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August 3, 1995
ODCIIDT >
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
FROM AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT
At o u r meeting on August 1 you asked f o r each P r i n c i p a l ' s
views on our endgame s t r a t e g y f o r Bosnia. I would be l a r g e l y
c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h your o r i g i n a l paper t h a t e n v i s i o n s a m o d i f i e d
l i f t and s t r i k e i f UNPROFOR were t o c o l l a p s e .
But I have t h o u g h t f o r some t i m e t h a t we must p u t Bosnia i n
a l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t and re-examine o u r fundamental
assumption t h a t t h e Europeans have a g r e a t e r s t a k e i n r e s o l v i n g
Bosnia t h a n we do. I n so d o i n g , we may conclude t h a t extending
t h e l i f e o f UNPROFOR i s no l o n g e r i n o u r i n t e r e s t .
(Why should
we w a i t f o r t h e day when London and P a r i s t e l l us t h a t they are
leaving?)
The f o l l o w i n g paper i s designed t o examine how t o s h i f t
from a European-led p l a n t o an A m e r i c a n - l e d p l a n .
Why Aroerica Must Take t h e Lead
Our commitment t o use American ground f o r c e s t o e x t r a c t
UNPROFOR on t h e one hand o r implement a peace p l a n on t h e o t h e r
means t h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t w i l l be " A m e r i c a n i z e d " sooner o r
l a t e r . Our p r e v i o u s s t r a t e g y — g i v e p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o
t h e Europeans, h e l p t h e Bosnians r h e t o r i c a l l y and hope t h e
p a r t i e s w i l l choose peace -- i s no l o n g e r s u s t a i n a b l e . With a
s t r o n g e r Bosnian army u n w i l l i n g t o w a i t f o r peace a t t h e
n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , and i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f S r e b r e n i c a and Zepa,
t h e Bosnian s i d e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n w i l l s i m p l y n o t
a l l o w us t o r e t u r n t o t h e r e l a t i v e success o f 1994. Muddle
t h r o u g h i s no l o n g e r an o p t i o n .
Meanwhile, I s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i s s u e has become
b i g g e r than Bosnia. A l t h o u g h we may have been c o r r e c t t o l i m i t
our r o l e i n t h e past — on t h e grounds t h a t t h e former
Yugoslavia was p r i m a r i l y a European r e s p o n s i b i l i t y -- t h e
circumstances and o u r i n t e r e s t s have now changed. Our i n t e r e s t
i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s c o n f l i c t has broadened.
—S6GRET—»
DECLASSIFIEE
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- 2 I n much t h e same way t h a t our f a i l u r e t o s o l v e t h e H a i t i
problem l a s t year t h r e a t e n e d t o overshadow a l l o f our o t h e r
accomplishments, I f e a r Bosnia w i l l overshadow our e n t i r e f i r s t
term.
The f a i l u r e o f our European a l l i e s t o r e s o l v e t h e Bosnia
c r i s i s has not o n l y exposed t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f t h e i r p o l i c y , b u t
i t has a l s o caused s e r i o u s e r o s i o n i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e
NATO a l l i a n c e and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
Worse, our c o n t i n u e d
r e l u c t a n c e t o l e a d an e f f o r t t o r e s o l v e a m i l i t a r y c r i s i s i n
t h e h e a r t o f Europe has p l a c e d a t r i s k our l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e
post Cold War w o r l d . P r e s i d e n t C h i r a c ' s comment — however
s e l f - s e r v i n g — t h a t " t h e r e i s no l e a d e r o f t h e A t l a n t i c
A l l i a n c e " has been c h i l l i n g my bones f o r weeks.
We have a l s o f a i l e d t o t a k e i n t o account t h e damage Bosnia
has done t o our l e a d e r s h i p o u t s i d e Europe. Moreover, o u r
f a i l u r e t o a c t i n support o f Bosnia t h r e a t e n s t o undermine
moderate I s l a m i c t i e s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . By c o n t r a s t ,
American l e a d e r s h i p i n support o f Bosnia w i l l redound t o o u r
advantage t h r o u g h o u t t h e Muslim w o r l d f o r a l o n g t i m e t o come
and c o u l d h e l p shore up key r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
For t h e s e reasons, I b e l i e v e we must s t o p t h i n k i n g o f
Bosnia as a " t a r baby." I n s t e a d , we s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h a t —
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g our successes i n t r a d e , Russia, and t h e Middle
East and d e s p i t e g e n e r a l agreement r e g a r d i n g Bosnia's
c o m p l e x i t y — our A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s t e w a r d s h i p o f f o r e i g n
p o l i c y w i l l be measured — f a i r l y o r u n f a i r l y —; by our
response t o t h i s i s s u e . That i s why we must t a k e t h e l e a d i n
d e v i s i n g a d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y p l a n t o achieve a d u r a b l e
peace. I f we agree t h a t American t r o o p s w i l l be i n Bosnia
sooner o r l a t e r , why not do i t on our terms and on o u r
timetable?
The Requirement f o r M i l i t a r y
Pressure
The essence o f any new s t r a t e g y f o r Bosnia must r e c o g n i z e
t h e one t r u t h o f t h i s sad s t o r y : our o n l y successes have come
when t h e Bosnian Serbs faced a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f m i l i t a r y
force.
Hence, we must base our p l a n on u s i n g m i l i t a r y pressure
t o compel t h e Pale Serbs t o n e g o t i a t e a s u i t a b l e peace
s e t t l e m e n t . I f d e s p i t e our best e f f o r t s , UNPROFOR becomes
u n s u s t a i n a b l e , then a m o d i f i e d form o f l i f t and s t r i k e remains
t h e b e s t way t o promote an a c c e p t a b l e peace over t h e long term.
T h i s approach e n t a i l s s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the
U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t means u s i n g our m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , p r i m a r i l y
t h r o u g h t h e a i r , t o h e l p t h e Bosnians by changing t h e balance
of power. A f t e r a s u i t a b l e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d t o improve
- CDCRDT*
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• SECRBT- 3Bosnian m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , we can and should disengage. I n
t h e absence o f t h i s s u p p o r t from us t o improve t h e Bosnian
m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , t h e h i s t o r y o f t h i s c o n f l i c t demonstrates
t h a t t h e Pale Serbs w i l l never f e e l enough m i l i t a r y pressure t o
n e g o t i a t e a d u r a b l e peace s e t t l e m e n t .
The
C u r r e n t D i p l o m a t i c Tr^ck
.
We should a c t i v e l y pursue a peace s e t t l e m e n t now. Recent
a c t i o n s by NATO, as w e l l as t h e m i l i t a r y c r e d i b i l i t y i n h e r e n t
i n t h e r a p i d r e a c t i o n f o r c e have g i v e n UNPROFOR a s m a l l window
of c r e d i b i l i t y . I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e ascendant t h r e a t from
C r o a t i a , UNPROFOR's s h o r t - l i v e d , new c r e d i b i l i t y may be
s u f f i c i e n t t o convince Pale t o n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y .
The steps we are now t a k i n g i n t h e Contact Group ( i . e . , t h e
r e v i s e d B i l d t o p t i o n ) w i l l t e s t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . My s t r o n g
s u s p i c i o n , however, i s t h a t t h e Serbs w i l l not be prepared t o
n e g o t i a t e on the b a s i s o f t h e Contact Group map, o r i f t h e y do,
t h e i r proposals w i l l be so one-sided as t o c r e a t e a s t a l e m a t e .
Even i n 1994, perhaps our b e s t year i n Bosnia, a more
e f f e c t i v e UNPROFOR and improved Bosnian-Croat m i l i t a r y
c o o p e r a t i o n d i d not b r i n g t h e Serbs t o t h e t a b l e i n a s e r i o u s
way.
Unless the Bosnian Serbs are convinced t h a t f a i l u r e a t
t h e peace t a b l e w i l l mean n o t o n l y s t a l e m a t e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d
but worse some r o l l - b a c k o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y g a i n s , I do not
b e l i e v e they are l i k e l y t o make t h e concessions necessary f o r a
d u r a b l e peace.
