1
500
21
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Clinton Presidential Library
1200 President Clinton Avenue
Little Rock, AR 72201
Inventory for FOIA Request 2009-1295-F
Records on Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Extent
20 folders, approximately 1,598 pages
Access
Collection is open to all researchers. Access to Clinton Presidential Records is governed by the
Presidential Records Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. Chapter 22, as amended) and the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552, as amended) and therefore records may be restricted in whole or in part in
accordance with legal exemptions.
Copyright
Documents in this collection that were prepared by officials of the United States government as part of
their official duties are in the public domain. Researchers are advised to consult the copyright law of the
United States (17 U.S.C. Chapter 1) which governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of
copyrighted material.
Provenance
Official records of William Jefferson Clinton’s presidency are housed at the Clinton Presidential Library
and administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of
the Presidential Records Act (PRA).
Processed by
Staff Archivist, June 2013. Previously restricted materials are added as they are released.
Scope and Content
The materials in FOIA 2009-1295-F are a selective body of documents responsive to the topice of the
FOIA. Researchers should consult the archivist about related materials.
The Algerian Civil War of the 1990s, and the accompanying massacres, had it roots in political and
economic challenges during the late 1980s. During the presidency of Chadli Benjedid (1979-1992),
political and economic relaxation had taken place. In the meantime, dropping infant mortality had
resulted in a growing, now politcally enabled, population. When the fall of oil prices in late 1980s
caused an economic crisis, many members of this younger generation turned to the Islamist Front
Islamique du Salut (FIS). The FIS perfomed very well in the parliamentary elections of January 1992.
The FLN hardliners in the Algerian military quickly forced the resignation of Benjedid, banned the FIS,
and set up a transitional government.
Some FIS activitists viewed the military’s ban of their political party as a declaration of war. Guerilla
fighters began attacking security forces. Though the FIS leadership condemned attacks on civilians,
they quickly lost control of the party’s more extreme elements. The violence continued to escalate and
2009-1295-F
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1
�now included civilian casualties. By 1993, serveral guerrilla factions had splintered from the FIS. The
most notorious of these was the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA).
In 1994, Minister of Defense Lamine Zeroual became President and indicated that he was willing to
have a dialogue with the Islamist factions. However, neither Zeroual nor the FIS could control their
more extreme supporters, and the dialogue broke down. Violence in Algeria increased as the
government and the insurgents launched aggressive attacks against each other.
The bloodshed peaked during latter half of 1997 and the beginning of 1998, following the June
parliamentary elections. During this period, many massacres, attributed to the GIA, occured against
civilians, including women and children. Often, entire villages or families were the targets. A majority
of these atrocities occured in the area south of Algiers, earning it the nickname “The Triangle of Death.”
The worst of these massacres included: Sidi Rais on August 29 (around 400 deaths), Beni Messous on
September 5 and 6 (around 100 deaths), Bentalha on September 22 (around 300 deaths), Relizane on
December 30 through January 4 (over 1000 deaths), and Sidi Hamed on January 11 (around 400 deaths).
The Relizane and Sidi Hamed massacres took place during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
The massacres caught the attention of the international community. Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch urged the response of the developed world. While the Clinton Administration’s policy
remained that the violence was an internal Algerian matter, it expressed sympathy for the victims and
urged a solution. American Ambassador to Algeria Cameron Hume made a well-pubicized visit to the
site of the Sidi Hamed massacre. The European Union sent two delegations to investigate the atrocities.
In addition, the GIA’s actions had become distasteful to many of its supporters. In September 1998 the
more extreme elements of the GIA left to form the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).
That same month, Zeroual resigned the presidency. His successor, Abdelaziz Bouteflika passed a law
by referendum that granted amnesty to many of the guerrilla fighters. Algeria slowly became more
stable, despite the continued existance of the GSPC. In 2007, the GSPC formally changed its name to
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
The majority of the records related to this FOIA case are closed for national security reasons. Records
released include White House press materials, National Security Council and State Department press
guidance, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch. These responsive materials are located in the files of Scott Busby in the National Security
Council’s Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Directorate, the Automated Records Management
System Emails between September 1997 and January 1998, the National Security Council Cables
between August 1997 and February 1998, and the National Security Council Emails between September
1997 and December 1998.
System of Arrangement
Records that are responsive to this FOIA request were found in these collection areas—Clinton
Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files, Clinton Presidential Records: ARMS Emails,
and Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems.
Staff and Offices files were maintained at the folder level by staff members within their individual
offices and document all levels of administration activity.
Staff and Office files are processed at the folder level, that is, individual documents are not selected and
removed from a folder for processing. While this method maintains folder integrity, it frequently results
in the incidental processing of documents that are not wholly responsive to the subject area.
2009-1295-F
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�The Automated Records Management System (ARMS) is a database that contains email records of the
Executive Office of the President. This system maintained unclassified Presidential email. The
ARMS database is comprised of seven sub-series of email records called "buckets." The
buckets generally represent a specific White House office. The buckets are titled: NPR for National
Performance Review, OPD for Office of Policy Development, POTUS for President of the United
States, WHO for White House Office, CEA for Council of Economic Advisers, Default for emails not
associated with an office and NSC for National Security Council.
The following is a list of documents and folders processed in response to FOIA 2009-1295-F:
Box 1
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs
Busby, Scott
Algeria [1] [OA/ID 1889]
Algeria [2] [OA/ID 1889]
Algeria [3] [OA/ID 1889]
Algeria [4] [OA/ID 1889]
Schwartz, Eric
Algeria, 1997 [OA/ID 3214]
Vaccaro, Jonathan
Algeria [OA/ID 2207]
Wippman, David
Algeria [OA/ID 1570]
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System [Email]
NSC [OA/ID 1200000]
[Algeria and massacre…]
[09/02/1997 – 01/15/1998]
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 – Dec 1998 [OA/ID 520000]
[Algeria and massacre…]
[08/30/1997 – 09/08/1997]
Box 2
[09/11/1997 – 09/26/1997]
[10/01/1997 – 10/31/1997]
[11/03/1997 – 01/07/1998]
[01/08/1998 – 01/13/1998]
[01/14/1998 – 01/21/1998]
[01/22/1998 – 01/30/1998]
[02/02/1998 – 02/17/1998]
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�Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System (continued)
Box 3
NSC Emails
Exchange – Record (Sept 97 – Jan 01) [OA/ID 620000]
[Algeria and massacre…]
[09/03/1997 – 02/09/1998]
Exchange – Non-Record (Mar 97 – Jan 01) [OA/ID 630000]
[Algeria and massacre…]
[09/23/1997 – 02/13/1998]
NSC Records Management System
[Algeria]
9705949 [OA/ID 1638]
9706037 [OA/ID 1639]
Last modified: 9/21/2015
2009-1295-F
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4
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Finding Aids - Collection Descriptions & Inventories
Description
An account of the resource
Finding aids at the Clinton Presidential Library contain a detailed description of the collection including the total number of pages or photos and length of video and audio recordings. Finding aids also include background information of the collection’s topic and details on the record type (ex: email, memorandum, briefing book, Betacam video, audio cassette etc). <br /><br />Finding aids describe collections at the box and folder level, and include a folder title list and information about the arrangement of the collection. <br /><br /><strong>Please note the majority of collections have not yet been scanned nor made available online.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Algeria - Collection Finding Aid
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
<strong>Please Note: No items in this collection have yet been scanned nor made available online. For access to the collection please visit the Clinton Library's research room.</strong>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Finding Aid
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6723398a1f98a4807ea655dae13762de.pdf
5ffa54d1eda377885914695c029f0140
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Original OA/ID Number:
1639
Document ID:
Stack:
v
9007
763
Row:
Section:
45
3
Shelf:
Position:
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001 a. form
NSC/RMO Profile Sheet (2 pages)
09/08/1997
PI/b(l)
001b. memo
Strobe Talbott to Erskine Bowles, re: Weekly Report from the
Department of State (7 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number:
1639
FOLDER TITLE:
9706037
2009-1295-F
ke2l01
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Aet -14.| U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(H)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
nnancial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001 a. form
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/08/1997
NSC/RMO Profile Sheet (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
P\/b(\)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number:
1639
FOLDER TITLE:
9706037
2009-1295-F
ke2101
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Aet -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Ereedom of Information Aet - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release w ould disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Seeuritj' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment lo Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001 b. memo
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Strobe Talbott to Erskine Bowles, re: Weekly Report from the
Department of State (7 pages)
09/03/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number: 1639
FOLDER TITLE:
9706037
2009-1295-r
ke2IOI
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A j
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e F O I A j
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the F O I A j
National Seeuritj' Classified Information |(a)(l) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) o f t h e PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
9706037
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Records Management System
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585721
42-t-7585709-20091295F-003-004-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 3
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585721">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/dd344a90f6dd3ff1d46fe2d30697b821.pdf
991a536cd0ed65b853d05e1a8444048c
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Original OA/ID Number:
1638
Document ID:
9705949
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
45
3
6
3
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001a. form
NSC/RMO Profile Sheet (2 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
001 b. memo
Samuel Berger to the Chief of Staff, re: National Security Council
Daily Wrap-Up (2 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number:
1638
FOLDER TITLE:
9705949
2009-1295-F
kc2100
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001 a. fonn
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
09/03/1997
NSC/RMO Profile Sheet (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(I)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number: 1638
FOLDER TITLE:
9705949
2009-1295-F
kc2100
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Aet - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b ( l ) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A |
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA)
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) o f t h e PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6) o f t h e PRA)
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
P R M . Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG#
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
PRS
NSC
ARS(^
A/O
DISPOSITION
INITIAL/DATE
SEQUENCE TO
INT
Cosgriff
Rice
Davies
Kerrick
Steinberg
Berger
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
Records Mgt.
A = Action
=3.
4
1 = Information
cc:
COMMENTS:
Exec Sec Office has diskette
1 fyMA?'^
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
-ftr
N = No Further Action
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
00 lb. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Samuel Berger to the Chief of Staff, re: National Security Council
Daily Wrap-Up (2 pages)
09/03/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Algeria]
OA/Box Number:
1638
FOLDER TITLE:
9705949
2009-1295-P
ke2IOO
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
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Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
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National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
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Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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9705949
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42-t-7585709-20091295F-003-003-2015-2015-2015
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585721">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a5433ce1e58f55586b7c6526be11894f.pdf
d003faa3dedc22238070c9cd39558066
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. email
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Scott Busby to Eric Schwartz, re: Good background for tomorrow's
Algeria meeting (6 pages)
01 /13/1998
RESTRICTION
PI /b( 1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Non-Record (Mar 97 - Jan 01) ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
630000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/23/1997 - 02/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2099
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Page 1 of3
344CC0E1.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
9/23/97 10:41:49 AM
FROM
Pedersen, Amy F.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
Libya and Algeria guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON COPY
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Marty, Joseph H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Simon, Steven N.
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
9-23guid.doc
Libya
September 23, 1997
Arab League Foreign Ministers Resolution on Libya
Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League's resolution on Libya?
Doesn't this
undercut UN sanctions on Libya?
Background: Arab League FMs met in Cairo this week. Among a
number of
resolutions considered, Libya promoted and got approval of a
resolution that
calls on Arab countries to ease the severity of the UN resolutions'
embargo on
flights into and out of Libya. The resolution appears to expand the
existing
exceptions for humanitarian and hajj-related flights to include
transport of
�344CC(J1.FIN
Page 2 of 3
workers, any aid from Libya to other countries, travelers for any
religious
reason, and official Libyan political leadership. Many Arab
governments were not
aware of the resolution, and none - especially Egypt - has called for
Arab
countries to ignore UN sanctions.
A: We have seen only preliminary reports of the resolution.
That said, the Arab League has no authority to override UN Security
Council
resolutions. We are making our strong views against the League's
action clear to
Arab governments.
UNSCRs 748 and 883 place restrictions on Libya - including flight
sanctions - in
response to the Libyan government's refusal to cooperate with the
investigation
into the downing of Pan Am 103, which killed 270 innocent people,
including 189
Americans.
Libya continues to refuse to fully comply, choosing instead to offer
sham offers
of cooperation. The UN Security Council has been clear that Libya is
far from
satisfying the requirements. Until it does so, there can be no excuse
for
loosening sanctions.
There are already exceptions in the UN resolutions that allow for
Libya's
legitimate humanitarian needs. Medivac flights are routinely granted.
Moreover,
the Council has made provisions in years past for Hajj-related flights
and we are
on record as being willing to continue to consider such requests.
The current UN sanctions remain in full force, and we expect the
Council to
ensure that any violations of these sanctions will be publicized and
dealt with.
Violence in Algeria
September 23, 1997
�344CCCH1.FIN
Page 3 of 3
Q: Any comment on today's massacre in Algeria?
A: We condemn the horrible massacres and bombings that have killed
so many people
in Algeria.
We are outraged at the savagery of these violent attacks.
The U.S. continues to encourage a policy of national reconciliation on
Algeria
based on the rule of law.
We are hopeful that local elections this fall will offer an opportunity
for
Algerians to renounce violence and participate meaningfully in a
political
process.
�Page 1 of 4
344CC391.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
9/24/97 8:29:35 AM
FROM
Crowley, Philip J.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY EARLY EDITION
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
news, doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1997
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA:
BOSNIA: APNSA acknowledges need for U.S. engagement past June
1998, setting up
battle with Congress over Bosnia exit strategy. He also rejects
partitionist
argument that Dayton will not succeed. (NYTI; WP27)
FRY: Serbian government may be coalition between Milosevic bloc
Serbian radical
party based on national election results. (NYT8)
CANADA: Despite prosperity, a five-party splintered Parliament
promises a
divisive debate on country's future. (WP23)
NORTHERN IRELAND: UUP and Sinn Fein sit down for first time
in 70 years, even if
talks only produced condemnations and denials. Trimble may have
�344CC391.FIN
Page 2 of 4
used
condemnation strategy to get to table, but it's unclear what he does
now. (NYT8;
WP25)
RUSSIA: VP Gore says that a joint U.S.-Russian investigation shows
that Iran is
vigorously pursuing ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs,
but refuses to
divulge details. Gore and Chernomyrdin focus on process-oriented
solutions to
oil agreements, nuclear reactor problems and religion law. (WP26;
NYT8)
SLOVAKIA: Hungary and Slovakia are locked in dispute over
Gabcikovo dam on the
Danube, which Hungary claims harms the river's water quality.
(WP26)
SPAIN: Basque Nationalist Party withdraws support for Aznar's
Popular Party.
(NYT11)
MIDDLE EAST:
ISRAEL/MEPP: Israel identifies four suicide bombers from last two
Jerusalem
attacks as coming from West Bank village of Asirah Shamaliya,
ending speculation
that attacks came from abroad. (NYT3; WP24)
ALGERIA: Muslim militants attempting to overthrow militarydominated government
killed another 200 civilians in Baraki. (NYT1, 3: WP23)
AFGHANISTAN: One year after Taliban takeover, frustration grows
in Kabul with
weekly Islamic decrees. (NYT1)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Prime Ministers of both countries met in New
York and agreed to
end Kashmir border skirmishes. (WP27)
ASIA/PACIFIC:
JAPAN: U.S. and Japan sign defense guidelines upgrading security
relationship and
committing Japan to its highest military profile since WW II, despite
China's
concerns. (WP1;NYT7)
KOREA: Kim Dae Jung is leading all Presidential polls, which would
make him first
opposition leader to be elected President. Four South Korean
journalists are
allowed to visit North. (NYT4)
AFRICA:
SUDAN: U.S. is returning diplomats to Sudan to pressure militant
regime to
improve actions on terrorism, human rights and its civil war. (WP26)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
�344CC391.FIN
Page 3 of 4
MEXICO: Two Maya Indians were killed in clashes between political
factions in
Chiapas. (NYT11)
PARAGUAY: Former general facing charges of attempted
presidential coup is
nominated by president's own party as May 1998 presidential
candidate. (NYT5)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON:
DEFENSE: Prior to Oslo negotiations, the military categorized antihandling
devices used in conjunction with anti-tank mines as APLs, making
Presidential
statements on eliminating anti-personnel landmines in the future
technically
incorrect. (WP19)
SPACE: NASA awaits two independent assessments of risks of
putting another
astronaut aboard Mir. (NYT18)
GWI: Draft of PAC report leaked to WP says Gulf War veteran
mistrust of Pentagon
investigation actually increased even as Pentagon expanded its
investigation
resources and effort. (WP2)
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: Texas couple convicted in Alexandria of
transporting
undocumented Mexican workers to jobs on the East Coast. (WP22)
UN ARE ARS: Several speakers at UNGA emphasize need for all
countries to pay dues.
(NYT 10)
ADMINISTRATION:
KAMEN: Richard Celeste is nominated to be Ambassador to India.
Daryl Jones will
soon be announced as Secretary of the Air Force. Susan Brophy is
engaged to
Gerald McGowan, who is expected to be named Ambassador to
Portugal. (WP19)
OPINION:
WP: Editorial examines the split on UN policy between the
Administration and
Congress and says that while Clinton speaks in favor of supporting the
world body
and acting multilaterally overseas, critics in Congress have regrettably
forced
him into more defensive, less positive actions. Wangdu letter urges
support for
a free Tibet. Falk op-ed on our losing efforts to stop cross-border drug
flows
urges more assertive efforts. Greenberg op-ed on the overrating of
Nobel prizes.
Cavanagh-Anderson op-ed says the assumptions used by advocates of
�344CC391.FIN
Page 4 of 4
fast-track
trade legislation that does not include labor and environmental
protections are
false. (20,21)
NYT: Editorial denounces Croatia's bullying of critics of government
policy.
Editorial praises the actions of Corazon Aquino and the Philippine
public in
stopping Ramos' efforts to run for another term. De Angelis letter
notes the
long history of Roman Catholicism in Russia and says the new
religion law will
trample on Catholics' rights just as the Soviets did. Ferris op-ed takes
a
humorous look at the problems on board the Mir. (30,31)
�Page 1 of 9
34CDA1C4.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/5/98 8:58:34 AM
FROM
Crowley, Philip J.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 2 of 9
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 3 of 9
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 4 of 9
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Soubers, Richard R.
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
�Page 5 of9
34CDA1C4.FIN
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
news.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 1998
MIDDLE EAST:
ISRAEL/MEPP: Foreign Minister Levy quits government, leaving
Netanyahu with a
razor-thin majority in Parliament. Lebanese-American is detained on
suspicion of
aiding Lebanese terrorist group. Saudi Prince Talal donates $1M to
Palestinian
charities. President will host Netanyahu on January 20 and Arafat two
days
later. Car theft is soaring in Israel, with many vehicles ending up on
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 6 of 9
the West
Bank and Gaza. (NYT1; WP1, 13, 14; LAT1; USA1, 10; WT1,7)
ALGERIA: Government calls recent attacks "residual terrorism," but
refuses to
confirm latest violence that claimed 412 lives. (NYT6; WP13;
USA 10; WT7)
IRAQ: SYG Annan is expected to approve new oil-for-food plan.
(WT8)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA:
FRANCE: Chirac delivers New Year's message, symptomatic of his
"symbolic
Presidency." (WP15)
ITALY: Prime Minister Prodi calls for European response to influx of
Kurds to
Italy. (WT7)
LITHUANIA: U.S. emigrant Valdas Adamkus is elected President.
(NYT7; WP13;
USA 10; WT7)
NATO EXPANSION: One ofthe major questions of NATO
expansion is the degree to
which intelligence agencies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic can be
trusted to keep secrets. Austrians may vote on whether to join NATO.
(NYT3;
WT9)
NORTHERN IRELAND: Security at the Maze prison is being
investigated amid calls
that the government assume greater responsibility for internal security
there.
(NYT3)
RUSSIA: Vladimir Lukin says that Russia will assert interests in
Caspian oil
development. Moscow elites have thrived both under communism and
capitalism.
(WT8, 9)
SWEDEN: Police arrest 314 people at neo-Nazi concert. (NYT7)
TURKEY: Police foiled a planned attack on Incirlik AB. (WT9)
EU: Monetary union represents huge political as well as financial
decision for EU
countries. Magnitude of transformation just now sinking in.
(NYT/D11)
ASIA/PACIFIC:
SOUTH KOREA: South Korea is trying to secure roughly $35B in
new financing by
selling bonds. Kim Dae Jung is already leading the effort to
resuscitate the
economy even though he is not yet President. Soros indicates an
interest in
increasing South Korean investments. Rubin says that Asian
meltdown will not
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 7 of 9
affect U.S. economy. (NYT1; WP12; WSJ 16; USA/IB)
CAMBODIA: Hun Sen has yet to consolidate his political and
military control,
leaving the country more unstable than ever. Rumors circulate that Pol
Pot has
escaped from the jungle and taken refuge in China. (NYT4; USA 10)
CHINA: Economy continues to grow, but outdated industry makes
1998 economic
performance unpredictable. Loss of chicken due to bird flu will
greatly affect
New Year celebration. Senior Chinese official will visit Taiwan later
this
month, signaling willingness to resume cross-strait talks. (NYT/D16;
LAT2;
WSJ 17; WT7)
JAPAN: 1998 is year of reckoning as Japan confronts need for reform.
Short of a
calamity, policymakers may not change economic model. (NYT/D15;
WP1)
THAILAND: People calling themselves the "formerly rich" sell off
their status
symbols. (NYT/D15)
AFRICA:
KENYA: President Moi is officially declared winner of election.
(NYT1; WP20;
USA 10; WT7)
CONGO(K): Future mineral exploration is into doubt as government
reexamines
copper project. (WSJ 17)
RWANDA: U.S. promises to continue efforts to extradite Rwandan
clergyman in Texas
in connection with genocide tribunal. (WT8)
ZAMBIA: President Chiluba sends disturbing signals about
democracy through arrest
of former President Kaunda. (LAT3)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN:
BRAZIL: While foreign investors cheered Cardoso's actions to
confront financial
crisis, impact will cause political problems at home. (NYT/D16)
CUBA: Fidel Castro greets U.S. scientific vessel during Havana port
call.
(USA 10)
MEXICO: Army conducts security sweep in Zapatista region,
increasing tension.
Zedillo has shown unexpected political skill in first half of his term.
Zedillo
replaces interior minister following Chiapas massacre. Magazine says
government
had secret plan in 1994 to crush Zapatista rebels by arming
paramilitary groups.
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 8 of 9
(WP13; LAT2; WSJ 17; USA 10; WT9)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON:
DEFENSE: Former Coast Guard official is awarded $130,000 after
being harassed
following report of toxic waste dump at Coast Guard Academy. Air
Force T-3
trainer has been grounded following series of accidents. New York
State review
of harassment case involving Air National Guard's first female fighter
pilot
recommends single standard of conduct, consistently applied for all
military
members. U.S. is committed to destroy non-stockpile chemical
weapons, even
though not obliged by CWC to do so. (NYT17; USA3; WT5, 8)
SPACE: Lunar Prospector launches tonight. Engineers propose
futuristic laser to
blast away space debris. (WP3; LAT/B5; USA3)
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: Interpol used data from Nigerian
arrested in Luxembourg for
heroin smuggling to crack drug ring across 30 countries on four
continents.
(LAT1)
ENVIRONMENT: UN prepares to launch Year ofthe Ocean. (WT8)
ADMINISTRATION:
KAMEN: CIA updates answer to frequently asked question about
spying on Americans.
Many CIA retirees were not invited to anniversary celebration because
of unknown
whereabouts. Kamen recalls defense of Larry Lawrence by thenSenator Harlan
Mathews of Tennessee. (WP17)
COHEN: Republicans think that Defense Secretary Cohen is suffering
from
"Stockholm Syndrome," which accounts for U-turn on Bosnia
position. (WT5)
OPINION:
WP: Letter from Turkish ambassador on Turkey-Israel connection.
Lofthouse letter
criticizes U.S. for supporting African dictators. Kuttner column on the
IMF's
"bailout blunder" in Korea says Seoul was hurt by too much market
liberalization
too soon. (18-19)
NYT: Editorial criticizes Texas judge's ruling against extraditing
Rwandan war
crimes suspect to the international tribunal. Lewis column on
Switzerland's
"noble experiment" with drug legalization. (20-21)
LAT: Editorial on the Kenyan elections laments the "sterile status
�34CDA1C4.FIN
Page 9 of 9
quo"that has
resulted from a flawed process. Reding claims that Zedillo's economic
policies
that have cut wages by one-third are responsible for increased crime,
such as
Chiapas killings. (2, 10)
WT: Brown op-ed on the Sandinistas' grab for money, property and
power not earned
at the ballot box. (13)
WSJ: Editorial roundtable exchange on Asia'sfinancialcrises and
their impact on
the U.S. (22)
3
�34L^B4j.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of 2
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/9/98 8:34:11 AM
FROM
Crowley, Philip J.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
Opinion II [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Rubin, Eric S.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
. .
.
opinion.doc
Opinion
LAT: Editorial accuses Algeria of displaying callous ineffectiveness
that has
reached criminal proportions and hopes the government will be
shamed into
protecting its people. Editorial suggests that Reliant Mermaid sent a
signal
that will be understood throughout the region. Mackey traces the
cultural and
political history of Iran, from the establishment of Persia to the
embrace of
Islam to exposure to Western political thought, as context to
Khatami's
"unprecedented act of diplomacy." (10-11)
USA: Editorial calls for some "cultural ping-pong" akin to our
approach to China
in the '70s to take advantage of Khatami's proposal. (13)
WSJ: Editorial points to Suharto as the primary problem with
Indonesia's response
to its currency crisis and, recalling the demise of his predecessor
Sukarno,
hopes that he will turn his attention to long overdue questions of
succession and
democracy. Queenan op-ed reviews the global wave of national
remorse, suggesting
that national contrition teaches important lessons that may help
prevent future
horrors. Sarmiento says that extreme poverty and absence of the rule
of law led
to the massacre at Chiapas and that the big loser is the Zedillo
�34D$EB4^.FIN
Page 2 of 2
government and
winners the EZLN and PRD. (16-17)
WT: Editorial calls for the Administration to face the "truth" as
outlined by the
CIA and devise an Iraq strategy that will face down Saddam. Editorial
calls for
the international community to attach tight restrictions on donations to
Zaire,
forcing President Moi to undertake reform. Grenier rejects military
reformer
arguments and says that key to military victory remains projecting
highly trained
forces anywhere in the world. Weisbrode cautions U.S. not to take
Turkey for
granted and be lumped in with the Greeks and EU when Turkey
inevitably broadens
its strategic focus to its east and south. Rangel says that our Cuba
policy
focuses more on past ghosts than reality and does not serve our
national
interest, and that the Pope's visit is a call for the U.S. to do better.
Gilman
says that the rest of the world ganged up on the U.S. at Kyoto and
calls for the
President to correct the treaty's flaws before signing it. Meyer sees
new
strategic positioning by Turkey in light of EU rejection, involving the
United
States, Iran and Israel. Beichman review's Albright's analysis on Iraq
during
her March 1996 speech at Georgetown, and calls for a new accounting
as to why he
remains in power today as the U.S. contemplates its next steps. (1417)
1
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
D O C U M E N T NO.
AND TYPE
001. email
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Scott Busby to Eric Schwartz, re: Good background for tomorrow's
Algeria meeting (6 pages)
01/13/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Non-Record (Mar 97 - Jan 01) ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 630000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/23/1997 - 02/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2099
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Aet - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOI A|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) o f t h e F O I A |
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) o f t h e PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Page 1 of 10
35012556.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
2/13/98 8:26:16 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
FEB. 13 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bamett, Cheryl E.
Bartlett, L. June
Battenfield, Pat A.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
�35012556.FIN
Page 2 of 10
Caravelli, John M.
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Cohen, Julie E.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, James B.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Dejban, Donna D.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Dymond, John C.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Farrar, Jay C.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Grummon, Stephen R.
�35012556.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Halperin, David E.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Hendricks, Lori A.
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Klein, Brian P.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Lawson, Chappell H.
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
�35012556.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
Odium, Geoffrey M.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Ryu, Rexon Y.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schrader, Joel M.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
�Page 5 of 10
35012556.FIN
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Soubers, Richard R.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Evans, Peter O.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
febl3.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
�35012556.FIN
Page 6 of 10
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAQ: Russian defense minister rebukes Cohen before press at start
of meeting;
new tensions seen. Russians deny report of 1995 CW deal with Iraq.
Support
troops from Andrews AFP head to Gulf. Lott delays Senate vote on
resolution;
lawmakers rally to support Clinton. Analysts say America's vast
military power
probably is not sufficient to accomplish goal of substantially reducing
or
delaying WMD. Dutch may send frigate, F16s; Czech may send CW
team; Poland
likely to sign on as well. Sen. Wamer praises Cohen. Russians play
crisis to
own advantage; Primakov says Saddam is not a madman. An array of
different aims
complicates U.S. efforts to build a coalition. Realpolitik is behind the
current
standoff. MEPP impasse impedes U.S. strategy. Desert Thunder: U.S.
plan of
attack. Gulf War was simpler. Japanese fear conflict in Gulf.
(WP1,28,29;NYT1,8
;LAT1; WSJ 1,11,12;USA 1,4; WT1,12)
ISRAEL: Nation is stunned by terrible living conditions for immigrant
family of
slain soldier. Residents of remote development town feel abandoned
by
government. (WP27,LAT1)
MEPP: Arafat threatens new intifada, says he will declare statehood
next year if
negotiations fail. Palestinians mark 50th anniversary of "catastrophe."
(WP28,NYT3,WT15)
AFGHANISTAN: Truck convoy reaches earthquake-devastated area
with food and
supplies. (WP28;USA4)
ALGERIA: As horrific killings continue, nation's poor are gripped
with fear.
(WP30)
BANGLADESH: Government denounces U.S. human rights report
criticism. (WT16)
EGYPT: Full-page ad by Coptic Christian community denouncing
persecution by
Mubarak government. (NYT 16)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
CUBA: Castro frees "dozens" of prisoners on Pope's list; up to 200 to
be
pardoned, but some are common criminals; Vatican is
�35012556.FIN
Page 7 of 10
"delighted." (NYT1;WP30;USA4;W
T15)
BRAZIL: Cardoso signs new environmental law aimed at protecting
Amazon. Congress
votes to cut social benefits despite anti-austerity protests.
(WP28,NYT5)
MEXICO: Unprecedented race for presidency in 2000 ends old
taboos; Zedillo will
not choose successor. (LAT3)
ARGENTINA: Nation's experience with currency board offers lessons
for Indonesia.
(WSJ 12)
COLOMBIA: Mayor of town where massacre occurred says army was
involved in
killings. (WT15)
ASIA/PACIFIC
INDONESIA: Rioters protest prices; stock market slides; Suharto
calls on troops
to keep order with "stem action." Fears of new smoke pollution as
forest fires
gain strong foothold. (WP28,31;NYT6;WSJ12;USA/B1;WT17)
JAPAN: PM Hashimoto is a hesitant steward of a shaky economy;
some see him as a
"man overboard." Nation's investors are net sellers of foreign bond
holdings for
fourth time in five months. Market rises with support from foreign
investors.
(NYT1,C2;WSJ12)
MALAYSIA: PM Mahathir again blames West, IMF for Asian crisis;
country rails at
foreign interference while imitating West, courting investment.
(WT16)
S. KOREA: General strike averted as unions and government continue
negotiations.
(NYT/C2,WSJ12,USA/B1)
N. KOREA: U.N. appeals for $37 million in new aid for WFP
projects. (WP28)
PHILIPPINES: Government rejects IMF budget demands as "tall
order." (WSJ11)
VIETNAM: Ambassador to U.S. is defensive about U.S. human rights
report
criticism. (WT16)
AUSTRALIA: Constitutional convention votes to replace monarchy
with republic;
referendum likely. (NYT6)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
ITALY/U.S.: Lawyers for crew of Marine jet ask Italian authorities
for permission
to view evidence. (WP28)
NAZI ART: Museum directors tell Hill panel they will aid survivors'
�35012556.FIN
Page 8 of 10
efforts to
regain stolen treasure. (WP/D2)
TURKEY: Ambassador to U.S. disputes Armenian-American claims
of genocide. (WPS 1)
NATO: Enlargement ratification is expected to sail through Senate.
(WT15)
FRANCE: Nation confronts "ugly face behind Corsican nationalism's
mask." (NYT4)
RUSSIA: Retired intelligence officer is arrested in 1994 killing of
investigative
journalist. (NYT3)
BULGARIA: FM Mihaylova, in Washington, outlines her nation's
economic and
political progress. (WP31)
GERMANY/U.S.: Travolta claims Clinton promised to help address
Scientologists'
problems in Germany. Authorities uncover neo-Nazi bomb factory,
seek fugitives.
(NYT1,11)
U.K.: Royal family denies claims by Al Fayed of conspiracy in death
of Diana,
Dodi. (USA4,WT17)
GEORGIA: U.S. and Russia are sending agents to help investigate
attempted
assassination. (WSJ1,USA4,WT15)
CZECH REP.: Havel is hospitalized with viral infection; breathing
problems
reported. (USA4)
AFRICA
LIBERIA: Rev. Jackson urges national reconciliation, prays with
President Taylor.
(WP27)
CONGO-K: Opposition leader Tshisekedi is arrested in Kinshasa.
(NYT11)
SIERRA LEONE: Nigerian-led peacekeeping troops capture capital,
mop up junta
forces. (WP28,NYT11,USA4)
SUDAN: Vice President Saleh, eight others killed in plane crash.
(WP28,NYT10)
KENYA: Malaria kills 1,500 in flood-stricken area. (WP28)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
ENVIRONMENT: Scientists see little benefit from Kyoto treaty;
ratification
prospects still uncertain. (WP14)
LAND MINES: Jody Williams quits ICBL; ego clashes are cited.
(WP22)
DEFENSE: Four Marines are charged with hazing that resulted in
serious injuries.
(WP22)
DRUGS: New Administration strategy sets performance objectives in
�35012556.FIN
Page 9 of 10
anti-drug fight
for first time. (WP23,LAT4)
BLOCH: Fired Foreign Service Officer seeks restoration of his
pension, citing
lack of proof of spying. (WP23)
ECON: Greenspan tells Senate panel that Asian crisis is moving world
toward
"Western form of free-market capitalism" and discrediting the socalled Asian
model. (NYT/C 1)
TRADE: Full-page ad denouncing MAI by International Forum on
Globalization.
(NYT13)
IMF: Fund says it is being responsive to U.S. Congressional criticism;
cites
Thailand as example. (WT17)
ADMINISTRATION
VP: Who's who on Gore's staff. (WSJ 16)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial sees Russia under Yeltsin as less cooperative with
respect to
Russia than Gorbachev was in 1991, an indication of a deteriorating
relationship.
Rosenthal calls for Saddam's overthrow, saying that any other
"solution" imposes
no costs on Iraq. Clancy op-ed says that the Administration has not
effectively
laid the groundwork for military action with the American people or
our allies.
(28-29)
WP: Editorial says the President must continue to stress the important
of getting
Iraq to comply, both because of the threat he poses and the importance
of
international respect for rules and institutions. Raspberry questions
whether
there is an adequate rationale for attacking Iraq. Dionne agrees with
Lieberman's thesis about China's attempt to influence the 1996
election: the
evidence is highly suspicious, but circumstantial. (24-25)
LAT: Quinones looks at the American dream from a common
Mexican immigrant point
of view: not assimilating into America, but coming here, earning
money and then
going back to Mexico. (2)
WSJ: Peters complains that Mexico has been slow to introduce true
competition
into its telephone service, leaving Telemex with a monopolistic
advantage.
(14-15)
�35012556.FIN
Page 10 of 10
WT: Buckley recommends that we do nothing militarily, since the
options available
are more likely to strengthen Saddam than not. Perlmutter says that if
we plan
to support the Iraqi opposition, we have to find more capable options
than those
supported in 1991. Roberts compares George Bush and Kenneth Starr,
both of whom
had opportunities to quickly finish what they started and didn't.
Dempsey
criticizes the high-handedness and patronizing attitude of High Rep
Westendorp.
Meyer op-ed calls the President's "autocratic response" to the
Lewinsky matter
one of the ingredients typically present in a totalitarian regime. (1821)
�
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Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
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National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
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Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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[09-23-1997-02/13/1998]
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National Security Council
NSC Emails
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24194021
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194021">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/11e9dbe6ee91af20d3e1bbd4dfd5a1c4.pdf
b8ce98d6ff83bad044a129799c7c3ac5
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. email
Joseph Marty to Jennifer Poole, et al., re: [Update] (2 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. email
Richard Clarke to Jamie Metzl, re: [cable] (6 pages)
01/05/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. email
Bruce Riedel to Glyn Davies, et al., re: [cable] (7 pages)
01/19/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Record (Sept 97 - Jan 01) ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
620000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/03/1997 - 02/09/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2098
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Aet - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. email
DATE
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Joseph Marty to Jennifer Poole, et al., re: [Update] (2 pages)
09/03/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Record (Sept 97 - Jan 01) ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
620000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/03/1997 - 02/09/1998]
2009-1295-1kc2098
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�344CC064.FIN
Page 1 of 3
Exchange Mail
DATE-TIME
9/23/97 9:24:16 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
URGENT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Marty, Joseph H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
CARBON COPY
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
TEXT BODY
We will need guidance on the latest dismaying news from Algiers by
10am to @PRESS. Thanks.
a0502
PM-Algeria,
1st Ld-Writethru, a0492,0565<
At least 200 killed, 100 wounded
in latest violence in Algeria<
Eds: Leads throughout to UPDATE
with government, Islamic Salvation
Front condemnation, mother's
quote, neighborhood where attack
happened, residents fleeing, villagers
elsewhere repulsing attack.
ADDS byline, background. No pickup.<
By
RACHID KHIARI=
Associated Press Writer^
ALGIERS, Algeria (AP)
Attackers shot or stabbed to death at
least 200 people and wounded
100 more early today, taking their
time plundering homes before
retreating, survivors and hospital
A
A
A
A
A
�344CC064.FIN
Page 2 of 3
sources said in describing the
latest violence in Algeria.
The attack took place in the Bentalha
neighborhood of Baraki, an
eastern suburb of the Algerian capital,
the sources said, speaking
on condition of anonymity.
The official
government news agency said 85 people died and 67
were wounded.
It condemned the massacre as an ''act of barbary"
carried out by
"terrorists."
"We kept watch every night since August, but
the attack
surprised us," said one mother who was searching for
her child at
the Zemirli d'El Harrach hospital. She spoke on condition
of
anonymity.
A bomb attack this moming in Reghaia, a town
19 miles east of
Algiers, also killed two and wounded 25, the hospital
sources
added.
Nobody claimed responsibility for either attack.
The Bentalha
neighborhood is considered a stronghold for Islamic
militants close
to the Armed Islamic Group, a group often blamed
for massacres and
one of the most violent Muslim organizations trying
to overthrow
Algeria's military-backed government.
The banned
Islamic Salvation Front condemned the attack.
According to survivors,
two groups of about 40 attackers took
their time killing people
and robbing their homes before fleeing.
After the massacre,
panicked residents began fleeing toward
downtown Algiers, about
12 miles away. Soldiers surrounded the
area, allowing only ambulances
and official vehicles to go in.
A bomb explosion in July in
Baraki killed about 20 people and
injured 40 more.
Following
�344CC064.FIN
Page 3 of 3
a series of massacres in the capital and in rural
villages, self-defense
groups have sprung up to try to prevent
increasingly frequent massacres.
Armed villagers backed by the army said they fought off an early
morning
assault by a group of suspected Islamic militants in a
village south
of the capital.
The villagers repulsed about 200 armed attackers
near Tipasa, 60
miles west of Algiers, the residents said today
on condition of
anonymity. The attackers, they said, set off a bomb
late Monday in
a village park and stole three trucks full of food,
including flour
from a baker they had just robbed.
But the
villagers and soldiers chased them off before further
damage was
done. The army swept clear a bridge the attackers had
mined before
fleeing.
It was the third time in 10 days that a self-defense
group
organized to prevent increasingly frequent massacres managed
to
ward off an attack.
Islamic militants began their insurgency
in 1992 afterthe army
canceled a parliamentary vote that the fundamentalists
were poised
to win. More than 60,000 people have died infiveyears
of
fighting.
The militants want to establish a government based
on a strict
interpretation of Koranic law, which would require women
to cover
their heads, ban alcohol and make Koranic education compulsory.
APE- 09/23/97 08:35:00
�344CC92E.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of47
Mail
DATE-TIME
9/25/97 4:57:30 PM
FROM
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijani, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 2 of 47
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
Chastain, George M.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 3 of 47
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Eddleman, Linda.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Click, Bonnie L.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I .
�344CC92E.FIN
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Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Johnson, David T.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 5 of 47
McCormick, Keith P.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Parker, Gwyn M.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Peggins, John W.
Peterson, G. Deane
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Rice, Susan E.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma C.
�344CC92E.FIN
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Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Soubers, Richard R.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
VanTassel, David S.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank (Trey)
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
�344CC92E.FIN
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Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
CARBON_COPY
TEXT BODY
PLEASE REVIEW AND FORWARD YOUR UPDATES IN BOLD TO @PRESS NLT
10:00AM FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26. THANKS.
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
sep25gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
September 25, 1997
Russia/Iran
Russia/Religion
Middle East
Turkey/Iraq
Iran/Khar azi
Russian Mir Situation
Sudan
�344CC92E.FrN
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Canada Border Crossing
Fast Track
Bosnia
Serbia
Northern Ireland
Cassini Spacecraft
Gulf War Illnesses
Jiang Visit
China Certification
Japanese Defense Guidelines
Japan Civair
CTBT
Cuba
Libya
Algeria
North Korea
RUSSIAN/IRANIAN MISSILE COOPERATION
September 25, 1997
�344CC92E.FIN
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Context: There has been extensive press reporting on Russia-Iran missile
cooperation. The U.S. takes these reports very seriously and is actively working
to prevent transfer of proliferation concern. We have repeatedly raised our
concerns with the Russians at the highest levels and will continue to do so. In
August and September, a Wisner-led team met with Senior Russian officials in
Moscow. Wisner and his counterpart reported to Gore and Chernomyrdin on
September 22. The report involves sensitive information and cannot be made
public.
Q: WTiat can you tell us about Russian missile-related transfers to Iran?
A:
* As you know the United States has been concerned for some time about Iranian
efforts worldwide to acquire missile technology.
* We are very concerned by reports indicating that Russian entities may have
provided ballistic missile-related assistance to Iran.
* Russia and the United States share a commitment to nonproliferation, regional
stability and strict adherence to the missile technology control regime.
* The issue of Iran was discussed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki
this spring and again in Denver, who agreed our Governments must work closely
together.
* In line with those discussions, Ambassador Wisner and Russian Space Agency Head
Koptev started a process in August and met again in Moscow September 18-19. They
were accompanied by teams of experts drawn form both Governments.
* They had productive discussions. Their effort strengthens our view that we and
Russia can and must cooperate to deal with threats of proliferation. The results
of the Moscow discussions were shared with the Vice President and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin in Moscow on September 22.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 10 of 47
* The United States is determined to make further progress in dealing with Iran's
ambitions. The process started by Frank Wisner and the Head of the Russian Space
Agency is an effective mechanism to address our concerns and will continue. They
will meet again in about six weeks.
If asked about the Wisner-Koptev report:
* This report involves sensitive information from both countries and cannot be
made public.
Q: Are there transfers inconsistent with Russia's commitments under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)?
A:
* In 1993, Russia agreed to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and annex which control
the export of missile equipment and technology. In 1995, Russia became an MTCR
member.
* However, I am not in a position to speculate as to whether any particular
reported transaction is inconsistent with those commitments.
Q: If we know transfers occurred, why aren't we doing anything? Aren't missile
sanctions required?
A:
* The United States takes very seriously any reports of transfers that might
contribute to missile proliferation.
* We vigorously follow-up on such reports and if the facts warrant, we take the
steps necessary to deal with the situation.
* We are taking action by raising our concerns repeatedly and at the highest
levels of the Russian Government. It is Russia's responsibility to control its
exports in accordance with its international commitments.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 11 of 47
If pressed only:
* We have not reached any determination that sanctionable activity has taken
place.
If asked if Israel is pressuring us to do more about Russia-Iran missile
cooperation:
* We have met frequently with Israeli officials to discuss this matter, and are
well aware of Israel's views.
RUSSIAN LAW ON RELIGION
September 25, 1997
Background: On July 21, President Yeltsin vetoed a bill that would have imposed
severe restrictions on freedom of conscience in Russia. In early September,
however, the Yeltsin administration endorsed a revised version of the legislation
that contains many of the worst elements of the original, including a provision
that would require newly established religious organizations to wait 15 years
before acquiring full legal status. The new draft would also impose severe
limitations on foreign missionaries. The Duma overwhelmingly approved the bill
on September 19 and the Federation Council passed it on September 24. We have
expressed our concerns to the most senior levels of the Russian government.
* Procedurally, the bill now goes to President Yeltsin.
* This issue has been a subject of discussion at the highest levels of our two
governments, and it was on the agenda of the Vice President's meetings with
Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin.
* Both the President and the Vice President have raised this issue with their
Russian counterparts. The Vice President told President Yeltsin that he and the
Prime Minister would continue their intensive dialogue to address the concerns of
�344CC92E.FIN
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religious leaders.
* We hope that whatever law is enacted will be fully consistent with Russia's
international commitments and with the principles expressed by President Yeltsin
in his July 21 veto of the original bill.
* President Yeltsin's remarks on religious freedom in his veto of the original
bill demonstrated his government's commitment to ensuring the rights of religious
minorities in Russia.
* Freedom of conscience and religious tolerance are essential components of a
democratic society. The Russian people today have this right, which is protected
by the 1993 Russian Constitution and a 1990 law on religious freedom.
Note to Backgrounder: As of September 25 President Yeltsin had not signed the
religion law and there is a slim chance that he could still veto it. For that
reason we want to gauge our current comments in a way that will not constrain
Yeltsin's flexibility to act; in particular, we don't want to create a situation
that will give rise to nationalist allegations that he is responding to Western
pressure, which would only make it more difficult to veto the law.
Should Yeltsin sign the law, we will want to begin emphasizing that our dialogue
with the Russians will continue on the law's implementation. Russia will need to
draft implementing guidelines and regulations that could affect the law's
fundamental impact on religious organizations. That is, these regulations and
guidelines could be just as profound as the letter of the law in their practical
effect. We will want to encourage the Yeltsin Administration to ensure that the
implementation provisions do everything possible to meet standards of religious
freedom consistent with the Russian constitution, Russia's international
commitments and President Yeltsin's June statement when he vetoed the original
religion law.
However, we do not want to make public comments on how the law might be
implemented prior to Yeltsin's signature in order to avoid any misinterpretation
that the U.S. would be willing to accept the law if we receive sufficient
assurances on its implementation.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 13 of 47
Background on Legal Provisions
* The law would require a 15 year waiting period for religious groups to
register, limit unregistered groups to informal and private practice, and impose
severe restrictions on foreign missionaries.
* Non-citizens, including those legally resident in Russia, would be prohibited
from forming religious associations, unless at least 10 Russians are part of such
associations.
* Civil authorities would have discretion in deciding which groups qualify as
religions. This essentially gives the authorities the power to ban a group which
is a bona fide religion.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
September 25, 1997
Efrat Settlement
Q: What is your reaction to PM Netanyahu's announcement yesterday that Israel
will build 300 new homes in the West Bank settlement of Efrat?
A: This is precisely the kind of activity which we feel is unhelpful to creating
the environment necessary to put the peace process back on track.
As Secretary Albright said in Israel earlier this month, Israel should take a
"time out" from unilateral actions that undermine confidence and trust in the
process. This is one of those actions.
Q: Have you communicated this view to the PM?
A: Yes.
The Prime Minister has made it clear that he wants to accelerate permanent
�344CC92E.FIN
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status negotiations, and is very serious about wanting such negotiations to
achieve their objectives.
The best means of demonstrating that seriousness is to help create the kind of
environment that would make it possible for accelerated permanent status
negotiations to succeed.
Q: Are you calling for a freeze on settlement activity?
A: The Secretary has called for a time out from actions that undermine trust and
confidence.
We've made our views very clear to the parties on what this involves. There's
no need for additional public comment.
Arrests by the PA
Q: Do you have anything on the Palestinian arrests of 20 suspects in Nablus?
A: We note that there have been a number of arrests by the PA of people suspected
of being involved in recent terrorist activities.
We welcome this development as a step in the right direction.
ID of Suicide Bombers
Q: Do you have anything on Dennis' talks with the Israelis? Are there meetings
today?
A: Dennis had extensive talks yesterday with the Israelis. In preparation for
the Secretary's trilateral meeting next week in NYC, they reviewed the array of
issues related to the Palestinian track. These include security issues as well
as how to put the political process back on track.
The Israelis remain in Washington and will have additional meetings today.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 15 of 47
The Palestinians arrive tomorrow.
Q: Given recent events, what does the Secretary hope to accomplish in her
trilateral?
A: The Secretary will continue discussions begun here this week and will explore
ways to put the peace process back on track.
She will review steps that both parties can take in order to help create a
credible environment in which talks can be reestablished.
Q: What is your reaction to Naveh's statement that there has been a deterioration
of security cooperation since the Secretary's visit? How do you assess
Palestinian security performance since her visit?
A: The Israeli statements, as well as the Israeli's announcement yesterday that
they had identified four of the suicide bombers, only underscore the need for a
comprehensive, sustained, and unrelenting effort by the Palestinian Authority to
dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Palestinians know our view that much more needs to be done - both
unilaterally, and bilaterally with the Israelis.
We are given assurances by the Palestinians on what they intend to do; we are
now looking for follow-through on those assurances.
Q: But what impact have the Secretary's entreaties with the Pals had if the
Israelis are publicly claiming deterioration in security cooperation?
A: As the Secretary has said, the parties in the region have some tough decisions
to make: for the Palestinians, this means following through on their assurances
to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza.
Q: What are your comments on yesterday's identification of four of the suicide
bombers? What about the debate between the two parties about who has security
responsibility in zone B?
�344CC92E.FrN
Page 16 of 47
A: We take note of the information made public by the Israelis.
As for security responsibility in zone B, the Palestinians have responsibility
for public order, and the Israelis have responsibility for internal security.
(If pressed on this specific case: We do not know the details of where these
men were after they escaped from prison).
Q: What is your view of the recent spate of extradition requests made by the GOI
of the PA, including of those suspected of attacks which killed Amcits?
A: We believe that these requests for transfer should be handled according to the
interim agreement and the note for the record which established the procedure for
addressing such requests.
TURKEY/IRAQ: TURKISH MILITARY INCURSION
September 25, 1997
Q: Any reaction to the new Turkish incursion into Iraq
A: We understand that the Turkish military has launched an operation against PKK
forces in Northern Iraq in response to PKK operations there.
The U.S. supports Turkey's right of self-defense against PKK terrorism.
We have discussed this operation with the Turkish government and stressed that
the operation should be limited in scope and duration, and that the rights of the
civilian population must be scrupulously respected. It should avoid civilian
casualties.
The Turkish government said the operation was of a limited nature.
Q: What about reports that Turkey has sealed off a border crossing point between
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 17 of 47
Iraq and Syria?
A: We have no information to confirm that.
IRANIAN FM KHARAZI: UNGA SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
September 25, 1997
Q: What's your reaction to Iranian FM Kharazi's UNGA speech?
Background
Iranian Fm Kharazi's UNGA speech was an attempt to signal a departure in style and maybe substance - from previous Iranian foreign policy.
* Calling for "global civil society," Kharazi emphasized Iran's support for
international dialogue, the rule of law in international relationships, and the
"expansion of relations with all countries," on the basis of mutual respect,
common interests, and noninterference in internal affairs.
* These views rack with the domestic policies President Khatami has promoted.
* Saying that "dialogue among civilizations lies at the very foundation of a
truly global civil society" Kharazi disagreed with the Sam Huntington idea of the
clash of civilizations.
* While he spoke against "unilateralism" and the "preponderance and hegemony of
one particular culture and value systems over all others," the speech is notable
for its lack of reference to the United States.
A: We are aware that the tone of Kharazi's speech was markedly different than
past such speeches. We have little disagreement with his words.
* Our disagreement with the government of Iran is over its behavior:
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 18 of 47
* support - both direct and indirect - of terrorism, including the government's
use of terrorism as a political tool against the middle east peace process;
* pursuit of WMD technologies and capabilities.
* The USG remains open to dialogue with the Government of Iran.
* Such a dialogue must be authoritative, i.e., is authorized by the leadership of
the Iranian government, and the dialogue should be openly acknowledged (the
actual discussions can and should be confidential).
* We set no preconditions on the agenda. We will raise our serious concerns
about Iran's use of terrorism and its pursuit of WMD. Iran can raise its own
agenda.
RUSSIAN MIR SITUATION
September 25, 1997
Background: At a NASA Headquarters press briefing today (9/25) at 10:00 AM, NASA
Administrator Dan Goldin will announce his decision to approve the launch of
STS-86 to the Mir. His decision includes approving the exchange of astronaut
Michael Foale for David Wolf, who will spend the next four months on the Mir.
The decision process included two internal NASA reviews and an external NASA
Advisory Council Task Force review led by Lt. Gen Tom Stafford (Ret). In
addition, Administrator Goldin asked former Martin Marietta CEO Tom Young to
review the NASA Inspector General report and assess NASA's response to its
recommendations. Administrator Goldin met with Stafford and Young yesterday
afternoon. Both Stafford and Young concluded that there are no technical reasons
to delay or cancel the launch or to delay or cancel Wolfs four month stay on the
Mir. Administrator Goldin informed the President's Science Advisor, Jack
Gibbons, of his decision last night. Jack Gibbons informed the President of the
decision last night.
Assuming good weather, the Space Shuttle is scheduled to launch tonight (9/25) at
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 19 of 47
10:34 PM. EDT, with a rendezvous and docking with the Mir scheduled for Saturday,
September 27, at 5:30 PM EDT. Atlantis will remain docked with the Mir for about
six days while the crew transfers water and supplies (including a new guidance
computer). An external spacewalk is planned for Wednesday, October 1, to
retrieve experiments and set up equipment to be used in future repair missions.
The Shuttle is scheduled to return to Kennedy Space Center on Sunday, October 5,
at approximately 7:00 PM EDT; if necessary, it can remain in orbit for an extra
day.
Q: Did the President approve the NASA Administrator's decision?
A: The President was informed of Dan Goldin's decision last night by Jack
Gibbons, his science advisor.
Q: Does he agree with the decision?
A: The President relied on Dan Goldin to make this decision based on the best
safety and technical advice available. He's satisfied with both the process and
the decision.
Q: Rep. Sensenbrenner yesterday called on the WTiite House to make a "policy call"
and terminate our cooperation with the Russians on Mir. Are you saying that this
was never a policy issue in the White House?
A: Our view is that this decision was best made by the NASA Administrator. He is
in the best position to ensure that all of the relevant safety and technical
issues are reviewed and addressed. Determining the operational safety of a space
system is not a policy call.
Q: How can NASA claim the Gen. Stafford and Tom Young are "independent." Both
have such close associations with NASA. (Stafford is a former Apollo astronaut,
Young is retired CEO of Martin Marietta before it merged with Lockheed).
A: Gen Stafford's task force included a number of non-government employees, all
of whom were subject to conflict of interest constraints. It's natural, given
the nature of the issue, that the individuals involved have some experience with
NASA. I don't think their independence from NASA is really an issue.
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Q: Did the White House review Stafford's or Young's recommendations before a
decision was made?
A: No. Jack Gibbons was informed by Dan Goldin of his decision last night after
Mr. Goldin had met with Gen. Stafford and Mr. Young.
Q: What will you do if the computer breaks down on Mir while the Shuttle is up
there?
A: NASA is in the best position to answer that question. They have flight rules
in place for contingencies on orbit.
Q: Did the Vice President know that Goldin was going to approve the launch before
he went to Moscow?
A: No. The decision process was concluded last night.
Q: Were the Russians informed of Administrator Goldin's decision in advance?
A: Through mission operational channels, the Russian Space Agency has been aware
that the countdown for tonight's Shuttle launch has been proceeding. They
learned of the decision to send Wolf to replace Michael Foale aboard Mir this
moming.
SUDAN: STATUS OF U.S. EMBASSY
September 25, 1997
(IF ASKED)
Q: Is the U.S. going to reopen our Embassy in Khartoum? If so, when?
A: The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum is not closed. Because of security concerns the
embassy staff, including the Ambassador, were withdrawn in January 1996. We
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continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Sudan. Our Ambassador is resident
in Nairobi, Kenya and visits regularly.
We have made no decision at this time about possible re-staffing of the Embassy.
CANADA: BORDER CROSSING
September 25, 1997
Background: There is no "good answer" here. There is a law requiring us to
collect entry and departure info on all aliens beginning 9/30/1998 (not next week
and not a visa requirement). We have told Hill that we need more time to
implement and cannot meet deadline, but that is not public knowledge. Canadians
lobbying hard for an exemption and I at least hope they get it. But we are not
stepping in at this point and may not b/c strong feelings on Hill and
relationship to Mexico, other issues. To say that our position is under review
would just open door to Canadian anger, e.g. what do you mean, you don't support
us?
* The provision that requires entry/exit data be collected on all foreigners
entering the US does not kick in for another year.
* Exactly how the provision will be implemented is currently under study by the
INS.
* The Canadian Government is understandably concerned. We have a mutual interest
in ensuring that the law is implemented in the smoothest manner possible.
FAST TRACK
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September 25, 1997
Q: What's the status of the President's Fast Track Legislation? Will you get a
vote before the year's out? Did you wait too late? Did you kill it by making
the wrong call on labor and the environment? What about Armey's call to delay
Fast Track until census-sampling and school vouchers are addressed?
A:
* President is committed to securing authority he needs to negotiate agreements
that open markets, provide job opportunities for American workers. Made that
case clearly to AFL-CIO in Pittsburgh September 24.
* Continue to believe legislative sequencing is on target: securing balanced
budget agreement, extensive consultations with Congress have set the stage for
legislative process that will result in bill that commands bipartisan support
from majority of both houses.
* We share goal expressed by Senator Lott, House Leadership to have floor votes
in both houses before Congress adjourns this fall; believe they're committed to
that goal. Leadership will set schedule of when those votes take place.
* Ambassador Barshefsky met with Congressmen Archer, Dreyer, and Crane September
24 to discuss legislative process; agreed to hold Ways and Means hearing next
week, mark-up bill the following week. Process clearly on track.
* Cong. Armey's an economist - he knows how important this legislation is for
opening markets and providing opportunities for America's workers and businesses.
Expect he, rest of House leadership, will press forward on their goal of voting
on Fast Track during the fall session.
BOSNIA
September 25, 1997
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Agreement between Serb Leaders on Elections
* We have seen reports of the agreement, but have not yet discussed with the
parties directly. We will be doing so in the next day or so.
* We understand Krajisnik has now accepted separate OSCE-supervised RS assembly
elections and we expect these to take place in the next few months. The
agreement also has provisions on sharing media and establishing conditions for
possible elections of the President and for the Serb representative to the
Bosnian Presidency.
* Today, the OSCE will decide on supervision of the RS assembly elections. Prime
Minister Primakov indicated that the Russians can accept OSCE supervision of
these elections. After that, it is up to President Plavsic and the OSCE to
determine the timing and other details of the elections.
If asked whether we support OSCE supervision of Presidential and RS
Representative to Joint Presidency Elections:
* If other elections are called according to constitutional procedures, they
should be supervised by the OSCE. Focus now is on holding democratic elections
for RS assembly elections.
Municipal Elections - Next Steps
* The OSCE, SFOR and Bosnian officials face tough challenges ahead in
implementing the results of the elections. In the coming days, this involves a
thorough and accurate vote tabulation and certification of the balloting in every
municipality. It also includes investigation and consideration of accusations of
misconduct by the Election Appeals Sub-Commission.
* Reporting of results and provisional OSCE certification are now not expected
until the end of September. Final certification would not happen until the newly
elected officials have taken office.
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* Following the provisional certification of results, the next challenge is
helping install newly elected representatives. We expect some newly elected
members in some areas to be minority officials in both the Federation and
Republika Srpska.
Berger Bosnia Speech Coverage
* Progress is being made, but there are still challenges ahead.
* The international community has a strong stake in success.
* We need to be involved in Bosnia in some fashion in the foreseeable future certainly in terms of economic assistance.
* The SFOR mission will end in June 1998. Whether an international security
presence is there after that, and what role the United States would play, has not
yet been decided.
Are we "opening the door" for follow-on mission in Bosnia?
* Nothing new here. Mr. Berger's statement is consistent with what we have been
saying for months. For example, more than two months ago (July 12) in Denmark,
when President Clinton was asked about the June 1998 date, he said " I believe the
present operation will have run its course by then and we'll have to discuss
what, if any, involvement the United States should have there." Reuters wrote a
story on it.
* It is too soon to speculate as to what, if any, role there may be for NATO
following the completion of SFOR's mission. Our focus is on intensifying
civilian implementation across the board so that parties themselves can assume
greater responsibility for their own future after SFOR's mission is completed.
End of Mission/Javier Solana Comments
* Our mission in Bosnia is to help peace become self-sustaining — not to become
a permanent occupation force on which peace depends. Instead of fixating on the
exit deadline, we're concentrating on what must be done to make peace
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self-sustaining:
* Establish stable military balance to lessen chance of renewed fighting.
* Strengthen democratic institutions and rule of law, including presidency,
parliament and justice system.
* Strengthen public safety through restructuring police forces.
* Help refugees return and improve freedom of movement
* Push parties to make good on commitment to bring war criminals to justice
* Lay new economic foundation on which stability must rest.
* The President has repeatedly said that the SFOR mission will end in June 1998.
* The critical question is what we do between now and then. We have to focus our
energy on assisting the parties with full implementation: common institutions,
refugees, economics, war criminals and police training.
* What role, if any, NATO plays, in or out of Bosnia, after June 1998 has not
been decided — let alone what role we would play.
Bosnian Serb Crowd forces SFOR to leave checkpoint?
* We fully support the SFOR's actions to prevent an escalation of violence in
northern Bosnia in recent days.
* SFOR established temporary checkpoints in northern Bosnia for the purpose of
controlling road traffic in the Doboj-Pmjavor area. When a mob became unruly at
one checkpoint - throwing rocks and lighting fires - SFOR moved the checkpoint
down the road while still maintaining control of the road traffic.
* SFOR effectively diffused the situation while continuing to perform its mission
of helping ensure a secure environment.
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Police Power Struggle in Pmjavor
* President Plavsic continues to gain strength. Incidents in Pmjavor in recent
days resulted from Pale's attempt to gain control of Pmjavor police station
after the police declared themselves loyal to President Plavsic. The Pmjavor
police loyal to Plavsic remain in control of the station.
* IPTF and SFOR took steps to contain the incident and prevent violence.
* President Plavsic now controls most Police and media in Western Srpska. These
officials have broken away from Pale and are now performing their duties under
the authority of the elected President. The Bosnian Serb people are clearly fed
up with the corruption and repression of the Karadzic wing in Pale.
Are you taking sides? Has the SFOR mandate changed?
* We are for the active, consistent implementation of Dayton.
* That doesn't mean just trying to just defuse disputes between those who want to
cooperated with Dayton and those who won't.
* It means supporting those who support Dayton and resisting those who are
undermining it.
* It means standing up to those who attempt to provoke SFOR or who try to break
down the secure environment which SFOR must help maintain under Dayton.
* We strongly support the decisive actions SFOR has taken in places like Banja
Luka recently.
* We intend to play our part squarely and resolutely. The parties will decide
for themselves which side they are on ~ and whether they ill get the active
support of the allies and the international community, or be made to bear
consequences.
Mob Violence and Threats to SFOR
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* All the parties must understand that they should not challenge SFOR. We will
hold the Parties' leadership responsible for keeping their people under control.
* They should know we would deal very effectively, very swiftly with a forceful
response. We'll do what we have to do to protect our troops.
What are we doing about media inciting violence? Are the Pale Serbs sticking to
their agreement?
* We will not tolerate broadcasts of propaganda that incite violence and create a
dangerous environment.
* In response to our warning, the Pale Serbs have recommitted themselves to
cooperate with the agreement to end offensive media and provide media time for
the international community and opposition views.
* We have their commitment; we will hold them to it. .SFOR is authorized to take
action if they do not.
Progress on War Criminals/Karadzic
* We continue to remain deeply concerned with the presence of war criminals in
Bosnia, including Karadzic.
* We've seen some progress in the last few months, including the recent arrest of
suspected war criminals in Croatia and the earlier arrest operations against
indicted war criminals in Croatia and Prijedor. We will not be satisfied until
all war criminals are brought to justice in the Hague.
* We remain concerned about his potential influence — in violation of agreements
that he not be involved in political life ~ and will not be satisfied until he
is brought to justice in the Hague.
* We are considering a full range of options to facilitate delivery of war
criminals to the Hague. We continue to press the Parties to live up to their
obligation to turn over war criminals.
* SFOR is authorized to detain war criminals encountered in the course of its
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regular duties and if the tactical situation permits. The recent SFOR operation
to detain war criminals in Prijedor conformed to this mandate. Any indicted war
criminal would be subject to detention in such circumstances,
(if pressed, cannot comment on possible future operations)
Corruption in Bosnia
* Corruption in Bosnia is a serious problem, particularly in Republika Srpska.
One of the reasons thousands of Bosnian Serbs are standing up to support Plavsic
is that the Bosnian Serb people are fed up with the corruption and repression of
the Pale hard-liners.
* We have tailored our assistance efforts specifically to counter corruption in
Bosnia, by making assistance contingent on behavior of the parties and with
substantial accounting requirements that prevent assistance funds from being
misused.
* One of our top priorities is the restructuring and retraining of police in
Bosnia in accordance with democratic standards. Retraining and restructuring
will help end the use of police as a tool for corruption and repression by
hard-line leaders. We have already completed initial restructuring of police
forces in two cantons of the Federation.
Helicopter
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
September 18,1997
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I am deeply saddened by the deaths in Bosnia yesterday of five dedicated
Americans serving the cause of peace. David Kriskovich, Deputy Commissioner of
the International Police Task Force (IPTF); Leah Melnick, Human Rights Officer
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with the Office of the High Representative; Livio Beccaccio, Senior Advisor to
Deputy Commissioner Kriskovich; Marvin Padgett, IPTF Training Coordinator and
Police Monitors; and William Nesbitt, Bosnia Program Manager for the Justice
Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) perished when a UN helicopter crashed on its way from Sarajevo to
Bugojno and Brcko.
Also lost in this tragic accident were five German citizens, including
Ambassador Gerd Wagner, Senior Deputy High Representative, as well as a British
and a Polish citizen.
These men and this woman were serving the cause of peace and reconciliation,
dedicated to building under exceptionally difficult circumstances what was
envisioned at Dayton almost two years ago. The selfless commitment of such
talented people is inspiring. We are determined to carry forward their vital
work.
My heartfelt sympathy is extended to the Kriskovich, Melnick, Beccaccio,
Padgett, and Nesbitt families as well as the families of their colleagues. May
they take comfort in the good works of their loved ones, for as the scripture
tells us, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God."
###
SERBIA
September 24, 1997
Serbian Elections
* The Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections last Sunday reflect the
sorry state of democracy in that comer of the Balkans.
* We fully agree with the assessment of the OSCE Election Monitoring Group that
�344CC92E.FIN
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the process leading up to the elections was fundamentally flawed.
* Belgrade has failed to implement the recommendations for democratic reform
advanced by former Spanish Prime Minister Gonzales following his mission earlier
this year.
- Media freedom has been further curtailed in recent months. Opposition
parties had to cope with biased coverage and limited access to existing news
outlets.
— Voting regulations are ambiguous, election commissions are partisan, and the
country lacks an independent judiciary to review the overall electoral process.
~ As Mr. Gonzales warned earlier this year, this situation means that elections
could actually "falsify or circumvent the will of the citizens."
* It's no surprise that the main opposition parties boycotted the elections and
that voter turnout was less than 50 percent.
* We will continue to hold Milosevic to his responsibilities as a signatory to
Dayton, to find a just solution to the situation in Kosovo, to resolve lingering
issues with other former Yugoslav republics, and take necessary steps towards
democratization.
If asked about opposition boycott
(FYI: All the members of the Zajedno coalition, except for Draskovic's Serbian
Renewal Movement, which finished third, boycotted the elections. Zajedno had
fractured long before the elections.)
* We regret that the Zajedno (Together) coalition was unable to find a way to
work together on a common agenda to advance democracy in Serbia.
* We will continue our efforts (about $5 million to NGOs like IRI, NDI) to
support the development of free media and democratic movements in Serbia and
Montenegro.
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NORTHERN IRELAND
September 25, 1997
Q: What is the White House reaction to last night's breakthrough in Belfast?
A: The President is heartened by yesterday's late news that the participants in
the multi-party talks agreed to the procedure for launching substantive
negotiations on Northern Ireland. Yesterday's outcome was indeed historic, with
all the major strands of Northern Ireland political life represented at one venue
for the first time in 75 years. This opens the way to a very different future
for the people in Northern Ireland. The President commends the leaders of the
unionists, and the nationalists, for showing determination and courage in
reaching this agreement for the next stage of the talks
The President is under no illusion that the road ahead will be easy or
predictable, but the talks offer the best chance in the last 27 years to find an
acceptable, just and lasting peace in Northern Ireland.
Q: What about arms decommissioning?
A: Yesterday's agreement included the setting up of the Independent Commission
which is to develop proposals for arms decommissioning. The President has
seconded to that Commission, which operates under the authority of the UK and
Irish governments, a senior American diplomat, Donald Johnson. He has been in
Belfast and Dublin for several weeks now reading into the assignment.
Decommissioning is an essential element of an overall settlement.
Q: There was another grenade attack on RUC stations last night. Your reaction?
A: The President deplores all acts of violence and are relieved there were no
injuries or damage. This was a desperate act by the enemies of peace process,
and unfortunately there are extremist elements on both sides that will resort to
any means to block progress towards a settlement.
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Q: Irish Foreign Minister Burke's visit?
A: National Security Advisor Sandy Berger had a good meeting with Irish Foreign
Minister Ray Burke yesterday to review the talks, as they were happening, in
Northern Ireland. We appreciated the opportunity to hear his personal
perspective of the peace process and were able to announce the appointment of Jim
Lyons as the new Special Advisor to the President for Economic Initiatives in
Ireland as well as the release of $19.6 million in FY97 money for the
International Fund for Ireland.
Q: First Lady's visit to Belfast?
A: Hillary Rodham Clinton is planning a visit to Belfast at the end of October,
almost two years after the President's and her visit there. Dates and details of
her program are not yet available.
Q: Is David Trimble coming to visit Washington?
A: The President is hopeful that Mr. Trimble will be able to visit Washington
this fall.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)
For Immediate Release
September 24, 1997
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
U.S. Economic Support for Northern Ireland Peace Process
President Clinton named today James M. Lyons to be the U.S. Special Advisor to
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the President and to the Secretary of State for Economic Initiatives for Ireland.
The President also signed September 22 a Presidential Determination which
releases the $19.6 million U.S. FY 1997 contribution to the International Fund
for Ireland (IFI).
Mr. Lyons, of Denver, Colorado, was named by the President in 1993 to be the
United States Observer to the International Fund for Ireland. He has been
working in this capacity actively to further the fund's objectives for the
promotion of economic redevelopment and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and
the border counties of the Republic of Ireland.
A senior trial partner with the Colorado law firm of Rothgerber, Appel, Powers
and Johnson, Mr. Lyons joined the firm in 1971, concentrating his practice in
complex business matters and litigation. His practice also involves
international trade.
Listed in the Best Lawyers in America, he is a fellow of the American College of
Trial Lawyers and the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Mr. Lyons has been
honored for his public service in Colorado by the Governor and the Colorado
Supreme Court. Since 1995, he has served as a trustee of the University of
Northern Colorado. He received a B.A. from the College of Holy Cross and his law
degree from DePaul University College of Law in Chicago.
In his new capacity, Mr. Lyons will coordinate the efforts of U.S. government
agencies to further the President's and the Secretary of State's economic
initiatives to support the peace process in Northern Ireland. Mr. Lyons succeeds
former Senator George Mitchell, who will continue in his role as chairman of the
multiparty talks in Belfast. Notable elements of the White House economic
initiative for Ireland include hosting in Washington (1995) and Pittsburgh (1996)
conferences to promote trade and investment in Northern Ireland and the Border
Counties.
This year's U.S. IFI contribution represents tangible support for the work of
community organizations in Northern Ireland and the border counties in Ireland
which promote economic and social advancement. It is intended to encourage
contact, dialogue, and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists. In
addition, fund resources are distributed in support of the U.S. priorities of job
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creation and leveraging additional investment in the economy, helping the people
of Northern Ireland make progress towards prosperity as they search for a lasting
peace. The Fund requires that recipient community organizations in Northern
Ireland include members from both communities and reflect the needs of the
community as a whole. Grant recipients adhere to the principle of equality of
opportunity and non-discrimination in employment with regard to religious
affiliation.
The 1997 contribution will bring the U.S. total since enactment of the
Anglo-Irish Support Act of 1986 to $267.9 million.
###
CASSINI SPACECRAFT LAUNCH
September 24, 1997
NASA's upcoming Cassini mission to Satum, now scheduled for launch on October
13, will carry significant amounts of plutonium to provide heat and electrical
power. Existing Presidential Directives require that such launches be approved
by the White House. Anti-nuclear activists oppose the launch, and some have
threatened to disrupt it.
Q: Has the President approved the Cassini launch?
A: NASA submitted its formal request for launch authorization to the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy on August 15. The decision on whether to
approve the launch is still under review at this time. We expect to be able to
provide a White House response to NASA's request sometime within the next two
weeks.
Q: What is the Administration response to allegations that launching nuclear
power sources into space is unsafe?
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A: An established process is in place for reviewing all launches containing
nuclear materials, and we are following that process rigorously. The safety of
the Cassini mission has been extensively analyzed and documented by NASA, the
Department of Energy, and an independent Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel.
These analyses are currently being reviewed by Dr. John Gibbons, the Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Q: Can the President stop the Cassini launch?
A: Under U.S. policy in place since 1977, the President's approval is required
for launches of spacecraft containing significant amounts of nuclear materials.
The launching agency (in this case NASA) forwards a request for Presidential
launch approval through the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP). The OSTP Director is authorized to render approval unless he considers
it advisable to forward the matter to the President for decision.
Q: Why does the Cassini spacecraft use plutonium power generators instead of
solar panels?
A: There is no other feasible power alternative for the Cassini mission. Satum
is so far from the sun (about a billion miles) that solar panels would have to be
over 1/4 the size of a football field to meet Cassini's electrical power
requirements of over 600 watts. They would make the spacecraft too massive to
launch. Cassini's radioisotope power generators are lightweight, compact and
extraordinarily reliable-an important consideration given Cassini's 11 -year
mission duration.
Q: What is the historical safety track record for radioisotope power generators?
A: The United States has an outstanding record of safety in using radioisotope
power generators on 26 space missions over the past three decades, including the
Apollo lunar landings, the Viking landers that searched for life on Mars, the
Voyager and Pioneer missions to the outer planets, the Galileo mission to
Jupiter, and the Ulysses mission studying the Sun's polar regions. Radioisotope
power sources have never caused a launch failure. They performed as designed on
all three launches that did fail for reasons unrelated to the generators.
More than three decades of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
engineering, safety analysis, and testing have proven they can withstand severe
physical conditions associated with launch accidents and reentry from orbit
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without releasing fuel or causing harmful effects. The three RTGs on Cassini are
not nuclear reactors, have no moving parts, and use neither fission nor fusion to
generate power. Instead they rely on heat from the radioactive decay of the
plutonium to generate electricity.
Q: What are the worst case plutonium accident scenarios during launch, Earth
orbit, or inadvertent reentry during Earth swingby, and what health effects would
they produce?
A: The worst case accidents involving either a launch failure or a reentry from
Earth orbit would release only a small amount of respirable plutonium. Extensive
analysis and evaluation have predicted a low probability of a launch accident
resulting in a release of plutonium dioxide (1 chance in 1,400, according to
NASA), or accidents from Earth orbit, and a very low probability of an accident
known as inadvertent Earth swingby reentry that could possibly cause the release
of some plutonium dioxide. In those cases, most of the released material would
not be fine particles. In order for plutonium dioxide to become a serious cancer
causing hazard, it must be reduced to very fine particles, inhaled into a
person's lungs or otherwise remain in a person's body, causing internal organs to
be exposed to alpha radiation over an extended period of time.
The ceramic form of the plutonium dioxide fuel on Cassini, and the multiple
layers of protective material encasing it, limit the generation and distribution
of fine particles. Even if released, its insolubility keeps it from being widely
distributed within the human body and inhibits it from moving through the
environment into water supplies or the food chain.
An inadvertent reentry during Earth swingby (less than 1 in 1,000,000) would
result in between about 1 and 20 pounds of vaporized plutonium being released
into the upper atmosphere, widely dispersed around the world. Over a 50-year
period-a span of time when nearly a billion people will die of cancer due to a
variety of other causes-it is possible to calculate that this level of additional
radiation exposure could result in between 120 and 1,500 cancer deaths in the
world's population. The average individual 50-year radiation dose would be about
the same as a person repeatedly absorbs in one day from natural background
radiation. It is also possible that exposure to such a low level of additional
radiation would produce no cancer deaths.
GULF WAR ILLNESSES
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September 25, 1997
Q: What is your reaction to the Presidential Advisory Committee's (PAC's)
recommendation in its report that DOD be removed from leading the investigations
into possible chemical exposures during the Gulf War?
A: The report you refer to is the PAC's Special Report is still a draft
undergoing review by the agencies and other interested parties. In fact, the
draft sent for agency review does not include the PAC's draft recommendations.
It is not fair to comment on the PAC's report until it is final.
Q: When is the President going to see the PAC's Special Report?
A: The report is due to the President on October 31, 1997.
Q: What is your reaction to the WP article that says that the Pentagon is failing
in a multimillion-dollar effort to salvage its credibility among ailing Persian
Gulf War veterans?
A: The Post article is based on a draft special report that is still in
interagency review, and it is not appropriate to comment on a draft report. I
would like to point out, however, that the President's Advisory Committee
deserves credit for highlighting the areas that government needed to improve its
approach to the Gulf War illnesses issue. The President is fully supportive of
the overall interagency effort to comply with his direction "to leave no stone
unturned."
It is important to note, however, that the President's commitment to our
veterans has remained unchanged: ensuring that our Gulf War veterans get the
medical care and compensation they deserve. The President looks forward to
reading the report after the all of the agencies have had an opportunity to
complete the review process.
JIANG VISIT
September 24, 1997
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* Jiang Zemin's visit begins new stage in efforts to develop relationship to
integrate China into world community. First visit by Chinese leader to U.S. in
12 years, first visit of new leadership in the post-Deng era.
* Engagement at Presidential level important in and of itself, just as we had
with Soviets during Cold War. This should begin process of regular summits.
* Summit should not be expected to produce dramatic results or immediate
alterations in relationship, which has been deeply troubled since 1989. We think
of this as beginning of long-term process.
* At same time we do look for concrete results building toward our objective of a
China integrated into the international community, playing by the rules, and
receptive to U.S. interests.
* For example:
* Working toward progress on China's commitments on nuclear nonproliferation
practices;
* Looking to further cooperation on other security issues, such as Korea;
* Developing military-to-military relations in ways that minimize chance of
miscalculation, advance transparency and communication;
* Pursuing initiative to cooperate on rule of law programs, important for China
in developing protections both for economic activity and ordinary citizens;
* Advancing cooperation on environment and energy projects;
* Increasing U.S. exports to China and removing Chinese market barriers to U.S.
products.
* On human rights, not optimistic about likelihood of short-term progress. Over
time, as China integrates more and more into world and interdependence grows,
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roots of more open society will take hold. But engagement not substitute for
human rights policy. Will continue to keep human rights high on agenda, make
clear to China that no other issue more profoundly, deeply affects the way in
which Americans view China.
* Finally, the details of the visit and other stops Jiang might make have not
been worked out. Hope he has opportunity to see several American cities - not
only Washington.
CHINA NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION
September 19, 1997
Background China issued its new nuclear export control regulations September 10.
The US has been pressing China to issue these regulations to control nuclear
exports. The US views their issuance as a positive development, and a necessary
element of any certification package the President could present to Congress.
Certifying China for nuclear cooperation with the U.S. is a possible outcome of
the upcoming summit, but no decision has yet been taken on certification.
Q: Do the new Chinese export control regulations cover dual-use exports?
A: The export control regulations issued by the Chinese on September 10 specially
cover nuclear items, and not dual-use items.
However, the statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
noted that the relevant Chinese departments are formulating nuclear-related
dual-use regulations.
In addition, there are interim dual-use controls in place in China which were
approved by the State Council in May and which apply to all Chinese government
ministries and non-governmental entities.
Chinese officials have explained that these interim export controls cover all
items contained on the internationally accepted dual-use control list of the
nuclear suppliers group.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 40 of 47
Q: How effective do we think the new nuclear export control regulations are?
A: Although we have not fully analyzed the new regulations on an interagency
basis, they appear to be a significant step forward toward an effective export
control system.
They require peaceful use guarantees, the application of IAEA safeguards, and
Chinese consent rights over retransfers to third countries.
In addition, the regulations clearly cover all forms of technology transfer
including personnel exchanges and exchanges of information.
While the final promulgation of China's nuclear export control regulations was
fairly recent (September 10), the Chinese have clearly been tightening up their
nuclear export control system for some time, especially since May 1996, when
China committed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
We have followed Chinese activities very carefully during this period and
believe China's track record in regulating nuclear-related trade during this
period demonstrates a commitment to effective controls.
JAPANESE DEFENSE GUIDELINES
September 25, 1997
Q: The Secretaries of State and Defense met with their Japanese counterparts in
New York today and approved the final report on the revision of U.S.-Japan
defense guidelines. What is the significance of this? Do these guidelines alter
Japan's military role? Do these guidelines require Japan to assist the U.S.
during a "Taiwan crisis?"
A: The revised defense guidelines are the result of 18 months of work aimed at
modernizing the U.S.-Japan security alliance as called for during the April 1996
summit meeting between the President and Prime Minister Hashimoto.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 41 of 47
The defense guidelines describe the way in which the U.S. and Japan will work
together during regional contingencies, for example in response to a sudden
humanitarian crisis or a military crisis on the Korean peninsula. They are not
aimed at any country.
In particular, the revised guidelines offer substantive improvements for
cooperation on peacekeeping, humanitarian relief operations and military
exchanges during peacetime, and defense cooperation during situations in areas
surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.
In both cases, the new guidelines provided greater definition and clarity to the
roles and missions of U.S. and Japanese forces during such contingencies.
The guidelines underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to
sustaining peace in the Asia Pacific and represent another important step in the
strategic and political partnership between the United States and Japan. This is
a positive signal to the region that the United States will remain fully engaged
in the Asia-Pacific.
JAPAN: CIVIL AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS
September 25, 1997
Q: Are press reports accurate that U.S.-Japan civair negotiations will extend
into October, past the September 30 deadline?
A: We did not reach agreement. There will be negotiations in October. Our
negotiators are working on dates.
Q: Are you prepared to conclude a deal?
A: There are issues of great importance to the United States that have not yet
been resolved. We will not agree to anything unless the package as a whole is in
our national interest.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 42 of 47
Q: Can you give us more details?
A: No. I understand U.S. officials will hold a press conference Friday moming
Tokyo time (Thursday evening EST).
CTBT
September 23, 1997
Q: Why is the Administration submitting the CTBT to the Senate now? What is the
urgency?
A: The President rightfully referred to the CTBT in his speech to the United
Nations as "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms
control." It is four decades in the making, and has been signed by over 140
countries in the past year.
In order for the Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible, the Unites
States must lead the effort to achieve the required ratifications.
Understand the Senate has a busy calendar, but as the National Security Advisor
said yesterday [Monday], we will hope to have this considered by the Senate at
least at the committee level this fall, and then in a larger debate next year.
Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helm's spokesman's statement that "This
Treaty is not on the front burner."
A: We will be working with the Foreign Relations Committee and other committees
to try to schedule a hearing or hearings this fall.
Meanwhile, at least two other committees have announced hearings next month on
some key issues related to CTBT, including stockpile stewardship and
verification.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 43 of 47
Q: Where does the administration "rank" CTBT on its list of priorities now with
the Foreign Relations Committee? Is it ahead of, or behind, NATO enlargement?
A: This is not a question of choosing between CTBT and NATO enlargement. Senate
is certainly capable of dealing with both agreements.
Q: Why should the Senate begin hearings, or take action, on this Treaty when
India still refuses to sign, and therefore the Treaty may not enter into force
for some time?
A: Certainly true that the Treaty requires the ratification of 44 states to enter
into force, including India.
We believe that, in order for the Treaty to enter into force as soon as
possible, the Unites States must lead the effort to achieve the required
ratifications.
Finally, if the required ratifications are not obtained by September 1999, the
Treaty includes a provision for the convening of a conference of those states
that have ratified the CTBT to consider what measures might be taken to
facilitate entry into force.
That's one reason why it's so important for the U.S. Senate to act on this and
for the U.S. to show leadership, so that we can be available if that contingency
should arise.
Q: Does our inability to make a determination as to the nature of the August 16
seismic event in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya indicate the CTBT is not
effectively verifiable?
A: We believe our national intelligence means, together with the Treaty's
verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with
the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable.
The CTBT would provide opportunities for clarification and on-site inspections
in cases such as these.
�344CC92E.FrN
Page 44 of 47
CUBA
September 23, 1997
September 20 Brothers to the Rescue Flight
Background (for briefer only): The Florida-based exile group Brothers to the
Rescue (BTTR) filed a flight plan with FAA on Saturday, September 20, for two
Cessna aircraft to fly in search of Cuban rafters. The flight plan was filed to
fly to coordinates southwest of Cay Sal Bank, an area where rafters are often
found, 1-2 miles outside Cuban airspace. The aircraft departed at approximately
9:30 A.M. from Opa-Locka airport, north of Miami, and were scheduled to return
approximately five hours later.
During the flight, DoD radar saw a fast moving aircraft over Cuba headed in the
direction where the BTTR planes were located. The assumption at the time was
that this was a MIG. Based on more in-depth review of radar data and other
available information, DoD has now concluded with 99% certainty that the Cuban
plane involved was not a MIG. Radar also indicates that the BTTR flight paths
took them from 13 to 18 nautical miles off Cuba (they were always at least one
mile away from the 12-mile limit). The press may ask about a Reuters report
where USG sources (military and State) referred to a MIG. Again, this was the
assumption on Saturday. Further investigation by DoD shows that the target seen
on radar was not a MIG.
Q: Is there any further information on events of September 20 when the Cubans
reportedly launched a MiG in response to BTTR aircraft flying close to Cuba?
A: On Saturday, U.S. assets identified a fast moving aircraft flying over Cuban
territory in the general vicinity of where the BTTR flights were located. A
warning about the fast moving aircraft was broadcast on emergency radio
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 45 of 47
frequencies, with a recommendation that the BTTR planes turn northward.
Upon further evaluation of the information from the September 20 incident, it
appears that the fast moving plane seen flying over Cuba was not a MiG sent in
response to the BTTR flights. There are several possible explanations for the
aircraft in question, including a military plane or a routine exercise mission.
Q: Was the Cuban plane flying in response to the BTTR flights?
A: There is no indication at this point that the aircraft in question was
responding to the BTTR flights.
Q: Did the BTTR planes violate Cuban airspace?
A: All indications are that the planes followed the flight plans submitted
earlier in the day which took them no closer than 1 -2 nautical miles of Cuba's
twelve-mile territorial limit.
LIBYA
September 23, 1997
Arab League Foreign Ministers Resolution on Libya
Background: Arab League FMs met in Cairo this week. Among a number of
resolutions considered, Libya promoted and got approval of a resolution that
calls on Arab countries to ease the severity of the UN resolutions' embargo on
flights into and out of Libya. The resolution appears to expand the existing
exceptions for humanitarian and hajj-related flights to include transport of
workers, any aid from Libya to other countries, travelers for any religious
reason, and official Libyan political leadership. Many Arab governments were not
aware of the resolution, and none - especially Egypt - has called for Arab
countries to ignore UN sanctions.
Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League's resolution on Libya? Doesn't this
undercut UN sanctions on Libya?
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 46 of 47
A: We have seen only preliminary reports of the resolution.
That said, the Arab League has no authority to override UN Security Council
resolutions. We are making our strong views against the League's action clear to
Arab governments.
UNSCRs 748 and 883 place restrictions on Libya - including flight sanctions - in
response to the Libyan government's refusal to cooperate with the investigation
into the downing of Pan Am 103, which killed 270 innocent people, including 189
Americans.
Libya continues to refuse to fully comply, choosing instead to offer sham offers
of cooperation. The UN Security Council has been clear that Libya is far from
satisfying the requirements. Until it does so, there can be no excuse for
loosening sanctions.
There are already exceptions in the UN resolutions that allow for Libya's
legitimate humanitarian needs. Medivac flights are routinely granted. Moreover,
the Council has made provisions in years past for Hajj-related flights and we are
on record as being willing to continue to consider such requests.
The current UN sanctions remain in full force, and we expect the Council to
ensure that any violations of these sanctions will be publicized and dealt with.
ALGERIA
September 23, 1997
Violence in Algeria
Q: Any comment on Tuesday's massacre in Algeria?
A: We condemn the horrible massacres and bombings that have killed so many people
in Algeria.
We are outraged at the savagery of these violent attacks.
�344CC92E.FIN
Page 47 of 47
The U.S. continues to encourage a policy of national reconciliation on Algeria
based on the rule of law.
We are hopeful that local elections this fall will offer an opportunity for
Algerians to renounce violence and participate meaningfully in a political
process.
NORTH KOREA
September 19, 1997
* Talks in New York have recessed without progress on an agenda or date for
four-party plenary.
* We will continue to explore through normal channels whether resumption of the
talks is possible.
(FYI Only: North Koreans won't agree to anything unless we guarantee more food
up front. They called our bluff, we called theirs in return. We are not calling
this a breaking off of talks to leave open the possibility that the DPRK will
come back to us.)
�Page 1 of 4
34601'353.r^N
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
10/15/97 7:46:29 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
EARLY EDITION OCT. 15 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS
SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Cicio, Kristen K.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
octl5.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15,1997
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
TRIP: Clinton praises progress by Brazil, says he takes it seriously,
apologizes
for comment on corruption; his motorcade is pelted with manure.
Cardoso lauds
Clinton's efforts on climate change. (NYT3,WP25)
ARGENTINA: On eve of President's arrival, nation is still coming to
terms with
its violent recent past. (WP25)
CUBA: Government, Catholic church have differing aims for Pope's
upcoming visit.
(WP26)
MEXICO: Cholera breaks out in Acapulco following torrential
storms. (WP26)
HAITI: Albright to visit Port au Prince on Friday to bolster
democratization
�34601853.KN
Page 2 of 4
efforts. (WP24)
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
ISRAEL: Anatomy of the "daring attack that blew up in Israel's face."
House
subcommittee freezes aid to Israel over Sheinbein case. Army
demolishes two
homes in West Bank. Orthodox rabbis refuse to compromise their
religious
monopoly; Netanyahu likely to anger American Jews by backing their
stand. West
Bank settler rabbi pays courtesy call on Hamas leader.
(NYT1,8,9;WP/B3)
GULF: Oil prices fall sharply as fears of U.S.-Iran confrontation in
Gulf recede.
(NYT/D17)
INDIA/U.K.: Queen, in Amritsar, apologizes for Jallianwala Bagh
massacre in 1919.
(NYT6)
AFGHANISTAN: Deputy FM Abdullah says pipeline project should
not benefit Taliban.
Washington Embassy moves to the Internet after it is closed by the
State Dept.
(WP27)
SRI LANKA: Huge car bomb and gunfire wrack Colombo; two dead.
(NYT3)
ALGERIA: International human rights groups urge the U.N. to
convene a special
session on Algeria. (WP27)
AFRICA
CONGO-B: Annan asks UNSC for peacekeepers and sanctions on
Brazzaville. Luanda
intervenes militarily in civil war to bolster Sassou-Nguesso's rebels.
(NYT7,WP23)
S. AFRICA: Former ministers Roelof Botha and Adriaan Vlok
apologize for
apartheid. (WP27)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
RUSSIA: Life is lonely for former dissidents in today's Russia. Rich
Russians
turn to raising horses.(WP23,NYT4)
SPAIN: Policeman dies while preventing a separatist attack on new
Guggenheim
museum in Bilbao. (WP26)
ITALY: PM Prodi is reinstated after Communists restore support for
his
government. (WP27,NYT5)
ASIA/PACIFIC
DPRK/U.S.: Washington is giving UNICEF an additional $5 million
for aid to North
Korea's needy. (WP24)
�34601B53.F;N
Page 3 of 4
PHILIPPINES: Arab gunmen attack army base, wound ten before
being shot dead.
(WP26)
JAPAN/U.S.: Dollar rises against the Yen; concern over fragility of
Japan's
economy continues. (NYT/D17)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
INTEL: The bizarre tale of the "spies who just wouldn't come in from
the Cold
War." (NYT1)
DEFENSE: Administration reduces scope of line-item veto of MilCon
bill to placate
Hill.(WP5,NYT12)
U.N.: Slovenia, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon and Gambia win UNSC seats
for 1998
session. (WP24)
KANSI: Legal wrangling builds in Kansi case. Defense says
extradition was
illegal. (WP/B1,B5)
IMMIGRATION: INS insists it must deport all aliens with criminal
records; critics
disagree. (NYT23)
MEDICINE: Two resign from New England Journal of Medicine over
criticism of AIDS
studies in Africa. (NYT1)
OPINION
WP: Editorial says bailout efforts for Southeast Asian nations must be
predicated
on real reforms and slams Malaysian PM Mahathir for his blame-theWest attitude.
Letter from Swedish Embassy defends Stockholm's record on arms
sales. Broder
column praises Helms for his stewardship of the SFRC. Shipler
column cites
comments by Ed Rice about racism in our society. Samuelson column
endorses
Clinton's views on free trade, globalization and the need for Fast
Track
authority. Amb. Kapanga op-ed defends Kinshasa's handling of U.N.
human rights
investigations. (20,21)
NYT: Editorial urges Brazil to save its rain forests in cooperation with
the U.S.
and others. Editorial item praises Blair's handshake with Adams.
McCarthy op-ed
urges immigration supporters and critics to base their positions on the
facts,
not ideology. (28,29)
�34601E53.F;N
Page 4 of 4
�Page 1 of 8
34C46C82.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
12/30/97 9:21:02 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
DEC. 30 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
�34C46C82.FIN
Page 2 of 8
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
�34C46C82.FIN
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Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Johnson, David T.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
�34C46C82.FIN
Page 4 of 8
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Soubers, Richard R.
�Page 5 of 8
34C46C82.FIN
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
dec30.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1997
ASIA/PACIFIC
S. KOREA: World's banks will allow South Korean borrowers an
extra month on loans
now due. Seoul bows to IMF reform demands; national assembly
approves key
legislation. Hoarding among consumers is reported. Huge company
town suffers
after collapse of Hanbo Steel. Despite new president's support for
�34C46C82.FIN
Page 6 of 8
unification,
hard-liners continue to use national security law to harass advocates of
reconciliation. (NYT 1 ,D 1;WP 1,14,D 1;WSJ6,7;USA 1 ,B 1;WT 1,11)
HONG KONG: As killing of chickens proceeds, mysteries remain
about "bird flu."
(NYT1,WP1,USA11,WT9)
JAPAN: After collapse of opposition coalition, troubled ruling party
faces
divided foes. (NYT8)
VIETNAM: Military strongman is named as new Communist Party
chief. (WP9)
INDONESIA: Local borrowing, not foreign speculation, was major
cause of collapse
of rupiah. Borrowers, foreign lenders are urged to renegotiate loans.
Investigators have some leads in mysterious death, collapse of
Canadian mining
venture in Borneo. (WSJ 1,4,6)
ECON: U.S. investors search for bargains in Asia's troubled
economies. Southeast
Asian banks reduce lending. (WP/D1,WSJ7)
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
PAKISTAN: Jailed husband of former PM Bhutto is sworn in as
senator. (NYT4)
P.A.: Bowing to pressure, Arafat accepts cabinet's resignation,
promises
reshuffle. (NYT4,WP9)
NEPAL: Famed Kazakh mountaineer is feared dead in avalanche.
(NYT8,USA11,WT11)
IRAQ: Conditions in nation's hospitals worsen as sanctions are
tightened. U.S.
blasts Baghdad for holding up food contracts. (WP9,USA11)
ALGERIA: 30 peasants slaughtered in mosque; Islamic militants are
blamed. Tense
Ramadan is seen. (WP9,WT9)
SAUDI ARABIA: U.S. is increasing security at Prince Sultan Air
Base housing.
(WT11)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
FRY: A look at the cynical young intellectuals of former Yugoslavia.
New FRY
President Milutinovic is sworn in. (NYT4,WP9,WT9)
FRANCE: Jobless demonstrators seize unemployment offices to
demand holiday bonus.
(NYT4)
TURKMENISTAN/IRAN: Defying U.S. and Russia, Ashkhabad and
Tehran open new gas
pipeline. (NYT10,WP9,WSJ7)
N. IRELAND: Three prisoners from IRA splinter group are charged
with prison
�34C46C82.FIN
Page 7 of 8
assassination last week. Prison security is a matter of politics; militias
control cell blocks. (NYT10,WP8,USA11)
U.K.: Britain is building huge dome in Greenwich to celebrate
millenium. (WPS)
RUSSIA/CHINA: Moscow wins contract to build nuclear reactor in
city near
Shanghai. (WP9,WTH)
CYPRUS: U.S. urges Turkish Cypriots not to ban contacts with Greek
Cypriots.
(WT10)
AFRICA
KENYA: Chaos forces delay in voting; second day of elections
scheduled;
opposition cries foul. (NYT6,WP8,USA8,WT9)
NIGERIA: More arrests by military as investigation of alleged coup
plot
continues. (WP9)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
MEXICO: Ugly feud erupts overfreezingof business tycoon's assets
in
Switzerland. (NYT3)
PERU: Huge car bomb explodes outside Canadian-Chilean firm; no
injuries. (NYT3)
BRAZIL: Sao Paulo prison siege continues; 450 are held hostage.
(WP9)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
DEFENSE: Women are taking on more combat support roles in
military, ignoring
rules. High rate of pregnancy causes tensions in Army ranks. USAF
can't find
new homes for research chimps. (WP1,6;WSJ1)
U.N./WAR CRIMES: Texas judge refuses to extradite Rwandan
suspect to war crimes
tribunal. (NYT1)
DEMOCRACY: Democracy as a foreign policy strategy is hit-ormiss; some successes
but also failures. (USA8)
ECON: Dollar rises against most currencies on optimism over Korea
bailout, but
falls against the yen. (NYT/D13)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial praises Egyptian supreme court for upholding ban on
female genital
mutilation, calls for continued international campaign to stop the
practice.
Rosenthal column on the growing movement in the U.S. to respond to
religious
persecution overseas, and the failure of the Administration and the
press to take
notice. (22-23)
�34C46C82.FIN
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WP: Editorial on the Chiapas massacre says the Mexican government
must first find
the culprits and then launch a "rolling national negotiation" with
indigenous
peoples. (12)
WSJ: Melloan column says the key economic lesson of 1997 is the
failure of the
Japanese model. (11)
USA: Editorial praises Hong Kong's swift reaction to prevent spread
of bird flu.
Schweizer op-ed on the growing BW/CW threat. (12-13)
WT: Editorial says hopes for peace in Northern Ireland should not
lead to a
glossing over of the hard fact that the violence and killing are
continuing.
Allard/Goure op-ed on the scarcity of good strategic thinking about
how to deter
Saddam. Jensen column on the tawdry state of
"Sloboslavia" (Milosevic's
Serbia). Wollacott op-ed says that while extending the international
presence in
Bosnia may prevent new eruptions of conflict, it will do little to
stabilize the
region's future. Beichman column slams Yeltsin for defending the
KGB's bloody
history. Blazquez op-ed on Cuba's successful efforts to compromise
reporting by
Western journalists from the island and suppress local efforts to
publish freely.
Pawlikowski op-ed says NATO enlargement will mark the final step
toward Poland
regaining the independence it lost 200 years ago. (12-15)
�Page 1 of 8
34C9AE7C.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/2/98 9:03:53 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
JAN. 2 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 2 of 8
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 3 of 8
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Johnson, David T.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 4 of 8
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Soubers, Richard R.
�Page 5 of 8
34C9AE7C.FIN
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
jan2.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
ISRAEL: FM Levy threatens to resign over Netanyahu spending;
damage to peace
process feared. Israeli woman is killed in West Bank shooting.
(WP1,29;NYT1,9;US
A8;WT1)
IRAN: Administration officials are debating TOTAL sanctions,
fearing
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 6 of 8
Congressional pressure; Khatemi interview on CNN will be watched
closely. (WSJ1)
PAKISTAN: Former judge Rafiq Tarar is sworn in as president; faces
court
challenge. Former PM Bhutto and her family are charged with
corruption.
(WP26,NYT7)
INDIA: Parliamentary elections are scheduled for four days beginning
Feb. 16 and
ending March 7. (WP26)
IRAQ: Baghdad denies allegations of recent mass executions. New
showdown is
likely as U.N. makes plans to inspect Saddam's palaces.
(NYT7,USA8,WT13)
ALGERIA: 78 civilians are massacred. (USA8)
EGYPT: Cairo wins World Bank approval for Nile Valley irrigation
project. (WSJ5)
JORDAN: Mayor named Badi to sue Clinton for naming dog after
him.(WTll)
ASIA/PACIFIC
S. KOREA: Accountants are in high demand as nation seeks to
balance its books,
end deceptive practices. Smaller banks balk at debt rescheduling,
endangering
rescue package. Worries remain that the IMF has "created a monster."
(WP1;NYT1;WSJ1,5;WT11
VIETNAM: Protests are expected as Administration prepares to
broaden ties with
Hanoi; labor and human rights groups are opposed. (WSJ1)
HONG KONG: Six months after handover, residents' biggest concern
is the economy,
not Chinese rule. 14th case of "bird flu" is diagnosed. Mass
disinfection
effort continues on farms. (USA8,WP26,NYT6,USA8)
THAILAND: Prime Minister warns that 1998 will be another bad year
economically.
(USA/B1)
CHINA: Seagram aims to make Tropicana OJ a Chinese staple.
(WSJ1)
JAPAN: Fears for future of banks are easing; U.S. sees signs that
government may
finally be acting. (WSJ 10)
INDONESIA: Jakarta will merge state banks as part of financial
sector reform
program. (WSJ5)
SINGAPORE: Government relies on sound management and financial
assets to stave
off contagion from neighbors' economic woes. (WSJ 10)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
CUBA/U.S.: U.S. grants parole to baseball player, two others; refuses
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 7 of 8
it to five
companions. Some see ploy for lucrative contract.
(WP3,NYT3,USA4)
MEXICO: Survivors of Chiapas massacre refuse government aid,
alleging lies and
incompetence. Four years after Zapatista uprising, little progress is
seen in
south Mexico. (WP1,NYT3,USA8,WSJ5)
PANAMA: Four Americans killed in crash of small plane. (WP26)
ARGENTINA: Vandals desecrate scores of tombstones in Buenos
Aires' Jewish
cemetery. (USA8,WT13)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
N. IRELAND: Rash of killings endangers peace process; one killed in
tavern attack
yesterday. (NYTl.WTll)
U.K.: London takes over E.U. presidency. (WP30)
RUSSIA: Package bomb injures three in Moscow metro. Chechen
leader dismisses
cabinet. Ruble loses three zeros, now trades at less than six to the
dollar;
some Russians are wary. Soviet sub builder Rubin saw writing on the
wall and
diversified; firm now does fast food and construction as well.
(WP26,NYT4,WSJ1)
ITALY: Navy rescues 386 Kurdish refugees from Turkish ship; fears
rise over mass
migration. (WP26,NYT5)
VATICAN: In New Year's message, Pope urges that globalization be
just and
equitable. (NYT6)
TURKEY: Despite hurt feelings, Ankara renews trade pact with E.U.
(WSJ5)
CYPRUS: Turkish Cypriot representative says pause in negotiations is
temporary.
(WT12)
FRANCE: U.S. fugitive Ira Einhom enjoys liberty in France; court
blocked
extradition for murder. (WT11)
AFRICA
BURUNDI: Hutu rebels are blamed for massacre of 150 civilians near
capital.
(NYT1,8;WP25,WT13)
KENYA: Opposition disputes Moi's claimed lead in vote counting.
(WP26,NYT8,USA8,WT
11
DROC: Kabila promises elections in early 1999. Government cancels
groundbreaking
copper deal with AMF. (NYT8,WSJ10)
SIERRA LEONE: U.S. refuses to allow senior civil servant to see his
�34C9AE7C.FIN
Page 8 of 8
wife and son
in Washington. (WP30)
NIGER: Five arrested in alleged coup plot. (NYT6,WT13)
S. AFRICA: Chinese flag is raised as Pretoria breaks ties to Taipei.
(WT13)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
ARMS CONTROL: U.S. is planning initiative to share information on
laser tests in
space; some fear giveaway of critical technology. (WT1)
ADMINISTRATION
CLINTON: Panel of experts gives President a C+ on foreign policy.
(USA11)
STATE: American Academy of Diplomacy, AFSA say they warned
against appointing
Larry Lawrence. (WT12)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial says serious hurdles remain for South Korea's
economic revival and
the U.S. and other donors must make sure that IMF remains vigilant
and flexible.
Churchill op-ed says Tony Blair must go all the way in House of
Lords reform and
opt for an elected chamber, rather than one which he can pack with
appointees.
(18-19)
WP: Klarevas op-ed says the U.S. needs to take a tough line with
Greece and
Turkey to prevent their disputes from escalating dangerously. (23)
WSJ: Ayittey op-ed slams U.S. Africa policy for "offering symbolic
shows of
compassion" rather than rectifying institutional defects caused by the
thugs who
rule most African nations. Brenner op-ed says Canada's capital gains
tax rate is
punitive and scares away investors and talent. (8-9)
WT: Grenier column on the lack of attention paid to victims of
Stalinism. Daniel
Pipes op-ed on the underestimated alliance between Israel and Turkey
and its
meaning for the Middle East. Sen. Ashcroft op-ed criticizes the
Administration
for worrying about global warming while Saddam continues his
defiance. (16-17)
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. email
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Richard Clarke to Jamie Metzl, re: [cable] (6 pages)
01/05/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Record (Sept 97 - Jan 01) ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
620000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/03/1997 - 02/09/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2098
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidenliHl Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�34CEE243.FIN
Exchange
Page 1 of4
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/6/98 7:46:09 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
EARLY EDITION JAN. 6 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS
SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
CARBON COPY
Crowley, Philip J.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
TEXT BODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT .
jan6.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
ISRAEL: Netanyahu wins budget vote; speculation increases on
possibility of early
elections. U.S. and Turkey prepare for joint maneuvers with Israel off
the coast
near Haifa. (NYT1;WP10,14)
P.A.: Palestinians complain of CBS' bias in 60 Minutes segment on
the West Bank,
threaten boycott. (NYT8)
ALGERIA: Troops kill 35 civilians in hunt for terrorists responsible
for
massacre. (WP14)
BANGLADESH: Hundreds die as rare cold spell covers nation.
(WP14)
ARAB LEAGUE: 20 nations agree to cooperate in fight against
�34CEE243.FIN
Page 2 of 4
terrorism.
(WP14,NYT9)
ASIA/PACIFIC
KOREAS: ROK and DPRK compete for world's attention now that
both are in trouble.
Seoul stock market rises after Soros says he may make big
investments. South
Koreans confer with New York banks. (WP 10,D 1 ;NYT/D4)
VIETNAM: Analysts see Hanoi moving away from reform with
choice of hard-liner as
new party chief. (WP14)
THAILAND: Its economy continuing to fall, Bangkok asks IMF to
ease bailout terms.
(NYT/D4)
JAPAN: Government seeks to save key banks by buying their shares.
(NYT/D4)
ECON: Key Asian currencies fall again; new doubts are raised about
efficacy of
rescue efforts. (WP/D1)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
MEXICO: FM Gurria is named treasury secretary; no word yet on
new foreign
minister. Judge releases five charged with killing American
businessman, citing
"modem Robin Hood"; U.S. protests. (WP14;NYT6,D2)
AFRICA
KENYA: Moi is inaugurated for fifth term; promises economic
reform, crackdown on
corruption. (WP10,NYT6)
CONGO (B): Sassou-Nguesso opens peace conference, promises
reconstruction. (WP14)
ZAMBIA: Defiant Chiluba denounces Western criticism of Kaunda
arrest: "To hell
with that." (WP14)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
RUSSIA: Balloonist Steve Fossett is defeated by the Russian winter.
(WP3;NYT1,4)
TURKEY: Ankara's war against PKK is leading to refugee flows to
Western Europe,
worrying neighbors. (NYT9)
LITHUANIA: Chicagoan Valdas Adamkus, a former senior EPA
official, is certified
as new president. (WP14)
N. IRELAND: Mowlam says the peace process is "fragile but
holding" despite
violent incidents. (WP14)
GERMANY: Nation's churches, long coddled by government
subsidies, face climate of
austerity. (NYT3)
FRANCE: Continued high unemployment strains governing leftist
�34CEE243.FIN
Page 3 of 4
coalition. (NYT3)
ITALY: New efforts to keep Tower of Pisa from toppling. (NYT4)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
NUNN-LUGAR-DOMENICI: Local authorities train for possible CW
or BW attacks using
special funds. (WP1)
SPACE: NASA delays launch of lunar orbiter due to radar trouble.
(WP2,NYT11)
DEFENSE: Air Force to modify British-built trainers after three fatal
crashes.
MIA Task Force continues efforts to locate missing personnel from
three wars.
Troops may soon be able to vote via the Internet. (WP7,11)
U.N.: Venezuelan diplomat ter Horst is named deputy high
commissioner for human
rights. (WP7)
AVIATION: Analysts see future showdown between Boeing and
Airbus over new
super-jumbo jets. (NYT/D1)
ADMINISTRATION
STATE: A/S Davidow is in line for Mexico ambassadorship. Jamie
Rubin and
Christiane Amanpour are engaged. (WP11,B3)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial questions whether Netanyahu can win Cabinet
approval for his
withdrawal plan prior to meeting with the President, and calls on
Netanyahu to
show leadership to achieve peace with security or call elections.
Lindsay
suggests that, without an IMF bailout of South Korea, market forces
would
dictate the same reforms but achieve greater competition in the long
run.
Friedman sees a possible U.S. diplomatic rapprochement with Iran as
the key to a
new strategy to unnerve Saddam. (20-21)
WP: Editorial supports Soros' view that the international financial
system needs
overhaul, and that financial institutions that encouraged Korea's
excessive
borrowing should have to pay a substantial share of the cost of the
bailout.
Editorial suggests that new elections in Israel are inevitable, but that
U.S.
interests lie in furthering the peace process, not in any particular party
or
politician. Zoellick calls on the President to connect the U.S. response
to the
Asian financial crisis to a larger strategy to shape the region's
�34CEE243.FIN
Page 4 of 4
economic
future, with particular emphasis on China and Japan. Seligmann
supports Tropical
Forest Conservation Act of 1998, which would allow nations to
reduce their debt
to the U.S. in return for setting aside funds to protect tropical forests.
(12-13)
�Page 1 of 10
34D2EB7E.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/9/98 8:51:01 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
JAN. 9 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 2 of 10
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Dymond, John C.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Farrar, Jay C.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Ryu, Rexon Y.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schrader, Joel M.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
�Page 5 of 10
34D2EB7E.FIN
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Soubers, Richard R.
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Evans, Peter O.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
jan9.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 1998
ASIA/PACIFIC
INDONESIA: Markets fall and instability fears worsen; panic buying
reported;
�34D7.EB7E.FIN
Page 6 of 10
concerns over possible IMF aid cutoff and Suharto's health.
Administration and
IMF launch joint rescue effort. Other Asian markets fall as result.
Suharto
appears blind to growing panic.
(NYT1 ,C2;WP1,26; WT1 ;USA1 ,B 1 ;LAT1 ;WSJ1,8)
S. KOREA: Seoul wins extension on debt repayment to world's
leading banks.
President-elect Kim blames previous regimes for lying to public,
disregarding
democracy; rejects "Asian model." Public backlash against feared
IMF
prescriptions is growing. A look at key bankers in deal.
(NYT/C1; WP 1,26; WT12;USA/
B1;WSJ8,10)
HONG KONG: Government ends policy of granting asylum to
Vietnamese. (WP24)
CHINA: Beijing launches campaign against sexual harassment in the
workplace.
(LAT2)
VIETNAM: Hanoi seeks to rehabilitate prostitutes in re-education
camps. (LAT3)
THAILAND: IMF's approach to Bangkok is different from its
approach to Indonesia.
(WSJ8)
JAPAN: Rescue plan may not help banks that need it the most.
(WSJ 10)
ECON: U.S. banks are setting aside extra funds to handle Asian
financial crisis.
Woes lead to expulsion of foreign workers across region.
(WP/G3;US A/B1; WSJ 10,C 1 ,C
12)
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAN: U.S. proposed direct talks with Tehran in overture conveyed
by Swiss
ambassador. U.S. skeptical of Khatami's overture, but Clinton said to
be
"seized" with idea of detente with Tehran. (WPl.WTl 1,LAT1)
PAKISTAN: Benazir Bhutto and her husband left behind an intricate
trail of
corruption. (NYT1,8,9)
ALGERIA: Repeated brutal killings defy logic; some fear government
role. West
gears up to respond; E.U. and Canada plan missions; government
rejects outside
role but approves E.U. delegation. (NYT1,WP24,WT11,USA9)
MEPP: Ross, in region, is trying to restart talks. Netanyahu says Israel
will
withdraw from more of West Bank only after Palestinians fulfill their
obligations
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 7 of 10
under Oslo; planning will continue. (NYT3,WP23,USA9)
IRAQ: White House rejects reported analysis in NID suggesting
Saddam has
benefited from standoff. Profile of Iraq's U.N. permrep Nizar
Hamdoon. Two U.S.
carrier groups to stay in Gulf. (WT1,NYT4,WP28)
ISRAEL: Jewish extremist is sentenced to two years in prison for
insulting
Muslims. Three soldiers injured by roadside bomb in south Lebanon.
Sharon and
Sharansky vie for foreign minister's post. (NYT6,WP24,WT13)
AFGHANISTAN: Librahimi continues efforts to mediate peace
settlement with U.S.,
Russian support. (WP27)
SAUDI ARABIA: Riyadh releases Pakistani child drug smugglers but
will try,
execute their parents. (WT11)
EGYPT: Kurtzer presents credentials; opposition newspapers say he
can't be
objective because he is Jewish. (WT12)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
GERMANY: Police, prosecutors to use electronic eavesdropping for
first time since
WWII. Opposition grows to demolition of 1936 Olympic stadium in
Berlin.
Economists scale back growth predictions. (NYT6;WP23;WSJ1,8)
RUSSIA: Bliss does not have to return to face trial; U.S. businesses
are still
wary. Chernomyrdin is upbeat about economy. Yeltsin's iffy health is
worrying
Russians. (WP24,LAT3)
N. IRELAND: Mowlam to visit loyalist prisoners in Maze today;
police crack down
on extremists. (USA9)
GREECE/TURKEY: Athens says its fighters intercepted 30 Turkish
jets in its
airspace yesterday. (USA9)
E.U.: Immigration controls are tightened in response to wave of
Kurdish refugees.
(WP24,WT13)
SERBIA: Anti-Serb militancy on the rise in Kosovo as Rugova's
influence fades.
(LAT2)
CROATIA: Amb. Montgomery tells Tudjman that Zagreb must
continue support for
Dayton process. (WT12)
CANADA: Freak ice storm knocks out power and heat to more than
three million
citizens; six dead. (WP25,USA3)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 8 of 10
MEXICO: District attorney files charges against judge who released
alleged
killers of American. (NYT4)
CHILE: Lower house of congress opposes lifetime senate seat for
Pinochet. (WP24)
AVIATION: A look at how American Airlines is extending its
dominance across
hemisphere. (WSJ1)
AFRICA
CLINTON VISIT: Angolan MFA tells reporters that President will
visit Angola,
South Africa, Congo (B), Congo (K), Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe.
White House says no decisions have been made. (WT12)
KENYA: Virus that killed hundreds is Rift Valley Fever, not Ebola.
Moi names new
cabinet. (NYT6,WP24)
ANGOLA: Government takes control of diamond mines formerly run
by UNITA. (WP24)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
TERRORISM: Yousef sentenced to life in prison for World Trade
Center bombing.
(NYT1,WP1,WT6,USA4)
DEFENSE: Cohen to nominate Ralston for second term as vice
chairman of JCS.
Hormel gave money to legal defense fund opposed to President's
policy on gays in
the military. Cohen off on seven-nation Asia trip aimed at bolstering
regional
alliances. (WP28;WT1,10)
SPACE: Mir spacewalk ends without a hitch. (NYT6)
JOURNALISM: Reporters' groups report 26 killed in 1997 around
world, down from
103 in 1994. (NYT6,WT11)
TRADE: WTO rules tend to put industry concerns ahead of
consumers and public
regulators. (NYT/C 1)
U.N.: Canadian deputy defense minister Louise Frechette to be first
deputy
secretary general. (WP28)
TWA 800: Retired military leaders including former CJCS Moorer
says a missile
brought down plane. (USA3)
FUND RAISING: Rep. Solomon alleges ties between Sioeng and
drug smugglers. Two
Mexican businessman say they were pressured to contribute to
Hinojosa fund-raiser
that Clinton will attend today. (USA9,WSJ1)
ENVIRONMENT: U.S. industry steps up lobbying efforts on global
warming treaty.
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 9 of 10
(WSJ1)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial on Algeria urges an international investigation of who
is behind
the slaughter as well as international mediation to end the civil war.
Editorial
praises Zedillo's nomination of Gurria as finance minister and
Labastida as
interior minister. Mottahadeh op-ed says Khatami is showing courage
in taking on
the hard-liners and the U.S. has not gone far enough to encourage
further
openings. (18-19)
WP: Editorial encourages Algeria to accept an international mission to
investigate extremist violence and possible government complicity.
Rosenfeld
supports Rev. Bryan Hehir's approach to religious freedom in China,
criticizes
Bob Kagan, says the issue merits a place at the table among other
human rights
and foreign policy issues but should not upset the table itself. (20-21)
LAT: Editorial accuses Algeria of displaying callous ineffectiveness
that has
reached criminal proportions and hopes the government will be
shamed into
protecting its people. Editorial suggests that Reliant Mermaid sent a
signal
that will be understood throughout the region. Mackey traces the
cultural and
political history of Iran ~ from the establishment of Persia to the
embrace of
Islam to exposure to Western political thought ~ as the context behind
Khatami's
"unprecedented act of diplomacy." (10-11)
USA: Editorial calls for "cultural ping-pong" akin to our approach to
China in
the '70s to take advantage of Khatami's proposal. (13)
WSJ: Editorial points to Suharto as the primary problem with
Indonesia's response
to its currency crisis and, recalling the demise of his predecessor
Sukarno,
hopes that he will turn his attention to long overdue questions of
succession and
democracy. Queenan op-ed reviews the growing trend toward
apologizing for past
misdeeds ~ France apologizes to Spain for the Napoleonic era,
Belgium to the
people of Zaire, Italy to the people of Ethiopia, and Germany to "just
about
�34D2EB7E.FIN
Page 10 of 10
everybody" -- suggesting that national contrition teaches important
lessons that
may help prevent future horrors. Sarmiento says that extreme poverty
and absence
of the rule of law led to the massacre at Chiapas; the big loser is the
Zedillo
government and the winners are the EZLN and PRD. (16-17)
WT: Editorial calls for the Administration to face the "truth" as
outlined by the
CIA and devise an Iraq strategy that will bring down Saddam.
Editorial calls for
the international community to attach tight restrictions on donations to
Zaire,
forcing Kabila to undertake reform. Grenier rejects military reformer
arguments
and says that key to military victory remains projecting highly trained
forces
anywhere in the world. Weisbrode cautions U.S. not to take Turkey
for granted and
cast our lot with the Greeks and EU; Turkey broadens our strategic
focus to its
east and south. Rangel says that our Cuba policy focuses more on past
ghosts
than reality and does not serve our national interest, and the Pope's
visit is a
call for the U.S. to do better. Gilman says that the rest of the world
ganged up
on the U.S. at Kyoto and calls for the President to correct the treaty's
flaws
before signing it. Meyer sees new strategic positioning by Turkey in
light ofEU
rejection, involving the United States, Iran and Israel. Beichman
reviews
Albright's analysis on Iraq during her March 1996 speech at
Georgetown, and calls
for a new accounting as to why he remains in power today as the U.S.
contemplates
its next steps. (14-17)
�Page 1 of 4
34D81B69.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/13/98 7:40:23 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
EARLY EDITION JAN. 13 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS
SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Crowley, Philip J.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
janl3.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1998
ASIA/PACIFIC
INDONESIA: Suharto responds to IMF demands, promises to accept
reforms;
skepticism persists. (NYT1,WP12)
JAPAN: Tokyo apologizes for mistreatment of British POWs during
WWII; Blair
accepts apology. Government seeks to calm investors' fears about bad
loans.
Japan's version of C-SPAN goes on the air. (NYT7,D1;WP11,D1)
HONG KONG: Asia's biggest stock underwriter goes under after
rescue attempt
fails. (NYT/D1,WP12)
THAILAND: Finance minister appeals to U.S., Europe for more aid.
(WP12)
TAIWAN: Bob Dole registers as agent of Taiwan; some see violation
�34D81B69.FIN
Page 2 of 4
of agreement
with Gingrich. (WPS)
CHINA: Beijing executes 16 charged with unrest in Muslim area of
Xinjiang. (WP11)
ECON: Asian woes cause global downturn; Wall Street overcomes
early fall with
rally. Bailouts come under criticism on Hill by both liberal Democrats
and
conservative Republicans. (WP1,NYT/D3)
ARMS SALES: Asian financial crisis prompts downturn in defense
sales; U.S.
companies may lose big. (NYT1)
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAQ: Baghdad again threatens to block inspects, citing U.S.
espionage; test of
UNSC's resolve is seen. U.N. proposes higher oil-for-food quota.
(WP1,NYT4)
ISRAEL: Rare blizzard shuts Jerusalem, postpones confidence vote
which Netanyahu
later wins. (NYT4,WP11)
ALGERIA: France, burdened by history, is reluctant to intervene as
bloodshed
worsens. 100 more killed in new slaughter in two villages.
(NYT4,WP10)
PAKISTAN: Shiites mourn victims of massacre by Sunnis; riots
erupt. (NYT4,WP11)
INDIA: Sonia Gandhi, campaigning for Congress Party, avoids issue
of her
husband's assassination. (WP11)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
CANADA: Severe ice storm persists; freezing cold worsens
conditions; millions
still affected; 15 dead. (NYTl.WPl 1)
N. IRELAND: British-Irish roadmap for future agreement wins
approval from
participants in talks. (NYT3,WP10)
BOSNIA: Plavsic is set to form a new government with Western
assistance. (NYT3)
GERMANY: Group of business and legal leaders petitions high court
to block EMU.
$110 million fund for Jewish victims of Holocaust is announced.
(NYT3,WP10)
FRANCE: Roman Catholic newspaper apologizes for anti-Semitic
writings on Dreyfus
case 100 years ago. (NYT6)
TURKEY: Kurdish refugee group criticizes Ankara's handling of
exodus. (NYT6)
RUSSIA: Yeltsin to meet with Pope at Vatican next month; Vatican
resumes talks
with Orthodox Church. (NYT7)
�34D81B69.FIN
Page 3 of 4
CLONING: Council of Europe adopts French proposal for ban on
human cloning.
(WP11)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
COLOMBIA: Prison standoff ends in Bogota. (NYT5,WP11)
MEXICO: Government accuses local police of complicity in Chiapas
massacre. Labor
Dept. reports sex discrimination is common in Mexican assembly
plants owned by
Americans. (NYT8,WP10)
CHILE: Communist Party sues Pinochet for genocide in effort to
block him from
assuming Senate seat. (NYT8)
AFRICA
IVORY COAST: Abidjan prepares to host West African exposition
Jan. 26-31.(NYT3)
RWANDA: Nine Catholic nuns are slain; Hutu rebels suspected.
(NYT6)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
U.N.: New Deputy Secretary General Louise Frechette is sworn in by
Annan. U.S.
funding for U.N., IMF still blocked by dispute over abortion.
(NYT5,WP5)
SPACE: Air lock on Mir space station is still leaking. (WP11)
ADMINISTRATION
TENET: DCI keeps a low profile, impresses both Administration and
Hill with
competence and honesty. (WP13)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial encourages the President to revive sense of urgency
about Iraq,
says the use of force can't be ruled out until Iraq obeys UNSC
resolutions.
Friedman sees the President's options with Netanyahu and Arafat as
either working
to meet both men's political concerns within the framework of a
phased Israeli
withdrawal, or announcing a U.S. plan to bridge the gap between the
Israeli and
PA positions. (22-23)
WP: Editorial says Iraq will continue to play games until Saddam is
convinced
that U.S. is serious about sanctions and willing to back them up with
force.
Editorial sees the task for Northern Ireland negotiations as finding a
result
that meets the needs of all parties and says that it is not a zero-sum
game.
�}4D81B69.FIN
Page 4 of 4
Grayson notes the prospect of Mexico's congress evolving into a
serious
institution. Glassman sees two lessons in Asia meltdown: that the
Japanese model
of a managed economy doesn't work, and that bailouts only
exacerbate the problem
and guarantee that the crisis will reoccur. (14-15)
�Page 1 of 10
34DAC9FD.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/15/98 8:29:46 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
JAN. 15 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Abdulmalik, April B.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 2 of 10
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Dymond, John C.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Farrar, Jay C.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 3 of 10
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kieman, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Mclntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 4 of 10
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug)
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Pedersen, Amy F.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.
Ryu, Rexon Y.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schrader, Joel M.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
�Page 5 of 10
34DAC9FD.FIN
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Soubers, Richard R.
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwenyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Evans, Peter O.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.
CARBON_COPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
janl5.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAQ: UNSC condemns Baghdad's latest defiance; Butler says Iraq is
blocking
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 6 of 10
investigation of allegations of human experimentation.
(NYT1 ,WP25,WT1 ,LAT2,USA6)
MEPP: Israeli cabinet says it will retain permanent control over large
sections
of the West Bank. Thousands demonstrate against concessions to
Palestinians.
Two Jewish extremists are charged with sedition for planning to throw
a pig's
head into Al Aqsa mosque. (NYT8,WP26,WT10,LAT1,USA6)
IRAN: Khatami's brother says a friendly gesture from the U.S. would
be nice.
(NYT8)
ALGERIA: Government cancels visit of E.U. delegation, citing lack
of seniority;
invites Canadian delegation. (WP26,NYT9,WT11,USA6)
ASIA/PACIFIC
INDONESIA: Suharto acts to restore stability, agrees with IMF on
reform plan.
Financial interests of Suharto's family are threatened.
(WP1;NYT1;WT1,12;LAT1,3;WS
J15;USA1)
CHINA: Pro-democracy dissident refuses order to go into exile in
U.S. Beijing
reacts with alarm to Asian financial crises; Chinese banking system is
very
vulnerable. Devaluation is not expected. (NYT6,D26;WSJ15,16)
MALAYSIA: As financial woes worsen, government to deport
900,000 foreign guest
workers. (WT12)
S. KOREA: Election of Catholic president is a reflection of nation's
religious
diversity. Labor unions scale back demands, agree to crisis talks with
government, employers. Seoul is still opposed to swapping
government and
commercial debts to Western banks.
(WP31 ,NYT/D12,WSJ16,USA/B 1)
HONG KONG: "Bird flu" claims fifth victim. (WP26,NYT10)
PHILIPPINES: Manila reaches agreement with U.S. on military
cooperation pact.
(WP26)
JAPAN: Government revises railway privatization terms; chilling
effect on foreign
investment is seen. (NYT/D26)
ECON: U.S. dollar regains its dominance in region as Asian
currencies fall.
Concern rises that Asia's reliance on exports will clash with growing
U.S.
backlash against free trade. IMF eases hard line on Asian reforms.
Finance
ministers to meet this spring to discuss crisis. House codel headed by
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 7 of 10
Rep.
Leach heads for Asia today to assess crisis. Pessimism increases over
impact on
U.S. economy. (WP/C1;NYT1;WT10;WSJ15;USA6,B1,B2)
DEFENSE: Pentagon's plans for defense cooperation, arms sales are
thwarted by
economic crisis. (LAT3)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
BALTICS: Clinton to sign charter with three presidents on Friday;
some see
"consolation prize." (WP11)
N. IRELAND: Victim of latest partisan killing is buried amid calls for
peace.
(WP29,NYT3)
CANADA: Quebec is still suffering effects of ice storm; thousands
have no heat or
power; nationalized utility, the pride of Quebec nationalists, loses
credibility.
(WP30,NYT6,WSJ2)
RUSSIA: Concern rises over Yeltsin's absence from Moscow, lack of
involvement in
governing. Foreign distillers find Russian vodka market is hard to
(WP25,WSJ1)
UKRAINE: Rada ratifies friendship treaty with Russia. (WP26)
CROATIA: Serb refugees express fear as Croatia regains control of
Eastern
Slavonia today. (LAT2)
SWITZERLAND: Jews interned by Bern during WWII recall
mistreatment, demand
compensation. (NYT3)
FRANCE: Activists for unemployed say they will continue sit-ins.
Rightists storm
out of parliament after PM Jospin accuses them of supporting slavery
150 years
ago. (WP28,WT11)
POLAND: Rioting erupts after funeral of youth slain by police at
basketball game.
(WT11)
ROMANIA: Governing coalition is in disarray, threatening reform
plans. (WSJ 16)
FRY: Street violence erupts in Montenegro as standoff over elections
continues.
(WP28,NYT11,WT11)
E.U.: Ban on British beef exports is eased. U.K. launches EMU
implementation
effort. Asian crisis is having a serious impact in Europe.
(NYT10,WT12,WSJ16)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
MEXICO: The Catholic Church becomes a major adversary of the
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 8 of 10
PRI in Chiapas. 22
police officers accused of involvement in massacre have tested
positive for
gunpowder traces on their hands. (WSJ1,USA6)
CHILE: Pinochet delays retirement from army until March.
(WP26,NYT11,USA6)
CUBA: Castro allows TV broadcast by Cardinal Ortega; first in 36
years.
(WP26,USA6)
VENEZUELA: Drop in world oil prices is big economic problem for
Venezuela, other
exporters in region.(WSJ16)
BRAZIL: Controversy over involuntary organ donations. (NYT4)
AFRICA
ZAMBIA: Two charged in coup attempt claim their confessions were
coerced under
torture. (WP26,NYT11)
BURUNDI: Renewed clashes between army and Hutu guerillas claim
76 lives. (WP26)
MOZAMBIQUE: Graca Machel says she will neither wed Mandela
nor run for her
nation's presidency. (WT13)
S. AFRICA: Interview with Winnie Mandela. (WT13)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
IMMIGRATION: State DS agents bust huge visa fraud ring based in
the Philippines.
Illegal immigrants form huge lines at INS offices as 245(i) provision
is set to
expire. (NYT1,WP8,USA3)
ENVIRONMENT: 50-year moratorium on mining and oil exploration
in Antarctic takes
effect. Environmentalists urge U.S. to stop U.K., France and Japan
from shipping
nuclear waste via Panama Canal. (WP26,WT11)
DEFENSE: DoD is set to recommend permanent cancellation of
involvement in
patrolling Mexican border. Shortage of anthrax vaccine will delay
inoculation
programs. (WT3)
U.N.: Jayantha Dhanapala, former Sri Lankan ambassador, is new
undersecretary
general for disarmament. (WT13)
ADMINSTRATION
PETERSON: Ambassador to Hanoi will marry Australian diplomat he
met there. (WT13)
OPINION
WP: Editorial praises Baltic Charter for recognizing the importance of
the Baltic
nations' clear commitment to Western values and ideals. Hoagland
column slams
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 9 of 10
the Administration for "lame excuses" for Saddam's defiance of the
international
community, and warns of Russia's growing collusion with Iraq on
sanctions issues.
Cohen column ponders the growing slaughter in Algeria and says that
while
Western intervention is not appropriate, we owe the victims our
concern and
attention. Frelick op-ed assails the double standard that allows Cuban
refugees
to stay in the U.S. and forces Haitians to return home. Novak column
on the
Hormel nomination says that GOP opposition to "the nation's most
aggressive
financier of the gay movement" is growing. (22-23)
NYT: Editorial suggests the Israeli Government no longer has its heart
in the
peace process and that the reciprocity debate is now a way to score
points, not
resolve differences; President Clinton must remind both parties of
their own
interest in completing the peace. Safire calls on the President to
establish a
rapport with Netanyahu and convince Arafat to go to final status talks,
since
time favors no one in the peace process. (22-23)
LAT: Treverton and O'Connell say that the problem for the
intelligence community
in the post-Cold War era is too much intelligence, not too little,
because of
changes in technology and the international system. (4)
USA: Oberg op-ed criticizes NASA for considering a space ride for
John Glenn,
recalling that NASA became "corrupted" when Senator Jake Gam
demanded a ride in
1985.(13)
WSJ: Editorial notes a court challenge in Germany to the EMU and
that the
plaintiffs may have a reasonable case, since the EU has changed EMU
criteria that
passed legal muster in a similar German court challenge in 1993. P.J.
O'Rourkc
imagines the content of the conversation between Presidents Clinton
and Suharto.
(18-19)
WT: Meri op-ed sees the Baltic Charter as the crystallization of U.S.
and EU
commitments that all countries have the right to chose their security
arrangements, regardless of location, and calls on NATO to integrate
�34DAC9FD.FIN
Page 10 of 10
the Baltics
into the Alliance. Summers notes the cultural split between military
and
society, opining that the military is preserving its core values while
society
changes. Geyer, based on CIA analysis, sees Saddam as the winner of
the latest
standoff, because of increased passivity by the Administration. (1417)
�0
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�Page 1 of 4
34ED3301.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
1/29/98 7:42:07 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
Early Edition Jan. 29 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT .
jan29.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAQ: Albright says U.S. is ready to strike Iraq alone if necessary.
Possible
U.S. moves after military strike are unclear; allies and Gulf states
want to know
strategy. Vedrine says use of force is not desirable and won't solve
problems;
Russia also urges diplomacy after Primakov meets with Chirac. Arab
leaders
publicly oppose U.S. attack. Baghdad says it may ask the International
Court of
Justice to intervene. (NYT 1,6;WP 1,23)
ISRAEL: Israel and U.S. agree to shift American aid from economic
to military;
�34ED33D1.FIN
-
*
Page 2 of 4
amount to stay the same for now but is expected to drop over 10
years.
(WP23,NYT5)
SYRIA: Syrian economy is hurt by lag in peace process; Assad balks
at reforms for
fear of losing power. (WP26)
INDIA: 26 Tamils sentenced to hang for slaying of Rajiv Gandhi.
(WP22,NYT9)
IRAN: Editor of English-language Iran News is sentenced to death for
spying for
U.S. (WP22)
SRI LANKA: Senior general is forced to resign for failure to protect
revered
Buddhist shrine from rebels. (WP22)
ALGERIA: Armed Islamic groups slaughter 34 in three separate
attacks. (WP22)
ASIA/PACIFIC
S. KOREA: Seoul and creditors reach agreement to extend $24 billion
in loans up
to 3 years. (NYT1)
JAPAN: Hashimoto is in deep trouble; ratings plunge over Finance
Ministry
scandal. Deputy Finance Minister resigns. (WP25,NYT/D1)
TAIWAN: U.S. to sell refurbished frigates to Taipei; Beijing objects.
(WP28)
INDONESIA: Ethnic Chinese minority fears for its future as economy
worsens,
unrest grows. New unemployed are angry. (WP28,NYT3)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
CUBA: Pope's visit has left behind unsettling debates in Cuban
society; he says
he hopes Cuba goes the way of Poland. Protestant churches are
growing fast in
Cuba. (WP21,NYT1)
MEXICO: Mexico City is sinking fast, and engineers are not able to
keep up.
(NYT4)
PERU: UNHRC mission interviews Lori Berenson in Peruvian prison.
(NYT8)
BRAZIL: Environmental laws are strengthened to protect rain forests.
(NYT8)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
U.K.: Blair agrees to new inquiry into 1972 "Bloody Sunday"
massacre. (WP22)
TURKEY: Report confirms that previous governments used murder,
kidnapping and
torture against Kurds. (WP22)
CZECH REP.: New coalition government wins cliffhanger vote of
confidence; new
�34ED33D1.FIN
Page 3 of 4
elections expected. (WP22)
BOSNIA: Local authorities' reluctance to share power with minorities
threatens
Dayton implementation. (WP24)
AFRICA
BURUNDI: Defense minister is killed in helicopter crash, postponing
peace talks.
(WP22,NYT9)
S. AFRICA: Police commander casts doubt on Winnie Mandela's alibi
in murder case.
(NYT9,WP22)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
INTEL: Tenet tells Senate intelligence committee that WMD
proliferation is
greatest threat to U.S. security; Oakley and Hughes say the overall
threat to
U.S. is low. (WP7,NYT3)
SPACE: U.S. astronaut's poor Russian is a source pf friction with
Russian mission
controllers. (WP16,NYT20)
DEFENSE: Clinton nominates Gen. Ralston for second term as vice
chairman of JCS.
House committee vows to tighten rules for burial at Arlington.
(WP17)
ADMINISTRATION
FUND-RAISING: DOJ secures indictment of Charlie Trie for
funneling illegal
foreign funds to DNC. (WP1)
OPINION:
WP: Editorial on Iraq's WMD program says the U.S. must do what it
takes to
achieve the goals outlined in the President's SOTU address, and must
also have a
strategy ready for use after a possible bombing campaign. Haass op-ed
urges the
Administration to hang tough and stay strong on Iraq, laying out a
strategy for
forcing Saddam to comply. Sinai op-ed on WMD collaboration
between Libya and
Iraq. (18-19)
NYT: Editorial says there are signs of progress toward moderation
and
conciliation in Bosnia. Editorials criticizes the State Department's use
of
unfair stereotypes to decide visa cases. (26)
�34ED33D1.FIN
Page 4 of 4
�Page 1 of 3
34FE56E1.FIN
Exchange
Mail
DATE-TIME
2/9/98 7:36:40 AM
FROM
Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
EARLY EDITION FEB. 9 NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS
SUMMARY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBONCOPY
TEXTBODY
TRANSLATED ATTACHMENT
feb9.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1998
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAQ: U.S. will not ask Saudi Arabia for use of bases for air strikes;
Cohen
visits Gulf states. U.S. has few options and even fewer chances for
success.
Kuwait is only Arab nation to endorse air strikes. (NYT1,6;WP1)
ISRAEL: Divided nation is in a sour, foul mood as it prepares to
celebrate its
50th anniversary. (WP1,14)
AFGHANISTAN: 250 dead in earthquake in northeast.
(NYT9,WP16)
ALGERIA: Government denies visiting E.U. legislators access to
massacre sites.
(WP16)
SYRIA: President Assad fires his brother Rifaat from vice presidency.
�34FE56E1.FIN
Page 2 of 3
(WP16)
EUROPE/NIS/CANADA
N. IRELAND: New political structure for province is emerging as
Belfast talks
move toward proposed settlement. (NYT4)
ITALY: Crew of Marine jet that hit cable car line issues statement of
sympathy
for victims. (NYT5,WP16)
CANADA: British Columbia's indigenous inhabitants win battle for
recognition of
their history. (NYT1)
FRANCE: Three arrested in probe of Friday's assassination of prefect
of Corsica.
(NYT3,WP16)
U.K.: Princess Diana lives on in the coverage of Britain's tabloids.
Enoch
Powell is dead at 85.(NYT4,21)
ARMENIA: In wake of Ter-Petrosian's resignation, nation's military
is main power
broker. (NYT8)
CYPRUS: President and foreign minister to face off in runoff for
presidency.
(NYT9)
BOSNIA: 44-year-old Serbian bard returns to Sarajevo to sing about
nation's lost
unity and peace. (WP13)
E.U.: Europe's anger at Hollywood surfaces in move to break up U.S.based film
distribution company. (NYT/D7)
ASIA/PACIFIC
CHINA: Three U.S. clerics visit China to assess freedom of worship
issues.
Beijing reportedly has freed Christian dissident. Big Bird and his
friends come
to Chinese television. U.S.-based Chinese dissident arrested on Friday
is a
longtime advocate of a multi-party system. (NYT3;WP15,16)
PHILIPPINES: Despite carnival-like atmosphere, serious issues
underlie upcoming
presidential elections. (WP13)
JAPAN: Backer of proposed U.S. heliport wins election as mayor of
Okinawa town of
Nago.(NYT9,WP16)
ASEAN: Southeast Asian nations explore using local currencies,
rather than the
U.S. dollar, for trade. (NYT9)
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
MEXICO: Flash floods in Baja California kill 13. (WPS)
GUATEMALA: Only nation in region with capital punishment to
conduct first lethal
�34FE56E1.FIN
Page 3 of 3
injection Tuesday. (WP16)
AFRICA
SIERRA LEONE: West African peacekeepers near Freetown in heavy
fighting. (WP16)
KENYA: Jesse Jackson, visiting Nairobi, says Moi must act to stop
ethnic
violence. (WP16)
GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON
IMMIGRATION: INS plans thorough high-tech overhaul of
procedures for obtaining
citizenship. (WP1)
ENCRYPTION: U.S. continues to fight for international controls, but
is virtually
alone among industrialized democracies in doing so. (NYT/D10)
OPINION
NYT: Editorial on "Armenia's Turmoil" warns that the NagornoKarabakh peace
process and Armenian democracy are both near collapse and even
clean elections
are not likely to lead to a president willing to compromise for peace.
Safire
column says DNC overseas fund-raising is the real scandal, not
Monica Lewinsky,
but it does not sell newspapers. Edmund Morris urges that we deport
the Pooh
Five to avoid having to pay for their social security., (22-23)
WP: Editorial warns against complacency on Asia's financial crises,
and says
shoring up the IMF is important but not the only necessary step.
Kissinger op-ed
urges the Administration not to neglect Asian economies as it prepares
for
confrontation with Iraq, and lays out a strategy for preventing future
crises.
(18-19)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
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National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
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2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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[09/03/1997-02/09/1998]
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National Security Council
NSC Emails
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24194021
42-t-7585709-20091295F-003-001-2015-2015-2015
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2009-1295-F
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Box 3
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194021">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e29fe331e272869f740bbf8bcb8202d4.pdf
7ff1a056f66b6814b9556ca77ba724d1
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [Counterinsurgency] (5 pages)
02/02/1998
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Meeting] (5 pages)
02/03/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Summary for 4 Feb.] (15 pages)
02/04/1998
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Summary for 4 Feb.] (13 pages)
02/04/1998
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [International Terrorism] (18 pages)
02/04/1998
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [EU Visit] (2 pages)
02/05/1998
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Algeria problems] (4 pages)
02/10/1998
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [EU Parliamentarians] (3 pages)
02/11/1998
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Observations 1997-1998] (4 pages)
02/11/1998
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: Algeria: Democracy and Human Rights (4 pages)
02/11/1998
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [Algerian Forces] (5 pages)
02/12/1998
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [Counterinsurgency] (3 pages)
02/16/1998
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [NSC Riedel Meeting] (3 pages)
02/17/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(I) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [European Union Delegations] (4 pages)
02/17/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PKA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PKA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe F'OIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
Re: [Counterinsurgency] (5 pages)
02/02/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified infnrmation ((b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
02/03/1998
Re: [Meeting] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose infnrmation compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Securit} Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PKA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) nf the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/04/1998
Re: [Summary for 4 Feb.] (15 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
7
2009-1295-1
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/04/1998
Re: [Summary for 4 Feb.] (13 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Securit) Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAI
P2 Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5)of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/04/1998
Re: [International Terrorism] (18 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(h)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(.S) of the PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITEE
DATE
02/05/1998
Re: [EU Visit] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIAJ
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRAJ
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) o f t h e PRAJ
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/10/1998
Re: [Algeria problems] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Aet - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAJ
b(8) Release would disclose infnrmation concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAJ
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRAJ
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/11/1998
Re: [EU Parliamentarians] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TI TLE
DATE
02/11/1998
Re: [Observations 1997-1998] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
SUBJECT-TITLE
DATE
Re: Algeria: Democracy and Human Rights (4 pages)
02/11/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) nf the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe KOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Oil. cable
DATE
Re: [Algerian Forces] (5 pages)
02/12/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)I
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRAI
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PR A]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TVPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/16/1998
Re: [Counterinsurgency] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical infnrmation
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [NSC Riedel Meeting] (3 pages)
02/17/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/17/1998
Re: [European Union Delegations] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacres...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[02/02/1998 - 02/17/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe KOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRAI
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
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2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
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Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[02/02/1998-01/17/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-007-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/15bf7daab2269a40db8aea80480ba4aa.pdf
dfedf2cbd29bdbae0e52315755db2a7e
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
001. cable
Re: Secretary's Morning Summary for 1/22/1998 (13 pages)
01/22/1998
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Algeria Situation] (3 pages)
01/22/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
RE: [Algerian Forces] (4 pages)
01/23/1998
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/26/1998
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [European Union] (6 pages)
01/27/1998
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Negotiations] (5 pages)
01/27/1998
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Forecast] (6 pages)
01/27/1998
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Discussions] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Meeting] (2 pages)
01/28/1998
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [Debriefing] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
012. cable
Re: [GIA] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [Debriefing] (5 pages)
01/30/1998
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Gable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO:
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA1814 0220226-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 220221Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
220221Z JAN 98
SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMRE/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY T B I L I S I IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0000
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VALYHINGEN GE//ECPA PRIORITY
RUEHLZ/AMCONSUL LEIPZIG PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG PRIORITY 0000
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE JANUARY 21, 1998
TEXT:
UNCLAS STATE 011814
PLEASE PASS TO ALL PAOS USIA PASS TO EEN AND WEU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE -
JANUARY 21, 1998
1.
THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED AND
APPROVED BY THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN
AFFAIRS AND OTHER SELECTED BUREAUS HANDLING ISSUES OF
INTEREST TO EUR POSTS FOR THE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING.
QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO LARRY CORWIN, EUR
POLICY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
TOPICS INCLUDE:
Page 1 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
BOSNIA:
NEW BOSNIA CURRENCY
BOSNIA:
APPREHENSION OF WAR CRIMINALS
ITALY:
DEATH OF ANGLICAN PRIEST IN MILAN, ITALY
SCANDINAVIA:
D/S TALBOTT'S ITINERARY
CZECH REPUBLIC:
RE-ELECTION OF CZECH PRESIDENT HAVEL
ALGERIA:
RESULTS OF EU TROIKA MISSION
2. BOSNIA:
NEW BOSNIA CURRENCY
Q:
DO YOU SUPPORT HIGH REPRESENTATIVE WESTENDORP'S
DECISION TO IMPOSE A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
A:
--
YES, WE DO.
-- THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE WAS GRANTED THE AUTHORITY
TO IMPOSE INTERIM BINDING DECISIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AT THE BONN PLC MINISTERIAL
MEETING LAST DECEMBER.
-- THE OBJECTIVE OF THAT DECISION IS TO ENSURE THAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA MOVES FORWARD AND TO PREVENT ANY
PARTY FROM BLOCKING PROGRESS.
-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS MADE IT CLEAR
THAT I T WILL NOT ACCEPT POLITICAL GRIDLOCK AMONG THE
PARTIES TO UNDERMINE THE FORMATION OF A UNIFIED
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS
ENVISAGED AT DAYTON.
-- THE ISSUANCE OF A NATIONAL CURRENCY IS A CRITICAL
ELEMENT IN THE FORMATION OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT.
Q:
WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE PRINTING OF TWO
DIFFERENT VERSIONS?
A: -THE BOSNIAN NATIONAL CENTRAL BANK LAW, WHICH
WAS ENACTED LAST JULY, ALLOWS FOR DISTINCT ENTITY
ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN A SINGLE NATIONAL
CURRENCY.
THE COMMON ELEMENTS OF THE TWO DESIGNS
WILL HELP TO ENSURE THAT BOTH DESIGNS ARE CIRCULATED
THROUGHOUT BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.
3. APPREHENSION OF WAR CRIMINALS
Q:
HAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT MET WITH THE 20TH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE?
A: -SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT GELBARD AND
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES ISSUES DAVID
SCHEFFER HAD A LENGTHY MEETING WITH THE TASK FORCE ON
TUESDAY. WE UNDERSTAND THE TASK FORCE ALSO MET WITH
OFFICIALS AT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC.
Q:
WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE 20TH CENTURY FUND'S
REPORT CALLING FOR THE APPREHENSION OF INDICTED
Page 2 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
WAR CRIMINALS?
A:
-- JUSTICE IS ESSENTIAL TO BRINGING A LASTING
PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
HAVING WAR CRIMINALS
STAND TRIAL IN THE HAGUE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE
DAYTON PEACE PROCESS.
CLEARLY, THOUGH, MORE NEEDS TO
DONE.
AS THE SECRETARY SAID ON SUNDAY, "THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS ON WAR CRIMINALS DOES NOT RUN OUT, AND
THEIR DAY WILL COME."
THOSE INDICTEES WHO REMAIN AT LARGE, INCLUDING
RADOVAN KARADZIC AND RATKO MLADIC, MUST REALIZE THAT
THAT THERE ARE NO DEALS TO CUT; THAT THERE IS NO WAY
THEY CAN AVOID A FAIR TRIAL IN THE HAGUE.
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN THE LEADER IN BRINGING
WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
WE LED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE CROATIA TO
FACILITATE THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF 10 INDICTEES ON
OCTOBER 6, 1997. WE STRENGTHENED THE TRIBUNAL1S
RESOURCES SO IT COULD PROVIDE PROMPT TRIALS.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ANNOUNCED ON DECEMBER 16 THAT THE
UNITED STATES WAS CONTRIBUTING $1 MILLION TO THE COST
OF A MUCH-NEEDED NEW COURTROOM.
Q:
WHAT ABOUT THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO BRING
ABOUT ARRESTS?
A:
-- ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY HAS LONG BEEN AN
IMPORTANT PART OF U.S. POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, WE
CONTINUE TO LEAD IN THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE "OUTER
WALL" OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA UNTIL THEY MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON A
NUMBER OF IMPORTANT FRONTS, INCLUDING TURNING
INDICTEES OVER TO THE TRIBUNAL.
Q:
WHAT ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE TO BRING ABOUT
ARRESTS?
A:
—
SFOR'S POLICY REMAINS
INDICTEES MAY BE DETAINED WHEN
COURSE OF NORMAL OPERATIONS.
THIS TWICE.
WE ARE COMMITTED
THE SAME, THAT
ENCOUNTERED IN THE
SFOR FORCES HAVE DONE
TO KEEPING ALL OPTIONS
OPEN TO SEE INDICTEES RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL IN THE
HAGUE.
4.
Q:
ITALY:
DEATH OF ANGLICAN PRIEST IN MILAN, ITALY
WHAT DO YOU K O ABOUT THE BRUTAL MURDER OF AN
NW
AMERICAN ANGLICAN PRIEST AT A CHURCH IN MILAN,
ITALY?
A:
-- THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL.IN MILAN ITALY
INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE EARLY JANUARY 21,
1998 THAT A U.S. CITIZEN
(GREGORY STEVEN BEHEYDT) WAS
FOUND DEAD IN HIS APARTMENT IN MILAN THIS MORNING.
Page 3 of 6
�F:\Gable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
--THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN MILAN IS CLOSELY
MONITORING THE SITUATION AND IS WORKING WITH LOCAL
AUTHORITIES.
-- THE ITALIAN POLICE ARE ON THE SCENE AND ARE
ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING THE CASE.
-- OUR CONDOLENCES GO OUT TO HIS FAMILY FOR THEIR LOSS
--THE INVESTIGATION IS ONGOING.
WE HAVE NO
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.
5.
Q:
SCANDINAVIA:
D/S TALBOTT'S ITINERARY
WHAT IS STROBE TALBOTT DOING IN EUROPE?
A:
-- DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT IS TRAVELING IN
SCANDINAVIA THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN AND EUROATLANTIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION, AND PROMOTE OUR
NORTHEAST EUROPE INITIATIVE.
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY IS MEETING SENIOR
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN OSLO, STOCKHOLM, AND HELSINKI
ON THIS SUBJECT.
HE ALSO TRAVELED TO LULEA, SWEDEN,
TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE BARENTS COUNCIL
MINISTERIAL
(WHICH THE U.S. ATTENDS AS AN OBSERVER).
DURING HIS TRIP, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY PRESENTED
AN ADDRESS AT THE NOBEL INSTITUTE
ON U.S. POLICY IN
THE REGION.
HE IS ALSO SPEAKING AT THE PAASIVIKI
SOCIETY IN HELSINKI TODAY.
Q:
WHAT IS THE NORTHEAST EUROPE INITIATIVE?
A:
-- I T IS OUR POLICY OF WORKING WITH THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES, THE BALTICS, AND NORTH WESTERN RUSSIA,
TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, TO PROMOTE
GREATER COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION THROUGHOUT THE
REGION, AND D A THEM CLOSER INTO EUROPEAN AND EURORW
ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS.
6. CZECH REPUBLIC:
Q:
RE-ELECTION OF CZECH PRESIDENT
HAVEL
DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON YESTERDAY'S REELECTION OF CZECH PRESIDENT VACLAV HAVEL?
A:
--WE CONGRATULATE PRESIDENT HAVEL ON HIS REELECTION TO A SECOND TERM OF OFFICE.
FOR OVER FIVE
YEARS, PRESIDENT HAVEL'S LEADERSHIP HAS GUIDED THE
REINTEGRATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC INTO THE
DEMOCRATIC FAMILY OF NATIONS.
HAVEL HAS BEEN AN INSPIRATION TO ALL WHO SHARE
THE VALUES HE HAS SO ELOQUENTLY ESPOUSED THROUGHOUT
WHAT HAS BEEN A TRULY REMARKABLE TRANSITION.
WE WISH PRESIDENT HAVEL MUCH SUCCESS IN HIS
Page 4 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
Page 5 of 6
SECOND TERM, PARTICULARLY AS THE CZECH REPUBLIC
PREPARES FOR THE HISTORIC OCCASSION OF ACCESSION TO
NATO MEMBERSHIP.
?.
ALGERIA:
RESULTS OF EU TROIKA MISSION
Q:
ANY REACTION TO THE OUTCOME OF THE EU TROIKA'S
MISSION TO ALGERIA? WHAT ABOUT THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO A
UN HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR?
AS YOU KNOW, WE WELCOMED THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THIS VISIT.
-- MISSION LEADER UK MININISTER OF STATE DEREK
FACHETT SAID THE MISSION HAD MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS
SOME OF ITS GOALS: CONTINUING THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE
WITH THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT; DEMONSTRATING
SOLIDARITY WITH THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE FOR WHAT THEY ARE
SUFFERING; CONDEMNING TERRORISM; AND IMPROVING
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN ALGERIA.
WE SHARE THESE GOALS.
UNFORTUNATELY, I T DID NOT MAKE PROGRESS ON OTHER
GOALS, INCLUDING GREATER OPENNESS.
YOU CAN ASK THE EU FOR FURTHER DETAILS
I WOULD JUST ADD THAT I T IS IN THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST TO ALLOW A HIGH DEGREE OF
OPENNESS, SO THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN GET
A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN ALGERIA.
AS FOR A VISIT BY A UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, WE
SUPPORT SUCH A VISIT AND ENCOURAGE THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT TO FACILITATE I T .
IF ASKED ONLY:
Q:
DID AMB. HUME VISIT ONE SITE OF MASSACRES?
DID HE CONCLUDE?
WHAT
AMB. HUME VISITED SIDI HAMED, THE SITE OF A
RECENT MASSACRE,
ON JANUARY 17. WE APPRECIATE THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S COOPERATION IN THIS VISIT.
IT WILL HELP US GAIN A CLEARER PICTURE OF RECENT
EVENTS.
WE ARE NOT GOING TO OFFER CONCLUSIONS BASED ON A
ONE-VISIT SNAPSHBT.
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT, AMB. HUME
EXPRESSED U.S. CONDEMNATION OF THE MASSACRES,
SYMPATYHY WITH THE VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND
OUR HOPE THAT ALL ALGERIANS WILL WORK TOGETHER TO -
�F:\Gable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3114029.html
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
OVERCOME THIS CRISIS.
ALBRIGHT
SECTION: 01 OF 01
1814
980121212918 M3114029
SIT: NSC
Page 6 of 6
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: Secretary's Moming Summary for 1/22/1998 (13 pages)
01/22/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2096
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Informntion Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRM
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/22/1998
Re: [Algeria Situation] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
1 2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
*
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RE: [Algerian Forces] (4 pages)
01/23/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe KOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between Ihe President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/26/1998
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Aet -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a F ederal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe F'OIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose infnrmation compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Re: [European Union] (6 pages)
01/27/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/27/1998
Re: [Negotiations] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/27/1998
Re: [Forecast] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Aet - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(I) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Discussions] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Aet - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(bK9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 100(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release w ould constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Meeting] (2 pages)
01/28/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 l .S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/28/1998
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Securit)' Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRAj
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
Oil. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Debriefing] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) oftheFOIAI
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Securit}' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment tn Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [GIA] (4 pages)
01/28/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Seeuritj Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
P2 Relating lo the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
PJ Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
Pf) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Debriefing] (5 pages)
01/30/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/22/1998 - 01/30/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Seeuritj Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[01/22/1998-01/30/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-006-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/a8c65b01ab189f1bd6e95c0063579f37.pdf
cdf1d7c1e4d3d923823ad835866c9516
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
S U B. JE CT/T TIT. E
DATE
001. cable
Re: [Algeria's Security Situation] (5 pages)
01/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Algeria Massacres] (4 pages)
01/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Cable 14 Jan 98] (3 pages)
01/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Summary for 15 Jan] (12 pages)
01/15/1998
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [Summary for 15 Jan.] (11 pages)
01/15/1998
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/17/1998
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/17/1998
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: Algeria - Visit to Massacre Site (4 pages)
01/18/1998
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Meeting] (2 pages)
01/19/1998
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [GIA Violence] (4 pages)
01/20/1998
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [Humanitarian Assistance] (4 pages)
01/20/1998
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [Summary for 21 Jan] (11 pages)
01/21/1998
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [EU Mission] (2 pages)
01/21/1998
Pl/b(l)
DOCUMEN T NO.
AND TYPE
RESTRICTION
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating In the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(A) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA)
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RE: [Sidi Hamed Attack] (5 pages)
01/21/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
PI
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of Ihe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
. b( I) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOI A]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/14/1998
Re: [Algeria's Security Situation] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/14/1998
Re: [Algeria Massacres] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Reeords Acl -1-44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Securit)'Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
IM Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Cable 14 Jan 98] (3 pages)
01/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Re: [Summary for 15 Jan] (12 pages)
01/15/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-]ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) nf the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 15 Jan.] (11 pages)
01/15/1998
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(]) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6)ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/17/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Seeuritj Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA)
Pd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/17/1998
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
P\fb(\)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
h(X) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: Algeria - Visit to Massacre Site (4 pages)
01/18/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 22()4(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthcFOlA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(K) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Page 1 of 3
F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110252.html
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SUBJ:
ROUTINE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000263
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GNEG, B/VOA/ AND NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ENA AND 3EA/PPR
WHITE HOUSE FOR LEBARON AND GRUMMON
LONDON FOR POL-TUELLER AND IO
PARIS FOR POL-LEAF AND ARS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PREL, PHUM, SCUL, AG
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION:
UN. AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO SIDI HAMED
INTRODUCTION
1. AMBASSADOR CAMERON HUME'S JANUARY 17 VISIT TO SIDI
HAMED, WHERE OVER 100 ALGERIANS WERE KILLED LAST WEEK,
RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE IN THE ALGERIAN PRESS. THE
GO"ERNMENT 9D INDEPENDENT PRESS REPORTED THAT
AMBASSADOR HUME'S VISIT REFLECTED AMERICA'S CONCERN
AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE.
SOME INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS CLAIMED THAT AMBASSADOR
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110252.html
HUME WAS ASKED TO GIVE A 24-HOUR NOTICE TO THE
AUTHORITIES BEFORE THE VISIT, THUS ENABLING THEM TO
SELECT THE PEOPLE TO W O HE MIGHT SPEAK, HOPING IN
HM
THIS WAY THAT THEY WOULD ARGUE AGAINST FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE.
2. THE INQPENDENT FRENCH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS--EL
WATAN, LE MATIN, LIBERTE, AND LA TRIBUNE--ALL RAN
LENGTHY FRONT-PAGE REPORTS WITH PICTURES OF THE
AMBASSADOR'S VISIT. ANOTHER REPORT APPEARED ON PAGE
THREE OF L'AUTHENTIQUE, AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH-LANGUAGE
DAILY KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR,
GENERAL MOHAMED BETCHINE (RETIRED). EL MOUDJAHID, THE
FRENCH-LANGUAGE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED ITS
REPORT OF THE VISIT ON PAGE FIVE OF THE JOURNAL.
QUOTES
3.
"THE EMOTIONS OF DIPLOMATS," READ A JANUARY 18
FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE IN "EL WATAN," A FRENCH-LANGUAGE
INDEPENDENT DAILY.
4.
"THE CHIEF OF THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN
ALGIERS VISITED SIDI HAMED YESTERDAY, WHERE HUNDREDS
OF VICTIMS WERE KILLED IN A HORRIBLE TERRORIST
MASSAZRE,.... IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE
SITUATION AND THE REAL CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE
MASSACRE. ACCOMPANIED BY A REINFORCED SECURITY DETAIL
AND DISREGARDING OFFQIAL DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS,
U.S. AMBASSADOR CAMERON HUME WANTED TO ESTABLISH CLOSE
CONTACT WITH THE POPULATION, THE SURVIVORS OF THE
CARNAGE, 'TO SEE AND K O MORE', AS HE PUT I T .
NW
AMBASSADOR HUME DID NOT CONTENT HIMSELF WITH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE SURVIVORS AND THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE
SECURITY SERVICE, BUT ALSO ASKED MANY QUESTIONS....
WHAT KIND OF BOMB WAS IT? WHERE WAS I T PLACED? DID
THE TERRORISTS SELECT THE FAMILIES? AT WHAT TIME DID
THEY COME? H W LONG WERE THEY IN EACH HOUSE? WHEN THE
O
COMMANDANT OF THE GENDARMERIE TOLD HIM THE OPERATION
LASTED 22 MINUTES, AMBASSADOR HUME, HESITATING FOR A
MOMENT AS I F TO EXPRESS DOUBT, ASKED, ' O DO WE K O
HW
NW
THAT I T WAS 22 MINUTES'. THE AMBASSADOR, COMMENTING
TO AN ASSISTANT ON THE VERSIONS THAT HE HAD HEARD OF
WHAT TOOK PLACE, EMPLOYED THE HEAVILY-LADEN PHRASE,
' H KNOWS' (IN ENGLISH IN THE ARTICLE)."
WO
5. "THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS," READ A JANUARY 18
FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE IN "LIBERTE", A FRENCH-LANGUAGE
INDEPENDENT DAILY CLOSE TO THE RCD PARTY, THE RALLY
FOR CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY.
6.
"ASKED TO MAKE A DECLARATION AT THE END OF HIS
VISIT, AMBASSADHR HUME EXCUSED HIMSELF AND SAID: ' I
AM NOT HERE TO MAKE A PRESS DECLARATION.' HE MATF NO
DECLARATION, BUT WAS DISTRESSED BY WHAT HE SAW AND
HEARD, AS TESTIFIED BY A WHISPER TO ONE OF HIS
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110252.html
COLLEAGUES: 'IT'S A HAIR-RAISING STORY.' SOME
VILLAGERS, WHO WERE UPSET, CLAIMED THAT THE PERSONS WHO
ANSWERED THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DESIGNATED
THE DAY BEFORE BY OFFICIALS.
7. "TOTAL RESPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY, READ A JANUARY 18
ARTICLE IN "EL MOUDJAHID," THE FRENCH-LANGUAGE DAILY
GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER.
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
8. "YESTERDAY, DURING A VISIT TO SIDI HAMED, THE U.S.
!AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS, CAMERON HUME, EXPRESSED HIS
COUNTRY'S TOTAL REJECTION AND CONDUNATION OF THE
SECTION: 01 OF 02
0263
980119042727 M3110252
SIT: NSC
Page 3 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110251.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO:
SUBJ:
ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
RAAUZYUW RUEHASA0263 0190923-UUUU —RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190923Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEHAS
190923Z JAN 98
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3317JHNFO RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0958
RUCNALG/ALGERIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9424
////
MEDIA REACTION:
Un. AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO SIDI HAMED
INTRODUCTION
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000263
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GNEG, B/VOA/ AND NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ENA AND 3EA/PPR
WHITE HOUSE FOR LEBARON AND GRUMMON
LONDON FOR POL-TUELLER AND IO
PARIS FOR POL-LEAF AND ARS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PREL, PHUM, SCUL, AG
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION:
Un. AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO SIDI HAMED
INTRODUCTION
1. AMBASSADOR CAMERON HUME'S JANUARY 17 VISIT TO SIDI
HAMED, WHERE OVER 100 ALGERIANS WERE KILLED LAST WEEK,
RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE IN THE ALGERIAN PRESS. THE
GO"ERNMENT 9D INDEPENDENT PRESS REPORTED THAT
AMBASSADOR HUME'S VISIT REFLECTED AMERICA'S CONCERN
AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE.
SOME INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS CLAIMED THAT AMBASSADOR
HUME WAS ASKED TO GIVE A 24-HOUR NOTICE TO THE
AUTHORITIES BEFORE THE VISIT, THUS ENABLING THEM TO
SELECT THE PEOPLE TO W O HE MIGHT SPEAK, HOPING IN
HM
Page 1 of3
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110251 .html
THIS WAY THAT THEY WOULD ARGUE AGAINST FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE.
2. THE INQPENDENT FRENCH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS--EL
WATAN, LE MATIN, LIBERTE, AND LA TRIBUNE--ALL RAN
LENGTHY FRONT-PAGE REPORTS WITH PICTURES OF THE
AMBASSADOR'S VISIT. ANOTHER REPORT APPEARED ON PAGE
THREE OF L'AUTHENTIQUE, AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH-LANGUAGE
DAILY KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR,
GENERAL MOHAMED BETCHINE (RETIRED). EL MOUDJAHID, THE
FRENCH-LANGUAGE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED ITS
REPORT OF THE VISIT ON PAGE FIVE OF THE JOMRNAL.
QUOTES
3. "THE EMOTIONS OF DIPLOMATS," READ A JANUARY 18
FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE IN "EL WATAN," A FRENCH-LANGUAGE
INDEPENDENT DAILY.
4. "THE CHIEF OF THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN
ALGIERS VISITED SIDI HAMED YESTERDAY, WHERE HUNDREDS
OF VICTIMS WERE KILLED IN A HORRIBLE TERRORIST
MASSAZRE, .... IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE
SITUATION AND THE REAL CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE
MASSACRE. ACCOMPANIED BY A REINFORCED SECURITY DETAIL
AND DISREGARDING OFFQIAL DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS,
U.S. AMBASSADOR CAMERON HUME WANTED TO ESTABLISH CLOSE
CONTACT WITH THE POPULATION, THE SURVIVORS OF THE
CARNAGE, 'TO SEE AND K O MORE', AS HE PUT I T .
NW
AMBASSADOR HUME DID NOT CONTENT HIMSELF WITH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE SURVIVORS AND THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE
SECURITY SERVICE, BUT ALSO ASKED MANY QUESTIONS....
WHAT KIND OF BOMB WAS IT? WHERE WAS I T PLACED? DID
THE TERRORISTS SELECT THE FAMILIES? AT WHAT TIME DID
THEY COME? H W LONG WERE THEY IN EACH HOUSE? WHEN THE
O
COMMANDANT OF THE GENDARMERIE TOLD HIM THE OPERATION
LASTED 22 MINUTES, AMBASSADOR HUME, HESITATING FOR A
MOMENT AS I F TO EXPRESS DOUBT, ASKED, ' O DO WE K O
HW
NW
THAT I T WAS 22 MINUTES'. THE AMBASSADOR, COMMENTING
TO AN ASSISTANT ON THE VERSIONS THAT HE HAD HEARD OF
WHAT TOOK PLACE, EMPLOYED THE HEAVILY-LADEN PHRASE,
' H KNOWS' (IN ENGLISH IN THE ARTICLE)."
WO
5.
"THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS," READ A JANUARY 18
FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE IN "LIBERTE", A FRENCH-LANGUAGE
INDEPENDENT DAILY CLOSE TO THE RCD PARTY, THE RALLY
FOR CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY.
6.
"ASKED TO MAKE A DECLARATION AT THE END OF HIS
VISIT, AMBASSADHR HUME EXCUSED HIMSELF AND SAID: ' I
AM NOT HERE TO MAKE A PRESS DECLARATION.' HE MAtF NO
DECLARATION, BUT WAS DISTRESSED BY WHAT HE SAW AND
HEARD, AS TESTIFIED BY A WHISPER TO ONE OF HIS
COLLEAGUES: 'IT'S A HAIR-RAISING STORY.' SOME
VILLAGERS, WHO WERE UPSET, CLAIMED THAT THE PERSONS WHO
ANSWERED THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DESIGNATED
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3110251 .html
THE DAY BEFORE BY OFFICIALS.
7. "TOTAL RESPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY, READ A JANUARY 18
ARTICLE IN "EL MOUDJAHID," THE FRENCH-LANGUAGE DAILY
GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER.
8. "YESTERDAY, DURING A VISIT TO SIDI HAMED, THE U.S,
|AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS, CAMERON HUME, EXPRESSED HIS
COUNTRY'S TOTAL REJECTION AND CONDuNATION OF THE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ALGIERS 000263
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, I/GNEA, B/VOA/N AND NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ENA AND NEA/PPR
WHITE HOUSE FOR LEBARON AND GRUMMON
LONDON FOR POL-TUELLER AND IO
PARIS FOR POL-LEAF AND ARS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PREL, PHUM, SCUL, AG
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION:
U.S. AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO SIDI HAMED
TERRORIST CRIMES PERPETRATED IN ALGERIA."
GREGOIR
E
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 0263
OSSN>0263
TOR: 980119042705 M3110251
< TOR>980119042458 M3110246
A
A
DIST:
SIT: COUNTRYMAN
SIT: NSC
Page 3 of 3
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/19/1998
Re: [Meeting] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PKA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/20/1998
Re: [GIA Violence] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(H)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
011. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/20/1998
Re: [Humanitarian Assistance] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(I)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices nf
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidcnlial commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/21/1998
Re: [Summary for 21 Jan] (11 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 100(1) ofthe PRA|
1 2 Relating lo the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
*
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe F'OIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning (he regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/21/1998
Re: [EU Mission] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-?
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
SUBJECITTHLE
DATE
RE: [Sidi Hamed Attack] (5 pages)
01/21/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/14/1998 - 01/21/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act -15 U.S.C. SS2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b ( l ) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A ]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[01/14/1998-01/21/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-005-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/20c1aa2df45a76f465027161a46cb76b.pdf
c728fb7deb8628c8b5b9f232d5dc6c83
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [AntarZouabri] (5 pages)
01/08/1998
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [GIA] (4 pages)
01/08/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: Secretary's Morning Summary for 1/9/98 (13 pages)
01/09/1998
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
01/11/1998
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [EU Visit] (2 pages)
01/11/1998
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Update for 11 January 1998] (9 pages)
01/12/1998
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Update for 11 January 1998] (14 pages)
01/12/1998
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Summary for 12 Jan] (9 pages)
01/12/1998
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Summary for 12 Jan] (7 pages)
01/12/1998
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: End-of-Year Update for 1997 Human Rights Report on Algeria (5
pages)
01/13/1998
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [EU Initiative] (4 pages)
01/13/1998
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [Situation] (6 pages)
01/13/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment tn Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(h)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/08/1998
Re: [Antar Zouabri] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
I ' i Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAI
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAJ
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIAJ
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAJ
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAJ
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [GIA] (4 pages)
01/08/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classided Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P(> Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6)of the PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECirHTLE
DATE
Re: Secretary's Moming Summary for 1/9/98 (13 pages)
01/09/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P t Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
C
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(h)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(h)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3098489.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINES:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHROA0135 00 9164 5-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 091645Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
RUEHRO
091645Z JAN 98
AMEMBASSY ROME
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0331
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0013
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0002
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0058
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0006
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0019
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0001
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0002
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0001
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0011
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0002
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0006
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0011
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0009
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0006
RUEHXQ/ALL EUROPEAN UNION POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 0051
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0081
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0064
ITALIAN FM DINI ON ALGERIA, IRANIAN
VIEWS ON TERRORISM
ITALIAN FM DINI COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON ALGERIA IN
STATEMENTS ON TV AND TO THE PRESS JANUARY 7 AND
TEXT:
UNCLAS ROME 000135
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EUN, X I , AG, IR, IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN FM DINI ON ALGERIA, IRANIAN
VIEWS ON TERRORISM
ITALIAN FM DINI COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON ALGERIA IN
STATEMENTS ON TV AND TO THE PRESS JANUARY 7 AND
8, AND IN A JANUARY 8 SPEECH ON KURDISH
IMMIGRATION BEFORE THE ITALIAN SENATE. DINI
CHARACTERIZED THE KILLINGS IN ALGERIA AS "AN
ENDLESS, UNACCEPTABLE MADNESS." HE TOLD
JOURNALISTS HE HAD SPOKEN WITH IRANIAN FM KAMAL
KHARRAZI OVER THE TELEPHONE JANUARY 7. ACCORDING
TO DINI, IRAN HAS CONDEMNED TERRORISM AND, AS
CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE,
Page 1 of 2
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3098489.html
INTENDS USING ITS "POWER OF INITIATIVE" TO STOP
THE KILLINGS. A SAMPLE OF DINI'S STATEMENTS
FOLLOWS:
-- \ E CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO CRIMES
W
AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED ON THEIR OWN SOIL BY
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT
BEFORE THIS MASSACRE." (SENATE SPEECH)
-- RECENT NEWS OF A FUTURE EU TROIKA VISIT TO
ALGERIA IS "ENCOURAGING" AND OPENS "POSSIBILITIES
FOR DIALOGUE. IT WILL ALLOW THE EU TO LISTEN TO
THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT POSITION AND SEE HOW TO
MOVE IN AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT
SITUATION." (TO JOURNALISTS, JANUARY 8)
-- "THE EU OFFERED COOPERATION IN ASSISTING THE
ALGERIAN POPULATION HIT BY TERRORISM; THIS
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED INTERFERENCE IN ALGERIA'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS." (TO JOURNALISTS, JANUARY 8)
—
"ALGERIA IS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY." NEITHER
THE EU NOR THE U.N. CAN INTERVENE OR SEND TROOPS
TO ALGERIA, "BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE INTERFERENCE.
WE CAN ONLY TRY TO CONVINCE" THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT OF WHAT TO DO.
(ON TV, JANUARY 7)
-- "ISLAMIC COUNTRIES -- AND IRAN IS AN ISLAMIC,
FUNDAMENTALIST COUNTRY — HAVE GREATER ACCESS
THAN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES."
(ON TV, JANUARY 7)
-- "IRAN RECENTLY CONDEMNED TERRORISM AND
CONTINUES TO CONDEMN IT EXPLICITLY. IRAN IS
CURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF T%~HSLAMIC CONFERENCE AND
THEREFORE HAS A POWER OF INITIATIVE WHICH IT
INTENDS TO USE WITH ALGERIA." (TO JOURNALISTS,
JANUARY 8)
FOGLIETTA
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 0135
TOR: 980109114935 M3098489
DIST:
SIT: NSC
Page 2 of 2
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCl'MENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/11/1998
Re: [Meeting] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Acl -144 l .S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformalion Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning w ells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Securit) Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [EU Visit] (2 pages)
01/11/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIAJ
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAJ
National Securit) Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
HOCUiMEM NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECI7nn.E
DATE
Re: [Update for 11 January 1998] (9 pages)
01/12/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe F01A|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Update for 11 January 1998] (14 pages)
01/12/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [S U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release w ould disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would conslitutc a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)((>) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TVPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
01/12/1998
Re: [Summary for 12 Jan] (9 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |4-4 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating lo the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 12 Jan] (7 pages)
01/12/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAI
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAJ
b(M) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe KOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAJ
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release w ould violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unw arranted invasion of
personal privacy ((a)(6) of Ihe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: End-of-Year Update for 1997 Human Rights Report on Algeria (5
pages)
01/13/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Seeuritj Classified Information |(a)(]) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(.S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices nf
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3103228.html
Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHNEA0299 0140320-UUUU—RHEHAAX.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 131010Z JAN 98 ZDK CTG NUM SVCS H ALL
W
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHNE
131010Z JAN 98
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0182
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0863
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
RUESFG/FBIS BANGKOK TH
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0203
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0209
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0131
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0240
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0212
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0169
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0431
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O 0109
OCW
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0109
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0125
MEDIA REACTION U.S.-IRAN/IRAQ ALGERIA
TEXT:
I/111111111111111111/111
INCOMPLETE MESSAGE
/11111/11111111111111111
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000299
USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TGI, I/RF, I/TIC, I/GNEA, I/REC,
I/RW,
STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR CODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY
USUN ALSO FOR CHUCK MAST
PASS AGRICULTURE FOR FAS/ITP EPURDY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PREL, IN
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION U.S.-IRAN/IRAQ ALGERIA
ARE TRUE.... THE REGION'S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE HAS
SHIFTED RADICALLY. ONLY THE AGILE WILL REMAIN
RELEVANT. MR. KHATAMI REFLECTS A MINDSET THAT
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3103228.html
RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO CHANGE: AN ACCEPTANCE THAT THE
ISLAMIC STATE IS NOT WORKING, THAT ANTI-AMERICANISM
CANNOT BE A SOURCE OF NATIONAL PROGRESS. MR. NETANYAHU
IS STRUGGLING, THOUGH MORE OUT OF POLITICAL
SPINELESSNESS THAN PERSONAL COMMITMENT, TO TURN BACK THE
WHEEL. THE THIRD PARTY THAT NEEDS TO CHANGE ITS OUTLOOK
IS THE US. WASHINGTON N W BLAMES ALL ITS ILLS ON IRAN.
