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Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) ofE.O. 13526 or (b)(3) and
(b)(6) of the FOIA.
�GGNFIDEN'PIAL
0583REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 31, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR
THROUGH:
ANTHONY LAK; JL.. /
RICHARD c1¥JPif;;'
DON STEINBER~
FROM:
TIMOTHY
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Update
D'eclas.Sified.Undef'A:uil}onti'ofth~-
,
Interagency SeryrltY De<:las~fieation 'A.ppeais Pan~i,
E'.'0~:1_35~6;$ection·_::~;3(b~(S)
.
J.~TKIN/SUS~
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No.1
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
UN Report on Camp Security
The Secretary General released his Second Report on Security in
the Rwandan Refugee _Camps January 27, 1995.
In consultation with
Mrs. Ogata, the Secretary General decided the quickest way to
improve camp security would be for UNHCR to make appropriate
arrangements with Zaire.
The report notes it has traditionally been host country
responsibility to provide security for refugees. On January 27,
UNHCRand Zairian government representatives signed a security
agreement.
The agreement covers five months with the option for
three month renewals until December 1995. UNHCR will pay
soldiers a salary complement and provide uniforms and equipment
at an estimated cost of $13M (raised by voluntary donation).
UNHCR will also establish a liaison group to provide training~and
logistical suppOrt. The pact calls for 1500 Zairian troops to:
•
maintain law and order in the camps;
•
prevent intimidation of refugees who wish to return home and
escort returning refugees as far as the Rwandan border; and,
•
protect humanitarian agency installations and personnel.
UNHCR is relying on USG backing for and financial support of this
proposal. It would be helpful, at an Ad Hoc level, to establish
the level of USG assistance.
The Secretary General ruled out peacekeeping, contracted training
and monitors, and international police monitors/military
observers because of a lack of contributing countries and/or
costs.
CONFIDENTIAL
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�CONFIDENTIAL
2
Operation Retour
As of January 26, over 22,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
have returned to their home communes via transport and unofficial
reports estimate another 20,000 have returned on foot. Open
Relief Centers (ORCs) are set up in the communes to provide
temporary assistance and, in the case of land tenure disputes,
shelter. Most ORCs are receiving little use as people return
home directly and the majority of land tenure cases are being
resolved in a few days.
Refugee Repatriation and the Volcanoes
The likelihood of a volcanic eruption near Goma in February or
March provides an opportunity to press refugee repatriation. The
present level of ~ctivity seen in one volcano has been
experienced five times in the last 10 years; the .volcano has
erupted each time.
Our new Rwanda coordinator, Ambassador Townsend F~dman, met
last week with Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, acutely aware of the potential
danger, has stepped up monitoring of the volcanoes' activities
ahd is drawing up evacuation contingency plans. At the same
time, UNHCR is exploring the possibility of moving the camps 30
miles north in Zaire. Friedman urged UNHCR to use the volcano
threat to encourage repatriation. While he found some
receptivity among mid-level UNHCR officials, there seems to be
little enthusiasm at high levels for induced repatriation.
We continue to stress to Friedman the importance of repatriation
as opposed to camp relocation. He and others in State are
focused on the possibility that the international community will
be culpable if th~ volcano erupts and masses 6f Rwandans and
relief workers are killed. Thus, State is more concerned with
moving the refugees away from.Goma in .general rather than back
into Rwanda in particula~.
State will finish an options paper by noon Thursday for
consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a
strong push on this one.
UNAMIR
The Ethiopians indicated they may pull their battalion out of
UNAMIR. They are frustrated with the absence of vision and
direction for UNAMIR (measured in part by a lack of refugees
returning), and with slow payment by the UN. We have pressed the
UN and the U/SYG Annan has personally overseen payment to the
Ethiopians. We and the UN are stressing to the Ethiopians the
CONFIDENTIAL
�3
importance of their participation and strongly urging troop
rotation in mid-February rather than withdrawal.
International War Crimes Tribunal
Justice Goldstone has a four member team in Kigali to finalize
arrangements. We anticipate the permanent seat to be up and
running around the end of February in Arusha with a small
contingent in Kigali.
The USG has already ordered computer
equipment for the tribunal headquarters.
While DOJ and FBI have not yet provided any investigators for the
Rwandan Tribunal, while talking with Nancy, Jamie Gorelick
assured us DOJ is supportive. To address DOJ concerns and help
offset USG agency resource demands of the Rwandan tribunal, State
has been pressing the UN to reimburse the U.S. for some Yugoslav
tribunal detailees ~nd believes we are close to securing that
commitment. At DOJ's request in November, we ensured that
security for investigators was added in UNAMIR's mandate.
AID Efforts
AID indicates the Kigali mission will be operating this week and
should accelerate their efforts. AID has been reluctant to
tackle the most critical need in Rwanda's justice system:
•
funding foreign jurists to adjudicate criminal cases; and,
•
technical assistance to the National Commission charged with
making administrative determinations.about the appropriateness
of detaining the 10,000+ criminals in overcrowded prisons.
AID believes U.S. assistance in resolving criminal cases is
problematic and could be a lose-lose proposition.
If the
criteria for release are interpreted too stringently we could be
blamed for stalling reconciliation, and if those released are
publicized as legitimate criminals we could be blamed for
watering down the justice system.
Furthermore, AID believes there may be a legislative prohibition
on helping the National Commission (if it's deemed law
enforcement assistance) . If io, we could use a legislative
exception or presidential waiver to provide the assistance.
The decision regarding appropriateness of USG support for these
elements of Rwanda's.judicial program is reportedly with Brian
Atwood and may need to be discussed at an Ad Hoc meeting.
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
Gml"FIDEHT IAL
Military Equipment and Training
State and OSD are researching if amended legislation for !MET
training will get through Congress or whether a Presidential
waiver may be required~
OSD has proposed redrafting the UNSC arms embargo to authorize
the provision of non-lethal support for the Rwandan military
(communications and logistics equipment). State is drafting an
issues paper.
This will need to be resolved at the Ad Hoc level.
Intelligence indicates around a dozen APCs missing from Zairian
containment areas are likely in ex-FAR control. State has moved
slowly to have the UN press Zaire to control the vehicles, return
them to Rwanda or destroy them (with GOR approval).
State is
developing a review of the options and the impact of the arms
embargo and international. law.
The DATT in Kigali is scheduled to depart next month and no
replacement is identified or anticipated. Walt Slocombe and the
DIA Administrator hope to resolve this issue Wednesday.
Next Steps
The last Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994 .. An Ad Hoc meeting
this week would help rejuvenate the interagency process and
clarify USG direction regarding assistance for the Zairian
security force, refugee repatriation, criminal justice system
support and the arms embargo.
A U.S. delegation departs February lOth for the regional refugee
conference in Bujumbura.
RECOMMENDATION
t,/t /.
That you agree to an Ad Hoc Meeting tQie ~riday with the agenda
at Tab I.
Approve ~
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda for Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting
CONFIDENTIAL
�5700
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 21, 1995
ACTION
Declassified Under'A.uthontV ofthe
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
I 11teragency·SectiritY Declassification. Appeals· Panel,
E.'0.·1352~;,section•s-3Cb)(3)
'
E~CE
'
~
.
.
'
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l ,.
•
• "'.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THROUGH:
SUSAN
FROM:
SHAWN H.·
SUBJECT:
Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Rwanda
McCORMI~
BACKGROUND
Rwanda has formally requested that the UNSC lift the arms embargo
on Rwanda. Action will likely occur during the week of July 24.
Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, barred the sale or supply oL arms
or other military material (including non-lethal equipment) to
Rwanda.
The embargo was aimed primarily at the former Rwandan
government during the height of the genocide and civil war.
Resolution 997 of June 9, 1995, affirms the arms embargo applies
to the sale and transfer of arms to persons in neighboring
states, if the arms are for use in Rwanda.
Nine votes with no Perm-S vetoes are required to pass a UNSC
resolution. We estimate Rwanda can count on NAM support (6
votes, including Rwanda), China (7) and possibly Russia and
Argentina (9).
USUN anticipates that France and UK will not
veto, but likely abstain. However, we would not discount the
possibility of a French veto. The Czech Republic, German and
Italian positions aie not known. Our vote may be piyotal.
OPTIONS
1)
Support Lifting - The ex-FAR is actively rearming in
neighboring states and possibly planning an August offensive.
The GOR claims that it needs arms to exercise its right to selfdefense (Article 51).
The existing embargo clearly works in
favor of the ex-FAR and militias.
The GOR remains the main
defense against renewed genocide.
Lifting the embargo will allow badly needed logistics,
communications and transport equipment to enter the country.
Lifting will also facilitate our IMET program and allow countries
to train Rwandan troops in huma~rights and non-violent crowd
control.
DIA (Tab A) estimates ~a lift will not result in a
CONFIDENTIAL
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OADR
2
�cmlFIDENTIAL
2
substantial amount of additional w.eapons entering the country,
because the GOR already has them in supply.
If.war resumes, some may label the UN and U.S. as complicitous.
Several countries in the region are likely to oppose lifting the
embargo. A vote to lift, however, may be exploited by those who
argue for lifting the Bosnia embargo.
2) Oppose Lifting Arms Embargo - The GOR already violates the
embargo and receives arms from Uganda and elsewhere. Lifting
could enable the GOR to funnel surplus weapons to the Burundi
army or associated Tutsi gangs. Repdrts of GOR-GOB military
links are worrisome since the GOB military has been conducting
genocide in northern Burundi. Lifting the embargo may also cau.$e
a diversion of funds from reconstruction and development
programs. Finally, even if unenforceable, the embargo has
significant symbolic value in conununicating international concern
about stopping weapons flows into the region.
3) Support Lifting for Non-Lethal Goods Only - Permit GOR to
purchase trucks, conununications gear, uniforms, etc. This had
been the USG position because the UNSC would not endorse a full
lift. While France and others may s~pport this step, it does not
address the full needs of the GOR, and would be interpreted as
indicative of our lack of support for the GOR.
4) Support Lifting With Conditions - Lifting could be
accompanied by conditions. These would include reaffirmation of
the prohibition on arms transfers to persons in neighboring.
states (i.e. ex-FAR, Burundi military and militias) for use in
Rwanda and the requirement that weapons be marked with the
country of destination and registered in some fashiori. Finally,
UNAMIR should be mandated to monitor the Burundi border and, if
feasible, increased in size to accomplish this additional task.
This move could increase our leverage to press the GOR to
announce its intention to prosecute only those 400-plus people
accused of war crimes - NOT the myriad of other suspects. This
announcement should be coupled with a general amnesty for others
to help allay Hutu refugees' fear of persecution. For its part,
the international community must demonstrate its commitment to
a~rest and prosecute the key 400-plus war criminals.
AGENCY POSITIONS
All agencies (at the deputies level or above) support Option 4.
Thei agree the resolution must include language prohibiting
Rwanda from trans rring arms to other countries as well as the
other conditions described above.
GOHFIDE~1TIAL
�3
CmfFIDEnTL'\L
The GOR will likely support UN conditions that ban transfer/sale
of weapons to other countries and that mandate end-user
certificates or markings. Kagame, however, is unlikely to accept
any increase in UNAMIR to monitor the Burundi border.
Ambassador Krueger is likely to oppose Option 4, because of the
potential effects of any lift on Burundi.
If we decide to
support lift, we.must take care to put our spin on the decision
rather than allow potential detractors to do so. We could
accomplish some of this press backgrounders. We would also work
with Legislative Affairs to apprise the Hill of our plans.
Concurrence by:
N;l~~£~o, Richa~e
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve option 4.
expected crosshatch) .
Approve
~
Attachment
Tab A
DIA analysis
COUFIDENTIAL
(If you approve, we will clear
Disapprove
�DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
Backqround Paper for the Senior Africa Director, HSC
SUBJECT:
Possible Consequences of Lifting the Arms Embargo against Rwanda (U)
1. -ret PVBPQSB: fo provide information to Ms. Susan Rica, the Senior Africa
Director, HSC concerning possible consequences of lifting the OH arms embargo
against the government of Rwanda.
2.
(U)
PQINTS OF MAJOR INTBUST:
a. (8/NP) lffact pn Regipnal Arm' Plows: Lifting the embargo against
Kigali while maintaining it against the Rwanda Hutu insurgents would do little
to change the current flow of arms into central Africa. DIA believes that the
Rwandesa Patriotic Army (RPA) receives intermittent shipments of arms and
munitions, ranging from small arms to artillery from various sources via Uganda
which is sufficient to sustain its current laval of operations. However, large
and more sophisticated pieces of equipment have bean difficult to obtain •. The
Hutu insurgents continua to receive small arms, machine guns, mortars, and
explosives in sufficient quantities to sustain their insurgent operations
despite increased international attention and the currant arms embargo.
(0/NP) The RPA apparently has problems procuring various non-lethal
military assistance such as communications equipment, trucks, night vision
devices and conventional military training support essential for a conventional
military because of the arms embargo. This hinders ita ability to transition
from an insurgent to a conventional army batter able to combat the on going
insurgency and thus improve security in Rwanda.
( 0/NP) If the embargo were lifted the RPA would likely purchase
light armored vehicles and military patrol boats. It would probably like to
obtain helicopters, however, at present they are too expansive for the
government. These weapons systems would increase the army's capability to
interdict and respgnd to insurgent attacks through increased fire power and
mobility. These systems are difficult to obtain clandestinely.
(0/NP) Currently, the majority of the RPA's weapons are either
Eastern Bloc (China and North ltoraa) or captured from the former Rwanda Armed
Porcas (PAR) (p~imarily French). These sources ware out of necessity rather
than desire. The army seems to favor the wast and would probably seek western
sources for their needs. Again, they probably would not seek to replace small
arms and"artillary, but purchase equipment to meet its transition to a
conventional force. To sustain its fleet of French built armored cars, the RPA
needs repair parts. Prance is an unlikely source, however, South Africa's Eland
armored car is similar to the French AML 90, thus a likely supplier of repair
parts and light armored vehicles.
Declassified Under Authoritj.~ of the.
InteragencySecurit); Dedassificati~n :~ppeals Panel,
CLASSIPIBB B¥ B~/PAW 3
BBOWSIP¥ ON OADR
E.O. q526, Section 5:3(h)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 54
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
SBGRB'!·
NO'l' ru!ILl!IASAmdil 'PO PORBIGN NATIONALS
�SBORB'R
(C/NF) Foreign military training and not high priced
to be Kigali • a moat important need. Purtherm6re, the government
massive quantities or high priced weapons. MG Kagame has proven
shrewd and pragmatic leader who recognizes the constraints faced
government.
DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
weapons appear
cannot afford
himself as a
by the Rwanda
b. ( C/NP) Imoact on Arlpa flows to the Burundi Ar1ned Forces l FAB l
While
the RPA and the FAB have increased official·meetings and appear to be prepared
to conduct joint operations, especially along the southwestern
Rwanda/northwestern Burundi. border, it is unlikely that the RPA would provide E.O. 135 2 6
substantial materiel support direct!
o the PAB. Although both forces are
1.4(c)
dominated by Tutais, recent
·~~-~1
·"(( ndicate that the RPA high command has
contem t for their Burundi counterparts and the latter's force as a whole.
Recent
indicates that the RPA baa taken extensive defensive measures to
protect
bases while the FAB has not.
(G/NF) The RPA'a main motivating factor for cooperation with the PAB
probably stems from the increasing threat from northwestern Burundi by Rwanda
Butu insurgents operating with Burundi Butu insurgents. Kigali would rather
ignore Burundi, although clearly events in either country impact on the other.
~ The Rwandasa Patriotic Front (RPF) political program
officially atrasaaa a Rwandase identity over maintaining separate Butu and Tutai
identities. This policy stems from many of the key RPP leaders havi~g grown up
in Uganda. Their Uganda experience, unlike that in Butu dominated Rwanda and
Tutai dominated Burundi did not reenforce severe ethnic cleavages. That said,
if the increasing Butu insurgency threatens the security of Rwanda's southern
border and it appeared that the Burundi Tutai faced an all out ethnic conflict
·the RPA would likely assist the PAB with materiel support.·
3. (C/NF) EXPECTED PEYELOPHEHTSa The RPA has demonstrated that it is the moat
capable, disciplined and. battle-hardened force in Central Africa. Therefore,
little impact would occur to upset the current military balance with regard to
conventional forces (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi). What would likely occur is an
increase in regional instability over the short term. The RPA with foreign
assistance would accelerate ita conversion to a professional conventional force
batter able to contain the regional insurgency. Insurgency in all likelihood
will never go away, however, ita daatablizing affect on Rwanda and the region as
whole would diminish in the long term aa reaul't.
~) The moat significant threat to regional stability comes from
the Rwandan Butu insurgents because not only do they destabilize Rwanda, but
eastern Zaire and Burundi and possibly western Tanzania. Given the RPA'a increased capability it would probably aggressively contain the insurgents through
interdiction and cross-border strikes. The likelihood of the latter is great
regardless of the status of the arms embargo. . The difference would be a more
professional and highly trained force batter able to control itself unlike ~t
2
Sl!lORl!l'R
NOT FtB:LI!IASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIQNM.S
�SBGRB'l'
DIA/PAW-3
18 Jul 95
Kibeho and one leas likely to generate massive panic amongst the Rutu refugee
population. The profeaaionalization and conventionalization of the RPA is just
a small portion of an overall counter.i naurgency plan involving all aspects of
the Rwanda government.
(X)()RDINATIONa
DIO/AFRICA.
[10
3
&B&N!I!I1
ROT D:tzftSid!H IO POM1!81f tWf!8tiMJ&
u.s.c ..424]
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07, 24.
' 95
12: I 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
Di!classinoo .Under AuthoritY. of the
Interage~cy Security Deda~ficarlon'Appeals.PaneJ;
E.O. 13,526,;'Section S~3(b)(3)
·.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
039
BE€ftEl"
DECL:7/21/05
TO:
G - Mr. Wirth
FROM:
AF - George E. Moose
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting on Burundi with NGOs, White House,
July 25, 1630
I.
PURPOSE;
o
Inform NGOs of USG policy objectives, accomplishments
to date and challenges ahead.
o
Engage NGOs in discussion of initiatives they and USG
can take.
o
Convince NGOs Rwanda/Burundi is receiving both the
high level attention and resources necessary to meet
our policy objectives.
II. KEY POINTS
State of £lay
o
Security has been steadily declining· over the last
.two months, as Tutsi extremists have moved to push
Hutus out of parts of the capital, Bujumbura.
Meanwhile, the Hutu opposition has reportedly formed a
government in exile and threatened military
reprisals. The Hutu-majority government has become
increasingly marginalized and essentially reduced to a
near-impotent facade. Some.observers predict a descent
into massacres on the Rwandan scale. Others expect
that the current level of violence and insecurity will
cont·inue or increase (but not to Rwanda levels) for
months. NGOs, like many players in the international
community, are becoming frustrated by the lack of
visible forward progress in Burundi. The~ sometimes
express this frustration by criticizing the USG for a
perceived lack of high level attention and activity.
BECRi':C
2
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
<MO)
07, 24,
' 95
12: I 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
Sf!CRB'f
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2 -
Format and NGO Participants
...
0
A tentative list of NGO participants is attached. The
tentative schedule is that NSC Advisor Tony Lake will
give welcoming remarks, introduce yourself, Brian
Atwood and DOD Undersecretary Walter Slocum, and then
give a short overview of USG policy in the region and
USG leadership in organizing the international
community. You will then be asked to speak for three
minutes, followed by three minute presentations by
Atwood and Slocum. Afterwards, Lake will open the·
floor and moderate 40 ~inutes of discussion before
making concluding remarks. Though the subject is
Burundi, questions might be asked about Rwanda.
Everything said is off the record.
TALKING POINTS
I I I.
0
Emphasize the high degree of attention which you are
giving to Burundi and Rwanda~
0
State that, from the beginning, we have. followed a
deliberate strategy focused on preventing the kind of
explosion in Burundi which we saw in Rwanda. That
strategy has been to provide as much support as we can
to the Secretary-General's representative, and to make
the Burundians aware that they are an object of
international attention by sending high level visitors
and messages, and through the good work of Amb.
Krueger in highlighting reality as we see it. In some
aspects, that strategy has worked. We still have a
Hutu President and a National Assembly. But, we are
not fooling ourselves into thinking that things are
going well. In fact, everybody in this room knows
that things are further deteriorating. And, for our
part, we have seen the need to take increasingly
vigorous measures, but always·with the adage in mind
"This above all, do no harm."
0
Hand out copies of the attached fact sheet on
preventive diplomacy and other USG initiatives.
0
Briefly discuss some of these preventive diplomacy
initiatives.
3
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07. 24.
' 95
12: I 7
NO.
1460120842 PAGE
- 3 -
------Give the status of the Burundi Commission of
Inquiry. We applaud UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali's July 17 annountement that he is
setting up a Commission of Inquiry into the October,
1993 coup attempt in Burundi and its aftermath. We
are proud to say that this announcement is a direct
result of our discussions with the UN in the days
leading up to his speech.
with the OAU and other members of the
international community, we are pushing hard for an
all-party regional political conference. We are
disappointed that. politicfans in Bujumbura rejected a·
call for all-Burundi conference in Addis Ababa for
July 24, but will continue to apply pressure on·this
issue.
---~--Along
------We understand that, in response to the rejection
of the July 24 conference, the OAU will be convening a
conference of regional African foreign ministers and
the OAU Central Organ to seek an African solution to
the Burundi situation, a move which we ~pplaud and
support.
0
Discuss military intervention. State that we have
been experiencing concern about the security situation
in Burundi since early March, and started contingency
planning at that time. We shared this plan with a
number of our allies, saying that we would do lift and
other limited ~upport, and we have gotten no takers.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
IV.
0
How will the US vote on Rwanda's request to lift
the arms embargo against its government?
Q,
A. We will vote for it, with certain conditions. The
most important of these is that the arms not be passed
on to third parties, i.e., to Burundi. This was a
tough call, and I know it won't be universally
popular. However, you have to remember that the
government of Rwanda is one which we support. They
are trying to defend themselves against armed
genocidists. To continue the embargo denies them the
tools to do that.
0
Is consideration being given to an arms embargo
against Burundi and Burundians?
Q.
8BOfU3'f
4
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07, 24,
' 95
12: 1 7
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
8EORS'f
- 4 -
A. Yes, it is being considered. Many observers
believe that implementing an embargo on Burundi will
lead the military to undertake a coup. We believe
that an embargo is the right step, and are proceeding
cautiously, due to these concerns.
o
What is the
sub-region?
Q.
us
doing to halt arms flows into the
A. We are pushing hard to get observers put into the
airports in the r~gion, especi~lly in Eastern Zaire,
and think that we are very clo~e to achieving this,
We are also supporting calls for a Commission of
Inquiry into arms flows in the area.
o
Aren't the French and others supplying arms to the
rebel Hutus?
Q.
A. Since this allegation was first made by Human
Rights Watch and others, we have asked the
intelligence community to look hard for any foreign
government involvement, including the French, and they
haven't found any. The French categorically deny any
involvement. We are pushing for a Commission of
Inquiry to look into the whole question of arms flows.
o
What is. the status of human rights observers for
Burundi?
Q.
A. The plan to put civilian human rights monitors on
the ground in Burundi has necessarily been revised to
include only Bujumbura. Due to security concerns, it
appears that observers will not be put in the
countryside for now.
o
Is it true that the OAU is pulling its military
observers out of Burundi?
Q.
A. We too have heard rum.ors, and have recently
learned.that the OAU Ambassador has·asked to withdraw
the observers. We are checking this with OAU
Secretary General Salim Salim, and will ask him to
leave them in.
o
Why doesn't the US bar Burundian extremists from
coming here?
Q,
5
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(MO)
07,24,
'95
12:17
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
SBCR'S'f
- 5 -
o
A. We. do. We have placed a number of extremists in
our look-out system. They and their families are
barred from receiving visas~ Other nations are doing
the same. Given our concerns for the security of
personnel on the ground, we have not publicized our
actions.
o
Q.
What is the status of a UN regional special envoy
for Rwanda and Burundi?
A. This is an idea we have given full support to. We
·are hopeful that the Secretary-General will make an
announcement soon. It has been suggested that
statesmen such as Brian Mulroney of Canada or Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania would be good carididates. I would
be interested in hearing any suggestions from this
group as to who would be a good candidate for this job.
o
What is the status of the War Crimes Tribunal in
Rwanda?
Q.
A. Justice Goldstone i~ meeting with
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali tomorrow to try to
straighten out some of the administrative and
bureauc~atic issues.· The Tribunal already has a
budget of $10 million, a staff of 10 and two shipments
of supplies on the ground in Kigali. There will be
21 more investigators in August.
The Tribunal plans
to have· some i~dictments before the end of 1995. The
slow progress on setting up this Tribunal is a source
of frustration to everybody,. but it • s beginning to
look like it will work.
Why don't Western countries freeze the assets of
extremists?
Q.
A. We're taking a hard look at effective ways of
doing this, and will be working on it.
Attachments&.
Tab 1 - Preventive Diplomacy in Burundi (copies to be.
handed out)
Tab 2 - Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda (copies to be handed
·out)
Tab 3 - Tentative List of Attendees
6
�DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Drafted: AF/C:DHeflin
7-3139
SEALLAF 6376
Cleared:
AF:PBushnell
P:SSyrnington
AF/C:ARender
PM:RWharton
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07. 24.
' 95
12: 17
NO,
1460120842 PAGE
7
�750<1
S/S 9518985
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C.
~tfl"If'EN'fiAh
20520
October 11, 1995
DECL:l0/02/05
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Subject:
Request for a meeting between National Security
Advisor Lake and Rwandan President Pasteur
Bizimungu
The State Department requests that National Security
Advisor Lake meet with Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu.
President Bizimungu will be at UNGA october 22 through 24.
The
Rwandan Embassy has indicated that President Bizimungu will
come to Washington October 17 through 21 for meetings and the
African~ dinner.
The purpose of the meeting would be to reaffirm our general
support for the Government of Rwanda and its goals of
repatriation, r~conciliation, reconstructibn and bringing those
~uilty of genocide to justice.
In addition, it would provide
an opportunity to press the Rwandans to reform their prisons.
The United States provides significant amounts of
humanitarian and bilateral aid to the sub-region. The
Government of Rwanda contains both Tutsis and moderate
and has brought some stability to the c6untry. We are
pressihg them to create conditions within Rwanda which
encourage voluntary repatriation of exiles, given that
threatening involuntary repatriation in January.
current
Hutus,
now
will
Zaire is
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Biographic Information
Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Securitjr. Declassification Appeals Panel.
E.O. 13526,Sectiori 5;3(b)(3)
.
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 040
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�Declassified. Under Authoiicy Of the
_Interagency Sec:urity D~dassification Appeals Panei;.
E.0.:13526,,Section 5:3(b)(3)
eetfPI:B:BN''fiAL
..
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 41
Declassification Date: rnarch.18, 2014
MEETING WITH RWANDAN PRESIDENT PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU
CONTEXT OF MEETING
President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu and member of the
(mainly Tutsi} RPF has been in power since the then-guerrilla
RPA took Kigali in July, 1994. His family and political
supporters suffered at the hands of extremist Hutus during the
events of April, 1994. The RPF-led coalition government has
brought a large measure of stability to the country. The USG
has supported the ·current government. We have given over $600
million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the sub-region;
AID has given substantial sums in development aid, DOD has
provided humanitarian assistance and IMET training; various
agencies have contributed money and personnel to efforts to
ready the International Tribunal and Rwandan court system to
try those suspected of crimes against humanity, including
genocide. We have also supported the Rwaridari governmerit::: ·at the
UN, including support for lifting the arms embargo'against
Rwanda. European governments believe that the USG is
especially credible with the GOR.
Despite considerable progress under very difficult
circumstances, President Bizimungu's government has encountered
several significant problems since taking power. The judicial
system was.decimated in 1994. There are over 55,000 prisoners
in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions, most arrested since
Bizimungu took office. Members·of Congress, NGOs and the
i~ternational community are concerned about this problem, and
the GOR S apparent lack of response to it. Zaire has given
Rwanda and the UNHCR until December 31 to show substantial
progress on repatriating the one million Rwandans in Zaire/ at
which time Zaire threatens to repatriate them involuntarily/ as
they started to do in August. Rwandan troops have committed
atrocities in April at Kibeho and again in September near
Gisenyi, resulting in the deaths of several hundreds. Both
incidents were promptly investigated with the full
.Participation of the government (the investigation into the
September incidents is not yet complete} .
1
The Government of Rwanda .is keenly interested in receiving
further development aid and diplomatic/political support from
the USG. They have indicated an interest in obtaining
non-lethal military equipment from DOD stocks. President
Bizimungu has met with Defense Secretary Perry, AID
Administrator Atwood, and Assistant Secretary of State George
�CONFIBElf'fiAb
-2Moose during his visit, and also met Secretary Christopher,
Vice President Gore and President Clinton as one of the six
Africare honorees.
OBJECTIVES
o
To assure President Bizimungu that the USG supports the
Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation,
reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
o
To discuss the future direction of U.S./Rwanda relations
with President Bizimungu.
o
To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in
seeing a successful repatriation of Rwanda refugees, and
note that a key step towards this goal would be reducing
the prison ·population so that refugees feel less of a
threat ·Of arrest and imprisonment.
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support for your government. The
situation in Rwanda has not been easy. Despite the very
difficult problems you have had to face, you have brought a
measure of stability to your country, and we wish to
continue to work with you.
o
What do you see as the future direction o{ U.S./Rwand~
relations? We would like a relationship where we can be
candid and honest with each other like true friends; where
we can support and criticize each other as necessary, but
always with the purpose of helping each other.
o
It is very important that there be a successful and timely
voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. An
involuntary repatriation; as threatened by the Zairians if
they do not see progress before January 1, would be chaotic
and potentially destabilizing to the region.
We will
continue to work with you and UNHCR to see that this does
not happen.
o
In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is
essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which
will encourage refugees to return.
There has been
progress, but it is particularly important that measurable
progress be taken towards reducing the prison population ..
This is of growing concern to the human rights community.
cen:fiBEU'fiAn
�-3-
The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their
conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make
refugees fear for their safety upon return.
If Asked:
o
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for
acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda
on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that public
concern about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could
limit our ability to act.
o
UNAMIR: We note that UNAMIR's mandate comes up for renewal
on December 8. What does your government consider to be
the best way to provide for s~curity of returning refugees,
security for the International Tribunal, military observers
and human rights monitors?
COUFIBEU'I'IltL
�6E6RE=r
SECRET
Rwanda-Burundi Paper: Prerequisites for Success
One key les~on of successful peacekeeping operations is the vital
role of consensus among interested major powers, regional
countries and border states. This lesson is particularly
applicable in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. The chQnce of
success in this troubled region even with French arlCf British
cooperation will be small. However, without a common
understanding among the interested players, especially France,
long-term success will be very difficult to achieve.
Recent efforts to deal with the conflict have been hampered by
the perception that the major powers (the U.S., France and
Britain) tacitly or overtly support opposite sides in the
conflict. Differences among regional players, notably Zaire and
Uganda, reflect the preferences of France and Britain. Lack of
consensus contributes to the poor showing of the international
community: little of the $700 million pledged has been
disbursed; support for UNAMIR has dwindled; the flow of arms to
ex-FAR forces has increased; few refugees have been repatriated;
and political turmoil, especially in Burundi, remains rampant.
Whatever the specific option, therefore, an effective strategy
for dealing with Rwanda and Burundi must have three elements:
(1) Agreement among the major powers (the U.S., France and
Britain) on a common approach. Private bilateral meetings (at
the principal or deputy level) with Britain and France will be
necessary to develop a common understanding. Once achieved, a
high-level, private channel should be established t6 discuss
sensitive political issues such as arms flows, hate radios or
indictments of high-level leaders for war crimes.
(2) A concerted effort by the major powers to persuade key
neighboring states, especially Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda, to
accept and implement an integrated strategy for Rwanda/Burundi.
Working together, the major powers can persuade their regional
allies to support a strategy that will promote political
reconciliation, control the flow of arms, bring to justice those
responsible for war crimes and repatriate refugees.
(3) A key coordinating role for the .United Nations. Our limited
humanitarian interests and constrained resources preclude a lead
role outside the-UN framework. To date, the UN has taken the
lead in Rwanda and Burundi, and it should continue to do so. ·The
available UN instruments are peacekeepers, human rights monitors,
war crimes tribunals, political good offices and coordination
mechanisms for emergency and development assistance.
SECRET
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Decla.$sified Under Authontjt of the
I ni:'!!ragency Sec:';lritY Deda~fication -Appeils Panel,
E:b; 135!!6; Section s:J(b)(3)
..
..
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· ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 3
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�Declassified U nde1' AutnontY of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel;
E.O. 13526,Section 5:3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 42
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
CeUFIBEJNq?L'U!5
MEETING WITH JUSTICE RICHARD GOLDSTONE
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Justice Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the Rwanda
War Crimes Tribunal, has had a distinguished career on the
South African bench with a key role in his native country's
reconciliation process. He is concerned with issues (e.g.,
information sharing) which are relevant to the Rwanda
Tribunal. The USG has supported the Rwanda Tribunal both
politically and financially, giving $3.5 million thus far. The
Tribunal has had some administrative growing pains, which are
being addressed. It had been expected that the Rwanda Tribunal
would issue indictments in November, but it's now clear that
won't happen until December. Our own draft legislation to
authorize surrender to the Tribunal of alleged offenders found
in the u.s. is stalled on the Hill. Goldstone is very
concerned about security for the Tribunal, and wants to see
that the UNAMIR_ peacekeeping force is kept in Rwanda to guard
the Tribunal, should the GOR agree to a continuation of
UNAMIR. The USG peacekeeping core group has decided to go
along with the emerging Security Council tonsensus to renew
UNAMIR with its current size and mandate for six months beyond
its expiry on December 8.
OBJECTIVES
o
To reiterate U.S. political and financial support for the
Tribunal.
o
To assure Justice Goldstone that the USG is concerned about
security for the Tribunal, and to seek his views.
o
To discuss our position on UNAMIR renewal.
o
To convey our concern over the long time it is taking the
Tribunal to return indictments.
o
To remind Justice Goldstone that we are concerned that
there may be one or two alleged violators in the U.S. and
ask how the Tribunal staff is progressing on their cases.
CON¥ I Ql9Piq:' L\L
�-2-
o
To bring up the fact that Zambia has performed admirably in
apprehending several alleged offenders, but that there are
concerns that any delays in removing them from Zambia may
result in their release (we understand that Goldstone may
go to Zambia).
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support, both political and
financial, for the Rwanda Tribunal. Thus far, our
government has committed $3.5 million, including
secondments of experts, and we have been glad to support
the creation and funding of the Tribunal at the UN.
o
We regret that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will
not issue indictments until December. Early action by the
Tribunal. is crucial to maintaining the credibility of the
international community with the GOR and our ability to
press the Rwandans to take appropriate judicial and
non-judicial action themselves.
o
As you know, discussions are going on at the UN now
regarding a renewal of UNAMIR, whose mandate expires
December 8. While we generally support the Security
Council consensus that the mandate should be renewed for
six months, the outcome is far from certain at this point.
o
We are committed to seeing that the International Tribunal
for Rwanda has adeq~ate and appropriate security. It
strikes ~s that some, though not all, of the security could
be provided by the Government of Rwanda. What are the
specific security needs you foresee that will require a
UNAMIR or other international presence? Could these needs
·be fulfilled some other way? •
o
Members of various agencies of our government have been
working with the Rwanda Tribunal staff regarding the case
of a B.wandan, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, who has immigrated
to Texas and has. now been accused by Rwandan human rights
activists of involvement in massacres in 1994. It now
appears that his son may have joined him in Texas over the
summer. What progress has your staff made on these cases?
o
Zambia has done an admirable j6b in detaining several
alleged offenders. Observers there are concerned that
delays in removing the suspects· from Zambia could result in
their being freed by the Zambian court system. What could
be done to address this problem?
:QQH:EIBEJH'Y'IAb
�DeClassified U nder.,Aut:hoi:ity of"the
Interage~cy SecurltyHeclassl.fication Appeals 'i>anei,
E.0.13526;Sect:ion:5;3(b)(3)
,
. ..
.,.
,.
C9NPIDEN':FIAL
Action Items
APNSA Trip To Rwanda Dec 94
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document no. 4
Declassification Date: March
1.
Ensure prompt delivery of $2.5M to clear World Bank arrears
and urge rapid obligation of $50M in World Bank reconstruction
funds;
2.
Obligate funds to support Rwandan Government, including help
for National Assembly, water supply, electricity, demining
education;
3. Continue to ur~e reconciliation and integration between
Government and moderate ex-government ministers (who have
standing with refugees);
4.
Continue u.s. support for International War Crimes Tribunal,
urge appointment of other justices;
5.
Ensure deployment of 147 UN Human Rights Monitors;
6. Continue consideration of options for improving security in
refugee camps, including working more closely with Zaire and
Tanzania, and possibly provide foreign trainers for local
gendarmerie; explore approach to Zaire with, through or supported
by Israelis;
7.
Encourage UN and Rwandan government efforts to provide for
security for displaced persons returning to their villages;
8.
Continue to ensure human rights observers have free access
country-wide;
9.
Find more ways to publicize reconciliation progress, in camps
and in washington; UNAMIR radio;
10. Continue to press government to provide for safe return and
protect rights of refugees;
11.
Status of Mr. Gacombitsi.
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
18, 2014
�SEC~ET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Surrunary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting onRwanda
DATE:
Wednesday, February 8., 1995
LOCATION:
White House Sitbation Room
TIME:
3:00p.m.- 4:-00p.m.