I n t h e event a new d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k f a i l s t o produce a
s e t t l e m e n t , t h e next few months w i l l see a r e i n v i g o r a t e d
UNPROFOR h e l p reduce f i g h t i n g , F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s poking a t Serb
defenses around t h e c o u n t r y , and t h e Serbs c o n t i n u i n g t o p i c k
o f f as many innocent and h e l p l e s s persons as i n t e r n a t i o n a l
opinion w i l l allow. Eventually, a l l sides w i l l s e t t l e i n f o r
the w i n t e r .
But t h i s p a t t e r n w i l l not l a s t . UNPROFOR's window o f
c r e d i b i l i t y w i l l b e g i n t o shut as t h e Europeans l o s e t h e i r
stomach f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
(The p a t t e r n o f s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l
w i l l t o a c t f o l l o w e d by e r o s i o n o f a l l i e d support w i l l
c o n t i n u e . Just as t h e a l l i e s ' commitment t o t h e Sarajevo
u l t i m a t u m o f 1994 eroded one year l a t e r , so w i l l t h e i r support
f o r NATO's recent d e c i s i o n s s o f t e n over t i m e . ) And as UNPROFOR
weakens, t h e Serbs m o t i v a t i o n t o n e g o t i a t e w i l l wane.
H o s t i l i t i e s w i l l i n c r e a s e by s p r i n g , and t h e t h r e a t o f
UNPROFOR's d e p a r t u r e w i l l emerge a g a i n — s t r o n g e r than ever.
We c o u l d w e l l face t h e p r o s p e c t o f U.S. f o r c e s on t h e ground i n
t h e s p r i n g and summer o f 1996.
1
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• ODCIU3T- 4 In a d d i t i o n t o t h e obvious p o l i t i c a l r i s k s f o r t h e
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , an UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l n e x t year w i l l enable
t h e p a r t i e s t o e x p l o i t campaign developments, as they p l a y t h e
candidates o f f .
New M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y Meets New D i p l o m a t i c S t r a t e g y
I f t h e f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , we should c o n s i d e r
t a k i n g c o n t r o l o f t h e s i t u a t i o n now. We should develop a p l a n
t h a t sets a deadline f o r t h e B i l d t - p l u s diplomatic t r a c k , a f t e r
which we would promote t h e c o l l a p s e o f UNPROFOR and b e g i n t h e
i n e v i t a b l e process o f handing o f f m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
Bosnia t o t h e Bosnians t h r o u g h a m o d i f i e d l i f t and s t r i k e
option.
T h i s i n i t i a t i v e has two e s s e n t i a l advantages over o u r
c u r r e n t p o l i c y . F i r s t , i t ensures t h a t we a r e n o t h e l d hostage
t o t h e t i m e t a b l e o f London, P a r i s o r t h e Bosnian government.
We decide when o u r commitment t o e x t r a c t UNPROFOR would be
o p e r a t i v e . Second, by s e t t i n g a d e a d l i n e a f t e r which t h e Serbs
would f a c e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e v e r s a l on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , we
would c r e a t e a p o w e r f u l i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e Serbs t o make t h e i r
concessions now. (For example, once we t h i n k B i l d t has r u n i t s
course, we c o u l d send an American envoy t o Belgrade w i t h a
message t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y t r a c k w i l l be immediately implemented
u n l e s s we see some marked change i n t h e Serb p o s i t i o n . )
M i l i t a r y Support f o r Bosnia a f t e r UNPROFOR
The o b j e c t i v e i s h a n d i n g - o f f t o t h e Bosnians t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s e l f - d e f e n s e and m i l i t a r y pressure on t h e
Serbs. T h i s r e q u i r e s l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo and m i l i t a r y
s u p p o r t , t h r o u g h a i r s t r i k e s and ground-based t r a i n i n g , u n t i l
t h e Bosnians can a c t themselves. The sooner we s t a r t p r e p a r i n g
F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s , t h e sooner t h e y can a c t on t h e i r own. As
t h e NSC paper i n d i c a t e s , a t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d should be some s i x
months t o one year.
The Role o f A i r Power.. The l i n c h p i n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a s s i s t a n c e w i l l be a c r e d i b l e commitment t o t h e d e c i s i v e use o f
a i r power a g a i n s t t h e Serbs t o p r e v e n t a c o l l a p s e o f Sarajevo
and o t h e r F e d e r a t i o n t e r r i t o r y b e f o r e new arms can be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e Bosnian army. T h i s means implementing t h e
t y p e o f a i r s t r i k e s NATO has j u s t p r o m i s e d b u t w i t h o u t t h e r i s k
of hostages. No f l y zone i m p l e m e n t a t i o n would a l s o c o n t i n u e .
(The NSC paper has an e f f e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n o f how these
missions can be handled.)
The New Ground Force. The post-UNPROFOR m u l t i n a t i o n a l
f o r c e on t h e ground w i l l a l s o be i m p o r t a n t , b o t h t o s u s t a i n
momentum i n Bosniac-Croat r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and t o t r a i n
F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s (as w e l l as t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n for. any
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- 5 p o s s i b l e a i r campaign). I n o r d e r t o show our bona f i d e s t o our
a l l i e s and maximize our i n f l u e n c e w i t h t h e Bosnians, we should
o f f e r a s m a l l ground c o n t i n g e n t , whose p r i m a r y m i s s i o n would be
t r a i n i n g t h e Bosnian f o r c e s .
I n the l i g h t o f Congressional
support f o r l i f t , m i l i t a r y t r a i n e r s s h o u l d be p o l i t i c a l l y
s u s t a i n a b l e , e s p e c i a l l y i f l i m i t s on t h e i r numbers and l e n g t h
of deployment are s p e l l e d o u t from t h e s t a r t .
I n response t o t h e obvious charge o f " s l i p p e r y s l o p e , " we
s h o u l d p o i n t t o H a i t i , where we s e t a t i m e t a b l e f o r deployment
and met t h e d e a d l i n e .
I t i s s i m p l y wrong t o argue t h a t a
m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e w i t h a U.S. component s p e l l s an open-ended
American commitment. Indeed, a U.S. r o l e i n t h e t r a i n i n g o f
the F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s would ensure t h a t i t c o u l d be completed
q u i c k l y . A s i d e b e n e f i t would be t h e f a c t t h a t an American
c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h i s k i n d c o u l d serve as a magnet f o r European
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , thus a v o i d i n g t h e p o s s i b l e a l l - M u s l i m army
s c e n a r i o many f e a r .
W i t h U.S.-led a i r power and t r a i n i n g f o r t h e Bosnians, t h i s
t r a n s i t i o n can be accomplished w i t h a minimum exposure f o r t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . The e f f e c t would be a new b a l a n c e o f power t h a t
p r o v i d e s t h e o n l y r e a l chance o f concessions by t h e Bosnian
Serbs as w e l l as new l e v e r a g e f o r us t o p l a y a d e c i s i v e
diplomatic role with a l l sides.
What I s t h e End-state?
I would o b v i o u s l y p r e f e r t o see t h e Bosnians a c h i e v e a
s e t t l e m e n t i n accordance w i t h t h e Contact Group p r i n c i p l e s ,
t h a t i s , a m a j o r i t y o f Bosnia's t e r r i t o r y and a u n i o n
e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e F e d e r a t i o n and a Serb e n t i t y , t h u s
p r e s e r v i n g t h e R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia's t e r r i t o r i a l b o r d e r s .
But two s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s suggest t h e m s e l v e s . And I
would c o n d i t i o n our s u p p o r t f o r t h i s m o d i f i e d l i f t and s t r i k e
w i t h a p p r o v a l i n advance from t h e Bosnian government f o r these
two m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
F i r s t , t h e s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be more f o r w a r d - l e a n i n g on t h e
Serbs r i g h t t o secede p e a c e f u l l y from Bosnia and j o i n a
p o t e n t i a l "Greater S e r b i a . "
Second, i t may be necessary t o c o n s i d e r p r o p o s a l s t o t r a d e
Federation t e r r i t o r y f o r Serb-held t e r r i t o r y , e s p e c i a l l y i f the
F e d e r a t i o n agrees and i f t h e exchange makes t h e F e d e r a t i o n more
d u r a b l e . T h i s means p o p u l a t i o n t r a n s f e r s t h a t we have
p r e v i o u s l y been u n w i l l i n g t o countenance.
