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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�rHOM U. S'. INFORMATION AGENCY
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3
United States
Infonnation
Agency
Washington, D C. 20S47
USIA
MEMORANDUM FOR:
NSC - Jamie Metzl
(phone: 456-9361; room 302)
FROM:
USIA/EEN - Rot
SUBJECT:
IPI Planning for Kosovo
Earthy
As requested at your August 25 meeting, attached is a draft public-diplomacy plan for supporting
NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a)
getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite
support before and after the action.
You also asked for thoughts on specific action to be taken now. Given the centrality of NATO to
success, we recommend you immediately propose to NATO coordinated planning on an
information campaign to support military action in Kosovo. We must engage them early if our
IPI effort is to be coherent. Because external broadcasting is so important for SerbiaMontenegro, especially for Kosovo, we also recommend you invite a representativefromUSIA's
International Broadcasting Bureau to attend our next meeting. We would be happy to identify the
right person.
Finally, please note the attached plan does not address specific programs and activities. USIA has
the full range of public-diplomacy tools available, from electronic information transmission to well
connected representatives in the field. Once a strategy is approved, we are prepared to move
forward with dispatch.
Attachment: as stated
JL
^
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A KOSOVO IPI STRATEGY
CONTEXT:
West Europe/NATO Members: International public support, especiallyfromNATO allies, is
critical to success of military action in Kosovo. A unilateral American step, or one that is
perceived as mainly American with only grudging allied backing, would engender anti-American
antipathy-the "hegemony factor." Allied support cannot be assumed, but it is obtainable.
Opinion polls demonstrate West European publics believe their governments have not responded
adequately to the crisis in Kosovo. Majorities would support NATO moves to ease the
humanitarian crisis but most would stop short at this time of endorsing military action. Most
would prefer that any action have multilateral approval; when asked directly, a narrow plurality
favors a UN mandate for any NATO intervention. Polling results suggest that if political
leaders explain the need and rationale for NATO action, with or without a UN mandate, they
could win broad public approval.
Balkan Region: USIA survey data shows the polarization in the region and also suggests public
diplomacy could be effective. A mid-August poll in Serbia indicates large majorities support
Serb police actions in Kosovo and oppose any significant change in Kosovo's political status.
But a small majority are willing to grant Kosovo some increased autonomy within Serbia.
About four in ten believe the government should comprornise on Kosovo if it meant some lifting
of sanctions (43%) or in response to NATO's stationing troops in neighboring countries (37%).
Yet as many or more oppose concessions. Significantly, nearly half (46%) would support
compromise to end NATO air strikes, but a third (35%) would oppose. Compared to June, fewer
Belgrade residents are now willing to make concessions when presented with these scenarios.
Despite the recent escalation in violence, Serbs are as likely now (35%) as they were in March to
support a family member going tofightto keep Kosovo part of Serbia. About four in ten would
be opposed (44%). Thus, despite their views on Kosovo, fairly substantial numbers of Serbs
appear willing to support changes if they will forestall/end NATO military action, and this group
would be predisposed to our IPI effort. Obviously, opinion trends can be unpredictable; we must
be alert for a hardening of opinion as a result of any military action.
Russia: We should recognize NATO military action in Kosovo will be a hard sell in Russia, and
could have political implications that affect other U.S. interests. Russia's historic cultural and
political association with the Balkan Serbs will make it particularly difficult to convince the
public that military action against the FRY is justified. Moreover, Russians are already
concerned about NATO enlargement and fear it may be directed at them; thus, they are unlikely
to support NATO action in what is acknowledged to be FRY sovereign territory. Military action
might trigger a sharp official reaction or have domestic political implications affecting our
longer-term interests. That having been said, many thoughtful Russians are uncomfortable with
Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. If and when a decision is made to intervene militarily in Kosovo,
NATO must make the strongest possible case that such action is necessary, and let facts speak
for themselves. Significant support for NATO peace keeping in Bosnia (54% of Moscow elites),
in which Russians participate, gives us a solid starting point.
FH
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STRATEGY:
This set of circumstances presents several diplomacy challenges. Thefirstis to convince our
NATO allies to take a more activist role by bringing along their publics. We can build public,
and thereby government support for NATO military involvement in Kosovo by targeting major
European media with stories about the growing humanitarian problem and potential refugee
crisis at their doorsteps. Emphasizing the growing humanitarian/refugee crisis will also create a~
sense of urgency and a need to act, out of self-interest as well as humanitarian concern. Rallying
allied support is a job specifically for the United States, until NATO decides to act.
Second, we have to make sure that when NATO does decide on a military course, that there is
no question in the international community that this is a joint action. To do that. Secretary
General Solana must have the lead in announcing NATO intentions and actions. All of the allied
nations should speak in support of the NATO action, drawing on common talking points.
NATO's spokesman, Jamie Shea, should be the primary source for information and explanation
"^Yi
about alliance actions. (Obviously, individual countries would speak about their own specific^
military contributions, in addition to those of the alliance as a whole). USG statements should
follow Secretary Solana's initial announcement, and all USG policies and actions thereafter _ J
should be characterized as support to the NATO-led mission.
To prepare for this secondary course of action, the United States should raise the need for a
Kosovo public diplomacy campaign in the appropriate NATO forum. Our Public Affairs Officer
at NATO HQ in Brussels is positioned to create and present an international public diplomacy
plan, with NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, to the NAC for consideration and joint action. The
NAC and the NATO Information Program (NATIP) are the proper institutional vehicles for
launching an allied international public diplomacy effort. The primary target audiences would be
publics within alliance countries (via their major media outlets), as well as publics and elites in
the Balkans, Russia, and other countries with particular interest in the region, especially current
members of the UN Security Council.
