1
500
2
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/fc827249cbfef74779415b799def8e00.pdf
2700638dd00be650682cde19ba729c8b
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Declassified documents concerning Russia
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2011-0892-M
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These Clinton Presidential Records were declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request for specific closures from Freedom of Information Act Request 2006-1185-F (Records related to a June 13 and June 14 telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin). Included are emails, draft telcons, and briefing memorandum. Topics include the former Bosnia and Russian armed forces. These documents are from the NSC Records Management System PRS File Series. This release includes 60 pages of declassified materials and forty-five additional pages.
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07/22/22
Boris Yeltsin
Bosnia
Memcon
Russia
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d20dd3e8a48b7e084accd4a5f24741de.pdf
77b43e1ec9e6629d26c4da7299817ed3
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�Page 1 of 3
37.80F3B6.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 6:04:35 PM
FROM
Kaufman, Stuart J.
CLASSIFICATION
•SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
Memos for POTUS call [GECRET]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBONCOPY
TEXT BODY
Drafts attached and saved in G:/Documents, under package no. 4523.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth
RECOMMENDATION
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�3780F3B6.FIN
Page 2 of 3
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
-SECRET
•SECRET
9ECRET'4523
SECRET"
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed a
great deal of
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
37S0F3B6.FIN
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, have linked the two tracks, and are using our desire for quick
agreement as
leverage for achieving a better deal on the long-term structure (Track
IDAttachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
-SECRET•SECRET
•SECRET 4523
SECRETClassified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(bXd)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Exchange
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/12/99 9:46:44 PM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/12/2009
SUBJECT
FW: URGENT ~ Yeltsin Call Package ESECRETf
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Bartlett, L. June
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Jacobson, Tracey A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Powell, Elliott
Rice, Edward A.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
Brody, Richard J.
Saunders, Richard M.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Schulte, Gregory L.
CARBON COPY
TEXT BODY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
Per Mr. Steinberg and Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Pascual made changes in
the
"strobe note" and the "tps" documents. The changes are now reflected
in the attached documents. Also per Mr. Pascual, the Situation Room
will follow the below instructions, using these altered documents.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Saturday, June 12,
1999 6:58 PM
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
D
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA Russia/Ukraine;
Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.;
Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package [SECRET]
Importance: High
1.
SITUATION ROOM -- please secure fax this note and the
attachments
to Sandy, Jim and Leon Fuerth. Please page Greg Schulte and read
them to him if he is not in the office.
2. Sandy, Jim, Leon,
Greg - attached is the Yeltsin call package and a note to Strobe.
Would appreciate your sending any comments to the Sit Room. Please
call if you have questions. If you concur, I recommend that the
Sit Room secure fax to Strobe the attached not to him from Sandy
and the points (and NOT the memos).
3. SITUATION ROOM -- assuming
Sandy et al concur, please fax to Strobe the note from Sandy and
the points once you get comments. Strobe will need these as early
in his day as possible. You will see that we have asked Strobe to
send back comments. If you get these, please insert in "track changes"
mode. If Strobe sends a complete re-write, could you please type
this into the system. Please call me once you get his comments.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4 2 3
5
s r b b o r i s
c a l
l.
d o c
June 12, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: STUART KAUFMAN
SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to
Russian
President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.
Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth (they have not yet cleared)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin
Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin
1
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET 4523
•SECRET.
Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation
in KFOR.
II. BACKGROUND
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 10
5781A14C.FIN
Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed
tremendous
disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting
through their
mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President
Gore that
Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of
Russian troops to
Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the
press that
Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the
movement
in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with
"plausible
deniability".
Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia
is aimed at
reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR
model and under
US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II,
led on our
side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for
Russia's
long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two
tracks
separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The
Russians,
fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as
capitulation to
NATO, may link the two tracks together. That, ironically, is Russia's
worst
option since it would create facts on the ground that make Russian
participation
all the harder to work out.
Attachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin
2
OECRET
SECRET
SCCRET 4523
•SECRET
Classified by: Pascual
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 6 of 10
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT 4523tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Despite the
difficulties we face now, it is important to remember how far Russia
has come in
seven years and how far we have come in our relationship.
* That very progress makes the current situation in Kosovo all the
more serious.
It would be tragic to jeopardize all we've accomplished bilaterally and
in
bringing peace to Kosovo.
* Have to say that I'm disappointed in so many mixed signals these
past days:
Russia commits not to deploy, then deploys; orders withdrawal then
doesn't; says
it's a mistake, then claims it was authorized.
* I have no interest in blaming anyone, Boris, but these conflicting
signals are
hurting Russia's image, and it is making people question the value of
our work
together.
* But I also said that I would always offer solutions along with citing
problems,
and that is what I want to focus on now.
* Here's my goal: to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia,
allows
it to participate in the international security force, and is consistent
with
unity of command and effectiveness, on which we have all agreed.
* Our teams worked day and night and have come up with a two-track
approach. The
ideas are sound, and I want to authorize our people to finalize the
details and
start to implement.
Track 1
* First, let's agree on the short-term proposal our generals have
worked out to
start to deploy forces together tomorrow.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 7 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
* Second, let's give our people instructions to find a solution as fast as
possible that meets Russia's concerns and ours for an effective
security force
under unified command.
Version A - Offer Neutral and U.S.-Russian Sector
* Strobe and his team have put two options on the table, and your
ministers have
the details.
* One is to create a neutral sector with a Finn commander and a
Russian deputy
commander. When you study this, you'll see we listened carefully to
your
concerns about reporting to NATO.
* I also think that there is tremendous merit in the U.S. and Russia
working
together. So I'm ready to create, Boris, a joint U.S.-Russian sector.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Version B - Offer U.S.-Russian Sector
* In this spirit, Boris, I want to suggest a joint U.S.-Russian sector
where we
would work together.
* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have
command of his
national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to
the
commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.
* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree
and cannot
work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out
differences
like we have in Bosnia.
* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come
up.
Closing
* Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the
first track.
Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work
side-by-side
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3781A14C.FIN
Page 8 of 10
to protect the peace.
* The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals
to agree
on the details on the basis of our conversation.
* If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace
settlement work in
Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in
Cologne.
If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2
* There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a
security vacuum
to form that would jeopardize the peace.
* We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia.
So let's use
it.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on
Track 2. My
bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2
* I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay
focused on an
effective force with unified command and control.
