1
500
5
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d81b579cc4914cbe257155797b8bfa82.pdf
ef6e13663ff5ecbaacd3a91d69b74f20
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0682-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
6/11/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review was for all documents from National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings related to Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia between January 1993 and December 1995. Documents being released include briefing papers, agenda, memorandum to the National Security Advisor or the President related to upcoming meetings. The collection includes support papers and briefs for the PC and DC members to make informed decisions. This collection also includes a significant amount of administrative paperwork related to document handling and records management. These documents are from National Security Council, Records Management Office files.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
09/03/2021
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2010-0533-M_2013-0682-M_dl.pdf
Bosnia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/77ada4cd7d38c8d5842c1d2a69956107.pdf
67f26ea21f1977132c522e0085b7771f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0682-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 to 1995. Materials include information papers on military options in Bosnia.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
05/23/2017
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0682-M.pdf
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
09/08/2017
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f5dc6559a12c1fc6d14e00cbaf4b09be.pdf
a4fa44c8031a2395960af2301a830001
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0682-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 to 1995. Materials include Department of Defense papers, memoranda, and reports regarding the Bosnian Federation, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and military activities in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0682-M
26457815
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c7aab4fa14f4ae3913df3566517d001f.pdf
b14952d2d69997524da61983526d2665
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) or Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.
�SECRETCLINTON LIBRARY P O O O ^
HTCP
ISSUE PAPER
HUMANTTARTAN ATT) OPTTONS
When the Bosnian Parliament voted to accept the Geneva Peace Plan but placed
conditions which in effect rejected the plan, hopes dimmed for a peaceful settlement in
Bosnia prior to the winter and last winter's concems over a humanitarian have been
resurrected. Last year mild weather and unidentified reserves of food helped to avert
disaster, but we cannot hope for a repeat of the mild weather this year. And with the
reserves of food and body fat depleted before the winter begins, therequirementsare even
greater this year. UNHCR has identified a shortfall of US$ 172 million for Oct-Dec 1993
and a requirement for USS 566 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but their donor appeal will go
out next week and the US and the international community will doubtless respond.
The real key to averting humanitarian disaster this winter is the thorny issue of
access. Once the international community responds to UNHCR's appeal, how do the
resources get to the target populations in the face of inclement weather and sporadic or
continuous hostilities? UNHCR has been so concerned with the dangers that aid delivery
poses to their workers, that they have been negotiating with UNPROFOR to turn over aid
delivery to the UN peacekeepers. Some of the key questions concerning access are
addressed below, followed by a more in-depth description of the security situation and
numerous "solutions" to help alleviate the access problem.
Key Quttttona;
Can anyone guarantee access?
The short answer is no. Asidefromthe decreased access expected due to winter
weather, the constant threat of hostilities has turned access into a cat and mouse game.
Access is dependent not only on the political parries' current support for access, but also
on each local war lord.
What can be done to increase the likelihood that aid reaches the target population?
Access can be increased by using force, or bribery, but it cannot be guaranteed.
The likelihood of UNPROFOR using force to deliver aid is nonexistent, and short of a US
decision to unilaterally ensure the delivery of aid, force will probably not be a viable
option. Bribery, providing carrots to the warring parties, in exchange for their guarantee
of access may have a slightly higher chance for success.
What would be the effect of lifting/suspending sanctions?
The Serbian economy is in dire straights and Milosevic's willingness to pressure the
Bosnian Serbs in the most recent round of peace talks was more than likely fueled by his
hope that sanctions would be lifted. Even a partial lifting of sanctions, to include such
commodities as heating oil, might prove to be a powerful carrot for Milosevic. The
SECRETSSKtfXr™*'
DeclMtify on: OADR
1
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
AOl2> " D
' Y)
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
HSECRETquestion is how much leverage he ultimately has not only over Karadzic, but over the
various Bosnian Serb warlords.
What leverage is there over the Bosnian Croats?
There may be several avenues to encourage Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats
to allowfreeaccess for humanitarian aid. Some of these include the threat of sanctions
and the offer of economic assistance. Once again, the question is how much leverage
Croatia has over the Bosnian Croat warlords. The threat of airstrikes against all three
parties is more direct, but failure to carry out this threat in the past has weakened its
effectiveness.
What leverage is there over the Bosnian Serbs?
While Serbia is concerned with the lifting of sanctions, the Bosnian Serbs have not
felt the same hurt, particularly as they have been able to siphon off significant humanitarian
assistance to keep their people and their armies feed and fUeled More likely leverage
would exist if there is some way to make the Bosnian Serbs actually feel the pinch of the
Serbian sanctions. The threat of airstrikes remains as a paper tiger.
What leverage is there to prevent Muslim instigated clashes?
Perhaps the greatest leverage would be the threat to cut off all humanitarian
assistance to Bosnia. However, this is an option which makes us out to be the bad guys.
The international community, and the US in particular, canreiteratethat no western power
will use military force to settle the war, and at the same timereiteratedie threat of
airstrikes againstffiXparty which prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid.
If security of LOCs is not likely, what can be done to increase airlift/airdrop
effectiveness?
Unfortunately the coming winter means a decrease rather than an increase in the
effectiveness of airlift and airdrop as a means to deliver humanitarian aid. In November,
December, and January 30% of theflyingdays will be lost to inclement weather. In
Febniaiy and March the number declinestoa loss of 20% of theflyingdays.
What are the Umitatlons of airlift/airdrop?
All of the airfields are limited to daylight hours of operation. To increase the
airflow into Sarajevo wouldrequireincreased personnel for ground operations. If Tuzla is
opened, the airport is limited to one C-141 or three C-1308 on the ground at any one time.
Airdrop of anything other than food or medicine is a difficult operation and presents
numerous challenges and risks. For both airland and airdrop operations, increases would
entail significantresourcecommitments.
SECRET
DnfedfayiLAA«/3-65 W60c<93
ClautfMbyOASD
DoclMiIfy on-. OADR
�SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
The Isstie-AccMS and Security, not Reagyrces;
The Security Situation!
The Bosnian people needing humanitarian assistance are located in isolated
pockets dispersed to numerous parts of the land-locked country. The UNHCR's major
distribution centers for humanitarian assistance are in Serbia (Belgrade) and Croatia
(Metkovic on the Dalmatian coast and Zagreb). Land convoys from these centers are
necessary in order for the resources to reach the target population in any volume. These
convoys can be and are augmented by airland into Sarajevo and airdrop into some of the
enclaves. However, land access is mandatory for the volume of aid required, especially
with the requirement for winterization materials.
The roads linking the enclaves with each other and the distribution centers have
been under attack for 18 months. Bridges are out, roads have been mined, repair work is
at a virtual standstill. In addition to the physical problems, convoys are turning back to
avoidfighting,and being denied access by the different factions. The onset of inclement
weather will make convoy passage of these roads even more difficult.
The program director of Britain's aid effort in the former Yugoslavia reported on
the serious shortage of diesel fuel facing all of Bosnia, and highlighted the threat to Tuzla
because it has one of the largest resident and refugee populations and is at the far end of
one of the most tortuous and vulnerable supply routes. Hisreportpredicted winter
weather conditions and continued fighting would threaten to close all road access to
Tuzla. In assessing the needs of Tuzla, the British director believed that Tuzla would need
relief flights even if some road access is kept.
If access is deniedforany significant period of time, it will have a devastating
impact on the population and will probably lead to a humanitarian disaster. The
magnitude of the disaster will depend on how completely access is denied, how long it is
denied, and which population centers are denied. In Srebrenica, for example, most of the
enclave families have sufficient food stocks to last them for about 2 or 3 days.
The Bosnian Serbs: In the past few weeks, the Bosnian Serbs have allowed
relativelyfreeaccess to UNHCR convoys transiting to Sarajevo and the eastern Muslim
enclaves. It is generally agreed that this loosening of the noose around these cities is due
in part to the threat of NATO airstrikes, but perhaps even more directly to the recent
hopes of a peace settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have acquired the territory they set out to
control, and it was in their and Serbia's best interest to appear asreadyand willing
participants in the peace process and as aiding in humanitarian efforts, in the anticipation
of the lifting of sanctions and acceptance into the greater world community. Even at the
height of cooperation, fuel convoys did not move, because UNHCR feared that the Serbs,
short of fuel due to sanctions, would siphon off an unacceptable percentage as a "tax".
Since therejectionof the peace plan by die Bosnian Parliament, the shelling and gunfire
Dntod by: LAmdi/5^Jl6/60ct93
OwilfledbyOASD
Dealuiify co: OADR
SECRET
�SECRET
around Sarajevo have definitely increased, and there is the expectation that Serbian
cooperation in the humanitarian arena will probably quickly diminish.
The Bosnian Croats: Since the middle of August, few convoys have departed
Metkovic (UNHCR's central distribution center on the Dalmatian coast) and reached their
destination. The siege of Mostar is a prime example of how continued hostilities in the
central and southern region have prevented convoys from reaching the target populations.
Airdrops were used as a last ditch effort to prevent starvation in the Muslim sector, and
when a land convoy wasfinallyallowed through after extensive negotiations, a large
portion of the food and supplies had to be delivered to the Croat western sector of
Mostar, even though the situation there was infinitely better than that in the Muslim
sector. Last week Sarajevo received its first convoy from Metkovic since the middle of
August. The convoy used a circuitous route that would probably be impassable in winter.
Despite a new cease-fire in Mostar, there is no reason to believe that hostilities will
decrease to the extent required to allowfreeaccess for humanitarian convoys.
The Muslims: Despite the fact that it is the Muslim population that is in most dire
need of humanitarian assistance, the very hostilities which prevent the delivery of this
assistance are often sparked by Muslim offensives against the Bosnian Croat forces. The
Muslims are equally responsible for the breaking of numerous cease-fires and have
reportedly detained and delayed convoys for extensive searches.
Inclement Weather: The deteriorating roads into Sarajevo and the Muslim
enclaves are made even more hazardous by sporadic or continualfighting,andrainingof
the roads. This winter, mud, snow, and ice will cause road conditions to deteriorate
seriously. Damage to bridges around the major transportation centers will force UN
convoys to use secondary roads through the mountains, where travel will be very slow and
difficult. In addition, the airland and airdrop operations will become more difficult as the
pilots must not only worry about potential evasive action against enemyfire,but also must
deal with the cloudy, stormy weatherrifewith wind shears, poor visibility and other
hazards which will cause the cancellation of many missions, and make those that aren't
more treacherous.
Scope of Requirements:
The UN estimates that up to 3.4 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia
will require assistance. The up to 2.5 million people requiring assistance in Bosnia will
need 45.000 metric tons of food and 11,000 metric tons of nonfood assistance (medicines,
fuel, shelters, and healers) each month. Over die course of the winter, this could amount
to nearly 300,000 metric tons.
The World Food Program (WFP) has adequate supplies of most commodities for
Bosnia through the end of the year. Because of earmarking, some areas, particularly
Serbia and Montenegro are experiencing shortages of many commodities, but these issues
can be worked. UNHCR has announced a $172 million shortfall for Oct-Dec 1993 and
Drifted by: LA™dtJi-45W60c&i
OMitfW try OASD
Declntify on: OADR
•SECRET-
�SECRETrequirement for $577 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but the real issue is not one of adequate
resources, but one of access. The critical shortage of fuel, which will have repercussions
on everythingfromdistribution of resources, to heating and providing medical care, is
again a problem of access, not resource availability. While we cannot ignore the
upcoming donor's call, and must participate along with other countries and the EC in
responding to it, the majority of our efforts should be focused on how we can increase the
likelihood of successful access to the target population.
Possible "Solutions" to alleviate the problem of access;
All of the proffered solutions fall into one of three categories. Thefirstcategory
involves increasing the likelihood of access by opening up more routes, adding methods of
deliveryi or adding resources. The second category uses force to increase the likelihood
of access. In either case, however, there is no guarantee of access to all areas at all times.
The third category uses bribeiy or diplomacy to get concessionsfromthe parties to allow
free access. Because the three political leaders do not have control over all of the forces,
agreement by these parties will need to be augmented with their escorts to ensure the aid
gets through. Whatever action is taken, the weather and the support of the three warring
parties will greatly influence the success of the operation. Several actions may increase
the likelihood of success.
Increasing Resources:
1. Preposition at least a month's supply of aid:
One hedge against inclement weather is to preposition at least a month's supply to
carry populations through the times when storms and road conditions prevent convoys and
aircraft delivery. UNHCR is already attempting to do this, but have been unable to make
much headway. There may be two weeks of supplies in Sarajevo and three weeks in
Tuzla, but most enclaves are consuming supplies as rapidly as they are receiving them.
Even now, with relatively good accessfromBelgrade, next week's food supplies are
competing for convoy space with winter parkas and other winterization supplies. .
2. Increase Airlift into Sarajevo:
The United Nations currently averages 20 airland missions per day into Sarajevo.
The delivery of food and medicines is the top priority. The US has provided
approximately 35 percent of the total airland mission sorties. All 15 US C-1308 operating
into Bosnia are equipped with defensive systems to counter ground-to-air threats. These
are the only Air Force airlift C-130s with counter measure equipment.
Increasing daily US operations tempo will be very difficult. Of the 15 C-130s
operating out of Rhein-Main, 12 are generally operational day-to-day. Six are dedicated
to airdrop operations. Increasing the airland flow at Sarajevo willrequirean increase in
manpower on the ground to mm the aircraft and remove the cargo. The US has
steadfastly refused to increase forces on the ground at Sarajevo or in Bosnia. If the
decision is made to increase airlift operations into Sarajevo, it should be a NATO
SECRET
Drifted by: LAndVS4Sl«/<Oot93
aoiified try OASD
Dccluilfy on: OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-SECRET
operation, with USNATO putting forward the request for additional assets. Presuming
the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground, we would have to convince
allies to contribute ground personnel to augment the airfield ground operations.
Inclement weather between October and March will also have an affect on the
ability to deliver via airland and airdrop. During November, December, and January, we
can expect to lose 30% of the flying days due to weather. In Febmary and March this will
probably drop to 20% of the flying days lost due to weather.
3. Increase Alrdop:
Currently six US C-lSOs and 2 C-160s (1 German and 1 French) participate in
airdrop operations. The US has provided approximately 80% of the airdrop sorties. Eight
sorties are considered a maximum generation effort based on current ground support at
Rhein-Main and the complexity of night operations to three separate drop zones in Bosnia.
Almost any commodity can be airdropped if it is packaged correctly. However,
this is an extremely expensive option for delivery of supplies. Deliveries of food, MREs
and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs),and medicine using the TRIAD method of
delivery have been extremely successful However, the dropping of other than food and
medicine items present potential challenges and risks. Fuel bladders are a scarce
commodity, and coal would present significant processing and loading problems. Heavy
equipment and large bundle airdrops require drop zones clear of populated areas for
safety, and then the goods are difficult or unsafe to retrieve. The only exception to this is
the TRIAD delivery of food, limited to MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs).
4. Open Tuzla Airport:
Since Tuzla is a center of distribution for humanitarian aid, opening the airport
would increase access to a large area in central Bosnia. However, there are several
drawbacks and limiting factors to this option. The airport ifl small with the capability to
handle only one C-141/ or three C-130 on the ground at a time.
Despite the small capacity which will not offer a significant increase to deliveries, it
will take additional personnel on the ground to secure and operate the airport and the
ground operation. The Nordic Battalion stationed at Tuzla is now able to provide limited
security for the airfield. The battalion commander has stated they intend to secure and
control the Tuzla airport, but currently the Bosnia Muslims (BIH) are unwilling to leave.
Unless they leave, the Serbs will continue to have an excuse to attack it and the
commander will not take control.
The remaining problem is to provide engineering support for the maintenance of
the field and navigational aids for inclement weather. These personnel would need to be
provided by UNPROFOR. Again, if the US does not want to put US personnel on the
ground in Bosnia, we will have to convince another country to provide those people. One
of the other limitations that Tuzla is currently experiencing in aid distribution is their
SECRET
Dftlted by: LAm4/3-6516/60ot93
annfedbyOASD
Deduiify on: OADR
�SECRET
shortage of fuel. In addition to the fact that there would not be fuel on the ground for any
aircraft, fuel would have to be brought in, either by land or air, for use by the convoys in
distributing their humanitarian aid to the oudying areas.
5. Use Helicopters:
The use of helicopters to airlift supplies into enclaves could possibly augment
ground convoys. However, the helicopters are limited by weather, range, and altitude
restrictions, and would require extensive logistical and personnel support at either a land
base in Croatia or Serbia or aboard naval shipping in the Adriatic. In any helicopter
operation, deployment schedules, contingency commitments, and security requirements
must be analyzed before the decision to deploy is made.
6. Send in a Civil Affairs Assessment Team:
Send a Civil Affairs survey team to Bosnia to make an assessment of the needs for
survival through the winter. Identify required items other thin food (for example,
batteries.) Then have the team regroup in Zagreb or Belgrade to develop a distribution
plan. (Ask OFDA if the DART has already done or if they see a need for this.) If they
don't already have a good tracking system to record final end user distribution, set up the
system used for Provide HOPE.
7. Provide Additional Equipment to Open Routes:
Last year the US provided excess equipment, including snow removal equipment
for Sarajevo. Additionalroadgraders and snow plows would help to keep roads open
during inclement weather, or reopen them shortly thereafter. We could also lobby for
increased UNPROFOR engineer support to assist in keeping the roads passable, assuming
we don't want to provide US engineering support.
8. Increase Engineer Support:
On option is to lobby with our allies to provide additional engineering personnel to
UNPROFOR to assist in keeping the roads passable. Another option would be to provide
US engineering support on a temporary basis to repair roads before the onset of winter.
Use of Force:
9. Deliver Humanitarian Aid Using Force:
Another option is to apply pressure to UNPROFOR to use all means available,
including force, to deliver humanitarian aid. This would not require any additional UN
action, nor any US troops in Bosnia, if current UNPROFOR forces are used to implement
this option. To maximize resources, two key routes could be identified, probably one
from Belgrade and one from Metkovic, and forces used to provide security for convoys
using these routes. One option already under discussion would be for UNHCR to hand
over the delivery of aid to UNPROFOR.
The most difficult partfromthe US perspective is convincing the countries with
troops on the ground to take this action, while not providing any US forces in Bosnia.
Dr«ftad by: UimdVS-SSl WOotM
ClMitfledbyOASD
Decluofy cm: OADR
SECRET
�SECRET
Key NATO allies have indicated they have not changed their position on the use of force
to deliver aid. Currendy our allies see the availability of resources as the most critical
problem, and have not focused on how the collapse of the Geneva talks would affect
humanitarian assistance.
Use of Diplomacy/"Bribery":
10. Negotiating a Humanitarian Agreement:
With the prospects dimming for an overall peace agreement before winter,
negotiators could expend their energies on a regional conference on humanitarian
assistance. Attention would focus on the issue of how we can lay a political framework
for humanitarian relief operations. Before initiating relief operations, we should explore
the feasibility of preserving die termination of hostilities between Serbs and Bosnians as
well as achieving a cease-fire between Bosnians and Croats, without trying to settle the
issue of final land distribution. Terminating hostilities throughout Bosnia will not be easy.
Whether the warring parties will display theflexibilitywill depend on two factors:
domestic political constraints, and the degree to which diplomatic pressure can be brought
to bear outside the region to overcome those domestic constraints. The weight of the
international community, including such key players as Russia and Greece for Serbia;
Germany for Croatia; and the US for Bosnia, must be brought to bear at the negotiating
table. The London Conference on Yugoslavia outlined last August several specific steps
to enhance delivery of humanitarian assistance.
It may be possible to achieve agreement onfreeaccess if humanitarian aid is freely
offered to all parties. Some sort of a delivery fonnula could be developed that allowed
one Serbian or Croatian convoy for every three Muslim convoys. Agreement on such a
scheme by all three political parties will not guaranteefreeaccess of humanitarian aid
deliveries, however, because these parties do not have control over the various warlords
fighting the individual battles. To ensure access through these areas, the three belligerents
may well have to provide escort through their territories.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Serbs:
1. Temporarily suspend sanctions on humanitarian goods, such as heating oil and
coal, through the winter, on the condition offreeaccess to the Bosnian target population.
2. Increase humanitarian aid to the refugee population in Serbia and Montenegro.
3. Use Russia to influence Serbian assistance.
4. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
5. Look for ways to make sanctions felt by Bosnian Serbs.
6. Make humanitarian aid to Serbia contingent uponfreeaccess to the Muslim
areas.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Croats:
1. Reiterate the threat of sanctions.
2. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
SECRETDrifted by: LAmdVtt-651 W0ot93
CluiiiMbyOASD
DocliulfyoniOADR
�SECRET
3. Convince Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats by offering Croatia specific
economic assistance conditioned on humanitarian aid access to Bosnia,
4. Support the Vance Plan for the UNP As.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Muslims:
1. Reiterate that no western power, including the US will use military force to
settle the war in Bosnia.
2. State that no humanitarian aid will flow to central Bosnia when hostilities are
underway. Place the blame on the Muslims when they are the instigators.
Attachments:
A. After the Policy Decision: Getting the Word Out (PSYOPs and Public Affairs)
B. Winter Assessment (DIA)
C. NATO Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance (NATO Policy)
D. Bosnian Winter Climatology Report (USAF/XOOOW)
E. Message ICFY Humanitarian Issues
SECRET
Drifted by: LAmdt/3.6316/60ot93
CUutfledbyOASD
DtcUiiify au OADR
�. c • •:_'*-»
•SECRET
rn.i.M i
J
IU
c u r . v 1 v * J'-O
IUIJ
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
P. 02
K;.^JV
29 October 1993
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject: Expansion of Mission - US Hospital Zagreb (U)
1.
(U) g.urp_oj5.e. Provide analysis of expanding US h o s p i t a l
(Zagreb) medical mission t o t r e a t p e d i a t r i c p a t i e n t s .
2. (U) Background. Request f o r expansion of mission r e s u l t of
28 Oct DC meeting. Ambassador G a l b r a i t h p r e v i o u s l y requested US
h o s p i t a l involvement i n the care of f i v e t o ten c h i l d v i c t i m s of
the c o n f l i c t . General Cot, UNPROFOR commander, agreed w i t h
concept of using spare capacity at UN f i e l d h o s p i t a l s t o t r e a t
war trauma v i c t i m s . State c u r r e n t l y reviewing request.
3. (X) P-i-S-CUS-5jL-gn. 48th A i r Transportable H o s p i t a l i s t h i r d US
h o s p i t a l i n r o t a t i o n . H o s p i t a l OPCON t o UNPROFOR as a UN "blue
hatted" u n i t . Mission t o provide medical support t o UNPROFOR.
Hospital s t a f f reported t o be operating below capacity and would
be able t o accept up t o 10 p e d i a t r i c p a t i e n t s . Treating
c i v i l i a n s requires UN approved change i n mission.
PROS
• High v i s i b i l i t y US humanitarian assistance c o n t r i b u t i o n
without commitment o f a d d i t i o n a l ground troops
•
Appeals t o American sentiment.
•
Reduces s u f f e r i n g .
• Taps under-used resource, provides varied medical t r a i n i n g
opportunities.
CONS
• I m p a r t i a l i t y and treatment of only n o n - b e l l i g e r e n t s must
be maintained or safety of e x i s t i n g mission at r i s k - both
h o s p i t a l personnel and aircrews. Hard t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e
between j u v e n i l e combatants and non-combatants (Somalia).
• May detract from p r i o r i t y mission. To do j o b r i g h t w i l l
require changes i n equipment, personnel, supplies ( p e d i a t r i c
sized supplies, p e d i a t r i c i a n , p e d i a t r i c nurse, p e d i a t r i c
pharmaceuticals).
• C r i t e r i a not i n place t o determine what c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
p a t i e n t h o s p i t a l w i l l accept, length of stay, d i s p o s i t i o n of
f a m i l y members, and procedures f o r t r a n s f e r should space be
required f o r UNPROFOR p a t i e n t .
PER E.0.13526
C l a s s i f i e d by D i r e c t o r , J-5
Declassify on OADR
�.SECRET
• Non-US personnel making triage decisions.
system with history of screening problems.
Over stressed
• May expand into "magnet" hospital. Ignores potential
flood of patients from refugee community in Zagreb.
•
Creates untenable problem of turning away patients.
• C i v i l i a n hospitals available i n Zagreb with pediatric
capability.
• Patients l i k e l y to require long-term care. US hospital
not a long term care f a c i l i t y . May create permanent refugee
status for children and strain the already over-burdened
Croatian government.
• P o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to terminate once started.
precedent for future involvement.
