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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documentsfromthis Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
Communications group
Bob Boorstin
1995 Communications Initiatives
February 17, 1995
Following up on our previous conversation, this memo roughly summarizes the rationale
and plans for Presidential national security initiatives over the course of 1995-96.
Initiatives and Rationale
Given the ongoing criticism of our foreign policy as reactive ~ the lack of a Clinton
doctrine ~ it is vital to the President's stature as Commander in Chief and our national
security agenda that we launch initiatives. Initiatives will provide us with positive
actions that we can claim as our own.
Due to limited news space and interest from the public and the media, however, we must
severely limit the number of initiatives that we put forth. Although the President will
obviously spend time on any number of key issues ~ as outlined in the "Action Agenda"
— his public time must be focused.
With that in mind, I believe that the President should launch initiatives on
nonproliferation and anti-terrorism. These initiatives should carry us through 1995 and
1996.
My rationale for choosing these areas:
(1) The time is right. This year is critical for nonproliferation efforts: NPT, North
Korea, Start I I , CTB, etc. Terrorism is always in the news, of course, but the World
Trade Center trial brings a special focus.
(2) People care. These are foreign policy issues which directly affect Americans
here at home. Polls demonstrate consistent public interest in both areas (especially focus
groups from this year's State of the Union.) We must continue to push our other best
choice of initiative - creating jobs through trade - but it has worn out its welcome with
the media.
(3) These are vital subjects in the post-Cold War era. The elites care. No
subjects better illustrate the challenges ~ and the potential for transnational cooperation.
Introducing new initiatives (even new packages) will stimulate elites and start academic
discussion.
(4) The risks of open partisan conflict are relatively small. With the exception of
North Korea, we have an even or upper hand on these issues. (Compare, for example,
with peacekeeping.) North Korea will continue to cause controversy. But arguments
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�against the NPT or START I I , for example, will not resonate with the public, and no one
opposes anti-terrorist activities.
(5) These subjects lend themselves to concrete demonstrations and television.
You can dismantle warheads and produce graphics showing the numbers of missiles
reduced. The arrest of terrorists and subsequent trials draw tremendous attention.
(6) The two initiatives intersect. Smuggling of nuclear materials, for example,
offers a prime opportunity for attack. Missions like "Operation Sapphire," presented
correctly, will draw intense media interest.
The Message
As with any message, the key is simplicity and repetition. We might want to attach
simple labels to each initiative. The message could be summarized as:
President Clinton is making Americans safer.
Americans sleep better at night because President Clinton has kept his promise to
reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. He is leading the world in efforts to stop
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Americans are more secure because President Clinton has kept his pledge to hunt
down and prosecute terrorists, at home and abroad. Now he has launched a new,
aggressive effort to stop terrorism.
The Plan
The initiatives would be introduced in major Presidential speeches and/or events. The
events would be preceded by small group and full White House corps backgrounders.
To maintain momentum, the initiatives would be the focus of the President's major
foreign policy addresses (i.e. UN Fiftieth Anniversary). Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
officials would include in their regular remarks reference to one or both initiatives. The
campaign would include regular op-ed pieces and articles in scholarly journals.
The campaign would begin immediately and build throughout the year, continuing
through 1996. A suggested calendar — including confirmed speeches and ideas for events
~ follows. It envisions starting the nonproliferation initiative almost immediately (the
calendar and our agenda are clear), while delaying the launch of the terrorism initiative
until late June (time to reach closure with domestic agencies and gain support of allies.)
•
March 1 ~ Possible POTUS address. Introduction of nonproliferation
initiative, with stress on NPT.
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�•
March 14 - Perry address to Council on Foreign Affairs. Relationship of
nonproliferation and conventional defense or focus on rogue states.
•
April — Christopher address. Nonproliferation and relationship with
Russia/former Soviet states.
•
April 18 ~ Perry address to Naval Academy. Nonproliferation subtopic.
•
May 12-13 - Perry commencement addresses.
•
May 31 - POTUS USAF Academy Commencement Address.
Nonproliferation, highlighting SALT II and further warhead reductions.
•
May/June - POTUS Russia visit. Event/speech at site where warheads are
dismantled.
•
June 26 - POTUS at UN 50th Anniversary. Launch of new worldwide antiterrorist campaign. (Alternate time might be G-7 meeting in Halifax, if
economic news is scarce.)
•
July - POTUS event. Announces new US task force on terrorism with
Reno, Freeh, Christopher, etc.
•
September ~ Congressional session. Introduction of new anti-terrorism
legislation.
•
September 2-3 ~ POTUS at VJ Day Commemoration. Prevention of conflict
through nonproliferation efforts. Update on initiative.
•
October 22 - POTUS at UN General Assembly. Fighting the terrorist threat,
particularly in regional conflicts. Initiative to fight nuclear smuggling.
•
November 18 - Japan state visit. Nonproliferation argument folded into
visit to A-bomb memorials.
As I indicated, these are obviously rough ideas. Congressional hearings, a potential trip
to Europe and other events offer further possibilities.