O
ITS TRADE SANCTIONS DO IT MORE HARM THAT TEHERAN
WASHINGTON WOULD DO WELL TO BETTER ITS DEADPAN
RESPONSE. THE OIC SUMMIT'S TURNOUT WAS ALSO A STATEMENT
OF H W FEW REGIONAL TAKERS THERE ARE THESE DAYS FOR THE
O
DUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS
A NEED TO MAKE I T CLEAR... THAT WASHINGTON HAS LITTLE OR
NO CONFIDENCE IN MR. NETANYAHU. IN WEST ASIA, TIMES ARE
CHANGING -- AND POLICIES NEED TO FOLLOW SUIT."
--"NO LET-UP IN U.S.-IRAQ SPARRING," ANALYSIS IN JANUARY
13 CENTRIST THE HINDU BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
SRIDHAR KRISHNASWAMI:
"THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE
HEAT OFF IRAQ ON THE WEAPONS INSPECTION ISSUE. MUCH
DEPENDS ON THE VISIT OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTION CHIEF,
RICHARD BUTLER TO BAGHDAD NEXT WEEK AND HIS REPORT TO
THE SECURITY COUNCIL.... THE ISSUE OF WEAPONS
INSPECTIONS IS NOT GOING TO BE RESOLVED EASILY FOR THE
SIMPLE REASON THAT BOTH WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD ARE FAR
FROM AGREEING ON THE EXACT LIST OF SITES.... THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, IN BRUSHING ASIDE THE CONTENT IN
THAT ITS HARDLINE POLICY ON SANCTIONS IS ACTUALLY
PARALYSING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE
'UNDERCUTTING' ITS AUTHORITY BY GIVING IRAQ A BREAK....
"WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT COUNTRIES LIKE FRANCE AND
RUSSIA HAVE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS IN IRAQ, THE U.S. HAS
POINTED OUT THAT SANCTIONS DID NOT INCLUDE FOOD OR
MEDICINES.... THE REFRAIN OF U.S. OFFICIALS AT THE UN
IS THAT IRAQ HAS CHOSEN NOT TO TAKE CARE OF ITS OWN
PEOPLE AND THAT THE LEADERSHIP IN BAGHDAD WAS KEEN ON
RETAINING POWER."
2. ALGERIA
--"ISLAM AND THE GENOCIDE IN ALGERIA," EDIT-PAGE ARTICLE
BY FEATURE EDITOR GOVIND SINGH IN JANUARY 12 HINDI
DAILY NAVBHARAT TIMES:
"THE WORLD HAS SEEN MANY FORMS OF TERRORISM,
ALTHOUGH NONE HAS SHAKEN IT LIKE ISLAMIC TERRORISM....
IN THE LAST SIX YEARS ALONE, AROUND 80,000 HAVE BEEN
SLAIN IN ALGERIA. SIGNIFICANTLY, THOSE WHO DIED WERE
NONE OTHERS THAN FOLLOWERS OF ISLAM. I T SEEMS STRANGE,
THEREFORE, THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TURNS A BLIND EYE
TO SUCH SITUATIONS AND SEES HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ONLY
IN KASHMIR. THE FACT IS THAT WHEN IT COMES TO TACKLING
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3103228.html
REAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM, THEY ARE HELPLESS.... THE
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAS URGED THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE U.S. TO MAKE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. OTHER THAN FRANCE AND GERMANY,
HOWEVER, NONE HAVE SHOWN MUCH INTEREST. WESTERN NATIONS
ARE ONLY STIRRED INTO ACTION WHEN THEIR OWN PEOPLE ARE
AFFECTED. THE PLIGHT OF THE THIRD WORLD DOES NOT MOVE
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000299
USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TGI, I/RF, I/TIC, I/GNEA, I/REC,
I/RW,
STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR CODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY
USUN ALSO FOR CHUCK MAST
PASS AGRICULTURE FOR FAS/ITP EPURDY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PREL, IN
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION U.S.-IRAN/IRAQ ALGERIA
THEM....
"A MAJOR FACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR ISLAMIC TERRORISM IS
THE INHERENT FEAR IN ISLAM THAT WESTERN VALUES ARE
CORRODING ITS OWN. THE WEST, ON THE OTHER HAND, CREATED
ITS OWN MONSTER BY USING ISLAM AS A SHIELD AGAINST
COMMUNISM.... BUT N W THE WEST HAS WOKEN UP TO THE
O
THREAT OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM. THE SAME AMERICA WHICH
USED TO HELP ISLAMIC RADICALS IS N W TALKING OF
O
CONTAINING THEM. ITS LIST OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
RELEASED LAST OCTOBER FEATURES MANY ISLAMIC TERRORIST
OUTFITS. SENSE HAS PREVAILED AT LONG LAST!"
--"ALGERIA IN A TIME OF MASSACRE" EDITPAGE ARTICLE IN
JANUARY 12 CENTRIST THE TELEGRAPH BY COLUMNIST A.N.D.
HAKSAR FROM CALCUTTA:
"AS THE VIOLENCE ESCALATED, HAWKS AND DOVES...ARE
PONDERING AN EVENTUAL ISLAMICIST TAKEOVER.... THIS COULD
HAPPEN IN THREE WAYS. ONE, A GRADUAL ISLAMICIST
ASCENDANCY FOLLOWING A TACTICAL POWERSHARING COMPROMISE
WITH THE GOVERNMENT. TWO, A FRAGMENTING OF ALGERIA WITH
SOME PARTS UNDER ISLAMIC CONTROL. THREE, A GOVERNMENTAL
COLLAPSE, AS HAPPENED IN IRAN. AN ISLAMIC
REGIME...WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE
1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION.... THIS COULD DESTABILIZE
MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, UNDERMINE SOUTH EUROPE'S SECURITY
AND AFFECT US INTERESTS.... THE WEST SHOULD
WHOLEHEARTEDLY BACK ALGIERS. UNTIL RECENTLY THE US,
FRANCE AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE DOING JUST THAT. BUT
CALLS FOR PEACE MISSIONS AND SIMILAR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
POLICIES POINT TO A NEW, UNSTATED WESTERN POLICY OF
PROMOTING POWER SHARING." WARD
SECT: SECTION: 03 OF 04
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3103228.html
A
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
SSN: 0299
< SSN>0299
TOR: 980113225511 M3103228
< TOR>980113225511 M3103229
A
A
DIST:
SIT: NSC
Page 4 of 4
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPF.
011. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Re: [EU Initiative] (4 pages)
01/13/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Aet - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe I O I A ]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the EOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information ((a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SU BJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/13/1998
Re: [Situation] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[01/08/1998 - 01/13/1998]
2009-1295-1ke2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[01/08/1998-01/13/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-004-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6d9743acb99f8d2795023d2a4a8b7cfe.pdf
a339ecd451148004e7ce948bd9b05dd5
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [Situation in Algeria] (6 pages)
11/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Algeria Human Rights] (2 pages)
11/05/1997
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Summary for 4 Dec] (13 pages)
12/04/1997
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Summary for 4 Dec] (11 pages)
12/04/1997
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [Conversation] (3 pages)
12/09/1997
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Algerian Government] (3 pages)
12/16/1997
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Algeria's Security Situation] (4 pages)
12/31/1997
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Summary for 03 Jan 98] (5 pages)
01/03/1998
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Relizane Massacre] (3 pages)
01/04/1998
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [Ambassador's Meeting] (4 pages)
01/05/1998
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [Public Statements] (3 pages)
01/06/1998
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [Call for International Inquiry] (3 pages)
01/06/1998
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [Armed Islamic Group] (4 pages)
01/06/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(I) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAI
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2)of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
014. cable
Re: Lst Quarter Status Report - Algiers (11 pages)
01/07/1998
Pl/b(l)
015. cable
Re: [Expectations] (2 pages)
01/07/1998
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-r
kc2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [-44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the F'OIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECTATITLE
DATE
1/03/1997
Re: [Situation in Algeria] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(]) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe KOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
1/05/1997
Re: [Algeria Human Rights] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom oflnformation Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)l
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
National Seeuritj Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office | ( ) ( ) otttie PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
a
2
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD028\NOV97\MSGS\M3047940.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINES
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ
TEXT
ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
RAAUZYUW RUEHASA4504 3341457-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301457Z NOV 97
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEHAS
301457Z NOV 97
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
SECSTATE WASHDC 9120
////
ALGERIA: 1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 004504
S/CT FOR REAP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REF: STATE 203771
FOLLOWING IS POST'S SUBMISSION FOR THE ANNUAL
TERRORISM REPORT. THE ANSWERS ARE PROVIDED IN THE
SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS ARE POSED IN REFTEL.
A) IN 1997, TERRORISTS CONTINUED TO COMMIT ATROCITIES
DAILY IN ALGERIA. THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT PROSECUTED
NUMEROUS CASES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH COMMITTING
TERRORIST ACTS OR SUPPORTING TERRORIST GROUPS IN
1997. IN NOVEMBER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALGIERS COURT
SENTENCED TO DEATH IN ABSENTIA TWENTY DEFENDANTS ON
CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN A FEBRUARY 1994 INCIDENT
INVOLVING A CLANDESTINE ARMS SHIPMENT TO THE
TERRORIST ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA). IN THE SAME
TRIAL, EIGHTEEN MORE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED JAIL
SENTENCES AND EIGHT WERE ACQUITTED. IN ADDITION,
CONVICTIONS ON CHARGES OF AIDING TERRORIST GROUPS
USUALLY CARRIED PRISON SENTENCES RANGING FROM FIVE TO
TWENTY YEARS.
TO DIMINISH THE STRENGTH OF ALGERIAN TERRORIST
GROUPS, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED ITS LIMITED CLEMENCY
PROGRAM. MEMBERS OF TERRORIST GROUPS WHO SURRENDERED
THEMSELVES TO THE AUTHORITIES RECEIVED TWENTY-YEAR
PRISON SENTENCES INSTEAD OF THE DEATH SENTENCE I F
THEY HAD COMMITTED MURDERS; THOSE INDIVIDUALS GUILTY
OF BEING MEMBERS OF TERRORIST GROUPS RECEIVED SHORTER
PRISON SENTENCES THAN NORMALLY PRESCRIBED. SOME
MEMBERS OF GROUPS WHO HAD NO PERwONAL CONNECTION TO
Page 1 of 4
�F:\CabIe\Data_Source\Cables\CD028\NOV97\MSGS\M3047940.html
ACTS OF VIOLENCE, INCLUDING TWO PROMINENT MEMBERS OF
THE BANNED ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT ( F I S ) , WERE
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN JULY.
THERE WERE NO ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST OR DIRECTLY
AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.
B) THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS HAD LONGSTANDING
REQUESTS TO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS FOR THE EXTRADITION
OF ALGERIAN ISLAMISTS CHARGED WITH COMMITTING
TERRORIST OFFENSES IN ALGERIA. THERE WERE NO REPORTS
OF NEW EXTRADITION REQUESTS FILED IN 1997. LIKEWISE,
THERE WERE NO INSTANCES IN WHICH THE U.S. REQUESTED
EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE FROM ALGERIA IN TERRORIST
CASES.
C) THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS.
D) THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY DENOUNCED
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1997. FOLLOWING THE
MASSACRE OF 93 PEOPLE IN BLIDA IN APRIL, THE INTERIOR
MINISTER VISITED THE SITE TO SEE WHAT MEASURES WERE
BEING TAKEN TO CARE FOR THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.
IN MAY, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED A LIST OF FOUR
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF TERRORISTS AND THE REWARDS
THAT WOULD BE GIVEN FOR THEIR CAPTURE. THE
GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT ALGERIA SUFFERED
ONLY FROM "RESIDUAL" TERRORISM. IN THE FALL OF 1997
PRESIDENT ZEROUAL TRAVELED TO SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES,
INCLUDING OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SYRIA, USING HIS
VISITS TO ADDRESS, AMONG OTHER CONCERNS, THE ISSUE OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
E) THE GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN A COUNTRY-WIDE EFFORT
TO IDENTIFY AND ELIMINATE DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS.
THE ALGERIAN ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND THE DEFENSE
MINISTRY'S GENDARMERIE ARE INVOLVED IN THIS EFFORT.
THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RAISED ADDITIONAL
SECURITY FORCES, CALLED "COMMUNAL GUARDS," TO HELP
IMPROVE LOCAL SECURITY CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN
RURAL AREAS. IN JANUARY 1997, THE GOA ISSUED A
DECREE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZING THE PREVIOUSLY INFORMAL
"SELF-DEFENSE FORCES" (AKA "PATRIOTS") COMPOSED OF
VOLUNTEERS WHO MAN CHECKPOINTS OR PATROL THE ENVIRONS
OF THEIR VILLAGES USING ARMS PROVIDED BY THE
GOVERNMENT.
FOLLOWING THE CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS DURING RAMADAN IN
EARLY 1997, THE GOVERNMENT MOUNTED A MAJOR
COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION IN ALGIERS. A
COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION IN THE KABYLIE REGION IN
LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL OF 1997 RESULTED IN THE
DEATHS OF OVER 100 TERRORISTS, AND AN OPERATION IN
HATTATBA IN WESTERN ALGERIA RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF
OVER N
INETY TERRORISTS DURING THE SUMMER. DIRECTLY
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD028\NOV97\MSGS\M3047940.html
IN RESPONSE TO THE MASSACRES OF HUNDREDS OF CIVILIANS
IN THE ALGIERS SUBURBS OF SIDI RAIS, BARAKI, AND BENI
MESSOUS, IN SEPTEMBER 1997 THE GOVERNMENT EMBARKED
UPON A MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION IN THE
VILLAGE OF OULED ALLEL OUTSIDE ALGIERS. IT WAS
FOLLOWED BY A SIMILAR OPERATION IN THE BAINEM FOREST
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ALGIERS 004504
S/CT FOR REAP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REGION OF ALGIERS. DURING THE OULED ALLEL OPERATION,
THE MILITARY - FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER - GAVE A
SERIES OF PRESS CONFERENCES TO INFORM THE PUBLIC
ABOUT THE GOA'S ONGOING COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS.
F) THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE SUPPORT
TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS.
G) THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MADE ANY PUBLIC
STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE.
H) THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DID NOT CHANGE
DURING 199?.
I ) THE U.S. MADE NO SPECIFIC, BILATERAL REQUESTS OF
THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION ON
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS OR INITIATIVES IN 1997.
J) ( I ) THE U.S. HAS NOT SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN
THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES
CITIZENS OR INTERESTS.
J) ( I I ) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL
PROTECTION FROM THE ALGERIAN SECURITY SERVICES FOR
THE AMERICAN CITIZENS WORKING ON PETROLEUM-SECTOR
PROJECTS IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ALGERIA. THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO PROVIDES FORCES TO PROTECT
WORKSITES AND RESIDENTIAL COMPOUNDS FOR THESE
AMERICANS, AND ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY ESCORTS FOR THE
AMERICANS TRAVELING BETWEEN THE COMPOUNDS AND THEIR
WORKSITES.
IN 1997 A NUMBER OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS VISITED
ALGERIA. DURING SUCH VISITS, THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT
PROVIDED 24-HOUR ARMED SECURITY ESCORTS WHO
ACCOMPANIED THE JOURNALISTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
K) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SOUGHT
COOPERATION FROM THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT DURING THE
PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD028\NOV97\MSGS\M3047940.html
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR
INTERESTS.
STAFFORD
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 4504
OSSN>4504
TOR: 971130100315 M3047940
< TOR>971130100300 M3047939
DIST:
SIT: NSC
A
A
Page 4 of 4
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
12/04/1997
Re: [Summary for 4 Dec] (13 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of Ihe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
SU BJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/04/1997
Re: [Summary for 4 Dec] (11 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Aet -15 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI National Seeuritj Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of Ihe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe KOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe F'OIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled fnr law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECTATITLE
DATE
12/09/1997
Re: [Conversation] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformation Aet -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National securily classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute ((b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to Ihe appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/16/1997
Re: [Algerian Government] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
r
2009-l295-l
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Aet -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classilled Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating lo the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD028\DEC97\MSGS\M3087826.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
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DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA1210 3640147-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 P 300143Z DEC 97
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
300143Z DEC 97
SECSTATE WASHDC
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC 1566
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1112
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7713
RUQNAAA/CTF NORTHERN WATCH INCIRLIK AB TU//POLAD//
INFO: ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0623
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0034
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 8506
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 2 605
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 9136
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY 6916
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 1474
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY 6630
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 7961
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5272
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4137
SUBJ:
NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR POST'S INFORMATION:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 241210
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRO, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR POST'S INFORMATION:
IRAN/EGYPT: AMBASSADOR WALKER COMMENTS
MEPP: UPDATE
ALGERIA: VIOLENCE
IRAQ: OIL-FOR-FOOD (10)
IRAN/TURKEY: GAS PIPELINES (EB)
IRAN: LANTOS TRAVEL TO TEHRAN (NSC)
Page 1 of 8
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD028\DEC97\MSGS\M3087826.html
IRAN/EGYPT: AMBASSADOR WALKER'S COMMENTS
Q. DID AMBASSADOR WALKER TELL FM LEVY OF EVIDENCE THAT
IRAN WAS INVOLVED IN THE LUXOR MASSACRE?
A.
THAT WAS NOT WHAT HE SAID DURING THIS CONVERSATION.
(IF PRESSED)
-- I AM NOT GOING TO GO INTO THE AMBASSADOR'S CONFIDENTIAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS.
Q. DO YOU K O OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE
NW
EGYPTIAN GROUP THAT CARRIED OUT THE MASSACRE (AL-GAMA'A AL
ISLAMIYA)?
A. WE K O THAT IRAN HAS A RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS GROUP.
NW
WE ALSO K O THAT A BRANCH OF AL-GAMAA CLAIMED
NW
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK AT LUXOR.
-- LET ME REITERATE THAT IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR GROUPS
ENGAGING IN TERRORISM IS OF GREAT CONCERN TO US.
(IF PRESSED ON CONNECTION OF IRAN TO LUXOR)
-- I AM NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND WHAT I HAVE SAID.
Q. WHAT ABOUT THE CONNECTION WITH THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN
DAMASCUS?
A. I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THIS.
MEPP UPDATE
Q. WILL THERE BE A THREE-WAY MEETING WITH ARAFAT AND
NETANYAHU IN WASHINGTON?
A. THE PRESIDENT HAS INVITED THE TWO LEADERS TO MEET
SEPARATELY WITH HIM EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR.
( I F PRESSED)
-- NO TRILATERAL IS CURRENTLY PLANNED.
Q. HAS ARAFAT DISCUSSED HIS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE
WEST BANK WITH THE US?
A. THE SECRETARY, AS YOU KNOW, HAS HAD INTENSIVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHAIRMAN, BUT WE DO NOT GO INTO
DETAILS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS.
Q. WHAT IS YOUR COMMENT ABOUT THE DEBATE GOING ON BETWEEN
NETANYAHU AND ARAFAT ABOUT THE WEST BANK? WHAT DO YOU MAKE
Page 2 of 8
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OF SAEB ERAHAT'S PLAN?
A. THE FUTURE DISPOSITION OF THE WEST BANK IS AT THE HEART
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 STATE 241210
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRO, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
OF THE PERMANENT STATUS ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED THROUGH
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
-- INSTEAD OF THESE PUBLIC CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS, WE
BELIEVE I T WOULD BE BETTER FOR BOTH SIDES TO CONCENTRATE ON
THE WORK THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ON THE FOUR-PART AGENDA THE
SECRETARY HAS LAID OUT.
Q. WHAT ABOUT THE STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN
THE WEST BANK?
A. AS I SAID, I AM NOT GOING TO GET DRAWN INTO ANY
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATED TO PERMANENT STATUS TALKS.
Q. ANY COMMENT ON THE NORWEGIAN FM'S EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A
DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
A. THE NORWEGIANS HAVE LONG PLAYED AN EXTREMELY HELPFUL
ROLE IN THE MEPP.
-- WE WELCOME THEIR CONTINUED EFFORTS.
Q. ANY COMMENT ON SHEIKH YASSIN'S PLEDGE TO CONTINUE A
HOLY WAR FOR "LIBERATED PALESTINE"?
A. OUR OPPOSITION TO HAMAS IS WELL KNOWN. I AM NOT GOING
TO REACT TO EVERY COMMENT MADE BY SHEIKH YASSIN.
ALGERIA: VIOLENCE
CONTEXT: THE PACE OF KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN ALGERIA HAS
QUICKENED IN RECENT DAYS; OVER 100 HAVE BEEN MURDERED IN
WESTERN AND CENTRAL ALGERIA IN THE PAST FIVE DAYS. THERE
ARE FEARS THE VIOLENCE WILL ESCALATE FURTHER, AS IT HAS IN
THE PAST, WITH THE APPROACH OF THE MUSLIM HOLY MONTH OF
RAMADAN. THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT BLAMES ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS
FOR THE KILLING, AND HAS VOWED TO STEP UP SECURITY
MEASURES. IN SOME ATTACKS DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS,
HOWEVER, NEARBY SECURITY UNITS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO STOP
VICIOUS ATTACKS. ALGERIAN OPPOSITION GROUPS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS SUSPECT GOVERNMENT
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COMPLICITY AND SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS' INVOLVEMENT IN
SPECIFIC INSTANCES. THERE HAVE BEEN CALLS FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA, BUT
THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A
PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS MISSION OR ABOUT ON-SITE VISITS BY
SEVERAL MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS.
U.S. POLICY:
THE U.S. VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNS THE TERRORISM IN
ALGERIA AND HAS ENCOURAGED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
ISOLATING EXTREMISTS. ALL ALGERIANS WHO REJECT VIOLENCE AS
A POLITICAL TOOL, INCLUDING ISLAMIST OPPOSITION PARTIES,
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ALGERIA. WE
HAVE NOT BACKED CALLS FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO STUDY THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA.
SUCH A SESSION LIKELY WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON THE
VIOLENCE AND ALSO LACKS SUPPORT FROM OUR ALLIES. THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND
CIVILIANS TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY, BUT THEY MUST ALSO
RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PROCESS. WHEN SECURITY SERVICE
MEMBERS ARE DETERMINED GUILTY OF ABUSES THEMSELVES, THEY
SHOULD BE PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED AND PUNISHED.
Q. ANY COMMENT ON THE MASSACRES AND BOMBINGS IN ALGERIA?
A. WE CONDEMN THE MASSACRES AND BOMBINGS IN ALGERIA THAT
HAVE KILLED SO MANY CIVILIANS IN RECENT DAYS. THESE
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 STATE 241210
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRO, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
ATTACKS MERIT CONDEMNATION FROM BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND ALL ALGERIANS.
- - I T IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO
PROTECT CIVILIANS WHILE ALSO RESPECTING THE RULE OF LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS.
--LONG-LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN ALGERIA ULTIMATELY
DEPEND ON BROADENING THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO INCLUDE ALL
ALGERIANS WHO REJECT VIOLENCE, AND ON PROMOTING NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION. AS THE NEW ALGERIAN PARLIAMENT BEGINS ITS
WORK, WE HOPE THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION
WILL WORK TOGETHER TO SPUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN THE COUNTRY.
IRAQ: SUFFERING OF IRAQI PEOPLE? STATUS OF "OIL-FOR-FOOD"
PROGRAM? (IO)
Q. WHAT IS OUR RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM
THAT IRAQIS ARE STARVING BECAUSE OF UN SANCTIONS?
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A. AS WE HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY, THE FAILURE OF IRAQ TO
FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ALL RELEVANT UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM, IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE
SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE.
-- SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM ONE YEAR AGO, NEARLY
3 MILLION METRIC TONS OF FOODS HAVE ARRIVED IN IRAQ. AT
THE SAME TIME, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY
REDUCED ITS OWN PURCHASES OF FOOD, MEDICINE AND
HUAANITARIAN GOODS OUTSIDE THE PROGRAM.
-- THE SECURITY COUNCIL RENEWED THE PROGRAM ON DECEMBER 4,
BUT IRAQ HAS STILL NOT BEGUN TO PUMP OIL -- THUS LIMITING
THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT IS AVAILABLE FOR FOOD PURCHASES.
-- THE U.S. HAS INDICATED ITS EAGERNESS TO CONSIDER AND
RECOMMEND FOR APPROVAL CONTRACTS FOR FOOD WORTH NEARLY $120
MILLION THAT ARE CURRENTLY WITH THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT. UNFORTUNATELY, IRAQ HAS TAKEN THE OUTRAGEOUS
STEP OF REQUESTING THAT THESE CONTRACTS NOT BE DISTRIBUTED
TO THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE FOR CONSIDERATION.
-- IT IS SHOCKING AND APPALLING THAT IRAQ WOULD DELAY
CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACTS FOR HUMANITARIAN GOODS THAT ARE
IN CRITICALLY SHORT SUPPLY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ALLEGING
THAT THE U.S. IS NOT SENSITIVE TO THE SUFFERING OF THE
IRAQI PEOPLE. THE TRUTH IS THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING IN IRAQ, WHILE SADDAM
HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO INCREASE AND THEN USE THIS SUFFERING
FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.
Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE "OIL-FOR-FOOD" PROGRAM?
A. IRAQ HAS PROVIDED INPUT TO THE UN ON ITEMS THAT SHOULD
BE INCLUDED ON THE NEW LIST OF HUMANITARIAN GOODS THAT ARE
ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION OF THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. (THIS IS A NORMAL AND NECESSARY STEP EVERY TIME
THE PROGRAM IS RENEWED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.) WE HAVE
NOT YET SEEN THE NEW LIST, AND CANNOT COMMENT ON THE
DETAILS.
-- I T IS N W UP TO THE APPROPRIATE UN AGENCIES TO REVIEW
O
AND APPROVE THIS LIST SO THAT GOODS CAN BE PURCHASED AND
DISTRIBUTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
— IRAQ KNEW THAT ANOTHER LIST WOULD BE REQUIRED WHEN THE
PROGRAM WAS RENEWED IN EARLY DECEMBER, BUT INTENTIONALLY
DELAYED PROVIDING ITS INPUT.
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 STATE 241210
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
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TAGS: OPRO, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
-- WE CONTINUE TO DECRY IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO SELL OIL SINCE
THE RENEWAL OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM EARLIER THIS MONTH.
THIS INTERRUPTION IN OIL SALES WAS NEITHER REQUIRED BY NOR
CONTEMPLATED UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL RENEWAL. WE ARE
CONCERNED THAT THIS UNNECESSARY INTERRUPTION WILL PREVENT
DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN GOODS (ESPECIALLY FOOD AND
MEDICINE) BY DELAYING THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO PAY FOR
THESE GOODS.
-- THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL SHORTLY PRESENT SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON POSSIBLE
CHANGES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HIS REPORT AND WILL BE
PREPARED TO ACT IMMEDIATELY TO IMPROVE THE DELIVERY OF FOOD
AND MEDICINE TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE.
( I F ASKED)
Q. HAS THE U.S. PLACED ON HOLD A CONTRACT FROM TUNISIA FOR
BABY MILK POWDER?
A. WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY CONTRACT OF THIS TYPE BEING
PLACED ON HOLD. WE WILL CHECK WITH THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT.
I T IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS CONTRACT IS BEING
REVIEWED BY THE SECRETARIAT BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN
DISTRIBUTED TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS.
TURKMENISTAN- IRAN AND TURKMENISTAN- IRANTURKEY GAS PIPELINES (EB)
BACKGROUND:
TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE MENTIONS TWO DISTINCT
PIPELINES. ONE IS BEING INAUGURATED TO BRING GAS FROM
TURKMENISTAN TO IRAN FOR IRAN'S DOMESTIC USE. THIS PROJECT
DOES NOT APPEAR TO FALL UNDER ILSA BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROJECT PRE-DATES THE ENACTMENT
OF ILSA. THE ARTICLE ALSO MENTIONS ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL'S
INTEREST IN BUILDING A DIFFERENT PIPELINE TO BRING GAS FROM
TURKMENISTAN ACROSS IRAN TO TURKEY PURSUANT TO A MAY 1997
AGREEMENT
WE SUPPORT THE DELIVERY OF TURKMEN GAS TO
TURKEY, BUT WE DO NOT SUPPORT DELIVERY VIA IRAN. I F A
PIPELINE IS BUILT ACROSS IRAN TO BRING TURKMEN GAS TO
TURKEY UNDER THIS AGREEMENT IT COULD RAISE ILSA CONCERNS.
Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON THE RECENTLY-OPENED GAS
PIPELINE BETWEEN TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN? WHAT ABOUT THE
PLANS BY ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL TO PROPOSE A PIPELINE TO BRING
NATURAL GAS FROM TURKMENISTAN THROUGH IRAN TO TURKEY? DOES
THIS ACTIVITY VIOLATE THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
(ILSA)?
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A. THE U.S. OPPOSES AS A MATTER OF POLICY THE CONSTRUCTION
OF PIPELINES ACROSS IRAN. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTENTION
TO PROMOTE THE DELIVERY OF CASPIAN OIL AND GAS TO
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS BY NON-IRANIAN ROUTES, SUCH AS TRANS
CASPIAN PIPELINES. WE ENCOURAGE OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO
JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT.
-- TODAY'S WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE REPORTS ON TWO
SEPARATE PIPELINE PROJECTS. FIRST IT REPORTS ON THE NEWLYOPENED PIPELINE BETWEEN EASTERN TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN,
WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE DEVOTED TO DELIVERING TURKMEN
GAS TO IRAN. THIS PIPELINE PROJECT PREDATES THE ENACTMENT
OF ILSA BY APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS.
-- SECOND, IT REPORTS THAT TURKEY, IRAN AND TURKMENISTAN
HAVE AUTHORIZED SHELL TO DRAW UP PLANS FOR A NEW NATURAL
GAS PIPELINE ACROSS THEIR TERRITORIES. AS WE HAVE
INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, TURKEY'S PLANS TO PURCHASE GAS FROM
TURKMEN-ISTAN DO NOT APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE SANCTIONABLE
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 STATE 241210
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRO, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 12/29/97
ACTIVITY UNDER ILSA.
-- HOWEVER, WE WILL EXAMINE CAREFULLY ANY NEW PROPOSALS
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANS-IRANIAN PIPELINES IN LIGHT OF
THE PROVISIONS OF ILSA. I F ANY SUCH PROJECT IS FOUND TO
INVOLVE SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY, WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE
ACTION UNDER THE LAW.
LANTOS TRAVEL TO IRAN (NSC)
Q. IS CONGRESSMAN TOM LANTOS CURRENTLY IN IRAN?
A. WE UNDERSTAND HE IS CURRENTLY IN CALIFORNIA. WE HAVE
NO INFORMATION ON HIS SCHEDULE; YOU WOULD HAVE TO CONTACT
HIS OFFICE FOR THAT INFORMATION.
-- CONGRESSMAN LANTOS EXPRESSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT AN INTEREST IN VISITING IRAN. SHOULD MR.
LANTOS BE TRAVELING TO IRAN, IT WOULD NOT BE AT THE REQUEST
OF THE WHITE HOUSE OR STATE DEPARTMENT.
Q. DID THE ADMINISTRATION DISCOURAGE CONGRESSMAN LANTOS'S
TRAVEL TO IRAN?
A. YES. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY OFFICIAL DIALOGUE SHOULD TAKE
PLACE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS
-- I T IS THE CONGRESSMAN'S DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO
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TRAVEL. U.S. CITIZENS ARE NOT BARRED FROM TRAVEL TO IRAN.
( I F PRESSED)
Q. IS TOM LANTOS A SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO IRAN?
A. THE PRESIDENT IS NOT SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY TO IRAN.
Q. WHAT WOULD BE HIS AGENDA IN IRAN?
A. WE DON'T KNOW. YOU SHOULD ASK CONGRESSMAN LANTOS.
Q. WHY ISN'T THE UNITED STATES SENDING AN ENVOY TO IRAN IN
RESPONSE TO IRAN'S CALL FOR DIALOGUE? WHY DID YOU
DISCOURAGE LANTOS FROM TRAVELING TO IRAN?
A. OUR POLICY TOWARD IRAN HAS NOT CHANGED. AS THE
PRESIDENT SAID EARLIER THIS MONTH, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE
NEW TONE WE ARE HEARING FROM IRAN, BUT WE NEED TO SEE THESE
WORDS MATCHED BY DEEDS.
-- WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR INCLUDING
ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, ITS SPONSORSHIP OF VIOLENT
OPPOSITION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND ITS EFFORTS
TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
Q. ARE YOU OPEN TO A DIALOGUE?
A. THE UNITED STATES HAS A LONGSTANDING POLICY OF BEING
OPEN TO A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN AS LONG AS IT IS AUTHORITATIVE
AND ACKNOWLEDGED PUBLICLY.
-- WE WOULD RAISE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S POLICIES,
IRAN COULD RAISE ANY ISSUE IT WANTS.
TALBOTT
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
OSECT>SECTION 02 OF 05
OSECT>SECTION 03 OF 05
04 OF 05
< SECT>SECTION
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SSN: 1210
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< TOR>971229210521 M3087830
A
A
S
A
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DIST:
SIT: NSC
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
12/31/1997
Re: [Algeria's Security Situation] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - \S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 03 Jan 98] (5 pages)
01/03/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/04/1998
Re: [Relizane Massacre] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PR A]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P(> Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TVPE
010. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Ambassador's Meeting] (4 pages)
01/05/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
kc2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [S U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe I O I A ]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning w ells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Securit) Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment tn Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
Oil. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Public Statements] (3 pages)
01/06/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Securit)' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAI
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2 :
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHOLA0056 0061019-UUXX--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUXX ZZH ZNZ1
0 061019Z JAN 98
FM USIS BONN
RUEHOL
061019Z JAN 98
USIS BONN
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/DSAA//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DC-4A//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHC/LABOR DEPT WASHDC//MCCAFFREY//
RUEAHQA/HQUSAF WASHDC//XOXX//
RUEHRL/USOFFICE BERLIN
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS//NESSEE//
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
RXFPSH/SACEUR SHAPE BE//PAA//
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA//CSBM/CSCE/PAA//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//PA/POLAD/ECPA//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/ECJ5/CJ1-HN//
RHFQAAA/AFOSI DET 501 RAMSTEIN AB GE//EAC//
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CCH
RUFDAAU/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RXFMB/US SUPPORT ELEMENT HQ BALTAP//PIO/NA//
MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
CONTENTS:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
Page 1 of9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HX BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
CONTENTS:
A.
LEAD STORIES SUMMARY
B.
(ISRAEL)
C.
(ALGERIA)
D.
(U.S.)
E.
(UN-IRAQ)
F.
(BOSNIA)
A.
LEAD STORIES SUMMARY
GOVERNMENT CRISIS
TERRORISM
FOREIGN POLICY
ATTACK ON UN OFFICE
PEACEKEEPING MISSION
HEADLINES
"SEARCH FOR A 'CUSTOMER-FRIENDLY SOLUTION' - CONFUSION AND
ANGER IN NEW TELECOMMUNICATION WORLD " (FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG)
"ISRAEL'S FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY STEPS DOWN" (SUEDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG)
"LAMBSDORFF DEMANDS END TO R W IN FDP" (DIE WELT)
O
"BONN GOVERNMENT DEMANDS A CHANGE IN TURKEY'S POLICY
TOWARDS KURDS" (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU)
"DISMAY ABOUT MASSACRE IN ALGERIA" (GENERAL-ANZEIGER)
EDITORIALS FOCUS ON THE RESIGNATION OF ISRAEL'S FOREIGN
MINISTER LEVY, ON THE MASSACRES IN ALGERIA, AND ON THE MOVE
OF DEUTSCHE TELEKOM TO CHARGE CUSTOMERS WHO CHOOSE NEW
SERVICE PROVIDERS.
SATURDAY, JANUARY 4,1998
HEADLINES
"KANTHER CALLS FOR INTENSIFIED FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGNERS" (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG)
"SCHAEUBLE INSISTS ON TAX INCREASES" (SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG)
"BONN ARGUES WITH ROME OVER BORDER CONTROLS" (DIE WELT)
Page 2 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
"TURKEY CASTIGATES ASYLUM FOR KURDS" (FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU)
"BLUEM CALLS ON GERMAN EMPLOYERS" (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU)
"STIHL: TURNAROUND ON LABOR MARKET" (GENERAL-ANZEIGER)
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HQ BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
EDITORIALS FOCUS ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION OF TURKISH
KURDS TO ITALY, ON PLANS OF DEUTSCHE TELEKOM TO CHARGE
CUSTOMERS WHO WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE THEIR SERVICE PROVIDER,
AND ON THE LATEST GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN ISRAEL.
B.
(ISRAEL)
GOVERNMENT CRISIS
1.
WERNER ADAM HAS THIS TO SAY IN AN EDITORIAL IN
RIGHT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (01/05) UNDER THE
HEADLINE:
"DIVIDED."
"THE FIRST DIRECTLY ELECTED ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER HAS
PROVEN TO BE A DESTRUCTIVE POLITICIAN RIGHT FROM OUTSET,
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE PROBLEM IS THE PEACE PROCESS OR
THE DOMESTIC POLICY SITUATION. BUT N W NETANYAHU MUST FEAR
O
FOR THE SURVIVAL OF HIS GOVERNING COALITION. HIS ARCH
OPPONENT DAVID LEVY CREATED THIS SITUATION WITH HIS THREAT
TO RESIGN.... THE REASON IS NOT ONLY THE R W ABOUT THE
O
BUDGET...BUT ALSO THE CONTRADICTORY POLICY OF THE PRIME
MINISTER TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS, AND LEVY IS SUPPORTED IN
HIS VIEW BY NO LESS A MAN THAN PRESIDENT CLINTON. EVEN THE
MODERATE DEFENSE MINISTER MORDECHAI DISAGREES WITH THIS
POLICY. THUS THE QUESTION MUST BE RAISED AS TO H W LONG,
O
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NETANYAHU CAN CONTINUE TO GOVERN
IN A HALFWAY EFFECTIVE MANNER. ALTHOUGH HE WAS DIRECTLY
ELECTED, HE DEEPENED THE DIVISION OF THE PEOPLE AS NO OTHER
PRIME MINISTER BEFORE HIM."
2.
JOSEF JOFFE HAS THIS TO SAY IN AN EDITORIAL IN
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CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH (01/05) UNDER THE
HEADLINE:
"A RESIGNATION WITHOUT IMMEDIATE EFFECT."
" I F FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY WERE REALLY TO STEP DOWN,
THE SURVIVAL OF THE NETANYAHU GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ACTUALLY
BE IN DANGER...SINCE NETANYAHU WOULD STILL HAVE 61 OF THE
120 SEATS IN THE KNESSET.... DAVID LEVY WILL CERTAINLY SAY
THAT HIS RESIGNATION IS AN ACT OF PEACE. BUT THIS IS ONLY
HALF THE TRUTH. I T IS CERTAINLY RIGHT THAT LEVY, COMPARED
TO THE HAWK NETANYAHU, HAS ALWAYS COOED LIKE A DOVE, BUT I T
IS ALSO TRUE THAT HIS RESIGNATION SIMPLY HAD INTERNAL
POLITICAL GROUNDS, SINCE NETANYAHU WANTS TO REDUCE THE
BUDGET DEFICIT BY MAKING CUTS AMOUNTING TO 650 MILLION
DOLLARS. AND THESE CUTS HAVE ANNOYED ALL HIS COALITION
PARTNERS, SINCE THEY ALL WANTED TO HELP THEIR
CONSTITUENTS ....
"ONCE LEVY'S RESIGNATION TAKES EFFECT, NOTHING WILL
HAPPEN FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT IN THE LONG RUN NETANYAHU
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HQ BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION —
DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
WILL BE INCREASINGLY WEAKENED BECAUSE HE - WITH A MAJORITY
OF ONLY ONE VOTE - CAN EASILY BE BLACKMAILED BY HIS
COALITION PARTNERS. AND WHAT ABOUT NEW ELECTIONS? THEY
WOULD NOT OFFER A REAL SOLUTION, SINCE THE PROPORTIONAL
ELECTION SYSTEM HAS NEVER PRODUCED MAJORITIES BUT ALWAYS
ONLY UNSTABLE, MUTUALLY BLOCKING COALITIONS."
3.
ARGUES:
LEFT-OF-CENTER WESER-KURIER OF BREMEN (01/05)
"FIVE TIMES BEFORE, FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY ANNOUNCED
HIS RESIGNATION BUT, IN THE END, CHANGED HIS MIND AGAIN.
IF HE HAD CONTINUED TO STAY IN OFFICE, HE WOULD NOT ONLY
HAVE RISKED HIS CREDIBILITY, BUT WOULD ALSO HAD TO SHARE
THE BLAME FOR AN IRRESPONSIBLE POLICY. IN ALMOST TWO YEARS
IN OFFICE, NETANYAHU FORFEITED NOT ONLY THE CONFIDENCE OF
THE EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS, BUT ALSO ALMOST FROZE
Page 4 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBORING ARAB COUNTRIES, AND ALLOWED
THE GAP BETWEEN THE RICH AND POOR IN HIS OWN COUNTRY TO
G O . THE NOOSE AROUND HIS NECK IS TIGHTENING. THE
R W
AMERICANS WANT TO HEAR CLEAR CONCESSIONS REGARDING THE
PLANNED TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT TWELVE PARLIAMENTARIANS'
ANNOUNCED A VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE I F THE GOVERNMENT DECIDES
TO PULL OUT THE FORCES."
C.
(ALGERIA)
TERRORISM
1.
RUDOLPH CHIMELLI NOTES IN AN EDITORIAL IN
CENTRIST SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF MUNICH (01/05) UNDER THE
HEADLINE:
"HORROR THAT REMAINS ANONYMOUS"
"THE HORROR STORIES FROM ALGERIA ARE REPEATING
THEMSELVES WITH DEPRESSING REGULARITY... AND THE REGIME IS
SPEAKING OF LINGERING REMNANTS OF TERRORISM AND REJECTS ANY
KIND OF INTERFERENCE. THE EUROPEANS ARE SHOCKED FOR A
MOMENT BUT THEN GO ON AND PUSH ASIDE THE HORROR. SO THERE
IS NOTHING NEW? THIS IS NO LONGER TRUE: THE NUMBER OF
VICTIMS IS INCREASING.... IN CONTRAST TO OTHER CONFLICTS,
WHEN THE OUTSIDE WORLD WAS FED WITH PICTURES OF HORROR, NO
CAMERA WILL BE THERE IN ALGERIA I F PEOPLE ARE KILLED....
IN THE BALKANS, IN AFRICA, DRASTIC PICTURES SOMETIMES HAD
AN EFFECT...BUT THE ALGERIAN VILLAGERS SUFFER AND DIE IN
ANONYMOUS INVISIBILITY.
"INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO DO SOMETHING
AGAINST THE BLOODSHED REMAINS LOW, SINCE THERE IS NOBODY
WHO HAS A RECIPE FOR H W TO STOP THE KILLINGS. THE GANGS
O
OF MURDERERS IN THE UNDERGROUND COULD PROBABLY BE
MANIPULATED, BUT THEY NO LONGER LISTEN TO ANY POLITICAL OR
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY, LET ALONE THE ISLAMIC SALVATION
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HQ BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
FRONT
A LONG TIME AGO, THE GREED FOR PETRO DOLLARS
REPLACED ANY IDEOLOGICAL REASON. EUROPE CAN CONTINUE TO
Page 5 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
LOOK AWAY, SINCE, SO FAR, THERE HAVE BEEN NO ALGERIAN BOAT
PEOPLE."
2.
CENTRIST LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG (01/05) NOTES:
"THE FACT THAT THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP, OF ALL
GOVERNMENTS, BLAMES THE GIA FOR THE KILLINGS IN ALGERIA IS
AN ENCOURAGING EVEN THOUGH FIRST SIGN. THE CAUTIOUS
REJECTION OF THE TEHRAN MULLAHS OF OPEN SUPPORT FOR
VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF ALLAH CREATES A NEW SITUATION FOR
ALGERIA. IN THE COUNTRY ITSELF, RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS ARE
INCREASINGLY ISOLATED. BUT EVEN WITH A VICTORY OF THE
MILITARY OVER THE ISLAMISTS, THE ALGERIAN CRISIS WOULD BY
NO MEANS BE RESOLVED.... FOR YEARS, THE VIOLENT FANATICS
HAVE ALWAYS GIVEN THE SAME ANSWER: NO NEGOTIATIONS, NO
CEASE-FIRE, NO DEMOCRACY. AN END TO THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE
IS NOT IN SIGHT. I F ALL SIDES INVOLVED ACHIEVED A PEACEFUL
AGREEMENT, THEN OLD ACCOUNTS WOULD CERTAINLY BE SETTLED
WITH THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRES. IN
ALGERIA, EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THE GENERALS IN PARTICULAR
SHAMELESSLY ENRICH THEMSELVES WITH YIELDS FROM THE
COUNTRY'S OIL EXPORTS. AND AS LONG AS THE WAR GOES ON, THE
PETRO DOLLARS CONTINUE TO FLOW."
3.
CENTRIST GENERAL-ANZEIGER OF BONN (01/05) OPINES
UNDER THE HEADLINE:
"CARNAGE IN ALGERIA."
" E ARE DESPERATELY WONDERING H W PEOPLE AT THE END OF
W
O
THE 20TH CENTURY CAN PRODUCE SO MUCH HATRED OR S O SO MUCH
HW
DISRESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE.... WHO TELLS YOUNG PEOPLE,
UNDER THE PRETEXT OF A HOLY WAR, TO KILL MORE THAN 400
WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND UNARMED MEN IN ONE SINGLE NIGHT? AND
WHY DO SECURITY FORCES NOT PUT ONE SINGLE CRIMINAL ON
TRIAL? IT IS HIGH TIME THAT THE WORLD CENTERS MUCH MORE ON
THE HELPLESS PEOPLE IN ALGERIA."
4.
RIGHT-OF-CENTER NUERNBERGER ZEITUNG (01/05)
MAINTAINS:
"THE ROLE OF A SPECTATOR WAS COMFORTABLE. BUT THE
LINKS TO THE ONES WHO PLACED BOMBS IN PARIS AND TO THE
ATTACKERS IN EGYPT ARE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT
ALGERIA'S TERRORISM IS NO ISOLATED PHENOMENON. IN VIEW OF
THE LATEST CARNAGE IN ALGERIA, EUROPEAN POLITICIANS MUST
FINALLY REALIZE THAT ALGERIA CANNOT BE LEFT ALONE IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST GENOCIDE...."
D.
(U.S.)
FOREIGN POLICY
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
Page 6 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HQ BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION —
DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT LEO WIELAND FILED THE
FOLLOWING EDITORIAL FOR RIGHT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE (01/05) UNDER THE HEADLINE:
"SIGNS OF NEW NORMALCY."
"IN HIS POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE, PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS
HIS HEART IN THE RIGHT PLACE. HE HAS CONSISTENTLY PURSUED
A POLICY WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED A YEAR AGO AS THE DUAL AIM
OF HIS SECOND TERM: THE CREATION OF AN 'UNDIVIDED AND
DEMOCRATIC EUROPE' AND THE CULTIVATION OF AN ACCOMPANYING
'PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE' WITH RUSSIA. NATO'S ENLARGEMENT,
THE SUPPORT OF AN EXTENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - EVEN
INVOLVING THE INCLUSION OF TURKEY - AND THE ANNOUNCED STAY
OF THE U.S. FORCES IN BOSNIA FIT THIS FRAMEWORK. CLINTON
PURSUES A FRIENDLY STRATEGY TOWARDS EUROPE, AND HE HIMSELF
IS WILLING TO HELP AND WILLING TO LEAD, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER
DOES NOT ALWAYS MEET WITH APPLAUSE ON THE OLD CONTINENT....
"BUT MEASURED AGAINST TENSIONS DURING THE TIMES OF THE
COLD WAR, SUCH IRRITATIONS, ARE OF NO GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.
THEY ARE A SIGN OF NEW NORMALCY, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL
FRICTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE PUT US IN A
SERIOUS MOOD.... THE 'EUROCENTRIC MOOD OF CLINTON AND HIS
TEAM DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE PARTLY NEO-ISOLATIONIST
AND PARTLY OPPORTUNISTIC VIEWS OF A REPUBLICAN-CONTROLLED
CONGRESS WHICH INTERFERES... IN THE MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY. I T IS TRUE THAT THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED HIS
VIEWS IN ALL ESSENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY TRADE AND ALLIANCE
AGREEMENTS, BUT CLINTON MUST EACH TIME FIGHT FOR HIS
'INTERNATIONALISTIC' PROJECTS. THE U.S. PARLIAMENT IS
YOUNGER AND MORE INEXPERT THAN EVER BEFORE AND TENDS TO
STARE AT ITS OWN NAVEL....
"CLINTON WHO FULLY BACKS AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY DOES
NOT SHARE THE AMERICAN VIEW OF STAYING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS. IN HIS LAST THREE YEARS IN OFFICE HE WILL
CERTAINLY NOT CHANGE THIS POSITION UNLESS FORCED. HE
RATHER HOPES THAT THE NEW 'EUROSCLEROSIS,' WITH ITS
SLUGGISH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TWO-DIGIT UNEMPLOYMENT
FIGURES CAN SOON BE OVERCOME WITH THE HELP OF
•AMERICAN-STYLE' APPROACHES. BUT SINCE HE IS CONVINCED
THAT 'STRONGER ALLIES ARE EVEN BETTER PARTNERS, THIS
PRESIDENT HAS GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE EUROPEANS THAN THE
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�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
EUROPEANS DO IN THEMSELVES."
E.
(UN-IRAQ)
ATTACK ON UN OFFICE
LOTHAR RUEHL JUDGES IN AN EDITORIAL IN RIGHT-OF-CENTER
DIE WELT OF BERLIN (01/05) UNDER THE HEADLINE:
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 BONN 000056
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; INFO:WEU, R, I/G, I/GWEU, D/P, VOA/BRE;
STATE FOR EUR/PPA, EUR/AGS, S/CSCE, PM, INR/RWE, ALSO
PASS FSI/CSFA; FRG POSTS FOR USIS; BRUSSELS FOR USIS AND
USEC; EMBASSIES FOR USIS, LONDON ALSO FOR POL; USNATO
ALSO FOR USDELMC; USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN ALSO FOR
ECPAO, POLAD, CJ1-HN, ECJ5-E, ECPA; USSUPPORT ELEMENT
HQ BALTAP ALSO FOR PIO/NATO; HQUSAF WASHDC ALSO FOR
XOXX
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ISRAEL ALGERIA U.S. UN-IRAQ BOSNIA;
BONN
"MORE QUESTIONS THAN DUST."
"THE POINTED MOCK ATTACK ON THE OFFICE OF THE UN
INSPECTOR IN BAGHDAD RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN DUST....
BUT THE ASSUMPTION...THAT THIS DELIBERATELY HARMLESS ATTACK
WAS PLANNED BY ARABS SEEMS LIKELY. DRIVING SADDAM INTO
OPEN CONFLICT WITH THE UN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE UN TEAM,
PROVOKING U.S. BOMBS ON BAGHDAD AS A RETALIATORY MEASURE
COULD BE A USEFUL AIM FOR THE SHIITE AND KURDISH
UNDERGROUND.... THE SAME IS ALSO TRUE FOR KUWAIT, WHICH
CONTINUES TO BE THREATENED BY IRAQ.
"THE IRAQI REGIME, WHICH CLAIMS THAT THE DOMESTIC
OPPOSITION, AND NOT FOREIGN AGENTS, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ATTACK, REACTED CAUTIOUSLY. THIS POINTS TO SADDAM'S
VULNERABILITY IN THE CURRENT SITUATION
COMPARED TO THE
CRISIS OVER UN INSPECTIONS, THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF IRAQ
WANTING INCREASE OIL EXPORTS TO JORDAN THUS WEAKENING THE
EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO, APPEARS RELATIVELY RELAXED."
F.
(BOSNIA)
PEACEKEEPING MISSION
JOHANN GEORG REISSMUELLER ARGUES IN AN EDITORIAL IN
RIGHT-OF-CENTER FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (01/05) UNDER THE
HEADLINE:
"WHAT BOSNIA NEEDS"
"AT THE TOP OF THE FEDERATIVE STATE IN BOSNIA,
Page 8 of 9
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3093515.html
MUSLIMS, CROATS, AND SERBS ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP IN
INSTITUTIONS THAT EXIST ON PAPER RATHER THAN IN REALITY.
BECAUSE NOTHING REALLY MOVES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, THE
WESTERN POWERS HAVE ESTABLISHED A KIND OF OCCUPYING REGIME.
THE INTERNATIONAL HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, CARLOS WESTENDORP,
CAN ISSUE DECREES WHICH HE CONSIDERS URGENT...BUT IN THE
CITIES AND VILLAGES, THESE NORMS ARE MEANINGLESS. NO
NON-SERB CAN RETURN TO SERBIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY, THE
MUSLIM-RULED REGIONS, INCLUDING SARAJEVO, ARE QUICKLY
ISLAMI ZED, ' AND THE WESTERN POWERS CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE
THEIR SEARCH FOR WAR CRIMINALS ON CROATS - AS I F THERE WERE
NO MUSLIM WAR CRIMINALS, AND AS I F THE MAJORITY OF THEM
COULD NOT BE FOUND ON SERBIAN TERRITORY. THOSE WHO WANT TO
GIVE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA A NEW ORDER NEED A FIRM HAND, NEED
TO ACT WITH CIRCUMSPECTION, AND NEED MORE THAN A
SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST."
ROUNDS
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 06
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 06
<' SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 06
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 06
< SECT>SECTION: 05 OF 06
<' SECT>SECTION: 06 OF 06
1
A
,
A
A
>
SSN: 0056
<"SSN>0056
< SSN>0056
< SSN>0056
< SSN>0056
< SSN>0056
A
A
A
A
TOR:
980106053438 M3093515
<"TOR>980106053524 M3093516
< TOR>980106053539 M3093517
< TOR>980106053601 M3093518
< TOR>980106053652 M3093519
<"TOR>980106053707 M3093520
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: MCELDOWNEY
SIT: NSC
Page 9 of 9
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/06/1998
Re: [Call for International Inquiry] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/I3ox Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-r
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(l>)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Securit) Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAJ
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/06/1998
Re: [Anned Islamic Group] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning w ells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) o f t h e PRA)
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3094978.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHLOA0159 0071108-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 071108Z JAN 98
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHLO
071108Z JAN 98
AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0087
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEBBEA/DOT WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2331
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0010
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0061
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0115
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0084
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0041
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O 0117
OCW
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0107
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0067
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0024
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0029
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0091
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0072
RUDOVFA/3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//PA//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//019//
LONDON MEDIA REACTION REPORT, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 199E
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
NO FOREIGN NEWS OF NOTE ON THIS MORNING'S NEWSCASTS.
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000159
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
Page 1 of 5
�F:\C3ble\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3094978.html
Page 2 of 5
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT:LONDON MEDIA REACTION REPORT, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7,
1998
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
NO FOREIGN NEWS OF NOTE ON THIS MORNING'S NEWSCASTS.
B) MAJOR PRESS STORIES
1. MIDEAST
2. ALGERIA
3. NORTHERN IRELAND
C) SUMMARY
1. MIDEAST
THE THRUST OF OPINION WAS THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WAS GETTING
NOWHERE FAST BUT THE UNITED STATES WAS PERSEVERING WITH ITS
EFFORTS. ONE PAPER OPINED THAT NETANYAHU'S PROSPECTS OF
POLITICAL SURVIVAL SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
2. ALGERIA
MORE PAPERS URGED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE AN ACTIVE
INTEREST IN THE "GHASTLINESS" AND "TRAGEDY" OF THE ALGERIAN
SITUATION.
3. NORTHERN IRELAND
ULSTER WAS REPORTED FACING RENEWED CRISIS AS LOYALISTS EXPRESS
DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE PEACE PROCESS.
D) TEXT
1. MIDEAST
"CLINTON MAINTAINS PEACE DRIVE DESPITE NETANYAHU CRISIS"
THE CONSERVATIVE "DAILY TELEGRAPH" REPORTED 01/07:
"THE UNITED STATES WARNED YESTERDAY THAT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE
PROCESS COULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN
WHICH BEN NETANYAHU FINDS HIMSELF... WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MIKE
MCCURRY INDICATED THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION WAS PREPARED TO
ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS EVEN WITH THE PROSPECT OF MORE DRAMATIC
UPHEAVALS IN ISRAELI POLITICS, SUCH AS A NEW COALITION AND NOT
NECESSARILY ONE WITH MR. NETANYAHU AT THE HELM..."
"GETTING NOWHERE FAST"
THE CENTRIST "HERALD" (GLASGOW) EDITORIALIZED 01/06:
"DAVID LEVY HATES BEN NETANYAHU.
BUT THIS ISRAELI SPAT DOES
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3094978.html
NOTHING FOR THE PEACE PROCESS... NETANYAHU'S SURVIVAL MIGHT NOT
LAST, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS COALITION GOVERNMENT IS HIGHLY
UNSTABLE, AND BECOMING MORE SO BY THE DAY. YET FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT IT IS THE EFFECT OF THIS ROLLING CHAOS AT
THE HEART OF ISRAEL'S GOVERNMENT ON THE FALTERING MIDDLE EAST
PEACE PROCESS WHICH IS OF PRIMARY INTEREST...
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 000159
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS AC DA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT:LONDON MEDIA REACTION REPORT, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1998
"THE ONLY SERIOUS HOPE OF IMPROVEMENT RESTS WHERE I T HAS ALWAYS
BEEN: WITH THE POLITICAL WILL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE HAS
REFUSED TO MEET WITH MR. NETANYAHU FOR ALMOST NINE MONTHS, BUT
EXPECTS THE ISRAELI LEADER TO TURN UP AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE
END OF THE MONTH WITH A DETAILED TROOP WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM. MR.
NETANYAHU WANTS TO DELAY. HIS LAST THROW MIGHT BE AN ELECTION,
WHICH WOULD BE A SERIOUS DELAY. THE AMERICANS MUST PUSH HARDER,
BUT IT MIGHT ALREADY BE TOO LATE."
"ISRAEL'S HOUDINI"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" EDITORIALIZED 01/07:
"MR. NETANYAHU'S CAPACITY FOR FURTHER SURVIVAL SHOULD NOT BE
UNDERESTIMATED. THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL BE EXCEPTIONALLY TAXING
FOR HIM...
"ISRAEL APPROACHES THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS FOUNDING IN A
STATE OF UNCERTAINTY. THAT WILL REMAIN SO REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
ELECTIONS COME SOONER OR LATER. A TENTATIVE CONSENSUS FAVORS A
CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS BUT WITH CAUTIOUS CONCESSIONS
SUBJECT TO CONTINUED SECURITY. THE PERSON WHO EMBODIES THIS
POSITION WILL PROBABLY COMMAND POWER. I F HIS COALITION WILL
ALLOW HIM THE SPACE — AND NOT DERAIL ITSELF ON OTHER MATTERS
SUCH AS THE AUTHORITY OF ORTHODOX RABBIS OVER THOSE FROM THE
REFORM AND CONSERVATIVE TRADITIONS -- MR. NETANYAHU CAN STILL END
1998 AND ENTER 1999 AS THAT FIGURE."
2. ALGERIA
"THIRST FOR REVENGE IS OUT OF HAND"
Page 3 of 5
�F:\CEible\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3094978.html
Page 4 of 5
LONDON'S CONSERVATIVE TABLOID "EVENING STANDARD" LAST NIGHT,
01/06, CARRIED THIS BACKGROUNDER BY GERALD BUTT, EDITOR OF THE
BBC WORLD SERVICE'S ARABIC MAGAZINE:
"ALGERIANS ARE NO STRANGERS TO VIOLENCE. IN THE LONG AND BLOODY
BATTLE WHICH SECURED INDEPENDENCE FROM FRANCE IN 1962, A MILLION
PEOPLE DIED. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, BRUTAL AS IT WAS, HAD
LOGIC AND A CLEAR GOAL. TODAY'S VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA APPEARS TO
BE AN ORGIASTIC CYCLE OF BLOOD-THIRSTY MASSACRES...
"THE ONLY CERTAINTY IS THAT THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND THE THIRST
FOR RETALIATION AND REVENGE HAVE GOT OUT OF HAND. THE CHALLENGE
FOR EUROPEAN AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS IS TO PERSUADE THE AUTHORITIES
IN ALGIERS TO INTRODUCE REFORMS THAT WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO
ISOLATE THE MILITANTS — BEFORE THE DEATH TOLL MATCHES THAT OF
THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE..."
"A MUCH-NEEDED START"
IN EDITORIAL COMMENT 01/07, THE LIBERAL ":GUARDIAN" SAID:
"ALGERIA HAS REACHED A CRITICAL MASS OF TRAGEDY WHERE -- AT LONG
LAST -- THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS COMPELLED TO PAY ATTENTION. THE NEW
E.U. INITIATIVE WHICH COINCIDES WITH THE START OF THE BRITISH
PRESIDENCY MAY E FUZZY IN DETAIL BUT IT IS A MUCH-NEEDED
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 000159
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT:LONDON MEDIA REACTION REPORT, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7,
1998
START...
"THE E.U.'S CONCERN SHOULD BE CALMLY EXPRESSED, BUT WITH
EMPHASIS. FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE GERMAN INITIATIVE,
N W TAKEN UP BY BRITAIN AS E.U. PRESIDENT, IS A USEFUL SIGNAL -O
SO LONG AS IT IS NOT UNDERCUT LATER BY CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS
FROM PARIS. AMERICAN CONCERN IS USEFUL BUT NEEDS TO BE CONVEYED
WITH MORE VIGOR..."
"AT
LEAST LET THE U.N. GATHER THE FACTS"
THE
CENTRIST "INDEPENDENT" EDITORIALIZED 01/07:
"THE GHASTLINESS OF ALGERIA G O S DAILY EVEN GHASTLIER. THE
RW
REVULSION AND ANGUISH ARE UNIVERSAL, BUT NOWHERE MORE DEEPLY FELT
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3094978.html
THAN IN EUROPE, LINKED BY HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY TO THE LANDS OF
NORTH AFRICA...
"ONE FAINT GLIMMER OF HOPE REMAINS. NO MORE THAN A DOCTOR CAN
PRESCRIBE A CURE WITHOUT KNOWING THE NATURE OF HIS PATIENT'S
SICKNESS, CAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PRESUME TO RECOMMEND
SOLUTIONS FOR ALGERIA UNLESS I T POSSESSES THE FACTS. AT THE VERY
LEAST, THEREFORE, OUTSIDE OBSERVERS, BE THEY FROM THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE EUROPEAN UNION OR THE ARAB WORLD, MUST BE ALLOWED
INTO THE COUNTRY TO GATHER INFORMATION ON THE GROUND...
"EVERY MASSACRE MAKES A GREATER MOCKERY OF THE CLAIMS OF THE
ALGIERS GOVERNMENT TO BE ON THE BRINK OF WINNING A CIVIL WAR THAT
HAS COST ALMOST AS MANY LIVES AS BOSNIA. ONLY NEGOTIATION WILL
PROVIDE A LASTING SETTLEMENT. WE CAN BUT PRAY THAT THAT
REALIZATION WILL DAWN UPON THE COMBATANTS, SOONER RATHER THAN
LATER."
3. NORTHERN IRELAND
"LOYALISTS' LOSS OF FAITH BRINGS ULSTER CLOSER TO VIOLENCE"
THE
CONSERVATIVE "DAILY TELEGRAPH" REPORTED 01/07:
ULSTER EDGED CLOSER TO A RESUMPTION OF FULL-SCALE VIOLENCE LAST
NIGHT WHEN LOYALIST PRISONERS IN THE MAZE PRISON CONFIRMED THAT
THEY HAD LOST FAITH IN POLITICAL TALKS AND BELIEVED THE CEASEFIRE
WOULD SERVE NO PURPOSE..."
"ULSTER FACES FRESH CRISIS"
THE
LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" REPORTED 01/07:
"NORTHERN IRELAND WAS IN DANGER OF BEING ENMESHED IN A FULL-SCALE
CRISIS LAST NIGHT AS LOYALIST POLITICAL LEADERS TRIED TO REGAIN
THE INITIATIVE OVER PRISONERS DEMANDING AN END TO THEIR
[PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS AT STORMONT. TENSIONS WERE
RUNNING HIGH AS MEETINGS TOOK PLACE TO TRY TO GET THE PEACE
PROCESS BACK ON TRACK...
"THE IMPASSE FOLLOWS GROWING UNIONIST AND LOYALIST FRUSTRATION AT
WHAT THEY SEE AS THE GOVERNMENT PURSUING A REPUBLICAN AGENDA..."
BERRINGTON
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
SSN: 0159
< SSN>0159
OSSN>0159
TOR: 980107061259 M3094978
< TOR>980107061314 M3094979
< TOR>980107061336 M3094980
A
A
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BUTLER
SIT: NSC
Page 5 of 5
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Re: Lst Quarter Status Report - Algiers (11 pages)
01/07/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[11/03/1997 - 01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |4-l U.S.C. 220.4(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
IM Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA2650 0072322-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 P 072318Z JAN 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC
OSRI
072318Z JAN 98
DTG
SECSTATE WASHDC
ORIG
TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC 1604
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1265
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7 7 98
RUQNAAA/CTF NORTHERN WATCH INCIRLIK AB TU//POLAD//
INFO: ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0653
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0085
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 8580
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 2687
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILLAFE FL
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 9280
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY 6961
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 1526
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY 6666
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 7996
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5364
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4269
SUBJ:
NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 01/07/97
THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR POST'S INFORMATION:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 002650
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 01/07/97
THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR POST'S INFORMATION:
MEPP: UPDATE
ME/FRANCE: U/S PICKERING MEETINGS IN PARIS
ALGERIA: U.S. REACTION TO VIOLENCE
ALGERIA/IRAN: IS IRAN SUPPORTING THE ALGERIAN ARMED
ISLAMIC GROUP?
IRAN: QUESTIONS CONCERNING FROZEN ASSETS (L)
IRAQ: MILK POWDER FOR IRAQI CHILDREN (IO)
Page 1 of7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
MEPP
Q.
WHAT IS DENNIS DOING?
A. DENNIS IS ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE ROUND OF MEETINGS
WITH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN LEADERS.
HE WILL LIKELY BE IN ISRAEL THROUGH THE END OF THE
WEEK.
ME/FRANCE:
U/S PICKERING MEETINGS IN PARIS
Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF U/S PICKERING'S MEETINGS IN
PARIS? WHO INITIATED THEM?
A. AMBASSADOR PICKERING HELD DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE
EAST WITH HIS FRENCH COUNTERPARTS IN PARIS ON JANUARY 7.
-- THE US AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS CONDUCTED THESE
DISCUSSIONS AS PART OF OUR ONGOING CONTACTS REGARDING
ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.
-- DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE GAMUT OF MIDDLE EAST ISSUES.
( I F PRESSED ON WHAT ISSUES)
-- THEY INCLUDED IRAN, IRAQ, ALGERIA, AND THE SECRETARY'S
RECENT TRIP TO AFRICA.
Q. WITH W O DID PICKERING MEET?
HM
A. U/S PICKERING MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LAVITTE AND
AMB. PICKERING'S DIRECT COUNTERPART AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY,
JACQUES BLOT.
Q. DID PICKERING RAISE THE TOTAL DEAL WITH IRAN?
A. AS I SAID, ISSUES RELATED TO IRAN WERE DISCUSSED.
AM OBVIOUSLY NOT GOING TO GET INTO SPECIFICS OF THE
DISCUSSIONS.
ALGERIA: US REACTION TO VIOLENCE
Q. WHAT IS THE US POSITION ON FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ALGERIAN SITUATION? DO YOU AGREE WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY
COOK THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A LEGITIMATE
INTEREST IN IT?
A. WE SHARE THE CONCERNS OF OTHER NATIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH REGARD TO THE MASSACRES IN
Page 2 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
ALGERIA. INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ONGOING HUMAN
TRAGEDY IN ALGERIA IS NORMAL AND UNDERSTANDABLE.
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 002650
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 01/07/97
-- THESE TERRORIST ATTACKS MERIT CONDEMNATION FROM THE
ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
WE WANT TO SEE THESE BARBARIC ATTACKS END.
THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO ALL I T CAN TO PROTECT
CIVILIANS AND BRING THE TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE, WHILE ALSO
RESPECTING THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
THE U.S. IS ENCOURAGING THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO
ALLOW OUTSIDE OBSERVERS TO VIEW AND STUDY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION THERE. ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE TOLD US THEY
WOULD ACCEPT A VISIT BY A UN HUMAN RIGHTS RAPPORTEUR. WE
ENCOURAGE THIS STEP.
-- WE ARE ALSO ENCOURAGING INDEPENDENT NGO'S TO UNDERTAKE
SUCH INQUIRIES.
-- LONG-LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN ALGERIA REQUIRES
FIGHTING TERROR AND, ULTIMATELY, A BROADENING OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS TO INCLUDE ALL ALGERIANS WHO REJECT
VIOLENCE, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IN
ADDITION, THERE MUST BE MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC REFORM.
-- LET ME REITERATE: THE NEED IS TO END THE MASSACRE OF
ALGERIA'S CITIZENRY. THERE CAN BE NO RATIONALE FOR
VIOLENCE, LET ALONE THE INHUMAN BEHAVIOR WE ARE N W
O
WITNESSING.
Q. BUT THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT SAID PUBLICLY AND TOLD YOUR
AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY THAT I T CATEGORICALLY REJECTED AN
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE SITUATION.
A. AS I JUST SAID, WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW OUTSIDE OBSERVERS TO VISIT AND LOOK AT
THE SITUATION. THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT TOLD US I T WOULD
ACCEPT A VISIT BY A UN HUMAN RIGHTS RAPPORTEUR. WE
ENCOURAGE THIS STEP.
I WOULD REFER QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT MEANT WHEN IT REFERRED TO AN INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT.
( I F PRESSED)
OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE
REVOLVED AROUND A VISIT BY A UN HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIAL
Page 3 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
RAPPORTEUR.
ALGERIA/IRAN: IS IRAN SUPPORTING THE ALGERIAN ARMED ISLAMIC
GROUP?
Q. DOES THE US HAVE EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP IN ALGERIA?
A. WE NOTED IN OUR LATEST REPORT ON "PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM" THAT THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ACCUSED IRAN
AND SUDAN OF SUPPORTING ALGERIAN EXTREMISTS.
— THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONDEMNED THE MASSACRES AND
SAID IT WANTED TO SEE THOSE RESPONSIBLE EXPOSED
INTERNATIONALLY..
THE QUESTION OF A U.S. ASSESSMENT OF ANY IRANIAN
RELATIONSHIP WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS WOULD INVOLVE
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND I AM NOT GOING TO GET INTO SUCH
MATTERS FROM THE PODIUM.
IRAN: QUESTIONS CONCERNING FROZEN ASSETS (L)
CONTEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 002650
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XF, IS
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 01/07/97
ON JANUARY 6, THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED AN ARTICLE
SUGGESTING THAT, AS A CONDITION FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS,
IRAN WOULD DEMAND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IT SAYS IT IS OWED BY
THE U.S. FOR WEAPONS IT PAID FOR BUT WERE NEVER DELIVERED
BECAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION. ALSO, ON JANUARY 6, ABC ASKED
AT THE NOON PRESS BRIEFING FOR A RUN-DOWN ON WHAT IRANIAN
ASSETS ARE IN THE U.S. AND WHAT MONEYS ARE IN DISPUTE. IN
1997, C-SPAN BROADCAST AN INTERVIEW WITH THEN-PRESIDENT
RAFSANJANI, IN WHICH HE STATED THAT RETURN OF IRANIAN
FROZEN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A "GESTURE"
SUFFICIENT FOR IRAN TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES. RAFSANJANI SPECIFIED THAT HE WAS REFERRING
TO FUNDS IRAN DEPOSITED FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT UNDER THE
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ("EMS") PROGRAM.
THE ALGIERS ACCORDS, THE 1981 AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE
HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED, RESULTED IN THE TRANSFER BY THE
UNITED STATES OF $9,975 BILLION OF PREVIOUSLY FROZEN
IRANIAN FUNDS TO IRAN AND TO VARIOUS ESCROW ACCOUNTS FOR
THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS AGAIN IRAN. IN ADDITION, IRAN HAS
MADE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
RELATED TO THE EMS PROGRAM THAT HAVE BEEN PENDING AT THE
Page 4 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE SINCE THE
EARLY 1980'S. WE REGARD THES? CLAIMS AS HIGHLY INFLATED
AND/OR WITHOUT MERIT. OUR BASIC POSITION IS THAT THESE
MATTERS ARE BEING LITIGATED AT THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL IN
THE HAGUE AND THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE IN A PUBLIC FORUM TO
ADDRESS THEM IN ANY DETAIL. UNDER THE ACCORDS, TRIBUNAL
AWARDS ARE BINDING AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST EITHER
GOVERNMENT IN THE COURTS OF ANY NATION.
Q. DOES THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO HOLD BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS OF IRANIAN FUNDS WHICH IRAN PROVIDED FOR
UNDELIVERED MILITARY EQUIPMENT?
A. NO.
HOWEVER, DURING THE 1980'S IRAN FILED CLAIMS
BEFORE THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE,
INCLUDING A CLAIM SEEKING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, PRIMARILY
FOR ALLEGED OVERCHARGES AND NON-DELIVERIES OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM WE HAD
-WITH IRAN PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION AND FOR ALLEGEDLY
UNJUSTIFIED CHARGES BILLED TO IRAN FOR TERMINATING THAT
PROGRAM.
-- THESE CLAIMS ARE UNDER ACTIVE ARBITRATION AT THE
TRIBUNAL. DECISION ON THEM WILL BE ISSUED BY THAT TRIBUNAL
IN DUE COURSE.
Q. DOES THE UNITED STATES HOLD BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF
IRANIAN FUNDS IN AN EMS ACCOUNT?
A. NO. WHETHER THE UNITED STATES OWES IRAN ANY FUNDS, AND
I F SO HOW MUCH, IS IN DISPUTE AND WILL IN DUE COURSE BE
RESOLVED BY THE TRIBUNAL.
Q. ARE THERE OTHER IRANIAN CLAIMS UNDER ARBITRATION AT THE
TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE?
A. YES. IRAN HAS MADE A SERIES OF OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES INCLUDING CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY THE SHAH
AND HIS FAMILY ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD IN THE UNITED STATES
IN 1981, CLAIMS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
DID NOT LICENSE CERTAIN PRIVATE EXPORTS TO IRAN AFTER THE
REVOLUTION, AND FOR INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
IN SOME OF THESE CLAIMS, IRAN ALSO SEEKS SEVERAL BILLION
DOLLARS.
Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON IRAN'S CLAIMS?
A. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THE SPECIFICS OF
THE CLAIMS. I CAN SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS VIGOROUSLY
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 STATE 002650
INFORM CONSULS-PASS PAOS-MILITARY ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, XF, IS
Page 5 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE - 01/07/97
CONTESTING IRAN'S CLAIMS.
Q. WHAT BENEFIT HAS THE TRIBUNAL BEEN TO THE UNITED
STATES?
A. AS A RESULT OF THE REVOLUTION, MANY U.S. INDIVIDUALS
AND BUSINESSES HAD CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN AND FILED THOSE
CLAIMS AT THE TRIBUNAL. SINCE ITS CREATION IN 1981, THE
TRIBUNAL HAS DISPOSED OF ABOUT 4,000 CASES AND HAS AWARDED
ABOUT $2.4 5 BILLION TO U.S. CLAIMANTS. AWARDS TO U.S.
CLAIMANTS HAVE ALL BEEN PAID OUT OF THE SECURITY ACCOUNT
ESTABLISHED BY THE ALGIERS ACCORDS FOR THAT PURPOSE.
( I F ASKED)
Q. ARE WE READY TO DISCUSS IRAN'S CLAIMS WITH IRAN?
A. UNITED STATES AND IRANIAN LAWYERS HAVE DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF PENDING CASES ON A REGULAR BASIS
SINCE 1986. WE DO NOT REGARD THE DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
PENDING IN THE HAGUE AS A POLITICAL MATTER. FOR EXAMPLE,
FORMER LEGAL ADVISER CONRAD HARPER CONDUCTED DISCUSSIONS
RESULTING IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE IRAN AIR 655 CASE THAT
IRAN HAD BROUGHT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
OF CERTAIN BANK CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
THAT IRAN HAD BROUGHT BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL.
-- CLAIM DISCUSSIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL A SETTLEMENT
IS CONCLUDED, AND ARE HANDLED SOLELY ON A LEGAL AND
TECHNICAL BASIS. THEY DO NOT INVOLVE ANY POLITICAL
MATTERS. WE DO NOT ANNOUNCE THE DATES OF SUCH TALKS IN
ADVANCE.
Q. ARE SUCH TALKS UNDER WAY NOW?
A. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES OCCUR REGULARLY IN THE
HAGUE.
IRAQ: MILK POWDER FOR IRAQI CHILDREN (IO)
Q. HAS THE U.S. BLOCKED THE DISTRIBUTION OF BABY MILK
POWDER?
A. IRAQ HAS ALLEGED RECENTLY THAT THE U.S. HAS BLOCKED
CONTRACTS FOR BABY MILK POWDER DESTINED FOR IRAQ. NOTHING
COULD BE FARTHER FROM THE TRUTH. WE HAVE NEVER BLOCKED
BABY MILK POWDER FOR ANY REASON.
-- IRAQ REQUESTED AN ALLOCATION OF 8,100 METRIC TONS OF
MILK POWDER DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE "OIL-FOR-FOOD"
PROGRAM. CONTRACTS FOR THE ENTIRE ALLOCATION WERE APPROVED
BY THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE.
Page 6 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD029\JAN98\MSGS\M3095930.html
-- WE RECEIVED A REQUEST ON MONDAY FOR APPROVAL OF 1000
METRIC TONS OF MILK POWDER FROM TUNISIA -- WORTH NEARLY $3
MILLION. WE HAVE ALREADY RECOMMENDED TO THE UN THAT THE
REQUEST BE APPROVED. FOR SOME REASON, IRAQ INITIALLY
REQUESTED AN ALLOCATION OF ONLY 3,160 MT OF MILK POWDER FOR
PHASE I I . ASSUMING THAT THE REST OF THE SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE TUNISIAN CONTRACT, WE
WILL HAVE APPROVED OVER 50& MORE BABY MILK POWDER UNDER
PHASE I I THAN IRAQ HAD INITIALLY REQUESTED.
-- THIS TUNISIAN CONTRACT FOR BABY MILK IS ONE OF $120
MILLION WORTH OF FOOD CONTRACTS THAT IRAQ ORIGINALLY
REQUESTED NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. WE
HOPE THAT THE REMAINDER OF THAT GROUP OF CONTRACTS CAN BE
CONSIDERED SHORTLY.
ALBRIGHT
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
<- SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
OSECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
SSN: 2650
< SSN>2650
< SSN>2650
< SSN>2650
TOR: 980107182522 M3095930
< TOR>980107182523 M3095931
< TOR>980107182524 M3095933
< TOR>980107182525 M3095935
DIST:
SIT: NSC
s
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
Page 7 of 7
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
015. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/07/1998
Re: [Expectations] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[1 1/03/1997 -01/07/1998]
2009-1295-F
ke2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Aet -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[11/03/1997-01/07/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-003-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/55ab1ae951ea7d535c15d7f94e50e2e8.pdf
059386cf3b91f80ee84ea5dc931deb08
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
001. cable
Re: [Elections] (6 pages)
10/01/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Summary for 05 Oct 97] (5 pages)
10/05/1997
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: 4th Quarter Status Report - Algiers (5 pages)
10/06/1997
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Press Conference] (4 pages)
10/06/1997
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [Algerian Tragedy] (5 pages)
10/06/1997
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Support Cable for Middle East Brief] (3 pages)
10/08/1997
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Support Cable for European Brief] (4 pages)
10/08/1997
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Algerian political situation] (3 pages)
10/08/1997
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Summary for 9 Oct.] (14 pages)
10/09/1997
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [Summary for 9 Oct.] (I I pages)
10/09/1997
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [GIA] (5 pages)
10/10/1997
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: 1997 Human Rights Report for Algeria (27 pages)
10/17/1997
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [Demarche] (6 pages)
10/31/1997
Pl/b(l)
DATE
RESTRICTION
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-1
7
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 220-4(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
Vi
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidcnlial or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/01/1997
Re: [Elections] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2958693.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHLOA1435 2751019-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 021019Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHLO
021019Z OCT 97
AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8275
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O 8996
OCW
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 64 93
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 9862
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0912
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1746
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3559
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7860
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2629
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3279
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9943
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEBBEA/DOT WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//019//
RUDOVFA/3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//PA//
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0296
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0305
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1877
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1017
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6590
LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
NO FOREIGN NEWS OF NOTE ON THIS MORNING'S NEWSCASTS.
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 011435
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
Page 1 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2958693.html
Page 2 of 5
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2,
1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
NO FOREIGN NEWS OF NOTE ON THIS MORNING'S NEWSCASTS.
B) MAJOR PRESS STORIES
1.
2.
3.
4.
C)
MIDEAST
ALGERIA
KYOTO
NORTHERN IRELAND
SUMMARY
1. MIDEAST
REPORTS SPECULATED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE "RELEASE"
OR "DEPTATION" TO JORDAN OF HAMAS LEADER SHEIKH AHMAD YASSIN. A
"DEAL" INVOLVING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN,
FOR THE RELEASE OF TWO MOSSAD AGENTS, WAS SUGGESTED.
2. ALGERIA
THE "TIMES" DEPLORED WHAT IT SAW AS "THE SHAMEFUL SILENCE" OF THE
ISLAMIC WORLD IN THE FACE OF ATROCITIES IN ALGERIA. "SHAME HAS
COVERED THE CRIMES IN ALGERIA; IT IS UP TO MUSLIMS EVERYWHERE TO
REDEEM THE NOBILITY AND COMPASSION OF THEIR FAITH," THE PAPER
EDITORIALIZED.
3. KYOTO
EUROPE WAS REPORTED CHALLENGING A RELUCTANT UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
TO ACHIEVE "A TOUGH PACT" ON GLOBAL WARMING AT THE UPCOMING KYOTO
CONFERENCE.
4. NORTHERN IRELAND
REPORTED THREATENING TO CUT OFF SINN FEIN'S AMERICAN FUNDING.
D) TEXT
1. MIDEAST
"AILING HAMAS LEADER FREED IN SHADY DEAL'"
THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL TIMES" HAD THIS REPORT FROM JERUSALEM
10/02 :
"ISRAEL YESTERDAY RELEASED SHEIKH AHMAD YASSIN, THE SPIRITUAL
LEADER OF HAMAS, THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, AND IMMEDIATELY
DEPORTED HIM TO JORDAN AMID SPECULATION OF A DEAL INVOLVING THE
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2958693.html
RETURN TO ISRAEL OF TWO ALLEGED MOSSAD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS...
"PALESTINIAN AND HAMAS OFFICIALS CONDEMNED THE DEPORTATION, SAYING
ISRAEL HAD ARRANGED A SHADY' DEAL WITH JORDAN FOR THE RELEASE OF
TWO AGENTS WHO THEY CLAIM WERE INVOLVED IN LAST WEEK'S BOTCHED
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON KHALED MESHAL, A HAMAS LEADER LIVING IN
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 011435
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1997
JORDAN...
"THE SPEED WITH WHICH ISRAEL RESPONDED TO KING HUSSEIN'S REQUEST
SUGGESTS A WELL-COORDINATED DECISION... SHEIKH YASSIN SAID HE
WOULD BE GOING BACK TO GAZA SOON."
"SPIRITUAL LEADER OF HAMAS RELEASED FROM PRISON"
THE CENTRIST "INDEPENDENT" HAD THIS REPORT FROM MIDDLE EAST EDITOR
PATRICK COCKBURN IN JERUSALEM 10/02:
" I F SHEIKH YASSIN DOES RETURN TO GAZA, WHICH CAN ONLY BE DONE WITH
ISRAEL'S PERMISSION, HIS PRESENCE WILL MAKE I T MORE DIFFICULT FOR
YASSER ARAFAT, THE PALESTINIAN LEADER, TO DEAL HARSHLY WITH HAMAS.
THE EXACT STATE OF HIS HEALTH IS UNCLEAR... BUT ON ARRIVAL IN
AMMAN, SHEIKH YASSIN SOUNDED MORE COHERENT THAN EXPECTED..."
2. ALGERIA
"IRON IN THE SOUL"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" EDITORIALIZED 10/02:
"THE HORROR IN ALGERIA KNOWS NO BOUNDS. THE WEEKEND MASSACRE BY
ISLAMIST TERRORISTS OF 40 VILLAGERS INCLUDED ATROCITIES UNSPEAKABLE
EVEN BY THE STANDARDS OF THE FIVE-YEAR CIVIL WAR...
"THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR IS AN ABOMINATION THAT HAS ALREADY CLAIMED
60,000 LIVES. NO END TO THE KILLINGS IS IN SIGHT...
"FROM MUCH OF THE WORLD THERE IS SILENCE. BUT THERE IS ONE SWATH
OF THE GLOBE WHERE SILENCE IS ESPECIALLY SHAMEFUL. THE MUSLIM
WORLD HAS SO MUFFLED ITS CONDEMNATION THAT ITS WHISPERED WORDS LOOK
Page 3 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2958693.html
PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT -- INSIST THAT THE TERRORIST PERVERSION
OF ISLAM HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH RELIGION. BUT OTHERS, RIDING THE
WAVE OF FUNDAMENTALISM, SHRINK FROM ANY DENUNCIATION OF POLITICAL
ISLAM, EVEN IN ITS CRUELLEST MANIFESTATION. WHERE ARE THE VOICES
THAT MATTER?..
"SHAME HAS COVERED THE CRIMES IN ALGERIA; I T IS UP TO MUSLIMS
EVERYWHERE TO REDEEM THE NOBILITY AND COMPASSION OF THEIR FAITH."
3. KYOTO
"EUROPE SETS GREENHOUSE GAS EXAMPLE TO AMERICA"
MARTIN WALKER OF THE LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" HAD THE FOLLOWING REPORT
FROM BRUSSELS 10/2:
"EUROPE IS ON TRACK TO BEAT ITS SELF-IMPOSED TARGET FOR THE
REDUCTION OF GLOBAL WARMING EMISSIONS TO BELOW 1990 LEVELS BY 2000,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION BOASTED YESTERDAY.
"THE UNEXPECTED SUCCESS GAVE CREDIBILITY TO ITS NEW OFFER TO CUT
EMISSIONS TO 15 PER CENT LOWER THAN 1990 LEVELS BY 2010, I T
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 011435
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1997
CLAIMED.
"THAT OFFER, DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN TO REACH A TOUGH PACT ON GLOBAL WARMING AT THE KYOTO SUMMIT
IN DECEMBER, HAD BEEN QUESTIONED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS AS
UNREALISTIC...
"THE COMMISSION ISSUED ITS DETAILED PLAN ON EMISSION REDUCTION
AHEAD OF NEXT WEEK'S SPECIAL CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WHERE
THE UNITED STATES IS EXPECTED TO THRASH OUT ITS OWN NEGOTIATING
POSITION ON GREENHOUSE GAS CUTS FOR KYOTO.
"UNDER PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS AND CORPORATIONS TO MAKE NO
COMMITMENT THAT COULD DAMAGE INDUSTRY, RAISE TAXES OR THREATEN
JOBS, THE UNITED STATES HAD TRIED TO FEND OFF THE EUROPEAN UNION
INITIATIVE AS UNREALISTIC..."
Page 4 of 5
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2958693.html
4. NORTHERN IRELAND
"DONATIONS BAN THREATENS TO BLOCK SINN FEIN'S U.S. FUNDS"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" REPORTED 10/2:
"PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR'S BAN ON FOREIGN DONATIONS TO POLITICAL
PARTIES THREATENS SERIOUSLY TO UNDERMINE SINN FEIN'S ADVANCE INTO
MAINSTREAM DEMOCRATIC POLITICS.
"GERRY ADAMS'S PARTY WILL BE BARRED FROM SPENDING THE DOLLARS I T
RAISES IN AMERICA EACH YEAR I F THE LEGISLATION THAT THE PRIME
MINISTER UNVEILED IN TUESDAY'S LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE SPEECH
APPLIES TO NORTHERN IRELAND. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED UNAWARE OF
THIS CONSEQUENCE YESTERDAY...
"SINCE PRESIDENT CLINTON FIRST ALLOWED MR. ADAMS TO RAISE MONEY IN
AMERICA IN 1995, SINN FEIN HAS RAISED ABOUT $2 MILLION..." SMITH
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
SSN: 1435
< SSN>1435
< SSN>1435
TOR: 971002062208 M2958693
< TOR>971002062254 M2958694
< TOR>971002062310 M2958695
A
A
A
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BUTLER
SIT: NSC
Page 5 of 5
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/05/1997
Re: [Summary for 05 Oct 97] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
7
2009-I295-I
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Securit) Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: 4th Quarter Status Report - Algiers (5 pages)
10/06/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Aet - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PR A]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
10/06/1997
Re: [Press Conference] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
7
2009-1295-1
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Aet - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute ((b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) oftheFOIAI
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined iu accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/06/1997
Re: [Algerian Tragedy] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices nf
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of Ihe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
DATE
SU BJECT/TITLE
Re: [Support Cable for Middle East Brief] (3 pages)
10/08/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-1ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(K) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAJ
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRAI
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Support Cable for European Brief] (4 pages)
10/08/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-r
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled fnr law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/08/1997
Re: [Algerian political situation] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release w ould disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 9 Oct.] (14 pages)
10/09/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAJ
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning w ells [(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA]
I'd Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/09/1997
Re: [Summary for 9 Oct.] (11 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-r
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
011. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
10/10/1997
Re: [GIA] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such adv isors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unw arranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(h)(1) nf the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT AIITI. E
DATE
Re: 1997 Human Rights Report for Algeria (27 pages)
10/17/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. S.S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating lo the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA)
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
Cable
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SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHL0A2025 29'31142-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 211142Z OCT 97
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHLO
211142Z OCT 97
AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8341
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEBBEA/DOT WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0344
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2632
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5362
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 364 4
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6554
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O 9077
OCW
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1979
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0385
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 034 9
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6621
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1806
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 9920
RUDOVFA/3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//PA//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//019//
LONDON MEDIA REPORT, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21,
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
1997
ON ALGERIA, BBC RADIO REPORTED 10/21:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 012025
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
Page 1 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
ON ALGERIA, BBC RADIO REPORTED 10/21:
"ALGERIA IS GOING THROUGH HELL. RECENT MONTHS HAVE SEEN SOME OF
THE WORST BUTCHERY SINCE THE CURRENT CRISIS BEGAN MORE THAN FIVE
YEARS AGO, WITH HUNDREDS OF CIVILIANS BEING MASSACRED IN APPARENTLY
SENSELESS AND BRUTAL ATTACKS.
"GIVEN THE FREQUENCY OF THE MASSACRES, FEW PEOPLE BELIEVE THE
GOVERNMENT'S CLAIMS THAT THE TERRORISTS ARE ON THEIR LAST LEGS AND
THAT PEACE IS AT HAND . MANY ALGERIANS ARE DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS."
B) MAJOR PRESS STORIES
1. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
2. KYOTO
3. MIDEAST
C) SUMMARY
1. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
IN PRE-ARRIVAL INTERVIEWS IN AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS, PRESIDENT JIANG
ZEMIN WAS REPORTED ATTEMPTING TO DEFUSE CRITICISM BY ACTIVISTS
PLANNING A HOSTILE RECEPTION. TWO FORMER USG OFFICIALS OFFERED
THEIR VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS OF ENGAGING
CHINA IN THE WORLD MARKET ECONOMY.
2. KYOTO
PUBLICATION OF FIGURES SHOWING A "SURGE" IN AMERICA'S GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS WERE SEEN AS NOT BODING WELL FOR THE UNITED STATES
POSITION AT THE DECEMBER CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL WARMING.
3. MIDEAST
DENNIS ROSS WAS REPORTED ON THE ROAD AGAIN AS THE ISRAELIS SIGNAL
"TIME-OUT" ON NEW SETTLEMENTS.
D) TEXT
1. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
"JIANG HITS BACK AT AMERICAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON 10/21:
"IN A RARE SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN JOURNALISTS, PRESIDENT
JIANG ZEMIN YESTERDAY CALLED FOR A NEW LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND BEIJING, ATTEMPTING TO DEFUSE CRITICISM BY HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS OF HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO AMERICA.
Page 2 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
"IN A MOVE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO SMOOTH THE PATH FOR THE FIRST STATE
VISIT BY A CHINESE LEADER TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE TIANANMEN
SQUARE MASSACRE, MR. JIANG URGED AMERICANS TO SEEK COMMON GROUND
WITH BEIJING.. . "
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 012025
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
"COMMENT AND ANALYSIS"
THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL TIMES" CARRIED TWO PERSONAL OPINION
BYLINERS BY ROBERT HORMATS, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, AND JEFFREY GARTEN, FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE. EXCERPTS:
"OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS"
HORMATS, CURRENTLY VICE-CHAIRMAN OF GOLDMAN SACHS, WROTE:
"THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN TO WASHINGTON PRESENTS
PRESIDENT CLINTON WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN
AMERICAN TIES WITH THE WORLD'S FASTEST GROWING ECONOMY AND TO
RESTORE MOMENTUM TO WASHINGTON'S FLAGGING EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION.
"MR. CLINTON SHOULD USE THE OCCASION... TO FORGE A PARTNERSHIP FOR
PROSPERITY WITH MR. JIANG. BY DOING SO HE COULD GIVE A POWERFUL
IMPETUS TO FURTHER INTEGRATION OF CHINA INTO THE WORLD MARKET
ECONOMY. THAT WOULD ADVANCE NOT ONLY CHINA'S REFORMS BUT ALSO THE
PROSPECTS FOR FREER GLOBAL COMMERCE GENERALLY..."
"ROGUE ELEPHANT RAMPANT?"
GARTEN, CURRENTLY DEAN OF THE YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, WROTE:
"WHEN BILL CLINTON MEETS HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART IN WASHINGTON NEXT
WEEK, HIGH ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S AGENDA WILL BE THE IMPORTANCE OF
HELPING CHINA BECOME MORE INTEGRATED INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY.
Page 3 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
Page 4 of 6
"THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION IS THAT, AS CHINA FURTHER OPENS ITS
TRADE AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, AND AS I T EVENTUALLY ACCEPTS THE RULES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION, THE WEST WILL NO LONGER HAVE TO FIGHT WITH BEIJING
ABOUT EVERYTHING FROM TEXTILES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.
INSTEAD, THE TASK WILL BE TO NUDGE CHINA ALONG TO ENSURE I T BECOMES
A FULLY FLEDGED MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
"IT IS AN APPEALING THOUGHT, BUT IT IS DEEPLY FLAWED. CHINA IS
LIKELY TO CHANGE THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM AS MUCH AS I T WILL BE
DISCIPLINED BY I T . AND THE WEST IS NOT REMOTELY READY FOR THE
TUMULTUOUS DISLOCATIONS AHEAD...
"NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT CHINA SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED TO JOIN THE
WESTERN CLUB. AFTER ALL, THE ALTERNATIVES ARE WORSE. BUT AS
NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA EXPERT AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE, ASKS: WILL CHINA CONFORM TO WESTERN VALUES OR WILL I T
FORCE THE WEST TO CHANGE? IN THE FACE OF POWERFUL CAPITALIST
CURRENTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE ANSWER IS THAT BOTH WILL
HAPPEN. ENGAGING WITH BEIJING WILL SURELY BE A MUCH LONGER AND
MORE PAINFUL PROCESS THAN WESTERN LEADERS N W CONTEMPLATE.
O
"AT THE FORTHCOMING BILATERAL SUMMIT, THERE WILL NO DOUBT BE THE
USUAL ROUND OF STATESMAN-LIKE RHETORIC. BUT THE WEST SHOULD
REMEMBER THAT, HITHERTO, CHINA HAS BEEN AN ELEPHANT DIPPING ITS
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 012025
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
TRUNK INTO THE WATER.
N W IT IS ABOUT TO JUMP INTO THE POOL."
O
2. KYOTO
"EMISSIONS IN U.S. SURGE"
THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL TIMES" REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON 10/21:
"AMERICAN EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES RECORDED THEIR LARGEST RATE
OF INCREASE IN RECENT YEARS, THE ENERGY DEPARTMENT SAID YESTERDAY
IN A REPORT EXPECTED TO BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING FOR THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION...
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
"PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS VOWED TO TAKE A LEAD ON THE REDUCTION OF
BINDING GOALS' AT THE KYOTO CONFERENCE IN DECEMBER...
"BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM INDUSTRY
NOT TO COMMIT TO ANY PLAN THAT WOULD PROVE COSTLY..."
"U.S. GREENHOUSE GASES RISE"
THE LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" REPORTED 10/21:
"SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN AMERICAN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS HAVE
ALL BUT PUT PAID TO ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE WORLD'S BIGGEST
CONTRIBUTOR TO GLOBAL WARMING WILL BE ABLE TO SIGN A NEW
INTERNATIONAL TREATY LIMITING POLLUTANTS LATER THIS YEAR...
"THE SOARING RISES CAME AS OFFICIALS FROM MORE THAN 150 COUNTRIES
MET IN BONN TO PREPARE A DRAFT TREATY ON GLOBAL WARMING TO BE
SIGNED IN KYOTO IN DECEMBER...
"BUT THE STARK CONCLUSION FROM THE NEW AMERICAN FIGURES IS THAT THE
UNITED STATES HAS DONE LITTLE TO CURB ITS ENORMOUS APPETITE FOR
ENERGY. THIS RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBYISTS
WILL RENEW CALLS FOR CONSUMER BOYCOTTS OF AMERICAN OIL AND CARS,
ESPECIALLY I F IT FAILS TO SIGN UP AT KYOTO..."
3. MIDEAST
"ENVOY BACK ON PEACE SHUTTLE"
THE INDEPENDENT "SCOTSMAN" (EDINBURGH) REPORTED FROM JERUSALEM
10/20:
"PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VETERAN PEACE ENVOY, DENNIS ROSS, HAS OPENED
A NEW MIDDLE EAST SHUTTLE MISSION WITH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS
SQUABBLING OVER THE FATE OF THEIR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS...
"BOTH SIDES SAID A WASHINGTON-PROPOSED TIME-OUT' ON SETTLEMENT
EXPANSION WOULD BE AMONG ISSUES RAISED DURING ROSS'S VISIT..."
"NETANYAHU SET TO CALL TIME ON NEW SETTLEMENTS"
THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL TIMES" REPORTED FROM JERUSALEM 10/21:
"ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU IS PREPARED TO STOP NEW PLANS FOR
EXPANDING SETTLEMENTS BUT WILL INSIST WORK ALREADY UNDERWAY WILL
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 012025
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
Page 5 of 6
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\OCT97\MSGS\M2985290.html
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
CONTINUE, SENIOR OFFICIALS SAID YESTERDAY.
"THE GESTURE, WHICH MR. NETANYAHU WILL MAKE TO AMERICAN ENVOY
DENNIS ROSS, COINCIDES WITH THE RESUMPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL TALKS
BETWEEN ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATORS UNDER UNITED STATES
AUSPICES. IT SIGNALS A MODEST SHIFT IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY.
SMITH
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
OSECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
A
A
SSN:
2025
< SSN>2025
< SSN>2025
< SSN>2025
971021074704 M2985290
< TOR>971021074719 M2985291
< TOR>971021074741 M2985292
< TOR>971021074741 M2985293
A
A
A
TOR:
A
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BANDLER BUTLER JOHNSON LUZZATTO MCELDOWNEY RUBIN SAPIRO TODD
SIT: NSC
Page 6 of 6
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PAAUZYUW RUDKMKA7 938 2 95164 9-UUAX--RHEH0ND.
ZNR UUUAX
P 221643Z OCT 97
FM FBIS LONDON UK
RUDKMKA
221643Z OCT 97
FBIS LONDON UK
RUCWAAA/FBIS RESTON VA
RAYWBBK/DIO CANBERRA AS
RHDIAAA/AFOSI REGION 2 RTAC LANGLEY AFB VA
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2//
RHDLPAA/AFOSI 51 FIS OL-C LONDON UK
RHDLPUQ/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA ROTA SP//EURT//
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RUWGTCG/COMPACAREA COGARD ALAMEDA CA//PI//
RUWMBKA/612 AINS DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ//INTA//
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RUWTAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
RYFWN/COMMNORTH//JOINTINT//
ACCT FBLD-EWDK
INFO:
SUBJ:
////
Take 3 o f 3 -- Spanish Foreign M i n i s t e r
Interviewed
TEXT:
UNCLAS 7L/SPAIP CUBAP ECP TERROR POL
WARNING: ATTN MILAN ECON
WARNING: GENEVA: ARMS CONTROL
WARNING: BRUSSELS/4: COML/ECON/PR/POL
WARNING: ATTN VIENNA LEGATT/FAA
WARNING: TOPIC:
SERIAL:
PASS:
LEADER, TERRORISM, POLITICAL, INTERNATIONAL
LD2210164397
COPY TO GSG/TOT
COUNTRY: SPAIN
SUBJ:
Take 3 o f 3 -- Spanish Foreign M i n i s t e r
REF:
ld2210164197 madrid t v e i n t e r n a c i o n a 1
220710///history of g i b r a l t a r .
Interviewed
t e l e v i s i o n Spanish
TEXT:
[FBIS T r a n s l a t e d E x c e r p t ] [Matutes c o n t i n u e s ] The f a c t i s t h a t a t
the p r e s e n t time the o b s t a c l e f o r the B r i t i s h — which does n o t
a f f e c t us and not even the United a t i o n s -- i s t h a t they have
promised, w e l l , not t o do a n y t h i n g , they say -- t h i s i s t h e i r
i n t e r n a l problem -- w i t h o u t the agreement o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e
colony, the famous r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , which was c l a i m e d on
Spanish T e l e v i s i o n by Mr. Caruana -- the c h i e f m i n i s t e r o f
G i b r a l t a r , I t h i n k he i s ; he i s no more than a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y
because e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s , defense, and so on,
and t h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a r e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the c o l o n i a l power, which
is Britain.
There i s no r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n here, t h i s i s
not even r e c o g n i z e d by the United N a t i o n s , which recognizes i t f o r
everyone. Why i s t h i s ? Because the Spanish -- and t h i s i s one o f
the q u e s t i o n s which I somewhat missed on the p a r t o f the j o u r n a l i s t
who i n t e r v i e w e d him [Caruana, on Spanish T e l e v i s i o n ] - when t h e
B r i t i s h occupied t h i s area, the Spanish were e x p e l l e d .
I t was t h e
B r i t i s h who brought i n the p o p u l a t i o n , so when i t comes t o
d e t e r m i n i n g the d e c o l o n i z a t i o n o f the Rock, i t i s not the c o l o n i z e d
p o p u l a t i o n which has the r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n because i t i s
the c o l o n i a l power's very own p o p u l a t i o n and t h i s i s why the U n i t e d
N a t i o n s , which always recognizes the r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,
does not r e c o g n i z e i t i n the case o f G i b r a l t a r and the o t h e r
p r i n c i p l e takes precedence i n s t e a d , the p r i n c i p l e o f the r e c o v e r y o f
Spain's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y .
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Page 4 of 5
This was a good q u e s t i o n t o have asked him [Caruana], b u t i n any
event, i t i s obvious t h a t i t i s a d i s p u t e about which we have been
t a l k i n g f o r some time and i n which, a l b e i t v e r y s l o w l y , we a r e
making some progress -- regards b e t t e r c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f i g h t
a g a i n s t drugs t r a f f i c k i n g , a g a i n s t smuggling, a g a i n s t i l l i c i t goods
i n g e n e r a l — b u t n o t enough p r o g r e s s .
For t h i s v e r y reason Spain
c o n t i n u e s t o apply r e s t r i c t i o n s on G i b r a l t a r , above a l l , a i r
restrictions.
Our idea i s t o see i f we can reach an agreement i n these t a l k s
w i t h t h e B r i t i s h i n such a way t h a t we b o t h f i n d advantage and can
ease o r l i f t t h e a i r r e s t r i c t i o n s i n exchange f o r concessions by t h e
B r i t i s h , something t h a t would be applauded by our NATO p a r t n e r s . I s
i t p o s s i b l e i n t h e end t o reach t h e agreement t h a t we would a l l want
between t h e two o f us? What we have t o do i s n o t take t h i s
b i l a t e r a l d i s p u t e t o t h e NATO t a b l e because i t i s n o t f a i r t o take
our p a r t n e r s hostage and say, w e l l , as l o n g as t h e s t a t u s quo
c o n t i n u e s , t h e s i t u a t i o n as i t i s w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s by Spain, w i t h
l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e p a r t o f t h e B r i t i s h as regards our r i g h t s t h e r e
— w e l l , l e t ' s p u t i t t o one s i d e , l e t ' s c o n t i n u e our b i l a t e r a l
n e g o t i a t i o n s , and t h e NATO reforms should n o t be a f f e c t e d by t h i s
absence o f agreement. This i s Spain's p o s i t i o n . As you know, day
by day B r i t a i n c o n t i n u e s t o demand t h e l i f t i n g o f these r e s t r i c t i o n s
w i t h o u t f u r t h e r ado and n a t u r a l l y . . .
[Gonzalez F e r r a r i , i n t e r r u p t i n g ] I n exchange f o r n o t h i n g , o f
course.
[Matutes] Spain, i n exchange f o r n o t h i n g , i s n o t going t o do i t .
This i s t h e p o s i t i o n on which you asked me f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . And we
are going t o m a i n t a i n i t w i t h t h e utmost f i r m n e s s . Moreover, Prime
M i n i s t e r Aznar h i m s e l f s a i d t h i s t o Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r 13 or
14 days ago on t h e occasion o f t h e C o u n c i l o f Europe summit i n
S t r a s b o u r g . [Passage o m i t t e d on f l y i n s t u d i o ]
[ I g l e s i a s ] I f you don't mind, Mr. M i n i s t e r , l e t ' s now t a l k about
Algeria.
I have t h e f e e l i n g t h a t i n a few years' time when we know
the t r u e f i g u r e s from t h e c i v i l war i n A l g e r i a w e ' l l shudder more
than we n o r m a l l y do when we know t h a t t h e r e has been a t e r r i b l e
massacre w i t h women and c h i l d r e n w i t h t h e i r t h r o a t s c u t , which i s a
v e r y f r e q u e n t occurrence t h e r e . You have expressed concern about
Algeria.
I t i s a l s o a concern which f o r us i s i n s e p a r a b l e from t h a t
r e g i o n o f t h e w o r l d and we would l i k e you t o t e l l us b e f o r e you go
what we can do t o improve t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e r e w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r i n g .
[Gonzalez F e r r a r i ] And, on 23 October they've g o t e l e c t i o n s
there.
[ I g l e s i a s ] And, on 23 October, e l e c t i o n s , which are no minor
event.
[Matutes] A l g e r i a i s a f r i e n d and a neighbor, a c l o s e neighbor,
which means., moreover, t h a t i t s s t a b i l i t y i s i m p o r t a n t , t o o , f o r
our own s t a b i l i t y .
We a l l know t h a t , indeed, i t i s immersed i n a
process o f t e r r i b l e v i o l e n c e i n which massacres occur which would
a f f l i c t t h e s e n s i b i l i t y o f any person.
Besides o f f e r i n g a l l i t s a s s i s t a n c e — and I d i d t h i s d u r i n g an
o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o A l g e r i a — what Spain i s doing i s s u p p o r t i n g t h e
process o f r e f o r m i n which t h e A l g e r i a n government and P r e s i d e n t
Liamine Zeroual are engaged, o f f e r i n g our h e l p i n t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s m , and, o f course, always recommending t h a t t h e y do
e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e t e r r o r i s m ; and t h e best way t o
i s o l a t e t e r r o r i s m i s , o f course, t o t r y t o b r i n g i n t o t h e framework
of n e g o t i a t i o n a l l t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s which e x p r e s s l y renounce
v i o l e n c e and e x p r e s s l y condemn i t .
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And t h i s i s where we are, given t h a t A l g e r i a v e r y much guards i t s
independence and i n response t o o f f e r s o f m e d i a t i o n by I t a l y and
o t h e r M e d i t e r r a n e a n c o u n t r i e s i t has r e j e c t e d any i n t e r v e n t i o n ,
which means t h a t , o f course, t h e r e s t o f us have t o be t h e r e t o h e l p
t o the e x t e n t we can by i n c r e a s i n g t r a d e and speeding up t h e
n e g o t i a t i o n o f the Euro-Mediterranean agreement -- which we a r e now
n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h A l g e r i a -- b u t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , as long as t h e
A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s do not l e t us o r do not ask us f o r more h e l p ,
t h e r e i s l i t t l e e l s e we can do o t h e r than f o l l o w t h e s i t u a t i o n very
c a r e f u l l y , f o r example, and, on t h e o t h e r hand, t r y t o h e l p o t h e r
n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s which are doing what they can t o c r e a t e
employment, improve t h e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r peoples and
achieve g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y -- f o r example, Morocco, which i s a
c o u n t r y which i s c a r r y i n g out i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l reforms and which
s t i l l has a long way t o go; i t i s a l s o c a r r y i n g out economic reforms
which a r e g i v i n g good r e s u l t s and I b e l i e v e t h a t f o r us i t should
c o n s t i t u t e a f a c t o r o f comparison i n t h e sense o f s a y i n g t h a t we a r e
going t o t r y t o ensure t h a t o t h e r n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s a l s o have
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s which a v o i d t h e scourge o f
i r r a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m which A l g e r i a i s now s u f f e r i n g and which we a l l
hope i t w i l l overcome as soon as p o s s i b l e .
[passage o m i t t e d on
asylum law]
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND
DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT
OWNERS.
( e n d a l l ) 220710 germanos/px 22/1647z o c t W 1091
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SECTION: 01 OF 01
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971022130516 M2988116
SIT: NSC
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
10/31/1997
Re: [Demarche] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
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[10/01/1997 - 10/31/1997]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
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Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[10/01/1997-10/31/1997]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-002-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
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2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
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Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c40a97e694eec62181d86a3190187f1e.pdf
f65a4416062d6bd830adff067c3375c4
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [Summary for 11 Sep.] (12 pages)
09/11/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Summary for 11 Sep.] (11 pages)
09/11/1997
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Algerian Crisis] (2 pages)
09/11/1997
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Algerian government] (3 pages)
09/19/1997
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [Support Cable for Middle East Brief] (5 pages)
09/24/1997
PI/b(l)
006. cable
Re: Secretary's Moming Summary for 9/25/97 (16 pages)
09/25/1997
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Defense] (4 pages)
09/25/1997
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Support. Cable for Middle East Brief] (9 pages)
09/26/1997
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Foreign Policy] (8 pages)
09/26/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke209l
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Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
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National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Re: [Summary for 11 Sep.] (12 pages)
09/11/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-1ke2091
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P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
09/11/1997
Re: [Summary for 11 Sep.] (11 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc209l
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Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
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I'4
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
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PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJEdTITTLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Re: [Algerian Crisis] (2 pages)
09/11/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke209l
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Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
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h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
09/19/1997
Re: [Algerian government] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
PI/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. .SS2(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
h(J) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRAj
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2941899.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHFRA1250 2651202-UUZZ--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUZZ ZZH
0 221202Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHFR
221202Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3042
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 5344
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1224
RUDKBR/FBIS BRUSSELS BE
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUFRQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2886
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1198
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9563
RUEKJS/DIA WASHDC//ASD/ISA//
RUEHBS/AMEMBASY BRUSSELS 1789
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0134
MEDIA REACTION REPORT - U.S. POLICY--AMBASSADOR ROHATYN
ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS UN--REFORMS AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ALGERIA-- U.S. POSITION BOSNIA-- ELECTION RESULTS
CHINA--AFTERMATH OF 15TH PARTY CONGRESS
PARIS - MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 021250
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; I/RW; I/RNY (RANK); B/VOA; I/WEU; AF; STATE FOR
EUR/WE (JIM WOJTASIEWICZ)/P/SP; AF; INRP; INR/EUC (ROWDYBUSH);
PM; OSC ISA OR ILN; FOR NEA; WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/WEUROPE; DOC
FOR ITA/EUR/FR AND PASS USTR/PA (ANN LUZZATO); USINCEUR FOR PAO;
NATO FOR USIS; M S O FOR USIS; ROME FOR USIS/AIO; BRUSSELS FOR
OCW
USIS; USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT - U.S. POLICY--AMBASSADOR ROHATYN
ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS UN--REFORMS AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ALGERIA-- U.S. POSITION BOSNIA-- ELECTION RESULTS
CHINA--AFTERMATH OF 15TH PARTY CONGRESS
PARIS - MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
Page 1 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2941899.html
(A) SUBJECTS COVERED IN TODAY'S REPORT:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
U.S. POLICY--AMBASSADOR ROHATYN ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
UN--REFORMS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ALGERIA-- U.S. POSITION
BOSNIA-- ELECTION RESULTS
CHINA—AFTERMATH OF 15TH PARTY CONGRESS
(B) SUMMARY OF COVERAGE:
VARIOUS EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC ISSUES ARE HEADLINED, WITH THE
FUTURE OF THE EURO AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE FOREFRONT.
EDITORIALISTS COMMENT ON "THE NEW APPEASEMENT" NOTED BETWEEN
FRANCE AND GERMANY, WHILE RIGHT-OF-CENTER LE FIGARO SPEAKS OF
"TRUSTING CONFIDENCES" BETWEEN CHIRAC AND KOHL. PAUL GUILBERT
WRITES IN HIS EDITORIAL: "THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE WEIMAR SUMMIT
MADE THEIR JOINT MARCH TOWARD THE EURO THE MOST IMPORTANT
ELEMENT OF THE SUMMIT ...FRENCH FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER VEDRINE
CONFIRMS THAT THE EURO HAS BECOME THE 'SYMBOL' OF BOTH NATIONS'
MUTUAL DETERMINATION."
FRANCE'S NEW BUDGET GUIDELINES WILL BE DISCUSSED ON WEDNESDAY,
LEADING THE ECONOMIC PRESS TO WRITE: "THIS MARKS THE FIRST
DIFFICULT TEST FOR JOSPIN'S GOVERNMENT." MEANWHILE, AN OPINION
POLL REVEALS THAT PRESIDENT CHIRAC RETAINS A GOOD PUBLIC IMAGE:
52 OF THE PEOPLE POLLED TRUST THE FRENCH PRESIDENT, 76
BELIEVE HE WILL GO THE END OF HIS MANDATE, AND 68 PER CENT
THINK HE SHOULD ADDRESS THE NATION WHENEVER HE CONSIDERS IT
NECESSARY.
THE ECONOMIC PRESS ANNOUNCES A MAJOR HOSTILE TAKEOVER IN THE
FRENCH INSURANCE SECTOR BY PINAULT WHO WANTS TO TAKE OVER W R S
OM
AND CIE FOR 28 BILLION FRANCS.
SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL STORIES ARE HEADLINED. THE BOSNIAN
ELECTION, THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TED TURNER'S
SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE AFTERMATH OF THE 15TH CHINESE PARTY
CONGRESS, THE U.S. POSITION ON ALGERIA AND U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
PARIS FELIX ROHATYN ON FRANCO-AMERICA RELATIONS. ( SEE PART C)
(C) SUPPORTING TEXT/BLOCK QUOTES:
U.S. POLICY--AMBASSADOR ROHATYN ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
"STRONG RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S."
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS REPORTS AFTER INTERVIEWING AMBASSADOR
ROHATYN: "THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE CONSIDERS THAT
LIONEL JOSPIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE RATHER 'PRAGMATIC AND THAT
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON WERE FUNDAMENTALLY 'VERY
STRONG...' FOR AMBASSADOR ROHATYN, RECENT TENSIONS ON SUCH
ISSUES AS NATO REFORMS DO NOT DOMINATE FRANCO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS...WHICH ARE 'CLEARLY BETTER THAN MOST PEOPLE THINK..."
AMBASSADOR ROHATYN CONFIRMED THAT 'WASHINGTON IN NO WAY WANTED
TO PUSH FRANCE OUT OF AFRICA OR TO REDUCE ITS INFLUENCE ON THE
CONTINENT. THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO COOPERATE WITH FRANCE IN
AFRICA TO HELP THE CONTINENT'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
AND TO HELP I T ACHIEVE DEMOCRACY.'"
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2941899.html
UN--REFORMS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
"THE UN HOSTAGE OF THE U.S."
PATRICK SABATIER IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/22) : "THE
GENERAL CONFLICT OVER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP IS UNDERSCORED
BY ANOTHER CRISIS IN THE MAKING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE REST OF
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 021250
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; I/RW; I/RNY (FRANK); B/VOA; I/WEU; AF; STATE FOR
EUR/WE (JIM WOJTASIEWICZ)/P/SP; AF; INR/P; INR/EUC (ROWDYBUSH);
PM; OSC ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/WEUROPE; DOC
FOR ITA/EUR/FR AND PASS USTR/PA (ANN LUZZATO); USINCEUR FOR PAO;
NATO FOR USIS; M S O FOR USIS; ROME FOR USIS/AIO; BRUSSELS FOR
OCW
USIS; USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT - U.S. POLICY--AMBASSADOR ROHATYN
ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS UN--REFORMS AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ALGERIA-- U.S. POSITION BOSNIA-- ELECTION RESULTS
CHINA--AFTERMATH OF 15TH PARTY CONGRESS
PARIS - MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
THE UNITED NATIONS OVER ITS REFORMS, AND BY MAJOR FINANCIAL
PROBLEMS...WASHINGTON WANTS TO REDUCE ITS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION
TO THE UN, MAKING THIS A CONDITION TO THE FUTURE REFORMS OF THE
ORGANIZATION ...IT IS CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WILL ONCE AGAIN IMPOSE
ITS VIEWS AS IT DID IN 1996 WITH THE DISMISSAL OF BOUTROSGHALI ... THERE IS A MAJOR RISK THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD COULD PARALYZE EVERYTHING (AT THE UN)
AND TAKE HOSTAGE THE MUCH NEEDED UN REFORMS..." THE REAL QUESTION
IS WHAT WE WANT THE UN TO BECOME, AND DO WE STILL WANT A UN'
SAYS A DIPLOMAT- WASHINGTON'S ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS ARE
STILL NOT VERY CLEAR."
"A BILLION DOLLARS FOR A LESSON IN MORALITY"
JEAN-JACQUES MEVEL IN RIGHT-OF-CENTER LE FIGARO (09/20):
"MADELEINE ALBRIGHT'S REACTION TO TED TURNER'S OFFER IS AWAITED
WITH MUCH INTEREST. THERE IS IN TED TURNER'S CHARITABLE GESTURE
A LATENT LESSON IN MORALITY..."
ALGERIA-- U.S. POSITION
"ONE MASSACRE TOO MANY?"
JACQUES AMALRIC IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/22) : "CONCERN
ABOUT A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THOSE WHO ARE IN POWER IN
ALGERIA HAS CONVINCED THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS SUPPORT OF
PRESIDENT ZEROUAL AND HIS SHY ATTEMPTS AT DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL NORMALIZATION. ZEROUAL CAN REST ASSURED, AT LEAST AS
FAR AS THE OUTSIDE FRONT IS CONCERNED... MEANWHILE, AS EVERYONE
AWAITS THE OCTOBER 23 ELECTIONS, THE KILLINGS CONTINUE."
BOSNIA-- ELECTION RESULTS
"MILOSEVIC: SERBIA'S REBORN MASTER"
Page 3 of 4
�F;\CabIe.\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2941899.html
MARC SEMO IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/20): "ONCE AGAIN
MILOSEVIC HAS SHOWN HIS MASTERY IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING... WHILE
LAST YEAR HE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ON THE SIDE LINES, HE
HAS N W MANAGED TO ELIMINATE THE OPPOSITION AND TO SECURE
O
SUNDAY'S ELECTIONS FOR HIMSELF... HIS MAJOR STRENGTH LIES IN THE
OPPOSITION'S WEAKNESS AND THEIR INTERNAL RIVALRIES..."
"A BAD OMEN FOR SERBIA"
PATRICE CHABANET IN REGIONAL LE JOURNAL DE HAUTE MARNE (09/22):
"ELECTIONS IN POLAND LAND US ON THE WELL-KNOWN GROUNDS OF
DEMOCRACY. THOSE IN SERBIA LEAVE US WITH A VERY DIFFERENT AFTERTASTE. THE VICTORY BY MILOSEVIC'S ELECTED CANDIDATE IS NOT A
GOOD OMEN FOR SERBIA ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT OR ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SCENE."
CHINA—AFTERMATH OF 15TH PARTY CONGRESS
"THE CHINESE ROCK"
ALAIN PEYREFITTE IN RIGHT-OF-CENTER LE FIGARO " ( 0 9 / 2 2 ) : "THE
PARTY CONGRESS HAS DECIDEDLY CONFIRMED DENG'S POLICY IN FAVOR OF
A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY... THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK HAVE
APPLAUDED THE DECISION... CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY IS CERTAIN I T
CAN MASTER THE HUGE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CHINA WILL HAVE TO FACE
IN ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION. IT WILL, ON CONDITION I T
HOLDS ON TO ITS STEADFAST POSITION." S O
NW
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 1250
OSSN>1250
TOR: 970922082524 M2941899
<"TOR>970922082539 M2941900
DIST:
SIT: NSC
Page 4 of 4
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Support Cable for Middle East Brief] (5 pages)
09/24/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-1ke209l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 14-4 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data
Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945688.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHRHA3713 2 67144 3-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 241443Z SEP 97 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
RUEHRH
241443Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4588
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1001
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA//
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1765
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 14 91
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1719
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2897
RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1599
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2048
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3511
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2 4 02
ALGERIAN MASSACRE AND JORDANIAN AMBUSH, SAUDI
MEDIA REACTION, 9/24/97
TEXT:
UNCLAS RIYADH 003713
USIA
USIA FOR NEA, R, R/MR, I/GNEA, P/FW, B/VOA/X, B/VOA/N
SECSTATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/P, INR, S/P (LEWIS)
WHITEHOUSE FOR LAIPSON
E.O. 12356:N/A
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN MASSACRE AND JORDANIAN AMBUSH, SAUDI
MEDIA REACTION, 9/24/97
1. SUMMARY: EDITORIALS APPEAR ON THE LATEST BLOODBATH
SOUTH OF ALGIERS AND THE AMBUSH ON THE ISRAELI EMBASSY
GUARDS IN AMMAN. AL-MADINA STRONGLY CONDEMNS THESE
ACTIONS AS "COWARDLY" AND "DETRIMENTAL TO ALL ALGERIANS,
ARABS AND MUSLIMS" AND CALLS UPON WESTERN NATIONS TO STOP
GIVING SHELTER TO LEADERS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE NAME
OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT STATES THAT THE
ATTACK ON THE ISRAELI EMBASSY GUARDS IS A TYPE OF ACTION
TO BE EXPECTED IN LIGHT OF INCREASE ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE
AND OFFICIAL ARAB HESITANCE TO CONFRONT NETANYAHU, WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING NETANYAHU WITH THE PRETEXT TO
CARRY OUT HIS "CONSPIRACY PLAN" ON THE REGION IN THE NAME
OF SECURITY. A CARTOON BY KAHIL HAS THE ARAB WORLD
Page 1 of2
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945688.html
DANCING AND BILL CLINTON PLAYING THE SAXOPHONE TO MUSIC
SHEETS ENTITLED "ISRAELI POP HITS" BEFORE A PLEASED
ISRAELI CROWD. END SUMMARY.
BLOCK QUOTES
2. JEDDAH-BASED, RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE AL-MADINA:
"ALGERIA'S MASSACRE IS A STRIKE AGAINST HUMANITY AND I T
IS DETRIMENTAL TO ALL ALGERIANS, ARABS AND MUSLIMS; THE
CONDEMNATIONS FOR THESE KINDS OF MASSACRES FROM SOME
WESTERN COUNTRIES CLAIMING TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL
BE MEANINGLESS AS LONG AS AUTHORITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES
DO NOT ACT TO REMOVE THE SHELTER OF POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR
LEADERS OF THOSE GROUPS IN ALGERIA WHO FIND SAFETY AND
SECURITY ALLOWING THEM TO ADMINISTER THEIR EVIL ACTS.
THE KILLING OF WOMEN, THE ELDERLY AND CHILDREN IS A
COWARDLY ACT AND THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONFRONTING
THESE COWARDS EXCEPT BY THE UNIFICATION OF THE ALGERIAN
PEOPLE AND THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."
3. LONDON-BASED, PAN-ARAB ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT COMMENTING
ON THE AMBUSH OF THE ISRAELI EMBASSY GUARDS: "THE ONE WHO
MONITORS THE "ARAB STREET" AND NOT ONLY THE "JORDANIAN
STREET," WOULD BE ABLE TO DETECT BITTERNESS STEMMING FROM
THE CURRENT SITUATION... WE SHOULD VIEW THIS INCIDENT FROM
TWO PERSPECTIVES. FIRST OF ALL, SUCH OPERATIONS ARE
EXPECTED, AND WE ARE NOT SURPRISED BY THE ACCELERATED
ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. THIS COINCIDES WITH A TIMID ARAB
HESITANCE IN DEVELOPING A POSITION, BUT EVEN MORE, A
TENDENCY AMONG SOME ARAB PARTIES TO OVERLOOK BINYAMIN
NETANYAHU'S GOVERNMENT'S SECRET AGREEMENTS WITH THE
SETTLERS...THE SECOND PERSPECTIVE WHICH THESE OPERATIONS
RAISE: WHETHER THEY PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE TIMING AND
FRAMEWORK FOR NETANYAHU'S GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT ITS
GREAT CONSPIRACY PLAN UNDER THE COVER OF SECURITY."
CARTOON BY KAHIL
4. SISTER PUBLICATIONS ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AND THE
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE ARAB NEWS: A CROWD OF BIG-NOSED MALES
AND FEMALES, SOME HASSIDIC AND SOME WEARING YARMALUKES,
ARE SMILING AND CLAPPING, WHILE IN FRONT OF THE CROWD,
BILL CLINTON IS PLAYING HIS SAXOPHONE AND THE ARAB WORLD
IS SHOWN BELLY DANCING AND SNAPPING FINGERS, ALL TO THE
MUSIC SHEET IN THE MIDDLE ENTITLED "ISRAELI POP HITS."
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
KATTOUF
SECTION: 01 OF 01
3713
970924113000 M2945688
SIT: NSC
Page 2 of2
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945493.html
Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC
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LINE4
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHFRA14 4 8 2 67150 9-UUZZ--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUZZ ZZH
0 241509Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHFR
OSRI
DTG
241509Z SEP 97
ORIG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3055
INFO
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1228
RUDKBR/FBIS BRUSSELS BE
RUFRQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 5350
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1799
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0140
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2895
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1206
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//ASD/ISA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9625
MEDIA REACTION REPORT - ALGERIA BOSNIA AFRICA--UN
SUBJ:
INQUIRY INTO CONGO MASSACRES
PARIS - WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1997
(A) SUBJECTS COVERED IN TODAY'S REPORT:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 021448
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; I/RW; I/RNY (FRANK); B/VOA; I/WEU; AF; STATE FOR
EUR/WE (JIM WOJTASIEWICZ)/P/SP; AF; INR/P; INR/EUC (ROWDYBUSH);
PM; OSC ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/WEUROPE; DOC
FOR ITA/EUR/FR AND PASS USTR/PA (ANN LUZZATO); USINCEUR FOR PAO;
NATO FOR USIS; M S O FOR USIS; ROME FOR USIS/AIO; BRUSSELS FOR
OCW
USIS; USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE.
E.O. 12958:
TAGS: NONE
N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT - ALGERIA
INQUIRY INTO CONGO MASSACRES
PARIS - WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1997
(A) SUBJECTS COVERED IN TODAY'S REPORT:
BOSNIA
AFRICA--UN
�I::\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945493.html
Page 2 of 4
UNCLASSIFIED
2
1. ALGERIA
2. BOSNIA
3. AFRICA--UN INQUIRY INTO CONGO MASSACRES
(B) SUMMARY OF COVERAGE:
ALGERIA IS INCREASINGLY BECOMING THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE
HEADLINED IN THE PRESS, AND THE MAJOR EDITORIAL SUBJECT ON RADIO
AND TELEVISION.
YESTERDAY'S NEW MASSACRE IN THE SUBURBS OF ALGIERS LEADS LEFTOF-CENTER LIBERATION TO ASK IN ITS FRONT PAGE HEADLINE: "WHAT
CAN BE DONE FOR ALGERIA?" WHILE RIGHT-OF-CENTER LE FIGARO
TITLES: "ALGERIA: FROM ONE MASSACRE TO THE NEXT." (SEE PART C)
BOSNIA'S ELECTION RESULTS AND THE QUESTION OF NATO TROOP
WITHDRAWAL ARE COVERED. (SEE PART C)
THE UNITED NATIONS INQUIRY INTO MASSACRES OF HUTU REFUGEES IN
CONGO AND THE ALLEGED U.S. IMPLICATION IS ANALYZED IN LEFT-OFCENTER LIBERATION. (SEE PART C)
FRANCE'S 1998 BUDGET WILL BE VOTED TODAY BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, MAKING THIS THE MAIN DOMESTIC STORY REPORTED. ECONOMIC
CENTRIST LA TRIBUNE HEADLINES: "A VERY MAASTRICH-ORIENTED FIRST
BUDGET FOR JOSPIN."
IN RIGHT-OF-CENTER LE FIGARO, ANTOINE-PIERRE MARIANO WRITES IN
HIS EDITORIAL: "A BUDGET WHICH DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO EARN
MORE, KILLS INITIATIVE, TAXES SAVINGS, PUTS PRESSURE ON
FAMILIES, AND PENALIZES THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHILE BOOSTING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR EVEN MORE, IS NOT A GOOD BUDGET."
(C) SUPPORTING TEXT/BLOCK QUOTES:
ALGERIA
"KNOWING BEFORE TAKING ACTION"
GERARD DUPUY IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/24): " O CAN WE
HW
SUPPORT, EVEN A LITTLE, THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WHEN IT IS
SUSPECTED OF CRIMES COVERED UP BY MILITARY CENSORSHIP?...SINCE
THE ALGERIAN REGIME IS DEFINITELY OPPOSED TO JOURNALISTS, AN
UNCLASSIFIED
3
INQUIRY HAS TO BE MADE BY NEUTRAL EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WHAT CAN WE DO IN ALGERIA? WE MUST
START WITH LEARNING EXACTLY WHAT GOES ON."
"GENERAL LAMARI'S GAME"
JOSE GARCON IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/24): "THE INTERNAL
CONFLICT WITHIN MILITARY RANKS IN ALGERIA HAS WITHOUT A DOUBT
BEEN MADE WORSE BY THE OPEN U.S. SUPPORT TO ZEROUAL...THIS
SUPPORT IS NOT SO MUCH TRIGGERED BY A U.S. DESIRE TO HAVE AN
IMPACT ON THE ALGERIAN DOMESTIC SITUATION, BUT RATHER BY U.S.
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945493.html
Page 3 of 4
REGIONAL STRATEGY. THE SURPRISING PROGRESS MADE BY JAMES BAKER
IN THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA HAS CERTAINLY FIGURED IN
WASHINGTON'S DECISION TO SUPPORT ZEROUAL'S POSITION. A CHANGE AT
THE HELM IN ALGERIA WOULD CERTAINLY BE A SETBACK TO THOSE
NEGOTIATIONS...THIS U.S. SUPPORT AND THE DOMINANT ROLE PLAYED BY
ZEROUAL HAVE LED TO THE WORST MILITARY CRISIS IN ALGERIA SINCE
1992."
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 021448
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR; I/RW; I/RNY (FRANK); B/VOA; I/WEU; AF; STATE FOR
EUR/WE (JIM WOJTASIEWICZ)/P/SP; AF; INR/P; INR/EUC (ROWDYBUSH);
PM; OSC ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/WEUROPE; DOC
FOR ITA/EUR/FR AND PASS USTR/PA (ANN LUZZATO); USINCEUR FOR PAO;
NATO FOR USIS; M S O FOR USIS; ROME FOR USIS/AIO; BRUSSELS FOR
OCW
USIS; USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE.
E.O. 12958:
TAGS: NONE
N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT - ALGERIA
INQUIRY INTO CONGO MASSACRES
PARIS - WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1997
BOSNIA
AFRICA--UN
"WASHINGTON'S ACTIVISM AND FRANCE'S MINIMALIST APPROACH"
THIERRY OBERLE IN RIGHT-OF-CENTEMNLE FIGACASVJQBQS
WISH NOT TO BECOME IMPLICATED IN THE ALGERIAN SITUATION STEMS IN
PART FROM THE COMPLEX POWER PLAY IN ALGERIA. WHO EXACTLY IS
DVNXMHTREMISTS ALONE, OR ARE THB MSUBQS THE ONLY NATION TO HAVE
MENTIONED CIVILIAN PROTECTION... WHEN BRINGING ITS SUPPORT TO
ALGERIA'S 'MILITARY MEASURES' TO PROTECT ITS POPULATION..."
"ALGERIA'S MANY WARS"
ALAIN DUHAMEL ON PRLVATELY-RUN EUROPE ONE RADIO (09/29): "IN THE
LABYRINTH OF THIS VIOLENCE, SEVERAL CONFLICTS ARE
UNRAVELING...FIRST AND FOREMOST, A CIVIL WAR BETWEEN ISLAMIC
EXTREMISTS AND SECURITY FORCES... BUT THERE ALSO RIVALRIES WITHIN
THE ARMY, BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE AND THOSE
WHO WANT A MAJOR 'CLEAN UP.'"
BOSNIA
"STAYING LONGER IN BOSNIA"
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE QUOTES FRENCH FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER
HUBERT VEDRINE: "THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS BEGINNING TO WONDER
UNCLASSIFIED
4
ABOUT THE SCHEDULED DATE FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM BOSNIA. THIS
MEANS THAT IT IS BEGINNING TO SEE THAT EXTENDING THE U.S.
COMMITMENT IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS. THIS IS
ALSO WHAT THE EUROPEANS THINK."
"IN BOSNIA HOPE WILL NOT COME FROM THE VOTERS"
LEFT-OF-CENTER LE MONDE IN ITS EDITORIAL(09/24): "THE WEST
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2945493.html
WANTED ELECTIONS NO MATTER WHAT. WELL, THE ELECTIONS HAVE NOW
TAKEN PLACE, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE ELECTIONS HAVE NOT
SERVED THE WEST'S INTENTIONS... THE MIRACLE DID NOT HAPPEN...THE
WEST NEEDED TO BANISH THE EXTREMISTS FROM THE ELECTORAL DEBATE
AND NOT TO APPEAR AS I F IT FEARED THE WAR CRIMINALS AND THEIR
INFLUENCE...THE MAJOR POWERS WILL N W HAVE TO STAY LONGER IN
O
ORDER TO KEEP THE PEACE, WITH THE HELP OF MEN LIKE MILOSEVIC,
WHOSE STATUS IS QUESTIONED ONLY BY THE WORST EXTREMISTS..."
AFRICA--UN INQUIRY INTO CONGO MASSACRES
"WASHINGTON'S COMPLEX SITUATION"
STEPHEN SMITH IN LEFT-OF-CENTER LIBERATION (09/24): "THE INQUIRY
INTO THE MASSACRES OF HUTU REFUGEES IN FORMER ZAIRE IS BECOMING
AN ISSUE WITH MAJOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STAKES. ON ONE SIDE
THERE IS THE MAJORITY OF AFRICAN STATES, AND EVEN NON-ALIGNED
THIRD WORLD NATIONS, ALL SUPPORTING KABILA...ON THE OTHER, THERE
ARE THE UNITED NATIONS AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION ASKING FOR
CLARIFICATION OF WHAT TOOK PLACE...IN THE MIDDLE, ONE FINDS THE
U.S., CAUGHT IN THE TRAP OF ITS OWN AFRICAN POLICY, WHICH HAS
ALLEGEDLY IMPLICATED I T IN THE MASSACRES. WHILE WASHINGTON TRIES
TO APPEASE ITS AFRICAN ALLIES AND TO MINIMIZE THE ROLE PLAYED BY
ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IS PRESSING FOR
CLARIFICATION." S O
NW
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
OSECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 14 48
OSSN>1448
TOR: 970924101021 M2945493
<"TOR>970924101108 M2945495
DIST:
SIT: COUNTRYMAN MCELDOWNEY
SIT: NSC
Page 4 of 4
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: Secretary's Moming Summary for 9/25/97 (16 pages)
09/25/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc209l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (4-1 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Securit) Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of Ihe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidcnlial advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
Cable
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: OAAUZYUW RUEHLOA1117 2681210-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 251210Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHLO
251210Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8250
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1835
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1001
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2616
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1724
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6471
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0552
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 974 6
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 9841
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1177
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3520
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 3745
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUDOVFA/3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//PA//
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY M S O 8 94 5
OCW
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0961
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//019//
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0270
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0887
RUEBBEA/DOT WASHDC
LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
ON NORTHERN IRELAND, BBC RADIO REPORTED 9/25:
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 011117
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
Page 1 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
A) BROADCAST MEDIA
ON NORTHERN IRELAND, BBC RADIO REPORTED 9/25:
"WHEN THE HISTORY IS EVENTUALLY WRITTEN OF THIS LATEST ATTEMPT TO
BRING PEACE TO NORTHERN IRELAND, IT MAY BE THAT YESTERDAY WAS A
REAL TURNING POINT. THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY, MO MOWLAM, WHO
HAS OFTEN BEEN IN DESPAIR, SAID IT WAS AN HISTORIC STEP FORWARD..."
B) MAJOR PRESS STORIES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
NORTHERN IRELAND
SAUDI-BRITISH RELATIONS
BOSNIA
ALGERIA
U.S.-E.U. TRADE
C) SUMMARY
1. NORTHERN IRELAND
A "BREAKTHROUGH" AT THE STORMONT TALKS SHARED THE FRONT PAGES TODAY
WITH THE FURORE OVER THE SENTENCING OF TWO BRITISH NURSES ACCUSED
OF MURDER IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS
HAS BEEN SET ASIDE SO THAT TALKS-ABOUT-TALKS AND PROCEDURAL
WRANGLING CAN GIVE WAY TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS STARTING NEXT
WEEK.
2. SAUDI-BRITISH RELATIONS
A GROWING RIFT IN BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA WAS THE
SUBJECT OF EXTENSIVE COVERAGE AND EDITORIAL OPINION TODAY. AT
ISSUE IS THE FATE OF TWO BRITISH NURSES FACING FLOGGING OR THE
DEATH PENALTY AFTER BEING CHARGED WITH MURDER. AT STAKE ARE
DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY ARMS CONTRACTS AND THE
THOUSANDS OF BRITISH JOBS DEPENDENT UPON THEM. BRITISH FOREIGN
SECRETARY ROBIN COOK WAS CRITICISED FOR ADOPTING A HIGH MORAL TONE
IN HIS ATTITUDE TO THE SAUDI AUTHORITIES OVER THE ISSUE.
3. BOSNIA
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SANDY BERGER WAS REPORTED "SIGNALLING" IN
HIS GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SPEECH THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS
PREPARING TO PROLONG ITS MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA BEYOND NEXT
JUNE'S SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL OF NATO FORCES.
4. ALGERIA
TWO ITEMS IN THE "GUARDIAN" REFLECTED INCREASING COVERAGE OF THE
Page 2 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
ATROCITIES IN ALGERIA.
5. U.S.-E.U. TRADE
EUROPEAN UNION AND AMERICAN TRADE NEGOTIATORS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE
MADE PROGRESS ON RESOLVING TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES OVER CUBA, IRAN
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 011117
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.O.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
AND LIBYA.
D) TEXT
1. NORTHERN IRELAND
"DEADLOCK BROKEN IN ULSTER"
THE LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" FRONTPAGED THIS REPORT 9/25:
"NORTHERN IRELAND'S POLITICAL PARTIES FINALLY AGREED A LANDMARK
COMPROMISE LAST NIGHT, ENABLING THEM TO BREAK LONG-STANDING
DEADLOCK AND MOVE INTO FULL ALL-PARTY TALKS NEXT WEEK ON THE
PROVINCE'S FUTURE...
"THE AGREED FORMULA, THRASHED OUT DURING A DAY OF HIGH DRAMA AND
FRANTIC BARTERING AT STORMONT, MEANS THE PROCESS, STUCK AT THE
TALKS-ABOUT-TALKS STAGE FOR 16 MONTHS, CAN AT LAST MOVE ON..."
"BLAIR HAILS ULSTER TALKS AGREEMENT"
THE CONSERVATIVE "DAILY TELEGRAPH" HAD THIS FRONT PAGE REPORT 9/25:
"UNIONISTS LAST NIGHT DROPPED THEIR LONG-STANDING INSISTENCE THAT
TERRORIST WEAPONS BE HANDED OVER DURING THE NORTHERN IRELAND TALKS
AND PAVED THE WAY FOR FULL-SCALE NEGOTIATIONS, ENDING 15 MONTHS OF
PROCEDURAL WRANGLING...
"THE DECISION WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE I T
CAME AS THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY'S CHALLENGE TO SINN FEIN'S
PRESENCE IN THE TALKS WAS REJECTED...
"ALTHOUGH AGREEMENT ON A SETTLEMENT -- DUE TO BE PUT TO A
REFERENDUM IN MAY -- IS A CONSIDERABLE WAY OFF, THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
DISCUSSION HAVE N W BEEN LAID..."
O
Page 3 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
2. SAUDI-BRITISH RELATIONS
"SOFTLY, SOFTLY IN SAUDI"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" HAD THIS OP-ED COMMENTARY BY COLUMNIST
MAGNUS LINKLATER ON 9/25:
"SAVING THE TWO BRITISH NURSES FROM POSSIBLE EXECUTION AND PUBLIC
FLOGGING SHOULD BE THE COMBINED OBJECTIVE OF BOTH SAUDI AND BRITISH
GOVERNMENTS. WHETHER THEY CAN ACHIEVE IT MAY NO LONGER BE ENTIRELY
IN THEIR HANDS. BOTH ARE UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC
OPINION, WHETHER IN SAUDI ARABIA OR IN BRITAIN.
"SUCH HAS BEEN THE OUTCRY OVER THE GRUESOME PROSPECT OF A WESTERN
WOMAN BEING SUBJECTED TO 500 LASHES IN FRONT OF A SAUDI CROWD THAT
QUIET DIPLOMACY NO LONGER SEEMS AN OPTION. YET THAT IS THE ONLY
WAY IN WHICH THE TWO ACCUSED WOMEN CAN, IN THE LONGER RUN, BE
EXTRADITED WITHOUT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT LOSING FACE IN THE EYES OF
ONE OF THE WORLD'S WEALTHIEST NATIONS."
"BLOW TO Q4 0 BILLION WEAPONS PROGRAM"
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 011117
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
THE LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" HAD THIS REPORT BY DEFENSE CORRESPONDENT
DAVID FAIRHALL 9/25:
"SHARES IN BRITISH AEROSPACE, THE PRIME CONTRACTOR FOR THE
GOVERNMENT'S Q40 BILLION ARMS PROGRAM WITH SAUDI ARABIA, FELL
SHARPLY YESTERDAY AS PROTESTS ERUPTED OVER THE FLOGGING SENTENCE
IMPOSED ON A BRITISH NURSE.
"THE GULF KINGDOM HAS PROVIDED A RICH GRAVY TRAIN FOR BRITISH
INDUSTRY, ESPECIALLY ARMS MANUFACTURERS, AND ANYTHING WHICH
THREATENS TO UPSET THAT CAUSES ALARM IN LONDON'S FINANCIAL
MARKET...
"THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH ARMS DEALS STRETCH INTO MANY OTHER
CORNERS OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, THROUGH THE SUPPORT AND CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS THAT GO WITH THEM."
Page 4 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
Page 5 of 7
"COOK'S DILEMMA OVER NURSES"
THE CONSERVATIVE TABLOID "EXPRESS" HAD EDITORIALIZED 9/25:
"NO FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS EVER TAKEN UP OFFICE WITH SUCH
ASPIRATIONS AS ROBIN COOK. WITHIN DAYS, HE ANNOUNCED THAT NEW
LABOUR WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE HARD-HEADED CYNICISM OF
PAST OCCUPANTS OF HIS JOB.
"INSTEAD HE PROCLAIMED THAT BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY WOULD IN FUTURE,
BE DRIVEN BY HIGH IDEALS RATHER THAN A RUTHLESS ASSESSMENT OF
NATIONAL INTEREST.
"HE RISKS INFURIATING ONE OF BRITAIN'S CLOSEST ALLIES, A COUNTRY
WHICH PROVIDES AN EXPORT MARKET FOR BILLIONS OF POUNDS (STERLING)
OF OUR GOODS. TENS, I F NOT HUNDREDS, OF THOUSANDS OF JOBS DEPEND
ON SAUDI GOODWILL...
"NEW LABOUR IS LEARNING FAST THAT THE WORLD IS A NASTY PLACE. AND
MR. COOK IS LEARNING QUICKLY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
OPPOSITION. IN OPPOSITION, IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS ALL SORTS OF
FINE-SOUNDING SENTIMENTS."
"COOK'S FOLLY"
THE MASS-CIRCULATION CONSERVATIVE TABLOID "SUN" EDITORIALIZED 9/25:
"WHAT HE LACKS IN STATURE, ROBIN COOK MAKES UP FOR IN VOLUME.
FOREIGN SECRETARY FALLS INTO THE TRAP OF MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY.
THE
"HE TELLS THE SAUDIS THAT I F THEY GIVE A BRITISH NURSE 500 LASHES
IT COULD HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS'.
"WHAT DOES HE HAVE IN MIND — A TRADE BOYCOTT? BOOTING OUT THEIR
AMBASSADOR? AND ALL BECAUSE THE SAUDIS HAVE ACTED WITHIN THEIR OWN
LAWS AND RELIGION? NO WONDER THEY'RE ANGRY AT COOK'S EMPTY AND
MEANINGLESS WORDS."
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 011117
USIA
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
3. BOSNIA
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
"CLINTON AIDE SAYS U.S. MUST EXTEND STAY IN BOSNIA"
THE CONSERVATIVE "TIMES" REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON 9/25:
"PRESIDENT CLINTON'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SETTING THE STAGE
FOR A PROTRACTED POLITICAL BATTLE WITH CONGRESS, HAS SIGNALLED THAT
AMERICA MUST BE READY TO KEEP TROOPS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA WELL
BEYOND THE SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL TO NATO FORCES IN JUNE.
"SANDY BERGER,
THE APPARENTLY
PRESENCE, SAID
PRESERVE PEACE
ALLIANCE."
IN A CLEAR EFFORT TO PREPARE THE UNITED STATES FOR
INEVITABLE CONTINUATION OF AN AMERICAN MILITARY
THE WEST MUST REMAIN ENGAGED IN BOSNIA BOTH TO
IN THE BALKANS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO
4. ALGERIA
"WEST VOICES SHOCK BUT LITTLE ELSE"
THE LIBERAL "GUARDIAN" REPORTED 9/25:
"RITUAL CALLS FOR AN END TO THE BLOODSHED IN ALGERIA AND THE
COLLECTIVE WRINGING OF HANDS WERE THE WEST'S REACTION YESTERDAY TO
THE LATEST MASSACRE IN THAT COUNTRY, IN WHICH AT LEAST 200 PEOPLE
WERE KILLED. THE COMMON RESPONSE FROM DIPLOMATS WAS: IT IS FOR
THE ALGERIANS THEMSELVES TO SORT IT OUT'."
"ESCALATION OF BLOOD"
THE SAME PAPER HAD THIS OP-ED COLUMN BY MIDDLE EAST COMMENTATOR
DAVID HIRST 9/25:
"THE THING THAT MOST SHOCKS ABOUT THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAS IS ITS
TERRIFYING FEROCITY AND, ABOVE ALL PERHAPS, THE FACT THAT, ON THE
INSURGENTS' SIDE, I T IS OSTENSIBLY CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF ONE OF
THE WORLD'S GREAT RELIGIONS.
"NATURALLY ENOUGH, IT IS THAT WHICH COMMANDS THE HEADLINES, SINCE
THIS IS A WAR THE OUTSIDE WORLD KNOWS SO LITTLE ABOUT, FOR I T IS
CONDUCTED FAR FROM INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE
INHERENT DIFFICULTY OF COVERING SUCH A CONFLICT AND BECAUSE THE
REGIME SO RIGOROUSLY EXCLUDES OR CONTROLS THE OUTSIDE OBSERVER."
5. U.S.-E.U. TRADE
"U.S.-E.U.
PEACE' HOPE"
THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL TIMES" HAD THIS REPORT FROM WASHINGTON
9/25:
"THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FACE AN UPHILL TASK IN
THEIR EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PUT AN
END TO TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES OVER CUBA, IRAN AND LIBYA, ACCORDING
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 011117
USIA
Page 6 of 7
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2947299.html
PERISHABLE INFORMATION - DO NOT SERVICE
USIA FOR I/GWEU; R/C; R/MR; WEU; NEA; VOA NEWS/CA; PL
LSECREST; B/TV/WP;
STATE FOR EUR/P AND PLS PASS ACDA/PA; EUR/PA; EUR/P/SP;
EUR/WE; EUR/NE; IO/CU; NEA/P; EB/TT; INR/P; PM; S/IR;
CSD ISA FOR ILN; FOR NEA; OASD/PA;
USDOC PASS USTR/PA
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC-WEUROPE, NSC FOR BERGER;
USMISSION USNATO FOR USIS
PARIS FOR USIS; UNESCO; OECD;
VIENNA PASS USDEL-CSCE;
E.0.12958:N/A
SUBJECT: LONDON MEDIA REPORT, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
TO SIR LEON BRITTAN, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION.
" WE ARE N W NEGOTIATING TO CONVERT THE ARMISTICE INTO A LASTING
O
PEACE', HE SAID IN WASHINGTON, REFERRING TO THE LAST-MINUTE DEAL
WHICH AVERTED A FORMAL E.U. COMPLAINT TO THE WTO... THE TWO SIDES
HAVE SET THEMSELVES A TARGET OF MAKING A DEAL BY OCTOBER 15,
WITHOUT WHICH THE E.U. MAY AGAIN HAVE RECOURSE TO THE WTO." SMITH
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
OSECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 05
< SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 05
< SECT>SECTION: 05 OF 05
SSN: 1117
< SSN>1117
< SSN>1117
< SSN>1117
< SSN>1117
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
TOR: 970925081534 M2947299
< TOR>970925081556 M2947300
<"TOR>970925081646 M2947301
OTOR>970925081700 M2947302
< TOR>970925081701 M2947303
DIST:
SIT: BUTLER MCELDOWNEY
SIT: NSC
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Page 7 of 7
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/25/1997
Re: [Defense] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
P]/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-1ke2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Ereedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P:
P3
IM
b(I) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance w ilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordanccVith 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Support Cable for Middle East Brief] (9 pages)
09/26/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-r
ke2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of Ihe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Re: [Foreign Policy] (8 pages)
09/26/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[09/11/1997 - 09/26/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[09/11/1997-09/26/1997]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-002-001-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1c61a89c1d0b2d76ed02507033ed7682.pdf
758650033d7528b7a3fac037314dbea7
PDF Text
Text
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [Support for Middle East Brief] (3 pages)
08/30/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. cable
Re: [Summary for 30 Aug 97] (4 pages)
08/30/1997
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Summary 31 Aug 97] (3 pages)
08/31/1997
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Village Massacres] (4 pages)
09/02/1997
Pl/b(l)
005. cable
Re: [Appraisal of Situation] (6 pages)
09/02/1997
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [Summary for 3 Sep.] (10 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Summary for 3 Sep.] (9 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [Notes for 03 Sep 97] (6 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [Algerian Violence] (6 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [Articles for 03 Sep 97] (13 pages)
09/03/1997
Pl/b(l)
OU. cable
Re: [Summary for 07 Sep 97] (5 pages)
09/07/1997
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [Summary for 8 Sep] (17 pages)
09/08/1997
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [Summary for 8 Sep] (14 pages)
09/08/1997
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Securily Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
1 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
*
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed iu accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
08/30/1997
Re: [Support for Middle East Brief) (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - \44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAI
P2 Relating to the appointment lo Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPF.
002. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
08/30/1997
Re: [Summary for 30 Aug 97] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Securily Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of Ihe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary 31 Aug 97] (3 pages)
08/31/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRAj
PJ Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
1 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
*
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) nf the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices nf
an agency ((b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute ((b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAJ
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2911282.html
Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINE1:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHAMA8 3 61 244114 4-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 011144Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHAM
011144Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2325
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7135
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3693
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9539
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2851
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 8096
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 2529
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 2980
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0362
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 514 8
MEDIA REACTION ON PEACE PROCESS AND SECSTATE
VISIT
SUMMARY
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008361
USIA
FOR R/MR, I/GNEA, BBXN, B/BRN, NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, SMEC FOR
DENNIS ROSS
WHITEHOUSE FOR RICHARD LEBARON, USCINCCENT//CCPA,
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL
NICOSIA FOR ILMG
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON PEACE PROCESS AND SECSTATE
VISIT
SUMMARY
-- THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT WILL VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST STARTING SEPTEMBER
9 WAS A LEAD STORY IN ALL PAPERS PUBLISHED OVER THE
WEEKEND, AUGUST 29-SEPTEMBER 1. STRAIGHT-FORWARD
REPORTS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY FEW COMMENTARIES THAT ARE
NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE
Page 1 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2911282.html
SECRETARY'S VISIT. COMMENTARIES MAINTAINED THAT THE
SECRETARY WILL NOT ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE
PALESTINIAN -ISRAELI PEACE TRACK, BUT WILL REJUVENATE
THE PEOPLE'S HOPE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING
PEACE. THE ISSUANCE OF A ROYAL DECREE DISSOLVING THE
12TH PARLIAMENT IN JORDAN WAS ANOTHER LEAD STORY OVER
THE WEEKEND. REPORTS ALSO HIGHLIGHTED A LETTER SENT
BY KING HUSSEIN TO THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT PRAISING
THEIR SENSE OF DUTY AND THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE
PAST FOUR YEARS. UNRWA'S DECISION TO CUT D W ITS
ON
SERVICES TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AS WELL AS JORDAN'S
CRITICISM OF THIS DECISION WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY ALL
PAPERS OVER THE WEEKEND. A FEW ARTICLES ARGUED THAT
UNRWA SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS SERVICES TO THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEES UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IS RESOLVED.
OTHER LEAD STORIES FOCUSED ON THE MASSACRE OF OVER 20O
PEOPLE IN ALGERIA BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS. MANY
COMMENTARIES STRONGLY CONDEMNED WHAT'S GOING ON IN
ALGERIA.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY ON PEACE PROCESS/SECSTATE VISIT
-- "MADELEINE ALBRIGHT AND THE U.S. ROLE"
PROMINENT MODERATE ISLAMIST AND FORMER MINISTER, KAMEL
AL-SHARIF, OPINES ON THE INSIDE PAGE OF CENTER-LEFT,
INFLUENTIAL ARABIC DAILY AL-DUSTUR (O9/01): "REMARKS
GIVEN BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT CAST SHADOWS ON HER
UPCOMING MISSION EVEN BEFORE IT STARTS. THE SECRETARY
GIVES PRIORITY TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND FATALLY TWISTS
THE NECK OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE BY MAKING ARAFAT AND
THE PNA'S LEAD ROLE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT SECURITY.
ALL THIS INSTEAD OF FOCUSING ON THE ISSUE AT HAND AND
PUTTING AN END TO THE SETTLEMENT BUILDING AND THE
JUDAIZING OF JERUSALEM. THE UNITED STATES, AS SEEN BY
ALBRIGHT, IS THE SOLE WORLD POWER AND, THEREFORE, CAN
DICTATE THE RULES WHILE THE PARTIES ACQUIESCE BECAUSE
THEY HAVE NO OTHER OPTION. NETANYAHU KNOWS THIS U.S.
LOGIC AND TAKES HEART IN CONTINUING TO IGNORE EVERY
ISRAELI COMMITMENT MADE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, NETANYAHU IS IGNORING THE
MOUNTING EMOTIONS INSIDE THE PEOPLE OF THIS REGION.
HISTORY TEACHES THAT THE EMOTIONS OF PEOPLE ARE
CAPABLE OF FORMING A NEW STATUS QUO AND PUTTING NEW
RULES TO THE GAMES. WILL ALBRIGHT REALIZE THIS AND
RISE TO WHAT HER MISSION IS ALL ABOUT?"
-- "WHAT IS ALBRIGHT BRINGING TO THE REGION?"
LEAD COLUMNIST, URAYB RINTAWI, WRITES ON THE FRONT
PAGE OF CENTER-LEFT, INFLUENTIAL ARABIC DAILY ALDUSTUR (09/01): "IT IS PROBABLE THAT ALBRIGHT'S VISIT
TO THE REGION WILL SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING A BREAKTHROUGH
IN THE PEACE TRACKS, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
PEACE TRACK. THE MOST OPTIMISTIC PEOPLE AGREE THAT
ALBRIGHT'S SUCCESS IN CONTAINING THE CRISIS,
POSTPONING A CONFRONTATION AND KEEPING THE HOPE OF
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2911282.html
PEACE ALIVE IS THE MOST THACAN BE EXPECTED OUT OF
HER VISIT."
-- "IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE THE ISSUE"
SENIOR EDITOR, SALEH QALLAB, OPINES ON THE BACK PAGE
OF INDEPENDENT, LIBERAL ARABIC DAILY AL-ARAB AL-YAWM
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 008361
USIA
FOR R/MR, I/GNEA, BBXN, B/BRN, NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, SMEC FOR
DENNIS ROSS
WHITEHOUSE FOR RICHARD LEBARON, USCINCCENT//CCPA,
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL
NICOSIA FOR ILMG
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON PEACE PROCESS AND SECSTATE
VISIT
(08/30): " E REALIZE THAT ALBRIGHT'S MISSION IS GOING
W
TO BE HARD. SHE IS DEALING WITH HISTORIC COMPLEXITIES
THAT ARE NOT EASY TO RESOLVE AND SHE IS FACING
NETANYAHU WHO LOOKS D W ON THE WORLD. BUT ALBRIGHT
ON
NEEDS TO K O THAT HER FAILURE TO EXERCISE GENUINE
NW
PRESSURE ON NETANYAHU WILL PLACE THE ENTIRE REGION AT
THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS AND WILL BELITTLE THE UNITED
STATES AND JEOPARDIZE ITS INTERESTS."
-- "ALBRIGHT'S RESCUE MISSION"
CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL AMONG THE ELITE ENGLISH DAILY
JORDAN TIMES (08/31) EDITORIALIZES: " O THAT IT IS
NW
CERTAIN THAT U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT WILL VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST, THE EYES OF ALL
CONCERNED PARTIES ARE FOCUSING ON WHAT SHE COULD
POSSIBLY BRING WITH HER BY WAY OF EFFECTIVE POLICY
MEASURES TO BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THE STALLED PEACE
PROCESS.... THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN,
JAMES RUBIN, HAS TRIED TO PLAY D W EXPECTATIONS THAT
ON
ALBRIGHT'S FIRST VISIT TO THE REGION COULD ACHIEVE
'INSTANT RESULTS' BY REMINDING US THAT 'SHE IS NOT A
MAGICIAN'. MAGICIAN OR NOT, ALL SIDES EXPECT FROM THE
VISITING SECRETARY OF STATE A GREAT DEAL.... THE
FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS
TO RID ITSELF OF EXTREMISTS AND FREE ITSELF FROM
SHAMIR'S MENTALITY. AND THE FIRST PRIORITY FOR THE
PNA IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
PEACE PROCESS BY MAINTAINING NATIONAL UNITY AND ENDING
ALL ACTIONS BY PALESTINIAN HARD-LINERS THAT RISK
DERAILING WHAT HAS ALREADY PAINSTAKINGLY BEEN
ACHIEVED. WITHOUT THE TWO SIDES SUCCEEDING IN THESE
EFFORTS, ALBRIGHT'S OWN ATTEMPTS TO SALVAGE THE PEACE
EFFORT WOULD COME TO NAUGHT."
-- "BAD OMEN FOR PEACE"
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2911282.html
CENTRIST, INFLUENTIAL AMONG THE ELITE ENGLISH DAILY
JORDAN TIMES (09/01) EDITORIALIZES: "ACCORDING TO
NETANYAHU AND SHARON, NOT TO MENTION THE OTHER CABINET
MEMBERS WHO ARE EQUALLY TROUBLED BY THE INTERIM PACTS,
THE DOOR IS WIDE OPEN FOR RENEGOTIATING WHAT WAS
ALREADY PAINSTAKINGLY NEGOTIATED AND AGREED UPON.
THIS IS EXACTLY THE MESSAGE THAT ISRAEL WOULD WISH TO
CONVEY TO MADELEINE ALBRIGHT ON THE EVE OF HER FIRST
TRIP AS SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
INSTEAD OF HIDING BEHIND MAKE-BELIEVE PRETEXTS, ISRAEL
IS AT LAST ON RECORD THAT IT SEEKS TO RE-EXAMINE THE
OSLO ACCORDS IN TOTAL. THIS IS THE GIST OF THE
BREWING CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AND THE
VISITING U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TO DEAL WITH THIS
HURDLE BEFORE SHE CAN PROCEED TO TACKLE OTHER
IMPORTANT OR MARGINAL ISSUES."
ZIADEH
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 8361
OSSN>8361
TOR: 970901074453 M2911282
<"TOR>970901074509 M2911283
DIST:
SIT: COUNTRYMAN
SIT: NSC
Page 4 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2912043.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE3
LINE4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHAMA8414 2451 407-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 021407Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHAM
021407Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2328
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3721
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9547
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7139
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0375
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5154
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 2531
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 8099
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 2982
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2856
MEDIA REACTION ON PEACE PROCESS AND ALGERIA
SUMMARY
TEXT:
UNCLAS AMMAN 008414
USIA
FOR R/MR, I/GNEA, BBXN, B/BRN, NEA
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, SMEC FOR
DENNIS ROSS
WHITEHOUSE FOR RICHARD LEBARON, USCINCCENT//CCPA,
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL
NICOSIA FOR ILMG
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON PEACE PROCESS AND ALGERIA
SUMMARY
-- THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEATH OF PRINCESS DIANA OF
ENGLAND CONTINUES TO LEAD FRONT PAGE STORIES IN ALL
PAPERS PUBLISHED TODAY, SEPTEMBER 2. SOME INSIDE
PAGES ARE DEDICATED TO DETAILED REPORTS AND BACKGROUND
PHOTOS ON THE PRINCESS. FRONT PAGE REPORTS ALSO
HIGHLIGHT KING HUSSEIN AND PRINCE HASSAN'S VISIT TO
THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN AMMAN TO PAY THEIR RESPECTS. ON
Page 1 of3
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2912043.html
THE MASSACRES IN ALGERIA, MORE AND MORE COMMENTARIES
ARE NOTED TO CRITICIZE WHAT IS HAPPENING IN ALGERIA.
A REPRESENTATIVE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY EXPRESSES PAIN
AT REPORTS COMING OUT OF ALGERIA. ON PEACE PROCESS
ISSUES, ISLAMIST ISHAQ AL-FARHAN ACCUSES ISRAEL OF
CONSPIRING TO MAKE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT A
CONFLICT AMONG ARABS. AL-FARHAN GIVES EXAMPLES OF H W
O
ISRAEL IS TRYING TO DO THAT.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY ON PEACE PROCESS
-- "TRANSFERRING THE CONFLICT TO THE ARAB HOUSE IS AN
ISRAELI CONSPIRACY"
ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT SECRETARY GENERAL, ISHAQ ALFARHAN, WRITES IN HIS WEEKLY COLUMN ON THE FRONT PAGE
OF CENTER-LEFT, INFLUENTIAL ARABIC DAILY AL-DUSTUR
(09/02): "OBSERVERS OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT NOTICE
H W ISRAEL TRIES TO SHIFT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
O
TOWARDS AN ARAB-ARAB CONFLICT IN ORDER TO SABOTAGE THE
UNITY OF THE ARAB MUSLIM FORCES IN THEIR BATTLE
AGAINST ZIONIST COLONIALISM.... ISRAEL STRESSES THE
NEED TO CONVENE THE MENA CONFERENCE IN DOHA BECAUSE
ISRAEL IS ATTENDING AND BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS
EXERCISING PRESSURE TO HAVE IT CONVENED. MOST OF THE
ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR BOYCOTT OF THE
CONFERENCE, BUT ISRAEL IS TRYING TO TURN I T INTO AN
ARAB POLITICAL STRUGGLE. ISRAEL SAYS THAT HIZBOLLAH,
SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORISM AND
VIOLENCE AND ARE SUPPORTED BY IRAN. ISRAEL IS TRYING
TO MAKE THE CONFLICT A LEBANESE-SYRIAN-IRANIAN ONE.
ISRAEL TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE LATEST BOMB ATTACK IN
JERUSALEM TO FORCE THE PNA TO PERFORM ITS SECURITY
DUTIES OVER THE PALESTINIANS. ISRAEL IS TRYING TO
MAKE THE CONFLICT A PALESTINIAN INTERNAL CONFLICT.
ISRAEL IS TRYING TO MOVE THE LOCATION OF THE YARMOUK
RIVER DAM INTO SYRIAN-CLAIMED TERRITORY. ISRAEL IS
TRYING TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND THE
JORDANIANS."
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY ON ALGERIA
-- "GO EASY ON YOURSELVES, ALGERIANS"
CENTER-LEFT, INFLUENTIAL ARABIC DAILY AL-DUSTUR
(09/02) EDITORIALIZES: "SEEING ONE MASSACRE AFTER
ANOTHER HAPPEN IN ALGERIA AND WATCHING THIS FUTILE
DEATH TAKE OVER WITHOUT REASON OR CAUSE, THE QUESTION
G O S BIGGER EVERYDAY ABOUT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
RW
THESE UNJUSTIFIABLE MASSACRES. OUR ALGERIAN BROTHERS
ARE VERY SENSITIVE REGARDING THEIR DOMESTIC ISSUES,
BUT OUR SHOCK AT THE MASSACRES AND WIDESPREAD KILLING
FORCES US TO CALL OUT FROM OUR HARTS: DEAR
ALGERIANS, GO EASY ON YOURSELVES. TERE IS NOTHING
MORE PAINFUL THAN SEEING THE NEWSAGENCIES REPORT
ABOUT ONE MASSACRE AFTER ANOTHER N ALGERIA AND NOT
Page 2 of 3
�F:\Cable\Data
Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2912043.html
BEING ABLE TO FIND AN ANSWER T WHY THIS I S
HAPPENING." ZIADEH
SECT
SECTION:
01 OF 01
SSN
8414
TOR
970902100643 M2912043
DIST
SIT: COUNTRYMAN
SIT: NSC
Page 3 of 3
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
09/02/1997
Re: [Village Massacres] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would v iolate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOI A]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Securit) Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
09/02/1997
Re: [Appraisal of Situation] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-rke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |4-4 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Seeuritj' Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of Ihe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(X) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 3 Sep.] (10 pages)
09/03/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997- 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating In the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCliMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 3 Sep.] (9 pages)
09/03/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of Ihe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2913624.html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
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LINES
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO:
SUBJ:
PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED
PAAUZYUW RUEHMOA224 9 2461338-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031338Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHMO
031338Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY M S O
OCW
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 8437
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3067
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 2737
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4121
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0900
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0434
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0057
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0034
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1909
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1819
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2757
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
////
DAILY MEDIA REACTION REPORT
MOSCOW -- WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 3, 1997
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 M S O 022249
OCW
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, EEN, WEU
STATE FOR S/NIS, PA, EUR/RUS, D
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC (PIFER)
NATO FOR USIS, PARIS FOR USIS, BONN FOR USIS
VIENNA FOR USIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
E.O. 12958:
SUBJECT:
N/A
DAILY MEDIA REACTION REPORT
MOSCOW -- WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 3,
1.
1997
SUBJECTS COVERED IN TODAY'S REPORT
-- MASSACRE IN ALGERIA
-- MIDDLE EAST: NETANYAHU IN EAST ASIA
Page 1 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2913624.html
--2.
U.S.: STAR WARS, LATIN AMERICA
RUSSIA: NATO, NAGORNO KARABAKH
--
MASSACRE IN ALGERIA --
"EU CRITICIZED FOR INDIFFERENCE"
YURY KOVALENKO REPORTED FROM PARIS FOR
REFORMIST IZVESTIA ( 9 / 3 ) : "IN THE LAST FEW
YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF CRITICISM AGAINST
THE EU, INCLUDING FRANCE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WHICH HAVE VIRTUALLY DONE
NOTHING TO SAVE ALGERIA FROM AN APPALLING
TRAGEDY. EVEN WORSE, AS THE BLOODY RAMPAGE
CONTINUES, FOREIGN COMPANIES KEEP DEVELOPING
'MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL' COOPERATION WITH THAT
COUNTRY IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY. BOMBS ARE
NO OBSTACLE FOR MASSIVE INVESTMENTS YIELDING
HUGE PROFITS."
3.
-- MIDDLE EAST: NETANYAHU IN EAST ASIA -"NETANYAHU PLAYS UP 'IRANIAN THREAT"'
BORIS PETROVSKY OPINED IN CENTRIST NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA ( 9 / 3 ) : "IN THE FAR EAST, NETANYAHU
APPARENTLY SOUGHT TO SECURE A CONTINUED STABLE
LEVEL OF INVESTMENTS N W THAT ASIAN TIGERS ARE
O
INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER AN UNFLAGGING
CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ALSO PURSUED
MILITARY-POLITICAL ENDS, TRYING TO PLAY UP THE
'IRANIAN CARD.' THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR-ROCKET
SYNDROME ACCOMPANIED THE ISRAELI PREMIER
WHEREVER HE WENT. I T APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT,
BY HARPING ON 'THE IRANIAN THREAT,' HE IS
TRYING TO DISTRACT THE PUBLIC FROM THE REAL
PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT
PROCESS."
4.
--
U.S.: STAR WARS, LATIN AMERICA
--
"U.S. TO EXTEND LEAD IN LASER WEAPONS"
REFORMIST IZVESTIA (9/3) RAN THIS REPORT BY
MELOR STURUA IN MINNEAPOLIS: "THE PENTAGON IS
CONSIDERING AN EXPERIMENT TO TRY TO DESTROY AN
EARTH SATELLITE WITH THE HELP OF A LASER. THE
MILITARY IS EAGER AND JITTERY AT THE SAME TIME.
THE EXPERIMENT WILL EXTEND THE UNITED STATES'
LEAD IN LASER WEAPONS AND SPY SATELLITES, BUT
IT MIGHT ALSO OPEN PANDORA'S BOX BY STARTING A
NEW SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE, THIS TIME IN AREAS
INVOLVING LASER TECHNOLOGY. SINCE MOST SPYSATELLITES CURRENTLY IN ORBIT ARE AMERICAN, THE
UNITED STATES WILL BE MOST VULNERABLE TO LASER
ATTACKS."
5.
"U.S. UPSETS POLITICAL BALANCE IN LATIN
AMERICA"
Page 2 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2913624.html
KAREN KHACHATUROV OF CENTRIST NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA ( 9 / 3 ) , COMMENTING ON SECRETARY OF STATE
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT'S LATIN AMERICAN DEBUT,
SAID: " I T ENDED IN CONFUSION AND A BIG ROW.
REFERRING TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S
UNILATERAL DECISION, THE SECRETARY DECLARED
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 M S O 022249
OCW
USIA
USIA FOR R/MR, EEN, WEU
STATE FOR S/NIS, PA, EUR/RUS, D
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC (PIFER)
NATO FOR USIS, PARIS FOR USIS, BONN FOR USIS
VIENNA FOR USIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: DAILY MEDIA REACTION REPORT
ARGENTINA A 'PRINCIPAL ALLY FROM AMONG NON-NATO
COUNTRIES,' SENDING THE WHOLE CONTINENT INTO A
SPIN OVER THE AMERICANS' UNHEARD-OF FAVORITISM.
UNDISGUISED FAVORITISM IS BAD FOR POLITICAL
BALANCE AND TRUST AMONG NATIONS. ALBRIGHT'S
STATEMENT, REMARKABLY, COINCIDED WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION'S LIFTING AN EMBARGO ON MODERN
ARMS SUPPLIES TO LATIN AMERICA. THAT SIGNALS
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ROUND OF THE ARMS RACE
IN THAT CONTINENT, ITS FIRST IN THE POST-SOVIET
ERA. "
6.
--
RUSSIA: NATO, NAGORNO KARABAKH
--
"NATO ENLARGEMENT--SPLINTER CONCEPT"
IGOR MAXIMYCHEV OF THE EUROPE INSTITUTE STATED
IN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
( 9 / 3 ) : "RUSSIA'S HEADS-UP REGARDING THE
POSSIBLE PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED
NATO EN
LARGEMENT EASTWARD IS BASED ON THE
COLLECTIVE OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS EXPRESSED IN 1990, AT THE END OF A
HALF-CENTURY EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. THE
FOUNDING ACT SIGNED IN PARIS ON MAY 27 DID NOT,
AND INDEED COULD NOT, REMOVE RUSSIA'S
OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE TO A SPLINTER CONCEPT
WHEREBY ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT RUSSIA AND A FEW
OTHER 'UNWORTHY' NATIONS SHOULD BE DRAWN INTO
THE ALLIANCE. WE MUST K O WHAT EXACTLY WE ARE
NW
TO PROTECT AND FROM WHOM. FOR EUROPE TO BE
UNITED, EVERY EUROPEAN MUST CONSISTENTLY WORK
TO MAKE SURE THAT NO ONE IS ARTIFICIALLY LEFT
OUT OF A CONTINENT-WIDE INTEGRATION PROCESS."
7.
"A BLESSING IN DISGUISE"
Page 3 of 4
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2913624.html
REFORMIST, BUSINESS-ORIENTED KOMMERSANT DAILY
(9/3) RAN THIS COMMENT BY LEONID GANKIN AND
GENNADY SYSOYEV: "THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE OSCE'S
MINSK GROUP INVOLVED IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
ARE UNANIMOUS IN REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
LEGITIMACY OF RECENT ELECTIONS IN NAGORNO
KARABAKH. BUT IT SEEMS THAT NOBODY WANTS TO
DRAMATIZE THE SITUATION, SEEING WHAT HAPPENED
AS A BLESSING IN DISGUISE. AT LEAST NOW THEY
HAVE A LOCALLY RECOGNIZED LEADER THEY CAN DEAL
WITH. THIS IS IMPORTANT CONSIDERING THAT
EVERYBODY IS EAGER TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE."
GOSENDE
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
OSECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 2249
<:''SSN>2249
TOR:
970903093832 M2913624
<:"TOR>970903093917
M2913625
DIST:
SIT:
NSC
Page 4 of 4
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/03/1997
Re: [Notes for 03 Sep 97] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number: 520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
7
2009-I295-1
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b ( l ) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) o f t h e FOIA]
National Seeuritj Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) o f t h e PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/03/1997
Re: [Algerian Violence] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b))
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA)
Relating tn the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/03/1997
Re: [Articles for 03 Sep 97] (13 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-r
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
O
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
Oil. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Summary for 07 Sep 97] (5 pages)
09/07/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLFXTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-r
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe F01A|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/08/1997
Re: [Summary for 8 Sep] (17 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
ke2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(h)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment lo Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice belween the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/08/1997
Re: [Summary for 8 Sep] (14 pages)
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 ([Algeria and massacre...])
OA/Box Number:
520000
FOLDER TITLE:
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997]
2009-1295-F
kc2090
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Acl - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
IM
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of Ihe PRA]
(.'. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2920781 .html
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE 2
LINES
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OAAUZYUW RUEHOTA3366 2512026-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 082026Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHOT
082026Z SEP 97
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1613
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2571
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUPEUNA/HQ USSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE
RUCNCAN/ALCAN COLLECTIVE
MEDIA REACTION ALGERIA
"THE HORROR CONTINUES"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANALYST ERIC MARGOLIS WROTE IN THE
CONSERVATIVE OTTAWA SUN (09/8) "LAST WEEKEND . .