Sets
4. £#5 B_o..t-toro_,Line. Seemingly attractive option - seen as
doing something. However, must be cautious of diverting US
military medical support from the UNPROFOR mission. Should not
proceed u n t i l s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a and procedures established and
agreed to for accepting, evacuating, treating, and returning
patients to families i n country of origin. Parties to agreement
must include affected agencies, governments and warring factions
- a significant diplomatic challenge.
I f USG undertakes mission
without agreement, belligerents l i k e l y to manipulate program as
an issue of taking sides - immediately jeopardizing the mission.
As an alternative to expanding US mission, recommend USG explore
consortium program with local hospitals under U H R W O auspices,
NC/H
Prepared by: LTC Kevin Campbell, USA and CPT Butch Betters, USA
J-5, European Division, X49435
BLKNWP 1977
•SECRET
TOTAL P.03
�otlintl
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC
.,
„^
DJSM-1196-93
8 November 1993
Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300
n r
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(REGIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
Subject:
Air Support Requirementsi to Support
Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)
French-Sponsored
1. (U) AB requested,* the Joint Staff has reviewed the French
proposal for delivering humanitarian r e l i e f supplies i n
Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) v i a convoy.
2.
Close a i r support (CAS) i n support of convoy
operations could be conducted using the forces engaged in NATO
Operation DENY FLIGHT i f the four AC-130 gunships deployed to
Somalia are returned to Operation DENY FLIGHT or replaced.
However, we recommend against providing CAS for the following
reasons:
a. UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized
military but by l o c a l bandits and groups of women and
children. CAS i s not useful in these situations.
b. Forcing delivery of humanitarian aid signals escalation
of military involvement and would require principals'
approval.
c. Serbs have j u s t offered guaranteed access from Bar to
Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid i s preferable to
convoying through potentially hostile areas.
3. ( / j We have determined that b a t t l e f i e l d a i r interdiction
operations are not desirable or feasible given the current
situation i n B-H, rules of engagement, and d i f f i c u l t i e s with
C l a s s i f i e d by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/3/15"
�target identification and linkage to enemy forces interfering
with convoy operations. The enclosed information paper
provides more details on the CAS for the French-sponsored
humanitarian relief operations.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
Enclosure
Reference:
* ASD(RSA) memorandum, 193/50258, 29 October 1993, "Air Support
Requirements To Support French Sponsored Humanitarian Relief
Operations"
ernprT
TI muz
a QE-.ST es,
ee A W
O
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
-fiDCHET-
3 November 1993
ENCLOSURE
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
A i r Support Requirements f o r French-Sponsored
Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)
1. (U) Purppse. To provide information on close a i r support
(CAS) f o r French-sponsored humanitarian r e l i e f operations.
2. (u) Key points
•
The French propose that m i l i t a r y escorted convoys be
used to d e l i v e r approximately 1,000 tons per day of r e l i e f
supplies to Sarajevo and environs t h i s winter.
• (p) The French estimate that one convoy per day of 50 trucks
(20 ton capacity) w i l l transport the r e l i e f supplies t o
Sarajevo and t h a t each convoy w i l l take 3 days t o t r a v e l t o
Sarajevo, unload supplies, and r e t u r n t o point of o r i g i n .
* (/) The three courses of action (COA) consider using two
route c l u s t e r s f o r convoy operations.
COA 1 - Escorting convoys on varied routes.
•» COA 2 - Escorting convoys on a s i n g l e route.
COA 3 - C o n t r o l l i n g a s i n g l e route.
* (^5 French operation w i l l require a i r support from Operation
DENY FLIGHT.
* (JX) The French f e e l that the current ROE i s adequate f o r the
conduct of CAS.
•
The current Operation DENY FLIGHT force l e v e l s are i n
place and adequate to meet the CAS mission f o r the French
proposal.
J-3 estimates that the r e t u r n of or deployment of 4
X AC-130 a i r c r a f t i s required. NATO would have t o approve
t h i s use.
DECLASSIFIED
FER E.0.13526
8/2/\5
-GECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by D i r e c t o r , J-3
Declassify on OADR
KBM
Enclosure .
TI W0TT2 d TE:ST EG, 60 AON
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
• {p) NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT conducts 70 f i g h t e r CAS
missions a week, maintains a 24-hour a l e r t a i r c r a f t , and
conducts 7 ABCCC missions per week. CINCSOUTH has scheduled 7
AC-130 gunship missions per week when assets return from
Somalia.
i
• (p) Current in-place CSAR assets are adequate f o r aircrew
recovery only.
• CS? ABCCC mission rate may increase.
• (£f UNPROFOR commands the CAS ground components and would
have to provide the AOCG at K i s e l j a k and FACPs on each convoy.
• (^7 UNHCR a i d convoys are not being stopped by organized
m i l i t a r y but by l o c a l bandits and groups of women and
c h i l d r e n . CAS i s not useful i n these s i t u a t i o n s .
•
Forcing the d e l i v e r y of humanitarian aid signals
unwanted e s c a l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y involvement and would require
P r i n c i p a l s ' approval.
• (jar) Serbs have j u s t offered guaranteed access from Bat t o
Sarajevo. Permissive d e l i v e r y of a i d i s preferable t o
convoying through p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e areas.
• C " The conduct of b a t t l e f i e l d a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n (BAI) t o
S)
support convoys i s not envisioned.
• (U) BAI i s a i r operations conducted to destroy, n e u t r a l i z e ,
or delay the enemy's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l before i t can be
brought to bear e f f e c t i v e l y against f r i e n d l y forces at such
distances from f r i e n d l y forces that d e t a i l e d i n t e g r a t i o n of
each a i r mission w i t h the f i r e and movement of the f r i e n d l y
forces i s not required.
• CS^ The current s i t u a t i o n i n B-H does not lend i t s e l f to the
conduct of BAI.
•» Concentrations of enemy forces are not present.
Interference w i t h convoys has been by small bands,
u n i d e n t i f i e d i n d i r e c t f i r e , c i v i l i a n mobs, and groups of
women and c h i l d r e n .
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of forces i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h convoy
operations and t a r g e t i n g t h e i r higher echelons would be
d i f f i c u l t t o impossible.
OECRET •
-
Sd
2
,
Enclosure
TI W0TT2 a cE:ST £6. 60 A N
O
li
�•&ECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
0
0
opeJatio^. ^"^ "
D E N Y
F L I G H T
R
0
E
d o
n o t
authorize BAI
C o l l a t e r a l damage w i l l be a major concern.
Prepared by: LTC B i l l FitzGerald, USA
J-3/JOD, 52541
EUCOM2//378//
'ERT
DCE
Enclosure
-
9 d
TI W0TT3 d £e:£T £ . 60 A W
6O
�CLINTON
SECRET
LIBRARY
P H O T O C O P Y November 1993
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
Increasing
Humanitarian Aid - Airdrops (U)
1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on improving the
d e l i v e r y of humanitarian a i d by increasing airdrop operations.
2. (U) Background. The ongoing airdrop operation began i n
February 93 as a temporary measure aimed at supplementing ground
convoys. Despite the recent success of the ground routes,
continued intransigence and d e t e r i o r a t i n g conditions due t o
winter weather make examination of a l t e r n a t i v e d e l i v e r y methods
necessary.
3. (u) Key Points
a.
•
ASSUMPTIONS
Enhanced operations
are requested/supported by UNHCR.
• Increased airdrops are temporary i n nature, aimed at those
i n need who cannot be reached by ground convoys due t o
f i g h t i n g or winter conditions.
•
A d d i t i o n a l supplies are a v a i l a b l e f o r increased
•
B e l l i g e r e n t s sanction
b.
•
<^
airdrops.
operation.
CONCEPT OF OPERATION
Airdrops continue
at night due t o t h r e a t .
• Surge c a p a b i l i t y above current s i x f l i g h t s per night using
dedicated f l e e t i m p r a c t i c a l . A i r c r a f t operating at near
maximum u t i l i z a t i o n rates due t o f l i g h t d u r a t i o n , crew
a v a i l a b i l i t y and p e r i o d i c maintenance requirements. For an
immediate surge, USEUCOM would be required t o r e p r i o r i t i z e
theater a i r missions i n order t o support.
Sustained surge
would require a d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t , aircrews, and r i g g e r s .
T h i r t y day supply of a i d items a v a i l a b l e i n Germany.
• For the long term, a d d i t i o n a l defensive system equipped
C-130s/crews are made a v a i l a b l e t o USEUCOM. This w i l l
probably require a d d i t i o n a l National Guard/Reserve
p a r t i c i p a t i o n depending on increased l e v e l of e f f o r t .
A d d i t i o n a l s o r t i e s require increase i n riggers (8 per s o r t i e
- i f airdrops doubled would require a d d i t i o n a l r i g g i n g
company).
•
S u f f i c i e n t ramp space i s a v a i l a b l e at Rhein Mein.
•SB€R£F
PER E.0.13526
a o \ 3 - OJO83L-
3 ^ / 5 - KBH
n
C l a s s i f i e d by: D i r e c t o r , J-5
Declassify on: OADR
�"-,r •
«.J-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
• Additional sorties w i l l require increased reliance on GPS
directed drops, due to limited number of A/C equipped with
AWADS (Radar for precision airdrops) and defensive systems.
• I f possible, new a i r items should be procured in an
international orange color. This would make them easy to
spot by those in need, easier to recover, and less valuable
to combatants. USG should seek UN funding to cover contract
costs.
b.
•
(^
DISCUSSION
This option presents minimal risk to US A/C,
crews.
• Airdrop operations are less weather dependent than
helicopter d e l i v e r i e s .
• Accuracy of current delivery means i s good. Increasing
airdrop operations, however, does not ensure that food i s
delivered to those in need; ground distribution systems are
uncertain and beyond our control.
• Airdrops are not capable of delivering required fuel/water
needed in some locations. This requires ground convoys,
which are the most e f f i c i e n t means of delivering aid.
• Airdrops do not address pressing issue of delivery of
winterization supplies. Belligerents have c l a s s i f i e d these
items as non-humanitarian aid due to potential for military
application. Airdropping winterization supplies l i k e l y
perceived as belligerent act.
• Belligerents could use these operations as a reason to
deny access to isolated areas by ground personnel. This
would not only undercut the UN efforts to expand ground
convoys, but could also prevent observers from getting in to
obtain accurate assessments.
• Incremental cost of each C-130 f l i g h t i s approximately
$12,500, not including costs of r e l i e f supplies.
C.
(U)
POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
PROS
• Safest method of US participation.
• Very v i s i b l e , high profile demonstration of US concern/
activism.
• Does not put forces on the ground.
• Overcomes access problems to isolated areas.
-SECRET
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
CONS
• Does not address cause of problem; subsidizes continued
fighting.
• Extremely c o s t l y e f f o r t producing minimal r e s u l t s .
• No c o n t r o l of ground d i s t r i b u t i o n ; unable to ensure
d e l i v e r y to those i n need.
• Decreases need f o r cooperation/negotiations by
belligerents.
• Enhanced e f f o r t may arouse congressional s c r u t i n y .
4. ( j f ) Bottom Line. While e f f e c t i v e i n accuracy, the airdrop
operation i s not e f f e c t i v e f o r the large volume of sustained
supply f o r a c i v i l i a n population. Operation i s i n v i t i n g due t o
the l o w - r i s k and high v i s i b i l i t y . J o i n t S t a f f would s t r o n g l y
recommend airdrops over h e l i c o p t e r or ground operations f o r
emergency resupply of l i m i t e d q u a n t i t i e s of r e l i e f supplies t o a
needy population.
Prepared by:
1
OECRET
J-3/4/5, POC CDR Mark A Stearns, USN, X49435
BLKNWP 19 80
�-SEGRET-
. N O LIBRARY
XTN
MEMORANDUM FOR
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
FROM:
YUGOSLAV TASK FORCE
Prepared by Col J.P. Kiley/EurPoI/x40661
SUBJECT:
Medical Options for Croatia
Tab A tasked a requirement to review medical capabilities in order to provide additional
relief for refugee assistance in Croatia. Currently, the 48th Air Transportable Hospital is deployed
in Zagreb in support of UNPROFOR. This unit is tasked and designed to give trauma and
stabilization care to combat casualties. It can provide for 60 bedriddenpatients. Ambassador
Galbraith has requested that surplus capacity be provided for the care of civilian patients,
particularly children. The JCS paper describing the additional requirements necessary to
accommodate this request is at Tab B.
Other options exist to provide additional medical capability to administer to the
requirements of the refugee population in Croatia. These options all require additional medical
personnel and equipment to be deployed in a potential combat area. A decision will be required
for deployment and expenditure of the necessary funds.
Options:
- Medical Civil Action Programs: augment the military hospital in Zagreb with additional
personnel in order to provide rotational medical service to the refugee camps. Active/reserve
forces from all services could be used to augment the hospital. This might benefit active duty
training for reserve personnel. It might be possible torequestcivilian health care professionals to
augment the hospital and provide the additional staffing from these volunteers.
- Environmental Health Assistance: civil action programs consisting of environmental
health specialists to advise therefugeepopulation could augment the hospital in Zagreb. While
providing no direct health care, they could assist by providing a forward deployed diagnostic
laboratory to conduct surveillance on the health status of therefugeecamps by monitoring the
sanitation, food preparation, water systems, and entomological sources of communicable diseases.
- Naval Assets:
- Assault Landing Ship (LHA) - an option exists to use helicopters to provide resupply
to therefugeepopulation in Bosnia for the winter. The LHA contains a 48 bed hospital with a
full operating suite for combat casualties. It could, if fully manned, provide humanitarian care for
patients prior to movement to a civilian facility. The resupply helicopters could provide the lift
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
r 'JJ^TJ
7,3/*
#*
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTQ££fe
from shore to ship as scheduled by UN organizations. Medical civil action programs from the
ship could also be conducted in conjunction with the U.S. hospital in Zagreb and coordinated with
the UN.
- Hospital Ship (TAH) - two are currently in the inventory under the control of the
Military Sealift Command (MSG). One is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. It has a complement of
1200 personnel; has 1,000 hospital beds; 12 operating suites; and is manned by acdve duty and
civilian personnel. The ship would require support to move patients to/from the vessel; escort
ships; and a defined UN procedure for returning patients to civilian hospitals would have to be
established. The ship is in Baltimore Harbor in reduced operating status (5 days). If ordered to
sea and medical personnel assigned, it could be at sea in 5 days. Activation costs will be $4060K. Operating costs range from $51K/day at sea to S41K/day in port or at anchor. Activation
costs are absorbed in these per diem costs. It is primarily a surgical facility but can be equipped
and staffed for humanitarian operations. A 30 day block of surgical supplies is valued at $12M.
Supplies for humanitarian assistance would be additive to this. Medical civil action could also be
conducted from this platform through coordination with the hospital in Zagreb. While current
plans call for the ship to be staffed with U.S. Navy personnel, joint staffing from USN, USA, and
USAF medical personnel might be possible, if this option is considered, to lessen the affect on
residual medical care for all services.
AU optionsrequirea threat assessment, personnel, fiscal, and logistical estimate.
Recommendation: none. For information only.
-SECRET
Classified by OASD
-
�OEGREX.
17 APR 94
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
Comments on D r a f t NSC Issues Paper on Bosnia 17 APR (U)
1. (U) Purpose.
on Bosnia.
To provide comments on d r a f t NSC issues paper
scussion.General comments:
• A l l options are escalatory i n nature using
brinksmanship to make the Bosnian-Serbs back down (which they've
j u s t demonstrated they're not l i a b l e to do). A i r power options
can not guarantee m i l i t a r y impact s u f f i c i e n t to compel
compliance.
• A l l options put UNPROFOR at increased
risk.
• A l l options could r e s u l t i n Bosnian government
manipulation of NATO responses.
•Failure of chosen option could r e s u l t i n t o t a l
f a i l u r e and withdrawal of UNPROFOR w i t h subsequent impact on
humanitarian a i d .
• A l l 5 options are escalatory i n nature and could lead
to s p i l l o v e r .
• A l l proposed options assume NAC consensus (which
would be extremely d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n i n a l l cases, and
impossible i n the more aggressive options) and UN cooperation i n
execution (such UN resolve a f t e r l a s t week's action i s
questionable).
OPTION 1: NATO Air Strikes on heavy weapons and infantry
PROs:
-Demonstrates f o r c e f u l action.
-Consistent w i t h NATO decisions o f 2/9 Aug 93 declaring
concern for B-H safe areas (NAC d e c i s i o n s t i l l required to
execute a i r s t r i k e s ) .
CONs:
-Successful only i f bombs don't drop.
-Most escalatory of a l l options.
-Taking on both attacks on heavy weapons and small i n f a n t r y
u n i t s places high requirement f o r a i r c a p a b i l i t y and
increases danger to NATO p i l o t s .
-Ignores l i k e l y Bosnian-Serb r e a c t i o n s .
-Relies on airpower alone to force B-S concessions on
ground.
- U l t i m a t e l y would weaken NATO; debate would be f r a c t i o u s ,
and i f passed, would promise more than a i r power can
deliver.
- L i k e l y to f u r t h e r antagonize Russians.
•SECRETDECLASSIFIED
C l a s s i f i e d by Director J-5
Declassify on OADR
PER E.0.13526
3/ViS
KSH
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OPTION 2: UNPROFOR exclusion areas around safe areas
PROs:
-Follows successful Sarajevo model.
-Builds on Feb 94 NAC decisions.
-Demonstrates evenhandedness i n t h a t i t also warns Bosnian
Muslims against attacking from safe areas (wording should
be changed to r e f l e c t not launching assaults from inside
safe areas vice r e f r a i n i n g from use of heavy weapons from
i n s i d e safe areas - applies to options 2,3,4).
CONs:
-Would require 8-10,000 a d d i t i o n a l UNPROFOR troops t o
enforce.
-Monitoring e f f o r t would s c a t t e r UNPROFOR forces leaving
them vulnerable t o harassment/detention, e t c .
- A d d i t i o n a l cost t o USG f o r troops and a d d i t i o n a l f l i g h t
hours.
OPTION 3: Exclusion areas without UNPROFOR c o n t r o l
PROs :
-Requires less troops.
-UNPROFOR less vulnerable and less v i s i b l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h
enforcement.
CONs:
-Makes NATO appear a b e l l i g e r e n t .
-Contrary t o e x i s t i n g UNSCRs.
-Without ground observers, t a r g e t i n g and execution
difficult.
-Requires extensive
recon.
OPTION 4: No-bombardment zone
PROs:
-Consistent w i t h UNSCRs supporting safe areas.
- I f passed sends strong message of NATO s o l i d a r i t y .
-Probably most saleable t o NAC.
-Doesn't attempt t o r o l l back B-S.
-Could be used as basis f o r country-wide cease f i r e .
CONs:
-Subject to manipulation given lack of ground presence.
-Extremely d i f f i c u l t to enforce.
«6ECRET2
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OPTION 5: Complete withdrawal from around safe areas
PROs:
-Evenhanded approach, demanding compliance from both sides.
-Provides comprehensive safety f o r safe areas.
CONs:
-Manpower intensive t o monitor on ground.
-Probably unacceptable t o B-S.
-Probably unacceptable t o Bosnian Government i n that lines
of c o n f l i c t would be frozen.
NSC ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
General comments noted above also a p p l i c a b l e t o a l t e r n a t i v e
strategy.
PROs:
-Recognizes geographic i s o l a t i o n of Gorazde and lack of
long-term v i a b i l i t y i n comprehensive agreement.
CONs :
-Doesn't specify how other safe areas are going t o be
protected by NATO.
-Admits UNPROFOR f a i l u r e i n Gorazde.
•
S f i G f i B : F
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP GECRgP
35
.c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
12 Hay 1994
Military Status Report
for Sarajevo, Gorazdo, and Tuala
Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have continued
to violate the cease-fire agreement and heavy veapon
exclusion aone around Sarajevo. Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs
appear to be systematically challenging the ON's control
over tho tone. Bosnian Serb forces also have not fully
implemented their vithdraval agreement vith the tm around
Oorazdo. The Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla city and tha
surrounding area on 11 Hay for the f i f t h time since NATO
conducted airstrikes on Serb forces attacking Gorazde last
month.
35
.c
Recent Sarajevo Exclusion Zone Violations
Bosnian Serbs are increasingly flaunting U control of
N
the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Serb
forces continue to operate heavy weapons outside of U
N
control or supervision within the Sarajevo exclusion zone.
Serb forces also are reportedly blocking U patrols in some
N
areas of the exclusion zone and have a generally hostile
attitude toward-UN personnel.
—
The Bosnian Serbs violated most of the stipulations
in the tank transit deal worked out by U special
N
envoy Akashi a.nd_Bosn.iafl_Sanb_Le*der_K*x»d.7.-ic_on
3 Hay. 1
!4c
The Serbs have removed and not returned about 20
heavy weapons from U weapon collection points
N
since the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. 0. 13526
8/3/t5 KBM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP GECRgP
3.5c
Small arms and machine gun exchanges occur
r e g u l a r l y throughout Sarajevo, and the UN s t a t e d
the f i r s t tank round s i n c e the February c e a s e - f i r e
and ultimatum was f i r e d on 9 May.
—
The Bosnian Serbs are l i m i t i n g freedom o f movement
f o r UN personnel w i t h i n the e x c l u s i o n zone. For
example, the Grbavica b r i d g e i s again closed t o UN
personnel
1.4c
3.5c
Bosnian Government forces have also v i o l a t e d the
Sarajevo heavy weapon e x c l u s i o n zone and c e a s e - f i r e
agreements, although not as b l a t a n t l y as the Bosnian Serbs.
] s i x or seven heavy weapons and
1.4c
preparations f o r four o r f i v e new heavy weapon
p o s i t i o n s on Mount Igman,
—
—
r e p o r t s of f7oro"0 Government troops massing i n the
area. Some Government u n i t s are u s u a l l y s t a t i o n e d
i n t h i s area, but these f o r c e s probably have been
r e i n f o r c e d w i t h s.o.n.e_additional troops and the
heavy weapons.
3.5c
r
Bosnian Serb Compliance vith Gorazde Oltimaturn
The UN has become i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned about Bosnian
Serb v i o l a t i o n s o f the Gorazde e x c l u s i o n zones. UN Special
Representative Akashi t o l d Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on
10 May t h a t unless the Bosnian Serbs immediately complied
w i t h the c e a s e - f i r e agreement, he would have t o r e f e r the
matter t o the UN Secretary-General and the S e c u r i t y Council,
A s e r i e s o f Serb
1.4c
v i o l a t i o n s nave been noted m recent days:
—
About 100 t o 150 armed Bosnian Serb " p o l i c e " remain
s t a t i o n e d i n s i d e the t h r e e - k i l o m e t e r e x c l u s i o n
zone, according t o UN o f f i c i a l s . Akashi has
demanded these personnel be removed, I
14
,c
The UN commander i n Gorazde r e c e n t l y stated
p u b l i c l y t h a t he i s c e r t a i n there are s t i l l heavy
weapons being held w i t h i n the zone. UN m i l i t a r y
observers r e c e n t l y found two 2^mm_AA_vLe-a.p_o.n.s.^_which
they escorted out o f the zone.
1.4c
The UN commander also stated
"tha"tr"tfie Serbs probably are h i d i n g weapons i n areas
they have declared o f f l i m i t s t o UN observers.
—
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1
3.5c
-
—
The Bosnian Serbs continue to harass and delay UN
m i l i t a r y and r e l i e f convoys entering Gorazde. A
French l o g i s t i c s convoy held up at a Serb
checkpoint f o r three days f i n a l l y arrived in
Gfira.z.di5L_o.n_? Kay, |
14
.c
Some personnel reportedly were not
allowed through and forced to return to Sarajevo.
3.5c
Bosnian Serb Actions Against Tuzla
Bosnian Serb forces shelled Tuzla c i t y and the
surrounding area on 11 May, |
14
.c
This i s the f i f t h a r t i l l e r y attack on Tuzla c i t y or
Tuzla a i r p o r t since the NATO a i r s t r i k e s .
—
The latest shelling of the c i t y may be a Serb
response to the Government mortar attack against
Brcko on 10 May that k i l l e d several c i v i l i a n s .
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SCCRET
�(b)(3)
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
25 July 1994
Effects of Creating and S t r i c t l y Enforcing Exclusion Zones
The creation of new exclusion zone i s u n l i k e l y to force the
Bosnian Serbs t o s e t t l e . While s t r i c t enforcement of those zones
would rachet up the pressure on the Serbs, i t could also
undermine the continuation of a Western troop presence i n Bosnia
and exacer
tures between NATO and the UN and w i t h i n the
Alliance.
