1
500
47
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/92984ee7c431217acfae5521e103b2ac.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning PRD-13
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2008-1220-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/21/2018
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material related to Presidential Review Document (PRD) - 13: Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<b>Scanned documents that are a part of this Mandatory Declassification Review are not associated with a Freedom of Information Act Request</b>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
8/29/2018
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2008-1220-M.pdf
26457815
PRD
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e8aa34e774b7516b2a5ced40003693cc.pdf
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Somalia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0988-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Somalia in 1993. Materials include a July 12, 1993 report concerning Somali warlord General Aideed and a December 7, 1993 report on the Somali ports of Chisimayu and Boosaaso.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0988-M
26457815
Declassified
Deputies Committee
PC
Principals Committee
Somalia
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/2a333df65ba1c3b34d76a9870a311331.pdf
cd6c4e403c15830ac868fd2b12cbee30
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0811-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between President Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder between October 27, 1998 and December 21, 1999. Materials include a National Security Council Records Management Office profile sheet for a letter from Chancellor Schroeder to President Clinton in March 1999.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0811-M
26457815
Germany
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/4f726b07bab26288c7fa8c6d5d0b721a.pdf
d14851ce7461a6eb438bb812a566c18d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0810-M-2
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between President Clinton and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Materials include a letter from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to German Minister of Defense Volker Ruehe from July 1997.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0810-M-2
26457815
Germany
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/5d060d0f48772b369e7f2d8f8f4e1e51.pdf
7871096262b4f4bcf933086b731376f9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning French President Francois Mitterrand
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0808-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between President Clinton and French President Francois Mitterrand between January 20, 1995 and May 17, 1995. Materials include a March 19, 1995 cable transmitting a message from Clinton to Mitterrand regarding participation in V-E Day Commemorations.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0808-M
26457815
France
Francois Mitterrand
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ad17e516cf7582ecab621819c11516ad.pdf
de3cffb1358314bb63c307aee1233118
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0777-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on memcons and telcons between President Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Materials include two copies of a cover memorandum from Lawrence Butler to Samuel Berger on February 10, 1999 transmitting briefing materials for the President's' meeting with Schroeder the following day.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0777-M
26457815
Germany
Memcon
Telcon
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/fb6ab4e40c3ab9f13b2738deb2604303.pdf
40b69cfb3700d2215b944dff809d77db
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning NATO Expansion
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0772-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on NATO expansion from the NSC Records Management System. Materials include a chart illustrating trends in Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo and a biography of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0772-M
26457815
Bosnia
NATO
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d7309797f261e4d4498490c4087830c3.pdf
f2d0143683cd6020ec64731b3c9e0d9f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning NATO Expansion
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0768-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings concerning NATO expansion from 1993 to 1999. Materials include a list of East European and CIS forces available for peacekeeping activities.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0768-M
26457815
Declassified
Deputies Committee
NATO
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f967e1124534aa886745afe723a34812.pdf
e4627276e0ee0c738ed564272186cdaf
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning China
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0221-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on China. Materials include agendas for the November 10, 1993 meeting of the Principals Committee and the February 6, 1995 meeting of the Deputies Committee, as well as a list of bilateral U.S.-China issues.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/15/2016
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2015-0221-M
26457815
China
Declassified
Deputies Committee
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ac2b4ab232852cfaaa314abe71bd6719.pdf
b75e41208e4db93daa658a9b98420e96
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents Concerning Hungarian President Arpad Goncz
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2015-0133-M
Date Available
Date (often a range) that the resource became or will become available.
9/19/2016
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on meetings between President Clinton and/or Vice President Gore and President Arpad Goncz of Hungary from 1993 to 2000. Materials include biographies of President Goncz and President Michal Kovac of Slovakia.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26457815">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Provenance
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War Crimes
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/f5dc6559a12c1fc6d14e00cbaf4b09be.pdf
a4fa44c8031a2395960af2301a830001
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2013-0682-M
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PC
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Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/69daf8a507be46da42aacd8ff71a3bc5.pdf
77258f67d837ba9c81ae3a573a0233b9
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2011-0261-M
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df496435dccfe87c079e570686721e50
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Declassified Documents Concerning Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
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2007-1829-M
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Japan
Memcon
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81087b5ee20e37b1803873db43bc5c51
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Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�3087
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1.0 I
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATICN
SUBJECT:
Telcon with ~abour Party Leader and Prime
Minister-elect Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Mr. Blair
Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Marc Koehler
and Marian~a Papadimitriou
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May I, 1997, 11:25-11:27 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Hello.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
. Hello?
Tony?
Congratulations.
Thanks very much indeed.
The President:
What are you doing, making a round of parties?
Mr. Blair: Yes we are just off. There's a big celebration by
the banks of the Thames. I'm just heading off there now. We're
slowing duwn through the night. It's a stunning result, really.
The President:
Mr. Blair:
Yes, it's amazing, isn't it?
The President:
Mr. Blair:
That was amazing.
I'm really happy for you.
Yes, well you showed the way.
The President:
I'm sorry you got so much grief from the press.
Mr. Blair: That's right.
Left don't defend you.
.
Always the Right attack you and the
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 1
'~' ·~_f'''~';;' DECLASSI~ICATION ~ATE: October 14,2015
,_At'"
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President: Well, the people voted for you. That's the main
thing.
I wish you well and look forward to working with you.
I
guess I'll see you soon, at that NATO meeting, if not. sooner.
Mr. Blair: Yes, that's right.
I would love to do that. We have
a chance to do something now.
I look forward to meeting with
you. We have a good and strong relationship.
The President: See you soon. Go on back to your people now.
just wanted to wish you congratulations.
Mr. Blair:
Thanks, thank you very much indeed.
The P.resident:
Mr. Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
End of Conversation
I
�CONFlOENriAL
GOHFIDji;NTIAI..
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Private Meeting with Prime Minister Blair and
British Cabinet (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Daley, Secretary of Commerce
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, NSC (Noteta~ec)
Prime Minister Blair
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister for Overseas Affairs
Members of the British Cabinet
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 11:40 a.m. - 12 noon
The Cabinet Room, No. 10 Downing Street
Prime Minister Blair:
(Following introductions of Cabinet
members)
Parliament is in recess; we are having a hell of a time
getting underway -- the honeymoon doesn't last long.
The second
term is what we need; to take nothing for granted and not rely on
the other side's unpopularity. »Ci
The President:
I am delighted to be here.
I admire what you did
for the party; it is important to have the freedom to capture the
center and move into tomorrow. -f€t
Prime Minister Blair:
The truth is we took part of what we did
from you;
I am happy that these issues are on the agenda in the
rest of Europe now. ~
The President:
There are some leaders like the prime ministers
of the Netherlands and Portugal who have the same ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
other examples.
~
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
Reason:
1.5 (b) ,
Declassify On, , 6/
And Sweden -- it is helpful to look at
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 2
5€;~;iiooiE]' O:"hff 14, 2015
�CONFIDtNTlAL
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
2
The President:
Kok was talking about France; they are not ready
yet to do what is needed.
~he UK, the Netherlands and the Uniterl
states have good social compacts that make the country work; in
the United States we need to maintain competitiveness while
looking out for people. Millions can't cope with work and
family; and these are the people who face education and safe
streets and health care challenges.
If you succeed, and I think.
you will, constructive change will have to take place.
France
and Germany need to balance social programs and global realities;
a different version of that problem faces us all. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is why it is so important to exchange
ideas; we have learned from the best and worst of experiences;
there. must .be structural change.
It could well be premature to
. introduce the euro without it. ;e1
The President:
It is interesting how a currency acquires a life
of its own -- it has become the litmus test for France and
Germany, though the underlying changes have not taken place.
yz(
(Cabinet meeting adjourned, discussion continued with Chancellor
of Exchequer Brown.)
Mr. Brown:
There is a need for a flexible labor market, which
you faced up to in the United States. You have 50 percent more
consumption per head than France and Germany because they have
not liberalized shopping hours, and 50 percent more computer
work.
If possible, we should make the G-7 the forum for
discussion of flexible labor forces so others can learn from the
U.s. experience.
The debate needs to go forward in Europe.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't mean giving up the social
compact but it is. a new world.
The role of government is not
about hostilities with business but to equip people with the
skills and technology they need and help families. ~
The President:
I agree with that.
k81
Mr. Brown:
In Great Britain, the long-term unemployed make up 40
percent of our unemployed, compared with 10 percent in the United
States. We have no way to get them back to work. There will
have to be huge changes; France is the best example because their
public sectqr is huge. We need to demonstrate that growth and
social programs can work together -- you do not have to sacrifice.
one for the other.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Jospin that he was attacking the
right for the wrong reasons -- he should be doing it because they
are not going far enough. Je7
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President:
We cut government employment by 300,000.
It is
now the smallest since the Kennedy Administration and, on a per
capita basis, the smallest it has been since 1933. We have
direct transfers to social security and to state and local
governments. You could be helpful with the difficulties within
France and Germany with regard to social spending. At least in
Germany they spend the money better, on long-terr:. training i in
France people are paid to stay unemployed for very long periods.
],Kf
Mr. Brown:
The system can only work if there is mobility,
flexibility and la~ge transfers. Right now, none of these three
exists. 0
.The President:
There is one thing to look at.
I know the United
states are different than EU member nations, but you would be
interested in how far big states can go in having different
financial policies. New Jersey is an example - - i t proved you
can raise the minimum wage and create more low-wage jobs.
I used
this experience to justify our rc:ising the minimum wage. But
unemployment will go up if the rise is too big. Your
unemployment rate is lower than other Europeans' because of your
f1exible system. -+-er
.
Mr. Brown:
Since they are not required to work, no long-term
unemployed single parents are included in our statistics.
That means unemployment is really closer to 20 percent in some
cases. We have the biggest single-parent population in Europe.
-+-er
The President:
If the culture says it is no longer necessary to
have a marriage to have children, then that means single parents
should have to work. ~
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
�6EGRE"T
SECRET
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
.
I.
o
~~
WASHINGTON
o~
('>0
Ir)ECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
i iNTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
I E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 3
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
Restricted Meeting with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, National Security Council
(Notetaker)
Anthony Blair, Prime Minister
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
John Holmes, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff to the
Prime Minister
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:00-12:30 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
Prime Minister Blair:
Should we work through our cards?
(U)
The President: If you see me with all the cards they give me,
you know it is going to be ~ long meeting because I have not done
my homework. If I .do it, I reduce it to this one card.
(U)
With regard to Northern Ireland, ,I would like to tell you that
when it comes time that you think it would be helpful for us to
say something about a cease-fire or decommissioning, let me know.
We may have to wait for the Irish election. I have some pull and
can call in chits; just let me know. --i-E"t"'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
3ECRE'f
Reason: 1.5 (b,l
Declassify On:;
,
�SECRE'l'
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I will think about the parade problem.
The
conflict reminds me of the Middle East. Do yuu have a resolution
in mind? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One problem is that the people are farther along
than the leaders.
For people like Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley, the
conflict is their whole life. ~
Ambassador Crowe: At Drumcree, however, all those peace-loving
people went indoors and shut their blinds.
(U)
The President:
Those were the same people in the streets
cheering us -- they need leadership. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Some of my rich yuppie friends cancelled trips to
Belfast to play golf. J21
Ambassador Crowe:
The President has been strongly supportive of
investment in Northern Ireland.
K)
SE(gET
�6EGf<E~r
SECRET
3
The President:
You need a place for the politicians to go to be
relevant.
They have to have a life
"
other than
their ability to stop the process.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You've got it right with a
guaran ee 0
some connection to Ire:and.
I have listened to them
talk and I think that if there were no political leaders, we
could get the people to agree. -fer
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~------------------------~I
I
Mr. Holmes: /
The President:
Sinn Fein needs to be on board with the substance
·of the resolution, whatever the details of the relationship to
Ireland. What is the role for the DUP and Paisley? If we leave
the extremes out, they can undermine the solution.
I was struck
by that when I met Paisley.
I didn't get a word in edgewise for
20 minutes, but I didn't care. ~
Mr. Holmes:
/r~I=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(=~~1------------------11
I
The President:
You mean if you give them a meaningful devolved
government? .JB1
Mr. Berger:
We are maintaining contact with the unionists -- I
called Trimble recently. ~
The President:
He is impressive.
~
Ambassador Crowe: But not at Drumcree. And the SDLP needs Sinn
Fein.in the talks so they cannot criticize the compromises Hume
makes.
(S)
The President:
You know where we are.
can do, let me know at the right time.
If there is anything I
(.e)
Mr. Berger: Mo Mowlam was over last week and we had a great
meeting. .Jce)
The President:
She is good, great on TV. Her happy face
inspires confidence. She seems soiid and not full of herself;
you don't need another person over there posturing like a
peacock.
-\-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I will tell her that.
End of Conversation
SECRE'!'
~
�CmJFI DEN''fIAL
CONfiDENTIAL
'/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Luncheon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
John Podesta, Deputy Chief of Staff
Daniel Tarullo, Head of the National
Economic Council
James Steincerg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
E. Anthony Wayne, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European
Affairs, ~ational Security Council
(Notetaker)
Prime Minister Blair
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.
Alistair Darling, Chief Secretary, Treasury
Colin Budd, Cabinet Office
Alex Allan, Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff
Philip Barton, Assistant Private Secretary
for the Prime Minister
John Holmes, Private Secretary for Overseas
Affairs
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 29, 1997, 12:30-3 p.m.
No. 10 Downing Street, London
The President:
We should talk about NATO.
I have the impression
that most leaders in Paris are in favor of a group of five,
adding Romania and Slovenia to the other three. We have
reservations about that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1.S(b)i
Declass:lfy On: ,:
�CONFIDENTIAL
2
. COHFI DEN'fIJltL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~I Our first concern is that the first shall not be the
last -- we have said that all along.
That is why we need
aggressively to build on PFP for future members.
If there are
five, no one will believe in a second round and we will be under
greater pressure to reassure them publicly.
This could lead
Russia to think tha~ we are committed to Baltic membership.
We
don't want any grey zones, but the open door must be credible.
That may not be as satisfying, but it may be the proper thing to
do. Ael
L -______
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(1) I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Ambassador Kerr:
Mr. Berger:
They're shifting because of Slovenia and because
they are grateful for Romania's deal with Hungary. ~
The President:
I see Kohl next week; he should know where you
are on this.
JkM
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
We need to be reassuring and embracing in our
language; perhaps not using the example of waiting room. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
E.O. 13526, section 1.
One way is to emphasize self-selection.
~
The President:
We are working on it and thinking of the package
we can put forward.
Bill just whispered, "Are Romania and
Slovenia ready? This is a military alliance." ~
Ambassador Crowe:
context. J.e1
You need to make the judgment in the military
The President:
We have a disagreement with our partners on the
continent but I am sure a larger group would turn up the heat on
the Baltic issue and we are not prepared to handle that yet.
This is a problem that needs time to sort itself out; we need to
give it a few years.
If you give it away now, you have nothing
to fill the time. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFiDENTIAL
,CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr, Holmes:
The President:
Mr. Holmes:
What argument did they make?
'l'hat they are not ready.
j)21
~
Ambassador. Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I would have thought that, but the republican
caucus actually favors letting in more countries.
I don't want
to misrepresent the Hill; I think the republicans will follow
their leadership on this. Some are against enlargement because
of the fear of provoking a nationalist response in Russia -- that
is a silly argument. )ef
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
Je1
Mr. Berger:
New polling data shows that NATO is just not a
grass-roots issue in Russia.
ket
they are just being
Prime Minister Blair: What a surprise
normal and caring more about the economy. --+er
The President:
What do you think about the Iranian election?
.(..e')
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
The President:
That is where we are. We hope things will get
better.
It concerns me that we are getting to the point that
there are no Western-educated politicians in the government.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFI WENTIAL
_ CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We have made an attempt to address this within
NATO -- the European Security and Defense Identity. Except for
AFSOUTH we are happy with that. And we are trying to work out
AFSOUTH. -ter
On the Middle East, Saddam has literally violated the no-fly
zone. We would be stupid to take action against those flights
that 99 percent of the world think are okay. But the UN
resolutions- are at stake; we have to do something about his
challenge of the no-fly zone. Our idea is that he can have as
many humanitarian flights as he wants but we need to-have advance
notice.
The only problem is that if you tell him that and he
does not comply, you have to respond.
That puts a burden on us.
But if we believe in the UN resolutions, it is the best we can
do. ....(..G1Ambassador Crowe:
Shoot them down?
P?i
The President: No. We want to avoid deaths and especially
deaths of civilians.
I don't want to comment because we have not
,defined it yet.
We will get credit with world opinion for
permitting humanitarian flights and it is reasonable to demand
notification. ~
Prime
Ambassador Kerr:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Mr. Berger:
There has been a refinement in our thinking. A
conversation between our two militaries produced a range of
options. -tet
The PresideDt:
This is not a question cf how to win, but how to
avoid a loss.
There is no way to win with world public opinion
but we are not prepared to let Saddam walk away from the
resolutions. We are not looking for a victory; this is not like
our response to the attempt on President Bush's life. There is a
sanctions committee in the UN but we don't trust them.
We don't
want him to think he can sucker punch us into shooting down
innocent civilians. ~
:'
.
�CONFIDENTIAL
. CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Holmes.:
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Budd:
Prime Minister Blair:
Mr. Berger:
If he knocks and a door opens, he will knock again
next time . .~
The President:
together. ::fC)
Whatever we do, even if it is less, we must do it
Ambassador Crowe:
I wonder what his lawyers are telling him?
fof'
The President:
I concur with your analysis on Iran.
It is
imperative we stay together.
I want to discuss it on its merits,
not in terms of money. Others are saying that all is well as
long as they don't blow up our people, and we can all make money.
But we have a larger responsibility. You know about terrorism
because of the IRA. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
We need to hold firm.
~
The President:
In terms of yesterday's NATO conference, there is
less than meets the eye.
I think what we are really doing is
reorganizing ourselves to face the new challenges, getting rid of
the intellectual clutter to free ourselves for the future.
If
you believe we need to combat proliferation, ethnic hatred and
terrorism and that we need a common policy on the environment,
then we have to be organized to deal with these transnational
problems. The world looks to us to be honest about these
problemsi we may not always be right but we have to be honest.
The pressure to go for the commercial benefits is enormous. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Can we discuss China and Hong Kong?
We are with you oh that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COWFIPEWTIAL
~
�CONFI DEH'fIAL
6
The President:
Under the terms of the 1984 agreement, the UK and
China made a deal that you asked us to endorse.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Have you heard about this
movie that is to released on July I? It is the story of how the
British got Hong Kongi you do not come off well. They are doing
what we did in Germany after the war, in reverse.
That won't
make much difference since Hong Kong is one of the most open
places in the world, but it is a metaphor for how they are going
to play it. ;ef
We want to be helpful.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have more leverage with Russia because of IFI programs
and denuclearization funding. We have some leverage with China
through the WTO, but Hong Kong is unique and we will support you.
)e(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Mr. Berger:
It would be useful to come up with agreed benchmarks
such as early elections under fair conditions, civil liberties.
If we are all sending the same message, it will be more
effective. We are not there yet. ~
Prime Minister Bla'
Mr. Steinberg:
Mr. Holmes:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
It depends what that means.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
I
)I)
�.CONFIDE~TTIAL
7
The President: We will be doing our best to stick with you -you have a big dog in this hunt.
jZ(
Ambassador·· Crowe:
The President:
once.
(U)
That is an Arkansas expression.
They hunt with dogs here too;
(U)
I went beagling
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
The President:
Red Army. ....ke1'"
So our officials will be sitting in front of the
Mr. Holmes:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We don't want to put them in a box publicly, but
privately we can try to persuade them. ~
Mr. Berger:
There will be 25,000 reporters there.
The danger is
that you set the bar too high with a press that wants a
confrontation, as do some people in Hong Kong.
If our benchmarks
are not clear, we could be drawn into a confrontation. +eJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The press tried to get me to comment yesterday.
I ducked the question because it is not our business.
I know
Kohl and Chirac are for it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
�COHFI DEN'!' IM
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But it
e good to un erstan w at t e consequences and
alternatives are.
It is usually discussed at the theological
level rath~~than in practical terms.
That is what I would want
to know.
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Mr. Tarullo:
It is difficult for us to say anything because they
think we are concerned about the euro displacing the dollar as a
reserve currency. ~
The President:
If it leads to lower growth, it will not be good
for us or the rest of the world. At Denver we are going to talk
about an Africa initiative; but if we, you and Japan don't have
economic growth, we cannot help Latin America or Africa.
Your position is principled; the Tories' is ideological. Yours
is the best way to go forward since the theological arguments are
hard to understand. ).R1
Mr. Alan: What is lacking is a strategy for job creation and
structural adjustment. ~
The President:
Our labor ministers held a conference in Detroit,
but it didn't accomplish much because of economic conditions.
Delors put out a white paper at the time but nothing happened.
I
think we should acknowledge we tried it a few years ago; it is a
grea t idea.
(,e')
I'd like you to come to Washington soon on an official visit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
York.
(U)
I'd like to as long as I can visit New
The President: You can. You know I ~m giving the commencement
speech at Chelsea's school. Dan Tarullo's daughter goes there
too; Chelsea says she is frighteningly smart but still nice.
Seniors finish a month early so they can do a special project.
Chelsea is going to be a doctor so she is at Georgetown Hospital
with a surgeon.
She watched a heart valve implant operation and
said it was too interesting to be queasy about the sight of
blood.
(U)
Dan, what is your daughter's project?
(U)
Mr. Tarullo:
She is teaching English, but I think she is going
to be a psychologist.
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
�c;mIFIDEN1'I}'rL
Ambassador Kerr:
It is amazing the extent to which his daughter
has a private life.
(U)
The President:
The press has been wonderful in honoring the
request Hillary and I made to them, with one or two exceptions.
Children deserve a chance to grew up in private.
I think the
press respected this because we did not put Chelsea in the
poli tical spotlight.
(U)
We will see each other in Denver. We are staying at an old
cowboy hotel.
Do you know where you are staying?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am not sure.
(U)
The President:
We are arranging a dinner at a place called The
Fort that specializes in buffalo meat, which is low fat.
When I
had lunch with Boris, he served roast pig and told me real men
hack off the ears and eat them. And once he served 24 courses,
including moose lips.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
conference.
(U)
It is time to get ready for the press
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 5
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Bricish Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
John Smith, Tony Campanile,
Lyle Harrison, Marc Koehler, Marianna
Papadimitriou and Mary Ann Peters
DATEr TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June lOr 1997, 1458-1517
The Oval Office
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello.
The President:
(U)
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill?
The President:
(U)
(U)
Fine.
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much
through.
I 'ust want a uick word with
for comin
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What can I do to help?
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DBNTIl'rL
Reason:
1. 5 (b)/
Declassify on: ;
(U)
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
GOHFIDE~J'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll be happy to do that.
immediately.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That's great
We'll contact them
~
The President:
This is crazy.
I don't know why they're doing
this now, when you're trying to put all this together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that. We'll get in touch with
them today and convey this in the strongest possible terms.
If
they are thinking about proceeding like this while you are
working in good faith, it makes no sense, it's crazy. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
That's what I think.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I've got it and I'll get on it.
doing otherwise? ~
How are you
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. There are pretty turbulent waters
here about European monetary union, with Jospin's victory.
~
The President:
It might give you a little more room, though.
+G+Prime Minister Blair:
I
Yeah, maybe it will give me more room.
>:'0. 13526,
~,ti'n
1.4(b)(d)
_.:Ai:':-"'_h~;';'"\.....--':;""':;---:...o::--:.--~--~-~...
cmlFIDEN'FIAL
n'
-'1'
"'..
-,_
.
,~
J-_~. '7"'~;'
":'
�COHFIDEN'PIAL
CONFlfJENllAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I thought the Econoflist this week had some
interesting suggestions on how to proceed with the currency but
change some of the Maastricht requirements.
They argue that
France cannot make it anyway with 12 percent unemployment; but
they acknowledge that the Bundesbank would not agree to such
changes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's just pretty hard to ask a Socialist
government -- it was hard to ask Chirac's government -- to do
nothing except cut spending when you have 13 percent
unemployment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, and if you're doing it
while kee
the franc hi h
ou're reall
the
econom .
The President:
Well, I don't believe they can solve their
economic and unemployment problems through the budget anyway.
They need structural reform. Maybe Socialist governments can
actually do this better than Conservative governments. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFJ DENTIAL
CONF IDEN'PIAL
The President:
Is he coming to Denver.or not?
Prime Minister Blair:
He must be?
(U)
(U)
The President: Well the way their constitution works, Chirac has
foreign policy and he has economic policy, so they normally bot~
come.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I suppose he will, won't he?·
should be interesting. Have you met him?
It
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
there? :Jef
"You guys have to help me."
Tell me who was
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president: Well I'm looking forward to it.
I'm glad to see
the debate being carried on our side of the field, but there
could be a huge backlash if the left fails to deliver.
Ultimately, in a democracy the poor rely upon the social judgment
of the middle class. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
that we will fail.
Absolutelyri ht.
There's a real risk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That nearly happened to us, you know, when the
Congress in '94 didn't pass my plan.
I fended it off and we now
have agreement in the budget to repair it.
I think we saved it,
but you don't want to miss those chances when they come along.
~
CONFI DEN1'IPrL
�CONFiDENTIAL
CONFIDEN''fH\:L
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right, there's a huge mood of
uncertainty in Europe at the moment.
It's almost impossible to
overstate it. %
The President: Well, they keep trying to draw me into
discussions on details and I keep trying to stay out of it.
)Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I think where you could have an impact is
that people look across the Atlantic, they see the American
economy and see that it works. ~
The President: What I try to do is to avoid getting drawn into
discussions of issues such as:
"If the European currency is
delayed, does that mean it is dead. N What I need to do is stay
'on my general theme that you can't create jobs without reform,
but you don't have to cut out the social safety net.
That is
what your election showed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think they are afraid that global corporations
and global money movers will take away the capacity of the
nation-state to preserve the social contract, but I don't think
that's true.
There was a fascinating piece in the Economist on
how the Czech experiment failed.
The market outran the capacity
of the regulators and they have negative growth now. You ought
to have somebody pull that for you, just because it makes the
case for reform without the Thatcher/Reagan idea of getting rid
of government. A little article on how the Czech economy, the
jewel of the post-communist period, could be in all this trouble
ironically because there was not enough regulation.
l-e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Economist?
(U)
Not in this edition, but in the last one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will look for it. We've got to provide
people with a way through this problem, so it's not a choice
between dismantlement and corporatism. This is a very European
problem, born out of the ideological clash between socialism and
capitalism . . You do not have it in the same way in the United
States.
(U)
CON"PI DEW!' IAL
�LUf'U /BENT/At
CONPIDEN'fIAL
6
The President:
The problem here is that because union membership
is declining, even if you have more jobs, people worry that
their families are vulnerable, especially because there is no
universal h.ealth care. But without growth and lower unemployment
it's hard to get these things done.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, that's right. You could have a more"
universal system of health care in your country without wrecking
the system.
(U)
The President:
Of course we could. We'd save money. But we're
going to take another pop at it this time, at least for the
children. Anyway, I can't wait to see you in Denver and I'll
call the appropriate people and send the message publicly and
privately.
kef
Prime Minister Blair: That would be very kind, Bill; it would
really help.
It will be great to see you in Denver.
(U)
The President:
Have you talked Bertie Ahern?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
kef
Do you think he'll be Okay?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I like him,
Y21
I
-1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We have to have a
unified position or it doesn't mean a thing. So I'll stick with
you as far as I can and see you in Denver. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, Bill, many, many thanks indeed.
(U)"
The President:" Once again, give my best to your wi fe. We had a
great time, and let's follow up on that project about philosophy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we are; it was great to see you and
Hillary. One of my few moments of real enjoyment.
(U)
The President: Well, you get to be a real person.
Denver. Bye-bye.
(U)
COHFIDEN'I'IM
See you in
�Luhl
CONFIDEWPIAL
Prime Minister Blair;
uJLJ'ijj iHL
7
,
See you in Denver.
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 6
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
-
The President
Prime Minister, Tony Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Wylma Robinson,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie Glick
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 27, 1997, 12:41 - 1:02 p.m. EDT
Private Residence, Los Angeles, California
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
Very well, indeed.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am sitting here outside Chequers having
a cup of tea with a friend of yours, Steven Spielberg.
(U)
The President: Steven Spielberg? You are? You tell Mr.
Spielberg that you may be drinking tea with him, but I am here
on the beach in Santa Monica having coffee with Ron Burkle,
which shows California has more influence than either the
British or the U.S. Government.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You are?
(U)
The President:
Yes.
I am looking at people skateboarding at
the beautiful beaches of Santa Monica.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
then?
(U)
CONFIl3EH'FIAL
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On:
You lucky man.
This is your vacation,
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONPIDEN'PIl's:L
2
The President: No, no.
I am out here working, but it is a
Sunday morning and you wanted to talk. And Ron Burkle is a
friend of mine who bought a house very close to the hotel where
I was last night.
I interrupted coffee to speak with you.
Congratulations again on the ceasefire. I think we have a
chance now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we have a chance now.
to fill ou in on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help you with
Trimble? Probably not. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
one more time.
You know that is a well I can only go back to
I am certainly willing to try to do that though.
).e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I could try to come on over to see you or
something. -+e1
cmlFI DEN'E' L"rL
�CONFIDEN'PIAL
CONFIOENTIAL
3
Prime Minister Blair: What I think, the reason why I think
there is some hope in the situation is that the ordinary people
in Northern Ireland are desperate for peace. ~
The President:
Oh God yes. This is the place in the world
where there is the largest disconnect between the leaders and
what the ordinary people want. Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And we will do that.
I got your letter on the
Middle East and I basically agree with the letter.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
And I am
really glad you are going to become EU president in January
because my sense is that we can get some grudging progress for
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
I
the rest of the year, and if there is going to be a
breakthrough, then we will need everyone's help to close next
year. I don't think the present situation can be maintained.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I
(JZ)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The_President:
point.
Well, first of all, a flashpoint or meltdown
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That's right.
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'll give you an example, here you are trying to do this
Northern Ireland and one day the IRA has the whole thing in its
power and the next day, Paisley does.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFIDEN'fIAL
5
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
That may be somet lng you cou
the Europeans examine -- because it is very important -you want to provide economic assistance to Jordan. With
parliamentary elections coming, we would be in a tough situation
without any real power if the people he is backing, who have
stable relations with Israel, lose ground because of economic
difficulties. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One of the things that would help is to raise
the economic fortune of the Palestinians.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
there.
(U)
Hello?
You are getting a bit faint
The President:
I know that you can't come to us on September 9
because of the Scottish devolution and 13-15 doesn't work for
CGHFIDEN'fIl's:L
�CONFIDEN'f'IAL
,
CONFIDENTIAL
6
.'
me, but we need to set up some time.
we find the time.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
We will keep working till
September is really difficult?
The President:
Just those two days for me.
out another time.
(V)
(V)
I think I can work
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it probably is a bit difficult
for me because if something starts to go wrong.
(V)
The President:
How are the English reacting?
pretty well? jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Is it going down
It is okay for the minute.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Are most of the Scots in the Westminster
parliament in your party? .J.0r
Prime Minister Blair:
We are going to give up a few seats.
)£1
The President:
You may have some to spare now, but you can
never tell what you'll need in five years.
JK)
Prime Minister Blair: However, it has not always been like this
in Scotland.
In the 50's it was mostly Tory. What I am trying
to do is build ,new bases of support, one of the most difficult
things to do.
There are two referendums, one in Scotland and
one in Wales.
yM
The President:
So you stay there and handle it. Your
preference is to get the visit done in the month of September.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
(V)
The President:
That is my strong preference.
people and we'll get it done.
(V)
I will talk to my
Prime Minister Blair: Let us do that, Bill, and I also had a
note from Hillary about the other thing we talked about and we
will work on that. You have a good time in Santa Monica.
(V)
CONFI DEH'fIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
cown DEl?ITIAL
7
The President:
Tell Steven Spielberg I hate coming all the way
out here and not get to see him because he is hanging out in
Chequers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will certainly.
(U)
The President:
I always suspected that beneath that ruffled,
intelle-ctual demeanor was a real Tory aristocrat working.
(UrPrime Minister Blair:
He is out here making a movie.
(U)
The President:
I know.
I told you before that he really wants
to help rebuild the movie industry in Great Britain because he
is so grateful for its influence. He got a lot of- input from
early Br{tish film makers.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Lots of possibilities here, but also
important to them that the U.S. and the British work closely,
especially because some of the other countries and some of the
stuff from the EU is not very sensible. The French and the
Italians have weird rules and prescriptions on film making.
It
would help if we can get some decent British movies.
(U)
The President:
You can do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Tell him I said hello.
All the best.
We'll be in touch.
(U)
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cown DEWT Il'.L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
COHFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH J NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Bonnie Glick,
Sean Rice and Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September I, 1997, 11:29 - 11:54 a.m.
Martha's Vineyard
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
grim business.
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill.
It's a grim business, a very
The President:
It's awful, it's really awful. We're up here on
Martha's Vineyard vacationing, and we're with a lot of people
who knew her.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We saw her again just weeks ago when we
hosted her for lunch with Prince William, he's a great kid. ~
The President:
Yeah, I worry a lot about those kids now.
le1
Prime Minister Blair: She was such a rock of stability in the
sense she connected them with the outside world. The eldest
boy, William, is quite like her in a way, he is very "feet on
the ground," he does things kids his age do. j..Q-t'
The President: Well, I just feel so bad for her.
basically getting a hold of her life.
~
She was just
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for your telegram yesterday and
your kind words.
The problem was the way she lived, in a press
frenzy.
It's impossible to contemplate how intrusive it was,
into every single aspect of her life. The last time I spoke
COMFI DEH'f' IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�CONFIPENTfAL
CONFI DEN'FIAL
with her, she said that were it not for the boys, she'd be off
the board.
The country is stunned.
(.et'
The President:
They liked her a lot, didn't they.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
She was not the royal family but .she was
liked by ordinary people, it gave her problems with the royal
establishment.
{.Q1"
The President: Well, I know it's a difficult time for you.
just wanted to let you know I was thinking of you.
yx
I
Prime Hinister Blair:
I will personally miss her, it's like a
She was a star for them.
j..e}
star falling.
The President:
What do they know? Is the British security
guard who was with her still alive?
%
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he is. And he may be able to offer
some more information. There has been some talk this afternoon.
They went to the hotel and thought they would be left alone.
The Embassy and the French government did not know they were
there. The media turned up, SQ they decided to go to dinner
then on to one of al-Fayed's houses. When they got to their
car, it did not start. They called someone from the hotel and
the hotel provided a car and driver. Apparently he'd been
drinking. yc)
The President:
That's what I was afraid of. Those guys were
chasing them? Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
Jumped on them as they left the hotel,
yet I can't believe some of the reports of how fast they were
going though.
It's just not possible they were going 100 mph
They wouldn't have to be going that fast
I mean, I know Paris.
in those tunnels, though. They must have hit a rim in the road
and turned over and smashed into a wall.
j..e}
The President:
It's a sad thing, I tell you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, someone we knew and liked. She had
a remarkable gift. She was beginning to get her life together.
j..e}
The President:
Yes, Hillary had a nice visit with her a few
weeks ago when she was here. We liked her a lot.
I just think
that anything you can do for those boys, I don't know how
CONFIDEN'fIl'rL
........ ~,i". -.
taNfl DtNTIAt~~;
~~~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ;'i;
..
"-~..
.
.
~
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
CONFIDEN'fIAL
~~____~~I_E_.~O~._13_5_2~6~,s~e~ct_io_n 1._4(~d~)~____~~~__~I in a situation like
__
this, about the challenges they will face.
Prime Minister Blair:
over.
~
I'll try to keep in touch and have them
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~I
______________
What about her sisters? What are they like?
~I~E=.O==.1=3=52=6~,s=ec=ti=on==1.4d(~d)~__________________~I jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Hillary and I just wanted to tell you all we were thinking of
you. .-keI
Prime Minister Blair: Your words yesterday were greatly
appreciated.
Thank you. So you are on holiday now?
(U)
The President:
I'm having a good holiday.
It's the longest
vacation we have had in ten years. We're getting ready to send
Chelsea: off to university.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you looking forward to that?
(U)
The President: She is, but that's all part of it, it's what you
raise them for.
(U)
cmlFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFI DEN'fIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
there, then?
(U)
You're going straight to California from
The president: No, we have one more week here, then we go back
to Washington for a week to ten days, then we will go to
California to take her out there.
(U)
You're doing well in Northern Ireland, no?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
tha t . -+-c+-
The Sinn Fein shouldn't have a problem with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
circumstances.
He's actually been good about this, under the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you think there is anything we can do to
Trimble to stroke him? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
cm~PIDEH'3'IM
f~"~' --'OONF!HENTlAE~->
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The President:
I think they're worried about being rendered
irrelevant in 20 years, given the way the demographics are
going, it's better to make a deal now rather than later. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you look at it, their popular majority is
eroding over time with the increasing birth rates, so now is the
time.
You'll have to come up with some sort of creative dual
relationship.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's consistent with what you are doing in
Scotland and Wales, anyway. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The.President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
No one wants to get up and put a sandwich in a
lunch tin to go to the factory if you have this going on.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
with you?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So all is well
You're getting re-engaged in the Middle East? kef
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFl DEHT L'\L
�CONFIDENHAL
CONFIDENTlhL
6
We're in a
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
difficult position'L-~.~==================______~ but we don't
want to be someone on the outside just seen as complaining.
We've got a good set of ideas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's your actual estimate?
~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now
progress.
or some
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO}IFIDJ1::HTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIUENTfAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Things are getting a little better in Bosnia. Plavsic is
showing some get up and go. You've got a decision coming your
way that we can't discuss on this line, but I think things are
going in -the right direction over the last weeks, no the last
couple of months, after a bad year.
I feel good about this.
We've got a shot to move it forward.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to you today.
Tell Cherie I said hello.
I just wanted to talk
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
calling about Diana.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Give our love to Hillary.
(U)
Take care, friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye Bill.
Bye.
(U)
All the best.
End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'PIAL
Thanks for·
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 8
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, Larry Wright, Tom
Crowell, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 9, 1997, 9:18 - 9:40 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hi, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill. How are you? I am in good
form; I just got my party conference out of the way.
(U)
The President:
here.
(U)
It went great, didn't it?
It got great press
Prime Minister Blair: Well, I feel like a man who is facing an
inevitable collapse, but in good shape, actually. How are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great, thanks.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw a great picture of you and Hillary
taking Chelsea to Stanford.
It was marvelous.
(U)
The President:
Well, it looked better than it felt.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
It looks like she's having a good time.
(U)
The President: She's very happy. She called last night and we
had a good talk.
It's a three-hour difference, so she always
calls late, but she knows I'm always up late. She had her first
:'lECRE't'
Reason:
1.5{b;d)
Declassify On';
....
___ .__ c- .• --F--;"
l0~::_
_
Yl
. ~.::,~:~~ Y:::.:(_L~;J-,.>·~i
�.sECRET
chemistry test.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Look, Bill, the reason I called was to
mention
couple of things:
I went to Moscow early in the week,
and also I have some thoughts on Northern Ireland. ~
a
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did he give any hint of whether he would run for
another term? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�bt:br"{c i
SECRE'f'
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will do that.
I was very encouraged by my
visit with Trimble, he's trying to be a part of this, more
upbeat than in the past. ~
Prime-Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Did Yeltsin mention the START II treaty?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
How about Iran?
+&t
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I believe that a lot of things do happen without
his knowledge.
When they changed their economy, they did not
have the intermediate controls in place that a normal economy
has. We have a process going with the Vice President,
Chernomyrdin, Wisner and Koptev, that I think will work. They
say they're cracking down, but he is careful about what he says
in public, maybe because he doesn't want to be seen to be
SECRE'f
�3ECREf
4
dancing to our tune.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Oh God, I'm really worried about it.
so strongly opposed to any of that stuff that I'm
about how they'd react to it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I appreciate
your help in keeping the issue over the French oil company Total
from becoming a bigger problem. We need to work the twin tracks
of an EU waiver and the Total-Gazprom case. I know that a lot
of Europeans don't agree with us, but I'm still concerned about
Iran becoming an industrial and military giant, given their
philosophy. I'm hoping that the new leadership in time will
have enough influence to change things, but there are no
indications of this yet. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I'd appreciate anything you can do to help.
don't want to get crossways with the French and EU. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
---~
.
":
r
·l
I
�5
SECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
'---_--'I yJ
The President:
The Iranians -- and I sometimes think the
Chinese ar.ethis way, too -- think we're so motivated by money
that we'll eventually cave in.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
to do. .k51.
It took a long time, but it was the right thing
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
So, we're with you on that
entirely.
People are very supportive of your efforts to bring
people around on the environmental issue. ~
The President:
The problem is, the u.s. Senate won't ratify
anything I sign. They're in the Dark Ages on this -- mostly the
Republicans, but Democrats, too.
They're being told against all
evidence that you can't do this without wrecking the economy.
We had a big conference here this week with energy experts,
people who are making a living implementing changes. But with
everything going on in Washington, it didn't break through as
I'd hoped.
It may have moved things a little.
I'm chipping
away, trying to do everything I can to get us in decent shape,
and the Japanese are trying to get us together.
+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
One thing we ought to do is to some way get the
developing countries involved in a regime -- where they don't
have the same controls as we -- to develop an alternate energy
future.
There are things they can do now that won't hamper
growth, but they can do it now so that when they become
developed, they'll already have a different energy structure.
The trick is to get them involved without their thinking that
we're trying to choke off their growth; we need their growth for
our own sake. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that totall
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�SECRE'f
The President: We need to find some formula to participate.
If
we gamble and take this on, but by the time you get halfway
through the. century, we're no better because we've been replaced
by China and India, still worse off, nothing has happened to
lower the global temperature. Get them to talk to us, find a
formula to benefit from, build a different energy structure.
The Indians are open, they're doing some big alternative
projects, more open than the Chinese. China is giving us grief
about criticism of their big Three Gorges hydropower project,
which is their biggest greenhouse gas project. Because it will
displace a million people and change the ecosystem, all the
environmentalists who are fighting global warming are fighting
the dam. Biggest dilemma. ~
.
Prime Minister Blair:
I a ree with the same basic
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, we will.
Well, carry
Thank you for calling.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm looking forward to seeing Hillary
when she is here. Everything ok with you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
She is thrilled, looking forward to it,
and we are working on a time for you to come here.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
It will be great to see you.
Bye.
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'l'
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Peter Huggins,
Lyle Harrison, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 22, 1997, 3:53-4:00 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
How's it going?
(U)
The President:
The speech went over pretty well, and we've
gotten some reasonable press. Some environmental groups are
pretty positive, some said we should have tighter deadlines.
We've gotten more business support than I thought, but the
traditional industries have dumped on it. The best we can hope
for right now.
I tried to leave open the language on developing
nations.
I was pretty explicit about the kind of joint projects
I think we ought to have, but using the language you gave me, I
was general on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CO~TnDENTIl'rL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:
lCJA,>~,3j.9.ki;.r'. .--..
- - -- --.~'~;
te~N LIBRARY PHO~OCOPYl
�2
CON'PIDEN'I'IAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
The President:
here. )J21
Well, I don't know.
We'll have to see how we do
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you know when he'll be here?
Prime Minister Blair:
think.
+et
The President:
~
I'm not sure; in the next few days, I
Have him check in with Sandy Berger.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
do. )Cl
Good, we will work with John and see what we can
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPIDEN'l'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
�3
• COHPIBENl'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, I'm really encouraged.
I guess you know
this, we had a plane crash over here and a British pilot was
killed. An F-16 and a T-38 were on a photo chase mission and
collided over Edwards Air Force Base. There was an American
pilot, but there was also a British pilot, Flight Lieutenant
Leigh Alexander Fox. His wife is there with him at Edwards, and
it is just awful. No one has figured out how it happened.
Somehow the F-16 was able to land, but the pilots of the T-38
ejected. Both were found dead.
I'll send you the information
on it. ~
-
-
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks, Bill.
~
The President: We will work on this other thing and see John
Prescott when he gets here. Thanks for working with me on this,
man.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Not at all.
OK, bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll be in touch.
(U)
Alright, Bill, speak to you soon.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
�• CONFIDEH'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[1
'.".
10
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, David Higgins,
Anthony Campanella, Peter Huggins, James
Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 21, 1997,
The Oval Office
Hey,
~Jny.
3:23~3:32
p.m. EDT
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, hello. Tony here.
I'm sorry·this
has to be ... I'm in the middle of a big dinner, but I thought I
would come out and speak to you about what we spoke about
yesterday.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I am due to speak to Wim Kok tomorrow.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPI DENT IM
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reas 0 n : 1 . 5 (b ; d) .. "~'h.ft'7.i~;:'-"~"'~-=~~--~"'\:
Declassify On:
J.O/ti~~~ONLIB~RYPH0TOCOPY ,,.,t
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•
�2
COUFIDEN'fL'lL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
On joint implementation?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
kef
~
The President:
What 1 can say there is we know we need to leave
some room on language for implementing on how developing
countries would participate, but what about targets? That's
what I am really worried about. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The big problem we have here is that I not only
talked to you, Kohl and Hashimoto -- and I want you to talk to
as many as you can -- but I also briefed Senate leaders this
afternoon and I will brief the House on what I am trying to do.
It will raise more questions than it will answer if I cancel the
speech tomorrow.
I see what you're doing, what you want me to
do:
say what I have to say, but leave as much wiggle room as
possible for you.
jef
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Alright, I will work on it as well as I can.
What I want you to do is to welcome the fact that we are clearly
committed to binding targets and clearly committed to
participa}ion.
If you give negotiations a chance, that would
help. fCl
CONFIDEN'fIAL
"
�3
cmrFIDEHTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Very haoov to do that.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
I have been saying that for months.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
The problem is I will lose all credibility if I
don't give some target range.
I have to say what our position
will be.
I will try to figure out a way to give it flexibility,
and, on jotnt implementation, I think I can do precisely what
. you want. ...{-et'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Alright.
Thank you very much.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, we are going to get out there and do the
best we can.
I will try to leave you as much wiggle room as
possible. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
(U)
(U)
All the very best.
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
-- End of Conversation --
cmlFI DENT IAL
'.
�cmrn DENT lAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, J. Laurence
Wright II, Jeff Rathke, Anthony Campanella,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 15, 1997, 12:40-12:50 p.m. EST
Air Force One, en route Las Vegas to
Sacramento
The President: Hello?
connection.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
We still don't have a good
(U)
The President:
Tony, can you hear me?
last time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
No problem.
I'm so serry about the
(U)
The President:
I am on the airplane and usually it works, but
sometimes it doesn't.
Thank you for the letter you sent me
earlier this week.
I want to talk throu h what I am thinkin
about this issue.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
CONFI DEN'±' L'\L
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(b
Declassify on:
�CONFI DEN'£' lAb
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We all see this looking back through the prism of the
Gulf War, but I want to see this looking forward through the
prism of the future. My goal in this and my definition of
victory, is that this is not a macho contest of getting him to
back down, but to reestablish the inspections regime, which I
think was a smashing success. Jef
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I am in total agreement with
everything you saif~d~.__~I~w~a~n~t~~y~o~u~t~o__k_n_o~w~w~e~w~i~l~l~s~t~i~c~k~w~i~t~h~y~ou
throughout this.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think this is very important.
Jacques Chirac
is in Vietnam right now, and I am trying to call him.
I will
talk to Yeltsin and several others over the next two days.
If
there is anything you can do to promote unity among the allies,
I would appreciate it.
I understand their position and the
popular sympathy in the Middle East for the people of Iraq.
I
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�3
COHFIDEN'fIAL
think we need to get people in your country, in France, and
elsewhere, to see what UNSCOM has destroyed. Tpey need to see
how successful the program of eliminating weap'ons of mass
destruction has been. But there is one thing going on in our
country and also in the UN, and that is that the only time Iraq
gets attention is when Saddam creates a crisis.
If people knew
how many weapons UNSCOM inspectors have exposed, they would
understand why this is so important.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O, 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We may need to talk again several times over the
next week, but I won't bother you unless I have to. We will
have to work together on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, absolutely right. And the more that
can be done to publicize the work that UNSCOM has done over the
last six years, the better. )e1
The President:
Did you see Netanyahu in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, I did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I know what you mean.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I will sen
meetings, I'm not sure
over the weekend.
+et
Let's
in touch
The President:
Thank you for the meeting and the time you spent
with Hillary.
She just loved it. It looked like it was very
successful.
(U)
CONTIDE1H:' IAL
�4
COHFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it was great.
form. All right then, all the best.
(U)
The President:
Okay, I will talk to you later.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CmJFIDEH'i'IAL
She was in fantastic
Bye-bye.
(U)
�CONFTDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 12
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: George Chastain, Tony
Campanella, James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 9, 1997, 3:19-3:24 p.m. EST
The Map Room
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
I'm doing great. I know it's later there, but I
wanted to check in with you.
I've been on the phone a lot the
last three or four days.
I think we've made a lot of progress
in Kyoto and John Prescott has been very helpful. We have made
quite an effort to come to a common posjtion, and I've
1""------,
authorized our negotiators to show more flexibility.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
to move to the European position on
based on some variation of the proposal
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
They're getting closer.
If we can get all the
big I Annex I countri es to agree, mC' ·jb<:o~· get the developing
cOtqFI DElffIAL
Reason:
1.S(d)
Declassify On::
�LUNtO'!UtN IIAL
CONFIDEN'fI:AL
2
countries to do more.
They agree on joint implementation
projects, but they're still resisting Article 10~
They seem to
think that we'll coerce them into joining. fe1'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Really?
in~Jrmation than I do.
You may have more up to date
y6
~
" Prime - Minis"ter Blair: /
'------~/
The President:
That's pretty good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we will get a lot of abuse, and I'm going
to get a lot of abuse at home. And I can't get it ratified
unless we get commitments under Article 10 from developing
countries. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------~/
The President:
I do, too. We have one more day, and maybe we
can talk tomorrow, if we need to. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I hope it is okay. /
I
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
CONFIElEH'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Thank you.
This is good news.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
l'he President:
Pr~me
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Me, too . ..J,12r
Minister Blair:
The president:
Fine.
Is everything fine
~ith
you?
IU)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will try to find out exactly what
is happening on Kyoto and we can talk again tomorrow if there is
(U)
a continuing problem.
The President: Okay, I'll be available.
Goodbye, my friend.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFI DEW!' IJlcL
Let's bring it horne.
�,-.--- .. ----... ~---...", ... ,,---,---.---.
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
CONFI DEN'f' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PART I C'I PANTS :
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, George Chastain,
Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell, Larry Wright,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 27, 1998, 10:30 - 10:41 a.m. EST
The Oval Office
Hello
Prime Minister Blair: Hello
The President:
Tony!
Prime Minister Blair:
about you.
How are you doing?
Bill!
I'm doing fine, and I'm thinking
The President:
I'm doing alright, I'm slogging on.
i t ' l l be alright.
I think
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to say that anything that
You have my 100
you want me to do or say, I'm happy to do.
percent support, and Cherie sends her love.
The President: When you're here, we can talk about it. One or
two things might actually make a difference, and we will talk
about it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, anything you want, we'll do it.
The President:
I wanted to talk to you a little bit about Iraq
and Northern Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section I.4( d) I
�~. ".,
. CONl!"IVI!:M"fIAL
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I really appreciate your saying that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
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Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I generally agree with that, but there's not a
lot of time left, we waited a long time, until the end of the
Muslim holy period.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President: /
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Ok.
Prime Minister Blair:
this? ...RJ
(U)
What is your sense about the timing of
The President:
It's going to take a couple of weeks to get
together, but not much longer. I would imagine we will be ready
to move with it not.J.,o;.ng__ ii!l.~t~H?-ybll'-r~ner::e~, .~
.
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Prime Minister Blair:
it when .. ,(Z) .
So we should have a chance to talk about
The President: We are on an open line, so I will have Sandy get
with your 2eo~le. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
r------------------~
~
Prime Minister Blair, /
The President:
violence? -tet
Where are we on Northern Ireland, Loyalist
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
right? j.e}
So we need to work to keep them from doing that,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
CO~TFIDENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Well, I worked like hell on the Middle East last
week, but I didn't get very far. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Thank you so much for what you said.
little about it when you arrive. ye(
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
The President:
Yes.
Anyway, we're thinking of you,
Take care man.
Prime Minister Blair:
OK, bye.
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'fIAL
We'll talk a
�SEeKEr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Tony Blair, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European
Affairs, Notetaker
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Holmes, Principal Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
John Sawers, Notetaker
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 5, 1998, 11:00 a.m.-12:40 p.m.
Oval Office
The President: We're off to a good start, Tony. Shall we turn
to Northern Ireland? How do you see the prospects for peace and
how can I help?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
I agree, and some others do as well, but not
everyone thinks the ceasefire,w~~~LUL--LUL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
SECRET
Reason:
1.5 (el)
,
Declassify On:; .
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 14
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
�2
SECRE'3'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Samuel Berger: Your efforts to develop the equality agenda seem
to us a key in the effort to keep the Republicans in the
process.
V1
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree. We will continue our contacts and
dialogue with Sinn Fein.
I also intend to keep seeing Trimble
and the other key Unionist leaders when they come to town.
Y21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you again for your continuing help on this critical
dimension of the peace process.
(U)
The President: Let's turn now to Iraq.
after your trip, Madeleine?
(rU)
Secretary Albright:
The trip worked rather well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRE'f
What is your assessment
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
I agree that their willingness to open eight
sites is interesting and offers some hope that our approach
could lead to an acceptable formula.' ~.
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, that might be acceptable if a few political
people were there in addition to the essential UNSCOM team. ~
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRET
�4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
Samuel Berger:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Vice President:
In the meantime, we are getting new
pressures, especially from Capitol Hill, to go after Saddam's
head.
l21
The President:
That's right, Tony, and you just heard our press
making exactly that point. But that approach is nowhere near as
simple as it sounds on the surface. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what is working and will work.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
SECRE'f'
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5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'F
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6
Prime Minister Blair: Our public opinion is not the same as
yours, but we are working hard to educate the public. We put
out a white paper yesterday on Iraq's WMD programs.
(U)
The President:
I heard it is an outstanding document.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We have to educate international opinion
so they see the real threat and choices we face.
(U)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
, Secretary Albright:
panicky reaction.
If we doa white paper, it could create a
~
The President:
But such a paper could also give us a margin of
maneuver.
It would show how much UNSCOM has accomplished in
reducing his stocks and capacity -- but not his future
potential. .J..!Cf'
Secretary Albright:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
The President:
AI, what do you think?
The Vice President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
:3ECRET
(U)
�aECRET
7
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)( d)
SECRET
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as part of the materials in this appeal because it could not be
found.
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
End of Conversation
SECRE!
�COMPIDEN'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: K.C. Brown, Cindy Lawrence,
Anthony Campanella, Joel Schrader and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 16, 1998, 5:14 - 5:41 p.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hey, Tony.
I saw you on the Prime Minister's
question time on C-SPAN yesterday.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
What a treat for you!
(U)
The President:
You got one hateful comment on Iraq from one of
your back benchers, and one hit you on welfare reform.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It doesn't much matter which row they
come from, they're very often stingers.
(U)
The President:
here.
J..e1
It kind of reminds me of Paul Wellstone over
Prime Minister Blair: Well you know, it is from a very usual
suspect. On Iraq, they are pretty good on the whole so it
doesn't much matter. So you watched? What did you think of my
opposite number there?
~
The President:
I didn't see him. I only saw the last 10
(Z)
minutes of you answering questions.
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It is the sort of thing you would do
really well, but frankly I could do without it every Wednesday .
.-ter
The President:
Well they just replayed it on C-SPAN last night.
So, how are you doing? }e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
We have two big problems
to take care of at the moment: Northern Ireland and Iraq.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah. He was very good.
told me to and he was very good. +&r'
I called him after you
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section lA(b)(d)
The President:
You're doing right. Absolutely right.
I'll
support you on this. Even our Irish guys have been great.
Kennedy and Dodd say there is no choice and they promised to get
in touch with Adams to say [gap]. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let's hope they behave while they are out.
That's the key, isn't it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. On Iraq, I just talked to
Sandy Berger. We have an agreed upon proposal to take to Kofi
Annan about how to do this. The Russians keep saying... can you
wait a second? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Taking care of Buddy are you?
(U)
The President:
Yes, he's got to go outside.
I have a door
right here.
I will let him out. (Pause)
Sorry. Hillary is at
another place working. We are not together. We're at Camp
David. Here's the problem we all have to watch. Because of
European public opinion and Arab public opinion, we don't want
to look blood thirsty and have to go the last mile. Saddam
needs a face saver. Kofi Annan would love to go in and save the
day, which is fine with me. The problem from my point of view
is, we can give them some sort of change in appearance here on
how to deal with the presidential palaces but it can't undermine
the integrity of the inspections and turn it from a professional
process to fundamentally a political one. We are trying to
arrive at language, whereby they open Presidential sites to
UNSCOM but palaces would be treated differently. Palaces would
be open to diplomats and political personages.
I think we are
agreed, at least that is what Sandy said. Apparently the actual
palaces would be subject to UNSCOM and then Annan could name
diplomats to go with them. But if you take UNSCOM out of the
decision making and let Annan make all the decisions, the
pressures on him would be enormous for a different standard.
Annan is talking about taking Ekeus with him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
He's Swedish, right?
(U)
The President: Yes. He was Butler's predecessor. He's now the
ambassador to the United States as fate would have it. But that
CONFH)ENTIAL
�4
COHFIDENTIAL
might not be all bad, even though Ekeus is viewed as softer than
Butler because he didn't put heat on the presidential sites.
The truth is Ekeus was there at the beginning and he had so damn
much work ,to do on other places that it was an acceptable
compromise at the time. He wasn't really at the point because,
he was full up on other sites.
It might work out all right. My,
worst nightmare is being isolated because we can't agree to
something that looks perfectly all right on the surface. We
simply have to insist on technically qualified inspectors.
Look, I wouldn't know a chemical lab from a football field.
We
have a good opening position but the trouble is there is no
place to go after the opening. You and I have to work closely
together on this.
I called King Hassan and had a long talk with
him. He has been a good friend of the United States and of
mine.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him to go to
Saddam, call him and tell him that I have no interest in killing
him or hunting him down.
I'm not fooling with him.
I just
don't want his chemical and biological program going forward.
By the way, the memo you put out on the web is phenomenally
successful. But you must know that.
Everybody wants it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair: My view, very clearly indeed, is that the
bottom line all the way through is that the inspectors have got
to be able to do their job uninhibited.
I don't care who
accompanies the inspectors provided they are not interfering
with the inspectors.
That doesn't trouble me.
~
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I agree.
(U)
�CONFIDENl'IAb
5
Prime Minister Blair: Where Saddam is at the moment is that he
will let us in to the presidential sites, but onl once and
Annan into the presidential palaces.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It puts him in a terrible position.
It looks
good to him because he gets to be a peacemaker and the real
issues are technical. Let me go back to the history a bit. The
history is that UNSCOM originally was set up answerable to the
Security Council and not to him, and he doesn't particularly
like that. There was a working group and an oversight board.
But there is a permanent staff at UNSCOM.
The real problem is,
for example, that if it were put under the Secretary General and
out from under UNSCOM, all decisions would come to him:
it
would be up to him to determine which site to inspect, where and
when.
They would have to go back to him and he would decide
when the files got closed, and which sites need future
monitoring. What we tried to do is say, look we don't want to
make those decisions either. We only care that independent,
making the inspections.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
Politically, the idea of letting these
inspectors decide when to inspect and where to inspect and when
to close files and which sites most likely require future
monitoring is very important. You can dress it up in a lot of
different ways. Our opening position, which Sandy said your
guys signed off on, we can take to Kofi and the French and the
Russians, but then what? It is hard to think of a fallback
position if the French and Russians push us on this.
I have
enormous regard for Kofi Annan.
I think he is a heck of a man,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
a
ave oun out dealing with this is that most
people, even in our own country, have not thought much about the
facts of chemical and biological weapons and how little space it
takes to produce them and their capacity for delivering this
stuff now.
That is what basically concerns me. They say in the
Middle East we are hypocrites. They say there are others who
CONFIDEH'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
have this, they say the Israelis, but no one else has shown a
willingness to use them or share them with anyone else. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
tell me this because I don't quite understand it, where is
Saddam Hussein on this, where does he corne down on this? My
people have been unable to tell me. ~
The President: . We. don't know either. The only outstanding
issue is who is in charge of the presidential site inspections.
He even tried to get Newt Gingrich to bring a congressional
delegation to the presidential sites. Newt was smart enough to
-know that one site has nearly 100 buildings that could be
warehousing these chemicals, labs, and stuff.
t€t
Prime Minister Blair:
A huge complex.
~
The President:
On biological agents, you hardly need a room the
size of a photographer's darkroom to do it. 121
Prime Minister Blair: That's right.
Is he now saying the only
outstanding issue is not the presidential sites but simply who
authorizes inspections? +e1
The President:
It is my understanding ... I've had so damn many
conversations today, I am not sure I remember.
I'm not sure I
know the answer on monitoring and corning back again. My
understanding is what he says is the outstanding issue is who
gets to come into the presidential sites. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sites or palaces?
Jef
The President:
Both, I think. He has a higher standard for
palaces than sites, but he is basically saying he will let
someone corne in and look at both categories.
;zi
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
The President:
Yes and basically he thinks Kofi will be
responsive to political pressures if he does that and will take
us off line.
Saddam thinks Butler is a stooge of America, but
hell, I never even talk to Butler. He is a tough guy and I like
what he is doing.
I've reached the conclusion after eliminating
CONFIDEN'F Hili
�CONFI DEN'fIAL
7
all possible alternatives that Saddam still has the makings of a
chemical and biological program he doesn't want to give up.
+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes.
I'm
and will call you back to
together on this.
If our
he wants Kofi to make all
construct a good argument
I
looking at some other things we can do
talk about it. We'll need to stay
two staffs are together and if he says
of the calls, then we need to
why that is not a good thing.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Je1
Awful.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
L -_ _~~~~~~~~~~_ _ _ _~
The President:
I am going to talk to him tomorrow-or maybe
tonight.
If I get any clUe, I'll let you know. Listen Tony,
what's the most direct contact you have had with Iraq since
1991? For instance, has the British Foreign Minister talked to
Tariq Aziz?
.JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
I honestly don't know.
check and get back to you. Jer
I'll have to
The President:
If I weren't constrained by the press, I would
pick up the phone and call the son of a bitch. But that is such
a heavy-laden decision in America.
I can't do that and I don't
think you can. ..J..e"}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
�8
CONFIDENI IAL
'Phe PresidepL:
I agree.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
~
Prime Minister Blair:J
The President:
I can't tell you how critical it is.
It costs
us a hell of a lot of money to do all this moving around we are
. doing, not counting the political costs. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Agree, but I will have a hard time selling
anything here short of military action, but I can do that if I
~
know it is real.
IPrime Minister Blair,
The President:
~
I
Can't allow that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFI DEN'3'IAL
I can't agree more.
~
�,
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
9
-
Prime Minister Blair:
If we stay in close contact tomorrow,
when will we send him off to Baghdad? ~
The President:
I don't know. He wants to go Wednesday or
Thursday.
I will let you know. Let's keep in close touch on
this.
If you want to talk about this, I don't care if you get
me up in the middle of the night if you want to. There is
hardly anything more important. le1
Pr-ime Minister Blair:
If I have more thoughts tomorrow, I'll
just give you a call, shall I? ~
The President:
Yes, I'm not doing much more.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye, Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
ke1
(u)
�CONi luCNT AL
COHFIDEN1'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telecon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
President Clinton
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Tony Campanella,
Bob Ford, Tom Crowell, Jim Smith, Peter
Huggins
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
FEBRUARY 12, 1998, 4:05 - 4:20 p.m. EST Oval
Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you?
The President: All right. We had a wonderful time with you
here.
I hope you enjoyed it half as much as we did.
Prime Minister Blair: We had an absolutely fantastic time.
especially enjoyed Friday night and Saturday morning.
We
The President: You've turned me into an icon for everyone at
the State dinner.
Prime Minister Blair: We had a great time. We are so pleased
at all the time you and Hillary spent with us; we really enjoyed
it.
I hope it wasn't too fraught or difficult for you.
The president: Everything is going okay from what we can see
here; we had a great time and wanted to thank you for that.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I have a problem now.
CONFIDE~lTIAL
Reason:
1.5 ( b , e D . .
. '
DeclaSS2fy On,
~ '"'-.-
..._~_~
._--' .-:-...;.-- -
-:-"
02/~tlJ~!1~t:J
,
�tONFIDEN':FL"rL
The President:
2
I know you do.
Prime Minister Blair: I spoke with Bertie Ahern this evening
and here is how the land lies. There have been two murders
carried out.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
What were they thinking about?
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
President Clinton:
they?
They haven't protested their innocence, have
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~---~
President Clinton: What are they thinking?
is payback for what happened before?
Do you think this
Prime Minister Blair:~r__________________________________________~
President Clinton:
Within the IRA?
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
ever you do?
Can you get Bertie to go along with what
Prime Minister Blair: /
COHFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
�CONE IDEN'fIAL
4
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I The only thing
we've done so far, because we thought it would be what you
wanted, is we got in touch with Sinn Fein and told them they
have to make a statement and have the IRA make a statement.
Prime-Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We have said that.
I want to do whatever I
can to be helpful, really helpful, it's important for me to keep
this thing going. I don't want to get in the position of you
and me against Ireland. I want some influence over those
people ...
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Let me call him. Give me one more chance to
hit these people, to get them to make a tough statement because
you can't be caught in the middle of this:
you are in a hell of
a pickle.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
President Clinton: Me too. It's so damned stupid unless they
have a spli t between them and their bad guys ...
CONFI DENT L'tL
�eONPI DEN9:' IAL
5
Prime Minister Blair: IIE.o.13526, section IH(b)(d)
President Clinton: ... and their.bad guys got out of hand and
their good guys don't think they have the strength to kick them
publicly.
It doesn't make a lick of sense.
Prime Minister Blair:
President Clinton:
are lucky
No, I agree with that.
You are the best friend they have and they
there.
This is so stupid,
this.
Let me get
in touch wLth Bertie and we'll get back together.
I want to do
·it in a way that's possible to keep this going.
Prime Minister Blair:
I just want to tell
ou Bill.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
President Clinton:
I agree.
Let me get on this and we will be
back in touch.
I am really sorry Tony this happened to you.
Prime Minister Blair:
the way through this.
President Clinton:
Well, there have been ups and downs all
We just have to make sure this works.
Thanks, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's get back in touch.
End of Conversation
COlqPIDEH'f TAL
�3E C!<:E 'I'
THE: WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Bonnie Glick,
Tom Crowell, Lawrence Butler, Gwenyth
Todd and Joe Marty
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 1:15 - 1:26 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello Bill.
Fine, thank you.
How are you?
(U)
Have you talked to Kofi?
Prime Minister Blair:
I talked to him
toda. He said he was going to call me.
~
but not
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The Pr"esident: Well, I'll tell you what I heard.
a little intelli ence this morning.
We picked up
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
to wait.
Now I don't know all the facts, we just have
The main thing I wanted to say is that it is really
�2
important to stay in close contact and stay determined on this.
1'&)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: All I got is secondhand rumor. All Madeleine
has is a cryptic call saying all the elements are in place. Who
knows what that means? ~
Prime Minister Blair: . Who does Butler work under anyway?
·The President:
He works for the Security Council.
the Security Council.
1G1
UNSCOM is
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree with that.
The President:
This is twice he's done this.·
again, it's our fault, not his. Jer
ke1
If it happens
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Here's the thing. We need to make sure, in
fairness to him and to us, we need to make sure we are speaking
in the same terminology. CNN had some damn fool of a reporter
saying these sites are smaller than I had led the American
public to believe.
If you're talking about the palaces, that's
one thing.
If you are talking about the grounds, that is quite
another.
If we ask Kofi to revisit where someone is living,
some house with a lab in the basement that's one thing. But
some of those sites have a hundred warehouse-sized buildings.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
£ECRET
I
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We have got to have another resolution so we
don't have to go through this again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, if Kofi calls you before me, call me.
if he calls me, I will contact you.
I am just going to be
hanging around here today_
(~
And
Prime Minister Blair:
I have to travel for 45 minutes today,
but other than that I am in Chequers or Downing Street. You're
at Camp David? ~
The President:
No, I stayed at the White House this weekend
because I think this thing is going to break. OK, we're totally
agreed on this situation, then, how do you feel on this Northern
Ireland thing?
tet
SECRET
�SECRE'l:'
4
KO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams is not coming here, which is good news.
--<-e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll do that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I want to work with you.
I don't want to
undercut you.
I'm pleased. Youfre doing well so far, we will
just stay in touch. This Iraqi thing might break in the next
six hours. -te1'""
Prime Minister Blair:
whatever time...
(e)
The President:
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bill, obviously itfs earlier for you, but
(U)
Goodbye.
Thank you.
(U)
Goodbye friend.
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'P
(U)
�C ONFI DENT L"rL
THE: WH ITE HOUSE:
WASnl~GTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 18
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Torn Crowell,
Jeff Rathke, Lawrence Butler and Gwenyth
Todd
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 22, 1998, 4:38 - 4:49 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hi, Tony.
prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
You're faint.
Can you hear me now?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I've spoken with Kofi and I gather he's
spoken to Madeleine as well.
~
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
But I'm not sure.
detail?
Have you been able to glean any more
-k-e"}
The President:
Well, I haven't.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
�2
CONFI DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, I don't think he wanted to talk on the
phone, and our guys are guessing on it, too. i€t
Prime Minister Blair:
,The Preside'nt:
sure. -teT-
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Well, I hope he hasn't either, but I'm just not
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
e Just have to wait and see what
happens.
If there is another violation we need to seriously
consider funding opposition groups and giving whatever help we
can and just cut the umbilical cord. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, and it's weird, because Kofi is not coming
back until Tuesday.
It's going to leak. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It's bound to.
ke1
The President:, It would put poor old Butler in a terrible
situation. Madeleine talked to him today, but couldn't say
much. We don't want him to spout off without knowing what kind
of deal it is. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
bloke is he? teT
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
of him? .fE7
~
C~IFIP£H'I'L'\L
I've never come across him.
What kind of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Madeleine couldn't get the details out
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
3
No, she doesn't know much more than
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He said he's going to have a press
conference tomorrow morning. What's he going to say then?
The President: We don't know.
I think
tomorrow morning that he has a'deal but
about it until he comes back and briefs
in Paris and give Chirac his plane back
What else can I tell you? I just don't
Prime Minister Blair:
Paris? l€1
The President:
he's going to say
he can't really talk
us. Then he will stop
and come on over here.
know.
~
And there's no one he's going to see in
Yeah, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
Y21
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yep, it's a very tenuous situation, and maybe
when he gets to Paris, we can figure something out.
It's a
really raw deal to sit for a day and a half, not knowing what
the deal is.
fCT
Prime Minister Blair:
If he just lands and takes off again ...
-f€t"
The President:
I don't know, I just heard he will stop in Paris
and then fly on to New York City.
~
Prime Minister Blair: He may say he won't talk or speak to
anybody, but on the other hand, we have got to know what is
happening.
(-eJ
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONPIDENTIAL
�eONFI15EM'fIAL
4
The President:
That's what I worry about -- I talked to
Madeleine and Sandy before I talked to you. Let me see what I
can find out -- they think it can work if it is strictly
administered by Kofi, but we need to know what Butler's going to
say about it.
J,.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
]
Prime Minister Blair:
_
The President: Apparently he did that, but maybe Kofi gets to
decide who goes back, and when. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Yep, uh-huh.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep, but if we can't get it, we have to say what
we were going to say anyway.
(0
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we'd better get working on that
right away.
I hate being in this position for the next thirtysix hours.
~
The President:
That's really bad. Let me call my crowd back
and see what they say, what we can work out.
I don't like being
in this position. -+etPrime Minister Blair:
I can try to contact Kofi and tell him
that when he gets to Paris he needs to call us right away, that
we really need to know what is going on.
I think I will try
that. -fer
The President:
Okay.
~
)
L-________________- - - - - - Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yep.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�5
cmlFIDEN'PIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'll get John Weston to start
working On the Security Council thing right away.
I'll try to find out some more from Baghdad.
The President:
Okay.
And in the meantime,
)k1
(U)
:_I___________________________________
_iL_p_r_i_m_e__
M_i_n_i_s_t_e_r B_l_a_l_.r
__
__
The President:
Yeah.
----~:J
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a curious way of doing business.
(C)
The President:
Yes, it's a weird deal.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: That bothers me. Kofi's wait gives him a chance
to spin it, and I don't like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------~
The President: Yes, Madeleine does.
there, too. ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'll see what we can do
~
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - - - - - - - -
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay. Right, Bill--I am here all night
if you need to get a hold of me... f€t
CONFIDEH'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
6
I'll do it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Thank you.
(U)
Thanks, Bill.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFI Dg~IT L1\d,
�CONP1DEN'PL"rL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHLNGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 19
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Bonnie
Glick, Tom Crowell, Jeff Rathke, Lawrence
Butler and Don Bandler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 23, 1998, 8:57 - 9:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
we, then?
(U)
(U)
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
The President:
Let me tell you what I
document.
First of all, the ood thin
How stand
been told about the
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think we
have to study this document and listen carefully to what Kofi
says tomorrow.
je}
.
It is important that the commission rush a group of qualified
experts -- I think that we have to test the agreement soon. You
know, we have to get whatever the agreement is:
show up at one
of these sites and start looking around.
I'd like to do it
before I have to move the whole U.S~ Navy around again. Now,
COHFI DEN'l' 1M
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (bi; d) - _ ;;..ri,---_ ~~sr'-' ~~~ .----~--------"',.
Declassify On:! 2/~80 - . _ ]
; __-<~ .-'~:r~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ).
.<?:..~::,-::;~-::~ __._,,_~ . c-';';:;";~_~"-' "->""..::___ ~ __/:;~-';'/
�eOMFIBEM'I'IAL
2
Baghdad has done this before with weapons of mass destruction.
-+et-"
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
First of all, you need to get this thing and look at it. What I
would like is to be in a position in the next two or three hours
to talk to Yeltsin and Chirac. ~
I want to compliment Kofi and say we understand they have agreed
to free and unfettered access,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
You guys get this document. He is going to make it
widely available in an hour. Let's go through it. ~
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONn DEH'I'IAL
�CONFIDEU'fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Exactly, my view is that we may have another
twenty-four to thirty-six hours of word wrangling.
We just have
to see. )Q1
- Prime- Minis-ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, apparently, he has some leeway over how
the UN structures itself for this special team. He has to know
that we want this done correctl , we don't want this to be a
bunch of olitical B.S.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
We very much hope this will work out.
approach.
That's my
-ret
Prime Minister Blair:
are you, Bill? ~
You're going to say something publicly,
The President:
I'm not going to say anything for three or four
hours -- I may not be able to, but I'm going to try.
The trick
is to embrace the effort, pocket his commitment, and thank Kofi
for getting it, and he has never done this before.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
or four hours,
gOlng
flesh
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'3'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
three
�4
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Tony, I don't know the answer to that.
We
haven't studied the agreement closely, and Kofi isn't here, so
.we can' t cail him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No one has spoken to Kofi?
~
The President: He told me he'd call me from Paris.
I don't
know if he will or not.
I talked to him late last night.
You
know, he clearly thinks he has a good deal, the question is
whether his definition of a good deal is the same as ours. Jef
Pr ime Minis ter Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
You and I don't want to rain on it, because if
we hadn't been tough, we wouldn't have had the damned deal. We
can't completely embrace it until we see the details.
We don't
want to be in the position of buying a pig in a poke and then
say, "Holy cow -- we don't know what happened to it." ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely.
message is, "Yes, if." ~
Sandy says we ought to say our
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
CONFIDEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�5
eONPIDEN'FIAL
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Miniiter Blair:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's why I just have to leave everyone where
they are, because we have to have a test.
I have to leave our
troops in place. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
We're having a vigorous agreement here.· Any
time in the next two hours you want to talk, after you have seen
it, let me know.
)4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wish you would.
I understand Yeltsin can take
my call in one hour. Chirac said he can't take my call for twoand-a-half hours.
That's a long time. He called here earlier,
while I was still in bed, and said he didn't want them to wake
me.
I don't think it's evasion, I think it's just the schedule.
It may be better not to talk to them right away. You get the
document and parse it a little, and see if there are any holes
in the road.
I'll try to call you before I talk to Yeltsin and
Chirac. Otherwise, I'll just talk to Yeltsin. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The moment I get the document I will look
at it carefully. And we can talk later. je1
The President:
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Thanks, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDaFfIAL
�CON FI DEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 20
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: James Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy,
Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke,
Nancy McEldowney, Rexon Ryu
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 23, 1998, 12:28-12:42 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, I'm fine.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Hold on.
Here's one, go on.
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
CONF'IDE1H 1AL
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Who's the commissioner?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. We believe he'll appoint
a guy with technical expertise, who will have credibility with
Butler, but it certainly needs to be. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I couldn't agree more. You've identified the
same things I'm worried about. Sandy suggested a
which
is quite good; our position on this shoul b to
and
test. We need to clarif , then test.
[ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIPrL
Yes, I agree with that entirely.
;ef
�3
COl>TFI DEN'FIAI:;
The President:
One thing that we thought of doing, is to get
Butler back in the ballgame, because we don't want him out; Kofi
is supposed to consult with Butler and the head of the IAEA, and
presumably that will keep him from underminin the inte rit .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
he can get a team In there until
What is today, the 23 rd , so that's
He doesn't think he can get a good team in
there, but I think that having someone say, "we're UNSCOM and we
want to check the Ministry of Defense" would be a good way to
check in a hurry.
te1
~rime ~inis~er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I understand. We need to ask all these
questions, but no matter how good his answers, we need an early
test.
kcJ
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: It will take me a few weeks to withdraw troops
from the Gulf, so we will sit tight.
I think we need to test,
as you said, test under 4 but also 5, because there are
sensitive sites that aren't presidential sites. Also it will
take longer under Para 4 to get started.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Has
anyone spoken to Kofi?
The President:
I spoke to him last night at 8:30 my time, which
was 4:30 his time. He was a little groggy, but he wanted to
demonstrate to us that the agreement would fully meet the P-5
instructions he took to Baghdad.
I said that's great, but at
that time I hadn't seen the agreement. He promised to call me
when he got to Paris.
I don't know if he's in Paris, but I
CONFI DEN'l'IAL
�COHFIDEH'FIAL
4
understood that he did not want to talk in enormous detail over
Iraqi phones. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, quite smart.
~
The President: Now, let me tell you some good news,
potentially.
I spoke with Yeltsin, and went over m concerns,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
.Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
That's pretty good.
That's pretty damn good.
.(.e-)-
Jer
The President: My relationship with Yeltsin is such that all
his hard-liners believe I could talk to Yeltsin and get him to
sell the oil wells for three dollars and a half, but that's not
true.
He's just more far-sighted and progressive than they are.
Half the time they go to work on him, and I have no doubt that
they'll make some effort to undermine this. He was quick and
unambiguous, and one thing about Yeltsin, he doesn't like for
people to take advantage of him.
If Saddam Hussein doesn't do
it, Yeltsin would take it as a personal insult to him.
I think
he wants to do right, so if he can stay hitched,
rea y e leve
a s
have that he'll observe the agreement.
If you talk to Yeltsin,
I would appreciate it if you would reinforce this. ~.
Prime Minister Blair: I
The President:
with me,
to.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
II tel
You should say you've talked to me and you agree
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely right.
spoken to Chirac, Bill? Aer
Did you say you've
The President:
I'll talk to him after I talk to you . And i f I
get anything, I may talk to you after I talk to him. .....(-e1
CONFIDEN'f'IlW
�i
5
CONI"IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
(C)
The President:
That's it, you got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CCMFIDEN'l'IAL
~
�cmrFI DEf<l''f IAt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell,
Joel Schrader, Jeff Rathke, James Smith
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 9, 1998, 5:38 - 6:05 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Great.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, I'm sorry to trouble you.
There
are a couple of things I wanted to discuss with ou.
First of
all, the Middle East Peace Process.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me tell you where we are and we may be able
to do something together. You mean you have aid to facilitate
some of these things? ~
COHFIDEN'P IAL
Classified by: ,-Glyn T, Davies, ''_~~-~~
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l. 5 (Jj, d) :--""''''''' -----ffi.""',;,.,-:'-----"'\:
Declassify On: f
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2
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
about it.
Let me tell
ou where we are and then we'll talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I think they're really ready to go now on the airport and the
industrial park, but they keep messing around with each other.
I think they're afraid, each for different reasons, to go ahead.
I had to put this off until the Iraq thing was resolved,
temporarily, at least. What I'd like to do is give them this
proposal and coordinate with you.
Part of the proposal is that
we want them to go ahead and finish the industrial park and get
on to safe passage. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
proposal? -t€t-
When do you think you will put forth your
The President: As soon as I can.
two weeks.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
This month; within the next
Right.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Arafat is afraid to take a redeployment now and
go to final status talks without a guaranteed third one; my view
is he can always make a final deal, and more is better than
less. ..(..et
CONn DEN'fIAL
�'~.'
': .. ,.,
.
:
3
CONFI DENT IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think there might be a way to do that. What
I'd like to do ... if I could give them the overall proposal
first, then we could get together and put this to them.
I think
if we could coordinate that way, it would give them a way to get
started on it. By putting more money on the table, it would
create a
if they're looking for a reason -- an excuse to go
forward, it would be good. k€1
Prime Minister Blair: Right. You reckon you will put your
proposal forward in the next couple of weeks? ~
The President:
Absolutely.
j€f
Prime Minister Blair: Some sort of redeployment package
including the other issues as well? Jer
The President:
Yes.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
Then we could help by having some sort of
quadrilateral summit afterwards. 1e1
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes. We're ready to go back to them and I think
we have some chance of getting them to move.
~
cmlFImmTIAL
�CONPIDEH'PIAL
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm set to go to the Middle East in
April, early April. Obviously it would help to have something
fairly concrete up and running before then.
(~
The President:
We'll have something by then.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We had a good day yesterday.
They were able to
go into the Ministry of Defense and get some records out which I
am hopeful will resolve something one way or another.
The fact
that ~hey ~ere able to get into ministry buildings is a real
reaffirmation of UNSCOM's ability to fulfill the understanding
Kofi says they got. Now we have to continue to test compliance
on sensitive sites, which will happen near the end of the month,
but my own view is we should leave our forces there to monitor
compliance and keep the integrity of UNSCOM strong.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
~~I~E~.~O~.1_3~52~6~,s~e~ct~io_n_l~.4~(b.)(~d~)__~1 ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I thought we ought to fight if off. My own
view is that Saddam got what he asked and we got what we asked
for, and not to politicize UNSCOM.
~
,--_____--'7
-J/
L -______________________________
The President:
Jer
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's right.
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d),
I
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eOMF'I DElffIAL
The President:
So far I'm feeling pretty good about it.
keeping my fingers crossed. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I'm
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President: Oh yeah.
I saw him.
I'll call him
few days. He doesn't want me to make this
the next
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
be down. ...(..e1""
They're really down, and they've got reason to
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the Palestinians are coupling
redeployment with some of these other issues. By all means, if
you guys in the United states can put together a big package,
that's fine.
Since we have so much aid tied up in this, we
should try to move on smaller stuff, as well.
~
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
move on all three things.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
leaded for a
ear to
I
Let us put our proposal to them and let's see if we can get
together and meet and we can push ahead. That can give them the
boost to move to permanent status talks.
s,e1
Prime Minister Blair: Right, okay, Bill, just one other thing
on Northern Ireland. ...(-e1""'
The President:
Where are we on that?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
We're getting along, basically.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�l..;L:;
'~j"
'u "- 1 ,I,''i_
•
t','
CONFIDENTIAL
6
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d)
The President:
You do?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~------------------~I
The President:
We'll do that.
Prime Minister Blair:
them all.
Mo's coming too, isn't she?
Yeah, I think she is.
~
So you can see
The President:
Let me ask you this: have you gotten a good
reaction to Straw's extradition decision?
»cr
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, I mean we got a good reaction in
certain quarters
as usual, it was a good reaction in certain
quarters and not so ood in others and that's 'ust the wa it
is.
The President:
I will do my best to bang their heads together
and caution them on good conduct, but attacks are likely to come
from quarters none of us can control.
J,.e)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
,." ~~.." _,.~[,':-:r~~,;~-'-·-·--· -----. --..-~-----=-~'\\
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COHFIDEN'fIAL
;
•
7
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
You really think you can go back to the original
timeframe and get something done by May?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I do.
ke1
When will the referendum be?
Prime Minister Blair:
In May.
The President:
fCl
.~
When?
ke(
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Then they think they'll get a bigger turnout for
their referendum, too? ;ef
Prime Minister Blair:
A bit of that,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So there it is, really, Bill.
just have to keep pushing on . ....(.eY
We
The President: Alright. We'll be in touch. We'll coordinate
with your people on the peace process in the next two weeks,
we'll hang around in Iraq to see what happens, and I'll do what
you ask on St. Patrick's Day. That's just a week from tomorrow.
I'll report back if I hear anything interesting. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
COI?lFIDENTIAL
Yeah, okay.
~
�CONf'IDEN''fIAL
The President:
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President;
along. -ter
(U)
I'm fine, actually.
(U)
It looks like your economy's still pumping
Prime Minister Blair:
It is, I remember you telling me once
that once the guys start coming in with good news, there are
other guys telling you that it's not good news. ~
The President:
Wall Street used to go down every time the
·economy would grow. Now it doesn't go down as much, now that
there's been such a long period without inflation.
I think if
you have the same experience, then soon investors and ordinary
folks begin to agree, and that's good news.
There's a guy at
Stanford who is an economist, and who COincidentally is the son
of DNC Chairman Roy Roemer. He's a bit of a libertarian, but he
argues that in the technological era, in countries with open
markets, the constraints of the business cycle have been
considerably loosened, and you can grow more and longer. All of
us are essentially underestimating productivity and the most
important economic policy is not to limit the ability of
technology to prod the economy.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well, I hope to goodness he's right.
Me, too.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair: We keep looking across the Atlantic
hoping it will happen . .-JRr
The President:
Well, I think it will.
I think it's coming to
you, and unemployment is way down, and you've got to stick with
it. ..{.e-jPrime Minister Blair: We have a very tough battle ahead on
welfare, there are a lot of things to do there.
~
The President:
you? jQ1'
Are the Tories going to vote against you or with
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)( d)
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�9
C ONFI DEt<f'f lAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: And with the parliamentary system, it really
pays off.
If I could have waited another year for elections,
I'd still have a majority.
I think you're doing the right
thing:
as long as you have the muscle and juice, go ahead and
go. ;e{ ..
Prime Minister Blair: Well that's what I reckon.
are testing this theory to destruction!
~
The President:
Ha!
Birmingham.
ke1
You'll be alright.
Anyway, we
I'm looking forward to
Prime Minister Blair: Well, that'll be great.
forward to having you.
Is Hillary well? ~
We are looking
The President:
She's great. You need to decide, we all do, if
anything would be served by me going to Ireland after
Birmingham. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We'll know that in the next few weeks, if
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It is a mess.
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1A(b)(d)
COMFIDEN''f'IAL
�10
CONFI DEN'FIl'rL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
. Yes, alright.
Prime Minister Blair:
Well I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
End of Conversation --
CONP ID'EH'fIAL
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'P
!i2v
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA.'" 1-1 ,"-, "TO N
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
KO. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 22
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Sean Rice,
Tony Campanella, Jim Smith and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 20, 1998, 5:18 - 5:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Tony. How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
day in Germany.
(U)
The President:
Fine, thank you very much.
Where are you in Germany, Berlin?
Prime Minister Blair:
Bonn.
(U)
The President:
(U)
I went to see Helmut Kohl.
I like Bonn.
Prime Minister Blair:
I spent the
(U)
I went to
It's a sweet little town.
I like i t as well.
(U)
The President: What is your take on the elections and on
Schroeder? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5"!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
(U)
�~.-
....
\~"'.: ~.-. ~
5ECRE'l'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yeah, he's a wonderful man.
)81
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's interesting, but remember, Tony, he was
18 points down in the last election, but I'm afraid in this last
term they haven't been able to restore any growth. He looked
good in the beginning.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
£ECRET
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3EC~El'
The President:
3
Scharping?
Prime M.inister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister
~
Yes, Scharping.
I
¢
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~B11~ali~r~:~=;~;=;i~~~~~~~~~~============~~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)( d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~hat kept us going in 1992.
~
That is
Prime Minister Blair: There was a sort of buzz about the place.
We .had a good time. Bill, thanks for everything you've done on
Ireland.
(.21
The President:
J.&'r
I tried to do exactly what you asked me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
can't tell you how much.
ou did. I dee 1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime·Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
bECRET
reciated it.
I
�SECRET
§ECRE'F
4
The President:
I tried to use public and private meetings.
met with all of them. Well almost all of them.
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I see something else relevant in my observation
·of the Middle East, and Bosnia where we sent in an occupying
army.
If we didn't, the peace would have led to more violence.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d
One problem is there are always enemies of peace out
there. The people that killed Rabin and blew up the bombs knew
exactly what they were doing. They were each other's best
friends. As part of this peace deal, we have to make the deal
first, but you have to have someone you trust thinking about the
next steps.
It is not too soon to start thinking about what you
want me to do and speculate what kind of outbursts or problems
you envision in the next few years.
I am prepared to make
whatever reasonable investment I can.
I'm worried that some
enemy of peace will gum it up, stop the investment coming in
there and torment people . . You have to have somebody thinking
about it, someone you trust but who's not involved: don't take
your eye off the ball. Churchill and Roosevelt were thinking
about the UN in 1943 and 1944. It's not too soon to start
thinking about this. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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Prime Minist.er Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you off to Africa,
Bill ?
JZl
The President:
Sunday.
Prime Minister Blair:
We're very excited.
(U)
It's quite a big trip.
(U)
The President:
Yes, for the United States. No American
president has even been to Africa. Carter went to Nigeria and
Liberia and Roosevelt and Reagan stopped over there.
It's
unconscionable what we. haven't done in Africa.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a fascinating continent.
I'm really excited for you.
(U)
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: All the best to you.
I see you have been
defeating your enemies as usual. Keep it up. ~
The President:
They've got a lot of money out there to get
people to say a lot of stuff. We're doing extremely well, but
it's a weird way to live.
~
Prime Minister Blair: We'll talk more the next time we meet.
Every time we see another one fall, we cheer.
~
The President:
Take care, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Okay, Bill and lots of love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
(U)
End of Conversation --
£EGRE'P
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION S.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 23
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Anthony
Sampanella, Robert Ford, Karen Harris and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
AprilS, 1998, 2:08 - 2:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Hey Tony.
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine, absolutely fine. You had a
successful trip over there. The crowd scenes were amazing.
(U)
The President: Unbelievable! It was my first time. We really
had a great time. We did some things that most people don't do
in South Africa. We got into the townships and little villages.
They were very good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It looked fantastic.
You really made an
impact on them.
It was a big boost to those countries. I t will
(U)
be a bigger boost to the people than to the government.
The President:
Well, I hope so.
How are we doing in Ireland?
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
3ECRET
�2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Is there anything else that you want me to do?
.-fCf
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think at the moment.
-+G+
The President:
I had a good round on Saint Patrick's Day.
really got to know each of them. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair: ri===================~------------------~
The President:
There is something else I would like to discuss:
the meeting I had with Mandela when Bandar magically showed up .
....f-B-r
II
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I
I knew him before I became President.
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Yes, I agree with that.
We need to know things;
1~________________-tl=E~.O~.~1~35=2=6,~s=ec:t=io=n~l=.4~(d~)~I____________________~I~)
Prime Minister Blair:
II E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
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Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's my theory.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
When are you going out there'?
Prime Minister Blair:
...(-et"
I'm going in a couple of weeks time.
~
The President:
ah good. By then we should have a clear path on
what to do by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister I:lair:
The President:
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It's touch and go all the time.
ke)
Let me know i f you want me to do anything.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Good.
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
))21".
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Prime Minister Blair:
bye.
(U)
The President:
Bye.
Alright, Bill.
~ay
hello to Hillary,
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
�3EeRE'!'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 24
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Peter Huggins, Joseph Wright,
James Smith, Anthony Campanella and Robert
Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 24, 1998, 11:36-11:52 a.m.
The Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
EDT
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. Bill, I thought we should have a
word to bring you up to date on Northern Ireland and the Middle
~~~--~==~~~~~
I East. I
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yeah, I saw some of Trimble's guys made a big
show when you voted. )Qf
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I wonder if there is anything I can do from this
end.
I will have some announcements when I go to Birmingham;
there are a number of things we can do, even if they don't want
me to go to Ireland.
One of the things we could do is have
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Bertie come down to Birmingham and make a 10 to 15 minute
presentation to the G-B, and you and I could go out and make
some statements that there are some goodies on the horizon.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In terms of my going there, I have no feelings
at all on it.
I just want to win the vote.
This thing could be
a parochial vote and those unionists could say, "this is our
lives and our futures, we have to decide." .k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why don't we do an informal poll at the end of
the first week in May, see where the undecided voters are by
religion, and see if that would help.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Good.
Prime Minister Blair: /
.(.G-1-
~------------~I
I
The President:
It's a weird world, isn't it?
J81
Prime Minister Blair:
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Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
here. -ter
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
If you want to talk more about it, I will be
Prime Minister Blair:
Ireland. -+er
Thanks again, you were a real
he~p
with
The President:
It will be a great victory.
You know, it will
be interesting to see where the splits are between the
Protestants and Catholics.
I know you must have someone up
there working the polls. We ought to be able to calibrate
everything.
The important thing is just to win the referendum.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:· This thing is bigger than foreign policy.
You're better at campaigning than the rest of them and have a
more sophisticated insight; you should just treat it like
another election and do whatever is necessary to win the
election. ..(-e1"
Prime Minister Blair:
to Hillary.· (U)
The President:
Bye.
Right.
Thanks Bill, all the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Love
�cmlFIDENTIlrL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(UP
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Rice, James Smith, David
Higgins, Marianna Papadimitriou, Jeffrey
Rathke
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 8, 1998, 1:50 - 2:12 p.m.
Dover, Delaware
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm great, I'm just, actually,L---------in my local workman's club doing constituent surgery in county
Durham.
(U)
The President:
Are you in Durham?
I love the Durham Cathedral.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just came out of a bar where the old
blokes were telling me about their troubles; from that to you.
(U)
The President:
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
I
love Durham.
Did you come here?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I did.
I liked it so well I brought Hillary
back to see the cathedral and walk around the town.
I took her
to York and Durham on one of our trips.
(U)
COHFI DEN'I'IAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b(d)
. Ai.",~~,''---~--·~---~-;,;,
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2
Prime Minister Blair: Oh, well.
I was a choirboy at the
cathedral in Durham, if you can believe that.
(U)
'The President:
You still have that choirboy look.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
(U)
The President:
I'm doing wonderful.
I'm looking forward to
being with you.
I'm glad you and Major went up there together.
It was good.
(U)
Prime -Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I hope it helped.
You know it did help some.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
right to take the decision you did.
I know Jim
there and took the temperature of the unionist
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
was
I
The President:
I think they didn't want to give Paisley and his
crowd a new pretext -- "that's the guy that gave Gerry Adams a
visa and broke the eggs," and all that stuff. j.Q-'(
Prime Minister Blair:
That's true, but it's the right decision
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'd like that. We released a few things
yesterday that we will do, and maybe we could pony it up some.
,ke)
Prime Minister Blair:
this thin and runnin
Yes, well, I'm now taking a real grip
i t like a oli tical
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: So you think we ought to do some sort of joint
announcement while we are there?
~
COH"FIDEN'FIAL
�3
cmIFIDEH'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we can do that
comin down to one point.
it's all
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
And they can't be in government if they don't ...
.JKf
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
It wouldn't just be me, but it would mess them
up here in America. Almost all Irish guys here, including guys
who gave them money under questionable circumstances, would bail
out on them if the vote went positive and if they reneged.
You'd see major abandonment of them by Irish-Americans. That's
something they can't afford. They know they can't.
I'm not so
worried anymore -- I was worried some of the IRA offshoots might
take action against Gerry, but the mainstream crowd knows they
can't violate the agreement or the Americans will go berserk on
them. ..keJ
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think for that to be said is very
important. That's reassuring. ~
The President: That's the only reason I wanted to go.
under the illusion that all those Protestants love me.
Prime Minister Blair:
I was keen
I'm not
()21
Well, you're absolutely right, that's why
�~E~.O~.~1~35~2~6~,s~ec~t=io=n~1~.4~(b~)~(d~)~I________________~I
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
If we say it in Birmingham, it might still have
enough echo to get there.
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I agree.
It certainly would. And
the stuff you've been saying today, or someone in the White
House has been saying today, about money and investment -there's something leading the news now about that. ~
The President:
That's something we put out yesterday.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
It shows you, though, that anything you
say will be carried and given prominence. What Paisley keeps
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COWFIDEN'HA::b
doing is putting out posters saying that Gerry Adams will be
Minister of Health.
E.O.13526,section1.4(b)(d)
I Jj2f
I I
The President:
The old guy is good.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What will the vote be?
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
Sinn Fein, you mean?
~
The President: Will three-quarters of Sinn Fein vote for the
referendum?
j,.ef
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know.
I suspect yes, about that .
.ke!
The President:
It seems like a pro forma thing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't think Gerry Adams would say he'll
win the vote unless he is going to win the vote. So I think it
will be pretty resounding. They're prepared to lose some of
their folks.
Prisoners is a big issue for them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that. Yesterday, I had a group in
to see me that I think is called WAVE.
It's a group of victims
who lost children, brothers, and parents. They were mostly, but
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
CONFIlSEN'fIAL
not entirely, Protestants. A group that really wants the IRA to
decommission.
They're a militant peace group.
They want to
deal with thousands of people in their inner and physical pain.
I agree with you. ~
We've all taken our licks for Gerry, so if they want a role in
the government, they have got to have some demonstration of good
faith on this violence issue.
These women gave me an idea
yesterday. Your people could vet it for practicality. Maybe
you and Bertie and I could ask for it. ~
They say that there is a some relatively small number of people,
like 2D -- people in the police or otherwise hated by the IRA,
whose remains have never been recovered.
They say if there's
not immediate decommissioning, right after the vote, if you
could work out the legalities so that people would not be
prosecuted and the IRA could somehow direct people to the
remains, so their families could give them a sanctified burial,
that would have a huge psychological impact over there.
I told
them I'd try to help, but I'd talk to you about it. They don't
want vengeance, they just want their people back.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
will. )ef
Yeah, I think that would be good.
I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
look into that \
The President:
Yeah, I think that's a great idea, we'11
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I will do it,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
I
�CONFIDEl1''l?IM
6
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~--------------~
The President:
Yes, it could give them some breathing space .
....(.ef"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, I'll look into that, Bill.
~
The President:
In terms of you and me making another economic
statement, I will do whatever you think is best for the vote.
If you want to do it in Birmingham or down in London.
yc(
'Prime Minister Blair: Well, I think there are two sorts of
stories from your angle: one is investments; the other is a firm
message to the IRA. ~
The President:
I'm glad to do that, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
very good.
.(R)
J€f
I think those two in combination would be
The President: See, by the time I get there, we are only a week
from the vote.
So it probably is good to do it sooner rather
than later so it does not seem like some desperate election
move.
tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll have our guys get in touch with you. Maybe
we could do two separate announcements -- a Sinn Fein one and an
economic one. You organize it, and I will read whatever script
you want me to read. .+eI
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
L - - - - -_
_
_
The President:
That's all it is. What did you make of
Netanyahu? Madeleine said you were very good.
J£1
Prime Minister Blair:/
COHFIDEN'FIlrL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�7
CONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I spent a lot of time with him in the last year.
After Madeleine's first session, I thought he was a hard
negotiator and not a no-negotiator.
Then he called and asked
Dennis to come over, and I thought that was a good sign. And
now Dennis is there and his spokesman put out a statement saying
he is not coming Monday. I never thought he would, but I
thought he would come once I got back from Europe.
I don't know
yet what's going on, but I may want to call you again once I
find out. Je}
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
be a place where we could do a reverse goo
Europe could bump him a little harder.
ket
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President; .. .And then it vanishes.
CONFIDEN'fL"iL
}e1
This may
cop, where
�COMFIDEH'fIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
It vanishes. ~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
But, when I see you, we can wor
on It more.
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah, well I'll do the same.
pretty regularly at the moment.
He calls me
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"The President:
You know they will.
)R1'
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's exactly where the Israelis are.
percent of them want that.
(e)
Eighty
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
comes". -\-&r
The President:
Aef
~
We'll stay in touch and talk when the G-8
I agree.
You just let me know what you want.
Prime Minister Blair: And, as ever, many thanks for all your
help. Love to Hillary.
(U)
The President:
CONFIDENT lAL
Yes.
(U)
�9
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bye.
Yes, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
COHFIDEN'3'IAL
�tONFIDElif'i'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 26
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (C)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick, Pat
O'Shaughnessy, James Smith, Peter Huggins,
Jenny McGee, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 21, 1998, 4:31 - 4:42 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine.
hours in Northern Ireland.
(U)
The President:
(U)
(U)
I just spent the last 48
I hear it is turning around a little bit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so. I did a complete blitz of
the place, really. Every single kind of radio show, TV show,
audience participation program -- sort of a two-day election
campaign.
It's coming around a bit.
(U)
The President:
I did a radio Bpot yesterday that they are
replaying today.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 b d
The President:
What were the best lines?
;z1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
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2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
He has come along, hasn't he?
JWf
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. They had a U2 concert last night
that was great.
Instead of having speeches, Bono told them to
"have a minute of silence for the victims, which was very clever .
..(..G7-
The President: He's a smart man. I met him by accident in 1992
in Chicago, he helped me out and we've stayed in touch ever
since. He's a very smart man. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we'll have to keep our fingers
crossed. Thanks for what ou did last weekend' it
tremendousl helpful;
The President: Good.
I've just been thinking about you.
I
couldn't think of anything else. I did a big plug for it during
a NATO expansion event.
I talked about Indonesia and Northern
Ireland at our NATO expansion ratification event. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It has
layed ver
well here.
The President: Yes, but you have to follow the locals. You've
done all you can.
I was glad to see in my morning intelligence
that there is movement in the polls your way.
I think the
undecided may break your way. +&r
Prime Minister Blair:
It is possible.
I
But it sure was the
I literally have spent the last 48 hours
L-~______________________________________~I
right thing to advise.
cmlFIDEN'l:'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section l.4{b)(d)
�3
CONFIDEN'FL"<L
there blitzing the place, everywhere, doing everything.
I
stayed on longer today to visit a hospital, visit a regiment,
saw the police, did a walk-about in the street. And as I got
back into my car, the last person's hand I shook was
(indistinct) McCartney.
~
The President:
Paul McCartney?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The President:
No, Bob McCartney.
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J!2:'J
(Y1'
fer
He started haranguing me.
Did he really?
j.C1-
fer
Prime Minister Blair: Yes. And after I left, he accused some
of the people around of being a rent-a-mob for us.
This old
lady turned on him and gave him a real'earwigging on television.
She said that she was out to vote Yes and that she was not
anyone's rent-a-mob.
She thought he was
disgrace. J.:ei
a
The President: Sometimes, something like that can be more of a
benefit than anything else.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let's keep our fingers crossed.
Put it
this way:
last weekend it was well that we did what we did.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
COHFIDEN'FIAL
�4
C'ONFIDEN'fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Well, let me tell you also that Hillary and I
had a wonderful time at Chequers.
It was wonderful for us.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Oh Bill, I can't tell you how great it
was to have you. And for the kids, Euan's friend went back to
school the next day in a daze.
I told my people that it was a
real tribute to you that you were prepared to sit down and spend
·time with them in that way. We loved having you and had a great
time, we really did.
(U)
The President: Even in the darkest days back in '94 and early
'95, when people thought we were finished, you can always spend
time with kids and you'll never know how you'll have an impact
on a young person that will change everything for them. A
little extra time is the best investment you can make.
Besides
that, it's interesting for me.
And in the work we do, you can
lose contact with people younger than you. A year'younger is a
year younger than you.
You don't even think about it, and then
you turn around and find out it's been a year since you've
.talked to anyone who is 25.
I liked it:
they were delightful
young men.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I'm glad you did.
are still on cloud nine.
(U)
For them, they
The President:
You ought to be proud of yourself. You've done
every damn thing you COUld. When the vote happens, we'll be on
pins and needles over here.
I guess we should know something by
mid-day our time tomorrow. What kind of vote counting operation
do they have over there? lei
Prime Minister Blair: Well, this is Northern Ireland.
Everything is done differently.
They won't start counting until
Saturday morning. We will know Saturday afternoon some time.
(C)
The President:
They will do exit polls, won't they?
yef
Prime Minister Blair:
In Northern Ireland, they've never done
an exit poll.
But you can never tell.
If you are in the wrong
part of town, you'll get completely skewed results.
I think we
~~~~~~~~~~--
CONFIDENTIAL
�5
ce)HFI DEN'? IM
will know by this time tomorrow evening. We will let you know,
and when the result comes through, let's just hope it is the
right one .. ---f.€-r
The President:
thing.
(C)
Well, keep your chin up.
Prime Minister Blair:
All right.
You did the right
(U)
The President: Okay, you've done a heck of a job turning this
thing around.
Take care my friend.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill.
The President:
a
We had
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
great time.