Obviously, the Balkans (and the FRY in particular) would be a special focus for public
diplomacy effort. We should stress the same themes that we employ elsewhere (see below), but
emphasize that NATO military action is designed to bring a quick and peaceful resolution of the
humanitarian crisis and push all parties to find a political accommodation that will restore
stability to the region. Currently we have excellent access to local media, but we must also be
prepared for a Milosevic crackdown. In that event we can reach audiences in Serbia and Kosovo
through 'spillover' effect from broadcasters in neighboring countries and via USG (and other)
external broadcasting. VOA Serbian and Albanian have large audiences and VGA's new TV
program "Open Studio" has a large direct-satellite viewership. If programmatically and
technologically feasible, we can increase air time of VOA Albanian and VOA Serbian
broadcasts. If Serbian authorities curtail local Internet service providers, we can disseminate
USG policy messages by fax to local opinion leaders, NGOs, and political opposition.
mmm
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OPERATING PRINCIPLES
1
The IPI message should emanatefromNATO and allied sources as much as possible to
illustrate broad multinational support, vice unilateral U.S. program. A formal NATO
public diplomacy plan is essential to coordinate allied IPI efforts.
The IPI message should be tailored for each major audience grouping (e.g. NATO allies,
non-NATO countries, Russia, the Balkans, etc.) in order to be effective-one size will not
fit all. It should also help solidify currently lukewarm allied support for a military option.
The IPI message should be divided into a pre-ops program (initiated immediately) to
build the rationale for potential NATO action as well as a post-ops package (ready to
implement) to justify and explain the operation.
IPI themes should be grounded in publicly stated policy objectives, consistently echoed
throughout the USG and which are consistent with the NATO public affairs effort.
^
THEMES AND OBJECTIVES
PRE-OPERATION PHASE
THEMES
Belgrade's continued use of force in Kosovo is not acceptable and cannot solve the
situation. Nor can force by the UCK lead to anything but more human suffering.
Continued unrest in Kosovo threatens the stability of the entire region. The international
community has a stake in restoring calm and stability in Kosovo.
The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is desperate and getting worse. The coming winter
will bring intolerable humanitarian crisis.
Diplomacy is the preferred tool to resolve the situation. U.S. and NATO will go the extra
mile tofinda peaceful solution which retains Kosovo as a part of the FRY. All the
nations of the Alliance back this effort, and it has broad international support..
NATO military action may be necessary in the face of continued diplomatic failure. The
U.S. will support military action if it becomes necessary.
Violence must be a last resort; however, military action may speed a diplomatic solution,
as it spurred the parties on at Dayton.
Belgrade's offensive military actions and undemocratic policies are largely responsible
for the desperate humanitarian situation in Kosovo; Belgrade must bear responsibility for
any NATO military response.
OBJECTIVES
Make the case that NATO has exhausted every reasonable diplomatic option to resolve
the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Document what has been done.
Rally allied support for NATO military action as a legitimate, useful, option.
Convince all parties to the conflict in Kosovo that NATO will act if they themselves do
not come to a solution.
Explain to non-members of the Alliance the justification of NATO military action.
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THEMES:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The NATO military option was the only option left to avert further humanitarian disaster.
The U.S., acting in concert with NATO allies, was a full participant in planning and
executing the action.
There can be no military solution to this conflict, but NATO is prepared to use military
action to bring all parties to the table to come to a diplomatic settlement.
European regional stability in general and the huge investment in Bosnian stability in
particular.'are protected by this operation.
Belgrade is largely responsible-its continued offensive in Kosovo made NATO's
military response necessary. However, the UCK also shares responsibility through its
refusal to enter into negotiations.
The NATO operation was lawful, proportionate, and effective in averting further
humanitarian suffering. We can document careful planning to limit casualties/damage
and show how strikes have relieved the humanitarian situation and deterred armed action
against innocent civilians.
NATO and the U.S. are prepared to assist with recovery efforts necessitated by the
operation.
Both Belgrade and the UCK must recognize that further military action by them will not
be tolerated.
OBJECTIVES
•
•
•
•
•
Stop all Serbian and UCK military and security forces' offensive activity.
Make it possible for Kosovo refugees to return to their homes and protect them.
Initiate meaningful negotiations for a peaceful solution.
Preserve regional stability.
Emphasize military operation as a concerted NATO action that has international support.
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09/28/98 79626
DEPUTY SECRETARY:STALBOTT
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EUR:MGROSSMAN EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICK EUR/SCE:MPALMER
P:ERUBIN D:JBASS EUR/RUS:MYOVANOVITCH IO/UNP:CSTOCKBRIDGE
OSD:TWHELAN JCS:
S/S:
S/S-O:
NSC:
EUR
IMMEDIATE USNATO, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE,
LONDON IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, BONN IMMEDIATE+
IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ANATO IMMEDIATE, BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
NODIS
NOT FOR ADS
E.O. 12 958:
DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR
SUBJECT: ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOSOVO
REF: A) SKOPJE 2543; B) USNATO 2522; C) USNATO 2517;
D) VERSHBOW 9/27/98 FAX
CLASSIFIED BY A/S GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
FOR AMBASSADORS/CHARGES
1.
AS A RESULT OF SUSTAINED AMERICAN EFFORT AND
LEADERSHIP, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS DURING THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 21 TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON FRY PRESIDENT
MILOSEVIC AND TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE NEED
TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE THREE TRACKS OF OUR KOSOVO
STRATEGY: HUMANITARIAN, NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING THE
CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. THE ADOPTION SEPTEMBER 23 OF UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 IS A CONCRETE STEP TOWARD
ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO. ONCE THE UNSCR PASSED, WE
AGREED TO A CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 23
WHICH WAS PRODUCTIVE. NATO REINFORCED THE MESSAGE TO
MILOSEVIC ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY AUTHORIZING SACEUR TO ISSUE AN
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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ACTIVATION WARNING (ACTWARN) TO GENERATE THE FORCES
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT A LIMITED AIR OPTION AND A PHASED
AIR CAMPAIGN. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN PORTUGAL
HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.
2 . (X) WE HAVE AT LEAST NINE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO MEET
IN THE COMING DAYS I F WE ARE TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO END THE
VIOLENCE, ALLOW ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM HIS
CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY, MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND
MONITOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. WE WILL NEED TO:
— MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE.ACHIEVED IN THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 2 1 .
