E
9. 28 98
! 0 : 5 2 ST. : 0 : 4 b •N'J.
;'5'JOJt>:^r
SECRET
E.D, 13526, 3.5lc)
28 September ]998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Rwlottetfi;'
y P:
2. Cease security forces'
actions affecting civilians
and withdraw forces used
in repression of civilians
mm
X
,•....:.;. •.„•.. ,..
ConimoDt [
Security forces operations continued up until
Sunday.
X
Security forces operations coolinued up until
Sunday.
• No:
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
#01
3. Provide security for
international montiors
X
Some minor incidents
4. AUowfreedom,of
movetnent for international
monitors
X
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
X
Relief centers established but people too
frightened to return.
X
Some people returning but many homes
destroyedvsotne interference with relief
convoys
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permitfreeaccess
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
Some incidents of interference
Has expressed willingness to grant limited
autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
X
Belgrade says will name a new provisional
government for Kosovotoday-astep which
does not bode well for cooperation between
Belgrade and the current shadow
government
Has not turned over suspects or allowed
investigators to work without hindrance
10. Bring to justice
members of the security
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
X
C I T N LIBRARY P O O O Y
LN O
HTCP
EjO. 13526, 3.5(b)
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�FSOM CMM
3ITE 3B
SECRET
d.O. 13526. 3.5ft)
forces involved in
mistreaunent of civilians
and destnjction of property
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
E.O. 13526. 3.5(c)
O tJ*— IVXJ t
�FROM CMN SITE 3A
(THU) 10. I " 98 1 6 : 59/ST. 1 6 : 58/NO. 3760655465 P
0. 13526, 3.5(:)
1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
#04
,
. 5 s l H l | t R W 3 « SBWIWttiUMKi
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
x->
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians:
and withdraw forces used,
in repressioniof civilians
3. Provide security for
international monitors
4. Allow, freedom of
movementfor international
monitors.
KDOM reports security is adequate.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
10. Bring to justice .
members of the security
forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians
and destruction of property.
GeneralfrceJamof movement except in conflict
artasl
[Access improving; KDOM
reports ho restrictions on 29 Sepi(U)
Government aid centers established andJlOiked,
butfightingstill causing more IDPs\
Orahovac mayor claims new governmental aic
center will soon open in Ratkovac, west of
Orahovac. (U).
Many IDPs returning, but rn<tny unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict o/eoif
KDOM reports good freedom of movement for
NGOs and aid organizations on 2? Sep. (U)
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permit free access •
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
KDOM witnessed no fighting on 30 Sept, but
diplomats reported continued shelling near Suva
Reka and Komorane. Inaccessible terrain near
Suva Reka has slowed conclusion of operations.
Militai^aad policeforce's: COTtinu^wtbdrawirig;
lo batracks. Two alleged massacres on 26 Sept.
KDOMreportedstories of continued Serb
repressioniigiainst refugees and health providers.
1
X
Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant
limited autonomy but no agreement on a
limctable.
X
Belgrade has named a new provisional V ,
gbvernment for Kosovo without te approval or
cooperation of the current shadow government
btil says it is willing to work towards Sections
agreed upon by all sides.
Granted visas to one ICTY te»m member but
denied three others week of 21 Sept.
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces.,
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
EjO. 13526, 3 ^ c )
SECRET
4
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SECRET CODEWORD
July 19, 1999
1500 EDT
KOSOVO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY # 199
Diplomatic Developments
Kosovar Albanian officials have developed a plan to cover all of Kosovo with radio-television
transmitters at a cost of $60 millionl
E.O. 13526. 1.4(c)
Jul 99
ythe station would not serve any political party, group or organization. (S€)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�
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Steven Naplan
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�lUUL IDLl'JUJLL
NATIONAL SECURITY
6506
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
September 2 9 , 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLAR^J^^/^
FROM:
JAMIE METZLJ
SUBJECT:
D e s i g n a t i o n s Of F o r e i g n T e r r o r i s t
To Prevent F u n d r a i s i n g
Organizations
A t t a c h e d a t Tab 1 i s a memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n o f t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s under t h e A n t i t e r r o r i s m
and E f f e c t i v e Death P e n a l t y A c t o f 1996.
The A c t a l l o w s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t o d e s i g n a t e f o r e i g n
o r g a n i z a t i o n s as t e r r o r i s t i f t h e i r a c t i v i t y t h r e a t e n s t h e
t
s e c u r i t y o f U.S. n a t i o n a l s o r t h e nai o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n t h e past year and a h a l f , we have c o o r d i n a t e d
e f f o r t s t o compile t h e records neces s a r y f o r t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n ,
which we w i l l be p r e s e n t i n g t o Congr ess on October 1. The
d e s i g n a t i o n f i l e s w i l l then be submi t t e d t o t h e Federal R e g i s t e r
on
November 10 absent Congressional opp o s i t i o n , which we do n o t
anticipate.
R o l l Out
I t i s t h e unanimous recommendation o f CSG t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t n o t
be i n v o l v e d i n announcing these d e s i g n a t i o n s . The process has
taken a year and a h a l f t o reach f r u i t i o n and we have been
c r i t i c i z e d f o r t a k i n g so l o n g and f o r s e i z i n g so few assets
under o u r p r e v i o u s IEEPA e f f o r t . We a r e a l s o h e s i t a n t t o p u t t h e
P r e s i d e n t o u t f r o n t on t h i s i s s u e because l i t t l e w i l l appear t o
happen a f t e r t h e announcement o f d e s i g n a t i o n . No a r r e s t s w i l l be
made o r assets b l o c k e d f o r months a f t e r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n s a r e
announced.
The r o l l o u t w i l l b e g i n w i t h a c l a s s i f i e d n o t i f i c a t i o n o f
Congress on October 1. The seven day p e r i o d f o r Congress t o
review t h e d e s i g n a t i o n s w i l l be extended u n t i l October 10, t o
take account o f t h e Jewish h o l i d a y s . I f you agree w i t h t h e CSG
•CONFIDENTIMJ
Reason: 1.5 W
TN THM
T D n A n\/
n
r\~mr*r^m / !?J? ASSIFIED
C L
P
E
Declassify ou I J Q LIBRARY PHOTOCOPYRE-o. 156
J LWd N
32
�.CONFIDEMTIMi
reconunendation, t h e S t a t e Department w i l l then announce t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n s , do t h e background b r i e f i n g w i t h Treasury and
J u s t i c e , and n o t i f y U.S. overseas p o s t s .