(U)
(U)
We had a great time too.
Goodbye.
(U)
'-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN:fIAL
!
Goodbye.
(U)
�GOJ?rFr'DE~JT IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair ~
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 23, 1998, 1:36
1:46 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, thank goodness.
The President:
You got 71 percent.
Protestant vote was yet?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Do you know what the
I think it was 55 percent.
(U)
The President:
Do you think it was as high as that? I just
talked to Trimble and he was still moaning about the vote. He
sounded upbeat but he said he lost in his constituency.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair: Overall, the most accurate poll was 55
percent. Yes, it was about five percent of the nationalist vote
that went no as well,so that brought figures down a bit. ~
The President:
I just did the math and it seems the vote is 53
percent of the nationalists and 49 percent for the Unionists.
Is that about right? ).G1'
emU'I ElENl'IAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
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Prime Minister Blair: Roughly, possibly a little higher on the
Unionist side but they reckoned that probably about five or six
percent of the non-Unionist voted "No" so that brought the
figure down.
Of the 28 or 29 percent, that will probably bring
it down to about 24 percent or 23 percent. The Unionists voted
"No" 23 percent, see what I mean? It probably means just the
majority of the Unionists went with the resolution. ke1
The President:
That is great though.
God, it's great.
I'm so
happy.
You must be ecstatic. You turned all those undecided
¢)
voters -- almost 100 percent.
Prime Minister Blair: Again, a million thanks for what you did.
It began with the interview on Sunday.
From then on it began to
turn. We were at one point considerably behind, although we
were looking at under 60 percent. Jeffery Donaldson, who is a
reasonable part of the no vote, is on TV now saying he wants to
work with Trimble now. ~
The President:
I don't think Paisley can maintain the level of
support. You are going to have a significant share of those
people from the 25-30 percent who think the thing ought to be
given a chance to go, and that will give you three out of four,
or four out of five of the Unionist voters who want to see
peace. -tel
The process will play out -- but we ought to get Gerry and his
crowd to do a thing or two to get this off on a good footing.
He's going to be hereon Thursday for reasons unrelated to me to
make some speeches. But he always seems to pop into the White
House.
If you want to have your guys tell us in the next three.
or four days what you want me to say I would appreciate it.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you going to see him yourself?
JGr
The President:
I don't know.
I was just calling to
congratulate a few of the guys and he told me about it.
I have
to check my schedule on whether I see him or not but we can
always have the message delivered. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
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The President:
shouldn't he?
3
He ought to chunk in some weapons pretty soon,
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, let me ask you something else. We had a
group touring the United states and I met with them for 10-15
minutes. I am embarrassed that I can't remember their name -- I
think maybe it was Waves. It was a group who had relatives
killed. I think it would help if the IRA indicated where the
remains are -- without exposing them. Would that help? Is
there some way to do that without exposing them to criminal
l i ab i l i t y? J.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President: If by Wednesday somebody can call Sandy or
Steinberg to let me know what kind of presentation I can make to
them if they tell where remains are and that they would not be
subject to criminal prosecution. That's a human touch that
might have a big psychological impact -- differentiate them from
the IRA. ...(..e-J
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I will get right on that.
Je1
�4
€OHFI DENT HlcL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll hammer it hard.
I thought if I can advance
a specific agenda -- I will work on getting a Sinn Fein person
to work on decommissioning. You just let me know if I can say
to him, "I want you to tell where those remains are and whoever
tells won't be subj ect to criminal liability." ~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, I will get someone to come back to
your guys in the next few days.
~
The President:
Have a great celebration.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I offered him a helluva deal to see if he will
do it.
I scraped together every penny, every pop gun I could in
72 hours.
I still think there is "a chance he won't do it.
f/2:)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right Bill, all the best.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFI DENT lAL
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
PRESIDENT CLINTON
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
LOCATION:
EAST HAMPTON, NEW YORK
NOTE TAKERS:
LARRY WRIGHT, TOM CROWELL, MATT SIBLEY, JOEL
SCHRADER, JAMES SMITH, STEVE SIMON
DATEmME:
31 JULY 1998/1609-1642 EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Tony?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Hi, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: Hey, how are you?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm looking forward to my holiday. I start tomorrow. I've been
reshuffling my cabinet this week.
THE PRESIDENT: You have? Who'd you change?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Quite a loti
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I'm doing fine. How are things with youl;;?;---L......;;;;';';;;';;";:;;;====-';;';";':";;':';=...J......_-_....J
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I'm really looking forward to your visit to Ireland.
THE PRESIDENT: We are trying to work out the final schedule. You and Cherie are
coming up to see us, we'll be there together, right?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That is right. We're still trying -we came through the
Drumcree situation, got through a terrible thing. The tragedy of the kidsc-THE PRESIDENT: It sobered them up though, didn't it?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, it did. We still have a lot of problems.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
,
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Let me tell you where we are. We are having terrible trouble with
Janet Reno. I think the FBI must be working on her. If you know anything about this
Starr business, you know law enforcement agencies are not really under direction of the
President. What she is saying is that this is coddling terrorists and making concessions
to get a trial. That is a policy statement and not her call, and I can disagree. Then she
raised all these questions as to whether it was legally sufficient. If you say there is no
British or Scottish objection to the character or legality of the trial, it is your law; it's not
our judgment to make. What I am trying to get her to do is give me an opinion saying
she disagrees as a matter of policy, but Justice can find no fault from the point of view of
the law. Then I think we are OK.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Ri ht.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b (d)
THE PRESIDENT: You got it. That is where I am trying to go.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Bill, a cou Ie of other things. Kosovo.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I agree.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
I
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
i·
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE. PRESIDENT: The KLA has put us in a tough position.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes.
fr,
==E;.::::O=.1::::3::::5:;:26=,=se=c=ti=on=1=.=4(:;:b=)(::::d)::::;------,
THE PRESIDENT: Alright.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: One other thing, on the Middle East peace process.
THE PRESIDENT: It's ve
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Right. Good. OK, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT: What else do you know?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Not much. I can't wait to go on holiday. I have got the flu this
week and am a bit under the weather. Basically, I'm fine and looking forward to my
holiday. But I have reshuffled my cabinet and done my spending plan. We will have an
economic downturn this next year, and we have to be careful about that. I called Stan
Greenberg today.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, he did some polling for us.
THE PRESIDENT: You know, the funny thing is our growth was down to 1.4 percent this
quarter. It was 5.4 percent last quarter, but we lost ~ painton the GM strike and a full
point off the Asian downturn already. We have got to do something about Japan. I am
very discouraged about what Obuchi and Miyazawa have said. Miyazawa, when he was
Prime Minister, he was already about 72 or 68.
PRIME MINISTE,R BLAIR:
,
I E.O. 13526, section l.P}{4:-k
.~ . . ~:·~~~~~RAR1'PBbTbCOPY· ;~;:;
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THE PRESIDENT:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
What they are worried about is not being
able to stimulate growth in their economy with tax cuts because they put these curlicues
in them and people in Japan take the money and save it, because they don't think they
are permanent or adequate. They think if they do all this bank restructuring, in the
absence of increased demand and demand for exports, a" it will do is just contract the
economy and further deflation. What we have to do is try to work with them to get the
necessary mix. I have been prepared to eat lower growth this year just to sop up some
of their exports so they wouldn't go down, but this whole thing is going to slow what I
think would be a boom in Europe and it is going to brake our expansion unless we can
turn Japan around. I don't think there is enough money to move Asia there
. independently, without Japan coming back in Indonesia and all the other places. I just
don't see it.
L...,--_--,-_ _ _ _---,_--:_ _ _ _ _- '
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: What do you think we have to do?
THE PRESIDENT: What we have to do is find a way to be supportive of them without
pushing, nudging them along and not humiliating them so they don't hunker down and
turn inward. It's a funny little balance we have to strike but we need a coherent strategy.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b) d)
but if I get an opening may press 1m an may e
ca you an w
something. We have to get the Europeans involved. What's going on in Germany?
Schroeder is going to win isn't he?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Stan polling for Schroeder?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I think he's doing some work along those lines.
THE PRESIDENT: When I was there before I didn't see any --I think Kohl is where
Churchill was at the end of World War II: the people are grateful but ready for a change.
PRIME MINSITER BLAIR: "'=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)(=d=): : : ; - - - - - - - - - l
,THE PRESIDENT:!
. -_ _hIE~.~O~.~13~5~2~6,~s~ec~ti~o~n~1.~4~(d~)~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I'
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
!
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)td)
�CONFJDENTML
5
THE PRESIDENT: How long has Helmut been in, 16 years? That's a hell of a long
time.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: That's right.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Very clever.
RIME MIN ISTER BLlAR: IrI=E=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4=(b=)=( :::;--------1
d=)
THE PRESIDENT: If the vote is close enough, he should do that. I still think Netanyahu
would have been better off doing that.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Me, too.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: You ought to tell him what I told you.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: I agree with you. Just today we had the announcement of
job losses here as a result of Asia. It's the first time it's been brought home.
THE PRESIDENT: I am really very concerned about it. The first place it hit us was in
agriculture. We export about half our grain and about 40 percent goes to Asia and we
are down 30 percent this year.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Gee. Thirty percent.
THE PRESIDENT: And we can't get new markets because of bumper crops and the
. climate change caused by el Nino. I think with 1.4 percent growth, unemployment will go
up a little. I just don't see any set of scenarios where we do better unless we get Japan
turned around. I would guess that you're seeing increased flows to Latin America like we
are. Thank God for Latin America, they are doing quite well.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Absolutely right.
PRESIDENT CLINTON:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTE~ BLAIR:,I!10pe~t.,..... _~<=-----='-",:'.'i'
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6
THE PRESIDENT: Anyway, I think our first order of business should be to deal with the
Japanese government. The Chinese are hanging in there and have not devalued, but
their target was revised downward. I feel I they will hang in there several more months.
There is a limit to the pounding they can take, expectations have been raised. You can
see, it is so palpable, they are proud as hell they have stayed strong and have not had to
devalue. But at some point, they'll have a hard time hanging on. I think the quicker we
could have some sort of EU-US initiative - This was this huge real estate boom, but the
Japanese stock market lost 50 percent of its value in the last five years. We're just not
getting any reinvestment in growth. The way they have done all tax changes to date,
people are saving the money, and they're spending all this money on a world-class big
infrastructure that hasn't done anything. I know they are frustrated because, basically,
they-have taken a whole series of half-measures and it has not helped them. They have
dragged Asia down.
THE PRESIDENT: Talk to Prodi. They've been very good at working with us, by the
way. Bob Rubin sent a/l our best people over there, but their political mechanism is
inadequate.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
II E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
THE PRESIDENT: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
1
I
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: "----;:=E==.=O=.==13==5=26=,=se=c=ti=on=1.=4(::::b=(==d)::::,-----i
THE PRESIDENT:
L I_ _ _
---"-I=E.=O=.=13=5=26;,=se=ct=io=n=l=.4~(d",",)='.I_ _ _.....l
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, the reform movement had a false birth under Hosokawa. Did
you ever meet him?
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: No.
THE PRESIDENT:
1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, and maybe not the last. Jospin was here last week. He
really loved his time in Washington.
�CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT
7
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:\-;========::::;-------~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's good. France and Brazil are two countries that have
permanent governments, for good or bad, but have inbred an anti-Americanism that
colors the atmosphere and the left in France had a lot of that, as well as the Gaullist
crowd, but! always admired the guy so much from a distance. You had a big influence
on him, too.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
THE PRESIDENT: I will follow up on Kosovo and get you a briefing on the Middle East.
It's a little more ambiguous than the last time we talked. Netanyahu has moved on some
issues and there is a chance we can break through. I didn't think he was bargaining in
good faith, but now I have seen some change and we might have a shot at it. We'll work
out Irish schedule and get the Attorney General to sign off on the legal adequacy as
soon as possible.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Again Bill, 101 percent support.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, I appreciate it, goodbye.
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Goodbye.
�CONFIDEN'f'IhL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Robert Ford,
Cindy Lawrence, Sean Tarver, Matthew Sibley
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 6, 1998, 4:46 p.m. - 5:06 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing? (U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm fine, enjoying my holiday.
Are you in Tuscany?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
God I'm jealous.
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been to Sienna?
We're going there next week.
The President: Oh, that is a great place.
beautiful little town?
(U)
Yes, it is.
The President: When I
four star restaurant.
sign of a fish, like a
three-hour lunch there
was there about ten years ago,
I can't remember its name, but
peace symbol, or something.
I
and they had to carry me out.
Declassify On:
i
,
(U)
(U)
Isn't that a
Prime Minister Blair:
COMFIDEN'fIAL
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
(U)
(U)
I ate at a
it had a
had a
(U)
�2
cm:rFIDE~H'IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good place to be carried out from.
(U)
Are you on holiday?
The President:
The House is here for another month, one more
day actually and so we are all working here.
I am going to go
on holiday in ten or eleven days.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Weren't you up with Steven Spielberg?
(U)
The President:
I spent the weekend up in Long Island with him.
We talked about you. He and Tom Hanks came here last month and
showed me their movie "Saving Private Ryan," about Normandy,
before it was in the theater.
It's an enormous film, really
. good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you're back in your office.
(U)
The President: Yes, I'm sitting here in my office.
It's a
beautiful day outside.
I'm concerned about the Japanese
situation, really worried. But that is not why I called.
Gerhard Schroeder was here yesterday and we had a long talk.
He's apparently still leading the polls by a solid 5-8 points.
You think he is going to win don't you? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
He just thinks it's time for a change?
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
je1
You can never tell for sure.
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know, it's the second time we've met;
it was much more relaxed this time.
The first time was in
Germany and I was on a campaign swing for Kohl
ou can
ima ine, but we had a good talk
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
GOHFIDEH'f IAL
�COHFIDEHTIAL
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
The longer you hang
around this business, it becomes apparent that very few people
make it this far by accident. They don't just give these jobs
away.
J.Ri
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah, I think that's true.
(U)
The President:
I called you to talk about Kosovo.
It is
getting worse. The headlines show that, but Milosevic is going
for a military solution. Serb security forces are not only
suppressing Albanian militants, but are also engaging in a
systematic campaign against the civilian population.
I think we
are getting closer to a major humanitarian disaster. ~
Milosevic has a sense of doing this under the threshold for NATO
military response because he believes that NATO will respond
only with a UN resolution, but Russia guarantees to block it.
My view is, at a minimum, we need to make him think again. We
need to finalize planning that we started, identify forces and
think about some sort of ultimatum to get him to stop the
offensive and restore autonomy for Kosovo.
~
I believe we ought to make it clear that, while we would like to
get UN authority, we can do it without it.
I know you differ
here, and Albright talked to Cook about asking the UN Security
Council for the necessary authority.
U21
Let me tell you we are headed to a collision on Kosovo and what
is going on in Russia.
I talk to Bob Rubin about every day.
I
am still quite concerned about their economy and about the
stability of the Yeltsin government. His health is
deteriorating and a lot of noise is being made about controls on
freedoms to get order in society. ..(.e)
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�.4
CONFI DEN'I' IAL
What I'm afraid of is, if things get worse in Kosovo, a lot of
civilians will be dying and others turning into refugees.
If we
put Yeltsin into this box, he will be forced to abstain because
it is so bad and would really hurt him at home politically with
the economy the way it is, or he can keep with Primakov and veto
it and run the risk of alienating the rest of the world at the
very time he needs the most support from the international
community. While it is better to have UN support, I am very
worried about bringing this to a vote right now.
(C)
Milosevic thinks he has a free hand.
I talked to you and John
Major and I understand you have different system to decide legal
authority there.
One thing I had our guys do -- there is a
.basis:- there have been a number of cross-border incursions and
threats to international observers, which could be a trigger for
self-defense. Also, there is Milosevic's record of threat to
international peace and security and then the humanitarian
atrocities.
I think we could construct a legal case, but if I
can't convince you about it, we don't have a chance with Chirac
and Kohl. ).ef
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this then. Shouldn't we try to
get Chirac and Kohl to sign off on ultimatums we would give
Milosevic? Word of planning would be somewhat helpful.
Convince Chirac and Kohl that a UN resolution is not legally
necessary.
I know how Chirac is on this, but it will hurt
Yeltsin if we put him in a position of having to sign off or
block now. .J.e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
/J
[------------------The President:
We can nose around it. His economic problems
are horrible and his internal political problems are awful.
I'm
very worried about this.
Yeltsin was going to go on vacation in
COMPI DEN'I'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COWFIDEN'fIAL
5
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
August, but then he had to come early, even though his health
needs the rest.
I am going over there and meet with him for a
few days in September, but I'm very worried about this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
].
'------------/
The President:
I don't know, we have to work on that.
We have
to work through another option, apart from a Security Council
resolution.
They would have to raise holy hell, but, in the
end, if we handle it in the right way, it would be the best of
three bad alternatives. Better than forcing them to veto it .
. Better than forcing him to eat it. My problem is I am afraid
what happens if we let it deteriorate more. There is a rumor,
news story, of 500 people in a mass grave.
It may not be true,
but the other side is trying to force us in, too. We have all
those problems you and I discussed before. People want us to be
their air force to get independence. But I think the near term
problem is we went through all this with the Bosnian civil war
and I don't want to replay it with another Muslim population .
..+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, that is exactly what's doing it and
Primakov gave it to him. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
down. Kinkel's
impact on their
basically it is
I'm going to call Helmut first and nail him
been aware of where the French are. Given the
election, but might help him electorally. But
a domestic election, so my guess is no effect.
J,e)
Prime Minister Blair:
COWFIDENTL"rL
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
• COHFIDEHTI1'.L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: We will nose around some more.
They may decide
to shape this and go along with us, but right now I don't see
it. ..J!Cr
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Maybe they will want to try to go along with us
on a resolution, but I doubt it. Let me mention a couple of
.other-things.
The Security Council had a discussion about Iraq
today with Kofi.
I think we have to playa measured game here.
I think this is a reaction by Iraq to the fact the IAEA says
they couldn't recommend ending the inspection regime and going
to monitoring on the nuclear issue.
~
This was a serious report that we had nothing to do with, on
very specific issues.
It could be they simply overacted, but my
instinct right now is to not come out with a bellicose reaction
at this point. We ought to be relaxed and work with the
Secretary General and focus on inspection requirements. We will
just say that we will postpone sanctions reviews until Iraq
achieves compliance. ~
Butler was very upfront.
I think the Iraqis may have been
showing a little leg about it. About every six months they try
to provoke us with their rhetoric, but they may come back. With
all these other problems in the world we should give Kofi a
chance to work through this.
If not, then we can say to hell
with them and we leave the sanctions on indefinitely. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What about these. reviews?
~
The President:
I think they over read the IAEA refusal to
recommend ending the inspection regime and going to monitoring
on nuclear.
The IAEA said they had just a few more things to do
here.
It would have been reviewed in August for monitoring in
October but, for whatever reason, they reacted the way they did.
Now is not the time for us to overact.
They probably hope we
will do that and spend a lot of money moving the fleet back in,
but I don't want to do that right now.
We'll monitor it
closely, but, on the other hand, don't let them think they can
wish this away. ~
CONF'I DEN1'L"xL
�7
• CONFHlEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I think we might, but hopefully we'll have our
course on Kosovo by then. Two other things.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I talked to'you about Lockerbie. I have the decision memo in
front of me and I will work through it as quickly as I can and
get back to you on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-----1:1=E=.O=,=1=35=2::6=,s:=ec=:ti=:o=n=1.::4(:::;b::::)(=d)"==!.._ _ _.......J1
The President:
1)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minster Blair:
Yes.
keJ
The President: You have more riding on it than I do.
The
Scottish regime has enough restrictions as it is. Go back to
your holiday, tell Cheri I said hi, have a wonderful time, and
drink a glass of wine for me tonight. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All the best to you.
(U)
We are thinking of you.
We're doing fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
(U)
(U)
�CO!<fPIDCN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Tony Campanella,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee, Chris Jansen
and Ralph Sigler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:'
August 16, 1998, 7:51-8:04 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Tony. Well, I just called to tell you I was
thinking about you.
You've had a miserable day.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, it's pretty grim.
What the hell happened?
(U)
Who did it?
Aer
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Do you believe the person who gave the warning
made a mistake or did it deliberately? )Q7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The truth is, we don't know.
Jer
Do you still want me to come?
CG}{fI DE,HT 1AL
Classified by:. Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (b, id).;A-~ .. -_~;;.r---~~-- ----~--.:,<
Declassify On: ! 8/1~~~ ". 1
: '. i-'e
TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' :
;
-
.
J.
--;-~'::~-"" ::,:~~;.. _.__-:~. ~~,: ;.";";~: :".r. "-'f-...' -"~-,_.,;",,_,,,-,:---~,:~, .;.... ~,!':
~
�2
COlifl"IDElif'f IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
---ll (,0'
Prime Minister Blair:
L . . -_ _ _ _
The President:
It is probably more important now than before.
You need to decide as time goes by if we need to visit the site
and make a stop.
(.t')
Prime Minister Blair: Absolutely.
I've visited some of the
victims and families tonight.
It was pretty harrowing. kef
Pretty tough, isn't it? ~
The President:
Prime _Minister Blair:
-helpless. ~
Yes, it's an awful feeling -- completely
The President:
I just had to sit with all those people, with
their families, who got murdered in Africa.
There's nothing you
can say, but it matters to them to know the leader of their
country came to see them, so you did a good thing. Even if you
felt like you have five thumbs. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
C~----The President:
Can Gerry Adams help you get these people?
Prime Minister Blair:
Je'(
I
~--------------~
The President:
Do you think they will? They could do more good
in less time by helping you get these guys.
tGt
//J
prime Minister Blra_i_r_:___________________________________________
I
1
/
1.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
The President:
Did they condemn it at all?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~I____________________~
The President: Not just Gerry Adams, but did the IRA condemn
it?
What do you want them to say? --fE-)Prime Minister Blair:
~
'--------~/
CONl"IDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�COHPIDEH'PIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If who proposes?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: And they will agree? Both will agree? You
would like the IRA to say, look, what happened is a part of the
past, it's allover, and if the chief constables can agree on
new security measures, they will support them? I'll see what I
can do.
(Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
L-______________________________________________------------------
The President:
~
I think this is an opportunity for him, too.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I've got it.
I will get on this right away.
I
guess I'll have to wait until morning to call them, but I'll be
up late tonight. ~
\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
name?
(R)
Ninety people, 15 hardcore.
Do they have a
Prime Minister Blair: \
com IDEN"fIAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�4
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
All right I'll get on this .
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
...(..G-J-
I
Okay, got it.
Prime Mini.ster Blair:
yz)
Bill, how are you?
yzr
The President:
I've been up to my ass in this Africa bombing,
because there's a lot more than meets the eye on what happened
in Africa.
If we were on a secure line, I could tell you more.
But I'll see what I can do.
I'll put Sandy on this tomorrow.
I'll make some calls tomorrow. )e(
'-------------Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
Damn right.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If Sinn Fein really forms an alliance with the
Unionists, that leaves the other group out. You'll have a
localized version of what's happened around the world, where
terrorists are not associated with or funded by governments.
In
this case, what you've got is a cell.
~
I don't know who's giving them money, but we're going to
increasingly have to deal with terrorists with no ties to any
nation-state, including Iran, if the precedent there keeps on
track. But in the case of a lot of Middle East and African
countries, we could be dealing with these people, like in those
old James Bond movies with SPECTRE and Dr. No. We're going to
have a twenty-first century version of those.
ycr
We're already dealing with drug cartels. The Colombian Army has
been defeated in battle four times in the last year with narcodealers.
They do not have the physical capacity to extract
these people.
They don't engage in terrorism; they just kill
people who get in the way of people making money.
If you can
CON rlfJEN'I' IAL
�CQ~JFIPEN'PIAL
5
get somebody worth about 200 or 300 million bucks to operate
this and earn enough money per year through stock earnings and
interest accounts, and if you're prepared to spend it building
an internati.onal network. -ter
Some of these guys earn enough money in terrorism and think,
compared to whatever they get paid, it's more than they were
making before. My worry is for all these IRA offshooots,
isolated cells who were kept apart and were kept isolated from
centralized control, that psychologically they may not be able
to handle it.
If what their real prospect is that they could
lay down their arms and not go to jail and take low-paying jobs
instead of terrorism, a lot of them may not be able to
·psychologically handle going to work everyday and carrying a
1 unchbox . )ef
What kind of psychological message are you sending to them?
What kind of economic message? Have you had someone working on
getting them college payments or job help? My worry is these
people will think, "I cannot imagine leading this deadly dull
life. ff I may be wrong, but I think these people personally
cannot imagine living in a different way.
If you're only
dealing with 15 killers and 75 others in a support system, what
thought can you give to offering them an interesting life? But
I'm all into dull these days.
I'm all for a little more dull.
This really is a problem, Tony.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Absolutely, and infused with meaning.
You ought
to have a really smart person think about the psychological and
economic dynamics about how they would spend their days, and do
a concerted effort on persuading them how else they could spend
their days.
It may be B.S., but I think it's part of the
problem and is worth thinking about.
You've got a lot of
brilliant people over there that could figure out a
psychological campaign to deal with them specifically. You
don't have much to lose and you might have some benefit from it.
I will do these things you asked.
I'm really sorry, Tony.
I'm
so sorry this happened.
You know, I was afraid this would
happen before the vote.
I was afraid they might try to kill
Gerry or David.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DENT L'\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�6
CQNFIDEN'P IAL
The President:
If you could bust these guys in a hurry, even
pick up just one or a couple of these guys.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay,
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We will try to do that.
I'll get on this.
~
Best of luck to you, too.
Thanks, man.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEU'PIAL
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: David Higgins, Lyle Harrison,
Cindy Lawrence, Liz Rogers, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
August 20, 1998, 4:52 - 4;59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Hi, Tony.
I am sorry the other phone was not
working.
Thank you for your statement.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Not at all.
It is important it is done.
~~~~~
The President;
Yes. We thought they were having a big meeting
there today, but we won't know for sure for a few hours.
This
place we hit is maybe the biggest terrorist camp in the world,
with 500-600 people there at a time. We thought we had good
intelligence that the leaders planned to meet there, but
unfortunately i t was reported in the international press; there
was no hint in our press of any consideration of an attack. l81
There was a report yesterday of rumors, and more than rumors,
that we were concerned that they planned to attack a third
embassy.
We also took down one of their cells in the Balkans,
so they are annoyed at us anyway. I'm sure you know this guy
signed a Fatwa and said that he would kill thousands of our
people.
J.81.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�SECRET
2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I am very grateful for
your statement.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Not at all.
happened tonight? ~
So, what has actually
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So
got in Afghanistan,
training facility.
the worst case, it
Yeah.
~
that is where we are. We don't know what we
but in the worst case we took out his
So we have to hope for the best, but even in
was worth doing.
E.O.13526, section 1.4(c)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d)
�SECRET
The President :
3
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Let me tell you, I need to speak to the
Pakistani Prime Minister before I go on TV, but I need to call
you next week to talk to you about Ireland before I come. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
-The President:
All right, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
All the very best to you.
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
SECRE'f
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 27, 1998, 4:32 - 4:54 p.m. EDT
Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are things?
(U)
The President: Oh, fine.
I just interrupted my vacation a
little bit today.
I went into Massachusetts and did an event.
It was great.
I got to work a line and speak to a cheering
crowd.
It wasn't something organized.
It was just put together
in two days.
There were thousands.
It was amazing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Good, I'm pleased.
(U)
The President:
This is my best state. You know, if I'd been in
Wyoming, they probably would have been shooting at me. You
never can tell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Good, I'm pleased about that.
you had all this stuff with the hurricane, too.
(U)
The President:
That's all right.
a lot worse.
(U)
It could have been a hell of
cmlFI DENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b,Q)
Decla"ify On, .
I'm sorry
8/2t;;-;;;::::;:::':oPY~1
-f._:':-"!-:;'~-_ .~~ -__ ,_,:_,-;---.-:..~:~~~.:.._~..-_~ ..........._._,;. __ ,,:;:;--__ -,::._./.,,:.:,,:,~-
�COHFIDEHTIPrL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
holiday.· (U)
The President:
I'm really sorry to interrupt your
Go ahead.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to raise a couple of
things.
The first is Ireland.
I know that my eople have
talked to your people today.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
CONTI DENT IAb
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I'll do it. When do you want me to call him?
Today, tomorrow, as quickly as I can?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, Bill.
yC)
The President: What's your view of the timetable? What's your
preferred timetable where all the leaders meet face-to-face?
o
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That would be great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you this. What's the date that Gerry
does the actual decommissioning? When does the IRA actually
have to turn some guns over? A week after that?
~
CONE IEJEN'l'I1'l:L
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
4
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask, what kind of understanding are you
trying to reach on the volume of weapons and type of ammunition?
$)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So it's something de Chastelain can say is
sUbstantial and must be significant.
I got it.
I'll call him .
.Je)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, that would be fantastic.
~
The President: Now, what the hell do you think is going on over
in Russia? I've got Strobe Talbott, my Deputy Secretary of
State, over there in Russia. We're watching it closely. Our
stock market took a big hit with this rumor that he would
resign. Yeltsin's in the dacha, Chernomyrdin's working on
confirmation.
There are rumors that Yeltsin would resign once
Chernomyrdin is confirmed.
I don't know, but I know this:
They
are absolutely insistent that I come.
I can't initiate my not
going.
It's kind of a mess. That could sink their economy or
politics sure enough.
kCl
Their economy is still rapidly deteriorating. The Central Bank
is still under pressure to inject liquidity into the banking
sector.
The problem is when they do, the banks turn around and
take the money out of the country, and so there's no control
over that money.
There's no clear economic policy, and I think
they've got this new Trilateral Duma Commission, talking about
renationalizing industries and price controls. ~
What I think they have to do is bite the bullet and pass a
decent regulatory system and tax system and a decent bank and a
decent social welfare system~
I think there's alienation among
the people because social welfare has always been a fraud in
CmJFIDEN'fIlrL
�CONFIDEHTL~iL
5
Russia.
The Economist a couple of weeks ago had a great little
piece on the missing social agenda. The charities are taking
over a lot of it, but the reason ordinary people felt so totally
insecure was they really don't think there's any social safety
net. --fC!
I think it's worth going over to try to work through this.
We've got to reassert our commitment and reassert the importance
of the weapons agreements we can still make, but tell them
they've still got to embrace democracy and free markets and have
tough Russian solutions to tough Russian problems.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
You can make money out of that under any circumstances,
even when it's screwed up, and God knows, it was screwed up.
It's a cash cow.
f,.e')
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
These social pressures, nationalism, retrograde
socialism, were present in Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser
extent, the Czech Republic.
For all kinds of reasons, they were
able to make the transition with a lot less fallout.
Russia is
a big country that could basically suck in a lot of stuff from
Warsaw Pact nations.
I am appalled to the extent there are not
'the functioning intermediary institutions without which neither
a democracy nor market economy can succeed.
I'm quite concerned
now that a working majority of the populace is for the
suspension of some democratic freedom just to have a strong
leader who'll get the damn show on the road again and make the
trains run on time.
They're disappointed in the executive but
also disappointed in the Duma going too much the other way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you think about it, it's quite interesting
how many places in the world there are -- including in your
discussion. with me -- where, at least to outsiders, the econom~c
answer or the political answer seems clear. And if you could
eOMFlDEWf lAL
�COlU'IElENl'IAL
6
just get over the hard knock of doing it, i t ' l l be better on the
other side, but the political system is unable to cross the
hurdle.
Both of us have been rather fortunate that our
political systems are still functioning well enough to do what
has to be done. ~
The biggest economic tragedy is not Russia, but Japan. Even
with their massive infrastructure and understanding of the
modern economy, they still can't put together the political
decisions that are manifestly in their interest.
I don't know
if Europe is on the upsurge of growth.
There's still some
internal growth that could be generated by France and Germany by
internal changes. ~
I don't know how much longer we can s'ustain our growth without
some more growth in Japan. We're absorbing 30 percent of
Chinese exports now, 50 percent more than our world GDP share,
and there's a huge increase in Japanese exports.
They can't buy
our imports, and the Chinese can take a lot more but they have
certain controls.
I'm worried that if we have three quarters
rather than one quarter of economic slowdown, there'll be an
increase in the trade deficit. We'll see a whole round of
protectionist pressure build up again, which will affect Europe,
if only indirectly. jQt
I think the Japanese issue is still the biggest economic issue.
The Russia issue is a political issue.
If they get a
dictatorial leader, they'll be much harder to deal with on
Kosovo and other things, I'm afraid.
I think it's worth my
going over there.
I'll meet with the Duma leaders from other
parties and have a little no-BS conversation about what's going
on here and hopefully reduce a little of their paranoia about
America and the West.
It may not be a conventional success, but
I'll go as long as they want me to come -- unless Yeltsin
resigns in the next two days -- if nothing else but to talk to
Chernomyrdin, who is physically and mentally quite alert and
strong, personally. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm worried about with Yeltsin is -- in my
last conversation I had with him, he said all the right things,
even on the things we disagree on, he said all the right things,
at least from his point of view, but he really seemed profoundly
tired in a way I had never heard him before.
I am afraid his
energy, his will to go on may be sapped.
~
COHFI DgNT ll'd,
�COHFID£HTIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, I'm afraid so.
~
But there's nothing I can do about it.
yz)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: One thing, we've got to do everything we can to
keep their IMF program going. You know, they've only gotten,
what, $7 billion out of $21 billion. There may be some other
"little thin"gs we could do, which I'm working on. But the hard
truth is we will be pouring good money after bad if the banks
keep taking the money and putting it in Europe. I'm worried
about Russia becoming like Africa.
It's bad enough the market
takes the pipe, but the citizens of the country who ought to be
putting their own wealth in there are shipping it out, and you
have massive capital outflows instead of internally generated
growth. We've got to talk through all that with them.
They
think they've been taken for a ride on an economic theory that
they were not able to embrace.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
Hello?
Bill?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I can barely hear you.
It sounds like
four other people are having a conversation on the same line.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You were saying?
(U)
The President: No, that's it. Look, if I find out anything
about Russia in the next few days before I come, I'll call you .
..kef
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I got it. And I'll get to work on it.
Honestly, I think politically for him, for Gerry, it might be
easier for him to do the decommissioning if it comes about with
me being there.
There's a perception in Northern Ireland, and
I've tried not to do this, but there's a perception that I've
tilted more toward him than Trimble.
In that case, it could be
CONFIDEN'l?IAL
�8
• COHFIDEH'FIAL.
an advantage and could make it a little easier, if it all goes
around this issue. )Xi
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me get on it, and I'll give you a report.
-*'t
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime-Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEHTIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAE=iH I NGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 33
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE,· TIME
AND PLACE:
August 30, 1998, 2:29
The Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
with the Queen.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
Yes.
Well, good.
~
2:38 p.m. EDT
(U)
How are you?
I'm up at Balmoral
Lucky for you.
Is it still light?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
doing?
(U)
It is a beautiful evening.
How are you
The President:
I bet it is.
I'm doing fine, working.
I just
got off the phone with Kohl on Russia. How are we doing on
Ireland? -+er
Prim€ Minister.Blair: Many, many thanks indeed for speakin
with Gerr Adams. Where we are?
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what he told me.
~
COHFIDEH'fIAL
Reason: 1.5(b,-d)
. _ . _ ..~ ______ ---,.---::----",.'
Declassify On:! 8 / ~~. -j"';'>~
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:
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~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ..
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�· CONFIDEN'fI1II:L
2
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)
The President: Well, you know do you think we can get them to
meet next week, while I am there? )J2f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's possible you know.
Not impossible.
je(
The President:
It would be huge and help me enormously here
with what I am dealing with.
Prime Minister Blair:
You are here on Thursday?
The President:
They could obviously do it in Belfast, or they
could go to Omagh with us.
It would be profoundly symbolic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
C@JFIDEN'l'IAL
�3
COUFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
I'm not asking you to promise.
I had a tough
talk with Gerry Adams.
It was probably worth doing even though
he didn't say yes on five and six.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
-The President: When I see you, I really hope we have some time
to talk about Russia and Kosovo too. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I agree with that.
do is get him confirmed, and
The first thing we have to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is rea
frustrating; all the money t a wen In as gone back out
$7.5 billion.
I'll see what I can do over there and work like
hell to influence the Duma people. Keep your fingers crossed.
When I see you we'll get a chance to talk about it.
I can't
wait to see you. J...G1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, likewise.
See you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
~
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
cmfFI DEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IPtL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 34
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Robin Rickarad,
Matt Sibley, Joel Schrader, James Smith, Don
Bandler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
September 11, 1998, 4:33 p.m.-4:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
I'm fine.
(V)
I'm fine.
How are things?
(V)
The President:
anyway.
(V)
We're doing pretty good here.
That's my gut,
Prime Minister Blair:
I saw you on television; I thought you
were pretty good, actually.
(U)
The President:
This morning?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(V)
(U)
Yes, it was pretty good.
It's coming together.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right really.
(U)
we're thinking of you.
The President:
Thanks.
What's up?
Anyway,
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
Two things.
I wanted to update you on
the Northern Ireland situation.
~
CONFIDElf'PlkL
Reason:
1.5{b,d)
Declassify On:
9/2lL.!;l:8' ___f"~~,,--~<~~·-_c.---~-·L\
r·
~:'~T~NLmRA~Y PHOTOCOPY
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�2
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Tell me where we are.
y1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
In theory that is what they agreed to.
willing to do any kind of schedule? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are they
~
I
What is the main Sinn Fein argument against it?
-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The IRA never disarmed and it can't look like
the Unionists forcing them to do so? yc)
]
Prime Minister Blair:!
The President:
Well, they made a deal, though.
+Gt
Prime Minister Blair: /
GONF! DEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
�IE.o.
3
COHFIDE1H' IAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The fact is there is a very
good feeling in Northern Ireland right now.
Your visit went
very well. -tel
The President:
It was wonderful.
-f€+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Everybody is so up. The
trip to the Irish Republic was unbelievable.
There were 50,000
in Limerick.
Bertie is in a strong position to weigh in with
Sinn Fein.
ter
=-oJ
Prime Minister Blair:
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
--~
The President:
Let me ask you something.
I've been thinkin
about all the possible permutations and angles.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I understand why the schedule is not enough.
Then he is giving them something concrete that he can't take
back and he is gettin something symbolic.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
COHFI DEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President:
Let me ask, I understand you announced that you
will leave your army in the barracks while your police do the
actual patrols. Are they putting any pressure on you to make a
symbolic withdrawal of British forces? fer
Prime Minister Blair:
1L-____~IE=.=O=.=13=5=26=,=s=ec=t=io=n=1=.4=(b=)=~=)~I______~
The President:
Would that matter to Gerry? Jim Steinberg
doesn't think you could work a deal with him.
I tried to
him to ex lain to me what the roblem was
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is a big hang-up and they are not ready to
cross the psychological divide.
I understand and sympathize
with them; I am kind of an expert in that.
But they did make a
deal.
I wonder, it seems to me the biggest barrier was they
have talked themselves into this position that is linguistically
accurate, but politically unrealistic. ~
The deal said they would get in the Executive branch when they
get the votes, and they would decommission in two years.
They
never disarmed, but here they would be disarmed to get something
they are legally entitled to anyway.
What if we could get the
schedule out and there was a symbolic decommissioning, for
something outside the agreement, so they would not look like
they were coerced by the Unionists? +er
I E.O. 13526, section IA(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Do you want me to raise this with him in a whatif way? I won't tell him I talked to you about this. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
~~:,~.f'':'"':~~~~~-:'c-~ ~-~'--- "--~.~,
C~~T~~ LIBIU.RY PHOTOCOPY'
J
'';-'.:'_~ ,---~_:,-,::,._<-;;~-,:-",~::...~~",_;"--<-t.'";~""-_._::~..". r.~_
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
5
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\~--------------~
The President: Are there any other sort of permutations or
circumstances that might permit them to do it? keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: When I talked to Bertie he thought he could take
those guys down that did the Omagh bombing. I thought it would
be sooner. I had the impression it was imminent when I left
Ireland. ~
LP_r_~_.m_e
__M
__
i_n_i_s_t_e_r Bl_a_i_r_:______________
____
/
The President:
------------------------~
Of course they do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President: An actual arrest, even if it only just one
person -- you've got 29 dead people there. It would be a real
coup for Trimble.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
argument you could make.
J&r
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
COHFIDEN'l'IAL
Do you want me to raise that with him?
yn
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll get on it.
(;tl
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
I agree. The chemistry is a lot better than
what I thought. We cOincidentally have a big Irish celebration
here in about 30 minutes. They are applauding George Mitchell.
I might nose around with some of the Sinn Fein supporters to see
what I can do to nudge them a bit. These Americans still have a
littl:e bit-of influence because they have money. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
The President:
schedule. Jc.ef
Let's explore this idea -- arrests -- plus a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I bet you anything, if you explain that the arms
thing is not a big deal because they have a stash, and they are
easily replaced.
Whereas, the arrest of people who murdered 29
folks in a country that is so small would be a tangible act of
good faith.
I think disbanding the Real IRA was an act of good
faith, but I am trying to work Trimble's politics around
Gerry's. +er
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree. From Trimble's point of view, he is
not asking for much. He is asking for something symbolic in
return for something tangible.
From Adams point of view, it is
not such a good deal since he gets a year and a half in return
for something he has a legal right to right now. Either you
have to get Trimble to change by getting a different good deal,
or get Adams to change. Jim Steinberg says we tried that latter
course, and he didn't seem very excited about it.
It might be
worth going back to Adams and Bertie to see if they can't figure
out how to identify who has done this. ~
Just because they disbanded, I don't think it is enough for
those 29 people, that beautiful teenaged girl who was blinded,
COUFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
7
and the other people. They need to arrest somebody anyway.
Unless whoever did this left the country, but Bertie didn't
think that was the case. Let us raise this with Sinn Fein, and
I will have Jim Steinberg nose around with three to four of the
most influential here today. -+eT
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Let me say a word about Russia.
is they have a government,
The
ood news
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I am glad
that you are hosting this G-7 meeting and Russia will be able to
be part of it.
It think it would be a good idea to talk to them
practically about the lessons learned from other countries with
financial problems.
I am
to call Yeltsin now that he has
Primakov in place.
The fundamental problem
was they
proper y Wl
putting in place the
building
that created a vacuum. All the oligarchs
and mafia are shipping money out of the country. They want to
come back with a solution that they can put old Humpty Dumpty
back together again and they can't do that. ~
On the other hand, it is equally true that there are
international dimensions here. We have to rethink the IMF deal.
It seems to me that we need to develop some sort of pro-growth
strategy for the rest of the world. You have 40 percent of the
world in recession now.
In the end, you and I can't keep our
growth going.
I just want you to do anything you can to walk
the Russians through this and maybe cut them a little slack on
some of these macro issues, but hey, you have to build a
skeleton before you can have the body of an economic power. You
might want to call Yeltsin after this meeting. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
~
The President: But, I think we just have to get their attention
on what they have to do, before it ever gets better there. We
need to look at it in the context of a larger settlement. We
have even considered paying for their space program for a year
so their scientists don't go build rockets for someone else.
The scientists on the board of the space program have not been
paid for six months.
It is unbelievable.
I know you have more
than you can say grace over, but to whatever extent you can tone
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
8
up that G-7 meeting and to call Yeltsin or Primakov when it is
over. %
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I am going to give a speech in New York on
Monday on the general outline of what we see. Deputy Finance
Ministers in the G-21 have been working for over a year. We
have the basis for some work. Maybe I can talk to you when you
get here on the 21 st • My instinct is that the G~7 should call
for them to at least present recommendations to us and to get
heads of state together and show some leg here. Bob Rubin
continually cautions me that we don't want to unrealistically
raise expectations if we don't know where we are going.
¢
The fundamental difficulty is that you can't get out of the fact
that these countries have to do certain things. On the one
hand, there is incredible fluidity in capital movements, while
on the other hand there is a pro-growth strategy.
If they are
not willing to have the infrastructure, all this pro-growth
strategy won't matter.
If we get them juiced up again, the
money will flow out and be in somebody's Swiss bank account.
It's a tough knot to untie.
The IMF tried to modify their
approach in Indonesia, but it doesn't necessarily work in the
context of massive, breathtakingly rapid capital flow.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've reviewed what the G-21 people are working
on. A lot of it is technical and arcane, but in aggregate it's
pretty good stuff.
It can make a big difference.
It will
remain arcane and complex and dense to the world as long as it
is operating at the level of deputy finance ministers. My
instinct is maybe we ought to talk next week before you corne to
New York and we do this conference, because maybe while we are
CONE'IDEN'HAL
�9
CONfIDEN'f'IAL
there we can make decisions and some scenario to elevate the
visibility of this and to get world leaders involved. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IIE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~1
...+-e-r
·The President:
It might help. Cardoso is cratering and is
facing reelection in October.
I am just sick about that.
I
think he will get reelected, but it will be tough.
Let me do
the Irish thing and you can chew on all of this.
I think you
should call Yeltsin after the meeting. Let's try to talk again
on this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
time.
(U)
Thanks again.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hillary and I had a wonderful
All the best.
(U)
(U)
Bye, bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFIDEN'l'IAL
.. ,·r
�COHF'IDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with ~ritish Prime Minister Blair
SUBJECT:
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Mariana Papadimitriou, Doug
Bayley, Matt Sibley, Joe Schrader and
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 6, 1998, 9:44 - 10:05 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hey Tony how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello Bill.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in China.
Are you having a good time?
(U)
Is it hot there?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was until we got here, but we brought
some British weather with us.
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Kosovo.
Yeltsin called me yesterday, as he called you, to say Milosevic
got the OSeE to come in and now everything is going to be all
right.
I think it would be a real mistake for us to take the
pressure off now. Kofi's report is going to be filed today and
it is a graphic account of Milosevic's continued defiance of the
UN and the International Community. »Cr
I believe we have to maintain momentum and keep building a
consensus for the NATO decision to authorize force.
Dick
Holbrooke is there and is still meeting either in Belgrade or
Pristina.
Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days,
COHFIDENTIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
Declassify On:i 10/QJ4,Q.~_.j,'_;';;~--'~"'~---·-~----:-~.,·
t::INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~ ~
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COWFIDEHTL"xL
but Milosevic hasn't withdrawn or agreed to measures that would
make the end of hostilities verifiable or durable.
(C)
I would like to find some way to get the Russians on
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
We can't force Yeltsin
into a veto.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
We have got to tell Yeltsin, look, if you are
right and we are wrong then Milosevic will be in full
compliance.
If he lied to you one more time, then we are going
to do it. This is an issue that to me seems to be a real
mistake to let pressure up now.
U?(
- Let me mention one other thing.
I KO. 13526, section 1.4( d)
That may be necessary but
it is a terrible time for me to deal with it with this Congress
of mine. They are always willing to give more money to the
military and then do not want to do anything with it. There is
a really strong block in the Republican party that wants to do
that and I have worked to get them to continue to support SFOR
in Bosnia. And we really do have a readiness problem. ~
Keep in mind this is the same group that took eight months to
approve IMF funding.
If we have to do this publicly, it will be
a real problem for me.
I don't want to do anything to undermine
my ability or encourage them to try some eleventh hour measure
to stop these air strikes. They will be gone in a week.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand that Bill.
first point I am in complete agreement.
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'l'IM
On the
�COHFIDEN'FIAL
3
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I completely agree with that. I am just saying
injecting that now into the public debate would be a problem .
.Y:!
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: It also might create problems with some other
NATO allies and get them to vote against it and we don't want to
complicate our business with .NATO. ~
By the way, Gordon Brown did a hell of a job here yesterday.
met with the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers about
international finance issues. I went over and met with him.
was terrific, you would have been really proud of him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Bloody bright, isn't he?
Yes, he is great.
He
He
(-C)
~
Prime Minister Blair: I will tell him today when I go to talk
to him. How are we going to go on this now Bill. ;e(
The President: I hope we can get support for the G7
G7 met after we talked last time to endorse the idea
the crisis from spreading to Latin America. We will
funding by the end of next week and can proceed with
emergency plan·. ..J,.e'(
plan. The
of keeping
have IMF
the
Gordon said what I have been saying all along. We have got to
modify the Bretton Woods convention and implement some sort of
bank regulatory system that has the effect of doing what bank
regulation does in each of our countries and the stock market
regulatory systems do, so that we can control the boom and bust
cmIFIDEN'FIAL
�CONFrDEN'I'IAL
4
cycles on an international scale. Bretton Woods dealt with how
to have sufficient money to deal with trade and services but
didn't anticipate independent financial forces, which leveraged
financial instruments, and that trading in money itself would
have an effect on the global economy. ~
Bretton Woods assumed 50 years ago that no matter what, the
issue would be to find enough money to facilitate trade and
investment -- not that money flows themselves would become a
greater force of nature in the global economy. We have got to
find a way to set up systems to replicate national systems that
prevent depressions by limiting boom and bust cycles. There are
two ways to do it.
You can do it outright or have some sort of
oversight. mechanism that requires countries to make those
. changes. .ke"1
r think that is where we are going, but we still have to decide.
r tried last night, but had a little wrinkle. I tried to get
this group of 22 -- I counted 25 around the table -- to
accelerate the reporting process. The working group of the
deputy finance ministers reports in December/January after which
we would have a meeting of world leaders. Aef
I think we can do one of two things.
If you and Prodi and I
want to have a meeting earlier than that they can accelerate the
reporting process, which we can meet and validate. Or the
alternative, based on this meeting, we could have a larger
meeting, or a G7 meeting, and endorse this central idea, that is
precisely I
I
1-)
There is another wrinkle. /
Europe is
The big three
doing quite well and the forecast is for growth.
countries in Europe are going to do well also. ~
I didn't want to confuse people and scare them about a worldwide
recession, but I wanted to say that Europe has a bigger stake in
Latin America than the United States does right now. We have
seen bigger credit strictures and a tightening of credit here
because of so many bad loans in the global economy.
Regulators
are cutting off good credit risks because of problems our banks
are having elsewhere.
~
COHFIDEN'l'IAD
�CmJFIDEN'fIA'b
5
I can understand it, but I did not place a lot of stock
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
But they did not disagree with the central idea that
was succinctly put in Gordon's comments, which is what we have
all been trying to say.
I think there is still a chance we can
do something more quickly if we want.
The big front line test
now is what happens to Brazil. Cardoso won the election but he
has a lot of people in the run-off elections, three weeks from
Sunday, or whenever.
They have less than $40 billion in cash
reserves now, and I don't think he can stall for three weeks
without saying what his reform proposal is.
If. Brazil goes
south we are all going to suck eggs big time.
~
-r
want to go give my speech today -- it is consistent with what
you and Gordon said -- and then see what the status of the group
is.
Then, we'll see if we should have the G7 or some other
group meeting where everybody gets together and endorses the
idea.
The developing countries were there and not one spoke
against it.
The Thais were there and they're doing quite well.
They seem to be in harness on interim measures and suffering
contractions because of it. ~
They need a dramatic increase in World Bank investment to build
a social safety net, but the problem is financial institutions
are running short of money, not just the IMF.
The World Bank is
worried about having so many bad investments out and that its
credit rating will go down. The longer we wait to get
consensus, the worse it will be. We can have consensus in the
long term.
I don't know enough yet, but my instinct is to move
sooner rather than later. But I need to let today pass to see
where we are and get back to you. You should ask the Chinese
where they stand.
They have been champs in not devaluing their
currency. They have taken some hits for it, but the benefits
outweigh the burden. Anyway, I wanted to say that's where we
are.
In 48 hours we will be in a place to decide whether to get
the leaders together sooner rather than later.
I am for it but
my Treasury department is against it. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think we will get any grief for not
having the Russians there? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
But they would probably go along?
rfl
Vl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree. That is why I want to go in there
today and be very aggressive.
If Europe and Japan will support
this and we have a united G7 front, we will be in pretty good
I
'hape.
I
I KO. 13526, ,octioo 1.4(d)
]
Prime Minister Blair:/
I
The President:
They might like it if we could put outside
pressure on them without appearing to.
That would be the best
of all possible worlds.
I need to go over now and give a talk.
I will be back to you within 48 hours to let you know where we
go from here.
How long are you going to be in China? kef
CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�CONtIDEN'PIAL
7
Prime Minister Blair:
J..ef
A few days here and then in Hong Kong.
The President:
Back on Kosovo, we will be in touch with the
French.
If the Contact Group meets Thursday we have to go
forward with the ACTORD no matter what the Russians say. We
will tell them we won't have to do this if your deal works.
This guy, all he understands is pressure and he lied before, and
pressure will increase the chances that the deal will work. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
couple of days.
(U)
The President:
I agree Bill, I'll talk to you in a
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Liz Rogers,
Robin Rickard, George Chastain, Jim Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 14, 1998, 2:38 - 2:58 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hey, Tony, how are you?
(UD)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine, fine, how are you?
The President:
It's nice to hear your voice.
Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It's good to hear you, too.
Arafat on his way to you. ~
The President:
..
'"
I saw Mr.
How did you find him?
Prime Minister Blair:
deal.
(C)
§
(U)
He still thinks it is possible to do a
;::
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it is.
He wants it, I think.
In a way,
I What we have to do is keep them from
falling into these old habits. I keep telling them if we don't
make this deal now, we've got May 1999 staring us straight in
the face and I think it will be a disaster. It will be
impossible to avoid a bad outcome unless we get this interim
agreement now and get into final status talks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
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Declassify On: i 10/1J~9~~.;,.;::'--~·-c------~~~···.
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�2
COliFI DEN'F IAL
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
The President:
first.
Maybe.
I think he wants to see how it plays,
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
lS lS aggrava e
y the fact that their economic
situation is worse than when they signed on to peace. The
Israelis close borders at the drop of a hat and they never
concluded all these economic things, the roads and airport and
industrial park, they have been on the verge of doing for months
and months.
~
Somehow we have to convince them they have to resolve all that
crap.
There is a train wreck facing them in May 1999 unless we
somehow can give them some breathing room, some progress and
confidence in one another's work.
If I were in their position,
the one interest they have in cornmon is finding some way to live
together before they have this horrible train wreck in 1999.
Ul)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think it might be important, depending on what
each side asks for.
During the next four days I might need to
call you again a time or two. Where will you be? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be here and anything I can do to
be helpful I will, just give me a call anytime.
I will speak to
the Europeans or anything. ~
The President:
Adams and Trimble are both over here, you know.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: My deputy labor secretary participated in the
opening of the road show last week and I think it's going pretty
COHFIDEH'FIAL
�CONFIDElfl'L"tL
3
well.
I understand de Chastelain's group got the lead on the
decommissioning issue, but I heard you think it will have to
wait until next spring.
If there's anything I can do to help .
.)-e"r
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, I am going to speak to McGuinness
and Trimble in the next few days.
It's tricky stuff. Sinn Fein
is saying we will decommission, but not just yet.
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
At the moment, we're working on it.
If it
comes to It, an
think you need to speak to people, I will
just give you a call.
J.G-r
The President:
I will do anything you want.
I don't know how
you are going to solve it, they both seem so dug in.
If you can
figure out anything I can do, I will. ~
I just cannot thank you enough for the strength you showed on
Kosovo.
It was fascinating to watch that NAC meeting unfold,
compared to where we were three months ago.
They all acted as
if they were disappointed Milosevic caved.
I told my folks here
that it bore some of the similarities to Bosnia, where we worked
for two years to get everybody off the dime. But it happened a
lot quicker, in no small measure because we were in lockstep
from the get-go. )£1
Parenthetically, we have to do the same on this global financial
thing; maybe we can talk about it in the next few days. ~
It was amazing to see how that happened. Here is where our next
problem in Kosovo is.
I think right now we are in a position
where we passed the ACTORD -- this action order -- and are
sus endin it as we see if he complies.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
And as soon as
happens, he
start cheating, but they'll argue it's not enough.
~
We really need to carefully coordinate our positions to keep
maximum pressure on him so we don't have to take military
action. We don't want to look weak three months from now.
It
CONFIDENTIAL
�4
COHFIDEHTL''xL
looks so good right now, just the right thing being done in the
right way. We really, really need to coordinate our positions;
I'm convinced we can avoid military action if it is always
hanging there.
But it would take 3-4 months to try to get
everybody where they were. And all the forces of the last 3
months will reassert themselves. Milosevic will cheat a little
here and there and undermine the integrity of this thing.
That
is my only sort of yellow caution light, but otherwise it's
terrific.
It's good to have some good news. -+et
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: We have to figure out a posture. Some guys will
say you can't keep granting 96-hour extensions, and then they
will say we ought to say, okay, let's go to one-week extensions,
two-week extensions. The point is, we don't want to let them
put us in a position where we have to do this allover again.
The minute we do that, he will start cheating.
(BT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one thing I want to raise on the
global economic stuff.
I've got a little bit to reportj-.___ _...,
I
think Gordon has done brilliant work on the Europeans.
GOHFIDEN'fI}'rL
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COHFIDEN'l'IAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
the seed issue I a ree. On an of these
finance problems,
E.O.13526, section 1.4 d
they could
have done this for a pittance of what they have to. We have two
different issues here. The longer we wait, given the amount of
leveraged money that is out there,.the greater chance of a more
serious collapse that will take more money to fix.
I do believe
we need to have a hardcore bright line to help Brazil and keep
Latin America from getting into this. The risks of our not
being successful are greater than when we helped Mexico. But
the risk will be minimized if simultaneously we have a
comprehensive short-term strategy, including these countries but
not limited to these countries.
~
At least have a framework agreement that in the long run wiil
sort of stabilize confidence and make people think this can be
made to work.
I believe the global version of what we're trying
to do in our respective countries is riding on this.
If this
comes apart at the seams, we'll have hell putting this back
together and putting in a coherent social component.
That is
what I believe. I think it is very, very serious. Much more
than what I say in my public remarks, because I have to keep
people jollied up here. ~
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�CGNFIDEN'PIAL
6
We just literally this minute got Gordon's proposals in.
Everybody here will be ready to see him by tomorrow and I will
read this personally.
I would like to follow up on the
suggestion you made to me before. Let's assume pretty good
accord among G-7 treasury and central bank people.
There should
be some meeting of the G-7, and sooner rather than later to
realize some momentum here; even the Wall street crowd, who hategovernment interference. Every time .1 give a talk, the market
goes up a bit, and they're disappointed we're not doing more.
There is an openness to action here in the market community that
I think is important.
I don't want to meet if we don't have
an thin to say, but I think you ought to think about it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
Prime-Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Let me read this.
I may call you
in a day or so. There's some urgency in timing.
If you look at
the amount of unregulated, leveraged cash out there and the fact
that people on their own are trying to reduce their exposure
within emerging markets and in the EU and U.S. already, we
already have a liquidity crisis that will affect our economies
in less than a year. But simultaneously the amount of risk is
so great that the two trends could run head on into each other
and cause an even bigger problem.
I hope Gordon will come
tomorrow, but if there is some problem at Treasury, let me look
into that.
I don't know about that. Let me have a little time
to look over this stuff, but I can't imagine not having him
here. )£1
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sure they will be happy to see him.
The President:
If you have gotten Tietmeyer and the French
central bank moved off where they were at the meeting of 25
countries (G-22) over here where Gordon spoke so well -- it
sounded like we'd read the same book just before speaking, we
don't want to give them a chance to change again. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
COUFIDEN'FIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�-
7
GGHFI DEN'fIkL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes. Let me read this stuff and get back to
you, and over the next few days we may have to talk again on the
Middle East.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
it with him.
je1
I'll get Gordon and get him to go through
The President: Tell.you what. Let me call Rubin and let
everybody read it.
They need time to talk about it and they
need digestion time.
I've been talking to them and pushing them
. every- day; . I feel the same sense of urgency you do, and I will
be back in touch.
(..e')
Prime Minister Blair:
In the meantime, just get someone to let
Gordon or us know about -~
The President:
-- the timing.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I will.
Okay, that is great.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEnTIAL .
~
Goodbye.
(U)
�CONFI DEN'l' IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
..s
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SUBJECT:
~
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
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(U)
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PARTICIPANTS:
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
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Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver,
Robert Ford, Tom Crowell, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
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Air Force One
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The President:
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
-z'"
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Tony, how are you doing?
I am doing great.
00,",'"
(U)
(U)
Things are going well here.
Prime Minister Blair:
You seem to be routing your enemies and
we're all happy about that. Where are you? Are you in a car or
something? kel
The President:
I'm doing fine.
I am in a plane.
I wanted to
say one thing to you.
I really believe we've got to do
something about this financial situation. I liked what you
outlined -- your speech was good. G-7 finance ministers are
meeting here this weekend.
I think we need to come up with some
sort of emergency coordinated set of bilateral credit lines.
The Germans are against it, but the French are moving toward it.
Some central banks are reluctant. We'll need to then get the
cooperation from private lenders to stem the tide.
I'm very
Cm~FIDEN'I'IAL
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I've just had our party "'zq 00'"
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm doing fine.
convention this week so I just got that out of the way.
The President:
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CONFIDENTIAL
worried about it affecting Latin America, particularly Brazil.
European bankers have so much exposure on these hedge loans that
we have a real risk of a world-wide recession here.
I think
that it is very important we get these guys to reach some kind
of agreemen i:: •
(£'!
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement. We have got to·
act.
I don't think we have seen the worst of this thing by any
means.
J9f
The President: No, but if we move in quick we could keep it
from taking down Brazil.
I think it would be really important
if you could tell your folks that.
I am going to see them on
_ Monda-y and -do my best to bring them around, as well.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair: Certainly, I will speak to our folks and
I think they will, in principle, be in favor of concerted
action.
I have just read the outline of the comments ou made
earlier today,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Exactly.
i€T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree with you more.
I have not
mentioned the prospect of using our exchange rate stabilization
fund.
I wanted to get IMF funding through Congress, and the
Germans are not yet for it.
I keep thinking that if we work at
this, we can get a lot done, but I have to figure out a way to
get them into it. We got to do it, and the central bank is
notoriously independent.
Prime Minister Blair:
issues really.
I agree with you.
I think there are two
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDEN1'L\L
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with everything you said.
If you could
urge your people to be forward leaning. Maybe we could talk on
Monday before I talk to the IMF. The other thing I wanted to
mention was Kosovo. We have begun to prepare Congress and the
people for the possibility of air strikes. We wanted to ask
NATO to authorize operations next Wednesday.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I agree with that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I told Chirac I would talk to him on Tuesday
after the UN report is released. Our guys can lead this
economic thing, we can say we want a short-term solution and a
long-term structural solution that will help.
~
Prime Minister Blair: What do you think about a summit of some
sort at some stage?
(e)
The President:
I am in favor of it.
If we can get anything
like remote consensus, I think we should do it by the end of the
(C)
year and before the final report toward the end of October.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Like the G-8 summit or something.
Yep, maybe even the G-22.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
Well, I'm all for it.
;ef
If we've
Let's see how far we get on Monday.
The President:
(.Q1
got something to say. How are you doing on Ireland?
It will be helpful i f you can intervene
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm seeing de Chastelain, who is
some time in the near future.
CONFIJ3EM'l'IAL
�4
CONfIDENTIAL
the bloke in charge of decommissioning on Monday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I gather you made good progress as well on the Middle
Eas t .
).,Q1
The President:
Yes, I think so.
I would say we have a better
than 50-50 chance to get a deal, to get them into final status
talks. Well, take care.
~
Prim~
MiniSter Blair:
Take care.
(U)
The President:
That would be good.
We will speak again soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEloiT 1AL
All the best, Bill.
Goodbye man.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut no. 38
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
Elizabeth Rogers and Robin Rickard
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 25, 1998,2:14 -2:42 p.m. EST
San Francisco, California
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations.
It was terrible.
(U)
+e!
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I was going home every morning at two or three.
The last go around dragged on for 36 hours, like the Irish
thing. But to be fair, the difference was you were integrating
both into one political system. Here we were dealing with two
diverging political systems.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDEH'fL"tL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(b,d)
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,.
When you were doing the Irish thing, you were actually in it
with them -- you had some leverage. All I can do is give them
money and my time. Here I just had to talk them through it and
wait it out.
It took 85 hours.
In the end, everybody pats me
on the back; but they have to take all the flak; Arafat took
some too. -t€+If it works, I think we have a chance to break the whole thing
open.
If this is faithfully implemented, this mra~k~e~s~t~h~e~______,
ultimate resolution of bilateral issues easier.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
e
Israe-lis know in the end they have to have an agreement.
good, but we still have along way to go. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I know exactly how you feel.
I feel
~
The President:
It is a lot like the Irish thing, there are a
lot of similarities. But you are in it with them. You have
more moral authority.
You have to make a decision to release
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I I t is an
prisoners.
I don't. I
interesting thing.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
I was absolutely fascinated watching this
on the news.
It was a real roller coaster, wasn't it? ~
The President:
It was amazing. We had the agreement, then it
got undone. We had a deal. You see there were two prisoners.
Most can't understand, but ou know what symbolic significance
prisoners have in Ireland.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFIDEN'fIAL
I can imagine.
~
�3
CONFIDENTIAL
The President:
The beautiful thing about it was Hussein, who
looks l.ike he is at death's door. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
He is an amazing man.
~
The President: Hussein kept telling them to think about their
children.
It was a thing of beauty.
I would fly him down and
he would wait in his house for 30 to 40 minutes for them to come
down. Then he would lecture them in a fatherly way.
It was
bizarre. +er
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought this would be an extraordinary
To-have done it is a tremendous achievement. Even
- making all allowances, it wouldn't have happened unless you had
been there and done it yourself. ~
thin~.
The President: There was no way.
For you it is the same. But
there is a limit to how many times you can do this.
I had to
just get there and listen to them for hours and hours. ~
Prime Minister Blair: We end up being part negotiator, part
therapist, and part leader.
~
I
The President:
Someday we should write a book together about
these two things, about our role as shrinks. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I could tell when I saw the signing
ceremony.
I could just tell what must have been going on -- the
nightmares to not let it disintegrate. You see they needed a
figure there.
This is what you will have done. You will have
brought them to see in the end that both of them had to do the
deal. -t€-)The President:
I don't have any question that I did the right
thing, but it was tough for them.
I tell
is one
thing I would like you tOrrd=o~.~~I~w~i~s~h~~o~u~~~~~~~o~f~f~a~____,
letter to both of them.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
~~==~====~------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am supposed to phone him, but I will
write him a letter.
I will definitely do that. Aef
The President: Call him, but if you write a letter, it can be
released.
I know we need to talk about finances and Kosovo a
bit, but, the other thin;
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CQNn DENT IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Mi ni s t e r BI air: / r:::-::o--:-:-::-:--:----:--:-:-:::-:-~
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
f
~~~~__~~__~--:---:-__~~~~~~~________~__~~~I
Okay,
Bill, I will certainly do that. And once again, well done. It
was a real personal triumph. ~
. The Presiderit:
Thank you.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We had Arafat out to the EU get together
-- this informal European summit we just had. He told us a bit
about it. I will try to gear up the other Europeans to do the
same.
The President: Okay, let's talk about Kosovo briefly and then
go back to finances. What is your sense of where we are on
Kosovo? )Z1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I got it. Last night Wes Clark literally stayed
up all night working on him. Milosevic agreed to a specific set
of things that most reasonable people would conclude if he did
between now and the day of the ACTORD, the 27 th , he would be in
compliance. The one thing that is most important is that
nothing we and the French say between now and then should look
like anything other than that we are prepared to put the planes
in the air. We are on the same wavelength. {et
I think that he will do enough to comply for us all to agree
that he's done what he has to do. In the last several days, he
has done a lot of things to comply but also some backsliding.
We just have to hang in there. -+etcmlFIDKNTIAL
�CONFIDEH'FL7I,L
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
5
I agree absolutel.
We are at one with
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That is good enough right now. I don't want to
give him mixed messages. Based on his meeting last night with
Wes, he will stick on compliance enough that we will not have to
use violence, but only if he thinks we are prepared to do it.
t,.ef -
Prime Minister Blair:
We are absolutely agreed on that.
+e1
The President: On the financial issues, I have a couple of
things. I got your letters last week and Bob talked to Gordon
Brown. There is a lot of good stuff in there. I would like to
propose that we try to put this in context of the heads of state
of the G-7 statement. ~
I would like to give you my view of this and let you respond.
First of all, I think we should be looking for -- without
raining on what Gordon has done so far -- I think we should be
looking for a G-7 statement from the leaders themselves
addressing long term reforms and the short term crisis as well
as the banking legislation in Japan and what we did with the IMF
here. ~
What I would hope we could do, because I think Rubin has a good
sense of how the markets will react, is ideally to get a
statement out next week, with or without a conference call with
our G-7 colleagues. It's your call as G-7 leader what you would
like. Then we would have a statement and it would have the
existing consensus on the promise for reform, on a detailed
agenda and procedure for achieving consensus. JR1
It would be good if we can get others to agree on this and on a
financial architecture. And I would also like to see, and Bob
thinks this is really important, an agreement on the proposal
for precautionary financing facility. In addition, we could
then or later also endorse the package for Brazil that the
finance ministers are working on. We know the shape it will be
in and who will pony up the money. ;e1
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDEN'l'VlrL
6
It is okay for the finance ministers to announce it, but we need
to ratify it in the context of our statement next week -- or
when w~ get it done.
If Gordon and Bob Rubin could work to
build consensus around these elements, we could then have two
complementary statements.
First, a leaders' statement
describing key elements with consensus on long term reform,
endorsing the precautionary financing facility and also
endorsing the Brazilian thing.
Then the finance ministers and
central bank governors could lay it all out in greater detail.
I think if you have the finance ministers do something without
the leaders at this time, it doesn't break through with the
necessary force.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I am in total agreement with that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
One thing I can't figure out how to do, is to
find a device that all of us can live with directly or
indirectly to put limits on the degree of speculation while
leaving markets open to trade, investment, and even appropriate
hedging against currency reevaluation up or down. We can't have
over a trillion dollars a day changing hands without some
regulatory limits. We car.'t afford to have hundreds of millions
of dollars moving on a 90 percent leverage where they only have
to put up 10 percent. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
We need prudent rules.
~
The President:
You just can't have 90 percent leverage -- the
compounding is devastating. You also have to have some way to
buy the private sector into this to stop hemorrhaging outflows
from these countries.
Some don't feel this way, but these
capital credit controls for the short term can work -- just like
if the market drops more than 10 percent in a day, we can
suspend trading. But they don't work over the long or medium
COl?lFIDEH'fIAL
�7
COHFI DEN'l? IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
term. Malaysia
cas h res e rve s. r---""--O.";",;""==,,;:,,::,,,=-==--,-,-='--..C::,=::,,::,,--=,,:::,,:::,,:::,,:::,:::,,,:=-=::::.r.-=.:=::..:::...--.:::.:.;
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. These ~re other things we need
to look at.
If we do a leaders' statement and finance
ministers' statement, it obviates the need for a summit now.
.JK}
The President:
One thing
particularly if there are
that our absolute outside
meeting, leaving open the
or Ja-nuary _or if we think
we should leave in reserve,
adverse reactions in the market, is
deadline should be the next G-7
possibility of a meeting in December
we have something else to say. j£'(
But let me say, this is more about your European political
situation than mine.
Two things: number one, it is important
to have the leaders' statement and let the finance ministers
fill in the blanks because you have a new leader in Germany
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
~
And we have a new leader in Italy
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
~
The President:
It will empower them and makes them members of
the club. I think it is very good politics. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is why I am anxious to do it.
s otted it absolutel .
You
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Alright.
Have you talked to Prodi?
I
CONFIDEN'f'IAL
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�COtilfIElEHlIAL
8
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he is.
You probably don't
know D'Alema, do you?
The President:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
:J
L-____________________- - - - The President:
He did a good job.
got a chance to call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm just sick.
I haven't
He would like that.
The President:
There are center left governments in every
country in Europe now.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
It is interesting with its possibilities,
but it also poses problems.
(e)
The President: Now that we have the responsibilities we have to
bear the burdens of the consequences. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The summit was quite interesting -- the
(Q')
The President:
I'll have Rubin follow up with Gordon Brown. We
may want to do a conference call next week. We can put out our
general statement on architecture of the precautionary financing
facility and ratify it when it is done.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be great.
The President:
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d)
us greater credibility.
)£1
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
Absolutely.
~
i t will give
�9
_ COMf'IDEliffTAL
,'
The President;
We also need to show we are serious on Brazil.
!z')
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill.
(U)
again congratulations.
The President:
Okay, goodbye.
All the very best'and once
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEH'l'IAL
�COHFIDEN'PIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski,
George Chastain, Jenny McGee and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
November 3, 1998, 3:29 - 3:37 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Fine, how are you doing? It's election day, so
I am just sitting around. Essentially, the elections are going
well.
These are good times, but the Republicans are in the
majority and have more money than we do. Not since 1922 has the
president's party gained seats, but we are doing well and the
exit polls look good.
They have outspent us, but we essentially
have a good message going.
(U)
I understand that you have been briefed on Bill Cohen's message
on Iraq.
I really appreciate all that you have said publicly,
but I still think that we have to take decisive action this time
to respond to Saddam's challenge. It is clear to me that Saddam
really wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without
giving up his weapons of mass destruction and missile program.
The Vice President talked to Crown Prince Abdallah today in
Saud'i Arabia, and he promised the support that we need. Bill is
discussing the details with him tonight in Riyadh.
~
We are working on a resolution for the Council, and I hope that
it can be finished in a couple of days. But it seems to me that
we need to be in a position to act soon, rather than drag it
out. We need to be in touch with Chirac.
I still have
questions about what they would say about the use of force.
The
COHFI DENT IA1
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1/5(b,d)
... '
Declassify On: _. 1l/0Y~-GB~,J'7C:'';;':''-~-'O-~~"-~'-~--'-~""'\.
i~tNTON L;:BRARY PHOTOCOPY
-:r
i?:~:~;~!:4;:~:~;;~.,.);"i;-;~.:;~-.>-~,-:\~.~.~~:.~:_---/.,~.~",\.
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COPlFIDENTIAl
French have been great in their public comments -- they have
been tough on Iraq -- but anything that you can do to keep
Chirac .on board.
I will call him tomorrow. -tetPrime Minister Blair:
The President:
Maybe I should call him.
I think you should.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I actually made my comments in a press
conference with Schroeder yesterday.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
next day to see where we stand.
I will talk to Chirac in the
~
The President: As far as the Russians are concerned, they seem
pretty angry, too. jQ(
Prime Minister Blair:
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
The President:
I agree with you. Kofi seems to be keeping his
distance since Saddam shafted him. What do you think about
sooner rather than later?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
COIU'I15EWf IAL
�3
'CONTI DEN'!' TAt
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
~
How soon were you thinking of, Bill?
The President:
I don't know. I was thinking of over the next
several days.
It will take time to set things up and to develop
a case against him.
I've got to know who is dancing with us and
who is not.
I just wanted to check your temperature on it and
ask you to call Chirac. On the details, we need to be in very
close touch and work together. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed for us tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill.
(U)
The President:
Thanks.
All right.
Goodbye.
All the very best to you,
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
(U)
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 20l3-090, document no. 40
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
NOTE -TAKERS:
Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David
Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 11, 1998 -- 1:00 p.m. - 1:15 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
I am at the EU summit in Vienna.
(U)
The President:
Is it cold in Vienna?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It is absolutely freezing.
cold, but a beautiful city.
(U)
Amazingly
The President:
I just wanted to check in with you on Iraq and
Ireland before I go to the Middle East this weekend. On
November 15, we said we would hold off on any strike while we
test Saddam's promise to cooperate with UNSCOM. So far, the
results have been mixed. There has been a lot of monitoring,
which is easy for the Iraqis to accept. But, UNSCOM was blocked
at Ba'ath party headquarters this week. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
_______________________
___
�2
~he
President: And they've received only 1 of 10 documents they
asked for, and Iraq is making inspections harder than they have
to be.
I can't tell if they are trying to get some concession
on sanctions review, or if they think we can't do anything at
this time of year.
If Iraq blocks another inspection this
weekend and if Butler finds that they are not cooperating as
they are required to do under the October 30 Security Council
letter -- if he actually says that -- I am inclined to think
that we should take the action that we suspended in November.
But, if he isn't significantly undercutting UNSCOM's ability to
do its job and Butler says that, I think he will simply have
slipped the disarmament noose forever. Now, we have a very
narrow window to operate with because of Ramadan and my going to
Israel this weekend. We will need to talk, and I will have to
find you wherever you are.
If the inspections are not blocked,
then we have to figure out how to handle the comprehensive
review issue.
Do we delay it or go forward? If we delay it,
there will almost certainly be a crisis, and out of respect for
their faith, we can't hit them during Ramadan. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We don't have much, I don't think.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
No.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
It's
The President: We think we can get them out in 24 hours.
a much quicker turn-around. This may be part of what he is
miscalculating. He may think he will have more notice than he
would.
yt'll
/
TQf
.sECRE'f
�3
Prime Minister Blair: Right. What happens if we start to take
action and Shen Ramadan starts, as it were? Ramadan starts next
Friday?
(j'1)
The President:
If we start on Wednesday, we have enough time.
They assure me we do.
(jl) .
Prime Minister Blair:
Ramadan?
ifj)
The President:
We can do it.
(l~s,
Then, we can go in and get out by
we have four days.
That's plenty of time.
~)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So, Butler is going to try to get more access
tomorrow? ..k8'f
The President:
says. ~
He has two more days, and then say whatever he
Prime Minister Blair:
say? -+&r
Right.
Do we know what he is going to
The President:
No, we don't. My gut is that he most likely is
going to say that he got some cooperation, but not full.
This
will make us think really hard on whether we can in good
conscience vote for this comprehensive review, and if we don't,
he will provoke a crisis over that.
It seems to me that it is
pretty substantial that he didn't let them go into Ba'ath party
headq~arters.
Anyway, you will have to talk to your folks, and
we may have to talk again in a few days when I am in the
Mideast. -+&JPrime Minister Blair:
Okay.
~
The President: Anyway, the other thing I wanted to tell you was
that I talked to Trimble and Adams on Tuesday.
I missed Hume
because he had to leave for Oslo.
I made it clear privately and
publicly in a speech that decommissioning is essential,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
What do you think is happening?
J.Z!
�4
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I did all I could.
can do, just let me know. ~
If there is anything else I
Prime Minister Blair:
There may be a time to speak to Adams
again, but, for now, it is for us to sort out.
~
The President:
Okay, I agree with that.
I just wanted to
mention very briefly that I am going to make a real push to
resolve the Cyprus issue next year. But, before that, we have
to avert this missile problem next month.
I hope when you see
Clerides on Saturday that you persuade him to stop delivery to
Cyprus.
It would be terrible.
I hope you will do what you can.
You really tried to get the ED to soften its stance on Turkey.
I don't know if the coming of Schroeder helps at all. Maybe,
you can et a little better Ian ua e in our statement in
Vienna.
I think this missile deal
rea ly bothers me because of the Russian connection, and I see
so much in Russia going south on us.
Their space scientists
haven't received a check in eight months, and they could be
making' a fortune on missile launches from us.
I
~ 3ECRE'I'
/'
I
�5
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you could make headway,
Prime Minister Blair:
tomorrow.
Oka, Bill.
I would appreciate it.
I will speak to Clerides
The President: After the first of the year, after I get all
this crap behind me, I would like to talk to you about this.
?-f
Prime Minister Blair:
I'd like to talk to you about a bunch of
things because there is a lot going on here in Europe.
yei
The President:
How is Schroeder working out?
~
J
Prime Minister Blair:
~----------------The President:
I had impressions watching his campaigning that
they adopted rhetoric similar to ours, but they didn't think it
through. You had a program to implement and so did I, and
that's a big difference. ~
prime Minister Blair:
Actually, I like him very much.
The president:
I do, too. The reason I mentioned this is
because I had a good talk with him on Turkey.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now,
ere are other prob
Turkey, such
as human rights. Anyway, you might nose around Vienna and see
if you can send him help. +eT
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure, I
opportunity at dinner tonight.
The President:
There rna
be an
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Tp('eECRE'P
/
�TOSE,CRET
'7-
6
T
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: As Christians, we are supposed to help whether
people appreciate it or not and it's the season for it. See you
soon.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
All the best.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
Bye.
See you soon.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
/
~SECRE!
(U)
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 21, 1999, 2:26-2:53 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
Kosovo.
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
'-" >9-J~"-'''''''--"~-=~-~-'--''-''''~'--':''>~~' ,
Declassify on:! 1 /~'
l'
'f i .." ,- 'i~()NJJB~RYPHo;rocOPY' '1
I
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.~.:~::::~::::":=~~=-_ ~;;;:";'',!'~-=:;' _.,'~
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2
be determined not to let him undermine the KVM and work over
Walker. I don't want to be slow or indecisive. I will try to
get Congress to go along with me and not stop it.
(R:')
Domestic politics aside, my problem about ground forces is that
if we send them in without some type of agreement beforehand -it doesn't have to be as detailed as Dayton --
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I really think we have to do somet ing, but I know
if we do military action without a political plan we will have a
problem. ...(.GtPrime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: I agree with that. On the other hand, this is
likely to be one of ·!:JieSe things where we can't see completely
to the end.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
eave 0 eep
working on it. We are in a much different situation than we
were legally and politically in Bosnia because the world has
said these people deserve autonomy but not independence. I
don't want to get into a pickle, but now that 45 people have
been slaughtered and Milosevic is trying to throw the KVM out,
we don't have any choice but to do something.
~
CONPIDEN''fIAL
�· COHFI DElff' IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
One thing is to go to them and say, "Look, if
you want us to do any more you have to help, too.
They
probably have as many violations of cease-fires as Milosevic,
though his are more egregious.
"For a long-term resolution you
have to come to the table too, you can't have it both ways, and
you never take any responsibility.
J,K1
U
/I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
It's important we do that.
~
They may ignore it but we have to try.
Prime Minister Blair:
we may get somewhere.
~
If we do that in a really concerted way,
I think it very important we do that,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That makes a lot more sense.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister
Blair·~~s.
(U)
The President:
It is a very difficult problem and I don't
pretend to have all the answers. We have to be careful not to
be weak and move decisively with NATO now, knowing it won't
solve the problem without a political resolution.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4 d
to sell
COMn OEM! IAL
ln an lmposslble posltlon.
I may not be able
time with Congress, but I certainly can't do
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
it unless there is an appropriate environment.
I think we
r - -.....
we have to keep working and go full speed ahead with NATO
E.O. 13526 section 1.4 d
Prime Mihister Blair:
The President:
I think that is exactly right.
I agree with that.
That is good.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_ _-------------~
The President:
I agree.
That is what we need to do.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
GONFIDEH'f'IM.
~
Okay, Bill, let's keep in touch on that.
Can I do anything?
Can I help at all?
(U)
�5
• C3HFI DEN':' L,\L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I'm really worried. Gerry Adams was here not
long ago, and I had a firm talk with him. I am really getting
kind of frustrated by them not doing anything. yel
.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You just let me know.
have not hit a lick of this.
ye)
I am concerned that they
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
),Q1
Yes, it does.
I don't know how .. just bizarre.
LP r_i_ffi_e__
__
M_i_n_l_.s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_.r : ____________________________________==:::>
__
I
r::IE-.O-.-c-':-35::":2-::-6,-s-ec-ti=-o-n-1.-4(-b:-)(--'d)I
1
CONFIDENTIAL
�, CONFIDEHTL'I:L
The President:
6
All right.
What else? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Let me tell you what we're going on and what the
lay of the land is. We tried to negotiate to get a solution to
the EU restrictions in '92.
I would still like to do it. The
problem now for me is, I don't have any flexibility for
delaying.
Congress was going to impose them by statute, and
that-was trouble that I headed off. But the only way I could do
it was by sending them a letter that said I would do it, and
basically there is a little time left.
February 1 plus 10 days,
then there is probably another week after that before customs
could enforce it.
If there is any way you think your guys have
flexibility and work out a solution I would like to do it, but
one operation here lost nearly a billion dollars since this all
happened.
The law is pretty clear.
I don't want to do anything
to cause you problems.
In principle, I don't want Congress
legislating in the trade area. We had to send a letter that we
would do it, and now time has run out. So if there is anything
we can do, I will do it.
I don't want to cause you any trouble
but we're sort of stuck on it. Jer
Pr ime Mini ster Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I know it does.
I've been fooling with it a
long time and also some people who are pushing it have enormous
influence in Congress and I know them well.
We sort of delayed
this for years and if there is any way we can resolve it, it
would be a good thing.
yef
Let me ask you another thing.
another year in office,
Menem was here and he said he has
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He has a great economic policy. We're trying to stave off the
financial crisis from reaching Latin America, and Brazil is
shaky" He asked i f you might be able to do something on it.
The thing he mentioned the most was travel.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIfJ,
I~.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
(C)
�7
.C ON F I DEIfy I f.L
The President: It's something you might think about.
He would
like to work out some accommodation.
The thing he mentioned
three different times was travel restrictions. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
He was here last week.L-~~~--~~==~~~~==~====~----------~
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There was a war, which they lost, and he understands that.
But
there are Argentines with relatives there, or relatives buried
there, and if they could get some across, to get access to do
things.
Whatever happens, if you could look into it, without
raising the fundamental questions from the war, it would be
positive for you and him.
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
speak soon. ~
Okay.
Okay.
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
The President:
I will look at that.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
..- :;
CONE'IDElfrIAL
Bill, we.' 11
�cm;rFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 42
DECLASSIFICATION DATE; October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
James Smith, Roger Merletti,
David Higgins, Matthew Sibley, Elizabeth
Rodgers, Robin Rickard, Michael Manning,
Larry Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
time.
(U)
February 4, 1999, 2:13-2:30 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Nice to hear your voice.
Al had a wonderful
Prime Minister Blair:
It was great. He went down well. He was
fantastic with all the New Deal programs. He met with all those
business people.
The unemployment program was really
impressive.
I thought it was a good visit and he was fantastic
on it.
(U)
The President:
He also liked when he went into Prescott's
office and the only decoration was a bowl of bananas.
I heard
(U)
all about it. He was very happy.
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope we get all that sorted out.
(U)
The President: My staff won't let me talk to you unless I have
a banana at hand.
I'm sitting here with a banana; it's a big,
ugly, brownish one.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
about Kosovo.
~
COHFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Now Bill, I thought we should have a word
�2
CONFIDEH'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
Let me tell you, the Prime Ministers of
both Macedonia and Albania were here today and they make .us look
like old men.
They are 31 and 33 years old.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I think Robin and Madeleine did a reall~
good job and we got a plan.
The parties are coming on Saturday
and the KLA are involved, as well.
That is all good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree.
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
First of all, I agree with everything you say
about maintaining pressure on Belgrade and the Kosovars on the
interim settlement.
I'm encouraged by Saturday's talks.
There
is no other way it works over the long run unless we can get a
peace agreement and troops on the ground. -tc+-
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It is a hard sell in Congress. They still lecture me on Bosnia
and how we didn't pay for it in advance.
I tell them Bosnia is
a great success story and they ought to be proud of it and keep
it going, and not let it be wiped out.
I gather there is a
general feeling that a lot of European countries are willing to
make troop contributions. That will help me to get Congress to
support participation. You know I always want to be part of
these things.
~
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�3
CONFI DENT IA L
I just gave a speech today.
I basically said we were
considering our participation and talking to Congress about it.
I will make the strongest case I can, but our system is that
they have to come up with money for it. The more European
countries that are willing to participate and the greater
extent, the better luck I will have with the Republican
Congress. .J.I21
Ironically, all the business with me might help us get something
done here.
I think the announcement of substantial British
participation, which I gather is your decision, will help us a
lot.
I want to help and I made my first big public pitch today.
We will work with Congress and stay in close touch. Our
military people are in contact and are simultaneously designing
this concerning who contributes what.
I will do the best that I
can.
I wish I could give you a number now, but I don't know
what level yet.
I am working it and I'll do the best I can .
..k81"
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, Bill, that is great.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Great. Let me say, there's one other thing that
would help me.
If you put out that we talked, say that we have
this under active consideration. That is what I just said
publicly.
If you could not say that I have made a definite
decision. Because the Congress is Republican, at every public
hearing we have, they start moping and saying that I expect them
to fall in line afterward because they never refuse to support
the troops.
If you could say I haven't made a decision, that
would give me another day to massage the congressional psyche
and break it loose here. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
Don't worry, that is absolutely fine.
That is very good indeed. Thanks, as ever.
~
The President:
Well, you are doing great.
press in the New York Times.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFI DEH'l? IAb
Well,
You even got good
it cost a lot of money.
(U)
�4
The President:
You got good press in the New York Times and I
got a good editorial in the Guardian.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Guardian. ·(U)
Yes, you got an editorial in the
The Pres iden t : They said I was more 1 iberal than you.
know if that is good or bad.
(U)
I don't··
Prime Minister Blair: Well, it's good for you. Your state of
the Union, as I suspected, had a big impact around Europe.
I
was in Vienna last week with center-left leaders.
It made a big
impact there.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We need to think about our next steps.
thought that NYU conference was good.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
They (the Center-left leaders) are
absolutely desperate for it. They now buy entirely the argument
that we can learn from America. The State of the Union did
help. The leader of the United states was talking about
building a cohesive, peaceful society and the rest of it.
It
was language they can understand.
JR7
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think we certainly should do some more.
They are desperate. ~
The President: One thing I think you should have your guys
thinking about. What is our response to tough challenges?
Like, is there a third way response to financial crises? How do
we stop the reversal of trade liberalization and take it up
again? With all these troubles in Asia, the temptations to
close down the movement for trade liberalization will be great.
-i-et"
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is absolutel
to be a big part of our discussions.
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEH'FL"rL
. ~-;~--.ft~F'c'=~~c~~~-"'~!
'~~INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
. ~~~_:~~~.-..::_ ;~"~~.!~~,",,-_';_:::::~~~J...."""
L
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right.
It has
�5
CONFIDEHT L,\L
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The president:
I agree with that.
I think when we do the next
G-8 meeting we really ought to give some thought to setting up
our trade position and also think about what wrinkles need to be
in the finance system position as well. We will have a lot to
talk about in advance, but the G-8 will give you a forum and me
a forum and our crowd a forum to elevate some of these issues.
J..&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree completely.
vtI
The President: We will be in constant touch the next few days
to wrap it up and nail down what to do.
;e1
Prime Minister Blair: King Hussein.
I'm really sorry. Je1
What a terrible thing.
The President:
Yes, he just left here. He is going home on
life support. You know he did his best, but I will be surprised
if he pulls out of this. -+et
Prime Minister Blair:
I just saw him a couple of days ago and
thought he was looking better.
(e)
The President: He had a severe relapse. Noor brought him over
here.
I just think that this is the way these conditions are.
They overwhelm your system and you have nothing left.
Y1
Prime Minister Blair:
other thing.
CONFI DEN'±' lAL
It's a shame for the guy.
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
(,,~~?-ffi;~~i""~-,-,..·=~p~,-·-..-c;""1
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' . t
,. .
.",.
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.
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.~;'.~\~~~.:':'>-.<- . -.--~.,.'.."" ",-
"
,;
',"
Bill, just one
�.IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
6
CONFIDENTIAL
The President: Any time, day ar night.
It is my awn private
passian . . I have been warried far yau. To. the peaple an the
autside, it seems idiatic that we wauld allaw these elements to.
disrupt progress. You are where you are and whatever I can do
to. disladge it, let me know.
If you have something specific for
me to come at them with, let me know that, too. -tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
1
Is Bertie going to be all right?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I hope so.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need him.
(C)
Really, we do need him.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
matters. -+&lThe President:
Let us keep in touch on Kosovo and other
All right, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll see you soon.
All the best.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COUFIDEN'l'IAL
,-
(U)
(U)
�CONFI DEN'P VeL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony Blair
Of the United Kingdom
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
British Prime Minister Blair
Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, David Higgins,
Robin Richard, Joel Schrader, James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
February 19, 1999, 10:59 a.m. - 11:24 a.m. EST
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
Kosovo
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Chlrac lS with you today?
The President: He is here and I will meet with him in a few
~m~iEn~U!t~e~s~.~==~--~~~~~~======~~~~--~--~--~----~-----\
I
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
_
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let's make sure we are on the same
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:i
2/~_,~~~-~~~~,,~~-~~
';:-.
i
_.
-.
;, ~~I
t'."L~tON LIBRARY PHOT060fy ',:.1. '
"2.~.:::'~ ¢~!;~:~:;"-:':~;'-~~~;d;~~~;:;'~~';i~_..;'·;5...-+f~
.
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
2
I
Prime Minister Blair:
'I
The President: Well, I agree with that.
The trick is to give
him some chance to come around and not seem lik
unlimitedly.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
agree with that.
you?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
COHFI DEN'!' lAL
--,
€,~fi~'~~~;(,
'r~: ,!~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY'
f
t-;.=...~~~~~~.::~:...." ..~--:_._.-.~,: -'-''':'.h._ L':'~~;:'_"" -~-:-o- r;~r,·.,:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�· CONFIDEN'l'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
The President:
I agree with that. That is good.
I think we are
doing all right on getting the enabling force together.
I don't
know if Milosevic is playing brinkmanship or not. He seems to
believe he loses Serbia if he lets NATO in there. ke1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yeah.
]
L l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - -
The President: Let me ask you a couple of questions. What is
your sense on KVM? I know the EU is interested in a n w
structure,
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
accomplished by tFh~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----,
implementation.
been so forthcoming, and I
want to screw it up. je)
Prime Mi nister Blaic
I
)
IL--_ _ _ ______
The President:
That's right.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is there anything else?
(U)
The President: No, I don't think so. What about Northern
Ireland? Jim Steinberg had a good meeting with Ambassador
Christopher Meyer yesterday on the outlook for the next two
months. We are working on some ideas to complement your strategy
for a push by the first anniversary of the Good FridayAgree~ent.
I am ready to do my part around st. Patrick's day here and look
forward to seeing Mo Mowlam. You have made a lot of progress and
seem to have gotten it back on track. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CO~jFI DENT' 1AL
�· COh'PIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm with you.
have no choice.
~
It could boomerang on us but we
Prime MinioterBlair:
- I . - - I_
The President:
_
)
_
I agree.
_
_
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Obviously you and I should speak before St. Patrick's day.
The President:
I think that's right.
yt)
Prime Minister Blair: So there it is, I think.
keep in close touch on things. I
CGNF I DEN'3?IAL
~)
So Bill, let's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�· conFIDENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The P:r:e,sident:
Six months o:r: so ago
when I spoke to you, I was in a big flght with my T:r:easu:r:y guys'
about the need to have leade:r:s get togethe:r: on it and cha:r:t a
cou:r:se whe:r:e we change the o:r:ientation of the IMF a little bit
and get into the necessity fo:r: inte:r:national standa:r:ds fo:r:
banking. We :r:eally a:r:e moving in steps, in increments towa:r:ds a
B:r:etton Woods II arrangement. I think we realized we :r:ushed into
getting money into them without them having the internal
protection'they needed. But a lot of T:r:easu:r:y folks treat this
like Einstein looking for the theory of relativity or biologists
looking for the cure for cancer: when they find it they will
tell us. I felt our Treasury kept resisting a big meeting six
months ago because markets we:r:e so shaky that if we met and did
not come up with an answer it would foster instability. They
don't feel that way anymore.
(Q1
We have to find a wa
thing kicked off.
around the G-7 or otherwise try to get this
We do need some
forum in which leaders can clearly articulate where we are, what
we have done, and where we are going.
o 0 peop e are upse
the composltion of
the commlt ee of the 25 nations (G-22) meeting because they are
not a sanctioned IMF type group. Maybe the G-7 cuts a lot of
people out of the loop and a lot of those nations think Europe is
over-represented. I am not hung up on that myself but, we do
need to find a way to have higher visibility to let the world
know we are working toward a more stable position. We ou ht to
tr to resolve this when the G-7 meets in Germany.
P:r:ime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFI moNT L",L
.§
~
~
'"
~
~
......
�CONFIDEHl'IAL
6
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
say?
yt)
Yes,
I like that.
What do you think Chirac will
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I got
track, but we need to
you back after I talk
right frame of mind.
).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
it.
I'm with you.
I think we are on same
figure out how to keep going.
I may call
to him, but I will try to get him in the
I
~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~/
The President:
I am worried about Russia as well.
have spent some quite intense discussion time on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The Russians have no tax
system.
I don't know what to do about all that either, but we
should talk about it.
Its almost like a psychological problem,
in part, as well as the obvious political problem. We may need
to put a little more money on the table for them to do that.
~
I
Prime Minister Blair:
i You and I
can talk about it later~.----------------------------~ ~=-~~--~----~~
IE.O. 13526, section
The President: All right, I'll follow up.
with Jacques right now.
+e1
--End of Conversation--
CONFI D£NTI}U
I'm going to meet
1.4(b)(d)i
�COpFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bayley,
Frank Jarosinski, Matthew Sibley, Roger
Merletti, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 4, 1999, 4:40 - 5:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, how are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm fine, I guess.
I just got a bunch of stuff
going on here, but everything is all right. How are you doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am fine.
you about this damn thing.
I'm really sorry to bother
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
When is the election, May 6?
Prime Minister Blair:
Jef
Yes, May 6.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what.
I have to be a little
careful about how I say this. Most of our people think that the
WTO panel may approve a smaller aggregate amount.
If they
will try to do what I can to be helpful.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
i
�CONFIDENT 13\L
2
we do this, it will presumably be well in advance of the
election. Anything you can do through Leon to get the WTO panel
to make their decision would be very helpful.
The only way we
can get nailed is if they approve the exact amount, but I assume
it will be lower, then we'll have an opportunity. -teT
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minlster Blair:
The President:
They are significant.
One of the things I've
tried to do before, and I hope this year will pass, is a new
initiative to get more money through trade and investment.
They're extremely vulnerable to drug lords, and bananas will be
essentially a holding action.
I think that maybe this is
something the European Union and United States can do together
and get them more help down there.
I am worried about both
Caribbean and Central America because of this storm.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
I think it is a legitimate serious issue, not just
about two Central American countries going broke.
It's a deeper
thing on all sides.
I would be prepared to work on that.
The
main thing between now and May is to get these guys to talk.
If
you could get the WTO panel to make a rapid decision, maybe we
could work something through on this.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
(..e)
The President: What they could do, what I am worried about, is
they may be sympathetic to you, and maybe rule against you on
the merits.
If they keep kicking the can down the road, that
would be the worst for you politically. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with you.
I'm trying to pass a billion
dollar trade initiative and all the right-wing Republicans
bailed out on me yesterday.
They spent all that money, billions
Ir.: 0;::-".-:17
E:-:.
35==2:-::6-,
s-ec-'-tl:-' 71."':-4(7b7":)(-:7ld)I
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�COHFIDEN'fIPrL
3
'JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
and billions, supporting dictatorships and taking sides in civil
wars, but they won't help me get them back on their feet.
They're trying to keep me from getting it before I go down there
next week,
..(-et
~rime
Minister Blair:
The President:
I got it. Look, basically what is at stake here
is I've had to fight back 80 percent of both parties in Congress
who want to legislate something worse than what I did. The
whole credibility of the WTO is at issue here. But what is
important, in order for me to do anything, is for the WTO to
decide sooner rather than later.
I should have some flexibility
if they decide that it should be X million dollars less. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be very helpful.
~
The President:
That is why it's important not to talk about it.
Because if we do I will have everybody allover me.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
Can I ask you another quick question.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
The President: What do you want me to say on
over here? Where will we be by then? ~
st.
Patrick's Day
Prime Minister Blair:
CmJFIDENTIAL
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
1
'----_ _ _--'--_-----'1
The President: Let me ask you this.
Is there some way to
manifest the commitment by something they say to you or me?
Then a week later, some big declaration on decommissioning.
there some way to do it that way? le1
Is
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
'------~~
The President:
Right now, they're saying trust me.
could make these statements, then dick around. Jk1
But they
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J,R:}
How do they justify the Good Friday accords?
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
GOHFI DEWl'Ilffi
�5
CGNFIDENnAL
• IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
I
The President:
I completely agree. If you have any more
instructions or advice between now and st. Patrick's Day, I'll be glad to have it. But, I got it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I think we have a chance to get the Kosovars to
all right on the Kosovo agreement. J21
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really?
(C)
(91
That would be great.
~
The President: Bob Dole went over there today for me. He's
been a champion of theirs.
I'd say we have a pretty goud
chance.
I'm worried about the possibility of the Kosovars
saying yes, Milosevic saying no, and NATO will blink.
I'm
really worried. We need to suck it up. You and I may have to
do another round of calls. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
stuff,
j)2')
All right.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me know about all this other
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Thanks a lot.
(U)
The President:
I'll see you.
If you have anything more on the
other issues, let me know, directly or indirectly, through our
channels.
(U)
CONFlDEN'i'IAL
�6
C~FIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
Again, sorry to trouble you.
(U)
The President: That's okay.
I may have to start ordering 50
_percent of my bananas from the Caribbean and Central America.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
See you.
(U)
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good-bye.
All the very best to you.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�., ..' ••..:...!....
COHFI DEN}' IAL
lil{l
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Matt Sibley, Lawrence Butler
and Miriam Sapiro
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 14, 1999, 1:55-2:12 p.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President: Hi, Tony.
I had a really good trip down to
Central America.
I am a bit tired.
It was a good trip.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you just get back?
(U)
The President:
I got back a couple of days ago and then had to
turn around and go to Arkansas. But it was a good trip.
The
thing I found interesting was that despite all the horrible
problems they have had with the hurricane and the legacy of all
of the civil wars, those places are very well governed, with
enormous potential.
They're all very poor, except for Costa
Rica, but they're very well governed. The biggest problem is in
the aftermath of all the civil wars a lot of guns were left
there, something that you know about. There are also a lot of
criminal gangs in the rural areas that make them less than safe
so it is hard to get tourism going there.
In El Salvador there
were former rebels and soldiers in suits listening to my speech.
It was quite nice.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I thought we could have a quick word on
Northern Ir'eland before they all get there.
(U)
The President:
I agree.
(U)
COUFIDEN'1'IAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On: 13/1~{.Ji~~,.;.{,,-~~-~-:--~-----,:\'
~~1NTO~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY, 'f'
'.
~:~~..:;~.-,:,,:,.~:,".<;';~j_.~..:::+; .>__ :~_;'~:~.r.-.~.t.~.:. ~r'"
�CotfPIDEN'fIAL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
First, I completely agree with that. George
Mitchell believes that there can't be very much time between
what Trimble does and the movement on decommissioning. They
need to give some sort of private assurances that they can
pocket. If they can't give i t to Bertie or DeChastelain, to you
or someone.
I am beginning to get a little concerned. )k1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do whatever I can to help get
this done.
We will just have to see, but I am quite hopeful.
(,e'(
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DE~lT L""L
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�3
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's fine.
I don't mind.
I am determined not
to let this. get away_
We need this badly, and I would like to
resolve this in the first half of this year, if we can. This
will give us the momentum while all the other things are going
on.
I will do whatever you want me to.
I will do whatever it
takes. )ef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes, I told D'Alema you can do whatever you
should. We have never had a problem with the EU having a
different position than the United States. EVen going back
before my presidency, we were sponsors of the resolution leading
to the Oslo accords.
We have to sa those issues will have to
be resolved in the last phase.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
principle.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Exactl.
That is m
osition as a matter of
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
Okay, thanks.
I think you are right where you
The President:
If not, then don't
need to be.
If you think it helps, do it.
do it. ..(-e)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFI LiEN T 1AL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�CONFIDENTIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: I
~
The President:
~----------------------------------~
That is my conclusion. -fer
]
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
When is the G-7 meeting in Germany?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
In the middle of June.
The President:
You are going to do something here with the DLC,
aren't you?
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, in April.
~
The President:
Our guys are worried about it raining on NATO's
parade. We got huge press coverage here yesterday. They went
to Harry Truman's home to sign the documents for the NATO event
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. +et
Prime Minister Blair:/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Let me have a look at my schedule.
In the first
half of the year it would be extremely difficult to make a
separate trip, but if I am in Germany, maybe I can add a day
onto my trip. Where does he want me to do it, in Florence? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so.
ke1
The President: That would be a real burden, would it not?
Someone has to shoulder the responsibility.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Have you been there before?
(Q1
The President:
Yes, Hillary and I spent a wonderful week there.
As a matter of fact, it was ten years ago this week.
Y21
I love it. It is one of my favorite
Prime Minister Blair:
cities in the world.
I will think about it and get back to you.
JKJ
CONFIDEN'fIAL
�COHPIDEN'PIAL
5
The President: Good.
I think that we are in sync on the other
two matters.
I won a big vote in Congress on Kosovo.
I think
it's interesting because when the Republicans pushed for it,
they didn't think I would win it. Our guys worked very hard on
it and won a big vote with explicit authorization to deploy,
consistent with the conditions I've stated.
I feel good about
it. But I don't think there is any way that Milosevic will take
this deal.
But we believe the Kosovars will take it and then .
we will be right back
and I.
KO. 13526, section 1.4 d
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
If the Kosovars say yes, and they have been
difficult, we may even get Milosevic to the point where he will
say yes -- if we stay tough and if we are prepared to use force.
But if not, he will jerk us around. ).e1
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah, I will do that. Do you want me to buy a
cashmere sweater from him with duties? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
bananas.
.(.e)
You don't have to do that or give him
The President:
I wish we could get this resolved before your
elections, you know.
IZ5
Prime Minister Blair:
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: We got a really rough column that said this is
not what the new world order was meant to be. Kosovo goes to
hell, and we have a war over this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONPI DEN'fIAL
Do shake hands with him.
(91
�courT BEtH' L"tL
6
The President:
I thought I could have my whole wardrobe of
Scottish cashmere brought down to him.