— READY NATO BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO- CONDUCT
AIR STRIKES WITHOUT A FURTHER UNSCR
— ENSURE THAT THE UNSC IS WELL BRIEFED AND THAT THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNSCR 1199 I S ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNAMBIGUOUS
— CONSULT CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY, AS WELL AS
THROUGH THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE NATO PJC
— ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
PRESENTED BY H I L L AND "IMPOSED" BY THE CONTACT GROUP
— PREPARE OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES TO ASSIST IN
IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
- - LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO LEVERAGE MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING
THROUGH DRIVING WEDGES BETWEEN HIM AND HIS PUBLIC AND
SECURITY FORCES
— FURTHER DEVELOP HUMANITARIAN RELIEF STRATEGIES FOR BOTH
BEST-CASE AND WORST-CASE OUTCOMES
— BUILD SUPPORT I N CONGRESS AND WITH THE PUBLIC
3. (X) WE WANT TO USE THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BRING THE
VARIOUS STRANDS OF OUR POLICY TOGETHER (INCLUDING WORKING
WITH THE RUSSIANS) SO THAT NATO I S READY (SHOULD POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES DECIDE) TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ACTION "AT A TIME
AND PLACE OF NATO'S CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COME
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN, CONTACT GROUP, AND NATO
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REQUIREMENTS. W DO NOT BELIEVE WE NEED ANOTHER UNSCR, NOR
E
SHOULD WE ASSUME THIS IS ATTAINABLE GIVEN THE LIKELY
OPPOSITION OF RUSSIA. WE DO NOT WANT TO TIE NATO'S
DECISION TOO CLOSELY TO THE UNSYG'S CONCLUSIONS. INSTEAD,
WE WANT TO ESTABLISH NATO'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSESS WHETHER
MILOSEVIC HAS OR HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH LONG-STANDING .
INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. SINCE WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD
PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY, WE WISH TO
AVOID ISSUING A FORMAL ULTIMATUM DURING THE WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO ISSUE A
LATE ULTIMATUM WHICH GIVES MILOSEVIC ANOTHER EXTENDED
PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE AND REQUIRES A FURTHER DECISION BY
EITHER THE NAC OR THE UNSC BEFORE MILITARY ACTION. NATO
SHOULD BE FULLY READY TO ACT, I F NECESSARY, THE WEEK OF
OCTOBER 5 WITH AS FEW ADDITIONAL DECISIONS REQUIRED AS
POSSIBLE. IF, AT THAT TIME, THE NAC DETERMINES THAT
MILOSEVIC REMAINS NON-COMPLIANT IT SHOULD:
— AUTHORIZE SACEUR TO EXECUTE THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AS A
DEMONSTRATION OF NATO DETERMINATION
— SPECIFY THE CONCRETE STEPS THAT NATO EXPECTS BELGRADE TO
TAKE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET NATO/UN/CG REQUIREMENTS
— THREATEN FURTHER STRIKES "AT TIMES AND PLACES OF NATO'S
OWN CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COMPLY
—
ISSUE A STRONG WARNING TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
A.
{tf
ACTIONS REQUESTED:
— FOR USNATO: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION,
WHICH NATO DEMONSTRATED BY MOVING TO ACTWARN, IS VITAL.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD USE THE COMING WEEK TO GIVE ALL
16 ALLIES A SENSE OF CO-OWNERSHIP OF OUR POLITICAL/MILITARY
STRATEGY. HE SHOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE MOVE TO ACTREQ FOR
THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THE
NAC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. NAC AUTHORIZATION
OF ACTREQ ON SEPTEMBER 30, WILL MAKE I T POSSIBLE FOR THE
NAC TO CONSIDER A DECISION TO GO TO ACTORD DURING THE WEEK
OF OCTOBER 5.
WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT NATO'S PRESS LINE AFTER
AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT
FORCES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO POSSIBLE ACTION. SYG SOLANA
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CCESHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE DECISION TO G TO ACTREQ W S BASED
O
A
O THE ALLIANCE'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO
N
COMPLY WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. WHILE
PREVIOUS NATO PRESS GUIDANCE EMPHASIZED THAT ACTWARN WAS
THE LAST STEP IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AND NOT THE FIRST
STEP IN USE OF FORCE, NATO SHOULD N W EMPHASIZE THAT THIS
O
IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. SYG
SOLANA SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NAC PLANS TO AGAIN REVIEW
WHETHER MILOSEVIC AHS COMPLIED WITH THESE DEMANDS W E IT
HN
MEETS NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD D A F O THE FOLLOWING
RW RM
POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESS LINE WITH ALLIES:
-- NATO FORCES ARE N W BEING COMMITTED ACTREQ
O
— MILOSEVIC IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE
~
MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO
CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL
AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1199
~
MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT CEASED HIS OFFENSIVE
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS
SECURITY FORCES
— MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR
DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS
~
W HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT
E
TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO
—
THE NAC WILL REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE
DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS NEXT
MEETING.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW MAY ALSO USE THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON
SEPTEMBER 29 AND THE NAC MEETING O SEPTEMBER 30 TO GIVE
N
ALLIES A SENSE OF OUR THINKING AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1-3.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD ALSO HAVE NATO CONSULT WITH
GECRCT
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RUSSIA THROUGH THE PJC. WE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD SHARE
SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN
KOSOVO WITH THE RUSSIANS IN BRUSSELS. (FYI: AMBASSADOR
MALLOY REVIEWED OVERHEAD ON DESTRUCTION IN KOSOVO WITH
AMBASSADOR CHIZHOV IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24).
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SECURE NAC AGREEMENT TO TASK
NMAS TO REFINE THEIR CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND
OPTIONS TO INCLUDE A POSSIBLE SMALLER ("LIGHT") OPTION. ON
SEPTEMBER 9 THE NAC NOTED OPLAN 10410 AS A "LIVING
DOCUMENT" REQUIRING FURTHER REFINEMENT. AN ADDITIONAL PLAN
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR NATO FORCES I F REQUIRED TO
IMPLEMENT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT EITHER WITHOUT THE NEED
FOR AN AIR OPTION OR AT THE CONCLUSION OF AIR STRIKES. I N
ADDITION, SACEUR SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO BRIEF THE NAC
DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 ON THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND
COMPLIANCE SITUATION IN KOSOVO.