2
CONTIDDNTIAfe
jCOMFIDEMTMcfc
COlitHDEUTIAL 4523
JTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
JCQNFIDD
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT 4533
s t r o b
e note.doc
FAX FOR STROBE TALBOTT FROM JIM STEINBERG
Strobe -
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 9 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
I am sending you a very preliminary draft of talking points for the
President's
call with Yeltsin. As you discussed with Carlos, I think you should
use these
points to preview with Minister Ivanov what the Russians might
accept on Track 1
and Track 2. Sandy still has not seen the points, so they may
obviously change.
On Track 1,1 know your priorities are to get commitment to move
ahead with an
SFOR model and to delink Track 1 from Track 2. That sounds like the
right
approach.
On Track 2, we have given you two models to work with: a neutral
zone and a
U.S.-Russia sector. As you requested, you have authority to explore
both
options. We'll need your advice on how to best play this issue in the
President's call-whether to propose version A or B in the points, or
simply
another variant. While we want to move the agenda forward, we also
want to avoid
overloading the circuits with Yeltsin.
On process, what would be most helpful is if your team could send the
Situation
Room after your meeting with Ivanov either pen and ink changes or a
revised
draft. If that does not work, call Carlos or the Situation Room and
give edits
or suggestions directly to them. If we need a wholesale rethink after
your
meetings, then we should talk. In any case, your report prior to the call
would
be most helpful. (The call is at 9:00 EST; 8:30 pre-brief.)
Regards,
Jim
1
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 10 of 10
3781A14C.FIN
SECRET'
SEeRET
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37820922.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 1:48:14 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
COI'tFIDEHTIAfc'
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin Talking Points [CQETriDENTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Ehrendreich, Joel
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37820922.FIN
Page 2 of 4
TEXTBODY
p
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
e r
y
o u r
request...
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37820922.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37820922.FIN
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
R78261F3.FIN
Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:07:13 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
Yeltsin TPs ^CONriDCNTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
I need to addfireproofersfromtoday's call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
J
u n e
14 B N Y call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Pleased to talk again after our good conversation yesterday. Our
hard work
together brought an end to conflict in Kosovo. We made the most of
our
cooperation and friendship and kept our disagreementsfromspoiling
everything.
* We must nOw work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground in Kosovo. Know that's
important to
both of us.
* We agreed yesterday that we'd talk again today to review today's
discussion
between our generals inside Kosovo on how they're going to
cooperate. Also want
to address two other issues.
* We contacted all necessary people on our side, glad their meeting
was
productive and resolved situation at the airport in Pristina. Minister
Ivanov
told us instructions had been given to Zvarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Glad our people got this
CLINTON LIBRARY
"CP
O OY
�R78261F3.FIN
Page 2 of 3
issue
fixed. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. Boris, this is a really
serious
problem. We need to instruct our people to get this done today.
* Want to come back to the other part of our conversation yesterday.
You made
proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal that we need to resolve the
shorter-term issue of cooperation with the Russian troops already
inside Kosovo.
* I would like us to say yes to both proposals. On the Russian
contingent
already in Kosovo, key step now is to fold these forces into KFOR
under unified
command.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov has told us that this approach is acceptable
and that
appropriate orders have been issued. We need to instruct key military
officials
to move forward and implement these proposals.
* Regarding our meeting, I'm looking forward to seeing you on
Sunday in Cologne,
or outskirts of Cologne. For that meeting to be a success, I think it
would be
useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet in next day or two to talk things over and
make some
concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in
Kosovo over
the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By the time of our meeting
in Cologne,
confident that we will have a well defined proposal to review.
2
GONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDCNTIAL
CONriDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
R78261F3.FrN
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
37826A8D.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 8:43:56 PM
FROM
Cheramie, Don E.
CLASSIFICATION
CQNEIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(b)(d)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS-YELTSIN CALL (6/13)
[CONriDCMTLtt]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate
you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way
in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another
important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work
together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements,
serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally
hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work
well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear
to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult
moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for
the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world
that we are working together.
* There is one matter I need to
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of3
37826A8D.FIN
raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at
Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN)
to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond
with the following points:
This situation arose because, until
now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions
for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.
As
President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon
as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions
for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest
of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of
the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This
will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security
Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the
short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy
forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have
been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some
promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important,
even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals,
if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne
one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should
intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some
instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
* Let's have
them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other
organizational
issues.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37826A8D.FIN
Page 3 of3
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can
resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the
time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public
statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational
commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM
Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris,
I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything
I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do,
too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's
team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals
on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in
Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and
interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three
things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2)
We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the
perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
* We need
to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
3-7827747.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:38:13 PM
FROM
Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Weiss, Andrew S.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
fyi
Original Message
From: Cheramie, Don E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation
Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points ECOMFIDEMTIAL]
Per your
request...
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT TPnotCS .doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership ~ and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of4
37827747.FIN
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827747.FIN
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827747.FIN
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 4
37827A33.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:50:41 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAfc
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call [COl'TIDEMTIAL]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Some suggestions. I hate to be a nudge, but I think the tone is
a little too negative. I've tried to soften. Unless there's sugar-coating,
we risk enraging Yeltsin who's already stirred up about anything
Kosovo-related.
Also, we cannot have the President do technical
issues or even technical terms that don't translate well into Russian
with this guy. It won't work. He'll check out of the call and we'll
get nothing.
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte,
Gregory L.
Subject: Points for Yeltsin Call tCONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW - made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires
to adjust based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg would appreciate your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
^ B N Y call tps_.doc
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O Y
H CP
�37827A33.FIN
Page 2 of 4
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over the meeting in Cologne. We must instruct our
people to fix
this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 4
37827A33.FIN
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deal with the
Russian
forces already in Kosovo. It is based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia.
We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our troops cooperating on
the
ground together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on all these fronts, we can get this issue under
control
and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 4
37827A33.FIN
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
into KFRO
because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would
jeopardize the
peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the command
arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFTPfiNTIAL
CONFIDENTjAL
CaNFIDENTIAfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY DU O O Y
CP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 5
Mai
DATE-TIME
6/13/99 9:52:25 PM
FROM
Schulte, Gregory L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Points for Yeltsin Call ^^NFTPFNTTATr]
TO
Pascual, Carlos E.
CARBON COPY
Weiss, Andrew S.