The Irish wouldn't like
it.
Hell, I think even the Irish sweaters I have are Scotti~h.
Okay, I will see you.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, all the best to you.
End of Conversation --
COUPI DEWPIAL
(U)
�SECR]!;T
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
IS CAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 46
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 21, 1999, 12:50.- 1:12 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
How are yoU?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
I'm fine.
How were things last week?
(U)
The President:
What do you mean, last week?
Prime Minister Blair:
and everything.
jet
(U)
With the Irish -- Gerry Adams, Trimble
The President:
I'm sorry; I have been through all kinds of hell
with this Kosovo thing. You ought to get a transcript of George
Mitchell's comments to them.
I gave him a Medal of Freedom
here. He said, "I don't want to talk about what I did, but what
needs to be done." He said, "I hope that about a thousand
people will ignore me while I make these remarks to the
parties." It was devastating. He was great.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I heard he was brilliant.
~
The President:
I did exactly what you asked me to. Hell, I
don't know.
It looks to me like Gerry needs some sort of cover
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
�8ECRET
2
for demilitiariztion and then can give cover to Trimble to do
what he needs to do. ,It is important to keep pushing it
forward.
(.Q1"
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, that's what we will do.
J.Gt
The President: Anyway, I did the very best I could.
I had
chills running up and down my spine yesterday.
There is a new
book here by Daniel Silva who is a former Washington journalist.
The book is called "The Marching Season" and you are in it.
For
some reason he uses a fictitious President, but the real you.
There is an ultrasecret Protestant group and they are out there
acting against everybody -- Protestants, Catholics.
It's purely
fictional,-but it gave me the chills about what could happen if
we don't keep doing this.
I was frustrated, and I know you are,
but I don't know what else I can do.
I will do whatever.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill, thanks anyway for last week .
..(-e)
The President:
You have to table some fix for this and let us
pressure Adams to take it.
I don't think there is anything else
we can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Can we talk Kosovo? Milosevic has agreed to
meet Holbrooke. He will go over there tomorrow and tell him he
will bear the full responsibility for consequences for NATO
military action unless he does what he is told to do.
I got
reports this morning of one village of 13,000 people that has
been completely evacuated.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRE'I'
3
Primakov is supposed to come here next week, and I need to give
him a heads up so if he wants to cancel he can. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely . .....fBi
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't a ree more.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
There are one "or two issues
that I want to talk to you about'before going on, but we can
talk in the next day or two on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that.
I had a meeting with a lot
of members of congress and several Republicans said that it
sounds bad -- if he were out there practicing ethnic cleansing
again we would support it, but if we take the initiative and he
moves against the people it will look like we caused it.
(S)
Sr:CIZEI
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President:
The reason we did not take any other action is
because the peace process was going on. ~
Prime Minister Blair:/
The President:
That is what my critics here are going to say .
......l-51
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. Let me ask you this. How
are the Tories reacting at home? Are they supporting you? .-\-B1
,prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Our right wing isolationists certainly would if
they thought they could get public opinion on their side and
since they have the parliamentary majority they would cause a
problem.
The Republicans fluctuate between isolationism and
unilateral action. They want the biggest possible military and
want to spend money on only the military and concrete, but never
want to use it on anything.
I think that in the near term I am
in need of a stronger presentational argument than you are.
I
am hoping that it will be fine, I couldn't agree more that we
3ECRE'f'
�SECREr
5
need to get a strong presentation.
If the others are going with
us, we need Chirac and Schroeder saying the same thing. ~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President: Yes, I will call them when I get off the phone
with you.
I understand they are even chiding us a little bit
about whether we are moving quickly enough.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I have to call and tell him the
truth and let him stay home if he wants to. But he still needs
to come here because he needs the money and the IMF agreement
worked out.
%
Prime Minister Blair:
(S)
The President:
I am still very worried about it. And I am
worried about them because the Duma seems incapable of doing
anything positive to help themselves along.
We could save them
a lot of money if they could ratify START II.
Then I could go
immediately to START III. And then I could pass this bill to
accelerate threat reduction with the nuclear stockpile that
could occupy as many as 20,000 or half the military scientists
over the next two years. But the Duma seems incapable of doing
a lot of this stuff.
I don't think we have any choice
whatsoever. We don't want to polarize them further, but we need
to take some form of action. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You got it. One thing we have to figure out is
a strategy that will keep the money there that we pump in. All
the money disappeared in 48 hours the last time. ..(..et
Prime Minister Blair:
SEeRE'!'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
6
The President:
Why don't we plan on talking tomorrow or the
next day and we will work on Kosovo right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair.
Okay, we will be in a position to
discuss it again tomorrow. ~
The President:
Okay man. Sorry I didn't do more on Ireland,
but I tried.
I even got Trimble and Adams to sit in my private
office alone for a while.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
Well it went off very well here.
kef
The President:
I think the public vibes were very good indeed,
but I didn't have the feeling that I helped you move the ball
forward on the substance of it. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Prime MInIs er Blair:
.~I
________________________________------------~
The President:
I don't think Gerry wants it to get off the
tracks and that is heartening.
I know damn well Trimble does
not, but he wants his leadership position as well.
(e)
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~/
The President:
If you could have a referendum on this, the
people could come up with 15 permutations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
That's another thing I thought about.
I think
the IRA people with personal history have a lot more ideology on
this whole decommissioning issue than the facts warrant. They
seem to think that if they unilaterally do this, it is like
saying that what the struggle is all about and what they said
all those years is illegitimate. They are loading a lot of crap
that does not need to be loaded. The only way to get off the
psychological hook is to make it part of a bigger disarmament or
find some proposal people could ratify and let their reps off
the hook.
The atmospherics seem great, but I didn't have any
specifics that I could glean.
I don't see Trimble having a
viable option.
I did not mean to be so negative but I don't
SECRE'F
�7
3ECREl'
think Sinn Fein thinks they can say different words and make it
happen. I don't think words alone will do it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All right man.
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(C)
The President:
I agree. If there is a problem with Chirac or
Schroeder I will have to call you back.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am here.
Bye, Tony.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
�TH E WH ITE HOUSE:
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph Sigler and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 23, 1999, 5:11-5:22 p.m. EST
The Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
I'm in Berlin.
(U)
The President:
I know, Gerhard just told me you were there.
Holbrooke is on his way back. Milosevic stiffed him. He
wouldn't agree to a cease-fire. He was belligerent and it seems
to me he's strongly poised to unleash reater violence in
Kosovo.
I want to talk about two things: first, Pri~akov has postponed
his visit to Washington. I think that's the best outcome given
the circumstances. Maybe you can call him in the next day or
two and tell him you understand why he didn't come to
Washington.
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
SECl":t!:T
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
3/23/0_9~,c~~,~ __~---~(
r"...A,?.::-.----,"~- .. ~;::--,:.
.
,'
J
'~:r~~LffiRA~~ PtlO:OCOPy__
"----:~ ;-~-:.:..:;-,-=- ;; ..--.,...'~ .-,:",~: -': '-.... --,.-~---."-,:;----'-~-.---.' -
,""
�2
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
\
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: \
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
/
The President:
Yes, we sat around the room today saying, "Geez,
this is re~11y bad. We could lose what we did in Bosnia but we
have no option." If we don't, he will just clean them out, kill
a bunch of people and do bad things.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
SECRE'f
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
L-~IE=.=O=.1=3=52=6=,s=e=ct=io=n=1.=4(=b=)(::::d)::!....I_...J1 ~
Is Jacques there with you, or is Jospin there?
( C)
Prime Minister Blair:
The
~resident:
They are both in Berlin, yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did it go over well in Europe?
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it went over very well.
said it was ver effective.
Our media
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I am completely there and knew you would be too.
I
Prime Minister Blair:
I "0.13526,
""'0" 1.4(d)
Okay, I will speak to him about that.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRf:T
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I couldn't agree more.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
There have never been any natural boundaries.
couldn't agree more. ~
I
. Prime Minister Blair: We will make strong points and I will
speak to D'Alema and Chirac tomorrow. ~
The President:
Great, if you want to call me any time of the
day or night, call me.
I don't expect to sleep much tonight.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Tougher than Iraq isn't it?
~
The President: Yeah. They have better air defenses and we have
people in the vicinity that are vulnerable. The stakes are high
but the potential benefits are enormous. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I hope Milosevic can find a way out. He
compares it to the Ottoman Empire and how they stopped them In
Bosnia, and now he stands up to the Empire of the West.
It is
crazy.
()21
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - - The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
All right, Bill.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'f
(U)
�.
.
SECRE'f
.'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee, Jim Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 30, 1999, 6:12 - 6;24 p.m. EST
Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hey Tony.
(U)
How are you doing?
Are you sleepy?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
doesn' t it?
yzi
Not much sleep in Northern Ireland.
(U)
Kind of makes you long for the Albanians,
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty much.
How is it going there?
The President:
I think your statements have been
seem to have a real consensus.
reat.
We
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes, I agree with that. They're all saying
maybe we didn't think it through, but we didn't have all the
time in the world.
,sECElli:T
Reason:
1 . 5 ( a, b, d)-
Declaosify On"
1
' . , ._" ___ 0~·--~~""
4/~~::::~CPHO:OCOPY
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fC)
�2
SECR!!:!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I urge you to keep briefed on this issue on particulars, in part
because we are being nickeled and dimed on some of the details
by the Allies. My instinct is to go on for maximum
effectiveness. ~
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We need them over here.
The President:
Where? -+€T
ye)
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
L - - I_
Who were they?
_
_
---:----~
Are they living in London now, or Albania?
Prime Minister Blair:
]
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Can you have your people send the names to our
people so we know who they are? I want to stage a meeting here
to give them some American publicity. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
I will put that in train.
Alright, where are we on Ireland?
-+er~
�SECRE'!'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Why?
What is their argument?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is the IRA excuse for not doing it?
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
\
The President:
How can it be surrender when the war is over?
-teT
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
'--------_--..1
The President:
3ECRE'!'
And they don't buy that?
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�gECRE'f
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Do you want me to caI1 Gerry?
-+e-r
I
~
\~--------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to call Adams?
Prime Minister Blair:
time is it now?
I think it's worth calling him.
(91
The President:
there? ..ke7
ye1
It's getting late.
Prime Minister Blair:
even now. j.eJ
What
What is it, twelve-thirty
It's probably not too late to call him
The President: But in no case no later than tomorrow.
see what I can do. k€1
OK, I'll
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
~--------------~
The President: All he ever wanted was an aggravated bonfire.
To all of us linear thinkers it doesn't seem like much of a big
deal. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It doesn't look like surrender if you have all
these people involved being let out of prison and all the others
are involved. It's crazy. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I.
£EGRET
, \\
INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY •L
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'k-:;:2~~~?~~~~~::;':,-:"j~c.::~\':·~;:;. ~).:~,_~~~.:;" __·:?-:.:_<fF.......::1t: _,"
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SECRE't'
, iE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) i
The President:
What are you offering?
What is Bertie offering?
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's got to be harder for them.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, I will follow up and give you a
have to call you tomorrow anyway.
Thanks, Tony. )K1
Okay, thank you.
(U)
End of Conversation --
SECRET
~:"~_~~::'--~_ -~O~~--~--·~:~\
';<~~~~~,LIB~YPHOTOCO,PY,_J
-..:.....,-.-.~-z~<...--,- "-.-,:,"_-:-":0>- .,-;-.:,.,._J._-t...r.'-"-_......:o_~.:-.• __ ._,~ .,
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1':1
Prime Minister Blair:
report~
1
�· GONFIDEHTIAJ:j
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair arid
Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Prime Minister Ahern
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Bob Ford and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 6:32 - 6:38 a.m. EST
The Residence
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DEN'f IAL
Reason: 1.5(d
Declassify On
�COUFIDEN1'IAL
2
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Ahern:
\
Prime Minister Blair:
I
Prime Minister Ahern: /
The President:
It's naIve for them to beiieve you can have a
break or a pause or wait for Easter without this thing getting
out. It's not possible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Prime Minister Ahern:
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
night?
(U)
No, no, It's all right.
Prime Minister Blair:
up.
(U)
You have problems.
Have you been up all
I gather you've been
The President:
Tony, what are you going to do the rest of the
day?
Are you going to bed?
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
,-
�'CO~IFIDEN'fViL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: ,r may want to talk to you on a secure line later
to tell you where I think things got off track a bit and what we
need to do now.
I don't have it all sorted out but would really
like to talk to you, because we really cannot afford to be
defeated on it. Let me talk to Gerry. 'The main thing is to let
you publish this thing if you pause for reflection. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Let me call him back.
Prime Minister Ahern:
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation
cmlFI DEN'fIAL
�3EeRE'!'
I,S2-THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Jenny McGee and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April I, 1999, 7:03 - 7:12 a.m. EST
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, hi Bill.
(U)
Have you talked to Adams since I talked to you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
No.
(U)
IL____~I=E=.O==.1=3=5=26=,=se=c=ti=on==1.=4=(d=)=_________~1(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Well done, Bill.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: A week from Tuesday we'll have a celebration,
but we'll probably need it by then.
I never thought I'd ever be
longing for the problems of Northern Ireland. ~
CONFIDEN'I'IAL
Reason: 1.5(a.b,d)
Declassify On
4~~_~--' ~_O' ~,
-i -~T~~ L;~RARY PHOTOCOPY' '}.
~':o'~~.-~~-:-_~_.:_ -...';.. =-.:-__~ '__ -..-:,;- _'_, '. ,,- ~
•
�2
We had another bad night weather-wise. I should go out a little
more. There was a good article in the New York Times. I don't
know if you saw it but it talked about what a good job you've
done making the case in Britain. Although we're at about 58
percent, but having these guys arrested and beat up may not be
so ood.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime
Blair:
/
~--------------------~
The
the
hit
hit
our
President: The press today has got this big article saying
CIA tried to tell us he would accelerate his attacks if we
him. Hell, we knew that but that's an argument for having
him 30 -day s earlier. I t
;::.-,-,h""i~n,""k,--"w:..;:e=-'-,r"-,e",--"-",o~n",n",a,--,h.:.:a=-v"-e",--",t""o---->t,-,,a,-,l,-,k-,--,,,",,,-_--,
allies on where we are.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Are you having to run all these targets by your
Attorney General? k8f
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'-------------)
The President: Holbrooke believes strongly we should be hitting
the media, power grids, and oil stuff with little collateral
damage. Shutting down the TV networks will have an impact.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECREl'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
The President:
The refineries. I approved all that stuff.
There is some chance of collateral damage, but it seems to me
really.remote. }81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We may need to examine if anything can be done
in the daytime, too. k8f
Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Tell you what I'll do. I have a meeting on this
in about two hours time, and will fly down to Norfolk to see the
troops, which I certainly need to do now that three of our guys
have been apprehended.
We are torn between doing something to
keep the alliance unified or do something that works.
I will
check back in and ca 1 1 you 1 ater today. You and I have to talk
this thing through. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:!
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Well.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
(U)
I'm around anytime you want, Bill.
Thanks, Tony.
(U)
(U)
�4
3ECRE'±
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
(U)
Alright Tony, we'll talk.
-- End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�£ECRE'l'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Sean Tarver, James
Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 1, 1999, 3:54 - 4;04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
get any sleep?
Hi, Bill.
Hi and excuse me.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
Did you
Prime Minister Blair: Not yet, but hoping to.
God, these
negotiations are a nightmare, but thanks so much for the help.
(U)
The President:
I hope I did help and Sinn Fein will start
negotiations.
The initial spin on it was okay. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like we got permission tonight from all
the NATO guys to do most of what we wanted to do, but I wanted
to say that I think we need better procedures here.
They tell
me Wes Clark is spending half or more than half his time every
day trying to schmooze the Allies. There should be'a mor
orderly way to pick the targets and vet them.
don't think we want to be in a position where every
I have to make six phone calls to ramp things up . ,r
,sECRET
Reason:
1.5(a.b,~l
, " ..
Declassify On:!
' .
<
. ' --=------ ---_. ""
<
_
<
4/~,..-~q-:,--~. ~ .•.
. ' .''','
,~";.' . ' 1m-ON LLBRARY PHOTOCOPY .,' i,
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
j81
The President: A lot of people knew what they were going to be
and were preparing for the~, so one of our fighter groups had to
turn around and come back. j81
Prime Minister Blair:
My God.
}21
The President:
That's why we keep this close.
I am not
accusing anybody, these are just the facts.
But the more people
that know, you increase exponentially the potential for leaks or
intercepted conversations, anything of that kind. So we need to
try to keep this closehold.
(5)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
�3
3ECRE'f'
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I will have Sandy follow up with your guys and
we will figure out who contacts whom. We'll talk to Solana and
get a new·procedure approved. We need to approve targets
quickly and hit them. We need to be relaxed about this,
determined but relaxed. We're not in a panic.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If it looks like we're afraid someone is going
to wimp out on us, we would never get a decent deal.
~
Prime-Minigter Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We've unsettled him some. We've had some
substantial strikes. We're not where we need to be yet, but we
need to keep after it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes. And it would be very well received here;
we cannot act like we're bombing timidly and making a plea for
peace.
That's not a position we can afford to be in. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That we have to hit them harder.
In fact, a
couple of senators have come out in favor of ground troops.
Though that could be a Trojan Horse. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We'll have our people come up with a strategy
for who you and I should call.
I will call Schroeder to see if
he will agree to a new procedure on target setting.
This is too
slow; we are encumbered by weather now, but as a practical
measure you will have more influence with Europeans than I will.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d) I
I
We can't afford to have Clark spending half his day, every day
trying to get approval to do his job rather than doing his job.
DEeRE'!'
�SE'CRE'F
4
e re on an open l~ne, so I don't want to
get into details, but we have gotten in a position now where we
can really, with the weather cooperating, do some more things
and get some more results.
I think it is quite important, and
it's an acceptable agreement if we don't have to keep slashing
awa. We've got to show real strength and impact here. )...S1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
\
I agree.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright.
Thanks.
121
I
I
~-------------------~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am happy to do it.
It's lasted so long that I
yz)
may miss it when it's gone. But I doubt it.
Prime Minister Blair:/
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Goodbye. -tel
We'll have our people work out strategy.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
agCRET
�§E:CRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matthew Sibley, James Smith, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 5, 1999, 1:50 - 2:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
The President:
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'm okay. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
this is important, it helps with the efficacy issue.
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On:! 4/91J),§>,,-_~,;.;:"·--'~-·-• ~ ...
__
-.
_
_
.
. . . . .---'--'--:..~ _ _ -7-'".~_
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C~~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY' -
·t
'~~~:":>~~,,:::~"-~-.-3-·~.h_>~.~~~;::_ -.~:-.__ ._\~).",,~).
~
�SECRET
Presentationally,
2
I think you are right.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that, but I don't think we are
quite ready to say it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree. You can be sure all these offers he
makes will not meet that standard. More and more of the
Europeans are of the mind that we may have some definitional
problems down the road.
I'd like to talk about two things that
are related.
One is the refugee issue.
It seems to me we are
doing a little bit better, with NATO taking the lead organizing
with Macedonia and Albania. But we have got to do more and
quickly in finding places to resettle them and the conditions of
their return.
Different countries have different conditions,
camps. J.&r
I don't know, but I know we have to create a release valve to
take the pressure off Albania and Macedonia.
We're increasing economic assistance to
countries bearing the greatest burden.
I hope we
others as we can, but the
offers out now. We don't
their borders and cause a
SECRE'f
can get as many concrete offers from
most important thing is to get those
want Albania and Macedonia to close
worse situation.
~
�4
3ECRE'f
The other thing I wanted to mention is I am quite concerned
about Russia's growing involvement,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We have to make it clear we understand this is a
political problem for them, and we don't mind them jumping on
us, but they shouldn't have military support that will put our
pilots and our forces at risk. We can't act as if there are no
consequences to that. -k81
Another issue that we're trying to work on is that surrounding
countries need to thoroughly inspect all the Russian shipments
going into Kosovo to make sure they are not violating the arms
. embargo.
I am concerned about that.
I think the military
situation is in pretty good shape,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This is an open line; we have to be careful what
we say. You and I have discussed this before. _ (£)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that. The problem we are having
here is whether we're taking people in Guantamano or the
continental United States, then they like it and say they don't
SECRE'l'
f·
�SECRE'l'
5
Will they want to go home, once they've seen
Blair:
The President:
I understand the problem. On the other hand, we
have to take enough pressure off Macedonia and Albania so they
don't close the borders to keep their countries from coming
apart. Talk to your folks.
On one level, I'd like to take 100
thousand and put them in America tomorrow and run the risk of
saying people don't want to go home. On another level/ I don't
want any. They might like it here and not want to leave.
(ef
Prime-Minister Blair:
J
The President:
I agree with that.
I wonder if our public
affairs people should talk specifically to each other.
ke1
Prime Minister Blair.:
]
The President:
Let's see if we can get this organized.
would make a huge difference. ~
It
Prime Minister Blair:/
~
L - - - -_
_
~
_
The President:
Let's have our own media people talking. We can
offer to have all 19 join the conference call.
If not, we ought
to have the major countries agreed.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
5ECRE1'
Je1
'r--------------------------------------------
I couldn't agree more.
7
okay, that's good.
)91
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SgCRgT
6
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I do, too, but we have a ways to go.
People can
say to us you don't have a clear strategy, but we have had clear
goals, but you have got to have the proper mix of long-term
goals and enough flexibility to deal with day-to-day realities.
Getting our presentation a little better has helped some, with the clearing of the weather, the targeting process being worked
out.
I thought your memo was terrific, by the way. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Absolutely. We've got that here.
They would be
calling people traitors, now they all join in. Everybody is a
Monday morning quarterback.
The right is saying you should have
ground forces in there. Some people think I'm on the receiving
end of a Trojan horse, that it's a.deliberate set-up. But we
have to take it as it comes and be determined we will not be
defeated, that we will run this strategy out. But under no
circumstances are we going to be defeated.
If you tell me that,
and I tell you that, and we hold hands. ~
Now, let me say one other thing. We had good news on Lockerbie,
with the suspects arriving in the Netherlands.
Thanks for
everything you did on that.
This is great. We got the
sanctions lifted, suspended for 90 days, but Libya will have to
do more to get them lifted permanently. But this is a pretty
good day for us since last August; it's a good argument for
staying the course against terrorism in the long run. You going
to follow up on the NATO PR thing and get back to us -- to Sandy
or someone else -- to see how we coordinate our daily message?
-+BY
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'¥
�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with British Prime
Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley,
Robert Ford, Robin Rickard, Lawrence Butler
and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 10, 1999, 1:31 -- 1:S0 p.m. EDT
Residence
The President:
Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
Are you still in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, I am back in Chequers now.
(U)
with Jose Maria Aznar.
The President:
days.
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
wishes.
(U)
The President:
I am
He is coming to see me in a couple of
He was telling me to send you his best
Are they happy in Scotland?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, a lot happier in Scotland and you
will be getting any amount of cashmere that you want.
(U)
The President:
What I want, is that when I am done here to be
made an honorary UK citizen and give me a seat from Scotland
next door to a good golf course. The daily papers today are
filled with China being pissed off and Russia threatening war.
SECRET
Reason: 1.S(a,b,d)
.
Declassify On:
4/12~_ =,;,r'-~"----'-'-=-~~"\!-:
.
,
~:~~~_~IBRA~YPHOTOC~~~;_J .. :
~~:".:;.>o:,-,:-::~.:,;;:;;-.,-"",,"~->';.. '-.--:;::
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SECREr
If you want, you can give me citizenship and make me a Brit.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You are one very popular man there.
I hope that it helps in the elections.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It has helped, Thanks for seeing Donald
Leu as well.
What it has done is to emphasize to the people
that sometimes it is useful to be part of something bigger. ~
The President:
Yes, I believe that.
We don't have time to talk
about this today, but when you are here -- I want you to think
about something between now and then -- we have to figure out
how to resolve this stupid banana thing. But the real thing is
that the Caribbean is in. bad shape economically.
I would like
to get a bill through that would treat them like Mexico in
exports.
It would help them a lot if the United states, and if
not the entire EU, then the French, Dutch, and British and
everybody that had some presence there could think about setting
up a joint effort for the long-term development strategy . . We
all have limited money, but if we coordinate it we could
leverage it.
Think about what we could do to help them
diversify their economies. We could try to improve their
economies, increase tourism and personal income, and reduce
their vulnerabilities to the narco-traffickers. Get them to
where they are not completely dependent on bananas. Anyway,
there has never been anything like this in this part of the
world where all the countries with ownership or colonization of
these islands coordinated together.
I think that this is a
third way deal, and I bet we could get some other Europeans
interested.
I don't know if the French would help. The Dutch
might be interested. Some of the Europeans might be interested.
We might think about doing something like that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
That's right. The EU is wrong on the trade
issue but right on the general concern for the Caribbean. The
EU is in the right on the larger economic well being, on the
longer-term interests of the Caribbean. lef
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
SEeRE'!'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
In Central America they are all concerned, I
was just down there and talked to all these guys. They are
sensitive because of the hurricane. What few bananas they have,
they want to sell.
I told them we will help them get through
this, but that we would have to diversify their economies too .
.J.Zi
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
The Central Americans. and the Caribbeans sound
like a boys school argument. They ought to be thinking about
making common cause and not pissing down each others' leg to see
who has the biggest bananas. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
____________~1
~
The President:
OK, on Kosovo, just want to check in and
reconnoiter where we are. We had greater military impact with
the air actions.
I think if we could do a couple more weeks I
think that we could really have it. The G-8 statement is good.
Have you received the report on the G-8 ministers? We are
hoping to get a statement here involving the Russians.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Ll_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The President:
That was good. Madeleine is going to see Ivanov
on Tuesday or Wednesday.
I also think that Kofi gave a good
statement.
k81
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: He is a little miffed, though maybe that's too
strong a word, disappointed maybe or concerned that neither of
us have put out a statement on it.
I told him that you were in
Scotland and that I was preoccupied with the Chinese. I think
that we ought to put one out now because he is out in Europe
now.
There are two things we need to think about.
One is
whether any economic pressures could be put on Milosevic that
don't hurt the Macedonians and the Montenegrens too badly.
I
have a list of things, maybe cutting down on their money
laundering in Cyprus and putting the squeeze on their London
accounts.
I don't want to cause the Montenegrins any trouble.
I will get that list to you today and let you guys look at it
�· SECRET
4
and respond to it. Any time that I try to get our banks to do
something the Treasury Department gets squirrelly on me.
It is
always a fight with those guys.
I would like to send you this
list and let you evaluate it. ~
We have to decide whether we want to have a more aggressive
diplomatic initiative and if so, how to intensify the military
action to enhance the likelihood that diplomatic efforts will
succeed, assuming we can achieve all our ob'ectives that Kofi
signed off on and bring Russia into it.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
It may turn
out to be, a bigger problem for me than you.
It assumes that we
can achieve our political objectives because Milosevic doesn't
want to get the hell bombed out of him and have Apaches on top
of his tanks.
If you assume -- the one downside is that we are
facing a lot of hurdles -- if you assume that all of our stated
objectives are achievable if we intensify our bombing campaign
without actually toppling Milosevic. Then it seems to me that
there will be some kind of diplomatic agreement for an
international force that will include Russian participation.
They will push Milosevic back when he says who can and cannot be
part of it.
I think that it will be difficult to have NATO as
NATO participate.
The problem this creates for us is Somalia.
J.8J
I don't want to take too much time going over this now but this
is a big problem for us. We went through this in Somalia when
the UN took over command and control. We had a messy deal
during the first part of the Administration. We stayed on in
Somalia when the UN took it over and it was a messy deal.
I
lost some American boys over there and one of them was dragged
naked through the streets of Mogadishu. We made some mistakes
there in what we did and did not do. We basically had serious
command and control problems where the Americans were supposed
to do two things -- the same things we'd have to do if it were a
non-NATO force in Kosovo -- in Somalia we were supposed to be
there doing humanitarian relief and act as a mUltinational peace
force.
One of the factional leaders who since has died, killed
a bunch of Pakistani peacekeepers -- something like 15-20. We
were the only presence there that had the capabilities to figure
out who did it and to go and get him. So the UN wanted us and
tasked us to go and get him, Aideed. The UN tasked us to do
that while doing humanitarian relief. They tasked our guys to
go'into a hotel and get him. Our guys landed on the top of a
hotel in the middle of the day -- he got away and then all of a
SECRS'!'
�5
GECRE'P
sudden more than 300 Somalis started shooting at them.
It is
the sort of thing that if NATO had been doing it, it would have
been totally different:
there would have been different command
and control arrangements, armor and artillery.
So there is
still a lingering bad taste.
I have a lot of support in
. Congress right now.
There is even more than before the Gulf
War. More and more in Congress are saying that they are in
favor of ground troops if we had to put them in there. And I am
telling you this in advance, if you could help me on this
because it is your guys' necks, too.
If they say NATO can
participate, but not as NATO, instead as the UN, we have this
awful memory of Somalia. We would also need the serious command
and control issues to be worked out. We did not have these
problems in Bosnia.
It worked like a charm once NATO went in
and the Russians came in with us. We only had to make an
amendment to the NATO issue.
Does that make sense? kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
This was the lowest point of my presidency.
It
was a goddamned nightmare.
I felt personally responsible for
that kid's body being dragged through the streets. So I see
this as a practical measure about k2.eping people alive. We were
prepared to take risks. We had all these glitches because of
the command and control problems. The Russians are allergic to
NATO and Milosevic is allergic to NATO. Keep in mind Tony, I
know you know this, if we go in, we can't go in with one foot.
If we get a multi-national force we have to go in at least with
the commitment to protect the Serbs in Kosovo at a minimum as
well as the Kosovar Albanians. There is enormous grass roots
support right now for the freedom fighters.
This will be a big
force protection issue -- command and control will be critical
with huge political implications. We may have all kinds of
problems where we have both sides pissed at us.
They will be
politically important as well in any country.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will send you the list of economic sanctions. We
will look like assholes at the garden party if we don't make
SECRE'f
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�SECRE'l'
6
sure that everybody understands that NATO means keeping our
people alive.
i&1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
The President:
It is horrible.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
We need to talk on a secure line or talk when
you get here.
There are arguments both for it and arguments
against it.
We will need to look at in the context of where it
is going to be five years from now. We need to keep our crowd
together and keep at him and get a diplomatic solution with a
mechanism that includes the UN and Russia.
I will follow up on
this.
I am in the country all next week and will get that
economic list out to you. Tell Jose Maria I said hello. Did
you show him Napoleon's pistol and Charles' sword? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I took him to Rothschild House today to
see the most amazing works of art.
(U)
The President:
I want to get there.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You must come back.
(U)
The President:
I will come back to t'he Scottish golf course.
You were the best first-timer that I ever saw play.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
keep in touch.
(U)
The President:
Joking apart, thanks for cashmere.
Thank you, find me a safe seat in a golf cart.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, good-bye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRE'E'
Let's
�£ECREf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti,
Frank Jarosinski, James Smith,
Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME:
The President:
April 14, 1999, 1:56 - 2:14 p.m. EDT,
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
fortunately.
Go on.
(U)
Hi, Bill .
This is a secure line,
.JRl"
The President:
Yes.
First of all, I didn't mean to take you
out of a meeting there, but I thought it was important I talk to
you as soon as possible. Aznar was here last night and he was
really good, and I know he is there.
181
Wes Clark asked for another 300 airplanes, and we've got these
Apaches corning in, but the truth is we're just going to have
more and more planes filling the air and restriking old targets
or hoping the weather gets better so we can hit tanks and
soldiers, unless we can get into Phase III targets. We have got
to make these people start paying a higher price. ~
~
was hoping while you're there, you and Aznar could convince
~____~Ito give Clarke and Solana the authority to strike a wider
range of targets.
That would require hitting national level
headquarters, military-industrial targets, the TV towers (which
he has resisted), some of the presidential targets, the power
plants, the Socialist Party headquarters, which also has a
radio-TV broadcasting facility there.
I really believe we are
making a mistake not .turning the heat up on these guys. )-21
SEeR]!!'f
Reason:
1.5 (Q., q)
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I have also been urged by our people to look at preventative
action against some targets in Montenegro.
I know I
I
doesn't want to hit there, but even I
Isaid there were
some things we ought to be hitting. Let me give you an example
or two:
there are several facilities where we think they are
moving in to take their missiles out; in and around the ports in
Montenegro; there's one critical bridge we need to take out,
before they start moving their military units.
So we're quite
worried about their ability to use these facilities.
There are
not a lot of targets and not a lot of risk of civilian damage,
But it's even more important we get to Phase I I I targets within
Serbia.
I know there'll be collateral damage and some
controversy, but if we want any chance of a solution soon, we
have to turn the heat up. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
SECRE'f'
That's what I want to do.
~
�SECRET
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I completely agree.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECREr
�I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
:SECRE!
4
The President:
Let's talk about all the points you've made.
First of all, we're agreed on targets.
On fuel and other
things, we are now banning Yugoslav ships from our ports and the
export and reexport of goods to Yugoslavia.
I hope you can
succeed in tightening EU exports, freezing government and
private projects and the assets of the leadership. You and I
should propose NATO search ships going into Yugoslav ports to
make sure there's no arms or fuel. 121
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Agreed.
(U)
On presentation, Solana is not there, is he?
Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
~
'-------~
The President:
Do you want to send someone in? I think there
would be some resentment if I sent an American over there.
Maybe we should talk to Solana and have him ask for more help on
presentation? Do you have someone you can deputize? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We've had to start doing a lot more of our
briefings, because they are so ineffective.
(.8f
Prime Minister Blair:
They start off every day at 3 or 4 o'clock, and the press
conference sometimes goes on for an hour or an hour and a half,
literally answering all their questions.
k&t
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
£ECRET
�3ECRE't'
The
him
5
Shouldn't we talk to Solana personally and get
how do we get this done? What's your
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I would support that strongly, and then he could
do the conference call every day, your guy.
keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
I am completely agreed.
Should we call
Solana separately or together. Separately.
I will tell him we
discussed this, I think your take is right and ask him to work
with you on it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is great, Bill.
(U)
Call me after you talk to Chirac and Schroeder.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I will call
ou back.
The President:
That's why I agreed to do this. With all the
problems, I figured you wouldn't have 19 elected officials with
their asses hanging out to dry. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
\L-_ _ _ _ _~~
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
SECRE'P
�6
SECRE'f
The President:
You've got a deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President.:
(U)
Alright, Bill.
(U)
And on the economic things,
you support them?
.Aef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
Alright.
One hundred percent.
I will get on it.
-- End of Conversation --
3ECRE'l'
~
~
�SEGREg:'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I NGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair
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(U)
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
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Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Tom Crowell,
James Smith, Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
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Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
Riqht.
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
straight ahead. fer
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Fine.
I'll call him tomorrow.
(U)
We'll get clearance on that and go
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April 14, 1999, 6:28 - 6:31 p.m. EDT
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The President:
2
Good.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: On presentation and structure. I will
speak to Solana tomorrow, and I think it would be good if you
did, too. J81
The President:
Do you want to call first?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I'd be happy to do that.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
It's a deal. After you talk to him, have
someone c~11our office and then I'll call him. That's great.
J,e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We'll speak soon.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
��2
COMFI DEN!'!:' IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
\~~
]
__~~~~~~~~~__~~~~r-I-t
was a terrible thing, but in the Gulf War, we had soldiers
killed by friendly fire where the Americans and British were.
So even in a relatively small conflict, these kinds of things
happen. We can't lose the forest for the trees.
(£1
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
That's what I said yesterday.
I was very strong
with the newspaper editors -- you know I completely agree with
you. We're on the same page. We'll get the briefing sorted out
there.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I'll tell you what I have done.
I have
done a note, which is longish, which sets out all my thoughts,
concerns, suggestions on this, on everything we are doing.
If
it's okay with you, I will fax it over to you on a secure fax .
.ket
The President:
Good.
Are we going to get together on Thursday?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think.
(U)
The President:
Do you want to spend the night at the White
House? Or at Blair House, if you want.
I won't get in until 1
a.m., and you may want to be in bed by then, but it's your
option. You can sleep in the same bed Churchill did. +&T
Prime Minister Blair:
I hope it's appropriate.
(U)
The Presiden-t: As long as you don't parade around naked before
the bath. You're too young and too trim.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm getting older in this bloody job.
Bill, that is great, and then we can meet Thursday mornin .
will get this information over to
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
there Tuesday to tal k
CONFIDEN'fLAL
�3
CONFIDEN'l'IAL
to people, and to SACEUR as well, to get a real fix on what is
happening before the summit.
)Q1
The President:
That's a very good idea. When you come here,
I'd like to develop a strategy on how to work with the others,
including some of the smaller countries.
I think a little
effort on the side could get us a strong voice in making those
folks feel included. Between the two of
I think we can
touch most people . . ,.all of that ... I
E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I probably need to call him.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That is what I think.
In Detroit, we had 40,000
Albanians and a whole bunch of Serbs. The Albanians were
outside demonstrating, and I said we have no fight with the
Serbian people; they were our allies in World War II and most
don't have a clue what Milosevic has done in their name in
Kosovo.
I said that was the proper way to express disagreement,
not by killing. We have to be upbeat and resolute.
It is
important to be determined, but not too damned grim, either. We
have to keep spirits up. We're in this world where people
expect instantaneous results. We need to act like this started
the day before yesterday and not twenty years ago. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you want me to do any more, like talking to
I thought it would be less
Solana or Wes Clark, let me know.
abrasive to everybody if I didn't lead the charge, and it seems
to have worked out well; but I'll be happy to follow up. +eY
COlQ'FIDEH'I'IAL
�4
COlH'IDEM'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure that's right. There's no reason to
believe these people are trained to deal with this situation.
J..0"
Prime Minister Blair: That's totally right.
This is a
situation they haven't dealt with before. ~
The President:
We will plan on being together on Thursday.
You
decide whether Blair House is more convenient.
It probably will
be fQr your retinue, but you can stay here and put another aide
upstairs if you want.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is really kind, Bill.
I will get
this note to you on secure fax, and probably we should have a
word over the weekend on the secure phone. ~
The President: Alright, we'll do that.
I understand we made a
little progress on those operational changes you and I wanted
and I am a little encouraged by that.
k8t
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think if we really work we can
unblock any obstacles there. We still know where the difficult
points are. ~
The President: We're finally getting some indication they're
feeling it and there's a lot of internal debate within the high
councils. That is important and we need to bear down.
I will
get your fax, and we will talk over the weekend. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Best of luck in Detroit.IU)
I'll see you next week.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
IU)
IU)
End of Conversation
COHFIDEN'PH'W
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
...
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Miles Murphy,
James Smith, Lawrence Butler and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
April 29, 1999, 5:22 - 5:43 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Fine, how are you?
(U)
The President:
Great.
I thought your trip went very well, and
everyone loved the DLC event we did later.
So I think your trip
went great.
I called to follow up a little bit on the memo you
gave me and what we're doing here.
Let me make three or four
points to respond to your memo and tell you what we are doing,
then we can talk about whatever else we need to. ~
First, on your statement I
I E.O.13526, section 1.4(d) I
We've got a small group working to develop an integrated
strategic plan that will merge our military and strategic
objectives and focus on putting pressure on Milosevic,' his
cronies, integrating military targets, covert action,
psychological operations and public affairs. And it is my
understanding we're already in touch with you. We'll have a
detailed plan ready sometime this weekend and share it with your
people. We will coordinate two to three times a week in a
telephone conference with people in a group led by John Sawers
and Sandy Berger.
So, we'll deal with that issue.
J81
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
SECRET
Reason:
1.5 (a, b, d)
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affairs thing is in much better shape now; the war room you and
I set up has a 24-hour capability and a rapid-response element,
and I think Joe and Alistair are talking two or three times a
day, including~ith the people in Brussels.
I think that's good
and we're trying to bring in the guy who used to work as my
communications director to work our operation here for 30 days
to make sure we've melded our political and diplomatic efforts
together. On all those areas, we're doing pretty well. JBf
Prime Minister Blair:
That sounds great.
(U)
The President:
The last item you raised is the need to do joint
planning on the ground force option.
I personally believe it
can be done under the umbrella of the assessment. As I told
you, we're working with our guys; they're so afraid it will
leak. We have to work through it, because there's no point in
doing this in detail unless we know how it will mesh together.
I will keep working on that, but I think we've made reasonable
progress on what we discussed and I wanted to see where you are
on that.
.k51
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If he means we won't assassinate him
or bomb him or extract him from Serbia, I think we can make that
commitment.
I don't think we can make a public commitment on
war crimes, because that is an independent body. Louise Arbour
is here, by the way. ~
I said we're cooperating with the tribunal, so that is a more
difficult issue. He's looking for some assurance, but that's a
pretty dicey thing.
So, that's all I have to report.
I do
think Chernomyrdin has the bit in his teeth to do something, but
whether he can, I don't know.
They are very anxious to playa
role in a diplomatic settlement and go in with their troops.
~
�SECRET
3
One other point:
the Russians might want to be in an area of
Kosovowhere the Serbs are dominant in population.
I said I
personally had'-no problems, as long as the Russians had a hard
and fast commitment to protect the Kosovars.
I had never
discussed this with the American people, not one time, without
saying that if the United States has a role, it will be
providing protection to the Serb minority as well as the
Kosovar/Albanian majority.
vn
The second thing -- and Sandy raised the red flag on this -- I
asked him to make it clear to Chernomyrdin that having Russians
and Greeks, Ukrainians, or other Orthodox denominations could
not become a de facto partition, because the EU has taken a
strong position on this, as has the United States and as has
NATO. As long as there's no partition, I think we could work
that out. Basically, that's a read-out of what D'Alema said.
ft}
Prime Minister Blair: Right. That is very helpful, Bill.
First, I think on the bit with the press side, and NATO and
SHAPE working together, we have a lot of people working well
with your people. That is working better and will get better
still. On the military side, I think that is great, to help
SACEUR with what he is doing. On the video conferencing, I
think that's fine.
The thing to do is have a constant updating
of all the different issues so they know exactly where we are,
feeding through the information we are getting to your guys, and
vice versa. ~
The President:
I agree.
j,21
Prime Minister Blair: On the ground troop thing:
I understand
all the problems, and we don't want this to start running in the
press and everything. We have done some work we are fairly
confident of, ~a~n~d~~~~~u~s~w~i~l~l~h~a~v~e~t~o~~e~t~i~n~t~o~u~c~h~a~s~~o~u~__,
want, reall .
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
So that is my only worry, is
not to get caught by the winter.
~
The President: Yes, I'm watching the calendar pretty closely.
We're back to the efficacy argument here.
The public in
America, in the latest survey yesterday, is against ground
troops; it supports bombing, but doesn't think it will work.
I
think whatever I decide is right, we can go forward with.
I
03ECRE'f
�SECRE'f
4
think what we don't want to do is not do what we need to do in
terms of planning. They're asking when this will be over.
I
looked at the weather map and said, "May is better than April,
and June is be'Eter than May, and July is better than June."
That had the right effect. It wasn't lost on them, to talk
about how the weather is getting better.
(81
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it is important, also.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
I don't know. I just don't know. We have to
wait and see.
We may have to talk again before the weekend is
over, when we see how he does.
We'll have to wait and see.
My guess is Milosevic will offer a little more tomorrow, but not
enough, and then come back and say, "How about a pause in
bombing?" He's still trying to stiff the Alliance. ~
I want you to think about two things with your planners, if
you've got a pretty good military plan now on the ground troop
option. There are two things. Life is not perfect~ but I
basically had three objectives going in:
one is to win in
Kosovo, to have the people come back to a protected area and
give them autonomy and then to have the larger approach to
southeastern Europe that we discussed.
k5i
The second thing is, to get from beginning to end with the NATO
alliance intact. When you think about it, this is the first
thing NATO has had to do in 50 years.
In Bosnia, we had a lot
of help on the ground from Croatian and Muslim forces; we didn't
have to do as much as we do here. ~
The third thing is, I was so happy about Chernomyrdin being back
in harness.
In talking to all our people, I've said that I want
this to come out in a way that enhances Russia's diplomatic role
and strategic partnership with us. That would be a real boost
SECRE'f
�SECRET
5
to the forces of progress and those who want a partnership with
us, rather than those who want to go off by themselves angry,
hurt and humiliated.
;zl
....
One thing you need to have your best Russia people dealing with:
if it comes to a troop option, what the hell are we going to do
with Russia if it leads to the collapse of our relationship.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
My view on this is,!
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
are you? .ke7
I agree with that.
How about Ireland?
Where
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Do you think the IRA has decided they are never
going to decommission? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECI<ET
�•
6
3ECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
The poll shows more people are in favor of the
Good Friday agreement than at the time of the referendum.
People just want this damn thing to happen.
Je1
'--,::_-,-;::;--;-,--_ _ _....11
The President:
...+GY
They're tired of screwing with it, aren't they?
Prime Minister Blair:
Anyway, we will keep on it.
I
think the next two wee s lS pretty crucial and I am just
thinking about what big thing we can do.
I am going to
Macedonia and Romania for a few days next week to visit our
troops and also to address the Romanians. When I come back,
will do a couple of days on the Irish thing.
JG1
I
The President:
Great.
I go to Germany next week.
Germany is
the one country where we have people flying and doing
humanitarian operations and there are refugees, and Schroeder
has the EU Presidency. My guys asked me not to go down to
Aviano because it,would be too disruptive, so I'll honor that.
J,Z)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think Germany is just the right
place to go next week.
If you give a message of public support,
it will be very important.
J21
The President:
Yes,
He's been good to stay with us.
There's a
big article in the paper today, "Germans Seek to Separate Serb
Leader From support." It's in The New York Times.
I can't
tell, but it looks like they're trying to set him up for war
crimes.
I want to talk to Gerhard about it.
I'll have somebody
fax that to you.
k&t
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
Just before we go.
our people should think about. I
Three things
1
£gCRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�7
SECRE'f'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
I will get on all of them and talk to ..
you.
If you want to talk over the weekend, I'm available.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Thanks for the weekend.
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�3ECRE'f
THE WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
..s
z
""
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Telcon with Biitish Prime Minister Blair
(U)
~
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PARTICIPANTS:
...:l
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The President
Prime Minister Blair
""
~
Notetakers: Doug Bayler, Bonnie Glick,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 4, 1999, 1:29 - 1:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
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The President:
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
How did you do on your trip?
(U)
(U)
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Prime Minister Blair: It was good. It was extraordinary,
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really. They've got a lot of problems in the refugee camps, and . .:l "" ~ -<e...:l
I am trying to help them set up another in Macedonia. Things
~~q ~~
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are pretty difficult there, because the refugees keep coming in. ~________~
But no, it was good. And the thing with the Romanian parliament
went well. It was good. We have also got good contacts with
the Kosovar people now. I met some leading people there, and
they've got quite a formidable network there, so we tapped into
all that.- How are you doing? How are you getting on? -\-&r
The President: Fine. I met yesterday with Chernomyrdin for a
long time, theu he met for an even longer time with Al Gore last
night, and Sandy, and then they met again this morning. I think
that Chernomyrdin's involvement is a chance to move Belgrade
toward our position, but we need to get Moscow moving in that
direction. I
I
/ I explained
to him what was necessary for this to be a success.
I told him we need a timetable on
withdrawal, as well as a commitment to an international security
SECRE'I'
Reason: 1.5 (a,j.:>,d)
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
force.
I
We sald he has to
commit to get all his forces out, then we can talk about a
presence symbo}ic of Serbian sovereignty. )21
We had a long talk about the rationale for an international
security force with NATO at its core and the rapid deployment
capability, to keep the Serbs and Albanians from clashing. I do
think he understands that if we are not in there, the peaceful
Albanians won't go back and the guerrillas will, and we'll all
be back where we are in six to eight months. I think he
understands. I
I
The only other thing is, the G8 political directors yesterday
was pretty good, except they talked about an international
authorized by the UN.
u
e1ne 1S trY1ng to have it redrafted to avoid
any 1mp 1cation that we're undermining the common requirements
of NATO. That is kind of where the diplomacy is. Sandy and the
rest of the Foreign Policy Team will review this 30-day
strategic campaign plan -- and I got your message the other day
-- and we'll share it with you. And we're making the
arrangements for the secure video teleconferencing between our
teams. So, we're kind of rocking along here. But I'm concerned
with Milosevi9's peace initiative and his release of the POWs
and the collateral damage, which is getting publicity. I'm
worried about Allied unity. I feel good about continuing this
for months, if necessary, but we've got to keep everybody else
in harness. Milosevic is in more trouble than we think, or he
wouldn't be going to all this trouble to stop the bombing.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRET
Yes.
+SJ
What do you think? -\-&t
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�3ECRE'l'
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree entirely.
First, the military
campaign is going a bit better, and I think it's beginning to do
real damage.
Taking out the power stations and blacking out
Belgrade .real19 made a difference.
The President:
They were too wimpy on the NATO thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
+Bt
You've just got to be careful.J
I I thlnk It's necessary to have constantly -~a~n~d"I~am~-tr=r~y7l~n~g~t~o get it sorted at this end -- people who go up
and talk to those refugees -- everyone has a horror story to
tell.
The most horrible things have been going on in there.
I
don't know whether public opinion in other countries is
different -- ours is pretty solid -- but most people, if they
think the campaign is beginning to work, will hold with it.
k5i
The President:- Also, there is going back, and there is going
back.
If they don't think it's strong and reliable and gives
them autonomy, even if you and I were there, we would have a
problem with the military elements.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree. But, Bill, what is your frank
assessment about how much damage we are prepared to do in the
next month to two months? Ir--~--------~~~--------------------)~
I
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SEC'tl::E'f
;-
�4
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
.
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
J2f
I
The President:
I think we should stick where we are.
The
Europeans feel strongly about it.
I don't feel strongly, I
could go either way, but I have been publicly strong about
leaving it in the country, because I don't want to be accused of
having a campaign for a greater Albania and disrupt the frontline states.
I think we ought to hang in there. The rest of
the EU have been pretty adamant against independence and we
ought to hang in there with them on that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
True. \
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
First of all, I strongly agree with that, and we
hammered Chernomyrdin on that. Let me tell you how I look at
this; I think it might also be helpful on the presentational
aspect in Europe.
I rarely talk about Kosovo now that I don't
talk about Bosnia.
It took us almost four years to get that
together and get Dayton. We defeated ethnic cleansing, but we
did not reverse it, because so many refugees were not going
home. The Kosovars have to be able to go home. We not only
have to defeat. it, we have to reverse it. When I remind people
of our work in Bosnia, I think it reinforces it.
I've got a
full-time person now doing nothing but Kosovo public affairs and
getting these stories out. What I think we need to look at is,
either we should have some more of those people -- should we put·
more people on it? It's delicate; it's in other countries where
this problem exits.
I don't want to mess on people's turf.
Maybe talk to D'Alema and others about it.
It would help if
there were more of these people in the Italian press and other
3Ee~ET
�SECRET
5
countries that are getting a lot of pressure, in the Spanish and
Portuguese press and others.
k81
Prime Minister-Blair:
Is your thinking that public opinion is
going soft in those countries? ~
The President:
I think it's softer in those than ours and I
don't know if they have a strategy for dealing with it.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
I
o
lng
campaign, one thing I hope will happen, now
we have hit and
taken out most of the bridges, I think we may be able to focus
more on power systems. And, looking at all hours at more
military targets, that will reduce further horror stories about
collateral damage, like the bus that got hit on the bridge.
That is, we can do more, more freely and with fewer civilian
problems.
f.-81
One thing I said here that sends a good message, that shows our
resolve:
I just comment on the weather, that the weather is
better in June than in May and July is better than June. All
you've got to do is say that. Psychologically, it's a very good
thing to say, and I've said it a couple of times.
(S)
One or two other things -- we're going to open another camp in
Albania, like you are in Macedonia.
If it appears we've been
too reluctant here and we haven't done enough there, this thing
could spin out of control on us and collapse our timetable. We
don't want opponents to be able to say we didn't do enough
there, so we've got to bring them here. We just have to work on
it.
I leave this afternoon for Belgium and Germany, so I'll
check with you when I get back, or maybe while I'm there.
I'll
see Dehaene and Schroeder. )Z!
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, the Macedonian situation with the
refugees is ve~y worrying. We're trying to get unblocked some
European money.
I talked to Michel Camdessus about the IMF
position on Macedonia.
I'm trying to get Macedonia to agree to
a big transit camp to drain off the problem, and we're also
taking some more ourselves. But I think we really have to watch
Macedonia. ,~
The President:
I do, too.
I'm worried about the politics of
Macedonia. The government could collapse and consensus could
SECRE'P
�3ECRET
6
disappear. The countr~ is so small and so poor.
could chan e that. ~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister-Blair:
The president:
I
]
Good for you.
Prime Minister Blair:
this. /
These numbers
~
We've got to just manage them through
I
\
"J
Kosovo 1S about
that is, it's
it's not unimaginably large. ,-----.
L..,t;:-h=e--:::s"'l-;:z;-::e""-;o""t"-"'t't::h-:::e"-;:c::-::o~u;-;n"'t"..y:-;--::::o-':f""""yr.:'"'r::"1k""'s"'h""l::-r=e--::"l-=nc-rE""n:-:g=-rra
"'n::ld,
o
not small, -but it's not vast:
The President:
I agree, there is a chance of that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's bullshit, and we know it. We want,
obviously if we could, to get out where Russia plays a bigger
role and a pos1tive role. That will reinforce the position of
the progressives within Russia and s-tabilize the situation and
have a good lead into the 2000 elections. I also think it will
help us keep the Alliance together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If we can achieve our objectives of having
defeated and reversed ethnic cleansing and kept the Alliance
together -- with the ties between Russia and the West stronger,
not weaker. That might be too much to hope for.
(~
SECRET
�7
:3EGRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be a full hand.
great thing to achieve. I
It would be a
----'I That's where the people are on tnlS. ,)$)
L -_ _ _ _ _ _
The President:
I agree.
xei
Prime Minister Blair: Hillary is going to the camps, is she?
..(-87-
The President:
Yes.
.J.G-'J
Prime Minister Blair: Her presence and the pictures that will
come out of that -- all the time, we've got to repersuade
people, remind them, really. You know the public attention
span. We had a terrible nail bomb thing going off in London
ut for four ays,
Kosovo ceased to be in people's minds. We have to persuade them
about it. Littleton happened and obviously the whole of America
s tar t s to ref 0 cus .
.4-Gt"
=--:::------:---------.1
~.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
rl
The President: We didn't want Jesse to be able to bring out
those soldiers, because people would feel we had to do a good
turn.
I mean, we got three guys going home, but a million can't
go home. -f€-T
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a constant, constant business. Her
going to the camps will make a big difference. When you go and
talk to them, then you realize what you have to do.
~
The President:
Alright, my friend.
Prime Minister Blair:
you soon.
(U)
The President:
(U)
Have a good time in Germany.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation.
·SECRB'P
Speak to
�THE WHITE HOUSE
.
WASHINGTON'
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcen with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
May 8, 1999, 3:26 - 3:46 p.m. EDT
Air Force One
Tony, can you hear me?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Yes, you're on Air Force One are you?
This was a "great" day wasn't it?
I
am afraid these things happen.
That's what I said too.
...(-e}
J.Q-'r
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
I t is bad, but we have just got to steady
our nerves on it, really. ..f.Et
The President:
Yes, that's what I did.
I just went out and
made a statement saying that we hit several important command
and contreltargets, and that the damage to the' Chinese Embassy
and the death~ and injuries were completely inadvertent.
I
extended deep regrets to the people and the leaders of China but
said it is important to remember why the strikes were necessary
and how to put an end to them. -k8r
They asked about the Chinese and Russian r.eactions and whether
it could derail the diplomatic efforts we're making toward a
peace deal.
I said I hoped not because that was the quickest
way to get it over with and I restated the conditions and
pointed out that we'd done over 10,000 sorties and because TV is
8ECRE'f
Reason:
1. 5 Ca, b, dL ' .
.
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�SECRET
2
in Belgrade, they could cite every time there's unintended
consequences, but our pilots have literally risked their lives
to avoid hitting innocent civilians in Serbia -- shot at from
rooftops and in the middle of civilian areas, they have not
responded.
They have done everything they could to dodge the
weapons and go on. We have to remember what caused these
strikes and what could end them, but our conditions have to be
met. No one would like to stop them more than me. Jei
~
Prime Minister Blair:
That is absolutely right.
The TV cameras
are not in Kosovo but if they were, they would be seeing people
killed every day by Serbs, by Milosevic.
~
The President: Yes.
If we had one TV picture of the 15 men
being roped together and burned alive, they would be demanding
that we bomb the hell out of them, people would be wondering why
we haven't leveled the place, but our people need to be telling
that to the media all the time. ~
Prime Minister Blair: What I'did today was to get the NATO
conference to go through all the atrocities in the last two weeks in Kosovo. We did a press conference on the same theme.
I understand when something like this happens, people get very
nervous about it, but day after day after day, things are
happening without any cameras and no one reports a bit of it.
Milosevic can take the cameras to wherever he likes and point to
these things.
But in Kosovo this is a daily happening, as a
result of deliberate policy, not as an accident. J.e1"
The President:
I am with you.
I just wanted to check in to
make sure we're on the same page. -0?r
Prime Minister Blair:
ri ht thing.
No doubt, Bill.
I'm sure you've said the
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I am with you.
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
,
"
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�SECRET
3
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
That is right.
They asked, 'What about the
Russians and Chinese saying this was barbaric?#
I said it was
not barbaric but a tragedy.
We ought to take that word and turn
it on them. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
You are absolutely right.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Let me ask a couple of questions.
In Germany, I
did what you suggested.
I did an hour interview with the press
people from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Macedonia and
Albania. Did it get press coverage? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
AbsDlutely, it got a lot of coverage.
-t-etThe President:
I think we all need to do more of that, reaching
into other countries.
One other thing, when I was there, I did
a lot of spade work with our people working on humanitarian
stuff about Macedonia, with the view as quickly as possible of
turning Maedonia into a way-station and you know telling them we
would move all of the refugees through there.
We would need to
get Turkey to~gree to take about 100,000, get safe passage for
them to Turkey.
I believe we have enough money to do this.
If
my supplemental passes the Senate this coming week, and I think
it will, what we would like to do is go to Turkey, with whatever
help we get from Europe, and build these camps.
We could build
camps for 20,000 which are quite comfortable with public space,
schools. They are tents, but nice tents. Also, if worse comes
to worse, they can be winterized with wooden floors and heaters.
They would be quite adequate.
Obviously, it would be better to
get them to Turkey anyway because the climate is better. )£1
SECRE'l.'
f.
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Then we could build a couple of camps in Macedonia; it would be
easier to secure a throughway if we could get them direct cash
...
to the government in a hurry -- which you could do quicker than
me through the EU -- then tell them we want to make Macedonia a
throughway, not permanent stops for refugees. We will be able
to get the numbers manageable and stabilize this thing in the
next few weeks.
If they know where we were going, they'd do a
lot better to hold and fend off domestic opponents. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally agree. That is an excellent
idea and I will do everything to facilitate it.
I spoke to
Santer about getting European money released.
The critical
priority is to get money as quickly as possible that will buy
their goodwill for forward transit to Turkey. We need to talk
to Greece as well, but that is an excellent idea and eXactly
what we need to be doing. ~
The President:
When' does Prodi take over? ...l8f
Prime Minister Blair:
It's not quite clear, not for a couple of
months.
I should think we need to get santer to work on that.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
necessary, we
from the EU.
Santer in the next
The President:
too.
W
If
money ourselves and then get it back
need money quickly.
I will speak to
of days. ~
If I get my money this week; I will ship some
Prime Minister Blair:
If I get the money there, we'll have the
goodwill to facilitate all of this.
I totally agree this is the
right thing to do if Turkey is willing to do it. ~
The President: We can put these camps up in a hurry for 20,000
people for about $20 million by the time you clear the land,
work sewage, water and all that. That is $1,000 a person,
that's not aIr that much. ..(..&1Prime Minister Blair: When you consider weapons and everything,
it is a pretty sensible investment. ~
The President:
I will work on this and get your guys in touch
with our guys.
We have to get money to Macedonia and Turkey to
take 100,000, build transit camps in Macedonia that are
physically separate and secure a commitment to build camps in
Turkey and then get safe passage. We also need to get money to
SECRE'f
�8ECRET
Albania.
5
They've taken a lot in homes now, but we need better
(.£-1-"
Prime Minister Blair: Right. We need to watch in Albania,
particularly because a lot of refugees are living with families
and are not getting any support. /
L......,,...,,_:::;-_ _ _ _---;-~;----...JI
I f necessary we can CiO 1 t ourse.L ves
with Germany and France and get it back from the EU. ~
The President:
Does -it? .~
The EU Parliament doesn't have to vote on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: What if you got a letter from every EU member to
Santer saying release it tomorrow? Would it help? J81
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, it would help. In the end, we
should probably just give them the money ourselves and then get
it back from the EU.
LM
The President: Do we need to call anyone else about this
incident with China to buck them up? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I was going to speak to D'Alema anyway.
(S)
The President:
Okay, I will call Jacques.
US)
Prime Minister Blair: I still think that in the end, the public
understands t~at in war these things happen. We have this
operation in NATO and SHAPE workin better now.
e medla is just bored with picttires of refugees. We
need actual pictures of what is happening in KoSovo. ~~~~~~_~_~~~
The President: Okay, I will work on that.
great ideas but I'll work on it. ~
3ECREI
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I don't have any
�£ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair: There are ways we could do it. We are
looking at, but I think people, all the time, need to be
J>
reminded of the basic principles. When I went to Macedonia and
saw those people, any doubt immediately leaves you. What has
happened to these people is just dreadful.
We need to make all_
the right diplomatic moves, but just carryon. ~
The President:
I'm with you. Where are we on Ireland? kG1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnls er B alr:
We got a little bit of a breakthrough
last week, because Sein Fein came up with far more positive
language. .1
1 I have a totally
different proposition which is based on words rather than
product and now I have to say to them you may not get product,
but you may get better words.
~
Sinn Fein may say, ~you've got better words, we want an answer
tomorrow."
For six months, we've been trying to get better
words. You can't rush. We actually had a good series of
meetings at Downin on Thursda and there is some possibilty
there.
But we're not quite
~y~e~t~a~tZ-~a~n~a~b~s~~~u~t~e~~c~r~i't~l~c~a~~~~~--~~e~n~it is at a critical
moment, if you are willing to do so, to help.
It may take in
the end,· a high profile intervention in this.
j.ZJ I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes.
I will do whatever you want me to do.
Prime Minister Blair:
I know Bill. You've been fantastic on
this.
I will try to bring this to a boil next week and will
keep in touch.
(eJ
SECREt
.(.e)
�7
13gCRE'J:'
The President:
I'll keep working on all of this and if I need
to call you again I will.
yn
Prime Minister"'Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill.
Thank you.
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
SECRE'f
�SECRE'F
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Joel Schrader,
Miles Murphy, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti,
James Smith and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 1999, 10;10 - 10:22 a.m. EDT
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
I am fine.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
So.
How are you?
(U)
(U)
What's happening?
(U)
How's the indictment going down over there?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I agree with that.
JQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
So, anyway, I sent
you a note setting out my thoughts.
I don't know whether it's
reached you yet, I just finished it this morning, but I think
the situation is, we are doing a lot of damage, but I think
�2
we're right to be stepping up the pressure.
We've got to be.
%
The President:
This planning process has got to proceed,
because we only have a few days before deciding what else to do
but I think 45,000 troops for KFOR is quite good. The more
people we have deployed in the area, the more quickly we can
move.
I agree entirely with you; we· obviously can't afford to
lose and have to keep doing everything necessary to make him
think that we're ready to intervene and no matter what we can't
afford ,to lose. But the combination of the impact of last
week's strikes and the fact that the NAC has voted to let NATO
increase the number of targets that will be hit and the nature
of them and the buildup will give us maximum pressure.
I agree
with you, I don't care what happens to him, whether he stays
there or goes someplace as you've said, like Belarus, it's all
right with me if we get our objectives met. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Because you save lives by doing that.
I
think we are in just about the right frame and it probably
hasn't reached you yet, but I have set out in a note what I
think you can do if we have to go a step further -- how you
would explain that and how you would take people with you. You
can set it in
er vision for the Balkans and how it's good
for people.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
That may be.
wouldn't do that.
E.O.13526 section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think he would.
J&r
He has been very tough on this so far. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, he has and I think they will come
along with us.
The problem is, until you see a real plan,
3ECRE'f
�SECRET
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
you're a bit in the dark on this.
So, I think if we get a
clear military consensus, I think people would go with that.
yr
The President:
The military consensus is 175,000 to 200,000
troops, at least that's what our people say, so we could
probably do it with less. But one thing we've found out is the
more we send in, the fewer will die. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
i81
The Fresident:
So the more unattractive we make it, the safer
it is for everyone. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
That is a big problem.
They're reeling around.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I think we need to let this
thing percolate for a day or two and see what the reaction in
Serbia is.
There's some chance it will be helpful, and there is
a chance that it will be harmful; I would be surprised if it had
no impact.
So I think we'll see something fairly soon.
~
Prime Minister Blair: \
The President:
I agree with that.
J21
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
.3ECRE'f
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes, I agree with that. Hillary and I are
taking a couple of days off, and I am mulling that over right
now. My gut feeling is that I have to give something sooner
rather that later. Unless it cracks in two or three days, it's'
better to say something very strong, that we have no intention
of losing this. Now the good news about the indictment, Tony,
is that is makes it less forgiveable for us to lose it. No one
can say, 'Oh well, they're just nationalists." I think it is
interesting that apparently the whole indictment is premised on
Kosovo and shows a systematic government policy. I thought in
the beginn:i..ng that if she (Louise Arbour) did do this, some
might be based on his role in the Bosnia slaughters. But
apparently it's all based on Kosovo. It's quite interesting.
And apparently -- I haven't seen it, but apparently it says that
it's more than chain of command, it's specific personal things
he ordered, not that he was just the head of the apparatus.
This will be quite helpful in makin that case. I a ree with
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
away and
lS ma lng lt lmpossible for everyone
see people are not going to walk away.
Prime Minister Blair: I th~k that is right.
haven't got this yet -- ()n
The President:
second. ..(-B-1
I just got it.
I just read it.
walk
V1
As I say, you
Just this
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Good. Well, I will be back in a few days and
get back with you on that, and we'll keep our fingers crossed.
I think the NAC did the right thing by approving a new range of
targets. JZ1'
SECRET
�PECRE!
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I think it has been a good few days.
%
The President:
Alright, I will talk to you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
:;,gCRE'f
(U)
(U)
�SECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, George Chastain,
Frank Jarosinski, Miles Murphy, Don Cheramie
and Lawrence Butler
June 3, 1999, 6:42 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Let's hope it sticks.
The President:
Yes, I hope it will.
best answer.
(U)
(U)
I think you and I gave the
Prime Minister Blair: Here (Cologne) it's like trying to stamp
down a bush fire.
(U)
The President:
There are a lot of unanswered questions. Maybe
72 hours from now we can celebrate, but we will all look stupid
if it turns into a red herring by Milosevic. My response today
was 'welcome, but cautious." ).81'"
Prime Minister Blair: As I said tonight, of course, the fact
that we got an agreement was great news,but it has to be done,
it has to be implemented and some trick questions have to be
answered in the right way.
I E.O. 13526, section tA(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree.
Academy speech. +eI
I turned up the heat at my Air Force
SECRE'f
Reason:
1.5 (a;b, d ) .
.
.~~~ __
'_-~'?-."'
Declassify on:! 61!::~r "'J'·:-,.;.r~· - - - ,
.
Ii
!".
I~:r?N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1-
~:'..'-::.::~.,...::~!~~_:....;,. .-:-c~--..,:--~~L. ~" ,:'"c.;-;>-~, __~./·"';(-.;
�3EeRE~
2
Prime Minister Blair:
you've been dotn .
Absolutely, I think its critical what
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We have a new problem, but we should be careful··
on this line.
Sometime in the next 72 hours I need to talk to
you about the planning process. Do you think over the next 72
hours we can talk about this? Do you think we could talk secure
over the weekend? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Sure.
(U)
The President:
Just tell them they can dance around a Maypole - you'll hold it up for them while they dance. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
should only rejoice when
We
The President: He's been a champ. Chernomyrdin has been good
too and for the Russians this is good too.
They have come out
well. ..(-et"
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think it is a good thing for
Russia.
They came out extremely well. ~
The President:
It makes them look like a world leader. They
don't want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. This
should help them with their economic stabilization.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
He is getting a lot of
criticism at home.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I mostly agree with that. Absolutely
right, people tonight are talking far more positively about them
and asking what we can do to help the Russians in economic
terms.
It really changes the atmosphere there, doesn't it? ~
The President: Yes, it certainly does. The other thing that
they and the Serbs should think about is that this saves us a
hell of a lot of money that can be used on development, the
money we would save from putting in a ground force. Also, the
main thing we need to do is look like we remain determined.
~
SECRET
��4
3ECRE'f
The President: Apparently, they are meeting on Saturday. He
wanted to wait-until Sunday probably to find out how much wiggle
factor, wiggle room he had. They pushed for Sunday and we
pushed him back to Saturday. ,.ke)
Prime Minister Blair: There is no reason they can't meet
tomorrow from NATO's point of view.
~
The President: Saturday is the earliest day we can get Wes to
meet them.
(i)
Prime Minister Blair:
Serbs to meet.
(-e1
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
This is the quickest we could get the
Un
I don't like that very much.
+et
The President: We may know Sunday or Monday where we are.
Maybe you and I could talk on Sunday. I need to talk to you
~
about the other option. There is good news and bad news.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Keep your fingers crossed.
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�8ECRE'f
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Pr.ime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 12:32 - 12:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hi, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
tied down.
(V)
How are you?
(U)
I'm anxious until this thing is properly
The President:
This is exactly what I was afraid of. A bombing
pause and then they would try to steal the peace now that we
have won the war. The position is that the Russians and Chinese
won't let a Security Council Resolution go through until there
is a bombing pause, but we won't pause unless there is clear
evidence of withdrawal.
Funny, but I understand the Serb
position; they don't want a vacuum so when their withdrawal
starts, they want us to come in. Yesterday, our guys said ~you
begin withdrawal, we will pause and try for one day to get a
Security Council Resolution.
If the Chinese and Russians won't,
we'll get a NATO accord and move in immediately." .k81
That was our position yesterday. Today, the Serbs came back and
said they couldn't live with this.
They want a Security Council
Resolution that links the authority to deploy and the authority
to run the country under the UN; if there is a delay, we'll
return to our pre-conflict force levels before we invaded until
the Security Council works it out. That's a nightmare and we
can't let that happen.
They're trying to steal the peace after
we won the conflict.
I know you agree with that.
I am going to
3ECRE':P
Reason:
1.S(a,b,d)
Declassify On:
6();'{9!!.fl~:-:----~---·-- -------~-,<, .
i~b~NLI~RARY PHOTOCOPY '-'s~~ ."
�SECRET
2
call D'Alema.
I don't know what to do except tell our guys to
hang tough. Ahtisaari delayed his China trip.
I)t)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I just talked to Ahtisaari.
What did he say?
J31
yi)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair: !
I
The President:
I'm not against that.
+&r
Prime Minister Blair: I said I wanted to think about
talk to ou.
If we ask him he would 0 do that toni
The President:
Good for him.
and
~
Prime Minister Blair:!
I
The President:
Yes.
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair: What do we lose? My guy down there,
Michael Jackson, is a good bloke, but he is a general not a
negotiator. J$t
The President:
I think Ahtisaari made a good impression on
Milosevic.
I haven't talked to Sandy, Madeleine or anyone about
him going down. But I worry about this thing dragging on.
I'm
not worried about sending a signal; we need to get this going
while the iron is hot. 1St
Prime Minister Blair:
that.
M
The President:
SECREr
Absolutely, I'm in total agreement on
You talk to your guys.
I'll talk to mine.
)Sf
�3
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Prime Minister Blair:
I told Martti I'd get back to him in an
hour.
If we want to have a chat to our folks and have them
chat..
The President:
I agree.
nervous as hell all da .
from us.
I've been waiting for this.
I've been
We can't let him take the eace away
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree 100 percent.
The President: We owe it to these people (the Kosovars), and
don't forget that they (the Serbs) are asking us to eat a hell
of a lot of shit. Now that they want us to sweep out Thaqi and
the KLA and give this Authority five years to work, our crowd is
going to be at some physical risk too. We have to think down
the road here.
Look at Bosnia four years later. We're taking
on a lot of water here.
If we can spring some money from the
IMF and the World Bank ... but there are all kinds of hurdles
with that.
Well, you and I are in the same place. We can't let
our folks get weak on this.
If the Europeans stay hitched on
this, we should be okay in a day or two.
I might give Chretien
a call too.
He has a lot of friends over there in Europe.
I
know he agrees with us. We may have to do some hand holding on
this.
1.21
Prime Minister Blair:
[
I agree.
J
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'll tell you what I'll do.
I'll call Sandy now
and talk to our guys and then I'll try to call D'Alema, and
decide who else I should call.
If there is any other problem,
I'll be available.
It's sunny here.
I may go out, but I'll
have phones with me. ~
SECREg:}
�SECRE~
4
Prime Minister Blair:
I have some people I really trust out
there at the negotiations. Okay, our people will be in touch .
.J.&tThe President:
If this thing is going to be drug out for
another 72 hours or so, we may also need a story about how our
planning is continuing. We have to put a squeeze on and we
can't let them get the peace. Okay, we have a vigorous
agreement going here, so we don't need to waste time.
I'll talk
to Sandy and we'll be in touch. Goodbye. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
"'~""'--~~------.-
--- ----
•• - -
:~~",~N LIBRARY PHO:OCOPY
~ ........ !
I
�SECRET·
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H 11\1 (:iTO 1\1
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 63
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Tony C~mpanella, Michael
Manning, Robin Rickard, Roger Merletti
and Lawrence Butler
June 7, 1999, 9:55 - 10:06 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
what I know? . (U)
The President:
Yep.
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi Bill.
Now do you want me to tell you
(U)
The talks broke off.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
Do you see
what I mean?
k81
�2
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yes.
I completely agree with everything you've
said.
The key here is where the Russians are on this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
just have to be tough as hell with them.
accord with where you are. )<r,(
We
I am completely in
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECl\E:T
�8ECRE'P
3
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yep. We are in the same place Tony, and we've
got to tough it out and get a good UN draft. Ma be I am
sensitive, but let me say something.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d) I
OK?
Prime Minister Blair:
)-51
OK Bill. /
I
The President:
with you.
?l
I am going to call Yeltsin as soon as I hang up
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
I agree to that.
hold to it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
morning.
aECRET
Yes.
Do you think the Allies will
I spoke with Schroeder this
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Alright. Let's hang ip there.
develops tonight I might call you.
kS)
If anything
Prime Minister Blair: I might trouble you again if I get a firm
readout on the Russians. If there is something we need to talk
about then we can talk again.
(S)
The President:
Thank you.
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye
(U)
The President:
(U)
Alright.
Goodbye.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SEeRE,],
f'~"'" £I'
-'~'---" v
.
.
'!~\,ti-"tQ~ LiBRARY PHOTOCOPyt
c"
"cc
\ :~~:~':~T':~::~>-l;-<~:'~~~"~:~:'-' ,)._.,:')c:. :._\;--/;,-,-~~'f[·
Thank you.
�SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 9:09 - 9:27 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President:
Hey, I just called to say thanks, it's been a
good run.
Life's greatest curse is the answer to our prayers;
now we have to figure out how to get all those people back in,
without getting blown up by all those landmines.
I had Elie
Wiesel here -- do you know him?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President:
He's a Holocaust survivor, and an advisor.
I
sent him to some of the camps, and he said, ~boy, there is so
much anger there.
Every Kosovar believes he knows the Serb who
ousted him."
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, it's going to be tough, isn't it?
tell you what, it could be a lot worse.
(U)
The President:
Well, it's quite wonderful.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: At least now it will be a problem of
construction instead of destruction.
(U)
The President: We've just got to hold everybody together and
keep working on it.
(U)
SECRET
I
�SECRET
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
~~~~~~~~~-'__-nvr________________________~[line drops, and
is reestablished.
The President:
Hey, Tony, I'm sorry.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: No, no, it's our fault.
person who dropped the line executed.
(U)
I'll have the
[Laughs]
The President:
We're trying to think through the
obvious questions, about how fast we can get people back in and
clear out the landmines, and we need to flush out Macedonia
first. -1-e:I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yeah, we have to keep working on that.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am, too.
There are not a lot of places he can
go, given his indictment by the war crimes tribunal. Maybe
Russia or Belarus would take him, or maybe he'd get a Pinochet
deal and leave him in Serbia. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
/~--------~-------------------~==~~~~I
IE.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
L -_ _ _ _ _.
The President:
Yeah, we can't do that.
We need to look at
basic humanitarian conditions, and make sure the lights are on
by winter,/
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
\ ______~============~/
L
SECRE'P
.~
,
I
�3
SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have to do that, too. Frankly, I don't know
what else I can do. I've been reading about it all through
this, because my daughter just happens to be doing a paper on
Adams. I don't know what the real deal is between him and the
IRA. It'phard to put pressure on him when you don't know
. what's going on. It's just bizarre.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
We've got to keep working on it, and I'll do whatever
you want me to do.
yr:).
Let me say this: we sent out our top people to NATO for Kosovo,
we need to do the same thing with getting the refugees back and
setting up a government. Whatever the formal structure, we have
to put our best people in to set up the mechanics and make this
thing work. There are literally thousands of detail questions
that we have to answer. ~
Prime Minister Blair: \
~
'----------~/
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)
The major concern I have about the
person on top is I want someone with confidence and energy to do
this thing.· I want someone to go there and stay. --fG+Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President: The commander of the overall military is going
to be British, isn't h.e? I think he's good. I haven't met him,
but I've seen him on TV. -+er
Prime Minister Blair:
2ECRET
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
SECRET
The President: Anyway, this won't require our obsession like
the battle, but it will require our attention for the next 10
days.
(Z).
Prime Minister Blair:
Cologne meeting? JRr
Right, well, Bill, you'll be over for the
The President:
Yeah, when we come to Cologne, we should have
major questions to answer as a body. We need to boost Yeltsin
and his pro-reform forces.
I wish we could resuscitate
Chernomyrdin, and I realize this may be more water than we can
carry.
J,.e1
I'd like to have him and Ahtisaari there to receive our thanks.
We may want to think about this.
They did a hell of a job for
us.
I think we also ought to think about some other things at
Cologne. We need to have good positions coming out of Cologne
for debt relief, and because of compound interest and falling
incomes, I think it will be a big deal there. We also need to
do more on the AIDS issue. According to our people, one percent
of the people in the world have AIDS.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
In Africa the numbers are staggering, and
in a country like South Africa it's just massive.
(ei
The President: And you've got 60 million people more or less,
and 35 million in Africa, and the number is going to double in
the next four years. kef
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
Yeah, let's see where they are with the World
Bank. Russia collapsed politically and economically after .1995.
It also deteriorated with Yeltsin's health problems even though
he was reelected in 1996. )Qt
[Line drops and is reestablished.]
The President:
Hi, Tony.
Solana is on TV.
(U)
You need to go to the press now.
Prime Minister Blair: Right, I'm sorry about that.
Let's speak before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Yeah we need to talk.
(U)
Okay, yes.
�~ECRE'P
5
Prime Minister Blair:
Right, let's talk again before Cologne.
(U)
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
aEGRE'f
�CON'FIlJEM'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 65
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Joel Ehrendreich, Jim Smith,
Roger Merletti
June 21, 1999, 2:26 - 2:33 p.m. EDT
Ljubljana, Slovenia
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
your soldiers.
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, I called to tell you I'm sorry about
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks very much.
It's very kind of you
to call. We're still trying to find out the details.
(U)
The President:
Tony?
(U)
[Call dropped and reestablished.]
The President:
You're still trying to get the news?
seen is what's on CNN.
(U)
All I've
Prime Minister Blair: We don't know how much more than that at
the moment.
It appears one of them was a sergeant, and they
were trying to demine a school, and a mine went off.
I'm afraid
we're going to see quite a bit of this before it's all through.
(U)
COHFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on:;
J.
�2
COl,PIDEfi"'fIAL
The President:
Yes.
They said it might have been more like a
booby trap than a traditional mine.
It's difficult to tell
whether they're deactivated.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: And it was in a school, I think. Well,
they're pretty sick, actually. As more comes out about these
Serb soldiers, it really is unbelievable.
(U)
~~~~~~~~~~~
The President:
There was a show
are at America and me. Our guys
interviewed with yesterday seems
close to showing the truth about
They're going to have to come to
. Prime Minister Blair:
on CNN on how mad the Russians
told me this TV station I
to be the only one that came
what Milosevic was up to.
grips with it.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think in the near term we have to check the
schedule by which our people are moving in. There was also a
special about the French troops trying to separate the Serbs and
the Kosovars. JR1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President: Well, I won't keep you.
I feel like we had a
good G-8.
I just wanted you to know I'm sorry about your men.
(U)
That's kind of you, Bill.
I thought we
Prime Minister Blair:
had a good G-8, too.
So you're off to Macedonia tomorrow?
(U)
The President:
Yeah, I'm going to a state dinner in Macedonia
[n.b., the President meant Slovenia] tonight, and Djukanovic,
I'll give you a readout in
the Montenegrin President, is here.
a couple of days. )ei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Goodbye, Tony.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CmtFIDEHTL".L
(U)
�CONFIDBNTL"tL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Joel Ehrendreich,
Rob Williams, Jenny McGee, Roger Merletti
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3D, 1999, 3:14 - 3:22 p.m. EDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
How are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty grim.
(U)
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(qJ
Declassify On:!
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
do now? j...G-Y
What exactly do the unionists want Sinn Fein to
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
~
~
L - - - -_ _ _ _
The President:
That way the IRA doesn't look like it's
surrendering to the unionists? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONn DEN'!' IAL
�3
COktFI DENT IAb
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It looks like you could manage this marching
thing if you could solve the bigger problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Which means i f they meet all the local people's
conditions, they could march. JRf
Prime Minister Blair:
J
I
I
The President:
Are you going back to the meeting now?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
J,e1
~
The president:
Do you want me to call them in a couple of hours
-- Adams and Trimble? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
Right now?
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-----------------~/
The President:
Why don't I monitor it from here?
~
IrE-.O-.1"C":3-52-6-,-se-c-ti-on-1,-4(-b-)(---'d)l
CONFI DEN''l'IAL
�4
CGNF I DEN'fIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I will check in where I am in 20 minutes to see
if they're through. JBr
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President:
If they're in a meeting, I will wait until they
finish to call them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
They, the unionists?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
J&r
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
Okay, I'm on it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks, Bill.
Goodbye.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
(U)
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CO~IFIDEN'fIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
I
'I
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 67
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM~-F-TELEPHONE-C:ONVERSATI~O~N~--------------~
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999, 9:25 - 9:38 p.m. CDT
Chicago, Illinois
Prime Minister Blair:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
The President:
You are where you were last time we talked,
aren't you?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
"'===:;======~:;;""'=~--":"----'
The President:
I know.
take my call now? .Jrf?'r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
It's just terrible.
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Make a counterproposal?
Prime Minister Blair:
Will Trimble even
~
Yes.
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Yeah.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDENTIAL
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Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is that their counterproposal one?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What is Gerry Adams saying in response?
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You mean put that through Parliament?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
!
What did he say?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President: Do you think keeping them up all night will get
them weary and make them give in? ~
cmlFI DENT L'\L
�3
CONFI DENT L",L
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
You mean let them get a little sleep . ...+8-
Prime Minister Blair:
\
Yes . \
[
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Is there anything I
can say to Gerry Adams? Anyth~ng
e
states can offer
them to help them politically to move closer to where Trimble
is? You know I actually have far more popularity within the
Catholic community than the Protestant community. Most of the
Protestants think I am a turncoat.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You offered him an act of Parliament, right?
.JR!I
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFIDE~lTIAL
�cmIFIDEN'fIAL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
So, they are not a judge of it?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
____________________________~I .ye1
I
Do you think Trimble will take that?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~I
God, I think that is the best deal.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
~
I
But Gerry thinks that is like crying uncle.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Especially if Great Britain can be the guarantor
of both sides.
If you have legal authority; they won't
understand that. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yes. So I should tell Adams that Trimble will
help him work through that? ~
�5
COHFI DEN'fIPrL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this.
a halt until tomorrow morning?
(Z)
Are you going back to call
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I have a little fiddling around to
do, but probably in the next quarter hour. ~
The President:
Do you believe I should call in the next half
hour or let them sleep first? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I would call them now.
~
The President:
Okay, I will start to call them. My national
security people are in if you need to call me in the middle of
the night.
I know what to say now. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will try to call them now.
~
The President: You think I might be able to get them in the
next ten minutes?
yc)
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
)X'r
The President:
Okay, I am getting ready to get on the plane, so
(U)
let me see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Alright, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'!' lAL
�CONFIDEN'l'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Amy Swarm and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:26 - 7:58 a.m. EDT
The Residence
Hello Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Sorry, it must be early morning for you.
(U)
The President:
It's fine.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
CONFI DEH'l'IAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5(d
Declassify On:
Glyn T. Davies
G'" -- .
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7/8
(",
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I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I talked to Adams about that for a long time.
I
spent the better part of a year trying to convince him that
ought to be his position without success. And last night I do
believe, rightly or wrongly, his belief is that he made some
significant commitments esterday about what he is
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: L-__~I=E=.O=.=13=5=26=,=se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(b=)(=d)~I____~I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
CGNFIDEN'PIAb
Yes.
~
~
.,
~ '-.'~
�CON'FIDEN''fIAL
3
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Did they commit to follow Chastelain's
timetable? ..)-e}
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CQNFI DEN'l' IA!7
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�4
Cotifr'I Il:l!:l<f'f IAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
that. JGt
There is no question -- I think Adams believes
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: What about the argument they can all take the
government down later, and we will all support it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
CONFIDEH'fL'\L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
�c mr FI DEN'J'IAL
5
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
My view is that is what you ought to work on.
Is there anything you can do, any stick or carrot, to shore
Trimble up? ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
I do believe they are trying to help on that; I
think Gerry was open to it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that an argument
The President: Well let me ask you this.
for you to go back to a hard deadline?
(Yl"
Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
'--------------/
CGNPI DENT IAL
I EoO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
CONFIDgNTIAl,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
It's crazy. The whole thing is just nuts, but I
think your·best chance is to get, based on what you say, I do
think they will accelerate the timetable.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I have talked until I am blue in
the face.
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
For one thing, there has to be some
definitiveness to the commitment.
I didn't know they weren't
.{.et
more definite.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
tGr
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: But the one thing that I am now persuaded on is,
after one year of trying to make a case,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFI DENT 1M
�7
CONFIDEN'flt,L
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
I think that is what we need to work on, and
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
!E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)!
The President:
(U)
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�cmlFIDEHTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robin Rickard, Joel Schrader,
Don Cheremie and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 1, 1999, 7:25 - 7:34 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium
Hey, Tony.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Hi, Bill.
finally getting somewhere. I
Hello.
Well.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
CONFIDEWfIAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (dJ
Declassify On:' 7 / !~"~' _fic~i;.,:'------ ------.--~~~.
f<.~T6N LIBl0-RY PHOTOCOPY
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I think we're
�CONPIDEH'fIAL
2
The President:
Yes.
of October? ~
They say they can't do it before the end
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, they can't do it earlier.
~
The President:
It would be interesting to see if they would do
it earlier if they can get in earlier.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, I can see that, actually.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm happy to. Do you want me to call tonight?
Do they know about the proposal? JZ}
CO~tFI DENTIAL
�3
CONn lJ!!:N'f IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call Trimble tonight.
Prime Minister Blair:
Gerry tonight?
~.
j
I
~--------------~
The President:
Because Bertie's gone back to Dublin, right?
.-+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, he has.
Jim can check.
;e1
The President:
I will have Jim check to see if the Irish have
talked to Gerry.
If they have, I will call him.
In any event,
I'll talk to David. When I call him, what should I say? That I
hope he takes this deal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, that's right.
I
~
'--------------~
The President:
Yes. And you will make this agreement public
tomorrow? This proposal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.}
The President: At what point tomorrow will you publicly float
this? So I could make a public comment.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Our people will coordinate with
folks. Hang on just a second.
our
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: Yes, I shouldn't talk to Gerry before the Irish.
That would be usurping. )J21'
cm1FIDE~f'l'IAL
�"
4
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Got it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Get some sleep.
~
Prime Minister Blair: You, too. I'm sorry.
It was very
helpful when you talked to them yesterday.
je1
The President:
Okay.
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
CQI>IFI P8HTIAL
�_CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
I
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Miles Murphy, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheremie, Doug Bayley and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 2, 1999, 6:39 - 6:48 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, congratulations.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~========~----------~
The President: Yes, but old Trimble was in a good frame of
He was
mind. I was stunned. I
I ~3¥~e D l m . I J,R:)
ttc~"n ~4(d)
pretty proud of himself when
a
I
F?
Prime Minister Blair:
Did you talk to him?
JQr
The President: Yeah, I talked to him an hour ago, 30 minutes
ago. He was really upbeat, saying it's bad and it'll get worse,
but it'll get better. He went through a laundry list of who was
with him, who was against him, who was on the fence. I told him
I would call them if he wanted. I told him what we always
agreed I'd tell him. I was very encouraged to see how upbeat he
was.
vJ
Prime Minister Blair: When I left a couple of hours ago, I was
I a bit down. /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
]
I
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1/5 (d,)
Declassify on:!
�CONFIDEN'l'IltL
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I think it is and I think he may be there now.
-+etPrime Minister Blair:
Do you mean that?/
The President: Absolutely.
I told him, give me a list; I will
call every damn one of them.
J.&r
Prime Minister Blair:
I had no idea.
~--------------------------~/
The President:
i t . ...J!C(
He said Taylor was with him, but I'm glad to do
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Adams was in a good humor, too.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
J
The president:
I'll keep doing it. Trimble said it will be a
real hard sell, but I think I could do it. He was really in a
very good place. That is all I know.
~
[The line dropped and was reestablished.]
The President:
Sorry.
Prime Minister Blair:
airport.
(U)
The President:
My fault.
Are you in London?
Prime Minister Blair:
CmlFIDg~ITL"<L
We got cut off.
(U)
I'm on my way back from the
(U)
Yes, I just landed.
(U)
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
The President: Well, I don't know what else to say, but I think
this is great. You did great. We've just got to nurse them
now, to get them there. Gerry was happy
clam. He said he
had to make Trimble look good, one thing
I E.O. 13526, section IA( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I told him if he wanted me to call anybody,
would call.
I
j)21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I made a statement.
I said you had issued this
proposal as a way forward and I thought it was a very good
thing, it gave them a chance to shape their own destiny and
their own government and to get rid of guns and violence for
everybody.
The United States expects everybody to comply and we
support you strongly and expect everyone who benefits to fully
comply. J,..eI
Prime Minister Blair:
And you said that on screen, did you?
JR5
The President:
Right.
Prime Minister Blair:
k€1
That will be good.
~
The President: We already got some feedback from Ireland.
was already beamed over there on CNN or something.
U?)
CONn j,)~NT H! L
It
�4
CONPIDEN'fIAL
Prime Minister Bl . .
The President:
Yes, even the ones who are mad at me for being
too pro-Sinn Fein, my dumping allover them will give them a
little confidence. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Yeas, I will see about that. You have your
people call me back with a list. Talk to Trimble; whoever he
wants me to call, I will call.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Get yourself some sleep, you've earned it.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Many, many thanks.
Thanks, I will.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'fL".L
(U)
(U)
�CONFIDENTIAL
5298
,.13
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 71
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Ralph Sigler, Liz Rogers,
Michael Manning, Rob Williams, Joel
Ehrendreich and Lawrence Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 12, 1999, 10:01 - 10:14 a.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony, I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
P~ime Minister Blair:
I keep seeing these great pictures over
here of you in the press from your trip.
You are doing some
great sweeping tours.
(U)
The President:
I've been going through the poorest parts of
America.
People have got to realize that not everyone here is
rich.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
can say so.
(U)
It is really effective campaigning if I
The President:
I don't know exactly what kind of financing you
do to encourage British investment.
I've gotten quite a bit of
stearn behind the idea of offering the same incentives to "invest
in poor -- really poor -- neighborhoods that I've given them to
invest in developing economies overseas.
So it turns around the
argument that people gripe about giving incentives for overseas
but not giving them the same incentives to invest in our own
CONFI DEHT L1l,d;,
Classified by;
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
Declassify On:j 7 ;iJ~'9" ~",r",~__----"-"'"--~;"\
;t::~:~~":~RARY PHOTOCOPY ,I
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COMFI DEN'fIAL
reservations.
Prime Minister Blair:
here's where we are.
The President:
Interesting.
Yes, I agree.
It's getting a
Now, on the Irish issue
)<1
Prime Minister Blair:
/ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)/
CG~TF IDEN'l'IAL
�3
CGHFIDEHTI}\L
The President:
What does the Good Friday Accord say on the
timing of prisoner releases?
(~
e
Prime Minister Blair:
It says that it's in the hands of the
body thatd~als with prisoner releases and shbuld run up to
May 2000. But it also says that decommissioning should run to
May 2000 as well.
"""
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The President:
Yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I got nowhere with Hume on SDLP after I talked
The President:
with you. So I don't know if I can nose around there again.
LQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Adams is still holding out the position that
nobody else should be in the executive even if it is all their
fault. .JGt"
Prime Minister Blair:/
CONFI DEN':FIAL
�COHPIDEN''l.'IAL
4
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d~
. The President:
Yes, I agree with that but I don't know what
that does for you on the other side. 1er
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know either for the minute.
I
The President:
Yes, well I'll look at what is ... I think the IRA
might give some kind of commitment that there would be a
statement after July 15. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CQWFIDg~ITL'lrL
I R.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
�COWFWENTIAL
5
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
tf)
Yes, alright, let me see what I can do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Okay, Bill, I'll be around anytime.
think the next two days. are pretty crucial, really.
~)
The President:
Well, I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
then.
(U)
. The President:
Thanks, Bill, I'll speak to you soon
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDEN'i'IAL
~
I
�CQNFIDEfi'I'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 72
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Liz Rogers, Michael Manning,
Rob Williams, Joel Ehrendreich and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 12, 1999, 1:56 - 2:01 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi, Bill, sorry to trouble you again.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, McGuinness is here.
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d);
,
Declassify On:
JR1
�2
CQNFIDENTIAL
-IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Won't the IRA say this is just changing the
sequencing again. Basically they have a matter of mistrust.
They still think they're going to get jacked around on the
executive on this, don't they? Jei
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you this. What about the legislation
itself? I hear the SDLP has problems with it.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
But do you think the legislation problems would
go away if you had any statement from the IRA?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think s
The President: Could you change the legislation to overcome
directives if you get the IRA statement? -H=T
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L - I_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
/
The President:
Let me call you back. When are you going to
bed? It must be getting pretty late there now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's only 7 o'clock now.
(U)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
cmlFIDEHTIJ'IJ,
;
�3
CQNFIDEN'T lAL
Tte President:
Let me see what I can do.
I'll call you back.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, thanks, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
GO~lFIDEH'fIAL
(U)
�COHrI Dg~IT III L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
Robin Rickard, Bob Ford, James Smith and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
July 16, 1999, 10:09-10:33 a.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair;
The President;
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Well, today is not as bad as yesterday, is it?
J;if
Prime Minister Blair:
I
think that is the right analysis.
(f)
The President:
I just had Barak here, and he said how much you
had done to help.
He admires you so much. We had a great talk.
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
seeing Massimo D'Alema on Monday.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)D
.J.e1
.
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
CONFIDElffIAL
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5 (d!)
Declassify On:i
(IZ)
I
am
�CeitH'IB~M'fIA:L
Prime Minister Blair:
is he? .(.e)
2
He's quite optimistic on the peace stuff,
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
That is a bit of hope, then . . ~
The President:
The other nice trivial thing is that the British
Open is humiliating every golfer in the world. The average
score yesterday was 79.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's the bloody weather, is it?
(U)
The President:
Yes. They have made i t has hard as they could.
They enjoy making people miserable.
It's quite good, though.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
We must get you up there playing someday.
(U)
The President:
Where are we? I hope I gave a helpful statement
yesterday.
I said that I had failed to persuade them to work it
out, too, and we should just go on from here. ;e1
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
GONFIDENTIM
�COHFIDEH'fIAL
3
'1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
There's nothing to do now, is there?
Mitchell going to do something to help a bit? .,.kef
Prime Minister Blair:
That would be helpful, Bill.
Is George
I
The President:
COHFIDE~J'l'VrL
Yes.
ye1
1E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONnDK~JTPL
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: They can't have it both ways. So many of them,
I believe, there are so very many of them who are having a hard
time,- whatever they say, in letting go of it. It's like their
security blanket. Imagine what their lives are like, a certain
amount of romance, danger, drama
fe1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: -- power. You're asking them to put a little
white bread sandwich in a lunchbox and go off to work at the
factory. It'll be hard for them. ~
Prime Minister Blair: You mentioned this once before, I don't
know if you recall. I have put some people to work on that. I
The President: Sinn Fein proper can imagine themselves running
social services agencies or political services, but somebody
ought to talk to Gerry about what are their people going to do
with their lives when this is over. I think it's a big problem.
It plays on their psychology. I just -- I've been thinking a
lot of what I'm going to do when I leave here, but -- this may
be a big postulate -- but what if I had been a romantic
terrorist, especially lately, when it wasn't a lot of work and
you didn't have to set off more than one bomb every two years,
you know? I think you really have to think about what we can do
not only to guarantee their security and safety, but to give
some meaning to their lives, some way that they can participate
in the new Ireland. I may be wrong, but I think it's a huge
problem for Gerry Adams, even if most are not aware of what the
real problem is. )£1
Prime Minister Blair: I agree. I have some people working on
that. ~J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
C O~IFI DEHT IAL
J E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)J
�5
CONFI DEHTIAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
They should be asked whether they have ever
actually talked to these people about what they would do with
their lives when this is over. They may have some ideas, but I
can't help but believe that is a big problem here.
If Gerry
thinks it's silly, at least you've opened it with him and he
should consider doing something. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weekend, too.
We will do that.
I'll call some of our Irish guys over the
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
COHFIDENTIJ'.L
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEN'1'L",L
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
I
6
The President:
Do you think I should come over there?
what you were going to say?
rer
Prime Minister Blair:
Is that
I was going to say it is not a bad idea .
.....(.ff
The President:
day trip.
JQ1
Okay, I'll do it.
I can do an overnight or a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'll call George and some of our congressmen
over the weekend.
I'll get on that. Maybe I can do that, if
George can come up with something different.
It wouldn't be
very different, but it could look different. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Bill, one other thin
IKO. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Yes, we have to have something there.
see George Soros' article? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
No, I didn't.
Did you
~
The President:
It's what you're arguing, but on a faster
timetable. He is arguing for a customs union within the Balkans
and some provision where you put them on a clear path to EU
membership as a region. Even if Serbia gets rid of Milosevic,
you can't deal with them on a nation-by-nation basis, because of
the inter-ethnic problems. He basically said they need to come
up with a regional currency to force them together.
It's quite
COWFIDE~l'TIl'.L
�7
• CQNFIDKNTL",L
a clever piece. Soros is not always right, but he's a genuine
visionary.
I will get someone to fax it over to you. And I'11
see what we can say on the 30 th • )Zl
./
Prime Minister Blair: Maybe our people should talk.
I think we
have to have an impact beyond just holding a conference.
J,Q-)"
I agree with that. We sure as hell can't go
The President:
just have a conference. Alright, man. Keep your
over there and
chin up. .kef
Prime Minister Blair:
All the best.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'FIAL
�. CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, documeut uo. 74
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Bilateral Meeting Between The President and
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Steven Ricchetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy and Director of
the National Economic Council
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
European Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Great Britain
Tony Blair, Prime Minister
John Sawers, Diplomatic Advisor
Allistar Campbell, Press Secretary
Private Secretary
-
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 1:40 - 2:35 p.m.
Hyatt Hotel, Cologne, Germany
The President:
Tony, you did a very good job on the debt issue.
If we can make it work, that will mean almost 2/3 debt
forgiveness for the poorest countries. This would be a real
step forward.
The Jubilee has enormous appeal -- getting rid of
all the debt for the millennium. But it also has real problems
that we would need to access before we embrace the concept.
For
example, Bob Rubin points out that for countries that may want
to borrow more who get 100 percent forgiveness, wiping out their
debt will be much harder for them because it will effect their
credit rating. Maybe we should look at adding rescheduling
CONFI±:lE~JTIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (~)..
Decla"ify OU,(
.
. _ .
JUIE~'-'2- _~u-'c-~
e:"., '. mTON LiBRARY PHOTOCOpy
~~~_:2.~~~~::.
t
"}_._-__:::--):,", . ,'
..
�COHFI D£HTIAL
2
without taking them out of the credit market. Rubin feels very
strongly about this. But anyway, what we need to do is focus on
the fact that we are doing a huge deal here. This is a major
achievement. We must not let what we are not doing become the
s or. It's what we are doing that's important. je1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
'-
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I fully agree with that.)
I
Jim Steinberg:
The problem is specifying who. That is, who are
the 1,000 companies and why are we choosing them.
I think it
woul~be better to callan the private sector as a whole.
kef
The President: That's true but on the other hand this needs to
be organized. We can't just calion companies to act.
~
Jim Steinberg: Well there is a legal question when asking
specific companies.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Gene Sperling:
The problem of asking specific companies is that
there could be a feeling of coercion. )£1
The President:
I think the thing to do would be to designate a
lead person in the business community to do this. That's what
we did on welfare.
I asked Eli Segal to run a voluntary
program.
ter
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Gene Sperling:
It would be a real political challenge to
support. And also I think there would be concern that we have
opened the door at the last moment. ~
The President:
The problem frankly is Congress. It is a
different party and not likely to do me any favors and so I do
not think we would get support. The way it works is that there
is an allocation to each committee. It is always less for
foreign affairs. So we are forced to choose among programs.
CONFIDEN'PIAL
�CQl)IFIDEN'FIJrL
3
There is a real weakness of commitment to foreign aid,
especially since the end of the Cold War. We have a big
surplus.
If I take the caps off, the Republicans will push for
a tax cut.
We have made a commitment to save Social Security.
So it wouidbe hard to do this without opening a Pandora's Box.
We need to wait to see if we get an omnibus deal. So I am
reluctant to look like we are urging this and then be in a
position where we can'tdelivet. But if we can quietly see that
there is a consensus on this, I can say to Congress this is what
the whole world wants to do.
It is a good idea on the merits.
But it would be better to forge a consensus here than for us to
lead on this issue given the politics. Also, we will have
another shot over the next couple of years. J21
Tony, do you want to talk about Kosovo? I have one big point to
make:
you had a huge impact on the execution of this campaign
and on our ability to sell what we needed to do. You realized
the need to improve our communications. Now, the big decision
we have to face is making sure that this works.
There is a huge
effort in bringing people back, in rebuilding lives, in spite of
the magnitude of the crisis. There is a mental health crisis.
I sent Elie Wiesel to the region to talk to the refugees.
I
talked to Jesse Jackson about this. All of us agree that we
need some kind of systematic, organized effort maybe working
through faith groups. We need to start. But before even all of
that, the UN must pick someone we would hire to oversee the
civilian implementation. Nationality doesn't matter to me. All
that counts is confidence, energy, and organization skills.
Those are the ke s.
The Economist had a uff eace on Bildt.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I fully agJee.
decision. Who are the candidates?
~)
This is a critical
Samuel Berger: No one has emerged that I am aware of. The
selection seems to focus on former Foreign Ministers or defeated
Prime Ministers. With all respect, that is the wrong mind-set.
We need a CEO-type. Je1
The President: There must be a terrific European business
person who has worked in the Balkans, for example. Someone with
imagination and executive ability. Je1
CONFIDEN"i'IAL
�4
CotilPIDEN'f'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
European.
J.e1
Yes he is, but of course, the Europeans want a
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
weeks.
r...e1
Well I am happy with an American.
I am afraid that the UN will dither on this for
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
Samuel Berger:
If I could just raise one idea. You both should
lay down a marker with the Secretary General on how you see the
job. You should imply a veto right.
In other words, you
together would expect he would not appoint someone without your
approval.
t,.e)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Anyway, I don't
know your politics in Europe. But I do know that this is our
deal.
If it fails, it will be our failure. My have no
preconceived notions and no conditions on nationality. My only
concern is confidence. ~
Jacques Klein is tough and good. But I keep coming back to the
bottom line -- whoever it is has to be up to the job. ~
John Sawers:
.....(.Gt-
Allister Campbell:
I
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
COHFIDEN'PIAL
�CONFIDEN:t'IAL
5
The President:
I don't think the Secretary General is thinking
ask who is the
and Europe. Who
Y POSl lon lS on
00
navigated the shoals of partisan politics and never
anything.
This requires special additional skills.
have loved to have the job myself.
(x1
Prime Minister Blair:
from scratch.
(U)
I would
Yes, it really is rebuilding a country
If I were the head of a company, I'd love this
Prime Minister Blair: We should start di
least there is a good choice.
The President:
for names so at
This must not be about politics.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
The President:
I KO. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
In the end, this really is a unique
position.
It's like being the procounsel of a country. You
need communication skills, executive skills.
John Sawers:
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President: On the issue of relief we've got $1 billion
earmarked for the short-term. On long-term reconstruction, I
guess we have this conference in the Fall. On the EU's
Stability Pact, we want to contribute but since most of the
money is European, it's hard for us to shape it.