Declassified Under the Authority of
the Interagency Declassification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b )(3)
Surrunary of Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting
on Rwanda f:&t
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 5
Declassification: March 18, 2014
PARTICIPANTS:
SUBJECT:
Office of the Vice President
Leon Fuerth
Mark Thomas
STATE
George Moose
Townsend Friedman
Phyllis Oakley
JCS
David Mcilvoy
Wayne Young
AID
Brian Atwood
JUSTICE
Jamie Gorelick
OSD
Walter S.locombe
Vincent Kern
The White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
USUN
David Scheffer
NSC
Don Steinberg
Susan Rice
Mac DeShazer
OMB
Gordon Adams
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Camp Security
State/RPM will provide at least $3.5-5 million to the UNHCR
security program for the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. 4-61
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SEC!lET
�SECRE'I'
Threat from Volcanoes
During the refugee conference next week in Bujumbura, State
will press UNHCR to prepare concrete, viable contingency plans to
respond to the potential eruption of one or both volcanoes. (-€-1
-- Beginning immediately, senior State Department officials will
use our substantial leverage with UNHCR to urge Mrs. Ogata to
take the opportunity of the threat from the volcanoes to
encourage refugees to return home to Rwanda.
If necessary, State
will apply earmarks to UNHCR funds to ensure that it$ efforts in
Zaire are focused primarily on repatriatiorL t-E-1
-- By COB February 15 1 State will prepare cost estimates of the
various optioris for movibg the refugees to new camps outside the
Goma area, including to locations further north in Zaire. (U)
Assistance to Rwandan Government and.War Crimes
Trib~nal
-- AID will continue disbursement of progratnmed funds to Rwanda
as swiftly as possible, particularly the $4 million in the
pipeline to support government ministries. (U)
-- AID will take immediate steps to ensure that funds are made
available to support the National Triag.e Commission. t-€-1
The Department of Justice will provid~ four experts (possibly
retirees) to assist the Rwandan Wars Crimes Tribunal.
USUN will
ensure that the Prosecutor's Office of the Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunal promptly fulfills its commitment, t.o reimburse the USG
for the cost of providing four indiViduals (two prosecutors and
two investigators) for a year. (U)
USUN will provide DOJ with an analysis of the January 12
Mansfield field report by Febr:uary 13. (U)
USUN will explore with Treasury the possibility of securing
several detailees for the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal from its law
enforcement divisions. (U)
Military Issues
USUN will initiate consultations·in New York to build the
case for a partial lift of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda in
order to enable provision to the GOR of nob-lethal military
equipment (e.g. vehicles, parts., communications equipment, etc.)
t-£-1
State will instruct Embassy Kigali to approach the GOR to .ask
if the GOR wants USG assistance to try to convince the Government
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3u11a.
of Zaire to destroy in place the remaining APCs in Z~irian.
custody so they cannot be used for future military activities.
Embassy Kigali will ensure the GOR understands we can by no tneans
guarantee the success of such .efforts; t-E-1
Starting the week of February 13, State will consult with key
members of Congress and relevant committees on the
Administration's intention to resume the IMET program for Rwanda
in FY95.
State will solicit congr~ssional views as to how to
remove the existing legal barriers, while st~essing our
preference for ~sing a Presidential waiver to speed resumption of
the program. Based on cbngressional reaction, State will proceed
either with the waiver or with legislation. (U) ·
Burundi
-- State will continue its efforts to promote stability in
Burundi.
The White House will pursue the possibility of taping a
one minute Presidential radio address urging calm. (U)
�SECRB~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
February 7, 1995
INFORMATION
Deciassifje:d: Under Alitholi~<ofthe
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
Interagency Securit}· Deci~ssification Appeals Paneli
E.0:>13526,.Section s~3(hJ(3)
..
.
,.
..
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FROM:
DON STEINBER~
SUSAN RI~
SUBJECT:
'
Rwanda-Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting, 3 p.m.,
Wednesday, February 8
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 6
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
This meeting is held against the backdrop of increasingly gloomy
projections by the intelligence agencies on the prospects for
peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda and for avoiding an
ethnic blow-:-up in Burundi. While our support programs for these
countries are proceeding, there are numerous specific issues that
need impetus at the senior level.
ISSUE I: To what extent should the USG provide support for UNHCR
camp security program?
Background: UNHCR plans to use Zairian troops to provide security
in the Zairian refugee camps .. UNHCR will pay salary supplements
for up to 1500 Zairian troops who will be supported by a UNHCR
trainers and logisticians. We anticipate the cost to UNHCR will
be $13-15 million, raised through voluntary contributions.
Absent willing troop contributors, this unorthodox method of
providing security remains the only game in town. Private
contractors were considered but.deemed prohibitively expensive.
State previously indicated its intention to provide as much as $5
million for this effort, but has recently indicated they may
instead provide 25 percent of whatever the total cost will be.
Goal
Nail down State's commitment to contribute at least 25%
percent of the cost of the UNHCR mission.
ISSUE II: How should the u.s. respond to the threat to the
refugee population posed by the potential eruption of the
volcanos?
Background: There is a body of convincing evidence that one or
both of the two volcanos near Goma will soon erupt. Experts
estimate one may well blow in next couple months; the other may
likely within six months. State conveyed its concerns for safety
of refugees to UNHCR. UNHCR is conducting a public information
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2
campaign, preparing contingency plans to evacuate refugees and
considering moving refugees to a site 30 miles north in Zaire.
We have urged State to press UNHCR to use the threat posed by the
volcanos to encourage substantial refugee repatriation. We have
sought to discourage notions of moving camps as costly and
ultimately counterproductive. State has done little so far as it
seems torn between the customary reluctance tb pressure refugees
to return and the various problems posed by a permanent refugee
population.
State's draft paper, proposing another approach to
Mrs. Ogata, is at Tab II.
Goal:
-- Instruct State to press Ogata next week at regional refugee
conference in Bujumbura to pursue activist repatriation campaign,
using volcanoes as impetus.
ISSUE III:
Assistance/Justice Programs
a) Is AID moving'sufficiently quickly to provide agreed
assistance to the GOR for rehabilitation of ministries,
administration of justice programs, and the National Triage
Commission?
b) Will DOJ/FBI Provide Personnel to support the Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunal?
Background:
AID Programs: AID's project grant agreement for $3.4 million for
assistance to ministries (other than Justice) was signed January
11. The project procurement of vehicles, computers, other office
equipment and technical assistance has begun, but is going
slowly.
Separately, on January 31, the World Bank made available
the $50 million line of credit to the GOR.
We remain concerned about the slow pace of the National Triage
Commission (NTC) in reviewing the files of some 20,000 persons
arrested (including 10,000 held in overcrowded prisons) to
determine if there are grounds to hold them. Brian Atwood is
still reviewing the appropriateness and legality of direct U.S.
assistance to the GOR for this purpose. Some in AID are
concerned there may be a legal prohibition against using AID
funds for what may be construed as law enforcement purposes. At
present, AID is providing $600,000 in supplies to the Ministry of
Justice, which oversees the NTC, and is preparing a longer-term
$4 million MOJ support project.
In addition, State will provide
$1.4 million for the War CrimesTribunal once the 15-day
notification period expires the week of February 20.
SECRE'P
�SECRE'i'
3
DOJ/FBI Personnel: DOJ and FBI have not provided any of the 13
investigators requested from them for the War Crimes Tribuna~
Jamie Gorelick assures us DOJ is supportive but the problem is
funding.
State has none for this purpose and believes either DOJ
or the Tribunal itself should identify the resources. Goldstone
is willing to pay for four DOJ investigators for Yugoslavia,
which may relieve some constraints on DOJ support for Rwanda, but
he may not be able to deliver the UN bureaucracy. Gorelick has
tasked DOJ to determine the maximum support it can provide. USUN
is pressing the UN to help with funding.
Goals
Ask AID for update on assist provided/planned; Direct AID to
move asap to provide assistance for the rehabilitation of
ministries.
Within legal constraints, instruct AID to provide as much
assistance as possible directly to NTC or through Ministry of
Justice for the rapid processing of cases, especially those of
individuals held in overcrowded prisons. Request status from AID
report to NBC by COB Monday.
Obtain commitment from DOJ directly and on behalf of FBI for
commitment a minimum of 5 investigators; ask USUN to continue
pressing UN agreement to some USG investigators and provide
status report by COB Monday.
<
ISSUE VI:
<
-
Military Issues
a} Should the u.s. seek a partial lifting of the UN arms embargo
against Rwanda to enable the provision of non-lethal aid to GOR?
b) Should the USG seek GOR agreement to destruction by GOZ of
ex-FAR APCs in Zaire?
c)
Should the Administration use Presidential waiver authorities
to lift legal restrictions on providing IMET to Rwanda in FY 95?
Background:
Arms Embargo:
At our urging, the UNSC imposed a sweeping
·arms/related materiel embargo on Rwanda last May.
Kagame wants
the embargo lifted so the RPA may receive non-lethal equipment,
including communications gear and vehicles. He argues this
equipment will help stabilize the security situation and improve
command and control, thereby reducing RPA indiscipline. DOD
supports modifying the embargo to allow provision of non-lethal
assistance (trucks, commo gear etc.). We agree with DOD that
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partial lift and possible prov1s1on of non-lethal aid is fully
consistent with our policy of bolstering GOR. St~te believes
even partial lift would be a mistake, sending signal that a
military solution is possible in Rwanda.
.
.
.
Obtaining agreement even to partial lift in UNSC would be
difficult . . French and UK at minimum are likely to resist.
Intelligence indicates about a dozen of the 20
ex-FAR APCs, known to have been in GOZ custody, are missing. The
presumption is they are in ex-FAR hands. The remainder. are in
GOZ cantonment sites. we would like to prevent ex-FAR from
obtaining remaining APCs for use .in counter-offensives. The UN
arms embargo against Rwanda prevents return of APCs to GOR.
State is resisting an alternative approach of urging GOR to ask
GOZ t.o destroy the vehicles in place. State thinks such an
approach places us in an awkward position. While we think this
less than a top-priority issue, we·believe we should try to
prevent ex-FAR from acquiring the remaining APCs.
APCs in Zaire:
IMET:
The FY95 Foreign Operations Act prohibits provision of
IMET to GOR. in FY95. The legislation was enac.ted in the wake of
the genocide last year and was not directed at the present
government. While the law does .not prohibit IMETin FY96, the
prohibition could be rolled over into the next FY. State has
agreed to work with Congress to ensure that the prohibition is
not extended.
·
Kagame requested IMET in December. All agencies agree we should
resume IMET immediately to promote professionalism and respect
for civilian authority and human rights, and we have $50,000
still available in FY 95. The issue is under what legal
authorities do we resume the program .. There are two options:
getting legislative relief, or; using a Presidential waiver
authority (e.g. 614). Legislative relief is uncertain and would
not come for months until there is an appropriate legislative
vehicle, which may be too iate in the FY. State is resisting
using a waiver, arguing we have used such waivers too frequently
in the past and risk angering Congress if we use this tool.
Initial Hill consultations reveal no resistance to lifting the
FY-95 IMET prohibition.
.
Earlier issue of whether DOD would. extend tour of
US DATT in Kigali has been resolved at least temporarily.
Current DATT will stay six more months. We may have to revisit
issue at end of that period;
Kigali DATT:
Goals
SECRB'P
�SBCRBT
5
Obtain agreement that State will begin consultations in New
. York and regional capitals on potential resolution lifting arms
embargo partially to allow provision of non-lethal aid.
Encourage State to approach GOR to urge that it request GOZ
to destroy APCs in place.
/
/
Instruct State to sound out key Members of Congress on how
best to provide IMET to GOR in FY95. State should stress
Administration's preference for using waiver due to slow pace of
legislation. If no significant negative reaction, State should
proceed with w~iver. State should report to NSC by Feb. 1?·
ISSUE V: What more can/should USG do to prevent major, new
outbreak of violence in Burundi?
Background:
Burundi seems to lurch from crisis to crisis, playing an
increasingly dangerous game of "chicken" with ethnic warfare.
While it is up to the FRODEBU and UPRONA leadership to take the
tough steps needed for national reconciliation, we have
undertaken a number of activities to build up the core of
moderates, ease the external pressures and keep the country ~n
the spotlight.
These ac.tions include: enhanced assistance focused largely on
\
national reconciliation; ensuring steady streqm of visitors, most
recently a UN Security Council team that leaves NY February 8 i
.
supporting a regional refugee conference in B~jumbura next week;
supporting OAU and other human rights monitorsi and issuing
strong statements from Embassy Kigali and State. We are now
considering additional steps, including a statement by POTUS to
the refugee conference and a taped VOA message.
Goals
Press Ad Hoc Group for ideas to expand efforts to prevent a
major blow-up in Burundi.
Urge State to prepare a public affairs strategy highlighting
Administration efforts to address this potential crisis,
including letter from A/S Moose to either New York Times or
Washington Post.
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda
Tab II
State Paper on Volcanos
SBCRBT
l
.
�Deda:Ssified Under 'Authority of the
lp,te.ragency Securit}·Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.G .. 13526,, Section· 5:3Q'J(3)
Hall, Wilma G.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Priority:
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 7
DeclassificatiOn Date: March 18, 2014
Steinberg, Donald K.
@UP- APNSA Special Assistants
.
/R, Record at A 1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA • African Affairs;
@DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs
Efforts to Ease Tensions in Burundi [GONFIDENTIAll
Friday, February 03, 1995 10:27AM
High
Tony/Nancy:
To follow-up on Burundi: Our efforts to keep ethnic tensions in check in Burundi have intensified since the
outbreak of killings in Rwanda. We have sought to build up the core of moderates, ease the external
pressures and keep the country in the spotlight~ We have enhanced our aid program focussed largely on
national reconciliation, maintained a steady stream of visitors {including the Presidential mission in
September and your visit in December), encouraged Ambassador Krueger to be a visible presence and urged
the UN, OAU and private groups to support these efforts. Given the history of ethnic violence and the
pressure that society is under, the absence of a major blow-up in the past year is an achievement. At
present, in addition to your letter to Ntibantunganya, the strong press statement from State and Krueger's
powerful speech, we have the following activities in train:
o We are helping fund the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura from February 1 5-1 7, in part to have
the positive effects of the presence of 750 international experts in the country. This is a joint UNHCR/OAU
activity that will address the issues of Rwandan and Burundian refugees. A/S Phyllis Oakley will head a
large American delegation. In addition, we are scheduling a meeting of the major donors to Burundi on the
· margins of this conference to consider additional efforts.
o The Western ambassadors in Bujumbura are working together to call on all the senior leaders of the
Government and opposition to urge restraint. Today, for example, they are doing a joint demarche on the
defense minister. The UN Special Representative Abdullah has been equally active.
o The 45 OAU human rights monitors have been moving more actively throughout the country to
demonstrate a more visible presence. As you know, their mandate has been renewed until at least June.
o We are supporting a conference, now taking place this week in London, where key Burundians have
been drawn together from across the political spectrum by the International Alert (an NGO with expertise .in
conflict management), with the goal of creating a core group of moderates.
o I met with the Carter Center Africa director yesterday, in part to discuss the Center sending out another
mission to Burundi, as they did last year when Obassanjo, Deng and others went out on a democracy
mission. They are considering the request. AF/C officer director Arlene Render has also been meeting with
· a wide variety of NGO's to see if there are other activities they can undertake.
If you think it appropriate, additional steps could go to the Presidential level. A letter or brief phone call to
Ntibantunganya; a taped message of reconciliation like the one we did for Rwanda for broadcast by VOA
into Burundi; a letter to the delegates to the refugee conference or at least a strong White ·
House/Presidential statement-- any of these would seem appropriate. What do you think?
Page 1
�CmJFIDEJHTIAL
20933
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi
DATE:
Wednesday, August 9, 1995
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
1:00-3:30 p.m.
TIME:
\
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi
PARTICIPANTS:
Office of the Vice President
Bill Wise
State
Dick Bogosian
Pru Bushnell
Phyllis Oakley
Defense
Bernd McConnell
Greg Saunders
USUN
Rick Inderfurth
Lori Shestack
JCS
Dave Mcilvoy
Orrin Young
AID
Dick McCall
Declassified Under the Authority of the
Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 8
Declassification: March 18,2014
White House
Nancy Soderbe.;r-g
NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Shawn McCormick
Mike Sheehan
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that the following actions would be completed by
COB on Tuesday, August 15 unless otherwise stated:
Arms Embargo:
Following the expected lifting of the arms embargo, we would
consider provisions of non-lethal equipment (communications,
trucks) if requested.
DOD agreed to review what might be
available in the near term. Any decision on provision of lethal
aid was deferred.
State will work up ideas to press for progress
in prison conditions/release as we consider aid requests.
COHFIDEHTIAL
Declassify
on:e-;-~~~~~~;~~~~~~,?:,~l
i8;;~ :. <1,1 '~-~~t{N~off'·L~[l-~f{V :?i{9:f6C_~~tv<:~~ ·.~~~~
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�COHFIDEH'!'IAL
2
Prison Conditions:
By Friday, August 11, State will provide NSC a report on
availability of funds to assist with construction of
prisons, prefabricated housing and tents (work w/ICRC).
t-€-1
War Crimes Tribunal:
By Friday, August 11, AID will work with State on a plan of
action to remove obstacles to assist with getting the
Tribunal up and running. As part of the plan, AID will work
to resolve issues involving UN reimbursements. for personnel
in Bosnia to free up funds to support DOJ personnel for
Rwanda.
t-€-1
Also, State will send to Justice the plan regarding security
for DOJ officials working with the Tribunal.
t-€-1
International Mediation:
State will report on a plan of forming a Bosnia-style
contact group as well as a possible regional conference on
Burundi and Rwanda.
Indicate plans for regional travel.
t-€-1
IMET Funds:
State, with DOD assistance, will determine whether and when
there might be an additional $50,000 in IMET funds for
Rwanda.
t-€-1
Refugees:
State/PRM in consultation with the Belgians will push UNHCR
to implement a plan to relocate UNHCR camps from Rwandan
border.
t-€-1 .
State will develop a prospective plan for engaging Mobutu on
Rwandan issues.
t-€-1
Burundi:
All agencies will review the situation in Burundi and
whether current efforts are adequate to stem ethnic
violence.
We will also review possibilities relating to an
ICITAP program. t-€-1
COHFIDEN'!'IAL
�\
iC~€r r~r")~~~
NATIJ~.~?r ~NCIL
COHFIDEHTIAL
20983
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
August 18, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
RI~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
McCO~~
SUBJECT:
Rwanda/Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting Taskings Update
We have received most but not all of the taskings from the
August 9 Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi.
Those that remain
include Bogosian's big think piece on.the contact group and
substantive policy proposal, IMET (which is being debated inside
State), and Mobutu (which will come as soon as Moose returns and
reviews it on Monday) .
At Tab I are the original taskings and status report.
are the responses received to date.
At Tab II
Attachments
Tab I
Taskings from August 9 Meeting and Status Report
Tab II Responses to Taskings
cc:
Michael Sheehan
Declassified ,U nd.erAuthont)' otthe,
Interagency· Security Decl~ificabon Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526; Section s::3Cb)C3)
ISCAP Appeal no. 2013-040, document no. 9
. Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
COHFIDEHTIAL
Declassify on:
OADR
�~~~ {l£h~·u~ruu:( t6\I(Jf} -.s. . ,3s~w- fMf'(. J5
.tl.:i:
.
.;:~,.~
Ft>t...U)-1)
DRAFT - CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT:
'
.
INTRODUCTION: At the August 9 White House meeting on Rwanda
and Burundi, we briefly considered our overall diplomatic
strategy and agreed to discuss this matter in more detail at
the next meeting which has been set for Thursday, August 17.
At the August 9 meeting we distributed an uncleared draft
strategy paper {wGreat Lakes Political Conference: Objectives
and Methods),ti This paper outlines the strategy behind a
comprehensive regional ·political conference. Two other
uncleared, internal State/AF memos provide additional
information and describe the operational context in which we
will implement our diplomatic strategy, One is an undated
draft regional strategy paper which was prepared in late July
and can serve as a good overall current action checklist. The
other is the August 2 Bogosian~Wirth memo that divides the many
specific issues and actions into five priority policy areas.
Copies of all three memos are enclosed under cover of this
memorandum.
,.·~··
..
,..·:
..,.;.,.~
....
OBJECTIVES: Our diplomacy is aimed at restoring stability to
the Great Lakes region. With stability, the international
community, together with local governments and inhabitants can
turn their attention to the more enduring challenges of
development and governance. To get to that point, it is
imperati~e to resolve the refugee crisis and achieve
reconciliation within Rwanda and Burundi. This will require
judicial and other reforms including of the military and the
police.
We have other diplomatic objectives as well including the
success of the Rwanda Tribunal given tbe implications of
genocide in Rwanda. Achieving our objectives requires that the·
USG maximize its influence.and "diplomatic reach" at~ time of
reduced resources and urgent problems clamoring for attention
in other parts of the world We, therefore, need the support of
the other key players in the Great Lakes area, and we need to
minimize conflicts with such key players as the French.
CONTACT GROUPS: As noted at last Wednesday's meeting, the
relationship with France could be crucial; therefore, we will
play particularly close attention to the French, largely
through the US-France-Belgium contact group that we have
initiated. There will also be a larger contact group of key
donors including the Germans, British, Dutch and Canadians who
may occasionally play helpful political roles and have been
among the most active donors in the region. The European
governments will assure that the EU continues to make a
positive contribution in the region.
DECL: OADR
�C6Hf'IBfJI~'fiA:h
-
2 -- '
In addition, we need to maintain active contact with the
key African players, i.e., Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia
and the OAU. In New York and Geneva important multilateral
officials comprise the third contact group. Of. course, we
will have continuing diplomatic contact with the governments
of Rwanda and Burundi.
As we move toward a regional conference, the diplomatic
pace is likely to intensify. Our Embassies and Missions will
carry out the majority of contacts, but the Rwanda/Burundi
Coordinator should take the lead in developing and
implementing our strategy, and he should establish personal
contact with key decisionmakers in the relevant capitals. He
will .work closely with the French and Belgian Embassies in
Washington and will travel as necessary to New York, Europe
and Africa. In early September he will make an extensive trip
to Europe (Brussels, Paris, Geneva, London, The Hague, Bonn,
and Rome) and to Africa (Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam,
Kampala, Kinshasa, Bujumbura, and Kigali) and will follow-up
as feasible. 'His prinicipal focus during the trip will be to
lay the groundwork for a comprehensive regional conference,
but inevitably the other issues will have to be addressed as
well.
Attachments:
1. Great Lakes Political Conference Memorandum dated Aug.
71 1995
2,
Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/Western Tanzanian Regional
Strategy paper
3. Rwanda/Burundi Priorities Memorandum dated August 2, 1995
Distribution:
AF/FO:P/DAS Bushnell
AF/C:ARender
AID:RMcCall
NSC:SRice
G:AJoyce
IO-Gward
PRM:POakley
DRL:JShattuck
Drafted by:AF/FO:Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator:Amb.RBogosian
SERWB 5
x7-1818
�D.edas!;ifled Under Authont)r:of the
Interagency Secm1~· Decl~sification .~ppeaJs Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5-3cb)C3)
·
1 ..
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 44
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
eeUF I B§U'fV\t.
MEMORANDUM
(revised)
August 7, 1995
TO:
AF - George E. Moose
THRU:
AF - Prudence Bushnell
FROM:
AF/C - Arlene Render
SUBJECT:
Great Lakes Politfcal
Methods
Conferenc~:
Objectives and
CONCEPT
A fundamental component of our African Great Lakes regional
strategy -- probably essential to breaking the downward spiral
of violence emanating from. unresolved conflicts in Rwanda and
Burundi Which threatens to destabilize the entire region -- is
the urgent convening of an international conference to deal
with the central issues confronting those countries. Key
Western countries, including France, Belgium, Germany and the
UK support the conference concept and the Spanish Presidency of
the EU has prepared a preliminary draft position paper
regarding the scops and goals for such a conference. In
addition, following the interna~ional conference, all-parties
conferences could be organized for Burundi and Rwanda, if
n.eces sa ry.
There is general agreement that the international
conference should be convened jointly by the UN and OAU,
probably with the respective organizations' Secretaries-General
chairing at least the initial sessions. In addition to the
immediately affected regional countries (Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and probably Kenya), important
neighbors need to be invited, at least in observer capacity.
In awareness of the anglophone/francophone cleavage, an
equitable number of invitations to African observers should be
given to a influential Arab and francophone observers as well
as anglophones. Most importantly, major dono~s including,
France, Belgium, UK, Japan, Netherlands, and the U.S. among
others need to be present as observers and to lend impetus to
�GONFIQEU'fli'>ch
- 2 -
the process. To enhance the African sense of importance of the
international conference, it should, if possible, be held in
Europe; Addis ~baba, as both OAU headquarters and seat of the
current OAU president would also be suitable but might diminish
the importance Africans attach to the conference. An
alternative site might be South Africa. Given deteriorating
security conditions in Burundi and fears of an imminent clash
between the ex-FAR and RPA, the conference should be convened
as soon as possible on the understanding that it be carefully
prepared .and that the internationa 1 communi t:Y is in agreement
on the goals.
ORGANIZATION
The conference should be viewed as two parallel tracks.
The first track would be an interlocking set of international
understandings and agreements between Great Lakes states
dealing with repatriation of refugees, security, and economic
development. The second track would focus on internal
reconciliation which would require the presence of all key
factions and political parties, both civilian and military from
Rwanda and Burundi. A crucial issue which would need to be
resolved if this track has any hope of success would be
agreement that acceptable (non-criminal or genocidally
responsible) exile representatives, particularly of the Hutu
communities of Burundi and Rwanda, would have to be present.
There could be no unilateral vetoes by one group of another.
Both the RPA and extremist Tutsi factions in Burundi would have
to be convinced to participate with these groups, however great
their reluctance. To assist in .the internal reconciliation
track, considerable reliance could be placed on experienced
NGOs such as South Africa's ACCORD or the Vatican's San Egidio
order.
Given the probable lack of time on the part of the UN and
OAU to prepare the organization of the conference, we should
consider soliciting an outside group such as the Global
Coalition for Africa (GCA),
(Since the GCA is part of the
World Bank and both.the UN &nd all African states are members
of the GCA, it should be an acceptable entity to provide both
conference services and to assist in the political spadework of
persuading the various possibly recalcitrant parties to attend
and be forthcoming.) The u.s. should be prepared, in concert
with the donor community, to help get participa'nts to the table
CQUFIBEU'iPIAb
�....\,.:,.rrr
.....0
·-
COlU ID!!:I4'fiA!b
- 3 -
and to assist in funding conference preparations. To maximize
the chances of success of the international conference, a
preliminary meeting should be held to go over conference
logistics and more importantly pre-agree on goals, and, if
possible, tactics.
The conference agenda could follow the Spanish EU draft
paper (attached) whose main agenda items are~
I.
II.
Political and Security
A. Political Dialogue/Protection of Minority
Rights
B. Legal Security (respect for human rights,
establishment of rule of law)
C. Military Security
Economic Rehabilitation and Development
III. Refugees and the Human Dimension
The goals of the conference would be as follows (some are
more properly defined as tactics encapsulating overall goals):
Track I: POLITICAL REQQNCILIATION
an end to internal violence, external incursions and armed
irregular militias;
progressive installation (in carefully phased stages) of
majority democratic rule (as registered in a free, fair,
and transparent elction process), tightly bound to
guarantees for minority rights;
an end to impunity and the cycles of violence through
establishment of a professional, neutral multiethnic
judiciary;
·
·
·
creation of a multiethnic, professional army obediant to
democratically elected civilian authority and respectful of
human rights;
repatriation and/or resettlement of refugees;
creation Of a follow-up mechanism to assure rigorous
enforcement of agreements;
99!iF I BStl'f V•h
�~~:..:
····'\.£::./
CeUF I BEU'f IA'd5
- 4 -
carefully structured regional economic
development/rehabilitation program with adequate infusion
of donor assistance. Emphasis should be given.to: maximum
employment strategies, especially for male youth; family
planning; improved agricultural practices; regional
economic integration focusing on comparative advantage.
careful preparation of educational, cultural and media
programs designed to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation
while pointing out the moral, physical and national costs
of hate, genocide and community strife.
Following the conference, some working groups could meet
from time to time to follow-up on agreed actions. A second
track could'be an all-parties internal conference, particularly
for Burundi.
U.S. ROLE
The U.S. would have overlapping, reinforcing roles in both
the international and all-parties conferences, if necessary.
Its principal roles would be.both facilitative and active.
Among them are:
·
providing behind-the-scenes organizational expertise'for
the conferences;
funding significant aspects of the.conferences including
transportation, accommodation and s~curity;
acting effectively, where necessary, to break deadlocks and
generally to serve as honest broker~ To be most effective,
such a role would ~ave to be performed "off camera";
galvanizing donor community to fund directly and i.n-kind
~ervices of activities deemed essenti~l to break the cycle
of violence i.e. alternative employment generation,
professionalizing military to serve democratically elected
civilian government; establishing media and cultural
programs designed to counter ethnic hatred propaganda.
To engender the necessary atmosphere conducive to obtaining
assent to participate from reluctant parties, the U.S. should
consider the following steps:
COl!FIBEU'f!Ab
�C011l' IBE!U'fL'\15
- 5 -
having the President personally and publicly appeal to all
regional governments to participate; -' private warnings of
aid -- both development and humanitarian -freeze/r~duction/cutoffs could be made to recalcitrant
parties;
getting key Western donors heads of government and NGOs to
make similar appeals;
France has strongly supported the concept of an
international regional political conference. Nevertheless,
France had been a staunch sup~orter of the Habyarimana
Attachments:
As stated
Approved:RCS:RWBogosian
8/3/95, X7-2080
W-SECB 6754
Drafted:AF/C:RJFendrick
Cleared:AF/C:DLHeflin
AF/RA:SFisher
IO/UNP:GStanton
�Declassified .Under Authority of the .
..
.
Interagency Security De-classification Appe-.a]s Panel,
E.O~ 13526, Section 5·3(b)(j)
L:
{;·
•. r·
•
-:.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 45
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
'''l[;'
···~)
C6ltf I fU!!U'f Utb
Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/ Western
Tanzanian Regional Strategy
The situation. in the sub-region requires a united long-term
strategy to deal with the complex, multifaceted issues.
Demographics, ethnicity and poverty ~re the· underlying causes
of the problems we now face. These problems are exacerbated by
lack of sufficient land within the two countries of Burundi and
Rwanda and poverty. A short-term solution may be the
separation of the two groups but it i~ not likely to succeed
given their strong ties to their respective countries. We must
continue to work for reconciliation underscoring clearly that
we support majority rule but with protection of minority
·
rights, the cornerstones of democracy. ·we should c~ntinue·to
take advantage of opportunities to explain our policy with a
view to continue building a broad consensus for it in
Washington and abroad.
Principles Governing Our Policy
o
We support a democratic process in both Rwanda and
Burundi. This means governments that practice genuine
powersharing and protection of minority rights.
o
We will ctintinue to highlight human rights abuses within
both countries and push for punishment for abusers.
o
Above all, do no harm.
U. S. Interests
Rwanda/.Burundi
a. Regional Stability. Promotion of strong internal
institutions, particularly through effective judicial
administration and a multi-ethnic military.
b. Establishment of a climate conducive to trading
opportunities and the establishment of businesses.
c.
Avoiding future large-scale humanitarian crisis.
d. Stopping the cycles of impunity in Africa and of
genocide.
Regional Stability
Assumptions:
COPIF I BEiWfh'\b
�.- ··rqtir·
·--··"lj;~
CONFIQKN'FH•h
- 2 -
o
Tutsi hegemony is growing in the sub-region. Cooperation
between the militaries of Rwanda and Burundi exists and
will grown as Hutus rearm themselves and cross border
violence increases. Given Tutsi minority status, this is
an inherently unstable development and conducive to state
disintegration/failure.
o
The militaries in both countries do not necessarily share
our sub-regional vision of powersharing in the two
countries.
o
The majority of Hutu refugees will not return to Rwanda for
many years. Therefore, we must relocate refugees to
minimize economic costs to the international community.
o
Continued presence of refugees in eastern Zaire and western
Tanzania will continue to h~ve a destabilizing effect not
only on the two countries but the region.
o
Zaire and Tanzania wili tire of refugees on their soil and
perhaps resort to closing bord~rs, aiding Hutus against
GOR, invading Rwanda, Burundi or both, etc.( Tanzania has
already closed its borders to refugees.)
o
The RPA may stage preemptive strikes .into Zaire to get at
the EX-FAR. Rwanda Hutus will use an insurgency to force
·political settlement with the RPA.
Goals and Objectives.
1. Push for.genuine powersharing in Rwanda.
strengthen the civilian government.
Our actions must
·Internal Rwanda .Elements:
Provide IMET.
Push donors on contributing to re-establishment of a
judicial system. Begin at provincial level.
Push ·International Tribunal to begin indictments and
prosecution of genocide cases before end of the year.
Push GOR to begin trials of military accused of human
rights abuses.
Push GOR to announce its list of war criminals. This will
have a positive effect on Hutus living in refugee camps.
Push GOR to relieve prison conditions by releasing
detainees and issuing warinings to population not to engage
in individual retribution.
�.·z. .e>
..
Q9lifiBEJif'f'IAh
- 3 -
Human Rights Training for all groups across the political
spectrum. Get Gov't to make it a required course for all
government employees including military personnel.
Push GOR to establish benchmarks for broadening political
base.
Demobilize children in RPA.
Broaden base of military.
Encourage aid ptograms in areas of education and
devel6p~ent ( for demobilize youth) of job training. skills
in areas which will encourage outside investments.
I
IMET to Rwanda. Stress role of a military in a civilian
government as well as provide other courses.
o
Internal Burundi Elements:
In Burundi, support peace and reconciliation programs
underway with appropriate human rights safeguards and plans
for a national debate.
IMET program should stress role of a military in a civilian
government and provide courses.
Work with political parties to combat ethnic hatred;
provide IV grants to study party process in the U.S.
Encourage aid programs in areas of education and
development of job training skills in. areas which will
encourage outside investments.
Create work programs for youth, thus marginalizing
Bagaza's/Nyangoma•s influence on them.
Get churches more active in reconciliation efforts/ Work
with Catholic Dioceses and others to take lead;
Create a multi-et~nic police force.
Increase OAU/Human Rights monitors.
Create a non-government peace radio.
2. Support an international political conference of countries
in the dreat Lakes region with five perm reps of UNSC as
observers. Conference and follow-up sessions should be
organized along Middle East talks format.
eeUl'If'!!:MTIAtl
�!1/f
0
CONF I BE!i'f H'd3
- 4 -
o
Refugees
Resettle refugees away f~om borders and
tools/ etc. to begin new lives.
pro~ide
them with
Explore with Tanzania/Zaire possibilities for relocating
those refugees on its soil in Tan~ania/Zaire for the
medium-term.
Explore possibility with Tribunal officials of setting up
shop on edge of camps to inform inhabitants whether or not
they can expect to face prosecution upon return to Rwanda.
This may speed up voluntary repatriation of those who are
skeptical about their future.
Decrease rations to refugees. This will decrease funds
available to refugees to buy weapons, etc.
Explore possibility of further separating military from
civilians in cam~s.
Explore placing Zairian/Tanzanian monitors in non-UNHCR
camps to monitor activities of ex~Far.
Track II Diplomacy:
Working with NGOs. interested in Burundi._ A number of U.S. and
international NGOs are active in Burundi. We should continue
to work with them and pursue the follwing:
Solict highly respected US NGOs to form the corps of a
friends of the Great Lakes group.
Objectives:
- Support "formal diplomatic track" with insights, ·
contacts, people to people reconciliation (they can put
Hutus together with Tutsis in patterns that USG can't for
"reasons of State" ole/ "bad" old government guys and
others).
- Provide "live" feedback on human rights efforts -- what's
working, what isn't, where are the gaps -- people, money.
- Strenthen international "NGO loop.
and others see and say.?
frQUPIBDti'f!Ab
(What do the French
�..
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- 5- Designate a person (FSO 1 or 2) to specifically work with
these groups.
- Build a media campaign around "peace and reconciliation"
-- regional solution for regional problems.
- VOA campaign but reset beyond to French, Belgian and
British.
- "PsyOps" campaign in local press and media.·
- Find hi-profile u.s. and other pop artists to deliver
-- "We Are The World."
m~ssage
- Host conference or provide NGO "seed" money to host
conference on "land-pressure" problems -- other solutions
elsewhere.
Short-Term Actions to Reinvigorate Preventive Diplomacy Efforts
in Burundi.
A. ·Current U.S. and international community efforts underway.
These attempts help to bolster moderates and deter extremists
and should continue.
High-level visits and public statements.
Promote dialogue.
[We have devoted USD 5 million to a
democracy/governance program that helps promote peaceful
conflict resolution.]
Move forward on the UN commission of inquiry.
Move forward on aid to the Burundi judiciary.
[The U.S.
has USD 400,000 in ESF to make available for this; the
Belgians are taking the lead.]
Move forward with deployment of human rights monitors,
provided they.have adequate training, a clear mandate, and
adequate security arrangements, and they· coordinate their
efforts with the Secretary General's special representative.
continue visa sanctions. The U.S. has entered the names of
47 extremists in our look-out system, and will try to
exclude them if they apply.
B.
The
u.s.
proposed the following additional measures:
Encourage more meetings between regional leaders to address
regional security and refugee issues.
Encourage an African elder statesman such as Mugabe or
Nyerere to become engaged over the long term to facilitate
dialogue between the two comm~nities.
COlU'I"BM'fllsib
�Declassified Under Authority .of the
Interagency·Security Declassification Appeals Panel, ·
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 46
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
United States Department of State
·. ~..:.f~~.; ...
.
...
Washington.. D.C.
.
.· ...~
20520
August 2, 1995
/0
QeHf:l.B rllf'i" Its fJ
MEMORANDUM
TO:
G - . .Timothy E. Wirth
THROUGH;
AF - George E._ Moo.~~~(
FROM:
Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator - R.W.
