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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documentsfromthis Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�lUUL IDLl'JUJLL
NATIONAL SECURITY
6506
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
September 2 9 , 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
RICHARD CLAR^J^^/^
FROM:
JAMIE METZLJ
SUBJECT:
D e s i g n a t i o n s Of F o r e i g n T e r r o r i s t
To Prevent F u n d r a i s i n g
Organizations
A t t a c h e d a t Tab 1 i s a memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n o f t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s under t h e A n t i t e r r o r i s m
and E f f e c t i v e Death P e n a l t y A c t o f 1996.
The A c t a l l o w s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t o d e s i g n a t e f o r e i g n
o r g a n i z a t i o n s as t e r r o r i s t i f t h e i r a c t i v i t y t h r e a t e n s t h e
t
s e c u r i t y o f U.S. n a t i o n a l s o r t h e nai o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n t h e past year and a h a l f , we have c o o r d i n a t e d
e f f o r t s t o compile t h e records neces s a r y f o r t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n ,
which we w i l l be p r e s e n t i n g t o Congr ess on October 1. The
d e s i g n a t i o n f i l e s w i l l then be submi t t e d t o t h e Federal R e g i s t e r
on
November 10 absent Congressional opp o s i t i o n , which we do n o t
anticipate.
R o l l Out
I t i s t h e unanimous recommendation o f CSG t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t n o t
be i n v o l v e d i n announcing these d e s i g n a t i o n s . The process has
taken a year and a h a l f t o reach f r u i t i o n and we have been
c r i t i c i z e d f o r t a k i n g so l o n g and f o r s e i z i n g so few assets
under o u r p r e v i o u s IEEPA e f f o r t . We a r e a l s o h e s i t a n t t o p u t t h e
P r e s i d e n t o u t f r o n t on t h i s i s s u e because l i t t l e w i l l appear t o
happen a f t e r t h e announcement o f d e s i g n a t i o n . No a r r e s t s w i l l be
made o r assets b l o c k e d f o r months a f t e r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n s a r e
announced.
The r o l l o u t w i l l b e g i n w i t h a c l a s s i f i e d n o t i f i c a t i o n o f
Congress on October 1. The seven day p e r i o d f o r Congress t o
review t h e d e s i g n a t i o n s w i l l be extended u n t i l October 10, t o
take account o f t h e Jewish h o l i d a y s . I f you agree w i t h t h e CSG
•CONFIDENTIMJ
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reconunendation, t h e S t a t e Department w i l l then announce t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n s , do t h e background b r i e f i n g w i t h Treasury and
J u s t i c e , and n o t i f y U.S. overseas p o s t s .
Concurrence by:
W i l l i a m Davis, A l a n Kreczko
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n and f o r w a r d t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t .
Attachments
Tab 1 Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab 2 L i s t o f Designated O r g a n i z a t i o n s
CONriDDNTIA'fi?
w (_ x
N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
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�CONFIDENTIAL.
NATIONAL SECURITY
6506
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Designations o f Foreign T e r r o r i s t
to Prevent T h e i r F u n d r a i s i n g
Organizations
The A n t i t e r r o r i s m and E f f e c t i v e Death P e n a l t y A c t o f 1996, which
you s i g n e d on A p r i l 24, 1996 a u t h o r i z e s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ,
i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury and t h e
A t t o r n e y General, t o d e s i g n a t e f o r e i g n o r g a n i z a t i o n s as
t e r r o r i s t i f t h e i r t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y threatens the s e c u r i t y o f
U.S. n a t i o n a l s o r t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
D e s i g n a t i o n w i l l enable us t o take a c t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t
f u n d r a i s i n g i n t h e U.S.
Congress must be n o t i f i e d o f d e s i g n a t i o n seven days b e f o r e t h e
d e s i g n a t i o n i s o f f i c i a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Federal R e g i s t e r .
Upon n o t i f i c a t i o n , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury may r e q u i r e
U.S. f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t r o l l i n g assets o f a d e s i g n a t e d
o r g a n i z a t i o n t o freeze a l l o f the organization's assets.
Persons who k n o w i n g l y p r o v i d e support o r resources t o a
t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n o r attempt o r c o n s p i r e t o do so, can be
f i n e d , i m p r i s o n e d f o r up t o t e n years, o r b o t h .
Designated
o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i l l have t h i r t y days from t h e date o f p u b l i c a t i o n
t o seek j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e U.S. Court o f Appeals f o r t h e DC
Circuit.
The departments have developed t h e e v i d e n t i a r y records on
t h i r t y - o n e groups.
The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , A t t o r n e y General,
and S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury have now s i g n e d o f f on t h e
r e q u i r e d documents. The groups i n c l u d e Hamas, H i z b a l l a h , Kahane
Chai, and IRA. ( F u l l l i s t a t Tab)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDEM'l IAL'
C l a s s i f i e d by: Samuel R. Berger
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
D^ssi^-o^LIOT LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1 DBITT IAL
We do not expect any immediate a r r e s t s because only
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to designated t e r r o r i s t organizations made a f t e r
p u b l i c a t i o n i n the Federal Register can be considered
v i o l a t i o n s . Banks w i l l freeze known assets of these
organizations. As these t e r r o r i s t organizations probably do not
maintain accounts i n t h e i r organization's name, we do not
a n t i c i p a t e the d o l l a r value of such assets to be great.
The r o l l o u t of these designations w i l l begin w i t h a c l a s s i f i e d
n o t i f i c a t i o n of Congress on October 1. The seven day p e r i o d f o r
Congress t o review the designations w i l l be extended u n t i l
October 10, to take account of the Jewish holidays. The State
Department w i l l then announce the designations, do the
background b r i e f i n g w i t h Treasury and J u s t i c e , and n o t i f y U.S.
overseas posts.
The announcement of these designations w i l l deter f u n d r a i s i n g on
behalf of the designated groups and demonstrate again our
commitment to combating t e r r o r i s m . I t w i l l strengthen our hand
i n e f f o r t s t o persuade other governments to crack down on
t e r r o r i s t f u n d r a i s i n g . We are developing an appropriate press
strategy to underscore t h i s message.
COHFIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�L i s t o f Foreign T e r r o r i s t Organizations f o r Designation
Abu N i d a l O r g a n i z a t i o n
Abu Sayyaf Group
Armed I s l a m i c Group
Aum S h i n r i k y o
Euzadi Ta Askatasuna
Democratic F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e - Hawatmeh
Faction
Hamas
Harakat u l - A n s a r
Hizballah
Gam'a a l - I s l a m i y y a
I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n Army
Japanese Red Army
al-Jihad
Kack
Kahane Chai
Khmer Rouge
K u r d i s t a n Workers' P a r t y
L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s o f Tamil Eelam
Manuel Rodriguea P a t r i o t i c Front D i s s i d e n t s
Mujahedin-e Khalq O r g a n i z a t i o n
N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Army
P a l e s t i n e I s l a m i c Jihad-Shaqaqi F a c t i o n
P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Front - Abu Abbas F a c t i o n
Popular F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e
Popular F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f P a l e s t i n e - General Command
R e v o l u t i o n a r y Armed Forces o f Colombia
R e v o l u t i o n a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n o f 17 November
R e v o l u t i o n a r y People's L i b e r a t i o n P a r t y / F r o n t
R e v o l u t i o n a r y People's S t r u g g l e
S h i n i n g Path
Tupac Amaru R e v o l u t i o n a r y Movement
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�COITFIDENTear
NATIONAL
SECURITY
1109
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 14, 1998
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
ERIC SCHWARTZ " ^ T ^
FROM:
JAMIE METZL^
SUBJECT:
Worldnet on I r a q - Tuesday, February 17, 1998
11:00am-12:00pm, OEOB 489
You have agreed t o a Worldnet s a t e l l i t e i n t e r v i e w w i t h
j o u r n a l i s t s from P a r i s , C a i r o , Ankara, and Riyadh on Tuesday i n
the OEOB s t u d i o . This i n t e r v i e w w i l l be broadcast s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
at t o i n v i t e d groups U.S. Embassies and on t e l e v i s i o n networks
w o r l d w i d e . The t o p i c i s "U.S. P o l i c y Towards I r a q . "
Format: The format o f t h e i n t e r v i e w w i l l be s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f
a press conference. The program w i l l begin w i t h a b r i e f opening
comment by t h e Worldnet moderator, f o l l o w e d by a s h o r t video on
U.S. e f f o r t s t o achieve a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n t o t h e weapons
inspection issue.
A f t e r t h e v i d e o , t h e host w i l l i n t r o d u c e you and ask you a
s c r i p t e d q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e U.S. p o s i t i o n towards I r a q . Tony
B l i n k e n i s p r e p a r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n and i t s answer, and w i l l
p r o v i d e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t o you s e p a r a t e l y . F o l l o w i n g t h i s
response, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n P a r i s , Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh w i l l
each r e c e i v e one opening q u e s t i o n , f o l l o w e d by a 12-minute time
b l o c k f o r each s i t e .
Questions and comments from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l i s t s a r e
l i v e and u n e d i t e d . The broadcast i s one-way video, two way
a u d i o . This means t h a t you w i l l hear b u t n o t see t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s . A l l questions w i l l be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
t r a n s l a t e d f o r you.
Based on r e c e n t Worldnet i n t e r v i e w s on t h i s s u b j e c t , you s h o u l d
expect c h a l l e n g i n g and p r o v o c a t i v e q u e s t i o n s . I t i s a l s o
expected t h a t t h e nature o f q u e s t i o n s may vary a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
n a t i o n a l i t i e s o f t h e i n t e r v i e w e r s . USIA has attempted t o p r e d i c t
coNriDDiTTifi[jNT0N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
f m
E
- -
a
1 3 5 2 6
�as b e s t i t can what type o f q u e s t i o n s might be asked by each
geographic b l o c . This i n f o r m a t i o n i s summarized a t Tab A.
Comment on Themes: USIA and CIA a n a l y s t s t e l l us t h a t t h e "man
i n t h e s t r e e t " i n the Arab w o r l d has l i t t l e p e r s o n a l sympathy
f o r Saddam, and p r o b a b l y r e c o g n i z e s him f o r what he i s .
However, Arab people are v e r y c r i t i c a l o f U.S. p o l i c y f o r two
reasons:
f i r s t , they see t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n o f
Saddam has h u r t the I r a q i people; and second, they b e l i e v e t h a t
n e i t h e r c o n t i n u e d i s o l a t i o n nor a U.S. bombing campaign w i l l
change m a t t e r s - i . e . , n e i t h e r w i l l remove Saddam from power.
Thus, they see f o r c e as o n l y c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e s u f f e r i n g o f
the I r a q i people. You w i l l have t o address b o t h these i s s u e s :
f i r s t , by d e s c r i b i n g our concern about t h e I r a q i people, and
second, by e x p l a i n i n g why our p o l i c y toward I r a q (even i f i t
doesn't r e s u l t i n the immediate e l i m i n a t i o n o f Saddam) serves
the r e g i o n . The key p o i n t s o f our i n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i c Diplomacy
e f f o r t are summarized a t Tab B.
Concurrence by:
Tony B l i n k e n , Joe Marty
Attachments
Tab A
Background Notes on I n t e r v i e w e r s and A n t i c i p a t e d
Areas o f D i s c u s s i o n
Tab B
Summary o f U.S. P u b l i c Diplomacy Themes
TOMFTPFNTT ATr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
August 27, 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR MARNIE GIRSHON
FROM:
JAMIE METZ^^.
SUBJECT:
White Paper on I r a q
Thank you v e r y much t o you and your c o l l e a g u e s f o r p r o d u c i n g t h e
e x c e l l e n t White Paper e n t i t l e d "Facts on I r a q ' s H u m a n i t a r i a n
S i t u a t i o n . " I sent a copy t o Sandy Berger who was v e r y impressed
and p r a i s e d t h e document h i g h l y . This White Paper i s a
s i g n i f i c a n t and much a p p r e c i a t e d c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o u r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n campaign on I r a q .