I think we
need to take a step back and look at the Marshall Plan, and also
think about what we want this to look like in ten years. We
CONFIDENTIAl.
�6
COHFI DEN l' 1M
need a prosperous Balkans so there is less temptation for
conflict. We want it to be more integrated with Europe. With
the EU, with NATO.
The first thing we need to do is to define
the universe: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, ~acedonia, Albania,
Montenegro, Kosovo. And Serbia if we can get rid of Milosevic.
I think we need to apply one of the central ideas of the
Marshall plan which is to get the beneficiaries to meet together
and define their own vision of the Balkans, how they would use
the money, how they would apportion it. We need to force them
to assume responsibility for their own future.
They need to
have a real plan and develop themselves with our help.
There
are some real smart u s there that can do this,
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes,
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: That's true. We all need to think about what
more we can do. We, in the United States, need to think about
whether we should say to Congress that we should accelerate
accession for some of the Balkan countries into NATO. You might
consider the same thing for the European Union. Should there be
a customs Union with the EU, like Turkey. Should you accelerate
the session process? If you think we, should push the envelope,
we can push Schroeder, Chirac and D'Alema to think about this~
j.Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree we should push the envelope.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: We need direct aid too. We've already got some
going for Albania and Macedonia.
I think we need to structure
our assistance in Kosovo in a way that is helpful to the Front
Line States.
For example, using their construction companies.
We need to get people on the ground to start turning our roadrnap
for the Balkans into reality. We need the person, we need the
plan, we need an approach that takes into account the whole
region. What I think we should do on the Stability Pact is for
us and Prodi to convene a meeting in the Balkans maybe in
Sophia. Bring all the people together, the U.S., the EU, the
CONP! DEN'!' IAL
�7
cmIFHlEN'I'IAb
concerned countries, and the international financial
institutions.
We need to forge a common vision and get their
buy in. We need to start a process for them to meet and to plan
their own future.
It's not like these people are not smart.
¢
Prime Minister Blair:
way to proceed.
Jet
Yes, I agree that would be a very good
The President: Similarly, we need to decide whatever we can do
with NATO, the EU, and with aid. We need to get to work.
If we
can get the people in the region bought in, it will change the
d namics and sychology of people and the region. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prlme Mlnlster B air:
I agree very strongly.
Samuel Berger: We also have to solve this problem with the
Russians.
I think we are almost there.
(U)
I
I
1'===~--------------------~
John Sawers:
Samuel Berger: Actually, that's been sorted out. The real
problem that still needs to be resolved is that Yelstin
continues to want a sector. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me make clear my view:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
I think we all need to watch them.
If we have
something that we can live with, I don't mind letting them
declare victory so we can just get this out of the headlines and
move on. Right now they are in the way and we need to resolve
this.
I want to nail this Russian thing down. The other reason
is that I am truly worried that Yeltsin might make a dangerous
decision. He thinks we are trying to extend our sphere of
influence. He just doesn't understand we are trying to make a
more peaceful Europe and reverse ethnic cleansing. But I think
he wili do the right thing at the end.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIPEN'I'IAlJ
We need to close on this today.
(U)
�CONTI DEN'I' IAL
8
The President:
Yeltsin is the only Russian leader who truly
hates communism, believes in freedom and integration with the
west.
vz!
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I agree with that.
In addition, we need a huge
effort to move the center of Russian politics.
I think one way
to do that is for us to get more parliamentarians there.
It's a
huge effort to go to them and to bring them to us in a more
. systematic way but I think it's worth it.
That will really help
to educate politicians there and move them to the center. We
need to combat their insularity.
02f
Prime Minister Blair:
I know we have run out of time but at
some point I would like to have a few words about Northern
Ireland.
tel'
The President:
Yes, I've got some ideas that we should discuss.
Let's try to find some time this afternoon. -+et
End of Conversation
GONFI QEHTIM
�cor,nSENTIAl
CONFIDEH'fIAL
/,11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 75
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SVBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(V)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Deana Sutliff,
Roger Merletti, James Smith and Richard
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
September 8, 1999, 5:13 - 5:32 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(V)
Hi, Bill.
(V)
Tony, how are you?
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Fine, I'm great.
holiday and I'm feeling good.
(V)
The President:
Did you go to Italy?
I've had a very good
(V)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I went to Italy and France and had a
good" time. ," Where were you now? (V)
The President: I was in Martha's Vineyard and then New York,
but I'm about to go off to New Zealand for a week, and I wanted
to talk to you before I left. I've been talking to everybody
about this East Timor situation and the rumor mill is rife that
Habibie might be deposed or they're sending some military leader
out there who says he will never give East Timor up. I believe
we all need to put as much pressure as possible on Indonesia to
accept a force and then figure out who'll make it up. The
Aussies are ready to go, they want to send 2,000 or 3,000 people
cmrn DEU'fIAL
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:!
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
there; they don't think it will (take very many people. And, if
the UN approved it, the Chinese might even send some people.
But I think it would be a very embarrassing comparison to Kosovo
if Indonesia runs all the Timorese out of the country or if they
reverse it and we don't do anything. We've got to do something,
it seems to me, so anything you can do to put the heat on
Indonesia would be helpful. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: Guterres is
going to table a
motion even if Indonesia won't support it. He's got to. He
said there was a lO-km human chain demonstrating against him.
-tet
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Absolutely right.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
JCr
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.13526, section l.4(b)(d)1
The President:
would
Prime Minister Blair:
CONTIDEN'fIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. I think -- I don't think the Chinese wili
allow the resolution to go through if they don't accept it,
because of this whole sovereignty thing.
tef
I_p_r_i_m_e__M_i_n_l_.s t_e_r__B_l_a_l_.r : _____________________________________~
~
__
__ I
The Bresident:
No.
Prime Minister Blair:
.J.e-rI haven't, either.
~
The President: The reason I haven't -- there's a rumor he's
being deposed now -- the reason I haven't called is, every time
I put pressure on him, he gets unmerciful grief there that he's
toad in to the United states.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -_______________________________- ~-----
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
wan e
0 say a word a out
the Balkans.
I got your letter and I understand the pressure
you're under to cut deployment in order to increase readiness
and retention, but I hope you can maintain your position as a
lead nation in both Bosnia and Kosovo, because our partnership
there has been a bedrock of success and the Russians, I believe,
are working out better than we'd hoped. I think the Kosovo
thing is settling down, if we can just hang on. Your letter
indicated you're talking to allies about making contributions to
backfill your forces.
I don't know how that's going, but I hope
we can maintain a good level of cooperation and ability with
whoever goes in there. ~
LP_r_i_ID_e M_l_'n_l_._s_t_e_r__
__
B_l_a_i_r_:_/
_________________________________________
CONFIDEWl'IAL
~j)
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�CONFIDEH'fIAL
4
.The President: Me, too.
I think we shouldn't get too soft on
these sanctions against Serbia.
I think we ought to tighten the
sanctions on Milosevic and his crowd.
I hope you'll get the
other
~
(C)
The President:
setback? 18
Have you talked to Schroeder since his
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Prime Minister Blair:
weeks.
¢
ele~tion
No.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I'm due to see him in the next couple of
The President:
I'll try to call him before I leave for Asia.
There's not much I can do, but I can encourage him.
(~
Prime Minister Blair:
cmiFIDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�5
CONFIDEN':PIAL
How are we doing on Northern Ireland?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
George is doing fine.
The Catholic?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
It was unanimous, wasn't it?
Americans? )..e1
Including the two
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Don't you think it will just get worse if we
don't resolve the politics of it? ..+-e-r
CONFIDENTIAL
;.
�6
CONFIDEWfL"do
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: You don't think there's any chance the Mitchell
talks will produce a breakthrough? Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
I think there's some chance, but it's
pretty slim at the moment.
The President:
when. Jct
I'm ready any time.
You just have to tell me
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
CONFIDBN''fL'lL
�7
The President:
So, the main thing you, want me to do now is say
something nice about the Patten report? )X1
Prime Minister Blair:
/kj
For us, now, that is the critical thing.
The President:
I'll be down in New Zealand, but there's a hellof a lot going on in the world at the moment, and we can always
talk.
I just wanted you to know I'll be out of pocket for the
next week or 10 days.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: When am I going to see you?
doing the Third Way thing in Florence?
(U)
The President:
Absolutely.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you
(U)
They're all very excited.
(U)
The President: You shouldn't be the only guy speaking English
who gets to go to Italy.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Italian.
(U)
The President:
You did?
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
Pr~me M~n~s er Blair:
The President:
When I was in Italy I learned a little
(U)
,-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
Enough to get by. /
Is he one of ours?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes, he's one of ours.
The President: Gosh, I thought I had had him in here.
check it out. .J&r
Let me
Prime Minister Blair:!
l
I
The President:
GG~TFI DENT 1hL
Got it.
When are his elections?
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
j.G-f
�8
GOHFIDEHI'IAb
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Okay, I'll do it.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Zealand. (U)
Okay, Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Okay.
Have a good time in New
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFI DEN'FIAL
Je1
�SECREr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INCHON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
Joel Ehrendreich, Elizabeth Rogers,
Roger Merletti and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 1999, 10:38 - 11:29 a.m.
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm fine.
(U)
(U)
The President:
I haven't talked to you in a while and I wanted
to check in on a few things.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
How are you doing?
(U)
The President:
I'm great.
I've been fighting reactionaries in
Congress, we're winning with the people.
I thought your speech
to your party group was great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Thanks. We've got an interesting
situation here at the moment because the conservatives have
really moved off to a very far right position.
(U)
The President:
That's what our guys are doing here. One reason
Bush is doing so well is because he criticized one thing on the
right. He is making people think he is saving them from the
right. But, it's a fraud because he is really for them on
everything else.
I have to figure out how to expose the fraud
that Bush is the new Clinton, establishing a new Republican
party like I made a new Democratic party.
It's helping Bush but
it is killing AI. They asked me what I thought, and I said it
SECRE'f
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(c,~d)
~~.'
_~~ ___,__ ~~_~-~,
Declassify On:! 10/~9~J~'<'''~' ---c~;
0';, .' ~TON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY . i'
. 'p! ~~~:.;.__ .__ .;.:---._..~ ..:.,..c..:,_",~~~_~~.~
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�SEeRE'£'
2
was terrible how the right wing was treating him. After all, he
was for them, and his lobbyists organized them to kill our
patients' bill ·of rights. He was for school vouchers and for
the NRAtrying to kill our handgun measures.
Why were they
being so mean to him? I thought it was terrible how mean they
were being, but they wouldn't give what I said that much press
-- it wasn't what they wanted to say.
That is what we've got to
do. Al has to position himself between Bush and Bradley. Now
it's very interesting. We are at a point where the perceptioos
of major players are at variance with their positions.
It's a
terrible thing and there'~ a limit to how much I can do because,
in our political culture, I can say what I think but it will
hurt if it appears I'm trying to control the outcome of another
election.
I've got to be careful not to tell people how to
vote.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
it?
(U)
Yes.
Policy is the way to do it, isn't
The President:
Yes, you're right, it is . . What I am doing -the results speak for themselves. The question is not whether
we are going to change, but how we change -- a u-turn or hold on
to what we're doing. Here are the new ideas for the 21 st
century. That is the argument I am making, and the argument
Gore has to make.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think he's got to really.
If it comes
down to general positioning, it will get more difficult.
(U)
The President:
The people still don't know what a VP does in
our country.
It's not an accident we've elected only two in our
history. But it's still the best way to become president -someone dies or something happens in the interim.
The Vice
President has become more important in modern American history.
That's how Nixon got to come back as President. Nixon barely
lost, and Bush won when Dukakis collapsed.
It's not such a bad
thing to be a Vice President now.
It's not the handicap it once
was, but you have to capitalize on it. So far we haven't been
able to capitalize on it even though our ratings are slightly
higher than Eisenhower's and Reagan's were at this point. He
ought to be able to do that, I think he is getting it sorted out
now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
SECRET
It's really about definition, I think.
�3
The President: It always is, isn't it? I have half a dozen
things I'd like to discuss. How did your government change play
Prime Minister
The President:
I really like him.
He is such a bright man.
+&l-
Prime Minister Blair:
-The President:
I saw him recently.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
He told me that. /
I
The President:
It was probably time for Mo to get out.
;e1
~_p_r_i_m_e M_~_'n
__
__
i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:____________________________________________
__ __
~~
The President: She served you well and worked very hard. She
made people laugh when she pissed them off, and that's a great
thing. ).e}
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you want me to do anything, let me know.
know that Ian Paisley got mad at what I said last week, but
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I
~
I I'll try
'-n-o-t:---;-t-=-o--=o"";f::-f::-e""':r::--=-a-=n-=-ym=-o-=r-:e=-u":"n=-h;--::-e'l-=p""f;:'u::-il;--a-:n-a-l'o-:--:-g"i-e-=s-:.---'I'i"-:w:-::-:"r':-o-':t-=e--:It::-:o:---lh im t ha t I
will try to stay out of the analysis business.
~)
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
aECRET
J
/
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�:>ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I've always found that if someone's offended by
a remark, it is better to apologize immediately because people
who agree with what you said won't hold it against you. Anyway,.
ring the bell if you want me to do anything. They just have to
finally decide whether to cut a deal ·or not.
I think in the end
they have to decide.
It has dragged on so long I don't expect
either side to eat the whole thing. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
The President:
One thing Gerry said, I've never talked to you
about it, Gerry told me they trusted de Chastelain and would
stay on it if he promulgated a schedule. ~
]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You could even have de Chastelain promulgate a
schedule for decommissioning starting on a date that was ten
days after they got in the executive. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Pr ime Minister Blair:
~
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
What if de Chastelain promulgated a schedule for
decommissioning and then you said to Trimble that he'd better
:>ECRE'I'
,
,.
�5
let Sinn Fein in the government before then so he doesn't give
them an excuse for slipping that date. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: And then Trimble lets them in and says if they
sli , we'll walk out. What about that?
~)
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
What about Adams? -tet
. Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I
\
The President:
Anyway, that is best idea I've got.
Prime Minister Blair:
~
LI_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
The President:
It sort of takes it away from them.
If you
could let de Chastelain offer the schedule, they could say
something nice about how they respect de Chastelain. But
they've got to be in the government to fulfill this obligation,
then if this date slips then Trimble says I'm walking. And then
it is allan them.
They both have what they asked for, they are
in the executive and then have this date staring them in the
face -- only ten days away.
It seems that would help Trimble
with his constituents if he has a deal in advance and not three
months away. Everybody's used to wandering around their offices
and getting to know each other and trying not to look like the
biggest asshole at the garden party.
This has to happen fairly
quickly.
(.G+Prime Minister Blair:
]
\====~----------------------~
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�6
SECRE'P
The President: Why don't we call Mitchell and run it by him if
ou think it ml ht have some merit. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
]
-
The President:
That way Adams doesn't have to say anything to
get into the government but they are screwed immediately and
quickly if they don't deliver. Let me run it by Mitchell. ~
Prime Minister Blair:~
\
The President:
Okay. There a couple of other things I'd like
to run through.
First, thank you and Jacques and Gerhard for
running that piece on CTBT in the New York Times. Here's the
problem. My Senate agreed to a truncated schedule. Half of the
Republicans are against this on its merit.
For the others it's
just politics. They are out to screw me because they don't want
to help me and don't want to help AI. But a bunch are genuine
isolationists.
They just say 'piss on our allies n and "to hell
with what they thinki screw anybody who screws with us. n
It's
just sick what a world we are living in here. But I'm trying to
work a deal so this is not voted down.
I'm trying to work on a
schedule.
If they start hearings, we will get them involved in
the process.
Even if they don't ratify while I am president,
it'll be obvious to the world that they are strengthening the
treaty. They will if they are working on safeguards. But it is
just silly intellectually, just awful what they are doing. And
they are hurting themselves. They are giving us a good issue in
the elections.
It is terrible what they have done. But your
piece was very helpful and I wanted to thank you for it. The
problem is that under the-rules of the Senate they are in a
position where a small majority can prevent the vote from being
delayed now. We may get it put off by one vote. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right.
~
Whatever happens, we'll bang them pretty good.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
L -__________________
I
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President: Thank you.
I don't think this is the end of
American leadership on arms control, just parliamentary
�SECRET
7
maneuvers.
out there.
It's just a rightwing group and they are just way
~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b )( d)
The President:
It's stupid. They won't pay UN dues and they
don't want an aid budget. They want a big military that never
does anything.
They spend more money on defense than I do, but
don't want them to do anything, and I'm the most pro-defense
Democrat President that we've had; They want a bunch of bombs
and missile.s and a defense system, and then they just cut
·everybody's taxes. They want to put rich people behind gates so
the starving can't get at them. They basically want an upscale
Brazil for America.
It is awful, but I think we can beat them
back.
I want to say a word about Florence, and then I've got
two other things.
I'm glad we let Cardoso come, but can you
explain to me, in a European context, why we didn't invite Wim
Kok or Guterres from Portugal? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
The other guy I thought should have been
invited, who has been a wonderful ally to all of us is Chretien.
r=~~~~~~~~I~E~.O~.=1=3=52=6~,~se=ct=io=n=1=.4=(d~)~I~~~~=-~~~~~I
Prime Minister Blair:
~
I agree.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I'm afraid it will undercut the whole idea of a
global movement.
I will not be in office to work with these
people more than another 15 months, but you and Chretien may be
around another five ears. The other guy in Latin America is
Zedillo,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
But if I were doing it and I were
European, I would want Guterres and Kok and I don't know about
Austria, I don't know him. Chretien, every time we need him, he
shows up and raises the flag.
~
al!:CRgT
�8
SECRET'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Absolutely.
I am in complete agreement.
Are you going to sing the Marseillaise?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Yes.
The President:
I do too. And it is also a way for Europe to
get more influence over him in a positive way. )Zl
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'-------~~
The President:
Is there anything we can do to help him?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Maybe one thing that could come out of Italy is
some sort of statement that will help him.
~
)
Prime Minister Blair: \
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)l
The President:
The thing that bot~ers me is that he has the
worst of both worlds.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
At least for all the horrible
�SECRE'f
9
bloodshed in '94 we had policies in place that turned the
country around by '96, congressional gains in '96 and '98, and
we rna be able 't get Congress back in 2000. -+erE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
]
The President:
Yeah.
I'll take some guidance from you, and I
will talk to him about it.
I think he's trying to do the right
thing but he's been a little foggy about it.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree.
I will do what I can.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Ye·s. Okay, we need to think about that. Let me
mention a couple of other things. The WTO ministerial will be
held in Seattle in Washington State in December and preparations
are in full swing.
I think this is a major opportunity for the
third way agenda to put a human face on the global economy. We
have to come out for more open trade and the legitimate
interests of labor and environment. I've been to Geneva twice
to talk about this and the child labor convention. We think it
would be a very good thing to have a WTO working group on trade
and strategy analysis, not on negotiations. We have been in
touch with your people, and I hope we can work together on this.
A lot of people are afraid to discuss the two things in the same
breath. But the whole pitch here has to be we can't turn our
backs on integrating the global economy. But I want to do it in
a way that takes everybody along. ~
�10
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~--------------~
The President: Yes, it is. We're going to have every NGO and
labor union demonstrating against us and we have to have
something that answers what they are saying.
I see rising
protectionism in this country.
In the last two years, we took
on a huge amount of the shortfall of the Asian economy by
increasing imports and running a trade deficit which is unusual
in conventional terms, but the world has changed quite a lot.
For example, in '97 and '98 we bought ten times more steel from
. Japan; China, and Russia than Europe did.
Protectionism is
rising among Republicans and Democrats, and I see it manifesting
itself in other countries. We have to find a way to turn back
the tide of it. We have to try to find mechanisms where we can
discuss all these things together.
Europe is in better shape on
this than we are.
I'm not trying to impose standards on other
countries, but there's got to be a way to work our way through
this. -+e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--J~
The President:
I wish you would. We have to see how this plays
out against the media story in America to see if there is more
coverage given to the people demonstrating than to the fact that
we are going to meet.
Two others issues I would like raise.
President Frei of Chile raised Pinochet with me in New Zealand.
He said Pinochet's presence in London is a big problem for the
Chilean government. He thought they had worked out a solution
to get rid of him by putting him in the Senate. They are very
concerned now.
Our position has got to be that this is a legal
matter and whatever you do, we will be in agreement. But Chile
has twice the per capita income of any other in Latin America,
they have had this immense success, and they thought they had
put this nightmare behind them.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRBT
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�£ECRE'f
11
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
The real thing we need to do is get more victims
to say ~send him home and let us handle it here. n
I got it .
.Jet
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
I won't say this to anybody.
I'm also aware
what a problem this is for you. My take on where they are is
they thought they had done their version of Mandela's Truth
Commission -- put it in a box and store it there, not live
forever. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
The President: A final point -- Iraq.
I am afraid we're in a
different place in the Security Council. We worked all these
years on negotiations and before that, and I hope we don't get
divided here.
The language your people worked out with the
French crosses a red line because it suspends sanctions on
Saddam Hussein before disarmament. When I took office, the Bush
position was, I thought, unfair. We wouldn't ever lift
sanctions until Saddam Hussein complied with his disarmament
obligations and with obligations on all other UN resolutions,
human rights and all that. Now I am prepared to say that if he
meets his disarmament obligations and puts a system in place
where he's complying, I would be prepared to suspend sanctions
and liberalize the oil-for-food program -- especially with the
price of oil going up, we should be better off. But I think if
we say to this guy, ~If you start to comply, we will lift
sanctions,n he will quickly reestablish the weapons of mass
destruction program, and it will become known in two years that
he has.
It may not happen "rhile I'm in office,
1
you.
It could become a real ni htmare for
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
I understand where the French are and we are prepared
to move from our former position aspecially on oil-for-food
SECRE'f
�gECREP
things.
12
I know everyone is getting sanctions fatigue,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Would it end the suspension because any country
could vote to veto continuing it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
SECRET
�SECRET
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
13
The President: Our guys here in Congress, even the Democrats,
are attacking me because I haven't. done enough to get rid of
him. I think they will eat me alive if I agree to lift
sanctions while he has his weapons program going on. f6+
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: But it looks like the UN has finally given in to
him if you have no sanctions without disarmament.
I
LP_r i_m_e__
__
M_i_n_l_'s_t e_r__
__ B_l_a_l_'r : __________________________________________
__
~/:).
The President: Have you worked out the differences between
"certain" and "all"? ye;)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President: I don't know, I am very skeptical.
at the specifics.
~
SECRE'f
I will look
�SECRET
14
Prime Minister Blair:
Look Bill.
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
! E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)!
The President: There may be a solution here in the details, but
I am genuinely quite skeptical.
I've been dealing with this guy
for a long time. )J21
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)\
The President:
We've been criticized for not bein
condemning of the coup.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
£ECRE'f'-
more
�oS EeRE'!'
15
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Two
strong people can do the sensible thing.
I think our objective
ought to be to get them to do the sensible' thing. J&r
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
We will stay in touch.
(U)
Bill, when will we see you then?
(U)
The President:
I will see you in Italy and probably at the OSCE
thing in Turkey.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
talk with you.
(U)
Yeah.
It will be good to have a proper
The President:
Yeah.
You are in a position, as you get more
influence in Europe, I believe we've got a shot now, because of
the two earthquakes, to resolve the conflict between Greece and
Turkey. To accept Turkey into the EU will lock Turkey into the
West for the next fifty years and that would help solve some
problems if east of there goes sour.
Two areas that I have
wanted to make progress on -- the Aegean and India/Pakistan. We
need to talk again, maybe before the OSCE, and I will tell you
what I have been doing on it. But I think we've got a shot in
the Aegean now.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
�16
SECRE'P
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The president:
The Turks and Greeks are getting along better.
The earthquakes made them see. each other as human beings again.
The problem is Cyprus. The Greeks think they were uprooted and
can't go to visit their relatives' graves.
It's got to be a
strictly cold-blooded deal. We've done our part with military
coope~atio~.
We've got to get something that leads them on the
-path to Europe.
Otherwise, they'll never do it because they
think they need to ~get alonif' like the Irish.
tGt
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That is what we need.
Prime Minister Blair:
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
Okay Bill.
~
(U)
I will see you soon and thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRET
(U)
�tONFI DEt.'!' IM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
..s
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Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Joel Ehrendreich,
Robert Ford, Hoyt Yee and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
I ~~
~~
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Ou
November 26, 1999, 11:55 a.m.-12:02 p.m. EST ~5
Penn National Golf Course, Maryland
; ~
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"'U~
The President: Can you hear me? I am celebrating Thanksgiving
with my entire family.
The wind is blowing and the rain is
going like crazy.
I might as well be in England.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Where are you?
(U)
The President:
I am up at Camp David.
I am out playing golf
and it is raining like hell, and the wind is blowing.
(U)
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Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
The President:
Can I help in any way?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)I
conFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:;
�2
CONFIDENTIAL
do that and put a statement out
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Sounds to me like you got some pretty good
language with Chirac on the European Security issue. Jef
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I just don't want to give the isolationists here
any encouragement.
~
Prime Hinister Blair:
The President:
am behind you.
I appreciate that.
I agree.
You are doing the right thing, and I
.(e)
Prime Minister Blair: I think it might be helpful, if at some
stage, I came over and saw some of the people on the Hill and
made a speech.
.(-e)
The President:
I agree with that.
Prime Minister Blair:
j£l
[Gap)!
The President: Let me ask you one other thing. I hear Chirac
wouldn't go along with the position you wanted to take on
Cyprus.
{.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
-tetcmiFI DEN'!' lAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�3
CWNFI DEH'I'IAL
The President: No, I just heard something and it may not be
right. The main thing, I know what Simitis wants you to say.
But it would be good if it didn't leak until as close to the loth
as possible. That would give us a week to get these talks,
(with Denktash)-, in New York, and I don't want to give him any
excuse to leave.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
[GAP]
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
IE.O. 13526, section I.4(b)(d)1
That's good news.
(I)
Prime Minister Blair: Incidentally, I thought you did
brilliantly in Florence.
(U)
The President:
Oh, thanks.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
You made a big impression on Jospin.
je1
The President: I tried to make him see that you and I were not
threatening everything he believes in. ye7
Prime Minister Blair: It would be really good to get together
in the next few months. I have so much that I would like to go
through with you. -+e-r
The President:
than February?
When would be good?
Is January better for you
~
Prime Minister Blair: We will see what we can arrange. If it's
not a summit in Bermuda, we can try something else. --t€+The President: I will look for something on the calendar. We
will do a statement on devolution and will clear it with you in
advance. ..+eY
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay Bill, all the best.
Okay, bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
COHFIDEHTIAL
(U)
�~
COHF'IDEH'fIAL
(~ I, ~ 0 \~
<
THE WHITE HOUSE
,-----------------------------------------------~~
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
~
I>
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I
S,»--O,/
. 'f,-/.LN3 0 \
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 78
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
. NOTE TAKERS:
Michael Manning,' Frank Jarosinski, Miguel
Aguilo, and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
December 16, 1999, 5:01 - 5:11 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Tony, how are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
How are you getting on?
(U)
I'm fine.
\
I Prodi will be
';':h-:e-:r::-e--:t;:-o::-m:-:-o-::r-:-r-:o-:-w:--a-:n::-d:;--:;=I-:-w:-:;i'l""l~s:::p::-e::-n:::-:;d-=s-=o-=m-:e~t:::l;-:'m::-e::--w""""'i""t-;:h""'h:-:l~'m---1.
I t h ink the r e
will be some investments needed, and we'll carry a lot of it, but
we may need EU help~1~------~--~--~~-------:-~--71 If things.
get resolved, it might come to a head in a couple of months. jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
jQ1
That would be unbelievable, wouldn't it?
Prime Minister Blair:
he?
(U)
The president:
That would be marvelous.
Yes.
When is Prodi getting there?
j£i
Tomorrow, is
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: So they are going to come back in early
January, and you think you can pull it together then? ~
The President:
Yes, I do.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That would be fantastic. If you can put
this and Northern Ireland together, it would be pretty good.
yz(
CONFIDEN"fIAL
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on
�IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
2
The President:
Yes.
That would be a good deal. Trimble is
coming in the next few days and I will see him. And we are doing
what we can with Sinn Fein on the issue of IRA guns. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good. The only other thing I wanted to
mention is that I think it is important to bring this Iraq
resolutioh-to a vote tomorrow.
I know the French are going to
abstain, but we've got to get something moving -- this thing is
stuck on idle. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You _mean with Iraq?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
I don't know.
(JZ')
Je1
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: We played around with this for so long, we
should go for it. ~
The President:
next. .J..C+
I think it will give us an idea of where to go
Prime Minister Blair:
If we let it go much longer, it will get
complicated for everybody,1
I
The President:
I agree.
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
Prime Minister Blair:
It is sad for the people in Iraq.
everything all right with you apart from this? ~
So is
The President:
Yes.
11m doing fine and I am delighted things
are going well. We have to just keep working .at it -- chippin~
!':I.t.f::::l U
Lf?1::
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
Prime Minister Blair:
I
)
~------The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
preparing to be a father again? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
selves. ...(-e}
It was so unexpected.
Yes, they have their good selves and their bad
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Are you
I
Yes, we have to keep working at it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Are you getting any golf in?
The President: No, but I'll play soon.
out of the way first.
(V)
~
(U)
I have to get this work
I am really thrilled about the Helsinki decisions. The Turkey-EU
thing is a big move and it will be a big help.
It will bring
resolution to other issues. The ESDI decision was good, too.
-f€+Prime Minister Blair:
I
~
~------------~/
I
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
�4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
The President:
)k1
He's really good.
~p_r_l_'m
____
e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________
__
The President:
Yep,
~
~
__________________
I am quite worried about it, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
]e1
I
L ____________________________________________
~
The President:
The in-crowd is making a lot of votes on
Chechnya. Maybe it will change when people start seeing a lot of
body bags, but as long as they keep getting the votes, they'll
keep'doing'it . ..J...e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Larry Summers came through here the other
day.
I had a good chat with him. Jef
The President:
He's a good man.
Prime Minister Blair:
rest of it.
(C)
The President:
keJ
We talked about the IMF job and all the
We've got to get somebody good.
Prime Minister Blair:
Really good.
~
~
The President: You take care of yourself.
I will keep you
posted on the Middle East stuff. It will take a little money.
kef
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
The President: Not yet.
we'll see.
.\Zl
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
I will say something to Prodi, then
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)1
All the best to you Bill.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
(U)
�co'iH'IDEN'FIAL
L «) I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(u)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Rob Williams,
Roger Merletti,James Smith, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
January 11, 2000, 4:22 to 4:45 p.m. EST
Air Force One
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi,
B~ll.
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
.How are you?
Same to you.
Happy New Year.
a'm fine.
(U)
You getting ready for fatherhood?
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, I'm psyched up.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
'-------'
The President:
I'm doing great. We're moving into our new home
and staying busy.
I've just been out to the Grand Canyon,
protecting another million acres of land, and Al's doing better.
So I'm feeling pretty good about things right now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He seems to be picking up.
That's
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes, I'm going to see him tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
-- a difficult situation --
Hello, Tony?
(U)
(U)
I can't hear a word you're saying.
(U)
Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on,!:
"-----"
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Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Is this any better?
I can hear you fine, now.
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright.
(U)
(U)
Good.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: For one thing, he will. We've worked very hard
this, and I want them to give de Chastelain something credible
wi h.
d n't hink the hav re'e ted it out of hand,
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
It's very helpful
de Chastelain and Mandelson have minimized the sense of a
·deadline," certainly publicly, because I think we need to frame
the issue for January not as meeting Trimble's deadline, but as
the need for concrete steps for de Chastelain to say the IRA is
on the way to meeting the timetable in the Good Friday agreement.
I know that Adams is trying to keep everybody together, but one
of the possibilities might be if they could be seen as responding
to you, rather than a unionist deadline. If something could be
done on the Patten report or something -- I want to make the
argument he's doing this in response to that, in addition to the
Good Friday Accord. .(.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
COWHDiWTIU
�·
3
CONFIDSN1'IAL
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)J
The President:
giving? .-tel
What is their reasoning?
What reason are they
Prime Minister Blair: /
J
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
CONE IDENTIAL
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
��5
"OMFIfJE1<f'fIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Yes. Well, I think we have to keep reaching out
toward them and just do our best. But I'm glad you saw him. Let
me say very briefly, we had a good week here with the Israelis
and the Syrians. There's a lot of tough work to go but when they
come back, I think you will see a break one way or another. I
just hope and pray it works. I think we have some chance to
achieve it, but we are not there by a long shot. jQt
Prime Minister Blair: Best of luck on it.
you're putting into it. ~
The President:
It's a great effort
I think we'll make'
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, and Bill, I think we will see each
other in Davos. You're making a speech? (V)
The President: Yes. So, I will see ~ou there, but I will call
you as soon as I know something on tnis.
(V)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's great.
okay, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(V)
(V)
(V)
End of Conversation
CONFIDEH1'IAL
.~~~._fl... ~;,.:,--·----
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�SECRE'f
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
0777
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 80
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
James Smith, Roger Merletti and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND. PLACE:
The President:
January 31, 2000, 2:29-2:50 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
Hello, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I am really sorry to trouble you, but I
thought I should bring you up to date on the Irish front.
(U)
The President:
It's okay.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section
3ECRET
Classified by:
Reason:
1.5d
Declassify on
tA(b)(d)
�2
$~CRE~
The President:
What do you think is really going on in the IRA?
J.81
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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The President:
Everyone else has made compromises
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Everybody else already delivered first.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Okay.
So you want me to call Gerry and take one
more whack at him?
(jf)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it's a
IE.o. 13526, section
ood idea.
1.4(b)(d)
The President:
So this statement they were willing to make about
the IRA, they can't even make that public? ~
SECRET
�3ECRE'l'
,
3
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Do you know what I mean?
The President:
language.
(..81
Yes,
I agree with you.
This is very conditional
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: No, no, I think the IRA may not care if America
withdraws its support, but I think Sinn Fein will be in a lot
worse condition if its friends in Congress lay it all on them.
He may not be able to do anything about it, ma be he even wants
it in some manner. He can't say this,
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
That is the thing.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRE'l'
�3ECRET
4
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I
I agree.
I'll call Adams and do the best I can.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The president:
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRE'l'
5
I E.O: 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
'11---_ _ _ _ _---'
The President: Yes. Even that is silly because they could
always get more if they had any grounds. The radical Irish could
get more. J.£-Y
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
--t3"I
That is what I think.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course they could tomorrow.
I
They are being pig-headed.
Yes.
-r-n-
NO, no.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Right, Bill.
(U)
I'll see what I can do.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
(U)
Many thanks.
Goodbye.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
(U)
�3ECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
/. C3,
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
Frank Jarosinski, Deana
Sutliff, Miguel Aguilo, RO'ger Merletti, Don
Gentile and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Februa~y 8, 2000, 11:15 to 11:42 a.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi Bill.
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm all right.
(U)
I'm having a pretty good time.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
You just presented the budget.
The President:
I did it yesterday.
the Senate in New York.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
interesting.
(U)
(U)
Hillary just declared for
Your presidential race is very
The President: Yes, it is.
I can't tell where it's going yet.
It's got a few turns left in the road. We have got to see if
Bush has anything inside him to pull himself back up and respond
to McCain. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Al seems to be running pretty well.
-SEO,Er
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: - 2/9/10 _
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The President:
2
He is doing fine.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think the State of the Union stuff and
what I have read about the budget seems very interesting indeed.
Well, I'm glad you're having a good time.
(U)
The President:
Yeah.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Well, let me tell
is where you can help me a bit.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
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ou about mine.
Here
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: What's your reaction to the argument that they
ought to be given more time since there was a such a delay in
setting up the government? .kf5}
SECRET
~.
�4
SECRE'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Of course I do.
I'm just trying to think about
how to keep this thing together.
JZI
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Let me ask you something. Do you think any
argument they use is looking for a pretext for doing this and
they wanted to make it clear they did not support such things
and wanted to do it partly because of the terrorist incident in
the north? \
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O.13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�5
2iECR£'l'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Well, did Adams give you any -kind of opening
when you asked for an act of reconciliation? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Let me ask you, you and Bertie have agreed on
~hat you've asked Adams to do? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
to Trimble?
vn
Right.
y()
And if he does it, do you think you can sell it
�3ECRE'f
6
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
Trimble is coming over here in a couple of days
-- a week or 10 days, but it will be done by then. ~
Prime Minister Blair: Yeah it will be done by then.
need is a two-week breathing space. ~
The President:
you two weeks?
What we
Exactly what do you think it will take to get
+&t-
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President: Okay. I'll get in touch with Gerry and Martin
and see what we can do.
I'll let you know.
(S)
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm sorry to lay this on you.
~
The President:
No, no.
I think about this more than anything
else, besides the screw-ups in the Middle East. Let me ask you
3ECRE'£'
�7
BECRE':F
something on a much more mundane issue. Yesterday, I met with
some cabinet members and Rodney Slater said we put some more
ideas down to resolve the airport dispute we have with British
Airways, USAIR and American Airlines. Would you take another
look at that and see if we can get it done?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
I'm not completely familiar with that.
(C)
The President:
I know you're up to your ears in other things
but we've been dealing with this for years and it's sort of a
big deal here. Rodney told me he put some more stuff down on
the table.
In a political season, it would be big over here to
_ get this open sore resolved.
If you could have somebody take a
look at it.
I have never seen him more agitated about anything.
He is just trying to get it resolved. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sure, I will have a look.
Okay, I will get on this.
~
How is mother doing?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Fine. She's getting pretty large.
you going to come oV,er incidentally?
(U)
Are
The President: Let me tell you what we are trying to work out.
You want me to come, don't you? -fC+Prime Minister Blair:
proper talk with you.
I'm desperate to sit down and have a
-+G-l-
The President: I'm trying to figure out what the best time is
because we have to do this Third Way thing in Germany and there
might be time to run to Russia. We're trying to resolve
bilateral issues with Russia and kind of get this Chechnya thing
resolved.
Putin has enormous potential, I think.
I think he's
very smart and thoughtful.
I think we can do a lot of good with
him.
I'm trying to figure how to do all these things and come
to London because Cherie's time is coming close.
I want to come
when it would cause you the least problems and try to leave open
the option, if you need me to, to go to Ireland.
I want to come
and do you the most good.
(£)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a good idea in any sort of
circumstances. They would be delighted to see you. Well,
(U)
Cherie is due on May 20.
I mean, anytime is good.
BECKE'!'
�8
SECI'tc';r
The President: Obviously, I hav~ to leave you a couple of weeks
on the front.
If we decided to do it, afterward, how much time
do you need for paternity leave?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I don't know that I would need much time,
more than a ~eek, on either end of it. We'd love for you to
come over and there is lots to discuss.
(U)
The President:
Fathers get that in Britain.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
I don't know if I'll do too much of it.
(U)
The President:
I just don't want to screw it up.
Prime Minister Blair:
and see them.
(U)
(U)
It would be quite nice for you to come
The President:
I would love to come afterwards and get to see
the baby. Let me see what I can do.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill, we will be in touch.
love to see you come over.
(U)
The President:
Okay, see you soon.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRE'1'
I would
�SF·eRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Telcon with
SUBJECT:
B~itish
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
The President
Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard, Don
Cheramie, Roger Merletti, Don Gentile and
Dick Norland
February 11, 2000, 12:38 - 12:49 p.m. EST
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
(U)
How are you doing?
I'm okay.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Bill, sorry to trouble you again but I
thought I would bring you up to date with what .has happened.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
3ECRE'f
Yes.
Y0
�£pCRE'l'
.1
2
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
What about Trimble?
Where is he on this?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
f5t-
But if you haven't announced it, can't you ...
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you ought to go to Trimble and try to
work it out. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
SECRE'P
Can't you go to Trimble today?
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
�3
3ECRE'f'
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
If you can get Trimble to say okay...
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
The President:
If we could get to him today you could have this
all resolved by Monday.
(.,g-)
Prime Minister Blair:
~I________________________________~
The President: We can't run the risk of this thing unraveling
over the weekend just because of the timing of it. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
If we don't have some move by you and Trimble
today or tomorrow, this thing could unravel over the weekend.
How much does Trimble know about this?
~
)
Prime Minister Blair:
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
What I'm suggesting is we tell him what they
said and get him to make some noise in tomorrow's papers saying,
you know, there is movement here, something where he can reach
out to them.
Or call Adams or something. You need them to
connect before they go to bed tonight.
I just think that
something has to be done before the papers corne out and all hell
breaks loose...
t&}
Prime Minister Blair:
3:ECr<:EI
Okay.
~
�4
~ECRE'f
·1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
... at least the IRA got off their backsides and
did something half reasonable.
u()
Prime Minister Blair: \
I
The President: Yes, I think to make that really work we need
some sort of signal from Trimble that he believes this is all
possible. .J...91
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree, but my problem is that if he waits
until next week ...
k&r
Prime Minister Blair: ~I______________________________~
The President:
.keI
I don't want this thing to get away from you .
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: If you could get it tonight that would be
wonderful.
I know it is a pain in the rear end, but I'm scared
that if this thing drifts for three days ... yn
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: I agree with that, but if Trimble can give them
an excuse to do that it would be great. ~
Prime Minister Blair: /
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
SECRET
�5
oSgCRgT
The President: We will go to work on our side. Have someone
call us to let us know what Trimble said. We need to know what
we are going to say to Adams when we call him. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, thanks Bill.
The President:
Goodbye.
Fine.
(U)
End of Conversation
SECRi;T
Bye.
(U)
�·CONFIDENTIAL
/1<6 S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana sutliff,
Frank Jarosinski, Sean Tarver, Don Gentile
. DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 6, 2000, 12:56 - 1:04 p.m. EST
Oval Office
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill, how are you?
Hi, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Look, Bill, I've got to do this live
television thing in five minutes?
(U)
The President:
Okay,
just talk.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Let me tell you what I told Schroeder this
morning.
I talked to him for forty minutes this morning. The
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Classified by:
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:,
Robert A. Bradtke
�2
· CONFIDENTIAL
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
IE-O. 13526, section
1.4(b)(d) I
I E-O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
This is a really important job.
jQ1
The President:
It is really important.
It's not just
political.
You need to talk to him. )Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
He's in that frame of mind, is he?
~
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE-O. 13526, section
L4(b)(d) I
The President:
There are a couple of Germans who are qualified,
but he can't get them to accept the job.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
The President: Absolutely. I can't afford to be the skunk at
the garden party.
I have got to have some help. jQf
conFI DEH'f' IAL
rk~"'-~-ft'7'-';'::'·· ".~'-'~"-'~'-~"-;;,
;;~~~~~LIBRA~Y PHO~~CO~YJ' .
~'~""-::;''-:~_;_:_J:'':-~ -:;-o,J. .. :- -.~~_ o~_ -,_-;:...-~ ___ ,,-'-/.':,.
�.COHFIDEN'l'IAL
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: He is going to call you. He is calling
Kwasniewski first.
I told him "this is going to look bad for
you.
It can't look like you and I made a deal and gagged Europe
and infuriated all of the developing countries." ~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.G. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I
Prime Minister Blair:
check with you. JQ1
E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I will say that to him.
I just wanted to
The President:
I E.G. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONTI DElif'l'IAL
Go.
Look, Bill, I've got to go.
(U)
We also need to talk about Kosovo.
ket
�4
-COHFIDEN'FIhL
Prime Minister Blair: We need to talk about Kosovo and we need
to talk about Northern Ireland as well.
+er
The President:
Call me in the next couple of days.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Good Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
(U)
Good Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
COHFIDE11!Il'tL
~
�SECRE'l'
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
1820
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 84
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14,2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
united Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
("
Notetakers: Don Gentile, Joel Ehrendreich,
Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski, Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 14, 2000, 1:05-1:29 p.m. EST
The Residence
Hello.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Can we talk about Kosovo a little bit?
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, sure.
feI
~
The President:
Let me give you my thoughts. We've got violence
everyday, KFOR attrition, UN operations too slow, and;:.-w.:..:..:::e'--'-"ro..:e"--_ _---.
corning up on spring which is a most dangerous time.
I KO. 13526, section l.4(d) I
Basically, you and I gave it a lot of highlevel attention during the air campaign. NOW, you're worried
about elections, I'm worried about elections and the Middle East.
Somehow, we have got to get this operation on a sounder footing
before Milosevic challenges us. ~)
I think three things have to be done.
We have the biggest stake
in this because we believed in it. You'll be around after I'm
gone and this will come back and bite you in the behind.
First
of all, we've got to make sure KFOR has enough forces to counter
the threat and then we've got to make sure the UN gets funding to
do the job and then get enough police there to take pressure off
KFOR. KFOR is getting weaker when it should be getting stronger.
We have to look at our pledged force levels and have a smooth
transition when the new KFOR commander takes over.
If not, I
think Milosevic, who seems to be getting stronger in Serbia, will
take it as a sign of weakness and then we'll be back in conflict.
3ECl3:E!
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason:
1.S(d)
i
Declassify on;
�2
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
rn!e
Ls--e-c-o-n-d~t~h~i-n-g--~i-s~t'h-a-t~-w-e~h-a-v--e~t-o--r-e-d'-o-u'b~l~e--o--u-r--e-f~f-o-r~t-s--w-l~'~t~h~the
Kosovar Albanians. We sent the two best people with connections
there this week to deliver that message. Then, we've got to send
We're sending more police this month, from 490 to.
Blair:
The President: That's good. Let's talk about DNMIK. They are
crippled by the funding shortage. I'm trying to do what we can
to increase our contributions to improve the infrastructure, and
I hope you can give some sort of concrete pledge as well.
If you
and I won't do it, nobody will. We can give up to $500 million
if other people kick in some money. I've got Republicans in the
Senate trying to pass some bill saying that we can't give more
money until the Europeans do. We need some help. We have given
out 100 percent of the money we promised to give but I think the
ED has only given 40 percent of what was committed. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: At some
with this Kosovo status
mine together and get a
deal
ind of muscle this up
a bit.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes. I
And a lot more money.
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
~
/
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
glbCRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�SECRE'f
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"E.O.
The President:
Let me ask you.
13526, section 1.4(d) I J
h' k
J
I
I t In the
trick is and the problem is that authority is too dispersed.
Is
there any way we can get Kofi to somehow empower them? The
problem is that Kouchner works for the UN, KFOR is a UN force,
and we're here not wanting to get in the way, but not wanting to
I
~
I
13526, section 1.4(d)
~
s_c r_e_w__ __________________________________________________
__
u_p_. I
E.O.
L..
Prime Minis
The President:
I think the other. You know, my sense is the
Stability Pact, because you're putting up the money, would be no
problem there.
What is Kouchner's relationship with the French?
If they tell him what to do, will he do it? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I think so, yes.
.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I agree with that. We will work on it from our
side and can talk about it.
I just think this is so important.
I think this is part of the calls you'll make next week in
Lisbon. We need to have our people gaming out what we will or
won't do if Milosevic sends people into the northern part of
Kosovo allegedly to protect the Serbs. What are we going to do
if there is a real battle in southern Serbia and what are we
going to do about Montenegro if he invades them?
(~
�SECRET
4
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely. Okay. I agree.
The President: Everyone of them is
wants to do anything, including us.
have an aggressive response in these
not only minimize these problems but
anything out of line in Montenegro.
~
a tough problem. No one
On the other hand, if we
other three areas early, we
also minimize him doing
J..&t
Prime Minister Blair:
I agree.
I believe that the window of
opportunity is starting to close.
J.Zl
The President:
I real 1
like this idea.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
The President:
Did you have a good trip to Russia?
it was very good. J€1
The press on
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I
~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I don't know.
(S)
Absolutel.
What does he think about Chechnya?
Prime Minister Blair:
J,.21
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
It's a really rough situation over there and in a"
lot of Central Asian countries bordering there.
It was so
typically Russian ham-handed. -HHPrime Minister Blair:
SECREr
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�5
,3ECRE'I'
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: We had a good joint statement on the Genome
project -- thank you for that. Go see the Queen.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay, Bill.
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SJ;:CRET
See you
soon~
�3ECP.£'f'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of The
United Kingdom
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguila, Don Gentile, Rob Hargis and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
April 19, 2000, 1:05-1:40 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
(U)
Hello, Wdad," how are you doing?
Prime Minister Blair:
I am preparing.
(U)
(U)
The President: You know, after January I'm available for
babysitting duties.
(U)
The President: You said you wanted to continue my work with the
Third Way, and this is it: helping Blair balance work and
family.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I could do with a bit of help, I tell you.
Cherie is in great form but just keeps getting bigger and bigger.
I tell you, just the thought and I feel as if my life's about to
begin again.
(U)
The President:
It is going to be interesting. Given the way the
world is changing, it'll be a completely different childhood than'
the one your others had. Anyway, it is a great thing.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Right, Bill, we'll put you down on the
babysitting list now, mate.
(U)
The President:
3ECRE'f'
Reason:
1.5(ct)
Declassify on;,
You've got a deal.
(U)
�Sl!;CRl!;'f
2
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
LIF_r_l_'____
m e M_i_n_i_s_t_e r __
__ B_l_a_i_r : ________________________________________
__
The President: Yes, I really want to hear about that.
to see him. ~
~~
I'm going
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We have a lot to discuss. I agree with that. I
think we'll get more out of this guy since he just started his
term and if he thinks we're trying to help him achieve his
obj ecti ves.
I..e:J
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'P
That's right.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�IE.O.
fjECRE'f
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
3
The President:
I think to get there we have to somehow
demonstrate, number one, that it is only useful as a defense,
even assuming it works and assuming it meets the criteria I set
out. Basically it's a defense against people who can lob a few
missiles at you rather than a lot. We need to show that those
cooperating in the nonproliferation movement are actually
benefiting, and I need to keep working on it. There's got to be
a way to do that.
I think there is a way to make sure all the
countries that are cooperating on this do benefit.
I need to
keep working on it . .J.8l
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I know.
I used to have these arguments with
Yeltsin all the time when we were looking at expanding NATO.
I
asked him once, ~Do you really believe that if we got a foothold
in Poland we would bomb western Russia?" He said, ~No, I don't,
but there are a lot of old ladies out in the country who do." He
was dead serious.
I think it's important to understand their
mentality on this.
They are still affected by Napoleon, Hitler,
and the way the Cold War .came to end, and about the way the
SECRE'l?
�SECRET
4
Soviet Empire collapsed.
Yeltsin was much more enthusiastic
about this in some ways than his progressive successors.
He
wound up mortally hating communism, but still believing in Mother
Russia. All these guys do, and we've got to be sensitive about
that. -+£+.
But we can't walk away from something that can keep a lot of usalive.
I want to talk to you about it in greater detail, maybe
before I go to see him. We can't get this done without serious
adverse implications unless both Russia and Europe believe this
can be something that benefits all of us.
Since it's a defense
system, I'm committed to that.
I think there might be some way
to plug him into that.
(8)
I am still formulating my ideas on it, but let's talk one more
time.
Let's do that first before my meeting with him.
I'll
really read up on it.
I will talk to you about it one more time
before I leave. ~
Another thing I was going to say about the tax system is that
they have to keep working on it. Before I became president, I
was there in 1990 when Boris Yeltsin was elected president when
it was still nominally the Soviet Union and then he got reelected head of the whole deal.
I knew a guy who ran a
McDonald's restaurant there, and we were talking about this tax
problem.
He said ~Look, by the time we pay our taxes -- federal,
local, etc. -- our effective tax rate is 85 percent.
Because
it's McDonalds, I can still end up making a hell of a lot of
money here.
However, my nominal Russian competitor pays an
effective tax rate of 5 percent. But there's almost no other
kind of economic activity you can imagine, except maybe for the
energy sector, that can sustain that kind of tax burden."
1%
He wasn't pleading for help.
I was just a governor at the time.
But later, after I was President, we talked again.
If they want
to get a huge amount of foreign investment, they need to
rationalize their tax system and treat everybody the same.
Otherwise, they are never going to be competitive. That is
essentially the problem with the tax system and their regulatory
problems. J..e-r
I think all the internal energy problems they've got have caused
and cost untold billions of dollars of investment.
Their whole
view of energy is caught up in the notion of sovereignty, and
we've had trouble cracking that nut. Al Gore couldn't move
Chernomyrdin very far on that stuff, but I still think they've
got just staggering potential.
1Gr
The other thing I think would be helpful to do without being
patronizing is to do something about their health system.
SECRET
�5ECREl'
5
They're the only country in the world where their life expectancy
is declining because of unsanitary conditions, not because of
doctors~
They still have a fairly large number of good doctors
over there.
It's so embarrassing that it's difficult to talk
about.
I'm convinced it's one of the things that really
demoralizes the country. ~
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lair:
I agree.
The President:
I might be completely wrong, but my gut tells me
he could do wonders with his popularity if he could make some
progress on the health care problem.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I'm sure you're right.
Yes, God, yes.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRE'f
IE.O.
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
6
The President:
Let me ask you this.
Is there any way to link
the d~comm~ssioning with the Good Friday accord in a concrete way
- that doesn't stick them on the date? Are there any up-front
confidence building measures they can take, short of a bonfire,
which they still see~ reluctant to do?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
We did something like that in Bosnia, too.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
un
Exactly. «1
Are they going to do it?
+&T-
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECRET
�aECRET
7
The President: Well, I'm ready to do it. Do you think that
Gerry and Martin realize that after this last vote, Trimble can't
=-~::i.1.L.!....lI...l...l.l.E....-LL-.l..,Lll:!.),c,don' t do something more?
.+etPrime Minister Blair:
The President: Absolutely. Not only that, I just can't conceive
how anybodY thinks this thing could go forward without the
- unionists. Gerry Adams told me in private he thought there was
no way forward without Trimble. They've got to know. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: It's inconceivable. The whole premise of the
Good Friday Accord was consent. It's a fraud if you get rid of
them. )Z1
)
Prime Minister Blair:/
L-____________________________________- - The President:
What are they going to give back?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
3ECRE'I'
Really?
;e1
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�'SECRET
8
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
I
LT_h_e_pr_e_Sl_'d_en_t_:I
___
I
~========================~~
Prime Minister Blair:
I
The President:
You can't make that dog hunt.
Prime- Minister Blair:
JQ1
+G+-
It isn't realistic.
The President:
I think you're onto some good ideas. We'll keep
talking to them. We have our channels open and when you want me
to do something, I will. I
~~______~__~____~__~~~~____~__~~__~~~~~Ithe same
thing may be happening in Northern Ireland.
It might not happen
again, there is so much prosperity, but it's one hell of a gamble
to take over basically, what are you going to do with a few arms?
You're not asking them to give them all up right now and they can
always replace what they lose. They can always go back.
It's so
bizarre.
Jj::1'
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
IE.a.
Prime Minister Blair:
It is.
~
The President:
I know you offered to meet with the IRA and they
said no. My only other suggestion is whether you or someone on
your behalf could open a channel of communication with others in
Sinn Fein/IRA besides.
In a way, at some point, it gets hard for
the leadership to make a case, and I have the feeling that the
rank and file read the newspapers and are sophisticated on one
level but in the absence of personally engaging with someone who
can explain what's going on out there, it's pretty tough.
I know
I have told you before, I think a lot of these guys can't imagine
how their lives are going to be different if this thing works
out.
I don't know how to do it, and I don't know if I can help
you, but that's the only suggestion I have.
It's a pretty narrow
funnel you're pouring all this in, and Gerry and Martin have a
heavy load.
Some may think, well, Martin is the Minister of
Education and Martin has a nice life, what/s in it for us? Maybe
3ECRE'f
'", "
_
rE
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�SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section
9
1.4(b)(d) I
there's nothing to this, but I think you should keep thinking
about this. .+-e1
~
I
L_p_r_i_m_e M_1_"n i_s_t_e_r B_l_a i_r_:_____________________________________________
__ __
__ __
The President: If I had your blessing, I'd be happy to do it. I
don't know if they~w~OU~l~d~d~O~i~t~-=-==i=f==t=h~e~y~w~o~U=l=d=-=t=a=l~k~t=o~a=n~__~
American either. I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
ere 1S a uge gap, you
. Prime Minister Blair:
I
j
The President: Give some thought to it. I'll have our people
talk to your people about how to establish some sort of dialog
through a British or American contact and talk these things
through and give some thought to what this will be like -- what
are they going to do with their lives, how will it be different?
I may be overstating this, but it strikes me that if we just
could get them to think about how their lives would be different
if this worked out. I now believe Gerry and Martin want this to
work. But, if they brought it to a vote and jammed the vote and
caused half of them to bolt to some other faction -- we don't
want that. It's worth some leakage, but not much. It's easy for
me to say this, because I don't have to deal with the aftermath
of the bombs, but you would be right back in the soup. -8?r
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes.
J£f
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�10
8ECRE1'
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President:
You know how badly I want this to work.
I really
think it's important. You have a good economy and good social
reform. And, if you could get a breakthrough here, I think you
would secure your place and your party's place for a long time to
come. You could help New Labor in ways we can't even evaluate.
I just want to do whatever I can for you before I have to leave
here.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
When are we going to see you?
y1
The P~esident:
I'll see you for sure in Berlin. 1'd like to
come to the UK and to Ireland before I go, but I want to be
flexible on timing.
I want to come see you when I can do the
mos t good.
JZI
/J
Prime Minister Blair:!
L-__________________- - - - - -
The President:
I've got a lot of things to talk to you about.
The main thing I don't want to do is something harmful to the
peace process, and it's not too good for me to look like I'm
taking a sentimental journey. I want to come and do something .
.....(..Gt""
Prime Minister Blair:
I
!E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) !
The President: God if you could do that, that'd be great. Let
me know when you want us to weigh in the next couple of weeks.
y(
Prime Minister Blair:
How is Hillary?
(U)
The President: She's doing well. I think she's going to win!
She is starting to sound like a real politician. She's always
been a good speaker, but now she's got to where she can get up
and give a real political speech and sound like a politician.
I'm beginning to sound like a meandering old man.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
well, too? ~
Not quite.
And Al?
He's doing pretty
The President: God, yes. He's doing much better. I expect him
to win. We have a big problem here. The cultural aversion of
white, married, Protestants to voting Democratic is a real
3gCRE'P
�SECRET
11
problem -- and one we have to overcome. Bush is a skilled
politician, but he is not ready to be president, maybe not ever,
certainly not now. But they want it real bad and they've got
lots of money and lots of media access and they are not freshly
discredited. And in this level of economic performance some tend
to believe it's automatic and nobody's going to screw it up, a
lot of people expect it -- think it is automatic.
It is going to
take a lot of discipline -- but I think Al will win. God knows
I'm doing everything I can to get it done without being
counter roductive. )R1
.
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d,
!
Prime Minister Blair:
I
I
~
The President: Whew. Well, yes. We're making a little progress
on the Africa trade bill.
(gap) I may run over to Nigeria in a
few months.
(,e1
Prime Minister Blair: /
I
The President:
But better gay than sad.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\
The President:
But I think we've given a lot of evidence.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
\L---=~====~-------------r~~~~~
E.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d)
The President:
If you are, you've;got a hell of a cover-up!
are doing the best you can do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay, Bill.
Thank you, man.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
All the best.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
8CCRC'P
You
�DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
SECRET
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 86
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Joel Ehrendreich, Jenny McGee,
Miguel Aguilo, and Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE.:
May 4, 2000, 6:26-6:34 p.m. EDT
Columbus, Ohio
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hello.
Hello, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
me.
Hi.
(U)
(U)
Thanks for callin
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Sounds like what we did in Bosnia.
Prime Minister Blair: .. [gap]
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECREi'
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: i
~
�·
SECRET
2
The President:
I heard it all. It sounded good to me.
I like
this idea of third-party verification. That way the IRA keeps
the nominal title to their weapons, so they didn't decommission,
but they did. ~)
Prime Minister Blair:
Exactly.
kB1
I like it.
If the IRA will take it, it's a good
put the government back up as soon as
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How about "Formerly Royal Police Service?"
s,.e1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
You don't want me to call Gerry or Martin now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
That's good.
Prime Minister Blair:
f€t
There we are.
We're trying our best.
I
The President: Well, I like this very much.
I always thought
the only way around this conundrum was something like secure
SECRET
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�3
storage with third-party verification.
I think that's about the
best we can do right now.
It is going to come down to whether
both believe it would be a crying shame to let May come and go
and basical~y junk the Good Friday Accord.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: You'll find a way, and I'll be glad to call them.
We've kept in touch with their people. You've got a really good
proposal. -I don't see how you could make it better than it is.
f-Q1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Anything else?
Prime Minister Blair:
No.
(U)
I will keep in close touch, if I may.
).QY
The President: You can call me in the middle of the night if you
want, if this thing gets hot. You know I care deeply about it.
I will do what I can. ~
.Prime Minister Blair:
If you don't mind, I may have to do that.
~
The President:
bye.
(U)
Okay, I'm eagerly looking forward to it.
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
SECRET
Okay,
�CONFIJ;lENl'f'IAL
3363
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE
~ONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTLCIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
(U)
Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
Joel Ehrendreich, Matthew Sibley, Don
Gentile, Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 15, 2000, 5:20 - 5:34 p.m. EDT
The Residence
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hey, Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Sellers movie.
Hello.
(U)
Hi, Bill.
I'm great.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
How are you doing?
(U)
I'm watching the end of an old Peter
Which one?
(U)
The President:
I can't tell.
I've only seen about five minutes.
But Herbert Long just disappeared along with a castle.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Pink Panther, I think.
I think it's the second one.
(U)
It's funny as hell.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
He was so funny, Peter Sellers.
Anyway ...
(U)
The President:
I just wanted to put you in good humor since
you're dealing with Northern Ireland.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I just wanted to bring you up to date.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDEN'fIAL
Reason: 1. 5d'
Declassify on
�CONFIDEHTlhL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
2
What does your legislation say right now?
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you have to move on this?
+G+-
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Weren't they saying before -- when you and I were
talking, I had a copy of the other legislation -- weren't they
claiming that they ... ~
~
Prime Minister Blair: /
L - - -_ _ _ _
----~
The President: But weren't the republicans saying if you did
that, unionists would just say that all time, and, therefore, the
Catholics wouldn't join? ;e1
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CON"FIDENTIAL
�3
CONFIDg~nIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
~
Prime Minister Blair:
L-~_ _-------------~
The President:
But the real fact is you would take it off.
Jer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: Let me see what I can do.
I'll mull it over a
bit. Let me ask you this. What do you think should be done in
Sierra Leone? Your guys have done a good job there. .Jret
Prime Minister Blair:
The President: We're talking about it here. My take on this is
that we could strengthen the UN hand if the Nigerians go in, and
you and whoever can stay in the coastal areas and the city, but
you don't want to be subjected to being picked off in those
jungles by those crazy people. They've got all these young kids
they've brutalized, hopped up on drugs.
I think if we can defeat
that kind of thing, it would be a good thing to do. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEH1'IAL
IE-O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDENTIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
The President:
4
I
Yes.
jQ1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Yes, we're taking them in.
fer
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I think you're doing fine.
I'm just worried
about whether we're doing enough and how to do it.
I think
having you there and securing the airport is about what you
should be doing. You don't have enough people to venture out,
and I would hate to see you go out and be shot into fodder.
I
think we need more troops. They will be scared if the Nigerians
come in there in full force and the Indians are willing to do so.
I may want to call you again if you think there is something else
we should do.
Let me know if we can hel . ou. You've done a
good thing.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I agree with that. You keep chewing on that.
I'll get back to you on that and on the Irish thing.
~
\E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) \
CONPIDEIJ'PIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
5
,.=p",r=i=m=e==M=~=·n=~='s=t~e=r=B=l=a=i=r:..::~_O:...:k..::.:a::::y,-,~B::..~::..·1::..::..1.:..J'
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: It's too bad the unionists won't let you kick the
can down the road a bit. If you could, the issue would become
relatively less important to both sides once things are up and
running. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
How's mama Cherie doing?
Prim~ Minister Blair:
producing.
(U)
The President:
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Fine.
(U)
She's about a week away from
Is she in a bad humor about being big?
Prime Minister Blair:
She's okay.
(U)
She's been in court today.
(U)
The President:
Good!
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: She's going to court to take on the
government over parental leave. Don't even talk to me about it.
She is great, but she could produce at any time.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thanks.
Alright, I'll see you soon.
Okay, Bill.
Bye.
(u).
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDEN'1'IAL
(U)
�CONPIDEN'f'IAL
1.40
THE: WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N,GTO N
...r
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
<
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SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
en
Telcon with Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom (U)
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
Hi, Bill.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
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Amy Swarm and Sean Tarver
May 27, 2000, 12:27-12:44 p.m. EDT
The Residence
AND PLACE:
Hey.
Prime Minister Blair:
..::en
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(U)
Congratulations!
What a good day.
Yes, it was good, but tight.
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yn
The President: Trimble was ri ht. He had to 0 back to
those crazies in his party. ~1~E~.=O=.=1=35=2=6=,=s=ec=t=io=n=1=.4=(=d=)~~~~~~
Yes.
Prime Minister Blair:
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The President: Yes.
I talked to Adams this morning. He is a
little bit peeved about Trimble talking about house-training him,
but, I said, "Oh hell, it's part of the deal to get the
government back up."
I told him, "Look Gerry, I will support
you. You've got to get the Patten thing, but you also have to do
those CBMs."
(.e1'
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes. /
~
'-----------~-----CONPIDEN'f'IAL
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2
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is exactly what the republicans are
thinking, so you have go to talk to them. There is no question··
they will completely, once they move forward with their CBM, cut
the ·ground from under the "no" unionists.
(.e-r
Prime Minister Blair:
I think that is right.
IE.D. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
"he President:
How's fatherhood coming?
·.,me Minister Blair:
It's different.
(U)
(U)
The President: You're not coming to Berlin?
to be on family leave.
(U)
Are you still going
I really wanted to come,
Prime Minister Blair: It's difficult.
but it is difficult to leave Cherie home alone on weekends
without anyone.
(U)
The President:
I think that is the right thing.
Prime Minister Blair:
to Russia?
(U)
(U)
It should be a good do and then you go on
I guess you saw
The President: Yes. What I am trying to do.
the sort of crazy speech Bush gave last week. . .(..G1Prime Minister Blair:
Yes, I did.
~
The President:
[gap]
He didn't promise to unilaterally reduce
below START III levels. He just promised to cut them below START
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONP'IDEM'fIAL
3
II levels. Hell, I've already done that. This is just crazy.
am terrified these guys will get in and say Reagan was right
about Star Wars. And then you'll get the Chinese building a
thousand weapons, after all the work I did passing China
Permanent Normal Trade Relations. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Congratulations, that was brilliant.
I
(91
The President:
It was a great thing, but too hard. The only
problem we have in this country is that our business community
always kills legislation. Anyway, I am just so afraid that all
the benefits will be squandered if Bush wins the elections.
I
still think we have a 50 percent or better chance to win.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
Quite close, isn't it?
~
The President:
It shouldn't be. White married'Protestants don't
think they should be voting for Democrats, partly because of the
gun issue that Al and I are taking on. All the specifics people
agree with. [gap] it is crazy. You can take a poll about
loopholes.
Sixty-five percent to 30 percent say yes, but even in
New York where it is more liberal than the rest of the country,
if Hillary were endorsed by this group that did the Million Mom
March, it's like 40 to 40 percent. A lot of the country likes it
when we are in, but they have a hard time admitting it. My job
approval was like 65 percent. Bush is really smart. The
campaign against McCain was the most vicious in modern memory.
He has these right wing foot soldiers do his dirty work, so he
can be nice.
I think Al had not the best couple of months, but
now he is in good form and doing well. And we have the record
and the people.
I think he'll do fine in debates, but I still
think he has a better than 50 percent chance of winning this
thing.
If he doesn't, then you will have to do a lot of heavy
lifting.
I think Al is sort of where I am on this stuff. Of
course, if Bush wins, whatever I do with Putin, they can reverse.
If we just came out and said we are not going to do this now and
we are not going to do it until we have technology everybody buys
into and believes in, but we have to do research -- if I did
that, all I would do is make Al vulnerable. There is an article
by Hugo somebody in one of your papers, saying he thought we were
nuts. ....(.et"
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hugo Young?
j£1
Did you see the piece?
Prime Minister Blair:
yn
No, but I had it summarized for me.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
The President:
It would be a good thing if national missile
defense worked on a broader basis.
If it gives people the
impression that it would work, people would believe that we could
use the thirig and they would be less likely to attack. But
you've got to figure out if you deploy and if you got beyond the
second phase and it could stop 50 or 60 warheads, what position ..
would that put the· Chinese in.
I don't think a lot of people say
let's go full tilt on this thing. The goal ought to be to get
rid of these damn offensive weapons and direct our energies
toward that.
In the meantime, we must not do anything in the
interim to increase the chances these weapons would be used.
j£1
Prime- Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) I
The President: The main thing is, the United States should take
a position that we have got to do this in the context of our
larger objectives.
I am working with Al in an effort to preserve
the arms control regime.
If we could do it, it would be good.
The problem I have with the Republican approach is they would
deploy this big Star Wars in the sky system and an adversary can
get under it if they want. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
L I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'=E=.O==.1=3=5=2=6,=s=e=ct=io=n=1=.4=(=b=)(= ________~
d=)~I
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The President: One thing Republicans say is that nobody believes
we can have bad intentions, but we are the only people who have
ever dropped one of these weapons. My objective is to try and
leave office with the thing in the best possible state in terms
of a decent outcome.
I am trying to do this deal with Putin to
foreclose the possibility of going to any bigger system which
would undermine arms control.
It might not work. We might not
be able to do it. But I still think we are going to win this
thing. We might not.
It might be close.
I always believed Al
is going to win.
I am going to try to make it difficult for Bush
to go off half-cocked on this Star Wars deal. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
Any chance of seeing you?
(~
The President:
I hope so.
I would still like to come over
there. Now that we have the Northern Irelaqd government back up,
maybe I can go by Ireland again.
yeJ
Prime Minister Blair:
I think it would be good.
I have some
ideas on this stuff.
It would be nice to sit down and talk in
detail.
It would also be nice to see you in Ireland. ~
CONFIDENTIAL
�COHFIDENTI."lL
5
The President:
I didn't want to go until it makes sense all
around in terms of the peace process and your schedule. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
arranged. J.G-r
Why don't we see what dates could be
The President:
I want to see your baby.
babies, you know.
(U)
I am quite good with
Prime Minister Blair: He is a great guy.
So good. A little
star, really.
And Cherie is doing great. We are going off to
mass now on Saturday night, to try to avoid the media.
If it is
not too mUGh of a hassle, to meet quite soon would be good and we
could use Ireland as the reason and have a proper talk at the
same time. Thanks for all your help again. When do you leave?
+c+The President:
I depart the Uni ted States on Monday.. I have an
EU thing in Portugal, then on to Russia, and then a brief stop in
the Ukraine.
I go to Portugal, Berlin, Russia, Ukraine, and then
home.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
So you leave next week?
(U)
It is a
The President: Yes. All right, tell Cherie hello.
great day for you. The way you keep everybody talking is amazing
to me.
~
Prime Minister Blair: Occasionally it is amazing to me, too.
One day at a time.
~
The President:
All right man.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
All the best.
(Ul
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
�_,_J . •
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
...i'
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
~
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(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
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Prime Minister Blair
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The President:
Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill.
Where are you?
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Really?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, Cherie is coming with me and making
a speech in New York at some lawyer thing, so we have to bring
the baby with us.
(U)
The President:
That's great.
Where are you staying?
(U)
I hope I get to see your baby.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CONFIDENTIAL
�2
CONFIDBlffIAL
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Here's the problem we've got.
First of all, I
won't do anything until I see you.
I don't want to jam you in
public. Our guys tell me that Lott .will basically shut down the
Senate and not even do China if we don't do something, and now
our Foreign Sales Corporation plan was rejected.
It is not a
political thing with me.
I am not running for election, and I
don't want to do anything to hurt you, but, on the other hand, I
can't take the risk they will shut the Senate down.
The real
damage will be if they walk away from the China issue.
That is
my p~oblem, We ought to talk tomorrow. We are going to. have
dinner tomorrow, right? ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Right.
(u)
The President:
Why don't we talk a little and see if there is
any reasonable prospect.
If I could just get either one of
these things resolved.
They are killing me on the FSC and the
other thing.
They know, or at least I know, you tried to help
us on both of these things.
I just can'.t let them shut the
thing down on me. JR1'
Prime Minister Blair: /
L -__________
~------------------------------~/
The President:
There might be.
don't we talk again tomorrow.
Prime Minister Blair:
Let me talk to our people.
Je1
Why
Okay.
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: The real problem on the banana issue is a
feeling over here that there is an Anglo-Irish company that is
the main beneficiary of not resolving the issue. That is adding
to the heat.
But the issue isn't a political one for me. We
were able to avoid putting cashmere on the list last time.
You
had those elections in Scotland, and I took a lot of crap the
last time.
It is not a political thing with me, it's just that
I've got to do business with these people for the next six
weeks.
I can't run the risk of having this blamed on me or
being accused of acting on the basis of a personal relationship,
and I can't do anything to hurt Al.
I think he is going to win,
but it is tight as a tick.
(p1
CONFIJ;;BNTIAL
�@OHFIDBHTIAL
3
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Prime Minister Blair:
(gap)
(U)
The President:
So when we tried to run it by them that you were
trying to help us, they said how can that be, this Anglo-Irish
company is the main beneficiary? Normally I do what I want but
Congress has a big oar in the water.
(gap)
Why don't you talk"
to your folks, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.
Maybe it will be
alright to call Lott, what the hell.
This has been dragging on
so long.
(gap) about as long as I can, and I can't run the risk
they would use that as a pretext against something as profoundly
important as China. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay,
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
I think that is quite possible.
I know the heat
they are getting, and I know where it is coming from.
But it
might be helpful, if we could have any indication we could get
that or the FSC thing resolved. Both are hanging out there
feeding on each other. And, in the Senate, it is not totally
confined to the Republicans either.
ye1
Prime Minister Blair:
I totally understand, okay.~
The President:
Okay, so I get to see your baby?
will see you tomorrow.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Alright, Bill, all the best.
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
Alright, I
(U)
�..
..:
.;- .
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O.13S26, SECTION s.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 90
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October ]4, 20]5
TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
l.4L--
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Rob Hargis, Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt
Van der Walde, and Don Cheramie
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
October 12, 2000, 9:11 - 9:19 a.m. EDT
Chappaqua, NY
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello .Bill?
Hey, Tony.
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It's a terrible situation.
It's terrible
what happened to your servicemen.
I want to express my
sympathies.
If there is anything I can do, I am glad to.
It
looks like it is spinning out of control.
je1
The President:
I tried for days.
We had two
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now, we don't know who blew up our ship.
We know there have been terrorist elements trainin for
something like this.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Now you have these
�SECRET
2
instabilities working against each other.
t
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
Let me te
you w at my pans are.
I'm In
New Yor , we Just celebrated our 25 th anniversary. What a
romantic background.
I'm on my way back to the· off;Lce.
It will
take about 2 hours.
I will call you back when I get there.
I've tried to put something concrete together for two days.
I '11 get back to you when I get to. Washington. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Biarritz.
I'm going off to the EU Council in
tE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) t
The President:
t
Prime Minister Blair:
it to me.
J.e1
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
If you need anything from us, please pass
The President:
I will.
Right now what we need is a nonjudgmental break. For God's sake, let's get past this and start
talking.
I'll know more later.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
'Let us know what we can do.
).e1
The President: Hell, in a 100 days you can call me to go to
places like Biarritz to go skiing. God really doesn't want me
to ease my way out. -ter
Prime Minister Blair:
SECRET
Take care Bill.
(U)
�3
The President:
Bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
+er
Bye.
~
End of Conversation
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Robert Hargis, Don Cheramie,
Tina Yarmchuk, Kurt Van der Walde, and Dick
Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
October 13, 2000, 3:36-3:59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office
Hi Tony.
Prime Minister Blair:
(U)
Hi Bill.
How are you?
(U)
The President: Well, we haven't been sleeping much, but we've
been on the phone for the ast two days. We may be near putting
something together.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
for two days now, and I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4( d)
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
I
to work on the
�SECRBT
2
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
SECREI
�3ECRE'f
3
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
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IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b )(d) I
SECRET
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�5
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The presirjent:Okay.
Good-bye.
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
i3BCRBT
�eONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Rob Hargis, Dianne
Ruschaupt, Jill Sandler and Dick Norland,
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 10, 2000, 3:40 - 3:54 p.m. EDT
Army-NaVy Country Club
Hello?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CU)
Hi, Bill.
(U)
Hi, Tony.' How are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliantly.
(U)
Fine.
(U)
How are you?
Hillary just did
The Pre.sident:
She did great. And it looks tome like Al' s got
the votes, but we don't know if theY'll get counted. --+er
Prime Minister Blair:
Well, what's going to happen?
+et
The President:
I don't know. They still have to count
5,000 overseas ballots.
It's a very confusing situation. There
was an illegal ballot in Florida, where they use a punch card
system. The Bush people are trying to bully him.
Some votes
went to Buchanan and there are 19,000 ballots for him that were
disqualified, and they were African-Americans. Usually, you'd
just say "tough," but here you've got a situation where Gore won
the popular vote. He picked up five points in five days and
also pulled out a huge minority vote, I just hope he can pull it
out. Last night we had former Presidents Ford, Bush, Carter, and
Lyndon Johnson's widow, and we all made reassuring sounds to the
public. --tel
CONFIDENtpIAL
Classified by:
Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 ($1)
. -"
"."~ __ c~ .•~~~~--~"~~
Declassify On:
11~·mO~"-"..
.';
!'
';. . INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
1
-:::.>';~ ~~~;_ ,___ ,""".-~Y;':~'-;::.-)i:;..."':.':"::o-~~,,",- }-----: ,;.~--;
�CGUFI8EH'fIAL
2
Prime Minister Blair:
Where is public opinion?
~
The President: Most want it settled but they don't understand
the issue. They do not understand how clearly these votes were
for Gore. They cite Nixon not challenging in Illinois. The
dif·ference is that i f Nixon had won Illinois, he still would not
have won the electoral vote. It's really bogus. Hillary is
doing great, happy as a clam.
I am really proud of her. -+eJ
Prime Minister Blair: Well, Hillary did wonderful. Give her
our love. She was just fantastic during the campaign. She was
so strong and brave.
I thought she was just great.
J,M.
The President:
She was . . Je(
Prime Minister Blair:
brilliant.
(..et'
Well, Cheri sends her love.
Hillary was
The President: Yeah, she was the "Little Engine That Could."
I
wish you were with me, I'm playing golf. The three guys with me
are on the green right now.
~
Prime Minister Blair: The thing I wanted to say to you was on
Northern Ireland.
I think if you still want and are able to
come over, I think you could playa part in putting this
together. We had a bit of a breakdown, but it should not be
terminal because both sides want this to happen now. There are
certain thin s we have to do and certain thin s the re ublicans
have to do.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
Trimble is really getting it done in the government as
the government is working well. ~
The President:
I saw what he said about no North-South
cooperation before they reengage. But the problem now is that
( C)
the IRA can't appear to be caving in to a unionist demand.
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
CGHPI8ENTIAL
�COHFIDEN'fIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
3
I think it ·would be great if you came over, and people
really welcome it.
I had a word with Trimble, and I think
he is keen about it as well.
He is desperate to make this work·
and so is McGuinness. We need something new, something
different to come in and sort it out a bit. ~
The President:
What's your thought?
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
When do you want me to come?
Prime Minister Blair:
~
Sometime in early December.
~
The President: We are working on this agreement with North
Korea to try to get them to end their missile program, and I
leave this weekend for Vietnam. It sounds weird but it will be
hard for me to take two more trips but I might be able to do
them both. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
here? J...e7
Do you want us to leave some of those deportees
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDEN'FIAL
IE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
4
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
In the end it would be up to you if you cando this, but I
think it is possible to put together a deal, and you wouldn't
just be visiting, but you would actually be helping to get the
deal done.
)£1
The President:
if I can come?
.
Do you want me to do some work on this and see
~
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
We can meet the Irish in the next
two or three days to try to get a common position with them, and
we will brief your guys on it.
I can send you a note with the
elements of the deal 'on it. je}
The President:
That would be wonderful.
You know I want to if
I can.
I realiy want to get this m.issile deal in Korea done, it
will make us all a lot safer.
I'll tell Hillary that you
called. .-k€1
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
CONFIDBN'3'IAL
(U)
He's perfect, just great.
Wonderful.
The Prime Minister:
(U)
The President:
(U)
How is your baby doing?
The Prime Minister:
The President:
Thank you.
(U)
I'll get to work on this.
Bye-bye.
(U)
(U) .
All the best.
�5
COUP IDBNT L"soL
Prime Minister Blair:
Bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
GONFIDEN'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with the British Prime Minister Blair
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Frank Jarosinski,
Jill Sandler, Clark Lystra, Dick Norland and
Ian Bowles
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE
The President:
November 23, 2000, 9:10-10:06 a.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland
Hello, Tony?
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
(U)
Hello, Bill.
(U)
Hey, Tony, How. are you?
Prime Minister Blair:
you?
(U)
I'm fine.
I'm fine.
(U)
I'm in good form, but how are
The President:. I'm doing great. I had a good trip to Vietnam.
I'm still jet lagged.
I guess it's just old age.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was a great visit.
(U)
The President:
It was great for us.and generally for
encouraging a force for change within Vietnam. They tried to
discourage the people, but they came out in droves. Sixty
percent of the country is under thirty years old, so they are
all kids. Most of them are thinking about tomorrow and there
are not a lot of elderly people. The Chairman of the party in
Saigon was talking. up private sector activity -- he sounded like
the mayor of a big mid-western city.
It was like a chamber of
commerce speech. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
CONFIDENTIAL
That's good.
�.CONFIDEN1'IAL
2
The President:
On the other side, the General Secretary said
first we have to get what happened in the war straight. He said
I'm glad you were against it. Your visit has· helped us a lot.
Our Ambassador, Pete Peterson, was in the Hanoi Hilton for six
years.
I said we were debating the nature of the conflict, but .
let's get one thing straight: we were not friends.
Now ~hat
you have a united country, we are still having the same debate
about how much of these things are eternal questions and how you
have to join the debate. )e}
Prime Minister Blair:
returned to.?
(J27
It looks fascinating -- but what have you .
The President: Between you and me, here's the problem. We
always knew this could happen where someone could win the
popular vote but lose the electoral college. You have electoral
votes that correspond to representation in the House and then
you get two more for your Senators, so it gives more influence
to smaller states. The other argument in the old days was that
we didn't have the telegraph, so we needed honest people to come
and say how the people voted.and now that is obviously
unnecessary.
This happened only twice before where nobody could
get a majority.
In 1876 and 1888 we had a case where the winner
of the popular vote lost the electoral college.
In both times,
the results were clouded and controversial, but largely the
South was still solidly democratic.
It was against the people
who won the Civil War so you had fluky results. This is just a
case where it just happened that 40,000 votes out of 200 million
people is what the dispute in Florida is about.
Gore has said
he will not challenge the electoral college, but he wants to
make sure that if Bush is given Florida that the people who
showed up got their vote counted. The truth is, Tony, everybody
knows Florida had complicated procedures.. They used a ballot a
lot of older people couldn't read, and more people intended to
vote for Gore than Bush. You still have ten thousands blacks in
one precinct.
They were going to vote for Gore. Ten thousand
uncounted votes in one county and six thousand in another. You
have nineteen thousand predominately blacks in Palm Beach County
who punched Buchanan and then punched Gore.
That is another
sixteen thousand votes for Gore. Then you had thirty two
hundred Jewish people who voted for Buchanan and we had a
statistician say it was a trillion to one shot that Buchanan
could have gotten that many votes. The real question is:. can
Gore re-enfranchise enough people to win the elections instead
of the Republicans? The Secretary of State was Bush's campaign
chairman and now the Republican House is threatening to make him
CONP IDEN'l'IAL
�CONFIDEN'fIAL
3
President if the electoral votes go to Gore or not.
The Florida
constitution says if you can divine the intention of the voter,
the vote should be counted and ironically, everything Bush is
fighting in Florida in the recount is precisely what the law he
signed in Texas requires. Any indentation at all these voters
make is supposed to count. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
So what's your bet?
~
The President:
I don't know. On the merits, Gore should win,
if we can re-enfranchise enough voters, but even the Florida
Supreme Court, they issued a great decision for Gore but Miami
Dade said· "we can't finish by Sunday, so we are not going to do
·it at all." So now they have to decide whether they can get
their own order by delaying. They don't need to have any of
this done until December 12th, but you know the Florida
Legislature is Republican. The Republican Congress is
threatening to change the law and they would throw it into the
House. But if they do that, he will be destroyed and he never
will recover. Je1
Prime Minister Blair:
What ~s your opinion?
jZ1
The President: Right now it's evenly divided because the
process is confusing but generally thought to be fair.
The
Republicans are great spin meisters. They just say it
differently.
It is a power grab. N~w we probably will not get
the ones reenfranchised who double voted on that illegal ballot,
but the truth is, if these people were running for State
Legislature, under the law, those courts would get those votes
to Gore. They just don't have the courage to do it in a
presidential election. You have heard only a slightly biased
opinion.
If I thought Bush won fair and square, I would tell Al
to pack it in, but Gore has on the merits of those who voted,
the stronger claim. So Bush is just trying to run out the
clock. That's why they are desperate to shut it down because
they know Gore lost a lot more votes in those that were thrown
out.
I don't know what. is going to happen. ))2t
Prime Minister Blair:
Really amazing.
jef
The President:
I think we will work it out and be all right.
It is very important to remember that the whole right wing in
America desperately wants this and they still control the
Congress. There are.other things we can talk about when I see
you because Gore carne back 4-5 percent last week and he started
running his campaign on continuing the progress of the last
CONFIDEN''fIAL
r~",::-:~~~AR~P:OIDcO:t _,"
\ <-~~2;~_:_~.~::-,,",;'.:,~~~~.~~~ .. :-_,~- __ '::_-e ..;:--~!,
�4
CONFIDENTIAL
eight years and it was obvious to me in the last 48 hours, I
told one of our people, he might win the popular vote and lose
the electoral college,
I don't think there is any question that
if everybody in Florida had'their vote counted as intended, Gore
would have won by thirty thousand votes. ~
Prime Minister Blair: The right wing press here has just been
desperate for Bush. ~
The President: They are all upset that the military people got
disenfranchised because they came out in force for Governor Bush
so he carried them 2 to 1. But World War II veterans and
holocaust, survivors, they were perfectly fine with having them
disenfranchised. ~
Prime Minister Blair: They are a lot more ruthless than our
folks aren't they? ..(..G1The President: They are. They hate us more than we hate them.
It's all about power to them. They don't care as much about
government, they just want the power.
I will tell you more when
I see you.
I have not said ~ublicly what I just told you.
I
have to be President here. The New York Times finally went
after the Republicans today. They said they are just over
reaching.
I wouldn't even be surprised to see the u.s. Supreme
Court try to overturn the Florida Supreme Court. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Blimey.
JGr
So here we are.
Jet
Prime Minister Blair: As I say, I can't wait to see you.
are going to have a good talk about it.
ktJ
We
The President: Yes. Let's talk about that. Did our people
tell you we might be able to come over on the 12th and maybe go
to Belfast and Dublin on the 13 th 'and 14 th? ...(.G)Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Any time.
%
Is that soon enough?
ke1
Prime Minister ~lair:
I've got to go to Zagreb tonight to this
European Balkans thing. ~
The -President:
COMFIDENIIAL
I'm really glad you are going.
jkn'
�5
CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Blair:
will talk on the plane about
Steinberg will fill you in.
there with Bertie Ahern and we
outlines of an a reement.Jim
r=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Yes.
tet
Prime Minister Blair: I am going to go through with Bertie
tonight what are the three more difficult issues:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
What we aim to have by the middle of.
next week is a package we agree on. The right package to go
with. But I would have thought the 12th_14th is about the right
time.
k-e1"
The President: Okay, I will set it up. I can do whatever in
England.
I am coming there basically for you, so I will do
whatever helps you the most.
I can come to Chequers or maybe
give a speech at Oxford.
I thought about talking about five or
six major issues the whole world will face together over the
next ten years.
Something that would keep the Third Way thing
going, but I don't have to give a speech at all.
I am
interested in helping you.
~
Prime Minister Blair: That is very good of you, Bill. I think
a speech on that theme would be very useful. Why don't I give
some thought to where it should be. We got an inkling, and it's
fine with us, that you preferred outside of London.
(C)
The President: No.
I just thought that if we went to London,
you would have to do a big dinner or something.
I wanted to
help you politically and push our agenda.
If it helps you, I am
happy to do that. J.et
Prime Minister Blair:
on that basis.
J.Q1
The President:
That is really kind of you.
r will work
If you think it is better, r will .go to Oxford.
..keJ
Prime Minister Blair:
through. --+Gt-
CONFIDE~nL'l.L
That is great.
r will think that
�6
,CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
The only caveat might be if we have timing
problems because the 12th is the day all the electors are
supposed to be certified and there might be some reason I have
to wait until the next morning to come. But I went to Brunei
and Vietnam and the best I can do is show the' country that
everything is just chugging along.
If in the next week
something goes haywire, I will call you.
ker
Prime Minister Blair:
I certainly think a speech is good and my
instinct is to stay outside of London.
We can get some private
time as well.
That is my instinct. But why don't I go through
it with my folks and we will come back to you with clear
suggestions.
~
The President:
Okay.
Prime Minister Blair:
the 14th?
()
~
So you will be here on the 12 th , through
The President:
Yes. My thought is the 12th'with you and to go
to Belfast on the 13 th . Maybe Dublin too, or on the 14th -- might
'have to allow two days in Be~fast.
If there is actually some
sort of deal cooked that you need me to bless, we might be able
to allocate a whole day to be there to work this.
I am going to
allow for that, but I think I just have to wait and see. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I will be in a better position once I
speak to Bertie tonight and take the temperature of the people
over the weekend.
I don't want to land you in something where
you only have a half day. fer
The President:
I won't do that.
That's why I left a day open.
~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Okay.
.JR'f
Can we talk about the Hague and climate change?
( C)
Prime Minister Blai'r:
Absolutely.
(..e1"
The President:
You know, first of all, thank you for helping
moderate the EU position so that we can all have agreement.
I
think you and Dutch are key for an agreement. The French and
the Germans aren't there yet.
I have to tell you where the
politics are going to be in,the United States. We have Congress
evenly divided.
We have Republicans ,acknowledging, even Bush,
CONFIDEN'fL~L
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,
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�CGNFIDENTL\L
7
that this is a real problem.
Something has to be done. We now
have through this partnership with Detroit on the next
generation of vehicles that Al Gore spearheaded, we got these
cars that will get 80 mpg.
We are trying hard.
The last step
is chemical research, which would help everybody and make your
oil money good for 30 years. Bio-mass fuels can help us get
something like seven or even eight times more efficient gas or
oil than we have today. That is about a third of the problem
with transportation. We are also trying to get this massive
progress to rapidly accelerate the construction industry. We
have another plan for dealing with our utilities and heavy
manufacturing which is the last third.
Finally, after being
treat€d like I was trying to wreck the economy, we are finally
- getting broad acknowledgement.
If we get what we need on the
sinks, forests and all our potential, the gain is something like
300 million tons. We are prepared to go down to less than a
third of that, but we need to get something. We will be
flexible, but we need to get something.
I think we are down to
125. I think it is a mistake to put limits on emission 'trading
because that is a real killer for us politically.
I think it
would be seen for what it is, that Europe wants to try to make
America adopt its tax struct~re and reduce our emissions in the
least efficient way.
It would give us less incenti ve-.
So the
problem may get worse as we get better.
I think it is bad
policy. Even Bush acknowledges it. Right now, about two House
seats left to be decided. The Senate is 50-50 if Bush wins but
51-49 if Al wins because Lieberman would leave his Senate seat
and the Governor of Connecticut is a Republican and would
appoint a Republican. _There are enough Democrats from energy
producing areas that i f this looks like we are getting a bad
deal, that will hurt us.
It also sends the wrong message to
developing countries. What matters is not the results, but how
we achieve it.
I think it is important to get an agreement.
If
we get no agreement, we just give the reactionaries an excuse to
walk away.
>¢)
Prime Minister Blair: Here's my take.
I just spoke with John
who is headin our delegation over there, on the sinks
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
you can
The president: Absolutely. We are prepared to take the overall
number lower than the science indicates.
I think the other
thing is you want to have some encouragement in this document
for sinks. We also need to do something about the rain forests
- an approach that is totally voluntary. ~
CONFIDEM'fIAL
�CONFIDEN'FIAL
8
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. But the French proposal is to tax itself.
We said, "Let's establish a fund."
I don't think any other
countries have done this as much as we have. We have done it in
two contexts in America with pollutants.
We had quicker
compliance with clean air efforts at lower costs than the people
projected. Every time we did it, it worked faster and cheaper.
I understand why some Europeans want to limit trading in any
way, but it is a big mistake. Developing countries are
important.
They don't have much of a problem, but you have to
give them the incentive to take action. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
I am totally in agreement with you.
IE.a. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
emJF IDE~JT L,\L
�,COllfFIBEM'fIAL
9
The President: Yes.
I will push our proposal on a fund more
and make it attractive to the G-77 and you want us to buck up
Aznar and Guterres. jQY
Prime Minister Blair:
Yes.
And Schroeder.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
We ought to be more for a market solution here.
( e)
Prime-Minister Blair:
Exactly.
02?
The President: The regulation sh9uld be the outcome, but how to
get there should be left to the most efficient means. Let me
ask something else. How did your visit with Putin go?
(e)
Prime Minister Blair:
It was fine.
Very interesting . He' feels
that he is not understood about the problems he is facing there.
He was very anxious to impress me. He wanted to see America as
}Q1
a partner, I think.
The President:
I think he does, depending on who wins our
elections, it might take a while to get it going, but the more
time you can spend with him the better. I think he is a guy
with a lot of ability and ambitions for the Russians. His
intentions are generally honorable and straightforward, but he
just hasn't made up his mind yet. He could get squishy on
democracy. -+e7
Prime Minister Blair:
lE.o. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Politically, he has got to be with the Arabs on
the Middle East dispute, but I told him one real problem you
have here is that it is not clear how much can be controlled in
CQNFIDi:WTI7\ 1.
�tONFIDEN'PIAL
this situation.
10 .
Violence beqets violence.
I
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) I
If you are the st'ronger person, that is
what you have to do.
It was like (gap) but I think especially
for the next year, whoever is President here, and until we get
organized, the more time you spend with him, the more it will
payoff. jJCJ
L--;--:-_ _--;-_...-----;-_-;----II
Prime Minister Blair: Yes.
I will carryon with it.
I think
the other thing is he is only now choosing the people around
);lim. That really matters in terms of what is being pumped into
his ears. He is highly intelligent. ~
The President: Yes. A lot of people pour crap in. He wants to
do a good job and he works at.it every day. He is intelligent
and disciplined. The last thing. I know you had a meeting with
Barak, and I know you're worried. I am doing my best. We've
made little headwa toda.
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)
I
am doing my best but yqu see what the problem is, don't 'you?
;er
.
Prime Minister Blair:
Absolutely.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President:
Did you tell him
Prime Minister Blair:
speak to him.
CONFIDRN'PIAL
that?~
Yes, I have.
I will follow
E.O.13526,section 1.4(b)(d)
and
�COnFIDEN''fIAL
13526, section 1.4(b)(d)
lE.o.
11
I
l . . . - - -_ _ _ _ _
----'I
The President:
It is interesting. The Israelis have good
substantive policies, but the level of misunderstanding between
the two sides is pretty high. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
)
~------The President:
I agree with that. +G+Pr~me
Minister Blair:
We will try.
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: Yes. We're trying to take another run at him on
that and maybe we'll get some movement today.
I am really glad
you are going to this Balkans conference. Tell all those Balkan
guys I said hello.
I am thrilled about what you are doing.
I
think America will do its part out there, no matter what you're
hearing out of the Bush campaign. ~
Prime Minister. Blair:
Bill. -+er
The President:
Thank you so much.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Ridiculous isn't it.
(U)
How is the Senator?
Happy as a clam.
Happy Thanksgiving,
(U)
Chelsea asked about Leo.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: He is absolutely great and you will see
when you come over.
(U)
The President:
I know Chelsea is coming. Hillary wants to but
she still has to sort out some scheduling things. I hope we see
you on the 12th.
(C)
Prime Minister Blair:
Okay.
(U)
�12
CONFIDEN'fIAL
The President:
Good-bye.
(U)
End of conversation
•
CONFHl~lTIAL
�~
• CONFTDE:N1'I"L
•
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with British Prime" Minister Blair
PARTICIPANTS: "
The President
Prime Minister Blair
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
(U)
Michael Manning and Clark Lystra
December 13, 2000, 4:30-4:41 a.m. EST
Belfast, Ireland
Hello?
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Hello?
The President:
(U)
Good.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Hi, Bill, how are you doing?
Did you get some rest?
Yes, a little.
(U)
(U)
(U)
Prime Minister Blair: It was amazing coverage of your visit
yesterday.
It was unbelievable.
In Northern Ireland, it "looks
( C)
good. Did you speak to Adams and Seamus this morning?
The President: No. Our people have been talking.
what they are going to say to you. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
What's that?
(gap) I know
(U)
The President: That the Sinn Fein view is that before the
election campaigns in the UK, there ought to be a deal on
demilitarization and decommissioning. They want to delay on
Patten and can't embrace it right now. They will not cooperate
directly on the Real IRA. We need to talk to them on the input
they would do.
There need to be more arrests in Omagh. Anyway,
all they said was that they couldn't do more.
Seamus Mallon is
in a particular situation, you know, and the problem is that he
says he will not agree yet on a police force.
He may agree on
one if arrests are made or something and if we find out more we
will tell you, but I think you have to flush them out.
I will
CONFIDE}lTI."tL
Reason: 1.5 <cp
Declassify on;
---. ,
�.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
JE.O. 13526, section l.4(b)(d) J
work today in our meeting with him.
I'll try to find out more
about\whatever the sequence is. -kef
Prime Minister Blair~
The President:
I
That might cut the mustard with them.
~
~
Prime Minister Blair:/
L - - f_
_
The President:
OK.
_
_
_
_
~/
~
Prime Minister Blai
The President:
CONFIDEN'fI.".L
There may be something there.
)Z'5
JE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) J
�•
CO~JFIDEN'fIM:.
3
Prime Minister Blair:
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) I
The President: That's why I think that if I were you, I would do
a specific trade-off and if you could make some progress there,
it would be alright (gap).
I have to go and get to my meetings
now. We'll be in touch. J<1
Prime Minister B.lair: We need to decide on how specific we
should be when we meet later.
(91
The President:
OK.
Prime Minister Blair:
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
~
(U)
End of Conversation·
CONFIDEUnAL i
�
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
Kosovo
Memcon
Northern Ireland
Telcon
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/33fbdbd780ab56ebe416489893556850.pdf
6616360bbdc9c683bd3cae5b73902f3f
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Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
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06/20/1996
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06/19/1996
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�L>h r A k ' i IVILI\ I
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2007-1635-F
vz2098
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NSC#
PHONE: .202-456-9432
FROM:
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SUBJECT:
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OP&ilp
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Sswff
1
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
�NATIONAL SECURITY
20596
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 20, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department o f t h e Treasury
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive S e c r e t a r i a t
Department o f Commerce
AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
O f f i c e of the Representative
o f t h e U.S. t o t h e U n i t e d
Nations
SUBJECT:
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate.Director f o r
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and
International Affairs
O f f i c e o f Management and
Budget
MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief o f S t a f f t o t h e
President
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o r Economic
Policy
MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament
Agency
COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, J o i n t S t a f f
P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on South A s i a ^J^T
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e Revised Agenda f o r t h e P r i n c i p a l s
Committee Meeting which w i l l be h e l d on Monday, June 24, from
2:00pm t o 3:30pm i n t h e White House S i t u a t i o n Room. (U)
A d i s c u s s i o n paper and r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s are a t t a c h e d a t Tab B.
(U)
w D. bens
t i v e Secretary
C l a s s i f i e d by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 06/19/06
DECLASSIFIED
WL;. „
CO. 1 5 6
32
"
^ '' ^n«,Sep e berJI
VVb
t
f)
(;
i
f
ni
2006
�1 M lh\ II 111
Attachments
Tab A
Agenda for Principals Committee Meeting on South Asia j^f
Tab B
Discussion Paper JJ})
CONFIDENTIAL
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DOCUMENT NO.
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001b. agenda
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Principals Committee Meeting June 24, 1996. Record ID: 9620596.
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06/20/1996
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Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2098
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purposes 1(b)(7)ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
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information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�20596
NATIONAL
SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 19, 1996
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
MARK R. PARRIS
GARY SAMORE, ACTING
FROM:
STEPHEN R. GRUMMON^
SUBJECT:
P r i n c i p a l s Cominittee Meeting
on South A s i a
A t t a c h e d i s a r e v i s e d agenda and D i s c u s s i o n Paper f o r t h e June 24
P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on South A s i a .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e r e l e a s e t o P r i n c i p a l s o f t h e a t t a c h e d package.
Approvj/yiA/
Di:
.sapprove
Attachments
Tab I Andrew Sens Memo t o C o u n t e r p a r t s
Tab A Agenda
Tab B D i s c u s s i o n Paper
-CONriDDNM&L.
Reason:
1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 06/19/06
DECLASSIFIED
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HyJGLNAKA.Datell/w/? '
Tun -fbir-f
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EOD
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ARS
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armon
ohse
Sens
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DOCUMENT NO.
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SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Anthony Lake from Stephen Grummon. Subject: Principals
Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9620589. (4 pages)
06/20/1996
RESTRICTION
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FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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DOCUMENT NO.
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06/20/1996
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2007-1635-F
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PI
P2
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
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Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRAj
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRAj
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
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SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Duplicate of 001c. (7 pages)
06/19/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2098
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -14-4 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�SCE.
ERT
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
R C R ID: 9620545
EOD
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 96 15
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 08 JUN 96
O
S U C REF:
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FO: SN
RM
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K Y O D : S U H ASIA
EWRS OT
AED
GNA
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O
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C
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STABILITY
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FOR INFO
GUMN
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C O ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
A
Z
X
Z
X
001 LAKE
001
001 S N
ES
002
96060721
96060815
96060815
96060816
F R DECISION
O
LAKE A P O E R C M
PRVD EO
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002
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960608 FUERTH, L
960608 BURNS, W
960608 MCALEER, R
960608 INDERFURTH, R
960608 TARULLO, D
960608 YANNUZZI, R
960608 STARR, B
960608 WILSON, F
960608 NYE, J
960608 BACA, B
960608 ADAMS, G
DISPATCH F R INFO
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�h
National Security Council
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ARS
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Soderberg
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Records Mgt.
A = Action
I = Information
cc:
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D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
�Bakke, Kyle D.
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Joshi, M. Kay
©NESASIA - NE/South Asia; ©NONPRO - Export Controls
/R, Record at A1; Bakke, Kyle D.; Sanborn, Daniel R. K.; ©EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary; ©LEGAL - Legal Advisor; ©LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; ©PRESS - Public
Affairs; ©UP - APNSA Special Assistants; ©WHSR - WH Situation Room
PC on South Asia Change 1.5(b) [CONriDENTIAL] Tuesday, June 18,1996 5:28PM
The Principals Committee meeting on South Asia scheduled for Friday, June 21, at 2:30 p.m., has been
rescheduled for Monday, June 24, from 2:00 - 3:30 p.m., in the Situation Room. All agencies have been notified.
Thank you.
DF-CLASSmtD
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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R O 292, OEOB
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WASHINGTON, D 20506
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PRINT LAST NAME:
M . WILLIAM J. BURNS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
R O 7224, MAIN STATE
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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U U / - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
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M . J. BENJAMIN NYE
R
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
R O 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG
OM
1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20220
C
MS. BETTIE BACA
DEPARTMENT OF C M E C
OMRE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
R O 5516
OM
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20230
C
DR. G R O M. ADAMS
ODN
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
R O 238
OM
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, D 20503
C
DATE
SIGNATURE
TIME
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: VIA FAX
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: VIA FAX
PRINT LAST NAME:
k'./ftfr/*
COPY: 1
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: \ n „- Date: l / T w / l
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. R O 379 OEOB
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
�DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(TU) 0 6 . 1 1 .
TIME OF TRANSMISSION:
'96 17:59
NO.
1460 1 1 5 6 6 3 PAGE
1
TIME OF RECEIPT:,/Q
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE:
xx
MESSAGE NO: 1 ^ 8 ^
(202)
PAGES: 6
(Including Cover)
456-9425
WH SITUATION ROOM
(PHONE NUMBER)
(ROOM NO.)
ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS AT 2 1 . JUNE. PC MTG ON
SOUTH ASIA
TO (AGENCY)
7
DTG:
CLASSIFICATION:
F R O M : NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)
MESSAGE D ESCRI P TION:
RELEASER:
*
DELIVER TO
. TREASURY K;
DEPT/ROOM N .
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ft
2 0 5 4 5
PHONE NUMBER
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMMERCE
NSC LOG
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REMARKS:
OPS CENTERS:
ATTACHED MEMO DOES NOT L I S T TREASURY OR
COMMERCE AS PARTICIPANTS BUT THEY WERE
ADDED.AFTER THE FACT.
PLEASE DELIVER
TO EXEC SECS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initiala: fL.
-Jjjof?^
�WHITE HOUSE S I T U A T I O N ROOM
(TU)
06. I I .
' 96
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TIME OF RECEIPT:
TIME OF TRANSMISSION:
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE:
XX
MESSAGE NO: l & S ^
S 0 U T H
(202)
TREASURY K COMMERCE
REMARKS:
L
PAGES:
6
(Including Cover)
456-9425
WH SITUATION ROOM
(PHONE NUMBER)
(ROOM NO.)
ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS AT 21 JUNE. PC MTG ON
A S I A
TO (AGENCY)
7
DTG:
CLASSIFICATION:
F R O M : NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)
MESSAGE D ESCRI PTION:
RELEASER:
NSC LOG #
DELIVER TO
EXECUTIVE
DEPT/ROOM NO. .
2 0 5 4 5
PHONE NUMBER
SECRETARY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OPS CENTERS:
ATTACHED MEMO DOES NOT L I S T TREASURY OR
COMMERCE AS PARTICIPANTS BUT THEY WERE
ADDED.AFTER THE FACT.
PLEASE DELIVER
TO EXEC SECS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials:
(T^ Date:
ToF?Iter -f
�SECRET.
NATIONAL SECURITY
20545
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 8, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o r Economic
Policy
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament
Agency
AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
O f f i c e o f the Representative
of t h e U.S. t o t h e U n i t e d
Nations
SUBJECT:
COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, J o i n t S t a f f
Meeting o f t h e P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee on Promoting
S t a b i l i t y i n South Asia — June 2 1 , 1996
A Principals' Committee meeting will be held on Friday, June 21,
1996, 2:30 - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room.
Attendance will be principals plus one. J j t f
An agenda i s a t Tab A. A background paper w i l l be c i r c u l a t e d
s e p a r a t e l y by t h e Department o f S t a t e .
ew D. Sens
ive Secretary
Attachments
r* T C Tt T? T •
T
1
Reason: 1.5 (b) (c) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: June 2 1 , 2006
4-
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White H ue Guidelines, September 11,2006
os
H y J ^ NARA, Date TIC
�>
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003a. agenda
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
National Security Council Principals Committee. Record ID:
9620545. (1 page)
06/08/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2098
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(8)1
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(bK7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�ro
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003b. draft
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
U.S. Policy on South Asia. (1 page)
06/08/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2098
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRAj
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003c. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Anthony Lake from Gary Samore and Steve Grummon. Subject:
Principals Committee Meeting -- June 21,1996. Record ID: 9620545.
(1 page)
06/07/1996
RESTRICTION
P\fb(\)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PCO 182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2098
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(h)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance wilh 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [2]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-003-003-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 3
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8f2bca3cb3ec8b8d90a7e70709a2c8f9.pdf
8d0c690424c7d7855fb656dfde58699e
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
PC0182 PC Meeting on South Asia, June 24, 1996 [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3902
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
43
6
2
2
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001a. memo
Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee.
Record ID: 9620614. (3 pages)
07/01/1996
Pl/b(l)
001b. draft
Summary of Conclusions. (2 pages)
07/01/1996
Pl/b(l)
001c. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
07/01/1996
b(7)(C)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PC0182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [ 1 ]
2007-1635-F
vz2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security' Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(J) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM, Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�•ERT
SCE
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
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R C R ID: 9620614
EOD
RECEIVED: 24 JUN 96 08
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 01 JUL 96
O
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ORE
FO: SN
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N N PROLIFERATION
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SC
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PERSONS:
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R 24 JUN P M G O S U H ASIA
UMR F
O
C T N OT
ACTION: D H E S D M M T AGENCIES
OS G EO O
D E DATE: 27 JUN 96
U
STAFF OFFICER: S M R
AOE
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9620545
NSCP: PC0182
DOCUMENT
F R ACTION
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STATUS: C
9620589
CDS SU
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DISTRIBUTION
FR CNURNE
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F R INFO
O
GUMN
RMO
JOSHI
KRECZKO
NC CRN
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PARRIS
PNMN
OEA
SMR
AOE
SDREG
OEBR
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White House Guidelines, Septemberll,
20
06
HyW NARA, Date Of ill
CMET:
OMNS
DISPATCHED B
Y
O E E BY: N D S
PND
SR
DATE
CLOSED BY: NSLA
B HN
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DC
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A
001 LAKE
001
002
Z 96062710 F R DECISION
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EO / OMN
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DISPATCH DATA S M A Y R P R
UMR
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DOC
DATE
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
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002
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960701
960701
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960701
960701
960701
960701
960701
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DISPATCH F R INFO
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DISPATCH FOR ACTION
FUERTH, L
BURNS, W
NYE, J
MCALEER, R
BACA, B
LAVIN, A
INDERFURTH, R
ADAMS, G
PANETTA, L
YANNUZZI, R
TARULLO, D
STARR, B
WILSON, F
SECRET"
�National Security Council
The White House
t/a. ?
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PROOFED BY:
LOG #.
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG Q ^ ^ T A / O
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SEQUENCE TO
Harmon
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Situation Room
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West Wing Desk
Records Mgt.
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cc:
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�NATIONAL S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L
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The White House
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Records Mgt.
A = Action
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cc:
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Exec Sec Office has diskette.
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�NATIONAL S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L
�1
-S£€RE3L
NATIONAL SECURITY
20614
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
J u l y 1, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department o f t h e Treasury
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive S e c r e t a r i a t
Department o f Commerce
MS. ANN LAVIN
D i r e c t o r , Executive
Secretariat
Department o f Energy
DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director f o r
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and
International Affairs
O f f i c e o f Management and
Budget
MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief o f S t a f f t o t h e
President
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o r Economic
Policy
MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament
Agency
COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, J o i n t S t a f f
AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
O f f i c e o f the Representative
o f t h e U.S. t o t h e U n i t e d
Nations
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on South Asia J^)
Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee meeting on Monday, June 24, 1996. JJerf
^ew D. Sens
:ive S e c r e t a r y
Attachment
Tab A
Summary o f Conclusions from t h e P r i n c i p a l s Meeting
on South Asia
-SBGRBSC l a s s i f i e d by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 ( b ) ( c ) ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y On: June 24, 2000
y,,, „
DECLASSIFIED
f:.0.13526
») J^NAKA, Date T H V d n
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee.
Record ID: 9620614. (3 pages)
07/01/1996
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3902
FOLDER TITLE:
PCO182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [ 1 ]
2007-1635-F
vz2097
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information ((b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
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ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
Of/5
THROUGH:
MARK PARR I
FROM:
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SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f t h e P r i n c i p a l s Committee
Meeting on South A s i a
DAN I EL PONEMAN
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e Summary o f Conclusions o f t h e P r i n c i p a l s
Committee meeting on South A s i a h e l d on Monday June 24, 1996.
RECOMMENDATION
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0182 PC Meeting on South Asia June 24, 1996 [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-003-002-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 3
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/7141ed4865821234103fa20318559b00.pdf
9381fbab3c4fcc108b04d169ef6d9a58
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan, March 14, 1998
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3909
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
43
4
4
i
Stack:
v
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
001a. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Mona Sutphen, William J. Bums, et al from Glyn
Davies. Subject: DC Meeting on Wednesday, February 18, 1998.
Record ID: 9820134. (2 pages)
02/16/1998
Pl/b(l)
001b. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
02/16/1998
b(7)(C)
002a. memo
For James Steinberg from Jay Greer. Subject: Deputies Committee
Meeting. Record ID: 9820129. (7 pages)
02/17/1998
Pl/b(l)
002b. agenda
Deputies Committee Meeting, February 18, 1998. Record ID:
9820134. (1 page)
02/17/1998
Pl/b(l)
003a. memo
Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting. Record
ID: 9820140. (3 pages)
03/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
003b. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
03/14/1998
b(7)(C)
003c. draft
Summary of Conclusions. (2 pages)
03/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
003d. draft
Summary of Conclusions. (2 pages)
03/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
003e. draft
Summary of Conclusions. (1 page)
03/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
003 f. draft
Summary of Conclusions. (3 pages)
03/14/1998
Pl/b(l)
RESTRICTION
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) of the FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�OCE
ERT
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
R C R ID: 9820134
EOD
RECEIVED: 13 FEB 98 08
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 16 FEB 98
O
S U C REF:
ORE
F O : DAVIES
RM
K Y O D : PAKISTAN
EWRS
AED
GNA
D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
GNA O
C T N
ACTION: RICE S D M M T AGENCIES
G EO O
D E DATE: 17 FEB 98
U
STAFF OFFICER: G E R
RE
FILES: IFM /f)
LOGREF:
NSCP: 'pd ^ 3 ^ * ^ -
DOCUMENT
F R ACTION
O
STATUS: C
CDS
OE:
DISTRIBUTION
FR CNURNE
O OCREC
F R INFO
O
GER
RE
HLE
EWG
KERRICK
NC CRN
S
HO
POE
OL
RIEDEL
STEINBERG
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White H ue Guidelines, S pe b r 11,2006
os
e tm e
By \ f l - NARA. D a t c l ^ l ^
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED B
Y
O E E BY: N T H
PND
SM
DATE
C O E BY: N T M
LSD
SS
B HN
Y AD
DC
O
WATH
/TC
2O
F
2
�•ERT
BGE
ACTION DATA S M A Y R P R
UMR
EOT
R C R ID: 9820134
EOD
C O ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
A
D C ACTION OFFICER
O
001 STEINBERG
001
002
Z 98021414 F R DECISION
O
X 98021621 STEINBERG APPROVED R C M
EO
X 98021621 RICE S D M M TO AGENCIES
G EO
DISPATCH DATA S M A Y R P R
UMR
EOT
DOC
DATE
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
980216
DISPATCH F R INFO
O
DISPATCH FOR ACTION
FUERTH, L
BURNS, W
COMSTOCK, N
MATTIS, J
SCHROEDER, G
SUTPHEN, M
ADAMS, G
STEINER, J
STARR, B
MANNING, M
•ERT
SCE
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # .
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG Sfa/
VJ^S
n^ty
[to/
SEQUENCE TO
CJ^Cosqriff
RBS
INITIAL/DATE
/
^JS^
INT
ARS
^ A/O
DISPOSITION
&CA\H
3
Rice
Davies
Kerrick
2
Steinberg
Ai ^
-
Berger
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
Records Mgt.
A = Action
I = Information
cc: M ^ t ^
COMMENTS:
f
98FESI3!>r! 8^9
Exec Sec Office has diskette
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
^
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Leon Fuerth, Mona Sutphen, William J. Bums, et al from Glyn
Davies. Subject: DC Meeting on Wednesday, February 18, 1998.
Record ID: 9820134. (2 pages)
02/16/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRAj
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�L G 9820134
O
DATE 16 FEB 98
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
GNA O
C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: • E R T
OUET
SCE
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
M . LEON FUERTH
R
R O 292, O O
OM
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WASHINGTON, D 20506
C
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
PRINT LAST N M :
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M . WILLIAM J. B R S
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2201 C STREET, N W
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DEPARTMENT O STATE
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initialfl: V^. Date: 1110) 7oi3
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT A D RETURN TO: N C R C R S M N . R O 379 O O
N
S E O D G T OM
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P G 01 O 02 PAGES
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�LOG 9820134
DATE 16 FEB 98
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
GNA O
C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: -SfiGBfiT
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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ATTN: M P G Y EVANS
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DATE
TIME
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M . JAMES E. STEINER
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
R O 7E12, H A Q A T R
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WASHINGTON, D 20505
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A E C
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT A D R T R TO: N C R C R S M N . R O 379 O O
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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
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concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
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�SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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t
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If Ms. Sutphen is not available please deliver to Isabelle Watkins.
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�SECRET'
NATIONAL SECURITY
20134
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 13, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG
THROUGH:
BRUCE RIEDEL
FROM:
JAY GREER
SUBJECT:
Agenda f o r DC Meeting on P a k i s t a n
This memorandum r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e DAPNSA approve an agenda
f o r an upcoming DC meeting.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e agenda and a u t h o r i z e Glyn Davies t o s i g n
the memorandum t o agencies a t Tab I .
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum/to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
W ie H ue Guidelines, S pe b r 1 , 0 6
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e t m e 12 0
zir7-H>yr-r
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 02/12/08
�R C R ID: 9820129
EOD
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 98 09
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
TO: STEINBERG
D C DATE: 17 FEB 98
O
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SUBJECT: B C G O N P P R F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
AKRUD AE O
C T N
D E DATE: 16 FEB 98
U
ACTION: N T D B STEINBERG
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STAFF OFFICER: G E R
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FILES: IFM
LOGREF:
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FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
CODES:
D I S T R I B U T I O N
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FOR INFO
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A
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A = Action
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cc:
COMMENTS:
•98 FEB l?!^ 2'iS
Exec Sec Office has diskette U 1/7
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
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SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
002a. memo
For James Steinberg from Jay Greer. Subject: Deputies Committee
Meeting. Record ID: 9820129. (7 pages)
02/17/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number: 3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Reeords Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information |(b)(l) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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SUBJECT/TITLE
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Deputies Committee Meeting, February 18, 1998. Record ID:
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RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
I'S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRAj
b(1) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions ((b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�"
5
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R C R ID: 9820140
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RECEIVED: 18 FEB 98 13
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 14 M R 98
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K Y O D : PAKISTAN
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SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
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D E DATE: 21 FEB 98
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980314 KENNEY, K
980314 COMSTOCK, N
980314 MATTIS, J
980314 SCHROEDER, G
980314 SUTPHEN, M
980314 ADAMS, G
980314 STEINER, J
980314 STARR, B
980314 MANNING, M
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R = Retain
N = No Further Action
�SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY
20140
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N . D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 14, 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o the Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e U.S.
to the United Nations
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director f o r
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and
International Affairs
O f f i c e o f Management and
Budget
MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department o f t h e Treasury
COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MR. GERALD A. SCHROEDER
A c t i n g Counsel f o r
Intelligence Policy
Department o f J u s t i c e
MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament
Agency
COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, J o i n t S t a f f
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions f o r t h e Deputies
Meeting on P a k i s t a n ^S-f
Committee
Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Pakistan held on Wednesday, February 18,
1998. i&r
Glyn T. Davies*
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Summary o f Conclusions
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b) , (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 02/18/08
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White H ue Guidelines, SeptemberJl, 2 0
os
06
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003a. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting. Record
ID: 9820140. (3 pages)
03/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) of the PRAj
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
L G 9820140
O
DATE 14 M R 98
A
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
UMR F
O
C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: GECRET
OUET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
M . LEON FUERTH
R
R O 292, O O
OM
EB
WASHINGTON, D 20506
C
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: 1
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
R O 7224, MAIN STATE
OM
2201 C STREET, N W
..
WASHINGTON, D C 20520
..
DEPARTMENT O STATE
F
M . NEAL C M T C
R
OSOK
R O 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG
OM
1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20220
C
DEPARTMENT O THE TREASURY
F
COL JAMES N. MATTIS
R O 3E880
OM
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D 20301-1000
C
DEPARTMENT O DEFENSE
F
M . GERALD A. S H O D R
R
CREE
R O 3305, MAIN JUSTICE
OM
10TH & PENNSYLVANIA AVE, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20530
C
DEPARTMENT O JUSTICE
F
MS. M N SUTPHEN
OA
UU/
SNW
R O 6333, DEPARTMENT O STATE
OM
F
2201 C STREET, N
W
WASHINGTON D C 20520-6319
..
U.S. MISSION T THE UNITED NATIONS
O
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�LOG 9820140
DATE 14 M R 98
A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R 18 FEB D M G O PAKISTAN
UMR F
O
C T N
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M . JAMES E. STEINER
R
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
R O 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
OM
WASHINGTON, D 20505
C
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A E C
GNY
MS. BARBARA S A R
TR
R O 5933, DEPT OF STATE
OM
2201 C STREET, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20451
C
A M CONTROL & DISARMAMENT A E C
RS
GNY
COL. MICHELLE MANNING
R O 2E865
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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(NAME)
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WH Situation Room
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(PHONE NUMBER)
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TO (AGENCY)
5 + o^- e
) re. b S ^ r y
DELIVER TO
NSC LOG#
DEPT/ROOM NO.
'2-01 H 0
PHONE NUMBER
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Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
USUKJ
C XfN
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0
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number: 3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
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financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
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information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
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2201(3).
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20140
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202-456-9425
18 ftk
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0 C, PxKiy-h^PAGES:
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5
(w/
Cover)
PLEASE DELIVER TO:
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NAME/OFFICE
Ms. Mona Sutphen
RHONE
212-415-4029
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J
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�20140
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 19, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG
fa
(*<V
S
THROUGH:
BRUCE RIEDEL/GARY SAMORE
FROM:
JAY GREER^
SUBJECT:
Sununary o f Conclusions f o r Deputies Committee
Meeting on P a k i s t a n , February 18, 1998
A t t a c h e d i s t h e Summary o f Conclusions f o r t h e Deputies
Committee Meeting on P a k i s t a n h e l d on February 18, 1998.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e a t t a c h e d Summary o f Conclusions and
a u t h o r i z e Glyn Davies t o t r a n s m i t them t o h i s
counterparts.
Appr
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum^to Agencies
Tab A
Summary o f Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED
K.0.13526
White H u e Guidelines, September 11,2006
os
SECRET—
Reason: 1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 02/18/08
»y
NAKA. l^tP 7//o/?a"*
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003c. draft
SUBJECIYTITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions. (2 pages)
03/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�NATIONAL SECURITY
20140
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o the Vice
President f o r National
SecuritySXf f a i r s
MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e U.S.
to the United Nations
•RS
UNE x e c u t i v e Secre
Y
Department o f Sta
DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate D i r e c t o r f o r
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and
International Affairs
O f f i c e o f Management and
Budget
MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department o f t h e Treasu^
COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MR. GERALD A. SCHROEDER
A c t i n g Counsel f o r
Intelligence Policy
Department o f J u s t i c e
MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
MS. BARBARA STARR
^Executive S e c r e t a r y
:ms C o n t r o l and Disarmament
^gency
COL\
Sec r e l
SUBJECT:
MANNING, USMC
:y, J o i n t S t a f f
Summary of Conclusions for the ) e p u t i e s Committee
Meeting on Pakistan J g f f
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e Summary o f Conclusions ffc
Committee Meeting on P a k i s t a n h e l d on Wednesday,
1998.
the Deputies
)ruary 18,
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Summary o f Conclusions
•SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
E.0.13526
Reason: 1.5(b), (d)
White House Guidelines, Septemberll,2006
D e c l a s s i f y On: 02/18/08
HyJfcL. NARA, Dale3JI$2<Sn
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003d. draft
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions. (2 pages)
03/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003e. draft
SU BJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions. (1 page)
03/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003 f. draft
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions. (3 pages)
03/14/1998
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Managemen
OA/Box Number:
3909
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
2007-1635-F
vz2096
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a))
Freedom of Information Act - J5 U.S.C. .S52(b)J
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information |(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�, 1998
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0382 DC Meeting on Pakistan March 14, 1998
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-003-001-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 3
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/178574c942babc1ed3bec899eadeb971.pdf
a83033143ba8633e01188f557142352d
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [3]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3996
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
43
4
5
3
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001. paper
PRD/NSC-22. (69 pages)
12/29/1993
Pl/b(l)
002. paper
Strategy Memo on South Asia. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
003. memo
For Anthony Lake from Warren Christopher. Subject: Advancing our
Non-Proliferation Objectives. Record ID: 9321474 (5 pages)
12/30/1993
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DCOOSO DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [3]
2007-1635-F
vz2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency |(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECTS ITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. paper
PRD/NSC-22. (69 pages)
12/29/1993
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DCOOSO DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [3]
2007-1635-F
vz2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
A
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRAj
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRAj
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
�Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
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Divider Title:
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
002. paper
Strategy Memo on South Asia. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DCOOSO DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [3]
2007-1635-F
vz2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information |(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�-SffffiBg
-^zrt^&TVT^r-
2147 8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
January 10, 1994
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
MARTIN INDYK
FROM:
ELLEN LAIPSO
SUBJECT:
N o t i f i c a t i o n Memo f o r Deputies Meeting on South
A s i a , Tuesday, January 1 1 , 1994, a t 2:30 p.m.
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n memo f o r t h e Deputies
Meeting on South Asia on Tuesday, January 11 a t 2:30 p.m. The
n o t i f i c a t i o n memo f o r w a r d s t h e agenda (Tab A ) , t h e PRD (Tab B)
and t h e S t r a t e g y memo (Tab C) which s h o u l d be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e
P r i n c i p a l s as soon as p o s s i b l e .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e W i l l I t o h t o s i g n t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n memo a t Tab
I which d i s t r i b u t e s t h e papers a t Tabs A t h r o u g h C t o t h e
Principals.
Approve [ j f m j
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
N o t i f i c a t i o n Memo
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
PRD on South Asia
Tab C
S t r a t e g y Memo
DECIASSIFIED
F,0.13526
While House Guidelines, September 11,2006
nyV^L NARA, DnteJpofloiJ
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
�•CRT
DOCN C R O PROFILE
S/M
R C R ID: 9321474
EOD
RECEIVED: 31 D C 93 11
E
TO: LAKE
F O : CHRISTOPHER, W
RM
D C DATE: 30 D C 93
O
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S U C REF: 9329278
ORE
K Y O D : N N PROLIFERATION
EWRS O
PAKISTAN
AM CNRL
RS OTO
S U H ASIA
OT
INDIA
D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: STATE P P R O ADVANCING N N PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES F R 11 JAN D
AE N
O
O
C
M G O S U H ASIA
T N OT
ACTION: N A P R P N M N
FR E
OEA
D E DATE: 04 JAN 94
U
STAFF OFFICER: P N M N
OEA
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320134
NSCP: D O S
COO
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
9320262
CODES:
D I S T R I B U T I O N
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White H ue Guidelines, S pe b r 11,2006
os
e tm e
H Y*- NARA. Dat 2j^/>n
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e
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED B
Y
O E E BY: NSJEB
PND
DATE
CLOSED BY: N A K
SS
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BY H N
AD
DC
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F
1
�SFPPFT
ACTION D T S M A Y R P R
AA UMR
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D C ACTION OFFICER
O
001 P N M N
OEA
001
R C R ID: 9321474
EOD
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
Z 93123111 ANY ACTION NECESSARY
X 94011916 NFAR PER P N M N
OEA
-9ECRET'
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
TIME STAMP
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:.
ACTION OFFICER:
DUE:
^(^Appropriate Action
•
Prepare Memo For Lake/Berger
•
Prepare Memo For Podesta
•
•
Prepare Memo
to
PHONE* to action officer at ext.
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
Concur
Q
FYI
Prepare Memo For Itoh
Concur
Concur
FYI
Harris
•
FYI
Riedel
•
P^Rosner
•
Holl
•
Aoki
•
Hooker
•
•
Saeed
Barth
•
Hull
•
•
Sanner
•
.
Andricos
•
•
Andreasen
•
•
•
•
•
•
Beers
Indyk
•
•
Schwartz
•
Jett
•
•
Sheehan
Bel1
•
X
•
Jones
•
•
Spalter
•
•
Bums
•
Kelly
•
•
Tenet
•
•
Canas
•
Kristoff
•
•
Tilley
•
•
Clarke
•
Kupchan
•
•
Van Eron
•
•
Clarke, P.
•
Kyle
•
•
Waguespack
•
•
Claussen
•
Lowenkron
•
•
Walker
•
•
Farrell
•
Menan
•
•
Walsh
•
•
Fauver
•
Merchant
•
•
Wayne
•
Feinberg
•
Morley
•
•
Wiedemann
•
Forsythe
•
O'Leary
•
Wilson
•
Fry
•
Owens-Kirkpatrick
•
Witkowsky
•
Gati
•
•
Gottemoeller
•
Primosch
•
Gross
•
Rice
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
X
Poneman
•
•
Hahn
^Itoh
^Kenney
^Soderberg
[J^Berger
INFORMATION
^^Records Mgmt.
•
Exec Sec Desk
COMMENTS
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VTDate: 7/Vo/a)f?
Logged By
Return to Records Mgmt.
379 OEOB
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Anthony Lake from Warren Christopher. Subject: Advancing our
Non-Proliferation Objectives. Record ID: 9321474 (5 pages)
12/30/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DCOOSO DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [3]
2007-1635-F
vz2095
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRAj
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
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86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
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<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia January 11, 1994 [3]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-002-020-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ec6ed78456b0ed89a0b1e0849a5e6d84.pdf
162079db32733f044a78273e8816a9ca
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3996
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
43
4
5
3
Stack:
v
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCL'MENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001a. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
01/17/1994
b(7)(C)
001b. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Marc Grossman, Edward Knight et al from William
Itoh. Subject: Summary of Conclusions. Record ID: 9420047. (3
pages)
01/17/1994
Pl/b(l)
002a. memo
For Samuel Berger from Ellen Laipson. Subject: Preparing for the
Deputies Meeting. Record ID: 9421479. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
002b. agenda
NSC Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9421478. (1 page)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
002c. paper
Strategy Memo on South Asia. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
002d. memo
For Anthony Lake from Warren Christopher. Subject: Advancing our
Non-Proliferation Objectives. Record ID: 9424174. (5 pages)
12/30/1993
Pl/b(l)
003a. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
01/10/1994
b(7XC)
003b. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Marc Grossman, Edward Knight et al from William
Itoh. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9421478. (1
page)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
003c. agenda
NSC Deputies Committee Meeting for January 11, 1994. (1 page)
01/10/1994
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(8)1
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) of the FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information ((b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�R C R ID: 9420.047
EOD
RECEIVED: 12 JAN 94 12
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
TO: AGENCIES
F O : ITOH
RM
D C DATE: 17 JAN 94
O
S U C REF:
ORE
K Y O D : S U H ASIA
EWRS OT
SC
O
D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R 11 JAN D M G O S U H ASIA
UMR F
O
C T N OT
ACTION: ITOH S D M M T AGENCIES
G EO O
DUE DATE: 15 JAN 94
STAFF OFFICER: LAIPSON
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320134
NSCP: DC0080
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
9320262
CODES:
D I S T R I B U T I O N
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BERGER
CICIO
DARBY
INDYK
LAIPSON
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
WRIGHT
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
While M ue Guidelines, September 11,2006
os
ByJ^_NARA, D a t e ^ / > o l 3
COMMENTS:
DATE
DISPATCHED B
Y
OPENED BY: NSKDB
CLOSED BY: NSJEB
CCEERT
B HN
Y AD
DC
O
WATH
/TC
2 OF
2
�SECRET'
ACTION DATA S M A Y REPORT
UMR
DOC ACTION OFFICER
RECORD ID: 9420047
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 BERGER
001 LAIPSON
001 BERGER
001
002
Z 94011208 FOR DECISION
Z 94011214 FOR REDO
Z 94011513 FOR DECISION
X 94011808 BERGER APPROVED R C M
EO
X 94011808 ITOH SGD M M TO AGENCIES
EO
DISPATCH DATA S M A Y REPORT
UMR
DOC DATE
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
940117
940117
940117
940117
940117
940117
940117
940117
940117
DISPATCH FOR ACTION
DISPATCH FOR INFO
FUERTH, L
GROSSMAN, M
KNIGHT, E
MCALEER, R
LAUDER, J
PATRICK, T
INDERFURTH, K
STARR, B
WILLIAMS, A
•SECRET
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
PRS
INT
A/O
HAS SEEN
SEQUENCE TO
(^NSO?
DISPOSITION
DepExecSec
ExecSec
taff Director
D/APNSA
APNSA
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
cc:
Y
3L
I = Information
VP
D = Dispatch
McLarty
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
Other.
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS:
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
,
t > ^ L o 5 ? e ^ \ c > / r tM- D o c 5
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
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DOCLOG QJAA
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HAS SEEN
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DepExecSec
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D/APNSA
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A = Action
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I = Information
VP
D = Dispatch
McLarty
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
Other.
Should be seen by:
(DateATime)
COMMENTS:
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
3
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 2001-1 ^
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
SEQUENCE TO
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HAS SEEN
^ ExecSec
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DISPOSITION
�National Security Council
The White House
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PROOFED BY:
LOG # _
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
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DOCLOG flJllA
HAS SEEN
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//VT"
PRS
A/O
DISPOSITION
DepExecSec
ExecSec
3
Staff Director
D/APNSA
APNSA
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
cc:
3
I = Information
VP
D = Dispatch
McLarty
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
Other.
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS:
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
LOG 9420047
DATE 17 JAN 94
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R D M G O SOUTH ASIA 11 JAN
UMR F
O C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: " E R T
OUET
SCEEXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME '
SIGNATURE
M . LEON FUERTH
R
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY B A S U
RNCM
R O 290, O O
OM
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WASHINGTON, D 20506
C
C P :J _
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M. MR GOSA
R AC RSMN
DEPARTMENT O STATE
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MS. BARBARA S A R
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2201 C STREET, N
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WASHINGTON, D 20451
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M . A R N WILLIAMS
R AO
A E C F R INTL DEVELOPMENT
GNY O
R O 5945, N W STATE
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2201 C STREET, N
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WASHINGTON, D 20523
C
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initialfl:
Date:
IjibjV'^
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT. R O 379 OEOB
OM
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
�.TIME OF/TRANSMISSION
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PR1QBIIY
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FROM
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PAGES
CLASSIFICATION
WILLIAM
West Wing
456-S534
(NAME)
(ROOM NO.)
(PHONE NUMBER)
NSC LOG # 20047
TO (AGENCY*
DEUVER TO
STATE
OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR
DOD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JCS
SECRETARY
CIA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TREASURY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ACDA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
AID
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PHONE NUMBER
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
USUN/STATE
DEPT/ROOM NO.
-•
REMARKS:
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Iiutial :_JX_Date:_3/(#D
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National Security Council
Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
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RESTRICTION CODES
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�SECURITY-CLASSIFICATION
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• FIASH
DATE/TIME:
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0 ROUTINE
MESSAGE #:
NSC LOG #
20047
PHONE: 202-456-2291
FROM:
National Security Council
SUBJECT:
Notic* of Mooting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
ROOM:
WHSR
PAGES:
3
PLEASE DELIVER TO:
USUN New York
PHONE
NAME/OFFICE
DEPT/AGENCY
Mr. Rick Inderfurth
212-415-4016
SECURE FAX
. (b)(7)(c)
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For Leon Fuerth, Marc Grossman, Edward Knight et al from William
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pages)
01/17/1994
RESTRICTION
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Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
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�20047 REDO
••SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 1 1 , 1994
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
MARTIN
FROM:
ELLEN L A I P S O l ^ ^ L -
SUBJECT:
Sununary o f Conclusions f o r Deputies Cominittee
Meeting on South A s i a on January 1 1 , 1994
INDYI?^—*
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s t h e Summary o f Conclusions f o r t h e Deputies
Committee on South A s i a which was h e l d Wednesday, January 1 1 .
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e Summary o f Conclusions f o r r e c o r d
Approve
purposes.
Disapprove
That you a u t h o r i z e W i l l I t o h t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e Summary o f
Conclusions t o P r i n c i p a l attendees a t today's meeting.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Summary o f Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White House Guidelines, September II, 2006
•SflCRET"
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EOD
RECEIVED: 30 D C 93 16
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N C R O PROFILE
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TO: B R E
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F O : LAIPSON
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O
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ORE
K Y O D : S U H ASIA
EWRS OT
PD
R
N N PROLIFERATION
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SUBJECT: B C G O N P P R F R 11 JAN D M G O S U H ASIA
AKRUD AE O
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U
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9320262
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INDYK
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DECLASSIFIED
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Hy VT^ NARA, Date IJIO/^
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R C R ID: 9321479
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a
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DOCUMENT NO.
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002a. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Samuel Berger from Ellen Laipson. Subject: Preparing for the
Deputies Meeting. Record ID: 9421479. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA)
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PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIAj
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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DOCUMENT NO.
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NSC Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9421478. (1 page)
01/10/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
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RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. S52(b)l
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA)
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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DOCUMENT NO.
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Strategy Memo on South Asia. (5 pages)
01/10/1994
RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
National Security Classified Information |(a)(l) ofthe PRA]
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA]
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
Financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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DOCUMENT NO.
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For Anthony Lake from Warren Christopher. Subject: Advancing our
Non-Proliferation Objectives. Record ID: 9424174. (5 pages)
12/30/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3)of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA)
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIAj
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�GOEERT
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
v
R C R ID: 9321478
EOD
RECEIVED: 30 D C 93 16
E
*
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 10 JAN 94
O
S U C REF:
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RM
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EWRS OT
AED
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D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 11 JAN D M G O S U H ASIA
GNA O
C T N OT
ACTION: ITOH S D M M T AGENCIES
G EO O
D E DATE: 03 JAN 94
U
STAFF OFFICER: LAIPSON
FILES: IFM 0
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COO
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
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CODES:
D I S T R I B U T I O N
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FOR INFO
INDYK
LAIPSON
NSC CHRON
WRIGHT
DECLASSIFIED
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001 BERGER
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A = Action
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�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
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DATE 10 JAN 94
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION O D M G O S U H ASIA 11 JAN
F C T N OT
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: • E R T
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COPY: 1
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A B S A O RICK INDERFURTH
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�LOG 9321478 '
DATE TO' JAN 94
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C T N
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DATE
TIME
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M . M R GROSSMAN
R AC
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R O 7224, MAIN STATE
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COPY: i .
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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M . JOHN A. LAUDER
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
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�LOG 9321478
DATE 10 JAN 94
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION O D M G O S U H ASIA 11 JAN
F C T N OT
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
M . LEON FUERTH
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OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
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456-6534
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION . DG MTG ON SOUTH ASIA 11 JAN
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003a. form
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
01/10/1994
b(7)(C)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
D O S DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
C OO
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act - |S U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions |(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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DATE/TIME:
MESSAGE #:
NSC#
FROM:
National Securfty Council
SUBJECT:
2147!
Notice of Mooting DC MTG ON SOUTH A S I A
PHONE:
202-456-2291
ROOM:
WHSR
PAGES;
76
PLEASE DELIVER TO:
NAME/OFFICE
DEPT/AGENCY
USUN New York
Mr. Rick Inderfurth
PHONE
SECURE FAX
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• (b)(7)(c)
SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS
Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand dejivery to Ambassador Madeleine
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.
Albright
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Clinton Library
DOCl'MENT NO.
AND TYPE
003b. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Leon Fuerth, Marc Grossman, Edward Knight et al from William
Itoh. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9421478. (1
page)
01/10/1994
RESTRICTION
Pt/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
D O S DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
C OO
2007-1635-F
vz2094
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA)
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIAj
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) of the FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
003c. agenda
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
NSC Deputies Committee Meeting for January 11, 1994. (1 page)
01/10/1994
RESTRICTION
PI/b(I)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DCOOSO DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2094
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. SS2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia January 11, 1994 [2]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-002-019-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/cb69e2e08a16d06b2e1a2c2418db5dc9.pdf
f56375c63433c3d7c27c6f9e53b633d1
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3996
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
43
4
5
3
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
001a. minutes
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee. Record ID: 9420577. (4
pages)
01/11/1994
Pl/b(l)
001b. draft
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee. Record ID: 9420577. (1
page)
01/11/1994
Pl/b(l)
002. memo
For William Itoh from Marc Grossman. Subject: Transmittal of
Papers. Record ID: 9420114. (7 pages)
01/28/1994
Pl/b(l)
003. memo
For William Itoh from Marc Grossman. Subject: Transmittal of
Papers. Record ID: 9420106. (9 pages)
01/27/1994
Pl/b(l)
004a. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
01/25/1994
b(7)(C)
004b. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Marc Grossman, Colonel Robert McAleer et al from
William Itoh. Subject: Transmittal of Papers. Record ID: 9420074.
(10 pages)
01/25/1994
Pl/b(l)
004c. memo
For Samuel Berger from Ellen Laipson. Subject: Transmittal of Papers
to Deputies. Record ID: 9420074 Redo. (2 pages)
01/24/1994
Pl/b(l)
RESTRICTION
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2093
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRAj
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA)
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) of the PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
�N C R O PROFILE
S/M
R C R ID: 9420577 <
EOD
•
RECEIVED: 09 M Y 94 10
A
TO: B R E
EGR
D C DATE: 09 M Y 94
O
A
S U C REF:
ORE
F O : LAIPSON
RM
K Y O D : S U H ASIA
EWRS OT
MINUTES
D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: MINUTES F R 11 JAN D M G O S U H ASIA
O
C T N OT
ACTION: B R E A P O E R C M
EGR PRVD EO
D E DATE: 12 M Y 94
U
A
STAFF OFFICER: LAIPSON
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9321474
NSCP: DC0080
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
9321478
CODES: S U
O
D I S T R I B U T I O N
FOR CONCURRENCE
F R INFO
O
BRE
EGR
CICIO
DRY
AB
INDYK
KRECZKO
LAIPSON
N CCRN
S HO
SDREG
OEBR
WOLIN
WRIGHT
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White H ue Guidelines, S pe b r 11,2006
os
e tm e
HyVl NARA, Date2pLp? ^
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED B
Y
O E E BY: NSJEB
PND
DATE
CLOSED BY: NSJDA
-SECRET
B HN
Y AD
DC
O
WATH
/TC
1O
F
1
�-SETRfi*
ACTION DATA S M A Y R P R
UMR
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D C ACTION OFFICER
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001 B R E
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001
R C R ID: 9420577
EOD
C O ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
A
Z 94051613 F R DECISION
O
X 94051613 B R E APPROVED R C M
EGR
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DECRfil
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG#
URGENT NOT PROOFED:.
SYSTEM
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCL
PRS
INT
_ A/O
HAS SEEN
SEQUENCE TO
((NSCj
DISPOSITION
w
Reed
Kenney
Itoh
Soderberg
Berger
Lake
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
cc:
I = Information
VP
D = Dispatch
McLarty
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
Other.
Should be seen by:
(DateATime)
COMMENTS:
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
�20577
> EC RETNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 9, 1994
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
MARTIN I N D ) ^ ^ —
FROM:
ELLEN LAIPSC
SUBJECT:
Minutes o f NSC Meeting on South A s i a , January 1 1 ,
1994
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I a r e t h e Minutes f o r t h e Deputies Committee on
South A s i a which was h e l d Wednesday, January 1 1 .
Concurrences by:
Steven?Aoki
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e MjLnutes f o r r e c o r d purposes.
Approve
.sapprove _____
Attachment
Tab I
Minutes
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White H ue Guidelines, S pe b r 11,2006
os
e tm e
GDCRETD e c l a s s i f y on: OADR
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001a. minutes
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee. Record ID: 9420577. (4
pages)
01/11/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRAI
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) ofthe FOIA|
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA|
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
OOlb.draft
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee. Record ID: 9420577. (I
page)
01/11/1994
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3996
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2093
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) ofthe PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA)
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
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financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
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concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIA)
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RESTRICTION
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Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2093
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DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia, January 11, 1994 [ 1 ]
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�R C R ID: 9420074,
EOD
RECEIVED: 21 JAN 94 12
-CRT •
SGE
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 25 JAN 94
O
S U C REF:
ORE
F O : ITOH
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K Y O D : S U H ASIA
EWRS OT
D
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PERSONS:
SUBJECT: F L O UP F R 11 JAN D M G O S U H ASIA - A E C TASKER
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C T N OT
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ACTION: K N E S D M M T AGENCIES
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D E DATE: 25 JAN 94
U
STAFF OFFICER: LAIPSON
FILES-: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320134
NSCP: DC0080
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
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CODES:
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FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
INDYK
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NSC CHRON
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WRIGHT
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By VI NARA, [W»"7fl|feft
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ACTION DATA S M A Y REPORT
UMR
DOC ACTION OFFICER
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001 BERGER
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O
DATE 25 JAN 94
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DATE 25 JAN 94
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�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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L G 9420074
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DATE 25 JAN 94
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N
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Initials:
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�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
L G 9420074 „
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DATE 25 JAN 94
SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL O PAPERS T DEPUTIES O S U H ASIA
F
O
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D C M N CLASSIFICATION: DEGRMk
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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R
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
VIA LARRY B A S U
RNCM
R O 290, O O
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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2007-1635-F
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
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DATE 17 JAN 94
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE
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COPY: 1_
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RS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: S M A Y OF CONCLUSIONS F R D M G O SOUTH ASIA 11 JAN
UMR
O C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: "SEeftfcT
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
M . LEON FUERTH
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OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
VIA LARRY B A S U
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TR
A M CONTROL & DISARMAMENT A E C
RS
GNY
R O 5933, N W STATE
OM
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CP: 1
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M . A R N WILLIAMS
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A E C F R INTL DEVELOPMENT
GNY O
R O 5945, N W STATE
OM
E
2201 C STREET, N
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
�L G 9420047
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DATE ' 7 JAN 94
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: S M A Y OF CONCLUSIONS F R D M G O SOUTH ASIA 11 JAN
UMR
O C T N
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: 'SELKBT
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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TIME
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M . LEON FUERTH
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VIA LARRY B A S U
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GNY
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2201 C STREET, N
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WASHINGTON, D 20451
C
COPY: 1
M . AARON WILLIAMS
R
A E C F R INTL- DEVELOPMENT
GNY O
R O 5945, N W STATE
OM
E
2201 C STREET, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20523
C
COPY: 1
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND R T R TO: N C SECRETARIAT. R O 379 O O
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DATE T7- JAN 94
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS F R D M G O SOUTH ASIA 11 JAN
UMR F
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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TIME
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OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
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A E C F R INTL DEVELOPMENT
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DATE 17'~lAN 94
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SUBJECT: S M A Y OF CONCLUSIONS F R D M G O SOUTH ASIA 1 JAN
UMR
O C T N
1
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: -fifitrR^FOUET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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TIME
SIGNATURE
M . LEON FUERTH
R
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
VIA LARRY B A S U
RNCM
R O 290, O O
OM
EB
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WASHINGTON, D 20520
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MS. BARBARA STARR
A M CONTROL & DISARMAMENT A E C
RS
GNY
R O 5933, N W STATE
OM
E
2201 C STREET, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20451
C
COPY: 1
M . AARON WILLIAMS
R
A E C F R INTL DEVELOPMENT
GNY O
R O 5945, N W STATE
OM
E
2201 C STREET, N
W
WASHINGTON, D 20523
C
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0080 DC Meeting on South Asia January 11, 1994 [1]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-002-018-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/3aff559547d2158ee9765306b40f7b8d.pdf
34a6d886f0e6948a76b6ea4f220300ae
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3995
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
43
4
5
2
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
PRD/NSC-22. (54 pages)
05/25/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - {44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 5S2(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA|
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA)
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA)
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells |(b)(9) ofthe FOIA)
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
001. report
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
PRD/NSC-22. (54 pages)
05/25/1993
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [2]
2007-1635-F
vz2092
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidenlial Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom oflnformation Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA]
b(l) National security classified information |(b)(l) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) of the FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) of the FOIAj
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
ofgift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
NSC Emails
NSC Records Management System
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Description
An account of the resource
This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Extent
The size or duration of the resource.
86 folders in 5 boxes
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia May 25, 1993 [2]
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
7585710
42-t-7585710-20071635F-002-017-2015
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2007-1635-F
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Box 2
<a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47945">Collection Finding Aid</a>
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585710">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Preservation-Reproduction-Reference
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
9/30/2015
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/ce39ec61b2c2de982de028b9483e0800.pdf
67fa1429bc88c263892f63ecd0331f8e
PDF Text
Text
Case Number: 2007-1635-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
3995
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
43
4
5
2
V
�Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
001a. list
Deputies Committee Meeting. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)
05/25/1993
P3/b(3)
001b. form
Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
05/25/1993
b(7)(C)
001c. memo
Summary of Conclusions. Record ID: 9320576. (3 pages)
05/25/1993
Pl/b(l)
00 Id. minutes
Minutes of NSC Meeting. Record ID: 9320576. (4 pages)
05/25/1993
Pl/b(l)
002. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Marc Grossman, et al. Subject:
Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9320531. (2 pages)
05/21/1993
Pl/b(l)
003. memo
For Samuel Berger to Bruce Riedel. Subject: Deputies Committee
Meeting. Record ID: 9320531 Add On. (7 pages)
05/21/1993
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
2007-1635-F
V22091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(S) of the PRA|
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA|
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) of the FOIAj
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIAj
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
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�• SECRET
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
R C R ID: 9320576
EOD
RECEIVED: 27 MAY 93 14
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 01 JUN 93
O
S U C REF:
ORE
F O : ITOH
RM
K Y O D : ASIA
EWRS
PAKISTAN
N N PROLIFERATION
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INDIA
AFGHANISTAN
DC
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: MINUTES & S M A Y OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 M Y DC M G O S U H ASIA
UMR
A
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ACTION: K N E SGD M M TO AGENCIES
ENY
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DUE DATE: 31 MAY 93
STAFF OFFICER:. RIEDEL
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320531
NSCP: DC0032
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
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CODES:
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930601
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930601
930601
930601
930601
930601
930601
930601
930601
FUERTH, L
GROSSMAN, M
SHERFIELD, M
SHEFFIELD, H
LAUDER, J
CUTTER, W
INDERFURTH, K
DAS, A
TYSON, L
KNIGHT, E
DISPATCH F R INFO
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DOCUMENT NO.
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SUBJECT/TITLE
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Deputies Committee Meeting. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)
05/25/1993
RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [ 1 ]
2007-1635-F
vz2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
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�DEPUTIES. COMhn.TT.EB ..MEETING
TU2Si).AY,'''XliZ 25 , '1993
3:00 'P.M. - .4.:.0Q P-.M.
SiTU&LL'IOK'-ROCM
:
!
WHITE HOUSE
Samuel R. Berger
OVP
Leon Fuerth
STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John M a l o t t
DOD
Charles Freeman
Frederick Smith
JCS
David Jeremiah
Frank Bpwman
CIA
[001]
(b)(3)
6 COMMERCE
Jonathan Menes
David Schlechty
s USUN
Rick I n d e r f u r t h (Not a v a i l a b l e )
•Stove itomixu Z±\-\-e r i V
TREASURY
? James F a l l
Joshua Steiner
NSC
Bruce Riedel
L-Oi-V
-
�TIME OF TRANSMISSION
TIME OF RECEIPT
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PR*
RELEASER:
DTCfc
MESSAGE NO.
FROM
CLASSIFICATION
WILLIAM H . I T O m i ^ i ^
PAQES
456-6534
(NAME)
(PHONE NUMBER)
(ROOM NO.)
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
LOG # 20576
TO (AGENCY)
DEPTTROOM NO.
DELIVER TO
STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JCS
SECRETARY
CIA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMMERCE
DEP EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TREASURY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REMARKS:
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
PHONE NUMBER
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
L G 9320576
O
DATE 01 JUN 93
SUBJECT: S M A Y O CONCLUSIONS
UMR
F
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
OUET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
SIGNATURE
TIME
M . LEON FUERTH
R
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
VIA LARRY B A S U
RNCM
R O 292, O O
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WASHINGTON, D 20506
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COPY: 1.
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COPY: 1.
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WASHINGTON, D 20500
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COPY: 1
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials:
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1
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OM
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
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Telephone Number, [partial] (1 page)
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RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz209l
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
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an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIA)
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIAj
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concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIAj
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�SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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RELEASER:
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• IMMEDIATE
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FROM:
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Notlco of Meeting
PHONE: 202-456-2291
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
ROOM:
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20576
PLEASE DELIVER TO:
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N = No Further Action
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COMMENTS:
:! i 'AY 95 .'. :
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS.
�.'ca.c'nijT-
20576
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
June 1 , 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
f o r Economic P o l i c y
MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o t h e
United Nations
COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y
Department o f Commerce
CAPT./H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
J o i n t Chiefs o f S t a f f
DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, President's Council o f •
Economic A d v i s o r s
, v
. M . JOHN A. LAUDER
.R
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
SUBJECT:.
MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department o f Treasury
'
Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting
on South Asia held May 25, 1993 J&r
Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on South Asia which was held on May 25, 1993 in
the Situation Room. J&f
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
/
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Summary o f Conclusions
DECLASSfFTCD
White HonseGuidclina, September 11,2006
-SEeRB¥
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
~JS* t T T ^ f * ! [ T " ^
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DOCUMENT NO.
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001 c. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
Summary of Conclusions. Record ID: 9320576. (3 pages)
05/25/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom o f l n f o r m a t i o n Act - |S U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information [(b)(1) o f t h e F O I A |
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an agency [(b)(2) o f t h e F O I A |
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) o f t h e FOIA)
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) o f t h e F O I A j
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) o f t h e F O I A j
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the F O I A |
National Security' Classified Information 1(a)(1) o f t h e PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) o f t h e PRA|
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAj
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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�Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO.
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OOld. minutes
SUBJECTATITLE
DATE
Minutes of NSC Meeting. Record ID: 9320576. (4 pages)
05/25/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2091
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act -144 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act -15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI
P2
P3
P4
b(l) National security classified information 1(b)(1) ofthe FOIAj
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency 1(b)(2) ofthe FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute 1(b)(3) ofthe FOIAI
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(b)(6) ofthe FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions 1(b)(8) ofthe FOIA)
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells 1(b)(9) ofthe FOIA]
National Security Classified Information 1(a)(1) ofthe PRA|
Relating to the appointment to Federal office 1(a)(2) of the PRA|
Release would violate a Federal statute 1(a)(3) ofthe PRA]
Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information 1(a)(4) ofthe PRA]
P.S Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) ofthe PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy 1(a)(6) ofthe PRA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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�^Rjg.T
20576
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 27, 1993
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
^v:-';
THROUGH:
MARTIN I
FROM:
BRUCE RIEDE
SUBJECT:
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s / M i n u t e s f o r D e p u t i e s
Committee Meeting on South Asia May 25, 1993
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s a memorandum -to t h e agencies t r a n s m i t t i n g
the Summary o f Conclusions a t Tab A f o r t h e D e p u t i e s Committee
Meeting i n South Asia h e l d May 25, 1993. You r e v i e w e d t h e
summary i n d r a f t on May 26. A l s o a t t a c h e d a r e t h e M i n u t e s o f t h e
meeting a t Tab I I .
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s / M i n u t e s f o r r e c o r d
purposes.
Approve
Disapprove
That you a u t h o r i z e W i l l I t o h t o s i g n t h e memo a t Tab I
d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s t o agencies.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo t o Agencies
Tab A
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s
Tab I I
Minutes
cc:
D a n i e l Poneman
Steve Aoki
E r i c Schwartz
DFXLASSIFTED
E.0.13526
White H ue Guidelines, SeptemberJl, 2 0
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RECEIVED: 18 M Y 93 11
A
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S/M
TO: AGENCIES
D C DATE: 20 M Y 93
O
A
S U C REF:
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RM
K Y O D : ASIA
EWRS
PAKISTAN
N N PROLIFERATION
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 25 M Y D M G O S U H ASIA
GNA O
A C T N OT
ACTION: K N E S D M M T AGENCIES
E N Y G EO O
D E DATE: 21 M Y 93
U
A
STAFF OFFICER: RIEDEL
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320576
NSCP: DC0032
DOCUMENT
FOR ACTION
STATUS: C
PRD0022
CDS
OE:
D I S T R I B U T I O N
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NC CRN
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HO
RIEDEL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526
White H ue Guidelines, September.ll, 2 0
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06
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COMMENTS:
DATE
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001 B R E
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001
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93061010
F R DECISION
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002
002
002
002
002
002
002
002
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930520
930520
930520
930520
930520
930520
930520
930520
930520
FUERTH, L
GROSSMAN, M
SHERFIELD, M
KNIGHT, E
MCHUGH, P
INDERFURTH, K
SHEFFIELD, H
LAUDER, J
TYSON, L
DISPATCH F R INFO
O
�National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
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A = Action
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R = Retain
N = No Further Action
Other.
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS:
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
�TIME Of TRANSMISSION
TIME OF RECEIPT
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PRECEDENCE: II
RELEASER:
DTCU
ROUTINE
MESSAGE NO.
FROM
CLASSIFICATION
PAQES
WILLIAM H . I T O H y f ^
456-6534
(NAME)
(PHONE NUMBER)
(ROOM NO.)
NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON 25 MAY
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
LOG #
TO (AGENCY)
DEPTTROOM NO.
DELIVER TO
STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TREASURY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMMERCE
MS. PATTY MCHUGH
JCS
SECRETARY
CIA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REMARKS:
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
20531
PHONE NUMBER
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
LOG 9320531
DATE 20 M Y 93
A
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & A E D F R 25 M Y D
GNA O
A C
D C M N CLASSIFICATION: - E n T
OUET
SCE
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
M . LEON FUERTH
R
OFFICE O THE VICE PRESIDENT
F
VIA LARRY B A S U
RNCM
R O 292, O O
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WASHINGTON, D 20506
C
C P : 1.
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M. MR GOSA
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DEPARTMENT O STATE
F
R O 7224, MAIN STATE
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2201 C STREET, N
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WASHINGTON, D 20520
C
CP: 1
OY
DR. LAURA D TYSON
.
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
R O 314, O O
OM
EB
WASHINGTON, D 20500
C
COPY: 1
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initialg: V?Date:
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT A D RETURN TO: NSC. R O 379 OEOB
N
OM
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
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For Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Marc Grossman, et al. Subject:
Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9320531. (2 pages)
05/21/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
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�20531
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 18, 1993
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
MARTIN INDYKty-
FROM:
BRUCE RIEDB^L
SUBJECT:
N o t i f i c a t i o n Memo f o r Deputies Meeting on South
A s i a on May 25 a t 3:00 p.m.
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n memo f o r t h e Deputies
Meeting on South A s i a , May 25, a t 3:00 p.m. The n o t i f i c a t i o n
memo f o r w a r d s t h e agenda (Tab A ) . I t s h o u l d be d i s t r i b u t e d t o
agencies as soon as p o s s i b l e . The d i s c u s s i o n paper was
d i s t r i b u t e d l a s t month.
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e W i l l I t o h t o d i s t r i b u t e
Approve
V^->
t h e a t t a c h e d agenda
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
N o t i f i c a t i o n Memo
Tab A
Agenda
cc:
E r i c Schwartz
D a n i e l Poneman
-SECRET •
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
White Housc^Cuidelines, Septemberll, 2006
ny_LkNARA, \)*\clp[bn>
�R C R ID: 9320531
EOD
RECEIVED: 18 M Y 93 11
A
SECRET
N C R O PROFILE
S/M
TO: B R E
EGR
F O : RIEDEL
RM
INDYK
D C DATE: 21 M Y 93
O
A
S U C REF:
ORE
K Y O D : ASIA
EWRS
PAKISTAN
N N PROLIFERATION
O
INDIA
AFGHANISTAN
D
C
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION P P R F R 25 M Y D M G O S U H ASIA
AE O
A C T N OT
ACTION: N T D B B R E
OE Y EGR
D E DATE: 21 M Y 93
U
A
STAFF OFFICER: RIEDEL
FILES: IFM 0
LOGREF: 9320576
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PRD0022
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ACTION DATA S M A Y REPORT
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RECORD ID: 9320531
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
Z 93051920 FOR DECISION
X 93052114 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 93052114 KENNEY SGD M M TO AGENCIES
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FUERTH, L
GROSSMAN, M
SHERFIELD, M
KNIGHT, E
MCHUGH, P
INDERFURTH, K
SHEFFIELD, H
LAUDER, J
TYSON, L
930520
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INT
bepExecSec
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has seen
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DOCUMENT NO.
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003. memo
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
For Samuel Berger to Bruce Riedel. Subject: Deputies Committee
Meeting. Record ID: 9320531 Add On. (7 pages)
05/21/1993
RESTRICTION
Pl/b(l)
COLLECTION:
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Records Management
OA/Box Number:
3995
FOLDER TITLE:
DC0032 DC Meeting on South Asia, May 25, 1993 [1]
2007-1635-F
vz2091
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PI
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information 1(b)(4) ofthe FOIAj
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purposes 1(b)(7) ofthe FOIAj
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concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIAj
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�i-3
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Pakistani Support of Terrorist Operations in Jammu & Kashmir
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National Security Council
George Tenet
Donald Camp
Kathleen Cooper
Stephen Grummon
NSC Cables
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2007-1635-F
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This collection consists of records related to Pakistani support of terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir. The majority of the records in this collection are closed due to National Security. This collection contains records from late 1993 to 2001. Open records are largely administrative paperwork tracking the movement of memorandum through the National Security Council. The collection also includes correspondence to the President from members of the public, the United States Congress and Senate, and some from the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. It also includes some open press articles reporting on the situation in the Kashmir.<br /><br /><span>This collection topic was requested via the Freedom of Information Act</span>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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86 folders in 5 boxes
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Text
C NDNA
O FE TL
I I
CONFIDENTIAL
5438
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h Former Secretary o f State Henry
K i s s i n g e r and Three Others re China fe}
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary
of S t a t e
Leon Panetta, Chief o f S t a f f
Anthony Lake, N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y Advisor
Samuel R. Berger, Deputy
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
Robert S u e t t i n g e r , NSC
(notetaker)
Henry K i s s i n g e r , former
Secretary o f State
Alexander Haig, former
Secretary o f State
Maurice Greenburg, Chairman,
American I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Group
John Whitehead, former Deputy
Secretary o f State
J u l y 13, 1995; 2:35-3:10 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
(Greetings and i n t r o d u c t i o n s )
The Vice President: The l a s t time I saw A l Haig, we were both
out campaigning i n the middle o f a f i e l d i n New Hampshire. f&)
Gen. Haig:
I t h i n k there were two o r three people t h e r e — i t
was l i k e a graveyard. And the c o l d e s t n i g h t o f t h e year. f€H
The President:
When d i d you get back? f&)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I got back on Friday. I t h i n k John (Whitehead)
got back a couple days e a r l i e r . We were i n China f o r a meeting
of the U.S.-China Society, which meets every year. f&)
The President:
(6)
Where do you t h i n k we are i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p ?
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : Well, as you know, we have never asked f o r a
meeting w i t h you before but decided t o do so on t h i s occasion.
We are a l l f o u r o f us deeply concerned about t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f
Sino-American r e l a t i o n s . I've been t o China 25 times o r so,
beginning back i n 1971. And i n a l l t h a t time, I've never seen
CONFIDENTIAL
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such p o t e n t i a l f o r d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s . So one evening,
when we were s i t t i n g around together i n B e i j i n g , we decided t o
request a meeting w i t h you. Since most of us are Republicans, we
considered i t best t o work more f o r m a l l y . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, I've j u s t signed the Base Closing r e p o r t ,
which w i l l probably end up c o s t i n g me 54 e l e c t o r a l votes i n
California.
f&)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I f the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n can move i n the d i r e c t i o n
of improving r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, we w i l l do what we can t o help
w i t h the Republicans i n Congress, who I b e l i e v e are behaving very
i r r e s p o n s i b l y on t h i s issue these days. I spoke t h i s morning
before the Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee, and I was very
c r i t i c a l of recent Congressional a c t i o n s toward China,
p a r t i c u l a r l y some o f the measures before Senator Helms, sponsored
by Republicans.
f&)
But t o get back t o our t r i p t o China. The e n t i r e time we were
t h e r e , we were exposed t o a l i t a n y of complaints. They s a i d t h a t
beginning w i t h President Bush's sale of F-16s t o Taiwan and
moving on through Tiananmen sanctions, other weapons sales and
p o l i c y changes, t o the d e c i s i o n t o allow Lee Teng-hui t o v i s i t
C o r n e l l , the U.S. has proceeded toward a "two Chinas" p o l i c y .
R e a f f i r m i n g our "one China" p o l i c y , which I d i d repeatedly, does
not reassure them any more. f€H
I t o l d them the d e c i s i o n on Lee Teng-hui was not a s t r a t e g i c
s h i f t but was a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , t r y i n g , among other t h i n g s ,
to avoid worse consequences w i t h Congress. They s a i d , even i f
t h a t ' s t r u e , once the sequence t h a t leads toward Taiwan
independence s t a r t s , i t can't be c o n t r o l l e d . And they won't
stand f o r i t . I f i t comes t o a choice between good r e l a t i o n s
w i t h the U n i t e d States and Taiwan's independence, they would
r a t h e r have bad r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U.S.
This case was put t o us
so i n c e s s a n t l y , and w i t h such c o n v i c t i o n , t h a t I take i t
s e r i o u s l y . And t h a t ' s why I'm here.
f€}
I got a c a l l from Lane K i r k l a n d — who's no f r i e n d of mine —
u r g i n g me t o take up the Harry Wu case w h i l e I was t h e r e — t r y
to i n t e r c e d e w i t h Chinese leaders. The Embassy also encouraged
us t o r a i s e i t , which we d i d . Recognizing t h e r e are l o t s of
p r a c t i c a l problems t h a t need t o be addressed, I d i d n ' t accuse
them of i l l e g a l i t y or gross i m m o r a l i t y i n a r r e s t i n g Harry Wu.
Rather, I s a i d I was concerned about i t s impact on Sino-American
r e l a t i o n s at a very d i f f i c u l t time. Their v e r s i o n of the s t o r y
was t h a t Wu appears t o be a p l a n t , a p r o v o c a t i o n t o d i s t u r b
r e l a t i o n s , which w i l l then provide the U.S. Government w i t h the
excuse i t needs t o continue on i t s chosen course toward "two
Chinas."
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I b e l i e v e t h a t i f we can a l l j u s t q u i e t down a l i t t l e b i t , not
hammer away a t them i n the press about how t h i s i s an example o f
t h e i r e v i l system, there i s at l e a s t a reasonable chance of Wu's
being released i n two or three weeks. fe)
So t h a t , Mr. President, i s the essence of my
report.
Gen. Haig:
I t h i n k they don't r e a l l y want a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h
us. But the constant d r i p p i n g — F-16s, post-Tiananmen
s a n c t i o n s , human r i g h t s accusations, transparency questions, IPR
and now Taiwan — has r e a l l y got them. The Foreign M i n i s t e r was
very c o n s i s t e n t , very tough on the problem i n the Taiwan S t r a i t s .
I t ' s the -fj^rst time I've seen them engaging d i r e c t l y
EO 13526 1.4d
I f we have a major breach i n our r e l a t i o n s , and go t o sanctions
on t h i s or t h a t , I t h i n k we have t o be prepared f o r the i s o l a t i o n
of the U n i t e d States on t h i s issue. The Europeans are f u l l y i n t o
China and won't go along. The Japanese won't j o i n us i n any k i n d
of p u n i t i v e e f f o r t . Furthermore, we'd be f o r c i n g the Chinese
i n t o the arms of Russia and I r a n . That k i n d of a c o a l i t i o n could
be d e v a s t a t i n g . Looking at i t from the p e r s p e c t i v e of our longrun i n t e r e s t s , i t ' s very dangerous f o r us t o go on t h i s way.
I t ' s time f o r both sides to stop, take a deep b r e a t h and cool
t h i s d i s p u t e o f f . f&)
As Republicans, we have a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o work on those
members of our p a r t y who are i n f l a m i n g the problem — they are so
volatile.
I t o l d G i n g r i c h t o get o f f t h i s w i c k e t . And he s a i d
t h a t he would.
fG}
Mr. President, you have got to get out and make a d e f i n i t i v e
statement about U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s . I t ' s a very d i f f i c u l t
t h i n g . I don't know. Can we do i t w i t h o u t l o s i n g face?
We
can't promise B e i j i n g t h a t w e ' l l never a l l o w another Lee v i s i t .
Mr. Greenburg: I b e l i e v e , Mr. President, t h a t i t ' s time f o r
q u i e t diplomacy.
I've been going t o China f o r 20 years, two or
three times a year. And I've never seen r e l a t i o n s as bad as they
are now.
We can't tamper w i t h the "one China" p o l i c y . They
t h i n k we've done so by deeds, i f not words. They see an e r o s i o n
i n the v a l i d i t y of the "Three Communiques." Anything t h a t
t h r e a t e n s the communiques, i n t h e i r view, i s bad.
I'm
p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned at the spreading e f f e c t o f t h i s d i s p u t e i n
Asia. We can't have an Asia p o l i c y unless China i s i n the midst
of i t .
I f our r e l a t i o n s w i t h China go awry, we could end up
d e s t a b i l i z i n g a l l of Asia.
fG}
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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We've got to b r i d g e t h i s gap. They t h i n k we s t a r t e d the problem,
so we have t o take the i n i t i a t i v e .
fe^
The Harry Wu case i s a red h e r r i n g . I f the U n i t e d States takes
steps t o improve the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p , I t h i n k the Chinese
w i l l work q u i e t l y t o l e t Wu out. But the more n o i s y the case
becomes, the more i t plays i n t o the hands of the h a r d l i n e r s i n
China.
f&)
Mr. Whitehead: Mr. President, I'm very alarmed about t h i s .
I
t h i n k there's an even s c a r i e r outcome p o s s i b l e . The Chinese
b e l i e v e we've v i o l a t e d the "Three Communiques" by l e t t i n g Lee
Teng-hui come to the United States. They never s a i d t h i s
d i r e c t l y , but they may now t h i n k they're f r e e t o v i o l a t e the
communiques, t o o . By t a k i n g Taiwan m i l i t a r i l y .
They may f e e l
t h a t they need t o take a c t i o n t o prevent Taiwan from becoming
independent.
I f they invade, or blockade Taiwan, w i l l we come t o
i t s defense? I know t h a t ' s a grim o u t l o o k , but t h a t ' s the road
we're heading down, i n my view. I t ' s time t o take a c t i o n , t o
change course.
(£
•}
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I t ' s not j u s t t h a t they t h i n k we've broken the
"Three Communiques." When I met w i t h Premier L i Peng, he was
much more b l u n t . He asked me, does the United States see China
as our enemy? And I got the same question from the Foreign
M i n i s t e r . For whatever reason, they seem t o view the Lee v i s i t
as a harbinger of f a r more d i f f i c u l t r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U.S.
f€4
The P r e s i d e n t :
What do you t h i n k we should do?
f&)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I don't t h i n k we need t o do a n y t h i n g dramatic. I
t h i n k there's a sequence of steps t h a t both sides can take. Both
seem t o agree on what they are. I t ' s j u s t a matter of t a k i n g
them. I'm c o n f i d e n t they w i l l work — I t a l k e d t o Warren about
them.
Even on the question of m i s s i l e p r o l i f e r a t i o n t o Pakistan, I
don't t h i n k there's anything new happening. Although I hasten t o
add t h a t I don't know the basic f a c t s . tG}
But I agree w i t h my colleagues completely. E v e r y t h i n g depends on
the s t a t e of U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s . And I don't t h i n k they want a
confrontation.
fe)
Mr. Greenburg: I had, a meeting w i t h Xiao Rona (Deng fiong), Deng
Xiaoping's daughter.
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Gen. Haig: Not t o make t h i s worse, but whatever the Chinese hear
from you, t h e y ' l l hear something very d i f f e r e n t from the
Republicans.
I t ' s a c l a s s i c challenge: A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o l i c y .
Congressional o p p o s i t i o n . fe-)
The Vice President: G i n g r i c h j u s t c a l l e d f o r w i t h h o l d i n g money
from the d e l e g a t i o n t o the Women's Conference i n B e i j i n g . fe)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Chinas." fe}
He also made i t p r e t t y c l e a r he f a v o r s "two
Well, I concede they are seeing t h i n g s i n t h e i r own way. And
t h e i r domestic problems and succession mean i t ' s the lowest
common denominator view. They can't seem t o stop asking t h a t the
r e l a t i o n s h i p be a one-way s t r e e t . I d i d n ' t s e l l F-16s, Bush d i d .
And i t was p r e t t y c l e a r why he d i d i t .
We're-making every e f f o r t
t o understand t h e i r domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and f a c t o r i t
i n t o our p o l i c y . Why can't they do. the same f o r us? fe^
I d e l i n k e d MFN and human r i g h t s , and t h i n g s seemed t o be going
along p r e t t y w e l l . They were h e l p f u l i n Korea, working w i t h the
North. I n f a c t , I don't t h i n k we would have been able t o reach
an agreement w i t h o u t China's help. They also helped out a l i t t l e
b i t on MTCR l a s t year. fe)
But otherwise, t h i n g s have not g o t t e n b e t t e r .
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"And they get a l l the b e n e f i t s of our market. You know our
b i g g e s t f o r e i g n a i d program i s buying 30 percent o f t h e i r
e x p o r t s . fe)
The Vice President: They seem t o be so out o f touch,
sense t h a t i n your discussions w i t h them? fG-)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r :
I don't know.
Did you
I d i d n ' t get any o f t h a t .
fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : You know, when I brought i n t h e i r ambassador, I
t o l d him t h a t I understand t h i s issue i s a very s e n s i t i v e one f o r
them and t h a t I know we don't view a l o t o f t h i n g s about human
r i g h t s and democracy i n the same way. But I t o l d him t h i s i s a
c o u n t r y where a man can be allowed t o v i s i t h i s alma mater, make
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a speech, be p e r m i t t e d t o t r a v e l . Lee's not a c r i m i n a l . And
d i d n ' t ask him t o come t o Washington, i t wasn't an o f f i c i a l
visit.
fG)
we
But I understand where they're coming from. I t ' s OK, a laydown
t h a t we purchase 30-40 percent of t h e i r e x p o r t s , they f e e l
they've earned some k i n d of reward from us.
fe)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : There were no economic t h r e a t s issued i n my
h e a r i n g . Part of the problem i s t h a t t h e i r perceptions are
shaped by t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l experience. On the one hand,
1,44
I remember once I was t r a v e l i n g i n China and went t o
the c i t y of Suzhou, where they have a l o t of canals. I s a i d t o
my hosts t h a t I understood Suzhou was c a l l e d "the Venice of
China." They s a i d t h a t , a c t u a l l y , Venice should be c a l l e d "the
Suzhou of Europe." fe)
On the other hand, when you add i n the experience of the 19th
century, w i t h c o l o n i a l domination and d i v i s i o n , i t ' s a very
p a i n f u l memory, even today. They don't l i k e h e a r i n g Western
p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r t h e i r problems. (e)
So when problems a r i s e i n r e l a t i o n s , they blame us f i r s t .
I'm
a f r a i d , under the circumstances, we have t o take i n t o account the
i d i o s y n c r a s i e s t h a t have b u i l t up over 5,000 years.
fe)
The President:
I tried.
fe)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I t h i n k t h a t you had a r i g h t t o expect more
progress on human r i g h t s i n r e t u r n f o r your d e c i s i o n . Maybe they
d i d n ' t see i t t h a t way.
But the Taiwan question i s too b i g an
issue f o r them. They don't f e e l they can compromise. They view
i t i n the c o n t e x t of t h e i r h i s t o r y w i t h Japan, t o o . I t was taken
away from them 100 years ago. Now they see i t happening again —
they can't back away. fG)
could not back away from a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t p o l i t i c a l
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damage from your opponents. They s a i d t h a t you have i t i n your
power t o prevent another Lee v i s i t .
I t doesn't have t o happen
again unless you say so.
f&)
Gen. Haig: We're not here t o blame you or side w i t h them.
There's a sea change going on i n terms of our r e l a t i o n s w i t h
China and Taiwan. And the Republicans are p a r t of the problem.
The President: I t ' s l i k e a funhouse. I got a l e t t e r the other
day, signed by Helms and Wellstone, D'Amato and Harkin — p o l a r
opposites, p o l i t i c a l l y , but saying the same t h i n g s about China.
I r e a l l y thought I was i n a funhouse. Domestically, you know,
we' re engaged i n some very fundamental debates on issues of great
importance.
Where our s o c i e t y i s going on issues l i k e w e l f a r e
and h e a l t h care. Everyone i s upset, saying p r e t t y extreme
things.
I can understand t h a t the Chinese would be i n a s i m i l a r
situation.
f&)
So what do you t h i n k i s the best we can do about Jiang Zemin
coming t o the UN i n October?
fG)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : The f i r s t t h i n g i s f o r Warren t o t a l k t o the
Foreign M i n i s t e r .
That could lead t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f what each
side t h i n k s a "one China" p o l i c y r e a l l y means. Then you can
r a i s e your concerns — on human r i g h t s , n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n . They,
i n t u r n , can t a l k " s t r a t e g i c a l l y " about Japan and I n d i a .
fe)
The
President:
EO 13526 1.4d
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Dr. K i s s i n g e r : As they see i t , our problems w i t h China are less
s i g n i f i c a n t than t h e i r problems w i t h Japan and I n d i a . They love
t o t a l k about the b i g p i c t u r e , engage i n s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e .
And
I r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t i f you c o n s u l t w i t h them —
l e c t u r e them — they w i l l respond. fe)
not j u s t
As f a r as Jiang Zemin i s concerned, they understand f u l l y t h a t
i t ' s not i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o have him come here f o r a press
disaster.
I t h i n k we should work t o put t o g e t h e r a modest set of
achievements t h a t could come from such a v i s i t .
fG-)
The President: I'm very w o r r i e d t h a t the Harry Wu problem could
blow e v e r y t h i n g o f f the t r a c k s . That issue has r e a l legs,
politically.
I t i s p o t e n t i a l l y a very bad problem.
(€)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : When I met w i t h Deng Rong l a s t November, we got
t o t a l k i n g about Fang L i z h i , the d i s s i d e n t who took refuge i n the
U.S. Embassy a f t e r Tiananmen. She was w e l l - b r i e f e d . She t o l d me
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we worked f o r a long time on a package deal t o get Fang out —
you take t h i s step, w e ' l l take t h a t . By the time we had worked
out the steps and Fang was released, the B e r l i n Wall was down,
the Soviet Union was f a l l i n g apart, Ceaucescu was dead.
The
w o r l d had changed. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , I don't know what a package
deal f o r Harry Wu might i n c l u d e . fe)
I know t h a t whatever we do, we have t o i n c l u d e a s i g n i f i c a n t
s t r a t e g i c component i n our discussions and avoid l e c t u r i n g them.
I t w i l l d r i v e them mad i f we t a l k n a r c o t i c s , human r i g h t s and
m i s s i l e s but not Russia, Japan and Southeast Asia. When we
t a l k e d t o them about these issues on our t r i p , we d i d n ' t come t o
great agreement -- i t was j u s t e x p o s i t i o n s . I f you can do t h i s ,
I'm sure you w i l l have success. fe)
Gen. Haig: On the question of Jiang coming here d u r i n g the UN
anniversary, I know t h a t , at l e a s t p r i o r t o the c u r r e n t problems,
they wanted him t o be i n v i t e d t o Washington. This l a s t t r i p ,
when I asked the Foreign M i n i s t e r i f Jiang would come i f we
i n v i t e d him, he j u s t r o l l e d h i s eyes. I t h i n k t h a t i f we do
i n v i t e him, you need some k i n d of b i p a r t i s a n assurance from the
H i l l t h a t t h e y ' l l a l l o w the v i s i t t o be s u c c e s s f u l . fe)
The President:
We can't have him come here and get r a i n e d on.
fe)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I t h i n k the i n v i t a t i o n should be u n c o n d i t i o n a l .
We can work w i t h them so t h a t they do the r i g h t t h i n g s on t h e i r
part.
fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : I appreciate your being w i l l i n g t o work t o g e t h e r
w i t h us on t h i s problem. I've been w o r r i e d s i c k about i t the
l a s t s e v e r a l days. I spent two hours on the phone, c a l l i n g
people a l l over the country t o t a l k about what we can do t o t u r n
t h i s around. I t ' s bad f o r the United States, bad f o r China, t o o .
Somehow, I hope you can l e t them know t h a t I want t o get t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p back on t r a c k .
fG)
The Vice President:
r i g h t now.
fe)
Working w i t h the H i l l i s r e a l l y important
The President: I don't know. I met w i t h Newt the other n i g h t
f o r d i n n e r . We t a l k e d f o r about three or f o u r hours. At the
same time as he's making outrageous statements about China, he
asked us t o help get some of the newer Republican members out
t h e r e so they understand the problems b e t t e r . Wants t o send 130140 of em out there i n a b i g herd.
(G)
x
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : I've t a l k e d t o G i n g r i c h b e f o r e .
him l a t e r on t h i s a f t e r n o o n .
fG)
And
I'm
seeing
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The Vice President:
I hope you can s t r a i g h t e n him out, fe-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s n o t t h a t I t h i n k they're s t u p i d ; t h e y ' r e
j u s t p r i s o n e r s o f t h e i r own experience.
I can't do much w i t h
them. Maybe you can. fe)
Let me j u s t say I appreciate your coming i n t o t a l k t o us about
this.
I t ' s a very important problem. I hope y o u ' l l continue
working w i t h us. fe)
Dr. K i s s i n g e r : Thank you f o r t a k i n g the time t o see us, Mr.
P r e s i d e n t . fe)
End o f Conversation
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�LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
September 17, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Through:
The Honorable Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor
Regarding the potential Chinese nuclear weapon test
Urgent action is needed to reinforce your commitment to the moratorium on nuclear
weapons testing in light of the evidence that China is preparing to test on October 5.
Public leadership underlining the importance of the testing moratorium to achieving
progress in the non-proliferation arena would stem any further erosion in adherence to the
moratorium and might give the Chinese reason to rethink their testing plans.
Even if action by our government does not deter China from performing a nuclear test,
strong international leadership on this issue will still serve us well in negotiations to
achieve your goals of an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and early
agreement to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As you demonstrated on Monday,
during this historic period of international realignment, the United States has the
opportunity to lead the world to a more secure future.
Threatened renewal of nuclear testing by the United States in response to a Chinese test
would be unlikely to have any affect on their plans. It would require six to nine months of
advance work, both technical and procedural, before we could perform such a test or
tests. Moreover, if we resume testing, it would likely have a domino effect, leading to
testing by the other three primary nuclear weapons states. Pressure on Russian
President Yeltsin to resume testing at this time would complicate his political situation at a
sensitive moment.
Over the past few months, our nuclear weapons laboratories have become convinced that
the stockpile stewardship program currently under development is the most effective way
of ensuring the safety, reliability and performance of our remaining nuclear weapons
consistent with your goal of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Preparing for
nuclear testing now would come at the expense of delaying progress on the stewardship
program designed to meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent in a
comprehensive test ban regime.
I remain convinced that your conclusion, announced in the July 3 radio address extending
the nuclear testing moratorium, remains valid: the price we would pay for conducting
additional nuclear tests outweighs the risks of continuing the moratorium.
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My recommendations are as follows:
o Make a high-profile public statement on the importance of maintaining the nuclear
testing moratorium, possibly tied to the signing of the Presidential Decision
Directive concerning non-proliferation. It is important that such a statement occur
prior to final backfilling of the Chinese test device which is expected to occur within
a week.
o Make direct contact with the Chinese leadership to express your personal concern
about the implications of continued testing on our shared non-proliferation goals.
o Privately and personally encourage other foreign leaders, including the Presidents
of Russia and France, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to directly contact the
Chinese leadership expressing support for the continuation of the testing
moratorium.
�
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�9516610
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 8, 1995
CONn DEMT IAL
DECL: 9/12/05
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r j / ^
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting w i t h A l b a n i a n P r e s i d e n t
S a l i Berisha
A l b a n i a n P r e s i d e n t Berisha's September 12 White House
v i s i t o f f e r s a key o p p o r t u n i t y t o press f o r w a r d o u r major
p o l i c y g o a l s f o r A l b a n i a . We want t o use B e r i s h a ' s v i s i t t o
urge a c o n t i n u e d r e s p o n s i b l e r e g i o n a l p o l i c y ; o f f e r our h e l p
i n b u i l d i n g democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s t o p r o t e c t human r i g h t s
f o r a l l A l b a n i a n s ; and s i g n a l o u r s u p p o r t f o r t h e ongoing
development o f a f r e e market economy i n A l b a n i a .
Long a f r i e n d o f t h e U.S., B e r i s h a shares these g o a l s
i n p r i n c i p l e . However, he expects more p r a c t i c a l economic
a s s i s t a n c e t h a n we can o f f e r , and o u r p r i o r i t i e s on some
democracy i s s u e s do n o t always c o i n c i d e . As o u r development
a i d i s l i m i t e d , we need t o use i t t o expand our a s s i s t a n c e
on law and democracy, which B e r i s h a says he welcomes, and t o
promote o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s t h a t support t h e b u i l d i n g o f
democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t can h e l p ensure human r i g h t s
for a l l Albanians, regardless o f ethnic o r i g i n .
Bosnian developments and t h e r e s e t t l e m e n t o f S e r b i a n
refugees i n Kosovo w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e dynamics o f
Berisha's v i s i t .
While v o i c i n g s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r U.S.
peace e f f o r t s , B e r i s h a urges t h a t a peace s e t t l e m e n t address
the Kosovo i s s u e , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e p l i g h t o f i t s e t h n i c
A l b a n i a n m a j o r i t y . You s h o u l d underscore t h a t we s u p p o r t
autonomy f o r t h e r e g i o n , and t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o urge t h e
Serbs t o r e s p e c t t h e human and c i v i l r i g h t s o f e t h n i c
A l b a n i a n s i n Kosovo. You a l s o s h o u l d make c l e a r t h a t ,
a l t h o u g h UNSC s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t S e r b i a may be l i f t e d i n t h e
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c o n t e x t o f an e v e n t u a l s e t t l e m e n t , we b e l i e v e Kosovo must be
d e a l t w i t h as p a r t o f any l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n . L a s t , you might
underscore t h a t t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n package t h a t
i s p a r t o f o u r broader Balkan peace p l a n i s designed t o
promote r e g i o n a l economic i n t e g r a t i o n and development.
B e r i s h a ' s agenda i n t h e U.S. w i l l o t h e r w i s e f o c u s on
s t i m u l a t i n g American a i d and investment i n A l b a n i a . He a l s o
wants t o secure U.S. b a c k i n g f o r A l b a n i a n membership i n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (NATO, EBRD, t h e World Bank, t h e
IMF, and t h e EU) and c l o s e r m i l i t a r y and s e c u r i t y
cooperation, including material assistance t o the Albanian
military.
He may express concern a t e r o s i o n o f t h e
p r e v i o u s l y c l o s e Albanian-American r e l a t i o n s h i p , owing
p a r t i c u l a r l y t o h i s p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e U.S. s i d e d w i t h
Greece i n p r e s s i n g t o r e l e a s e t h e Omonia case defendents
e a r l i e r t h i s year. B e r i s h a w i l l want a c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n
of American support f o r A l b a n i a n i n t e r e s t s , i n p a r t due t o
h i s need f o r t h i s t r i p t o g i v e him a p o l i t i c a l boost a t
home: p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s next s p r i n g may d e a l h i s
Democratic P a r t y a setback u n l e s s he can speed up economic
and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e improvements.
As t h e r e i s no guarantee t h a t B e r i s h a ' s p a r t y w i l l
remain i n power a f t e r t h e 1996 e l e c t i o n s , t h e focus o f o u r
a s s i s t a n c e and p u b l i c statements s h o u l d be on b u i l d i n g
i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e U.S.-Albanian r e l a t i o n s h i p , n o t t h e
p a r t y o r B e r i s h a as an i n d i v i d u a l . We s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h e
tremendous p r o g r e s s which A l b a n i a , once t h e most r e p r e s s i v e
of a l l communist d i c t a t o r s h i p s , has made under B e r i s h a ' s
l e a d e r s h i p . Our commitment t o t h e f u t u r e s h o u l d be t o h e l p
A l b a n i a c o n t i n u e down t h i s road. Moreover, t o disabuse
B e r i s h a o f t h e n o t i o n t h a t we are i n t e r e s t e d o n l y i n
s e c u r i t y g o a l s , you s h o u l d underscore t h a t B e r i s h a ' s s u p p o r t
f o r U.S. m i l i t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s i n A l b a n i a i s
a u s e f u l complement t o h i s e f f o r t s t o b u i l d a democratic
society.
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I.
- ALBANIAN MILITARY COOPERATION
BACKGROUND
I n l i n e w i t h i t s pro-Western p o l i c i e s , A l b a n i a seeks
g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e West, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n 1991 A l b a n i a was a d m i t t e d t o t h e OSCE and
agreed t o implement i t s p r i n c i p l e s and s t a n d a r d s . A l b a n i a has
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l o f t h e m i l i t a r y . (The
M i n i s t e r o f Defense, h i s deputy, and o t h e r key o f f i c i a l s a r e
civilians.)
Forces have been slashed t o some 40,000 as p a r t o f
a wholesale m i l i t a r y r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The U.S.-Albanian s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p has e v o l v e d
rapidly.
I n 1993, t h e U.S. and A l b a n i a s i g n e d a MOU on Defense
C o o p e r a t i o n l a y i n g out numerous areas o f c u r r e n t and p r o j e c t e d
c o o p e r a t i o n i n s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s . A l b a n i a became t h e f i r s t
C e n t r a l o r E a s t e r n European s t a t e t o r e q u e s t membership i n
NATO, and i n 1994 was t h e f i r s t t o s i g n up f o r NATO'S
P a r t n e r s h i p f o r Peace. As a symbol o f i t s s u p p o r t f o r UN/NATO
a c t i o n s i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a , A l b a n i a has o f f e r e d i t s
m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s t o NATO. We are c u r r e n t l y b a s i n g unmanned
a e r i a l v e h i c l e s f o r use over Bosnia a t A l b a n i a ' s Gjader
Airfield.
The South C a r o l i n a N a t i o n a l Guard i s c o n d u c t i n g
major r e p a i r s o f t h e C e n t r a l M i l i t a r y Trauma H o s p i t a l .
Numerous j o i n t t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s are b e i n g conducted t h i s year.
A l b a n i a i s an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n U.S. b i l a t e r a l
a s s i s t a n c e programs. We p r o v i d e d H u m a n i t a r i a n A s s i s t a n c e and
S e c u r i t y A s s i s t a n c e and h e l d B i l a t e r a l Working Group meetings
on Defense M a t t e r s . Under t h e S e c u r i t y A s s i s t a n c e Program, we
have proposed d o u b l i n g f u n d i n g l e v e l s f o r IMET t o $400,000 i n
FY96. The A l b a n i a n m i l i t a r y has r e c e i v e d over 150 courses o f
i n s t r u c t i o n i n fundamental concepts and p r a c t i c e s o f combat,
combat s u p p o r t and combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t . A l b a n i a i s e l i g i b l e
t o purchase defense a r t i c l e s c o m m e r c i a l l y and t h r o u g h F o r e i g n
M i l i t a r y Sales, and t o r e c e i v e n o n - l e t h a l EDA. Through
C o n g r e s s i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e , p a c k i n g , c r a t i n g , and s h i p p i n g c o s t s
f o r these a r t i c l e s w i l l be p a i d by DoD.
A M i l i t a r y L i a i s o n Team (MLT) has o p e r a t e d i n A l b a n i a s i n c e
1992.
The MLT oversees v i s i t s and exchanges between U.S. and
Albanian m i l i t a r i e s . P r i o r i t i e s include t r a i n i n g i n
o r g a n i z a t i o n and s t r u c t u r e , defense p l a n n i n g and p o l i c y
development, p e r s o n n e l management, o p e r a t i o n s , n a v a l and a i r
f o r c e o r g a n i z a t i o n , and l e g a l i s s u e s .
A p a r t from c o n s u l t a t i o n s and t r a i n i n g , A l b a n i a has l i t t l e
t o show f o r i t s a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d c o o p e r a t i o n on o v e r f l i g h t s ,
b a s i n g , a c t i v i t i e s i n t e r r i t o r i a l waters, and o t h e r s e c u r i t y
i s s u e s . B e r i s h a wants U.S. a s s i s t a n c e f o r : improved defense
c a p a b i l i t i e s i n c l u d i n g a n t i - t a n k and a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons;
opening o f a S e c u r i t y A s s i s t a n c e O f f i c e ; expanded c o o p e r a t i o n
w i t h t h e U.S. Navy and h e l p i n c o n t r o l l i n g i t s c o a s t a l w a t e r s ;
and e q u i p p i n g an A l b a n i a n u n i t f o r peacekeeping a c t i v i t i e s .
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TALKING POINTS
The d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e B i l a t e r a l Working Group and o u r
r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y and arms c o n t r o l d i a l o g u e have advanced
our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f your s e c u r i t y concerns.
We a r e g r a t e f u l f o r your c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e m i l i t a r y f i e l d ,
i n c l u d i n g your o f f e r s o f f a c i l i t i e s and your p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n j o i n t exercises.
The "Warsaw I n i t i a t i v e " which I announced e a r l i e r t h i s year
w i l l be t h e c e n t e r p i e c e o f our s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e program
f o r 1996. We b e l i e v e t h a t a p r i o r i t y f o r A l b a n i a under
t h i s program should be o u t f i t t i n g t h e peacekeeping u n i t
which you have proposed. Our f u n d i n g r e q u e s t i s s t i l l
b e f o r e Congress.
A l b a n i a i s e l i g i b l e t o purchase defense a r t i c l e s
c o m m e r c i a l l y and t h r o u g h F o r e i g n M i l i t a r y Sales, and t o
r e c e i v e Excess Defense A r t i c l e s .
This i n c l u d e s , i n
p r i n c i p l e , l e t h a l weapons.
We a r e p r e p a r e d t o c o n s i d e r your r e q u e s t f o r a n t i - t a n k and
a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons. We do n o t y e t know whether Congress
w i l l p r o v i d e F o r e i g n M i l i t a r y Sales a s s i s t a n c e f o r such
purchases.
NATO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i l l conduct a b r i e f i n g on t h e s u b j e c t
o f NATO expansion p l a n s f o r your government t h i s f a l l i n
Tirana.
We need t o f i n a l i z e a b i l a t e r a l S t a t u s o f Forces Agreement
(SOFA). The l a c k o f t h i s agreement has c o m p l i c a t e d U.S.
a c t i v i t i e s i n A l b a n i a and t h e t r a i n i n g o f A l b a n i a n u n i t s i n
the U.S.
1
•HULU 1DLNTIAJ.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
I.
BACKGROUND
Once t h e most r e p r e s s i v e and i s o l a t e d o f E a s t e r n Europe's
M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s t a t e s , A l b a n i a has over t h e l a s t f o u r years
enacted s i g n i f i c a n t economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g and p o l i t i c a l
r e f o r m . Since assuming power i n A p r i l 1992, P r e s i d e n t S a l i
B e r i s h a ' s government has completed a r a d i c a l m i l i t a r y
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , revamped t h e communist era j u d i c i a l system,
p r i v a t i z e d housing and a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d , and passed new
c r i m i n a l , l a b o r , and investment laws. R e c e n t l y , A l b a n i a was
a d m i t t e d t o t h e C o u n c i l o f Europe.
A l b a n i a i s g e a r i n g up f o r p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s
scheduled f o r n e x t s p r i n g . Berisha hopes t h a t h i s m e e t i n g w i t h
you w i l l b o l s t e r h i s p a r t y ' s s t a n d i n g . He h i m s e l f does not
face e l e c t i o n u n t i l 1997.
v
B e r i s h a ' s Democratic P a r t y (PD) has a s o l i d w o r k i n g
m a j o r i t y i n t h e u n i c a m e r a l l e g i s l a t u r e , b u t has s u f f e r e d a
s e r i e s o f r e v e r s e s i n t h e t h r e e years s i n c e coming t o power.
S e v e r a l prominent members were e x p e l l e d and formed s m a l l but
i n f l u e n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . The government was stunned by
t h e d e f e a t o f i t s d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n i n a referendum l a s t
November. That blow b r o u g h t disagreements w i t h i n t h e p a r t y
i n t o t h e open, and l e d B e r i s h a t o r e s h u f f l e t h e c a b i n e t and
c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l o f t h e p a r t y . He removed h i s former f r i e n d
Eduard Selami as head o f t h e p a r t y . I n August t h e PD a p p o i n t e d
30 new D i s t r i c t Chairmen t o r e v i t a l i z e i t s grass r o o t s
organization.
The S o c i a l i s t P a r t y (PS) — p o l i t i c a l h e i r s o f t h e
communist regime -- e n j o y s s i g n i f i c a n t s u p p o r t and f o r m i d a b l e
o r g a n i z a t i o n a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l . The second l a r g e s t p a r t y i n
p a r l i a m e n t , t h e PS c o n t r o l s r o u g h l y h a l f o f t h e l o c a l
governments. P a r t y Chairman Fatos Nano remains i n p r i s o n a f t e r
b e i n g j a i l e d i n 1993 on charges of c o r r u p t i o n d u r i n g h i s
three-month t e n u r e as Prime M i n i s t e r under t h e l a s t S o c i a l i s t
government i n 1991.
I f r e l e a s e d , he i s expected t o c o n t e s t t h e
p r e s i d e n c y i n 1997.
Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r s Nano a
p o l i t i c a l prisoner.
The c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s have not agreed on steps
toward drawing up and r a t i f y i n g a new c o n s t i t u t i o n .
The
I n t e r i m Law on Major C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r o v i s i o n s remains t h e
f o u n d a t i o n f o r democratic government based on t h e r u l e o f law.
A network o f laws i n c l u d i n g s t a t u t e s on p r o p e r t y q u e s t i o n s ,
c i v i l and l e g a l r i g h t s , t h e government's r i g h t s and
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and commercial r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s are
b e i n g enacted and implemented. A new Penal Code, Penal
P r o c e d u r a l Codes, C i v i l Procedures Code, and o t h e r i m p o r t a n t
l e g i s l a t i o n have been adopted i n r e c e n t months. I n g e n e r a l ,
these laws are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Western concepts.
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- 2II.
TALKING POINTS
o
We have been impressed w i t h t h e r a p i d p r o g r e s s o f
p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m d u r i n g t h e t h r e e years you have h e l d
office.
o
Your government and l e g i s l a t u r e a r e c r e a t i n g new economic
and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s from t h e ground up. The huge
volume o f laws which have been passed by t h e People's
Assembly a t t e s t s t o t h e s c a l e o f t h i s e f f o r t .
o
We a p p r e c i a t e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n
t o democracy, and we want t o h e l p t o f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n
democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n A l b a n i a .
o
Your commitment t o democracy was c l e a r l y demonstrated by
your g r a c i o u s acceptance o f t h e d e f e a t o f t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l referendum i n November. That r e s u l t and
your e f f o r t s t o stem c o r r u p t i o n and r e b u i l d your p a r t y ' s
t i e s t o t h e people a r e marks o f a mature democracy.
o
We count on your c o n t i n u e d moderation r e g a r d i n g t h e
n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s where t h e r e a r e s i z e a b l e e t h n i c
A l b a n i a n p o p u l a t i o n s . Your avoidance o f i n f l a m m a t o r y
s t a t e m e n t s , even though they might be p o p u l a r
d o m e s t i c a l l y , a t t e s t s t o your statesmanship.
o
As a m a t t e r o f p o l i c y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s does n o t t a r g e t
assistance t o p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .
I do,
however, wish you success i n t h e coming e l e c t o r a l campaign
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HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
I.
BACKGROUND
A l b a n i a ' s weak j u d i c i a l and law enforcement s t r u c t u r e s
d e t r a c t from a s t e a d i l y i m p r o v i n g r e c o r d on human r i g h t s . A l l
p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s were f r e e d by t h e summer o f 1991.
There
are no l o n g e r any r e s t r i c t i o n s on freedom o f movement w i t h i n
t h e c o u n t r y , and r e g u l a t i o n s on f o r e i g n t r a v e l and e m i g r a t i o n
are now i n a c c o r d w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l norms. Workers now have
t h e r i g h t t o a s s o c i a t e f r e e l y , and have formed t r a d e unions o f
t h e i r own c h o o s i n g . Freedom o f r e l i g i o n has been e s t a b l i s h e d
i n law and p r a c t i c e .
I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c g a i n s has t a k e n h o l d . A
Law on Basic C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r o v i s i o n s was passed i n 1991, and
t h e government adopted OSCE human r i g h t s p r i n c i p l e s i n t o law i n
1993.
I t has adhered t o t h e C o u n c i l o f Europe's Framework
Convention f o r t h e P r o t e c t i o n o f N a t i o n a l M i n o r i t i e s . However,
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have been unable t o agree on a process f o r
d r a f t i n g and r a t i f y i n g a new c o n s t i t u t i o n .
The j u d i c i a l and law enforcement systems are moving t o w a r d
r e f o r m , though t h e process i s slow. S e r i o u s gaps i n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and implementing j u d i c i a l procedure remain
t h r o u g h o u t t h e l e g a l system. A s u s t a i n e d e f f o r t w i l l be needed
t o complete t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t o a f u l l y f u n c t i o n i n g
d e m o c r a t i c , f r e e - m a r k e t c o u n t r y . S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n must be
p a i d t o p e r f e c t i n g t h e r u l e o f law, an independent j u d i c i a r y ,
t h e f r e e p r e s s , a workable body o f commercial and p r o p e r t y law,
and m a i n t a i n i n g good r e l a t i o n s w i t h and f a i r t r e a t m e n t o f
minorities.
P o l i c e c o n t i n u e t o beat d e t a i n e e s , sometimes c a u s i n g
deaths. C o r r u p t i o n i s a l s o emerging as a s i g n i f i c a n t problem.
Freedom o f speech, press and assembly a r e g e n e r a l l y r e s p e c t e d ,
a l t h o u g h t h e p u b l i s h i n g and d i s t r i b u t i o n system remain under
s t a t e c o n t r o l . The e l e c t r o n i c media (except f o r one r a d i o
s t a t i o n ) a r e s t a t e monopolies. There i s no mechanism t o ensure
t h a t e d i t o r i a l and programming d e c i s i o n s are independent o f t h e
government.
The e t h n i c Greek community complains o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n
e d u c a t i o n , p u b l i c employment and r e l i g i o u s m a t t e r s . Access t o
i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e Greek language c o u l d be expanded, b u t
problems i n o t h e r areas have been o v e r s t a t e d .
II.
TALKING POINTS
o
We a r e p l e a s e d t h a t you have p u t a h i g h p r i o r i t y on
a d d r e s s i n g human r i g h t s i n A l b a n i a . As you know, Americans
a l s o a t t a c h g r e a t importance t o t h e r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s
wherever t h e y may l i v e .
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o
We support your e f f o r t s t o r e f o r m t h e j u d i c i a r y , t o
e s t a b l i s h r u l e o f law, t o f o s t e r p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m , t o
encourage wide-open debate i n t h e p r e s s , and t o a l l o w
e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s t o pursue t h e i r own c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y .
o
We r e a l i z e t h a t i t may t a k e years t o achieve t h e goals
which you have s e t . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t these problems
r e s u l t from inadequate r e s o u r c e s , we want t o h e l p .
o
There a r e p a r t i c u l a r areas where your p e r s o n a l a t t e n t i o n
m i g h t have a d e c i s i v e impact. We would encourage you t o
make sure t h a t progress c o n t i n u e s i n t h e s e areas:
As you know, t h e r e a r e many concerns expressed by
Greek-Americans about t h e s t a t u s o f e t h n i c Greeks i n
your c o u n t r y . These concerns focus on e d u c a t i o n ,
r e l i g i o u s p r o p e r t y , and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f e t h n i c
Greeks i n government s e r v i c e .
We r e c o g n i z e t h a t your government i s t r y i n g t o
address these issues s e r i o u s l y .
I hope you w i l l
c o n t i n u e t o make progress here, r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t
these i s s u e s can a f f e c t your r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s as w e l l .
The independence o f t h e j u d i c i a r y i s a n o t h e r area.
Some observers c l a i m t h a t p e r s o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s have
i n t r u d e d i n t o t h e workings o f t h e c o u r t s . Judges
must n o t have t o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e y c o u l d l o s e t h e i r
p o s i t i o n s as a r e s u l t o f c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r d u t i e s .
o
Your e f f o r t s t o loosen government c o n t r o l o f r a d i o and
t e l e v i s i o n a l s o seem t o be bogged down. We c o n s i d e r
a b o l i t i o n o f s t a t e c o n t r o l o f e l e c t r o n i c media as a key
s t e p i n t h e process o f b u i l d i n g democracy.
o
You have p u t a h i g h p r i o r i t y on a new c o n s t i t u t i o n .
A l t h o u g h i n t e r i m l e g a l s t r u c t u r e s seem t o be f u n c t i o n i n g
w e l l , we share your i n t e r e s t i n a c h i e v i n g a permanent
constitution.
I hope t h a t you w i l l extend a hand t o o t h e r
p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s t o reach agreement on a c o n s t i t u t i o n
embraced by a l l A l b a n i a n s .
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ALBANIAN—GREEK RELATIONS
I.
BACKGROUND
A l b a n i a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Greece have rebounded from s e r i o u s
d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered l a s t year.
A s e r i e s o f i n c i d e n t s i n e a r l y 1994 c u l m i n a t e d i n a r a i d on
t h e A l b a n i a n b o r d e r post a t Peshkepi and A l b a n i a ' s a r r e s t and
c o n v i c t i o n o f members o f t h e e t h n i c Greek "Omonia" o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The GOA c l a i m e d t h e GOG s u p p o r t e d e x t r e m i s t groups t r y i n g t o
d e s t a b i l i z e A l b a n i a , w h i l e Greece a l l e g e d t h a t t h e GOA
r e p r e s s e d t h e e t h n i c Greek m i n o r i t y i n A l b a n i a . Greece b l o c k e d
A l b a n i a ' s access t o EU a s s i s t a n c e and f o r c i b l y r e p a t r i a t e d some
70,000 A l b a n i a n s working i l l e g a l l y i n Greece.
A f t e r a v i g o r o u s m e d i a t i o n e f f o r t by t h e USG, A l b a n i a
r e l e a s e d t h e e t h n i c Greek "Omonia" defendants i n February, and
FM P a p o u l i a s v i s i t e d T i r a n a i n March. Since t h a t t i m e GreekA l b a n i a n r e l a t i o n s have improved s t e a d i l y . Working groups were
e s t a b l i s h e d t o d e a l w i t h a range o f b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . Greek
M i n i s t e r o f J u s t i c e Peponis was r e c e i v e d by h i s A l b a n i a n
c o u n t e r p a r t M i n i s t e r F r a s h e r i on August 15. The two sides
signed an e x t r a d i t i o n t r e a t y and o t h e r j u d i c i a l agreements.
A l b a n i a opened a c o n s u l a t e i n l o a n n i n a . A l b a n i a n FM S e r r e q i
has been i n v i t e d t o Athens, and Greek P r e s i d e n t Stephanopoulos
i s expected t o v i s i t T i r a n a t o m a i n t a i n t h e momentum o f t h e i r
rapprochement.
Some i r r i t a n t s remain i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . The
GOA
b e l i e v e s t h e GOG has b a d l y handled t h e case a g a i n s t seven
Greeks i n i t i a l l y charged i n t h e Peshkepi i n c i d e n t .
Conspiracy
and murder charges a g a i n s t t h e e i g h t were dropped, and one was
r e l e a s e d from d e t e n t i o n . A l t h o u g h s e r i a l numbers o f weapons
possessed by t h e defendants matched t h o s e s t o l e n from Peshkepi,
t h e A l b a n i a n s were unable t o f u r n i s h t h e Greeks w i t h t h e
s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o r e n s i c evidence necessary t o s u c c e s s f u l l y
p r o s e c u t e t h e murder charge. A l l s t i l l face weapons charges,
and i t appears t h e GOG w i l l pursue t h i s avenue o f p r o s e c u t i o n .
However, t h i s development c o u l d be misread by T i r a n a as GOG
b a c k s l i d i n g on an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e a f f e c t i n g b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s ,
Greece remains concerned about c o n d i t i o n s o f e t h n i c Greeks
in Albania.
I t urges expanded access t o e d u c a t i o n i n t h e Greek
language, t h e r e t u r n of r e l i g i o u s p r o p e r t y taken by t h e
p r e v i o u s communist government, and measures t o i n c r e a s e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f Greeks i n t h e p o l i c e and c i v i l s e r v i c e . A
new Secondary Education law w i l l go some way toward answering
t h e demand f o r Greek-language i n s t r u c t i o n . The A l b a n i a n
Autocephalous Orthodox Church i s e x p e r i e n c i n g problems w i t h
r e c l a i m i n g i t s p r o p e r t y , as are a l l o t h e r r e l i g i o u s bodies and
o t h e r former landowners.
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aws-iow-n
�- 2 Improved Greek-Albanian r e l a t i o n s have b e n e f i t e d
Greek-U.S. r e l a t i o n s . As t h e governments i n Athens and T i r a n a
acknowledge, t h e success in. i m p r o v i n g Greek-Albanian r e l a t i o n s
was due i n no s m a l l p a r t t o U.S. e f f o r t s t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s .
II.
TALKING POINTS
o
We a r e v e r y p l e a s e d a t t h e p r o g r e s s t h a t your government
has made i n e s t a b l i s h i n g b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Athens.
o
I would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e t o c o n g r a t u l a t e you on t h e
success o f r e c e n t m i n i s t e r i a l m e e t i n g s , t h e work o f t h e
b i l a t e r a l commission, and t h e ongoing meetings o f t h e
subcommissions.
o
F u l l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e C o u n c i l o f Europe's M i n o r i t i e s
Convention and your government's Secondary E d u c a t i o n Law
i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y and our c o n t i n u e d
support.
v
o
We have t o l d t h e Greeks t h a t we hope t o see c o n t i n u e d
p r o g r e s s t o w a r d l e g a l i z i n g t h e s t a t u s o f A l b a n i a n workers
i n Greece and on d e m a r c a t i n g t h e b o r d e r .
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ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH SERBIA AND THE F.Y.R.O.M.
I.
BACKGROUND
Serbia:
A l b a n i a and Serbia are r e p r e s e n t e d i n each o t h e r ' s c a p i t a l
by a Charge d ' A f f a i r e s . The i s s u e o f Kosovo dominates
A l b a n i a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e FRY. A l b a n i a i s t h e o n l y c o u n t r y
t o r e c o g n i z e t h e "Republic o f Kosova" d e c l a r e d by
representatives o f the e t h n i c Albanian m a j o r i t y i n t h i s
f o r m e r l y autonomous Serbian p r o v i n c e . The GOA m a i n t a i n s some
a m b i g u i t y about i t s r e c o g n i t i o n , however. B e r i s h a has s t a t e d
t h a t A l b a n i a recognizes Kosova as an autonomous e n t i t y " w i t h i n
S e r b i a . Others, i n c l u d i n g PM Meksi, have c a l l e d f o r i t s
independence.