TEXT:
UNCLAS OTTAWA 003366
USIA
AGENCY FOR R/MR;I/RFW;VOA/BXN;
I/GWEU;WEU;EEN
STATE FOR EUR/CAN,EUR/PA
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: XA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ALGERIA
"THE HORROR CONTINUES"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANALYST ERIC MARGOLIS WROTE IN THE
CONSERVATIVE OTTAWA SUN (09/8) "LAST WEEKEND . .
.KILLERS SLIPPED INTO THE ALGERIAN VILLAGE OF SIDI RAIS
UNDER THE COVER OF NIGHT. THEY METHODICALLY
SLAUGHTERED 300 INHABITANTS. . . . IT'S TIME FOR THE
WEST TO PRACTICE WHAT IT PREACHES AND PRESSURE THE
GENERALS IN ALGIERS TO ACCEPT THE 1992 FREE VOTE AND
ALLOW THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT, ALGERIA'S LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT, INTO POWER. THE FRONT, IN TURN, MUST BE
STERNLY REMINDED THAT POLITICAL POWER DOES NOT COME
FROM ALLAH, BUT FROM THE VOTERS. . . . ALGERIANS . . .
Page 1 of2
�F:\Cable\Data Source\Cables\CD027\SEP97\MSGS\M2920781 .html
SECT
SSN
TOR
DIST
NEED TO BE REMINDED THAT DEMOCRACY IS A VITAL PART OF
TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC CULTURE. FANATICS OF THE ARMED
ISLAMIC GROUPS WHO CONTINUE FIGHTING MUST BE CRUSHED. .
. . WESTERNIZED, FRANCOPHILE ALGERIANS -'BROWN
FRENCHMEN' - WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT ARE NO LONGER THE
NATION'S SOLE ELITE. . . . ALGERIA'S ISLAMISTS MUST
ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF MANY OF THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS TO
FOLLOW SECULAR VALUES. . . . FRANCE AND THE U.S. NEED
URGENTLY TO ENGINEER SUCH A SOFT LANDING FOR ALGERIA BEFORE ITS CIVIL WAR SPREADS TO THE REST OF MAGHREB,
AND EVEN TO FRANCE. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS
MADE SOME TENTATIVE STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION BUT NEEDS
MORE DECISIVENESS. . . . EACH YEAR, AGERIA'S DEATH TOLL
HAS RISEN GEOMETRICALLY. UNLESS THIS NIGHTMARE IS
STOPPED - AND ONLY OUTSIDE POWERS CAN DO THIS - ALL
NORTH AFRICA COULD BECOME A BLOODSTAINED SIDI RAIS."
GULLISEN
SECTION: 01 OF 01
3366
970908163001 M2920781
SIT: NSC
Page 2 of 2
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
[08/30/1997 - 09/08/1997
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Cables
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
24194018
42-t-7585709-20091295F-001-009-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24194018">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5c1aa2611ae3088f56ce25ad61339668.pdf
87faf06a28442956ad955969e2bf17b5
PDF Text
Text
.ARMS. Email System
RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL
Page 1 of 22
(EXTERNAL MAIL)
CREATOR: Kathleen_Brahney/R
MR/WASHDC/USIA/GOV.USIA@notesl.usia.gov@INET@EOPMRX
CREATION DATE/TIME: 2-SEP-1997 08:44:00.00
SUBJECT: E a r l y Report:
EXPECTATIONS FOR ALBRIGHT VISIT:
'TO SAVE MIDEAST PEACE P
TO: BULLETIN
READ:NOT READ
( BULLETIN@HR.HOUSE.GOV@INET@EOPMRX )
TO:
mary_robertson
READ:NOT READ
( mary_robertson@govt-aff.senate.gov@INET@E
TO: gbracken
READ:NOT READ
( gbracken@comdt.uscg.mil@INET@EOPMRX )
TO: Idupont
READ:NOT READ
( ldupont@pagate.pa.osd.mil@INET@EOPMRX )
TO: d b e h r i n g
READ:NOT READ
( dbehring@mail3.eop.gov@INET@EOPMRX )
TO: r u s s e l l t
READ:NOT READ
( russellt@carlisle-emh2.army.mil@INET@EOPM
TO: d b o l t z
READ:NOT READ
( dboltz@pagate.pa.osd.mil@INET@EOPMRX )
TO: baronk
READ:NOT READ
( baronk@policy1.policy.osd.mil@INET@EOPMRX
TO: bmorgan
READ:NOT READ
( bmorgan@usis.hu@INETdEOPMRX )
TO: r u b i n _ e
READ: 2-SEP-1997 09:56:26.54
( rubin_e@Al@CD ) (NSC)
TO: jbrown
READ:NOT READ
( jbrown@amembbg.co.yu@INET@EOPMRX )
TEXT:
Commentators i n the Middle East, both Arab and I s r a e l i , made c l e a r t h e i r
e x p e c t a t i o n s t hat S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e A l b r i g h t ' s September 9 v i s i t t o the r e g i o n
They were not i n
would "save pe ace" by r e v i t a l i z i n g the s t a l l e d process.
agreement, how ever, as t o whether Ms. A l b r i g h t c o u l d achieve t h i s g o a l , w i t h a
m a j o r i t y skept i c a l t h a t even the t o p U.S. d i p l o m a t c o u l d b r i n g the s i d e s
t o g e t h e r . T e l Aviv's mass-appeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv g l o o m i l y p r e d i c t e d ,
"Lacking a mag i c f o r m u l a , Madeleine A l b r i g h t can h a r d l y be expected t o produce
a s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s . "
Several Arab a n a l y s t s p o i n t e d t o t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n
of a U.S. t i l t i n I s r a e l ' s f a v o r as the p r i n c i p a l reason why the A l b r i g h t miss
ion might n o t succeed. Independent, l i b e r a l Al-Arab Al-Yawm o f Amman i n s i s t e d ,
" A l b r i g h t need s t o know t h a t her f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e genuine pressure on
Netanyahu w i l l place the e n t i r e r e g i o n a t the edge o f the abyss and w i l l
b e l i t t l e the U .S. and j e o p a r d i z e i t s i n t e r e s t s . "
I n I s r a e l , some c o l u m n i s t s
warned p r e c i s e l y a g a i n s t the U.S. a d o p t i n g such a stance, w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t
Hatzofe q u o t i n g a government o f f i c i a l saying t h a t her m i s s i o n would f a i l i f the
U.S. t r i e s " t o l e a n " on I s r a e l on the issue o f s e t t l e m e n t s . A h a n d f u l o f
observers rema i n e d somewhat h o p e f u l , however, t h a t Ms. A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t would
" c o n t a i n the c r i s i s , postpone a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and keep the hope o f peace
�ARMS Email System
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a l i v e . " Cairo's pro-government A l Ahram "welcomed" t h e s e c r e t a r y ' s o u t l i n e o f
the t e n e t s t h a t would guide her e f f o r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y her emphasis on UN
r e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338 and on s a f e g u a r d i n g "U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n . "
CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA:
TIME FOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS?
Alarmed by t h e l a s t week's h o r r i f i c s l a u g h t e r o f c i v i l i a n s i n t h e A l g e r i a n
c i v i l war, a few commentators wondered whether i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s c o u l d help
stop t h e k i l l i n g .
N o t i n g statements by UN S e c r e t a r y General K o f i Annan t h a t
" i t may be time f o r t h e UN t o i n t e r v e n e " and t h e Pope's condemning what he
c a l l e d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's " i c e - c o l d i n d i f f e r e n c e , " London's
c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph wrote, "While i t may not be time f o r t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l powers t o i n t e r v e n e , i t i s h i g h time they s t a r t e d a s k i n g
q u e s t i o n s about what i s going on i n A l g e r i a . " I t a l i a n observers, n o t i n g t h e
" i n t e r n a l r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e A l g e r i a n regime and t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n "
to European i n t e r v e n t i o n , w o r r i e d about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e g i o n a l
d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n and seconded a c a l l by P a r i s ' s l e f t - o f - c e n t e r Le Monde f o r a UN
i n v e s t i g a t i v e committee. Jordan's c e n t e r - l e f t , i n f l u e n t i a l A l - D u s t u r
acknowledged t h a t "our A l g e r i a n b r o t h e r s are v e r y s e n s i t i v e r e g a r d i n g t h e i r
domestic i s s u e s " b u t expressed dismay a t t h e " f u t i l e death." A r g u i n g t h a t t h e
A l g e r i a n government's "crackdown on m i l i t a n t s o n l y provoked them t o e s c a l a t e
t h e i r v i o l e n c e , " J a k a r t a ' s l e a d i n g independent Kompas d e c l a r e d , " I f i t i s t r u e
t h a t t h e FIS [ I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ] has g i v e n peace s i g n a l s , we hope o t h e r s
will
help make peace a r e a l i t y . "
BRIEFS
Death Of Princess Diana:
'World Loses A Legend'
Oslo Land Mine Conference:
'Slim Hopes For Breakthrough'
Toward U.S.-Iran N o r m a l i z a t i o n : An American Proposal?
EDITORS: M i l d r e d Sola Neely, B i l l Richey and Kathleen J. Brahney
EXPECTATIONS FOR ALBRIGHT VISIT:
EGYPT:
'TO SAVE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS'
" A l b r i g h t ' s V i s i t Expected To Achieve T a n g i b l e
Results"
I b r a h i m N a f i e , e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f o f pro-government A l Ahram, h e l d ( 8 / 2 9 ) :
"Observers expect A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t t o achieve t a n g i b l e p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t s . . . .
Before t h e v i s i t she p u t t h e peace process i n i t s r i g h t p l a c e . . . based on
r e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338.... Her spokesman s t a t e d t h a t t h e v i s i t w i l l be more
comprehensive... i n c l u d i n g U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n . . . . C e r t a i n l y , t h i s
deserves welcome....
[ B u t , ] we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e peace process c o n t i n u e s t o be
in c r i s i s . . . .
The U n i t e d States must r e a l i z e t h a t Netanyahu has d i v e r t e d
h i m s e l f from t h e peace process....
The U n i t e d States i s n o t a mediator i n t h e
t a l k s , b u t a g u a r a n t o r o f t h e Oslo agreements... which g i v e s t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s
the hope f o r a s t a t e . . . .
Since A l b r i g h t determined t h e b a s i c s o f t h e peace
process i n her speech, we expect her t o c o r r e c t t h e imbalance t h a t happened t o
it."
"U.S. C r e d i b i l i t y I s Now At Stake"
According t o pro-government A l Ahram (8/30): "The U n i t e d States i s going
through a d i f f i c u l t t e s t o f i t s p o s i t i o n on t h e peace process....
A l l parties
are e x p e c t i n g t h e American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o save peace.... I n f a c t , p a r t o f
the c r i s i s i s due t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' r e l i n q u i s h i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
toward t h e peace process....
I s r a e l has l a i d one o b s t a c l e a f t e r another, a l l
t o a b o r t American e f f o r t s . . . .
I s r a e l s p e c i f i c a l l y seeks t o s p o i l A l b r i g h t ' s
visit....
American c r e d i b i l i t y i s now a t s t a k e . "
"Region Needs Urgent U.S. Movement"
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Columnist Sanaa A l Said wrote i n o p p o s i t i o n A l Wafd (8/31): " C e r t a i n l y , t h e
r e g i o n needs an urgent American movement.... A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t comes a f t e r a
s e r i o u s I s r a e l i e s c a l a t i o n w i t h a l l p a r t i e s . . . . Although announcing A l b r i g h t ' s
visit
i s coming too l a t e , yet t h e r e i s a chance t o s o l v e t h e d i f f i c u l t
issues.
But the U n i t e d States should understand t h a t I s r a e l ' s demand t o s t a r t
peace from square one i s unacceptable....
The U n i t e d States should r e t a i n
c r e d i b i l i t y f o r i t s p o l i c y by f o r c i n g I s r a e l t o c o n t i n u e the peace
process....
The U n i t e d States should d e a l w i t h the c o u n t r i e s o f the r e g i o n
equally."
ISRAEL:
"A No-Nonsense, Determined Lady"
Ms. A l b r i g h t may not be a magician, t o quote her spokesman's words, b u t ,
a c c o r d i n g t o a Jerusalem Post e d i t o r i a l page c a r t o o n , S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t i s a
no-nonsense, determined l a d y who does n o t h e s i t a t e t o grab both Netanyahu and
A r a f a t by the ears and drag them t o the peace process.
"Jerusalem Concerned Over U.S. P r o - P a l e s t i n i a n T i l t "
N a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe s a i d i n i t s l e a d s t o r y ( 9 / 2 ) : "Concern i s growing i n
Jerusalem t h a t t h e U n i t e d States might t r y t o lean on I s r a e l i n the run-up t o
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t . . . . There i s a sense o f apprehension t h a t Mrs.
A l b r i g h t i s p l a n n i n g t o t e l l I s r a e l t o f r e e z e s e t t l e m e n t a c t i v i t i e s and suspend
f o r a s h o r t w h i l e the Har Homa p r o j e c t .
Science M i n i s t e r Michael E i t a n
expressed those f e e l i n g s yesterday.
He s a i d t h a t A l b r i g h t would f a i l i n her
m i s s i o n i f she t o l d I s r a e l t o f r e e z e the s e t t l e m e n t s as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r r e
suming the d i p l o m a t i c process."
"Not
a Magician"
Mass-appeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv's l e a d e d i t o r i a l concluded ( 8 / 3 1 ) : "Lacking a
magic f o r m u l a , Madeleine A l b r i g h t can h a r d l y be expected t o produce a s o l u t i o n
t o the c r i s i s . . . .
The f e a r remains, however, t h a t once A l b r i g h t goes back
empty handed, the s i t u a t i o n here would worsen."
"Expect No M i r a c l e s "
Senior a n a l y s t U z i Benziman m a i n t a i n e d i n independent Haaretz (8/31): " A l b r i g h t
i s v e r y u n l i k e l y t o be able t o break the v i c i o u s c i r c l e .
Israeli-Palestinian
r e l a t i o n s have n o t yet reached the stage where h i g h p r e s s u r e d American
m e d i a t i o n c o u l d work.... True, l a c k o f progress may l e a d t o a c o n f l a g r a t i o n no
one wants, b u t t h i s does n o t appear t o be enough t o push the l e a d e r s toward a
solution."
JORDAN:
"Madeleine A l b r i g h t And U.S. Role"
Prominent moderate I s l a m i s t and former m i n i s t e r Kamel A l - S h a r i f opined i n
c e n t e r - l e f t , i n f l u e n t i a l , Arabic-language A l - D u s t u r ( 9 / 1 ) :
"Remarks g i v e n by
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t cast shadows on her upcoming m i s s i o n even b e f o r e i t
starts.
The s e c r e t a r y g i v e s p r i o r i t y t o I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y and f a t a l l y t w i s t s
the neck o f the P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e by making A r a f a t and the PNA's l e a d r o l e t h e
achievement o f t h a t s e c u r i t y .
A l l t h i s i n s t e a d o f f o c u s i n g on the i s s u e a t
hand and p u t t i n g an end t o the s e t t l e m e n t b u i l d i n g and t h e J u d a i z i n g o f
Jerusalem. The U n i t e d S t a t e s , as seen by A l b r i g h t , i s the s o l e w o r l d power
and, t h e r e f o r e , can d i c t a t e the r u l e s w h i l e the p a r t i e s acquiesce because they
have no o t h e r o p t i o n . Netanyahu knows t h i s U.S. l o g i c and takes h e a r t i n
c o n t i n u i n g t o i g n o r e every I s r a e l i commitment made t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community.... H i s t o r y teaches t h a t the emotions o f people a r e capable o f
f o r m i n g a new s t a t u s quo and p u t t i n g new r u l e s t o the games. W i l l A l b r i g h t
r e a l i z e t h i s and r i s e t o what her m i s s i o n i s a l l about?"
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"What Can Be Expected From A l b r i g h t ' s
Visit"
I n the o p i n i o n o f l e a d c o l u m n i s t Urayb R i n t a w i on t h e f r o n t page o f
center-left,
i n f l u e n t i a l , Arabic-language A l - D u s t u r ( 9 / 1 ) :
"The most
o p t i m i s t i c people agree t h a t A l b r i g h t ' s success i n c o n t a i n i n g the c r i s i s ,
p o s t p o n i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and keeping the hope o f peace a l i v e i s t h e most
t h a t can be expected out o f her v i s i t . "
"What A l b r i g h t Needs To Know"
Senior e d i t o r Saleh Q a l l a b t o l d readers o f independent,
liberal,
Arabic-language Al-Arab Al-Yawm (8/30): " A l b r i g h t needs t o know t h a t her
f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e genuine p r e s s u r e on Netanyahu w i l l p l a c e t h e e n t i r e r e g i o n
at t h e edge o f t h e abyss, and w i l l b e l i t t l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s and j e o p a r d i z e
its interests."
OMAN:
"Fear Of A l b r i g h t ' s
'Realism'"'
Sudanese n a t i o n a l T a r i q Ashqar commented i n semi-independent, A r a b i c - l a n g u a g e
Al-Watan (8/31), "Her l o n g - a w a i t e d t o u r (comes) a t a time when t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i
c o n f l i c t b a d l y needs t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a t h i r d p a r t y capable o f having an
influence.
Though the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s the o n l y p a r t y t h a t can have an impact
on the c u r r e n t impasse i n the peace process, (Rubin's) words make us a f r a i d o f
the American r e a l i s m we expect A l b r i g h t t o be b e a r i n g . . . . Our f e a r s a r e
i m p l i e d by t h e sharp d i f f e r e n c e s between Arab and I s r a e l i views about r i g h t s ,
e s p e c i a l l y Arab r i g h t s . And here, the American u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r i g h t s i s
d e r i v e d from the s p e c i a l n a t u r e o f U . S . - I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s . "
QATAR:
" S i t u a t i o n Must Change"
An e d i t o r i a l i n semi-independent, Arabic-language Al-Watan (9/1) judged:
"Although the s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e p r e v i o u s l y made her views c l e a r w i t h r e g a r d t o
the n e c e s s i t y o f h a v i n g . . . t h e p r i n c i p l e o f land f o r peace as t h e b a s i s o f any
p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n , t h i s p o s i t i o n d i d not compel B i l l C l i n t o n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
to t a k e any p r a c t i c a l measure which would l e a d t o the u l t i m a t e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a
j u s t and comprehensive peace. And i f the s i t u a t i o n remains unchanged, Mrs.
A l b r i g h t w i l l r i s k , not o n l y s t a l l i n g the peace process, but a l s o i g n i t i n g t h e
i s s u e . Her f a i l u r e w i l l c r e a t e a depressed and desperate s i t u a t i o n , which w i l l
be s o l v e d t h r o u g h the use o f f o r c e . "
WEST BANK:
"Focus Of Peace Process"
Moderate, pro-peace process Al-Quds (9/2) noted, " I s r a e l i steps i n c l u d e
a l l o w i n g hundreds o f merchants and t e a c h e r s and a few thousand l a b o r e r s i n s i d e
the Green L i n e w h i l e the r e s t o f the r e s t r i c t i o n s w i l l
remain imposed on
P a l e s t i n i a n s who are f a c i n g economic, s o c i a l and medical h a r d s h i p s .
Regardless o f the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f such
'easing o f measures,'
I s r a e l must c o m p l e t e l y l i f t a l l forms o f t h e s t r a n g u l a t i n g s i e g e , which cannot
be p a r t o f any environment f o r peace.
I t i s i r o n i c t o see a s t a t e imposing
p u n i t i v e measures a g a i n s t a people as a p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g c h i p .
I t i s more
i r o n i c t o see t h e 'easing' being commended as a p o s i t i v e s t e p i n t h e r i g h t
direction.
I s r a e l and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must r e a l i z e t h a t resumption o f t h e
peace process has t o focus on g i v i n g P a l e s t i n i a n s t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s and
nothing else . "
FRANCE:
"The A l b r i g h t
Effect?"
C h r i s t o p h e B o l t a n s k i remarked i n l e f t - o f - c e n t e r L i b e r a t i o n
(9/2):
"Albright's
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t r i p t o Jerusalem i s n o t u n t i l September 9. But t h e e f f e c t s o f her planned
v i s i t can a l r e a d y be f e l t . As a welcome p r e s e n t I s r a e l has eased up i t s
c o n t r o l o f the West Bank and i n Gaza."
ITALY:
"Albright:
To Save Peace Process"
A r e p o r t from Jerusalem i n l e a d i n g business I I Sole-24 Ore read (8/30) :
"Madeleine
A l b r i g h t f i n a l l y gave up. The U.S. s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e i s l e a v i n g
f o r t h e Middle East i n 10 days w i t h a s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e : t o save the peace
process which began i n Oslo and has now been s t u c k f o r months.... She has been
working on the Middle East d o s s i e r f o r some t i m e , and has concluded t h a t , i n
order t o save t h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n d i a l o g u e , i t i s necessary t o work on a
wider f r o n t , a l s o i n v o l v i n g S y r i a , which may r e p r e s e n t t h e key t o a s o l u t i o n
of t h e Lebanese c r i s i s . "
CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA:
JORDAN:
TIME FOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS?
"Go Easy On Yourselves, A l g e r i a n s "
C e n t e r - l e f t , i n f l u e n t i a l A l - D u s t u r (9/2) e d i t o r i a l i z e d :
"Seeing one massacre
a f t e r another happen i n A l g e r i a and watching t h i s f u t i l e death take over
w i t h o u t reason o r cause, t h e q u e s t i o n grows b i g g e r everyday about who i s
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r these u n j u s t i f i a b l e massacres. Our A l g e r i a n b r o t h e r s a r e v e r y
s e n s i t i v e r e g a r d i n g t h e i r domestic i s s u e s , b u t our shock o f the massacres and
widespread k i l l i n g f o r c e s us t o c a l l o u t from our h e a r t s : Dear A l g e r i a n s , go
easy on y o u r s e l v e s . There i s n o t h i n g more p a i n f u l than seeing the news
agencies r e p o r t about one massacre a f t e r another i n A l g e r i a and not b e i n g able
to f i n d an answer t o why t h i s i s happening."
BRITAIN:
"Darkness I n A l g e r i a "
The c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 9 / 2 ) : " K o f i Annan, t h e
S e c r e t a r y General o f the UN, has s a i d t h a t i t may be time f o r the UN t o
i n t e r v e n e t o stop t h e s p i r a l o f k i l l i n g and a t r o c i t y i n A l g e r i a ' s c i v i l war,
which has a l r e a d y l a s t e d f i v e years. F o l l o w i n g the grotesque orgy o f beheading
and t h r o a t - c u t t i n g l a s t week, which took a t l e a s t 300 l i v e s i n two v i l l a g e s
south o f A l g i e r s on one day, the V a t i c a n has accused the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community o f i c e - c o l d i n d i f f e r e n c e . ' The m i l i t a r y regime o f P r e s i d e n t Liamine
Zeroual has r e j e c t e d Mr Annan's statement as unacceptable i n t e r f e r e n c e i n
A l g e r i a ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . With no end i n s i g h t t o the v i o l e n c e , i n which up
t o 100,000 A l g e r i a n s have d i e d h i d e o u s l y , i t i s Mr. Zeroual's statement which
i s unacceptable. While i t may not be time f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l powers t o
intervene, i t i s
h i g h time they s t a r t e d t o ask s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s about what i s going on i n
A l g e r i a . . . . The w o r l d s h o u l d back Mr. Annan and the Pope. Mr. Zeroual cannot
s o l v e A l g e r i a ' s woes and ensure h i s own s u r v i v a l by b l o o d a l o n e .
ITALY:
"The U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' R i g h t To I n t e r f e r e "
A commentary by Aldo Rizzo i n T u r i n ' s c e n t r i s t , i n f l u e n t i a l La Stampa h e l d
( 9 / 2 ) : " I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c l a i m t h a t t h e s y s t e m a t i c massacres which t h e
A l g e r i a n o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s seem unable t o p r e v e n t c o n t i n u e t o be an
' i n t e r n a l ' problem. Should we w a i t f o r the A l g e r i a n v i o l e n c e t o spread t o i t s
Maghreb n e i g h b o r s , o r f o r waves o f refugees t o a r r i v e on Europe's M e d i t e r r a n e a n
shores? The problem, o f course, i s how t o i n t e r v e n e ( b e a r i n g i n mind t h e
European r e l u c t a n c e t o i n t e r v e n e due t o the massive i m p o r t s o f gas and o i l ) .
Why n o t t r y , as Le Monde suggested, a UN i n v e s t i g a t i v e committee?
The A l g e r i a n
government and the m i l i t a r y c o u l d h a r d l y oppose i t , and perhaps t h a t c o u l d be
the b e g i n n i n g o f a p u r i f i c a t i o n , the premise f o r a d i a l o g u e which w i l l i s o l a t e
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the m e r c i l e s s a s s a s s i n s .
I n r e a l i t y , e v e r y t h i n g seems c o m p l i c a t e d . But
e v e r y t h i n g i s c o m p l i c a t e d i n A l g e r i a , b u t t h a t i s no reason t o g i v e up. The
i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s n o t t o l e t t h e emotion o f r e c e n t days d i s s i p a t e a s we w a i t
f o r f u r t h e r and worse d i s a s t e r s . "
"More Shadows"
Umberto De Giovannangeli wrote i n PDS ( l e a d i n g government p a r t y ) d a i l y L'Unita
(8/31): " I f Europe h e s i t a t e s t o i n t e r v e n e i n A l g e r i a , t h a t i s due m a i n l y t o t h e
i n t e r n a l r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e A l g e r i a n regime and t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n .
The a l a r m i n g statement [by I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r D i n i t h a t t h a t n e i t h e r t h e
A l g e r i a n government nor t h e A l g e r i a n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n ' d e s i r e an
I t a l i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n o r m e d i a t i o n ' ] i s a harsh a c c u s a t i o n which c a s t s more
shadows on t h e a l r e a d y gloomy f u t u r e o f t h e tormented N o r t h e r n A f r i c a n n a t i o n . "
SPAIN:
"Algerian Violence"
Conservative ABC e d i t o r i a l i z e d (8/29): "Fundamentalism i s d i v i d e d and
broken.... The o n l y o p t i o n remaining i s t o d e a l w i t h i t p o l i t i c a l l y : w i t h
p o l i c e and r e p r e s s i o n c o n f r o n t i n g i t s t e r r o r i s t s and w i t h d i a l o g u e and
agreements w i t h t h e moderates. The end o f t h e t e r r o r i s t s seems t o
depend... o n l y on t h e l o y a l t y o f t h e moderates. Madani should n o t f a l l i n t o
t h e t e m p t a t i o n o f o t h e r a y a t o l l a h s : t h e o l d and t r e a c h e r o u s idea o f u s i n g t h e
b a r b a r i t y o f t e r r o r i s m f o r h i s own b e n e f i t ."
INDONESIA:
" A l g e r i a ' s Entangled
S i t u a t i o n : Hundreds o f People
Massacred"
Leading independent Kompas commented (9/2) : "The p r i n c i p l e o f democracy has
been d i s g r a c e d by t h e c o r r u p t , r e p r e s s i v e abuses o f power. Democracy has been
reduced t o d i s a p p o i n t i n g r h e t o r i c because i t i s n o t e x e r c i s e d .
The I s l a m i c
Front p a r t y (FIS) i s t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f t h e c u r r e n t c o r r u p t regime. I f t h e
N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front (FLN) had m a i n t a i n e d i t s democratic p r i n c i p l e s , t h i s
p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s would n o t have t u r n e d o u t as b a d l y as i t has.... The FLN's
crackdown on m i l i t a n t s o n l y provoked them t o e s c a l a t e t h e i r v i o l e n c e . . . . I f
i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e FIS has g i v e n peace s i g n a l s , we hope o t h e r s w i l l help make
peace a r e a l i t y . "
BRIEFS
DEATH OF PRINCESS DIANA:
BRITAIN:
'THE WORLD LOSES A LEGEND'
"Let The Mourners Come"
The c o n s e r v a t i v e Times s a i d i n an l e d i t o r i a l (9/2) : "Every l i f e i s unique, b u t
not every death i s mourned by an e n t i r e n a t i o n . Diana, Princess o f Wales, was
i r r e p l a c e a b l e . Her f u n e r a l must a l l o w t h e people t o p a r t i c i p a t e . . . . The
B r i t i s h p r i d e themselves on t h e i r t a l e n t f o r i m p r o v i s e d
ceremonial.
The r o y a l f a m i l y has made a good s t a r t by heeding t h e prime
m i n i s t e r ' s request t h a t t h i s should be 'a people's f u n e r a l . ' A seamless f u s i o n
of t h e u n i v e r s a l and t h e p e r s o n a l would be a worthy t r i b u t e t o t h e most
spontaneous p u b l i c f i g u r e o f our t i m e . "
"Not One Of Us At A l l "
The l i b e r a l Guardian r a n t h i s op-ed commentary by c o l u m n i s t Hugo Young ( 9 / 2 ) :
" I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , where I've watched i t , i t ' s t h e b i g g e s t death s i n c e
P r e s i d e n t Kennedy. I t has t h e same sense o f r e v e r b e r a t i n g impact, across t h e
p l a i n s and over t h e mountains, t o u c h i n g some p a r t o f many people.
Sonorous
network anchor-persons have taken t r a n s m i s s i o n perches i n f r o n t o f Buckingham
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Palace and the Tower of London. I t s u r e l y s h o u l d n ' t be so--but i t i s . For
many Americans, as f o r many o t h e r s , p r e s i d e n t and p r i n c e s s occupy the same
emotional t e r r a i n . . . .
What Diana might have changed i s the i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t
she was c l o s e s t t o , the one t h a t made h e r — t h e monarchy i t s e l f .
She was the
o n l y member of t h a t b e n i g h t e d c l a n who showed any sense o f how monarchy might
be made r e l e v a n t t o the p u b l i c w i l l i n the modern age."
RUSSIA:
"World Loses A Legend"
O f f i c i a l government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (9/2) remarked i n a r e p o r t by i t s P a r i s
correspondent N i k o l a i P a k l i n :
"Princess Diana was c o n s i d e r e d the w o r l d ' s
most-photographed woman. Maybe t h a t i s what k i l l e d her. As a human, you can't
but f e e l s o r r y f o r her. The c h i l d r e n l o s t t h e i r mother, t h e w o r l d one of i t s
legends."
" P a r t i n g With A Dream"
Pavel Bogomolov i n London wrote f o r neo-communist Pravda-Five ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Our
f a r e w e l l today i s not f o r her a l o n e . We are b e w a i l i n g , i f unknowingly, our own
dream about the sublime, almost u n a t t a i n a b l e day when beauty, t a s t e , i n t e l l e c t ,
n o b i l i t y , l o v e , and motherhood become one, and t h a t f o r which years ago
i n d i v i d u a l s s t r i v e d i n t u i t i v e l y , t h r o u g h e r r o r s and t e a r s , becomes r e a l i t y . "
"Lesson For A l l Of
Us"
A l b e r t P l u t n i k s t a t e d on page one o f r e f o r m i s t I z v e s t i a ( 9 / 2 ) ; "Everyone agrees
t h a t the c h i e f cause of the death of the B r i t i s h a r i s t o c r a t and one o f the most
a t t r a c t i v e f i g u r e s o f t h i s c e n t u r y i s the media's v o r a c i o u s a p p e t i t e f o r what
i s s t r i c t l y p r i v a t e . . . . As those photo r e p o r t e r s chased the p r i n c e s s down
P a r i s s t r e e t s , they put i n danger not o n l y the l i v e s o f people i n t h a t posh
Mercedes, but genuine freedom o f i n f o r m a t i o n which has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h the
methods o f gangsters or s p e c i a l s e r v i c e s . They were a danger t o the media's
p r e s t i g e , which does not grow t h r o u g h the use o f immoral methods, a t l e a s t not
i n the eyes o f t h e i r most e x a c t i n g audience."
BELGIUM:
"Tabloid Journalism"
New York correspondent Peter Vanderbruggen noted i n f i n a n c i a l
Financieel-Economische T i j d ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Americans are proud t h a t t h e i r press i s
much ' c l e a n e r ' than the European. Bare b r e a s t s on page 3? That i s something
which i s s t i l l f a r from p o s s i b l e i n p r u d i s h America.
However, when i t comes t o
exposing the p r i v a t e l i v e s of f i l m s t a r s , m i l l i o n a i r e s , and a r i s t o c r a t i c
f a m i l i e s , American t a b l o i d s are second t o none. That, t o o , i s the f a u l t o f the
Europeans i n the U.S. media's eyes.
Indeed, was i t not Rupert Murdoch who
e x p o r t e d the B r i t i s h gossip j o u r n a l i s m o f The Sun t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1979
by t a k i n g over The New York Post?...
' F o r t u n a t e l y , Murdoch does not have as
much i n f l u e n c e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s as i n the U n i t e d Kingdom,' says New York
Times c o l u m n i s t Anthony Lewis. But, t h a t does not mean t h a t the impact o f
g o s s i p media i s not i n c r e a s i n g c o n t i n u a l l y i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . "
SPAIN:
"More Than an A c c i d e n t "
L i b e r a l E l Pais e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 9 / 1 ) :
"The death o f P r i n c e s s Diana....has
provoked immense shock....The whole w o r l d f e e l s g r i e f about the disappearance
of t h i s young woman who had reached an incomparable l e v e l o f p o p u l a r i t y . . . .
What can be s a i d i s t h a t j o u r n a l i s m w i t h o u t s c r u p l e s can have t e r r i b l e
consequences... The worst p a r t i s t h a t the scandal mongers o n l y e x i s t because
t h e r e i s an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r t h e i r p r o d u c t . . . . I t might be naive t o
t h i n k t h a t the t r a g e d y i n P a r i s i s going open a p e r i o d of r e f l e c t i o n about the
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p r a c t i c e s o f t h i s type o f j o u r n a l i s m , but i t c e r t a i n l y would be d e s i r a b l e - - a n d
not o n l y i n the U n i t e d Kingdom."
JAPAN:
" G r i e f Over Tragedy Of Princess
Diana"
T o p - c i r c u l a t i o n , moderate Yomiuri opined ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Diana's p o p u l a r i t y was n o t
based on her s u p e r s t a r s t a t u s alone. While s t r u g g l i n g w i t h s e p a r a t i o n and
d i v o r c e , she became a symbol o f the change i n t r a d i t i o n a l and class-bound
B r i t i s h s o c i e t y . . . . ( A f t e r the d i v o r c e ) she performed v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l
roles....
She r e d i s c o v e r e d t h i s s o c i a l r o l e i n the course o f her stormy
p e r s o n a l l i f e and t r i e d t o move f o r w a r d . B r i t a i n , and the r e s t o f the w o r l d as
w e l l , came t o value her c o n t r i b u t i o n . "
OSLO LAND MINE CONFERENCE:
NORWAY:
'SLIM HOPES' FOR BREAKTHROUGH
"Ban Mines"
Looking f o r w a r d t o the opening o f the Oslo conference on l a n d mines,
c o n s e r v a t i v e A f t e n p o s t e n remarked (8/29): "We're pleased t h a t the U n i t e d
States has decided t o take p a r t i n the Oslo conference.
However, because
Washington wants many t h i n g s exempted from the f i n a l ban, t h e r e i s acute danger
t h a t the f i n a l agreement w i l l be watered down c o n s i d e r a b l y . M i l i t a r y and
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , t o o , a r e f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t the ban. I n
Korea, the demarcation zone i s f i l l e d w i t h mines; F i n l a n d covered i t s border t o
the S o v i e t Union w i t h mines f o r defense purposes.... The way l a n d mines a r e
used today are t r u l y a weapon o f t e r r o r .
120 m i l l i o n mines are hidden i n the
ground. Ban them now--and make the ban as comprehensive as p o s s i b l e . "
GERMANY:
"Slim Hopes For Breakthrough"
R i g h t - o f - c e n t e r Dresdner Neueste N a c h r i c h t e n (9/2) t o l d i t s readers:
"There
are o n l y s l i g h t i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the Oslo l a n d mine conference w i l l achieve a
breakthrough i n the d i s c u s s i o n about the ban on a n t i - p e r s o n n e l mines. Main
producers such as the U n i t e d S t a t e s , have come t o Oslo o n l y r e l u c t a n t l y and
o n l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . Other mine producers, such as Russia and China,
are not even p r e s e n t .
However, the meeting should not be i n v a i n , s i n c e the
s o - c a l l e d s m a l l s t a t e s have never b e f o r e pressed i n such a massive manner f o r a
ban.
I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t wars do not become more humane w i t h o u t l a n d
mines. But every banned weapon i s a t the same time one chance more f o r the
saving o f human l i v e s . The ban o f very i n s i d i o u s weapons systems should by no
means r e s u l t i n the l e g i t i m a t i o n o f o t h e r weapons. However, the b i g l a n d mine
producers want t o keep t h i s ' l o o p h o l e ' open. However, the p r o d u c t i o n o f
'smart' and h i g h - t e c h mines r e s p e c t i v e l y i s supposed t o c o n t i n u e . But t h e Gulf
War showed t h a t weapons do not have any i n t e l l i g e n c e a t a l l , they o n l y have the
p o t e n t i a l t o d e s t r o y and k i l l . "
FRANCE:
"The Future Of Land Mines"
G i l l e s Dauxerre wrote i n r e g i o n a l L'Yonne R e p u b l i c a i n e ( 9 / 2 ) :
"The f u t u r e o f
l a n d mines w i l l depend on each n a t i o n ' s commitment not t o manufacture them and
i t s commitment t o stop u s i n g them. France has a l r e a d y made t h a t
commitment... but two major producers and users are absent from the
c o n f e r e n c e — C h i n a and Russia. The U n i t e d States f o r i t s p a r t has a l r e a d y
asked f o r a nine-year delay b e f o r e a p p l y i n g the new t r e a t y ,
along w i t h a
waiver r e g a r d i n g t h e i r use on the border between North and South Korea....
Meanwhile, women and c h i l d r e n c o n t i n u e t o d i e i n A s i a , A f r i c a and Bosnia."
DENMARK:
"U.S. P a r t i c i p a t i o n W i l l Strengthen Move Toward Ban"
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C e n t e r - r i g h t B e r l i n g s k e Tidende m a i n t a i n e d (8/30) : "Both d u r i n g t h e Korean and
the Vietnam Wars, U.S. t r o o p s f e a r e d American l a n d mines most. I n Korea, more
American s o l d i e r s d i e d as t h e r e s u l t o f U.S. mines than enemy ones.... I n Oslo
today t h e l a n d mine issue i s again on t h e agenda, and i t l o o k s l i k e t h e
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be much s t r e n g t h e n e d by U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The U n i t e d
S t a t e s , howeverm, wants t o c o n t i n u e t o use l a n d mines on t h e border o f North
and South Korea. I t a l s o advocates t h e use o f s o - c a l l e d 'smart mines.'
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s , t h e f a c t t h a t 100 c o u n t r i e s a r e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e
t a l k s w i l l make i t harder t o j u s t i f y t h e s a l e and use l a n d mines."
SOUTH KOREA:
" W i l l Landmines Disappear From The Earth?"
According t o pro-business Joong-Ang I l b o ( 8 / 2 ) :
"The Oslo meeting i s a
p r e l i m i n a r y one t o p u t t h e f i n i s h i n g touches on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l ban o f
a n t i - p e r s o n n e l landmines. The problem, however, i s t h a t major c o u n t r i e s , such
as Russia, China, and I s r a e l , r e f u s e t o j o i n t h e ban, r a i s i n g doubts about i t s
e f f e c t i v e n e s s . . . . The U.S. government i s d i v i d e d i n t h i s r e g a r d , and i t s
demand f o r e x c e p t i o n s w i l l s u r e l y make progress on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l ban on
a n t i - p e r s o n n e l mines hard."
TOWARD U.S.-IRAN NORMALIZATION:
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:
AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL?
" I r a n Studying American
Proposal"
The main s t o r y i n t h e l a r g e s t - c i r c u l a t i o n A r a b i c d a i l y A l - K h a l e e j (8/31) c i t e d
I r a n i a n w e l l - i n f o r m e d sources as t e l l i n g v i s i t i n g j o u r n a l i s t Michel Noufal t h a t
" I r a n i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s are c u r r e n t l y s t u d y i n g an American proposed
formula t o i n i t i a t e d i a l o g u e between I r a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o end t h e long
b o y c o t t between them.... The American p r o p o s a l was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e I r a n i a n
l e a d e r s h i p through r e g i o n a l mediators f o l l o w i n g t h e v i c t o r y o f P r e s i d e n t
Khatami i n t h e May p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . . . .
Khatami kept t h e p r o p o s a l f o r
h i m s e l f t o take o f f i c i a l power and t o form a new c a b i n e t i n Tehran." The s t o r y
noted:
"What i s new i n t h e p r o p o s a l was t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l American w i l l i n g n e s s
f o r a d i a l o g u e l e a d i n g t o n o r m a l i z a t i o n w i t h I r a n a f t e r i t has been proven t o
Washington t h a t t h e p o l i c y o f dual containment was a f a i l u r e , and t h e l o s i n g
p a r t y i n t h i s economic e q u a t i o n was t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , n o t I r a n . The American
p r o p o s a l i s based on t h r e e s c e n a r i o s : h o l d i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s t o r e s t o r e b i l a t e r a l
r e l a t i o n s as they were b e f o r e 1979; -holding n e g o t i a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e Middle
East d i s p u t e and m a i n l y t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n i n a
Middle East system where I r a n would p l a y a r o l e ; and f i n a l l y , t h e r e l e a s e o f
f r o z e n I r a n i a n assets i n Washington i f I r a n accepts t h e p r o p o s a l . "
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FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION
EARLY REPORT
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#9
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USIA
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$8
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U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON DC 20547
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#9
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OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND MEDIA
REACTION
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$8
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B i l l Richey, Branch Chief Media Reaction
619
(R/MR),
Richey@usia.gov, (202)
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-6511
Ann Pincus,
Director,
(202) 619
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-6511
Tuesday, September 2,
1997
EXPECTATIONS FOR ALBRIGHT V I
SAVE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS'
Commentators i n t h e Middle East, both Arab and I s r a e l i , made c l e a r
t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e A l b r i g h t ' s September 9
v i s i t t o t h e r e g i o n would "save peace" by r e v i t a l i z i n g t h e s t a l l e d
process.
They were n o t i n agreement, however, as t o whether Ms.
A l b r i g h t c o u l d achieve t h i s g o a l , w i t h a m a j o r i t y s k e p t i c a l t h a t even
the t o p U.S. d i p l o m a t c o u l d b r i n g t h e sides t o g e t h e r . T e l Aviv's
mass
•
-appeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv g l o o m i l y p r e d i c t e d , "Lacking a magic
f o r m u l a , Madeleine A l b r i g h t can h a r d l y be expected t o produce a
solution t o the c r i s i s . "
Several Arab a n a l y s t s p o i n t e d t o t h e i r
p e r c e p t i o n o f a U.S. t i l t i n I s r a e l ' s f a v o r as t h e p r i n c i p a l reason
why t h e A l b r i g h t m i s s i o n might not succeed. Independent, l i b e r a l
Al
•
-Arab A l
•
-Yawm o f Amman i n s i s t e d , " A l b r i g h t needs t o know t h a t h e r
f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e genuine pressure on Netanyahu w i l l p l a c e t h e
e n t i r e r e g i o n a t t h e edge o f t h e abyss and w i l l b e l i t t l e t h e U.S. and
jeopardize i t s i n t e r e s t s . "
I n I s r a e l , some c o l u m n i s t s warned
p r e c i s e l y a g a i n s t t h e U.S. a d o p t i n g such a stance, w i t h n a t i o n a l i s t
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Hatzofe q u o t i n g a government o f f i c i a l saying t h a t her m i s s i o n would
f a i l i f t h e U.S. t r i e s " t o l e a n " on I s r a e l on t h e i s s u e o f
s e t t l e m e n t s . A h a n d f u l o f observers remained somewhat h o p e f u l ,
however, t h a t Ms. A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t would " c o n t a i n t h e c r i s i s ,
postpone a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and keep t h e hope o f peace a l i v e . "
Cairo's
pro
•
-government A l Ahram "welcomed" t h e s e c r e t a r y ' s o u t l i n e o f t h e
t e n e t s t h a t would guide her e f f o r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y her emphasis on UN
r e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338 and on s a f e g u a r d i n g "U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n t h e
region."
CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA:
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS?
TIME FOR
Alarmed by t h e l a s t week's h o r r i f i c s l a u g h t e r o f c i v i l i a n s i n t h e
A l g e r i a n c i v i l war, a few commentators wondered whether i n t e r n a t i o n a l
e f f o r t s c o u l d h e l p stop t h e k i l l i n g .
N o t i n g statements by UN
S e c r e t a r y General K o f i Annan t h a t " i t may be time f o r t h e UN t o
i n t e r v e n e " and t h e Pope's condemning what he c a l l e d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's " i c e
•
- c o l d i n d i f f e r e n c e , " London's c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y
Telegraph wrote, "While i t may n o t be time f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
powers t o i n t e r v e n e , i t i s h i g h time they s t a r t e d a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s
about what i s going on i n A l g e r i a . " I t a l i a n observers, n o t i n g t h e
" i n t e r n a l r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e A l g e r i a n regime and t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s t
o p p o s i t i o n " t o European i n t e r v e n t i o n , w o r r i e d about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
r e g i o n a l d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n and seconded a c a l l by P a r i s ' s l e f t
•
-of
•
-center
Le Monde f o r a UN i n v e s t i g a t i v e committee.
Jordan's c e n t e r
•
-left,
influential Al
•
-Dustur acknowledged t h a t "our A l g e r i a n b r o t h e r s a r e
very s e n s i t i v e r e g a r d i n g t h e i r domestic i s s u e s " b u t expressed dismay
at t h e " f u t i l e death." Arguing t h a t t h e A l g e r i a n government's
"crackdown on m i l i t a n t s o n l y provoked them t o e s c a l a t e t h e i r
v i o l e n c e , " J a k a r t a ' s l e a d i n g independent Kompas d e c l a r e d , " I f i t i s
t r u e t h a t t h e FIS [ I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ] has g i v e n peace s i g n a l s ,
we hope o t h e r s w i l l
h e l p make peace a r e a l i t y . "
BRIEFS
Death Of Princess Diana:
'World Loses A Legend'
Oslo Land Mine Conference:
'Slim Hopes For Breakthrough'
—
Toward U.S.
•
- I r a n N o r m a l i z a t i o n : An American Proposal?
EDITORS: M i l d r e d Sola Neely, B i l l Richey and Kathleen J. Brahney
EXPECTATIONS FOR ALBRIGHT VISIT:
MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS'
EGYPT:
" A l b r i g h t ' s V i s i t Expected To Achieve T a n g i b l e
Ibrahim Nafie, e d i t o r
•
-in
Results"
'TO SAVE
�ARMS Email System
Page 12 of 22
•
- c h i e f of pro
•
-government A l Ahram, h e l d
(8/29): "Observers expect A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t t o achieve t a n g i b l e
political results....
Before the v i s i t she put the peace process i n
i t s r i g h t p l a c e . . . based on r e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338.... Her spokesman
s t a t e d t h a t the v i s i t w i l l be more comprehensive... i n c l u d i n g U.S.
i n t e r e s t s i n the r e g i o n . . . . C e r t a i n l y , t h i s deserves welcome....
[But,] we b e l i e v e t h a t the peace process c o n t i n u e s t o be i n c r i s i s . . . .
The U n i t e d States must r e a l i z e t h a t Netanyahu has d i v e r t e d h i m s e l f
from the peace process....
The U n i t e d States i s not a mediator i n the
t a l k s , but a g u a r a n t o r of the Oslo agreements... which
gives the
P a l e s t i n i a n s the hope f o r a s t a t e . . . . Since A l b r i g h t determined the
b a s i c s of the peace process i n her speech, we expect her t o c o r r e c t
the imbalance t h a t happened t o i t . "
"U.S. C r e d i b i l i t y I s Now At Stake"
According t o pro
•
-government A l Ahram (8/30) : "The U n i t e d States i s
going t h r o u g h a d i f f i c u l t t e s t of i t s p o s i t i o n on t h e peace
process....
A l l p a r t i e s are e x p e c t i n g the American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o
save peace.... I n f a c t , p a r t of the c r i s i s i s due t o the U n i t e d
S t a t e s ' r e l i n q u i s h i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s toward the peace
process....
I s r a e l has l a i d one o b s t a c l e a f t e r another, a l l t o a b o r t
American e f f o r t s . . . .
I s r a e l s p e c i f i c a l l y seeks t o s p o i l A l b r i g h t ' s
visit....
American c r e d i b i l i t y i s now a t s t a k e . "
"Region Needs Urgent U.S. Movement"
Columnist
Sanaa A l Said wrote i n o p p o s i t i o n A l Wafd (8/31) :
"Certainly,
the r e g i o n needs an urgent American movement....
A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t comes a f t e r a s e r i o u s I s r a e l i e s c a l a t i o n w i t h a l l
p a r t i e s . . . . Although announcing A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t
i s coming t o o l a t e ,
yet t h e r e i s a chance t o s o l v e the d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s .
But the U n i t e d
States should understand t h a t I s r a e l ' s demand t o s t a r t peace from
square one i s unacceptable....
The U n i t e d S t a t e s should r e t a i n
c r e d i b i l i t y f o r i t s p o l i c y by f o r c i n g I s r a e l t o c o n t i n u e the peace
process....
The U n i t e d States should deal w i t h the c o u n t r i e s of the
region equally."
ISRAEL: "A No
•
-Nonsense, Determined
Lady"
Ms. A l b r i g h t may not be a magician, t o quote her spokesman's words,
but, a c c o r d i n g t o a Jerusalem Post e d i t o r i a l page c a r t o o n , S e c r e t a r y
A l b r i g h t i s a no
•
-nonsense, determined l a d y who does not h e s i t a t e t o
grab both Netanyahu and A r a f a t by the ears and drag them t o the peace
process.
"Jerusalem Concerned Over U.S.
Pro
•
-Palestinian
Tilt"
N a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe s a i d i n i t s l e a d s t o r y ( 9 / 2 ) : "Concern i s growing
i n Jerusalem t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s might t r y t o lean on I s r a e l i n the
run
•
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-up t o S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t ' s v i s i t . . . . There i s a sense o f
apprehension t h a t Mrs. A l b r i g h t i s p l a n n i n g t o t e l l I s r a e l t o f r e e z e
s e t t l e m e n t a c t i v i t i e s and suspend f o r a s h o r t w h i l e the Har Homa
project.
Science M i n i s t e r Michael E i t a n expressed those f e e l i n g s
yesterday.
He s a i d t h a t A l b r i g h t would f a i l i n her m i s s i o n i f she
t o l d I s r a e l t o f r e e z e the s e t t l e m e n t s as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r resuming
the d i p l o m a t i c process."
"Not a Magician"
Mass
•
-appeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv's lead e d i t o r i a l concluded (8/31):
"Lacking a magic formula, Madeleine A l b r i g h t can h a r d l y be expected t o
produce a s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s . . . .
The f e a r remains, however, t h a t
once A l b r i g h t goes back empty handed, t h e s i t u a t i o n here would
worsen."
"Expect No M i r a c l e s "
Senior a n a l y s t U z i Benziman m a i n t a i n e d i n independent Haaretz (8/31) :
" A l b r i g h t i s very u n l i k e l y t o be able t o break the v i c i o u s c i r c l e .
Israeli
•
- P a l e s t i n i a n r e l a t i o n s have not yet reached the stage where
h i g h pressured American m e d i a t i o n c o u l d work.... True, l a c k o f
progress may l e a d t o a c o n f l a g r a t i o n no one wants, b u t t h i s does n o t
appear t o be enough t o push the leaders toward a s o l u t i o n . "
JORDAN:
"Madeleine A l b r i g h t And U.S. Role"
Prominent moderate I s l a m i s t and former m i n i s t e r Kamel A l
•
-Sharif
in
opined
center
•
-left,
influential,
Arabic
•
-language A l
•
-Dustur (9/1) :
"Remarks g i v e n by S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t cast shadows on her upcoming
m i s s i o n even b e f o r e i t s t a r t s .
The s e c r e t a r y g i v e s p r i o r i t y t o
I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y and f a t a l l y t w i s t s the neck o f the P a l e s t i n i a n issue
by making A r a f a t and the PNA's l e a d r o l e the achievement o f t h a t
security.
A l l t h i s i n s t e a d o f f o c u s i n g on the issue a t hand and
p u t t i n g an end t o the s e t t l e m e n t b u i l d i n g and the J u d a i z i n g o f
Jerusalem. The U n i t e d S t a t e s , as seen by A l b r i g h t , i s the s o l e w o r l d
power and, t h e r e f o r e , can d i c t a t e the r u l e s w h i l e the p a r t i e s
acquiesce because they have no o t h e r o p t i o n . Netanyahu knows t h i s
U.S. l o g i c and takes h e a r t i n c o n t i n u i n g t o i g n o r e every I s r a e l i
commitment made t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.... H i s t o r y teaches
t h a t the emotions o f people a r e capable o f forming a new s t a t u s quo
and p u t t i n g new r u l e s t o the games. W i l l A l b r i g h t r e a l i z e t h i s and
r i s e t o what her m i s s i o n i s a l l about?"
"What Can Be Expected From A l b r i g h t ' s V i s i t "
In the o p i n i o n o f l e a d c o l u m n i s t Urayb R i n t a w i on the f r o n t page o f
center
•
-left,
•
influential,
Arabic
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-language A l
•
-Dustur ( 9 / 1 ) : "The
most o p t i m i s t i c people agree t h a t A l b r i g h t ' s success i n c o n t a i n i n g t h e
c r i s i s , p o s t p o n i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and keeping the hope o f peace a l i v e
is
the most t h a t can be expected out o f her v i s i t . "
"What A l b r i g h t Needs To Know"
Senior e d i t o r Saleh Q a l l a b t o l d readers o f independent,
Arabic
liberal,
•
-language A l
•
-Arab A l
•
-Yawm (8/30):
" A l b r i g h t needs t o know t h a t
her f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e genuine p r e s s u r e on Netanyahu w i l l p l a c e t h e
e n t i r e r e g i o n a t the edge o f the abyss, and w i l l b e l i t t l e the U n i t e d
S t a t e s and j e o p a r d i z e i t s i n t e r e s t s . "
OMAN:
"Fear Of A l b r i g h t ' s 'Realism'''
Sudanese n a t i o n a l T a r i q Ashqar commented i n semi
•
-independent,
Arabic
•
-language A l
•
-Watan (8/31), "Her l o n g
•
-awaited t o u r (comes) a t a
time when the Arab
•
- I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t b a d l y needs t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a
t h i r d p a r t y capable o f having an i n f l u e n c e .
Though the U n i t e d S t a t e s
i s the o n l y p a r t y t h a t can have an impact on the c u r r e n t impasse i n
the peace process, (Rubin's) words make us a f r a i d o f the American
r e a l i s m we expect A l b r i g h t t o be b e a r i n g . . . . Our f e a r s a r e i m p l i e d by
the sharp d i f f e r e n c e s between Arab and I s r a e l i views about r i g h t s ,
e s p e c i a l l y Arab r i g h t s . And here, the American u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
r i g h t s i s d e r i v e d from the s p e c i a l n a t u r e o f U.S.
•
-Israeli relations."
QATAR:
" S i t u a t i o n Must Change"
An e d i t o r i a l i n semi
•
-independent, A r a b i c
•
-language A l
•
-Watan (9/1)
judged: "Although the s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e p r e v i o u s l y made her views
c l e a r w i t h r e g a r d t o the n e c e s s i t y o f h a v i n g . . . t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l a n d
f o r peace as the b a s i s o f any p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n , t h i s p o s i t i o n d i d n o t
compel B i l l C l i n t o n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o take any p r a c t i c a l measure
which would l e a d t o the u l t i m a t e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a j u s t and
comprehensive peace. And i f the s i t u a t i o n remains unchanged, Mrs.
A l b r i g h t w i l l r i s k , n o t o n l y s t a l l i n g the peace process, b u t a l s o
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i g n i t i n g t h e i s s u e . Her f a i l u r e w i l l c r e a t e a depressed and desperate
s i t u a t i o n , which w i l l be s o l v e d t h r o u g h t h e use o f f o r c e . "
WEST BANK: "Focus Of Peace Process"
Moderate, p r o
•
-peace process A l
•
-Quds (9/2) noted, " I s r a e l i steps
i n c l u d e a l l o w i n g hundreds o f merchants and t e a c h e r s and a few thousand
l a b o r e r s i n s i d e t h e Green Line w h i l e t h e r e s t o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s w i l l
remain imposed on P a l e s t i n i a n s who a r e f a c i n g economic, s o c i a l and
medical h a r d s h i p s . Regardless o f t h e p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f
such
'easing o f measures,' I s r a e l must c o m p l e t e l y l i f t a l l forms o f
the
s t r a n g u l a t i n g s i e g e , which cannot be p a r t o f any environment f o r
peace.
I t i s i r o n i c t o see a s t a t e imposing p u n i t i v e measures
a g a i n s t a people as a p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g c h i p .
I t i s more i r o n i c
to see t h e 'easing' b e i n g commended as a p o s i t i v e s t e p i n t h e r i g h t
direction.
I s r a e l and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must r e a l i z e t h a t resumption
of t h e peace process has t o focus on g i v i n g P a l e s t i n i a n s t h e i r
l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s and n o t h i n g e l s e . "
FRANCE: "The A l b r i g h t E f f e c t ? "
C h r i s t o p h e B o l t a n s k i remarked i n l e f t
•
-of
•
-center L i b e r a t i o n (9/2):
" A l b r i g h t ' s t r i p t o Jerusalem i s n o t u n t i l September 9. But t h e
e f f e c t s o f her planned v i s i t can a l r e a d y be f e l t . As a welcome
p r e s e n t I s r a e l has eased up i t s c o n t r o l o f t h e West Bank and i n Gaza."
ITALY: " A l b r i g h t : To Save Peace Process"
A r e p o r t from
Jerusalem i n l e a d i n g business I I Sole
•
-24 Ore read
(8/30): "Madeleine A l b r i g h t f i n a l l y gave up. The U.S. s e c r e t a r y o f
s t a t e i s l e a v i n g f o r t h e Middle East i n 10 days w i t h a s i n g l e
o b j e c t i v e : t o save t h e peace process which began i n Oslo and has now
been s t u c k f o r months.... She has been working on t h e Middle East
d o s s i e r f o r some t i m e , and has concluded t h a t , i n o r d e r t o save t h e
Israeli
•
- P a l e s t i n i a n d i a l o g u e , i t i s necessary t o work on a wider
f r o n t , a l s o i n v o l v i n g S y r i a , which may r e p r e s e n t t h e key t o a
s o l u t i o n o f t h e Lebanese c r i s i s . "
CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA:
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS?
JORDAN:
"Go Easy On Yourselves, A l g e r i a n s "
Center
•
-left,
influential Al
•
-Dustur (9/2) e d i t o r i a l i z e d :
"Seeing one
massacre a f t e r another happen i n A l g e r i a and watching t h i s f u t i l e
death take over w i t h o u t reason o r cause, t h e q u e s t i o n grows b i g g e r
everyday about who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r these u n j u s t i f i a b l e massacres.
TIME FOR
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Our A l g e r i a n b r o t h e r s are v e r y s e n s i t i v e r e g a r d i n g t h e i r domestic
i s s u e s , but our shock of the massacres and widespread k i l l i n g f o r c e s
us t o c a l l out
from our h e a r t s : Dear A l g e r i a n s , go easy on
y o u r s e l v e s . There i s n o t h i n g more p a i n f u l than seeing the news
agencies r e p o r t about one
massacre a f t e r another i n A l g e r i a and not
being able t o f i n d an answer t o why t h i s i s happening."
BRITAIN: "Darkness I n A l g e r i a "
The c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d (9/2) : " K o f i Annan, the
S e c r e t a r y General of the UN, has s a i d t h a t i t may be time f o r the UN
t o i n t e r v e n e t o stop the s p i r a l o f k i l l i n g and a t r o c i t y i n A l g e r i a ' s
c i v i l war, which has a l r e a d y l a s t e d f i v e years.
F o l l o w i n g the
grotesque orgy of beheading and t h r o a t
•
- c u t t i n g l a s t week, which took
at l e a s t 300 l i v e s i n two v i l l a g e s south of A l g i e r s on one day,
V a t i c a n has accused the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community of i c e
the
•
-cold
i n d i f f e r e n c e . ' The m i l i t a r y regime of P r e s i d e n t Liamine Zeroual has
r e j e c t e d Mr Annan's statement as unacceptable i n t e r f e r e n c e i n
Algeria's internal a f f a i r s .
With no end i n s i g h t t o the v i o l e n c e , i n
which up t o 100,000 A l g e r i a n s have d i e d h i d e o u s l y , i t i s Mr. Zeroual's
statement which i s unacceptable.
While i t may not be time f o r the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l powers t o i n t e r v e n e , i t i s
h i g h time they s t a r t e d t o ask s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s about what i s
going on i n A l g e r i a . . . . The w o r l d should back Mr. Annan and the
Pope. Mr. Zeroual cannot s o l v e A l g e r i a ' s woes and ensure h i s own
s u r v i v a l by blood alone.
ITALY: "The U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' Right To I n t e r f e r e "
A commentary by Aldo Rizzo i n T u r i n ' s c e n t r i s t , i n f l u e n t i a l La Stampa
h e l d ( 9 / 2 ) : " I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c l a i m t h a t the s y s t e m a t i c massacres
which the A l g e r i a n o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s seem unable t o prevent
c o n t i n u e t o be an ' i n t e r n a l ' problem. Should we w a i t f o r the A l g e r i a n
v i o l e n c e t o spread t o i t s Maghreb neighbors, or f o r waves of refugees
t o a r r i v e on Europe's Mediterranean shores? The problem, of course,
i s how t o i n t e r v e n e ( b e a r i n g i n mind the European r e l u c t a n c e t o
i n t e r v e n e due t o the massive i m p o r t s of gas and o i l ) . Why not t r y , as
Le Monde suggested, a UN i n v e s t i g a t i v e committee? The A l g e r i a n
government and the m i l i t a r y c o u l d h a r d l y oppose i t , and perhaps t h a t
c o u l d be the b e g i n n i n g of a p u r i f i c a t i o n , the premise f o r a d i a l o g u e
which w i l l i s o l a t e the m e r c i l e s s assassins.
In r e a l i t y , everything
seems c o m p l i c a t e d .
But e v e r y t h i n g i s c o m p l i c a t e d i n A l g e r i a , but t h a t
i s no reason t o g i v e up.
The i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s not t o l e t the
emotion of r e c e n t days d i s s i p a t e a s we w a i t f o r f u r t h e r and worse
disasters."
"More Shadows"
Umberto De Giovannangeli wrote i n PDS ( l e a d i n g government p a r t y ) d a i l y
L'Unita (8/31): " I f Europe h e s i t a t e s t o i n t e r v e n e i n A l g e r i a , t h a t i s
due m a i n l y t o the i n t e r n a l r e s i s t a n c e of the A l g e r i a n regime and the
f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n . The a l a r m i n g statement [by I t a l i a n Foreign
M i n i s t e r D i n i t h a t t h a t n e i t h e r the A l g e r i a n government nor the
A l g e r i a n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n ' d e s i r e an I t a l i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n or
m e d i a t i o n ' ] i s a harsh a c c u s a t i o n which casts more shadows on the
a l r e a d y gloomy f u t u r e of the tormented Northern A f r i c a n n a t i o n . "
SPAIN: " A l g e r i a n V i o l e n c e "
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Conservative ABC e d i t o r i a l i z e d (8/29): "Fundamentalism i s d i v i d e d
and broken.... The o n l y o p t i o n remaining i s t o d e a l w i t h i t
p o l i t i c a l l y : w i t h p o l i c e and r e p r e s s i o n c o n f r o n t i n g i t s t e r r o r i s t s
and w i t h d i a l o g u e and agreements w i t h t h e moderates. The end o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t s seems t o depend...only on t h e l o y a l t y o f t h e moderates.
Madani should not f a l l i n t o t h e t e m p t a t i o n o f o t h e r a y a t o l l a h s : t h e
o l d and t r e a c h e r o u s idea o f u s i n g t h e b a r b a r i t y o f t e r r o r i s m f o r h i s
own b e n e f i t ."
INDONESIA: " A l g e r i a ' s Entangled S i t u a t i o n : Hundreds o f People
Massacred"
Leading independent Kompas commented ( 9 / 2 ) :
"The p r i n c i p l e o f
democracy has been d i s g r a c e d by t h e c o r r u p t , r e p r e s s i v e abuses o f
power. Democracy has been reduced t o d i s a p p o i n t i n g r h e t o r i c because
i t i s not e x e r c i s e d .
The I s l a m i c Front p a r t y (FIS) i s t h e
a n t i t h e s i s o f t h e c u r r e n t c o r r u p t regime. I f t h e N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n
Front (FLN) had m a i n t a i n e d i t s democratic p r i n c i p l e s , t h i s p o l i t i c a l
c r i s i s would not have t u r n e d out as b a d l y as i t has.... The FLN's
crackdown on m i l i t a n t s o n l y provoked them t o e s c a l a t e t h e i r
violence....
I f i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e FIS has g i v e n peace s i g n a l s , we
hope o t h e r s w i l l help make peace a r e a l i t y . "
BRIEFS
DEATH OF PRINCESS DIANA:
LOSES A LEGEND'
BRITAIN:
"Let The Mourners Come"
The c o n s e r v a t i v e Times s a i d i n an l e d i t o r i a l ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Every l i f e i s
unique, b u t not every death i s mourned by an e n t i r e n a t i o n . Diana,
Princess o f Wales, was i r r e p l a c e a b l e . Her f u n e r a l must a l l o w t h e
people t o p a r t i c i p a t e . . . .
The B r i t i s h p r i d e themselves on t h e i r
t a l e n t f o r improvised
ceremonial.
The r o y a l f a m i l y has made a good s t a r t by heeding t h e
prime m i n i s t e r ' s request t h a t t h i s should be 'a people's f u n e r a l . ' A
seamless f u s i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s a l and t h e p e r s o n a l would be a worthy
t r i b u t e t o t h e most spontaneous p u b l i c f i g u r e o f our t i m e . "
"Not One Of Us At A l l "
The
l i b e r a l Guardian ran t h i s op
•
-ed commentary by c o l u m n i s t Hugo Young
(9/2):
" I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , where I've watched i t , i t ' s t h e b i g g e s t
death s i n c e P r e s i d e n t Kennedy. I t has t h e same sense o f r e v e r b e r a t i n g
impact, across t h e p l a i n s and over t h e mountains, t o u c h i n g some p a r t
of many people.
Sonorous network anchor
•
-persons have taken
t r a n s m i s s i o n perches i n f r o n t o f Buckingham Palace and t h e Tower o f
London. I t s u r e l y s h o u l d n ' t be so•
-but i t i s . For many Americans, as
f o r many o t h e r s , p r e s i d e n t and p r i n c e s s occupy t h e same e m o t i o n a l
terrain....
What Diana might have changed i s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t she
was c l o s e s t t o , t h e one t h a t made h e r •
-the monarchy i t s e l f .
She was
the o n l y member o f t h a t b e n i g h t e d c l a n who showed any sense o f how
monarchy might be made r e l e v a n t t o t h e p u b l i c w i l l i n t h e modern age."
RUSSIA: "World Loses A Legend"
'THE WORLD
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O f f i c i a l government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (9/2) remarked i n a r e p o r t by
i t s P a r i s correspondent N i k o l a i P a k l i n :
"Princess Diana was
c o n s i d e r e d the world's most
•
-photographed woman. Maybe t h a t i s what
k i l l e d her. As a human, you can't but f e e l s o r r y f o r her.
c h i l d r e n l o s t t h e i r mother, the w o r l d one o f i t s legends."
" P a r t i n g With A Dream"
The
Pavel Bogomolov i n London wrote f o r neo
•
-communist Pravda
•
-Five (9/2) :
"Our f a r e w e l l today i s not f o r her alone. We are b e w a i l i n g , i f
unknowingly, our own dream about the sublime, almost u n a t t a i n a b l e day
when beauty, t a s t e , i n t e l l e c t , n o b i l i t y , l o v e , and motherhood become
one, and t h a t f o r which years ago i n d i v i d u a l s s t r i v e d i n t u i t i v e l y ,
t h r o u g h e r r o r s and t e a r s , becomes r e a l i t y . "
"Lesson For A l l Of Us"
A l b e r t P l u t n i k s t a t e d on page one of r e f o r m i s t I z v e s t i a ( 9 / 2 ) ;
"Everyone agrees t h a t the c h i e f cause o f the death o f the B r i t i s h
a r i s t o c r a t and one o f the most a t t r a c t i v e f i g u r e s o f t h i s c e n t u r y i s
the media's v o r a c i o u s a p p e t i t e f o r what i s s t r i c t l y p r i v a t e . . . .
As
those photo r e p o r t e r s chased the p r i n c e s s down P a r i s s t r e e t s , they put
i n danger not o n l y the l i v e s o f people i n t h a t posh Mercedes, but
genuine freedom o f i n f o r m a t i o n which has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h the
methods o f gangsters or s p e c i a l s e r v i c e s . They were a danger t o the
media's p r e s t i g e , which does not grow t h r o u g h the use of immoral
methods, a t l e a s t not i n the eyes o f t h e i r most e x a c t i n g audience."
BELGIUM: " T a b l o i d J o u r n a l i s m "
New York correspondent Peter Vanderbruggen noted i n f i n a n c i a l
Financieel
•
-Economische T i j d ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Americans are proud t h a t t h e i r
press i s much 'cleaner' than the European. Bare b r e a s t s on page 3?
That i s something which i s s t i l l f a r from p o s s i b l e i n p r u d i s h America.
However, when i t comes t o exposing the p r i v a t e l i v e s o f f i l m s t a r s ,
m i l l i o n a i r e s , and a r i s t o c r a t i c f a m i l i e s , American t a b l o i d s are second
t o none. That, t o o , i s the f a u l t of the Europeans i n the U.S.
media's eyes.
Indeed, was i t not Rupert Murdoch who e x p o r t e d the
B r i t i s h g o s s i p j o u r n a l i s m of The Sun t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1979 by
t a k i n g over The New York Post?...
' F o r t u n a t e l y , Murdoch does not have
as much i n f l u e n c e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s as i n the U n i t e d Kingdom,' says
New York Times c o l u m n i s t Anthony Lewis. But, t h a t does not mean t h a t
the impact o f g o s s i p media i s not i n c r e a s i n g c o n t i n u a l l y i n the U n i t e d
States."
SPAIN:
"More Than an A c c i d e n t "
L i b e r a l El Pais e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 9 / 1 ) :
"The death o f P r i n c e s s
Diana....has provoked immense shock....The whole w o r l d f e e l s g r i e f
about the disappearance o f t h i s young woman who had reached an
incomparable
l e v e l of p o p u l a r i t y . . . . What can be s a i d i s t h a t
j o u r n a l i s m w i t h o u t s c r u p l e s can have t e r r i b l e
consequences... The
worst p a r t i s t h a t the scandal mongers o n l y e x i s t because t h e r e i s an
�Page 19 of22
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ever
•
- i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r t h e i r p r o d u c t . . . .
I t might
be naive t o
t h i n k t h a t t h e t r a g e d y i n P a r i s i s going open a p e r i o d o f r e f l e c t i o n
about t h e p r a c t i c e s o f t h i s type o f j o u r n a l i s m , b u t i t c e r t a i n l y would
be d e s i r a b l e •
-and not o n l y i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom."
JAPAN: " G r i e f Over Tragedy Of Princess
Diana"
Top
•
- c i r c u l a t i o n , moderate Yomiuri opined ( 9 / 2 ) :
"Diana's p o p u l a r i t y
was not based on her s u p e r s t a r s t a t u s alone. While s t r u g g l i n g w i t h
s e p a r a t i o n and d i v o r c e , she became a symbol o f t h e change i n
t r a d i t i o n a l and c l a s s
•
-bound B r i t i s h s o c i e t y . . . . ( A f t e r t h e d i v o r c e )
she performed v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e s . . . . She r e d i s c o v e r e d t h i s
s o c i a l r o l e i n t h e course o f her stormy p e r s o n a l l i f e and t r i e d t o
move f o r w a r d . B r i t a i n , and t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d as w e l l , came t o
value her c o n t r i b u t i o n . "
OSLO LAND MINE CONFERENCE:
'SLIM HOPES' FOR
BREAKTHROUGH
NORWAY: "Ban Mines"
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e opening o f t h e Oslo conference on l a n d mines,
c o n s e r v a t i v e A f t e n p o s t e n remarked (8/29): "We're pleased t h a t t h e
U n i t e d States has decided t o take p a r t i n t h e Oslo conference.
However, because Washington wants many t h i n g s exempted from t h e f i n a l
ban, t h e r e i s acute danger t h a t t h e f i n a l agreement w i l l be watered
down c o n s i d e r a b l y . M i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n o t h e r
c o u n t r i e s , t o o , are f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t t h e ban. I n Korea, t h e
demarcation zone i s f i l l e d w i t h mines; F i n l a n d covered i t s border t o
the S o v i e t Union w i t h mines f o r defense purposes.... The way l a n d
mines are used today are t r u l y a weapon o f t e r r o r .
120 m i l l i o n mines
are hidden i n t h e ground. Ban them now•
-and make t h e ban as
comprehensive as p o s s i b l e . "
GERMANY: "Slim Hopes For Breakthrough"
Right
•
-of
•
- c e n t e r Dresdner Neueste N a c h r i c h t e n (9/2) t o l d i t s readers:
"There are o n l y s l i g h t i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e Oslo l a n d mine conference
w i l l achieve a breakthrough i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n about t h e ban on
anti
•
-personnel mines. Main producers such as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , have
come t o Oslo o n l y r e l u c t a n t l y and o n l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s .
Other mine producers, such as Russia and China, are not even p r e s e n t .
However, t h e meeting should n o t be i n v a i n , s i n c e t h e so
•
- c a l l e d small
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Page 20 of 22
s t a t e s have never b e f o r e pressed i n such a massive manner f o r a ban.
I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t wars do not become more humane w i t h o u t l a n d
mines. But every banned weapon i s at the same time one chance more
f o r the saving of human l i v e s .
The ban of very i n s i d i o u s weapons
systems should by no means r e s u l t i n the l e g i t i m a t i o n of o t h e r
weapons. However, the b i g l a n d mine producers want t o keep t h i s
' l o o p h o l e ' open. However, the p r o d u c t i o n of
'smart' and h i g h
•
-tech
mines r e s p e c t i v e l y i s supposed t o c o n t i n u e . But the Gulf War showed
t h a t weapons do not have any i n t e l l i g e n c e at a l l , they o n l y have the
p o t e n t i a l t o d e s t r o y and k i l l . "
FRANCE: "The Future Of Land Mines"
G i l l e s Dauxerre wrote i n r e g i o n a l L'Yonne R e p u b l i c a i n e ( 9 / 2 ) :
"The
f u t u r e of l a n d mines w i l l depend on each n a t i o n ' s commitment not t o
manufacture them and i t s commitment t o stop u s i n g them. France has
a l r e a d y made t h a t commitment... but two major producers and users are
absent from the conference•
-China and Russia. The
i t s p a r t has a l r e a d y
asked f o r a nine
U n i t e d States f o r
•
-year delay b e f o r e a p p l y i n g the new t r e a t y ,
along
w i t h a waiver r e g a r d i n g t h e i r use on the border between North and
South Korea.... Meanwhile, women and c h i l d r e n c o n t i n u e t o d i e i n
Asia, A f r i c a and Bosnia."
DENMARK: "U.S.
P a r t i c i p a t i o n W i l l Strengthen Move Toward Ban"
Center
•
- r i g h t B e r l i n g s k e Tidende m a i n t a i n e d (8/30) : "Both d u r i n g the
Korean and the Vietnam Wars, U.S. t r o o p s f e a r e d American l a n d mines
most. I n Korea, more American s o l d i e r s d i e d as the r e s u l t of U.S.
mines than enemy ones.... I n Oslo today the l a n d mine i s s u e i s again
on the agenda, and i t looks l i k e the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be much
s t r e n g t h e n e d by U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
The U n i t e d S t a t e s , howeverm,
wants t o c o n t i n u e t o use land mines on the border of North and South
Korea. I t a l s o advocates the use of so
•
- c a l l e d 'smart mines.'
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s , the f a c t t h a t 100 c o u n t r i e s are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n
the t a l k s w i l l make i t harder t o j u s t i f y the s a l e and use l a n d mines."
SOUTH KOREA: " W i l l Landmines Disappear From The Earth?"
According
t o pro
•
-business
Joong
•
-Ang I l b o ( 8 / 2 ) :
"The Oslo meeting i s
a p r e l i m i n a r y one t o put the f i n i s h i n g touches on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
of a n t i
ban
•
-personnel landmines. The problem, however, i s t h a t
c o u n t r i e s , such as Russia, China, and I s r a e l , r e f u s e
r a i s i n g doubts about i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s . . . . The U.S.
d i v i d e d i n t h i s r e g a r d , and i t s demand f o r e x c e p t i o n s
progress on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l ban on a n t i
major
t o j o i n the ban,
government i s
w i l l s u r e l y make
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Page 21 of 22
•
-personnel mines hard."
TOWARD U.S.
•
-IRAN NORMALIZATION:
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:
AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL?
" I r a n S t u d y i n g American Proposal"
The main s t o r y i n the l a r g e s t
0
- c i r c u l a t i o n Arabic d a i l y Al
•
-Khaleej
(8/31) c i t e d I r a n i a n w e l l
•
- i n f o r m e d sources as t e l l i n g v i s i t i n g
j o u r n a l i s t M i c h e l Noufal t h a t " I r a n i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s are
c u r r e n t l y s t u d y i n g an American proposed formula t o i n i t i a t e d i a l o g u e
between I r a n and the U n i t e d States t o end the long b o y c o t t between
them.... The American p r o p o s a l was
d e l i v e r e d t o the I r a n i a n
l e a d e r s h i p t h r o u g h r e g i o n a l mediators f o l l o w i n g the v i c t o r y of
P r e s i d e n t Khatami i n the May p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . . . .
Khatami kept
the p r o p o s a l f o r h i m s e l f t o take o f f i c i a l power and t o form a new
c a b i n e t i n Tehran." The s t o r y noted:
"What i s new i n the p r o p o s a l
was the u n c o n d i t i o n a l American w i l l i n g n e s s f o r a d i a l o g u e l e a d i n g t o
n o r m a l i z a t i o n w i t h I r a n a f t e r i t has been proven t o Washington t h a t
the p o l i c y of dual containment was a f a i l u r e , and the l o s i n g p a r t y i n
t h i s economic e q u a t i o n was the U n i t e d S t a t e s , not I r a n . The American
p r o p o s a l i s based on t h r e e s c e n a r i o s : h o l d i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s t o r e s t o r e
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s as t h e y were b e f o r e 1979; h o l d i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s
r e g a r d i n g the Middle East d i s p u t e and m a i n l y the e l i m i n a t i o n of
weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n i n a Middle East system where I r a n would
p l a y a r o l e ; and f i n a l l y , the r e l e a s e of f r o z e n I r a n i a n assets i n
Washington i f I r a n accepts the p r o p o s a l . "
##
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END ATTACHMENT
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(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.EDU@INETgLNGTWY ( owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.E
CREATION DATE/TIME: 6-OCT-1997 19:31:08.00
SUBJECT:
971006 U.S. S t a t e Dept. D a i l y B r i e f i n g T r a n s c r i p t #144
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC ] )
READ:UNKNOWN
TEXT:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Monday, October 6, 1997
Briefer:
James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS/DEPARTMENT
1
S e c r e t a r y ' s Schedule
1- 2
Bosnia/Croatia:
ISRAEL
2- 3
3- 4
4- 5
5- 8
8- 9
10- 11
IRAQ
I s r a e l / P a l e s t i n i a n Trade o f P r i s o n e r s
P a l e s t i n i a n E f f o r t s t o Fight Terrorism
US P o s i t i o n on Hamas and Mossad
US View on T e r r o r i s m i n t h e Middle East
Amb. Ross and t r i l a t e r a l meeting
Sheinbein case
9- 10
War Crimes T r i b u n a l
A t t a c k on UN b u i l d i n g i n Bagdad
LIBYA
11- 12
Progress on TWA 800/Lockerbie case
INDIA
12
Timing o f C o n f i r m a t i o n o f Nominated US Ambassador
12,14-15
Secretary'
and U/S P i c k e r i n g ' s T r i p s t o I n d i a
ALGERIA
12- 13
Massacre o f School C h i l d r e n
13
US View o f Increased V i o l e n c e
IRELAND
13- 14
Meetings o f U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Mr. David T r i m b l e i n Washington
14
Request f o r IRA t o be on US T e r r o r i s m l i s t
HELMS-BURTON
15
Extension o f EU c o n s i d e r a t i o n beyond Oct 15th d e a d l i n e
IRAN/FRANCE/EU/RUSSIA/MALAYSIA
15-17
C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f US s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t TOTAL, e t a l , f o r South
Pars gas deal
BOSNIA/CROATIA/SERBIA
17- 18
Surrender o f C r o a t i a n War Crimes I n d i c t e e s
18- 19
Gelbard meeting w i t h M i l o s e v i c
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 144
MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1997 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN:
H i . Welcome t o the S t a t e Department b r i e f i n g .
Today i s Monday. S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t has a t t e n d e d a l r e a d y today one
session o f the White House Conference on Climate Change. She w i l l be
speaking t h i s a f t e r n o o n a t another s e s s i o n .
Tomorrow she w i l l be t e s t i f y i n g a t 10:30 a.m. b e f o r e the Senate Foreign
R e l a t i o n s Committee on the s u b j e c t o f NATO enlargement. That i s t h e
k i c k - o f f h e a r i n g f o r the Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s
i s s u e , p r i o r t o an a c t u a l t r a n s m i s s i o n o f a proposed amendment t h a t
would b r i n g a d d i t i o n a l members i n t o the NATO a l l i a n c e . That amendment
would o n l y come a f t e r a d e c i s i o n was made -- p r o b a b l y around the time o f
the December m i n i s t e r i a l meeting.
But the committee has begun i t s
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s issue p r i o r t o t h a t submission.
Secretary
A l b r i g h t w i l l be the o n l y witness i n the k i c k - o f f f o r those a p p a r e n t l y , a set o f h e a r i n g s , which I'm sure Mr. Thiessen can g i v e you
more d e t a i l s about.
QUESTION: One t h i n g , though, has she gone up, t r a d i t i o n a l l y ? Most o f
the time people go up ahead o f time and t a l k t o members o f the committee
and t r y t o smooth over any -MR. RUBIN: She's had many d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h them on NATO enlargement. I
t h i n k most o f her c o n t a c t s w i t h senators i n recent days and weeks have
been about the b i l l s pending b e f o r e the Congress, and not on t h i s
subj e c t .
I have one statement
your q u e s t i o n s .
I ' d l i k e t o read, and then I ' d be happy t o take
The U n i t e d States applauds the a c t i o n s taken today by the government o f
C r o a t i a and the Bosnian Croats' l e a d e r s h i p i n e f f e c t i n g the s u r r e n d e r o f
the t e n Bosnian Croat i n d i c t e e s t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i m i n a l T r i b u n a l
i n The Hague.
This i s a s i g n i f i c a n t step f o r w a r d i n the Dayton peace process. As
sponsor o f the Dayton peace agreement and one o f the s t r o n g e s t
s u p p o r t e r s o f the War Crimes T r i b u n a l , the U n i t e d States i s f u l l y
committed t o h e l p i n g ensure t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n s o f a l l s i g n a t o r i e s t o
the peace agreement are f u l f i l l e d .
U n t i l today, o v e r a l l c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the T r i b u n a l by t h e p a r t i e s had
been d i s a p p o i n t i n g . Today's developments s i g n a l a new d e t e r m i n a t i o n by
the C r o a t i a n Government and Bosnian Croat l e a d e r s i n the F e d e r a t i o n t o
f u l f i l l t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the
Dayton peace agreement. Those who surrendered today w i l l be assured o f
a f a i r t r i a l and due process.
T h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o appear v o l u n t a r i l y a t The Hague t o face the charges
brought a g a i n s t them i s an example t h a t o t h e r i n d i c t e e s would be w e l l advised t o f o l l o w .
Two months ago today i n S p l i t , i n a meeting w i t h S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
Gelbard, P r e s i d e n t Tudjman undertook t o do h i s utmost t o e f f e c t t h e
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surrender of Croat i n d i c t e e s s t i l l a t l a r g e t o the T r i b u n a l .
commitment has now produced concrete r e s u l t s .
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That
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o f u r t h e r c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h C r o a t i a . The U n i t e d
States and C r o a t i a have a shared i n t e r e s t i n the f u l l and s u c c e s s f u l
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Washington, Dayton and Erdut Agreements.
We
i n t e n d t o work c l o s e l y w i t h P r e s i d e n t Tudjman and h i s government i n the
coming months toward t h a t end.
The f a i l u r e of Belgrade and Pale t o comply w i t h t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under
Dayton on war crimes stands i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t t o the events of today.
Bosnian Serb i n d i c t e e s , i n c l u d i n g Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and
o t h e r s remain at l a r g e . This i s unacceptable.
Today's step f o r w a r d r e s u l t s from the combination o f c o o r d i n a t e d a l l i e d
p r e s s u r e , the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the p o l i t i c a l w i l l of
the C r o a t i a n Government and the c r e d i b l e t h r e a t of apprehension.
Those i n d i c t e e s s t i l l at l a r g e who choose not t o s u r r e n d e r must know
t h a t the U n i t e d States remains committed t o keeping open a l l p o s s i b l e
o p t i o n s f o r making them a v a i l a b l e t o the T r i b u n a l f o r p r o s e c u t i o n .
I have s i g n i f i c a n t a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l on t h i s i s s u e , should you a l l be
interested.
Barry.
QUESTION: There's n o t h i n g on t h a t .
I thought I ' d ask you about the
unusual swap between I s r a e l and the P a l e s t i n i a n s . Obviously, the S t a t e
Department's o b s e r v a t i o n s would be welcome. I'm s p e c i f i c a l l y wondering
i f the US can make a c r e d i b l e argument now t h a t A r a f a t should r o o t out d i s m a n t l e t e r r o r i s t o p e r a t i o n s . Did t h i s deal have the US b l e s s i n g ?
What do you t h i n k of the d e a l , c o n s i d e r i n g the US used t o have a
p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t d e a l i n g w i t h t e r r o r i s t s ? Maybe i t s t i l l does; I don't
know.
MR. RUBIN: Let me say t h i s , Barry. We were not i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a f f a i r
i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way.
You w i l l have t o address y o u r s e l f t o t h e
p a r t i e s i n the r e g i o n . I am not going t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o comment on
our d i p l o m a t i c exchanges, except t o say t h a t we have had e x t e n s i v e
d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t w i t h both governments, as would be expected a t normal
times and e s p e c i a l l y now.
I can say t h a t one of our major concerns has
been t o p r o t e c t J o r d a n i a n - I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s , which remain a c o r n e r s t o n e
of the peace process.
As f a r as your q u e s t i o n on t e r r o r i s m i s concerned, our p o s i t i o n on Hamas
i s c l e a r . They have r e p e a t e d l y shown t h a t they do not support the peace
process and use t e r r o r i s m t o d e s t r o y i t . We are opposed t o Hamas f o r
t h a t reason and b e l i e v e i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t i t s t e r r o r i s t
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e be d i s m a n t l e d .
As f a r as any comment on the Sheikh's r e t u r n t o Gaza, again, t h i s i s
something t h a t was worked out between the p a r t i e s i n the r e g i o n , and
none of t h a t changes our view of Hamas. There i s l i t t l e i n the
o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s behavior i n r e c e n t times - t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of the peace
process, t h e i r promotion of t e r r o r - t h a t leads us t o b e l i e v e they are a
moderate f o r c e .
As you know, Dennis Ross i s i n the r e g i o n today, working t o implement
the S e c r e t a r y ' s e f f o r t s t o put the peace process back on t r a c k . This i s
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where we b e l i e v e t h e focus should be, and we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o work w i t h
the p a r t i e s on t h e v a r i o u s s u b j e c t s . But as t h e events o f t h e l a s t week
show, progress i n t h e peace process i s p r i m a r i l y up t o t h e p a r t i e s i n
the r e g i o n . I t i s based on t h e d e c i s i o n s they make and how they choose
to deal w i t h one another. As t h e S e c r e t a r y has s a i d r e p e a t e d l y , t h e
tough d e c i s i o n s must be taken by them.
With respect t o your q u e s t i o n on the I s r a e l i s f i g h t i n g t e r r o r i s m , I can
say t h i s :
t h e I s r a e l i s have t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o defend t h e i r people from
t e r r o r i s t a c t s , and we a r e n o t i n t h e h a b i t o f second-guessing I s r a e l
when i t comes t o her s e c u r i t y . That s a i d , we b e l i e v e t h a t I s r a e l must
take i n t o account t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n s and consequences o f any a c t i o n s i t
takes i n i t s f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
What does t h a t mean?
I t means - I c o u l d repeat i t .
QUESTION: You c o u l d . I don't know i f i t would mean any more.
apropos today's event, o r do you mean -MR. RUBIN:
Is i t
I t ' s i n general.
QUESTION: W e l l , I mean, you have o p i n i o n s about border c l o s i n g s . You
don't second-guess I s r a e l , b u t you t e l l them t o ease up on t r a v e l
r e s t r i c t i o n s , f o r instance.
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
Right
—
So I don't know what you mean by t h a t brave
I don't t h i n k i t was a brave
statement.
statement.
QUESTION: W e l l , I mean, g e n e r a l - you know, t h a t a b s o l u t i s t statement.
There a r e ups and downs i n i n d i v i d u a l s i t u a t i o n s , and t h e US, you know,
has a more s u b t l e p o l i c y than t h a t .
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Right.
I n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s apply.
Right.
MR. RUBIN: Some s i t u a t i o n s r e l a t e t o s e t t l e m e n t a c t i v i t y .
Some
s i t u a t i o n s r e l a t e t o f i n a l s t a t u s i s s u e s . Some s i t u a t i o n s r e l a t e t o
d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s . And some s i t u a t i o n s r e l a t e t o t e r r o r i s m . And as I
s a i d , t h e I s r a e l i s have t h e o b l i g a t i o n s t o defend t h e i r people from
t e r r o r i s t acts.
QUESTION:
Right.
MR. RUBIN: We a r e n o t i n t h e h a b i t o f second-guessing I s r a e l when i t
comes t o her s e c u r i t y . On t h e o t h e r hand, we b e l i e v e t h a t I s r a e l must
take i n t o account t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n s and consequences o f any a c t i o n s i t
takes i n i t s f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r .
I t h i n k t h a t speaks f o r i t s e l f .
QUESTION: W e l l , t h e f i r s t sentence sounds u n d e r s t a n d i n g and sympathetic
to t h e swap. The second sentence sounds r e p r o a c h f u l . So I don't know
what t o make o f i t .
MR. RUBIN:
Well --
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QUESTION: But t h a t ' s - maybe i t ' s my problem.
I f you t h i n k i t ' s c l e a r
- I can't communicate t h a t , because I have no idea what i t means.
QUESTION: Are you f a m i l i a r w i t h r e p o r t s t h a t t h e EU a l l o w e d Leon
B r i t t a n t o c o n t i n u e t a l k s past t h e October 15 d e a d l i n e ?
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
I t h i n k they want t o s t a y on t h i s one.
On t h i s s u b j e c t , you speak o f —
But thanks.
QUESTION: You speak o f Hamas as i f i t i s a m o n o l i t h i c t e r r o r i s t
o r g a n i z a t i o n . The Hamas people say t h a t much o f t h e i r f u n d i n g and much
of t h e i r work goes i n t o s o c i a l work - schools, n u r s e r i e s and o t h e r
things.
One, do you b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s p r i m a r i l y e s s e n t i a l l y a t e r r o r i s t
o r g a n i z a t i o n ? And two, do you b e l i e v e i t i s m o n o l i t h i c ?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going t o get i n t o an a n a l y t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
p r e c i s e aspects o f every d i f f e r e n t o p e r a t i o n or p r o d u c t or p r o j e c t o f
Hamas.
I can say t h a t we b e l i e v e they are not a moderate f o r c e ; t h a t they have
sponsored t e r r o r ; and t h a t they are, t h e r e f o r e , t h e enemies o f peace.
When i t comes t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between genuine c h a r i t a b l e e f f o r t s ,
h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t s , and t h e support o f t e r r o r , we b e l i e v e t h e r e i s a
way t o d i s t i n g u i s h . The way t o d i s t i n g u i s h i s t o make an a n a l y s i s , case
by case, o f t h e e x t e n t t o which any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n has a
m i l i t a r y component or sponsors a m i l i t a r y component, promotes a m i l i t a r y
component, or takes a c t i o n t h a t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e a c t s o f t e r r o r .
The dozen-plus i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t were shut down by Chairman A r a f a t i n
recent days were cases and examples where those i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d support
the t e r r o r i s t i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t we're t r y i n g t o e l i m i n a t e . So one
can't make any statement more c l e a r than those i n s t i t u t i o n s - whether
t h e i r l a b e l i s "Hamas h u m a n i t a r i a n " or "Hamas m i l i t a r y " - i f they have
support or i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t supports t e r r o r i s m , then we b e l i e v e they
should be shut down.
QUESTION: Jamie, i n l i g h t o f a c t i o n s o f t h e l a s t couple o f weeks, does
the U n i t e d States c o n s i d e r t h e Mossad a t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n ?
MR. RUBIN: Wow.
I t h i n k t h e best answer I can g i v e you t o t h i s
q u e s t i o n i s t o say t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , as a m a t t e r o f law, does n o t
conduct a s s a s s i n a t i o n s . We have a law a g a i n s t t h a t ; t h e r e f o r e , we're
opposed t o i t .
And t h e r e f o r e , we're opposed t o a s s a s s i n a t i o n s by o t h e r
governments as w e l l .
QUESTION: What do you make o f Sheikh Yassin's r e t u r n t o Gaza? I mean,
t h e r e are f i g u r e s o f over 15,000 people - he was g i v e n a hero's welcome.
Are h i s s u p p o r t e r s a l s o d r i v e n t o extremism i f Hamas i s n o t a moderate
force?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o analyze t h e m o t i v a t i o n
of a l l 15,000 people t h a t may or may not be g r e e t i n g him on h i s r e t u r n .
I don't know t h e numbers o f h i s g r e e t i n g .
What I can say i s t h a t our government has been working v e r y c l o s e l y w i t h
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the P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y and the I s r a e l i Government t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y
s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t we b e l i e v e sponsor or support t e r r o r i s m ; and
t o work t o convince Chairman A r a f a t and the P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y t o
shut those i n s t i t u t i o n s down. Whatever t h e i r l a b e l , whatever t h e i r
espoused purpose, i f t h e i r f u n c t i o n p r a c t i c a l l y , s u b s t a n t i v e l y and
r e a l i s t i c a l l y g i v e s support t o those who commit these e v i l a c t s of
t e r r o r i s m , then we want them shut down.
Those people who support them
ought t o be a r r e s t e d , and ought t o s t a y i n j a i l .
That's our p o s i t i o n on t e r r o r i s m .
I t ' s one t h a t we have taken f o r some
t i m e . I t ' s one t h e S e c r e t a r y l a i d out v e r y c l e a r l y i n the r e g i o n when
she was t h e r e . And r e g a r d l e s s of the events of the l a s t week, t h a t has
not changed. That's our view of t e r r o r i s m .
QUESTION: Jamie, how can you ask
r e v o l v i n g door p o l i c y , when I s r a e l
t e r r o r i s t s or t e r r o r i s t s u p p o r t e r s
another 40 t o 50 t o f o l l o w i n the
the P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y t o stop the
r e l e a s e s 20-something a l l e g e d
now, w i t h , a c c o r d i n g t o r e p o r t s ,
coming weeks?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I don't have the l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n on who may or may
not have been r e l e a s e d . But I can say t h i s : we view those who support
t e r r o r i s m and sponsor t e r r o r i s m i n the Middle East as the enemies of
peace. They are the enemies of the P a l e s t i n i a n people; they are t h e
enemies of the I s r a e l i people.
Regardless of what may or may not occur, our p o s i t i o n i s unchanged.
We
want the sponsors of t e r r o r i s m , those who support t e r r o r i s m t o be taken
down, t h e i r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t o be d i s m a n t l e d , and these people a r r e s t e d
and s t a y i n j a i l .
That i s the p o s i t i o n o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
QUESTION: You're saying - I don't q u i t e understand.
You're saying t h a t
t h i s government - the C l i n t o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s opposed t o p o l i t i c a l
a s s a s s i n a t i o n by o t h e r governments.
MR.
RUBIN:
Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: And yet e a r l i e r you say I s r a e l has an o b l i g a t i o n t o defend
i t s n a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s - t h i s i n response t o a q u e s t i o n
about t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Can you f u r t h e r e x p l a i n the
C l i n t o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n on t h i s a t t a c k ? I t j u s t doesn't - the
two are c o n t r a d i c t o r y -MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I have not made a comment on our p o s i t i o n on t h i s
attack.
I've been v e r y c l e a r on t h a t . Any q u e s t i o n about t h a t has t o
be d i r e c t e d towards the I s r a e l i Government or the Jordanian Government.
I f asked our p o s i t i o n on a m a t t e r of p o l i c y , number one, the d i f f i c u l t
s i t u a t i o n I s r a e l faces i n the Middle East as a c o u n t r y t h a t has been the
s u b j e c t o f heinous a c t s of t e r r o r i s m as r e c e n t l y as the l a s t s e v e r a l
weeks, where innocent people were s l a u g h t e r e d on the s t r e e t - doing
n o t h i n g more than going t o the market, some of whom S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t
v i s i t e d w i t h i n I s r a e l -- we understand the d i f f i c u l t neighborhood i n
which they l i v e and the d i f f i c u l t , e x t r a o r d i n a r y problem t h a t they f a c e .
That's a c l e a r p o s i t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
At the same t i m e , as a m a t t e r of p o l i c y , i f the q u e s t i o n i s , "Do we
support a s s a s s i n a t i o n s ? " , the answer i s , as a m a t t e r of law, t h i s n a t i o n
has p r o h i b i t e d a s s a s s i n a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e , as a m a t t e r of law, we
regard them as something t o be opposed and we oppose them.
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QUESTION: Do you condemn t h i s attempted a s s a s s i n a t i o n by t h e government
of I s r a e l ?
MR. RUBIN: I'm n o t going t o comment on t h e s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s o f t h i s .
haven't been g i v e n them. We don't have a p o s i t i o n on t h e s p e c i f i c
d e t a i l s o f t h i s case, o t h e r than t o say t h a t we have had e x t e n s i v e
d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t w i t h I s r a e l and Jordan. We would l i k e t o see t h e
best p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s between them, and t h a t ' s t h e g o a l o f our
diplomacy.
QUESTION:
Does Jordan have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o r o o t out t e r r o r i s t s ?
QUESTION:
I
Let me j u s t f o l l o w up, please.
MR. RUBIN:
Yes.
QUESTION: So i s i t f a i r t o say t h a t u n t i l t h e s i t u a t i o n i s f u r t h e r
c l a r i f i e d t o you, you cannot make a comment on t h i s a t t e m p t e d
assassination?
MR. RUBIN:
R i g h t , and i f ever, yes.
QUESTION: You're a s k i n g t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y t o r o o t o u t
terrorists.
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n has i n t r o d u c e d l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t some
people t h i n k i s on shaky c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds, b u t i t r e p r e s e n t s a
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o choke o f f t e r r o r i s t s u p p o r t e r s i n t h i s c o u n t r y . Do
your f r i e n d s l i k e Jordan have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y n o t t o harbor t e r r o r i s t s ?
MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k we've made c l e a r t o every c o u n t r y i n t h e w o r l d t h a t
h a r b o r i n g and s u p p o r t i n g t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t e r r o r i s t s i s
something t h a t i s a bad t h i n g .
I c e r t a i n l y t h i n k t h a t would a p p l y t o
Jordan as i t would t o any c o u n t r y .
As f a r as whether t h a t a p p l i e s i n t h i s s p e c i f i c case, I have no d e t a i l s
t o p r o v i d e you on t h e case, o t h e r than t o say what our p o l i c y i s on
t e r r o r i s m , what our p o l i c y i s on p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , and what our
p o l i c y i s on t h e importance o f good r e l a t i o n s between Jordan and I s r a e l .
Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, I'm j u s t going back t o f o l l o w up on something t h a t you
had s a i d .
You s a i d t h a t t e r r o r i s t s should be i n j a i l , they should s t a y
i n j a i l , they should be punished, and t h e r e should be an u n r e l e n t i n g
e f f o r t on everybody's s i d e - from what I'm assuming from your remarks.
So t h a t would lead one t o b e l i e v e or c h a r a c t e r i z e I s r a e l ' s r e l e a s e o f
the Sheikh as maybe an enemy o f peace, t h a t a c t i o n .
By r e l e a s i n g him t o
Gaza, i s i t f a i r t o say t h a t I s r a e l acted i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y or as an enemy
of peace, because you s a i d t h a t -MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k I've been p r e t t y c l e a r t h a t I'm n o t going t o r e a c t
t o t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h i s case.
Yes .
QUESTION: Not even t o say t h a t maybe t r a c k i n g down a Hamas l e a d e r i n
another c o u n t r y would be u n h e l p f u l t o t h e peace process?
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Not even t o say t h a t ,
Not even t o say t h a t .
correct.
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Page 8 of 18
QUESTION: No, b u t when you say I s r a e l - i f you want t o speak
g e n e r i c a l l y , you speak g e n e r i c a l l y o f I s r a e l ' s r i g h t -- you seem t o
support i t - t o defend i t s e l f a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . Are t h e r e t e r r i t o r i a l
l i m i t s t o t h a t defense? Do they o n l y hunt down t e r r o r i s t s i n t h e West
Bank, o r c o u l d they hunt them down i n Jordan?
QUESTION:
Or t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
QUESTION: Or t h e U n i t e d States? Does t e r r o r i s m s t o p a t a - I mean, are
you p u t t i n g a b i g g e r burden on A r a f a t than you're p u t t i n g on t h e King?
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
Or t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
of Israel?
Other than t h a t , our p o l i c y i s c l e a r ?
(Laughter)
QUESTION: I sympathize w i t h you. I mean, when t h e Labor government was
ready t o recognize t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e , t h e spokesman had t o stand up
here and say they had no such p o s i t i o n .
I t became r a t h e r
immaterial,
because t h e p l a y e r s i n t h e area had a l r e a d y moved beyond your p o s i t i o n .
You know, I -MR. RUBIN: Barry, t h e d e t a i l s o f t h i s case are u n f o l d i n g as we speak,
i n v a r i o u s f o r a . Ambassador Ross i s t h e r e .
I have every reason t o
t h i n k t h i s issue w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h , because how c o u l d one n o t
d i s c u s s i t ? We have been d i s c u s s i n g i t i n d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s . As f a r
as our o v e r a l l p o l i c y towards t e r r o r i s m t h a t Chairman A r a f a t must f i g h t ,
I t h i n k I've been c l e a r , and n o t h i n g has changed. As f a r as our
p o s i t i o n on I s r a e l ' s d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n , I t h i n k I've been c l e a r . As
f a r as our p o s i t i o n on p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , I t h i n k I've been
clear.
But p u t t i n g a l l those p o s i t i o n s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e d e t a i l s i f t h i s case,
and g i v i n g you r e a c t i o n s t h a t you u n d e r s t a n d a b l y want, would r e q u i r e
going t h r o u g h t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e case, which we are n o t prepared t o do
at t h i s t i m e .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Have t h e t a l k s begun?
I d i d n ' t n o t i c e --
They should have begun, yes.
Where are they?
They are -I s t h e US a t t h e t a b l e ?
MR. RUBIN: Dennis Ross, Ambassador Ross, i s a t t h e t a b l e , yes. He t o l d
me h i s f i r s t s e t o f meetings should be - I guess they a r e a c t u a l l y - t h e
t r i l a t e r a l i s going t o s t a r t i n about two hours.
QUESTION:
I n Jerusalem?
MR. RUBIN: I b e l i e v e
know where he i s ?
QUESTION:
he i s i n Jerusalem, b u t I ' l l have t o - does anyone
And you're s t i l l
on schedule f o r next week
—
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MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Page 9 of 18
Yes.
b r i n g i n g them here?
MR. RUBIN: There's been no change as a r e s u l t o f these developments i n
I s r a e l o f our meeting t h i s week o r meetings next week.
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
area .
Can I push a l i t t l e b i t ?
I s i t Washington next week?
I n t h e Washington area.
I mean, Delaware was l a s t n o t i c e d t o be i n t h e Washington
MR. RUBIN: We have a week t o work o u t t h e l o c a t i o n .
I ' l l work i t o u t
f o r you as soon as I can. They've o n l y g i v e n me " i n t h e Washington
area," which means they p r o b a b l y haven't f i n a l l y d e c i d e d .
Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, g e n e r a l l y speaking, i s t e r r o r i s m j u s t i f i e d when i t s
s t a t e d purpose i s t o combat t e r r o r i s m ?
(Laughter)
MR. RUBIN: That sounds l i k e a t r i c k q u e s t i o n , Norm. I t h i n k I can o n l y
answer i t by saying t h a t we oppose p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n s i n t h i s
c o u n t r y as a m a t t e r o f law; and we t h e r e f o r e oppose them by o t h e r
f o r e i g n governments.
Can we go t o another s u b j e c t ?
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
briefing.
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
W i l l t h e r e be a b r i e f i n g
tomorrow?
The S e c r e t a r y w i l l be t e s t i f y i n g tomorrow.
Can we have t h e M i d d l e East, b u t d i f f e r e n t
We w i l l n o t be
topics?
Okay.
QUESTION: Over t h e weekend, t h e World H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n was a t t a c k e d
i n Baghdad, and I r a q - a t l e a s t t h e o f f i c i a l I r a q i news agency accused
the I r a n i a n s o f being behind t h e a t t a c k .
Does t h e US know who was
behind i t ?
MR. RUBIN: We have seen r e p o r t s t h a t a t t a c k e r s threw grenades and f i r e d
b u l l e t s a t a UN f a c i l i t y i n a r e s i d e n t i a l p a r t o f Baghdad t h e n i g h t o f
Saturday, October 4. The r e p o r t s v a r i o u s l y i d e n t i f y t h e b u i l d i n g as
housing t h e World H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n o r t h e Food and A g r i c u l t u r a l
Organi z a t i o n .
There were no c a s u a l t i e s among UN employees. A c c o r d i n g t o r e p o r t s t h a t
we have, one a t t a c k e r r e p o r t e d l y was i n j u r e d and taken i n t o custody by
the I r a q i army.
I t i s u n c l e a r who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a t t a c k , b u t
the U n i t e d S t a t e s condemns t h i s a t t a c k on UN o f f i c e s , whatever i t s
source and f o r whatever reason.
QUESTION: Does t h i s a f f e c t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a t a l l ?
I mean, I know
you don't u s u a l l y comment on Pentagon s t u f f , b u t t h e N i m i t z i s g o i n g , as
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Page 10 of 18
we heard l a s t n i g h t -MR. RUBIN: R i g h t , I t h i n k S e c r e t a r y Cohen s a i d today i n P a r i s t h a t t h e
deployment o f t h e N i m i t z i s designed as a s i g n a l t o I r a q o f our
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o e n f o r c e t h e n o - f l y zone. I can't imagine t h i s i n c i d e n t
would a f f e c t t h a t i n any way whatsoever.
QUESTION: Are you concerned t h e r e might be f u r t h e r a t t a c k s i n Baghdad
or i n o t h e r c i t i e s ?
MR. RUBIN: There i s always concern about t h e s a f e t y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
personnel i n Baghdad. There have been numerous i n c i d e n t s over t h e years
of a t t a c k s on them. We have r e c e i v e d assurances o f p r o t e c t i o n f o r them
from t h e I r a q i Government, b u t they always take t h e necessary
precautions.
That e s p e c i a l l y i n c l u d e s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t o r s f o r
the UN S p e c i a l Commission on Disarmament.
But a t t h i s t i m e , we have no reason t h a t I'm aware o f t o suggest t h i s i s
the b e g i n n i n g o f some wave.
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
I s t h e deployment o f t h e N i m i t z o n l y a s i g n a l t o I r a q ?
I t h i n k he s a i d t h a t t h a t way f o r a reason, yes.
Not t o I r a n ?
I t h i n k he s a i d i t t h a t way f o r a reason.
Can we go back j u s t f o r a second?
Yes.
QUESTION: Has t h e S e c r e t a r y had any recent c o n v e r s a t i o n s
the p l a y e r s - Netanyahu, t h e King, A r a f a t ?
w i t h any o f
MR. RUBIN: S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t d i d send a message t o Prime M i n i s t e r
Netanyahu w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e Sheinbein case, i n which she made c l e a r
t h a t we t h i n k t h a t t h e maximum c o o p e r a t i o n from t h e I s r a e l i Government
would be h e l p f u l i n t r y i n g t o b r i n g t h i s person t o j u s t i c e .
We understand t h a t I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s , from him, are c o n t i n u i n g t o
review t h e issue o f whether he i s e n t i t l e d t o I s r a e l i c i t i z e n s h i p .
As you know, p r o s e c u t o r s from Maryland are i n I s r a e l d i s c u s s i n g t h e
case. The c i t i z e n s h i p i s s u e remains under review.
I t ' s our view t h a t t h e I s r a e l i Government should a s s i s t us i n b r i n g i n g
Mr. Sheinbein t o j u s t i c e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
I f your q u e s t i o n was w i t h regard t o t h e o t h e r i n c i d e n t s , I'm n o t aware
of any c o n v e r s a t i o n s by her w i t h any o f t h e key p l a y e r s over t h i s
weekend.
QUESTION: I t h i n k you answered.
c o o p e r a t i o n , she i n c l u d e s a t r i a l
the U n i t e d States?
I ' l l j u s t make sure.
By maximum
i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , or j u s t i c e i n
MR, RUBIN: W e l l , t h a t i s c e r t a i n l y - we a r e t r y i n g t o do what we can
pursuant t o everybody's laws t o b r i n g him t o j u s t i c e .
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As f a r as t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h e e x t r a d i t i o n request and where i t stands,
I would have t o r e f e r you t o t h e J u s t i c e Department. But she d i d want
t o make c l e a r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Netanyahu t h a t t h i s was a case t h a t was
i m p o r t a n t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h a t we wanted him t o do e v e r y t h i n g
p o s s i b l e -- o b v i o u s l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and h i s laws and
our laws -- t o b r i n g t h i s case t o c l o s u r e q u i c k l y , w i t h t h e goal o f
b r i n g i n g him t o j u s t i c e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
Yes .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
Libya?
Libya.
QUESTION: Q u i c k l y , does t h e U.S. have any p o l i c y , a n y t h i n g more t o say
on t h e d i s p u t e over t h e suspects i n t h e Lockerbie crash and t h e d i s p u t e
going on i n t h e UN now over where they should be t r i e d ?
MR. RUBIN: I don't t h i n k t h e r e ' s t h a t much o f a d i s p u t e . When t h e
S e c r e t a r y was i n New York -- t h e o c c a s i o n a l comment does come up about
e x p l o r i n g t h e o p t i o n o f going t o a d i f f e r e n t format. But Foreign
M i n i s t e r Cook was very c l e a r t h a t you can't have a S c o t t i s h c o u r t and
S c o t t i s h j u s t i c e i f you're i n another c o u n t r y . We a r e l o o k i n g t o t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t o c o n t i n u e i t s support o f t h e U n i t e d States and
the U n i t e d Kingdom, t o b r i n g t o j u s t i c e those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
L o c k e r b i e t e r r o r i s t i n c i d e n t ; and t h a t r e q u i r e s them t o be handed over
f o r j u s t i c e i n e i t h e r S c o t l a n d or t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . That p o s i t i o n has
not changed.
QUESTION: What about t h e r e p o r t i n The New York Times on Saturday t h a t
Libya i s smuggling goods?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , t h e r e are always leaks i n s a n c t i o n s regimes. As t h e
r e p o r t i n The New York Times i n d i c a t e d - I t h i n k I j u s t broke my r u l e ,
m e n t i o n i n g a news o r g a n i z a t i o n - as t h e r e p o r t mentioned, have a l o t o f
people working t h i s problem, and I'm sure t h a t they w i l l c o n t i n u e t o
work t h i s problem, perhaps w i t h renewed energy as a r e s u l t o f r e c e n t
news r e p o r t s .
Yes .
QUESTION: Jamie, I n d i a i s w i t h o u t a US ambassador f o r some t i m e , and a
l o t o f t o p o f f i c i a l s are v i s i t i n g I n d i a , i n c l u d i n g a meeting w i t h
P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o f I n d i a i n t h e UN. There's a
new nomination o f t h e US ambassador t o I n d i a , b u t s t i l l i t ' s t a k i n g
t i m e . Also, a t t h e same t i m e , you have q u e s t i o n s i f he's going t o be
c o n f i r m e d b e f o r e Ambassador Thomas P i c k e r i n g ' s v i s i t t o I n d i a and
P a k i s t a n . Also, do you have any agenda about t h e v i s i t t o I n d i a and
P a k i s t a n o f Ambassador Thomas P i c k e r i n g ?
MR. RUBIN: As I know myself, t h e t i m i n g f o r nominations and
c o n f i r m a t i o n s i s n o t a s u b j e c t f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e E x e c u t i v e
Branch. I t ' s a s u b j e c t t h a t i s f u l l y determined by t h e Senate, and I
urge you t o i n q u i r e o f them what t h e i r time frame i s . Obviously, we
would l i k e him t o be c o n f i r m e d as soon as p o s s i b l e .
As f a r as t h e agenda and t i m i n g f o r t h e v i s i t s o f Under S e c r e t a r y
P i c k e r i n g and then t h e S e c r e t a r y i n November, we can t r y t o g e t you some
a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on t h a t l a t e r t h i s a f t e r n o o n .
Page 11 of 18
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Yes.
QUESTION: Do you t h i n k , Jamie, t h e Ambassador's nomination t o I n d i a i s
going t o be c o n f i r m e d by t h e Senate? Do you have any idea i f he's going
t o be confirmed?
Do you see any o p p o s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y from Senator
Helms?
MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k t h a t we hope and expect
the Senate as soon as p o s s i b l e .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
sentence.
Jamie, yesterday
t h a t he w i l l be c o n f i r m e d by
—
I got i n "hope," "expect,"
and "as soon as p o s s i b l e " i n one
Sorry.
QUESTION: Yesterday, i n A l g e r i a , a busload o f young c h i l d r e n was f o r c e d
o f f t h e road, and then they had t h e i r t h r o a t s s l i t and they were shot i n
the head by some group, perhaps a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e government. The
l i s t o f a t r o c i t i e s t h e r e i s g e t t i n g almost g e n o c i d a l i n i t s p r o p o r t i o n s .
Last week, t h e S t a t e Department came o u t w i t h a l a r g e volume, a m i s s i o n
statement and g o a l s , p a r t o f which was t o prevent t h i n g s l i k e t h i s
happening -- an o b l i g a t i o n t o step i n , stop t h i n g s l i k e t h i s . How long
i s t h e C l i n t o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n going t o stand by and a l l o w t h i s t o
c o n t i n u e i n A l g e r i a ? I s t h e r e a n y t h i n g you a l l are p l a n n i n g t o do,
besides p l a t i t u d e s from t h e podiums i n Washington?
MR. RUBIN:
I r e a l l y l i k e t h a t l a s t one.
The U n i t e d States has condemned these massacres i n t h e past and w i l l
c o n t i n u e t o do so. For those o f you who were i n New York w i t h t h e
S e c r e t a r y , I r e p o r t e d on her b e h a l f a d i s c u s s i o n she had w i t h French
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine, i n which they both expressed t h e i r h o r r o r a t
the developments i n A l g e r i a i n t h i s r e g a r d , and pledged t o develop a
d i a l o g u e between our two governments t o see whether t h e r e were any
a c t i o n s t h a t we and t h e French c o u l d take t o g e t h e r or i n c o o r d i n a t i o n ,
or i n complement w i t h each o t h e r , t o t r y t o a s s i s t t h e process here.
But
and
the
see
beyond t h a t , I don't have a n y t h i n g t o say, o t h e r than we condemn i t
we, as a r e s u l t o f those meetings, w i l l soon begin a d i a l o g u e w i t h
French Government, which a l s o has unique i n f l u e n c e i n t h a t area, t o
what can be done.
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
Do you have a c u r r e n t p o l i c y towards A l g e r i a ?
Yes.
What i s i t ?
I t w i l l be p r o v i d e d f o r t h e r e c o r d .
QUESTION: On A l g e r i a , i s t h e r e a p o i n t a t which - A l g e r i a c l a i m s t h a t
i t ' s an i n t e r n a l , domestic problem and they can handle i t v e r y w e l l by
themselves, thank you very much. I s t h e r e a p o i n t a t which t h e US does
i n t e r v e n e ? I s t h e r e some procedure, i s t h e r e something —
MR. RUBIN: As I s a i d , t h e S e c r e t a r y had a d i s c u s s i o n w i t h Foreign
M i n i s t e r Vedrine about t h e i r j o i n t concerns about t h i s problem, and
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t h e i r h o r r o r at the s p e c i f i c massacres. They pledged t o work t o g e t h e r
i n the coming weeks t o see whether t h e r e i s something t h a t the two
governments, w i t h t h e i r unique i n f l u e n c e and r o l e , can do.
QUESTION: Jamie, another s u b j e c t . The l e a d e r of the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t
Party, David T r i m b l e , i s i n town. He's supposed t o be seeing some S t a t e
Department o f f i c i a l s tomorrow. Does the S e c r e t a r y p l a n t o meet him?
MR. RUBIN: As I understand i t , he i s i n Washington t h i s week t o meet
w i t h a v a r i e t y of o f f i c i a l s .
Tuesday morning he w i l l be a t the N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and i n the a f t e r n o o n he i s meeting w i t h Under
Secretary Pickering.
He a l s o w i l l be meeting w i t h v a r i o u s members of Congress, and
understand he w i l l be a t the N a t i o n a l Press Club on Thursday.
t h i s t i m e , I'm not aware of a meeting scheduled.
QUESTION:
MR.
RUBIN:
He was
t h e r e t h i s morning.
Anyway, the
we
But at
--
W e l l , then t h a t i s wrong.
QUESTION: The White House - yes, t h a t ' s wrong. The White House l e t i t
be known t h a t P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n i s going t o drop i n on the meeting
tomorrow w i t h the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r .
I wondered i f the
S e c r e t a r y i s p l a n n i n g t o drop i n on the P i c k e r i n g meeting.
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of a p l a n at t h i s p o i n t .
I know t h a t he's
meeting w i t h Under S e c r e t a r y P i c k e r i n g . I haven't seen a drop-by l i k e
t h a t on her schedule.
QUESTION: Also, he mentioned t h a t the S t a t e Department i s working on a
l i s t of t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s under the law t h a t was passed l a s t year
by Congress. And he put i n the request t h a t the IRA be put i n t h a t
organi zation.
MR.
RUBIN:
QUESTION:
On t h a t
Yes,
list?
on the
list.
MR. RUBIN: The S e c r e t a r y has been r e v i e w i n g a s s i d u o u s l y a mountain of
paperwork on t h i s very i m p o r t a n t i s s u e . We are p l o w i n g t h r o u g h the
l e g a l requirements of making such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s .
As you know, once such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are made, they are s u b j e c t t o
c o u r t c h a l l e n g e . This has r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e review w i t h o t h e r
agencies.
That review i s coming t o a head. Soon, I hope t o be i n a
p o s i t i o n t o r e p o r t t o you on the r e s u l t s of t h a t work; but not now.
QUESTION: I f I c o u l d j u s t go back t o A l g e r i a f o r a second, t o your l a s t
statement t h e r e . You say US p o l i c y towards A l g e r i a w i l l be p r o v i d e d f o r
the r e c o r d l a t e r . Would you make t h a t p u b l i c f o r us, please?
MR.
RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR.
RUBIN:
Yes,
I was
using
shorthand.
You w i l l make t h a t p u b l i c ?
Yes.
QUESTION: Can we go back t o I n d i a f o r j u s t a second? You s a i d t h a t
Under S e c r e t a r y Thomas P i c k e r i n g ' s v i s i t w i l l f o l l o w - the S e c r e t a r y of
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S t a t e w i l l be v i s i t i n g t h e r e g i o n o f I n d i a and P a k i s t a n .
Does he c a r r y
some k i n d o f p o l i t i c a l message from t h e Secretary?
And what i s he going
t o discuss about Indo-US and US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , o r I n d i a - P a k i s t a n
relations?
MR. RUBIN: As I i n d i c a t e d , we w i l l t r y t o g e t you a d e s c r i p t i o n o f what
the t o p i c s f o r those meetings w i l l be. The S e c r e t a r y i s s t i l l r e v i e w i n g
the o p t i o n s f o r her November t r i p , and we don't have any a t t h i s p o i n t .
I'm s u r p r i s e d , having stood here f o r s e v e r a l months and being asked
r e g u l a r l y about whether t h e C r o a t i a n Government was ever going t o t u r n
over war c r i m i n a l s , and t h e r e has been an e x t e n s i v e and i m p o r t a n t
development, and i t seems t o have passed t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e press
corps.
QUESTION:
Oh, you can't
tell.
QUESTION:
Can we g e t back t o my question?
QUESTION: I f you want t o take t h a t up, a r e you going t o now r e l e a s e
some money f o r C r o a t i a ?
I s t h a t t h e p a y o f f here? I s t h a t how
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
What was your
question?
About Leon -I n t h e back, yes.
Thank you.
I have a q u e s t i o n about Leon B r i t t a n .
Yes.
QUESTION: Are you f a m i l i a r w i t h r e p o r t s t h a t he's been g i v e n p e r m i s s i o n
t o extend t h e Helms-Burton t a l k s past t h e October 15 d e a d l i n e ?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any i n f o r m a t i o n . That i s n ' t our d e a d l i n e ;
t h a t ' s t h e i r d e a d l i n e . We are working w i t h them t o t r y by October 15 -t h e i r s t a t e d d e a d l i n e -- t o work o u t d i s c i p l i n e s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f
e x p r o p r i a t e d p r o p e r t y , and we w i l l be working a s s i d u o u s l y on t h a t
s u b j e c t . But I don't have any i n f o r m a t i o n . I w i l l see whether they have
extended t h e d e a d l i n e . We can g e t you an answer t o t h a t .
But i f they
have, t h a t ' s f i n e w i t h us.
QUESTION:
I have a f o l l o w - u p t o t h a t .
MR. RUBIN:
Yes.
QUESTION:
W i l l t h e US waive s a n c t i o n s f o r T o t a l ?
MR. RUBIN: No d e c i s i o n has been made concerning t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f
s a n c t i o n s under t h e I r a n and Libya Sanctions A c t a g a i n s t T o t a l and i t s
investment p a r t n e r s , t h e Russian company Gazprom and t h e Malaysian
company Petronas, f o r t h e i r r e p o r t e d investment i n I r a n ' s South Pars gas
d e a l . As we have s a i d b e f o r e , we are a c t i v e l y i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h i s case
to determine whether s a n c t i o n a b l e a c t i v i t y has o c c u r r e d .
I'm n o t going t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e r e s u l t s o f our review o r s p e c u l a t e about
what d e c i s i o n s we w i l l make. This i s t h e law, and we w i l l implement i t .
I t i s one o f t h e t o o l s t h e U n i t e d States Government uses t o address our
concerns about I r a n i a n - s p o n s o r e d t e r r o r i s m and I r a n ' s e f f o r t s t o a c q u i r e
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nuclear weapons and o t h e r weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n .
Our European a l l i e s share these concerns and are a l r e a d y c o o p e r a t i n g
w i t h us i n many i m p o r t a n t ways, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p r e v e n t i n g t h e
p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y hardware and dual use t e c h n o l o g y t h a t can be
used t o b u i l d weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n ; b u t we s t i l l have i m p o r t a n t
d i f f e r e n c e s over how best t o advance our goals r e g a r d i n g I r a n . Over t h e
past s e v e r a l months, we have i n t e n s i f i e d our d i a l o g u e w i t h
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e European Union on these i s s u e s . We i n t e n d t o
c o n t i n u e t h a t d i a l o g u e , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e outcome o f t h e South Pars
case, w i t h a view t o b r i n g i n g our p o l i c i e s c l o s e r t o g e t h e r .
We are going t o be sending e x p e r t s t o t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s t o i n v e s t i g a t e
and t a l k w i t h o f f i c i a l s i n those c o u n t r i e s about t h e terms o f these
c o n t r a c t s as p a r t o f t h e work t h a t we need t o do t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of whether s a n c t i o n a b l e a c t i v i t y has taken place or w i l l take p l a c e .
That i n v e s t i g a t i o n , as you know again, c o u l d take time because o f t h e
importance o f making sure i t can w i t h s t a n d a c o u r t c h a l l e n g e t h a t has
been promised by t h e Europeans and o t h e r s .
QUESTION: Are you saying t h e r e ' s no prima f a c i e s i t u a t i o n here c a l l i n g
for
sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: No, t h e r e i s not a prima f a c i e case; t h e r e i s a case t h a t i s
s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r t o j u s t i f y an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , b u t not s u f f i c i e n t l y
c l e a r t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
I mean, I ask because t h e monetary t h r e s h o l d i s —
Right.
—
R i g h t , t h e r e are a l o t o f l e g a l - -
exceeded, b u t t h e r e are o t h e r
—
MR. RUBIN: -- aspects t o i t , because, again, t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g here
i s t h a t you have t o be able t o w i t h s t a n d a c o u r t c h a l l e n g e .
There are
o t h e r aspects o f t h e law — what i s t h e purpose o f t h e c o n t r a c t ; d i d i t
precede t h e law's a p p l i c a t i o n ; were some o f t h e aspects o f i t
grandfathered?
There's a whole s e r i e s o f l e g a l h u r d l e s t h a t one must
pass through t o be sure t h a t we've met our own t e s t , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t
i t can meet any c o u r t c h a l l e n g e t h a t might r e s u l t .
QUESTION: Not t o extend t h i s p o i n t and extend t h e b r i e f i n g , b u t t h e
n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s s u e , even i f t h a t i s n ' t p a r t o f t h i s , you s t i l l
have something t o l o o k a t i n regard t o s a n c t i o n s . That's a v e r y u n c l e a r
q u e s t i o n . What I'm saying i s -MR. RUBIN:
Which n u c l e a r --
QUESTION: The i n q u i r y goes beyond whether, i n some way, I r a n i s helped
w i t h a n u c l e a r program; r i g h t ? There can be a s a n c t i o n even i f t h e deal
doesn't b e n e f i t I r a n ' s program, i s what I'm t r y i n g t o say.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. As I understand, t h e law i s about investment i n t h e
o i l and gas s e c t o r . I t i s our view t h a t money i s f u n g i b l e , and
a d d i t i o n a l funds p r o v i d e d t o t h e I r a n i a n Government make i t e a s i e r f o r
them t o conduct t h e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t we oppose so s t r o n g l y , i n c l u d i n g
t e r r o r i s m , i n c l u d i n g t h e seeking o f weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n .
But t h e e x t e n t t o which t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a c t - which has n o t been
p u b l i s h e d , r e p o r t s o f i t have been discussed - would be covered by t h e
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law i s something a government, b e f o r e i t makes an announcement, wants t o
do a v e r y c a r e f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f because t h i s case i s s u f f i c i e n t l y
c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h a t i t c o u l d , i f s a n c t i o n s were imposed, y i e l d a c o u r t
c h a l l e n g e t h a t would r e q u i r e us t o be sure we had d o t t e d a l l our " i " s
and crossed a l l our " t " s b e f o r e s t a t i n g whether i t was s a n c t i o n a b l e .
QUESTION: I ask because you seem t o f i n d common ground w i t h t h e
Europeans i n f i g h t i n g I r a n i a n - s p o n s o r e d t e r r o r i s m .
So I wondered i f t h e
p o l i c y was t i l t e d i n a way t h a t was u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e d e a l .
A p p a r e n t l y n o t . You s t i l l have - money i s f u n g i b l e .
You s t i l l have
concern about h e l p i n g I r a n i n any way, shape or form.
MR. RUBIN: C o r r e c t . We have an embargo on a l l t r a d e from t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s . I guess i t would be a s a n c t i o n s p o l i c y on a l l t r a d e w i t h t h e
government o f I r a n because we b e l i e v e t h a t we've p u t our money where our
mouth i s when i t comes t o t r a d i n g w i t h I r a n and our p o l i c y towards I r a n .
We wish t h a t o t h e r governments would understand t h e r i s k s a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h s u p p o r t i n g , however i n d i r e c t l y , a government t h a t i s determined t o
support i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m and seek n u c l e a r weapons.
QUESTION:
Do you want t o say a n y t h i n g about C r o a t i a ?
QUESTION:
When are those e x p e r t s going t o t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s ?
MR. RUBIN:
I'm remembering
Soon, yes.
QUESTION: I'm remembering t h a t day w i t h Tudjman, and how subsequently
US support t h r o u g h o u t t h a t area - even t o towns - was c a r e f u l l y
c a l i b r a t e d on t h e i r compliance w i t h Dayton.
MR. RUBIN:
Right.
QUESTION: Are you about t o a t l e a s t support some s o r t o f suspended bank
loans or i n some way w i l l C r o a t i a b e n e f i t from i t s a c t i o n s ?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , as t h e statement i n d i c a t e d , we have p r a i s e d t h e
government o f C r o a t i a f o r t h e i r c r i t i c a l r o l e i n t h e v o l u n t a r y t r a n s f e r
of i n d i c t e e s t o t h e t r i b u n a l .
Let's remember who we're t a l k i n g about here.
I n t h i s one case, we're
t a l k i n g about a gentleman named K o r d i c , who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r ,
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t r i b u n a l , t h e worst k i n d o f a t r o c i t i e s i n C e n t r a l
Bosnia:
bombing towns where c i v i l i a n s were p r e s e n t when t h e r e were no
m i l i t a r i e s p r e s e n t , and then s l a u g h t e r i n g c i v i l i a n s who were t r y i n g t o
run away.
The people who were s u r r e n d e r e d were t h e s u b j e c t o f separate
i n d i c t m e n t s , and we have worked very, v e r y hard w i t h t h e government o f
C r o a t i a t o t r y t o convince them o f t h e wisdom o f having these people
t u r n e d over.
The way we d i d t h a t , and t h e reason why we're so pleased t h a t t h i s has
come about, i s we had a c o o r d i n a t e d p o l i c y w i t h our a l l i e s t o t r y t o
make c l e a r t o t h e government o f C r o a t i a t h a t a f a i l u r e t o g e t these
people t o t u r n over would p r e v e n t C r o a t i a from g e t t i n g t h e b e n e f i t s o f
r e i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community - i n c l u d i n g loans a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and i n c l u d i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e
U n i t e d States t h a t they are seeking v e r y s t r o n g l y .
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As f a r as whether t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n w i l l y i e l d a change i n the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , I would remind you, o r t e l l you
t h a t t h e r e are f o u r o t h e r i n d i c t e e s who have not yet been t u r n e d over.
But as a d e c i s i o n i s made and we c o n s u l t w i t h Congress on any f u t u r e
vote i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , we w i l l take t h i s welcome
and p o s i t i v e development i n t o account.
QUESTION: The o t h e r i n d i c t e e s - do you have a n y t h i n g about t a l k s which
Ambassador Gelbard had w i t h P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c i n Belgrade?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, he met w i t h P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c a few hours ago. He
discussed w i t h him the i m p o r t a n t issues r e l a t e d t o the Dayton Accords o f
g e t t i n g the p o l i c e i n Bosnia r e s t r u c t u r e d ; o f g e t t i n g a commitment from
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c t o work t o ensure t h a t the media t h e r e was as f r e e
and as f a i r as p o s s i b l e - and t h a t r e l a t e s t o the t r a n s m i t t e r s t h a t SFOR
is i n control of.
As f a r as the war c r i m i n a l s i s s u e i s concerned, I t h i n k the case he made
to Mr. M i l o s e v i c i s , i t ' s now your t u r n -- i f you want your c o u n t r y t o
r e j o i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, i f you want t o be able t o have the
b e n e f i t s o f the new Europe t h a t i s being b u i l t , then you should pay
c l o s e a t t e n t i o n and take heed what P r e s i d e n t Tudjman has done by u s i n g
his i n f l u e n c e w i t h Bosnian Croats t o get i m p o r t a n t i n d i c t e e s t u r n e d over
t o the War Crimes T r i b u n a l -- and t h a t a f a i l u r e by P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c
to take those steps w i l l leave him c o n t i n u a l l y i s o l a t e d i n the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, and w i l l leave h i s people c o n t i n u i n g t o s u f f e r
from the i s o l a t i o n t h a t we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o impose on him.
QUESTION: Was he moved a t a l l by Mr. Gelbard's statement?
a n y t h i n g d i f f e r e n t than he's s a i d i n the past?
Did he say
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware t h a t P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c made any new
commitments on t h i s s u b j e c t .
QUESTION: Are you a l s o working w i t h the Russian and Malaysian
Governments over your concerns?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I s a i d t h a t the e x p e r t s t h a t w i l l be sent out w i l l go
to a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s .
QUESTION:
Thank you.
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================== END ATTACHMENT
1 ==================
Page 18 of 18
�Page 1 of 19
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RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL
(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: Mildred_Neely@notes1.usia.gov@INETOLNGTWY ( Mildred_Neely@notesl.usia.gov@I
CREATION DATE/TIME: 5-JAN-1998 09:25:11.00
SUBJECT:
E a r l y Report: MIDDLE EAST:
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC ] )
READ:UNKNOWN
TEXT:
The announcement o f the r e s i g n a t i o n o f I s r a e l i F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r David Levy
was the t o p f o r e i g n news s t o r y i n many c o u n t r i e s today, w i t h most observers
wondering i f t h i s would lead t o the f a l l o f the Netanyahu government and
the f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f the Middle East peace process.
Writers
u n d e r l i n e d the dismaying t i m i n g o f the c r i s i s i n I s r a e l , now t h a t r e p o r t s
i n d i c a t e t h a t the Washington meetings o f the I s r a e l i prime m i n i s t e r and
P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y head A r a f a t w i t h P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n are scheduled f o r
January 20 and 22 and w i t h U.S. s p e c i a l envoy Dennis Ross' l a t e s t m i s s i o n
to the Middle East due t o b e g i n t h i s week.
A few p u n d i t s suggested t h a t , even i f Mr. Netanyahu's government s u r v i v e s
the l o s s o f some o f i t s c o a l i t i o n members, the I s r a e l i l e a d e r might be l e f t
w i t h even l e s s room t o maneuver owing t o the p r e s s u r e o f more r i g h t - w i n g
members. "Despite U.S. pressure t o announce a t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l p l a n , "
France I n t e r r a d i o s a i d , "Netanyahu, h e l d hostage a t the Knesset, c o u l d
back down under pressure from the extreme r i g h t , which i s opposed t o any
w i t h d r a w a l from the West Bank." Responding t o the widespread i m p r e s s i o n
t h a t the U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would not mind seeing t h e " t o p p l i n g " o f
I s r a e l ' s government, n a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe o f T e l A v i v c a l l e d f o r s u p p o r t f o r
the e m b a t t l e d Mr. Netanyahu, d e c l a r i n g , " e must show the Americans t h a t
W
Netanyahu does not walk a l o n e . " A v a i l a b l e Arab commentary r e f l e c t e d , y e t
once a g a i n , the b e l i e f t h a t I s r a e l i s j u s t t r e a d i n g water t o p r e v e n t any
progress i n the peace process and t h a t the Ross v i s i t i s s i m p l y a g e s t u r e
to calm the " b i t t e r n e s s " r i s i n g t h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n .
BRIEFS
—
--
EDITORS:
Algeria:
'Holy T e r r o r ' ?
Asian F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s : B a i l o u t Plans A Boon Or An IMF
Kenya E l e c t i o n : A 'Scarcely J u s t i f i e d ' V i c t o r y For Moi
Mildred
MIDDLE EAST:
ISRAEL:
Sola Neely and Kathleen J. Brahney
LEVY'S RESIGNATION ANOTHER 'BLOW' TO PEACE PROCESS
" B a t t l e For Redeployment Would Begin"
'Trap'?
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A p o l l i n t o p - c i r c u l a t i o n , p l u r a l i s t Yediot showed t h a t 62 p e r c e n t
supported and 34 c r i t i c i z e d Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n . The press r e p o r t e d t h a t
the Knesset i s expected t o pass the budget b i l l today by 3-5 v o t e s .
"And
t h e n , " s a i d I s r a e l Radio, "the b a t t l e f o r the redeployment would b e g i n . "
"Levy's R e s i g n a t i o n Blow To Peace Process"
Mass-appeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv's e d i t o r i a l h e l d ( 1 / 5 ) :
"Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n
i s . . . a blow t o the peace process. S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t i s going t o have t o
reassess her peace o f f e n s i v e . . . . I f the Americans decide t o h o l d I s r a e l
accountable f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e process, we would have t o brace f o r a
v e r y c o l d w i n t e r i n Washington and Europe. I n s t e a d o f 'peace w i t h
s e c u r i t y , ' we'd get an i s o l a t e d I s r a e l , exposed t o t e r r o r and i n t i f a d a and
f a c i n g a new w a r - - a l l t h i s has become more r e a l a f t e r Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n . "
"U.S.:
We Have Put Netanyahu Between A Rock And A Hard Place"
Netanyahu c r i t i c and s e n i o r a n a l y s t Hemmi Shalev opined i n mass-appeal,
p l u r a l i s t Maariv ( 1 / 4 ) :
"Had i t not been an e x c e e d i n g l y absurd n o t i o n , one
c o u l d have b e l i e v e d t h a t P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Levy have
cooked up a j o i n t c o n s p i r a c y . I n a p e r f e c t l y timed o p e r a t i o n , each threw
h i s own monkey wrench i n t o t h e prime m i n i s t e r ' s a l r e a d y p r e t t y wrecked
government wagon.... The Americans are t e l l i n g Netanyahu t h a t they w i l l
never agree t o have the next t r o o p p u l l b a c k w a i t u n t i l he manages t o
r e s o l v e t h e budget c r i s i s . . . .
That Netanyahu may not be able t o c a r r y out
the second redeployment now and t h a t , consequently, he may l o s e h i s o f f i c e ,
do not e x a c t l y make C l i n t o n and h i s a d v i s e r s lose t h e i r s l e e p . The way t h e
Americans l i k e t o put i t , they have put Netanyahu between t h e rock and t h e
hard p l a c e . "
"New
E l e c t i o n s Unavoidable"
Netanyahu c r i t i c Haaretz's e d i t o r i a l concluded ( 1 / 5 ) : "With Levy's
r e s i g n a t i o n , t h e government has reached a p o l i t i c a l impasse and a n a d i r i n
i t s performance. Gesher's d e p a r t u r e removes a c o r n e r s t o n e from t h e
Netanyahu government. General e l e c t i o n s are a must."
"They Think They Smell Blood"
Under t h e h e a d l i n e above, an e d i t o r i a l i n n a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe s t r e s s e d
( 1 / 5 ) : "The urgency Washington has a l l o f a sudden been a t t a c h i n g t o peace
issues i s undoubtedly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the b e l i e f t h a t i t would take j u s t
another t u r n of the screw t o t o p p l e t h e government t h e Americans never
wanted i n the f i r s t p l a c e . . . . Washington b e l i e v e s t h a t heavy p r e s s u r e on
Netanyahu--with perhaps a l i t t l e h e l p from, say, Defense M i n i s t e r
Mordechai... would l e a d t o t h e f a l l of t h e government... and t o t h e d e f e a t of
the n a t i o n a l camp i n subsequent e l e c t i o n s . . . . We can and must f i g h t t h e
American t r e n d . . . . We must show t h e Americans t h a t Netanyahu does not walk
alone."
EGYPT:
" C r i s i s W i l l Create More Obstacles To Peace Process"
Pro-government A l Ahram s a i d ( 1 / 4 ) : "While t h e r e g i o n i s p r e p a r i n g f o r
Dennis Ross' v i s i t , t h e I s r a e l i government e n t e r e d a new
c r i s i s because of
i t s a n t i - p e a c e p o l i c i e s . This c r i s i s w i l l p l a c e more o b s t a c l e s t o
a c h i e v i n g r e a l progress i n the peace process. Mordechai preceded Ross'
v i s i t by l a y i n g the b a s i s of a new s e t t l e m e n t i n Jerusalem. This opposes
Washington's main demand t h a t s e t t l e m e n t s should stop i n o r d e r t o m o t i v a t e
the peace process."
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Page 3 of 19
"Netanyahu's Game Continues"
Columnist Sanaa A l Said a s s e r t e d i n o p p o s i t i o n A l Wafd ( 1 / 4 ) : "Netanyahu's
game c o n t i n u e s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h f u l l American support and c l e a r Arab
weakness. His game i s t o i n s t i g a t e e x t r e m i s t I s r a e l i l e f t i s t s and s e t a
c l a s h among c o a l i t i o n m i n i s t e r s w h i l e he p l a y s the r e f e r e e and time i s
wasted."
SAUDI ARABIA:
"Diverting Attention"
London-based, i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y c i r c u l a t e d Al-Sharq Al-Awsat's e d i t o r i a l
observed ( 1 / 5 ) : "Dennis Ross, the American peace c o o r d i n a t o r , has i g n o r e d
Netanyahu's a t t e m p t s t o postpone Ross' t r i p t o the area and w i l l a r r i v e
today. Two weeks from now, P r e s i d e n t B i l l C l i n t o n w i l l r e c e i v e I s r a e l i
Prime M i n i s t e r Netanyahu and P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l A u t h o r i t y P r e s i d e n t
Yasser A r a f a t s e p a r a t e l y a t the White House. P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n a l s o
d e c l i n e d a request from Netanyahu t o postpone the Washington meeting....
S k e p t i c a l observers might say t h a t these movements aim t o d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n
from the j o i n t m i l i t a r y maneuvers between I s r a e l , Turkey, Jordan and the
United States . "
"Bad News:
Ross I s Coming"
Jeddah's c o n s e r v a t i v e Al-Madina suggested i n an e d i t o r i a l ( 1 / 4 ) : "Whenever
b i t t e r n e s s r i s e s i n the area, Washington announces a new t r i p f o r Dennis
Ross, the American eace c o o r d i n a t o r who has k i l l e d h i s n e u t r a l i t y d u r i n g
previous s h u t t l e t r i p s .
Ross' v i s i t i s one o f those bad p i e c e s o f news we
hear from Washington."
GERMANY:
"Divided"
Werner Adam e d i t o r i a l i z e d i n r i g h t - o f - c e n t e r F r a n k f u r t e r Allgemeine ( 1 / 5 ) :
"Now Netanyahu must f e a r f o r the s u r v i v a l of h i s g o v e r n i n g c o a l i t i o n .
His
arch opponent David Levy has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h h i s
t h r e a t t o r e s i g n . . . . The reason i s not o n l y the row about the budget...but
a l s o the c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o l i c y o f the premier toward the P a l e s t i n i a n s , and
Levy i s supported i n h i s view by no l e s s a man than P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n .
Even the moderate Defense M i n i s t e r Mordechai d i s a g r e e s on t h i s p o l i c y .
Thus the q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d f o r how l o n g , under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
Netanyahu can c o n t i n u e t o govern i n a h a l f w a y e f f e c t i v e manner. A l t h o u g h
he was d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d , he deepened the d i v i s i o n o f the people l i k e no
o t h e r premier b e f o r e him."
"Netanyahu's Noose I s T i g h t e n i n g "
L e f t - o f - c e n t e r Weser-Kurier of Bremen argued (1/5) : " I n almost two years
i n o f f i c e , Netanyahu f o r f e i t e d not o n l y the c o n f i d e n c e o f the Europeans and
Americans, but he a l s o almost f r o z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Arab n e i g h b o r i n g
c o u n t r i e s , and a l l o w e d the gap between the r i c h and poor i n h i s c o u n t r y t o
grow. The noose around h i s neck i s t i g h t e n i n g . The Americans want t o hear
concessions r e g a r d i n g the planned t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l , but t w e l v e
p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s announced a v o t e o f no-confidence i f the government
decides t o p u l l out the f o r c e s . "
FRANCE:
"A Major P o l i t i c a l Blow"
Georges Levy t o l d l i s t e n e r s of RTL r a d i o (1/5) : "Benjamin Netanyahu has
not l o s t t h e war, but he has c e r t a i n l y l o s t an i m p o r t a n t b a t t l e .
David
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Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n i s a major p o l i t i c a l blow f o r Netanyahu... and a p e r s o n a l
humiliation."
"A Hostage At The Knesset"
P i e r r e V e i l s a i d t h i s on France I n t e r r a d i o ( 1 / 5 ) :
"With David Levy gone,
Benjamin Netanyahu i s
t a k i n g over as f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , which doesn't change t h e s i t u a t i o n
much.... I n s p i t e o f the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , Netanhayu i s not r e a l l y
t h r e a t e n e d because he has the support o f r e l i g i o u s and e x t r e m i s t p a r t i e s .
This i s where t h e most s e r i o u s consequences f o r t h e peace process become
apparent: Despite U.S. p r e s s u r e t o announce a t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l p l a n ,
Netanyahu, h e l d hostage a t the Knesset, c o u l d back down under p r e s s u r e from
the extreme r i g h t , which i s opposed t o any w i t h d r a w a l from the West Bank."
"Out On A Limb"
Regional La Provence ran t h i s commentary by Jean-Rene Laplayne (1/5) :
"Netanyahu i s out on a l i m b , w i t h o u t a budget, t i e d by e l e c t i o n s promises
he cannot keep. Without h i s countrymen's s u p p o r t , he i s a t t h e head o f a
government on the b r i n k o f e x t i n c t i o n . "
ITALY:
" I s r a e l i Government
Cannot Reach An Agreement"
A l b e r t o S t a b i l e f i l e d from Jerusalem i n l e f t - l e a n i n g , i n f l u e n t i a l La
Repubblica ( 1 / 5 ) , "The f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r laments the l a c k o f i n i t i a t i v e . . . on
the peace process. For example, f o r months now Netanyahu was supposed t o
i n d i c a t e how much of t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s he i n t e n d s g i v i n g t o t h e
Palestinian Authority.
For months
t h e America sponsor has been a s k i n g
Netanyahu t o o f f e r h i s c o u n t e r p a r t a ' c r e d i b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t ' w i t h d r a w a l .
Today we d i s c o v e r t h a t . . . t h e government cannot reach an agreement."
" L i t t l e Tussles K i l l i n g
Peace"
I n t h e view of Fiamma N i e r e n s t e i n i n c e n t r i s t , i n f l u e n t i a l La Stampa ( 1 / 5 ) ,
"Levy has opened a very e x c i t i n g b u t r a t h e r u n c e r t a i n c h a p t e r . One o f t h e
v i c t i m s o f h i s move might even be t h e e n t i r e f r a g i l e a t t e m p t t o r e m o b i l i z e
the peace process. Indeed, C l i n t o n ' s apppointments w i t h b o t h Netanyahu and
A r a f a t are set f o r two weeks from now.
For a long t i m e , C l i n t o n was
r e l u c t a n t t o accept S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t ' s p r o p o s a l and o n l y h e s i t a n t l y d i d
he agree t o these meetings."
BELGIUM:
"Levy's R e s i g n a t i o n Heightens C r i s i s I n I s r a e l "
I n a f r o n t - p a g e a r t i c l e under t h e h e a d l i n e above, T e l A v i v c o r r e s p o n d e n t
Salomon Bouman wrote i n independent C a t h o l i c De Standaard ( 1 / 5 ) , "The
g e n e r a l e x p e c t a t i o n i s t h a t Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n w i l l spark a domino e f f e c t
which w i l l l e a d t o the f a l l o f t h e government.... Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n comes
a t a moment when U.S. mediator Dennis Ross i s expected i n Jerusalem and
Ramallah. Because of Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n , Netanyahu i s i n such a deep
government c r i s i s t h a t he w i l l have l i t t l e time f o r t h e American. He
e a r l i e r suggested t o him t h a t he come next week.
"The Americans are more than f e d up w i t h the I s r a e l i dawdling and want t o
see progress b e f o r e some d r a m a t i c event removes the f o u n d a t i o n from under
the Oslo accords. That i s why P r e s i d e n t B i l l C l i n t o n has summoned b o t h
Netanyahu and P a l e s t i n i a n leader A r a f a t t o Washington i n l e s s than t h r e e
weeks from now."
BRIEFS
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ALGERIA:
FRANCE:
'HOLY TERROR'?
"The Massacre Of The Innocents"
R i g h t - o f - c e n t e r France S o i r e d i t o r i a l i z e d (1/5) : "We cannot hope f o r any
a c t i o n from e i t h e r the UN o r the European Union unless i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c
o p i n i o n puts on the p r e s s u r e .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the p u b l i c i s very p o o r l y
informed on what i s r e a l l y going on i n A l g e r i a . "
GERMANY:
" A l g e r i a ' s C r i s i s Far From Being Resolved"
C e n t r i s t L e i p z i g e r V o l k s z e i t u n g noted ( 1 / 5 ) : "The f a c t t h a t the I r a n i a n
l e a d e r s h i p o f a l l governments blames the GIA f o r the k i l l i n g s i n A l g e r i a i s
an encouraging even though f i r s t s i g n . . . . But even w i t h a v i c t o r y o f t h e
m i l i t a r y over the I s l a m i s t s , the A l g e r i a n c r i s i s would by no means be
resolved....
For years, the v i o l e n t f a n a t i c s have always g i v e n the same
answer: no n e g o t i a t i o n s , no c e a s e - f i r e , no democracy. An end t o t h e
s p i r a l o f violence i s not i n s i g h t .
I f a l l sides i n v o l v e d achieved a
p e a c e f u l agreement, then o l d accounts would c e r t a i n l y be s e t t l e d w i t h those
who are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the massacres. I n A l g e r i a , everybody knows t h a t
the g e n e r a l s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , shamelessly e n r i c h themselves w i t h y i e l d s from
the c o u n t r y ' s o i l e x p o r t s . As long as the war goes on, the p e t r o d o l l a r s
continue t o flow."
"No
Cameras A v a i l a b l e "
Rudolph C h i m e l l i e d i t o r i a l i z e d i n c e n t r i s t Sueddeutsche Z e i t u n g (1/5) : I n
c o n t r a s t t o o t h e r c o n f l i c t s when the o u t s i d e w o r l d i s f e d w i t h p i c t u r e s o f
h o r r o r , no cameras a r e a v a i l a b l e i n A l g e r i a i f people a r e k i l l e d . . . . I n
the Balkans, i n A f r i c a , d r a s t i c p i c t u r e s sometimes had an e f f e c t . . . b u t
A l g e r i a n v i l l a g e s s u f f e r and d i e i n anonymous i n v i s i b i l i t y . I n t e r n a t i o n a l
p r e s s u r e on the regime t o do something a g a i n s t the bloodshed remains low,
since t h e r e i s nobody who has a r e c i p e on how t o stop the k i l l i n g s . . . .
Europe can c o n t i n u e t o look away, s i n c e , so f a r , t h e r e have been no
A l g e r i a n boat people."
BRITAIN:
"Holy T e r r o r "
The c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 5 ) : "Whatever the t r u e
f i g u r e , the next weeks o f Ramadan promise a hideous a d d i t i o n t o the death
roll.
That prospect i s a measure o f the f a i l u r e o f P r e s i d e n t Liamine
Zeroual's government t o r e t u r n the c o u n t r y t o normal a f t e r the d r a m a t i c
c u r t a i l i n g o f the e l e c t o r a l process i n 1992.... The p r e s i d e n t ' s c l a i m t h a t
the e x t r e m i s t s have been crushed i s p a l p a b l e nonsense. The regime has
shown i t s e l f incapable o f p r o t e c t i n g the people i t i s supposed t o
represent....
The l a t e s t k i l l i n g s r a i s e a huge q u e s t i o n mark over t h e
wisdom both o f t h w a r t i n g the e l e c t o r a t e ' s wishes and o f c o n t i n u i n g t o place
any f a i t h i n Mr. Zeroual's government. I t has d r i v e n l e g i t i m a t e Islamism
underground and deludes i t s e l f i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t can c o n t a i n the
r e s u l t a n t r i s e i n v i o l e n c e . The GIA i s a canker. I t s use o f Koranic
r h e t o r i c t o j u s t i f y a campaign o f t e r r o r makes a mockery o f a book t h a t
begins by i n v o k i n g a m e r c i f u l and compassionate God. But i t s malignancy
has spread through the i n a b i l i t y o f a m i l i t a r y - r u n regime t o meet popular
demands f o r peace and decent government."
ITALY:
'Missing
Balance Between Market And 'Moral
Issues'"
Stefano C i n g o l a n i wrote i n c e n t r i s t , t o p - c i r c u l a t i o n C o r r i e r e d e l l a Sera
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(1/5):
"Now Germany having a go a t i t . Klaus K i n k e l . . . h a s asked t h e
European Union l o o k a t t h e A l g e r i a n i s s u e . Last October, when I t a l i a n
Foreign M i n i s t e r D i n i s a i d t h e same t h i n g , a d i p l o m a t i c i n c i d e n t
f o l l o w e d . . . . D i v i d e d by p o l i t i c a l disagreements, h i s t o r i c a l h e r i t a g e and
senses o f g u i l t , t h e EU has been s e p a r a t i n g i t s t r a d e . . . f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
of a h u m a n i t a r i a n or e t h i c a l n a t u r e . . . . The moment has come t o show t h a t
Europe i s g e t t i n g ready not o n l y t o issue a common c u r r e n c y , b u t t o d e a l
w i t h t h e most d r a m a t i c c r i s e s a t i t s doors."
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS:
SOUTH KOREA:
BAILOUT PLANS A BOON OR AN IMF 'TRAP'?
"Reforms Moving Too S l o w l y "
Pro-business Joong-Ang I l b o m a i n t a i n e d i n an e d i t o r i a l ( 1 / 5 ) : "The
government and p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s are p u t t i n g o f f passage o f l e g i s l a t i o n on
l a y o f f s u n t i l February.
That i s n o t a good t h i n g because we do n o t want t o
waste time when t h e prospects o f f o r e i g n investment and f i n a n c i a l
a s s i s t a n c e remain u n c e r t a i n even i f t h e b i l l i s made i n t o law as e a r l y as
January....
Although we
hear about signs t h a t f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s are f i n a l l y r e t u r n i n g t o Korea, we
should bear i n mind once again t h a t they w i l l t u r n t h e i r backs on s f o r
good unless we r e a l l y r e f o r m o u r s e l v e s t h i s t i m e . We should n o t delay a
moment l o n g e r i n passing r e f o r m b i l l s , i n c l u d i n g one on l a y o f f s .
We
a b s o l u t e l y have no reason t o w a i t u n t i l February t o pass them.... Our
reforms should n o t slow down."
AUSTRALIA:
"Indonesia Faces C r i s i s Of U n c e r t a i n t y "
The n a t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i v e A u s t r a l i a n concluded ( 1 / 5 ) :
" J a k a r t a ' s response
to ( i t s economic) c r i s i s has been u n c o n v i n c i n g . There have been good moves
but these have been compromised by a l a c k o f f o l l o w - t h r o u g h or by
subsequent c o n t r a d i c t o r y a c t i o n s . . . . The government has l a c k e d a c l e a r and
authoritative figure articulating
t h e o v e r a l l r a t i o n a l e o f i t s response t o
the c r i s i s and t h e i m p r e s s i o n has been one o f a l a c k o f r e s o l v e . This i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous because a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e r e g i o n ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s i s
a c r i s i s o f c o n f i d e n c e among i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s i n Southeast Asia's
economic f u t u r e .
I t would be i n Indonesia's i n t e r e s t s t o r e s t o r e t h i s
c o n f i d e n c e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . "
MALAYSIA: "South Korean IMF Trap A Lesson For Us"
The g o v e r n m e n t - i n f l u e n c e d , English-language S t a r commented ( 1 / 5 ) :
"South
Korea was saved from having t o d e c l a r e a 'debt d e f a u l t . ' . . .
But r e a d i n g
the f i n e r p r i n t o f t h i s whole episode, one gets more and more d i s t u r b e d .
For t h e v i c t o r y belongs not t o t h e Koreans a f t e r a l l , b u t t o t h e major
r i c h c o u n t r i e s and t o f o r e i g n banks.... Korea has not been l e t o f f t h e
hook. I t has o n l y won a r e p r i e v e . . . .
I t appears t h a t t h e Koreans were
f o r c e d i n t o a corner w i t h t h e i r backs t o t h e w a l l , and then i n a s i t u a t i o n
of
extreme weakness, they had t o g i v e i n t o c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would c r i p p l e
t h e i r own banks and companies, b u t would open t h e door f o r f o r e i g n banks
and companies t o enjoy an undreamt o f bonanza."
PHILIPPINES:
"Mahathir's Theory Lacks C r e d i b i l i t y "
P u b l i s h e r G u i l l e r m o Santos wrote i n t h e government-owned P h i l i p p i n e J o u r n a l
(1/5):
"Do not envy t h e G-7 c o u n t r i e s , or t h a t t h e y are r e a p i n g t h e
benefits....
I n f a c t , they are now w o r r i e d about t h e n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s o f
the East Asian f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s . . . .
The d e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e poor w o r l d
c u r r e n c i e s w i l l a l s o mean a r e d u c t i o n o f demand f o r i m p o r t s o f t h e poor
n a t i o n s . . . . The d i m i n u t i o n o f i m p o r t s from t h e poor n a t i o n s are causing
the slowdown o f t h e G-7 c o u n t r i e s ' m a n u f a c t u r i n g . . . .
For t h e same reason,
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the Americans and Japanese are r u s h i n g t o the rescue o f the South Koreans
and the ASEANs. These wealthy c o u n t r i e s a r e n o t l e n d i n g us poor n a t i o n s
money out o f l o v e , but out o f concern f o r t h e i r own economic h e a l t h - - a n d
p r o f i t s . I t i s f o r t h i s . . . c a u s e - a n d - e f f e e t reason we cannot accept t h e
Malaysian t h e o r y t h a t t h i s f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s was caused by a U.S.
c o n s p i r a c y t o teach us ASEANs a lesson f o r a c c e p t i n g Myanmar (Burma) i n t o
ASEAN. "
KENYA ELECTION:
A 'SCARCELY JUSTIFED' VICTORY FOR MOI
KENYA: "Can KANU Change?"
An e d i t o r i a l i n the c e n t r i s t weekly East A f r i c a n d e c l a r e d (1/5) : "From the
o u t s e t , the new government w i l l have t o shoulder the burden o f a
q u e s t i o n a b l e l e g i t i m a c y r e s u l t i n g from the deeply f l a w e d n a t u r e o f t h e
e l e c t o r a l process and widespread charges o f r i g g i n g . "
"Why NCEC A n a r c h i s t s Reject V o t e r s ' Choice"
An e d i t o r i a l i n the r u l i n g - p a r t y owned Sunday Times h e l d ( 1 / 4 ) :
"During
the
coming week, the N a t i o n a l Convention Executive Counci1...and a number o f
u n s u c c e s s f u l p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n l o s e r s p l a n t o d i s r u p t the peace i n
N a i r o b i and elsewhere i n the c o u n t r y i n
a b i d t o f o r c e m i l l i o n s o f Kenyans back t o the p o l l s . . . .
These a r e t h e
men who c l a i m t o have so much love f o r t h i s n a t i o n t h a t they want t o p l a y a
key r o l e i n the r e f o r m process.
So f a r , the one r o l e they have p l a y e d
e f f e c t i v e l y i s t h a t o f causing mayhem and f e a r .
I t i s t h e i r strongest
weapon."
" O p p o s i t i o n Plan F o o l i s h And Dangerous"
An e d i t o r i a l i n the c e n t r i s t D a i l y N a t i o n had t h i s o p i n i o n ( 1 / 3 ) :
"Talk o f
p o p u l a r a c t i o n t o press f o r a r e v e r s a l o f the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t o r a
government o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y i s f o o l i s h and dangerous.... I f candidates
have s p e c i f i c evidence o f malfeasance, such evidence should be l a i d b e f o r e
the c o u r t s i n the accepted p e t i t i o n a r y form as p r o v i d e d i n law."
BRITAIN:
"Kenya's P o l l "
According t o the independent F i n a n c i a l Times ( 1 / 5 ) :
" P r e s i d e n t D a n i e l arap
Moi's v i c t o r y i n the Kenyan e l e c t i o n was s c a r c e l y j u s t i f i e d by h i s r e c o r d
i n government. I n s t e a d , i t owed much t o an e t h n i c a l l y d i v i d e d and p o o r l y
l e d o p p o s i t i o n , unable t o take f u l l advantage o f p o l i t i c a l reforms
r e l u c t a n t l y conceded by Mr. Moi i n the face o f domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
pressure.
But o p p o s i t i o n f a i l u r e s a r e no reason f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e n d i n g
agencies and f o r e i g n donors t o l e t up i n t h e i r demand t h a t Mr. Moi t a c k l e s
the c o r r u p t i o n t h a t has done so much damage, and which the c o u n t r y can i l l
afford."
AUSTRALIA:
"A Hand I n A f r i c a "
The l i b e r a l Melbourne Age had t h i s t o say ( 1 / 5 ) :
"Kenya, which used t o be
one o f the r i c h e s t and most s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s i n A f r i c a ,
e n t e r e d the new
year i n a s t a t e o f h i g h t e n s i o n , w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n contenders i n l a s t
week's e l e c t i o n vowing not t o accept the r e s u l t i f the l o n g - t i m e p r e s i d e n t ,
Mr. D a n i e l Arap Moi, was d e c l a r e d the winner....
While u l t i m a t e l y
A f r i c a ' s d e s t i n y l i e s i n the hands o f A f r i c a n s , i t i s , even a p a r t from
h u m a n i t a r i a n concerns, i n the world's i n t e r e s t t h a t A f r i c a should become a
p e a c e f u l and prosperous p a r t o f the g l o b a l community."
�Page 8 of 19
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LEVY'S RESIGNATION ANOTHER 'BLOW TO PEACE PROCESS
X~
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•The announcement of t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of I s r a e l i F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r David Levy
was
the t o p f o r e i g n news s t o r y i n many c o u n t r i e s today, w i t h most o b s e r v e r s
wonder
i n g i f t h i s would l e a d t o the f a l l o f the Netanyahu government and the
further
d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f t h e M i d d l e East peace process. W r i t e r s u n d e r l i n e d
the dismayi
ng t i m i n g o f the c r i s i s i n I s r a e l , now t h a t r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t
the Washingto
n meetings o f the I s r a e l i prime m i n i s t e r and P a l e s t i n i a n
A u t h o r i t y head A r a f a t
w i t h P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n are scheduled f o r January 20 and
22 and w i t h U.S. specia
1 envoy Dennis Ross' l a t e s t m i s s i o n t o t h e Middle East
due t o begin t h i s week.
A few p u n d i t s suggested t h a t , even i f Mr. Netanyahu's government s u r v i v e s t h e
1
oss of some of i t s c o a l i t i o n members, the I s r a e l i l e a d e r might be l e f t w i t h
eve
n l e s s room t o maneuver owing t o the p r e s s u r e o f more r i g h t w i n g members.
"Desp
i t e U.S. p r e s s u r e t o announce a t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l p l a n , " France I n t e r
radio said
, "Netanyahu, h e l d hostage a t t h e Knesset, c o u l d back down under
pressure from
the extreme r i g h t , which i s opposed t o any w i t h d r a w a l from t h e
West Bank."
Res
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Page 9 of 19
ponding t o the widespread i m p r e s s i o n t h a t the U.S.
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would not min
d seeing the " t o p p l i n g " o f I s r a e l ' s government,
n a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe o f T e l A v i v
c a l l e d f o r support f o r the e m b a t t l e d Mr.
Netanyahu, d e c l a r i n g , "We must show t
he Americans t h a t Netanyahu does not
walk a l o n e . " A v a i l a b l e Arab commentary r e
f l e e t e d , y e t once a g a i n , the b e l i e f
t h a t I s r a e l i s j u s t t r e a d i n g water t o preve
nt any progress i n the peace
process and t h a t the Ross v i s i t i s s i m p l y a g e s t u r
e t o calm the " b i t t e r n e s s "
r i s i n g t h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n .
•BRIEFS
•X'
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Algeria:
'Holy T e r r o r ' ?
Asian F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s : B a i l o u t Plans A Boon Or An IMF 'Trap'?
Kenya E l e c t i o n : A 'Scarcely J u s t i f i e d ' V i c t o r y For Moi
X~
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EDITORS: M i l d r e d Sola Neely and Kathleen J. Brahney
•MIDDLE EAST:
ISRAEL:
LEVY'S RESIGNATION ANOTHER 'BLOW' TO PEACE PROCESS
" B a t t l e For Redeployment Would Begin"
•A p o l l i n t o p c i r c u l a t i o n , p l u r a l i s t Yediot showed t h a t 62 p e r c e n t supported
an
d 34 c r i t i c i z e d Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n . The press r e p o r t e d t h a t the Knesset i s
exp
e c t e d t o pass the budget b i l l today by 35 v o t e s . "And t h e n , " s a i d I s r a e l
Radio
, "the b a t t l e f o r the redeployment
would b e g i n . "
•"Levy's R e s i g n a t i o n Blow To Peace Process"
•Massappeal, p l u r a l i s t Maariv's e d i t o r i a l h e l d ( 1 / 5 ) : "Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n
is . .
.a blow t o the peace process. S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t i s going t o have t o
reassess
her peace o f f e n s i v e . . . . I f the Americans decide t o h o l d I s r a e l
accountable f o r
the f a i l u r e o f the process, we would have t o brace f o r a v e r y
c o l d w i n t e r i n Wa
s h i n g t o n and Europe. I n s t e a d o f 'peace w i t h s e c u r i t y , ' we'd
get an i s o l a t e d I s
r a e l , exposed t o t e r r o r and i n t i f a d a and f a c i n g a new
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Page 10 of 19
w a r a l l t h i s has become mo
re r e a l a f t e r Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n . "
•"U.S.:
We Have Put Netanyahu Between A Rock And A Hard Place"
•Netanyahu c r i t i c and s e n i o r a n a l y s t Hemmi Shalev opined i n massappeal,
plurali
st Maariv ( 1 / 4 ) :
"Had i t n o t been an e x c e e d i n g l y absurd n o t i o n , one
c o u l d have
b e l i e v e d t h a t P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n and Foreign M i n i s t e r Levy have
cooked up a j o i
nt c o n s p i r a c y . I n a p e r f e c t l y timed o p e r a t i o n , each threw h i s
own monkey wrenc
h i n t o t h e prime m i n i s t e r ' s a l r e a d y p r e t t y wrecked government
wagon.... The Ame
r i c a n s a r e t e l l i n g Netanyahu t h a t they w i l l never agree t o
have the next t r o o p
p u l l b a c k w a i t u n t i l he manages t o r e s o l v e the budget
crisis....
That Netanyahu
may not be able t o c a r r y out the second
redeployment now and t h a t , consequent!
y, he may l o s e h i s o f f i c e , do n o t
e x a c t l y make C l i n t o n and h i s a d v i s e r s l o s e t h
e i r s l e e p . The way the Americans
l i k e t o put i t , they have put Netanyahu betwee
n the rock and the hard p l a c e . "
•"New E l e c t i o n s Unavoidable"
•Netanyahu c r i t i c Haaretz's e d i t o r i a l concluded ( 1 / 5 ) : "With Levy's
resignation
, t h e government has reached a p o l i t i c a l impasse and a n a d i r i n
i t s performance
Gesher's d e p a r t u r e removes a c o r n e r s t o n e from the Netanyahu
government. Gen
e r a l e l e c t i o n s a r e a must."
•"They Think They Smell Blood"
•Under the h e a d l i n e above, an e d i t o r i a l i n n a t i o n a l i s t Hatzofe s t r e s s e d ( 1 / 5 ) :
"The urgency Washington has a l l o f a sudden been a t t a c h i n g t o peace issues i s
u
ndoubtedly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e b e l i e f t h a t i t would t a k e j u s t another t u r n
of t
he screw t o t o p p l e t h e government t h e Americans never wanted i n t h e f i r s t
place
.... Washington b e l i e v e s t h a t heavy p r e s s u r e on Netanyahuwith perhaps
a little
h e l p from, say, Defense M i n i s t e r Mordechai... would l e a d t o t h e f a l l
of t h e gove
rnment...and t o the d e f e a t o f the n a t i o n a l camp i n subsequent
e l e c t i o n s . . . . We
can and must f i g h t the American t r e n d . . . . We must show t h e
Americans t h a t Neta
nyahu does n o t walk alone."
•EGYPT:
" C r i s i s W i l l Create More Obstacles To Peace Process"
•Progovernment A l Ahram s a i d
Dennis
( 1 / 4 ) : "While t h e r e g i o n i s p r e p a r i n g f o r
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Ross' v i s i t , the I s r a e l i government e n t e r e d a new c r i s i s because o f
i t s antipe
ace p o l i c i e s . This c r i s i s w i l l place more o b s t a c l e s t o a c h i e v i n g
r e a l progress
i n the peace process. Mordechai preceded Ross' v i s i t by l a y i n g
the b a s i s o f a
new s e t t l e m e n t i n Jerusalem.
This opposes Washington's main
demand t h a t s e t t
lements should s t o p i n o r d e r t o m o t i v a t e the peace process."
•"Netanyahu's Game Continues"
•Columnist Sanaa A l Said a s s e r t e d
gam
e continues, e s p e c i a l l y with f u l l
weakness. H i
s game i s t o i n s t i g a t e e x t r e m i s t
c l a s h among c o a l i
t i o n m i n i s t e r s w h i l e he p l a y s the
wasted."
•SAUDI ARABIA:
i n o p p o s i t i o n A l Wafd ( 1 / 4 ) : "Netanyahu's
American support and c l e a r Arab
I s r a e l i l e f t i s t s and set a
r e f e r e e and time i s
"Diverting Attention"
•Londonbased, i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y c i r c u l a t e d AlSharq AlAwsat's e d i t o r i a l
observed (
1/5): "Dennis Ross, the American peace c o o r d i n a t o r , has i g n o r e d
Netanyahu's a t t
empts t o postpone Ross' t r i p t o the area and w i l l a r r i v e
today. Two weeks from
now. P r e s i d e n t B i l l C l i n t o n w i l l r e c e i v e I s r a e l i Prime
M i n i s t e r Netanyahu and
P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l A u t h o r i t y P r e s i d e n t Yasser A r a f a t
s e p a r a t e l y at t h e White
House. P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n a l s o d e c l i n e d a request
from Netanyahu t o postpone t h
e Washington meeting....
S k e p t i c a l observers
might say t h a t these movements a i
m t o d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n from the j o i n t
m i l i t a r y maneuvers between I s r a e l , Turkey,
Jordan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . "
•"Bad News:
Ross I s Coming"
•Jeddah's c o n s e r v a t i v e AlMadina suggested i n an e d i t o r i a l ( 1 / 4 ) : "Whenever
bitt
erness r i s e s i n the area, Washington announces a new t r i p f o r Dennis
Ross, t h e
American eace c o o r d i n a t o r who has k i l l e d h i s n e u t r a l i t y d u r i n g
previous s h u t t l e
trips.
Ross' v i s i t i s one o f those bad pieces o f news we
hear from Washington
•GERMANY:
"Divided"
•Werner Adam e d i t o r i a l i z e d i n r i g h t o f c e n t e r F r a n k f u r t e r Allgemeine ( 1 / 5 ) :
"Now
Netanyahu must f e a r f o r the s u r v i v a l o f h i s g o v e r n i n g c o a l i t i o n . His
arch opp
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onent David Levy has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h h i s
t h r e a t t o res
i g n . . . . The reason i s not o n l y the row about t h e budget...but
a l s o the c o n t r a d
i c t o r y p o l i c y o f t h e premier toward the P a l e s t i n i a n s , and
Levy i s supported i n
h i s view by no l e s s a man than P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n .
Even
the moderate Defense Mi
n i s t e r Mordechai d i s a g r e e s on t h i s p o l i c y . Thus t h e
q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d f o
r how l o n g , under these circumstances, Netanyahu
can c o n t i n u e t o govern i n a ha
I f w a y e f f e c t i v e manner. Although he was
d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d , he deepened t h e d i v i
s i o n o f t h e people l i k e no o t h e r
premier b e f o r e him."
•"Netanyahu's Noose I s T i g h t e n i n g "
• L e f t o f c e n t e r WeserKurier of Bremen argued ( 1 / 5 ) :
" I n almost two years i n
offi
ce, Netanyahu f o r f e i t e d not o n l y the confidence of t h e Europeans and
Americans,
but he a l s o almost f r o z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Arab n e i g h b o r i n g
c o u n t r i e s , and a l
lowed t h e gap between t h e r i c h and poor i n h i s c o u n t r y t o
grow. The noose arou
nd h i s neck i s t i g h t e n i n g . The Americans want t o hear
concessions r e g a r d i n g t h
e planned t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l , but t w e l v e
p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s announced a vote o f noc
o n f i d e n c e i f the government decides
t o p u l l out the f o r c e s . "
X~
hp x (#DFRANCE:
"A Major P o l i t i c a l
Blow"
•Georges Levy t o l d l i s t e n e r s of RTL r a d i o ( 1 / 5 ) :
"Benjamin Netanyahu has not
1
ost t h e war, but he has c e r t a i n l y l o s t an i m p o r t a n t b a t t l e .
David Levy's
resig
n a t i o n i s a major p o l i t i c a l blow f o r Netanyahu... and a p e r s o n a l
humiliation."
•"A Hostage At The Knesset"
• P i e r r e V e i l s a i d t h i s on France I n t e r r a d i o (1/5) : "With David Levy gone,
Ben
jamin Netanyahu i s
t a k i n g over as f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , which doesn't change the s i t u a t i o n much....
I
n s p i t e of t h e p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , Netanhayu i s not r e a l l y t h r e a t e n e d because
he
has the support o f r e l i g i o u s and e x t r e m i s t p a r t i e s . This i s where the
most ser
ious consequences f o r t h e peace process become apparent:
Despite
U.S. p r e s s u r e
t o announce a t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l p l a n , Netanyahu, h e l d hostage a t
the Knesset, c
o u l d back down under p r e s s u r e from the extreme r i g h t , which i s
opposed t o any w
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i t h d r a w a l from the West Bank."
•"Out On A Limb"
•Regional La Provence ran t h i s commentary by JeanRene Laplayne (1/5) :
"Netanya
hu i s out on a l i m b , w i t h o u t a budget, t i e d by e l e c t i o n s promises he
cannot kee
p. Without h i s countrymen's support, he i s a t the head o f a
government on the
brink of e x t i n c t i o n . "
X'
hp x (#DITALY:
" I s r a e l i Government
Cannot Reach An Agreement"
• A l b e r t o S t a b i l e f i l e d from Jerusalem i n l e f t l e a n i n g , i n f l u e n t i a l La
Repubblica
( 1 / 5 ) , "The f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r laments the l a c k o f i n i t i a t i v e . . . on
the peace p r o
cess. For example, f o r months now Netanyahu was supposed t o
i n d i c a t e how much
of the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s he i n t e n d s g i v i n g t o t h e
Palestinian Authority.
Fo
r months
the America sponsor has been a s k i n g
Netanyahu t o o f f e r h i s c o u n t e r p a r
t a ' c r e d i b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t ' w i t h d r a w a l .
Today we d i s c o v e r t h a t . . . t h e govern
ment cannot reach an agreement."
•"Little
Tussles K i l l i n g
Peace"
• I n t h e view of Fiamma N i e r e n s t e i n i n c e n t r i s t , i n f l u e n t i a l La Stampa ( 1 / 5 ) ,
"L
evy has opened a very e x c i t i n g b u t r a t h e r u n c e r t a i n c h a p t e r . One o f the
victim
s of h i s move might even be t h e e n t i r e f r a g i l e attempt t o r e m o b i l i z e
the peace
process. Indeed, C l i n t o n ' s apppointments w i t h b o t h Netanyahu and
A r a f a t are se
t f o r two weeks from now.
For a long time, C l i n t o n was
r e l u c t a n t t o accept Sec
r e t a r y A l b r i g h t ' s p r o p o s a l and o n l y h e s i t a n t l y d i d he
agree t o these meetings."
•BELGIUM:
"Levy's R e s i g n a t i o n Heightens C r i s i s I n I s r a e l "
• I n a f r o n t p a g e a r t i c l e under the h e a d l i n e above, T e l A v i v c o r r e s p o n d e n t
Salomo
n Bouman wrote i n independent C a t h o l i c De Standaard ( 1 / 5 ) , "The g e n e r a l
expecta
t i o n i s t h a t Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n w i l l spark a domino e f f e c t which w i l l
lead t o t
he f a l l of t h e government.... Levy's r e s i g n a t i o n comes a t a moment
when U.S. m
e d i a t o r Dennis Ross i s expected i n Jerusalem and Ramallah.
Because o f Levy's r
e s i g n a t i o n , Netanyahu i s i n such a deep government c r i s i s
t h a t he w i l l have l i t
t i e time f o r t h e American. He e a r l i e r suggested t o him
t h a t he come next week.