Concurrence by:
W i l l i a m Davis, A l a n Kreczko
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n and f o r w a r d t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t .
Attachments
Tab 1 Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab 2 L i s t o f Designated O r g a n i z a t i o n s
CONriDDNTIA'fi?
w (_ x
N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL.
NATIONAL SECURITY
6506
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Designations o f Foreign T e r r o r i s t
to Prevent T h e i r F u n d r a i s i n g
Organizations
The A n t i t e r r o r i s m and E f f e c t i v e Death P e n a l t y A c t o f 1996, which
you s i g n e d on A p r i l 24, 1996 a u t h o r i z e s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ,
i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury and t h e
A t t o r n e y General, t o d e s i g n a t e f o r e i g n o r g a n i z a t i o n s as
t e r r o r i s t i f t h e i r t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y threatens the s e c u r i t y o f
U.S. n a t i o n a l s o r t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
D e s i g n a t i o n w i l l enable us t o take a c t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t
f u n d r a i s i n g i n t h e U.S.
Congress must be n o t i f i e d o f d e s i g n a t i o n seven days b e f o r e t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n i s o f f i c i a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Federal R e g i s t e r .
Upon n o t i f i c a t i o n , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury may r e q u i r e
U.S. f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t r o l l i n g assets o f a d e s i g n a t e d
o r g a n i z a t i o n t o freeze a l l o f the organization's assets.
Persons who k n o w i n g l y p r o v i d e support o r resources t o a
t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n o r attempt o r c o n s p i r e t o do so, can be
f i n e d , i m p r i s o n e d f o r up t o t e n years, o r b o t h .
Designated
o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i l l have t h i r t y days from t h e date o f p u b l i c a t i o n
t o seek j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e U.S. Court o f Appeals f o r t h e DC
Circuit.
The departments have developed t h e e v i d e n t i a r y records on
t h i r t y - o n e groups.
The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , A t t o r n e y General,
and S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury have now s i g n e d o f f on t h e
r e q u i r e d documents. The groups i n c l u d e Hamas, H i z b a l l a h , Kahane
Chai, and IRA. ( F u l l l i s t a t Tab)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDEM'l IAL'
C l a s s i f i e d by: Samuel R. Berger
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
D^ssi^-o^LIOT LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1 DBITT IAL
We do not expect any immediate a r r e s t s because only
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to designated t e r r o r i s t organizations made a f t e r
p u b l i c a t i o n i n the Federal Register can be considered
v i o l a t i o n s . Banks w i l l freeze known assets of these
organizations. As these t e r r o r i s t organizations probably do not
maintain accounts i n t h e i r organization's name, we do not
a n t i c i p a t e the d o l l a r value of such assets to be great.
The r o l l o u t of these designations w i l l begin w i t h a c l a s s i f i e d
n o t i f i c a t i o n of Congress on October 1. The seven day p e r i o d f o r
Congress t o review the designations w i l l be extended u n t i l
October 10, to take account of the Jewish holidays. The State
Department w i l l then announce the designations, do the
background b r i e f i n g w i t h Treasury and J u s t i c e , and n o t i f y U.S.
overseas posts.
The announcement of these designations w i l l deter f u n d r a i s i n g on
behalf of the designated groups and demonstrate again our
commitment to combating t e r r o r i s m . I t w i l l strengthen our hand
i n e f f o r t s t o persuade other governments to crack down on
t e r r o r i s t f u n d r a i s i n g . We are developing an appropriate press
strategy to underscore t h i s message.
COHFIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�L i s t o f Foreign T e r r o r i s t Organizations f o r Designation
Abu N i d a l O r g a n i z a t i o n
Abu Sayyaf Group
Armed I s l a m i c Group
Aum S h i n r i k y o
Euzadi Ta Askatasuna
Democratic F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e - Hawatmeh
Faction
Hamas
Harakat u l - A n s a r
Hizballah
Gam'a a l - I s l a m i y y a
I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n Army
Japanese Red Army
al-Jihad
Kack
Kahane Chai
Khmer Rouge
K u r d i s t a n Workers' P a r t y
L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s o f Tamil Eelam
Manuel Rodriguea P a t r i o t i c Front D i s s i d e n t s
Mujahedin-e Khalq O r g a n i z a t i o n
N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Army
P a l e s t i n e I s l a m i c Jihad-Shaqaqi F a c t i o n
P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Front - Abu Abbas F a c t i o n
Popular F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e
Popular F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e - General Command
R e v o l u t i o n a r y Armed Forces o f Colombia
R e v o l u t i o n a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n o f 17 November
R e v o l u t i o n a r y People's L i b e r a t i o n P a r t y / F r o n t
R e v o l u t i o n a r y People's S t r u g g l e
S h i n i n g Path
Tupac Amaru R e v o l u t i o n a r y Movement
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COITFIDENTear
NATIONAL
SECURITY
1109
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 14, 1998
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
ERIC SCHWARTZ " ^ T ^
FROM:
JAMIE METZL^
SUBJECT:
Worldnet on I r a q - Tuesday, February 17, 1998
11:00am-12:00pm, OEOB 489
You have agreed t o a Worldnet s a t e l l i t e i n t e r v i e w w i t h
j o u r n a l i s t s from P a r i s , C a i r o , Ankara, and Riyadh on Tuesday i n
the OEOB s t u d i o . This i n t e r v i e w w i l l be broadcast s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
at t o i n v i t e d groups U.S. Embassies and on t e l e v i s i o n networks
w o r l d w i d e . The t o p i c i s "U.S. P o l i c y Towards I r a q . "
Format: The format o f t h e i n t e r v i e w w i l l be s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f
a press conference. The program w i l l begin w i t h a b r i e f opening
comment by t h e Worldnet moderator, f o l l o w e d by a s h o r t video on
U.S. e f f o r t s t o achieve a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n t o t h e weapons
inspection issue.
A f t e r t h e v i d e o , t h e host w i l l i n t r o d u c e you and ask you a
s c r i p t e d q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e U.S. p o s i t i o n towards I r a q . Tony
B l i n k e n i s p r e p a r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n and i t s answer, and w i l l
p r o v i d e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t o you s e p a r a t e l y . F o l l o w i n g t h i s
response, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n P a r i s , Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh w i l l
each r e c e i v e one opening q u e s t i o n , f o l l o w e d by a 12-minute time
b l o c k f o r each s i t e .
Questions and comments from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l i s t s a r e
l i v e and u n e d i t e d . The broadcast i s one-way video, two way
a u d i o . This means t h a t you w i l l hear b u t n o t see t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s . A l l questions w i l l be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
t r a n s l a t e d f o r you.