( I n the context o f
an American l e a d e r s h i p r o l e t o put m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e on t h e
Serbs, such t r a n s f e r s a r e p o l i t i c a l l y and m o r a l l y d e f e n s i b l e ) .
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- 6The p r i n c i p l e would be q u a l i t y n o t q u a n t i t y . P o p u l a t i o n
t r a n s f e r s t h a t i n c r e a s e t h e v i a b i l i t y o f b o t h p a r t i e s c o u l d now
be s a f e l y proposed. For example, Gorazde o r F e d e r a t i o n
t e r r i t o r y around t h e Posavina c o r r i d o r might be exchanged f o r
t e r r i t o r y around Sarajevo and i n C e n t r a l Bosnia. Again, t h e
t h r e a t t o use d e c i s i v e f o r c e may be d i s p o s i t i v e .
Exchanges
b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e F e d e r a t i o n would•probably r e q u i r e t h a t t h e
Serbs concede l a n d t h e y a s s e r t was S e r b - m a j o r i t y . This w i l l
r e q u i r e c o n f r o n t i n g t h e Serbs w i t h a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
I n t h e c o n t e x t o f new engagement by Washington, a s e r i o u s
d i s c u s s i o n w i t h Sarajevo should y i e l d these concessions. But
even more i m p o r t a n t , t h e Bosnian Government must be t o l d
b l u n t l y t h a t o u r support f o r t h i s i n i t i a t i v e i s c o n t i n g e n t upon
i t s commitment n o t t o seek m i l i t a r y g a i n s beyond t h e Contact
Group p l a n and i t s guarantee t o l i m i t s e v e r e l y t h e i n f l u e n c e o f
r a d i c a l I s l a m i c regimes i n Bosnia. I n summary, we must ensure
t h a t a l l t h e p a r t i e s can achieve reasonable o b j e c t i v e s and t h u s
t h e i r c o n f l i c t can be c o n t a i n e d over t h e l o n g - t e r m .
How Long & Deadline?
We should s e t a d e a d l i n e f o r t h e B i l d t - p l u s phase sometime
this f a l l .
I n as much as w i t h d r a w a l has become e a s i e r and some
may choose t o s t a y i n a f o l l o w - o n f o r c e i n C e n t r a l Bosnia, o u r
p r e v i o u s t i m e t a b l e under 40104 s h o u l d be s i g n i f i c a n t l y
s h o r t e r . I f diplomacy f a l l s i n t h e near-term, t h e new v a r i a n t s
of 40104 may a l l o w us t o b e g i n a w i t h d r a w a l m i d - f & l l and end i t
before winter sets i n .
What About t h e Russians?
Some p e r s u a d i n g o f B r i t a i n and France w i l l o b v i o p s l y be
necessary, b u t t h e prime d i p l o m a t i c o b s t a c l e would be Russia.
We should n o t u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e h i g h - l e v e l d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t
t h a t w i l l be necessary t o a v o i d a Russian v e t o i n t h e S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l and minimize Russian support f o r S e r b i a . We w i l l have
t o make c l e a r t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o Bosnia has become America's
t o p p r i o r i t y , and we i n t e n d t o c a l i b r a t e our r e l a t i o n s h i p
accordingly.
As f a r as l i f t i s concerned, I would expect t h e y would n o t
want t o i s o l a t e themselves and v e t o such a r e s o l u t i o n i f
B r i t a i n and France went along and key Muslim C o u n t r i e s were
induced t o weigh i n . L e g a l l y , t h e y c o u l d accept t h a t
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR w i l l m a t e r i a l l y change t h e circumstances
i n which t h e arms embargo was e s t a b l i s h e d , l e a v i n g i t — u n l i k e
o t h e r embargoes -- w i t h o u t a r a t i o n a l e .
(As t h e NSC paper
p o i n t s o u t , we may need some p a r a l l e l l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s on
Serbia.)
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NO. 1460 120307 PAGE
- 7 How To Deter Serbia and a T h i r d Balkan War?
The NSC paper t r e a t s t h e s e s u b j e c t s a d e q u a t e l y . S u f f i c e i t
t o say, t h e e n t i r e c l i m a t e f o r containment o f a w i d e r war and
d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t M i l o s e v i c would be changed i f Washington
were t o engage f u l l y and NATO were t o remain u n i t e d .
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STRATEGY FOR THE BALKAN CONFLICT
Introduction: As we seek to manage the immediate crises in Bosnia and Croatia, we must develop a
strategy that can lead to a resolution of the Balkan Conflict, one that is consistent with vital U.S.
interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of
NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could
destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the forcible changing of
borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.
Our basic goal should be the preservation of viable Bosnia-Herzegovina along lines that are
broadly consistent with the principles and goals of the Contact Group plan — i.e., preserving
Bosnia as a single state and providing roughly half the territory to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and
half to the Bosnian Serbs. While the geographic division will need to be on a more realistic basis than
the Contact Group map, reflecting the new realities on the ground, any significant retreat from the
50/50 principle would be tantamount to ratifying aggression and undermine U.S. leadership. It
would, in any case, be futile to attempt to impose a solution based on the status quo on the Bosnian
Government, since it would lead to an unenforceable settlement and a revanchist Bosnian state.
There are two ways in which we can achieve this goal:
~
To achieve a political settlement in Bosnia this year, based on new territorial trade-offs within the
framework of the Contact Group plan; or
— To put in place a strategy that can carry us through the next 18 months, including the likely
withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and lay the basis for the Bosnians to reestablish a balance of power
on the ground, one that could lead ultimately to a durable political settlement consistent with U.S.
interests.
Our present course provides little assurance of achieving either of these results. Even if our current
efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR and reassert NATO air power are successful, they will provide at
best a temporary respite. By next spring, if not sooner, we are likely to see a renewed escalation of
hostilities and renewed pressure to withdraw UNPROFOR just as the U.S. election campaign moves
into high gear. The increased likelihood of a new war in the Krajina only adds to the precariousness
of the current situation and the dangers of a wider conflict.
Therefore, in the coming weeks, we should make an all-out effort to obtain a realistic diplomatic
settlement, capitalizing on the new leverage provided by the London decisions and the parties' (and
the Allies') new anxieties about developments on the battlefield. If this effort fails, we should let
UNPROFOR collapse this year, face up to our extraction obligations now and move to help the
Bosnians obtain the capabilities needed to establish a balance of power on the ground and to gain
control of the main territories allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would be
underpinned during a post-withdrawal transition period by enforcement of the no-fly zone and air
strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, possibly reinforced by a non-U.S. UNPROFOR
successor force or paramilitary volunteers.
We would make clear up front, as a quid pro quo, to the Bosnians that our willingness to stay
engaged and support them in this fashion would be dependent on their showing demonstrable
flexibility and realism during the negotiating effort. At the same time, we would make known to the
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�Bosnian Serbs what they will face following UNPROFOR withdrawal in order to encourage them to
make the concessions needed to achieve a settlement.
PRESSING FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THIS YEAR
The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to Bosnian Government acceptance of more
realistic territorial solutions and constitutional arrangements, ones that modify the Contact Group
plan while preserving its core principles (single state; territorial solution close, but not strictly limited,
to 51/49; and sufficient autonomy for the Serb and Muslim/Croat entities, as well as links to neighboring states, that enable them to co-exist peacefully and avoid a slide back to war). The Bosnian
Serbs may want to negotiate before their military position erodes and have put out signals suggesting
a willingness to compromise on terms compatible with the Contact Groupframework.(See Annex I
for a more detailed description of the elements of a modified Contact Group plan.)
Getting to Negotiations: The Intelligence Community has judged it unlikely that either the Bosnian
Government or the Bosnian Serbs are genuinely interested in negotiating a peace settlement in the
near term. Developments over the past two weeks, however, may have altered the parties'
calculations: the Bosnian Serbs may have been sobered by the RRF, the NATO air strike decisions,
and, above all, by the Croatians' successful intervention in the Livno valley, which has exposed how
thinly spread their forces are; Milosevic has to be worried about the impending new war in Krajina
and the risk that intensified fighting could destroy his chances of obtaining sanctions relief before
another winter sets in; even the Bosnian Government ~ while emboldened by these recent developments ~ has doubts about the staying power of NATO's new resolve and is uncertain about its
prospects on the battlefield (as well as managing the humanitarian consequences) if UNPROFOR
leaves and the arms embargo isfinallylifted.