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"The Americans are more than fed up w i t h the I s r a e l i dawdling and want t o see
P
rogress b e f o r e some d r a m a t i c event removes the f o u n d a t i o n from under the
Oslo a
ccords. That i s why President B i l l C l i n t o n has summoned both Netanyahu
and Pal
e s t i n i a n leader A r a f a t t o Washington i n l e s s than t h r e e weeks from
now. "
BRIEFS
•ALGERIA:
FRANCE:
'HOLY TERROR'?
"The Massacre Of The Innocents"
• R i g h t o f c e n t e r France S o i r e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 5 ) : "We cannot hope f o r any
action
from e i t h e r the UN or the European Union unless i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c
opinion p
u t s on the pressure.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the p u b l i c i s v e r y p o o r l y
informed on what
i s r e a l l y going on i n A l g e r i a . "
•GERMANY:
" A l g e r i a ' s C r i s i s Far From Being Resolved"
• C e n t r i s t L e i p z i g e r V o l k s z e i t u n g noted ( 1 / 5 ) : "The f a c t t h a t the I r a n i a n
leade
r s h i p o f a l l governments blames the GIA f o r the k i l l i n g s i n A l g e r i a i s
an encou
r a g i n g even though f i r s t s i g n . . . . But even w i t h a v i c t o r y o f the
m i l i t a r y over
the I s l a m i s t s , the A l g e r i a n c r i s i s would by no means be
resolved....
For year
s, the v i o l e n t f a n a t i c s have always given the same
answer: no n e g o t i a t i o n s , no
c e a s e f i r e , no democracy. An end t o the s p i r a l
of v i o l e n c e i s not i n s i g h t . I
f a l l sides i n v o l v e d achieved a p e a c e f u l
agreement, then o l d accounts would cer
t a i n l y be s e t t l e d w i t h those who are
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the massacres. I n A l g e r i a
, everybody knows t h a t the
g e n e r a l s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , shamelessly e n r i c h themselv
es w i t h y i e l d s from the
country's o i l exports.
As long as the war goes on, t h e
petro d o l l a r s
continue t o flow."
•"No
Cameras A v a i l a b l e "
•Rudolph C h i m e l l i e d i t o r i a l i z e d i n c e n t r i s t Sueddeutsche Z e i t u n g (1/5) : I n
con
t r a s t t o o t h e r c o n f l i c t s when the o u t s i d e w o r l d i s f e d w i t h p i c t u r e s o f
horror,
no cameras are a v a i l a b l e i n A l g e r i a i f people are k i l l e d . . . .
I n the
Balkans,
i n A f r i c a , d r a s t i c p i c t u r e s sometimes had an e f f e c t . . . b u t A l g e r i a n
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v i l l a g e s suf
f e r and d i e i n anonymous i n v i s i b i l i t y . I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure on
the regime t o
do something a g a i n s t the bloodshed remains low, s i n c e t h e r e i s
nobody who has
a r e c i p e on how t o stop the k i l l i n g s . . . .
Europe can c o n t i n u e
t o l o o k away, s i n
ce, so f a r , t h e r e have been no A l g e r i a n boat
people."
•BRITAIN: "Holy T e r r o r "
•The c o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d (1/5) : "Whatever the t r u e
f igu
re, the next weeks of Ramadan promise a hideous a d d i t i o n t o the death
roll.
Th
at prospect i s a measure of the f a i l u r e of P r e s i d e n t Liamine
Zeroual's governme
nt t o r e t u r n the c o u n t r y t o normal a f t e r the d r a m a t i c
c u r t a i l i n g of the e l e c t o r
a l process i n 1992.... The p r e s i d e n t ' s c l a i m t h a t
the e x t r e m i s t s have been c r u
shed i s p a l p a b l e nonsense. The regime has shown
i t s e l f i n c a p a b l e of p r o t e c t i n g
the people i t i s supposed t o r e p r e s e n t . . . .
The l a t e s t k i l l i n g s r a i s e a huge q
u e s t i o n mark over the wisdom both of
t h w a r t i n g the e l e c t o r a t e ' s wishes and of c
o n t i n u i n g t o place any f a i t h i n Mr.
Zeroual's government. I t has d r i v e n l e g i t i
mate Islamism underground and
deludes i t s e l f i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t can c o n t a i n t
he r e s u l t a n t r i s e i n
v i o l e n c e . The GIA i s a canker. I t s use of Koranic r h e t o r
ic to j u s t i f y a
campaign of t e r r o r makes a mockery of a book t h a t begins by i n v
oking a
m e r c i f u l and compassionate God.
But i t s malignancy has spread through
the
i n a b i l i t y of a m i l i t a r y r u n regime t o meet p o p u l a r demands f o r peace and
dec
ent government."
•ITALY:
'Missing Balance Between Market And
'Moral I s s u e s ' "
•Stefano C i n g o l a n i wrote i n c e n t r i s t , t o p c i r c u l a t i o n C o r r i e r e d e l l a Sera
(1/5) :
"Now Germany having a go a t i t . Klaus Kinkel...has asked the
European Union
l o o k a t the A l g e r i a n i s s u e . Last October, when I t a l i a n
Foreign M i n i s t e r D i n i s
a i d the same t h i n g , a d i p l o m a t i c i n c i d e n t f o l l o w e d . . . .
D i v i d e d by p o l i t i c a l d i
sagreements, h i s t o r i c a l h e r i t a g e and senses of g u i l t ,
the EU has been s e p a r a t i n
g i t s t r a d e . . . f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of a h u m a n i t a r i a n
or e t h i c a l n a t u r e . . . .
The
moment has come t o show t h a t Europe i s g e t t i n g
ready not o n l y t o issue a common
currency, but t o d e a l w i t h the most d r a m a t i c
c r i s e s at i t s doors."
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X~
Page 16 of 19
hp x (#DASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS:
SOUTH KOREA:
BAILOUT PLANS A BOON OR AN IMF 'TRAP'?
"Reforms Moving Too S l o w l y "
•Probusiness JoongAng I l b o m a i n t a i n e d i n an e d i t o r i a l ( 1 / 5 ) :
"The
government a
nd p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s are p u t t i n g o f f passage o f l e g i s l a t i o n on
l a y o f f s u n t i l Fe
b r u a r y . That i s not a good t h i n g because we do not want t o
waste time when t h e
p r o s p e c t s of f o r e i g n investment and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e
remain u n c e r t a i n eve
n i f the b i l l i s made i n t o law as e a r l y as January....
A l t h o u g h we
hear about signs t h a t f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s are f i n a l l y r e t u r n i n g t o Korea, we
shou
I d bear i n mind once again t h a t they w i l l t u r n t h e i r backs on s f o r good
unless
we r e a l l y r e f o r m o u r s e l v e s t h i s t i m e . We should not delay a moment
longer i n
passing r e f o r m b i l l s , i n c l u d i n g one on l a y o f f s . We a b s o l u t e l y have
no reason t
o w a i t u n t i l February t o pass them.... Our reforms should not
slow down."
•AUSTRALIA: "Indonesia Faces C r i s i s Of U n c e r t a i n t y "
X~
hp x (#
•The n a t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i v e A u s t r a l i a n concluded ( 1 / 5 ) :
" J a k a r t a ' s response t o
( i t s economic) c r i s i s has been u n c o n v i n c i n g . There have been good moves b u t
t
hese have been compromised by a l a c k o f f o l l o w t h r o u g h or by subsequent
contradi
c t o r y a c t i o n s . . . . The government has lacked a c l e a r and
authoritative figure a
rticulating
the o v e r a l l r a t i o n a l e o f i t s response t o
the c r i s i s and the impres
s i o n has been one o f a l a c k o f r e s o l v e . This i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous because
a l a r g e p a r t of t h e r e g i o n ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s i s a
c r i s i s o f c o n f i d e n c e among i n t e
r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s i n Southeast Asia's
economic f u t u r e .
I t would be i n Indon
esia's i n t e r e s t s t o restore t h i s
c o n f i d e n c e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . "
X~
hp x (#DMALAYSIA:
"South Korean IMF Trap A Lesson For Us"
•The g o v e r n m e n t i n f l u e n c e d , Englishlanguage Star commented ( 1 / 5 ) : "South
Korea
was saved from having t o d e c l a r e a 'debt d e f a u l t . ' . . . But r e a d i n g t h e
f i n e r pr
i n t of t h i s whole episode, one gets more and more d i s t u r b e d .
For
the v i c t o r y
belongs not t o the Koreans a f t e r a l l , b u t t o the major r i c h
c o u n t r i e s and t o f
o r e i g n banks.... Korea has not been l e t o f f t h e hook. I t
has o n l y won a r e p r i
eve....
I t appears t h a t the Koreans were f o r c e d i n t o a
corner w i t h t h e i r back
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s t o the w a l l , and then i n a s i t u a t i o n o f extreme
weakness, they had t o g i v e i
n t o c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would c r i p p l e t h e i r own
banks and companies, but would ope
n the door f o r f o r e i g n banks and companies
t o enjoy an undreamt o f bonanza."
X~
hp x (#
•PHILIPPINES: "Mahathir's Theory Lacks C r e d i b i l i t y "
• P u b l i s h e r G u i l l e r m o Santos wrote i n the governmentowned P h i l i p p i n e J o u r n a l
(1/
5):
"Do not envy the G7 c o u n t r i e s , o r t h a t they are r e a p i n g the
benefits....
I n f a c t , they are now w o r r i e d about the n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s o f the
East Asian f i n a
ncial crisis....
The d e v a l u a t i o n o f the poor w o r l d c u r r e n c i e s
w i l l a l s o mean a
r e d u c t i o n o f demand f o r i m p o r t s o f the poor n a t i o n s . . . . The
d i m i n u t i o n o f imp
o r t s from the poor n a t i o n s are causing t h e slowdown o f t h e
G7 c o u n t r i e s ' manuf
acturing....
For the same reason, the Americans and
Japanese are r u s h i n g t o t h
e rescue o f the South Koreans and t h e ASEANs.
These wealthy c o u n t r i e s are no
t l e n d i n g us poor n a t i o n s money out o f l o v e ,
but out o f concern f o r t h e i r own
economic h e a l t h a n d p r o f i t s . I t i s f o r
t h i s ...causeandeffeet reason we cannot a
ccept the Malaysian t h e o r y t h a t
t h i s f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s was caused by a U.S. con
s p i r a c y t o teach us ASEANs a
lesson f o r a c c e p t i n g Myanmar (Burma) i n t o ASEAN."
•KENYA ELECTION: A 'SCARCELY JUSTIFED' VICTORY FOR MOI
X'
hp x (#
KENYA: "Can KANU Change?"
X~
hp x (#
•An e d i t o r i a l i n the c e n t r i s t weekly East A f r i c a n d e c l a r e d (1/5) : "From the
ou
t s e t , the new government w i l l have t o shoulder the burden o f a q u e s t i o n a b l e
leg
i t i m a c y r e s u l t i n g from the deeply flawed n a t u r e o f the e l e c t o r a l process
and wi
despread charges o f r i g g i n g . "
•"Why NCEC A n a r c h i s t s Reject V o t e r s ' Choice"
•An e d i t o r i a l i n the r u l i n g p a r t y owned Sunday Times h e l d ( 1 / 4 ) :
"During the
coming week, the N a t i o n a l Convention E x e c u t i v e Counci1... and a number o f
unsuc
c e s s f u l p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n l o s e r s p l a n t o d i s r u p t the peace i n
N a i r o b i and e
Isewhere i n the c o u n t r y i n
a b i d t o f o r c e m i l l i o n s o f Kenyans back t o the p o l l s . . . .
These are the men
wh
o c l a i m t o have so much love f o r t h i s n a t i o n t h a t they want t o p l a y a key
role
i n the r e f o r m process.
So f a r , the one r o l e they have p l a y e d
�^ ARMS Email System
effectively is th
at o f causing mayhem and f e a r .
weapon."
Page 18 of 19
I tis their
strongest
• " O p p o s i t i o n Plan F o o l i s h And Dangerous"
•An e d i t o r i a l i n t h e c e n t r i s t D a i l y N a t i o n had t h i s o p i n i o n (1/3) : "Talk o f
po
p u l a r a c t i o n t o press f o r a r e v e r s a l o f t h e e l e c t i o n r e s u l t o r a government
of
n a t i o n a l u n i t y i s f o o l i s h and dangerous....
I f c a n d i d a t e s have s p e c i f i c
eviden
ce o f malfeasance, such evidence should be l a i d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s i n
the accept
ed p e t i t i o n a r y form as p r o v i d e d i n law."
X~
hp x (#DBRITAIN: "Kenya's P o l l "
X~
hp x (#
• A c c o r d i n g t o t h e independent F i n a n c i a l Times ( 1 / 5 ) :
" P r e s i d e n t D a n i e l arap
Mo
i ' s v i c t o r y i n t h e Kenyan e l e c t i o n was s c a r c e l y j u s t i f i e d by h i s r e c o r d i n
gove
rnment.
I n s t e a d , i t owed much t o an e t h n i c a l l y d i v i d e d and p o o r l y l e d
oppositi
on, unable t o take f u l l advantage o f p o l i t i c a l reforms r e l u c t a n t l y
conceded by
Mr. Moi i n t h e face o f domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e . But
opposition fa
i l u r e s are no reason f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e n d i n g agencies and
f o r e i g n donors t o 1
e t up i n t h e i r demand t h a t Mr. Moi t a c k l e s t h e c o r r u p t i o n
t h a t has done so much
damage, and which t h e c o u n t r y can i l l a f f o r d . "
X~
hp x (#
•AUSTRALIA: "A Hand I n A f r i c a "
X~
hp x (#
•The l i b e r a l Melbourne Age had t h i s t o say (1/5) : "Kenya, which used t o be
one
of t h e r i c h e s t and most s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s i n A f r i c a ,
e n t e r e d t h e new year
in a
s t a t e o f h i g h t e n s i o n , w i t h t h e o p p o s i t i o n contenders i n l a s t week's
election
vowing not t o accept t h e r e s u l t i f t h e l o n g t i m e p r e s i d e n t , Mr.
D a n i e l Arap Moi,
was d e c l a r e d t h e winner....
While u l t i m a t e l y A f r i c a ' s
d e s t i n y l i e s i n t h e ha
nds o f A f r i c a n s , i t i s , even a p a r t from h u m a n i t a r i a n
concerns, i n t h e w o r l d ' s i
n t e r e s t t h a t A f r i c a s h o u l d become a p e a c e f u l and
prosperous p a r t o f t h e g l o b a l
community."
## #Xx\ P6QyXP#
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Page 1 of 9
(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: owner-dosbriefSLISTSERV.UIC.EDU@INETSLNGTWY (
owner-dosbriefSLISTSERV.UIC.E
CREATION DATE/TIME: 6-JAN-1998 19:14:01.00
SUBJECT:
980106 U.S.
S t a t e Dept. D a i l y B r i e f i n g T r a n s c r i p t #2
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC
READ:UNKNOWN
] )
TEXT:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Tuesday, January 6, 1998
Briefer:
James P. Rubin
DEPARTMENT
1
Presence of S h a l i k a s h v i l i , Scowcroft and Perry a t S t a t e Department
8-9
No announcement on Spokesman's f u t u r e plans
TURKEY / ISRAEL / U.S.
1- 2
Egypt opposes Exercise R e l i a n t Mermaid j o i n t search-and-rescue
m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e , concern about p o t e n t i a l a l l i a n c e ; p o s s i b i l i t y o f
another R e l i a n t Mermaid e x e r c i s e
NORTH KOREA
2- 3
WFP appeals f o r a d d i t i o n a l DPRK food a i d under y e a r - l o n g
program, i n c l u d i n g s t a f f i n c r e a s e s , d o u b l i n g of. m o n i t o r s
MEXICO
3- 4
White House r e s p o n s i b l e f o r nomination o f Ambassador t o Mexico
3
S t a f f i n g of A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y p o s i t i o n s a t S t a t e Department
4
Mexico C i t y Judge's r e l e a s e of confessed murderers of American
c i t i z e n John Zarate
4
Z a p a t i s t a s p r o t e s t Chiapas massacres i n Mexico C i t y s t o c k
exchange, r a d i o s t a t i o n s
ALGERIA
5
U.S. condemns massacres; encourages A l g e r i a government t o a l l o w
outside investigators/observers
5
U.S.-France c o n t i n u i n g d i s c u s s i o n s on v i o l e n c e i n A l g e r i a
5- 6
Reports o f I r a n i a n support f o r r a d i c a l , armed I s l a m i c groups
(GIS) i n A l g e r i a
IRAN
6
U.S. c o n s i d e r a t i o n of ILSA v i o l a t i o n i n T o t a l - S o u t h Pars o i l
development p r o j e c t
6- 8
U.S. c r i t e r i a f o r resumption of b i l a t e r a l d i a l o g u e w i t h I r a n ,
i n c l u d i n g ending o b s t r u c t i o n o f Middle East peace process
7
I r a n i a n assets i n the U.S., s t a t u s o f claims d i s p u t e
RUSSIA
6
Timing o f Wisner t r a v e l t o Moscow
CAMBODIA
8
Pol Pot whereabouts; King Sihanouk t r a v e l t o China
CUBA
8
P o t e n t i a l f o r p o l i t i c a l change a r i s i n g from Pope's v i s i t
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9
Nothing new on s t a t u s o f Cuban m i g r a n t s
Page 2 of 9
i n t h e Bahamas
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 2
TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1998 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: G r e e t i n g s .
I have no statements
I'm hear t o take your q u e s t i o n s .
and no announcements, and
QUESTION: Jamie, I was wondering i f i t ' s t r u e t h a t S h a l i k a s h v i l i ,
Scowcroft and Perry are i n t h e b u i l d i n g - maybe have K - r a t i o n s f o r lunch
w i t h the Secretary.
I s t h e r e some h i g h - l e v e l meeting o f former - a good
r e p o r t e r s p o t t e d a l l t h r e e o f them.
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't r u l e o u t t h e y ' r e i n t h e b u i l d i n g .
S e c r e t a r y i s i n t h e c a f e t e r i a e a t i n g lunch r i g h t now.
QUESTION:
I believe the
The c a f e t e r i a ?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION:
A l l right, that's a dry well, let's t r y -
(Laughter.)
The Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r takes a v e r y n e g a t i v e view o f t h e
t r i l a t e r a l e x e r c i s e s - US, Turkey and I s r a e l .
Since you always - n o t
o n l y you, f o r 20 years Egypt has been p o r t r a y e d as pro-West and a g r e a t
f r i e n d o f I s r a e l and a l l . I wondered what you made o f a l l t h i s .
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I haven't seen h i s s p e c i f i c comments. I can say t h a t
we b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s c e r t a i n l y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
I s r a e l and Turkey t o engage i n e x e r c i s e s . These a r e i m p o r t a n t f r i e n d s
of t h e U n i t e d States i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r e g i o n s .
This e x e r c i s e , I would remind you, i s a h u m a n i t a r i a n e x e r c i s e . I t ' s
about a s c e n a r i o i n which a s h i p i s s u f f e r i n g and needs a s s i s t a n c e i n a
h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n . The e x e r c i s e i s n o t d i r e c t e d a t any one
c o u n t r y . I t ' s n o t designed t o be a r e a l - w o r l d case, o t h e r than as a
h u m a n i t a r i a n e x e r c i s e . We t h i n k i t ' s c e r t a i n l y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s , I s r a e l and Turkey t o engage i n t h a t .
As f a r as what t h e Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r ' s views are, I haven't seen
them. As I s a i d yesterday i n response t o a s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n , I'm sure
t h e r e w i l l be c o u n t r i e s i n t h e Middle East t h a t wish t h i n g s d i d n ' t
happen. But w i s h i n g them not t o happen doesn't make them n o t happen.
QUESTION: W e l l , i t ' s coming from Egypt i s what makes i t e s p e c i a l l y
interesting.
You say you haven't seen a statement, b u t h i s t h r e a t - I
suppose i t ' s a t h r e a t - t h a t maybe t h e r e has t o be a counter-course t o
t h i s a l l i a n c e , as he looks a t i t .
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , w e ' l l have t o see what t h e r e s u l t s are. I t h i n k we've
made c l e a r t h a t we support t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . We made c l e a r we support
t h i s e x e r c i s e . We c e r t a i n l y don't t h i n k i t would j u s t i f y any ramping-up
of anybody e l s e ' s m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , because, again, i t ' s a
humanitarian exercise.
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QUESTION: A q u i c k f o l l o w - u p - t h e name o f t h i s e x e r c i s e , I b e l i e v e , i s
R e l i a n t Mermaid I . So do you t h i n k more i s i n s t o r e ?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I wouldn't r u l e i t o u t . The i n f o r m a t i o n I r e c e i v e d
yesterday was j u s t t h a t i t was R e l i a n t Mermaid. I c o u l d n ' t r u l e o u t
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be o t h e r e x e r c i s e s . But again, l e t me remind you, these
are h u m a n i t a r i a n e x e r c i s e s ; and we t h i n k i t ' s t o t a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o
conduct them w i t h major f r i e n d s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i m p o r t a n t f r i e n d s
of t h e U n i t e d States i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r e g i o n s .
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have a n y t h i n g on t h e new appeal f o r food a i d t o
North Korea? I t ' s a c o n s i d e r a b l e appeal.
They seem t o be widening t h e
number o f people and t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f people t h a t they would h e l p .
MR. RUBIN: This appeal does d i f f e r from e a r l i e r ones i n i t s s i z e , t h e
number o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s and t h e l e n g t h o f time covered.
The amount
requested i s n e a r l y double t h e t o t a l 1997 appeal.
The WFP hopes t o
a s s i s t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7.5 m i l l i o n people, as opposed t o l a s t year's 4.7
m i l l i o n ; and t h e appeal i s f o r a 12-month p e r i o d , r a t h e r than f o r t h e
immediate needs as i t has been i n t h e p a s t . So p r e v i o u s l y , they have
engaged i n piecemeal appeals, and now they are l a y i n g out t h e i r
p r o j e c t e d needs f o r t h e year.
Our p o l i c y , as you know, has been t o address s p e c i f i c h u m a n i t a r i a n
appeals as they come f o r w a r d . We w i l l c a r e f u l l y examine t h i s appeal,
and t h e U n i t e d States i n t e n d s t o c o n s u l t w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . We have
always responded p o s i t i v e l y t o p r e v i o u s appeals f o r t h e needy c h i l d r e n
of North Korea. This i s a h u m a n i t a r i a n p o l i c y we've had i n t h e p a s t .
We have an e x c e l l e n t r e c o r d i n t h i s r e g a r d . We've responded p r o m p t l y
and generously t o such appeals i n t h e p a s t .
The U n i t e d States i s t h e l a r g e s t donor o f food a i d t o North Korea, under
the auspices o f t h e World Food Program. I n 1997, we p r o v i d e d some
170,000 m e t r i c tons o f food, valued a t some $50 m i l l i o n , f o r North
Korea. And I would p o i n t o u t t h a t , as we understand i t from t h e World
Food Program, they are going t o double t h e number o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a f f
and open two more s u b - o f f i c e s i n t h e r e g i o n , which gets a t some o f t h e
q u e s t i o n s t h a t have come up b e f o r e here about m o n i t o r i n g o f t h e food a i d
as i t i s d i s t r i b u t e d .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Doubling o f monitors?
Doubling o f t h e m o n i t o r s ,
correct.
Do you have t h e numbers, from what t o what?
MR. RUBIN: The numbers t h a t I have here are double i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s t a f f o f 24, and open two more s u b - o f f i c e s i n order t o expand i t s
m o n i t o r i n g o f food d i s t r i b u t i o n .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
Did North Korea agree t o t h a t arrangement?
Yes.
QUESTION: The p r e v i o u s arrangement which they had agreed t o b u t not
a c t u a l l y a l l o w e d t o be implemented, i s t h a t now i n p l a c e , t h e m o n i t o r s
you had wanted f o r l a s t year's m o n i t o r i n g ?
MR. RUBIN:
As I understand,
t h e a d d i t i o n a l work t h a t had been done
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Page 4 of 9
a f t e r our assessment team went f o r w a r d were r e s o l v e d . And I t h i n k , as we
l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h i s next year, t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t they are prepared
t o double t h e s t a f f and open two more o f f i c e s i n d i c a t e s t h a t they a r e
open t o t h e k i n d o f m o n i t o r i n g t h e WFP deems necessary.
I w i l l t r yto
get you t h e exact number t h a t are t h e r e m o n i t o r i n g t h e e x i s t i n g
programs. This i s l a i d o u t as an agreement f o r t h e coming year.
QUESTION: Jamie, i s J e f f e r y Davidow being c o n s i d e r e d f o r t h e post t o
Mexico -- t h e ambassador post?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassadorial posts are t h e p r e r o g a t i v e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f
the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and we don't comment on personnel s e l e c t i o n s t h e
P r e s i d e n t may o r may n o t make p r i o r t o h i s making them.
QUESTION: I s i t f a i r t o say he would be a c o n s i d e r a t i o n , perhaps he
c o u l d be a c a n d i d a t e , w i t h h i s experience i n L a t i n American a f f a i r s ?
MR. RUBIN:
He's c e r t a i n l y experienced
i n L a t i n American a f f a i r s .
QUESTION: W i l l t h e r e be a search on? This i s something t h a t ' s t h e
S t a t e Department's business.
Or w i l l t h e r e be a need t o f i n d a new
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r I n t e r - A m e r i c a n A f f a i r s a t any time soon?
MR. RUBIN:
I f --
QUESTION: That's t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s p r e r o g a t i v e , t o o , o f course, b u t
presumably, t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e chooses her s e n i o r d e p u t i e s .
MR. RUBIN: I f t h e P r e s i d e n t s e l e c t s an ambassador from t h e ranks o f t h e
a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s i n t h e S t a t e Department - and I emphasize t h e word
" i f " - then i t would c e r t a i n l y be a p p r o p r i a t e t o seek a new a s s i s t a n t
secretary.
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
great.
QUESTION:
Do you know i f he speaks Spanish,
by any chance?
I t h i n k h i s f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h m a t t e r s L a t i n American i s
You don't know i f he speaks Spanish?
MR. RUBIN: I would be very s u r p r i s e d i f J e f f Davidow d i d n ' t speak
Spanish.
Whether i t ' s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a l l Spanish-speakers, I
don't know; i n o t h e r words, t h e l e v e l o f h i s f l u e n c y and h i s accent.
QUESTION:
This i s Spanish,
n o t French.
QUESTION: S t i l l on Mexico, yesterday a Mexican judge s e t f r e e t h e
k i l l e r s o f American c i t i z e n s .
The judge considered them Mexican Robin
Hoods. Do you have any response t o t h a t ?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , l e t me say t h i s - we condemn u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h i s
judge's d e c i s i o n t o r e l e a s e men who Mexican f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t p r o s e c u t o r s
themselves say confessed t o t h e murder o f US c i t i z e n John Z a r a t e . The
Mexico C i t y p r o s e c u t o r ' s o f f i c e has p u b l i c l y denounced t h e judge's
a c t i o n , and i s a p p e a l i n g t h e judge's r u l i n g , and i s seeking t o d e t a i n
the r e l e a s e d men on o t h e r u n r e l a t e d charges.
We condemn t h i s d e c i s i o n . Whatever one may want t o c a l l robbers, i f
they've confessed t o k i l l i n g an American c i t i z e n , they should c e r t a i n l y
not be r e l e a s e d from p r i s o n . So we condemn t h i s u n e q u i v o c a l l y .
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QUESTION: Do you have any response t o my q u e s t i o n o f yesterday,
r e g a r d i n g the Z a p a t i s t a s i n Mexico C i t y ?
MR. RUBIN: The p r o t e s t i n Mexico C i t y t h a t you r e f e r r e d t o y e s t e r d a y ,
we understand these p r o t e s t a c t i o n s were p e a c e f u l , were taken place a t
the Mexico Stock Exchange. The stock exchange went f o r w a r d . We
understand t h a t s t u d e n t sympathizers o f the Z a p a t i s t a movement
t e m p o r a r i l y occupied two Mexico C i t y r a d i o s t a t i o n s .
What these i n c i d e n t s i l l u s t r a t e i s the c o n t i n u i n g depth o f f e e l i n g and
concern about the December massacre t h a t o c c u r r e d i n Chiapas. We w i l l
c o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w c l o s e l y the developments i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the
massacre.
QUESTION: I s the U n i t e d States Government concerned o f i n c r e a s i n g
i n s t a b i l i t y i n Chiapas t h a t i s now s p i l l i n g over t o the c a p i t a l and
throughout Mexican s o c i e t y ? Dangerous i n s t a b i l i t y .
MR. RUBIN: We are a w a i t i n g the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r
massacre. And b e f o r e we make any broader-based comments on t r e n d s o r
l a c k o f t r e n d s , we'd l i k e t o know more about what e x a c t l y happened and
why i t happened.
QUESTION: I t ' s been r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e are more s l a u g h t e r s i n A l g e r i a .
Yesterday US o f f i c i a l s proposed t h a t a group o f independent human r i g h t s
campaigners and European r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s be sent t o A l g e r i a . Has t h i s
been g i v e n the green l i g h t ? And i f so, when w i l l t h i s happen?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , those US o f f i c i a l s are s t a n d i n g here. We understand
and share the concern o f o t h e r n a t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community
w i t h r e g a r d t o the massacres i n A l g e r i a .
Let me say, f i r s t o f a l l , t h a t these massacres have been condemned from
the e n t i r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Statements from C a i r o t o Tehran
have condemned these massacres. I t i s v e r y c l e a r t h a t these a c t s o f
t e r r o r i s m must be condemned and must be stopped.
I can repeat t h a t i t i s , f i r s t and foremost, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the
A l g e r i a n Government t o p r o t e c t c i v i l i a n s , w h i l e a l s o r e s p e c t i n g the r u l e
of law. We are encouraging the A l g e r i a n Government t o a l l o w o u t s i d e
observers t o view and study the human r i g h t s s i t u a t i o n t h e r e . A l g e r i a n
a u t h o r i t i e s have t o l d us they would accept a v i s i t by UN human r i g h t s
r a p p o r t e u r , and we encourage t h i s s t e p . We are a l s o encouraging
independent NGOs t o undertake such i n q u i r i e s .
E x a c t l y what form t h i s o u t s i d e f a c t - f i n d i n g takes i s not as i m p o r t a n t t o
us as t h a t i t takes p l a c e . Let's remember t h a t the f a c t s of many o f
these massacres are o f t e n u n c l e a r . The p e r p e t r a t o r s are sometimes
u n c l e a r . The best way t o get t o the bottom of the h o r r o r t h a t i s going
on i n A l g e r i a i s t o get o u t s i d e r s i n so t h a t they can make an
assessment. That w i l l put us i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n , h o p e f u l l y , t o see
what steps can be taken t o stop them.
QUESTION: On A l g e r i a , back a t the UN i n September, the S e c r e t a r y met
the French Foreign M i n i s t e r , and they discussed t h i s i s s u e , as I r e c a l l .
I f o r g e t e x a c t l y the language t h a t was used, but they agreed the US and
France would take a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and work toward t r y i n g t o
a l l e v i a t e the v i o l e n c e . Has a n y t h i n g come o f those i n i t i a t i v e s ?
Page 5 of 9
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MR. RUBIN: W e l l , again, I would h e s i t a t e t o frame i t p r e c i s e l y t h e way
you s a i d i t . I t h i n k they met - t h e French Foreign M i n i s t e r and t h e
S e c r e t a r y -- met a t a b r e a k f a s t on t h e very day, l i k e today and
yesterday, where massacres had o c c u r r e d , and they d i s c u s s e d them because
of t h e concerns o f both governments about these k i n d o f t e r r o r i s t
a c t i v i t i e s and t h e deaths o f so many i n n o c e n t women and c h i l d r e n and
agreed t h a t they should c o n t i n u e t o t a l k about them.
Ambassador P i c k e r i n g i s i n t e n d i n g t o v i s i t P a r i s on o t h e r m a t t e r s . He's
l e f t a l r e a d y , and w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g p r i m a r i l y I r a q and I r a n and o t h e r
s u b j e c t s ; and I wouldn't be s u r p r i s e d i f t h i s came up. But again, I
t h i n k t h a t was l e s s an i n i t i a t i v e than more a r e f l e c t i o n o f both
c o u n t r i e s ' concerns about what's going on t h e r e .
QUESTION: On A l g e r i a , does t h e US Government have any evidence o f
I r a n i a n support or backing t o t h e GIS groups - t h e armed I s l a m i c groups
t h a t a r e a l l e g e d t o be c o m m i t t i n g some o f t h e massacres.
MR. RUBIN: I ' l l have t o take t h a t q u e s t i o n .
don't know t h a t i t ' s --
I haven't heard any, b u t I
QUESTION: And as long as you're m e n t i o n i n g Ambassador P i c k e r i n g ' s
t r a v e l , c o u l d I j u s t ask you, how c l o s e i s t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o a
d e c i s i o n on how t o handle t h e -MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
ILSA?
—
t h e ILSA apparent
violation
by T o t a l , Gazprom, and o t h e r s ?
MR. RUBIN: We are c o n t i n u i n g t o study t h a t i s s u e . As we g e t c l o s e r t o
a time when t h e S e c r e t a r y w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n t o make a judgment,
w e ' l l l e t you know, b u t we're not t h e r e y e t .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
When does Wisner go t o Moscow; do you know?
I ' l l have t o g e t t h a t date f o r you.
I mean, i s i t —
I t h i n k i t ' s t h i s week.
Oh.
A l l right.
QUESTION: On I r a n -- I guess we've discussed t h i s i n t h e p a s t , b u t n o t
t h i s year -- can you go over t h e c o n d i t i o n s again f o r a d i a l o g u e between
the US and I r a n ?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We have made c l e a r two p r o c e d u r a l issues and t h r e e
s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s . P r o c e d u r a l l y , we've made c l e a r we would want t h i s
d i a l o g u e t o be a u t h o r i z e d and acknowledged openly. We've a l s o made
c l e a r t h a t our issues o f concern would be something t h a t we would l i k e
t o d i s c u s s i n such a d i a l o g u e , and those t h r e e s u b s t a n t i v e issues a r e
our concerns about weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n ; our concerns about
support f o r t e r r o r i s m ; and our concerns about o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Middle
East peace process.
These are t o p i c s t h a t we would t h i n k ought t o be
p a r t o f a s e r i o u s , and s u b s t a n t i v e , and a u t h o r i t a t i v e , and openlyacknowledged d i a l o g u e t h a t we have long s a i d we'd be prepared t o e n t e r
into.
QUESTION:
And a simple w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e p a r t o f I r a n t o d i s c u s s
those
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r a t h e r than t o n e c e s s a r i l y pre-commit t o doing a n y t h i n g about them i s
sufficient?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , again, t h e f i r s t step towards progress i s d i s c u s s i o n s ,
and what we're saying i s we would want t o know, p r o c e d u r a l l y , t h a t t h e
d i a l o g u e would be a u t h o r i z e d w i t h an a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ; t h a t i t
would be p u b l i c l y acknowledged; and s u b s t a n t i v e l y , t h a t our agenda items
would i n c l u d e those, and t h a t would have t o something t h a t was
acceptable.
QUESTION: On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e P r e s i d e n t , d o w n s t a i r s i n t h e press
conference, s a i d something about - t h a t any I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s can have
o p p o s i t i o n on t h e peace process, and t h i s would be - t h i s i s p e r m i s s i b l e
for I r a n t o oppose t h e peace process, b u t n o t v i o l e n t l y .
Does t h i s
change t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e t h a t you're t a l k i n g about?
MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k t h e P r e s i d e n t was making c l e a r t h a t i t ' s one t h i n g
to have an o p i n i o n ; i t ' s another t h i n g t o support or applaud or f i n a n c e
those who take s p e c i f i c steps t o k i l l t h e peace process, as some groups
have done i n t h e Middle East. And t h e r e are many c o u n t r i e s i n t h e w o r l d
who have o p i n i o n s , and t h e r e are o n l y a few o f them who i n t e r f e r e t o t h e
extent that I described.
Let's bear i n mind, t h e Middle East peace process i s something t h a t i s
supported across t h e board, by c o u n t r i e s around t h e w o r l d , and t h e r e a r e
very few who see wisdom i n a t t a c k i n g something t h a t i s supported by t h e
l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s -- Chairman A r a f a t , on
b e h a l f o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s . So we s t i l l don't understand what p o s s i b l e
r a t i o n a l e t h e r e would be f o r opposing a peace process t h a t i s supported
by t h e people who are a f f e c t e d .
QUESTION: So you are a g a i n s t I r a n i a n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e peace process,
as f a r as t h e I r a n i a n s are s u p p o r t i n g groups l i k e Hezbollah, and s t u f f
l i k e that?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm -today i s no day t o g e t t o o s p e c i f i c on these
subjects.
I t h i n k I've been q u i t e c l e a r .
QUESTION: Could you g e t f o r us a run-down as t o what I r a n i a n assets
t h e r e a r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; what moneys might be i n d i s p u t e between
the U n i t e d States and I r a n ? For example, a t t h e time o f t h e hostage
c r i s i s - what i s i t , 19, 20 years ago - they had p a i d f o r q u i t e a few
weapon systems t h a t they never r e c e i v e d . What's t h e s t a t u s o f a l l t h a t ?
Could we g e t a -MR. RUBIN:
questions.
QUESTION:
L e t me get you, f o r t h e r e c o r d , an answer f o r a l l those
Thank you.
QUESTION: Jamie, how many I r a n i a n l e a d e r s , s p i r i t u a l and o t h e r w i s e ,
have t o s i g n on t o make a d i a l o g u e a u t h e n t i c , a u t h o r i t a t i v e ?
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
We'll know t h a t when we see i t .
No, no, i t ' s a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n because -I t was a s e r i o u s answer.
I know you know t h e problem, as we do, on t h i s s i d e o f t h e
Page 7 of 9
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roster.
I guess i t c o u l d be s a i d , i f the P r e s i d e n t approves a d i a l o g u e ,
i t is authoritative.
But the n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e are two v o i c e s - two
loud v o i c e s - i n I r a n .
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I was asked t h i s q u e s t i o n y e s t e r d a y , and I'm not sure
t h a t one should assume t h a t t h e r e are two v o i c e s i n I r a n . The P r e s i d e n t
and the S e c r e t a r y w i l l both be l i s t e n i n g very c a r e f u l l y t o see what i t
i s t h a t P r e s i d e n t Khatami has t o say, and we w i l l respond a p p r o p r i a t e l y .
But as f a r as knowing when you have a u t h o r i z a t i o n , I don't t h i n k t h a t ' s
a major problem.
I t h i n k the b i g g e r problem i s what the d i s c u s s i o n s
would be, r a t h e r than the p r o c e d u r a l q u e s t i o n o f a u t h o r i z a t i o n .
QUESTION:
MR.
RUBIN:
New
s u b j e c t , i f I may?
Anybody else?
Okay.
QUESTION: Do you have any i n f o r m a t i o n about the whereabouts of Pol Pot,
and/or the d e p a r t u r e from Cambodia of King Sihanouk?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t l y t o c o n f i r m r e p o r t s t h a t
Pol Pot has l e f t Cambodia. The i n f o r m a t i o n I've seen suggests t h a t he
has n o t .
As f a r as King Sihanouk going t o China, we understand he has done so,
and has done so many times i n the p a s t . That's what I know about t h e i r
whereabouts .
QUESTION:
For medical reasons,
do you know?
MR. RUBIN: I gather t h a t may have been one of the f a c t o r s c i t e d .
t h e r e are o f t e n myriad reasons f o r the King t o t r a v e l .
But
QUESTION: Can I s w i t c h over t o Cuba and the Pope's upcoming v i s i t ?
I
was wondering i f the S t a t e Department has a view on whether t h i s v i s i t
c r e a t e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p o l i t i c a l change i n Cuba.
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I t h i n k we've s a i d i n the past - the S e c r e t a r y h e r s e l f
has s a i d t h a t we c e r t a i n l y t h i n k the Holy Father w i l l b r i n g a message of
hope f o r the Cuban people, and a message of respect f o r human r i g h t s .
We hope t h a t a f t e r t h a t message i s d e l i v e r e d , t h a t the Cuban Government
listens.
QUESTION: Do you p l a n any t r a v e l of your own w i t h o u t the S e c r e t a r y
l a t e r i n the year?
MR.
RUBIN:
No.
(Laughter.)
No p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a v e l .
I p l a n no p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a v e l .
QUESTION: I ' l l be the bad guy and ask what I t h i n k i s a h i g h l y p e r s o n a l
m a t t e r , but how would you r a t e The Washington Post g o s s i p l e v e l ?
Accurate;
semi-accurate?
MR.
RUBIN:
QUESTION:
I have no announcements f o r you
today.
I t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e , wouldn't i t ?
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MR. RUBIN:
Page 9 of 9
Yeah, I t h i n k i t would.
QUESTION:
Thank you.
QUESTION:
Wait, a n y t h i n g new on t h e Cubans i n t h e Bahamas?
MR. RUBIN:
But I ' l l
accept wishes o f c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s .
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: A n y t h i n g new on t h e Cubans i n t h e Bahamas?
b a s e b a l l p l a y e r s -MR. RUBIN:
You know, t h e
Yes, n o t h i n g new s i n c e y e s t e r d a y .
QUESTION:
A l l right.
QUESTION:
Thank you.
(The b r i e f i n g concluded a t 1:10 p.M.)====================
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(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.EDU@INET@LNGTWY ( owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.E
CREATION DATE/TIME: 7-JAN-1998 18:36:06.00
SUBJECT:
980107 U.S. S t a t e Dept. D a i l y B r i e f i n g T r a n s c r i p t #3
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC ] )
READ:UNKNOWN
TEXT:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Wednesday, January 7, 1998
Briefer:
James P. Rubin
ALGERIA
I- 3
U.S. support f o r UN human r i g h t s S p e c i a l Rapporteur and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l non-governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o i n v e s t i g a t e v i o l e n c e i n
Algeria
3
Reports o f I r a n i a n support f o r r a d i c a l , armed I s l a m i c groups i n
Algeria
IRAN
3-5
Pres. Khatami's address t o t h e American people/U.S. c r i t e r i a f o r
resumption o f b i l a t e r a l d i a l o g u e w i t h I r a n
5- 6
S t a t u s o f c l a i m s on f r o z e n I r a n i a n assets i n t h e U.S.
6
Reports o f I r a n p u r s u i n g long-range b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s
DEPARTMENT
5
Under S e c r e t a r y P i c k e r i n g ' s Meetings i n France
CUBA
6- 8
Cuban m i g r a n t s i n t h e Bahamas w i l l go t o Nicaragua
COLOMBIA
8
Gen. Serrano's comments on U.S. concerns o f n a r c o - t r a f f i c k i n g and
Colombia
8
Reports o f Colombian Army a t t e m p t s t o c r e a t e p a r a m i l i t a r y groups
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
8,14
Amb. Ross' D i s c u s s i o n s i n t h e Region
9- 10
Progress i n t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and a f u r t h e r r e deployment
10- 11
Current p o l i t i c a l
situation i n Israel
AFGHANISTAN
11
Reports o f Massacres i n n o r t h e r n Afghanistan/U.S. p o l i c y on
political situation
UNITED KINGDOM
I I - 12
S t a t u s o f peace t a l k s i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
SOUTH KOREA
12
Ordered r e l e a s e o f a r r e s t e d American c i t i z e n Choi
NORTH KOREA
12
S t a t u s o f U.S. d e c i s i o n on new WFP appeal f o r food a i d
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Page 2 of 15
MEXICO
12
Release o f murderers o f American c i t i z e n
13
Reports o f Mexican Army f o r m i n g p a r a m i l i t a r y groups i n Chiapas
HONDURAS
12- 13
Cost o f Congressional
delegation's stay a t a r e s o r t
INDONESIA
13- 14
U.S. View o f Indonesian compliance w i t h IMF package/Regional
economic s t a b i l i t y
14
Threats
from Indonesian m i l i t a r y on p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t
layoffs
RUSSIA
14
Update on B l i s s case
14- 15
Update on P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n ' s h e a l t h
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 3
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1998 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: G r e e t i n g s .
L i k e yesterday, no announcements and no
statements.
QUESTION: A l g e r i a , l i k e y e s t e r d a y .
E v i d e n t l y the A l g e r i a n Government
c a l l e d on the American ambassador, i s j u s t not i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n q u i r y .
I s t h a t the end o f i t , as f a r
as S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t , the S t a t e Department are concerned? I s t h e r e
a n y t h i n g you can or p l a n t o do?
MR. RUBIN: I spoke t o Ambassador Hume t h i s morning, and he d e s c r i b e d
the circumstances t h a t u n f o l d e d yesterday.
The s h o r t answer t o your
q u e s t i o n i s no. We share the concerns o f o t h e r n a t i o n s i n t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i t h r e g a r d t o the massacres i n A l g e r i a . An
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the ongoing t r a g e d y i s normal and
understandable.
But l e t ' s focus f i r s t on the c u l p r i t s .
These t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s must be
condemned i n the s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e terms.
The t e r r o r i s t s must be
condemned by the e n t i r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. The q u e s t i o n i s ,
what's the best way t o get a t some o f the f a c t s i t u a t i o n s ; not blaming
the government, but g e t t i n g a t the f a c t s i t u a t i o n . We do b e l i e v e t h a t
o u t s i d e r s may p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the scope and the source
of these heinous crimes.
Ambassador Hume t o l d me t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o discuss w i t h the A l g e r i a n
Government the idea o f a UN human r i g h t s r a p p o r t e u r . There a r e
d i f f e r e n t ways i n which the f a c t s i t u a t i o n can be determined, and t h a t
idea, as f a r as we know, has not been r e j e c t e d by the A l g e r i a n
Government, and i t i s s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y .
Other o p t i o n s i n c l u d e
o u t s i d e NGOs being able t o go i n and i n q u i r e and get t o the bottom o f
t h i s and be i n a p o s i t i o n t o p r o v i d e us w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community has not had - how many people a r e r e a l l y d y i n g ;
what a r e the sources o f t h i s ; what a d d i t i o n a l steps were o r weren't
taken.
The p o i n t i s t h a t t h i s i s a t e r r i b l e s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t we have
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encouraged t h e A l g e r i a n Government t o a l l o w o u t s i d e observers t o v i s i t
and t o l o o k a t t h e s i t u a t i o n .
They t o l d us t h a t they would accept a
v i s i t by a UN human r i g h t s r a p p o r t e u r . What we a r e r e i t e r a t i n g here i s
t h a t t h e t e r r o r i s t a c t s a r e condemnable; t h e y ' r e something t h a t t h e
e n t i r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s r i g h t t o condemn. We want t o see
these b a r b a r i c a t t a c k s stopped. We're encouraging t h e A l g e r i a n
Government t o do a l l i t can t o p r o t e c t c i v i l i a n s , b r i n g t h e t e r r o r i s t s
t o j u s t i c e , w h i l e a l s o r e s p e c t i n g t h e r u l e o f law and human r i g h t s .
QUESTION: Did they s e t any c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h i s UN o f f i c i a l - i n o t h e r
words, t h a t he must be from a c e r t a i n r e g i o n , o r they would d i s c u s s o n l y
x, y and z?
MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k a t t h i s p o i n t i t i s s t i l l under d i s c u s s i o n , and I
p r e f e r not t o get i n t o the d e t a i l s .
But t h e idea o f a UN human r i g h t s
r a p p o r t e u r has n o t been r e j e c t e d , and something we c o n t i n u e t o encourage
them t o pursue.
QUESTION: What about non-governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s going i n t h e r e ,
such as Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l , which has n o t been able t o go s i n c e '97?
MR. RUBIN: R i g h t . Again, we support t h e idea o f o u t s i d e NGOs b e i n g
able t o go. We t h i n k t h a t t h e prospect o f d e t e r r i n g , and u l t i m a t e l y
s t o p p i n g , these t e r r i b l e a t r o c i t i e s would be improved i f o u t s i d e r s , l i k e
a UN human r i g h t s r a p p o r t e u r , l i k e NGOs, were i n a p o s i t i o n t o p r o v i d e
the w o r l d and t h e A l g e r i a n Government w i t h a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e
scope, n a t u r e , and source o f these crimes.
QUESTION: I j u s t want t o c l a r i f y .
I n t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n between t h e
ambassador and t h e A l g e r i a n Foreign M i n i s t r y , d i d they a c t u a l l y say they
were opposed t o non-governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s coming i n ?
MR. RUBIN: I don't b e l i e v e - I don't have any i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e
q u e s t i o n o f o p p o s i t i o n t o NGOs. I can say t h a t we support t h e idea o f
NGOs going i n .
QUESTION: Yes, again, j u s t t o c l a r i f y .
You s a i d t h e A l g e r i a n
Government t o l d you they would accept a v i s i t by a UN human r i g h t s
rapporteur?
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
I n p r i n c i p l e , yes.
I n p r i n c i p l e -And we are c o n t i n u i n g t o encourage them t o do so.
Jamie, do you have a response t o t h e C o u n c i l o f N a t i o n a l --
MR. RUBIN:
Are we s t i l l
QUESTION:
I t ' sAlgeria.
MR. RUBIN:
on A l g e r i a here?
Okay.
QUESTION: But a p p a r e n t l y t h e s p e c i a l r a p p o r t e u r -- I t h i n k he's f o r
e x t r a j u d i c i a l k i l l i n g s - has been t r y i n g t o go t o A l g e r i a f o r q u i t e a
long t i m e .
MR. RUBIN:
Right.
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QUESTION:
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So what has changed, r e a l l y ?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , again, what's - I don't know what has changed, i n t h e
way you framed the q u e s t i o n .
I can s t a t e t o you what t h e US p o s i t i o n i s
-- t h a t a s p e c i a l r a p p o r t e u r ought t o be able t o go; t h a t i n our
d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the A l g e r i a n Government, they have not r e j e c t e d t h a t
i d e a ; and t h a t i s an o p t i o n we a r e p u r s u i n g i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e idea
of o u t s i d e groups, NGOs, o t h e r people who can h e l p get t o t h e bottom o f
this.
QUESTION: And a l s o , i f I c o u l d ask, t h e A l g e r i a n Government s a i d t h a t
they take o f f e n s e t o t h e f a c t t h a t you're s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e ' s a need
t o get t o t h e bottom o f t h e f a c t s concerning the massacres, and they see
a s u g g e s t i o n t h e r e t h a t i t would be o t h e r f o r c e s , o t h e r then I s l a m i c
extremists.
Do you have any -MR. RUBIN: W e l l , I haven't seen them s t a t e i t q u i t e t h a t way. I t h i n k
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i s more g e n e r a l than t h a t . But i t i s our view t h a t
o u t s i d e r s and a UN human r i g h t s r a p p o r t e u r would h e l p t h e w o r l d know
b e t t e r what's going on i n t h i s t e r r i b l e t r a g e d y t h a t ' s u n f o l d i n g i n
Algeria .
QUESTION: To f o l l o w David's q u e s t i o n o f y e s t e r d a y , I r a n i a n r e s i s t a n c e
o f f i c i a l s t h i s morning r e i t e r a t e d t h a t they b e l i e v e t h a t a l i n k between
t e r r o r i s t s i n I r a n and t h i s t e r r o r i s m i n A l g e r i a e x i s t e d , and i f t h e
government were changed i n I r a n , t h e r e wouldn't be t h i s problem. Can
you respond t o t h a t statement?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can make a few b r i e f p o i n t s .
Obviously, t h i s i s a
t r i c k y one. Let me say t h i s — t h a t we have noted i n t h e past t h a t t h e
A l g e r i a n Government has accused I r a n and Sudan o f s u p p o r t i n g A l g e r i a n
extremists.
The I r a n i a n Government, however, has condemned t h e
massacres and s a i d i t wanted t o see those r e s p o n s i b l e exposed
internationally.
The q u e s t i o n o f our assessment o f what I r a n i a n
r e l a t i o n s h i p might e x i s t w i t h these e x t r e m i s t groups would be a m a t t e r
I'm not i n a p o s i t i o n t o get i n t o from t h i s podium.
QUESTION: But your comment, then, about I r a n i a n sources s a y i n g t h a t
t h e r e i s a l i n k , and t h e r e i s a d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n -MR. RUBIN:
link.
QUESTION:
I referred t o Algerian
Okay.
Government statements t h a t t h e r e ' s a
You can't comment on t h e I r a n i a n N a t i o n a l
Council?
MR. RUBIN: I'm p o i n t i n g t o two types o f statements -- I haven't seen
t h a t s p e c i f i c one; we haven't c i t e d t h a t - t h a t the A l g e r i a n Government
has accused I r a n and Sudan, on the one hand. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e
I r a n i a n Government has condemned t h e massacres, and s a i d t h a t i t wanted
t o see those r e s p o n s i b l e exposed i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .
QUESTION: Have you seen any evidence i n t h e l a s t month t h a t I r a n has
ceased i t s development o f weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n o r i t s support f o r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l terrorism?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I am going t o w i t h h o l d a l i t t l e b i t on any d r a m a t i c
sweeping assessments o f those k i n d u n t i l t h e day u n f o l d s .
The P r e s i d e n t
i s going t o be watching c a r e f u l l y what P r e s i d e n t Khatami has t o say.
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t w i l l be watching c a r e f u l l y what P r e s i d e n t Khatami has
t o say. Based on what he says, we w i l l f i n d an a p p r o p r i a t e way t o
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respond.
But I can say t h e f o l l o w i n g - t h a t we have concerns i n those t h r e e
areas, and we s t i l l have. We've had them f o r a long time, and we s t i l l
have them. But t r y i n g t o g i v e you a grade i s not something I'm prepared
t o do from t h i s podium, e s p e c i a l l y a t t h i s time o f day, g i v e n what we're
e x p e c t i n g t o see - what t h e P r e s i d e n t has c a l l e d an h i s t o r i c message t o
the American people.
QUESTION: I know what you mean, and you p r o b a b l y don't mean what I'm
going t o suggest you seem t o be s a y i n g . But you're w a t c h i n g words
i n s t e a d o f deeds.
MR. RUBIN:
No, on t h e c o n t r a r y .
QUESTION: There must have been enough deeds or l a c k o f deeds f o r you t o
come t o some -MR. RUBIN: I'm t r y i n g t o use t h e delay t o a v o i d s a y i n g what I wouldn't
say y e s t e r d a y or tomorrow.
QUESTION:
Okay, gotcha.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION:
Wouldn't
say tomorrow,
either?
MR. RUBIN: We're n o t i n a p o s i t i o n each day t o g i v e a grade on each
t h r e e o f these i s s u e s .
QUESTION:
Another s u b j e c t
—
MR. RUBIN: Because some o f t h e - b a s i s f o r those judgments a r e t h i n g s
we are not i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a l k about on a d a i l y b a s i s .
QUESTION: On t h i s s u b j e c t , would you care a t a l l t o t a l k about what
kinds o f s i g n a l s you are l o o k i n g f o r ; what kinds o f t e a leaves might be
m e a n i n g f u l t o you i n a Khatami message?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we're l o o k i n g f o r — s u b s t a n t i v e l y , our p o l i c y has
been based on changes i n b e h a v i o r i n those t h r e e areas, two o f which S i d
mentioned.
As f a r as what would be s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a d i a l o g u e , I went i n t o
g r e a t d e t a i l y e s t e r d a y , and I'm happy t o do t h a t a g a i n . A d i a l o g u e
between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and I r a n must be an a u t h o r i z e d d i a l o g u e ; i t
must be one t h a t i s openly acknowledged; and i t must be one i n which we
are a b l e t o r a i s e our areas o f concern - concern about weapons o f mass
d e s t r u c t i o n , concern about t e r r o r i s m , and concern about o p p o s i t i o n t o
the Middle East peace process. Those t h r e e issues l e n d themselves t o
criteria.
We w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n t o judge what i s s i g n i f i c a n t based
on a c t i o n s , n o t words.
But words o f t e n a r e t h e p r e c u r s o r t o a c t i o n s ; so
i t w i l l be a c o m b i n a t i o n .
QUESTION:
Cuba.
MR. RUBIN:
Any more on I r a n ?
QUESTION:
Iran - (inaudible).
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MR. RUBIN: Under S e c r e t a r y P i c k e r i n g i s on h i s way back. He w i l l be
r e p o r t i n g t o the S e c r e t a r y upon h i s r e t u r n ; but he's i n the plane now.
QUESTION: Do you have a n y t h i n g today, Jamie, on the s t a t u s of what t h e
US i s h o l d i n g i n terms of I r a n i a n assets?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
There i s not US h o l d i n g s of I r a n i a n funds p r o v i d e d f o r
u n d e l i v e r e d m i l i t a r y equipment, as has been suggested.
During the 1980s, I r a n f i l e d claims b e f o r e the Iran-US Claims T r i b u n a l
i n The Hague, i n c l u d i n g a c l a i m seeking b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s , p r i m a r i l y
f o r a l l e g e d overcharges and n o n d e l i v e r i e s of m i l i t a r y equipment under
the f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y s a l e s program t h a t we had w i t h I r a n p r i o r t o the
r e v o l u t i o n , and f o r a l l e g e d l y u n j u s t i f i e d charges b i l l e d t o I r a n f o r
t e r m i n a t i n g t h a t program. Those claims are under a c t i v e a r b i t r a t i o n at
the T r i b u n a l . Decisions on them w i l l be i s s u e d by t h a t t r i b u n a l .
The q u e s t i o n of whether we owe I r a n funds based on those c l a i m s i s
something t o be decided by the T r i b u n a l . We v i g o r o u s l y c o n t e s t these
claims.
I can say t h a t the I r a n i a n claims i n t h i s area, as w e l l as t h e
area of p r o p e r t y the Shah and h i s f a m i l y a l l e g e d l y have i n the U n i t e d
S t a t e s , reach the b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s i n terms of t h e i r c l a i m s .
But
i t ' s not about funds; i t ' s more about moneys owed because of changes i n
the m i l i t a r y sales program, or a l l e g e d p r o p e r t y the Shah and h i s f a m i l y
owned. I can't comment s p e c i f i c a l l y on these t h i n g s because they are
under a l e g a l process, but we are v i g o r o u s l y c o n t e s t i n g the c l a i m s .
I can t e l l you t h a t , as a r e s u l t of the r e v o l u t i o n , many US i n d i v i d u a l s
and businesses had claims a g a i n s t I r a n , and f i l e d those c l a i m s at the
T r i b u n a l . Since i t s c r e a t i o n i n 1981, the T r i b u n a l has disposed of
about 4,000 cases and awarded $2.5 b i l l i o n t o US c l a i m a n t s . US and
I r a n i a n lawyers have d i s c u s s e d p o s s i b l e s e t t l e m e n t of pending cases on a
r e g u l a r b a s i s s i n c e 1986 at The Hague. We do not r e g a r d the d i s c u s s i o n
of claims pending i n The Hague as a p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r .
For example, former l e g a l a d v i s o r Conrad Harper conducted d i s c u s s i o n s
r e s u l t i n g i n the s e t t l e m e n t of the I r a n A i r 655 case t h a t I r a n had
brought t o the ICJ, and of c e r t a i n bank c l a i m s a g a i n s t the U n i t e d
S t a t e s . These are c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n s u n t i l a s e t t l e m e n t i s
concluded, and l e g a l and t e c h n i c a l exchanges do occur r e g u l a r l y i n The
Hague.
QUESTION: Most of the c l a i m s by i n d i v i d u a l s have been p a i d , haven't
they?
Do you have any —
MR. RUBIN: I don't know whether i t ' s most. I j u s t i n d i c a t e d t h a t 4,000
cases have been a d j u d i c a t e d , w i t h the r e s u l t of awards over r o u g h l y $2.5
billion.
QUESTION:
You don't know the o v e r a l l numbers?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know how many remaining claims t h e r e are, no, but I
c o u l d t r y t o get you t h a t and put our lawyers back t o work.
QUESTION:
The
U n i t e d States i s not h o l d i n g any f r o z e n I r a n i a n
assets?
MR. RUBIN: Not i n the way t h a t i t has been p u b l i c l y p o r t r a y e d . I t i s ,
r a t h e r , a d i s p u t e about what funds they are owed as a r e s u l t of changes
i n p o l i c i e s r a t h e r than moneys. Because i n 1981, almost $10 b i l l i o n was
t r a n s f e r r e d as p a r t of the A l g i e r s Accord i n 1981.
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QUESTION: So - but you say t h e r e are no f r o z e n a s s e t s .
Is there
money being h e l d i n escrow or i n any o t h e r k i n d of account by the
Government ?
Page 7 of 15
any
US
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , the account t h a t y i e l d s funds f o r the i n d i v i d u a l
c l a i m a n t s was p a r t of the o r i g i n a l accords.
A c e r t a i n amount of money
was put i n t o t h i s account, which accrues i n t e r e s t and has generated
funds of $2.5 b i l l i o n towards the award of c l a i m s . How much money i s
l e f t i n the account, I do not know.
QUESTION: Jamie, can you j u s t say s i m p l y , d i d the I r a n i a n s purchase pay money f o r m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s i n the U n i t e d States t h a t they never
received?
MR.
I'm
RUBIN: We are d i s p u t i n g the claims they have made, and beyond t h a t
not prepared t o comment.
QUESTION: One more on I r a n . This morning the I r a n i a n r e s i s t a n c e
announced, here i n Washington, t h a t t h e r e were - t h e r e ' s a t l e a s t one
p r o t o t y p e of a 1400-kilometer-ranged m i s s i l e t h a t has been produced,
t h a t i s o p e r a t i o n a l . They p l a n t o produce 14 or 15 more of them t h i s
year.
This i s an over-one-ton payload, Jamie. This was done w i t h the
help of the Chinese and the North Koreans, a c c o r d i n g t o the I r a n i a n s ,
w e l l - i n f o r m e d I r a n i a n s . Do you have any comment t o t h i s t h r e a t t o
I s r a e l and Saudi?
MR. RUBIN: I t won't s u r p r i s e you i f I say t h a t we do take r e p o r t s of
I r a n i a n p u r s u i t of long-range or medium-range m i s s i l e s v e r y s e r i o u s l y .
But I'm not i n a p o s i t i o n t o comment on the s p e c i f i c s , because of the
i n t e l l i g e n c e n a t u r e of the i n f o r m a t i o n .
QUESTION: On Cuba, do you have something about the people w a i t i n g i n
the Bahamas? A p p a r e n t l y they are l e a v i n g .
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I do.
We understand t h a t Orlando Hernandez and A l b e r t o
Hernandez, as w e l l as the f i v e o t h e r Cubans who accompanied them t o the
Bahamas have been i s s u e d temporary v i s a s by the Nicaraguan Government,
and t h a t they w i l l soon t r a v e l t o t h a t c o u n t r y .
As you know, on December 31st, the US g r a n t e d p e r m i s s i o n f o r Orlando
Hernandez Pedroso, h i s common-law w i f e , and A l b e r t o Hernandez Perez t o
e n t e r the US.
I have gone through i n g r e a t d e t a i l w i t h you on s e v e r a l
occasions the reasons f o r those s p e c i a l circumstances.
But o b v i o u s l y ,
w i t h the v i s a s o f f e r e d by the Nicaraguan Government, t h a t p a r t i c u l a r
p a r o l e i s not as germane as i t was a couple of days ago.
QUESTION: At l e a s t f o u r of those f i v e people have r e l a t i v e s i n the
U n i t e d S t a t e s . While are i n Nicaragua w i l l they be e l i g i b l e t o come t o
the U n i t e d States?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , i t w i l l depend on what happens. But I would p o i n t out
t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the t h r e e who were g r a n t e d p a r o l e and the
f i v e who were not, I t h i n k you've asked me t h i s q u e s t i o n and I've q u i t e
gone i n t o a g r e a t d e t a i l t o e x p l a i n the s p e c i a l circumstances t h a t , i n
our view, j u s t i f i e d the t h r e e r e c e i v i n g p a r o l e w h i l e t h e f i v e d i d n o t .
And as we i n d i c a t e d , we d i d not b e l i e v e the f i v e were heading back t o
Cuba; as t h i s new i n f o r m a t i o n i n d i c a t e s , they are indeed n o t .
Let me
remind
you t h a t the q u e s t i o n of the freedom and the s a f e t y and
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the p o s i t i o n o f these people v i s - - v i s harassment i s a r e g i o n - w i d e
concern. Cuba i s t h e o n l y d i c t a t o r s h i p i n t h e r e g i o n .
I t ' s the only
c o u n t r y t h a t does n o t have some form o f democracy. We b e l i e v e a l l t h e
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n - C e n t r a l America, L a t i n America, South America,
the Caribbean - have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
So t h i s k i n d o f an outcome,
where another c o u n t r y a l s o p l a y s a r o l e - Bahamas p l a y e d a r o l e ,
Nicaragua's p l a y i n g a r o l e , and i t wouldn't s u r p r i s e us i f some o f these
people d i d end up i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n one form - one p r o f e s s i o n o r
another, i s a reasonable outcome t h a t p r o t e c t s them and spreads t h e
responsibility regionally.
QUESTION: Because on Monday, a Congressman from F l o r i d a , D i a z - B a l a r t ,
wrote t o t h e Bahamian Prime M i n i s t e r , a s k i n g him t o leave those people
i n t h e Bahamas u n t i l t h e r e l a t i v e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s arranged f o r
them t o g e t a v i s a i n t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , t h e y ' r e a l l heading f o r Nicaragua now.
have a n y t h i n g -QUESTION:
So I don't
And from Nicaragua they cannot come here?
MR. RUBIN: I d i d n ' t r u l e t h a t o u t . I'm j u s t s a y i n g t h a t t h a t ' s where
i t looks l i k e t h e y ' r e going now. Again, we a l l have - I want t o p o i n t
to you t h e r e g i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; t h a t i t ' s not j u s t t h e U n i t e d
States' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
Any more on Cuba?
QUESTION: Yes. Jamie, so i t would be your assumption t h a t you had s a i d
e a r l i e r t h a t t h e UN human r i g h t s people would be i n t e r v i e w i n g them.
MR. RUBIN:
Right.
QUESTION: And so i t would be your u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t they would then be
i n t e r v i e w e d i n Nicaragua.
MR. RUBIN:
They c o u l d w e l l do t h a t i n Nicaragua, as w e l l , yes.
QUESTION: The o f f e r o f p a r o l e , though, i s s t i l l
Hernandez; i s n ' t i t ?
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
out there f o r
I t is.
And he can go t o Nicaragua and then
—
MR. RUBIN: An o f f e r o f p a r o l e was based on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f
circumstances. Those circumstances are d i f f e r e n t now, b u t I'm n o t
s a y i n g a n y t h i n g o t h e r than t h e y ' r e heading f o r Nicaragua. I f i t needs
to be reviewed, i t w i l l be reviewed.
QUESTION: But he can go t o Nicaragua and s u b s e q u e n t l y come t o t h e
United States; that's s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y .
MR. RUBIN: I f t h e circumstances change, t h e review has t o be conducted.
That i s something t h e J u s t i c e Department would do, and I ' d d i r e c t your
q u e s t i o n s t o them.
QUESTION: On Colombia, General Serrano, t h e c h i e f o f t h e n a t i o n a l
p o l i c e o f Colombia has s a i d t h a t t h e r e a r e some f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d
States t h a t are t r y i n g t o pursue t h e p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n Colombia
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because the o n l y i n t e r e s t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s t o stop n a r c o - t r a f f i c
i n Colombia. Do you have any response t o t h a t argument?
MR. RUBIN: Our i n t e r e s t s i n Colombia and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n
are not s o l e l y based on n a r c o - t r a f f i c k i n g . They're based on narcot r a f f i c k i n g i n p a r t , but they a l s o i n c l u d e the promotion of democracy,
the promotion of t r a d e , the promotion of r e g i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and
peace and s e c u r i t y .
So i t ' s broader than t h a t .
QUESTION: And t h e r e i s an argument t h a t the Colombian army i s t r y i n g t o
c r e a t e p a r a m i l i t a r y groups i n Colombia. Do you have any source of t h a t
k i n d of accusations?
MR.
RUBIN:
I ' l l have t o take t h a t q u e s t i o n .
QUESTION: Jamie, even b e f o r e r e p o r t s t h a t Netanyahu i s w i l l i n g t o g i v e
up 10 percent of the West Bank t o be s u b s t a n t i a t e d , t h e r e were r e p o r t s
t h a t he i s n ' t going t o do i t ; t h a t the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and such -MR.
RUBIN:
There's a l o t of r e p o r t i n g out of t h a t p a r t of the w o r l d .
QUESTION: But p r e c i o u s l i t t l e
I wondered i f , based on -MR.
RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR.
RUBIN:
from Dennis Ross, p u b l i c l y , a t l e a s t .
Could be good, c o u l d be
So
bad.
Could be the same.
Could be the same.
QUESTION:
I s t h a t good or bad?
QUESTION:
Could be.
(Laughter.)
Knowing what the odds are of p r y i n g any i n f o r m a t i o n out of the Dennis
Ross m i s s i o n , c o u l d you t e l l us what you can - please don't say, t h e r e ' s
been some p r o g r e s s .
But c o u l d you g i v e us some s p e c i f i c s of what he has
accomplished or hasn't accomplished.
MR.
RUBIN:
QUESTION:
on f a i t h .
W e l l , i f t h e r e were p r o g r e s s , I would t e l l
But you wouldn't
s p e l l i t o u t , of course.
you about i t .
We would take i t
MR. RUBIN: Often one wants t o keep d i p l o m a t i c progress p r i v a t e so t h a t
i t can y i e l d f r u i t , d i p l o m a t i c f r u i t .
Let me say t h i s . S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t has r e c e i v e d a number of r e p o r t s
from Ambassador Ross. He i s now meeting w i t h Chairman A r a f a t . He's met
w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Netanyahu. Based on those r e p o r t s , she i n d i c a t e d t o
me t h a t she i s n e i t h e r more o p t i m i s t i c nor more p e s s i m i s t i c than she was
b e f o r e sending him o u t . This i s a d i f f i c u l t process.
But we are
determined t o c o n t i n u e i t w i t h the same sense of urgency, the same focus
on the substance t h a t we've had i n the p a s t , and a g a i n , t h e same
t i m e t a b l e t h a t we've had i n the p a s t .
Ambassador Ross i s expected t o be i n I s r a e l through the end of t h e week.
H o p e f u l l y , as we get c l o s e r t o the end of the week, perhaps we can be
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more f o r t h c o m i n g about what he has s p e c i f i c a l l y been able t o achieve, or
what i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s new he has.
QUESTION: Much o f t h e r e p o r t i n g , much o f t h e focus has been on I s r a e l
and what t h e US wants from I s r a e l .
Just t o round t h i n g s out a l i t t l e
b i t , assuming i t ' s a two-way s t r e e t you're on, what i s i t e x a c t l y you
want from Yasser A r a f a t ?
MR. RUBIN: I t h i n k we've made q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s m i s t h e s i n e qua non o f t h e Middle East peace process, and we
are l o o k i n g f o r a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, 52-weeks-a-year progress
by t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y . This i s a f i g h t t h a t they should be i n
f o r t h e i r own sake, not j u s t f o r t h e sake o f t h e I s r a e l i s , because t h e
t e r r o r i s t s are t h e i r opponents as w e l l as t h e opponents o f t h e I s r a e l i s
and, o b v i o u s l y , t h e k i l l e r s o f those t h a t they k i l l .
So we are l o o k i n g f o r a comprehensive approach, a s u s t a i n e d approach
over t i m e , 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year, from t h e
P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y . And we b e l i e v e , and have s a i d so b e f o r e , t h e r e
i s a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e I s r a e l i Government t o
redeploy t h e i r f o r c e s , and t h e connection i s t o t h e s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n
t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s face. So t h e q u e s t i o n o f a f u r t h e r redeployment i s
one t h a t depends on q u a n t i t y , depends on q u a l i t y , depends on t h e
s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n t h a t p e r t a i n s d u r i n g t h e f u r t h e r redeployment and
a f t e r t h e f u r t h e r redeployment, and i t depends on t h e t i m i n g .
A l l o f those are connected. But f i r s t and foremost, i t i s a s i n e qua
non f o r t h e peace process t o have t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y engage i n a
comprehensive, s u s t a i n a b l e f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m .
QUESTION: Now, t h e S e c r e t a r y , i n her major speech t o t h e Press Club
s e v e r a l months ago, a l s o asked t h a t - or demanded t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f
t e r r o r i s m be d i s m a n t l e d by Mr. A r a f a t . Can -- Ross a s i d e , i t ' s j u s t
been a few days -MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
Over t h e r e c e n t
—
Over those months, how w e l l have they done i n -W e l l , again, I'm going t o a v o i d -—
removing t e r r o r i s t groups, r o o t and branch?
MR. RUBIN: Much as i t w i l l s u r p r i s e you, I'm going t o a v o i d a d i r e c t
grade i n t h i s area and t e l l you t h a t progress has been made, steps have
been taken, b u t more needs t o be done.
QUESTION:
progress?
Do t h e U n i t e d States and I s r a e l agree on t h e degree o f
MR. RUBIN: We have not seen - t h e problem i n t h i s area has n o t been
disagreement between us and t h e I s r a e l i s ; t h e problem has been t h e
e x t e n t o f t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and t h e s u s t a i n a b i l i t y o f t h a t
fight.
We t h i n k t h e r e has been s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s , b u t t h e r e i s
s i g n i f i c a n t work t h a t needs t o be done t o make i t a comprehensive,
sustained f i g h t against t e r r o r i s m .
QUESTION: I t ' s not unusual f o r t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , envoys t o sound
out t h e o p p o s i t i o n i n a democracy, where t h e r e i s o p p o s i t i o n i n I s r a e l .
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MR. RUBIN:
days .
I'm not aware of any p a r t i c u l a r c o n t a c t s i n the l a s t
few
QUESTION: Given the s i t u a t i o n , the -- ( i n a u d i b l e ) — of i t , you don't
t h i n k Ross i s t a k i n g a - doing some c l o s e - what should I say - c l o s e
m o n i t o r i n g of what might happen i f the L a b o r i t e s get back i n power?
MR. RUBIN: Let me make two p o i n t s on t h a t .
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t , when
she was t h e r e , d i d meet w i t h the Labor leader —
QUESTION:
Traditional.
MR. RUBIN: -- t r a d i t i o n a l l y - as i s t r a d i t i o n a l .
Ambassador Ross i s
going t o be i n I s r a e l , and as you know f o r being t h e r e , t h e t o p i c of the
p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e of any government i s something t h a t i s t a l k e d about
morning, noon and n i g h t i n I s r a e l ; so t h e r e f o r e I'm sure i t w i l l come
up.
QUESTION:
MR.
RUBIN:
On
Afghanistan.
Yes.
QUESTION: I t ' s been 20 years now, we are i n 1998, and c i v i l war i s
s t i l l c o n t i n u i n g . Both sides are accusing each o t h e r of k i l l i n g
civilians.
C i v i l i a n s are the v i c t i m s i n the hundreds and thousands.
Now the ousted p r e s i d e n t , Mr. Rabbani, he has accused - or he has
w r i t t e n a l e t t e r t o the UN s e c r e t a r y , K o f i Annan, accusing the T a l i b a n
t h a t over 600 c i v i l i a n s have been k i l l e d i n A f g h a n i s t a n . And v i c e versa, the T a l i b a n s are accusing them of k i l l i n g c i v i l i a n s .
And when Mr. I n d e r f u r t h was i n Russia, he discussed A f g h a n i s t a n w i t h the
Russian o f f i c i a l s , and a l s o T a l i b a n l e a d e r s were here i n the S t a t e
Department. So what i s the f u t u r e , what's going on a f t e r twenty years?
MR. RUBIN: Ambassador B r a h i m i , a s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the
S e c r e t a r y General i s here, I b e l i e v e , today, d i s c u s s i n g these m a t t e r s
w i t h Department o f f i c i a l s .
Let me t e l l you what our p o l i c y i s . We would l i k e t o see an end t o the
f i g h t i n g and the f o r m a t i o n of a b r o a d l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government t h a t
w i l l p r o t e c t the r i g h t s of a l l Afghans and abide by A f g h a n i s t a n ' s
international obligations.
We welcome any c o n s t r u c t i v e e f f o r t t o b r i n g Afghan groups t o g e t h e r , and
b e l i e v e the UN remains best placed t o h e l p broker a s e t t l e m e n t .
The
U n i t e d States supports no p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i o n , movement, group or
individual.
We've m a i n t a i n e d c o n t a c t s w i t h a l l the major groups f o r
s e v e r a l years, i n c l u d i n g the T a l i b a n , p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h our embassy i n
Islamabad and c o n s u l a t e i n Peshawar.
QUESTION: Jamie, the I r i s h s i t u a t i o n , a couple of setbacks.
Do you
have - i t was l o o k i n g good f o r a w h i l e ; now maybe i t ' s s l i p p e d a l i t t l e .
What i s the S t a t e Department's c u r r e n t a p p r a i s a l ?
MR. RUBIN: W e l l , the peace t a l k s on Northern I r e l a n d are scheduled t o
resume a f t e r t h e i r h o l i d a y break, on Monday, January 12.
Former Senator
George M i t c h e l l w i l l p r e s i d e . We are h o p e f u l t h a t the groups t h a t are
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the l o y a l i s t p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the peace t a l k s
w i l l maintain t h e i r cease-fire.
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Obviously t h e r e are problems, b u t Senator M i t c h e l l i s an able
n e g o t i a t o r , d i p l o m a t ; and we're h o p e f u l t h a t he w i l l be able t o h e l p t h e
p a r t i e s see t h e wisdom o f not l e t t i n g v i o l e n c e i n t e r f e r e w i t h what i s
the o n l y chance f o r them t o improve t h e i r l i v e s , which i s peace.
QUESTION: Jamie, do you have an update on t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h i s
American r e p o r t e r who i s j a i l e d i n South Korea?
MR. RUBIN: I do have such an update. Richard Choi was scheduled t o be
r e l e a s e d from t h e Seoul d e t e n t i o n c e n t e r , where he's been h e l d s i n c e h i s
December 19 a r r e s t , today, January 7, a t 6:00 p.m. l o c a l t i m e .
We understand b a i l was not i n v o l v e d . The c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s r e l e a s e are
t h a t he not leave Korea w i t h o u t t h e judge's p e r m i s s i o n , and t h a t he
remain i n Korea f o r h i s t r i a l .
The order f o r h i s r e l e a s e i s v a l i d f o r
t h r e e months, and can be renewed. Two consular o f f i c e r s from our
embassy v i s i t e d him e a r l i e r today, and r e p o r t e d t h a t he appears t o be i n
good c o n d i t i o n and does not have any c o m p l a i n t s about h i s t r e a t m e n t .
The embassy w i l l c o n t i n u e t o m o n i t o r h i s case.
QUESTION: Moving o f f a l i t t l e b i t t o c a l l s f o r North Korean a s s i s t a n c e .
A n y t h i n g new t h e US has i n t h e works t o help those s t a r v i n g f o l k s ?
MR. RUBIN: Our view hasn't
to repeat t h a t , I w i l l .
QUESTION:
changed s i n c e y e s t e r d a y .
I f you'd l i k e me
I d i d n ' t know you --
MR. RUBIN: I even - yes, I addressed t h e new appeal, and s t a t e d t h a t we
have i n t h e past responded p o s i t i v e l y t o p r e v i o u s WFP appeals.
And t o
answer your q u e s t i o n from yesterday, S i d , t h e r e were some delays i n
i s s u i n g and renewing v i s a s l a s t f a l l , b u t a l l v i s a issues were
s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s o l v e d p r e v i o u s l y - p r i o r t o t h i s new appeal.
QUESTION: Do you have a n y t h i n g new on t h e suspects
They a l l e g e d l y murdered a US c i t i z e n .
r e l e a s e d i n Mexico?
MR. RUBIN: Only t o say t h a t our embassy i n Mexico sent a d i p l o m a t i c
note t o t h e Mexican Government, r e q u e s t i n g a f o r m a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e
judge's d e c i s i o n t o r e l e a s e t h e f i v e men who confessed t o t h e murder o f
US c i t i z e n , Peter John Zarate. We are a w a i t i n g a response.
The p r o s e c u t o r ' s o f f i c e has p u b l i c l y denounced t h e judge's
we u n e q u i v o c a l l y condemn i t .
a c t i o n , and
QUESTION: Also, t h e r e was a r e p o r t i n today's New York Times t h a t has
the American Embassy i n Honduras n e g o t i a t i n g a f a i r l y d r a s t i c a l l y
reduced r a t e a t a r e s o r t f o r senators t h a t was lower than t h e i r r a t e f o r
US t r o o p s , and much lower than t h e normal r a t e . Do you have any comment
on t h a t ?
MR. RUBIN: G e n e r a l l y speaking, my comment i s , i t i s always easy t o f i n d
ways t o d e t e r congressmen from t r a v e l i n g .
I f j o u r n a l i s t s continue t o
d e t e r congressmen from t r a v e l i n g by t r y i n g t o p l a y gotcha w i t h them,
then t h e U n i t e d States w i l l s u f f e r because one w i l l n o t be s u r p r i s e d
t h a t t h e r e ' s an i n c r e a s i n g i s o l a t i o n i s t tendency i n t h e Congress.
I f congressmen and senators don't have an a b i l i t y t o t r a v e l and see t h e
r e s t o f t h e w o r l d , then i t w i l l not be s u r p r i s i n g when they are not as
open t o a c t i v i s m around t h e w o r l d as some would l i k e them t o be.
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I don't have any s p e c i f i c comment on these charges. I t seems t o me
reasonable t h a t one would have a meeting a t a n i c e r p l a c e , r a t h e r than a
less nice place.
I expect j o u r n a l i s t s , as w e l l , t r y t o s t a y a t n i c e r
p l a c e s , r a t h e r than n o t n i c e p l a c e s , and t r y t o g e t t h e best r a t e they
can.
QUESTION:
On a d i f f e r e n t
subject?
MR. RUBIN:
Yes.
QUESTION:
Indonesia --
QUESTION:
You g e t charged f o r f o u r n i g h t s --
MR. RUBIN:
QUESTION:
W e l l , sometimes i t doesn't work, b u t we t r y .
Four n i g h t s f o r two hours?
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Can I go back t o Mexico f o r a moment? I n t h e US c o n t i n u e d
o b s e r v a t i o n - ( i n a u d i b l e ) - developments o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e
massacre i n Chiapas. Has t h e U n i t e d States r e c e i v e d any i n f o r m a t i o n
t h a t t h e Mexican army has been c r e a t i n g p a r a m i l i t a r y groups i n Chiapas,
as i t was r e p o r t e d i n Mexico t h i s week by m i l i t a r y papers?
MR. RUBIN:
I'll
have t o g e t you an answer f o r t h e r e c o r d on t h a t .
QUESTION: On Indonesia, i s t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a t i s f i e d w i t h
Indonesia's r e c o r d o f r e f o r m i n g i t s economy and a d h e r i n g t o t h e
c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e IMF loan?
MR. RUBIN: The economic a s s i s t a n c e package t o which t h e Indonesians
agreed w i t h t h e IMF i n c l u d e d commitments on c u t t i n g government spending
and i n c r e a s i n g revenues, r e d u c i n g s u b s i d i e s , a d j u s t i n g i m p o r t and e x p o r t
t a x e s , and t i g h t e n i n g monetary p o l i c y .
P r e s i d e n t Soeharto and o t h e r
government o f f i c i a l s have expressed t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o undertake
reforms o u t l i n e d i n t h e IMF program.
Some steps have been taken, i n c l u d i n g t h e c l o s i n g o f 16 banks. But f a r
more remains t o be done, e s p e c i a l l y i f markets are t o have confidence
t h a t Indonesia i s f u l l y committed t o implementing t h e l e t t e r and s p i r i t
of t h e program. I n s h o r t , we are a w a i t i n g f u l l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e
package.
QUESTION: Jamie, j u s t a q u i c k thought on t h e Middle East.
I guess you
would have s a i d so, b u t d i d t h e S e c r e t a r y g e t on t h e phone w i t h e i t h e r
A r a f a t or Netanyahu t h i s morning?
MR. RUBIN: Not i n t h e l a s t day o r two.
but n o t i n t h e l a s t day o r two.
I know she d i d l a s t weekend,
QUESTION: I had a q u i c k q u e s t i o n on t h e Asian - c o n t i n u i n g Asian
economic t r o u b l e s . I s i t concern t o t h e US f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and a l s o , do
you see any more n a t i o n s i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n l i k e South Korea o r i n
Asia?
MR. RUBIN: L e t me say t h i s - a s t a b l e and growing American economy
depends upon a s t a b l e and growing w o r l d economy. The U n i t e d States
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Page 14 of 15
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n these programs f o r a v e r y c l e a r reason:
e n s u r i n g the
s t a b i l i t y o f the A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n i s i n our economic and n a t i o n a l
security interests.
As America's economic d e s t i n y becomes more c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o the world's
economic p r o s p e c t s , we cannot and must not bear the burden o f g l o b a l
l e a d e r s h i p alone. That's why we work through the IMF; but we work v e r y
hard t o support the IMF i n the d i f f e r e n t programs t h a t we've d e s c r i b e d
t o you. We have acted t o i n t e r v e n e t o h e l p s t a b i l i z e these s i t u a t i o n s .
We're making p r o g r e s s , but these problems w i l l not be s o l v e d o v e r n i g h t ;
and t h e r e ' s a d d i t i o n a l work t o be done.
QUESTION: Jamie, on the same s u b j e c t , t h e r e ' s been two r a t h e r b e l l i c o s e
statements by the Indonesian m i l i t a r y t h i s week, r e g a r d i n g steps they
would take a g a i n s t p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t mass l a y - o f f s , which i s a r e s u l t o f
the IMF c o n d i t i o n s . I know i t ' s a t i c k l i s h q u e s t i o n , but do you have
a n y t h i n g t o say about those t h r e a t s from the Indonesian m i l i t a r y ?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen them s p e c i f i c a l l y .
Obviously, we
r e s p e c t the r i g h t o f people t o p r o t e s t and respect the r i g h t
government t o ensure t h a t p r o t e s t s d i d n ' t go i n t o v i o l e n c e .
f i n e l i n e , and I haven't seen the s p e c i f i c comments. But we
r i g h t s on both sides i n t h a t k i n d o f a case.
QUESTION:
Thank you.
QUESTION:
Barry, one more.
would b o t h
of a
So i t ' s a
respect t h e
Do you have any update on the B l i s s case?
MR. RUBIN: Just t h a t he's s t i l l
him r e t u r n i n g a t t h i s p o i n t .
QUESTION:
MR. RUBIN:
here, and I don't have any update about
And Y e l t s i n ' s h e a l t h - i s t h e r e any update on t h a t ?
Nothing new f o r you on t h a t .
(The b r i e f i n g concluded a t 1:40 p.M.)==================== ATTACHMENT
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RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL
Page 1 of 8
(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.EDU@INET@LNGTWY (
owner-dosbrief@LISTSERV.UIC.E
CREATION DATE/TIME:12-JAN-1998 15:26:21.00
SUBJECT:
980109 U.S.
S t a t e Dept. Press B r i e f i n g T r a n s c r i p t #5
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC
READ:UNKNOWN
] )
TEXT:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA BRIEFING INDEX
F r i d a y , January 9, 1998
Briefer:
James B. Foley
BURUNDI
1
Condemnation of January 1 A t t a c k
AFGHANISTAN
1
C a l l t o End V i o l e n c e / C a l l f o r Guarantee S a f e t y o f Humanitarian
R e l i e f Workers
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
1-2
Ambassador Ross' T r i p t o Region Ends/Topics Discussed
1,5
I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Remarks on Troop Deployments and
Settlement A c t i v i t y
IRAN
2
2,3
3
3
4
Iran
D i p l o m a t i c Channels f o r Contacts
People-to-People Contacts
T r a v e l t o I r a n by A m e r i c a n s / A d v i s o r i e s / R e s t r i c t i o n s
Mujahedin-e Khalq Group's Recent Press Conference
Number o f I r a n i a n s Coming t o US/Numbers of Americans T r a v e l i n g t o
4
Concerns about I r a n ' s Program f o r Weapons o f Mass D e s t r u c t i o n
INDONESIA
5
Treasury Department t o l e a d USG t r i p / S t a t e Members o f D e l e g a t i o n
5
Need f o r Indonesia t o Adhere t o IMF Program
ALGERIA
6
I n t e r n a t i o n a l V i s i t t o Assess Human Rights S i t u a t i o n
GREECE/TURKEY
6
T u r k i s h D e c i s i o n t o Modify Plans f o r A i r E x e r c i s e s
7
Greek Claims o f T u r k i s h V i o l a t i o n s of Greek A i r s p a c e
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO
7
Ambassador Gelbard's T r i p Next Week
MEXICO
7-8
Reports of Army's Involvement w i t h Massacres i n Chiapas
unconfirmed
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA PRESS BRIEFING
�ARMS Email System
Page 2 of 8
DPB # 5
Briefer:
James B. Foley
FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 1998 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. FOLEY: Good a f t e r n o o n . I j u s t have a few announcements.
First,
t h e U n i t e d States Government condemns the v i o l e n c e and k i l l i n g
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the r e c e n t f i g h t i n g on the o u t s k i r t s o f Bujumbura. We
d e p l o r e the c o n t i n u e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e k i l l i n g o f c i v i l i a n s by both t h e
Burundian army and the r e b e l f o r c e s .
Our Ambassador t o Burundi, Rusty Hughes, v i s i t e d the s i t e o f the v i l l a g e
massacre, where he saw the hacked bodies o f innocent c h i l d r e n and o t h e r
civilians.
Such grotesque v i o l e n c e makes t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f Burundi's
problems more d i f f i c u l t and complicates e f f o r t s t o b r i n g an e n d u r i n g and
e q u i t a b l e peace t o Burundi.
The U n i t e d States Government c a l l s on a l l
p a r t i e s t o t h i s c o n f l i c t t o r e s p e c t the l i v e s o f non-combatants and
immediately cease h o s t i l i t i e s .
The US Government b e l i e v e s t h a t l a s t i n g peace w i l l come t o Burundi o n l y
through a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . We support the missions o f b o t h the OAU
and the UN, which are c u r r e n t l y i n the r e g i o n i n an e f f o r t t o
r e i n t e g r a t e the r e g i o n a l peace process.
P r e s i d e n t i a l S p e c i a l Envoy f o r
the Great Lakes, Howard Wolpe, w i l l t r a v e l t o the r e g i o n next week as
p a r t o f our c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t t o support endeavors t o launch peace
negotiations.
Secondly, the U n i t e d States f u l l y supports t h e statements o f the UN
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l P r e s i d e n t and S e c r e t a r y General K o f i Annan, d e p l o r i n g
T a l i b a n a i r s t r i k e s on Bamian, A f g h a n i s t a n . We c a l l on the T a l i b a n and
o t h e r Afghan f a c t i o n s t o guarantee the s a f e t y o f h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f
workers, and f a c i l i t a t e the f r e e f l o w o f r e l i e f s u p p l i e s t o a l l Afghan
c i v i l i a n s i n need.
We a r e concerned t h a t s p e c i f i c e t h n i c groups a r e i n c r e a s i n g l y being
t a r g e t e d i n the c o n f l i c t .
We c a l l on a l l Afghans t o j o i n t o g e t h e r t o
end the v i o l e n c e , and t o begin the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e i r c o u n t r y . We
c o n t i n u e t o work w i t h the UN and o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s and
groups t o e x p l o r e a l l avenues o f r e l i e f f o r c i v i l i a n groups i n
A f g h a n i s t a n i n need o f h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e .
QUESTION: Dennis Ross a p p a r e n t l y i s f i n i s h e d w i t h h i s m i s s i o n .
wondering i f you had a n y t h i n g t o say concerning Prime M i n i s t e r
Netanyahu's remarks on t r o o p deployments and planned s e t t l e m e n t
activity?
I was
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , I'm not going t o be able t o get i n t o t h a t . Ambassador
Ross, as you say, i s c o m p l e t i n g h i s c u r r e n t m i s s i o n i n I s r a e l . He's
r e t u r n i n g t o n i g h t , or he's d e p a r t i n g the r e g i o n t o n i g h t . He's going t o
be r e p o r t i n g t o the S e c r e t a r y and a l s o t o the P r e s i d e n t , r e g a r d i n g h i s
d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the I s r a e l i s and the P a l e s t i n i a n s .
So I r e a l l y don't want t o pre-empt h i s r e p o r t w i t h an i n t e r i m e v a l u a t i o n
of h i s t r i p from t h i s podium. Obviously, h i s d i s c u s s i o n s d e a l t w i t h t h e
f o u r - p a r t agenda and v a r i o u s i n t e r i m committee i s s u e s .
No more
questions?
QUESTION:
On I r a n , what about The Washington Post s t o r y t h a t t h e
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Page 3 of 8
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n sent a message t o I r a n through t h e Swiss ambassador
t h e r e , s h o r t l y a f t e r Khatami's appointment, s u g g e s t i n g a d i a l o g u e ?
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , on I r a n , g e n e r a l l y , I'm n o t going t o have v e r y much t o
say from t h e podium today. As Jamie Rubin i n d i c a t e d y e s t e r d a y , t h e r e
has been 20 years o f m i s t r u s t and d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s .
We've seen new developments and an encouraging tone coming o u t o f t h e
p r e s i d e n t o f I r a n , and as Mr. Rubin i n d i c a t e d yesterday, we're going t o
be e v a l u a t i n g very c a r e f u l l y P r e s i d e n t Khatami's speech and our
responses.
So Mr. Rubin's comments y e s t e r d a y were a d e f i n i t i v e statement o f t h e
i n i t i a l U n i t e d S t a t e s Government r e a c t i o n t o h i s media i n t e r v i e w and
comments t o t h e American p u b l i c , and I'm n o t going t o have a n y t h i n g o f
substance t o add t o t h a t today.
However, i n response t o your s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n , I ' d l i k e t o i n d i c a t e
t h a t we're n o t going t o comment i n any way p u b l i c l y c o n c e r n i n g
a l l e g a t i o n s about what may o r may n o t t r a n s p i r e i n d i p l o m a t i c channels.
Our p o s i t i o n on a d i a l o g u e has been f u l l y s t a t e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t and by
o t h e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , and I r a n knows our p o s i t i o n v e r y w e l l .
QUESTION: There was a r a t h e r l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n y e s t e r d a y about how
t h i s d i a l o g u e would be above board, p u b l i c l y acknowledged; t h e r e
wouldn't be any cakes o r keys o r s e c r e t messages. And then, t h i s
morning i t appears t h a t t h e r e has been something t h a t ' s n o t q u i t e doesn't q u i t e meet t h a t s t a n d a r d , d e s p i t e Mr. Rubin's l e n g t h y words
otherwise.
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , f i r s t o f a l l , l e t me repeat t h a t I'm n o t going t o
comment p u b l i c l y about a l l e g a t i o n s about what may o r may n o t t r a n s p i r e
i n d i p l o m a t i c channels.
We do have a c a p a b i l i t y f o r c o n t a c t through a
d i p l o m a t i c channel.
But again, as Mr. Rubin c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d
yesterday, we're n o t i n a p o s i t i o n o f commenting p u b l i c l y about t h a t
channel.
And i n s o f a r as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government p o s i t i o n i s concerned, we've
s t a t e d i t p u b l i c l y . What we f a v o r i s an a u t h o r i z e d d i a l o g u e w i t h
a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e I r a n i a n Government -- a d i a l o g u e t h a t
would be acknowledged. And t h e p r e s i d e n t o f I r a n i n d i c a t e d i n h i s
r e c e n t i n t e r v i e w t h a t t h a t i s n o t i n h i s c u r r e n t p l a n s . He has n o t
taken up t h a t o f f e r . We are i n t h e process o f e v a l u a t i n g h i s s u g g e s t i o n
t h a t people-to-people exchanges be emphasized a t t h i s stage. We found
t h a t s u g g e s t i o n u s e f u l , and, as Mr. Rubin s a i d y e s t e r d a y , we're going t o
take a very c a r e f u l l o o k a t i t .
QUESTION: Can you e l a b o r a t e on t h a t , Jim?
r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t c o u l d be eased?
Are t h e r e any v i s a
MR. FOLEY: The f a c t i s , as Jamie Rubin mentioned y e s t e r d a y , t h a t t h e r e
are no t r a v e l r e s t r i c t i o n s , as such, f o r Americans going t o I r a n .
We
have a t r a v e l warning i n p l a c e , dated - t h e l a s t issuance was J u l y 8,
1997 - t h a t recommends t h a t US c i t i z e n s n o t t r a v e l t o I r a n .
But as
Jamie Rubin s a i d , t h i s whole i s s u e , though, o f a more c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t
to promote exchanges on a people-to-people b a s i s - I b e l i e v e t h e
p r e s i d e n t o f I r a n t a l k e d about s c h o l a r s and e x p e r t s and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of c i v i l s o c i e t y i n both c o u n t r i e s i n a more c o n c e r t e d , p r o - a c t i v e way
he seemed t o be i n d i c a t i n g . That's p r e c i s e l y what we're going t o be
s t u d y i n g -- t h e degree t o which t h i s i s something t h a t we can encourage
on our s i d e ; t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether we need t o l o o k a t t h e f l o w o f
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Page 4 of 8
people between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , and any way t o encourage, g i v e
momentum t o t h a t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n i n d i c a t e d by t h e p r e s i d e n t o f I r a n . I
have n o t h i n g t o announce o r i n d i c a t e on t h a t s u b j e c t today; o n l y t h a t ,
as we s a i d y e s t e r d a y , we're going t o be l o o k i n g v e r y c l o s e l y a t t h a t .
QUESTION: The same day t h a t Khatami gave t h i s speech, t h e r e was a press
conference here i n Washington by t h e Mujahedin-e Khalq t a l k i n g about
I r a n d e v e l o p i n g a long-range m i s s i l e c a p a b i l i t y . This has a l r e a d y been
commented on a t t h e podium; however, i s n o t t h e Mujahedin-e Khalq t h e
same group t h a t was on t h e October r e p o r t o f t h e S t a t e Department,
r e g a r d i n g t e r r o r i s t groups? And i f t h a t i s t h e case, have they appealed
t h i s , or done something which would mean t h a t they were n o t under t h e
ban o f h o l d i n g press conferences o r fund r a i s i n g i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
as was i n d i c a t e d by t h e October statement o f t h e S t a t e Department on
terrorism?
MR. FOLEY: F i r s t , you're r i g h t , they were on t h e l i s t .
have t o r e f e r you t o t h e J u s t i c e Department, i n terms o f
of t h e law, t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . There i s bound t o be an
phase a f t e r t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e made her d e c i s i o n .
I
t h a t they are s t i l l i n t h a t stage o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
Secondly, I ' d
the application
implementation
would expect
Whether o r n o t t h i s press conference i n any way i n d i c a t e d a v i o l a t i o n o f
the p r o h i b i t i o n s under her d e t e r m i n a t i o n , I ' d have t o r e f e r you t o t h e
J u s t i c e Department.
QUESTION: Jim, are you aware o f any c u l t u r a l o r academic exchanges t h a t
e x i s t now between u n i v e r s i t i e s - say, U n i v e r s i t y o f Tehran, u n i v e r s i t i e s
i n t h i s c o u n t r y - s o r t o f c e r t a i n l y n o t government-sanctioned, b u t are
i n f o r m a l arrangements t h a t e x i s t a t t h i s time t h a t c o u l d be b u i l t on?
MR. FOLEY: I'm n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y aware o f t h a t . I t h i n k i t would be
d i f f i c u l t , a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , t o compile t h a t k i n d o f i n f o r m a t i o n .
There wouldn't be a c e n t r a l source o f i n f o r m a t i o n on t h a t s u b j e c t .
C e r t a i n l y t h e r e are hundreds o f thousands o f I r a n i a n - A m e r i c a n s i n t h i s
c o u n t r y , who do t r a v e l back, which i s a source o f p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e
exchange, i f you w i l l .
I r a n i a n s who t r a v e l o b t a i n v i s a s t o v i s i t t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . So t h a t i s going on.
But what t h e p r e s i d e n t o f I r a n was i n d i c a t i n g , as I s a i d , was a
h i g h l i g h t i n g o f t h i s phenomenon; I t h i n k an e l e v a t i o n o f t h i s phenomenon
t o a h i g h e r plane - one t h a t , as he s a i d , would h o p e f u l l y l e a d towards a
b r e a k i n g down o f some o f t h e w a l l s o f m i s t r u s t and a l i e n a t i o n t h a t have
b u i l t up over t h e l a s t 20 years. We found t h a t p r o p o s a l u s e f u l and, as
I s a i d , we're s t u d y i n g i t .
QUESTION: Do you have any idea o f how many I r a n i a n s
c o u n t r y t o study - who g e t v i s a s t o come here?
MR. FOLEY: I t h i n k we c o u l d g e t t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n
to look i n t o i t .
travel to this
f o r you.
I ' d be g l a d
QUESTION: And would t h e US Government have a count o f t h e Americans who
may do t h e same - t r a v e l t o I r a n t o study?
MR. FOLEY: I t h i n k we'd have a b e t t e r handle on t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n than
on t h e second one, b u t I ' l l take t h e q u e s t i o n .
QUESTION:
Another one on I r a n - on Wednesday, t h e spokesman f o r t h e
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N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o f Resistance o f I r a n issued a r e p o r t r e g a r d i n g m i s s i l e
proliferation.
I t c i t e d t h a t t h e r e were 350 I r a n i a n agents being
t r a i n e d i n North Korea. There were dozens and dozens o f Chinese and
North Korean m i s s i l e e x p e r t s s t a t i o n e d a t a p r o d u c t i o n complex - m i s s i l e
p r o d u c t i o n complex i n I r a n . Also s t a t i n g t h a t guidance systems f o r
these longer-ranged m i s s i l e s t h a t t h e I r a n i a n s are p u t t i n g on t h e s h e l f
now were coming from o u t o f t h e c o u n t r y . So my q u e s t i o n would be, i s
t h e r e concern from these r e p o r t s and from o t h e r knowledge t h a t t h e
Chinese and North Koreans may, i n f a c t , be d i r e c t i n g t h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n
t h a t puts American v i t a l i n t e r e s t s a t r i s k , both i n t h e Gulf and i n t h e
Western P a c i f i c ?
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , we've r e c e i v e d assurances and commitments from t h e
Chinese Government, d a t i n g back t o around t h e time - most r e c e n t l y , t o
the time o f P r e s i d e n t Jiang's v i s i t here, which assure us t h a t t h e
Chinese are phasing o u t c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e n u c l e a r area w i t h I r a n .
But you're a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t , though, t h a t t h e whole issue o f I r a n i a n
a t t e m p t s , by whatever means, indigenous o r i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r
n a t i o n s , t o a c q u i r e weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n , m i s s i l e systems f o r
d e l i v e r i n g those weapons, i s o f utmost concern t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and
we are working very hard on t h i s issue w i t h n a t i o n s around t h e w o r l d .
I t remains one o f t h e t h r e e p i l l a r s o f concern i n our assessment o f
I r a n i a n a c t i o n s around t h e w o r l d .
QUESTION: Does t h i s r e p o r t o f exchange o f personnel
a c c u r a t e , then, t o you?
seem t o be
MR. FOLEY: I c o u l d n ' t p o s s i b l y say, b u t c e r t a i n l y t h i s i s an issue o f
utmost concern t o t h e U n i t e d States Government.
QUESTION:
MR. FOLEY:
I have a Middle East q u e s t i o n i f we are f i n i s h e d w i t h I r a n .
Are we f i n i s h e d w i t h I r a n ?
(No response.)
MR. FOLEY:
Go ahead.
QUESTION: There was a s t o r y i n Ha'aretz, t h e I s r a e l i newspaper, today
about plans t o b u i l d 30,000 new u n i t s i n t h e West Bank and Gaza by t h e
year 2020. Do you c o n s i d e r t h a t a t such l e v e l , which might double
I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s i n -MR. FOLEY:
Do I c o n s i d e r what?
QUESTION: Do you consider t h a t such l e v e l o f c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e
t e r r i t o r i e s t h a t might double t h e s e t t l e r s by 2020 t o be s t i l l j u s t
u n h e l p f u l , o n l y u n h e l p f u l t o t h e peace process?
MR. FOLEY: We've made c l e a r f o r a l o n g , long time our view t h a t
s e t t l e m e n t a c t i v i t y - any a c t i v i t i e s which tend t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e ,
which tend t o prejudge f i n a l s t a t u s issues p r i o r t o f i n a l s t a t u s
n e g o t i a t i o n s are v e r y u n h e l p f u l t o t h e peace process.
They do n o t help
t o c r e a t e t h e environment r e q u i r e d f o r s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Again,
t h i s includes settlement a c t i v i t y .
QUESTION:
Indonesia?
MR. FOLEY: Yes.
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QUESTION: I n o t i c e t h e S t a t e Department i s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s h a s t i l y arranged m i s s i o n t o I n d o n e s i a .
Could you t e l l us what message they are
t a k i n g w i t h them?
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , I ' d l i k e t o r e f e r you t o t h e Treasury Department f o r a
d e f i n i t i v e account o f t h e purpose o f t h e t r i p .
I understand Deputy
S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Treasury Summers, who w i l l be accompanied by Ambassador
Larson and Ambassador Wolf from t h e S t a t e Department, w i l l be going t o
Indonesia t o take stock o f t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e r e and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n
the r e g i o n , t o hear a u t h o r i t i e s ' thoughts and t o share t h e
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s views on t h e best way t o r e s o l v e t h e i r problems.
A l l I can say i s t h a t i n d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e Indonesians, t h e US
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i l l underscore P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n ' s commitment t h a t
Indonesia do whatever i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o f i n d i t s way t h r o u g h i t s c u r r e n t
difficulties.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , they w i l l emphasize — as t h e P r e s i d e n t
d i d i n h i s telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n l a s t n i g h t -- h i s encouragement o f t h e
Indonesians t o adhere f u l l y t o t h e IMF program. We b e l i e v e Indonesian
s t a b i l i t y i s i m p o r t a n t t o t h e r e g i o n and i m p o r t a n t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
and t h e phone c a l l and t h e v i s i t are r e f l e c t i v e o f t h a t .
QUESTION:
MR. FOLEY:
Can I ask a q u e s t i o n o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n on A l g e r i a ?
Sure.
QUESTION: Does t h e U n i t e d States s t i l l want t o see an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i n q u i r y i n t o t h e human r i g h t s s i t u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a ?
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , we've s a i d t h a t we have been encouraging t h e A l g e r i a n
Government t o a l l o w o u t s i d e observers t o view and study t h e human r i g h t s
situation.
We had a semantic d i s c u s s i o n - Jamie Rubin d i d y e s t e r d a y on t h i s s u b j e c t .
A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s have t o l d us t h a t they would accept a v i s i t by a UN
human r i g h t s r a p p o r t e u r . We encouraged t h i s s t e p . We note t h e press
r e p o r t s t h a t t h e EU i s p l a n n i n g t o send a d e l e g a t i o n t o A l g e r i a , I
b e l i e v e , b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e month. We share t h e concerns o f t h e EU
and o t h e r n a t i o n s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
massacres i n A l g e r i a , and t h e need t o g a i n a c l e a r e r p i c t u r e o f what i s
happening i n A l g e r i a . So we support t h e EU e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n .
QUESTION: The reason I'm asking t h e q u e s t i o n , Jim, i s because t h e
A l g e r i a n Government s p e c i f i c a l l y does n o t want t o have an i n q u i r y , an
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . And you're n o t u s i n g those terms.
So I assume a l t h o u g h i t ' s w i l l i n g t o discuss and h o l d t a l k s on -MR. FOLEY: W e l l , again, t h e r e was a s p i r i t e d , semantic exchange
y e s t e r d a y ; and i t ' s p r o b a b l y n o t f r u i t f u l t o go over i t . But what we
have s a i d i s t h a t we encourage t h e v i s i t by t h e UN r a p p o r t e u r , b u t we're
not seeking an i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission o f i n q u i r y .
So I can make t h a t
d i s t i n c t i o n f o r you.
QUESTION: -- s a i d i t ' s going t o send a d e l e g a t i o n t o A l g e r i a and t h e
( i n a u d i b l e ) f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r ' s comment on t h a t r e a c t i o n was n o t v e r y
encouraging.
Do you have any comment on t h e European d e c i s i o n ?
MR. FOLEY:
QUESTION:
I j u s t commented on t h e European d e c i s i o n . I welcomed i t .
You s a i d you support t h e UN, b u t you don't
support a
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European?
MR. FOLEY: I s a i d we support EU e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n .
transcript.
Check t h e
QUESTION: On t h e Aegean, Greece and Turkey, a q u e s t i o n about t h e r e c e n t
T u r k i s h a c t i v i t y i n t h e Aegean. T u r k i s h f i g h t e r planes c o n t i n u e t o
c h a l l e n g e Greek s o v e r e i g n t y w i t h f l i g h t s over Greek i s l a n d s these l a s t
couple o f days, and they keep i n f r i n g i n g on t h e Athens FIR and Greek
n a t i o n a l a i r s p a c e . There i s a l o t o f t a l k from Athens - a l o t o f
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , t o say t h e l e a s t . Any r e a c t i o n t o t h a t ?
MR. FOLEY: I have a b r i e f comment. F i r s t , we were pleased t o note t h a t
Turkey m o d i f i e d some i f i t s o r i g i n a l e x e r c i s e plans f o r t h e month o f
January i n response t o Greek concerns, most n o t a b l y by c a n c e l i n g a p l a n
t o e x e r c i s e around t h e K a l o y e r o i i s l e t s i n t h e mid-Aegean, which we have
longed considered t o be Greek.
We c o n s i d e r t h i s a g r a t i f y i n g example o f Greece and Turkey a v o i d i n g a
p o t e n t i a l problem through communication. Now, we are aware o f r e p o r t s and I would emphasize r e p o r t s , because t h e y ' r e n o t items t h a t we can
i n d e p e n d e n t l y c o n f i r m - o f T u r k i s h v i o l a t i o n s elsewhere i n t h e Aegean
t h i s week. We t r e a t s e r i o u s l y a l l r e p o r t s o f a i r s p a c e v i o l a t i o n s i n t h e
Aegean.
The occurrence o f such v i o l a t i o n s t h i s week, would, i f they indeed
happened, be n e e d l e s s l y p r o v o c a t i v e and c o n t r a r y t o t h e s p i r i t o f c l o s e r
c o o p e r a t i o n and r e d u c t i o n o f t e n s i o n t o which t h e T u r k i s h and Greek
Governments have committed themselves.
QUESTION:
But you don't
know i f i t happened or not?
MR. FOLEY: No, we're n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o n f i r m them.
r e p o r t s - press r e p o r t s , e s s e n t i a l l y .
We've seen
QUESTION: The NATO m o n i t o r s s i t p r e t t y c l o s e l y . You a l l can't - i t ' s
been a week and you haven't p i c k e d up t h e phone t o NATO t o ask i f i t ' s
happening?
MR. FOLEY: We're n o t c u r r e n t l y i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o n f i r m t h e r e p o r t s . I
would note, however, t h a t t h e U n i t e d States and o t h e r n a t i o n s do n o t
recognize Greece's c l a i m t o a 10-mile n a u t i c a l a i r s p a c e i n t h e Aegean.
Thus, we do n o t c o n s i d e r T u r k i s h , US o r any o t h e r a i r c r a f t f l y i n g i n t h e
zone between s i x and t e n n a u t i c a l m i l e s from Greek t e r r i t o r y t o be i n
v i o l a t i o n . A p p a r e n t l y some, b u t n o t a l l , o f t h e r e p o r t s we've seen
r e g a r d i n g yesterday's T u r k i s h a i r o p e r a t i o n s f a l l i n t o t h i s c a t e g o r y .
But again, t h a t ' s based on t h e r e p o r t s t h a t d e s c r i b e d those a l l e g e d
v i o l a t i o n s as such.
QUESTION: The Balkans - do you have a n y t h i n g on Robert Gelbard's
to Kosovo?
trip
MR. FOLEY: I ' d have t o take t h e q u e s t i o n . He's l e a v i n g f o r t h e r e g i o n ,
I t h i n k , over t h e weekend. H e ' l l be t h e r e f o r t h e b u l k o f next week.
He w i l l be going t o Belgrade; h e ' l l be going t o Sarajevo; I b e l i e v e a l s o
to Zagreb; I t h i n k t o Montenegro, as w e l l .
I don't know whether he's
going t o Kosovo, b u t I can check, sure, no problem.
QUESTION: A f o l l o w - u p on t h e p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n - as a m a t t e r o f p o l i c y ,
does t h e U n i t e d States Government recognize Athens FIR - f l i g h t
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information
region
MR. FOLEY:
I'll
QUESTION:
Page 8 of 8
- as Greek n a t i o n a l
airspace?
have t o take t h e q u e s t i o n .
Thank you.
QUESTION: Do you have any answer t o t h e r e p o r t s t h a t t h e Mexican army
was i n v o l v e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n Chiapas t h a t were
i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e c e n t massacre o f I n d i a n s ?
MR. FOLEY: W e l l , we've seen t h e r e p o r t s , b u t we have no i n f o r m a t i o n on
the a l l e g a t i o n s . The Mexican Government, as we've i n d i c a t e d and
applauded, has undertaken a f u l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e massacre. We
support P r e s i d e n t Z e d i l l o ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b r i n g t o j u s t i c e a l l those
r e s p o n s i b l e , b u t we can't c o n f i r m those r e p o r t s .
QUESTION:
MR. FOLEY:
Thank you.
Thank you.
(The b r i e f i n g concluded a t 1:25 p.M.)====================
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(NOTES MAIL)
CREATOR: USIA_Media_Reaction@notesl.usia.gov@INET@LNGTWY ( USIA_Media_Reaction@notes
CREATION DATE/TIME:15-JAN-1998 14:32:11.00
SUBJECT:
D a i l y Digest 1/15:
VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA
TO: Steven J. Naplan@eop ( Steven J. Naplan@eop [ NSC ] )
READ:UNKNOWN
TEXT:
Alarmed by the b r u t a l massacre o f over 1,000 A l g e r i a n s - - m o s t l y r u r a l women,
c h i l d r e n and e l d e r l y p e o p l e - - s i n c e the h o l y month o f Ramadan began December
30, the f o r e i g n press r a i s e d a "hue and c r y " f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n
i n A l g e r i a . I n r e f e r e n c e s t o Bosnia and Somalia, the press r a i l e d
a l t e r n a t e l y a g a i n s t the UN, r e g i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r own governments
f o r once again " s t a n d i n g by" and "doing n o t h i n g " t o stop the rampant
v i o l e n c e i n A l g e r i a t h a t began i n January 1992 when a u t h o r i t i e s c a n c e l l e d a
g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n i n which the now-banned I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n Front (FIS) had
taken a huge l e a d . As signs o f hope f o r a way out o f the c u r r e n t
" t r a u m a t i c phase" faded w i t h the Zeroual government's r e f u s a l t o a l l o w an
o u t s i d e i n q u i r y requested by the U.S. and o t h e r s (the EU f a c t - f i n d i n g
m i s s i o n t h a t was t o s t a r t today was r e j e c t e d on the b a s i s t h a t the m i s s i o n
lacked s e n i o r i t y ) , w r i t e r s painted a bleak p i c t u r e of A l g e r i a ' s f u t u r e .
Arguing t h a t A l g e r i a ' s carnage i s being " t o l e r a t e d " by the Zeroual
government, A l g i e r s ' s French-language, independent E l Watan complained t h a t
A l g e r i a would escape s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community
because o f Western business i n t e r e s t s i n i t s o i l and gas i n d u s t r y .
London's independent weekly Economist and o t h e r s argued t h a t " u n t i l an
independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n removes the smear o f c o m p l i c i t y , o r e x p l a i n s the
n e g l i g e n c e " o f the Zeroual government, " a n t i - t e r r o r i s t a s s i s t a n c e f o r
A l g e r i a makes l i t t l e sense." An I n d i a n p u n d i t wondered whether A l g e r i a
would e v e n t u a l l y become an I s l a m i s t s t a t e l i k e I r a n o r j o i n the amorphous
sphere o f o t h e r s t a t e s l i k e Somalia t h a t have imploded.
These were themes:
NO SANCTIONS OR MILITARY FORCE—Observers u n i f o r m l y opposed the use o f
e i t h e r m i l i t a r y f o r c e o r s a n c t i o n s as a n t i - t e r r o r i s m t o o l s . Many o f these
w r i t e r s p o i n t e d out t h a t a f t e r the Somalian i n t e r v e n t i o n n e i t h e r
F r a n c e — w i t h i t s l a r g e Muslim p o p u l a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a host o f A l g e r i a n
refugees--nor any o t h e r c o u n t r y would be w i l l i n g t o send s o l d i e r s i n t o a
" h o r n e t s ' n e s t " and t h a t i t i s s t i l l " a b s o l u t e l y u n c l e a r a g a i n s t whom an
i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e w i l l have t o a c t . " L i k e w i s e r e g a r d i n g s a n c t i o n s ,
w r i t e r s h e l d up the I r a q i example, a s s e r t i n g t h a t an embargo a g a i n s t
A l g e r i a would punish the very people the s a n c t i o n s were designed t o t r y t o
p r o t e c t . The most f i r m l y h e l d c o n v i c t i o n was t h a t t h e o n l y permanent
s o l u t i o n t o ending A l g e r i a ' s r e i g n o f t e r r o r and v i o l e n c e would be a
d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n and t h a t i t must come from A l g e r i a i t s e l f .
Writers
urged the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t o c o n t i n u e t o press f o r o u t s i d e
i n q u i r i e s i n t o the s i x - y e a r - o l d c r i s i s and t o pressure t h e Zeroual
government " t o reopen a d i a l o g u e " w i t h FIS leaders w i t h a view t o b r i n g i n g
them back i n t o the p o l i t i c a l arena.
'TARNISHING ISLAM'—There was a g r e a t deal o f f r u s t r a t i o n among Muslim
commentators from Egypt t o I r a n over the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f Arab and Muslim
institutions.
Cairo's pro-government A l Ahram lamented, "Arab s i l e n c e on
the s i t u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a i s understood, but shameful."
I n Iran, the
c u r r e n t c h a i r o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f I s l a m i c C o u n t r i e s (OIC), papers
accused the Zeroual government o f " t a r n i s h i n g the name o f the I s l a m i s t s " by
p e r p e t r a t i n g o r a l l o w i n g the v i o l e n c e and argued t h a t the OIC should take
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the d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e t o end A l g e r i a ' s i n s u r r e c t i o n .
This survey i s based on 48 r e p o r t s from 23 c o u n t r i e s , January 6-15.
EDITOR: G a i l Hamer Burke
ALGERIA
ALGERIA:
"Armed Groups Are
'Tolerated'"
Yasser Benmiloud commented i n h i s d a i l y column i n French-language,
independent E l Watan (1/14), "The Americans are b i g c h i l d r e n .
Their
Anadarko o i l company i s i n v e s t i n g m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s i n southern A l g e r i a ,
j u s t l i k e o t h e r B r i t i s h , A r g e n t i n e , Spanish, German, and o t h e r companies
t h a t have a l l signed j u i c y c o n t r a c t s w i t h Sonatrach [ t h e n a t i o n a l
hydrocarbon company]. Today, the Americans, the Germans and t h e i r race
b r o t h e r s are c a l l i n g f o r sending an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n commission
t o know who i s k i l l i n g i n A l g e r i a . This i s very amusing. I n b r i e f , t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s addressing t h i s message t o Z e r o u a l : Mr.
P r e s i d e n t , i t i s a p l e a s u r e t o work w i t h you. We l i k e what you are doing
very much, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g your 1.7 b i l l i o n tonnes o f proven
hydrocarbon r e s e r v e s . However, t h e r e i s j u s t a s m a l l problem:
We would
l i k e t o send i n an i n v e s t i g a t i o n commission, j u s t t o know i f i t i s you who
i s smashing babies a g a i n s t w a l l s . T r u l y , t h i s i s humbug.
"The U n i t e d S t a t e s , l i k e Germany, knows v e r y w e l l who i s k i l l i n g .
I t is
not the army. They a l s o know very w e l l who does n o t h i n g t o p r o t e c t the
populations.
I t i s the army. They have the p i c t u r e s p i c k e d up by t h e i r
s a t e l l i t e s t h a t enable them t o t r a c k the movements o f t h e GIA [Armed
I s l a m i c Group] and the N a t i o n a l People's Army. And they know t h a t the
armed groups are ' t o l e r a t e d . ' They a l s o know t h a t as long as the number o f
dead has not exceeded 200,000, as i n Bosnia, i t would be indecent t o take
the m a t t e r up w i t h the U n i t e d Nations, and t o t r y c e r t a i n incumbent
businessmen f o r crimes a g a i n s t humanity.
U n t i l then, much blood w i l l
have been shed under the bombs."
"U.S.
I s Favorable
To An I n v e s t i g a t i v e Commission"
French-language independent E l Watan wrote ( 1 / 6 ) :
"This d e c l a r a t i o n o f a
h i g h - r a n k i n g o f f i c i a l o f the American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n [ u n d e r l i n e d ] an
a t t i t u d e which c o n t r a s t s s t r o n g l y w i t h the p o s i t i o n e x h i b i t e d f o r some time
by Washington v i s - a - v i s the A l g e r i a n regime. The U n i t e d S t a t e s i n e f f e c t
p r o v i d e d f l a w l e s s support t o the p o l i t i c a l programs o f the regime.... At
the moment when a l i v e l y c o n t r o v e r s y provoked debates i n Europe over the
q u e s t i o n 'who k i l l s whom' i n the drama which rocks A l g e r i a , the American
Department o f S t a t e on the c o n t r a r y e x h i b i t e d a staunch s e r e n i t y , n o t
h e s i t a t i n g f o r a moment t o accuse d i r e c t l y the armed I s l a m i s t groups, which
they added t o the l i s t o f the most dangerous t e r r o r i s t groups i n the w o r l d
a g a i n s t which one must f i g h t w i t h o u t r e s p i t e .
[Rubin's remarks] can f i n d
t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n i n a d e s i r e [ o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s ] t o modify t h e i r
a t t i t u d e , judged too c o n s e n t i n g . . . v i s - a - v i s the regime i n A l g e r i a by
European p o l i t i c a l - m e d i a c i r c l e s .
[Rubin's remarks] c o u l d a l s o be the
f r u i t o f l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s and pressure on the p a r t o f well-known
i n t e r n a t i o n a l NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l
which e x e r c i s e t h e i r major i n f l u e n c e on Western p u b l i c o p i n i o n s e n s i t i v e t o
q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o human r i g h t s . "
MIDDLE EAST
EGYPT: "Arab S i l e n c e I s Shameful"
Columnist Salama Ahmed Salama commented (1/13) i n pro-government A l Ahram,
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure so f a r has f a i l e d t o u n v e i l the mystery o f the
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b r u t a l massacres i n A l g e r i a .
The U n i t e d States and Europe have r e t r a c t e d
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s when they r e c e i v e d the A l g e r i a n angry response t o t h e
request t o send an i n v e s t i g a t i o n committee t o A l g e r i a . The A l g e r i a n
government's p r e t e x t f o r r e j e c t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e i s n o t
c o n v i n c i n g . Arab s i l e n c e on the s i t u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a i s understood, b u t
shameful."
JORDAN:
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g The A l g e r i a n
Crisis?"
Senior e d i t o r Saleh Q a l l a b opined i n independent, mass-appeal Al-Arab
Al-Yawm ( 1 / 7 ) :
"Some people t h i n k i t i s easy t o form i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r Arab
f l e e t s and send them i n t o A l g e r i a .
They t h i n k t h a t the A l g e r i a n army w i l l
g i v e way, t h e t e r r o r i s t s w i l l throw away t h e i r weapons and e v e r y t h i n g w i l l
be over. S i m p l i f y i n g the m a t t e r i n t h i s way i s such a b i t t e r laugh. Those
who suggest t h e f o r m a t i o n o f these s a v i o r f l e e t s f o r g e t t h a t what i s
happening i n A l g e r i a i s n o t c h i l d r e n ' s p l a y i n a s m a l l v i l l a g e .
I t i s the
outcome o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l p o l a r i z a t i o n t h a t found the p e r f e c t
atmosphere t o take r o o t and f l o u r i s h and then t u r n a g a i n s t the A l g e r i a n s . "
"Yes
To I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g The A l g e r i a n
Crisis"
Managing e d i t o r Yahya Mahmoud argued i n b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d Al-Aswaq ( 1 / 7 ) :
"The c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n on the A l g e r i a n c r i s i s . . . should be
approved by anyone who r e a l i z e s the amount o f s u f f e r i n g o f the A l g e r i a n
people.... The f a c t t h a t the A l g e r i a n government i s i n c a p a b l e o f
p r o t e c t i n g the A l g e r i a n people, and t h a t the Arabs and Muslims have f a i l e d
t o A r a b i z e t h i s c r i s i s leaves one hope o n l y :
t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e s
w i l l i n t e r v e n e i n order t o r e s t o r e s e c u r i t y t o the A l g e r i a n s . "
SAUDI ARABIA:
"Foreign I n t e r v e n t i o n W i l l Not End A l g e r i a ' s
Suffering"
Jeddah-based, c o n s e r v a t i v e Al-Madina h e l d (1/13), "To f r e e A l g e r i a from t h e
nightmare o f t e r r o r i s m and v i o l e n c e i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f i t s people.
Foreign i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l n o t end A l g e r i a ' s s u f f e r i n g from t e r r o r i s m , which
has found save havens i n some European c o u n t r i e s t h a t have welcomed
t e r r o r i s t elements.... Nonetheless, what i s t a k i n g p l a c e i n A l g e r i a ,
k i l l i n g i n the name o f I s l a m . . . w i l l g r e a t l y damage Muslims' image among
non-Muslim s o c i e t i e s and w i l l a l s o open a wide window b e f o r e v i o l e n t groups
which might b e l i e v e t h a t by seeing what i s going i n A l g e r i a w i l l condone
k i l l i n g as a method t h a t i s s t i l l l e g i t i m a t e . "
EUROPE
FRANCE:
"Algiers
For A Status Quo"
Dominique Bromberger commented on government-run France I n t e r r a d i o
(1/15):
"The EU has j u s t proved i t d i d not know o r understand how t h e
A l g e r i a n regime worked.... I n the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n , good i n t e n t i o n s a r e
not enough. EU members should decide what they want. A l g i e r s knows what
i t wants:
I t wants t o c o n t i n u e w i t h the same p o l i c i e s . The West, on t h e
o t h e r hand, i s v e r y unsure o f i t s o b j e c t i v e s .
P a r i s , f o r example, f e a r s an
initiative
t h a t might change t h i n g s i n the Maghreb.... The temporary
f a i l u r e o f the
EU i n i t i a t i v e can h a r d l y be a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t t o many French
officials."
" A l g e r i a And The UN C h a r t e r "
Georges Kiejman, a lawyer and former m i n i s t e r ,
i n l e f t - o f - c e n t e r Le Monde
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(1/13), " I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, through i t s own
r u l e s , has d i v e s t e d i t s e l f o f t h e r i g h t t o a s s i s t v i c t i m s i n s i d e t h e
borders o f a recognized n a t i o n . This p r i n c i p l e i s i n d i s p u t a b l e . But u n t i l
when w i l l i t remain undisputed?
This q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d . . . . The
q u e s t i o n i s whether we are ready t o break w i t h a p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e , t h a t
of
r e s p e c t i n g s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n s , even when i t means human beings cannot be
helped.
I n t h e end, human beings are t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s . . . . The goal i s not t o p r o t e c t n a t i o n s , b u t t o p r o t e c t t h e men,
women and c h i l d r e n who c o n s t i t u t e n a t i o n s . . . . Every n a t i o n w i l l have t o
examine t h e UN Charter i t has signed and wonder: p r o t e c t n a t i o n s o r t h e i r
c i t i z e n s ? I t i s time t o choose."
"France Continues I t s Support Of A l g i e r s , Without Any I l l u s i o n "
Jean-Christophe P l o q i n i n C a t h o l i c La C r o i x (1/12) : "France no l o n g e r has
any i l l u s i o n s about t h e A l g e r i a n regime, y e t i t s i m p l i c i t support o f
Zeroual's regime w i l l c o n t i n u e . . . . An observer, d i s a p p o i n t e d by France's
l a c k o f involvement, y e t r e a l i s t i c , made t h i s commentary: 'One must
choose between bombs i n t h e s t r e e t s o f P a r i s or i n Relizane ( A l g e r i a ) . '
P a r i s does not want i t s p o p u l a t i o n t o s u f f e r from i t s involvement i n t h e
Algerian situation....
I t has accepted t h e U.S. i n t r u s i o n i n t h e A l g e r i a n
c r i s i s . . . even i f France's i n f l u e n c e i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e c r i s i s remains
e s s e n t i a l f o r Washington and B r u s s e l s . . . .
France's d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n ,
unchanged i n s p i t e o f a change i n i t s government, can be e x p l a i n e d i n p a r t
because no one can see an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e A l g e r i a n regime.... The
c r i s i s i n v o l v e s t h r e e aspects:
s e c u r i t y , a v o i d i n g bombs i n P a r i s ;
s t r a t e g y , France's r o l e i n t h e Maghreb must be m a i n t a i n e d ; economic, t r a d e
must be safeguarded.
For these t h r e e reasons, i t i s i m p o r t a n t f o r France
not t o e n t e r i n t o a c o n f l i c t w i t h A l g e r i a . "
"The F a u l t L i n e "
P i e r r e Beylau wrote i n r i g h t - o f - c e n t e r weekly Le Point (1/9) : " I n t e r v e n t i o n
i s a d e l i c a t e e x e r c i s e . Former examples such as Lebanon, I r a q , Somalia and
Rwanda were f a i l u r e s f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, even i f t h e n a t i o n s
i n q u e s t i o n were p r a c t i c a l l y w i t h o u t government, which i s n o t t h e case f o r
A l g e r i a . . . . But A l g e r i a i s p a r t o f a g i g a n t i c s e m i - c i r c l e o f c r i s e s , from
the Caucasus t o t h e Maghreb, from C e n t r a l Asia t o t h e Balkans, and from
the Middle East t o t h e G u l f , which i s a f f e c t i n g t h e Arab and I s l a m i c w o r l d .
The massacres i n A l g e r i a cannot be c o m p l e t e l y d i s a s s o c i a t e d from those o f
A f g h a n i s t a n , Egypt or I r a n .
I t i s a cauldron of s o c i a l f r u s t r a t i o n s ,
i d e n t i t y c r i s e s and n o s t a l g i a f o r t h e golden age o f I s l a m . A l g e r i a , l i k e
Turkey, i s a t t h e core o f a f a u l t l i n e between two w o r l d s : one t u r n e d
toward Western modernity, t h e o t h e r toward r e g r e s s i o n t o t h e Middle Ages."
"A D i p l o m a t i c
Intervention"
Jose Garcon s a i d i n l e f t - o f - c e n t e r L i b e r a t i o n ( 1 / 7 ) : "Whatever becomes o f
Washington's hopes f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n q u i r y , t h e U.S. request w i l l
have a t l e a s t underscored t h e r i s i n g doubts and q u e s t i o n s over t h e r e a l
c u l p r i t s behind t h e massacres.... The s i l e n c e which f o l l o w e d t h i s request,
b e f o r e A l g i e r s decided t o c a l l t h e U.S. ambassador, i s i n d i c a t i v e o f
A l g e r i a ' s embarrassment w i t h r e g a r d t o Washington's new p o s i t i o n , a f t e r
having been l u l l e d by U.S. support o f t h e A l g e r i a n regime over t h e
summer."
"Algeria,
Again"
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Bruno Frappat judged i n C a t h o l i c La C r o i x (1/6) : " I t seems t h a t f o r t h e
first
time t h e r e i s a s i g n a European conscience.... The a t t i t u d e o f t h e
A l g e r i a n government remains an enigma.... I t has o f f i c i a l l y remained deaf
to every o f f e r o f m e d i a t i o n or i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement.
I f this attitude
c o n t i n u e s , t h e government's i n a b i l i t y t o ensure t h e s a f e t y o f i t s
p o p u l a t i o n w i l l be compounded by doubts about whether these massacres
d i s t u r b t h e government a t a l l . "
BRITAIN:
" A l g e r i a ' s Awful
Slaughter"
Independent weekly Economist e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 9 ) : "The savagery beggars
the i m a g i n a t i o n . At t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s do e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
l i t t l e t o protect c i v i l i a n s .
Negligence o r c o m p l i c i t y ? Many A l g e r i a n s
have come t o suspect c o m p l i c i t y . This c o u l d be wicked nonsense. But u n t i l
an independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n removes t h e smear o f c o m p l i c i t y , o r e x p l a i n s
the n e g l i g e n c e , a n t i - t e r r o r i s t a s s i s t a n c e f o r A l g e r i a makes l i t t l e sense.
O u t s i d e r s should n e i t h e r be i n t i m i d a t e d by A l g e r i a ' s b r u i s e d n a t i o n a l i s m
nor accept t h a t i t i s business as u s u a l . The best way t o h e l p A l g e r i a n s i s
t o h e l p them t o f i n d o u t what t h e h e l l i s going on i n t h e i r own sad
country. "
"Terror I n A l g e r i a "
Conservative D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 9 ) : "The h i s t o r i c s l a u g h t e r
i n A l g e r i a has a t l a s t s t i r r e d Western powers t o attempt t o i n t e r v e n e . The
West should now be u r g i n g t h e government i n A l g i e r s t o reopen a d i a l o g u e
w i t h t h e FIS leaders Abassi Madani and A l i Benhadj, w i t h a view t o b r i n g i n g
them back i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l arena. T h e i r commitment t o democracy, beyond
i t s u s e f u l n e s s as a s t e p p i n g stone t o power, i s open t o doubt, b u t they a r e
v i a b l e i n t e r l o c u t o r s i n t h e search f o r peace."
"Demand For I m p a r t i a l E x t e r n a l I n v e s t i g a t o r s "
Independent F i n a n c i a l Times e d i t o r i a l i z e d (1/6) : "The l e a s t t h e ( A l g e r i a n )
government can do now i s t o accede t o t h e growing demand...for i m p a r t i a l
e x t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t o r s t o be g i v e n f u l l access so t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
the massacres can be e s t a b l i s h e d as c l e a r l y as p o s s i b l e . The longer i t
refuses t h a t demand, the more i t b r i n g s s u s p i c i o n on i t s e l f , and the more
u n c o m f o r t a b l e i n v e s t o r s must f e e l doing business w i t h t h e generals i n
Algiers."
GERMANY: "The EU Makes I t Too Easy For A l g e r i a "
C e n t r i s t Der Tagesspiegel o f B e r l i n s t a t e d (1/15), " I f t h e Europeans had
decided t o send m i n i s t e r s t o A l g e r i a , then i t would have been i m p o s s i b l e
f o r t h e regime t o drag i t s head so e a s i l y o u t o f t h e noose. The statement
t h a t t h e EU d e l e g a t i o n l a c k s p r e s t i g e i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . . . . On t h e o t h e r
hand, the A l g i e r s government i s happy about the postponement, since i t o n l y
r e l u c t a n t l y agreed t o t h e v i s i t o f t h e EU d e l e g a t i o n . . . . However, t h e EU
should not g i v e i n and demand an i n v e s t i g a t i o n about the massacres and i t s
background. To r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t o questions r e g a r d i n g t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s m — a s t h e regime has demanded—would u n i l a t e r a l l y s t r e n g t h e n a
m i l i t a r y regime which does n o t make any v o l u n t a r y step t o end the p o l i t i c a l
crisis."
" L e f t By A l l a h "
Axel V e i e l noted (1/15) i n an e d i t o r i a l i n l e f t - o f - c e n t e r F r a n k f u r t e r
Rundschau, " I t i s d i f f i c u l t n o t t o f a l l i n t o c y n i c i s m .
I n a state with
whom the EU conducts t a l k s about an a s s o c i a t i o n agreement, people are
massacred by t h e hundreds almost on a d a i l y b a s i s . . . .
U n t i l yesterday, a
l i t t l e b i t o f hope r e s t e d w i t h t h e EU, or l e t us be more p r e c i s e , w i t h some
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p o l i t i c i a n s o f the EU who haggled w i t h t h e r u l e r s i n A l g i e r s about t h i n g s
they were a l l o w e d t o say d u r i n g t h e i r t r i p t o A l g e r i a . But they were n o t
allowed
t o r a i s e embarrassing q u e s t i o n s . . . since t h i s would have r a i s e d t h e
q u e s t i o n o f power i n a c o u n t r y i n which the army has a l o t b u t t h e
o p p o s i t i o n almost n o t h i n g t o say.
The A l g i e r s government s a i d t h a t i t
would accept a s s i s t a n c e i n i t s f i g h t ' a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and i t pretended
t h a t the past s i x years d i d not r e v e a l t h a t the bloodshed c o u l d not be
c o n t a i n e d w i t h p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y f o r c e alone.
"But now the weak hopes o f the Europeans have now a l s o been i n v a i n .
Obviously, the Europeans d i d not want t o submit t o the censorship o f t h e
hosts and the v i s i t was canceled.... What can now be done t o e x e r t
i n f l u e n c e on the country?
Economic t h r e a t e n i n g gestures w i l l h a r d l y
impress t h e r u l e r s i n A l g i e r s . There c o f f e r s have been f i l e d w i t h r e c o r d
y i e l d s from o i l and gas businesses deals as h a r d l y b e f o r e i n the p a s t .
Sanctions a l s o harbor the r i s k o f c o n t i n u i n g t o weaken the d i s c r e d i t e d
s t a t e power b u t , a t t h e same t i m e , o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g the t e r r o r i s t s and o f
encouraging them o f c o m m i t t i n g even g r e a t e r b a r b a r i t i e s .
I t seems t h a t
A l g e r i a ' s youth i s n o t the o n l y one t h a t i s l e f t by A l l a h . "
"Mediation M i s s i o n "
Immo Vogel commented on ARD-TV's ( n a t i o n a l channel one) l a t e evening
newscast Tagesthemen (1/14): "The A l g e r i a n government has been unable t o
c r e a t e a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y open c l i m a t e and t o e n t e r i n t o a d i a l o g u e w i t h
everybody who i s w i l l i n g t o do so. This i s where
we must o f f e r a s s i s t a n c e .
This c o u l d be d i p l o m a t i c a s s i s t a n c e , b u t i t
must take place i n a v i g o r o u s manner. And t h i s energy should not weaken
when our i n t e r e s t s i n A l g e r i a n o i l and gas s u p p l i e s a r e i n v o l v e d . I f t h e
EU t r o i k a r e a l l y t r a v e l s t o A l g i e r s , i t should a l s o be w i l l i n g t o r i s k
s h o r t - t e r m economic i n t e r e s t s i n order t o achieve l o n g - t e r m g o a l s . I t
would be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the EU t o p r a c t i c e f i n a l l y
a foreign policy that
deserves i t s name."
"U.S. Superpower Could Use I t s I n f l u e n c e "
R i g h t - o f - c e n t e r Koelnische Rundschau judged (1/14), " I t i s an open s e c r e t
t h a t some o f the 'Arab b r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , ' p r o b a b l y w i t h Saudi Arabia a t
the helm, support the murderous gangs w i t h money and arms. I n t h i s
r e s p e c t , t h e U.S. superpower c o u l d use i t s i n f l u e n c e . "
"No Domestic P o l i c y A f f a i r "
R i g h t - o f - c e n t e r Maerkische Oderzeitung o f F r a n k f u r t on the Oder s t a t e d
(1/12) i n an e d i t o r i a l by Uwe Krueger: "From the Pope t o the r e l i g i o u s
leaders i n I r a n everybody agrees: The massacres i n A l g e r i a must s t o p . But
nobody has shown an approach on how t h i s can be achieved. The regime i n
A l g i e r s does n o t want t o show i t s hand. This n u r t u r e s t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t
the f a n a t i c I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n i s n o t s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the bloodshed
w i t h o u t end.
I n view o f the e s t i m a t e d 80,000 people who have been k i l l e d
so f a r , o n l y massive i n t e r f e r e n c e from the o u t s i d e can h e l p . The h e s i t a n t
EU attempt t o support the v i c t i m s i s going t o the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n but t h i s
i s n o t enough. the A l g i e r s government must a l l o w independent observers a
view onto the r e a l s i t u a t i o n .
For a long time, the u n i n h i b i t e d k i l l i n g o f
d e f e n s e l e s s c i v i l i a n s has no longer been a domestic a f f a i r . "
ITALY: "Another Defeat I n Mediterranean For Europe"
A l b e r t o Negri commented i n l e a d i n g business I I Sole-24 Ore (1/15):
" A l g i e r s ' 'big r e f u s a l '
can be a s u r p r i s e o n l y f o r d i s t r a c t e d Brussels
bureaucrats....
Political
Europe has been a c y n i c a l s p e c t a t o r o f t h e
massacre as much as t h e A l g e r i a n government, now accused o f being unable
t o p r o t e c t t h e p o p u l a t i o n , or even o f being i n v o l v e d i n the massacres.
The r e s u l t i s c l e a r t o everybody. The A l g e r i a n government can a f f o r d t o
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slam t h e door on t h e European t r o i k a and t h i s Mediterranean t r a g e d y , long
i g n o r e d , i s t u r n i n g i n t o a European f a i l u r e , t o which we can add t h e Middle
East and Turkey. The l i s t grows longer by t h e day."
"Wrong Steps By A l l Sides"
A commentary i n l e f t - l e a n i n g , i n f l u e n t i a l La Repubblica (1/12) by
e c o n o m i c / p o l i t i c a l commentator Mario P i r a n i focuse on t h e d i s p u t e c r e a t e d
by I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r D i n i ' s r e c e n t telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e
I r a n i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r about t h e s i t u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a and t h e l a t t e r ' s
i r r i t a t i o n over D i n i ' s i n i t i a t i v e .
P i r a n i wrote:
"In trying t o explain
the e x t r a v a g a n t I t a l i a n i n i t i a t i v e . . . we should keep i n mind t h a t , some time
ago, t h e ENI ( I t a l i a n
s t a t e o i l company) gas p i p e l i n e i n A l g e r i a was t h e
t a r g e t o f a t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k and s u p p l i e s t o I t a l y were i n t e r r u p t e d f o r
f o u r days. We can guess t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e d g o o d w i l l r e c e n t l y shown by t h e
I r a n i a n government towards t h e West has prompted M i n i s t e r D i n i ' s opening
towards I r a n , s i n c e i t i s t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e best p o s i t i o n t o convince t h e
t e r r o r i s t s t o spare t h e p i p e l i n e network which p r o v i d e s s u p p l i e s t o I t a l y .
An e x e r c i s e i n o i l diplomacy which we cannot condemn. However, s i n c e t h i s
k i n d o f diplomacy o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t s o f f i c i a l p o l i c y , i t r e q u i r e s maximum
secrecy and, should i t be d i s c o v e r e d , t h e promptest and most impudent
d e n i a l . L e t alone TV i n t e r v i e w s . "
BELGIUM: " A l g e r i a n Government Has Key To S o l u t i o n To T e r r o r I n I t s Hands"
Foreign a f f a i r s w r i t e r J i m Lannoo s t a t e d (1/13) i n business
Financieel-Economische T i j d ,
"Despite t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's
c o n s i d e r a b l e response, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t o e n t e r i n t o a c t i o n i s l i m i t e d .
m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t o be r u l e d o u t f o r s e v e r a l reasons.
First,
A l g i e r s does n o t
A
want t o hear about i t .
Second, t h e r e w i l l be h a r d l y any c o u n t r i e s w i l l i n g
t o send s o l d i e r s i n t o t h e A l g e r i a n h o r n e t s ' n e s t . Moreover, i t i s
a b s o l u t e l y u n c l e a r a g a i n s t whom an i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e w i l l have t o a c t .
Even an embargo...on A l g e r i a n o i l and gas e x p o r t s - - t h e a r t e r y o f t h e
economy-~would n o t b r i n g s o l a c e .
Indeed, such an embargo would h i t m a i n l y
the people....
Consequently, t h e hands o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community seem
t o be t i e d .
That means t h a t t h e b a l l i s i n t h e A l g e r i a n camp.... I t i s
very l i k e l y , however, t h a t A l g i e r s w i l l n o t take i n i t i a t i v e s t o take
measures i t s e l f , as was t h e case i n t h e p a s t . Only through s u f f i c i e n t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure w i l l something s t a r t t o move i n A l g e r i a t o p o s s i b l y
begin t o end t h e t e r r o r .
Only i f t h a t i s t h e case w i l l t h e recent
s a c r i f i c e s n o t have been i n v a i n . "
"The
S i l e n c e Of Power"
C a t h o l i c Vers 1'Avenir (1/10) opined, "The armed f o r c e s ' apparent
powerlessness, t h e s i l e n c e o f power, i t s stubborn r e f u s a l o f an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n are unavoidably sowing doubt.
' I f i t has
n o t h i n g t o h i d e , i t should l e t us work,' say i n substance t h e human r i g h t s
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . We do n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h them."
"Two A l g e r i a s "
I n s o c i a l i s t La W a l l o n i e (1/10) and s o c i a l i s t Le Peuple
(1/12) Robert
Falony wrote:
"There are indeed two A l g e r i a s , t h a t o f P r e s i d e n t Z e r o u a l ,
of good business, o f o i l and gas c o n t r a c t s . That A l g e r i a i s n o t t h r e a t e n e d
by t e r r o r i s m and i t s u i t s t h e IMF p e r f e c t l y w e l l . And then, t h e r e i s t h e
s u f f e r i n g A l g e r i a , w i t h i t s p o p u l a t i o n s taken hostage and abandoned t o t h e
w i l d beasts....
I f Western European governments want t o be heard from t h e
A l g e r i a n government, they must q u e s t i o n t h e o i l and t h e gas c o n t r a c t s . The
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time i s even p r o p i t i o u s t o do so, w i t h low o i l p r i c e s and abundant s u p p l y . "
"Americans Fed Up"
Foreign a f f a i r s w r i t e r Joost Loncin i n l a b o r C a t h o l i c Het Volk (1/7)
observed:
"The f a c t t h a t t h e U n i t e d States i s demanding c l a r i t y should be
a s i g n a l t o t h e regime.
The Americans have enormous o i l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e
c o u n t r y . Because they are a l l e r g i c t o f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s , they have always
supported A l g e r i a ' s regime.
However, they are now f e d up w i t h t h e army's
passiveness v i s - a - v i s t h e t e r r o r i s t s . "
"Important
Turnabout"
In c o n s e r v a t i v e C a t h o l i c La L i b r e Belgique (1/7) f o r e i g n e d i t o r Gerald Papy
wrote:
"The step taken by Washington r e p r e s e n t s an i m p o r t a n t t u r n a b o u t . . . .
The Americans — and t h e E u r o p e a n s — p r o b a b l y have t h e necessary means o f
pressure t o make t h e Zeroual regime accept i t s p r i n c i p l e .
But one should
a l s o make sure t h a t t h e m i s s i o n i s n o t so impeded t h a t t h e outcome o f i t s
research i s j e o p a r d i z e d , as was t h e case i n t h e Congo."
CANADA:
"Sign Of L i g h t I n A l g e r i a "
The l i b e r a l Montreal Gazette (1/12) opined b e f o r e A l g e r i a ' s r e f u s a l o f t h e
EU d e l e g a t i o n , "For t h e f i r s t time i n t h e s i x - y e a r c i v i l war... A l g e r i a ' s
m i l i t a r y - b a c k e d government might a l l o w an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i s s i o n i n t o t h e
c o u n t r y . . . . Even though A l g e r i a n P r e s i d e n t Liamine Zeroual has r e j e c t e d
any k i n d o f i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v i o l e n c e , t h e mere presence o f a
m u l t i n a t i o n a l f a c t - f i n d i n g m i s s i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l f i r s t s t e p t o d e a l i n g
w i t h t h e h o r r o r o f repeated, l a r g e - s c a l e massacres. Having made t h i s f i r s t
s t e p , t h e EU must c a r r y t h r o u g h on i t s i n i t i a t i v e and n o t a l l o w i t s
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o be d i c t a t e d t o by t h e A l g e r i a n government. I t must push
f o r a thorough and t r u t h f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e murky q u e s t i o n o f who i s
responsible f o r the k i l l i n g s .
Nothing can be done t o s t o p t h e v i l o l e n c e
u n t i l i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d who i s r e s p o n s i b l e . . . . As o u t s i d e
i n v e s t i g a t o r s . . . s t a r t t o a r r i v e i n A l g e r i a , o t h e r Western and Arab n a t i o n s
should use t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o add t h e i r v o i c e s and impress on A l g e r i a t h e
need t o accept o u t s i d e h e l p i n ending
the war.... This i s one o f t h e r a r e i n s t a n c e s where t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community i s o f one mind. A l g e r i a e v i d e n t l y i s v e r y u n w i l l i n g t o comply.
And t h e f a c t remains t h a t t h e European Union has l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l leverage
over A l g e r i a , s i n c e i t s t r a d e w i t h t h e North A f r i c a n n a t i o n i s s m a l l . But
i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure has an undeniable e f f e c t . . . .
For t h e t e r r i f i e d
c i t i z e n s o f A l g e r i a , convinced t h a t t h e i r government has abandoned them,
the o u t s i d e w o r l d i s t h e i r o n l y hope."
THE NETHERLANDS: " I r a n O f f e r s I t s M e d i a t i o n S e r v i c e s "
Amsterdam-based, f i n a n c i a l Het F i n a n c i e e l e Dagblad c a r r i e d t h i s i n s i d e page
a n a l y s i s (1/13): " I t i s remarkable t h a t I r a n has o f f e r e d i t s s e r v i c e s t o
reach a d i a l o g u e i n A l g e r i a between t h e regime o f P r e s i d e n t Zeroual and t h e
FIS and p o s s i b l e o t h e r Muslim movements. I r a n i a n P r e s i d e n t Khatami
p r o b a b l y has two reasons f o r t h i s d e c i s i o n : Tehran i s l o o k i n g f o r an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f u t e e a r l i e r Western a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t both t h e A l g e r i a n
regime and I r a n support and encourage t h e r e v o l u t i o n o f t h e A l g e r i a n
Muslims; t h e second reason c o u l d be t h a t I r a n i s t r y i n g t o show t h e w o r l d
t h a t i t i s s e r i o u s about a d o p t i n g a more c o n s t r u c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y which
c o u l d end I r a n ' s i s o l a t i o n . "
"International
Investigations"
I n f l u e n t i a l , l i b e r a l De V o l k s k r a n t e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 9 ) :
" I f the Algerian
government c o n t i n u e s t o p r e t e n d t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g wrong, then i t does
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c r e a t e an impression of c o m p l i c i t y . . . .
Only through
independent
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , as requested by the UN and the U.S./EU, can
the r e a l s i t u a t i o n be c l a r i f i e d . "
POLAND:
"Democracies Do Not Cut
Throats"
C e n t r i s t Rzeczpospolita ran t h i s a r t i c l e i n by Kazimierz Dziewanowski,
former P o l i s h ambassador t o the U.S.
(1/10-11):
"With so many a t r o c i t i e s
committed i n the w o r l d , i t i s f u t i l e t o d i s c u s s which one i s more h o r r i b l e
than the o t h e r s .
What has been o c c u r r i n g i n A l g e r i a , however, i s
something p o s s i b l y the most a t r o c i o u s and simply u n t h i n k a b l e . . . .
The
t e r r o r i n A l g e r i a n v i l l a g e s exceeds any [known] c a t e g o r i e s .
People
should not cut o t h e r people's t h r o a t s or burn them a l i v e , e s p e c i a l l y so
w i t h respect t o women and c h i l d r e n .
How c i t i z e n s of one c o u n t r y can do
such h o r r i b l e t h i n g s t o t h e i r c o m p a t r i o t s , w i t h whom they are not on a war
f o o t i n g , i s simply not p o s s i b l e t o understand."
RUSSIA:
" A l g e r i a P r e f e r s U.S.
To Europe"
Aleksandr S h u m i l i n observed i n r e f o r m i s t , b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d Kommersant
D a i l y (1/15): "The EU has not given up t r y i n g t o i n f l u e n c e the s i t u a t i o n i n
A l g e r i a , the scene of a s i x - y e a r t e r r o r i s t rampage, e s p e c i a l l y as the
Union's u l t i m a t e goal i s t o secure i t s economic i n t e r e s t s i n t h a t o i l - and
gas-rich country.
I t has been r e p o r t e d i n f o r m a l l y t h a t the Europeans
a r e n ' t t r u s t e d much i n A l g e r i a , t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y q u e s t i o n e d by the the
local authorities.
By c o n t r a s t , the Americans are s a i d t o be more
understanding and very s u p p o r t i v e , and t h a t combines w i t h economic
c o o p e r a t i o n between A l g e r i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . "
" A u t h o r i t i e s Helpless I n The Face Of T e r r o r "
Y u l i a Petrovskaya s a i d i n c e n t r i s t Nezavisimaya Gazeta (1/13): "As of now
i t i s obvious t h a t the government can't cope w i t h I s l a m i s t m i l i t a n t s .
The
m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n s are s p l i t on how t o deal w i t h the t e r r o r i s t s .
At
the same t i m e , i t i s hard t o see how o t h e r c o u n t r i e s can r e a l l y h e l p .
The
c o n f l i c t i n A l g e r i a , a c c o r d i n g t o UN e x p e r t s , i s v e r y s p e c i f i c and s t r i c t l y
i n t e r n a l , not t h r e a t e n i n g t o spread beyond the n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s .
Besides,
the A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s have o f f i c i a l l y t u r n e d down a l l f o r e i g n a i d
o f f e r e d t o r e s o l v e the problem."
SPAIN: " A l g e r i a "
J. R. Gonzalez Cabezas d e p l o r e d i n Barcelona's c e n t r i s t La Vanguardia
(1/14): " A l g e r i a i s i n a s t a t e of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
I t isn't that central
a u t h o r i t y doesn't e x i s t ; i t simply doesn't govern, c o n f i n i n g i t s e l f t o the
c o n t r o l of the petroleum economy.... I t i s w e l l known t h a t n o t h i n g
provokes h u m a n i t a r i a n concern as much as economic or g e o s t r a t e g i c
i n t e r e s t s . At the present time, no one i n A l g e r i a knows where the power
l i e s , not today nor i n the f u t u r e . Given t h i s vacuum, no one knows who i s
doing the k i l l i n g , i n whose name, or of how many, which i s why the r e p o r t s
of h o r r i f i c happenings i n t h a t c o u n t r y at times l a c k a framework of
understanding....
The t r u t h i s being h e l d hostage. Thus, when the Pope
d e c l a r e s t h a t 'no one can k i l l i n the name of God,' one wonders whether
t h i s i s a plea or a condemnation.... I n s t e a d of making i m p o s s i b l e demands
f o r p r e c i s e body-counts, what needs t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d i s the a u t h o r s h i p of
these c r u e l massacres i n order t o f i n d out why."
TURKEY: "The World I s Helpless Again"
Sami Kohen wrote i n mass-appeal M i l l i y e t (1/13), "The massacres i n a l g e r i a
are i n c r e a s i n g , and every week more h o r r i f y i n g than ever r e p o r t s appear.
And what i s the whole w o r l d doing r e g a r d i n g t h i s drama? The i n t e r n a t i o n a l
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community's r e a c t i o n , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , reminds me o f t h e i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o
the Bosnian c i v i l war. I n o t h e r words, t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s not
t a k i n g any measures t o prevent t h e massacres, b u t o n l y e x p r e s s i n g concern
and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t .
The I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s , OIC i n p a r t i c u l a r , should take
the i n i t i a t i v e .
But t h e r e i s n o t h i n g coming on t h a t s i d e . The U n i t e d
Nations d i d n o t even i n c l u d e A l g e r i a i n i t s agenda. As f o r t h e U n i t e d
States and EU, t h e r e are o n l y i n i t i a l signs t h a t they p l a n t o take t h e
initiative.
The C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n wants an i n s p e c t i o n team t o be sent
to A l g e r i a . And t h e EU plans t o send another group w i t h i n t h e framework o f
' c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m under war c o n d i t i o n s , ' i n an attempt t o
persuade t h e A l g e r i a n government.... Of course, sending f o r e i g n t r o o p s t o
A l g e r i a or f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s not t h e way t o end t h e ongoing drama i n
t h i s c o u n t r y . I t should be up t o t h e A l g e r i a n government and i t s s e c u r i t y
f o r c e s t o decide t h e ways and means t o prevent these massacres. However,
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o show s e n s i t i v i t y , and
help f i n d out what i s r e a l l y going on i n A l g e r i a . "
SOUTH ASIA
IRAN:
"The Butchers
Of A l g e r i a "
D a i l y Tehran Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l opined ( 1 / 8 ) , " I n t h e North A f r i c a n s t a t e
of A l g e r i a , human r i g h t s are being s a c r i f i c e d a t t h e a l t a r o f p o l i t i c s .
The m e r c i l e s s s l a u g h t e r o f innocent A l g e r i a n s i s becoming a r o u t i n e a f f a i r .
The f i n g e r o f s u s p i c i o n , o f course, p o i n t s t o t h e c o m p l i c i t y o f t h e
government, headed by Liamine Zeroual, and t h e m i l i t a r y i n t h e h o r r i b l e
massacres. The m i l i t a r y which has propped up Z e r o u a l , p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e
i n A l g e r i a and s i n c e i t commands c o n s i d e r a b l e sway i n i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , i t
i s a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e law and order s i t u a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y . But,
as i t has f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y , i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t t h e army i s
i n cahoots w i t h t h e regime i n t h e b u t c h e r i n g o f t h e A l g e r i a n s w i t h t h e
m a l i c i o u s i n t e n t i o n o f t a r n i s h i n g t h e name o f t h e I s l a m i s t s . . . . The w o r l d
community has been rendered powerless by t h e r e f u s a l o f A l g i e r s t o a l l o w an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a c t - f i n d i n g m i s s i o n or even a European Union team t o i n q u i r e
i n t o t h e human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s . . . . A l g e r i a , or r a t h e r i t s people, needs
a h e l p i n g hand from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community whether t h e government
l i k e s i t or n o t . I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure should be kept up on A l g i e r s t o see
reason, s i n c e t h e r e i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . "
"OIC
Now Or Nuremberg L a t e r "
The o f f i c i a l , English-language I r a n News opined ( 1 / 7 ) , "The a c t i o n s o f
A l g e r i a ' s generals are a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i r wish t o dominate t h e
c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l system and exclude t h e p o p u l a t i o n from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n
the p o l i t i c a l process w h i l e t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d , on t h e eve o f t h e 2 1 s t
c e n t u r y , i s marching toward democracy, p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and
freedom.
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s and o t h e r groups p r e t e n d i n g t o be
guardians o f freedom and j u s t i c e have been s i l e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e A l g e r i a n
c r i s i s and t h e ongoing genocide i n t h a t c o u n t r y .
[German Foreign M i n i s t e r ]
K i n k e l ' s s u g g e s t i o n [ t h a t t h e European Union become i n v o l v e d ] , i f adopted
by t h e EU, would be a t r u l y p o s i t i v e step i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f r e s o l v i n g t h e
A l g e r i a n problem. However, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t A l g e r i a i s a Muslim
c o u n t r y and a member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e I s l a m i c Conference (OIC),
i t i s t h e duty o f OIC t o get a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e A l g e r i a n i s s u e and t o
go f u r t h e r than j u s t r e l e a s i n g statements and a d o p t i n g non-binding
resolutions.
I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s , r e g i o n a l groupings and a l l i a n c e s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A f r i c a n U n i t y (OAU) should p u t pressure on
the A l g e r i a n government and b r i n g an end t o these massacres."
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BANGLADESH:
"Genocide I n A l g e r i a Should
Page 11 of 36
Stop"
I n t h e view o f c o n s e r v a t i v e I t t e f a q (1/14), "The I s l a m i s t s are being h e l d
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e ominous k i l l i n g t h a t i s t a k i n g so many i n n o c e n t l i v e s .
So f a r , t h e government v e r s i o n has been taken as t r u e o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y .
Now, many a n a l y s t s doubt t h a t government hands may be behind t h e
killings....
Many observers b e l i e v e t h a t t h e UN must f i n a l l y do something
to stop the k i l l i n g .
I t c o u l d begin by sending an i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission
t o A l g e r i a . They t h i n k t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e i s enough t o make t h e
A l g e r i a n government agree t o a commission.... We t h i n k t h a t t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community must p u t pressure on t h e government t o e s t a b l i s h a
genuine democracy t h r o u g h a f r e e , f a i r and a c c e p t a b l e e l e c t i o n s i d e by s i d e
of saving t h e innocent people from t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s t hyenas. We do not
t h i n k t h a t a permanent peace w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d i n A l g e r i a w i t h o u t genuine
democracy."
"UN I n v e s t i g a t i o n Team I s Needed For A l g e r i a "
C o n s e r v a t i v e I s l a m i c Sangram m a i n t a i n e d (1/12), "The Geneva-based UN Human
r i g h t s commission has s a i d t h a t they are p l a n n i n g t o send a d e l e g a t i o n ( t o
A l g e r i a ) as a f i r s t step t o i n v e s t i g a t e genocide.
The UN and i t s members
can e a s i l y save t h e people o f many c o u n t r i e s from t y r a n n y . There are
precedents....
But i n many cases, t h e UN shows n e g l i g e n c e a t t h e
beginning.
I t u s u a l l y o n l y becomes a c t i v e a f t e r scores o f human l i v e s a r e
lost.
The case o f Bosnia i s a g l a r i n g example. The same i s happening i n
A l g e r i a . Any delay i n t a k i n g a c t i o n by t h e UN cannot be j u s t i f i e d a g a i n s t
the backdrop o f a t r o c i o u s i n c i d e n t s o f genocide and t h e continuous
v i o l a t i o n o f human r i g h t s i n A l g e r i a . We t h i n k t h a t t h e UN should take
speedy measures t o i n v e s t i g a t e genocide i n A l g e r i a , unmask t h e r e a l k i l l e r s
and punish them, i n o r d e r t o save t h e people."
INDIA:
" T r u t h Or Dare"
The c e n t r i s t Telegraph o f C a l c u t t a commented (1/15): "There i s i n c r e a s i n g
grounds f o r A l g i e r s t o r e c o n s i d e r i t s p o s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y toward t h e EU
which i s i t s l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r and c l o s e s t p o l i t i c a l a l l y .
This i s
because... massacres are s t a r t i n g t o undermine t h e government's c r e d i b i l i t y
both a t home and overseas....
The r e a l q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e government
i s d e l i b e r a t e l y encouraging t h e massacres, by d i r e c t involvement o r by
d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f u s i n g t o prevent them.... The apoplexy w i t h which A l g i e r s
r e a c t s t o any request f o r an independent look i n t o t h e k i l l i n g s has
s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e s u s p i c i o n . . . t h a t something i s r o t t e n i n t h e s t a t e . The
A l g e r i a n government... can s t i l l count on much i n t e r n a t i o n a l support g i v e n
f e a r s o f fundamentalism.
But i t w i l l n o t h e l p i t s cause i f i t does not
h e l p s c o t c h w o r r i e s t h a t t h e massacres i n d i c a t e e i t h e r a counter i n s u r g e n c y
o p e r a t i o n gone amok or an attempt t o sabotage peace n e g o t i a t i o n s by army
h a r d l i n e r s . And s u s p i c i o n s cannot be abated except t h r o u g h n e u t r a l
inquiry.
I n b a t t l i n g i n s u r g e n c i e s , h a l f t h e war i s waged over i n t a n g i b l e s
l i k e popular support and o f f i c i a l c r e d i b i l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y . By a d o p t i n g
a hedgehog p o l i c y towards e x t e r n a l requests f o r g r e a t e r t r a n s p a r e n c y , t h e
A l g i e r s regime w i l l f i n d i t s e l f l o s i n g t h e b a t t l e f o r such i n t a n g i b l e s on
the home f r o n t . "
"No S o l u t i o n I n S i g h t To A l g e r i a n I m b r o g l i o "
An e d i t o r i a l page a n a l y s i s i n Hindi-language Rajasthan P a t r i k a (1/13) s a i d ,
"France i s w i t n e s s i n g a deluge o f A l g e r i a n refugees. The f o u r m i l l i o n
Muslims i n France sympathize w i t h t h e A l g e r i a n s and want France t o
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i n t e r v e n e i n the c r i s i s .
This has l e f t France i n a dilemma. I f i t
i n t e r v e n e s as i t i s being expected t o do, i t w i l l be seen as being
supportive of a m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p .
I f i t takes the s i d e o f t h e
democrats, then i t w i l l have t o support the Nizam-e-Mustafa.... An
enhanced r o l e i n the c r i s i s i s being expected o f France because o f i t s
c o l o n i a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h A l g e r i a . . . . Over the past f i v e years, however,
France's peace i n i t i a t i v e s have been i n v a i n . "
" A l g e r i a I n A Time Of Massacre"
An e d i t o r i a l page a r t i c l e i n the c e n t r i s t Telegraph (1/12) by c o l u m n i s t
A.N.D. Haksar from C a l c u t t a noted, "As the v i o l e n c e e s c a l a t e d , hawks and
doves...are pondering an e v e n t u a l I s l a m i c i s t t a k e o v e r . . . . This c o u l d happen
i n t h r e e ways. One, a g r a d u a l I s l a m i c i s t ascendancy f o l l o w i n g a t a c t i c a l
powersharing compromise w i t h t h e government. Two, a f r a g m e n t i n g o f A l g e r i a
w i t h some p a r t s under I s l a m i c c o n t r o l . Three, a governmental c o l l a p s e , as
happened i n I r a n . An I s l a m i c regime... would have an e f f e c t s i m i l a r t o t h a t
of t h e 1979 I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . . . . This c o u l d d e s t a b i l i z e moderate Arab
regimes, undermine South Europe's s e c u r i t y and a f f e c t U.S. i n t e r e s t s . . . .
The West should w h o l e h e a r t e d l y back A l g i e r s . U n t i l r e c e n t l y the U n i t e d
S t a t e s , France and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s were doing j u s t t h a t .
But c a l l s f o r
peace missions and s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n p o l i c i e s p o i n t t o a new,
u n s t a t e d Western p o l i c y o f promoting power-sharing."
" I s l a m i c O r i e n t a t i o n Issue Of C o n f l i c t I n Moderate N a t i o n s "
The "Global Watch" column i n the pro-economic-reforms Economic Times by
p u n d i t K. Subrahmanyam s a i d (1/12), " While the I s l a m i c s t a t e s r a i s e hue
and c r y when they have a case a g a i n s t a n o n - I s l a m i c s t a t e they have chosen
t o keep t o t a l l y s i l e n t on t h i s carnage as they d i d d u r i n g the I r a q - I r a n war
and do i n respect o f A f g h a n i s t a n . . . .
"There a r e n o t enough m u l t i p a r t y democracies i n I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s t o g i v e
confidence t h a t I s l a m i c p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those who p r o f e s s l o y a l t y t o
I s l a m i c orthodoxy and r e v i v a l i s m , would p l a y p o l i t i c s a c c o r d i n g t o
democratic r u l e s o f the game. G e n e r a l l y they do not s u b s c r i b e t o t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f s e p a r a t i o n o f s t a t e and r e l i g i o n . . . .
The k i n d o f outrages
p e r p e t r a t e d on t o u r i s t s i n Egypt r e c e n t l y by I s l a m i c e x t r e m i s t groups does
not make I s l a m i c p a r t i e s c r e d i b l e f o r democratic i n t e r a c t i o n . . . .
I t is
a l s o an o v e r l o o k e d f a c t t h a t a m a j o r i t y o f the I s l a m i c p o p u l a t i o n l i v e
o u t s i d e the area o f c o n f l i c t where I s l a m i s t h e i s s u e . The m a j o r i t y o f t h e
Muslims i n the w o r l d a r e i n Indonesia, I n d i a , Bangladesh, Malaysia, t h e
C e n t r a l Asian r e p u b l i c s and elsewhere.
I s l a m i s seen as a source o f
extremism o n l y i n the Arab world,Turkey, I r a n , A f g h a n i s t a n and P a k i s t a n . "
AFRICA
BURKINA FASO:
"Algeria--The S t r a n g l e h o l d Of E x t e r n a l ' I n t e r f e r e n c e ' "
According t o independent Le Pays's " I n t e r n a l Dialogue" (1/13), "The
d e c i s i o n o f the Arab League, Canada and the European Union t o send an
i n v e s t i g a t i o n m i s s i o n t o t h i s c o u n t r y i s r e v e a l i n g o f the new a t t i t u d e s o f
the A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s who seem t o have watered down t h e i r usual
i n t r a n s i g e n c e . Even i f they do t h e i r utmost t o i n s i s t on the f a c t t h a t
such missions must have o n l y the vague o b j e c t i v e i n the f i g h t a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s m , i t doesn't lessen the f a c t t h a t they [are t r y i n g t o a v o i d ] t h e
u n i v e r s a l condemnation o f t h e i r way o f d e a l i n g w i t h the A l g e r i a n drama. I n
any case, t h e idea t h a t dominates i n a l l the chanceries i s t h a t the o n l y
way o f removing the s u s p i c i o n s t h a t weigh on them c o n s i s t s o f the A l g e r i a n
a u t h o r i t i e s a l l o w i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n m i s s i o n as suggested by
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the
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U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o determine r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the
massacres o f p o p u l a t i o n s . . . . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the e s c a l a t i n g c y c l e o f
v i o l e n c e and r e p r e s s i o n has never r e s o l v e d p o l i t i c a l problems.
Again, the
A l g e r i a n l e a d e r s must r e c o g n i z e t h e i r p a r t i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s
i m b r o g l i o . Hence t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e i n the s e t t i n g up o f an i n v e s t i g a t i o n
committee."
KENYA:
" A l g e r i a n s Cry For End To Massacres"
The c e n t r i s t D a i l y Nation's e d i t o r i a l h e l d (1/13) p r i o r t o A l g e r i a ' s
r e f u s a l t o admit the EU d e l e g a t i o n : "The frequency and savagery of the
a t t a c k s and the i n c r e a s i n g l y h i g h c a s u a l t i e s are a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t
the government cannot expect t o c o n t a i n the a t t a c k s .
In this l i g h t , i t is
encouraging t h a t the government has accepted t o meet a m i s s i o n from the
European Union t o advise on how t o counter I s l a m i c e x t r e m i s t s . We hope i t
i s a s t a r t t o g e t t i n g a formula t h a t w i l l b r i n g t o an end the b l o o d b a t h
t h a t has come t o c h a r a c t e r i z e l i f e i n A l g e r i a . "
EAST ASIA AND
INDONESIA:
"End A l g e r i a n
PACIFIC
Tragedy"
The l e a d i n g , independent, English-language J a k a r t a Post s a i d (1/15):
"Both the Western and Arab d e l e g a t i o n s , f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n reasons, should
adopt a f i r m stance i n persuading the A l g i e r s government t o take c o n c r e t e
measures t o p r o t e c t i t s people from becoming t a r g e t s o f f u r t h e r massacres,
c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the m i l i t a r y - b a c k e d government o f P r e s i d e n t Liamine
Zeroual has proven t o be i n e f f e c t i v e i n combating years o f v i o l e n c e .
E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t f o r the missions t o undertake i s t o f i n d out who the
c u l p r i t s are amid a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t the s e c u r i t y t r o o p s c o u l d a l s o be
i m p l i c a t e d i n the c o u n t l e s s massacres i n A l g e r i a so as t o t a r n i s h the
image o f FIS members."
LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA:
"Dead-End Tragedy"
Rolando R i v i e r e , d a i l y - o f - r e c o r d La Nacion's Europe-based correspondent,
wrote from Madrid (1/13) c o n c e r n i n g a European m i s s i o n t o A l g e r i a :
"Imagine an A u s t r i a n , a B r i t and a Luxembourg c i t i z e n t r y i n g t o c a p t u r e ,
not the essence o f these a s s a s i n s ' groups, whether f u n d a m e n t a l i s t or n o t ,
but the i d i o s y n c r a s y o f a m i l l e n i a l and d i s t a n t people, who l i v e and s l e e p
i n a d i f f e r e n t manner, i n s p i t e o f being o n l y 200 k i l o m e t e r s away from
Europe. W i l l t h e y o u t l i n e a c a t a l o g w i t h the GIA, t h e FIS, and Hamas's
s o f t e r elements i n a separate chapter? W i l l t h e y worry about not annoying
anyone, making sure t h a t the r e f i n e r i e s and gas are safe? And the
k i l l i n g s ? They w i l l c o n t i n u e . Death i s not c a l l e d out i n the Stock
Exchange."
COSTA RICA:
"Cycle Of
Barbarism"
C o n s e r v a t i v e La Nacion observed (1/15) : "Last June, the f i r s t m u l t i p a r t y
p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s s i n c e 1992 were conducted... the r e s u l t s c o n f i r m e d
the g e n e r a l r e p u d i a t i o n of the excesses of the r a d i c a l I s l a m i c
f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s s m a l l democratic opening d i d not
d i m i n i s h the v i o l e n c e . . . . The EU w i l l send e m i s s a r i e s t o A l g e r i a t o
e x p l o r e ways t o r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t .
H o p e f u l l y these a c t i o n s w i l l
t r a n s l a t e i n t o more democracy, w i t h o u t which A l g e r i a w i l l never achieve
peace."
�Page 14 of 36
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•VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA:
P6Qy&P#Thursday, January
15, 1998
IS THE WORLD 'HELPLESS IN THE FACE OF TERROR'?
•Alarmed by t h e b r u t a l massacre o f over 1,000 A l g e r i a n s m o s t l y r u r a l women,
chil
dren and e l d e r l y p e o p l e s i n c e t h e h o l y month o f Ramadan began December
30, t h e f
o r e i g n press r a i s e d a "hue and c r y " f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n
in Algeria.
I n r e f e r e n c e s t o Bosnia and Somalia, t h e press r a i l e d
a l t e r n a t e l y against the
UN, r e g i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r own governments
f o r once again " s t a n d i n g by
" and "doing n o t h i n g " t o stop t h e rampant v i o l e n c e
i n A l g e r i a t h a t began i n Jan
uary 1992 when a u t h o r i t i e s c a n c e l l e d a g e n e r a l
e l e c t i o n i n which t h e nowbanned
I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n Front (FIS) had taken a
huge l e a d . As signs o f hope f o r a wa
y out o f t h e c u r r e n t " t r a u m a t i c phase"
faded w i t h t h e Zeroual government's r e f u
s a l t o a l l o w an o u t s i d e i n q u i r y
requested by t h e U.S. and o t h e r s (the EU f a c t f i
nding m i s s i o n t h a t was t o
s t a r t today was r e j e c t e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e m i s s i o
n lacked s e n i o r i t y ) ,
w r i t e r s painted a bleak p i c t u r e of A l g e r i a ' s f u t u r e . Argui
ng t h a t A l g e r i a ' s
carnage i s being " t o l e r a t e d " by t h e Zeroual government, A l g i e
rs's
Frenchlanguage, independent E l Watan complained t h a t A l g e r i a would escape
s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community because o f Western
busin
ess i n t e r e s t s i n i t s o i l and gas i n d u s t r y . London's independent weekly
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Page 15 of 36
Economi
st and o t h e r s argued t h a t " u n t i l an independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n removes
the smear
of c o m p l i c i t y , o r e x p l a i n s t h e n e g l i g e n c e " o f t h e Zeroual
government, " a n t i t e r
r o r i s t a s s i s t a n c e f o r A l g e r i a makes l i t t l e sense." An
I n d i a n p u n d i t wondered wh
e t h e r A l g e r i a would e v e n t u a l l y become an I s l a m i s t
s t a t e l i k e I r a n or j o i n the a
morphous sphere o f o t h e r s t a t e s l i k e Somalia
t h a t have imploded. These were t h
ernes :
NO SANCTIONS OR MILITARY FORCEObservers u n i f o r m l y opposed t h e use o f e i t h e r
mil
i t a r y f o r c e o r s a n c t i o n s as a n t i t e r r o r i s m t o o l s . Many o f these w r i t e r s
pointed
out t h a t a f t e r t h e Somalian i n t e r v e n t i o n n e i t h e r Francewith i t s
l a r g e Muslim p
o p u l a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a host o f A l g e r i a n refugeesnor any o t h e r
c o u n t r y would be
w i l l i n g t o send s o l d i e r s i n t o a "hornets' n e s t " and t h a t i t
is s t i l l "absolutel
y unclear a g a i n s t whom an i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e w i l l have t o
a c t . " L i k e w i s e regar
d i n g s a n c t i o n s , w r i t e r s h e l d up t h e I r a q i example,
a s s e r t i n g t h a t an embargo ag
a i n s t A l g e r i a would p u n i s h t h e very people t h e
s a n c t i o n s were designed t o t r y t
o p r o t e c t . The most f i r m l y h e l d c o n v i c t i o n
was t h a t t h e o n l y permanent s o l u t i o n
t o ending A l g e r i a ' s r e i g n o f t e r r o r and
v i o l e n c e would be a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o
n and t h a t i t must come from A l g e r i a
itself.
W r i t e r s urged t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community t o c o n t i n u e t o press f o r
outside i n q u i r i e s i n t o the sixyearold c r i s i s
and t o pressure t h e Zeroual
government " t o reopen a d i a l o g u e " w i t h FIS leaders
w i t h a view t o b r i n g i n g
them back i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l arena.
'TARNISHING ISLAM'There was a g r e a t deal o f f r u s t r a t i o n among Muslim
commentato
rs from Egypt t o I r a n over t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f Arab and Muslim
institutions.
Cairo's progovernment A l Ahram lamented, "Arab s i l e n c e on t h e
situation i n Al
g e r i a i s understood, b u t shameful." I n I r a n , t h e c u r r e n t
c h a i r o f t h e Organize
t i o n o f I s l a m i c C o u n t r i e s (OIC), papers accused t h e
Zeroual government o f " t a r n
i s h i n g t h e name o f t h e I s l a m i s t s " by p e r p e t r a t i n g
or a l l o w i n g t h e v i o l e n c e and
argued t h a t t h e OIC should take t h e d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e t o end A l g e r i a ' s i n s u
rrection.