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r on f u t u r e p r o j e c t s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
13 Fcbruarv 1998
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
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�Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs
programs while wearing down the will of the Security
Council to maintain sanctions.
Overview
The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn's biological,
chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council
and accepted by Iraq following the war to eliminate
and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further,
the UN established sanctions to prevent the purchase
of equipment and materials needed to reconstitute
Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find
remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.
On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the
world's experts conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise
has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to
resume development and production of WMD. They
believe Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological
munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.
This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued
obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring
activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of
"sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and
Saddam's efforts to end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad
has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is
making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has
also enhanced indigenous capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy
in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged; he is
actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring
activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of operational
missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads
would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries
and US military forces in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems.
Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military
purposes against Iran and to suppress rebellious segments of his population in Kurdish-held areas.
Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and
the IAEA
Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM
inspections and has taken an increasingly hard line
since March 1996 when the UN began inspecting
security facilities suspected of concealing WMDrelated documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq admitted (after
Husayn Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former head
of Iraqi military industries, defected in August 1995)
that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the UN:
• Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15 days
after the Security Council enacted the resolution in
1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations
covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile
programs.
• Baghdad has modified each declaration several
times to accommodate data uncovered by UNSCOM
and the IAEA and has provided new information
only when confronted with direct evidence. For
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�The Husayn Kamil Connection
as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn—Saddam's second son—has assumed many of the responsibilities for
concealing the proscribed programs. In addition,
many of the leading scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:
Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law,
was the preeminent military industries' official and a
fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan
in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil
took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he
oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued
Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the
Al-Husayn missile—an indigenous modification of the
Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil
directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological
weapons on Iranian prisoners of war:
• After the Gulf war. Kamil—first from his position as
Minister of Defense and then as the director of the
Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization—led Iraq's
efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.
• Husayn Kamiis influence over the Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible
for using Saddam's security services—of which he
was a member in the early 1980s—to hide proscribed
materials and documents from the United Nations.
• Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi—who serves officially
as a presidential adviser and is a leading official in
Iraqi relations with UNSCOM—was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a
doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and nonconventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi
received rare public praise from Saddam for his role
in the development of the Al-Husayn missile.
• Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur—currently
Minister of Culture and Information—is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former head of its
nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close
associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally
serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA. He lead an
Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in
October 1997.
• Jafar Dia Jafar is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear
scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now
officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his
position—unlike that of Sadi—appears to be largely
nominal.
• Dr. Rihab Taha is the leading official in charge of
Iraq's biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum
toxin and directed testing on animal subjects. Taha
is also politically well-connected—she is married to
the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps
direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.
Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program
did not die with his defection and subsequent murder.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�/50 boxes of documents presented to UNSCOM at a chicken farm in Iraq in August 1995.
example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to
the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial
submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to
date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.
Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from
inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996,
mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive" and the
inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has
applied the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities—
on one occasion security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit UN
access to Special Republican Guard garrisons that are
responsible for executing the highest priorities of
Saddam's inner circle:
Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of
reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected Iraqi
officials removing documents and material from
buildings and even burning documents to prevent
them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out after
their entry was delayed for several hours.
Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's
ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country
in November 1997.
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�• Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escorts have endangered UN helicopter
flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot
and grabbing the flight controls. Security guards
have harassed inspectors on the ground.
Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of
cooperation while working hard to conceal essential
information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD
programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided
incomplete documentary evidence to support its
claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed
nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant
information was buried within a massive volume of
extraneous data, all of which was intended to create
the appearance of candor and to overwhelm
UNSCOM's analytic resources:
• For example, Iraq released detailed records of how
many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but
it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it
destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering
biological and chemical agents.
• UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of
the documentary material and concluded that,
despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not
release its most important WMD-related documents.
Biological Weapons
No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August 1995,
when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection,
the existence of an offensive biological warfare (BW)
capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin (19,000 liters), and aHatoxin (2,200 liters)
Remains of chemicallbiological-warfare-agcnt-filled
missile
warheads secretly destroyed by Iraq.
after years of claiming that they had conducted only
defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing
BW-filled munitions—including 25 Scud missile warheads (five anthrax; 16 botulinum toxin; four aflatoxin). 157 aerial bombs, and aerial dispensers—
during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq
acknowledged researching the use of 155-mm artillery
1
2
1
3
Inhalation of anthrax spores—an infectious dose is about 8,000
spores or less than one-millionlh of a gram—is fatal within five to
seven clays nearly 100 percent of the time.
2
Botulinum toxin, which would most likely be dispensed as an
aerosol, can kill in as little as 24 to 36 hours by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.
' AHatoxin is a liver carcinogen that can kill years after ingestion.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in
the summer of 1996:
• Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate
civilian facility designed to produce single-cell
proteins and biopesticides.
• Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of
Baghdad) and the security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a
BW production facility from the outset.
Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support
claims that it destroyed all of its B W agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler
stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration, submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely
credible account of Iraq's biological weapons
program":
• In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on
Ricin, but did not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced
the biological agent Ricin.
4
Destroyed chemicallbiological-warfare-agent-filled
aerial bombs.
R-400
shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol
generators to deliver BW agents:
• UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production
equipment, seed stocks, and growth media claimed
by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
• UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its
production of biological agents and could be holding
back such agents, which are easily concealed.
• Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a smallscale BW program at known facilities that cunently
produce legitimate items, such as vaccines and other
pharmaceuticals. Without effective UN monitoring,
Baghdad could probably begin production within a
few days. For example, Iraq can convert production
of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed
material.
Chemical Weapons
Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and against its
own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi forces
4
Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two (lays of
inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 500 micrograms.
Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in
1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of
BW agents at the facility between 1989 and 1990.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Date
Area Used
Type
Approximate
Casualties
Target
Population
August 1983
Hajj Umran
Mustard
fewer than 100
Iranians/Kurds
October to November 1983
Panjwin
Mustard
3,000
Iranians/Kurds
February to March 1984
Majnoon Island
Mustard
2.500
Iranians
March 1984
A l Basrah
Tabun
50 to 100
Iranians
March 1985
Hawizah Marsh
Mustard/Tabun
3.000
Iranians
February 1986
A l Faw
Mustard/Tabun
8.000 to 10,000
Iranians
December 1986
Umtn ar Rasas
Mustard
reportedly in the thousands
Iranians
April 1987
A l Basrah
Mustard/Tabun
5,000
Iranians
October 1987
Sumar/Mehran
Mustard/nerve agents
3,000
Iranians
March 1988
Halabjah
Mustard/nerve agents
reportedly in the hundreds
Iranians/Kurds
1
" Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have cauased some of the
casualties.
While precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have
received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of numerous Iraqi
chemical attacks against civilian villages in the 1987 and 1988 time
frames—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to both
the Iranian and Turkish borders.
5
delivered chemical agents (including Mustard agent
and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun'') in aerial
bombs, aerial spray dispensers, 122-mm rockets, and
several types of artillery, both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical
munitions and had a major production capacity.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than
40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000
empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters
of chemical precursors, and eight different types of
delivery systems—including ballistic missile warheads—in the past seven years. Following Husayn
Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:
7
• Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX
than it previously admitted. Baghdad acknowledged,
despite previous claims that it only conducted
research, that it had conducted pilot production of
about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
• Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons
before the Gulf war—an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life
of chemical agents.
• Perfected techniques for the large-scale production
of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-term
storage.
UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small
stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and production
5
Mustard is a blister agent used primarily to cause medical casualtics by blistering the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is extremely persistent and presents a long-term hazard.
* Sarin and Tabun are G-serics nerve agents that act within seconds of exposure and can be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. These agents kill by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.
Both are relatively nonpersistcnt and present more of a vapor hazard than a skin hazard.
7
VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to—but more
advanced than—G-series agents, in that it is far more persistent.
VX presents a far greater skin hazard and would be used for longterm contamination of territory.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�UNSCOM inspector in protective suit opening filling plug for sample-taking inside a
ScudlAl-Husayn chemical-agent-filled missile warhead.
equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its
CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much
as 200 metric tons of chemical precursors. 70 Scud
warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled
munitions has not been verified:
• Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW
production. In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors,
Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production
within a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin
within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production
levels—including VX—within two or three years.
• Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it
once used to produce chemical agents and has the
capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW
production.
Ballistic Missiles
Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war
that included 819 operational Scud-B missiles (300km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union,
an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and
modify its warhead (for example, the Al-Husayn with
a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km
range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and
indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq
also had programs to indigenously produce long-range
missiles (such as the Condor) that never entered the
production phase:
• UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction
of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Handling of leaking 122-mm rockets filled with the chemical nerve agent sarin prior to destruction.
30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and
related equipment.
• UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction
of" only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile
launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by
being fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars or used in
static tests and training.
Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and
launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all
but two of the original 819 Scud missiles imported
from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately
explained the disposition of important missile
components that it could not produce on its own and
may have removed before destruction. There are still
many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile
programs:
• Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of
missiles by integrating guidance and control systems
it concealed with indigenously produced parts.
• Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes,
and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has not
verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.
• Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts
through clandestine procurement networks. In 1995,
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�UNSCOM supervision of the destruction of ScudlAl-Husayn long-range missiles.
Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment
(gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted
under UNSCOM questioning that it received a
similar shipment earlier in 1995.
research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions
were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps within one year:
• In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously
undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile
launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf
war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major
elements of missile systems from UNSCOM
inspectors.
• Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs—within the UN-allowed 150-km range
limit—serve to maintain production expertise within
the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently
flight-tested the Al-Samoud, which UNSCOM
describes as a scaled down Scud, successfully. Iraq
probably will begin converting these efforts into
long-range missile programs as soon as sanctions
are lifted.
Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger,
longer range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered
numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage
systems and clustered engine designs, that theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have
uncovered evidence that Iraq has continued missile
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�111
fa
ScudlAl-Husayn missile launchers before destruction.
Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham—currently used to support its
authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication
buildings at the facility are spacious enough to
house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
linked (o a ballistic missile project that was the
intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's
defection in 1995, Iraq retreated from its longtime
claim that its nuclear program was intended only to
conduct research:
Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and administrative
facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent
size and capacity.
• Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium
enrichment techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
• Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991
by using IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.
Nuclear Weapons
Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was focused on
building an implosion-type weapon. The program was
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�'•'i
v
', ''
•
.
:
• •
Calutrons for uranium enrichment secretly destroyed by Iraq.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's
nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in acquiring
or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:
• Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation of its
nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists
may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that
would reduce the time required to produce a weapon
should Iraq acquire suflicient fissile material.
weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and
intelligence services in obtaining external assistance
and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the technical
achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.
Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction
between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile
program.
• Iraq continues to withhold signilicant information
about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement,
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Appendix A
Iraqi Biological Warfare Program
BW Agent Production Amounts
11
B W Agent (Organism)
Declared Concentrated
Amounts
Declared Total
Amounts
Comments
Anthrax
(Bacillus anthracis)
8.500 liters
(2,245 gallons)
85.000 liters
(22,457 gallons)
UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
three to four times more than the declared amounts, but
is unable lo contirm.
Botulinum toxin
(Clostridium botulinum)
19,400 liters
380,000 liters
(lOx and 20x concentrated) (100.396 gallons)
(5,125 gallons)
Gas Gangrene
(Clostridium perfringens)
340 liters
(90 gallons)
3,400 liters
(900 gallons)
Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
unable to confirm.
AHatoxin
(Aspergillus flavus and
Aspergillus parasiticus)
N/A
2,200 liters
(581 gallons)
Production amounts and time frame of production
claimed by Iraq do not correlate.
Ricin
(Castor Bean plant)
N/A
10 liters
(2.7 gallons)
Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is
unable to confirm.