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�MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
Communications group
Bob Boorstin
Nonproliferation speech/calendar
February 19, 1995
As you know, the President is scheduled to deliver a major foreign policy address on March 1/2.
The speech will focus on nonproliferation and illustrate the benefits of engagement.
The message is simple:
President Clinton is making Americans safer.
We sleep better at night because President Clinton has kept his promise to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons. He is leading the world in efforts to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
We will announce the initiative (i.e. Operation Secure Future) in the President's speech, putting
it in the context of our belief in engagement and our accomplishments to date. We would then
lay out an agenda for the year, hitting each major area without getting bogged down in the detail.
In the days, weeks and months to follow, the President, Vice President, Cabinet secretaries and
other officials would include agreed upon language on the nonproliferation initiative in their
public and private appearances. Subtopics ~ the NPT, START II, North Korea, Iran/Iraq, CTB,
chemical weapons, landmines ~ would be addressed and short reports would be delivered to the
President. The President would have at least one public event per month to advance the
initiative. Major speeches ~ Air Force Academy, UN Anniversary - would focus on this topic.
A proposed calendar and strategy for the first month might include:
February 20-25:
February 26:
February 27:
February 28:
March 1/2:
March 2/3:
March 6-10:
March M.March 13-17:
March 27-31:
Planning
Holum oped Times/Post
Select journalist/columnist briefings
White House press corps briefing
State Department press corps briefing
USIA foreign press corps briefing
POTUS speech
POTUS CNN interview
Christopher/Perry Reuter interview
START II press conference/event
Follow-up opeds
Perry speech on rogue states
POTUS event (meet with NPT delegation?)
Christopher address on Russia/former Soviet states
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�co!';riri::Ti:-L
Nonproliferation
Schedule
; )or' • •}> • • ro
;.
/
We'd l i • e t o k i c k o f f our n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n e f f o r t Ji/; The' Presiident
:
i s sche d u l e d t o d e l i v e r a speech on March 1/2, on o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n
^ f^
.
and i l l u s t r a t e t h e b e n e f i t s o f engagement.
;
The message i s s i m p l e :
Pr e s i d e n t C l i n t o n i s making Americans s a f e r .
We s l e e p b e t t e r a t n i g h t because P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n has k e p t
h i s p r o m i s e t o reduce t h e t h r e a t o f n u c l e a r weapons. He i s
l e a d i n g t h e w o r l d i n e f f o r t s t o s t o p t h e s p r e a d o f weapons
1
o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n .
We w i l l announce t h e i n i t i a t i v e ( i . e . O p e r a t i o n Secure F u t u r e ) i n
the P r e s i d e n t ' s speech, p u t t i n g i t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f our b e l i e f
i n engagement and our accomplishments t o d a t e . We w o u l d t h e n l a y
out an agenda f o r t h e year, h i t t i n g each.major area w i t h o u t
g e t t i n g bogged down i n t h e d e t a i l .
I n t h e days, weeks and months t o f o l l o w , t h e P r e s i d e n t , V i c e
P r e s i d e n t , C a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s and o t h e r o f f i c i a l s would i n c l u d e
agreed upon language on t h e n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e i r
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e appearances.
S u b t o p i c s -- t h e NPT, START I I ,
N o r t h Korea, I r a n / I r a q , CTE, c h e m i c a l weapons, landmines -- would
be addressed and s h o r t r e p o r t s would be d e l i v e r e d t o t h e
President.
The P r e s i d e n t would have a t l e a s t one p u b l i c event
per month t o advance t h e i n i t i a t i v e . M a j o r speeches -- A i r Force
Academy, UN A n n i v e r s a r y -- would focus on t h i s t o p i c .
NPT and a l l i e d i s s u e s should be f l a g g e d i n a l l v i s i t s h e r e by
heads o f state/govermment.
I n a d d i t i o n , a proposed c a l e n d a r and
s t r a t e g y f o r t h e f i r s t month m i g h t i n c l u d e :
•
•
•
February 26:
February 27
February 2 8
•
•
March 1/2
March 2/3
•
•
March 6/7
March 14:
•
March 18
TL oped Times/Post
Select j o u r n a l i s t / c o l u m n i s t b r i e f i n g s
White House p r e s s corps b r i e f i n g
S t a t e Department p r e s s c o r p s b r i e f i n g
USIA f o r e i g n press corps b r i e f i n g
C h r i s t o p h e r speech on Engagement/Resources
POTUS speech
POTUS CNN i n t e r v i e w
C h r i s t o p h e r / P e r r y Reuter i n t e r v i e w
C h r i s t o p h e r on N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n
Perry speech on n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n and s e c u r i t y
Lake meeting w i t h i n t e r e s t groups
Perry t o M i d d l e East
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�• March 18-24
Gore to Middle East
• March 20:
Christopher address on Russia/foririer Soviet
states
Joint meeting of N a t i o n a l Academy of Science
and Center f o r Foreign R e l a t i o n s
(Gore,Ferry,Holum)
START I I press conference/event f o l l o w i n g
Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n
Follow-up opeds
POTUS event (meet w i t h NPT delegation)
NPT extention Conference. Vice President t o
attend t o d e l i v e r speech
Marcn
•
l a t e March:
• A p r i l 16-17
• A.oril 17:
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Blinken, Antony J .