The creation of new exclusion zones around Bihac, Tuzla,
Zepa, and Srebrenica without t h e i r s t r i c t enforcement w i l l place
much of Bosnia's Muslim population under Western protection but
w i l l have l i t t l e m i l i t a r y or diplomatic impact on the Bosnian
conflict.
—
The s i t e s f o r the new zones, which have already been
declared safe havens, are not the current scenes of
major f i g h t i n g .
—
The Serbs and the Muslims probably w i l l redeploy t h e i r
forces i n the zones t o more contentious areas. Refugees
may t r y to return t o areas under Serb control w i t h i n the
zones, increasing ethnic tensions there.
New exclusion zones are not l i k e l y to propel the Serbs into
accepting the Contact Group plan. Instead, they are l i k e l y to
increase t h e i r harassment of UN personnel i n Bosnia by blocking
UN resupply convoys, aggravating UN troops with small-arms f i r e ,
and r e s t r i c t i n g the UN's freedom of movement.
—
The UN said that Bosnian Serb Army Commander Mladic on
Monday threatened to "make l i f e d i f f i c u l t " f o r UN forces
beginning on 30 July, when the Contact Group foreign
ministers discuss how t o t r y t o reverse the Serbs'
r e j e c t i o n of the peace plan.
—
Bosnian Serbs have already stepped up actions against
the UN, probably to remind the Contact Group of the
p o t e n t i a l costs of t h e i r decisions. I n Sarajevo,
Bosnian Serb forces may have h i t as many as f i v e UN
a i r c r a f t with small-arms f i r e l a t e l a s t week and
attempted to withdraw heavy weapons from storage s i t e s .
On Sunday, Serb forces moved an a r t i l l e r y piece into the
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP
SECRET
(b)(3)
Gorazde. exclusion zone and fired on Muslim civilians,
The Bosnian Government has indicated that i t w i l l complain
bitterly i f the international community does not act quickly and
decisively to compel fiprh ar.r.ftntance nf thi> contact Group plan.
Sarajevo probably
according to press
14
.c
w i l l attempt to t i e the credibility of the Contact Group, the UN,
and NATO to international support for more aggressive action.
—
Bosnian President Izetbegovic told the press that his
government would drop their support for the plan i f the
Serbs maintain their demands or the major powers f a i l to
act.
—
Bosnia's UN Ambassador Sacirbey noted that " i t was time
for the qnntar.t Group to show i t has some kind of
teeth."
(b)(3)
Once the international community moves to s t r i c t l y enforce
the exclusion zones, the Bosnian Serbs probably w i l l dramatically
step up their pressure on UNPROFOR and r e l i e f agencies.
After NATO airstrikes around Gorazde this spring,
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, charging that the UN
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
TOP
(b)(3)
OECRET
�TOP
GCORCT
(b)(3)
had aided with the Muslims, placed UN personnel under
house arrest and attempted to remove Serb weapons from
UN c o l l e c t i o n sites around Sarajevo. I (bp)
The Bosnian Serbs probably w i l l continue to r e j e c t the plan
i n hopes they can e x p l o i t any r i f t s between Contact Group
members, and the UN and NATO, t o minimize the p o s s i b i l i t y of
action against them. The Serbs w i l l escalate t h e i r tests of the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's resolve unless they face a threat that
they calculate w i l l i n f l i c t severe damage t o t h e i r forces.
—
The Bosnian Serb m i l i t a r y remains unintimidated by the
t h r e a t of NATO m i l i t a r y s t r i k e s , a point Mladic has made
to various Western i n t e r l o c u t o r s . Karadzic perhaps i s
more f e a r f u l , but i n the face of a perceived onslaught
by NATO forces, the Bosnian Serb leadership, which
t h r i v e s on feelings of persecution, probably w i l l r a l l y
around the cause of zealous nationalism.
—
Even Milosevic, who would prefer acceptance of the
Contact Group plan, worries that he w i l l have to bow t o
domestic pressure to help his Bosnian Serb brothers i f
they come under Western attack, according to special
intelligence.
—
The Bosnian Muslims, meanwhile, would take advantage of
a i r s t r i k e s against the Bosnian Serbs by continuing t h e i r
operations outside of the zones and by resupplying t h e i r
troops,
(b)(3)
The burden of s t r i c t enforcement of the zones i s l i k e l y t o
a l t e r seriously Western involvement i n UNPROFOR and exacerbate
fissures between NATO and the UN and w i t h i n NATO.
1.4c
^
witnouT t ~ ~
ne
continued presence of~UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves
probably cannot survive. Even i f UNPROFOR stays, the
West European are l i k e l y t o reduce t h e i r troop
commitments, increasing UN reliance on Islamic
contributors.
If
�TOP SECRET |
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP OECRET
�3.5c
SECRET
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
3 August 1994
Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Pire
Agreements and Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
(Infonnation Current as of 1500, 3 August 1994)
Summary
The security s i t u a t i o n i n Sarajevo and Gorazde has
deteriorated since the Bosnian Serb r e j e c t i o n of the Contact
Group peace proposal.
14
.c
| the number of reported
cease-tire v i o l a t i o n s i s at i t s highest l e v e l i n months;
i n Gorazde, there was a high of 180 on 26 July, and i n
Sarajevo there were over 700 on 2 August--up from an
average of 100 t o 200 f o r the l a s t several months.
Small-arms and machine-gun f i r e accounts f o r almost a l l
of the cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s that occur i n the Sarajevo
and Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zones. The l e v e l of
reported heavy-weapons f i r e remains very low and i s not *
comparable t o the l e v e l of f i r e p r i o r t o implementation
of the exclusion zones.
Bosnian Serb forces are renewing t h e i r challenge t o UN
control over the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion
zone--they reportedly t r i e d on 2 August t o recover
weapons stored at UN c o l l e c t i o n points--and have
continuously flouted UN authority i n the Gorazde
exclusion zones.
Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have restricted
UN personnel fre.e.dQm_af movement in the Sarajevo and
Gorazde areas.
35
.c
Bosnian Serb actions seem intended to remind the Contact
Group that i t needs Serb cooperation to control the exclusion
zones, that a decision to create additional exclusion zones
without Serb concurrence would be resisted, and that there i s a
price to be paid for implementing the other "sticks" in the
Contact Group plan. The Bosnian Serb actions also come at a time
when they are very frustrated by Bosnian Government failure to
agree to prisoner exchanges, as well as Government offensive
operations, despite the Bosnia^wl<ie_cea8e-fire agreement that
went into effect on 10 June.
35
.c
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3.5c
TOP SECRET
�SECRET
3.5c
The Sarajevo and Gorazde Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
The Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone was created by a
Northern Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on 9 February. The
decision gave Bosnian Serb and Government forces 10 days to
withdraw or place under UNPROFOR control a l l weapons larger
than 12.7mm (e.g. tanks, a r t i l l e r y pieces, mortars, multiple
rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons) within
20 kilometers of the center of Sarajevo, excluding an area
within two kilometers of Pale; the decision stipulated,
moreover, that any heavy weapons within the exclusion zone and
not under UN control would be subject to NATO airstrikes. Nine
collection sites are situated throughout the 20-kilometer
exclusion zone and the UN currently controls or supervises over
300 Serb and about 50 Muslim heavy weapons in the Sarajevo
area. The NAC decision also decreed that a l l UN and r e l i e f
^ersoni^el in Bosnia should have free access to Sarajevo.
35
.c
The Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zone went i n t o e f f e c t on
24 A p r i l 1994. A 22 A p r i l NAC decision gave the Bosnian Serbs
u n t i l 0100 on 24 A p r i l to cease attacks on Goratzde, withdraw
t h e i r forces three kilometers from the c i t y center, and allow
UN forces, humanitarian r e l i e f convoys, and medical assistance
teams free access t o the c i t y . CINCSouth was authorized t o
conduct a i r s t r i k e s against Serb heavy weapons w i t h i n
20 kilometers of Gorazde c i t y center, provided they were inside
Bosnian t e r r i t o r y . The NAC decision also called on the Bosnian
Government not t o undertake offensive m i l i t a r y action from
w i t h i n the safe area of Gorazde.
35
.c
Saraj evo
Small-arms f i r e and sporadic s h e l l i n g have been reported
w i t h i n the Sarajevo 20-kilometer zone since the NATO ultimatum i n
mid-February. These incidents, which averaged between 100 and
200 per day over the l a s t few months (see t a b l e ) , have rapidly
escalated i n the l a s t two weeks.
7 0 6
.
cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on
14
.c
2 August, 578 v i o l a t i o n s on 1 August, and 580 on
31 July. Small-ams and machine-gun f i r e accounts for
almost a l l of the v i o l a t i o n s .
Both warring factions have violated the Sarajevo
cease-fire agreement over the past week, with increased
sniping and several significant clashes reported in the
Grbavica area.I
14
.c
heavy sniper f i r e forced
35
.c
3.5c
�CONPIDENTIAL
Cease-fire Violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde*
800
1.4c
700-
600-
500-
400-
300-
200-
n
to
. o
o
100-
ftul
•
j I HUL
MI
Sarajevo • Gorazde
I.
zz
CONFIDENTIAL
I
�TOP—j
OBCRB'P
3.5c
the city's tram lines to close on 29 July after s i x
passengers were wounded by snipers.
The UN closed Sarajevo airport on 22 July after five UN
aircraft were h i t by small-arms f i r e , according to press
reports. Secretary of Defense Perry's scheduled v i s i t
to Sarajevo on 22,,.Julv was cancelpd as a rftmiir nf thaaa_
actions.
14
,c
~ l Aircraft landing at Sarajevo airport
occasionally have come under small-arms f i r e since
April.
After a l u l l following the establishment of the Sarajevo
exclusion zone, small-arms f i r e broke out within the
city center shortly after the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde
in April and remains a daily concern. On 9 May,
1.4c
I the f i r s t report of tank fire
since the mid-February ultimatum, and a UN observer was
k i l l e d in a mortar attack--probably by Serb forces-within the zone on 12 May,F
'
1.4c, 3.5c
The Bosnian Serbs have been challenging UN control of the
Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone since the NATO airstrikes in
Gorazde in April, probably as a means of testing UN resolve to
maintain control of the zone and 'demonstrating Serb freedom of
action. The Serbs have the capability to take the weapons
against UNPROFOR resistance should they choose to do so.
Bosnian Serb forces attempted to retrieve
" e a « " ~ r r r c n of the. sites but were turned away by UN
w"pnsrot"le
troops. UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose stated publicly
on 3 August that force would be used t6 prevent the
Serbs from recovering weapons.
3.5c
3.5c
TOP OECRET
�3.5c
SECRET
14
.c
| Bosnian Serb forces
qiaaasembled and removed a 20mm anti-ajrc^aft onn frnm
the Ilidza collection site in late July.
In the weeks following the airstrikes at
uorazae, Serb forces removed--and reportedly have not
returned--about 20 heavy weapons and some ammunition
from various collection sites throughout the zone.
[Serb forces were maintaining weapons at some
collection sites, possibly in preparation for pulling
the weapons out in case the situation deteriorates
further.
1.4c, 3.5c
Bosnian Government forces also have reneged on some of their
commitments around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR claims that Bosnian
Government forces have violated the August 1993 agreement
demilitarizing the Mt. Igman area.
14
.c
six or seven
In early May,
14
.c
heavy-weapons positions on Mt. Igman and preparations
under way for more weapons positions.-
1.4c, 3.5c
Gorazde
The Bosnian Serbs have violated both the three-kilometer
military withdrawal zone or the 20-kilometer heavy-weapon
exclusion zone established arourtd Gorazde in April.
35
.c
4
3.5c
TOP <3BCRBT,
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
Incidents of small-arms and machine-gun f i r e i n Gorazde
p r i o r t o the Contact Group m i n i s t e r i a l l a s t weekend.
jaaaked at 180 . on 2fi tinly, according to press
1.4c
The l e v e l of v i o l a t i o n s has
taperea o t t m recent days t o 70-80 v i o l a t i o n s , but
remains higher than before the announcement of the
Bosnian Serb r e j e c t i o n of the Contact Group proposal.
1.4c
| On the night of~2T^July, Ser5
forces turned a 40mm a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun inside the
exclusion zone on Muslim c i v i l i a n s harvesting crops,
according t o press reports. Negotiations f o r the
removal of t h i s weapon are under way. The next day,
Serb forces f i r e d an 82tnm mortar from w i t h i n the zone at
Bosnian Government positions, according to a UN
spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops also f i r e d on UN
observation positions i n the enclave.
The Bosnian Serbs have never complied f u l l y with the
Gorazde 20-kilometer exclusion zone, withdrawing weapons
only a f t e r UN observers discovered them. I n mid-May,
the UN Commander i n Gorazde stated that the Serbs
probably were hiding other weapons i n areas they had
declared o f f - l i m i t s t o UN observers. Bosnian Government
f>r=f haw harAnHPri Serb troops i n the Gorazde area.
rr<»l
3.5c
Freedom of Movement
Bosnian Serb forces have denied UN and r e l i e f pereonnel, as
well as c i v i l i a n s , freedom of movement i n the Sarajevo and
Gorazde areas. Increased harassment of UN and r e l i e f personnel
appears t o coincide with i n t e r n a t i o n a l attempts to pressure the
Bosnian Serbs i n t o compliance with ultimatums.
3.5c
3.5c
TOP CECRET
$ LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
<
�TOP GECRET
3.5c
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced on 26 July that
he could no longer guarantee the safety of t r a f f i c on
two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were
being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.
The next day, Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply
convoy on one of these routes outside Sarajevo--killing
a British UN soldier--and later fired on a French
contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs
also fired on Federation President Zubak'a motorcade
returning to the city, according to press]
14
.c
Bosnian Serb forces have at various times restricted and
blocked movement in and around Sarajevo; for a time
shortly after the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in
April, they placed a l l UN personnel i n Serb-held
territory under virtual house arrest. The Serbs
temporarily mined the perimeters of several weapons
collection sites and detained UN personnel supervising
Serb weapons in the exclusion zone.
Bosnian Serb forces now close convoy checkpoints enroute
to Gorazde from Friday to Monday each week and employ
other delaying tactics. On 26 July, Bosnian Serb
o f f i c i a l s detained a UNHCR o f f i c i a l on his way to
Gorazde. Serb authorities recently denied entry for a
water specialist and confiscated part of a convoy
shipment, including rat poison needed to control the
growing rat population of Gorazde that has led to a
possible outbreak of hemorrhagic fever.
1.4c, 3 5
.c
35
.c
1
TOP SBCRBT
�TOP gEQRET
3.5c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 August 1994
Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Fire Agreements and
Heavy-Weapon Exclusion zones: An Update
(Information Current as of 0900, 4 August)
Small-arms f i r e and explosions continued i n Sarajevo
overnight, and Gorazde remains unstable.
—
Sniping continues i n Sarajevo despite a Tuesday
agreement between the warring parties t o end t h i s form
of harassment of c i v i l i a n s , according t o press reports.
French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents have
placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn t o
discourage snipers.
—
The Bosnian Serbs also continue t o challenge , N control
U
of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone
"Recently, Bosnian
"Serb forces twice nave attempteoT"to remove mortars from
the Poljine weapons c o l l e c t i o n point but were turned
away by French UNPROFOR troops,
Yesterday, the Bosnian Serb forces placed
mines around the compound a f t e r the French again
intervened, but a f t e r two hours of negotiations the
mines were removed and the Serbs withdrew.
1 4c
the
home-made heavy rocket f i r e d a t Visoko on
2 August—probably from w i t h i n the Sarajevo heavy-weapon
exclusion zone—was of a type previously used by Bosnian
Serb forces.
—
Cease-fire violations continue at high levels and) 1 4
.c
an increasing number of
explosions i n and around the c i t y .
3.5c
The recent events are t y p i c a l of the steadily d e t e r i o r a t i n g
security s i t u a t i o n around Gorazde and Sarajevo over the l a s t
month.
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
Aot3- 00.31-H
8/3/15 KBV1
TOP
3.5c
SECRET
�TOP 0EGRET
35
.c
By Tuesday, cease-fire violations in Sarajevo, primarily
small-arms f i r e , were the highest level—over 700—since
the mid-February NATO ultimatum. A week before, the
United Nations had been forced to close the Sarajevo
airport due to five attacks on r e l i e f aircraft,!
~4c
The Bosnian Serbs cont nue to violate the exclusion
zones around Gorazde.
14
.c
the two sides have more than 10 heavy weapons in the
exclusion zone. Small-arms and machine-gun f i r e in the
exclusion zone peaked at 180 on 26 July, but has taperei
off to some 70-80 in recent days, according to press(_
14, 3 5
.c . c
35
.c
3.5c
TOP CECRET
�TOP SECRET
35
.c
DCI Interagency Balkan Force
5 August 1994
Recant Incidents in Sarajevo and Qorazde
Sarajevo
—
NATO aircraft were deployed on 5 August against a known
Bosnian Serb heavy weapon position within^Lha_2.Q=_
kilometer exclusion zone, according to
14
.c
I press reports.
On 5 August,
jL4c
|Bosnian Serb forces
removed a T-55~tahk7~two armorea personnel carriers, and
an antiaircraft gun from the I l i d z a heavy weapons
collection site, according to press reports.
The UN resumed humanitarian flights into Sarajevo
airport on 5 August after a two-week suspension. After
Bosnian Serb troops removed weapons from the I l i d z a
collection site, the UN suspended a l l flights into the
airport, according to various press reports.
670 cease-fire violations on 4 August.
on 3 August, UNPROFOR/Bosnia Commander Rose publicly
stated that force would be used to prevent the Serbs
from recovering weapon's from UN-controlled heavy weapon
collection s i t e s . I
14r
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
A&te - 01*32.- n
8/3/15- KBM
3.5c
TOP GECRET
�TOP SECRET
35
.c
Bosnian Serb and Government force agreed t o cease sniper
a c t i v i t y i n Sarajevo on 3 August, according t o press
reports. UN anti-sniping teams responded t o continued
Serb sniping with r e t a l i a t o r y f i r e , according t o press
reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR
contingents placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn
©snipers.
14
.c
14
.c
—
661 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on 3 August.
On 3 August,
a home-made rocket
14
.c
f i r e d a t Visoko the day before—probably from w i t h i n the
the Sarajevo 20-kilometer exclusion zone=Lji£aE
previously used by Bosnian Serb forces.
l
706 cfease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on 2 August,
578 on 1 August, 580 on 31 July, and 597 on 30 July,
1406 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s .
14
.c
heavy sniper f i r e forced the c i t y ' s
tram lines to^close alfter s i x passengers were wounded by
snipers'.
On 29 July,
—
435 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s .
14
.c
On 27 July, Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed
a 20inm antiaircraft gun form the I l i d z a collection site,
On 28 July,
35
.c
TOP 0EGRET
�TOP CECRET
3.5c
Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy
outside of Sarajevo on 27 J u l y — k i l l i n g a British UN
soldier—and later fired on a French contingent
attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on
Federation President's motorcade returning to the city,
14
.c
On 26 July, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced that
he could no longer guarantee the safety of t r a f f i c on
two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were
being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.
337 cease-fire violations on 26 July,
14
.c
184 on 25 July, 173 on 24 July, and 314 on 23 July.
The UN closed Sarajevo airport to a l l but UNPROFOR
flights on 22 July after five UN aircraft
small-arms, according to press reports. 1
14^
14
.c
3.5c
j264 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
3.5c
TOP GECRET
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
Qorasda
197 cease-fire violations in the Gorazde
14
.c
exclusion zone on 4 August and 160 on 3 August.
38 cease-fire violations on 31 July and
73 on 30 July.
12 cease-fire violations on 28 July and
180 on 26 July.
Bosnian Serb forces fired an 82inm mortar from within the
20-kilometer zone at Bosnian Government positions on 25
July, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops
fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.
—
65 cease-fire violations.
On 25 July,
On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 4 0mm
antiaircraft gun inside the heavy weapon exclusion zone
on Muslim c i v i l i a n s harvesting crops, according to press
reports.
41 cease-fire violations on 24 July and
29 on 23 July.
30 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
35
.c
35
.c
TOP SECRET
�DECLASSIFIED)
PER E.0.13526
8/3/15 ^
'
0
-SECRET-
^
ft*?
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO:
THE POLICY CONTEXT
The principal objective of proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives toward lifti
the arms embargo is to get Pale to reconsider its position and accept the Map-in other words, it
designed to bring about a negotiated peace settlement. Specifically, lifting the arms embargo is
intended to provide B-H with the self-defense capability necessary to defend the proposed Feder
territory outlined by the CG Map. This translates into an ability to hold current territory, take en
of the high ground around Sarajevo to make it defensible, be able to ensure that humanitarian a
in, and conduct limited other offensive operations to seize lands proposed to be under Federation
control by the Map but currently in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. It is a course of action frau
with pehi.
The U.S. will insert no ground troops, advisors, or logisticians into B-H. Even so, whether as a
unilateral lifting or as part of an orchestrated, multilateral effort, lifting will be perceived as
dramatically raising U.S. involvement and the stakes. We will be perceived as having chosen to side
with the Bosnian Govt. We will be ever more responsible for training and equipping the Bosnian
Govt, forces, most likely in the U.S. and for at least a year so that the effect can play out on the
battlefield. Even given that increased level of involvement (including a transition period during which
U.S. air power will be used to help equalize the battlefield), there is no guarantee of success. In fact,
absent committed U.S. ground forces, jio amount of air power can prevent the BSA from overrunning
the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo.
W do not want to act alone, but acting multilaterally will be a difficult proposition, as each of
e
the actors tends to sec things from its unique vantage point. UNPROFOR will withdraw in a
nightmare scenario of hostages seized and the potential for heavy casualties. Moreover, without an
intense diplomatic effort and logistical and military support, we will sour relations with our NATO
and UN allies as well as undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia and our efforts
to enforce UN embargoes that we suppon.
It is the purpose of the sections that follow to identify the key concems of the other nations that
have interests in the outcome of the current conflict. Containing and then ending the conflict while
not fracturing the current (albeit fragile) consensus for action is paramount to the success of our
planning. What we need to do is balance carefully the attimescompeting objectives of maintaining
the unity of the CG and getting the Bosnian Serbs to reverse their position and accept the Map. Going
too far too quickly down the path of extension followed by more robust enforcement of the Exclusion
Zones and then lifting the arms embargo is certain to fracture the unity of the CG. It is an awful idea.
On the other hand, not proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives is likely to perpetuate the
status quo-continuing war and frustration. Yet there may be reason to consider a course of action
that does not include the major outside powers imposing a solution or thrashing the Serbs militarily.
The history of the Balkan Wars suggests that ultimately Serbia may extend itself territorially beyond
the means of its military power, thus inviting its many neighbors with territorial claims-Bosnia,
Croatia, Hungary , and AJbania-to pile on, regain lost lands, and restore a more natural equilibrium.
r
Gl?CB17 V
Cluiified by OASD
Dtcu*^ o OADR
o
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
9 September 1994
Military Situation in Bihao
Fighting i n the Bihac enclave has i n t e n s i f i e d between
Government and Serb forces since the collapse of Abdic's
Muslim s e p a r t i s t forces i n August.
Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces have launched a t t a c k s —
possibly coordinated—on Bosnian government forces and have
concentrated on seizing key lines of communication along the
southern edge of the enclave and maintaining a demilitarized
zone between Krajina Serb and Bosnian government t e r r i t o r y
i n the northeastern corner of the enclave.
Shelling of Bihac c i t y , which i s the actual safe area,
has been n e g l i g i b l e , but s h e l l i n g of the Muslim c i t i e s of
Cazin and Buzim has increased. I f the UN declared a 20-km
exclusion zone around Bihac c i t y , Cazin woulsL-faXl-Sfithin
and Buzim would f a l l outside. (See map.)
3
5c
Bosnian Serb forces have deploy_e.d_as_manv_as_6_Q_0jQ.
troops around the Bihac enclave.
14
.c
Krajina Serb forces have reinforced their forces around
Bihac with additional troops, tanks, and a r t i l l e r y —
primarily near the demilitarized zone—and may have as many
as 2,000 troops deployed in the area. Bosnian government V
Corps forcLes-numker.,at least 6,000, deployed throughout the
enclave.
35
.c
J
The fiercest fighting in recent weeks has continued to
be for control of the Grabez Plateau, the high ground five
kilometers west of Bihac city. The Bosnian Serbs apparently
are attempting to control key lines of communication
connecting Serb-held territories in Bosnia and tha Krajina.
1.4c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
3.5c
TOP
8/3/15"
K6H
0EGRET
3.5c
�9 JP SECRET
H
3.5c
l-fc
|at least
"eight probable Bosnian Serb a r t i l l e r y deployment
areas containing 22 pieces of a r t i l l e r y or mortars
within 20 kilometers r>f Bihar r^ty, primarily near
the Grabez plateau.