TEXT BODY
Pis see some suggested toughening up. I'll trust you to de-toughen,
if you think my additions would be counterproductive. But I think
we need to tell Boris that what Russia is doing could wreak the peace,
and put his own soldiers at risk. We might also need to add hints
that he needs to get his military under control.
Original
Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999
9:30 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: Points
for Yeltsin Call ECONTIDENTIAL]
Importance: High
AW -made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires to adjust
based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.
Greg ~ would appreciate
your clearance.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT Junel4BNYcalltps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
^CLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
�Page 2 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite - with our forces in the middle.
* There were already report of the KLA preparing to attack Russian
forces, since
the KLA thought that your forces had come in to protect Serb forces.
We've made
clear to the Albanians that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. Minister Ivanov told us you gave instructions to
Zavarzin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken
charge of the
issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious and
potentially
dangerous. It's already cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it
could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break
down. We
must instruct our people to fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37.827A9C.FIN
Page 3 of 5
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo until we agree on a
plan. But
every day there are more reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo. I
know
that you wouldn't let your military do this - it would be an act
tantamount to
war.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really set us at odds, and it is damaging Russia's
credibility.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo
based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works;
it's the
fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground
together.
* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement
the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on both these fronts — implementing the
interim proposal
to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our
defense and
foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
week — we can
get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 5 of 5
37827A9C.FIN
side-by-side.
CONFIDENTIAL
•CQMFIDENTIAL
-CONFIDENTIAL
•eONriBENTTTtfc
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 1 of 6
Exchange Mai
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 12:24:04 AM
FROM
Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION
CONriDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Schrader, Joel M.
McGee, Jenny A.
CARBON COPY
Chastain, George M.
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Monday,
June 14, 1999 12:18 AM
To: Chastain, George M.
Subject: FW: Draft
TPs for Yeltsin Call [CONriDEl'JTIAL]
Importance: High
George
I
read the Yeltsin talking points to Berger on the Stu III. He dictated
the changes, which I added and e-mailed to all relevenat parties
(as shown below). Based on this, and the late hour, we did not fax
a revised copy to Berger. Called Steinberg. He said he doesn't
need to see the points until morning. We faxed a copy to Talbott.
Berger and Steinberg will get copies in their morning take. Can't
confirm if ExecSec has staffed them to the President's Staff Sec
yet.
Original Message-—
From: Tarver, J. Sean
Sent: Sunday,
June 13, 1999 11:52 PM
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 6
37829E26.FIN
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl
Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory
L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M ; Davidson, Leslie K.;
@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin
Call [CONnDENTIAl]
Importance: High
Mr. Berger's changes are
reflected in the attached copy.
Original Message
From: Pascual,
Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM
To: @WHSR - WH
Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: ©RUSSIA - RussiaAJkraine;
Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.;
Davidson,
Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Draft TPs for
Yeltsin Call [CONFIDCNTIALj
Importance: High
SIT ROOM
Please
send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.
Attached
is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins
and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg
will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and
Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after
the VP-Stepashin call.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT j
u
n
e
1
4
B
m
call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 3 of 6
No
issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict
in Kosovo
will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to
resolve the
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarsin.
* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown
that when
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good
for both of
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken
charge of
the issue and broken an impasse.
* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked
for
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will
cast
a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the
meeting in
Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct
our people to
fix this today.
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers
agreed there
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual
agreement. But we
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your
military
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.
* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new
deployments to
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a
confusing
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright
yesterday evening.
* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37829E26.FIN
Page 4 of 6
to resolve
these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further
unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made,
Russia's
credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have
a
serious impact on our relationship.
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to
mine.
* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces
in Kosovo.
It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it
works; it's the
fastest way to get ourRussian and American troops cooperating on the
ground
together over the next week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need
to give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to
us on how we
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have
a well
defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense
and foreign
ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week ~ we
can get this
issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37'829E26.FIN
Page 5 of 6
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are
not part
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 6 of 6
37'829E26.FIN
of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect
Serb forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
•CQMHBENTIAL
CONFIDaffhtfr
CONFIDCNTIAL
CQNriDENTIAE
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 1 of 4
Exchange M a i
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 8:19:41 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
COWIDCNTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/13/2009
SUBJECT
FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONriDENTIAL}
TO
Dames, Victoria J.
Ficklin, John W.
Kaplan, Dean M.
Konrad, Elizabeth M.
Marsh, Thomas S
Porter, Pete
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.(Records)
Starks, Tali T.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
FYI
Original Message
From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday,
June 13,1999 9:39 PM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW:
June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points ECONFIDENTI AL]
These were the points
actually used for the call.
Original Message
From: Cheramie,
Don E.
Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos
E.
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points
[CONFIDENTIAfc.]
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13S26
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 2 of 4
Per your request.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
TPnotes.doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.
Russia has
come a long way in seven years under your leadership - and so has
our
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be
very proud of
that, and I'm proud to work with you.
* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our
partnership.
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We
kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we
made the
most of our cooperation and friendship.
* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace
and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin
yesterday, we
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to
coordinate
our roles in Kosovo.
* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our
goals in
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working
together.
* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of
the use
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General
Zvarzin
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the
KFOR Commander on
the basis of unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement
on the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of4
37830D9F.FIN
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in
the
peacekeeping operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as
possible
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the
closest
possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian
Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any
misunderstanding
and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict
accordance with the
UN Security Council resolution.
* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our
generals have
worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for
Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops
on the
ground together now.
* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working
with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we
should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee
us a good
meeting in Cologne one week from today.
* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts,
I think it
would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense
as well.
* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things
over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can
coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational
issues.
* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these
problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�37830D9F.FIN
Page 4 of 4
* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on
next steps on
arms control and announce that our binational commission will
resume its work
under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative
proposals on
how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo
which is
equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
present us with solutions.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 5
•3783179B.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:02:17 AM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)(x6)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2024
SUBJECT
Updated Yeltsin TPs [CONFIDENTIAL]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
Moretz, Sheila K.
Rice, Edward A.
Rudman, Mara E.
Sargeant, Stephen T.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.
CARBON COPY
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Russ, Judith P.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Hurley, C. Michael
Moyn, Samuel A.
Quinn, Mary E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Segal, Jack D.
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Saunders, Richard M.