To succeed, the new diplomatic effort will require that the U.S. reassume leadership of the process as
we did in early 1994 when we brokered the Federation agreement and put together the Contact
Group map. Getting the parties to the table will require finessing the issue of Bosnian Serb
"acceptance" of the Contact Group plan "as the starting point" and breaking our self-imposed ban on
contacts with Pale. We should pursue several tracks to achieve an early resumption of negotiations:
— Begin with consultations with key Allies and the Russians in which we signal a willingness to
work on a modified Contact Group plan and to reopen contacts with Pale. The Allies will be
enthusiastic about this proposal, and it will also take the sting out of our less-than-ringing
endorsement of the current Bildt package on mutual recognition and sanctions relief. (Bildt is
only too willing to see the Americans step back into the breach.)
~
Continue to explore whether we can broaden the negotiations with Milosevic (both through
Carl Bildt and renewed U.S. engagement) to secure early Bosnian Serb agreement to a cessation
of hostilities and initiation of negotiations using the Contact Group plan as basis or starting point.
~
Begin a discreet bilateral dialogue with the Bosnian Government to encourage new flexibility
on the map, the constitutional issues and the semantics of Serb "acceptance" in the run-up to
negotiations, making clear that our willingness to support a robust post-UNPROFOR-withdrawal
strategy will be dependent on such flexibility.
— Send a secret envoy for talks with Pale leaders (e.g., Chuck Redman, Bob Frasure or Bill
Richardson, with talks taking place in Belgrade on the margins of U.S. talks with Milosevic) ~
preferably with the Bosnians' approval or acquiescence - to find a formula for negotiations that
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finesses the issue of "acceptance," and to explore territorial trade-offs and constitutional
arrangements that would gain their agreement to the Contact Group framework.
Negotiating the terms of a settlement: U.S. mediation and behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the
two sides will remain key once formal negotiations begin, even though we will need to maintain some
role for our Contact Group partners. Shuttle diplomacy between Pale and Sarajevo will probably be
the best approach, with a Summit or international conference at the end of the process.
Shoring up the Croatian flank: In light of recent events, we will need to take the initiative to
contain the danger that war in Croatia will escalate to a region-wide conflict that could derail any new
diplomatic effort in Bosnia. Our aim should be to cut short Tudjman's assault on the Krajina at the
best moment. To that end, we should capitalize on the Croatians' new military leverage by pressing
the Krajina Serbs to agree to immediate implementation of confidence-building measures and
negotiations aimed at full political integration in Croatia on the basis of autonomy for Serb-majority
areas. The CBMs could include secure rail access to the Dalmatian coast, opening of the Adriatic
pipeline and removal of artillery and missiles from within range of Zagreb and the coast. We would
offer to play a leading role in mediating the settlement as part of the Z-4 process (the Z-4 plan will
have to be discarded since Tudjman, in his new position of strength, will not agree to the "state within
a state" for the Krajina that it would establish).
SUPPORTING BOSNIA'S SURVIVAL POST-UNPROFOR
If the last-ditch effort to establish a viable Bosnian state through negotiations fails and/or we fail to
restabilize the situation on the ground, we should seek UNPROFOR's withdrawal and implement a
post-withdrawal strategy aimed at ensuring Bosnia's survival by establishing a balance of power on
the ground. (It is our judgment that it would be better to deal with the challenge of implementing
OPLAN 40104 this year, rather than having to carry out a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal
operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive
to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict.) Implementation of our new strategy would, as
noted above, be contingent on the Bosnian Government having shown flexibility in the negotiations.
Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the
Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, to consolidate
their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to have the
potential to regain most of the territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. We
would make clear that our support would end if they set more ambitious war aims (e.g., if they sought
to retake territory that would jeopardize achieving a settlement consistent with our modified Contact
Group proposal). This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of
power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.
— Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage
of a UNSC resolution, perhaps making it part of the same resolution that terminates
UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizes withdrawal. Some of our allies have indicated they will go
along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we would, at a
minimum, need to make lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including SerbiaMontenegro), and we might need to accept more sanctions relief for Belgrade as well.
— If the Russians threatened to veto, we would undertake covert provision of arms to the
Bosnians, either directly or through third countries, without formally asserting the right to arm
them in violation of UNSC resolutions ~ thereby minimizing the damage to UNSC sanctions
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regimes against Iraq, Libya and other pariah states. (An alternative would be to seek Allied
agreement to a joint declaration that, with the termination of the UN's role in Bosnia, we were no
longer bound by the arms embargo; this "NATO unilateral lift," however, could provoke a serious
rift with Moscow and undermine other sanctions regimes.)
Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we
first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need
additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help
the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for
a transition period of roughly one year, we would:
~
Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air
superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD); as a fallback, we would enforce the
NFZ unilaterally or through a coalition of the willing; and
~
After proper warning, conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb
military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against
Serb artillery attacks. This would preferably be done through NATO or if our allies refused to
renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air
strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied
to UNPROFOR) or as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense.
Forward air controllers would be provided by countries prepared to deploy forces in Bosnia after
UNPROFOR withdrawal (e.g., Turkey, Jordan or Egypt), since we would want to avoid assigning
this function to the Bosnian Government. We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and
possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian
ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.
~
Encourage members of UNPROFOR to remain, and other countries to volunteer, as members of a
successor force to UNPROFOR, although we would not formally organize or lead a coalition of
the willing. The mission of the force (which would most likely be comprised of moderate Islamic
states) would be to help protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas and/or to continue to promote
stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. One essential function, as noted above,
would be to serve as forward air controllers. The force might be deployed openly under a Chapter
VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression;
alternatively, it could deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government, invoking Article 51 of the
UN Charter; a third option would be for the volunteer forces to deploy semi-covertly. The
Bosnians would need to agree, however, as a condition for our military support, that pariah states
like Iran and Libya not be permitted to deploy troops on the ground. (The humiliating prospect of
Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could
prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in a successor force or to perform the specific
function of forward air controllers.)
We would set a limit on the NFZ and air strike commitments (e.g., one year - until the end of
1996 — or some event-driven deadline), making clear to the Bosnians that once we have made a
reasonable effort to level the playing field, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and
training to reinforce the Bosnians' ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective
air defenses to counter Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed. Whether our own assistance were
overt or covert, we would mobilize a multinational effort to arm and train the Bosnians, so as to
spread the burden and reduce the overall U.S. role.
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Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playingfieldbecomes a much more formidable challenge if
Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial
sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, fully seal the border and accept a much larger
international monitoring force. We would at the same time warn Milosevic that if we detect
significant Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside
Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes and that we do not rule out strikes
against military targets inside Serbia.
Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range
of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:
-
Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new
crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air
strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
-
Pressing to bring an early end to the Croatian assault on the Krajina and to negotiate the peaceful
reintegration of Serb areas under Croatian sovereignty; and
-
Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with
the FRY.
We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat
military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political
settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we might would jettison the
Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.
Getting from Here to There: We should begin intense private discussions with our key Allies now
on our post-withdrawal strategy in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the
short term, to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if
withdrawal must occur and, if possible, to gain their cooperation. This will also be essential to
determining whether we will be able to carry out the air operation through NATO (using Italian
bases) or whether we will need to make alternative arrangements (e.g., upgrade bases in Croatia or
other neighboring countries). We should also lay out our strategy for the Bosnians to gain their
flexibility in the nego-tiations, as noted above, and to encourage them to rein in their supporters on
Capitol Hill. We would emphasize that a strong post-UNPROFOR commitment will give us leverage
to pursue a settlement.