SACEUR'S BRIEFING SHOULD ASSESS COMPLIANCE IN THE FOLLOWING
AREAS:
— CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY
FRY AND/OR SERBIAN FORCES
— WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO OF VJ AND MUP UNITS NOT NORMALLY
BASED IN KOSOVO
— RETURN OF VJ AND MUP UNITS BASED IN KOSOVO TO THEIR
LOCAL GARRISONS
— LIFTING O? EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND
OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO
— FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVERS, AGENCIES AND NGOS ACCREDITED TO THE FRY
~ RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR
HOMES
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIS
QUAD COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR VERSHBOWS
VIEWS ON H W BEST TO INVOLVE PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE
O
EAPC.
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-SB€RETFINALLY, I N KEEPING WITH OUR STRATEGY OF WORKING CLOSELY
WITH THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THEM ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A
CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SEEK A
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON SEPTEMBER 2 9 .
VERSHBOW
SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE SEPTEMBER 30 NAC WILL CONSIDER THE
NEXT STEP IN FORCE GENERATION, AND I T I S POSSIBLE THAT
ALLIES WILL APPROVE ADDITIONAL STEPS.
THE PJC FOLLOWPNG
THE NAC WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER FRANK DISCUSSION
ON NATO PLANNING. WHILE REMAINING GENERAL, VERSHBOW SHOULD
CONVEY TO KISLYAK OUR COMMITMENT TO PUSH AHEAD AT NATO I N
THE DAYS AHEAD.
MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH ALLIES MEASURES NATO MAY TAKE
TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE
NOTIFIED THAT NATO HAS AUTHORIZED ACTREQ FOR THE AIR
OPTIONS AND INFORMED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTREQ
AUTHORIZATION.
IN ADDITION, WHILE NATO WOULD WISH TO
EXTEND A WARNING TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL ONLY PRIOR TO
COMMENCEMENT OF A NATO MILITARY STRIKE, THESE ORGANIZATIONS
SHOULD PRUDENTLY CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION.
WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN
DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE.
I T I S WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT
ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION.
I N INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH
ALLIES MISSION MAY OBSERVE THAT MILOSEVIC'S VIOLATION OF
TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY
MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO
DEMAND ACTION BY NATO.
- - FOR USUN: W NEED THE UNSYG'S REPORT TO CLEAR THE PATH
E
FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ALL OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SODERBERG TO THE
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 26, INCLUDING TRAVEL BY
DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, RENEWED FOCUS ON WAR CRIMES, AND HUMANITARIAN
BRIEFINGS.
WE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY THAT SHE BE
IN CONTACT WITH THE SYG ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF HIS
REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
FOLLOW-UP WITH THE NONPERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS (WHO SEEMED AT THEIR MEETING WITH
THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 24 TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NEED TO
KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC) WOULD BE USEFUL. WE
WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS FROM USUN ON WAYS TO
•CDCRET
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1
-SEGRETINFLUENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE SECRETARIAT AND THE
SC.
— FOR SKOPJE: WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR HILL'S AGREEMENT TO
TRAVEL TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 2 TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP
EXPERTS TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR
HILL SHOULD PRESS FOR SERB COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT AND '
CONTINUE HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED
PRESSURE NOW BEING PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. AT THE SAME TIME,
AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE CONTINUING NEED FOR
MILOSEVIC TO PULL BACK SECURITY FORCES FROM KOSOVO AND MAKE
GOOD ON ALL HIS PREVIOUS PROMISES, E.G. ON HUMANITARIAN AND
INTERNATIONAL ACCESS. WITH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS,
AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE GROUND FOR
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
AN END TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE AND BEGINNING OF TALKS ON
STATUS.
— FOR MOSCOW: WE WANT TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD AS WE
CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL, SPECIFIC STEP.S WE CAN TAKE BEYOND
CONSULTATION (AT THE PJC, FOR EXAMPLE) AND INFORMATION
SHARING. WE MUST MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 PJC
TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH COMMONALITY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR
POSITION AND RUSSIA'S. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED
(1) A "COORDINATING MECHANISM" ON THE GROUND IN BELGRADE
(THEY HAVE SUGGESTED CHRIS HILL LEAD THIS GROUP OF LOCAL
AMBASSADORS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY), (2)
POSSIBLE TROIKA (RUSSIAN/EU/US) MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL
DIRECTOR LEVEL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A
CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TWO WEEKS FROM
SEPTEMBER 23. WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH THE
RUSSIANS AND ACCOMMODATE THEM WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WITHOUT
GIVING THEM A VETO ON NATO ACTION THROUGH THE UNSC OR OTHER
MECHANISMS.
— FOR LONDON, PARIS AND BONN: AT QUAD MEETINGS IN NEW YORK
THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF A POLDIR LEVEL QUAD MEETING IN
EUROPE ON OCTOBER 8 TO REVIEW A FORMAL ULTIMATUM. EVENTS
ARE RUNNING AHEAD OF THAT PLAN. GROSSMAN WILL BE IN
CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO REVIEW
OUR THINKING. HE WILL REPORT TO AMBASSADORS/DCMS ON THESE
CONTACTS. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT/NOT APPROACH YOUR HOST
GOVERNMENT I N CAPITALS UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM GROSSMAN. BUT
-SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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8
�CECRETAMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD/SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE I N CONTACT
WITH HIS QUAD COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OUR
THINKING.