This survey i s based on 48 r e p o r t s from 23 c o u n t r i e s , January 615.
EDITOR: G a i l Hamer BurkeQ
ALGERIA
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•ALGERIA: "Armed Groups Are ' T o l e r a t e d ' "
•Yasser Benmiloud commented i n h i s d a i l y column i n Frenchlanguage,
independent
El Watan (1/14), "The Americans are b i g c h i l d r e n . T h e i r Anadarko
o i l company i
s i n v e s t i n g m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s i n southern A l g e r i a , j u s t l i k e
other B r i t i s h , A
r g e n t i n e , Spanish, German, and o t h e r companies t h a t have a l l
signed j u i c y c o n t r
a c t s w i t h Sonatrach [ t h e n a t i o n a l hydrocarbon company].
Today, the Americans,
the Germans and t h e i r race b r o t h e r s a r e c a l l i n g f o r
sending an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n
v e s t i g a t i o n commission t o know who i s k i l l i n g i n
A l g e r i a . This i s very amusing
I n b r i e f , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s
addressing t h i s message t o Z e r o u a l :
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , i t i s a p l e a s u r e t o work
w i t h you.
We l i k e what you a r e doing
very much, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g your
1.7 b i l l i o n tonnes o f proven hydrocarbon
reserves.
However, t h e r e i s j u s t a
small problem:
We would l i k e t o send i n
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n commission, j u s t
to know i f i t i s you who i s smashing babies a
gainst walls. Truly, t h i s i s
humbug.
"The U n i t e d S t a t e s , l i k e Germany, knows very w e l l who i s k i l l i n g .
I t i s not
th
e army. They a l s o know very w e l l who does n o t h i n g t o p r o t e c t t h e
populations.
I t i s t h e army. They have the p i c t u r e s p i c k e d up by t h e i r
s a t e l l i t e s t h a t ena
ble them t o t r a c k the movements o f the GIA [Armed I s l a m i c
Group] and the Nation
a l People's Army. And they know t h a t the armed groups
are ' t o l e r a t e d . ' They a
Iso know t h a t as long as t h e number o f dead has n o t
exceeded 200,000, as i n Bos
nia, i t would be indecent t o take the m a t t e r up
w i t h the U n i t e d Nations, and t o
t r y c e r t a i n incumbent businessmen f o r crimes
a g a i n s t humanity.
U n t i l then,
much blood w i l l have been shed under t h e
bombs."
•"U.S. I s Favorable
To An I n v e s t i g a t i v e Commission"
•Frenchlanguage independent E l Watan wrote ( 1 / 6 ) :
"This d e c l a r a t i o n o f a
highr
anking o f f i c i a l o f the American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n [ u n d e r l i n e d ] an a t t i t u d e
which c
o n t r a s t s s t r o n g l y w i t h the p o s i t i o n e x h i b i t e d f o r some time by
Washington v i s a v
i s the A l g e r i a n regime. The U n i t e d States i n e f f e c t
p r o v i d e d f l a w l e s s support
t o the p o l i t i c a l programs o f the regime.... At t h e
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moment when a l i v e l y c o n t r o v
ersy provoked debates i n Europe over the q u e s t i o n
'who k i l l s whom' i n the drama
which rocks A l g e r i a , the American Department o f
S t a t e on the c o n t r a r y e x h i b i t e
d a staunch s e r e n i t y , n o t h e s i t a t i n g f o r a
moment t o accuse d i r e c t l y the armed
I s l a m i s t groups, which they added t o t h e
l i s t o f the most dangerous t e r r o r i s t g
roups i n the w o r l d a g a i n s t which one
must f i g h t w i t h o u t r e s p i t e . [Rubin's rema
rks] can f i n d t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n i n
a d e s i r e [ o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s ] t o modify t h
e i r a t t i t u d e , judged t o o
c o n s e n t i n g . . . v i s a v i s t h e regime i n A l g e r i a by European
politicalmedia
circles.
[Rubin's remarks] c o u l d a l s o be the f r u i t o f l o b b y i n g
e f f o r t s and
p r e s s u r e on the p a r t o f wellknown i n t e r n a t i o n a l NGOs such as Human
Rights
Watch and Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l which e x e r c i s e t h e i r major i n f l u e n c e on
Western p u b l i c o p i n i o n s e n s i t i v e t o questions
r e l a t i n g t o human r i g h t s . "
MIDDLE EAST
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•EGYPT: "Arab S i l e n c e I s Shameful"
•X'
hp x (#Columnist Salama Ahmed Salama commented (1/13) i n progovernment A l A
hram,
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure so f a r has f a i l e d t o u n v e i l the mystery o f t h e
b
r u t a l massacres i n A l g e r i a . The U n i t e d States and Europe have r e t r a c t e d
their
p o s i t i o n s when they r e c e i v e d the A l g e r i a n angry response t o the request
t o sen
d an i n v e s t i g a t i o n committee t o A l g e r i a . The A l g e r i a n government's
pretext for
r e j e c t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l assistance i s not convincing.
Arab
s i l e n c e on the s i t
u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a i s understood, b u t shameful."
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•JORDAN:
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g The A l g e r i a n C r i s i s ? "
•Senior e d i t o r Saleh Q a l l a b opined i n independent, massappeal AlArab
AlYawm ( 1 /
7):
"Some people t h i n k i t i s easy t o form i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r Arab
f l e e t s and sen
d them i n t o A l g e r i a . They t h i n k t h a t the A l g e r i a n army w i l l
g i v e way, the t e r r
o r i s t s w i l l throw away t h e i r weapons and e v e r y t h i n g w i l l be
over. S i m p l i f y i n g
the m a t t e r i n t h i s way i s such a b i t t e r laugh.
Those who
suggest t h e f o r m a t i o n
of these s a v i o r f l e e t s f o r g e t t h a t what i s happening i n
A l g e r i a i s not c h i l d r e
n's p l a y i n a s m a l l v i l l a g e .
I t i s the outcome o f
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l p
o l a r i z a t i o n t h a t found t h e p e r f e c t atmosphere t o
take r o o t and f l o u r i s h and t h e
n t u r n against the Algerians."
•"Yes To I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g The A l g e r i a n C r i s i s "
•Managing e d i t o r Yahya Mahmoud argued i n b u s i n e s s o r i e n t e d AlAswaq ( 1 / 7 ) :
"The
c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n on t h e A l g e r i a n c r i s i s . . . should be approved
by any
one who r e a l i z e s t h e amount o f s u f f e r i n g o f t h e A l g e r i a n people....
The f a c t t
hat t h e A l g e r i a n government i s incapable o f p r o t e c t i n g t h e A l g e r i a n
people, and
t h a t t h e Arabs and Muslims have f a i l e d t o Arabize t h i s c r i s i s
leaves one hope
o n l y : t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e s w i l l i n t e r v e n e i n order
to r e s t o r e s e c u r i t
y t o the Algerians."
•SAUDI ARABIA:
"Foreign
I n t e r v e n t i o n W i l l Not End A l g e r i a ' s S u f f e r i n g "
•Jeddahbased, c o n s e r v a t i v e AlMadina h e l d (1/13), "To f r e e A l g e r i a from t h e
nigh
tmare o f t e r r o r i s m and v i o l e n c e i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f i t s people.
Foreign i
n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l n o t end A l g e r i a ' s s u f f e r i n g from t e r r o r i s m , which
has found sa
ve havens i n some European c o u n t r i e s t h a t have welcomed t e r r o r i s t
elements....
Nonetheless, what i s t a k i n g place i n A l g e r i a , k i l l i n g i n t h e
name o f Islam...w
i l l g r e a t l y damage Muslims' image among nonMuslim s o c i e t i e s
and w i l l a l s o open
a wide window b e f o r e v i o l e n t groups which might b e l i e v e
t h a t by seeing what i s
going i n A l g e r i a w i l l condone k i l l i n g as a method t h a t
is s t i l l legitimate."
EUROPE
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•FRANCE: " A l g i e r s For A Status Quo"
•Dominique Bromberger commented
on governmentrun France I n t e r r a d i o
(1/15):
The EU has j u s t proved i t d i d n o t know o r understand how t h e A l g e r i a n regime
w
orked....
I n t h e present s i t u a t i o n , good i n t e n t i o n s a r e n o t enough. EU
member
s should decide what they want. A l g i e r s knows what i t wants: I t
wants t o con
t i n u e w i t h t h e same p o l i c i e s .
The West, on t h e o t h e r hand, i s
v e r y unsure o f i
t s o b j e c t i v e s . P a r i s , f o r example, f e a r s an i n i t i a t i v e
that
might change t h i n
gs i n t h e Maghreb.... The temporary f a i l u r e o f t h e EU
i n i t i a t i v e can h a r d l y be
a disappointment t o many French o f f i c i a l s . "
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• " A l g e r i a And The UN C h a r t e r "
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•Georges Kiejman, a lawyer and former m i n i s t e r , i n l e f t o f c e n t e r Le Monde
(1/13)
, " I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, t h r o u g h i t s own r u l e s ,
has d i v
e s t e d i t s e l f o f t h e r i g h t t o a s s i s t v i c t i m s i n s i d e t h e borders o f a
recognized
n a t i o n . This p r i n c i p l e i s i n d i s p u t a b l e . But u n t i l when w i l l i t
remain u n d i s p u t e
d? This q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d . . . . The q u e s t i o n i s whether
we are ready t o b
reak w i t h a p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e , t h a t o f r e s p e c t i n g
s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n s , even whe
n i t means human beings cannot be helped.
I n the
end, human beings are t h e j u s
t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . . . . The goal i s
not t o p r o t e c t n a t i o n s , b u t t o
p r o t e c t t h e men, women and c h i l d r e n who
c o n s t i t u t e n a t i o n s . . . . Every n a t i o n w
i l l have t o examine t h e UN Charter i t
has signed and wonder: p r o t e c t n a t i o n s o
r t h e i r c i t i z e n s ? I t i s time t o
choose."
•"France Continues I t s Support Of A l g i e r s , Without Any I l l u s i o n "
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JeanChristophe P l o q i n i n C a t h o l i c La C r o i x (1/12) : "France no l o n g e r has
any i
l l u s i o n s about t h e A l g e r i a n regime, y e t i t s i m p l i c i t support o f
Zeroual's r e g i
me w i l l c o n t i n u e . . . . An observer, d i s a p p o i n t e d by France's
l a c k o f involvemen
t , y e t r e a l i s t i c , made t h i s commentary:
'One must choose
between bombs i n t h e
s t r e e t s o f P a r i s or i n Relizane ( A l g e r i a ) . '
P a r i s does
not want i t s p o p u l a t i o
n t o s u f f e r from i t s involvement i n t h e A l g e r i a n
situation....
I t has accepted
t h e U.S. i n t r u s i o n i n t h e A l g e r i a n
c r i s i s . . . even i f France's i n f l u e n c e i n d e a l
i n g w i t h t h e c r i s i s remains
e s s e n t i a l f o r Washington and B r u s s e l s . . . .
France's
diplomatic position,
unchanged i n s p i t e o f a change i n i t s government, can be
explained i n part
because no one can see an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e A l g e r i a n regime.
The c r i s i s
i n v o l v e s t h r e e aspects:
s e c u r i t y , a v o i d i n g bombs i n P a r i s ; s t r
ategy,
France's r o l e i n t h e Maghreb must be m a i n t a i n e d ; economic, t r a d e must be
safeguarded.
enter
For these t h r e e reasons,
into a c o n f l i c t with Algeria."
X~
hp x (#a"The F a u l t L i n e "
i t i s i m p o r t a n t f o r France n o t t o
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Page 20 of 36
• P i e r r e Beylau wrote i n r i g h t o f c e n t e r weekly Le P o i n t ( 1 / 9 ) : " I n t e r v e n t i o n
is a
d e l i c a t e e x e r c i s e . Former examples such as Lebanon, I r a q , Somalia and
Rwanda
were f a i l u r e s f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, even i f t h e n a t i o n s i n
question
were p r a c t i c a l l y w i t h o u t government, which i s n o t t h e case f o r
A l g e r i a . . . . Bu
t A l g e r i a i s p a r t o f a g i g a n t i c s e m i c i r c l e o f c r i s e s , from
the Caucasus t o t h e
Maghreb, from C e n t r a l Asia t o t h e Balkans, and from t h e
Middle East t o t h e Gu
I f , which i s a f f e c t i n g t h e Arab and I s l a m i c w o r l d . The
massacres i n A l g e r i a can
not be c o m p l e t e l y d i s a s s o c i a t e d from those o f
A f g h a n i s t a n , Egypt or I r a n .
Iti
s a cauldron of s o c i a l f r u s t r a t i o n s ,
i d e n t i t y c r i s e s and n o s t a l g i a f o r t h e g o l
den age o f I s l a m . A l g e r i a , l i k e
Turkey, i s a t t h e core o f a f a u l t l i n e between
two w o r l d s : one t u r n e d toward
Western m o d e r n i t y , t h e o t h e r toward r e g r e s s i o n t
o t h e Middle Ages."
•"A D i p l o m a t i c I n t e r v e n t i o n "
•Jose Garcon s a i d i n l e f t o f c e n t e r L i b e r a t i o n (1/7) : "Whatever becomes o f
Washi
ngton's hopes f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n q u i r y , t h e U.S. request w i l l
have
at l e a s
t underscored t h e r i s i n g doubts and q u e s t i o n s over t h e r e a l
culprits
behind t h
e massacres.... The s i l e n c e which f o l l o w e d t h i s r e q u e s t , b e f o r e
A l g i e r s decide
d t o c a l l t h e U.S. ambassador, i s i n d i c a t i v e o f A l g e r i a ' s
embarrassment w i t h r
egard t o Washington's new p o s i t i o n , a f t e r having been
l u l l e d by U.S. support o
f t h e A l g e r i a n regime over t h e summer."
• " A l g e r i a , Again"
•Bruno Frappat judged i n C a t h o l i c La C r o i x ( 1 / 6 ) :
" I t seems t h a t f o r t h e
first
time t h e r e i s a s i g n a European conscience....
The a t t i t u d e o f t h e
Algerian
government remains an enigma.... I t has o f f i c i a l l y remained deaf
t o every o f f
er o f m e d i a t i o n or i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement. I f t h i s a t t i t u d e
continues, the
government's i n a b i l i t y t o ensure t h e s a f e t y o f i t s p o p u l a t i o n
w i l l be compounde
d by doubts about whether these massacres d i s t u r b t h e
government a t a l l . "
•BRITAIN:•
•Independent
i
• " A l g e r i a ' s Awful S l a u g h t e r "
weekly Economist e d i t o r i a l i z e d
(1/9):
"The savagery beggars t h e
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magination.
At the v e r y l e a s t , the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s do e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
little t
0 protect c i v i l i a n s .
Negligence or c o m p l i c i t y ? Many A l g e r i a n s have
come t o su
spect c o m p l i c i t y . This c o u l d be wicked nonsense. But u n t i l an
independent i n v
e s t i g a t i o n removes t h e smear of c o m p l i c i t y , or e x p l a i n s t h e
negligence, a n t i t e r
r o r i s t a s s i s t a n c e f o r A l g e r i a makes l i t t l e sense.
O u t s i d e r s should n e i t h e r be
i n t i m i d a t e d by A l g e r i a ' s b r u i s e d n a t i o n a l i s m nor
accept t h a t i t i s business as
u s u a l . The best way t o help A l g e r i a n s i s t o
help them t o f i n d out what t h e h e l
1 i s going on i n t h e i r own sad c o u n t r y . "
•"Terror In Algeria"
• C o n s e r v a t i v e D a i l y Telegraph e d i t o r i a l i z e d (1/9) : "The h i s t o r i c s l a u g h t e r i n
A l g e r i a has a t l a s t s t i r r e d Western powers t o attempt t o i n t e r v e n e . The West
s
hould now be u r g i n g t h e government i n A l g i e r s t o reopen a d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e
FIS
l e a d e r s Abassi Madani and A l i Benhadj, w i t h a view t o b r i n g i n g them back
into
the p o l i t i c a l arena. T h e i r commitment t o democracy, beyond i t s
u s e f u l n e s s as a
s t e p p i n g stone t o power, i s open t o doubt, b u t they are
viable interlocutors i
n t h e search f o r peace."
•"Demand For I m p a r t i a l E x t e r n a l I n v e s t i g a t o r s "
•Independent F i n a n c i a l Times e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 6 ) :
"The l e a s t t h e ( A l g e r i a n )
go
vernment can do now i s t o accede t o the growing demand...for i m p a r t i a l
external
i n v e s t i g a t o r s t o be g i v e n f u l l access so t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e
massacres
can be e s t a b l i s h e d as c l e a r l y as p o s s i b l e . The l o n g e r i t r e f u s e s
t h a t demand,
the more i t b r i n g s s u s p i c i o n on i t s e l f , and t h e more
uncomfortable i n v e s t o r s m
ust f e e l doing business w i t h t h e generals i n
Algiers."
X~
hp x (tOGERMANY:
"The EU Makes I t Too Easy For A l g e r i a "
•
C e n t r i s t Der Tagesspiegel o f B e r l i n s t a t e d (1/15), " I f the Europeans had
decide
d t o send m i n i s t e r s t o A l g e r i a , then i t would have been i m p o s s i b l e f o r
the r e g i
me t o drag i t s head so e a s i l y out o f t h e noose. The statement t h a t
the EU dele
g a t i o n l a c k s p r e s t i g e i s understandable....
On t h e o t h e r hand,
the A l g i e r s gov
ernment i s happy about the postponement, s i n c e i t o n l y
r e l u c t a n t l y agreed t o t h
e v i s i t o f t h e EU d e l e g a t i o n . . . . However, t h e EU
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should n o t g i v e i n and demand
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n about t h e massacres and i t s
background. To r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t
o questions regarding the f i g h t against
t e r r o r i s m a s t h e regime has demandedwoul
d u n i l a t e r a l l y strengthen a
m i l i t a r y regime which does n o t make any v o l u n t a r y s
tep t o end t h e p o l i t i c a l
crisis."
• " L e f t By A l l a h "
•Axel V e i e l noted (1/15) i n an e d i t o r i a l i n l e f t o f c e n t e r F r a n k f u r t e r
Rundschau,
" I t i s d i f f i c u l t n o t t o f a l l i n t o c y n i c i s m . I n a s t a t e w i t h whom
the EU condu
c t s t a l k s about an a s s o c i a t i o n agreement, people a r e massacred by
the hundreds
almost on a d a i l y b a s i s . . . . U n t i l yesterday, a l i t t l e b i t o f
hope r e s t e d w i t h
the EU, or l e t us be more p r e c i s e , w i t h some p o l i t i c i a n s o f
the EU who haggle
d w i t h t h e r u l e r s i n A l g i e r s about t h i n g s they were a l l o w e d
t o say d u r i n g t h e i r
t r i p t o A l g e r i a . But they were n o t a l l o w e d t o r a i s e
embarrassing q u e s t i o n s . .
.since t h i s would have r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f power
i n a c o u n t r y i n which t h e
army has a l o t b u t t h e o p p o s i t i o n almost n o t h i n g t o
say.
The A l g i e r s governmen
t s a i d t h a t i t would accept a s s i s t a n c e i n i t s
f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and i t p
retended
t h a t t h e past s i x years d i d n o t
r e v e a l t h a t t h e bloodshed c o u l d not b
e c o n t a i n e d w i t h p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y
f o r c e alone.
"But now t h e weak hopes o f t h e Europeans have now a l s o been i n v a i n .
Obviousl
y, t h e Europeans d i d n o t want t o submit t o t h e c e n s o r s h i p o f t h e
hosts and t h e
v i s i t was canceled....
What can now be done t o e x e r t i n f l u e n c e
on t h e country?
Economic t h r e a t e n i n g gestures w i l l h a r d l y impress t h e r u l e r s
i n A l g i e r s . The
re c o f f e r s have been f i l e d w i t h r e c o r d y i e l d s from o i l and
gas businesses deals
as h a r d l y b e f o r e i n t h e p a s t . Sanctions a l s o harbor t h e
risk of continuing t o
weaken t h e d i s c r e d i t e d s t a t e power b u t , a t t h e same
time, o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e
t e r r o r i s t s and o f encouraging them o f c o m m i t t i n g
even g r e a t e r b a r b a r i t i e s . I t
seems t h a t A l g e r i a ' s youth i s n o t t h e o n l y one
t h a t i s l e f t by A l l a h . "
•"Mediation Mission"
•
Immo Vogel commented on ARDTV's ( n a t i o n a l channel one) l a t e
newscast T
evening
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Page 23 of 36
agesthemen (1/14): "The A l g e r i a n government has been unable t o
c r e a t e a democr
a t i c a l l y open c l i m a t e and t o e n t e r i n t o a d i a l o g u e w i t h
everybody who i s w i l l i
ng t o do so. This i s where
we must o f f e r a s s i s t a n c e .
This c o u l d be d i p l o m a t i c a s s i s t a n c e , b u t i t must
ta
ke place i n a v i g o r o u s manner. And t h i s energy should not weaken when our
int
e r e s t s i n A l g e r i a n o i l and gas s u p p l i e s a r e i n v o l v e d . I f t h e EU t r o i k a
really
t r a v e l s t o A l g i e r s , i t should a l s o be w i l l i n g t o r i s k s h o r t t e r m
economic i n t e
r e s t s i n order t o achieve longterm g o a l s .
I t would be
a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e EU
to practice f i n a l l y
a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a t deserves
i t s name."
Xhp x (#
•"U.S. Superpower Could Use I t s I n f l u e n c e "
• R i g h t o f c e n t e r Koelnische Rundschau judged (1/14), " I t i s an open s e c r e t
that s
ome o f t h e 'Arab b r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , ' p r o b a b l y w i t h Saudi A r a b i a a t t h e
helm, su
p p o r t t h e murderous gangs w i t h money and arms. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e
U.S. super
power c o u l d use i t s i n f l u e n c e . "
X'
hp x (#
•"No Domestic P o l i c y A f f a i r "
• R i g h t o f c e n t e r Maerkische Oderzeitung o f F r a n k f u r t on t h e Oder s t a t e d (1/12)
in
an e d i t o r i a l by Uwe Krueger: "From t h e Pope t o t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s i n
Iran
everybody agrees: The massacres i n A l g e r i a must s t o p . But nobody has
shown an
approach on how t h i s can be achieved. The regime i n A l g i e r s does
not want t o
show i t s hand. This n u r t u r e s t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e f a n a t i c
Islamic opposition
i s n o t s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e bloodshed w i t h o u t end.
I n view o f t h e e s t i m
ated 80,000 people who have been k i l l e d so f a r , o n l y
massive i n t e r f e r e n c e from
the o u t s i d e can h e l p . The h e s i t a n t EU attempt t o
support t h e v i c t i m s i s going
t o t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n but t h i s i s n o t enough.
the A l g i e r s government must a l l
ow independent observers a view onto t h e r e a l
situation.
For a long t i m e , t h e
u n i n h i b i t e d k i l l i n g o f defenseless c i v i l i a n s
has no longer been a domestic a f f a
ir. "
•ITALY: "Another Defeat I n Mediterranean For Europe"
X'
hp x (#
• A l b e r t o Negri commented i n l e a d i n g business I I Sole24 Ore (1/15): " A l g i e r s '
•b
ig refusal'
can be a s u r p r i s e o n l y f o r d i s t r a c t e d Brussels
bureaucrats....
Po
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litical
Europe has been a c y n i c a l s p e c t a t o r o f t h e massacre as much as t h e
Al
g e r i a n government, now accused o f being unable t o p r o t e c t t h e p o p u l a t i o n ,
or e
ven o f b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n t h e massacres. The r e s u l t i s c l e a r t o
everybody. Th
e A l g e r i a n government can a f f o r d t o slam t h e door on t h e
European t r o i k a and t
h i s Mediterranean t r a g e d y , long i g n o r e d , i s t u r n i n g i n t o
a European f a i l u r e , t o
which we can add t h e Middle East and Turkey. The
l i s t grows l o n g e r by t h e da
y."
X~
hp x (#D"Wrong Steps By A l l Sides"
•A commentary i n l e f t l e a n i n g , i n f l u e n t i a l La Repubblica (1/12) by
economic/poli
t i c a l commentator Mario P i r a n i focuse on t h e d i s p u t e c r e a t e d by
I t a l i a n Foreign
M i n i s t e r D i n i ' s r e c e n t telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e
Iranian foreign minist
er about t h e s i t u a t i o n i n A l g e r i a and t h e l a t t e r ' s
i r r i t a t i o n over D i n i ' s i n i t
iative.
P i r a n i wrote: " I n t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n the
extravagant I t a l i a n i n i t i a t i v
e...we s h o u l d keep i n mind t h a t , some time ago,
the ENI ( I t a l i a n
s t a t e o i l com
pany) gas p i p e l i n e i n A l g e r i a was t h e t a r g e t
of a t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k and s u p p l i e s
t o I t a l y were i n t e r r u p t e d f o r f o u r days.
We can guess t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e d goo
d w i l l r e c e n t l y shown by t h e I r a n i a n
government towards t h e West has prompted M
i n i s t e r D i n i ' s opening towards
I r a n , s i n c e i t i s t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e best p o s i t
ion t o convince t h e
t e r r o r i s t s t o spare t h e p i p e l i n e network which p r o v i d e s su
pplies to I t a l y .
An e x e r c i s e i n o i l diplomacy which we cannot condemn. Howev
er,
since t h i s
k i n d o f diplomacy o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t s o f f i c i a l p o l i c y , i t r e q u i r
es maximum
secrecy and, should i t be d i s c o v e r e d , t h e promptest and most impude
nt
d e n i a l . Let alone TV i n t e r v i e w s . "
•BELGIUM:• • " A l g e r i a n Government Has Key To S o l u t i o n To T e r r o r I n I t s Hands"
• F o r e i g n a f f a i r s w r i t e r J i m Lannoo s t a t e d (1/13) i n business
FinancieelEconomise
he T i j d ,
"Despite t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's
c o n s i d e r a b l e response, t h e pos
s i b i l i t y t o enter i n t o action i s l i m i t e d . A
m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t o be r u l
ed out f o r s e v e r a l reasons. F i r s t , A l g i e r s
does not
want t o hear about i t .
s
Second, t h e r e w i l l be h a r d l y any c o u n t r i e s w i l l i n g t o
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end s o l d i e r s i n t o t h e A l g e r i a n h o r n e t s ' n e s t . Moreover, i t i s a b s o l u t e l y
uncle
ar a g a i n s t whom an i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e w i l l have t o a c t . Even an
embargo... on A
I g e r i a n o i l and gas e x p o r t s t h e a r t e r y o f t h e economywould
not b r i n g solace. I n
deed, such an embargo would h i t m a i n l y t h e people....
Consequently, t h e hands
of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community seem t o be t i e d .
That
means t h a t t h e b a l l i s i n
the A l g e r i a n camp.... I t i s very l i k e l y , however,
t h a t A l g i e r s w i l l n o t take
i n i t i a t i v e s t o take measures i t s e l f , as was t h e
case i n t h e p a s t . Only through
s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure w i l l
something s t a r t t o move i n A l g e r i a t o po
s s i b l y begin t o end t h e t e r r o r .
Only
i f t h a t i s t h e case w i l l t h e recent s a c r i
f i c e s n o t have been i n v a i n . "
X'
hp x (#
•"The S i l e n c e Of Power"
X'
hp x (#
• C a t h o l i c Vers 1'Avenir (1/10) opined, "The armed f o r c e s ' apparent
powerlessnes
s, t h e s i l e n c e o f power, i t s stubborn r e f u s a l o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
investigation
are unavoidably sowing doubt.
' I f i t has n o t h i n g t o h i d e , i t
should l e t us wo
r k , ' say i n substance t h e human r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s . We do
not d i s a g r e e w i t h
them."
•"Two A l g e r i a s "
• I n s o c i a l i s t La W a l l o n i e (1/10) and s o c i a l i s t Le Peuple
(1/12) Robert Falony
wrote:
"There are indeed two A l g e r i a s , t h a t o f P r e s i d e n t Z e r o u a l , o f good
busi
ness, o f o i l and gas c o n t r a c t s . That A l g e r i a i s n o t t h r e a t e n e d by
t e r r o r i s m an
d i t s u i t s t h e IMF p e r f e c t l y w e l l . And then, t h e r e i s t h e
suffering Algeria, w
i t h i t s p o p u l a t i o n s taken hostage and abandoned t o t h e
w i l d beasts....
I f West
ern European governments want t o be heard from t h e
A l g e r i a n government, they mu
s t q u e s t i o n t h e o i l and t h e gas c o n t r a c t s . The
time i s even p r o p i t i o u s t o do s
o, w i t h low o i l p r i c e s and abundant s u p p l y . "
X~
hp x (#n"Americans Fed Up"
• F o r e i g n a f f a i r s w r i t e r Joost Loncin i n l a b o r C a t h o l i c Het Volk (1/7)
observed:
"The f a c t t h a t t h e U n i t e d States i s demanding c l a r i t y should be a
signal t o t
he regime.
The Americans have enormous o i l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e
c o u n t r y . Because
they are a l l e r g i c t o f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s , they have always
supported A l g e r i a ' s r e g i
me. However, they are now f e d up w i t h t h e army's
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passiveness v i s a v i s the
rists . "
•"Important
Page 26 of 36
terro
Turnabout"
• I n c o n s e r v a t i v e C a t h o l i c La L i b r e Belgique (1/7) f o r e i g n e d i t o r Gerald Papy
wr
ote:
"The step taken by Washington r e p r e s e n t s an i m p o r t a n t t u r n a b o u t . . . .
The
Americansand the Europeansprobably have the necessary means of
p r e s s u r e t o make
the Zeroual regime accept i t s p r i n c i p l e .
But one should
a l s o make sure t h a t t
he m i s s i o n i s not so impeded t h a t the outcome of i t s
research i s j e o p a r d i z e d , a
s was the case i n the Congo."
X~
hp x (#DCANADA:
"Sign Of L i g h t I n A l g e r i a "
•The l i b e r a l Montreal Gazette (1/12) opined b e f o r e A l g e r i a ' s r e f u s a l of the
d e l e g a t i o n , "For
the f i r s t time i n the s i x y e a r c i v i l war... A l g e r i a ' s
militaryb
acked government might a l l o w an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i s s i o n i n t o the
country....
Eve
n though A l g e r i a n President Liamine Zeroual has r e j e c t e d any
k i n d of i n q u i r y i
nto the v i o l e n c e , the mere presence of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l
f a c t f i n d i n g mission i s a
n e s s e n t i a l f i r s t step t o d e a l i n g w i t h the h o r r o r of
repeated, l a r g e s c a l e massa
c r e s . Having made t h i s f i r s t step, the EU must
c a r r y through on i t s i n i t i a t i v e
and not a l l o w i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o be
d i c t a t e d t o by the A l g e r i a n government
I t must push f o r a thorough and
t r u t h f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the murky q u e s t i
on of who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the
killings.
Nothing can be done t o stop the v i l
olence u n t i l i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d
who i s r e s p o n s i b l e . . . . As o u t s i d e i n v e s t i g a t o r s
...start to arrive i n
A l g e r i a , o t h e r Western and Arab n a t i o n s should use the op
p o r t u n i t y t o add
t h e i r voices and impress on A l g e r i a the need t o accept o u t s i d e
help i n ending
the war.... This i s one of the r a r e i n s t a n c e s where the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
communit
y i s of one mind. A l g e r i a e v i d e n t l y i s v e r y u n w i l l i n g t o comply.
And the f a c t
remains t h a t the European Union has l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l leverage
over A l g e r i a , s i
nee i t s t r a d e w i t h the North A f r i c a n n a t i o n i s s m a l l .
But
i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressu
re has an undeniable e f f e c t . . . .
For the t e r r i f i e d
c i t i z e n s of A l g e r i a , convinc
ed t h a t t h e i r government has abandoned them, the
o u t s i d e w o r l d i s t h e i r o n l y ho
pe."
X~
hp x (IDTHE NETHERLANDS:
" I r a n Offers I t s Mediation
Services"
EU
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X~
hp x (#
•Amsterdambased, f i n a n c i a l Het F i n a n c i e e l e Dagblad c a r r i e d t h i s i n s i d e page
ana
l y s i s (1/13): " I t i s remarkable t h a t I r a n has o f f e r e d i t s s e r v i c e s t o
reach a
d i a l o g u e i n A l g e r i a between the regime of P r e s i d e n t Zeroual and the
FIS and pos
s i b l e o t h e r Muslim movements. I r a n i a n P r e s i d e n t Khatami p r o b a b l y
has two reaso
ns f o r t h i s d e c i s i o n : Tehran i s l o o k i n g f o r an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
r e f u t e e a r l i e r We
s t e r n a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t both the A l g e r i a n regime and I r a n
support and encourage
the r e v o l u t i o n of the A l g e r i a n Muslims; the second
reason c o u l d be t h a t I r a n i s
t r y i n g t o show the w o r l d t h a t i t i s s e r i o u s
about a d o p t i n g a more c o n s t r u c t i v e
f o r e i g n p o l i c y which c o u l d end I r a n ' s
isolation. "
•"International Investigations"
Xhp x (#
• I n f l u e n t i a l , l i b e r a l De V o l k s k r a n t e d i t o r i a l i z e d ( 1 / 9 ) :
" I f the A l g e r i a n
gove
rnment c o n t i n u e s t o p r e t e n d t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g wrong, then i t does
create a
n i m p r e s s i o n of c o m p l i c i t y . . . .
Only through
independent
international invest
i g a t i o n s , as requested by the UN and the U.S./EU, can the
r e a l s i t u a t i o n be c l a
rified."
Xhp x (#
•POLAND: "Democracies Do Not Cut T h r o a t s "
• C e n t r i s t R z e c z p o s p o l i t a ran t h i s a r t i c l e i n by Kazimierz Dziewanowski, former
P o l i s h ambassador t o the U.S.
(1/1011):
"With so many a t r o c i t i e s committed
in
the w o r l d , i t i s f u t i l e t o discuss which one i s more h o r r i b l e than the
others.
What has been o c c u r r i n g i n A l g e r i a , however, i s something p o s s i b l y
the most a
t r o c i o u s and s i m p l y u n t h i n k a b l e . . . . The t e r r o r i n A l g e r i a n
v i l l a g e s exceeds an
y [known] c a t e g o r i e s .
People should not cut o t h e r
people's t h r o a t s or burn t
hem
a l i v e , e s p e c i a l l y so w i t h respect t o women and
children.
How c i t i z e n s of
one c o u n t r y can do such h o r r i b l e t h i n g s t o t h e i r
c o m p a t r i o t s , w i t h whom they
are not on a war f o o t i n g , i s simply not p o s s i b l e
t o understand."
X"
hp x (#DRUSSIA:
" A l g e r i a P r e f e r s U.S.
To Europe"
•Aleksandr S h u m i l i n observed i n r e f o r m i s t , b u s i n e s s o r i e n t e d Kommersant D a i l y
(1
/15): "The EU has not g i v e n up t r y i n g t o i n f l u e n c e the s i t u a t i o n i n
Algeria, th
e scene of a s i x y e a r t e r r o r i s t rampage, e s p e c i a l l y as the Union's
u l t i m a t e goal
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i s t o secure i t s economic i n t e r e s t s i n t h a t o i l and g a s r i c h
country.
I t has b
een r e p o r t e d i n f o r m a l l y t h a t the Europeans a r e n ' t t r u s t e d
much i n A l g e r i a , t h e i
r o b j e c t i v i t y q u e s t i o n e d by the the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s .
By c o n t r a s t , the Americ
ans a r e s a i d t o be more u n d e r s t a n d i n g and very
s u p p o r t i v e , and t h a t combines w i
t h economic c o o p e r a t i o n between A l g e r i a and
the U n i t e d S t a t e s . "
X~
hp x (#
• " A u t h o r i t i e s H e l p l e s s I n The Face Of T e r r o r "
• Y u l i a Petrovskaya s a i d i n c e n t r i s t Nezavisimaya Gazeta (1/13): "As o f now i t
i
s obvious t h a t the government can't cope w i t h I s l a m i s t m i l i t a n t s . The
military
and c i v i l i a n s a r e s p l i t on how t o deal w i t h the t e r r o r i s t s .
At t h e
same time,
i t i s hard t o see how o t h e r c o u n t r i e s can r e a l l y h e l p . The
conflict in Algeri
a, a c c o r d i n g t o UN e x p e r t s , i s very s p e c i f i c and s t r i c t l y
i n t e r n a l , not threate
n i n g t o spread beyond the n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s .
Besides,
the A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s
have o f f i c i a l l y t u r n e d down a l l f o r e i g n a i d o f f e r e d
t o r e s o l v e the problem."
•SPAIN:
"Algeria"
•
J. R. Gonzalez Cabezas d e p l o r e d i n Barcelona's c e n t r i s t La Vanguardia
(1/14)
IT
Algeria i s i n a state of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . I t i s n ' t that central authority
doesn
' t e x i s t ; i t s i m p l y doesn't govern, c o n f i n i n g i t s e l f t o the c o n t r o l o f
the p e t r
oleum economy.... I t i s w e l l known t h a t n o t h i n g provokes
h u m a n i t a r i a n concern
as much as economic or g e o s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . At t h e
p r e s e n t time, no one i n A
I g e r i a knows where the power l i e s , n o t today nor i n
the f u t u r e . Given t h i s vacu
um, no one knows who i s doing the k i l l i n g , i n
whose name, or o f how many, which
i s why the r e p o r t s o f h o r r i f i c happenings
i n t h a t c o u n t r y a t times l a c k a fram
ework o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . . The t r u t h i s
being h e l d hostage. Thus, when the Pop
e d e c l a r e s t h a t 'no one can k i l l i n t h e
name o f God,' one wonders whether t h i s
i s a p l e a o r a condemnation....
I n s t e a d o f making i m p o s s i b l e demands f o r p r e c i
se bodycounts, what needs t o
be i n v e s t i g a t e d i s the a u t h o r s h i p o f these c r u e l m
assacres i n o r d e r t o f i n d
out why."
•TURKEY: "The World I s Helpless Again"
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•
Sami Kohen wrote i n massappeal M i l l i y e t (1/13), "The massacres i n a l g e r i a
are i
n c r e a s i n g , and every week more h o r r i f y i n g than ever r e p o r t s appear.. And
what i
s t h e whole w o r l d doing r e g a r d i n g t h i s drama? The i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's re
a c t i o n , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , reminds me o f t h e i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o
the Bosnian c i v i l
war. I n o t h e r words, t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s not
t a k i n g any measures t o
prevent t h e massacres, but o n l y e x p r e s s i n g concern and
disappointment.
The I s
lamic c o u n t r i e s , OIC i n p a r t i c u l a r , should take t h e
initiative.
But t h e r e i s n
o t h i n g coming on t h a t s i d e . The U n i t e d Nations
d i d not even i n c l u d e A l g e r i a i n
i t s agenda. As f o r t h e U n i t e d States and EU,
t h e r e are o n l y i n i t i a l signs t h a
t they p l a n t o take t h e i n i t i a t i v e .
The
C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n wants an inspec
t i o n team t o be sent t o A l g e r i a . And
the EU plans t o send another group w i t h i n
the framework o f ' c o o p e r a t i o n
a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m under war c o n d i t i o n s , ' i n an a
t t e m p t t o persuade t h e
A l g e r i a n government.... Of course, sending f o r e i g n t r o o
ps t o A l g e r i a or
f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s not t h e way t o end the ongoing drama i
n t h i s country.
I t should be up t o t h e A l g e r i a n government and i t s s e c u r i t y f o
rces t o decide
the ways and means t o prevent these massacres. However, t h e i n t
ernational
community has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o show s e n s i t i v i t y , and help f i n d ou
t what i s
r e a l l y going on i n A l g e r i a . "
SOUTH ASIA
•IRAN: "The Butchers Of A l g e r i a "
X'
hp x (#
• D a i l y Tehran Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l opined ( 1 / 8 ) , " I n t h e North A f r i c a n s t a t e
of
A l g e r i a , human r i g h t s are being s a c r i f i c e d a t t h e a l t a r o f p o l i t i c s .
The
mere
i l e s s s l a u g h t e r o f innocent A l g e r i a n s i s becoming a r o u t i n e a f f a i r .
The
finger
of s u s p i c i o n , o f course, p o i n t s t o t h e c o m p l i c i t y o f t h e government,
headed by
Liamine Zeroual, and t h e m i l i t a r y i n t h e h o r r i b l e massacres. The
m i l i t a r y whi
ch has propped up Zeroual, p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n A l g e r i a and
s i n c e i t command
s c o n s i d e r a b l e sway i n i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , i t i s a l s o
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e law an
d order s i t u a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y . But, as i t has
f a i l e d t o provide security, i
t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t t h e army i s i n cahoots
w i t h t h e regime i n t h e b u t c h e r i n g
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of t h e A l g e r i a n s w i t h t h e m a l i c i o u s
i n t e n t i o n o f t a r n i s h i n g t h e name o f t h e I s
l a m i s t s . . . . The w o r l d community
has been rendered powerless by t h e r e f u s a l o f
A l g i e r s t o a l l o w an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a c t f i n d i n g m i s s i o n or even a European Union
team t o i n q u i r e
i n t o t h e human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s . . . . A l g e r i a , or r a t h e r i t s pe
o p l e , needs a
h e l p i n g hand from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community whether t h e governm
ent l i k e s i t
or n o t . I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure should be kept up on A l g i e r s t o see
reason,
s i n c e t h e r e i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . "
• "OIC Now Or Nuremberg L a t e r "
•The o f f i c i a l , Englishlanguage I r a n News opined ( 1 / 7 ) , "The a c t i o n s o f
Algeria'
s generals are a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i r wish t o dominate t h e
country's p o l i t
i c a l system and exclude t h e p o p u l a t i o n from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n
the p o l i t i c a l proc
ess w h i l e t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d , on t h e eve o f t h e 2 1 s t
c e n t u r y , i s marching t o
ward democracy, p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and freedom.
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s and o t h e r groups p r e t e n d i n g t o be
gua
r d i a n s o f freedom and j u s t i c e have been s i l e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e A l g e r i a n
c r i s i s an
d t h e ongoing genocide i n t h a t c o u n t r y .
[German Foreign M i n i s t e r ]
K i n k e l ' s sug
g e s t i o n [ t h a t t h e European Union become i n v o l v e d ] , i f adopted by
the EU, would
be a t r u l y p o s i t i v e step i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f r e s o l v i n g t h e
A l g e r i a n problem. Ho
wever, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t A l g e r i a i s a Muslim
c o u n t r y and a member o f t h
e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e I s l a m i c Conference (OIC), i t
i s t h e duty o f OIC t o get ac
t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e A l g e r i a n issue and t o go
f u r t h e r than j u s t r e l e a s i n g s t a
tements and a d o p t i n g nonbinding r e s o l u t i o n s .
I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s , r e g i o n a l group
ings and a l l i a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f A f r i c a n U n i t y (OAU) should pu
t p r e s s u r e on t h e A l g e r i a n
government and b r i n g an end t o these massacres."
•BANGLADESH: "Genocide I n A l g e r i a Should Stop"
X*
hp x (#
• I n t h e view o f c o n s e r v a t i v e I t t e f a q (1/14), "The I s l a m i s t s are being h e l d
resp
o n s i b l e f o r t h e ominous k i l l i n g t h a t i s t a k i n g so many innocent l i v e s .
So f a r ,
the government v e r s i o n has been taken as t r u e o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y .
Now, many
a n a l y s t s doubt t h a t government hands may be behind t h e k i l l i n g s . . . .
Many obser
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vers b e l i e v e t h a t the UN must f i n a l l y do something t o stop the
killing.
I t cou
I d begin by sending an i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission t o A l g e r i a .
They t h i n k t h a t i n
t e r n a t i o n a l pressure i s enough t o make the A l g e r i a n
government agree t o a commi
s s i o n . . . . We t h i n k t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community must put pressure on the g
overnment t o e s t a b l i s h a genuine
democracy t h r o u g h a f r e e , f a i r and acceptable
e l e c t i o n s i d e by s i d e of saving
the innocent people from the f u n d a m e n t a l i s t hye
nas.
We do not t h i n k t h a t a
permanent peace w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d i n A l g e r i a w i t
hout genuine democracy."
•"UN
I n v e s t i g a t i o n Team I s Needed For A l g e r i a "
• C o n s e r v a t i v e I s l a m i c Sangram m a i n t a i n e d (1/12), "The Genevabased UN Human
righ
t s commission has s a i d t h a t they are p l a n n i n g t o send a d e l e g a t i o n ( t o
Algeria)
as a f i r s t s t e p t o i n v e s t i g a t e genocide.
The UN and i t s members can
e a s i l y sa
ve the people of many c o u n t r i e s from t y r a n n y . There are
precedents....
But i
n many cases, the UN shows negligence at the b e g i n n i n g .
I t u s u a l l y o n l y become
s a c t i v e a f t e r scores of human l i v e s are l o s t .
The
case o f Bosnia i s a g l a r i n g
example. The same i s happening i n A l g e r i a .
Any
delay i n t a k i n g a c t i o n by the
UN cannot be j u s t i f i e d a g a i n s t the backdrop of
a t r o c i o u s i n c i d e n t s of genocide
and the continuous v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s
i n A l g e r i a . We t h i n k t h a t the UN
should take speedy measures t o i n v e s t i g a t e
genocide i n A l g e r i a , unmask the rea
1 k i l l e r s and punish them, i n order t o
save the people."
•INDIA: " T r u t h Or Dare"
X'
hp x (#
•The c e n t r i s t Telegraph of C a l c u t t a commented (1/15): "There i s i n c r e a s i n g
gro
unds f o r A l g i e r s t o r e c o n s i d e r i t s p o s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y toward the EU
which i s
i t s l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r and c l o s e s t p o l i t i c a l a l l y .
This i s
because...mass
acres are s t a r t i n g t o undermine the government's c r e d i b i l i t y
both at home and o
verseas....
The r e a l q u e s t i o n i s whether the government i s
d e l i b e r a t e l y encour
aging the massacres, by d i r e c t involvement or by
d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f u s i n g t o preve
nt them.... The apoplexy w i t h which A l g i e r s
r e a c t s t o any request f o r an indep
endent l o o k i n t o the k i l l i n g s has
s t r e n g t h e n e d the s u s p i c i o n . . . t h a t something i
s r o t t e n i n the s t a t e .
The
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A l g e r i a n government... can s t i l l count on much i n t e r
n a t i o n a l support g i v e n
f e a r s o f fundamentalism.
But i t w i l l not h e l p i t s cause
i f i t does not h e l p
s c o t c h w o r r i e s t h a t the massacres i n d i c a t e e i t h e r a counte
r insurgency
o p e r a t i o n gone amok o r an attempt t o sabotage peace n e g o t i a t i o n s b
y army
h a r d l i n e r s . And s u s p i c i o n s cannot be abated except through n e u t r a l inqu
iry.
I n b a t t l i n g i n s u r g e n c i e s , h a l f the war i s waged over i n t a n g i b l e s l i k e pop
ular
support and o f f i c i a l c r e d i b i l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y . By a d o p t i n g a hedgehog
P
o l i c y towards e x t e r n a l requests f o r g r e a t e r t r a n s p a r e n c y , the A l g i e r s regime
wi
11 f i n d i t s e l f l o s i n g the b a t t l e f o r such i n t a n g i b l e s on the home f r o n t . "
•"No
S o l u t i o n I n S i g h t To A l g e r i a n I m b r o g l i o "
•X*
hp x (#An e d i t o r i a l page a n a l y s i s i n Hindilanguage Rajasthan P a t r i k a
said,
"France i s w i t n e s s i n g a deluge o f A l g e r i a n refugees. The f o u r m i l l i o n
M
u s l i m s i n France sympathize w i t h the A l g e r i a n s and want France t o i n t e r v e n e
in
the c r i s i s .
This has l e f t France i n a dilemma. I f i t i n t e r v e n e s as i t i s
bein
g expected t o do, i t w i l l be seen as being s u p p o r t i v e o f a m i l i t a r y
dictatorshi
p.
I f i t takes the s i d e o f the democrats, then i t w i l l have t o
support the N i z
ameMustafa.... An enhanced r o l e i n the c r i s i s i s being
expected o f France beea
use o f i t s c o l o n i a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h A l g e r i a . . . . Over
the past f i v e years, how
ever, France's peace i n i t i a t i v e s have been i n v a i n . "
• " A l g e r i a I n A Time Of Massacre"
•An e d i t o r i a l page a r t i c l e i n the c e n t r i s t Telegraph (1/12) by c o l u m n i s t
A.N.D.
Haksar from C a l c u t t a noted, "As the v i o l e n c e e s c a l a t e d , hawks and
doves...are
pondering an e v e n t u a l I s l a m i c i s t t a k e o v e r . . . . This c o u l d happen
i n t h r e e ways.
One, a g r a d u a l I s l a m i c i s t ascendancy f o l l o w i n g a t a c t i c a l
powersharing comprom
ise w i t h the government. Two, a f r a g m e n t i n g o f A l g e r i a
w i t h some p a r t s under I s
lamic c o n t r o l . Three, a governmental c o l l a p s e , as
happened i n I r a n . An I s l a m i c
regime... would have an e f f e c t s i m i l a r t o t h a t
of the 1979 I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . .
This c o u l d d e s t a b i l i z e moderate Arab
regimes, undermine South Europe's secu
r i t y and a f f e c t U.S. i n t e r e s t s . . . . The
West should w h o l e h e a r t e d l y back A l g i e r s
(1/13)
�ARMS Email System
Page 33 of 36
U n t i l r e c e n t l y the United States,
France and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s were doing j u s t
that.
But c a l l s f o r peace
m i s s i o n s and s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n p o l i c i e s p
o i n t t o a new, u n s t a t e d
Western p o l i c y o f promoting powersharing."
• " I s l a m i c O r i e n t a t i o n Issue Of C o n f l i c t I n Moderate
Nations"
•The "Global Watch" column i n t h e proeconomicreforms Economic Times by
pundit K
. Subrahmanyam s a i d (1/12), " While t h e I s l a m i c s t a t e s r a i s e hue and
c r y when t
hey have a case a g a i n s t a n o n l s l a m i c s t a t e they have chosen t o
keep t o t a l l y s i l
ent on t h i s carnage as they d i d d u r i n g t h e I r a q l r a n war and
do i n respect o f Af
ghanistan....
"There are n o t enough m u l t i p a r t y democracies i n I s l a m i c
conf i
dence t h a t I s l a m i c p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those who p r o f e s s
Islamic o r t
hodoxy and r e v i v a l i s m , would p l a y p o l i t i c s a c c o r d i n g t o
rules of the
game. G e n e r a l l y they do not s u b s c r i b e t o t h e p r i n c i p l e
separation of state
and r e l i g i o n . . . .
The k i n d o f outrages p e r p e t r a t e d on
t o u r i s t s i n Egypt recent
l y by I s l a m i c e x t r e m i s t groups does not make I s l a m i c
p a r t i e s c r e d i b l e f o r democ
ratic interaction....
I t i s a l s o an overlooked
fact that a m a j o r i t y of the I s l
amie p o p u l a t i o n l i v e o u t s i d e t h e area o f
c o n f l i c t where I s l a m i s t h e i s s u e . Th
e m a j o r i t y o f t h e Muslims i n t h e w o r l d
are i n Indonesia, I n d i a , Bangladesh, Mal
a y s i a , t h e C e n t r a l Asian r e p u b l i c s
and elsewhere. I s l a m i s seen as a source o f
extremism o n l y i n t h e Arab
world,Turkey, I r a n , A f g h a n i s t a n and P a k i s t a n . "
AFRICA
X~
X"
hp x (#
hp x (ttDBURKINA FASO:
"AlgeriaThe
countries t o give
loyalty to
democratic
of
S t r a n g l e h o l d Of E x t e r n a l ' I n t e r f e r e n c e ' "
• A c c o r d i n g t o independent Le Pays's " I n t e r n a l Dialogue" (1/13), "The d e c i s i o n
o
f t h e Arab League, Canada and t h e European Union t o send an i n v e s t i g a t i o n
missi
on t o t h i s c o u n t r y i s r e v e a l i n g o f t h e new a t t i t u d e s o f t h e A l g e r i a n
authoritie
s who seem t o have watered down t h e i r usual i n t r a n s i g e n c e . Even i f
they do t h e
i r utmost t o i n s i s t on t h e f a c t t h a t such m i s s i o n s must have o n l y
the vague o b j
e c t i v e i n t h e f i g h t a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m , i t doesn't lessen t h e
f a c t t h a t they [ a r
e t r y i n g t o a v o i d ] t h e u n i v e r s a l condemnation o f t h e i r way
of d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
�ARMS Email System
Page 34 of 36
A l g e r i a n drama. I n any case, the idea t h a t dominates i n
a l l the chanceries i s
t h a t the o n l y way of removing the s u s p i c i o n s t h a t weigh
on them c o n s i s t s of the
A l g e r i a n a u t h o r i t i e s a l l o w i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i n v e s t i g a t i o n m i s s i o n as sugges
t e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o determine
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the
massacres of p o p u l a t i o n s . . . .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the e s c a l a t i n g c y c l e of v i o l e n c e
a
nd r e p r e s s i o n has never r e s o l v e d p o l i t i c a l problems. Again, the A l g e r i a n
leade
rs must r e c o g n i z e t h e i r p a r t i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s i m b r o g l i o .
Hence t h
e i r r e l u c t a n c e i n the s e t t i n g up of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n committee."
Xhp x (#
•KENYA: " A l g e r i a n s Cry For End To Massacres"
•The c e n t r i s t D a i l y Nation's e d i t o r i a l h e l d (1/13) p r i o r t o A l g e r i a ' s r e f u s a l
t
o admit the EU d e l e g a t i o n : "The frequency and
savagery of the a t t a c k s and
the
i n c r e a s i n g l y h i g h c a s u a l t i e s are a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the government
cannot
expect t o c o n t a i n the a t t a c k s . I n t h i s l i g h t , i t i s encouraging t h a t
the gov
ernment has accepted t o meet a m i s s i o n from the European Union t o
advise on ho
w t o counter I s l a m i c e x t r e m i s t s . We hope i t i s a s t a r t t o
g e t t i n g a formula t
hat w i l l b r i n g t o an end the b l o o d b a t h t h a t has come t o
characterize l i f e i n A
Igeria."
X~
hp x (#EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC
•INDONESIA: "End A l g e r i a n Tragedy"
X'
hp x (#
•The l e a d i n g , independent, Englishlanguage J a k a r t a Post s a i d (1/15):
"Both
t
he Western and Arab d e l e g a t i o n s , f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n reasons, should
adopt a
firm
stance i n persuading the A l g i e r s government t o take concrete
measures
to prot
ect i t s people from becoming t a r g e t s of f u r t h e r massacres,
considering that t h
e m i l i t a r y b a c k e d government of President
Liamine Zeroual
has proven t o be i n e f
f e c t i v e i n combating years of v i o l e n c e .
Equally
i m p o r t a n t f o r the m i s s i o n s t o
undertake i s t o f i n d out who the c u l p r i t s are
amid a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t the secur
i t y t r o o p s could a l s o be i m p l i c a t e d i n the
c o u n t l e s s massacres i n A l g e r i a so a
s t o t a r n i s h the image of FIS members."
X x (#LATIN AMERICA
X~
hp x (#DARGENTINA:
"DeadEnd Tragedy"
�ARMS Email System
Page 35 of 36
•Rolando R i v i e r e , d a i l y o f r e c o r d La Nacion's Europebased
correspondent,
wrote f
rom Madrid (1/13) c o n c e r n i n g a European m i s s i o n t o A l g e r i a : "Imagine
an A u s t r i
an, a B r i t and a Luxembourg c i t i z e n t r y i n g t o c a p t u r e , n o t t h e
essence o f these
a s s a s i n s ' groups, whether f u n d a m e n t a l i s t or n o t , b u t t h e
idiosyncrasy of a m i l
l e n i a l and d i s t a n t people, who l i v e and sleep i n a
d i f f e r e n t manner, i n s p i t e o
f being o n l y 200 k i l o m e t e r s away from Europe.
W i l l they o u t l i n e a c a t a l o g w i t h
the GIA, t h e FIS, and Hamas's s o f t e r
elements i n a separate chapter? W i l l t h e
y worry about n o t annoying anyone,
making sure t h a t t h e r e f i n e r i e s and gas a r e
safe? And t h e k i l l i n g s ?
They
w i l l c o n t i n u e . Death i s n o t c a l l e d o u t i n t h e St
ock Exchange."
•COSTA RICA: • "DCycle Of Barbarism"
• C o n s e r v a t i v e La Nacion observed (1/15) : "Last June, t h e f i r s t m u l t i p a r t y
pari
iamentary e l e c t i o n s s i n c e 1992 were conducted... t h e r e s u l t s c o n f i r m e d
the gen
e r a l r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e excesses o f t h e r a d i c a l I s l a m i c
fundamentalists.
Unfo
r t u n a t e l y , t h i s s m a l l democratic opening d i d n o t
d i m i n i s h t h e v i o l e n c e . . . . Th
e EU w i l l send e m i s s a r i e s t o A l g e r i a t o e x p l o r e
ways t o r e s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t .
H o p e f u l l y these a c t i o n s w i l l t r a n s l a t e i n t o
more democracy, w i t h o u t which A l g
e r i a w i l l never achieve peace."
##
#Xx\
P6QyXP#
END ATTACHMENT
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�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
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Original Format
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Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
[09/02/1997 - 01/15/1998]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Automated Records Management System
Source
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574745
42-t-0574745-20091295F-001-008-2015-2015-2015
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2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
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Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/574745">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/75cf357019f5a68d707e03a0bcc2c3a0.pdf
97356d0fb6d4a16ac60f5b3af4f70014
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Wippman, David
Original OA/ID Number:
1570
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
41
2
5
3
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. report
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
11/17/1997
Re: Algeria Update (7 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Wippman, David)
OA/Box Number:
1570
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria
2009-1295-F
kc2089
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIAj
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. report
SUIUECITTITLE
DATE
11/17/1997
Re: Algeria Update (7 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Wippman, David)
OA/Box Number:
1570
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria
2009-1295-F
ke2089
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidcnlial advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of Ihe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Algeria
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
David Wippman
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585657
42-t-7585657-20091295F-001-007-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585657">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/133b122024f11a93ed66aa6d86ca0fd3.pdf
cb438d93aa58d7cf1400adfe29cf28cf
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Vaccaro, Jonathan
Original OA/ID Number:
2207
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
41
i
9
2
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. report
Re: [Algeria Militants] (7 pages)
01/06/2000
Pl/b(l)
002. report
Re: [Algeria's Islamic Militancy] (6 pages)
08/20/1999
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Vaccaro, Jonathan)
OA/Box Number:
2207
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria
2009-1295-F
ke2088
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformalion Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
h(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidcnlial or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe F'OIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe F'OIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the F'OIA]
National Securit} Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
001. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/06/2000
Re: [Algeria Militants] (7 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Vaccaro, Jonathan)
OA/Box Number: 2207
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria
2009-1295-F
kc2088
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Acl - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. report
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
08/20/1999
Re: [Algeria's Islamic Militancy] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian AfTairs (Vaccaro, Jonathan)
OA/Box Number: 2207
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria
2009-1295-F
ke2088
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformalion Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) nf the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled fnr law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Algeria
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Jonathan "Matt" Vaccaro
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585655
42-t-7585655-20091295F-001-006-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585655">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4c07a0e8b9fd21f3158a5e49496c44b7.pdf
76b44f38ad18d9be34e3f550fa1d9a59
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria, 1997
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Schwartz, Eric
Original OA/ID Number:
3214
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
40
6
2
3
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Algeria Human Rights] (4 pages)
10/20/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Schwartz, Eric)
OA/Box Number:
3214
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria, 1997
2009-1295-F
ke2087
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
1 6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
*
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
�1*
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Algeria Human Rights] (4 pages)
10/20/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Schwartz, Eric)
OA/Box Number: 3214
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria, 1997
2009-1295-F
kc2087
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)]
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information ((b)(1) ofthe FOIA(
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells ((b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Algeria, 1997
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
NSC Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office (1993-1998)
Eric Schwartz
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585537
42-t-7585537-20091295F-001-005-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585537">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7556051df1aa61c8641fb469a4ffaf08.pdf
93c5ec1b7b052b75315c40e479c57fa7
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria [4]
Staff Office-Individual
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Busby, Scott
Original OA/ID Number:
1889
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
40
4
2
i
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. memo
Richard Schifter to Anthony Lake, re: Another Update on Algeria and
Thoughts on the Maghreb (3 pages)
ca. 11/1996
Pl/b(l)
002. memo
Richard Schifter to Anthony Lake, re: Another Update on Algeria (3
pages)
11/20/1996
Pl/b(l)
003. cable
Re: [Algerian constitution] (4 pages)
11/29/1996
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Constitutional Referandum] (6 pages)
1/27/1996
Pl/b(l)
005. memo
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Algeria Policy Update (5 pages)
03/05/1996
Pl/b(l)
006. cable
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
09/12/1996
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Armed Islamic Group (GIA)] (1 page)
07/17/1996
Pl/b(l)
008. cable
Re: [GIA] (2 pages)
07/08/1996
Pl/b(l)
009. cable
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
06/30/1996
Pl/b(l)
010. cable
Re: [Algeria Political System] (2 pages)
06/27/1996
Pl/b(l)
011. cable
Re: [Algerian Islamists] (3 pages)
04/25/1996
Pl/b(l)
012. cable
Re: [FIS Leader] (2 pages)
04/17/1996
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(X) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
013. cable
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
03/13/1996
Pl/b(l)
014. cable
Re: [GIA Purge] (2 pages)
03/13/1996
Pl/b(l)
015. cable
Re: [FIS and GIA] (5 pages)
02/01/1996
Pl/b(l)
016. cable
Re: [GIA] (2 pages)
01/03/1996
Pl/b(l)
017. cable
Re: [FIS communique] (2 pages)
12/21/1995
Pl/b(l)
018. cable
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
1/29/1995
Pl/b(l)
019. cable
Re: [Ali Benhadj Letter] (2 pages)
03/15/1995
Pl/b(l)
020. cable
Re: [FIS Leadership] (3 pages)
12/03/1994
Pl/b(l)
021. cable
Re: [Benhadj Letter] (2 pages)
12/07/1994
Pl/b(l)
022. cable
Re: [Ali Benhadj] (4 pages)
12/15/1994
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(I) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�0 AMNESTY_
INTERNATIONAL
USA
MARYAM ELAHI
Government Program Officer
for North Africa, Middle East & Europe Affairs
Washington Office
304 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 544-0200, phone
(202) 546-7142, fax
metahi@igc.apc.org
Amnesty International is an independant,
worldwide human rights organization, working
impartially for:
• the release of prisoners of conscience
• men, women, and children imprisoned for
their beliefs, provided they have neither
used nor advocated violence;
• fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners;
• an end to torture and executions in all cases.
LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�[EMBARGOED FOR: 19 November 1996]
amnesty international
ALGERIA
Fear and silence:
A hidden human rights crisis
November 1996
SUMMARY
Al INDEX: MDE 28/11/96
DISTR: SC/CO/GR
Extrajudicial executions, deliberate and arbitrary killings, "disappearances", torture, abductions,
death threats, and other abuses have become part of Algeria's daily reality. As confrontations
between security forces and armed opposition groups, who define themselves as "Islamic
groups", continue, killings and abuses are carried out in the name ofthe "anti-terrorist fight" by
some or "holy war" by others, and the civilian population is bearing the brunt of the
confrontation.
More than 50,000 people are reported to have been killed in Algeria in the past five
years. If many were killed in armed confrontation between security forces and armed opposition
groups, thousands of civilians were victims of both targeted and indiscriminate attacks. Both
security forces and armed opposition groups have shown utter disregard for the most basic
human right of the civilian population - the right to life.
The identity and motives of those responsible for killings and abductions has become
increasingly difficult to establish, as patterns of behaviour of security forces and armed
opposition groups are often similar: the army and security forces wear plain clothes, use
ordinary vehicles and do not identify themselves, whereas armed opposition groups at times
wear security forces uniforms and pose as security forces.
The pattern of killings and abuses has become more and more entrenched and has
created an atmosphere of fear, where many among the civilian population neither know nor
understand why they are being targeted or by whom.
The recently set-up government-backed militias, who define themselves as "self-defence
groups" or "patriots" have increasingly been involved in counter-insurgency operations using
military and security forces uniforms and equipment, and have also been responsible for
deliberate and arbitrary killings. With the atmosphere of increasing breakdown of law and order
the civilian population has been drawn more and more into the confrontation.
In addition to extrajudicial executions and deliberate and arbitrary killings, other grave
human rights abuses have continued to be committed. Hundreds of people have "disappeared"
after having been arrested by security forces; torture and ill-treatment of detainees held in secret
detention by security forces is widespread, and thousands of people have been arbitrarily
detained, including prisoners of conscience.
�Armed opposition groups, for their part, have also tortured some of their victims before
killing them, and have abducted and raped dozens of women. In addition, these groups have
repeatedly issued death threats against civilians including civil servants, relatives of members
of security forces, journalists, teachers, women, foreigners and many others from various
sectors of civilian society
The increasingly strict censorship of security-related information has kept many of the
killings and abuses hidden behind a wall of silence, and the international community has
remained indifferent to the plight of victims of human rights violations in Algeria.
This report describes the human rights situation in Algeria, including some of the
aspects of the hidden reality. The report is based on testimonies and information collected on
a daily basis from a wide range of sources, including victims, their families, human rights
activists, lawyers, medical doctors, journalists, members of the security forces, and government
authorities.
The organization condemns and opposes the killings of civilians and other abuses
committed by armed opposition groups, and has repeatedly called on these armed groups to stop
targeting civilians. However, no level of violence by these groups - no matter how serious - can
ever justify extrajudicial executions, torture, "disappearances" and other grave violations which
continue to be committed by the security forces.
To date not a single case of human rights violations committed by security forces is
known to have been thoroughly and independently investigated, and members of the security
forces responsible for the violations are allowed to continue violating human rights with
impunity.
This report contains recommendations to the Algerian Government to take concrete
action to stop and prevent human rights violations committed by security forces, to investigate
violations and bring to justice anyone found responsible, and to disband all militias The report
also reiterates calls to all armed opposition groups to put an immediate end to deliberate killings
and abductions of civilians, torture and rape, and to stop threatening civilians with death.
KEYWORDS: EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS! / INDISCRIMINATE KILLINGS 1
/HARASSMENT! / CENSORSHIP 1 / IMPUNITY 1 /TORTURE/ILL-TREATMENT 1
/ WOMEN 1 / JOURNALISTS 1 / FOREIGN NATIONALS 1 / NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES! / ARMED CONFLICT 1 / BOMB ATTACKS! /
ARBITRARY ARRESTS / MASS KILLING / SEX ASSAULT / INCOMMUNICADO
DETENTION / UNLAWFUL DETENTION / UNACKNOWLEDGED DETENTION /
CONFESSIONS / DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL / ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION / AGED / JUVENILES / ACADEMICS / MANUAL WORKERS /
EDITORS / STUDENTS / POLICE AS VICTIMS / SAILORS / RELIGIOUS GROUPS
/ RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS / POLITICIANS / LAWYERS / HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS / DOCTORS / MILITARY / POLICE / CIVIL DEFENCE / AI AND
GOVERNMENT / PRISONERS' TESTIMONIES / PRISON VIOLENCE / MISSIONS /
CONSCRIPTION / BANNING / ILL-HEALTH /
This repoil summarizes a 45-page document (20,919 words), : ALGERIA, Fear and silence: A hidden
human rights crisis (AI Index: MDE 28/1 1/96) issued by Amnesty International in November 1996.
Anyone wishing fuither details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document.
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM
�[EMBARGOED FOR: 19 November 1996]
amnesty international
ALGERIA
Fear and silence:
A hidden human rights crisis
November 1996
Al Index: MDE 28/11/96
Distr: SC/CO/GR
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM
�TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
BACKGROUND
3
KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS: A CAMPAIGN OF TERROR
6
CIVILIANS CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO FIRES
7
EXTRAJUDICIAL AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
10
KILLINGS OF DETAINEES
13
THE SERKADJI PRISON MASSACRE
15
DELIBERATE AND ARBITRARY KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENT-BACKED
MILITIAS
KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS AND OTHER ABUSES BY ARMED OPPOSITION
GROUPS
Deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians and non-combatants
Killings of foreigners
Indiscriminate attacks resulting in the killings of civilians
Acts of torture committed by armed opposition groups: rape
20
21
25
26
27
THE "DISAPPEARED": WHERE ARE THEY?
28
ARREST PROCEDURES: THE ROUTE TO "DISAPPEARANCE"
33
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PRACTICE
Methods of torture
36
38
17
THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE TORTURE AND UNLAWFUL DETENTION
39
PROLONGED DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL
41
CONCLUSION
42
RECOMMENDATIONS
43
�AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S WORK AGAINST ABUSES BY OPPOSITION GROUPS
Amnesty International does not support or oppose any government or political system. Nor does
it support or oppose the views of the victims whose rights it seeks to protect. It is concerned solely
with the protection of human rights, within its mandate, regardless of the ideological, political or
other conflicts involved.
Amnesty International takes no position on the question of violence. It does not identify itself with
any of the parties to a particular conflict, nor does it presume to judge in any situation whether
recourse to violence is justified or not. It deliberately restricts itself to working for the protection
of the human rights that fall within its mandate and does not comment or act on issues that fall
outside those terms of reference.
In armed conflicts both governments and those opposing them must observe recognized standards
protecting the individual's basic rights. Therefore Amnesty International condemns and actively
opposes the deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians and other abuses by individuals or groups
of individuals who claim to act for political objectives. In using neutral terms, like "armed
opposition groups". Amnesty International neither recognizes nor extends any legitimacy to these
groups; nor does it seek to compare either the abuses or the perpetrators; its concern is for the
victims and its objective is to give facts about the human rights situation in the country.
Amnesty International's opposition to human rights violations perpetrated by governments
worldwide is based on international human rights norms concerning the protection of therightsof
individuals in relation to governmental authority; it is states which have ratified international human
rights treaties and adopted other international humanrightsinstruments within theframeworkof the
United Nations, and it is states which are obliged to implement them. Therefore, while opposing
and campaigning to end abuses by armed opposition groups, the organization will continue to place
its primary focus on humanrightsviolations by governments and the responsibility of those with
governmental authority to abide by their international obligations - notably their solemn obligation
under international humanrightstreaties to safeguard human rights and prevent human rights
violations. The responsibility for investigating humanrightviolations and bringing to justice those
found responsible for humanrightsviolations and abuses lies with the state authorities.
�ALGERIA
Fear and silence:
A hidden human rights crisis
INTRODUCTION
"People in Algeria are killed and slaughtered without any reason at all.... Some
people are killed because their names were mentioned in a list; others because
their names were omitted from another list. .. Both the government and the
Islamists are killing innocent people. .. Algerians are suffering and dying in
silence. .. The international community has so far remained indifferent to what
is happening in Algeria...." .
1
More than 50,000 people are reported to have been killed in the past five years;
if many have died in armed confrontation between security forces and armed opposition
groups, thousands of victims have been civilians who had no involvement with armed
confrontation.
As the circle of violence has continued to expand, the civilian population has
increasingly borne the brunt of the confrontation. Both security forces and armed
opposition groups which define themselves as "Islamic groups" have murdered civilians
and committed other grave abuses. Security forces have extrajudicially executed
individuals, including in their homes in front of their families, and in detention;
extrajudicial executions have also been used as a means of eliminating known or
suspected members or supporters of armed opposition groups instead of arresting them.
Armed opposition groups, for their part, have deliberately and arbitrarily killed civilians,
both in targeted attacks and in indiscriminate bomb explosions, in addition to thousands
of members of the security forces.
The identity and motives of those responsible for killings and abductions have
become increasingly difficult to establish, as patterns of behaviour by security forces
and armed opposition groups have often been similar; members of the army and security
forces often wear plain clothes, use ordinary vehicles, and do not present arrest warrants
or identify themselves; and armed opposition groups at times wear security forces'
uniforms and pose as security forces The recently set up government-backed civilian
militias, who define themselves as "self-defence groups" or "patriots", and who have
increasingly been involved in counter-insurgency operations, also use military or
security forces' uniforms and equipment.
'
Extractsfroma letter recently sent by an Algerian to Amnesty International.
Amnesty International November 1996
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
Killings and death threats are daily occurrences; the violence spares no one;
many fear that they may be targeted, but do not knowfromwhich side or why. Killings
and abuses are justified in the name of the "anti-terroristfight"by some, or "holy war"
by others, as each side uses terms which de-humanize the other. The media coverage
and condemnation of abuses inside Algeria is often selective, only certain crimes and
atrocities being reported. Doing otherwise may be interpreted as "siding with the
enemy".
Every day more lives are lost, but most of the killings are not even reported, or
are mentioned only in passing. Reports like "Ten people killed in a 'terrorist' attack",
or "Ten 'terrorists' eliminated by security forces", have become routine. The majority
of the victims have no face or name; the numbers and statistics concealing the human
suffering of each victim, each family.
Amnesty International has continued to visit the country for fact-finding,
whenever possible, and to closely monitor the human rights situation, gathering
information on a daily basisfroma wide range of sources, including victims and their
families, eyewitnesses, lawyers, human rights activists, doctors, nurses, journalists, and
army and security forces personnel. No other international human rights organization
has carried out research in Algeria since 1992.
In armed conflict both governments and those opposing them must observe
recognized standards protecting the individual's basic rights. Therefore Amnesty
International condemns and actively opposes the deliberate killings and other attacks on
civilians by individuals or groups of individuals who claim to act for political
objectives. In using neutral terms, like "armed opposition groups". Amnesty
International neither recognizes nor extends any legitimacy to these groups; nor does
it seek to compare either the abuses or the perpetrators; its concern is for the victims and
its objective is to give facts about the human rights situation in the country.
As well as placing its concerns about the human rights situation in Algeria on
the public record by regularly publishing reports, Amnesty International has continued
to raise its concerns with the Algerian Government, in discussions with government
officials and through correspondence. The authorities have often denied allegations of
human rights violations contained in Amnesty International's reports, but they have not
responded to most of the confidential letters and memoranda requesting clarification
and information on specific cases, and general concerns.
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Amnesty International November 1996
�Algeria: Fear and silence
This report describes the continuing deterioration of the human rights situation
over the past two years. The report contains further recommendations to the Algerian
authorities to investigate killings and other human rights violations committed by its
security forces and by government-backed militias, to bring those responsible to justice,
and to take the necessary measures to stop and prevent further violations, in compliance
with its obligations under international human rights treaties to which Algeria is a state
party. The report also calls on armed opposition groups to put an end to the killing and
targeting of civilians and non-combatants.
2
3
The names and other details which could lead to the identification of certain
individuals and families have been omitted, as this could expose them to further risks.
BACKGROUND
In June 1994 Yousef Fathallah, the President of the Algerian Human Rights League,
was murdered at the entrance of his office in Algiers. Three weeks earlier he had
addressed an Amnesty International meeting in Berlin (Germany), describing the human
rights situation in Algeria. He spoke of daily extrajudicial executions, killings and other
abuses by security forces and armed groups, of the increasingly widespread fear among
the civilian population, and of the increasing censorship and selective reporting of the
violence in Algeria.
What he said about the human rights situation in Algeria remains relevant
today; the atmosphere of fear he described has become more and more entrenched, and
tens of thousands more people have been killed.
Increasing restrictions by the authorities on access and disclosure of securityrelated information have made it impossible for the media and others to investigate and
2
For further background on Amnesty International concerns see: ALGERIA: Repression
and violence must end, AI INDEX: MDE 28/08/94, of October 1994.
3
In addition to recommendations contained inprevious reports and confidential
memoranda and correspondence..
Amnesty International November 1996
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
4
report objectively on killings and other abuses
The censorship of security-related
information has been increasingly strict, only allowing information issued by the
security forces or by the official press agency to be published by Algerian media
Journalists, in addition to being killed and threatened with death by armed opposition
groups, risk imprisonment if they issue unauthorized information on security issues;
indeed several have been arrested and prosecuted on these grounds; Amnesty
International considers them as having been prisoners of conscience. Several
newspapers have been suspended and seized for the same reason.
5
Initially government censorship of information on the violence curtailed mainly
the reporting of abuses by security forces. Killings, abductions and other crimes
committed by armed opposition groups were widely publicized, yet crimes such as
extrajudicial killings, torture, "disappearances" and other violations committed by the
security forces remained hidden by a wall of silence. Fear, censorship and the political
positions of certain media account for such selective reporting.
While some killings of members of the security forces by armed opposition
groups have been reported, many others, especially those resulting from armed
confrontations between armed opposition groups and security forces or from attacks and
ambushes by these groups on army and security forces, have usually not been reported
Bomb explosions and other attacks on civilians committed by armed opposition groups,
especially in rural areas, have also been kept silent. Similarly, bombings, house
demolition and other attacks, including with heavy artillery, by the army and security
forces in villages and in areas where armed opposition groups are believed to be hiding
have also not been reported. In the past two years information on murders, bombs and
other attacks by armed opposition groups has been increasingly censored, as the
authorities describe the security situation as having improved and the violence as being
only "residual"
4
A confidential Decree from the Ministry of the Interior of June 1994 laid down strict
critena for media coverage of security-related information, in February 1995 further restrictions were
imposed with the creation of censorship committees Several journalists have been detained,
interrogated and prosecuted, several newspapers have been repeatedly suspended and hundreds of
issues of different newspapers have been seized for publishing unauthorized security-related
information.
• For example, the French-language weekly La Nation of 4 March 1996. which contained
a dossier on the human rights situatio. i in Algeria describing abuses by both security forces and armed
opposition groups, was seized. The dossier was published in France by the monthly Le Monde
Diplomatique.
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
Some media have not only kept silent about humanrightsviolations committed
by security forces, but they have attacked human rights organizations and others who
have reported and condemned such violations. The suggestion that human rights
violations committed by the security forces are crimes which must be investigated and
stopped is taken by many as an expression of support for armed opposition groups or
as a defence for their crimes.
Increasing restrictions have also been imposed on foreign media; several foreign
journalists have been banned or expelled from Algeria; others are unable to obtain
access to the country and most of those who visit Algeria are under permanent security
forces escort . There are few independent reports of the confrontation which has cost
the lives of tens of thousands of people, and the true extent of the human rights crisis in
Algeria has been kept hidden
6
The media routinely report killings of groups of individuals described as
"terrorists", in most cases without mentioning the identity of the victims or the
circumstances in which they were killed; reports of killings by armed opposition groups
are often equally vague. It is mainly the killings of foreigners or well-known Algerians
which are reported in detail, while the majority of the victims remain nameless. The
lack of interestfromthe international community in the human rights crisis in Algeria
has left those who live in terror in Algeria feeling that they have been forgotten.
The Algerian authorities have repeatedly refuted reports by Amnesty
International and others that human rights violations such as torture. Extrajudicial
executions and "disappearances" have been committed by security forces; they have not,
however, called into question the veracity of reports by the same organizations about
killings and other abuses committed by armed opposition groups. Similarly, Islamist
groups have denied accusations that armed opposition groups are responsible for killing
civilians, raping women and other abuses, but have not refuted reports of violations by
security forces. Meanwhile, the pattern of abuses demonstrates that on both sides
human rights abuses are an integral part of their strategy.
In some cases the authorities have referred to the possibility that "bovures"
(mistakes) or "depassements" (excesses) may have been committed by members of the
security forces in isolated cases. However, human rights violations are committed on
6
;
The security escort r; for the journalists' own protection; however, foreign journalists
have complained that such measures have curtailed their ability to research and investigate certain
issues; often foreign journalists are only allowed access to the country on condition that they accept
this type of protection.
Amnesty International November 1996
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
such a scale that they cannot be seen as isolated abuses of authority or individual
"excesses".
The Algerian authorities have in some cases stated that investigations are carried
out into complaints of violations by security forces; however, to date not a single case
of extrajudicial execution, torture, "disappearance" and other violations perpetrated by
security forces is known to have been independently and thoroughly investigated
Members of the security forces responsible for such violations have not been brought
to justice, and are thus able to continue to violate human rights with impunity.
KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS: A CAMPAIGN OF TERROR
Ofthe tens of thousands of people who have been killed in Algeria since the beginning
of 1992 many were civilians, often killed in their homes in front of their families, or
after having been abducted, or in circumstances which were never clarified, or were
victims of indiscriminate attacks. The pattern of extrajudicial executions by security
forces and deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed opposition groups has become
deeply entrenched since 1993. The victims come from all walks of life; many of them
youths, but also women, children, civil servants, teachers, journalists, religious figures,
and political activists.
There has been an increasing proliferation andfragmentationof armed groups
which define themselves as "Islamic groups", whose composition and leadership remain
unclear. There are also indications that armed opposition groups and common law
criminals have taken advantage of the atmosphere of fear and breakdown of law and
order to engage in activities such as racketeering, extortion, and plundering; these
crimes are generally referred to in the Algerian media as "terrorism".
Civilians have borne the brunt of a complex situation of political violence and
counter-violence, where all those involved have shown utter disregard for the most basic
human rights - the right to life - of the civilian population.
Statistics of killings from official sources have often been contradictory and
failed to give an accurate reflection of the reality. At the end of 1994 Ministry of the
Interior sources gave afigureof 20,000 "terrorists" killed in the previous two years. In
a report published at the beginning of 1996 by the official human rights body, the
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Amnesty International November 1996
�Algena: Fear and silence
7
Observatoire National des Droits de I'Homme (ONDH) , 5,029 individuals described
as "terrorists" were said to have been killed by the security forces during 1994 and 1995
(while in the same period armed opposition groups killed 1,400 civilians). However,
the ONDH states in the report that these figures are underestimates, given that they are
the result of a compilation of security forces' communiques published in the press.
The authorities and security forces have often stated that there are only a handful of
"terrorists" and that most of the "terrorists" have been "neutralized". For example, in
August 1996 the Algerian newspaper Liberie, quoting security forces' sources, stated
that the number of existing "terrorists" is 2,000, compared to 1,100 in 1993. It is hard
to reconcile thesefigureswith other official accounts of the thousands who were killed
and described as "terrorists".
8
CIVILIANS CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO FIRES
As violations and abuses by both government forces and armed opposition groups have
continued to spread, an increasing number of civilians have found themselves caught
in the spiral of violence, targeted by one side or the other, or by both. People, especially
youths living in areas where there had been widespread support for the Front Islamique
du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front), FIS, at the time of the 1991 elections, often poor
districts, have been particularly vulnerable. After the cancellation of the election many
youths from these areas were arbitrarily arrested and thousands of them were detained
in internment camps in the desert in the south of the country and held there for months
without charge or trial . As armed groups started to emerge, and especially since they
stepped up their attacks in 1993, thousands were arrested, tortured and killed by the
security forces who suspected them of having links with armed opposition groups or
9
7
The ONDH was set up in 1992 to replace the Human Rights Ministry which had been
created in the summer of 1991, after the imposition of the state of siege. The mandate of the ONDH.
which reports to the President of the Republic, includes investigating humanrightsviolations by
government security forces; however, since its existence the ONDH has not adequately investigated
humanrightsviolations by government forces, and has focused most of its activities on publicizing
killings and other acts of violence committed by armed opposition groups.
8
As stated in the ONDH report 1994-95 (page 39, para 1.14).
'
At the beginning of 1992, after the cancellation ofthe second round ofthe legislative
elections thousands of people were detained , of these more than 10,000, many of them youths, were
detained administratively in desert camps in the south of Algeria; most of them were released after a
few months, but more than 640 of them were held without charge or trial until the end of November
1995. when the last camp in Ain M'Guel was closed and the inmates released.
Amnesty International November 1996
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
of supporting or failing to denounce such groups, or in retaliation for attacks committed
by the armed opposition groups. At the same time armed opposition groups killed or
threatened to kill youths who refused to join or support them, comply with their orders
to leave their job, or to observe a certain behaviour . Security forces also targeted
relatives of members of armed opposition groups, and armed opposition groups targeted
relatives of members of the security forces.
10
Eyewitnesses have described to Amnesty International how raids by security
forces have resulted in groups of people being rounded up, beaten, bundled into car
boots and taken away, or shot dead on the spot Others have witnessed attacks by armed
opposition groups, who rounded up groups of people, killing some - often by slitting
their throats or decapitating them - and threatening others with death before leaving.
Often such raids and attacks by security forces or armed opposition groups appear to
have been carried out in retaliation for previous attacks and raids, or simply to terrorize
and intimidate the population.
This is the testimony of a young man who left Algeria. Amnesty International
has verified the information relating to his case with his family, lawyers, neighbours
and others in Algeria. His account is echoed by many others whose testimonies have
been gathered both inside Algeria and abroad:
" I was arrested at the beginning of 1992 in a raid; they tortured me and then
sent me to a camp in the desert for over three months and then released me; they
never even brought me to a judge. I was glad to be out but then life became a
nightmare; some of my childhood friends from the neighbourhood became
'terrorists' or supported the 'terrorists' and were putting pressure on me to join
too; I didn't want to have anything to do with things like that, but I was scared,
they kill people just like that, for nothing. 1 was arrested again in 1993 and they
tortured me again, but it was nothing compared to others; one of those who was
detained with me, Yassine Simozrag, was tortured very badly, they burned his
face with a blowtorch and did other horrible things to him; and in the end he was
killed in prison Others who were detained with me in Chateauneuf have
"disappeared" Some guys from the neighbourhood were killed by the army,
11
10
Certain armed opposition groups have issued communiques forbidding smoking,
playing modem music, mixed (men and women) camping and other activities which they consider as
"un-Islamic"
"
Yassine Simozrag was one ofthe detainees killed in the massacre in Serkadji Prison in
February 1992, see page 41.
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�Algena: Fear and silence
and others were killed by the 'terrorists'; but not in armed battles, they were
assassinated by one side or the other. A 'terrorist' group kills a policeman, or
makes an ambush or some other attack and leaves; and then the security forces
come and round up people at random and take them away or kill them, because
they suspect them of being accomplices of the 'terrorists' or maybe just to
punish them for not having stood up to the 'terrorists'. The 'terrorists' also
come and kill and threaten people to take revenge after raids by the security
forces, because they suspect that local people may have given information to the
security forces. So people who manage to escape an attackfromone side are
then in dangerfromthe other side".
Some people have left the district where they lived because they felt at risk from
armed opposition groups orfromthe security forces, orfromboth. However, in a
situation of high unemployment and housing shortages moving is often difficult; some
have gone to stay with relatives elsewhere, and a few have succeeded in leaving the
country, but the majority continue to live in fear.
Several medical doctors have been accused of cooperating with armed
opposition groups for having failed to report to the security forces instances when
they were forced to treat injured members of armed opposition groups. In the
atmosphere of fear and insecurity some doctors have refrained from informing the
security forces of such incidents because they feared that this would put them and
their families at risk ofretaliationfrom the armed groups, and that they would not
be able to obtain any effective protection from the security forces.
Many people who were threatened with death by armed opposition groups if they
did not leave their jobs did not want to give in to the threats, or could not afford to lose
the income, but were unable to obtain any protection. Amnesty International gathered
testimonies from civil servants, judges, town hall officials appointed to replace the
elected FIS mayors, and others who stated that when they sought protectionfromthe
authorities they were only offered a gun to protect themselves. Many do not want to
carry a gun because they fear that this may make them even more a target of armed
opposition groups; others because they feel that a gun would give them little protection,
given that in most cases people who are assassinated are victims of surprise attacks.
Some stated that they had tried to resign out of fear of being killed by armed opposition
groups but their resignations were not accepted; others expressed fear that if they tried
to resign this would be interpreted by the authorities as an expression of support for the
armed opposition groups, putting them atriskfromthe security forces.
A civil servant who fled Algeria told Amnesty International:
Amnesty International November 1996
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�10
Algeria: Fear and silence
"Both myself and my wife worked for the government, and we lived in a poor
district where we know a lot of people because we both grew up there. I used to be
a member of the Syndicat Islamique du Travail, SIT [Islamic trade union, close to the
FIS, banned since 1992] and a sympathizer with the FIS, but since the trouble began
in 1992 I stayed out of politics. At the end of 1994 some guys from my district came
to me and told me that both myself and my wife had to comply with the request of
the 'mujahidin' and quit our jobs. I tried to explain to them that with our salaries
we supported our families, but they said that God would provide for us and our
families; they said that they would give us three months to quit our jobs. I did not
know what to do, and a little while after they came back and gave me the same
warning again. I know that they were serious and that they could have killed us. We
could not leave our jobs because I was afraid that the security forces would have
taken it as declaration of support for the 'terrorists' and for that they also could have
killed me. I have already been arrested once, my brother is in prison and my cousin
has 'disappeared' after having been arrested. His brother was a 'terrorist', but he
himself had nothing to do with the 'terrorists'. Two of my neighbours were killed by
the security forces; they arrested them from home and then they were found dead and
reported in the press as two 'terrorists' killed; one of them had a brother who was a
'terrorist', but they were not 'terrorists'. So whatever you are or whatever you do,
you are not safe. We felt completely trapped and so we left. My wife's sister also
received death threats from the 'terrorists'; she worked for a foreign company and she
got a letter under her door saying that because she worked for foreigners she would
be killed; she wasn't even warned toresign;they just told her that they would kill her
and they also tried to get into her flat, so she too left".
12
EXTRAJUDICIAL
AND
GOVERNMENT FORCES
SUMMARY
EXECUTIONS
BY
Detailed information gatheredfromeyewitnesses, relatives of victims, members of the
security forces and the army, medical doctors, journalists, and others, indicates that, in
addition to killings which occur during armed confrontations with armed groups,
extrajudicial executions are widespread
Extrajudicial killings seem to be used by the security forces as an alternative to
arrest, as a way of eliminating individuals known or suspected of having links with, or
12
Literally means holy fighters; a term used by armed groups who define themselves as
"Islamic groups" to refer to their members.
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Amnesty International November 1996
�Algeria: Fear and silence
11
supporting, armed opposition groups, and in revenge for killings and other acts of
violence carried out by these armed groups. Victims of extrajudicial executions have
been killed in their homes, in the street, in detention, and after having been captured from
hiding places.
Thousands of killings by the security forces of people, described as "terrorists"
or "criminals" have been reported in official communiques as having taken place when
security forces stormed hiding places of armed opposition groups. According to these
official reports, some of the victims were not even armed, and in the overwhelming
majority of cases reported all the individuals in the group were killed; none were injured
or arrested, and no casualties were sustained by members of the security forces in the
confrontation. The frequent instances whereby the security forces have killed entire
groups of people when storming houses or armed opposition groups' hideouts raises the
question of how many of these people were deliberately extrajudicially executed,
including killings as a result of excessive use of lethal force in situations where they
posed no threat to the lives of the security forces.
Testimonies and information gathered by Amnesty International from a wide
range of sources, which include eyewitnesses, relatives of victims, members of the army
and security forces, and government officials, point to an increasingly deeply rooted
pattern of deliberate physical elimination of individuals and groups of individuals by the
security services. In many cases such extrajudicial executions are not reported at all,
while in other cases the victims have been reported as having been killed by the security
forces in the context of armed confrontation, and in other cases still as having been killed
by "terrorists" Some families have reported that they had to sign declarations stating
that their relatives had been killed by "terrorists", even though in some cases the families
knew that their relatives had been killed by the security forces, and in other cases they
did not know who had killed them and they were provided with no evidence that they had
been killed by armed groups. Other families reported having to sign statements that their
sons were "terrorists" who had been killed in armed confrontations, even though their
sons had either been extrajudicially executed by the security forces, and not killed in
armed confrontations, or had been killed in circumstances they knew nothing about.
Families of such victims are often too frightened to complain for fear of reprisals; the
fact that no inquiries have been held to date into such cases, and that no members of the
security forces have been brought to justice for committing extrajudicial executions
leaves families of the victims feeling that they have no recourse for seeking justice.
On the night of 10 to 11 May 1996. an 84-year-old man and four of his sons, aged
between 46 and 23, were killed in their home in front of their family. This is the
testimony of the mother of the four men:
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"It was about 11.30 at night and we were watching television, myself, my
husband, three of my sons, my daughter, and the wives of two of my sons; my
youngest son was in bed. convalescent; my other sons were absent. Four armed
men dressed in plain clothes, some wore jeans and they all wore blue jackets and
balaclavas, came to the house; my oldest son went to open the door and they
came upstairs and took him and the two others downstairs and made them lie face
down; then they took my youngest sonfromhis bed and also took him downstairs
and made him lie face down and shot all four of them in the back of the head and
killed them; my husband panicked and started to scream and they shot him in the
face and killed him; their guns had silencers; then as they were leaving one of
them shot the dog three times with a gun without a silencer, but did not kill it.
Before leaving they said 'a head for a head'. They asked no questions and said
nothing else. A car was waiting for them outside and the driver was not hooded
and we recognized him; he isfromthe security services and isfromour area but
no longer lives here; four or five members of his family had been killed two
weeks before by the 'terrorists'. One of my sons was a 'terrorist' and he was
killed over a year ago; he had taken up arms and he was killed and we did not
complain, but my other children and my husband had nothing to do with it, they
didn't do anything; when the security forces were looking for my son who was
a 'terrorist', in 1994, they arrested another son and kept him for two weeks then
released him. After my son was killed in 1995 the security forces again took
another son and kept him for a few days and then released him. They [the security
forces] knew that none of my children had anything to do with their brother, who
had left home a long time ago. After they killed my husband and my four
children they made us sign a paper saying they had been killed by the 'terrorists';
we signed; what can we do? We don't want them to come back and kill my other
children".
The sister and wives of the four men who were present when they were killed
confirmed the mother's testimony.
On 30 January 1996 a 17-year-old boy was taken by members of the security
forces from his high school in Algiers and "disappeared" All efforts by his family to
establish his whereabouts remained in vain, until 14 February 1996, when his father
found his body in the morgue; he had been kilted by several bullets in the chest and his
body had been brought to the morgue on 31 January 1996. His family were not allowed
to take the body back for burial, and there was no record of the circumstances of his
death at the morgue No other report was issued by the security forces about the killing
of a young boy; yet his body was taken to the morgue by the security forces. Five days
before his abduction and killing, the security forces had gone to his home at night and
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had questioned his parents about their children, who were in the house but were not
questioned. Two days later, on 27 January 1996 members of the security forces went to
the boy's school and questioned the staff about him; he was at the school but was not
questioned. They returned on 30 January and took him away from his classroom. The
staff at the school confirmed the information, but said they were unwilling to testify out
of fear Repeated requests by the boy's family for his death to be investigated have
yielded no result to date.
KILLINGS OF DETAINEES
Amnesty International has received widespread reports of extrajudicial executions of
detainees while they were held in secret detention weeks or months after their arrest.
These victims are sometimes described by the authorities or by the media, citing security
forces' communiques, as "terrorists" killed during armed confrontations. Their families
are not informed of their deaths by the authorities and in some cases leam about it from
the newspapers or from other sources The responses of the authorities concerning some
of these cases point to a deliberate effort to conceal the evidence that the victims were
extrajudicially executed.
Fouad Bouchelaghem. a 30-year-old lecturer of physics at the University of
Blida, married and father of a 10-month-old baby, was arrested by members of the
security forces at his home in Algiers on 3 June 1994 at 1.15am. The members of the
security forces, who did not present an arrest or a search warrant, searched the apartment
and reportedly took a portable computer and Fouad Bouchelaghem's car. After his arrest
he "disappeared" and his family was unable to find out where he was detained. He was
seen for the last time as he was being taken away, hooded and in poor physical condition,
from the Chateauneuf security centre - where detainees are routinely tortured - on 20 July
1994. His family continued to look for him and on 8 September 1994 found a record in
the morgue that his body had been brought in on 21 July 1994 and buried on 15 August
1994. No details were available at the morgue or at the cemetery of the cause or
circumstances of his death.
In 1996, in reply to inquiries about the case the Algerian authorities stated that
Fouad Bouchelaghem had been arrested in July 1994 and had been killed by security
forces as he tried to escape. The explanation given is that during interrogation he
confessed to knowing the hiding place of an armed group, and that the security forces
took him to this location, where there was an exchange of fire between the security forces
and the armed group. During that time Fouad Bouchelaghem tried to escape and was
killed. The Algerian authorities do not indicate either the date of his arrest or the date
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on which he was killed, nor do they explain why his family, who was looking for him,
was never informed of his death.
Amnesty International has examined a number of police statements in connection
with the case which contain contradictory information: one police statement dated 25
June 1994 contains details of an interrogation of Fouad Bouchelaghem and is signed by
him and by a member of the security forces. Another police statement dated 28 June
1994 states that Fouad Bouchelaghem is dead Another police statement dated 3 July
1994 states that Fouad Bouchelaghem is sought by the authorities and is on the run.
Another police statement dated 20 July 1994 states that Fouad Bouchelaghem agreed to
show the security forces the hiding place of Mokhtar Djilali and Smain Kouissi in an
apartment in the Bab El Oued district in Algiers, and that once arrived at the apartment
there was an exchange of fire between the security forces and the two men in hiding
were killed, as was Fouad Bouchelaghem who tried to escape. However Mokhtar Djilali
and Smain Kouissi had actually both been arrested in May 1994; Amnesty International
examined police statements according to which they were detained and had been
interrogated in June 1994, and other detainees stated that they had seen them in detention
at that time.
Amnesty International had been informed of the arrest of Fouad Bouchelaghem
immediately following his arrest and had written to the Algerian official human rights
body, the ONDH, on 19 June 1994; his family also contacted the ONDH on 25 June The
ONDH wrote to the Ministry of the Interior and to the Police and Gendarmerie
headquarters on 9 July 1994. By 17 September 1994, that is almost two months after he
was killed, the ONDH had yet not received any reply. More than two years after Fouad
Bouchelaghem's death, and despite repeated requests for an investigation to be carried
out into his illegal prolonged secret detention and allegations that he was tortured and
extrajudicially executed, no investigation has been carried out. Moreover, in spite of the
evidence that he was arrested on 3 June 1994, the authorities continue to claim that he
was arrested later, in July 1994, in contradiction to their own interrogation records and
in an apparent attempt to conceal his illegal and prolonged secret detention, torture and
the circumstances surrounding his death.
A similar case is that of Saghir Bouhadida, a journalist and assistant lecturer at
the Institute of Communications and Information and at the Institute of Social Sciences
in Algiers, who was arrested on 11 June 1995 at about 7pm with two students after
leaving the Institute of Social Sciences. The two students arrested with him were
released after three days but he remained "disappeared" and his family's inquiries with
the local authorities bore no' fruit He was seen by other detainees in a detention centre
in La Montagne suburb of Algiers in the weeks following his arrest. Amnesty
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15
International repeatedly asked the Algerian authorities for information on his
whereabouts and reasons for detention but received no reply. In 1996 the Algerian
authorities responded to inquiries about his case denying that he had ever been arrested
and saying that he had been killed during a security forces operation aimed at arresting
members of an armed group. They provided no explanation as to why his family, who
was looking for him, was not informed of his death and was not allowed to see his body
before burial.
Abdelhamid Kechouane, a manual worker for a state company, married and the
father of ten children aged between one and 18 years, was arrested from his home in
Bougara on 7 April 1993 and "disappeared". In raising his case with the Algerian
authorities Amnesty International mistakenly reported the date of his arrest as 7
February 1993 instead of 7 April. The Algerian authorities never responded to Amnesty
International, but in 1996 they stated that Abdelhamid Kechouane had joined the
"terrorist" groups in 1993 and was killed in an armed confrontation with the security
forces on 8 February 1993 in Bougara The date given by the Algerian authorities as the
date of his death corresponds to the day after the date of arrest initially given by Amnesty
International; however, he was only arrested on 7 April 1993, that is two months later,
and up to the date of his arrest he lived at home and went to work, and this information
was confirmed by his family, neighbours and colleagues.
THE SERKADJI PRISON MASSACRE
On 21 and 22 February 1995 at least 96 prisoners were killed when the security forces
intervened to quell a mutiny. Five prison guards had also been killed before the
beginning of the mutiny. During the two days of the incident and for several days after
the families of the detainees in Serkadji Prison were unable to obtain any information and
were left wondering if their relatives were dead or alive. The families of those who were
killed were not informed of their deaths until after their burial. The majority of the
victims were buried in nameless graves marked only "X Algerien". No autopsies or
ballistic tests were carried out; although these could have been crucial in establishing
facts about the manner in which the detainees were killed. There were allegations that
many of the detainees were deliberately extrajudicially executed, even after the incident
had ended and the detainees had returned to their cells; information gathered from
surviving detainees, lawyers and other sources have strengthened these allegations.
13
For a more detailed account of the incident see the report ALGERIA: Medical concern;
Killings in Serkadji Prison, Al Index: MDE 28/01/96, of 26 February 1996.
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At the end of March 1995 the ONDH announced that it was setting up a
commission of inquiry, and in May 1995 it published a report of its findings. However,
the focus of the inquiry it carried out has little to do with seeking to establish the truth
about the death of some 100 people. The ONDH commission of inquiry failed to
investigate the most crucial issue, namely the circumstances in which the detainees were
killed. Its account of the events is almost identical to that given by the authorities
immediately after the incident. The commission of inquiry did not set out to examine the
bodies of those killed or the weapons used, and no autopsies or ballistic tests were ever
carried out. The ONDH report states that, in quelling theriot,the security forces chose
not to use teargas in order to avoid causing suffocation in a confined space , but it does
not explain why the security forces chose to use grenades and live ammunition instead,
which resulted in such a disproportionately high number of casualties among the
detainees. Even though at the time of the incident there were about 1,500 detainees in
Serkadji Prison, the ONDH commission of inquiry only interviewed 10 detainees, most
of whom had already testified on Algerian television a few days after the event giving
an account of the incident similar to that of the authorities. While the ONDH report
mentions some detainees' account of the incident, it fails to mention the allegations by
other detainees of the deliberate extrajudicial execution of detainees and other
information concerning the incident.
14
Not only has no proper inquiry been carried out almost two years after the
massacre, but other evidence has come to light which raises further questions about the
impartiality of the ONDH's inquiry. The report states that all the bodies were
photographed,fingerprintedand numbered, to allow for post-burial identification, and
that for each body there was a descriptive medical certificate. The President of the
ONDH visiting London in April 1995 also told Amnesty International that each body
had been photographed and fingeiprinted before burial.
15
An Amnesty International delegation, which included a prominent human
rights medical doctor, visited Algeria in March and June 1995 and attempted to
investigate the killings in Serkadji Prison, but were not allowed access to the prison
or to the documentation. In June 1995 Amnesty International delegates met with
members of the ONDH commission of inquiry in Algeria andrequestedcopies of the
photographs of the bodies and of the medical certificates; the members of the ONDH
commission of inquiry stated that they were not in possession of the photographs or
other documents, but that they had seen them in the course of their inquiry.
14
"
See page 24 ofthe ONDH report.
See pages 27 and 28 of the ONDH report of May 1995 into the Serkadji events.
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In May 1996, Amnesty international delegates visiting Algeria once again
requested from the President of the ONDH copies of the photographs, but were told
that he was not aware of the existence of any such photographs; when the delegates
pointed out that these photographs are mentioned in the ONDHreport,which he
himself signed as the rapporteur of the ONDH commission of inquiry, herepliedthat
he could notrememberthe existence of any such photographs. Another member of
the ONDH commission of inquiry, who in June 1995 had told Amnesty International
delegates that he had himself seen the photographs and commented on these, told
Amnesty International delegates in May 1996 that he had never seen the photographs.
Requests for the photographs from the Ministry of Justice also yielded no results.
16
The unwillingness of the Algerian authorities to disclose information (such as
the photographs of the bodies and the medical certificates) which they claim exists
and which could help to clarify the circumstances in which the massacre took place,
and the increasingly obvious inconsistencies of the ONDH's inquiry, fuither increase
existing concerns that either the photographs do not exist, or that they contain
evidence of serious human rights violations by security forces, including possible
extrajudicial executions. The Algerian authorities have a duty, both under Algerian
law and under the international human rights treaties ratified by Algeria, to ensure
that such a serious incident is thoroughly, independently and impartially
investigated . The fact that to date no adequate investigation has been carried out
can only increase concerns about the lack of will to hold accountable those
responsible for extrajudicial executions and other violations.
1
7
DELIBERATE AND ARBITRARY KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTBACKED MILITIAS
An increasing number of government-backed militias, who define themselves as "self-defence
groups" or "patriots", have come into existence in the past two years, mainly in rural areas,
where the absence of the security forces had left the civilian population vulnerable to attacks
by armed opposition groups. These militias, which do not appear to be subject to any degree
of control and accountability, have increasingly been involved in "anti-terrorist" operations
16
See paragraph 3 of page 5 of the Serkadji Medical Action of 28 February 1995, AJ
Index: MDE 28/01/96.
17
The investigation should conform with the Principles on the Effective prevention and
investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions (Annex to the Economic and Social
Council resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989).
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and have been responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings. They are composed of local
civilian volunteers, equipped with weapons, including Kalashnikovs, automatic pistols,
carabines, and hunting rifles, and ammunition provided by the security forces; some of them
also use other equipment, such as military vehicles, radio-transmitters and wear security
forces uniforms. They routinely set up road-blocks to check the identity of those coming to,
or leaving, the area, and search their vehicles.
Initially militias appear to have been set up to defend their villages and communities
against armed opposition groups, who would carry out attacks on villages, killing, plundering
and threatening the population with death if they did not comply with their demands or if they
did not adhere to a certain code of behaviour. Security forces were not present in many rural
areas, and in addition, according to members of militia groups and villagers, the security
forces were often unable or unwilling to intervene to protect the civilian population in rural
areas because of lack of familiarity with the areas. However the activities of these militias
appear to have evolvedfroma defensive role to an active involvement in counter-insurgency
operations, resulting in deliberate and arbitrary killings of individuals and groups of
individuals whom they define as "terrorists". Ambushes and attacks on armed opposition
groups are carried out by militias either acting in conjunction with the security forces, or on
their own initiative, on the basis of information they receivefromthe security forces or other
sources about the whereabouts of armed opposition groups' hideouts.
Until the end of 1995 the authorities denied the existence of militias, or played down
their role; however, in the past year the authorities have increasingly openly encouraged the
existence of such militias, pointing to them as evidence that the civilian population is taking
part in the "anti-terroristfight"alongside the security forces. Much coverage by the national
media - both television and newspapers - has been given to the activities of militia groups,
portraying them as a key element in the "anti-terroristfight".For example, in a documentary
broadcast on national television in December 1995 and entitled "Rijal khuliku li-l watan"
(men born for their motherland), members of a militia group in the east of the country are
filmed as they prepare for their operations, discussing strategies for ambushing armed
opposition groups; they have weapons and ammunition and one of them, pointing to his
Kalashnikov, says that it was given to him by afriendin the security forces who got it from
a "terrorist" whom he killed. They are shown setting up road-blocks, interrogating and
searching passers-by, and talking about their experiences, including about people they have
killed. A member of a militia group says that once while he and another militia members
were hiding behind some rocks they saw two men, one of them armed, walking by whom
they thought were "terrorists"; he says:
"I looked at the sky and prayed: 'my God, if I am wrong may the bullet not touch
him, and if he is the faulty one help me to cut his throat, like he cuts the throats of
his brothers and then shot him; one bullet went through the back of his neck and
came out at thefrontand the other opened his throat sideways. I then shot the
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19
second man and injured him in his right leg and he fell to the ground; as I was
recharging my weapon my friend shot him and finished him off".
Several members of militia groupsfromthe Kabylie region and from other areas near
Algiers interviewed by Amnesty International stated that they were determined to track down
and "eliminate" all the "terrorists" in their areas. When asked how they knew who was a
"terrorist", they said that there were few "terrorists" left and that they were known, adding
that if the security forces had wanted they could have got rid of all "terrorists" long ago, but
they did not want to pursue them either because they did not want to risk their lives in rural
areas they were not familiar with, or for other unknown reasons. When asked if they had
captured members of armed opposition groups during their ambushes and handed them over
to the security forces, some militia members stated that they killed all "terrorists" they came
across because if handed to the security forces they might be released under the "Qanun alRahma" (clemency law) . When asked how many casualties there had been in the course
of their ambushes and confrontations with armed opposition groups, members of a militia
group stated that they had killed approximately 40 "terrorists", while two members of their
militia had been killed. Many members of militia groups are individuals whose relatives or
friends were killed by armed opposition groups, and who are determined to take the law into
their own hands to avenge their relatives and friends. A member of a militia group told
Amnesty International:
18
"They can kill me, but if they kill one of my relatives I will kill their entire families;
this is the only language that "terrorists" understand; they had an easy time
terrorizing defenceless people, but they are beginning to understand that they are the
ones who should be scared; they don't dare to come into our villages any more and
they are retreating into hiding; but we can find them and will continue to go after
them until we have got rid of the last one".
The grievances and fear expressed by villagers and civilians in rural areas where
armed opposition groups have killed civilians and terrorized the population are indeed
legitimate, as is their desire to have durable protection against such attacks. However,
providing protection for the civilian population is the responsibility of the state, and the task
of law enforcement should be carried out only by law enforcement officers who have received
the necessary training and who operate within a framework of accountability. Members of
militia groups also told Amnesty International that the members of armed opposition groups
they kill in ambushes are usually buried by other members of the group. When asked if the
security forces came to investigate to establish the identity of those killed, one of them said:
"We inform the gendarmerie after our ambushes and tell them how many we have killed and,
IR
The clemency law of ir5 February 1995 (No 95-12) provides for charges to be dropped
or reduced penalties imposed for people involved in "terronst" activities who give themselves up and
renounce their activities.
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if we know, where they are buried, but they don't often come to check; they trust us because
we know the area and the local population well".
For the past five years Algeria has been plunged in a situation of violence and
counter-violence, where there is an increased tendency for people to take the law into their
own hands. The creation of militias has drawn the civilian population further into the
confrontation. Members of militia groups told Amnesty International that armed opposition
groups have reacted to the existence of militias by killing relatives of militia members and
civilians from villages where militias exist, to punish the local civilian population for
supporting the militias.
By allowing militias, whom they have armed, to commit abuses such as deliberate and
arbitrary killings with impunity, the Algerian authorities have encouraged such abuses and
allowed the rule of law to be further eroded and undermined. Any forces necessary for lawenforcement in rural areas should be placedfirmlyunder the chain-of-command control of
the regular security forces. Paramilitary forces and militias operating outside the chain of
command should be disbanded.
KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS AND OTHER ABUSES BY ARMED
OPPOSITION GROUPS
Armed opposition groups which define themselves as "Islamic groups" have continued to kill
civilians, and to be responsible for abductions, torture and death threats which terrorize the
civilian population. These groups, which up to mid-1993 had focused their attacks on
members ofthe security forces, have increasingly targeted civilians, both in deliberate and
indiscriminate attacks, such as bomb explosions in situations likely to result in high civilian
casualties. Armed opposition groups have also killed thousands of security forces' members,
both in armed confrontation and in targeted attacks.
Over the past few years there have been reports of the existence and activities of
various groups, most of which are referred to by their French acronym. The best known
such group, the Groupe Islamique Armd (Armed Islamic Group), GIA, has been responsible
for many ofthe worst atrocities against civilians. There have been various reports about the
leadership, composition and motives of this and other groups, but it is often not possible to
verify the information. As a result of the proliferation andfragmentationof these groups,
increased armed confrontations and killings between different groups are reported to have
occurred, and the increased confusion has made it even more difficult to establish who is
responsible for killings and other attacks. There is, however, undeniable evidence that these
armed opposition groups have killed thousands of civilians and committed other atrocities.
The Armte Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Army), AIS, which is believed to
be the armed wing of the banned political party FIS, is also reported to have been responsible
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for killings and other attacks against civilians. In the past there .had been reports that the GIA
and the AIS cooperated, at least in certain areas and on certain occasions, but since 1995
armed confrontations between the AIS and the GIA have been reported and the GIA has
threatened to kill, and reportedly killed, members of the AIS and FIS leading figures". Since
1995 the AIS has openly distanced itself from the GIA and has issued communiques
condemning the targeting of civilians, including women, foreigners, journalists and others
who are "not involved in the repression".
Armed opposition groups have issued death threats either directed at specific
individuals, by mail, telephone calls and other means, or by communiques posted on walls,
sent to the media or in leaflets. Death threats have been addressed to different social and
professional categories, to wives and relatives of members of the security forces, youths of
conscription age, women, foreigners, and others. As a result hundreds, possibly thousands
of people have left their homes. Some have been able to obtain accommodation in housing
protected by the security services, but these protection measures are available mainly to
government officials, and some prominent journalists, intellectuals and business people. The
majority have had to find other alternatives, such as staying with relatives and friends or
living in their workplace, and many have been forced to live apart from their families.
Amnesty International has continued to call on all armed opposition groups in Algeria
to stop killings of civilians and non-combatants, and to put an end to other abuses such as
rape, abductions, and death threats. The organization has also called on the leadership of the
FIS, which has repeatedly claimed that it has influence over the armed Islamist groups in
Algeria, to condemn clearly and unequivocally all killings of civilians and to call on these
groups not to target civilians. In the last two years some FIS spokesmen outside Algeria,
including those who had in the past justified certain killings by armed opposition groups,
have condemned killings and other attacks against civilians and have increasingly distanced
themselves from killings of civilians and other crimes committed by armed groups in
Algeria. However, FIS spokesmen have often condemned killings of "innocent civilians" or
of "those not involved in the repression", rather than condemning clearly and unequivocally
killings of any civilians.
Deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians and non-combatants
Killings of civilians by armed opposition groups have been particularly widespread since
1994. In the capital and other big cities civilians have been killed mainly in targeted
individual attacks, or as a result of indiscriminate bomb attacks, whereas in rural areas, armed
" The Algerian authorities have publicised numerous testunonies of men said to be former
GIA members who have "repented", *ho have stated that the GIA had "sentenced" to death leaders
and members of the FIS and AIS.
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groups have also killed groups of people in their homes, in villages or at checkpoints where
they stopped cars and buses, posing as security forces.
Those who have been killed in targeted attacks have been either shot dead or have had
their throats cut, and some were also decapitated or mutilated; in some cases the head of the
victim was found elsewhere, far from the body. Victims were at times slaughtered in front
of their families, including small children. A young woman told Amnesty International:
"On the night of 21 July 1994 a group of 'terrorists' came to our house and took my
17-year-old brother outside; they put adhesive tape on his mouth and tied his hands
behind his back; they held him up, grabbed his hair and pulled his head back; he
struggled in vain; one of them cut his throat; I watched his body curl up and his arms
and legs shake as he collapsed to the ground. On the same night the 'terrorists' killed
seven other young men; three of them were conscripts. The 'terrorists' came back
on 18 May 1995 in the middle of the night; they shot my mother dead and my other
brother ran away, but he was also shot dead in the street on 31 July 1995".
After the killing of her mother and two brothers this woman was forced to leave her
home for her safety; she was rehoused elsewhere and given a gun by the authorities to protect
herself.
Such atrocities have created an atmosphere of terror, where people fear not just being
killed, but being killed in these particularly brutal ways. A university lecturer, echoing the
same fear expressed by many others, said:
"If I must be killed, I pray it is by bullet and not by having my throat cut".
Although the victims whose killings have been most widely reported by the Algerian
media have tended to be foreigners, well-knownfiguresand people in certain professional and
social categories, thousands of ordinary people have also lost their lives. The motives for such
killings are often unclear, but certain patterns have emerged indicating that some of the
victims were targeted because of their profession, political views, behaviour, or family links,
or because of their refusal to support or cooperate with the armed groups or to comply with
their demands and threats. Those targeted because of their profession include civil servants,
officials appointed to replace the elected FIS mayors , tax collectors. Imams (prayer leaders)
in government-controlled mosques, workers in state-owned companies, teachers, journalists
3
0
21
20
After the FIS was dissolved in March 1992. FIS mayors who had been elected in the
municipal elections of June 1990 were removed by the authorities and replaced by appointed officials
called Presidents des Delegations Executives Communales (Presidents of Executive Communal
Delegations), DEC.
21
After the FIS was dissolved many Imams were also replaced by the authorities.
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�Algena: Fear and silence
23
and youths who had just finished compulsory military service. These victims were apparently
targeted because armed opposition groups considered that through their profession they
supported the authorities; this argument has been made to others in the death threats they have
received from armed groups warning them to leave their jobs or face death.
The killings of journalists, more than 60 of whom have been killed since mid-1993
in attacks believed to have been carried out by armed opposition groups, have been among
the most widely reported, both in Algeria and abroad. Armed groups have accused
journalists of siding with the government because of the media's selective reporting focusing
on killings of civilians and other acts of violence by armed opposition groups, while
remaining silent about killings and other violations committed by the army and the security
forces, or about casualties among the army and security forces in confrontations with, or as
a result of ambushes by, armed opposition groups. Strict censorship does not allow the media
to report such information, which armed opposition groups would want to see publicized, and
which they themselves publish in leaflets and newsletters. The killing of so many journalists
has led many to leave the country and others to live in hiding. Some journalists have
expressed concern that the censorship imposed by the authorities on the reporting of securityrelated information has put them atftirtherrisk because it only allows them to give a selective
coverage of events, while other journalists have alleged that some of the killings of journalists
were carried out by the security forces and not by armed opposition groups. Omar
Belhouchet, editor of the daily El Watan. and Malika Boussouf, journalist at the daily Le soir
d'Algtrie, were prosecuted for making such allegations .
22
Among the journalists killed in the past two years is Khadidja Dahmani, a 28-year-old
woman who wrote for the Arabic-language el-Chourouk el-Arabi, who was shot dead on 5
December 1995 in the Baraki district (suburb of Algiers). Another young woman journalist
at the same newspaper, Malika Sabour, had also been shot dead inside her home in front of
her mother and family on 21 May 1995. Belkacem SSadi, a 40-year-old journalist for the
regional network of the national television (ENTV) in Constantine, was found dead in a forest
in Skikda, north of Constantine, on 2 March 1996. He had reportedly been abducted a few
days earlier. Another ENTV journalist, Khaled Merioud, had been killed two months earlier;
he was found shot dead in the Baraki suburb of Algiers on 23 December 1995, the day after
he was abducted from his home in the Algiers suburb of La Montagne. The editor-in-chief,
and two journalists of the daily French-language Le Soir d'Algtrie, Allaoua Ait M'Barek,
Djamel Derraz, and Mohamed Dorbane, were killed when a bomb exploded outside the
Maison de la Presse (Press House) in central Algiers on 11 February 1996.
22
Omar Belhouchet was sentenced to one year's imprisonment for alleging in an
interview with the French TV channel Canal + in November 1995, that certain journalists and
intellectuals, whose killings were blamed on armed opposition groups, were in fact killed by
government forces. In April 1996 Malika Boussouf was sentenced to three months' imprisonment,
suspended, for alleging in an interview with the Italian newspaper 11 Manifesto that Aboubakr Belkaid.
a well-known political figure, might not have been killed by armed opposition groups.
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Algeria. Fear and silence
Communiques signed by the GIA or other armed groups repeatedly threatened with
death civil servants and employees of state companies, French-language teachers, wives and
relatives of members of the security forces, sellers of newspapers and cigarettes, hairdressers,
beauticians, women who do not wear the hidjab or who go to mixed schools, college and
university students, conscripts, musicians, and many others. In some cases the threats seemed
to vary according to the areas, apparently because different groups were present in different
parts of the country. Among the civilians killed by armed groups, some had personally
received death threats, and some belonged to several categories. For example, in June 1995
Fatima Godhbane, a 17-year-old student was taken from her classroom in Oued Djer by a
group of armed men, who dragged her outside the school and cut her throat infrontof the
other pupils. Beforefleeingher murderers wrote "GIA" on her hand. Some believed that she
had been targeted because she continued to go to school, or because she did not wear the
hidjab until shortly before she was killed, or because she was related to a member of the
security forces, or simplytointimidate and terrorize others; it will probably never be known
what was in the minds of those who committed such a crime.
Armed opposition groups have also killed soldiers and members of the security forces
after having abducted or captured them, and in some cases they reportedly tortured their
victims before killing them.
On 6 February 1995 a group of eight men wearing hoods and armed with sawn-off
hunting rifles and Kalashnikovs went to the house of Mohamed Ben Arbia, a 55-year-old
gendarme in Halamiya, in the Boumerdes province. He managed to escape but his wife,
Zahra, a 37-year-old housewife, was shot and injured infrontof her 12-year-old daughter and
two younger sons. Three weeks later the armed group (the children could not tell if they
were the same men or others) came back and shot dead Mohamed Ben Arbia; they then tied
his wife by the hands and shot her dead; they then also shot dead another woman neighbour
who had taken Zahra Ben Arbia to hospital three weeks earlier, when she was shot and
injured. All three killings took place in front of the children.
Relatives of members of security forces, both male and females have been targeted
by armed opposition group as a means of hurting their relatives. Among victims of such
attacks are Bakhta Moudjani, Fayza Kouadit, Meriem Chabra, Bakhta Metteur, and Fadia
Neggaz, aged between 15 and 22 years. They were abductedfromtheir homes in Oued Foda
on 18 June 1995 and were found slaughtered outside the town the following day.
Killings of civilians by armed opposition groups who set up road-blocks posing as
security forces have continued to be reported. On 21 July 1996 more than 10 passengers of
a bus transporting workers of the national company of industrial vehicles (Soctttt nationale
des vthicules industriels, SNVI), were killed by an armed group after the bus was stopped at
one of these "road-blocks". Other passengers were reported to have been injured when the
armed group fired on the bus before leaving.
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25
Youths have been repeatedly threatened with death by armed opposition groups if they
do military service. In addition to the hundreds of conscripts killed during armed
confrontation with armed opposition groups, in ambushes, or when visit their families, many
have been killed after they have finished their military service. Military service is
compulsory in Algeria and there is no provision for conscientious objection. The tasks which
conscripts have to carry out include manning checkpoints and guarding state-owned oil and
other companies; activities which make them very vulnerable to attacks from armed
opposition groups. Youths have thus been caught in an impossible situation; many do not
want to join the army because they fear being killed by armed opposition groups, or because
they do not want to take part in the killings and other violations which are committed by the
army, but they have no opportunity to register their objection nor the choice of a civilian
alternative service, and are forced to join the army.
Killings of foreigners
Since 1993 more than 100 foreigners have been killed in Algeria. The GIA has claimed
responsibility for most of these killings.
The first foreigners to be killed in such attacks were two French surveyors who were
killed in September 1993. Communiques from the GIA had warned foreigners to leave
Algeria or be killed and subsequently continued to threaten to kill foreigners who remain in
Algeria.
Many of the victims were killed by having their throat cut. On 14 December 1993
12 Croatian workers were killed in Tamesguida, southwest of the capital; all of them had
their throats slit. On 7 July 1994 seven Italian sailors were slaughtered on board their boat
in the port of Djendjen, in the Djijel region in the east of the country.
Victims have included foreign women married to Algerian nationals; they include
Polnya Larissa, a Russian woman shot dead in December 1993 in Algiers and Monique Afri,
a French woman working at the French consulate in Algiers who was shot dead in January
1994 in Algiers.
Foreign members of the Christian religious community, including nuns, and monks
have also been particularly targeted. Some of these victims were abducted and killed in
captivity. Seven French Trappist monks aged between 50 and 82 years who were abducted
from a monastery in Tibehirine, in the Medea region, were found dead two months later.
The GIA claimed responsibility for their abduction and for the killings.
In August 1996 Pierre Claverie, Bishop of Oran, was killed by a bomb which
exploded in his house wherf he returned from a meeting with the French Foreign Minister
who was visiting Algeria. A few days later the Algerian security forces announced that those
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Algena: Fear and silence
responsible for his assassination had been killed. To date none of those responsible for the
killings of foreigners are known to have been brought to trial; in many cases the Algerian
security forces have announced that people involved in the killings of foreigners had been
killed. However, the Algerian authorities have not made available the details of any of the
investigations.
Indiscriminate attacks resulting in the killings of civilians
In addition to killing civilians in targeted attacks, armed groups have also put bombs in
buildings housing security forces and their families. In taking such action they know that the
main victims are likely to be wives, children and other relatives of members of the security
forces, given that many members of the security forces no longer live in their homes out of
fear of being killed.
Bomb explosions near police and gendarmerie stations have often resulted in the
killing of civilian passers by. The attack which is believed to have caused the highest number
of civilian casualties took place in the afternoon of 30 January 1995, when a bomb exploded
infrontofthe central police station in central Algiers killing 42 people and injuring 286. A
FIS spokesman who commented on the bombing stated that the explosion was targeted at the
police station, because it was a torture centre. However, those who carried out the attack
knew that at that time of day in such a place a large number of civilians would be killed and
wounded.
Between mid-July and mid-August 19% more than 20 people, many of them civilians,
were reportedly killed by bomb explosions in public places, including caf6s and restaurants
frequented by members ofthe security forces. The attacks included two bomb explosions in
cafes in the districts of el Biar and Bab el Oued on 29 and 30 July respectively. Each
explosion killed one person and injured several others.
At least 15 people were reported to have been killed and more than 75 injured on 27
September 1996, when a car-bomb exploded in a market in Boufarik at about 10am, a time
when the market is usually crowded.
Official figures for the people killed and injured in these and other recent bomb
explosions and attacks are substantially lower than figures obtainedfromother sources,
including journalists, hospital staff and the local population.
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27
Acts of torture committed by armed opposition groups: rape
In 1994 and 1995 there were numerous reports of abductions and rape of women by armed
groups, especially in isolated areas where the security forces were not present. Some families
living in rural and isolated areas have sent their daughters to live with relatives in the cities
out of fear that they may be abducted by these armed groups. The stigma attached to rape
and the lack of support structures for victims of rape has made it difficult to gather
testimonies and details about such cases and to establish the real extent of such crimes.
Several testimonies of women who stated that they had been raped either in their own homes
or after having been abducted by armed groups have been broadcast on Algerian national
television. Amnesty International has not been able to interview these victims, but has
gathered detailed informationfroma wide range of sources about dozens of women who were
raped by armed groups. According to the information obtained, the victims were often
abductedfromtheir homes, infrontof their families, and in some cases were as young as 1617 years; some of them managed to escape from captivity, others werefreedor were left
behind when the armed groups movedfromtheir place of hiding, and others were freed when
the security forces attacked the hideouts. In addition to having been raped, some of the
victims were also reportedly beaten, tortured and ill-treated in other ways during their
captivity, including by being burned with cigarettes, and threatened with death; others were
reportedly killed during their captivity
A 22-year-old woman who was abducted in August 1994 told Amnesty International:
"A group of 'terrorists' came to the house and told my father they wanted me for
marriage; my father and I refused but they took no notice; they read the Fatiha
(opening verse of the Quran read for marriage), then two of them took me, one on
each side, and put me in a car with others and drove off into the mountains. Some
others stayed behind at my house and they threatened my father and told him not to
tell the police. We arrived at a kind of mud-house and there one of them told me I
was now married to him. He told me his name, but I noticed that his friends called
him by another name. He hit me because I did not want him to touch me and he
tried to rape me, but he couldn't; so he became angry and told me I had put a spell
on him. The following moming they took me back to my parents and told them they
were witches because they had put a spell and it had not been possible to rape me.
They took over the mud-house near our house for a while, and eventually they left.
Later the security forces bombed the house because they said we had given shelter
to the 'terrorists'; as if we had any choice; we live near a forest and there is nothing,
no gendarmerie and no neighbours to help. Now for me it's over; the 'terrorists'
have ruined my life and dishonoured me and my family".
A student of journalism told Amnesty International that in May 1995 she was
abducted in the street on her way home from college by three armed men who pushed her in
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Algena: Fear and silence
a car and blindfolded her. She was taken to an isolated farm about two and half hours' drive
from the capital, and when she arrived she was questioned by a young man who appeared to
be in charge of the armed group. He asked her why she did not wear the hidjab, and told
her that God had commanded women to stay at home. He then told her that she would be
"married" to a manfromthe group. She was raped by another man and was also beaten and
burned with cigarettes, and she fainted. When she regained consciousness she was in hospital
and was told that she had been found on a road outside Algiers.
THE "DISAPPEARED": WHERE ARE THEY?
The phenomenon of "disappearances" has become increasingly widespread. Amnesty
International has gathered information about hundreds of people who have "disappeared" in
the past three years, and has heard of hundreds, possibly thousands, of others have also
suffered the same fate. The vast majority of those who have "disappeared" are known or
believed to have been arrested by the military security, gendarmerie, and police .
23
Thousands of men and women are living in anguish, wondering if their "disappeared"
relatives are still alive, looking for traces and clues of where they might be held, hoping to
find someone who can give them any news.
" I just want to know where he is; if he is alive or dead". This is what families of
the "disappeared" keep repeating, but to date most have received no answer.
Many of these "disappeared" were arrested from their home, in front of their families
and often at night; others were taken from their place of work or in the street. In the days,
weeks and months following their arrest their families went to police and gendarmerie stations
to ask about them. Some were told that there was no record of their arrest, and others were
told that they were detained and could not be visited, but would be released soon; in other
cases the police and gendarmerie stations accepted the food and clothes brought by the
families for their relatives, but after a few days or weeks the families were told not to bring
food or clothes any more because their relatives had been transferred elsewhere.
Some of those who had "disappeared" in secret detention have "reappeared" after
months; they were either transferred to prisons or released without charge or trial and without
there being any record of their arrest and detention. Those who have come out of secret
detention have provided information about some of the "disappeared" who were held with
them in secret detention centres and army barracks. However, in most cases the information
relates only to the first few months of detention.
23
Amied opposition groups do not control temtory in Algena and have no detention
camps. Only tlie secunty forces have secret detention centres.
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29
Families have also tried to obtain information about their "disappeared" relatives from
relatives and acquaintances in the security forces and the army. Some were told that their
relatives are still alive in detention and others were told that they were killed; however,
members of the security forces or the army who give such information to families are usually
unwilling to give them further details because they feel it is not safe for them.
A police officer whose brother was arrested three years ago and has since
"disappeared", told Amnesty International:
"I cannot do anything tofindmy brother because he is in the hands of the military
security. I know those who arrested my brother but they then passed him on to the
military security and they themselves have no idea where he is kept, or if he is still
alive. My brother was an active FIS member and had been a FIS candidate in the
elections, and so it is even more difficult for me to ask about him because even my
colleagues could suspect me of sympathizing with the 'terrorists'. As a police officer
1 am threatened with death by the 'terrorists'; I rarely go home and I sent my wife
to live with relatives because in the district where we lived everybody knows what
my job is, and so I was afraid that she may be killed because she is my wife. I do
not share my brother's political views, but I know that he was not a 'terrorist' and
that he had nothing to do with the 'terrorists'. And in any case, if they accuse him
of something they should bring him to justice and put him in prison, but it is not fair
to make him "disappear" like that. My brother is not the only one in that situation,
hundreds of others have 'disappeared'; I think many were killed soon after they were
arrested. Some families have contacted my mother, because they know that I am a
police officer and they asked my mother to ask me tofindtheir sons, but I can't do
anything even for my own brother, so what can I do for them? I would not even
dare to ask about them, even when I tried to ask about my brother I did so very
discreetly and only asked colleagues whom I trust and whom I know trust me and
would not think that I might sympathize with the 'terrorists'".
Another of the "disappeared" was arrested in July 1994 at the house of a police
officer whom he was visiting. The security forces hadfirstgone to his own house looking for
him late at night and his parents had told them that he was visiting a police officer friend and
they went there to look for him. The family recognized some of the members of the security
forces who came to the house; they wore plain clothes and said they were security forces but
did not specify from which service. They then went to his friend's house and there they
arrested him; his friend also recognized the members of the security forces who took him.
Since then he has "disappeared"; his family has received assurances from acquaintances in
the security forces that he is alive in secret detention, but has not been able to obtain any
information through official channels. Shortly before the man's arrest one of his brothers had
also been arrested and held blindfolded for one week by the military security in an unknown
place of detention, before being released on the motorway and told to make his way home.
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Algena: Fear and silence
Often, as in the above case, other members of the family were also arrested at around
the same time as the "disappeared". Djamel Farsadou, a 42-year-old cinema operator,
married and the father of a small child, was arrested from his home on 5 June 1995 at around
2pm in the presence of his family and neighbours, and has since "disappeared". A few days
before his arrest his 70-year-old father had also been arrested by members of the security
forces who came to the family home in the middle of the night and took him away in his
pyjamas. He was taken to a detention centre where he was tortured during interrogation and
accused of sheltering "terrorists" in his house. He was released the following morning at
around 10am on the highway leading to his district, still in his pyjamas, and given some
money to get a taxi to go back home.
Families have often kept silent about their relatives' "disappearance" for months
hoping that they would be released and because they feared that publicizing the case could
put the "disappeared" at risk, or simply because they did not know what to do or who to
contact - this is especially the case in rural areas. However, hundreds of families have
contacted lawyers, human rights organizations, political parties, and the Algerian authorities;
some have written hundreds of letters - but have received no reply. The father of a
"disappeared" told Amnesty International:
"I have contacted everyone I could think of; I don't understand much about politics
or things like that and I never knew who the ministers were, even all the presidents
since independence I don't know; but now I can tell you the names of all the
ministers [and he started to recite names of various ministers], because I have written
to all of them many times; I am illiterate, but I dictate the letters and my other
children write them. I haven't received any reply, but I still write, and when a new
minister comes I write again; I hope one of them will do something to help me to
find my son. I even looked in the morgues and in the cemeteries but 1 didn't find his
name anywhere. An acquaintance in the army told me that he is alive but couldn't
tell me anything else. My son is not a "terrorist"; I know that you may say that all
parents think that their children are good, but if he has done something let him be
brought to justice; all I want is to know where he is".
The families of some "disappeared" have spared no efforts to find their relatives, and
have tried to break the silence which surrounds the fate of their relatives, but in most cases
the Algerian authorities have simply ignored enquiries on behalf of the "disappeared".
However, in some cases where the families have been particularly insistent and have contacted
international human rights organizations and intergovernmental human rights bodies, the
authorities have felt compelled to respond. The inaccurate and contradictory information
contained in the replies to several of these cases indicates that instead of carrying out
investigations to establish the fate of the "disappeared" efforts are made to cover up the
involvement ofthe security forces in the "disappearance".
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31
For example, a group of 16 men were arrestedfromtheir homes in Rass el-Oued
during the night between 21 and 22 July 1994 and have since "disappeared". Their families
made repeated enquiries to try to establish their whereabouts but in vain; some of the families
were dismissed by the authorities who told them that their relatives had probably gone to join
the armed opposition groups. No investigation was carried out by the authorities to try to
find them and there was no mention of their case in the media. Amnesty International made
enquiries with the Algerian authorities but received no response. In March 1995 the ONDH
told Amnesty International that they had no information about these cases, but that the
individuals concerned might have disappeared of their own accord as, according to the
ONDH, has happened in other cases. In September 1995, after more than one year of
continuous andfruitlessresearch, two of the families, who live outside Algeria and who had
been the most active in searching for their "disappeared" relatives, received lettersfromthe
ONDH informing them that on 22 July 1994 - that is the day after the arrest of their relatives
- 15 bodies were found in a forest some distance from Rass el-Oued and it appeared that they
had been abducted and killed by a "terrorist group". The ONDH did not inform these two
families whether the bodies identified were those of their relatives or of others in the same
group and all attempts by these families to obtain further information were in vain. In May
19% the authorities claimed that only two of these 15 bodies could be identified, and named
them as being two ofthe group of the 16 "disappeared"fromRass el-Oued. The authorities
also stated that all the bodies had been photographed before burial. The authorities gave no
reason why the families of these two "disappeared", who had been inquiring about their
"disappeared" relatives incessantly, had up until then not been informed of their death, or
allowed to see the bodies, so as to confirm their identity prior to their burial, or to be present
at the burial, or to see the photographs of the bodies, so as to confirm their identity after their
burial.
Djamaleddine Fahassi, a 40-year-old journalist with the national Algerian radio,
married and the father of a six-month-old girl, "disappeared" after being arrested near his
home in the el-Harrache district of Algiers in the afternoon of 6 May 1995. He had left his
daughter with a relative to go to buy some food. Despite repeated enquiries his family
received no replyfromthe authorities, who now claim that he was probably abducted by a
"terrorist group". However, his arrest and "disappearance" received no coverage in the
media, which has given wide publicity to all cases of journalists killed or abducted by armed
opposition groups; the silence about his case suggests that it was knownfromthe beginning
that he was abducted by the security forces and not by an armed opposition group. In 1991,
Djamaleddine Fahassi had been tried by the Blida Military court for an article criticizing the
military which he had written in el-Forkone (a newspaper close to the FIS which was shut
down in 1992) and had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment. He was arrested again
at the beginning of 1992, along with more than 10,000 other people, and held for six weeks
in an internment camp in Ain Salah, in the desert in the south of Algeria; he was then
released without charge or trial.
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Algeria: Fear and silence
Among the hundreds of "disappeared" is also Nacera Lazreg, a thirty-five-year-old
woman, mother of six young children. She was arrested by security forces from her home
at around 1.30 am during the night between 5 and 6 December 1994 and has since
"disappeared". At the time of her arrest her husband, who had been in hiding, had just been
killed by the security forces, and her brother-in-law, who had been arrested on 17 October
1994, had just been trasnferred to prison after 43 days in secret detention.during which he
was reportedly tortured. Nacera Lazreg had herself been previously arrested a few months
before, also at night from her home, and had been released the following morning after
having been questioned about her husband's whereabouts and activities. A few days after her
"disappearance" in December 1994, she was reportedly seen by other detainees in the police
station in Bouroubaa, but to date all efforts by her family and lawyers to obtain information
concerning her whereabouts from the authorities have been in vain.
Some of those who have "disappeared" after arrest were FIS members who had been
elected as mayors in the 1990 municipal election or as parliamentarians in the first round of
the legislative election in December 1991, which were later cancelled. They include
Mohamed Rosli, Director of the Institute of Sociology at Blida University, who was arrested
on 30 October 1993fromhis office in Blida University; Brahim Charrad, who was arrested
in the night of 21-22 July 1994 from his home in Rass el-Oued with 15 other people
(mentioned above); and Djilali Nouri, mayor of el-Harrache (until the FIS was banned and
its mayors replaced), who was arrested on 23 April 1994 in central Algiers with Hamou
Mahboub, a journalist for the newspaper el-Djazair el-youm (Algeria Today, which was
banned in mid-1994). Both Djilali Nouri and Hamou Mahboub were reportedly seen by other
detainees in the Commissariat Central (Central police station) in Algiers between 15 and 18
April 1995.
In addition to "disappearances" of individuals who were arrested and never brought
to trial and whose detention the authorities refuse to acknowledge, at least two convicted
prisoners are also being held in secret detention. Ali Belhadj, the FIS vice-president has been
held in an unknown location for almost two years without access to his family and lawyers.
He was arrested in July 1991 with the FIS president, Abbassi Madani, and was sentenced in
July 1992 to 12 years' imprisonment by the military court. They were both moved from
prison and placed under house arrest in an undisclosed location in September 1994, during
political negotiations with the Algerian Presidency, but were again moved to a prison after
a few months. In early 1995 Ali Belhadj was taken to a secret detention centre in the desert
in the south of the country and his family has been unable to obtain any information on his
whereabouts since then. A journalist of the Algerian press agency (APS) who revealed in
February 1995 (on an internal APS wire) that Ali Belhadj was detained in the Tamanrasset
region was arrested and sentenced by a military court to three years' imprisonment on charges
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33
24
of publishing information considered to endanger state security . Ali Belhadj's wife and
children, and his lawyers have continued to seek information on his place of detention, but
to no avail; moreover there are reports that his health has deteriorated and that he is not being
given the necessary medical care. Abbassi Madani, the FIS president, is also being detained
in an undisclosed place of detention; some of his relatives are allowed to visit him but on
condition that they do not reveal his whereabouts. Amnesty International has sought
information from the Algerian authorities and from the ONDH about the whereabouts and
legal status of Ali Belhadj and Abbassi Madani, but was told that no information could be
provided because these cases are of a political nature.
ARREST PROCEDURES: THE ROUTE TO "DISAPPEARANCE"
The Algerian authorities deny all knowledge of the "disappeared", stating that there is no
proof that they were arrested by the security forces, often suggesting that the "disappeared"
were probably abducted by "terrorist" groups. Indeed arrests by the security forces do in
many cases resemble abductions by armed opposition groups: a group of armed men,
wearing uniform or plain clothes, and sometimes balaclavas; they may present themselves as
security forces; they may be very polite with the families and reassure them that their relative
is only being taken for a check and will be prompdy released, or they may verbally abuse and
threaten the family; often they may search the house. They may take the detainees away in
security force or army vehicles or in ordinary cars. Families of those abducted are usually
unable to obtain any information on their whereabouts during the time they are held in secret
detention; when they inquire with the security forces and authorities these either deny holding
the detainees or do not reply.
Such practices by the security forces violate both Algerian law and international
standards. Article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances requires that detainees be held in an officially recognized place of detention and
that their families and lawyers be promptly informed of their place of detention. Rule 92 of the
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules)
contains similar provisions". According to Article 51 of the Code of Penal Procedure (CPP)
24
The APS Journalist, Abdelkader Hadj-Benaamane. was arrested on 27 February 1995
and was tried on 25 July 1995 by a military court in Ouargla. Amnesty International considers him a
prisoner of conscience and calls for his immediate and unconditional release.
25
"An untried prisoner shall be allowed to inform immediately his family of his detention
and shall be given all reasonable facilities for communicating with his family. "
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Algena: Fear and silence
24
those arrested may be held in incommunicado detention for a maximum of 12 days , but the
families of those arrested must be immediately informed of their arrest and place of detention.
However, the 12-day maximum limit has been routinely violated and the security forces have
held detainees in secret and unacknowledged detention for weeks and months.
For example, on 31 July 1996, Rachid Mesli, a human rights lawyer, was abducted.
According to Amnesty International's information, he was driving his car, with his five-yearold son and his brother-in-law, in a country road in the Rouiba area in the outskirts of Algiers
at about 7.30 pm when he was stopped by a group of armed men wearing plain clothes and
carrying radio transmitters. The armed men, who did not identify themselves, asked his son
and his brother-in-law to look the other way and then took him away in an ordinary car. It
was feared at first that he had been abducted by an armed opposition group; for a week his
family and colleagues were unable to obtain any information on his whereabouts from the
security forces, who denied having arrested him. Amnesty International immediately
contacted the Algerian authorities to seek information on his whereabouts but received no
reply. The Head of the Algerian Bar Association informed Amnesty International on 7
August that he had inquired with the authorities about Rachid Mesli's whereabouts but had
received no response. This would indicate that either his secret detention was not authorized
by the judicial authorities, and was therefore illegal, or that the judicial authorities allowed
the security forces to hold him in secret and unacknowledged detention in violation of both
Algerian and international human rights law.
On the evening of 7 August members of the security forces searched the home and
office of Rachid Mesli, which indicated that he was indeed detained by the security forces and
not by an armed opposition group. He was finally brought before an examining magistrate
on 10 August and was charged with complicity with an armed group and transferred to elHarrache Prison in Algiers. During his secret detention he was reportedly beaten and illtreated and lawyers who saw him confirmed that he had bruises on his right eye and on his
hand and that he looked in poor physical condition.
On 11 August the ONDH confirmed to Amnesty International that Rachid Mesli had
been arrested by the security forces on 31 July and stated that his incommunicado detention
had been carried out with judicial authorization. However, the ONDH did not clarify why,
for more than 10 days, the security forces responsible for the detention and the judicial
authorities not only failed to inform the family of Rachid Mesli that he had been arrested, but
also refused to acknowledge his detention.
26
The Decret legislati/No 92-03 relatif d la lutte contre la subversion et le terrorisme of
September 1992 prolonged the period c? incommunicado detention from 48 hours (double this period
in cases of state security) to 12 days. On 25 February 1995 this (and most other) provision of the antiterrorist emergency decree was incorporated into permanent legislation and Article 51 of the CPP was
amended to allow for a 12-day period of incommunicado detention.
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Amnesty International November 1996
�Algeria: Fear and silence
35
In some cases the families recognize some of the members of the security forces who
carried out the arrest, but even in these cases when they inquire about the place of detention
of their relatives from the security forces concerned they are usually unable to obtain any
information. The security forces often tell families of "disappeared" that their relatives were
probably abducted by "terrorists", or that their relatives are "terrorists" and that they
themselves simulated the abduction in order to join the armed groups; some families have
been told by one security service that their son was abducted by "terrorists" and by another
security service that their son is a "terrorist" who went to join the armed groups. However,
in many cases the detainees whose families were given such explanations were later released
or transferred from secret detention to prison, thus confirming that they had indeed been
arrested and had neither been abducted by armed groups nor gone to join the armed groups.
The wall of silence and secrecy surrounding arrest and secret detention is used by the
security forces and by the authorities to disclaim all knowledge of individuals who have
"disappeared" after arrest, claiming that there is no proof that they were ever arrested. Such
practices have largely contributed to creating an atmosphere of fear, and have added to the
confusion of a situation where victims and their families neither know nor understand the
reason for their being targeted or even by whom. In the vast majority of cases brought to the
attention of Amnesty International over the past five years, the security forces never showed
an arrest or search warrant to those arrested or to the families; this includes cases of
individuals arrested in cases which do not fall within the "anti-terrorist" legislation.
For example, in March 1996 two journalists working for the satirical newspaper
Mesmar in Constantine were arrested in connection with articles and cartoons published in
the newspaper. They were arrested in the evening from near the newspaper's office by men
wearing civilian clothes who did not show them any arrest warrant or any other form of
identification to prove that they were indeed members of the security forces. Given the
number of death threats issued by armed opposition groups against journalists, and that so
many journalists have been killed, at the time of their arrest these journalists feared that they
were being abducted by an armed group; only when they arrived at the police station did they
realize that they had indeed been arrested by security forces.
The fact that security forces are permitted to carry out arrests in such a manner, and
to hold detainees in secret detention in places which are not under the supervision of the
judicial authorities, leaves those arrested particularly vulnerable to abuses such as torture,
"disappearance" and extrajudicial executions.
In none of the numerous cases where Amnesty International has asked the Algerian
authorities for information about individuals held in secret detention for prolonged periods
was it possible to obtain any information on their whereabouts so long as they remained in
secret detention; the same problem has been experienced by the families of those arrested,
their lawyers, Algerian and international human rights organizations, and the official human
rights body (ONDH)
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TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: AN INSTITUTIONALIZED
PRACTICE
The events of the past five years have shown how the practice of torture, which had been
virtually eradicated in Algeria between 1989 and 1991, could again be allowed to become
institutionalized as a result of the failure of the authorities to take the necessary measures to
stop it. Since 1992 Amnesty International has expressed concern that torture was once again
being used in Algeria and called on the authorities to investigate torture complaints and bring
to justice those responsible, and to put in place mechanisms to ensure that all places of
detention be brought under judicial control, and that relevant international human rights
treaties and guarantees contained in Algerian law be implemented. Amnesty International
believes that if such measures had been taken, the spread of the practice of torture could have
been stopped. However, to date no concrete measures have been taken by the authorities to
stop and prevent torture, no investigations are known to have been carried out into cases of
torture, and members of the security forces responsible for torturing detainees continue to do
so with impunity.
27
M
Torture and ill-treatment of detainees is reported to occur mainly during secret
detention in police and gendarmerie stations, military security centres and other secret places
of detention. The security forces use torture to obtain information from individuals known or
suspected of having links with armed opposition groups, and to force detainees to sign
statements (prods verbaux) admitting involvement in killings and other crimes, or denouncing
others. Torture and ill-treatment have also been reportedly used to punish detainees outside
the context of interrogations.
The use of torture violates both the Algerian Constitution and international treaties
to which Algeria is a state party. Article 33 of the Algerian Constitution states:
"The State guarantees the inviolability of the human person. Every form of physical
or moral violence is proscribed".
Article 7 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states:
27
Reports of ill-treatment by the security forces were received dunng the state of siege in
1991; internal inquuies were reportedly earned out and members of the security forces arrested for
assault, but the findings of such inquiries were never made public and it is not known whether any
members of the security forces were prosecuted and convicted.
28
Since 1992 no judicial investigations are known to have been carried out into
complaints of torture.
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37
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment...".
Article 4 of the same treaty provides that this right cannot be derogated from under
any circumstances, even in a "time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation".
Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture) states:
"No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture".
Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also contains similar
provisions.
Algeria has ratified both the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture in 1989, but
to date neither of these treaties has been published in the Algerian Official Gazette. A
decision ofthe Algerian Constitutional Council of 20 August 1989, states that international
treaties and conventions which have been ratified are completely integrated into internal
Algerian law only when they have been published in the Official Gazette. Such provision is
incompatible with the treaties themselves, for these become binding upon ratification and calls
into question the commitment of the Algerian authorities to ensuring compliance with these
treaties.
Algerian law also contains a number of provisions which, if implemented, could
provide substantial protection against abuses for detainees held in incommunicado detention.
Article 51 of the Algerian CPP and Article 45 of the Algerian Constitution provide for
detainees to be examined by an independent doctor of their choice, requested by themselves,
their families or their lawyers, at the end of incommunicado detention. Rule 91 of the
Standard Minimum Rules has similar provisions. Article 52 of the CPP also stipulates that
the State Attorney (Procureur de la Republique) may order, either of his own accord or upon
request of the detainee's family, the medical examination of detainees during incommunicado
detention. It is important to note that when these articles were promulgated incommunicado
detention was limited to 48 hours (renewable once in exceptional cases). Since this limit has
been extended to 12 days, the need for independent medical supervision of detainees during
and at the end of the period of incommunicado detention is even more crucial.
However, in most of the cases brought to Amnesty International's attention the
detainees were not afforded this right, nor did they receive independent medical examinations
after they were transferred from the place of incommunicado detention to prison. Of the
detainees who have died during secret detention, some are reported to have been
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Algeria: Fear and silence
extrajudicially executed and others to have died as result of torture. In some cases detainees
who sustained injuries during torture have been taken to hospitals for emergency treatment,
but in most cases reported to Amnesty International they were not examined by a doctor or
given any medical treatment, even of the most basic kind. In the few cases where a medical
examination was ordered by the judicial authorities, these were carried out by a stateappointed doctor, and in most cases only took place weeks after the torture had allegedly
occurred.
In August 1994 Amnesty International delegates visiting Algeria requested to meet
some detainees in el-Harrache Prison who had reported that they had been tortured during
secret detention. They included Noureddine Lamdjadani, a medical doctor, who was arrested
on 17 May 1994, when he reported to the police station after receiving a summons, and held
in secret detention for 60 days, and Said Moulay, a professor of mathematics, who was
arrested on 19 June 1994 and held in secret detention for 29 days. During this period both
detainees were reportedly tortured by the "chiffon" method (see below), severe beatings,
including with rubber hoses and sticks, and one was allegedly threatened with death. Said
Moulay sustained severe injuries and was taken to hospital where he received stitches on the
head and hand. A medical examination repeatedly requested by his lawyers was eventually
ordered at the end of July, but was not carried out in the following months. The two men are
still detained without trial. Amnesty International's delegates did not meet these or other
detainees because the prison authorities and the examining magistrate did not accept the
delegates' request to interview the detainees in private, a necessary requirement to protect
confidentiality.
To date no Algerian or international independent human rights or humanitarian
organization has been able to visit detainees in prisons. The Algerian authorities have stated,
including in their reports to the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights and to
the United Nations Conunittee Against Torture, that they have given authorization to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons in Algeria; however, the
ICRC has confirmed that to date no arrangement has yet been made to allow them to visit
prisons in Algeria. Allowing such organizations to visit detainees in prison, interview them
in private, and medically examine them would be an important step in investigating and
assessing complaints of torture and ill-treatment during incommunicado detention, as well as
preventing torture and ill-treatment.
Methods of torture
Testimonies received from detainees, including former detainees who were subsequently
examined by medical doctors in Algeria and in other countries, and detailed and consistent
information collected from other sources, including former magistrates, security and armed forces
personnel, lawyers, medical doctors, nurses, journalists and families of detainees, indicate that
the practice of torture has to some extent become institutionalized, both because it now appears
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Amnesty International November 1996
�Algeria: Fear and silence
39
to be a routine practice and because some of the methods used require equipment which would
not normally be held in places of detention.
The most commonly used methods of torture appear to be the "chiffon" method (the
detainee is tied in a horizontal position to a bench and cloth is inserted in his mouth, then his nose
is held closed and a mixture of dirty water and chemicals is poured in his mouth in large
quantities causing choking and swelling of Ute stomach); the "chalumeau" (blowtorch, which
is used to bum the face and parts of the detainee's body); electric shocks applied to the ears,
genitals, anus and other sensitive parts ofthe detainee's body; tying a rope around the detainee's
penis and/or testicles causing swelling of the genitals; and beatings all over the body, especially
on the sensitive parts. Others methods reported are burnings on the body with cigarettes;
insertion of bottles, sticks and other objects, including firearms, in the anus; putting glue in the
detainee's anus; placing the detainee's penis in open drawers and shutting the drawer; and
suspending tlie detainee in contorted position.
In most of the cases reported to Amnesty International the detainees were held
blindfolded during transfers to the places of detention, and some were also held blindfolded
dunng interrogations and at other times of their incommunicado detention.
Amnesty International is concerned that unless increasingly widespread allegations of
torture and ill-treatment of detainees by members of the security forces are independently,
impartially and publicly investigated and those found responsible are brought to justice - as the
Algerian authorities are obliged to do under their own law -the perception by members of the
security forces that torture is an acceptable means of extracting confessions from detainees or of
forcing them to sign proces verbaux, will further encourage them to torture and ill-treat detainees.
THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE TORTURE AND UNLAWFUL
DETENTION
Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed its concern that judges and magistrates have
consistently failed to investigate systematic violations at all stages of pre-trial investigation, such
as illegally prolonged incommunicado and secret detention and torture and ill-treatment of
detainees by the secunty forces responsible for their detention.
According to Article 5 1 of the Algerian CPP, members of the security forces responsible
for violating incommunicado regulations are liable to punishment for arbitrary detention. Article
52 of the CPP requires that the date, time and duration of each interrogation, and the date and
time of the detainee's release or transfer io the competent magistrate, be recorded on the police
statement, as well as on a special register signed by the State Prosecutor (Procureur de la
Republique), and which must be kept in all places where detainees may be held in
incommunicado detention.
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3
Articles 13" and Article 15 " of the Convention Against Torture provide for
investigations into complaints of torture and render null and void confessions obtained under
torture. Article 12 ofthe same convention requires prompt and impartial investigations, wherever
there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed, even if there has
been no formal complaint.
However, confessions retracted in court, by detainees, who stated that they had been
forced io sign their confessions under duress or without being allowed to read the content, have
continued to be accepted as evidence by judges, even when there was ample evidence that the
members of the secunty forces who had conducted the interrogation and obtained the confessions
had done so in violation of both Algerian and international law. Even though Article 54 of the
CPP states that each proces verbal must be signed on each page by the officer who writes it.
Amnesty International has examined numerous proces verbaux which did not contain the
signature of the responsible officer, or the date, time and duration of each interrogation, but
which were nonetheless accepted by judges who did not question the validity of such proces
verbaux and did not investigate the conditions in which the detainees had signed them - even if
the detainees stated in court that they had been forced to sign them under torture.
Judges, and officials from the Ministry of Justice and the ONDH have told Amnesty
International that detainees systematically say they have been tortured as part of their defence,
but that this is an exaggeration. Such outright dismissal of torture complaints, on the part of
those with a responsibility to investigate allegations and complaints of torture indicates a lack of
will to stop and prevent torture.
Amnesty International knows of cases where detainees appeared before the courts with
physical injuiics and scars of torture, and has seen copies of scores of requests for medical
examinations and of complaints of torture requesting investigation, which were either refused or
ignored by the court. The organization has submitted hundreds of cases of allegations of torture
to the Algerian authorities and has asked them to ensure that independent and impartial
investigations arc carried out. The authonties have cither not responded or denied that such
allegations have any foundation; in some cases they have stated that the allegations would be
investigated However, to date not a single judicial investigation is known to have been carried
out.
Nadir Hammoudi, who was arrested in October 1992 and who remains detained without
trial, was held in secret detention for 40 days, that is 28 days beyond the maximum period of
incommunicado detention allowed by Algenan law He complained that during secret detention
^
"Each Staie Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to
torture in any temtory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to and to have his case promptly
und impartially examined by its competent authorities."
10
"Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established lo have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement, was made."
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41
in Bab el Oued police station and in another detention centre he was tortured and beaten. His
family and lawyers, and Amnesty International raised the case with the Algerian authorities on
numerous occasions, and in 1993 the ONDH published a complaint against an Amnesty
International staff member who had written to the ONDH asking for this and other cases to be
investigated. In 1996, officials from the Ministry of Justice told Amnesty International that the
case was still under investigation. Similarly, a complaint of torture by Abdelkrim Mammeri,
who was arrested in November 1993, held in secret detention for a month and tortured, has not
yet been investigated, even though members of the ONDH who visited him in prison confirmed
that he still bore torture marks and recommended that an investigation be carried out.
31
Some of the detainees who had complained of torture during secret detention in previous
years were killed in Serkadji Prison in February 1995; their complaints had never been
investigated. They include Yassine Simozrag, who had been arrested in July 1993, tortured
including by the chalumeau method during secret detention and held without trial since (see page
8), and Mohamed Ait-Bellouk, who had been arrested in November 1993, reportedly became
impotent as a result of torture and was sentenced to death in January 1995.
Judges and magistrates have a responsibility to investigate violations and breaches of the
law which are brought to their attention in order to ensure both the respect of the defendant's right
to a fair trial, and the proper administration of justice. The consistent failure of the judiciary to
investigate torture complaints and violations of procedures by the security forces, and their
willingness to accept as evidence confessions allegedly extracted under torture and prods
verbaux fraught with irregularities, seriously calls into question their independence, impartiality
and commitment to protecting human rights. The failure of the Algerian authorities to ensure that
investigations are carried out and to take measures to stop and prevent secret detention - which
facilitates torture, "disappearances", extrajudicial killings and other violations - can only
encourage such violations and further undermine the rule of law.
PROLONGED DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL
Several detainees accused of "terrorist" activities have been held without trial for more than four
years. According to Algerian law , pre-trial detention is limited to four months, renewable three
times in criminal cases - to a maximum period of 16 months. However, detainees arrested in
1992, 1993 and 1994 are still being held without trial.
32
For example, Abdelkader Hachani, a leading FIS figure who had led the party to the
legislative elections of December 1991 after the detention ofthe FIS president and vice-president,
has been detained without trial since 22 January 1992. When Amnesty International sought
31
Pages 86 to 89 ofthe ONDH Revue des droits de I'homme; No 3 of June 1993.
32
Articles 125 and 125 bis of the CPP.
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Algeria: Fear and silence
clarification concerning his prolonged detention without trialfromthe Ministry of Justice and
from the ONDH, these responded that they could not comment on the case because it is a political
case.
Ali Zouita, a lawyer who had been part of the defence team of the FIS leaders in their
trial 1992 continues to be detained without trial since February 1993. He was accused in the
case ofthe bombing of Algiers' airport and in another case of belonging to an armed group; the
charges were subsequently dropped in both cases, but he remains detained without trial.
Others in the same situation include Nadir Hammoudi (whose case is mentioned on
page 40), who was arrested on 9 October 1992 and remains in prison without trial. Some
of the detainees who were killed in the massacre in Serkadji prison had been detained for
more than 16 months without trial.
At the end of November 1995, more than 640 people were released from a desert
camp in Ain M'Guel, in the south of Algeria, after being held in administrative detention
without charge or trial since the beginning of 1992.
While welcoming the release of those held in administrative detention, Amnesty
International remains concerned at the prolonged pre-trial detention of other political
detainees, and calls for them to be tried promptly and fairly, in accordance with international
human rights standards, or else released.
CONCLUSION
Over the past four years, the Algerian authonties have repeatedly stated that the secunty
situation is improving. However, killings and abuses have continued, and the civilian population
has been increasingly drawn into the confrontation.
Amnesty International is aware of the widespread violence by armed opposition groups;
it condemns unreservedly the killings of civilians and other abuses within its mandate committed
by such groups, and recognizes therightand the duty of the Algerian authorities to bring to
justice those responsible for such crimes and acts of violence and to take measures to prevent
killings and attacks on civilians, members of the security forces and public property.
However, no level of violence by armed individuals or groups can ever justify the security
forces' recourse to practices such as extrajudicial executions, "disappearances" and torture.
Article 4 of the ICCPR clearly states that certain basic rights protected by the Covenant, such
as the right to life (Article 6), and the right not to be tortured (Article 7) may not be
derogated from, even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. By
ratifying international human rights standards, Algeria has willingly undertaken the obligation
to respect human rights at all times.
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43
Gross human rights violations are being committed by the security forces in the name of
"fighting terrorism"; such violations are not being investigated and those responsible are being
afforded impunity. While killings of civilians, abductions, rape and other abuses committed by
armed opposition groups must be condemned in the strongest terms, they cannot continue to be
used as an excuse for the security forces to violate human rights. The need to maintain security,
and the fact that their own lives are often in danger does not absolve themfromtheir obligation
to respect and uphold human rights.
Amnesty International's opposition to human rights violations perpetrated by
governments worldwide is based on international human rights norms concerning the
protection of the rights of individuals in relation to governmental authority; it is states which
have ratified international human rights treaties and adopted other international human rights
instruments within the framework of the United Nations, and it is states which are obliged
to implement them. Therefore, while opposing and campaigning to end abuses by armed
opposition groups, the organization will continue to place its primary focus on human rights
violations by governments and the responsibility of those with governmental authority to abide
by their international obligations - notably their solemn obligation under international human
rights treaties to safeguard human rights and prevent human rights violations. The
responsibility for investigating human right violations and bringing to justice those found
responsible for human rights violations and abuses lies with the Algerian authorities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Algerian Government, as the only party responsible for law-enforcement, must act in
accordance with the international obligations which it has undertaken by ratifying international
human rights treaties. To this end, it should take concrete and effective measures without
further delay to ensure that thorough, independent and impartial investigations are carried out
into human rights violations and abuses committed by security forces, by government-backed
militias, and by armed opposition groups. The findings of such investigations should be made
public and those responsible for the violations and abuses be brought to justice.
Recommendations made by Amnesty International to the Algerian Government in
previous years for measures to ensure effective judicial control over arrest and detention
procedures, to put an end to secret detention, and to stop and prevent extrajudicial executions,
torture and other violations, remain relevant today .
33
"
In addition to recommendations appended to public reports issued in previous years.
Amnesty International has made other detailed recommendations to the Algerian Government in a
Memorandum in August 1995 and in other confidential correspondence.
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Algena: Fear and silence
In addition to renewing its call on the Algerian Government to implement the
recommendations it has made in the past. Amnesty International now urges the Algerian
Government to:
- State publicly and in clear and unequivocal terms that extrajudicial executions,
"disappearances", torture, and arbitrary and secret detention are crimes punishable
by law and will not be tolerated. Any members of the security forces who commit
any such crimes should be brought to justice.
34
- Set up an independent and impartial commission of inquiry to investigate
extrajudicial executions, torture, "disappearance", arbitrary and secret detention, and
other violations committed since 1992. The methods, findings and conclusions of any
investigation should be made public and anyone found responsible for violations
should be brought to justice.
- Take immediate steps to bring arrest and detention procedures under the control of
the judiciary, so as to ensure that no one is held in secret detention. All those
currently held in secret detention must be released, unless they are charged with a
recognizable criminal offence and tried in accordance with recognized international
human rights standards - in which case they must be transferred to a recognized place
of detention and granted full access to family, lawyers and medical care if necessary.
- Make it clear to all security forces that confessions obtained under torture are
invalid and will not be accepted as evidence in court; and instruct judges and
magistrates that such confessions must not be accepted as evidence under any
circumstances.
- Disband all civilian militias and ensure that security operations are carried out only
by law-enforcement personnel who have received the necessary training and who
operate in a framework which ensures accountability.
54
Comprehensive guidelines for the setting up of such commission of inquiry have been
previously provided to the Algerian Government.
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�Algeria: Fear and silence
45
- Review the recently-amended Penal Code (CP) and the Code of Penal Procedures
(CPP) with a view to bringing Algerian law into conformity with international human
rights treaties to which Algeria is a State Party .
35
Amnesty International also reiterates once again its call on all armed opposition
groups and all groups who claim to act for political motives to:
- Put an immediate end to deliberate killings and abduction of civilians and noncombatants.
- Immediately cease to abduct women and subject them to rape and other acts of
torture.
- Stop threatening civilians with death.
55
Amendments to the CKand CPP of February 1995 have resulted in the inclusion of most
ofthe provisions of the "anti-terronst" decree of September 1992, thus making an emergency decree
into permanent legislation.
Amnesty International November 1996
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�Clinton Presidential Records
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�FOREIGN POLICY
NUMBER 99
SUMMER 1995
Algeria's War on Itself
by Andrew ]. Pierre and William B. Quandt
Igeria, once an exemplar of Third World radical
nationalism, is again being ripped apart by political
violence. Hundreds of people are dying each week in
the bloody struggle between an unpopular military
.regime willing to use harsh measures of oppression and
an Islamist opposition, part of which is resorting to vicious
terrorism in pursuit of its goals. Recent months have seen an
escalation in both the armed violence and the number of horrifying
atrocities. Car bombs planted by armed Islamists have killed dozens
in downtown Algiers. In response, the military has sent out
"ninjas"—hooded commandoes who engage in summary executions.
The conflict seems distant to Americans, but what happens in
Algeria in this struggle over power, ideas, and revenge will have repercussions beyond Algeria's borders. Algeria's fate will influence the future of its immediate neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as democratization and development efforts in the Arab world, the role
that Islamist movements will play in the politics of the Middle East,
and even the chances for Arab-Israeli peace. In addition, future oil
and gas supplies for Europe could be at stake.
Across the Mediterranean, Europeans follow events in Algeria
with mounting concern out of the fear that political and economic
turmoil in the Maghreb may produce waves of immigrants seeking
asylum, especially in France and Spain. European countries, sensitive to the Muslim communities in their midst, worry that an Islamist
regime in Algeria could radicalize their own Islamic citizenry.
Americans, already burned by Bosnia where Western diplomacy
A N D R E W J. P I E R R E is a senior associate of the Carnegie
Endowment. W 1 L L I A M B . Q U A N D T is a professor of government and
foreign affairs at the University of Virginia. They are co-directors of a Carnegie
Endowment study group on Algeria, France, and the United States.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AN I) TYPE
001. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Richard Schifter to Anthony Lake, re: Another Update on Algeria and
Thoughts on the Maghreb (3 pages)
ca. 11/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(h)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or nnancial
information |(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A |
h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
nnancial information 1(a)(4) of (he PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a ek-arly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. memo
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
Richard Schifter to Anthony Lake, re: Another Update on Algeria (3
pages)
11/20/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOI A]
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning (he regulation of
financial institutions 1(h)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to Ihe appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
11/29/1996
Re: [Algerian constitution] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�UNCLASSIFIED
PREC: RUSH
CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL
NWSID: R0220106
SOURCE: Reuter
a0676
BC-AU»I5RIA 4THLD (SCHEDULED, GRAPHIC)
Algerians endorse new charter banning Islamists
(Updates with accusation of vote-rigging, more quotes)
PARIS, Nov 29 (Reuter) - Algerians have voted overwhelmingly
for constitutional changes banning Islamic political parties,
boosting the position of President Liamine Z^fQUM, a former
general who is trying to end a fundamentalist rebellion.
Official figures showed 85.8 percent or 10.94 million people
voted "yes" for a draft constitution against 14.19 percent
"no" in Thursday's referendum, Interior Minister Mustapha Ben
Mansour told a news conference broadcast live in
on
Friday.
He said turnout was 79.8 percent of the 16.4 million
electorate with about 359,000 spoilt ballots.
The endorsement is expected to strengthen Zerai#at's hand
ahead of parliamentary elections set for the first half of 1997.
"It was a vote of confidence in fceroual," a university
scholar said of the result in a television talk show on Thursday
night.
Said Saadi, the leader of an anti-Islamist party, the Rally
for Democracy and Culture, accused i | t $ i ! ! l of rigging the vote,
but provided no evidence of cheating.
Ben Mansour said a huge security operation thwarted Islamist
guerrilla threats to disrupt the referendum.
"Peace, freedom and calmness marked referendum day," Ben
Mansour said, hailing efforts of the country's security forces
to protect voters.
The Armed Islamic Group, or GIA -- most feared of Algeria's
fundamentalist guerrilla movements - threatened to "strike the
neck" of voters.
Algiers-based diplomats said the government deployed more
than 300,000 soldiers and policemen to guard voters across the
country, five times the size of France.
Residents in the garrison town of Blida, 50 km (30 miles)
south of Algiers, said the army shelled mountains near the city
on Wednesday night, apparently trying to pre-empt any buildup of
Moslem guerrillas. Blida is a route for guerrillas seeking to
carry out attacks around the capital.
More than 60,000 people have died in Algeria's violence
A
A
�More than 60,000 people have died in Algeria s violence
since 1992 when the authorities annulled a general election in
which radical Islamists had taken a huge lead.
Opposition parties had called for a boycott ofthe poll or
for Algerians to vote against the changes.
The new constitution bars politicians from campaigning on
the basis of the Moslem faith, the Arab or Berber languages,
gender issues or regional differences.
It gives the country's two legal Islamist groups - Hamas
and Nahda - a year to change their manifestoes.
Algeria's largest fundamentalist group, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS), was banned shortly after the 1992
elections were cancelled. FIS had taken an unbeatable lead in
those elections.
High "yes" returns were reported in a number of areas,
including 95 percent in the western town of Mascra and more than
90 percent in the southeastern region of El Oued and the
southwestern province of Saida, said state radio.
The Berber-dominated northeastern town of Tizi-Ouzou was one
of the exceptions with nearly 63 percent of the voters opposing
the draft constitution, the radio added.
The planned constitution says Arabic will be the only state
language, angering Berber activists who want official
recognition for their language as well.
The lowest turnouts were in Berber areas, where a
Berber-dominated party had called for a boycott. Only a quarter
of the electorate in Tizi-Ouzou voted.
R B - 11/29/96 06:58:00
DIST:
�UNCLASSIFIED
PREC: RUSH
CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL
NWSID: R0206255
SOURCE: Reuter
a0623
BCMipl-REFERENDUM-MEDIA
Algerian editors blast government on media control
PARIS, Nov 27 (Reuter) - i i l i l i i ' s independent newspapers on
Wednesday denounced the government for tightening control on the
media ahead of Thursday's referendum to amend the constitution
to ban Moslem fundamentalists from rising to power.
"The Defence Committee of Press Freedom rejects this
improper practice by the authorities which defies the basic
right of the citizen to have a plural and objective media,"
said the committee in a statement published in the country's
main independent newspapers.
The Defence Committee of Press Freedom, grouping editors of
the six independent newspapers and leading figures, said the
government has monopolised the state media, giving a one-sided
view of the proposed constitution designed to prevent
politicians from using Islam as a weapon to gain power.
State-controlled television and radio stations have been
running extensive coverage of government officials campaigning
since October to win support for the draft constitution which
would be put to vote on Thursday.
The committee said the government has "scorned the struggle
of Algerian journalists for a credible and plural media" and
ignored President Liamine i M i l l ' s repeated pledges to
guarantee press freedom and free speech.
"The Committee, finding that the draft constitution does
not establish immunity for press freedom, voices great fear in
the face of diminishing margins of expression and threats on
press freedom in our country," the committee statement added.
More than 50 journalists have been killed in
in the
past three years in attacks blamed on Moslem guerrillas.
The Algerian authorities have shut down 20 publications in
the past three years over reports on the country's violence.
An estimated 60,000 people have died in Atgerla since early
1992 when the authorities cancelled a general election in which
radical Islamists had taken a commanding lead.
A
A
R B - 11/27/96 06:39:00
�DIST.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
11/27/1996
Re: [Constitutional Referandum] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Acl - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)l
PI
P2
1'3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
005. memo
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Algeria Policy Update (5 pages)
03/05/1996
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointmenl to Federal office |(a)(2)of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance wilh restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TVPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
09/12/1996
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the I OI A]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Seeuritj' Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
DATE
SU BJECT/TITLE
07/17/1996
Re: [Armed Islamic Group (GIA)] (1 page)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe F'OIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCl'MENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [GIA] (2 pages)
07/08/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/bO)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRAI
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
06/30/1996
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - (5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(.S) of the PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
06/27/1996
Re: [Algeria Political System] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(h)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
Oil. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
04/25/1996
Re: [Algerian Islamists] (3 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-1ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. .S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe F01A|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRAI
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. cable
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
04/17/1996
Re: [FIS Leader] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells ((b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to Ihe appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors (a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
03/13/1996
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian AfTairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe I OIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe F01A|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to (he appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
03/13/1996
Re: [GIA Purge] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -1-44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the KOI A]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
015. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [FIS and GIA] (5 pages)
02/01/1996
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe I OIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment lo Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
016. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [GIA] (2 pages)
01/03/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian AfTairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the F O I A j
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A j
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e F O I A j
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) o f t h e F O I A j
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the F O I A j
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation nf
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the F O I A j
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment tn Federal office |(a)(2)of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
017. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/21/1995
Re: [FIS communique] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Seeuritj'Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
018. cable
SU BJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [FIS] (2 pages)
1/29/1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |4-4 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Seeuritj' Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
019. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
03/15/1995
Re: [Ali Benhadj Letter] (2 pages)
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. .S52(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Seeuritj Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPF.
020. cable
SUIUECT/TITLK
DATE
Re: [FIS Leadership] (3 pages)
12/03/1994
RKSTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of Ihe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Seeuritj' Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
021. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/07/1994
Re: [Benhadj Letter] (2 pages)
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
ke2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5.52(b)l
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
Pfi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
022. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Ali Benhadj] (4 pages)
12/15/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [4]
2009-1295-F
kc2086
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices nf
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe I 01A|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
20 folders in 3 boxes
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Algeria [4]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Scott Busby
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585640
42-t-7585640-20091295F-001-004-2015-2015-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2009-1295-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585640">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3a2c83f439ed95faedf1971c9863a877.pdf
e6272d676c99e033e1261f877113a795
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria [3]
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Busby, Scott
Original OA/ID Number:
1889
Row:
40
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
v
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
D O C U M E N T NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. cable
Re: [Algerian press] (4 pages)
01/07/1997
Pl/b(l)
002. memo
David Welch to the Secretary of State, re: [Algerian Elections] (5
pages)
02/06/1997
Pl/b(l)
003. report
Re: [Algeria] (2 pages)
01/1997
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
004. cable
Re: [New Law] (6 pages)
01/06/1997
Pl/b(l)
005. letter
Robert Esbrook to Anwar Haddam, re: [asylum] (7 pages)
12/12/1996
P6/b(6)
006. cable
Re: [Anwar Haddam] (2 pages)
12/23/1996
Pl/b(l)
007. cable
Re: [Another approach] (5 pages)
12/16/1996
Pl/b(l)
008. report
Re: [Anwar Haddam] (1 page)
12/12/1996
Pl/b(l)
009. memo
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Algeria Policy Update (6 pages)
ca. 1995
Pl/b(l)
010a. cable
Re: Message from President Clinton to President Zeroual (I page)
ca. 1995
Pl/b(l)
010b. cable
Re: [Election Results] (5 pages)
12/07/1995
Pl/b(l)
011. memo
Richard Schifter to Morton Halperin, Mark Parris, and Bruce Pease,
re: Meeting with Algerian Journalists (2 pages)
07/28/1995
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the F O I A |
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) o f t h e F O I A |
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e F O I A j
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(S) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the F O I A j
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Ecdcral office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) o f t h e PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
012. report
Re: [Algeria] (14 pages)
06/1995
Pl/b(l)
013. cable
Re: [Public Meeting] (6 pages)
06/12/1995
Pl/b(l)
014. cable
Re: [Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)] (5 pages)
05/24/1995
Pl/b(l)
015. cable
Re: [Algerian Politics] (6 pages)
05/25/1995
Pl/b(l)
016. cable
Re: [The Berbers] (4 pages)
06/06/1995
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-1kc2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/07/1997
Re: [Algerian press] (4 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Securit)- Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment tn Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe KOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(h)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
David Welch to the Secretary of State, re: [Algerian Elections] (5
pages)
02/06/1997
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
:
2009-l295-l
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Ereedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(h)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(h)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
D O C U M E N T NO.
AND TYPE
003. report
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/1997
Re: [Algeria] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l), P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b ( l ) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the I O I A ]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e F O I A j
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e F O I A j
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e F O I A j
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) o f t h e F O I A j
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. cable
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
01/06/1997
Re: [New Law] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Acl -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(h)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l)ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�12/13/96 FRI 16:14 FAX 202 456 9110
©001
NSC/LGL ADVISER
NATIONAL SECURITY C O U N C I L
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER
FAX TRANSMITTAL
COVER SHEET
DATE:
TO:
PHONE N O . :
PHC5NE NO. :
St
202/456-9111
FAX N O . :
FAX NO. :
202/456-9110
COMMENTS:
NUMBER OF PAGES (including com page) I
�NSC/LGL ADVISER
©002
514 6044
aCROUCl-l-MEdfloiO
tain custody of the excluded alien for
an additlon&l Beven do^B bayopd the
date or tho deportation/exclusion oiftar.