Based on r e c e n t Worldnet i n t e r v i e w s on t h i s s u b j e c t , you s h o u l d
expect c h a l l e n g i n g and p r o v o c a t i v e q u e s t i o n s . I t i s a l s o
expected t h a t t h e nature o f q u e s t i o n s may vary a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
n a t i o n a l i t i e s o f t h e i n t e r v i e w e r s . USIA has attempted t o p r e d i c t
coNriDDiTTifi[jNT0N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
f m
E
- -
a
1 3 5 2 6
�as b e s t i t can what type o f q u e s t i o n s might be asked by each
geographic b l o c . This i n f o r m a t i o n i s summarized a t Tab A.
Comment on Themes: USIA and CIA a n a l y s t s t e l l us t h a t t h e "man
i n t h e s t r e e t " i n the Arab w o r l d has l i t t l e p e r s o n a l sympathy
f o r Saddam, and p r o b a b l y r e c o g n i z e s him f o r what he i s .
However, Arab people are v e r y c r i t i c a l o f U.S. p o l i c y f o r two
reasons:
f i r s t , they see t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n o f
Saddam has h u r t the I r a q i people; and second, they b e l i e v e t h a t
n e i t h e r c o n t i n u e d i s o l a t i o n nor a U.S. bombing campaign w i l l
change m a t t e r s - i . e . , n e i t h e r w i l l remove Saddam from power.
Thus, they see f o r c e as o n l y c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e s u f f e r i n g o f
the I r a q i people. You w i l l have t o address b o t h these i s s u e s :
f i r s t , by d e s c r i b i n g our concern about t h e I r a q i people, and
second, by e x p l a i n i n g why our p o l i c y toward I r a q (even i f i t
doesn't r e s u l t i n the immediate e l i m i n a t i o n o f Saddam) serves
the r e g i o n . The key p o i n t s o f our i n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i c Diplomacy
e f f o r t are summarized a t Tab B.
Concurrence by:
Tony B l i n k e n , Joe Marty
Attachments
Tab A
Background Notes on I n t e r v i e w e r s and A n t i c i p a t e d
Areas o f D i s c u s s i o n
Tab B
Summary o f U.S. P u b l i c Diplomacy Themes
TOMFTPFNTT ATr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
August 27, 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR MARNIE GIRSHON
FROM:
JAMIE METZ^^.
SUBJECT:
White Paper on I r a q
Thank you v e r y much t o you and your c o l l e a g u e s f o r p r o d u c i n g t h e
e x c e l l e n t White Paper e n t i t l e d "Facts on I r a q ' s H u m a n i t a r i a n
S i t u a t i o n . " I sent a copy t o Sandy Berger who was v e r y impressed
and p r a i s e d t h e document h i g h l y . This White Paper i s a
s i g n i f i c a n t and much a p p r e c i a t e d c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o u r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n campaign on I r a q .
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r on f u t u r e p r o j e c t s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
13 Fcbruarv 1998
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs
programs while wearing down the will of the Security
Council to maintain sanctions.
Overview
The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn's biological,
chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council
and accepted by Iraq following the war to eliminate
and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further,
the UN established sanctions to prevent the purchase
of equipment and materials needed to reconstitute
Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find
remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.
On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the
world's experts conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise
has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to
resume development and production of WMD. They
believe Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological
munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.
This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued
obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring
activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of
"sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and
Saddam's efforts to end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad
has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is
making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has
also enhanced indigenous capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy
in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged; he is
actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring
activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of operational
missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads
would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries
and US military forces in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems.
Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military
purposes against Iran and to suppress rebellious segments of his population in Kurdish-held areas.
Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and
the IAEA
Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM
inspections and has taken an increasingly hard line
since March 1996 when the UN began inspecting
security facilities suspected of concealing WMDrelated documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq admitted (after
Husayn Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former head
of Iraqi military industries, defected in August 1995)
that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the UN:
• Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15 days
after the Security Council enacted the resolution in
1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations
covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile
programs.
• Baghdad has modified each declaration several
times to accommodate data uncovered by UNSCOM
and the IAEA and has provided new information
only when confronted with direct evidence. For
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�The Husayn Kamil Connection
as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn—Saddam's second son—has assumed many of the responsibilities for
concealing the proscribed programs. In addition,
many of the leading scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:
Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law,
was the preeminent military industries' official and a
fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan
in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil
took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he
oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued
Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the
Al-Husayn missile—an indigenous modification of the
Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil
directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological
weapons on Iranian prisoners of war:
• After the Gulf war. Kamil—first from his position as
Minister of Defense and then as the director of the
Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization—led Iraq's
efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.
• Husayn Kamiis influence over the Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible
for using Saddam's security services—of which he
was a member in the early 1980s—to hide proscribed
materials and documents from the United Nations.
• Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi—who serves officially
as a presidential adviser and is a leading official in
Iraqi relations with UNSCOM—was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a
doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and nonconventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi
received rare public praise from Saddam for his role
in the development of the Al-Husayn missile.
• Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur—currently
Minister of Culture and Information—is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former head of its
nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close
associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally
serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA. He lead an
Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in
October 1997.
• Jafar Dia Jafar is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear
scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now
officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his
position—unlike that of Sadi—appears to be largely
nominal.
• Dr. Rihab Taha is the leading official in charge of
Iraq's biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum
toxin and directed testing on animal subjects. Taha
is also politically well-connected—she is married to
the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps
direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.
Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program
did not die with his defection and subsequent murder.
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�/50 boxes of documents presented to UNSCOM at a chicken farm in Iraq in August 1995.
example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to
the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial
submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to
date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.
Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from
inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996,
mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive" and the
inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has
applied the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities—
on one occasion security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit UN
access to Special Republican Guard garrisons that are
responsible for executing the highest priorities of
Saddam's inner circle:
Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of
reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected Iraqi
officials removing documents and material from
buildings and even burning documents to prevent
them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out after
their entry was delayed for several hours.
Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's
ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country
in November 1997.
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�• Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escorts have endangered UN helicopter
flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot
and grabbing the flight controls. Security guards
have harassed inspectors on the ground.
Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of
cooperation while working hard to conceal essential
information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD
programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided
incomplete documentary evidence to support its
claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed
nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant
information was buried within a massive volume of
extraneous data, all of which was intended to create
the appearance of candor and to overwhelm
UNSCOM's analytic resources:
• For example, Iraq released detailed records of how
many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but
it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it
destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering
biological and chemical agents.
• UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of
the documentary material and concluded that,
despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not
release its most important WMD-related documents.
Biological Weapons
No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August 1995,
when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection,
the existence of an offensive biological warfare (BW)
capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin (19,000 liters), and aHatoxin (2,200 liters)
Remains of chemicallbiological-warfare-agcnt-filled
missile
warheads secretly destroyed by Iraq.
after years of claiming that they had conducted only
defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing
BW-filled munitions—including 25 Scud missile warheads (five anthrax; 16 botulinum toxin; four aflatoxin). 157 aerial bombs, and aerial dispensers—
during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq
acknowledged researching the use of 155-mm artillery
1
2
1
3
Inhalation of anthrax spores—an infectious dose is about 8,000
spores or less than one-millionlh of a gram—is fatal within five to
seven clays nearly 100 percent of the time.
2
Botulinum toxin, which would most likely be dispensed as an
aerosol, can kill in as little as 24 to 36 hours by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.
' AHatoxin is a liver carcinogen that can kill years after ingestion.
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�UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in
the summer of 1996:
• Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate
civilian facility designed to produce single-cell
proteins and biopesticides.
• Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of
Baghdad) and the security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a
BW production facility from the outset.
Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support
claims that it destroyed all of its B W agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler
stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration, submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely
credible account of Iraq's biological weapons
program":
• In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on
Ricin, but did not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced
the biological agent Ricin.
4
Destroyed chemicallbiological-warfare-agent-filled
aerial bombs.
R-400
shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol
generators to deliver BW agents:
• UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production
equipment, seed stocks, and growth media claimed
by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
• UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its
production of biological agents and could be holding
back such agents, which are easily concealed.
• Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a smallscale BW program at known facilities that cunently
produce legitimate items, such as vaccines and other
pharmaceuticals. Without effective UN monitoring,
Baghdad could probably begin production within a
few days. For example, Iraq can convert production
of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed
material.
Chemical Weapons
Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and against its
own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi forces
4
Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two (lays of
inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 500 micrograms.
Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in
1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of
BW agents at the facility between 1989 and 1990.
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�Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Date
Area Used
Type
Approximate
Casualties
Target
Population
August 1983
Hajj Umran
Mustard
fewer than 100
Iranians/Kurds
October to November 1983
Panjwin
Mustard
3,000
Iranians/Kurds
February to March 1984
Majnoon Island
Mustard
2.500
Iranians
March 1984
A l Basrah
Tabun
50 to 100
Iranians
March 1985
Hawizah Marsh
Mustard/Tabun
3.000
Iranians
February 1986
A l Faw
Mustard/Tabun
8.000 to 10,000
Iranians
December 1986
Umtn ar Rasas
Mustard
reportedly in the thousands
Iranians
April 1987
A l Basrah
Mustard/Tabun
5,000
Iranians
October 1987
Sumar/Mehran
Mustard/nerve agents
3,000
Iranians
March 1988
Halabjah
Mustard/nerve agents
reportedly in the hundreds
Iranians/Kurds
1
" Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have cauased some of the
casualties.
While precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have
received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of numerous Iraqi
chemical attacks against civilian villages in the 1987 and 1988 time
frames—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to both
the Iranian and Turkish borders.
5
delivered chemical agents (including Mustard agent
and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun'') in aerial
bombs, aerial spray dispensers, 122-mm rockets, and
several types of artillery, both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical
munitions and had a major production capacity.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than
40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000
empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters
of chemical precursors, and eight different types of
delivery systems—including ballistic missile warheads—in the past seven years. Following Husayn
Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:
7
• Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX
than it previously admitted. Baghdad acknowledged,
despite previous claims that it only conducted
research, that it had conducted pilot production of
about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
• Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons
before the Gulf war—an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life
of chemical agents.
• Perfected techniques for the large-scale production
of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-term
storage.
UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small
stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and production
5
Mustard is a blister agent used primarily to cause medical casualtics by blistering the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is extremely persistent and presents a long-term hazard.
* Sarin and Tabun are G-serics nerve agents that act within seconds of exposure and can be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. These agents kill by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.
Both are relatively nonpersistcnt and present more of a vapor hazard than a skin hazard.
7
VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to—but more
advanced than—G-series agents, in that it is far more persistent.
VX presents a far greater skin hazard and would be used for longterm contamination of territory.
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�UNSCOM inspector in protective suit opening filling plug for sample-taking inside a
ScudlAl-Husayn chemical-agent-filled missile warhead.
equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its
CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much
as 200 metric tons of chemical precursors. 70 Scud
warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled
munitions has not been verified:
• Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW
production. In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors,
Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production
within a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin
within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production
levels—including VX—within two or three years.
• Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it
once used to produce chemical agents and has the
capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW
production.
Ballistic Missiles
Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war
that included 819 operational Scud-B missiles (300km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union,
an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and
modify its warhead (for example, the Al-Husayn with
a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km
range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and
indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq
also had programs to indigenously produce long-range
missiles (such as the Condor) that never entered the
production phase:
• UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction
of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,
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�Handling of leaking 122-mm rockets filled with the chemical nerve agent sarin prior to destruction.
30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and
related equipment.
• UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction
of" only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile
launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by
being fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars or used in
static tests and training.
Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and
launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all
but two of the original 819 Scud missiles imported
from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately
explained the disposition of important missile
components that it could not produce on its own and
may have removed before destruction. There are still
many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile
programs:
• Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of
missiles by integrating guidance and control systems
it concealed with indigenously produced parts.
• Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes,
and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has not
verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.
• Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts
through clandestine procurement networks. In 1995,
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�UNSCOM supervision of the destruction of ScudlAl-Husayn long-range missiles.
Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment
(gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted
under UNSCOM questioning that it received a
similar shipment earlier in 1995.
research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions
were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps within one year:
• In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously
undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile
launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf
war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major
elements of missile systems from UNSCOM
inspectors.
• Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs—within the UN-allowed 150-km range
limit—serve to maintain production expertise within
the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently
flight-tested the Al-Samoud, which UNSCOM
describes as a scaled down Scud, successfully. Iraq
probably will begin converting these efforts into
long-range missile programs as soon as sanctions
are lifted.
Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger,
longer range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered
numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage
systems and clustered engine designs, that theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have
uncovered evidence that Iraq has continued missile
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�111
fa
ScudlAl-Husayn missile launchers before destruction.
Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham—currently used to support its
authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication
buildings at the facility are spacious enough to
house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
linked (o a ballistic missile project that was the
intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's
defection in 1995, Iraq retreated from its longtime
claim that its nuclear program was intended only to
conduct research:
Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and administrative
facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent
size and capacity.
• Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium
enrichment techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
• Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991
by using IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.
Nuclear Weapons
Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was focused on
building an implosion-type weapon. The program was
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�'•'i
v
', ''
•
.
:
• •
Calutrons for uranium enrichment secretly destroyed by Iraq.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's
nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in acquiring
or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:
• Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation of its
nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists
may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that
would reduce the time required to produce a weapon
should Iraq acquire suflicient fissile material.
weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and
intelligence services in obtaining external assistance
and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the technical
achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.
Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction
between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile
program.
• Iraq continues to withhold signilicant information
about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement,
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�Appendix A
Iraqi Biological Warfare Program
BW Agent Production Amounts
11
B W Agent (Organism)
Declared Concentrated
Amounts
Declared Total
Amounts
Comments
Anthrax
(Bacillus anthracis)
8.500 liters
(2,245 gallons)
85.000 liters
(22,457 gallons)
UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
three to four times more than the declared amounts, but
is unable lo contirm.
Botulinum toxin
(Clostridium botulinum)
19,400 liters
380,000 liters
(lOx and 20x concentrated) (100.396 gallons)
(5,125 gallons)
Gas Gangrene
(Clostridium perfringens)
340 liters
(90 gallons)
3,400 liters
(900 gallons)
Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
unable to confirm.
AHatoxin
(Aspergillus flavus and
Aspergillus parasiticus)
N/A
2,200 liters
(581 gallons)
Production amounts and time frame of production
claimed by Iraq do not correlate.
Ricin
(Castor Bean plant)
N/A
10 liters
(2.7 gallons)
Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
unable to confirm.
Botulinum Toxin
Aflatoxin
Comments
UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable
to confirm.
BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems
Delivery System
Anthrax
5
R-4()0 aerial bombs
A i r c r a f t aerosol spray tanks
F-l Mirage modihed fuel drop tank
16
4
UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral
destruction of these 25 warheads due to
conflicting accounts provided by Iraq.
50
Missile warheads
Al-Husayn (modified Scud B)
100
7
Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of
157 bombs, but U N S C O M is unable to
confirm this number. U N S C O M has
found the remains of at least 23.
Iraq claims to have produced four, but
may have manufactured others.
4
1
BW Agent Growth Media Media
Quantity Imported
Unaccounted For Amounts
B W Agent Growth Media
31,000 kg
(68.200 lbs)
3,500 kg
(7,700 lbs)
* Total refers to amount of material obtained from the production
process, while concentrated refers to the amount of concentrated
agent obtained afterfinalfiltration/purification.The concentrated
number is the amount used to till munitions.
''Media refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the
growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.
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�Appendix B
Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program
CW Agent Stockpiles
CW Agent
Chemical Agents
Declared by Iraq
Potential CW Agents Based on Comments
Unaccounted Precursors"
VX
at least 4 metric tons
200 metric tons
G-Agents (Sarin)
Mustard
100 to 150 metric tons
500 to 600 metric tons
200 metric tons
200 metric tons
Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil's
defection in 1995.
Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
CW Delivery Systems
Estimated Numbers
Before the Gulf War
15 to 100
Delivery System
Missile Warheads
-Al Husayn (modihed Scud B)
Rockets
100,000
Aerial Bombs
Artillery Shells
Aerial Spray Tanks
16,000
30,000
unknown
Munitions
Unaccounted For
45 to 70
15,000 to 25,000
Comments
b
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 30 warheads.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nearly 40,000
chemical munitions (including rockets, artillery, and
aerial bombs) 28,000 of which were filled.
2,000
15,000
unknown
"These estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary
meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is
concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq may also retain a
small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to
quickly resume CW production at known dual-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides.
UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of some 45 different types of
CW precursors (1,800.000 liters of liquid and 1,000,000 kilograms of
solid).
b
AII of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The
numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during
the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of
these warheads.
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�Appendix C
Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program
Item
Comments
Initial Inventory
Soviet-Supplied Scud Missiles
SI9
(includes Iraqi modifications of the
Scud: the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km
and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km)
UNSCOM accepts Iraqi accounting for all but two of the original
819 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq has not
explained the disposition of major components that it may have
stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some
Iraqi claims—such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests—are not
believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully
account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest that Iraq
retains a small missile force.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Missiles
Unknown
Iraqi-Produced Scud Warheads
120
Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced/procured and tested all major subcomponents.
Iraq claims all 120 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the
destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional
CW/BW warheads beyond those currently admitted.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Airframes
2
Iraqi-Produced Scud Engines
80
Soviet-Supplied Missile Launchers
11
Iraqi-Produced Missile Launchers
Iraq claims testing two indigenous airframes in 1990. It is unlikely
that Iraq produced only two Scud airframes.
Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests—
53 of which failed quality controls—are unverifiable and not
believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue.
8
UNSCOM doubts Iraq's claim thai it unilaterally destroyed five
launchers. The Soviet Union may have sold more than the declared
11 launchers.
Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers.
17
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�For Internal Use Only
IRAQ CORE POINTS
What We Were Seeking
•
From the onset of this crisis, the fundamental goal of the U.S. has been to assure that
UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites, as called for by UN
Security Council resolutions. Diplomacy, backed by the threat to use overwhelming force if
required, has moved us forward toward achieving that goal.
Iraq precipitated this crisis by trying to avoid its obligations to UN Security Council
resolutions. It attempted to dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could
hold inspections, the manner in which inspections would be conducted and the length of time
they would continue. Iraq's effort failed.
What We Have Achieved
•
The government of Iraq has made a written commitment to provide immediate, unrestricted,
unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all suspect sites. If fully implemented,
this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fiilfill its mission:
-First, to find and destroy all of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
--Second to find and destroy the missiles to deliver these weapons; and,
-Third, to institute a system for long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq does not build more.
•
This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country, including eight so-called
"Presidential sites" that now have been precisely delineated, as well as so-called sensitive
sites which up to now Iraq had tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of
these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines for UNSCOM to complete its
work. In short, for the first time, Iraq explicitly has committed to open every site throughout
the country to the weapons inspectors.
•
For the "Presidential Sites" the agreement allows diplomats to accompany the UNSCOM
inspectors. That is acceptable if the inspectors are free to conductrigorousand professional
inspections. All other sites will be open to inspection under existing UNSCOM procedures.