Brody, Richard J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�.3783179B.FIN
Page 2 of 5
TEXT BODY
PLEASE PASS ASAP TO SANDY AND JIM
Below version incorporates Jim's
fixes as well as VP-Stepashin call. Strobe has cleared.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
June 14 BNY call tps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in
Kosovo; glad we're
continuing to work on this today. Vice President and Stepashin had
good call
this morning. Clearly, no issue is more important than Kosovo to
sustaining our
cooperation and friendship.
* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.
Otherwise the
withdrawals will slow, the KLA will not be under control or
demilitarize, and the
conflict in Kosovo will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the
middle.
* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion
between our
generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problem at Pristina airport.
Also want
to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to
make
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions
to resolve the
airport problem.
* Your representatives have told us that instructions were given to the
Russian
military to reach agreement on procedures for the airport.
* Despite what we asked for yesterday, problem at airport still isn't
fixed.
This is serious. General Zavarzin said today he was not there to work
things
out, only to listen. And he insisted on Russian control of airport.
* That won't do. Both the Ahtisaari-Chemomyrdin agreement and
UNSCR
specifically call for unity of command. It will be impossible to go on
to other
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 5
.3783179B.FIN
questions while this issue is pending.
* This problem will cast a negative tone over all we've done on
Kosovo; it could
ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down.
We must
instruct our people tofixthis today,
[pause for response]
* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Vice President and
Albright
have been told by counterparts that there will be no new Russian
deployments to
Kosovo without mutual agreement. Let me underscore continuing
importance of this
issue. We also believe sending Russian forces to Serbia would be
[provocative
move][very serious matter].
* * Boris, this issue can really become a big stumbling block and will
send a
confusing signal about Russia's goals in Kosovo.
* Appreciate PM Stepashin's and FM Ivanov's assurances on this
issue, even in
past few hours. They have worked hard to resolve these issues.
* However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further unilateral
deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made, Russia's
credibility in the
free world will be greatly diminished and it will have a serious impact
on our
relationship.
[pause for response]
Track 1, Track 2
* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for
us to
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals
worked out
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
* I think we cansay yes to your proposal and to mine.
* Both Vice President and Stepashin and Albright and Ivanov have
agreed, Boris,
on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo. It is based on
what you and I
worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get
our Russian
and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next
week.
* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to
implement the
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work
together to
implement the peace.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 4 of 5
3783179B.FIN
* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could
meet in
Cologne later this week. For that meeting to be a success, we need to
give
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.
* Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations
to us on how
we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your
people and mine
have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting
there.
Let's have our defense ministers meet there.
* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams
could present to
you and me a well defined proposal to review.
* Boris, if we can move on these fronts ~ implementing the interim
proposal to
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams
meet to
prepare for our meeting ~ we can get this issue under control and help
make
Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander
* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary
Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative
proposals on how we
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which
is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition
of
Kosovo.
4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the
possibility that
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of
a KLA plot
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this
week and
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�3783179B.FIN
Page 5 of 5
present us with solutions.
If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2
* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
fully
integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to
form that
would jeopardize the peace.
* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.
* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the longer-term
command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My
bottom lines are
effectiveness and unity of command and control.
* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.
If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces
* We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not
part of
KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb
forces, and
Russian troops will become a greater target.
* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your
forces, but
this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR
with its UN
mandate.
3
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
•GQNFIDENTIAb
-CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 3
378320DC.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
6/14/99 9:41:46 AM
FROM
Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION
CONTIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON
06/14/2009
SUBJECT
FW: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [CONTIDENTIAL]
TO
Bartlett, L. June
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
Taken care of. Saved to G:/EXECSEC as Yeltsin Jun 14.doc
Original
Message
From: Hachigian, Nina L.
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999
9:32 AM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @NSA
- Natl Security Advisor
Subject: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [€QNFiDEWTlAfcj
APPROVED BY JS AND SRB--PLEASE TAKE TO STAFF
SECRETARY ASAP.
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT D
o c
l
rfoc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
* Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet
and resolve
the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what
they worked
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 2 of 3
378320DC.FIN
out.
* I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general
said he was
only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the
commander of KFOR,
General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.
* I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a
good call a
few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have
agreed that
Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree
on a
long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in
this interim
period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good
arrangement, but
it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions
to
implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do
you
agree?
* Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this
weekend;they
can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for
Russian
participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have
the
airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.
* Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached
agreement with
General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will
instruct Cohen
to meet with Sergeyev.
* In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us there will be
no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter.
I hope we
can count on this.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 3
378320DC.FIN
CONriDEl'JTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 1 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
7/8/99 1:14:02 PM
FROM
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION
SECRCT
CLASSIFICATIONREASON
1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON
07/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON
07/08/2009
SUBJECT
pis put in final, thanks. [OECRET]
TO
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128memcon.doc
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin
<«
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin
INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel
Ehrendreich, Roger
Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office
The President: Hello. (U)
President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)
The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to
instruct our
generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport
and report
back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed ~ p8f
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 2 of?
R7A2F69C.FIN
President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave
instructions
to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement
with regard
to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the
airport of
Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this
group, in
the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be
functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international
peacemaking
force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula, ffl
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the
group,
will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of
coordination
with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already
exchanged
liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the
security of
the personnel of the Russian contingent. {$)
I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for
the joint
operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of
clear-cut
use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia.
However, in
this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. {$]
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three
days,
completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue
of
deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the
peacemaking
operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such
agreement to
Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of
Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me
before the
meeting in Cologne. ^
In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of
Defense to
meet tomorrow or at the latest, the day after tomorrow, at a place
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Page 3 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
acceptable for
them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster of Defense
Sergeyev would be
prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. ^
I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such
agreements on the
matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should
enable us
not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that
event, we
would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American
cooperation in
other important areas. ^s
JQ
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another
problem.
If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could
be in
danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions
of the
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the
other
members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted
to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo
could and
would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities.
Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with
the
Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the
peacemakers
in Kosovo, in fact, tum a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of
that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the
Russian
peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats
are
translated into reality. Madam Albright assured Ivanov that
appropriate work has
been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to
ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This
is all
I wanted to say.
The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo
Liberation
Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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R7A2F69C.FIN
would not
tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is
important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the
impasse at
the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came
into Kosovo
only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We
made it
clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this
resolved
or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. ^
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it
could be
jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came
out of the
meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what
you have said
to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general
has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today.