Botulinum Toxin
Aflatoxin
Comments
UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually
two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable
to confirm.
BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems
Delivery System
Anthrax
5
R-4()0 aerial bombs
A i r c r a f t aerosol spray tanks
F-l Mirage modihed fuel drop tank
16
4
UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral
destruction of these 25 warheads due to
conflicting accounts provided by Iraq.
50
Missile warheads
Al-Husayn (modified Scud B)
100
7
Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of
157 bombs, but U N S C O M is unable to
confirm this number. U N S C O M has
found the remains of at least 23.
Iraq claims to have produced four, but
may have manufactured others.
4
1
BW Agent Growth Media Media
Quantity Imported
Unaccounted For Amounts
B W Agent Growth Media
31,000 kg
(68.200 lbs)
3,500 kg
(7,700 lbs)
* Total refers to amount of material obtained from the production
process, while concentrated refers to the amount of concentrated
agent obtained afterfinalfiltration/purification.The concentrated
number is the amount used to till munitions.
''Media refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the
growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Appendix B
Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program
CW Agent Stockpiles
CW Agent
Chemical Agents
Declared by Iraq
Potential CW Agents Based on Comments
Unaccounted Precursors"
VX
at least 4 metric tons
200 metric tons
G-Agents (Sarin)
Mustard
100 to 150 metric tons
500 to 600 metric tons
200 metric tons
200 metric tons
Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil's
defection in 1995.
Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
CW Delivery Systems
Estimated Numbers
Before the Gulf War
15 to 100
Delivery System
Missile Warheads
-Al Husayn (modihed Scud B)
Rockets
100,000
Aerial Bombs
Artillery Shells
Aerial Spray Tanks
16,000
30,000
unknown
Munitions
Unaccounted For
45 to 70
15,000 to 25,000
Comments
b
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 30 warheads.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nearly 40,000
chemical munitions (including rockets, artillery, and
aerial bombs) 28,000 of which were filled.
2,000
15,000
unknown
"These estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary
meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is
concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq may also retain a
small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to
quickly resume CW production at known dual-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides.
UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of some 45 different types of
CW precursors (1,800.000 liters of liquid and 1,000,000 kilograms of
solid).
b
AII of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The
numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during
the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of
these warheads.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Appendix C
Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program
Item
Comments
Initial Inventory
Soviet-Supplied Scud Missiles
SI9
(includes Iraqi modifications of the
Scud: the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km
and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km)
UNSCOM accepts Iraqi accounting for all but two of the original
819 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq has not
explained the disposition of major components that it may have
stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some
Iraqi claims—such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests—are not
believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully
account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest that Iraq
retains a small missile force.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Missiles
Unknown
Iraqi-Produced Scud Warheads
120
Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced/procured and tested all major subcomponents.
Iraq claims all 120 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the
destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional
CW/BW warheads beyond those currently admitted.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Airframes
2
Iraqi-Produced Scud Engines
80
Soviet-Supplied Missile Launchers
11
Iraqi-Produced Missile Launchers
Iraq claims testing two indigenous airframes in 1990. It is unlikely
that Iraq produced only two Scud airframes.
Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests—
53 of which failed quality controls—are unverifiable and not
believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue.
8
UNSCOM doubts Iraq's claim thai it unilaterally destroyed five
launchers. The Soviet Union may have sold more than the declared
11 launchers.
Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers.
17
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�For Internal Use Only
IRAQ CORE POINTS
What We Were Seeking
•
From the onset of this crisis, the fundamental goal of the U.S. has been to assure that
UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites, as called for by UN
Security Council resolutions. Diplomacy, backed by the threat to use overwhelming force if
required, has moved us forward toward achieving that goal.
Iraq precipitated this crisis by trying to avoid its obligations to UN Security Council
resolutions. It attempted to dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could
hold inspections, the manner in which inspections would be conducted and the length of time
they would continue. Iraq's effort failed.
What We Have Achieved
•
The government of Iraq has made a written commitment to provide immediate, unrestricted,
unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all suspect sites. If fully implemented,
this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fiilfill its mission:
-First, to find and destroy all of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
--Second to find and destroy the missiles to deliver these weapons; and,
-Third, to institute a system for long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq does not build more.
•
This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country, including eight so-called
"Presidential sites" that now have been precisely delineated, as well as so-called sensitive
sites which up to now Iraq had tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of
these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines for UNSCOM to complete its
work. In short, for the first time, Iraq explicitly has committed to open every site throughout
the country to the weapons inspectors.
•
For the "Presidential Sites" the agreement allows diplomats to accompany the UNSCOM
inspectors. That is acceptable if the inspectors are free to conductrigorousand professional
inspections. All other sites will be open to inspection under existing UNSCOM procedures.
•
The Secretary General has assured us UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in charge of
UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has also made that clear to the Iraqis.
Questions About the MOU
•
There are issues which still need clarification, notably with respect to the inspection
procedures for the eight "Presidential Sites." We have made clear that we expect all aspects
of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that UNSCOM be permitted to
carry out its inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•
We have received important assurances from Secretary General Annan that clarify aspects of
the MOU, notably with respect to the eight "Presidential Sites":
=> UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their independence.
=> The Special Team for the Presidential Sites will be part of UNSCOM.
=> The team leader will be an UNSCOM commissioner who is expert in Iraqi WMD,
chosen by the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler.
=> The Special Team leader will report to Chairman Butler.
=> The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM retaining operational control.
=> Procedures for these inspections will be developed by UNSCOM and SGY, not Iraq.
=> As has been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to the
Security Council through the Secretary General.
What Next
UNSC Resolution
•
We support a resolution that will make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments
would have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful, but not necessary, signal
from the international community.
Test and Verify
•
In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment.
Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would have serious consequences.
•
The United States will keep its military forces in the Gulf at a high state of preparedness
while we see if Iraq lives up to the commitment that it has signed. The United States remains
resolved to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full compliance with its commitment
to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.
The Bottom Line
•
Iraq's commitments are an important step forward - but only if matched by Iraq's
compliance. As the President said, "the proof is in the testing".