•
The Secretary General has assured us UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in charge of
UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has also made that clear to the Iraqis.
Questions About the MOU
•
There are issues which still need clarification, notably with respect to the inspection
procedures for the eight "Presidential Sites." We have made clear that we expect all aspects
of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that UNSCOM be permitted to
carry out its inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�•
We have received important assurances from Secretary General Annan that clarify aspects of
the MOU, notably with respect to the eight "Presidential Sites":
=> UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their independence.
=> The Special Team for the Presidential Sites will be part of UNSCOM.
=> The team leader will be an UNSCOM commissioner who is expert in Iraqi WMD,
chosen by the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler.
=> The Special Team leader will report to Chairman Butler.
=> The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM retaining operational control.
=> Procedures for these inspections will be developed by UNSCOM and SGY, not Iraq.
=> As has been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to the
Security Council through the Secretary General.
What Next
UNSC Resolution
•
We support a resolution that will make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments
would have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful, but not necessary, signal
from the international community.
Test and Verify
•
In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment.
Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would have serious consequences.
•
The United States will keep its military forces in the Gulf at a high state of preparedness
while we see if Iraq lives up to the commitment that it has signed. The United States remains
resolved to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full compliance with its commitment
to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.
The Bottom Line
•
Iraq's commitments are an important step forward - but only if matched by Iraq's
compliance. As the President said, "the proof is in the testing".
•
This agreement can be a win/win: either Iraq implements the agreement — or it does not. If
it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access
to all suspect sites in Iraq, with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete
their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger
position internationally than ever. After two crises provoked by Iraq in four months, the
international community will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�INITIALS
APPR: SEC
DRAFT: AJB
CLR 1: TRP
CLR 2: MSI
CLR 3: KAK
CLR 4: S/S-0
DDCRDT
NEA/NGA:AJBARRY:AJB (ZALDAC2.DOC)
12/09/98 7-6366
THE SECRETARY
P:TRPICKERING
S/S:KAKENNEY NEA:INDYK
S/S-O:
S, D, P, M C, E, G, H, L, T SS, SSO, CMS, TF1-3, A, CA,
,
DS, FMP, M/DGP, M/FLO, M M D NEA, S/CT, PM, PA, L
/E,
NIACT IMMEDIATE ALDAC, SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM NIACT
IMMEDIATE, BUJUMBURA NIACT IMMEDIATE +
IMMEDIATE RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE+
r
FOR AMBASSADORS, CHARGES, AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/18
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ
SUBJECT: US MILITARY ACTION/URGENT DEMARCHE REQUEST
REF: SEPTEL
CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING, REASONS 1.5 (B),
(D).
1.
NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE JUSTIFIED BY NEED FOR
IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS I S AN URGENT ACTION MESSAGE FOR ALL
POSTS. SEE PARAS 6-10.
2. 4«t-POSTS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED SEPTEL NOTIFICATION OF
U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. REFTEL INSTRUCTED POSTS
TO NOTIFY HOST GOVERNMENTS OF THE STRIKES, AND TO ASSURE
THEM THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.
3. 4fl-)~SENI0R RANKING OFFICERS PRESENT IN RECEIVING POSTS
SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP MEETINGS TO BRIEF HIGHESTLEVEL AVAILABLE HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON THE BACKGROUND OF
AND RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. STRIKES. ALL POSTS SHOULD D A
RW
FROM POINTS IN PARAS 7 AND 8 IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS
CECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER EX). 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�TO HOST COUNTRY INTERLOCUTORS, AND ADD APPROPRIATE
COURTESIES. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE SENT SEPTEL.
4. tST ALL POSTS SHOULD REPORT DELIVERY OF THIS DEMARCHE,
AND SUBSTANTIVE HOST COUNTRY RESPONSES TO THE DEPARTMENT BY
IMMEDIATE CABLE.
5. -fr&) POSTS LISTED BELOW SHOULD BE AWARE THAT SEPARATE
ORAL MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT WILL BE DELIVERED AS
FOLLOWS: UK (BLAIR), ISRAEL (NETANYAHU), JAPAN (OBUCHI),
SAUDI ARABIA (KING FAHD), KUWAIT (AMIR), BAHRAIN (AMIR),
QATAR (AMIR), PA (ARAFAT), O A (SULTAN QABOOS), UAE
MN
(AMIR), EGYPT (MUBARAK), SYRIA (ASAD), RUSSIA (YELTSIN),
FRANCE (CHIRAC), CHINA (JIANG), TURKEY (DEMIREL), CANADA
(CHRETIEN), GERMANY (SCHROEDER), UNSYG.
IN ADDITION, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
WILL RECEIVE PHONE CALLS FROM THE PRESIDENT.
6. 4Si- FOR A M N OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS,
M A ,
THE HAGUE, 1998 AND 1999 UNSC CAPITALS, NATO CAPITALS,
USNATO: WHEN DELIVERING POINTS PLEASE NOTE THAT TEXT IS AN
ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY. A M N SHOULD DELIVER
MA
MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN; USNATO TO THE NATO SYG.
ALL OTHER POSTS SHOULD DELIVER TO FOREIGN MINISTER.
AMBASSADORS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR HELPFUL
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND/OR PREVIOUS OFFERS OF MILITARY
SUPPORT, AS APPROPRIATE.
7.
BEGIN POINTS:
— THE US HAS UNDERTAKEN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ
BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF UNSCRS 687, 1154, 1194,
1205 AND OTHERS.
—
THE THREAT TO THE REGION POSED BY IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO
COOPERATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH UNSCOM, AND THE CONSEQUENT
INABILITY OF UNSCOM TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES THE
COUNCIL HAS ENTRUSTED TO IT CANNOT BE TOLERATED. UNSCR
1205 EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMED THAT EFFECTIVE UNSCOM OPERATION
WAS ESSENTIAL TO IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 687.
—
THE SITUATION HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO
PROVIDE FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM, A
DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE GULF W R CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION
A
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�AvA^pC" CL(*<>(/V. A T
CDGRBT
(UNSCR 687) AND UfAQ' S
SECURITY COUNCIL.
rv.tS'
14 COMMITMENT TO THE
— ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ PROMISED TO PROVIDE TJNSCOM AND THE \ ^
IAEA WITH FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION.