I n August, f o l l o w i n g t h e r e s e t t l e m e n t o f some K r a j i n a Serbs
i n Kosovo, FM S e r r e q i wrote t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t o s t r e s s
t h a t t h e GOA " w i l l not be i n d i f f e r e n t and w i l l not adopt a
p a s s i v e s t a n d " toward a p o s s i b l e s p i l l o v e r o f c o n f l i c t i n t o
Kosovo. A l t h o u g h A l b a n i a c o u l d do l i t t l e t o a s s i s t Kosovo
m i l i t a r i l y a g a i n s t t h e Serbs, i t c o u l d p r o v i d e arms and
encouragement i n t h e event o f c o n f l i c t .
I t is entirely
unprepared f o r t h e p o t e n t i a l i n f l u x o f hundreds o f thousands
of r e f u g e e s .
A l b a n i a has opened i t s m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s f o r use by t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s and NATO, and f e a r s p o s s i b l e r e p r i s a l s from Pale
or Belgrade f o r t h i s c o o p e r a t i o n .
The FYROM:
A l b a n i a and t h e FYROM have f u l l d i p l o m a t i c t i e s .
Relations
between t h e two c o u n t r i e s t e n d t o blow hot o r c o l d , depending
on events a f f e c t i n g e t h n i c A l b a n i a n s i n Macedonia.
R e l a t i o n s were s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d i n 1993 when e t h n i c
A l b a n i a n s caught t r a f f i c k i n g arms across t h e FYROM/Albania
border were served harsh sentences f o r t r e a s o n . The GOFYROM
a l l e g e d t h a t t h e A l b a n i a n government had been d i r e c t l y
i n v o l v e d . A meeting between B e r i s h a and FYROM P r e s i d e n t
G l i g o r o v i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1994 smoothed t r o u b l e d waters and, as
a r e s u l t , B e r i s h a encouraged e t h n i c A l b a n i a n s i n t h e FYROM t o
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e 1994 census. L a t e r i n 1994, however, t h e
GOFYROM accused t h e A l b a n i a n government o f i n t e r f e r i n g i n
i n t e r n a l Macedonian a f f a i r s t w i c e : once when t h e l a r g e s t
e t h n i c A l b a n i a n p a r t y s p l i t and t h e GOA openly supported t h e
more r a d i c a l f a c t i o n , and a g a i n when t h e A l b a n i a n MFA i s s u e d a
statement i n support o f an i l l e g a l l y - f o r m e d A l b a n i a n u n i v e r s i t y
i n t h e FYROM. A c o n f r o n t a t i o n between p o l i c e and f a c u l t y and
s u p p o r t e r s o f Tetovo U n i v e r s i t y r e s u l t e d i n t h e death o f an
e t h n i c A l b a n i a n and s e v e r a l wounded policemen i n February.
Since t h a t t i m e t e n s i o n has subsided c o n s i d e r a b l y .
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TALKING POINTS
o
Your c o n t i n u e d moderation toward n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s which
include large ethnic Albanian populations i s e s s e n t i a l t o
a v o i d f u r t h e r i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e Balkans. The danger o f
s p a r k i n g c o n f l i c t i n Kosovo o r Macedonia f a r overshadows
t h e gains o f championing a "Greater A l b a n i a . "
o
A s o l u t i o n f o r Kosovo must be found b e f o r e
Serbia-Montenegro can be f u l l y r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. We support r e s t o r a t i o n o f
autonomy f o r t h e p r o v i n c e , and we c o n t i n u e t o urge t h e
Serbs t o r e s p e c t t h e human and c i v i l r i g h t s o f e t h n i c
A l b a n i a n s i n Kosovo.
o
We support t h e a s p i r a t i o n s o f e t h n i c A l b a n i a n s i n Macedonia
f o r access t o e d u c a t i o n i n t h e i r n a t i v e tongue. The means
t o a c h i e v i n g t h i s g o a l , however, s h o u l d be c o o p e r a t i v e , n o t
confrontational.
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THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h S a l i Berisha, President o f
Albania (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary o f State
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o the President f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Joseph Lake, U.S. Ambassador t o Albania
George Stephanopoulos, Senior Advisor t o the
President f o r Policy and Strategy
Christopher H i l l , D i r e c t o r f o r South
Central Europe, Department o f State
Daniel Fried, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r Central
and Eastern Europe, NSC S t a f f (notetaker)
Albania
President S a l i Berisha
Dylber V r i o n i , Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r and
M i n i s t e r o f Finance
A l f r e d Serreqi, M i n i s t e r o f Foreign A f f a i r s
L u b l i n D i l j a , Ambassador
Fatos Beja, Diplomatic Advisor t o the
President
DATE, TIME
AND•PLACE:
The President:
September 12, 1995, 11:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Welcome and I'm very glad t o see you here.
(U)
President Berisha: Thank you, Mr. President, f o r t h i s meeting.
I and a l l Albanians are g r a t e f u l t o you, t o the United States and
to the American taxpayer f o r your important assistance t o Albania
at t h i s most c r u c i a l time i n a l l of our long h i s t o r y . Since the
very beginning o f our struggle f o r democracy, the United States
has provided assistance t o Albania, the most f o r g o t t e n country i n
Europe. You are helping us through one of the worst c r i s e s i n
Europe and are helping us t o b u i l d the r u l e o f law and a market
economy i n Albania. The l e v e l of f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g by Albanians
toward the U.S. i s very high, and I am e s p e c i a l l y proud o f t h i s .
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When (former Secretary of State James) Baker came t o Albania
there was an explosion of f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g toward the United
States, and Albanians are j u s t as w e l l disposed toward the United
States now as then. (jZl
The President: I g r e a t l y appreciate the progress you have made,
e s p e c i a l l y your work t o develop democracy i n Albania and t o
transform your economy. I also appreciate your r o l e i n Albania's
p o l i c y toward Kosovo and your support f o r the enforcement of
sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. The United States i s t r y i n g
to create the basis f o r peace i n former Yugoslavia but we w i l l
not f o r g e t Kosovo. We w i l l not have f u l l y normalized r e l a t i o n s
w i t h Serbia without f u l l y restored autonomy f o r the people o f
Kosovo. (J^T
President Berisha: I have always been convinced of the c r u c i a l
and u s e f u l r o l e of the United States i n Europe and the Balkans.
The United States i s not p l a y i n g the r o l e of world gendarme. But
i t i s responsible f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and order. Please accept
my c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s at the l a t e s t developments i n Bosnia. Now,
thanks t o you, there i s a r e a l hope f o r peace. Your agenda
should be supported and t h i s includes a i r s t r i k e s which I consider
important and completely j u s t i f i e d . I n a way, the a i r s t r i k e s
have compensated f o r the arms embargo, which was not j u s t i f i e d .
Albania i s ready t o work c l o s e l y w i t h you and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o
increase support f o r your p i l o t s and planes.
(£T
Other Central and Eastern European countries d i d not s t a r t t h e i r
process o f democratization as badly o f f as Albania. But thanks
to the impulse of freedom and your help, Albania i n the past
three years has f i x e d two goals and made progress. F i r s t , we
have created a democratic space f o r Albanians: the r u l e of law
and a market economy. Second, we have achieved f a s t economic
growth. This i s an impressive achievement because we l o s t f i f t y
years. Now we are moving ahead.
I n a l l of our e f f o r t s we had your support. We are a n a t i o n
d i v i d e d i n t o three states. We s h a l l oppose changes o f borders
through force, and we w i l l seek t o support democracy and free
markets f o r Albanians l i v i n g i n these other states. Such
achievements would b r i n g 90 percent happiness t o these Albanians.
The President:
Ninety percent i s as good as i t gets.
President Berisha: We are s t r i v i n g t o make progress.
changed our laws and passed laws on a European model.
changed 4 0 percent of government personnel and 60-90
some categories. I t r i e d t o use my p o l i t i c a l mandate
economic reforms, and we l i b e r a l i z e d p r i c e s and began
p r i v a t i z e . The r e s u l t has been lowered i n f l a t i o n and
.CONriDENTIAL
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We have
We have
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of per capita income from $200 to $700. We have achieved
macroeconomic stability, and I think we can call ourselves today
a poor but healthy economy. Now we are engaged in large scale
privatization and are making progress. y?)
Our main goal is integration with Euroatlantic structures. The
Partnership for Peace (PFP) was a great idea, a great invention
that opened doors to countries in our region with a strange past.
We were the first country to ask to join NATO. We have begun
good military cooperation with NATO countries which will help us,
one day, to join the alliance. (jt)
We also have made great progress in human and national rights and
in the establishment of democratic institutions. Before, Albania
was a country that banned religion, that banned rights. Now we
are establishing tolerance and freedom. Freedom of information
is important, and we have different television programs and
stations throughout Albania. We have passed good laws, although
the referendum to establish a new constitution failed. ffi
S t i l l , the s i t u a t i o n i n the region i s very worrying. Kosovo i s
under t o t a l occupation. I spoke about t h i s w i t h the Secretary o f
State and asked whether the United States could take the r o l e o f
intermediary i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o restore autonomy there. Of
course, I ' l l be asked by Albanians about whether we should ask
f o r more. But I say no because asking too much would mean war.
The warnings o f the Bush A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (the Christmas warnings
w i t h respect t o Kosovo) and the presence of U.S. troops i n
Macedonia was c r u c i a l t o preventing a s p i l l o v e r of the Bosnian
c o n f l i c t t o the south. (^f
Our relations with Greece went through a very difficult stage but
now are becoming better. What is the real story? In 1990 and
1991, during a period of real turmoil in Albania, many thousands
of Albanians fled south. Greece received them well, and I am
grateful. But some Greeks thought that Albania was dying and
they began thinking about annexation, about "Northern Epirus." I
am grateful to your statements encouraging Greece to negotiate
and to remove a blockade in our relations with the EU. The
Holbrooke mission was successful. He understood the situation.
We want to work with Greece to improve relations. The current
issues can be solved and will be solved. This is important for
us. If the Government of Greece is willing, we will be able to
work toward this result. {tf
The President: What you have said i s very important. The Greeks
are working w i t h the Government of FYROM, and i f we make the
progress we hope f o r , i t may become easier t o make progress
between Greece and Albania. W were r i g h t to put troops i n
e
FYROM. President Bush issued h i s warning t o the Serbs about
Kosovo and because i t took occurred i n December, a f t e r the
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elections, the Serbs came to me. I said this was a proper
decision. We are doing what we can to end the war and we will
keep up our efforts. I appreciated what you said to me about
Greece. They are showing a new willingness to work with their
neighbors and this is very important. Still, the Government of
Greece has concerns regarding the Greek minority in Albania in
the areas of education, religious discrimination and employment
discrimination, including in areas of administration and law
enforcement. We're hopeful that you can make progress on these
questions. (firf
You mentioned progress i n e s t a b l i s h i n g democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s .
I hope you w i l l do more regarding an independent j u d i c i a r y . We
have found some funds i n our assistance budget can help w i t h a
program f o r the t r a i n i n g of prosecutors and the p o l i c e , and I'm
encouraged that we are able t o help. ( O
^
Our assistance to Albania has come to about $140 million so far,
and we hope to be able to provide about $45 million in fiscal
year 1996. We hope that this will be helpful to your efforts.
We are impressed by your economic growth and by your efforts to
resolve issues concerned with human and minority rights. Some
believe that ethnic conflicts will destroy the world in the next
twenty years, but you can prove them wrong. If you can, we won't
have more Bosnias, Rwandas and Burundis — a world in which
people just kill one another because of these issues. So,
Albania is not simply a little country all alone and forgotten.
/ )
President Berisha: The r o l e of the United States i s primary, and
we appreciate i t . I assure that you we w i l l move ahead. The
most d i f f i c u l t question i s the consolidation of democratic and
other i n s t i t u t i o n s . Albania must do b e t t e r than i n the past.
Freedom gives a great p o t e n t i a l and freedom can be assured by
c o n s o l i d a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . I asked Secretary Christopher and
Secretary Rubin f o r help t o do t h i s . I am g r a t e f u l f o r your
o f f e r of j u d i c i a l assistance and believe t h a t , working w i t h
Ambassador Lake, we can use i t w e l l . Please encourage your
government t o keep providing such assistance.
We also need support for our institutions that are doing the most
to stimulate economic growth. We need foreign investment and
OPIC could play an important role. Perhaps OPIC could treat
Albania as a special case. (f?f
President C l i n t o n :
doing? (U)
Mr. Fried:
How i s the Albanian-American Enterprise Fund
I t i s very a c t i v e . (U)
•eONn DENT IAL
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President Berisha: I t i s very good and has strong leadership
under Mr. Domenick Scaglione. He wants t o launch a commercial
bank and we consider t h i s a very good idea. Your decision t o
appoint him was e x c e l l e n t . (^f
President Clinton: Perhaps we could do more with OPIC as well.
Let me thank you for your support in basing the Predator unmanned
aircraft. Thank you also for your active participation in the
Partnership for Peace. I want to continue our defense
cooperation and look to increase it. [jtf
My notes f o r t h i s meeting mentioned a $7 m i l l i o n r e f o r e s t a t i o n
p r o j e c t . This i s very important. We are working hard t o support
democracy i n H a i t i near t o our own country, and we have found
t h a t erosion and environmental problems have a bad e f f e c t on the
economy and on peoples l i v e s . I n H a i t i , the top s o i l has j u s t
been washed away because of the absence of f o r e s t s . So we don't
underestimate the importance of such p r o j e c t s .
President Berisha: I t i s a very important p r o j e c t , and we need
to proceed w i t h i t . M i l i t a r y cooperation i s very important as
w e l l . I would p a r t i c u l a r l y appreciate your support f o r m i l i t a r y
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s . We need basic things, not any s o r t of
high technology. Before, our m i l i t a r y was dispersed through the
country i n a crazy way. We need t o deploy i t i n a way t h a t makes .
sense. We also need help t o c o n t r o l our t e r r i t o r i a l waters and
airspace. We are facing pressure from the east; problems could
come from t h i s area, and we lack the c a p a b i l i t y t o carry out our
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l our own water and a i r t e r r i t o r y . We
would be g r a t e f u l i f you could help us i n t h i s area. ( r
^T
The Vice President: I t i s great t o see you here. I have many
f r i e n d s i n the Albanian-American community, i n c l u d i n g B i l l Kovac.
I know how e x c i t e d they are about Albania's transformation. This
generates great enthusiasm. L i s t e n i n g t o you, i t seems t o me
that you are close t o the threshold of a surge of your economy
and a surge of investment. (^)
Countries t h a t have enjoyed democratic successes are o f t e n held
to higher standards. Problems i n t h i s area can cause more
concern on the p a r t of your f r i e n d s . So i t would help us t o help
you i f you were able t o f i g h t any a u t h o r i t a r i a n trends or
anything else t h a t could hurt investments. But i t i s clear t h a t
there i s great excitement about Albania i n the United States.
The President: We may be able t o do more i n our m i l i t a r y
cooperation. For example, we may be able t o support the
equipping o f an Albanian peacekeeping company. I understand your
p o i n t about c o n t r o l of your airspace and t e r r i t o r i a l waters and
we w i l l f o l l o w up. (£j
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President Berisha: Thank you. This would help us c o n t r o l our
own t e r r i t o r y . I understand the Vice President's p o i n t . I
assure you t h a t we w i l l do your best t o consolidate our
democracy. We had t o make some strong decisions, l i k e c u t t i n g
back on the s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and proceeded. The r e s u l t s
j u s t i f y these steps. Of course, we have committed mistakes and
l o t s of them. We are engaged i n a tremendous t r a n s i t i o n and the
forces involved are very powerful. {^f
The Vice President:
democracy. (U)
We here are s t i l l t r y i n g t o p e r f e c t our own
The President: I can't t e l l you how pleased I am t h a t you have
come so f a r i n so short a time. (U)
Secretary Christopher: I should add t h a t Albania has j u s t
dedicated a new m i l i t a r y h o s p i t a l t o the memory of Joe Kruzel.
(U)
The President:
Thank you so much.
(U)
President Berisha: I was shaken by the news of his death. I had
had two meetings with him and knew that Mr. Kruzel was a real
friend of Albania and a real supporter of PFP. I also had met
with Bob Frasure and had had a long conversation with him; I was
very impressed by him. I think that the most recent developments
in Bosnia are the best memorial to their sacrifice. America's
commitment to remain engaged in the Balkans brings us hope.
NATO's airstrikes are a great step for NATO and for friendly
countries. ytf
I think that Yeltsin's recent reaction to this shows that he is
really a member of the Politburo. He reacted in a Brezhnev
style. yt)
The President: We are determined to resolve the Bosnian
situation. We cannot let it remain a cancer in the world,
unresolved and festering. (firf
President Berisha: How do you plan to help reorganize the
Bosnian Army? This is an important question. (Jgff
The Vice President:
General Mladic?
The President:
Do you have any suggestions f o r r e s e t t l i n g
Thank you.
— End of Conversation
rONFTPFNTTM...
—
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
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�SECRETCLINTON LIBRARY P O O O ^
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ISSUE PAPER
HUMANTTARTAN ATT) OPTTONS
When the Bosnian Parliament voted to accept the Geneva Peace Plan but placed
conditions which in effect rejected the plan, hopes dimmed for a peaceful settlement in
Bosnia prior to the winter and last winter's concems over a humanitarian have been
resurrected. Last year mild weather and unidentified reserves of food helped to avert
disaster, but we cannot hope for a repeat of the mild weather this year. And with the
reserves of food and body fat depleted before the winter begins, therequirementsare even
greater this year. UNHCR has identified a shortfall of US$ 172 million for Oct-Dec 1993
and a requirement for USS 566 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but their donor appeal will go
out next week and the US and the international community will doubtless respond.
The real key to averting humanitarian disaster this winter is the thorny issue of
access. Once the international community responds to UNHCR's appeal, how do the
resources get to the target populations in the face of inclement weather and sporadic or
continuous hostilities? UNHCR has been so concerned with the dangers that aid delivery
poses to their workers, that they have been negotiating with UNPROFOR to turn over aid
delivery to the UN peacekeepers. Some of the key questions concerning access are
addressed below, followed by a more in-depth description of the security situation and
numerous "solutions" to help alleviate the access problem.
Key Quttttona;
Can anyone guarantee access?
The short answer is no. Asidefromthe decreased access expected due to winter
weather, the constant threat of hostilities has turned access into a cat and mouse game.
Access is dependent not only on the political parries' current support for access, but also
on each local war lord.
What can be done to increase the likelihood that aid reaches the target population?
Access can be increased by using force, or bribery, but it cannot be guaranteed.
The likelihood of UNPROFOR using force to deliver aid is nonexistent, and short of a US
decision to unilaterally ensure the delivery of aid, force will probably not be a viable
option. Bribery, providing carrots to the warring parties, in exchange for their guarantee
of access may have a slightly higher chance for success.
What would be the effect of lifting/suspending sanctions?
The Serbian economy is in dire straights and Milosevic's willingness to pressure the
Bosnian Serbs in the most recent round of peace talks was more than likely fueled by his
hope that sanctions would be lifted. Even a partial lifting of sanctions, to include such
commodities as heating oil, might prove to be a powerful carrot for Milosevic. The
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HSECRETquestion is how much leverage he ultimately has not only over Karadzic, but over the
various Bosnian Serb warlords.
What leverage is there over the Bosnian Croats?
There may be several avenues to encourage Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats
to allowfreeaccess for humanitarian aid. Some of these include the threat of sanctions
and the offer of economic assistance. Once again, the question is how much leverage
Croatia has over the Bosnian Croat warlords. The threat of airstrikes against all three
parties is more direct, but failure to carry out this threat in the past has weakened its
effectiveness.
What leverage is there over the Bosnian Serbs?
While Serbia is concerned with the lifting of sanctions, the Bosnian Serbs have not
felt the same hurt, particularly as they have been able to siphon off significant humanitarian
assistance to keep their people and their armies feed and fUeled More likely leverage
would exist if there is some way to make the Bosnian Serbs actually feel the pinch of the
Serbian sanctions. The threat of airstrikes remains as a paper tiger.
What leverage is there to prevent Muslim instigated clashes?
Perhaps the greatest leverage would be the threat to cut off all humanitarian
assistance to Bosnia. However, this is an option which makes us out to be the bad guys.
The international community, and the US in particular, canreiteratethat no western power
will use military force to settle the war, and at the same timereiteratedie threat of
airstrikes againstffiXparty which prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid.
If security of LOCs is not likely, what can be done to increase airlift/airdrop
effectiveness?
Unfortunately the coming winter means a decrease rather than an increase in the
effectiveness of airlift and airdrop as a means to deliver humanitarian aid. In November,
December, and January 30% of theflyingdays will be lost to inclement weather. In
Febniaiy and March the number declinestoa loss of 20% of theflyingdays.
What are the Umitatlons of airlift/airdrop?
All of the airfields are limited to daylight hours of operation. To increase the
airflow into Sarajevo wouldrequireincreased personnel for ground operations. If Tuzla is
opened, the airport is limited to one C-141 or three C-1308 on the ground at any one time.
Airdrop of anything other than food or medicine is a difficult operation and presents
numerous challenges and risks. For both airland and airdrop operations, increases would
entail significantresourcecommitments.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
The Isstie-AccMS and Security, not Reagyrces;
The Security Situation!
The Bosnian people needing humanitarian assistance are located in isolated
pockets dispersed to numerous parts of the land-locked country. The UNHCR's major
distribution centers for humanitarian assistance are in Serbia (Belgrade) and Croatia
(Metkovic on the Dalmatian coast and Zagreb). Land convoys from these centers are
necessary in order for the resources to reach the target population in any volume. These
convoys can be and are augmented by airland into Sarajevo and airdrop into some of the
enclaves. However, land access is mandatory for the volume of aid required, especially
with the requirement for winterization materials.
The roads linking the enclaves with each other and the distribution centers have
been under attack for 18 months. Bridges are out, roads have been mined, repair work is
at a virtual standstill. In addition to the physical problems, convoys are turning back to
avoidfighting,and being denied access by the different factions. The onset of inclement
weather will make convoy passage of these roads even more difficult.
The program director of Britain's aid effort in the former Yugoslavia reported on
the serious shortage of diesel fuel facing all of Bosnia, and highlighted the threat to Tuzla
because it has one of the largest resident and refugee populations and is at the far end of
one of the most tortuous and vulnerable supply routes. Hisreportpredicted winter
weather conditions and continued fighting would threaten to close all road access to
Tuzla. In assessing the needs of Tuzla, the British director believed that Tuzla would need
relief flights even if some road access is kept.
If access is deniedforany significant period of time, it will have a devastating
impact on the population and will probably lead to a humanitarian disaster. The
magnitude of the disaster will depend on how completely access is denied, how long it is
denied, and which population centers are denied. In Srebrenica, for example, most of the
enclave families have sufficient food stocks to last them for about 2 or 3 days.
The Bosnian Serbs: In the past few weeks, the Bosnian Serbs have allowed
relativelyfreeaccess to UNHCR convoys transiting to Sarajevo and the eastern Muslim
enclaves. It is generally agreed that this loosening of the noose around these cities is due
in part to the threat of NATO airstrikes, but perhaps even more directly to the recent
hopes of a peace settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have acquired the territory they set out to
control, and it was in their and Serbia's best interest to appear asreadyand willing
participants in the peace process and as aiding in humanitarian efforts, in the anticipation
of the lifting of sanctions and acceptance into the greater world community. Even at the
height of cooperation, fuel convoys did not move, because UNHCR feared that the Serbs,
short of fuel due to sanctions, would siphon off an unacceptable percentage as a "tax".
Since therejectionof the peace plan by die Bosnian Parliament, the shelling and gunfire
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around Sarajevo have definitely increased, and there is the expectation that Serbian
cooperation in the humanitarian arena will probably quickly diminish.
The Bosnian Croats: Since the middle of August, few convoys have departed
Metkovic (UNHCR's central distribution center on the Dalmatian coast) and reached their
destination. The siege of Mostar is a prime example of how continued hostilities in the
central and southern region have prevented convoys from reaching the target populations.
Airdrops were used as a last ditch effort to prevent starvation in the Muslim sector, and
when a land convoy wasfinallyallowed through after extensive negotiations, a large
portion of the food and supplies had to be delivered to the Croat western sector of
Mostar, even though the situation there was infinitely better than that in the Muslim
sector. Last week Sarajevo received its first convoy from Metkovic since the middle of
August. The convoy used a circuitous route that would probably be impassable in winter.
Despite a new cease-fire in Mostar, there is no reason to believe that hostilities will
decrease to the extent required to allowfreeaccess for humanitarian convoys.
The Muslims: Despite the fact that it is the Muslim population that is in most dire
need of humanitarian assistance, the very hostilities which prevent the delivery of this
assistance are often sparked by Muslim offensives against the Bosnian Croat forces. The
Muslims are equally responsible for the breaking of numerous cease-fires and have
reportedly detained and delayed convoys for extensive searches.
Inclement Weather: The deteriorating roads into Sarajevo and the Muslim
enclaves are made even more hazardous by sporadic or continualfighting,andrainingof
the roads. This winter, mud, snow, and ice will cause road conditions to deteriorate
seriously. Damage to bridges around the major transportation centers will force UN
convoys to use secondary roads through the mountains, where travel will be very slow and
difficult. In addition, the airland and airdrop operations will become more difficult as the
pilots must not only worry about potential evasive action against enemyfire,but also must
deal with the cloudy, stormy weatherrifewith wind shears, poor visibility and other
hazards which will cause the cancellation of many missions, and make those that aren't
more treacherous.
Scope of Requirements:
The UN estimates that up to 3.4 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia
will require assistance. The up to 2.5 million people requiring assistance in Bosnia will
need 45.000 metric tons of food and 11,000 metric tons of nonfood assistance (medicines,
fuel, shelters, and healers) each month. Over die course of the winter, this could amount
to nearly 300,000 metric tons.
The World Food Program (WFP) has adequate supplies of most commodities for
Bosnia through the end of the year. Because of earmarking, some areas, particularly
Serbia and Montenegro are experiencing shortages of many commodities, but these issues
can be worked. UNHCR has announced a $172 million shortfall for Oct-Dec 1993 and
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�SECRETrequirement for $577 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but the real issue is not one of adequate
resources, but one of access. The critical shortage of fuel, which will have repercussions
on everythingfromdistribution of resources, to heating and providing medical care, is
again a problem of access, not resource availability. While we cannot ignore the
upcoming donor's call, and must participate along with other countries and the EC in
responding to it, the majority of our efforts should be focused on how we can increase the
likelihood of successful access to the target population.
Possible "Solutions" to alleviate the problem of access;
All of the proffered solutions fall into one of three categories. Thefirstcategory
involves increasing the likelihood of access by opening up more routes, adding methods of
deliveryi or adding resources. The second category uses force to increase the likelihood
of access. In either case, however, there is no guarantee of access to all areas at all times.
The third category uses bribeiy or diplomacy to get concessionsfromthe parties to allow
free access. Because the three political leaders do not have control over all of the forces,
agreement by these parties will need to be augmented with their escorts to ensure the aid
gets through. Whatever action is taken, the weather and the support of the three warring
parties will greatly influence the success of the operation. Several actions may increase
the likelihood of success.
Increasing Resources:
1. Preposition at least a month's supply of aid:
One hedge against inclement weather is to preposition at least a month's supply to
carry populations through the times when storms and road conditions prevent convoys and
aircraft delivery. UNHCR is already attempting to do this, but have been unable to make
much headway. There may be two weeks of supplies in Sarajevo and three weeks in
Tuzla, but most enclaves are consuming supplies as rapidly as they are receiving them.
Even now, with relatively good accessfromBelgrade, next week's food supplies are
competing for convoy space with winter parkas and other winterization supplies. .
2. Increase Airlift into Sarajevo:
The United Nations currently averages 20 airland missions per day into Sarajevo.
The delivery of food and medicines is the top priority. The US has provided
approximately 35 percent of the total airland mission sorties. All 15 US C-1308 operating
into Bosnia are equipped with defensive systems to counter ground-to-air threats. These
are the only Air Force airlift C-130s with counter measure equipment.
Increasing daily US operations tempo will be very difficult. Of the 15 C-130s
operating out of Rhein-Main, 12 are generally operational day-to-day. Six are dedicated
to airdrop operations. Increasing the airland flow at Sarajevo willrequirean increase in
manpower on the ground to mm the aircraft and remove the cargo. The US has
steadfastly refused to increase forces on the ground at Sarajevo or in Bosnia. If the
decision is made to increase airlift operations into Sarajevo, it should be a NATO
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operation, with USNATO putting forward the request for additional assets. Presuming
the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground, we would have to convince
allies to contribute ground personnel to augment the airfield ground operations.
Inclement weather between October and March will also have an affect on the
ability to deliver via airland and airdrop. During November, December, and January, we
can expect to lose 30% of the flying days due to weather. In Febmary and March this will
probably drop to 20% of the flying days lost due to weather.
3. Increase Alrdop:
Currently six US C-lSOs and 2 C-160s (1 German and 1 French) participate in
airdrop operations. The US has provided approximately 80% of the airdrop sorties. Eight
sorties are considered a maximum generation effort based on current ground support at
Rhein-Main and the complexity of night operations to three separate drop zones in Bosnia.
Almost any commodity can be airdropped if it is packaged correctly. However,
this is an extremely expensive option for delivery of supplies. Deliveries of food, MREs
and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs),and medicine using the TRIAD method of
delivery have been extremely successful However, the dropping of other than food and
medicine items present potential challenges and risks. Fuel bladders are a scarce
commodity, and coal would present significant processing and loading problems. Heavy
equipment and large bundle airdrops require drop zones clear of populated areas for
safety, and then the goods are difficult or unsafe to retrieve. The only exception to this is
the TRIAD delivery of food, limited to MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs).
4. Open Tuzla Airport:
Since Tuzla is a center of distribution for humanitarian aid, opening the airport
would increase access to a large area in central Bosnia. However, there are several
drawbacks and limiting factors to this option. The airport ifl small with the capability to
handle only one C-141/ or three C-130 on the ground at a time.
Despite the small capacity which will not offer a significant increase to deliveries, it
will take additional personnel on the ground to secure and operate the airport and the
ground operation. The Nordic Battalion stationed at Tuzla is now able to provide limited
security for the airfield. The battalion commander has stated they intend to secure and
control the Tuzla airport, but currently the Bosnia Muslims (BIH) are unwilling to leave.
Unless they leave, the Serbs will continue to have an excuse to attack it and the
commander will not take control.
The remaining problem is to provide engineering support for the maintenance of
the field and navigational aids for inclement weather. These personnel would need to be
provided by UNPROFOR. Again, if the US does not want to put US personnel on the
ground in Bosnia, we will have to convince another country to provide those people. One
of the other limitations that Tuzla is currently experiencing in aid distribution is their
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shortage of fuel. In addition to the fact that there would not be fuel on the ground for any
aircraft, fuel would have to be brought in, either by land or air, for use by the convoys in
distributing their humanitarian aid to the oudying areas.
5. Use Helicopters:
The use of helicopters to airlift supplies into enclaves could possibly augment
ground convoys. However, the helicopters are limited by weather, range, and altitude
restrictions, and would require extensive logistical and personnel support at either a land
base in Croatia or Serbia or aboard naval shipping in the Adriatic. In any helicopter
operation, deployment schedules, contingency commitments, and security requirements
must be analyzed before the decision to deploy is made.
6. Send in a Civil Affairs Assessment Team:
Send a Civil Affairs survey team to Bosnia to make an assessment of the needs for
survival through the winter. Identify required items other thin food (for example,
batteries.) Then have the team regroup in Zagreb or Belgrade to develop a distribution
plan. (Ask OFDA if the DART has already done or if they see a need for this.) If they
don't already have a good tracking system to record final end user distribution, set up the
system used for Provide HOPE.
7. Provide Additional Equipment to Open Routes:
Last year the US provided excess equipment, including snow removal equipment
for Sarajevo. Additionalroadgraders and snow plows would help to keep roads open
during inclement weather, or reopen them shortly thereafter. We could also lobby for
increased UNPROFOR engineer support to assist in keeping the roads passable, assuming
we don't want to provide US engineering support.
8. Increase Engineer Support:
On option is to lobby with our allies to provide additional engineering personnel to
UNPROFOR to assist in keeping the roads passable. Another option would be to provide
US engineering support on a temporary basis to repair roads before the onset of winter.
Use of Force:
9. Deliver Humanitarian Aid Using Force:
Another option is to apply pressure to UNPROFOR to use all means available,
including force, to deliver humanitarian aid. This would not require any additional UN
action, nor any US troops in Bosnia, if current UNPROFOR forces are used to implement
this option. To maximize resources, two key routes could be identified, probably one
from Belgrade and one from Metkovic, and forces used to provide security for convoys
using these routes. One option already under discussion would be for UNHCR to hand
over the delivery of aid to UNPROFOR.
The most difficult partfromthe US perspective is convincing the countries with
troops on the ground to take this action, while not providing any US forces in Bosnia.
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Key NATO allies have indicated they have not changed their position on the use of force
to deliver aid. Currendy our allies see the availability of resources as the most critical
problem, and have not focused on how the collapse of the Geneva talks would affect
humanitarian assistance.
Use of Diplomacy/"Bribery":
10. Negotiating a Humanitarian Agreement:
With the prospects dimming for an overall peace agreement before winter,
negotiators could expend their energies on a regional conference on humanitarian
assistance. Attention would focus on the issue of how we can lay a political framework
for humanitarian relief operations. Before initiating relief operations, we should explore
the feasibility of preserving die termination of hostilities between Serbs and Bosnians as
well as achieving a cease-fire between Bosnians and Croats, without trying to settle the
issue of final land distribution. Terminating hostilities throughout Bosnia will not be easy.
Whether the warring parties will display theflexibilitywill depend on two factors:
domestic political constraints, and the degree to which diplomatic pressure can be brought
to bear outside the region to overcome those domestic constraints. The weight of the
international community, including such key players as Russia and Greece for Serbia;
Germany for Croatia; and the US for Bosnia, must be brought to bear at the negotiating
table. The London Conference on Yugoslavia outlined last August several specific steps
to enhance delivery of humanitarian assistance.
It may be possible to achieve agreement onfreeaccess if humanitarian aid is freely
offered to all parties. Some sort of a delivery fonnula could be developed that allowed
one Serbian or Croatian convoy for every three Muslim convoys. Agreement on such a
scheme by all three political parties will not guaranteefreeaccess of humanitarian aid
deliveries, however, because these parties do not have control over the various warlords
fighting the individual battles. To ensure access through these areas, the three belligerents
may well have to provide escort through their territories.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Serbs:
1. Temporarily suspend sanctions on humanitarian goods, such as heating oil and
coal, through the winter, on the condition offreeaccess to the Bosnian target population.
2. Increase humanitarian aid to the refugee population in Serbia and Montenegro.
3. Use Russia to influence Serbian assistance.
4. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
5. Look for ways to make sanctions felt by Bosnian Serbs.
6. Make humanitarian aid to Serbia contingent uponfreeaccess to the Muslim
areas.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Croats:
1. Reiterate the threat of sanctions.
2. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
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3. Convince Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats by offering Croatia specific
economic assistance conditioned on humanitarian aid access to Bosnia,
4. Support the Vance Plan for the UNP As.
Potential Leverage Dealing with the Muslims:
1. Reiterate that no western power, including the US will use military force to
settle the war in Bosnia.
2. State that no humanitarian aid will flow to central Bosnia when hostilities are
underway. Place the blame on the Muslims when they are the instigators.
Attachments:
A. After the Policy Decision: Getting the Word Out (PSYOPs and Public Affairs)
B. Winter Assessment (DIA)
C. NATO Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance (NATO Policy)
D. Bosnian Winter Climatology Report (USAF/XOOOW)
E. Message ICFY Humanitarian Issues
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
P. 02
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29 October 1993
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject: Expansion of Mission - US Hospital Zagreb (U)
1.
(U) g.urp_oj5.e. Provide analysis of expanding US h o s p i t a l
(Zagreb) medical mission t o t r e a t p e d i a t r i c p a t i e n t s .
2. (U) Background. Request f o r expansion of mission r e s u l t of
28 Oct DC meeting. Ambassador G a l b r a i t h p r e v i o u s l y requested US
h o s p i t a l involvement i n the care of f i v e t o ten c h i l d v i c t i m s of
the c o n f l i c t . General Cot, UNPROFOR commander, agreed w i t h
concept of using spare capacity at UN f i e l d h o s p i t a l s t o t r e a t
war trauma v i c t i m s . State c u r r e n t l y reviewing request.
3. (X) P-i-S-CUS-5jL-gn. 48th A i r Transportable H o s p i t a l i s t h i r d US
h o s p i t a l i n r o t a t i o n . H o s p i t a l OPCON t o UNPROFOR as a UN "blue
hatted" u n i t . Mission t o provide medical support t o UNPROFOR.
Hospital s t a f f reported t o be operating below capacity and would
be able t o accept up t o 10 p e d i a t r i c p a t i e n t s . Treating
c i v i l i a n s requires UN approved change i n mission.
PROS
• High v i s i b i l i t y US humanitarian assistance c o n t r i b u t i o n
without commitment o f a d d i t i o n a l ground troops
•
Appeals t o American sentiment.
•
Reduces s u f f e r i n g .
• Taps under-used resource, provides varied medical t r a i n i n g
opportunities.
CONS
• I m p a r t i a l i t y and treatment of only n o n - b e l l i g e r e n t s must
be maintained or safety of e x i s t i n g mission at r i s k - both
h o s p i t a l personnel and aircrews. Hard t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e
between j u v e n i l e combatants and non-combatants (Somalia).
• May detract from p r i o r i t y mission. To do j o b r i g h t w i l l
require changes i n equipment, personnel, supplies ( p e d i a t r i c
sized supplies, p e d i a t r i c i a n , p e d i a t r i c nurse, p e d i a t r i c
pharmaceuticals).
• C r i t e r i a not i n place t o determine what c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
p a t i e n t h o s p i t a l w i l l accept, length of stay, d i s p o s i t i o n of
f a m i l y members, and procedures f o r t r a n s f e r should space be
required f o r UNPROFOR p a t i e n t .
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• Non-US personnel making triage decisions.
system with history of screening problems.
Over stressed
• May expand into "magnet" hospital. Ignores potential
flood of patients from refugee community in Zagreb.
•
Creates untenable problem of turning away patients.
• C i v i l i a n hospitals available i n Zagreb with pediatric
capability.
• Patients l i k e l y to require long-term care. US hospital
not a long term care f a c i l i t y . May create permanent refugee
status for children and strain the already over-burdened
Croatian government.
• P o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to terminate once started.
precedent for future involvement.
Sets
4. £#5 B_o..t-toro_,Line. Seemingly attractive option - seen as
doing something. However, must be cautious of diverting US
military medical support from the UNPROFOR mission. Should not
proceed u n t i l s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a and procedures established and
agreed to for accepting, evacuating, treating, and returning
patients to families i n country of origin. Parties to agreement
must include affected agencies, governments and warring factions
- a significant diplomatic challenge.
I f USG undertakes mission
without agreement, belligerents l i k e l y to manipulate program as
an issue of taking sides - immediately jeopardizing the mission.
As an alternative to expanding US mission, recommend USG explore
consortium program with local hospitals under U H R W O auspices,
NC/H
Prepared by: LTC Kevin Campbell, USA and CPT Butch Betters, USA
J-5, European Division, X49435
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WASHINGTON, DC
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DJSM-1196-93
8 November 1993
Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300
n r
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(REGIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
Subject:
Air Support Requirementsi to Support
Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)
French-Sponsored
1. (U) AB requested,* the Joint Staff has reviewed the French
proposal for delivering humanitarian r e l i e f supplies i n
Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) v i a convoy.
2.
Close a i r support (CAS) i n support of convoy
operations could be conducted using the forces engaged in NATO
Operation DENY FLIGHT i f the four AC-130 gunships deployed to
Somalia are returned to Operation DENY FLIGHT or replaced.
However, we recommend against providing CAS for the following
reasons:
a. UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized
military but by l o c a l bandits and groups of women and
children. CAS i s not useful in these situations.
b. Forcing delivery of humanitarian aid signals escalation
of military involvement and would require principals'
approval.
c. Serbs have j u s t offered guaranteed access from Bar to
Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid i s preferable to
convoying through potentially hostile areas.
3. ( / j We have determined that b a t t l e f i e l d a i r interdiction
operations are not desirable or feasible given the current
situation i n B-H, rules of engagement, and d i f f i c u l t i e s with
C l a s s i f i e d by Director, J-3
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PER E.O. 13526
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�target identification and linkage to enemy forces interfering
with convoy operations. The enclosed information paper
provides more details on the CAS for the French-sponsored
humanitarian relief operations.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
Enclosure
Reference:
* ASD(RSA) memorandum, 193/50258, 29 October 1993, "Air Support
Requirements To Support French Sponsored Humanitarian Relief
Operations"
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3 November 1993
ENCLOSURE
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
A i r Support Requirements f o r French-Sponsored
Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)
1. (U) Purppse. To provide information on close a i r support
(CAS) f o r French-sponsored humanitarian r e l i e f operations.
2. (u) Key points
•
The French propose that m i l i t a r y escorted convoys be
used to d e l i v e r approximately 1,000 tons per day of r e l i e f
supplies to Sarajevo and environs t h i s winter.
• (p) The French estimate that one convoy per day of 50 trucks
(20 ton capacity) w i l l transport the r e l i e f supplies t o
Sarajevo and t h a t each convoy w i l l take 3 days t o t r a v e l t o
Sarajevo, unload supplies, and r e t u r n t o point of o r i g i n .
* (/) The three courses of action (COA) consider using two
route c l u s t e r s f o r convoy operations.
COA 1 - Escorting convoys on varied routes.
•» COA 2 - Escorting convoys on a s i n g l e route.
COA 3 - C o n t r o l l i n g a s i n g l e route.
* (^5 French operation w i l l require a i r support from Operation
DENY FLIGHT.
* (JX) The French f e e l that the current ROE i s adequate f o r the
conduct of CAS.
•
The current Operation DENY FLIGHT force l e v e l s are i n
place and adequate to meet the CAS mission f o r the French
proposal.
J-3 estimates that the r e t u r n of or deployment of 4
X AC-130 a i r c r a f t i s required. NATO would have t o approve
t h i s use.
DECLASSIFIED
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• {p) NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT conducts 70 f i g h t e r CAS
missions a week, maintains a 24-hour a l e r t a i r c r a f t , and
conducts 7 ABCCC missions per week. CINCSOUTH has scheduled 7
AC-130 gunship missions per week when assets return from
Somalia.
i
• (p) Current in-place CSAR assets are adequate f o r aircrew
recovery only.
• CS? ABCCC mission rate may increase.
• (£f UNPROFOR commands the CAS ground components and would
have to provide the AOCG at K i s e l j a k and FACPs on each convoy.
• (^7 UNHCR a i d convoys are not being stopped by organized
m i l i t a r y but by l o c a l bandits and groups of women and
c h i l d r e n . CAS i s not useful i n these s i t u a t i o n s .
•
Forcing the d e l i v e r y of humanitarian aid signals
unwanted e s c a l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y involvement and would require
P r i n c i p a l s ' approval.
• (jar) Serbs have j u s t offered guaranteed access from Bat t o
Sarajevo. Permissive d e l i v e r y of a i d i s preferable t o
convoying through p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e areas.
• C " The conduct of b a t t l e f i e l d a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n (BAI) t o
S)
support convoys i s not envisioned.
• (U) BAI i s a i r operations conducted to destroy, n e u t r a l i z e ,
or delay the enemy's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l before i t can be
brought to bear e f f e c t i v e l y against f r i e n d l y forces at such
distances from f r i e n d l y forces that d e t a i l e d i n t e g r a t i o n of
each a i r mission w i t h the f i r e and movement of the f r i e n d l y
forces i s not required.
• CS^ The current s i t u a t i o n i n B-H does not lend i t s e l f to the
conduct of BAI.
•» Concentrations of enemy forces are not present.
Interference w i t h convoys has been by small bands,
u n i d e n t i f i e d i n d i r e c t f i r e , c i v i l i a n mobs, and groups of
women and c h i l d r e n .
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of forces i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h convoy
operations and t a r g e t i n g t h e i r higher echelons would be
d i f f i c u l t t o impossible.
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C o l l a t e r a l damage w i l l be a major concern.
Prepared by: LTC B i l l FitzGerald, USA
J-3/JOD, 52541
EUCOM2//378//
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�CLINTON
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LIBRARY
P H O T O C O P Y November 1993
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
Increasing
Humanitarian Aid - Airdrops (U)
1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on improving the
d e l i v e r y of humanitarian a i d by increasing airdrop operations.
2. (U) Background. The ongoing airdrop operation began i n
February 93 as a temporary measure aimed at supplementing ground
convoys. Despite the recent success of the ground routes,
continued intransigence and d e t e r i o r a t i n g conditions due t o
winter weather make examination of a l t e r n a t i v e d e l i v e r y methods
necessary.
3. (u) Key Points
a.
•
ASSUMPTIONS
Enhanced operations
are requested/supported by UNHCR.
• Increased airdrops are temporary i n nature, aimed at those
i n need who cannot be reached by ground convoys due t o
f i g h t i n g or winter conditions.
•
A d d i t i o n a l supplies are a v a i l a b l e f o r increased
•
B e l l i g e r e n t s sanction
b.
•
<^
airdrops.
operation.
CONCEPT OF OPERATION
Airdrops continue
at night due t o t h r e a t .
• Surge c a p a b i l i t y above current s i x f l i g h t s per night using
dedicated f l e e t i m p r a c t i c a l . A i r c r a f t operating at near
maximum u t i l i z a t i o n rates due t o f l i g h t d u r a t i o n , crew
a v a i l a b i l i t y and p e r i o d i c maintenance requirements. For an
immediate surge, USEUCOM would be required t o r e p r i o r i t i z e
theater a i r missions i n order t o support.
Sustained surge
would require a d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t , aircrews, and r i g g e r s .
T h i r t y day supply of a i d items a v a i l a b l e i n Germany.
• For the long term, a d d i t i o n a l defensive system equipped
C-130s/crews are made a v a i l a b l e t o USEUCOM. This w i l l
probably require a d d i t i o n a l National Guard/Reserve
p a r t i c i p a t i o n depending on increased l e v e l of e f f o r t .
A d d i t i o n a l s o r t i e s require increase i n riggers (8 per s o r t i e
- i f airdrops doubled would require a d d i t i o n a l r i g g i n g
company).
•
S u f f i c i e n t ramp space i s a v a i l a b l e at Rhein Mein.
•SB€R£F
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• Additional sorties w i l l require increased reliance on GPS
directed drops, due to limited number of A/C equipped with
AWADS (Radar for precision airdrops) and defensive systems.
• I f possible, new a i r items should be procured in an
international orange color. This would make them easy to
spot by those in need, easier to recover, and less valuable
to combatants. USG should seek UN funding to cover contract
costs.
b.
•
(^
DISCUSSION
This option presents minimal risk to US A/C,
crews.
• Airdrop operations are less weather dependent than
helicopter d e l i v e r i e s .
• Accuracy of current delivery means i s good. Increasing
airdrop operations, however, does not ensure that food i s
delivered to those in need; ground distribution systems are
uncertain and beyond our control.
• Airdrops are not capable of delivering required fuel/water
needed in some locations. This requires ground convoys,
which are the most e f f i c i e n t means of delivering aid.
• Airdrops do not address pressing issue of delivery of
winterization supplies. Belligerents have c l a s s i f i e d these
items as non-humanitarian aid due to potential for military
application. Airdropping winterization supplies l i k e l y
perceived as belligerent act.
• Belligerents could use these operations as a reason to
deny access to isolated areas by ground personnel. This
would not only undercut the UN efforts to expand ground
convoys, but could also prevent observers from getting in to
obtain accurate assessments.
• Incremental cost of each C-130 f l i g h t i s approximately
$12,500, not including costs of r e l i e f supplies.
C.
(U)
POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
PROS
• Safest method of US participation.
• Very v i s i b l e , high profile demonstration of US concern/
activism.
• Does not put forces on the ground.
• Overcomes access problems to isolated areas.
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CONS
• Does not address cause of problem; subsidizes continued
fighting.
• Extremely c o s t l y e f f o r t producing minimal r e s u l t s .
• No c o n t r o l of ground d i s t r i b u t i o n ; unable to ensure
d e l i v e r y to those i n need.
• Decreases need f o r cooperation/negotiations by
belligerents.
• Enhanced e f f o r t may arouse congressional s c r u t i n y .
4. ( j f ) Bottom Line. While e f f e c t i v e i n accuracy, the airdrop
operation i s not e f f e c t i v e f o r the large volume of sustained
supply f o r a c i v i l i a n population. Operation i s i n v i t i n g due t o
the l o w - r i s k and high v i s i b i l i t y . J o i n t S t a f f would s t r o n g l y
recommend airdrops over h e l i c o p t e r or ground operations f o r
emergency resupply of l i m i t e d q u a n t i t i e s of r e l i e f supplies t o a
needy population.
Prepared by:
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MEMORANDUM FOR
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
FROM:
YUGOSLAV TASK FORCE
Prepared by Col J.P. Kiley/EurPoI/x40661
SUBJECT:
Medical Options for Croatia
Tab A tasked a requirement to review medical capabilities in order to provide additional
relief for refugee assistance in Croatia. Currently, the 48th Air Transportable Hospital is deployed
in Zagreb in support of UNPROFOR. This unit is tasked and designed to give trauma and
stabilization care to combat casualties. It can provide for 60 bedriddenpatients. Ambassador
Galbraith has requested that surplus capacity be provided for the care of civilian patients,
particularly children. The JCS paper describing the additional requirements necessary to
accommodate this request is at Tab B.
Other options exist to provide additional medical capability to administer to the
requirements of the refugee population in Croatia. These options all require additional medical
personnel and equipment to be deployed in a potential combat area. A decision will be required
for deployment and expenditure of the necessary funds.
Options:
- Medical Civil Action Programs: augment the military hospital in Zagreb with additional
personnel in order to provide rotational medical service to the refugee camps. Active/reserve
forces from all services could be used to augment the hospital. This might benefit active duty
training for reserve personnel. It might be possible torequestcivilian health care professionals to
augment the hospital and provide the additional staffing from these volunteers.
- Environmental Health Assistance: civil action programs consisting of environmental
health specialists to advise therefugeepopulation could augment the hospital in Zagreb. While
providing no direct health care, they could assist by providing a forward deployed diagnostic
laboratory to conduct surveillance on the health status of therefugeecamps by monitoring the
sanitation, food preparation, water systems, and entomological sources of communicable diseases.
- Naval Assets:
- Assault Landing Ship (LHA) - an option exists to use helicopters to provide resupply
to therefugeepopulation in Bosnia for the winter. The LHA contains a 48 bed hospital with a
full operating suite for combat casualties. It could, if fully manned, provide humanitarian care for
patients prior to movement to a civilian facility. The resupply helicopters could provide the lift
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from shore to ship as scheduled by UN organizations. Medical civil action programs from the
ship could also be conducted in conjunction with the U.S. hospital in Zagreb and coordinated with
the UN.
- Hospital Ship (TAH) - two are currently in the inventory under the control of the
Military Sealift Command (MSG). One is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. It has a complement of
1200 personnel; has 1,000 hospital beds; 12 operating suites; and is manned by acdve duty and
civilian personnel. The ship would require support to move patients to/from the vessel; escort
ships; and a defined UN procedure for returning patients to civilian hospitals would have to be
established. The ship is in Baltimore Harbor in reduced operating status (5 days). If ordered to
sea and medical personnel assigned, it could be at sea in 5 days. Activation costs will be $4060K. Operating costs range from $51K/day at sea to S41K/day in port or at anchor. Activation
costs are absorbed in these per diem costs. It is primarily a surgical facility but can be equipped
and staffed for humanitarian operations. A 30 day block of surgical supplies is valued at $12M.
Supplies for humanitarian assistance would be additive to this. Medical civil action could also be
conducted from this platform through coordination with the hospital in Zagreb. While current
plans call for the ship to be staffed with U.S. Navy personnel, joint staffing from USN, USA, and
USAF medical personnel might be possible, if this option is considered, to lessen the affect on
residual medical care for all services.
AU optionsrequirea threat assessment, personnel, fiscal, and logistical estimate.
Recommendation: none. For information only.
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�OEGREX.
17 APR 94
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject:
Comments on D r a f t NSC Issues Paper on Bosnia 17 APR (U)
1. (U) Purpose.
on Bosnia.
To provide comments on d r a f t NSC issues paper
scussion.General comments:
• A l l options are escalatory i n nature using
brinksmanship to make the Bosnian-Serbs back down (which they've
j u s t demonstrated they're not l i a b l e to do). A i r power options
can not guarantee m i l i t a r y impact s u f f i c i e n t to compel
compliance.
• A l l options put UNPROFOR at increased
risk.
• A l l options could r e s u l t i n Bosnian government
manipulation of NATO responses.
•Failure of chosen option could r e s u l t i n t o t a l
f a i l u r e and withdrawal of UNPROFOR w i t h subsequent impact on
humanitarian a i d .
• A l l 5 options are escalatory i n nature and could lead
to s p i l l o v e r .
• A l l proposed options assume NAC consensus (which
would be extremely d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n i n a l l cases, and
impossible i n the more aggressive options) and UN cooperation i n
execution (such UN resolve a f t e r l a s t week's action i s
questionable).
OPTION 1: NATO Air Strikes on heavy weapons and infantry
PROs:
-Demonstrates f o r c e f u l action.
-Consistent w i t h NATO decisions o f 2/9 Aug 93 declaring
concern for B-H safe areas (NAC d e c i s i o n s t i l l required to
execute a i r s t r i k e s ) .
CONs:
-Successful only i f bombs don't drop.
-Most escalatory of a l l options.
-Taking on both attacks on heavy weapons and small i n f a n t r y
u n i t s places high requirement f o r a i r c a p a b i l i t y and
increases danger to NATO p i l o t s .
-Ignores l i k e l y Bosnian-Serb r e a c t i o n s .
-Relies on airpower alone to force B-S concessions on
ground.
- U l t i m a t e l y would weaken NATO; debate would be f r a c t i o u s ,
and i f passed, would promise more than a i r power can
deliver.
- L i k e l y to f u r t h e r antagonize Russians.
•SECRETDECLASSIFIED
C l a s s i f i e d by Director J-5
Declassify on OADR
PER E.0.13526
3/ViS
KSH
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OPTION 2: UNPROFOR exclusion areas around safe areas
PROs:
-Follows successful Sarajevo model.
-Builds on Feb 94 NAC decisions.
-Demonstrates evenhandedness i n t h a t i t also warns Bosnian
Muslims against attacking from safe areas (wording should
be changed to r e f l e c t not launching assaults from inside
safe areas vice r e f r a i n i n g from use of heavy weapons from
i n s i d e safe areas - applies to options 2,3,4).
CONs:
-Would require 8-10,000 a d d i t i o n a l UNPROFOR troops t o
enforce.
-Monitoring e f f o r t would s c a t t e r UNPROFOR forces leaving
them vulnerable t o harassment/detention, e t c .
- A d d i t i o n a l cost t o USG f o r troops and a d d i t i o n a l f l i g h t
hours.
OPTION 3: Exclusion areas without UNPROFOR c o n t r o l
PROs :
-Requires less troops.
-UNPROFOR less vulnerable and less v i s i b l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h
enforcement.
CONs:
-Makes NATO appear a b e l l i g e r e n t .
-Contrary t o e x i s t i n g UNSCRs.
-Without ground observers, t a r g e t i n g and execution
difficult.
-Requires extensive
recon.
OPTION 4: No-bombardment zone
PROs:
-Consistent w i t h UNSCRs supporting safe areas.
- I f passed sends strong message of NATO s o l i d a r i t y .
-Probably most saleable t o NAC.
-Doesn't attempt t o r o l l back B-S.
-Could be used as basis f o r country-wide cease f i r e .
CONs:
-Subject to manipulation given lack of ground presence.
-Extremely d i f f i c u l t to enforce.
«6ECRET2
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OPTION 5: Complete withdrawal from around safe areas
PROs:
-Evenhanded approach, demanding compliance from both sides.
-Provides comprehensive safety f o r safe areas.
CONs:
-Manpower intensive t o monitor on ground.
-Probably unacceptable t o B-S.
-Probably unacceptable t o Bosnian Government i n that lines
of c o n f l i c t would be frozen.
NSC ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
General comments noted above also a p p l i c a b l e t o a l t e r n a t i v e
strategy.
PROs:
-Recognizes geographic i s o l a t i o n of Gorazde and lack of
long-term v i a b i l i t y i n comprehensive agreement.
CONs :
-Doesn't specify how other safe areas are going t o be
protected by NATO.
-Admits UNPROFOR f a i l u r e i n Gorazde.
•
S f i G f i B : F
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP GECRgP
35
.c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
12 Hay 1994
Military Status Report
for Sarajevo, Gorazdo, and Tuala
Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have continued
to violate the cease-fire agreement and heavy veapon
exclusion aone around Sarajevo. Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs
appear to be systematically challenging the ON's control
over tho tone. Bosnian Serb forces also have not fully
implemented their vithdraval agreement vith the tm around
Oorazdo. The Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla city and tha
surrounding area on 11 Hay for the f i f t h time since NATO
conducted airstrikes on Serb forces attacking Gorazde last
month.
35
.c
Recent Sarajevo Exclusion Zone Violations
Bosnian Serbs are increasingly flaunting U control of
N
the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Serb
forces continue to operate heavy weapons outside of U
N
control or supervision within the Sarajevo exclusion zone.
Serb forces also are reportedly blocking U patrols in some
N
areas of the exclusion zone and have a generally hostile
attitude toward-UN personnel.
—
The Bosnian Serbs violated most of the stipulations
in the tank transit deal worked out by U special
N
envoy Akashi a.nd_Bosn.iafl_Sanb_Le*der_K*x»d.7.-ic_on
3 Hay. 1
!4c
The Serbs have removed and not returned about 20
heavy weapons from U weapon collection points
N
since the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. 0. 13526
8/3/t5 KBM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP GECRgP
3.5c
Small arms and machine gun exchanges occur
r e g u l a r l y throughout Sarajevo, and the UN s t a t e d
the f i r s t tank round s i n c e the February c e a s e - f i r e
and ultimatum was f i r e d on 9 May.
—
The Bosnian Serbs are l i m i t i n g freedom o f movement
f o r UN personnel w i t h i n the e x c l u s i o n zone. For
example, the Grbavica b r i d g e i s again closed t o UN
personnel
1.4c
3.5c
Bosnian Government forces have also v i o l a t e d the
Sarajevo heavy weapon e x c l u s i o n zone and c e a s e - f i r e
agreements, although not as b l a t a n t l y as the Bosnian Serbs.
] s i x or seven heavy weapons and
1.4c
preparations f o r four o r f i v e new heavy weapon
p o s i t i o n s on Mount Igman,
—
—
r e p o r t s of f7oro"0 Government troops massing i n the
area. Some Government u n i t s are u s u a l l y s t a t i o n e d
i n t h i s area, but these f o r c e s probably have been
r e i n f o r c e d w i t h s.o.n.e_additional troops and the
heavy weapons.
3.5c
r
Bosnian Serb Compliance vith Gorazde Oltimaturn
The UN has become i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned about Bosnian
Serb v i o l a t i o n s o f the Gorazde e x c l u s i o n zones. UN Special
Representative Akashi t o l d Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on
10 May t h a t unless the Bosnian Serbs immediately complied
w i t h the c e a s e - f i r e agreement, he would have t o r e f e r the
matter t o the UN Secretary-General and the S e c u r i t y Council,
A s e r i e s o f Serb
1.4c
v i o l a t i o n s nave been noted m recent days:
—
About 100 t o 150 armed Bosnian Serb " p o l i c e " remain
s t a t i o n e d i n s i d e the t h r e e - k i l o m e t e r e x c l u s i o n
zone, according t o UN o f f i c i a l s . Akashi has
demanded these personnel be removed, I
14
,c
The UN commander i n Gorazde r e c e n t l y stated
p u b l i c l y t h a t he i s c e r t a i n there are s t i l l heavy
weapons being held w i t h i n the zone. UN m i l i t a r y
observers r e c e n t l y found two 2^mm_AA_vLe-a.p_o.n.s.^_which
they escorted out o f the zone.
1.4c
The UN commander also stated
"tha"tr"tfie Serbs probably are h i d i n g weapons i n areas
they have declared o f f l i m i t s t o UN observers.
—
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1
3.5c
-
—
The Bosnian Serbs continue to harass and delay UN
m i l i t a r y and r e l i e f convoys entering Gorazde. A
French l o g i s t i c s convoy held up at a Serb
checkpoint f o r three days f i n a l l y arrived in
Gfira.z.di5L_o.n_? Kay, |
14
.c
Some personnel reportedly were not
allowed through and forced to return to Sarajevo.
3.5c
Bosnian Serb Actions Against Tuzla
Bosnian Serb forces shelled Tuzla c i t y and the
surrounding area on 11 May, |
14
.c
This i s the f i f t h a r t i l l e r y attack on Tuzla c i t y or
Tuzla a i r p o r t since the NATO a i r s t r i k e s .
—
The latest shelling of the c i t y may be a Serb
response to the Government mortar attack against
Brcko on 10 May that k i l l e d several c i v i l i a n s .
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SCCRET
�(b)(3)
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
25 July 1994
Effects of Creating and S t r i c t l y Enforcing Exclusion Zones
The creation of new exclusion zone i s u n l i k e l y to force the
Bosnian Serbs t o s e t t l e . While s t r i c t enforcement of those zones
would rachet up the pressure on the Serbs, i t could also
undermine the continuation of a Western troop presence i n Bosnia
and exacer
tures between NATO and the UN and w i t h i n the
Alliance.
The creation of new exclusion zones around Bihac, Tuzla,
Zepa, and Srebrenica without t h e i r s t r i c t enforcement w i l l place
much of Bosnia's Muslim population under Western protection but
w i l l have l i t t l e m i l i t a r y or diplomatic impact on the Bosnian
conflict.
—
The s i t e s f o r the new zones, which have already been
declared safe havens, are not the current scenes of
major f i g h t i n g .
—
The Serbs and the Muslims probably w i l l redeploy t h e i r
forces i n the zones t o more contentious areas. Refugees
may t r y to return t o areas under Serb control w i t h i n the
zones, increasing ethnic tensions there.
New exclusion zones are not l i k e l y to propel the Serbs into
accepting the Contact Group plan. Instead, they are l i k e l y to
increase t h e i r harassment of UN personnel i n Bosnia by blocking
UN resupply convoys, aggravating UN troops with small-arms f i r e ,
and r e s t r i c t i n g the UN's freedom of movement.
—
The UN said that Bosnian Serb Army Commander Mladic on
Monday threatened to "make l i f e d i f f i c u l t " f o r UN forces
beginning on 30 July, when the Contact Group foreign
ministers discuss how t o t r y t o reverse the Serbs'
r e j e c t i o n of the peace plan.
—
Bosnian Serbs have already stepped up actions against
the UN, probably to remind the Contact Group of the
p o t e n t i a l costs of t h e i r decisions. I n Sarajevo,
Bosnian Serb forces may have h i t as many as f i v e UN
a i r c r a f t with small-arms f i r e l a t e l a s t week and
attempted to withdraw heavy weapons from storage s i t e s .
On Sunday, Serb forces moved an a r t i l l e r y piece into the
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP
SECRET
(b)(3)
Gorazde. exclusion zone and fired on Muslim civilians,
The Bosnian Government has indicated that i t w i l l complain
bitterly i f the international community does not act quickly and
decisively to compel fiprh ar.r.ftntance nf thi> contact Group plan.
Sarajevo probably
according to press
14
.c
w i l l attempt to t i e the credibility of the Contact Group, the UN,
and NATO to international support for more aggressive action.
—
Bosnian President Izetbegovic told the press that his
government would drop their support for the plan i f the
Serbs maintain their demands or the major powers f a i l to
act.
—
Bosnia's UN Ambassador Sacirbey noted that " i t was time
for the qnntar.t Group to show i t has some kind of
teeth."
(b)(3)
Once the international community moves to s t r i c t l y enforce
the exclusion zones, the Bosnian Serbs probably w i l l dramatically
step up their pressure on UNPROFOR and r e l i e f agencies.
After NATO airstrikes around Gorazde this spring,
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, charging that the UN
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
TOP
(b)(3)
OECRET
�TOP
GCORCT
(b)(3)
had aided with the Muslims, placed UN personnel under
house arrest and attempted to remove Serb weapons from
UN c o l l e c t i o n sites around Sarajevo. I (bp)
The Bosnian Serbs probably w i l l continue to r e j e c t the plan
i n hopes they can e x p l o i t any r i f t s between Contact Group
members, and the UN and NATO, t o minimize the p o s s i b i l i t y of
action against them. The Serbs w i l l escalate t h e i r tests of the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's resolve unless they face a threat that
they calculate w i l l i n f l i c t severe damage t o t h e i r forces.
—
The Bosnian Serb m i l i t a r y remains unintimidated by the
t h r e a t of NATO m i l i t a r y s t r i k e s , a point Mladic has made
to various Western i n t e r l o c u t o r s . Karadzic perhaps i s
more f e a r f u l , but i n the face of a perceived onslaught
by NATO forces, the Bosnian Serb leadership, which
t h r i v e s on feelings of persecution, probably w i l l r a l l y
around the cause of zealous nationalism.
—
Even Milosevic, who would prefer acceptance of the
Contact Group plan, worries that he w i l l have to bow t o
domestic pressure to help his Bosnian Serb brothers i f
they come under Western attack, according to special
intelligence.
—
The Bosnian Muslims, meanwhile, would take advantage of
a i r s t r i k e s against the Bosnian Serbs by continuing t h e i r
operations outside of the zones and by resupplying t h e i r
troops,
(b)(3)
The burden of s t r i c t enforcement of the zones i s l i k e l y t o
a l t e r seriously Western involvement i n UNPROFOR and exacerbate
fissures between NATO and the UN and w i t h i n NATO.
1.4c
^
witnouT t ~ ~
ne
continued presence of~UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves
probably cannot survive. Even i f UNPROFOR stays, the
West European are l i k e l y t o reduce t h e i r troop
commitments, increasing UN reliance on Islamic
contributors.
If
�TOP SECRET |
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP OECRET
�3.5c
SECRET
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
3 August 1994
Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Pire
Agreements and Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
(Infonnation Current as of 1500, 3 August 1994)
Summary
The security s i t u a t i o n i n Sarajevo and Gorazde has
deteriorated since the Bosnian Serb r e j e c t i o n of the Contact
Group peace proposal.
14
.c
| the number of reported
cease-tire v i o l a t i o n s i s at i t s highest l e v e l i n months;
i n Gorazde, there was a high of 180 on 26 July, and i n
Sarajevo there were over 700 on 2 August--up from an
average of 100 t o 200 f o r the l a s t several months.
Small-arms and machine-gun f i r e accounts f o r almost a l l
of the cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s that occur i n the Sarajevo
and Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zones. The l e v e l of
reported heavy-weapons f i r e remains very low and i s not *
comparable t o the l e v e l of f i r e p r i o r t o implementation
of the exclusion zones.
Bosnian Serb forces are renewing t h e i r challenge t o UN
control over the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion
zone--they reportedly t r i e d on 2 August t o recover
weapons stored at UN c o l l e c t i o n points--and have
continuously flouted UN authority i n the Gorazde
exclusion zones.
Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have restricted
UN personnel fre.e.dQm_af movement in the Sarajevo and
Gorazde areas.
35
.c
Bosnian Serb actions seem intended to remind the Contact
Group that i t needs Serb cooperation to control the exclusion
zones, that a decision to create additional exclusion zones
without Serb concurrence would be resisted, and that there i s a
price to be paid for implementing the other "sticks" in the
Contact Group plan. The Bosnian Serb actions also come at a time
when they are very frustrated by Bosnian Government failure to
agree to prisoner exchanges, as well as Government offensive
operations, despite the Bosnia^wl<ie_cea8e-fire agreement that
went into effect on 10 June.
35
.c
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3.5c
TOP SECRET
�SECRET
3.5c
The Sarajevo and Gorazde Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
The Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone was created by a
Northern Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on 9 February. The
decision gave Bosnian Serb and Government forces 10 days to
withdraw or place under UNPROFOR control a l l weapons larger
than 12.7mm (e.g. tanks, a r t i l l e r y pieces, mortars, multiple
rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons) within
20 kilometers of the center of Sarajevo, excluding an area
within two kilometers of Pale; the decision stipulated,
moreover, that any heavy weapons within the exclusion zone and
not under UN control would be subject to NATO airstrikes. Nine
collection sites are situated throughout the 20-kilometer
exclusion zone and the UN currently controls or supervises over
300 Serb and about 50 Muslim heavy weapons in the Sarajevo
area. The NAC decision also decreed that a l l UN and r e l i e f
^ersoni^el in Bosnia should have free access to Sarajevo.
35
.c
The Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zone went i n t o e f f e c t on
24 A p r i l 1994. A 22 A p r i l NAC decision gave the Bosnian Serbs
u n t i l 0100 on 24 A p r i l to cease attacks on Goratzde, withdraw
t h e i r forces three kilometers from the c i t y center, and allow
UN forces, humanitarian r e l i e f convoys, and medical assistance
teams free access t o the c i t y . CINCSouth was authorized t o
conduct a i r s t r i k e s against Serb heavy weapons w i t h i n
20 kilometers of Gorazde c i t y center, provided they were inside
Bosnian t e r r i t o r y . The NAC decision also called on the Bosnian
Government not t o undertake offensive m i l i t a r y action from
w i t h i n the safe area of Gorazde.
35
.c
Saraj evo
Small-arms f i r e and sporadic s h e l l i n g have been reported
w i t h i n the Sarajevo 20-kilometer zone since the NATO ultimatum i n
mid-February. These incidents, which averaged between 100 and
200 per day over the l a s t few months (see t a b l e ) , have rapidly
escalated i n the l a s t two weeks.
7 0 6
.
cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on
14
.c
2 August, 578 v i o l a t i o n s on 1 August, and 580 on
31 July. Small-ams and machine-gun f i r e accounts for
almost a l l of the v i o l a t i o n s .
Both warring factions have violated the Sarajevo
cease-fire agreement over the past week, with increased
sniping and several significant clashes reported in the
Grbavica area.I
14
.c
heavy sniper f i r e forced
35
.c
3.5c
�CONPIDENTIAL
Cease-fire Violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde*
800
1.4c
700-
600-
500-
400-
300-
200-
n
to
. o
o
100-
ftul
•
j I HUL
MI
Sarajevo • Gorazde
I.
zz
CONFIDENTIAL
I
�TOP—j
OBCRB'P
3.5c
the city's tram lines to close on 29 July after s i x
passengers were wounded by snipers.
The UN closed Sarajevo airport on 22 July after five UN
aircraft were h i t by small-arms f i r e , according to press
reports. Secretary of Defense Perry's scheduled v i s i t
to Sarajevo on 22,,.Julv was cancelpd as a rftmiir nf thaaa_
actions.
14
,c
~ l Aircraft landing at Sarajevo airport
occasionally have come under small-arms f i r e since
April.
After a l u l l following the establishment of the Sarajevo
exclusion zone, small-arms f i r e broke out within the
city center shortly after the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde
in April and remains a daily concern. On 9 May,
1.4c
I the f i r s t report of tank fire
since the mid-February ultimatum, and a UN observer was
k i l l e d in a mortar attack--probably by Serb forces-within the zone on 12 May,F
'
1.4c, 3.5c
The Bosnian Serbs have been challenging UN control of the
Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone since the NATO airstrikes in
Gorazde in April, probably as a means of testing UN resolve to
maintain control of the zone and 'demonstrating Serb freedom of
action. The Serbs have the capability to take the weapons
against UNPROFOR resistance should they choose to do so.
Bosnian Serb forces attempted to retrieve
" e a « " ~ r r r c n of the. sites but were turned away by UN
w"pnsrot"le
troops. UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose stated publicly
on 3 August that force would be used t6 prevent the
Serbs from recovering weapons.
3.5c
3.5c
TOP OECRET
�3.5c
SECRET
14
.c
| Bosnian Serb forces
qiaaasembled and removed a 20mm anti-ajrc^aft onn frnm
the Ilidza collection site in late July.
In the weeks following the airstrikes at
uorazae, Serb forces removed--and reportedly have not
returned--about 20 heavy weapons and some ammunition
from various collection sites throughout the zone.
[Serb forces were maintaining weapons at some
collection sites, possibly in preparation for pulling
the weapons out in case the situation deteriorates
further.
1.4c, 3.5c
Bosnian Government forces also have reneged on some of their
commitments around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR claims that Bosnian
Government forces have violated the August 1993 agreement
demilitarizing the Mt. Igman area.
14
.c
six or seven
In early May,
14
.c
heavy-weapons positions on Mt. Igman and preparations
under way for more weapons positions.-
1.4c, 3.5c
Gorazde
The Bosnian Serbs have violated both the three-kilometer
military withdrawal zone or the 20-kilometer heavy-weapon
exclusion zone established arourtd Gorazde in April.
35
.c
4
3.5c
TOP <3BCRBT,
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
Incidents of small-arms and machine-gun f i r e i n Gorazde
p r i o r t o the Contact Group m i n i s t e r i a l l a s t weekend.
jaaaked at 180 . on 2fi tinly, according to press
1.4c
The l e v e l of v i o l a t i o n s has
taperea o t t m recent days t o 70-80 v i o l a t i o n s , but
remains higher than before the announcement of the
Bosnian Serb r e j e c t i o n of the Contact Group proposal.
1.4c
| On the night of~2T^July, Ser5
forces turned a 40mm a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun inside the
exclusion zone on Muslim c i v i l i a n s harvesting crops,
according t o press reports. Negotiations f o r the
removal of t h i s weapon are under way. The next day,
Serb forces f i r e d an 82tnm mortar from w i t h i n the zone at
Bosnian Government positions, according to a UN
spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops also f i r e d on UN
observation positions i n the enclave.
The Bosnian Serbs have never complied f u l l y with the
Gorazde 20-kilometer exclusion zone, withdrawing weapons
only a f t e r UN observers discovered them. I n mid-May,
the UN Commander i n Gorazde stated that the Serbs
probably were hiding other weapons i n areas they had
declared o f f - l i m i t s t o UN observers. Bosnian Government
f>r=f haw harAnHPri Serb troops i n the Gorazde area.
rr<»l
3.5c
Freedom of Movement
Bosnian Serb forces have denied UN and r e l i e f pereonnel, as
well as c i v i l i a n s , freedom of movement i n the Sarajevo and
Gorazde areas. Increased harassment of UN and r e l i e f personnel
appears t o coincide with i n t e r n a t i o n a l attempts to pressure the
Bosnian Serbs i n t o compliance with ultimatums.
3.5c
3.5c
TOP CECRET
$ LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
<
�TOP GECRET
3.5c
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced on 26 July that
he could no longer guarantee the safety of t r a f f i c on
two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were
being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.
The next day, Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply
convoy on one of these routes outside Sarajevo--killing
a British UN soldier--and later fired on a French
contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs
also fired on Federation President Zubak'a motorcade
returning to the city, according to press]
14
.c
Bosnian Serb forces have at various times restricted and
blocked movement in and around Sarajevo; for a time
shortly after the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in
April, they placed a l l UN personnel i n Serb-held
territory under virtual house arrest. The Serbs
temporarily mined the perimeters of several weapons
collection sites and detained UN personnel supervising
Serb weapons in the exclusion zone.
Bosnian Serb forces now close convoy checkpoints enroute
to Gorazde from Friday to Monday each week and employ
other delaying tactics. On 26 July, Bosnian Serb
o f f i c i a l s detained a UNHCR o f f i c i a l on his way to
Gorazde. Serb authorities recently denied entry for a
water specialist and confiscated part of a convoy
shipment, including rat poison needed to control the
growing rat population of Gorazde that has led to a
possible outbreak of hemorrhagic fever.
1.4c, 3 5
.c
35
.c
1
TOP SBCRBT
�TOP gEQRET
3.5c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 August 1994
Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Fire Agreements and
Heavy-Weapon Exclusion zones: An Update
(Information Current as of 0900, 4 August)
Small-arms f i r e and explosions continued i n Sarajevo
overnight, and Gorazde remains unstable.
—
Sniping continues i n Sarajevo despite a Tuesday
agreement between the warring parties t o end t h i s form
of harassment of c i v i l i a n s , according t o press reports.
French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents have
placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn t o
discourage snipers.
—
The Bosnian Serbs also continue t o challenge , N control
U
of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone
"Recently, Bosnian
"Serb forces twice nave attempteoT"to remove mortars from
the Poljine weapons c o l l e c t i o n point but were turned
away by French UNPROFOR troops,
Yesterday, the Bosnian Serb forces placed
mines around the compound a f t e r the French again
intervened, but a f t e r two hours of negotiations the
mines were removed and the Serbs withdrew.
1 4c
the
home-made heavy rocket f i r e d a t Visoko on
2 August—probably from w i t h i n the Sarajevo heavy-weapon
exclusion zone—was of a type previously used by Bosnian
Serb forces.
—
Cease-fire violations continue at high levels and) 1 4
.c
an increasing number of
explosions i n and around the c i t y .
3.5c
The recent events are t y p i c a l of the steadily d e t e r i o r a t i n g
security s i t u a t i o n around Gorazde and Sarajevo over the l a s t
month.
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
Aot3- 00.31-H
8/3/15 KBV1
TOP
3.5c
SECRET
�TOP 0EGRET
35
.c
By Tuesday, cease-fire violations in Sarajevo, primarily
small-arms f i r e , were the highest level—over 700—since
the mid-February NATO ultimatum. A week before, the
United Nations had been forced to close the Sarajevo
airport due to five attacks on r e l i e f aircraft,!
~4c
The Bosnian Serbs cont nue to violate the exclusion
zones around Gorazde.
14
.c
the two sides have more than 10 heavy weapons in the
exclusion zone. Small-arms and machine-gun f i r e in the
exclusion zone peaked at 180 on 26 July, but has taperei
off to some 70-80 in recent days, according to press(_
14, 3 5
.c . c
35
.c
3.5c
TOP CECRET
�TOP SECRET
35
.c
DCI Interagency Balkan Force
5 August 1994
Recant Incidents in Sarajevo and Qorazde
Sarajevo
—
NATO aircraft were deployed on 5 August against a known
Bosnian Serb heavy weapon position within^Lha_2.Q=_
kilometer exclusion zone, according to
14
.c
I press reports.
On 5 August,
jL4c
|Bosnian Serb forces
removed a T-55~tahk7~two armorea personnel carriers, and
an antiaircraft gun from the I l i d z a heavy weapons
collection site, according to press reports.
The UN resumed humanitarian flights into Sarajevo
airport on 5 August after a two-week suspension. After
Bosnian Serb troops removed weapons from the I l i d z a
collection site, the UN suspended a l l flights into the
airport, according to various press reports.
670 cease-fire violations on 4 August.
on 3 August, UNPROFOR/Bosnia Commander Rose publicly
stated that force would be used to prevent the Serbs
from recovering weapon's from UN-controlled heavy weapon
collection s i t e s . I
14r
3.5c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
A&te - 01*32.- n
8/3/15- KBM
3.5c
TOP GECRET
�TOP SECRET
35
.c
Bosnian Serb and Government force agreed t o cease sniper
a c t i v i t y i n Sarajevo on 3 August, according t o press
reports. UN anti-sniping teams responded t o continued
Serb sniping with r e t a l i a t o r y f i r e , according t o press
reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR
contingents placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn
©snipers.
14
.c
14
.c
—
661 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on 3 August.
On 3 August,
a home-made rocket
14
.c
f i r e d a t Visoko the day before—probably from w i t h i n the
the Sarajevo 20-kilometer exclusion zone=Lji£aE
previously used by Bosnian Serb forces.
l
706 cfease-fire v i o l a t i o n s on 2 August,
578 on 1 August, 580 on 31 July, and 597 on 30 July,
1406 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s .
14
.c
heavy sniper f i r e forced the c i t y ' s
tram lines to^close alfter s i x passengers were wounded by
snipers'.
On 29 July,
—
435 cease-fire v i o l a t i o n s .
14
.c
On 27 July, Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed
a 20inm antiaircraft gun form the I l i d z a collection site,
On 28 July,
35
.c
TOP 0EGRET
�TOP CECRET
3.5c
Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy
outside of Sarajevo on 27 J u l y — k i l l i n g a British UN
soldier—and later fired on a French contingent
attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on
Federation President's motorcade returning to the city,
14
.c
On 26 July, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced that
he could no longer guarantee the safety of t r a f f i c on
two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were
being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.
337 cease-fire violations on 26 July,
14
.c
184 on 25 July, 173 on 24 July, and 314 on 23 July.
The UN closed Sarajevo airport to a l l but UNPROFOR
flights on 22 July after five UN aircraft
small-arms, according to press reports. 1
14^
14
.c
3.5c
j264 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
3.5c
TOP GECRET
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
Qorasda
197 cease-fire violations in the Gorazde
14
.c
exclusion zone on 4 August and 160 on 3 August.
38 cease-fire violations on 31 July and
73 on 30 July.
12 cease-fire violations on 28 July and
180 on 26 July.
Bosnian Serb forces fired an 82inm mortar from within the
20-kilometer zone at Bosnian Government positions on 25
July, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops
fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.
—
65 cease-fire violations.
On 25 July,
On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 4 0mm
antiaircraft gun inside the heavy weapon exclusion zone
on Muslim c i v i l i a n s harvesting crops, according to press
reports.
41 cease-fire violations on 24 July and
29 on 23 July.
30 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
35
.c
35
.c
TOP SECRET
�DECLASSIFIED)
PER E.0.13526
8/3/15 ^
'
0
-SECRET-
^
ft*?
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO:
THE POLICY CONTEXT
The principal objective of proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives toward lifti
the arms embargo is to get Pale to reconsider its position and accept the Map-in other words, it
designed to bring about a negotiated peace settlement. Specifically, lifting the arms embargo is
intended to provide B-H with the self-defense capability necessary to defend the proposed Feder
territory outlined by the CG Map. This translates into an ability to hold current territory, take en
of the high ground around Sarajevo to make it defensible, be able to ensure that humanitarian a
in, and conduct limited other offensive operations to seize lands proposed to be under Federation
control by the Map but currently in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. It is a course of action frau
with pehi.
The U.S. will insert no ground troops, advisors, or logisticians into B-H. Even so, whether as a
unilateral lifting or as part of an orchestrated, multilateral effort, lifting will be perceived as
dramatically raising U.S. involvement and the stakes. We will be perceived as having chosen to side
with the Bosnian Govt. We will be ever more responsible for training and equipping the Bosnian
Govt, forces, most likely in the U.S. and for at least a year so that the effect can play out on the
battlefield. Even given that increased level of involvement (including a transition period during which
U.S. air power will be used to help equalize the battlefield), there is no guarantee of success. In fact,
absent committed U.S. ground forces, jio amount of air power can prevent the BSA from overrunning
the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo.
W do not want to act alone, but acting multilaterally will be a difficult proposition, as each of
e
the actors tends to sec things from its unique vantage point. UNPROFOR will withdraw in a
nightmare scenario of hostages seized and the potential for heavy casualties. Moreover, without an
intense diplomatic effort and logistical and military support, we will sour relations with our NATO
and UN allies as well as undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia and our efforts
to enforce UN embargoes that we suppon.
It is the purpose of the sections that follow to identify the key concems of the other nations that
have interests in the outcome of the current conflict. Containing and then ending the conflict while
not fracturing the current (albeit fragile) consensus for action is paramount to the success of our
planning. What we need to do is balance carefully the attimescompeting objectives of maintaining
the unity of the CG and getting the Bosnian Serbs to reverse their position and accept the Map. Going
too far too quickly down the path of extension followed by more robust enforcement of the Exclusion
Zones and then lifting the arms embargo is certain to fracture the unity of the CG. It is an awful idea.
On the other hand, not proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives is likely to perpetuate the
status quo-continuing war and frustration. Yet there may be reason to consider a course of action
that does not include the major outside powers imposing a solution or thrashing the Serbs militarily.
The history of the Balkan Wars suggests that ultimately Serbia may extend itself territorially beyond
the means of its military power, thus inviting its many neighbors with territorial claims-Bosnia,
Croatia, Hungary , and AJbania-to pile on, regain lost lands, and restore a more natural equilibrium.
r
Gl?CB17 V
Cluiified by OASD
Dtcu*^ o OADR
o
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
�TOP SECRET
3.5c
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
9 September 1994
Military Situation in Bihao
Fighting i n the Bihac enclave has i n t e n s i f i e d between
Government and Serb forces since the collapse of Abdic's
Muslim s e p a r t i s t forces i n August.
Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces have launched a t t a c k s —
possibly coordinated—on Bosnian government forces and have
concentrated on seizing key lines of communication along the
southern edge of the enclave and maintaining a demilitarized
zone between Krajina Serb and Bosnian government t e r r i t o r y
i n the northeastern corner of the enclave.
Shelling of Bihac c i t y , which i s the actual safe area,
has been n e g l i g i b l e , but s h e l l i n g of the Muslim c i t i e s of
Cazin and Buzim has increased. I f the UN declared a 20-km
exclusion zone around Bihac c i t y , Cazin woulsL-faXl-Sfithin
and Buzim would f a l l outside. (See map.)
3
5c
Bosnian Serb forces have deploy_e.d_as_manv_as_6_Q_0jQ.
troops around the Bihac enclave.
14
.c
Krajina Serb forces have reinforced their forces around
Bihac with additional troops, tanks, and a r t i l l e r y —
primarily near the demilitarized zone—and may have as many
as 2,000 troops deployed in the area. Bosnian government V
Corps forcLes-numker.,at least 6,000, deployed throughout the
enclave.
35
.c
J
The fiercest fighting in recent weeks has continued to
be for control of the Grabez Plateau, the high ground five
kilometers west of Bihac city. The Bosnian Serbs apparently
are attempting to control key lines of communication
connecting Serb-held territories in Bosnia and tha Krajina.
1.4c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0. 13526
3.5c
TOP
8/3/15"
K6H
0EGRET
3.5c
�9 JP SECRET
H
3.5c
l-fc
|at least
"eight probable Bosnian Serb a r t i l l e r y deployment
areas containing 22 pieces of a r t i l l e r y or mortars
within 20 kilometers r>f Bihar r^ty, primarily near
the Grabez plateau.
35
C
Clashes between the Government V Corps and Krajina Serb
forces have been escalating in the northeastern section of
the enclave, near the demilitarized zone. Bosnian forces
have made numerous probing attacks which have resulted in
the Krajina Serbs reinforcing this area.
On 8 September, at least 500 Krajina Serb troops
supported by at least eight tanks attacked Bosnian
government positions near the DMZ, according to
Radio Sarajevo.
1.4c
the Krajina Serbs had established a
DMZ.
Equipment at the base included four M-87
multiple rocket launcher vehicles.
35
.c
TOP 0EGRET
�3 5r.
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
2 November 1994
Implications of the Bihac Offensive
The Bosnian Army launched its most successful offensive of
the war on 24 October around Bihac i n northwestern Bosnia,
capturing some 250 to 300 square kilometers of territory. We
anticipate a further escalation of tbe fighting, although
Government forces remain incapable of decisively altering the
current distribution of territory. Bosnian Government successes
may induce Zagreb to launch an attack against the Krajina Serbs.
Meanwhile, tbe food situation i s c r i t i c a l for 200,000 people in
the Bihac enclave; Serb obstruction of aid there and elsewhere
could put many at r i s k .
35
.c
The Bihac Offensive
Increasingly e f f e c t i v e leadership, growing t a c t i c a l s k i l l ,
and high morale—combined with an improved l o g i s t i c s s i t u a t i o n —
were key t o the Bosnian Army's F i f t h Corps success. The
operation was also directed a t what i s widely perceived t o be the
weakest Bosnian Serb forces.
—
The Army's high command successfully coordinated the
Bihac operation with attacks near Doboj, Gradacac, and
Kupres i n order t o t i e down Bosnian Serb forces.
35
.c
Bosnian Serb forces already have retaken some t e r r i t o r y i n
counterattacks. The Bosnian Government F i f t h Corps i s spread
t h i n and i s awkwardly deployed a f t e r i t s rapid advance, which
probably exceeded i n i t i a l goals.
—
Local Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) t r o o p s — r e i n f o r c e d
by u n i t s from as f a r away as the Posavina
c o r r i d o r — h a v e forced a government withdrawal from Kulen
Vakuf and about 50 square kilometers of recently
captured t e r r i t o r y , according t o
14
.c
press reports
-
The Krajina Serbs are supporting the Bosnian Serb
counterattack by shelling some Government positions and
supplying troops, according t o a v a r i e t y of reports.
Thev are also reportedly mobilizing a d d i t i o n a l forces.
35
.c
35
.c
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
3.5c
•v
A O \ 3 - OV.83L-
2/3//5" KBH
H
•••n
Clinton Library Photocopy
�3.5c
Bosnian Croats Join the Conflict
Bosnian Croat forces are actively supporting the Government
offensives near Bihac and Kupres—their f i r s t major joint
offensive with government troops since 1992. Zagreb almost
certainly had to approve of the Bosnian Croat participation in
the Kupres attack.
—
The joint operations at Kupres, long advocated by the
Muslims, almost certainly w i l l help to ease Muslim-Croat
tensions elsewhere in Bosnia.
Bosnian Forces Potential Gains Limited
Despite the recent successes, the Bosnian Army remains
incapable of decisively defeating the Serbs or even seizing a l l
the territory given i t under the Contact Group plan.
—
Sarajevo i s now able to coordinate multiple operations
that maximize their manpower advantage and i t s infantry
formations—especially i t s special assault u n i t s — a r e
increasingly effective.
—
Government forces w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y making similar
gains elsewhere where they generally face larger numbers
of more mobile and better trained and equipped Serb
troops.
Fighting Will Continue to Intensify
Recent Government successes probably w i l l lead to a major
increase in fighting.
—
Bosnian Croat attacks have reignited fronts quiet since
1992. Government forces are likely to continue
launching multiple attacks throughout the country to
stretch the Serbs thin.
—
Meanwhile, the BSA w i l l respond vigorously and
ranidlv—especially i f key Serb areas are threatened.
Possible Spillover of Fighting
Government successes could cause fighting to spillover into
Croatia or draw "Yugoslav" and possibly Croatian forces into
combat in Bosnia.
nor nvjanrj.r
Clinton Library Photocopy
�SECRET
3.5n
14
.c
iserpian "volunteers" comet cross
i n t o Bosnia i f the government advances continue.
Yugoslav Army elements almost c e r t a i n l y w i l l t r y t o
increase covert support t o the Bosnian Serbs,
especially i f they continue t o lose ground.
Croatian attack could take advantage of tha Krajina
and Bosnian Serb preoccupation v i t h the Bihac
offensive.
35
.c
Grave Humanitarian Conditions Loom
the food situation for
14
.c
200,000 people i n the Bibac enclave i s c r i t i c a l and some
could face s t a r v a t i o n by mid-winter. Bosnian Serb
r e t a l i a t i o n against a i d deliveries could cause a
d e t e r i o r a t i o n of conditions i n Bihac and elsewhere i n
Bosnia.
—
An additional 30,000 people, Bosnian refugees from
the enclave who fled after rebel Muslim leader
Abdic's f a l l , are ill-prepared for winter and
depend on UN food and water deliveries. Meanwhile,
Bosnian Government offensives south of Bihac have
forced 10,000 Serbs from their homes,)
14
.c
—
Last week, Serb o f f i c i a l s linked a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r
UN f u e l d e l i v e r i e s t o a suspension of the Bihac
offensive and have since denied most UN f u e l convoy
requests. Serb authorities are going t o require
24-hours advance n o t i f i c a t i o n f o r using the
Sarajevo a i r p o r t road, aicrnifiqantly complicating
a i r l i f t deliveries.
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1W StjCRRT
3.5c
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 November 1994
NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING
ABOUT BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO
I. Legal Analysis
As of November 12,1994, the Nunn-MitcheU provision of the DOD authorization
act will prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds for intelligence support in those
limited circumstances where the purpose of that support is participation in, support for, or
assistance to voluntary aspects of the Bosnian arms embargo.
The effect of the funding prohibition is limited. It does not prohibit collection
activities, but restricts passage of intelligence information on the arms flows to Bosnia
where the information is provided solely to enforce the Bosnian embargo:
Congress intended to continue support under UN Resolution 713 and to
preclude voluntary enforcement or the Bosnian arms embargo unless it would
impede the enforcement of the Serbian economic and arms embargo.
The President indicated in a signing statement that the provision applies only
when appropriated funds are used "for the purpose of enforcing tne arms
embargo.
--
The prohibition would not affect the ability of the US to participate in
activities that are necessary to avoid impeding the enforcement of the Serbian
embargo or other authorized purposes, even if indirect, consequentiaLoi
incidental support to enforcement of the Bosnian embargo results.
The US is not required to cease providing information concerning violations of US
law or relating to other arms shipments, or information which supports the Serbian
embargo but which may also support enforcement of the Bosnian embargo. Moreover, the
US Government may continue to provide information about arms shipments to Bosnia
where the purpose for that support is driven by concems other than enforcement of the
Bosnian embargo.
Examples include passage of intelligence necessary for the defense of allied
forces or facilities, or necessary to maintain intelligence liaison relationships.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
TOP SECRET
3/S/i ^
KBM
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�TOP LSECRET
3.5c
Caveat: Although a strict reading of the statute's "purpose" test would permit the
conunuation of a number of activities that support voluntary enforcement of the embargo,
activity that reasonably can be expected to result in enforcement may raise questions about
compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
Dissemination of intelligencefromjoint collection sites, infonnation for liaison
enhancement, and other activities should not be undertaken without senior
review even if not strictly intended for enforcement where there is a significant
potential an enforcement action will result. Passage of strategic rather than
tactical intelligence is less likely to raise such a concern, and activities that are
necessary for other purposes and that actually are beyond US control may
proceed.
II. Intelligence Activities Under Nunn-MitcheU
A. Intelligence support can be divided into several different categories for purposes
of assessing the impact or the funding prohibition:
Intelligence Collection. The funding prohibition would not affect the actual
collection of intelligence. A joint collection activity not directed solely at enforcement of
the Bosnian embargo with allied countries may continue where its cessation would impede
the enforcement of the Serbian embargo.
Intelligence Support Concerning Illegal Arms Shipments to Bosnia.
-
Defense articles and services exportedfromthe US or with another US nexus
and destined for Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue concerning these
activities, which are required by U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713,
and which are also a violation of US law.
Arms shipments destined for Bosnia in violation of the U.N. arras embargo
that has no US nexus. Intelligence support concerning these types of
shipments solely for the purpose of enforcing the Bosnian arms embargo must
cease as of 12 November 1994.
OPERATION SHARP GUARD actions exclusively taken to effect the arms
embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina are affected.
Actionable infonnation relating solely to the knowledge of arms destined for
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be marked and treated as
NOFORN-not to be disseminated to foreign nationals without prior review.
It also may not be used in any US Government action to enforce the Bosnian
arms embargo unless a violation of US law is involved.
It may be possible to delay dissemination of actionable intelligence on Bosnian
arms shipments until it can no longer support an enforcement action.
However, this approach should be carefully reviewed, as even "after theJact!!
intelligence can be used in support of long-range enforcement efforts.
TOP SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3.5c
B. Determining the Purpose of the Activity:
Where the purpose for providing such intelligence support is other than to
enforce the arms embargo-such as the enforcement of the no-fly zone
(Operation DENY FLIGHT); enforcement of the myriad of actions
authorized by other U.N. resolutions in this area, including the Serbian arms
and economic embargo and force protection for US or cooperating country
forces; intelligence liaison enhancement; or any other authorized purposes
the intelligence support may continue to be provided even if an incidental or
indirect support to enforcement of the Bosman arms embargo results.
Arms Shipments to Serbia and Other Countries Except Bosnia. Intelligence
support may continue to be provided to enforce the Serbian embargo or the
requirements of other U.N. sanctions, as may intelligence support concerning
arms shipments to destinations except for Bosnia.
Other Intelligence. Intelligence support not related to the "deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Bosnia," see U.N. Security Council
Resolution No. 713, may continue to be provided in accordance with existing
authorities and established procedures.
Finished Intelligence. Finished intelligence which contains no information
upon which an enforcement action could be based may continue to be
provided.
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
3.5c
7 c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
�lUfSECRET
3.5c
1.4c, 1.4d. 3.5c
3.5c
tQP"lECnBt
�^--u
TOP SECRET
3.5c
1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
TOP SECRET
r u t
�DEC 16 '94 18:55
R 21 IBM TI
P. 2
REINVIGORATED UNPROFOR PROPOSALS
(revised)
FRENCH PROPOSALS.
• Secure the Sarajevo Airport. This idea is consistent with the current
humanitarian mission. However, when considered previously, the idea
was rejected because of the number of troops required to secure the
Serb controlled approaches to the airport on a full-time basis. The
French may have in mind something less ambitious than this.
• Secure a land route to Sarajevo. Consistent with current UNPROFOR
mandate; most of the route is in Muslim/Croat control, but Serbs control
the immediate access to Sarajevo and will oppose UN convoys and
target the route; weather also an issue in some areas; and the troop
requirement is unclear.
• Consolidate UNPROFOR in the central area. Provides economy of
force and efficiency; if it means pulling out of the enclaves, creates the
image of withdrawal and abandonment of the eastern enclaves; French
seem to have in mind a less complete pull back, e.g., closing down the
isolated weapons storage sites around Sarajevo, pulling back UNMO's.
OTHER OPTIONS (within existing mandate)
• Tougher convov ROE. A variant of the "blue route" concept. Would
force through Serfr roadblocks, instead of negotiating. Problems are
Serb counter-escalating, use of civilians to block convoys.
• Safe Area/EZ focus. Clearly define safe areas, create small exclusion
zones and expand them. Deploy UNPROFOR more heavily In safe
areas/EZs. Use military force to defend people in safe areas and the
movement of humanitarian supplies to them. Option is impartial and
within current mandate. Links easily to build-down. Difficult to
coordinate, support and control dispersed units; requires a tactical
reorientation and probably more troops.
• Central Based Rapid Reaction Force, Concentrate UNPROFOR in
Sarajevo with a small presence in limited, designated safe areas.
Create a viable mechanized and armor (consider attack helicopters)
reaction force (Bn or Bde) configured for combat and located in
Sarajevo to respond with ground combat power and air support to UN
missions as required. UNPROFOR more defensible; restores UN
initiative and gives combat capability to UN but requires new
organizational structure, C3I, combat equipment and log support. May
increase fighting.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94
18:56
R 2110M TI
P.3
Secure Tuzla airport. Easier to secure than Sarajevo airport because it
is deeper inside government area. However, it creates new opportunity
for fighting, and Tuzla is remote from other areas requiring humanitarian
support. Would also require redeployment of many UNPROFOR
forces.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94 14:10 R 2110M T I
P.2
Build Down
Background: On September 30,1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter
outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as
worthy of serious consideration in his October 7,1994, response. Nunn followed up with
a second letter on December 1,1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either
unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough
military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated
settlement.
Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how itfitsinto our near
and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.
Discussion:
The Concept an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons
rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt Build down is designed to equalize the
forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying
them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence
by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing
the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian
conflict.
Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an
amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could
include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of
Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the
negotiating process include:
• Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
• Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
• More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
• Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.
Implementation: (Assumption-former President Carter has some success in
getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good
faith) Present build downtothe UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their
endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift
and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�DEC 16 '94
14:10
R 2110M TI
P.3
arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of
defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be
pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.
Potential Pmblemfi: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more
rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H.
Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be
married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may
require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with
or without strike) may label build down naive.
Recommendation: adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present
it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument
if favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the
Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CLINTON LIBRARV PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDENTIAL
FUNDING UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL:
CHOICES AND DYNAMICS
SHAPE has prepared a document, NATO Withdrawal Budget Estimates (1995).
dated 31 January 1995, that provides preliminary cost estimates for the
implementation of SHAPE/AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104, DETERMINED EFFORT,
a NATO-conducted withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and BosniaHercegovina. The OPLAN does not consider evacuation of assets currently
stationed in the Foimer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
According to the SHAPE estimate, OPLAN 40104 will take six months to
execute, involve a multi-national force of approximately 70,000 ground, air and
naval personnel, and cost approximately $1.9B at minimum. This cost estimate
breaks down as follows: about $515M for NATO common costs (i.e., common
procurement and O&M costs); $1.4B in national costs (personnel, equipment and
sustainment costs for all troop-contributing nations); and $37.2M for the
evacuation of 31,000 UNPROFOR personnel, 9,400 vehicles and related
equipment.
Organizations involved in military operations in and around the former Republic
of Yugoslavia have not developed a single, common, standardized funding
mechanism for defraying costs because of the current division of operational
control. Funding arrangements have been primarily threefold: (1) "blue helmet"
operational costs paid through the UN's assessment system; (2) NATO members
"paying their own way" for costs associated with their forces supporting the UN
Security Council mandate (e.g., SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT); and (3)
NATO using its Military Budget to pay NATO common costs.
A detailed funding mechanism for UNPROFOR withdrawal, that can be agreed to
by the various organizations involved, will have to be devised to ensure the
success of the operation. There are four possible options (all costs use OPLAN
estimates as a base).
UN Funding Option: This option would entail the UN paying for all costs
associated with the operation to include military and civilian elements engaged in
planning, execution or support. It uses the standard UN peacekeeping assessment
process which assesses member states for a percentage share of the total
operational costs. U.S. share would be 30.4%, or approximately $590M plus the
incremental costs for forces and other support paid upfront,less any
reimbursements. Each country contributing to the operation would be required to
pay incremental costs up front and be reimbursed by the UN for personnel and
other support later.
CONFIDENTIAL
CUMified by: Multiple Sourcea
Declagtify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P) ISA and S&R, 17 Feb 95
z-d
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PER E.O. 13526
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
• GONFIDENTIAL
"Pav-Your-Own Wav" Option: This option entails each participating nation,
organization, and non-governmental organization, paying its own evacuation costs
without the expectation of reimbursement from another organization. The cost to
the U.S. would be contingent upon the level of support the U.S. furnished (number
of personnel, airlift, CAS, etc.). UN members, including the U.S. may also be
assessed for the cost of evacuating the non-NATO troops UNPROFOR troops if
this costs was borne by the UN. The estimated cost to the U.S. using this
approach is $600M to $1B for incremental costs associated with operational
support..
NATO Funding Option: NATO members would be obligated to pay the entire
cost of the operation. It currently pays for only common costs in FRY through its
Military Budget. NATO accounts have never been used before to carry the full
cost of a military operation. One approach to funding the operation would be to
use the NATO national cost share formula to set the assessment rate for each
NATO member (U.S. share 25% or approximately $490M plus the incremental
costs for operational support minus any reimbursements). This approach assumes
also that non-NATO UNPROFOR nations would not be assessed by NATO for the
accrued costs. Each NATO nation contributing forces and support would pay its
own incremental costs up front. Later reimbursement by NATO is problematic.
"Hybrid Option": This option uses two approaches. Non-NATO UN member
states pay for a portion of the total cost of the operation at their regular UN
peacekeeping rate (non-NATO UN member assessments total 32% of the UN
peacekeeping budget). These costs would be paid into a UN fund that would be
used to fund the cost of non-NATO forces in the operation and UN administrative
and support costs. NATO nations would pay the other portion and not be assessed
by the UN, but pay under the NATO national cost share fonnula described above.
The cost to the U.S. under this approach would be approximately $330Mplus
incremental operational support costs less reimbursements. If the operational cost
was allocated based on the proportion on NATO and non-NATO troop strength,
the U.S. cost may be reduced to $225M (plus incremental support costs less
reimbursements) since 54% of the UNPROFOR troops are non-NATO.
NATO and the UN have been discussing cost sharing arrangements for funding a
potential withdrawal operation for several months, with no tangible results.
Indeed, in recent correspondence to NATO SYG Claes, UN SYG Boutros-Ghali
stated his assumption that, in the case of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO
would bear the costs. NATO Permanent Representatives were sharply critical of
this position, and agreed that SYG Claes would tell Boutros-Ghali that funding
arrangements for such an operation were to be the subject of future negotiations
between the two organizations.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clarified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared Jointly by OUSD(P) ISA and S&R, 17 Feb 95
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
While NATO has set no specific timetable for entering into these negotiations,
military planning factors and operational timing requirements may play a
significant role in determining the final funding scheme. They therefore merit
serious consideration in the overall context of this evolving situation,
SACEUR indicates that he must have a pre-positioned command and
control/logistics infrastructure in place to execute the OPLAN. His preference is
that this operating base be established prior to execution of any withdrawal
operation, and in light of agreed ministerial political, military and financial
guidance (i.e., formal funding arrangements). SHAPE planners estimate that it
will take about three to four weeks to establish the pre-positioned support structure
after a political decision to execute has been rendered by NATO Ministers.
However, if SACEUR must establish his operating base on a contingency basis
(i.e., as outlined in OPLAN 40104, but without final agreement between NATO
and the UN on some issues, like funding arrangements), the US government (as a
NATO and UN member) may have no alternative but to accept a de facto funding
arrangement (a la "Pay-Your-Own-Way"), which would leave us little hope or
expectation of being reimbursed for accrued costs.