•
This agreement can be a win/win: either Iraq implements the agreement — or it does not. If
it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access
to all suspect sites in Iraq, with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete
their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger
position internationally than ever. After two crises provoked by Iraq in four months, the
international community will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�INITIALS
APPR: SEC
DRAFT: AJB
CLR 1: TRP
CLR 2: MSI
CLR 3: KAK
CLR 4: S/S-0
DDCRDT
NEA/NGA:AJBARRY:AJB (ZALDAC2.DOC)
12/09/98 7-6366
THE SECRETARY
P:TRPICKERING
S/S:KAKENNEY NEA:INDYK
S/S-O:
S, D, P, M C, E, G, H, L, T SS, SSO, CMS, TF1-3, A, CA,
,
DS, FMP, M/DGP, M/FLO, M M D NEA, S/CT, PM, PA, L
/E,
NIACT IMMEDIATE ALDAC, SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM NIACT
IMMEDIATE, BUJUMBURA NIACT IMMEDIATE +
IMMEDIATE RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE+
r
FOR AMBASSADORS, CHARGES, AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/18
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ
SUBJECT: US MILITARY ACTION/URGENT DEMARCHE REQUEST
REF: SEPTEL
CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING, REASONS 1.5 (B),
(D).
1.
NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE JUSTIFIED BY NEED FOR
IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS I S AN URGENT ACTION MESSAGE FOR ALL
POSTS. SEE PARAS 6-10.
2. 4«t-POSTS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED SEPTEL NOTIFICATION OF
U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. REFTEL INSTRUCTED POSTS
TO NOTIFY HOST GOVERNMENTS OF THE STRIKES, AND TO ASSURE
THEM THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.
3. 4fl-)~SENI0R RANKING OFFICERS PRESENT IN RECEIVING POSTS
SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP MEETINGS TO BRIEF HIGHESTLEVEL AVAILABLE HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON THE BACKGROUND OF
AND RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. STRIKES. ALL POSTS SHOULD D A
RW
FROM POINTS IN PARAS 7 AND 8 IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS
CECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER EX). 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�TO HOST COUNTRY INTERLOCUTORS, AND ADD APPROPRIATE
COURTESIES. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE SENT SEPTEL.
4. tST ALL POSTS SHOULD REPORT DELIVERY OF THIS DEMARCHE,
AND SUBSTANTIVE HOST COUNTRY RESPONSES TO THE DEPARTMENT BY
IMMEDIATE CABLE.
5. -fr&) POSTS LISTED BELOW SHOULD BE AWARE THAT SEPARATE
ORAL MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT WILL BE DELIVERED AS
FOLLOWS: UK (BLAIR), ISRAEL (NETANYAHU), JAPAN (OBUCHI),
SAUDI ARABIA (KING FAHD), KUWAIT (AMIR), BAHRAIN (AMIR),
QATAR (AMIR), PA (ARAFAT), O A (SULTAN QABOOS), UAE
MN
(AMIR), EGYPT (MUBARAK), SYRIA (ASAD), RUSSIA (YELTSIN),
FRANCE (CHIRAC), CHINA (JIANG), TURKEY (DEMIREL), CANADA
(CHRETIEN), GERMANY (SCHROEDER), UNSYG.
IN ADDITION, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
WILL RECEIVE PHONE CALLS FROM THE PRESIDENT.
6. 4Si- FOR A M N OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS,
M A ,
THE HAGUE, 1998 AND 1999 UNSC CAPITALS, NATO CAPITALS,
USNATO: WHEN DELIVERING POINTS PLEASE NOTE THAT TEXT IS AN
ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY. A M N SHOULD DELIVER
MA
MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN; USNATO TO THE NATO SYG.
ALL OTHER POSTS SHOULD DELIVER TO FOREIGN MINISTER.
AMBASSADORS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR HELPFUL
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND/OR PREVIOUS OFFERS OF MILITARY
SUPPORT, AS APPROPRIATE.
7.
BEGIN POINTS:
— THE US HAS UNDERTAKEN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ
BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF UNSCRS 687, 1154, 1194,
1205 AND OTHERS.
—
THE THREAT TO THE REGION POSED BY IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO
COOPERATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH UNSCOM, AND THE CONSEQUENT
INABILITY OF UNSCOM TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES THE
COUNCIL HAS ENTRUSTED TO IT CANNOT BE TOLERATED. UNSCR
1205 EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMED THAT EFFECTIVE UNSCOM OPERATION
WAS ESSENTIAL TO IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 687.
—
THE SITUATION HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO
PROVIDE FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM, A
DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE GULF W R CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION
A
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�AvA^pC" CL(*<>(/V. A T
CDGRBT
(UNSCR 687) AND UfAQ' S
SECURITY COUNCIL.
rv.tS'
14 COMMITMENT TO THE
— ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ PROMISED TO PROVIDE TJNSCOM AND THE \ ^
IAEA WITH FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION.
IRAQ
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IRAQ
INFORMED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT WAS THE "CLEAR AND
UNCONDITIONAL DECISION OF THE JCHE^[RAQI GOVERNMENT TO
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RESUME COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.'' ^IRAQ HAS
VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT, AS- IT HAS VIOLATED &IWILAR—PAST
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~ IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REQUESTED {[u5££f^'"S
INFORMATION ON ITS BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND MISSILE
PROGRAMS. IT BLOCKED UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO BA'ATH PARTY
HEADQUARTERS ON DECEMBER 9. IT BARRED UNSCOM FROM
INSPECTING A BASE ON NOVEMBER 25. ON DECEMBER 11, IRAQ
FURTHER RESTRICTED UNSCOM'S ACTIVITIES BY ASSERTING THAT IT
COULD NOT INSPECT ON FRIDAYS, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF DOING
SO. ON DECEMBER 5, IRAQ RESTRICTED AN UNSCOM TEAM'S
ABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH BOMBS RELATED TO ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM AND, ON THE SAME DATE, ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT ANOTHER
TEAM FROM VIDEOTAPING AND PHOTOCOPYING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS.