— FOR CONTACT GROUP CAPITALS: WHILE WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT
ATTENDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL
IN TWO WEEKS AS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (AND SUPPORTED BY
MANY OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES), OUR INTENTION I S TO
PROCEED AS WE DID I N ADVANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING
ON SEPTEMBER 24 IN NEW YORK: THAT IS, WE WILL WANT TO CHOSE
SEVERAL SPECIFIC THINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE
ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE/BEFORE WE WOULD ATTEND A CONTACT GROUP
MEETING. I F / I F YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT OUR THINKING ON A
CONTACT GROUP, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE SECRETARY FOUND THE
MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23 TO BE HELPFUL, THAT WE LOOK FORWARD
TO AMBASSADOR HILL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP
ON OCTOBER 2, THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ABOUT ATTENDING
ANOTHER CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, BUT THAT SUCH A
DECISION WOULD NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF
PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC
AND CREATING A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.
5.
WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER
28 TO BUILD SUPPORT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UNSYG ON THE
NEED FOR A CLEAR, TIMELY REPORT TO THE UNSC. WE WILL ALSO
BE EXPLORING FURTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON
MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING ASKING GENERAL CLARK (AS USCINCEUR) TO
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE VJ AS APPROPRIATE. WE WILL ALSO
NEED TO FASHION A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF
SEPARATE MESSAGES.
YY
ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
SKOPJE IMMEDIATE
M S O IMMEDIATE
OCW
WARSAW IMMEDIATE
PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
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AMERICAN EMBASSY BELGRADE
Kneza Mlloa^O^
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
Phone:
Telex:
U/CFax:
(381) (11)645-655
11529 AMEMBAYU
(381) (11) 645-332
FAX COVER PAGE
DATE
:
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sHeer
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TO
Jim, as discussed, here is the revised version reflecting changes flowing
from Dick's discussions with Milosevic and Milutinpvic this afternoon. He
welcomes your further comments ASAP. Best probably to phone to the
Palace secure setup.
All brackets are Milosevic's. Per discussion, we will work to retain all this
language. The whole business of the NATO cell in Pristina is especially
tough as I mentioned. In addition, we will try to add language into die
evacuation paragraph that mentions "military means" or "...assets" or as
fallback "all necessary means" or something comparable. I haven't put it
here because I need to discuss with Dick first, and let him work it in.
Larry Rossin
CLINTON LI
Y PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
AD\S - 083O - H
8 / y 15 KBM
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SITUATION ROOW A
(SUN) 10. i r 98
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F
3
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission
Preambular Lanzuaze
•
Devoted to therespectof the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the
Helsinki Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris
Charter,
•
Considering ii^ particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting
solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the
equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,
• Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and temtorial integrity of all states in the region.
Willing to contribute to the implementation of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN
Security Council,
•
The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,
•
and, The OSCE, on the other,
•
have reached the following AGREEMENT:
Establishment and Terminaiion
•
The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE
Permanent Council pursuant to aresolutionof the United Nadons Security Council
calling upon OSCE to establish the Mission.
•
The FT^Y government has infonned the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its
endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.
•
OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the
Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.
•
OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem
appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most
effectively.
•
KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its
establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the
Verification Mission.
•
The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the Verification
Mission and all its members.
Tr^Anv n r r m r n n v
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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•
In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgment of the
Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the
FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission
members.
•
The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic
entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission
will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its
members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.
•
The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to
work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina andfieldlocations. The
FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide lull cooperation
and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to,
billets,frequencyorfrequencies,visas and documentation, customs facilities,
vehicleregistration,fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and
access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal
procedures.
•
The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, which can
be prolonged upon decision of the UN Security Council.
General Resoonsibilities. Roles and Missions
•
"
^"f" ^
<tf
<
^
To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council ^-<_^X <**j-Gu4Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the <*-—4
OSCE Permanent Council and the United Nations Security Council [and the
Z,^. / / ^ L
NATO Secretary-General). These reports will also be provided to the authorities
of the FRY.
r
•
To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as il
deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities;
•
To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo
authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited
international and non-govemment organizations to assist in fulfilling its
responsibilities;
To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN
Security Council (and the NATO Secretary-General] on areas covered by UN
Security Council Resolution 1199.
Specific Terms of Reference
The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance
of the ceasefire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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(SUN) 10. 1 ' 9 8 1 1 :37/ST. 11 -.SZ/NO. 3760619378 ?
Mission personnel will have fullfreedomof movement and access throughout
Kosovo at all times.
[The Verification Mission will be permitted to visit all military/police
cantonments within Kosovo.]
The Verification Mission will receive weekly informationfromrelevant
FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of
forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of
the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to accompany
police within Kosovo.
The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other
emplacements which influence lines of communication erectedforpurposes other
than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant
authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the reasons
for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed
immediately. The Verification Mission will alsoreceivenotification should
emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than
traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the
removal of any roadblock.
The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border
control activity and movements by units with border control responsibilities
through areas of Kosovo awayfromthe border. The Verification Mission, when
invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, -will visit border control units
and accompany them as they perfonn their normal border control roles.
When invited or uponrequest,the Verification Mission will accompany police
units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.
The Verification Mission will verify the return of displaced persons to their homes,
the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the FRY,
Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian organizations and
NGOs, and the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its
entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs in facilitating
proceduralrequirementssuch as issuance of travel documentation, expedited
customs clearance for humanitarian shipments and radiofrequencies.The Mission
will make suchrepresentationsas it deems necessary toresolveproblems it
observes.
^
As the political settlement defining Kosovo's self-government is achieved and
implementation begins, the Mission Director will receivefromthe OSCE
implementation support in areas such as elections oversight, assistance in the
establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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SITUATION ROOM A
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•
The Ivjission Director will receive periodic updatesfromthe relevant authorities
concerning allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status
of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses.
•
The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as
appropriate, Kosoyo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to detained
persons.
•
The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national
communities and authorities to exchange infonnation and provide guidance on
implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.
The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or
lack of full cooperationfromany side to the OSCE [and NATO Secretary
General].
Conwqpition and FacilUies
•
A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification
Mission requirements, to include a liaison unit with [the NATO support element]
[a small multinational military cell] to be established in Pristina.
•
1800 unarmed verifiersfromOSCE member states will be permitted.