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Blinken, Antony J.
/Ft, Record at A1
FW: State of Union Language - [GONriDEWTW?
Tuesday, January 24,1995 4:26PM
From: Fried, Daniel
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Burns, Nicholas R.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: State of Union Language - [CQNriDD'JTIAEr
Date: Tuesday, January 24, 1995 02:53 PM
For Tony Lake
From the Troika (Vershbow, Burns, Fried)
We recommending adding to the State of the Union text two sentences on NATO expansion, CEE and Russia.
The Administration" NATO/PFP initiatives show Presidential leadership and balance; they preempt Republican
criticism (the previous Administration did nothing on NATO expansion when it had the chance). Our sentences
are fonvard looking, rather than a catalogue of past activities.
Bob Boorstin would not take the language, stating that the speech was too long and the President had cut the
foreign policy sections by two pages already.
The sentences would go on page 18, the final paragraph (the paragraph beginning "The United States has proudly
supported free elections...")
"By launching the Partnership for Peace and initiating the process of NATO's expansion, we are building the
foundations for an expanded TransAtlantic community of secure, free market democracies. NATO will build close
and string ties with a democratic Russia, in parallel with expansion."
^CLASSIFIED
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�Cicio, Kristen K.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Poneman, Daniel B.
@NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
IR, Record at A l ; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.
NPT & State of the Union [CONriDENTIACT
Monday, January 23, 1995 10:50AM
PLEASE PASS TO TONY LAKE AND SANDY BERGER:
I have not seen the State of the Union, but would like to make a pitch -- just in case it's not there -- for a
phrase like "call this year for the INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, so that our children and their children may be protected from the specter of
nuclear war." The key words are in caps (the President was criticized for omitting "indefinite" at the
UNGA, giving rise to comment that the US was softening its support for that aim).
I know we don't want a laundry list in the speech, but omitting reference to NPT at this critical juncture in
the run-up to the Extension Conference will be noted in foreign capitals, and criticized in arms control
circles as showing a lack of Presidential vision and leadership on a critical challenge for the 1995 national
security agenda.
Dan
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
�Hall, Wilma G.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Poneman, Daniel B.
@NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
/R, Record at A l ; Andreasen, Steven P.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Darby, M.
Brooke; Ross, Thomas B.; @NONPRO - Export Controls
Revised TL speech outliniHtGONriDLNTIAin'
Wednesday, January 25, 1995 10:13AM
< <File Attachment: LAKE.DOO >
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�NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL
1995 marks a p o i n t o f accomplishment and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
of the
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n and arms c o n t r o l agenda.
-- Key elements o f the g l o b a l regime have r e c e n t l y been
completed
START I e n t r y i n t o
force
Ukraine/Kazakhstan/Belarus
—
NPT adherence
and we are moving e x p e d i t i o u s l y
t o put others i n place
NPT i n d e f i n i t e e x t e n s i o n
CTB
{Announce new p o l i c y on 10-year withdrawal
right}
START I I r a t i f i c a t i o n
CWC
ratification
Fissile material
convention
BWC i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
Increasingly,
increasing
a more c o o p e r a t i v e U.S.-Russia r e l a t i o n s h i p and t h e
importance o f p r o l i f e r a t i o n as a preeminent
national
s e c u r i t y concern mean t h a t the arms c o n t r o l and n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n
agendas a r e c o n v e r g i n g .
—
For example, we are u n d e r t a k i n g a comprehensive
to control f i s s i l e materials
t h a t addresses b o t h arms
c o n t r o l and n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s .
Thousands o f
Russian s c i e n t i s t s w o r k i n g i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Centers.
effort
Science
Five hundred tons o f Russian HEU t o be blended
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�down to harmless r e a c t o r f u e l .
Operation Saphire.
DOE
labs working with Russian counterparts. {Announce t h a t
U.S.
i s p u t t i n g s u b s t a n t i a l stock of f i s s i l e
from weapons under IAEA safeguards.
We
material
(Check with
DOE)}
c o n t i n u e t o need t o d e a l w i t h the imminent danger a r i s i n g from
b a c k l a s h s t a t e s who
Korea and
t h a n one
Iran.
seek weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n ,
Since many these c o u n t r i e s
r o u t e t o n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l arms, our
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n agenda must i n c r e a s i n g l y
be
e.g.
North
t y p i c a l l y pursue more
nuclear
interlinked with
CBW
and
missile
nonproliferation.
And
t h a t n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n p o l i c y must be woven i n t o the broader
c o n t e x t o f our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and
Expanding democracies —
nuclear arsenal.
foreign policy interests.