ON NOVEMBER 23, AN IRAQI ESCORT HELICOPTER PASSED OVER A UN
HELICOPTER AT A LOW SPEED AND AKTITUDE, THREATENING THE
SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL. -^T^HASJPROVI DED ONLY ONE OF J^AN?
$ <^tS oY~
DOCUMENTS UNSCOM HAS REQUESTED, AND HAS SOUGHT TO PLACE
UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO OTHER
MATERIALS. ^ « /^cs o IT I^CS— -jn-tvr Tl^-cr i^/rcs, r~~' << *YW
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~ THE US HAS WORKED WITH OUR PARTNERS ON THE SECURITY
\
^
COUNCIL AND FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO BRING ABOUT A DIPLOMATIC
s A ? ^ SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON WENT THE EXTRA
* ^
MILE IN NOVEMBER W E HE CALLED OFF PLANNED AIR STRIKES IN
HN
ORDER TO GAVE IRAQ ONE MORE CHANCE TO FULFILL ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
0
—
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN FIRM AND UNITED IN
INSISTING IRAQ MUST PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION. REPEATED
CALLS HAVE BEEN MADE IN UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS THAT IRAQ MUST COMPLY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IT
UNDERTOOK AT THE END OF THE GULF WAR, OBLIGATIONS IT
RECOMMITTED ITSELF TO LAST FEBRUARY IN THE SECRETARY
GENERAL'S MOU AND AGAIN ON NOVEMBER 14.
SECRBT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�•CECRET
—
I T IS CLEAR N W THAT BAGHDAD WILL NOT RELENT. THE
O
CYCLE WOULD CONTINUE I F LEFT UNCHECKED.
—
IRAQ HAS BEEN GIVEN REPEATED OPPORTUNITIES TO COME INTO
COMPLIANCE AND MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING WEAPONS ISSUES.
IT HAS DEMANDED INSTEAD THAT THE COUNCIL LIFT THE OIL
EMBARGO IRRESPECTIVE OF IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE.
* '
—
REPEATED COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS
IS UNACCEPTABLE.
~
IRAQ PRESENTS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS COMMITTED MAJOR ACTS OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST TWO NEIGHBORS. IT HAS USED NONCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND AGAINST
INNOCENT IRAQI CIVILIANS.
—
THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR SINCE 1991 DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE REGIME HAS NOT LEARNED FROM PAST MISTAKES. IRAQ WANTS
TO RETAIN ITS RESIDUAL W D AND MISSILE CAPABILITY AND
M
REGAIN CONTROL OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO RECONSTITUTE ITS
NON-CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
CANNOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. THE US IS DETERMINED THIS
WILL NOT HAPPEN.
—
EXISTING RESOLUTIONS PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR
ACTING. WE ARE ACTING DECISIVELY, BUT WITH EVERY EFFORT TO
AVOID COLLATERAL CIVILIAN DAMAGE.
— THE OBJECTIVE OF^HE MILITARY ACTION W HAVE UNDERTAKEN
E
IS TO DCGRADC CAppj^M' S ABILITY TO THREATEN THE REGION AND'
-TO" DEGRADE HIS/M)ILITY TO DEVELOP AND DELIVER WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION Te-NbiGHBORING COUNTRIES,
oe&*.K*>o- K.S A/xOTr
—
WE HAVE NOT TAKEN THIS DECISION LIGHTLY.
AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION COULD BE AT RISK.
US PERSONNEL
—
BAGHDAD HAS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD
BE OF USING NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AGAINST US OR OUR
ALLIES.
—
WE BELIEVE THAT MOST COUNTRIES WILL UNDERSTAND AND
SUPPORT THIS ACTION. WE HONESTLY DO NOT SEE THAT THERE IS
ANY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE.
-SBeRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-efiCRET
—
WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT THIS CONFRONTATION.
—
IT I S BAGHDAD THAT HAS PROVOKED THE CRISIS BY ITS
DELIBERATE AND REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
UNSCR 687 ET AL. RESPONSIBILITY LIES SOLELY WITH BAGHDAD.
—
WE HOPE THAT AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY YOU WILL FIND A WAY TO EXPRESS YOUR
SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
8.
(SBU) LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE.
— UNSCR 678 AUTHORIZED MEMBER STATES COOPERATING WITH
KUWAIT TO USE "ALL NECESSARY MEANS" TO IMPLEMENT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS "TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN
THE AREA." UNSCR 678 AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL REMAIN IN FORCE.
— UNSCR 687 MANDATED A CEASE-FIRE, REAFFIRMED ALL EXISTING
RESOLUTIONS, AND ALSO IMPOSED A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE ACCEPTANCE BY IRAQ OF UN
INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING. COMPLIANCE WITH THESE
REQUIREMENTS I S A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF THE RESTORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.
— ON AUGUST 5, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO
SUSPEND ALL UNSCOM AND IAEA INSPECTION ACTIVITY IN IRAQ,
ALLOWING ONLY LIMITED ONGOING MONITORING ACTIVITIES TO
CONTINUE. ON OCTOBER 31, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION
TO CUT OFF ALL COOPERATION WtTH UNSCOM.
— ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ RESCINDED THESE DECISIONS AND
AGREED TO RESUME FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH
UNSCOM AND THE IAEA CONSISTENT WITH RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS
AND THE MOU.
— HOWEVER, IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT
AND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCRS.
— UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, COALITION MEMBERS ARE
ENTITLED TO EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY^GIVEN-BY' UNSCR 678, AND
TO TAKE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE MEASURES (INCLUDING THE
USE OF FORCE) TO COMPEL IRAQ TO TERMINATE ITS BREACH OF THE
—fcrKCKErr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-SECRET
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND THE MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING AND TO ENSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE.
~ FURTHERMORE, MEMBER STATES ARE ENTITLED TO USE FORCE IN
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE BY IRAQ.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY
OF COALITION AIRCRAFT, GROUND FORCES AND NAVAL FORCES
AGAINST IRAQI ATTACK, OR THREAT OF ATTACK.