35
C
Clashes between the Government V Corps and Krajina Serb
forces have been escalating in the northeastern section of
the enclave, near the demilitarized zone. Bosnian forces
have made numerous probing attacks which have resulted in
the Krajina Serbs reinforcing this area.
On 8 September, at least 500 Krajina Serb troops
supported by at least eight tanks attacked Bosnian
government positions near the DMZ, according to
Radio Sarajevo.
1.4c
the Krajina Serbs had established a
DMZ.
Equipment at the base included four M-87
multiple rocket launcher vehicles.
35
.c
TOP 0EGRET
�3 5r.
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
2 November 1994
Implications of the Bihac Offensive
The Bosnian Army launched its most successful offensive of
the war on 24 October around Bihac i n northwestern Bosnia,
capturing some 250 to 300 square kilometers of territory. We
anticipate a further escalation of tbe fighting, although
Government forces remain incapable of decisively altering the
current distribution of territory. Bosnian Government successes
may induce Zagreb to launch an attack against the Krajina Serbs.
Meanwhile, tbe food situation i s c r i t i c a l for 200,000 people in
the Bihac enclave; Serb obstruction of aid there and elsewhere
could put many at r i s k .
35
.c
The Bihac Offensive
Increasingly e f f e c t i v e leadership, growing t a c t i c a l s k i l l ,
and high morale—combined with an improved l o g i s t i c s s i t u a t i o n —
were key t o the Bosnian Army's F i f t h Corps success. The
operation was also directed a t what i s widely perceived t o be the
weakest Bosnian Serb forces.
—
The Army's high command successfully coordinated the
Bihac operation with attacks near Doboj, Gradacac, and
Kupres i n order t o t i e down Bosnian Serb forces.
35
.c
Bosnian Serb forces already have retaken some t e r r i t o r y i n
counterattacks. The Bosnian Government F i f t h Corps i s spread
t h i n and i s awkwardly deployed a f t e r i t s rapid advance, which
probably exceeded i n i t i a l goals.
—
Local Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) t r o o p s — r e i n f o r c e d
by u n i t s from as f a r away as the Posavina
c o r r i d o r — h a v e forced a government withdrawal from Kulen
Vakuf and about 50 square kilometers of recently
captured t e r r i t o r y , according t o
14
.c
press reports
-
The Krajina Serbs are supporting the Bosnian Serb
counterattack by shelling some Government positions and
supplying troops, according t o a v a r i e t y of reports.
Thev are also reportedly mobilizing a d d i t i o n a l forces.
35
.c
35
.c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
3.5c
•v
A O \ 3 - OV.83L-
2/3//5" KBH
H
•••n
Clinton Library Photocopy
�3.5c
Bosnian Croats Join the Conflict
Bosnian Croat forces are actively supporting the Government
offensives near Bihac and Kupres—their f i r s t major joint
offensive with government troops since 1992. Zagreb almost
certainly had to approve of the Bosnian Croat participation in
the Kupres attack.
—
The joint operations at Kupres, long advocated by the
Muslims, almost certainly w i l l help to ease Muslim-Croat
tensions elsewhere in Bosnia.
Bosnian Forces Potential Gains Limited
Despite the recent successes, the Bosnian Army remains
incapable of decisively defeating the Serbs or even seizing a l l
the territory given i t under the Contact Group plan.
—
Sarajevo i s now able to coordinate multiple operations
that maximize their manpower advantage and i t s infantry
formations—especially i t s special assault u n i t s — a r e
increasingly effective.
—
Government forces w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y making similar
gains elsewhere where they generally face larger numbers
of more mobile and better trained and equipped Serb
troops.
Fighting Will Continue to Intensify
Recent Government successes probably w i l l lead to a major
increase in fighting.
—
Bosnian Croat attacks have reignited fronts quiet since
1992. Government forces are likely to continue
launching multiple attacks throughout the country to
stretch the Serbs thin.
—
Meanwhile, the BSA w i l l respond vigorously and
ranidlv—especially i f key Serb areas are threatened.
Possible Spillover of Fighting
Government successes could cause fighting to spillover into
Croatia or draw "Yugoslav" and possibly Croatian forces into
combat in Bosnia.
nor nvjanrj.r
Clinton Library Photocopy
�SECRET
3.5n
14
.c
iserpian "volunteers" comet cross
i n t o Bosnia i f the government advances continue.
Yugoslav Army elements almost c e r t a i n l y w i l l t r y t o
increase covert support t o the Bosnian Serbs,
especially i f they continue t o lose ground.
Croatian attack could take advantage of tha Krajina
and Bosnian Serb preoccupation v i t h the Bihac
offensive.
35
.c
Grave Humanitarian Conditions Loom
the food situation for
14
.c
200,000 people i n the Bibac enclave i s c r i t i c a l and some
could face s t a r v a t i o n by mid-winter. Bosnian Serb
r e t a l i a t i o n against a i d deliveries could cause a
d e t e r i o r a t i o n of conditions i n Bihac and elsewhere i n
Bosnia.
—
An additional 30,000 people, Bosnian refugees from
the enclave who fled after rebel Muslim leader
Abdic's f a l l , are ill-prepared for winter and
depend on UN food and water deliveries. Meanwhile,
Bosnian Government offensives south of Bihac have
forced 10,000 Serbs from their homes,)
14
.c
—
Last week, Serb o f f i c i a l s linked a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r
UN f u e l d e l i v e r i e s t o a suspension of the Bihac
offensive and have since denied most UN f u e l convoy
requests. Serb authorities are going t o require
24-hours advance n o t i f i c a t i o n f o r using the
Sarajevo a i r p o r t road, aicrnifiqantly complicating
a i r l i f t deliveries.
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1W StjCRRT
3.5c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 November 1994
NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING
ABOUT BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO
I. Legal Analysis
As of November 12,1994, the Nunn-MitcheU provision of the DOD authorization
act will prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds for intelligence support in those
limited circumstances where the purpose of that support is participation in, support for, or
assistance to voluntary aspects of the Bosnian arms embargo.
The effect of the funding prohibition is limited. It does not prohibit collection
activities, but restricts passage of intelligence information on the arms flows to Bosnia
where the information is provided solely to enforce the Bosnian embargo:
Congress intended to continue support under UN Resolution 713 and to
preclude voluntary enforcement or the Bosnian arms embargo unless it would
impede the enforcement of the Serbian economic and arms embargo.
The President indicated in a signing statement that the provision applies only
when appropriated funds are used "for the purpose of enforcing tne arms
embargo.
--
The prohibition would not affect the ability of the US to participate in
activities that are necessary to avoid impeding the enforcement of the Serbian
embargo or other authorized purposes, even if indirect, consequentiaLoi
incidental support to enforcement of the Bosnian embargo results.
The US is not required to cease providing information concerning violations of US
law or relating to other arms shipments, or information which supports the Serbian
embargo but which may also support enforcement of the Bosnian embargo. Moreover, the
US Government may continue to provide information about arms shipments to Bosnia
where the purpose for that support is driven by concems other than enforcement of the
Bosnian embargo.
Examples include passage of intelligence necessary for the defense of allied
forces or facilities, or necessary to maintain intelligence liaison relationships.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
TOP SECRET
3/S/i ^
KBM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP LSECRET
3.5c
Caveat: Although a strict reading of the statute's "purpose" test would permit the
conunuation of a number of activities that support voluntary enforcement of the embargo,
activity that reasonably can be expected to result in enforcement may raise questions about
compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
Dissemination of intelligencefromjoint collection sites, infonnation for liaison
enhancement, and other activities should not be undertaken without senior
review even if not strictly intended for enforcement where there is a significant
potential an enforcement action will result. Passage of strategic rather than
tactical intelligence is less likely to raise such a concern, and activities that are
necessary for other purposes and that actually are beyond US control may
proceed.
II. Intelligence Activities Under Nunn-MitcheU
A. Intelligence support can be divided into several different categories for purposes
of assessing the impact or the funding prohibition:
Intelligence Collection. The funding prohibition would not affect the actual
collection of intelligence. A joint collection activity not directed solely at enforcement of
the Bosnian embargo with allied countries may continue where its cessation would impede
the enforcement of the Serbian embargo.
Intelligence Support Concerning Illegal Arms Shipments to Bosnia.
-
Defense articles and services exportedfromthe US or with another US nexus
and destined for Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue concerning these
activities, which are required by U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713,
and which are also a violation of US law.
Arms shipments destined for Bosnia in violation of the U.N. arras embargo
that has no US nexus. Intelligence support concerning these types of
shipments solely for the purpose of enforcing the Bosnian arms embargo must
cease as of 12 November 1994.
OPERATION SHARP GUARD actions exclusively taken to effect the arms
embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina are affected.
Actionable infonnation relating solely to the knowledge of arms destined for
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be marked and treated as
NOFORN-not to be disseminated to foreign nationals without prior review.
It also may not be used in any US Government action to enforce the Bosnian
arms embargo unless a violation of US law is involved.
It may be possible to delay dissemination of actionable intelligence on Bosnian
arms shipments until it can no longer support an enforcement action.
However, this approach should be carefully reviewed, as even "after theJact!!
intelligence can be used in support of long-range enforcement efforts.
TOP SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3.5c
B. Determining the Purpose of the Activity:
Where the purpose for providing such intelligence support is other than to
enforce the arms embargo-such as the enforcement of the no-fly zone
(Operation DENY FLIGHT); enforcement of the myriad of actions
authorized by other U.N. resolutions in this area, including the Serbian arms
and economic embargo and force protection for US or cooperating country
forces; intelligence liaison enhancement; or any other authorized purposes
the intelligence support may continue to be provided even if an incidental or
indirect support to enforcement of the Bosman arms embargo results.
Arms Shipments to Serbia and Other Countries Except Bosnia. Intelligence
support may continue to be provided to enforce the Serbian embargo or the
requirements of other U.N. sanctions, as may intelligence support concerning
arms shipments to destinations except for Bosnia.
Other Intelligence. Intelligence support not related to the "deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Bosnia," see U.N. Security Council
Resolution No. 713, may continue to be provided in accordance with existing
authorities and established procedures.
Finished Intelligence. Finished intelligence which contains no information
upon which an enforcement action could be based may continue to be
provided.
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
3.5c
7 c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
�lUfSECRET
3.5c
1.4c, 1.4d. 3.5c
3.5c
tQP"lECnBt
�^--u
TOP SECRET
3.5c
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
r u t
�DEC 16 '94 18:55
R 21 IBM TI
P. 2
REINVIGORATED UNPROFOR PROPOSALS
(revised)
FRENCH PROPOSALS.
• Secure the Sarajevo Airport. This idea is consistent with the current
humanitarian mission. However, when considered previously, the idea
was rejected because of the number of troops required to secure the
Serb controlled approaches to the airport on a full-time basis. The
French may have in mind something less ambitious than this.
• Secure a land route to Sarajevo. Consistent with current UNPROFOR
mandate; most of the route is in Muslim/Croat control, but Serbs control
the immediate access to Sarajevo and will oppose UN convoys and
target the route; weather also an issue in some areas; and the troop
requirement is unclear.
• Consolidate UNPROFOR in the central area. Provides economy of
force and efficiency; if it means pulling out of the enclaves, creates the
image of withdrawal and abandonment of the eastern enclaves; French
seem to have in mind a less complete pull back, e.g., closing down the
isolated weapons storage sites around Sarajevo, pulling back UNMO's.
OTHER OPTIONS (within existing mandate)
• Tougher convov ROE. A variant of the "blue route" concept. Would
force through Serfr roadblocks, instead of negotiating. Problems are
Serb counter-escalating, use of civilians to block convoys.
• Safe Area/EZ focus. Clearly define safe areas, create small exclusion
zones and expand them. Deploy UNPROFOR more heavily In safe
areas/EZs. Use military force to defend people in safe areas and the
movement of humanitarian supplies to them. Option is impartial and
within current mandate. Links easily to build-down. Difficult to
coordinate, support and control dispersed units; requires a tactical
reorientation and probably more troops.
• Central Based Rapid Reaction Force, Concentrate UNPROFOR in
Sarajevo with a small presence in limited, designated safe areas.
Create a viable mechanized and armor (consider attack helicopters)
reaction force (Bn or Bde) configured for combat and located in
Sarajevo to respond with ground combat power and air support to UN
missions as required. UNPROFOR more defensible; restores UN
initiative and gives combat capability to UN but requires new
organizational structure, C3I, combat equipment and log support. May
increase fighting.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94
18:56
R 2110M TI
P.3
Secure Tuzla airport. Easier to secure than Sarajevo airport because it
is deeper inside government area. However, it creates new opportunity
for fighting, and Tuzla is remote from other areas requiring humanitarian
support. Would also require redeployment of many UNPROFOR
forces.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94 14:10 R 2110M T I
P.2
Build Down
Background: On September 30,1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter
outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as
worthy of serious consideration in his October 7,1994, response. Nunn followed up with
a second letter on December 1,1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either
unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough
military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated
settlement.
Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how itfitsinto our near
and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.
Discussion:
The Concept an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons
rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt Build down is designed to equalize the
forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying
them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence
by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing
the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian
conflict.
Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an
amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could
include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of
Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the
negotiating process include:
• Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
• Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
• More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
• Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.
Implementation: (Assumption-former President Carter has some success in
getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good
faith) Present build downtothe UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their
endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift
and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94
14:10
R 2110M TI
P.3
arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of
defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be
pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.
Potential Pmblemfi: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more
rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H.
Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be
married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may
require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with
or without strike) may label build down naive.
Recommendation: adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present
it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument
if favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the
Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARV PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDENTIAL
FUNDING UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL:
CHOICES AND DYNAMICS
SHAPE has prepared a document, NATO Withdrawal Budget Estimates (1995).
dated 31 January 1995, that provides preliminary cost estimates for the
implementation of SHAPE/AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104, DETERMINED EFFORT,
a NATO-conducted withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and BosniaHercegovina. The OPLAN does not consider evacuation of assets currently
stationed in the Foimer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
According to the SHAPE estimate, OPLAN 40104 will take six months to
execute, involve a multi-national force of approximately 70,000 ground, air and
naval personnel, and cost approximately $1.9B at minimum. This cost estimate
breaks down as follows: about $515M for NATO common costs (i.e., common
procurement and O&M costs); $1.4B in national costs (personnel, equipment and
sustainment costs for all troop-contributing nations); and $37.2M for the
evacuation of 31,000 UNPROFOR personnel, 9,400 vehicles and related
equipment.
Organizations involved in military operations in and around the former Republic
of Yugoslavia have not developed a single, common, standardized funding
mechanism for defraying costs because of the current division of operational
control. Funding arrangements have been primarily threefold: (1) "blue helmet"
operational costs paid through the UN's assessment system; (2) NATO members
"paying their own way" for costs associated with their forces supporting the UN
Security Council mandate (e.g., SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT); and (3)
NATO using its Military Budget to pay NATO common costs.
A detailed funding mechanism for UNPROFOR withdrawal, that can be agreed to
by the various organizations involved, will have to be devised to ensure the
success of the operation. There are four possible options (all costs use OPLAN
estimates as a base).
UN Funding Option: This option would entail the UN paying for all costs
associated with the operation to include military and civilian elements engaged in
planning, execution or support. It uses the standard UN peacekeeping assessment
process which assesses member states for a percentage share of the total
operational costs. U.S. share would be 30.4%, or approximately $590M plus the
incremental costs for forces and other support paid upfront,less any
reimbursements. Each country contributing to the operation would be required to
pay incremental costs up front and be reimbursed by the UN for personnel and
other support later.
CONFIDENTIAL
CUMified by: Multiple Sourcea
Declagtify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P) ISA and S&R, 17 Feb 95
z-d
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2 . D t ^ - O b S 2 - 1*1
UGxA
/ 3/J J
nDKl
ff/a/.<•
13:41 PM
5
ii muz
a ZS-.EI se, iz QIA
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
• GONFIDENTIAL
"Pav-Your-Own Wav" Option: This option entails each participating nation,
organization, and non-governmental organization, paying its own evacuation costs
without the expectation of reimbursement from another organization. The cost to
the U.S. would be contingent upon the level of support the U.S. furnished (number
of personnel, airlift, CAS, etc.). UN members, including the U.S. may also be
assessed for the cost of evacuating the non-NATO troops UNPROFOR troops if
this costs was borne by the UN. The estimated cost to the U.S. using this
approach is $600M to $1B for incremental costs associated with operational
support..
NATO Funding Option: NATO members would be obligated to pay the entire
cost of the operation. It currently pays for only common costs in FRY through its
Military Budget. NATO accounts have never been used before to carry the full
cost of a military operation. One approach to funding the operation would be to
use the NATO national cost share formula to set the assessment rate for each
NATO member (U.S. share 25% or approximately $490M plus the incremental
costs for operational support minus any reimbursements). This approach assumes
also that non-NATO UNPROFOR nations would not be assessed by NATO for the
accrued costs. Each NATO nation contributing forces and support would pay its
own incremental costs up front. Later reimbursement by NATO is problematic.
"Hybrid Option": This option uses two approaches. Non-NATO UN member
states pay for a portion of the total cost of the operation at their regular UN
peacekeeping rate (non-NATO UN member assessments total 32% of the UN
peacekeeping budget). These costs would be paid into a UN fund that would be
used to fund the cost of non-NATO forces in the operation and UN administrative
and support costs. NATO nations would pay the other portion and not be assessed
by the UN, but pay under the NATO national cost share fonnula described above.
The cost to the U.S. under this approach would be approximately $330Mplus
incremental operational support costs less reimbursements. If the operational cost
was allocated based on the proportion on NATO and non-NATO troop strength,
the U.S. cost may be reduced to $225M (plus incremental support costs less
reimbursements) since 54% of the UNPROFOR troops are non-NATO.
NATO and the UN have been discussing cost sharing arrangements for funding a
potential withdrawal operation for several months, with no tangible results.
Indeed, in recent correspondence to NATO SYG Claes, UN SYG Boutros-Ghali
stated his assumption that, in the case of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO
would bear the costs. NATO Permanent Representatives were sharply critical of
this position, and agreed that SYG Claes would tell Boutros-Ghali that funding
arrangements for such an operation were to be the subject of future negotiations
between the two organizations.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clarified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared Jointly by OUSD(P) ISA and S&R, 17 Feb 95
t'd
13:41 P
M
T i W0TT3 a PS:El 96.- Tc a3J
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
While NATO has set no specific timetable for entering into these negotiations,
military planning factors and operational timing requirements may play a
significant role in determining the final funding scheme. They therefore merit
serious consideration in the overall context of this evolving situation,
SACEUR indicates that he must have a pre-positioned command and
control/logistics infrastructure in place to execute the OPLAN. His preference is
that this operating base be established prior to execution of any withdrawal
operation, and in light of agreed ministerial political, military and financial
guidance (i.e., formal funding arrangements). SHAPE planners estimate that it
will take about three to four weeks to establish the pre-positioned support structure
after a political decision to execute has been rendered by NATO Ministers.
However, if SACEUR must establish his operating base on a contingency basis
(i.e., as outlined in OPLAN 40104, but without final agreement between NATO
and the UN on some issues, like funding arrangements), the US government (as a
NATO and UN member) may have no alternative but to accept a de facto funding
arrangement (a la "Pay-Your-Own-Way"), which would leave us little hope or
expectation of being reimbursed for accrued costs.
Since the Croatian government has declared 31 March the expiration date of the
UN mandate there, planning, negotiations and decision making on formal funding
arrangements between NATO and the UN must begin soon, lest events foreclose
available options.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clwifiad by: Multiple Source*
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P) ISA snd S&R, 17 Feb 93
t7-d
13:41 PM
T I W0TT2 a 9S:ET S6.- Tc a 3 J
�BOSNIA
FIGHTING"
FRY
VOLUNTEERS
VP'
CROATIA MANDATE
FIGHTING
RESUMES
POSS MAJOR FRY
INTERVENTION
EXPIRES
UNPROFOR W;D FROM
CROATIA
W/D
(JB- COMPLETE
ESCALATION
FIGHTING IN
KRAJINA
'
/
O
fetr
INTENSIFIES
UNPROFOR VV/D FROM
BOSNIA
& DECIDE STEP 2 (COMMUNICATIONS PREPOSITIONING)
/ DEPLOY STEP 2 — f e >
O
NATO
O
k
DEPLOY
DECIDE ENABLING
FORCE
4
ENABLING
•
REORGANIZE/
REDEPLOY
4 CONDUCT WITHDRAWAL
DECIDE MAIN BODY
A DEPLOY MAIN . B O D Y —
" .BEEF UP
. DECIDES TO
^CEPON^
A W/D FROM CROATIA
^ 1 0 0 DAY SANCTIONS REVIEW
' 4 DECIDES TO W/D FROM BOSNIA
CQ
i—i
4 DECIDE STEP 2
I
4 INFORM HILL
DEPLOY U.S.
'LOG FORCE
A DEPLOY U.S. FORCES
O
END NATO
. OPCON _
4 DECIDE MACEDONIA
A DECIDE ENABLING FORCE
U.S.
i—i
NEW
DIPLOMATIC
-APPROACH
BRIEF
40104
DEPLOY U.S.
GROUND FORCE
4 DIPLOMATIC PRESS ON TUDJMAN
ASSUMPTIONS
ACROATIA DECISION
^DECIDE MAIN BODY
4 CONSULT HILL/SEEK AUTHORIZATION
CONGRESSIONAL P R E S S U R E TO
TRAIN BOSNIANS
V
POSS HILL P R E S S U R E
FOR UNILATERAL LIFT
NO DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT
FIGHTING RESUMES
UNPROFOR WITHDRAWS
NATO DEPLOYS
U.S. PARTICIPATES
f>-r\Mt-ir\i-Ki-ri A i
*; ^
635A8-M3
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
5/3/13-
KBM
�OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OEFENSE/CCC
i ^ - '^* .
(TH) 03.02.
'95 10:23
NO, 1460109318 PAGE
DRAFT
«E€RET~
Theihteniatioiwl i ^ i t ^
Regional Stability and Containment
in Macedonia and
surrounding countries td'^htaiii 'he jTwtber'Sipread ;5^ar;ip.UM>. Bauoms should UNPROFOR
t i>
withdrawfromCroatia and Bosnia andfightingincrease there. This military strategy is
designed to support the long-term stabilization of Macedonia as an area criticaltospread of
war further into the southern tier of Europe.
Background
The Principals' Committee meeting otf February 7,1995, directed more comprehensive
planning on options to contain the conflict in Bosnia arid Croatia. Pressure is growing for the
withdrawal of UNPROFORfromthe former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for renewed
fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia are high in the Spring. Given Macedonia's importance to
stability in Southern Europe, the Principals directed that special attention be given to
strengthening forces in Macedonia to provide stability through deterrence of military threats
to MacedoniaNational Interg$fr
..y' \ ] \ ^ , ^ . % \ •
Pteventing the spread of yfai in the Balkans is a vitalriatidhalsiecurity interest of the
United States, and Macedonia is the center of gravitytocontaining conflict in Southern
Europe. Regional war would threaten the overall stability of Europe and could trigger a
conflict between Greece and Turkey, thereby further straining NATO in an increasingly
volatile area. The US commitment to stability in Macedonia is well-established. This
Administration has reaffirmed the Bush Admihistration's announcement in December 1992
that the US would employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper in
the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. While the threat of Serbian caused
violence is low, the consequence of a large refugee flow into Macedonia is grave for the
entire region.
The Threat: m v F<KUs 6 n ^
L£ ~
<
The sizable ethnic 'Mb^'ajl^nty in Maceddnia rtfai&sJtUkely'that should Macedonia
be destabilized, the Albanians will movetomerge those ethnically Albanian
dominated areas within Macedonia with Albania. An upheaval in Kosovo, which is
90% ethnic Albanian, would result in massive refugeeflowsthat would present Macedonia with
insupportable economic, political, and security problems. This is the greatest threat to the region
in general for it is thb most likely conditiontodestabilize Macedonia and lead to
a land grab of at least parts of Macedonia with the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece
and Turkey onopposite sides, Russia, Serbia, itnd Bulgaria.
;
" *rrW ^
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(TH) 03.02.
'95 10:23
NO. 1460109318 PAGE
DRAFT
SECRET"
The greatest threat to Macedonian stability is its iriternal condition undermined by
external factors. The combined effects of enforcing the tfr<f-mandated economic sanctions on
Macedonia's major trading partner, Serbia, and the closure of the border with Greece,
have led to deteriorating and grave economic difficulties--30% unemployment, per capita
income at 1964 levels, and industrial output operating at 40% efficiency. These problems
only exacerbate ethnic tensions. At the same time, Macedonian nationalists have become
more militant. It is conceivable that the fragile democracy that Gligorov has built cannot
survive these pressures.