South A f r i c a ' s d e c i s i o n
t o g i v e up i t s
Expanding t r a d e as an engine of growth --
seek c l o s e r
economic c o o p e r a t i o n and
who
i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n norms.
fulfill
-- US
we
h i g h t e c h t r a d e w i t h those
S t r o n g defense
s e c u r i t y commitments t o Europe, South Korea and
Japan have
been c r i t i c a l t o p r e v e n t i n g p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n the p a s t 25
L o o k i n g t o the f u t u r e , we have the o p p o r t u n i t y
and
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o b u i l d on the accomplishments, b u t
years.
the
a l s o t o move
beyond the i s s u e s t h a t d e f i n e d n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n d u r i n g
the
Cold
War.
S t a r t i n g from the January and
u n d e r t a k e n a new
September Summits, we've
agenda f o r t r a n s p a r e n c y and
irreversibility
weapons dismantlement.
We're t a k i n g s i g n i f i c a n t steps towards u n i l a t e r a l
openness on n u c l e a r
stockpiles.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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of
�D e t a r g e t t i n g and u n i l a t e r a l
and new
reductions i n a l e r t status
weapons development add t o mutual c o n f i d e n c e
and
s t a b i l i t y w i t h o u t complex n e g o t i a t i o n s
We're seeking t o use the momentum from g l o b a l
m a t e r i a l i n i t i a t i v e s t o s t i m u l a t e new
t h i n k i n g about t h e most
i n t r a c t a b l e r e g i o n a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n problems:
Middle
fissile
South A s i a and t h e
East.
Need t o move from 70s t o 90s approach t o arms c o n t r o l
and n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
pursued
independently.
multilateral.
Each o f these i n i t i a t i v e s s h o u l d be
Some u n i l a t e r a l ,
others b i l a t e r a l , others
Need t o move beyond l i n k a g e ; each i n i t i a t i v e
i m p o r t a n t t o h o l d hostage
too
t o the o t h e r s .
This has been and w i l l remain an i s s u e of American
leadership.
Christopher
{Announce P r e s i d e n t i a l , V i c e P r e s i d e n t i a l ,
speeches; VP opening of NPT
Extension
Conference}
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�-SECRET
THE
WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Your Trip to the 49th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
OVERVIEW
The dominant theme during your second trip to the UN General Assembly will be the
mission of the multinational coalition in Haiti - an issue that dovetails neatly with the other
themes you will stress in your speech to the General Assembly, in your bilateral meetings and in
the social events that you will host or attend. These themes include: continued U.S. leadership in
world affairs; the strong U.S. commitment to the United Nations; the need to strengthen and
reform the UN's peacekeeping capabilities and management practices; and, the importance of UN
initiatives in the realm of sustainable development and human rights.
Your visit comes at a relative high-point in U.S. leadership at the UN, where this
Administration is generally regarded favorably, especially in comparison to its predecessors. The
New York Times reported on Sunday, September 18, "As the General Assembly approaches, a
variety of diplomats say they like what they have seen of the Clinton Administration." U.S.
leadership in the Haiti crisis will likely enhance this perception. Moreover, having recently won
approval from Congress for $1.2 billion to pay past and anticipated peacekeeping expenses funds that will avert a once-imminent UN cash flow crisis - the Administration has proved its
willingness to fight to strengthen and sustain the UN.
Nevertheless, there remains an under-current of resentment towards the U.S. at the
United Nations, where some perceive us as bullying the membership into accepting U.S. dictates.
In part, this perception is unavoidable, given our status as the world's only superpower.
However, the strong pressure we applied to obtain Resolution 940, our resistance to impractical
and costly peace operations, and Congress's regular withholdings on payments to the UN are
cited by some as evidence of strong-arm tactics.
The centerpiece of your visit will be your speech to the General Assembly in which
you will.
SUMMARY OF EVENTS/OBJECTIVES
You will spend September 25 and 26 at the UN. On Sunday, September 25, you will
participate in four UN-related events:
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
PHOTOCOPY
�-SEeRET-
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-- Bilateral meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which
you should strive for an open discussion on the UN's current challenges and its future as well as
developments in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. You should urge appointment of a U.S. force
commander for UNMIH, stress our commitment to UN reform, and reiterate you personal
support for the candidacy of Dr. William Foege for UNICEF Executive Director.
-- Drop-by Trilateral Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, hosted by Secretary Christopher.
- Bilateral Meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia, in which you should draw
him out on the notion of a six month delay in lifting the arms embargo, ask for his help during this
period in which we are intensifying pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, and stress the importance of
the Federation to any workable, long-term settlement.
- Reception for selected African Heads of State and Delegation whose countries
have made significant progress towards democracy and economic reform. At present, two
African heads of state/government have committed to attend: President Bedie of Cote d'lvoire
and Prime Minister Veiga of Cape Verde along with Foreign Ministers and senior representatives
from over twenty other African countries, Members of Congress, and representatives from the
U.S. business and non-profit communities. The reception affords an opportunity to reiterate the
U.S. commitment to Africa and highlight the constructive contributions made during your
Administration. You will give brief remarks, and President Bedie of Cote d'lvoire will reply.