SUBJECT:
v
Rwanda/Burundi Priorities
Bogosian~
Over the near teim, five sets.of.activities or
priority issues will dominate my agenda ·as Rwanda/Burundi
Coordinator. They are:
A Regional Conference
Human Rights/AdministratiDn o-f JusticeRefugees
Support of Government of Rwanda/Burundi Centrists
EmergensY.-Pl-ann ing
___.
---
The following is an annotated outline of some of the most
important or delicate aspects of each set of is~ues and
actions:
8~~lQNAL
CONFERENCE: There is a fairly· broad consensus
that the time is ripe for a comprehensive regional
conference. We will provide our views on how best to
organize and prepare for such a conference in a separate
memorandum. Over the near term, we will consult closely
with several important constituencies, viz., the UN and
OAU; · key European governments including, perhaps, the
Vatican; Rwanda and Burund~ neighbors, which could touch on
sensitive bilateral issues, notably with Zaire; and with
the Hill, the NGOs and the press. In addition to basic
political issues, many of the specific points noted ·below
wo11ld have to be considered at the Regional Conference or
follow-on meetings.
COttfiBBU'fiUz
DECL: OADR
�.r
'"··
COMl'IBEUCfH'd5
- 2 -
HUMAN RIGHTS/ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: Past or present
human rights abuses are central concerns for us in both
Rwanda and Burundi. In both countries it is essential to
make progress in improving very weak, virtually moribund,
systems of Justice. It seems that at last we are making
progress with the Rwanda tribunal and the Burundi
Commission
Inquiry, but much more remains to be done. In
addition, prison overcrowding in Rwarida, administration of
justice legislation, the issue of foreign magistrates and
related issues all require priority attention if there is
to be progress on the human rights front and if w$ are to
succeed in encouraging repatriation of refugees.
Tactically, we have opportunities to exert leverage as we
support Rwanda's request to have the arms embargo lifted.
of
REFUGEES: The whole range of refugee issues will.continue
to require urgent attention, including issues aiising out
of the actua,l return of refugees such as reconciliation at
the local level. Current concerns include the presence~.
arms among Rwandan refugees in Zaire. There are logistical
problems related to managing the refugee camps and moving
them. We are also concerned about the possibility of fresh
refugee movements out of Burundi and the possible closure
of Tanzania's border with Burundi.
SUPPORT FOR THE GOR AND BURUNDI CENTRISTS: This is a
shorthand way of referring to the several efforts underway
to shore-up moderates in both countries. As you know,
there are several AID, USIS and IMET programs already being
implemented and others being requested and/or considered.
In addition, there is the UNDP Roundtable process where
disbursements have been very disappointing, especially
compared to pledges. SRSG Abdallah informally has proposed
having a UNDP Roundtable for Burundi. One aspect of this
set of issues is the military element. We need to consider
what military assistance, if any, we or our allies should
consider providing either country. We are talking of
lifting the arms embargo on Rwanda while looking into
whether one should be imposed on Burundi. Related to the
need to improve. the administration of justice is the need
to professionalize local police capabilities. What role,
if any, should the u.s. play in this regard?
COllE I BEU'f IAL
�COMP: I%'JEN IIBL
- 3 -
EMERGENCY PLANNING: Even as we plan specific programs with
their staffing implications, we have to plan for
contingencies. These.include OFDA-type planning for
sudd~n, massive re~uge~ flows. Such thorny problems as
being able to provide adequate water remain to be
resolved. We also have continually to review the safety of
Americans in Rwanda and Burundi. The latter situation,
should it deteriprate precipitously, may require an
emergency evacuation or further reduction in staff at the
Embassy in Bujumbura. As long as the security situation in
Burundi remains potentially hazardous, we will have to
review other normally routine staffing and management
issues through the security filter.
Cleared by:
AF/FO:OAS Bushner~.
· AF /C: Arlene Rende~
COUFIFJfiff'fiAp
·...
..
�SECRET
20987
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
August 21, 1995
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG
Deda.Ssifi8dt.rn~er Auilioilt{ofthe
interagency SecuritY.-f>eclassification Appeals
·
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
R~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
McCORMICK~
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi, August 22, 1995, ~-
E.O; 1J526;:~ction:s:p(b)C3)
·'~
ISC~ Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 10
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
II
~r'\
ISSUES FOR DECISION
SITREP:
You should ask the CIA to provide an update covering
intensification of war in Burundi, Rwanda after the lifting of
the arms embargo and Mobutu's decision to forcibly repatriate
refugees to both countries.
JOE NYE:
Just returned from a visit to the region.
He is fired
up to do more on Rwanda/Burundi.
This is a posture we should
encourage. Ask him to'briefly summarize his conclusions from his
trip.
Nye will likely argue for pursuing the notion of an all
Afri~an intervention force for Burundi as originally proposed by
Tanzania (see Tab III). Welcome his thinking and task the IWG to
continue reviewing. DO NOT allow this to become topic oj
conversation in this meeting. Agenda is too full.
TASKINGS: Acknowledge positive response to taskings in previous
meeting. Mandate the Working Group to continue implementing
these items under Bogosian's leadeiship.
IS$Ue 1: .Should the U.S. Lead a Diplomatic Effort to Promote
Long-term Solutions to the Problems in Rwanda and Burundi?
Achieving our objective of restoring stability to the Great Lakes
region requires that the U.S. exert maximum influence and
"diplomatic reach" at a time of reduced resources and urgent
problems in other parts of the world. We therefore need to
decide whether the·U.S. is prepared to make sfich an investment,
particularly with respect to Burundi - the problem that will be
more costly and difficult to restore.
SECRET
Declassify on:
OADR
Pan ei, ·
�SECRET
2
Rwanda: Zairian troops expelled more than 2,000 refugees by
dumping them on the border Monday prompting at least 26,000
oth~rs to flee to the hills to escape.
The situation remains
unclear but remains d~ngerous while also pres~nting an
opportunity to pursue long-term solutions.
Burundi: State has produced only threads of a political
framework. More work needs to be done to put meat on the bones
of a political framework (see paper at Tab V). We need a
decision in principle to continue thinking/planning on these
lines in preparation for Principals concurrence. If we are to
move fo~watd, we need: 1) ·principals sign-off given the required
high expenditure of money and diplomatic capital.
Your Goal: A) Rwanda -Ask State to report on situation in
general. and efforts taken to date to respond to forced
repatriation of refugees. Ask AID to brief on UNHCR's
preparedness to deal .with this potential humanitarian crisis.
Seek agreement to pursue immediately long-term Rwanda strategy at
Tab IV. This is similar to Option 1 in original NSC paper.
B) Burundi - Gain agreement that State should continue its
efforts to add detail to a draft political framework that would
serve as the basis of negotiations with a contact group and for
an eventual regional conference. The proposed political
framework should cull from relevant elements of the Convention of
Government and the Arusha Peace Accords as well as from U.S.
government experts on Burundi. Ask State to provide a paper by
c.o.b. Friday (8/25). Authorize Bogosian in principle to consult
_with European allies and countries on basis of paper at Tab V.
Flag need for Principals concurrence. Lead discussions on
whether USG should make investment of resources and political
capital to try to achieve lasting Burundi solution.
Issue 2:
Should the U.S. Support an Arms Embargo on Burundi?
Burundi risks spiraling downward into widespread violence, as
occurred in October 1993. Government military forces have
actively pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing through terror and
reported massacres. As of late, however, Burundian Hutu forces
have combined efforts with Rwandan extremists in their ethnic
battle against the Burundian army and possibly against a
vulnerable southern Rwandan border. A classic African guerrilla
war is developing. See pros/cons at Tab VI. _See CIA assessment
at Tab VII.
.n
Your Goal: To gain agreement on terms of an arms embargo but
hold-off introducing any such resolution.
SECRET
�SECRET
3
Issue 3: Should the U.S. Support a Freeze of Assets Belonging to
Burundian Extremists?
There are approximately 40 Burundian extremist leaders, both Hutu
and Tutsi, to whom the United States and European countries deny
visas. These individuals have limited ·if any holdings in the
U.S. but larger amounts in Europe. A UN resolution calling on
countries to freeze assets of these leaders will send an
important signal that we want to isolate extremists, bolster
moderates and end the cycle of impunity. Such a move could also
limit funds available to purchase wea~ons. Although Treasury and
State EB are traditionally reluctant to implement asset freezes,
State AF supports such a move. We agree. If we proce~d, we
should expect resist.ance from other UNSC members, particularly
several of the Europeans who resist such sanctions as a matter of
policy. See pros/cons at Tab VIII.
Your Goal:
To gain agreement that the U.S. support a UN
res.olution freezing the assets of specific Burundian extremists.
Attachment
Agenda
Tab I
List of Participants
Tab II
OSD Considerations on All-African Force
Tab III
Long-term Rwanda Strategy
Tab IV
Long-term Burundi Strategy
Tab V
Burundi Arms Embargo Pros/Cons
Tab VI
CIA Report on Implications·of Burundi Arms Embargo
Tab VII
Tab VIII Burundi Asset Freeze Pros/Cons
SECRET
�SECRET
Considerations on All-African Force
for Burundi Crisis Response
(A~F)
BACKGROUND: While there are some highly qualified Chapter VI peace!«<pin2
forces in Africa, the Chapter
military capabilities of mB:Ily of the proposed
intervention force participants are generally poor, necessitating an almost ground-up
approach to equipping, training, deploying and sustaining. PDD-25 and the. Joint Staffs
Concept for a Multinational Force intervention serve as the basis for this analysis.
vn
PEACEKEEPING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: At this preliminary stage, many of
the PDD-25 considerations have not yet been adequately addressed. Key issues include
the lack of an analysis of mandate. provisions and clearly defined peacekeeping and
~
humanitarian objectives, Nonetheless, here is a rough analysis of the utility of an AAF
~
based on the options for peace operations:
~
0..
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Chapter VI Option: The A.AF would have potential as a Chapter VI force,
subject to the consent of the parties involved and the establishment of realistic
objectives. Given the force size of 6,000 troops, with substantial training, the AAF
would have limited capability to monitor and supervise the implementation of peace
settlement However, the AAF could only be deployed after all major parties agree to
forego fighting.
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Chapter Vll Options: By itself, the AAF would not have viable capabilities as ]C~o13
Chapter Vll force. As an ad hoc military coalition of 6,000 troops, the AAF would be ~ al z ~
rno.oM-rn
~ ~
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entirely too small, poorly trained, ill-led, and ill-equipped to .be successful petforming
~ 20 ~"U
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required military operations. If the AAF were to fail as a Chapter Vll force in Burundi, o ...... w~o
the U.S, could be called upon to assist and protect the AAF during its extraction.
Clearly, some other Chapter vn option is preferable. For instance, should a Western
power such as France decide to lead a UN coalition inclucijng some 6,000 -10,000
French troops, the AAF could augment this force with 6,000 troops and perform less .
demanding support missions. Another possibility would be to use the AAF as follow-on
Chapter VI force, once a Chapter Vll mission, performed·~under the direction of a major
power, is complete.
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• •
FORCE CONSIDERATIONS
Ethiopia: Requested lift, NVGs, flak jacketS for UNAMIR deployment, a Chapter
VI operation, not Chapter vn. Our contribution would have to be sweetened
considerably as CIA paper notes.
·· ·· ·
Francophone units: Battalion in UNAMIR was pushed by French, who want no
part of this operation.
.
.
South Africa: As the continent's most capable foree, the SANDF could be an
important participant, even if they were only to provide logistical support. However,
money is a major factor for even our richest partner in Africa.- Further, our general policy·
is that we not press the South Africans to participate in PK./PE operations, allowing them
time to stabilize their internal situation.
SECRET··.:.. ·
~
�.
;
SEC.RET
·
Tanzania: The Tanzanian military's perfonnance.during the 1~78 intervention in
Uganda was poor (their anned forces today are even worse). Also, there are grave
doubts about their neutrality if involved in Burundi.
Francophone v. Anglophone: Most of the proposed forces are Anglophone.
Not only does this raise suspicions with Francophone Africans and France, but it creates
major communications problems for AAF interaction with the local population.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
U.S. Troop Participation: U.S. support troops would be involved in d1e crisis
area if TALCEs (and security teams) deployed to facilitate·air movement of the AAF.
Should the AAF fail, U.S. could be called upon to extract the AAF.
.
Equipment and logistical support required (for ~!.'forces currently named save
South Africa, Ethiopia partial): CommWtications gear, anununition, armored vehicles,
helicopters (we have excess helos, but who will train, mainW-n and sustain), some
personal weapons and uniforms, and equipment main~nance capacity. Intra-theater
airlift would be provided for outsized/oversized equipment and then some. Inter-theater
lift could be provided by many other countries.
··
Command and Control: With different levels of capability, no experience in
working together in a combat environment, and probably incompatible communications
structure, the AAF would be severely hamstrung in· its ability to deploy across northern
Burundi.
...
Operational security: Word of interventio~iprep will be impossible to contain as
the AAF will ~uire marrying up African troops· with equipment and training prior to
deployment. nus may doom the operation before it gets off the ground and, worse,
cause the very explosion we are hoping to avoid.
Time requirement: Deployment of African•forces for other peace operations has
almost never been done quickly. The force concept requires the force be ready at a
moment's notice to deploy to deter ethnic violence and help prevent an explosion .
.
....
Troops Available: The Joint Staff plan calls for a Western-led force of at least
6.000 to accomplish the mission - a less capable force would require larger numbers of
troops, not necessarily available from potential contributors;· this would drive up
transportation costs. The intervention force also requires airmobile assets which the
AAF (without South Africa) would not have.
Change of Mission: A whole host of proble.ms ensues if the Burundian military
becomes hostile to AAF presence and the Mrican ·forc~s are forced to fight. While
recent reports suggest the Burundian military has only a~limited capability to counter an
.intervention force's actions. the Burundi Ambassaoor warned that an intervention force
"would wind up fighting Tutsi guerrillas for years."
·,·
....
;
SECRET
�.
.,.
.;.
SECRET
FINANCIAL SUPPORT CON SIDERATIONS
.
State and Joint Staff Legal papers list the applicable authorities. Much of the
support f~r this force, if not mitigated by State monies [FAA Sections 551, 552(c)(l) and
(2)], would .probably come out of DoD funds. An international trust fund would be a
potential s.ource of funds but might be neady impossible to put together in advance of a
· . .
·
crisis. Some additional notes: ·
• Drawdown only allows us to provide stocked items and services - no
procurement is allowed and usually there is some readiness degradation.
·
• There is no FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa · · ·
• Procurement authorized if done on a reimbur~able basis.
• OAU FMF account for PKO?
·' ·· · ·
• There is no known authority for loaning.tf}..is equipment
• Assumption: EDA is not a viable means helping equip the A.AF because of
maintenance and availability drawbacks.
...
.
• Training on any new equipment will place an additional burden on available
funds and time considerations.
.
• Leasing is a means to provide much of the equipment needed on a low cost
basis.
of
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Congressional support to equip, train,
deploy and maintain part of this force will be problematic ..
Bottom Line: Even if funding for the AAF is found, there'ls· no reasonable expectation
it could deter ethnic violence in Burundi successfu_lly •. even with several months of
equipping and training by Western forces. The burden of equipping, training, moving
and maintaining the AAF will be tremendous. This effort helps to underline the need to
develop the OAU's peacekeeping mechanism. The AAF option may have utility as a
Chapter VI force, should the conditions in Burundi permit However, the AAF could not
be successful as a stand-alone Chapter VII force in Buru.rtdi.
Ol<··~
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�SEGRET
Declassified Under. Authority ofthe
Inl:eragene!y·Security,Declassifieaiion Appe;m.:Panel,
E,O, ~3,526, Section 5·3(b)(J)
,
lSCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 11
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Proposed Elements of USG Strategy for Bringing Long-Term Stability to Rwanda
The Need for a Long-Term Strategy: At the August 9, interagency Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
and Burundi chaired by the NSC, participants briefly discussed elements of a long-term strategy
for enhancing political stability in Rwanda and the region. This strategy would supplement, not
replace, the important diplomatic and development efforts the USG has already taken in
Rwanda, which include but are not limited to support for the War Crimes Tribunal, assistance to
the GOR, particularly for administration of justice activities, support for UNAMIR, lJumanitarian
assistance, military training, etc.
In addition to these efforts, however, it is necessary for the international community and the.
Rwandan government to agree on an over-arching strategy to bring lasting peace/stability to
Rwanda and the region. Doing so entails active support for the GOR so long as it pursues
policies of peace and national reconciliation as well as pro-active efforts to address the
destabilizing refugee problem bycreating.a climate conducive to refugee return and energizing the
international community to prosecute swiftly the several hundred ring-leaders oflast year's
genocide.
Key elements of a long-term strategy are summarized below.
Recent Developments --A Window of Opportunity?:.
In the time that has elapsed since the
August 9 meeting, there have been a number of important developments. The first element ofthe
strategy below -- lifting the Rwandan arms embargo -- has been accomplished. More recently,
Zaire has begun to implement its threat to forcibly return all Rwandan and Burundian refugees as
a consequence of the UNSC decision to suspend the arms embargo. Already, we have reports
that thousancis of refugees are fleeing or being forced both towards the Rwandan border and
further into the interior of Zaire. lfnot stemmed quickly or managed effectively, this situation
has the potential to become extremely violent and result in a humanitarian crisis culminating in
significant loss of life. ·
Most elements of the strategy outlined below have not yet been pursued by the USG, although we
appear to have a unique window of opportunity to do so, given the USG' s enhanced credibility
with the GOR following our leadership role in lifting the arms embargo and the dangers inherent
in forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire.
LONG-TERM STRATEGY
It is proposed that the U.S. begin immediately to lobby the Government of Rwanda, other
countries in the region and concerned donors as appropriate with the aim of implementing
the strategy outlined below:
a) Lift Arms Embargo with Conditions to deter arms transfers to Burundi.· [Status:
AccomplishedAugust 16, 1995.]
SE6RE=r
�2
b) Create a Climate in Rwanda Conducive to Safe Refugee Repatriation.
-- Urge GOR to issue swiftly a blanket amnesty for all those except known military/militia
leaders and key alleged war criminals. (NB: Any future Rwandan amnesty would not affect the
jurisdiction of the War Crimes Tribunal established by the Security Council nor our obligation to
·
deport alleged war criminals to stand trial before the Tribunal.)
•
Urge GOR to work with UNHCRIICRC to screen returning refugees in orderly
process at the border. UNHCR should provide repatriation package.
•
GOR, with UNAMIR support, should guarantee safe passage for refugees as they
return to their communes.
•
International assistance should be directed in part to building additional housing for ·
returning refugees and adjudicating property disputes. U.S .. assistance would continue
to be directed primarily to capacity-building and administration of justice activities.
In pursuing a general amnesty, the GOR will have taken an important step toward solving the·
refugee problem. While repatriation is certain to be slow and partial, by announcing an amnesty,
the GOR can assume the moral high-ground, reduce tensions with neighboring countries and
demonstrate clearly to international donors that it is serious about reconciliation.
-- Encourage GOR to name 400+ most heinous genocide perpetrators and issue warrants for
their arrest. If the GOR and the international community are ever to prosecute war criminals
effectively and move forward with national reconciliation, we must focus our prosecutorial efforts
on the ringleaders and allow a return to normalcy for the remaining refugees/prisoners. The GOR
has a list of approximately 400 ringleaders. The War Crimes Tribunal reportedly has a similar list.
These individuals should be the focus of international efforts. To pursue this approach credibly
and effectively, the international community must demonstrate swiftly and surely its readiness to
bring the ringleaders to justice. This will require:
-- The U.S. and other countries making a concerted effort worldwide to apprehend
perpetrators by surprise.
--The U.S. and others reiterating their commitment to capture, deport/detain all400+ and
begin by widely publicizing names and suspected whereabouts of key genocide
perpetrators. This must be part ofan aggressive international campaign (w/newspaper
ads, etc.) to shame countries harboring war criminals to turn them over. For our part, the
U.S. would deport suspected criminals in U.S. to the Hague or Rwanda as appropriate.
-- International community/UN must do all possible to expedite work of War Crimes
Tribunal.
SEGRE.T
�3
e) Press UNBCR to Endorse Efforts by GOR to Encourage Refugee Return (assuming this
occurs) and Announce that Within Six Months UNBCR will Close Existing Refugee Camps
Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.
in
-- Refugees would be encouraged but not compelled to return underUN or other
international escort.
-- Those that wish to remain would have two options: 1) resettlement on a more
permanent basis inside the country of first asylum, or; 2) move to new, presumably smaller
UNHCR camps constructed further away from the Rwandan border. Both these steps will require
t,tle consent of the asylum countries, which will be difficult to obtain. However, if coupled with a
GOR general amnesty and serious efforts to encourage refugee return, host governments may be
persuaded to assent.
-- These steps would be taken in conjunction with efforts to create a climate conducive to
repatriation to Rwanda. ·
d) Improve Prison Conditions. The USG has made plain to the GOR our strong concern about
the horrid prison conditions in which more than 50,000 poople are being held. While providing
tents to ease prison crowding, the USG must increase pressure on the GOR to release from prison
all but the key suspected genocide perpetrators and improve living conditions for those that
remain. The USG approach should include the elements outlined in the State paper (attached).
e) Intensify Support for Current Government Via "Tough Love" Campaign.
The international community needs to make plain both the benefits of cooperation on the elements
above and the consequences of failure to move forward. If Rwanda pursues the steps above, the
U.S. ought to push its allies to recognize these accomplishments in a tangible way and reward the.
Rwandan leadership directly. Rewards might include the following, in addition to rapid release of
pledged assistance and other direct support to the GOR:
--France initiates bilateral assistance to the GOR
-- Europeans invite senior GOR leaders for official visits
--U.S. receives Rwandan leaders at the White House
On the other hand, we have to make plain to Rwandan 'leaders that ifthe GOR fails to move
forward on the key issues above, we will to have reassess of policy of continued strong support
for the GOR
f) Consider Enlisting Help from Mobutu. [Status: State is preparing paper on possible role
for Mobutu in resolving the regional crisis.]
Mobutu might be enlisted to take immediate steps to halt involuntary refugee repatriation, curtail
arms flows in Zaire, allow stationing of monitors at key airports in eastern Zaire and movement of
refugee camps inland, use his forces to disarm/close ex-FAR camps in Zaire, put forces on border
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to prevent/deter ex-FAR incursions. In exchange, we may have to agree to help fund Zairian
forces through UNHCR and provide Mobutu with a degree of international recognition. These
efforts should not be divorced from our principal goal of pushing Mobutu towards a serious
democratic transition in Zaire.
President Carter has initiated a dialogue with Mobutu on his own. The USG must decide whether
we believe it worthwhile to engage Mobutu at all on these issues and, if so, whether we want to
do so directly or work in conjunction with Carter.
Progress on the above items need not be stalled while the USG resolves the broader issue of
whether and how to engage Mobutu.
�·Revised 8/18/95
:!
'::.,_ il..,_.
~.
t.
~.
Prison Reduction Strategy
G.Q..a.l: To dramatically reduce the pr.ison population in
Rwanda and start trials of the most serious offenders in
national custody.
Background: Although the GOR has made some noises about
reducing the prison capacity and appears willing to form a
Presidential Commission on the issue, hardliners within the
government have shown little interest in· reducing the prison
population, making the jails more humane or beginning trials.
Indeed, the prison population has surged from 30,000 in May to
50,000 at present.
Although the USG ha~ made various
demarches to the Rwandan Government, greater political pressure
is needed to gain a reduction in the prison population.
Pressure is timely given the lifting of the arms embargo. We
may wish to underscore the importance we place on the prison
issue by a visit to Rwanda from a senior State Department
official to lay out our position. We should also seek support
from the ROSG. khen appropriate, President Clinton could
follow with a call or letter to President Bizimungu and Vice
President Kagame.
Message:
To pressure the GOR, we should tell them that we must see
tangible progress within one month in the areas enumerated
below or the USG will have to review its assistance to.the
GOR. Given the level of concern within the Congress and the
USG about prison conditions, we will tell the GOR that it will
be extremely difficult for the US to maintain the level of
support we have (e.g., aid to government ministries). It will
be difficult to authorize new support (e.g., lethal or
non-lethal arms equipment) until! we see tangible improvements
in the prison situation.
To ensure continued USG assistance, the GOR must show
progress in the following areas within the next month:
1. Work with international humanitarian organizations to
increase the capacity of its prisons and spread out the
population. (We have given $625,000 to the ICRC to expand
prison capacity but could give more money or equipment for
this purpose).
2. Release the young (over 400 under age 14), the elderly
(over 3,200 age 55 and over), the pregnant and the infirm
on humanitarian grounds.
3. Dramatically reduce the number of arrests (currently at
500 a week) by only making arrests where there is
sufficient evidence of guilt.
DeClassified Under Authority .Of the.
Interagency Secunty Declassification Appeals-P~nei;
E.O.: 13526; S.ection S-3(b)(3)
·
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 47
Declassification Date: march 18, 2014
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4. Take steps necessary to appoint Rwandan judges and begin
trials in Rwanda.
5. Provide for the security of released prisoners and make
clear that repris~l killings will not be tolerated.
6. Give high-level support to a Presidential Commission to
develop a political strategy for reducing the prison
population, triaging prisoneis and re-integrating Hutus.
(AID will provide $300,000 out of the $4 million rule of
law assistance to the Commission, as suggested by post);
Drafted: DRL: CNix
8/15/95 SENIX 211
Cleared: DRL:NEly-Raphel(subs); AF:RBogosian(subs);
G:AJoyce(subs) AF/C:ARender
�Declassified Under Authority of the
SECRE'l'
Interagency SecuritY Dec]assification A:ppeais Panei,
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 12
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
Elements of a Regional Solution to the Crisis in Burundi
As tasked at the August 9 interagency meeting on Burundi, State has drafted several papers
outlining a potential diplomatic process for building a Bosnia-style.Contact Group to prepare for a
regional peace conference on Burundi (and possibly Rwanda). State has also begun considering
the elements of a political framework that would serve as the basis for discussions with our allies.
Once refined with allies' input and that of countries/players in the region, this framework could
form the basis for negotiations at a regional conference.
This paper summarizes key elements of the State-prepared papers and outlines in general terms
the substance of a potential USG proposal to reach a long-term solution to the problems in
Burundi. Finally and most importantly, it poses a central policy question: is the USG prepared to
invest the resources and diplomatic capitaln:ecessary to make a serious attempt at finding a
long-term solution to the problem in Burundi on the basis of the proposal below?
I. Outlines of Proposed USG Initiative for Burundi
Proposed Political Framework: The current crisis in Burundi, like those in its past, is rooted in a
· fundamental struggle between rival ethnic groups for power and scarce resources. Hence, any
long-term solution to this problem must take into account both the need for a political solution to
the. power struggle, while seeking to contain the struggle for resources by demonstrating that
'
there are economic benefits to peace and a high price for continued warfare.
Burundi is a long way from Jeffersonian democracy, which should not be the immediate goal of
U.S. policy. Our immediate goal must be to end the killings and achieve relative stability in
Burundi and the region. Once these conditions are achieved, restoration of genuine democracy in
Burundi is a reasonable objective.
Any near-term and lasting political solution in Burundi must entail genuine power-sharing among
the ethnic groups. The details of a power-sharing agreement must ultimately be worked out
among the Burundians themselves, but the international community can and should assist by
suggesting a starting point for their discussions. Towards this end, the USG should work to
refine a proposal for power-sharing based on the following elements: decentralized governmental
authority/greater regional autonomy (localities are increasingly ethnically homogenous, so local
authorities would likely be run by representatives of one or the other ethnic group) and; loose
federal structure bound together by a multi-ethnic civilian central government that has genuine
control of the military and provides key services to all parts of the country.
The above elements of a proposed political framework are overly general and need amplification.
While our final proposal should not be too specific, it should be sufficiently qeveloped to serve as
the basis for renewed discussions with our allies and fresh negotiations among the parties to the
conflict. A more detailed political framework should cull froin relevant elements of the Burundi
Convention of Government agreed last year, the Arusha Accords,. and the perspectives ofUSG
· experts on Burundi. State will develop a more detailed political framework as soon as possible.
SECRET
�SECRET
2
Essential Societal Reforms: To be viable, any political framework must be buttressed by essential
reforms including integration of the military, eradication of widespread human rights abuses in the
military, police training and judicial reform. In addition, Burundi must embark on a concerted
long-term program to ensure equal opportunity for members of each ethnic group in education,
government, the military, judiciary and other key segments of civil society.
International Assistance Required: Burundi has proved itself incapable of implementing such
sweeping social reforms alone. It will need the active support of the international community in
the form of substantial development assistance and help in keeping the peace and building key
institutions. One method of providing this support is to establish a broad UN presence -- a Ia the
temporary UN interim administration in Cambodia (or West Irian in the early 1960s). The UN
would assist in implementing the agreed political· settlement, help run key ministries as they
embark on reform programs, deploy peacekeepers to deter acts of violence, and help with police
training and military integration.
Such a proposal may be the best solution but would require substantial resources. (The UN
mission in Cambodia-- significantly larger country than Burundi-- required 20,000
peacekeepers and cost approximately $1 billion.) Today, the UN faces a serious funding crisis, in
large part due to U.S. arrearages. Without a new injection offunds, the UN does not have the
ability to embark on such a mission in Burundi. U.S. financial support to the UN could not be
forthcoming without large appropriations from Congress, which almost certainly will not be
available. In addition, given the UN' s recent track record in peacekeeping, it is highly
questionable whether another ambitious UN mission could succeed. While a UN mission is by no
means the orily method of providing sustained international support, other methods are likely also
to be costly. The U.S. should consult with our allies on alternative means of providing
international support following any negotiated settlement in Burundi.
a
Carrots and Sticks: The parties to the conflict in Burundi have exhibited little, if any, interest in
reaching a negotiated 'political solution to their problems. Both sides are poised for war and have
rejected OAU-proposed peace talks. Any serious international effort to negotiate a lasting
solution to Burundi's problems must be coupled with tempting carrots and heavy sticks.
The international community, led by key donors and countries in the region, would seek the
parties' agreement to a political settlement. If successful, the international community will
commit to provide substantial economic assistance and political and security assistance to a
reconstituted Burundian federal government.
If the parties refuse to work toward or reach agreement, the international community would cut
all· development assistance to Burundi, seek to try the extremists for crimes against humanity and
impose an economic as well as arms embargo. These tough steps would be aimed at weakening
the extremists, taking away the resources for which they compete, and stimulating the population
to recommit themselves and their leaders to the establishment of a viable national entity.
SBCRB':F
�SECRS'l'
3
PROS
•
•
•
•
Threat of harsh, concerted international action along with risks of continued ethnic
conflict, may be sufficient to bring parties to a viable, lasting settlement.
May be achievable in the relative short term.
If implemented swiftly, could forestalUprevent widespread genocide.
Allows international community to try one last step short ofthe use of force to resolve
the current crisis.
CONS
~
•
•
•
International community must reach agreement on outlines of settlement and tough
measures to be imposed if settlement fails. Thus far, donors have been able to agree
on little with respect to Burundi.
Chances of success are limited.
Costly. Would require substantial political/diplomatic, economic and military
investment in Burundi. International involvement should be expected to last at least
five years.
Burundi leaders may divide and conquer international community by neither rejecting
agreement outright nor negotiating in good faith.
II. Building a Contact Group and Preparing a Regional Conference
To negotiate a comprehensive political settlement in Burundi, the United States needs the active
support and assistance of key donors (who must be equal partners in this endeavor) and the
constructive support of countries in the region. These factors are key to any successful approach
to the conflicting parties in Burundi.
STEP 1: Contact Group. An important first step would be the establishment of an
international Bosnia-style 'contact group' consisting at least of the United States, France,
Belgium, UK, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. An essential prerequisite to any diplomatic
initiative is gaining the agreement of the French and Belgians. The U.S. must start with these two
countries in building an international negotiating team. Anlbassador Bogosian should initiate this
effort by conducting intense consultations with the French and Belgians in early September on the
modalities of a lasting political solution in Burundi and seek their agreement to participate actively
in an international contact group. Bogosian's efforts must be back-stopped by active
interventions, when necessary, by top officials at State and the White House. Once constructive
French and Belgian participation is assured, the contact group should be broadened to include the
other countries listed above.
In approaching key donors, the U.S. should seek support for a political solution along the broad
lines described· above. However, we should be flexible and welcome any helpful modifications to
the U.S. proposal.
STEP 2: Regional Conference. Following agreement among members ofthe contact group,
we would seek support for a regional conference from countries in the region, the UN and the
OAU. If obtained, we would support a joint UN/OAU effort to convene a regional conference.
(For details of conference process/modalities, see attached State memo.) Ambassador Bogosian
SECRE'l'
�SECRET
4
would lead consultations with countries in the region and the UN and OAU. However, most of
the day-to-day spade work would be done by our missions in the field. Bogosian plans a trip to
the region in mid-September, which provides an important opportunity to solicit support for a
contact group plan and lay the foundation for a regional conference. The contact group would
provide financial and diplomatic support to the conference by working in conjunction with the UN
and OAU to put forward a proposed political framework, offer good offices and serve as honest
brokers .. Key countries in the region would join us as full partners in these efforts and participate
with us in an observer capacity at the conference.
If successful, the regional conference would result in tangible progress towards a long-term
political solution in Burundi. If other countries insist that Rwanda also be on the agenda, the U.S.
should not object but focus its own energies on solving the more difficult conceptual problem -Burundi. The regional conference should be viewed not as an end in itself but the substantive
launching ofwhat must-- by necessity-- be an extended negotiation process.
ill. Is It Worth The Investment?
· As noted above, pursuit of the above diplomatic strategy to achieve a long-term political solution
to the crisis in Burundi will require a substantial investment of scarce U.S. financial resources
·(possibly tens of millions of dollars), political capital, and the time and attention of the most senior
members of the Administration's foreign policy team. Before we embark on this effort, we must
obtain the commitment of senior leaders in the relevant agencies to devote the substantial priority,
time and resources that this effort requires. Moreover, there is a substantial risk of failure and
hence, embarrassment. In the worst case, by proving the futility of the best efforts of the
international community, failure could also conceivably hasten intensified conflict and
humanitarian crisis.
a
On the other hand, failure to act now to try to achieve a political solution leaves a festering
regional crisis unattended. No other countries are offering the leadership required to find a lasting
solution. In the absence of a lasting solution, the odds of a massive and even more costly
humanitarian crisis ate greatest. The Administration.could be open to charges yet again of not
taking adequate steps to prevent a potential genocide-- this time one for which. we have had
ample warning. Finally, the fact of recurrent genocide in Central Africa, on top of that in the
former Yugoslavia, would seriously erode the already frayed normative fabric that binds the
international community and could undermine, possibly irreparably, the international instruments
o~ collective security.
Before the U.S. embarks on the strategy outlined above, the principals must agree to invest their
own time, resources and political capital, which are necessary, but far from sufficient for success.
SECRET
�..
. Declassified Under. AuthontY of the
Interage.ncy Security Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3'(b)(3)
C8!1PIBEl!l'fiA:b
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document number 48
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
1.
Options Regarding an Arms Embargo Against Burundi
A.
Introduce Embargo Now
o
Aimed at arms flows to extremist Hutus, who are launching
frequent armed attacks in the countryside.
o
Aimed at arms flows to the Tutsi-dominated Army and Tutsi
extremists, both of whom are launching reprisals, often
against civilian populations.
o
No cost.
0 .
Sends a signal that ·the international conununity is appalled
by the continuing violence in Burundi, and wishes to do
s6mething about it .
;
..
.~
o
Given the recent suspension/lifting of the embargo against
Rwandans, which some persons worried would lead to more
arms finding their way to Burundi, the timing is bad.
o
An embargo against Burundi, with none against Rwanda, would
not be effective.
o
Difficult to enforce.
o
Over time, likely to.affect the Army's ability to fight
insurgencies, while not affecting the insurgents or ethnic
cleansing operations as much.
B.
Holding an Arms Embargo in Reserve
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to have destabilizing effect or prompt Tutsi
hardliner action.
�08Hf'IBBU'f!llf.!
o
We retain the leverage which a threat to impose an embargo
gives us.
o
We avoid the possibility.of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN, due to possible European
opposition.
o
If/when we do call for an embargo, it could be used in a
broader context, as part of a concerte.d series of actions.
o
The status quo, which is not acceptable as far as the
security situation is concerned, continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about violence in Burundi.
o
Arms continue to flow to the Army and to extremists of both
ethnic groups, fuelling the cycle of extremist attack and
reprisal, as well as providing the materiel for any coup
attempt.
�2.
Options Regarding an Assets Freeze Against Burundians
A.
Introduce Freeze Resolution
o
Bolsters the work of the moderates.
o
Cuts off funds which are being used to purchase weapons by
extremists on both sides.
o
Sends strong signal that we want to isolate extremists and
break the cycle of impunity.
o
Low cost.
o
More surgical than a sweeping arms embargo---more
calculated to affect only extremists.
o
Gives Europeans political cover for something they may wish.
to do. ·
~
o
May prcvoke panic response by extremists.
o
Difficult to enforce~--mainly symbolic.
GQHf I96N'fi.'U5
o
Europeans are sometimes reluctant about assets freezes.
The relevant bank accounts are more likely to be in Europe
than in the u.s., so Eur.opean cooperation is key.
o
Because of above considerations, may be difficult to obtain
enough votes on the Security Council.
o
Treasury traditionally is reluctant about assets freezes,
for policy, legal and technical reasons.
�B.
Hold Off on Assets Freeze
o
Leaves us with the leverage to threaten an .assets freeze,
e.g. to help force extremists to the conference table.
o
As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less
likely to prompt extremist reaction.
o
We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see
it go nowhere at the UN~
o
we· would cease to commit to already agreed upon preventitve
measure.
o
The cycle of impunity continues.
o
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal
about extremists in Burundi.