Although it would be desirable to use the withdrawal period to begin laying the groundwork for postUNPROFOR support, our overriding consideration must be the safety of U.S., NATO and UN
troops. Therefore, we would have to abide by the NATO OPLAN's principle of neutrality during
withdrawal, using force primarily in self-defense and refraining from seeking to enhance the Bosnians'
military position. We would, however, seek to shorten the duration of the withdrawal operation in
order to minimize the exposure of our troops to Serb attacks. Moreover, we would seek Allied
agreement to continue to enforce UNSC resolutions and NATO mandates during the withdrawal, in
order to reduce the Serbs' ability to threaten the safe areas and permit the use of close air support
against Serb forces interfering with the withdrawal. (We might even use implementation of 40104 to
establish more secure control over Sarajevo for the Bosnians after NATO leaves.) The Bosnian
Government's awareness of the support we intend to provide after withdrawal should help minimize
the chances that government troops or Bosnian civilians would impede UNPROFOR's departure.
Attachment: Modified Contact Group Plan
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Annex I
Outline of a Modified Contact Group Plan
•
In renewed peace talks or exploratory contacts with the parties, we would float possible
modifications to the Contact Group map. These would preserve the 51:49 ratio but provide
for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g., trading Srebrenica, Zepa and
Gorazde, plus a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and
additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a Silajdzic proposal to Juppe, we could
state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation. Ultimately,
we should be prepared to encourage the Bosnians to consider accepting somewhat less than
51% if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible Federation frontiers in Central
Bosnia.
We would, similarly, develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show
the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of
the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
•
A more controversial proposal would be to encourage the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can
conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years. The Bosnians agreed to this in the 1993
Invincible package but subsequently backed away; endorsing a secession right could be viewed as
accepting the eventual establishment of a Greater Serbia. Nevertheless, the case could be made
that if the Bosnians cannot, after 2-3 years, persuade the Serb population that their best future lies
in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the peaceful separation of the Union along the lines
of the Czechoslovak model.
•
We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement
"mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans, including the prospect of EU association
agreements. This would serve to encourage reconstruction and reestablishment of economic ties
within the new Bosnian Union, foster regional economic cooperation that satisfy Bosnian Serb
desires for links to Serbia and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.
•
We could promote the development of Balkan economic union or confederation uniting all the
interested states of the former Yugoslavia in a customs union or single market, with the possibility
of establishing regional political bodies further down the road. This would offer an additional
means for promoting regional economic cooperation and dampening Serb nationalists' insistence
that all Serbs must live in one state.
In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners would tell Milosevic that:
•
We will terminate the current sanctions relief if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible
action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin) and to secure concrete action to deescalate Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas;
•
Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of largescale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY
but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
•
At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for noncompliance, we would increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps,
such as suspending all non-strategic trade sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia, really seals the border
and delivers Bosnian Serb de-escalation actions or perhaps lifting vice suspending a few of the
phase-one sanctions.
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Endgame Strategy: A S u s t a i n a b l e Defense o f a V i a b l e Bosnia
a f t e r UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Summary: I f UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w s , t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s r i s k
t h a t , l e f t on i t s own, t h e Bosnian government w i l l be unable
t o defend t h e t e r r i t o r y i t c u r r e n t l y h o l d s . A l i m i t e d
package o f US a s s i s t a n c e , s u f f i c i e n t t o ensure t h e Bosnian
government's s u r v i v a l as a v i a b l e e n t i t y , would serve
i m p o r t a n t US i n t e r e s t s . T h i s s u p p o r t would c o n s i s t o f a
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e package l i m i t e d i n q u a n t i t y and t y p e s o f
weapons t o m a t e r i a l needed f o r d e f e n d i n g e x i s t i n g Bosnian
h e l d t e r r i t o r y , t r a i n i n g o u t s i d e Bosnia, and l i m i t e d a i r
s t r i k e s i n t h e event o f Serb a i r o r heavy weapon a t t a c k s on
Bosnian t e r r i t o r y t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e Bosnians' a b i l i t y t o
ensure t h e i r own defense. I t would a l s o i n c l u d e an economic
package o f a s s i s t a n c e t o h e l p t h e Bosnian government r e b u i l d
and ensure t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t h e Bosnian s t a t e .
To improve Bosnia's l o n g - t e r m p r o s p e c t s , and t o reduce
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r US a s s i s t a n c e , we would c o n t i n u e t o
f o s t e r c l o s e r l i n k s between Bosnia and C r o a t i a t h r o u g h t h e
F e d e r a t i o n and C o n f e d e r a t i o n . Because t h i s approach i s
l i k e l y t o be a c c e p t a b l e t o a t l e a s t some US a l l i e s (as w e l l
as some I s l a m i c n a t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t Bosnia) US a s s i s t a n c e
i s l i k e l y t o be supplemented by o t h e r s .
R a t i o n a l e : I n t h e immediate a f t e r m a t h o f UNPROFOR's
w i t h d r a w a l , t h e Bosnian government i s l i k e l y t o f i n d i t s e l f
a t a s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y d i s a d v a n t a g e . The l o n g - t e r m impact o f
t h e arms embargo and t h e Serbs' advantage i n heavy weaponry
and a i r c r a f t c r e a t e a r i s k t h a t t h e Bosnian Serbs c o u l d make
q u i c k m i l i t a r y g a i n s , j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e government's
s u r v i v a l . Simply l i f t i n g t h e embargo, w i t h o u t more a c t i v e
US a s s i s t a n c e , i s u n l i k e l y t o remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n f o r
s e v e r a l reasons: 1) weapons may n o t a r r i v e i n t i m e t o h a l t
d e v a s t a t i n g Serb o f f e n s i v e s ; 2) a p e r i o d o f t r a i n i n g w i l l be
r e q u i r e d f o r some o f t h e needed weaponry; and 3) l i f t i n g t h e
embargo c o u l d b r i n g Belgrade more a c t i v e l y i n t o t h e war on
t h e Bosnian Serb s i d e b e f o r e t h e weapons reach S a r a j e v o ,
f u r t h e r j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e Bosnian government
i n t h e short-run. F a i l u r e o f the United States t o provide
a t l e a s t l i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e would r e q u i r e t h e Bosnian
government t o depend almost e x c l u s i v e l y on I s l a m i c s t a t e s ,
e s p e c i a l l y r a d i c a l s t a t e s such as I r a n and L i b y a , i n c r e a s i n g
t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n and p o l a r i z i n g t h e c o n f l i c t .
Lack o f US i n v o l v e m e n t would a l s o l i m i t o u r a b i l i t y t o
influence the parties i n favor o f a p o l i t i c a l settlement.
A c t i o n s r e q u i r e d : At t h e time o f t h e d e c i s i o n t o withdraw
UNPROFOR, t h e US would announce i t s i n t e n t i o n t o p r o v i d e
-^r CLINT0N LIBRARY P O O O Y
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oaDR
PERE
0
- -HSK
�-0BCIU3T'
l i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bosnian government t o ensure t h e i r
defense, and seek agreement among t h e P-5 t o l i f t t h e
embargo f o l l o w i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f UNPROFOR's w i t h d r a w a l ( t h i s
may r e q u i r e concessions t o Russia on l i f t i n g t h e embargo and
s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t S e r b i a ) . I f agreement cannot be reached
t o r e p e a l t h e embargo, t h e US would p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e
d i r e c t l y u s i n g an A r t i c l e 51 r a t i o n a l e ( e i t h e r o v e r t l y o r
c o v e r t l y ) . An arms package focused on remedying d e f e n s i v e
d e f i c i e n c i e s (e.g. a n t i - t a n k and c o u n t e r - a r t i l l e r y , a i r
defense, perhaps C2 and i n t e l l i g e n c e ) would be developed i n
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Bosnia government; we would h e l p
assemble t h e package w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s from as broad as
p o s s i b l e group o f c o n t r i b u t o r s . Any t r a i n i n g r e q u i r e d by US
p e r s o n n e l would t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e Bosnia; arrangements
would be made f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f weapons t o Bosnia
t h r o u g h C r o a t i a . We would a l s o seek NATO agreement f o r
l i m i t e d a i r s t r i k e s pursuant t o A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e C h a r t e r i n
t h e event t h a t Serb o f f e n s i v e s t h r e a t e n e d t o o v e r r u n Bosnian
defenses
( t h i s c o u l d a l s o be done pursuant t o a UNSC
Chapter V I I r e s o l u t i o n , b u t t h e d u a l key i s s u e s make t h i s
undesirable.)