Monday, September 26, will be devoted entirely to UN-related activities:
- Jog with President Menem of Argentina (Tentative). The Argentinians have
provided crucial support for U.S. policies at the United Nations, most recently and importantly on
Haiti. Our goals are to thank the Argentinians for their support at the UN and with the Summit of
the Americas and smooth over any remaining ruffled feathers they may have about being surprised
by the Carter mission.
- Photo-Opportunity with the Incoming UNGA President, Foreign Minister
Amara Essy of Cote d'lvoire, purely for protocol purposes.
- Speech to the 49th UN General Assembly, highlighting
.
- Bilateral Meeting with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, in which you
should reinforce Tudjman's commitment to responsible international behavior, especially
cooperation with UNPROFOR. You should also encourage full implementation of the
Washington Agreement and warn him against any attack on the UN Protected Areas.
- Visit to the UN Situation Center, the UN's fledgling 24-hour crisis management
cell. Until last year, the UN had no capability to monitor its field operations continuously. For
instance, in 1989, UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari placed a weekend call to UNHQ
from Namibia to report his UN forces were caught in a deadly firefight on the first day of the
ceasefire. His call went unanswered. Today, the Situation Center, established with significant
™
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�U.S. assistance, represents a substantial step forward. Your visit underscores the U.S.
commitment to improving UN capabilities pursuant to our peacekeeping policy.
-- Visit to U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Tentative). A brief visit and remarks
by you would be greatly appreciated by USUN staff who are among the most hard-working and
poorly compensated of U.S. embassy staff anywhere.
- Luncheon Hosted by Boutros-Ghali. The Secretary General customarily hosts a
luncheon for visiting heads of state on the opening day of the UNGA. This is an opportunity to
talk with heads of state with whom you will not have bilateral meetings. The Secretary General
will offer a toast, and you will respond with brief remarks.
~ Bilateral Meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, in which you should
congratulate him on this week's agreement to develop the large Caspian petroleum reserves with
a Western consortium, encourage Azerbaijan's cooperation in a CSCE-sponsored peace process
for Nagorno-Karabakh, and urge progress on political/economic reforms and human rights.
- Bilateral Meeting with President Iliescu of Romania, in which you should
encourage his country's economic reforms, acknowledge Bucharest's strengthening democracy,
thank him for his steadfast support of UN sanctions against Serbia/Montenegro, and praise
Romania's enthusiastic embrace of the Partnership for Peace.
~ Bilateral Meeting with President Salinas of Mexico, the object of which is to
compliment him on completion of his enormously successful presidency, thank him for hard work
in improving bilateral ties ~ especially NAFTA - and acknowledge Mexico's political and
economic progress. Salinas will likely tout his candidacy for director of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), established under GATT, and has requested a brief, one-on-one session
with you during the meeting.
- Press Availability (one half hour)
- Reception for Heads of State and Delegation at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
You will offer brief remarks to Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, UN officials, and Permanent
Representatives from almost every country in the world. This event has become something of an
American tradition and a symbol of our leadership. Most invitees will have no other opportunity
to meet you.
CONTEXT
The Year in Review. The UN's record over the past year has been mixed at best.
The 48th General Assembly ended with some significant successes, including the establishment of
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and an independent office of inspector general top U.S. priorities. The UNGA also adopted favorable modifications to the customary Middle
East resolutions. In addition, the UN Population Conference, just concluded in Cairo,
succeeded in reaching broad consensus on a strategy to bolster educational opportunities for
women and ensure access to family planning, maternal and child health services. Most nations
should pursue implementation aggressively.
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Nearly 2,000 UN electoral observers were the backbone of the international
monitoring effort during the South African elections. After much wrangling, the UN deployed
observers to Georgia to assist in refugee repatriation and monitor the Russian peacekeeping
force. Most notably, the passage of UNSC Resolution 940, authorizing the use of "all necessary
means" in Haiti, constituted a triumph of U.S. leadership and diplomacy.
Against the backdrop of these notable successes, however, several serious setbacks
have occurred. Bosnia, where fighting is intensifying, remains an open wound for the UN. The
UN has proved reticent to enforce the exclusion zones and has turned the other cheek to repeated
violations of other UN resolutions. In Somalia, the factions have made no measurable progress
toward political reconciliation, and the UN is increasingly a target for attack.
Arguably, the worst stain on the UN's record this year is Rwanda. The UN, and
particularly the U.S., have been blamed for abandoning Rwanda when the killings began and
responding slowly to the resultant genocide. In fact, the UN's response reveals more about the
gap between international expectations and the UN's capabilities than about the will of member
states. It is improbable that a large peacekeeping force, even if well-trained and equipped, could
have prevented the genocide in Rwanda. In any event, a large UN force could not have been
assembled in time. Troop contributors are over-extended and hard to recruit. Many poor
countries have not been reimbursed for months - sometimes years - due to the large debt owed
the UN. Moreover, the bulk of UN troops come from developing countries, and many are poorly
trained or equipped.