If. altar the third day of tblfi tddltlosal
seven day period, the carrier has not
soade aU the necottajy tranoportoclcni
arraagements for she excluded alles to
be returned to his/her point at embaz^
kadoB by Che end of the addlUoual
seven day period, the Service vUl
malee the orruccmencs and bill the
carrier for Its coats.
tV7 Fit 1479. Fab. 17. iflHI. as aneade* at S
A
PH 109. Jan. 1. IB©]
S 837-8 DepoitatiOB.
(a) i3e/tntti07u o/ tern*. Por the purposea of Chla Beotioxu tha followl&e
terms meaa:
(1) Adlaeenc Ifllandr-aa defined la Motion lOUbXS) of the ACC
(2; Foreign oontlguoua territory—any
country m^ayt^ a enrnmnn boundary
with the United SfiateB.
(3) Residence in foreign condgnouA
territory or adlacent loland—any phyeloal preuence, regaidleaa of Intent, in a
foreign eontlffuoua terrleory or an adjacent island 1/ the goveraneqc of euoh
temtory or island agrees to acoopt che
alien.
(•I) Aircraft or veaBel—any oonveyanoe and other mode of travel by which
arrival la e free tad.
(5) Next available fllghWa to be the
carrler'a next regularly aohednled departore to the exolnded alien's polut of
embarkation regazdleBs of seat) availability. If the oarrter'a next regnlarly
scheduled departure to the excluded
aliens point of embarkation la fell, the
carrier haa the option of arranging for
re cure tnaeportadon oo other carriers
whloh Bervlce the excluded aliens point
of embarkation.
(b) Place to which deported. Any alien
(other than aa alien crewmember or an
aUen who boarded an aircraft or vessel
in foreign eonciguoue territory or an
adlacent island) who is ordered excluded shall be deported to tie country
where the alien boarded the vouel or
aircraft on which the alien arrived in
the United States. Zf that country refosea to accept the alien, the alien
ohall be deported to:
(1) The oonntry of which the alien is
a BObjeet, oitlzen, or national:
(2) The country where the alien w u
born;
(3) Tha coontry where the alien has a
cflsidsnce; or
(4) Any country wim&g to ancept the
alien.
(o) Ctmtigumu territory and acpacent
islands. Any alien ordered exelndied who
boarded an aircraft or vessel In foreign
oentlgnous territory or in any adjacent
lalud shall be deported to such foreign
contignoua cerritory or adlanent island
If the alien Is a native, citizen, subject,
or national of snch foreign oontiguous
territory or adjaoent island, or If the
alien haa a residence in ouoh foreign
contiguous territory or adjacent Island. Otherwise, the alien shall be deported, in die fine Instasoe, to the
country in which la located the port at
which the alien embarked for auch foreign contiguous territory or adjacent
island.
(d) land border pedestrian artvoZs.
Any alien ordered excluded who arrived
at a land border on foot shall be deponed in the name manner as If the
alien had boarded a ve&Bel or aircraft in
foreign conttgnons teirltory.
[47 FR 4*397. Oat. 7. UBL as mnandwl at 64 FR
US, Jap. 4. UBS)
PART 238—CONTRACTS WITH
TRANSPORTATION LINES
Sec.
28.1 COBtrftotfc
aSJ Tntfjapertatlcni llaai brioging aliens »
the unltad Btacesfromor tbrough foi*
elgn eo&tlKuoua tairltory or adjaoanc it338.3 AliniB ID immediate and continuraa
wa&sit.
238.4 Pieinasaedan ovtaida the onicad
States.
338^ Alton antartiv Omm pumant to saeUoa 1 of Public I A » 99-908, "OmalbOB
4
Tirritortet Act".
A T O T T 6 B.S.C. 1108. 1238; 8 CFft pal*
UH HT:
Contracta
The contracts with transportation
linesreferredto in section 23B(a) of the
Act may be entered into by the Executive Asaoolaxa ConunlsBloner for Operations, or by an Immigration OflJoer
designated by the Exeoudve Associaw
Conunlaslaner for OperaUons an behalf
of the govezunent and shall be does-
342
P
imn^BivAon ond NQIIK
nwMHd on roim l with transportation Unt
seotloa S8(o) of the Ac
by the Commlseloner a
govarnBie&t and shall
on Form 1-488. The
trassporcatlon Unse dr.
sengers to be prelnsp
ouealde the United £
made by the Commiaali
the government and
men ted on Ponn I-49S:
tractfi for InB^ularly •
it. flights may tie entered
if ecutdve Aeeoclaca Cc
K Operations or an Uns
Jf dealgnated by the Sic
{r; Commissioner for Ope
Ing Juriediction ove
j, where the inspection «
j twFRawrr.Doo.n. i
S
, | X a u TraBaMrtatku
fi" . aliena to tbe Italt
|
toy or adlacent is
Fonn I-fSQ shall bt
& eate and forwarded to
r- ofQoe of Inspections,
v each Regional Offlce .
districe ofOoe and t]
furnished with one c
, ment. The transmit
Seadauarten Office
; shall indicate whethj
.the agreement la a a
/.ate of a line which
. a similar agreamer
legardlng ancillary >
•pace and other fa
alshed by Qanaporb
Ifie stations In Can
larly handled.
:
PrFREMOT. Dec IT. IB
tXt&S Aliena in in
nous transit
(a) Form. t-t26 agr
tatlon line hrlngiix
ed States pursuant
chapter shall entei
M Tom 1-436. 5
»
«faall be negotiat.
Semoe's Headquai
flee and the head
Ponation lines.
(b) Slmatory Un&
ttreementa on Fc
tte following;
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
005. letter
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Robert Esbrook to Anwar Haddam, re: [asylum] (7 pages)
12/12/1996
RESTRICTION
P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
kc2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A j
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e F O I A j
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e F O I A j
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the F O I A j
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) o f t h e PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRAj
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
006. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Anwar Haddam] (2 pages)
12/23/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-1ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules und practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A j
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) o f t h e F O I A j
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e F O I A j
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning Ihe regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) o f t h e FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�6*A
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
007. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/16/1996
Re: [Another approach] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information |(b)(l)of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�(TH)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W A S H F A X
12. 12.
' 96
RECEIPT
D E P A R T M E N T
OF"
18 •.35
NO.
1 460 12048
^
S T A T E
"96
,
ESSAGE NO.
044214
(Officer name)
fajpfhlk
,
rtm
(Extension)
/ T L ^ J O T ^ -
DELIVER TO:
RlcL^cf
)R:
.No. Pages
(Office symbol)
ESSAGE RFSCRIPTION
j; (Agency)
CLASSIFICATION
CLEARANCE
Extension
U^an>r>
INFORMATlOt
f&f/X./
PER REQUEST
z
(Room number)
/&/)'l_
Room No.
AtesM-
COMMENT
;MARKS:
S/S Officer
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
W t i a l T ^ X r t - . Date:iM3iSf>'3
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
008. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/12/1996
Re: [Anwar Haddam] (1 page)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
1 3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
*
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(h)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Anthony Lake to the President, re: Algeria Policy Update (6 pages)
ca. 1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of (he FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
National Seeuritj' Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
0!0a. cable
SUBJECT/TI TLE
DATE
Re: Message from President Clinton to President Zeroual (I page)
ca. 1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(I)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
IM
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) of (he PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
010b. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
12/07/1995
Re: [Election Results] (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(h)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe l*RA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
OU. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Richard Schifter to Morton Halperin, Mark Parris, and Bruce Pease,
re: Meeting with Algerian Journalists (2 pages)
07/28/1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information |(b)(l) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
012. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Algeria] (14 pages)
06/1995
RESTRICTION
PI/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Prcsidcnlial Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A j
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the F O I A j
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(bK9) o f t h e FOIAJ
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) o f t h e PRAJ
Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) o f t h e PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
013. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
06/12/1995
Re: [Public Meeting] (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
kc2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
014. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)] (5 pages)
05/24/1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsidcntiHl Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
h(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the I OIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) oftheFOIAI
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
N'Htional Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance w ith restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
015. cable
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Algerian Politics] (6 pages)
05/25/1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - [S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(h)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
Relating to Ihe appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCtiMEiM NO.
AND TYPE
016. cable
SUBJECT/TITI.E
DATE
Re: [The Berbers] (4 pages)
06/06/1995
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [3]
2009-1295-F
ke2085
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to Ihe appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
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2009-1295-F
Description
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This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
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Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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Paper
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Title
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Algeria [3]
Creator
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National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Scott Busby
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7585640
42-t-7585640-20091295F-001-003-2015-2015-2015
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2009-1295-F
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Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585640">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3013f145d395c64b8105f7d391587918.pdf
57da434dd1941af232d1433a4019f6a0
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Busby, Scott
Original OA/ID Number:
1889
Row:
40
Section:
Shelf:
2
Position:
Stack:
v
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMKNT NO.
AND TYPE
DATE
SUBJECT/TITLE
RESTRICTION
001. memo
Jamie Metzl to Samuel Berger, re: [Algerian Massacres] (2 pages)
01/29/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. report
Re: [Algeria] (4 pages)
12/29/1997
Pl/b(l)
004. cable
Re: [Algeria Human Rights] (9 pages)
10/20/1997
Pl/b(l)
005a. form
Form 1-589 (8 pages)
01/09/1997
P6/b(6)
005b. statement
Affadavit (5 pages)
01/09/1997
P6/b(6)
005c. form
Passport (8 pages)
1989
P6/b(6)
006. memo
Peter Vrooman to Arthur Hughes, re: Current Status of Anwar
Haddam (4 pages)
05/20/1997
Pl/b(l)
007. letter
William Bartlett to Immigration Judge, re: [Anwar Haddam] (3 pages)
01/27/1997
P6/b(6)
008. cable
Re: [Algeria policy] (2 pages)
01/22/1997
Pl/b(l)
009. letter
William Bartlett to Immigration Judge, re: [Anwar Haddam] (4 pages)
01/27/1997
P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [2]
2009-1295-F
kc2084
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Ereedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
1 1 National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
*
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PKA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(h)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) nfthcFOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile deflned in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Jamie Metzl to Samuel Berger, re: [Algerian Massacres] (2 pages)
01/29/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [2]
2009-1295-F
kc2084
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. S52(b)|
PI
P2
PJ
IM
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(J) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
220I(J).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�01/21/98
17:58 0 : 0 1
NO:598
HUMAN RICHTS WATCH
",21 K St N
W
Washington, Of. 20005
T«l»phnn»: }nj-37i-659J
facsimile ?f>?-37i-ni24
E-mail: hrwdcffldc.org
Website: http://www.hrw.org
•WHAM •ICIfTI VATCH/MBOU U I T
IUIIIIV MCMJIV
January 22, 1998
Eric Schwartz
National Security Council
Ki'iiHiiibliirnrni
/l'»<'f#rfif r*lr*\-tf>r
Dear Eric,
)•+ Slnrk
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Nrjla SfllllJIiakiA
(•nirfthM (jipt>
Awali S;iil)»M
.umciaro
On behalf of myself and Joe Stork and Nejla Sammakia, I wish to thank all of you for taking the
time to discuss Algeria with us on January 14.1 wanted to reiterate some of the points wc made
and voice some concerns about one point.
We believe that the Algerians should be pressured publicly and privately for maximum
transparency concerning the ongoing violence. Whoever is committing the massacres, the
government's inaction is of great concern and should not be accepted by the international
community. We believe that international pressure can he effective with the government of Algeria
despite its prickliness. The prospect of improved relations with the U.S. and the Europe is
something the present government desires and should be conditioned on allowing prompt and
unfettered international scrutiny of the massacres.
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We are grateful for U.S. demarches in favor of access for international human rights organizations.
We also believe the U.S. should actively support the use of U.N. mechanisms, such as the prompt
dispatch of special rapporteurs and the upcoming meeting of the Human Rights Commission, to
press Algeria on its rights record. We hope that Secretary of State Albright will use the occasion
of the release next week of the Slate Department's Country Reports on Human Rights to
underscore these points, and to underscore the point that abases on this scale cannot be considered
an "internal affair." These initiatives are all the more important in light ofthe apparent failure of
the F.umpean Troika delegation to obtain Algeria's assent to a visit by the U.N. special
rapporteurs, and the apparent refusal of the delegation's request to meet with victims of the terror.
It is worth adding that no credible human rights investigation by Algerians has yet been conducted
into the massacres; nor are we aware of any in progress.
Finally, we infeethave reservations with the idea of sending military counter-terrorism experts
to Algeria to study the massacres and advise their Algerian counterparts on how better to prevent
them. This would be tantamount to providing military assistance to the Algerian government,
which currently receives no military aidfromthe U.S. The Country Reports on Human Highis
documents a pattern of grave abuses by the Algerian security forces. Cognizant of this record, the
I I.S. currently rejects licenses sought hy U.S. companies for the sale to Algeria of equipment that
could he used by the security forces in an offensive capacity.
In that light we would object to counter-terrorism initiatives unless they avoid any complicity in.
or encouragement of, the grave human rights abuses for which the Algerian securily forces are
responsible. Any such initiatives must also be coupled with a strong and outspoken human rights
policy, one that includes sustained criticism of abuses and pressure for access by international
human rights entities to the massacre sites.
I would appreciate your sharing these views with interested colleagues.
Ojillr
Yours, iT)
x
Eric Goldstein
• »iia«*i •
{]
I A l i f t
A M
��UMAN RICHTS WATCH
3 5th Avenue
5
aw York, New York 10017
;lephone: (212)972-8400
:csimile: (212)972-0905
mail: hrwnyc5>hrw.org
ebsite: http://www.hrw.org
JMAN RICHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST
miiy Megally
:ccutivc Director
ic Goldstein
•xcarcb Director
rpioin N. Sherry
•sociate Director
c Stork
/i/ocac}' Director
arisa Bencomo
ahc Sharifpour-I licks
jjla Sammakia
•search Associates
.-orgina Copty
vali Samara
sociates
)VIS0RY COMMITTEE
try G Sick
wir
sa Anderson
•uce Rabb
ce Chairs
i:iul Bakhash
Cherif Bassiouni
artin Blumenthal
.ul Chcvigny
clena Cobban
uricia Derian
lilh Everetl
ansour Farhang
iristopher E. George
ia E. Hauser
:rich Haynes
;v. J. Bryan Hehir
ly Kaufman
arina Pinto Kaufman
.mir Khalaf
dith Kjpper
lina Lahav
1 1 M. Lesch
1
cphen P. Marks
ilando Matalon
lilip Mattar
narles Shamas
ivid K. Shipler
mford Solender
ary Ann Siein
libley Telhami
1 drew Whitley
ipoleon B. Williams, Jr.
nies J. Zogby
JMAN RIGHTS WATCH
jnncth Roth
iecutive Director
isan Osnos
•sociate Director
ichele Alexander
jvelopment Director
. nthia Brown
•ngram Director
irbara Guglielmo
nance & Administration
director
me Leicht
•ussels Office Director
isan Osnos
ttnmunications Director
ilder Tayler
L'ncral Counsel
•anna Weschler
nited Nations
(cpresentative
:)lx.'n L. Bernstein
hair
January 9, 1998
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
For additional information, contact:
Joe Stork 202 371 6592 ext 118 (Washington)
202 291 0846 (home)
Jean-Paul Marthoz 32 2 736 7838 (Brussels)
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH URGES U.S., E.U. TO PRESS ALGERIA
ON MASSACRES INQUIRY
(Washington, March 9) -- In a Brussels press conference this moming, Human Rights
Watch called on Washington and European states to insist that Algeria cooperate with
international efforts to ascertain responsibility for massacres of civilians and to recommend
steps to prevent their recurrence. "The Algerian authorities have failed to initiate or allow
any impartial investigation of the massacres and of the government's failure to protect its
citizens," said Kenneth Roth, the group's executive director in New York. "The scale and
duration of the human rights crisis there makes a mockery of Algeria's insistence that it is
strictly an internal matter."
The group called on Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to underscore U.S. concern with
the situation when the State Department releases its annual humanrightscountry reports later
this month, and for the U.S. and European governments to co-sponsor a resolution at the
upcoming U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting establishing the position of a Special
Rapporteur for Algeria.
The group welcomed the plans of European foreign ministers to visit Algeria, but cautioned
that such a visit could not substitute for an internationally sponsored investigation of the
atrocities. "The foreign ministers need to press the Algerian authorities to stop the atrocities,
halt the gross abuses committed by security forces, and allow journalists and human rights
workers to investigate," said Roth. "Most importantly, they need to avoid any appearance of
supporting the government's refusal to cooperate with an international inquiry."
A copy of the Brussels statement is attached.
Human Rights Watch: Mission Statement
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold political
freedom and to protect peoplefrominhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human
rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.
Kenneth Roth is the executive director and Robert L. Bemstein is the chair of the board.
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEW YORK
RIO DE IANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�HUMAN RICHTS WATCH
485 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212)972-8400
Facsimile: (212)972-0905
E-mail: hrwnyca)hrw.org
Website: http://www.hrw.org
HUMAN RICHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST
Manny Megally
Exvcutitie Director
l:ric Goldstein
Research Director
Virginia N. Sherry
Assf>ciate Director
Joe Stork
Advocacy Director
Clarisa Bencomo
Elah6 Sharifpour-Hicks
Nejla Sammakia
Research Associates
Georgina Copty
Awali Samara
Associates
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Gary G. Sick
Chair
Lisa Anderson
Bruce Rabb
Vice Chairs
Shaul Bakhash
M Cherif Bassiouni
Martin Blumenthal
Paul Chcvigny
Helena Cobban
Patricia Derian
ndith Everett
Mansour Farhang
Christopher E. George
Rita E. Hauser
Ulrich Haynes
Rev. J. Bryan Hehir
Edy Kaufman
Marina Pinto Kaufman
Samir Khalaf
Judith Kipper
Pnina Lahav
Ann M. Lesch
Stephen P. Marks
Rolando Matalon
Philip Mattar
Charles Shamas
David K. Shipler
Sanford Solender
Mary Ann Stein
Shibley Telhami
Andrew Whidcy
Napoleon B. Williams, Jr.
James J. Zogby
HUMAN RICHTS WATCH
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Susan Osnos
Associate Director
Michele Alexander
Development Director
Cynthia Brown
Program Director
Barbara Guglielmo
l-lnance & Administration
Director
Lotte Leicht
Brussels Office Director
Susan Osnos
Communications Director
Wilder Tayler
General Counsel
Joanna Weschler
United Nations
Representative
Robert L. Bemstein
Chair
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH URGES E.U., U.S. :
THOROUGH INQUIRY INTO ALGERIA MASSACRES MUST ACCOMPANY
DIPLOMACY, HUMANITARIAN AID IF CIVILIAN POPULATION TO BE
PROTECTED
The escalating episodes of violence against civilians in Algeria have prompted high-level
expressions of concern and also revived calls for inquiries to ascertain responsibility for these
crimes against humanity, to recommend steps to prevent such atrocities, and to afford the
protection of international scrutiny to the country's traumatized civilian population. U.N.
Human Rights High Commissioner Mary Robinson has urged Algeria to allow the U.N.
Special Rapporteurs on torture and on summary, arbitrary and extrajudicial executions to
conduct missions in the country. A U.S. government spokesperson encouraged the Algerian
government to allow such inquiries, as well as visits by humanrightsorganizations. The E.U.
foreign ministers are proposing to send a high-level delegation to Algeria and material aid
to the survivors ofthe violence, and a delegation from the foreign affairs committee of the
European Parliament is tentatively scheduled to visit the country in February.
Human Rights Watch welcomes these calls for action regarding a situation that has
until now appeared immune to international concern. The steps being proposed are
complementary, and if conducted with adequate preparation and logistical support and a clear
set of priorities they can help bring the weight of the international community to bear in
bringing Algeria's horror to an end. But there remains a pressing need for an international
mechanism of inquiry, preferably under United Nations auspices, to ascertain as
comprehensively as possible the facts concerning the massacres and other abuses, to examine
allegations of responsibility, for them, and to propose concrete steps to restore law and order
and respect for fundamental human rights. To this end, Human Rights Watch urges the
governments of the European Union, the United States, and other members of the United
Nations to sponsor a resolution at the upcoming March meeting ofthe U.N. Human Rights
Commission establishing a Special Rapporteur on the situation in Algeria.
The reason such a step is necessary is because the Algerian government has
manifestly failed to meet its responsibilities in this area. The government has not initiated
any form of credible, independent and transparent inquiry mechanism on its own. This
pertains not only to the massive bloodletting of the last six months, in which hundreds of
women, children and men have been slaughtered in single incidents, and where the security
forces have failed to intervene despite their proximity. The authorities have been similarly
negligent with regard to the high-profile assassinations of public figures, journalists,
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEWYORK
RIO DE IANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�intellectuals and activists that typified the violence in earlier years. When alleged perpetrators are
prosecuted, trials are often not public and do not meet basic fair trial standards. This is a government
that heavily censors independent reporting of attacks by armed opposition groups and often refuses
even to issue its own findings or estimates regarding casualties from such attacks and from clashes
between security forces and armed groups.
Human Rights Watch fully supports efforts by Algerians to conduct impartial investigations
of the massacres and other atrocities. Such initiatives could be launched by the executive branch, the
National Assembly, or non-governmental groups. To date, however, no thorough or credible
investigation has been carried out, and none appears imminent. Meanwhile, the crisis continues to
escalate, claiming hundreds upon hundreds of innocent victims by acts of unspeakable brutality.
The adamant refusal of the Algerian government to cooperate with proposals for an
international inquiry, or to meet its own responsibility to conduct independent and transparent
investigations and make such an international effort unnecessary, should not be allowed to sustain
international inaction. Disregard for human rights has become the norm in Algeria, exacerbating the
breakdown in law and order and leaving civilians vulnerable and unprotected. The Algerian
authorities have built a wall of silence around the complex reality of violence and counter-violence,
of mass killings by armed opposition groups and gross abuses by government forces, insisting that
the problem is simply one of "residual terrorism."
The crisis in Algeria is of such scale and duration as to make a mockery of the government's
insistence that it is strictly an "internal affair." The escalating mass killings of women, children, and
other civilians make it imperative that the international community reject the idea that human rights
protection is limited by national sovereignty. The need for international scrutiny in Algeria is more
pressing than ever. Human Rights Watch therefore makes the following recommendations:
To the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
Human Rights Watch supports the efforts of High Commissioner Mary Robinson to arrange
for missions to Algeria of the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial execution and on torture. We urge
the High Commissioner to continue her efforts to bring the resources of her office and of the U.N.
system to bear on the Algerian crisis.
To the European Union and Member States
The E.U. and member states should without delay urge the Algerian government to facilitate
immediately a mission by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial executions and on torture,
as requested by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. These missions by the U.N. special
mechanisms should not be contingent on the results of any E.U. missions to Algeria. Nor should
discussion of these missions be delayed until the meetings of the U.N. Human Rights Commission
in March, as the Algerian government is proposing.
The E.U. member states should co-sponsor a resolution at the upcoming Human Rights
Commission session in Geneva finding that the severity and scale of the human rights crisis in
�Algeria requires the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for the country.
Any E.U. ministerial visit, such as a visit by the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, Britain,
and Austria (the troika) as proposed by Germany, should not be limited to discussing humanitarian
aid or support for the government's campaign to suppress the armed opposition groups. It is crucial
that the mission should also have the following priorities:
•
Impress upon the Algerian authorities their responsibilities, under international law and
human rights treaties to which Algeria is party, to afford protection of life, liberty and
security of its citizens, and to bring to justice those responsible for violating those rights in
timely public and fair trials.
•
Stress the need for the Algerian government to take credible steps to halt abuses committed
by government forces, including torture, extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention, and
"disappearances," to investigate complaints of such abuses promptly and meaningfully, and
to punish appropriately those responsible for committing or condoning such abuses.
•
Urge the Algerian authorities to end censorship and pressures on the media that aim to
enforce a state monopoly on information related to the internal security situation, including
human rights violations, or that aim to restrict coverage that displeases government officials.
•
Request credible explanations from government and security officials for the apparent failure
of security forces to intervene in recent large scale massacres, notably those in Rais and
Bentalha in August and September 1997.
•
Request credible explanations for the apparent failure of the government to investigate
credibly the killings of public figures, or to indict or prosecute those cases in courts of law.
•
Meet with leaders and spokespeople of opposition parties, including those represented in the
National Assembly and those outside of the Assembly which have repudiated and
condemned armed violence.
•
Meet with human rights activists and lawyers, including women's rights activists, and
commit some meaningful proportion of any material aid package to support the work of these
groups and efforts.
i
•
Impress upon Algerian authorities the importance of cooperating with international
investigators, including those under U.N. auspices, to examine allegations of responsibility
and to make recommendations with respect to human rights abuses by all parties.
•
Make clear to the Algerian government that the ministerial mission is not intended to
supplant an international investigation into the country's human rights crisis, avoid any
appearance of supporting the government's refusal to cooperate with such an investigation,
and publicly dispute any effort by the Algerian authorities to impute such support to the
ministers' visit.
The proposed European Parliament delegation should adopt similar priorities. The delegation
should include as consultants experienced human rights field workers, and should take advantage
of its larger size and lesser protocol to request unmonitored meetings with human rights lawyers,
community activists, opposition political forces, journalists and others who have had access to
massacre sites and survivors. The delegation should seek to visit Rais, Bentalha, Relizane and other
mass killing sites, and should request meetings with security officials responsible for those areas at
the times of the massacres. At the same time, the delegation should make absolutely clear that it is
not and does not consider itself to be a substitute for an international committee of inquiry, which
�is how it has been represented by the Algerian media
To the Clinton Administration
The U.S. government should continue to urge the government of Algeria to welcome
investigations into the human rights crisis by international humanrightsorganizations. In addition,
Washington should use the means at its disposal to persuade the government of Algeria to cooperate
with the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights and to facilitate without further delay official
visits to the country by the Special Rapporteurs on summary executions and on torture.
In particular, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright should use the occasion of the late
January release of the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to
highlight U.S. concern with the situation in Algeria. Secretary Albright should at this time convey
U.S. support for the recommendations of the U.N. High Commissioner, Mary Robinson. Finally, the
U.S. should declare that it will co-sponsor a resolution at the Human Rights Commission meetings
in Geneva establishing the position of a Special Rapporteur for Algeria.
�February 1998
Vol. 10,No. 1(E)
PLEASE NOTE: THIS IS AN ADVANCE COPY OF THIS REPORT. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE. YOU
WILL RECEIVE SHORTLY FULL COPIES WITH APPENDICES.
ALGERIA
"NEITHER AMONG THE LIVING NOR THE DEAD":
STATE-SPONSORED "DISAPPEARANCES" IN ALGERIA
ABOUT THIS REPORT
2
SUMMARY
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
3
INTRODUCTION
5
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
8
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
10
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
12
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
13
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
17
APPENDICES
19
APPENDIX A
Letter from Human Rights Watch to President Liamine Zeroual
19
APPENDIX B
Statement by Human Rights Watch of September 26
20
APPENDIX C
Joint Statement of October 15 by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
International Federation of Human Rights and Reporters without Borders
21
APPENDIX D
Letter from Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra to Human Rights Watch
22
APPENDIX E
For families and friends of the "disappeared": What you can do
23
APPENDIX F
Form for submission of information to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
25
�ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report was written by Nejla Sammakia and Eric Goldstein, respectively research associate and
research director at Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division. It is based in part on
research conducted in Algeria between March 30 and April 13, 1997, by Nejla Sammakia and Baher
Alashhab, a consultant to Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Hanny Megally, executive director
of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.
Human Rights Watch wishes to thank the many lawyers and relatives of "disappeared" persons who
provided us with information. For reasons related to their own security, some asked to remain anonymous.
Human Rights Watch also wishes to thank M. Kemal Rezag Bara, president of the official National Human
Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme, ONDH), for meeting with us to
discuss cases of suspected "disappearances."
SUMMARY
Among the many human rights tragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces. As with many acts of
violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been difficult to confirm. Armed
Islamist groups are responsible for abductions as well as deliberate killings of thousands of civilians.
However, there is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are carrying out "disappearances." They
are doing so on such a wide scale that the practice could persist only with the sanction of the highest levels
of authority. While Algerian officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing" in state custody,
Human Rights Watch is aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states in Article
7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political stability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances." International instruments that
Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain articles that, if fully implemented,
protect against enforced disappearances. However, since political violence became endemic in 1992, these
instruments and laws have been routinely flouted by Algeria's security forces. Persons are seized by forces
that often refuse to identify themselves; they are held in unacknowledged detention without being able to
contact family or lawyer, and beyond the time limit set forth in Algerian law. Detained in this fashion, they
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment.
In the hope of finding their "disappeared" relatives, families make the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, file missing-person complaints with official agencies, and seek help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Nacera Dutour told Human Rights Watch that when
she inquired about her "disappeared" son Amine Amrouche, a gendarmerie official told her in May 1997
that, in the gendarmerie's records, Amrouche's name "was neither among the living nor the dead."
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February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1 (E)
�RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of Algeria
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all persons arbitrarily detained.
•
Investigate allegations of unlawful and/or arbitrary detention, make public the results of such
investigations, and take legal measures, under the abuse of authority provisions of Article 51 of
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure, against those responsible for such offenses, and make public
these legal measures.
•
Ensure compliance by the security forces with international standards for the prevention of
"disappearances," including those contained in international agreements ratified by Algeria and
those safeguards against "disappearances" that are found in Algerian laws. These include enforcing
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure by
requiring officers holding a person to allow him or her to communicate
immediately and directly with relatives; and
punishing officers who are found responsible for holding persons in garde
a vue (pre-arraignment) detention for periods exceeding the limits provided
by law.
•
Implement recommendations made by the official National Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme, ONDH) by requiring that arresting authorities
identify themselves at the time of arrest or detention, and requiring that detainees be held only in
publicly recognized detention facilities.
•
Inform persons upon arrest of the reasons for their detention, and enable them to challenge promptly
the legality of that detention before an independent judicial authority, as provided by Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Algeria is a State Party.
•
Establish a public register listing the names and whereabouts of all persons detained by all branches
of the army, intelligence, and national and local security forces. The register should be updated on
a frequent and regular basis. It should include for each person the time of arrest, and specify by
which order and under what charge he or she was arrested. The register should be made available
without restriction to judges, lawyers, families and human rights organizations.
•
Ensure that the mechanisms set up by the Algerian authorities to respond to inquiries from families,
lawyers and nongovernmental organizations concerning the whereabouts and fate of persons
detained are speedy and responsive to their needs and are reviewed regularly for promptness.
•
Communicate to all military, intelligence and security forces that "disappearances" and torture will
not be tolerated, and that commanders who order or condone such actions will be prosecuted and,
if found guilty, punished according to the gravity of the crime of enforced "disappearance."
•
Publicize information about the official mechanisms by which victims of illegal detention can
exercise their enforceable right to compensation, as provided in Article 9(5) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�•
Allow access for international investigators, including those under United Nations auspices, to
examine allegations of responsibility and to make recommendations with respect to human rights
abuses by all parties.
To the Armed Opposition Groups
•
Cease and repudiate all deliberate attacks on and/or the abduction of civilians.
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all abducted civilians.
•
Investigate and remove from any position of authority those who are found to have participated in
the torture or ill-treatment, including rape and sexual abuse, or murder of abducted persons.
To the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
•
In light of the scope of the problem of "disappearances" in Algeria, seek to conduct a mission to
Algeria to research and prepare a report on the issue.
To the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
•
Lend political and logistical support to the activities of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances in its effort to address the situation in Algeria, including the preparation
of a comprehensive report.
•
Urge the government of Algeria to allow an independent investigation of human rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law by all parties in Algeria, organized by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights and including the
appropriate mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights.
To the European Union and Member States
•
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by armed opposition
groups.
•
Raise with the Algerian government, at the highest levels and as an urgent matter, the cases of
Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of the authorities.
•
Instruct member state embassies in Algiers to investigate the extent of "disappearances" in Algeria,
to pursue specific cases of "disappearances" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees
whose names are known.
•
Use all possible means, including the negotiations over the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreement with Algeria and linkage of financial assistance, to persuade the government of Algeria
to implement the recommendations in this report, including a full accounting concerning persons
arbitrarily detained and "disappeared," and publicly support such initiatives by the government.
•
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
To the Clinton administration
•
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by arined opposition
groups.
Raise with the Algerian government the cases of Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of
the authorities.
Instruct the U.S. embassy in Algiers to increase its monitoring of "disappearances" in Algeria, to
pursue specific cases of "disappeared" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees.
Use all possible means, including financial assistance and official guarantees for foreign
investments, to persuade the government of Algeria to implement the recommendations in this
report, including a full accounting concerning persons detained illegally and "disappeared," and
publicly support such initiatives by the government.
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1992, Algeria has been riven by a conflict between security forces and armed opposition
groups that call themselves Islamist. It has claimed at least 60,000 lives, many of them civilians. Under the
guise of fighting "terrorism," security forces have engaged in systematic torture, summary executions, and
arbitrary arrests with impunity. Armed groups have targeted for assassination individuals whom they viewed
as hostile to their religious-polihcal agenda or supportive of the present government, and have carried out
a series of massacres of unarmed men, women and children in rural areas. In its reporting on the crisis in
Algeria, Human Rights Watch has consistently condemned violations of human rights and of humanitarian
law by all parties.'
Among the many human rights tragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces.
Searching for their "disappeared" loved ones, families have made the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, filed missing-person complaints with official agencies, and sought help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Some of the relatives of the "disappeared" have recently
taken to the streets, holding up photos of their missing fathers, sons, and brothers, demanding answers.
As with many acts of violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been
difficult to confirm. Persons have been seized at their homes, in their workplaces, or in public places, by men
in plainclothes who refused to identify themselves or present a warrant, but who were later confirmed to be
members of the security forces. There have also been instances of police-style actions by men in
uniform—such as the staffing of checkpoints—where witnesses suspected the men of being members of
armed groups who had disguised themselves as security force members.
' Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Elections in the Shadow of Violence and Repression," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 4, June 1997; Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One Is Spared (New York:
Human Rights Watch, January 1994); see also annual editions of Human Rights Watch World Report.
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�In some cases, confirmation of security force responsibility was later confirmed when the person
seized was located within the prison system or released after a period of detention. In other cases, such as
the abductions of women that accompanied some of the gruesome massacres in villages southeast of Algiers
during 1997, the circumstances of the abduction led families of victims to suspect the hand of armed
opposition groups.
2
3
While abductions by armed opposition groups are a grave human rights problem in Algeria, there
is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are responsible for many hundreds of unresolved cases
of "disappearance." The phenomenon is of such proportions that it could only persist with the sanction of
the highest levels of national authority. While high officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing"
in state custody, we are aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
"Disappeared" persons come from a wide range of professions. They include government employees,
physicians, businessmen, political activists, and journalists. Among the cases Human Rights Watch has
investigated, the arrests took place mostly at night, and according to eyewitnesses, were carried out by mixed
military and police forces who arrived in cars, generally with private license plates. Sometimes armored
vehicles were also used. Some members of these forces wore uniforms and others were in plainclothes. When
the police came wearing civilian clothes, they often wore jackets with a recognizable police insignia. When
arresting someone at home or on the street, they rarely presented an arrest warrant or official identification.
These were reportedly shown more often when the arrest was made at the person's workplace.
After a relative was seized, family members often visited nearby police stations to see if he or she
was being held there. Some made inquiries with the state prosecutor's office after the twelve-day limit on
garde a vue (pre-arraignment) detention had elapsed, and received a receipt acknowledging their complaint.
Others reported locating their arrested relatives, only to lose track of them after being told they had been
transferred to another place of detention whose location was not disclosed.
4
When detainees are held in unknown locations, they are invariably deprived of legal assistance and
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment. A prisoner who was released in December 1996, after three and-a-half years in jail, told
Human Rights Watch that he first obtained a lawyer only after he was charged and transferred to a prison,
following three months in secret detention in police custody. Once in el-Harrache prison, he asked other
detainees to have their visiting relatives inform his family of his whereabouts. When the former prisoner,
2
"Scores of women are reported to have been abducted by armed groups and held captive for varying periods
of time during which they were raped and ill-treated....Reports of abduction and rape of women had decreased during
1996, but have once again become widespread in the context of recent massacres in regions around the capital."
Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence (London: Amnesty International,
November 1997), p. 22.
3
There are no official figures of the number of persons abducted by armed groups. The president of Soumoud
("steadfastness," in Arabic), an Algerian organization concerned with the issue, was quoted in the press as saying,
"Excluding the wilayas of Med^a and Bouira, we counted, as of July 26, 1996, 2,000 persons kidnaped by terrorists
whose fate is unknown." Quoted anonymously in Salima Tlem5ani, "Plus de 2000 personnes pontes disparues," ElWatan, April 22, 1997. Since that interview, abductions have continued at an alarming pace.
4
The twelve-day limit applies only to crimes that are considered "terrorist or subversive acts" (Article 8 of
Ordonnance no. 95-10 modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure). The limit is in other cases forty-eight hours (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Article 51).
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�who preferred to withhold his name, had earlier appeared before an investigating judge, he was not notified
of his right to a lawyer or to contact his family. He also told us that he was tortured for three days while in
police custody. The torture methods included beating with large sticks, the "chiffon " (or washrag) method
in which a cloth soaked in dirty water and chemicals is stuffed down his mouth, and leaving him suspended
by the arms for hours.
The problem of persons going missing while in state custody has been recognized by the government
and nongovernmental organizations alike. Justice Minister Mohamed Adami told Human Rights Watch, "We
give these [missing person] cases all our special attention. Sometimes we find the person in question, but
until we do we keep the files open on these cases." Late in 1996, the military authorities had set up a "social
services" department to receive relatives who wish to report missing persons and attempt to trace them.
Algeria's official National Human Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de rHomme,
ONDH), which was created by and reports to the office of the president, has flagged "disappearances" as a
major concern. The head of the independent Algerian Human Rights League (Ligue Algerienne des droits
de I'Homme, LADH), Ghechir Boudjemaa, called "disappearances" one of the country's most serious human
rights problems, in an interview published in the Algiers daily al-Khabar on November 17.
5
During and after a mission to Algeria in March-April 1997, Human Rights Watch collected
testimony from families and lawyers concerning persons who "disappeared" at the hands of security forces.
We restricted ourselves to those cases where evidence existed—usually eyewitness accounts of the arrest
or abduction—that pointed to the involvement of the security forces. In all of these cases, the victims were
men. On September 12 we submitted this information to the authorities (see Appendix A). We asked in each
case whether the person was in official custody, and if so, his precise whereabouts, legal status, and whether
and when he had been brought before a judicial authority; the charges, if any, against him; and whether he
had been visited by his legal counsel and by his family.
Although we did receive a response indirectly—in the form of a case-by-case working session with
ONDH president M. Kemal Rezag Bara on October 14—in none of the twelve cases presented did the
authorities confirm that the individual was in official custody or specify his whereabouts.
6
Human Rights Watch believes these cases reflect a pattern of state-sponsored "disappearances." The
failure of judges and prosecutors to perform their legally mandated oversight functions, including their duty
to ensure that the arresting forces comply with both domestic legislation and international legal instruments
designed to prevent secret and unacknowledged detentions, results in the effective absence of judicial remedy
for these practices. As Amnesty International reported, "Examining magistrates and judges have consistently
shown little interest in establishing how the detainees came to be in the custody of the security forces, even
when there is ample evidence that the detainees were held in secret detention in violation ofthe law."
7
The government of Algeria has responded to some of the many case inquiries submitted to it by the
U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. In many instances, the government
contended that the person in question had been killed by security forces in combat or when attempting to
5
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
6
Human Rights Watch also received a letter from the Algerian ambassador to the U.S., dated September 30,
criticizing its demarche on "disappearances" and providing no comments on the cases and questions it contained. The
ambassador's letter indicated that no further official response would be forthcoming and advised Human Rights Watch
instead to establish a "constructive dialogue" with the ONDH. The letter is reproduced as Appendix D.
7
Amnesty International, Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence, p. 16.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�escape, or had been assassinated by "terrorist" groups. However, as Amnesty International notes, in these
cases the authorities "tailed to provide the necessary details and to explain why for months or years they had
not informed the families and lawyers, who had continued to seek information on their whereabouts from
the authorities, of the fate of these 'disappeared'.""
As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, no Algerian security force member or official has been
subjected to disciplinary measures for his or her involvement in a case of "disappearance." A request for
information about such cases, contained in the attached letter to President Liamine Zeroual, went
unanswered. The lack of disciplinary measures is further evidence of state sanction for the practice of
"disappearances."
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
"Enforced disappearance" is defined in the 1992 U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance as:
[Pjersons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, thereby placing such persons outside the
protection of the law.
The government of Algeria has maintained a state of emergency since February 9, 1992, justifying
it with reference to the rampant political violence. The state of emergency permits various derogations from
Algerian laws, including those that protect civil liberties. The minister of interior is empowered to restrict
"all public gatherings that could disturb the public order and safety," order searches both day and night and
place in detention centers persons "whose activity is considered to threaten the public order, public security,
or the proper functioning of public services." The Algerian authorities informed the United Nations on
February 13, 1992 that it was derogating from articles 9(3), 12, 17, and 21 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
9
10
International law affirms that even during declared states of exception certain basic human rights
cannot be suspended. The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
states in Article 7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances."
8
Ibid., p. 17.
9
Presidential decree no. 92-44 of 9 February 1992 establishing the state of emergency. The preamble to the
decree refers to "serious and persistent attacks on public order that have taken place in numerous places in the country"
and "the threats to the stability of institutions and serious and repeated attacks against the security of citizens and civil
peace."
10
Article 9(3) guarantees that "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge...and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release...." Articles 12, 17 and 21 refer,
respectively, to the right to freedom of movement; freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family
home or correspondence; and the right of peaceful assembly.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�International instruments that Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain
articles that, if fully implemented, protect against enforced disappearances. Algeria has, for example, ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states in Article 9( 1):
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedures as are established by law.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance requires in
Article 3 that each state "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and
terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction." Article 6(1) states: "No order
or instruction of any public authority, civilian, military or other, may be invoked to justify an enforced
disappearance."
The declaration stipulates in Article 10 that detainees must be held in officially recognized places
of detention, that their families must be promptly informed of their place of detention and that they must
have access to a lawyer. These provisions are intended to prevent "disappearances." Guidelines for punitive
action against officials responsible for acts of enforced disappearance and for compensation of its victims
are found in Article 14 and Article 19 respectively:
Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance in a particular State shall,
when the facts disclosed by an official investigation so warrant, be brought before the competent
civil authorities of that State for the purpose of prosecution and trial....All States should take any
lawful and appropriate action available to them to bring all persons presumed responsible for an act
of enforced disappearance, who are found to be within their jurisdiction or under their control, to
justice.
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall have
the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their
dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.
Algerian law also provides a number of safeguards against "disappearances." Even when a criminal
investigation necessitates holding a detainee without a warrant, Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CPP) states that "the officer must immediately inform the state prosecutor." Article 51 also stipulates:
While protecting the confidentiality of the investigation, the police officer is obligated to grant to
the person held in garde a vue [pre-arraignment] detention all means for enabling him to
communicate immediately and directly with his family and to receive visits by it."
A time limit of twelve days is imposed on garde a vue detention in cases of suspected terrorist or
subversive acts by Article 8 of Decree 95-10 issued on 25 November 1995 and amending Article 51 of the
CPP. During that time, detainees must appear before the state prosecutor if they are to be charged, according
to Article 51, second paragraph:
" "Toute en veillant au secret de I'enquete, TofTicier de police judiciaire est tenu de mettre & la disposition de
la personne gardee & vue, tout moyen lui permettant de communiquer immediatement et directement avec sa familie,
et de recevoir ses visites."
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�If there is evidence that is substantial and corroborating so as to warrant the filing of charges, the
police officer must present the detainee to the state prosecutor without holding the detainee in his
custody for more than forty-eight hours [amended to twelve days as indicated above].
12
Similarly, amended Article 65 stipulates that if detainees are to be kept longer than twelve days, they
must be brought before the state prosecutor, who can order an extension of the incommunicado detention
by not more than twelve additional days. The criminal code, in Articles 109-110, provides for penalties of
up to ten years in prison for public servants who participate in acts of arbitrary or illegal detention or who
violate procedures relating to detention.
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
Estimates vary concerning the number of persons who were seized by the security forces and who
remain unaccounted for. The Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (Federation
internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme, FIDH), after interviewing lawyers in Algeria during an
April 1997 mission, stated that it "believes that the number of at least 2,000 'disappearances' attributable
to the security forces would be well below the actual figure."
13
Mohamed Tahri, one of several Algerian lawyers who follows "disappearance" cases, estimated that
some 500 persons were unaccounted for after being arrested during 1997, most of them taken from urban
areas by security forces in police or military vehicles. He reached this figure by informally polling other
lawyers who represent relatives of the "disappeared. Tahri himself said that as of November he himself had
come to represent the families of twenty-nine persons who "disappeared" during the year and remained, to
his knowledge, unaccounted for. Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Mahmoud Khelili, told Human
Rights Watch that he had a comparable number of clients whose relatives had gone missing in 1997.
Together Tahri and Khelili reported representing a total of over 500 families of persons who had gone
missing since 1993 and remained unaccounted for.
The National Human Rights Monitoring Body (ONDH) stated that during 1996 it registered a total
of 988 cases of presumed "disappearances," a figure that represents a large increase over the 373 and 567
recorded in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The data collected by the ONDH represents only a fraction of
persons reported missing in Algeria and cannot be considered a representative sample, since it is based on
information brought to its attention—mostly by relatives—rather than on proactive fieldwork. Despite its
limitations, the data suggest that many "disappearances" are long-term, and that in the majority of cases
families identify state forces as responsible for the arrest.
14
Of the cases of "disappearances" recorded by the ONDH during 1996, the dates that the persons went
missing were distributed as follows:
12
"S'il existe contre une personne des indices graves et concordants de nature a motiver son inculpation,
I'officier de police judiciaire doit la conduire devant le procureur de la Republique, sans pouvoir la garder & sa
disposition plus de quarante-huit heures."
13
Federation internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme (FIDH), La levee du voile: I'Algerie de
I'extrajudiciaire et de la manipulation (Paris: FIDH, June 1997), p. 16. See response to that report by the ONDH, De
la manipulation des fails au detournement des concepts, October 1997.
14
Observatoire National des droits de I'Homme, Rapport annuel 1996, Algiers, 1997.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1
21
329
390
247
According to the information received by the ONDH, 337 of the "arrests" in 1996 were carried out
in the person's home, 108 in their workplace, 192 in the street and twenty-four after the persons presented
themselves to the security services. The persons carrying out the "arrests" were unidentified in 134 cases;
in 754 cases, however, one of the security services was identified by the complainants as responsible, broken
down as follows: police: 338, gendarmerie: 168, and armed forces: 248."
The ONDH report acknowledged that some of the "disappearance" cases reported to it involved
persons being held without charge by authorities, beyond the legally permissible period of time and
sometimes outside the established places of detention. However, the ONDH cautioned, not all of the 754
cases attributed by complainants to the security forces were necessarily government-sanctioned
"disappearances." It said that the picture could be distorted by several factors, including:
16
• when a "disappeared" person resurfaces, that information does not always reach the ONDH;
• abductions by armed groups are sometimes mistakenly attributed to security forces;
• the person being sought by his/her family may have voluntarily joined the ranks of "terrorist
groups" (and sometimes the family files a complaint about a "disappearance" to cover for the relative who
has done so);
• the person being sought emigrated abroad illegally and has not informed his family of his
whereabouts.
During his meeting with Human Rights Watch on October 14, Mr. Rezag Bara stated that he could
not estimate the distribution of cases within these categories. However, in an interview he gave earlier to Le
Monde, Mr. Rezag Bara asserted that authorities bore responsibility for only a small fraction of these alleged
"disappearances":
Some of the disappeared are really terrorists who secretly went underground. Many disappeared
persons were, by contrast, abducted by terrorist groups disguised as security force members. The
abductions attributable to the security forces are exceptional.
17
Mr. Rezag Bara has noted additional circumstances that he said could misleadingly inflate the tally
of "disappearances." Persons who had been previously arrested and released, he told Human Rights Watch
on October 14, may have fled into the ranks of armed groups out of fear of being re-arrested. He
acknowledged that police sometimes re-arrested persons who had been acquitted by the courts when the
police disagreed with their acquittal. He also noted that families sometimes remained uninformed about a
relative's detention because prison officials failed to allow detainees to exercise their right to notify their
families. He said this abuse was more common with persons held for alleged security offenses. In a meeting
15
These figures, which are reproducedfromthe ONDH report, add up to 888, not the 988 that the ONDH gives
as the total number of complaints during the year.
16
The ONDH reported in its 1994-1995 report the existence of secret detention centers in "places that the law
has not designated for that function. They are mainly...certain police stations or army barracks serving as detention
centers. Persons arrested were freed after more than three months of secret detention in these places."
17
Hacene Terro, "On emm6ne ton fils pour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�with the FIDH, Mr. Rezag Bara added that some of the persons reported as missing were men who had fled
to avoid their military service.
18
While these alternative explanations may be true in some instances, Human Rights Watch believes
that there is strong evidence of security force involvement in the cases brought to our attention and that this
reflects a policy of state sponsored "disappearances" in Algeria.
Mr. Rezag Bara also provided some general statistics about incarceration in Algeria, a country of
28 million inhabitants. In 1997, the number of persons in some form of detention was 38,000, of which
10,000-12,000 were being held in connection with the activities of armed groups and subversion cases, most
of whom had yet to be tried. Fifteen to 20 percent of these 10,000-12,000 were directly linked to acts of
"terrorism" while the rest were being held for providing services to armed groups or failure to report offenses
by them.
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
A peaceful demonstration on October 20 in Algiers by lawyers and families of the "disappeared"
was blocked by police. At a time when the international press corps was present to cover the local elections
taking place on October 23, dozens of women and their supporters, carrying photos of relatives who had been
arrested or "disappeared," gathered in front of the central post office in Algiers. Security forces dispersed
the demonstrators and arrested about fifteen women and lawyer Mohamed Tahri, who represents the families
of many "disappeared" persons. Participants told Human Rights Watch by phone that some members of the
police had warned the women that they would meet the same fate as their missing relatives if they did not
disperse. All of those arrested were released the same day. Mr. Tahri, who was released without charge after
six hours, told Human Rights Watch that a police officer accused him of being a "traitor" because he had
"links with foreign organizations." Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Rachid Mesli, had been sentenced
to three years in prison in July 1997 after an unfair trial in which he was questioned about his contacts with
Amnesty International (see below).
On September 22, a group of relatives of "disappeared" persons attempted to present a petition to
officials of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World
Health Organization, who were attending a conference on political violence organized by the ONDH at the
Aurassi Hotel in Algiers. Signed by "the families of the disappeared," the petition called on the international
community to "denounce vigorously the silence of the authorities before the repeated complaints and efforts
to win the release of the 'disappeared,' and to obtain information on the fate that awaits them." Security
forces barred the petitioners from presenting their petition. Human Rights Watch subsequently learned that
two of the participants, Mebarka SaT, age sixty-one, and Masouda Boukhari, were arrested in early October
and held for several days before being released.
Mr Tahri's arrest at the October 20 demonstration was not his first brush with trouble apparently
linked to his human rights work. During the weekend of June 12-13, his office in the Kouba neighborhood
was burglarized. Tahri reported afterward that some of his casefilesand correspondence with clients whose
relatives had "disappeared" were missing but that no objects offinancialvalue had been taken. The break-in
occurred after a week in which Mr. Tahri had been featured in major media in France denouncing
19
18
La levee du voile, p. 15.
^ Algeria's weekend is Thursday and Friday.
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February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1 (E)
�"disappearances" and other human rights abuses in Algeria. He was interviewed on a program about Algeria
that aired on the French television station "Arte" on June 5. Also, the issue of Le Monde that appeared on
the afternoon of June 12 (dated June 13) contained a full-page article devoted to the narratives of Tahri's
clients about their relatives who had "disappeared."
Mr. Tahri said that the police conducted an
investigation but he has learned of no arrests made in connection with the break-in.
20
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
The cases presented below are but a few among hundreds that have been brought to the attention of
human rights lawyers in Algeria and international human rights organizations. The information we present
includes: first, the information collected by Human Rights Watch during and after a mission to Algeria,
which we submitted to the authorities for their comments (see Appendix A); second, the response provided
by ONDH President Rezag Bara in an October 14 meeting in Washington—the only response on cases that
Human Rights Watch received from any official body; and third, any additional information about the case
that Human Rights Watch collected after submitting its inquiry to the authorities. In none of the cases has
the person reappeared, to the best of Human Rights Watch's knowledge.
In his meeting with Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara noted that the ONDH, a five-year-old
body that was created by and reports to the office of the president of the republic, serves as a conduit
between complainants who approach the ONDH and the appropriate authorities. It conducts no investigations
on its own into cases. The ONDH's responses to Human Rights Watch concerning specific individuals who
had "disappeared" fell into three basic categories:
•
•
•
the ONDH was unfamiliar with a case, presumably because the family had not approached it;
it had submitted a written inquiry with authorities about the case but had received no reply;
it had received a reply, most commonly a denial that the person in question was in official custody.
When acting in response to a complaint about a missing person, the ONDH submits letters to two
security force offices that together are presumed to answer for all agencies legally authorized to detain
persons: the Direction Generale de Surete Nationale (DGSN) and the Gendarmerie Nationale. The former
is an agency within the Ministry of Interior that oversees Algeria's police forces. The gendarmerie is a
branch of the military; Mr. Rezag Bara said that he assumes that when the gendarmerie responds to the
ONDH it is speaking on behalf of all branches of the military.
According to this ONDH methodology, only a denial from both agencies could be construed as an
official denial that an individual was in state custody. This was rarely forthcoming. In many cases, the
ONDH received a reply from one agency but not the other. Sometimes, Mr. Rezag Bara noted, the replies
took weeks or months. He did not provide Human Rights Watch with copies or dates of the correspondence
between the security agencies and the ONDH.
***
Amine Amrouche, age twenty-one, was arrested on January 30, 1997 from outside his house in
Baraki by men in plainclothes who took him away in an unmarked car, according to neighbors who described
the incident to his mother, Nacera Dutour, who lives in France. One of the witnesses said he believed the
men to be members of the security forces. Ms. Dutour tried to track down rumors of her son's detention in
20
Hacene Terro, "On emmene ton fils pour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
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�various police stations, prisons and at a military camp in Oran. She also sought assistance from the ONDH
and the office of the state prosecutor, who informed her that they had made inquiries but could find no trace
of him. She told Human Rights Watch that a gendarmerie official said to her in May that her son's name
"was neither among [the gendarmerie's records of] the living nor the dead."
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mr. Amrouche was "officially not in custody" since
the ONDH had received replies from both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale that neither had any
record of arresting Amrouche. Amnesty International reported on October 17 that it had received information
indicating that he was alive and being held in a military security center in Algiers. In early November, Mr.
Amrouche's mother said she had no new information, although she continued to hear rumors that he was in
detention.
21
Aziz Bouabdallah is a journalist with the independent Al- 'Alam al-Siyassi daily. His family said
he was arrested on April 12, 1997 from his home in Algiers by men dressed in police uniforms who
introduced themselves as members of the security forces, according to statements released by the New Yorkbased Committee To Protect Journalists and Amnesty International. Mr. Bouabdallah was reportedly being
held in an Algiers detention center. His family has received no official confirmation of his whereabouts.
Both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale informed the ONDH that they are not holding Mr.
Bouabdallah.
Ali Lakhdar Chaouche, age twenty-seven, was arrested at Kouba Hospital near Algiers, where he
works as an orthopedic surgeon. He was arrested by men who reportedly identified themselves as military
personnel to the hospital administration at 2:00 a.m. on April 1, 1997, during Mr. Chaouche's night shift.
They presented an order of arrest issued by the military authorities. Trying to locate Ali, his family wrote
to the ministries of justice and defense, the ONDH and to the police stations of Kouba and Baraki, where he
lives. They have received no answer so far.
Due apparently to a confusion of similar names, Mr. Rezag Bara came prepared to discuss a different
case but said he had no information on Ali Lakhdar Chaouche.
Djamil and Mourad Chihoub "disappeared" after their brother Said joined an armed Islamist
group. On May 16, 1996 police and military forces came looking for Said at the family home.in the Algiers
suburb of Baraki. Not finding him, the security forces arrested Djamil and told his father they would release
him when Said turned himself in. The next month, the authorities told the family that Said had been killed
in a clash with military forces. They allowed the family to identify his body and gave them a death
certificate. However, Djamil has not been released, and his family has not been informed of his whereabouts.
On November 14, 1996, the military forces of the Baraki barracks, together with a "self-defense"
group from the area, went to the Chihoub home and arrested Mourad, who was less than seventeen years old
at the time. When his father attempted to intervene, they threatened to shoot him. He inquired at the military
barracks but was told to inquire with Military Security (Securite Militaire, an agency within the Armed
Forces). He wrote several letters to the authorities, and was summoned last February to the military's
department of social services in Beni Messous to provide details about Mourad and Djamil and was told to
wait for news. He then received a letter dated May 11, 1997 from the state prosecutor's office saying there
was no information on his sons.
21
Amnesty International Urgent Action, MDE28/28/97, October 17, 1997.
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�The ONDH, which had submitted a request for information about Djamil in August 1996, received
a reply from one of the responding agencies several months later saying that its forces had not arrested
Djamil. The ONDH received a similar reply from that agency on August 24, 1997, concerning Mourad.
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. His wife, Safia, stated
that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from near his home in el-Harrache by about four men
carrying walkie-talkies whom they believed to belong to the security forces. They drove him away in a
convoy of two vehicles.
Safia received in response to her inquiries a statement from the Ministry of Justice on March 16,
1997 stating that el-Harrache police station had no record of Djamel's arrest. She has received no official
information about his whereabouts, but about two months after his arrest, a released detainee wrote a letter
to a private newspaper saying that he had seen Mr. Fahassi at Chateauneuf, a Military Security center in
Algiers. His wife was unable to confirm this. In October 1995, the public-sector newspaper I'Horizon
printed an article claiming that Fahassi was alive and well outside the country. However, others at that
journal later dissociated themselves from the report. No evidence was provided and the family discounted
the report.
Mr. Fahassi had served a six-month sentence in 1991 for an article about the violent conduct of the
security forces toward civilians that he wrote for a newspaper run by the then-legal Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). He was also detained without charge in a detention camp after the
cancellation of general elections in January 1992, and published an account of that detention in the Algiers
daily press.
Both police and military forces told the ONDH they had no information on Mr. Fahassi, Mr. Rezag
Bara said. As of November 1997, Fahassi's wife Safia said the family remained without news.
Mohammed al-Hedi Hamidi, a twenty-four year-old civil servant at the Dely Ibrahim municipality,
was taken from his home in Cite Chevalley by police and military forces in uniform shortly after midnight
on March 19, 1996, according to his family, which has so far been unable to establish his whereabouts. They
have inquired at local police stations and the office of the state prosecutor, and have sent letters of inquiry
to the ONDH and the president's office. On July 13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, a group of security
forces, including some of those who had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, went to the same home and arrested
his brother, whose name is Mohammed (see below). One of them reportedly admitted to his mother that they
had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, and Mohammed was located more than one month later.
Mr. Rezag Bara said the ONDH had received no reply to its requests Tor information about
Mohammed al-Hedi, which it had submitted to authorities in July 1996.
Mostafa Houari, age thirty-six, an employee of the Algerian state oil and gas company Sonatrach,
was arrested at his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers, on the night of April 6, 1996, by about twenty military
and police security forces who questioned his wife about his acquaintances and friends. Mr. Houari had been
detained for five days in October 1995 and held at Dely Ibrahim police station in Algiers. He was tried and
acquitted of the charge of assisting members of armed groups by the Bir Mourad criminal court in Algiers
in January 1996. Since his arrest in April 1996, his wife has been unable to locate him despite several letters
of inquiry, including one to the office of the president.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch the ONDH received no response from either agency about
Mr. Houari. His family, reached by phone in November, said they had no further news about him.
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�Mourad Ouchefoune, age twenty-five and an economics student from Dar el-Baida in Algiers, was
arrested from his home by police and military forces after midnight on March 17, 1997. According to
testimony the family gave to lawyers, the security forces broke into the house, forced everyone out and
checked their identities. They then picked out Mourad, handcuffed him and led him away, saying he was
only required for an investigation. The family has received no reply to their official inquiries as to his
whereabouts.
Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no record of a missing person by this name. The family said by phone
in December that they had no further news of Mr. Ouchefoune.
Hedi Saibi, age thirty, was arrested on November 15, 1994. About four Military Security personnel
in cars with private license plates took him away from outside al-Rahma mosque in Meissonier, Algiers,
according to his father and other worshipers leaving the mosque at the same time. His brother Yahia, who
was in detention at the time, was sentenced in January 1996 to a three-year prison term for having provided
services to "terrorists." He was released last June. Hedi's father has written to a number of senior officials,
including the president and the interior, defense and justice ministers, as well as to the ONDH. In response
to his letter to the president, he was summoned by the police who asked questions about his missing son but
was given no information about him.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale
informed the ONDH that they had not arrested Mr. Saibi. On September 22, Mr. Saibi's father joined a group
of relatives who attempted to present a petition on the "disappeared" at the Aurassi Hotel during an ONDHorganized international conference entitled "Contemporary Forms of Violence and the Culture of Peace."
They were barred from entry. Mr. Saibi's father inquired at the ONDH again a few days later, but received
no new information about his son. Contacted by phone on November 17, he told Human Rights Watch he
had obtained no further information.
Abderrahmane Yemeni, age forty-four, was arrested from his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers,
on June 6, 1996. His wife said in letters of inquiry that five military security forces broke into the house in
the early afternoon, searched the premises, and arrested Mr. Yemeni. She wrote complaining about the arrest
and received a polite letter from the state prosecutor's office that did not acknowledge his arrest and said
authorities were unable to locate him.
The ONDH received a response from only one of the two responsible agencies concerning Yemeni.
That agency said he had not been arrested by its forces. The family's lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said by
telephone on November 16 that he had received no further information about Mr. Yemeni.
Allaoua Ziou, age thirty, a farmer in Heliopolis, Guelma, was arrested in the nearby area of Jebenat
Chouhada on the evening of January 1, 1995 by about four men in civilian clothes who took him away in
a car. According to a brother, Djamel, who lives in Canada, eyewitnesses said they followed the car up to
the gates of the Heliopolis gendarmerie barracks. Djamel Ziou told Human Rights Watch that he telephoned
the Heliopolis gendarmerie at the time and was informed that Allaoua was being held there. The family was
told unofficially that about one month after his arrest Allaoua had been transferred to another region. Since
then, the family has received no further information about him. Between March and September 1995 Djamel
Ziou wrote to the ministries of interior, justice, the ONDH and the office of the president, but received no
reply. The ONDH replied to a letter on the case sent by Human Rights Watch saying that "according to
recent information...Mr. Ziou is a militant of the ex-FIS and is implicated in a case of supplying help to
terrorist groups." The ONDH said an arrest warrant, dated January 23, 1995, had been issued against him
but did not state that he had been taken into custody. When shown this letter from the ONDH to Human
Rights Watch, Djamel Ziou responded that in the nearly three years since the arrest warrant was supposedly
Human Rights Watch
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/
�issued, the family had never been informed by authorities that Allaoua was wanted. In his meeting with
Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no further information on Mr. Ziou beyond what he had
provided in his letter.
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
Messaoud Ouziala, a kidney transplant physician was held by security forces who disregarded laws
governing arrest and detention. Dr. Ouziala "disappeared" on July 8, 1997 at around 5:30 pm, after he left
his workplace at Moustapha Hospital in Algiers, according to a statement issued by Amnesty International
and public appeals to the authorities for information about him. These appeals were made by the Association
of Algerian Nephrologists and Association Espoir, a group of Algerian dialysis and transplant patients. His
family was unable to obtain any information about him or confirm who had abducted him. The only official
evidence of his arrest and detention came after his release when the ONDH wrote to Amnesty International
stating that Dr. Ouziala had been arrested on July 8 and released July 22. The letter gave no further details
and did not address assertions by Amnesty International that Dr. Ouziala's family had been unable to obtain
any information on his whereabouts despite repeated inquiries with officials.
In an abduction-like arrest on July 31, 1996, lawyer and human rights activist Rachid Mesli was
stopped in the Rouiba area outside Algiers by four armed men in civilian clothes who took him away in a
car. All questions to the authorities by his family, lawyers, and international human rights organizations as
to his whereabouts went unanswered. On August 7, about twenty police in uniform searched his home and
office and informed his family that he was in police detention. He was finally brought before an investigating
judge on August 10, charged with complicity with an armed group and transferred to el-Harrache prison in
Algiers. A day later, the ONDH confirmed to Amnesty International that Mesli had been held with judicial
authorization prior to his appearance, but did not explain why the security forces had refused to acknowledge
his detention. Lawyers who saw Mesli in his first court appearances noted that he had bruises on his right
eye and his hand, and seemed to be in poor health. After he was convicted and sentenced to three years in
prison, Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to Justice Minister Adami on July 17, 1997, protesting Mr.
Mesli's unfair trial, but has received no response. Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that a forensic
expert who examined Mr. Mesli concluded in August 1996 that he had suffered a light wound to his right
eyebrow, but had not been tortured.
Ammar Ghazoul, age thirty-one, an unemployed agricultural engineer, was apparently arrested in
May 1997 by police forces. Family members said police broke into their house in the early hours of May 4,
and when they did not find Ghazoul, took away his mother instead, saying she was needed for an
interrogation. She was released the next day. On May 6, Ammar's brother and neighbors caught sight of him
in a police car. He was later listed as a fugitive being sought in connection with a criminal case involving
an attack on government property. After the family's lawyer brought to the attention of the Algiers criminal
court judge and the state prosecutor that Ammar had apparently been detained, he was presented in early
August in court, where an investigating judge ordered him held in Serkadji prison in Algiers. Mr. Ghazoul
was still unable to contact his family, which learned of his whereabouts only through friends who visited
other inmates at Serkadji.
As of November, his family had confirmed his presence in Serkadji prison and had been able to visit
him a few times.
Mohammed Hamidi is a thirty-three year-old tax inspector in Ben Aknoun. He was arrested on July
13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, by a group of security forces, including some of those who had
arrested his brother, Mohammed al-Hedi (see above). His family wrote letters of inquiry to the state
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�prosecutor's office, the ONDH and other officials but received no reply. More than a month later he was
found to be held in Serkadji Prison, according to other detainees who asked their visitors to inform his
family. His family subsequently obtained permission to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that he was unaware that Mr. Hamidi had been located in Serkadji prison. He
told Human Rights Watch he would inquire with the Ministry of Justice about Mr. Hamidi's detention, and
said that if the reports about his unacknowledged detention were accurate, his lawyer should file a formal
complaint about illegal detention. Reached by telephone in November, Mohammed's family said they had
obtained legal counsel for him and had seen him three times.
Noureddine Mihoubi, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested in February 1992 as he was
visiting a brother in the southern town of Bousaada. He was held at a police station there for fifteen days,
during which time his family was able to visit and bring him food and medicine. Then they were told that
he had been transferred to Algiers but were given no further information. A month later, a newly released
detainee told them he had seen Mihoubi at the Military Security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in
poor health. On May 12, 1996, the ONDH told his family an arrest warrant had been issued for him on March
31, 1993. In July of 1996 the family obtained a police report issued the same month saying Mihoubi had been
arrested by security forces and transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. It contained no more details. In
early August 1997, a prisoner who had just been released after serving a three-year jail sentence told
Mihoubi's family that he was being held in Blida military jail and was to be tried by a military court in
September. He said Mihoubi had requested a lawyer to defend him in his upcoming trial. His family was
preparing to obtain official permission to visit him and to provide him with a lawyer.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mihoubi was still officially wanted, following the
1993 arrest warrant. He said he was aware of the developments concerning his arrest that were reported by
the family, but had no official confirmation of them. Contacted by telephone on November 17, the family's
lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said the released prisoner gave details about Mihoubi to his family which confirmed
he had seen him, but as of November his family was unable to locate him after inquiring at the Blida jail and
at the region's civil and military courts.
Ali Belhadj, one of the two chiefs of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front, has been held in secret
and incommunicado detention since he was transferred from his former place of imprisonment, apparently
at the end of 1994. He has been serving a prison term after being tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve
years in jail for conspiring against state authority, harming the economy, and distributing seditious tracts.
Since his transfer to secret detention at the end of 1994, he has faced new charges following the alleged
discovery of a letter on the body of an armed Islamist implicating Belhadj in incitement to violence.
Belhadj's lawyers have written to the authorities requesting their right under Algerian law to have
access to their client and charging that his whereabouts were unknown. His family has also written to the
ONDH and other official quarters requesting the right to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that the ONDH considered Belhadj's case as an issue of visitation rights, and
said the ONDH had asked the authorities to permit Mr. Belhadj to exercise his right to receive his family.
He said he had not received a reply.
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�HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH/MIDDLE EAST OVERVIEW/ALGERIA
feuds between armed groups; vendettas between competing armed Islamist groups and
government-backed "self-defense" militias;
and disputes over land ownership.
The shadowy Armed Islamic Group
(known by the acronymGI A) was blamed for
much of the carnage and claimed responsibility for some of the killings. For example, on
September 26, after attacks on the Algiers
suburbs of Rais and Bentalha on August 29
and September 22 respectively that, according to press reports, left more than 500 dead,
For a listingofrelevant reports and missions, the GIA issued a statement in London saying
it was behind the recent massacres, according
see page 459 at the end of this report. Partial
to the Agence France-Presse.
listings also follow each country chapter.
Many of the massacres occurred in districts that had voted overwhelmingly for the
FIS in the 1990 and 1992elections. According
to press reports, several of the massacres
targeted villages whose inhabitants had, since
1993, reportedly given provisions and money
Human Rights Developments
The year was marked by the first legislative to the armed groups, but had since withdrawn
and local elections since the last round of their support and in some cases had sought
voting was cancelled in 1992. Algeriahad been weaponsfromthe authorities to defend themgoverned without an elected parliament since selves.
elections were halted in January that year to
The security forces often reportedly did
prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation not try to halt the massacres or apprehend the
Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). Since killers, even when the slaughter took hours to
then, political strife has become endemic. complete and occurred less than a mile from
1997 appeared to be the bloodiest year yet their barracks and installations. According to
and, more than ever, civilians bore the brunt survivors interviewed by Amnesty Internaofthe violence.
tional, armed forces units with armored veThe main adversaries were armed Islam- hicles stationed just outside Bentalha did not
ist groups on the one hand and, on the other, intervene even though it was clear they were
the security forces and armed civilian groups aware of the situation, and even stopped
allied with them. Assaults on civilians in- some villagers trying to flee from doing so.
cluded an unprecedented wave of massacres The army also didnot allow neighboring local
in farming and semi-rural communities, mostly militia to enter Bentalha in response to the
in the Mitidja region southwest ofthe capital. attack. After massacring over two hundred
The assailants indiscriminately killed and persons over the course of several hours, the
maimed men, women, children and infants in attackers fled without being stopped..
the communities they attacked by beheading
Algerian newspapers and others exthem, hacking them to death or mutilating pressed skepticism toward the semi-official
them and leaving them to die. Some women explanations of security force inaction, which
were abducted and reportedly raped and then focused on the dangers to soldiers posed by
killed
land mines and ambushes.
Various factors impeded identification
Observers attributed the attacks to
motives that included reprisals by armed of the perpetrators of specific atrocities.
groups against villagers who had retreated These included both government censorship
from their one-time support of the rebels;
of an Egyptian court decision rejecting a
government ban on female genital mutilation.
As always, we responded on many
occasions where local lawyers, activists, journalists and others were being pressured or
persecuted because of their efforts to expose
human rights abuses. Letters were sent to
governments in support of lawyers in Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia, activists and journalists in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and the
West Bank, to name but a few.
ALGERIA
ALGERIA
of security-related information (see below)
and the physical risks of conducting on-site
investigations in conflict zones. In addition,
criminal trials shed little light on specific
incidents since they tended to focus only on
such general charges as membership in "an
armed group."
The government largely denied the existence of a humanrightsproblem other than the
"terrorism" it attributed to armed Islamist
groups. However, security forces were responsible during 1997Tor summary executions and "disappearances," most of them
carried out against suspected Islamists and
their sympathizers. Human Rights Watch is
unaware ofa single instance in which security
force members were punished for their role in
these grave abuses.
Police commonly detained suspects
without identifying themselves and without
warrants. Persons detained on suspicion of
links to "terrorism" and "subversion" often
remained in incommunicado custody beyond
the twelve-day limit stipulated by the penal
code, and without their families being informed of their whereabouts, as required by
law. Dozens of persons arrested in 1997
remained unaccounted for as this report went
to press, adding to the hundreds of cases of
"disappearances" reported by human rights
lawyers since 1993. When confronted with
inquiries on cases of "disappearances," authorities have either not responded or stated
that the missing person is not in their custody,
even when eyewitnesses testified to having
seen the person being taken away by security
force members.
Government-backed militia were also
reportedly responsible for "anti-terrorist"
operations that went beyond self-defense
and the limits ofthe law, including killings of
suspected Islamists or their families in reprisal for acts attributed to armed groups,
according to Amnesty International. The
government issued a decree in March intended to bring the militia under closer supervision by the defense and interior ministries
but did not refer to basic human rights standards.
On June 5, parliamentary elections took
place under the eyes of national and international observers. The elections produced the
country's first-ever multiparty National
Assembly. Pro-govemment parties won a
solid majority. While the outlawed FIS was
barred from participating, two other Islamist
parties won 27 percent of the seats.
The election stakes were determined in
part by a referendum in November 1996
under unfair conditions in which the government secured voter approval for amendments
to the constitution that enhanced the powers
of the executive branch at the expense of the
National Assembly. The constitutional
amendments, along with new election and
party laws passed in March 1997, restricted
Algerians' right to freedom of association by
banningparties based on religion and ethnicity.
In local elections on October 23, a progovemment party won more than half the
seats, triggering street marches in Algiers in
which more than 15,000 supporters of the
other major parties protested alleged fraud.
The interior ministry banned further "unauthorized public demonstrations" and police
in some instances prevented protestors from
gathering.
Following the June elections, authorities released from prison FIS chief Abbasi
Madani, who was in the middle of a twelveyear sentence for subversion, and another
senior FIS figure, Abdelqader Hachani, who
had been held for over five years without trial.
In July he was tried and sentenced to five
years in prison—time already served—for
incitement against state security. Mean whi Ie,
the whereabouts of deputy FIS chief Ali
Belhadj, who also had been imprisoned for
subversion, remained unknown since his transfer in 1995 to secret detention.
FIS representatives in exile repeatedly
disassociated their party from the massacres
and otherdeliberate killing of civilians. "The
FIS condemns all of these terrible killings,"
said Abdelkrim Ould Adda, FIS executive
committee inexile spokesman in April. "Let
me say it very clearly: The FIS has no links
with the GIA. We firmly condemn these
barbarous acts committed by these terrorist
�ALGERIA
ALGERIA
groups against the civilian population." A
unilateral cease-fire declared for October I by
ihe FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation
A rmy (AIS), was denounced by the GIA and
did not stem the massacres taking place.
Algeria's private press enjoyed some
freedom tocriticize govemmentpolicies. Statecontrolled television opened up a bit during
(he election campaigns, providingairtime for
all parlies running parliamentary candidates,
and later aired debates in the National Assembly. However, authorities censored the
speeches of opposition candidates that referred to the military-backed cancellation of
ihe January 1992 elections as a "coup."
Although private newspapers reported
on the massacres in the second half of 1997,
what they could say about them was limited
; by censorship, restriction on access to masi sacre sites and witnesses, and the armed
security forces who accompanied most Algerian and foreign journalists, whether they
wanted them or not. Any reporting on governmental abuses carried out in connection
with the internal strife was liable to be deleted.
Algerian television offered only the official
line on the conflict, generally playing down
the scope of violence, in an apparent effort to
buttress the government's case that "terrorism" was only residual.
The government allowed many foreign
journalists in at the time of the two election
campaigns, but throughout the year denied
visas to certain reporters without explanation, including those of the French daily
Liberation. On September 29, the authorities
withdrew the accreditation of an Agence
France Presse (AFP) correspondent, one of
the few foreign news bureausremaining in the
country. A Foreign Ministry official did not
provide a reason except to say that AFP had
been "warned" about its coverage of the
unrest, the agency reported.
Journalists, intellectuals, artists and
political figures continued to be assassinated
in 1997. in anacks attributed by the authorities to armed groups. The best-known figure
to be slain was Abdelhaq Benhamouda, leader
of the country's main labor syndicate, the
(General I Jninn of Algerian Workers. A group
calling itself the Islamic Front for the Anned
Jihadclaimed responsibility forhiskilling in
January. At least three political party activists were killed in the days leading up to the
June 5,1997 elections, and ten party officials
were killed ahead of the municipal elections.
Human Rights Watch investigated, while
in Algiers in April, the apparent execution in
custody of Rached Medjahed, the alleged
mastermind of the assassination of
Benhamouda. Medjahed was arrested a few
days after the killing and was shown "confessing" on Algerian national television. But
when his family requested permission from
an investigating judge to visit him, they were
told he had died. Authorities claimed that he
had died from wounds incurred during his
arrest, but the information collected by Human Rights Watch cast doubt on this claim.
Medjahed's death in custody fueled suspicion about who was behind the killing of
Benhamouda.
The Right to Monitor
Two independent human rights organizations functioned openly in Algeria, although
neither the Algerian Human Rights League
nor the Algerian League for the Defense of
Human Rights produced much documentation of abuses. Defense lawyers played a key
role in aiding victims and disseminating information about their plight. They sometimes
paid a price for their activism. The office of
lawyer Mohamed Tahri, whose clients include relatives of "disappeared" persons,
suffered a suspicious burglary during the
weekend of June 12-13, in which the only
items missing were personal documents and
correspondence^ with clients.The break-in
occurred only days after Tahri was featured
speaking about humanrightsin Le Monde
(Paris) and on French television. On October
20, Tahri was arrested and held for seven
hours after demonstrating in Algiers with
aboutfiftywomen seeking information about
missing relatives.
Rachid Mesli, an Algiers lawyer who
had been openly helpful to Amnesty International during and since its 1996 mission to
Algeria, was sentenced after an unfair trial to
said, "it is extremely difficult for all of us to
pretend that it is not happening, that we do
not know about it and that we should leave the
Algerian population to their lot."
Annan's comments were echoed on September 30 by the new U.N. Human Rights
Commissioner,iMary Robinson. After meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed
Attaf that day, she commented, "When there
are serious violationsof civilians'rights,and
when a situation is as bad as in Algeria, I do
not consider that—and I cannot consider
that—to be internal." Following a meeting
late October with Mohamed-Salah Dembri,
Algeria's representati ve to the U N. in Geneva,
Robinson said they had "discussed Algeria's
cooperation" with U.N. humanrightsmechanisms, which include the Working Group on
Enforced or In voluntary Disappearances and
various rapporteurs. Algerian authorities
publicly rejected any outside intervention in
the crisis, however.
Earlier in the year, the U.N. secretarygeneral had played a more considered role
than his predecessor when asked by President Zeroual to send U.N. election observers.
For the presidential elections of 1995, thenSecretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali had
sent a team of observers who had then made
no public statements on voting conditions,
thereby giving the government the right to
boast of the international presence without
having to face public reporting. In 1997,
Annan did not send observers but deployed
a team of fourofficials who only coordinated
the efforts of observers from some twenty
countries who could speak freely of their
findings. Thus the secretary-general provided
a gesture of support for the holding of elections while making it difficult forthat gesture
to be exploited.
OnAugust 13,theU.N.Commission on
The Role of the
Human Rights' Subcommission on PrevenInternational Community
tion of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities defeated by secret ballot a draft
United Nations
resolution that Algerian authorities had lobFollowing a series of massacres U.N. Secre- bied against. While critical of "armed groups
lary-General Kofi Annan issued a public of religious extremists, who...are terrorizing
appeal on August 30 for an "urgent solution" civilian population," the draft had also ex'° the bloodshed. "As the killing goes on," he pressed concern at reports "indicating that,
three years in prison, on charges of "encouraging" and "providing apologetics" for "terrorism." During his initial interrogation and
trial, the judge questioned Mesli about his
contacts with Amnesty International.
The Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire National des Droits de
l-Homme, ONDH), which reports to the
president's office, continued to serve as a
conduit between the government and persons
lodging complaints of humanrightsabuses.
While it made some general criticism of government abuses, in its annual report for 1996
and elsewhere, the ONDH publicly defended
the government's record against criticism
from international humanrightsorganizations. The ONDH's president immediately
rejected a joint call by international human
rights organizations on October 15 for an
international inquiry into the human rights
situation in Algeria, saying it showed "a
deliberate willingness to spread misunderstanding about those responsible for the latest massacres ofcivilians in Algeria," according to Algerian radio.
Several international organizations were
granted permission during 1997 to investigate
abuses in Algeria. However, applications to
visit from Amnesty International, an organization that has persistently documented
abuses in Algeria, were refused. The Human
Rights Watch delegation was assisted by the
ONDH and received by the ministers of
interior and justice. However, thedelegation
was accompanied by government security
personnel during half the visit, despite the
organization's strong protests. Although
imposed ostensibly for the delegation's protection, this unwanted escort severely hampered the delegation's ability to meet freely
with Algerians.
:
315
�ALGERIA
ALGERIA
going beyond the requirements of the fight
against terrorism, violations of human rights
arc being committed more and more frequently by certain sectors of the security
forces."
In a statement issued on September 18,
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) urged governments to
refrain from the "hasty deportation of rejected Algerian asylum seekers in the midst of
an upsurge of violence in Algeria." UNHCR
defined those at risk as coming from both
sides of the conflict: "Algerians who have
close links with the government" as well as
"members or perceived members of Islamic
groups."
allow the rule of law and respect for human
rights, includingthefreedomofthepress and
therightto demonstrate, to be reestablished."
The resolution also called on European Union
member states "not to repatriate Algerian
nationals residing in their territory whose
safety would be endangered if they are forced
to return to Algeria."
European Union
The European Parliamentpassed aresolution
on December 12,1996, criticizing the constitutional referendum held in November for
"concentrat[ing] power in the hands of the
president" and thus being "likely to make it
more difficult to establish democratic and
cultural pluralism."The resolution urged the
European Commission "to take into account
developments with regard to democratization and respect for human rights" in upcomini; talks regarding a Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement. Article 2 ofthe trade
agreement stresses "respect for human rights
and democratic principles... constitute an
essential clement." Negotiations commenced
in March, and at the time of writing had not
concluded.
Manuel Marin, vice president of the
European Commission, urged adoption of
the Association Agreement as a means to
democratic reform. Following Algeria's parliamentary elections, Marinon June24 urged
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to take a "pragmatic" and
"realistic"attitude regarding Algeria in order
to encourage it to complete its "democratic
transition."
On September 18, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the Algerian
government to "deepen the dialogue with all
the p o l i t i c a l forces and democratic
elements, who reject the use of violence...and
France
France, Algeria's former ruler and largest
trading partner, remained quietly supportive
ofthe government while insisting that Algerians alone could solve the country's problems. It extended annual assistance worth
nearly U.S.S 1.2 billion, mostly in the form of
government-backed credits to purchase French
goods. About a third of the sum was not
renewed in 1997 due to administrative problems. Viewed generally as the Western state
with the greatest interest in developments in
Algeria, France actively lobbied international
financial institutions in 1995 to provide debt
refinancing to Algeria on favorable terms, and
sought to set the course of Western policy
toward Algeria.
E.U. foreign ministers met on October
26, at a time ofmounting calls for intemattonal
involvement in the crisis in Algeria. But the
ministers limited themselves to a general
condemnation of the violence, with some
explaining that without the Algerian authonties' consent they could play no role in ending
the country's crisis.
French authorities tended to condemn
atrocities attributed to armed Islamist groups
while remaining circumspect on government
repression. Indications of a shift in approach
came in the fall, after the election of a Socialistled government and an unchecked streak of
massacres that shocked French opinion. Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin suggested, on September 29, that the violence did not have a
single address: "We can see there is a terrible
reign of terror.. .but it is extremely difficult to
make out what is happening." He referred not
only to "a fanatical and violent opposition"
but also to "a State which is in a way imposing
its will with violence and force."
In high-level consultations in September
and October with the U.S. and European
govemments,Francereportedlyargued against
international initiatives on Algeria as long as
Algiers opposed them. Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine told the Paris weekly
L Express in October that France can show
its wi llingness to "support any form ofaction
undertaken by the international community if
it were accepted or requested by all the
parties, starting with theTuthorities." Premier Jospin indicated that France should
respond at home by opening its doors toward
Algerians seeking safety. "I am in favor of...
relaxing the visa policy for all who fear for
their lives in Algeria," he said on September
29.
The National Consultative Council on
Human Rights, an advisory commission attached to the prime minister' s office, adopted
a resolution in October urging that the question of humanrightsin Algeria be placed on
the agenda of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and that U.N. missions should be
dispatched as soon as possible to investigate
torture, summary executions and arbitrary
detentions.
With the holding of parliamentary elections, the U.S. seemed to regard the govemment-led political process as worthy of encouragement, despite its limitations. The
U.S. stopped calling publicly for a national
political dialogue that included "pragmatic
elements of the FIS," the banned Islamist
party that the government had excluded from
the elections. In gestures of support for the
vote, the U.S. financed thirteen election observers and openly encouraged other countries to send teams. On June 9, four days after
the polling, State Department spokesman
Nicholas Bums described the election as a
"positive" move but acknowledged, "I would
not use the wordsfreeand fair to describe the
Algerian elections, simply because the international monitors ... did not use these
words....We do think it's positive, however,
that people voted in great numbers; and it's
positive that the government was able to open
up television and radio to political debate."
He urged the Algerian government to take into
account the "issues raised by international
observers and political parties" about flaws in
the election process.
On September 10, at a time of almost
daily reports of massacres, outgoing U.S.
United States
Ambassador Ronald Neumann said after a
U.S. government influence on Algeria refarewell audience with President Zeroual that
mained limited. The U.S. provided no direct the U.S. backed "military measures, consiseconomic or military assistance other than an tent with the rule of law, to protect civilians"
annual U.S.$75,0OO military training proand "the policy spelled out by President
gram. Cognizant of human rights concerns,
Zeroual of economic and political reforms,
Washington maintained a policy of rejecting freedom of the press, and development of the
licenses soughtby U.S. companies forthe sale rule of law. We encourage national reconcilito Algeria of equipment that could be used by ation and the inclusion in the political process
the security forces in an offensive capacity. of all who reject violence."
However, U.S. engagement in Algeria apIn light of the U.S. support for the
peared to increase during the year, as U.S. parliamentary elections, the lack of U.S.
private investment in Algeria'senergy sector comment on the government' s shocking failsoared to nearly $2 billion. The U.S. Export- ure to intervene to protect the population
Import Bank (Ex imbank) resumed activity in from a steady succession of massacres, some
Algeria in 1996 after a two-year halt. It set a observers interpreted the ambassador's stateceiling of $ 150 million for new projects and ment as a signal of a new pro-govemment tilt
financially backed U.S. corporations selling in U. S. policy. Denying this, officials told the
to Sonatrach, Algeria's state-run oil and gas press that the ambassador's comments were
company. As of September 30, Eximbank's
merely an attempt "to give a gentle push to the
exposure in Algeria totaled $2.1 billion.
army to do its job."
3
�ALGERIA/BAHRAIN
Neumann told a U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on October 1 that
human rights problems remained an impediment to better relations. In his prepared
remarks, Neumann praised the convening of
a multiparty parliament but cautioned that
the election was "only a modest, first step
towards representative institutions." He added
that while the unity of the military was
important to Algeria's stability, "We must
continue to be cautious in our dealings as
doubts linger about the military's respect for
the rule of law and their willingness to allow
parliament to develop real power." He continued, "Sometimes security forces themselves have been guilty of excesses....There
are also credible reports of torture...and the
A Igerian government refuses to al low observers to inspect prisons."
The Clinton administration's nominee
to replace Neumann, Cameron Hume, said at
his Senate confirmation hearing on October
28 that Washington could not intervene directly in what "all Algerians feel isan internal
conflict." But he noted the U.S. actively
promoted press freedom for Algerian journalists, through diplomatic demarches and bringing Algerianjoumaliststothe U.S. He added
that the U.S. supported the work of nongovernmental organizations, including international human rights groups.
The U.S. condemned "terrorism" in
Algeria on numerous occasions during the
year and maintained the Armed Islamic Group
on its official list of terrorist organizations
worldwide.
Relevant Human Rights Watch
Report:
Algeria—Eleclions inlhe ShadowoJViolence
and Repression, 6/97
BAHRAIN
Human Rights Developments
The human rights situation in Bahrain showed
no improvement in 1997 and in some respects
worsened. Street protests and clashes be-
BAHRAIN
tween security forces and demonstrators calling for political reform, which had first erupted
in December 1994, continued throughout the
year, intensifying in June 1997. Shaikh Abd
al-Amir al-Jamri and seven other Shi'a community leaders, arrested in January 19%
remained in detention without charge. The
government continued to prosecute penon*
on security-related charges in the State Security Court, where procedures did not meet
basic fair trial standards and whose verdicts
werenotsubjecttoappeal. The exercise ofthe
freedoms of assembly and political association remained effectively outlawed under the
terms ofthe penal code and the law of societies and clubs.
The year saw further arrests and harassment of individuals for writing or possessing
written materials which the government considered hostile. On June 14,1997, six young
men in detention for the previous fourteen
months were found guilty by a State Security
Court on charges of possessing leaflets that
according to the Interior Ministry conuined
"false news and unfounded statements."They
were sentenced to time already served plus
fines of 200 Bahraini dinars (BD; approximately U.S.$530). In March 1997, Sayyid
Jalal Alawi Sharaf, an engineer employed by
the state telecommunications company, was
arrested in a dawn raid on his home, and his
home computer equipment was confiscated,
reportedly on the grounds that he was transmitting information abroad via the Internet.
He remained in detention without charge or
trial as of early October. In February. Alt
Hasan Yusif wasdismissed from hisjob with
the Ministry oflnformation and subsequently
arrested and detained without charge for several months in connection with a volume of
poems he had published, some of which
referred in very general terms to conditions of
censorship and oppression. Yasir al-Sayigh
was detained for months without charge and
beaten after a coworker had thrown a leaflet
in his office wastebasket.
The government also moved to prevent
information about the situation in the country
from reaching the outside world through the
media In late September 1996. Abbas Salman.
a Bahraini reporter working for Reuters for
nearly twenty years, was detained for more
than twenty-four hours and interrogated about
a story he had filed before being released
without charge. In early 1997, the government issued a regulation restricting Bahraini
jojmalists employed by local media from
also working for the international press. The
government was thus able to force Ismat
Moussawi, a reporter with A l-Ayyam, a daily
close to the government, to cease her work as
the BBC Arabic Service stringer, thus effectively stifling an important source of uncensored news for many Bahrainis.
In June 1997 the government closed the
office and expelled the correspondent of the
German Press Agency (DPA), the last Westcm news agency wi th a bureau in Bahrain. The
correspondent, Ute Meinel, told Human
R ights Watch that her expulsion followed her
eyewitness accounts of three days of intense
clashes in the town of Sanabis in June, and
dispatches regarding several unrelated cases
of Bahrainis who had died after being beaten
by security forces. On the night of June 24,
she was summoned by a senior interior ministry official and interrogated about a recent
dispatch. The next day she was shown a
charge sheet accusing her of "spreading lies,
harming the welfare of the state, insulting the
ruling family." Two days later, the Interior
Ministry official told her that she would have
io leave Bahrain immediately.
In July 1997, ten leaders ofthe People's
Petition Committee prepared a letter to the
smir. Shaikh Isa bin Salman, requesting a
meeting to discuss political reform issues
raised in a 1994 petition which the organizers
claimed had been signed by 21,751 Bahrainis.
These issues included restoring the partiallyelected National Assembly, which was dishanded by decree in 1975, freeing political
prisoners, and allowing the return of persons
forciblyexiled by thegovemment An official
"i the prime minister's office telephoned
*veral committee members to warn them
against delivering the letter. On July 29 a high
Interior Ministry official summoned two of
'hem. Ahmad al-Shamlan, a defense lawyer
and veteran opposition activist, and Ibrahim
Kamal Eddin, a businessman, and warned
them to cease their efforts. When the men
declined, the official told al-Shamlan, who
suffersfroma heart ailment, to "think of your
health." The next day the official phoned alShamlan to say that he would not be allowed
to leave for Europe that evening as planned for
medical tests and a vacation. Several hours
later al-Shamlan suffered a serious stroke
from which he had not recovered as of October 1997.
The government provides virtually no
information regarding numbers of persons
arrested, tried, convicted, acquitted or released in political or security-related cases.
The exception concerned the high-profile
March 1997 security court trials of fifty-nine
Bahrainis whom the government charged in
June 1996 with planning and carrying out acts
of sabotage on behalf of "Hizballah BahrainMilitary Wing." Thirty-six of the defendants
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms
ranging from three to fifteen years plus large
fines, and twenty-three were acquitted. Based
on information made available by Bahraini
defense lawyers, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 600 persons were taken
into custody for political or security-related
offenses over the past year, and at least
seventy-one were convicted by state security
courts. Bahraini lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that the number of persons in prolonged detention without trial was around
1,500 in late September 1997—approximately the same number as were being held a
year earlier—and that beatings and other
forms of physical abuse werecommonly used
to secure confessions and information.
In late October 1996, the government
signed an agreement with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), allowing that organization access to persons held
for security-related offenses. There were reports that the ICRC had visited over one
thousand detainees in more than twenty detention centers. In keeping with ICRC policy,
its findings were communicated directly to
the government and not announced publicly.
During the year, three persons died in
detention or very shortly after being released
�15 October 1997
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
REPORTERS SANS FRONTI RES
ALGERIA. A CALL FOR ACTION TO END A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Human
Rights Watch and Reporters sans frontiSres join together to appeal to the international
community to act now to address the deteriorating human rights situation in Algeria, and are
calling on members of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to convene a Special
Session on the human rights situation in Algeria. As the UN body with primary responsibility for
the promotion and protection of human rights, we look to the Commission on Human Rights to
provide leadership in seeking solutions to this human rights tragedy.
The last year has seen the longest, most intense spell of violence since the beginning of
the conflict in Algeria five years ago. Violence which has taken a new and terrifying turn with the
massacre of civilians.
Thousands of people - women and children, the poor and elderly - have been massacred
with unspeakable brutality. Some of those lucky enough to have escaped having their throats cut
or being burned alive in their homes have reached nearby security forces posts and called for
help. In vain.
Their cries have not been heard in their country, or beyond their national borders. Up to
80,000 people have been killed behind a virtual wall of silence on the part ofthe international
community.
Recent statements of the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, UNICEF and the UNHCR condemning the massacres of civilians and other human rights
abuses in Algeria go some way towards breaking through the barriers of silence surrounding the
crisis. But words are not enough.
The international community has for too long turned a blind eye to the plight of the
victims in Algeria, in spite ofthe warnings sounded by human rights organizations. The UN
Commission on Human Rights has so far not scrutinized the situation. It is time to take concrete
action to end this spiral of violence and to ensure the protection of the civilian population.
The need to investigate and reveal the truth is the first step to finding solutions to this
human rights tragedy. For this reason, we are calling for the establishment of an international
investigation to ascertain the facts, examine allegations of responsibility and to make
recommendations in respect of the massacres and other abuses by all sides in Algeria. Such an
investigation has to be provided with broad powers, adequate staff and resources. It should
collect evidence, statements, including testimony from victims, witnesses and responsible
officials, to discover the truth.
Since the outbreak ofthe current conflict in 1992, extrajudicial executions, deliberate and
arbitrary killings, torture, rape, "disappearances" and hostage-taking have become routine. The
large-scale massacres of civilians over the past year have taken place against a background of
increasingly widespread human rights abuses by security forces, state-armed militias and armed
�"OINT-AP.ASC
~
Islamist groups, which have increasingly targeted and terrorized civilians. Disregard for human
rights has become the rule rather than the exception. This is despite the fact that Algeria has
ratified important international and regional human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Time after time, the Algerian Government has simply failed to investigate these abuses by
its own forces and by armed opposition groups, and to bring those responsible to justice. This
failure has exacerbated the breakdown of law and order and left civilians feeling ever more alone
and unprotected.
The complex reality of violence and counter-violence has become increasingly confused
with the clampdown on information and investigations. Information defined by the authorities as
"security-related" is censored and manipulated. International human rights organizations and
foreign media have often been refused entry to the country. Human rights workers and journalists
who have been let into the country have been subject to surveillance and restrictions. Those who
have continued to work in the country have faced death threats and killings. All of these actions
have contributed to building a wall of silence around the human rights crisis in Algeria
We echo the call of the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the UN and African institutions, and urge
Member States of the OAU to support an initiative of this kind.
In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement with Algeria, which
contains provisions for the respect of human rights, we urge Member States of the European
Union to work for the special session ofthe Commission on Human Rights and the
investigation to become a reality.
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, UN Member States
reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the
international community. We call on them now to honour their pledge.
The Algerian Government routinely accuses anyone criticizing their human rights record
of deliberately lying, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and political bias. Human rights
protection is not just an internal affair or an issue of national sovereignty. Algeria is not above
international scrutiny. At a time when its citizens are being slaughtered en masse week after
week, the government of Algeria should welcome - not oppose - international attention aimed at
helping to protect lives. /END/
"PaggZl
�HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / MIDDLE EAST
- A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST REPORT; COPYRIGHT © HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH; ISSN: 1 080-61 99
Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
June 1997
ALGERIA
ELECTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION
ABOUT THIS REPORT
2
POLITICAL PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT
2
SUMMARY
3
RECOMMENDATIONS
5
MODALITIES OF THE ELECTION
7
BACKGROUND
8
NEW LAWS AFFECTING THE STAKES AND FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS
10
VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, AND THE ELECTIONS
13
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
22
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
25
485
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�ABOUT THIS REPORT
A Human Rights Watch delegation visited Algiers from March 30 to April 13, 1997, with the knowledge and
agreement of the government. We met with the ministers of justice and interior, political party leaders, representatives
of civic associations, human rights lawyers and ordinary citizens. Human Rights Watch wishes to thank all of the
Algerians who received us. and in particular the Observatoire National des Droits de rHomme for facilitating meetings
with government officials.
We note that, despite our strong objections, our delegation was accompanied during part of the mission by a
security escort. After initially agreeing to withdraw the armed escort at our insistence that it placed unacceptable
constraints on our freedom of movement and independence, the authorities insisted toward the end of our visit on
reimposing this detail on the delegation wherever it went. This forced us to cancel at least three appointments out of
consideration for the persons with whom we wished to meet. The security escort, whatever its intentions, thus hampered
our ability to gather information.
This report was researched by Nejla Sammakia, research associate at Human Rights Watch/Middle East, and
Baher Al-Ashhab, a consultant to Human Rights Watch/Middle East. It was written by Ms. Sammakia. It was edited by
Eric Goldstein, acting executive director of Human Rights Watch/Middle East, and Mike McClintock, deputy program
director of Human Rights Watch. Shira Robinson, associate at Human Rights Watch/Middle East, formatted the report
and assisted in its research.
POLITICAL PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT
ANR: Alliance nationale republicaine (National Republican Alliance)
Ettahaddi: the Challenge
FFS: Front de forces socialistes (Socialist Forces Front)
FIS: Front islamique du salut (Islamic Salvation Front), banned in 1992
FLN: Front de liberation nationale (National Liberation Front)
MAJD: Mouvement Algerienne pour la justice et le developpement (Algerian Movement for Justice and Development)
MDA: Mouvement pour la democratic en Algerie (Movement for Democracy in Algeria)
MSP: Mouvement de la societe pour la paix (Movement for a Peaceful Society, formerly the Movement for an Islamic
Society, Movement de la societe islamique, Hamas)
An-Nahdha: Renaissance (formerly an-Nahdha al-Isl imiyya, Islamic Renaissance)
El-Oumma: the Nation (disbanded in 1997 after new political parties law took effect)
PRA: Parti du renouveau algerien (Party of Algerian Renewal)
PT: Parti des travailleurs (Workers Party)
RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la democratic (Rally for Culture and Democracy)
RND: Rassemblement National Democratique (National Democratic Rally)
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
2
June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�SUMMARY
Algerians go to the polls on June 5, 1997 in the first parliamentary elections since the military-backed
government canceled elections in January 1992. That measure, taken to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation
Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS), plunged the country into endemic violence that continues today and has
claimed more than 60,000 lives, most of them civilians. Many Algerians hope that a reasonably fair vote on June
5 will contribute to reducing the political violence; others are more pessimistic.
1
The government hopes that these elections will crown its efforts to assert its legitimacy at home and abroad,
and remove the taint it incurred when the democratic process was interrupted in 1992. In early May, President
Liamine Zeroual said that after these elections and the local elections to follow shortly thereafter, Algeria "will have
completed the period of transition and the return to popular sovereignty and legitimate institutions." In an indication
of the importance that they attach to the elections as a means of legitimizing the government, Algerian authorities
have created a national election monitoring group and have actively sought foreign monitoring.
2
3
Except for the flawed presidential election of 1995, Algerians have their first opportunity since 1992 to elect
those who would govern them. Other than the president, unelected officials govern the country at the national,
provincial and local level. Given the stakes, it is important to scrutinize not only the conduct of the vote but also
underlying human rights conditions that affect the ability of Algerians to associate with one another, conduct political
activities, and impart and receive information and views relevant to the decisions they will make on election day.
1
The June 5 elections cannot be seen as the capstone of the process of establishing democratic rule in Algeria,
because of the following factors that limit the significance of these elections as a free expression of the will of the
1
Armed operations by Islamist groups preceded the cancellation of elections, but were isolated and rare.
2
Jean-Pierre Tuquoi,'"L'Algerie continue a vivre sous un regime de double terreur," Le Monde,(Par\s) May 9, 1997. .
3
Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf stated, "There will be a double guarantee of a fair vote. First, we have set up an independent
national supervisory committee with members from all the political parties participating in the elections. Second, we have
requested the presence of observers from the United Nations, the Arab League and the OAU." LeSoir (Brussels), March 13, 1997,
as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter FBIS), Near East and South Asia, March 13, 1997.
President Zeroual issued formal invitations to the U.N., the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity on
February 6, describing the initiative as "part of the natural progression of the processfreelybegun by Algeria with the presidential
election of November 1995." "Le president Zeroual a demande la presence d'observateurs pour les legislatives," Agence FrancePresse (hereinafter AFP), February 6, 1997.
The international response has been one of reserved, sometimes skeptical, encouragement. In a letter to President Zeroual
dated March 18, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed to send a "small technical team in order to coordinate and support
the work" of observers being sent by various countries to monitor the vote. The United Nations, Annan wrote, "will not itst!
observe the elections in order to certify their good conduct or their results, nor will the organization make any declaration
concerning them. The judgments expressed on the elections will be made by the international observers, who will name their own
spokespersons and prepare their own declarations." Thus far, more than twenty countries have pledged to send observers or
contribute financially to the observation efforts. Both the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity will send observers,
as they did for the presidential elections of 1995. Altogether, some 200 international observers are expected to monitor the
campaign and voting.
f
4
A review of technical aspects of the election preparations, the monitoring and the voting itself are beyond the scope of this
report.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
3
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Algerian people to choose those who would govern them. The first of the factors below reduces what is at stake in
these election, while the others detract from the extent to which they should be considered free and fair.
A weakened National Assembly: The Assembly to be elected on June 5 is a far weaker body than the one that was
to have been chosen in 1992. The new constitution, drafted by the authorities and approved in a controversial
November 1996 referendum, has stripped the assembly of many of its lawmaking powers, while strengthening the
office of the president and creating a second legislative chamber, one-third of whose members are appointed by the
president, and two-thirds of whom are elected by local officials who themselves will have been elected by popular
vote. While international human rights standards do not dictate how power should be divided among different
branches of government, it is important to note the significantly reduced powers of the institution that is being elected
through popular suffrage.
Ongoing political violence and repression: Although many Algerians have courageously and defiantly plunged into
the campaign, the rampant violence, for which the security forces and armed Islamist groups are responsible,
continues to claim scores of lives each week and has terrorized many Algerians who would wish to express their
views or take part in political life. Political activists from a wide range of parties and tendencies have been
assassinated since 1992, including at least five so far in the run-up to this legislative election.
Exclusion of parties: Certain provisions of the 1996 constitution and 1997 political parties law violate the right to
freedom of association by not permitting parties based on religion, region, language or gender. The FIS, the Islamist
movement that was poised to win the last legislative elections, was outlawed in 1992 and remains barred from any
political activity. Other parties have been required to change elements of their names and program in order to comply
with the law.
Restrictions and favoritism: Authorities have to some extent restricted the political activities and coverage on statecontrolled radio and television of some legal parties, particularly those that criticize the interruption of the last
legislative elections. By contrast, the authorities have facilitated the rapid rise of the RND, formed only in February
to mobilize support for the President and his government.
Media censorship: Systematic censorship in the press of security-related news and, to a lesser extent, of criticism
of government corruption and performance, deprives voters of information concerning some of the key issues in this
campaign. The authorities have harassed publications and journalists associated with independent print media, and
have preserved state-controlled television as a government mouthpiece. The ability of journalists to gather and
disseminate news and information has also been impeded by the unprecedented assassination campaign that has cost
the lives of fifty-nine media workers since 1992. Armed opposition groups are believed responsible for most of these
killings.
The right of citizens to participate in their country's public affairs, directly or through representatives chosen
freely, is a fundamental human right enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right
is central to Algeria's political crisis, since it was the denial of that right—when authorities annulled the country's
first multi-party legislative elections—that led to the political violence becoming endemic, and has diminished in
the eyes of many Algerians the legitimacy of their rulers.
If these elections are to be a step toward ending the political stalemate, significant additional steps are
required for the Algerian people to be able, in a meaningful way, to "take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives." Because so much power will continue to rest with the presidency
and Algeria's military, such steps toward broadening political participation will have to come through acts of political
will. Such steps may also help to marginalize the armed groups whose campaign of violence against the security
forces and civilians has contributed so heavily to the national tragedy.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
4
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of Algeria:
Human Rights Watch recognizes that the elections taking place on June 5 can contribute to solving Algeria's
political crisis and to enabling the Algerian people to exercise their right to participate, through elected
representatives, in the conduct of public affairs. However, much remains to be done if Algerians are to enjoy their
political rights in a meaningful sense. One factor impairing the ability of Algerians to exercise their political rights
is the rampant political violence. While the armed Islamist groups bear a large measure of responsibility for this
violence, the government is responsible to a considerable degree as well.
In order to enable Algerians to exercise their political rights more fully, Human Rights Watch urges the
government of Algeria to:
•
.
End censorship and pressures on the media that aim to enforce a state monopoly on information related to
the internal security situation, including human rights violations, or that aim to restrict other coverage that
displeases government officials.
•
End all measures designed to impede the peaceful activities and public expression of political parties and
movements, including those that urge the inclusion of the FIS in negotiations with the government.
•
Bring domestic legislation on political parties into conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by abolishing the prohibition on parties based on religion, gender, race or region. Such
broad-based prohibitions violate the right of Algerians to freedom of association.
•
Take steps to halt human rights abuses perpetrated by the security forces, including arbitrary detention,
"disappearances," extrajudicial executions, and torture, that target suspected Islamist activists, their relatives,
and suspected sympathizers. Such abuses are presently practiced with virtual impunity. Toward this end,
authorities should declare publicly and ensure that:
(1) such practices will not be tolerated;
(2) complaints about abuses will be investigated promptly and meaningfully and the results made public; and
(3) those found guilty of abuses will be punished in a manner befitting the offense and in a manner that
makes clear to others in the security services as well as the public that the government takes allegations of
abuse seriously.
•
Provide humane treatment to anyone in government custody who has been incapacitated by wounds,
surrendered, or taken captive, including members of the armed groups, in compliance with international
human rights and humanitarian law.
To the armed groups:
Human Rights Watch urges all armed groups to:
•
Halt immediately deliberate attacks on civilians and noncombatants, and indiscriminate attacks that disregard
the protection of civilians.
•
Provide humane treatment to anyone under their control who has been incapacitated by wounds, surrendered,
or taken captive, including members of the security forces, in compliance with international humanitarian
law.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
5
June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�•
Cease all activities intended to threaten or intimidate persons because of their personal or political beliefs
or activities.
Persons empowered to speak on behalf of the FIS, as a movement with aspirations to political power in
Algeria, should clearly and unconditionally condemn attacks by armed Islamist groups against all civilians and other
acts that violate basic human rights and humanitarian norms. These include all acts and threats of violence intended
to intimidate Algerians who wish to exercise their right to political participation and association. Leaders of the FIS
should utilize whatever influence they have over armed groups to end violence against and intimidation of civilians.
To the European Union and Member States:
The European Union is presently negotiating a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Algeria
similar to ones already signed between the E.U. and Morocco, Israel, and Tunisia. Algeria hopes to obtain financial
aid or debt relief in the context of this accord. Article 2 of each association agreement states, "Respect for the
democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
inspires the domestic and external policies of the [European] Community and of [the other party] and constitutes an
essential element of this Agreement." Human Rights Watch therefore makes the following recommendations to the
European Union and member states:
5
•
The European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should scrutinize not only
the June 5 elections but also human rights conditions in the months that follow the elections, and make clear
to the Algerian government that improved relations depend on the government's making tangible progress
in improving in human rights practices and in giving greater substance to the right of Algerian people to
participate in self-governance.
•
In particular, the European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should monitor
the extent to which the elections represent a starting point for the government to redress some of the
outstanding human rights issues for which authorities are responsible, such as the hundreds of cases of
"disappearances". They should publicly acknowledge and condemn these practices by Algerian authorities,
and submit lists of. names of reportedly "disappeared" persons that come to their attention and request
clarifications from Algiers.
•
The European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should assess whether state
broadcasting media remain open to opposition views, as they have to a degree during the election campaign,
or revert to their rigid practices of recent years, and whether the print press is allowed real freedom. They
should further monitor whether the policy of granting visas relatively freely in the run-up to elections to
journalists and foreign observers, including human rights monitors, will revert to the more restrictive past
policy on visas.
•
The European Parliament should adopt an urgent resolution, making reference to Article 2 of the draft
Association Agreement with Algeria, requesting the European Commission and Council of Ministers to
undertake the auove recommendations and to icoort back to the Parliament with regard to these undertakings.
•
The European Parliament should itself undertake to document human rights developments in Algeria in the
post-election period.
Algeria's public debt was U.S.$26 billion in 1994. The loans are repaid primarily with revenue from export sales of natural
gas and petroleum.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�To the International Community:
Those countries participating in the multi-national election monitoring effort have a responsibility to provide
a frank and public assessment of the atmosphere for free and fair voting, despite the difficult conditions on the ground
faced by their observers. The lackluster and silent monitoring of the 1995 Algerian presidential elections by the Arab
League, Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations enabled the authorities to boast of the international
presence without having to face thorough monitoring or public reporting by the observers.
This time, governments and multilateral institutions sending election observers must not forfeit the leverage
for improvements that their presence offers. They should take steps to ensure that their observers are able to have
access to potential sources of pertinent information regarding the free character of the polling, including restrictions
on basic civil and political rights for all Algerians. They should ensure that their observers are able to speak publicly
and promptly concerning conditions. If the observers travel with armed escorts from the security forces, assigned
for their protection, they have a duty to weigh the deterrent effect this will have on ordinary citizens and party
activists who might otherwise approach them with complaints about irregularities, and should identify means of
enabling these potential sources to meet with them in private in order to provide them with information pertinent to
the elections. If the armed security personnel are assigned against their express wishes, or if other obstacles are
placed on their access or activities, observers should publicly state that such constraints can impugn the freedom and
fairness of the elections themselves.
Governments and international institutions that have leverage with the government of Algeria should
continue, after the elections, to monitor steps toward promoting political participation and curtailing human rights
abuses. Aid and partnership agreements, which the government of Algeria is reported to be eagerly seeking, should
be linked to measurable progress in these domains.
In addition, foreign governments that maintain contact with representatives of the FIS should demand, as
a condition of such relations, that the FIS take specific and visible steps to implement the above recommendations
that are addressed to it.
MODALITIES OF THE ELECTION
The terms of the election process are fixed by the election law adopted by the appointed interim legislature,
the National Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition, CNT), on February 19, 1997. The 380-seat
People's National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale Populaire, ANP, hereafter National Assembly) is elected for a
five-year term using a proportional list system and secret balloting. There are 16.7 million registered voters, out
of a population of twenty-eight million. Algerian citizens, above the age of eighteen, male and female, are eligible
to vote. A total of 7,740 candidates, including independents and representatives of thirty-nine parties, are vying for
seats. Four parties have lists in all districts: the RND, FLN, PRA, and an-Nahdha. The MSP and the FFS have lists
in most of the fifty-six districts. There are approximately 34,000 voting stations throughout the country.
6
7
The number of deputies to represent each governorate (wilaya) is determined by population, with no
govemorate having fewer than four deputies. Some governorates are divided into two or more electoral districts. A
number of deputies are to be selected by Algerian citizens residing abroad, who are also eligible to vote.
6
Ordonnance no. 97-07 du 27 chaoual 1417 correspondant au 6 mars 1997 portant loi organique relative au regime Electoral.
7
The proportional system represents a major revision of the winner-take-all system in the previous electoral law of 1990. That
law facilitated the FIS landslide in the 1991 legislative elections. That party had won 189 of the 232 seats decided in the first
round even though it had won only 47.54 percent of the votes cast. The other two parties to win seats were the FLN and the FFS.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
7
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�The ballot presents the voter with a choice of lists of candidates. Each list is put forward by one or more
parties or is composed of independent candidates. The number of candidates on each list is limited to the number of
seats apportioned to that district, plus three. Seats are assigned according to the proportion of votes won by each list
in the district. Parties or lists that receive less than 5 percent of vote within a district do not participate in the
allocation of seats.
Candidates must be at least twenty-eight years old, Algerian by birth or naturalised for at least five years.
Male voters must have completed military' service or be exempt. Independent candidates must have collected at least
400 voter signatures to be eligible. Both men and women are eligible to run.
Candidates and parties are permitted to have up to five representatives at the polling stations on voting day
and during the counting of votes. The voting stations are staffed by polling officers appointed by the local governor.
The vote count is public, and is conducted by private citizens chosen by the polling officers (Article 54).
Members of the military and security forces are to vote in their barracks (Article 63). Some parties have
protested this provision. It is not clear whether international and domestic observers will be permitted to monitor
voting in the barracks to the same extent as elsewhere.
Algeria's Constitutional Council is to declare the results within seventy-two hours after receiving polling
data from around the country and overseas. Parties or candidates have forty-eight hours to file complaints about
irregularities to the Constitutional Council, which has the authority to cancel or change results.
8
After consultations with some of the political parties, President Zeroual established a National Independent
Elections Observation Commission (Commission nationale independante de surveillance des elections legislatives,
CNISEL) that includes representatives of many political parties, officials from the ministries of justice, interior,
communication and foreign affairs, and members of the semi-official National Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme, ONDH) and of the independent Algerian League of Human Rights
(Ligue Algerienne des Droits de I'Homme, LADH). The CNISEL is responsible for overseeing the election process,
including voter registration, allocating to parties broadcast time and access to public gathering places, and the ballot
count.
BACKGROUND
The forthcoming National Assembly elections will be the first since the military-backed annulment of the
January 1992 elections and the forced resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid. Between 1992 and 1995, Algeria
was governed entirely by unelected officials. The military-backed High Council of State appointed the president and
cabinet. The National Assembly was replaced by the National Transitional Council, a consultative body whose sixty
members were appointed. At the local level, most of the officials who won their posts in the Islamic Salvation Front
landslide in the 1990 municipal elections were ousted and replaced by persons selected by the central government.
9
8
In December 1991, complaints of voting irregularities were submitted to the council, mostly in districts won by the FIS, but
before the council could pronounce on the charges, the military-backed High Security Council, a presidential advisory body,
halted the electoral process.
9
On those elections and their aftermath, see Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Middle East), "Human Rights
in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 4, no. 2, February 1992.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
8
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�In November 1995, a multi-candidate presidential election confirmed as president retired General Liamine Zeroual,
who had been appointed to that post in January 1994.'°
Algeria continues to be governed under a state of emergency decreed in February 1992. That decree gives
the authorities vast powers to arrest and intern individuals, prevent public gatherings, close an organization on the
grounds of an impending danger to the public order, and suspend or dissolve local assemblies or governments if they
impede the legal actions of the public authorities. At the same time as it imposed the state of emergency, the
authorities banned the FIS, the party calling for an Islamic state that had been legalized in 1989 and that was poised
to capture a majority in the National Assembly if the election had proceeded. The top leadership of the FIS had
already been in prison since 1991 on subversion charges; most of the remaining senior cadres either went
underground or fled into exile. Some members of the now-outlawed FIS and other Islamist groups took up arms
against the government, and have since attracted a stream of recruits to their ranks. The ensuing violence, in which
both the security forces and armed groups have targeted civilians as well as each other, shows no signs of abating."
Several topics have dominated political debate among Algerians. These include the pace at which the statedominated economy should be liberalized; high-level corruption; the heavy influence exercised by the military in
running the affairs of the state; how to address the violence and political impasse that followed the cancellation of
the elections; and what role, if any, to permit Islamists, including the outlawed FIS, in the political process.
On the question of the role for the FIS, many opponents argue that the party is implicated in violence and
intimidation against its perceived adversaries in Algerian society, and that it is hostile to democracy, women's rights,
Berber cultural rights, and the rights of persons who do not share their religious views. Those who favor a role for
the FIS argue that the 1990 and 1991 elections demonstrated the broad popular support it enjoys, and argue that it
will—or can be constrained to—respect democratic rules. Parties that have advocated a role for the FIS have been
the target of much of the censorship imposed during the presidential and current legislative campaigns.
The government has largely denied the existence of a human rights problem other than the "terrorism" it
attributes to Islamist armed groups, despite the compelling evidence, collected by human rights organizations, that
torture, "disappearances", and arbitrary killings by the security forces are widespread. In a typical comment, a
Foreign Ministry official was reported to have said on March 3, "It is true that Algeria, a victim of terrorism, is going
through a difficult period that involves a certain number of measures to protect persons and property, but any state
that respects human rights imposes some measures within the framework of its struggle against terrorism, such as
the state of emergency." Interior Minister Mustafa Benmansour said in an interview with Human Rights Watch
on April 9:
12
I personally do not consider Algeria as a country that has human rights violations. All procedures
are carried out according to the law. There are no violations, except for some excesses that take
place in the framework of operations, such as insults, or beatings—but these are subjected to
prosecution or internal disciplinary measures....We lived through a war in 1992 and 1993, and at that
time the very foundations of the country were threatened. Nevertheless, Algeria handled [human
rights issues] with great care.
10
On the presidential election, see Human Rights Watch/Middle East press release, "Algeria: Islamist Violence, Government
Pressures Cast Shadow on Presidential Elections," November 16, 1995.
" See, Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Middle East), Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).
12
"Ouverture mardi des negociations avec I'EU," AFP, March 3, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�President Zeroual maintained contacts with FIS leaders during the early part of his presidency but, according
to the government, the contacts broke down over the refusal by the FIS to agree in advance to abandon its support
of armed resistance. The FIS, for its part, co-signed a platform in Rome in January 1995 with five legal political
parties, calling for negotiations between the government and political parties, including the FIS, suspension of
violence by both sides and eventual democratic elections. The signatories included the three parties—the FIS, the
FLN and the FFS—that together had won 78.5 percent of the popular vote in the first round of legislative voting in
December 1991 and captured 229 of the 232 seats decided in that round of voting. The Rome initiative, known as
the National Contract, was rejected by the authorities.
While spurning demands for negotiations with a broad range of parties toward establishing a framework for
a cease-fire and new elections, the authorities invited legal political parties for "consultations" as they prepared the
country for the presidential elections in November 1995. In that polling, President Zeroual defeated three other
candidates by a wide margin. Zeroual's victory and the high rate of voter participation, in defiance of threats by
armed groups to kill those who cast ballots, impressed many observers who interpreted the outcome as a mandate
to break the political deadlock and end the endemic violence.
13
The period that followed disappointed those who looked to the president to initiate a meaningful opening
toward representative political forces. Instead, the government drafted a new constitution with minimal input from
the political parties, and announced that it would be put to a popular referendum. President Zeroual also promised
legislative and municipal elections in 1997. Meanwhile, the lull in political violence around the presidential elections
proved to be short-lived.
In November 1996, Algerians voted to approve the new constitution. Some parties, including the RCD,
MDA and Ettahaddi, boycotted the referendum, while the FFS urged a "no" vote. Independent estimates put the rate
of participation well below the officially declared 79 percent, of which nearly 86 percent voted "Yes." No
international observers were present, and foreign journalists present were hampered in their movements. '*
1
In February, a new political party was announced that would draw its support from union, veteran, peasant,
and civic associations that supported President Zeroual in the 1995 election. The so-called National Democratic
Rally (RND) is led by Abdelkader Bensalah, who also heads the government-appointed National Transitional
Council. It would be the first manifestly pro-government party since the FLN went into the opposition after the
cancellation of elections in 1992. The FLN was the ruling party during nearly three decades of one-party rule.
In March, the government set legislative elections for June 5, and announced that the campaign would start
on May 15.
NEW LAWS AFFECTING THE STAKES AND FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS
A Weaker National Assembly
The new constitution, drafted by the governmeni and adopted by a referendum last November, has diluted
the power of the National Assembly and given the president more far-reaching powers. It also creates a second
13
The official results were 61.34 percent for Zeroual, 25.38 percent for Mahfoudh Nahnah of Hamas (now the MSP), 9.29
percent for Said Saadi (RCD), and 3.78 percent for Noureddine Boukrouh of the PRA. The authorities stated that the rate of
participation was 74.92 percent. Many in the opposition questioned that figure, although they acknowledged that voting was
heavier than had been expected.
14
Roger Cohen, "Algeria says Charter Passes, but Critics Charge Vote Fraud," New York Times, November 30, 1996.
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�chamber, the National Council, composed of members who are not directly elected, that will share legislative
functions with the National Assembly. Two thirds ofthe 170-member National Council will be elected by communal
and provincial council deputies who are to be chosen in local elections later in 1997. The remaining one-third will
be appointed by the president.
15
The president appoints the prime minister (Article 77). The National Assembly can force the resignation
of the prime minister by voting down the government's program. In that case, the president appoints a new prime
minister (Article 81). The president has the power to dissolve the National Assembly at any time (Articles 82 and
129).
The prime minister or a group of at least twenty deputies are entitled to introduce draft legislation (Article
119). To become law, it requires the approval not only of the National Assembly, but also the support of threefourths of the National Council (Article 120). Once adopted by the two chambers, the president of the republic may
still send the legislation back to the National Assembly for a second vote. This time, the legislation must obtain a
two-thirds majority in order to pass (Article 127).
Restrictions on the Nature of Political Parties
Both the 1996 constitution and its predecessor guarantee freedom of association. Following the political
reforms of 1989 and 1990, independent and party-related civic associations proliferated. However, under the 1992
emergency law, the interior minister could suspend or close associations by administrative order when their activities
were deemed to "endanger public order, public security, the normal function of institutions or the higher interests
of the country." After the banning of the FIS in February 1992, this provision was used to outlaw numerous civic
and labor organizations that the government accused of affinity with that party.
16
The constitution recognizes and guarantees in Article 42 the right to create political parties. However, the
same article prohibits their creation on a basis that is "religious, linguistic, racial, gender-related, corporatist [i.e.,
an organized economic interest] or regional. The political parties law, promulgated on March 6, states further in
Article 5 that a political party "cannot establish its founding or action" on these criteria. Article 3 stipulates, "the
fundamental components of the national identity in its three dimensions, Islam, Arabism and Amazighte [Berber
ethnicity], cannot be exploited for partisan propaganda purposes." The law gives parties two months to bring their
names and programs into conformity with these requirements.
17
This law, like others passed since the cancellation in 1992 of the legislative elections, was decreed by the
president and approved by the National Transitional Council. Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia praised the
constitutional provisions on political parties for presenting "the definition of a framework for the conduct of
pluralism which bans parties based on religion, on regional special interest groups, and still more on violence."
18
15
They are to be appointed from among "national figures and experts in the scientific, cultural, professional, economic and
social spheres," according to Article 101 of the constitution.
16
Presidential decree 92-320 of August 11, 1992.
17
"Dans le respect des dipositions de la presente Constitution, les partis politiques ne peuvent etre fondes sur une base
religieuse, linguistique, raciale, de sexe, corporatiste, ou regionale."
18
"Premier Interviewed on Constitutional Referendum," Rome Rai Uno Television Network, November 27, 1996, as reported
by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter FBIS), Near East and South Asia, November 27, 1996.
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�Interior Minister Mostafa Benmansour said the new party law introduced "features that will allow the country to
avoid the disastrous slip-ups of the past."
19
Article 40 of the previous constitution recognized the right to create political "associations." The 1989 Law
on Political Associations also restricted political associations based on religion. But, at that time, the authorities
granted the FIS and other Islamist parties legal status and allowed them to function. Some thirty political groupings
sought and received official recognition in the year following adoption of the 1989 political associations law.
20
Altogether, under the March 1997 law, some fifty groups have already won recognition as political parties;
of these, about four-fifths are competing in the legislative elections. The FIS remains banned. Two other Islamist
parties, MSP (formerly Hamas) and an-Nahdha, both of which fared poorly in the 1991 parliamentary elections, are
running candidates, after conforming to the new political party law by changing their names and parts of their
platforms.
El-Oumma, a small pro-Islamist party, disbanded a month after the new party law was passed. Its secretary
general, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, told us, "The government wanted to deprive us of our national symbols. Islam
is at the center of our national identity and we refuse to abide by this unjust party law. We preferred to disband rather
than function under these conditions."
21
The MDA, headed by Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, announced it would boycott the elections
rather than comply with an official order to change its platform. In a letter to the MDA, the Interior Ministry asked
the party to change by May 8 Articles 3 and 6 of its platform, or face "stringent measures to implement the law."
Article 3 says: "The MDA aims to bring together various forces of the country around national unity, democracy,
social justice and Arab-Islamic values." Article 6 defines MDA work in developing national cultural independence,
national unity and "the defense and growth of Islam, the religion of the State and of the people." In the view of
Human Rights Watch, nothing in these articles would justify attempts by the state to foreclose their peaceful
expression or forbid persons who support them from associating together. As this report went to press, negotiations
were continuing between the interior ministry and the MDA.
It is the prerogative of a government, where evidence exists that a party or its members have engaged in
illegal conduct, such as acts of, or incitement to violence, to prosecute them according to the law. However, Algeria's
broadly worded bans on particular categories of political parties violate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Algeria ratified that treaty in 1989, and published it in the Official Gazette in March 1997,
a step required for its becoming part of domestic legislation. The ICCPR guarantees to citizens the right to take part
in the conduct of public affairs either directly or through freely chosen representatives and the right to vote and to
be elected in periodic and fair elections. These rights, articulated in Article 25, entail participation in, and voting
for, political parties. They are to be guaranteed "without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions." Article 2 of the ICCPR requires States Parties to respect and ensure civil and political
"AFP, February 18, 1997.
20
Article 5 prohibited political associations the founding or activity of which has a basis that is "exclusively" religious,
linguistic or regionalist, or tied to a single gender, race, or particular professional status." ("Aucune association a caractere
politique ne peut fonder sa creation et son action sur une base et/ou des objectifs comportant:
-des pratiques sectaires et regionalistes, le feodalisme et le nepotisme....
Dans ce cadre, I'association & caractere politique ne peut, en outre, fonder sa creation ou son action sur la base
exclusivement confessionelle, linguistique, regionaliste, d'appartenance a un seul sexe, a une seule race ou a un statut
professionelle determine.")
21
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 3, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�rights "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." The criteria that Algeria forbids as the basis for political
parties—ethnicity, religion, language, gender, and regional origin—correlate with these forbidden categories of
discrimination. The present law violates the rights of supporters of a party that claims a religious basis for its program
to associate together and to vote for representatives of their choice.
22
Algeria's ban on broad categories of parties also restricts free association with others. Article 22 of the
ICCPR, which guarantees this right, permits restriction only in the narrow circumstances where three conditions are
met: 1) the restriction is "prescribed by law"; 2) the restriction is "necessary in a democratic society"; and 3) it is
necessary "in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." These conditions are not met by Algeria's
decision to proscribe whole categories of political parties on the basis of discriminatory criteria. The burden rests
with the government to show that the restrictions meet each of Article 22's conditions. To be "lawful," a restriction
must not only be embodied in a law, but also be consistent with fundamental human rights norms, including the
requirement that it is "necessary in a democratic society." A "necessary" restriction is one that is narrowly drawn
and proportionate to the interest it seeks to protect; it must further accord with values of tolerance, pluralism, popular
sovereignty and equality characteristic of "democratic" societies. Finally, the specific interests that may be protected
have restrictive meanings. National security, for example, entails a threat to the physical integrity of the state, and
not merely to the tenure of any particular government. Public order (ordre public) is endangered by violent
disturbances, not by partisanship or public debate on controversial topics. Algeria, to the best of our knowledge, has
made no case that any of these criteria have been met in justifying the ban on categories of political parties.
VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, AND THE ELECTIONS
23
The political violence in Algeria since 1992 has cost an estimated 60,000 lives. The precise figures are
unknown, as are. the proportions of security forces, armed opposition militants, and civilians who have been killed
and the extent to .which the militants or the security forces and paramilitary forces are responsible. Censorship, fear
and other factors have prevented an accurate accounting of the casualties.
The widespread, vicious, and often random nature ofthe violence has created a climate of fear and terror
among the population. While some categories of civilians may be at particular risk, many Algerians do not
understand who is being targeted or by whom. The identity of those carrying out the violence is difficult to establish,
as the security force and the anned groups often conduct themselves in similar ways: the former often wear civilian
clothes and do not identify themselves, while the latter sometimes disguise themselves as security forces when
stopping cars on the roads or attempting to gain entry to a building.
Human Rights Watch has interviewed many Algerians who described a sense of being caught between both
sides. Young men have been threatened with death by armed groups if they do not join them or if they answer the
military draft. Yet they also feared that if they did not report to the military barracks they would be suspected of
supporting the armed groups, and face imprisonment or worse. A person who is the victim of a carjacking by an
armed group is warned not to report the theft of the vehicle to the police, so that the group's use of the vehicle will
22
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
proclaimed by the UNGA in November 1981, gives important guidance about the concept of "intolerance or discrimination"
based on religion. Article 2 of the Declaration states that intolerance or discrimination "means any distinction, exclusion,
restriction, or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment or the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis."
23
This is the unofficial figure most cited by local and international media.
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�not arouse suspicion. They may be reluctant to file a report in any event, out of fear of being seen entering a police
station. Yet failure to file a police report puts the victim under suspicion of cooperating with the armed groups.
Physicians and other health professionals reportedly have been forced to provide care for members of armed groups
and were then harassed or prosecuted by the government for having done so. Families who have been forced at
gunpoint to provide money or provisions to the armed groups have encountered the same fate.
Although identifying who is responsible for specific killings is often impossible, it is clear that armed groups
identifying themselves as Islamist have killed thousands of people, including civilians and members of the security
forces. The composition of these groups is varied; some groups consider themselves loyal to the FIS or to elements
of its leadership; others are radical groups that reject the political mantle of the FIS.
When legal, the FIS sheltered a range of Islamist tendencies and never articulated a detailed political
program. Its two undisputed leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, were said to espouse moderate and hardline
views respectively. With both chiefs in prison and unable to communicate with their followers, FIS figures who are
at liberty to speak continue to articulate a range of positions, including on the subject of political violence.
The armed groups seem to be largely decentralized, many operating only in limited areas of the country.
Some Islamist groups have targeted civilians in blatant violation of the most elemental humanitarian norms,
assassinating relatives of security-force members as well as journalists, intellectuals, government workers, popular
singers, and others whose personal politics or profession they deem hostile or contrary to their Islamist project. Car
bombs and other explosive attacks have taken the lives of hundreds of civilians and caused tremendous damage to
public and private property. If the communiques issued in the name of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique
arme, GIA) and the Islamic Front of the Armed Jihad (Front islamique du djihad arme, FIDA) are authentic, these
two groups bear responsibility for a significant share of atrocities committed against civilians.
The Islamic Salvation Army (Armee Islamique du Salut, AIS), a group claiming to be the arined wing of
the FIS, asserts that it targets only security personnel and objects; but its record in practice is not known, and some
communiques that were issued in its name clearly threatened civilians.
24
FIS figures in exile continue to make statements repudiating violence directed at civilians while claiming
the right to wage war against the security forces and state apparatus. The "National Contract," co-signed in January
1995 by FIS officials abroad (see above), committed signatories—in principle—to the "rejection of violence as a
means of acceding to or maintaining power." Subsequently, after the authorities rejected this demarche and the
actions of armed groups continued, FIS leaders reaffirmed their right to fight the government with arms while tending
to dissociate their party from attacks against civilians. They blamed such attacks either on radical groups such as
the GIA that they portrayed as outside FIS control, or claimed that they were committed by state agents acting to
discredit Islamists. For example, Abdelkrim Ould Adda, a spokesperson for the group calling itself the "Executive
Comminee of the FIS Abroad" (instance executive a Fetranger), told the Barcelona daily La Vanguardia:
The FIS condemns all of these terrible killings. Let me say it very clearly: the FIS has no links with
the GIA. We firmiy condemn the barbarous acts committed by these terrorist groups against the
civilian population. The AIS also condemns these actions. The AIS does not kill civilians, women,
children, journalists, intellectuals, foreigners. Its actions are always directed against military
24
For example, the AIS announced in 1994 that it had compiled a list of journalists who were "accomplices of the regime"
who would be executed, according to an AlS-affiliated underground publication, al-Fath al-Moubine. "L'AIS affirme avoir
dresse une liste de joumalistes qui seront executes," AFP, August 24, 1994.
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�targets. The AIS controls more than 80 percent of the groups fighting against the regime's
repressive forces. It is stronger than the GIA.
21
A statement issued the same week by the "Executive Committee of the FIS Abroad" blamed the massacres
on the authorities, saying they "fit into the context of a politics of eradication [of Islamists] pursued by the regime,
which is trying to instrumentalize it these days for electoral purposes."
26
More radical FIS figures in exile, who were reportedly recently dismissed from the "Executive Committee
of the FIS Abroad," have suggested closer links between their party and the GIA. For example, Qamareddine
Kherbane, stated in an interview that the FIS rejected the GIA's practice of killing "innocents, Algerian or foreign,"
which he said was "the major difference between us and them." But rather than treat this unpardonable practice as
grounds for repudiating the GIA, he characterized the conflict with the GIA as "minor" and asserted that "all the
mujahedin (holy warriors) realize that the main enemy is the regime." Anouar Haddam, spokesperson for the "FIS
Parliamentary Delegation in Exile," appeared to justify a bomb that exploded on a crowded street outside an Algiers
police station on January 30, 1995, killing forty-two persons, most of them civilian passersby. In a conversation with
the Financial Times, he insisted that the attack was part of the "armed struggle." He said:
27
The mujahideen never meant to harm civilians. The bomb was meant for the central commissariat,
which is known as a torture centre. We send our deep condolences to the families of the victims.
Despite this claim, it should be noted that the attack occurred in broad daylight, shortly before the start of the holy
month of Ramadan, when the street was most likely to be jammed with pedestrians.
28
The FIS has called on its followers to boycott the elections but has not, to our knowledge, made or endorsed
threats against candidates or voters. Abdelkrim Ould Adda, told a news conference in Brussels on April 2, "The FIS
asks all citizens not to take part in this electoral conspiracy, neither by their mobilization nor by their vote, except
where they are forced to or where their security or means of support are put under pressure." However,
Qamareddine Kherbane, another FIS figure in. exile (see above), was quoted at about the same time as saying, "We
will do everything to boycott this fraudulent vote and to prevent elections froni taking place."
29
30
While a party is within its rights to call for a peaceful boycott, threats and violence intended to prevent or
deter participation in political life is manifestly criminal. During the 1995 presidential elections, the GIA was
reported to have threatened "a bullet for every ballot." Although we are unaware if a similar threat has been issued
during the current election campaign, the ongoing violence, the bloody record of the GIA and the known opposition
of armed Islamists to these elections certainly intimidates Algerians as they campaign and prepare to vote.
25
La Vanguardia, April 20, 1997, as reported in FBIS, Near East and South Asia, April 21,1997.
26
"Le FIS tient le pouvoir algerien pour responsable des tueries perpetrees," AFP, April 24, 1997.
27
Mark Dennis, "Algeria on the Brink," Newsweek, international edition, April 14, 1997.
28
Roula Khalaf, "Islamists Says Algiers Bomb Aimed at Police HQ," Financial Times, February 2, 1995.
29
Asharq Al-Awsat, April 4, 1997. See also, Jean-Paul Mari, "Les freres ennemis de I'islamisme algerien," Le Nouvel
Obsen'aieur, April 10, 1997.
30
"Une seule legitimite, celle de Madani et de Benhadj," Le Nouvel Obsen'aieur, April 10, 1997.
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�Indiscriminate bomb attacks in public places, calculated to inflict maximum civilian casualties, pose a
potential threat to campaign rallies or large meetings. During the month of Ramadan, which ended in early February,
car bombs in Algiers killed at least fifty people and injured more than 300. Statements issued in the name of the
GIA claimed responsibility for the attack. On May 11, four days before the start of the election campaign, bombs
exploded in a discotheque and three booby-trapped cars, killing six people and injuring seventy-one others, all in
greater Algiers. In the midst of the election campaign, three car bombs exploded in different towns killing at least
thirty people, according to security sources cited in the press. A leader of the MSP, Mohamed Chenouf, died in one
of the explosions on May 22 in the town of Boufarik, south of Algiers, and one of the car bombs exploded near a
hotel in Tlemcen where members of the CNISEL were staying.
31
32
Since the fall of 1996, many of the casualties have occurred during massacres committed against residents
of isolated rural communities. According to local press, the attackers have used rifles, knives, swords and even
chain-saws. Most of the victims have been women, children and infants. In April alone, more than 300 people were
slain in rural attacks. On April 21, the last day of registration for candidates for the election, ninety-three men,
women, and children were killed in an overnight attack on a farm in the Bougara region south of Algiers. On May
14, the eve of the election campaign, thirty civilians were killed in the area of Chebli, not far from Bougara and in
the Mitidja plains, an area known to be a GIA stronghold and also the site of concentrations of government-backed
armed militia.
Survivors have held Islamist groups responsible for many of the massacres, according to the local media.
However, there are persistent rumors that self-defense militias and security forces may also be implicated in some
of the attacks on rural settlements. Heavy press censorship and restrictions on access have made it difficult to
conduct independent investigations into many of these incidents.
The carnage and destruction of property in rural areas has displaced thousands, who have fled to the capital
or to other localities where they feel more protected. Some ofthe areas most affected by depopulation are Blida,
Bouira, Chief, Medea and M'sila. This disruption has diminished political life in these areas while raising concerns
about how and where displaced persons will be able to cast their votes.The election law requires voters to register
in their area of permanent residence. As of this writing, the government had not decided whether it intends to allow
the displaced persons to vote in what the election law refers to as "mobile" polling booths, or to provide them with
security to return home to vote. Political parties were urging the second choice.
33
34
The right to move about freely is also important during election periods, but armed groups have created
dangerous and frightening conditions that persuade Algerians to minimize their travel. Flundreds have been
slaughtered while traveling on intercity roads, either at false checkpoints manned by anned groups posing as security
forces, or while traveling in buses that have been ambushed.
31
AFP, February 24, 1997.
32
Associated Press, Algiers, May 11,1997.
33
AFP, May 24, 1997. For example, more than 2,000 residents have fled from outlying villages to the city of Tipasa, sixty
kilometers west of Algiers, according to Abderrahmane Denden, a member of the Algerian League of Human Rights and the
CNISEL. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 17, 1997.
34
FFS spokesperson Ali Rachedi said his party had asked the government to guarantee security to displaced persons so they
can return home. Abderrahmane Denden of the CNISEL said that commission was making the same recommendation.
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�Violence has taken the form of targeted political assassination as well. In June 1992, the military-appointed
president, Mohamed Boudiaf, was shot to death at a public rally. Since 1993, candidates and activists from a
variety of parties, including the FFS, the RCD, MSP (former Hamas), and smaller parties, have been assassinated
around the country, including in the run-up to elections. In September 1995, Abdelmadjid Benhadid, a presidential
aspirant, was slain. A senior official of the FFS, Embarek Mahiou, was assassinated ten days before the presidential
vote.
35
On May 10, 1997 gunmen shot dead two RCD activists in a high school in the Berber area of Beni Yenni,
about 120 kilometers east of Algiers. A day later, two activists representing a small party, the MAJD, were killed
in an ambush near the town of Medea, about 80 kilometers south of Algiers. These attacks, along with the deliberate
killing of hundreds of sitting government officials since 1992, including mayors, prosecutors, clerks and other public
servants, have terrorized others into withdrawing from public life. It is not possible to confirm the identities of the
perpetrators of these attacks, which the authorities have generally attributed to armed groups.
36
Many activists in political parties, women's rights organizations, and other civic and political associations
have taken to living a semi-clandestine life. Many sleep in different locations, alter their daily habits, and do not
publicize their movements in advance. This inhibits their ability to participate in the country's public and political
life, and deters others from becoming involved.
Others have fled the country. One activist with the secularist RCD party described the violence that
exploded during the 1993-1994 period, nearly costing him his life and driving him and his family into exile. A
professional in his late thirties, Khaled (he asked that his real name not be used), ran as an RCD candidate in 1991
for National Assembly in the governorate of'Ain Defla, an Islamist stronghold southwest of the capital:
The evening that the voting results [the FIS landslide of December 26, 1991] came in, there were
some Islamists in the room. They said nothing, but one of them looked at me and made a throatslashing gesture. [In the next few months] some of them started calling me and my wife "infidel"
[kafir] when they passed us in the streets. Democrats in the region started to be attacked later in
1992. I was warned that my son could be targeted. My wife stopped going out alone.
Khaled moved his family to his native Tizi-Ouzou govemorate, which was more peaceful, but they returned
to 'Ain Defla in August 1993 so that Khaled would not lose hisjob there:
In February 1994, some men told a guard in town that they were going to start killing the "infidels,"
especially "the one with the red car," meaning me. On February 3, a man called out my name on
the street. I didn't recognize him, so I was suspicious. I swung around and another man was behind
me with a butcher's knife. I hit him and knocked the knife from his hand. People came running.
We captured one of the guys, but the other escaped.
One day soon afterward, I heard gunfire near our area. I took my family and we hid near a water
station. The gunfire lasted one or one and-a-half hou;'.. The police never left their station. Lots of
people were killed, including the entire police crew of four or five men. When we went back to our
home, we discovered that it had been ransacked.
35
Although a young soldier was convicted in the killing, many Algerians believe that a larger conspiracy lies behind the killing
that has not been unveiled.
36
The RCD is well-known for its opposition to the program of Islamists. "Deux militants du RCD assassines a Beni Yenni,"
El-Watan, May 11, 1997.
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�The security forces from [a nearby city] sent reinforcements to our village. They killed seven people
in reprisal, people who did not have anything to do with the attack, people who were not even proF1S. They took these people to the gendarmerie [police station] in [the city] and their bodies were
later found in the woods.
Khaled went into hiding and, with the help of a contact in the military, evacuated his family from the region.
They returned to Tizi-Ouzou, where Khaled resumed his activism in the RCD. In September 1994, he learned that
a fire had destroyed his house in 'Ain Defla. He recalls:
I received a threatening tract, and noticed that I was being followed in Tizi-Ouzou. When I went
on errands I found myself between two cars that I suspected were up to something. I complained
to the police, but they said, Don't worry. But I realized I was safe nowhere, and decided to leave
the country.
37
Many Algerians active in political or civic organizations have had similar experiences or know others who
have. Delila Meziane, a refugee in France, described the persecution she suffered for her outspoken politics and her
independent lifestyle as a woman. Meziane, a lawyer born in 1957, was a long-time activist in the women's
movement, unions, and the communist PAGS party, the precursor of Ettahaddi. "I never missed a demonstration,"
she recalled. "I participated in marches against the FIS beginning in 1990. In 1992 I gave interviews on the radio
attacking the Islamists and the mixing of religion and the state." Meziane, who is single and lived alone, opened a
law practice in Bouira, a city near the capital where Islamist sympathies were strong. After being threatened several
times and aggressively confronted in the streets of Bouira, she and her female colleague closed the practice.
Meziane moved her law office to her apartment in the Bab Ezzouar district of Algiers. But the
threats continued. "The phone would ring and the persons on the other end would call me a "heathen" and
"unbeliever" and say I was going to die," she said. On the walls of her neighborhood, a list was posted naming local
women who lived alone and calling them "impure." In 1992, death threats were scrawled across her front door, and
her apartment was ransacked by unknown persons. In November of that year, a man who lived nearby whom she
knew to be an Islamist assaulted her and tried to strangle her. She managed to free herself. The assailant was
arrested but soon released.
In 1993, two friends and a policeman she knew were slain, and she witnessed a court clerk being killed on
the steps of an Algiers courthouse. In February of that year, she returned from a trip abroad to discover that her
apartment had again been ransacked and the doors and walls covered with death threats. The police advised her to
leave, warning that they could not assure her safety. She began sleeping at friends' homes. On March 17, 1993 she
returned home to pick up some documents and found that the phone, water and electricity had been cut off. Despite
the nighttime curfew in effect, she heard people outside her front door, knocking and shouting threats. Three days
later, Meziane left the country.
38
***
Since 1992, state repression has mostly been directed at suspected Islamists, their families, and sympathizers.
Before 1992, the FIS operated openly and legally, fielding candidates, publishing newspapers, and organizing rallies
and other political activity. This open activity, under the watchful eyes of the security services, facilitated the
massive round-up of many of these people beginning in 1992. In.the months following the cancellation of elections,
37
Human Rights Watch interview, Paris, July 10, 1995.
38
Human Rights Watch interview, Simandre, France, July 8, 1995.
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�at least 9,000 suspected Islamists including elected officials and rank-and-file supporters, were put into desert
detention camps without charge. Abdelqader Hachani, who was provisionally heading the party while its two chiefs
were in prison, was arrested in January 1992 for urging soldiers to disobey orders to repress the Algerian people.
He is now in his sixth year in detention without trial. The crackdown and continuing repression no doubt discourages
political activism by some actual or potential supporters of Islamist-leaning candidates.
New elements that heighten the level of fear among Islamist sympathizers and their relatives are the
communal guards and "self-defense" militias, armed and sponsored by the state. The communal guards, set up in
1993 and paid to back security forces in their areas of residence, operate under the jurisdiction of the interior
ministry. The "self-defense" militia, created mainly in poorly protected rural areas where armed groups are active,
have also been armed and sponsored by the state. While these two paramilitary forces have played a role in providing
security for some sectors of the vulnerable population, they have also reportedly carried out "anti-terrorist" operations
that go beyond self-defense and the limits of the law. These include offensive operations against individuals or
groups they define as "terrorists" and killings of suspected Islamists or their families in reprisal for acts attributed
to armed groups. Amid criticism that the "self-defense" militia were not subject to sufficient oversight, the
government issued a decree in March 1997 intended to bring them under closer supervision by the defense and
interior ministries.
39
Some political activists voiced concern about the effect of militias on political activity during the campaign.
"We don't want any militia around during the elections. They could belong to one party or another and intimidate
voters, " Abdel-Madjid Menacera, of the Islamist MSP party, commented. Many Algerians believe that the victims
of some rural massacres have been targeted by Islamist armed groups because the victims—or, more generally,
people in their village—were suspected of supporting the militia or security forces. Similarly, many Algerians
suspect that the security forces and militia have perpetrated killings against persons who are suspected of supporting
the Islamists. These perceptions must weigh heavily on voters in these terrorized areas when they contemplate the
fact that local voting patterns will become known after the elections.
40
The regular security forces have engaged in extrajudicial killings. Human Rights Watch and other groups
have reported on the suppression of a mutiny at Serkadji prison in Algiers in February 1995 that took the lives of
about one hundred inmates and was never properly investigated by the authorities. There has been no thorough
independent investigation of the circumstances in which security forces storm hideouts of persons described as
"terrorists." Amnesty International has noted that the official communiques concerning such clashes state, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, that all of the individuals in the group were killed, and none was arrested or injured,
including those who were not armed. This "raises the question of how many of these people were deliberately
extrajudicially executed, including killings as a result of excessive use of lethal force in situations where they posed
no threat to the lives of the security forces." The Algerian League of Human Rights (LADH) wrote recently that
under the emergency law "there has been an increase in the use of firearms and an abuse of them during the pursuit
41
42
39
Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence: A Hidden Human Rights Crisis, (AI Index MDE 28/11/96), November
1996.
40
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 1, 1997.
41
Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Six Months Later, Cover-Up Continues in Prison Clash that Left 100 Inmates
Dead," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 7, no. 5, August 1995.
42
Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence, p. 11.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�of persons suspected of violence and terrorism, or under threat of danger, which has led to a large number of
extrajudicial killings."
43
Algerian authorities have also engaged in a pattern of arbitrary arrests; prolonged detention without charge
or trial and with no access to lawyers or relatives and torture during interrogation. There have been numerous reports
of deaths during detention in suspicious circumstances.
44
Human Rights Watch investigated one high-profile case in which circumstances suggest that extra-judicial
execution was the cause of death. On January 28, 1997, Abdelhaq Benhamouda, head of Algeria's largest union, the
Union General de Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA), was assassinated outside the UGTA office in Algiers, despite the
presence of his guard detail. On February 23, Rachid Medjahed, a suspect being held in incommunicado detention,
"confessed" on Algerian television to having masterminded the assassination. Shortly thereafter, Medjahed's
relatives requested permission from an investigating judge to visit him in detention and were told that he had died.
A lawyer for the family obtained a police report dated February 26 stating that Medjahed was dead. On April 2 his
family was summoned to view his body in a morgue and reported that it bore nine bullet wounds. On April 8,
Minister of Justice Mohamed Adami told Human Rights Watch that, as far as he knew, Medjahed was being treated
in a hospital for three bullet wounds received during the clash that led to his arrest. In a letter sent to the authorities
on April 26, Human Rights Watch expressed concern that Medjahed was extrajudicially executed while in custody
and that authorities had sought to cover up, rather than expose what happened to him between his arrest and his death.
In a May 11 letter responding to the intervention by Human Rights Watch, the ONDH stated that it had learned from
the authorities that Medjahed had indeed been wounded during his arrest and died on March 18 from "complications"
related to the injuries he had suffered. The information conveyed by the ONDH was inconsistent with Human Rights
Watch's finding that the family had been told well before March 18 of Medjahed's death and that the police report
confirming the death was dated February 26. The case illustrates why many Algerians are sometimes skeptical of
government attribution of most acts of political violence to Islamist groups.
45
46
Human Rights Watch also spoke in Algiers with relatives of several persons arrested between 1994 and early
January 1997, and whose whereabouts were still unknown in April 1997. In many of the cases, the family was either
unable to locate their detained relative through inquiring at local police stations and with higher authorities, or had
lost track of them after they had been transferred from one holding facility to another. All had submitted at least one
inquiry with the ONDH or directly with the government. Lawyers told us they were pursuing hundreds of such cases
of reported disappearances. Justice Minister Adami said that his ministry takes reports of missing persons seriously.
"We give these cases all our special attention," he said. "Sometimes we find the person in question, but until we do
we keep the files open on these cases."
47
48
43
44
Statement by the LADH on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, April 11,1997.
See Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence.
45
Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Human Rights Watch Urges Investigation of Death in Detention of Suspect
in Labor Leader's Killing," April 30, 1997.
46
Speculation as to who killed Benhamouda began the day he died. Many observers noted that he may have won the enmity
of factions within the country's leadership after he declared his intention late last year to launch a political party that would have
been pro-President Zeroual in the June 5 elections. Medjahed's "confession" followed by his death—instead of a court
trial—further obscures the identity of the labor leader's assassins.
47
48
See also Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence.
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Those relatives we interviewed had received replies via the ONDH after considerable delays, if they received
replies at all. But none of the replies specified a reason for the arrest nor information on the person's whereabouts.
Sometimes, the ONDH responses stated that the missing person may have joined the armed groups. For example,
Zobeir Chekhli's family complained to the ONDH on March 9, 1996, about his disappearance in June 1995. About
a year later, the ONDH replied that, according to the gendarmerie, Chekhli had not been arrested, and that he may
have joined the armed groups, since his brother Lahkdar was a "terrorist" and had been arrested.
49
Human Rights Watch spoke to a relative of two young men, Djamil and Mourad Chihoub, who "disappeared"
after their brother joined an armed Islamist group:
In May 1996, when military forces came to look for Saeed, who had gone to the armed groups, they
took away Djamil instead, from our home in Baraqi. They told me to find Saeed. Since then, we
found out that Saeed had been killed, but Djamil has not been returned. I looked everywhere for
him, in morgues, hospitals, and have written to officials, but got no reply. Then, on November 1996,
the military forces together with a self-defense group from Baraqi came to our house at around 11
o'clock at night and warned me, "If you move, we will shoot," and they took away my youngest son,
Mourad. According to rumors he was arrested in connection to the armed groups.
The family wrote to the authorities but has received no information. The boys' father was summoned to
military security headquarters in February, along with other relatives of "disappeared" persons, where he was asked
for details of the cases by the social services department formed late last year to trace "disappeared" persons. The
fate of Djamil and Mourad Chihoub remains unknown.
A relative of Mohamed Oucief, twenty-six, described how he was arrested around 2 a.m. on March 28, 1997
by six armed security personnel:
They forced their way through the balcony of our first floor apartment. One of the men was masked.
They had no identification papers or arrest warrant. They went to Mohamed's room, and when 1
entered I saw the masked man hitting him and asking him questions about something he had
delivered to somebody. They pushed me out and shut the door and then took him away. We only
found out today, from neighbors who visited their son in Serkadji prison, that Mohamed was there,
but we have no information about a trial or anything else. We managed to confirm that he was
indeed in Serkadji from a guard at the gate, after a lot of pleading. This is the usual way to find out
where people are taken to and held.
50
Noureddine Mihoubi, twenty-nine, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested more than four years
ago as he was visiting a brother outside Algiers. He was held at a police station there and his family was able to
visit him and bring him food and medicine for fifteen days. Then they were told that he had been transferred to
Algiers but were given no further information. A month later, a newly released detainee told them he had seen
Noureddine at the military security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in poor condition. The family in the
summer of 1996 obtained a police report issued in July 1996 saying he had been arrested by security forces and
transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. His location and fate remain unknown.
51
49
ONDH showed this correspondence to Human Rights Watch at its headquarters on April 5, 1997.
50
Human Rights Watch interview with a relative of Mohamed Oucief who wished to remain anonymous, Algiers, April 6,
1997.
51
Human Rights Watch interview with a relative of Noureddine Mihoubi who wished to remain anonymous, Algiers, April
6, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�Ali Belhadj, one of the two FIS chiefs imprisoned since June 1991, was last seen by his family and lawyers
in the beginning of 1995. He was tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve years in jail. He is facing new charges
following the alleged discovery of a letter from him on the body of an armed Islamist implicating him in inciting
violence. His lawyers have written to the authorities, including President Zeroual, asking for their right under
Algerian law to have access to their client and complaining that his whereabouts were unknown. In April, the
London-based Arabic language daily Al-Hayat quoted a FIS statement saying he had been moved to Blida military
jail.
52
The ONDH acknowledged in its 1994-1995 report the existence of secret detention centers in "places that
the law has not designed for that function. They are mainly...certain police stations or army barracks serving as
detention centers. Persons arrested were freed after more than three months of secret detention in these places."
53
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
The obstacles that a government or other actors place in the way of holding meetings, rallies, debates, and
other public events have a direct bearing on the openness of elections. While Algeria's constitution guarantees, in
Article 41, "freedom of expression, association and assembly," the state of emergency and the Law on Assemblies
and Public Demonstrations impose excessive limits on these rights. In practice, restrictions on political gatherings
have been inconsistent. Legal parties of all tendencies have been able to hold meetings and public rallies, but their
gatherings have been banned or restricted on some occasions.
5
International law permits restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly only in narrow circumstances. ''
Advance prohibitions of assemblies must always be exceptional measures, and be based on well-founded concerns
for security or public safety, and not on preventing persons from challenging the legitimacy of the government of
the moment. As the examples provided in this report show, the measures taken by the authorities to restrict freedom
of the press, assembly and association clearly exceed that which may be justified on the basis of legitimate concerns
for security and public order.
On February 13, 1992, the Algerian government notified the United Nations Secretary-General that it was
imposing a state of emergency and, in accordance with Article 4(3) ofthe ICCPR, derogating from articles of the
covenant. That article states that derogations may not exceed "the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation." The Algerian government, in its letter to the Secretary-General, asserted that the state of emergency
"which is aimed essentially at restoring public order, protecting the safety of individuals and property and ensuring
the normal operation of institutions and public services, does not interfere with the democratic process inasmuch as
the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms continues to be guaranteed."
52
Also arrested and tried with Ben Hadj, FIS leader Abbassi Madani i: held in an unknown location outside Algiers where
his sister has reportedly been able to visit him.
53
Observatoire National des droits de I'homme, Rapport 1994-1995, p. 44-45.
54
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 21 provides:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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�International jurisprudence suggests strongly that even where one finds "a public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation," a government cannot simply equate its own perpetuation with the "life of the nation." The
European Commission of Human Rights, interpreting the identical language of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights," concluded that the threat to the "life of the nation" must, in its magnitude, involve
the whole nation. This characterization can refer with equal justification to the application of Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
56
57
The February 9, 1992 state of emergency decree gives the interior minister and local governors sweeping
powers to "restrict or prohibit the movement of persons and vehicles," order the "temporary closure of [all types of]
halls and ban all demonstrations that could disturb the public order and peace." The decree does not require the
authorities to explain or justify such measures.
In addition, public gatherings by parties and associations are restricted by December 1991 amendments to
Law 89-28 relating to assemblies and demonstrations. The procedure for organizing gatherings shifted from one of
simple notification, where the provincial governor (wali) had authority to request a change of location, to one of
obtaining permission from the wali, who is appointed by the president and who can "ban an assembly and inform
its organizers if it is deemed to poses a real risk of disturbing public order or if it clearly appears that the real
objective of the meeting constitutes a danger for the preservation of public order."
During the 1995 presidential elections, authorities refused to authorize some meetings called by political
parties urging a boycott of the election, including the FFS and the FLN. The government also arrested overnight an
activist, Djamel Zenati, who publicly urged a boycott, and allowed little or no television coverage of those urging
a boycott of the vote.
58
There was similar, sporadic interference with those parties that opposed the constitutional referendum of
November 1996. Seddik Debaili, FFS secretary general, said:
We asked to debate the proposed constitution on television before the referendum. That was
refused. Some of our militants in.Bejaia [governorate] were arrested, tried and acquitted on the day
of the constitutional referendum. They were accused of pressuring the voters to vote "No."
59
Following the constitutional referendum, the FFS was not permitted to hold a rally to denounce "the fraudulent result
and injustice" of the vote, according to Bouallam Kolai, in charge of inter-party relations at the FFS. "When we asked
permission to hold an outdoor rally on December 12," he said, "The authorities responded that our request was not
made in the formally correct way. We complied and made a second, correct request, but again we were rejected, with
no reason."
60
15
European Convention forthe Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (1950).
56
Greek case, 12a Y.B. Eur. Conv. Human Rights, para. 153 (1969).
57
Buergenthal, "State Obligations and Permissible Derogations," The International Bill of Rights, p. 80.
58
See Human Rights Watch/Middle East press release, November 16, 1995.
59
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
60
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�In May 1997, some political parties and independent candidates complained that following their public
election campaign meetings, local officials and security forces had harassed attendants or tried to pressure them into
joining the RND. The head of the MSP, Mahfoudh Nahnah, said his party was prevented from holding some
meetings, while the pro-government parties had easy access to public halls. He threatened on May 26 to pull out of
the elections:
There is a double standard at work here, and there are abuses. Our candidates held a meeting in a
cafe yesterday and the owners were later questioned by security forces. Unless the administration
stops interfering, we will have to pull out because we will not be part of a rigged election.
61
Representatives of other political parties and civic associations complained that their freedom to hold
meetings had been sharply curtailed in the past two years. These included parties sitting in the National Transitional
Council, whose members are government-appointed. For example, Abdelmedjid Menacera, a senior figure in the
MSP, said his party did not get permission to meet in public halls. This, he said:
hindered the party's activities because some small towns only had spaces that were governmentowned. We have complained to the highest levels, and we always were reassured our needs would
be met, but the problem is at a lower level, where local officials have the freedom to act as they
please.
62
The Interior Ministry's director of civil liberties, Belhadj Abdel Razeq, told Human Rights Watch, 'The only
reason to reject a request for a public meeting by a party or an association is related to security, if there is any danger,
or a security problem. But this is decided at the local level and not at our office."
63
The National Union of Magistrates (1'Union nationale de magistrals) took the governor (wali) of the Algiers
governorate to court because he refused its request for a permit to hold a meeting in December 1996. A split in the
union had resulted in the leadership of one of the factions holding its own general assembly last October. When the
other faction, which claims to be more independent of government influence, requested permission to convene its
general assembly, the wali refused, explaining that the new leadership had already met. "The wali has overstepped
his authority and has no right to pass judgment on the union leadership," Fatima Chenaif, chief magistrate at the
criminal court of Algiers and a founding member of the union, told us.
64
Members of the Rally for Youth Action (Rassemblement action des jeunes, RAJ), a nongovernmental youth
association that leads university seminars and addresses the problems of unemployment, poverty and human rights,
said their group had come under heavy pressure, including bans on meetings, particularly after it launched a
"Manifesto for Peace" in April 1995. The organization demanded "respect for human rights regardless of social
position, ideology or culture," the right to peaceful assembly, and "a peace process, in which all, with no exception,
must participate."
Karima Hammache, RAJ's director of public relations, said:
61
Roula Khalaf, "Islamist party may pull out of Algeria poll," Financial Times, May 27, 1997.
62
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 1, 1997.
63
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
64
Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, D.C, May 8, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�At our concert in June 1995, for which we were given permission the same day, we got thousands of people
to sign our manifesto for peace. We want the political opposition and the government to talk to each other.
They clash and we, the young people, are victims caught in the middle.
65
Since the concert, she said, the authorities have rarely allowed RAJ activists to hold seminars and
conferences in high schools or in state-run youth centers, and rejected a request to organize a concert in March 1997.
"Before our 1995 concert, we had access to the radio and to the public press. We realize there are armed Islamist
terrorists, but we can't understand why the government restricts organizations like ours which are against all forms
of totalitarianism," Hammache said.
Another call for a broad-based political dialogue was made by an ad hoc group of political figures, lawyers,
and intellectuals in November 1996, many of whom were identified with the National Contract platform. Their
initiative, a Call for Peace (Appel pour la paix), condemned the proposed constitution and called for a dialogue with
political forces across the spectrum, an end to the emergency law, the release of prisoners of conscience, and freedom
of expression.
The government initially rejected a request for permission by the group to hold a public meeting planned in
December 1996. The government allowed a Call for Peace rally in March, and about 1,000 people attended,"
according to Bouallam Kolai, an FFS activist and signatory of the Call for Peace.
66
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Press freedom is an essential condition for free and fair elections. This includes the coverage accorded the
various parties and candidates and the flow of information more generally that will influence Algerians' decisions
about whom to elect. For example, authorities make frequent claims that terrorism is "residual" and have accused
the press of blowing it out of proportion. In assessing whether the present policies pursued toward political violence
are succeeding, Algerians need accurate information about the nature and extent of political violence in their country.
But this is the area where press censorship is most strict.
67
Government restrictions on expression in Algeria violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which Algeria has ratified. The ICCPR states in Article 19(2):
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The Covenant allows certain restrictions on this right, including for the protection of national security or of
public order (Article 19(3Xb)). Derogations are also permitted in the event of "a public emergency which threatens
65
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 11, 1997.
66
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
67
In a typical declaration, Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf stated in March, "Terrorism has failed at every level. It has not
caused the collapse of the institutions and has not prevented normal life at the political, economic, social and cultural level from
continuing. Democracy is being consolidated, and pluralism is taking root. Terrorism has been unable to mobilize the people
and is now wreaking vengeance upon them with contemptible killings which are proof of its failure. The elimination of terrorism
is simply a question of time." Le Soir (Brussels), March 13,1997, as reported in FBIS, Near East and South Asia, March 13,
1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
25
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June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed...to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation." (Article 4(1)). The Government of Algeria exercised the option provided in Article 4(3)
for taking derogations by informing the United Nations Secretary-General of the imposition of the state of emergency
(see above).
As the examples provided below demonstrate, most of the Algerian government's actions against the press
since 1992 seem primarily designed to inhibit criticism of government officials and institutions, and to muzzle
independent reporting and commentary on the internal security situation. These actions go well beyond the "extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" to protect "the life of the nation."
After massive street riots and protests over political and economic conditions in November 1988, the state
and ruling party ended their monopoly over the media. Dozens of private dailies and weeklies and political party
organs were launched. Radio, television, and the main news agency (Algerie Presse Service, or APS) remained in
state hands, but they broadened their coverage to include hitherto taboo subjects, such as demands for Berber cultural
and linguistic rights, and provided access to politicians critical of the authorities, including the leaders ofthe FIS.
Algerian media emerged as among the liveliest in the Arab world. The print press continues to tackle some issues
generally untouched in other parts of the region. It gives coverage to politicians and parties that are critical ofthe
authorities, and is free, within certain limits to expose social ills and question aspects of the government's
performance.
Since 1992 however, press freedom has been steadily eroded by government pressures, censorship, and
financial constraints, as well as by the violence against journalists that is generally attributed to Islamist groups. The
erosion has been most dramatic at Algerian television and radio, which have reverted to being government
mouthpieces (see below).
No discussion of press freedom is possible without considering the assassination campaign that has cost the
lives of some fifty-nine journalists and media workers since 1993. Others have been wounded in assassination
attempts. Although individual killings have rarely been followed by claims of responsibility or court trials that
identified the culprits, it is clear from publicly issued threats and occasional claims of responsibility that armed
Islamist groups, and particularly the GIA, are responsible for many, if not most, of these assassinations.
68
Statements attributed to Islamist groups have railed against a pro-govemment bias in the media. In fact, the
journalists and others who have been slain do not share any particular political affiliation; some were secularist but
critical of the government, while others had Islamist sympathies. The target of the violence has been the media in
general, and the victims have included editors, reporters, photographers, proofreaders, and drivers, both men and
women apparently perceived as working either to promote the government's version of the conflict or to undermine
the Islamist movement by failing openly to support it.
The campaign of violence against journalists has clearly affected the ability of the press to inform the public.
In addition to the members of the profession who have been killed, many have fled to other countries, fearing for
their lives; others have dropped out of the profession. Those who continue to work take precautions such as sleeping
in different locations, avoiding daily routines that might facilitate the work of an assassin, and skipping on-site
reporting that they might otherwise undertake. All of this has taken a heavy toll on the ability of media to inform
their readers.
68
Article 19 and Committee to Protect Journalists, "Press Freedom Groups Condemn Algeria's Silencing of the Independent
Press," May 21, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�The government has exercised vigorous censorship ofthe independent press through various means, ranging
from banning newspapers and jailing reporters to exerting financial pressures on the private print media, which in
1996 accounted for 77 percent of the total print press volume and 83 percent of sales. The issues subjected to
censorship are important to voters choosing a national assembly, including security, human rights, and criticism of
the government's handling ofthe economy.
69
The 1990 press code provides the basis for significant restrictions on the press. It allows for the prosecution
ofjournalists, editors and publishers for dissemination of "harmful" information. Article 86 provides five-to-ten-year
prison sentences and fines for deliberately publishing or spreading "false or misleading information capable of
harming national order or state security." Article 87 states:
The incitement by means of any information media to crimes or misdemeanors against state security
or national unity, when the incitement produces these consequences, shall subject the director of the
publication and the author of the offending article to penal sanctions as accomplices to the crimes
and misdemeanors that are committed. If the provocation produces no consequences, the director
and the author shall be punished by imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 10,000 to
100,000 dinars, or one of the two.
The Penal Code has also been used to prosecute journalists for defaming state institutions and agencies.
Article 96 provides that anyone who disseminates, with an intent to persuade others, material "that may harm the
national interest" is subject to a prison term of up to three years and a fine of up to 36,000 Algerian dinars
(approximately U.S.$640. at the official rate). Article 144 provides that anyone who wilfully causes grave offense
to employees of the government in terms of the performance of their duties, shall be subject to a prison sentence and
a fine. Article 146 provides punishments for giving grave offense to state institutions, and Article 147 for acts or
words that "aim to discredit judicial decisions and that may harm the authority and independence of the judiciary."
Several journalists who have written critically about the authorities or about the judiciary have been charged under
these articles (see below).
The 1992 state of emergency decrees provide for punishments for the publication or distribution of
documents that attack symbols of the state, or "obstruct" the authorities. They define "terrorism" and "subversion"
to include, among other things, acts "directed at state security, territorial integrity, the stability and normal
functioning of institutions," whose purpose is to "impede the functioning of public institutions or harming the life
or property of their agents, or impeding the application of laws or regulations." Article 4 of the same decree goes
well beyond Article 87 of the press code, and well beyond international law, by punishing not just "incitement" but
also "expressions of sympathy for" and "encouragement" of proscribed acts.
70
Since 1992, according to Reporters sans frontieres (RSF), a press freedom organization based in France, at
least twenty-three journalists have been detained, thirty-nine have received summons to appear in court, and there
have been fifty-eight incidents involving the seizure, suspension or banning of dailies or weeklies in connection with
security matters or criticism of the authorities.
71
In January 1993, when the pace of attacks by armed opposition groups was accelerating, the government
began implementing regulations, through circulars and directives, that prevent media from publishing unauthorized .
69
Reporters sans frontieres (Reporters without Borders), "Algerie: La guerre civile i huis clos," March 1997.
70
Legislative Decree 92-03 Relative to the Fight against Subversion and Terrorism.
71
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: La guerre civile a huis clos."
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�information about the actions of the security forces and of the armed groups. In March 1994, the government issued
a circular to the press instructing editors-in-chief to publish security-related information only if it was obtained from
the official APS news agency. In February 1996 the interior ministry established "reading committees" at the print
media to censor news reports that do not conform to the instructions. Journalists and senior editors of private
newspapers told us that the reading committee scrutinizes all sec urity-related reports, advises the editor on what to
censor and may remove a page or ban the day's edition altogether if its advice has not been followed.
As a result of the security-related censorship, newspapers print almost nothing about losses sustained by
security forces or reports implicating the regular security forces or paramilitary forces, in attacks on civilians or other
human rights abuses. They are permitted to cover killings and massacres of civilians attributed by authorities to
armed Islamist extremists, although the press has at different times been instructed either to play up or play down
this sort of news and has been prevented from conducting independent investigations into massacres and reporting
on its findings.
During a spate of rural massacres in January, many of which were covered in the local press, Interior Minister
Mustafa Benmansour accused journalists of "exaggerating the number of victims or even inventing acts of
terrorism," and threatened unspecified sanctions against media that "play the game of terrorist propaganda." His
statements came a day after President Zeroual gave a televised address concerning the violence, promising to
intensify efforts to wipe out "terrorism." Following the interior minister's warning, coverage ofthe massacres
diminished in the private press. However, in April, papers resumed detailed stories of the carnage attributed to the
armed groups, featuring quotes from survivors, the names of victims and their families, and photos of bodies in
shrouds and damaged homes.
72
These mixed signals apparently reflect the authorities' conflicting objectives of wishing to minimize the
capabilities of the armed groups and at the same time to publicize atrocities attributed to them in order to rally
support for a tough security response. Salima Ghezali has said that the newspaper she edits, La Nation, refuses to
cover security incidents because it believes that government restrictions on coverage make objective reporting
. impossible.
Belhadj Abdel Razek, director of the office of public liberties at the Interior Ministry, minimized the extent
of state interference in the press. While acknowledging that his ministry had exerted control on the press "briefly"
after the presidential elections, he stated, "If there is now any censor committee at the printing press level, 1 don't
know about it, it is not our domain. We try not to control the press. Although they publish many lies and
inaccuracies and we ask them to publish corrections, we don't take them to court for it."
73
Some newspapers with well-placed security contacts sometimes publish their own reports of security
incidents without repercussions—so long as the information does not displease the authorities. In addition, four or
five private papers have sometimes, in defiance of the restrictions, coordinated the publication on a given day of the
same, independently obtained report, making it politically more difficult for the authorities to seize all the papers for
the day, according to several Algerian journalists working for private newspapers. According to these journalists
and othe" observers, when official coverage of a security-related incident is allowed, such as an attack attributed to
Islamists, reporters for the Algerian media are generally escorted as a group by armed members of the security forces,
who generally remain present during interviews with survivors or eyewitnesses. "When reporters go to the site of
a massacre, the security forces block the place and we can't get close to it. Sometimes the forces allow some
journalists to take pictures, conduct interviews with family members, but journalists are never free to go on their
72
Associated Press, January 26, 1997.
73
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�own," a journalist working for an Algerian daily and who asked to remain anonymous told us. While most attacks
by armed groups in rural areas have been attributed by authorities to Islamist groups, the "self-defense" militia are
suspected in some of them, many Algerians told us. However, even if these areas were open to reporters who wished
to investigate, state censorship would prevent the dissemination of any findings that implicated the military-backed
militia or regular security forces.
Foreign journalists must obtain visas to visit Algeria, which are sometimes refused. Roula Khalaf of the
Financial Times was denied a visa during the early months of 1997, although she was granted one in May, during
the election campaign. In 1996, the authorities withdrew the accreditation of two Spanish correspondents, Ferran
Sales of the daily El Pais (Madrid) and Tahar Majdoub of the EFE agency. Those who are allowed in are assigned
security force escorts by the foreign press center attached to the foreign ministry, ostensibly for their own protection.
Authorities reject attempts by journalists to waive this escort. Resident foreign journalists are allowed to move free
of escorts, but their coverage of security-related incidents, such as the recent rural massacres, is tightly controlled
by military security or government-backed militia who have accompanied reporters to the scene ofthe incident and
have remained nearby during interviews with witnesses or survivors.
Visiting foreign reporters have complained that the "protection" hampers their freedom of movement and
often intimidates people they wish to interview. Peter Strandberg, a journalist for several European newspapers, said
that when he traveled in April to Tizi-Ouzou, a provincial capital east of Algiers, he was accompanied by some
twenty-five military personnel in army vehicles, six of them in plainclothes. They accompanied him, over his
objections, into a coffeehouse, a textile factory, a mosque and a school. The plainclothes escorts later asked some
of the people Strandberg spoke to for an account of their conversation, Strandberg said. He complained about the
interference to the press center but got no reply. ''
7
Government efforts to restrict the media extend far beyond security topics, and affect reporting about
corruption, criticism of government personalities, and other issues that might displease those in power. "The press
liberties in theory consolidate a liberal political system, but on the ground the realities are different," said Khaled
Bourayou, a lawyer representing a number of independent newspapers. "Some of the Algerian press is against
Islamic fundamentalism, but it is also against the system which is still tainted by single-party rule and is not
transparent. So as soon as the press denounces the economic and political mafia," they face trouble.
75
The French-language daily El-Watan faced charges of defamation in October 1995 and its editor-in-chief
and reporter were placed under court supervision when it published a report about the import of medical equipment
and the alleged embezzlement of government funds.
76
The editor-in-chief and a reporter of another French-language independent daily, Liberie, were given
suspended prison sentences in December 1995 for writing that a presidential advisor was to be promoted to defense
minister, while at the same time publishing a story critical of him. (President Zeroual held, and continues to hold
the defense portfolio.)
77
74
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 7, 1997.
75
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
76
When under court supervision, the court may restrict a person's civil liberties such as foreign travel. Under court supervision,
El-Watan editor Omar Belhouchet was almost prevented from participating in a ceremony honoring slain journalists in
Washington in May 1996. After international protests, his passport was returned and he was able to travel.
77
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: La guerre civile a huis clos.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�La Tribune, a French-language daily, was suspended for six months and its publisher and editor given oneyear suspended sentences in September 1996 for a satirical cartoon that "profaned" the Algerian flag. After a month
in preventive detention, the cartoonist, Chawki Amari, was given a suspended three-year sentence for desecrating
a national emblem by his cartoon printed on July 2. It showed two men walking underneath flags draped across a
street. "Is this for the July 5 celebration (Algerian independence day)?" asks one man. "No, they are hanging out
their dirty laundry," replies the other man.
When the paper resumed publication, Amari and editor-in-chief Baya Gacemi quit their posts. Since its
resumption, Ms. Gacemi said La Tribune has moderated its criticism ofthe authorities. "The editorial management
has adopted a different strategy, to avoid any problems and not to take any risks," she observed.
78
Journalists have also been detained without charge by the government, and have sometimes "disappeared"
for periods of time. A journalist recently detained without charge or trial told us of his experience. Mohammed
Yousfi, formerly with Al- 'Alam Al-Siyassi, an Arabic daily that reflects varied viewpoints, including Islamist ones,
was arrested in his hotel room on March 5 as he was attending a conference on the rule of law in Tizi-Ouzou:
Two armed men entered my hotel room at three o'clock in the morning, they flashed a strong light
in my face and pointed their guns at my chest. I was paralyzed with fear. They didn't identify
themselves. They searched my room and dragged me out to a car and pushed me.inside, lowering
my head to the ground.