IRAQ
\_ f^a^—
IRAQ
INFORMED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT WAS THE "CLEAR AND
UNCONDITIONAL DECISION OF THE JCHE^[RAQI GOVERNMENT TO
i^F
RESUME COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.'' ^IRAQ HAS
VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT, AS- IT HAS VIOLATED &IWILAR—PAST
PROMISES.rtuTcwv.*.A-cv^t-R ffXiripAz£F*Aj~Z r.j^r
^-^j-uSto^
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0
~ IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REQUESTED {[u5££f^'"S
INFORMATION ON ITS BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND MISSILE
PROGRAMS. IT BLOCKED UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO BA'ATH PARTY
HEADQUARTERS ON DECEMBER 9. IT BARRED UNSCOM FROM
INSPECTING A BASE ON NOVEMBER 25. ON DECEMBER 11, IRAQ
FURTHER RESTRICTED UNSCOM'S ACTIVITIES BY ASSERTING THAT IT
COULD NOT INSPECT ON FRIDAYS, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF DOING
SO. ON DECEMBER 5, IRAQ RESTRICTED AN UNSCOM TEAM'S
ABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH BOMBS RELATED TO ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM AND, ON THE SAME DATE, ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT ANOTHER
TEAM FROM VIDEOTAPING AND PHOTOCOPYING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS.
ON NOVEMBER 23, AN IRAQI ESCORT HELICOPTER PASSED OVER A UN
HELICOPTER AT A LOW SPEED AND AKTITUDE, THREATENING THE
SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL. -^T^HASJPROVI DED ONLY ONE OF J^AN?
$ <^tS oY~
DOCUMENTS UNSCOM HAS REQUESTED, AND HAS SOUGHT TO PLACE
UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO OTHER
MATERIALS. ^ « /^cs o IT I^CS— -jn-tvr Tl^-cr i^/rcs, r~~' << *YW
-r
oxv-Oi^-OO TCi
,
~ THE US HAS WORKED WITH OUR PARTNERS ON THE SECURITY
\
^
COUNCIL AND FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO BRING ABOUT A DIPLOMATIC
s A ? ^ SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON WENT THE EXTRA
* ^
MILE IN NOVEMBER W E HE CALLED OFF PLANNED AIR STRIKES IN
HN
ORDER TO GAVE IRAQ ONE MORE CHANCE TO FULFILL ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
0
—
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN FIRM AND UNITED IN
INSISTING IRAQ MUST PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION. REPEATED
CALLS HAVE BEEN MADE IN UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS THAT IRAQ MUST COMPLY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IT
UNDERTOOK AT THE END OF THE GULF WAR, OBLIGATIONS IT
RECOMMITTED ITSELF TO LAST FEBRUARY IN THE SECRETARY
GENERAL'S MOU AND AGAIN ON NOVEMBER 14.
SECRBT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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•J
�•CECRET
—
I T IS CLEAR N W THAT BAGHDAD WILL NOT RELENT. THE
O
CYCLE WOULD CONTINUE I F LEFT UNCHECKED.
—
IRAQ HAS BEEN GIVEN REPEATED OPPORTUNITIES TO COME INTO
COMPLIANCE AND MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING WEAPONS ISSUES.
IT HAS DEMANDED INSTEAD THAT THE COUNCIL LIFT THE OIL
EMBARGO IRRESPECTIVE OF IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE.
* '
—
REPEATED COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS
IS UNACCEPTABLE.
~
IRAQ PRESENTS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS COMMITTED MAJOR ACTS OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST TWO NEIGHBORS. IT HAS USED NONCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND AGAINST
INNOCENT IRAQI CIVILIANS.
—
THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR SINCE 1991 DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE REGIME HAS NOT LEARNED FROM PAST MISTAKES. IRAQ WANTS
TO RETAIN ITS RESIDUAL W D AND MISSILE CAPABILITY AND
M
REGAIN CONTROL OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO RECONSTITUTE ITS
NON-CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
CANNOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. THE US IS DETERMINED THIS
WILL NOT HAPPEN.
—
EXISTING RESOLUTIONS PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR
ACTING. WE ARE ACTING DECISIVELY, BUT WITH EVERY EFFORT TO
AVOID COLLATERAL CIVILIAN DAMAGE.
— THE OBJECTIVE OF^HE MILITARY ACTION W HAVE UNDERTAKEN
E
IS TO DCGRADC CAppj^M' S ABILITY TO THREATEN THE REGION AND'
-TO" DEGRADE HIS/M)ILITY TO DEVELOP AND DELIVER WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION Te-NbiGHBORING COUNTRIES,
oe&*.K*>o- K.S A/xOTr
—
WE HAVE NOT TAKEN THIS DECISION LIGHTLY.
AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION COULD BE AT RISK.
US PERSONNEL
—
BAGHDAD HAS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD
BE OF USING NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AGAINST US OR OUR
ALLIES.
—
WE BELIEVE THAT MOST COUNTRIES WILL UNDERSTAND AND
SUPPORT THIS ACTION. WE HONESTLY DO NOT SEE THAT THERE IS
ANY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE.
-SBeRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-efiCRET
—
WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT THIS CONFRONTATION.
—
IT I S BAGHDAD THAT HAS PROVOKED THE CRISIS BY ITS
DELIBERATE AND REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
UNSCR 687 ET AL. RESPONSIBILITY LIES SOLELY WITH BAGHDAD.
—
WE HOPE THAT AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY YOU WILL FIND A WAY TO EXPRESS YOUR
SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
8.
(SBU) LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE.
— UNSCR 678 AUTHORIZED MEMBER STATES COOPERATING WITH
KUWAIT TO USE "ALL NECESSARY MEANS" TO IMPLEMENT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS "TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN
THE AREA." UNSCR 678 AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL REMAIN IN FORCE.
— UNSCR 687 MANDATED A CEASE-FIRE, REAFFIRMED ALL EXISTING
RESOLUTIONS, AND ALSO IMPOSED A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE ACCEPTANCE BY IRAQ OF UN
INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING. COMPLIANCE WITH THESE
REQUIREMENTS I S A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF THE RESTORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.
— ON AUGUST 5, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO
SUSPEND ALL UNSCOM AND IAEA INSPECTION ACTIVITY IN IRAQ,
ALLOWING ONLY LIMITED ONGOING MONITORING ACTIVITIES TO
CONTINUE. ON OCTOBER 31, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION
TO CUT OFF ALL COOPERATION WtTH UNSCOM.
— ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ RESCINDED THESE DECISIONS AND
AGREED TO RESUME FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH
UNSCOM AND THE IAEA CONSISTENT WITH RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS
AND THE MOU.
— HOWEVER, IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT
AND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCRS.
— UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, COALITION MEMBERS ARE
ENTITLED TO EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY^GIVEN-BY' UNSCR 678, AND
TO TAKE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE MEASURES (INCLUDING THE
USE OF FORCE) TO COMPEL IRAQ TO TERMINATE ITS BREACH OF THE
—fcrKCKErr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-SECRET
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND THE MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING AND TO ENSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE.
~ FURTHERMORE, MEMBER STATES ARE ENTITLED TO USE FORCE IN
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE BY IRAQ.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY
OF COALITION AIRCRAFT, GROUND FORCES AND NAVAL FORCES
AGAINST IRAQI ATTACK, OR THREAT OF ATTACK.
9. 4&*-ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR UNSC CAPITALS:
— THE AUTHORITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS
BEING SEVERELY TESTED.
— AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WE HAVE A SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN I S NOT ALLOWED
TO PLAY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS I F THEY HAD NO
SIGNIFICANCE.
10.
ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR WARSAW (ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY):
— THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE AS THE
PROTECTING POWER OF US INTERESTS IN IRAQ. .
— I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT YOU WERE INFORMED OF THE
REASONS THIS ACTION HAS BECOME NECESSARY.
— WE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER THE COMING DAYS.
11. -f-ST ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR NATO CAPITALS AND USNATO:
— WE WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE NAC.
— WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE
NATO SYG ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY.
12. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
YY
ASMARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE
PESHAWAR NIACTIMMEDIATE
TIRANA NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET '
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-seeRET
MONROVIA NIACT IMMEDIATE
FREETOWN NIACT IMMEDIATE
KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE
D H NIACT IMMEDIATE
OA
Y
\
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS P IMMEDIATE
M
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUCBACM/USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB I L IMMEDIATE
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FORT BRAGG NC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE M IMMEDIATE
D
FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CBGRET—•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Day A f t e r Strategy
Key Elements f o r Sunday
• We w i l l maintain a robust m i l i t a r y presence i n the area
and a readiness t o use force again. Saddam should
already know t h a t we w i l l use force i f I r a q threatens i t s
neighbors, r e c o n s t i t u t e i t s W D or moves against the
M,
Kurds.
• We w i l l continue t o contain I r a q by enforcing
Nations sanctions and the two no f l y zones.
• We support the containment
c o a l i t i o n of a l l i e s .
the United
o f I r a q w i t h the help of a
• We w i l l support extension o f the o i l f o r food arrangement
so t h a t the humanitarian needs o f the I r a q i people are
assured.
• We w i l l welcome UNSCOM/IAEA's r e t u r n t o I r a q a f t e r
concrete, a f f i r m a t i v e and demonstrated a c t i o n by I r a q
t h a t show t h a t i t w i l l provide the f u l l cooperation that
allow UNSCOM/IAEA t o do t h e i r j o b . The burden i s on I r a q
to demonstrate i t s cooperation. We w i l l work w i t h the
Security Council on the nature of these assurances.
• We w i l l work w i t h the I r a q i opposition t o b r i n g about a
change o f leadership i n I r a q because t h i s i s the only
r e l i a b l e means t o ensure an I r a q t h a t i s w i l l i n g t o l i v e
at peace w i t h i t s neighbors and i t s own people.
• We w i l l be ready t o work w i t h a new leadership i n I r a q
t h a t abides by the UNSCRs t o quickly r e i n t e g r a t e I r a q
i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and ease the economic
burden Saddam has created.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Future o f UNSCOM
Key Elements:
-- We want t o see an e f f e c t i v e UNSCOM r e t u r n t o operations i n
I r a q . But i f i t cannot, we w i l l use our own means t o ensure
t h a t I r a q does not r e c o n s t i t u t e i t s W D or threaten i t s
M
neighbors.
— An e f f e c t i v e UNSCOM would be independent, p r o f e s s i o n a l and
i m p a r t i a l and able t o exercise the f u l l range of i t s mandated
a c t i v i t i e s under the UNSCRs.
— Given the record o f the l a s t year, I r a q must f i r s t
demonstrate i t s seriousness by concrete, a u t h o r i t a t i v e , and
a f f i r m a t i v e actions.
— Once I r a q has taken such steps, UNSCOM w i l l r e t u r n t o
operations i n Iraq f o r a sustained p e r i o d o f work.
— When UNSCOM i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t has received f u l l
cooperation, i t w i l l inform the UNSC; sanction reviews can
resume and there can be a Comprehensive Review.
-- The Comprehensive Review w i l l assess the progress made toward
compliance and set out a workplan f o r r e s o l v i n g issues.
-- When the UNSC judges t h a t I r a q has met i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under
the r e s o l u t i o n s , the UNSC w i l l implement those r e s o l u t i o n s .
— U n t i l then, the needs of the I r a q i people must be protected
by an extended and broad humanitarian program under the o i l - f o r food r e s o l u t i o n s .
P r i o r Conditions f o r the Return o f UNSCOM:
-- An a u t h o r i t a t i v e statement from the highest l e v e l s committing
to f u l l and unconditional access t o a l l s i t e s , information and
documents, and accepting a l l WMD-related r e s o l u t i o n s ;
—
Provision of a l l documents requested by UNSCOM/IAEA;
— An accurate f u l l , f i n a l and complete disclosure of W D as
M,
r e q u i r e d by UNSCR 687;
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�— Adoption o f required WMD-related l e g i s l a t i o n ;
— Optional; termination of sensitive
site
150 km permitted
missile
programs; deadlines
above.
Conditions
modalities;
end to
for any of the
a f t e r UNSCOM Returns:
— A t e s t i n g period w i t h p e r i o d i c reports from UNSCOM/IAEA.
— I r a q must demonstrate to UNSCOM/IAEA s a t i s f a c t i o n i t s f u l l
cooperation.
— When UNSCOM/IAEA report f u l l I r a q i cooperation, then
sanctions reviews are restored; and a Comprehensive Review can
begin.
I f I r a q Refuses t o Cooperate:
—
UNSCOM w i l l maintain o f f i c e s i n New York and Bahrain.
— I t w i l l continue t o c o l l e c t i n f o r m a t i o n on I r a q W D and make
M
p e r i o d i c reports t o the UNSC.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�
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Declassified Documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information Policy
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2013-0792-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on PDD-68 (International Public Information policy). Material includes a memo to National Security Advisor Samuel Berger regarding Worldnet on Iraq and a December 1998 Department of State cable to diplomatic outposts regarding a public reponse if military strikes are launched against Iraq.
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Steven Naplan
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2013-0792-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
Presidential Decision Directive