0
We miss, for now, the opportunity to send such a message
in what would be a basically low cost, symbolic manner for
us, there being few such bank accounts here.
o
Extremists will use the money to buy arms and pay fighters.
emtPIBE!t'fiAfl
�CONFIDEiN'l'IAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
21001
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi
DATE: Tuesday, August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME ; 11 : 0 0 a • m. -12 : 40 p . m •
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi
PARTICIPANTS:
Office of the Vice President
Marc Thomas
State
Tim Wirth
George Moose
Richard. Bogosian
Phyllis Oakley
JCS
Dave Mcilvoy
Orrin Young
AID
Dick McCall
Douglas Stafford
Treasury
_
Richard Newcomb
White House
Nancy Soderberg
Defense
Joseph Nye
Vince Kern
NSC
Susan Rice
Mike Sheehan
Eric Schwartz
Shawn McCormick
USUN
Laurie Shestack
OMB
Jeff Ashford
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Taskings .from 8/9 Meeting:
The interagency working group chaired by the Rwanda-Burundi
Coordinator will ensure swift implementation of taskings from the
August 9 Ad Hoc Group meeting.
(-€-}
cm+FIDEiN'l'IAL
Declassify on:
OADR
�GONFI DEP.lT L'\L
2
Refugee Repatriation:
USUN will work to assure swift passage of ·a UN Security
Council statement demanding a halt to Zaire's forced repatriation
of refugees, while acknowledging the substantial burdens borne by
asylum countries in Central Africa.
(U)
State will issue a press release condemning forced
repatriation.
(U)
State will contact Kengo and Mobutu to make clear to Zairian
leaders the risks inherent in forced repatriation and the
negative ramifications for Zaire's international standing. State
will also stress we have no indications of any offensive military
build-up by the Rwandan government across the border and our
intention to continue urging the GOR to exercise restraint.
~
USUN will ask Boutros-Ghali to telephone Mobutu to encourage
him to walk Zaire back from the brink.
~
State will urge Belgium and France to take actions similar
to our own.
~
The Administration will pursue the policy steps outlined in
Rwanda paper agreed in this meeting. Specifically, these steps
include but are not limited to: encouraging the GOR to grant
broad amnesty and create a climate conducive to safe refugee
repatriation; pressing UNHCR to encourage refugee return and
announce within six months the closure of existing refugee camps
and movement of any remaining camps away from the borders in
Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania; pressuring the GOR to improve prison
conditions; and considering enlisting help from Mobutu.
~
Joseph Nye Trip:
The interagency working group will generate options for
providing material assistance to an All-African military force
for potential deployment to Burundi.
~
Humanitarian Assistance:
NSC, OMB and State/PRM will identify options for use of rema1n1ng
FY 95 refugee/humanitarian funds for the Rwanda crisis area with
the a.im of making funds available to support the regional refugee
population.
(U)
Burundi:
NSC will bring together a group of experts to flesh out a
notional political framework for resolution of the crisis in
GmlFIDEHTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
Burundi. The framework would serve as the starting point for
discussions with our allies and countries in the region in
preparation for a regional conference. Separate groups will
generate options for international support for a peace
settlement, should one occur, as.well as the costs and funding
sources for such support. State will produce a paper on these
issues by Monday (August 28) in preparation for Principals-level
consideration of whether the USG should lead pursuit of a longterm strategy to resolve the crisis in Burundi.
~
The U.S. will not move forward on a UNSC resolution imposing
an arms embargo on Burundi as this time. However, NSC and State
will collaborate on a paper que Monday (August 28) on
alternatives for freezing the assets of Burundi extremists.
~
Next Meeting:
The Ad Hoc group may reconvene after Labor Day to discuss
outstanding issues.
(U)
GO't-lFIDENTIAL
�Declassified Under Authority of the.
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals. Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 14
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
Dear Mr. President:
As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes and those of the
American people to you and the people of Rwanda.
These remain difficult times for Rwanda, and I want you to know I
follow events in your country closely. Rwanda needs peace and
its people need security to enable political and economic
development to flourish. Ambassador Albright's visit.at this
time is a reflection of the United States' interest in ensuring
lasting peace and security in your country.
Be assured the United States is ready to continue its strong
support for reconstruction and development in Rwanda as long as
Rwanda moves steadily forward toward achieving peace and
~tability!
The greatest challenge in this regard is to nourish
the healing process in the aftermath of the genocide, to bring
justice through the International War Crimes Tribunal, to make
every effort to bring together the peoples of Rwanda and to lay
the groundwork so there will never again be a repetition of those
horrific events.
We continue to believe that as a crucial part of this process,
your government must fulfill its pledge to take all necessary
steps to enable the early repatriation of Rwandan refugees in
neighboring countries. In addition, and in accordance with the
commitments your government made in Bujumbura, Cairo and Geneva,
Rwanda .should take immediate measures to alleviate the inhumane
overcrowding in Rwanda's prisons. We also think it essential to
ensure adequate security for the War Crimes Tribunal and other
international personnel after UNAMIR's mandate expires in March.
W~
remain prepared to play an energetic diplomatic role to
achieve those ends. we.recognize that they represent a major
challenge. However; as I know you agree, the alternative ~- more
suffering for the people of Rwanda -- is unacceptable.
�2
I welcome your thoughts on how the United States and the
international community, including the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, can assist you and your government in
achieving these goals.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Pasteur Bizimungu
President of the Republic of.Rwanda
Kigali
�Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declas-sification Appeals,Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5,3(b)(3)
'ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
15
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
Dear Mr. President:
As the new year begins, I extend to you and the people of Burundi·
the best wishes of the American people as well as my personal
regards.
I know these are difficult times for Burundi, and I
want you to know I follow developments in your country closely.
I have asked Ambassador Albright to visit Burundi to reiterate
the importance we attach to ending·the cycle of violence and the
culture of impunity, without which Burundi cannot achieve the
economic development that is so urgently required.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve development in the
absence of security, particularly when the targets of violence
include those who have come to help the people of Burundi.· The
United States alan~ with Burundi's many other friends in the
international community, is deeply concerned about the escalating
violence, rampant killings and other human right~ abuses that
have become daily occurrences in recent months.
It is imperative
that Burundi's leaders work vigorously to stop the violence,
isolate extremists and seek a lasting peace.
I know that you have pledged to combat the violence that plagues
Burundi.
The United States fully supports you in that endeavor.
Like you, we view the Convention of Government and a spirit of
compromise and conciliation as the basis upon which to build a
lasting peace in Burundi. My government will continue to support
international efforts to facilitate political reconciliation in
Burundi including those of neighboring governments, the United
Nations and its agencies, President Carter, and other private
groups working to that end. We also remain prepared to help
sttengthen Burundi's political, judicial, social and economic
institutions so that peaceful development can resume.
However, the United States will provide no political recognition
or economic assistance to any government in Burundi that comes to
power by force.
�2
I know you share our views and I would welcome your ideas on how
the international community, including the United Nations and its
agencies, can further help Burundi.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya
President of the Republic of Burundi
Bujumbura
�0161
COl'lFI DEN'!' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1996
96JhN 15
r~ lO
• 33
FOR THE PRESIDENT
ANTHONY
L~
Letters for Ambassaqor Albright to Deliver to
Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President
Bizimungu and Burundian President Ntibantunganya
To provide Ambassador Albright with letters that she can deliver
to Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President Bizimungu and
Burundian President Ntibantunganya during her visit to Africa
·
next week.
Ba~kground
Angola:
President dos Santos has carried out several of the
commitments he made to you during his visit to Washington last
month to push the peace process forward;
To date, UNITA has not
reciprocated despite indications that they would_.
The most
pressing concern is the quartering of UNITA troops, which is
several months behind schedule.
President dos Santos must remain
patient as we apply continued pressure on UNITA to adhere to
their commitments under the peace accord.
Rwanda:
Donor patience with the government continues to be
tested as little has been done to address the two most pressing
problems facing the country: more than two million refugees
remain outside the country, and the government has.done little to
alleviate serious overcrowding in its prisons.
In addition, more
than 40 NGOs were recently forced to cease operations because
they had failed to provide the government with the requisite
documentation.
The political· leadership in Kigali must take more
forceful action to promote reconciliation among its people to
enable political and economic development to occur.
Burundi:
The situation has degenerated significantly over the
last 30 days as political murders, violence against civilians and
attacks against Westerners increase.
Several embassies
(including ours) are drawing down staff and many NGOs have scaled
back or suspended operations. Extremist elements are gaining
strength as the position of the moderate president and his
government becomes more precarious.
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Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:
1.6, X6
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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2
Ambassador Albright's trip is important and timely because each
of these three countries is currently facing critical transition
periods in which American influence could be an important
determining factor.
She will also travel to Liberia.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letters to Angolan President dos Santos (Tab
A), Rwandan President Bizimungu (Tab B) and Burundian President
Ntibantunganya (Tab C) .
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to President dos Santos
Tab B . Letter to President Bizimungu
Tab C
Letter to President Ntibantunganya
COHFIDEHTIAL
�COHFI DE~J'l' Il\L
0547
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
January 30, 1996
NOTED
SUSAN E. ~E
Report on Trip to Liberia, Angola, Burundi and
Rwanda with Ambassador Albright, January 16-23,
1996
Ambassador Albright will forward separately a memo to the
President. oh her trip to Africa.
I endorse her general
conclusions.
Below are my personal impre.ssions, conclusions and
a summary of action items (Tab A) jointly drafted with USUN.
Albright's delegation included staff from USUN, State/AF PDAS
Prudence Bushnell, BG Doc Fogelsong (J-5, Mid East/Africa/Asia/UN
Director), Col. Mike Turner (J-5 Africa), NYT Columnist Tom
Friedman, a CNN crew and various other journalists for portions
.of the trip.
Overview
The purpose of the trip was to advance the peace processes at
critical stages in Liberia and Angola, to seek to deter
widespread conflict in Burundi and enhance prospects for lasting
peace in Rwanda.
Given these lofty objectives, success can only
be measured with certainty over the longer run.
However, in each
place, I believe Albright's visit made a positive contribution
and, in Angola in particular, may have had a direct bearing on
the success of the peace process.
Liberia
Key Meetings/Events: ~ SRSG Nyakyi; ECOMOG Commander Ineinger
and top staff along with ECOWAS Special Representative Victor
Gbeho; The Council of State (Wilton Sankowolo -- chair, Oscar
Quiah, Chief Tamba Tailor, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George
Boley); Roosevelt Johnson; Telcon with President Rawlings of
Ghana; Lunch with UN agency reps; Visit to WFP-funded job
training center for ex-combatants; Visit to UNHCR refugee center.
Impressions:
We were struck by how devastated Monrovia is -- no
electricity, bombed out buildings, key ministries are squatter
camps.
Yet, the population was active, the markets were bustling
and there· was no evidence in Monrovia of the sense of despair the
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em·! t:
Reason:
1.5 (a), (d)
ffiE~ IT!
Declassify On:
1/29/06 ~\~IF 11 1 't·.\
·~
;
4•
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r.i
�CONFIDENTIJ\L
2
surroundings might indicate. As one who has always rejected as
simplistic and patronizing the notion that the U.S. has some
special obligation to Liberia, I was nevertheless moved by the
mess that is Liberia.
I noted witb some shame the contrast
between Cote d'Ivoire (where the.French had comparative success)
and Liberia -- potentially a very rich country run amok.
It is difficult to tell whether the 13th accord will be the lucky
one for Liberia or whether it too will pass. There is good news
and bad news.
The good news is that the mixed civilian-faction
leader Council of State (CoS) seems to.be working well together.
There were no signs of animosity, and many indications its
members are cooperating rather effectively. All on the CoS
profess commitment to peace. All also look to the. U.S. for
support.
We stressed that Liberians made the war; they must make
the peace.
Some understood that message well (i.e., Taylor and
the other faction leaders); the civilians, in particular, seemed
to look to the U.S. as a crutch.
The bad news is it app~ars the faction leaders on the CoS cannot
maintain full control of their respective factions as well as of
factions not represented on the Council, such as Roosevelt
.Johnson's ULIMO-J. ULIMO-J has not only been fighting in recent
weeks with ULIMO-K but also with ECOMOG, undermining the fragile
Abuja Accords.
In addition, some are concerned that the CoS may
assume powers beyond those granted in the Abuja Accord.
Elections are slated for August, although no one expects them to
occur so soon.
ECOMOG is managing pretty well, despite its recent losses.
The
Nigerian commander appears sensible, competent and determined to
proceed with deployment and disarmament. ECOMOG deployed without
adequate logistical support (ai our urging) and took a beating.
It will be reluctant to deploy further to outlying areas until it
has more trucks and improved communications. The U.S. is the
only country that is providing any meaningful support to ECOMOG.
We pleoged $10 million in late October for logistical support -trucks, helicopters. U.S. support has been slow in arriving due
to the normal, glacial process of disbursing compounded by the
USG shutdown. Only 20 U.S.-leased trucks are in use.
Helicopters have been due for the past couple of weeks.
The
remaining 80+ trucks will be leased locally or from the Dutch who
have trucks in Cote d'Ivoire.
They are not expected in Liberia
until next month.
Special Envoy Dane Smith is now traveling in
Europe and West Africa to try to remove some remaining ·
roadblocks.
Disarmament and demobilization have not yet commenced, and the
factions may be losing control over hungry soldiers.
The Council
of State is seeking to alter the disarmament plan so that ECOMOG
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�COHFIDEHTIAL
3
goes to soldiers in the field and disarms them in place rather
than soldiers gathering at designated assembly areas.
The new
plan may be better for faction leaders who may have difficulty
persuading their soldiers to go to assembly areas, but it is all
but impossible for ECOMOG and the UN to fulfill.
The UN and
ECOMOG are coordinating -- at least superficially -- but it is
unclear whether the relevant UN agencies have an effective and
viable disarmament/demobilization plan. Without one, the whole
process could fall apart even if the factions try to do the right
thing.
This is also a key issue for Dane Smith.
Conclusions: lhis peace accord may fail for reasons beyond the
control of the key faction leaders. One important factor will be
whether ECOMOG can mobilize quickly to begin the disarmament/
demobilization process and whether the international community
will fashion a sufficiently attractive and efficient disarmament/
demobilization program to attract and retain ex-combatants.
Resources are a real problem. There is not enough for ECOMOG to
do its job.
In contrast to Mozambique, there is not an
attractive demobilization package for ex-combatants in Liberia.
I am convinced (for the first time) that the U.S. can and should
do more in Liberia. We have made a number of mistakes there in
the past. While it is not our responsibility to make the peace,
our assistance -- or lack thereof -- can make or break the peace
process, even if sufficient political will exists on all sides.
We ought to try to provide additional assistance to ECOMOG
directly or through other means. We ought to revisit the issue
of whether or not we could partially support ECOMOG on the UN
peacekeeping budget in a post-UNPROFOR world. AID also should be
pressed to do more on demobilization. Above all,· since we cannot.
carry this ball alone, we must press other Western countries to
share the financial burden with us on Liberia. Thus far, our
appeals -- issued at a relatively low level -- have fallen on
deaf ears.
Angola
Key Meetings/Events:
President dos Santos, Dr. Savimbi (in
Bailundo), President of the Parliament Moco, SRSG Beye, the Joint
Commission, FM de Moura, Visit to Vila Nova Assembly Area, Visit
to Kuito.
Impressions:
In Angola, the United States is playing a crucial
role in shepherding the peace process. We ·should relish that
role and use it to the greatest advantage. Years of hard work
are paying off, as both sides now clearly see the U.S. as a fair
and honest broker. As one party leader said, "the U.S. is the
only country in the world that really matters to us." In several
places on our trip, our interlocutors were keen to remind us how
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powerful the U.S. is and lamented that others appear to
appreciate our power more than we ourselves do. Well, in Angola,
the peace process is obviously the Angolans to use or lose, but
our influence is palpable and we must use it to the maximum
extent possible.
Dos Santos evinced a surprising comfort in his relationship with
the U.S. in the wake of his visit to Washington. He clearly
wants to be given credit for largely fulfilling the pledges he
made at the White
On the whole, dos Santos seems intent
his
UNITA is the real stumbling block at the moment.
We arrived at
Bailundo in the middle of UNITA's annual conference, which
Savimbi claimed he called-to build political support for the
difficult decision to quarter his troops. Having secured that
support, he is prepared, he says, (finally) to start quartering.
At our request, Savimbi pledged to Albright and to the press to
quarter 16,500 men by February 8 (when the UNAVEM mandate comes
up ior renewal). We told him that international patience is
wearing thin, and we would not look kindly on a broken pledge.
As President of the UNSC in February, we have great influence
over whether or not UNAVEM III's mandate is renewed and for how
long. Now, we are watching and waiting. According to Embassy
Luanda, UNITA forces·are gathering near 2 of the 4 open
quartering areas but have yet to enter.
If they try to enter en
masse, there could be a logistical difficulties.
UNAVEM III is an impressive peacekeeping mission that seems to be
working. The UNAVEM-run quartering site we visited was an
impressive, if relatively empty, place. The UN seems well
prepared to handle the UNITA troops -~ at least at the one site
we ~aw. All the essentials -- water, food, kit, shelter, medical
supplies, in-processing mechanisms, recreation, training
programs, etc. -- seem to be in place. A family site is located
just down the road.
The challenge will be to occupy the UNITA
forces productively while they are in the camps and to get them
out into the new army or civilian life promptly. The former
requires completion of the.military integration talks and the GRA
getting
s act together. The latter requires international
resources, which may prove to be lacking.
Kuito is both the same and much better than when we were there.
The buildings remain bombed out, but some are starting to be
repaired.
The squatter camp/orphanage/WFP feeding site we
visited is gone.
Far fewer people are starving. The hospital
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�COHFI DEJ:H'l' L"rL
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still has many malnourished babies but not as mahy or as
emaciated as when we were there. Halo Trust continues its
demining efforts -- clearing fields.
The population is right on
its heels planting every new square foot the deminers clear.
Don Steinberg seems to be doing very well. He's clearly happy
and in his element. He seems to have won the respect of both
sides and is playing an energetic, effective role.
He put on a
great stop for Albright and crew.
Conclusions: I am hopeful but not sanguine about Angola.
I'd
give it just better than even chances of success.
I think dos
Santos is committed.
The danger he faces is a hard-line coup.
This he can guard against if UNITA shows solid commitment. At
the moment, dos Santos is vulnerable because he has taken some
bold steps and UNITA has not. come with him.
The hard-liners will
pounce shortly, if Savimbi does not make good on his pledge.
Savimbi remains an enigma. My hunch is he wants peace, but I
would not bet on it. We will learn a lot in the next 10 days.
If UNITA fails to start quartering in earnest (the precise number
is less important than momentum), we will have to conclude they
are not serious.
The FAA may then try to push dos Santos to
finish UNITA off, and it would be hard to blame them --' twice
burned.
If UNITA does. quarter, there is real hope. We pressed
dos Santos to keep his nose clean while we pressured UNITA and
not to react with force, if UNITA fails to quarter. He demurred
on the latter but promised to consult with us before acting, if
UNITA reneges.
Burundi
Key Meetings/Events: President Ntibantunganya; PM Nduwayo.; Chief
of the Army and Chief of the Gendarme; Speaker of the Parliament;
UN Commission of Inquiry; Visit to Orphanage; Lunch with Human
Rights activists and Parliamentarians; Drop-by Burundian Women's
conference on peace and reconciliation.
Impressions: Bujumbura is one of the creepiest places I've ever
been. Beautiful, lush city with people quietly going about their
daily business. No overt signs of hostility or tension on the
day .we were there; yet fear pervades the place. As one person
said to a member of our delegation: "we are all buying guns."
Bujumbura is now virtually ethnically cleansed. Only Tutsis on
the streets.
We delivered a very tough message to the military directly and to
extremists via the press:
"Stop the killing or you will pay a
high price. We have just seen your future (Liberia, Angola).
Civil war stinks. Don't go there. We will totally isolate a
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regime that comes to power by force. We know the military is
responsible for the bulk of the killing, and we hold the
leadership responsible.u We were heard.
I think we even shook
them up a bit, but I doubt we will be heeded.
All of the leadership blamed someone else -- the Hutu insurgency,
the political leaders, the military leaders, the "hate radio,"
the international community. As Albright noted, it was "the dog
ate my homework.u In addition, it is clear this is a power
struggle among elites. The people do not share the hatred~ Hutu
and Tutsi women can share a crowded ballroom in a downtown hotel
in a common quest for peace, but the orchestrated killing
continues.
At the same time, I was struck by the sense that the people with
whom we met do not feel the same sense of urgency as we do about
Burundi.
Perhaps, the killing is far away or they are used to
it.
No one we met advocated (or even understood the logic of)
foreign intervention, including the President. They all want
help in silencing the "hate radio." They also want constructive,
sustained international assistance· (resources) . And a ''superenvoy,u some say. They are clearly sick of being buzzed by highlevel delegations who do not understand.and leave as quickly as
they come. They are as frustrated with us as we are with them.
It is uncertain that the worst case scenario is another Rwandastyle genocide.
It may be, but it may also be continued daily
killing~
In seeking to avert a genocide, we cannot forget the
daily killings are adding up-- into the tens of thousands.
Conclusions: We must continue to exert all the pressure we can
to keep the lid on things and shine the light. Warnings of the
type we've recently issued, possible UNSC sanctions, preventive
planning -- all must continue. If we can reach a plateau in the
crisis, we then need to throw all our energies behind finding a
lasting solution to the problem in Burundi -- a negotiated powersharing formula that works. We have talked about this before but
not acted. We will need a high-level, sustained effort. The risk
of failure is real, but the costs of inaction are greater.
I
think we must try.
To do so, we must
ear the decks of all t~e miscellaneous, halfhearted initiatives out there (Carter, Ogata, OAU, French Great
Lakes Conference) and, with the rest of the international
community, back one horse fully. Nyerere may be that horse. We
then need to support him.with a top-rate U.S. envoy who spends
lots of time on the round in Burundi -- a
Paul Hare in
Angola.
'tS:"·:e
If Nyerere won't
step up to the plate, we may have to do
ourselves. Other~ise,
it won't get done.
CONFIDBN'l'I:A:L
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-- po ar oppos1te of Krueger (perhaps by
reduced staff for security reasons, which may be short-sighted.
Burundi needs more U.S. involvemerit, not less; We urgently need
to get Krueger back briefly so we are not perceived as cutting
and running. We then need to get a new ambassador out asap. One
is chosen --Rusty Hughes. He has got a good reputation. He must
still go through D-Committee and then we ought to consider
getting both he and Krueger out through recess appointments this
coming month.
Rwanda
Key Meetings/Events: President Bizimungu and Vice President
Kagame; Lunch with UN o
cials; Visit to Kibuye near Zaire
border (War Crimes exhumation site, killing stadium, discussions
with recently return~d refugees); Kigali Women's Prison;
Orphanage in Kigali.
Impressions:
Rwanda is coming back to life.
It is quite
amazing.
Infrastructure is being repaired. The roads are fixed,
buildings rehabilitated. There is a good quality hotel in the
city. The President lives in a decent place. The electricity
works. Ministries are being repaired. The city is clean,
flowers in the city center. The bodies are gone from the
churches and the stench is all but gone. This Government is
determined to rebuild the country, and is doing so.
At the same time, the burden of psychological reconstruction
seems incredibly daunting. How do you forgive? How can you
bring justice to tens of thousands and~do justice to hundreds of
thousand mo~e? How can people kill their own family members and
neighbors? How do you begin?
The GOR has made great strides and yet is severely lacking in
certain respects. There is a sense of pride, stubbornness and
determination that reminds me of the Eritreans.
It gives me hope
that these people will at least try to reconstruct their country
-- mentally and physically. Yet, they also do stupid things that
drive us crazy
the prisons, the NGO expulsions, etc. The risk
is either that hard-liners gain ascehdancy or that our patience
runs out before the current leadership can persuade us they
really want to do the right thing.
I come away from Rwanda more hopeful than cynical. Yet so much
depends on the justice system. The War Crimes Tribunal is just
getting started, and its method of work appears impressive. ·They
need our sustained support. The men's jail (although not the
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women's) is by all accounts abysmal.
The GOR needs to stop
messing around and do something real. We hit them hard on this.
They want our political and technical support for a domestic
Tribunal to triage and try those of the 60,000+ prisoners who
must be punished.
They are frustr~ted by the refugee issue.
While we pressed them for innovative solutions, the reality is
there is nothing they are doing deliberately to dissuade refugees
from returning. UNHCR also needs to be pressed to drop its rigid
opposition to anything other than purely voluntary repatriation
(i~e., ordered camp closings).
Conclusions:
We need to do all we can to support the War Crimes
Tribunal, UN human rights monitors, etc. A post-UNAMIR UN
presence will remain.
The GOR is amenable to UN police to
protect the Tribunal. The biggest threat to the internatitinal
presence may be lack of coordination ~nd lack of funds.
We plan
to make available an additional $1 million for the human rights
monitors.
However, both the Tribunal and the HR monitors need to
be put on a firmer financial footing.
We ought to consider
funding the post-UNAMIR UN presence on the UN regular budget
rather than through voluntary contributions, which are
unpredictab~e and often inadequate.
We also need to continue impressing upon the GOR that our support
is not unconditional. While we should laud the progress made, we
must be firm in conditioning continued support on specific
judicial reforms and genuine adherence to a policy of
reconciliation.
Attachment
Tab A
Action Items
cc:
Richard Clarke
CO'NFIDE'N'fiAL
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:16
Declassified Undei· Authority of the
Inter~ge~cy Security Declassification .4.ppeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3(1))(3)
·
P. 02.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 49
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
RECOHHENDATIONS
Burundi and Rwanda:
Appoint a distinguished, high-profile individual as the
President's "Special Envoy to Burundi" to help end genocidal
violence and help build a democratic and stable government in
Burundi. It may be useful to expand his or her duties to cover
Rwanda, namely to facilitate the return of Hutu refugees to
Rwanda peacgfully, the resettlement of Rwanda in a manner
conducive to a peaceful.and stable society, and the
administration of justice within Rwanda fairly and efficiently.
The Special Envoy must have direct access to government leaders
and freedom to move among competing factions. He or she also
must deal directly and frequently with international and
non-governmental organizations operating in the region. The
Special 'Envoy's personal safety probably would be at risk much of
fhe.time, and the m~asure of success largely not within our
control. But he or she wotild serve as th~. catalyst for peace and
reconciliation that is now lacking.
.
.
Burundi:
•
Encourage President Chirac during his forthcoming
visit to coordinate with us for a more activist role in
Burundi, including what diplomatic and military steps may
be required to prevent genocide.
Use diplomatic intervention to convene a roundtable of
key political and military leaders, moderates and
extremists, in Burundi, to discuss means to resolve
differences and restore peace and security within the
country.
Launch a major planning effort with the United Nations
to prepare for, and hopefully deter, accelerated genocide
in Burundi:
(1.) Two contingencies should be immediately addressed by
Pentagon and State planners: deployment of an
international force (perhaps stationed in Zaire) to
intervene in Burundi and stop genocidal violence;
deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation with the
consent of the Government of Burundi to create safety zones
or otherwise establish a more peaceful environment.
(The
Pentagon has already undertaken sorne of this contingency
planning.)
(2) With our own plans informing our request, we should
press hard to activate the U.N.'s "Standby Arrangements for
Peacekeeping Operations" which the United States has been
instrumental in supporting pursuant to PDD-25. This is a
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:17
P. 03
data base of forces and logistical support that 47 nations
have voluntarily notified the United Nations could be made
available for peacekeeping operations. For example, the
United·states has identified a range of logistical
resources that could be tapped to support U.N.-mandated
operations.
(3) Determine which type of deployment, if any, should and
can be undertaken and within what time frame~
(4) Demarche potential contributors and move within the
Security Council to create such a military presence near or
in Burundi.
·
Take necessary action to ailence Radio Democracy
(located in Zaire) if we confirm that its broadcasts are
aimed at violence and genocide within Burundi.
Increase our diplomatic presence at Embassy Bujumbura,
including the immediate assignment of a "hands-on"
ambassador.
As proposed by the Burundian Prime Minister, send a
special envoy (of the type described above) for an extended
assessment of the situation throughout the country.
Arrange for assignm~nt of additional U.N. Human Rights
Monitors to Burundi, including adequate funding.
Follow through on the Burundi Government's willingness
to permit U.N. security" guards for members of the
International Commission of Inquiry examining the 1993
massacres.
•
Condition provision of humani~arian aid on Burundi
Government approval of adequate U.N. or other international
security fcir aid worker~.
Use Burundi as a test case for active implementation
of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.
Rwanda:
Establish a post-UNAMIR presence in Rwanda {after
March 8) that maintains U.N. humanitarian, judicial, and
development operations with adequate transportation and
security. Explore funding through regular (not
peacekeeping) O.N. assessemnts.
•
.Use diplomatic intervention to resolve apparent
differences between the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees
and the Government of Rwanda on strategy for repatriation
of refugees.
·
Respond to Rwanda's appeal for expert assistance on
administration of justice and assign Department of Justice
and legal experts to work closely with the Government of
Rwanda to establish a "Special Tribunal(s)" to adjudicate
expeditiously (and with due process) the tens of thousands
of Rwandan citizens (about 64,000) jailed in Rwandan ·
prisons.
�FEB- 1-98 THU 14:17
P. 04
• ·
Urgently assist the ·Governme~t of Rwanda to find a
solution to the prison problem at all of the prison
facilities in Rwanda.
·
•
Fulfill our pledge to contribute up to $1 million to
the U.N. Human Rights Field Operation before the end of
1996.
•
Provide further personnel and logistical assistance to
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Liberia:
•
Issue a Presidential statement or let'ter praising t.he
peace process but emphasizing the need for all parties to·
adhere .strictly to the Abuja Peace Accord.
•
Initiate a new and more stable funding scheme for
ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led and dominated regional
peacekeeping force in Liberia and currently funded entirely
by voluntary contributions. Consider funding at least some
of ECOMOG on an assessed basis at the United Nations, ·
either on the regular or peacekeeping budget.
•
Help create more incentives for soldiers to disarm and
demobilize.
• .
Use. U.S. expertise t.o formulate job-training and
public works programs for soldiers being demobilized under
the Abuja Peace Accord.
.
•
Explore urgently a strategy to forgive Liberia's U.N.
arrears, which are hampering access to international
financing.
Explore how to assist in re-opening Roberts
International Airport. (Senator Kassebaum has expressed her
interest in this project.)
Angola:.
Press Savimbi directly to fulfill his pledge to me at
Bail undo to quarter 16,500 UNITA soldi'ers by February 8.
(Though it may not be realistic now to expect such a large
number by Feb. 8, we should keep the heat on Savimbi to
perform.)
Press Savimbi on his other commitments, including
cessation of propaganda broadcasts, release of prisoners,
ending cease-fire violations, submission of names of
officials pursuant to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, permit
free circulation of goods and people, and end the
ha'rassment of UNAV'EM troops.
Plan for contingency of Savimbi reneging on quartering
pledge.
•
Discuss UNITA violations of arms embargo in the U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
�FEB- 1-96 THU 14:18
P. 05
•
Press the Government of Angola to take more
affirmative steps to integrate UNITA politically into
political institutions and militarily into the Angolan
Army. Press Government to follow through generally on its
commitments under the Lusaka Peace Agreement and
commitments President Des Santos made in Washington in
December. ·Also engage in private discussions with Angolan
officials about continued arms flows into the country.
Follow through on U.S. commitments at the Brussels
Donors Conference ($190 million of reconstruction and
humanitarian aid), and press other governments to do their
share.
·
Assist UNAVEM and the Government of Angola to provide
transitional training to tJNITA soldiers in the quartering
areas, and means to integrate into civilian life those not
joining the Angolan Army.
Undertake high-visibility u.s. missiona to bolster the
quartering process, such as a U.S. medical mission into a
quartering site, and a JCET (Joint Comoined Exercise
Training) to help build a quartering camp (including
medical. facility) .
·
Send in more medical supplies for local hospitals, and
more tents for quartering areas.
•
Provide rnor~ U.S. de-mining expertise and equipment.
�3463
· SBCRE'!'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Declassified UnderAuthorit)rofthe.
Interagency Secmiij· De(ll¥sificationAppeals Panel,
INFORMATIO:tf
E:o. ~3.5.26;,Sect1<m.;S·3(b){3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040ydocument no. 18
Declassification Date: Mar~h 18, 2014
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Recent U.S. Initiative on Burundi
I
/
'
/
~nt
Tce U.S.
1
This memorandum provides you with an update· on r
efforts to help resolve the crisis in Burundi .
The situation in Burund~~ontinues to
deteriorate. Hundreds of people are dying 1~eekly. Analysts
predict that a high-level assassinati~·oup attempt or
n,
insu7gent. at~ack on the capital Buj·umbu·r. could precipitate
mass1ve k1ll1ng and refugee flows, pos bly on a scale
·
approaching that of Rwanda in 1994. ·
Current Situation:
T~ip:
To launch a n
U.S. strategy to prevent a
humanitarian disaster in Burundi. Our strategy has three
components: 1) shoring up the f agile "moderate'; Hutu-Tutsi
coalition government; 2) urging the Tutsi moderates to rein in
Tutsi extremists responsible f r much of the killing; and 3)
curbing the deadly and destab lizing extremist Hutu insurgency
based in Zaire. We will al
strengthen the negotiating efforts
of former Tanzanian Presid t Julius Nyerere by appointing a
special· envoy to·assist h' .
Purpose of My
Ou message was well-received. I believe my
trip advanced the
rs two elements of our ~trategy by
encouraging Burundia moderates to remain in positions of
influence. Their d arture would cause a dangerous power vacuum
that the extremist would eagerly fill. Whil~ we_continue to try
to influence Tuts' extremists by threatening to isolate any
government that .ames to power by force, our actual leverage with
them is limited
Those with greatest influence are Tutsi
moderates in t e Government and Army. In the past, they have
curbed extrem'st activity by arresting perpetrators and appealing
to the popul tion to exercise restraint. I pushed them to do so
again.
Results of My Trip:
They aske
activity
for our assistance, in return, to curb Hutu extremist
We pledged to do all we could in that regard.
Reas n: 1.5 (d)
Dec assify On: 5/20/06
Derived From: Multiple Sources
cc: Vice. President
Chief of Staff
·
�SECRET
2
The Need to Engage Mobutu:
Fulfilling this pledge require
prevailing upon the Hutu insurgents and their Zairian sp sors to
halt the civil war and commit to power-sharing negotia ·ons under
Nyerere's auspices. President Mobutu of Zaire can do uch to
rein in the Hutu insurgents and durb arms flows to
e region.
At present, Zaire serves as a base for the Hutu i surgency as
well as their main source of arms. Zaire also
lows
inflammatory radio broadcasts into Burundi fro Zaire. Mobutu
has failed, moreover, to arrest Rwandan war
iminals resident in
Zqire and allow UN monitors at airports use for arms shipments.
To pressure Mobutu o play a more
constructive role, we sent a high-level team to Zaire from May
20-21 to press Mobutu to take specifi steps to curb the violence
in Burundi. While our team made no
mmit;:ments regarding u.s.
support, they indicated we would be repared to reciprocate in
some fashion if Mobutu first took oncrete, positive action.
U.S. "carrots" might include ens ing that Mobutu receives full
credit internationally for his
le in a peace agreement,
reconsidering providing him a isa to participate in the Atlanta
Great Lakes conference, looki g at ways to enhance our support ·
for the upcoming elections i Zaire and supporting
reestablishment of the Econ mic Community of Great Lakes States.
Meeting With Mobutu:
Mobutu assured
ion of his control over the Hutu ·
insurgents and
obtain a cease-fire declaration from
them in return
se-fire from the Burundi government and
the start of negotiat' ns. Mobutu asked us to engage the Burundi
government on a poss· le cease-fire date. After a cease-fire,
Mobutu pledged to s p arms flows through Zaire.
1-known for his grand promises and lack of
While Mobutu is
action, we have ~ rious indications that.he may be taking some of
the steps he pl ged. We must be cautious, however, to judge
· Mobutu on what e actually does and not on what pe promises.
To this end, George Moose and an interagency team
returned to he region this week. Their goal is to try to broker
a cease-fir and the start of all-party negotiations under
President yerere's auspices.
Moose Missio .
Finally, the United States
continu s to press for joint military planning to enable the
intern ional community tq respond rapidly to a humanitarian
crisis should preventive diplomacy fail. We have reiterated our
pledg made over a year ago to provide airlift and related
supp rt for an emergency humanitarian force, while making clear
no .s. ground troops will deploy to Burundi.
Military Contingency .Planning:
�---- · · · · - · - · · · · · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - · · · - · · · - · · - - - - - · - · · ·-----------·-----
SECRET
3
The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Germany, Fra
the UN have recently ag~eed to join in planning efforts.
everal
African countries have indicated a willingness to partie' ate in
a Burundi force, if provided equipment, logistical and inancial
support. However, at present the international commu ty is far
from ready to deploy such a force.
�. SECRST
3463
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
Declassi!ied UngerA\.1thorit):. of.th'!'
Interagency Security Declassincatii:m.i?ppeals Panei,
E.O: 13526; Section 5·30>)(3)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
13-040, document no. 19
FROH:
1\NTHONY LJU<E
.SUBJECT:
Recent U.S. Initiat
ate: March 18, 2014
Purpose
To provide an update on our recent effor s to help resolve the
crisis in Burundi~
~
Background
Curreht Situation:
The situation n Burundi continues to
deteriorate.
Estimates aree #und eqs of people are dying weekly,
Analysts predict a high-level a sassination, coup attempt or
insurgent attack on the capita Bujumbura '(all serious
possibilities) could precipi te massive killing and refugee
flows, possibly on a scale
aChing that·of Rwanda in 1994.
Purpose of My Trip:
- derw .all il reaso
an
in Burundi.