Yousfi said he was kept for fifteen days in numerous detention centers that he could not identify, since he
had been blindfolded when he was transferred. He recalled:
When they brought me in court, the prosecutor looked confused and said he had no charge against me. The
judge acquitted me immediately. I demanded compensation, but the judge told me I should just be relieved
that I am free.
79
Abdelkader Hadj Benaamane, a journalist at the official APS news agency, was freed on April 2 on parole,
after spending more than two years of a three-year sentence in prison, handed down by a military court. He had been
arrested in connection with a report he had filed on the internal APS wire disclosing the place where Ali Belhadj,
the second in command of the FIS, was held. The internal APS wire goes to the President and government ministers.
Benaamane disappeared February 27, 1995, and his whereabouts were unknown until El-Watan reported almost two
months later that he had been arrested.
The fate of at least three other journalists who have "disappeared" over the last three years remains unknown.
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist with Islamist sympathies at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. He had been
jailed twice before since 1991. His wife, Safia, stated that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from his
home in el-Harrache by men they believed to belong to the security forces. In response to her inquiries, she has
received no official information about his whereabouts other than a statement by the Ministry of Justice that there
was no record of his arrest at el-Harrache's local police station.
80
78
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 2, 1997.
79
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
80
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 11, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�In two other cases, the identity of those responsible is more unclear. Mohammed Hassaine, reporter for Alger
Republicain, was abducted by unknown persons in March 1994; Kadour Bouselham, of the state-owned Horizon,
has been missing since October 29, 1994. '
8
A recent case is that of Aziz Bouabdallah, journalist with the Arabic-language daily Al-Alam al-Siyassi
who was taken from his home on April 12, 1997 by three men who introduced themselves as members of the security
forces. His family has been unable to obtain information on his whereabouts, but Amnesty International reported
that, according to information it had received, he was being held in the Chateauneuf military security center in
Algiers.
The government also resorts to a combination of financial pressure and strong-arm tactics to keep in line the
private press through its domination of the country's printing presses, imported newsprint supplies and advertising
budgets. In 1996, the interior ministry banned weeklies and dailies on at least six occasions. These include ElWatan, censored on April 24 and May 7 when the Algerian government-owned Algiers Printing Press (Societe
d'Impression d'Alger, SIA) refused to print the issues. Journalists at the paper attributed the censorship to the
coverage of government counterinsurgency operations.
82
83
The press that has been hit hardest by government control has been the pro-Islamist and Islamist-leaning
press, most of it published in Arabic. The first to be closed were the organs of the FIS, El-Mowujuidh and ElForqane, in February 1992. At least four Arabic-language dailies and weeklies were suspended by the authorities
between 1992 and 1995 and have not reappeared since. They include AssahAfa, a satirical weekly suspended and
accused in August 1992 of being a de facto FIS "mouthpiece" and Djazair el-Yom, suspended twice in 1992 and again
in 1993.
The governmental printing houses have altered their past practice by requiring some of its private customers
to remain completely current on their bills. These include La Nation and its Arabic-language sister weekly, alHourria, private papers that favored the National Contract (see above) and wrote critically of the 1995 presidential
elections. Neither has been able to resume publication since December 1996, when the Algiers Printing Press (SIA)
refused to print the papers until they paid their debts.
84
La Nation had been suspended at least nine times between January 1995 and December 1996. Its owner was
charged with "endangering state security," following an interview with a FIS leader Abdelkader Omar in August
1995. No official reasons were given for the suspensions. In one instance, the issue carried a large report on human
rights in Algeria co-published with Le Monde Diplomatique in March 1996. In another instance the issue of AlHourria featured a review of a book on human rights in Algeria.
Algeria's four operating printing presses are all state-run. The sole private press, Sodipresse, was closed
down in April, less than three months after its launching. One owner, Saad Lounas, was arrested on April 10, 1997
and sentenced to thirty months in prison on April 28 for allegedly writing a check with insufficient funds to the
81
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: la guerre civile a huis clos," p. 22.
82
Amnesty International Urgent Action, UA 118/97 "Disappearance/Fear of torture," (Al Index: MDE 28/06/97), April 28,
1997.
83
Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 1996, A Worldwide Survey' by the Committee to Protect Journalists.
(New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 1997).
84
A statement issued by the two papers at the time protested the move on grounds that a sixty-day grace period was generally
granted.
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June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�public-sector Algiers Printing Press (SIA). Lounas has appealed his sentence. He is also editor of an Arabiclanguage daily El-Oumma, which has not been published since the closure of Sodipresse.
El-Oumma and the Arabic-language weekly Ech-Chorouk, which was also printed by Sodipresse, both favor
a political dialogue with Islamists. Journalists at El-Oumma charged that Lounes's arrest was meant to "wreck the
first private printing venture and to prevent the publication of El-Oumma at all cost." Whatever the merits of the
charges against Lounas, we note that, as a result of the collapse of Sodipresse, the Algerian media are again without
a private printing press.
85
Ech-Chorouk's editors have been charged some twenty times in the last five years for "insulting personalities
of authority" and "inciting rebellion," according to editor-in-chief Ali Fodhil. At the same time, three members
of the staff, two of them women, were killed since 1995 in attacks blamed widely on the armed Islamist groups.
Journalist Malika Sabour was killed in May 1995 after receiving death threats in the name of the GIA. Khadija
Dahnani, a graduate in Islamic theology who wrote political and economic stories critical of the government, was
killed near her home in December 1995. Hamaoui Mokrane, marketing director at Ech-Chorouk, was killed in
October 1996 by gunmen who fired at his car. The government said security forces later shot dead his killers.
86
The state-run publishing house Entreprise Nationale Algerienne de Presse cited unpaid bills when, in
February 1997, it stopped printing Ech-Chorouk, which claims a circulation of 250,000. The paper filed a suit
claiming ENAP had not honored its contract, and in March a civil court ordered ENAP to resume printing EchChorouk. An appeals court upheld the ruling at the end of April, but two weeks later the paper was still not in print.
In May, Fodhil, the editor, told us, "The ENAP has given us no reason. They can't point to a debt because the court
has ruled that there was none. So for the moment we are still suspended."
87
Broadcast media
. Algeria's twenty-eight million citizens are spread out over the second largest country on the African
continent. The illiteracy rate is estimated to be 43 percent. These features reinforce the importance of broadcast
media as sources of political news. In Algeria, all radio and television stations are government-controlled. Stations
broadcast in the Arabic, French and Tamazight languages.
88
The 1990 press code requires in Article 10 that broadcast media "assure equal access to expression for
currents of opinion and thought," and "under no circumstances [are] to take into consideration influences or
considerations that would compromise the accuracy of information." Since 1992, radio and especially television have
strayed far from these principles, becoming more like the government mouthpieces they were during the quartercentury of one-party rule. A columnist in the daily El-Watan recently observed, "Censorship has hit television hard,
not only with regard to images of violence but also any images that are not in line with the official discourse. The
rare "moments of truth" serve political or electoral calculations; they respond generally to concerns about timing but
never to a simple concern to inform."
89
85
AFP, Algiers, April 19, 1997.
86
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31. 1997.
87
Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 15, 1997.
88
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 1996 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1996). (URL:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/ag.htm.)
89
A. Balil, "Misere mediatique," El-Watan, May 11, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Many Algerians watch European television broadcasts via satellite, and sometimes first hear news about their
country on foreign channels, especially concerning security issues or the positions of political parties critical of the
authorities. Radio remains somewhat livelier and more varied in its political coverage. Interviews with and coverage
of oppositionfiguresand parties are more frequent.
The government assigned the National Independent Elections Observation Commission (CNISEL) the task
of apportioning airtime on broadcast media for each of the parties and independent candidates competing in the
elections. The election law states, in Article 175, that the CNISEL is to allocate radio and television time "according
to the respective number of candidates presented by each political party or group of political parties." Independent
candidates may qualify for air time by forming groups among themselves.
The 1997 elections law sets guidelines for the conduct of the campaign. Some of those guidelines infringe
on the right to freedom of expression. Article 174 says, "The use of foreign languages during the electoral campaign
is forbidden." The Constitution says in Article 3 that "Arabic is the national and official language." A significant
percentage of the population speak a Berber language, Tamazight, that is unrelated to Arabic. Some Algerians
consider French to be their first language. The election law also requires candidates to refrain from "any disloyal,
dishonorable, illegal or immoral gesture, attitude, action or behavior," (Article 181) The wording of this prohibition
is disturbingly broad.
Human Rights Watch is aware of at least two instances in which the CNISEL ordered parties to alter the
content of campaign materials submitted for television broadcast. FFS spokesman Ali Rachedi said that his party
was asked to change afive-minutemessage that one of its leaders, Seddik Debaili, had recorded for broadcast May
16 because he used the term "coup d'etat" when referring to the military-backed cancellation of elections in 1992 and
forced resignation of the president. Rachedi charged that while there was no censor at the recording studio, recorded
material submitted to television by the parties was presented to the Interior Ministry for approval.
90
The CNISEL also censored a television message by the PT, a small leftist party that supports the National
Contract platform. The PT said it had learned only through a report in El-Watan daily that its spot would not be
broadcast on May 15, 1997. According to a PT communique issued the same day, the newspaper reported that PT
president Louisa Hanoune's spots, recorded by Algerian television "will not be broadcast...That was the CNISEL's
decision after it was notified by the interior ministry that the contents of two recordings by the leader of the PT were
judged to consist of an attack on a public institution." The offending phrase apparently was Hanoune's reference to
the events of January 1992 as a "military coup."
However, candidates, in the context of their allocated airtime, have been able to make statements that
directly challenge government policy, including the exclusion of the FIS from the political process. For example,
one week later, Ms. Hanoune appeared in a television campaign spot warning that Algeria's conflict cannot end
without the participation of all parties. "Therefore, all politicians, including the FIS leaders, should sit down and try
to find a peaceful solution..."
91
The CNISEL issued a directive that, beginning one week befo.-e the launch of the election campaign, the
media would cease covering the official activities of cabinet ministers running in the elections to avoid giving them
an advantage over their rivals. The newly formed pro-government RND includes at least eight cabinet ministers,
among them the prime minister, and interior minister. All are election candidates. Other parties, such as the MSP,
also have government ministers running in the elections.
90
Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 16, 1997.
91
Algiers ENTV, May 21, 1997, as reported by FBIS, Near East and South Asia, May 21, 1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�During Human Rights Watch's two-week mission in Algiers, state television featured news, public
announcements and talk shows concerning the elections. Before and after the 7 p.m. newscast, viewers were urged
to fulfill their duty by going to the ballot box. "This is an appointment with history and an extraordinary operation,"
said Laamri Bel'Arbi, an official from the Culture Ministry explaining the role of media in a program on the
forthcoming elections. "The president's assurance that the state media is used for public welfare is a good guarantee
that television will be deployed in total neutrality" for the elections. The television was also filled with favorable
coverage of cabinet ministers and government achievements, such as a new state-run natural gas project that
promised employment opportunities, and programs to assist camel herders in remote desert areas. Political party
leaders were shown only infrequently on newscasts. These included MSP head Mahfoudh Nahnah, who was shown
urging his party members to go to the polls.
92
93
Some parties complained that they got no television coverage whatsoever in the months leading up to the
elections. Seddik Debaili, first secretary of the FFS, a major political party that supports the National Contract (see
above), said that state television (ENTV) did not cover two of their regional congresses early April. "The
independent press reported our meetings, and we had interviews on the Arabic and French radio stations, but ENTV
did not cover our meetings, although they were invited," he said. He added that the pro-government RND's founding
congress had been covered extensively.
94
While allocating campaign airtime to parties fielding candidates, including those belonging to opposition
parties, Algerian television tends not to cover events organized by political groupings whose views are in disfavor
with the authorities. The Call for Peace group (see above) held a meeting March 17 in a movie theater that was
attended by a crowd that the group estimated at 1,000. The meeting was significant if only because it was the first
time such a meeting was allowed since the movement launched its petition in November 1996 calling for broad-based
political dialogue. Local independent papers, as well as some foreign press, covered the event, which was supported
by many intellectuals and public personalities, but television did not report it, according to Salima Ghezali, one of
the signatories of the Call for Peace and the editor of La Nation weekly.
95
Opposition parties reserved their strongest objections for the high media profile of the RND candidates who
are also sitting cabinet ministers, and the extensive television coverage they received in the two months preceding
the official campaign. The RCD Secretary General Said Saadi, who ran against President Zeroual in the presidential
elections, was quoted by El-Watan on May 5 saying the government's exploitation of Algerian Television (ENTV)
was "truly a scandal." Ben Younis Ammara, public relations director of the RCD, told us on April 10, "All the
political parties have indirectly begun their campaign, but the problem is the government's relationship with the
RND. It is the party of the system. It gets wide coverage in the media, on television, its founding members include
television announcers and personalities, and there are a number of cabinet ministers who will also join."
96
Algerian radio, generally free from government influence, has often featured independent political figures
who do not normally get time on television. This exposure has increased in the weeks before the election campaign.
FFS representatives were interviewed in four different programs on the Arabic and French-language radio stations
92
ENTV program on elections, March 31, 1997, as registered by Human Rights Watch.
93
ENTV 17:00 news, April 10, 1997, as registered by Human Rights Watch.
94
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
95
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
96
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 10, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�97
in which they talked about their party politics and the forthcoming elections, according to the FFS's Seddik Debaili.
Other parties also got more radio time than usual. But some viewed that development warily. The RCD's Said Saadi
noted, "The radio is always monopolized (by the government) except when it's time for elections. This also happened
before the presidential elections, when we witnessed lively media coverage but after the elections, everything went
back to the same old pattern and we're afraid this will happen again."
98
***
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance
of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories
of the Helsinki accords. It is supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. It
accepts no government funds, directly or indirectly. The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele
Alexander, development director; Cynthia Brown, program director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance and administration
director; Robert Kimzey, publications director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director;
Susan Osnos, communications director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Wilder Tayler, general counsel; and Joanna Weschler,
United Nations representative. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the board and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair.
Its Middle East division was established in 1989 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Eric Goldstein is the acting executive director; Joe Stork is the
advocacy director; Virginia N. Sherry is associate director; Clarissa Bencomo, Elahe Sharifpour-Hicks, and Nejla
Sammakia are research associates; Gamal Abouali is the Orville Schell fellow; Shira Robinson and Awali Samara
are associates. Gary Sick is the chair of the advisory committee and Lisa Anderson and Bruce Rabb are vice chairs.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Gopher Address: gopher://gopher.humanrights.org:5000/l 1/int/hrw
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to majordomo@igc.apc.org with "subscribe
hrw-news" in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).
97
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
98
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 10, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
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�©001/001
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© 2 0 2 736 4458
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NEA-MAG
PAGE
02
FIS
n The Name Of God The Most Gracious The Most Merciful
islamic Front For Salvation
(Algeria)
Oeiegatlon
ParKffiwntaira
Parliamentary Delsgation Bureau
Manassas, Virginu
May ]5, 1997
C P FR YU
OY O OR
I F R AI N
NO M T
O
Open Lener to The US Government
I, Anwar Haddam. Elected-Member of Parliament of Algeria, President of FIS
Parliamentary Delegation Abroad, POLITICAL prisoner at the Detention Center in Manassas,
Virginia, where I am unjustly detained since December 6,1996, request that the US
government to either grant me asylum or to immediately turn me over to the terrorist regime
of Algeria : I would prefer to be killed in the hand ofthe Algerian junta, in my country, than
to be held with criminals in the US.
Until then, I have decided to engage, starting May^jggTJna.hunger^strike as
protest against the psy chological torture that I have been put through, since my arrest and
detention.
I ^ t a i n e d because of my political views, therefore I am a political prisoner and should not
be treated as a criminal. I will no longuer accept this situation.
The US government is to be held responsible for the consequences of those who took the
ponsible decisions to keep in prison a duly elected political figure.
irres
Anwar N. Haddam
FAX
TRANSMII^JL
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DATE
01/22/1997
Re: [Algeria policy] (2 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Bo.x Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [2]
2009-1295-F
ke2084
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
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Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
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and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
009. letter
DATE
SUBJECmilLE
William Bartlett to Immigration Judge, re: [Anwar Haddam] (4 pages)
01/27/1997
RESTRICTION
P6/b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number:
1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [2]
2009-1295-F
ke2084
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
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financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA)
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion nf
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
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JftECE-iVtD
fltr 1 S <n P» 't«;WiTBD
7
; »
STATES DISTRICT COURT
Ufct U J 30 i jn
DISTRICT OP COLOMBIA
N. HiYcR-' '• .VIM
Janq.. ^op; £ \ on teha 1 f of
her©eif;aia the e s t a t e of
her deceased son; Jofcn Doo I
on behalf of h l a e e l f and
the estate of h i s deceased
son; Jane Doe I I , on behalf
C i v i l Action No.
of herself and h e r minor
daughter; Jane Doe I I I ?
COMPLAINT FCR CRIKES AGAINST
Jane Doe IV, on behalf of
BDHANITY? TOR CRIMES:
herself and of the e s t a t e of
HIGHJACKING ; HOSTAGE-TAKING ;
her deceased husband; Jane
SUMMARY EXECUTION; TORTORE;
Doe V; Jane Doe V I ;
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOKEN;
Jane Doe v i l i Jane Doe'.VflT;
ARBITRARY ARREST AND
Jane Doe IX and John Doe I I
DETENTION; dRUEL, INHUMAN OR
Rassemblenent Algerien de
DEGRADING TREATHENT;
Femnes Deaocrates (RAFD)
WRONGFUL DEATH; ASSAULT AND
BATTERY; AND INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OP EMOTIONAL
Plaintiffs,
HASH
- vs JURY TRIAL DEMAND
ISLAMIC SALVATION FROHT ( P I S ) ;
CASE NUMBER l 9GCV02792
and ANWAR HADDAM, /Z(2. N /
:
t
f
r
JUDGS: Gladys Kessler
Defendants.
DECK TYPE: C i v i l General
PRELOtTNARY STM
1.
DATE STAMP: 12/17/96
This, i s an action for coapensatory and punitive
dajaages for crijaes against humanity, war crimes and other gross
human rights and humanitarian law violations planned,
instigated,
directed, coiomitted, aided,, abetted, incited and! furthered i n a
conspiracy by the I s l a m i c Salvation Front (FIS) and Anwar Haddam,
acting i n concert with other organized armed gro jps and/or agents
in Algeria.
2.
P l a i n t i f f s seek damages for violations including
suraaary execution, a s s a s s i n a t i o n , mutilation, an£ beheading;
torture including sexual violence; hijacking and the taking of
0
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hostages; crubl, inhuman and degrading treatment and other forms
of corporal puniBhinent; gender violence, d i s c r i k i n a t i o n , and sexbased apartheid.
3-
P l a i n t i f f s include women, j o u r n a l i s t s , p o l i t i c a l
democrats, i n t e l l e c t u a l s , non-Algerian c i t i z e n s J and persons who
oppose r e l i g i o u s intolerance and discrimination who were
subjected to the above-listed violations as part of a F I S
campaign of t e r r o r against the c i v i l i a n population of A l g e r i a
corojoitted with the objective of taking over the ^ I g e r i a n s t a t e as
a jihad, or holy war for God.
JURISDICTION AMD VENUE
4.
This court hais jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
ClaiTns Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1350; 28 U.S.c, § 1331; l[he Torture
Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 78 (1992);
and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
5.
The Alien Tort Claims Act provides federal
l
3urisdiction for "any c i v i l action by an a l i e n tot a t o r t only,
committed i n v i o l a t i o n of the law of nations or a t r e a t y of the
United States."
The Torture Victim Protection Act provides
federal j u r i s d i c t i o n for actB of torture and e x t r a j u d i c i a l
execution6.
P l a i n t i f f s ' causes of action a r i s e vlnder, among
s and t r e a t i e s :
others, the following laws, agreements, resolutior|:
a)
Customary international law;
b)
United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. lOSfl, 3 Bevans
1153 {1945);
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c) .'Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A- Res.
2 1 7 A ( i i i ) , U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
d)
Geneva Convention IV of 1949. Aug. 12, 1949,
6 UST
3516; TIAS No. 3365; 75 UNTS 287; Additional Prtatocol I I to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, openefl for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
16 ILH 1391,
f)
1442 (1977);
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against
Women (UN General Assembly Resolution);
g) Montreal Convention on Hijacking (1971);
h) International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted Dec. 17. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/14k, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp- (No. 39) U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979);
i)
Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of A i r c r a f t , signed Dec, 16, 1970,
T.I-A-S. No. 7192,
22 U.S.T. 1641,
860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered intd force for the
united States Oct. 18, 1971);
j)
Common law of the United States of America;
k)
Statutes and common law of the D i s t r i c t of
Columbia, including but not limited to wrongful ddath, a s s a u l t
and battery, intentional i n f l i c t i o n of emotional d: s t r e s s ;
i
1)
Laws of Algeria.
7.
-The United States D i s t r i c t Court for the D i s t r i c t
of Columbia i s the proper venue of t h i s action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391.
PARTIES
8.
Jane Doe I i s a c i t i z e n of Algeria, liut out of fear
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for her safety, she has fled the country. She fcias an opponent to
the F l s d i r e c t i v e s conoerning women and the mother of a
journalist who was ascaasinated after he spoke but against the
FIS.
She brings t h i s action on behalf of h e r s e l f and the estate
of her deceased son.
9.
John Doe I i s a c i t i z e n of Algeric(, but out of fear
for h i s safety, he has f l e d the country.
With h i s wife, Jane Doe
I , he brings t h i s action on behalf of himself and the estate of
iiis deceased son.
10.
l i v e s there,
Jane Doe"Tl> i s a c i t i z e n of A l g e r i a and currently
she brings t h i s action on behalf of h e r s e l f and her
minor daughter, who was held on a hijacked plane for 54 hours.
11.
resides there.
Jane Doe I I I i e a c i t i z e n of Alger i a and currently
Because of her a c t i v i t i e s oppoaino the F I S as a
Lement Algerien
journalist and a member and leader of the Rassembl
< o Fowmco Deww^i.-ia.Tis
*
(KAFD),
fiheand family members have been
threatened and harassed by the F I S .
She brings tljiis action on
her own behalf.
12resides there.
the FIS.
Jane Doe IV i s a c i t i z e n of Aigerial arid currently
Her husband was a democratic a c t i J i s t who opposed
She and her daughter survived three armeo attacks to
their home and her brother-in-law and husband were k i l l e d . She
brings t h i s action on behalf of herself and the e s t a t e of her
deceased husband13.
I
Jane Doe v i s a c i t i z e n of Algeria, but out of
fear for her safety, she has fled the country- Several family
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@006
jaembers, who were independent intellectuals, were assassinated.
She brings t h i s action on tier own behait.
14.
Jane Doe VI i s a c i t i z e n of Algeria , but out of
fear for her safety, she has fled the country.
Arter the F I S
began a campaign against independent journalists, she
received
threats and her nane appeared on an assassination l i s t .
She
brings this action on her own behalf15.
Jane Doe v u i s a citizen of France who l i v e d i n
Algeria for 30 years.
Out of fear for her safety, ehe has f l e d
her hoae i n Algeria.
After the FIS began attacks on foreigners.
she was attacked and beaten i n her home. She brings t h i s action
on her own behalf.
16.
Jane Doe V I I I , Jane Doe IX and Johr Doe I I are the
surviving family members of a leading i n t e l l e c t u a l who spoke out
for democracy, the r i g h t s of women and the disadvantaged and who
was assassinated i n 1993.
They are citizens of Algeria and
reside there and bring t h i s action on their own behalf and on
behalf of the estate of t h e i r deceased husband anc father.
17-
A l l individual p l a i n t i f f s f i l e under f i c t i t i o u s
names out of fear for t h e i r safety i f their i d e n t i t i e s were
known.
18-
The Rassemblement Algerien da FemmeB Democrates
(RAFD) i s a non-governmental membership organization of
democratic Algerian women with i t s headquarters i r A l g i e r s .
19.
The i s l a m i c Salvation Front (FIS) i s a p o l i t i c a l
party and organized arraed group in Algeria, which, s i n g l y and i n
�-n
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il007
concert with other armed dissident groups, including the Islamic
-
Salvation Army (AIS), the Armed Islamic Hovejnent (MIA), and Armed
Islamic Group (GIA), has engaged in armed c o n f l i c t with the armed
forces of Algeria, and has planned, instigated, committed, aided,
abetted, incited, threateried i n a conspiracy, and f a i l e d
to
prevent and/or i s otherwise responsible for the crimes against
humanity and other v i o l a t i o n s against the c i v i l i a n population
alleged in t h i s complaint.
20.
For the prarpese of t h i s litigationL, the F I S i s an
entity that e x e r c i s e s i l l e g a l de facto power over part of the
i
territory of Algeria having a permanent populatiojn and engages in
and has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other
states.
The F I S , i n concert with the other armed dissident
groupsj operates under responsible command and e x e r c i s e s such
control over t e r r i t o r y as to enable i t to carry out sustained and
concerted m i l i t a r y operations and a campaign of terror against
c i v i l i a n populations, as well as enable i t to prevent the ongoing
violations i f i t so chose.
21,
Algeria.
Defendant Anwar (Anouar) Haddam i s a c i t i z e n of
Upon information and belief, he has held and continues
to hold a top leadership position in the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), and i s an o f f i c i a l thereof.
Sinoe 1993, be has resided i n
the United States as the President of Parliamentarians of the FIS
in Washington D.C. ; he has been a member of the Islamic Executive
L'Etranger (Executive Council of the FIS in E x i l e ) ; and he has
represented the FIS i n negotiations with other Aloerian p o l i t i c a l
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parties and in.,meetings and negotiations v i t h o f f i c i a l s , among
others of the United States, Algeria and-Europe.
He has a l s o
spoken on behalf of the FIS,. j u s t i f y i n g i t s campaign of t e r r o r
and p o l i t i c a l a t r o c i t i e s -
As an o f f i c i a l of F I S , he has, acting
singly and i n concert with other members of the F I S as w e l l as
other organized armed groups, directed, planned,
instigated,
conspired, committed, aided, abetted, incited, and f a i l e d to
prevent and/or i s otherwise responsible for the campaign of
crimes against humanity an<i. gross violations of human r i g h t s and
i
humanitarian law s e t forth i n t h i s complaint.
22.
The FIS, as an unincorporated a s s o c i a t i o n , has
since 1993, operated an office i n the D i s t r i c t of Columbia with
the Defendant Haddam as i t s chief officer and managing agent-
On
information and b e l i e f , the FIS and Kaddam, i t s o f f i c i a l
representative i n the United States, have, among other thinge,
held meetings and other communications with merobefrs of the United
States, Algerian, and European governments; have published
newsletters, and issued statements to the press concerning t h e i r
goal of creating an Islamic state and supporting '^he campaign of
terror carried out by the "mujaheddin" on t h e i r behalf.
STATtaSET OF FACTS
23.
Since 1990, the FIS and Haddam, on© of i t s high-
level o f f i c e r s , furthering a conspiracy and acting i n concert
with the AIS, MIA and/or GIA, have planned, instigated, d i r e c t e d ,
cornrcit-ed, aided, abetted, conspired, incited, f a i l e d to prevent
and/or are otherwise responsible for a systematic and widespread
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©009
nawpa^rjn o f CEimcs a g a i n s t : H u m a n i t y , w a r c r i i a c e k n d ©"fchcsr human
r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s d i r e c t e d against portions o f t i e c i v i l i a n
population on p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , and n a t i o n a l grounds and on
the basis o f gender and membership i n other s o c i i l groups
i d e n t i f i e d as t a r g e t s o f the defendants' j i h a d t p e s t a b l i s h an
Islamic s t a t e .
24.
Since 1990, the FIS, w i t h the AIS,, MIA and/or GIA,
has exercised de f a c t o governmental power through l o c a l v i l l a g e
councils or communes and through the use o f f o r e
and t e r r o r . I t
has t e r r o r i z e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f these areas as w e l l as the
population o f non-occupied t e r r i t o r y through t h e issuance o f
communiques and warnings demanding l o y a l t y t o t h s i r campaign t o
e s t a b l i s h an I s l a m i s t s t a t e and obedience t o t h e i r I s l a m i s t
rules.
These warnings have been enforced by acts o f v i o l e n c e ,
such as a s s a s s i n a t i o n , beheading, t o r t u r e —
i n c l u d i n g rape,
forced p r o s t i t u t i o n and other forms sexual violence —
bombing,
kidnapping, h i j a c k i n g , and hostage-taking.
25.
The exercise o f power by the FIS £nd p a r a m i l i t a r y
groups i t d i r e c t s and/or conspires w i t h has included: f o r c e d
imposition o f t a x e s ; recruitment of boys and men i n t o m i l i t a r y
s e r v i c e ; the maintenance of a coordinated m i l i t a r y command
s t r u c t u r e ; the i m p o s i t i o n o f curfews; the o r g a n i s a t i o n o f l o c a l
t r i b u n a l s ; the performance o f marriages; the expulsion o f
f o r e i g n e r s ; the c l o s i n g of schools and day care c e n t e r s ; t h e
imposition of sex d i s c r i i n i n a t i o n , gender violence and sexual
apartheid; and a campaign of i n t i m i d a t i o n against f e m i n i s t s ,
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independent j o u r n a l i s t s , i n t e l l e c t u a l s , a r t i s t s and democrats.
26.
Upon information and b e l i e f , i nAlgeria, 38,000
families have been victims of terrorism including murder,
resulting i n 160,000 orphans, 15-20,000 widows and 300 cases of
rape c f young women.
27.
The FIS and i t s officer, Anwar J&ddam, have
directed and/or conspired with the GIA, MIA anc /or AIS or other
armed groups t o t e r r o r i z e women by acts and thieats of violence
and to force them to ob6y t h e i r Islamic dictates and to establish
sex-based apartheid.
28.
I n the region of Blida a ^-year- old woman was
beheaded for f a i l i n g to wear a headscarf (hijab) in violation of
FIS orders, and the FlS/GIA paraded her head i n the street29.
Young women are raped and presse* into slavery and
servitude i n "temporary marriages" to militant I s l a m i s t s .
Two
women were k i l l e d i n Blida i n November 1994 for r e s i s t i n g these
"temporary marriages" and sexual slavery.
30.
Women are also forced into absolute segregation
from men i n public s e t t i n g s , including education and public
transportation, and prohibited from working-
The FIS ordered the
closing of day care centers and ordered women t o remain home.
Women are also prohibited from using the public baths where t h i s
i s the only source of clean water.
31.
The area of Boufarik, 45 miles south of Algiers i s
one of the areas c o n t r o l l e d by the FIS together with GIA from
1993 u n t i l nid-1995.
During t h i s time, the F l s land GIA required
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©Oil
that a l l c h i l d r e n be segregated by gender i n schcjjols, and that
women and g i r l s s t a r t i n g at age 6 wear the v e i l ( h i j a b ) .
These
orders were enforced by violence and threats of violence against
women and g i r l s .
32.
As of March 1995, approximately 360 women and
g i r l s have been k i l l e d , including feminists who have spoken out
against these attacks against women and the FIS ]^iles
establishing sex-base apartheid.
Countless others have been
raped, maimed, threatened and otherwise assaulted.
33.
intellectuals.
level to close.
The F I S and Anwar Haddam have also persecuted
The F I S has ordered a l l schools Above the primary
Many r e s i s t e d t h i s order and in 1994, the armed
groups acting on the orders of and/or in concert with the F I S s e t
f i r e to more than 600 schools and k i l l e d scores of students.
34.
The F l s and/or i t s officer Anwar Haddam have
directed and/or conspired with armed groups, including the GIA,
MIA, and the AIS, to carry out a campaign of violence and
intimidation to s i l e n c e journalists and drive them into hiding or
exile.
The campaign of terror was not confined t;o the prominent,
but directed at a l l j o u r n a l i s t s .
Upon information and b e l i e f ,
from May 1993 to November 1994, approximately 25 j o u r n a l i s t s were
k i l l e d ; many went into semi-hiding and up to SOD fled the
country.
On information and belief, the FIS has targeted an
additional 140 j o u r n a l i s t s as of mid-1995,
35.
In 1993, attacks on foreigners bedan-
In
September and October, 1993, several non-Aigeriar) c i t i z e n s
10
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working in A l g e r i a were k i l l e d by paramilitary f
orces operating,
on information and b e l i e f , under the control or with the
encouragement" of the F I S . Thereafter, the FIS, acting through
the GIA, kidnapped thr66 employees of the French! consulate i n
Algiers and, upon t h e i r release, issued a commun ique claiming to
"eliminate impurity" and containing an ultimatum ordering
foreigners to leave the country by the end of KoVember or face
execution.
36.
I n November. 1993, a communique wimed foreigners
to leave the country by^ the end of the month or be k i l l e d .
On
information and b e l i e f , the F I S directed and/or Conspired with
the GIA, HIA and/or AIS t o carry out these assassinations, issue
this communique and enforce i t through executions.
were assassinated i n December, 1993 alone.
19 foreigners
As of June 1995, 25
were k i l l e d and approximately 600 had l e f t t h e i r tomes .
37.
F I S has constituted i t s e l f and i t s paramilitary
agents and co-conspirators as an i l l e g a l insurgen: regime which
has continued to engage i n military encounters wi":h the Algerian
army and to commit crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other
violations against c i v i l i a n s .
PIAiyrUPFS* ALLBGATIOIfS
Jane Doe T
38.
Jane Doe I i s an Algerian c i t i z e n ajnd the mother
of a young j o u r n a l i s t and musician who resided in A l g i e r s and had
spoken out against the F I S ' s compaign of terror snfi plan to
establish an Islainic s t a t e .
11
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©013
NEA-MAG
Along v i t h other young men i n t h i neighborhood,
the son o f P l a i n t i f f Jane Doe I was pressured b i Pis members t o
j o i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n .
As a r e s u l t of h i s r e f u s a l t o support the
Fis and h i s v o c a l o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e i r goals, he was ambushed and
k i l l e d on h i s way home i n June 1994.
40.
A f t e r h e r son was shot, Jane Doe I took him by
h e r s e l f t o the h o s p i t a l -
No one would help her t r a n s p o r t her son
t o t h e h o s p i t a l due t o fear o f r e t a l i a t i o n .
FIS/GIA
A few days l a t e r ,
t e r r o r i s t s came t o P l a i n t i f f Jane Doe T's home, b u t t h e
family had gone i n t o h i d i n g i n another home.
41.
Both P l a i n t i f f Jane Doe I and h e r daughter refused
to wear the v e i l , as d i r e c t e d by the FIS i n l e a f l e t s warning
women t o wear t h e v e i l before Harch 8, which i s :.nternational
women's day and much celebrated i n Algeria.
On :.nformation and
b e l i e f , t h e i r r e f u s a l may have also i d e n t i f i e d t l i e f a m i l y as
opposed t o the FIS and been another reason f o r h4r son's
assassination.
42.
Eyewitnesses t o assassination o f E l l a i n t i f f Jane
Doe I's son were t h r e a t e n e d and therefore were u n w i l l i n g t o
testify.
Fearing f o r t h e i r l i v e s , the remainder p f t h e f a m i l y
went i n t o e x i l e and c u r r e n t l y resides i n France.
John Doe I
43.
John Doe I i s an Algerian c i t i z e n -
He i s t h e
father of the young j o u r n a l i s t and musician whose a s s a s s i n a t i o n
i s described above Jane Doe I I
12
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44.
NEA-MAG
Jane Doe I I i s an Algerian c i t i a k n whose s i s t e r
and young daughter were trstpped on December 24, 1994 f o r 54 hours
on a French Airbus en route from Algiers to Par|s.
45.
The hijacking caused Jane Doe I I unspeakable
terror as she watched v i a t e l e v i s i o n the assault of French troops
on the plane and experienced the horror and emptfiness of
believing her loved ones dead.
46.
Upon information and belief, the plane was
hijacked by I s l a m i s t t e r r o r i s t s operating under the contxol of.
in conspiracy with and i n concert with the defehidants.
47.
Jane Doe I I brings this action on behalf of
error f o r her
herself and her daughter who not only lived i n tl i f e for 54 hours but was forced to observe the decaying bodies
of the two hostages executed and displayed by the t e r r o r i s t s .
Jane Doe I I I
48.
Algiers.
Jane Doe I I I i s an Algerian c i t i z e n and r e s i d e s i n
She was formerly a journalist with a newspaper strongly
opposed to the F I S .
49.
Since 1994, Jane Doe I I I has worked with the
Rassemblement Algerien de Femmes Democrats fRAFD) and i e w e l l known for her opposition to the FIS and i t s t e r r o r i s t campaign to
establish an Islamic s t a t e .
50.
Upon information and belief, she has been under
surveillance by F I S since 1991. She began to nrovk from, place to
place i n 1993 due to fear of attack on herself and her son.
51.
Tn December of 1994, Algerian secufity forced
13
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© 2 0 2 736 4458
121015
k i l l e d a t e r r o r i s t a f f i l i a t e d with the FIS. The t e r r o r i s t had in
his
possession a l i s t of f i v e women a c t i v i s t s 6f RAFD, and Jane
Doe I I I was on that l i s t .
I n addition to the l i s t , the t e r r o r i s t
had a very detailed drawing of RAFD headquarters indicating that
Jane Doe I I I had been under surveillance and the FIS/GIA intended
to attack the headquarters.
52.
Subsequently, i n 1995 another t e r r o r i s t was found
with a piece of paper containing Jane Doe I l l ' s name, address,
the location and of family, and a description of her movements
and d e t a i l s regarding her appearance on the s t r e e t .
53.
On August 14, 1996, four armed men entered the
RAFD o f f i c e , shot Jane Doe I l l ' s
to s l i t h i s throat.
younger brother, and attempted
He triggered off an alarm and used tear gas
to forced them to leave.
Jane Doe IV
54.
Jane Doe IV resides south of Algiers, i n an area
which was controlled by the FIS together with GIA from 1993 u n t i l
mid-1995-
P l a i n t i f f Jane Dos TV's husband was a democratic
a c t i v i s t who made known h i s opposition to the FIS/GIA and t h e i r
rule of t e r r o r .
55.
I n 199 3, she and her daughter survived three armed
attacks on her home.
56.
i n 1994, her brother-in-law was tottured by agents
of the FIS/GIA i n the presence of his family and was kidnapped
and beheaded i n r e t a l i a t i o n for a c t i v i t i e s of Jan^ Doe IV's
husband.
Neither her husband nor h i s other brothers were able to
14
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NEA-MAG
attend the funeral because of warning that the I'IS/GIA was
planning to execute the whole family.
57..' On December i s , 1995, P l a i n t i f f 4
a n e D
o
G
I V
'
S
husband was shot to death by the PIS/GIA.
Jane Doe V
58.
Jane Doe V i s a member of a w e l l known f a m l y
which includes prominent intellectuals i n Algiers-
As p a r t of a
campaign against independent intellectuals, the F I S , i n concert
with other actors, assassinated close family members of Jane Doe
V.
Because her l i f e and safety were also threatened, she was
forced to leave her home and job and go into e x i l e .
Jane Doe VT
59.
Jane Doe VI i s an Algerian c i t i z e r and j o u r n a l i s t
currently residing i n e x i l e i n France. She worked as a
journalist i n Algiers for ten years.
60.
I n 1993, the FIS, working together with
paramilitary groups, began a campaign against independent
journalists and issued a formal warning to a l l j o i r n a l i s t s to
quite t h e i r jobs or be considered as working with the m i l i t a r y
junta of the s t a t e .
61.
she received threats over the phone and her name
appeared on a l i s t of j o u r n a l i s t s to be k i l l e d whijch was posted
outside the mosque.
As a r e s u l t , she had to move from her home
and in 1934 went into e x i l e where she remains today.
Jane Doe V I I
62-
Jana Doe V I I i s n French c i t i z e n who l i v e d for
15
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NEA-MAG
over 30 years i n A l g e r i a and raised her c h i l d r e n t h e r e p e a c e f u l l y
and without i n c i d e n t .
A l g e r i a was her home.
63. ' i n 1993, when the attacks on f o r e i g n e r s began,
Jane Doe v u was attacked and beaten i n her home.
64.
When t h e Tls issued a communique c l a i m i n g t o
"eliminate i m p u r i t y " and containing an ultimatum o r d e r i n g
foreigners t o leave t h e country by the end o f No /ember o r face
execution, and b e l i e v i n g t h a t the FIS/GIA meant :o c a r r y o u t i t s
t h r e a t , Jane Doe immediately l e f t the country along w i t h many
other non-Algerian c i t i z e n s . Nineteen f o r e i g n e r s were
assassinated i n December, 1993 alone.
Jane Doe v m ,
65.
Jane Doe IX and John Doe I I
Jane Doe v m ,
j
a
n
e
Doe IX and Johln Doe I I are the
widow, daughter and son o f a leading i n t e l l e c t u a l
f o r democracy, t h e r i g h t s o f women and the disadvantaged and who
was assassinated i n 1993.
P l a i n t i f f RAFD
66.
The Rassemblement Algerien de Femmds Democrafes
(RAFD) i s a non-governmental membership o r g a n i z a t i o n o f
democratic A l g e r i a n women w i t h i t s headquarters i r A l g i e r s .
The
organization was founded i n October of 1993 i n connection w i t h a
s t r e e t demonstration o u t s i d e t h e o f f i c e of the President o f
Algeria t o p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s ' holdin? a dialogue
with the FIS leaders.
67.
RAFD'3 purpose and i t s a c t i v i t i e s are d i r e c t e d
p r i m a r i l y aaainst- •F-fi-iA^ma.n^^xi.^m ana t e r r o r i s m as Y i i t i o n s o f
0
16
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4458
NAMG
E-A
0018
women's hutoar. rights and the organization acts i:i s o l i d a r i t y with
those threatened by the t e r r o r i s t s and the families of those
k i l l e d by the t e r r o r i s t .
I n response to a F l s oider threatening
women who did not wear the v e i l in March of 1994,
and despite a
major waive of t e r r o r , RAFD held a street denonstxation with 1000
women participants68-
RAFD has participated in c a l l i n g ether major
demonstrations and organizing international Woaer 's Day
a c t i v i t i e s against the fundamentalist program of terror.
RAFD
has issued many conununigues protesting, condemning and accusing
the FIS/GIA of assassination and bombinge. Hembet-s of RAFD, have
been subject to threats and three have gone into - x i l e .
Another
member, also threatened by FIS/GIA, was the targe- of an
assassination attempt.
69.
Defendants Haddam and FIS, acting eingly and i n
concert with other members of the Pis as well as dther organized
armed groups, have planned, directed, instigated,
conspired, aided, abetted, incited, failed to prevent and/or are
otherwise responsible for the particular above-mentioned
incidents and the campaign of crimes against humankty and gross
violations of human rights and humanitarian law s e t forth i n t h i s
Complaint.
70.
Defendants knew or should have known of the above-
described actions and f a i l e d to take steps to prevent or punish
said actions.
17
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1 r TL
C R E E H
a-^^syon*.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices
participating i n
the formulation of these acts are responsible for a l l acts
performed by any person i n execution of such plan.
SBCQMD CLATM POtt R*T TfiF
f
(ifar Crimes)
76.
The allegations set forth i n paragraphs l through
70 of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y s e t forth herein.
77.
The acts described herein constitute war crimes i n
violation of the applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
and the Additional Protocol 'thereto, i n particulaj-:
(a) Common A r t i c l e 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and/or,
(b) Additional Protocol I I to the Genevii Conventions.
78.
Defendants committed these war criTies against the
c i v i l i a n population as part of internal armed c o n f l i c t i n which
they, as a dissident armed group, directing and conspiring with
other armed dissident groups and under responsible command,
engaged i n h o s t i l i t i e s with the security forces o i Algeria and
controlled a part of the t e r r i t o r y enabling them to carry out
sustained and concerted h o s t i l i t i e s and prevent, i f they chose
to, victimization of the c i v i l i a n populationTHIRD CIAIK POR REl^^P
(Summary Execution)
79.
The allegations s e t forth i n paragraphs 1 through
70 cf this Complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y s e t forth herein.
OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)
FAX
19
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80. '-The suimary executions described herein were
deliberate k i l l i n g s , not authorized as lawful punishment i n
accordance with due process of law.
ai.
These acts of suwmary execution v£re i n v i o l a t i o n
of the Torture victiin Protection Act, customary international
law, the common law of the United States, thestatutes and common
law of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia, and the laws of Algeria,
82.
Defendants, and the paramilitary groups directed
by, and conspiring, and^acrfeing i n concert with tl;
em, were
operating as a de facto i l l e g a l regime in the i n f l l i c t i o n of
i
summary execution.
FODRTH CLAIM FQR T^TJ^P
(Torture)
S3-
The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through
7o of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y s e t f o r t h herein.
84.
The a c t s described herein constitulte torture i n
violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act, customary
international law, the common law of the United States, the
statutes and common law of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia, and the laws
of Algeria.
85.
Defendants, together with other pabramilitary
groups they d i r e c t , conspire and act in concert with, were
operating as a de facto i l l e g a l regime in the i n f a i c t i o n of
torture.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
20
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(Sex-Based Apartheid, DiBcrimination and Violence Against Woaen)
86.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through
70 of t h i s complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y s e t f o r t h herein.
87.
Defendants directed, committed, conspired, and/or
acted in concert with each other and with other airmed groups to
commit acts against p l a i n t i f f s of physical and psychological
violence because of t h e i r gender, including assassination ajid
threat of a s s a s s i n a t i o n to~force women and g i r l s to obey t h e i r
Islamist r u l e s and to accomplish the complete separation of
females from males, thus violating their rights to be f r e e from
gender violence; the r i g h t to non-discrimination and equality,
liberty, s e c u r i t y of person; freedom of movement; and the right
to education, work and family l i f e on a basis of equality between
men and women.
88.
The acts described herein constitulte v i o l a t i o n s of
the customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, the common law cf the United
states, and the s t a t u t e s and common law of the D i s t r i c t of
columbia.
89.
Defendants, and the paramilitery groups conspiring
facto i l l e g a l
and in concert with then, were operating as a de
regime in the i n f l i c t i o n of violence against wom^n
?TXTF
™
REUBF
(Hostage-Taking)
90.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs l through
70 of t h i s complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
21
121003
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12004
as i f f u l l y set forth herein.
91.
The p l a i n t i f f s were placed in fear for t h e i r
l i v e s , were deprived of t h e i r freedom, separated from t h e i r
families and forced to s u f f e r severe physical and mental abuse92.
The acts described herein constitute v i o l a t i o n s of
the applicable conventions, customary international law, the
common law of the United States, and the statute^ and common law
of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia.
S g V C T m P T ^ J K TOR TTRT.TRF
(Hijacking)
93.
The allegations set forth i n paragraphs 1 through
70 of t h i s complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y 36t forth herein.
94.
The p l a i n t i f f s were placed i n fear for t h e i r
l i v e s , were deprived of t h e i r freedom, separated from t h e i r
families and forced to s u f f e r severe physical ard mental abuse.
95.
The a c t s described herein constitute hijacking i n
violation of the applicable conventions, customary
international
law, the statutes and common law of the United ^tates and the
D i s t r i c t of Columbia.
ftTt^flTCT r T ^ T K POR R E L I E F
(Arbitrary Arrest and Detention)
96.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs l tfirough
70 of t h i s complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y set forth herein.
97.
The a r r e s t and detention of p l a i n t i f f s
22
described
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NEA-MAG
@1005
herein was illtegal and unjust, carried out without a warrant,
probable cause, a r t i c u l a b l e suspicion or notice of charges.
98.
The p l a i n t i f f s were placed i n fear for t h e i r
l i v e s , were deprived of t h e i r freedom, separated from t h e i r
families and forced to suffer severe physical and. mental abuse.
99.
The acts described herein constitvite a r b i t r a r y
arrest and detention in violation of the applicable conventions,
customary international law, the statutes and coi^on law of the
United States and the D i s t r i c t of Columbia..
100.
Defendants, and the
paramilitary groups they
direct and which conspire and act in concert w i t i them, were
operating as a de facto i l l e g a l regime in the i n t l i c t i o n of
arbitrary a r r e s t and detention.
(Cruel, Inhumari, or Degrading Treataient)
101.
The allegations set forth in patagraphs l through
70 of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporcited by reference
as i f f u l l y set forth herein.
102.
The acts described herein had tlie intent of
grossly humiliating
and debasing the p l a i n t i f f s , forcing them to
act against t h e i r w i l l and conscience, i n c i t i n g fear and anguish.
breaking physical or moral resistance, and/or forcing them to
accept sex-based apartheid
and Islamic rule or leave t h e i r homes
customary
1f states, the
Unitec|
and country and f l e e into e x i l e , in violation
international law. the common law of the
statutes and common law of the D i s t r i c t of Colvmbia, and the laws
23
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19:27
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EI006
Algeria.
103.
P l a i n t i f f s were placed iri great f e a r for t h e i r
lives and forced to suffer severe physical artd psychological
abuse and agony.
104.
Defendants, and the paramilitary groups they
direct and which conspire and act i n concert with then, were
operating as a de facto i l l e g a l regime i n the i n f l i c t i o n of
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
TEBttH^6LAXH TOR RELXBF
(Wrongful Death)
105.
The allegations set forth i n paragraphs 1 through
70 of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporated by
reference
as i f f u l l y s e t forth herein.
106.
P l a i n t i f f are the heirs and/or represent
the
estates of c i v i l i a n s who were summarily executed by armed
t e r r o r i s t agents directed by and/or conspiring and acting i n
concert with defendants.
KfrEVKHTg C I A I K FOP TtFT.TBF
(Assault and
107.
Battery)
The allegations set forth i n paraglraphs 1 through
70 of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporated by
reference
as i f f u l l y set forth herein.
108.
The acts described herein constitute a s s a u l t and
of the D i s t r i c t
battery and other torts actionable under the laws
laws of
of Columbia, the laws of the United States and t h ^
Algeria.
24
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0007
GREEN
1 0 9 A a a r e s u l t of these acts, p l a i n t i f f s were placed
in great fear for t h e i r l i f e and suffered severe p h y s i c a l and
psychological abuse and agonyT V T F H CIAIM FOR RELIEF
W..T
(Intentional I n f l i c t i o n of Emotional Di^tresis)
110.
The allegations set forth i n paragraphs l through
70 of t h i s Complaint are realleged and incorporated by reference
as i f f u l l y s e t forth herein111.
The act's-described herein constituted outrageous
conduct i n v i o l a t i o n of a l l normal standards of decency and were
without p r i v i l e g e or j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
112.
These outrageous acts were i n t e n t i o n a l and
malicious and done for the purposes of causing p l a i n t i f f s to
suffer humiliation, mental anguish and extreme emotional and
physical d i s t r e s s .
113.
Defendants' outrageous conduct constitutes the
intentional i n f l i c t i o n of emotional distress and i s actionable
under the laws of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia, the ifnited States and
Algeria.
114.
As a r e s u l t of defendants' a c t s ,
p l a i n t i f f s were
placed i n great fear for t h e i r l i v e s and were forced t o s u f f e r
severe physical and psychological abuse and agony.
25
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©008
Std'd 10X01
WHEREFCBB,
p l a i n t i f f s pray for judgaent greater thin 550,000
agoinst the fleienflants as follows:
a)
For compensatory damages according to proof;
b) For punitive and exeaplary daoagea accordi.ng to proof;
c)
For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of s u i t ,
according to proof; and
d> For such other and further relief as the <jourt nay deea
3ust and proper.
^"
A jury t r i a l i s demanded on a l l icaiaes.
Dated: Decenbor
, 1996
Sespectfuliy subaittJd,
R O D COPELOK
HNA
CATHERINE ALBlSik
IHTERKATIOKAL W0MEK S HUMAN
RIGHTS CLUac
CWf
UT
SCHOOL
65-21 Kain Street
Flushing, »V 11367
716-575-4300
J
JIFBR GREEN
BfctfH STEPHENS
CENTER FOR C0SSTITUTIOKAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th flour
Kew Ypjfc,. BY 1001;
MICSAEL HlsGGlO
HAGSIO i KATTAR
11 DuPont Circle, K-K
Haehington, D.C. 2003$
202-483-0052
DC Bar #254094
�
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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2009-1295-F
Description
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This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
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Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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Algeria [2]
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National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Scott Busby
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7585640
42-t-7585640-20091295F-001-002-2015-2015-2015
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2009-1295-F
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Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585640">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e37165bc9031b1059594bc5fc6aea1f5.pdf
a7f7a4f6a69eebf6540dbc20bad78212
PDF Text
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Case Number: 2009-1295-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Algeria [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Busby, Scott
Original OA/ID Number:
1889
Row:
40
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Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
v
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
SUBJECT/1 ITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. letter
To Jeff DeLaurentis [partial] (1 page)
02/18/1998
P3/b(3)
002. report
Re: [Algerian Civilian Massacres] (7 pages)
01/23/1998
Pl/b(l)
003. report
Algeria Human Rights Report (5 pages)
01/1998
Pl/b(l)
004. report
Re: Algeria Update (6 pages)
01/29/1998
Pl/b(l)
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scon)
OA/l3ox Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [1]
2009-1295-F
ke2083
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |4-4 U.S.C. 220-4(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)l
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A |
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(bK3) o f t h e I O I A |
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e F O I A |
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A |
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A |
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) o f t h e FOIA)
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
��UAAAN RIGHTS WATCH
55 5th Avenue
ew York, New York 10017
ilephone: (212)972-8400
icsimile: (2(2)972-0905
mail: hrwnyca>hrw.org
ebsitc: http://www.hrw.org
JMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MlDOLE EAST
limy Mcgally
iccutivc Director
ic Goldstein
•search Director
rginia N. Sherry
sociatc Director
c Stork
iuocacy Director
:irisa Bcncomo
:ihe Sharifpour-Hicks
jjly Sammakia
•search Associates
_-orgina Copty
v:ili Samara
sociates
>VIS0RY COMMITTEE
ir>' G. Sick
ia Anderson
uce Rabb
ca Chairs
Bakiiash
Chcrif Bassiouni
iriin Blumenthal
.ul Chcvigny
'jlena Cobban
iricia Derian
Nth Everetl
.msour FarhanR
iristopher E. George
la E. Hauser
rich Haynes
:v. J. Bryan Hehir
ly Kaufman
urina Pimo Kaufman
mir Khalaf
diih Kjpper
lina Lahav
11 M. Lesch
1
cphen P. Marks
ilando Ma talon
lilip Mat tar
varies Shamas
ivid K. Shipler
nford Solender
nry Ann Siein
libley Telhami
idrew Whitley
ipoleon B. Williams, Jr.
mcsj. Zogby
JMAN RIGHTS WATCH
:nncth Roth
•ecutivc Director
isan Osnos
sociate Director
ichele Alexander
melopment Director
-nthia Brown
•ograrn Director
irhara Guglielmo
nance & Administration
director
iiic Lctcht
ussels Office Director
isan Osnos
nnmunications Director
ildcr Taylcr
jnerai Counsel
anna Weschler
•lited Nations
Representative
)lx!rt L. Bernstein
tair
January 9, 1998
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
For additional information, contact:
Joe Stork 202 371 6592 ext 118 (Washington)
202 291 0846 (home)
Jean-Paul Marthoz 32 2 736 7838 (Brussels)
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH URGES U.S., E.U. TO PRESS ALGERIA
ON MASSACRES INQUIRY
(Washington, March 9) - In a Brussels press conference this moming, Human Rights
Watch called on Washington and European states to insist that Algeria cooperate with
international efforts to ascertain responsibility for massacres of civilians and to recommend
steps to prevent their recurrence. "The Algerian authorities have failed to initiate or allow
any impartial investigation of the massacres and of the government's failure to protect its
citizens," said Kenneth Roth, the group's executive director in New York. "The scale and
duration ofthe human rights crisis there makes a mockery of Algeria's insistence that it is
strictly an internal matter."
The group called on Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to underscore U.S. concern with
the situation when the State Department releases its annual human rights country reports later
this month, and for the U.S. and European governments to co-sponsor a resolution at the
upcoming U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting establishing the position of a Special
Rapporteur for Algeria.
The group welcomed the plans of European foreign ministers to visit Algeria, but cautioned
that such a visit could not substitute for an internationally sponsored investigation of the
atrocities. "The foreign ministers need to press the Algerian authorities to stop the atrocities,
halt the gross abuses committed by security forces, and allow journalists and human rights
workers to investigate," said Roth. "Most importantly, they need to avoid any appearance of
supporting the government's refusal to cooperate with an international inquiry."
A copy of the Brussels statement is attached.
Human Rights Watch: Mission Statement
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold political
freedom and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human
rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.
Kenneth Roth is the executive director and Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the board.
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEW YORK
RIO DE JANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�HUMA'N RIGHTS WATCH
1,85 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212)972-8400
Facsimile: (212)972-0905
E-mail: hrwnyca)hrw.0Tg
Website: http://www.hrw.org
HUMAN RICKT5 WATCH/MIDDLE EAST
Hanny Megnlly
Executive Director
Eric Goldstein
Research Director
VirKinia N. Sherry
Associate Director
Joe Siork
Advocacy Director
Clarisa Bencomo
Elaht Sharifjxiur-Hicks
Nejla Sammakia
Research Associates
Gcorgina Copty
Awali Samara
Associates
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Gary G. Sick
Chair
Lisa Anderson
Bruce Rabb
Vice Chairs
Shaul Bakhash
M. Chcrif Bassiouni
Martin Blumenthai
Paul Chevigny
Helena Cobban
Patricia Derian
Edith Everett
Mansour Earhang
Christopher E. George
Rita E. Mauser
Ulrich Haynes
Rev. J. Bryan Hehir
Edy Kaufman
Marina Pinto Kaufman
Samir Khalaf
Judith Kipper
Pnina Lahav
Ann M. Lesch
Stephen P. Marks
Rolando Malalon
Philip Mattar
Charles Shamas
David K. Shipler
Sanford Solender
Mary Ann Stein
Shiblcy Telhami
Andrew Whidcy
Napoleon B. Williams, Jr.
James J. Zogby
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Susan Osnos
Associate Director
Michele Alexander
Development Director
Cynthia Brown
Program Director
Barbara Guglielmo
Finance & Administration
Director
Lone Leicht
Brussels Office Director
Susan Osnos
Communications Director
Wilder Tayler
General Counsel
Joanna Weschler
United Nations
Representative
Robert L. Bernstein
Chair
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH URGES E.U., U.S.:
THOROUGH INQUIRY INTO ALGERIA MASSACRES MUST ACCOMPANY
DIPLOMACY, HUMANITARIAN AID IF CIVILIAN POPULATION TO BE
PROTECTED
The escalating episodes of violence against civilians in Algeria have prompted high-level
expressions of concern and also revived calls for inquiries to ascertain responsibility for these
crimes against humanity, to recommend steps to prevent such atrocities, and to afford the
protection of international scrutiny to the country's traumatized civilian population. U.N.
Human Rights High Commissioner Mary Robinson has urged Algeria to allow the U.N.
Special Rapporteurs on torture and on summary, arbitrary and extrajudicial executions to
conduct missions in the country. A U.S. government spokesperson encouraged the Algerian
government to allow such inquiries, as well as visits by human rights organizations. The E.U.
foreign ministers are proposing to send a high-level delegation to Algeria and material aid
to the survivors of the violence, and a delegation from the foreign affairs committee of the
European Parliament is tentatively scheduled to visit the country in February.
Human Rights Watch welcomes these calls for action regarding a situation that has
until now appeared immune to international concern. The steps being proposed are
complementary, and if conducted with adequate preparation and logistical support and a clear
set of priorities they can help bring the weight of the international community to bear in
bringing Algeria's horror to an end. But there remains a pressing need for an international
mechanism of inquiry, preferably under United Nations auspices, to ascertain as
comprehensively as possible the facts concerning the massacres and other abuses, to examine
allegations of responsibility, for them, and to propose concrete steps to restore law and order
and respect for fundamental human rights. To this end, Human Rights Watch urges the
governments of the European Union, the United States, and other members of the United
Nations to sponsor a resolution at the upcoming March meeting of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission establishing a Special Rapporteur on the situation in Algeria.
The reason such a step is necessary is because the Algerian government has
manifestly failed to meet its responsibilities in this area. The government has not initiated
any form of credible, independent and transparent inquiry mechanism on its own. This
pertains not only to the massive bloodletting of the last six months, in which hundreds of
women, children and men have been slaughtered in single incidents, and where the security
forces have failed to intervene despite their proximity. The authorities have been similarly
negligent with regard to the high-profile assassinations of public figures, journalists,
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEWYORK
RIO DE JANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�intellectuals and activists that typified the violence in earlier years. When alleged perpetrators are
prosecuted, trials are often not public and do not meet basic fair trial standards. This is a government
that heavily censors independent reporting of attacks by armed opposition groups and often refuses
even to issue its own findings or estimates regarding casualties from such attacks and from clashes
between security forces and armed groups.
Human Rights Watch fully supports efforts by Algerians to conduct impartial investigations
ofthe massacres and other atrocities. Such initiatives could be launched by the executive branch, the
National Assembly, or non-governmental groups. To date, however, no thorough or credible
investigation has been carried out, and none appears imminent. Meanwhile, the crisis continues to
escalate, claiming hundreds upon hundreds of innocent victims by acts of unspeakable brutality.
The adamant refusal of the Algerian government to cooperate with proposals for an
international inquiry, or to meet its own responsibility to conduct independent and transparent
investigations and make such an international effort unnecessary, should not be allowed to sustain
international inaction. Disregard for human rights has become the norm in Algeria, exacerbating the
breakdown in law and order and leaving civilians vulnerable and unprotected. The Algerian
authorities have built a wall of silence around the complex reality of violence and counter-violence,
of mass killings by armed opposition groups and gross abuses by government forces, insisting that
the problem is simply one of "residual terrorism."
The crisis in Algeria is of such scale and duration as to make a mockery of the government's
insistence that it is strictly an "internal affair." The escalating mass killings of women, children, and
other civilians make it imperative that the international community reject the idea that human rights
protection is limited by national sovereignty. The need for international scrutiny in Algeria is more
pressing than ever. Human Rights Watch therefore makes the following recommendations:
To the United Nations High Commissioner pn Human Rights
Human Rights Watch supports the efforts of High Commissioner Mary Robinson to arrange
for missions to Algeria of the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial execution and on torture. We urge
the High Commissioner to continue her efforts to bring the resources of her office and of the U.N.
system to bear on the Algerian crisis.
To the European Union and Member States
The E.U. and member states should without delay urge the Algerian government to facilitate
immediately a mission by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial executions and on torture,
as requested by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. These missions by the U.N. special
mechanisms should not be contingent on the results of any E.U. missions to Algeria. Nor should
discussion of these missions be delayed until the meetings of the U.N. Human Rights Commission
in March, as the Algerian government is proposing.
The E.U. member states should co-sponsor a resolution at the upcoming Human Rights
Commission session in Geneva finding that the severity and scale of the human rights crisis in
�Algeria requires the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for the country.
Any E.U. ministerial visit, such as a visit by the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, Britain,
and Austria (the troika) as proposed by Germany, should not be limited to discussing humanitarian
aid or support for the government's campaign to suppress the armed opposition groups. It is crucial
that the mission should also have the following priorities:
•
Impress upon the Algerian authorities their responsibilities, under international law and
human rights treaties to which Algeria is party, to afford protection of life, liberty and
security of its citizens, and to bring to justice those responsible for violating those rights in
timely public and fair trials.
•
Stress the need for the Algerian government to take credible steps to halt abuses committed
by government forces, including torture, extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention, and
"disappearances," to investigate complaints of such abuses promptly and meaningfully, and
to punish appropriately those responsible for committing or condoning such abuses.
•
Urge the Algerian authorities to end censorship and pressures on the media that aim to
enforce a state monopoly on information related to the internal security situation, including
human rights violations, or that aim to restrict coverage that displeases government officials.
•
Request credible explanationsfromgovernment and security officials for the apparent failure
of security forces to intervene in recent large scale massacres, notably those in Rais and
Bentalha in August and September 1997.
•
Request credible explanations for the apparent failure of the government to investigate
credibly the killings of public figures, or to indict or prosecute those cases in courts of law.
•
Meet with leaders and spokespeople of opposition parties, including those represented in the
National Assembly and those outside of the Assembly which have repudiated and
condemned armed violence.
•
Meet with human rights activists and lawyers, including women's rights activists, and
commit some meaningful proportion of any material aid package to support the work of these
groups and efforts.
t
•
Impress upon Algerian authorities the importance of cooperating with/'international
investigators, including those under U.N. auspices, to examine allegations of responsibility
and to make recommendations with respect to human rights abuses by all parties.
•
Make clear to the Algerian government that the ministerial mission is not intended to
supplant an international investigation into the country's human rights crisis, avoid any
appearance of supporting the government's refusal to cooperate with such an investigation,
and publicly dispute any effort by the Algerian authorities to impute such support tp the
ministers' visit.
The proposed European Parliament delegation should adopt similar priorities. The delegation
should include as consultants experienced human rights field workers, and should take advantage
of its larger size and lesser protocol to request unmonitored meetings with humanrightslawyers,
community activists, opposition political forces, journalists and others who have had access to
massacre sites and survivors. The delegation should seek to visit Rais, Bentalha, Relizane and other
mass killing sites, and should request meetings with security officials responsible for those areas at
the times of the massacres. At the same time, the delegation should make absolutely clear that it is
not and does not consider itself to be a substitute for an international committee of inquiry, which
�is how it has been represented by the Algerian media.
To the Clinton Administration
The U.S. government should continue to urge the government of Algeria to welcome
investigations into the human rights crisis by international humanrightsorganizations. In addition,
Washington should use the means at its disposal to persuade the government of Algeria to cooperate
with the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights and to facilitate without further delay official
visits to the country by the Special Rapporteurs on summary executions and on torture.
In particular, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright should use the occasion of the late
January release of the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to
highlight U.S. concern with the situation in Algeria. Secretary Albright should at this time convey
U.S. support for the recommendations of the U.N. High Commissioner, Mary Robinson. Finally, the
U.S. should declare that it will co-sponsor a resolution at the Human Rights Commission meetings
in Geneva establishing the position of a Special Rapporteur for Algeria.
�February 1998
Vol. 10, No. 1(E)
PLEASE NOTE: THIS IS AN ADVANCE COPY OF THIS REPORT. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE. YOU -J
WILL RECEIVE SHORTLY FULL COPIES WITH APPENDICES.
ALGERIA
"NEITHER AMONG THE LIVING NOR THE DEAD":
STATE-SPONSORED "DISAPPEARANCES" IN ALGERIA
ABOUT THIS REPORT
2
SUMMARY
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
3
INTRODUCTION
5
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
8
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
10
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
12
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
13
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
17
APPENDICES
19
APPENDIX A
Letter from Human Rights Watch to President Liamine Zeroual
19
APPENDIX B
Statement by Human Rights Watch of September 26
20
APPENDIX C
Joint Statement of October 15 by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
International Federation of Human Rights and Reporters without Borders
21
APPENDIX D
Letter from Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra to Human Rights Watch
22
APPENDIX E
For families and friends ofthe "disappeared": What you can do
23
APPENDIX F
Form for submission of information to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
25
�ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report was written by Nejla Sammakia and Eric Goldstein, respectively research associate and
research director at Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division. It is based in part on
research conducted in Algeria between March 30 and April 13, 1997, by Nejla Sammakia and Baher
Alashhab, a consultant to Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Hanny Megally, executive director
of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.
Human Rights Watch wishes to thank the many lawyers and relatives of "disappeared" persons who
provided us with information. For reasons related to their own security, some asked to remain anonymous.
Human Rights Watch also wishes to thank M. Kemal Rezag Bara, president of the official National Human
Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de 1'Homme, ONDH), for meeting with us to
discuss cases of suspected "disappearances."
SUMMARY
Among the many human rights tragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces. As with many acts of
violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been difficult to confirm. Armed
Islamist groups are responsible for abductions as well as deliberate killings of thousands of civilians.
However, there is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are carrying out "disappearances." They
are doing so on such a wide scale that the practice could persist only with the sanction of the highest levels
of authority. While Algerian officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing" in state custody,
Human Rights Watch is aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states in Article
7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political stability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances." International instruments that
Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain articles that, if fully implemented,
protect against enforced disappearances. However, since political violence became endemic in 1992, these
instruments and laws have been routinely flouted by Algeria's security forces. Persons are seized by forces
that often refuse to identify themselves; they are held in unacknowledged detention without being able to
contact family or lawyer, and beyond the time limit set forth in Algerian law. Detained in this fashion, they
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment.
In the hope offindingtheir "disappeared" relatives, families make the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, file missing-person complaints with official agencies, and seek help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Nacera Dutour told Human Rights Watch that when
she inquired about her "disappeared" son Amine Amrouche, a gendarmerie official told her in May 1997
that, in the gendarmerie's records, Amrouche's name "was neither among the living nor the dead."
Human Rights Watch
2
February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1 (E)
�RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of Algeria
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all persons arbitrarily detained.
•
Investigate allegations of unlawful and/or arbitrary detention, make public the results of such
investigations, and take legal measures, under the abuse of authority provisions of Article 51 of
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure, against those responsible for such offenses, and make public
these legal measures.
•
Ensure compliance by the security forces with international standards for the prevention of
"disappearances," including those contained in international agreements ratified by Algeria and
those safeguards against "disappearances" that are found in Algerian laws. These include enforcing
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure by
requiring officers holding a person to allow him or her to communicate
immediately and directly with relatives; and
punishing officers who are found responsible for holding persons in garde
a vue (pre-arraignment) detention for periods exceeding the limits provided
by law.
•
Implement recommendations made by the official National Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire national des droits de 1'Homme, ONDH) by requiring that arresting authorities
identify themselves at the time of arrest or detention, and requiring that detainees be held only in
publicly recognized detention facilities.
•
Inform persons upon arrest ofthe reasons for their detention, and enable them to challenge promptly
the legality of that detention before an independent judicial authority, as provided by Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Algeria is a State Party.
•
Establish a public register listing the names and whereabouts of all persons detained by all branches
of the army, intelligence, and national and local security forces. The register should be updated on
a frequent and regular basis. It should include for each person the time of arrest, and specify by
which order and under what charge he or she was arrested. The register should be made available
without restriction to judges, lawyers, families and human rights organizations.
•
Ensure that the mechanisms set up by the Algerian authorities to respond to inquiries from families,
lawyers and nongovernmental organizations concerning the whereabouts and fate of persons
detained are speedy and responsive to their needs and are reviewed regularly for promptness.
•
Communicate to all military, intelligence and security forces that "disappearances" and torture will
not be tolerated, and that commanders who order or condone such actions will be prosecuted and,
if found guilty, punished according to the gravity of the crime of enforced "disappearance."
•
Publicize information about the official mechanisms by which victims of illegal detention can
exercise their enforceable right to compensation, as provided in Article 9(5) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Human Rights Watch
3
February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1(E)
�•
Allow access for international investigators, including those under United Nations auspices, to
examine allegations of responsibility and to make recommendations with respect to human rights
abuses by all parties.
To the Armed Opposition Groups
•
Cease and repudiate all deliberate attacks on and/or the abduction of civilians.
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all abducted civilians.
•
Investigate and remove from any position of authority those who are found to have participated in
the torture or ill-treatment, including rape and sexual abuse, or murder of abducted persons.
To the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
•
In light ofthe scope of the problem of "disappearances" in Algeria, seek to conduct a mission to
Algeria to research and prepare a report on the issue.
To the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
•
Lend political and logistical support to the activities of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances in its effort to address the situation in Algeria, including the preparation
of a comprehensive report.
•
Urge the government of Algeria to allow an independent investigation of human rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law by all parties in Algeria, organized by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights and including the
appropriate mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights.
To the European Union and Member States
•
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by armed opposition
groups.
•
Raise with the Algerian government, at the highest levels and as an urgent matter, the cases of
Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of the authorities.
•
Instruct member state embassies in Algiers to investigate the extent of "disappearances" in Algeria,
to pursue specific cases of "disappearances" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees
whose names are known.
•
Use all possible means, including the negotiations over the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreement with Algeria and linkage of financial assistance, to persuade the government of Algeria
to implement the recommendations in this report, including a full accounting concerning persons
arbitrarily detained and "disappeared," and publicly support such initiatives by the government.
•
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
To the Clinton administration
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by armed opposition
groups.
Raise with the Algerian government the cases of Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of
the authorities.
Instruct the U.S. embassy in Algiers to increase its monitoring of "disappearances" in Algeria, to
pursue specific cases of "disappeared" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees.
Use all possible means, including financial assistance and official guarantees for foreign
investments, to persuade the government of Algeria to implement the recommendations in this
report, including a full accounting concerning persons detained illegally and "disappeared," and
publicly support such initiatives by the government.
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1992, Algeria has been riven by a conflict between security forces and armed opposition
groups that call themselves Islamist. It has claimed at least 60,000 lives, many of them civilians. Under the
guise of fighting "terrorism," security forces have engaged in systematic torture, summary executions, and
arbitrary arrests with impunity. Armed groups have targeted for assassination individuals whom they viewed
as hostile to their religious-political agenda or supportive of the present government, and have earned out
a series of massacres of unarmed men, women and children in rural areas. In its reporting on the crisis in
Algeria, Human Rights Watch has consistently condemned violations of human rights and of humanitarian
law by all parties.
1
Among the many human rights tragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces.
Searching for their "disappeared" loved ones, families have made the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, filed missing-person complaints with official agencies, and sought help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Some of the relatives of the "disappeared" have recently
taken to the streets, holding up photos of their missing fathers, sons, and brothers, demanding answers.
As with many acts of violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been
difficult to confirm. Persons have been seized at their homes, in their workplaces, or in public places, by men
in plainclothes who refused to identify themselves or present a warrant, but who were later confirmed to be
members of the security forces. There have also been instances of police-style actions by men in
uniform—such as the staffing of checkpoints—where witnesses suspected the men of being members of
armed groups who had disguised themselves as security force members.
1
Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Elections in the Shadow of Violence and Repression," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, ho. 4, June 1997; Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One Is Spared (New York:
Human Rights Watch, January 1994); see also annual editions of Human Rights Watch World Report.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�In some cases, confirmation of security force responsibility was later confirmed when the person
seized was located within the prison system or released after a period of detention. In other cases, such as
the abductions of women that accompanied some of the gruesome massacres in villages southeast of Algiers
during 1997, the circumstances of the abduction led families of victims to suspect the hand of armed
opposition groups.
2
3
While abductions by armed opposition groups are a grave human rights problem in Algeria, there
is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are responsible for many hundreds of unresolved cases
of "disappearance." The phenomenon is of such proportions that it could only persist with the sanction of
the highest levels of national authority. While high officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing"
in state custody, we are aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
"Disappeared" persons come from a wide range of professions. They include government employees,
physicians, businessmen, political activists, and journalists. Among the cases Human Rights Watch has
investigated, the arrests took place mostly at night, and according to eyewitnesses, were carried out by mixed
military and police forces who arrived in cars, generally with private license plates. Sometimes armored
vehicles were also used. Some members of these forces wore uniforms and others were in plainclothes. When
the police came wearing civilian clothes, they often wore jackets with a recognizable police insignia. When
arresting someone at home or on the street, they rarely presented an arrest warrant or official identification.
These were reportedly shown more often when the arrest was made at the person's workplace.
After a relative was seized, family members often visited nearby police stations to see if he or she
was being held there. Some made inquiries with the state prosecutor's office after the twelve-day limit on
garde a vue (pre-arraignment) detention had elapsed, and received a receipt acknowledging their complaint.
Others reported locating their arrested relatives, only to lose track of them after being told they had been
transferred to another place of detention whose location was not disclosed.
4
When detainees are held in unknown locations, they are invariably deprived of legal assistance and
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment. A prisoner who was released in December 1996, after three and-a-half years in jail, told
Human Rights Watch that he first obtained a lawyer only after he was charged and transferred to a prison,
following three months in secret detention in police custody. Once in el-Harrache prison, he asked other
detainees to have their visiting relatives inform his family of his whereabouts. When the former prisoner,
2
"Scores of women are reported to have been abducted by armed groups and held captive for varying periods
of time during which they were raped and ill-treated....Reports of abduction and rape of women had decreased during
1996, but have once again become widespread in the context of recent massacres in regions around the capital."
Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence (London: Amnesty International,
November 1997), p. 22.
3
There are no official figures of the number of persons abducted by armed groups. The president of Soumoud
("steadfastness," in Arabic), an Algerian organization concerned with the issue, was quoted in the press as saying,
"Excluding the wilayas of M£d£a and Bouira, we counted, as of July 26, 1996, 2,000 persons kidnaped by terrorists
whose fate is unknown." Quoted anonymously in Salima Tlemfani, "Plus de 2000 personnes pontes disparues," ElWatan, April 22, 1997. Since that interview, abductions have continued at an alarming pace.
4
The twelve-day limit applies only to crimes that are considered "terrorist or subversive acts" (Article 8 of
Ordonnance no. 95-10 modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure). The limit is in other cases forty-eight hours (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Article 51).
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�who preferred to withhold his name, had earlier appeared before an investigating judge, he was not notified
of his right to a lawyer or to contact his family. He also told us that he was tortured for three days while in
police custody. The torture methods included beating with large sticks, the "chiffon " (or washrag) method
in which a cloth soaked in dirty water and chemicals is stuffed down his mouth, and leaving him suspended
by the arms for hours.
The problem of persons going missing while in state custody has been recognized by the government
and nongovernmental organizations alike. Justice Minister Mohamed Adami told Human Rights Watch, "We
give these [missing person] cases all our special attention. Sometimes we find the person in question, but
until we do we keep the files open on these cases." Late in 1996, the military authorities had set up a "social
services" department to receive relatives who wish to report missing persons and attempt to trace them.
Algeria's official National Human Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme,
ONDH), which was created by and reports to the office of the president, has flagged "disappearances" as a
major concern. The head of the independent Algerian Human Rights League (Ligue Algerienne des droits
de I'Homme, LADH), Ghechir Boudjemaa, called "disappearances" one of the country's most serious human
rights problems, in an interview published in the Algiers daily al-Khabar on November 17.
5
During and after a mission to Algeria in March-April 1997, Human Rights Watch collected
testimony from families and lawyers concerning persons who "disappeared" at the hands of security forces.
We restricted ourselves to those cases where evidence existed—usually eyewitness accounts of the arrest
or abduction—that pointed to the involvement of the security forces. In all of these cases, the victims were
men. On September 12 we submitted this information to the authorities (see Appendix A). We asked in each
case whether the person was in official custody, and if so, his precise whereabouts, legal status, and whether
and when he had been brought before a judicial authority; the charges, if any, against him; and whether he
had been visited by his legal counsel and by his family.
Although we did receive a response indirectly—in the form of a case-by-case working session with
ONDH president M. Kemal Rezag Bara on October 14—in none of the twelve cases presented did the
authorities confirm that the individual was in official custody or specify his whereabouts.
6
Human Rights Watch believes these cases reflect a pattern of state-sponsored "disappearances." The
failure of judges and prosecutors to perform their legally mandated oversight functions, including their duty
to ensure that the arresting forces comply with both domestic legislation and international legal instruments
designed to prevent secret and unacknowledged detentions, results in the effective absence ofjudicial remedy
for these practices. As Amnesty International reported, "Examining magistrates and judges have consistently
shown little interest in establishing how the detainees came to be in the custody of the security forces, even
when there is ample evidence that the detainees were held in secret detention in violation of the law."
7
The government of Algeria has responded to some of the many case inquiries submitted to it by the
U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. In many instances, the government
contended that the person in question had been killed by security forces in combat or when attempting to
5
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
6
Human Rights Watch also received a letter from the Algerian ambassador to the U.S., dated September 30,
criticizing its demarche on "disappearances" and providing no comments on the cases and questions it contained. The
ambassador's letter indicated that noftirtherofficial response would be forthcoming and advised Human Rights Watch
instead to establish a "constructive dialogue" with the ONDH. The letter is reproduced as Appendix D.
7
Amnesty International, Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence, p. 16.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�escape, or had been assassinated by "terrorist" groups. However, as Amnesty International notes, in these
cases the authorities "failed to provide the necessary details and to explain why for months or years they had
not informed the families and lawyers, who had continued to seek information on their whereabouts from
the authorities, of the fate of these 'disappeared'."
8
As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, no Algerian security force member or official has been
subjected to disciplinary measures for his or her involvement in a case of "disappearance." A request for
information about such cases, contained in the attached letter to President Liamine Zeroual, went
unanswered. The lack of disciplinary measures is further evidence of state sanction for the practice of
"disappearances."
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
"Enforced disappearance" is defined in the 1992 U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance as:
[Pjersons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, thereby placing such persons outside the
protection of the law.
The government of Algeria has maintained a state of emergency since February 9, 1992, justifying
it with reference to the rampant political violence. The state of emergency permits various derogations from
Algerian laws, including those that protect civil liberties. The minister of interior is empowered to restrict
"all public gatherings that could disturb the public order and safety," order searches both day and night and
place in detention centers persons "whose activity is considered to threaten the public order, public security,
or the proper functioning of public services." The Algerian authorities informed the United Nations on
February 13, 1992 that it was derogating from articles 9(3), 12, 17, and 21 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
9
10
International law affirms that even during declared states of exception certain basic human rights
cannot be suspended. The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
states in Article 7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances."
8
Ibid., p. 17.
Presidential decree no. 92-44 of 9 February 1992 establishing the state of emergency. The preamble to the
decree refers to "serious and persistent attacks on public order that have taken place in numerous places in the country"
and "the threats to the stability of institutions and serious and repeated attacks against the security of citizens and civil
peace."
10
Article 9(3) guarantees that "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge...and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release...." Articles 12, 17 and 21 refer,
respectively, to the right tofreedomof movement; freedomfromarbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family
home or correspondence; and the right of peaceful assembly.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�International instruments that Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain
articles that, if fully implemented, protect against enforced disappearances. Algeria has, for example, ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states in Article 9( 1):
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedures as are established by law.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance requires in
Article 3 that each state "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and
terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction." Article 6(1) states: "No order
or instruction of any public authority, civilian, military or other, may be invoked to justify an enforced
disappearance."
The declaration stipulates in Article 10 that detainees must be held in officially recognized places
of detention, that their families must be promptly informed of their place of detention and that they must
have access to a lawyer. These provisions are intended to prevent "disappearances." Guidelines for punitive
action against officials responsible for acts of enforced disappearance and for compensation of its victims
are found in Article 14 and Article 19 respectively:
Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance in a particular State shall,
when the facts disclosed by an official investigation so warrant, be brought before the competent
civil authorities of that State for the purpose of prosecution and trial....All States should take any
lawful and appropriate action available to them to bring all persons presumed responsible for an act
of enforced disappearance, who are found to be within their jurisdiction or under their control, to
justice.
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall have
the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their
dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.
Algerian law also provides a number of safeguards against "disappearances." Even when a criminal
investigation necessitates holding a detainee without a warrant, Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CPP) states that "the officer must immediately inform the state prosecutor." Article 51 also stipulates:
While protecting the confidentiality of the investigation, the police officer is obligated to grant to
the person held in garde a vue [pre-arraignment] detention all means for enabling him to
communicate immediately and directly with his family and to receive visits by it."
A time limit of twelve days is imposed on garde a vue detention in cases of suspected terrorist or
subversive acts by Article 8 of Decree 95-10 issued on 25 November 1995 and amending Article 51 of the
CPP. During that time, detainees must appear before the state prosecutor if they are to be charged, according
to Article 51, second paragraph:
11
"Toute en veillant au secret de I'enquete, I'officier de police judiciaire est tenu de mettre & la disposition de
la personne gard^e & vue, tout moyen lui permettant de communiquer imm^diatement et directement avec sa familie,
et de recevoir ses visiles."
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�If there is evidence that is substantial and corroborating so as to warrant the filing of charges, the
police officer must present the detainee to the state prosecutor without holding the detainee in his
custody for more than forty-eight hours [amended to twelve days as indicated above].
12
Similarly, amended Article 65 stipulates that if detainees are to be kept longer than twelve days, they
must be brought before the state prosecutor, who can order an extension of the incommunicado detention
by not more than twelve additional days. The criminal code, in Articles 109-110, provides for penalties of
up to ten years in prison for public servants who participate in acts of arbitrary or illegal detention or who
violate procedures relating to detention.
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
Estimates vary concerning the number of persons who were seized by the security forces and who
remain unaccounted for. The Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (Federation
internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme, FIDH), after interviewing lawyers in Algeria during an
April 1997 mission, stated that it "believes that the number of at least 2,000 'disappearances' attributable
to the security forces would be well below the actual figure."
13
Mohamed Tahri, one of several Algerian lawyers who follows "disappearance" cases, estimated that
some 500 persons were unaccounted for after being arrested during 1997, most of them taken from urban
areas by security forces in police or military vehicles. He reached this figure by informally polling other
lawyers who represent relatives of the "disappeared. Tahri himself said that as of November he himself had
come to represent the families of twenty-nine persons who "disappeared" during the year and remained, to
his knowledge, unaccounted for. Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Mahmoud Khelili, told Human
Rights Watch that he had a comparable number of clients whose relatives had gone missing in 1997.
Together Tahri and Khelili reported representing a total of over 500 families of persons who had gone
missing since 1993 and remained unaccounted for.
The National Human Rights Monitoring Body (ONDH) stated that during 1996 it registered a total
of 988 cases of presumed "disappearances," a figure that represents a large increase over the 373 and 567
recorded in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The data collected by the ONDH represents only a fraction of
persons reported missing in Algeria and cannot be considered a representative sample, since it is based on
information brought to its attention—mostly by relatives—rather than on proactive fleldwork. Despite its
limitations, the data suggest that many "disappearances" are long-term, and that in the majority of cases
families identify state forces as responsible for the arrest.
14
Of the cases of "disappearances" recorded by the ONDH during 1996, the dates that the persons went
missing were distributed as follows:
12
"S'il existe centre une personne des indices graves et concordants de nature a motiver son inculpation,
I'officier de police judiciaire doit la conduire devant le procureur de la R^publique, sans pouvoir la garder & sa
disposition plus de quarante-huit heures."
13
F6d£ration internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme (FIDH), La levee du voile: I'Algerie de
I'extrajudiciaire et de la manipulation (Paris: FIDH, June 1997), p. 16. See response to that report by the ONDH, De
la manipulation des faits au detournement des concepts, October 1997.
14
Observatoire National des droits de I'Homme, Rapport annuel 1996, Algiers, 1997.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1
21
329
390
247
According to the information received by the ONDH, 337 of the "arrests" in 1996 were carried out
in the person's home, 108 in their workplace, 192 in the street and twenty-four after the persons presented
themselves to the security services. The persons carrying out the "arrests" were unidentified in 134 cases;
in 754 cases, however, one ofthe security services was identified by the complainants as responsible, broken
down as follows: police: 338, gendarmerie: 168, and armed forces: 248.
15
The ONDH report acknowledged that some of the "disappearance" cases reported to it involved
persons being held without charge by authorities, beyond the legally permissible period of time and
sometimes outside the established places of detention. However, the ONDH cautioned, not all of the 754
cases attributed by complainants to the security forces were necessarily government-sanctioned
"disappearances." It said that the picture could be distorted by several factors, including:
16
• when a "disappeared" person resurfaces, that information does not always reach the ONDH;
• abductions by armed groups are sometimes mistakenly attributed to security forces;
• the person being sought by his/her family may have voluntarily joined the ranks of "terrorist
groups" (and sometimes the family files a complaint about a "disappearance" to cover for the relative who
has done so);
• the person being sought emigrated abroad illegally and has not informed his family of his
whereabouts.
During his meeting with Human Rights Watch on October 14, Mr. Rezag Bara stated that he could
not estimate the distribution of cases within these categories. However, in an interview he gave earlier to Le
Monde, Mr. Rezag Bara asserted that authorities bore responsibility for only a small fraction of these alleged
"disappearances":
Some of the disappeared are really terrorists who secretly went underground. Many disappeared
persons were, by contrast, abducted by terrorist groups disguised as security force members. The
abductions attributable to the security forces are exceptional.
17
Mr. Rezag Bara has noted additional circumstances that he said could misleadingly inflate the tally
of "disappearances." Persons who had been previously arrested and released, he told Human Rights Watch
on October 14, may have fled into the ranks of armed groups out of fear of being re-arrested. He
acknowledged that police sometimes re-arrested persons who had been acquitted by the courts when the
police disagreed with their acquittal. He also noted that families sometimes remained uninformed about a
relative's detention because prison officials failed to allow detainees to exercise their right to notify their
families. He said this abuse was more common with persons held for alleged security offenses. In a meeting
15
These figures, which are reproducedfromthe ONDH report, add up to 888, not the 988 that the ONDH gives
as the total number of complaints during the year.
16
The ONDH reported in its 1994-1995 report the existence of secret detention centers in "places that the law
has not designated for that function. They are mainly...certain police stations or army barracks serving as detention
centers. Persons arrested werefreedafter more than three months of secret detention in these places."
17
HacSne Terro, "On emm6ne ton fils pour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�with the FIDH, Mr. Rezag Bara added that some of the persons reported as missing were men who had fled
to avoid their military service.
18
While these alternative explanations may be true in some instances, Human Rights Watch believes
that there is strong evidence of security force involvement in the cases brought to our attention and that this
reflects a policy of state sponsored "disappearances" in Algeria.
Mr. Rezag Bara also provided some general statistics about incarceration in Algeria, a country of
28 million inhabitants. In 1997, the number of persons in some form of detention was 38,000, of which
10,000-12,000 were being held in connection with the activities of armed groups and subversion cases, most
of whom had yet to be tried. Fifteen to 20 percent of these 10,000-12,000 were directly linked to acts of
"terrorism" while the rest were being held for providing services to armed groups or failure to report offenses
by them.
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
A peaceful demonstration on October 20 in Algiers by lawyers and families of the "disappeared"
was blocked by police. At a time when the international press corps was present to cover the local elections
taking place on October 23, dozens of women and their supporters, carrying photos of relatives who had been
arrested or "disappeared," gathered in front of the central post office in Algiers. Security forces dispersed
the demonstrators and arrested about fifteen women and lawyer Mohamed Tahri, who represents the families
of many "disappeared" persons. Participants told Human Rights Watch by phone that some members of the
police had warned the women that they would meet the same fate as their missing relatives if they did not
disperse. All of those arrested were released the same day. Mr. Tahri, who was released without charge after
six hours, told Human Rights Watch that a police officer accused him of being a "traitor" because he had
"links with foreign organizations." Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Rachid Mesli, had been sentenced
to three years in prison in July 1997 after an unfair trial in which he was questioned about his contacts with
Amnesty International (see below).
On September 22, a group of relatives of "disappeared" persons attempted to present a petition to
officials of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World
Health Organization, who were attending a conference on political violence organized by the ONDH at the
Aurassi Hotel in Algiers. Signed by "the families of the disappeared," the petition called on the international
community to "denounce vigorously the silence of the authorities before the repeated complaints and efforts
to win the release of the 'disappeared,' and to obtain information on the fate that awaits them." Security
forces barred the petitioners from presenting their petition. Human Rights Watch subsequently learned that
two of the participants, Mebarka Sai, age sixty-one, and Masouda Boukhari, were arrested in early October
and held for several days before being released.
Mr Tahri's arrest at the October 20 demonstration was not his first brush with trouble apparently
linked to his human rights work. During the weekend of June 12-13, his office in the Kouba neighborhood
was burglarized. Tahri reported afterward that some of his case files and correspondence with clients whose
relatives had "disappeared" were missing but that no objects of financial value had been taken. The break-in
occurred after a week in which Mr. Tahri had been featured in major media in France denouncing
19
18
La levee du voile, p. 15.
19
Algeria's weekend is Thursday and Friday.
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February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1 (E)
�"disappearances" and other human rights abuses in Algeria. He was interviewed on a program about Algeria
that aired on the French television station "Arte" on June 5. Also, the issue of Le Monde that appeared on
the afternoon of June 12 (dated June 13) contained a full-page article devoted to the narratives of Tahri's
clients about their relatives who had "disappeared."
Mr. Tahri said that the police conducted an
investigation but he has learned of no arrests made in connection with the break-in.
20
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
The cases presented below are but a few among hundreds that have been brought to the attention of
human rights lawyers in Algeria and international human rights organizations. The information we present
includes: first, the information collected by Human Rights Watch during and after a mission to Algeria,
which we submitted to the authorities for their comments (see Appendix A); second, the response provided
by ONDH President Rezag Bara in an October 14 meeting in Washington—the only response on cases that
Human Rights Watch received from any official body; and third, any additional information about the case
that Human Rights Watch collected after submitting its inquiry to the authorities. In none of the cases has
the person reappeared, to the best of Human Rights Watch's knowledge.
In his meeting with Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara noted that the ONDH, a five-year-old
body that was created by and reports to the office of the president of the republic, serves as a conduit
between complainants who approach the ONDH and the appropriate authorities. It conducts no investigations
on its own into cases. The ONDH's responses to Human Rights Watch concerning specific individuals who
had "disappeared" fell into three basic categories:
•
•
•
the ONDH was unfamiliar with a case, presumably because the family had not approached it;
it had submitted a written inquiry with authorities about the case but had received no reply;
it had received a reply, most commonly a denial that the person in question was in official custody.
When acting in response to a complaint about a missing person, the ONDH submits letters to two
security force offices that together are presumed to answer for all agencies legally authorized to detain
persons: the Direction Generale de Surete Nationale (DGSN) and the Gendarmerie Nationale. The former
is an agency within the Ministry of Interior that oversees Algeria's police forces. The gendarmerie is a
branch of the military; Mr. Rezag Bara said that he assumes that when the gendarmerie responds to the
ONDH it is speaking on behalf of all branches of the military.
According to this ONDH methodology, only a denial from both agencies could be construed as an
official denial that an individual was in state custody. This was rarely forthcoming. In many cases, the
ONDH received a reply from one agency but not the other. Sometimes, Mr. Rezag Bara noted, the replies
took weeks or months. He did not provide Human Rights Watch with copies or dates of the correspondence
between the security agencies and the ONDH.
***
Amine Amrouche, age twenty-one, was arrested on January 30, 1997 from outside his house in
Baraki by men in plainclothes who took him away in an unmarked car, according to neighbors who described
the incident to his mother, Nacera Dutour, who lives in France. One of the witnesses said he believed the
men to be members of the security forces. Ms. Dutour tried to track down rumors of her son's detention in
20
Hac6ne Terro, "On emm6ne ton fils pour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
Human Rights Watch
Tl
February 1998, Vol. 10, No. I (E)
�various police stations, prisons and at a military camp in Oran. She also sought assistance from the ONDH
and the office of the state prosecutor, who informed her that they had made inquiries but could find no trace
of him. She told Human Rights Watch that a gendarmerie official said to her in May that her soivs name
"was neither among [the gendarmerie's records of] the living nor the dead."
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mr. Amrouche was "officially not in custody" since
the ONDH had received replies from both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale that neither had any
record of arresting Amrouche. Amnesty International reported on October 17 that it had received information
indicating that he was alive and being held in a military security center in Algiers. In early November, Mr.
Amrouche's mother said she had no new information, although she continued to hear rumors that he was in
detention.
21
Aziz Bouabdallah is a journalist with the independent Al-'Alam al-Siyassi daily. His family said
he was arrested on April 12, 1997 from his home in Algiers by men dressed in police uniforms who
introduced themselves as members of the security forces, according to statements released by the New Yorkbased Committee To Protect Journalists and Amnesty International. Mr. Bouabdallah was reportedly being
held in an Algiers detention center. His family has received no official confirmation of his whereabouts.
Both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale informed the ONDH that they are not holding Mr.
Bouabdallah.
Ali Lakhdar Chaouche, age twenty-seven, was arrested at Kouba Hospital near Algiers, where he
works as an orthopedic surgeon. He was arrested by men who reportedly identified themselves as military
personnel to the hospital administration at 2:00 a.m. on April 1, 1997, during Mr. Chaouche's night shift.
They presented an order of arrest issued by the military authorities. Trying to locate Ali, his family wrote
to the ministries of justice and defense, the ONDH and to the police stations of Kouba and Baraki, where he
lives. They have received no answer so far.
Due apparently to a confusion of similar names, Mr. Rezag Bara came prepared to discuss a different
case but said he had no information on Ali Lakhdar Chaouche.
Djamil and Mourad Chihoub "disappeared" after their brother Said joined an armed Islamist
group. On May 16, 1996 police and military forces came looking for Said at the family home in the Algiers
suburb of Baraki. Not finding him, the security forces arrested Djamil and told his father they would release
him when Said turned himself in. The next month, the authorities told the family that Said had been killed
in a clash with military forces. They allowed the family to identify his body and gave them a death
certificate. However, Djamil has not been released, and his family has not been informed of his whereabouts.
On November 14, 1996, the military forces of the Baraki barracks, together with a "self-defense"
group from the area, went to the Chihoub home and arrested Mourad, who was less than seventeen years old
at the time. When his father attempted to intervene, they threatened to shoot him. He inquired at the military
barracks but was told to inquire with Military Security (Securite Militaire, an agency within the Armed
Forces). He wrote several letters to the authorities, and was summoned last February to the military's
department of social services in Beni Messous to provide details about Mourad and Djamil and was told to
wait for news. He then received a letter dated May 11, 1997 from the state prosecutor's office saying there
was no information on his sons.
21
Amnesty International Urgent Action, MDE28/28/97, October 17, 1997.
Human Rights Watch
14
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�The ONDH, which had submitted a request for information about Djamil in August 1996, received
a reply from one of the responding agencies several months later saying that its forces had not arrested
Djamil. The ONDH received a similar reply from that agency on August 24, 1997, concerning Mourad.
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. His wife, Safia, stated
that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from near his home in el-Harrache by about four men
carrying walkie-talkies whom they believed to belong to the security forces. They drove him away in a
convoy of two vehicles.
Safia received in response to her inquiries a statement from the Ministry of Justice on March 16,
1997 stating that el-Harrache police station had no record of Djamel's arrest. She has received no official
information about his whereabouts, but about two months after his arrest, a released detainee wrote a letter
to a private newspaper saying that he had seen Mr. Fahassi at Chateauneuf, a Military Security center in
Algiers. His wife was unable to confirm this. In October 1995, the public-sector newspaper I'Horizon
printed an article claiming that Fahassi was alive and well outside the country. However, others at that
journal later dissociated themselves from the report. No evidence was provided and the family discounted
the report.
Mr. Fahassi had served a six-month sentence in 1991 for an article about the violent conduct of the
security forces toward civilians that he wrote for a newspaper run by the then-legal Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). He was also detained without charge in a detention camp after the
cancellation of general elections in January 1992, and published an account of that detention in the Algiers
daily press.
Both police and military forces told the ONDH they had no information on Mr. Fahassi, Mr. Rezag
Bara said. As of November 1997, Fahassi's wife Safia said the family remained without news.
Mohammed al-Hedi Hamidi, a twenty-four year-old civil servant at the Dely Ibrahim municipality,
was taken from his home in Cite Chevalley by police and military forces in uniform shortly after midnight
on March 19, 1996, according to his family, which has so far been unable to establish his whereabouts. They
have inquired at local police stations and the office of the state prosecutor, and have sent letters of inquiry
to the ONDH and the president's office. On July 13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, a group of security
forces, including some of those who had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, went to the same home and arrested
his brother, whose name is Mohammed (see below). One of them reportedly admitted to his mother that they
had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, and Mohammed was located more than one month later.
Mr. Rezag Bara said the ONDH had received no reply to its requests Tor information about
Mohammed al-Hedi, which it had submitted to authorities in July 1996.
Mostafa Houari, age thirty-six, an employee of the Algerian state oil and gas company Sonatrach,
was arrested at his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers, on the night of April 6, 1996, by about twenty military
and police security forces who questioned his wife about his acquaintances and friends. Mr. Houari had been
detained for five days in October 1995 and held at Dely Ibrahim police station in Algiers. He was tried and
acquitted of the charge of assisting members of armed groups by the Bir Mourad criminal court in Algiers
in January 1996. Since his arrest in April 1996, his wife has been unable to locate him despite several letters
of inquiry, including one to the office of the president.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch the ONDH received no response from either agency about
Mr. Houari. His family, reached by phone in November, said they had no further news about him.
Human Rights Watch
15
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�Mourad Ouchefoune, age twenty-five and an economics student from Dar el-Baida in Algiers, was
arrested from his home by police and military forces after midnight on March 17, 1997. According to
testimony the family gave to lawyers, the security forces broke into the house, forced everyone out and
checked their identities. They then picked out Mourad, handcuffed him and led him away, saying he was
only required for an investigation. The family has received no reply to their official inquiries as to his
whereabouts.
Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no record of a missing person by this name. The family said by phone
in December that they had no further news of Mr. Ouchefoune.
Hedi Saibi, age thirty, was arrested on November 15, 1994. About four Military Security personnel
in cars with private license plates took him away from outside al-Rahma mosque in Meissonier, Algiers,
according to his father and other worshipers leaving the mosque at the same time. His brother Yahia, who
was in detention at the time, was sentenced in January 1996 to a three-year prison term for having provided
services to "terrorists." He was released last June. Hedi's father has written to a number of senior officials,
including the president and the interior, defense and justice ministers, as well as to the ONDH. In response
to his letter to the president, he was summoned by the police who asked questions about his missing son but
was given no information about him.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale
informed the ONDH that they had not arrested Mr. Saibi. On September 22, Mr. Saibi's father joined a group
of relatives who attempted to present a petition on the "disappeared" at the Aurassi Hotel during an ONDHorganized international conference entitled "Contemporary Forms of Violence and the Culture of Peace."
They were barred from entry. Mr. Saibi's father inquired at the ONDH again a few days later, but received
no new information about his son. Contacted by phone on November 17, he told Human Rights Watch he
had obtained no further information.
Abderrahmane Yemeni, age forty-four, was arrested from his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers,
on June 6, 1996. His wife said in letters of inquiry that five military security forces broke into the house in
the early afternoon, searched the premises, and arrested Mr. Yemeni. She wrote complaining about the arrest
and received a polite letter from the state prosecutor's office that did not acknowledge his arrest and said
authorities were unable to locate him.
The ONDH received a response from only one of the two responsible agencies concerning Yemeni.
That agency said he had not been arrested by its forces. The family's lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said by
telephone on November 16 that he had received no further information about Mr. Yemeni.
Allaoua Ziou, age thirty, a farmer in Heliopolis, Guelma, was arrested in the nearby area of Jebenat
Chouhada on the evening of January 1, 1995 by about four men in civilian clothes who took him away in
a car. According to a brother, Djamel, who lives in Canada, eyewitnesses said they followed the car up to
the gates of the Heliopolis gendarmerie barracks. Djamel Ziou told Human Rights Watch that he telephoned
the Heliopolis gendarmerie at the time and was informed that Allaoua was being held there. The family was
told unofficially that about one month after his arrest Allaoua had been transferred to another region. Since
then, the family has received no further information about him. Between March and September 1995 Djamel
Ziou wrote to the ministries of interior, justice, the ONDH and the office of the president, but received no
reply. The ONDH replied to a letter on the case sent by Human Rights Watch saying that "according to
recent information...Mr. Ziou is a militant of the ex-FIS and is implicated in a case of supplying help to
terrorist groups." The ONDH said an arrest warrant, dated January 23, 1995, had been issued against him
but did not state that he had been taken into custody. When shown this letter from the ONDH to Human
Rights Watch, Djamel Ziou responded that in the nearly three years since the arrest warrant was supposedly
Human Rights Watch
16
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�issued, the family had never been informed by authorities that Allaoua was wanted. In his meeting with
Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no further information on Mr. Ziou beyond what he had
provided in his letter.
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
Messaoud Ouziala, a kidney transplant physician was held by security forces who disregarded laws
governing arrest and detention. Dr. Ouziala "disappeared" on July 8, 1997 at around 5:30 pm, after he left
his workplace at Moustapha Hospital in Algiers, according to a statement issued by Amnesty International
and public appeals to the authorities for information about him. These appeals were made by the Association
of Algerian Nephrologists and Association Espoir, a group of Algerian dialysis and transplant patients. His
family was unable to obtain any information about him or confirm who had abducted him. The only official
evidence of his arrest and detention came after his release when the ONDH wrote to Amnesty International
stating that Dr. Ouziala had been arrested on July 8 and released July 22. The letter gave no further details
and did not address assertions by Amnesty International that Dr. Ouziala's family had been unable to obtain
any information on his whereabouts despite repeated inquiries with officials.
In an abduction-like arrest on July 31, 1996, lawyer and human rights activist Rachid Mesli was
stopped in the Rouiba area outside Algiers by four armed men in civilian clothes who took him away in a
car. All questions to the authorities by his family, lawyers, and international human rights organizations as
to his whereabouts went unanswered. On August 7, about twenty police in uniform searched his home and
office and informed his family that he was in police detention. He was finally brought before an investigating
judge on August 10, charged with complicity with an armed group and transferred to el-Harrache prison in
Algiers. A day later, the ONDH confirmed to Amnesty International that Mesli had been held with judicial
authorization prior to his appearance, but did not explain why the security forces had refused to acknowledge
his detention. Lawyers who saw Mesli in his first court appearances noted that he had bruises on his right
eye and his hand, and seemed to be in poor health. After he was convicted and sentenced to three years in
prison, Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to Justice Minister Adami on July 17, 1997, protesting Mr.
Mesli's unfair trial, but has received no response. Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that a forensic
expert who examined Mr. Mesli concluded in August 1996 that he had suffered a light wound to his right
eyebrow, but had not been tortured.
Ammar Ghazoul, age thirty-one, an unemployed agricultural engineer, was apparently arrested in
May 1997 by police forces. Family members said police broke into their house in the early hours of May 4,
and when they did not find Ghazoul, took away his mother instead, saying she was needed for an
interrogation. She was released the next day. On May 6, Ammar's brother and neighbors caught sight of him
in a police car. He was later listed as a fugitive being sought in connection with a criminal case involving
an attack on government property. After the family's lawyer brought to the attention of the Algiers criminal
court judge and the state prosecutor that Ammar had apparently been detained, he was presented in early
August in court, where an investigating judge ordered him held in Serkadji prison in Algiers. Mr. Ghazoul
was still unable to contact his family, which learned of his whereabouts only through friends who visited
other inmates at Serkadji.
As of November, his family had confirmed his presence in Serkadji prison and had been able to visit
him a few times.
Mohammed Hamidi is a thirty-three year-old tax inspector in Ben Aknoun. He was arrested on July
13, 1997, at five o'clock in the morning, by a group of security forces, including some of those who had
arrested his brother, Mohammed al-Hedi (see above). His family wrote letters of inquiry to the state
Human Rights Watch
FT
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�prosecutor's office, the ONDH and other officials but received no reply. More than a month later he was
found to be held in Serkadji Prison, according to other detainees who asked their visitors to inform his
family. His family subsequently obtained permission to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that he was unaware that Mr. Hamidi had been located in Serkadji prison. He
told Human Rights Watch he would inquire with the Ministry of Justice about Mr. Hamidi's detention, and
said that if the reports about his unacknowledged detention were accurate, his lawyer should file a formal
complaint about illegal detention. Reached by telephone in November, Mohammed's family said they had
obtained legal counsel for him and had seen him three times.
Noureddine Mihoubi, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested in February 1992 as he was
visiting a brother in the southern town of Bousaada. He was held at a police station there for fifteen days,
during which time his family was able to visit and bring him food and medicine. Then they were told that
he had been transferred to Algiers but were given no further information. A month later, a newly released
detainee told them he had seen Mihoubi at the Military Security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in
poor health. On May 12, 1996, the ONDH told his family an arrest warrant had been issued for him on March
31, 1993. In July of 1996 the family obtained a police report issued the same month saying Mihoubi had been
arrested by security forces and transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. It contained no more details. In
early August 1997, a prisoner who had just been released after serving a three-year jail sentence told
Mihoubi's family that he was being held in Blida military jail and was to be tried by a military court in
September. He said Mihoubi had requested a lawyer to defend him in his upcoming trial. His family was
preparing to obtain official permission to visit him and to provide him with a lawyer.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mihoubi was still officially wanted, following the
1993 arrest warrant. He said he was aware of the developments concerning his arrest that were reported by
the family, but had no official confirmation of them. Contacted by telephone on November 17, the family's
lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said the released prisoner gave details about Mihoubi to his family which confirmed
he had seen him, but as of November his family was unable to locate him after inquiring at the Blida jail and
at the region's civil and military courts.
Ali Belhadj, one of the two chiefs of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front, has been held in secret
and incommunicado detention since he was transferred from his former place of imprisonment, apparently
at the end of 1994. He has been serving a prison term after being tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve
years in jail for conspiring against state authority, harming the economy, and distributing seditious tracts.
Since his transfer to secret detention at the end of 1994, he has faced new charges following the alleged
discovery of a letter on the body of an armed Islamist implicating Belhadj in incitement to violence.
I
Belhadj's lawyers have written to the authorities requesting their right under Algerian law to have
access to their client and charging that his whereabouts were unknown. His family has also written to the
ONDH and other official quarters requesting the right to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that the ONDH considered Belhadj's case as an issue of visitation rights, and
said the ONDH had asked the authorities to permit Mr. Belhadj to exercise his right to receive his family.
He said he had not received a reply.
***
Human Rights Watch
18
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�Page f
15 October 1997
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
REPORTERS SANS FRONTI RES
ALGERIA: A CALL FOR ACTION TO END A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Human
Rights Watch and Reporters sans frontiSres join together to appeal to the international
community to act now to address the deteriorating human rights situation in Algeria, and are
calling on members of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to convene a Special
Session on the human rights situation in Algeria. As the UN body with primary responsibility for
the promotion and protection of human rights, we look to the Commission on Human Rights to
provide leadership in seeking solutions to this human rights tragedy.
The last year has seen the longest, most intense spell of violence since the beginning of
the conflict in Algeria five years ago. Violence which has taken a new and terrifying turn with the
massacre of civilians.
Thousands of people - women and children, the poor and elderly - have been massacred
with unspeakable brutality. Some of those lucky enough to have escaped having their throats cut
or being burned alive in their homes have reached nearby security forces posts and called for
help. In vain.
Their cries have not been heard in their country, or beyond their national borders. Up to
80,000 people have been killed behind a virtual wall of silence on the part of the international
community.
Recent statements of the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, UNICEF and the UNHCR condemning the massacres of civilians and other human rights
abuses in Algeria go some way towards breaking through the barriers of silence surrounding the
crisis. But words are not enough.
The international community has for too long turned a blind eye to the plight of the
victims in Algeria, in spite of the warnings sounded by human rights organizations. The UN
Commission on Human Rights has so far not scrutinized the situation. It is time to take concrete
action to end this spiral of violence and to ensure the protection of the civilian population.
The need to investigate and reveal the truth is the first step to finding solutions to this
human rights tragedy. For this reason, we are calling for the establishment of an international
investigation to ascertain the facts, examine allegations of responsibility and to make
recommendations in respect of the massacres and other abuses by all sides in Algeria. Such an
investigation has to be provided with broad powers, adequate staff and resources. It should
collect evidence, statements, including testimony from victims, witnesses and responsible
officials, to discover the truth.
Since the outbreak of the current conflict in 1992, extrajudicial executions, deliberate and
arbitrary killings, torture, rape, "disappearances" and hostage-taking have become routine. The
large-scale massacres of civilians over the past year have taken place against a background of
increasingly widespread human rights abuses by security forces, state-armed militias and armed
�JDTRT^APASU
~~
Islamist groups, which have increasingly targeted and terrorized civilians. Disregard for human
rights has become the rule rather than the exception. This is despite the fact that Algeria has
ratified important international and regional human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Time after time, the Algerian Government has simply failed to investigate these abuses by
its own forces and by armed opposition groups, and to bring those responsible to justice. This
failure has exacerbated the breakdown of law and order and left civilians feeling ever more alone
and unprotected.
The complex reality of violence and counter-violence has become increasingly confused
with the clampdown on information and investigations. Information defined by the authorities as
"security-related" is censored and manipulated. International human rights organizations and
foreign media have often been refused entry to the country. Human rights workers and journalists
who have been let into the country have been subject to surveillance and restrictions. Those who
have continued to work in the country have faced death threats and killings. All of these actions
have contributed to building a wall of silence around the human rights crisis in Algeria
We echo the call of the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the UN and African institutions, and urge
Member States of the OAU to support an initiative of this kind.
In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement with Algeria, which
contains provisions for the resp^~t of human rights, we urge Member States of the European
Union to work for the special session ofthe Commission on Human Rights and the
investigation to become a reality.
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, UN Member States
reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the
international community. We call on them now to honour their pledge.
The Algerian Government routinely accuses anyone criticizing their human rights record
of deliberately lying, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and political bias. Human rights
protection is not just an internal affair or an issue of national sovereignty. Algeria is not above
international scrutiny. At a time when its citizens are being slaughtered en masse week after
week, the government of Algeria should welcome - not oppose - international attention aimed at
helping to protect lives. /END/
PageTl
�JOINI-AP.ASC
Pagel
15 October 1997
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
REPORTERS SANS FRONTI RES
ALGERIA: A CALL FOR ACTION TO END A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Human
Rights Watch and Reporters sans frontiSres join together to appeal to the international
community to act now to address the deteriorating human rights situation in Algeria, and are
calling on members of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to convene a Special
Session on the human rights situation in Algeria. As the UN body with primary responsibility for
the promotion and protection of human rights, we look to the Commission on Human Rights to
provide leadership in seeking solutions to this human rights tragedy.
The last year has seen the longest, most intense spell of violence since the beginning of
the conflict in Algeria five years ago. Violence which has taken a new and terrifying turn with the
massacre of civilians.
Thousands of people - women and children, the poor and elderly - have been massacred
with unspeakable brutality. Some of those lucky enough to have escaped having their throats cut
or being burned alive in their homes have reached nearby security forces posts and called for
help. In vain.
Their cries have not been heard in their country, or beyond their national borders. Up to
80,000 people have been killed behind a virtual wall of silence on the part of the international
community.
Recent statements ofthe UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, UNICEF and the UNHCR condemning the massacres of civilians and other human rights
abuses in Algeria go some way towards breaking through the barriers of silence surrounding the
crisis. But words are not enough.
The international community has for too long turned a blind eye to the plight of the
victims in Algeria, in spite ofthe warnings sounded by human rights organizations. The UN
Commission on Human Rights has so far not scrutinized the situation. It is time to take concrete
action to end this spiral of violence and to ensure the protection of the civilian population.
The need to investigate and reveal the truth is the first step to finding solutions to this
human rights tragedy. For this reason, we are calling for the establishment of an international
investigation to ascertain the facts, examine allegations of responsibility and to make
recommendations in respect of the massacres and other abuses by all sides in Algeria. Such an
investigation has to be provided with broad powers, adequate staff and resources. It should
collect evidence, statements, including testimony from victims, witnesses and responsible
officials, to discover the truth.
Since the outbreak of the current conflict in 1992, extrajudicial executions, deliberate and
arbitrary killings, torture, rape, "disappearances" and hostage-taking have become routine. The
large-scale massacres of civilians over the past year have taken place against a background of
increasingly widespread human rights abuses by security forces, state-armed militias and armed
�•"OlRT^PASt
'
Islamist groups, which have increasingly targeted and terrorized civilians. Disregard for human
rights has become the rule rather than the exception. This is despite the fact that Algeria has
ratified important international and regional human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Time after time, the Algerian Government has simply failed to investigate these abuses by
its own forces and by armed opposition groups, and to bring those responsible to justice. This
failure has exacerbated the breakdown of law and order and left civilians feeling ever more alone
and unprotected.
The complex reality of violence and counter-violence has become increasingly confused
with the clampdown on information and investigations. Information defined by the authorities as
"security-related" is censored and manipulated. International human rights organizations and
foreign media have often been refused entry to the country. Human rights workers and journalists
who have been let into the country have been subject to surveillance and restrictions. Those who
have continued to work in the country have faced death threats and killings. All of these actions
have contributed to building a wall of silence around the human rights crisis in Algeria
We echo the call ofthe Secretary General ofthe Organization of African Unity (OAU)
for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the UN and African institutions, and urge
Member States of the OAU to support an initiative of this kind.
In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement with Algeria, which
contains provisions for the respect of human rights, we urge Member States of the European
Union to work for the special session of the Commission on Human Rights and the
investigation to become a reality.
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, UN Member States
reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the
international community. We call on them now to honour their pledge.
The Algerian Government routinely accuses anyone criticizing their human rights record
of deliberately lying, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and political bias. Human rights
protection is not just an internal affair or an issue of national sovereignty. Algeria is not above
international scrutiny. At a time when its citizens are being slaughtered en masse week after
week, the government of Algeria should welcome - not oppose - international attention aimed at
helping to protect lives. /END/
Page 21
�HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST OVERVIEW/ALGERIA
feuds between armed groups; vendettas between competing armed Islamist groups and
government-backed "self-defense" militias;
and disputes over land ownership.
The shadowy Armed Islamic Group
(known by the acronym GIA) was blamed for
much of the carnage and claimed responsibility for some of the killings. For example, on
September 26, after attacks on the Algiers
suburbs of Rais and Bentalha on August 29
and September 22 respectively that, according to press reports, left more than 500 dead,
Fora listingofrelevant reportsand missions, the GIA issued a statement in London saying
see page 459 al the end ofthis report. Partial it was behind the recent massacres, according
to the Agence France-Presse.
listings also follow each country chapter.
Many of the massacres occurred in districts that had voted overwhelmingly for the
FIS in the 1990and 1992 elections. According
to press reports, several of the massacres
targeted villages whose inhabitants had, since
1993, reportedly given provisions and money
Human Rights Developments
The year was marked by the first legislative to the armed groups, but had since withdrawn
and local elections since the last round of their support and in some cases had sought
voting was cancelled in 1992. Algeriahad been weapons from the authorities to defend themgoverned without an elected parliament since selves.
The security forces often reportedly did
elections were halted in January that year to
prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation not try to halt the massacres or apprehend the
Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). Since ki Hers, even when the slaughter took hours to
then, political strife has become endemic. complete and occurred less than a mile from
1997 appeared to be the bloodiest year yet their barracks and installations. According to
and, more than ever, civilians bore the brunt survivors interviewed by Amnesty International, armed forces units with armored veofthe violence.
The main adversaries were armed Islam- hicles stationed just outside Bentalha did not
ist groups on the one hand and, on the other, intervene even though it was clear they were
the security forces and armed civilian groups aware of the situation, and even stopped
allied with them. Assaults on civilians in- some villagers trying to flee from doing so.
cluded an unprecedented wave of massacres The army also didnot allow neighboring local
in farming and semi-rural communities, mostly militia to enter Bentalha in response to the
in the Mitidja region southwest of the capital. attack. After massacring over two hundred
The assailants indiscriminately killed and persons over the course of several hours, the
maimed men, women, children and infants in attackers fled without being stopped-...
the communities they attacked by beheading
Algerian newspapers and others exthem, hacking them to death or mutilating pressed skepticism toward the semi-ofTicial
them and leaving them to die. Some women explanations of security force inaction, which
were abducted and reportedly raped and then focused on the dangers to soldiers posed by
killed.
land mines and ambushes.
Various factors impeded identification
Observers attributed the attacks to
motives that included reprisals by armed of the perpetrators of specific atrocities.
groups against villagers who had retreated These included both government censorship
from their one-time support of the rebels;
of an Egyptian court decision rejecting a
government ban on female genital mutilation.
As always, we responded on many
occasions where local lawyers, activists, journalists and others were being pressured or
persecuted because of their efforts to expose
human rights abuses. Letters were sent to
governments in support of lawyers in Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia, activists and journalists in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and the
West Bank, to name but a few.
ALGERIA
ALGERIA
of security-related information (see below)
and the physical risks of conducting on-site
investigations in conflict zones. In addition,
criminal trials shed little light on specific
incidents since they tended to focus only on
such general charges as membership in "an
armed group."
The government largely denied the existence of a humanrightsproblem other than the
"terrorism" it attributed to armed Islamist
groups. However, security forces were responsible during 1997Tor summary executions and "disappearances," most of them
carried out against suspected Islamists and
their sympathizers. Human Rights Watch is
unaware of a single instance in which security
force members were punished for their role in
these grave abuses.
Police commonly detained suspects
without identifying themselves and without
warrants. Persons detained on suspicion of
links to "terrorism" and "subversion" often
remained in incommunicado custody beyond
the twelve-day limit stipulated by the penal
code, and without their families being informed of their whereabouts, as required by
law. Dozens of persons arrested in 1997
remained unaccounted for as this report went
to press, adding to the hundreds of cases of
"disappearances" reported by human rights
lawyers since 1993. When confronted with
inquiries on cases of "disappearances," authorities have either not responded or stated
that the missing person is not in their custody,
even when eyewitnesses testified to having
seen the person being taken away by security
force members.
Government-backed militia were also
reportedly responsible for "anti-terrorist"
operations that went beyond self-defense
and the limits of the law, includingkillings of
suspected Islamists or their families in reprisal for acts attributed to armed groups,
according to Amnesty International. The
government issued a decree in March intended to bring themilitia under closer supervision by the defense and interior ministries
but did not refer to basic human rights standards.
On June 5, parliamentary elections took
place under the eyes of national and international observers. The elections produced the
country's first-ever multiparty National
Assembly. Pro-govemment parties won a
solid majority. While the outlawed FIS was
barred from participating, two other Islamist
parties won 27 percent of the seats.
The election stakes were determined in
part by a referendum in November 1996
under unfair conditions in which the government secured voter appro val for amendments
to the constitution that enhanced the powers
ofthe executive branch at the expense of the
National Assembly. The constitutional
amendments, along with new election and
party laws passed in March 1997, restricted
Algerians' right to freedom of association by
banning parties based on religion and ethnicity.
In local elections on October 23, a progovemment party won more than half the
seats, triggering street marches in Algiers in
which more than 15,000 supporters of the
other major parties protested alleged fraud.
The interior ministry banned further "unauthorized public demonstrations" and police
in some instances prevented protestors from
gathering.
Following the June elections, authorities released from prison FIS chief Abbasi
Madani, who was in the middle of a twelveyear sentence for subversion, and another
senior FIS figure, Abdelqader Hachani, who
had been held for over five years without trial.
In July he was tried and sentenced to five
years in prison—time already served—for
incitement against state security. Meanwhi le,
the whereabouts of deputy FIS chief Ali
Belhadj, who also had been imprisoned for
subversion, remained unknown since h is transfer in 1995 to secret detention.
FIS representatives in exile repeatedly
disassociated their party from the massacres
and otherdeliberate killing of civilians. "The
FIS condemns all of these terrible killings,"
said Abdelkrim Ould Adda, FIS executive
committee inexile spokesman in April. "Let
me say it very clearly: The FIS has no links
with the GIA. We firmly condemn these
barbarous acts committed by these terrorist
�ALGERIA
ALGERIA
groups against the civilian population." A
unilateralcease-firedeclaredforOctober I by
ihe FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation
Army (A IS), was denounced by the GIA and
did not stem the massacres taking place.
Algeria's private press enjoyed some
freedom to criticize govemmentpolicies. Statecontrolled television opened up a bit during
thcclection campaigns, providing airtime for
M parties running parliamentary candidates,
and later aired debates in the National Assembly. However, authorities censored the
speeches of opposition candidates that refcrrcd to the military-backed cancellation of
; the January 1992 elections as a "coup."
A Ithough private newspapers reported
j on the massacres in the second half of 1997,
what they could say about them was limited
by censorship, restriction on access to massacre sites and witnesses, and the armed
security forces who accompanied most Algerian and foreign journalists, whether they
wanted them or not. Any reporting on governmental abuses carried out in connection
with the internal strife washable to be deleted.
Algerian television offered only the official
line on the conflict, generally playing down
the scope of violence, in an apparent effort to
buttress the government's case that "terrorism" was only residual.
The government allowed many foreign
journalists in at the time of the two election
campaigns, but throughout the year denied
visas to certain reporters without explanation, including those of the French daily
Liberation. On September 29, the authorities
withdrew the accreditation of an Agence
France Presse (AFP) correspondent, one of
the few foreign news bureaus remaining in the
country. A Foreign Ministry official did not
provide a reason except to say that AFP had
been "warned" about its coverage of the
unrest, the agency reported.
Journalists, intellectuals, artists and
political figures continued to be assassinated
in 1997, in attacks attributed by the authorities to armed groups. The best-known figure
to be slain was Abdelhaq Benhamouda, leader
of the country's main labor syndicate, the
Hcncral Union of Algerian Workers. A group
:
calling itself the Islamic Front for the Armed
Jihad claimed responsibility forhis killing in
January. At least three political party activists were killed in the days leading up to the
June5,1997elections, and ten party officials
were killed ahead of the municipal elections.
Human Rights Watch investigated, while
in Algiers in April, the apparent execution in
custody of Rached Medjahed, the alleged
mastermind of the assassination of
Benhamouda. Medjahed was arrested a few
days after the killing and was shown "confessing" on Algerian national television. But
when his family requested permission from
an investigating judge to visit him, they were
told he had died. Authorities claimed that he
had died from wounds incurred during his
arrest, but the information collected by Human Rights Watch cast doubt on this claim.
Medjahed's death in custody fueled suspicion about who was behind the killing of
Benhamouda
The Right to Monitor
Two independent human rights organizations functioned openly in Algeria, although
neither the Algerian Human Rights League
nor the Algerian League for the Defense of
Human Rights produced much documentation of abuses. Defense lawyers played a key
role in aiding victims and disseminating information about their plight. They sometimes
paid a price for their activism. The office of
lawyer Mohamed Tahri, whose clients include relatives of "disappeared" persons,
suffered a suspicious burglary during the
weekend of June 12-13, in which the only
items missing were personal documents and
correspondence with clients.The break-in
occurred only days after Tahri was featured
speaking about humanrightsin Le Monde
(Paris) and on French television. On October
20, Tahri was arrested and held for seven
hours after demonstrating in Algiers with
about fifty women seeking information about
missing relatives.
Rachid Mesli, an Algiers lawyer who
had been openly helpful to Amnesty International during and since its 1996 mission to
Algeria, was sentenced after an unfair mal lo
three years in prison, on charges of "encouraging" and "providing apologetics" for "terrorism." During his initial interrogation and
trial, the judge questioned Mesli about his
contacts with Amnesty International.
The Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire National des Droits de
rHomme, ONDH), which reports to the
president's office, continued to serve as a
conduit between the government and persons
lodging complaints of humanrights abuses.
While it made some general criticism of go vemment abuses, in its annual report for 1996
and elsewhere, the ONDH publicly defended
the government's record against criticism
from international humanrightsorganizations. The ONDH's president immediately
rejected a joint call by international human
rights organizations on October 15 for an
international inquiry into the human rights
situation in Algeria, saying it showed "a
deliberate willingness to spread misunderstanding about those responsible for the latest massacres ofcivilians in Algeria," according to Algerian radio.
Several international organizations were
granted permission during 1997 to investigate
abuses in Algeria. However, applications to
visit from Amnesty International, an organization that has persistently documented
abuses in Algeria, were refused. The Human
Rights Watch delegation was assisted by the
ONDH and received by the ministers of
interior and justice. However, the delegation
was accompanied by government security
personnel during half the visit, despite the
organization's strong protests. Although
imposed ostensibly for the delegation's protection, this unwanted escort severely hampered the delegation's ability to meet freely
with Algerians.
The Role ofthe
International Community
United Nations
Following a series of massacres U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a public
appeal on August 30 for an "urgent solution"
'o the bloodshed. "As the killing goes on," he
said, "it is extremely difficult for all of us to
pretend that it is not happening, that we do
not know about it and that we should leave the
Algerian population to their lot."
Annan's comments were echoed on September 30 by; the new U.N. Human Rights
Commissioner.lMary Robinson. After meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed
Attaf that day, she commented, "When there
are serious violationsof civilians'rights,and
when a situation is as bad as in Algeria, I do
not consider that—and I cannot consider
that—to be internal." Following a meeting
late October with Mohamed-Salah Dembri,
Algeria'srepresentativetotheU.N. in Geneva,
Robinson said they had "discussed Algeria's
cooperation" with U.N. humanrightsmechanisms, which include the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and
various rapporteurs. Algerian authorities
publicly rejected any outside intervention in
the crisis, however.
Earlier in the year, the U.N. secretarygeneral had played a more considered role
than his predecessor when asked by President Zeroual to send U .N. election observers.
For the presidential elections of 1995, thenSecretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had
sent a team of observers who had then made
no public statements on voting conditions,
thereby giving the government the right to
boast of the international presence without
having to face public reporting. In 1997,
Annan did not send observers but deployed
a team of four officials who only coordinated
the efforts of observers from some twenty
countries who could speak freely of their
findings. Thus the secretary-general provided
a gesture of support for the holding of elections while making it difficult for that gesture
to be exploited.
OnAugust 13,theU.N.Commission on
Human Rights' Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities defeated by secret ballot a draft
resolution that Algerian authorities had lobbied against. While critical of "armed groups
of religious extremists, who...are terrorizing
civilian population," the draft had also expressed concern at reports "indicating that,
315
�ALGERIA
ALGERIA
going beyond the requirements of the fight allow the rule of law and respect for human
against terrorism, violations of human rights rights, including the freedom ofthe press and
arc being committed more and more fre- therightto demonstrate, to be reestablished "
quently by certain sectors of the security Theresolution also called on European Union
forces."
member states "not to repatriate Algerian
In a statement issued on September 18, nationals residing in their territory whose
the United Nations High Commissioner for safety would be endangered ifthey are forced
Refugees (UNHCR) urged governments to to return to Algeria."
refrain from the "hasty deportation of reE.U. foreign ministers met on October
jected A Igerian asylum seekers in the midst of
26, at a time ofmounting calls for international
an upsurge of violence in Algeria." UNHCR
involvement in the crisis in Algeria. But the
defined those at risk as coming from both
ministers limited themselves to a general
sides of the conflict: "Algerians who have condemnation of the violence, with some
close links with the government" as well as explaining that without the Algerian authori"members or perceived members of Islamic ties' consent they could play no role in ending
groups."
the country's crisis.
European Union
The European Parliament passed a resolution
on December 12,1996, criticizing the constitutional referendum held in November for
"concentrat[ing] power in the hands of the
president" and thus being "likely to make it
more difficult to establish democratic and
cultural pluralism." The resolution urged the
European Commission "to take into account
developments with regard to democratization and respect for human rights" in upcoming talks regarding a Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement. Article 2 ofthe trade
agreement stresses "respect for human rights
and democratic principles... constitute an
essential element."Negotiationscommenced
in March, and at the time of writing had not
concluded.
Manuel Marin, vice president of the
European Commission, urged adoption of
the Association Agreement as a means to
democratic reform. Following Algeria's parliamentary elections, Marin on June 24 urged
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to take a "pragmatic" and
"realistic" attitude regarding Algeria in order
to encourage it to complete its "democratic
transition."
On September 18, the European Parliament passed aresolution urging the Algerian
government to "deepen the dialogue with all
the political forces and democratic
elemcnis... who reject the use of violence, .and
France
France, Algeria's former ruler and largest
trading partner, remained quietly supportive
ofthe government while insisting that Algerians alone could solve the country's problems. It extended annual assistance worth
nearly U.S.S 1.2 billion, mostly in the form of
government-backed credits to purchase French
goods. About a third of the sum was not
renewed in 1997 due to administrative problems. Viewed generally as the Western state
with the greatest interest in developments in
Algeria, France actively lobbied international
financial institutions in 1995 to provide debt
refinancingto Algeriaon favorable terms, and
sought to set the course of Western policy
toward Algeria.
French authorities tended to condemn
atrocities attributed to armed Islamist groups
while remaining circumspect on government
repression. Indications of a shift in approach
came in the fall, afterthe election ofa Socialistled government and an unchecked streak of
massacres that shocked French opinion. Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin suggested, on September 29, that the violence did not have a
single address: "We can see there is a terrible
reign of terror.. .but it is extremely difficult to
make out what is happening." He referred not
only to "a fanatical and violent opposition"
but also to "a State which is in a way imposing
its will with violence and force."
With the holding of parliamentary elections, the U.S. seemed to regard the government-led political process as worthy of encouragement, despite its limitations. The
U.S. stopped calling publicly for a national
political dialogue that included "pragmatic
elements ofthe FIS," the banned Islamist
party that the government had excluded from
the elections. In gestures of support for the
vote, the U.S. financed thirteen election observers and openly encouraged other countries to send teams. On June 9, four days after
the polling. State Department spokesman
Nicholas Bums described the election as a
"positive" move but acknowledged, "I would
not use the wordsfreeand fair to describe the
Algerian elections, simply because the international monitors ... did not use these
words....Wedo think it's positive, however,
that people voted in great numbers; and it's
positive that the government was able to open
up television and radio to political debate."
He urged the Algerian government to take into
account the "issues raised by international
observers and political parties" about flaws in
the election process.
On September 10, at a time of almost
daily reports of massacres, outgoing U.S.
United States
Ambassador Ronald Neumann said after a
U.S. government influence on Algeria re- farewell audience with President Zeroual that
mained limited. The U.S. provided no direct the U.S. backed "military measures, consiseconomic or military assistance other than an tent with the rule of law, to protect civilians"
annual U.S.$75,00O military training pro- and "the policy spelled out by President
gram. Cognizant of humanrightsconcerns, Zeroual of economic and political reforms,
Washington maintained a policy of rejecting freedom of the press, and development of the
licenses soughtby U.S. companies for the sale rule of law. We encourage national reconcilito A Igeria of equipment that could be used by ation and the inclusion in the political process
the security forces in an offensive capacity. of all who reject violence."
However, U.S. engagement in Algeria apIn light of the U.S. support for the
peared to increase during the year, as U.S. parliamentary elections, the lack of U.S.
private investment in Algeria's energy sector comment on the government's shocking failsoared to nearly $2 billion. The U.S. Export- ure to intervene to protect the population
Import Bank (Eximbank) resumed activity in from a steady succession of massacres, some
Algeria in 1996 after a two-year halt. It set a observers interpreted the ambassador's stateceiling of $ 150 million for new projects and ment as a signal of a new pro-govemment tilt
financially backed U.S. corporations selling in U.S. policy. Denying this, officials told the
to Sonatrach, Algeria's state-run oil and gas press that the ambassador's comments were
company. As of September 30, Eximbank's merely an attempt "to give agentle push to the
exposure in Algeria totaled $2.1 billion.
army to do its job."
In high-level consultations in September
and October with the U.S. and European
governments, France reportedly argued against
international initiatives on Algeria as long as
Algiers opposed them. Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine told the Paris weekly
L Express in October that France can show
its willingness to "support any form of action
undertaken by the international community if
it were accepted or requested by all the
parties, starting with theTuthorities." Premier Jospin indicated that France should
respond at home by opening its doors toward
Algerians seeking safety. "I am in favor of ...
relaxing the visa policy for all who fear for
their lives in Algeria," he said on September
29.
The National Consultative Council on
Human Rights, an advisory commission attached to the prime minister's office, adopted
a resolution in October urging that the quesnon of humanrightsin Algeria be placed on
the agenda of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and that U.N. missions should be
dispatched as soon as possible to investigate
torture, summary executions and arbitrary
detentions.
3
�BAHRAIN
ALGERIA/BAHRAIN
Neumann told a U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on October 1 that
human rights problems remained an impediment to better relations. In his prepared
remarks, Neumann praised the convening of
a multiparty parliament but cautioned that
the election was "only a modest, first step
towards representati ve institutions." He added
that while the unity of the military was
important to Algeria's stability, "We must
continue to be cautious in our dealings as
doubts linger about the military's respect for
the rule of law and their willingness to allow
parliament to develop real power." He continued, "Sometimes security forces themselves have been guilty of excesses....There
are also credible reports of torture...and the
A Igerian go vemment refuses to al low observers to inspect prisons."
The Clinton administration's nominee
to replace Neumann, Cameron Hume, said at
his Senate confirmation hearing on October
28 that Washington could not intervene directly in what "all Algerians feel isan internal
conflict." But he noted the U.S. actively
promoted press freedom for Algerian journalists, through diplomatic demarches and bringing Algerianjoumaliststothe U.S. He added
that the U.S. supported the work of nongovernmental organizations, including international human rights groups.
The U.S. condemned "terrorism" in
Algeria on numerous occasions during the
year and maintained the Armed IslamicGroup
on its official list of terrorist organizations
worldwide.
tween security forces and demonstiators calling for pol itical reform, which hadfirsterupted
in December 1994, continued throughout the
year, intensifying in June 1997. Shaikh Abd
al-Amir al-Jamri and seven other Shi'a community leaders, arrested in January 1996
remained in detention without charge. The
government continued to prosecute person*
on security-related charges in the State Security Court, where procedures did not meet
basic fair trial standards and whose verdicts
werenotsubjecttoappeal. The exercise ofthe
freedoms of assembly and political association remained effectively outlawed under the
terms of the penal code and the law of societies and clubs.
The year saw further arrests and harassment of individuals for writing or possessing
written materials which the government considered hostile. Or. June 14,1997, six young
men in detention for the previous fourteen
months were found guilty by a State Security
Court on charges of possessing leaflets that
according to the Interior Ministry conuined
"false news and unfounded statements."Thcy
were sentenced to time already served plus
fines of 200 Bahrain! dinars (BD; approximately U.S.$530). In March 1997, Sayyid
Jalal Alawi Sharaf, an engineer employed by
the state telecommunications company, was
arrested in a dawn raid on his home, and his
home computer equipment was confiscated,
reportedly on the grounds that he was transmitting information abroad via the Internet
He remained in detention without charge or
trial as of early October. In February. Ali
Hasan Yusif was dismissed from hisjob with
the Ministry oflnformation and subsequently
Relevant Human Rights Watch
arrested and detained without charge for sevReport:
eral months in connection with a volume of
Algeria—Elections in ihe Shadowo) Violence
poems he had published, some of which
and Repression, 6/97
referred in very general terms to condit ions of
censorship and oppression. Yasir al-Sayigh
was detained for months without charge and
beaten after a coworker had thrown a leaflet
in his office wastebasket.
BAHRAIN
Human Rights Developments
The human rights situation in Bahrain showed
no improvement in 1997 and in some respects
worsened. Street protests and clashes be-
The government also moved to preveni
information about the situation in the country
from reaching the outside world through the
media. In late September 1996, Abbas Salman.
a Bahraini reporter working for Reuters for
nearly twenty years, was detained for more
than twenty-fourhours and interrogated about
a story he had filed before being released
without charge. In early 1997, the government issued a regulation restricting Bahraini
joomalists employed by local media from
also working for the international press. The
government was thus able to force Ismat
Moussawi, a reporter withAl-Ayyam, a daily
close to the government, to cease her work as
the BBC Arabic Service stringer, thus effectively stifling an important source of uncensored news for many Bahrainis.
I n June 1997 the government closed the
office and expelled the correspondent of the
German Press Agency (DPA), the last Westem news agency with a bureau in Bahrain. The
correspondent, Ute Meinel, told Human
Rights Watch that her expulsion followed her
eyewitness accounts of three days of intense
clashes in the town of Sanabis in June, and
dispatches regarding several unrelated cases
of Bahrainis who had died after being beaten
by security forces. On the night of June 24,
she was summoned by a senior interior ministry official and interrogated about a recent
dispatch. The next day she was shown a
charge sheet accusing her of "spreading lies,
harming the welfare ofthe state, insulting the
ruling family." Two days later, the Interior
M mistry official told her that she would have
io leave Bahrain immediately.
In July 1997, ten leaders ofthe People's
Petition Committee prepared a letter to the
^nir. Shaikh Isa bin Salman, requesting a
meeting to discuss political reform issues
raised in a 1994 petition which the organizers
claimed had been signed by 21,751 Bahrainis.
These issues included restoring the partiallyelected National Assembly, which was disbanded by decree in 1975, freeing political
prisoners, and allowing the return of persons
forcibly exiled by the government. An official
" i 'he prime minister's office telephoned
several committee members to warn them
against delivering the letter. On July 29 a high
'nierior Ministry official summoned two of
'"em. Ahmad al-Shamlan, a defense lawyer
and veteran opposition activist, and Ibrahim
Kamal Eddin, a businessman, and warned
them to cease their efforts. When the men
declined, the official told al-Shamlan, who
suffersfroma heart ailment, to "think of your
health." The next day the official phoned alShamlian to say that he would not be allowed
to leave for Europe that evening as planned for
medical tests and a vacation. Several houi s
later al-Shamlan suffered a serious stroke
from which he had not recovered as of October 1997.
The government provides virtually no
information regarding numbers of persons
arrested, tried, convicted, acquitted or released in political or security-related cases.
The exception concerned the high-profile
March 1997 security court trials of fifty-nine
Bahrainis whom the government charged in
June 1996 with planning and carrying out acts
of sabotage on behalf of "Hizballah BahrainMilitary Wing." Thirty-six of the defendants
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms
ranging from three to fifteen years plus large
fines, and twenty-three were acquitted. Based
on information made available by Bahraini
defense lawyers, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 600 persons were taken
into custody for political or security-related
offenses over the past year, and at leasi
seventy-one were convicted by state security
courts. Bahraini lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that the number of persons in prolonged detention without trial was around
1,500 in late September 1997—approximately the same number as were being held a
year earlier—and that beatings and other
forms of physical abuse werecommonly used
to secure confessions and information.
In late October 1996, the government
signed an agreement with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), allowing that organization access to persons held
for security-related offenses. There were reports that the ICRC had visited over one
thousand detainees in more than twenty detention centers. In keeping with ICRC policy,
its findings were communicated directly to
the government and not announced publicly.
During the year, three persons died in
detention or very shortly after being released
�HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / MIDDLE EAST
-
A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST REPORT; COPYRIGHT © HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,- ISSN: 1080-61 9 9
Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
June 1997
ALGERIA
ELECTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION
ABOUT THIS REPORT
2
POLITICAL PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT
2
SUMMARY
3
RECOMMENDATIONS
5
MODALITIES OF THE ELECTION
7
BACKGROUND
8
NEW LAWS AFFECTING THE STAKES AND FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS
10
VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, AND THE ELECTIONS
13
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
22
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
25
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�ABOUT THIS REPORT
A Human Rights Watch delegation visited Algiers from March 30 to April 13, 1997, with the knowledge and
agreement of the government. We met with the ministers of justice and interior, political party leaders, representatives
of civic associations, human rights lawyers and ordinary citizens. Human Rights Watch wishes to thank all of the
Algerians who received us, and in particular the Observatoire National des Droits de rHomme for facilitating meetings
with government officials.
We note that, despite our strong objections, our delegation was accompanied during part of the mission by a
security escort. After initially agreeing to withdraw the armed escort at our insistence that it placed unacceptable
constraints on our freedom of movement and independence, the authorities insisted toward the end of our visit on
reimposing this detail on the delegation wherever it went. This forced us to cancel at least three appointments out of
consideration for the persons with whom we wished to meet. The security escort, whatever its intentions, thus hampered
our ability to gather information.
This report was researched by Nejla Sammakia, research associate at Human Rights Watch/Middle East, and
Baher Al-Ashhab, a consultant to Human Rights Watch/Middle East. It was written by Ms. Sammakia. It was edited by
Eric Goldstein, acting executive director of Human Rights Watch/Middle East, and Mike McClintock, deputy program
director of Human Rights Watch. Shira Robinson, associate at Human Rights Watch/Middle East, formatted the report
and assisted in its research.
POLITICAL PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT
ANR: Alliance nationale republicaine (National Republican Alliance)
Ettahaddi: the Challenge
FFS: Front de forces socialistes (Socialist Forces Front)
FIS: Front islamique du salut (Islamic Salvation Front), banned in 1992
FLN: Front de liberation nationale (National Liberation Front)
MAJD: Mouvement Algerienne pour la justice et le developpement (Algerian Movement for Justice and Development)
MDA: Mouvement pour la democratic en Algerie (Movement for Democracy in Algeria)
MSP: Mouvement de la societe pour la paix (Movement for a Peaceful Society, formerly the Movement for an Islamic
Society, Movement de la societe islamique, Flamas)
An-Nahdha: Renaissance (formerly an-Nahdha al-Islamiyya, Islamic Rcnaissa: ce)
El-Oumma: the Nation (disbanded in 1997 after new political parties law took effect)
PRA: Parti du renouveau algerien (Party of Algerian Renewal)
PT: Parti des travailleurs (Workers Party)
RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la democratic (Rally for Culture and Democracy)
RND: Rassemblement National Democratique (National Democratic Rally)
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�SUMMARY
Algerians go to the polls on June 5, 1997 in the first parliamentary elections since the military-backed
government canceled elections in January 1992. That measure, taken to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation
Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS), plunged the country into endemic violence that continues today and has
claimed more than 60,000 lives, most of them civilians. Many Algerians hope that a reasonably fair vote on June
5 will contribute to reducing the political violence; others are more pessimistic.
1
The government hopes that these elections will crown its efforts to assert its legitimacy at home and abroad,
and remove the taint it incurred when the democratic process was interrupted in 1992. In early May, President
Liamine Zeroual said that after these elections and the local elections to follow shortly thereafter, Algeria "will have
completed the period of transition and the return to popular sovereignty and legitimate institutions." In an indication
of the importance that they attach to the elections as a means of legitimizing the government, Algerian authorities
have created a national election monitoring group and have actively sought foreign monitoring.
2
3
Except for the flawed presidential election of 1995, Algerians have their first opportunity since 1992 to elect
those who would govern them. Other than the president, unelected officials govern the country at the national,
provincial and local level. Given the stakes, it is important to scrutinize not only the conduct of the vote but also
underlying human rights conditions that affect the ability of Algerians to associate with one another, conduct political
activities, and impart and receive information and views relevant to the decisions they will make on election day.
4
The June 5 elections cannot be seen as the capstone of the process of establishing democratic rule in Algeria,
because of the following factors that limit the significance of these elections as a free expression of the will of the
1
Armed operations by Islamist groups preceded the cancellation of elections, but were isolated and rare.
2
Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, "L'Algerie continue a vivre sous un regime de double terreur," Le Monde,(Paris) May 9, 1997.
3
Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf stated, "There will be a double guarantee of a fair vote. First, we have set up an independent
national supervisory committee with members from all the political parties participating in the elections. Second, we have
requested the presence of observers from the United Nations, the Arab League and the OAU." Le Soir (Brussels), March 13,1997,
as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter FBIS), Near East and South Asia, March 13, 1997.
President Zeroual issued formal invitations to the U.N., the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity on
February 6, describing the initiative as "part of the natural progression of the process freely begun by Algeria with the presidential
election of November 1995." "Le president Zeroual a demande la presence d'observateurs pour les legislatives," Agence FrancePresse (hereinafter AFP), February 6, 1997.
The international response has been one of reserved, sometimes skeptical, encouragement. In a letter to President Zeroual
dated March 1P, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed to send a "small technical team in order to coordinate and support
the work" ot observers being sent by various countries to monitor the vote. The United Nations, Annan wrote, "will not itself
observe the elections in order to certify their good conduct or their results, nor will the organization make any declaration
concerning them. The judgments expressed on the elections will be made by the international observers, who will name their own
spokespersons and prepare their own declarations." Thus far, more than twenty countries have pledged to send observers or
contribute financially to the observation efforts. Both the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity will send observers,
as they did for the presidential elections of 1995. Altogether, some 200 international observers are expected to monitor the
campaign and voting.
4
A review of technical aspects of the election preparations, the monitoring and the voting itself are beyond the scope of this
report.
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�Algerian people to choose those who would govern them. The first of the factors below reduces what is at stake in
these election, while the others detract from the extent to which they should be considered free and fair.
A weakened National Assembly: The Assembly to be elected on June 5 is a far weaker body than the one that was
to have been chosen in 1992. The new constitution, drafted by the authorities and approved in a controversial
November 1996 referendum, has stripped the assembly of many of its lawmaking powers, while strengthening the
office of the president and creating a second legislative chamber, one-third of whose members are appointed by the
president, and two-thirds of whom are elected by local officials who themselves will have been elected by popular
vote. While international human rights standards do not dictate how power should be divided among different
branches of government, it is important to note the significantly reduced powers of the institution that is being elected
through popular suffrage.
Ongoing political violence and repression: Although many Algerians have courageously and defiantly plunged into
the campaign, the rampant violence, for which the security forces and armed Islamist groups are responsible,
continues to claim scores of lives each week and has terrorized many Algerians who would wish to express their
views or take part in political life. Political activists from a wide range of parties and tendencies have been
assassinated since 1992, including at least five so far in the run-up to this legislative election.
Exclusion of parties: Certain provisions of the 1996 constitution and 1997 political parties law violate the right to
freedom of association by not permitting parties based on religion, region, language or gender. The FIS, the Islamist
movement that was poised to win the last legislative elections, was outlawed in 1992 and remains barred from any
political activity. Other parties have been required to change elements of their names and program in order to comply
with the law.
Restrictions and favoritism: Authorities have to some extent restricted the political activities and coverage on statecontrolled radio and television of some legal parties, particularly those that criticize the interruption of the last
legislative elections. By contrast, the authorities have facilitated the rapid rise of the RND, formed only in February
to mobilize support for the President and his government.
Media censorship: Systematic censorship in the press of security-related news and, to a lesser extent, of criticism
of government corruption and performance, deprives voters of information concerning some of the key issues in this
campaign. The authorities have harassed publications and journalists associated with independent print media, and
have preserved state-controlled television as a government mouthpiece. The ability of journalists to gather and
disseminate news and information has also been impeded by the unprecedented assassination campaign that has cost
the lives offifty-ninemedia workers since 1992. Armed opposition groups are believed responsible for most of these
killings.
The right of citizens to participate in their country's public affairs, directly or through representatives chosen
freely, is a fundamental human right enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right
is central to Algeria's political crisis, since it was the denial of that right—when autliDrities annulled the country's
first multi-paity legislative elections—that led to the political violence becoming endemic, and has diminished in
the eyes of many Algerians the legitimacy of their rulers.
If these elections are to be a step toward ending the political stalemate, significant additional steps are
required for the Algerian people to be able, in a meaningful way, to "take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives." Because so much power will continue to rest with the presidency
and Algeria's military, such steps toward broadening political participation will have to come through acts of political
will. Such steps may also help to marginalize the armed groups whose campaign of violence against the security
forces and civilians has contributed so heavily to the national tragedy.
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�RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of Algeria:
Human Rights Watch recognizes that the elections taking place on June 5 can contribute to solving Algeria's
political crisis and to enabling the Algerian people to exercise their right to participate, through elected
representatives, in the conduct of public affairs. However, much remains to be done if Algerians are to enjoy their
political rights in a meaningful sense. One factor impairing the ability of Algerians to exercise their political rights
is the rampant political violence. While the armed Islamist groups bear a large measure of responsibility for this
violence, the government is responsible to a considerable degree as well.
In order to enable Algerians to exercise their political rights more fully, Human Rights Watch urges the
government of Algeria to:
•
End censorship and pressures on the media that aim to enforce a state monopoly on information related to
the internal security situation, including human rights violations, or that aim to restrict other coverage that
displeases government officials.
•
End all measures designed to impede the peaceful activities and public expression of political parties and
movements, including those that urge the inclusion of the FIS in negotiations with the government.
•
Bring domestic legislation on political parties into conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by abolishing the prohibition on parties based on religion, gender, race or region. Such
broad-based prohibitions violate the right of Algerians to freedom of association.
•
Take steps to halt human rights abuses perpetrated by the security forces, including arbitrary detention,
"disappearances," extrajudicial executions, and torture, that target suspected Islamist activists, their relatives,
and suspected sympathizers. Such abuses are presently practiced with virtual impunity. Toward this end,
authorities should declare publicly and ensure that:
(1) such practices will not be tolerated;
(2) complaints about abuses will be investigated promptly and meaningfully and the results made public; and
(3) those found guilty of abuses will be punished in a manner befitting the offense and in a manner that
makes clear to others in the security services as well as the public that the government takes allegations of
abuse seriously.
•
Provide humane treatment to anyone in government custody who has been incapacitated by wounds,
surrendered, or taken captive, including members of the armed groups, in compliance with international
human rights and humanitarian law.
To the armed groups:
Human Rights Watch urges all armed groups to:
•
Halt immediately deliberate attacks on civilians and noncombatants, and indiscriminate attacks that disregard
the protection of civilians.
•
Provide humane treatment to anyone under their control who has been incapacitated by wounds, surrendered,
or taken captive, including members of the security forces, in compliance with international humanitarian
law.
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�•
Cease all activities intended to threaten or intimidate persons because of their personal or political beliefs
or activities.
Persons empowered to speak on behalf of the FIS, as a movement with aspirations to political power in
Algeria, should clearly and unconditionally condemn attacks by armed Islamist groups against all civilians and other
acts that violate basic human rights and humanitarian norms. These include all acts and threats of violence intended
to intimidate Algerians who wish to exercise their right to political participation and association. Leaders of the FIS
should utilize whatever influence they have over armed groups to end violence against and intimidation of civilians.
To the European Union and Member States:
The European Union is presently negotiating a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Algeria
similar to ones already signed between the E.U. and Morocco, Israel, and Tunisia. Algeria hopes to obtain financial
aid or debt relief in the context of this accord. Article 2 of each association agreement states, "Respect for the
democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
inspires the domestic and external policies of the [European] Community and of [the other party] and constitutes an
essential element of this Agreement." Human Rights Watch therefore makes the following recommendations to the
European Union and member states:
5
•
The European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should scrutinize not only
the June 5 elections but also human rights conditions in the months that follow the elections, and make clear
to the Algerian government that improved relations depend on the government's making tangible progress
in improving in human rights practices and in giving greater substance to the right of Algerian people to
participate in self-governance.
•
In particular, the European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should monitor
the extent to which the elections represent a starting point for the government to redress some of the
outstanding human rights issues for which authorities are responsible, such as the hundreds of cases of
"disappearances". They should publicly acknowledge and condemn these practices by Algerian authorities,
and submit lists of names of reportedly "disappeared" persons that come to their attention and request
clarifications from Algiers.
•
The European Commission and Council of Ministers, and E.U. member states, should assess whether state
broadcasting media remain open to opposition views, as they have to a degree during the election campaign,
or revert to their rigid practices of recent years, and whether the print press is allowed real freedom. They
should further monitor whether the policy of granting visas relatively freely in the run-up to elections to
journalists and foreign observers, including human rights monitors, will revert to the more restrictive past
policy on visas.
•
The European Parliament should adopt an urgent resolution, making reference to Article 2 ofthe draft
Association Agreement with Algeria, requesting the European Commission and Council of Ministers to
undertake the above recommendations and to report back to the Parliament with regard to these undertakings.
•
The European Parliament should itself undertake to document human rights developments in Algeria in the
post-election period.
5
Algeria's public debt was U.S.$26 billion in 1994. The loans are repaid primarily with revenue from export sales of natural
gas and petroleum.
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�To the International Community:
Those countries participating in the multi-national election monitoring effort have a responsibility to provide
a frank and public assessment of the atmosphere for free and fair voting, despite the difficult conditions on the ground
faced by their observers. The lackluster and silent monitoring ofthe 1995 Algerian presidential elections by the Arab
League, Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations enabled the authorities to boast of the international
presence without having to face thorough monitoring or public reporting by the observers.
This time, governments and multilateral institutions sending election observers must not forfeit the leverage
for improvements that their presence offers. They should take steps to ensure that their observers are able to have
access to potential sources of pertinent information regarding the free character of the polling, including restrictions
on basic civil and political rights for all Algerians. They should ensure that their observers are able to speak publicly
and promptly concerning conditions. If the observers travel with armed escorts from the security forces, assigned
for their protection, they have a duty to weigh the deterrent effect this will have on ordinary citizens and party
activists who might otherwise approach them with complaints about irregularities, and should identify means of
enabling these potential sources to meet with them in private in order to provide them with information pertinent to
the elections. If the armed security personnel are assigned against their express wishes, or if other obstacles are
placed on their access or activities, observers should publicly state that such constraints can impugn the freedom and
fairness of the elections themselves.
Governments and international institutions that have leverage with the government of Algeria should
continue, after the elections, to monitor steps toward promoting political participation and curtailing human rights
abuses. Aid and partnership agreements, which the government of Algeria is reported to be eagerly seeking, should
be linked to measurable progress in these domains.
In addition, foreign governments that maintain contact with representatives ofthe FIS should demand, as
a condition of such relations, that the FIS take specific and visible steps to implement the above recommendations
that are addressed to it.
MODALITIES OF THE ELECTION
The terms of the election process are fixed by the election law adopted by the appointed interim legislature,
the National Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition, CNT), on February 19, 1997. The 380-seat
People's National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale Populaire, ANP, hereafter National Assembly) is elected for a
five-year term using a proportional list system and secret balloting. There are 16.7 million registered voters, out
of a population of twenty-eight million. Algerian citizens, above the age of eighteen, male and female, are eligible
to vote. A total of 7,740 candidates, including independents and representatives of thirty-nine parties, are vying for
seats. Four parties have lists in all districts: the RND, FLN, PRA, and an-Nahdha. The MSP and the FFS have lists
in most of the fifty-six districts. There are approximately 34,000 voting stations throughout the country.
6
7
The number of deputies to represent each governorate (wilaya) is determined by population, with no
govemorate having fewer than four deputies. Some governorates are divided into two or more electoral districts. A
number of deputies are to be selected by Algerian citizens residing abroad, who are also eligible to vote.
6
Ordonnance no. 97-07 du 27 chaoual 1417 correspondant au 6 mars 1997 portant loi organique relative au regime electoral.
7
The proportional system represents a major revision of the winner-take-all system in the previous electoral law of 1990. That
law facilitated the FIS landslide in the 1991 legislative elections. That party had won 189 of the 232 seats decided in the first
round even though it had won only 47.54 percent of the votes cast. The other two parties to win seats were the FLN and the FFS.
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�The ballot presents the voter with a choice of lists of candidates. Each list is put forward by one or more
parties or is composed of independent candidates. The number of candidates on each list is limited to the number of
seats apportioned to that district, plus three. Seats are assigned according to the proportion of votes won by each list
in the district. Parties or lists that receive less than 5 percent of vote within a district do not participate in the
allocation of seats.
Candidates must be at least twenty-eight years old, Algerian by birth or naturalised for at least five years.
Male voters must have completed military service or be exempt. Independent candidates must have collected at least
400 voter signatures to be eligible. Both men and women are eligible to run.
Candidates and parties are permitted to have up to five representatives at the polling stations on voting day
and during the counting of votes. The voting stations are staffed by polling officers appointed by the local governor.
The vote count is public, and is conducted by private citizens chosen by the polling officers (Article 54).
Members of the military and security forces are to vote in their barracks (Article 63). Some parties have
protested this provision. It is not clear whether international and domestic observers will be permitted to monitor
voting in the barracks to the same extent as elsewhere.
Algeria's Constitutional Council is to declare the results within seventy-two hours after receiving polling
data from around the country and overseas. Parties or candidates have forty-eight hours to file complaints about
irregularities to the Constitutional Council, which has the authority to cancel or change results.
8
After consultations with some of the political parties, President Zeroual established a National Independent
Elections Observation Commission (Commission nationale independante de surveillance des elections legislatives,
CNISEL) that includes representatives of many political parties, officials from the ministries of justice, interior,
communication and foreign affairs, and members of the semi-official National Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire national des droits de rHomme, ONDH) and of the independent Algerian League of Human Rights
(Ligue Algerienne des Droits de I'Homme, LADH). The CNISEL is responsible for overseeing the election process,
including voter registration, allocating to parties broadcast time and access to public gathering places, and the ballot
count.
BACKGROUND
The forthcoming National Assembly elections will be the first since the military-backed annulment ofthe
January 1992 elections and the forced resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid. Between 1992 and 1995, Algeria
was governed entirely by unelected officials. The military-backed High Council of State appointed the president and
cabinet. The National Assembly was replaced by the National Transitional Council, a consultative body whose sixty
members were appointed. At the local level, most of the officials who won their posts in the Islamic Salvation Front
landslide in the 1990 municipal elections were ousted and replaced by persons selected by the central government.
9
8
In December 1991, complaints of voting irregularities were submitted to the council, mostly in districts won by the FIS, but
before the council could pronounce on the charges, the military-backed High Security Council, a presidential advisory body,
halted the electoral process.
9
On those elections and their aftermath, see Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Middle East), "Human Rights
in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process," A Hitman Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 4, no. 2, February 1992.
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�In November 1995, a multi-candidate presidential election confirmed as president retired General Liamine Zeroual,
who had been appointed to that post in January 1994.
10
Algeria continues to be governed under a state of emergency decreed in February 1992. That decree gives
the authorities vast powers to arrest and intern individuals, prevent public gatherings, close an organization on the
grounds of an impending danger to the public order, and suspend or dissolve local assemblies or governments if they
impede the legal actions of the public authorities. At the same time as it imposed the state of emergency, the
authorities banned the FIS, the party calling for an Islamic state that had been legalized in 1989 and that was poised
to capture a majority in the National Assembly if the election had proceeded. The top leadership of the FIS had
already been in prison since 1991 on subversion charges; most of the remaining senior cadres either went
underground or fled into exile. Some members of the now-outlawed FIS and other Islamist groups took up arms
against the government, and have since attracted a stream of recruits to their ranks. The ensuing violence, in which
both the security forces and armed groups have targeted civilians as well as each other, shows no signs of abating."
Several topics have dominated political debate among Algerians. These include the pace at which the statedominated economy should be liberalized; high-level corruption; the heavy influence exercised by the military in
running the affairs of the state; how to address the violence and political impasse that followed the cancellation of
the elections; and what role, if any, to permit Islamists, including the outlawed FIS, in the political process.
On the question of the role for the FIS, many opponents argue that the party is implicated in violence and
intimidation against its perceived adversaries in Algerian society, and that it is hostile to democracy, women's rights,
Berber cultural rights, and the rights of persons who do not share their religious views. Those who favor a role for
the FIS argue that the 1990 and 1991 elections demonstrated the broad popular support it enjoys, and argue that it
will—or can be constrained to—respect democratic rules. Parties that have advocated a role for the FIS have been
the target of much of the censorship imposed during the presidential and current legislative campaigns.
. The government has largely denied the existence of a human rights problem other than the "terrorism" it
attributes to Islamist armed groups, despite the compelling evidence, collected by human rights organizations, that
torture, "disappearances", and arbitrary killings by the security forces are widespread. In a typical comment, a
Foreign Ministry official was reported to have said on March 3, "It is true that Algeria, a victim of terrorism, is going
through a difficult period that involves a certain number of measures to protect persons and property, but any state
that respects human rights imposes some measures within the framework of its struggle against terrorism, such as
the state of emergency." Interior Minister Mustafa Benmansour said in an interview with Human Rights Watch
on April 9:
12
I personally do not consider Algeria as a country that has human rights violations. All procedures
are carried out according to the law. There are no violations, except for some excesses that take
place in the framework of operations, such as insults, or beatings—but these are subjected to
prosecution or internal disciplinary measures....We lived through a war in 1992 and 1993, and at that
time the very foundations of the country were threatened. Nevertheless, Algeria handled [human
rights issues] with great care.
10
On the presidential election, see Human Rights Watch/Middle East press release, "Algeria: Islamist Violence, Government
Pressures Cast Shadow on Presidential Elections," November 16, 1995.
" See, Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Middle East), Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).
12
"Ouverture mardi des negociations avec I'EU," AFP, March 3, 1997.
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�President Zeroual maintained contacts with FIS leaders during the early part of his presidency but, according
to the government, the contacts broke down over the refusal by the FIS to agree in advance to abandon its support
of armed resistance. The FIS, for its part, co-signed a platform in Rome in January 1995 with five legal political
parties, calling for negotiations between the government and political parties, including the FIS, suspension of
violence by both sides and eventual democratic elections. The signatories included the three parties—the FIS, the
FLN and the FFS—that together had won 78.5 percent of the popular vote in the first round of legislative voting in
December 1991 and captured 229 of the 232 seats decided in that round of voting. The Rome initiative, known as
the National Contract, was rejected by the authorities.
While spuming demands for negotiations with a broad range of parties toward establishing a framework for
a cease-fire and new elections, the authorities invited legal political parties for "consultations" as they prepared the
country for the presidential elections in November 1995. In that polling, President Zeroual defeated three other
candidates by a wide margin. Zeroual's victory and the high rate of voter participation, in defiance of threats by
armed groups to kill those who cast ballots, impressed many observers who interpreted the outcome as a mandate
to break the political deadlock and end the endemic violence. '
1
The period that followed disappointed those who looked to the president to initiate a meaningful opening
toward representative political forces. Instead, the government drafted a new constitution with minimal input from
the political parties, and announced that it would be put to a popular referendum. President Zeroual also promised
legislative and municipal elections in 1997. Meanwhile, the lull in political violence around the presidential elections
proved to be short-lived.
In November 1996, Algerians voted to approve the new constitution. Some parties, including the RCD,
MDA and Ettahaddi, boycotted the referendum, while the FFS urged a "no" vote. Independent estimates put the rate
of participation well below the officially declared 79 percent, of which nearly 86 percent voted "Yes." No
international observers were present, and foreign journalists present were hampered in their movements. '
11
In February, a new political party was announced that would draw its support from union, veteran, peasant,
and civic associations that supported President Zeroual in the 1995 election. The so-called National Democratic
Rally (RND) is led by Abdelkader Bensalah, who also heads the government-appointed National Transitional
Council. It would be the first manifestly pro-government party since the FLN went into the opposition after the
cancellation of elections in 1992. The FLN was the ruling party during nearly three decades of one-party rule.
In March, the government set legislative elections for June 5, and announced that the campaign would start
on May 15.
NEW LAWS AFFECTING THE STAKES AND FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS
A Weaker National Assembly
The new constitution, drafted by the government and adopted by a referendum last November, has diluted
the power of the National Assembly and given the president more far-reaching powers. It also creates a second
" The official results were 61.34 percent for Zeroual, 25.38 percent for Mahfoudh Nahnah of Hamas (now the MSP), 9.29
percent for Said Saadi (RCD), and 3.78 percent for Noureddine Boukrouh of the PRA. The authorities stated that the rate of
participation was 74.92 percent. Many in the opposition questioned that figure, although they acknowledged that voting was
heavier than had been expected.
u
Roger Cohen, "Algeria says Charter Passes, but Critics Charge Vote Fraud," New York Times, November 30, 1996.
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�chamber, the National Council, composed of members who are not directly elected, that will share legislative
functions with the National Assembly. Two thirds ofthe 170-member National Council will be elected by communal
and provincial council deputies who are to be chosen in local elections later in 1997. The remaining one-third will
be appointed by the president.
15
The president appoints the prime minister (Article 77). The National Assembly can force the resignation
of the prime minister by voting down the government's program. In that case, the president appoints a new prime
minister (Article 81). The president has the power to dissolve the National Assembly at any time (Articles 82 and
129).
The prime minister or a group of at least twenty deputies are entitled to introduce draft legislation (Article
119). To become law, it requires the approval not only ofthe National Assembly, but also the support of threefourths of the National Council (Article 120). Once adopted by the two chambers, the president of the republic may
still send the legislation back to the National Assembly for a second vote. This time, the legislation must obtain a
two-thirds majority in order to pass (Article 127).
Restrictions on the Nature of Political Parties
Both the 1996 constitution and its predecessor guarantee freedom of association. Following the political
reforms of 1989 and 1990, independent and party-related civic associations proliferated. However, under the 1992
emergency law, the interior minister could suspend or close associations by administrative order when their activities
were deemed to "endanger public order, public security, the normal function of institutions or the higher interests
of the country." After the banning of the FIS in February 1992, this provision was used to outlaw numerous civic
and labor organizations that the government accused of affinity with that party.
16
The constitution recognizes and guarantees in Article 42 the right to create political parties. However, the
same article prohibits their creation on a basis that is "religious, linguistic, racial, gender-related, corporatist [i.e.,
an organized economic interest] or regional. The political parties law, promulgated on March 6, states further in
Article 5 that a political party "cannot establish its founding or action" on these criteria. Article 3 stipulates, "the
fundamental components of the national identity in its three dimensions, Islam, Arabism and Amazighte [Berber
ethnicity], cannot be exploited for partisan propaganda purposes." The law gives parties two months to bring their
names and programs into conformity with these requirements.
17
This law, like others passed since the cancellation in 1992 of the legislative elections, was decreed by the
president and approved by the National Transitional Council. Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia praised the
constitutional provisions on political parties for presenting "the definition of a framework for the conduct of
pluralism which bans parties based on religion, on regional special interest groups, and still more on violence."
18
15
They are to be appointed from among "national figures and experts in the scientific, cultural, professional, economic and
social spheres," according to Article 101 of the constitution.
16
Presidential decree 92-320 of August I I , 1992.
17
"Dans le respect des dipositions de la presente Constitution, les partis politiques ne peuvent etre fondes sur une base
religieuse, linguistique, raciale, de sexe, corporatiste, ou regionale."
18
"Premier Interviewed on Constitutional Referendum," Rome Rai Uno Television Network, November 27, 1996, as reported
by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter FBIS), Near East and South Asia, November 27, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�Interior Minister Mostafa Benmansour said the new party law introduced "features that will allow the country to
avoid the disastrous slip-ups of the past."
19
Article 40 of the previous constitution recognized the right to create political "associations." The 1989 Law
on Political Associations also restricted political associations based on religion. But, at that time, the authorities
granted the FIS and other Islamist parties legal status and allowed them to function. Some thirty political groupings
sought and received official recognition in the year following adoption of the 1989 political associations law.
20
Altogether, under the March 1997 law, some fifty groups have already won recognition as political parties;
of these, about four-fifths are competing in the legislative elections. The FIS remains banned. Two other Islamist
parties, MSP (formerly Hamas) and an-Nahdha, both of which fared poorly in the 1991 parliamentary elections, are
running candidates, after conforming to the new political party law by changing their names and parts of their
platforms.
El-Oumma, a small pro-Islamist party, disbanded a month after the new party law was passed. Its secretary
general, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, told us, "The government wanted to deprive us of our national symbols. Islam
is at the center of our national identity and we refuse to abide by this unjust party law. We preferred to disband rather
than function under these conditions."
21
The MDA, headed by Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, announced it would boycott the elections
rather than comply with an official order to change its platform. In a letter to the MDA, the Interior Ministry asked
the party to change by May 8 Articles 3 and 6 of its platform, or face "stringent measures to implement the law."
Article 3 says: "The MDA aims to bring together various forces of the country around national unity, democracy,
social justice and Arab-Islamic values." Article 6 defines MDA work in developing national cultural independence,
national unity and "the defense and growth of Islam, the religion of the State and of the people." In the view of
Human Rights Watch, nothing in these articles would justify attempts by the state to foreclose their peaceful
expression or forbid persons who support them from associating together. As this report went to press, negotiations
were continuing between the interior ministry and the MDA.
It is the prerogative of a government, where evidence exists that a party or its members have engaged in
illegal conduct, such as acts of, or incitement to violence, to prosecute them according to the law. However, Algeria's
broadly worded bans on particular categories of political parties violate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Algeria ratified that treaty in 1989, and published it in the Official Gazette in March 1997,
a step required for its becoming part of domestic legislation. The ICCPR guarantees to citizens the right to take part
in the conduct of public affairs either directly or through freely chosen representatives and the right to vote and to
be elected in periodic and fair elections. These rights, articulated in Article 25, entail participation in, and voting
for, political parties. They are to be guaranteed "without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions." Article 2 of the ICCPR requires States Parties to respect and ensure civil and political
19
AFP, February 18, 1997.
20
Article 5 prohibited political associations the founding or activity of which has a basis that is "exclusively" religious,
linguistic or regionalist, or tied to a single gender, race, or particular professional status." ("Aucune association a caractere
politique ne peut fonder sa creation et son action sur une base et/ou des objectifs comportant:
-des pratiques sectaires et regionalistes, le feodalisme et le nepotisme....
Dans ce cadre, I'association a caractere politique ne peut, en outre, fonder sa creation ou son action sur la base
exclusivement confessionelle, linguistique, regionaliste, d'appartenance a un seul sexe, a une seule race ou a un statut
professionelle determine.")
21
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 3, 1997.
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�rights "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." The criteria that Algeria forbids as the basis for political
parties—ethnicity, religion, language, gender, and regional origin—correlate with these forbidden categories of
discrimination. The present law violates the rights of supporters of a party that claims a religious basis for its program
to associate together and to vote for representatives of their choice.
22
Algeria's ban on broad categories of parties also restricts free association with others. Article 22 of the
ICCPR, which guarantees this right, permits restriction only in the narrow circumstances where three conditions are
met: 1) the restriction is "prescribed by law"; 2) the restriction is "necessary in a democratic society"; and 3) it is
necessary "in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." These conditions are not met by Algeria's
decision to proscribe whole categories of political parties on the basis of discriminatory criteria. The burden rests
with the government to show that the restrictions meet each of Article 22's conditions. To be "lawful," a restriction
must not only be embodied in a law, but also be consistent with fundamental human rights norms, including the
requirement that it is "necessary in a democratic society." A "necessary" restriction is one that is narrowly drawn
and proportionate to the interest it seeks to protect; it must further accord with values of tolerance, pluralism, popular
sovereignty and equality characteristic of "democratic" societies. Finally, the specific interests that may be protected
have restrictive meanings. National security, for example, entails a threat to the physical integrity ofthe state, and
not merely to the tenure of any particular government. Public order (ordre public) is endangered by violent
disturbances, not by partisanship or public debate on controversial topics. Algeria, to the best of our knowledge, has
made no case that any of these criteria have been met in justifying the ban on categories of political parties.
VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, AND THE ELECTIONS
23
The political violence in Algeria since 1992 has cost an estimated 60,000 lives. The precise figures are
unknown, as are. the proportions of security forces, arined opposition militants, and civilians who have been killed
and the extent to .which the militants or the security forces and paramilitary forces are responsible. Censorship, fear
and other factors have prevented an accurate accounting of the casualties.
The widespread, vicious, and often random nature of the violence has created a climate of fear and terror
among the population. While some categories of civilians may be at particular risk, many Algerians do not
understand who is being targeted or by whom. The identity of those carrying out the violence is difficult to establish,
as the security force and the armed groups often conduct themselves in similar ways: the former often wear civilian
clothes and do not identify themselves, while the latter sometimes disguise themselves as security forces when
stopping cars on the roads or attempting to gain entry to a building.
Human Rights Watch has interviewed many Algerians who described a sense of being caught between both
sides. Young men have been threatened with death by armed groups if they do not join them or if they answer the
military draft. Yet they also feared that if they did not report to the military barracks they would be suspected of
supporting the armed groups, and face imprisonment or worse. A person who is the victim of a carjacking by an
armed group is warned not to report the theft of the vehicle to the police, so that the group's use ofthe vehicle will
22
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
proclaimed by the UNGA in November 1981, gives important guidance about the concept of "intolerance or discrimination"
based on religion. Article 2 of the Declaration states that intolerance or discrimination "means any distinction, exclusion,
restriction, or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment or the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis."
23
This is the unofficial figure most cited by local and international media.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�not arouse suspicion. They may be reluctant to file a report in any event, out of fear of being seen entering a police
station. Yet failure to file a police report puts the victim under suspicion of cooperating with the armed groups.
Physicians and other health professionals reportedly have been forced to provide care for members of armed groups
and were then harassed or prosecuted by the government for having done so. Families who have been forced at
gunpoint to provide money or provisions to the armed groups have encountered the same fate.
Although identifying who is responsible for specific killings is often impossible, it is clear that armed groups
identifying themselves as Islamist have killed thousands of people, including civilians and members of the security
forces. The composition of these groups is varied; some groups consider themselves loyal to the FIS or to elements
of its leadership; others are radical groups that reject the political mantle of the FIS.
When legal, the FIS sheltered a range of Islamist tendencies and never articulated a detailed political
program. Its two undisputed leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, were said to espouse moderate and hardline
views respectively. With both chiefs in prison and unable to communicate with their followers, FIS figures who are
at liberty to speak continue to articulate a range of positions, including on the subject of political violence.
The armed groups seem to be largely decentralized, many operating only in limited areas ofthe country.
Some Islamist groups have targeted civilians in blatant violation of the most elemental humanitarian norms,
assassinating relatives of security-force members as well as journalists, intellectuals, government workers, popular
singers, and others whose personal politics or profession they deem hostile or contrary to their Islamist project. Car
bombs and other explosive attacks have taken the lives of hundreds of civilians and caused tremendous damage to
public and private property. If the communiques issued in the name of the Anned Islamic Group (Groupe islamique
arme, GIA) and the Islamic Front of the Armed Jihad (Front islamique du djihad anne, FIDA) are authentic, these
two groups bear responsibility for a significant share of atrocities committed against civilians.
The Islamic Salvation Army (Armee Islamique du Salut, AIS), a group claiming to be the armed wing of
the FIS, asserts that it targets only security personnel and objects; but its record in practice is not known, and some
communiques that were issued in its name clearly threatened civilians.