Since the Croatian government has declared 31 March the expiration date of the
UN mandate there, planning, negotiations and decision making on formal funding
arrangements between NATO and the UN must begin soon, lest events foreclose
available options.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clwifiad by: Multiple Source*
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P) ISA snd S&R, 17 Feb 93
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f>-r\Mt-ir\i-Ki-ri A i
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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�OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OEFENSE/CCC
i ^ - '^* .
(TH) 03.02.
'95 10:23
NO, 1460109318 PAGE
DRAFT
«E€RET~
Theihteniatioiwl i ^ i t ^
Regional Stability and Containment
in Macedonia and
surrounding countries td'^htaiii 'he jTwtber'Sipread ;5^ar;ip.UM>. Bauoms should UNPROFOR
t i>
withdrawfromCroatia and Bosnia andfightingincrease there. This military strategy is
designed to support the long-term stabilization of Macedonia as an area criticaltospread of
war further into the southern tier of Europe.
Background
The Principals' Committee meeting otf February 7,1995, directed more comprehensive
planning on options to contain the conflict in Bosnia arid Croatia. Pressure is growing for the
withdrawal of UNPROFORfromthe former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for renewed
fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia are high in the Spring. Given Macedonia's importance to
stability in Southern Europe, the Principals directed that special attention be given to
strengthening forces in Macedonia to provide stability through deterrence of military threats
to MacedoniaNational Interg$fr
..y' \ ] \ ^ , ^ . % \ •
Pteventing the spread of yfai in the Balkans is a vitalriatidhalsiecurity interest of the
United States, and Macedonia is the center of gravitytocontaining conflict in Southern
Europe. Regional war would threaten the overall stability of Europe and could trigger a
conflict between Greece and Turkey, thereby further straining NATO in an increasingly
volatile area. The US commitment to stability in Macedonia is well-established. This
Administration has reaffirmed the Bush Admihistration's announcement in December 1992
that the US would employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper in
the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. While the threat of Serbian caused
violence is low, the consequence of a large refugee flow into Macedonia is grave for the
entire region.
The Threat: m v F<KUs 6 n ^
L£ ~
<
The sizable ethnic 'Mb^'ajl^nty in Maceddnia rtfai&sJtUkely'that should Macedonia
be destabilized, the Albanians will movetomerge those ethnically Albanian
dominated areas within Macedonia with Albania. An upheaval in Kosovo, which is
90% ethnic Albanian, would result in massive refugeeflowsthat would present Macedonia with
insupportable economic, political, and security problems. This is the greatest threat to the region
in general for it is thb most likely conditiontodestabilize Macedonia and lead to
a land grab of at least parts of Macedonia with the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece
and Turkey onopposite sides, Russia, Serbia, itnd Bulgaria.
;
" *rrW ^
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(TH) 03.02.
'95 10:23
NO. 1460109318 PAGE
DRAFT
SECRET"
The greatest threat to Macedonian stability is its iriternal condition undermined by
external factors. The combined effects of enforcing the tfr<f-mandated economic sanctions on
Macedonia's major trading partner, Serbia, and the closure of the border with Greece,
have led to deteriorating and grave economic difficulties--30% unemployment, per capita
income at 1964 levels, and industrial output operating at 40% efficiency. These problems
only exacerbate ethnic tensions. At the same time, Macedonian nationalists have become
more militant. It is conceivable that the fragile democracy that Gligorov has built cannot
survive these pressures.
In sum, Macedonia is the most politically, economically, and militarily vulnerable of
the states in the region, and its political and military collapse would trigger a preventable
wider Balkan war.
:
Options.
:
• - ' , . ^ - ^ ^ ^ ' ^ r >
•-
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Four optidnij^Ms^abyt'^M^tt^ mtentetioh^jmiitaiy presence in Macedonia.
These include:
1. A NATO deployment; ,
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2. A U.S. led, multinai^hi^
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• 3. A U.S. unUatertf^lo^
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4. 'Retain UNPROFOfo^:^ " 4 ' • . . . - : . v \ \
The d i s a d v a n t ^ ^ ^ | ^ i ^ r S t ; i n ^ ^ ^ ^ U . ^ ; action would likely
aggravate regional tensions"?' Such actioh would risk.NATO,'pFP, and bur emerging
partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant
to support any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from
our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so
involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.
A U.S.-led multinational (but not NATO) suffersfrommany of the disadvantages of a
unilateral U.S. action, and does not enjoy the existing infrastructure advantages of a NATOrun operation.
A NATO-run containment strategy has/intrinsic merit Containment of the
conflict is a European problemfirstand foremost, and NATO has the existing political and
military infrastructure to support siich activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would
not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized UNNATO command relationships in Bosnia to date. Even so, such an enhanced NATOcontrolled operation alsorisksheightening regional tensions. Without the economic
assistance and political stabilization package, such a strategy would not address internallybased stability concems.
The status quo option is based on the premiss that the current UNPROFOR mission
and force structure noi only is adequate to respondtothe current threat environment, but also
that any increase in the in the size of the forces would be counterproductive in the long-termthat it would be destabilizing by provoking internal unrest
yWkSmiim?-:.: •
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�DRAFT
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ProposedC^ncept^ , ; ; ^ ; :
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,
Given the withdraw^/of DNP^^^^
and the potential
for conflict among Serbia, Croatia, and the warring parties iii Bosnia, the deployment of a
more capable NATOforceto Macedonia and associated sites in the southern Balkans is
designed to deter a wider Balkan war. It should be equipped and have the ROE to carry out
its assigned mission. This deployment is expected to be of indefinite duration. It should be
under NATO command and control (C2), operating under a UN mandate. It is intended to
send a strong international and internal signal regarding its commitment to preserve internal
and regional stability in Southern Europe, thereby containing the present conflict to the
former Yugoslavia.
/ v
Mandate •, •
.
-
.
] . . ^K^t.^.,,,;,,
The principal^ focus of this strategy is not the. areas of cd'nfiict; themselves but rather the
areas of potential conflict in the countries surrounding Bosnia. Authority for the operations
will emanatefroma UN mandate, but under NATO C2.
General Mission
An appropriately sized NATO ground force, with significant U.S. participation and
with appropriate air and naval Support In the region, will deploy to Macedonia. This force
will deter threats to Macedonia and preserve the inviolability of Macedonia's internationally
recognized borders, thereby enhancing internal and regional stability and prevent the spread
of war throughout the Balkans.
• Consider increasing NATO nay^p^sence in the Adriatic) • .
• Consider increasing NATO air%"rces''deployed to.the region; consider basing in Albania.
:
Assumptions
.
_
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, _; V ^ • /.. ^ _
•
•
NATO will cdhcentrate qn'c.bntainMeiit ofithe (£niiict vice active ground involvement in
the former Yugoslavia.
• Macedonia will accept*the NATO deployment and periftif the full use of its military
infrastructure.
• UN sanctions agaihk Serbia will not be part of the NATO mission.
• Russia, Turicey, and Greece cannot prevent this deployment
• UNPROFOR has withdrawnfromBosnia and Croatia.
• Deployment will be under permissive conditions-logistics hubs, overflight and transit
rights, and $OFAs will be available.
• Funding arrangements will be acceptable t8 the U.S.
; :
PHOTOCOPY'
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�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal
As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S.
would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation
to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.
Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an
essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would
risk grave damage to NATO.
We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our
decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.
The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or
Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops
would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR
withdrawal.
I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR
from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia this spring.
Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.
Since it would take 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to
implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces in place to
commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend
that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to
ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military
operation.
Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle
to preposition approximately 450 U.S. DOD personnel to the area over 300 in
Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with
NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.
In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; there has
been no final determination on the numbers of troops that would be provided from
among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, nor
when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.
Prior to implementation of the complete plan, we will consult with you again.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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IF ASKED
• Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about
$11 million ).
• As for Croatia, we believe that UNPROFOR has a critical role to play in that nation as
well. We are currently urging President Tudjman to reverse his decision not to extend
UNPROFOR's mandate beyond March 31.
• Due to ongoing negotiations with Croatian President Tudjman on a future role for
UNPROFOR, President Clinton has not yet made a formal determination on whether
the U.S. would agree to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR
forces presently deployed in Croatia. At this point, therefore, NATO prepositioning
in Croatia would be done to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.
�UKAKT
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—SECRET"
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA
BackCTOund; Senator Dole, Rep. Oilman, and others wrote the President on February 17,
1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the
use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way
to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce
their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.
Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote
President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which
training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that
such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against
aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of
stability as peace is secured...."
An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a
"narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the
negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the
protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate
domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.
Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces
in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.
Options:
1. Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance
Act agreemenr-The U.S. has $7(),(XX) available for IMET should such an agreement be
signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require Finessing the
issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H
earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms
embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at
our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training
would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training
would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on
the battlefield.
2. Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or
receiving English language training. Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training
courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care.
Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the
battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
DRAFT
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�-SECRET3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be
used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training
could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development
and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but
would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could
be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It
would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral
responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This
would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country,
most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand
the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it
directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces
from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a cobelligerent in the conflict.
Discussion; The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic.
However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those
outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.
• Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training
effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become
a co-belligerent.
• Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of
enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger
of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
• UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance
programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
• Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the
pro-government forces for a return to war.
• The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H.
Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall
quickly.
• Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
• The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling-training ax contemplated
by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of evenhandedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
• The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist
outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.
Recommendation: Approve Option I -narrow 505 agreement-as the basis of the President's
response to Senator Dole.
DRAFT
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-(4
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA
Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Oilman, and others wrote the President on February 17,
1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the
use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way
to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce
their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.
Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote
President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which
training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that
such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against
aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of
stability as peace is secured..."
An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a
"narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the
negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the
protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate
domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.
Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces
in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.
Options:
(hJUmit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance
*r A t agreement-Tht U.S. has $70,(XX) available for IMET should such an agreement be
signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would requirefinessingthe
issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H
earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms
embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at
our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training
would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training
would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on
»^ the battlefield.
rl^jExpand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or
receiving English language training. Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training
courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care.
Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the
battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
c
N
DRAFT
SECRET
Classified by OASD
- y
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
OtoSa-H
8 / 3 / » 5 KSVl
�3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be
used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training
could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development
and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but
would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could
be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It
would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral
responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This
would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country,
most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand
the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it
directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces
from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a cobelligerent in the conflict.
Discussion; The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic.
However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those
outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.
• Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training
effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become
a co-belligerent.
• Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of
enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger
of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
• UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance
programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
• Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the
pro-government forces for a return to war.
• The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H.
Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall
quickly.
• Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
• The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling-training as contemplated
by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of evenhandedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
• The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist
outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.
Recommendation: Approve Option 1-narrow 505 agreement-as the basis of the President's
response to Senator Dole.
DRAFT
-SE€RETClassified by OASD
�Intelligence Report
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6
13 April 1995
3.5c
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the
Bosnian Serbs in hopes of isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and of
getting sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) lifted. Milosevic apparently is
allowing limited resupply to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) so the BSA is not prevented
from holding its own against the Bosnian Army.
3.5c
Activity since mid-January at internationally monitored border crossings suggests that
the embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia~Bosnia border
to belowpre-August levels, when the embargo was imposed. Since mid-February
enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December, which
suggests that the Bosnian Serbs arc increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that
the VJ is supplying the BSA. In addition to those crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border,
other goods are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia, a large potential loophole
that probably is the largest conduit for fuel to the Bosnian Serbs. I
35
C
Because the embargo has reduced the amount of goods crossing the Serbia-Bosnia
border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy, particularly its financial
and industrial sectors. There are no indications that the embargo has had a serious
impact on the BSA's capabilities, even with some spot shortages reported. The BSA
seems largely self-sufficient in logistics capability, except for fuel and some munitions.
i~4^
(the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions
is stilt in operation, and Pale probably has used the current cease-fire to resupply its
forces. 3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
3/3/15
K6VI
�Milosevic Keeping Pressure on Karadzic With Sanctions
Serbian President Slobodan Milose\>ic continues to support sanctions against the
Bosnian Serbs. He probably has determined that he has few other means for
pressuring and isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic also
hopes that the West will respond by dropping sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro
(FRY). Another former source of political pressure, the dissident group of Bosnian Serb
assembly members who are aliened with Milnsevic. apparently has lost its impetus to
pressure Karadzic]
1 4c
\So far, Milosevic has not forced
Karadzic to accept a peace plan Belgrade likes, nor has he significantly weakened him
with sanctions. Nevertheless. Karadzic mav now be feelina some pressure after eight
months of sanctions.
Milosevic's
pressure will continue to grow, as wilYmtemal pressure from the constant shortage of
essentials.
3.5c
Milosevic probably does not intendfor the embargo to prevent the Bosnian Serb Army
(BSA) from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. Moreover, his allowing some \
assistance to the BSA appeases the leadership of the Yugoslav Army, which generally
opposes Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs. As a consequence, he is apparently
allowing limited resupply to the BSA so long as it serves Serbian political aims and the
activity can be plausibly denied
1.4c, 3.5c
This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide infonnation on Serbia's
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and Queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI
Interagency Balkan Task Force
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�3.5c
1.4c, 3.5c
Shipments Across FRY-Bosnia Border Remain Restricted
1.4c
[suggests that Belgrade's embargo and winter weather have held
shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to levels below those observed before the
embargo was imposed in August. The presence of the monitors from the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) at most of the border crossings capable
ofhandlittR large quantities ofgoods has inhibited major violations of the embargo. In
particular
only one large-scale fuel shipment attempted since 30
December, suggesting that B egrade has largely shut off such shipments across the
~
Bosnian border.
3.5c
In response to ICFY requests since January, FRY officials implemented measures that
have helped restrict shipments. As it did in late December 1994, Belgrade recently
addressed major problems with an eye to>vard the United Nations review on lifting
sanctions on the FRY scheduled for April.
Customs officers increased the number and thoroughness of bus inspectk
the major border crossings, but implementation has been inconsistent,
1.4c
|As a result of their auto and bus inspections, Yugoslav officials at the bordeT
have regularly confiscated or turned back unauthorized shipments of fuel, construction
materials, agricultural supplies, clothing, and livestock,
During February, for example officials confiscated 26 tons of fuel and 19 tons of
suggests that similar amounts of fiiel were turned back
fertilizer, but
from the border but not confiscated. In March, a patrol reportedly confiscated about
80 tons of fuel from four trucks using hidden tanks.
Yugoslav officials have taken steps to reduce the.use of some minor crossings and
1.4c
bypasses discovered by ICFY monitors.
On 13 March, ICFY protested to FRY officials about buses loaded with soldiers
Belgrade promised to take immediate
1.4c
transiting the border.
action, and there have been no subsequent confirmed transits of troops.
^stopped 24-hour monitoring at the Jamena
1.4c
ICFY
ferry crossing after the FRY had erected barricades in response to ICFVs request.
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Too Secret
Serbia also has cooperated with ICFY at Priboj and Uzice in inspecting and sealing
Yugoslav trains that transit Bosnia, includingfreightcars on passenger trains.
In March, Serbian postal officials were checking packages for prohibited goods,
1.4c
On 27 March, Customs Director Kertes agreed to improve controls on loading
Yugoslav Red Cross (YKC) trucks to ensure that only approved goods were included
1.4c
in the shipments.
unidentified FRY
officials were pressuring them to allow YRC vehicles to be used to move unauthorized
goods into Bosnia.
3.5c
Belgrade also has imposed more penalties on smugglers. Yugoslav customs initiated
action in 215 cases of sanctions violations in February and imposed fines of 127,000
dinars.
1.4c
this was a marked improvement over the August 1994 to
January 1995 period when 138 cases were initiated and 341,450 dinars infineswere
meted out. 3.5
C
Widespread Problems »t the Border Indicate Enforcement Deteriorating
Although Belgrade has addressed some ICFY concerns and no large shipments have
been observed, the nature andfrequency of enforcement shortcomings since midFebruary indicate enforcement overall has deterioratedfrom the levels noted in late
December. The deteriorating enforcement suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are
increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA across
the Bosnia border.
1.4c
we cannot determine if the enforcement
deficiencies have allowed enough shipments to compensate for quantities lost from the
cutoff in August 1994 of large trucks.
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Belgrade is shipping large
Moreover
1.4c
quantities of fiiel and other goods to the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia via the BelgradeZagreb highway. Large-scale use of this route could have permitted Belgrade to shift
cargo trucks away from the inter-Serb border, accounting for the apparent cessation of
transits at those crossings. In addition, the information on the detected cross-border
helicopterflightsis insufficient to confirm that any have been used to resupply the
BSA
3.5c
Deteriorating Enforcement Against "Ant Trade'
ICFY has had few indications of transits by large cargo trucks or tankers across the
border, but theflowof truck, bus, automobile, farm tractor, and pedestrian traffic, which ^
composes the "ant trade," appears to have been relatively steady through March at ICFY- .
manned crossings. Monitors have noted significant enforcement deficiencies by FRY
officials against this traffic since mid-February. In particular, ICFY patrols in March
detected an increasing number unauthorized truck transits.
3.5c
Yugoslav officials have not responded to monitors' requests to improve enforcement
procedures, ha^e^QtJtaUed^eiieatedjiiolations^ndJtav.eattenwXedJ^ircumveiit
ICFY controls.
1.4c, 3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Top Secret
3.5c
1.4c
|suggests' (hat goods are crossing the
1.4c, 3.5c
funding <;onstraiiitS5fiaYej'forcerf
l^oiSipiHBTW; -Wfifch-in turn has reduceidnhe number of'crossingj-inomtored^ll
||fici||^!^^<)^patroIs. |
]d'
tQucBjng^n<n\omt6r security, which could lead'the monitors to be mor&cwtioumn
ji^trollin^fw^
4
Top SecreC
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1.4c
nadcquate coverage by FRY patrols,
inadequate personnel andfacilities to support inspections, and insufficient euidance
on enforcement regulations also have hampered enforcement
1.4c, 3.5c
Pressure on FRY officials from Serbs living and trading alone the border also mav
contribute to lax enforcement. \
1.4c
confrontation on 14 March between police andHosnian Serb civilians at Krstac escalated
into an exchange of gunfire and grenades. At the Nudo Valley checkpoint
[on 10 March that a customs officer was reluctant to inspect most of the vehicles
because he claimed that the local people knew him.
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Una u t h prized' Hfcl icon ter A cfi vi tvCon t i n ti i n g
fM"a'rv.^hefe1iaVfe-Vfeensfevera^^
1.4c
50
ts detected originate in Bosnia and
.^.uw,^erbia^ecausethe'flights enteringBosnia probably fit the profile of eland festirife
htslfldwrsih'gly-ahdpnffl^^
3.5c
r
r
t
?
i
-life^^s^Suspect^rosis-border violatiOifoccuited^bn 3February wherl i 4c
fQund the eastern enclave of Srebrenica reponed 15 helicoptersiflying
i.ately <TQ-lalort'efers north of the ehclave travelmgin^ westerly direction^
^^^j^ite^igbt4ire<«ionftnd.proximi>4o.tKeborder,reported that
' • f c ^ ^ ^ W ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^ in'O; Bosnia. At'the same-limes UNobservefs
l^i^iiMiM^^ocetn^aAir facility^ which is used to monitor the border for illegal tfoss^M0^^^^f ^ ^^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ In fesponse<tO'UN inqufti^
^^9l^^$ned«tet*do*dieopters>ci^ssed^h^order. The^nited-Nations'
S^(ll^vtetfgatiOafdr-tac^feifl<fcnce. The UN QbseryersJiavei^o. '<
ibtedfaWtite^le^^
fhe
:
1
,
0
; i
z c i
t
i
Military-Related Activity Increasing Along the Border
Since late January, reports of military vehicles, aircraft, and troops crossing the border
have increased. The reports reinforce
1.4c
rAflf
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Belgrade Using Croatian "Back Door" to Get Around Embargo
In addition to goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border because of deteriorating
enforcement, fuel and other products from the FRY are reaching the Bosnian Serbs
through Croatia. Insufficient information is available to determine how long this
„
route has been used to evade the blockade, the volume of the shipments, and
*
Belgrade's involvement, but the traffic appears to be increasing. This represents a
large potential loophole in the embargo and probably already is the largest conduit for
fuel shipments to the Bosnian Serbs.
1.4c
in early March that tanker trucks were supplying fuel to Serb-controlled
areas of Bosnia via the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway. |
Jtheflowof goodsfromSerbia to Bosnia through
Croatia has steadily increased since the highway was reopened in December 1994.
lumber, consumer goods, and food destined for Bosnia also have
crossed into Croatia at Lipovac, with 50-60 trucks believed transiting the border in each
direction during each eight-hour period when monitors are present. From 7 February to
1,109 trucks may have transited west while
23 March,
Russian battalion soldiers and
monitors were afLipovac.
Croatian police do not stop vehicles from entering Croatia when they are not present.
the shipments travel the
highway west to Okucani and turn south to deliver to Banja Luka and elsewhere in
Bosnia.
3.5c
More Impact on Civilian Than Military Sector
Because the embargo apparently has reduced goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia
border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy. There is insufficient data
available to distinguish the extent of the embargo's impact from that caused by the fighting
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Ton firrrcL
3.5c
and the spilloverfromUN sanctions against the FRY. The limited data suggests,
however, that the greatest damage from all the external factors, including Belgrade's
embargo, has been to Pale's financial and industrial sectors.
Bosnian Serb banks have been cut off from the Serbian financial system, with no
electronic funds transfers operating. Trade transactions take place on a cash basis,
either in German marks or with the few Serbian dinars Pale acquired while part of the
Serbian monetary union in 1994. Due to its lack of hard currency, Pale has tried with
little success to provide liquidity by using various types offiatmoney, including
commodity coupons and checks, but the German mark remains the principal medium
of exchange.
•
The non-military industrial sector reportedly is operating at 10 to 15 percent of
1.4c
capacity, with the timber industry the only significant export sector,
for example, reported that 457
trucks containing Bosnian lumber were detected bound for Serbia during a 45-day
period, anq
llumber trucks have crossed the Serbia-Bosnia
border]
The blockade also appears to have caused additional shortages of fuel, electricity, and
all
basic foodstuffs, such as meat and cooking oil.
1.4c
goods are rationed in Bosnian Serb areas, with fuel two tofivetimes more expensive than
in Serbia. As a consequence, farming has shifted from mechanized to labor intensive
methods, possibly employing locally conscripted labor. Even the BSA faces constant spot
shortages pf food, clothing, and fuel, which could result from interna] distribution delays.
3.5c
Despite the spot shortages for the BSA, there are no indications the embargo has had a
serious impact on its capabilities. Reporting on recent fighting indicates Bosnian Serb
forces have been abls to counter Bosnian Government attacks in the Majevica Mountains
and Travnik area. Similarly, Bosnian Serb forces conducted a successful counteroffensive
last November to regain territory in northwest Bosnia, south of Bihac.l 3.5c
The BSA remains largely self-sufficient in logistic capability, except for fuel and
certain munitions. Available reporting indicates the Bosnian Serb network to acquire
critical munitions inside Serbia is still in operation:
1.4c
A press report on 24
March identified four of these supply links and revealed two additional FRYfirms,the
10
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�Sloboda and Milan Blagovevic Factories, that are associated with Bosnian Serb
ammunition suppliers.
1.4c
the BSA had no
problems receiving military supplies from factories inside Serbia, suggesting Pale is
confident it can continue receiving suppliesfromSerbia.
In addition, Bosnian Serb officials continue to attempt to acquire military supplies and
other goods through Cyp
is probably have used the current cease-fire
to resupply their forces.
3.5c
Top Secret
3.5c
Clinton Library Photocopy
�1
•B R y
g C B.
17 MaY 1 9 9 5
DRAFT
FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE
OPTIONS REVIEW
BACKGROUND
'
r
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
to\3-ou83L-fn"
8/3/15- K6V1
UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals
regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the
deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:
(1) Maintenance of the status quo;
7
(2) A more aggressive militazy posture, including sustained use of air power, with
the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;
(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia
(4) Redeployment, and reductpon in the number of troops, with necessary
modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.
Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed
(option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the
perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.
OPTIONS
(1) Maintenance of Status Quo. Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction
shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But
changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being
involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an
UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would
be the worst case for the US.
The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is
an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive
for the warring parties to reach a settlement.
We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN
mandates would only increase the possibihty of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to
work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.
Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few
months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map,freedomof
movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication
with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more
involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more
liberal ROE, and air attacks.
The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and
make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin
•flBCRgg-
' rvn/vCTl
D AD
Rf
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON OADR
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�OC EE RT
Qp^py
reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in hefping to stop the fighting and to promote
conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to
propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal.
There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.
US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must
remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering
withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between
UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must
support UNPROFOR.
(2) More Aggressive Military Posture. Sustained use of air power against the
Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a
belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor
would accept. Not a prudent option.
(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia. The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end
state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.
(4) Redeployment and Troop Reduction. This is the UNSYG's real recommendation.
The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a
disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of
the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.
The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown,
especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in
Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one
swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception
problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel
redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral
assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.
The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status
quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in
The Netherlands willaddress several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation
under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.
CONCLUSION
The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the
status quo while regaining the intitiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the
conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that
could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a postwithdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.
Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption. doc
DAO
RR
s
€
- * *
B i p
-
2
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�UKAb'i' - OCCJRE¥ -
DRAFT
UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIANALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (gf
ISSliE
Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO
remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led
withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?
OPTIONS (Sf:
• "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
• "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop
contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
• "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces
without coordination with allies or UN
• "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
• "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
• "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to
rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation
KEY FACTORS
• Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
• Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
• Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
• Humanitarian concerns
•
NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance
DISCUSSION
•
Risk of Casualties: Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily
dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the
forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas
(enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties
will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of
protecting the withdrawing forces.
• UN Limitations: UN military command structure, rules of engagement,
mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to
withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
• Lighter Options: Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, oncall options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have
rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force
to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
• Longer View: While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the
alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of
NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we
decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or
NATO, we lose.
CONCLUSION (jfi: If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.
DRAFT - SECRET - DRAFT
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/3/15" K8V1
�NATIONAL
MILITARY
(JUMMAPJU
otiHinK
L.
-SSGRE-lVKOrORN-
31 Jul 95
Lift of Bosnian Arms Embargo
The objective of lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government forces would
be to enable them to defend their core areas and regain some territory lost in
the conflict. Initially, Improved small arms, anti-tank , counter-battery and
additional heavy weapons, and trucks are high priority items for the Bosnians.
We believe the Bosnian Government will have resources available to bring in
substantial weaponry over a six month period without our active involvement.
We estimate any substantial change in capabilities will require at least six
months due to Bosnian organizational problems and Inadequacies in Bosnian
logistics and the requirements to distribute weapons and support throughout
the Bosnian army.
Implications of this lift poUcy include:
— Defensive capability would progressively strengthen, but offensive
capability will fall short of that required to offset Serbian advantages in heavy
weapons, intelligence, airpower. electronic warfare, and command aiid control.
~ Croatians would exact a heavy price on the Bosnians for permitting the
armament and would inevitably prevent, absent active US support, heavy
weaponry from augmenting the Bosnian force.
— During the six month build up, BSA would receive rapid reinforcement from
Serbia which would largely offset improvements shown by the Bosnians.
— The net effect: would be a higher level of intensity of fighting with a virtually
unchanged military balance.
-- US Allies would keep pressure to bear to restrain our activities in DENY
FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, and to provide any overt assistance.
— Russia would provide overt assistance to Serbia, some of which will flow
into Bosnia.
— The radical Muslim presence would be considerably strengthened inside
Bosnia.
Overall, lifting the arms embargo is more likely to precipitate a Bosnian defeat
than a successful effort to restore legitimate territorial boundaries.
-SSG^T-NorORK CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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Air Support to Bosnia
This paper assumes that air support will be provided following a UNPF
withdrawal to assist Bosnian defense of their core areas without the benefit of
Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on the ground.
The air power required to implement this policy is available in theater now and
is sustainable provided effective Suppression of Enemy Defenses (SEAD) is
conducted and sustained throughout the air operation.
If so directed, air forces can attack to degrade Serb command and control and
artillery and impede movement of Serb units, reinforcements, and supplies.
However, without ground FACs, air power is likely unable to decisively affect
close engagements, offensive or defensive, fought by Bosnian Army.
Wide spread use of airpower for a prolonged period of time will likely Invite
Serbian and possibly Russian assistance, overt or covert, to strengthen
protection against air activity. This assistance could include provision of more
capable Surface-to-Air Missile systems, sophisticated electronic equipment to
offset US jamming/electronic warfare systems, and increased efforts at
camouflage/concealment. Of course this would be accompanied by diplomatic,
moral, and public pressure against our use of air power to Include exploiting
collateral damage.
While this use of air power may raise the costs to the Serbs it is unlikely to be
decisive in defeating their force absent strong military action by the Bosnian
Government.
It would unmistakably mark the US as a combatant in the operation, and if
done unilaterally, would impose additional severe strains on NATO. It would
also require us to forego basing in Italy, and require us to develop bases
elsewhere in the Balkans or use only Carrier-based assets.
Overall use of air power is a stop gap, temporary measure which could raise
Bosnian morale and set back Serb planning and logistics. However, the use of
air power is unlikely to decisively effect the outcome on the ground and would
most likely provoke a more determined aggression by Serbia.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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DRAFT -- DRAFT - DRAFT
Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia
Military Stabilization Measures (U)
Background (gf: International efforts to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia are
more likely to result in an enduring peace if (1) the Bosnian Muslim - Bosnian Croat
Federation (the "Federation") has a military capability to defend itself against the Bosnian
Serbs, (2) no party to the conflict significantly increases its offensive capabilities, and (3)
measures are developed to reassure the parties as to each others' military actions and
intentions. An approach is needed to balance militarily capabilities, limit the incentives
and ability of all the parties to obtain offensive weapons, and institute confidencebuilding measures (CBMs). The USG will lead an international effort to provide military
assistance to the elements of the Federation so they can develop a more viable defense
vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs while also supporting basic measures designed to avoid an
arms race and reduce tensions. The effort will also be designed to strengthen the internal
cohesion of the Federation and avoid features which could detract from cooperation
within the Federation.
Arms Embargo (8?: A premise of this paper is that the arms embargo and economic
sanctions currently in place for the former Yugoslavia will be lifted by UN Security
Council action in connection with the peace agreement. This will enable efforts to
improve the Federation's self-defense capabilities, but also opens the door for additional
arms flows to the Bosnian Serbs and could permit an unconstrained arms race in the
region.
Military Balance ($: While the military balance in Bosnia and the Federation's
specific needs will require a detailed assessment, including an in-country evaluation of
Federation capabilities, enough information is now available to estimate the general needs
and scale of effort required to enable a viable Federation defense:
• The Bosnian Serbs have an equipment advantage (-4:1 in tanks, -10:1 in APCs, -2:1
in artillery), whereas the Federation has a manpower advantage (2:1). Current
equipment levels are at Tab A.
• Qualitatively, the Federation has an effective light infantry force able to defend
against most Bosnian Serb attacks, but its military effectiveness is limited by
equipment shortages, poor tactical and operational leadership skills, and by a lack of
operational coordination between Muslims and Croats.
• The Bosnian Serbs have shown better organizational skills, but are constrained by
manpower shortages and low morale.
Both sides have good skills in conducting defensive operationsfromprepared
positions. The resulting stalemates in many parts of the country and, more recently,
dynamic results on the battlefield attest to a modest imbalance in aggregate military
Classified hy Milciple Scuroes
Declassify on C*m
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capability between Federation and Bosnian Serb forces, with the Bosnian Serbs
holding a particular advantage in mechanized capabilities. Recent Federation
successes against the Bosnian Serb Army do not change this fundamental judgment,
because they have been so dependent on Croatian efforts and support.
Security Assistance Program
Efforts to enhance Federation self defense
capabilities will be limited to the minimum necessary to create a balance without
stimulating an arms race. The approach will be to improve the elements of the
Federation's defensive capabilities by enhancing one brigade within each corps
(equivalent) of the Federation -- a total of ten (3-4 Bosnian Croat and 6-7 Bosnian
Muslim) brigades. These ten enhanced brigades will provide each corps (equivalent) a
mobile reserve. By dispersing the enhancements across the ten corps (equivalents) and
limiting training to the lowest (unit) level, increases in Federation offensive capability
will be minimized. All support will be provided directly to the elements of the Federation
(Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim) rather than to the Federation itself and will be provided
in proportion to their parts of the Federation forces. Further, the effort will lay the
groundwork for continuing mil-to-mil contacts with US and other moderate nations,
contributing to stability. The estimates below will be revised if necessary, once a
comprehensive in-country assessment is conducted.
• Training. Training will be focused on defensive tactics, techniques and
procedures to attain proficiency at the platoon level. Additionally, leader
training in defensive planning and execution will be provided at company,
battalion and brigade levels. The effort will require about 1,500 trainers and
about seven months to accomplish. The in-country trainers will be principally
USG contractor personnel and military personnel from nations not involved in
IFOR operations.
• Equipment. Each of the ten mobile brigades will receive 10 APCs, 20 tanks,
18 howitzers, 15 mortars, a mix of air defense missiles and guns, antitank
weapons, and small arms. For ease of integration, principally former WP
equipment will be provided. The total major equipment to be provided to the
Federation will be:
Equipment
Tvpe(s)
Quantity
Tanks
T-72
200
APCs
BTR-60
100
Howitzers
122mm
180
Mortars
82/120 mm
270(150/120)
MANPAD missiles SA-7/16
50
Light AD guns
ZSU-23
60
Antitank Weapons T-12 100mm 60
Rocket Launcher
128mm
60
Recoilless Rifle
82mm
60
Small Arms
AK-47
10,000
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Cost. Preliminary estimates indicate a likely cost of $385M: $353Mfor
equipment, $12M for training, $14M for operations, and $6M for
transportation.
Arms Control Measures $)\ The goal of arms control is to prevent an arms race in the
wake of the removal of the arms embargo. Simple caps on the inventory of major
weapons with offensive potential, limiting the Federadon and the Bosnian Serbs each to
the inventory level of the higher of the two parties in each category of weapons at the
time of settlement, are likely to be all that we can achieve in the context of the peace
agreement. More complex arrangements can then be pursued as the peace matures.
Confidence Building Measures j#5: The peace agreement will contain provisions to
enable both political and military dialogue between the parties to permit the resolution of
differences before they escalate, including the establishment of a Joint Military
Commission. Further, the agreement could contain provisions for the exchange of
advance information concerning military exercises and force movements. Specific
information to be exchanged could be agreed between the military leaders of the parties
after the peace agreement has been signed.
Action
The USG will undertake the following actions to achieve stabilization of the
peace agreement (lead agency as indicated):
• Subject to the negotiators' sense of acceptability to the parties, strive to include
in the agreement the following stabilization features (State):
--Caps on the numbers of selected categories of major weapon systems (e.g.,
Ground Attack aircraft, tanks, surface-surface missiles, artillery)
-Parties agree not to accept security assistance from radical/pariah parties.
-Establishment of a joint military commission to resolve disputes.
--Parties to exchange information concerning major military movements and
exercises.
• Obtain unconditional multilateral removal of the arms embargo and lifting of
economic sanctions agains the Former Yugoslavia. (State)
• Seek agreement and support from key allies for the US approach. (State)
• Organize a coalition of willing nations to provide security assistance
(equipment and training) to the Federation. Contributions of funding,
equipment, and trainers will be needed. (State)
• Obtain Croatian agreement to permit unobstructed passage and not to interfere
with the US-led effort. (State)
• Upon cessation of hostilities, conduct an in-country assessment to confirm the
Federation's security needs. (JCS)
• Using intermediaries if necessary, seek at least tacit agreement from Serbia and
Croatia to limit their support to their clients in Bosnia to items which will not
adversely affect the balance or undermine the US effort. (State)
iECRET.
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Seek Congressional support and funding for the effort. (State)
Conduct the security assistance program commencing on signature of the peace
agreement and completing within twelve months thereafter. (JCS/DSAA)
Prepared by CAPT W. L. Boyd, USN, OASD (S&R), 614-2759
Rev 4,05 Oct 95
• 3ECRET
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INFORMATION PAPER
1. Purpose. To identify unresolved issues concerning the overall peace
implementation effort in Bosnia, to determine the USG position and to
delineate the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions and provisions of the draft
framework agreement for peace (referred to below as the "framework
agreement"). This will assist decision makers in identifying inconsistencies
between USG positions, NATO positions, and tentative provisions of the
framework agreement for peace. Areas in which further NAC guidance initiated
by the US would be required, or changes to the framework agreement are
required, are identified below in the recommendation sections.
1
2. Key Points. There were nine main areas of concem discussed during the 20
October 1995 NSC Deputies Committee (DC) meeting (JCS paper dated 20
October attached). They are: mission, non-compliance, election security,
deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public
outreach. Issues in which there was consensus at the 20 October DC are listed
below as Resolved Issues. Those issues which remain unresolved, or those
additional issues that were identified (additional issues are underlined), are
listed under the remaining areas of concem.
Resolved Issues
1. What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep?
•
USG position is consistent with the NAC decision on 29 September that
IFOR would conduct an operation to implement the military aspects of the
agreement to ensure compliance, to create safe conditions for the
withdrawal of UN forces, and to create secure conditions (within the limits of
key military tasks) for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with
the peace agreement. To avoid mission creep, the USG must establish tasks
and responsible parties for non-military tasks; ensure coordination
mechanisms exist between civil and military aspects, and over-watch to
prevent migration of tasks. Additionally, language in the framework
agreement should clearly state IFOR's mission is to implement the military
aspects of the peace agreement. Further, it is clear, a fully developed
strategy to implement the civil aspects of the peace agreement is essential to
ensure success for the entire peace implementation effort, to achieve the
desired end state, and to allow IFOR to be withdrawn within 12 months
from its initial deployment. On an urgent basis, the USG must define nonmilitary tasks and assign USG responsibilities with timelines for execution.
The implementation of the peace agreement would have many aspects
including political, military, civil police, elections, humanitarian assistance,
1
Unless otherwise noted, IFOR missions, tasks, assumptions or situations are
based on the DoD paper "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement - Revision 30"
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human rights, monitoring, and nation building. The USG should assure
international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and the World Bank
promptly begin work on the non-military tasks that will complement the
work of the IFOR.
2. What is our strategy for coordinating the refinement of the NATO plan
and the negotiated settlement?
•
To ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning,
and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be
finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. State will develop a draft
framework agreement based on the 23 October drafting sessions. This draft
should be cleared within the interagency on 24 October, and once the
details of the military aspects of the peace agreement are finalized they
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning, to include
identification of potential changes in required force structure.
3. What constitutes a violation of the peace agreement? What is the
response of IFOR to violations?
•
The NAC decided on 29 September that the Implementation Force (IFOR)
will ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement, in
particular, withdrawal offerees to their respective territories and the
establishment of agreed zones of separation. The USG position, and the
framework agreement are consistent with the NAC decision. ROE and the
good judgment of the IFOR Commander will be the basis of when and what
force will be used.
5. How could SICOR interact with IFOR if there was a violation?
•
NAC decisions and the framework agreement are clear; the SICOR has no
authority over the IFOR. The IFOR Commander has the responsibility for
military aspects of the implementation agreement, and within that
authority, will coordinate his actions with the SICOR. Routinely, civilmilitaiy interaction will be coordinated in a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC). The DC on 20 October also agreed that the IFOR Commander will
deal directly with the head of state of each entity and not just with the
Chiefs of Defense.
6. What is the relation of the IFOR to the civilian police?
•
The NAC decisions, USG position, and framework agreement are consistent.
The NAC on 11 October approved SACEUR's concept of operations dated 6
October 1995 in which the establishment of civil-military structures would
•BeeRBg-NOPORN-
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occur during Phase I of the operation. SACEUR's briefing to the President
on 18 October identifies a coordination relationship between IFOR and the
civilian police representative (through a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC) established to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of the
implementation of the peace agreement).
7. Will IFOR be used to deter attacks on UN civilian agencies and their
workers, or civilians? What will IFOR do about atrocities and human
rights violations? Who will decide?
•
On 20 October the DC determined IFOR will not be responsible for
investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or
atrocities and human rights violations (additional issues identified are
addressed below).
8. What violations do the police handle and what violations does EFOR
handle?
•
On 20 October, the DC agreed IFOR will not provide for civil order. IFOR's
responsibility concerning attacks on international civilians and the
indigenous population is discussed below.
• On 20 October, the DC determined that the USG should develop a plan
(State lead) for a civilian police component and a lead organization should
be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to
organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to
assist local governments and populations in developing local police forces.
This should include, at a minimum, authority to assess the present police
force, vet the personnel presently assigned, train police, monitor police
functions, supplement the police force as necessary, and establish a border
patrol.
10. Do we have a "threshold" for use of force against the Federation?
Who will decide when the force will be used? How do we define evenhandedness? How does the IFOR mission relate to efforts by countries to
provide military assistance to the Bosnian Government?
•
On 20 October the DC determined this issue relates to sporadic violations of
the peace agreement. Since in peace operations, the impartiality (evenhandedness) of peace forces and the international organizations is critical to
the legitimacy and success of the operation, evenhandedness must be
demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances.
Additionally, to sustain IFOR's impartiality, the concurrent "equip and train"
program must be completely separate from IFOR. To maintain the
legitimacy of the operation, the DC determined that IFOR will enforce
implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly and assume the IFOR
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will be withdrawn in the event of a total breakdown in strategic consent (the
issue of total breakdown is discussed below).
12. What, if anything, will we do about election security?
•
At the 6 October Deputies Committee meeting there was general agreement
with the conclusion in the JCS paper "Election Security - Implications to
the Implementation Force (IFOR)" which was: the IFOR would create secure
conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces
to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and
enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement. As a
part of the peace agreement there should be a civil administrative, police,
and electoral component of the overall implementation effort to assist local
governments and populations in providing local security for elections. These
components would be part of those organizations specifically tasked to
monitor the election process, provide assistance to the civilian population
and allow governments to draft electoral law, educate voters, register voters,
and conduct the election. The DC on 6 October deferred a formal decision,
however, pending discussions with the US negotiating team. The DC on 20
October agreed to follow through with the recommendations in the JCS
paper and the provisions of the framework agreement, and that OSCE
should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of
the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election
security plan.
13. Can we confirm that IFOR will actually be under NATO command and
control during the UNPROFOR-IFOR transition?
•
Yes, IFOR will conduct the operation under NATO command and control and
ROE, with no UN involvement in military decision making.
17. Where will the Russians be located?
•
On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately. The US
is opposed to a separate AOR or chain of command for the Russian troops.
18. Will IFOR patrols in the Zone of Separation be armed?
•
IFOR patrols will be armed and backed up by reserve forces.
•SBBRET NOFORN
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" -SEGRET-NeFeRN19. What wiU IFOR's role be in Eastern Slavonia? What will the US role
be? What will happen to the Russian battalion there under the UNCRO
mandate? What are the IFOR responsibilities for forces in theater but not
in Bosnia? What will happen to UNCRO and UNPREDEP responsibilities?
Who will be responsible for their mission?
•
•
On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately.
The USG and UN position is that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations
continue under UN control. IFOR Commander is responsible for
coordinating with these UN missions.
• Presently there is no role, assigned by NATO, for IFOR in Eastern Slavonia.
However, the NAC gave SACEUR the mission to control and secure the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces not transferred to IFOR, to include if
necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces. The NAC on 29
September agreed that SACEUR should submit a concept of operations
based on the planning assumption that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations
continue under UN control. If the UNCRO mandate is renewed, we
anticipate the Russian battalion would remain in Eastern Slavonia. If
required and requested, NATO is still committed to withdrawing UNPF from
Bosnia and/or Croatia (Sector East) using OPLAN 40104.
• The framework agreement, as presently written, does not address Eastern
Slavonia or FYROM.
23. While we are prepared to enforce the settlement and will not wait for
"indicators of seriousness" after signature, should we demand that parties
make tangible gestures of good faith in week or so between initialing and
signature?
•
On 20 October the DC agreed there should be "indicators of seriousness" in
the framework agreement to be required between initialing and signature of
the peace agreement, but that these would not be preconditions for IFOR
deployment. At a minimum, immediately upon initialing the agreement, the
parties will continue the cessation of hostilities and observance of the ceasefire in accordance with the Agreement of 5 October, will not patrol forward
of friendly force positions, will not fire large caliber weapons, all air early
warning or air defense radars will be shutdown within 72 hours and will
remain inactive, and each party will begin withdrawing its forces/military
institutions/facilities/weapons from the zone of separation immediately
(completed within 30 days).
25. Kcw will winter affect the timing of deployment, transition, and
operations?
•
Winter weather will affect the speed of deployment of forces into the theater.
Roughly 60 percent of UNPROFOR's casualties have resulted from vehicular
accidents. Deployment in winter conditions will be difficult. In addition to
5
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treacherous road conditions, location and removal of mines will be
extremely difficult during the winter months.
27. What constitutes a total breakdown? Who decides?
•
On 20 October, the DC agreed in the event of a major breakdown in
compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North
Atlantic Council which will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the
situation and advice of military commanders.
28. Does the IFOR remain only 12 months?
• The NAC decision of 29 September directed SACEUR to develop a concept of
operations planning on the assumption that the mission of the IFOR would
be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been
implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
• The President, based on the final peace agreement and the final plan, will
determine whether the US position will remain that IFOR withdraws 12
months from its initial deployment.
Unresolved Issues
Mission
3A. Are there restrictions on the deployment and use of military forces in
the parties' own entities? What would IFOR's response be to breaches of
the cease fire or the use of military force to coerce/intimidate within the
two entities?
•
Neither the USG position, nor the NAC decisions delineate restrictions on
military forces in their own entity. The NAC determined that planning
should assume the IFOR will "ensure compliance with the military aspects
of an agreement (in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective
territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of
separation of forces".
• The framework agreement states, within 90 days of the signing of the
agreement, all forces will begin to withdraw to Cantonment and barracks
areas to be completed no later than 120 days. Subsequent to movement to
cantonment areas, no training, military exercises, maneuvers, patrolling, or
other such activities outside of the cantonment areas are permitted without
approval of the IFOR Commander. Unauthorized activities will constitute
2
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hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR.
This measure should be seen as an additional demonstration of good faith
on the part of the parties, which in principle should reduce the potential for
violence and enhance the force protection of the IFOR.
Recommendation. It is clear from the above language in the draft
framework agreement that any unauthorized activities will constitute hostile
intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. Because
this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will
ultimately determine the overaJl objectives and rules of engagement for the
IFOR. USG should propose a NAC decision based on the above language
from the framework agreement and that the two provisions on restrictions to
deployment and use of military forces which constitute hostile intent should
also be included in the definition of "hostile intent" in the Rules of
Engagement Annex of the OPLAN.
4. Who decides If there is a violation? Who decides whether IFOR is
responsible for handling the violation?
•
The USG position states that on order, CINCSOUTH {the IFOR Commander)
will conduct operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H.
• On 29 September, the NAC stated CINCSOUTH (the IFOR commander) is to
implement the military aspects, and ensure compliance, of the peace
agreement. This includes arrangements for NAC guidance and political
advice and information to SACEUR, including stages at which additional
guidance could be requested. Those stages include, but are not limited to,
major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to
assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, disagreements
with non-NATO troop contributors or other organizations that can not be
resolved in theater, and other circumstances prompting requests from the
IFOR Commander.
• "Recognizing the need to provide for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of this agreement," the framework agreement states the parties
will request the deployment of IFOR for that purpose. The framework
agreement also establishes a Joint Military Commission, run by the IFOR
Commander. In this role, the IFOR Commander would make decisions
consistent with IFOR's mandate as necessary to enhance compliance. This
commission would also receive reports on compliance with the provisions of
the agreement from the parties or from the monitors. In Article XI, the IFOR
Commander is noted as the final authority concerning all questions
associated with the implementation of the military aspects of the peace
agreement.
• Recommendation. None, the USG position, the NAC decisions, and the
framework agreement are consistent, the IFOR Commander is noted as the
final authority. It is clear the IFOR Commander is assigned the
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responsibility of completing the military tasks in theater associated with the
peace agreement, and as such, in this role and in his role as the Chairman
of the Joint Military Commission, would make decisions consistent with the
IFOR's mandate as necessary to ensure compliance. If circumstances occur
which prompt a request for additional political guidance or advice, he is
authorized to request that guidance as per the NAC decision (i.e., total
breakdown in strategic consent).
7A. What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person
against international civilian personnel (i.e.. UNHCR personnel)? What will
IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against the
indigenous population? When violence is conducted in the presence of
IFOR personnel? When reported as it is happening but not observed
directly by IFOR personnel? When reported in retrospect?
•
On 29 September the NAC decided that within the limits of IFOR's key
military tasks, IFOR will deter attacks on UN civilian agencies by creating
secure conditions for others organizations conducting tasks associated with
the peace agreement. While specific ROE is not yet drafted, the NAC
determined guidance under OPLAN 40104 would apply in principle to this
operation for handling civilian obstruction and deliberate violence to life and
person ("the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of
urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present
and have the local means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life
and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.").
• The framework agreement does not address IFOR's responsibility in this
area.
• Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined NATO forces should
be authorized to slop deliberate violence to life and person against
international civilian personnel and indigenous population where NATO
forces are present or have the means and opportunity, but IFOR will not be
responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international
civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations. Because this is
a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately
determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The
USG should propose the following NAC decision: "In accordance with the
provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to
act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO
forces are present and or have the leeal means and opportunity, to stop
deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the
hostilities.".
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9. Will the IFOR do anything to help refugees exercise the right to regain
their property and return to their homes?
9A. Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where the
territory changes control from one waning faction to the other? (Note:
This may include the impartial establishment and supervision of
protected zones, humanitarian assistance for the civilian population,
permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, guarantee of the
security of civilians, dissemination oflnformation to the public, and
movement of populations across borders.)
•
The USG position is for the IFOR to be prepared to facilitate other
organizations (UNHCR) in the accomplishment of its mission.
• NAC agreed on 29 September that the UNHCR and other organizations
would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons, although the
NATO Theater Commander, within capabilities, should be prepared to
consider requests for assistance. Additionally the NAC agreed with the key
tasks which included the supporting task of observing, securing, and
preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees,
displaced persons and their property.
• The framework agreement states that parties to the framework agreement
shall facilitate the ability of all refugees and displaced persons to freely
decide whether to return to their homes of origin or to make a claim.
Additionally, in Article XII, that within 30 days military forces occupying
- the territory to be transferred from one entity to another will completely
vacate and clear the territory to be transferred. In order to provide the
civilians in those areas being transferred to a different entity with a period of
adjustment, however, opposing military forces of an entity receiving new
territory will not occupy this new territory for 90 days or until approval is
received by the IFOR Commander. The IFOR Commander is authorized all
necessary force to ensure compliance with thel article.
• Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined IFOR forces have no
role in such areas as the Krajina, Zepa, Gorazde, etc. where it is clear the
UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and
displaced persons. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North
Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and
rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following
NAC decision: Assign the IFOR the key military task of enforcing the
provision that armed forces are precluded from entering the territory to be
transferred (as defined in the framework agreement) and that the UNHCR
and other organizaUons would retain responsibility for humanitarian
assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and
displaced pefsons, dissemination of information to the public, and
movement of populations across borders. The local governments, supported
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by the civilian police component of the implementation plan, would be
responsible for the security of civilians.
Non-Compliance
11. What will IFOR do about protecting or monitoring external borders?
11 A. Should there be a symbolic presence on the external borders
(particularly the inner-Serb border)?
•
•
•
The USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement do not
address protection or monitoring of external borders.
The Constitutional Structures annex of the framework agreement delineates
the responsibilities of the Central Government and its exclusive and
additional responsibilities. Protection or monitoring of external borders is
not expressly assigned. According to the framework agreement, all
governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the
Government of B-H shall be those of the Entities (Federation of B-H and
Republic Srpska).
Recommendation. This question strikes at the heart of the "partitioning"
issue. Because the addition of a task for IFOR to protect or monitor the
external borders of B-H will significantly increase the force structure
requirement the IFOR, the protection and monitoring of the external borders
should be left to the two Bosnian entities. If it is determined in the
negotiations that a "symbolic presence" is required on the external border,
the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for an external border
monitoring component and a lead organization (possibly ICFY) should be
solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize
an external border monitoring component and delineate its mandate.
Deployment
14. What forces of the various parties are to be permitted within the
Weapons Free Zone (20 Km wide)?
•
•
The US military planners envision a 10 Km monitored zone (20 Km total) on
either side of the boundary line where only IFOR and the respective side's
forces will be allowed, and where national representaUves (BSA, ABiH, and
HVO) co-located in IFOR command posts have control of forces. IFOR would
patrol both sides, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air
sensors, patrol by helo and block/monitor roads to control high density
areas. Heavy weapons would be excluded.
The NAC directed the IFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspects
of an agreement, and in particular, the establishment of agreed zones of
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separation. Current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km weapons
free zone.
• In the framework agreement there is a provision for a Military Exclusion
Buffer Zone of approximately 16 Km on either side of the Military Exclusion
Zone (4 Km wide) for a total of a 20 Km zone. No direct fire, armored or
mechanized vehicles are permitted.
• Recommendation: The US military planning and the draft framework
agreement are consistent. The planned force structure is sufficient to
monitor and enforce this provision. Recommend the framework agreement
includes a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone. The proposed Military Exclusion
Buffer Zone will reduce risk for IFOR. Because current NATO planning has
not addressed a 20 Km Military Exclusion Buffer Zone, this provision
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
15. Will there be a 2 Km buffer zone?
•
•
•
•
US military planners envision a 4 Km wide separation zone (2 Km on either
side of the boundary line) established, then monitored and enforced by the
IFOR. This will be a weapons-free area. IFOR command post will be
established in the zone of separation with IFOR, BSA, ABiH, and HVO
components. US envisions IFOR units will direct combined patrols which
will investigate violations and resolve disputes at the lowest level. IFOR-only
patrols will also be conducted. Combined checkpoints will be established
along lines of communication. The decisions on force placement should be
made at the operational level by the force commander.
Neither the NAC decisions, nor the SACEUR concept of operations,
specifically address this issue.
In the framework agreement there is a proposal for a 4 Km Military
Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line). No
weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted. This zone is
established to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of
hostilities.
Recommendation: The US military planning and the framework agreement
are consistent. Recommend the framework agreement include a provision
for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity
Boundary Line) to be established as a buffer zone to prevent any incidents
which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. Because current NATO
planning has not addressed a 4 Km zone of separation, this provision
should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper
channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the
troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
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16. Will IFOR deploy into Serb areas? Will IFOR zones cover the entire
country?
•
The USG position is IFOR would operate principally from Federation
territory. US military planners envision IFOR will patrol or monitor (both
ground and helo) both sides of the boundary line, investigate and respond to
violations, monitor ground/air sensors, and monitor/control roads to
control high density areas.
|
• The NAC decisions do not address this issue in detail.
• The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for
training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and
calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of
movement. The redeployment of all Serb forces into cantonment areas,
monitored by IFOR, will facilitate IFOR's mission accomplishment. The
cantonment concept will increase control of military forces, promoting the
effectiveness of local police. Particularly during the election process,
effective police will complement any IFOR presence in the Serb entity,
contributing to a secure environment. On the other hand, if uncontrolled
military forces, and ineffective police, complicate the security situation,
IFOR's task will be more difficult, perhaps leading to IFOR conducting police
functions.
• Recommendation: The NAC decision, USG position and framework
agreement are consistent. To complete the military tasks assigned to IFOR
in accordance with the latest revision of the framework agreement IFOR can,
and is expected to, operate predominately on Federation territory.
• However, if the framework agreement is adjusted to include military tasks in
which IFOR must deploy into Bosnian Serb entity to accomplish its mission
or further political guidance is provided requiring IFOR to deploy into the
Bosnian Serb entity, additional troops will be required for the task assigned.
If additional troops are required, the US will face the decision to authorize
additional forces or delete such a provision from the framework agreement.
Once again, to ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO
military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework
agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency.
When politically feasible, these details should be shared with the NATO
Military Authorities, via the proper political channels within NATO, to allow
military planning to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine
IFOR planning.
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Area of Operations
20. Should IFOR HQ be in Naples, Sarajevo, or Zagreb? Should IFOR HQ
be in Sarajevo, and if so, how soon?
•
While the NAC decisions do not specifically address this issue, the selection
of IFOR HQ is best made by the military commander responsible for the
operation.
• SACEUR concept of operations has the IFOR Theater HQ in Zagreb and
ARRC HQ (Ground Commander) in Sarajevo. US Division HQ likely to be in
Tuzla.
• The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for
training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and
calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of
movement.
• Recommendation: If it is decided IFOR must establish a HQ in Sarajevo for
political reasons, recommend the IFOR Commander be allowed to determine
how soon it is logistically feasible, and that he be authorized to establish
rear headquarters in Zagreb and Naples as appropriate.
Timing
21. Some equipment and forces must be prepositioned before signature
of the peace agreement. When do we have to give the order to
preposition?
•
Will be address in Notional Timeline below.
22. What is the sequencing of approvals required for ACTWARNs,
ACTREQs, and ACTORDs?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
24. How much time between signing and deployment?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
26. What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When?
•
Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
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Exit
29. What is an acceptable end state to the US when IFOR leaves?
•
•
•
•
•
USG ~ when the Federation has a reasonable self defense capability.
The NAC determined end state is when the military aspects of the peace
agreement have been implemented.
The framework agreement defines the military aspects of the peace
agreement in the Cessation of Hostilities and Disengagement Annex.
Recommendation: The framework agreement, as discussed in many of the
questions and answers above, will define the military aspects of the peace
agreement. IFOR should withdraw when the military aspects of the peace
agreement are accomplished. There is, however, an inescapable linkage
between^ the IFOR exit strategy and the parallel civil effort. The true
indicators of success of the operation may in fact be the progress made in
the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. There must be strong civilian
agency support in the overall effort. Of course, the other key to exit strategy
is simultaneously completing an equip and train program for the Bosnian
Federation to ensure a stable military situation, or rough balance of power,
between the two entities. However, it should be noted the key military tasks
approved by the NAC and the below success criteria should not be a
precondition, or checklist, necessary for IFOR departure:. Possible criteria
for success in the overall peace implementation effort include:
• UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former
Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;
• the establishment of the Entity Boundary Line, areas of separation,
and any cantonment areas which have been marked and agreed to by
the involved parties;
• withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, to include
adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use, and
reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment
areas;
• the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission,
Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for
Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National
Monuments, Joint Public Transportation Corporation, and all civilian
components of the peace implementation effort are established and
allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;
• Elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local
Parliaments are completed and the Constitutional Structures are
seated to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.
Essentially, IFOR will give the civilian aspects of the peace implementation
and the military stabilization efforts a reasonable opportunity to establish
peace. We should continue to assume that the mission of the IFOR would
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be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been
implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
Congressional Strategy
30. What is our strategy for addressing congressional concems? Is it
coordinated?
•
•
NSC must either specify the strategy or designate an agency to do so.
Recommendation: State is probably the appropriate lead agency, OSD will
have a large role.
Public Outreach
31. What is our strategy for addressing the public's concem? Is it
coordinated?
•
Recommendation: OSD recommends a proactive public affairs policy,
coordinated by the White House staff with full support from DoD and State.
USG should explain the IFOR deployment to the public, actively advocating
the USG decision using a common set of talking points.
Notional Timeline
32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG
decisions required to support the timeline?
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Proximity Talks begin
Presidential/NCA approval of response to
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces
President Clinton approves draft peace agreement
Peace Agreement initialed
CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN
President Clinton approves OPLAN
NAC approve OPLAN 40104X
President Clinton seeks Congressional
support
SHAPE submits ROE request
NAC approves ROE request
NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces
SACEUR issues oi uci foi Enabling Forces
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12 October
31 October
3 November
3 November
13 November
14 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
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President/NCA approves Issue of deployment order
for Enabling Forces
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes
London Conference
Moscow Conference
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR
Peace Conference
Agreement signed
NAC approves deployment of main force
SACEUR Issues order for Main Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Main Body
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater
UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental
15 November
15-29 November
17 November
20-21 November
23-24 November
14-24 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
27 November
30 November
30 November
30 Nov - completion
TBD
Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
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�32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG
decisions required to support the
N LIBRARY P O O O Y
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SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Proximity Talks begin
Presidential/NCA approval of response to
SACEUR's request to confirm forces
Response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces
President Clinton approves draft peace agreement
Peace Agreement initialed
CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN
President Clinton approves OPLAN
NAC approve OPLAN 40104X
President Clinton seeks Congressional
support
SHAPE submits ROE request
NAC approves ROE request
NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces
SACEUR Issues ordci foi Enabling Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Enabling Forces
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes
London Conference
Moscow Conference
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR
Peace Conference
Agreement signed
NAC approves deployment of main force
SACEUR issues order for Main Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order
for Main Body
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater
UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental
12 October
31 October
3 November
3 November
13 November
14 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15 November
15-29 November
17 November
20-21 November
23-24 November
14-24 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
27 November
30 November
30 November
30 Nov - completion
TBD
Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
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i
ISSUE PAPER
LIFTING THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO
Background
This plan for l i f t i n g the siege of Sarajevo vould be but one elemsnt — albeit a
major one — of a larger plan of military arrangements for iirplementing an
overall peace plan agreed upon ty the parties. I t is recognized that there are
inherent limitations in drafting a plan without knowing more about the overall
context.
Despite the agreements made at the London Conference last August, Bosnian Serb forces under
the direction of Radovan Karadzic continue to pound the city of Sarajevo from 15 "major"
artillery sites in the hills around Sarajevo. Additionally, with the exception of the Sarajevo
airport, which is held by UNPROFOR, we believe there are 6000-8000 Bosnian Serb
Arm/ regular troops and 4000-5000 Serb irrregulars i n the area of Sarajevo.
Opposing them are 15,000-20,000 Bosnian government forces. The map at Tab A
shows the reported locations of Bosnian Serb artillery in the immediate area of Sarajevo. In
recent days, Bosnian Serb units have pressed forward into the suburbs of Sarajevo and into Stup,
threatening to cut off the city from the airport.
There is no reliably open land route from Sarajevo to Muslim-controlled territory, all roads out
being held by Serbian forces or subject to fire from them. Sarajevo depends for its food on
UNHCR supplies, mostly delivered by airlifts (in which US planes participate). UNHCR
estimates that, despite periodic interruptions of the airlift and of distributions from the airport
warehouses, it has provided minimum subsistence rations to the city, at virtually the full level of
requirement. However, food beyond survival rations, and other basic services -- water,
electricity, medical supplies, fuel, building materials - are not being provided with any regularity.
Though the electrical power substaions that serve the city remain largely intact, the main power
switching center in downtown Sarajevo has been destroyed, and the gas pipeline and three major
(400kv) power lines servicing the city pass through Serb-controlled areas. It must be noted that
the city's water and sewerage systems depend on electricty.
Sarajevo continues to function as the official headquarters of the GOBH, which the USG
recognizes, although we do not, for security reasons, maintain an embassy in the city. (No
country maintains an embassy there, although France does have a resident ambassador on the
ground.) Significant numbers of foreigners, including UN officials (some of whom are American
military attached to the UNPROFOR headquarters), journalists, and relief workers, are in the city.
Two proposals have been made for breaking this siege: the Western European Union's "Safe
Haven Sarajevo" document and the Vance/Owen plan's Draft Military Accord. In addition,
NATO has proposed a concept analysis of "relief areas" and "safe zones" (NATO 742). All
contain many common elements, similar schedules for being put into effect - though the
Vance/Owen plan is more detailed and offers more specifics on necessities for implementation.
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The plan developed below attempts to draw upon the strengths of the two existing proposals,
bearing in mind the political and military realities. Since we do not have a clear sense of
virat diffenait Russians have meant when the/ talk of a joint initiative to l i f t
the siege, we lave not endeavored to factor possible Russian views into this
plan. Indeed, since their ideas might be problematic at best, perhaps i t would
be better to present them with our concept.
Design of the plan was based upon several assumptions. First, it assumes agreement and full
compliance by all parties with all steps of the implementation process, which is problematical at
best. Second, no estimates for the number of troops required to enforce the plan after compliance
by the parties have been made independently. Rather, the estimates used in the original
Vance/Owen and WEU formulations are repeated. Additionally, there will be a continuing
requirement for humanitarian aid. The plan assumes that such will be provided by other agencies
and makes no provision for escort, distribution, etc.
A major consideration is that the plan, like the Vance/Owen and WEU models, calls for the
demilitarization of the city proper. In effect the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
denied the ability to maintain military forces in its own capital.
There are, in principle, at least two other conceptual approaches to "lifting the siege":
1) Driving the Serb forces investing the city back a sufficient distance -- some 30 km for them to
be out of artillery range of the city and vital infrastructure facilities - that they could no longer
impose a direct threat to the population in the city or its links with the airport, while permitting
GOBH functions to continue to operate from Sarajevo.
Such an approach would seek to replicate the effects of decisive local military success by the
Bosnian forces. There is no reason to believe the Serbians would voluntarily agree to pull back
unilaterally, other than as a part of a general settlement (if then). Use of foreign forces to compel
such an end to the vulnerability of Sarajevo to military attack would require very substantial
ground and air forces and would amount to large scale, direct combat intervention on the Bosnian
side. Accordingly, this approach has not been examined in detail.
2) Securing an agreement not to use heavy weapons against Sarajevo, or to a withdrawal of
heavy weapons by both sides. ( For these purposes, "heavy weapons" mean directfireweapons
over 12.7mm, mortars and artillery of 82mm and above, tanks, and ground-to-ground missiles.)
This would entail the Bosnian government forces' removing their heavy weapons from the city
altogether and the Serbians' pulling their heavy weapons back some 30 km from the city.
(Alternatively, heavy weapons would be assembled in set locations and placed under UN control.)
Thereafter, both sides would remain free to continue tofightover the city and access to it, but
only with lightly armed units. The focus in the plan is therefore on heavy weapons
rather than on driving the Serbs back. The effect would be to reduce the dangers to the
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civilian population-- and, in practice, to shift the military balance toward the Muslims, who have
more troops but many fewer heavy weapons.
Bosnian President Izetbegovic has said he will insist on a halt to the shelling of Sarajevo as a
condition to participating further in the Vance/Owen talks. Presumably he would be prepared to
agree to have Bosnian units stop their shelling of Serb positions in exchange. Whether the
Serbian forces would regard keeping the Bosnians in the talks as a sufficient incentive to agree to
cease shelling, much less place their heavy weapons under UN control, is uncertain.
Some element of outside enforcement is likely to be necessary for a limit on heavy weapon use to
be meaningful. After the 1991 Vance accords for Croatia, Krajina Serb heavy weapons were
assembled under UNPROFOR guard, but when Croatian forces broke the truce to attack Krajina
Serb positions in the "pink zone," the Krajina Serb forces pushed the UN guards aside and retook
control of the assembled weapons. Without an international commitment to monitor compliance
with a ban on heavy weapons deployment or use and to take action against violators, it is unlikely
that a ban would hold for long.
However, whether described as a prohibition on use of heavy weapons or an agreement to
withdraw them from the area, this approach would differ from thefirstin that it might be
enforceable with less foreign ground involvement. The USG, and possibly other outside
governments as well, by use of highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and airborne weapons
capabilities, might be able to locate and attack weapons deployed or used in violation of such an
agreement, without having to use ground forces, and with a more focused and limited military
commitment than would be entailed by attempting to drive off Serbian forces generally from
around Sarajevo. While capabilities to detect violations and attack heavy weapons used or
deployed in violation of a ban would be much less than 100%, it would probably be possible to
impose a significant cost on violations. However, the weapons involved are relatively easy to
conceal and are highly mobile, and the US would definitely not be able to detect and attack all
violating weapons. Further analysis of US surveillance and attack capabilities are at the
Codeword level.
In the event the US or other outside countries used air power to enforce a heavy weapons ban
around Sarajevo, they would have crossed the line to direct military action in the conflict and,
because of the imbalance in heavy weapons capability, to de facto intervention on the Bosnian
government side. Even if, as seems likely, that action could be taken with relatively good effect
and without requiring ground forces, US planes would be exposed to Serbian air defenses (and to
theriskof a Bosnian Muslim provocation). Moreover, the Serbian forces would have the option
of responding to the US action in other areas, e.g. by ceasing to permit UN relief operations or
attacking UNPROFOR units. In this respect, enforcing a heavy weapons ban presents
considerations similar to those involved in enforcing the no-fly zone.
The balance of this paper details a proposal for an agreed demilitarization of Sarajevo.
Basic Elements of Plan
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Stopping the fighting in and around Sarajevo on an agreed, internationally monitored basis will
require the following basic elements:
•
An agreement by the warring parties to undertake this plan and to accept international
monitoring of its implementation.
•
In conjunction with this agreement will be a declaration of forces and weapons, followed by
a cease-fire within three days of agreement. A demarcation line - whose position will be
determined in the agreement - will be established, and within 48 hours of a cease-fire parties
must withdraw personnel, heavy weaponry, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain)
beyond the demarcation line.
•
Establishment of a 2-part "safe zone" that will require the withdrawal of troops and their
heavy weapons in order to provide protection to the civilian population in and around
Sarajevo. The inner zone would consist of the Sarajevo core, its airport, signifiicant power
infrastructure, and the immediate concentration of civilians in the plain of Sarajevo. It will
measure 15 km east to west and 2-3 km north to south except in the heavily disputed western
part of the city, where it will measure 8-9 km north-south. All military personnel and their
equipment will be withdrawn from within the inner zone. For the Bosnian Muslims,
compliance would mean withdrawal of all military forces from the inner zone, along
established "safe routes" (see below) through Serb-controlled areas, to Muslim-controlled
areas in central Bosnia. There is r i s k and d i f f i c u l t y i n demanding that the G B
OH
demilitarize the c i t y as a quid, but the Serbians would pncfcably insist. The
advantage, however, i s that GOBH d a n i l i t a r i z a t i o n of Sarajevo gives us
some hope of presenting this as even-handed, s t i l l neutral, and therefore i t
would not be necessary to end the humanitarian aid e f f o r t . This advantage
holds especially i f Russia participates i n monitoring/enforcement.
Moreover, since we might be seen as having entered the war on Bosnia's
side, we might be able to play vp disarming the c i t y ' s defenders as
balancing the pain on both sides.
We should also consider, however, i f we would wont f i r s t to propose
enforcement of the heavy weapons part of the London agreement, and save
demilitarizaticn of Sarajevo to o f f e r the Serbians i f the/ demand a quid.
Another alternative might be t o move not just the Serb heavy weapons but
the Serb forces themselves outside the 30-Km outer zone, and allow
Bosnian forces minus heavy weapons to reitain i n the c i t y , perhaps with
t h e i r strength significantly reduced and subject to monitoring t y the Joint
Cormission. A variation of this would be to require a l l Bosnian forces (Serb
and Muslim) to withdraw beyond the 30-kilometer r i n g . That would also be
easiest f o r U P O O to enforce.
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Although UNPROFOR military personnel will continue to monitor the boundary of the inner
zone, civilian authorities under UN supervision will be responsible for maintaining law and
order within it. The outer zone would extend to a 30 km radius from Sarajevo and would be
patrolled by UNPROFOR. Teams of UNPROFOR members and local authorities will
maintain civil order in the towns on the outer zone. All heavy weapons would be removed
from the outer zone to beyond the 30 km radius from the center of the city and placed in
depots under UN control. In practice, this would create a "doughnut" around Sarajevo into
which Serbian units would not be permitted to move heavy weapons.
•
Introduction of a 10,000-nieniber UNPROFOR military and civilian contingent to
undertake the operations listed below. This contingent will maintain its own, organic air
support. (This represents a minimum force, according to the WEU plan, based on "confidence
in political agreements." The WEU "worst case" stated that up to a division (15-20,000)
would be needed.) This augmented UNPROFOR will be responsible for:
- monitoring the inner zone boundary between Serb-controlled territory outside Sarajevo
and the demilitarized city inside;
- monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and with the ban on heavy weapons in the 30
km radius area; in the event of violations, UNPROFOR peace keepers would , through the
joint commission, issue a warning to the offending parties, including a short deadline for
"cease and desist;" upon expiration of deadline, peace keepers would shift to a peaceenforcing operation, using their broad ROE authority and air support to force compliance
- opening the blue roads and monitoring compliance with the requirement of free passage
along the "blue routes" from the city, to include operation of checkpoints and convoy escorts;
- maintaining civil order within the inner zone with local authorities, i.e. in the city and its
immediate environs. Civil authorities in the outer zone would be executed by teams consisting
of combined units of UNPROFOR troops and local civil police authorities;
- its own self-defense without issuance of a warning, initiated by commanders on the scene;
- occupation of militarily significant points in the outer zone so as to form quick, mutually
supporting reaction forces in the event of cease-fire violations.
(Note that these are the forces' duties assume compliance by the parties; compelling compliance
or punishing non-compliance would require additional effort}
• Establishment of a Joint Commission for executing and monitoring the plan. It will be
composed of the Commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo Command, a command and
support element from UNPROFOR, and a representative from each of the warring sides
consisting of the commander for the troops in the area affected.
•
The opening of safe routes along the major transportation corridors surrounding Sarajevo in
order to allow for the protected withdrawal of forces and weaponry, the free movement of
UN forces and relief convoys, and the control of entry to and exit from the "safe zone." Safe
routes would be from Sarajevo northwest to Zenica, northeast to Zvornik on the Serbian
border (which is the main entry point for UNHCR relief convoys from Belgrade), southwest
to Mostar, and to Split. Except to the northwest, these routes extend through contested areas
outside the 30 km circle. (It would, theoretically, be possible to add other routes, e.g. to the
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�-SEGRETeast and northeast to permit supply to eastern Bosnia from Sarajevo). UNPROFOR personnel
would establish checkpoints along these routes and at the outer limits of the "safe zone."
•
Restoration of civilian infrastructure, with a joint commission of representatives of all sides
and a UN civilian team determining priorities and needs and executing the work with civil
authorities and UN technical experts.
h pe e t to of the Plan
n l m nai n
The plan is to be carried out in 4 phases. Under the best of circumstances the full implementation
could take place over a period of approximately 3 weeks. Though phases will follow a sequential
order, steps within each phase may be carried out in a parallel manner, except where noted.
Phase I: Agreement and cease-fire
Step 1 - Agreement by the warring parties.
Step 2 - Cease-fire within 24 hours of agreement and a freeze on movement of forces and
weapons. Within 48 hours of cease-fire, warring parties will move all troops, weapons, and
equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond a demarcation line along the to be
determined by the agreement.
Step 3 - Declaration of forces within 72 hours of ceasefire,which will include precise
documentation of number and location of personnel, heavy weapons, and a description of
minefields.
Step 4 - Declaration of "safe routes" between Sarajevo and the 3 cities listed above.
Step 5 - Declaration of the inner and outer safe zones.
Step 6 - Declaration of fall back/assembly areas beyond the outer zone to which the warring
parties and their heavy weapons will be withdrawn.
Step 7 - Establishment of Joint Commissions for weapon inspections and infrastructure repair.
Phase 1 should require 4 days to complete. Steps 3-6 can be executed simultaneously.
Phase II: Demilitarization of inner zone
Step 1 - UNPROFOR military personnel will move to the following areas: 1) the demarcation
line to complete the separation of forces; 2) the outer limits of the inner zone to control
access to it and prevent reinforcements to any of the parties; 3) the checkpoints along the
"safe routes" and the entry and exit point to these routes. Along with inspectors from the
Joint Commission, UNPROFOR military personnel will begin to move into the outer zone to
establish positions for the later removal of weapons
Step 2 - UNPROFOR military personnel begin clearing "safe routes" of obstacles and land
mines. They also carry out repairs on these routes where necessary.
Step 3 - Upon completion of Step 2, safe routes will be open to civilian and humanitarian
movement.
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Step 4 - All parties begin removal of heavy weapons from the inner zone, withdrawing along
designated safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km
limit of the outer zone.
Step 5 - Only upon full completion of step 4, all parties will evacuate troops from the inner
zone, withdrawing along the safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement
beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone. (As noted above, this effectively de-militarizes the
city, because the Muslim forces must move out entirely.) The evacuation would have
to be conducted i n a fashion that does not upset the military balance, i . e . ,
there most be provisions that ensure Serbian forces new i n place would not
be able to over run or seriously harass a c i t y which had been l e f t
defenseless exo^t f o r Mislim forces i n the outer zene.
Specifically, we
recognize the potential danger of requiring the Bosnian government to p u l l
a l l of i t s forces out of Sarajevo and relocate than i n central Bosnia, whereas
Serbian troops minus t h e i r heavy weapons wouldd be allowed within 2-15
KM of the c i t y , with heavy weapons close eiough t o the c i t y to permit rapid
reinforcanent i f the ceasefire were broken at any point. Moreover, even i f
the present non-heavy-weapons balance i n the outer zone would enable
Bosnian forces there to protect themselves and the c i t y , there most be sore
provisions f o r preventing influx of nav forces, e.g., iirplementaticn of a
military freeze and sore kind of patrols of the perimeter to prevent a
buildup.
Step 6 - UNPROFOR military personnel previously in place along the demarcation line and
Joint Commission teams undertake inspections to determine full compliance with withdrawal
of heavy weapons and troops. This plan allows f o r UNPROFOR to issue warnings
i n cases of non-carpi iance with deadlines, then s h i f t i n g from peacekeeping
to peace enforcing i f deadlines pass. The U.S. would not participate i n
peacekeeping operations i n Bosnia on the assunption that the parties w i l l
voluntarily oenply with the agreenents; the best hope for getting
"voluntary" ccnpliance is to have the iruscle and clear intent to enforce i f
necessary. Because, short of a decision t o sweep a l l Serbian forces (the
likely violators of t i e cease-fire) from the 30 KM zone through major military
action (which would probably require even more than the division planned
by the WEU and serious - - read NATO - - command and c o n t r o l ) , UNPROFOR
would be i n a d i f f i c u l t situation: constantly faced with decisions en whan to
s h i f t modes, asuming even a low-level of violence.
The s h i f t i n g back and forth under these circumstances would see f i r e f i g h t s
breaking out between forces previously on peaceful terms, followed t y a
period of tense peace, and then possibly more violence, an extremely
d i f f i c u l t scenario f o r small unit ocrrrmnders.
The rerredies f o r the problems outlined above might be (1) a universal,
ceasefire followed inmediately t y p o l i t i c a l negotiatiens country-wide, to
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRETencourage the Bosnians to withdraw and the Serbs to cooperate; and (2) a
crediblwe threat of overwhelming force were the Serbs to carry out even lowintensity attacks against Muslims or even U P O O . "Nickle and dime"
NR F R
Serbian attacks producing clumsy U P O O response as i t trys to s h i f t
NR F R
frcm peacekeeping to police to peacemaking and back is a recipe for
disaster. Yet the threat to be credible las to be real (i.e., involving the U.S.).
Step 7 - UNPROFOR civilian personnel move to inner zone to oversee the maintenance of
law and order in conjunction with existing civil authorities.
Step 8- Joint Commission for infrastructure begins determining and mapping most vital
installations for attention and repair.
The steps of phase 2 should take about 7 days for completion under the most benign
circumstances, though necessary repairs on the safe routes may require additional time.
Phase III: Heavy weapons removal from outer zone
Step 1 - All parties begin removal heavy weapons from the outer zone. Weapons are to be
moved outside the 30 km limit of the safe zone and turned over to UNPROFOR personnel at
designated locations. Those that cannot be moved will be placed under UNPROFOR
supervision. Military personnel will not be required to evacuate this outer zone.
Step 2 - UNPROFOR and Joint Inspection teams begin inspection searches within the outer
zone to monitor compliance with weapons withdrawal/deactivation.
Step 3 - UNPROFOR/local police teams move into place to maintain civil authority within
the outer zone. Such police teams could not guarantee that the outer zone
would not become a dangerous no-man's land, with a largely Muslim
population, Serbian troops, and U P O O forces in an area of hundreds
NR F R
of square miles. U P O O ty i t s presence would have an obligation to do
NR F R
i t s best to preserve the peace between Muslims and Serbs, but probably has
inadequate forces to cover every hamlet, in a situation wheree at least lowlevel violence and "settling of accounts" are almost inevitable.
Step 4 - Repair of Sarajevo's civilian infrastructure begins, using local help as well as UN
technical teams.
The steps of Phase III should require 7 days under the best of circumstances.
Phase IV: End State (approximately 3 weeks after agreement)
UNPROFOR military personnel and Joint Commission Inspectors continue monitoring
compliance of weapons removal from outer zone.
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UNPROFOR observers are in place on safe routes and at entry and exit points or the safe
zone.
Civil Authority is functioning.
UNPROFOR patrols are operating along limits of inner zone. {Wee: the Joint
Ccmmission responsible for executing and rronitoring such patrols w i l l be
corrprised of U P O O representatives, Serbian m i l i t a r y Commanders,
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and G B civilian officials since, in the letter's case, there would be no
CH
G B military commander i n the inner zone)
OH
Most significant power, transportation, and communication infrastructure is functioning.
Comment
The Vance-Owen plan makes no provision for the number of UNPROFOR civilian and military
personnel that will be necessary for its implementation. The WEU plan estimates that it could
require a force of up to 20,000. It is questionable that current troop contributing countries,
having provided 24,000 UNPROFOR personnel for the former Yugoslavia, will make 20,000
more available for Sarajevo. It will be extremely difficult to obtain 10,000 for the mission, but it
could be possible under two conditions. First, almost half of this number could be obtained from
the existing UNPROFOR contingents, with perhaps 1,000 from each of the four UNPA's in
Croatia. Second, it will be easier to obtain more European and Canadian and other participation
if the United States commits forces to this mission. These US personnel could be in the civilian
UN component and involved in the supervision of the civil authorities in the inner zone and the
rebuilding of Sarajevo's infrastructure. Even this small US contingent might have symbolic
meaning and could encourage current participating countries to provide the remaining needed
forces. I f a small U.S. ocntingent fails to prorpt other participating states to
provide real military forces, significant U.S. forces cn the ground would
probably be necessary. Ultimately only the U.S. might be able to provide the
credible "overwhelming force" threat cited above as necessary. W note in
e
conclusicn that i t would be inadvisable to redeploy forces in Croatia to Bosnia;
not only would that weaken the already inadequate forces in Croatia, i t would
send precisely the wrong signal to Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs alike.
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ISSUE PAPER
INTERIM OBJECTIVES FOR BOSNIA
This paper outlines the pros and cons of adopting as an interim objective for
Bosnia the establishment of a UN-supervised cease-fire in place, with the features
described below, based on the principles of the London Conference.
Context. The current US — and UN and EC — objective in Bosnia is to have the
Serbs sign and comply with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. A key feature of that plan is
that it requires large scale Serbian withdrawals from territory they now control and from
which the Muslim population has been forcibly expelled. (See attached map) In
addition, it would establish a new Bosnian state of ten provinces, each (except nominally
for Sarajevo) dominated by one ethnic group, but with a complex tripartite power sharing
structure, and it would entitle those expelled and refugees to return to their former
homes.
Despite vigorous negotiating efforts, there is little immediate prospect of Serbian
agreement to sign, much less to fully implement, the VOPP. There is, to be sure, some
level of US force with which we could occupy the entire country, and force acceptance
of whatever peace terms we like. However, there is no significant support in the
Administration, much less in the Congress or among our allies, for sending a direct
intervention force of this scale. While various increased pressures - ranging from
tightened sanctions to limited air strikes - are being considered, there are difficulties
about all the pressure options, if only because of the need to secure UN, allied, and/or
Russian authorization or participation. Moreover, there is also serious question whether
even the strongest actions being considered ~ such as strikes against Serbian artillery and
other heavy weapons ~ would suffice to induce the Serbs to surrender by agreement
much of the territory they have won by military force, brutally but successfully applied,
in what they regard as a national crusade.
The Proposal. The goal laid out by the Administration on February 10 was a
"negotiated settlement...acceptable to all parties." An alternative to continuing, given the
present context, to focus our principal effort on seeking Serbian agreement to the VOPP
is to seek, as an interim step, the implementation of key features of the London Accords - a cease fire, limited withdrawals of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of
relief, and release of prisoners. This more modest objective would be based on the
urgent need to stop the fighting and civilian suffering, pending agreement on the future
political structure of the country. It would also seek to broaden the scope of the
discussion beyond Bosnia itself, to try to create stability in the Former Yugoslavia
generally.
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-2The proposal has the following elements:
1.
We would seek to have the parties agree to a cease-fire in place.
In order to avoid the uncertainties of the multiple prior aborted cease fire agreements, it
should be negotiated in advance, and would come into effect on a phased basis in
different areas and as progress was made in implementation (see Annex A for a possible
phasing system). As cease-fires were established across the country, opposing forces
would separate by withdrawals to pre-agreed lines (creating a DMZ between forces) and
heavy weapons would be turned over to UN control.
2.
The cease fire would be followed by limited Serbian withdrawals
from around Sarajevo, as well as other places, such as Tuzla and Mostar, where they can
easily cut off relief supplies to Muslim-held areas. The Muslim enclaves in Eastern
Bosnia, but not Bihac in the West, would be evacuated. Other geographic arrangements
are possible.
3.
Muslims who wished to leave Serb (or Croatian) controlled areas
would be assisted to do so. Similar assistance would be offered other ethnic groups who
found themselves on the "wrong" side of a line of de facto control. All prisoners would
be released, with some system to deal with prisoners who are alleged war criminals, such
as having them screened by an international tribunal.
4.
UN and other relief efforts would have free movement throughout
the country. Humanitarian programs would be stepped up, and expanded beyond
subsistence food supply to include restoration of basic services (fuel, water, sewer,
power) and construction of housing, both to replace damaged residences and to
accommodate refugees.
5.
The US would, through NATO, and with UNSC authority,
participate with other nations in an expanded UN force to implement the interim
agreement. Deployments would be phased to match progress on compliance by the
parties. The force deployed would be sized and configured (as is the notional VOPP
implementation force) to overwhelm local resistance, not merely to monitor voluntary
implementation, and would have ROEs authorizing use of effective force for that
mission. In particular, once a cease fire had been established in an area, violators would
be counterattacked vigorously, as would those who interfered with relief convoys. In the
event of a general breakdown of the cease fire, i.e., of a collapse of the basic political
agreement to end the war essentially in place, the implementation force would either be
re-enforced or withdrawn.
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-36.
There would be no effort to establish multi-ethnic civil authorities:
De facto, Muslim controlled areas, including Sarajevo, would be run by the BosniaHercegovina Government, while Serbian and Croatian controlled areas would be run by
the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat "governments" respectively. The exact control and
relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.
7.
A similar cease fire in place, with weapons under international
control, would be established for Croatia, leaving the Croatian Serbs in effective control
of the bulk of the area they now hold. This would replace the 1991 Vance plan for
Croatia. Alternatively, no explicit changes would be made in arrangements for Croatia.
8.
US would lead international efforts focused on securing an
effective cease fire, limited withdrawals, and expanded humanitarian programs of the
interim agreement, not on an ultimate political solution, and we would not, in practice,
resist the de facto extension of Belgrade and Zagreb authority to the Serbian and Croatian
controlled areas.
9.
Economic sanctions and the NFZ would continue, as additional
sureties for Serbian compliance with the interim agreement, to be relaxed in a phased
process in conjunction with implementation of the agreement.
10.
Consistent with the idea of creating a viable Muslim enclave state,
the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government would be lifted, possibly in phases as
other sanctions were eased.
11.
The US would repeat its warnings about Serbian and other
factions' misconduct in Kosovo - and extend them to actions in the Vojvodina and
Sandzak.
Although nominally only an interim agreement, without prejudice to final
political settlement along the lines of the VOPP, the cease-fire in place, limited
withdrawals, and population transfers would, if it succeeded, create a de facto partition of
Bosnia, establishing de facto a Muslim enclave state, essentially within territory now
controlled by the Muslims (less the eastern enclaves, and plus some territory around
Sarajevo and other cities, e.g., Tuzla and Mostar) along with de facto Serbian and
Croatian "ministates" with very close connections to Serbia and Croatia.
Arguments for and against.
The case against shifting our focus to a cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals,
and orderly population transfers includes the following points:
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�-4The "solution" rewards ethnic cleansing and aggression, and indeed all but
concedes the creation of a Greater Serbia, absorbing big chunks of Croatia and Bosnia.
As such it is immoral, and likely to encourage further ethnic aggression in the Balkans
and elsewhere.
It would be seen by many as a significant retrenchment by the USG. The
outcry from the press and the international community could be significant.
The proposal will be strongly resisted by the Muslims, who believe they
have - or should have - a commitment from the US to pressure the Serbs into signing up
for Vance-Owen.
The Muslims may prefer to "go down fighting" rather than, in effect,
surrender. Securing Croatian support will prove nearly as difficult as Muslim support.
The Serbs would be less likely to agree to the provisions of this proposal,
notably the cease-fire, if the arms embargo against the Muslims were to be lifted.
In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, a decision would be
required to reinforce or withdraw the implementation force. Both alternatives represent
an admission of failure with respect to the mission upon which we embarked.
Accepting so limited and unsatisfactory an outcome is wholly inconsistent
with the Administration's past declarations that even Vance-Owen is unfair to the
Muslims, and that partition is not an acceptable solution.
The success such an outcome would represent for Serbian nationalism
would re-enforce all the worst forces in Serbia and encourage ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
and the Vojvodina, and actually ratifies Serbian intransigence in the Krajina and the other
UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia.
Croatia will gladly pocket ratification of its de facto annexation of the
Croatian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but it will not acquiesce in the loss of the UNPAs,
or the creation of a secure Serbian Northern Corridor along the Sava. Even if the cease
fire held in Bosnia, the Croats may resume military probes at the UNPAs.
The proposal is not even stable so far as the Muslims are concerned. Even
if they accepted it now, on the ground that, having been abandoned by the West, they
have no choice, they will never be reconciled to the result. We will have created what
former French Defense Minister Joxe rightly called "a Gaza strip in the middle of
Europe."
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�-5Implementation of the agreement, assuming only limited local opposition,
would probably require about the same force as envisioned for the Vance-Owen plan,
and face similar difficulties.
The Muslim enclave state will not be viable politically, economically, or
militarily. The international community (with heavy reliance on the U.S.) will be
committed to protecting it militarily and supporting it economically for years to come.
The case for the proposal includes the following:
Granted that the VOPP, or some variant of it that denied the Serbs
the fruits of their brutal ethnic cleansing, would be the ideal solution, there is simply no
prospect of its being achieved short of massive - corps plus scale - US intervention.
Only those who favor such intervention, or have some evidence lesser pressures will
work to produce massive Serbian concessions, can credibly argue against an interim
solution on the ground that VOPP is not only better (which everyone should concede) but
that it is attainable.
If the US is not prepared to support substantially the large scale
international military intervention needed to force the Serbs to accept and implement
VOPP, the only possible outcomes are (1) indefinite war, (2) a Serbian victory, and (3)
some negotiated cease-fire with much smaller Serbian withdrawals than VOPP requires.
Among these three - the only real - possible outcomes, the third is clearly better.
It ends the fighting early, avoiding the very real prospect of a final
Serb push this spring to eliminate the Muslim hold on the eastern enclaves, and perhaps
even Sarajevo itself, with all that would entail in human suffering and frustration of US
goals.
It provides a framework for a greatly enhanced humanitarian
effort, which remains the aspect of the US (and UN and European) effort that has the
greatest popular support.
Serbians (whether in Belgrade, Pale, or Knin) will now probably
accept an outcome which requires a real ceasefire,separation of forces, control of heavy
weapons, free movement of relief, and even some locally significant withdrawals. There
is no particular evidence they seek to eliminate Muslims throughout Bosnia, so long as
they get control of the territory they believe should be Serbian. They have (except for
the eastern enclaves) now secured the territory they regard as Serbian by right, and could
well be prepared to make modest concessions to solidify that control. Further military
successes - which are well within their capability - might well increase their minimum
requirements for peace.
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�-6While the Muslims would certainly prefer a more favorable
solution, they recognize the desperation of their military position, and the unlikelihood of
major military intervention. They will need to be convinced that they will do better to
cut a deal now, before their situation deteriorates further.
A reasonably contiguous, internationally protected, Muslim state,
while facing many problems, is more likely to be viable and stable than whatever would
come out of another year or so of continued fighting.
Given the profound ethnic tensions in the area, and the effects of
two years of ethnic war, an ethnic-based partition, however distasteful, is likely to be the
only stable solution. (Even VOPP is an ethnic partition in all but name.) Better that it
should be negotiated, and effected under international supervision, than result purely
from military operations.
By frankly recognizing that large-scale population movements
(mostly but by no means exclusively by Muslims) will accompany any settlement, the
agreement can provide explicitly for those movements and for accommodating the people
who move.
The financial costs of enforcing an agreement that has a better
chance of actually being complied with by the parties, and of sustaining a Muslim state,
while large, are likely to be small compared to the costs of the military effort that would
be needed to force acceptance of the VOPP.
A de facto partition provides also a framework for resolving the
Croatian-Serbian conflict. For all their horrible and treacherous actions, the Serbs have
some legitimate grievances, chief among them being mistreatment of Serbs by Croatians
on a massive scale in living memory, especially in the Krajina. Serbia will intervene
with the old Yugoslav army to prevent Croatia from regaining control of the Krajina. A
partition in which Croatia is compensated for the loss of the Krajina with de facto control
of Western Hercegovina may well represent the best hope of a stable outcome of that
conflict.
Reluctant international acceptance of a result that gives the Serbs
much of what they feel entitled to, and resolution to enforce that result, will be the best
basis on which to convince the Serbs that they will lose badly if they press their luck by
making trouble in Kosovo or Vojvodina.
The proposal requires significant Serbian concessions, including
some withdrawals and a willingness not to press their military advantage. The scale of
pressures we are actually prepared to apply - sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, NFZ
enforcement - are far more likely to be successful in achieving these limited but
meaningful concessions than in forcing greater ones.
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-7Moving to a policy that would stress an interim arrangement along
these lines is not inconsistent with our backing Vance-Owen up to this point. We have
always made clear that we want a settlement the parties themselves agree on, not that we
will impose our own notion of a good solution. The proposal seeks, in effect, to
implement the key features of the London accords, which has long been US policy.
Moreover, there is a view that even if VO were signed, we would
be doing very well if it produced, not full implementation, but merely Serbian action to
meet the conditions proposed by DOD for commitment of a US force element, namely an
effective cease fire, control of heavy weapons, separation of forces, free movement of
relief, and release of prisoners. These elements of Vance-Owen would amount, in effect,
to a cease fire in place, marginal local Serbian withdrawals, and the creation of a Muslim
enclave under UN protection. In short, the practical difference between what it would be
reasonable (some even argue too much) to expect of Vance-Owen, and the new proposal,
may be rather slight. Moreover, seeking an interim agreement on these lines would not
preclude continuing to treat the VOPP as a long term objective.
And it would allow for a negotiated settlement, albeit long term, to
be conducted out from under the gun.
A policy along these lines has the greatest chance of winning
active Russian support, which is important not only for its own sake but as a contribution
to our overriding goal of protecting reform in Russia.
{161430ZApr.93}
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�
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Declassified documents on Bosnia
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2013-0682-M
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9/21/2015
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 through 1995. Materials include papers, memos, talking points, and reports on the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Topics include humanitarian aid options, lifting the arms embargo, the United Nations Protection Force, and a peace agreement.
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management System
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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9/2/2015
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2013-0682-M
7388808
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
Foreign Policy
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/bdbd6434f7161e88865b7d54750a15c9.pdf
daf67eae393f7ee6fa4a69d60d6f3adb
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
May
3,
'S7MftV5AHS:t10
1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
ACTION
xo^- ova- r\
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G E g ^
SUBJECT:
Purpose
8/U/15
Your Trip t o Europe i n May
To approve the o u t l i n e o f your May t r i p t o Europe and decide
whether t o stop i n London f o r a meeting w i t h Tony B l a i r .
Background
You w i l l be making a short t r i p t o Europe i n l a t e May. At t h i s
p o i n t , you w i l l be departing the evening o f Memorial Day, Monday,
May 26 and r e t u r n i n g Thursday, May 29. This t r i p w i l l focus
l a r g e l y on European s e c u r i t y i n the run-up t o the Madrid NATO
Summit i n July.
There are two a l t e r n a t i v e scenarios f o r the t r i p . I f we succeed
i n n e g o t i a t i n g a NATO-Russia agreement w i t h Moscow (and we are
c a u t i o u s l y o p t i m i s t i c ) , then the f i r s t major event o f your t r i p
w i l l be a NATO-Russia Summit May 27 i n Paris. A NATO-Russia
agreement would be a major step toward achieving your v i s i o n o f a
democratic, undivided and prosperous Europe. The Summit and
r e l a t e d events would take v i r t u a l l y a l l day Tuesday.
For May 28, you have accepted the i n v i t a t i o n o f the Dutch
Government t o v i s i t The Hague t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the semiannual
U.S.-EU Summit and d e l i v e r an address commemorating the 50th
anniversary o f the Marshall Plan. We envisage t h a t address as a
major speech t o the people o f Europe l i n k i n g your v i s i o n f o r
Europe's f u t u r e w i t h the generosity and commitment o f the
Marshall Plan. The Dutch have i n v i t e d each o f the 52 OSCE
countries t o send t h e i r heads of state or government and two
youth leaders t o the Marshall event; a t t h i s p o i n t we expect 40
of those leaders, i n c l u d i n g Kohl and p o s s i b l y Y e l t s i n , t o attend.
There w i l l not be time f o r b i l a t e r a l meetings i n the Hague but
Queen B e a t r i x w i l l host a luncheon i n your honor f o r the v i s i t i n g
leaders.
•CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On:
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
5/2/07
-G6NRBENT1AL
CNO LR R POOOY
LT N B A Y H T C P
I
I
�•CONFI DENT IAL
The t h i r d major piece o f the t r i p , subject t o your agreement,
would be a short stop i n London t o meet w i t h Tony B l a i r . A stop
i n London would be seen by the B r i t i s h p u b l i c as a compliment t o
B l a i r and would set the stage f o r what we expect t o be an
extremely productive r e l a t i o n s h i p . We would also recommend t h a t
you use an e a r l y meeting w i t h B l a i r t o encourage him t o t r y t o
make progress on Northern I r e l a n d r i g h t away, rather than p u t t i n g
i t on the back burner. I f there i s a NATO-Russia Summit May 27
you could stop i n London on your way back t o Washington May 29;
i f there i s no Summit, you could stop there on your way t o The
Hague May 27.
I w i l l send you a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f the themes and
goals o f the t r i p closer t o the event; a t t h i s p o i n t I would
appreciate your agreement t o the o u t l i n e described above and your
decision on London.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the general o u t l i n e f o r the t r i p described
above.
Approve
Disapprove
That you agree t o stop in-^London t o see Tony B l a i r ,
Approve
Disapprove
-CONFIDENTIAL.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
�mmm
-\o-'(n
3996
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
June 1 0 , 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
61/
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
Your Phone C a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
June 10, 1997, 2:45 p.m.
My c o u n t e r p a r t John Holmes c a l l e d t o ask t h a t you accept a c a l l
from Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t h i s a f t e r n o o n . B l a i r wants t o g i v e
you an update on t h e B r i t i s h response t o t h e f o u r issues Sinn
Fein has s a i d must be s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h e y can go t o t h e IRA f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . We expect B l a i r w i l l a l s o ask t h a t you take a tough
l i n e on t h e resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
I n h i s May 16 speech i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , B l a i r announced t h a t
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s would meet w i t h Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o
d i s c u s s t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r a c e a s e f i r e (the f i r s t such meetings
s i n c e t h e c e a s e f i r e was broken i n February 1996). There have
been two meetings so f a r . Sinn Fein has s a i d i t needs p r o g r e s s
on f o u r p o i n t s : a date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t a l k s once t h e r e
i s a c e a s e f i r e ; assurance t h a t t h e decommissioning i s s u e w i l l n o t
b l o c k m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s ; a timeframe t o ensure t h a t
n e g o t i a t i o n s do h o t go on i n d e f i n i t e l y ; and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g
measures from t h e B r i t i s h Government. Though Sinn Fein has n o t
s a i d so e x p l i c i t l y , i t should a l r e a d y be s a t i s f i e d on two o f
those p o i n t s : t h e timeframe and c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures
(e.g. t h e t r a n s f e r o f p r i s o n e r s , acknowledgment o f p a r t i a l
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e Great Famine, and Mo Mowlam's
comments on r e f o r m o f p o l i c e ) .
Sinn Fein has complained t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have n o t y e t s e t a f i r m
date f o r t h e i r e n t r y i n t o t a l k s c o n t i n g e n t on a c e a s e f i r e , b u t
t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h would be w i l l i n g t o do so.. I t
i s t h e decommissioning i s s u e t h a t may prove t h e most i n t r a c t a b l e .
D u b l i n and London are now w o r k i n g o u t t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s over how
t o handle t h i s i s s u e i n t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s , b u t they w i l l have t o
s e l l David T r i m b l e and t h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y on whatever p l a n
t h e y agree on. Up t o t h i s p o i n t , T r i m b l e has remained adamant
t h a t decommissioning must s t a r t b e f o r e t h e t a l k s move i n t o t h e i r
-6QKP-I DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
6/10/07
Nf IDbNTIftL'
CNO LR R POOOY
LT N B A Y HTCP
I
I
�j ON FIDEMTI AL
s u b s t a n t i v e phase; t h e governments want t o use M i t c h e l l ' s f o r m u l a
o f decommissioning " i n p a r a l l e l " w i t h progress i n n e g o t i a t i o n s .
About 10 days ago, what had looked l i k e a "de f a c t o " IRA
c e a s e f i r e began t o u n r a v e l when t h e IRA abandoned a van f u l l o f
e x p l o s i v e s ( r e p o r t e d l y n o t primed t o explode) t h a t was p r o b a b l y
on i t s way t o a m i l i t a r y s i t e . Today t h e IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s h o o t i n g a t t a c k on B r i t i s h t r o o p s i n which
no one was i n j u r e d .
The B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t they are deeply concerned about
the renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e , even i f i t has n o t c l a i m e d any
v i c t i m s y e t . B l a i r w i l l want your support i n condemning t h i s
v i o l e n c e and making c l e a r t o t h e IRA t h a t i t i s
c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e , as w e l l as wrong.
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
•CONn DENT IAL
n m i r n r k r IRI
C Ni E ifL
O rD Nll
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�tUNiiUimlnL
CONn DENT IAL
3996
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Northern I r e l a n d
General p o i n t s as a p p r o p r i a t e :
•
As always w i l l do what we can t o h e l p .
•
Renewal o f IRA v i o l e n c e deeply u n s e t t l i n g , coming as Sinn
Fein's e l e c t o r a l successes show t h a t they have a f u t u r e i f
they pursue t h e democratic p a t h .
•
With your government, e l e c t i o n o f Ahern, M i t c h e l l i n B e l f a s t
and my own commitment, IRA has best p o s s i b l e c o n s t e l l a t i o n .
I f t h e y do n o t grab o p p o r t u n i t y , agree t h a t t a l k s must move
ahiad w i t h o u t them (though w i t h o u t c l o s i n g door t o Sinn Fein
p a r t i c i p a t i o n on b a s i s o f a c e a s e f i r e . )
I f Blair
says
HMG o f f i c i a l s will
stop
meeting
with
Sinn
Fein:
•
Understand t h a t you f e e l you must do t h i s .
o n l y wrong b u t c o m p l e t e l y i l l o g i c a l .
•
Assume you w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek agreement w i t h D u b l i n on how
to handle decommissioning. S t i l l t h i n k you need t o p u t a l l
p i e c e s i n p l a c e so t h a t t h e r e i s no excuse f o r IRA n o t c a l l i n g
ceasefire.
•
W i l l you s t o p c o n t a c t s w i t h Sinn Fein
I f Blair
asks
for
strong
message
IRA v i o l e n c e n o t
indefinitely?
condemning
IRA
violence:
•
NSC (Jim S t e i n b e r g ) a l r e a d y p l a n s t o d e l i v e r tough message t o
Adams on resumption o f v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
(Call
w i l l p r o b a b l y take p l a c e Thursday).
•
I f asked: W i l l be happy t o have Mike McCurry make p u b l i c
statement condemning renewed v i o l e n c e .
•
I f appropriate:
I f you are n o t t a l k i n g t o Sinn Fein d i r e c t l y ,
we w i l l be happy t o pass any o t h e r messages you may have.
CONFI BEN'TTEMJ
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/10/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�xtntnijtfttW:
-COMF1 DEMT IAL
If Blair
discusses
progress
on Sinn
Fein's
four
points:
•
You have taken number o f c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g steps -- your
moves on p r i s o n e r s , your comment on t h e famine ( f i r s t B r i t i s h
acknowledgment o f some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . Mo Mowlam's remarks on
need f o r r e f o r m o f p o l i c i n g . A l l have made c l e a r your good
f a i t h , d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o addross a l l aspects o f problem.
•
On timeframe, agree t h a t May 1998 e x p i r a t i o n o f your
l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g t h e Forum i s n a t u r a l p e r i o d t o assess
progress o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
•
Urge you t o press ahead w i t h I r i s h t o reach agreement on how
to handle decommissioning and how t o s e l l i t t o T r i m b l e . I f
t h e r e i s any chance f o r c e a s e f i r e , w i l l o n l y happen i f IRA
assured Sinn Fein w i l l n o t be s t u c k i n t a l k s about
decommissioning.