President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the
agreement should
be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions.
The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on
this, let me
go through the points, and see if we have agreement,
President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term,
using the
Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport.
Second,
impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there,
but
there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense
ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we
can, you and I , have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that.
^
President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)
The President: I would like to - (U)
President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�Page 5 of 7
R7A2F69C.FIN
The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I
might.
First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister
Sergeyev
meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr.
Stepashin,
and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agree to do it, so
I think
they should meet there,
President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions.
(U)
The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I
will
work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia
in this
united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in
Bosnia, and I
have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work
through this
so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I
think
it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this
mission
will succeed. ^5
Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but
one that will
be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will
ensure an
equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and
capacity to
contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need
you
there. It is very important, ffi
President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to
share
with me? (U)
The President: Absolutely. (U)
President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I
will
issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be
fully carried
into affect. (U)
The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�R7A2F69C.FIN
Page 6 of 7
you in
Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)
President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have
elected
such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner.
(U)
The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)
President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)
The President: Goodbye. (U)
President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)
~ End of Conversation ~
4
-SECRET 5128
•SECRET
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
TRANSLATEDATTACHMENT
5128srb.doc
July 6, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL
FROM: ANDREW
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin,
June 14, 1999
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14
telephone
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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RECOMMENDATION
That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
1
SgCR&T
.SECRET
SECRET XXXX
Classified by: XXXX
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/7/09
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a
long way in seven years under your leadership — and so has our relationship,
including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm
proud to work with you.
I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our
hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most
of our cooperation and friendship.
We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our
militaries work well together on the ground.
As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have
had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles
in Kosovo.
We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and
so that we can show the world that we are working together.
•
There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the
airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to
work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of
unity of command.
We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:
This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping
operation.
As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to
the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible
cooperation of our forces in the interest ofpeace in Kosovo.
We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation
in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the
implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council
resolution.
•
First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked
out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON^MW^iPHOTOCOPY
�•
This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We
know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the
ground together now.
•
Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign
Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the
next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
•
These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting
in Cologne one week from today.
•
While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would
be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
•
Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make
some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and
cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.
•
With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.
•
At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms
control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice
President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:
•
Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can
- and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as
we possibly can in accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how
we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
•
At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
1) The operation must be militarily effective;
2) We must ensure unity of command;
3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
•
We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us
with solutions.
CLINTON
"CP
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LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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HTCP
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C I T N L B A Y POOOY
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PER E.O. 13526
UK
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
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�.COMFIDEMTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , you and I agreed y e s t e r d a y t o i n s t r u c t our g e n e r a l s t o
meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f command a t t h e a i r p o r t , and
r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked o u t .
•
I was v e r y d i s a p p o i n t e d and concerned t o l e a r n t h a t your
g e n e r a l s a i d he was o n l y t h e r e t o l i s t e n and r e f u s e d t o work
out a p l a n w i t h t h e coinmander o f KFOR, General Jackson. This
i s a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n which must be r e s o l v e d .
•
I was encouraged t o hear from A l Gore t h a t he and S t e p a s h i n
had a good c a l l a few hours ago on t h i s s u b j e c t . S t e p a s h i n
t o l d Gore t h a t you have agreed t h a t Bosnia r u l e s w i l l a p p l y i n
Kosovo i n t h e i n t e r i m u n t i l you and I agree on a l o n g - t e r m
arrangement, and t h a t t h e arrangements f o r your f o r c e s i n t h i s
i n t e r i m p e r i o d w i l l be worked o u t w i t h General Jackson. This
i s a good arrangement, b u t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we g i v e o u r
g e n e r a l s c l e a r and d e c i s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o implement t h i s
today. L e t ' s b o t h do i t as soon as we f i n i s h t h i s c a l l . Do you
agree?
•
S t e p a s h i n and A l a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h e J i f i h a o t Sec Cohen and
M i n i s t e r Sergeyev g e t t i n g t o g e t h e r / t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e meeting
between you and I t h i s weekend; they can make a j o i n t p r o p o s a l
t o us on t h e l o n g - t e r m arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. I t h i n k t h i s i s a good idea, b u t o n l y i f we have t h e
a i r p o r t i s s u e and t h e i n t e r i m arrangements i n p l a c e .
•
Once we have heard t h a t your General i n P r i s t i n a has reached
agreement w i t h General Jackson on t h e Bosnia model f o r t h e
i n t e r i m p e r i o d , I w i l l i n s t r u c t Cohen t o meet w i t h Sergeyev.
•
I n t h e meantime, b o t h PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured
us t h e r e w i l l be no f u r t h e r deployments t o Kosovo u n t i l you
and I r e s o l v e t h i s m a t t e r . I hope we can count on t h i s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON
D^OTOCOPY
At
�rnMnnriTTTTMr
a success, we need t o g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o our M i n i s t e r s o f
Defense.
L e t ' s have them meet u r g e n t l y t o develop c o n c r e t e
recommendations t o us on how we can cooperate t o g e t h e r i n
."Kosovo over t h e l o n g e r - t e r m . Your people and mine have
discussed H e l s i n k i .
I support t h a t . You and I had a good
meeting t h e r e . L e t ' s have our defense m i n i s t e r s meet t h e r e .
Our f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s would f o l l o w - u p . By Cologne, our teams
c o u l d p r e s e n t t o you and me a w e l l d e f i n e d p r o p o s a l t o r e v i e w .
B o r i s , i f we can move on these f r o n t s — implementing t h e
i n t e r i m p r o p o s a l t o deploy our f o r c e s i n t h e s h o r t - t e r m , and
a g r e e i n g t o have our teams meet t o prepare f o r our meeting —
we can g e t t h i s i s s u e under c o n t r o l and h e l p make Cologne a
success.
I f Yeltsin
pushes
for (& Russian
sector/commander
•
Boris, I
going t o
Madeleine
possibly
t h i n k I understand your needs and i n t e r e s t s . I'm
do e v e r y t h i n g I can - and w i l l make sure t h a t
and S e c r e t a r y Cohen do, t o o - and go as f a r as we
can i n accommodating you.
•
Strobe's team t h a t was j u s t i n Moscow made some c r e a t i v e
p r o p o s a l s on how we can ensure t h a t Russia has an area o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Kosovo which i s e q u i t a b l e - and t h a t i s
w o r t h y o f Russia's r o l e and i n t e r e s t s .