In sum, Macedonia is the most politically, economically, and militarily vulnerable of
the states in the region, and its political and military collapse would trigger a preventable
wider Balkan war.
:
Options.
:
• - ' , . ^ - ^ ^ ^ ' ^ r >
•-
..A.v-
Four optidnij^Ms^abyt'^M^tt^ mtentetioh^jmiitaiy presence in Macedonia.
These include:
1. A NATO deployment; ,
j . ^ L ^J
v V ;...
2. A U.S. led, multinai^hi^
.!
'
• 3. A U.S. unUatertf^lo^
i
•. ^
4. 'Retain UNPROFOfo^:^ " 4 ' • . . . - : . v \ \
The d i s a d v a n t ^ ^ ^ | ^ i ^ r S t ; i n ^ ^ ^ ^ U . ^ ; action would likely
aggravate regional tensions"?' Such actioh would risk.NATO,'pFP, and bur emerging
partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant
to support any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from
our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so
involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.
A U.S.-led multinational (but not NATO) suffersfrommany of the disadvantages of a
unilateral U.S. action, and does not enjoy the existing infrastructure advantages of a NATOrun operation.
A NATO-run containment strategy has/intrinsic merit Containment of the
conflict is a European problemfirstand foremost, and NATO has the existing political and
military infrastructure to support siich activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would
not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized UNNATO command relationships in Bosnia to date. Even so, such an enhanced NATOcontrolled operation alsorisksheightening regional tensions. Without the economic
assistance and political stabilization package, such a strategy would not address internallybased stability concems.
The status quo option is based on the premiss that the current UNPROFOR mission
and force structure noi only is adequate to respondtothe current threat environment, but also
that any increase in the in the size of the forces would be counterproductive in the long-termthat it would be destabilizing by provoking internal unrest
yWkSmiim?-:.: •
1
• • f i f e S3 /
fti&fe
�DRAFT
SECRET
ProposedC^ncept^ , ; ; ^ ; :
r;
;
v
,
Given the withdraw^/of DNP^^^^
and the potential
for conflict among Serbia, Croatia, and the warring parties iii Bosnia, the deployment of a
more capable NATOforceto Macedonia and associated sites in the southern Balkans is
designed to deter a wider Balkan war. It should be equipped and have the ROE to carry out
its assigned mission. This deployment is expected to be of indefinite duration. It should be
under NATO command and control (C2), operating under a UN mandate. It is intended to
send a strong international and internal signal regarding its commitment to preserve internal
and regional stability in Southern Europe, thereby containing the present conflict to the
former Yugoslavia.
/ v
Mandate •, •
.
-
.
] . . ^K^t.^.,,,;,,
The principal^ focus of this strategy is not the. areas of cd'nfiict; themselves but rather the
areas of potential conflict in the countries surrounding Bosnia. Authority for the operations
will emanatefroma UN mandate, but under NATO C2.
General Mission
An appropriately sized NATO ground force, with significant U.S. participation and
with appropriate air and naval Support In the region, will deploy to Macedonia. This force
will deter threats to Macedonia and preserve the inviolability of Macedonia's internationally
recognized borders, thereby enhancing internal and regional stability and prevent the spread
of war throughout the Balkans.
• Consider increasing NATO nay^p^sence in the Adriatic) • .
• Consider increasing NATO air%"rces''deployed to.the region; consider basing in Albania.
:
Assumptions
.
_
-^ J
, _; V ^ • /.. ^ _
•
•
NATO will cdhcentrate qn'c.bntainMeiit ofithe (£niiict vice active ground involvement in
the former Yugoslavia.
• Macedonia will accept*the NATO deployment and periftif the full use of its military
infrastructure.
• UN sanctions agaihk Serbia will not be part of the NATO mission.
• Russia, Turicey, and Greece cannot prevent this deployment
• UNPROFOR has withdrawnfromBosnia and Croatia.
• Deployment will be under permissive conditions-logistics hubs, overflight and transit
rights, and $OFAs will be available.
• Funding arrangements will be acceptable t8 the U.S.
; :
PHOTOCOPY'
. t*
^
r.
*
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal
As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S.
would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation
to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.
Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an
essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would
risk grave damage to NATO.
We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our
decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.
The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or
Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops
would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR
withdrawal.
I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR
from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia this spring.
Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.
Since it would take 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to
implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces in place to
commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend
that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to
ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military
operation.
Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle
to preposition approximately 450 U.S. DOD personnel to the area over 300 in
Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with
NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.
In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; there has
been no final determination on the numbers of troops that would be provided from
among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, nor
when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.
Prior to implementation of the complete plan, we will consult with you again.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/3/15' KBH
-FfwuiikivTiAi-
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
IF ASKED
• Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about
$11 million ).
• As for Croatia, we believe that UNPROFOR has a critical role to play in that nation as
well. We are currently urging President Tudjman to reverse his decision not to extend
UNPROFOR's mandate beyond March 31.
• Due to ongoing negotiations with Croatian President Tudjman on a future role for
UNPROFOR, President Clinton has not yet made a formal determination on whether
the U.S. would agree to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR
forces presently deployed in Croatia. At this point, therefore, NATO prepositioning
in Croatia would be done to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.
�UKAKT
J |
—SECRET"
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA
BackCTOund; Senator Dole, Rep. Oilman, and others wrote the President on February 17,
1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the
use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way
to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce
their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.
Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote
President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which
training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that
such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against
aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of
stability as peace is secured...."
An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a
"narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the
negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the
protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate
domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.
Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces
in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.
Options:
1. Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance
Act agreemenr-The U.S. has $7(),(XX) available for IMET should such an agreement be
signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require Finessing the
issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H
earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms
embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at
our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training
would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training
would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on
the battlefield.
2. Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or
receiving English language training. Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training
courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care.
Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the
battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
DRAFT
Classified by OASD_
"S^^*^
DECLASSIFIED
o . 13526
p
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
E
R
E >
f / y ^ f ^
^
�-SECRET3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be
used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training
could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development
and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but
would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could
be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It
would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral
responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This
would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country,
most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand
the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it
directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces
from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a cobelligerent in the conflict.
Discussion; The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic.
However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those
outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.
• Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training
effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become
a co-belligerent.
• Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of
enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger
of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
• UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance
programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
• Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the
pro-government forces for a return to war.
• The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H.
Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall
quickly.
• Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
• The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling-training ax contemplated
by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of evenhandedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
• The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist
outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.
Recommendation: Approve Option I -narrow 505 agreement-as the basis of the President's
response to Senator Dole.
DRAFT
SECRET Classified by OASD
rx
:r-
A
r\r»
CLINTON LIBRARV FHUTUCOM
�DKAKJ
SECRET
-(4
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA
Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Oilman, and others wrote the President on February 17,
1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the
use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way
to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce
their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.
Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote
President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which
training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that
such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against
aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of
stability as peace is secured..."
An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a
"narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the
negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the
protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate
domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.
Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces
in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.
Options:
(hJUmit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance
*r A t agreement-Tht U.S. has $70,(XX) available for IMET should such an agreement be
signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would requirefinessingthe
issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H
earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms
embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at
our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training
would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training
would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on
»^ the battlefield.
rl^jExpand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or
receiving English language training. Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training
courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care.
Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the
battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
c
N
DRAFT
SECRET
Classified by OASD
- y
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
OtoSa-H
8 / 3 / » 5 KSVl
�3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be
used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training
could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development
and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but
would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could
be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It
would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral
responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This
would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country,
most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand
the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it
directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces
from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a cobelligerent in the conflict.
Discussion; The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic.
However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those
outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.
• Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training
effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become
a co-belligerent.
• Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of
enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger
of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
• UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance
programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
• Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the
pro-government forces for a return to war.
• The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H.
Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall
quickly.
• Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
• The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling-training as contemplated
by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of evenhandedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
• The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist
outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.
Recommendation: Approve Option 1-narrow 505 agreement-as the basis of the President's
response to Senator Dole.
DRAFT
-SE€RETClassified by OASD
�Intelligence Report
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6
13 April 1995
3.5c
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the
Bosnian Serbs in hopes of isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and of
getting sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) lifted. Milosevic apparently is
allowing limited resupply to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) so the BSA is not prevented
from holding its own against the Bosnian Army.
3.5c
Activity since mid-January at internationally monitored border crossings suggests that
the embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia~Bosnia border
to belowpre-August levels, when the embargo was imposed. Since mid-February
enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December, which
suggests that the Bosnian Serbs arc increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that
the VJ is supplying the BSA. In addition to those crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border,
other goods are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia, a large potential loophole
that probably is the largest conduit for fuel to the Bosnian Serbs. I
35
C
Because the embargo has reduced the amount of goods crossing the Serbia-Bosnia
border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy, particularly its financial
and industrial sectors. There are no indications that the embargo has had a serious
impact on the BSA's capabilities, even with some spot shortages reported. The BSA
seems largely self-sufficient in logistics capability, except for fuel and some munitions.
i~4^
(the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions
is stilt in operation, and Pale probably has used the current cease-fire to resupply its
forces. 3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3/3/15
K6VI
�Milosevic Keeping Pressure on Karadzic With Sanctions
Serbian President Slobodan Milose\>ic continues to support sanctions against the
Bosnian Serbs. He probably has determined that he has few other means for
pressuring and isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic also
hopes that the West will respond by dropping sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro
(FRY). Another former source of political pressure, the dissident group of Bosnian Serb
assembly members who are aliened with Milnsevic. apparently has lost its impetus to
pressure Karadzic]
1 4c
\So far, Milosevic has not forced
Karadzic to accept a peace plan Belgrade likes, nor has he significantly weakened him
with sanctions. Nevertheless. Karadzic mav now be feelina some pressure after eight
months of sanctions.
Milosevic's
pressure will continue to grow, as wilYmtemal pressure from the constant shortage of
essentials.
3.5c
Milosevic probably does not intendfor the embargo to prevent the Bosnian Serb Army
(BSA) from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. Moreover, his allowing some \
assistance to the BSA appeases the leadership of the Yugoslav Army, which generally
opposes Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs. As a consequence, he is apparently
allowing limited resupply to the BSA so long as it serves Serbian political aims and the
activity can be plausibly denied
1.4c, 3.5c
This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide infonnation on Serbia's
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and Queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI
Interagency Balkan Task Force
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�3.5c
1.4c, 3.5c
Shipments Across FRY-Bosnia Border Remain Restricted
1.4c
[suggests that Belgrade's embargo and winter weather have held
shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to levels below those observed before the
embargo was imposed in August. The presence of the monitors from the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) at most of the border crossings capable
ofhandlittR large quantities ofgoods has inhibited major violations of the embargo. In
particular
only one large-scale fuel shipment attempted since 30
December, suggesting that B egrade has largely shut off such shipments across the
~
Bosnian border.
3.5c
In response to ICFY requests since January, FRY officials implemented measures that
have helped restrict shipments. As it did in late December 1994, Belgrade recently
addressed major problems with an eye to>vard the United Nations review on lifting
sanctions on the FRY scheduled for April.
Customs officers increased the number and thoroughness of bus inspectk
the major border crossings, but implementation has been inconsistent,
1.4c
|As a result of their auto and bus inspections, Yugoslav officials at the bordeT
have regularly confiscated or turned back unauthorized shipments of fuel, construction
materials, agricultural supplies, clothing, and livestock,
During February, for example officials confiscated 26 tons of fuel and 19 tons of
suggests that similar amounts of fiiel were turned back
fertilizer, but
from the border but not confiscated. In March, a patrol reportedly confiscated about
80 tons of fuel from four trucks using hidden tanks.
Yugoslav officials have taken steps to reduce the.use of some minor crossings and
1.4c
bypasses discovered by ICFY monitors.
On 13 March, ICFY protested to FRY officials about buses loaded with soldiers
Belgrade promised to take immediate
1.4c
transiting the border.
action, and there have been no subsequent confirmed transits of troops.
^stopped 24-hour monitoring at the Jamena
1.4c
ICFY
ferry crossing after the FRY had erected barricades in response to ICFVs request.
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Too Secret
Serbia also has cooperated with ICFY at Priboj and Uzice in inspecting and sealing
Yugoslav trains that transit Bosnia, includingfreightcars on passenger trains.
In March, Serbian postal officials were checking packages for prohibited goods,
1.4c
On 27 March, Customs Director Kertes agreed to improve controls on loading
Yugoslav Red Cross (YKC) trucks to ensure that only approved goods were included
1.4c
in the shipments.
unidentified FRY
officials were pressuring them to allow YRC vehicles to be used to move unauthorized
goods into Bosnia.
3.5c
Belgrade also has imposed more penalties on smugglers. Yugoslav customs initiated
action in 215 cases of sanctions violations in February and imposed fines of 127,000
dinars.
1.4c
this was a marked improvement over the August 1994 to
January 1995 period when 138 cases were initiated and 341,450 dinars infineswere
meted out. 3.5
C
Widespread Problems »t the Border Indicate Enforcement Deteriorating
Although Belgrade has addressed some ICFY concerns and no large shipments have
been observed, the nature andfrequency of enforcement shortcomings since midFebruary indicate enforcement overall has deterioratedfrom the levels noted in late
December. The deteriorating enforcement suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are
increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA across
the Bosnia border.
1.4c
we cannot determine if the enforcement
deficiencies have allowed enough shipments to compensate for quantities lost from the
cutoff in August 1994 of large trucks.
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Belgrade is shipping large
Moreover
1.4c
quantities of fiiel and other goods to the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia via the BelgradeZagreb highway. Large-scale use of this route could have permitted Belgrade to shift
cargo trucks away from the inter-Serb border, accounting for the apparent cessation of
transits at those crossings. In addition, the information on the detected cross-border
helicopterflightsis insufficient to confirm that any have been used to resupply the
BSA
3.5c
Deteriorating Enforcement Against "Ant Trade'
ICFY has had few indications of transits by large cargo trucks or tankers across the
border, but theflowof truck, bus, automobile, farm tractor, and pedestrian traffic, which ^
composes the "ant trade," appears to have been relatively steady through March at ICFY- .
manned crossings. Monitors have noted significant enforcement deficiencies by FRY
officials against this traffic since mid-February. In particular, ICFY patrols in March
detected an increasing number unauthorized truck transits.
3.5c
Yugoslav officials have not responded to monitors' requests to improve enforcement
procedures, ha^e^QtJtaUed^eiieatedjiiolations^ndJtav.eattenwXedJ^ircumveiit
ICFY controls.
1.4c, 3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Top Secret
3.5c
1.4c
|suggests' (hat goods are crossing the
1.4c, 3.5c
funding <;onstraiiitS5fiaYej'forcerf
l^oiSipiHBTW; -Wfifch-in turn has reduceidnhe number of'crossingj-inomtored^ll
||fici||^!^^<)^patroIs. |
]d'
tQucBjng^n<n\omt6r security, which could lead'the monitors to be mor&cwtioumn
ji^trollin^fw^
4
Top SecreC
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1.4c
nadcquate coverage by FRY patrols,
inadequate personnel andfacilities to support inspections, and insufficient euidance
on enforcement regulations also have hampered enforcement
1.4c, 3.5c
Pressure on FRY officials from Serbs living and trading alone the border also mav
contribute to lax enforcement. \
1.4c
confrontation on 14 March between police andHosnian Serb civilians at Krstac escalated
into an exchange of gunfire and grenades. At the Nudo Valley checkpoint
[on 10 March that a customs officer was reluctant to inspect most of the vehicles
because he claimed that the local people knew him.
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Una u t h prized' Hfcl icon ter A cfi vi tvCon t i n ti i n g
fM"a'rv.^hefe1iaVfe-Vfeensfevera^^
1.4c
50
ts detected originate in Bosnia and
.^.uw,^erbia^ecausethe'flights enteringBosnia probably fit the profile of eland festirife
htslfldwrsih'gly-ahdpnffl^^
3.5c
r
r
t
?
i
-life^^s^Suspect^rosis-border violatiOifoccuited^bn 3February wherl i 4c
fQund the eastern enclave of Srebrenica reponed 15 helicoptersiflying
i.ately <TQ-lalort'efers north of the ehclave travelmgin^ westerly direction^
^^^j^ite^igbt4ire<«ionftnd.proximi>4o.tKeborder,reported that
' • f c ^ ^ ^ W ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^ in'O; Bosnia. At'the same-limes UNobservefs
l^i^iiMiM^^ocetn^aAir facility^ which is used to monitor the border for illegal tfoss^M0^^^^f ^ ^^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ In fesponse<tO'UN inqufti^
^^9l^^$ned«tet*do*dieopters>ci^ssed^h^order. The^nited-Nations'
S^(ll^vtetfgatiOafdr-tac^feifl<fcnce. The UN QbseryersJiavei^o. '<
ibtedfaWtite^le^^
fhe
:
1
,
0
; i
z c i
t
i
Military-Related Activity Increasing Along the Border
Since late January, reports of military vehicles, aircraft, and troops crossing the border
have increased. The reports reinforce
1.4c
rAflf
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Belgrade Using Croatian "Back Door" to Get Around Embargo
In addition to goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border because of deteriorating
enforcement, fuel and other products from the FRY are reaching the Bosnian Serbs
through Croatia. Insufficient information is available to determine how long this
„
route has been used to evade the blockade, the volume of the shipments, and
*
Belgrade's involvement, but the traffic appears to be increasing. This represents a
large potential loophole in the embargo and probably already is the largest conduit for
fuel shipments to the Bosnian Serbs.
1.4c
in early March that tanker trucks were supplying fuel to Serb-controlled
areas of Bosnia via the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway. |
Jtheflowof goodsfromSerbia to Bosnia through
Croatia has steadily increased since the highway was reopened in December 1994.
lumber, consumer goods, and food destined for Bosnia also have
crossed into Croatia at Lipovac, with 50-60 trucks believed transiting the border in each
direction during each eight-hour period when monitors are present. From 7 February to
1,109 trucks may have transited west while
23 March,
Russian battalion soldiers and
monitors were afLipovac.
Croatian police do not stop vehicles from entering Croatia when they are not present.
the shipments travel the
highway west to Okucani and turn south to deliver to Banja Luka and elsewhere in
Bosnia.
3.5c
More Impact on Civilian Than Military Sector
Because the embargo apparently has reduced goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia
border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy. There is insufficient data
available to distinguish the extent of the embargo's impact from that caused by the fighting
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Ton firrrcL
3.5c
and the spilloverfromUN sanctions against the FRY. The limited data suggests,
however, that the greatest damage from all the external factors, including Belgrade's
embargo, has been to Pale's financial and industrial sectors.
Bosnian Serb banks have been cut off from the Serbian financial system, with no
electronic funds transfers operating. Trade transactions take place on a cash basis,
either in German marks or with the few Serbian dinars Pale acquired while part of the
Serbian monetary union in 1994. Due to its lack of hard currency, Pale has tried with
little success to provide liquidity by using various types offiatmoney, including
commodity coupons and checks, but the German mark remains the principal medium
of exchange.
•
The non-military industrial sector reportedly is operating at 10 to 15 percent of
1.4c
capacity, with the timber industry the only significant export sector,
for example, reported that 457
trucks containing Bosnian lumber were detected bound for Serbia during a 45-day
period, anq
llumber trucks have crossed the Serbia-Bosnia
border]
The blockade also appears to have caused additional shortages of fuel, electricity, and
all
basic foodstuffs, such as meat and cooking oil.
1.4c
goods are rationed in Bosnian Serb areas, with fuel two tofivetimes more expensive than
in Serbia. As a consequence, farming has shifted from mechanized to labor intensive
methods, possibly employing locally conscripted labor. Even the BSA faces constant spot
shortages pf food, clothing, and fuel, which could result from interna] distribution delays.
3.5c
Despite the spot shortages for the BSA, there are no indications the embargo has had a
serious impact on its capabilities. Reporting on recent fighting indicates Bosnian Serb
forces have been abls to counter Bosnian Government attacks in the Majevica Mountains
and Travnik area. Similarly, Bosnian Serb forces conducted a successful counteroffensive
last November to regain territory in northwest Bosnia, south of Bihac.l 3.5c
The BSA remains largely self-sufficient in logistic capability, except for fuel and
certain munitions. Available reporting indicates the Bosnian Serb network to acquire
critical munitions inside Serbia is still in operation:
1.4c
A press report on 24
March identified four of these supply links and revealed two additional FRYfirms,the
10
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Sloboda and Milan Blagovevic Factories, that are associated with Bosnian Serb
ammunition suppliers.
1.4c
the BSA had no
problems receiving military supplies from factories inside Serbia, suggesting Pale is
confident it can continue receiving suppliesfromSerbia.
In addition, Bosnian Serb officials continue to attempt to acquire military supplies and
other goods through Cyp
is probably have used the current cease-fire
to resupply their forces.
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1
•B R y
g C B.
17 MaY 1 9 9 5
DRAFT
FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE
OPTIONS REVIEW
BACKGROUND
'
r
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
to\3-ou83L-fn"
8/3/15- K6V1
UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals
regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the
deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:
(1) Maintenance of the status quo;
7
(2) A more aggressive militazy posture, including sustained use of air power, with
the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;
(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia
(4) Redeployment, and reductpon in the number of troops, with necessary
modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.
Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed
(option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the
perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.
OPTIONS
(1) Maintenance of Status Quo. Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction
shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But
changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being
involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an
UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would
be the worst case for the US.
The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is
an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive
for the warring parties to reach a settlement.
We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN
mandates would only increase the possibihty of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to
work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.
Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few
months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map,freedomof
movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication
with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more
involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more
liberal ROE, and air attacks.
The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and
make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin
•flBCRgg-
' rvn/vCTl
D AD
Rf
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON OADR
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OC EE RT
Qp^py
reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in hefping to stop the fighting and to promote
conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to
propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal.
There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.
US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must
remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering
withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between
UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must
support UNPROFOR.
(2) More Aggressive Military Posture. Sustained use of air power against the
Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a
belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor
would accept. Not a prudent option.
(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia. The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end
state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.
(4) Redeployment and Troop Reduction. This is the UNSYG's real recommendation.
The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a
disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of
the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.
The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown,
especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in
Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one
swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception
problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel
redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral
assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.
The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status
quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in
The Netherlands willaddress several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation
under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.
CONCLUSION
The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the
status quo while regaining the intitiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the
conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that
could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a postwithdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.
Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption. doc
DAO
RR
s
€
- * *
B i p
-
2
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�UKAb'i' - OCCJRE¥ -
DRAFT
UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIANALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (gf
ISSliE
Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO
remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led
withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?
OPTIONS (Sf:
• "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
• "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop
contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
• "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces
without coordination with allies or UN
• "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
• "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
• "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to
rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation
KEY FACTORS
• Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
• Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
• Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
• Humanitarian concerns
•
NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance
DISCUSSION
•
Risk of Casualties: Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily
dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the
forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas
(enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties
will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of
protecting the withdrawing forces.
• UN Limitations: UN military command structure, rules of engagement,
mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to
withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
• Lighter Options: Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, oncall options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have
rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force
to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
• Longer View: While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the
alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of
NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we
decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or
NATO, we lose.
CONCLUSION (jfi: If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.
DRAFT - SECRET - DRAFT
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/3/15" K8V1
�NATIONAL
MILITARY
(JUMMAPJU
otiHinK
L.
-SSGRE-lVKOrORN-
31 Jul 95
Lift of Bosnian Arms Embargo
The objective of lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government forces would
be to enable them to defend their core areas and regain some territory lost in
the conflict. Initially, Improved small arms, anti-tank , counter-battery and
additional heavy weapons, and trucks are high priority items for the Bosnians.
We believe the Bosnian Government will have resources available to bring in
substantial weaponry over a six month period without our active involvement.
We estimate any substantial change in capabilities will require at least six
months due to Bosnian organizational problems and Inadequacies in Bosnian
logistics and the requirements to distribute weapons and support throughout
the Bosnian army.
Implications of this lift poUcy include:
— Defensive capability would progressively strengthen, but offensive
capability will fall short of that required to offset Serbian advantages in heavy
weapons, intelligence, airpower. electronic warfare, and command aiid control.
~ Croatians would exact a heavy price on the Bosnians for permitting the
armament and would inevitably prevent, absent active US support, heavy
weaponry from augmenting the Bosnian force.