...---
Our strategy has th/ee components: ·
1) shoring up
e "modera·te" :-eenter in Buru~g;i,b~,'hich lead3 Ure~
-fr:agt:le- Hutu-T tsi coal i tiori gove:rnment·i 2) urging the Tutsi
moderates to ein
Tutsi extretnists responsible for much of the
killing; 3)
urbing the deadly an(i destabilizing extremist Hutu
insurgency ased in
re.
In aclaition 7 'We will increase support
to the ne tiating eff·or.ts. o·f former Tanzanian P~esident Julius.
Nyerere
appo
ing a spe9ial envoy to assist iffiA:in th9
+J--:--f;...,.--s-1'..,..-::rh::srroo-nnlhnnrmi±'-.
•r>egi~
. ~
.
Cl~ll.r~
Our message, of eent:inued.
:::IECP.i:'L
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:
5/20/06
cc: ViGe President
Chief of Staff.
�SECRET
2
-=~
,±eackrs thafll<ed us for oor pt esence, 3t.r.at:
is impossible
to~:ur~ ~
success
r:~
crete
terms, I believe my trip · · · eo . o. adva,ncecL~ first wo elenents
of our~Burund~ strategy. fn the past,
. . visitS-R..r¥ti'1!"' helpeJ.e_
quell violence and encourageK Burundian m era
· -elers ~ho fear
-:for Lheir lives to
positions
infl
-'fhis is
't:h .
\
WhileJh';i~t~Sd StatesCGan eont:inuo
extremists by threa-tening to isolate
to
power by force, our leverage is limi
influence -ever Tutsi ext1 e:mists.. are utsi mot;ierates in the
Government a~ Army.
In the past,
. ·.
, they have ·-been
~ curb extremist a.ctivity
arresting perpetrators and
appealing to
population to
restraint.
I pushed them
to do so again.
for our· assistance J V.
-and ,.rould Eio their best. -J~~-¥-e~
to qurb Hutu extremist
do all ~ we
could in ~ regar~
...-strat:e~y.
tr-r
.
~-~1
plt_~,)~
.
.' .
~a.:.:,.~.(... ~
The Need to Engage Mobu.
third element o.f ou£"
-st:t:ate.gy requires prey iling upon the Hutu insurgents and th.eir
Zairian sponsors to h lt the civil war and cornniit to powersharing negotiation unde
· ·
±an
-J;l.J:;esident Jt1l±~rer~ ~ey to resolvin13
in BJJrundi
~s persuad~ Pres dent M butu of Zaire)t? rein
Hut.u
lhsurgents and cu b arm flows to the rlg1on.
~ementiL§fJ.:he
M ~~--
. 's ~rlLO-.
~~
·
.
u~
c).,
Zaire
~~~8~::.Q'.l:i~~H+t;.;i,..1~~--G-;t.....ia..t:J:as-~e--oe-tlfe::-Httffi-:rttStt-:fr'€!g:.ee:TJnrt:-:t:~ trcLI..l ~
broadcasts into Burundi from
to irnplemi!Snt pledges t9 arrest
.
wandan war crimina s .re dent in
ire and
low UN J,.A\-~
. airports used f:::>F_ ~rms shipments.
·
"d-o!...a-1;1-~~,.y.,:>J:!.'<?
·
·
o.l--
~~~
t~v-J--
Meeting With Mobutu: ~-:E-fe-:E:J; ·1o pressure Mobut · to play a
more c nstructive rolel\with .~;esp~ct to EIO:t:ond:i(, wit your
appro al, we ..:&eoX: the ~HFJf:eeedented step of •Sendin-g a high-level
team to Zaire May 20-21.
DDCI Georg~ Tenet, Assistant Secretary
e Moose and NSC Directoi Shawn McCormick pressed Mobutu to
specific steps to curb the violence in Burundi.
~hbs~
�SECRET
3
/
unconditionally negotJ.£ions t;mder Nyer~re~pices,; 2)
stopping weapons ~ments to the Hutu i
urgents; 3) perm·
UN observers a
ey boarder airports
monitor arms fl
halting extr ,ist Hutu radio broa
sts emanating fr
aire;
5) contin ng to detain intimi
ors
the Rwanga r fugee
camps/nd 6) arresting su~ cted Rwar:dan war etimi ls in Zaire.
in
While the U.S. team made ho commitment's regardin u.S. ·suppo
y indicated we would be prepared to reciproc te in some
fashion i f Mobutu first took c6ncret~, positi,e
ion. U.S.
'.'carrots'.' might incl~~~~ring
'Mobut
full cre.dit
1nternat1onally for br:1ng:u1g about a peace
r e considering providing .him a vis a to ¥4'-s-;i'LF---fo-i""""-f':rrr+t::rr-fPT1"'h:n---;-,:-rAtlanta. to participate
a Great Lakes · Oriference, looking at
ways to enhance. our support for the up oming elections in Zaire
and perhaps assisting in support
t e re~establishment of an
Economic Community of Great Lakes S tes (CEPGL).
~~eftse
to U.S. request:B"(' Mob
assured our delegation of
his control over the Hutu insur nts and offered to obtain a
cease-fire declaration from th
in return for a cease-fire from
the Burundian government and
e beginning of negotiations.
_
Mobutu asked our side to eng ge the Burundi government o~~ "
possible date for a cease-f' re.
He also sai~~ ~e-fire) t...t. ~Ld
-wOlJld include a
arms flows through Zaire.
~
While Mobutu d1·
· ree to stationing UN o
at key airports,
e di agree to re iew the issue. Moreov r, his
National Security dv'sor privately
omised DDCI Tenet that he
would push Mobutu h d on·this point.
·obutu promised to d al
with extrem~st radi
roadcasts· emanatin from zaire, if w could
pinpoint exactly were the.transmissions
re coming from.
We
agreed to do so. Unfort::: nately, Mobutu mad no .commitmen s to
continue detaini g intimi tors in the Rwanda refugee ca ps or
to arrest war c
�SSG RET
SECRET
4
�CONFIDEN'PIAL
with ~ECI\E'f ATTACHME!ttTIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5426
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 8, 1996
INFORMATION
~
1
ci
~
~
~
<U
"1"
"):l
0
8 g
~
..c::
~SUBJECT:
&, ::E
~QC'?,... ..
.,r, !:· l/) ~ ~
o'1je
.. ·c ~'~
~ i3 ·~
:5 Ji.::;.
.1:!
11 6
THROUGH:
E8
~ ~
.~· ~
~
§ "! FROM :
"' .g
0
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~
'Of
NatJ Sec Advisor
has seen
/
MACARTHUR DeSHAZER
SHAWN
.
McCORMI~
NOTED
Your Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Paul
Kagame, 11:15 a.m., Friday, August 9
o· ;::,
z ~
0
] ·.;:: Recen t Deve 1 opmen t s .
~~r;,§::~
i i ~· ~ ·~Rwanda -- of stability toRPF-led coalition government has brought
Internal: The
a measure
the country, but has both adopted and
0
!l>A u ]
'-----'~
0
The judicial system and
administrative state were decimated in 1994. At least 75,000
peopl~ suspected of genocide but as yet uncharged live in squalid
prisons with more being added daily. The Parliament has
repeatedly delayed passage of a draft genocide law which would
categorize crimes, allow charges to be brought and permit limited
amnesty. Members of Congress, NGOs and the international
community are concerned about these' ongoing problems. Guerrillas
linked to the former genocidist regime now launch attacks into
western Rwanda, and have committed hundreds of assassinations
throughout the country. This fuels the RPF's feeling of
insecurity, which in turn makes it unwilling to act on the draft
genocide law. It also raises the spectre of retaliatory raids
into Zaire. Rwandan troops have also committed atrocities since
Kagame took office.
created several formidable problems.
Refugees: There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees living in camps
under the care of international organizations 11 million iri
eastern Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania). Reconstituted elements
of the former
gime, their army and militias which were
responsible for the 1994 genocide largely control the camps and
have prevented any substantive efforts at repatriation. The
presence· of these camps has become a serious destabilizing
element in the region. The international community is spending
approximately $1 million on these camps of which the United
states provides 30 percent.
CONFIDEN'PIAL
with SECRET ATTACHMENT
Classified by: Derivative
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On: 8/5/06
Derived From: 8/5/96 Burns Memo to Sens
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
BACKGROUND
Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent RPF military
tactician and politician Paul Kagame, is here on a private visit
at the invitation of the Council ·on Foreign Relations where he is
scheduled to speak on August 8. His itinerary includes events at
CSIS, the Holocaust Museum, U.S. Committee for Refugees, IMF,
World Bank and the Corporate Council on Africa. He has already
met with Tim Wirth, George Moose and Secretary Perry during this
visit. You last met with Kagame in your office in December 1994
and again during your ten-day trip to the continent the same
month.
·
U.S. is a strong supporter of the GOR. AID has provided
transition assistance, DOD humanitarian assistance and IMET, and
various agencies have contributed money and personnel to assist
the International-War Crimes Tribunal and Rwandan court system.
We have also supported Rwanda at the UN, including support for
lifting the_ arms embargo. European governments believe the U.S.
has a heighten~d degree of credibility with the GOR.
Th~
Vice President Kagame's Agenda
Kagame will want to discuss continued cross border attacks from
elements of the former reg~me based among the camps in eastern
Zaire. He may also raise. the larger security threat posed by the
continued existence of the camps and the unwillingness of camp
leaders to permit repatriation. He can be expected to seek
further development aid and diplomatic/political support. Kagame
has indicated an interest in obtaining non-lethal military
equipment from DOD stocks.
OBJECTIVES
You should emphasize your commitment to a strong U.S.-Rwandan
relationship. Stress need to attain GOR goals of repatriation,
reconcil
ion, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
General Kagame has expressed concern about general security
situation and cross-border incursions into Rwanda·. You should
inform him that the United States is preparing to take the lead
in developing a plan with the international community to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation away from
the Rwanda border. Kagame will likely be very supportive of such
measures but may express concern about how best to separate the
ex-FAR from the returning refugees. You should highlight
important GOR role in protecting and welcoming refugees home and
stress need for Rwandan Parliament to pass draft genocide law.
CONFIDEnTIAL
'~
�COHFIDBN'PIAL
3
Burundi:
The GOR has supported small-scale transfers of weapons
to the Burundi military over the last two years. While it is
willing to support sanctions against the Buypya regime, the GOR
felt deceived by other regional states which moved last week to
implement sanctions immediately rather than using~th~ }preat as
5
leverage for beginning talks with Hutu insurgents.~ ~~press
interest in working to end arms flows to Burundi and press, with
the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi government
and Hutu ins~rgents.
~
Concurrence by:
Eric Schwartz (
Attachments
Tab I
Talking Points
Tab II Bio
COHFIDBN'PIAL
�DeclasSified Under Auihoi:itx of tn(i
.
I nter·agency Securit',\'· Declassification Appeals Panel.
E.:o. 1~26, Sectlon5..3(b)(3)
.
.
CONFIDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 21
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Bilateral Relationship:
•
Despite difficult problems, you have brought meas~re of
stability to Rwanda and we wish to continue working with you.
Want to reaffirm support for your government's objectives of
repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and justice.
•
Only long-term solution for Rwanda is power-sharing in which
all non-genocidist elements can participate~ Rwandans must
develop this system since no amount of outside assistance can
replace consensus among the Rwandan people.
Refugees:
•
Continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire
and Tanzania is destabilizing and untenable.
•
Recognize the security problems camps pose and are preparing
to lead an effort with the international community to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. This
will include moving humani
an supplies to within Rwanda.
•
Will require cooperation of GOR to receive large numbers of
returnees. Hope your government will take all necessary steps
to protect and welcome them home.
•
Large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their conditions,
are being used by the extremist Hutus to make refugees fear
for safety upon return. Understand your Parliament has yet to
pass its draft genocide law. When do you expect this will
happen?
•
Share concern Tribunal has not 'moved as quickly as we would
like. Hope GOR will cooperate to the fullest extent with the
Tribunal, including providing access to.witness~s and
documents. It is in all our interest to see perpetrators
brought to justice.
Burundi:
•
Your visit follows Buyoya coup and Arusha II summit of
regional leaders that called for extensive .sanctions as a
"shock therapy" for Bujumbura regime. As sanctions come into
CONFI DE~JT IJ'rL
Declassify on: 8/7/06
Reason: 1.5(d)
�GO:HFIDENTIAL
2
force, we count on your government's key role in enforcing
them. I am interested in your views about the situation.
•
Hope you can use ties to Burundian authorities to press need
for talks with Hutu insurgehts.
If Asked:
•
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for acquisition
of non~lethal U~S. military equipment by Rwanda on a case-bycase basis. ~owever, we note that our concern about prisons,
especially on Capitol Hill, will limit our ability to act.
•
IMET: Rwanda is eligible for expanded IMET, but not regular
IMET. Serious concerns on Capitol Hill about human rights
violations and prison overcrowding. Must pass genocide law.
GO'NFIDENTIAL
�Decllliified Under A,~thoritY ?hl;le
Interagency'Secwity-D,ecJ.assificabori Appeals Panel,
E.0; 1~526, Section 5;3(b)(3)
,
.
COUPIDE!i'fi:AL
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 50
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
MEETING WITH RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT PAUL KAGAME
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent Rwanda
politician f'aul Kagame, a Tut
and member of the (mainly
Tutsi} RPF has been in office since the then-guerrilla RPA took
Kigali in July, 1994. Kagame is one of the "59ers" who grew up
as a refugee in Uganda and served in Museveni's army.
He led
the RPA to victory, but ceded the top spot to PreBident Pasteur
Bizimuhgu, a moderate Hutu.
Kagame can be expected to seek further development aid and
diplomatic/political support from the USG. He has indicated an
interest in obtaining non-lethal military equipment from DOD
stocks. Vice President Kagame will have met with
Undersecretary of State Tim Wirth and As stant Secretary of
State George Moose on August 6, and Defense Secretary Perry on
August 7.
The RPF-led coalition government has brought a large measure of
stability to the country, while also encountering several
formidable problems since taking power~ The judicial system
and administrative state were decimated in 1994. There are
over 75,000 prisoners in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions,
most arrested since Kagame took office. Members of Congress,
NGOs and the international community are concerned about this
problem, and the GOR's apparent lack of response to it. ·There
are delays in putting a new law in place to handle this huge
case load. There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees, most of
them in eastern Zaire and some of them armed. Most of the
refugees receive international assistance and are under the
control of the government and milit
responsible for the
genocide. Armed attacks back int<) Rwanda from this population
have increased.
Rwandan troops have committed atrocities since
Kagame took office. There is a sense that guerrillas linked to
the former genocidist regime now launch attacks in western
Rwanda, as well as assassinations throughout the country, at
will.
This fuels the RPF's feeling of insecurity, which in
turn makes it_ unwilling to release prisoners.
·
The USG has supported the current government. We have given
over $750 million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the
sub-region (much more than development aid for Rwanda, a sore
eenFIDEN'fiAL
�88NFII3fllf'i'Hs::C
-2point with Kagame); AID has given substantial sums in
development aid, DOD has provided humanitarian assistance and
IMET training; various agencies have contributed money and
personnel to efforts to ready the International Tribunal and
Rwandan court system to try those suspected of crimes against
humanity, including genocide. We have also supported the
Rwandan government at the UN, including support for lifting the
arms embargo against Rwanda.
European governments believe that
the USG is especially credible with the GOR.
OBJECTIVES
o
To assure Vice President Kagame that the USG supports the
Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation,
reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of
genocide to justice.
o
To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in
seeing a successful voluntary repatriation of Rwanda
refugees, and note that a key step towards this goal would
be reducing the prison population so that refugees feel
less of a threat of arrest and imprisonment. The genocide
bill currently before Rwanda's Parliament is a good first
step.
o
To impress upon the Vice President the u.s. interest in
working with Rwanda to end arms flows to Burundi and press,
with the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi
government and Hutu insurgents.
TALKING POINTS
o
We wish to reaffirm our support for your government's
objectives. The situation in Rwanda has not been easy.
Despite the very difficult problems you have had to face,
you have brought a measure of stability to your country,
and we wish to continue to work with you.
o
We feel that the only long-term solution for Rwanda will be
a power-sharing arrangement in which all non-genocidist
elements of Rwanda can participate.
It must be up to
Rwandans to develop thi~ arrangement, si~ce no amount of
outside assistance can replace consensus among the Rwandan
people. This may be your government's biggest challenge.
o
The continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in
Zaire and Tanzania is destabilizing and unt~nable.
It is
in neither the Rwandan government's nor the international
community's interest to continue with the status quo.
It
CQ'WFIB:Stl''ii?Ilxl5
�CONTI flBU'f H!tL
-3-
is critical that there be an expeditious and successful
voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The
USG is discussing with the international community
relocation of camps away from the border and resulting
closure of those that have qeen most problematic, and
taking steps to encourage voluntary repatriation. Rwanda
would have serious responsibilities if such a strategy is
adopted, including being prepared to receive large numbers
of returnees and moving the Petit Barriere camp deeper into
Rwanda.
o
At the same time, we are deeply concerned by the actions
taken several weeks ago by Burundi authorities in expelling
thousands of Rwandans from refugee camps against their
will. We were equally disturbed by reports that this
action, which contavenes Burundi_,s obligations under the
Refugee Convention and established international practice,
may have enjoyed the support of your government.
o
In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is
essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which
will encourage refugees to return. There has been
progress, but it is particularly important that the prison
population be reduced significantly, that there be security
for those who repatriate to their homes, and that abuses at
the hands of security forces be minimized.
This is of
grave concern to us all.
o
The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their
conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make
refugees fear for the
safety upon return. The same is
true of reports of killings of military-age Hutu men and
other civilians.
o
We share your concern that the Rwanda Tribunal has not
moved as quickly as we all would like. We hope your
government will cooperate to the fullest extent with the
Tribunal, including by providing access to witnesses and
documents.
It is in all of our interest to see
perpetrators brought to justice.
o
We were pleased that your government ceased its
participation in the recent forced repatriation of Rwandan
refugees from Burundi.
Ignoring internationally accepted
humanitarian principles not only leads to further regional
instability, but also undermines the credibility of the
GOR's policy of welcoming refugees home in safety and
dignity.
�COM!iTEH!lff'fV:tL
-4-
o
Your visit comes in the wake of the Buyoya coup and the
Arusha II summit of regional leaders, including Rwanda,
that called for extensive sanctions as a "shock therapy"
for the Bujumbura regime. We would be very interested in
your views. As sanctions come into force, we will count
very much on your government's key role in enforcing them.
If Asked:
o
Military Equipment: We will consider requests for
acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda
on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that our concern
about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could limit our
ability to act.
·
CON~ I
l9EU'il? Iil\..J:s
�SECRET
7576
THE PRESIDENT HAS S£EN
'"'1.-1~-q"
DeClassified UnderAutnoiit:Y .of the.
Interage~cy Securlty·D-~classificaiion Appeals Panel,
E.O. 1.3526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE~ESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Eastern Zaire:
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 22
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Update and Next Steps
,Situation on the Ground: More than 500,000 refugees have
returned to Rwanda from North Kivu, Zaire since Friday. An
estim~ted 30,D00-8D,OOO more remain in that area --many of whom
are former soldiers and their-families who will.not return to
Rwanda. The rest mai wish to return but require assistance.
Still .unaccounted for are several hundred thousand ref~gees in
South Kivu. Imagery reveals no large population masses. Hence,
we speculate these refugees may have moved deeper into Zaire or
north to join the flow back to Rwanda. Another possibility is
that UNHCR's original estimate of 1.2 million refugees may be
inflated.
Re-Defining the Mission: I had productive meetings today in
Ottawa with senior Canadian defense and foreign affairs officials
as well as with PM Chretien. We agreed the mass refugee return
necessitated a different, more limited mission focused on
assisting the Rwandan Gover:nment (GOR) to absorb and reintegrate
returnees. If the GOR agrees, we propose to establish an airbridge immediately through Entebbe, Uganda, to Kigali, Rwanda, to
transport any needed relief assistance. JCS estimates the total
international personnel required would be about 500 in Entebbe
and 200 in Kigali (including the Canadian headquarters, U.S. air
control element, civil affairs and psy-ops teams and a civilmilitary relations cell). This presence would also enable us to
respond quickly, if necessary, to any humanitarian requirements
in Eastern Zaire. We will continue to monitor population flows
in South Kivu to try to determine if there are large numbers of
people at risk. We believe no foreign military presence is
necessary at this time in Goma.
Incidentally, we detected less enthusiasm among Canadian
Gove·rnment officials for a large mission to Rwanda/Zaire than PM
SECRET
Classified by: Susan E. Rice
Reason: x4
Declassify On: ll/18/21
Derived From: Multiple Sources
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�SECRET
2
Chretien has expressed. Undoubtedly, the PM has been personally
inspired by Amb. Raymond Chretien's direct pleas for action.
Next Steps: The U.S. pledged $140 mill. today to assist
international agen~ies and the GOR with refugee relief,
reintegration and reconstruction. We have pre-positioned air
assets.in Europe tri respond to any airlift requests, ~nd U.s.
personnel are en route to the region to prepare for air lift
operations. Before deployment of any multinational force, we
must obtain the consent of the GOR, which is likely to accept
this limited mission provided there are no French troops in
Rwanda. We must also work with Canada to ensure broad
international agr~ement to the redefined mission. A Canadian-led
multinational military planning session is still scheduled for
Thursday in Stuttgart.
We have agreed with Canada on the designation of an African
deputy commander who will be subordinate effectively, if not
·nominally, to the U.S. Deputy. We hope this position coupled
with the inclusion of a significant Afri~an presence in the force
will allay African ~oncerns.
Finally,
evolving
underway
with NGO
SECRET
we are working to keep the press informed of the
mission requirements and the specific U.S. actions
tb address these new requirements. We will also consult
leaders November 19 at the White House.
�7743
/;, .. :16,yu_.~'(;:?""' ·
... /(;,,,r:rlfu/ r/f-,. ;z,;-,.,.
5be .-:!/).,r:.;,.r/e"''/ r6
Cape Martin, France, November 6th 1996.
To His Excellency
Mr. William J~fferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600, Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.c. 20500
of
America
UNITED STATES OF· AMERICA
Dear Mr. President,
I would like to hasten and congratulate
you for your recent reelection victory. I know you
must be very happy about this new four years term that
enables you to lead the .United States of America. The
american people are satisfied with your strong leader.,..
ship. I share in your joy.
As you know it, the situation that prevails
in the Great J Lakes Region 'of Central Africa is worry.,..
some.
Zaire is suffering on its eastern boundaries
from a dramatic situation and once again, we are victims
of our hospitality. Indeed, after we suddenly opened
up in 1994 our borders to more than one million refugees'
for humanitarian reasons, we ar~ actually facing an
unfair warfare imposed to us by some neighboring states.
The current conflicts in several countries
bordering Zaire are of ethnical intensity. They are
at the same time complex; we ought to solve them through
politically concerned means. That is why I strongly
urge the United States to use his strong leadership
to help reach the global, political and concerted solu.,..
tions to the present conflicts in the Great Lakes Region .
.. /.
�"Z~ ,.:j').,:,;.,;k/1/ ...h
fi, ./itj~rrlti?m'
./#6u,ecAa/r/tr Jiru;/-1'!
2
Such a positive implication of the United
States in this approach will of course help as it did
in the former Yugoslavia case, and put an end to the
ethnic and unjustified warfare that Zairean neighboring
states have imposed upon him. Finally, I would like
to sease this opportunity and let you know that the
democratic process in my "country is going on quite
well. As it has been agreed on by all the Zairean
political
leaders
and
other
international
partners,
the free,
transparent and democratic elections will
be held next year.
I thank you in advance for your benevolent
attention to my request and for the reply you intend
to give to it. My best wishes and highest regards.
HOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA
�SEGRET
SS6~S!J:
THE PRESIDENT HAS Sfl~
~ -~
1
~~ ~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1996
ACTION
ou 26 ~s~o'l
~96~
\c._
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
- ~r.ocr{
~
FROM:
ANTHONY~
SUBJECT:
Eastern Zaire/Rwanda: Response to Canadian
Proposal for Deployment of Multinational Force to
Central Africa
Purpose
To decide whether or not to support the Canadian proposal for
deployment of a multinational force (MNFl to Central Africa.
:Background
Following the Stuttgart planning session, the Government of
Canada (GOC) today presented a specific proposal for a
multinational humanitarian mission in Central ~frica and
requested a formal response from potential troop contributors
within 36 hours.
The Canadian Proposal
Canada is proposing the immediate establishment of a
multinational force (MNF) with the mission of facilitating the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitating voluntary
refugee repatriation~ The MNF would perform the following tasks:
• Establish MNF Headquarters (HQ) in Entebbe, Uganda and Kigali,
Rwanda. There would be no HQ in Zaire. Any decision to
deploy the HQ to Zaire must be taken subsequently by consensus
of key troop contributors represented on the planned
multinational Steering Board.
•
Place existing national forces in the theater (airlift control
elements, psyops, aerial reconnaissance etc.) under Canadian
operational control.
SSGRST
Reason: 1.6, x4
Declassify On: 11/26/21
SEGRET
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�ot::bt~t: I
SECRET
•
2
·Deploy 350-person Canadian military Disaster Assistance team
(DART) to Entebbe and possibly to Rwanda.
The DART would not
deploy to Zaire unless there is a subsequent consensus among
key troop contributors to do so.
•
Plan, prepare and execute air-drops of supplies in Zaire, if
necessary, to assist populations in need. The airdrop
operation would be conducted from Entebbe. While aware of the
drawbacks of airdrops, Canada seeks our agreement now to give
the Force Commander (FC) authority to decide whether to
execute airdrops in Zaire. The GOC would like the U.S. and
·others to participate in the airdrop operation.
Unresolved Issues: Canada has not defined the force structure,
although we estimate it would consist of 1000-2000 persons. Nor
has it defined the role for African countries. We continue to
stress the importance of .significant African participation in the
force. Canada has not yet secured the consent of the Governments
of Rwanda and Uganda for this operation. Finally, Canada is
soiiciting at least 2,000 troops to participate in a potential
convoy security operation in Eastern Zaire but does not have
sufficient pledges to date. canada agrees any decision to
conduct convoy security operations in Zaire must be taken
subsequentl~ by consensus of key troop contributors.
Proposed
u.s.
Res,ponse
State, OSD, JCS, OVP and NSC recommend the U.S. convey to Canada
our willingness to participate in the following MNF activities:
•
•
•
Establish,Multinational Headquarters.
Place. existing national forces in the theater under Canadian
operational control.
Plan for airdrops, issue alert order and take other necessary
steps to enable execution within 48 hours.
The .decision to
execute must be made subsequently by the Steering Board.
•
Support deployment of the Canadian DART team to Entebbe or
Rwanda, provided any decision to deploy to Zaire must be taken
subsequently by the Steering Board.
U.S. agreement to and participation in the MNF should be
predicated, however, on fulfillment of the following conditions;
Establishment of a Steering Board -- the composition, mandate
and voting procedures of which are acceptable to the USG.
Formal agreement of the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to
the deployment, including status of forces agreements.
SECRE':P
�------·-··-·-
ot.bHE~r
3
SSCRET
Significant African participation in the mission.
Agreement on appropriate rules of engagement.
Confirmation of the command and control arrangements agreed
bilaterally with Canada.
l
\
J
J
~
AID, OMB and USUN support the above proposal as well. However,
AID is concerned that, by deferring any decision to deploy assets
for airdrops at this time, we may look irresponsible if later we
learn there is a dire need and our response is delayed 48 hours.
OMB notes the U.S. costs of this operation are likely to be
substantially below the estimates made for the original MNF
proposal. U.S. forces currently on the ground (approximately
4301 could cost $25 mill. or less; potential U.S. participation
in an expanded mission would increase this estimate. As planning
proceeds, we would need to address those costs and review
potential ways of offsetting them. USUN recommends the U.S. not
object to other countri~s' p~e-positioning asset~ in the region
for air~r~ps; however, 1t th1nks the U.S. should ~ot do so and
any dec1s~on to execute must be made by the Steer~ng Board.
Other Countries' Perspectives
We anticipate that Canada will not be satisfied with the proposed
U.S. response and will continue to insist on immediate authority
to conduct airdrops. The GOC feels under substantial political
pressure to 'do something' in Zaire. DOD thinks advance
authorization of airdrops is imprudent and strongly recommends we
not cede this point. We do not know whether Canada will accede
to the U.S. positio~ or decide to proceed without us. Several
other countries have expressed in New York a preliminary
readiness to support the Canadian proposal, including France,
Belgium, Ireland, Uganda, Denmark, Senegal and Portugal.
(They
do not yet have final positions from capitals.) Key UN agencies
also support the Canadian proposal as the best means of getting
an operation launched. However, UNHCR and the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations note that airdrops are potentially
dangerous and the least desirable method of delivering
assistance.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the proposed U.S. position outlined above for
transmission to Canada as soon as possibl~.
Approve
Disapprove
SSCRET.
~-
. S-E:GRET
(;t:~~:ON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,.':.:."
�SE:GRE+
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
20740
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 6, 1996
LO.CATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:20-4:15 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee
Meeting on Burundi and Rwandan Refugee Camps f-&1
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President's Office
William Wise
State
Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Bogosian
Defense
John White
Walter Slocombe
USUN
Madeleine Albright
Rick Inderfurth
Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta
OMB
Jack Lew
Gordon Adams
CIA
John Deutch
George Tenet
William Foltz
AID
Richard McCall
Nan Borton
JCS
John Shalikashvali
Michael Byron
White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Eric Schwartz
Mike Sheehan
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
Neither an ultimatum nor deadlines will be set for Major
Buyoya's regime. Sanctions implemented by regional states will
be supported.
f-&1
EUCOM/JCS will provide a detailed contingency plan for a
possible humanitarian operation in Burundi by Wednesday, August 7.
(-8.1
SECRET
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1. 5 (b) (d)
·
Declassify on: . 1. 6 X5,. X6s·~t-==~e=a..-=~~E~~,-=
�SECRET
SEGR~T
2
As a matter of urgency, NSC will coordinate an interagency
effort to formulate and implement a plan to recruit, support and
train African and other forces to participate in a potential
humanitarian intervention in Burundi. This plan will draw
heavily on the concept of an African Crisis Response Force, which
State and DOD will seek to implement as soon as possible.
~·
OMB will provide detailed options for funding the
establishment of a Burundi contingency force, modeled on the
concept of the African Crisis Response Force, as well as for
funding the U.S. contribution to a Burundi intervention force
established under UN auspices.
~
The interagency proposal for closure of refugee camps near
the Rwandan border is approved. The U.S. will seek to lead an
international effort to stimulate voluntary return of Rwandan
refugees and camp relocation, as necessary. The United States
proposal entails phasing out international assistance to existing
refugee camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps
·which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat.
Those refugees who choose not to return to Rwanda would be
relocated to camps away from the border.· ~
SECRET
SEGRE+
�20729 redo
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 5, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~
FROM:
MACARTHUR DESHAZER ~
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 p.m.
Burundi
1. Situation Report: Ask CIA to provide an update on recent
developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a
humanitarian cris
in the next six months.
For your information, there is
that Hutu rebels are planning insu gent operat1on
this weekend
imilarly, Bu
a preliminary strategy
Forces are repor
ave
renewed counterinsurgency efforts against Hutu rebels. It is
also expected to begin before the end of August.
2. Revised Options: Following your instructions during the JCS
briefing on Saturday, we have revised the options to include
alternatives that do not involve the U.S. leading the
intervention force. We have added two sub~options (2a&b) to
Option 2. Essentially, Option 2a calls for the U.S. to provide
requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the
operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. We
would pursue an intense diplomatic effort to identify a third
world country to lead the force and mount an all-out effort to
train, equip and support the selected country to lead the
intervention force. Option 2b is a variation of direct U.S.
participation outlined in the original paper.
You should discuss with General Shali how he wants to present to
the Principals .the JCS plan for.a humanitarian contingency force.
Ideally, he ·would give a short briefing on the safe area concept
briefed to you on Saturday and likely force size and composition
(by unit or function} required to perform the mission.
SECRET
Classified by: Derivative
Reason: 1.5 (a} (d)
Declassify On: 7/2/06
Derived From: Multiple Sou~ces
Declassified Under Authont~r o(th(!.
Interagency Security Declassific.ation Appeals Panel,
E.O. 1352( Section 5,3(1>)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 025
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�-----------
SECRET
3.
2
Options for U.S. Participation
If we are to be in a position to react effectively to the
impending crisis in Burundi, the only practical alternative to
doing nothing or doing it all ourselves is to marry the most
competent African forces with a competent lead nation and provide.
the Africans with substantial amounts of equipment, resources,
logistics support and (time.permitting) training.· In any case,
the u.s. should be prepared to play the role of lead nation i·f a
sis erupts before this plan can be implemented. You should
try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:
-- Take immediate steps to identify a third world nation in order
to obtain a commitment to lead a multinational intervention force
for Burundi.
-- Agree to provide requisite force cohesion and direction to the
selected third world country to lead a multinational in1:;.ervention
force by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and
organizational skill.
-- Pledge to commence accelerated training and logistics support
designed to prepare the force for mission requirements.
-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop
contributors to perform specific mission tasks 'along the lines of
the proposed action plan at Tab B(l).
-- Gain agreement for direct U.S. participation (Option 2b) in
the event a crisis erupts before an intervention force can be
assembled and prepared. If a crisis occurs within the next few
months, only the U.S. or France is capable of mounting a highly
e
ive humanitarian intervention. France
unlikely to do
so.
You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template
and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In
addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency
effort to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this
force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S.
con@buti.gn (vlce""-that of all1es). We will have great
~aifficultif"inding the required funds and may even have to
consider a supplemental.
4.
African Crisis Response Force
.You .should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to
establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be
implemented by the U.S. Task NSC to coordinate·implementation
effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the
SECRET
�------·--··----·-···
SECRET
3
proposal to selected African nations. Task OMB to work with
State and DOD to produce cost estimates and options for funding
to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.
Rwandan Refugee Camps
Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate
options for dealing with the security threat posed by the
continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC
produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all
concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level.
While the details of implementation must still be finalized,
there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR
and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to
Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with
those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat.
Those who choose·not to return would be relocated inside Zaire
and Tanzania.
While there is interagency consensus on the plan {which Dan
Spiegal ~upports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable
{and highly risky) without -~
•
a beefed up security presence in the camps, a determination to
neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of
Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement
plan) ;
•
a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve
the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due
process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal
killings, etc.
You should indicate that you share these concerns, and that our
efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with
what we are doing on the political/security side. ·
You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask
State to work with NSC to consult with ~llies and UNHCR to
implement the plan.
.
~ ,4,.,...,~
Concurrences by:
r-----~--~~~---------
Richard Clarke, Eric Schwarfz
Attachments
Tab A . Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
Tab 1 Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of
Option 2
Tab 2 African Crisis Response Force
Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps
SECRET
�Declassified Under AuthoritY of the
Interage~cy SecuritYDeela;sification Appeals Panel,
SECRET
E:o .. 1~526, Secrloq S:3Cb)C3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 58
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation
Principals·Committee Discussion Paper
Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian
contingency operation in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the
USG are warranted. ~
Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the
Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending
imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region
combine to increase the ·possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In
the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a
genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. ~
Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the: ·
international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete steps ·
have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response
should a worst case scenario ensue. ~
Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages.
UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide
support to humanitarian assistance efforts. ~
Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so
ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have
indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention
(Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an
effective mission without map.y months of intense training, substantial equipment,
logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide
ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country
willing to organize, command and control the force. ~
In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning
exercise in Carlisle, P A. That session produced a mission statement and concept for
the establishment of safe areal) to provide security to civilians at risk and for
supporting" delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis
for U.S. planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the
UN and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise
force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. (B)
EUCOM has been tasked to produce a detailed plan, which is due shortly
and which will represent the next step in the planning process. From these
SECRET
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/2/06
�SECRET
2
analyses, we hope to derive notional force structures for a basic plan and excursions
(i.e., with reduced mission and attendant force reductions). Excursions might
include one single or two safe areas. With notional force structures available, the
USG would be able, if desired, to try to recruit capable troops from targeted African,
western and other countries to perform specific functions. (81
At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States should move
beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a
humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near-term crisis
in Burundi. fS1
Assumptions
•
H a humanitarian disaster occurs, there will be substantial pressure for the
international community to respond, particularly since there has been
substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (81
•
H a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France
is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is
unlikely to do so. (81
•
If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing
nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other
foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail
providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics
support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. ~
•
No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a '1ead" nation
providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3). (81
•
The African countri~s most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g.,
Tanzania, ·uganda) ar.e least capable of performing effectively unless their
troops have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months.
(81
•
.
The cost to the United States of helping equip, sustain and support Mrican
troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. (Sj
Options:
1) Current Approach
To date, the United States has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian
crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift
international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we
SECRET
�SECRET
3
have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We
have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the
Arusha process in Dar es Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic
airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in
principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual
regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear
to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not
involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. (81
However, another. genocide remains all too possible. In th~ worst case, a wider
regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the ~risis builds, the United
States and others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not
doing more to try to stop the killing. (81
In the event of a crisis, the United States can maintain with considerable credibility
that we did our best -- within the limits of our prior commitments -- to avert
genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would stress
yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate. Most.
importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at risk
and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention.
Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food,
shelter; water) to refugees and displaced persons. (81
2) Enhanced International Donor Involvement
Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing one
of two hybrid Mrican/Western to respond quickly to a major crisis: (81
2 a) Robust Arusha Model
The Concept: The robust Arusha model would require the U.S. Government,
possibly in tandem with other key western donor nations, to commit to play a
greater role than previously planned in the provision of incentives for participation.