Lacking a rapid reaction force or an emergency humanitarian response capability, the
UN is hamstrung in such situations. While the Administration's peacekeeping policy rules out any
standing UN army "at this time", it does call for further consideration of a UN rapid reaction
force, once the UN implements fundamental peacekeeping reforms. In the meantime, the NSC
plans to initiate a policy review on means of strengthening international humanitarian response
capabilities so that the world is not entirely dependent on the U.S. military in extremis. President
Menem's "White Helmets" proposal will serve as a spring-board for the review. (For details, see
background paper).
Another milestone this year was the release of the Administration's long-awaited
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, PDD-25, which you signed May 3. This
was the first comprehensive review of its sort. Among its most prominent features are the tough
questions the U.S. will ask before voting for new peace operations or committing U.S. forces.
Some analysts on the left cite these questions as proof we seek to curtail UN peacekeeping.
Others on the right argue the PDD reveals our readiness to subcontract our foreign policy to
Boutros-Ghali.
Both interpretations are groundless. The purpose of the PDD is to offer a concrete
proposals to strengthen UN peacekeeping as an effective tool of U.S. interests and an efficient
method of burden-sharing. The PDD acknowledges peacekeeping is not a panacea but an
instrument applicable in certain contexts, particularly when conditions are ripe for a political
settlement. In short, our aim is to ensure we use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively.
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While PDD-25 was misconstrued in some quarters, most in Congress, in the UN and
foreign capitals view it as pragmatic. The release of the PDD, preceded by extensive
consultations, served to dampen Congressional criticism of our policy on such emotional issues as
command and control of U.S. forces. Since then, our political opponents have had little success
in using the UN against us. Moreover, the UN has begun to implement several reforms we
proposed, and the Security Council adopted a Presidential statement in May embracing many of
our tough questions as those it will weigh before authorizing new missions.
The Year to Come: 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN
50). There are many UN commemorative events and conferences scheduled throughout next
year. You have or will be invited to several. While no scheduling decisions have been made, you
should be aware of the following events planned for 1995:
•
UN Security Council Summit, New York, January 31. Argentina's President Menem will
chair this summit attended by Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand and President
Yeltsin, among others. No formal agenda has been set, but the meeting, which will review the
work of the Council since the last summit in 1992 and deliberate tasks for the future, fulfills a
goal set by you and President Yeltsin at the Moscow Summit.
•
World Summit on Social Development, Copenhagen, March 6-12. The "Social Summit"
will address issues of poverty, employment and social integration, building on the Population
Conference and 1992 Earth Summit. Boutros-Ghali may again urge you to attend.
•
50th Anniversary of the UN Charter, San Francisco, June 26. A non-profit UN50
committee will host 184 Permanent Representatives to the UN for two days of
commemorative activities in San Francisco, including re-enactment of the Charter signing and
a reading by Maya Angelou of a poem written for the occasion. This event is of particular
interest to several in the California congressional delegation.
•
Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 4-15, which will adopt a
platform of action for accelerating women's economic and social progress. The USG and
women's groups throughout the U.S. are actively planning for this event, which it is hoped the
First Lady will attend.
UN General Assembly Summit, New York, October 22-24, will supplant the opening of
the UNGA in September as the event for which Heads of State will travel to New York.
KEY ISSUES
Haiti (Placeholder): There will be wide interest at the UN in your views on Haiti,
especially U.S. plans for standing up the police force and the risks inherent in the interim period
before the de facto leaders resign. You should emphasize that the UN gave the U.S. authority to
use "all necessary means", and we did not abuse it, choosing to seek at peaceful settlement up
until the last minute.
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Initial UN Security Council and Secretariat reaction to the Carter Mission and U.S.
deployment was cautious, though relatively optimistic. A subsequent briefing by a senior
interagency team has done much to assuage pique among UN officials and Security Council
representatives that they were not consulted on the Carter Mission. Nevertheless, most capitals
have warmly praised the U.S. success in avoiding an invasion. A few UNSC members ~ notably
Brazil and China -- remain cool even to the permissive U.S. presence in Haiti.
There is wide consensus in the Security Council that most multilateral sanctions should
not be lifted until after Aristide is restored, in accordance with UNSC Res. 917. At present,
countries are poised to participate in the coalition, and the UN expects to deploy the first
contingent of 16 UN military observers to Haiti by September 25. The U.S. continues to press
the UN to accelerate dispatch of the UN-OAS human rights observers (ICM).
The U.S. confronts several challenges at the UN with respect to Haiti. The first is to
ensure continuous, close coordination on the ground and in New York. Dante Caputo's
resignation is a reminder that we cannot coordinate enough with the UN. The second is to
persuade skeptics that our objectives in Haiti are not altered by permissive entry. In the shortterm, we may face more ambiguity and complexity that had we entered forcefully. These short
term costs are easily outweighed by the improved long-term prospects for a peaceful transition to
stability and democracy in Haiti.
Third, we must continue to insist on a U.S. force commander for UNMIH to maximize
continuity with the coalition and security during Phase II and to minimize difficulties with
command and control of U.S. forces. Boutros-Ghali has resisted a U.S. commander, arguing that
this mission - as with any other UN undertaking - will lose its international credibility if
perceived as U.S-dominated.