— During the six month build up, BSA would receive rapid reinforcement from
Serbia which would largely offset improvements shown by the Bosnians.
— The net effect: would be a higher level of intensity of fighting with a virtually
unchanged military balance.
-- US Allies would keep pressure to bear to restrain our activities in DENY
FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, and to provide any overt assistance.
— Russia would provide overt assistance to Serbia, some of which will flow
into Bosnia.
— The radical Muslim presence would be considerably strengthened inside
Bosnia.
Overall, lifting the arms embargo is more likely to precipitate a Bosnian defeat
than a successful effort to restore legitimate territorial boundaries.
-SSG^T-NorORK CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�GECRET/HOrORN
31 July, 1995
Air Support to Bosnia
This paper assumes that air support will be provided following a UNPF
withdrawal to assist Bosnian defense of their core areas without the benefit of
Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on the ground.
The air power required to implement this policy is available in theater now and
is sustainable provided effective Suppression of Enemy Defenses (SEAD) is
conducted and sustained throughout the air operation.
If so directed, air forces can attack to degrade Serb command and control and
artillery and impede movement of Serb units, reinforcements, and supplies.
However, without ground FACs, air power is likely unable to decisively affect
close engagements, offensive or defensive, fought by Bosnian Army.
Wide spread use of airpower for a prolonged period of time will likely Invite
Serbian and possibly Russian assistance, overt or covert, to strengthen
protection against air activity. This assistance could include provision of more
capable Surface-to-Air Missile systems, sophisticated electronic equipment to
offset US jamming/electronic warfare systems, and increased efforts at
camouflage/concealment. Of course this would be accompanied by diplomatic,
moral, and public pressure against our use of air power to Include exploiting
collateral damage.
While this use of air power may raise the costs to the Serbs it is unlikely to be
decisive in defeating their force absent strong military action by the Bosnian
Government.
It would unmistakably mark the US as a combatant in the operation, and if
done unilaterally, would impose additional severe strains on NATO. It would
also require us to forego basing in Italy, and require us to develop bases
elsewhere in the Balkans or use only Carrier-based assets.
Overall use of air power is a stop gap, temporary measure which could raise
Bosnian morale and set back Serb planning and logistics. However, the use of
air power is unlikely to decisively effect the outcome on the ground and would
most likely provoke a more determined aggression by Serbia.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
-SEGRdSWfOFeftH-
Aova-owga-'f*)'
3/3/15- K6H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�^,
C R h
,
i l
CLINTON LIBRARY MOTOCOPY
DRAFT -- DRAFT - DRAFT
Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia
Military Stabilization Measures (U)
Background (gf: International efforts to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia are
more likely to result in an enduring peace if (1) the Bosnian Muslim - Bosnian Croat
Federation (the "Federation") has a military capability to defend itself against the Bosnian
Serbs, (2) no party to the conflict significantly increases its offensive capabilities, and (3)
measures are developed to reassure the parties as to each others' military actions and
intentions. An approach is needed to balance militarily capabilities, limit the incentives
and ability of all the parties to obtain offensive weapons, and institute confidencebuilding measures (CBMs). The USG will lead an international effort to provide military
assistance to the elements of the Federation so they can develop a more viable defense
vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs while also supporting basic measures designed to avoid an
arms race and reduce tensions. The effort will also be designed to strengthen the internal
cohesion of the Federation and avoid features which could detract from cooperation
within the Federation.
Arms Embargo (8?: A premise of this paper is that the arms embargo and economic
sanctions currently in place for the former Yugoslavia will be lifted by UN Security
Council action in connection with the peace agreement. This will enable efforts to
improve the Federation's self-defense capabilities, but also opens the door for additional
arms flows to the Bosnian Serbs and could permit an unconstrained arms race in the
region.
Military Balance ($: While the military balance in Bosnia and the Federation's
specific needs will require a detailed assessment, including an in-country evaluation of
Federation capabilities, enough information is now available to estimate the general needs
and scale of effort required to enable a viable Federation defense:
• The Bosnian Serbs have an equipment advantage (-4:1 in tanks, -10:1 in APCs, -2:1
in artillery), whereas the Federation has a manpower advantage (2:1). Current
equipment levels are at Tab A.
• Qualitatively, the Federation has an effective light infantry force able to defend
against most Bosnian Serb attacks, but its military effectiveness is limited by
equipment shortages, poor tactical and operational leadership skills, and by a lack of
operational coordination between Muslims and Croats.
• The Bosnian Serbs have shown better organizational skills, but are constrained by
manpower shortages and low morale.
Both sides have good skills in conducting defensive operationsfromprepared
positions. The resulting stalemates in many parts of the country and, more recently,
dynamic results on the battlefield attest to a modest imbalance in aggregate military
Classified hy Milciple Scuroes
Declassify on C*m
DECLASSIFIED
^SECRET-
PER E.O. 13526
8/3/15
�L *+uu i u y i I i
rAijfc
-fiEGRBT
capability between Federation and Bosnian Serb forces, with the Bosnian Serbs
holding a particular advantage in mechanized capabilities. Recent Federation
successes against the Bosnian Serb Army do not change this fundamental judgment,
because they have been so dependent on Croatian efforts and support.
Security Assistance Program
Efforts to enhance Federation self defense
capabilities will be limited to the minimum necessary to create a balance without
stimulating an arms race. The approach will be to improve the elements of the
Federation's defensive capabilities by enhancing one brigade within each corps
(equivalent) of the Federation -- a total of ten (3-4 Bosnian Croat and 6-7 Bosnian
Muslim) brigades. These ten enhanced brigades will provide each corps (equivalent) a
mobile reserve. By dispersing the enhancements across the ten corps (equivalents) and
limiting training to the lowest (unit) level, increases in Federation offensive capability
will be minimized. All support will be provided directly to the elements of the Federation
(Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim) rather than to the Federation itself and will be provided
in proportion to their parts of the Federation forces. Further, the effort will lay the
groundwork for continuing mil-to-mil contacts with US and other moderate nations,
contributing to stability. The estimates below will be revised if necessary, once a
comprehensive in-country assessment is conducted.
• Training. Training will be focused on defensive tactics, techniques and
procedures to attain proficiency at the platoon level. Additionally, leader
training in defensive planning and execution will be provided at company,
battalion and brigade levels. The effort will require about 1,500 trainers and
about seven months to accomplish. The in-country trainers will be principally
USG contractor personnel and military personnel from nations not involved in
IFOR operations.
• Equipment. Each of the ten mobile brigades will receive 10 APCs, 20 tanks,
18 howitzers, 15 mortars, a mix of air defense missiles and guns, antitank
weapons, and small arms. For ease of integration, principally former WP
equipment will be provided. The total major equipment to be provided to the
Federation will be:
Equipment
Tvpe(s)
Quantity
Tanks
T-72
200
APCs
BTR-60
100
Howitzers
122mm
180
Mortars
82/120 mm
270(150/120)
MANPAD missiles SA-7/16
50
Light AD guns
ZSU-23
60
Antitank Weapons T-12 100mm 60
Rocket Launcher
128mm
60
Recoilless Rifle
82mm
60
Small Arms
AK-47
10,000
-flECRET
�UKKlUt
UK THE SECKETAKY
DEFENSE/CCC
CKKJ
•SECRET
•
1U. 06.
'95 09:46
NO.
1460 109111
PAGE
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Cost. Preliminary estimates indicate a likely cost of $385M: $353Mfor
equipment, $12M for training, $14M for operations, and $6M for
transportation.
Arms Control Measures $)\ The goal of arms control is to prevent an arms race in the
wake of the removal of the arms embargo. Simple caps on the inventory of major
weapons with offensive potential, limiting the Federadon and the Bosnian Serbs each to
the inventory level of the higher of the two parties in each category of weapons at the
time of settlement, are likely to be all that we can achieve in the context of the peace
agreement. More complex arrangements can then be pursued as the peace matures.
Confidence Building Measures j#5: The peace agreement will contain provisions to
enable both political and military dialogue between the parties to permit the resolution of
differences before they escalate, including the establishment of a Joint Military
Commission. Further, the agreement could contain provisions for the exchange of
advance information concerning military exercises and force movements. Specific
information to be exchanged could be agreed between the military leaders of the parties
after the peace agreement has been signed.
Action
The USG will undertake the following actions to achieve stabilization of the
peace agreement (lead agency as indicated):
• Subject to the negotiators' sense of acceptability to the parties, strive to include
in the agreement the following stabilization features (State):
--Caps on the numbers of selected categories of major weapon systems (e.g.,
Ground Attack aircraft, tanks, surface-surface missiles, artillery)
-Parties agree not to accept security assistance from radical/pariah parties.
-Establishment of a joint military commission to resolve disputes.
--Parties to exchange information concerning major military movements and
exercises.
• Obtain unconditional multilateral removal of the arms embargo and lifting of
economic sanctions agains the Former Yugoslavia. (State)
• Seek agreement and support from key allies for the US approach. (State)
• Organize a coalition of willing nations to provide security assistance
(equipment and training) to the Federation. Contributions of funding,
equipment, and trainers will be needed. (State)
• Obtain Croatian agreement to permit unobstructed passage and not to interfere
with the US-led effort. (State)
• Upon cessation of hostilities, conduct an in-country assessment to confirm the
Federation's security needs. (JCS)
• Using intermediaries if necessary, seek at least tacit agreement from Serbia and
Croatia to limit their support to their clients in Bosnia to items which will not
adversely affect the balance or undermine the US effort. (State)
iECRET.
4
�OFFICt
OF T H t St'UKh'l AKY
U t F t NS t/^(JCJ
( f K)
I U . UD.
GECRET
yo Uy:40
INU.
!40UIUUMI
rAUb
CLINTON LIBRARY J H T C P
P O O OY
Seek Congressional support and funding for the effort. (State)
Conduct the security assistance program commencing on signature of the peace
agreement and completing within twelve months thereafter. (JCS/DSAA)
Prepared by CAPT W. L. Boyd, USN, OASD (S&R), 614-2759
Rev 4,05 Oct 95
• 3ECRET
D
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
-GECRET"NOrORN .
SlO\3- Oto&X- ?)
S/S/i^
K6H
10/23/95 8:11 PM
INFORMATION PAPER
1. Purpose. To identify unresolved issues concerning the overall peace
implementation effort in Bosnia, to determine the USG position and to
delineate the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions and provisions of the draft
framework agreement for peace (referred to below as the "framework
agreement"). This will assist decision makers in identifying inconsistencies
between USG positions, NATO positions, and tentative provisions of the
framework agreement for peace. Areas in which further NAC guidance initiated
by the US would be required, or changes to the framework agreement are
required, are identified below in the recommendation sections.
1
2. Key Points. There were nine main areas of concem discussed during the 20
October 1995 NSC Deputies Committee (DC) meeting (JCS paper dated 20
October attached). They are: mission, non-compliance, election security,
deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public
outreach. Issues in which there was consensus at the 20 October DC are listed
below as Resolved Issues. Those issues which remain unresolved, or those
additional issues that were identified (additional issues are underlined), are
listed under the remaining areas of concem.
Resolved Issues
1. What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep?
•
USG position is consistent with the NAC decision on 29 September that
IFOR would conduct an operation to implement the military aspects of the
agreement to ensure compliance, to create safe conditions for the
withdrawal of UN forces, and to create secure conditions (within the limits of
key military tasks) for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with
the peace agreement. To avoid mission creep, the USG must establish tasks
and responsible parties for non-military tasks; ensure coordination
mechanisms exist between civil and military aspects, and over-watch to
prevent migration of tasks. Additionally, language in the framework
agreement should clearly state IFOR's mission is to implement the military
aspects of the peace agreement. Further, it is clear, a fully developed
strategy to implement the civil aspects of the peace agreement is essential to
ensure success for the entire peace implementation effort, to achieve the
desired end state, and to allow IFOR to be withdrawn within 12 months
from its initial deployment. On an urgent basis, the USG must define nonmilitary tasks and assign USG responsibilities with timelines for execution.
The implementation of the peace agreement would have many aspects
including political, military, civil police, elections, humanitarian assistance,
1
Unless otherwise noted, IFOR missions, tasks, assumptions or situations are
based on the DoD paper "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement - Revision 30"
-
SECRET NOFORN
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•DECRET NOrORN
human rights, monitoring, and nation building. The USG should assure
international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and the World Bank
promptly begin work on the non-military tasks that will complement the
work of the IFOR.
2. What is our strategy for coordinating the refinement of the NATO plan
and the negotiated settlement?
•
To ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning,
and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be
finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. State will develop a draft
framework agreement based on the 23 October drafting sessions. This draft
should be cleared within the interagency on 24 October, and once the
details of the military aspects of the peace agreement are finalized they
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning, to include
identification of potential changes in required force structure.
3. What constitutes a violation of the peace agreement? What is the
response of IFOR to violations?
•
The NAC decided on 29 September that the Implementation Force (IFOR)
will ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement, in
particular, withdrawal offerees to their respective territories and the
establishment of agreed zones of separation. The USG position, and the
framework agreement are consistent with the NAC decision. ROE and the
good judgment of the IFOR Commander will be the basis of when and what
force will be used.
5. How could SICOR interact with IFOR if there was a violation?
•
NAC decisions and the framework agreement are clear; the SICOR has no
authority over the IFOR. The IFOR Commander has the responsibility for
military aspects of the implementation agreement, and within that
authority, will coordinate his actions with the SICOR. Routinely, civilmilitaiy interaction will be coordinated in a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC). The DC on 20 October also agreed that the IFOR Commander will
deal directly with the head of state of each entity and not just with the
Chiefs of Defense.
6. What is the relation of the IFOR to the civilian police?
•
The NAC decisions, USG position, and framework agreement are consistent.
The NAC on 11 October approved SACEUR's concept of operations dated 6
October 1995 in which the establishment of civil-military structures would
•BeeRBg-NOPORN-
qnv^
ZJJiainQPi
"DM
fir:nI
cfi .
-c? - m
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
7B6RET NOFORN
occur during Phase I of the operation. SACEUR's briefing to the President
on 18 October identifies a coordination relationship between IFOR and the
civilian police representative (through a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC) established to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of the
implementation of the peace agreement).
7. Will IFOR be used to deter attacks on UN civilian agencies and their
workers, or civilians? What will IFOR do about atrocities and human
rights violations? Who will decide?
•
On 20 October the DC determined IFOR will not be responsible for
investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or
atrocities and human rights violations (additional issues identified are
addressed below).
8. What violations do the police handle and what violations does EFOR
handle?
•
On 20 October, the DC agreed IFOR will not provide for civil order. IFOR's
responsibility concerning attacks on international civilians and the
indigenous population is discussed below.
• On 20 October, the DC determined that the USG should develop a plan
(State lead) for a civilian police component and a lead organization should
be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to
organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to
assist local governments and populations in developing local police forces.
This should include, at a minimum, authority to assess the present police
force, vet the personnel presently assigned, train police, monitor police
functions, supplement the police force as necessary, and establish a border
patrol.
10. Do we have a "threshold" for use of force against the Federation?
Who will decide when the force will be used? How do we define evenhandedness? How does the IFOR mission relate to efforts by countries to
provide military assistance to the Bosnian Government?
•
On 20 October the DC determined this issue relates to sporadic violations of
the peace agreement. Since in peace operations, the impartiality (evenhandedness) of peace forces and the international organizations is critical to
the legitimacy and success of the operation, evenhandedness must be
demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances.
Additionally, to sustain IFOR's impartiality, the concurrent "equip and train"
program must be completely separate from IFOR. To maintain the
legitimacy of the operation, the DC determined that IFOR will enforce
implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly and assume the IFOR
SECRET NOFORN-
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
-SBGRET NOFOttt^
will be withdrawn in the event of a total breakdown in strategic consent (the
issue of total breakdown is discussed below).
12. What, if anything, will we do about election security?
•
At the 6 October Deputies Committee meeting there was general agreement
with the conclusion in the JCS paper "Election Security - Implications to
the Implementation Force (IFOR)" which was: the IFOR would create secure
conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces
to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and
enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement. As a
part of the peace agreement there should be a civil administrative, police,
and electoral component of the overall implementation effort to assist local
governments and populations in providing local security for elections. These
components would be part of those organizations specifically tasked to
monitor the election process, provide assistance to the civilian population
and allow governments to draft electoral law, educate voters, register voters,
and conduct the election. The DC on 6 October deferred a formal decision,
however, pending discussions with the US negotiating team. The DC on 20
October agreed to follow through with the recommendations in the JCS
paper and the provisions of the framework agreement, and that OSCE
should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of
the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election
security plan.
13. Can we confirm that IFOR will actually be under NATO command and
control during the UNPROFOR-IFOR transition?
•
Yes, IFOR will conduct the operation under NATO command and control and
ROE, with no UN involvement in military decision making.
17. Where will the Russians be located?
•
On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately. The US
is opposed to a separate AOR or chain of command for the Russian troops.
18. Will IFOR patrols in the Zone of Separation be armed?
•
IFOR patrols will be armed and backed up by reserve forces.
•SBBRET NOFORN
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
" -SEGRET-NeFeRN19. What wiU IFOR's role be in Eastern Slavonia? What will the US role
be? What will happen to the Russian battalion there under the UNCRO
mandate? What are the IFOR responsibilities for forces in theater but not
in Bosnia? What will happen to UNCRO and UNPREDEP responsibilities?
Who will be responsible for their mission?
•
•
On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately.
The USG and UN position is that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations
continue under UN control. IFOR Commander is responsible for
coordinating with these UN missions.
• Presently there is no role, assigned by NATO, for IFOR in Eastern Slavonia.
However, the NAC gave SACEUR the mission to control and secure the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces not transferred to IFOR, to include if
necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces. The NAC on 29
September agreed that SACEUR should submit a concept of operations
based on the planning assumption that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations
continue under UN control. If the UNCRO mandate is renewed, we
anticipate the Russian battalion would remain in Eastern Slavonia. If
required and requested, NATO is still committed to withdrawing UNPF from
Bosnia and/or Croatia (Sector East) using OPLAN 40104.
• The framework agreement, as presently written, does not address Eastern
Slavonia or FYROM.
23. While we are prepared to enforce the settlement and will not wait for
"indicators of seriousness" after signature, should we demand that parties
make tangible gestures of good faith in week or so between initialing and
signature?
•
On 20 October the DC agreed there should be "indicators of seriousness" in
the framework agreement to be required between initialing and signature of
the peace agreement, but that these would not be preconditions for IFOR
deployment. At a minimum, immediately upon initialing the agreement, the
parties will continue the cessation of hostilities and observance of the ceasefire in accordance with the Agreement of 5 October, will not patrol forward
of friendly force positions, will not fire large caliber weapons, all air early
warning or air defense radars will be shutdown within 72 hours and will
remain inactive, and each party will begin withdrawing its forces/military
institutions/facilities/weapons from the zone of separation immediately
(completed within 30 days).
25. Kcw will winter affect the timing of deployment, transition, and
operations?
•
Winter weather will affect the speed of deployment of forces into the theater.
Roughly 60 percent of UNPROFOR's casualties have resulted from vehicular
accidents. Deployment in winter conditions will be difficult. In addition to
5
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
JECRET NQPORN-
treacherous road conditions, location and removal of mines will be
extremely difficult during the winter months.
27. What constitutes a total breakdown? Who decides?
•
On 20 October, the DC agreed in the event of a major breakdown in
compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North
Atlantic Council which will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the
situation and advice of military commanders.
28. Does the IFOR remain only 12 months?
• The NAC decision of 29 September directed SACEUR to develop a concept of
operations planning on the assumption that the mission of the IFOR would
be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been
implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
• The President, based on the final peace agreement and the final plan, will
determine whether the US position will remain that IFOR withdraws 12
months from its initial deployment.
Unresolved Issues
Mission
3A. Are there restrictions on the deployment and use of military forces in
the parties' own entities? What would IFOR's response be to breaches of
the cease fire or the use of military force to coerce/intimidate within the
two entities?
•
Neither the USG position, nor the NAC decisions delineate restrictions on
military forces in their own entity. The NAC determined that planning
should assume the IFOR will "ensure compliance with the military aspects
of an agreement (in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective
territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of
separation of forces".
• The framework agreement states, within 90 days of the signing of the
agreement, all forces will begin to withdraw to Cantonment and barracks
areas to be completed no later than 120 days. Subsequent to movement to
cantonment areas, no training, military exercises, maneuvers, patrolling, or
other such activities outside of the cantonment areas are permitted without
approval of the IFOR Commander. Unauthorized activities will constitute
2
2
D r a f t "Framework Agreement f o r Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95
-SECRET-NOFORN •
6
�•SECRET NOFORN
•
\y I
L
N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
HTCP
hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR.
This measure should be seen as an additional demonstration of good faith
on the part of the parties, which in principle should reduce the potential for
violence and enhance the force protection of the IFOR.
Recommendation. It is clear from the above language in the draft
framework agreement that any unauthorized activities will constitute hostile
intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. Because
this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will
ultimately determine the overaJl objectives and rules of engagement for the
IFOR. USG should propose a NAC decision based on the above language
from the framework agreement and that the two provisions on restrictions to
deployment and use of military forces which constitute hostile intent should
also be included in the definition of "hostile intent" in the Rules of
Engagement Annex of the OPLAN.
4. Who decides If there is a violation? Who decides whether IFOR is
responsible for handling the violation?
•
The USG position states that on order, CINCSOUTH {the IFOR Commander)
will conduct operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H.
• On 29 September, the NAC stated CINCSOUTH (the IFOR commander) is to
implement the military aspects, and ensure compliance, of the peace
agreement. This includes arrangements for NAC guidance and political
advice and information to SACEUR, including stages at which additional
guidance could be requested. Those stages include, but are not limited to,
major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to
assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, disagreements
with non-NATO troop contributors or other organizations that can not be
resolved in theater, and other circumstances prompting requests from the
IFOR Commander.
• "Recognizing the need to provide for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of this agreement," the framework agreement states the parties
will request the deployment of IFOR for that purpose. The framework
agreement also establishes a Joint Military Commission, run by the IFOR
Commander. In this role, the IFOR Commander would make decisions
consistent with IFOR's mandate as necessary to enhance compliance. This
commission would also receive reports on compliance with the provisions of
the agreement from the parties or from the monitors. In Article XI, the IFOR
Commander is noted as the final authority concerning all questions
associated with the implementation of the military aspects of the peace
agreement.
• Recommendation. None, the USG position, the NAC decisions, and the
framework agreement are consistent, the IFOR Commander is noted as the
final authority. It is clear the IFOR Commander is assigned the
3
3
D r a f t "Framework Agreement f o r Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated
•SEGRET-NQFORN
10/21/95
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
responsibility of completing the military tasks in theater associated with the
peace agreement, and as such, in this role and in his role as the Chairman
of the Joint Military Commission, would make decisions consistent with the
IFOR's mandate as necessary to ensure compliance. If circumstances occur
which prompt a request for additional political guidance or advice, he is
authorized to request that guidance as per the NAC decision (i.e., total
breakdown in strategic consent).
7A. What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person
against international civilian personnel (i.e.. UNHCR personnel)? What will
IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against the
indigenous population? When violence is conducted in the presence of
IFOR personnel? When reported as it is happening but not observed
directly by IFOR personnel? When reported in retrospect?
•
On 29 September the NAC decided that within the limits of IFOR's key
military tasks, IFOR will deter attacks on UN civilian agencies by creating
secure conditions for others organizations conducting tasks associated with
the peace agreement. While specific ROE is not yet drafted, the NAC
determined guidance under OPLAN 40104 would apply in principle to this
operation for handling civilian obstruction and deliberate violence to life and
person ("the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of
urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present
and have the local means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life
and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.").
• The framework agreement does not address IFOR's responsibility in this
area.
• Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined NATO forces should
be authorized to slop deliberate violence to life and person against
international civilian personnel and indigenous population where NATO
forces are present or have the means and opportunity, but IFOR will not be
responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international
civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations. Because this is
a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately
determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The
USG should propose the following NAC decision: "In accordance with the
provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to
act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO
forces are present and or have the leeal means and opportunity, to stop
deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the
hostilities.".
'SECRET NOFORN
8
•RlVr-l r. / M n I n o t . i
'(-IM
017 : n 1 r «
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
-SECRET NOFORN
9. Will the IFOR do anything to help refugees exercise the right to regain
their property and return to their homes?
9A. Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where the
territory changes control from one waning faction to the other? (Note:
This may include the impartial establishment and supervision of
protected zones, humanitarian assistance for the civilian population,
permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, guarantee of the
security of civilians, dissemination oflnformation to the public, and
movement of populations across borders.)