In sum, the United States would provide requisite force cohesion and direction by
underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. An
intense diplomatic effort would focus on a short list of most-capable Mrican nations
in order to obtain a commitment by one to lead the force. The short list would, at
best, include South Mrica, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania
and Zimbabwe. Once selected, an all-out effort would be made to train and support
selected country to lead the intervention force. To leverage other participation, the
United States would consider a full range of tools including economic offsets and
military incentives. Similar but tailored approaches would be made to the most
capable donor nations to flush out headquarters, combat support and brigade
structures. The immediate recruiting goals would be, in priority, a force
headquarters, support elements and sufficient troops to secure two safe areas
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(approximately 13,000). Once commitment to participation is obtained, the United
States (and hopefully other western nations) would commence accelerated training
and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements. Once
the operations commence, operational and sustainment support could be phased in
through a combined U.S. and/or western and MNF support group located in an
offset location(s) outside of Burundi; ~
Pros:
•
•
•
•
•
•
No U.S. troop involvement in Burundi beyond the modest support committed by
the President;
Limited direct U.S. military and political liabilities;
Positive and proactive U.S. leadership and support for the force;
Allows the United States to shape the force (and therefore the outcome);
Builds for interagency regional peacekeeping; ·
Positive sign (domestic/international) of U.S. interest and engagement. ~
Cons:
•
•
•
Gap between U.S. decision and operational readiness of force;
High cost/limited resources (however, this must be weighed relative to the cost of
doing nothing or committing U.S. forces);
Will require a major interagency effort to orchestrate legislative, fiscal, and
diplomatic activities. ~
2 b) Direct U.S. Participation:
The Concept: This model would involve a substantial U.S. troop commitment in
Burundi beyond that pledged by the President but would rely on African forces to
actually conduct the majority of operations in the contested areas, thereby reducing
the risk ofU.S. casualties. Even with American military and political leadership,
there is no guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown
American leadership often spurs others to follow suit.~
The United States would command the MNF in Burundi, provide logistics and
specialized headquarters support, a capability for country-wide Quick Reaction
Force operations, airport security, medical support, and aviation support. Other
Mrican donor nations would provide brigade headquarters and battalions "as is,
where is" to support an MNF structure similar to the one currently envisioned. The
United States would airlift these battalions into Burundi at which time they would
come under U.S. command and control. Costs would remain high as the United
States would still undertake to train and sustain African operational forces in
addition to absorbing operational and maintenance costs related.to U.S. forces.
Costs related to headquarters and support training would be reduced, however. ~
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Pros:
•
•
Tangible sign of U.S. commitment beyond logistics and training; could attract
other donor nations;
Enhanced efficiency in headquarters and C3I; could lower requirement for some
specialized equipment. ~
·
Cons:
•
Raises a myriad of problems related to PDD-25, command of U.S. forces and
force protection;
• Will raise war power issues;
• Increased likelihood of U.S. casualties, particularly if the United States provides
rotary wing aviation support;
• Saddles United States with potential for major operational failure since
combatant elements are not U.S.;
• Unknown level of opposition/resistance on the ground. (Sj
NB: Training costs would initially be less than the option above because the
United States would be drawing on existing battalions and would not be required to
substantially increase the capabilities of the African donor battalions. On the other
hand, training would take much longer since more units would have to be trained,
and costs would skyrocket at execution due to the greatly increased U.S.
involvement. ~
3) U.S. Intervention.
This is the only option which will provide an effective, immediate response to a
genocide in Burundi until some type of African force is trained. It is also the option
with the greatest chance for success assuming success is stopping the genocide.
Concomitantly, it is the option with the greatest likelihood of U.S. casualties. Such
an intervention would have a major downside in terms of domestic reaction. The
United States might be able to conduct this operation in tandem with other western
partners to temper criticism. ~
Pros:
•
•
Provides the quickest response to a genocide in Burundi;
Provides maximum operational efficiency (Sj
Cons:
•
•
Will trigger significant domestic reaction;
War powers issues will surface;
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•
•
•
6
Great likelihood of U.S. casualties;
Far beyond stated Presidential support;
Unknown resistance on the ground;
High potential for sustained U.S. commitment in Burundi.
~
Duration/Exit Strategy: A time limit would be placed on any intervention. The
duration of such a mission must still be determined. It could be set arbitrarily (e.g.,
three moriths) as the French did in Rwanda or it could be tied to a political outcome
--such as a negotiated power-sharing agreement. Should technical or operational
support beyond the regional force's capability be required in country, it could be
provided by contract personnel.· The "adopt-a-battalion" concept tried in Rwanda
could also provide a means to share the cost burden. In any case, after closure of
the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be
required to perlorm more traditional functions-- either to enhance security and
deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II in Rwanda) or to implement a peace
agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The duration of the follow-on force is
also uncertain but should be tied to the effective re-establishment by the
government of general security throughout the country. ~
Political Oversight: A body and process to provide political oversight to the
multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha
heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical
first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force.
Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a
regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia.
Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. (U)
U.S. Recruitment Effort: The United States would have to invest equipment,
money and diplomatic capital_to recruit and establish an effective force. We would
have to appro~ch capable African arid other troop contributors at the highest levels
and urge their participation in specific roles, primarily infantry but also certain
combat support functions. Those African countries most capable of participating
quickly and effectively in such a force include: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana,
Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia. We must also be prepared to welcome
limited numbers of less capable but politically important African troops such as
those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other traditional troop contributors
such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to participate. ~
U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip,
sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded
through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided the UNSC authorized the mission
and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement ~ould
be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be
preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining
over time. ~
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Western Support: The United States would also have to work to attract competent
logistics support elements (e.g., transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water,
etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that
have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and
Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU
countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous
efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may
well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for
instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain
such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. ~
Garnering Public' Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our
public of the wisdom of an enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested
above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but
enables others to do a lot. This is U.S.leadership as well as burden-sharing at its
best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, if we do not act
to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. ~
Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.
Long-Term Alternatives
If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can takes steps now
to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or
elsewhere in Africa with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept
called the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) -- (Summary at Tab 2). This
concept calls for the United States and possibly others to identify, recruit, train and
equip capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian
contingencies in Africa. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of
African troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need
for western ''lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able
to train and equip less capable African troops (i.e., Tanzania and Uganda) so they
could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. ~
Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources -- such as
FMF and/or voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth
pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into
the Administration's FY 98 budget request. ~
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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 56
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of Option 2
1) Define Precise Mission and Force Requirements; Determine U.S.
contribution. (Action: JCS/EUCOM; Principals Recommendation/POTUS
decision)
2) Identify Attractive Target Countries to Provide Specific Military
Capabilities. (Action: OSD/JCS)
3) Identify Resources/Method of Funding U.S. contribution of equipment,
training, and financial support. (Action: 01\ffi with State, DOD and NSC)
4) Brief UN, allies, OAU, Arusha Participants on U.S. plan and proposed
contribution; Request UN assistance in Recruitment. (Action: State!USUN)
5) Launch recruitment effort in conjunction w/ UN. Determine Support
Requirements for Participating Countries. (Action: State with substantial
support from OSD, JCS, NSC)
.
Phase I: Africa and Others
·· POTUS letters
·· Send joint USG team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC .;. Assistant Secretary level) to key
African and other nations to brief operational plan, force reqUirements, U.S. role
and requested contribution.
-- Follow-up.calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.
Phase IL· Western Partners (troops and resources)
·· POTUS letters
·· Send joint US.G team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC -- Assistant Secretary level) to key
Western nations to brief operational plan, force requirements, U.S~ role and
requested troop and financial contributions.
·
··Follow-up calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.
(With regard to both Phase I and II, JCS notes that the joint USG team must
include USEUCOM military planners and the discussions should be about the
operational concept not the operational plan. Once a firm donor commitment is
made, USEUCOM planners would establish mil-to-mil contacts with all donor
nations to coordinate the details of the plan as necessary. Security at this stage
will be vitai.)
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6) Align Force Contributions to Mission requirements/Adjust Mission, if
necessary. (Action: JCS/EUCOM with direction from Principals, if necessary)
7) Identify Tripwires/Obtain quiet commitment from UNSC Members to
authorize mission, if circumstances warrant. (Action: State/USUN)
8) Provide equipment, training, funding as required. (Action: State and
DOD)
9) PrepQsition equipment or troops as required; (Action: DOD)
10) Identify political structure under which the force will be built, funded
and controlled. (Action: State) ·
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Declassi~ed Und_er Atitlioritj.·ofthe
Interagency Security. Declassification Appeals Panel,
E:o. 13526, Section 5·3(b)C3)
CONFIDENTIAL
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 026
Declassification Date: march 18, 2014
August 2, 1996
Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire
To decide whether to pursue a strategy to obtain the
closure of refugee camps near the Rwandan border.
Purpose:
In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans
ed
ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dominated rebel army into eastern
Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. The United States led Operation
Support Hope in an effort to stabilize the humanitarian situation
and, today, more than 1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and
Tanzania. The current cost of maintaining the camps is about one
million dollars per day, of which the United States provides more
than 30%.
Background:
While at least 300,000 of those whofled have
returned to Rwanda voluntarily, the remainder (about one million
in Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the
authority of the former government, its military forces (the exFAR) and militia {Interahamwe). Many of those in the camps
participated in the genocide and would likely never return to
Rwanda voluntarily. Many others who might return are forceq (by
threat and intimidation) to remain in the camps by the leadership
of the former governm~nt. We believe that many would go home if
they could make that decision freely; conditions in Rwanda are
far from ideal, but the situation has stabilized sufficiently to
permit large scale voluntary return.
Status quo:
The camps pose a security threat
for the Government of Rwanda and for the countries in which they
are located. Most of the camps in Zaire and Tanzania are near
the border, and ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in Zaire as
bases of operation from which to launch attacks into western
Rwanda. In fact, the political/military structures in the camps
appear to be forming a nascent ethnic parastate, mobilizing the
Rwandan Hutu population through an ethnic nationalist creed. The
risks to'U.S. objectives are many: increasing attacks into
Rwanda from the camps as the ex-FAR strengthen their position,
retaliation by. the Government of Rwanda in the form of attacks on
the camps, increasing collaboration between ex-FAR and Hutu
extremists in Burundi, and neighboring states being drawn into
increased conflict.
Problems. with the status quo:
u.s. Proposal: As a result of these concerns, U.S.
Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Richard Bogosian broached the
concept of selected camp closure during the June Rwanda
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2
Operational Support Group Meeting in Geneva.
Our allies are
awaiting a formal proposal from us on this issue.
Interagency agreement on this issue: At an Assistant Secretarylevel meeting held at the National Security Council last month,
agencies reached a general consensus on the following points:
•
The United States should seek to lead an international effort
to stimulate voluntary return and relocation of remaining
displaced persons;
•
The plan should envision a phase out of assistance to the
camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps which
pose the greatest immediate regional security threat;
•
That those individuals who choose not to return to Rwanda
should be relocated in camps further from the border.
Factors to Consider:
It is important to recognize that such a
strategy will be difficult to implement -- if that were not the
case, it would have already been effected.
In particular, a
detailed strategy and operations plan will have to take account
of the following factors, all of.which concern political and
security issues:
Coordination with the EU and with UNHCR: while the U.S. is the
largest donor, this is an international effort, and decisionmaking on camp strategy will have to be collective.
Security concerns in the camps: we can expect vigorous efforts
by ex-FAR and Interahamwe to thwart any relocation/repatriation
plan.
If there is no effort to neutralize this threat, the plan
will, at best, fail and, at worst, result in chaos and violence.
Actions by the Government of Rwanda: we will
actions by the GOR to improve the climate for
providing at least a semblance of due process
detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings,
COHFIDENTIAL
need to encourage
return, by
for the 80,000
etc.
�20729
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 2, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
NOTED
Na~! Sec fl.dv!sor
has set:Ji1
Ydi CE
FROM:
susAN E .
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 pm.
Burundi
1. Situation Report: Ask CIA to provide'an update on recent
developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a
humanitarian crisis in the next six months.
2. JCS Briefing: Following your briefing by JCS on Saturday,
you should discuss with Shali how he wants to present to the
Principals the JCS plan for a humanitarian contingency force.
Ideally, he would give a short briefing on the safe area concept
and likely force size and composition (by unit or function)
required to perform the mission on different scales -- small (one
safe area), medium (two areas) and large (three plus).
~--~3.
Options for U.S. Participation
You should try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:
-- Take immediate steps to serve as the Lead Nation in organizing
a multinational intervention force for Burundi.
-- Privately pledge to contribute the headquarters unit and
airport security battalion for a force.
-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop
contributors to perform specific mission tasks along the lines of
the proposed action plan at Tab B(1).
You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template
and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In
addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency
effort'to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this
force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S.
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contribution (vice that of allies).
We will have great
difficulty finding the required funds and may even have to
consider a supplemental.
4.
African Crisis Response Force
You should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to
establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be
implemented by the U.S.
Task NSC to coordinate implementation
effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the
proposal to selected African nations. Task OMB to work with
State and DOD to produce cost estimates and options for funding
to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.
Rwandan Refugee Camps
Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate
options for
ling.with ~he security t~reat posed by the
continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC
produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all
concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level.
While the details of implementation must still be finalized,
there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR
and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to
Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with
those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat.
Those who choose not to return would be relocated inside Zaire
and Tanzania.
While there is interagency consensus on the plan (which Dan
Spiega~ supports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable
(and highly risky) without -•
a beefed up security presence in the campsi a determination to
neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of
Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement
plan) ;
•
a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve
the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due
process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal
killings, etc.
You should indica~e that you share these concerns, and that our
efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with
what we are doing on the political/security side.
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You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask
State to work with NSC to consult with allies and UNHCR to
im~lement the plan.
nbt A \I cr.~ 141./.e
\its-~"'
Richard Clarke, Eri~ Schwartz
Concurrences by:
Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
Tab 1
Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of
Option 2
Tab 2
African Crisis Response Force
Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps
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E.O. 13526.,Section 5,j(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 57
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation
Principals Committee Di.scussion Paper
Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian
contingency operation' in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the
USG are warranted. (81
Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the
Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending
· imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region
combine to increase the possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In
the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a
genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. ~
Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the
international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete· steps
have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response
should a worst case scenario ensue .. (81
· Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages. ·
UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide
support to humanitarian assistance efforts. ~
Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so
ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have
indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention
(Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an
effective mission without many months of intense training, substantial equipment,
logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide
ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country
willing to organize, command and control the force. ~
In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning
exercise in Carlisle, P A. That session produced a mission statement and concept
for the establishment of safe areas to provide security to civilians at risk and for
supporting delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis
for U.S~ planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the UN
and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise
force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. ~
The Joint Staff has made some preliminary estimates of the requirements for a
U.S.-led humanitarian mission. EUCOM has been tasked to produce a
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detailed plan, which is due shortly and which will represent the next step
in the planning process. From these analyses, we hope to derive notional force
structures for a basic plan and excursions (i.e., with reduced mi~sion and attendant
force reductions). Excursions might include one single or two safe areas. With
notional force structures available, the USG would be able, if desired, to try to
recruit capable troops from targeted African, western and other countries to
perform specific functions. (81
·
At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States.should move
beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a
humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near term crisis in
Burundi. (8j
Assumptions
will
•
If a humanitarian disaster occurs, there
be substantial pressure for the
international community to respond, particularly since there has been
substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (81
•
If a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France
is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is
unlikely to do so. ~
•
If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing
nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other
foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail
providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics
support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. (81
•
No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a "lead" nation
providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3).
~
•
The African countries most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g.,
Tanzania, Uganda) are least capable of performing effectively unless their troops
have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months. ~
•
The cost to the United Sstates of helping equip, sustain and support African
troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. ~
Options:
1) C.urrent Approach
To date, the United Sstates has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian
crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift
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international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we
have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We
have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the
Arusha process in Dares Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic
airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in ·
principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual
regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear
to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not
involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. ~
However, another genocide remains all too possible. In the worst case, a wider
regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the crisis builds, the U.S. and
others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not doing more to
try to stop the killing. ~
In the event of a crisis, the United Statescan maintain with considerable credibility
that we did our best -· within the limits of our prior commitments -· to avert
genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would
stress yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate.
Most importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at
risk and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention.
Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food,
shelter, water) to refugees and displaced persons. ~
2) Enhanced U.S. Role- Lead Nation in Assembling Capable Multinational
Force
Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing a
hybrid African/Western force to establish one or more humanitarian safe areas in
the event of a widespread crisis. ~
The Concept: JCS estimates roughly 20,000 troops would be needed to man three
safe areas (approximately 2,500 square kilometers- the size of the French zone in
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda). With fewer troops, the notional mission would
require modification to reflect limits in terms of capability and geographic area of
responsibilities. The force would require peace enforcement capabilities and
Chapter VII UNSC authority. ~
While a hybrid force would not be as effective as a U.S.· or French-only operation, it
could still save thousands of lives at least in a limited area. Such a force would
take several months to recruit and equip. Moreover, unless forces and equipment
are pre-positioned in advance, it would take several additional weeks before any
large force could be fully deployed. ~
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Duration/Exit Strategy: The duration of such a mission must still be determined.
It could be set arbitrarily (e.g., three months) as the French did in Rwanda or it
could be tied to a political outcome ·· such as a negotiated power-sharing
agreement. In the latter case, the force might remain in Burundi for an extended
period of time. In any case, after closure of the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional
follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be required to perform more traditional
functions.·· either to enhance security and deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II
in Rwanda) or to implement a peace agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The
duration of the follow-on force is also uncertain.but should be tied to the effective
re-establishment by the Government of general security throughout the country.
~
There is considerable risk the establishment of safe areas could result in the quasipermanent separation of Hutu and Tutsi populations either through refugee flows
or the de facto partition of the country. Further consideration must be given to
ways to dissolve safe areas in a manner that reduces the possibility of either
partition or additional refugee flows.~
Political Guidance: A body and process to provide political oversight to the
multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha
heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical
first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force.
Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a
regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia.
Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. AA
U.S. Military Role: Given the reluctance to date of other countries to participate in
a multinational humanitarian intervention force, the U.S. would have to commit to
play a greater military role than previously planned to attract other capable forces
to join such a force. The U.S. role could be limited but must be meaningful and
provide an important new degree of leadership and force cohesion that has been
lacking. Even with American military and political leadership, there is no
guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown American
leadership often spurs others to follow suit.~
The U.S. military role could be expanded to include one or more command or
support capabilities, in addition to our previous pledge to provide airlift and an air
control element. Such capabilities could include but are not limited to:
•
Headguarters/C3 element. The headquarters could be based at Bujumbura
airport where U.S. forces would be positioned to support airlift operations. U.S.
personnel might include planners, logisticians, communicators, liaison
personnel, administrative support, command elements, plus other support. ·They
could be joined by African, NATO or other officers, if desired. The headquarters
SECRET
�-------------
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5
function is essential to provide the command, control and communications (C3),
necessary for any force to function. ~
•
Airport security battalion to provide security at Bujumbura airfield.
•
Aviation Battalion to provide air mobility to the force.
• ,Surgical Hospital.
~
~
~
Western donor nations could also provide some or all of these capabilities. ~
U.S. Recruitment Effort: In addition.to a greater military contribution, the United
States would have to invest equipment, money and diplomatic capital to recruit and
establish an ~ffective force. We would have to approach capable African and other
troop contributors at the highest levels and urge their participation in specific roles,
primarily infantry but also certain combat support functions. Those Mrican
countries most-capable of participating quickly and effectively in such a force
include: Zimbabwe, South Mrica, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia.
We must also be prepared to welcome limited numbers ofless capable but politically
important African troops such as those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other
traditional troop contributors such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to
participate. ~
U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip,
sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded
through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided.the UNSC authorized the mission
and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement would
·be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be
preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining
over time. ~
Western Sunnort: The United States would also have to work to attract competent .
logistics support elements (e.g. transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water,
etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that
have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and·
Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU
countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous
efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may
well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for
instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain
such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. ~
Garnering Public Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our
public of the wisdom ofan enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested
above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but
SECRET
�SECRET
6
enables others to do a lot. This is U.S. leadership as well as burden-sharing at its
best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, ifwe do not act
to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. ts1
Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.
Long-Term Alternatives
If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can takes steps now
to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or
elsewhere in Mrica with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept
called the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) ·· (Summary at Tab 2). This
concept calls for the U.S. arid possibly others to identify, recruit, train and equip
capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies
in Mrica. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of Mrican
troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need for
western "lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able to
train and equip less capable African troops (i.e. Tanzania and Uganda) so they
could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. ts1
Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources ·· such as
FMF and/~:~r voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth
pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into·
the Administration's FY 98 budget request. ts1
SECRET
�SECRET
5053
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
July 26, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
~;_
THROUGH:
SUSAN E. o••c
~~CE/ERIC SCHWARTZ. .
~
FROM:
SHAWN H.
SUBJECT:
Rwanda Refugee Strategy
M~ICK/RICHARD
RAGAN
an A/S-level interagency meeting last Wednesday1 it was
agreed that the United States should become actively involved in
resolving the Rwanda refugee crisis. The preferred course of
action calls for gaining donor support to phase out assistance to
all Rwandan refugee camps over 180-days, starting with those
camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat
. and relocating those who choose not to return. This ftpush-p~ll
option" is conditional. on our allies agreeing to the same
approach and African government agreeing to relocate those who
choose not to return. UNHCR would be the lead agency interacting
with African governments on this matter.
D~ring
It was agreed that each A/S would gain support of their Deputy or
Principal for this course of action and ascertain whether they
thought a DC or PC is necessary. In the meantime, State is
drafting an instruction cable to European and African capitals.
At Tab I is a copy of the paper being circulated for
Deputies/Principals, along with CIA analysis, maps of the region
and OMB memo on funding.
DeClassified Under Ahthorit);.ofthe .
.
.
· Interagen~;y.Securit5•.DeclassificationAppeals Panel,
E.b. tJS26;.section.s.J(b)C3J
·
Attachments
Tab I
Rwanda
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
Refugee Paper
OMB Memo on Funding
CIA Analysis
Maps
·
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 028
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Sus~~~~
t-
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ki-H,
~
"tnJ'
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ltb \--~
SECRET
Classified by: McCormick, Shawn H.
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6,X6
�Declassified Under Authority of tJ:le
. .
Interagency Security·. Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section S-3Cb)(j)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Delassification Date: March 18, 2014
029
Ad Hoc Interagency/Deputies Committee Meeting
on Rwandan Refugee Camps
To decide what steps, if any, the United States should
take to resolve the Rwandan refugee crisis in an effort to
achieve greater stability in the Great Lakes region.
PURPOSE:
Background
Mass Exodus: In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans heeded
the call of the sitting Hutu-dorninated government, which was
responsible for the genocide of more than 500,000 Tutsis and
moderate Hutus, and fled ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dorninated
rebel army into eastern Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. This
was the largest movement of people in the shprtest period ever
recorded and posed an overwhelming humanitarian dilemma. The
United States led Operation Support Hope in an effort to
stabiliz~ the health/food/housing situation.
Today, more than
1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and Tanzania and enjoy the
highest living standards and the highest birth rate on the
continent, appreciably higher for than those living inside
Rwanda.
Since 1994 the United States has spent approximately $540 million
on its initial operation and subsequent measures to sustain the
camps. During that same period, we have only provided
approximately $110 million to assist with the situation inside
Rwanda. The current cost to the international community to
maintain the camps is approximately $1 million per day, of which
the U.S. provides more than 30-percent.
Current Situation: There are numerous problems with the status
quo. While at least 300,000 of the 1994 refugees have returned
to Rwanda of their own volition, the remainder (one million in
Zaire, 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the authority of
the former government, its military forces (the ex-FAR) and
militia (Interaharnwe). Estimates are that as many as 200,000
people in the camps may have been implicated in the genocide and
therefore would likely never return to Rwanda peacefully. Many
of those who might repatriate voluntarily stay because they are
ordered to do so by the leadership of the former government which
has reconstituted itself in the camps. This former leadership
tells the displaced that they will be killed by the new Tutsidorninated government if they return horne. In an unprecedented
move, ten international humanitarian organizations withdrew ·
GECRE'f
Classified by: Shawn McCormick
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6 X6
�OEGRI!;;
2
services in the camps last year due to the aggressive authority
of the former government leaders over the refugees. Only one
American NGO continues to operate in the eastern Zaire camps.
The fear of persecution or death for most potential repatriating
refugees had initially been generally accepted as plausible but
is increasingly specious as time passes. The Rwandan government
does have 75,000 people suspected of genocide in make-shift jails
in deplorable conditions; however, at least 300,000 Hutu
returnees across the country have resumed normal lives without
fear of persecution (one million Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda
in 1959 have also returned to Rwanda). In fact, the situation
inside Rwanda is largely stable and non-threatening except for
those directly if!lplicated in the genocide. ·The international
community maintains efforts to promote reforms by the new Rwandan
government and has met with considerable success outside of the
judicial sphere. Under pressure from families of survivors, the
GOR finds it extremely difficult to move forward on judicial
reform until some degree of justice is meted out to the
leadership of the former government which is living in camps
sustained by the international community just across its borders.
Security Threat: The refugee camps also pose a significant
security threat not only for the GOR, but for the countries in
which they are located. Most of the 55 camps in Zaire and
Tanzania are within five miles of the border with Rwanda (none is
more 25 miles), with those in Zaire sitting on a strip of land
150-miles long. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in
Zaire as bases of operation from which they launch.attacks into
western Rwanda. The camps and their internal political/military
structures appear increasingly to resemble a nascent ethnic
parastate which mobilizes the Rwandan Hutu population through an
ethnic nationalist cree~. Inherently, the interests 6f this Hutu
parastate are hostile to Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda.
Attacks by the ex-FAR into Rwanda have increased recently with
dozens of genocide survivors (who represent potential witnesses
in war crimes proceedings) being massacred on a regular basis
before the fighters cross back to the safety of Zaire. The GOR
has sent military reinforcements to its western border which
heightens tensions, stunts the trickling level of voluntary
repatriation and raises the specter of the GOR launching attacks
across the border to pursue th~ invaders and risking a·wider war
with Zaire. The ex-FAR also attack Rwanda from staging points in
northwestern Burundi. Credible reports indicate collaboration
between the ex-FAR and extremist Burundian Hutu rebels which
could explain the increased effectiveness of forces seeking to
topple the fragile moderate coalition government in Bujumbura.
There are significant fears that with the same ethnic composition
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�~l!lCRE'%'
3
and explosive atmosphere, Burundi could replay events of Rwanda
in 1994 if the situation further degenerate~.
Eastern Zaire - A Tinder Box: The presence of one million
Rw~ndans in eastern Zaire has also resulted in violence and tense
relations with the local population they have displaced. Ethnic
clashes caused by the influx of Rwandan refugees in the Masisi
region of 1 Zaire have caused 250,000 indigenous people to flee, in
some cases, into Rwanda. The refugees have also caused a major
ecological disaster destroying more than 20,000 acres of the now
threatened Virunga National Forest~ As the Zairian government
moves toward national elections next year, the crisis caused by
Rwandan refugees becomes an increasingly important issue.
·
International Efforts· to Date: There have been numerous efforts
since 1994 to ~nd the refugee crisis. UNHCR has promoted cross
border visits by refugee elders to assess the situation in
Rwanda, and trips to the camps by GOR officials attempting to
convince refugees they would be safe upon returning home. In
addition, the UNHCR has operated a daily mass information
campaign since March encouraging voluntary repatriation with
virtually no impact. Former President Carter produced a
videotape shown regularly in the c.amps of himself and various
regional heads of state, including President Bizimungu of Rwanda
and President Mobutu of Zaire, urging voluntary repatriation.
The Government of Zaire attempted refoulement initiatives last
ye~r which were initially effective, but eventually stalled in
the face of international opposition. Leaders of the. former
government in the camps quickly applied pressure to prevent mass
repatriation by the refugees and a sta-lemate resumed.
Since Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Ambassador Richard
Bogosian first broached the concept of selected camp closure
during the June Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting in
Geneva, our allies have been awaiting a formal proposal from us.
Embassy Geneva is requesting policy-level approval and a strategy
urgently to lead discussions toward developing a common approach
to this issue. It is important that any refugee strategy be
agreed upon by major donors, those international organizations
involved with Rwandan refugees and regional governments.
Key Assumptions.
•
The camps pose a significant and growing threat to regional
peace and security because they have displaced local
populations, serve as a base for ex-FAR and Interahamwe
collaboration with extremist Burundian Hutu rebels and attacks
against Rwanda, and invite cross border retaliatory raids by
the government of Rwanda.
�4
• Many Rwandans {perhaps as many as 200,000) will never return
to Rwanda because of their involvement in genocide, or to a
lesser extent, their fea~s of being-~ccused 6f such
involvement.
•
The remainder are unable to return primarily because extremist
camp leaders do not permit them to do so.
•
The situation in Rwanda can be improved still further with
international help and could enhance the attractiveness of
return to refugees. The GOR has the capacity to cope with
refugees in a ste~dy stream but not all en masse.
•
The cost to the international community of maintaining the
camps is unsustainable over the long term.
• ·Unless the international community takes.direct and prompt
action to deal with the refugee problem, the regional security
situation will steadily worsen.
Issues for Decision
A)
Should the United States try to lead an international effort
to stimulate voluntary repatriation and relocate remaining
displaced persons?
It is important that as many refugees as possible return to their
homes in Rwanda and reintegrate into the society. Those
remaining should be withdrawn from the border and away from bases
operated by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. This will be
constructive for regional security, decrease prospects of
retaliatory raids by the GOR into Zaire, calm tensions in Masisi
and diminish ties between ·the ex-FAR and extremist Burundi Htitu
rebels.
An internationally coordinated effort to stimulate repatriation
and refugee relocation could include an agreement by all donor
nations and the UNHCR that food, medical and other supplies to
the existing camps near the border would end within a specific
time period. Countries currently hosting the camps would also
have to agree to relocation of a smaller number of camps several
hundred kilometers away from.the Rwandantiorder. Res,tdents of
the camps would be given the choice of repatriating or
relocating. The international community would agree to a
corresponding shift of resources to within Rwanda to assist in
the resettlement of returnees.
�5
Analysis: Maintaining current assistance levels of $1 million
per day to the camps upholds a two-year old approach coordinated
with European and other donors.· It also deflects potential ·
criticisms from human rights groups, refugee advocates and others
who may claim that terminating assistance violates international
agreements on refugee treatment. Moving people risks the
possibility of resistance or conflict from ex-FAR and Interahamwe
elements in the camps who, some analysts believe, would use
civilians as a human shield to occupy western Rwanda if forced to
return. Any new strategy will be dependent on the Rwandan
government's ability to honor their commitments to welcome these
refugees home and the commitment of Great Lakes leaders to
provide security and land to those whowant to be relocated.
Strictly voluntary, not stimulated repatriation remains the
humanitarian/refugee community's preferred durable solution to
the Rwandan refugee situation.
The alternative is to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda or
move them to camps a significant distance from the border.
Noting the control of former government officials, the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe over the population and a standard of living higher
than in Rwanda itself, there is virtually no likelihood that an
end to the status quo will materialize unless provoked.
Continued international support to the refugee camps has diverted
scarce resources from efforts to provide adequate levels of
assistance inside Rwanda where it is most needed and has the
greatest impact. It also raises the moral question of providing
for the care and feeding of possibly 200,000 genocide
perpetrators and other active combatants who have no intention of
returning except through force. Those within the camps, with the
exception of genocide perpetrators and their families, have
little ground to suspect persecution if they return to Rwanda.
Those who did participate in the murder of at least 500,000
people over a three month period in 1994 would in all likelihood
be excluded from all protections contained in the Refugee
Conventions. Our allies and UNHCR Mrs. Ogata share our concerns
and have begun to.question the rationale for continuing
humanitarian assistance under existing terms and conditions.
The leadership of the former government, ex-FAR and Interahamwe
will continue to act with impunity destabilizing the region.
Attacks by these armed elements into Rwanda have steadily
increased and will continue to do so, heightening fears of GOR
retaliatory attacks into Zaire and raising co~cerns of a larger
regional war. Conflicts between camp residents and the local
Zairian population have also risen dramatically and are expected
to increase. Voluntaryrepatriation has proved a failed endeavor
013CRE'f
�-----------·
6
because it does not address the reality that camp residents have
few incentives and many disincentives to return.
B)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, in
what fashion should these measures occur?
Rwandan refugee camps are located in three principal areas;
Tanzania, and both North and South Kivu in eastern Zaire. To
stimulate voluntary repatriation or camp relocation for .those who
will not return voluntarily, international assistance (food,
medicine~ supplies) could be phased out within specific
timeframes. It is imperative, however, that while this
international assistance is phased out in the·camps, it be
shifted for use within Rwanda by returnees. For those who choose
to return home, the distance to the border in virtually all cases
is less than five miles, permitting them to walk or await
transportation by buses that can be provided by the international
community. The refugees could be notified in advance they can
either return to Rwanda or, if they fear persecution, relocate to
UNHCR-run camps that would be smaller, less attractive and offer
only the minimum internationally accepted levels of service·s
several hundred kilofueters away from the border.
Relocation costs per camp at their current size is estimated at
$1 million, however with some portion of the refugees returning
the to:tal amount would be less than $55 million for relocating
all camps. Relocation, and thus the following options, are
dependent on Zaire and Tanzania agreeing to permit such camps to
be established several hundred kilometers from the Rwandan
border. If other donors agree to this approach, a concerted
effort must be undertaken at senior levels to convince both Zaire
and Tanzania of the need.to undertake this step.
Tanzania appears willing to relocate refugees unwilling to return
several hundred miles away near the Mozambican border. While
Zaire has said it may be willing to consider a similar relocation
scheme, there is the likelihood they may not. In such a case,
the international community must encourage Tanzania to proceed
and consider approaching other states (possibly Uganda, Central
African Republic or Kenya) to accept the establishment of such
camps on their territories. However, each of these examples ·pose
tremendous logistical difficulties noting the very limited
infrastructure in the region. Efforts to close the camps in
Zaire could be slowed while international pressure is applied to
the Zairian government urging officials to adopt a position
similar to that of Tanzania. UNHCR must lead this and all other
efforts to engage Zairian President Mobutu on measures related to
this initiative.
�.----------------------------------------
.GECREJ'f
7
In pursuit of stimulating refugee repatriation and relocation,
additional security measures will be required. Initial reports
·indicate that Tanzania is prepared to use its military forces to
provide needed security to cope with camps on its territory. In
Zaire, however, the Zairian Camp Security Contingent organized
and funded under UNHCR must be augmented to provide added
protection for international relief workers, convoy movements and
to prevent refugees moving from closed camps to ones at least
temporarily remaining open. While details of such augmentation
and its costs should be left to UNHCR, this must not include
either a regional. or international peaCekeeping mission.
Concurrent with any option to stimulate voluntary repatriation
and relocation must be an effort to gain the agreement of the
Rwandan government to a series of measures aimed at building the
confidence of returning refugees and promoting longterm
stability. Among these the GOR parliament must pass its long
awaited judicial reform bill, establish additional mechanisms to
process potentially large numbers of returning refugees and
guarantee basic safeties and freedoms from prosecution f6r
returnees. It is important that the GOR also agree to a
comprehensive plan of action in coordination with the UNHCR and
other organizations to support returning refugees with increased
international aid, reiterate is assurances on land tenure and
cooperate in cross border visits to be arranged by UNHCR.
Another important issue is the risk of violence. Fomented by
former government leaders, the ex-FAR or Interahamwe, any attempt
by the international community to change the status quo could
prompt a violent response directed at UNHCR officials in the
camps, international relief workers, local populations and
others. It is also possible that armed members of the former
government could attempt to use refugees as a human shield to
enter Rwanda en masse. In the face of such possibilities, it is
imperative that the international community maintain its
resoluteness of action once the announc~ment to move forward
occurs.
There are several options for st~ulating voluntary repatriation
or relocation.
(OMB paper on funding options forthcoming)
1. Gain donor agreement to stop all assistance to all camps
simultaneously within 90-days and relocate those individuals who
choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would
choose a specific date to end assistance to all existing refugee
camps simultaneously, shifting those supplies to within Rwanda.
This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along
with information regarding repatriation or the option for those
who fe~r persecution to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse
camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border.
GECRE'f
�---------------~~--··
. BEC:RE'f
----------·--
8.
The 90-day timeframe to end all assistance to all camps
simultaneously and shift those supplies to within Rwanda would
begin when refugees are first informed of the impending action.
A universal approach ending all assistance to all camps
simultaneously would be the swiftest way to address the immediate
regional security threat posed by the refugee camps. It would
permit the international community swiftly to direct its
resources to within Rwanda to entice returnees back and limit the
ability of the leadership of the former government, the ex-FAR
and Interahamwe to prepare strategies to oppose any alteration to
the status quo. It would also have the most immediate positive
impact on environmental conditions in areas around the camps.
However, such a measure might well prompt the ex-FAR to use large
numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return and
attempt to occupy large portions of Rwanda. Additionally, such
potentially significant numbers returnees in this·brief timeframe
could severely overwhelm the capacity of the Rwanda government to
absorb them even with substantial international assistance.
2. Gain donor support to phase out assistance to camps gradually
over 180-days, starting with those camps which pose the least
immediate regional security threat, and relocate those
individuals who choose not to return. In coordination with
donors, UNHCR would choose a specific date to phase out all
assistance over 180-days (shifting those supplies to within
Rwanda), starting in the initial 90-days with those refugee camps
that pose the least immediate regional security threat first.
This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along
with information regarding the reality of repatriation and the
option - - for those who fear persecution - - to relocate to new,
smaller and more sparse camps several hundred kilometers away
from the Rwandan border. Residents in the remaining camps would
be informed at the same. time that after this first phase was
complete, all assistance to their camps would end over a
subsequent 90-day period and they too would have the option of
relocation. The initial 90~day timeframe would begin when
refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to
end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately
after the first 90-day period expires.