A s s u r i n g t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e Bosnian government serves
i m p o r t a n t US i n t e r e s t s : A l l o w i n g t h e Serbs t o d e f e a t t h e
Bosnian government i s c o n t r a r y a number o f i m p o r t a n t US
i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g our commitment t o r e s i s t aggression
a g a i n s t s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n and human r i g h t s
consequences o f a t o t a l Serb v i c t o r y , t h e e r o s i o n o f US
c r e d i b i l i t y , t h e impact on US r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e I s l a m i c
w o r l d , and t h e consequences f o r t h e r e g i o n (e.g. t h e
K r a j i n a , Kosovo, Macedonia) o f t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f g r e a t e r
Serbia.
Need t o l i m i t scope o f US a s s i s t a n c e : Nonetheless, an openended commitment has s u b s t a n t i a l c o s t s . L i m i t i n g t h e scope
of US a s s i s t a n c e w i l l h e l p serve i m p o r t a n t a d d i t i o n a l US
i n t e r e s t s t h a t would be j e o p a r d i z e d i f our a i d extended t o
h e l p i n g t h e Bosnian government recover ( t h r o u g h combat) a l l
or p a r t o f t h e t e r r i t o r y now h e l d by Serbs.
•
L i m i t i n g our a s s i s t a n c e t o d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i s
more l i k e l y t o g a i n t h e support o f our a l l i e s (who
would face i m p o r t a n t domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o s t s i f Bosnia were overrun e n t i r e l y ) , p e r m i t t i n g a
m u l t i l a t e r a l approach t o l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo
and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . M u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t would
p r o t e c t our i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y o f
UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n s , a v o i d A m e r i c a n i z i n g
t h e c o n f l i c t , and a v o i d s e r i o u s i n t e r - A l l i a n c e r i f t s
t h a t c o u l d f u r t h e r j e o p a r d i z e NATO. US support f o r
Bosnian o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s would be opposed by o u r
allies.
CLINTON i i m m P O O O Y
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�-6HCRET"
S i m i l a r l y , a l i m i t e d approach i s more l i k e l y t o be
a c c e p t a b l e t o Russia, t h u s a v o i d i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n
w i t h Russia d u r i n g a d e l i c a t e p e r i o d o f our
r e l a t i o n s , and r e d u c i n g t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t Russia
would come t o t h e a i d o f t h e Serbs t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e
our e f f o r t s
A l i m i t e d approach would p l a c e s m a l l e r f i n a n c i a l
burdens on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and reduce (though n o t
e l i m i n a t e ) t h e r i s k o f US c a s u a l t i e s . D e f i n i n g t h e
o b j e c t i v e as defense o f c u r r e n t t e r r i t o r y improves
the p r o s p e c t f o r an e a r l y h a n d - o f f t o t h e Bosnian
government f o l l o w i n g an i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f
a s s i s t a n c e . T h i s s h o u l d improve t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r
Congressional support.
L i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e i s l e s s l i k e l y t o provoke a wider
Balkan war.
Limited assistance i s less l i k e l y t o i n t e n s i f y the
f i g h t i n g , t h e r e f o r e reducing t h e humanitarian
consequences.
CLINTON LI
YP OO O Y
HTCP
�OECIUiHg
Diplomatic Strategy
I n t h e wake o f t h e Serb a t t a c k s on t h e e a s t e r n enclaves
and t h e C r o a t i a n o f f e n s i v e , t h e r e i s an u r g e n t need t o
expand t h e t h r u s t o f t h e c u r r e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h M i l o s e v i c
i n two dimensions:
•
speed up t h e l i n k a g e between Plan B ( r e l i e f f o r
M i l o s e v i c i n r e t u r n f o r b o r d e r c l o s u r e and
r e c o g n i t i o n ) and Plan A ( c e a s e - f i r e and
n e g o t i a t i o n s between Sarajevo and Pale) and
•
resolve the Krajina s i t u a t u i o n
A "Bosnia o n l y " s t r a t e g y i s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o
execute g i v e n t h e growing c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e Bosnian
and C r o a t i a government t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a t i o n and
C o n f e d e r a t i o n , and t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e most l i k e l y
s u c c e s s f u l l o n g - t e r m outcome w i l l i n v o l v e c l o s e p o l i t i c a l
l i n k s between Bosnia and C r o a t i a . As t h e n e g o t i a t i o n
becomes more complex, deeper US i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e
n e g o t i a t i n g t r a c k i s e s s e n t i a l , s i n c e o n l y t h e U n i t e d States
has adequate c l o u t w i t h a l l t h e p a r t i e s .
The
elements o f t h e approach a r e as f o l l o w s :
1. A s a n c t i o n s suspension package i s agreed " i n
p r i n c i p l e " w i t h M i l o s e v i c and a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
Resolution i s introduced, but implementation
through
f i n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a c t i o n i s w i t h h e l d pending
p r o g r e s s on t h e ground and movement t o w a r d a n e g o t i a t e d
s e t t l e m e n t (elements 2-4, b e l o w ) .
2. I z e t b e g o v i c meets w i t h M i l o s e v i c t o c o n f i r m
r e c o g n i t i o n agreement, b o r d e r c l o s u r e p r o v i s i o n s and
r e i t e r a t e support f o r Contact Group p l a n . They agree
on p r i n c i p l e s t o govern a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n
Bosnia, which c o u l d i n c l u d e two autonomous e n t i t i e s
w i t h i n a s i n g l e s t a t e i n e x i s t i n g borders, respect f o r
Bosnia's s o v e r e i g n t y , p r o t e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t y r i g h t s ,
etc.
3. Sarajevo o f f e r s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Pale based on t h e
p r i n c i p l e s announced w i t h M i l o s e v i c and t h e Contact
Group p l a n , w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e "accept t h e
Contact Group p l a n as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t " f o r m u l a . The
p a r t i e s would a l s o agree t o a c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s
and disengagement o f f o r c e s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e
beginning of the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s .
4. Pale and Sarajevo begin n e g o t i a t i o n s and c e a s e f i r e
begins.
•-«-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Decl: OADR
�OECRET
5. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopts t h e s a n c t i o n s
package
suspension
6. I z e t b e g o v i c , M i l o s e v i c and Tudjman meet t o announce
agreement on r e c o g n i t i o n and " p r i n c i p l e s " g o v e r n i n g
p o l i t i c a l settlement i n Croatia, i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c a l
and human r i g h t s , some p o l i t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g
K r a j i n a , perhaps a d e f e r r a l o f Sector East as " f i n a l
s t a t u s " i s s u e t o be n e g o t i a t e d l a t e r . C r o a t i a would be
"recognized" subject t o the l i m i t a t i o n s w i t h respect t o
Sector East. Meeting c o u l d be hosted by EU or Contact
Group.
6.
C e a s e f i r e and draw back implemented and
negotiations begin.
Possible
Bilateral
Variant
T h i s approach may pose an i m p o r t a n t d i f f i c u l t y f o r
Bosnia, s i n c e t h e government has now s a i d t h a t any
" r e c o g n i t i o n f o r s a n c t i o n s suspension" d e a l w i t h M i l o s e v i c
must a l s o i n c l u d e C r o a t i a . The approach i s a l s o l i k e l y t o
meet o b j e c t i o n s from M i l o s e v i c because i t does n o t a l l o w
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a n c t i o n s suspension package u n t i l t h e
P a l e - S a r a j e v o n e g o t i a t i o n s b e g i n . These two problems c o u l d
be s o l v e d by a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e " t h r e e P r e s i d e n t s " meeting and
implementing s a n c t i o n s suspension b e f o r e t h e b i l a t e r a l
Sarajevo-Pale n e g o t i a t i o n s b e g i n . The sequence would be:
1. Sanctions
suspension package agreed (as above).
2. I z e t b e g o v i c , Tudjman and M i l o s e v i c meet, agree on
m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n ( w i t h p r o v i s i o n as above t o d e f e r
Sector E a s t ) , and e s t a b l i s h p r i n c i p l e s f o r s e t t l e m e n t
o f b o t h b i l a t e r a l c o n f l i c t s (Sarajevo-Pale; C r o a t i a C r o a t i a n Serbs).