Headquarters and support staff included in this total. [OSCE may include armed
•ecurity personnel in its Mission for own-force protection.]
•
A headquarters in Pristina.
Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission
Director.
A small liaison office in Belgrade.
Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired
interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the
performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.
Field Presence
Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each opstina in Kosovo
with specific areas ofresponsibility,under the Mission Director located in Pristina.
Many opstina coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller
towns/villages in the opstina. The number and location of sub-stations will vary
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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from opstina to opstina, depending on the verification environment and past
conflict situation.
•
The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the
opstina authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other
communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local
authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.
•
The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and
sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the particular
area.
•
Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured
vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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7
�SECRET
Diplomatic Support of 30 Day S t r a t e g i c Plan
Object: Compel M i l o s e v i c t o accept NATO c o n d i t i o n s by
eroding h i s base and denying him defensive t o o l s .
Means:
•
Reinforce m i l i t a r y operations w i t h diplomacy aimed a t
i s o l a t i n g M i l o s e v i c and Serbia; s u s t a i n A l l i e d support
w h i l e managing Russia and Front L i n e States:
Target M i l o s e v i c ' s comfort zone, convince him NATO w i l l keep
r a i s i n g the pressure and o u t l a s t him, t h a t he w i l l not be
able t o d r i v e wedges e i t h e r i n t o NATO o r between NATO and
Russia.
With A l l i e s :
• M a i n t a i n NAC consensus on expanding a i r o p e r a t i o n s ,
i n c r e a s i n g economic pressure;
• Prevent f r e e l a n c e i n i t i a t i v e s / v i s i t s t o Belgrade
EO 13526 1.4d
Prevent d i l u t i o n o f SACEUR's a u t h o r i t y ;
• Gain approval o f V i s i t and Search OPLAN NLT May 3;
• Press forward ground f o r c e reassessments;
• Work t o close d i s t a n c e between A l l i a n c e and Russia
on UNSCR elements.
With Russia:
• Continue h i g h l e v e l c o n t a c t s , U.S. and A l l y , t o
s u s t a i n Russian understanding o f A l l i e d u n i t y and
resolve;
• A f t e r Chernomyrdin Belgrade v i s i t work t o narrow
d i s t a n c e Russia and NATO (Secstate c a l l s t o Ivanov,
Chernomyrdin, coordinated w i t h Quint c a l l s t o same);
• G-8 P o l d i r s discussions t o determine whether a G-8
M i n i s t e r i a l w i l l advance peace, p o s s i b l e G-8 Sherpa
meeting May 2-3 (need agreed t e x t t o ensure Russians
do not take advantage and produce n o t h i n g ) .
With Front Line States:
• Work f o r FLS leaders' statement — a g a i n s t
M i l o s e v i c , f o r Serb people;
o Relieve pressure from Macedonia t o deny M i l o s e v i c
weapon o f refugees:
• Urge NAC a c t i o n t o b u i l d more t r a n s i t camps i n
Macedonia;
OECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
Ao
,3.0330 - n
�GECRET
•
Announce a c c e l e r a t e d evacuation o f Kosovar
refugees t o U.S.A., increased s i z e o f Camp America
(once b u i l d i n g commenced);
• Urge a l l Europeans t o a c t i v a t e and expand t h e i r
previous commitments t o s h e l t e r refugees;
o Shore up FLS by supporting r e l i e f e f f o r t s :
> May 4 - U.S.-EU i n Brussels;
> May 5 G-24 Donor's conference i n P a r i s ;
> May 6 A l b r i g h t - F i s c h e r meeting i n Washington;
> May 7 Coordination conference w i t h 10s i n
Vienna;
> May 1 U.S.-EU a i d c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n Brussels.
Cronies and Family — sow seeds o f f e a r t h a t they w i l l lose
wealth and i n f l u e n c e a f t e r the c o n f l i c t .
•
P u b l i c announcement o f EU and U.S. sanctions
(planned).
Work FLS, Partners, and others t o support Maritime
V i s i t and Search ( i . e . agree t o a l l o w i n s p e c t i o n o f
their vessels);
Work FLS t o a c t i v e l y support EU and U.S. POL
embargoes ( p o s s i b l e : provide support f o r p o l i c e and
customs i n s p e c t i o n s ) ;
Work Europeans ( e s p e c i a l l y Cyprus) t o freeze a l l
Yugoslav assets;
Repeat message a t U.S.-EU meetings o f FRY i n c l u s i o n
i n SEI i f they come t o terms i n Kosovo.
•
o
•
•
VJ l e a d e r s h i p — sow doubt about M i l o s e v i c as commander i n
c h i e f , generate f e a r about personal w e l l being.
o
Continue naming o f VJ commanders i n areas where
a t r o c i t i e s are r e p o r t e d (NAC r e p o r t t o r e i n f o r c e
this?);
o OSCE, NGO r e p o r t s i n May t o h i g h l i g h t a t r o c i t i e s ;
o Work UN t o f o r e s t a l l negative r e s o l u t i o n s / r e p o r t s
on Kosovo t o deny VJ comfort (push back Russian
mischief);
• Move q u i c k l y t o b u i l d camps and evacuate refugees
from Macedonia — denies M i l o s e v i c and VJ key
weapon intended t o d i s t r a c t the A l l i a n c e .
Serb P u b l i c — generate doubts about the f u t u r e o f Serbia
and i t s i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h c i v i l i z e d Europe.
o
Work FLS-Leaders* statement
(see
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
above);
�SECRET
Work with I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizations {e.g. OSCE) to
publicize impact of Milosevic's wars since 1991;
Work public statements to h i g h l i g h t corruption of
current regime.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRCT
U:\Serbia\Kosovo\04-30-99 30 Day Plan
Drafted: EUR/SCE:GHFrowick
Cleared: S/SA:JDobbins
EUR:JSwigert
EUR/TMS:JPardew
EUR/SCE:CHoh
EUR/RPM:PMoon
S/NIS:GKrol
PRM:ENA:NBibbins
P:ERubin
D:JBass
S/P:DHamilton
GECRET
�SECRET
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Purpose: Assess feasibility and potential effectiveness of
additional military and non-military measures to degrade and
undermine FRY's ability to conduct military operations and to
sustain national defense in the next 30 days.