9. 4&*-ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR UNSC CAPITALS:
— THE AUTHORITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS
BEING SEVERELY TESTED.
— AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WE HAVE A SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN I S NOT ALLOWED
TO PLAY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS I F THEY HAD NO
SIGNIFICANCE.
10.
ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR WARSAW (ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY):
— THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE AS THE
PROTECTING POWER OF US INTERESTS IN IRAQ. .
— I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT YOU WERE INFORMED OF THE
REASONS THIS ACTION HAS BECOME NECESSARY.
— WE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER THE COMING DAYS.
11. -f-ST ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR NATO CAPITALS AND USNATO:
— WE WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE NAC.
— WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE
NATO SYG ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY.
12. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
YY
ASMARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE
PESHAWAR NIACTIMMEDIATE
TIRANA NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET '
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-seeRET
MONROVIA NIACT IMMEDIATE
FREETOWN NIACT IMMEDIATE
KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE
D H NIACT IMMEDIATE
OA
Y
\
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS P IMMEDIATE
M
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUCBACM/USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB I L IMMEDIATE
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FORT BRAGG NC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE M IMMEDIATE
D
FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CBGRET—•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Day A f t e r Strategy
Key Elements f o r Sunday
• We w i l l maintain a robust m i l i t a r y presence i n the area
and a readiness t o use force again. Saddam should
already know t h a t we w i l l use force i f I r a q threatens i t s
neighbors, r e c o n s t i t u t e i t s W D or moves against the
M,
Kurds.
• We w i l l continue t o contain I r a q by enforcing
Nations sanctions and the two no f l y zones.
• We support the containment
c o a l i t i o n of a l l i e s .
the United
o f I r a q w i t h the help of a
• We w i l l support extension o f the o i l f o r food arrangement
so t h a t the humanitarian needs o f the I r a q i people are
assured.
• We w i l l welcome UNSCOM/IAEA's r e t u r n t o I r a q a f t e r
concrete, a f f i r m a t i v e and demonstrated a c t i o n by I r a q
t h a t show t h a t i t w i l l provide the f u l l cooperation that
allow UNSCOM/IAEA t o do t h e i r j o b . The burden i s on I r a q
to demonstrate i t s cooperation. We w i l l work w i t h the
Security Council on the nature of these assurances.
• We w i l l work w i t h the I r a q i opposition t o b r i n g about a
change o f leadership i n I r a q because t h i s i s the only
r e l i a b l e means t o ensure an I r a q t h a t i s w i l l i n g t o l i v e
at peace w i t h i t s neighbors and i t s own people.
• We w i l l be ready t o work w i t h a new leadership i n I r a q
t h a t abides by the UNSCRs t o quickly r e i n t e g r a t e I r a q
i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and ease the economic
burden Saddam has created.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Future o f UNSCOM
Key Elements:
-- We want t o see an e f f e c t i v e UNSCOM r e t u r n t o operations i n
I r a q . But i f i t cannot, we w i l l use our own means t o ensure
t h a t I r a q does not r e c o n s t i t u t e i t s W D or threaten i t s
M
neighbors.
— An e f f e c t i v e UNSCOM would be independent, p r o f e s s i o n a l and
i m p a r t i a l and able t o exercise the f u l l range of i t s mandated
a c t i v i t i e s under the UNSCRs.
— Given the record o f the l a s t year, I r a q must f i r s t
demonstrate i t s seriousness by concrete, a u t h o r i t a t i v e , and
a f f i r m a t i v e actions.
— Once I r a q has taken such steps, UNSCOM w i l l r e t u r n t o
operations i n Iraq f o r a sustained p e r i o d o f work.
— When UNSCOM i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t has received f u l l
cooperation, i t w i l l inform the UNSC; sanction reviews can
resume and there can be a Comprehensive Review.
-- The Comprehensive Review w i l l assess the progress made toward
compliance and set out a workplan f o r r e s o l v i n g issues.
-- When the UNSC judges t h a t I r a q has met i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under
the r e s o l u t i o n s , the UNSC w i l l implement those r e s o l u t i o n s .
— U n t i l then, the needs of the I r a q i people must be protected
by an extended and broad humanitarian program under the o i l - f o r food r e s o l u t i o n s .
P r i o r Conditions f o r the Return o f UNSCOM:
-- An a u t h o r i t a t i v e statement from the highest l e v e l s committing
to f u l l and unconditional access t o a l l s i t e s , information and
documents, and accepting a l l WMD-related r e s o l u t i o n s ;
—
Provision of a l l documents requested by UNSCOM/IAEA;
— An accurate f u l l , f i n a l and complete disclosure of W D as
M,
r e q u i r e d by UNSCR 687;
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�— Adoption o f required WMD-related l e g i s l a t i o n ;
— Optional; termination of sensitive
site
150 km permitted
missile
programs; deadlines
above.
Conditions
modalities;
end to
for any of the
a f t e r UNSCOM Returns:
— A t e s t i n g period w i t h p e r i o d i c reports from UNSCOM/IAEA.
— I r a q must demonstrate to UNSCOM/IAEA s a t i s f a c t i o n i t s f u l l
cooperation.
— When UNSCOM/IAEA report f u l l I r a q i cooperation, then
sanctions reviews are restored; and a Comprehensive Review can
begin.
I f I r a q Refuses t o Cooperate:
—
UNSCOM w i l l maintain o f f i c e s i n New York and Bahrain.
— I t w i l l continue t o c o l l e c t i n f o r m a t i o n on I r a q W D and make
M
p e r i o d i c reports t o the UNSC.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning PDD-68, International Public Information Policy
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2013-0792-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on PDD-68 (International Public Information policy). Material includes a memo to National Security Advisor Samuel Berger regarding Worldnet on Iraq and a December 1998 Department of State cable to diplomatic outposts regarding a public reponse if military strikes are launched against Iraq.
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National Security Council
Mulilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Jamie Metzl
Steven Naplan
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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2/6/2015
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2013-0792-M
7388766
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
Presidential Decision Directive