They i n v i t e t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t i e s
(Sarajevo/Pale and Croatia/RSK) t o n e g o t i a t e on t h e
b a s i s o f (acceptance o f ) these p r i n c i p l e s .
3. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l implements s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f package
Other p r o v i s i o n s as above:
The p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s v a r i a n t i s t h a t
M i l o s e v i c has adamantly r e s i s t e d r e c o g n i z i n g C r o a t i a , and
t h e c u r r e n t f i g h t i n g c o u l d make t h i s even more d i f f i c u l t i n
t h e s h o r t r u n . Since we have always been prepared t o g i v e
Milosevic a d d i t i o n a l sanctions r e l i e f i n conjunction w i t h
progress on C r o a t i a , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t h i s r e s i s t a n c e
c o u l d be overcome by sweetening t h e i n i t i a l s a n c t i o n s
suspension package w i t h s a n c t i o n s l i f t .
Moving t o t h i s
approach would be a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o p o s a l
we gave B i l d t , so p r o b a b l y c o u l d not be deployed unless t h e
f i r s t approach f a i l e d t o get o f f t h e ground.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�How would t h i s i n i t i a t i v e
be launched?
1.
( a l r e a d y accomplished) C a r l B i l d t meets w i t h M i l o s e v i c ,
o u t l i n i n g US concerns over t h e c u r r e n t package o f s a n c t i o n s
r e l i e f , and t h e need t o improve t h e " s i t u a t i o n on t h e
ground" i n Bosnia b e f o r e any s a n c t i o n s suspension can be
implemented. B i l d t suggests t h a t a s e n i o r US o f f i c i a l meet
w i t h M i l o s e v i c t o d i s c u s s US concerns. M i l o s e v i c agrees.
2. ( i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7-10 days, depending on events i n
C r o a t i a ) A s e n i o r l e v e l o f f i c i a l (e.g. A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y
Holbrooke) goes t o f i r s t t o Sarajevo t o l a y o u t o v e r a l l
s t r a t e g y and g a i n t h e Bosnians' c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s i s
f o l l o w e d by a v i s i t t o Belgrade t o d i s c u s s o u r approach.
3. Belgrade and Sarajevo f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s meet p r i v a t e l y
t o work o u t d e t a i l s (they a r e a l r e a d y t a l k i n g about
meeting).
4. M i l o s e v i c and I z e t b e g o v i c meet ( w i t h o r w i t h o u t
"host").
5. C e a s e - f i r e and disengagement implemented as b i l a t e r a l
t a l k s between Sarajevo and Pale b e g i n , e i t h e r f a c e - t o - f a c e
or t h r o u g h m e d i a t o r . (US? Contact Group?)
6. Three p r e s i d e n t s meet under aegis o f EU o r Contact Group.
7. B i l a t e r a l t a l k s between C r o a t i a n p a r t i e s b e g i n .
CLINTON LI
Y P OO O Y
HTCP
�see^ET-
- r-r, IN a . ? l ; - ^ - f
6050
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE P E I E T HAS S E
R SD N
EN
WASHINGTON
August 5, 1995
9 A G 5 A0 ! 11
5U
|
*
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY U
SUBJECT:
Balkan S t r a t e g y : Options f o r D i s c u s s i o n a t F o r e i g n
P o l i c y Group Meeting, August 7, 1995
P r i n c i p a l s have taken f o r w a r d t h e r e v i e w you r e q u e s t e d o f l o n g term s t r a t e g y f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e Balkan c o n f l i c t .
We asked
agencies t o r e f l e c t on where we want t o be i n 12-18 months -- t h e
"end s t a t e " t h a t would best serve U.S. i n t e r e s t s -- and then
determine how t o get t h e r e . Agencies have w r i t t e n papers
r e f l e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e approaches, which are a t t a c h e d . I t h o u g h t
you might want t o review them b e f o r e Monday's meeting.
The p o l i c y r e v i e w has r e v e a l e d a g r e a t d e a l o f common ground:
•
Everyone agrees we s h o u l d make a determined e f f o r t t o reach a
p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e coming weeks, t a k i n g advantage o f
the window o f o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by NATO's and UNPROFOR's
renewed r e s o l v e , as w e l l as by Serb (and A l l i e d ) a n x i e t i e s
about t h e s h i f t i n g s t r a t e g i c balance i n t h e wake o f C r o a t i a ' s
m i l i t a r y action.
-
-
•
The s e t t l e m e n t would adhere t o t h e c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e
Contact Group p l a n b u t w i t h a more r e a l i s t i c map, maximum
autonomy f o r t h e two e n t i t i e s and, p o s s i b l y , an o p t i o n f o r
the Serbs t o secede p e a c e f u l l y a f t e r 2-3 y e a r s .
I t would r e q u i r e t h a t t h e U.S. reassume a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n
the n e g o t i a t i o n s and break t h e f r e e z e on c o n t a c t s w i t h Pale.
(The NSC paper p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a m o d i f i e d
Contact Group p l a n and how t o achieve i t ; a l l agencies agree
w i t h t h i s b a s i c approach, a l t h o u g h S t a t e has r e s e r v a t i o n s
about c e r t a i n aspects.)
A l l agree that, i f a settlement cannot be reached and/or i f
UNPROFOR's c r e d i b i l i t y continues to erode, then we should p u l l
the plug, f u l f i l l our commitment to help UNPROFOR withdraw,
l i f t the arms embargo and move to a post-withdrawal s t r a t e g y .
Muddling through i s no longer an option.
A l l agree as w e l l t h a t we cannot walk away a f t e r UNPROFOR
leaves and t h a t we need t o p r o v i d e some degree o f s u p p o r t
(arms, t r a i n i n g , a i r s t r i k e s , economic a i d ) t o h e l p ensure t h e
s u r v i v a l o f a Bosnian s t a t e f o r t h e Muslims and C r o a t s .
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A l l agree t h a t our c o n t i n u e d engagement s h o u l d be c o n d i t i o n e d
on p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w i t h t h e Bosnian government.
While a l l agree on t h e need t o s u p p o r t a v i a b l e Bosnian s t a t e , t h e
major d i f f e r e n c e among P r i n c i p a l s i s over i t s dimensions:
•
Madeleine A l b r i g h t and I b e l i e v e t h a t we s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o
s u p p o r t t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a Bosnia-Herzegovina a l o n g l i n e s
b r o a d l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s and goals o f t h e Contact
Group p l a n ( i . e . , a s i n g l e s t a t e , w i t h t h e Muslims and Croats
c o n t r o l l i n g roughly h a l f o f the t e r r i t o r y , give or take 5%).
-
-
•
We f e e l a n y t h i n g l e s s would be tantamount t o r a t i f y i n g
a g g r e s s i o n and would, i n any case, be r e j e c t e d by S a r a j e v o
l e a d i n g t o c o n t i n u e d i n s t a b i l i t y and a r e v a n c h i s t Bosnian
state.
—
Madeleine makes t h e a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t t h a t f a i l u r e t o s u p p o r t
a v i a b l e Bosnia would undermine U.S. l e a d e r s h i p i n NATO and
the I s l a m i c w o r l d and overshadow a l l t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
o t h e r accomplishments.
S t a t e and Defense argue f o r a more l i m i t e d commitment: t h a t we
s h o u l d o n l y h e l p t h e Bosnians c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l over t h e
t e r r i t o r y t h e y now possess, w i t h some modest a d j u s t m e n t s f o r
v i a b i l i t y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y around S a r a j e v o ) . They b e l i e v e t h a t
the c o s t s o f s u p p o r t i n g Bosnian e f f o r t s t o r e c o v e r t e r r i t o r y
would be t o o g r e a t , t h e p r o s p e c t s t o o u n c e r t a i n , and t h a t i t
would r i s k s e r i o u s s t r a i n s i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h our A l l i e s and
w i t h Russia.
While t h e c h o i c e between these two e n d - s t a t e s i s a p o l i t i c a l one,
i t w i l l a f f e c t t h e n a t u r e and scope o f t h e m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t h a t
we would need t o p r o v i d e .