•
A t t h e same t i m e , we must be c a r e f u l about f o u r t h i n g s :
1) The o p e r a t i o n must be m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e ;
2) We must ensure u n i t y o f command;
3) We must n o t a l l o w e i t h e r t h e p e r c e p t i o n o r t h e r e a l i t y
of a p a r t i t i o n o f Kosovo.
4) Russia must be f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR t o m i n i m i z e
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e KLA w i l l see t h e Russian t r o o p s as
a t a r g e t . We became aware o f a KLA p l o t a g a i n s t Russian
t r o o p s y e s t e r d a y , which we were able t o head o f f .
•
We need t o ask our defense m i n i s t e r s t o develop these ideas
t h i s week and p r e s e n t us w i t h s o l u t i o n s .
I f Yeltsin
links
Track
1 and Track
2
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
I
�T>
rE
_r;nNr *»*ft*T
•
There i s a r e a l urgency about g e t t i n g t h e Russians a l r e a d y i n
Kosovo f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o KFOR because we cannot a l l o w a
s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
•
Our people have agreed on an i n t e r i m model t h a t w i l l get t h i s
•problem f i x e d q u i c k l y . We're u s i n g a s i m i l a r approach i n
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t and make i t work.
•
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e on
the l o n g e r - t e r m command arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n KFOR. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e ground t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
I f Yeltsin
says
the
KLA is
going
to provoke
Russian
forces
•
We l e a r n e d o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia. B o r i s , i f Russian t r o o p s
are n o t p a r t o f KFOR, t h e KLA w i l l b e l i e v e they came i n t o
Kosovo t o p r o t e c t Serb f o r c e s , and Russian t r o o p s w i l l become
a greater target.
•
We've made c l e a r t h a t we would n o t t o l e r a t e any a t t a c k s on
your f o r c e s , b u t t h i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e importance o f your
f o r c e s coming f u l l y i n t o KFOR w i t h i t s UN mandate.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COtTFIDEMT IAD
G
fQN^t-TBRARY TOOTOCOPY
1
C&WMWfSW^tiSWeWY: :
�r^NFTHFiNTT ATi
•
B o r i s , I hope a t a minimum we can agree now t o go ahead w i t h
the f i r s t t r a c k . Time i s p r e c i o u s , and we need t o show again
t h a t our t r o o p s can work s i d e - b y - s i d e t o p r o t e c t t h e peace.
•
The second t r a c k i s more c o m p l i c a t e d , b u t l e t ' s i n s t r u c t our
-generals t o agree on t h e d e t a i l s on t h e b a s i s o f our
conversation.
•
I f we can do these t h i n g s , n o t o n l y can we make t h e peace
s e t t l ^ i i f i e n t work i n Kosovo, we w i l l have t h e b a s i s f o r a r e a l
r a t i o n when we meet i n Cologne.
Boris
linJfcs Track
1 to
agreement
on Track
2
There i s a r e a l urgency about Track 1 because we cannot a l l o w
a s e c u r i t y vacuum t o form t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e t h e peace.
We know t h e i n t e r i m model works.
Bosnia. So l e t ' s use i t .
We're making i t work i n
You a l s o have my commitment t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia can
on Track 2. My bottom l i n e s are e f f e c t i v e n e s s and u n i t y o f
command and c o n t r o l .
•
But l e t ' s n o t l i n k these two t r a c k s t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y when
we can move t o g e t h e r now and get f a c t s on t h e g ^ u n d t h a t show
t h a t we can work e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e - b y - s i d e .
If
Boris
suggest
a one-week
deadline
on T:
•
I am committed t o move as q u i c k l y as Russia as long as we s t a y
focused on an e f f e c t i v e f o r c e w i t h u n i f i e d command and
control.
PHOTOCOPY
. HANDWRITING
)r'MBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
5128
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
WAS H I N GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
Y e l t s i n (/)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, M i l e s Murphy, Matt
S i b l e y , J o e l Ehrendreich, Roger M e r l e t t i , Doug
Bayley, and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
The
President:
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
w i t h Russian P r e s i d e n t
(U)
Good morning. B i l l .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Good morning, B o r i s .
Yesterday, you and I agreed
to i n s t r u c t o u r generals t o meet and r e s o l v e t h e problem o f
command a t t h e a i r p o r t and r e p o r t back t o us on what they worked
out.
I was q u i t e d i s a p p o i n t e d —
(^0
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Yes, they d i d . They met y e s t e r d a y , and I
gave i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h o l d t h e necessary n e g o t i a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o
come t o an agreement w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e
support team f o r t h e Russian presence a t t h e a i r p o r t o f S l a t i n a
near P r i s t i n a . And we proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h i s
group, i n t h e framework o f t h e f i r s t stage, w i l l remain a t t h e
a i r p o r t and w i l l be f u n c t i o n i n g i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e . And t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e group
w i t h t h e commanders o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacemaking f o r c e w i l l
be p o r t r a y e d i n an accord based on t h e Bosnia f o r m u l a .
The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning
of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in
the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals
Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers.
They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the
personnel of the Russian contingent. { j f )
SECRET
Reason:
1.5(b)
Declassify O(;LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�.SCCRET
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement p r o v i d i n g
f o r t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e S l a t i n a a i r p o r t . An example o f
such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f
the Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia.
However, i n t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s
of c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by Russia. (^ff
And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or
three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the
principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage
of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian
contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or
the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of
Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and
me before the meeting in Cologne. [JS)
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , I c o n s i d e r i t v e r y i m p o r t a n t f o r our
M i n i s t e r s o f Defense t o meet tomorrow o r a t t h e l a t e s t t h e day
a f t e r tomorrow a t a p l a c e acceptable f o r them. I f S e c r e t a r y
Cohen i s prepared, then M i n s t e r o f Defense Sergeyev would be
p r e p a r e d t o welcome him i n Moscow and meet him here.
^0
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t , h a v i n g reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t
i n Kosovo, t h a t should enable us n o t t o overburden t h e agenda o f
our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n t h a t event, we would be i n
p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n on Russian-American c o o p e r a t i o n
i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
(/0
I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo,
another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken
then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized.
What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo
Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members
of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to
Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives
of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And
the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is
a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in
fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that,
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to
threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the
consequences if these threats are translated into reality.
Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been
done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I
should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your
personal control. This is all I wanted to say. i f f )
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t o f a l l , l e t me say w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army, we d i d l e a r n o f a p l o t a g a i n s t Russia,
*CWT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�and we t o l d them we would n o t t o l e r a t e a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s ,
and t h e y agreed n o t t o do i t . But i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o understand
why t h e y wanted t o do i t . They b e l i e v e t h e impasse a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l p r e v e n t an e f f e c t i v e KFOR. They b e l i e v e you came
i n t o Kosovo o n l y t o p r o t e c t t h e Serbs, n o t t o be p a r t o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e . We made i t c l e a r we w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e
a t t a c k s on your f o r c e s . We have t o g e t t h i s r e s o l v e d or we can
expect t r o u b l e .
We have t o r e s o l v e t h e a i r p o r t i s s u e .
Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is,
it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this
is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and
your general. So based on what you have said to me and the
conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get
those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. {JOf
President Y e l t s i n :
But t h a t was n o t our agreement. F i r s t , t h e
agreement s h o u l d be reached, and then we s h a l l immediately i s s u e
i n s t r u c t i o n s . (^f
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree. So what I am s a y i n g , i f we are a g r e e i n g
on t h i s , l e t me go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f we have
agreement.
President Y e l t s i n :
Okay.
(U)
The President: First, there will be an interim deployment,
short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian
component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will
be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be
no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers
will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian
participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and
ratify that.
{^]
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o —
President Y e l t s i n :
agree. (U)
(U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t I
The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two
if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary
Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that
we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to
President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they
should meet there.
(pf
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e the a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t :
That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I wanted t o say
i s t h a t I w i l l work hard on t h i s .
There must be a f a i r and
r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d o p e r a t i o n , and t h e r e
are i s s u e s somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i n Bosnia, and I have some
ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and t r y t o work t h r o u g h
t h i s so you w i l l be pleased and so t h a t the m i s s i o n w i l l be
s u c c e s s f u l . But I t h i n k i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o
terms t h a t w i l l assure us t h a t t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed.
(^f
T h e r e f o r e , we have t o agree on terms f o r the u n i f i e d command, b u t
one t h a t w i l l be acceptable t o you.
I t h i n k we can do t h a t . I
commit t o you we w i l l ensure an e q u i t a b l e and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e of
Russia w o r t h y o f your i n t e r e s t s and c a p a c i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e .
There are t h i n g s t h e r e t h a t no one e l s e can do, and we need you
there.
I t i s very important.
(JST
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Did you set f o r t h a l l your items t h a t
wanted t o share w i t h me?
(U)
The
President:
Absolutely.
you
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y agree,
t h a t I w i l l i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and then those
i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l be a
good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y g l a d
we have e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do not i n f r i n g e on t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f the o t h e r p a r t n e r .
(U)
The
President:
Good.
President Y e l t s i n :
The
President:
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
U n t i l we meet.
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
(U)
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�5128
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with
Yeltsin {jfl
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
President Y e l t s i n
INTERPRETER:
N i k o l a i Sorokin
Notetakers:
Joel
r a d e r , M i l e s Murphy,
Matt S i b l e y , J o e l
r e n d r e i c h , Roger
M e r l e t t i , Doug Ba^ .ey and Andrew Weiss
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 14, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
President Y e l t s i n :
issian President
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
06 - 10:32 a.m.
(U)
Good inorning, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Good morning,
Boris. Yesterday, you and I
agreed to instruct our/generals to meet and resolve the
problem of command at/the airport and report back to us on
what they worked out/.
I was quite disappointed -- (Jg)
President Yeltsin^/ Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and
I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in
order to come tc/ an agreement with regard to the regulations
of the support /team for the Russian presence at the airport
of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the
understanding/that this group, in the framework of the first
stage, will /remain at the airport and will be functioning in
the interests of the international security force. And the
cooperation of the group with the commanders of the
international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an
accord b^sed on the Bosnia formula. (jgfl
The foi/ces t h a t a r e n o t t h e r e y e t , t o ensure t h e f u l l
f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e group, w i l l be deployed upon r e a c h i n g an
agreement and i n t h e framework o f c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h General
JackJon.
Generals Z a v a r z i n and Jackson have a l r e a d y
exchanged l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s .
They have discussed t h e
problems o f e n s u r i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e personnel o f t h e
Russian c o n t i n g e n t .
I i n s t r u c t e d General Z a v a r z i n t o a r r i v e a t an agreement
providing f o r the j o i n t operation of the Slatina a i r p o r t .
An example o f such j o i n t use, o f c l e a r - c u t use, c o u l d be t h e
CECRETReason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f ^ ^ n J [\j7pQ|\j9 L I B R A R Y
Pl~
CP
OY
�j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Tuzla a i r p o r t i n Bosnia. However, i n
t h i s case t h e p o s i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l should be r e t a i n e d by
Russia.
And i t i s o f extreme importance t o have, i n t h e coming two
or t h r e e days, completed t h e process o f r e a c h i n g an
agreement on t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e o f deployment i n t h e coarse
o f t h e second stage o f t h e f u l l scope o f t h e peacemakii
o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Russian c o n t i n g e n t under a j o i n t command.
Such agreement t o Track 2, o r t h e second stage, s h o u l d be
reached a t t h e l e v e l o f M i n i s t e r s o f Defense and M i n i s t e r s
of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and r e p o r t e d t o you and me b e f o r e t h e
m e e t i n g i n Cologne. (X)
In this connection, I consider it very important for our
Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at/the latest the
day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If
Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minster/of
Defense
Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome h/m in Moscow and meet
him here. (J?)
I proceed from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h ^ t , having reached such
agreements on t h e m a t t e r s o f p r i n o i p l e r e g a r d i n g t h e
s e t t l e m e n t i n Kosovo, t h a t shoulcr enable us n o t t o
overburden t h e agenda o f our c o n v e r s a t i o n i n Cologne. I n
t h a t event, we would be i n p o s i t i o n t o c e n t e r our a t t e n t i o n
on Russian-American cooperat/on i n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t areas.