An approach to ending assistance to those camps posing the least
immediate regional security threat (over the first 90-days) could
possibly bring the greatest initial success, thereby building
momentum toward dealing with most contentious camps at a later
stage (second 90-day phase) . It is likely that under this option
those refugees in the least problematic camps who are most likely
to return home would do so without much convincing. A phased
approach of this nature also permits UNHCR the opportunity to
SE!CFl:E'f
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�.SEGRE~
9
learn from mistakes during the first phase which can be applied
in the latter.
While this approach could bring initial success, it could create
the opportunity for the leadership of the former government, exFAR and Interahamwe to implement well organized resistance to
these efforts. These leaders could use refugees in the remaining
camps as virtual hostages to prevent the ending of international
assistance. Another possibility is that these forces could
organize a well coordinated plan to use the refugees as a human
shield to occupy portions of Rwanda. It also fails to address
the pressing problems posed by those camps posing the greatest
immediate regional security threat.
3. Gain donor support to phase out assistance over 180-days,
starting with those camps which pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat, and relocate those individuals who
choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would
choose a specif1c date to phase out all assistance over 180-days
(shifting those supplies to within Rwanda) starting in the first
90-days with those refugee camps that pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat. This impending action would be
conveyed to the refugees along with information regarding the
reality of repatriation and the option - - for those who fear
persecution - - to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse camps
several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border.
Residents in the remaining camps would be informed at the same
time that after this first phase was complete, all assistance to
their camps would end over a subsequent 90-day period and they
too would have the option 6f relocation. The initial 90-day
timeframe to end all assistance in those camps which pose the
greatest immediate regional security threat would begin when
refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to
end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately
after the first 90-day period expires.
By first closing the camps that pose the greatest immediate
regional security threat, the resistance of camp leaders might be
minimized because they would have little time to prepare. Those
who remain behind would be more clearly identifiable as members
of the former government, ex-FAR or Interahamwe and could be
taken to camps several hundred kilometers away from the border
with haste. This method would also provide the quickest solution
to the immediate regional security threat posed by the presence
of the camps. Success with these camps in the early stages could
reflect relative ease in repatriating or relocating refugees from
those camps that pose the least immediate regional security.
threat.
SSCRET
�.SEGRfl'!'
10
However, if camp leaders offer stiff resistance, the initial
phase of stimulating voluntary repatriation could be stunted with
unclear consequences for the second portion. As in option two,
this approach might prompt the ex-FAR and Interahamwe to use
large numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return
and attempt to occupy portions of Rwanda.
::!ElCRE'f
�De(!lassified Under .~uthont).· of the.
. .
Interagency,Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5·3(b)(J)
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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 030
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Prospective Diplomatic Strategy
A} What diplomatic strategy should we pursue to implement a
policy of stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation?
There are two groups that need to be convinced that this course
of action is the most appropriate: other key donors (OECD
countries, EU, UNHCR, 'NGOs) and states in-the Great Lakes region.
1.
Key Allies
Feedback from the June meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support
Group (ROSG) in Geneva along with follow-up reporting indicates
support for creative ideas to stimulate voluntary repatriation
and camp relocation. It is critical to obta1n the agreement of
these actors to coordinate their contributions to achieve these
objectives.
USG should take the following steps to build donor consensus:
A.
Senior Administration official write a letter to OECD and EU
counterparts to rethink and seek agreement to a plan to stimulate
voluntary repatriation and camp relocation.
B.
Senior Administration official meet with UNHCR Ogata to
explain position and solicit support.
c.
Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to UNHCR headquarters
and OECD and EU capitals to press points in senior· Administration
official letter.
2.
Great Lakes States
Stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation cannot
occur without the cooperation and participation of affected
governments in the region (Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire) . All have
made commitments in international fora to promote regional
security and refugee return, but have taken little action to
follow through. We should inform these states of the strategic
importance of promoting voluntary repatriation and camp
relocation. The message must be clear, future contributions to
UNHCR, IOs and NGOs will be linked to actions by effected
governments toward the achievement of voluntary repatriation and
camp relocation. Despite such a strong message, the African
governments, Rwanda in particular, must be assured the U.S. and
our partners will shift resources from the camps to provide the
necessary support for an increased population.
Of3CRI3'!'
Classified by Shawn McCormick
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6 X6
�2
Steps USG might take include:
A.
Senior Administration official write a letter to African
counterparts to seek agreement on plan to stimulate voluntary
repatriation and. camp relocation.
B.
Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to African capitals to
press points in Christopher letter.
B)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
st.imulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what
measures should be taken to provide for adequate security?
UNHCR is currently funding a special contingent of 1,500 Zairian
soldiers (Zairian Camp Security Contingent) to provide basic
levels of security in several of the refugee camps. While the
troops have curtailed crime, they have been unsuccessful in
eliminating the influence of the extremists. UNHCR, however,
considers them indispensable·. If an effort were undertaken to
stimulate voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, some
degree of additional security presence might be required to
assist in Zaire. No security mechanisms should be required to
assist with refugees returning from Tanzania.
1.
In a demarche to allies, request they provide funds to
support an additional contingent of Zairian forces to augment the
cur~ent size of the zcsc~
2.
In a demarche to Mobutu, request that he detail those
additional forces needed to the command of UNHCR to conduct
required duties.
C)
If the United States is to support programs aimed at
stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what
measures should be taken to lay the proper psychological
groundwork among the refugees to ensure these efforts are
successful?
To be successful, there must be a well coordinated public
relations campaign from international media, states in the region
and UNHCR.
1.
Daily messages, statements and interviews by various
officials from the United States, European countries and UNHCR
must be broadcast via international radio to instill in the minds
of the refugees that this effort at repatriation and refugee .
relocation will shortly begin and there is no alternative.
�3
2.
The Rwandan, Zairian and Tanzanian governments should make
regular statements on the impending initiatives before they are
undertaken and additional daily comments when they are underway
to local and international radio.
3. UNHCR should begin rotating its expatriate directors from the
camps and replace them with new staff whose mandate is to
stimulate repatriation and refugee relocation. UNHCR should also
initiate cross boarder visits with or without ministerial
activity. The buses and logistics support required should also
be staged and ready to provide transportation to those unable to
walk the short distance back into Rwanda.
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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 031
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Ad Hoc Interagency Meeting on Eastern Zaire
Issues Paper
November 2. 1996
Purpose
•
To decide what strategy for repatriation of Rwandan refugees the U.S. should
urge UNHCR to pursue. (81
•
To consider additional steps the USG might take to prepare to assist
international aid agencies to respond to a potential wider humanitarian disaster
in Eastern Zaire. (81
•
To decide what further diplomatic steps the USG might take to achieve an
immediate ceasefire and spur resolution of the crisis on the Zaire-Rwanda
border. (81
.
·
•
To decide whether to give consideration to a series of additional
over the longer
(81
Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios (See Tab C)
POLICY GOALS
U.S. policy objectives in Central Africa remain regional stability, prevention of a
wider humanitarian crisis, finding a negotiated solution to the conflict in Burundi,
and the repatriation of Rwandan refugees whose presence on the border is a
proximate cause of the current instability. 6S1
To achieve these goals, over the past several months we have engaged in aggressive
regional diplomacy, supported humanitarian aid efforts and pressed a strategy to
encourage refugee repatriation. In the current context, however, further and
perhaps more radical steps rriay be necessary to secure an end to the fighting,
return refugees and respond to a wider humanitarian crisis. (81
ISSUES FOR DECISION
1)
Refugee Repatriation Strategy?
UNHCR agrees with U.S. officials that refugees should not return to reconstituted
camps on the Rwandan border. Re-establishment of these camps would merely
replicate the circumstances that sparked the latest round of violence -- at great ·
expense to the international communi~y. UNHCR also realizes that Zaire will
oppose the establisliment of new camps further inside the country. (81
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Moreover, new camps further west.in Zaire would be difficult, if not impossible, to
provide with adequate food and water. Neither the dispersal ofthe refugees
further west into Zaire nor the re-establishment of the refugee camps on the
Rwandan border is desirable. Hence, UNHCR recognizes that repatriation is the
only way to avert a larger humanitarian disaster and reduce instability in the
region. ~
To work through these issues with UNHCR and try to arrive at a viable, aggressive
repatriation plan, it may be necessary to send a policy team to UNHCR Geneva and
·to consult in key European capitals. The U.S. team should be armed with an
agreed U.S. strategy to promote repatriation in the current unsettled environment.
That strategy might draw upon all or some of the "imll" and "push" elements
outlined below: ~
SECRET
( .,..
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3
PULL ELEMENTS
•
Aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to
encourage repatriation. Leaflet drops, air-borne loud-speaker messages,
statements by the GOR and UNHCR, radio broadcasts, in-person testimonials
by safely returned refugees and other means could be used to try to convince
refugees it is safe to return to Rwanda, the old camps on the border will not reopen, and no relief supplies can be provided to those refugees that move west
into Zaire. ~
•
Establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian corridors inside Zaire and
Rwanda to protect returnees. ZCSC and RPF forces would have to form this
corridor from Goma to Gisenyi. To give refugees further confidence, there must
be a substantial complement of international observers-- civilian or military,·
official or non-official. UNHCR has maintained that only international
peacekeepers can perform this role adequately. However, such a force cannot be
constituted quickly, if at all. The only practical, immediate alternative might be
to ask all foreign embassies and NGOs in the region to' dispatch all potentially
available personnel to observe repatriation through the corridors. The U.S.
might activate former Peace Corps volunteers with local language capability.
The OAU should also be asked to provide observers (military or civilian) and the
UN might supply UN volunteers or other officials on TDY basis. Ethiopia
(which served admirably in Rwanda, has a capable military and indicated a
· potential Willingness to respond to another Great Lakes crisis) might be asked to
provide a battalion or two to assist the ZCSC with security.*
•
Significantly increase UNHCR and other international resources and
personnel inside Rwanda: establishment of reception centers, resettlement
packages, positioning of food, water, medicines and other supplies inside ·
Rwanda, augmentation of human rights monitors group with other international
observers, safe transit to home communes. ts+-
•
Urge the Rwandan Government to take further steps to encourage
refugee return. Such steps should include public announcements that the
GOR will: start genocide trials immediately and issue a timetable for trials;
ensure returning refugees are processed fairly and swiftly with international
supervision and their cases monitored over the long-term at the communal level;
prosecute in military court all military personnel accused of attacking civilians;
establish a mechanism for adjudicating property disputes.~
PUSH ELEMENTS
•
Urge the GOR to press Zairian Tutsi forces to deploy in a fashion that
spurs repatriation. Fear is what motivates the refugees; .The refugees are
almost certain not to return to Rwanda unless fear of staying in Zaire exceeds
fear of return to Rwanda. Zairian Tutsi forces may be the only indigenous force
S:ECR"E'f.
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capable of spurring refugee movement back to Rwanda in the near term. The
refugees have fled the Zairian Tutsi forces in fear in recent days and may move
again in the opposite direction, if prompted. While, thus far, reports indicate the
Zairian Tutsi forces have demonstrated discipline, tactical capability and have
treated refugees with civility, their ability and will to spur repatriation without
significant bloodshed operation is uncertain. Lives could be lost, particularly if
Zairian Army andlor ex-FAR forces to resist this operation. If the mission is
fails and is perceived as a U.S. idea, the political fall-out could be significant.
However, the alternative to spurred refugee return ~- the death of thousands of
displaced in the interior of Zaire-- is an even worse scenario. t81
•
Urge the Zairian Government to use its forces to spur repatriation.
Rather than using Tutsi rebels to spur repatriation, some consideration has
been given to suggesting that Zairian forces do so. This approach would enable
Zairian forces to preserve control over significant portions of its own territory
and may be less politically problematic. However, given their incompetence,
corruption and indiscipline, FAZ forces-- even elite forces, paid by the
international community and deployed from Kinshasa to the region-- probably
could not conduct this operation effectively in the near term, if at all. To date,
F AZ forces have abandoned virtually all contested areas and resorted to looting
rather than face the small, but well armed, trained and equipped Tutsi
opposition. ts1
Alternatively, Ethiopia might be asked to assist the F AZ in this operation.
While Ethiopia is unlikely to accept and Zaire may resist inviting in Ethiopian
forces, this option may be both viable and more desirable than using F AZ alone
or the Zairian Tutsi forces.
•
Employ sophisticated PsyOps campaign to convince refugees at
Mugunga that Zairian Tutsi forces are approaching from the West.
UNHCR would have to lead the campaign, possibly with U.S. assistance. The
threat alone of approaching Tutsi forces may be sufficient to cause mass
movement east back in the direction of Rwanda. Many refugees left their camps
in the last few weeks out of fear rather than under actual attack. ~
2) USG preparations for wider humanitarian disaster
DOD has already issued a general planning order in anticipation of a worst case
contingency and potential international organization requests. These requests
might involve assistance with water delivery/supply, building pit latrines and
sanitary systems, opening airheads to relief supplies, airlifting supplies, evacuating
humanitar~an workers.~.
In order for the U.S. to be prepared to respond swiftiy and effectively to potential
requests to provide uniqu~ capabilities or other critical services, we could take any
or all of the following steps: ts1
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5
•
Dispatch technical team (humanitarian experts plus military planners and
logisticians) to Geneva for intensive consultations with UNHCR to identify
likely gaps and facilitate USG planning.
•
Send CDC water expert to region; pre-position water bladders and
other critical equipment in the region ..
•
Issue warning order/deploy evacuation team to Entebbe.
•
Establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State to track U.S. citizens,
monitor developments, liaise with NGO community, coordinate U.S. relief
efforts.
•
Dispatch an experienced U.S. humanitarian coordinator with strong
diplomatic skills to work with a representative from a leading U.S. NGO,
UNHCR and the GORin Kigali to help coordinate the international response to
the impending humanitarian crisis.
·
•
Urge Embassy Kinshasa to allow the DART team in Kigali access to
Eastern Zaire through Rwanda. AID has just decided that it needs to
dispatch the DART team to Eastern Zaire. AID seeks clearance from Embassy
Kinshasa to send this team over as needed and as security conditions permit.
Once clearance is granted in principle, the DART team would notify Embassy
Kinshasa prior to crossing the border from Rwanda to Zaire. ·
It is important to note that even in the best of circumstances -- large-scale refugee
repatriation-- a substantial international humanitarian relief operation will be
necessary. t£1
3) Diplomacy
· The most urgent diplomatic objective is to achieve a ceasefire in eastern Zaire,
which would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and diminish the
potential for a wider conflict. This is the top priority of UN Special Representative
Raymond Chretien, who will depart the U.S. Wednesday for consultations with
Mobutu in Switzerland and then proceed to the region. The U.S. is lending full
support to Chretien, including intelligence-sharing and expert briefings in
Washington. In addition, the U.S. could consider offering to second a senior
diplomat and a representative from EUCOM to his staff to assist in any way he
might find helpful. t£1
Equally urgent is the need for the top political and military leaders of Rwanda and
Zaire to agree on concrete steps aimed at defusing the crisis. These steps should
include: t£1
-- immediate ceasefire.
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6
-· withdrawal of all foreign forces from Zafre and Rwanda.
·· affirmation by the GOZ that all Banyamalenge and other Zairian Tutsis
are Zairian citizens, need not leave the country and will not be
persecuted or harassed by GOZ officials.
--public commitment by Rwanda (as well as by Uganda) not to provide
further direct or indirect support to any elements in Eastern Zaire.
-- reciprocal commitment by Zaire not to provide support or sanctuary to ExFAR and Rwandan Hutu militias in Zaire.
-·joint GOZ-GOR border monitoring mechanism with UN assistance.
-· refugee repatriation/camp closure plan.
Thus far, Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has refused such a meeting until all
foreign forces are out of Zaire. VP Kagame ofRwanda has conditioned Rwandan
participation on guarantees by Zaire that the Banyamalenge will be accorded the
full rights and protections of Zairian citizens and that remaining camps will be
moved away from the border. (8j
NEXT STEPS
a) Nrurobi Summit
Kenyan President Moi has invited regional leaders to attend a summit in Nairobi
on Tuesday, November 5 to discuss the situation in central Mrica. OAU Secretary
General Salim Salim and most key regional leaders (except Kengo) plan to attend.
This summit affords a potentially important opportunity for regional leaders to
discuss the regional crisis and for Zaire and Rwanda to reach agreement on the
steps above. To facilitate a successful outcome at Nairobi, the USG could: tSj
-- Join with European countries to take all possible steps to push key regional
leaders to attend the Nairobi Summit, especially Kengo plus his top military aides
and Kagame. (This should include demarches, phone calls by senior U.S. officials -e.g. Moose, Tenet -- to appropriate leaders, as necessary.)
-- Dispatch senior U.S. official to Nairobi to work on the margins of the summit to
gain agreement to the steps above.
b) Threat to Zairian Tutsis
In addition, to try to prevent reprisals or possible genocide against Zairian Tutsis,
the U.S. could use its influence to:~
-- persuade Zairian officials and military leaders to take all necessary action to
prevent incendiary rhetoric and protect ethnic Tutsis.
SECRET
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:7 ·
·· stress publicly and privately we will rwt tolerate ethnic cleansing of Tutsis, hold
the GOZ and its officials personally accountable, and sanction those guilty of such
action.
·· urge European partners to reinforce this message.
c) Rwandan Government
The GOR could be pressed to allow humanitarian relief supplies to cross Rwanda
into Zaire and to avoid attacks at or near Mugunga refugee camp, which would
cause a humanitarian catastrophe. ~
4) Additional Issues
There are five additional actions the USG might take aimed at promoting regional
stability over the longer term and improving olir intelligence collection capabilities.
Each of these possible steps have significant policy and resource implications and
require substantial further study before decisions can be taken. To facilitate ·
further study of these issues, appropriate action agencies are suggested below. ~
A) Provide financial incentives to separate intimidators. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) released a list of more than 400 individuals
who were suspected leaders in the 1994 genocide. To date, fewer thail 50 have been
apprehended around the world. Most are suspected to reside among the refugee
populations in Eastern Zaire and Tanzania. The governments of Zaire and
Tanzania have been unwilling to arrest any of these suspects, even in cases when
the ICTR has issued international arrest warrants. Offering a bounty for the arrest
of each of these individuals could increase the likelihood they are apprehended.
(Action agency: State/DRL) ~ ·
B) Increase USG funding for the ICTR. The international community has provided
limited funding to the Tribunal which has been tasked with bringing to justice the
leaders of the genocide~ No investigations of genocide have been conducted in the
entire eastern portion of the country due to lack of resources and personnel. The
first trial has been delayed repeatedly in part due to insufficient detention facilities
and limited prosecutorial staff. Additional U.S. financial support, technical
assistance and leadership to secure additional funding is necessary, if the ICTR is
to become an effective instrument in the struggle to bring lasting justice to Rwanda.
At the same time, however, there are serious allegations of illismanagement at the
ICTR under investigation by the UN inspector general. (Action agency: State/DRL
andiO) ~
�SECRET
SECRET
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�Declassified Under :~uthoi:ity of the
lnteragencySecurity'Declassification AppealsPanel,
E.O.:l3526, Section 5;3(b)(;j)
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no.
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios
As of Friday, there were more than 100 international aid workers and ex-patriates,
including seven Americans, trapped in Goma awaiting evacuation. Rwandan forces
(RPF) took control of the main UNHCR headquarters, according to some sources "in
the nick of time" as ex-FAR and interhamwe we approaching. All ex-pats were
reported sBfe, and the RPF reportedly plans to escort them safely to Rwanda. ~
Attacks by Banyamulenge and other forces threatened with expulsion or genocide
in eastern Zaire have resulted in relatively few casualties but displaced more than
500,000 refugees and Zairois. Resistance from Zairian government forces and
armed elements of the former Rwandan government has been minimal as the rebel
troops, supported directly and indirectly by Rwanda and possibly by Uganda and
Burundi, have captured Uvira, Bukavu and most areas north or.Goma. Refugees
are fleeing mainly West and South into surrounding areas where there is no
international assistance or infrastructure to support them as well as to already
crowded refugee camps. ~
·
As many as 700,000 refugees may soon converge at Mugunga refugee camp west of
Goma. Mugunga previously held only 200,000 and cann()t possibly accommodate
the more than 500,000 already there. Sanitation is a major problem. Lack of water
is another potential problem that could result in cholera. · Relief workers in the
Goma area are hoping to be evacuated as soon as possible. Humanitarian re-supply
efforts have been halted due to fighting around key airports and closure of
remaining roads. As a result, food supplies will run out in the Goma area late next
week due, although sufficient food stocks are available in the region.~
·The whereabouts of several hundred thousand refugees that fled camps in South
Kivu (Uvira and Bukavu) are unknown. Many of these refugees (Barundi
outnumber Rwandans 2:1) have fled into the bush or are believed to be moving
south towards Fizi, Zaire, an inaccessible town 75 miles south of Bujumbura.~
Refugee agencies agree conditions in Rwanda are suitable for repatriation.
However, only approximately 700 Rwandan refugees have recently crossed into
Rwanda along with 3,000-4,000 new Zairian refugees; several thousand Burundian
Hutus have returned to Burundi. The movement westward of Rwandan refugees
will result not only in .a certain humanitarian crisis, since aid agencies will be
unable to support them, but also risks further destabilizing Eastern Zaire where
the local populations have previously attacked persons of Rwandan origin. ~
There is also a significant risk that the demonstration effect of turmoil in Eastern
Zaire, the ineffectual response of Zairian forces (F AZ) and Mobutu's incapacitation
will encourage separatist and violent elements in other unstable parts of Zaire, .
including potentially Kasai, Katanga and even Kinshasa. The fragmentation
of
032
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Zaire, which borders nine other countries, would be catastrophic and destabilize
much of the rest of Africa, including Angola and southern Africa. ~
Graver still is the possibility that the current instability will lead to a wider
regional war. Several NGOs reported to U.S. officials yesterday that Zairian
authorities have drawn up mass lists of Tutsis resident in Zaire. This action was a
precursor to the genocide in Rwanda. On October 31, the Zairian Transitional
Parliament voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Zaire sever diplomatic
relations with Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda and that Zairian Tutsis be removed
from all government and quasi-government positions. On November 1, the
Rwandan ambassador in Kinshasa was reportedly abducted. The act or even the
threat of genocide against Tutsis in Zaire could spark a war pitting Rwanda,
·Burundi and Uganda against Zaire (supported by arms supplied by France and
Libya). Sudan, already effectively at war with Uganda and funneling arms to
Zaire, is likely to work in concert with Zaire. In this case, Ethiopia and Eritrea
(already sympathetic to Rwanda and Burundi and allied with Uganda) may join the
war against Sudan. Other regional actors hostile to the Tutsi governments in
Rwanda and Burundi, such as Tanzania and Kenya, might also take sides by
imposing an economic blockade against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi or even by
taking military action. ~
�SECRE'f
21001
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 1, 1996
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
RIC~
THROUGH:
SUSAN E.
FROM:
SHAWN
SUBJECT:
Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Interagency on Eastern
Zaire, Saturday, November 2, 1996, 9:30 a.m.
McCORMIC~
READING TIME
Since most people will only receive the meeting package Saturday
morning, you may want to provide ten minutes at the start of the
meeting for people to read the Issues Paper at Tab B.
SITREP
Ask CIA to provide· assessment of the military/humanitarian
situation in eastern Zaire, likely humanitarian requirements,
status of Americans and other ex-patriots in Goma and Bukavu, and
future prospects.
ISSUES FOR DECISION
1.
Approval of Push-Pull Strategy
UNHCR now accepts that closed camps should not be reconstituted
and a policy of ~ggressive repatriation must begin.
Zaire
refuses to allow new camps to be established further inland and
conditions in Rwanda do permit the refugees to return home.
Only
repatriation can avert a larger humanitarian disaster and promote
long-term stability.
Ogata is focusing on "pull" factors such as prepositioning food
and supplies in· Rwanda, utilizing testimonials,· leaflet airdrops
and other mea~ures to convince refugees to repatriate.
We have
tried. much of this for the last two years with virtually no
success.
Under her concept, the refugees would .transit a
humanitarian corridor manned by Zairian troops or 5,000
international troops that do not and will not exist.
What is
missing is an effective pull strategy, possibly including the use
SECRE'f
Classified by: McCormick, Shawn
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify On:
1.6, X6
�SECRET
2
of armed elements, to encourage repatriation through this
humanitarian corridor.
NSC staff unanimously support the "pullu elements, including an
aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to
encourage repatriation, establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian
corridors insiqe Zaire and Rwanda to protect refugees,
significantly increasing UNHCR and other international resources
and personnel inside Rwanda, and urging Rwanda to take its own
steps to encourage repatriation.
On the "pushu side, all concerned NSC staff agree on a psyops
campaign, but we are split whether to use Zairian government
troops, Zairian Tutsi forces or outside.troops, perhaps from
Ethiopia.
Soderberg, Schwartz and McCormick favor, in the first
instance, using Zairian forces to lead a "pushu strategy.
Rice
favors using Zairian Tutsi forces, or as a fallback position also
supported by Soderberg and McCormick outside forces, possibly
from Ethiopia to effect the "push.u Rice feels strongly that to
use undisciplined and corrupt Zairian troops would certainly
result in people being killed.
Schwartz is also concerned that, while we do not want to reestablish camps at the border, we will need an assistance
strategy for Zaire - even if repatriation works.
This is because
repatriation is not likely to occur as quickly as we would like.
We face the specter of tens of thousands of women and childien
suffering badly as they await fruition of our "strategy."
Schwartz would avoid public statements of our bottom line until
after we have consulted with UNHCR.
Doing so would risk us
assuming responsibilities (and blames for failures) that should
be those of the international community..
Finally, Schwartz urges
dispatch of a team to Geneva this weekend and elements onward to.
Kigali.
Goal:
Gain approval of the psyops campaign and "pull" elements
as central tenets of a·U.S. strategy to promote repatriation.
Discuss "pushu options of using Zairian government forces,
Zairian Tutsis, or an outside force, possibly Ethiopia in a
"push" strategy.
Gait:l approval to dispatch Eric Schwartz and
State official to Geneva this evening to work with UNHCR in
Geneva and key European capitals beginning Monday to arrive at an
aggressive repatriation plan.
2.
Take Steps-to Prepare for Humanitarian Crisis
With only 500,000 or so· refugees in camps, more than 500,000
others are in transit to unknown destinations. Both groups will
be in need of significarit humanitarian assistance within a m~tter
of days.
Food and water needs are acute, and sanitation could
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3
become an even more pressing problem as large numbers of refugees
congregate at Mugunga camp west of Goma.
International relief
agencies can provide some of the needs, but the U.S. and others
will likely be called upon to fill the gaps.
Our problem is that
neither we nor UNHCR know what those gaps are and no effective
planning is taking place.
Goal:
Gain agreement to dispatch a technical team this weekend
(humanitarian experts, military planner/logistician) to Geneva to
assess likely gaps in humanitarian crisis planning.
Gain
agreement to send a CDC water expert to the region, issue a
warning order/consider deploying evacuation team to Entebbe,
establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State, dispatch an
experienced US humanitarian coordinator to Kigali .to work with
UNHCR, and press State to allow the DART team now in Rwanda
access to Eastern Zaire.
3.
Approve Diplomatic Strategy
Regional leaders will hold their first summit since the latest
crisis in Eastern Zaire next Tuesday in Nairobi.
This is an
important opportunity to press leaders toward a cease-fire and
other necessary agreements. However, it is unclear if Zairian
Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister along with Rwanda
VP/Defense Minister Kagame will attend.
It is important the U;S.
push for all of them to attend and to send a high-level official
(Moose) to help broker an agreement. State opposes this and
wants to send its Central Africa division directdr (too l6w
level) .
Efforts by Zairians to deny Zairian Tutsis their citizens, rights
and property is an important reason for the current instability
in Eastern Zaire. Affirmation of their rights and assurances df
no persecution is critical if the conflict and Rwandan support to
the Tutsis is to cease.
Adequate supplies of international humanitarian assistance are in
the region, but it cannot be transshipped due to fighting which
has closed road access from Uganda and the airports in Goma and
Bukavu.
The only available route is overland via Rwanda, but the
Kigali government is not allowing supplies to pass.
Goal:
Gain agreement to work with European allied to encourage
Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister and Rwandan
Vice President/Defense Minister Kagame to attend regional summit
in Nairobi on November 5. Gain agreement to dispatch A/S Moose
from Paris to work the margins of the summit. Gain agreement to
press Zairian officials to halt incendiary rhetoric against Tutsi
and stress the need to protect them from reprisals across the
SECRET
�SECRET
4
country.
Stress publicly and privately we will not tolerate
ethnic cleansing of Tutsi and will hold the GOZ accountable if it
occurs (we must not consider specific sanctions before engaging
the economic agencies). Lastly, gain agreement to press the
Rwandan government to permit humanitarian relief supplies to
cross its territory into Zaire, and to avoid attacks on the
Mugunga cru:np.
4.
Task Additional Issues
There are a set of additional steps which if implemented might
assist in promoting long-term st~bility in the region and expand
our intelligence base in Eastern Zaire. Various agencies should
be tasked to analyze each of these five proposals,
Goal:
Gain agreement to task out: 1) State/DRL prepare
assessment of how offering bounties for those leaders implicated
in the genocide could lessen their control over refugees and how
such a program could be funded; 2) State/DRL and IO prepare
analysis of how Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal could
additional
resources and where they could come from and· 3
the benefits and risks
ITEM NOT IN INTERAGENCY ISSUES PAPER
We omitted the following additional from the paper for further
study due to its sensitivity. You can decide whether or not to
raise.
Concurrences by: .
Eric Schwartz, Richard Clarke/Rand Beers
(info)
Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B
Issue Paper
Tab C
Recent Developments
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�··-·······-···---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . .
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20410
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI .L
WASHINGTON, D.C . 20504
May 6, 1998
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. STEINBERG
WILSONr~
THROUGH:
JOSEPH C.
FROM:
JOHN P.
SUBJECT:
~tf~~p~~~;~~i~!!e!y~~~!hy:~~;~nt~~ilt~!?l[!'t~t~m
PRENDERGAST7)f
.
.
Th6us-ands: ·of :t'he. -soTdier:s :·.anCl
.
rtt'i1i'.t~ia .
.
.
~
.
.
who. carrie.d'.,.out the -1.994
~=~-~i-~:~~ : ·: f~!i;~_ - -,&: =.:~·8-t:~£i-.•~·-~;d~~8t~:~;,.:~·:~dt·~=,~k~;~!.~;~Z~f~z;~~i:~:--£!.O.n,
Tut:_si-s ·and .inoder:,ate H.utu.;s. · ·t n recent m~nths, " the -g~'i-JocJ.i:i~i'fes
have expanded their atta.cks ··· against Tutsi and selected ·. Hutu
civilians beyond their northwest stronghold. They aim their .
attacks primarily at schools,. hospi.t als, prisons and other
undefended, "softu targets. Well over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of
Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone.
~Z'~il~;~~~fjt~'~ii:(~~~1~f~1~J~;~~iklJ~f~{~:tf$;lf~~i~t~;~~;ir;rtp~.ove
its inadequate· arid
.
non~t-ra~hspa,r:ent ; ·mi-J:Jtaiyj: ;J.u_~:(~ c.¢.·~ ir!~..~li~n:i~fni:f.
.
.
. . . ... .
.. . . ' . . .
~
Th. se ..· ac.t :~ .V;it~es,~:grea·tl• y llndetrnihe·
e
)
· -:~
~
our·::.e~ffor.bs . ta ·,' pr0mote· . a. m0re
· !~lfl~~~f~~ei~l~!~~~!iilf!;Wl,l1~~~~~~i~ilJi(~~,:,g;:;~~ss··.
ki·-l ..t'ihg : ih .< e :;.;:Great- L.:ikes·.;; To this end, we a-re s.ignificantly
t:h:·
enha~cing , o{;_'~ · dlp·l~~ati~ arid. dev-elopment strategies (see
Discussion . Paper section on . "U.S. Policy," p . _ l) . o'~I?ut1~s•!,will~'{'·
c~~.~-Yref":.~~p. gtn,.~: · _: ~7 •. ~-r~j~~~P~~· ~a·.:.t·<? f9:~r=:P7T~ A¥,f'i' · ~-~<r:~f~j~M:.· :· . ~:
i·:,
.. en·gagemE:m'-li as. an . eiemen:t of·. · a'::,•l:>roader•;,:genocide••preyeh';t;i·on>.~~
•
,
•...·. .
·
·" E!:t~.$;f~;~C~~~~;·.;~;!J;t:~ . ;Q~·~:;~a;~b1%~.;..~~·0 uiJY~~!~~~'· ·
~Iff'
devE?lopmerit ;.of
.
_·a. c~rrtRJ;e'r),e_n~(v e~-;p\ib.r:i_i: :~ffa~.r:9 : ?:ricl:. A~· g_i'sJa~ive
strategy to expfa'ir{·o·u r' poT.fc·y. 'c§_·fict/ i:fc.t:i'ons ;>and ·:·2 l' ~ the'· · . ··
'
iden't ff icat {on, :.6{_ -~pe c·i ,t,ib: ~~o.~tc:~~,-.: dt:." 1~h4i'~g.:' ~r~~q.q{rJ~d,; . .for ; ...
exparid'ed ac·t i.vi t'ies . e~ 'g.~: : · FMF, .··E
:SF, ~ H1E:T~ : · DA -~hd : ··q;r._awct6wn~ .
E
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
Declassified,Under:Authontv
of the
Interage~cy Securlty-DeCla;sificati~n Appeals Panel, .
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
·
SECRE'l'
Classified by.
Jolm Prendergast
Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
Declassify On: 5/2/08
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013~040 , document no. 034
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�S£CRET
2
·-:"';
ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of
additional USG mili ~ary aid and training for Rwanda?
~~· .~:r~..~;~ ;~.i·~~~~ri~i£:i~~:fh~r;~~t~J!~~in!tt.£:et.~~W'~~k\~~f~~ff%~;~~1··
sta.ls'ie{'in"st:It\it?L:br{~;· 0·~:.8"');;, tb ,'CJ.,frect'l.Y''contr'ibute 'to the GOR'':S .
effort\ t~:' hli1.~·t~rily <:i~;&e·:r:~: .'·26i#:~i'n·~· (:)'~· ri~''i:i~i~:l''ize tfie'tr .· ''j
geh'oci(Jai:i:es·: ·;~;; A decis-ion' by Dep.uties w.ould- then provide the
par~meters f~i a DOD assessment team to determine the
appropriate mix of activitie~, subject to re~uirements described
below.
!~pt:riEl:t~'~~~~~~f~,~~:t~~~t~~~j~~~~z~,:~~~~~·~~~~~~J~t~~~\~9 s~. ·
the }·e:gi6n'.3!.' Th:~"te·a~ ·c·o~ld .. th~-~-re.co~end what specific
· .,
. military activities we migh~ undertake to most effectively
counter the genocidaires, The parameters should allow for
1 e tha 1 assistance and c;ount e r~ ins1,1r9~n..1= y tF a il}i!'l,g··:, .'Tin~~·§;: :9I?.t,~on
'
.
'
-
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~~~v~~~~d~t~~~~~*?'~~~a~~~~:f;f~:~~~i~"fl'£~i·~~:;::~r~tr:tt}"~11:.,arxe
. to
more ef:tiC:ient,· tar:geted,
co0ntE;;'iJng:g,e'J1p,c:'f¢:!'i:ll.,:!.a,c:t.i~v}tyr,i:s. a'
. . . . ••.. · ••• ( ... ·.:
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prof'es~:ional··G.OR'' :q:ourit.~:r~i'hsprgency·ope·ra'tj,(on.
.
,
Demonstra tlng
our direct support for an anti-genocide ca~paign ~auld likely
improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political
liberalization and respect for human rights .
-;,;,~
.There, . a't e . hO.weV'er. ~ ::s etic)·u::S ., cohc~tns;<:about ..' abu~e s ·in the.:
:~~.~~:~~:£~i~~~~~:~~;~1~:ft.t~;t~.:~~~~t~~~ c~:~::.i~~5·~:~W~~~~. ·9~1
civilian's .have J)een· forcibly ·disp:laced, :probably .. as a ,r.esul t of <:1
4·'.·
"'""'' .
·...-,r-/):t•,
'•'"
RPA cou.nt~r-iri~urgenc:y., operation·s, c:L·...Thus,. we would hp.ve': to
condition Option _B a;ss_i~~:ans~. ::pp ~R.~C:ific .!?.·.S.t,~.sl1s. PYJh_e.: GOR,
·s~:h }:~ "·~·~~c~~~;~J:·:~s ,'~.:~;~,~pgJ,;t,Q~,~;~):;:1,.,,¥·9·'~.6p.~~:.rv$~:::hl.Vn?.n.::E:.}. .9hJ,~: 1, .. · . .
ccm.ditions·,; ... a1:,;code,.-:6f;:~tonduct·:.to ·ensure ·that· aid .a:nd t.rp,in:lng
are not. ·.u~:ect'. ~,ga:.f~~t·: ·i.'n~~.~~nt:~.:ci:vi-1 ip.ns.; · increased. pros e.i:;u t.ion
rights/•;Jt0:s~:r-l~:,;:rYd ···a:.~$·yst:effi··
inoni'tO'r ·actions '6£
.i:ro~p~ ..t.hat :ie~~Jrve ;s';·:.. t'ra:;J.hi:n;~_;}; Moreover, w.e would seek to
help the GOR meet these requirements as part of our·Great Lakes
Justice Initiative.
'··
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.
at hu.tna..n..
Goa·:~
u
to'
Gain agreement that the objective of our security
engagement with the Rwandan Government should be to directly
contribute to efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the
genocidaires and that the scope of our potential assistance
should include lethal aid. and training.
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:~;ISSUE ,TJYO: Should we also pursue a regional strategy that might
include m'ili tary aid, training and contingency support to better
prepare the region to counter future .genocidal activity?