•
The USG position is for the IFOR to be prepared to facilitate other
organizations (UNHCR) in the accomplishment of its mission.
• NAC agreed on 29 September that the UNHCR and other organizations
would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons, although the
NATO Theater Commander, within capabilities, should be prepared to
consider requests for assistance. Additionally the NAC agreed with the key
tasks which included the supporting task of observing, securing, and
preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees,
displaced persons and their property.
• The framework agreement states that parties to the framework agreement
shall facilitate the ability of all refugees and displaced persons to freely
decide whether to return to their homes of origin or to make a claim.
Additionally, in Article XII, that within 30 days military forces occupying
- the territory to be transferred from one entity to another will completely
vacate and clear the territory to be transferred. In order to provide the
civilians in those areas being transferred to a different entity with a period of
adjustment, however, opposing military forces of an entity receiving new
territory will not occupy this new territory for 90 days or until approval is
received by the IFOR Commander. The IFOR Commander is authorized all
necessary force to ensure compliance with thel article.
• Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined IFOR forces have no
role in such areas as the Krajina, Zepa, Gorazde, etc. where it is clear the
UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and
displaced persons. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North
Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and
rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following
NAC decision: Assign the IFOR the key military task of enforcing the
provision that armed forces are precluded from entering the territory to be
transferred (as defined in the framework agreement) and that the UNHCR
and other organizaUons would retain responsibility for humanitarian
assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and
displaced pefsons, dissemination of information to the public, and
movement of populations across borders. The local governments, supported
4
D r a f t "Framework Agreement f o r Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95
-SECRET NOFORN
r\w -i c i t I n i no t7 i
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
W
N
SECRET NOFORN
by the civilian police component of the implementation plan, would be
responsible for the security of civilians.
Non-Compliance
11. What will IFOR do about protecting or monitoring external borders?
11 A. Should there be a symbolic presence on the external borders
(particularly the inner-Serb border)?
•
•
•
The USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement do not
address protection or monitoring of external borders.
The Constitutional Structures annex of the framework agreement delineates
the responsibilities of the Central Government and its exclusive and
additional responsibilities. Protection or monitoring of external borders is
not expressly assigned. According to the framework agreement, all
governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the
Government of B-H shall be those of the Entities (Federation of B-H and
Republic Srpska).
Recommendation. This question strikes at the heart of the "partitioning"
issue. Because the addition of a task for IFOR to protect or monitor the
external borders of B-H will significantly increase the force structure
requirement the IFOR, the protection and monitoring of the external borders
should be left to the two Bosnian entities. If it is determined in the
negotiations that a "symbolic presence" is required on the external border,
the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for an external border
monitoring component and a lead organization (possibly ICFY) should be
solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize
an external border monitoring component and delineate its mandate.
Deployment
14. What forces of the various parties are to be permitted within the
Weapons Free Zone (20 Km wide)?
•
•
The US military planners envision a 10 Km monitored zone (20 Km total) on
either side of the boundary line where only IFOR and the respective side's
forces will be allowed, and where national representaUves (BSA, ABiH, and
HVO) co-located in IFOR command posts have control of forces. IFOR would
patrol both sides, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air
sensors, patrol by helo and block/monitor roads to control high density
areas. Heavy weapons would be excluded.
The NAC directed the IFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspects
of an agreement, and in particular, the establishment of agreed zones of
-SEGRET-NOFORN10
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•SECRET NOFORN •
separation. Current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km weapons
free zone.
• In the framework agreement there is a provision for a Military Exclusion
Buffer Zone of approximately 16 Km on either side of the Military Exclusion
Zone (4 Km wide) for a total of a 20 Km zone. No direct fire, armored or
mechanized vehicles are permitted.
• Recommendation: The US military planning and the draft framework
agreement are consistent. The planned force structure is sufficient to
monitor and enforce this provision. Recommend the framework agreement
includes a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone. The proposed Military Exclusion
Buffer Zone will reduce risk for IFOR. Because current NATO planning has
not addressed a 20 Km Military Exclusion Buffer Zone, this provision
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
15. Will there be a 2 Km buffer zone?
•
•
•
•
US military planners envision a 4 Km wide separation zone (2 Km on either
side of the boundary line) established, then monitored and enforced by the
IFOR. This will be a weapons-free area. IFOR command post will be
established in the zone of separation with IFOR, BSA, ABiH, and HVO
components. US envisions IFOR units will direct combined patrols which
will investigate violations and resolve disputes at the lowest level. IFOR-only
patrols will also be conducted. Combined checkpoints will be established
along lines of communication. The decisions on force placement should be
made at the operational level by the force commander.
Neither the NAC decisions, nor the SACEUR concept of operations,
specifically address this issue.
In the framework agreement there is a proposal for a 4 Km Military
Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line). No
weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted. This zone is
established to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of
hostilities.
Recommendation: The US military planning and the framework agreement
are consistent. Recommend the framework agreement include a provision
for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity
Boundary Line) to be established as a buffer zone to prevent any incidents
which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. Because current NATO
planning has not addressed a 4 Km zone of separation, this provision
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
DECRET NOFORN—
11
i n t n rn-. i
�-
•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
16. Will IFOR deploy into Serb areas? Will IFOR zones cover the entire
country?
•
The USG position is IFOR would operate principally from Federation
territory. US military planners envision IFOR will patrol or monitor (both
ground and helo) both sides of the boundary line, investigate and respond to
violations, monitor ground/air sensors, and monitor/control roads to
control high density areas.
|
• The NAC decisions do not address this issue in detail.
• The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for
training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and
calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of
movement. The redeployment of all Serb forces into cantonment areas,
monitored by IFOR, will facilitate IFOR's mission accomplishment. The
cantonment concept will increase control of military forces, promoting the
effectiveness of local police. Particularly during the election process,
effective police will complement any IFOR presence in the Serb entity,
contributing to a secure environment. On the other hand, if uncontrolled
military forces, and ineffective police, complicate the security situation,
IFOR's task will be more difficult, perhaps leading to IFOR conducting police
functions.
• Recommendation: The NAC decision, USG position and framework
agreement are consistent. To complete the military tasks assigned to IFOR
in accordance with the latest revision of the framework agreement IFOR can,
and is expected to, operate predominately on Federation territory.
• However, if the framework agreement is adjusted to include military tasks in
which IFOR must deploy into Bosnian Serb entity to accomplish its mission
or further political guidance is provided requiring IFOR to deploy into the
Bosnian Serb entity, additional troops will be required for the task assigned.
If additional troops are required, the US will face the decision to authorize
additional forces or delete such a provision from the framework agreement.
Once again, to ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO
military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework
agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency.
When politically feasible, these details should be shared with the NATO
Military Authorities, via the proper political channels within NATO, to allow
military planning to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine
IFOR planning.
"SBCRETTJOFORN12
pi
a n w _i
c i
�MchETKoronK
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Area of Operations
20. Should IFOR HQ be in Naples, Sarajevo, or Zagreb? Should IFOR HQ
be in Sarajevo, and if so, how soon?
•
While the NAC decisions do not specifically address this issue, the selection
of IFOR HQ is best made by the military commander responsible for the
operation.
• SACEUR concept of operations has the IFOR Theater HQ in Zagreb and
ARRC HQ (Ground Commander) in Sarajevo. US Division HQ likely to be in
Tuzla.
• The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for
training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and
calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of
movement.
• Recommendation: If it is decided IFOR must establish a HQ in Sarajevo for
political reasons, recommend the IFOR Commander be allowed to determine
how soon it is logistically feasible, and that he be authorized to establish
rear headquarters in Zagreb and Naples as appropriate.
Timing
21. Some equipment and forces must be prepositioned before signature
of the peace agreement. When do we have to give the order to
preposition?
•
Will be address in Notional Timeline below.
22. What is the sequencing of approvals required for ACTWARNs,
ACTREQs, and ACTORDs?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
24. How much time between signing and deployment?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
26. What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
SECRET NOFORN
13
�LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
GECRET NOFORN
Exit
29. What is an acceptable end state to the US when IFOR leaves?
•
•
•
•
•
USG ~ when the Federation has a reasonable self defense capability.
The NAC determined end state is when the military aspects of the peace
agreement have been implemented.
The framework agreement defines the military aspects of the peace
agreement in the Cessation of Hostilities and Disengagement Annex.
Recommendation: The framework agreement, as discussed in many of the
questions and answers above, will define the military aspects of the peace
agreement. IFOR should withdraw when the military aspects of the peace
agreement are accomplished. There is, however, an inescapable linkage
between^ the IFOR exit strategy and the parallel civil effort. The true
indicators of success of the operation may in fact be the progress made in
the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. There must be strong civilian
agency support in the overall effort. Of course, the other key to exit strategy
is simultaneously completing an equip and train program for the Bosnian
Federation to ensure a stable military situation, or rough balance of power,
between the two entities. However, it should be noted the key military tasks
approved by the NAC and the below success criteria should not be a
precondition, or checklist, necessary for IFOR departure:. Possible criteria
for success in the overall peace implementation effort include:
• UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former
Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;
• the establishment of the Entity Boundary Line, areas of separation,
and any cantonment areas which have been marked and agreed to by
the involved parties;
• withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, to include
adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use, and
reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment
areas;
• the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission,
Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for
Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National
Monuments, Joint Public Transportation Corporation, and all civilian
components of the peace implementation effort are established and
allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;
• Elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local
Parliaments are completed and the Constitutional Structures are
seated to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.
Essentially, IFOR will give the civilian aspects of the peace implementation
and the military stabilization efforts a reasonable opportunity to establish
peace. We should continue to assume that the mission of the IFOR would
•CECRET NOFORN
14
�•GECRET NOFORN-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been
implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
Congressional Strategy
30. What is our strategy for addressing congressional concems? Is it
coordinated?
•
•
NSC must either specify the strategy or designate an agency to do so.
Recommendation: State is probably the appropriate lead agency, OSD will
have a large role.
Public Outreach
31. What is our strategy for addressing the public's concem? Is it
coordinated?
•
Recommendation: OSD recommends a proactive public affairs policy,
coordinated by the White House staff with full support from DoD and State.
USG should explain the IFOR deployment to the public, actively advocating
the USG decision using a common set of talking points.
Notional Timeline
32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG
decisions required to support the timeline?
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Proximity Talks begin
Presidential/NCA approval of response to
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces
President Clinton approves draft peace agreement
Peace Agreement initialed
CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN
President Clinton approves OPLAN
NAC approve OPLAN 40104X
President Clinton seeks Congressional
support
SHAPE submits ROE request
NAC approves ROE request
NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces
SACEUR issues oi uci foi Enabling Forces
-SECRET NOFORN15
Q I
qnwj
c i i I n i not, i
12 October
31 October
3 November
3 November
13 November
14 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
�-SECRET NOFORN
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
President/NCA approves Issue of deployment order
for Enabling Forces
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes
London Conference
Moscow Conference
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR
Peace Conference
Agreement signed
NAC approves deployment of main force
SACEUR Issues order for Main Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Main Body
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater
UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental
15 November
15-29 November
17 November
20-21 November
23-24 November
14-24 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
27 November
30 November
30 November
30 Nov - completion
TBD
Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
N:\EUR\EURCENEA\NATO\IFOR\UNRSOLV3.DOC
-SECRET •NOFORN.
16
�32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG
decisions required to support the
N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Proximity Talks begin
Presidential/NCA approval of response to
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces
President Clinton approves draft peace agreement
Peace Agreement initialed
CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN
President Clinton approves OPLAN
NAC approve OPLAN 40104X
President Clinton seeks Congressional
support
SHAPE submits ROE request
NAC approves ROE request
NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces
SACEUR Issues ordci foi Enabling Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Enabling Forces
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes
London Conference
Moscow Conference
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR
Peace Conference
Agreement signed
NAC approves deployment of main force
SACEUR issues order for Main Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Main Body
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater
UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental
12 October
31 October
3 November
3 November
13 November
14 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15-29 November
17 November
20-21 November
23-24 November
14-24 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
27 November
30 November
30 November
30 Nov - completion
TBD
Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
N:\EUR\EURCENEA\NATO\IFOR\UNRSOLV3.DOC
�-SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
i
ISSUE PAPER
LIFTING THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO
Background
This plan for l i f t i n g the siege of Sarajevo vould be but one elemsnt — albeit a
major one — of a larger plan of military arrangements for iirplementing an
overall peace plan agreed upon ty the parties. I t is recognized that there are
inherent limitations in drafting a plan without knowing more about the overall
context.
Despite the agreements made at the London Conference last August, Bosnian Serb forces under
the direction of Radovan Karadzic continue to pound the city of Sarajevo from 15 "major"
artillery sites in the hills around Sarajevo. Additionally, with the exception of the Sarajevo
airport, which is held by UNPROFOR, we believe there are 6000-8000 Bosnian Serb
Arm/ regular troops and 4000-5000 Serb irrregulars i n the area of Sarajevo.
Opposing them are 15,000-20,000 Bosnian government forces. The map at Tab A
shows the reported locations of Bosnian Serb artillery in the immediate area of Sarajevo. In
recent days, Bosnian Serb units have pressed forward into the suburbs of Sarajevo and into Stup,
threatening to cut off the city from the airport.
There is no reliably open land route from Sarajevo to Muslim-controlled territory, all roads out
being held by Serbian forces or subject to fire from them. Sarajevo depends for its food on
UNHCR supplies, mostly delivered by airlifts (in which US planes participate). UNHCR
estimates that, despite periodic interruptions of the airlift and of distributions from the airport
warehouses, it has provided minimum subsistence rations to the city, at virtually the full level of
requirement. However, food beyond survival rations, and other basic services -- water,
electricity, medical supplies, fuel, building materials - are not being provided with any regularity.
Though the electrical power substaions that serve the city remain largely intact, the main power
switching center in downtown Sarajevo has been destroyed, and the gas pipeline and three major
(400kv) power lines servicing the city pass through Serb-controlled areas. It must be noted that
the city's water and sewerage systems depend on electricty.
Sarajevo continues to function as the official headquarters of the GOBH, which the USG
recognizes, although we do not, for security reasons, maintain an embassy in the city. (No
country maintains an embassy there, although France does have a resident ambassador on the
ground.) Significant numbers of foreigners, including UN officials (some of whom are American
military attached to the UNPROFOR headquarters), journalists, and relief workers, are in the city.
Two proposals have been made for breaking this siege: the Western European Union's "Safe
Haven Sarajevo" document and the Vance/Owen plan's Draft Military Accord. In addition,
NATO has proposed a concept analysis of "relief areas" and "safe zones" (NATO 742). All
contain many common elements, similar schedules for being put into effect - though the
Vance/Owen plan is more detailed and offers more specifics on necessities for implementation.
SEGRE^
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
AotS - OfeSi- r )
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-SECRET
The plan developed below attempts to draw upon the strengths of the two existing proposals,
bearing in mind the political and military realities. Since we do not have a clear sense of
virat diffenait Russians have meant when the/ talk of a joint initiative to l i f t
the siege, we lave not endeavored to factor possible Russian views into this
plan. Indeed, since their ideas might be problematic at best, perhaps i t would
be better to present them with our concept.
Design of the plan was based upon several assumptions. First, it assumes agreement and full
compliance by all parties with all steps of the implementation process, which is problematical at
best. Second, no estimates for the number of troops required to enforce the plan after compliance
by the parties have been made independently. Rather, the estimates used in the original
Vance/Owen and WEU formulations are repeated. Additionally, there will be a continuing
requirement for humanitarian aid. The plan assumes that such will be provided by other agencies
and makes no provision for escort, distribution, etc.
A major consideration is that the plan, like the Vance/Owen and WEU models, calls for the
demilitarization of the city proper. In effect the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
denied the ability to maintain military forces in its own capital.
There are, in principle, at least two other conceptual approaches to "lifting the siege":
1) Driving the Serb forces investing the city back a sufficient distance -- some 30 km for them to
be out of artillery range of the city and vital infrastructure facilities - that they could no longer
impose a direct threat to the population in the city or its links with the airport, while permitting
GOBH functions to continue to operate from Sarajevo.
Such an approach would seek to replicate the effects of decisive local military success by the
Bosnian forces. There is no reason to believe the Serbians would voluntarily agree to pull back
unilaterally, other than as a part of a general settlement (if then). Use of foreign forces to compel
such an end to the vulnerability of Sarajevo to military attack would require very substantial
ground and air forces and would amount to large scale, direct combat intervention on the Bosnian
side. Accordingly, this approach has not been examined in detail.
2) Securing an agreement not to use heavy weapons against Sarajevo, or to a withdrawal of
heavy weapons by both sides. ( For these purposes, "heavy weapons" mean directfireweapons
over 12.7mm, mortars and artillery of 82mm and above, tanks, and ground-to-ground missiles.)
This would entail the Bosnian government forces' removing their heavy weapons from the city
altogether and the Serbians' pulling their heavy weapons back some 30 km from the city.
(Alternatively, heavy weapons would be assembled in set locations and placed under UN control.)
Thereafter, both sides would remain free to continue tofightover the city and access to it, but
only with lightly armed units. The focus in the plan is therefore on heavy weapons
rather than on driving the Serbs back. The effect would be to reduce the dangers to the
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-SECRET
civilian population-- and, in practice, to shift the military balance toward the Muslims, who have
more troops but many fewer heavy weapons.
Bosnian President Izetbegovic has said he will insist on a halt to the shelling of Sarajevo as a
condition to participating further in the Vance/Owen talks. Presumably he would be prepared to
agree to have Bosnian units stop their shelling of Serb positions in exchange. Whether the
Serbian forces would regard keeping the Bosnians in the talks as a sufficient incentive to agree to
cease shelling, much less place their heavy weapons under UN control, is uncertain.
Some element of outside enforcement is likely to be necessary for a limit on heavy weapon use to
be meaningful. After the 1991 Vance accords for Croatia, Krajina Serb heavy weapons were
assembled under UNPROFOR guard, but when Croatian forces broke the truce to attack Krajina
Serb positions in the "pink zone," the Krajina Serb forces pushed the UN guards aside and retook
control of the assembled weapons. Without an international commitment to monitor compliance
with a ban on heavy weapons deployment or use and to take action against violators, it is unlikely
that a ban would hold for long.
However, whether described as a prohibition on use of heavy weapons or an agreement to
withdraw them from the area, this approach would differ from thefirstin that it might be
enforceable with less foreign ground involvement. The USG, and possibly other outside
governments as well, by use of highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and airborne weapons
capabilities, might be able to locate and attack weapons deployed or used in violation of such an
agreement, without having to use ground forces, and with a more focused and limited military
commitment than would be entailed by attempting to drive off Serbian forces generally from
around Sarajevo. While capabilities to detect violations and attack heavy weapons used or
deployed in violation of a ban would be much less than 100%, it would probably be possible to
impose a significant cost on violations. However, the weapons involved are relatively easy to
conceal and are highly mobile, and the US would definitely not be able to detect and attack all
violating weapons. Further analysis of US surveillance and attack capabilities are at the
Codeword level.
In the event the US or other outside countries used air power to enforce a heavy weapons ban
around Sarajevo, they would have crossed the line to direct military action in the conflict and,
because of the imbalance in heavy weapons capability, to de facto intervention on the Bosnian
government side. Even if, as seems likely, that action could be taken with relatively good effect
and without requiring ground forces, US planes would be exposed to Serbian air defenses (and to
theriskof a Bosnian Muslim provocation). Moreover, the Serbian forces would have the option
of responding to the US action in other areas, e.g. by ceasing to permit UN relief operations or
attacking UNPROFOR units. In this respect, enforcing a heavy weapons ban presents
considerations similar to those involved in enforcing the no-fly zone.
The balance of this paper details a proposal for an agreed demilitarization of Sarajevo.
Basic Elements of Plan
SECRET*
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Stopping the fighting in and around Sarajevo on an agreed, internationally monitored basis will
require the following basic elements:
•
An agreement by the warring parties to undertake this plan and to accept international
monitoring of its implementation.
•
In conjunction with this agreement will be a declaration of forces and weapons, followed by
a cease-fire within three days of agreement. A demarcation line - whose position will be
determined in the agreement - will be established, and within 48 hours of a cease-fire parties
must withdraw personnel, heavy weaponry, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain)
beyond the demarcation line.
•
Establishment of a 2-part "safe zone" that will require the withdrawal of troops and their
heavy weapons in order to provide protection to the civilian population in and around
Sarajevo. The inner zone would consist of the Sarajevo core, its airport, signifiicant power
infrastructure, and the immediate concentration of civilians in the plain of Sarajevo. It will
measure 15 km east to west and 2-3 km north to south except in the heavily disputed western
part of the city, where it will measure 8-9 km north-south. All military personnel and their
equipment will be withdrawn from within the inner zone. For the Bosnian Muslims,
compliance would mean withdrawal of all military forces from the inner zone, along
established "safe routes" (see below) through Serb-controlled areas, to Muslim-controlled
areas in central Bosnia. There is r i s k and d i f f i c u l t y i n demanding that the G B
OH
demilitarize the c i t y as a quid, but the Serbians would pncfcably insist. The
advantage, however, i s that GOBH d a n i l i t a r i z a t i o n of Sarajevo gives us
some hope of presenting this as even-handed, s t i l l neutral, and therefore i t
would not be necessary to end the humanitarian aid e f f o r t . This advantage
holds especially i f Russia participates i n monitoring/enforcement.
Moreover, since we might be seen as having entered the war on Bosnia's
side, we might be able to play vp disarming the c i t y ' s defenders as
balancing the pain on both sides.
We should also consider, however, i f we would wont f i r s t to propose
enforcement of the heavy weapons part of the London agreement, and save
demilitarizaticn of Sarajevo to o f f e r the Serbians i f the/ demand a quid.
Another alternative might be t o move not just the Serb heavy weapons but
the Serb forces themselves outside the 30-Km outer zone, and allow
Bosnian forces minus heavy weapons to reitain i n the c i t y , perhaps with
t h e i r strength significantly reduced and subject to monitoring t y the Joint
Cormission. A variation of this would be to require a l l Bosnian forces (Serb
and Muslim) to withdraw beyond the 30-kilometer r i n g . That would also be
easiest f o r U P O O to enforce.
NR F R
-SEGRETClassified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�SECRET
Although UNPROFOR military personnel will continue to monitor the boundary of the inner
zone, civilian authorities under UN supervision will be responsible for maintaining law and
order within it. The outer zone would extend to a 30 km radius from Sarajevo and would be
patrolled by UNPROFOR. Teams of UNPROFOR members and local authorities will
maintain civil order in the towns on the outer zone. All heavy weapons would be removed
from the outer zone to beyond the 30 km radius from the center of the city and placed in
depots under UN control. In practice, this would create a "doughnut" around Sarajevo into
which Serbian units would not be permitted to move heavy weapons.
•
Introduction of a 10,000-nieniber UNPROFOR military and civilian contingent to
undertake the operations listed below. This contingent will maintain its own, organic air
support. (This represents a minimum force, according to the WEU plan, based on "confidence
in political agreements." The WEU "worst case" stated that up to a division (15-20,000)
would be needed.) This augmented UNPROFOR will be responsible for:
- monitoring the inner zone boundary between Serb-controlled territory outside Sarajevo
and the demilitarized city inside;
- monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and with the ban on heavy weapons in the 30
km radius area; in the event of violations, UNPROFOR peace keepers would , through the
joint commission, issue a warning to the offending parties, including a short deadline for
"cease and desist;" upon expiration of deadline, peace keepers would shift to a peaceenforcing operation, using their broad ROE authority and air support to force compliance
- opening the blue roads and monitoring compliance with the requirement of free passage
along the "blue routes" from the city, to include operation of checkpoints and convoy escorts;
- maintaining civil order within the inner zone with local authorities, i.e. in the city and its
immediate environs. Civil authorities in the outer zone would be executed by teams consisting
of combined units of UNPROFOR troops and local civil police authorities;
- its own self-defense without issuance of a warning, initiated by commanders on the scene;
- occupation of militarily significant points in the outer zone so as to form quick, mutually
supporting reaction forces in the event of cease-fire violations.
(Note that these are the forces' duties assume compliance by the parties; compelling compliance
or punishing non-compliance would require additional effort}
• Establishment of a Joint Commission for executing and monitoring the plan. It will be
composed of the Commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo Command, a command and
support element from UNPROFOR, and a representative from each of the warring sides
consisting of the commander for the troops in the area affected.