Finally, we are likely to have difficulty gaining UN agreement to a timely transition to
UNMIH. This is a sensitive issue at the UN, where there is still a broad perception that the U.S.
left the UN holding the bag in Somalia. We must continue reassuring the UN of our long-term
commitment to Haiti. The best way around Boutros-Ghali's delaying tactics will be to establish
quickly a secure and stable environment and provide every assistance to the UN in recruiting,
equipping and deploying non-U.S. troops to Haiti - a top priority of the Haiti ExComm.
Bosnia: The increased fighting in Bosnia, repeated violations of the Sarajevo
exclusion zone, and the UN's continued reluctance to resort to NATO air power have taken a
considerable toll on the UN's credibility there. At NATO's urging, UNPROFOR has begun
planning for an orderly withdrawal. It is in this context that the Security Council will consider
UNPROFOR's mandate when it comes up for renewal on September 30. The Croatian
Government, still frustrated by the UN's failure to roll-back the Serbs from UN Protected Areas,
may be reluctant to extend UNPROFOR's tenure in Croatia beyond three months. Other UNSC
members are skeptical about UNPROFOR's future but will likely accede to a six month mandate
without modifications to avoid signaling any uncertainty about continued UN involvement. You
should stress to Boutros-Ghali our commitment to a regular, six-month mandate extension.
The UN and some key troop contributors remain apprehensive about strict enforcement of
the exclusion zones. However, the British who have been among the most apprehensive, have
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spoken more positively in recent days about strict enforcement. Progress on resolutions lifting
sanctions on the Belgrade Serbs and tightening sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs has been slow, but
Contact Group unity has held up reasonably well. The recently agreed border monitoring regime
has begun successfully. Passage of the sanctions resolutions, coupled with continuing
confirmation that the border remains closed and strict enforcement of the exclusion zones, may
help alleviate pressure on the Administration to lift the arms embargo.
Somalia: UNOSOM's mandate comes up for renewal on September 30, and the
Council will decide whether to extend the mission until 1995, as originally planned, or end it early
(e.g. December 31) and begin immediate troop withdrawal. The Secretary General has
recommended a one-month extension and a delay in any decision about UNOSOM's future.
Meanwhile, violence is increasing in Somalia: ten UN peacekeepers have been killed in the past
month. The parties have made no progress towards national reconciliation. Apart from providing
limited security to relief efforts, UNOSOM is mainly engaged in force protection, while
consuming approximately $80 millVmonth (U.S. share is $25 milL/month). Increasingly, the UN
and troop contributors concede that the mission is not succeeding, as evidenced by the recent
UNSC decision to reduce UNOSOM by 3,000 troops to 15,000.
The U.S. position is that withdrawal should begin immediately with the aim of terminating
UNOSOM by year's end. Withdrawal will be risky, as Somalis try to seize UN assets (many of
which are USG property) and possibly test the UN on its way out. Keenly aware of their
vulnerability, the UN and numerous troop contributors - including Pakistan, India, Egypt and
Australia - have asked for U.S. assistance in withdrawal. They are quick to remind us the U.S.
persuaded many of them to go to Somalia. If abandoned in a pinch, allies are unlikely to forgive
us. The implications for UN and other coalition missions, including Haiti, could be grave.
We have given no formal response to the UN and will soon ask you to decide whether we
are prepared, in principle, to provide support for a UNOSOM exit. The Joint Staff, which favors
U.S. assistance to UNOSOM, has begun evaluating potential U.S. force requirements. Its
preliminary judgment is we would need to place an Amphibious Task Force offshore to deter
attacks on UN forces and possibly to go ashore to cover the withdrawal's last stages. We would
need to consult closely with Congress about any such effort. Anxious for a U.S. response,
Boutros-Ghali may ask you about U.S. support. We recommend you respond in general bui
favorable terms.
Rwanda: U.S. forces will complete withdrawal from the Rwanda Crisis Area by
September 28, having fulfilled the four agreed UNHCR service packages. U.S. military
responsibilities are being transferred to civilian organizations (i.e. UNHCR and NGOs) with equal
or better capabilities. Our forces accelerated the flow of critical humanitarian assistance to the
region and were instrumental in producing and distributing adequate water supplies in Goma.
While the immediate crisis appears to have subsided, there remain tremendous long-term
challenges such as the welfare and security of 800,000 refugees in Goma, the presence in the
camps of armed Rwandan Army personnel poised to resume the civil war, and delays in
prosecuting war criminals. The situation in Burundi also remains highly unstable. The U.S. will
continue to provide substantial humanitarian, political and other assistance to the region.
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The UN is taking several steps to assist in Rwanda. UNAMIR, the 5,500-person
peacekeeping force, is finally nearing full strength, following many months in which troops were
short and resources limited. The U.S. has provided considerable logistics support and equipment
to UNAMIR. The UN is gradually deploying human rights monitors to Rwanda to investigate
and deter additional acts of genocide. In the meantime, we are receiving credible reports that the
RPF, and possibly the Government itself, is responsible for killing up to 10,000 Rwandan civilians
per month. Though the agony in Rwanda is far from over, it is unclear what more, if anything, the
international community can do to help.