( A l l agree, however, t h a t we s h o u l d
draw t h e l i n e a t ground f o r c e s , a l t h o u g h Madeleine argues we
s h o u l d d e p l o y U.S. m i l i t a r y t r a i n e r s t o symbolize our l e a d e r s h i p . )
There are a l s o d i f f e r e n c e s over whether t h e r e s h o u l d be c o n d i t i o n s
a t t a c h e d t o our s u p p o r t f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l .
NSC, DOD and Madeleine A l b r i g h t argue t h a t whatever t h e scope
of our a s s i s t a n c e , i t s h o u l d be l i n k e d t o Bosnian agreement n o t
to seek more a m b i t i o u s t e r r i t o r i a l aims on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d :
-
Under t h e NSC approach, Bosnia would need t o r e f r a i n f r o m
s e e k i n g t e r r i t o r y t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e a c h i e v i n g a s e t t l e ment c o n s i s t e n t w i t h our m o d i f i e d Contact Group p r o p o s a l .
-
Under t h e DOD approach, t h e y would need t o accept t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f b e i n g a l l o w e d
to e s t a b l i s h more secure c o n t r o l over S a r a j e v o .
S t a t e argues t h a t our support s h o u l d be l i m i t e d t o d e f e n s i v e
weapons and a i r s u p p o r t e n a b l i n g the Bosnians t o h o l d e x i s t i n g
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t e r r i t o r y b u t t h a t we should accept
o f f e n s i v e weapons from o t h e r sources
a d d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y . I n t h i s way,
f o r t h e i r success o r f a i l u r e beyond
holdings.
•
the f a c t t h e y would o b t a i n
w i t h which t o r e t a k e
we would not be r e s p o n s i b l e
defense o f t h e i r c u r r e n t
Everyone agrees, however, t h a t we should t e l l the Bosnians now
t h a t any U.S. m i l i t a r y support f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l
w i l l be c o n t i n g e n t on t h e i r showing f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e
d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s we w i l l pursue i n the s h o r t term.
P r i n c i p a l s i d e n t i f i e d a number o f areas where f u r t h e r work w i l l be
needed b e f o r e we can make a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on these i s s u e s .
•
The s t r u c t u r e o f a m o d i f i e d Contact Group map, r e f l e c t i n g new
t r a d e - o f f s (e.g., Muslims cede Gorazde f o r t e r r i t o r y around
S a r a j e v o ) , under b o t h the more l i m i t e d and more expansive
objectives.
•
An u p - t o - d a t e a n a l y s i s o f the m i l i t a r y balance,
Bosnians w i l l f a r e when UNPROFOR leaves.
•
An a n a l y s i s o f t h e m i l i t a r y requirements (arms, t r a i n i n g ) f o r
the Bosnians:
(a) t o c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l over t h e 30 p e r c e n t
of t h e t e r r i t o r y t h e y now c o n t r o l ; o r (b) t o p l a y on a more
level field.
•
The scope o f t h e a i r support we would need t o p r o v i d e t o h e l p
the Bosnians s u r v i v e e a r l y Serb a t t a c k s and ways t o p r o v i d e
t h a t s u p p o r t i f we were unable t o a c t t h r o u g h NATO o r use
I t a l i a n bases o r had no f o r w a r d a i r c o n t r o l l e r s on t h e ground.
•
The elements o f an economic a s s i s t a n c e program t h a t we would
develop w i t h t h e EU t o support the Bosnian F e d e r a t i o n and, i n
the event o f a s e t t l e m e n t , t o u n d e r p i n r e g i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
and c o o p e r a t i o n .
•
The r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r enforcement,
an u l t i m a t e peace agreement.
Questions
and how t h e
p r e f e r a b l y t h r o u g h NATO, o f
f o r Discussion
•
What k i n d o f Bosnia should be our u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e ?
•
What w i l l
•
Should we take t h e i n i t i a t i v e and c o l l a p s e UNPROFOR t h i s year
i f diplomacy f a i l s ?
I f UNPROFOR c r e d i b i l i t y erodes f u r t h e r ?
•
What are the impediments t o " l e v e l i n g t h e p l a y i n g f i e l d " as
suggested i n t h e NSC and A l b r i g h t papers?
•
Could we convince the Bosnians t o s e t t l e f o r the s t a t u s quo?
•
When and how s h o u l d we engage our A l l i e s i n l o n g e r - r a n g e
planning?
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CLINTON
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Attachments
Tab A Memorandum from Ambassador A l b r i g h t
Tab B NSC Paper: S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Balkan C o n f l i c t
Tab C OSD/JCS Paper: Bosnia Endgame/What K i n d o f Bosnian S t a t e ?
Tab D S t a t e Paper: A S u s t a i n a b l e Defense o f a V i a b l e Bosnia
a f t e r UNPROFOR W i t h d r a w a l
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH IN GTO N
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
/
/
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
/
SUBJECT:
Balkan S t r a t e g y : Options f o r D i s c u s s i o n a t F o r e i g n
P o l i c y Group Meeting, August 7,
/
P r i n c i p a l s have taken f o r w a r d t h e review you r e q u e s t e d o f l o n g term s t r a t e g y f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e Balkan c o n f l i c t . We asked
agencies t o r e f l e c t on where we want t o be I n 12-18 months — t h e
end s t a t e " t h a t would best serve U.S. i n t e ' r e s t s — and t h e n
determine how t o g e t t h e r e . Agencies have w r i t t e n papers
r e f l e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e approaches, w h i c t / a r e a t t a c h e d . I t h o u g h t
you might want t o r e v i e w them b e f o r e Monday's meeting.
The p o l i c y review has r e v e a l e d a great d e a l o f common ground:
Everyone agrees we should make / determined e f f o r t t o reach a
p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e ceding weeks, t a k i n g advantage o f
t h e window o f o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by NATO's and UNPROFOR's
renewed r e s o l v e , as w e l l as/by Serb (and A l l i e d ) a n x i e t i e s
about t h e s h i f t i n g s t r a t e g i c balance i n t h e wake o f C r o a t i a ' s
m i l i t a r y action.
/
/
-
The s e t t l e m e n t would/adhere t o t h e c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e
Contact Group p l a n b u t w i t h a more r e a l i s t i c map, maximum
autonomy f o r t h e t&o e n t i t i e s and, p o s s i b l y , an o p t i o n f o r
t h e Serbs t o secede p e a c e f u l l y a f t e r 2-3 years.
-
I t would requirfe t h a t t h e U.S. reassume a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s and break t h e f r e e z e on c o n t a c t s w i t h Pale.
(The NSC pap^'r p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a m o d i f i e d
Contact Group p l a n and how t o achieve i t ; a l l agencies agree
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A l l agree t h a t , i f a s e t t l e m e n t cannot be reached and/or i f
UNPROFOR's/credibility c o n t i n u e s t o erode, then we s h o u l d p u l l
t h e p l u g , / f u l f i l l o u r commitment t o h e l p UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w ,
l i f t the/arms embargo and move t o a p o s t - w i t h d r a w a l s t r a t e g y .
Muddling t h r o u g h i s no l o n g e r an o p t i o n .
A l l agree as w e l l t h a t we canr.ot walk away a f t e r UNPROFOR
leaves and t h a t we need t o p r o v i d e some degree o f s u p p o r t
(arjds, t r a i n i n g , a i r s t r i k e s , economic a i d ) t o h e l p ensure t h e
s u r v i v a l o f a Bosnian s t a t e f o r the Muslims and C r o a t s .
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Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2012-0799-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Bosnia related documents from the summer of 1995 referenced in the book, Getting to Dayton. Material includes a memo from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to President Clinton regarding the Balkan conflict, an NSC paper on current strategy in the region, and a Department of State memo on present diplomatic negotiations.
Creator
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
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2012-0799-M
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Madeleine Albright
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/0eb7ec5b03ccf3a1e819258739b25e45.pdf
e11fe18339e64e0d0907c303a08a9ed9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
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Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified Documents Concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2012-0799-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
01/03/2020
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains one document: a Department of Defense / Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing paper on an endgame strategy for Bosnia.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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Date Created
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12/10/2019
Bosnia War