Tools: Overt - use military and non-military measures to
increase the pressure on Milosevic within the context of
Operation ALLIED FORCE. Unconventional - use non-military
measures to target specific high-value/high-payoff economic
targets, which sustain FRY defense and military capabilities.
Constraints: FRY economy redundant, nearly self-sustaining &
capable of operating on near subsistence. FRY funds held offshore and very difficult to disrupt or freeze.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20 3 - osso - n
.1
1
�-SCCREIT
^TESOf"
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Expand economic target set: Conduct air strikes aimed at
economic targets which are primary means of cash
generation controlled by Milosevic and his cronies:
• Mines/mining equipment (Bor, Majdenpak, Trepca,)
• Sartid 1913 steel plant at smederevo
• Gosa heavy industries
• Timber/wood production & Simpo furniture factory
• Beocin & Novi Popovac cement plants
-CCCRCT
�"SECRET
%^^J
^ ^
0
of
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Milosevic/cronies' targets assets, cont'd.
• Serbia's only newsprint factory
• Beopetrol and Jugopetrol facilities
• Customs warehouses and customs facilities in
Belgrade, major cities, and border areas
• Warehouses of large trading firms
• Banks 6 state banks and influential "private" banks
such as Delta bank, Karic bank, commercial bank
• Cigarette factories (imports would be required)
•SCCRET
�Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Economic measures & actions: Impose economic sanctions
to degrade Milosevic's and the VJ's ability to support and
conduct FRY government, military, and business
transactions, which sustain the war economy.
U.S. will expand current U.S. sanctions which result in
practice to a comprehensive trade & investment ban
(expected entry in force May 1):
• Ban on export and reexport of all U.S. goods, technology,
and services to the FRY, including oil, petroleum
products, strategic materials, and dual-use items; special
consideration for humanitarian goods.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-SECRET
�SCCRET
*?k£j»$
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
(Continued)
• Block on all FRY and Serbian government capital and
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction
• Ban on all trade and export financing
• Ban on all imports from the FRY
• Ban on new investment by U.S. persons in the
territory of Serbia
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1
*
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
EU will also adopt sanctions on May 1, but which are less
comprehensive than U.S. sanctions (expected entry in force
May1):
• Export ban on oil, petroleum products, strategic
materials, dual-use items
• Expanded funds freeze on FRY and Serbian government
officials
• Prohibition of provision of export finance by private
sector to existing government-financed export credits
• Extention of the EU investment ban
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
vjLCRET ~
�•SEGRET-
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Widening of scope of prohibition on export of equipment for
international repression
Comprehensive flight ban between FRY and EU countries
(already in place in U.S.)
• Ban on travel of all senior leadership of the FRY and Serbian
governments, including military officials and Milosevic
business cronies and family members (already in place in
U.S.)
rEGR&F-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Q
WW
\^^/
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
Unconventional measures with economic impact: These
actions are directed at specific and discrete economic-military
and economic-psychological targets, which will impede,
disrupt, or complicate Milosevic's and the FRY's ability to
conduct military operations and sustain national defense.
• Hack into FRY and Serbian government and military
computers to disrupt operations of government &
business, including government-economic assets, i.e.,
government command & control links, National Bank of
Yugoslavia, & telephone/fax systems
• Interdict Milosevic's key money managers and disrupt
their travel and ability to transact business
• Discredit Milosevic's money managers, spread rumors of
personal corruption and avarice
0
-SEGRET—
�'SECRET
,<r *
Q
..
WW ,
jflg^/
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Discredit and smear Milosevic's immediate family members,
especially his wife Mira Markovic and her JUL party
• Reduce/eliminate remittances from Serbs living abroad
• Stoke inflation • Spread rumors of inflation & goods shortages
• Print counterfeit dinar
• Swap Montenegrin-held dinars for dollars or deutsch
marks and dump in Serbia
• Artificially increase exchange rate in Republika
Srpska of convertible mark with Yugoslav dinar
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET^
,-::v-,
^
%^jg>^
*>ATES<**
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav
Capabilities
• Suspend or block use of assets abroad of large state firms or
successful smaller ones government does not entirely
control such funds and they buoy production when necessary
• Seize capital equipment abroad, including merchant ships,
JAT aircraft, and other militarily-significant capital assets
• Target and shut down "new" Serbian firms springing up in
neighboring countries, Greece, Cyprus, or even Western
Europe as these will be the sanctions busters following the
pattern of the UN sanctions
• Monitor sanctions-busting routes to consider possible
interdiction of cash and high value goods by air or in
cooperation with neighboring country governments
10
SECRET •
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
Dublin Core
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information
Identifier
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2013-0830-M
Date Available
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9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on PDD-68 (Presidential Decision Directive) and International Public Information. Material includes Department of State cables, outlines, and slides on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Creator
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National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Jamie Metzl
Steven Naplan
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0830-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Presidential Decision Directive
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7a08c3c0a725fa580ba8fb57cd3f8192.pdf
738207459824b2889af79e85024da7ab
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�Serb Compliance with UN Security Council ResolutionE.o. 13526. 3.5(c)
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance
Complying
Comment
Security forces
operations
continue
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease-fire
Improve the humanitarian
situation
c
Relief centers
established but
people too
frightened to
return
Enter a meaningful dialogue
on a political solution
c
Willing to grant
only limited
autonomy
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Security forces
operations
continue
e
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Some incidents
of interference
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free access
for humanitarian organizations
Some people
returning but
many homes
destroyed; some
interference with
relief convoys
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
r
©
No agreement on
a timetable
Some minor
incidents
Provide security for international
monitors
Cooperate with the war crimes
tribunal
e
Has not turned
over suspects or
allowed
investigators to
work without
hindrance
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved iri
mistreatraent of civilians and
destruction of property
©
No charges made
against any
member of
security forces
Seerglo. 13526. 3.S(fc)
364819P65 8118
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Not
Complying
Partial
Compliance Complying
Comment
Cease hostilities and maintain
a cease fire
Security forces have halted offensive
operations in most areas, but shelling
continued near Suva Reka and
Komorane on 30 September.