U.S. Debt to the UN: As of early August, member states owed the UN over $2.1
billion for the peacekeeping and regular budgets. The U.S. was by far the biggest debtor, with
arrears amounting to $883 million in the peacekeeping budget and $531 million in the regular
budget. The large U.S. debt resulted from the establishment in 1993 of huge missions in Somalia
and Bosnia, each costing over $1 billion per year and Congress's refusal to appropriate adequate
FY 94 funds for peacekeeping or the regular budget.
This year, the Administration had remarkable success in gaining Congressional
approval for payments to the UN. With strong Democratic support (but virtually none from the
GOP), we obtained $1.2 billion for peacekeeping expenses, including a $670 million FY 94
supplemental for past arrears. The Administration managed to preserve its entire FY 95 request
in the State Department budget, except $30 million, which was to be our FY 95 down payment
for Reagan-era regular budget arrears.
Congress also failed to appropriate $300 million in FY 95 peacekeeping funds
requested in the DOD budget as part of the Administration's new "shared responsibility" policy.
Conferees agreed to revisit this issue next year. The resultant shortfall, combined with the
establishment of a large UNMIH - unanticipated at the time of our budget submission ~ ensures
additional arrears in FY 95. Their size, however, could vary substantially depending on whether
missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia continue long into next fiscal year.
U.S. Debt to the United Nations
$U.S. Millions
Peacekeeping
BudRet
Regular Budget
Total
U.S. Debt as of
August 1
883
U.S. Payments to be
Made by September 30
670
U.S. Payments
in FY 1995
533'
Remaining
U.S. Debt
?
531
0
335
58'
1.414
670
868
?
1
The U.S. will make an immediate payment of at least $213 mill, at the start of the fiscal year, clearing all
outstanding current peacekeeping arrears.
The UN carries on its books $138 mill, in U.S. anears that we do not acknowledge and will never pay due to
congressionally-mandated "policy holds" for such things as previous UN activities in support of the PLO and
SWAPO.
2
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UN Inspector General and Other UN Reforms: The U.S. recently won a hard-fought
battle to establish, by consensus resolution, an independent UN office of inspector general, known
as the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). Its establishment, in accordance with
Congressionally-mandated requirements, is a major victory for the Administration. It also averted
the loss of half the $670 mill. FY 94 peacekeeping supplemental and 20% of our FY 95 regular
budget dues. On Friday, September 23, the Secretary of State will certify to Congress that the
UN has in place an independent office of inspector general, and we will release the bulk of the
sequestered funds.
The U.S. continues to press for various UN reforms, including cost containment,
procurement and personnel reform, reduction of waste and fraud, and openness in UN budget
processes. However, our top reform priority is reduction of our peacekeeping assessment from
the current 30.4% to 25% by FY 96. While the reduction is consonant with Administration
policy, it is also now law: Congress has prohibited payments exceeding 25% after October 1,
1995. We have tried to work constructively within the UN system to get other OECD countries
to assume a greater share of the burden. Our success has been minimal thus far, despite some
help from Boutros-Ghali, who recognizes the dangers of over-dependence on a single large
donor. We will continue to urge a UN-managed reduction but expect, ultimately, it will be
imposed unilaterally by Congress. This will leave us technically in perpetual arrears to the UN.
U.S. Priorities Purine the 49th UNGA: During this UNGA session, the U.S. will
continue pursuing concrete peacekeeping and management reforms. We will also seek broad
support for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and swift conclusion
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. will aim to cut-offfissilematerial production
and establish a regime limiting exports of anti-personnel land mines.
Limits on UNGA resolutions addressing the Middle East, and further improvements
in the texts of those that remain, is a major U.S. goal. Resolutions should reflect progress in the
Peace Process and should be rid of unbalanced language. The U.S. will again press for Israel's
inclusion in one of the five UN regional groupings and encourage support for economic
development in the region.
The U.S. will lobby for priority attention to women'srightsas well as increased
funding for the UN's Human Rights Center and newly established High Commissioner for
Human Rights. We will also pursue adequate resources for the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunals and swift prosecution of suspected war criminals.
In addition, the U.S. will continue its support for an array of initiatives aimed at
promoting sustainable development, while seeking substantive follow-up to the UN Conference
on Environment and Development.
Finally, the U.S. will support Security Council reform efforts. There has been little
progress in the open-ended UNGA working group established for this purpose last year. Its work
will continue through the upcoming UNGA session, with the aim of placing a resolution before
the GA in late 1995. However, the near-term prospects for reform are dim, and the U.S. must
soon decide how hard it wants to push for change. Other permanent members have made
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conciliatory sounds but privately prefer no reform in order to preserve their own privileged
positions. The U.S. joins many other nations in supporting a modest expansion to 20-21 seats (up
from 15) to create a more representative Council but opposes any expansion that would render
the Council unwieldy and ineffective. We continue to support permanent seats for Germany and
Japan but have taken no formal position on extending to them the veto.
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