24
FIS figures in exile continue to make statements repudiating violence directed at civilians while claiming
the right to wage war against the security forces and state apparatus. The "National Contract," co-signed in January
1995 by FIS officials abroad (see above), committed signatories—in principle—to the "rejection of violence as a
means of acceding to or maintaining power." Subsequently, after the authorities rejected this demarche and the
actions of armed groups continued, FIS leaders reaffirmed their right to fight the government with arms while tending
to dissociate their party from attacks against civilians. They blamed such attacks either on radical groups such as
the GIA that they portrayed as outside FIS control, or claimed that they were committed by state agents acting to
discredit Islamists. For example, Abdelkrim Ould Adda, a spokesperson for the group calling itself the "Executive
Committee of the FIS Abroad" (instance executive a I'etranger), told the Barcelona daily La Vanguardia:
The FIS condemns all of these terrible killings. Let me say it very clearly: the FIS has no links with
the GIA. We firmiy condemn the barbarous acts committed by these terrorist groups against the
civilian population. The AIS also condemns these actions. The AIS does not kill civilians, women,
children, journalists, intellectuals, foreigners. Its actions are always directed against military
24
For example, the AIS announced in 1994 that it had compiled a list of journalists who were "accomplices of the regime"
who would be executed, according to an AlS-affiliated underground publication, al-Fath al-Moubine. "L'AIS affinne avoir
dresse une liste de joumalistes qui seront executes," AFP, August 24, 1994.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�targets. The AIS controls more than 80 percent of the groups fighting against the regime's
repressive forces. It is stronger than the GIA.
23
A statement issued the same week by the "Executive Committee of the FIS Abroad" blamed the massacres
on the authorities, saying they "fit into the context of a politics of eradication [of Islamists] pursued by the regime,
which is trying to instrumentalize it these days for electoral purposes."
26
More radical FIS figures in exile, who were reportedly recently dismissed from the "Executive Committee
of the FIS Abroad," have suggested closer links between their party and the GIA. For example, Qamareddine
Kherbane, stated in an interview that the FIS rejected the GIA's practice of killing "innocents, Algerian or foreign,"
which he said was "the major difference between us and them." But rather than treat this unpardonable practice as
grounds for repudiating the GIA, he characterized the conflict with the GIA as "minor" and asserted that "all the
mujahedin (holy warriors) realize that the main enemy is the regime." Anouar Haddam, spokesperson for the "FIS
Parliamentary Delegation in Exile," appeared to justify a bomb that exploded on a crowded street outside an Algiers
police station on January 30, 1995, killing forty-two persons, most of them civilian passersby. In a conversation with
the Financial Times, he insisted that the attack was part of the "armed struggle." He said:
27
The mujahideen never meant to harm civilians. The bomb was meant for the central commissariat,
which is known as a torture centre. We send our deep condolences to the families of the victims.
Despite this claim, it should be noted that the attack occurred in broad daylight, shortly before the start of the holy
month of Ramadan, when the street was most likely to be jammed with pedestrians.
28
The FIS has called on its followers to boycott the elections but has not, to our knowledge, made or endorsed
threats against candidates or voters. Abdelkrim Ould Adda, told a news conference in Brussels on April 2, "The FIS
asks all citizens not to take part in this electoral conspiracy, neither by their mobilization nor by their vote, except
where they are forced to or where their security or means of support are put under pressure." However,
Qamareddine Kherbane, another FIS figure in exile (see above), was quoted at about the same time as saying, "We
will do everything to boycott this fraudulent vote and to prevent elections from taking place."
29
30
While a party is within its rights to call for a peaceful boycott, threats and violence intended to prevent or
deter participation in political life is manifestly criminal. During the 1995 presidential elections, the GIA was
reported to have threatened "a bullet for every ballot." Although we are unaware if a similar threat has been issued
during the current election campaign, the ongoing violence, the bloody record of the GIA and the known opposition
of armed Islamists to these elections certainly intimidates Algerians as they campaign and prepare to vote.
25
La Vanguardia, April 20, 1997, as reported in FBIS, Near East and South Asia, April 21, 1997.
26
"Le FIS tient le pouvoir algerien pour responsable des tueries perpetrees," AFP, April 24, 1997.
27
Mark Dennis, "Algeria on the Brink," Newsweek, international edition, April 14, 1997.
28
Roula Khalaf, "Islamists Says Algiers Bomb Aimed at Police HQ," Financial Times, February 2, 1995.
29
Asharq Al-Awsal, April 4, 1997. See also, Jean-Paul Mari, "Les freres ennemis de I'islamisme algerien," Le Nouvel
Obsenateur, April 10, 1997.
30
'Une seule legitimite, celle de Madani et de Benhadj," Le Nouvel Observaieur, April 10, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Indiscriminate bomb attacks in public places, calculated to inflict maximum civilian casualties, pose a
potential threat to campaign rallies or large meetings. During the month of Ramadan, which ended in early February,
car bombs in Algiers killed at least fifty people and injured more than 300. Statements issued in the name of the
GIA claimed responsibility for the attack. On May 11, four days before the start of the election campaign, bombs
exploded in a discotheque and three booby-trapped cars, killing six people and injuring seventy-one others, all in
greater Algiers. In the midst of the election campaign, three car bombs exploded in different towns killing at least
thirty people, according to security sources cited in the press. A leader of the MSP, Mohamed Chenouf, died in one
of the explosions on May 22 in the town of Boufarik, south of Algiers, and one of the car bombs exploded near a
hotel in Tlemcen where members of the CNISEL were staying.
31
32
Since the fall of 1996, many of the casualties have occurred during massacres committed against residents
of isolated rural communities. According to local press, the attackers have used rifles, knives, swords and even
chain-saws. Most of the victims have been women, children and infants. In April alone, more than 300 people were
slain in rural attacks. On April 21, the last day of registration for candidates for the election, ninety-three men,
women, and children were killed in an overnight attack on a farm in the Bougara region south of Algiers. On May
14, the eve of the election campaign, thirty civilians were killed in the area of Chebli, not far from Bougara and in
the Mitidja plains, an area known to be a GIA stronghold and also the site of concentrations of government-backed
armed militia.
Survivors have held Islamist groups responsible for many of the massacres, according to the local media.
However, there are persistent rumors that self-defense militias and security forces may also be implicated in some
of the attacks on rural settlements. Heavy press censorship and restrictions on access have made it difficult to
conduct independent investigations into many of these incidents.
The carnage and destruction of property in rural areas has displaced thousands, who have fled to the capital
or to other localities where they feel more protected. Some of the areas most affected by depopulation are Blida,
Bouira, Chief, Medea and M'sila. This disruption has diminished political life in these areas while raising concerns
about how and where displaced persons will be able to cast their votes.The election law requires voters to register
in their area of permanent residence. As of this writing, the government had not decided whether it intends to allow
the displaced persons to vote in what the election law refers to as "mobile" polling booths, or to provide them with
security to return home to vote. Political parties were urging the second choice.
33
34
The right to move about freely is also important during election periods, but armed groups have created
dangerous and frightening conditions that persuade Algerians to minimize their travel. Hundreds have been
slaughtered while traveling on intercity roads, either at false checkpoints manned by armed groups posing as security
forces, or while traveling in buses that have been ambushed.
31
AFP, February 24, 1997.
32
Associated Press, Algiers, May 11,1997.
33
AFP, May 24, 1997. For example, more than 2,000 residents have fled from outlying villages to the city of Tipasa, sixty
kilometers west of Algiers, according to Abderrahmane Denden, a member of the Algerian League of Human Rights and the
CNISEL. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 17, 1997.
34
FFS spokesperson Ali Rachedi said his party had asked the government to guarantee security to displaced persons so they
can return home. Abderrahmane Denden of the CNISEL said that commission was making the same recommendation.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Violence has taken the form o f targeted political assassination as well. In June 1992, the military-appointed
president, Mohamed Boudiaf, was shot to death at a public rally.
Since 1993, candidates and activists from a
variety o f parties, including the FFS, the RCD, MSP (former Hamas), and smaller parties, have been assassinated
around the country, including in the run-up to elections. In September 1995, Abdelmadjid Benhadid, a presidential
aspirant, was slain. A senior official of the FFS, Embarek Mahiou, was assassinated ten days before the presidential
vote.
35
On May 10, 1997 gunmen shot dead two RCD activists in a high school in the Berber area o f Beni Yenni,
about 120 kilometers east of Algiers. A day later, two activists representing a small party, the M A J D , were killed
in an ambush near the town of Medea, about 80 kilometers south o f Algiers. These attacks, along with the deliberate
killing of hundreds of sitting government officials since 1992, including mayors, prosecutors, clerks and other public
servants, have terrorized others into withdrawing from public life. It is not possible to confirm the identities of the
perpetrators of these attacks, which the authorities have generally attributed to armed groups.
36
Many activists in political parties, women's rights organizations, and other civic and political associations
have taken to living a semi-clandestine life. Many sleep in different locations, alter their daily habits, and do not
publicize their movements in advance. This inhibits their ability to participate in the country's public and political
life, and deters others from becoming involved.
Others have fled the country. One activist with the secularist RCD party described the violence that
exploded during the 1993-1994 period, nearly costing him his life and driving him and his family into exile. A
professional in his late thirties, Khaled (he asked that his real name not be used), ran as an RCD candidate in 1991
for National Assembly in the govemorate o f ' A i n Defla, an Islamist stronghold southwest o f the capital:
The evening that the voting results [the FIS landslide o f December 26, 1991] came in, there were
some Islamists in the room. They said nothing, but one o f them looked at me and made a throatslashing gesture. [In the next few months] some o f them started calling me and my wife " i n f i d e l "
[kafir] when they passed us in the streets. Democrats in the region started to be attacked later in
1992. I was warned that my son could be targeted. M y wife stopped going out alone.
Khaled moved his family to his native Tizi-Ouzou govemorate, which was more peaceful, but they returned
to ' A i n Defla in August 1993 so that Khaled would not lose h i s j o b there:
In February 1994, some men told a guard in town that they were going to start killing the "infidels,"
especially "the one with the red car," meaning me. On February 3, a man called out my name on
the street. I didn't recognize him, so I was suspicious. I swung around and another man was behind
me with a butcher's knife. I hit him and knocked the knife from his hand. People came running.
We captured one o f the guys, but the other escaped.
One day soon afterward, I heard gunfire near our area. I took my family and we hid near a water
station. The gunfire lasted one or one and-a-half hours. The police never left th eir station. Lots o f
people were killed, including the entire police crew o f four or five men. When we went back to our
home, we discovered that it had been ransacked.
35
Although a young soldier was convicted in the killing, many Algerians believe that a larger conspiracy lies behind the killing
that has not been unveiled.
36
The RCD is well-known for its opposition to the program of Islamists. "Deux militants du RCD assassines a Beni Yenni,"
E/-lVaran,May 11, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, V o l . 9, No. 4 (E)
�The security forces from [a nearby city] sent reinforcements to our village. They killed seven people
in reprisal, people who did not have anything to do with the attack, people who were not even proFIS. They took these people to the gendarmerie [police station] in [the city] and their bodies were
later found in the woods.
Khaled went into hiding and, with the help of a contact in the military, evacuated his family from the region.
They returned to Tizi-Ouzou, where Khaled resumed his activism in the RCD. In September 1994, he learned that
a fire had destroyed his house in 'Ain Defla. He recalls:
I received a threatening tract, and noticed that 1 was being followed in Tizi-Ouzou. When I went
on errands I found myself between two cars that I suspected were up to something. I complained
to the police, but they said, Don't worry. But I realized I was safe nowhere, and decided to leave
the country.
37
Many Algerians active in political or civic organizations have had similar experiences or know others who
have. Delila Meziane, a refugee in France, described the persecution she suffered for her outspoken politics and her
independent lifestyle as a woman. Meziane, a lawyer born in 1957, was a long-time activist in the women's
movement, unions, and the communist PAGS party, the precursor of Ettahaddi. "1 never missed a demonstration,"
she recalled. "I participated in marches against the FIS beginning in 1990. In 1992 I gave interviews on the radio
attacking the Islamists and the mixing of religion and the state." Meziane, who is single and lived alone, opened a
law practice in Bouira, a city near the capital where Islamist sympathies were strong. After being threatened several
times and aggressively confronted in the streets of Bouira, she and her female colleague closed the practice.
Meziane moved her law office to her apartment in the Bab Ezzouar district of Algiers. But the
threats continued. "The phone would ring and the persons on the other end would call me a "heathen" and
"unbeliever" and say I was going to die," she said. On the walls of her neighborhood, a list was posted naming local
women who lived alone and calling them "impure." In 1992, death threats were scrawled across her front door, and
her apartment was ransacked by unknown persons. In November of that year, a man who lived nearby whom she
knew to be an Islamist assaulted her and tried to strangle her. She managed to free herself. The assailant was
arrested but soon released.
In 1993, two friends and a policeman she knew were slain, and she witnessed a court clerk being killed on
the steps of an Algiers courthouse. In February of that year, she returned from a trip abroad to discover that her
apartment had again been ransacked and the doors and walls covered with death threats. The police advised her to
leave, warning that they could not assure her safety. She began sleeping at friends' homes. On March 17, 1993 she
returned home to pick up some documents and found that the phone, water and electricity had been cut off. Despite
the nighttime curfew in effect, she heard people outside her front door, knocking and shouting threats. Three days
later, Meziane left the country.
38
Since 1992, state repression has mostly been directed at suspected Islamists, their families, and sympathizers.
Before 1992, the FIS operated openly and legally, fielding candidates, publishing newspapers, and organizing rallies
and other political activity. This open activity, under the watchful eyes of the security services, facilitated the
massive round-up of many of these people beginning in 1992. In.the months following the cancellation of elections,
37
Human Rights Watch interview, Paris, July 10, 1995.
38
Human Rights Watch interview, Simandre, France, July 8, 1995.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�at least 9,000 suspected Islamists including elected officials and rank-and-file supporters, were put into desert
detention camps without charge. Abdelqader Hachani, who was provisionally heading the party while its two chiefs
were in prison, was arrested in January 1992 for urging soldiers to disobey orders to repress the Algerian people.
He is now in his sixth year in detention without trial. The crackdown and continuing repression no doubt discourages
political activism by some actual or potential supporters of Islamist-leaning candidates.
New elements that heighten the level of fear among Islamist sympathizers and their relatives are the
communal guards and "self-defense" militias, armed and sponsored by the state. The communal guards, set up in
1993 and paid to back security forces in their areas of residence, operate under the jurisdiction of the interior
ministry. The "self-defense" militia, created mainly in poorly protected rural areas where armed groups are active,
have also been armed and sponsored by the state. While these two paramilitary forces have played a role in providing
security for some sectors of the vulnerable population, they have also reportedly carried out "anti-terrorist" operations
that go beyond self-defense and the limits of the law. These include offensive operations against individuals or
groups they define as "terrorists" and killings of suspected Islamists or their families in reprisal for acts attributed
to armed groups. Amid criticism that the "self-defense" militia were not subject to sufficient oversight, the
government issued a decree in March 1997 intended to bring them under closer supervision by the defense and
interior ministries.
39
Some political activists voiced concern about the effect of militias on political activity during the campaign.
"We don't want any militia around during the elections. They could belong to one party or another and intimidate
voters, " Abdel-Madjid Menacera, of the Islamist MSP party, commented. Many Algerians believe that the victims
of some rural massacres have been targeted by Islamist armed groups because the victims—or, more generally,
people in their village—were suspected of supporting the militia or security forces. Similarly, many Algerians
suspect that the security forces and militia have perpetrated killings against persons who are suspected of supporting
the Islamists. These perceptions must weigh heavily on voters in these terrorized areas when they contemplate the
fact that local voting patterns will become known after the elections.
40
The regular security forces have engaged in extrajudicial killings. Human Rights Watch and other groups
have reported on the suppression of a mutiny at Serkadji prison in Algiers in February 1995 that took the lives of
about one hundred inmates and was never properly investigated by the authorities. There has been no thorough
independent investigation of the circumstances in which security forces storm hideouts of persons described as
"terrorists." Amnesty International has noted that the official communiques concerning such clashes state, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, that all of the individuals in the group were killed, and none was arrested or injured,
including those who were not armed. This "raises the question of how many of these people were deliberately
extrajudicially executed, including killings as a result of excessive use of lethal force in situations where they posed
no threat to the lives of the security forces." - The Algerian League of Human Rights (LADH) wrote recently that
under the emergency law "there has been an increase in the use of firearms and an abuse of them during the pursuit
41
4
39
Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence: A Hidden Human Rights Crisis, (AI Index MDE 28/11/96), November
1996.
JO
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 1, 1997.
41
Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Six Months Later, Cover-Up Continues in Prison Clash that Left 100 Inmates
Dead," A Hitman Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 7, no. 5, August 1995.
42
Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence, p. 11.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�of persons suspected of violence and terrorism, or under threat of danger, which has led to a large number of
extrajudicial killings."
43
Algerian authorities have also engaged in a pattern of arbitrary arrests; prolonged detention without charge
or trial and with no access to lawyers or relatives and torture during interrogation. There have been numerous reports
of deaths during detention in suspicious circumstances.
44
Human Rights Watch investigated one high-profile case in which circumstances suggest that extra-judicial
execution was the cause of death. On January 28, 1997, Abdelhaq Benhamouda, head of Algeria's largest union, the
Union General de Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA), was assassinated outside the UGTA office in Algiers, despite the
presence of his guard detail. On February 23, Rachid Medjahed, a suspect being held in incommunicado detention,
"confessed" on Algerian television to having masterminded the assassination. Shortly thereafter, Medjahed's
relatives requested permission from an investigating judge to visit him in detention and were told that he had died.
A lawyer for the family obtained a police report dated February 26 stating that Medjahed was dead. On April 2 his
family was summoned to view his body in a morgue and reported that it bore nine bullet wounds. On April 8,
Minister of Justice Mohamed Adami told Human Rights Watch that, as far as he knew, Medjahed was being treated
in a hospital for three bullet wounds received during the clash that led to his arrest. In a letter sent to the authorities
on April 26, Human Rights Watch expressed concern that Medjahed was extrajudicially executed while in custody
and that authorities had sought to cover up, rather than expose what happened to him between his arrest and his death.
In a May 11 letter responding to the intervention by Human Rights Watch, the ONDH stated that it had learned from
the authorities that Medjahed had indeed been wounded during his arrest and died on March 18 from "complications"
related to the injuries he had suffered. The information conveyed by the ONDH was inconsistent with Human Rights
Watch's finding that the family had been told well before March 18 of Medjahed's death and that the police report
confirming the death was dated February 26. The case illustrates why many Algerians are sometimes skeptical of
government attribution of most acts of political violence to Islamist groups.
45
46
Human Rights Watch also spoke in Algiers with relatives of several persons arrested between 1994 and early
January 1997, and whose whereabouts were still unknown in April 1997. In many of the cases, the family was either
unable to locate their detained relative through inquiring at local police stations and with higher authorities, or had
lost track of them after they had been transferred from one holding facility to another. All had submitted at least one
inquiry with the ONDH or directly with the government. Lawyers told us they were pursuing hundreds of such cases
of reported disappearances. Justice Minister Adami said that his ministry takes reports of missing persons seriously.
"We give these cases all our special attention," he said. "Sometimes we find the person in question, but until we do
we keep the files open on these cases."
47
48
43
Statement by the LADH on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, April 11, 1997.
44
See Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence.
45
Human Rights Watch/MiJdle East, "Algeria: Human Rights Watch Urges Investigation of Death in Detention of Suspect
in Labor Leader's Killing," April 30, 1997.
46
Speculation as to who killed Benhamouda began the day he died. Many observers noted that he may have won the enmity
of factions within the country's leadership after he declared his intention late last year to launch a political party that would have
been pro-President Zeroual in the June 5 elections. Medjahed's "confession" followed by his death—instead of a court
trial—further obscures the identity of the labor leader's assassins.
47
See also Amnesty International, Algeria: Fear and Silence.
48
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
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�Those relatives we interviewed had received replies via the ONDH after considerable delays, if they received
replies at all. But none of the replies specified a reason for the arrest nor information on the persoir s whereabouts.
Sometimes, the ONDH responses stated that the missing person may have joined the armed groups. For example,
Zobeir Chekhli's family complained to the ONDH on March 9, 1996, about his disappearance in June 1995. About
a year later, the ONDH replied that, according to the gendarmerie, Chekhli had not been arrested, and that he may
have joined the armed groups, since his brother Lahkdar was a "terrorist" and had been arrested.
49
Human Rights Watch spoke to a relative of two young men, Djamil and Mourad Chihoub, who "disappeared"
after their brother joined an armed Islamist group:
In May 1996, when military forces came to look for Saeed, who had gone to the armed groups, they
took away Djamil instead, from our home in Baraqi. They told me to find Saeed. Since then, we
found out that Saeed had been killed, but Djamil has not been returned. I looked everywhere for
him, in morgues, hospitals, and have written to officials, but got no reply. Then, on November 1996,
the military forces together with a self-defense group from Baraqi came to our house at around 11
o'clock at night and warned me, "If you move, we will shoot," and they took away my youngest son,
Mourad. According to rumors he was arrested in connection to the armed groups.
The family wrote to the authorities but has received no information. The boys' father was summoned to
military security headquarters in February, along with other relatives of "disappeared" persons, where he was asked
for details of the cases by the social services department formed late last y ear to trace "disappeared" persons. The
fate of Djamil and Mourad Chihoub remains unknown.
A relative of Mohamed Oucief, twenty-six, described how he was arrested around 2 a.m. on March 28, 1997
by six armed security personnel:
. They forced their way through the balcony of our first floor apartment. One of the men was masked.
They had no identification papers or arrest warrant. They went to Mohamed's room, and when I
entered I saw the masked man hitting him and asking him questions about something he had
delivered to somebody. They pushed me out and shut the door and then took him away. We only
found out today, from neighbors who visited their son in Serkadji prison, that Mohamed was there,
but we have no information about a trial or anything else. We managed to confirm that he was
indeed in Serkadji from a guard at the gate, after a lot of pleading. This is the usual way to find out
where people are taken to and held.
50
Noureddine Mihoubi, twenty-nine, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested more than four years
ago as he was visiting a brother outside Algiers. He was held at a police station there and his family was able to
visit him and bring him food and medicine for fifteen days. Then they were told that he had been transferred to
Algiers but were given no further information. A month later, a newly released detainee told them he had seen
Noureddine at the military security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in poor condition. The family in the
summer of 1996 obtained a police report issued in July 1996 saying he had been arrestsd by security forces and
transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. His location and fate remain unknown.
51
ONDH showed this correspondence to Human Rights Watch at its headquarters on April 5, 1997.
50
Human Rights Watch interview with a relative of Mohamed Oucief who wished to remain anonymous, Algiers, April 6,
1997.
51
Human Rights Watch interview with a relative of Noureddine Mihoubi who wished to remain anonymous, Algiers, April
6, 1997.
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�Ali Belhadj, one of the two FIS chiefs imprisoned since June 1991, was last seen by his family and lawyers
in the beginning of 1995. He was tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve years in jail. He is facing new charges
following the alleged discovery of a letter from him on the body of an armed Islamist implicating him in inciting
violence. His lawyers have written to the authorities, including President Zeroual, asking for their right under
Algerian law to have access to their client and complaining that his whereabouts were unknown. In April, the
London-based Arabic laneuage daily Al-Hayat quoted a FIS statement saying he had been moved to Blida military
jail.
52
The ONDH acknowledged in its 1994-1995 report the existence of secret detention centers in "places that
the law has not designed for that function. They are mainly...certain police stations or army barracks serving as
detention centers. Persons arrested were freed after more than three months of secret detention in these places."
53
F R E E D O M OF ASSEMBLY
The obstacles that a government or other actors place in the way of holding meetings, rallies, debates, and
other public events have a direct bearing on the openness of elections. While Algeria's constitution guarantees, in
Article 41, "freedom of expression, association and assembly," the state of emergency and the Law on Assemblies
and Public Demonstrations impose excessive limits on these rights. In practice, restrictions on political gatherings
have been inconsistent. Legal parties of all tendencies have been able to hold meetings and public rallies, but their
gatherings have been banned or restricted on some occasions.
54
International law permits restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly only in narrow circumstances.
Advance prohibitions of assemblies must always be exceptional measures, and be based on well-founded concerns
for security or public safety, and not on preventing persons from challenging the legitimacy of the government of
the moment. As the examples provided in this report show, the measures taken by the authorities to restrict freedom
of the press, assembly and association clearly exceed that which may be justified on the basis of legitimate concerns
for security and public order.
On February 13, 1992, the Algerian government notified the United Nations Secretary-General that it was
imposing a state of emergency and, in accordance with Article 4(3) of the ICCPR, derogating from articles of the
covenant. That article states that derogations may not exceed "the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation." The Algerian government, in its letter to the Secretary-General, asserted that the state of emergency
"which is aimed essentially at restoring public order, protecting the safety of individuals and property and ensuring
the normal operation of institutions and public services, does not interfere with the democratic process inasmuch as
the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms continues to be guaranteed."
52
Also arrested and tried with Ben Hadj, FIS leader Abbassi Madani is held in an unknown location outside Algiers where
his sister has reportedly been able to visit him.
53
Observatoire National des droits de I'homme, Rapport 1994-1995, p. 44-45.
54
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 21 provides:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order {ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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�International jurisprudence suggests strongly that even where one finds "a public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation," a government cannot simply equate its own perpetuation with the "life of the nation." The
European Commission of Human Rights, interpreting the identical language of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, concluded that the threat to the "life of the nation" must, in its magnitude, involve
the whole nation. This characterization can refer with equal justification to the application of Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
55
56
57
The February 9, 1992 state of emergency decree gives the interior minister and local governors sweeping
powers to "restrict or prohibit the movement of persons and vehicles," order the "temporary closure of [all types of]
halls and ban all demonstrations that could disturb the public order and peace." The decree does not require the
authorities to explain or justify such measures.
In addition, public gatherings by parties and associations are restricted by December 1991 amendments to
Law 89-28 relating to assemblies and demonstrations. The procedure for organizing gatherings shifted from one of
simple notification, where the provincial governor (wali) had authority to request a change of location, to one of
obtaining permission from the wali, who is appointed by the president and who can "ban an assembly and inform
its organizers if it is deemed to poses a real risk of disturbing public order or if it clearly appears that the real
objective of the meeting constitutes a danger for the preservation of public order."
During the 1995 presidential elections, authorities refused to authorize some meetings called by political
parties urging a boycott of the election, including the FFS and the FLN. The government also arrested overnight an
activist, Djamel Zenati, who publicly urged a boycott, and allowed little or no television coverage of those urging
a boycott of the vote.
58
There was similar, sporadic interference with those parties that opposed the constitutional referendum of
November 1996. Seddik Debaili, FFS secretary general, said:
We asked to debate.the proposed constitution on television before the referendum. That was
refused. Some of our militants in .Bejaia [governorate] were arrested, tried and acquitted on the day
of the constitutional referendum. They were accused of pressuring the voters to vote "No."
59
Following the constitutional referendum, the FFS was not permitted to hold a rally to denounce "the fraudulent result
and injustice" of the vote, according to Bouallam Kolai, in charge of inter-party relations at the FFS. "When we asked
permission to hold an outdoor rally on December 12," he said, "The authorities responded that our request was not
made in the formally correct way. We complied and made a second, correct request, but again we were rejected, with
no reason."
60
55
European Convention for :he Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (1950).
56
Greek case, 12a Y.B. Eur. Conv. Human Rights, para. 153 (1969).
57
Buergenthal, "State Obligations and Permissible Derogations," The International Bill of Rights, p. 80.
58
See Human Rights Watch/Middle East press release, November 16, 1995.
59
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
60
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
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�In May 1997, some political parties and independent candidates complained that following their public
election campaign meetings, local officials and security forces had harassed attendants or tried to pressure them into
joining the RND. The head of the MSP, Mahfoudh Nahnah, said his party was prevented from holding some
meetings, while the pro-government parties had easy access to public halls. He threatened on May 26 to pull out of
the elections:
There is a double standard at work here, and there are abuses. Our candidates held a meeting in a
cafe yesterday and the owners were later questioned by security forces. Unless the administration
stops interfering, we will have to pull out because we will not be part of a rigged election.
61
Representatives of other political parties and civic associations complained that their freedom to hold
meetings had been sharply curtailed in the past two years. These included parties sitting in the National Transitional
Council, whose members are government-appointed. For example, Abdelmedjid Menacera, a senior figure in the
MSP, said his party did not get permission to meet in public halls. This, he said:
hindered the party's activities because some small towns only had spaces that were governmentowned. We have complained to the highest levels, and we always were reassured our needs would
be met, but the problem is at a lower level, where local officials have the freedom to act as they
please.
62
The Interior Ministry's director of civil liberties, Belhadj Abdel Razeq, told Human Rights Watch, "The only
reason to reject a request for a public meeting by a party or an association is related to security, if there is any danger,
or a security problem. But this is decided at the local level and not at our office."
63
The National Union of Magistrates (1'Union nationale de magistrals) took the governor (wali) ofthe Algiers
governorate to court because he refused its request for a permit to hold a meeting in December 1996. A split in the
union had resulted in the leadership of one of the factions holding its own general assembly last October. When the
other faction, which claims to be more independent of government influence, requested permission to convene its
general assembly, the wali refused, explaining that the new leadership had already met. "The wali has overstepped
his authority and has no right to pass judgment on the union leadership," Fatima Chenaif, chief magistrate at the
criminal court of Algiers and a founding member of the union, told us.
64
Members of the Rally for Youth Action (Rassemblement action des jeunes, RAJ), a nongovernmental youth
association that leads university seminars and addresses the problems of unemployment, poverty and human rights,
said their group had come under heavy pressure, including bans on meetings, particularly after it launched a
"Manifesto for Peace" in April 1995. The organization demanded "respect for human rights regardless of social
position, ideology or culture," the right to peaceful assembly, and "a peace process, in which all, with no exception,
must participate."
Karima Hammache, RAJ's director of public relations, said:
61
Roula Khalaf, "Islamist party may pull out of Algeria poll," Financial Times, May 27, 1997.
62
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April I , 1997;
63
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
64
Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, D.C, May 8, 1997.
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�At our concert in June 1995, for vvhicli we were given permission the same day, we got thousands of people
to sign our manifesto for peace. We want the political opposition and the government to talk to each other.
They clash and we, the young people, are victims caught in the middle.
65
Since the concert, she said, the authorities have rarely allowed RAJ activists to hold seminars and
conferences in high schools or in state-run youth centers, and rejected a request to organize a concert in March 1997.
"Before our 1995 concert, we had access to the radio and to the public press. We realize there are armed Islamist
terrorists, but we can't understand why the government restricts organizations like ours which are against all forms
of totalitarianism," Hammache said.
Another call for a broad-based political dialogue was made by an ad hoc group of political figures, lawyers,
and intellectuals in November 1996, many of whom were identified with the National Contract platform. Their
initiative, a Call for Peace (Appel pour la paix), condemned the proposed constitution and called for a dialogue with
political forces across the spectrum, an end to the emergency law, the release of prisoners of conscience, and freedom
of expression.
The government initially rejected a request for permission by the group to hold a public meeting planned in
December 1996. The government allowed a Call for Peace rally in March, and about 1,000 people attended,"
according to Bouallam Kolai, an FFS activist and signatory of the Call for Peace.
66
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Press freedom is an essential condition for free and fair elections. This includes the coverage accorded the
various parties and candidates and the flow of information more generally that will influence Algerians' decisions
about whom to elect. For example, authorities make frequent claims that terrorism is "residual" and have accused
the press of blowing it out of proportion. In assessing whether the present policies pursued toward political violence
are succeeding, Algerians need accurate information about the nature and extent of political violence in their country.
But this is the area where press censorship is most strict.
67
Government restrictions on expression in Algeria violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which Algeria has ratified. The ICCPR states in Article 19(2):
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The Covenant allows certain restrictions on this right, including for the protection of national security or of
public order (Article 19(3)(b)). Derogations are also permitted in the event of "a public emergency which threatens
65
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 11, 1997.
66
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31, 1997.
67
In a typical declaration, Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf stated in March, "Terrorism has failed at every level. It has not
caused the collapse ofthe institutions and has not prevented normal life at the political, economic, social and cultural level from
continuing. Democracy is being consolidated, and pluralism is taking root. Terrorism has been unable to mobilize the people
and is now wreaking vengeance upon them with contemptible killings which are proof of its failure. The elimination of terrorism
is simply a question of time." Le Soir (Brussels), March 13, 1997, as reported in FBIS, Near East and South Asia, March 13,
1997.
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed...to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation." (Article 4(1)). The Government of Algeria exercised the option provided in Article 4(3)
for taking derogations by informing the United Nations Secretary-General of the imposition of the state of emergency
(see above).
As the examples provided below demonstrate, most of the Algerian government's actions against the press
since 1992 seem primarily designed to inhibit criticism of government officials and institutions, and to muzzle
independent reporting and commentary on the internal security situation. These actions go well beyond the "extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" to protect "the life of the nation."
After massive street riots and protests over political and economic conditions in November 1988, the state
and ruling party ended their monopoly over the media. Dozens of private dailies and weeklies and political party
organs were launched. Radio, television, and the main news agency (Algerie Presse Service, or APS) remained in
state hands, but they broadened their coverage to include hitherto taboo subjects, such as demands for Berber cultural
and linguistic rights, and provided access to politicians critical of the authorities, including the leaders of the FIS.
Algerian media emerged as among the liveliest in the Arab world. The print press continues to tackle some issues
generally untouched in other parts of the region. It gives coverage to politicians and parties that are critical of the
authorities, and is free, within certain limits to expose social ills and question aspects of the government's
performance.
Since 1992 however, press freedom has been steadily eroded by government pressures, censorship, and
financial constraints, as well as by the violence against journalists that is generally attributed to Islamist groups. The
erosion has been most dramatic at Algerian television and radio, which have reverted to being government
mouthpieces (see below).
No discussion of press freedom is possible without considering the assassination campaign that has cost the
lives of some fifty-nine journalists and media workers since 1993. Others have been wounded in assassination
attempts. Although individual killings have rarely been followed by claims of responsibility or court trials that
identified the culprits, it is clear from publicly issued threats and occasional claims of responsibility that armed
Islamist groups, and particularly the GIA, are responsible for many, if not most, of these assassinations.
68
Statements attributed to Islamist groups have railed against a pro-govemment bias in the media. In fact, the
journalists and others who have been slain do not share any particular political affiliation; some were secularist but
critical of the government, while others had Islamist sympathies. The target of the violence has been the media in
general, and the victims have included editors, reporters, photographers, proofreaders, and drivers, both men and
women apparently perceived as working either to promote the government's version of the conflict or to undermine
the Islamist movement by failing openly to support it.
The campaign of violence against journalists has clearly affected the ability of the press to inform the public.
In addition to the members of the profession who have been killed, many have fled to other countries, fearing for
their lives; others have dropped out of the profession. Those who continue to work take precautions such as sleeping
in different locations, avoiding daily routines that might facilitate the work of an assassin, and skipping on-site
reporting that they might otherwise undertake. All of this has taken a heavy toll on the ability of media to inform
their readers.
68
Article 19 and Committee to Protect Journalists, "Press Freedom Groups Condemn Algeria's Silencing of the Independent
Press," May 21, 1997.
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�The government has exercised vigorous censorship ofthe independent press through various means, ranging
from banning newspapers and jailing reporters to exerting financial pressures on the private print media, which in
1996 accounted for 77 percent of the total print press volume and 83 percent of sales. The issues subjected to
censorship are important to voters choosing a national assembly, including security, human rights, and criticism of
the government's handling of the economy.
69
The 1990 press code provides the basis for significant restrictions on the press. It allows for the prosecution
ofjournalists, editors and publishers for dissemination of "harmful" information. Article 86 provides five-to-ten-year
prison sentences and fines for deliberately publishing or spreading "false or misleading information capable of
harming national order or state security." Article 87 states:
The incitement by means of any information media to crimes or misdemeanors against state security
or national unity, when the incitement produces these consequences, shall subject the director of the
publication and the author of the offending article to penal sanctions as accomplices to the crimes
and misdemeanors that are committed. If the provocation produces no consequences, the director
and the author shall be punished by imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 10,000 to
100,000 dinars, or one of the two.
The Penal Code has also been used to prosecute journalists for defaming state institutions and agencies.
Article 96 provides that anyone who disseminates, with an intent to persuade others, material "that may harm the
national interest" is subject to a prison term of up to three years and a fine of up to 36,000 Algerian dinars
(approximately U.S.$640 at the official rate). Article 144 provides that anyone who wilfully causes grave offense
to employees of the government in terms of the performance of their duties, shall be subject to a prison sentence and
a fine. Article 146 provides punishments for giving grave offense to state institutions, and Article 147 for acts or
words that "aim to discredit judicial decisions and that may harm the authority and independence of the judiciary."
Several journalists who have written critically about the authorities or about the judiciary have been charged under
these articles (see below).
.
..
The 1992 state of emergency decrees provide for punishments for the publication or distribution of
documents that attack symbols of the state, or "obstruct" the authorities. They define "terrorism" and "subversion"
to include, among other things, acts "directed at state security, territorial integrity, the stability and normal
functioning of institutions," whose purpose is to "impede the functioning of public institutions or harming the life
or property of their agents, or impeding the application of laws or regulations." Article 4 of the same decree goes
well beyond Article 87 of the press code, and well beyond international law, by punishing not just "incitement" but
also "expressions of sympathy for" and "encouragement" of proscribed acts.
70
Since 1992, according to Reporters sans frontieres (RSF), a press freedom organization based in France, at
least twenty-three journalists have been detained, thirty-nine have received summons to appear in court, and there
have been fifty-eight incidents involving the seizure, suspension or banning of dailies or weeklies in connection with
security matters or criticism of the authorities.
71
In January 1993, when the pace of attacks by armed opposition groups was accelerating, the government
began implementing regulations, through circulars and directives, that prevent media from publishing unauthorized
69
Reporters sans frontieres (Reporters without Borders), "Algerie: La guerre civile a huis clos," March 1997.
70
Legislative Decree 92-03 Relative to the Fight against Subversion and Terrorism.
71
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: La guerre civile a huis clos."
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�information about the actions of the security forces and of the armed groups. In March 1994, the government issued
a circular to the press instructing editors-in-chief to publish security-related information only if it was obtained from
the official APS news agency. In February 1996 the interior ministry established "reading committees" at the print
media to censor news reports that do not conform to the instructions. Journalists and senior editors of private
newspapers told us that the reading committee scrutinizes all security-related reports, advises the editor on what to
censor and may remove a page or ban the day's edition altogether if its advice has not been followed.
As a result of the security-related censorship, newspapers print almost nothing about losses sustained by
security forces or reports implicating the regular security forces or paramilitary forces, in attacks on civilians or other
human rights abuses. They are permitted to cover killings and massacres of civilians attributed by authorities to
armed Islamist extremists, although the press has at different times been instructed either to play up or play down
this sort of news and has been prevented from conducting independent investigations into massacres and reporting
on its findings.
During a spate of rural massacres in January, many of which were covered in the local press, Interior Minister
Mustafa Benmansour accused journalists of "exaggerating the number of victims or even inventing acts of
terrorism," and threatened unspecified sanctions against media that "play the game of terrorist propaganda." His
statements came a day after President Zeroual gave a televised address concerning the violence, promising to
intensify efforts to wipe out "terrorism." Following the interior minister's warning, coverage of the massacres
diminished in the private press. However, in April, papers resumed detailed stories of the carnage attributed to the
armed groups, featuring quotes from survivors, the names of victims and their families, and photos of bodies in
shrouds and damaged homes.
72
These mixed signals apparently reflect the authorities' conflicting objectives of wishing to minimize the
capabilities of the armed groups and at the same time to publicize atrocities attributed to them in order to rally
support for a tough security response. Salima Ghezali has said that the newspaper she edits, La Nation, refuses to
cover security incidents because it believes that government restrictions on coverage make objective reporting
impossible.
Belhadj Abdel Razek, director of the office of public liberties at the Interior Ministry, minimized the extent
of state interference in the press. While acknowledging that his ministry had exerted control on the press "briefly"
after the presidential elections, he stated, "If there is now any censor committee at the printing press level, I don't
know about it, it is not our domain. We try not to control the press. Although they publish many lies and
inaccuracies and we ask them to publish corrections, we don't take them to court for it."
73
Some newspapers with well-placed security contacts sometimes publish their own reports of security
incidents without repercussions—so long as the information does not displease the authorities. In addition, four or
five private papers have sometimes, in defiance of the restrictions, coordinated the publication on a given day of the
same, independently obtained report, making it politically more difficult for the authorities to seize all the papers for
the day, according to several Algerian journalists working for private newspapers. According to these journalists
and other observers, when official ''.overage of a security-related incident is allowed, such as an attack attributed to
Islamists, reporters for the Algerian media are generally escorted as a group by armed members of the security forces,
who generally remain present during interviews with survivors or eyewitnesses. "When reporters go to the site of
a massacre, the security forces block the place and we can't get close to it. Sometimes the forces allow some
journalists to take pictures, conduct interviews with family members, but journalists are never free to go on their
72
Associated Press, January 26, 1997.
73
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
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�own," a journalist working for an Algerian daily and who asked to remain anonymous told us. While most attacks
by armed groups in rural areas have been attributed by authorities to Islamist groups, the "self-defense" militia are
suspected in some of them, many Algerians told us. However, even if these areas were open to reporters who wished
to investigate, state censorship would prevent the dissemination of any findings that implicated the military-backed
militia or regular security forces.
Foreign journalists must obtain visas to visit Algeria, which are sometimes refused. Roula Khalaf of the
Financial Times was denied a visa during the early months of 1997, although she was granted one in May, during
the election campaign. In 1996, the authorities withdrew the accreditation of two Spanish correspondents, Ferran
Sales of the daily El Pais (Madrid) and Tahar Majdoub of the EFE agency. Those who are allowed in are assigned
security force escorts by the foreign press center attached to the foreign ministry, ostensibly for their own protection.
Authorities reject attempts by journalists to waive this escort. Resident foreign journalists are allowed to move free
of escorts, but their coverage of security-related incidents, such as the recent rural massacres, is tightly controlled
by military security or government-backed militia who have accompanied reporters to the scene of the incident and
have remained nearby during interviews with witnesses or survivors.
Visiting foreign reporters have complained that the "protection" hampers their freedom of movement and
often intimidates people they wish to interview. Peter Strandberg, a journalist for several European newspapers, said
that when he traveled in April to Tizi-Ouzou, a provincial capital east of Algiers, he was accompanied by some
twenty-five military personnel in army vehicles, six of them in plainclothes. They accompanied him, over his
objections, into a coffeehouse, a textile factory, a mosque and a school. The plainclothes escorts later asked some
of the people Strandberg spoke to for an account of their conversation, Strandberg said. He complained about the
interference to the press center but got no reply.
74
Government efforts to restrict the media extend far beyond security topics, and affect reporting about
corruption, criticism of government personalities, and other issues that might displease those in power. "The press
liberties in theory consolidate a liberal political system, but on the ground the realities are different," said Khaled
Bourayou, a lawyer representing a number of independent newspapers. "Some of the Algerian press is against
Islamic fundamentalism, but it is also against the system which is still tainted by single-party rule and is not
transparent. So as soon as the press denounces the economic and political mafia," they face trouble.
75
The French-language daily El-Watan faced charges of defamation in October 1995 and its editor-in-chief
and reporter were placed under court supervision when it published a report about the import of medical equipment
and the alleged embezzlement of government funds.
76
The editor-in-chief and a reporter of another French-language independent daily, Liberie, were given
suspended prison sentences in December 1995 for writing that a presidential advisor was to be promoted to defense
minister, while at the same time publishing a story critical of him. (President Zeroual held, and continues to hold
the defense portfolio.)
77
74
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 7, 1997.
75
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
76
When under court supervision, the court may restrict a person's civil liberties such as foreign travel. Under court supervision,
El-Watan editor Omar Belhouchet was almost prevented from participating in a ceremony honoring slain journalists in
Washington in May 1996. After international protests, his passport was returned and he was able to travel.
77
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: La guerre civile a huis clos."
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
29
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�La Tribune, a French-language daily, was suspended for six months and its publisher and editor given oneyear suspended sentences in September 1996 for a satirical cartoon that "profaned" the Algerian flag. After a month
in preventive detention, the cartoonist, Chawki Amari, was given a suspended three-year sentence for desecrating
a national emblem by his cartoon printed on July 2. It showed two men walking underneath flags draped across a
street. "Is this for the July 5 celebration (Algerian independence day)?" asks one man. "No, they are hanging out
their dirty laundry," replies the other man.
When the paper resumed publication, Amari and editor-in-chief Baya Gacetni quit their posts. Since its
resumption, Ms. Gacemi said La Tribune has moderated its criticism of the authorities. "The editorial management
has adopted a different strategy, to avoid any problems and not to take any risks," she observed.
78
Journalists have also been detained without charge by the government, and have sometimes "disappeared"
for periods of time. A journalist recently detained without charge or trial told us of his experience. Mohammed
Yousfi, formerly with Al- 'Alain Al-Siyassi, an Arabic daily that reflects varied viewpoints, including Islamist ones,
was arrested in his hotel room on March 5 as he was attending a conference on the rule of law in Tizi-Ouzou:
Two armed men entered my hotel room at three o'clock in the morning, they flashed a strong light
in my face and pointed their guns at my chest. I was paralyzed with fear. They didn't identify
themselves. They searched my room and dragged me out to a car and pushed me inside, lowering
my head to the ground.
Yousfi said he was kept for fifteen days in numerous detention centers that he could not identify, since he
had been blindfolded when he was transferred. He recalled:
When they brought me in court, the prosecutor looked confused and said he had no charge against me. The
judge acquitted me immediately. I demanded compensation, but the judge told me I should just be relieved
that I am free.
79
Abdelkader Hadj Benaamane, a journalist at the official APS news agency, was freed on April 2 on parole,
after spending more than two years of ai three-year sentence in prison, handed down by a military court. He had been
arrested in connection with a report he had filed on the internal APS wire disclosing the place where Ali Belhadj,
the second in command ofthe FIS, was held. The internal APS wire goes to the President and government ministers.
Benaamane disappeared February 27, 1995, and his whereabouts were unknown until El-Watan reported almost two
months later that he had been arrested.
The fate of at least three other journalists who have "disappeared" over the last three years remains unknown.
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist with Islamist sympathies at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. He had been
jailed twice before since 1991. His wife, Safia, stated that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from his
home in el-Harrache by men they believed to belong to the security forces. In response to her inquiries, she has
received no official information about his whereabouts other than a statement by the Ministry of Justice that there
was no record of his arrest at el-Harrache's local police station.
80
78
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 2, 1997.
79
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
80
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 11, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
30
June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�In two other cases, the identity of those responsible is more unclear. Mohammed Hassaine, reporter for Alger
Republicain, was abducted by unknown persons in March 1994; Kadour Bouselham, of the state-owned Horizon,
has been missing since October 29, 1994.
81
A recent case is that of Aziz Bouabdallah, journalist with the Arabic-language daily Al-Alain al-Siyassi
who was taken from his home on April 12, 1997 by three men who introduced themselves as members of the security
forces. His family has been unable to obtain information on his whereabouts, but Amnesty International reported
that, according to information it had received, he was being held in the Chateauneuf military security center in
Algiers.
The government also resorts to a combination of financial pressure and strong-arm tactics to keep in line the
private press through its domination of the country's printing presses, imported newsprint supplies and advertising
budgets. In 1996, the interior ministry banned weeklies and dailies on at least six occasions. These include ElWatan, censored on April 24 and May 7 when the Algerian government-owned Algiers Printing Press (Societe
d'Impression dAlger, SIA) refused to print the issues. Journalists at the paper attributed the censorship to the
coverage of government counterinsurgency operations.
82
83
The press that has been hit hardest by government control has been the pro-Islamist and Islamist-leaning
press, most of it published in Arabic. The first to be closed were the organs of the FIS, El-Moimquidh and ElForqane, in February 1992. At least four Arabic-language dailies and weeklies were suspended by the authorities
between 1992 and 1995 and have not reappeared since. They include AssahAfa, a satirical weekly suspended and
accused in August 1992 of being a de facto FIS "mouthpiece" and Djazair el-Yoin, suspended twice in 1992 and again
in 1993.
The governmental printing houses have altered their past practice by requiring some of its private customers
to remain completely current on their bills. These include La Nation and its Arabic-language sister weekly, alHourria, private papers that favored the National Contract (see above) and wrote critically of the 1995 presidential
elections. Neither has been able to resume publication since December 1996, when the Algiers Printing Press (SIA)
refused to print the papers until they paid their debts.
84
La Nation had been suspended at least nine times between January 1995 and December 1996. Its owner was
charged with "endangering state security," following an interview with a FIS leader Abdelkader Omar in August
1995. No official reasons were given for the suspensions. In one instance, the issue carried a large report on human
rights in Algeria co-published with Le Monde Diplomatique in March 1996. In another instance the issue of AlHourria featured a review of a book on human rights in Algeria.
Algeria's four operating printing presses are all state-run. The sole private press, Sodipresse, was closed
down in April, less than three months after its launching. One owner, Saad Lounas, was arrested on April 10, 1997
and sentenced to thirty months in prison on April 28 for allegedly writing a check with insufficient funds to the
81
Reporters sans frontieres, "Algerie: la guerre civile a huis clos," p. 22.
82
Amnesty International Urgent Action, UA 118/97 "Disappearance/Fear of torture," (AI Index: MDE 28/06/97), April 28,
1997.
" Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press in 1996, A Worldwide Sun'ey by the Committee to Protect Journalists.
(New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 1997).
84
A statement issued by the two papers at the time protested the move on grounds that a sixty-day grace period was generally
granted.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
31
June 1997, Vol.9, No. 4 (E)
�public-sector Algiers Printing Press (SIA). Lounas lias appealed his sentence. He is also editor of an Arabiclanguage daily El-Oumma, which has not been published since the closure of Sodipresse.
El-Oumma and the Arabic-language weekly Ech-Chorouk, which was also printed by Sodipresse, both favor
a political dialogue with Islamists. Journalists at El-Oumma charged that Lounes's arrest was meant to "wreck the
first private printing venture and to prevent the publication of El-Oumma at all cost." Whatever the merits of the
charges against Lounas, we note that, as a result ofthe collapse of Sodipresse, the Algerian media are again without
a private printing press.
85
Ech-Chorouk's editors have been charged some twenty times in the last five years for "insulting personalities
of authority" and "inciting rebellion," according to editor-in-chief Ali Fodhil. At the same time, three members
of the staff, two of them women, were killed since 1995 in attacks blamed widely on the armed Islamist groups.
Journalist Malika Sabour was killed in May 1995 after receiving death threats in the name of the GIA. Khadija
Dahnani, a graduate in Islamic theology who wrote political and economic stories critical of the government, was
killed near her home in December 1995. Hamaoui Mokrane, marketing director at Ech-Chorouk, was killed in
October 1996 by gunmen who fired at his car. The government said security forces later shot dead his killers.
86
The state-run publishing house Entreprise Nationale Algerienne de Presse cited unpaid bills when, in
February 1997, it stopped printing Ech-Chorouk, which claims a circulation of 250,000. The paper filed a suit
claiming ENAP had not honored its contract, and in March a civil court ordered ENAP to resume printing EchChorouk. An appeals court upheld the ruling at the end of April, but two weeks later the paper was still not in print.
In May, Fodhil, the editor, told us, "The ENAP has given us no reason. They can't point to a debt because the court
has ruled that there was none. So for the moment we are still suspended."
87
Broadcast media
Algeria's twenty-eight million citizens are spread out over the second largest country on the African
continent. The illiteracy rate is estimated to be 43 percent. These features reinforce the importance of broadcast
media as sources of political news. In Algeria, all radio and television stations are government-controlled. Stations
broadcast in the Arabic, French and Tamazight languages.
88
The 1990 press code requires in Article 10 that broadcast media "assure equal access to expression for
currents of opinion and thought," and "under no circumstances [are] to take into consideration influences or
considerations that would compromise the accuracy of information." Since 1992, radio and especially television have
strayed far from these principles, becoming more like the government mouthpieces they were during the quartercentury of one-party rule. A columnist in the daily El-Watan recently observed, "Censorship has hit television hard,
not only with regard to images of violence but also any images that are not in line with the official discourse. The
rare "moments of truth" serve political or electoral calculations; they respond generally to concerns about timing but
never to a simple concern to inform."
89
85
AFP, Algiers, April 19, 1997.
86
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, March 31. 1997.
87
Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 15, 1997.
88
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook
http://www. odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/ag.htm.)
89
1996 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1996). (URL:
A. Bali!, "Misere mediatique," El-Watan, May 11, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
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June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�Many Algerians watch European television broadcasts via satellite, and sometimes first hear news about their
country on foreign channels, especially concerning security issues or the positions of political parties critical of the
authorities. Radio remains somewhat livelier and more varied in its political coverage. Interviews with and coverage
of opposition figures and parties are more frequent.
The government assigned the National Independent Elections Observation Commission (CNISEL) the task
of apportioning airtime on broadcast media for each of the parties and independent candidates competing in the
elections. The election law states, in Article 175, that the CNISEL is to allocate radio and television time "according
to the respective number of candidates presented by each political party or group of political parties." Independent
candidates may qualify for air time by forming groups among themselves.
The 1997 elections law sets guidelines for the conduct ofthe campaign. Some of those guidelines infringe
on the right to freedom of expression. Article 174 says, "The use of foreign languages during the electoral campaign
is forbidden." The Constitution says in Article 3 that "Arabic is the national and official language." A significant
percentage of the population speak a Berber language, Tamazight, that is unrelated to Arabic. Some Algerians
consider French to be their first language. The election law also requires candidates to refrain from "any disloyal,
dishonorable, illegal or immoral gesture, attitude, action or behavior," (Article 181) The wording of this prohibition
is disturbingly broad.
Human Rights Watch is aware of at least two instances in which the CNISEL ordered parties to alter the
content of campaign materials submitted for television broadcast. FFS spokesman Ali Rachedi said that his party
was asked to change a five-minute message that one of its leaders, Seddik Debaili, had recorded for broadcast May
16 because he used the term "coup d'etat" when referring to the military-backed cancellation of elections in 1992 and
forced resignation of the president. Rachedi charged that while there was no censor at the recording studio, recorded
material submitted to television by the parties was presented to the Interior Ministry for approval.
90
The CNISEL also censored a television message by the PT, a small leftist party that supports.the National
Contract platform. The PT said it had learned only through a report in El-Watan daily that its spot would not be
broadcast on May 15, 1997. According to a PT communique issued the same day, the newspaper reported that PT
president Louisa Hanoune's spots, recorded by Algerian television "will not be broadcast...That was the CNISEL's
decision after it was notified by the interior ministry that the contents of two recordings by the leader of the PT were
judged to consist of an attack on a public institution." The offending phrase apparently was Hanoune's reference to
the events of January 1992 as a "military coup."
Flowever, candidates, in the context of their allocated airtime, have been able to make statements that
directly challenge government policy, including the exclusion of the FIS from the political process. For example,
one week later, Ms. Hanoune appeared in a television campaign spot warning that Algeria's conflict cannot end
without the participation of all parties. "Therefore, all politicians, including the FIS leaders, should sit down and try
to find a peaceful solution..."
91
The CNISEL issued a directive that, beginning one week befo.-e the launch of the electicp campaign, the
media would cease covering the official activities of cabinet ministers running in the elections to avoid giving them
an advantage over their rivals. The newly formed pro-government RND includes at least eight cabinet ministers,
among them the prime minister, and interior minister. All are election candidates. Other parties, such as the MSP,
also have government ministers running in the elections.
90
Human Rights Watch telephone interview, May 16, 1997.
91
Algiers ENTV, May 21, 1997, as reported by FBIS, Near East and South Asia, May 21, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
33
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�During Human Rights Watch's two-week mission in Algiers, state television featured news, public
announcements and talk shows concerning the elections. Before and after the 7 p.m. newscast, viewers were urged
to fulfill their duty by going to the ballot box. "This is an appointment with history and an extraordinary operation,"
said Laamri BePArbi, an official from the Culture Ministry explaining the role of media in a program on the
forthcoming elections. "The president's assurance that the state media is used for public welfare is a good guarantee
that television will be deployed in total neutrality" for the elections. The television was also filled with favorable
coverage of cabinet ministers and government achievements, such as a new state-run natural gas project that
promised employment opportunities, and programs to assist camel herders in remote desert areas. Political party
leaders were shown only infrequently on newscasts. These included MSP head Mahfoudh Nahnah, who was shown
urging his party members to go to the polls.
92
93
Some parties complained that they got no television coverage whatsoever in the months leading up to the
elections. Seddik Debaili, first secretary of the FFS, a major political party that supports the National Contract (see
above), said that state television (ENTV) did not cover two of their regional congresses early April. "The
independent press reported our meetings, and we had interviews on the Arabic and French radio stations, but ENTV
did not cover our meetings, although they were invited," he said. He added that the pro-govemment RND's founding
congress had been covered extensively.
94
While allocating campaign airtime to parties fielding candidates, including those belonging to opposition
parties, Algerian television tends not to cover events organized by political groupings whose views are in disfavor
with the authorities. The Call for Peace group (see above) held a meeting March 17 in a movie theater that was
attended by a crowd that the group estimated at 1,000. The meeting was significant if only because it was the first
time such a meeting was allowed since the movement launched its petition in November 1996 calling for broad-based
political dialogue. Local independent papers, as well as some foreign press, covered the event, which was supported
by many intellectuals and public personalities, but television did not report it, according to Salima Ghezali, one of
the signatories of the Call for Peace and the editor of La Nation weekly.
95
Opposition parties reserved their strongest objections for the high media profile of the RND candidates who
are also sitting cabinet ministers, and the extensive television coverage they received in the two months preceding
the official campaign. The RCD Secretary General Said Saadi, who ran against President Zeroual in the presidential
elections, was quoted by El-Watan on May 5 saying the government's exploitation of Algerian Television (ENTV)
was "truly a scandal." Ben Younis Ammara, public relations director of the RCD, told us on April 10, "All the
political parties have indirectly begun their campaign, but the problem is the government's relationship with the
RND. It is the party of the system. It gets wide coverage in the media, on television, its founding members include
television announcers and personalities, and there are a number of cabinet ministers who will also join."
96
Algerian radio, generally free from government influence, has often featured independent political figures
who do not normally get time on television. This exposure has increased in the weeks before the election campaign.
FFS representatives were interviewed in four different programs on the Arabic and French-language radio stations
92
ENTV program on elections, March 31, 1997, as registered by Human Rights Watch.
93
ENTV 17:00 news, April 10, 1997, as registered by Human Rights Watch.
94
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
95
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
96
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 10, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
34
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
�97
in which they talked about their party politics and the forthcoming elections, according to the FFS's Seddik Debaili.
Other parties also got more radio time than usual. But some viewed that development warily. The RCD's Said Saadi
noted, "The radio is always monopolized (by the government) except when it's time for elections. This also happened
before the presidential elections, when we witnessed lively media coverage but after the elections, everything went
back to the same old pattern and we're afraid this will happen again."
98
***
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance
of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories
of the Helsinki accords. It is supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. It
accepts no government funds, directly or indirectly. The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele
Alexander, development director; Cynthia Brown, program director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance and administration
director; Robert Kimzey, publications director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director;
Susan Osnos, communications director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Wilder Tayler, general counsel; and Joanna Weschler,
United Nations representative. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the board and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair.
Its Middle East division was established in 1989 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Eric Goldstein is the acting executive director; Joe Stork is the
advocacy director; Virginia N. Sherry is associate director; Clarissa Bencomo, Elahe Sharifpour-Hicks, and Nejla
Sammakia are research associates; Gamal Abouali is the Orville Schell fellow; Shira Robinson and Awali Samara
are associates. Gary Sick is the chair of the advisory committee and Lisa Anderson and Bruce Rabb are vice chairs.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Gopher Address:.gopher://gopher.humanrights.org:5000/l 1/int/hrw
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to majordomo@igc.apc.org with "subscribe
hrw-news" in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).
97
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 9, 1997.
98
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 10, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
35
June 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (E)
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(F.8().l) The Silenced Kurds, 10/96, 38|>i>.
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(2076) Human Rights 'Watch World Report 1997, 12/96,116])]).
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�FEB. 19.1998
fSO.526
e:24PlM
P.S
Central nidligpncc Agency
' Wul ngon.aC2050$
18 F:bruary 1998
Mr. Jeff DeLaurentis
Director, Ihter-American AflFairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Room 361
Washington, D.C. 20504
Via Fax: 202-456-9130
Dear Jeff,
This is with respect to ourdiscussions as to methods we might take to
accommodate the concerns of variousreqv esters regarding the redactions in the
docui lents. Such requesters, as you are aware,
Guatemalan/Honduras human rights
include Dr. Leo Valladares, the Honduran luman Rights Commissioner, and the family
and religious associates of Father Carney.
We propose to provide an "oral Vi ughn" session at which time the requesters
could identify documents and/or redactions of particular interest and a senior government
representative (probably the undersigned) i 'ould orally provide a detailed-as-possible
explanation ofthe information redacted am I the legal basis for that redaction. Invited to
the session would be the individual request :r(s) as well as their legal or other
representative. While notes (but not tape r wordings) would be permitted, we would ask
that the requesters) and their counsel cons der the proceeding to be in the nature of a
privileged, confidential settlement negotiati 3n. More specifically in this regard, the parties
would be free to share or make any use oft ie information provided and would only
pledge not to make specificreferenceto th< fact that it was provided in the context of an
"oral Vaughn" or otherwise use the infora ation in any pending or prospective litigation
(e.g., to argue that the government had war red a privilege by virtue of the discussions); all
parties to the proceeding would sign a stant ard confidentiality agreement. Lastly, to
facilitate such sessions, we would ask that t ie documents and redactions of concern be
identified in writing at least several days pri or to the meeting.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
D O C U M K N T NO.
AND TYPE
001. letter
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
02/18/1998
To Jeff DeLaurentis [partial] (1 page)
RESTRICTION
P3/b(3)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [1]
2009-1295-F
ke2083
RESTRICTION CODES
PrcsitlcntiHl Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
IM
1*2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) o f t h e FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) o f t h e FOIA]
National Security ClassiUcd Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA|
1*5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
I'fi Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�FEB. 19.1998
B:24Rri
NO.
p.3
For background infoimation, ihay advise the requesters That the "Vaughn "
you
requirement arisesfromthe seminal D.C.
('irctdt Court decision in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 4 U.S. 977 (1974), where Judge Wilkey
5
devised an indexing system to allow both
(jourts and plaintiffs to review an agency's
decision to withhold infoimation
wilhout t aving to actually inspect each bit of information
withheld. As later elaborated, a "Vaughn
index" should adequately describe each
withheld record or deletion by identifying document by type and each redaction by
he
location as well as describing each redacti with as much information as possible without
i
thwarting the purpose of the exemption(s)An "oral Vaughn" - as we propose - is
essentially a creation- of the FOIA bar for t|ie
expeditious resolution of FOIA cases using
an informal oral process as contrasted tie more formal written process of describing
to
i
deletions. I am confident that all parties have participated in such sessions in the past
who
would regard them as a success: the ster typically receives a more complete
reque
understanding of the redaction(s) and theovemment avoids the very time-consuming and
I
costly process of creating lengthy, formal, sometimes less-than-iiluminating, written
nd
court filings.
While the requesters at issue are in litigation with the Government, we are
;nct
prepared, as an accommodation to them light of their humanitarian interests, to extend
in
If
the offer of an "oral Vaughn"^ at this timeyou desire, you may convey the foregoing
information and offer to the concerned lestersand ask that they contact me to
req
schedule a mutually agreeable time. I may be reached a^7^»^y^T;^j^
COI
Sine rely yours,
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H IN GTO N
Dear Dr. Wiesel:
Thank you f o r your F^cerrt l e t t e r r e g a r d i n g -the—ftn
d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s r e l a t e d t o t h e Myrna Ma£k case m
Guatemala. I a p p r e c i a t e your e n c l o s i n g t h e Academy/s r e p o r t on
the 1992 m i s s i o n t o Guatemala o f the Committee on /Human R i g h t s .
We understand t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l s ye-w—r^-^er -to i / i ypur l e t t e r may
have r e l e v a n c e t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n . o f Ms. Mack'sr calse. We are
cu-£^eR-t4-y working w i t h the e-eteWft-t agencies/to^review*' '-y=feTiT
again t o see whether - t h o i r - d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o r / m a y be p o s s i b l e . We
share your commitment t o b r i n g t o j u s t i c e / a n y o n e who may be
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Ms. Mack's death.
l
Thank you f o r your i n t e r e s t i n t h i s i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r
/
Sincerely/
Sami/el R. Berger
As/istant t o the President
:or N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Torsten Wiesel, MD.,FRS
Chair, Committed on Human Rights
N a t i o n a l Academy o f Sciences ,
2101 C o n s t i t u t i o n Avenue, N 7-'-- •
W
Washington/ D.C.,20418
0
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
002. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Re: [Algerian Civilian Massacres] (7 pages)
01/23/1998
KESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [I]
2009-1295-F
kc2083
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
1*4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e F O I . \ |
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the F O I A j
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the F O I A |
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�JAN. -30' 98(FRI) 16:00 D L
R
TEL:2026479519
P. 00]
United States Department of State
BUREAU OF D M C A Y H M N RIGHTS
EORC, UA
A D LABOR
M
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION C O V E R S H E E T
D a t e
I j30
Time:
TRANSMITTED
Name:
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F
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Pages Transmitted:
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Number:
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plus cover
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JsJSC^
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COMMENTS:
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Telephone:
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
D O C U M E N T NO.
AND TYPE
003. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/1998
Algeria Human Rights Report (5 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian AfTairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Box Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [1]
2009-1295-P
ke2083
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. SS2(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the F O l A |
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the F O I A |
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation o f
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOI A|
National Seeuritj Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA)
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) o f t h e PR A]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) o f t h e PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
004. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
01/29/1998
Re: Algeria Update (6 pages)
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Busby, Scott)
OA/Dox Number: 1889
FOLDER TITLE:
Algeria [I]
2009-1295-1ke2083
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Krcedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
\'3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) o f t h e FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A |
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) o f t h e FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) o f t h e FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the F O I A |
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) o f t h e PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) o f t h e PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) o f t h e PRAJ
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) o f t h e PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N . D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
UNCLASSIFIED
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET
Number
of
pages
TELEPHONE:
FAX NUMBER:
+
202-456
cover
9171
—
202-456-9170
TO
PHONE
FAX
NUMBER
1. "SccA-V C^cJ^-^j
2.
3.
5.
6.
tOO/TOOl?]
3AIIV1SID31 DSti
0£T69£tZ0ZO
OS:OT
86/T0/S0
�II l..t
F \M5\HASTFLM-IASTFL.048
IDiVni lON'i.iRF.ss
•_ l^ SKssinv
;
H. R S
E,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPKESENTATJVES
Mr-. [LAST1M;> nf n.iritlt! siiLmivt.-ii ilu- ('iiilcn^inL; i w i n t i u t , ; ulnrh n-.i.i-i'['i-i r r j in l iu- < 'i'mitiirr<-<' "ii
,
r _
.
—
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with
respect to the spiraling violence m Algeriii.
\Micreas on January 1 1, 1992, the miliiary bucked Government of Alg-eria franeeled r.hc second romul of p<irliamf?ntarv eleetions that the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front;
was expected to win;
Whereas 1992 was the start of an Islamic insurgency;
Whereas, recently, violence became increasingly widespread
and barbaric;
Whereas tlie elections were dominated by fundamentalists
who wanted tu establish an Islamic state;
Whereas the interaational community has witnessed mass
murders and violations of human rights in Algeria;
3AIIV7SID31
DSN
OLTRWtrnrn
�F:\M5\UASTFL\HASTFL.046
'2
WTicreas acts of brutal viulence have left thousands of innocent civilians, particularly women and young children,
dead or injured;
Whereas there has been little to no progress in brokering a
cease-fire after many years of slaughter;
Whereas the Algerian Government refuses to allow an international inquiry into the massacres; and
Wliercas the world commuiuty must not tolerate crimes
against humanity or any other violations of international
law: Now, therefore, be it.
1
2
3
4
Resolved, That the House of Representatives—
(1) strongly condemns the atrocities being carried out in Algeria;
(2) condemns the perpetrators of violence and
5
other crimes against humanity and violations of Cun-
6
damental human rights in Algeria;
7
(3) condemns those who are inciting violence
8
and arges the warring parties to reach an immediate
9
cessation to the violence in Algeria;
10
(4) urges the Government in Algeria to take all
11
necessary and lawful steps to avoid more violence in
12
the future;
13
(5) urges the Algerian leadership io be more
14
open and to cooperate with international inquiries
15
into all violence;
�F\M5\HASTFL\HASTFL.048
I l.l-.*
:i
1
(6) encourageh! the Algerian authorities to act
2
more effectively against the ongoing violence that
3
lias plagued Algeria for more than fi years:
4
(7) urges the Government of Algeria to fulfill
5
the basic functions of any government to provide for
6
the security, safety, and welfare of all Algerian c-iti-
7
zens; and^
^
feoA
b
/v^Jhf
<5^ s|) Q&A
8
(8) urges the United States to continue to call
9
for national reconciliation and a more democratic
10
course in Algeria and to encourage the Algiers rc-
11
gime to have a dialogue with all who renounce vjo-
12
lence.
FOO/frOOlg
0IT69SK0ZO
OS-OT
86/^0/20
�0J1B/RD.I
ID:202-395-5691
«?/3
0'
FEB OS'gS
18:20 No.017 P.Ol
5"
�OBR.
M/DI
•
10:202-395-5691
FEB 03'98
18 = 20 No.017 P.02
STATEMENT OF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN At't'AIRS
RONALD E. NEUMANN
BEFOKt THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
FEBRUARY 5, 1997
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members
of the Subcommit-.r.**. j
honored to bo invited to moet
with you this afternoon to discuss the country where I was
proud to represent the United Ctatea as Ambaesddox- for three
years.
a m
The news these days from Algeria i s appalling. The
world rightly reacts in shock and horror to the brutal
massacres occurring on a daily basis. The United States
vigorously condemns the atrocities being eoitmitted against
innocent men, women and children in Aloeria. We extend nur
deepest sympathies to the victims of these crimes. Our
Ambassador to Algiers Cameron H m recently v i s i t s d the cito
ue
of one of the massacres to express solidarity with the
Algerian psoplo and to raitcrata our condemnation of
terrorism. We c a l l upon a l l Algerians to denounce and stop
the viol«nco
now.
Me also c d i l upon the government o£ Algeria to do more
to f u l f i l l i t s duty to protect i t s citizens within the rule
o? .law and respect tor human rights. We continue to believe
that the Islamic extremist organization, the GIA, i s
responsible for the great majority of the atrocities.
You
w i l l r e c a l l that in October 1997, we included this vicious
group in our designation of principal t e r r o r i s t
organizations. Thp. government has a right to protect itoelf
and a duty to protect i t s citizens against this bloodthirsty
group, COftftistant w i t h the r u l e of law.
Ilowavai:, son*
security forces personnel may also be involved to some
extent in some of the kllliuyt'. Tha situation i s complex
and as long as there continue to be differing accounts of
what i s going on, and many questions about why c i v i l i a n s are
not bettor protected, the need for greater openness remains.
Along with many in the international community, we have
repeatedly asked the Algerian government for more
transparency--to let respected organ.i.7ftt.i ons conduct
objective, factual studies into the massacres and other
human rights enn.-nrns in Algeria. Towards thoa* ende, wo
have suggested to the government that f a c i l i t a t i n g v i s i t s by
internation*! non-governm&ntal orgenieationa would not
violate Algerian sovereignty since such groups have visited
�DMB/RQI
10:202-395-5691
FEB 03'98
18:21
No.017 P.03
before. We welcomed the Algerian government's intention to
invite the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Executions,
and anotner on Torture to v i s i t . We have urged these
organizations to go to Algeria to perform such fact-finding
missions. The real issue here, however, i s increased
transparency.
I underline this because i t cannot be
obtained without the willing cooperation of the Algerian
government and even then objective reporting w i l l be a
d i f f i c u l t task. Therefore i t i s important for us to keep
the focus on transparency—that i s , the quality of
information—not the particular means by which that
transparency io attain«d.
Transparency ia alao iuipux icml roi ihw GovaxiuneiiL' a
c r e d i b i l i t y within the international conununity. We, along
with others in the international community, continue to
impress this point on Algiers in our respective dialogues.
We think i t i s the advice of a friend. However, the
Algerian government has vet to respond positively or
definitively. Recently, they also rejected offers made by
the European Union of hrnnanitflrlan assistance for the
victims.
As tragic as the situation i s , i t i s important to
recuynize, and I am scd to t e l l you, that the violence in
Algeria w i l l not end tomorrow. There are no "quick fixes."
More needs to be done to protect c i v i l i a n s , but the violence
in Algeria i s the result of complicated p o l i t i c a l , economic
and security factors. Each w i l l need to be addressed to
bring the country to peace. While the elements are complex,
the broad lines of what needs to be done are not.
A longer-term solution must combine p o l i t i c a l and
economic reform. Consequently, our policy in ftlgairlA i s
properly a long-term one that encourages the growth of
democratic institutiona and tho liberalization of the
economy. The form of such changes i s properly an Algerian
concern because only Alye^lcinw w i l l be able to solve
Algeria's c r i s i s . At the same time, we strongly believe
that p o l i t i c a l retorm must be credible to Algerians
themselves. They, not we, must believe that the reforms
open the way for people to affect how they are governed.
Only i f this happens w i l l there be a broadening of
participation and support for the state so that extremists
and terrn-r-T *t.« w i l l be isolated and, eventually, eliminated.
We continue to believe that: a l l Algerians who renounce
terrorism and violence should ba able to participatP. Ry
the same logic, we believe that the economic system must
move away from state ownership and control and toward
privatization and market reform which encourage the f u l l
�QMB/RDI
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FEB 03'98
18 = 21 No. 017 P.04
P u r t i c i p a t i ' t m o f A l g e r i a n s i n t h e econcmic j i f t s u£
ineir
ccuntry.
When' he was elected i n 1995, Piresident Zeroual pledged
to support a p o l i c y o i economic and pc.Utic&l reform,
freedom of the press and development of tho rule of law.
The u.S. strongly supports t h i s policy as enunciated by
Zeroual, I want t o restate today our support: for a
p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n even as I make clsar that the r e s u l t s on
all
o f t h e abov» f r o n t s r:>i..9e quest i o n s f o r us.
W« hopo t o
see a more d e f i n i t i v e cojuir.itjnent i n action t o the goals
Prosiciant
7.aroual h*a a r t i c u l n t o d .
In the l a s t four years, the AlgetidJiti iiave elected a
President, a Parliament and l o c a l governnenta. These
elections replaced a r u l i n g m i l i t a r y council and an
appointed l e g i s l a t u r e with the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure of a
mixed Prasidential/Parliamentary system. .Tt i s not yet a
democracy, but neither i s i t the one-parry stato of the
past. A balanced appraisal i s complex, but I want t o make a
few central points. The November 19SS mnlri-randidate
P r e s i d e n t i a l elections were considerad by observers and the
opposing candidates to hsvo produced the real e l e c t i o n of a
l e g i t i m a t e President, Liamine aeroual.
The national l e g i s l a t i v e elections held i n June 1997
wtsrti dlsu bruadly leprBsentatlvu and Algeria i n v i t e d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l observers. There were allegations of fraud,
xet t h i s h i s t o r i c election, while by no means completely
free and f a i r , produced the f i r s t multi-party parliament i n
Algerian h i s t o r y , including a wide spectrum of opposition
voices. The following c i t y end p r o v i n c i a l council
elections, i n October of 1997, had no i n t e r n a t i o n a l
obRRrvftrw. Thftr* W - R widespread allegations* of fraud and
P^
vote-rigging. Thfet results from thtse elections -lent
opposition members i n t o the etreete ir. protect. Some of
these protests may be overstated.
Whatever the precise
f a c t s , the i n d i r e c t l y tslected upper house j.6 clucirly
as
representative of the o v e r a l l body p o l i t i c i n Algeria es is.
the Lower house.
Despite theye d i f f i c u l t i e s i n p u t t i n g these new
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o place, chare have been indications that
the newly-elected lower 'riouse i s taking i t s l e g i s l a t i v e and
oversight duties appropriiitely seriously. For RXAmpi*, -h«
l e g i s l a t u r e established, parliamentary commissions t o
investigate questions of parlitwMr.r.tary immunity and f r * u d i n
the l o c a l and municipal election as well as a commission t o
focus cn the internal! cacurity c i t u a t i o n . Recently, the
Parliament went on " s t r i k e " i n order t o get the government
�QMB/RDI
10:202-395-5691
FEB 03'98
18:22 NO.01.7.P.05
to respond to questions about the securily siLuation and
were successful in getting the Prime Minister to address
their questions.
Although Algeria's p o l i t i c a l reform thus far has had
mixed results, this newly-elected multi-party parliament
could prove to be a significant vehicle for change in the
long run. I t has the potential to eventually funrtinn as a
v i t a l forum both for expressing conflicting viewpoints and
fnr worVing out se-naibla compromises. More ngeda to be done
by the Algerians to strengthen these new institutions and i t
ie here that wc arc foouoing our p o l i t i c e l efforts and
looking for ways to help. As an immediate step, we are
sponsoring a group of six. mewly-elecLed Algerian
parliamentarians representing a l l of the major p o l i t i c a l
parties for a v i s i t to the unitea states to learn about
democratic institutions. They arrive in Washington later
this week. As part of their program, we anticipate that
their v i s i t w i l l include meetings with Members of Congress.
We hope that this w i l l be the f i r s t of many such exchange
v i s i t s , and would 1 i k». to aep, i f possible, a delegation of
Members v i s i t Algeria to demonstrate further our commitment
to i t s nascent
democracy.
We
a n t i c i p a t a uoing funding from
the Middle East Regional Democracy fund to finance
a c t i v i t i e s and training supporting thetfevelopiutJuLul
democratic governance.
Economic reform i s equally essential for the long-term
well-being of the Algerian people. However, the balance
sheet on the economy i s also mixed. Four years ago, the
Algerian economy was a shambles: facing huge international
debt and f a l l i n g o i l prices, the government embarked on »n
IMF-supported program. We strongly supported this step and
we also supported ft subssguant generous rescheduling of
public debt, including U.S. debt, and a strong World Bank
program. Dor.pinc unovon performance of the domestic
economy, the government has balanced i t s international
a c c o u n t s and
the IMF
ptogram w i l l
complete next month.
To change a s t a t i s t system into a market economy i s a huge
task. The government legislated reform to encourage foreign
investment. But state-owned industry and banking sectors
continue to impede this reform. The housing shortage
worsens yearly, and unemployment has reached 30 percent and
i s growing (and much higher amongst youth). We have
supported the continuation of U.S. invesf.mmnt in
hydrocarbons essential for Algeria. Other investment may be
possible. We strongly support the decision of a U.S. bank
to open in Algiers. Business i s possible in some areas and
with duo caution. But, ooonomio chonge in Algeria i s ft race
against time that the government w i l l lose unless i t picks
�QMB/RDI
10:202-395-5691
FEB 03'98
18:23 No. 017_P.06
up i t e pace of liberalization, Thia reform i& esbttjiL-ial to
treat the massive unemployment and social desperation which
feed extrdiiuisui.
The Algerians want to do more business with American
firms and, despite security concerns, U.S. firms have
concluded major deals in the petroleum sector. In time, we
are hopeful that the economy w i l l grow in ot.hwr sectors as
well, such as housing and construction. We are considering
technical trainirirj tn help th* Algerians with their current
housing c r i s i s . We continue to press the government to move
towards a market eyetem which could provide adequate
housing, food, and employment for a l l Algerians, thereby
weakening the appeal of extremisui. We also continue to
encourage the Algerians to expand their private sector and
dismantle the state controls which s t i f l e i t . I t i s the
private sector that in the long term w i l l produce
sustainable growth.
Labor organizations, professional associations, women's
groups, human rights groups, a free pr*** ^ d humanitarian
organizations already active in Algeria are also agents for
constructiv* change and for the rule of law. Thcoc things
exist. They are a tribute to the Algerian people and hold
the hope of the future. And they are a l l f i a y i l e . We are
working to promote these burgeoning organizations and the
CjiuwUi of c i v i l society in Algeria. We continue to
encourage improvements in c i v i l society, including
strengthening the rule of law and furthering freedom of the
press. Algerian journalists of widely different p o l i t i c a l
views t e l l me our support i s a major source of encouragement
to them. We w i l l continue. The earliament w i l l ri«h»t.i.ng
a new information law this year which we w i l l follow closely
as i t may gr*»flMy * f » . the f » d i > of tho pr*£s. We w i l l
ffcr
r*oi
continue also to bring leading Algerian writers, judges,
human rights workers and othorc to vinit here and I hope you
and your staffs w i l l meet them.
Mr. Chairman, in closing today I want to be clear: the
challenge i s for the Algerian government and people to
attain their own goals. Algeria i s a country of great
promise in the throes of a long c r i s i s . Any action we take
is meant to be supportive and in the direction of greater
p o l i t i c a l openness, respect for human rights,
marqinalizetion of extremism, elimination of terrorism anrt
p o l i t i c a l violence, of market reform, and of hope for the
citizena of AlgariA.
�14=33 JAN 22, 1998 ID: RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR TEL NO: 202-667-9070
4
#4706 PAGE: 1/4
•
RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER
OF REFORM JUDAISM
The Religious Action Center (RAC) pursues socialpstice and religious liberty by mobilizing
the American Jewish community and serving as its advocate in the nation's capital.
The Religious Action Center is the Washington otfice ofthe
Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central
Conference of American Rabbis, representing I.SmHtion
Reform Jews and 1,800 Reform rabbis in 875
congregations ttmughout North America.
2027 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone (202) 387- 2800
Fax (202) 667- 9070
http://rj.org/rac • rac@uahc.org
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET
To:
Eric Schwartz
NCC
From: Mark Pelavin
Date:
Thursday, Jan 22, 1998
Pages:
4
Memo:
I thought you might be interested in seeing this letter we
put together with nine other religious groups to Secretary
Albright. Please feel free to call if you have any
questions or comments. Thanks.
Rabbi David Saperstein
Director and Counsel
David S. Davidson
Chairperson
Commission on Social Action
of Reform Judaism
Mark J. Pelavin
Associate Director
Leonard Fein
Director
Commission on Social Action
of Reform Judaism
�14:3b JAN 22, 1998 ID: RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR TEL NO: 202-667-9070
ft
#4706 PAGE: 2/4
RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER
OF REFORM JUDAISM
The Religious Action Center pursues social justice and religious liberty by mobilizing the
American Jewish community and serving as its advocate in the nation's capital
2027 Massachusetts Ave.. NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone (202) 387- 2800
Fax (202) 667- 9070
January 21, 1998
Secretary of State Madeline Albright
State Department
2201 CSt.NW
Washington, D C 20520
Dear Secretary Albnght,
On behalf of the undersigned religious groups representing a diverse segment of the American
population, we are writing to express our dismay and outrage at the recent massacres in Algeria.
As religious groups, we are particularly disturbed by the hundreds of killings which have occurred
during the holy month of Ramadan, beginning on December 30, 1997. Each subsequent day
brings horrifying accounts of massacres, including the slaughter of over 100 people yesterday
while praying in a mosque. In the six years since the Algerian military canceled elections, over
75,000 innocent people have been mutilated, tortured and killed as the Islamic fundamentalists
have tried to gain power from the secular, military government. As Americans, and as people of
faith, we cannot remain silent. That these killings have been done, a least in part, in the name of
religion makes it even more imperative for us to speak out.
Men, women and children live in fear in Algeria, hoping their government will put an end to this
nightmare, and not enough is being done. The Algerian government has not effectively responded
to the latest killings, and insists that only "residual violence" remains from the Islamic
fundamentalists who oppose the secular government. While the facts are uncertain, it is clear that
a thorough investigation is necessary to develop a strategy in order to end this violence. The
government has recently made movement toward allowing an international inquiry into the
violence, and we tiilly endorse this measure.
We support the Administration's efforts in encouraging outside observers to investigate the
killings in Algeria, and we urge our government to continue this pressure. The Bible admonishes
us that we cannot "sit idly by the blood of our neighbors" (Leviticus 19:16). The U.S. and the
international community cannot turn a blind eye to these the massacres, but rather we must try to
protect the innocent citizens who are suffering at the hands ofthe internal power struggle between
�14=39 JAN 22, 1998 ID: RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR TEL NO: 202-667-9070
#4706 PAGE: 3/4
the current government and the Islamic fundamentalists, beginning at least with providing the kind
of accurate information and attention that international observers can provide.
While the U.S. cannot be the only peacekeeper in the international sphere working to secure
peace and the protection of human rights, it is imperative that we not become numb to the pain
and suffering of others and turn our backs to those who need our help. History is replete with
examples ofthe suffering that occurs when the world turns its back on evil. Let us, please, not
allow that to happen again.
We stand ready to assist you in any way we can in responding to this urgent humanitarian crisis.
Sincerely,
Rabbi David Saperstein
Director, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
Rev. Drew Christiansen, S.J.
Director, Office of International Justice and Peace,
United States Catholic Conference
Sarrae Crane
Director of Social Action and Public Policy, United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism
Ann Delorey
Legislative Director, Church Women United
Dr. Thomas White Wolf Fassett
General Secretary, General Board of Church and Society
Dr John Graz
General Secretary, International Religious Liberty Association
Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory
Director, Washington Office, Presbyterian Church (USA)
'Heather Nolen
Coordinator, Church of the Brethren Washington Office
Rev. Dr Albert M Pennybacker
Associate General Secretary for Public Policy, National Council of Churches
Rev Meg. A Riley
Director, WashingtonFriends CommitteeUniversalist Association of Congregations
Executive Secretary, Office, Unitarian on National Legislation
Joe Volk
�14=40 JAN 22, 1998 ID: RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR TEL NO: 202-667-9070
#4706 PAGE: 4/4
�r
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT; COPYRIGHT © 1 9 9 8 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH; ISSN: 1 0 8 0 - 6 1 9 9
February 1998
^
b ^ J 6 t a l U t ~h/ J
0-6ITU frrj I f f %
Vol. 10, No. 1(E)
ALGERIA
"NEITHER AMONG THE LIVING NOR THE DEAD":
STATE-SPONSORED "DISAPPEARANCES" IN ALGERIA
2
ABOUT THIS REPORT
2
SUMMARY
3
RECOMMENDATIONS
5
INTRODUCTION
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
8
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
10
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
12
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
13
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
17
APPENDICES
19
APPENDIX A
Letter from Human Rights Watch to President Liamine Zeroual
19
APPENDIX B
Statement by Human Rights Watch of September 26
29
APPENDIX C
Joint Statement of October 15 by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International
Federation of Human Rights and Reporters without Borders
31
APPENDIX D
Letter from Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra to Human Rights Watch
34
APPENDIX E
For families and friends of the "disappeared": What you can do
37
APPENDIX F
Form for submission of information to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
39
350
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
FIFTH AVENUE, 34TH FLOOI;
33
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�ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report was written by Nejla Sammakia and Eric Goldstein, respectively research associate and
research director at Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division. It is based in part on
research conducted in Algeria between March 30 and April 13, 1997, by Nejla Sammakia and Baher
Alashhab, a consultant to Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Hanny Megally, executive director
of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.
Human Rights Watch wishes to thank the many lawyers and relatives of "disappeared" persons who
provided us with information. For reasons related to their own security, some asked to remain anonymous.
Human Rights Watch also wishes to thank M. Kemal Rezag Bara, president of the official National Human
Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme, ONDH), for meeting with us to
discuss cases of suspected "disappearances."
SUMMARY
Among the many human rights tragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces. As with many acts of
violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been difficult to confirm. Armed
Islamist groups are responsible for abductions as well as deliberate killings of thousands of civilians.
However, there is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are carrying out "disappearances." They
are doing so on such a wide scale that the practice could persist only with the sanction ofthe highest levels
of authority. While Algerian officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing" in state custody,
Human Rights Watch is aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All PersonsfromEnforced Disappearance states in Article
7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political stability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances." International instruments that
Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain articles that, if fully implemented,
protect against enforced disappearances. However, since political violence became endemic in 1992, these
instruments and laws have been routinely flouted by Algeria's security forces. Persons are seized by forces
that often refuse to identify themselves; they are held in unacknowledged detention without being able to
contact family or lawyer, and beyond the time limit set forth in Algerian law. Detained in this fashion, they
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment.
In the hope of finding their "disappeared" relatives, families make the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, file missing-person complaints with official agencies, and seek help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Nacera Dutour told Human Rights Watch that when
she inquired about her "disappeared" son Amine Amrouche, a gendarmerie official told her in May 1997
that, in the gendarmerie's records, Amrouche's name "was neither among the living nor the dead."
Human Rights Watch
2
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of Algeria
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all persons arbitrarily detained.
•
Investigate allegations of unlawful and/or arbitrary detention, make public the results of such
investigations, and take legal measures, under the abuse of authority provisions of Article 51 of
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure, against those responsible for such offenses, and make public
these legal measures.
•
Ensure compliance by the security forces with international standards for the prevention of
"disappearances," including those contained in international agreements ratified by Algeria and
those safeguards against "disappearances" that are found in Algerian laws. These include enforcing
Algeria's Code of Criminal Procedure by
requiring officers holding a person to allow him or her to communicate
immediately and directly with relatives; and
punishing officers who are found responsible for holding persons in garde
a vue (pre-arraignment) detention for periods exceeding the limits provided
by law.
•
Implement recommendations made by the official National Human Rights Monitoring Body
(Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme, ONDH) by requiring that arresting authorities
identify themselves at the time of arrest or detention, and requiring that detainees be held only in
publicly recognized detention facilities.
•
Inform persons upon arrest of the reasons for their detention, and enable them to challenge promptly
the legality of that detention before an independent judicial authority, as provided by Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Algeria is a State Party.
•
Establish a public register listing the names and whereabouts of all persons detained by all branches
of the army, intelligence, and national and local security forces. The register should be updated on
a frequent and regular basis. It should include for each person the time of arrest, and specify by
which order and under what charge he or she was arrested. The register should be made available
without restriction to judges, lawyers, families and human rights organizations.
•
Ensure that the mechanisms set up by the Algerian authorities to respond to inquiries from families,
lawyers and nongovernmental organizations concerning the whereabouts and fate of persons
detained are speedy and responsive to their needs and are reviewed regularly for promptness.
«
Communicate to all military, intelligence and security forces that "disappearances" and torture will
not be tolerated, and that commanders who order or condone such actions will be prosecuted and,
if found guilty, punished according to the gravity of the crime of enforced "disappearance."
•
Publicize information about the official mechanisms by which victims of illegal detention can
exercise their enforceable right to compensation, as provided in Article 9(5) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Human Rights Watch
3
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�•
Allow access for international investigators, including those under United Nations auspices, to
examine allegations of responsibility and to make recommendations with respect to human rights
abuses by all parties.
To the Armed Opposition Groups
•
Cease and repudiate all deliberate attacks on and/or the abduction of civilians.
•
Release immediately and unconditionally all abducted civilians.
•
Investigate and remove from any position of authority those who are found to have participated in
the torture or ill-treatment, including rape and sexual abuse, or murder of abducted persons.
To the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
•
In light of the scope of the problem of "disappearances" in Algeria, seek to conduct a mission to
Algeria to research and prepare a report on the issue.
To the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
•
Lend political and logistical support to the activities of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances in its effort to address the situation in Algeria, including the preparation
of a comprehensive report.
•
Urge the government of Algeria to allow an independent investigation of human rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law by all parties in Algeria, organized by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights and including the
appropriate mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights.
To the European Union and Member States
•
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by armed opposition
groups.
•
Raise with the Algerian government, at the highest levels and as an urgent matter, the cases of
Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of the authorities.
•
Instruct member state embassies in Algiers to investigate the extent of "disappearances" in Algeria,
to pursue specific cases of "disappearances" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees
whose names are known.
•
Use all possible means, including the negotiations over the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreement with Algeria and linkage of financial assistance, to persuade the government of Algeria
to implement the recommendations in this report, including a full accounting concerning persons
arbitrarily detained and "disappeared," and publicly support such initiatives by the government.
•
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
To the Clinton administration
•
Publicly acknowledge at a high level and condemn actions by the Algerian authorities that result in
Human Rights Watch
4
•
'
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�the "disappearances" of Algerian citizens, as well as abductions carried out by armed opposition
groups.
•
Raise with the Algerian government the cases of Algerians who have "disappeared" at the hands of
the authorities.
•
Instruct the U.S. embassy in Algiers to increase its monitoring of "disappearances" in Algeria, to
pursue specific cases of "disappeared" with the authorities, and to seek access to detainees.
•
Use all possible means, including financial assistance and official guarantees for foreign
investments, to persuade the government of Algeria to implement the recommendations in this
report, including a full accounting concerning persons detained illegally and "disappeared," and
publicly support such initiatives by the government.
•
Support initiatives on Algeria at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the
convening of a special session on Algeria and the establishment of an international investigation into
human rights in Algeria.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1992, Algeria has been riven by a conflict between security forces and armed opposition
groups that call themselves Islamist. It has claimed at least 60,000 lives, many of them civilians. Under the
guise of fighting "terrorism," security forces have engaged in systematic torture, summary executions, and
arbitrary arrests with impunity. Armed groups have targeted for assassination individuals whom they viewed
as hostile to their religious-political agenda or supportive of the present government, and have carried out
a series of massacres of unarmed men, women and children in rural areas. In its reporting on the crisis in
Algeria, Human Rights Watch has consistently condemned violations of human rights and of humanitarian
law by all parties.
1
Among the many humanrightstragedies in Algeria has been the "disappearance" of more than one
thousand men and women since 1992, following their arrest by government forces.
Searching for their "disappeared" loved ones, families have made the rounds of police stations, jails
and courthouses, filed missing-person complaints with official agencies, and sought help through informal
channels such as freed prisoners or prison guards. When authorities have responded to their queries, it has
generally been to deny that the person is in custody. Some of the relatives ofthe "disappeared" have recently
taken to the streets, holding up photos of their missing fathers, sons, and brothers, demanding answers.
As with many acts of violence in Algeria, authorship of some cases of "disappearances" has been
difficult to confirm. Persons have been seized at their homes, in their workplaces, or in public places, by men
in plainclothes who refused to identify themselves or present a warrant, but who were later confirmed to be
members of the security forces. There have also been instances of police-style actions by men in
uniform—such as the staffing of checkpoints—where witnesses suspected the men of being members of
armed groups who had disguised themselves as security force members.
1
Human Rights Watch/Middle East, "Algeria: Elections in the Shadow of Violence and Repression," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 4, June 1997; Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One Is Spared (New York:
Human Rights Watch, January 1994); see also annual editions of Human Rights Watch World Report.
Human Rights Watch
5
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�In some cases, confirmation of security force responsibility was later confirmed when the person
seized was located within the prison system or released after a period of detention. In other cases, such as
the abductions of women that accompanied some pf the gruesome massacres in villages southeast of Algiers
during 1997, the circumstances ofthe abduction led families of victims to suspect the hand of armed
opposition groups.
1
3
While abductions by armed opposition groups are a grave human rights problem in Algeria, there
is overwhelming evidence that the security forces are responsible for many hundreds of unresolved cases
of "disappearance." The phenomenon is of such proportions that it could only persist with the sanction of
the highest levels of national authority. While high officials have admitted that persons have "gone missing"
in state custody, we are aware of no high-level acknowledgment that the practice of forcible disappearance
is rampant and ongoing, nor of any efforts by the Algerian authorities to bring to justice those responsible.
"Disappeared" persons come from a wide range of professions. They include government employees,
physicians, businessmen, political activists, and journalists. Among the cases Human Rights Watch has
investigated, the arrests took place mostly at night, and according to eyewitnesses, were carried out by mixed
military and police forces who arrived in cars, generally with private license plates. Sometimes armored
vehicles were also used. Some members of these forces wore uniforms and others were in plainclothes. When
the police came wearing civilian clothes, they often wore jackets with a recognizable police insignia. When
arresting someone at home or on the street, they rarely presented an arrest warrant or official identification.
These were reportedly shown more often when the arrest was made at the person's workplace.
After a relative was seized, family members often visited nearby police stations to see if he or she
was being held there. Some made inquiries with the state prosecutor's office after the twelve-day limit on
garde a vue (pre-arraignment) detention had elapsed, and received a receipt acknowledging their complaint.
Others reported locating their arrested relatives, only to lose track of them after being told they had been
transferred to another place of detention whose location was not disclosed.
4
When detainees are held in unknown locations, they are invariably deprived of legal assistance and
are at the mercy of the arresting authority, thereby making them more vulnerable to abuses such as torture
or ill-treatment. A prisoner who was released in December 1996, after three and-a-half years in jail, told
Human Rights Watch that he first obtained a lawyer only after he was charged and transferred to a prison,
following three months in secret detention in police custody. Once in el-Harrache prison, he asked other
detainees to have their visiting relatives inform his family of his whereabouts. When the former prisoner,
2
"Scores of women are reported to have been abducted by armed groups and held captive for varying periods
of time during which they were raped and ill-treated....Reports of abduction and rape of women had decreased during
1996, but have once again become widespread in the context of recent massacres in regions around the capital."
Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence (London: Amnesty International,
November 1997), p. 22.
3
There are no official figures of the number of persons abducted by armed groups. The president of Soumoud
("steadfastness," in Arabic), an Algerian organization concerned with the issue, was quoted in the press as saying,
"Excluding the wilayas of Medea and Bouira, we counted, as of July 26, 1996, 2,000 persons kidnaped by terrorists
whose fate is unknown." Quoted anonymously in Salima Tlemijani, "Plus de 2000 personnes portees disparues," ElWatan, April 22, 1997. Since that interview, abductions have continued at an alarming pace.
4
The twelve-day limit applies only tp crimes that are considered "terrorist or subversive acts" (Article 8 of
Ordonnance no. 95-10 modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure). The limit is in other cases forty-eight hours (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Article 51).
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�who preferred to withhold his name, had earlier appeared before an investigating judge, he was not notified
of his right to a lawyer or to contact his family. He also told us that he was tortured for three days while in
police custody. The torture methods included beating with large sticks, the "chiffon " (ox washrag) method
in which a cloth soaked in dirty water and chemicals is stuffed down his mouth, and leaving him suspended
by the arms for hours.
The problem of persons going missing while in state custody has been recognized by the government
and nongovernmental organizations alike. Justice Minister Mohamed Adami told Human Rights Watch, "We
give these [missing person] cases all our special attention. Sometimes we find the person in question, but
until we do we keep the files open on these cases." Late in 1996, the military authorities had set up a "social
services" department to receive relatives who wish to report missing persons and attempt to trace them.
Algeria's official National Human Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire national des droits de I'Homme,
ONDH), which was created by and reports to the office of the president, has flagged "disappearances" as a
major concern. The head of the independent Algerian Human Rights League (Ligue Algerienne des droits
de I'Homme, LADH), Ghechir Boudjemaa, called "disappearances" one of the country's most serious human
rights problems, in an interview published in the Algiers daily al-Khabar on November 17.
5
During and after a mission to Algeria in March-April 1997, Human Rights Watch collected
testimony from families and lawyers concerning persons who "disappeared" at the hands of security forces.
We restricted ourselves to those cases where evidence existed—usually eyewitness accounts of the arrest
or abduction—that pointed to the involvement of the security forces. In all of these cases, the victims were
men. On September 12 we submitted this information to the authorities (see Appendix A). We asked in each
case whether the person was in official custody, and if so, his precise whereabouts, legal status, and whether
and when he had been brought before a judicial authority; the charges, if any, against him; and whether he
had been visited by his legal counsel and by his family.
Although we did receive a response indirectly—in the form of a case-by-case working session with
ONDH president M. Kemal Rezag Bara on October 14—in none ofthe twelve cases presented did the
authorities confirm that the individual was in official custody or specify his whereabouts.
6
Human Rights Watch believes these cases reflect a pattern of state-sponsored "disappearances." The
failure of judges and prosecutors to perform their legally mandated oversight functions, including their duty
to ensure that the arresting forces comply with both domestic legislation and international legal instruments
designed to prevent secret and unacknowledged detentions, results in the effective absence of judicial remedy
for these practices. As Amnesty International reported, "Examining magistrates and judges have consistently
shown little interest in establishing how the detainees came to be in the custody of the security forces, even
when there is ample evidence that the detainees were held in secret detention in violation of the law."
7
The government of Algeria has responded to some ofthe many case inquiries submitted to it by the
U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. In many instances, the government
contended that the person in question had been killed by security forces in combat or when attempting to
5
Human Rights Watch interview, Algiers, April 8, 1997.
6
Human Rights Watch also received a letter from the Algerian ambassador to the U.S., dated September 30,
criticizing its demarche on "disappearances" and providing no comments on the cases and questions it contained. The
ambassador's letter indicated that no further official response would be forthcoming and advised Human Rights Watch
instead to establish a "constructive dialogue" with the ONDH. The letter is reproduced as Appendix D.
7
Amnesty International, Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence, p. 16.
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�escape, or had been assassinated by "terrorist" groups. However, as Amnesty International notes, in these
cases the authorities "failed to provide the necessary details and to explain why for months or years they had
not informed the families and lawyers, who had continued to seek information on their whereabouts from
the authorities, of the fate of these 'disappeared'."
8
As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, no Algerian security force member or official has been
subjected to disciplinary measures for his or her involvement in a case of "disappearance." A request for
information about such cases, contained in the attached letter to President Liamine Zeroual, went
unanswered. The lack of disciplinary measures is further evidence of state sanction for the practice of
"disappearances."
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
"Enforced disappearance" is defined in the 1992 U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance as:
[Pjersons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence ofthe
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, thereby placing such persons outside the
protection of the law.
The government of Algeria has maintained a state of emergency since February 9, 1992, justifying
it with reference to the rampant political violence. The state of emergency permits various derogations from
Algerian laws, including those that protect civil liberties. The minister of interior is empowered to restrict
"all public gatherings that could disturb the public order and safety," order searches both day and night and
place in detention centers persons "whose activity is considered to threaten the public order, public security,
or the proper functioning of public services." The Algerian authorities informed the United Nations on
February 13, 1992 that it was derogating from articles 9(3), 12, 17, and 21 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
9
10
International law affirms that even during declared states of exception certain basic human rights
cannot be suspended. The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
states in Article 7, "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of war, internal political
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances."
8
Ibid., p. 17.
9
Presidential decree no. 92-44 of 9 February 1992 establishing the state of emergency. The preamble to the
decree refers to "serious and persistent attacks on public order that have taken place in numerous places in the country"
and "the threats to the stability of institutions and serious and repeated attacks against the security of citizens and civil
peace."
10
Article 9(3) guarantees that "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge...and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release...." Articles 12, 17 and 21 refer,
respectively, to therightto freedom of movement;freedomfromarbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family
home or correspondence; and the right of peacefiil assembly.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�International instruments that Algeria has ratified, as well as Algerian domestic legal codes, contain
articles that, if fully implemented, protect against enforced disappearances. Algeria has, for example, ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states in Article 9(1):
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedures as are established by law.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance requires in
Article 3 that each state "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and
terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction." Article 6(1) states: "No order
or instruction of any public authority, civilian, military or other, may be invoked to justify an enforced
disappearance."
The declaration stipulates in Article 10 that detainees must be held in officially recognized places
of detention, that their families must be promptly informed of their place of detention and that they must
have access to a lawyer. These provisions are intended to prevent "disappearances." Guidelines for punitive
action against officials responsible for acts of enforced disappearance and for compensation of its victims
are found in Article 14 and Article 19 respectively:
Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance in a particular State shall,
when the facts disclosed by an official investigation so warrant, be brought before the competent
civil authorities of that State for the purpose of prosecution and trial.... All States should take any
lawful and appropriate action available to them to bring all persons presumed responsible for an act
of enforced disappearance, who are found to be within their jurisdiction or under their control, to
justice.
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall have
the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their
dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.
Algerian law also provides a number of safeguards against "disappearances." Even when a criminal
investigation necessitates holding a detainee without a warrant, Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CPP) states that "the officer must immediately inform the state prosecutor." Article 51 also stipulates:
While protecting the confidentiality ofthe investigation, the police officer is obligated to grant to
the person held in garde a vue [pre-arraignment] detention all means for enabling him to
communicate immediately and directly with his family and to receive visits by it."
A time limit of twelve days is imposed on garde a vue detention in cases of suspected terrorist or
subversive acts by Article 8 of Decree 95-10 issued on 25 November 1995 and amending Article 51 of the
CPP. During that time, detainees must appear before the state prosecutor if they are to be charged, according
to Article 51, second paragraph:
" "Toute en veillant au secret de I'enquete, I'officier de police judiciaire est tenu de mettre a la disposition de
la personne gardee a vue, tout moyen lui permettant de communiquer immediatement et directement avec sa familie,
et de recevoir ses visites."
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�If there is evidence that is substantial and corroborating so as to warrant the fding of charges, the
police officer must present the detainee to the state prosecutor without holding the detainee in his
custody for more than forty-eight hours [amended to twelve days as indicated above].
12
Similarly, amended Article 65 stipulates that if detainees are to be kept longer than twelve days, they
must be brought before the state prosecutor, who can order an extension of the incommunicado detention
by not more than twelve additional days. The criminal code, in Articles 109-110, provides for penalties of
up to ten years in prison for public servants who participate in acts of arbitrary or illegal detention or who
violate procedures relating to detention.
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF "DISAPPEARED"
Estimates vary concerning the number of persons who were seized by the security forces and who
remain unaccounted for. The Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (Federation
internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme, FIDH), after interviewing lawyers in Algeria during an
April 1997 mission, stated that it "believes that the number of at least 2,000 'disappearances' attributable
to the security forces would be well below the actual figure."
13
Mohamed Tahri, one of several Algerian lawyers who follows "disappearance" cases, estimated that
some 500 persons were unaccounted for after being arrested during 1997, most of them taken from urban
areas by security forces in police or military vehicles. He reached this figure by informally polling other
lawyers who represent relatives of the "disappeared. Tahri himself said that as of November he himself had
come to represent the families of twenty-nine persons who "disappeared" during the year and remained, to
his knowledge, unaccounted for. Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Mahmoud Khelili, told Human
Rights Watch that he had a comparable number of clients whose relatives had gone missing in 1997.
Together Tahri and Khelili reported representing a total of over 500 families of persons who had gone
missing since 1993 and remained unaccounted for.
The National Human Rights Monitoring Body (ONDH) stated that during 1996 it registered a total
of 988 cases of presumed "disappearances," afigurethat represents a large increase over the 373 and 567
recorded in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The data collected by the ONDH represents only a fraction of
persons reported missing in Algeria and cannot be considered a representative sample, since it is based on
information brought to its attention—mostly by relatives—rather than on proactive fieldwork. Despite its
limitations, the data suggest that many "disappearances" are long-term, and that in the majority of cases
families identify state forces as responsible for the arrest.
14
Ofthe cases of "disappearances" recorded by the ONDH during 1996, the dates that the persons went
missing were distributed as follows:
12
"S'il existe contre une personne des indices graves et concordants de nature a motiver son inculpation,
I'officier de police judiciaire doit la conduire devant le procureur de la Republique, sans pouvoir la garder a sa
disposition plus de quarante-huit heures."
13
Federation internationale des ligues des droits de I'Homme (FIDH), La levee du voile: I'Algerie de
I'extrajudiciaire et de la manipulation (Paris: FIDH, June 1997), p. 16. See response to that report by the ONDH, De
la manipulation des faits au detournement des concepts, October 1997.
14
Observatoire National des droits de I'Homme, Rapport annuel 1996, Algiers, 1997.
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1
21
329
390
247
According to the information received by the ONDH, 337 of the "arrests" in 1996 were carried out
in the person's home, 108 in their workplace, 192 in the street and twenty-four after the persons presented
themselves to the security services. The persons carrying out the "arrests" were unidentified in 134 cases;
in 754 cases, however, one of the security services was identified by the complainants as responsible, broken
down as follows: police: 338, gendarmerie: 168, and armed forces: 248.
15
The ONDH report acknowledged that some of the "disappearance" cases reported to it involved
persons being held without charge by authorities, beyond the legally permissible period of time and
sometimes outside the established places of detention. However, the ONDH cautioned, not all of the 754
cases attributed by complainants to the security forces were necessarily government-sanctioned
"disappearances." It said that the picture could be distorted by several factors, including:
16
• when a "disappeared" person resurfaces, that information does not always reach the ONDH;
• abductions by armed groups are sometimes mistakenly attributed to security forces;
• the person being sought by his/her family may have voluntarily joined the ranks of "terrorist
groups" (and sometimes the family files a complaint about a "disappearance" to cover for the relative who
has done so);
• the person being sought emigrated abroad illegally and has not informed his family of his
whereabouts.
During his meeting with Human Rights Watch on October 14, Mr. Rezag Bara stated that he could
not estimate the distribution of cases within these categories. However, in an interview he gave earlier to Le
Monde, Mr. Rezag Bara asserted that authorities bore responsibility for only a small fraction of these alleged
"disappearances":
Some ofthe disappeared are really terrorists who secretly went underground. Many disappeared
persons were, by contrast, abducted by terrorist groups disguised as security force members. The
abductions attributable to the security forces are exceptional.
17
Mr. Rezag Bara has noted additional circumstances that he said could misleadingly inflate the tally
of "disappearances." Persons who had been previously arrested and released, he told Human Rights Watch
on October 14, may have fled into the ranks of armed groups out of fear of being re-arrested. He
acknowledged that police sometimes re-arrested persons who had been acquitted by the courts when the
police disagreed with their acquittal. He also noted that families sometimes remained uninformed about a
relative's detention because prison officials failed to allow detainees to exercise their right to notify their
families. He said this abuse was more common with persons held for alleged security offenses. In a meeting
15
These figures, which are reproduced from the ONDH report, add up to 888, not the 988 that the ONDH gives
as the total number of complaints during the year.
16
The ONDH reported in its 1994-1995 report the existence of secret detention centers in "places that the law
has not designated for that function. They are mainly...certain police stations or army barracks serving as detention
centers. Persons arrested were freed after more than three months of secret detention in these places."
17
Hacene Terro, "On emmene tonfilspour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�with the FIDH, Mr. Rezag Bara added that some of the persons reported as missing were men who had fled
to avoid their military service.
18
While these alternative explanations may be true in some instances, Human Rights Watch believes
that there is strong evidence of security force involvement in the cases brought to our attention and that this
reflects a policy of state sponsored "disappearances" in Algeria.
Mr. Rezag Bara also provided some general statistics about incarceration in Algeria, a country of
28 million inhabitants. In 1997, the number of persons in some form of detention was 38,000, of which
10,000-12,000 were being held in connection with the activities of armed groups and subversion cases, most
of whom had yet to be tried. Fifteen to 20 percent of these 10,000-12,000 were directly linked to acts of
"terrorism" while the rest were being held for providing services to armed groups or failure to report offenses
by them.
POLICE BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION BY RELATIVES OF THE "DISAPPEARED"
A peaceful demonstration on October 20 in Algiers by lawyers and families of the "disappeared"
was blocked by police. At a time when the international press corps was present to cover the local elections
taking place on October 23, dozens of women and their supporters, carrying photos of relatives who had been
arrested or "disappeared," gathered in front of the central post office in Algiers. Security forces dispersed
the demonstrators and arrested about fifteen women and lawyer Mohamed Tahri, who represents the families
of many "disappeared" persons. Participants told Human Rights Watch by phone that some members of the
police had warned the women that they would meet the same fate as their missing relatives if they did not
disperse. All of those arrested were released the same day. Mr. Tahri, who was released without charge after
six hours, told Human Rights Watch that a police officer accused him of being a "traitor" because he had
"links with foreign organizations." Another Algiers human rights lawyer, Rachid Mesli, had been sentenced
to three years in prison in July 1997 after an unfair trial in which he was questioned about his contacts with
Amnesty International (see below).
On September 22, a group of relatives of "disappeared" persons attempted to present a petition to
officials ofthe United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World
Health Organization, who were attending a conference on political violence organized by the ONDH at the
Aurassi Hotel in Algiers. Signed by "the families of the disappeared," the petition called on the international
community to "denounce vigorously the silence of the authorities before the repeated complaints and efforts
to win the release of the 'disappeared,' and to obtain information on the fate that awaits them." Security
forces barred the petitioners from presenting their petition. Human Rights Watch subsequently learned that
two ofthe participants, Mebarka Sai', age sixty-one, and Masouda Boukhari, were arrested in early October
and held for several days before being released.
Mr Tahri's arrest at the October 20 demonstration was not his first brush with trouble apparently
linked to his human rights work. During the weekend of June 12-13, his office in the Kouba neighborhood
was burglarized. Tahri reported afterward that some of his casefilesand correspondence with clients whose
relatives had "disappeared" were missing but that no objects of financial value had been taken. The break-in
occurred after a week in which Mr. Tahri had been featured in major media in France denouncing
19
18
La levee du voile, p. 15.
19
Algeria's weekend is Thursday and Friday.
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�"disappearances" and other human rights abuses in Algeria. He was interviewed on a program about Algeria
that aired on the French television station "Arte" on June 5. Also, the issue of Le Monde that appeared on
the afternoon of June 12 (dated June 13) contained a full-page article devoted to the narratives of Tahri's
clients about their relatives who had "disappeared." Mr. Tahri said that the police conducted an
investigation but he has learned of no arrests made in connection with the break-in.
20
CASE STUDIES: " DISAPPEARANCES"
The cases presented below are but a few among hundreds that have been brought to the attention of
human rights lawyers in Algeria and international human rights organizations. The information we present
includes: first, the information collected by Human Rights Watch during and after a mission to Algeria,
which we submitted to the authorities for their comments (see Appendix A); second, the response provided
by ONDH President Rezag Bara in an October 14 meeting in Washington—the only response on cases that
Human Rights Watch received from any official body; and third, any additional information about the case
that Human Rights Watch collected after submitting its inquiry to the authorities. In none of the cases has
the person reappeared, to the best of Human Rights Watch's knowledge.
In his meeting with Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara noted that the ONDH, a five-year-old
body that was created by and reports to the office of the president of the republic, serves as a conduit
between complainants who approach the ONDH and the appropriate authorities. It conducts no investigations
on its own into cases. The ONDH's responses to Human Rights Watch concerning specific individuals who
had "disappeared" fell into three basic categories:
•
•
•
the ONDH was unfamiliar with a case, presumably because the family had not approached it;
it had submitted a written inquiry with authorities about the case but had received no reply;
it had received a reply, most commonly a denial that the person in question was in official custody.
When acting in response to a complaint about a missing person, the ONDH submits letters to two
security force offices that together are presumed to answer for all agencies legally authorized to detain
persons: the Direction Generale de Surete Nationale (DGSN) and the Gendarmerie Nationale: The former
is an agency within the Ministry of Interior that oversees Algeria's police forces! The gendarmerie is a
branch of the military; Mr. Rezag Bara said that he assumes that when the gendarmerie responds to the
ONDH it is speaking on behalf of all branches of the military.
According to this ONDH methodology, only a denial from both agencies could be construed as an
official denial that an individual was in state custody. This was rarely forthcoming. In many cases, the
ONDH received a reply from one agency but not the other. Sometimes, Mr. Rezag Bara noted, the replies
took weeks or months. He did not provide Human Rights Watch with copies or dates of the correspondence
between the security agencies and the ONDH.
***
Amine Amrouche, age twenty-one, was arrested on January 30, 1997 from outside his house in
Baraki by men in plainclothes who took him away in an unmarked car, according to neighbors who described
the incident to his mother, Nacera Dutour, who lives in France. One of the witnesses said he believed the
men to be members ofthe security forces. Ms. Dutour tried to track down rumors of her son's detention in
20
Hacene Terro, "On emmene tonfilspour quelque temps," Le Monde, June 13, 1997.
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�various police stations, prisons and at a military camp in Oran. She also sought assistance from the ONDH
and the office of the state prosecutor, who informed her that they had made inquiries but could find no trace
of him. She told Human Rights Watch that a gendarmerie official said to her in May that her son's name
"was neither among [the gendarmerie's records of] the living nor the dead."
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mr. Amrouche was "officially not in custody" since
the ONDH had received replies from both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale that neither had any
record of arresting Amrouche. Amnesty International reported on October 17 that it had received information
indicating that he was alive and being held in a military security center in Algiers. In early November, Mr.
Amrouche's mother said she had no new information, although she continued to hear rumors that he was in
detention.
21
Aziz Bouabdallah is a journalist with the independent^/- 'Alam al-Siyassi daily. His family said
he was arrested on April 12, 1997 from his home in Algiers by men dressed in police uniforms who
introduced themselves as members of the security forces, according to statements released by the New Yorkbased Committee To Protect Journalists and Amnesty International. Mr. Bouabdallah was reportedly being
held in an Algiers detention center. His family has received no official confirmation of his whereabouts.
Both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale informed the ONDH that they are not holding Mr.
Bouabdallah.
Ali Lakhdar Chaouche, age twenty-seven, was arrested at Kouba Hospital near Algiers, where he
works as an orthopedic surgeon. He was arrested by men who reportedly identified themselves as military
personnel to the hospital administration at 2:00 a.m. on April 1, 1997, during Mr. Chaouche's night shift.
They presented an order of arrest issued by the military authorities. Trying to locate Ali, his family wrote
to the ministries of justice and defense, the ONDH and to the police stations of Kouba and Baraki, where he
lives. They have received no answer so far.
Due apparently to a confusion of similar names, Mr. Rezag Bara came prepared to discuss a different
case but said he had no information on Ali Lakhdar Chaouche.
Djamil and Mourad Chihoub."disappeared" after their brother Said joined an armed Islamist
group. On May 16, 1996 police and military forces came looking for Sai'd at the family home in the Algiers
suburb of Baraki. Not finding him, the security forces arrested Djamil and told his father they would release
him when Said turned himself in. The next month, the authorities told the family that Said had been killed
in a clash with military forces. They allowed the family to identify his body and gave , them a death
certificate. However, Djamil has not been released, and his family has not been informed of his whereabouts.
On November 14, 1996, the military forces of the Baraki barracks, together with a "self-defense"
group from the area, went to the Chihoub home and arrested Mourad, who was less than seventeen years old
at the time. When his father attempted to intervene, they threatened to shoot him. He inquired at the military
barracks but was told to inquire with Military Security (Securite Militaire, an agency within the Armed
Forces). He wrote several letters to the authorities, and was summoned last February to the military's
department of social services in Beni Messous to provide details about Mourad and Djamil and was told to
wait for news. He then received a letter dated May 11, 1997 from the state prosecutor's office saying there
was no information on his sons.
21
Amnesty International Urgent Action, MDE28/28/97, October 17, 1997.
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�The ONDH, which had submitted a request for information about Djamil in August 1996, received
a reply from one of the responding agencies several months later saying that its forces had not arrested
Djamil. The ONDH received a similar reply from that agency on August 24, 1997, concerning Mourad.
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. His wife, Safia, stated
that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from near his home in el-Harrache by about four men
carrying walkie-talkies whom they believed to belong to the security forces. They drove him away in a
convoy of two vehicles.
Safia received in response to her inquiries a statement from the Ministry of Justice on March 16,
1997 stating that el-Harrache police station had no record of Djamel's arrest. She has received no official
information about his whereabouts, but about two months after his arrest, a released detainee wrote a letter
to a private newspaper saying that he had seen Mr. Fahassi at Chateauneuf, a Military Security center in
Algiers. His wife was unable to confirm this. In October 1995, the public-sector newspaper I'Horizon
printed an article claiming that Fahassi was alive and well outside the country. However, others at that
journal later dissociated themselves from the report. No evidence was provided and the family discounted
the report.
Mr. Fahassi had served a six-month sentence in 1991 for an article about the violent conduct ofthe
security forces toward civilians that he wrote for a newspaper run by the then-legal Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). He was also detained without charge in a detention camp after the
cancellation of general elections in January 1992, and published an account of that detention in the Algiers
daily press.
Both police and military forces told the ONDH they had no information on Mr. Fahassi, Mr. Rezag
Bara said. As of November 1997, Fahassi's wife Safia said the family remained without news.
Mohammed al-Hedi Hamidi, a twenty-four year-old civil servant at the Dely Ibrahim municipality,
was taken from his home in Cite Chevalley by police and military forces in uniform shortly after midnight
on March 19, 1996, according to his family, which has so far been unable to establish his whereabouts. They
have inquired at local police stations and the office of the state prosecutor, and have sent letters of inquiry
to the ONDH and the president's office. On July 13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, a group of security
forces, including some of those who had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, went to the same home and arrested
his brother, whose name is Mohammed (see below). One of them reportedly admitted to his mother that they
had arrested Mohammed al-Hedi, and Mohammed was located more than one month later.
Mr. Rezag Bara said the ONDH had received no reply to its requests for information about
Mohammed al-Hedi, which it had submitted to authorities in July 1996.
Mostafa Houari, age thirty-six, an employee of the Algerian state oil and gas company Sonatrach,
was arrested at his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers, on the night of April 6, 1996, by about twenty military
and police security forces who questioned his wife about his acquaintances andfriends.Mr. Houari had been
detained for five days in October 1995 and held at Dely Ibrahim police station in Algiers. He was tried and
acquitted of the charge of assisting members of armed groups by the Bir Mourad criminal court in Algiers
in January 1996. Since his arrest in April 1996, his wife has been unable to locate him despite several letters
of inquiry, including one to the office of the president.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch the ONDH received no response from either agency about
Mr. Houari. His family, reached by phone in November, said they had no further news about him.
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�Mourad Ouchefoune, age twenty-five and an economics student from Dar el-Baida in Algiers, was
arrested from his home by police and military forces after midnight on March 17, 1997. According to
testimony the family gave to lawyers, the security forces broke into the house, forced everyone out and
checked their identities. They then picked out Mourad, handcuffed him and led him away, saying he was
only required for an investigation. The family has received no reply to their official inquiries as to his
whereabouts.
Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no record of a missing person by this name. The family said by phone
in December that they had no further news of Mr. Ouchefoune.
Hedi Saibi, age thirty, was arrested on November 15, 1994. About four Military Security personnel
in cars with private license plates took him away from outside al-Rahma mosque in Meissonier, Algiers,
according to his father and other worshipers leaving the mosque at the same time. His brother Yahia, who
was in detention at the time, was sentenced in January 1996 to a three-year prison term for having provided
services to "terrorists." He was released last June. Hedi's father has written to a number of senior officials,
including the president and the interior, defense and justice ministers, as well as to the ONDH. In response
to his letter to the president, he was summoned by the police who asked questions about his missing son but
was given no information about him.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that both the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale
informed the ONDH that they had not arrested Mr. Saibi. On September 22, Mr. Saibi's father joined a group
of relatives who attempted to present a petition on the "disappeared" at the Aurassi Hotel during an ONDHorganized international conference entitled "Contemporary Forms of Violence and the Culture of Peace."
They were barred from entry. Mr. Saibi's father inquired at the ONDH again a few days later, but received
no new information about his son. Contacted by phone on November 17, he told Human Rights Watch he
had obtained no further information.
Abderrahmane Yemeni, age forty-four, was arrested from his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers,
on June 6, 1996. His wife said in letters of inquiry that five military security forces broke into the house in
the early afternoon, searched the premises, and arrested Mr. Yemeni. She wrote complaining about the arrest
and received a polite letter from the state prosecutor's office that did not acknowledge his arrest and said
authorities were unable to locate him.
The ONDH received a response from only one of the two responsible agencies concerning Yemeni.
That agency said he had not been arrested by its forces. The family's lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said by
telephone on November 16 that he had received no further information about Mr. Yemeni.
Allaoua Ziou, age thirty, a farmer in Heliopolis, Guelma, was arrested in the nearby area of Jebenat
Chouhada on the evening of January 1, 1995 by about four men in civilian clothes who took him away in
a car. According to a brother, Djamel, who lives in Canada, eyewimesses said they followed the car up to
the gates ofthe Heliopolis gendarmerie barracks. Djamel Ziou told Human Rights Watch that he telephoned
the Heliopolis gendarmerie at the time and was informed that Allaoua was being held there. The family was
told unofficially that about one month after his arrest Allaoua had been transferred to another region. Since
then, the family has received no further information about him. Between March and September 1995 Djamel
Ziou wrote to the ministries of interior, justice, the ONDH and the office ofthe president, but received no
reply. The ONDH replied to a letter on the case sent by Human Rights Watch saying that "according to
recent information...Mr. Ziou is a militant ofthe ex-FIS and is implicated in a case of supplying help to
terrorist groups." The ONDH said an arrest warrant, dated January 23, 1995, had been issued against him
but did not state that he had been taken into custody. When shown this letter from the ONDH to Human
Rights Watch, Djamel Ziou responded that in the nearly three years since the arrest warrant was supposedly
Human Rights Watch
\6
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�issued, the family had never been informed by authorities that Allaoua was wanted. In his meeting with
Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rezag Bara said he had no further information on Mr. Ziou beyond what he had
provided in his letter.
CASE STUDIES: TEMPORARY "DISAPPEARANCES" AND SECRET DETENTIONS
Messaoud Ouziala, a kidney transplant physician was held by security forces who disregarded laws
governing arrest and detention. Dr. Ouziala "disappeared" on July 8, 1997 at around 5:30 pm, after he left
his workplace at Moustapha Hospital in Algiers, according to a statement issued by Amnesty International
and public appeals to the authorities for information about him. These appeals were made by the Association
of Algerian Nephrologists and Association Espoir, a group of Algerian dialysis and transplant patients. His
family was unable to obtain any information about him or confirm who had abducted him. The only official
evidence of his arrest and detention came after his release when the ONDH wrote to Amnesty International
stating that Dr. Ouziala had been arrested on July 8 and released July 22. The letter gave no further details
and did not address assertions by Amnesty International that Dr. Ouziala's family had been unable to obtain
any information on his whereabouts despite repeated inquiries with officials.
In an abduction-like arrest on July 31, 1996, lawyer and human rights activist Rachid Mesli was
stopped in the Rouiba area outside Algiers by four armed men in civilian clothes who took him away in a
car. All questions to the authorities by his family, lawyers, and international human rights organizations as
to his whereabouts went unanswered. On August 7, about twenty police in uniform searched his home and
office and informed his family that he was in police detention. He was finally brought before an investigating
judge on August 10, charged with complicity with an armed group and transferred to el-Harrache prison in
Algiers. A day later, the ONDH confirmed to Amnesty International that Mesli had been held with judicial
authorization prior to his appearance, but did not explain why the security forces had refused to acknowledge
his detention. Lawyers who saw Mesli in his first court appearances noted that he had bruises on his right
eye and his hand, and seemed to be in poor health. After he was convicted and sentenced to three years in
prison, Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to Justice Minister Adami on July 17, 1997, protesting Mr.
Mesli's unfair trial, but has received no response. Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that a forensic
expert who examined Mr. Mesli concluded in August 1996 that he had suffered a light wound to his right
eyebrow, but had not been tortured.
Ammar Ghazoul, age thirty-one, an unemployed agricultural engineer, was apparently arrested in
May 1997 by police forces. Family members said police broke into their house in the early hours of May 4,
and when they did not find Ghazoul, took away his mother instead, saying she was needed for an
interrogation. She was released the next day. On May 6, Ammar's brother and neighbors caught sight of him
in a police car. He was later listed as a fugitive being sought in connection with a criminal case involving
an attack on government property. After the family's lawyer brought to the attention of the Algiers criminal
court judge and the state prosecutor that Ammar had apparently been detained, he was presented in early
August in court, where an investigating judge ordered him held in Serkadji prison in Algiers. Mr. Ghazoul
was still unable to contact his family, which learned of his whereabouts only through friends who visited
other inmates at Serkadji.
As of November, his family had confirmed his presence in Serkadji prison and had been able to visit
him a few times.
Mohammed Hamidi is a thirty-three year-old tax inspector in Ben Aknoun. He was arrested on July
13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, by a group of security forces, including some of those who had
arrested his brother, Mohammed al-Hedi (see above). His family wrote letters of inquiry to the state
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�prosecutor's office, the ONDH and other officials but received no reply. More than a month later he was
found to be held in Serkadji Prison, according to other detainees who asked their visitors to inform his
family. His family subsequently obtained permission to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that he was unaware that Mr. Hamidi had been located in Serkadji prison. He
told Human Rights Watch he would inquire with the Ministry of Justice about Mr. Hamidi's detention, and
said that if the reports about his unacknowledged detention were accurate, his lawyer should file a formal
complaint about illegal detention. Reached by telephone in November, Mohammed's family said they had
obtained legal counsel for him and had seen him three times.
Noureddine Mihoubi, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested in February 1992 as he was
visiting a brother in the southern town of Bousaada. He was held at a police station there for fifteen days,
during which time his family was able to visit and bring him food and medicine. Then they were told that
he had been transferred to Algiers but were given no further information. A month later, a newly released
detainee told them he had seen Mihoubi at the Military Security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in
poor health. On May 12,1996, the ONDH told his family an arrest warrant had been issued for him on March
31,1993. In July of 1996 the family obtained a police report issued the same month saying Mihoubi had been
arrested by security forces and transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. It contained no more details. In
early August 1997, a prisoner who had just been released after serving a three-year jail sentence told
Mihoubi's family that he was being held in Blida military jail and was to be tried by a military court in
September. He said Mihoubi had requested a lawyer to defend him in his upcoming trial. His family was
preparing to obtain official permission to visit him and to provide him with a lawyer.
Mr. Rezag Bara told Human Rights Watch that Mihoubi was still officially wanted, following the
1993 arrest warrant. He said he was aware of the developments concerning his arrest that were reported by
the family, but had no official confirmation of them. Contacted by telephone on November 17, the family's
lawyer, Mohamed Tahri, said the released prisoner gave details about Mihoubi to his family which confirmed
he had seen him, but as of November his family was unable to locate him after inquiring at the Blida jail and
at the region's civil and military courts.
Ali Belhadj, one of the two chiefs ofthe outlawed Islamic Salvation Front, has been held in secret
and incommunicado detention since he was transferred from his former place of imprisonment, apparently
at the end of 1994. He has been serving a prison term after being tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve
years in jail for conspiring against state authority, harming the economy, and distributing seditious tracts.
Since his transfer to secret detention at the end of 1994, he has faced new charges following the alleged
discovery of a letter on the body of an armed Islamist implicating Belhadj in incitement to violence.
Belhadj's lawyers have written to the authorities requesting their right under Algerian law to have
access to their client and charging that his whereabouts were unknown. His family has also written to the
ONDH and other official quarters requesting the right to visit him.
Mr. Rezag Bara said that the ONDH considered Belhadj's case as an issue of visitation rights, and
said the ONDH had asked the authorities to permit Mr. Belhadj to exercise his right to receive his family.
He said he had not received a reply.
***
Human Rights Watch
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February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Letter from Human Rights Watch to President Liamine Zeroual
Human Rights Watch
19
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
1522 K St., N.W. Suite 910
Washington, D.C. 20005-1202
Telephone: 202/371-6592 ext 15
1
Facsimile: 202/371-0124
E-mail: hrwdcShrw.org
Website: http://www.hrw.0Tg
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST
Eric Goldstein
Acting Executive Director
Virginu N. Sherry
Associate Director
Joe Siork
Advocacy Director
Clarisa Bencomo
Elah6 Sharifpour-Hicks
Nejla Sammakia
Research Associates
Georgina Copty
Awali Samara
Associates
ADVISORY COMMITrtl
Gary G. Sick
Chair
Lisa Anderson
Bruce Rabb
Vice Chain
Shaul Bakhash
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Martin Blumenthal
Paul Chcvigny
Helena Cobban
Patricia Derian
Stanley Engelstein
Edith Everett
Mansour Farhang
Christopher E. George
Rita E. Hauser
Rev. J. Bryan Hehir
Edy Kaufman
Marina Pinto Kaufman
Samir Khalaf
Judith Kipper
Pnina Lahav
Ann M. Lesch
Stephen P. Marks
Rolando Matalon
Philip Mattar
David K. Shipler
Sanford Solender
Mary Ann Stein
Shibley Telhami
Andrew Whidey
Napoleon B. Williams, Jr.
James J. Zogby
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Susan Osnos
Associate Director
Michele Alexander
Development Director
Cynthia Brown
Program Director
Barbara Guglielmo
Finance & Administration
Director
Ijone Leicht
Brussels Office Director
Susan Osnos
Communications
Director
Wilder Tayler
General Counsel
Joanna Weschler
United Nations
Representative
Robert L. Bernstein
Chair
September 12, 1997
via fax and mail
President Liamine Zeroual
La Presidence de la Republique
El-Mouradia, Algiers, Algeria
Dear President Zeroual:
We wish to take this opportunity to write to Your Excellency concerning the
hundreds of Algerian citizens who have "disappeared" after their arrest by Algerian
security forces and whose families know neither the reason for their arrest nor their fate
or whereabouts. We are alarmed that, while older cases of enforced disappearances
continue unresolved, fresh reports of Algerians being "disappeared" during 1997 continue
to reach us.
While in Algeria last March and April, a Human Rights Watch delegation
collected testimony about "disappearances" and raised the issue with Minister of Justice
Mohamed Adami and Minister of Interior Mustapha Benmansour, who received the
delegation. We also raised this issue in a June 17 meeting with your ambassador in
Washington, Ramtane Lamamra. In that meeting Ambassador Lamamra assured us that
we shared a deep concern when it came to individual cases of possible abuse. The
ambassador pledged his government's cooperation in making inquiries if we presented to
it details of specific cases of possible human rights violations.
With this letter, we wish to present Your Excellency with information about cases
of enforced disappearances in the hope that you will clarify the whereabouts and legal
status of the individuals concerned. After October 6, we will publicize this letter along
with any pertinent information we have received from Algerian authorities or the
National Monitoring Body for Human Rights {Observatoire National des Droits de
I 'Homme, ONDH). We welcome information both about the cases documented below as
well as general information on the mechanisms available to Algerians when they believe
a relative has been taken into custody but are unaware of the person's fate or
whereabouts.
"Enforced disappearance" is described in the 1992 U.N. Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance as:
[Pjersons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of
Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or
with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, thereby placing such
persons outside the protection of the law.
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEW YORK
RIO DE JANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
The Declaration provides a number of measures to ensure against acts of enforced
disappearance. Other international instruments, ratified by Algeria, as well as Algerian domestic
law contain articles that, if fully implemented, protect against enforced disappearances (please
see below).
In writing you this letter, we wish to reinforce the efforts that relatives of "disappeared"
persons have already made. Among the cases we followed, we noted that authorities answered
some of the families' inquiries, but usually after long delays and in a manner that did not confirm
the whereabouts of the "disappeared" person.
These relatives had submitted their inquiries, providing the date and details of arrest of
the "disappeared" person to various authorities: to the police, gendarmerie, and prison
authorities; different departments within the ministries of defense, justice and interior; the
prosecutor general's office; Your Excellency's office; and with the Observatoire Nationale des
Droits de I 'Homme, which serves as a liaison between the public and the aforementioned
ministries.
It is often claimed by official and semi-official sources that some persons are mistakenly
categorized as "disappeared" who are in fact not in the hands of the security forces but have
instead joined armed Islamist groups, either voluntarily or by force. In this letter, we document
only cases where there is testimony to indicate that the person is in official custody. This
evidence consists of eyewitness accounts of the abduction or reported sightings of the individual
in a detention center. The victims come from a wide range of professions, and include
government employees, physicians, businessmen, political activists and journalists.
Among the cases we investigated, the arrests took place mostly at night, and according to
eyewitnesses, were carried out by mixed military and police forces who arrived in cars, generally
with private license plates. Sometimes armored vehicles were also used. Some members of these
forces wore uniforms and others were in plainclothes. When the police came wearing civilian
clothes, they often wore jackets with a recognizable police insignia. When arresting someone at
home or on the street, they rarely presented an arrest warrant or official identification. These are
reportedly shown more often when the arrest is made at the person's workplace.
After a relative was seized, family members often visited nearby police stations to see if
he or she was being held there. Some made an inquiry with the Prosecutor General's office after
the twelve-day limit on garde a vue (pre-arraignment) detention had elapsed, and received a
receipt acknowledging their complaint. Some families reported locating their arrested relatives,
only to lose track of them after being told they had been transferred to a new place of detention.
Many families received information about their relatives through unofficial channels, such as
freed prisoners or prison guards, but often remained unable to gain access to them.
When detainees are held in unknown locations, they are often deprived of legal assistance
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
because their lawyer — if the family is able to hire one — cannot confirm their whereabouts. A
prisoner who was released in December 1996, after three and-a-half years in jail, told our
delegation that he first obtained a lawyer after being charged and transferred from police custody,
where he had spent three months, to el-Harrache jail where he was able to ask other detainees to
have their visiting relatives inform his family of his whereabouts. When the former prisoner, who
preferred to withhold his identity, had earlier appeared before an investigating judge, he was not
notified of his right to a lawyer or to contact his family.'jHe also told us that he was tortured for
three days while in police custody. The torture methods included beating with large sticks, and
the "chiffon " (or washrag) method in which a cloth soaked in dirty water and chemicals is
stuffed down his mouth; and leaving him suspended for hours with his arms stretched out in
painfiil positions. His case illustrates the fact that persons who are forcibly disappeared and held
in unknown places of detention have fewer safeguards against abuse, including torture.
In another, more recent, case of temporary "disappearance," Messaoud Ouziala, a kidney
transplant physician was held by security forces who disregarded laws governing arrest and
detention. Dr. Ouziala "disappeared" on July 8, 1997 at around 5:30 pm, after he left his
workplace at Moustapha Hospital in Algiers, according to a statement issued by Amnesty
International and public appeals to the authorities for information about him. These appeals were
made by the Association of Algerian Nephrologists and Association Espoir, a group of Algerian
dialysis and transplant patients. His family was unable to obtain any information about him or
confirm who had abducted him. The only official evidence of his arrest and detention came after
his release when the ONDH wrote to Amnesty International stating that Dr. Ouziala had been
arrested on July 8 and released July 22. The letter gave no further details and did not address
assertions by Amnesty International that Dr. Ouziala's family had been unable to obtain any
information on his whereabouts despite repeated inquiries with officials.
In an abduction-like arrest on July 31, 1996, lawyer and human rights activist Rachid
Mesli was stopped in the Rouiba area outside Algiers by four armed men in civilian clothes who
took him away in a car. All questions to the authorities by his family, lawyers and international
human rights organizations as to his whereabouts went unanswered. On August 7, about twenty
police in uniform searched his home and office and informed his family that he was in police
detention. He was finally brought before an investigating judge on August 10, charged with
complicity with an armed group and transferred to el-Harrache prison in Algiers. A day later, the
ONDH confirmed to Amnesty International that Mesli had been held with judicial authorization
prior to his appearance, but did not explain why the security forces had refused to acknowledge
his detention. Lawyers who saw Mesli in his first court appearances noted that he had bruises on
his right eye and his hand, and seemed to be in poor health. After he was convicted and
sentenced to three years in prison, Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to Justice Minister Adami
on July 17, 1997, protesting Mr. Mesli's unfair trial, but has received no response.
The following cases are among hundreds of "disappearances" and temporary
"disappearances" that have occurred in Algeria since 1992. The information is based on our own
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
interviews as well as that collected by lawyers in Algiers. We look forward to the information
you can provide concerning the whereabouts of these Algerian citizens:
Amine Amrouche, age twenty-one, was arrested on January 30,1997 from outside his
house in Baraki by mixed police, gendarmes and special anti-terrorist forces, according to
neighbors who witnessed the arrest. His mother tried to track down rumors and reports of her
son's detention in various police stations, prisons and at a military camp in Oran. She also went
through the ONDH and the office ofthe Prosecutor General, who told her it had inquired but
could find no trace of him.
Aziz Bouabdallah is a journalist with the independent Al- 'Alam al-Siyassi daily. His
family said he was arrested on April 12, 1997 from his home in Algiers by men dressed in police
uniforms who introduced themselves as members of the security forces, according to statements
released by the Committee To Protect Journalists and Amnesty International. Bouabdallah was
reportedly held in an Algiers detention center but his family has been unable to officially confirm
his whereabouts.
Ali Lakhdar Chaoueche, age twenty-seven, was arrested at Kouba Hospital near
Algiers, where he works as an orthopedic surgeon. He was arrested by men who reportedly
identified themselves as military personnel to the hospital administration at 2:00 am on April 1,
1997 during Chaoueche's night shift, and presented an order of arrest issued by the military
authorities. Trying to locate Ali, his family wrote to the ministries of justice and defense, the
ONDH and to the police stations of Kouba and Baraki, where he lives. They have received no
answer so far.
Djamil and Mourad Chihoub "disappeared" after their brother Saeed had joined an
armed Islamist group. On May 16, 1996 police and military forces came looking for Saeed at the
family home in the Algiers quarter of Baraki. Not finding him, the security forces arrested
Djamil and told his father they would release him when Saeed turned himself in. The next
month, the authorities told the family that Saeed had been killed in a clash with military forces.
They allowed the family to identify his body and gave them a death certificate. However, Djamil
has not been released.
On November 14, 1996, the military forces of the Baraki barracks, together with a "selfdefense" group from the area, went to the Chihoub home and arrested Mourad, who was less than
seventeen years old at the time. When Djamil's father attempted to intervene, they threatened to
shoot him. He inquired at the military barracks but was told to ask the Military Security
authorities. He wrote several letters to the authorities, and was summoned last February to the
Beni Messous Military Security's department of social services to provide details about Mourad
and Djamil and was told to wait for news. He then received a letter dated May 11, 1997 from the
Prosecutor General's office saying there was no information on his sons.
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
Djamel Fahassi, a journalist at Algiers Radio, was arrested on May 6, 1995. His wife,
Safia, stated that neighbors said they witnessed him being taken from his home in el-Harrache by
about four men carrying walkie-talkies whom they believed to belong to the security forces.
They drove him away in a convoy of two vehicles.
Safia received in response to her inquiries a statement from the Ministry of Justice on
March 16, 1997 stating that el-Harrache police station had no record of Djamel's arrest. She has
received no official information about his whereabouts, but about two months after his arrest, a
released detainee wrote a letter to a private newspaper saying that he had seen Fahassi at
Chateauneuf, a Military Security center in Algiers. His wife was unable to confirm this. In
October 1995, the newspaper / 'Horizon printed an unattributed article claiming that Fahassi had
been seen abroad and was alive and well. No evidence was provided and the family discounted
the report.
Fahassi had served a six-month sentence in 1991 for an article he wrote while working
with a newspaper run by the then-legal Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). He was also detained
without charge in a detention camp after the cancellation of general elections in January 1992,
and published an account of that detention in the Algiers daily press.
Mohammed al-Hadi Hamidi, a twenty-four year-old civil servant at the Dely Ibrahim
municipality, was taken from his home in Cite Chevalley by police and military forces in
uniform shortly after midnight on March 19, 1996, according to his family who has so far been
unable to establish his whereabouts. They have inquired at local police stations and the office of
the Prosecutor General, and have sent letters of inquiry to the ONDH and to Your Excellency's
office. On July 13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, a group of security forces, including
some of those who had arrested Mohammed al-Hadi, went to the same home and arrested his
brother, whose name is Mohammed (see below). One of them reportedly admitted to his mother
that they had arrested Mohamed al-Hadi, and Mohamed was later located.
Mostafa Houari, age thirty-six, an employee of the Algerian state oil and gas company
Sonatrach, was arrested at his home in Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers, on the night of April 6, 1996,
by about twenty military and police security forces who questioned his wife about his
acquaintances andfriends.Houari had been arrested for five days in October 1995 and held at
Dely Ibrahim police station in Algiers. He was tried and acquitted of the charge of assisting
members of armed groups by the Bir Mourad criminal court in Algiers in January 1996. Since
his arrest in April 1996, his wife has been unable to locate him despite several letters of inquiry,
including one to Your Excellency's office.
Mourad Ouchefoune, age twenty-five and a medical student from Dar el-Baida in
Algiers, was arrested from his home by police and military forces after midnight on March 17,
1997. According to testimony the family gave to lawyers, the security forces broke into the
house, forced everyone out and checked their identities. They then picked out Mourad,
handcuffed him and led him away, saying he was only required for an investigation. The family
has received no reply to their official inquiries as to his whereabouts.
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
Hadi Saibi, age thirty, was arrested on November 15, 1994. About four Military Security
personnel in cars with private license plates took him away from outside al-Rahma mosque in
Meissonier, Algiers, according to his father and other worshippers leaving the mosque at the
same time. His brother Yahiai, who was in detention at the time, was sentenced in January 1996
to a three-year prison term for having provided services to "terrorists." He was released last June.
Hadi's father has written to a number of senior officials, including the ONDH, the interior,
defense and justice ministers as well as to Your Excellency's office. He was summoned by
police in response to his letter to Your Excellency's office, but was given no information.
Abderrahmane Yemeni, age forty-four, was arrested from his home in Bir Mourad Rais,
Algiers, on June 6, 1996. His wife reportedly said in letters of inquiry that five military security
forces broke into the house in the early afternoon, searched the premises, and arrested Yemeni.
She wrote complaining about the arrest and received a polite letter from the prosecutor general's
office saying authorities were unable to locate him and did not acknowledge his arrest.
Allaoua Ziou, age thirty, a farmer in Heliopolis, Guelma was arrested in the nearby area
of Jebenat Chouhada, on the evening of January 1, 1995 by about four men in civilian clothes
who took him away in a car. According to a brother who lives in Canada, eyewitnesses said they
followed the car up to the gates ofthe Heliopolis gendarmerie barracks. The village gendarmerie
told his family they had no information. The brother in Canada wrote to the ministries of interior,
justice, the ONDH and Your Excellency between March and September 1995 but received no
reply. The ONDH replied to a letter sent by Human Rights Watch saying that "according to
recent information...Mr. Ziou is a militant of the ex-FIS and is implicated in a case of supplying
help to terrorist groups." The ONDH said an arrest warrant, dated January 23, 1995, had been
issued against him but did not acknowledge that he had been taken into custody.
In addition to the preceding cases, we wish to draw your attention to the following
sample of cases of temporary "disappearances." In these cases, the families have been able to
locate relatives only through unofficial channels, sometimes months or years after they were
"disappeared."
Ammar Ghazoul, age thirty-one, an unemployed agricultural engineer, was apparently
arrested in May 1997 by police forces. Family members said police broke into their house in the
early hours of May 4, and when they did not find Ghazoul, took away his mother instead, saying
she was needed for an interrogation. She was released the next day. On May 6, Ghazoul's
brother and neighbors caught sight of him in a police car. He was later listed as a fugitive being
sought in connection with a criminal case involving an attack on government property. After the
family's lawyer brought to the attention of the Algiers criminal court judge and the Prosecutor
General that Ghazoul had apparently been detained, he was presented in early August in court,
where an investigating judge ordered him held in Serkadji prison in Algiers. Ghazoul was still
unable to contact his family, which learned of his whereabouts only through friends who visited
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
other inmates at Serkadji. They are currently attempting to obtain a permit to visit him and to
provide him with legal assistance.
Mohamed Hamidi, is a thirty-three year-old tax inspector in Ben Aknoun. He was
arrested on July 13, 1997, at five o'clock in the moming, by a group of security forces, including
some of those who had arrested his brother, Mohammed al-Hadi (see above). His family wrote
letters of inquiry to the prosecutor general's office, the ONDH and other officials but received no
reply. More than a month later he was found to be held in Serkadji Prison, according to other
detainees who asked their visitors to inform his family. His family has obtained to permission to
visit him every twenty-one days and has seen him once. They are currently seeking legal counsel
for him and trying to leam the charges, if any, against him.
Noureddine Mihoubi, a resident of el-Harrache in Algiers, was arrested in February
1992 as he was visiting a brother in the southern Algerian town of Bousaada. He was held at a
police station there and his family was able to visit him and bring him food and medicine for
fifteen days. Then they were told that he had been transferred to Algiers but were given no
further information. A month later, a newly released detainee told them he had seen Mihoubi at
the Military Security facility at Chateauneuf and that he was in poor health. On May 12, 1996,
the ONDH told his family an arrest warrant had been issued for him on March 31, 1993. In July
of 1996 the family obtained a police report issued the same month saying Mihoubi had been
arrested by security forces and transferred to Algiers on February 7, 1993. It contained no more
details. In early August 1997, a prisoner who had just been released after serving a three-year jail
sentence told Mihoubi's family that he was being held in Blida military jail and was to be tried
by a military court in September. He said Mihoubi had requested a lawyer to defend him in his
upcoming trial. His family was preparing to obtain official permission to visit him and to provide
him with a lawyer.
We also wish to raise the case of Ali Belhadj, one ofthe two chiefs ofthe outlawed
Islamic Salvation Front. Belhadj, who has been held in secret and incommunicado detention
since he was transferred from his former place of imprisonment, apparently at the end of 1994.
He has been serving a prison term after being tried and sentenced in July 1992 to twelve years in
jail for conspiring against state authority, harming the economy, and distributing seditious tracts.
Since his transfer to secret detention at the end of 1994, he has faced new charges following the
alleged discovery of a letter on the body of an armed Islamist implicating Belhadj in incitement
to violence.
Belhadj's lawyers have written to the authorities, including Your Excellency, requesting
their right under Algerian law to have access to their client and charging that his whereabouts
were unknown. His family has also written to the ONDH and other official quarters requesting
the right to visit him.
The cases cited above point to a continuous pattern of enforced disappearance at the
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
hands of different security services in acts that violate Algeria's domestic law and international
obligations. Algeria has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which states in Article 9 (1):
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
requires in Article 3 that each state "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its
jurisdiction." Article 6(1) states: "No order or instruction of any public authority, civilian,
military or other, may be invoked to justify an enforced disappearance." Furthermore, Article 7
of the Declaration specifies "No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify
enforced disappearances."
The Declaration stipulates in Article 10 that detainees must be held in officially
recognized places of detention, that their families must be promptly informed of their place of
detention and that they must have access to a lawyer. These provisions are intended to prevent
"disappearances." Guidelines for punitive action against officials responsible for acts of
enforced disappearance and for compensation of its victims are found in Article 14 and Article
19 respectively:
Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance in a particular
State shall, when the facts disclosed by an official investigation so warrant, be brought
before the competent civil authorities of that State for the purpose of prosecution and
trial....All States should take any lawful and appropriate action available to them to bring
all persons presumed responsible for an act of enforced disappearance, who are found to
be within their jurisdiction or under their control, to justice.
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and
shall have the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of
enforced disappearance, their dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.
Algerian law also provides a number of safeguards against "disappearances." Article 51
of the Code of Penal Procedure (CPP) states that when a criminal investigation necessitates
holding a detainee without a warrant, "the officer must immediately inform the prosecutor
general." Article 51 also stipulates:
While protecting the confidentiality of the investigation, the police officer is obligated to
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
grant to the person held in pre-arraignment detention all means for enabling him to
communicate immediately and directly with his family and to receive visits by it.
[Toute en veillant au secret de I 'enquete, I 'officier de police judiciaire est tenu de mettre
a la disposition de la personne gardee a vue, tout moyen lui permettant de communiquer
immediatement et directement avec sa familie, et de recevoir ses visites. ]
A time limit of twelve days is imposed on garde a vue (pre-arraignment) detention in
cases of suspected terrorist or subversive acts, according to Article 8 of Decree 95-10 issued on
25 November 1995 and amending Article 51 of the CPP. During that time, detainees must appear
before the Prosecutor General if they are to be charged, according to Article 51, second
paragraph:
If there is evidence that is substantial and corroborating so as to warrant the filing of
charges, the police officer must present the detainee to the Prosecutor General without
holding the detainee in his custody for more than forty-eight hours [amended to twelve
days as indicated above].
[S'il existe contre une personne des indices graves et concordants de nature a motiver
son inculpation, I 'officier de police judiciaire doit la conduire devant le procureur de la
Republique, sans pouvoir la garder a sa disposition plus de quarante-huit heures.]
Similarly, amended Article 65 stipulates that if detainees are to be kept longer than
twelve days, they must be brought before the Prosecutor General, who can order an extension of
the pre-arraignment detention by not more than twelve additional days.
The CPP, in Article 51, sixth paragraph, stipulates punishment of officers who violate
articles ofthe CPP:
The violation of regulations concerning the period of garde a vue detention as provided in
the preceding paragraphs makes the officer subject to penalties specified in the section
dealing with arbitrary detention.
[La violation des dispositions relatives aux delais de garde a vue tels que prevus aux
alineas precedents expose I'officier de police judiciaire aux peines encourues en matiere
de detention arbitraire.J
In each of the cases presented above, we are concerned that violations both of Algerian
law and of Algeria's international obligations may have occurred. To clarify the circumstances in
these cases, we would be grateful to receive the following information for each one:
•
confirmation whether he is in official custody, and if so, his precise whereabouts;
�Letter to President Zeroual from Human Rights Watch
•
his legal status, and whether and when he has been brought before a judicial authority
after being taken into custody;
•
the charges, if any against him; and
•
10
whether he has had visits by his legal counsel and by his family; and
We would also be grateful to receive assurances that detainees will be held only in
publicly recognized places of detention, and information about:
•
disciplinary actions that have been taken against persons involved in causing
"disappearances".
•
policies in place to prevent "disappearances" by providing families with accurate and upto-date information about the whereabouts of persons in official custody; and by
providing persons in official custody the possibility of contacting legal counsel promptly
upon arrest.
•
Measures to compensate victims of wrongful detention, as provided for by Article 19 of
the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.
In closing, we wish to thank you for your consideration, and ask that you excuse us for
addressing this letter to you in English.
We hope to receive information from you by October 6, so that we can disseminate it at
the same time that we release this letter publicly.
Sincerely yours.
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
cc: Minister of Justice Mohamed Adami
Minister of Interior Mustapha Benmansour
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Attaf
Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, Washington, D.C.
Me. M. Kemal Rezzag-Bara, President, Observatoire National des Droits de I'Homme
�APPENDIX B
Statement by Human Rights Watch of September 26
Human Rights Watch
29
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
1522 K St. N
W
Washington, D 2000s
C
Telephone: 202-371-6592
Facsimile: 202-371-0124
E-mail: hrwdcShrw.org
Website; http.V/www.hrw.org
HUMAN WCHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST
Hanny Megally
Executlw Director
Virginia N. Sherry
Associate Director
Joe Stork
Advocacy Director
Clarisa Bencomo
Elahi Sharifpour-Hicks
Nejla Sammakia
Research Associates
Georgina Copty
Awali Samara
Associates
ADVISORY COMMimE
Gary G. Sick
Chair
Lisa Anderson
Bruce Rabb
Vice Chairs
Shaul Bakhash
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Martin Blumenthai
Paul Chcvigny
Helena Cobban
Patricia Derian
Stanley Engelstein
Edith Everetl
Mansour Farhang
Christopher E. George
Rita E. Hauser
Rcv.J. Bryan Hehir
Edy Kaufman
Marina Pinto Kaufman
Samir Khalaf
Judith Kipper
Pnina Lahav
Ann M. Lesch
Stephen P. Marks
Rolando Matalon
Philip Matur
David K. Shipler
Sanford Solender
Mary Ann Stein
Shibley Telhami
Andrew Whitley
Napoleon B. Williams, Jr.
James J. Zogby
H M N RIGHTS W T H
UA
AC
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Susan Osnos
Associate Director
Michele Alexander
Development Director
Cynthia Brawn
Program Director
Barbara Guglielmo
Finance & Administration
Director
Lotte Leicht
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 26, 1997
For more information, contact:
Eric Goldstein (Washington): 202 371 6592 ext. 115
Joe Stork (Washington): 202 371 6592 ext. 118
Nejla Sammakia (Washington): 202 371 6592 ext. 144
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CONDEMNS ALGERIA MASSACRES, CALLS ON
GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION,
ENDORSES U.N. CALL FOR "URGENT SOLUTION"
(Washington, September 26,1997) — Human Rights Watch condemns unequivocally the
murderous attacks in Algeria that in the last several days and weeks have added the deaths
of hundreds of civilians to the toll of the civil war there, and calls on the government there
to facilitate international scrutiny of these incidents.
"Responsibility and motive for the killings-or even the numbers and identity of the
victims-will remain a matter of speculation until the government breaks its longstanding
obstruction to independent monitoring," said Eric Goldstein, research director of the
international human rights organization's Middle East division. "The government has
imposed a shroud of censorship over virtually all independent reporting of these horrendous
crimes, making itself the sole source of what very limited information has been available."
Many of the inhabitants of Sidi Rais and Bentalha, the sites of the most extensive recent
carnage, are reportedly sympathizers of the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The
government blames the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), as does the FIS. Algerians have
attributed past attacks to a combination of actors, including the GIA, rival armed groups, and
government-backed militia, and to a variety of motives, ranging from political assaults to
vendettas and land disputes.
Human Rights Watch has condemned the deliberate attacks on civilians by any party~as well
as the government obstruction and censorship which has blocked investigations of the
massacres and suppressed information about them.
Brussels Office Director
Susan Osnos
Communications Director
Wilder Tayler
General Counsel
Joanna Weschler
United Nations
Representative
Robert L
Chair
Bemstein
A unilateral ceasefire recently announced by Madani Mezarag, commander of the Islamic
Salvation Army, the military wing of the FIS, could be an important step toward deescalating the violence that has afflicted the country and toward isolating those responsible
for attacks on civilians.
BRUSSELS
HONGKONG
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
MOSCOW
NEWYORK
RIO DE JANEIRO
WASHINGTON
�The government, for its part, has a responsibility to provide for the security of its citizens, and it
must do so by means that are consistent with Algeria's obligations under international human rights
and humanitarian law. Some of the most recent attacks have occurred in the vicinity of army
barracks, notably the attack on Sidi Rais, and survivors of this attack and in Bentalha have reportedly
charged that security forces did not respond to their calls for assistance.
Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Algeria to allow Algerian and foreign journalists
and human rights monitors to investigate the massacres that have occurred and to end the censorship
and restrictions that have effectively prevented local and international media from reporting on the
internal security situation, including human rights violations. The government continues to deny
visas to many journalists and human rights researchers, severely restricts access to sites where
civilians have been killed, and closely monitors those interviews with survivors that it does permit.
Human Rights Watch has long advocated greater concern on the part of the international community
toward Algeria's crisis, and applauded U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's public call earlier this
month for an "urgent solution" to end the bloodshed. The government rejected Annan's initiative
as "unacceptable" and as "external intervention." When governments ratify the basic international
human rights instruments, as Algeria has done, they agree to forego the dubious claim that human
rights are merely an internal, sovereign matter rather than a subject of universal concern. Given the
scale of human rights abuses taking place in Algeria, Human Rights Watch urges the international
community to fulfill its duty to take appropriate measures aimed at halting the slaughter of civilians.
Human Rights Watch's most recent report on Algeria is Elections in the Shadow of Violence (June
1997).
mm
Human Rights Watch/Middle East
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance
of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories
of the Helsinki accords. It is supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. It accepts
no government funds, directly or indirectly. Kenneth Roth is the executive director and Robert L. Bemstein is the chair
ofthe board. Its Middle East division was established in 1989 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally
recognized human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Hanny Megally is the executive director.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Gopher Address: gopher://gopher.humanrights.org:5000/l l/int/hrw
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to majordomo@igc.apc.org with "subscribe hrw-news"
in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).
�APPENDIX C
Joint Statement of October 15 by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International
Federation of Human Rights and Reporters without Borders
Human Rights Watch
31
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�15 October 1997
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
REPORTERS SANS FRONTI RES
ALGERIA: A CALL FOR ACTION TO END A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Human
Rights Watch and Reporters sans frontieres join together to appeal to the international
community to act now to address the deteriorating human rights situation in Algeria, and are
calling on members of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to convene a Special
Session on the human rights situation in Algeria. As the UN body with primary responsibility
for the promotion and protection of human rights, we look to the Commission on Human Rights
to provide leadership in seeking solutions to this human rights tragedy.
The last year has seen the longest, most intense spell of violence since the beginning of
the conflict in Algeria five years ago. Violence which has taken a new and terrifying turn with
the massacre of civilians.
Thousands of people - women and children, the poor and elderly -- have been massacred
with unspeakable brutality. Some of those lucky enough to have escaped having their throats cut
or being burned alive in their homes have reached nearby security forces posts and called for
help. In vain.
Their cries have not been heard in their country, or beyond their national borders. Up to
80,000 people have been killed behind a virtual wall of silence on the part of the international
community.
Recent statements of the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, UNICEF and the UNHCR condemning the massacres of civilians and other human rights
abuses in Algeria go some way towards breaking through the barriers of silence surrounding the
crisis. But words are not enough.
The international community has for too long turned a blind eye to the plight of the
victims in Algeria, in spite of the warnings sounded by human rights organizations. The UN
Commission on Human Rights has so far not scrutinized the situation. It is time to take concrete
action to end this spiral of violence and to ensure the protection of the civilian population.
The need to investigate and reveal the truth is the first step to finding solutions to this
human rights tragedy. For this reason, we are calling for the establishment of an international
investigation to ascertain the facts, examine allegations of responsibility and to make
recommendations in respect of the massacres and other abuses by all sides in Algeria. Such an
�investigation has to be provided with broad powers, adequate staff and resources. It should
collect evidence, statements, including testimony from victims, witnesses and responsible
officials, to discover the truth.
Since the outbreak ofthe current conflict in 1992, extrajudicial executions, deliberate and
arbitrary killings, torture, rape, "disappearances" and hostage-taking have become routine. The
large-scale massacres of civilians over the past year have taken place against a background of
increasingly widespread human rights abuses by security forces, state-armed militias and armed
Islamist groups, which have increasingly targeted and terrorized civilians. Disregard for human
rights has become the rule rather than the exception. This is despite the fact that Algeria has
ratified important international and regional human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Time after time, the Algerian Government has simply failed to investigate these abuses by
its own forces and by armed opposition groups, and to bring those responsible to justice. This
failure has exacerbated the breakdown of law and order and left civilians feeling ever more alone
and unprotected.
The complex reality of violence and counter-violence has become increasingly confused
with the clampdown on information and investigations. Information defined by the authorities as
"security-related" is censored and manipulated. International human rights organizations and
foreign media have often been refused entry to the country. Human rights workers and journalists
who have been let into the country have been subject to surveillance and restrictions. Those who
have continued to work in the country have faced death threats and killings. All of these actions
have contributed to building a wall of silence around the human rights crisis in Algeria
We echo the call of the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the UN and African institutions, and urge
Member States of the OAU to support an initiative of this kind.
In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement with Algeria, which
contains provisions for the respect of human rights, we urge Member States of the European
Union to work for the special session of the Commission on Human Rights and the
investigation to become a reality.
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, UN Member States
reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of all hunmn rights is a legitimate concern ofthe
international community. We call on them now to honour their pledge.
The Algerian Government routinely accuses anyone criticizing their human rights record
of deliberately lying, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and political bias. Human rights
protection is not just an internal affair or an issue of national sovereignty. Algeria is not above
international scrutiny. At a time when its citizens are being slaughtered en masse week after
�week, the government of Algeria should welcome - not oppose - international attention aimed at
helping to protect lives. /END/
�APPENDIX D
Letter from Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra to Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch
34
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�THE AMBASSADOR OF ALGERIA
WASHINGTON, D. C
September 30, 1997
Mr. Kenneth Roth
Executive Director,
Human Rights Watch
1522 K Street, N.W.,
Suite 910
Washington, D.C. 20005-1202
Dear Mr. Roth:
I have read your correspondence dated September 12, 1997, and would like
to convey to you the following comments on the course of action undertaken by
your organization, its timing and contents.
1.
Your course of action claims to be in keeping with the framework of the talks
that the two Human Rights Watch delegates had in Algiers in March-April 1997 and
the meeting that I had on June 17, 1997, at the Embassy with two members of your
staff. Thus, you imply the existence of a functional continuity in your exchanges
with the Algerian Government and you keep silent on the fact that the contacts you
mentioned are linked by the all-too-famous 35 page report published by HRW in
June 1997 under the title "Algeria: Elections in the Shadow of Violence and
Repression." It is therefore necessary to stress the fact that the purpose of the
meeting at the Embassy was to explain to Mr. Eric Goldstein and Ms. Najla
Sammakia the extend to which the report I referred to was a flagrant demonstration
of a partial attitude regarding the pluralist democratic process in Algeria, to further
�make the point that the questioning by Human Rights Watch of the constitutional
order in Algeria has the effect to deprive any meaningful dialogue of an
indispensable common ground, and that my interlocutors would better serve the
cause of human rights, to which Algeria is deeply attached, only if they established
a constructive dialogue with the Observatoire National des Droits de THomme.
within due respect for Algerian legislation.
Your course of action, obviously, was not undertaken in that spirit. It is
rather a new attempt intended to amplify the exclusively politically motivated
propaganda led by those who have made it their occupation to relentlessly distort
the realities of today's Algeria. This course of action, similar to all those adopted
in the past and to your press release of September 26, 1997, very distinctly
pronounces a predetermined guilty verdict against the Algerian Authorities,
ceaselessly exposed to the trials by ambush set up for them by Human Rights Watch.
2.
Your correspondence arrived at a time when countless voices were rising
from all corners to condemn the horrible massacres of dozens of innocent civilians
that terrorist groups perpetrate with a barbarity which revolts national consciousness and world opinion. Yet, your voluminous mailing did not include a single
word of sympathy for all those victims or any reaffirmation of the fundamental right
to life which naturally is the foremost of all human rights. Furthermore, that was
not even an involuntary omission on your part: indeed, one of your assistants,
seemingly resorting to her privileged sources, explained to us the silence of Human
Rights Watch by the uncertainty as to who the actual perpetrators of the massacres
are!? Besides, is it not a mere coincidence that this new campaign of bitter
denunciation of my country started a few weeks before the holding of local elections
which will enable Algeria to carry through the building process of pluralist
democratic institutions? Similarly to last June when the Algerian people were called
to exercise their will in all sovereignty, the coming election seems to disturb those
who bet on the instability and the weakening of my country.
3.
Under the improper title of "disappeared", your correspondence lists names
of individuals some of whom have been duly sentenced by courts of law, other
persons whose arrests you noted have not been established by the competent
authorities, along with other cases being handled by the Observatoire National des
�Droits de rHomme. This amalgam and the circumstantial approximations
surrounding it in your document would lead any reader to think that its writers have
sought to and succeeded in assembling "info-ammunition" in order to deliberately
dramatize the situation of human rights in Algeria. Even the references you made
to some of the provisions of Algerian law which codify the guarantees enjoyed by
the citizens were made in order to imply that such dispositions have been violated
rather than to acknowledge the overall advances made by the rule of law in Algeria
in difficult circumstances.
May I conclude by assuring you that the Algerian Authorities, who are fully
aware of the requirements of the international commitments and the laws and
regulations of the country, have been fighting terrorism with a high sense of the
human being's value and dignity. I would also like to assure you that the
fundamental right to life, which in your document is not granted the place that it
deserves, is sacrosanct in an Algeria which made immense sacrifices to recover its
sovereignty and continues today to make similar sacrifices for democracy.
Finally, I would like to ask you, if I may, to disseminate my letter if and
when you choose to make yours public, so that your readers may not, once again,
be limited to a one-sided vision of the reality in Algeria.
�APPENDIX E
For families and friends of the "disappeared": What you can do
Often the best way to provide assistance for a "disappeared" relative is to make public the
information about his or her situation — and to seek the support of domestic and international human rights
bodies. International human rights organizations can offer support in publicizing the plight of a victim of
"disappearance," and help the family use specialized human rights procedures of the United Nations that are
keyed specifically to making urgent interventions on behalf of the "disappeared."
Organizations such as Human Rights Watch respect the need, in many cases, to withhold the identity
of the sources of reports of human rights abuse in order to minimize the risk to them. The risk for families
and others who protest the secret detention of their loved ones may be a real one, and we can only seek to
minimize any risk. International human rights groups have a range of options in their work for the
"disappeared." They can publicize individual cases of the "disappeared" including, when known, the
circumstances of their detentions, with a view to mobilizing international pressure on the governments
involved to release them or to acknowledge their detentions and whereabouts, and the reasons they are being
held. Publicity is also an important means to ensure the individuals believed to be in secret detention are not
simply forgotten. Alternatively, international organizations can formally communicate, without publicity,
to the governments involved and to intergovernmental bodies which have as part of their responsibility to
raise urgent cases directly with governments.
The provision of basic information about any "disappearance" is essential to facilitate domestic and
international action on behalf of the victim: the name and other identifying information about the person who
was seized and "disappeared," a detailed account of the time, place and circumstances of the detention, and
the measures taken to establish the whereabouts and legal situation of the "disappeared." A photograph of
the "disappeared" can in itself prove a potent antidote when governments act as i f a secret detainee had
never existed.
In continuing our work to end "disappearances" in Algeria, Human Rights Watch is interested in
establishing contact with families who believe that their relatives are "disappeared." Updated information
on "disappearances" is important for work on behajf of the "disappeared" even when particular details—and
names— must remain confidential. Human Rights Watch will respect requests by relatives not to make
public certain information. Below, we provide information about how to contact us.
The United Nations has a special mechanism available for the families and friends of the
"disappeared." It is called the Working Group on Enforced or.Involuntary Disappearances. The Working
Group was established in 1980 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which meets in
Geneva, Switzerland. Since 1980, the Working Group has made inquiries to governments about thousands
of cases of "disappearances" in more than forty countries around the world.
The Working Group accepts and examines reports about "disappearances" that are submitted to it
by relatives of the "disappeared" or by human rights organizations acting on behalf of the family. The
Working Group meets three times a year for six to eight working days. In May 1997, the Working Group
met in New York, and Human Rights Watch presented this report to its members and discussed the problem
of "disappearances" in Lebanon.
Although international human rights groups regularly submit requests for urgent action to the
Working Group, families may want to contact the Working Group directly on behalf of relatives who are
"disappeared." For that purpose, we outline below the basic information this dynamic part of the U.N.'s
humanrightsstructure requires in order to act. In the appendix of this report is a copy of a form produced
Human Rights Watch
37
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�by the Working Group, which the relatives of the "disappeared" can use to mail information to the Working
Group about a specific case.
If you would like to report the case of a relative who has "disappeared" to the Working Group, you
should submit the following minimum information:
•
The full name of the "disappeared" person.
•
When the "disappearance" occurred.
The date of the "disappearance," including the day, month and year, if known. You can include either the
date of the abduction or arrest, or the date that the missing person was last seen.
•
Where the "disappearance" occurred.
The place of the arrest or abduction, or the place where the "disappeared" person was last seen.
•
Information about who or what agency is responsible, if known
Information about parties that were presumed to have carried out the arrest or abduction, and/or the parties
that are believed to be holding the "disappeared" person in unacknowledged detention.
•
Information about the search.
The steps that your family, and others, have taken to determine the fate and the whereabouts of the
"disappeared" person.
You must submit information in writing to the Working Group at the following address:
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
Centre for Human Rights
United Nations Office at Geneva
CH-1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
You may also contact Human Rights Watch about the case of a "disappeared" family member, in
any of the following ways:
By mail:
Human Rights Watch
Middle East and North Africa Division
1522 K St., NW, Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20005-1202 USA
By mail to oiir post office box in New York, without the need to use our name:
P.O. Box 4428
Grand Central Station
New York, N.Y. 10163
By facsimile:
Human Rights Watch
Middle East and North Africa Division
Washington, DC fax: 202/371-0124
By email to our office in Washington: hrwdc@hrw.org
Human Rights Watch
38
:
February 1998, Vol.10, No. 1(E)
�APPENDIX F
Form for submission oflnformation to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
Human Rights Watch
39
February 1998, Vol.10, No.l(E)
�CHR/WGEID/1987
UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE FOR H M N RIGHTS
UA
Explanatory note for the submission of information on enforced
or involuntary disappearances of persons
Reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons may be
transmitted to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of
the Commission of Human Rights, c/o Centre for Human Rights, United Nations
Office at Geneva, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, cable address UNATIONS
GENEVA, telex 289696.
Experience has shown that information on the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of a person varies greatly in detail by reason of the nature of
each case and the surrounding circumstances. While i t i s important to receive
as much information as possible, missing details should not prevent the
submission of reports. However, the Working Group can only deal with clearly
identified individual cases containing the following minimum elements of
information;
(a) Full name of the missing person (including any available data
relevant to the missing person's identification, such as national
identity document number, photograph, etc.);
(b) Year, month, day of the disappearance;
(c) Place of arrest or abduction or where the missing person was last
seen;
(d) Indication of the persons believed to have carried out the arrest or
abduction;
(e) Indication of the action taken by the relatives or others to locate
the missing person (inquiries with authorities, habeias corpus
petitions, etc.);
(f) Identity of the person or organization submitting the report (name
and address, which w i l l be kept confidential upon request).
Information on the enforced or involuntary disappearance of a person may
be submitted in any written form, in urgent cases preferably by cable or telex.
In submitting such reports, consideration nay be given to preparing a
narrative summary of the events and providing, to the extent possible, the
information listed on the attached form. A photograph of the missing person
and annexes, such as habeas corpus petitions or statements of witnesses, can
be sent with the suggested form. Please send only copies of documents, the
originals should remain in your f i l e s . The person or organization Baking the
report should be clearly identified and an address should be given at which
they can be contacted. I f the author of the report i s not a relative of the
missing person, but acts, directly or indirectly, upon the family's request,
he should resain in contact with the family, since any replies obtained by the
Working Group on the missing person's fate or whereabouts are for the
exclusive information of the relatives.
GE. 89-17300
GE.94-17988
�CHR/WGEID/1987
page 2
REPORT ON THE ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE OF A PERSON
I.
Identity of the person subjected to enforced or involuntary
disappearance
1.
Family name;
2.
First name;
3.
Sex: Male
Female
4. Birth date or age (at time of disappearance):
5. Nationality (ies):
6. C i v i l status (single, married, etc.):
7.
Identity document:
Nr.
8. Profession:
9. Address of usual residence:
•':
>'
W.'
..
"
;> *
10. Activities: (trade union, political, religious,
humanitarian/solidarity, press, etc.)
I I . Date of disappearance
11. Year, month, day and hour when missing person was arrested or
abducted:
12. Year, month, day and hour when missing person was l a s t seen:
13. Other indications relating to date of disappearance:
I*-,. . V
.
«
�CHR/WGEID/1987
page 3
III.
Place of disappearance
(please indicate as precisely as possible country, province, city,
location, etc. and i f identical with home address)
14. Place where missing person was arrested or abducted:
15. Place where missing person was last seen:
16. I f subsequent to the disappearance of the person information was
received about him/her being detained, please indicate, i f possible, the
places (official or others) and period of detention, as well as the source of
the information, in particular witnesses who have seen the disappeared person
in captivity.
(Do you wish the identity of the witnesses or sources to be
kept confidential?
)
17. Other indications concerning the place of disappearance;
IV.
Forces believed to be responsible for the disappearance
18.If the person was arrested or abducted, please indicate who carried
out the arrest: military, police, persons in uniform or civilian clothes,
agents of security services, unidentified; whether these agents identified
themselves (with credentials, orally, etc.); whether they were armed; whether
they appeared to act with impunity;
whether a vehicle was used (official,
with or without licence plates, etc.)
�CHR/WGEID/1987
page 4
19. I f the forces or agents who carried out the arrest or abduction cannot
be identified, state why you believe that Governnent authorities, or
persons linked to them, are responsible for the disappearance;
20. I f the arrest or abduction took place in the presence of witnesses
indicate the names of the witnesses. I f the witnesses have not
identified themselves or wish to withold their names, indicate i f they
are relatives, neighbours, bypassers etc.:
21. I f any written evidence of the arrest exists, please describe (arrest
order, communiques, o f f i c i a l notes, letters, etc.):
22. I f a search took place of the missing person's domicile, office or place
of work, (or that of any other person connected with him/her) , before,
during or after the disappearance, please indicate and describe the
search:
23. I f someone was questioned concerning the disappeared person by agents of
the security services, o f f i c i a l authorities or other persons related to
them, before or after the arrest (or disappearance), please indicate and
provide available information concerning the questioning:
�CHR/WGEID/1987
page 5
V.
National action (legal or other) on behalf of the missing person
A.
Habeas corpus, amparo or similar
24. Nature of the action:
25. Date:
-
26. Tribunal:
27. Result (date and nature):
28. I f a judicial decision exists please indicate i t s contents, i f possible:
B.
Criminal complaints
29. Nature of the action:
30. Date;
31. Tribunal:
32. Result (date and nature):
33. I f a judicial decision exists please indicate i t s contents, i f possible:
C.
Other measures taken at the national level
(letters, petitions, etc., or other steps taken before the c i v i l or
military authorities):
VI.
Measures taken at the international level on behalf of the missing person
34. Organizations addressed
35. Date:
36. Result (date and nature):
�CHR/WGEID/1987
page 6
VII.
Related cases of arrest or disappearance, in particular missing
relatives or children
37. Please give a narrative account indicating relevant names, dates and
places:
38. I f the missing person was pregnant at the time of disappearance, please
indicate the date on which her baby might have been born:
VIII. Information concerning the author of the present report
39. Surname:
40. First name:
41. Nationality (ies):
42. Relationship with the missing person:
43. Present address:
Telephone
IX.
Confidentiality
44. Please state whether the author of the present report wishes his/her
identity to be kept confidential:
Note: I f any information contained in the present report should be kept
confidential please print the word "CONFIDENTIAL" beside the relevant
. entry.
X.
Date:
Signature of author:
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Massacres in Algeria, 1997-1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Automated Records Management System
National Security Council
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Identifier
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2009-1295-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to massacres that took place in Algeria in 1997 and 1998. The records include press materials, news summaries, correspondence, and reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Preisdential Records; White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: Automated Records Management System
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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20 folders in 3 boxes
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
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Algeria [1]
Creator
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National Security Council
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs Office
Scott Busby
Source
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7585640
42-t-7585640-20091295F-001-001-2015-2015-2015
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2009-1295-F
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Box 1
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585640">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47918">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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9/30/2015