•
The opening of safe routes along the major transportation corridors surrounding Sarajevo in
order to allow for the protected withdrawal of forces and weaponry, the free movement of
UN forces and relief convoys, and the control of entry to and exit from the "safe zone." Safe
routes would be from Sarajevo northwest to Zenica, northeast to Zvornik on the Serbian
border (which is the main entry point for UNHCR relief convoys from Belgrade), southwest
to Mostar, and to Split. Except to the northwest, these routes extend through contested areas
outside the 30 km circle. (It would, theoretically, be possible to add other routes, e.g. to the
-SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-SEGRETeast and northeast to permit supply to eastern Bosnia from Sarajevo). UNPROFOR personnel
would establish checkpoints along these routes and at the outer limits of the "safe zone."
•
Restoration of civilian infrastructure, with a joint commission of representatives of all sides
and a UN civilian team determining priorities and needs and executing the work with civil
authorities and UN technical experts.
h pe e t to of the Plan
n l m nai n
The plan is to be carried out in 4 phases. Under the best of circumstances the full implementation
could take place over a period of approximately 3 weeks. Though phases will follow a sequential
order, steps within each phase may be carried out in a parallel manner, except where noted.
Phase I: Agreement and cease-fire
Step 1 - Agreement by the warring parties.
Step 2 - Cease-fire within 24 hours of agreement and a freeze on movement of forces and
weapons. Within 48 hours of cease-fire, warring parties will move all troops, weapons, and
equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond a demarcation line along the to be
determined by the agreement.
Step 3 - Declaration of forces within 72 hours of ceasefire,which will include precise
documentation of number and location of personnel, heavy weapons, and a description of
minefields.
Step 4 - Declaration of "safe routes" between Sarajevo and the 3 cities listed above.
Step 5 - Declaration of the inner and outer safe zones.
Step 6 - Declaration of fall back/assembly areas beyond the outer zone to which the warring
parties and their heavy weapons will be withdrawn.
Step 7 - Establishment of Joint Commissions for weapon inspections and infrastructure repair.
Phase 1 should require 4 days to complete. Steps 3-6 can be executed simultaneously.
Phase II: Demilitarization of inner zone
Step 1 - UNPROFOR military personnel will move to the following areas: 1) the demarcation
line to complete the separation of forces; 2) the outer limits of the inner zone to control
access to it and prevent reinforcements to any of the parties; 3) the checkpoints along the
"safe routes" and the entry and exit point to these routes. Along with inspectors from the
Joint Commission, UNPROFOR military personnel will begin to move into the outer zone to
establish positions for the later removal of weapons
Step 2 - UNPROFOR military personnel begin clearing "safe routes" of obstacles and land
mines. They also carry out repairs on these routes where necessary.
Step 3 - Upon completion of Step 2, safe routes will be open to civilian and humanitarian
movement.
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�SECRET
Step 4 - All parties begin removal of heavy weapons from the inner zone, withdrawing along
designated safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km
limit of the outer zone.
Step 5 - Only upon full completion of step 4, all parties will evacuate troops from the inner
zone, withdrawing along the safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement
beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone. (As noted above, this effectively de-militarizes the
city, because the Muslim forces must move out entirely.) The evacuation would have
to be conducted i n a fashion that does not upset the military balance, i . e . ,
there most be provisions that ensure Serbian forces new i n place would not
be able to over run or seriously harass a c i t y which had been l e f t
defenseless exo^t f o r Mislim forces i n the outer zene.
Specifically, we
recognize the potential danger of requiring the Bosnian government to p u l l
a l l of i t s forces out of Sarajevo and relocate than i n central Bosnia, whereas
Serbian troops minus t h e i r heavy weapons wouldd be allowed within 2-15
KM of the c i t y , with heavy weapons close eiough t o the c i t y to permit rapid
reinforcanent i f the ceasefire were broken at any point. Moreover, even i f
the present non-heavy-weapons balance i n the outer zone would enable
Bosnian forces there to protect themselves and the c i t y , there most be sore
provisions f o r preventing influx of nav forces, e.g., iirplementaticn of a
military freeze and sore kind of patrols of the perimeter to prevent a
buildup.
Step 6 - UNPROFOR military personnel previously in place along the demarcation line and
Joint Commission teams undertake inspections to determine full compliance with withdrawal
of heavy weapons and troops. This plan allows f o r UNPROFOR to issue warnings
i n cases of non-carpi iance with deadlines, then s h i f t i n g from peacekeeping
to peace enforcing i f deadlines pass. The U.S. would not participate i n
peacekeeping operations i n Bosnia on the assunption that the parties w i l l
voluntarily oenply with the agreenents; the best hope for getting
"voluntary" ccnpliance is to have the iruscle and clear intent to enforce i f
necessary. Because, short of a decision t o sweep a l l Serbian forces (the
likely violators of t i e cease-fire) from the 30 KM zone through major military
action (which would probably require even more than the division planned
by the WEU and serious - - read NATO - - command and c o n t r o l ) , UNPROFOR
would be i n a d i f f i c u l t situation: constantly faced with decisions en whan to
s h i f t modes, asuming even a low-level of violence.
The s h i f t i n g back and forth under these circumstances would see f i r e f i g h t s
breaking out between forces previously on peaceful terms, followed t y a
period of tense peace, and then possibly more violence, an extremely
d i f f i c u l t scenario f o r small unit ocrrrmnders.
The rerredies f o r the problems outlined above might be (1) a universal,
ceasefire followed inmediately t y p o l i t i c a l negotiatiens country-wide, to
^SECRETClassified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRETencourage the Bosnians to withdraw and the Serbs to cooperate; and (2) a
crediblwe threat of overwhelming force were the Serbs to carry out even lowintensity attacks against Muslims or even U P O O . "Nickle and dime"
NR F R
Serbian attacks producing clumsy U P O O response as i t trys to s h i f t
NR F R
frcm peacekeeping to police to peacemaking and back is a recipe for
disaster. Yet the threat to be credible las to be real (i.e., involving the U.S.).
Step 7 - UNPROFOR civilian personnel move to inner zone to oversee the maintenance of
law and order in conjunction with existing civil authorities.
Step 8- Joint Commission for infrastructure begins determining and mapping most vital
installations for attention and repair.
The steps of phase 2 should take about 7 days for completion under the most benign
circumstances, though necessary repairs on the safe routes may require additional time.
Phase III: Heavy weapons removal from outer zone
Step 1 - All parties begin removal heavy weapons from the outer zone. Weapons are to be
moved outside the 30 km limit of the safe zone and turned over to UNPROFOR personnel at
designated locations. Those that cannot be moved will be placed under UNPROFOR
supervision. Military personnel will not be required to evacuate this outer zone.
Step 2 - UNPROFOR and Joint Inspection teams begin inspection searches within the outer
zone to monitor compliance with weapons withdrawal/deactivation.
Step 3 - UNPROFOR/local police teams move into place to maintain civil authority within
the outer zone. Such police teams could not guarantee that the outer zone
would not become a dangerous no-man's land, with a largely Muslim
population, Serbian troops, and U P O O forces in an area of hundreds
NR F R
of square miles. U P O O ty i t s presence would have an obligation to do
NR F R
i t s best to preserve the peace between Muslims and Serbs, but probably has
inadequate forces to cover every hamlet, in a situation wheree at least lowlevel violence and "settling of accounts" are almost inevitable.
Step 4 - Repair of Sarajevo's civilian infrastructure begins, using local help as well as UN
technical teams.
The steps of Phase III should require 7 days under the best of circumstances.
Phase IV: End State (approximately 3 weeks after agreement)
UNPROFOR military personnel and Joint Commission Inspectors continue monitoring
compliance of weapons removal from outer zone.
SEettE^
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
UNPROFOR observers are in place on safe routes and at entry and exit points or the safe
zone.
Civil Authority is functioning.
UNPROFOR patrols are operating along limits of inner zone. {Wee: the Joint
Ccmmission responsible for executing and rronitoring such patrols w i l l be
corrprised of U P O O representatives, Serbian m i l i t a r y Commanders,
NR F R
and G B civilian officials since, in the letter's case, there would be no
CH
G B military commander i n the inner zone)
OH
Most significant power, transportation, and communication infrastructure is functioning.
Comment
The Vance-Owen plan makes no provision for the number of UNPROFOR civilian and military
personnel that will be necessary for its implementation. The WEU plan estimates that it could
require a force of up to 20,000. It is questionable that current troop contributing countries,
having provided 24,000 UNPROFOR personnel for the former Yugoslavia, will make 20,000
more available for Sarajevo. It will be extremely difficult to obtain 10,000 for the mission, but it
could be possible under two conditions. First, almost half of this number could be obtained from
the existing UNPROFOR contingents, with perhaps 1,000 from each of the four UNPA's in
Croatia. Second, it will be easier to obtain more European and Canadian and other participation
if the United States commits forces to this mission. These US personnel could be in the civilian
UN component and involved in the supervision of the civil authorities in the inner zone and the
rebuilding of Sarajevo's infrastructure. Even this small US contingent might have symbolic
meaning and could encourage current participating countries to provide the remaining needed
forces. I f a small U.S. ocntingent fails to prorpt other participating states to
provide real military forces, significant U.S. forces cn the ground would
probably be necessary. Ultimately only the U.S. might be able to provide the
credible "overwhelming force" threat cited above as necessary. W note in
e
conclusicn that i t would be inadvisable to redeploy forces in Croatia to Bosnia;
not only would that weaken the already inadequate forces in Croatia, i t would
send precisely the wrong signal to Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs alike.
• SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ISSUE PAPER
INTERIM OBJECTIVES FOR BOSNIA
This paper outlines the pros and cons of adopting as an interim objective for
Bosnia the establishment of a UN-supervised cease-fire in place, with the features
described below, based on the principles of the London Conference.
Context. The current US — and UN and EC — objective in Bosnia is to have the
Serbs sign and comply with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. A key feature of that plan is
that it requires large scale Serbian withdrawals from territory they now control and from
which the Muslim population has been forcibly expelled. (See attached map) In
addition, it would establish a new Bosnian state of ten provinces, each (except nominally
for Sarajevo) dominated by one ethnic group, but with a complex tripartite power sharing
structure, and it would entitle those expelled and refugees to return to their former
homes.
Despite vigorous negotiating efforts, there is little immediate prospect of Serbian
agreement to sign, much less to fully implement, the VOPP. There is, to be sure, some
level of US force with which we could occupy the entire country, and force acceptance
of whatever peace terms we like. However, there is no significant support in the
Administration, much less in the Congress or among our allies, for sending a direct
intervention force of this scale. While various increased pressures - ranging from
tightened sanctions to limited air strikes - are being considered, there are difficulties
about all the pressure options, if only because of the need to secure UN, allied, and/or
Russian authorization or participation. Moreover, there is also serious question whether
even the strongest actions being considered ~ such as strikes against Serbian artillery and
other heavy weapons ~ would suffice to induce the Serbs to surrender by agreement
much of the territory they have won by military force, brutally but successfully applied,
in what they regard as a national crusade.
The Proposal. The goal laid out by the Administration on February 10 was a
"negotiated settlement...acceptable to all parties." An alternative to continuing, given the
present context, to focus our principal effort on seeking Serbian agreement to the VOPP
is to seek, as an interim step, the implementation of key features of the London Accords - a cease fire, limited withdrawals of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of
relief, and release of prisoners. This more modest objective would be based on the
urgent need to stop the fighting and civilian suffering, pending agreement on the future
political structure of the country. It would also seek to broaden the scope of the
discussion beyond Bosnia itself, to try to create stability in the Former Yugoslavia
generally.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
-SEGREX
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
AD13- O M - f t
£/3/l5~
' '
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-2The proposal has the following elements:
1.
We would seek to have the parties agree to a cease-fire in place.
In order to avoid the uncertainties of the multiple prior aborted cease fire agreements, it
should be negotiated in advance, and would come into effect on a phased basis in
different areas and as progress was made in implementation (see Annex A for a possible
phasing system). As cease-fires were established across the country, opposing forces
would separate by withdrawals to pre-agreed lines (creating a DMZ between forces) and
heavy weapons would be turned over to UN control.
2.
The cease fire would be followed by limited Serbian withdrawals
from around Sarajevo, as well as other places, such as Tuzla and Mostar, where they can
easily cut off relief supplies to Muslim-held areas. The Muslim enclaves in Eastern
Bosnia, but not Bihac in the West, would be evacuated. Other geographic arrangements
are possible.
3.
Muslims who wished to leave Serb (or Croatian) controlled areas
would be assisted to do so. Similar assistance would be offered other ethnic groups who
found themselves on the "wrong" side of a line of de facto control. All prisoners would
be released, with some system to deal with prisoners who are alleged war criminals, such
as having them screened by an international tribunal.
4.
UN and other relief efforts would have free movement throughout
the country. Humanitarian programs would be stepped up, and expanded beyond
subsistence food supply to include restoration of basic services (fuel, water, sewer,
power) and construction of housing, both to replace damaged residences and to
accommodate refugees.
5.
The US would, through NATO, and with UNSC authority,
participate with other nations in an expanded UN force to implement the interim
agreement. Deployments would be phased to match progress on compliance by the
parties. The force deployed would be sized and configured (as is the notional VOPP
implementation force) to overwhelm local resistance, not merely to monitor voluntary
implementation, and would have ROEs authorizing use of effective force for that
mission. In particular, once a cease fire had been established in an area, violators would
be counterattacked vigorously, as would those who interfered with relief convoys. In the
event of a general breakdown of the cease fire, i.e., of a collapse of the basic political
agreement to end the war essentially in place, the implementation force would either be
re-enforced or withdrawn.
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-SECRET
-36.
There would be no effort to establish multi-ethnic civil authorities:
De facto, Muslim controlled areas, including Sarajevo, would be run by the BosniaHercegovina Government, while Serbian and Croatian controlled areas would be run by
the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat "governments" respectively. The exact control and
relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.
7.
A similar cease fire in place, with weapons under international
control, would be established for Croatia, leaving the Croatian Serbs in effective control
of the bulk of the area they now hold. This would replace the 1991 Vance plan for
Croatia. Alternatively, no explicit changes would be made in arrangements for Croatia.
8.
US would lead international efforts focused on securing an
effective cease fire, limited withdrawals, and expanded humanitarian programs of the
interim agreement, not on an ultimate political solution, and we would not, in practice,
resist the de facto extension of Belgrade and Zagreb authority to the Serbian and Croatian
controlled areas.
9.
Economic sanctions and the NFZ would continue, as additional
sureties for Serbian compliance with the interim agreement, to be relaxed in a phased
process in conjunction with implementation of the agreement.
10.
Consistent with the idea of creating a viable Muslim enclave state,
the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government would be lifted, possibly in phases as
other sanctions were eased.
11.
The US would repeat its warnings about Serbian and other
factions' misconduct in Kosovo - and extend them to actions in the Vojvodina and
Sandzak.
Although nominally only an interim agreement, without prejudice to final
political settlement along the lines of the VOPP, the cease-fire in place, limited
withdrawals, and population transfers would, if it succeeded, create a de facto partition of
Bosnia, establishing de facto a Muslim enclave state, essentially within territory now
controlled by the Muslims (less the eastern enclaves, and plus some territory around
Sarajevo and other cities, e.g., Tuzla and Mostar) along with de facto Serbian and
Croatian "ministates" with very close connections to Serbia and Croatia.
Arguments for and against.
The case against shifting our focus to a cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals,
and orderly population transfers includes the following points:
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-4The "solution" rewards ethnic cleansing and aggression, and indeed all but
concedes the creation of a Greater Serbia, absorbing big chunks of Croatia and Bosnia.
As such it is immoral, and likely to encourage further ethnic aggression in the Balkans
and elsewhere.
It would be seen by many as a significant retrenchment by the USG. The
outcry from the press and the international community could be significant.
The proposal will be strongly resisted by the Muslims, who believe they
have - or should have - a commitment from the US to pressure the Serbs into signing up
for Vance-Owen.
The Muslims may prefer to "go down fighting" rather than, in effect,
surrender. Securing Croatian support will prove nearly as difficult as Muslim support.
The Serbs would be less likely to agree to the provisions of this proposal,
notably the cease-fire, if the arms embargo against the Muslims were to be lifted.
In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, a decision would be
required to reinforce or withdraw the implementation force. Both alternatives represent
an admission of failure with respect to the mission upon which we embarked.
Accepting so limited and unsatisfactory an outcome is wholly inconsistent
with the Administration's past declarations that even Vance-Owen is unfair to the
Muslims, and that partition is not an acceptable solution.
The success such an outcome would represent for Serbian nationalism
would re-enforce all the worst forces in Serbia and encourage ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
and the Vojvodina, and actually ratifies Serbian intransigence in the Krajina and the other
UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia.
Croatia will gladly pocket ratification of its de facto annexation of the
Croatian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but it will not acquiesce in the loss of the UNPAs,
or the creation of a secure Serbian Northern Corridor along the Sava. Even if the cease
fire held in Bosnia, the Croats may resume military probes at the UNPAs.
The proposal is not even stable so far as the Muslims are concerned. Even
if they accepted it now, on the ground that, having been abandoned by the West, they
have no choice, they will never be reconciled to the result. We will have created what
former French Defense Minister Joxe rightly called "a Gaza strip in the middle of
Europe."
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-5Implementation of the agreement, assuming only limited local opposition,
would probably require about the same force as envisioned for the Vance-Owen plan,
and face similar difficulties.
The Muslim enclave state will not be viable politically, economically, or
militarily. The international community (with heavy reliance on the U.S.) will be
committed to protecting it militarily and supporting it economically for years to come.
The case for the proposal includes the following:
Granted that the VOPP, or some variant of it that denied the Serbs
the fruits of their brutal ethnic cleansing, would be the ideal solution, there is simply no
prospect of its being achieved short of massive - corps plus scale - US intervention.
Only those who favor such intervention, or have some evidence lesser pressures will
work to produce massive Serbian concessions, can credibly argue against an interim
solution on the ground that VOPP is not only better (which everyone should concede) but
that it is attainable.
If the US is not prepared to support substantially the large scale
international military intervention needed to force the Serbs to accept and implement
VOPP, the only possible outcomes are (1) indefinite war, (2) a Serbian victory, and (3)
some negotiated cease-fire with much smaller Serbian withdrawals than VOPP requires.
Among these three - the only real - possible outcomes, the third is clearly better.
It ends the fighting early, avoiding the very real prospect of a final
Serb push this spring to eliminate the Muslim hold on the eastern enclaves, and perhaps
even Sarajevo itself, with all that would entail in human suffering and frustration of US
goals.
It provides a framework for a greatly enhanced humanitarian
effort, which remains the aspect of the US (and UN and European) effort that has the
greatest popular support.
Serbians (whether in Belgrade, Pale, or Knin) will now probably
accept an outcome which requires a real ceasefire,separation of forces, control of heavy
weapons, free movement of relief, and even some locally significant withdrawals. There
is no particular evidence they seek to eliminate Muslims throughout Bosnia, so long as
they get control of the territory they believe should be Serbian. They have (except for
the eastern enclaves) now secured the territory they regard as Serbian by right, and could
well be prepared to make modest concessions to solidify that control. Further military
successes - which are well within their capability - might well increase their minimum
requirements for peace.
SECRETClassified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�-6While the Muslims would certainly prefer a more favorable
solution, they recognize the desperation of their military position, and the unlikelihood of
major military intervention. They will need to be convinced that they will do better to
cut a deal now, before their situation deteriorates further.
A reasonably contiguous, internationally protected, Muslim state,
while facing many problems, is more likely to be viable and stable than whatever would
come out of another year or so of continued fighting.
Given the profound ethnic tensions in the area, and the effects of
two years of ethnic war, an ethnic-based partition, however distasteful, is likely to be the
only stable solution. (Even VOPP is an ethnic partition in all but name.) Better that it
should be negotiated, and effected under international supervision, than result purely
from military operations.
By frankly recognizing that large-scale population movements
(mostly but by no means exclusively by Muslims) will accompany any settlement, the
agreement can provide explicitly for those movements and for accommodating the people
who move.
The financial costs of enforcing an agreement that has a better
chance of actually being complied with by the parties, and of sustaining a Muslim state,
while large, are likely to be small compared to the costs of the military effort that would
be needed to force acceptance of the VOPP.
A de facto partition provides also a framework for resolving the
Croatian-Serbian conflict. For all their horrible and treacherous actions, the Serbs have
some legitimate grievances, chief among them being mistreatment of Serbs by Croatians
on a massive scale in living memory, especially in the Krajina. Serbia will intervene
with the old Yugoslav army to prevent Croatia from regaining control of the Krajina. A
partition in which Croatia is compensated for the loss of the Krajina with de facto control
of Western Hercegovina may well represent the best hope of a stable outcome of that
conflict.
Reluctant international acceptance of a result that gives the Serbs
much of what they feel entitled to, and resolution to enforce that result, will be the best
basis on which to convince the Serbs that they will lose badly if they press their luck by
making trouble in Kosovo or Vojvodina.
The proposal requires significant Serbian concessions, including
some withdrawals and a willingness not to press their military advantage. The scale of
pressures we are actually prepared to apply - sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, NFZ
enforcement - are far more likely to be successful in achieving these limited but
meaningful concessions than in forcing greater ones.
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�SECRET
-7Moving to a policy that would stress an interim arrangement along
these lines is not inconsistent with our backing Vance-Owen up to this point. We have
always made clear that we want a settlement the parties themselves agree on, not that we
will impose our own notion of a good solution. The proposal seeks, in effect, to
implement the key features of the London accords, which has long been US policy.
Moreover, there is a view that even if VO were signed, we would
be doing very well if it produced, not full implementation, but merely Serbian action to
meet the conditions proposed by DOD for commitment of a US force element, namely an
effective cease fire, control of heavy weapons, separation of forces, free movement of
relief, and release of prisoners. These elements of Vance-Owen would amount, in effect,
to a cease fire in place, marginal local Serbian withdrawals, and the creation of a Muslim
enclave under UN protection. In short, the practical difference between what it would be
reasonable (some even argue too much) to expect of Vance-Owen, and the new proposal,
may be rather slight. Moreover, seeking an interim agreement on these lines would not
preclude continuing to treat the VOPP as a long term objective.
And it would allow for a negotiated settlement, albeit long term, to
be conducted out from under the gun.
A policy along these lines has the greatest chance of winning
active Russian support, which is important not only for its own sake but as a contribution
to our overriding goal of protecting reform in Russia.
{161430ZApr.93}
SECRET
Classified by OASD
Declassify on OADR
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified documents on Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0682-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2015
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 through 1995. Materials include papers, memos, talking points, and reports on the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Topics include humanitarian aid options, lifting the arms embargo, the United Nations Protection Force, and a peace agreement.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/2/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0682-M
7388808
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
Foreign Policy
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d353a77f2fd57e6606d09ef905bcc817.pdf
2cf896d54030a70c49b57e0361fae0da
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�25 January. 1995
TALKING PAPER
Subject:
Reinforcing UNPROFOR
1. Purpose. To provide talking points on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR.
2. Talking Points
• UNPROFOR continues to perform a valuable mission in Bosnia,
including facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and establishing the
conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.
• UNPROFOR has requested 6,500 additional troops and equipment to
support the current cessation of hostilities agreement, to Improve Its
capability to protect itself.and to respond to acts by the warring parties
against UNPROFOR. These additional troops and equipment would provide
operational flexibility, better ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. and
allow the use of more robust measures to keep ground and air aid corridors
open.
• On several occasions, most recently In Blhac. UNPROFOR could have
done a better job tf it had more manpower and equipment resources,
including helicopters, at its disposal.
• The NATO Chiefs of Defense met with UN. Russia, and other Interested
nations at The Hague. Netherlands, in December to consider how
UNPROFOR could be made more effective. Two initiatives resulted from
this meeting:
-the formulation of concepts for maintaining open the air and land
routes into Sarajevo and the enclaves, and
-the decision to offer UNPROFOR additional manpower and equipment
to better accomplish Its mission.
• As a result of this Initiative fourteen countries have offered almost 6,000
troops and significant additional equipment.
• We consider it essential to support this efTort and have offered to the UN
helicopters, armored personnel carriers, radars, radios, night vision
goggles, and assorted engineer vehicles on a lease or sale basis.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�• The success of the cessation of hostilities agreement would be a
significant achievement on the road to a peaceful settlement In the former
Yugoslavia. The UN deserves the help of the entire international
community to take advantage of this cessation of hostilities to better
prepare for whatever comes next.
• The UN is still evaluating all the offers it has received. We expect the UN
to inform us shortly of their desires. At that time we will negotiate financial
arrangements for sale or lease of the equipment offered by the U.S.
government.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0682-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 thru 1995. Included is a Department of Defense paper on reinforcing the U.N. protection force in Bosnia from January 1995.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0682-M
7388808
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
Foreign Policy
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.