Cease security forces' actions
affecting civilians and withdraw
forces used in repression of
civilians
Some military and police forces
withdrawing to barracks. Two alleged
massacres on 26 Sept. KDOM reported
stories of continued Serb repression
against refugees and health providers.
Provide security for international
monitors
KDOM reports security is adequate.
Allow freedom of movement for
international monitors
Access improving; KDOM reports no
restrictions on 29 Sep.
Improve the humanitarian
situation
Government aid centers established
and stocked, but fighting still causing
more IDPs.
Facilitate return of refugees and
displaced persons; permit free
access for humanitarian
organizations
Many IDPs reluming, but many unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict areas.
Establish and abide by a timetable
for talks on confidence building
measures and a political solution
Belgrade has expressed willingness to
grant limited autonomy but no
agreement on a timetable.
©
Enter a meaningful dialogue on a
political solution
Belgrade has named a new provisional
government for Kosovo without the
approval or cooperation of the current
shadow government but says it is willing
to work towards elections agreed upon
by all sides.
Cooperate with war crimes
tribunal
Granted visas to one ICTY team member
but denied three others week of 21 Sept.
Bring to justice members of the
security forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians and
destruction of property
No charges reported against any
member of security forces.
e
36SOO0P6S 10-98
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�r .vov. :y.:; c . [ t
iMON'
5E
9. 28 98
! 0 : 5 2 ST. : 0 : 4 b •N'J.
;'5'JOJt>:^r
SECRET
E.D, 13526, 3.5lc)
28 September ]998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
Rwlottetfi;'
y P:
2. Cease security forces'
actions affecting civilians
and withdraw forces used
in repression of civilians
mm
X
,•....:.;. •.„•.. ,..
ConimoDt [
Security forces operations continued up until
Sunday.
X
Security forces operations coolinued up until
Sunday.
• No:
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
#01
3. Provide security for
international montiors
X
Some minor incidents
4. AUowfreedom,of
movetnent for international
monitors
X
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
X
Relief centers established but people too
frightened to return.
X
Some people returning but many homes
destroyedvsotne interference with relief
convoys
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permitfreeaccess
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
Some incidents of interference
Has expressed willingness to grant limited
autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
X
Belgrade says will name a new provisional
government for Kosovotoday-astep which
does not bode well for cooperation between
Belgrade and the current shadow
government
Has not turned over suspects or allowed
investigators to work without hindrance
10. Bring to justice
members of the security
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
X
C I T N LIBRARY P O O O Y
LN O
HTCP
EjO. 13526, 3.5(b)
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�FSOM CMM
3ITE 3B
SECRET
d.O. 13526. 3.5ft)
forces involved in
mistreaunent of civilians
and destnjction of property
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
E.O. 13526. 3.5(c)
O tJ*— IVXJ t
�FROM CMN SITE 3A
(THU) 10. I " 98 1 6 : 59/ST. 1 6 : 58/NO. 3760655465 P
0. 13526, 3.5(:)
1 October 1998
Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199
#04
,
. 5 s l H l | t R W 3 « SBWIWttiUMKi
1. Cease hostilities and
maintain a cease fire
x->
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians:
and withdraw forces used,
in repressioniof civilians
3. Provide security for
international monitors
4. Allow, freedom of
movementfor international
monitors.
KDOM reports security is adequate.
X
9. Cooperate with war
crimes tribunal
10. Bring to justice .
members of the security
forces involved in
mistreatment of civilians
and destruction of property.
GeneralfrceJamof movement except in conflict
artasl
[Access improving; KDOM
reports ho restrictions on 29 Sepi(U)
Government aid centers established andJlOiked,
butfightingstill causing more IDPs\
Orahovac mayor claims new governmental aic
center will soon open in Ratkovac, west of
Orahovac. (U).
Many IDPs returning, but rn<tny unable or
afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access
generally good, except in conflict o/eoif
KDOM reports good freedom of movement for
NGOs and aid organizations on 2? Sep. (U)
5. Improve the
humanitarian situation
6. Facilitate return of
refugees and displaced
persons; permit free access •
for humanitarian
organizations
7. Establish and abide by a
timetable for talks on
confidence building
measures and a political
solution
8. Enter a meaningful
dialogue on a political
solution
KDOM witnessed no fighting on 30 Sept, but
diplomats reported continued shelling near Suva
Reka and Komorane. Inaccessible terrain near
Suva Reka has slowed conclusion of operations.
Militai^aad policeforce's: COTtinu^wtbdrawirig;
lo batracks. Two alleged massacres on 26 Sept.
KDOMreportedstories of continued Serb
repressioniigiainst refugees and health providers.
1
X
Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant
limited autonomy but no agreement on a
limctable.
X
Belgrade has named a new provisional V ,
gbvernment for Kosovo without te approval or
cooperation of the current shadow government
btil says it is willing to work towards Sections
agreed upon by all sides.
Granted visas to one ICTY te»m member but
denied three others week of 21 Sept.
X
No charges reported against any member of
security forces.,
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
EjO. 13526, 3 ^ c )
SECRET
4
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SECRET CODEWORD
July 19, 1999
1500 EDT
KOSOVO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY # 199
Diplomatic Developments
Kosovar Albanian officials have developed a plan to cover all of Kosovo with radio-television
transmitters at a cost of $60 millionl
E.O. 13526. 1.4(c)
Jul 99
ythe station would not serve any political party, group or organization. (S€)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information Policy
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0830-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on PDD-68 (International Public Information policy). Several charts from 1998 listing Serbian compliance with a U.N. Security Council resolution and a July 1999 White House Situation Room summary are included.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs
Jamie Metzel
Steven Naplan
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0830-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Presidential Decision Directive