Given the limitations of ACRI (which is training for
peacekeeping, not· peace enforcement-in the context of genocide
or mass killing) and lack of desire for direct intervention, we
n~ed t9 ....9.~9: i,.l1 ,.9.-· J?.?99.~.~.9;•.;fdcr.~:.q.~t ~(rri;1:n:~l)9~,·-t:f:.·a·I1i:l:~):9:: .w~.~-~;,· ~.~:.~~~·~'\t·· We
are ptepC[.r.$.Ei :t:O .. w.ork~wi·th re'g'idhal ·s'Utte:s' to.: :·i'nbr:ea~e . :';qll4c,kly ·
their. p~pac~ty,, .t.R·.:.f~.S,p~ri<d, ,·'~~ the event :of ~:e.su~gen t gerioc'ict~<\?,'r
mass . killing. ,,. : D,e,l:>v,t:i,ies;·:.w~j,+i~ .. J:'e. yi. e."Y,,,w_pe,i;:qe.F th.~C:P .~ s, :,,. . ,~,hO,';Ild
·
C~~~ t e _ an . I~G.. tit a~. ~quld, ·.•~h~lyz,e. ,c,9x~t~r:g.enc~.es';ji;fi.<:i:.·,p·pt i.'oi)•s:
regaF:ctA~,g;::R~~,~·~:P~~·.i·~t::H~-·sl>:,.. ?i¥J?pqtt:·::,tor\)SuLidfDg::.re:g"io'~~r. 'c~p~t~·tY
for ~pe'ace' enf0fCemen:t.•. ,i~.After doing the appropriate internal ...
an~iysis, it· is···our ·vie0,·.tnat the· ..USG•should:,erribark di-1 . ·
consul.~a t kirr'·:~:hd'·.~:s:~:~:~~fit.~·fl~~~:, p~.q.ce§·~~~ ,\;;{,th :r.~g.i'6·n·a'l states~ and
dono:!:' counti'ies.aimed Cit determining·how we might .comtribute to
buildfng ·that .capacity. t
1
be
We also believe that we r:, should explore h.ow w.e ~.i;ght·
p:tE:ipared
"
... , '
•'·
, ..
to offer aitl,ift and .. logistical ...~_uppoit· to forces:. u);lcl,e,:r:;ta,K:i:I19'. a
peace~ e'nfoic,e'ment. op'eratioi'l or hu~anitariali intervention, such
a:s the i9~5 oif~r to provide airlift sUpport in a Burundi
interVention. We believe that the only willing volunteet~ to
counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass
killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, ~e should
c_ons}der: ,h().F'·proyiding,.r,e:J,¢.:lan.t, t£q~flil}g a,~ci _eqtlipmenf. WC?pld
· enhant'e "d{~·ir' ahii i.ty ··t:'b~''ci.i:;i.i'ht~!f ·':sJ2h':.:'a2'tJ.Vitie:~. we need' a
,; reliable ~apict resp~nS~ ~ystem. t~ ~ddreSS WOr~t-case SCenariOS
in one of the most crisis-p~one regions of the world .
-~
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'
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,·,,,,~·I"'·"~,'
~
1.
. GOAL:.
Gain agreement to embark on an assessment process with
regional actors about iupporting appropriate regional
intervention capacity, and seek agreement to pledge airlift and
logistical support for an intervention in a strictly defined
crisis .
.iss6E·;}t'HREE: Should the.· ri. s. equip and train the Rwandan anny to
locate and suppres·s hate radio broadcasts?
Given the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding
genocidal activity, it i~s· 9l:ir ,V.i.eR::tha,t. ~.e sl!p)l);d :trai11 ... and
equip th~ RwB;:nda!'l~:·a,'t:¥.if<J9,.A~bd~t~~;~.~:n·~:,'iu'pp~·e:~s: :~_oiJ:Lte> ractA<?',, .: ...
trah's:rititte'rs< We also,~ ,< ~<~' '·• ...·
b"E\l·feve. .::.··:: .,--.• '~:.' DO·D~ shouid .develop on-:':'the- :~
'bh:'i:l't:
.·.·,, ; ' ·:·:,.·,f:·~·. :·.:: :· ,1··;:t·"<·.· ;,;·~·
~-1.'
shelf plaf!.s ,:,fqr a· \.-fOrst-case> coitt,ipg~.DCY·, w)1ich · m~ght ·r.eq1lire use
of .. Y.?t; . _.~s~i(s.;.. 19. . •jaf11:.:;g~l1?<;:AdE!l,,hate~r.ad~p... !Jrq~9c;:a.s~~'s:;i:.~·i?iov~d\ng
equiptn.erit and training·t'6 the. GORwill certainly minimize the
l. •
SECRET
• ",
••••:. '1
• { .... ' " ; ' ' ' . ; ·, .
<I "•;
'.'' ··.'
,.!
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•
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'
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�4
SECRET
necessity for ··l1s:irj.g. out ov.,rn .assets· to supptes':S· transmissiof1s. in.
a ci isis si t)-lafipn'.. It. ·"··~:,~·\; -:'~"1
0J:ii. ~ ~'•'-'' :.:f:/t:Oii.l,cie ·those ·>wi'tn·' .t'hEt' greatest
~.·~
~
,,~·.'
1ricentive -to halt such br.oadcasfs with· the .means of doing· so. · ·
Provisi:on:·,or · t.tai~Inc;J.arid/d~· ~gu'ipfr\~nt,wi11 lqe·aC:comp.aniect·· by
guidelines to define the· kind d't '1's.uppt,essioh~: ·fh,'at: ·i?s;·oi~·.-is
not· app.toprh1te .i ·ba·t·n:·:rn :tEir~s ·'of 'the.
tGre 6.f the ·b~oactcasts
that' will be suppr·~~;ed·.:and .·the ~ethods of s'~ppresshm. . .
o'
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GOAL:
Gain agreement to seek funcjing for the provision of
training and equipment to enable the GOR to locate and suppress
hate radio broadcasts.
Gain agreement that DOD will develop-onthe-shelf contingency plans for jamming broadcasts ourselves.
Concurrences by:
Mary McCarthy, Rithard Ragan, Leonard
Hawley, ·Gina Abracromie-Winstal)Jey
~_
--------~
__.,.....____-~-
Qo·.
tt'
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v
---~
�SECRET
.
..~. .;..
·..... ,'/
'
.
20408
·.... ····~·
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON
COUNTERING GENOCIDE IN THE GREAT LAKES f&t
BACKGROUND
Thousands of
soldiers of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and their extremist
Irlterahamwe militia allies who carried out the 1994 genocide
continue to sow t~rror in the Great Lakes region. They retain
·their genocidal ideology and aim to exterminate Tutsis and
target moderate Hutus. In recent months, the genocidaires have
intensified their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu
civilians and expanded their area of operation. Their
destabilizing activities undermine reconstruction and
reconciliation efforts. Since mid~l997, the genocidaires are
conducting larger, better-coordinated operations aimed at
schools, hospitals and other undefended targets. Over 1,000
Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last
six months alone. Analysts do not believe these forces
represent a direct threat to the Rwandan Government (GOR) .
Despite efforts to mobilize along ethnic lines, the genocidaires
have not been successful in generating mass popular support.
t-&1
The Threat of Resurgent Genocide Persists:
As the force which stopped the
genocide, the GOR held the moral high ground upon taking power
in 1994. But a number of its actions have eroded that position.
Its counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of
civilian deaths, and there are continuing reports of collateral
civilian damage. GOR le~ders acknowledge human rights abuses
and say they do not condone reprisal acts and are taking steps
to improve less-than-effective and non-transparent military
justice mechanisms.
t-&1
Rwandan Government Response:
U.S. efforts to support reconstruction and
democratic transitions in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes
region are threatened by the genocidaires and ~heir cooperation
with other armed insurgents in DROC, Uganda an~ Burundi, as well
as with the regime in Sudan. In order to fulfill the
President's commitment to do everything possible to prevent a
recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes, we
are pursuing several elements of an effective strategy,
including: implementing the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to
help break the cycle of impunity; dispatching two highly
U.S. Policy:
r-----------------------------~
Decla5sified Under Autnorit~· Of the.
SECRET
C1 ass i fie d by ; G1 yn Davies
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify on: April 17, 2008
6EGR6l
Interagency SecuritY Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O: 13526, ·section 5·3(b)(J)
ISCAPAppeaiNo.2013-040,documentno.o3s
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�SE;GR~
2
SECRET
qualified American lawyers to help accelerate and bring due
process to the genocide trials in Rwanda; supporting local
elections in Rwanda scheduled for later this year, which will
expand opportunities for participation for the Hutu majority;
exploring possible avenues for expanding dialogue between the
GOR and untainted elements of the former government and
opposition that might credi91Y represent other constituencies
within Rwanda; discussing with the GOR the establishment of
regional development offices patterned after those in DROC;
working to enhance reconciliation radio programming in Rwanda
and the GOR's efforts to counter hate propaganda; consulting in
the region about'the possible establishment of an international
Coalition Against Genocide; and revitalizing the UN Arms Flow
Commission. This Deputies meeting will address military
elements. of an enhanced strategy.
~
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our
security engagement as one element of a broader genocide
prevention strategy. A separate discussion later will identify
specificfunding sources, if necessary.
~
ISSUE ONE:
What should be tbe policy objective and scope of
additional U.S. military aid and training for Rwanda?
Given the expanded activity of the genocidaires, Deputies are
asked to review whether the objective of our military assistance
should be to expand 6ur current efforts to help professionalize
the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution, or
to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter,
contain or neutralize the genocidaires. A decision is necessary
to provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine
the appropriate mix of activities. We do not expect that either
option would spark demands from other regional states for
similar aid. On the contrary, more serious engagement would be
positively received by most Eas~ and Central African states.
to-}
OPTION A:
EXPAND EFFORTS TO PROFESSIONALIZE. THE RWANDAN ARMY
This option would expand our current efforts to enable the
Rwandan army to professionalize its senior and junior
operational leadership, strengthen its military justice
institutions and facilitate its transition to a national
military, without introducing lethality into our assistance.
The DOD assessment team would examine how to expand our efforts
SECRET
�SECRE.!il
SEGRE=r
3
at leader development through command and staff training.
Illustrative activities might include: training of officers and
staff in planning, command and control, management systems and
military justice; supporting an NCO and officer academy;
expanding human rights training in the rules of war; developing
the command and staff of their nascent air force; and providing
further equipment such as uniforms, communication and loadbearing equipment. This could require additional IMET
resources, dispatching U.S. personnel for enhanced training
activiti~s and making additional slots open to Rwandans for the
Command General Staff CoL!.ege in Fort Leavenworth.
r&-1
PROS: This option would strengthen a critical GOR institution
and assist in the long-term goal of facilitating a transition to
a more professional military. Supporting the creation of and
training trainers for a training academy would assist the GOR to
lower costs, integrate disparate efforts and enhance
sustainability of inputs. This option would increase our
leverage to promote reforms of and the rule cif law within the
Rwandan military. The Ministry of Defense recently finished its
own ~ssessment of military justice and we could build on the
w~ndow of opport~nity tb ensure greater internal accountability
and protection of civilians.
r&+
CONS: This option will not in the short run contribute greatly
to the GOR's ability to deter or prevent a resurgence of mass
killings or to defeat the genocidaires because it would not
involve operational and tactical training. It only addresses
long-term improvements in the Rwandan army's. capabilities, not
lethal aid to deal with the immediate threat.
r&-1·
OPTION B: . SUPPORT GOR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE GENOCIDAIRES
This option would establish our policy objective to more
directly contribute to Rwanda's military efforts to deter,
contain or neutralize the genocidaires. We would commit to
enhancing the GOR's internal defensive or offensive capabilities
through the provision of lethal and non-lethal training and
equipment. The DOD assessment team would consider a scope of ·
activities that would build on Option A but also include
counterinsurgency training, intelligence sharing and logistical
support to internal defense.
r&-1
PROS: ·This option would help enable the GOR to more effectively
counter the activitie~ of the genocidaires and provide it with
adequate capacity to deter, prevent or neutralize a resurgence
of mass killing. Critical to countering genocidal activity is a
SECRE'I'
SEGR~T
�SECRET
more efficient, targeted and professional GOR counter-insurgency
operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an antigenocide campaign would improve our leverage to increase GOR
commitment to political liberalization and respect fOr human
rights. Specific performance criteria resulting from
consultations with human rights groups would be attached to this
option, such as a code of conduct to ensure that aid and
training are not used against innocent civilians.
rei
CONS: Because of publicized human rights abuses within the
context of its counter-insurgency operation, providing lethal
military aid to the RPA would be highly controversial with human
rights groups and certain Members of Congress. This approach
would require a change in policy to support lethality and would
require a concerted public affairs campaign and consultation
effort in Congress. It also requires additional resources.
Opposition to lethal support for.the Rwandan military might
obstruct our efforts to make non-military policy enhancements.
(-8-t
ISSUE TWO: Should we also consider a regional strategy that
might include military aid, training and contingency support to
better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?
The African Cr.isis Response Initiative (ACRI) in its current
form is years away from creating a capacity for Africa to do
peacekeeping operations by itself and does not address some of
the particular requirements of peace enforcement operations.
Regional states by themselves lack the current capacity to
intervene succ~ssfully to stop a genocide or situation of mass
killing. Some regional leaders have spoken about the
possibility of. intervening unilaterally or as a regional
coalition against the genocidaires if the situation markedly
deteriorates. We need to determine if and to what extent we are
prepared to work with these states to increase quickly their
capacity to respond to resurgent genocide. · rei
Deputies are asked to review whether the United States should
task the IWG to analyze contingencies and options regarding
potential U.S. support for building regional capaqity for peace
enforcement. The IWG would address the following questions:
What do we need to do now to support regional capacities to
undertake peace enforcement in strictly defined circumstances?
What should we be prepared to do ourselves (unilaterally and to
support an intervening force) in the event.of an intervention to
counter genocide? What should we do to develop an apprOpriate
SECRET
�SECRET
SE:GRE;T
5
multilateral political framework for intervention contingencies?
{-8-t
The range of options could include the following:
•
•
•
•
specialized training and/or equipment through additional
JCETs, IMET, EDA, FMF or emergency drawdown to support
regional logistical and peace enforcement capacities;
modi cation of the Program of Instruction (POI) for some ACRI
training and equipment transfers to address requirements
unique to peace enforcement operations;
modi cation of Frontline States equipment transfers;
contingency planning for providing airlift and(or logistical
support to intervening forces, such as the 1995 offer to
provide airlift support for humanitarian operations in the
event of an internationally sanctioned regional intervention
in Burundi . (-&t
PROS: It' is possible that the only willing volunteers to
counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass
killing .would be neighboring states. Therefore, providing
relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to
counter such activities. We don't want to find ourselves in a
position of having to choose to either stand by and do nothing
or intervene unilaterally in the face of another mass killing.
We need a reliable alternative response system. This approach
promotes regional solutions to regional problems. It may
minimize Congressional concerns if presented as a way to both
reduce future military or humanitarian commitments and promote
regional solutions to regional problems.
f-&t
CONS: This option requires support for regional deterrent
action and may be misinterpreted as endorsing regional
intervention more broadly. Regional states deploying ACRItrained units for a non-UN sanctioned operation would engender
resistance from the Hill, UN and elsewhere. Assistance could be
used for military purposes other than those we intend, given
that regional states have been instrumental in revolutions in
Zaire and Sudan. This option would require additional funding
for participating countries. A commitment to provide airlift
~nd logistical support might raise false ~xpectations that the
United States would back a regional intervention that would not
be endorsed by the UNSC. We need to clarify the conditions
under which we would be prepared to support such an
intervention.
(-&t
SECRET
�SECRET
SEGRE+
6
ISSUE. THREE: Sbou~d the. United States equip and train the
Rwandan army to locate and SUpPress bate radio broadcasts?
The 1994 genocide demonstrated the potential hate radio
broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity. Although
most of the hate propaganda currently being disseminated is
written, hate radio has the_potential to reemerge as a tool of
the genocidaires. Deputies are asked to decide what we are
prepared to do to address the possibility of an intense hate
propaganda campaign in a rapidly deteriorating crisis situation.
We are already taking a number of steps to counter hate
propaganda in the Great Lakes through the positive use of
information. But countering a potential upsurge in inflammatory
hate radio broadcasts would require training and equipping the
Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters.
The GOR currently can monitor and sometimes jam broadcasts, but
lacks the direction-finding capabilities which would be required
to locate and suppress mobile transmitters. Providing this
equipment and training to the GOR could be carried ·out either by
U.-S. military personnel or by contractors. Deputies should also
consider .whether to develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case
contingency which might require use of USG assets to.jam
genocidal hate radio broadcasts.
~PROS: Providing equipment and training to the GOR will
forestall future pressure on us to use our own assets to
suppress such transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also
provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such
broadcasts with the means of doing so.
~
CONS: On the other hand, once this equipment and training have
been provided, it may be difficult for us to control how these
capabilities might be used. Human rights groups and some
Members of Congress may criticize any provision of this type of.
equipment to governments which themselves have imperfect human
rights records. To counter such concerns, an agreement that
provides for a monitoring regime on the use of the equipment
should be negotiated as part of the package.
~
SECRET
sEsr~E-r
�SEGRE+
SECRE'f
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
20546
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
Summary .of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 28, 1998
LOCATION: Cordell Hull Conference Room
TIME:
2;00-3:30 P.M.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Jim Steinberg
Chief of Staff
John Podesta
OVP
Leon Fuerth
J~im Babbitt
CIA
Roderick Isler
State
Wendy Sherman
Susan Rice
AID
Richard McCall
JCS
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Defense
Walter Slocombe
Vincent Kern
NSC
Joseph Wilson
John Prendergast
Richard Ragan
Len Hawley
Mary McCarthy
OMB
Phil DuSault
USUN
David Goldwyn
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
•
In light of the continuing attacks on civilians by the forces
that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide, and in response to the
President's pledges to do everything possible to prevent a
recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes,
Deputies agreed to deepen our security engagement with the
Government of Rwanda as an element of a broader genocide
prevention strategy.
~
DeClassified Undei•Authority ofth'e
_Interagency Security Declassific~tion Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526".Sect:lon S;j(b)(3)
.
.
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(d)
5/28/08
Declassify on:
SE:GRE;T
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 36
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
�8BCRBT
2
•
A DOD assessment team with State Department participation will
travel to Rwanda and complete within 90 days an assessment of
the appropriate mix of additional military training activities
and equipment aimed at contributing to Rwandan efforts to
deter, contain or minimize the effect of the genocidaires.
The DOD plan will also include specific cost estimates for
proposed activities.
(Action: DOD, State)
(-&1
•
The parameters of the assessment will include lethal and nonlethal aid requirements. However, no commitment will be made
to the GOR concerning lethal aid. State Department members of
the team will seek agreement with the GOR on enhanced human
rights safeguards necessary for the provision of lethal
military assistance should Deputies authorize aid. Deputies
will re-convene at the a~propriate time to decide whether to
provide lethal aid.
(Action: State)
(-&1
•
The issue of whether the United States should equip and train
the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts
will be integrated into the assessment team's mandate. If the
assessment team recommends .any lethal activity associated with
countering hate radio, it will also be subject to Deputies
decision.
(-Si
•
DOD will produce within ninety days a plan to give neighboring
countries the military capacity to respond to gen6cidal
activity on a timeline much shorter than ACRI. DOD's plan
will also address airlift and logistical gaps.
(Action: DOD)
(-&1
•
In tandem with the DOD planning process, NSC will convene an
IWG to analyze contingencies and develop options for the
provision of U.S. political support for building regional
capacity to respond quickly to genocide or mass killing.
The·
IWG should also develop a diplomatic strategy to maximize
multilateral buy-in and African regional leadershi~ to avoid a
backlash from Africans and a perception that this might be a
U.S.-led initiative.
(Action:· NSC)
(-&1
•
The DOD plan and the results of the IWG process will be
presented to Deputies for their consideration.
f-€-1
•
Any enhancement of our security relationship with the
Government of Rwanda will require the development of a
comprehensive public affairs and legislative strategy to
explain our policy and actions.
f-€-1
8BCRBT
�SECRET
•
3
Following the DOD assessment and cost estimates, OMB, State,
and DOD will identify appropriate sources of funding required
for any enhancement of our security ~ssistance relationship.
(Action: OMB, State, DOD)
t€-1
SECRET
�Detr Mr. President,
l'hank
you
for Your kir.d letter delivered to Me fn New York
on OCtober ~· by Ambas.ador Mad4tleJne Albright with regard to the
utrildJtion of Rwandan Colonel Bagoeore. I ~tee fully with You that it
Is in the intervst of all of us that this lndivldul, ac;c;.used of genocide,
be judged by the lnternatlonll Crh11inal Tribunal fur R•anda. There he
a-n answer for his allegld crla" sgalnst humanity.
I
au11
pleased to Inform Vou, acoordingly, that all tegal
\
impediments within the Republic or C.•roon to the extradition of Colonel
Bagosora af'ld th,... oth•r• have b.en c1ear.cl away and that I have today
authorl~atlon.
I hope that thete c:ase& c;an be
handled expedftlousfy by the TrlbutNtl In Arusha In order to dtaonatrate
to the world that crimes of that nature •Ill not be to1enated, regardleas
signed the extradition
of whet"& they IIAIJ occur In the world.
I ua looking forward tQ continued cooperation
betwt~~~n
uur two
Governmenu In the New Year. P11111e accept. Mr. PAsldent, the renaw.s
assurances of My highest con151deratlon./-
n. ...._... -
CIJIITOII
Pltlldlll . . ... Unllal
trNSIII_.TOII, D.C.
s....
v
�- CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Mar_ch 7, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR
DENT
BERGER~~
FROM:
SAMUEL
SYLVIA MATHEW~~~l
STEPHANIE STREET~6·
SUBJECT:
Possible Stop in Rwanda on Your Trip to Africa
Purpose
To .decide whether you will make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.
Background
The Rwandan Government has invited you to stop in Rwanda for a
brief event to. underscore our condemnation of genocide no matter
where it occurs.
Given the centrality of this issue for
Rwandans, President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame b~lieve
that without an airport stop by you iri Rwanda, it would be
impossible for them to attend the regional meeting in Uganda.
Rwandan participation in the Kampala summit is clearly important
achievinq DUr objectives for the meeting.
But there are
other compelling reasons for stopping· in Rwanda, as well.
Remembering the victims of genocide in the country where the
atrocities occurred sends a powerful message that the United
States and the international community are as concerned with
genocide in Africa as we are 0ith genocide in other parts of the
world-- a message that would resonate.both in Africa and in the
United States.
The stop would also more vividly highlight the
importance of the regional discussions we will be having in
Uganda on ending the cycle of impunity.
Finally, we should be
able to announce ~everal additional alements of support for
Rwanda (like!~ candidates include a contribution to the newly
establi~hed genocide survivors fund, assistahce in the area of
democratization an~ hate radio) ,
~o
We can accommodate this event by making a bri.ef trip to the
Kigali airport in lieu of the roundtable di.scussion with women
emerging from conflict scheduled for the second day in Kampala.
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
l.S(d)
Declassify On:
3/3/08
�2
CmJFI DEH'l' IPx:L
The new schedule - resulting in a long day - would be:
depart
Kampala for Kigali at approximately 8:00a.m.; about one hour
flight time; conduct the airport stop at Kigali; return early
afternoon for the Regional Summit; and depart. Kampala that
evening, arriving at your hotel in Cape Town at approximately
2:00 a.m.
You are down the following day until early afternoon.
The Secret Service believes that concerns about security
associated with a visjt to Rwanda while real can .be managed so
long as the activities in Kigali are limited to the airport, are
small'in scope, and are kept logistically simple.
We are also
working with the Secret Service and our military to heighten
security for the advance team that will prepare the stop.
RECOMMENDATION
That you make a
ta~stop
Approve
in Rwanda.
~----·----
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Letter from President Bizimungu
COHFIDEH'l'IAL
�Declassified Under Authorlty.Of
the
JnteragencySecurity Declassification Appeals Panel,
GONFIDEH'PIAL
E.0.13526,: S.ection 5.3(b)(3)
1567
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 038
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
.
. ...
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
.c
\
i ']
,~ r-.'1_\:·\~s
·.
~1.·
.yI
\
\,AS\ '...-------_.
BERGER .-r~\V\}\~ .
•
FROM:
-~'·'· . ..
//
1
SAMUEL
STEPHANIE STREE'Fr
\
Possible Stop in
· ..:::::.._.. ,
\\w~
/
on Your Trip to Africa
Purpose
To decide whether you will make i tarmac stop in Rwanda .
.\.1
/1.. ~.·
Background
The Governmeht of Rwanda .has ifivited you to make a short tarmac
stop at Kigali International Air~ort ~o that you might make an
historic gesture _..,; condemnation ·of genocide wherever it occurs
"'/..,
-- to Africa and to the wor~d. ~ft:er a week of careful
Ji
deliberations, the Rwandan Gover:\ment has decided that -- absent
·'}'
your visiting Rwanda. itself .,-.- a~,t~nding the Kampala Summit and
"(~·-.£) discussing the genocide there is~poli t
lly and symbolically
L"\~ w_)
_. •
,0
-,
too problematic. The Rwandans f;§~l it is essential that
-:)
5\ American condemnation o.f the· RwaJ{qan genocide be articulated on
0
\/ .::,"<..·J:~/.::.Y Rwandan ~oil. We h~ve indicc:.tiu:{l;~. that othe~ :egion~l leaders
<: ~ · c}--}, share th1s perspect1 v~ and v1:e~v i:h1s as a cr1 t1cal s1gnal of a
~JP -:::·c,
new U.S. policy toward Africa, b;J1,:lding on Madeleine.' s pledge
"< l l
that the United states would star1.a against the resurgence of
i-1'
genocide in Africa.
In addi tion;j:a. Kigali tarmac· stop would
ensure Rwandan Government .Partic)'pation in the Regional Summit.
.J<
i-
~.
..
.x
r::~....,r
tJ
~
r~\.
K.
<.l
There are important moral, symbc
and political reasons for ~J i ,ti.(i.\~ \.
you to consider making this stop., •. It. would allow you to
--~:; ~...z"").'I....'C/
dramatically commemorate ... victims &.f genocide, as you have in
.V\ 1~0 ~_p
•
.
.
. ., ·'·
.
'I
\.·
. Bosnia and Germany. You·could h~~hlight our recent efforts to
p-~~
help break the cycle of impunity :and restore the rule of law to
.<'.~
the region. More importantly, yc\u· could send a powerful message
,S"'·\'-l" ):.~
to the continent -- and the. worl,:~";:-- that genocide in Africa is
\-v
f~r0
no di·fferent than genocide in Eu::-:ppe. You could also strengthen
":) '-it/'
our message about the internatio":,j:l' community's responsibility
1-:;'l
in the 1994 genocide, s
sing 6u:t; commitment to work with
\ty!..
other countries and alone if nece:~·sary to check genocide .and·
address impending mass human rigr~'ts abuses. This mE:;ssage would
:v·
·'
COHFIBEH':FI:P:cL
Reason:· 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:
3/3/08
..
cc: Vice Piesident
Chief of Staff
�r---------------~----------------------------------
---------------
2
COHFIDEltTL"m
rebound throughout the continent, the world, and back to the
United States, where key constituencies -- particularly AfricanAmerican and human rights activists -- believe that African
lives are not viewed as being as important to Americans or
American policy-makers as those from other continents.
As you have pointed out, a stop in Rwanda would indeed raise the
ghosts of our inaction in April-June 1994. Nevertheless, this
perception might be better addressed by focusing on what we are.
now doing in the region and making the case for lessons learned
from the 1994 experience. This approach received uniformly
positive media coverage during H·adeleine' s visit. Addi tiolially,
relations with Rwanda have progre§~ed far beyond recriminations
over past mistakes.
President Bizimungu made clear in his
personal invitation to you that the people of Rwanda view
continued U.S. engagement, as well as Madeleine's words, as
important indications of America's strong resolve on the issue of
gen~cide.
All signs ~ndicate that ~he Rwandans want to look _ . -\.}\'(N\, __
towards the future wh1le cornrnemorat1ng the past,.
..
c~d~Q. ·'svi. c ··\\D. .-~c. . .~ISSUE FOR DECISION:
\\Jt2 QrV-fO\~ii:._. <V.;..) ~G
Cx'-K'
\l
0
_ __v-,~,.-.
.\v
e-~c·
.
A TARMAC STOP IN RJTANDf\? ',L.~,...,:-\"U
o..ci\Sc.:..,.S'S\c...:;r _/
'\[..,...\ ()-. b,\C.)..*'(-1'-·
SHOULD YOU
~
.VVl.
. ·..+-;--..
./
r---' ')(
.
.
.
~-~-..:..~
T~.e.~t"'-Se-rvi--s-e-sl!l.e..~.JH~L-J3·r00.1-em....._w.J...t-l:l-..a---sn or L. ~--O·r:l-th e
r-
0
0 Q)'
t.a-:nma-e~~. A.'lc;er-..e~..::e>-F--.event involving genocide '-,...)// J
survivors and a short speech are ~11 that would be required. ·
(!)
The Rwandans have indicated a bilat in Rwanda would not be
necessary, The impact of your stop would resonate throughout
the continent and the world, and more than any other stop. on the
~
trip would truly underscore that we are cornrni tted to a new
. \-iL
. l'..,.
partnership with a new Africa.
..--("\,~ vV\ 0
~ ~(.,.._, 0
-J'I .
'\.~ J
•/
To accommodate this stop in your .schedule, we propose- cancelling ·'\.O,{C''·f''E
the roundtable discussion with women em~rging fromjconfl_~_ct,
'\yQ~
prese~Jy. scheduled for the seco~d day 1n Kampa~a. IR;S~~d, . CJ!""- _c . ·0'·
that rrro-:J?-r-rr-~\_ypu would travel to ·Rwanda, approx1mately one hour -\)D iY
fn:ght time, ahd return early that afternoon for the Summit.
~-
-1\' \/\
J
s/
--~-2~EN;~;:~~~'v'-(f
tar~ac
\ ...\..:'<:__
'-N~-J\c~ -§~\".\ \
1\\. \::~v··, ':'{~·'\
. E···v'cs"·('' c,y
That you make a
~
O<" '-\\:) C.."'\ .
stop in Rwanda.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Letter from Presiderit Bizimungu
COHFIE3EHTilrL
-
cr--. '-C\(\ V\. '-.r~
C}..
\.
~-~
r
.:~::...'?--! . ,
\.(\ (,) 1 ......_. \. l-." '._ ). (' {) '\ / ~- r--...
\~-"" ' X ,,.--., \ \.)
""'<, . •..•
..,.:'-.,.
, •.
't··~
I
�----------------------------
SENT BY:
3- 2-SS ;lO:lSAM ;
. AF/FQ-t
2023955673;# 3/ 4
•
lat March, 1991
DeclasSified-·u ndelAuth6ntviofth~
I nteragen17y Security. D~cl~ification Appeals Panel,
E.0.13526, Section 5;3(b)(3)
.
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 53
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014
Mr. William Jefferson Clh.non.
President ortho Unitod StatCI
The White House
Wnahinaton. D.C
Dear Mr. Prealdent.
I am writing to lhank you for your invitation to attend a regional summit in
Kampala on 24th and 25th. March i 998. I also wish to \Ike this opportunil)' to
welcome you to Afiica and to the region. This willglvo you and Afril:an lcadors an ••
opportunity to work out principle' that would auide the new partnership.
Mr. PresJdenl, J am keenly aware of your strong s~nthnonta aaainsl gunoc;ido
as is evident from our frequent correspondence and mouages from you through some
of your moat notable omclals. Secre\8ry State Madeleine Albright , fonncr
Secretary of Defense William Perry. Anthony Lake, Susan Ri!i:c have all conveyed
your measagoa on 11veral QQCIIiona. It Ia with thia in mind that Jexpressed our strong
wish that you include Rwanda on your forthcomlna tour of Aftlca.
or
'
A ttop.over In Rwanda, however brief. would give you a unique and historical
opponunlty to re-amnn your personal condemnation of genocide on one of the sites
whcro h took pl-" only recently. An opponunity to repeat the call to ..NEVER
AGAIN"; to denounce the heinous crimes: to show solidarity with the survivors. and
to lead the intemallonaJ community In a rododlcation to doter gonocJde.
1'
.
�SENT BY:
3- 2-88
:10:15~~
;
AF/f(}-t
2023355673; # 4/ 4
Unfortunately, yaur vlait to Africa which does not include Rwanda will
be judpd, fairly or unrairly. as diminilhlna the tnaic events that occurred In
our counU')'.Indeed, ~me caun1riu and indlvlduale havo attempted to dismiss
pnoc:ide In Rwanda u inaianit1cant, thus complicating the management of its
aftermath. Thase who deny. or minimize its significonc;e give contforl to ita
pcrpatratc-r~, hence the continuation of acts of genocide In Rwanda and in the
region. To our peopto who suffered and still suffer tho trauma of the genocide,
and who so gallantly fought to atop it, 08NOC1DE hu a moaning.
Besides the fact thal that would be in swrk contnst to your usual position,
both on domestic and intema&io.nal luucs, this Interpretation would be
agravaatod by sny aoing to Kampala lo di~uss. among other things, the
eontinuins acts of senocide. The confusion and embarraument this would Q&UIO
In Rwanda put$ me in a rather diMcult position with regard 10 attending the
meotlns,. in the event that the stop-over doos not occ,•r.
The issue here is not a visit Eo Rwanda, It is the unique and historical
opportunity for the US to rc•affirm Its moral leadership.
Mr. Prcsidenl,l still hope, against all odds. thot you wilJ make the slop-o\lor.
In the even• th•& this Is not so. and boca usc or tho importance we attach
to our relationship and our tupport for your vision ofUS ..Affica partnership, I
propote to meet you in Waahinaton, DC after your African taur. This will
onable me to discuss bilateral isau.es and lo inform you on our ahared etTons to
reconstruct our country and to create an environment Jn. which ·national
reconciliation can bo nunu~d.
Slnceroly,
"
�
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Rwanda from 1995 thru 1998. The records include trip reports, discussion papers, memos, NSC Deputies Committee and Ad Hoc Summaries of Conclusions, and head of state correspondence.
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Rwanda
Susan Rice
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c6744dd65f7534db883ac1c9d11f456a.pdf
e13daeb97939133ed6ec804ce0ebdddb
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Library
1200 President Clinton Avenue
Little Rock, AR 72201
Inventory for MDR Request 2012-0316-M
NSC Records Management System Records of Susan Rice on Rwanda, 1995 thru 1998
Extent
31 folders, approximately 188 pages
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Collection is open to all researchers. Access to Clinton Presidential Records is governed by the
Presidential Records Act (PRA) (44 USC 2201), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552,
as amended), and Executive Order 13526 (Section 3.5) and therefore, records may be restricted in whole
or in part in accordance with legal exemptions.
Copyright
Documents in this collection that were prepared by officials of the United States government as part of
their official duties are in the public domain. Researchers are advised to consult the copyright law of the
United States (17 USC 101), which governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of
copyrighted material.
Provenance
Official records of William Jefferson Clinton’s presidency are housed at the Clinton Presidential Library
and administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of
the Presidential Records Act (PRA).
Processed by
Staff Archivist, April 2012. Previously restricted materials are added as they are released.
Scope and Content
The materials in MDR 2012-0316-M are a selective body of documents responsive to the topic of the
MDR. Researchers should consult the archivist about related materials.
MDR request 2012-0316-M contains NSC Records Management System (RMS) numbered documents,
associated with Susan Rice, Senior Director of African Affairs, regarding Rwanda from 1995 thru 1998.
The RMS numbered documents contain memoranda, correspondence, emails, cables, maps, and reports
on the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the U.S. government’s response.
System of Arrangement
Records that are responsive to this MDR request were found in one collection area—Clinton Presidential
Records: NSC Cable, NSC Email, and NSC Records Management System.
The following is a list of documents and folders processed in response to MDR 2012-0316-M:
2012-0316-M
http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-1-
�Box 1
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
NSC Records Management System
PRS-Presidential Records
[Rice and Rwanda]
9500583 [OA/ID 561]
9505700 [OA/ID 596]
9505730 [OA/ID 596]
9505969 [OA/ID 598]
9506170 [OA/ID 590]
9507504 [OA/ID 608]
9507785 [OA/ID 610]
9508404 [OA/ID 615]
9520055 [OA/ID 3919]
9520177 [OA/ID 3919]
9520308 [OA/ID 3919]
9520933 [OA/ID 3919]
9520968 [OA/ID 3919]
9520983 [OA/ID 3919]
9520987 [OA/ID 3919]
9521001 [OA/ID 3920]
9600161 [OA/ID 1081]
9600547 [OA/ID 1083]
9603463 [OA/ID 1103]
9605426 [OA/ID 1116]
9607576 [OA/ID 1130]
9607743 [OA/ID 1131]
9607746 [OA/ID 1131]
9620729 [1] [OA/ID 3902]
9620729 [2] [OA/ID 3902]
Box 2
9620748 [OA/ID 3921]
9621000 [OA/ID 3921]
9621001 [OA/ID 3921]
9700327 [OA/ID 1598]
9801567 [OA/ID 2020]
9820408 [OA/ID 3891]
Last modified: 09/11/2014
2012-0316-M
http://www.clintonlibrary.gov
-2-
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Susan Rice and Rwanda - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2012-0316-M
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16208">Digital Library Collection</a>
Description
An account of the resource
Records in this collection include correspondence, reports, papers, memos, emails, and agendas. All records are from the NSC Records Management System numbered documents series and are associated with Susan Rice and Rwanda from 1995 thru 1998. A majority of the records describe the U.S. response to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the neighboring region of Zaire and Burundi.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Subject
The topic of the resource
Rwanda
Finding Aid