I s h o u l d l i k e t o r a i s e f o r your b e n e f i t , w i t h r e g a r d t o
Kosovo, another p r o b l e m / I f measures, t i m e l y measures, a r e
not t a k e n then t h e s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be i n danger, c o u l d be
j e o p a r d i z e d . What is^meant i s t h e p r o v o c a t i v e a c t i o n s o f
the s o - c a l l e d Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. We c o n t i n u o u s l y s a i d ,
and a l l t h e o t h e r members o f t h e G-8 agreed, t h a t such a
s i t u a t i o n cannot/be p e r m i t t e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e i n which t h e
r e t u r n o f t h e A l b a n i a n refugees t o Kosovo c o u l d and would
r e s u l t i n chasing away t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f o t h e r
n a t i o n a l i t i e s - ' . R e g r e t t a b l y , t h a t i s t a k i n g p l a c e . And t h e
main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s w i t h t h e A l b a n i a n m i l i t a n t s .
This i s
a cause of/my disenchantment, t h a t t h e peacemakers i n
Kosovo, / n f a c t , t u r n a b l i n d eye t o t h a t occurrence.
The
r e s u l t / 6 f t h a t , when i t went as f a r as t h i s , i s t h a t t h e
m i l i t a n t s b e g i n t o t h r e a t e n t h e Russian peacekeepers. And
you/fcan imagine t h e consequences i f these t h r e a t s a r e
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r e a l i t y . Madame A l b r i g h t assured Ivanov
t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e work has been done v i s - a - v i s t h e l e a d e r s o f
the Kosovo L i b e r a t i o n Army. I should l i k e t o ask you t o
take t h i s i s s u e and keep i t under your p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l .
This i s a l l I wanted t o say.
aINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�The President: First of all, let me say with regard to tl
Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against
Russia, and we told them we would not tolerate attacks /3n
your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is,
important to understand why they wanted to do it. T^ney
believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an/effective
KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to /protect the
Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made
it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your/forces. We
have to get this resolved or we can expect t/ouble. We have
to resolve the airport issue. y£)
Now what you have s a i d about t h e a i r p o r t / t o d a y i s good.
That i s , i t c o u l d be j o i n t l y operated and access be
guaranteed, b u t t h i s i s n o t what came/out o f t h e meeting
between General Jackson and your g e n e r a l . So based on what
you have s a i d t o me and t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n A l Gore and
S t e p a s h i n had, t h e g e n e r a l has t o /get those i n s t r u c t i o n s so
we can r e s o l v e t h a t m a t t e r t o d a y / (^1
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : But t h a t w^s n o t our agreement.
the agreement should be reac d, an^ then we s h a l l
and
immediately issue i n s t r u c t i o n s .
First,
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree.
what I am s a y i n g , i f we a r e
a g r e e i n g on t h i s , l e t me/go through t h e p o i n t s , and see i f
we have agreement. ^20
President
Yeltsin:
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r ^ t , t h e r e w i l l be an i n t e r i m deployment,
s h o r t - t e r m , u s i n g t h e Bosnian model t h a t w i l l i n c l u d e a
Russian component/at t h e a i r p o r t .
Second, impasses a t t h e
a i r p o r t w i l l be /resolved. Russian t r o o p s w i l l s t a y t h e r e ,
b u t t h e r e w i l l /be no more deployments u n t i l we agree.
T h i r d , our defense m i n i s t e r s w i l l meet t o work o u t t h e l o n g term arrangements f o r Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n so we can, you
and I , have/a meeting i n Cologne and r a t i f y t h a t . (S)
President/Yeltsin:
The
President:
Agreed.
(U)
I would l i k e t o -- (U)
President Y e l t s i n :
I agree. (U)
I say o u t r i g h t and from t h e o u t s e t t h a t
The P r e s i d e n t : Okay, I would l i k e t o make another p o i n t o r
two i f I m i g h t .
F i r s t o f a l l , I would l i k e t o propose t h a t
S e c r e t a r y Cohen and M i n i s t e r Sergeyev meet i n H e l s i n k i
because I know t h a t we have discussed t h a t w i t h ^ c J - ^ \ ^ R ( J j . ^ ^
Stepashin, and I mentioned i t t o P r e s i d e n t A h t i s a a r i , and4ie
has agreed t o do i t , so I t h i n k they should meet t h e r e . (^f
<^-e£lINT0N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�President Y e l t s i n :
instructions.
(U)
I agree and s h a l l i s s u e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
The P r e s i d e n t : That i s g r e a t . The o t h e r t h i n g I Wanted t o
say i s t h a t I w i l l work hard cn t h i s .
There must/be a f a i r
and r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e f o r Russia i n t h i s u n i t e d -eJperation,
and t h e r e are issues somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i^n Bosnia, and
I have some ideas t h a t I w i l l g i v e t o S e c r e t a r y Cohen and
t r y t o work t h r o u g h t h i s so you w i l l be p l e a s e d and so t h a t
t h e m i s s i o n w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . But I t j / i n k i t i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t t h a t we come t o terms t h a t w j / l l assure us t h a t
t h i s m i s s i o n w i l l succeed. (^f
Therefore, we have to agree on terifis for the unified
command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we
can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable
and responsible role of Russia/worthy of your interests and
capacity to contribute. The/e are things there that no one
else can do, and we need yqn there. It is very important.
<fi
President Y e l t s i n :
Did/you s e t f o r t h a l l your items
you wanted t o share w i / h me? (U)
The
President:
Abso/utely.
that
(U)
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n : / Then I would l i k e t o t e l l you I f u l l y
agree, t h a t I w i l d i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e n
those i n s t r u c t i o n s would be f u l l y c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : / Thank you so much, B o r i s . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
seeing you i n ' Cologne. We w i l l work t h i s o u t , and i t w i l l
be a good t h i n g .
(U)
P r e s i d e n t / Y e l t s i n : Very good, v e r y good. B i l l , I am v e r y
g l a d we h,4ve e l e c t e d such i s s u e s , which do n o t i n f r i n g e on
the i n t & r e s t s o f t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r . (U)
The
President:
Good.
B o r i s , I w i l l see you soon.
(U)
/
President Y e l t s i n :
U n t i l we meet.
(U)
/'
/
The
President:
Goodbye.
President Y e l t s i n :
(U)
Goodbye, B i l l .
—
I embrace you.
End o f Conversation
—
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
(U)
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
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2011-0892-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from June 13-14, 1999. Material includes emails with drafts of proposed talking points, background information on the military and political situation in Kosovo vis-a-vis Russia, and a telcon from June 14.
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388766" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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2/6/2015
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2011-0892-M
7388766
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Kosovo
Russia
Telcon