•
On date f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y , have i m p r e s s i o n t h i s can be
worked o u t as l o n g as t a l k s do n o t proceed i n p l e n a r y s e s s i o n
w i t h o u t Sinn Fein a f t e r an IRA c e a s e f i r e .
New I r i s h Government
•
A l t h o u g h new government ( l e d by B e r t i e Ahern) w i l l n o t be
f o r m a l l y i n p l a c e u n t i l June 26, understand t o p I r i s h
o f f i c i a l s expect t o be empowered t o a c t when t h e y meet your
o f f i c i a l s next week t o d i s c u s s decommissioning.
•
Doubt you w i l l see change.in b a s i c I r i s h p o s i t i o n s on peace
p r o c e s s . What do you t h i n k ?
NATO
•
Have been c o n s i d e r i n g f u r t h e r which c o u n t r i e s t o i n v i t e t o
j o i n NATO a t Madrid and w i l l be meeting w i t h C o n g r e s s i o n a l
l e a d e r s tomorrow.
•
W i l l be i n touch w i t h you i n couple o f day t o d i s c u s s how t o
b r i n g t h i s issue t o closure w i t h i n A l l i a n c e — i f p o s s i b l e ,
w i t h o u t messy argument w i t h Jacques C h i r a c .
•
I f asked: S t i l l l e a n i n g toward s m a l l f i r s t group combined
w i t h s t r o n g "open door" t o assure those.not s e l e c t e d t h a t
process w i l l c o n t i n u e . W i l l e l a b o r a t e when we t a l k a g a i n .
•€0NFI DENT TAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
• O r I TA
C NDN I L
i
�SQNriDCNTlAL-
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: SUM2, BASS, BERGER, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, STEINBERG, HOTLINEJN, PETERS,
VERSHBOW
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG: 111 845Z JUN 97
FM: CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:
THE WHITE HOUSE
////
C O N F I D E N T I A L - VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
11 JUNE 1997.
CONriDCHTIAfc AND PERSONAL
DEAR BILL
IT WAS GOOD TO TALK TO YOU ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT, PARTICULARLY
ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR AGREEING TO USE YOUR
INFLUENCE WITH SINN FEIN TO PUT A STOP TO RENEWED IRA VIOLENCE, WHICH
COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES JUST AT THE TIME WHEN WE ARE
TRYING TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. THE KILLING OF A LOYALIST TERRORIST
THIS MORNING FURTHER INCREASES MY FEARS, ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THIS IS NOT YET CLEAR.
AS YOU KNOW, I WANT TO GET SINN FEIN INTO THE TALKS IF I CAN. WE HAVE
HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THEM AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION
ON VARIOUS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND TO SET OUT OUR OWN. I NOW
WANT OFFICIALS TO SEND THEM A SHORT PIECE OF PAPER BY THE END OF THIS
WEEK, SO THAT THEY CAN BE IN NO DOUBT OF WHERE WE STAND. I ATTACH A
COPY OF WHAT WE PROPOSE TO SEND. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD
TREAT THIS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FOR THE MOMENT. WE MAY WANT TO
ARRANGE A FURTHER MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH SINN FEIN EARLY NEXT
WEEK, BUT THAT ITSELF IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY CONTINUING IRA
VIOLENCE.
IN ANY CASE I PLAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT OUR POSITION, PROBABLY
NEXT WEEK. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN AGAIN OUR POSITION ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, DECOMMISSIONING, AND THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SET OUT THAT WE HAVE IN MIND A PERIOD OF
SOME SIX WEEKS TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE. IN OTHER WORDS A CEASEFIRE
IN MID-JUNE WOULD LEAD, IF IT WERE SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, TO
SINN FEINS FORMAL ENTRY INTO THE TALKS BY THE END OF JULY.
C I T N LB A Y P O O O Y
LN O I R R H T C P
___ ,
/ r
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c
c
,
7
_ _ _
PER E.O. 13526
• CONriDCNTIAL-
^ 3
- VHTX~
V\
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-CONriDCNTlAb"
I SHOULD ADD THAT I PROPOSE TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL
TALKS GET UNDER WAY IN SEPTEMBER, WHETHER SINN FEIN ARE IN THE TALKS
OR NOT. I AM NOT PRPEARED TO ALLOW FURTHER DELAY. SO SINN FEIN NEED
TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHETHER THEY WANT TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS OR NOT.
I HOPE YOU WILL BE READY TO SUPPORT FULLY THIS APPROACH. I AM
PREPARED TO MAKE A REASONABLE OFFER TO SINN FEIN, DESPITE THE RISKS
THIS ENTAILS. I HOPE THEY WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE POSITION OR MY
DETERMINATION. I WILL NOT TOLERATE AN APPROACH FROM THEM WHICH CLAIMS
TO BE POLITICAL BUT REMAINS UNDERPINNED BY VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF
IT. THEIR CURRENT TWIN-TRACK STRATEGY LEAVES ME GENUINELY ALARMED
ABOUT THEIR SINCERITY.
I WANT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS THIS SUMMER AND WILL DO EVERYTHING I
CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR INFLUENCE TO HELP ME
DO SO.
KINDEST REGARDS TO HILLARY.
YOURS EVER
TONY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AIDE MEMOIRE
MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE WAS
NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN FEINS.
THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON THE
POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN
INTO THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA
CEASEFIRE. NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT
OF VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN INCLUSIVE
BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE SINN FEIN
PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEINS ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE GROUND RULES
FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS LEGALLY
OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN SHE CONSIDERS THOSE
REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD
FAITH.
WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING
THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN
UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE, AND IS SATISFACTORY IN
WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO A PLENARY SESSION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT WOULD BE THE OCCASION
FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL 6
PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESo TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT
SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS OF'
PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR IT SUPPORTS PARALLELDECOMMISSIONING AS RECOMMENDED BY
MITCHELL AND THAT m W A N T ^ T O RESOLVE THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF TH^PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT DOES NOT BLOCK THE START
OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS WORKING
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. THIS CAN ONLY BE ON THE BASIS
OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS CAN
CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS? A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF
THE PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AND A
REVIEW MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW? A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? A
CONriDCNTIAL
�CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
-CONriDCNTIAL
COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET? A
COMMITMENT TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT? AND A
COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE
CAPABLE OF SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A
MORE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY-FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
#0001
NNNN
< "SECT > SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0001
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CONriDCNTIAL
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: COQ, PETERS, S U M 2 , VERSHBOW, NSC, BASS, BERGER, BRADEN, BROWN, DAVIES,
FUERTH, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, STEINBERG, TRIP
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CQMFIUENTIAL
DTG:1 3 2 1 4 5 Z JUN 97
F M : CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO:WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
///////CORRECTED COPY////////
CONriDCNTIAL
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM JOHN HOLMES
TO SANDY BERGER
DEAR SANDY
I WAS GRATEFUL THAT YOUR PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND SO QUICKLY TO
THE DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH WE SENT TO YOU UNDER COVER OF A LETTER
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT. WE HAVE TRIED TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE. I
NOW ENCLOSE A REVISED VERSION OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, WHICH WE ARE
PASSING TO SINN FEIN THIS EVENING.
YOURS EVER
JOHN HOLMES
BEGINS
AIDE MEMOIRE
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE
WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN
FEINS. THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON
THE POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.
FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN INTO
THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE.
NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT OF
VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN
INCLUSIVE BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE
SINN FEIN PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEIN'S ENTRY IS GOVERNED
BY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE
GROUND RULES FOR SUBSTANTIVE ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY
OF STATE IS LEGALLY OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN
SHE CONSIDERSTHOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL
JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.
SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND
DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. Tti!S_PERIOD
SHOULD BE USED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEEDSOFAlT
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
compcriTiAL
DECLASSIFIFD
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�CONriDCNTIAL
PARTIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO
ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH. WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY
MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS
SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE,
AND IS SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO
A PLENARY SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT
WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT
TO THE MITCHELL 6 PRINCIPLES.
IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID
BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER
MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT
CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO AN OFFICE
IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.
SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING,
THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY
1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION, AND THAT A
SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS
OF PROGRESS.
THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS
MADE IT CLEAR THAILULWANTfi TO RFSOI VF THIS RAPIDLY TO THE
SATISFACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT OOFS NOT BfOfflTTHE
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. REALISTICALLY, THIS CAN ONLY BE
ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT.
IT IS WORKING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SECURE AGREEMENT AMONfe
THE PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THIS BASIS. AS MUTUAL
PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS
CAN CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT
BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO
IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AN INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS; A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF THE
PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AND A REVIEW
MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE NEGOTIA1 IONS.
FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE
ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES
ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC
LAW; A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE; A
COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET; A COMMITMENT
TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT; AND A COMMITMENT TO
IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE CAPABLE OF
SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A MORE
INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM. IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER POINT
OF APPARENT CONCERN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS MADE CLEAR IT HAS
EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE VARIED CULTURAL TRADITIONS OF BOTH
COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING THE IRISH LANGUAGE AND CULTURE. IT ALSO
RECOGNISED THE PARTICULAR SENSITIVITIES OF PRISONER ISSUES ON ALL SIDES.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND
LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE
ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY
SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO
STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMEIDEffflAtr
IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, AND OTHER
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT.
SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS
NOTE ANSWERE THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA
CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET
OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.
ENDS
#0001
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0001
< TOR>970613201812 M2804944
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A
FROM:
Alexander R. Vershbow/National Security Council
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
CONriDENTIAL-
�COIttriDENTIAir
4 1 7 5 REDO
NATIONALSECURITYCOUNC.IL
W A S H I N G T O N . D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW fo
FROM:
MARY ANN PETER^i
SUBJECT:
Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d / R e p l y t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
As you r e c a l l , Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent t h e P r e s i d e n t a message
l a s t week c o v e r i n g t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r t o Sinn
Fein on Sinn Fein's e n t r y i n t o t h e peace t a l k s i f an u n e q u i v o c a l
c e a s e - f i r e i s d e c l a r e d . We had i n t e n d e d t o send a P r e s i d e n t i a l
r e p l y l a t e r t h i s week, f o l l o w i n g Jim's planned c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
Adams t o get Sinn Fein's i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
In l i g h t o f t h e IRA murders today, Jim d i d n o t t a l k t o Adams.
However, a P r e s i d e n t i a l l e t t e r i s needed i n any event t o express
sympathy on t h e l o s s o f t h e policemen. We recommend u s i n g t h e
l e t t e r a l s o t o make c l e a r t h a t we t h i n k t h e o f f e r i s a good one
and t o pass on a message Mary Ann g o t from Sinn Fein today.
The l o c a l F r i e n d s o f Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Mairead Keane,
c a l l e d Mary Ann w i t h a message from Adams. He s a i d t o t e l l us
t h a t he w i l l n o t be d i s t r a c t e d by t h e IRA a t t a c k from t h e t a s k o f
g e t t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e IRA's ongoing campaign.
Adams s a i d Sinn Fein had r e c e i v e d t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r F r i d a y and
Sinn F e i n (read IRA) a r e s t u d y i n g i t ; though t h e r e remains a
problem w i t h decommissioning, t h e d r a f t c o n t a i n s p o s i t i v e
elements.
I f i t would be u s e f u l , Adams s a i d , he i s ready t o t a l k
to J i m about t h i s .
The bottom l i n e appears t o be t h a t today's
a t t a c k was n o t i n t e n d e d as a response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Tab C F i n a l Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Tab D Incoming Correspondence
-CONFIDENTIAfc
Reason:—TTSb
D e c l a s s i f y On:
PER E.O. 13526
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
WMS-O^"?* - H
�COUriDEUTraiT
417 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. F u t u r e Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
The B r i t i s h government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the B r i t i s h a r e g o i n g t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f the murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
CONFIDENTTm
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
1
6/16/07
1^17^1 ACC¥17'I"E'r&
UtA^A&MffliLD
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the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
We w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o g e t t o a c e a s e - f i r e on t h e
b a s i s o f t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r i n s p i t e o f t h e murders o f t h e
policemen. P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o
underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l commitment t o t h e process,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n
early July.
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Gerry Adams today t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders.
However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve
t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r
B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn F e i n
Incoming Message
CITN LBAY P O O O Y
LNO IRR H T C P
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONFIDENTIAL
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. YOU HAVE MY
SINCERE SYMPATHY AMD HILLARY'S. OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG
FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN. PRIOR TO
HIE ATROCITY ON MONDAY, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JIM
STEINBERG, HAD INTENDED TO TALK TO ADAMS AND TELL HIM THAT WE
BEIrl-EVE-^OUR-OFFSR-^-S FORTHCOMI-NG-AN-B—SER IOU-S—AND—T-HAT THE IRA
SHOULD ACT ON I T WITHOUT DELAY. BECAUSE OF THE MURDERS/ JIM DID
NOT GET I N TOUCH WITH ADAMS, F o l l o w i n g our phone c a l l , my Deputy
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r , Jim S t e i n b e r g , c o n t a c t e d Adams t o pass
on my deep concern about the c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e , and t o urge a
f o r t h c o m i n g response t o y o u i e f f o r t s . We had planned t o f o l l o w
up on Monday, b u t p u t o f f the c a l l f o l l o w i n g t h e murders. BUT
SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF I T WAS THAT
NO^H^NG—SHOULD BE REAB-INTO THE ATTACK BEYON-B-T-H-E-which was t h a t
t h e a t t a c k was n o t i n response t o your p r o p o s a l , b u t r a t h e r a
CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN. WE TAKE THAT TO MEAN THAT
SINN FEIN DOES NOT WANT THE MURDERS TO BE SEEN AS THE
RE-PUBixiGANS-* RBSFQNSS TO YOUR—OFFER-; WHILE I AM NOT REPOSING
ANY CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO
YOU.
SANDY BERGER AND JIM STEINBERG ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR
OFFICIALS AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE
TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE
CRIME. WE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I
LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^OV^ - 0\"72. -
�'•GONFIDENTIAL
4175
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
.To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA c l a i m e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
democratic process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g the p r o s p e c t s f o r g e t t i n g Sinn F e i n i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by the press s e c r e t a r y warning
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was
p r o b a b l y planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , n o n e t h e l e s s
the IRA c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f the policemen i n t h e face o f
c l e a r warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e - f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d
s u g g e s t i o n s from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t
the B r i t i s h and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c
agreement on how t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process,
.CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
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t h i s i s t h e b e s t o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h . I t
would a l l o w them i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n 6 weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
a m e a n i n g f u l c e a s e - f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t
be a l l o w e d t o d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l
timeframe f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d w i l l r e t u r n t o
the l e v e l s c f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i f t o f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s . Nonetheless, t h e
B r i t i s h have made c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e
r e a s o n a b l y near f u t u r e (perhaps by t h i s f a l l ) t h e y w i l l t r y t o
move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn F e i n . Meanwhile,
t?he o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o c o n t i n u e t o t r y t o p u t t o g e t h e r a
deal f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on
the t a b l e , we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o s u p p o r t them and
the I r i s h a t t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y t i n c . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l
want t o t a k e a h i g h p r o f i l e t o underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l
o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and commitment t o peace and
reconciliation,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e worst o f t h e marching season
approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim S t e i n b e r g had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because
of t h e murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d
c a l l an NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does
not i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business,
of g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d read
n o t h i n g i n t o t h e a t t a c k beyond t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e IRA
campaign. We b e l i e v e t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us
t h a t t h e a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r .
The B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s
are p l a n n e d w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r
know t h a t we heard t h i s from Adams.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e message t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
Approve
•CQMJf-lbLiN'l I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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33
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab
Tab
Tab
Tab
A
B
C
D
Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Statement on Murders i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
Text o f B r i t i s h O f f e r t o Sinn Fein
Incoming Message
C
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�COHriDDNTIAtr
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on N o r t h e r n
Ireland
Purpose
To express condolences on t h e deaths o f t h e two policemen who
were murdered by t h e IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn F e i n .
Background
On June 16, two policemen w a l k i n g a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan.
The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a t t a c k w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and B r u t o n
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were b o t h i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU'Summit; b o t h i s s u e d s t r o n g statements condemning t h e
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern i s s u e d a p a s s i o n a t e
statement, c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o disabuse r e p u b l i c a n s o f t h e n o t i o n
t h a t a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy i s s u e d h i s s t r o n g e s t d e n u n c i a t i o n y e t o f t h e
r e p u b l i c a n t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e
d e m o c r a t i c process.
The statement we i s s u e d i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
F o l l o w i n g up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim S t e i n b e r g made c l e a r
t o Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t t h e v i o l e n c e i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d was t h r e a t e n i n g t h e prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We a l s o i s s u e d a statement by t h e press s e c r e t a r y w a r n i n g
a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . While t h e a t t a c k was p r o b a b l y
planned w e l l b e f o r e our message was g i v e n , nonetheless t h e IRA
c a r r i e d o u t t h e murder o f t h e policemen i n t h e face o f c l e a r
warnings from t h e B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein e n t r y i n t o t h e B e l f a s t t a l k s on t h e b a s i s o f
an u n e q u i v o c a l c e a s e f i r e . The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d s u g g e s t i o n s
from us and from t h e I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
COMF1 DENT-£ftj=r
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
6/16/07
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CITN LBAY P O O O Y
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�CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
CONFIDENTIAh
t o handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are going t o w i t h d r a w t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e reasonably near
f u t u r e ( p r r h n p n b y t h i n f n l l ) t h r y w i l l t r y tc move t h e peace
process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
t o underscore your continusra p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
worst o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim Sfcoinborflp had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his
initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because
of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did
call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does
not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business
of getting a political process going and that we should read
nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA
campaign^ ^BTn . bn ] i
the purpose of the message was to tell us
that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer.*
The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks^
are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair
know that we heard this from Adams. /L
RECOfoM^NDATION
That you
CONFIDENTIAL
the
mes^ctge t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r a t Tab A.
�COMF1DENTIAL
3
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime Minister B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
�CONn DENT I A I T
4175
THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H I N GTO N
17 .^.'f'J-3
June 17, 1997
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE P E DENT
R'
KBH
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGEI^/
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on Northern I r e l a n d
Purpose
To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who
were murdered by the IRA June 16 and t o pass on a message from
Sinn Fein.
Background
On June 16, two policemen walking a beat were shot and k i l l e d i n
the Northern I r e l a n d town o f Lurgan. The IRA claimed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the attack w i t h i n hours. B l a i r and Bruton
(who i s s t i l l Taoiseach u n t i l June 26) were both i n Amsterdam f o r
the EU Summit; both issued strong statements condemning the
murders. Future Taoiseach B e r t i e Ahern issued a passionate
statement, c l e a r l y intended t o disabuse republicans o f the n o t i o n
that a Fianna F a i l prime m i n i s t e r w i l l be s o f t on v i o l e n c e .
Senator Kennedy issued h i s strongest denunciation yet of the
republican t a c t i c o f seeking t o combine violence w i t h the
democratic process. The statement we issued i n your name i s a t
Tab B.
Following up on B l a i r ' s request t o you, Jim Steinberg made clear
to Adams l a s t week your concern t h a t the violence i n Northern
I r e l a n d was threatening the prospects f o r g e t t i n g Sinn Fein i n t o
t a l k s . We also issued a statement by the press secretary warning
against violence a t t h i s juncture. While the a t t a c k was probably
planned w e l l before our message was given, nonetheless the IRA
c a r r i e d out the murder of the policemen i n the face o f clear
warnings from the B r i t i s h and from us.
The B r i t i s h Government had passed t o Sinn Fein on June 13 i t s
o f f e r f o r Sinn Fein entry i n t o the Belfast t a l k s on the basis o f
an unequivocal ceasefire. The t e x t (Tab C) r e f l e c t e d suggestions
from us and from the I r i s h Government. Assuming t h a t the B r i t i s h
and I r i s h governments can reach a more s p e c i f i c agreement on how
•CONFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b
D e c l a s s i f y On:
cc: Vice President
Chief- of S t a f f
6/16/07
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DEMTIAL
to handle decommissioning i n t h e t a l k s process, t h i s i s t h e best
o f f e r Sinn Fein can expect from t h e B r i t i s h .
I t would a l l o w them
i n t o t a l k s w i t h i n s i x weeks o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a m e a n i n g f u l
c e a s e f i r e ; i t s t a t e s t h a t decommissioning w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o
d e l a y s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; promises a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g measures; and s e t s May 1998 as t h e n o t i o n a l timeframe
for completion of negotiations.
We have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e going t o withdraw t h e
o f f e r i n t h e wake o f t h e murders, though B l a i r d i d announce t h a t
the B r i t i s h have c a l l e d o f f t h e meeting w i t h Sinn Fein scheduled
f o r t h i s week. B l a i r w i l l a l s o p r o b a b l y postpone t h e p u b l i c
announcement o f t h e elements o f t h e o f f e r .
There a r e no a t t r a c t i v e choices i n t h e wake o f t h e murders: i f
the B r i t i s h withdraw t h e i r o f f e r , v i o l e n c e c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e
l e v e l s o f t h e "The T r o u b l e s " w i t h l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n f o r s e v e r a l years. Nonetheless, t h e B r i t i s h have made
c l e a r t h a t i f no c e a s e f i r e i s d e c l a r e d i n t h e r e a s o n a b l y near
f u t u r e t h e y w i l l t r y t o move t h e peace process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t
Sinn Fein ( p r o b a b l y i n September). Meanwhile, t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o continue t o t r y t o put together a deal f o r a
c e a s e f i r e . Assuming t h e B r i t i s h leave t h e i r o f f e r on t h e t a b l e ,
we w i l l be w o r k i n g on a s t r a t e g y t o support them and t h e I r i s h a t
t h i s c r u c i a l t i m e . P u b l i c l y , we w i l l want t o take a h i g h p r o f i l e
to underscore your c o n t i n u e d p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and
commitment t o peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e
w o r s t o f t h e marching season approaches i n e a r l y J u l y .
Jim had planned t o t a l k t o Adams June 16 t o g e t h i s i n i t i a l
r e a c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t d i d n o t do so because o f t h e
murders. However, t h e l o c a l Sinn Fein r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d c a l l an
NSC s t a f f member w i t h a message from Adams t h a t he does n o t
i n t e n d t o be " d i s t r a c t e d " by today's a t t a c k from t h e business o f
g e t t i n g a p o l i t i c a l process going and t h a t we s h o u l d r e a d n o t h i n g
i n t o t h e a t t a c k ; t h e purpose o f t h e message was t o t e l l us t h a t
the a t t a c k i s n o t any k i n d o f response t o t h e B r i t i s h o f f e r , b u t
a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e ongoing campaign a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h .
The
B r i t i s h a l r e a d y r e a l i z e t h i s , as t h e y know t h a t such a t t a c k s are
planned w e l l i n advance, b u t we recommend t h a t you l e t B l a i r know
what we heard from Adams. Adams' message i s , o f course,
d i s i n g e n u o u s s i n c e Monday's a t t a c k c o u l d presumably have been
c a l l e d o f f i f t h e IRA l e a d e r s h i p had wanted t o do so. From t h e
r e p u b l i c a n s ' warped p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e v i o l e n c e w i l l c o n t i n u e
unless an a c t u a l d e a l i s reached on a c e a s e f i r e . They may a l s o
be under t h e m i s t a k e n i m p r e s s i o n t h a t c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e w i l l
soften the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n .
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e r e p l y t o B l a i r ' s message t h a t I
a u t h o r i z e d on your b e h a l f .
C 0 1 i r i D E
"
T I A L
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-
CONriDENTIAL
Attachments
Tab A Reply t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Statement on Murders i n Northern I r e l a n d
Tab C Text of B r i t i s h Offer to Sinn Fein
Tab D Incoming Message
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
�PREC: .
IMMEDIATE
CLASS:
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT: MESSAGE F O THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
RM
(BEGIN TEXT)
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS
MURDER OF THE T O POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. OUR HEARTS G
W
O
OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT W S IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN
A
BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO
ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE
MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY
IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING
THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN.
FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
JIM STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT
THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO
YOUR EFFORTS. W HAD PLANNED TO FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF
E
THE CALL FOLLOWING THE MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE
TO US; THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK W S NOT IN
A
RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S
CAMPAIGN. WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR G O FAITH, I
OD
WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER IS PREPARED TO W R WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND WITH THE
OK
IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE PEACE
PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. W WILL HAVE
E
THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOUR THERE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
(END TEXT)
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
3/fc/iS rtBM
�IMMEDIATE
CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
C NO LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UT N
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BASS BERGER BRADEN COMM DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: COQ FICKLIN FRIEDRICH MILLISON PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTI-AL
<DTG> 1723 36Z JUN 97
PM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
INFO ////
• C O N F I D E N T I A L
QQQQ
V I A CABINET CHANNELS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR TONY:
LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S
VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN I N NORTHERN IRELAND.
OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.
I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS I N STEP WITH WHAT YOU,
JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR
KENNEDY HAS ALSO ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN
CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT I T REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER I T
WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT.
I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK
FORWARDING THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN
FEIN. FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, J I M STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP
CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A
FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO YOUR EFFORTS. WE HAD PLANNED TO
FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF THE CALL FOLLOWING THE
MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF
WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK WAS NOT I N RESPONSE TO YOUR
PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN.
WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE I N THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED
TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.
SANDY BERGER I S PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND
WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE
PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK I N SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL
HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY I N DENVER. I LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SINCERELY,
BILL
CONFIDCNTIAL
�IMMEDIATE
-GONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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#4332
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<"SSN>4332
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CONFIDENTIAL
�bOlNl'WElM HAL - PERSONAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
31 July 1997
THE PRIME MINISTER
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
^o\S- OV72.- n
)
When we spoke on the telephone on Sunday, I promised to send you some
more specific thoughts on Northern Ireland and areas where you may be able to
help.
As we agreed, the renewed IRA ceasefire offers a new opportunity to
move to a lasting political settlement and the lasting peace which the people of
Northern Ireland are so desperate to see. Halting violence is a very welcome
move by the republicans. As the word suggests, a ceasefire is not of course the
same as peace. We must all work very hard to turn what may be currently no
more than a tactical move by the republican movement into a permanent
abandonment of violence and commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic
means. Nothing else will do in the end. This means keeping up the pressure on
Sinn Fein to move away from a twin-track strategy of politics and violence to
politics alone. Your influence may be very important here. I hope your
response to Sinn Fein over the next few months will be carefully graduated to
reflect real progress in consolidating the ceasefire and making it permanent.
It is the issue of permanence which gives the vexed question of the
decommissioning of illegally held arms its importance, particularly in Unionist
�-CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
2
- •
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O V
HTCP
eyes but also in our own. Of course decommissioned arms could be replaced,
even if the decommissioning process were complete. But readiness to
decommission implies readiness to give up violence. That is why Sinn Fein
statements that the IRA will not give up a single weapon cause such disquiet, and
are so unhelpful in terms of keeping the Ulster Unionists tied in to the multi-party
process.
We spoke about how you might be able to help influence David Trimble.
As I said, I think it is useful if the Administration keeps in close touch with him,
to show that his effort to stay in the process is both important and appreciated,
and to reinforce that you are even-handed in dealings with both communities (the
Unionists will obviously be watching your contacts with Sinn Fein very closely).
Anything you can say to show understanding of the Ulster Unionist concerns
about decommissioning would also be helpful. I hope that we and the Irish
Government may be able to say a little more in due course about our own desire
to see at least some actual decommissioning during negotiations, in accordance
with George Mitchell's proposals. This may be very important in influencing
David Trimble towards staying in the talks.
I also mentioned to you my desire to do more to harness the strong desire
of the people of Northern Ireland for a settlement, by showing them that this is
now a real prospect with high-level international support. You may be able to
play a key role in this at the right moment, when substantive talks are well under
way. I hope we can be in touch about this in the autumn.
�•GONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL
-3CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I am absolutely determined to make progress soon on the substance of the
Northern Ireland issue. That is why I have set a timetable of September-May for
a settlement to come out of negotiations. This is an arbitrary target, but I believe
it can be achieved if all concerned are prepared to put aside old enmities and
prejudices. Our aim must be to create conditions where they can most easily do
so.
(/
The President of the United States of America
�O LIBRARY P O O O Y
N
HTCP
IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
2 October 1997
I am pleased to say that in the past couple of weeks we have made progress
in Northern Ireland. As you will have heard, Sinn Fein have joined the talks and
sworn their commitment to the Mitchell principles; we have kept the Ulster
Unionists in play - though only just; we succeeded in finding a procedural way
through the decommissioning problem for now and ultimately got agreement to
move, at last, into the substantive talks.
This is all good news. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists and one of the
other smaller Unionist parties have withdrawn from the discussions but otherwise
the pieces are now in place for us to press on with the real negotiations. As
always, part of the credit must go to George Mitchell and the other independent
chairmen who have skilfully helped to guide the parties round the obstacles.
I also want you to know how grateful I am to you for providing
Ambassador Donald Johns on as a member of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning, which was formally established on
24 September, and to Ambassador Johnson for agreeing to take on this
challenging role. The Commission is now ready to commence work on
decommissioning alongside the substantive negotiations. It marks an important
�LINTON LIBRARY P C P
H OY
-2-
step in our objective to bring about an enduring political settlement in Northern
Ireland by May next year. As before, we have found we can rely on you to give
generous and speedy assistance. I am most grateful.
Both communities will need constant encouragement to make the most of
the opportunity so painstakingly created. I know I can look to you for help over
this. I look forward to staying in close touch.
/
J
(
The President of the United States of America
�CONriDCNTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
57 07 REDO 4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
October 2, 1997
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER fP)
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER '• j
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r , Prime M i n i s t e r
of t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
The P r e s i d e n t and B l a i r have kept i n r e g u l a r touch on N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d and o t h e r issues. There have been v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t
developments i n B e l f a s t , t h e s u b j e c t o f a B l a i r l e t t e r t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t dated October 2. P r i o r t o t h a t , t h e P r e s i d e n t c a l l e d
the Prime M i n i s t e r September 1. E a r l i e r , B l a i r wrote t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t f o l l o w i n g t h e i r phone c o n v e r s a t i o n J u l y 27 conveying
h i s thoughts on t h e Northern I r e l a n d peace process, asking t h a t
we f i n d ways t o support t h e U n i o n i s t s . I t would be a p p r o p r i a t e ,
now t h a t t h e t a l k s are due t o s t a r t and Trimble w i l l see t h e
P r e s i d e n t and you October 7, f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o send a
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y l e t t e r . Attached a t Tab I f o r your approval i s
your memorandum t o t h e President f o r w a r d i n g a d r a f t message t o
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r i n b o t h signed o r i g i n a l (TaD A) and cable
format (Tab B ) .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo t o t h e President a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memo
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
t o the President
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Cable v e r s i o n o f l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Incoming Correspondence
•CONFI DEN^Ma
Reason: 1.5d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
09/30/07
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
3/{p/i5" K 8 H
�COMF1DENTIAL
5707
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
Purpose
To c o n g r a t u l a t e Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on recent developments i n
Northern I r e l a n d .
Background
You spoke w i t h B l a i r October 9 b r i e f l y on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
B l a i r w r o t e you October 2 w i t h an update. W i t h t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
t a l k s underway, i t i s w o r t h c o n g r a t u l a t i n g B l a i r f o r t h e
breakthroughs i n B e l f a s t which have made t h i s p o s s i b l e . E a r l i e r
i n t h e summer he conveyed h i s impressions on t h e process ( l e t t e r
a t t a c h e d a t Tab C), and asked t h a t you look f o r ways t o support
David T r i m b l e , who you d i d October 7. A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s your
l e t t e r on these developments.
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r t o Tony B l a i r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Cable V e r s i o n o f L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab C Incoming correspondence
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SI\*llS KBH
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/30/07
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�)
HOUTINE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
"? t 7 ^
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RI£EE SIT
SeBERBfiRG STEINBERG
SIT: BANDLER FICKLIN POOLE RIEDEL SUM2
SIT: HOTLINE_IN
<PREC> ROUTINE
<CLAS> UUNtIDENTIAL" <DTG> 082245Z NOV 97
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO-WHITE HOUSE
INFO / / / /
C O W F I D E M T 1 A L VIA CABINET CHANNELS
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
1.0\?> - O ^ T . - H
FM THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ONCE MORE, WE FACE A TEST OF OUR RESOLVE OVER IRAQ AND THE
DANGERS POSED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. I KNOW THIS
WILL BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU, AS I T I S TO ME.
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, AS I N THE PAST, WE MUST STAND ABSOLUTELY
FIRM AND ABSOLUTELY TOGETHER. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN
ACHIEVE THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF UNSCOM RESUMING ITS OPERATIONS
AND COMPLETING ITS WORK I N AN UNFETTERED WAY. CLEARLY OUR
PREFERENCE MUST BE FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION I F ONE CAN BE
FOUND. EQUALLY, I N THE LAST RESORT, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO
CONTEMPLATE OTHER MEANS.
WE WILL FACE A SIGNIFICANT TEST I N THE SECURITY COUNCIL I N
THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
AND PARTICULARLY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, I S ESSENTIAL I F WE
ARE TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM. BUT WE MUST AT THE SAME
TIME WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THIS MESSAGE I S ROBUST ENOUGH
TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT, WHILE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE EVENTUAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE UNSCOM HAS FULLY AND
SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED ITS TASK. THAT WILL NOT BE AN EASY
BALANCE TO STRIKE, GIVEN THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME TO CONTEMPLATE
FURTHER ACTION AGAINST IRAQ.
I AM PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSIONS AT
THE END OF LAST WEEK WITH JACQUES CHIRAC. AS YOU WILL KNOW,
HE HAS STRONG PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.
SO WE WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY HARD TO KEEP THE FRENCH WITH US,
NOT TO MENTION THE RUSSIANS. I N THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MUST
BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THEM, AS FAR AS WE CAN, TO ENSURE
THERE I S NO POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
US BECAUSE OF ALLEGED LACK OF CONSULTATION.
I KNOW OUR PEOPLE ARE I N VERY CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT ALL THIS ALREADY,
BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW PERSONALLY THE STRENGTH OF MY SUPPORT FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�ROUTINE
CONriDENTIALWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
YOU I N THE PRESENT SITUATION. I WILL BE MAKING THIS VERY CLEAR I N A
SPEECH ON MONDAY. I F WE NEED TO TALK BEFORE THEN, I WILL OF COURSE
BE HAPPY TO DO SO.
#0001
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�7717
P o i n t s f o r - g f e g i d c a L i a l r ^ l l t o /PM^Tony B l a i r
_ii^r47^
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and n r ^ ^ ^ ^
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York y e s t e r d a y ^ g e t - t t e a
c l e a r statement from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o
s t e p back.
•
Saddam's announcement today t o expel t h e Americans i s a c l e a r
r e p u d i a t i o n o f the S e c u r i t y Council's w i l l .
We s u p p o r t
Ambassador B u t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o withdraw UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from
Iraq.
•
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o seek d i p l o m a t i c means t o t u r n back I r a q ' s
c h a l l e n g e . S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t w i l l be i n London tomorrow, and
she w i l l l a y o u t t o Robin Cooke our ideas on how t o move
f o r w a r d t o g e t h e r on t h i s c h a l l e n g e , and how t o work t o g e t h e r
w i t h t h e French and Russians.
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me should we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
Once t h e UNSCOM s t a f f e r s are o u t o f I r a q tomorrow, I p l a n t o
announce t h e i n c r e a s e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y assets i n t h e G u l f
region.
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s means movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r USS George Washington t o t h e G u l f .
•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g t h e U-2 f l i g h t i n s u p p o r t UNSCOM
t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o c o n s u l t c l o s e l y d u r i n g t h i s . p e r i o d . As ever, I
t a k e s t r e n g t h from t h e c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
DECLASSIFIED
r
.
( l i ^ ^ . I-S.
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
S / L , / ^ KBH
�-eemfclbENllAL
7717
THE WHITE HOUSE
. '97 NOU 14 PMb-3b
f
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1997
TELEPHONE CALL TO
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE F r i d a y , November 14, 1997
LOCATION Oval O f f i c e
TIME TBD
FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER ( M
I.
PURPOSE
Place phone c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r t o respond
t o h i s November 8 l e t t e r (Tab B) on t h e I r a q c h a l l e n g e , t o
a d v i s e him o f our deployment o f a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s t o t h e
P e r s i a n G u l f and t o ask t h a t he be w i t h us as we move
forward.
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r ' s l e t t e r was w r i t t e n b e f o r e t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n was passed, and p r i o r t o Thursday's demand t h a t
UNSCOM remove a l l Americans i m m e d i a t e l y . As i n p a s t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h I r a q , t h e B r i t i s h have been b o t h
r e s o l u t e and d e s i r o u s o f f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n . Y o u ' l l want t o
e x p l a i n our planned movement o f t h e USS George Washington
t o t h e r e g i o n , and press f o r h i s support i f and when we
need t o b u i l d t h e case f o r use o f f o r c e . You can commit t o
c l o s e s t c o n s u l t a t i o n s as t h i s c r i s i s u n f o l d s .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made
Tab B
Incoming Cable
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENT tA=L-.
Reason:
1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/13/07
S/b/'S" K B H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
i 0 r
�rONFIDEMTIATr
7717
P o i n t s f o r C a l l t o Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r
•
A p p r e c i a t e v e r y much t h e message you sent me e a r l i e r t h i s
week. We share views on t h e t h r e a t I r a q poses w i t h i t s l a t e s t
a t t e m p t t o undermine UNSCOM, and how r e s o l u t e we must be.
•
Firmness i s e s s e n t i a l .
to Robin Cook.
•
I r a q ' s l a t e s t demand i s a v e r y s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e UN,
the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
•
Since Saddam c h a l l e n g e d us on October 29, we have t r i e d t o
work t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c means t o respond.
Your and my
c o u n t r i e s ' s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s i n New York on t h e r e s o l u t i o n
and on t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l statement produced c l e a r statements
from t h e C o u n c i l about t h e need f o r I r a q t o s t e p back.
•
Saddam's e x p u l s i o n o f t h e Americans i s a c l e a r r e p u d i a t i o n o f
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s w i l l . We s u p p o r t Ambassador B u t l e r ' s
d e c i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w UNSCOM p e r s o n n e l from I r a q .
•
Madeleine l a i d o u t t o Robin Cook our d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y .
Know t h a t Madeleine made these p o i n t s
•
F i r s t , m a i n t a i n UNSC u n i t y .
•
Second, press French and Russians t o use a l l o f t h e i r
l e v e r a g e t o g e t I r a q t o comply; i f t h e y f a i l , c h a l l e n g e
them t o j o i n us i n r a t c h e t i n g up p r e s s u r e .
•
F i n a l l y , your and my governments should d i s c u s s q u i e t l y
some c r e a t i v e means t o g i v e I r a q some " l i g h t a t t h e end o f
the t u n n e l " t h a t gets UNSCOM back o p e r a t i n g and c o n t i n u e s
our a b i l i t y t o c o n t a i n I r a q .
•
Tony, I have r e a l concerns t h a t diplomacy w i l l n o t be
sufficient.
I w i l l need you t o j o i n w i t h me s h o u l d we need t o
use m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
•
I announced y e s t e r d a y t h e movement o f t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r USS
George Washington t o t h e r e g i o n . I may announce f u r t h e r f o r c e
movements as necessary.
Know you have s t a r t e d moving HMS
Invincible.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
O-OVi - O V 7 a - W
S/k/iS" K 8 H
11/13/07
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•
We remain committed t o f l y i n g the U-2 f l i g h t i n support o f
UNSCOM t h i s weekend, and p e r i o d i c a l l y t h e r e a f t e r .
•
I want us t o consult closely during t h i s period. As ever, I
take strength from the close working r e l a t i o n s h i p we have. I
know t h a t I can count on you.
I f Asked:
Q.
Don't we need f i n d i n g of "material breach" t o conduct
m i l i t a r y operations?
A.
I f we can get Council on board t h a t would be e x c e l l e n t .
But we may not be able t o . Shouldn't l e t t h a t stop us from
t a k i n g necessary a c t i o n .
Our lawyers and yours are consulting on how t o handle.
Iraq-Potus-Blair-11-14
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�H e l w e g , M. D i a n a
Courtney, William H.
Thursday, November 20,1997 8:50 AM
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; ©NESASIA - NE/Sou
FW: Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin fOONriDCN
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
High
Importance:
FOR SANDY AND JIM FROM BILL
Embassy Moscow just called to say that a few minutes ago Yeltsin foreign policy aide Prihodkho had informed
them Yeltsin would call the President on Iraq. The call would most likely take place tomorrow, but timing was
unclear. We'll work with NESA on contingency talking points.
The President's doing a short note of the kind proposed below is now less urgent, but it would still be a good
gesture, especially if we could get it out today.
—Original Message
From:
Courtney, William H.
Sent:
Thursday, November 20, 1997 8:34 AM
To:
Malley, Robert; Helweg, M. Diana
Cc:
©RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject:
Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin [rnMFIDFNTIfll ]
Importance:
High
—
Now might be a good time for the President to write a short note to Yeltsin offering appropriate praise for
Russia's effort on Iraq, for CWC ratification and Yeltsin's China visit, and for the appointment yesterday of the
new, reformist economics minister, which will could help maintain international confidence in Russian economic
policy.
In his call on Sandy two weeks ago, Jim Collins suggested occasional handwritten notes to Yeltsin to bolster his
confidence and augur relations. Sandy agreed.
I would be grateful if you could run this proposal for a note by Sandy and Jim to see if they concur. Thanks.
^
,
.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
no
8/u/iS
r.
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
nirae.
*S>A
�SECRDT
:
" - ?- ';•-?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
07
'97 N0y2lPM8:2
INGTON
November 2 1 , 19 97
ACTION
/•
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
T
^'
FROM:
SAMUEL
BERGE^/
SUBJECT:
Messages t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n a n d ^ b a r t ' d ' ^ "
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r r e I r a q
'
\/
-1 •
'V
Purpose
Approval to send messages on Iraq to Presidents YeltsifcrTa'nd
Chirac and Prime Minister Blair.
^
'-//
;
Background
We have been a t t e m p t i n g t o arrange telephone c a l l s on I r a q from
you t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t Chirac and P r e s i d e n t
Yeltsin.
(We a l s o heard today from Embassy Moscow t h a t Y e l t s i n
wanted t o t a l k t o you and might t r y t o c a l l . )
Unfortunately,
g i v e n t h e time d i f f e r e n c e , no one was a v a i l a b l e t o t a k e a c a l l
y e s t e r d a y . We b e l i e v e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t immediate messages from
you conveying your thanks f o r t h e i r p e r s o n a l e f f o r t s on I r a q and
your t h o u g h t s on next steps w i l l be t h e most e f f e c t i v e way t o
d o u b l e - t r a c k any e v e n t u a l c a l l s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e a t t a c h e d message t o
P r e s i d e n t s Y e l t s i n and Chirac and Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Approve
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Message t o Russian P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n
Tab B Message t o French P r e s i d e n t Chirac
Tab C Message t o B r i t i s h PM B l a i r
-SECRET
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 11/20/2007
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.qrp.pg^.
�•OCCnCT/NODIC
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM :
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE /OLLOWIN^ MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT TI}E EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THE
RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY TO
ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE REDOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
IRAQ HAS/PROMISED TO COOPERATE
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW
TO TCWTHAT COOPERATION ON THE
WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NE
IOULD EXPECT AN END TO IRAQ'S
GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE
R
ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAM C UNSCOM INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A
CESSATION OF IRAQI THREAT^ AGAINST U-2 FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO ^NCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. I PROPOSE THAT OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES I N NEW
YORK WORK TOCCTIIER T^BRING THIS ABOUT QUICKLY. THE PEOPLE OF
IRAQ DESERVE OUR HE1
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST CHAPTER
OF THIS STORY HA^ NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL NEED TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM PLEASED
THAT STRONGLY /ETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY HIGHLY CREDIBLE
FORCE, APPEAR/ TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED
RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
.&/ic/\5
KBVj
�SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�IMMEDIATE
^ ~
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: COQ FICKLIN MARTY POOLE RIEDEL SUM2 f f L ^ W - i / ^ . ^ j d j L A
SIT: NSC
V
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CECRET
<DTG> 221819Z NOV 97
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
•- E C R E T
S
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5 482 G D G R E T
*
DEAR TONY:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE
THE RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY
TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE READOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.
WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW. IRAQ HAS PROMISED TO
COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NEED TO SEE THAT
COOPERATION ON THE GROUND AND I N THE AIR. WE SHOULD EXPECT
AN END TO IRAQ'S ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAMPER UNSCOM
INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A CESSATION OF IRAQI THREATS AGAINST U-2
FLIGHTS.
I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ DESERVE OUR HELP.
I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
-SECRET
-OMT31- H
8/t*/l5 KBH
�-fMMEpiATE
CCCnCTWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5 482 • O E C R E T "
CHAPTER OF THIS STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL
NEED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM
PLEASED THAT STRONGLY DETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY
HIGHLY CREDIBLE FORCE, APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A
PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT.
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>5482
<MSGID> M3038215
A
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�IO D O W N I N G STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
18 February 1998
THE PRIME MINISTER
> - . ,
I am writing to mention one matter I did not have the chance to raise
you during my visit to Washington.
I have recently learnt that the Kuwaitis may be on the point of selecting a
system to meet their requirement for self-propelled artillery, even though they
have given assurances that they would hold an open competition first. I
understand that the only real contenders in any such.competition would be your
M109 and our AS90. There are obviously arguments in favour of both.
Nevertheless, I strongly believe that the AS90 would be much better for the
Kuwaitis. I therefore hope that they will not be rushed into a decision and that
the two systems will be allowed to compete on equal terms.
(fW
The President of the United States of America
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Purpose
To respond t o a l e t t e r from B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r .
Background
/ l - r^
p
J
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!
1 •
•
J
Tony B l a i r wrDte you a-^r&fefee^j-4atod
FGbg^a-]^y----l-8T "btrtr-nert
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his i n t e r e s t i n
f i t J ^ U - J - ~ - ^ 'O
"
irl"~MaTre-h—Ay a - i ^ i i f ^ ^ us
Kttwa-i-t. We—have
•eas-systems --sa-l
e-E-i-€a-Jriy--l-ee-ked—up-t-h-i-s- sa-le^' fo^—a—se-li-ptope4ied--a-rti4-i&r-y
sy&t-enL. Your response acknowledges t h e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t and
notes t h a t i t i s up t o t h e K u w a i t i s t o decide which system i s
b e t t e r f o r them.
CJ
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
cc: V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
�-eeWFIDEMTIAL
1617
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C'. U N C I L
W A S H I N G T O N . D C . ZC
M
March 19, 199
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD K. BANDLER
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLE
SUBJECT:
B l a i r L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t on K ^ a i t A r t i l l e r y
Sale
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r sent a l e t t e r t o t h j ^ P r e s i d e n t , d a t e d
February 18 b u t n o t d e l i v e r e d u n t i l March 4, r e g a r d i n g
c o m p e t i t i o n t o s e l l a s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ^ a r t i l l e r y system t o Kuwait.
We have locked-up t h i s c o n t r a c t f o r /Our s u p e r i o r P a l a d i n system.
The B l a i r l e t t e r appears t o be a p/o forma appeal on b e h a l f o f
the competing B r i t i s h system. Gi/zen t h a t t h i s i s a done deal
f o r us, t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i r / the P r e s i d e n t r e p l y i n g i n
writing toBlair.
I n s t e a d , we/p op°se t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
respond t o t h i s l e t t e r t h e next time he and B l a i r speak on t h e
M i d d l e East; NESA would prepare a t a l k i n g p o i n t .
r
Concurrence by:
and St
Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That t h e P r e s i d e n t us4 h i s n e x t c a l l w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r
t o respond t o t h e I s x t e r .
. .
AprSrove
Blair
„-
.u
Disapprove
/ '
^
h
Attachment
Tab A Incoming correspondence
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
jason:
1.5(b)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/18/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/fr/i5" K8W
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1617 r e d o
W A S H I N G T O N . D C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 26, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
DONALD B A N D L E ^ O
FROM:
LAWRENCE E. BUTLER ;. ,
.'
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r t o UK Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on
Kuwait A r t i l l e r y Sale
As a p o s t s c r i p t t o h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t here February 5-7, Prime
Minister/v'wrote t h e P r e s i d e n t w i t h a p r o forma appeal f o r us t o
p u l l back from c l o s i n g an arms s a l e t o Kuwait. Your memorandum
c o v e r i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e p l y i s a t Tab I .
Concurrences by:
Joe Marty and Steve Simon
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o PM B l a i r
Tab B Incoming correspondence
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
�T H E W H I T E H( . S I :
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 6, 19 S
Dear Tony:
Thank you f o r your note on the Kuwaiti s e l f propelled a r t i l l e r y system sale. I can
appreciate your keen i n t e r e s t i n t h i s issue.
I am sure t h a t the U.K. and U.S. systems hot:
have strong merits ana that the Kuwaitis w i i :
face a d i f f i c u l t decision. I know you agree
that, i n the end, i t w i l l be up to the
Kuwaiti government to decide which system
best s u i t s t h e i r needs.
Again, thanks f o r your note.
w i t h you soon.
I hope to t a l k
Sincere i.y,
The Right Honorable Tony B l a i r ,
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
M.P.
C N O LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
UTN
�r
n
P'H i QHri
CONriDENTIAL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
May
8,
1998
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL B E R G ^ ^ ^
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
Tony B i a i r has asked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the M i d d l e East
Peace Process and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f o r e the May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22. He met w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t t o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g t h e A p r i l 10 Peace Accord and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were decommissioning, p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response t o a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f approved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes v o t e
enables people t o have a chance, a s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by t h e "no" v o t e campaign. His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k the r e l e a s e o f a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t the most c o n t e n t i o u s marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. This would have g i v e n ammunition t o t h e opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes v o t e on May 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech Wednesday accusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f " r u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are b e i n g c a r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r o f the accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r the accord — a b i t t e r blow t o I a n P a i s l e y .
Sinn Fein members w i l l vote Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n the new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p b u t t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
-60NFI DENT I Air
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
cc : Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
on?- : r j n n .
ULi^J! i u ' u ;
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMFIDEHTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reports
that they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an armored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-far
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North. B l a i r ' s people now b e l i e v e ,
since the problems w i t h the vote are i n the Unionist community,
a Blair-Ahern-Clinton event i s inadvisable; we w i l l work on
something w i t h you and B l a i r .
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l get you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans t o see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CONriDENTIAL
00^
UUr*
Ll'
8
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�n
CONriDDNTIAL
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3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
• Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group yesterday - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose father was k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. Their courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
• Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l help w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and t o support establishment o f the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r t h a t .
•
Powerful image of you and John Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you having any luck w i t h the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
Middle East Peace Process
• Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a t were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked f o r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s using t h i s time t o convince them of the need t o move
forward.
• He faces important decision — serious consequences whichever
path he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At B i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
ways t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
• We have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
diplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm not going t o s e l l A r a f a t out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENHftfr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5 / 7 / 0 8
DECLASSIFIED
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8/1*/ JT K6V1
C Ni E T L
O r NA
D I
�-CONFIDENTIAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, not a
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannot.
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n the peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadership conference;
made clear that while I am best f r i e n d I s r a e l has ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s .
•
Dennis should be back by the time I see you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n depth.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COMF1DENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s support group y e s t e r d a y - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who p o s t
sons, and a M e t h o d i s t preacher whose f a t h e r was k i l L e d .
They
are t h e reason why t h i s peace must work. T h e i r courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames o t h e r s .
•
A l s o announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h e l p w i t h f u n d i n g f o r
S p r i n g v a l e campus and t o support e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e N I
assembly. A l s o , S e c r e t a r y Daley w i l l l e a d Jousiness m i s s i o n
n e x t month — hope we can speed up j o b c r e a t i o n t h e r e . J i m
Lyons has some g r e a t ideas f o r t h a t .
•
P o w e r f u l image o f you and John Major
B e l f a s t t h i s week.
Are you h a v i n g any l u c k w i t h t h e Or/mge Order and t h e
undecided U n i o n i s t s ?
yoy^iyiinJeOLt would-be/use]
f a t h e r t l i s ^ o n 1 y(
/for.
WO]
f o r B ^ r t i e i s Sunday.
Middle E a s t Peace Process
•
D e s p i t e media c l a i m s , Madeleine and Dennis made p r o g r e s s .
B i b i and A r a f a t wereyeerious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
•
B i b i asked f o r f e y days t o c o n s u l t w i t h h i s Cabinet.
Hopeful
he i s u s i n g t h i s / t i m e t o convince them o f t h e need t o move
forward.
•
He faces imgJbrtant d e c i s i o n — s e r i o u s consequences
p a t h he chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s o u t .
•
A t Bibi^'s r e q u e s t , I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
waysyco make our ideas acceptable t o b o t h p a r t i e s .
•
We/have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y o f c o n f i d e n t i a l
Iiplomacy and "no s u r p r i s e s " w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
'continue t h a t approach.
•
I'm n o t going t o s e l l A r a f a t o u t .
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENS^jU,
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/7/08
whichever
I know we can't l e t him
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�CONriDCNTIALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There a r e r e p o r t s
t h a t they a r e seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored ca/
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
1
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process. Boopito modia claima t o t h e con)
Madeleine and Dennis made some progress i n London.
Netanyahu and A r a f a t were s e r i o u s and constxuetir^e. Netanyahu
asked f o r a few days t o go back a£ui--etyrfsult w i t h h i s Cabinet.
We a r e h o p e f u l t h a t he_J_s---trrfngthis time t o convince/them o f
the need t^in©ve --Torward i n t h e process. Netanyahu /aces an
i m p o ^ r t a n t d e c i s i o n and we need t o g i v e him t h e time/and space t o
;nnis Ross wont back t-Qleft^.j^
grfe region ie-pursue creative ways to make our requests
acceptable to both parties, ^^j^
^Q^tr^TtT^l^r^^^
r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
8/u/lS K6H
�CONFIDENTIAL
as evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s s e r i o u s about peace. The IRA
c o n t i n u e s t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are r e p o r t s
t h a t t h e y are s e e k i n g t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r f r i n g e
r e p u b l i c a n groups f o r j o i n t a t t a c k s . The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t o f a gang a t t e m p t i n g t o rob an armored/car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a s e r i e s o f s o - f a r
i n e f f e c t i v e a t t a c k s i n t h e M^t-h fr^v^n i.n i i
t - f n nnlf n.irm r
whethei: he t h i n k s yotr?—AlTum and 1* >• s h o u l d moat a f t e r fe
W f l n
•Bi rm-i n g h n m
.qiirfimi±. n n
flnnriny,.—May
1'
M i d d l e East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately/ We w i l l g e t v6u a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l seer A r a f a t e i t h e r / l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r l u n c h tomorrow w i t h a message o f reassurance t h a t we are
not w a t e r i n g down our i d e a s . Dermis p l a n s t o >see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday b e f o r e th'e c a b i n e t meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r Sharon has n o t
r e t u r n e d t o I s r a e l f o r t h e cabinjet s e s s i o n / s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t i n g
he i s c o n f i d e n t B i b i w i l l n o t aqcept o u r A d e a s .
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
-CONFIDENTIAL
xmm LlttKARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2 / u / i S KBV1
�COHriDCHTIAfc
3311
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Your c a l l t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Tony B l a i r ,
F r i d a y , May 8, 1998, time TBD.
\
Tony B l a i r has a sked t o speak t o you r e g a r d i n g the Middle
Peace Process and^Northern I r e l a n d .
Proce
v
East
Background
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The\press i s now aware t h a t you are not going
t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d b e f a r e t h e May 22 referendum.
Blair visited
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on Wednesday, w i t h John Major, t o press f o r a
yes v o t e on May 22.
He meV w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s and Orange
Order l e a d e r s i n an e f f o r t r o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r a n x i e t i e s
r e g a r d i n g the A p r i l 10 P e a c e V c c o r d and secure t h e i r b a c k i n g .
Key q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d were d e c o W i s s i o n i n g , p o l i c i n g r e f o r m and
p r i s o n e r r e l e a s e s . I n response\to a q u e s t i o n on whether t h e
accord can be made t o work i f apWoved, B l a i r s a i d t h e yes vote
enables people t o have a chance, \ s k i n g what a l t e r n a t i v e was
o f f e r e d by the "no" v o t e campaign. \ His p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the n o r t h was t o b l o c k t h e r e l e a s e o^. a Parades Commission
r e p o r t recommending t h a t t h e most contventious marches ( i n J u l y )
be banned. T h i s would have g i v e n ammunition t o the opponents o f
the Accord, weakening the yes vote on Mav 22.
T r i m b l e gave a b l i s t e r i n g speech WednesdaAaccusing u n i o n i s t
opponents o f " p o l i t i c a l cowardice" and o f R u n n i n g away from the
b a t t l e f i e l d l a s t year." Pundits are being c f e r e f u l not t o
presume a l a r g e U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o r ofVthe accord, b u t
v a r i o u s N I town c o u n c i l s w i t h U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t i e s have passed
r e s o l u t i o n s f o r t h e accord — a b i t t e r blow t o X
Paisley.
a n
Sinn Fein members w i l l v o t e Sunday on motions i n f a v o r o f the
Accord and changing the SF c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p e r m i t members t o
take seats i n t h e new Assembly. A copy was leaked p r e m a t u r e l y ,
t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f SF l e a d e r s h i p but t o warm welcomes i n I r e l a n d
CONFIDDNTIAL.
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Reason: 1.5(d)
Chief o f S t a f f
DECLASSIFIED
D e c l a s s i f y On: 5/8/08
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eeNUlDhNllALas evidence t h a t Sinn Fein i s serious about peace. The IRA
continues t o have problems w i t h d i s s i d e n t s . There are reporl
t h a t they are seeking t o make a l l i a n c e s w i t h other f r i n g e
republican groups f o r j o i n t attacks. The I r i s h p o l i c e k i l l e d
one such person, p a r t of a gang attempting t o rob an arprored car
t r a n s p o r t i n g cash. There have been a series of so-fa]
i n e f f e c t i v e attacks i n the North.
Middle East Peace Process. Dennis a r r i v e d i n Jerusalem today
and w i l l see Netanyahu immediately. We w i l l gel? you a readout
as soon as a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l see A r a f a t e i t h e r l a t e r t o n i g h t
or f o r lunch tomorrow w i t h a message of reassurance t h a t we are
not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans/to see Netanyahu
again a f t e r Shabat ends on Saturday befoj?4 the cabinet meeting
Sunday. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I n f r a s t r u c t u r e i ^ i n i s t e r Sharon has not
returned t o I s r a e l f o r the cabinet session, s t r o n g l y suggesting
he i s confident B i b i w i l l not accept/our ideas.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3311
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern Ireland
Met w i t h a t e r r i f i c v i c t i m s supporlt group yestei?aay - WAVE.
Wounded woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r , widows and mothers who l o s t
sons, and a Methodist preacher whose f a t h e r vfas k i l l e d . They
are the reason why t h i s peace must work. jPheir courage
i n s p i r e s us, and shames others.
Also announced i n i t i a t i v e s — w e ' l l h^lp w i t h funding f o r
Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI
assembly. Also, Secretary Daley w i l l lead business mission
next month — hope we can speedup j o b c r e a t i o n there. Jim
Lyons has some great ideas f o r / t h a t .
• Powerful image of you and J
* Major i n B e l f a s t t h i s week,
Are you having any luck wi
the Orange Order and the
undecided Unionists?
I U ^^T^X f - y,-, ft-t /4<~
Do ^.u^
Do
H
•
totfAild JtSye-*lik^.d» t o hi
K u k i K i [s &<^ieftefleVdo^s4
:
M i d d l e E a s t Peace Process
ee B e r t i e 2^herxL--W'ith~Ysii^in
r
London,
pferflfit.
.
^
-Vuc t-~r ^
• Despite media c/aims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress.
B i b i and A r a f a / were serious and c o n s t r u c t i v e .
• B i b i asked >r few days t o consult w i t h h i s Cabinet. Hopeful
he i s usinc t h i s time t o convince them o f the need t o move
forward.
• He faces' important decision — serious consequences whichever
path her chooses. He needs time t o work t h i s out.
• At R i b i ' s request, I sent Dennis Ross back t o pursue c r e a t i v e
wave t o make our ideas acceptable t o both p a r t i e s .
have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued a p o l i c y of c o n f i d e n t i a l
liplomacy and "no surprises" w i t h the I s r a e l i s , and I w i l l
continue t h a t approach.
I'm not going t o s e l l Arafat out.
down and r i s k l o s i n g him.
CONFI DENT I Ab
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/7/08
I know we can't l e t him
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
K 6 M
SO^A
�neettFI DENT IAL
•
But i t i s important we get r e a l r e s u l t s on the ground, noi
package t o which one party says yes and the other cannol
•
I f t h a t i s not achievable, we w i l l remain engaged i n / t h e peace
process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
•
I spoke l a s t night t o an Arab American Leadersh^j conference;
made clear t h a t while I am best f r i e n d Israelyfias ever had i n
White House, I am also committed t o peace process and t o
s o l u t i o n meeting the needs of both p a r t i e s ^
•
Dennis should be back by the time I se( you i n Birmingham
where we can discuss t h i s more i n dep,*
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
HINGTO N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B e r t i e
Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 12:13 - 12:16 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t ?
The P r e s i d e n t : B e r t i e , i t ' s a g r e a t day f o r t h e I r i s h . You
must know by name every S.O.B. t h a t v o t e d i n the R e p u b l i c .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The
President:
I t h i n k we g o t 95 p e r c e n t .
They broke 70 p e r c e n t i n t h e N o r t h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Well I headed out t r y i n g t o g e t 80-20
here, b u t I t h i n k i t s going t o be 95-5 on a huge v o t e .
It's
almost as good as our l a s t e l e c t i o n .
I'm r e a l l y happy about
t h a t . Yes, by o u r r e c k o n i n g they g o t 71 p e r c e n t . Four o r f i v e
p e r c e n t o f t h e Republicans would have v o t e d "No," b u t i t i s
c e r t a i n l y a m a j o r i t y o f Republicans by f i v e p e r c e n t . There i s i
m a j o r i t y o f U n i o n i s t s who v o t e d "Yes," b u t even on t h e v e r y
w o r s t case every s i n g l e n a t i o n a l i s t would have t o have v o t e d
a g a i n s t . That c o u l d n ' t have happened, so, c l e a r l y I would say
f i v e o r s i x p e r c e n t more v o t e d "No;" b u t we g o t t h e
N a t i o n a l i s t s , Republicans, I r i s h and t h a t wasn't bad, Mr.
President.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The P r e s i d e n t :
God i t ' s w o n d e r f u l .
I'm happy f o r you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I a p p r e c i a t e your h e l p .
t o g e t t i n g you back soon.
We l o o k
forward
The P r e s i d e n t :
W e l l , i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g we can do t o h e l p ,
you l e t me know. I hope t h e assembly e l e c t i o n s now go as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
P a i s l e y w i l l have t o be n e g a t i v e .
The P r e s i d e n t : W e l l , I b e t a l o t o f people who v o t e d w i t h
P a i s l e y w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed t o come over and work
w i t h t h i s agreement.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: About 85 p e r c e n t o f t h e i s l a n d v o t e d
"Yes." I can't t h i n k o f anywhere i n t h e w o r l d where such a
c l e a r v o t e has been h e l d i n t h e l a s t 50 years.
The P r e s i d e n t :
God, i t ' s so t o u c h i n g .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: We a p p r e c i a t e a l l your e f f o r t Mr.
President.
I f we d i d n ' t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e t h i s , i t would never
have happened Mr. P r e s i d e n t . Without your support we never
would have been able t o s t a y around t h e t a b l e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
celebration.
I can't w a i t t o come because i t w i l l be a g r e a t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
We'll have a good c e l e b r a t i o n .
Keep i n t o u c h .
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
f o r w a r d t o seeing you g e t back here.
The P r e s i d e n t :
bye.
I l o o k f o r w a r d t o g e t t i n g back.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
We l o o k
Take care,
good
Goodbye.
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h David T r i m b l e , U l s t e r U n i o n i s t
P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
May 23, 1998, 1:01 - 1:04 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
David?
Yes.
Congratulations.
Mr. T r i m b l e : Thank you v e r y much Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Everything
came t h r o u g h i n t h e end w i t h a b i t o f a f i g h t , b u t we g o t t h e r e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm r e a l l y proud o f you. I n t h e l a s t t h r e e days
everyone was r e a l l y pumping hard. You g o t a l l t h e undecided t o
break f o r you.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t took t h e whole r u n o f t h e week, b u t I t h i n k i t
t u r n e d over t h e weekend and more people w i l l come a f t e r t h e
event.
Even some o f those who v o t e d "No" w i l l change.
The P r e s i d e n t : I b e l i e v e t h a t a l s o . I've heard what P a i s l e y i s
s a y i n g , b u t I b e l i e v e a l o t o f people who v o t e d "No" w i l l say
g i v e i t a chance. Do you t h i n k you g o t 52 p e r c e n t i n t h e
Protestant elections?
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP\
�Mr. T r i m b l e :
I don't know i f i t was as good as t h a t . I f i t was
a Westminster e l e c t i o n today, I would have l o s t my s e a t .
I have
a p r o b l e m b u t i t w i l l come r i g h t .
I ' v e g o t a few years.
The P r e s i d e n t : You d i d a h e l l o f a t h i n g and you were v e r y
brave.
I want t o h e l p however I can.
Mr. T r i m b l e : That was one t h i n g I was q u i t e sure o f i n my mind
and I managed t o do i t . I t was t h e r i g h t t h i n g and I knew t h a t
i t would come r i g h t i n t h e end. There were some times l a s t week
when I wondered i f we would a c t u a l l y make i t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t s .
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I am now l o o k i n g f o r Adams t o d i v v y up a b i t .
There a r e a number o f t h i n g s he has g o t t o do and t h e sooner he
s t a r t s d o i n g them t h e b e t t e r .
The P r e s i d e n t :
earned i t .
I w i l l g e t on i t .
Have a w o n d e r f u l day. You
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I'm heading o f f i n 45 o r 50 minutes t i m e f o r t h e
f i r s t m e e t i n g o f our c o n s t i t u e n c y c o u n c i l t o p l a n f o r our f i r s t
assembly e l e c t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. T r i m b l e :
That's g r e a t .
Take care man.
Right.
—
End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein Leader
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
N o t e t a k e r s : David H i g g i n s , Sean Rice,
George Chastain, J o e l Schrader and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
May 23, 1998, 1:28 - 1:32 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry, c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s .
Thank you v e r y much; you are v e r y k i n d
The P r e s i d e n t :
You guys d i d a g r e a t j o b .
Mr. Adams: I have t o l d everyone a l l day t h a t t h i s
b e g i n n i n g and we're moving t o t h e f u t u r e . Thank you f o r keeping
f a i t h i n a l l t h i s . I r e f l e c t sometimes on t h e f i r s t t i m e I went
t h e r e , and I t h i n k you were r i g h t then — w e l l done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
What do you t h i n k t h e f i n a l P r o t e s t a n t v o t e was?
Mr. Adams: I t ' s i m p o s s i b l e t o know. I t ' s c l e a r t h a t t h e
m a j o r i t y v o t e d i n f a v o r o f t h i s , and I t h i n k i t was a v e r y
s o p h i s t i c a t e d v o t e . O b v i o u s l y people from a l l q u a r t e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Republicans had problems. I do b e l i e v e t h i s i s a leap
of f a i t h i n t o t h e f u t u r e .
I was a p p e a l i n g t o t h e "No" v o t e r s
t h a t t h e y were v o t i n g t h r o u g h f e a r and n o t t o t h i n k about i t .
There w i l l be r e s i s t a n c e from t h i s q u a r t e r , b u t we c o n t i n u e t o
s t a y focused and work t h r o u g h i t .
The P r e s i d e n t : That's what I t h i n k . We have t o work a t i t now,
and l o o k a t some ways t o keep everybody's f a i t h and good s p i r i t s
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP j
�up now. We need t o g e t t h e process on t h e r i g h t t r a c k . You a r e
i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n now; w i t h t h i s v o t e ; you have been
validated.
Mr. Adams: 70 p e r c e n t v o t e d i n f a v o r i n t h e n o r t h . I n t h e
south, t h e r e wasn't such a h i g h t u r n o u t , b u t 92 p e r c e n t i n
favor... t o me, i t ' s t h a t they were v o t i n g i n f a v o r o f a whole
r a f t o f f u t u r e issues.
I am going t o t a l k t o B l a i r l a t e r .
I'm
going t o be a t t h e White House next week, Thursday o r Wednesday;
I ' d l i k e t o see you t h e r e . I'm going t o t h e S t a t e s f o r some
speaking engagements.
The
President:
I f I'm i n town, I ' d be g l a d t o see you.
Mr. Adams: My sense o f a l l t h i s i s t h a t t h e people a r e ahead o f
the p o l i t i c i a n s .
The
You
President:
They o f t e n are; n o t j u s t t h e r e , b u t everywhere.
have a good time and enjoy your c e l e b r a t i o n .
Mr. Adams:
The
Please say h e l l o t o my w i f e .
President:
Sure.
[Mr. Adams passes phone t o Mrs. Adams.]
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello?
The P r e s i d e n t :
good today.
Mrs.
Adams:
Hello.
Yes.
How are you?
I s n ' t i t grand.
You must be f e e l i n g so
I t ' s g r e a t t o t a l k t o you.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you. I'm r e a l l y l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
keeping on w i t h t h i s . You must be v e r y proud.
Mrs.
The
Adams:
W e l l , I'm v e r y proud o f my husband.
President:
Mrs. Adams:
bye.
I t ' s n i c e speaking t o you.
W e l l , i t was n i c e speaking t o you. Thank you; bye
[Mr. Adams back on l i n e . ]
Mr. Adams:
Thanks f o r t h a t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President:
Okay, man.
Mr. Adams: Tomorrow, by the way, my county team, the one my son
plays on, plays Donegal i n Gaelic f o o t b a l l . That w i l l be the
r e a l t e s t ; Antrim hasn't beaten them i n 15 years. That would be
the u l t i m a t e m i r a c l e .
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Well done, and thanks again.
Good bye.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�3778
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h John Hume, S o c i a l Democratic and
Labour P a r t y Leader
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
John Hume
Notetakers:
Cindy Lawrence, Anthony
Campanella, Robert Ford, J o e l Schrader
and Lawrence B u t l e r
May 23, 1998, 7:05 - 7:09 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
Mr.
Hume:
John?
Yes. H i t h e r e , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
day was over.
I j u s t wanted t o say c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s b e f o r e t h e
Mr. Hume: Thanks a m i l l i o n .
Thank you f o r your h e l p and
support.
We c o u l d n o t have done i t w i t h o u t you, and we would
not be where we a r e today.
The P r e s i d e n t :
ecstatic.
W e l l , I'm j u s t t h r i l l e d .
Everyone over here i s
Mr. Hume: Very good. I t was t r u l y amazing and q u i t e an
h i s t o r i c day. We had 80 p e r c e n t come o u t t o v o t e and 71 p e r c e n t
voted yes.
The P r e s i d e n t :
d i d n ' t you?
You g o t a s l i g h t m a j o r i t y o f t h e P r o t e s t a n t s ,
Mr. Hume: Oh, yes, r i g h t across t h e board. There i s a g r e a t
mood among t h e people.
I t was marvelous a l l t o g e t h e r . There i s
g r e a t g r a t i t u d e f o r a l l you've done.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
�The President: Well, thank you. I t ' s been my pleasure.
have t o keep at i t and I ' l l do my p a r t .
We
Mr. Hume: Absolutely! The months ahead w i l l be very c r u c i a l .
P o l i t i c i a n s are now moving t o work together across our d i v i d e .
The r e a l t h i n g i s working the common ground, which I c a l l
economics. Economically, both sides w i l l be able t o break down
the b a r r i e r s of c e n t u r i e s .
The President: I agree w i t h t h a t . Like I said, I am ready t o
go t o work. I t a l k e d t o B e r t i e and Tony and others.
Mr. Hume: That w i l l be very good and encouraging t o everyone.
I understand that the Secretary o f State ( s i c - Commerce) w i l l
be coming here next month.
The President:
That's what I hear.
Mr. Hume: Funny, the two days he i s here, I am i n New York.
w i l l be l o o k i n g forward t o your next v i s i t .
I
The President: Yes, I ' d l i k e t o come. I t ' s a great day. I t
took years and years. You must f e e l somewhat v i n d i c a t e d today.
Mr. Hume: Ah, yes. I t ' s very good. I t o l d people the problem
has not changed and n e i t h e r should our approach t o solve i t .
You know what i s r e a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i s the mood of the people,
e s p e c i a l l y the mood of the young people. Young people are
generally very c y n i c a l about p o l i t i c s ; but t h e i r p o s i t i v e
response i n the s t r e e t s — I couldn't believe i t . I t was
powerful. We had a special show the other n i g h t w i t h U2, you
know the pop group. Well, a young person got up on stage and
said, "our generation i s the one generation t h a t has l i v e d w i t h
the t r o u b l e s our whole l i f e . And we don't want t o see another
generation l i v e through i t . " The statement made a tremendous
impact.
The President:
Oh great.
Mr. Hume: I am about t o c a l l your Ambassador, Jean Kennedy
Smith. She had a great TV show l a s t n i g h t . I t was on a l l over.
I t ' s a p i t y she's leaving us.
The President:
She's a good soul.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Mr. Hume: She r e a l l y got down t o the grass-root l e v e l i n a way
most ambassadors don't.
The President: Well, I ' l l t r y t o p i c k another good one f o r you
who w i l l do the same.
Mr. Hume:
I look forward t o seeing you.
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Thank you. Goodbye,
Thanks a m i l l i o n .
friend.
A l l the best.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP V
�C NI DNIL
O F ET
A
CONFIDENTIAL
4114
Redo(2)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
June 16, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ROBERT G. BELL
FROM:
ANNE WITKOWSKt
SUBJECT:
Landmines: POTUS L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
At Tab A i s a proposed l e t t e r t o be sent v i a p r i v a c y channels
from t h e P r e s i d e n t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r on U.S. APL concerns,
g i v e n UK adherence t o t h e Ottawa Convention.
On A p r i l 27, on
the margins o f a memo from you, t h e P r e s i d e n t agreed t o r a i s e
the i s s u e w i t h B l a i r t h e next time they spoke. However, t h e
press o f o t h e r business has p r e c l u d e d a d i s c u s s i o n on i t .
Though S e c r e t a r i e s A l b r i g h t and Cohen have r a i s e d t h e i s s u e w i t h
t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s , we have been t o l d r e p e a t e d l y by t h e B r i t i s h
Embassy here t h a t B l a i r i s t h e ke^
Concurrence by:
Larry Butle
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve t h e Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I
recommending he send t h e proposed l e t t e r a t Tab A.
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Proposed L e t t e r
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6 / 0 2 / 0 8
eemftiAt
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�^I.TIDCHTIAb-
598 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
August 27, 1998
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE: August 27, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: 4:15 p.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
g^.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s your v i s i t t o Russia, and the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r , and t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
II.
BACKGROUND
Tony B l a i r w i l l be e i t h e r i n S c o t l a n d o r have j u s t r e t u r n e d
from t h e r e when you speak. He has the Russian f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n v e r y much on h i s mind. Your t a l k i n g p o i n t s cover
the main issues t h a t he w i l l cover -- seriousness o f the
f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n and who i s i n power i n Moscow.
Russia.
News r e p o r t s and rumors o f Y e l t s i n ' s death o r
r e s i g n a t i o n have c i r c u l a t e d t h r o u g h o u t Moscow and g l o b a l
f i n a n c i a l markets today. The most s e r i o u s i s t h a t Y e l t s i n
s i g n e d a l e t t e r o f r e s i g n a t i o n , b u t w i l l not date i t u n t i l
Chernomyrdin i s c o n f i r m e d as prime m i n i s t e r ; upon Y e l t s i n ' s
r e s i g n a t i o n , Chernomyrdin would become a c t i n g P r e s i d e n t f o r
90 days, f o l l o w e d by new e l e c t i o n s . We cannot c o n f i r m any
of these r e p o r t s . Y e l t s i n ' s spokesman s a i d e a r l i e r today,
"No r e s i g n a t i o n has been on the agenda."
S t r o b e r e p o r t s from Moscow t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s indeed
s e r i o u s , and events are changing r a p i d l y . B l a i r w i l l a l s o
want t o review your plans f o r t h e Summit and assessment the
Russian economic s i t u a t i o n .
Russia's economic s l i d e
a c c e l e r a t e d again today. Currency markets d i d not reopen
a f t e r y e s t e r d a y ' s r u b l e c r a s h . Stocks c o n t i n u e d t h e i r
plunge, f a l l i n g 17%. P u b l i c concern i s growing; l i n e s f o r
b a s i c goods and a t banks are b e i n g r e p o r t e d i n v a r i o u s
cities.
Work c o n t i n u e d on a d r a f t a n t i - c r i s i s program
j o i n t l y a u t h o r e d by the Duma, F e d e r a t i o n C o u n c i l , and t h e
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 8/27/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
aoiS - OM-?*- n
�CCNFIDLNTIAL
e x e c u t i v e branch; t h e p l a n a p p a r e n t l y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l
r e p u d i a t i o n s o f t h e p r e v i o u s government's s t a b i l i z a t i o n and
r e f o r m measures.
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o review your
schedule and t r i p o b j e c t i v e s and themes, as w e l l as b r i e f
you on h i s s i x s t e p p l a n t o break t h e logjam i n
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord. He and B e r t i e
Ahern have engaged b o t h l e a d e r s i n an i n t e n s i v e s h u t t l e
d i a l o g u e and have a s i x - s t e p p l a n . F i r s t i s g e t t i n g Adams
to make a statement t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t the war i s over.
Second i s f o r a meeting o f a l l t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s . T h i r d i s
an Adams-Trimble b i l a t e r a l .
Fourth i s appointing Martin
McGuinness as Sinn Fein's c o o r d i n a t o r f o r decommissioning.
F i f t h i s some form o f a c t u a l decommissioning. S i x t h i s
T r i m b l e naming t h e E x e c u t i v e ( i n c l u d e s two Sinn Fein
m i n i s t e r s ) . The dominant h u r d l e i s number f i v e ; B l a i r may
suggest (and we concur) t h a t you c a l l Adams t h i s week t o
urge him t o a c t b o l d l y on t h i s unique o p p o r t u n i t y t o
demonstrate t h a t process has momentum.
You should ask B l a i r what c o n c r e t e steps we can t a k e t o
b r i n g Adams on board, i n c l u d i n g any sweeteners t h a t e i t h e r
the UK o r we can p r o v i d e him t o make i t e a s i e r ; however,
you should a l s o e x p l a i n t h a t your experience w i t h Adams t h e
past f o u r years shows we need t o be c a u t i o u s i n i s o l a t i n g
him -- weakening Gerry w i l l n o t advance our common
o b j e c t i v e i n f i n a l l y m a r g i n a l i z i n g the "hard men."
Regarding t h e Real IRA and A n g l o - I r i s h measures t o suppress
i t , you should i n d i c a t e t o B l a i r concern about a backlash
to suspension o f f i r s t and f i f t h amendment r i g h t s i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The UK w i l l enact l e g i s l a t i o n next week
making i t p o s s i b l e f o r a suspected RIRA member t o be
c o n v i c t e d on t h e word o f a s e n i o r RUG o f f i c e r when t h e
i n d i v i d u a l r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t h i m s e l f . This runs
counter t o t h e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n e n v i s i o n e d under t h e Good
F r i d a y Accord, seems t o be a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e response t o
the t h r e a t posed by a v e r y s m a l l group, and (as r e c e n t
h i s t o r y shows) lends i t s e l f t o abuse by s e c u r i t y o f f i c i a l s
w i t h o l d scores t o s e t t l e .
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Schedule. We are l a r g e l y i n sync w i t h t h e
B r i t i s h on your schedule, t h e d e t a i l s o f which were passed
to B l a i r ' s o f f i c e t h i s morning. You a r r i v e mid-morning
from Moscow and go d i r e c t l y t o Stormont f o r a s h o r t
b i l a t e r a l w i t h T r i m b l e and M a l l o n , f o l l o w e d by s e r i e s o f
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHriDCMTIAL
s e m i - p r i v a t e meetings w i t h t h e p a r t i e s a t a r e c e p t i o n w i t h
the assembly. You w i l l then go t o W a t e r f r o n t H a l l , b r i e f l y
m e e t i n g w i t h John Hume upon a r r i v a l , t o d e l i v e r your p o l i c y
speech t o t h e Assembly members and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s s o c i e t y . Your l a s t stop i n B e l f a s t i s
f o r t h e S p r i n g v a l e E d u c a t i o n a l V i l l a g e groundbreaking;
B l a i r i s uncomfortable w i t h t h i s as he has not been seen i n
p u b l i c w i t h Adams y e t . Adams w i l l be present among a group
of VIPs ( i n h i s d i s t r i c t ) b u t he w i l l not be onstage and
has no i n d i v i d u a l r o l e . The B r i t i s h are s l i g h t l y uneasy
w i t h what might seem t o be a reward t o Adams i f t h e r e i s no
p r o g r e s s on democracy, b u t t h e y now seem t o accept our
l o g i c on t h e importance o f S p r i n g v a l e and i t s c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fund f o r I r e l a n d and t h e low key
n a t u r e o f t h e Adams r o l e .
You w i l l then depart f o r Omagh t o meet b r i e f l y w i t h a group
i n c l u d i n g a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f community leaders and f a m i l y
members and l a y a wreath, and c o n t i n u e on t o Armagh f o r
your crowd event. Each o f those events accomplishes your
major o b j e c t i v e s i n s u p p o r t i n g N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s peace and
prosperity:
the peace process and a new p o l i t i c a l
i n s t i t u t e , e d u c a t i o n , help f o r e c o n o m i c a l l y disadvantaged
areas, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and r e d e d i c a t i o n o f American support
f o r t h e N o r t h e r n I r i s h people.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN
Closed
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
COMriDCNTIAI,
�JXMEZ DENT IAL
59^5
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
S i t u a t i o n i n Moscow
•
Strobe i s on the ground t a l k i n g t o a l l the major p l a y e r s .
He
says t h e s i t u a t i o n i s o b v i o u s l y s e r i o u s ; some r e p o r t s o f
u n r e s t and d i s o r d e r may be exaggerated. Agrees t h a t we need
t o watch the s i t u a t i o n v e r y c l o s e l y .
•
Key concern: who's i n charge. Seen r e p o r t s o f Y e l t s i n
r e s i g n a t i o n ; cannot c o n f i r m them. Y e l t s i n i n dacha,
Chernomyrdin focused on c o n f i r m a t i o n .
•
Strobe met w i t h Y e l t s i n ' s c h i e f o f s t a f f Yumashev. He
r e a f f i r m e d t h a t Chernomyrdin w i l l lead a r e a l government, n o t
a government o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y .
•
Strobe underscored t h e r i s k o f being o v e r - i n c l u s i v e .
s a i d t h a t they are p r e p a r e d t o r e s i s t .
•
What t h a t means i s u n c l e a r . Yumashev i m p l i e d t h a t new
government c o u l d have members w i t h " d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l
labels."
Yumashev
Economic Issues
•
We a r e e x t r e m e l y concerned about r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e
economy. C e n t r a l Bank i s under tremendous p r e s s u r e t o i n j e c t
l i q u i d i t y i n t o the banking sector.
•
Banks are t a k i n g t h a t money o u t o f t h e c o u n t r y , i n s t e a d o f
meeting t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s .
The Russians need t o send c l e a r e r s i g n a l s about t h e i r economic
p o l i c y . Concerned t h a t we may get c o n f u s i n g messages b e f o r e
t h e r e i s more c l a r i t y .
New t r i l a t e r a l commission (Duma/Federation C o u n c i l / E x e c u t i v e
Branch) f l o a t i n g ideas l i k e p r i c e c o n t r o l s and r e n a t i o n a l i z i n g
key i n d u s t r i e s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
^•iru oHtjjx
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/27/08
*7
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
, Z.
Jau
8/k/»S K8Vt
�:oNriDEMTIAL
•
This k i n d o f t a l k w i l l send p r e c i s e l y t h e wrong s i g n a l s t o
markets, even though i t ' s n o t c l e a r t h e ideas w i l l be
implemented.
•
Russians need t o understand t h a t s t a b i l i z a t i o n depends on t h e
steps t h e y take i n t e r n a l l y . No easy choices or s i l v e r b u l l e t s
available.
Summit
•
As f a r as Strobe can t e l l ,
underway.
Russian summit p r e p a r a t i o n s
•
Know t h a t I'm w a l k i n g i n t o v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d s i t u a t i o n .
agenda:
still
My
-- underscore t h a t engagement w i t h Russia remains v e r y
i m p o r t a n t and has major s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e U.S.
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l community;
-- r e a f f i r m stakes i n Russia's fundamental c h o i c e t o
embrace democracy and f r e e markets and t h e importance o f
Russia s t a y i n g on t h a t p a t h ;
-- s t r e s s t h a t economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n and r e c o v e r y depends
on Russian s o l u t i o n s t o Russian problems; and
-- speak c l e a r l y t o a broad spectrum o f Russian l e a d e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g Chernomyrdin, t h e Duma, and r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s ,
about t h e c h a l l e n g e s Russia faces.
Northern
Ireland
•
G r e a t l y impressed by t h e r e a c t i o n t o your v i s i t t o Omagh.
Think t h a t t r a g e d y makes my v i s i t even more i m p o r t a n t t o
peace i m p l e m e n t a t i o n -- remind people t h a t t h e f i r s t b l o o d
shed s i n c e t h e Good F r i d a y Agreement does n o t a f f e c t our
commitment.
•
My i n s t i n c t was t o go t o Omagh from the b e g i n n i n g ; we
wanted t o g i v e t h e community t h e r e b r e a t h i n g space b e f o r e
t h e y g e t caught up i n p r e p a r a t i o n s . I was s u r p r i s e d a t t h e
warmth o f t h e welcome t h e town has extended t o o u r advance
p e o p l e . There, and a f t e r w a r d s i n Armagh, I i n t e n d t o
r e i n f o r c e message i n p r i v a t e and p u b l i c l y t h a t a d e s i r e f o r
.COMF1 DEMEJM.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUi .
�ION ITI DENT IAL
peace and t h e promise o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a r e t h e e s s e n t i a l
i n g r e d i e n t s f o r making t h e Good F r i d a y Accord work.
P e r v e r s e l y , Omagh and o t h e r bombings i n t h e w o r l d t h i s
month may have made i t e a s i e r f o r Gerry Adams t o begin
moving on weapons. I am ready t o h e l p w i t h t h e s i x step
p l a n . What do you want me t o do, and how do you e n v i s i o n
an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning? That seems v e r y hard and
we need t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o lose him i n t h e process.
On o t h e r events on t h e schedule, I am l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o
w o r k i n g t h e Assembly w i t h you a t Stormont; want t o keep t h e
f o r m a l i t i e s t h e r e b r i e f t o spend more time w i t h t h e
parties.
That w i l l g i v e me a b e t t e r sense f o r how t o
d e l i v e r my p o l i c y address a f t e r w a r d s a t W a t e r f r o n t .
A f t e r w a r d s , S p r i n g v a l e stop i s i m p o r t a n t . I t i s symbol o f
American support f o r t h e I F I and e d u c a t i o n and economic
r e g e n e r a t i o n . Our j o i n t presence underscores t h a t
n o r m a l i t y r e i g n s d e s p i t e Omagh, and t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o
share i n t h e r i s k s Adams, and T r i m b l e , a r e t a k i n g .
CONFIDENTIAL.
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�REVISED
CONFIDEHTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
•
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month.
What do you want me to do?
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d currency,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic experience.
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other parts of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l Y e l t s i n now t h a t Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can preserve h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
•
H i l l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 a t
the NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson
(Sweden), P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are
w a i t i n g f o r Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g
panel d i s c u s s i o n .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
" Jftu
t^mrTKH
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/11/08
�INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES
•
As we discussed when we were together, I am q u i t e concerned
about the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system. Over l a s t month,
c r i s i s i n confidence has taken on global character a f f e c t i n g
a l l emerging markets. Believe i t i s important t o p u b l i c l y
discuss the nature of the c r i s i s and show we are focused on
addresing i t .
Plan t o make a speech on Monday i n New York.
•
I believe i t would be h e l p f u l i f the G-7 finance m i n i s t e r s
and c e n t r a l bank governors made a statement recognizing the
serious s t r a i n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system and
committing t o respond appropriately. Our Treasury has
discussed t h i s idea w i t h your o f f i c i a l s .
•
S i t u a t i o n i n B r a z i l has d e t e r i o r a t e d s e r i o u s l y . Believe we
may need t o consider bold f i n a n c i a l responses. Finance
o f f i c i a l s are i n touch.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
6252
•COMF1 BENT IAL.
POINTS TO RE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply appreciated your and Cherie's hospitality last Week.
Didn't expect could top the 1995 visit, but think
it/did.
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
•
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got,.some Icvorago e-m—.
kijjju What do you want me t o do? W&at i s B e r t i e ' s take-on t h i ^ 3
Russia
•
Primakov has a huge t a s k — i n s o l v e n t banks, collapsech-GUxrency,,
s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n -- and no economic e x p e r i e n c e . Somo rumoi
te-head euunuiuic Learn are from t h e o l d s c h o o l . •
Fear i s t h a t Primakov w i l l t r y t o govern on t h e b a s i s o f
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than s t a k i n g meaningful steps t o
r e s t o r e t h e economy. Early' i n d i c a t i o n s on h i s economic team are
not encouraging.
Glad you are h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e Russians
w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r us
to share w i t h Russians lessons l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n
other p a r t s of the world.
I p l a n t o c a l l . Y e l t s i n a f t e r Primakov i s c o n f i r m e d .
Will
emphasize t h a t now t h a t he has a Prime M i n i s t e r i n p l a c e , he
needs t o make sure someone i n t h e government can p r e s e r v e h i s
legacy on economic r e f o r m .
Do you t h i n k i t makes sense f o r you t o make a s i m i l a r c a l l t o
Y e l t s i n , on b e h a l f o f t h e G-7 b e f o r e t h e Monday meeting?
New York Conference
{
a ,
• H i / t l a r y and I are l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o seeing you September 21 aft ( ^ ^ ^ r
t/e NYU d i a l o g u e on democracy and t h e g l o b a l economy; Persson/,
P r o d i , Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) are on board, and we are w a i t i n g f o r
/Mandela - w i l l make f o r d i v e r s e and v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g panel
/ discussion.
/CONFIDENTIAL.
y/ Reason: 1. 5 (d)
/ D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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)
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFIDENTIAL
6252
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
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PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DECLASSIFIED
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Northern I r e l a n d
Deeply a p p r e c i a t e d your and Cherie's h o s p i t a l i t y l a s t week.
D i d n ' t expect c o u l d t o p t h e 1995 v i s i t , b u t t h i n k i t d i d .
What i s your thinking on how to f i n i s h the,.-Trimble and Adams
two-step - decommissioning and naming the-'executive?
/-A
/
e i r meeting y e s t e r d a y Ipo^ed l i k e / ^ t N ^ ^ . ' £ ) \ ^
j m ^ ^ n t ^ a . rplation^hijD,
• [Knpw t h a t packaging s e c u r i t y ' ^ r e s e n c e . r e a c t i o n s and t r o o p
j w i t h d r a w a l s / f o r an\ IRA a c t ' o f c^eeommi'ssioning t r i , c f l c y \ f o r y o y ^
•i
y ^ . ^ v ^ , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s u f f i c i f e n t ^ l i f t foNs^Ad^ms t o s^l-K'to Whe hodmen.
v
4 T r i m b l e l o s t \ t h r e e UUP Assembly members y e s t e r d a y over t h e
l e los-fcv
'•^Adams^b i l / t ; • an he s u r v i v e l e t t i n g /Sirm Fein i n t b N t h e
Executive unde^an^.-c'ircum^ances?.-'' What \qan yje' do u©—bolster
his position?
^
Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got some leverage on
him. What do you want me to do? What is Bertie's take on
this?
^
1
R u s s i a
\
• •"'
k
GlXd E o r i s f i n g j ^ y ^ p a m e d a^riirres^Minister
y-
\
XT
be
U^. -f pJa-A
-
P-rimakov l i k e l y _
t^ojifirmed-r'''' The^pe-3ritical v o i d - w a - s c i e b i l i t a t i n g .
'
^— .
- — ,
— • -
Pr^-itTakov has a huge task -- i n s o l v e n t banks, c o l l a p s e d ^~*~)''^Ccur^ency, s p i r a l i n g i n f l a t i o n — and no economic e x p e r i e n c e .
" ''"^
"'"
:me rumored t o head economic team are from t h e o l d s c h o o l .
Real f e ^ r i s t h a t Primak6v m^y apply t o economics t h e same
'.philo'sopny he f o l l o ws-'on f o r e i g n p o l i c y -- . g e t i h t e r n a t i o n a l
ws
o
•I comifiunity\ t o bend ,to Russia' s\views . If.-he f l a u n t s reai-rtTT^H ""
\ oV i n t e r n a .ona. economics, i t ' ^ i l l be^a d i s a s t e r r 5 r Russia.
-
•
1
Glad you a r e h o s t i n g G-7 meeting on Russia and t h a t t h e
Russians w i l l j o i n f o r p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . Good
e a
CONFIDENTIAL
' "'Reason: 1.5(d)
^
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/11/08
^
". "
^ C : , \
v
C^yC^jAP
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DEMT IAL.
6252
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
DATE: September 11, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: 4:15 - 4:35 p.m. .•
.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER/
I.
PURPOSE
To d i s c u s s f u r t h e r steps i n the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d peace
process t o f o l l o w up your v i s i t , as w e l l as review
developments i n Russia and note t h a t you w i l l see him i n
New York on September 21.
II.
BACKGROUND
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . Your v i s i t l a s t week helped unlock a
growing logjam on.Good F r i d a y Accord i m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Adams
statements on v i o l e n c e and t h i s week's f i r s t - e v e r AdamsT r i m b l e meeting) , but the df.commissioning-Shadow e x e c u t i v e
d e a l i s p r o v i n g e l u s i v e . Tony B l a i r w i l l want t o o u t l i n e
h i s ideas f o r a second round o f steps t h a t c o u l d get Adams
and T r i m b l e over t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h u r d l e s .
T r i m b l e d e l i v e r e d on h i s premise t o you l a s t week t o meet
w i t h Gerry Adams. He engaged Adams i n d i r e c t d i a l o g u e a t a
m u l t i l a t e r a l event Monday, and then had an one-on-one
y e s t e r d a y . A T i i m b l u p a i d a v,Biee, •thtragh-: Throojj&P
Assembly members q u r t the p ^ t t y , p u t t i n g J T j i i m b T e ' s m a j o r i t y
•at r i s k z / x h e a n t i - a c c o t d \ m i o i n l s X ^ ^ r r 5 u p c a n now t r i g g e r
the s p e c i a l "suf f i c i e n t ^ ^ ^ e n s u s " v o t i n g mechanism.
)le w i l l hav^^t<r^anpeaiNto the p r o - a c c o r d b u t nona l i g n e d Assembly mem^^rs (Womeh<^Coalition and A l l i a n c e )
to^jLsg-rstcr as u n i u n i ^ L ^ fuz L a C l i c d l v u l l u y Iedbuns-r.
\Adams and T r i m b l e agreed t o meet again next week. The next
events are. the September 14-15 meeting o f the new Assembly,
which w i l l be f o l l o w e d by announcement o f a f i n a l round o f
c o n s u l t a t i o n s September 28-29 b e f o r e T r i m b l e moves f o r w a r d
CONriDENTIAL•
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/10/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
ao\3- ovtt- n
�CQMriDEHTiAL
2
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
on naming t h e new E x e c u t i v e . This a l l o w s t h r e e weeks t p '
f i n a l i z e a decommissioning d e a l .
/
T r i m b l e c o u l d be t o p p l e d as UUP l e a d e r next month/at t h e
p a r t y c o n v e n t i o n i f he were t o p u t SF i n t o t h e Executive^--- / -W
absent an a c t u a l a c t o f decommissioning.
However, / ^ I f a r t i n g '
decommissioning i n exchange f o r seats on t h e / E x e c u t i v e i s
^
more than Adams^can s e l l t o IRA h a r d l i n e r s . - As B e r t i e
Ahern o u t l i n e d , he and B l a i r a r e working t o e x p l o i t t h e
RIRA c e a s e - f i r e and lessened s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o s e l l t h e
^(\.C •'
consequent drawdown i n t h e B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y presence as
" d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , " t o secure an IRA u n i l a t e r a l response
( e x p l o s i o n o f Semtex t h a t c o u l d be v e r i f i e d a f t e r w a r d s ) .
C
u
1
L
J
A down payment was made yesterday, when Chief Constable
Flanagan announced that he no longer needs B r i t i s h Army
p a t r o l s to protect the poli.ce i n B e l f a s t , which has been
understood as a prelude to UK.-troop withdrawals .^^gg^gj^^&k
La—the- -Bri t i sh-i s—t-hat--t-hey- ,<^uld'-be^Ccu'sed"of
l e g i t i m i z i n g the IRA i f they were to engage i n a fjbrce
drawdqwn e x e r c i s e with t e r r o r i s t s . This^.will remire-'you,
B l a i r jand Ahern' to engag^ i n very ^ u i e t ; and/per sonal /
diplomp.cy to £;et up the /choreography t h a t gives /Trimble'
cover/to let;'Sinn F e i n / i n t o the Exectitive,/ ailcnt^ th4/lRA
to s p i n to Q & i r f o l k /th^ decoinii^Lssioning,^and p r o t e c t s
B l a i r from accusatipns-"bf appea^iaent.
-
/
S\
ha^ve'some upcoming l e v e r a g e ^ i t h Adams^^AHe i s p l a n n i n g
a; v i s i t t o t h e / j j n i t e d S t a t e s / i n Qctober,/anq w i l l / \
undbubte^dly ^ e e k an Oval O f f i c e meeting'; t h i f e w p u l d
^p^ropriaJug' i f he i s i n t h e E x e c u t i v ^ a n d engaged i n
(^commissioning.
-—
V
Russia. Primakov's nomination i s l i k e l y t o s a i l t h r o u g h
c o n f i r m a t i o n on F r i d a y . E a r l y i n d i c a t i o n s about t h e makeup
of t h e Cabinet a r e n o t encouraging. Gorbachev-era f i g u r e s
such
Gerashchenko and Maslyukov have t h e i n s i d e t r a c k
f o r t h e C e n t r a l Bank and macroeconomic czar p o s i t i o n s ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Gerashchenko i s t h e man who t r i e d t o s o l v e
Russia's problems i n 1992 by p r i n t i n g money t o keep
f a c t o r i e s open, s p a r k i n g 25% monthly i n f l a t i o n .
Maslyukov
/has s i m i l a r views. I f t h e downward s p i r a l c o n t i n u e s , i t
w i l l l i k e l y a c c e l e r a t e . The impacts a r e p r e d i c t a b l e : r u n
away i n f l a t i o n , f u r t h e r e r o s i o n o f t h e c u r r e n c y , food
s h o r t a g e s , t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r goes i d l e , b l a c k markets,
crime and c o r r u p t i o n become p e r v a s i v e .
/
/
/
/
• O FI DENT I Ah
SN
�CONTI DGNT IAD.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,Wc have t-wo—obvfrms—aprt-fon-s-:—Hd—ie-fe—the—R-u-s sians—go—the i r
'©iiO_j^y_jjid_no^ge±^t^r-red--wirth-^
o'r~~ ("2") t r y - 1 o
eggage the__Ru_s,sJ-aas-,—at-tempWto.-.educate-P-r-imako-v—on—T--e &CLnnriu^_jLeali.ties---and---t-ry-feo-m-i-fe-igat e - the- • prospects f o r
j±Laas-t-er-r^—We--a4v-i-se-t-he---seeond---r-©ute --.but^_w.e__.ne.e,dLto
~aeeep-t~a-t-the-_ou.t set- t-ha-t- -chances -f or—sueeess--a-r-e-not-"hTgh .
I n your c a l l w i t h B l a i r , you s h o u l d s t r e s s t h e importance
of t h e Monday G-7/G-8 London meeting on Russia and t h e need
t o have a s e r i o u s exchange w i t h t h e Russians on lessons
l e a r n e d from f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d .
You might a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t you w i l l c a l l Y e l t s i n a f t e r
Primakov i s confirmed t o underscore the,-importance o f
naming a s t r o n g leader on economic r e f o r m t o t h e
government. You might suggest t h a t B l a i r make a s i m i l a r
call.
T
NY event. NYU School o f Law i s h o s t i n g September 21 an
"opening d i a l o g u e " on democracy i n t h e g l o b a l economy. The
format i s a one-day seminar composed o f t h r e e panels. The
f i r s t two w i l l be made up o f ' l e a d i n g w o r l d f i g u r e s and t h e
NYU community and are on c i v i l s o c i e t y , and t h e new economy
and t h e f u t u r e f o r o p p o r t u n i t y . The F i r s t Lady w i l l
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f i r s t panel. You w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n
the t h i r d panel on s t r e n g t h e n i n g democracy.
Participation
of l e a d e r s i s e v o l v i n g p o s i t i v e l y .
I naddition to Blair,
Persson (Sweden), Prodi and Stoyanov ( B u l g a r i a ) . NYU i s
seeking c o n f i r m a t i o n from Mandela. C h r e t i e n , Cardoso,
Havel and Kok were i n v i t e d b u t are unable t o a t t e n d .
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
PRESS PLAN ,
Closed press.
V.
SEQUENCE
TBD /
Attachment
Tab A ' P o i n t s t o make
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/
•CONriDENTIAL
/
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
•
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today. F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , nor agreed t o measures t h a t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and d u r a b l e .
•
Know t h a t you've been t h i n k i n g about ways t o g e t Russia on
board.
•
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can
come a t t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
•
A l t h o u g h I have doubts about t h e wisdom, we can agree t o
Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD b u t o n l y i f key
a l l i e s agree i n advance t h a t NATO w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f
what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
•
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f your o f f i c i a l s a r e p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a p p r o v i n g a i r s t r i k e s t o NATO's w i l l i n g n e s s
to commit ground f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l
settlement.
•
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress.
I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to s u s t a i n s u p p o r t f o r SFOR g i v e n Congress's concerns about
r e a d i n e s s and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o r a i s i n g f o r c e s
f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o ensure domestic
support f o r possible a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , t h e n we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
^ONFTPFNTT AT.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�•CQNriDENTIAL
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s ,
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we n e e d A o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e pafet few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , n o r agreed t o measures t h / t would make t h e
end o f h o s t i l i t i e s v e r i f i a b l e and durabl<
I/
Und^r^tand that/^yo^r represent^
po'ssii^yility seeking UN Se i r i t y
1 p e c i f\c a 1 ly/a
u t h o r r^ing^ pz
ce.
New YorkT i s ' c o n s i d e r i n g
more
)uncil Re^oluti
We have all go't4^en a clear signal from Moscow that'they will
not support anoh^a resolution/ Seems to me only harm can come
at this point in forcing Yelzsin
to veto.
, .^
i..
c
;king a^r&w r e s o l u t i o
ild
5m]3\licat(
.so
IIS
;eture NATO CG^nsensu^-^la/er
fek t o ^ a i i t i
strikes.
,
effo]
Rather than purouin)g a UNSCR, w ^ c a n agree t o Contact Group
m e e t i n g p r i o r t o NATO ACTORD/cfs "luny as key a l l i e s agree i n
advance t h a t NATy w i l l proceed r e g a r d l e s s o f what Russian
position i s . /
. n^w^j^,
,
i
(IA)
V?'
A l s o , I u n d e r s t a n d Irnat some o f y o u r / o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n o n / a i r s t r i k e s t o frfre gern
ireff'Of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You s h o u l d know t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i / c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to gcit roady f o r SFOR/ and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we a r e a l s o
r a c i n g f o r c e s / f o r K o s t n ^ w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
e/sure domesl^lc support f o r ^ p e i s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
5
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8/y\5 v e
<n
'c^a
�CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c V s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e we need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO d e c / s i o n t o
authorize force.
Holbrooke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgrade /nd P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l f o r t h e / p a s t few days, b u t
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e necessary p o l i c e and
,
m i l i t a r y forces^
Understand t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e yh New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g ^ ^
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
\
s p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
/
civ>- ^ .
W
We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n / Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n / / o u l d a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus 1 4 t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t /&me o f your o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o l i n k
a d e c i s i o n on a i r / s t r i k e s t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground f o r c e s
to oversee a c e / s e - f i r e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d ki*ow t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t i s s u e f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r ! ^ w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
to g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g / o r c e s f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure d o m e s t i c support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our e f o j e c t i v e now i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
119B.
I f t h e r e i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i / l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
ifeeded and what i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t o keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
GONn DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aoi3- o n a - n
�•CONFIDENTIAL
i
\
Can agree t o Contact Group meeting p r i o r t o ACTORD at NATCX as
'long as key a l l i e s agree i n advance that NATO w i l l proceed
regardless of what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
This woul^L-^rVe^ the Russiansj3J3---eppT7rTfuhity to •Coh^dlt and t o
themselves w i i h — e t r r ^ p o s i t i o n .
€ONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-CONFI DEITT IAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
_
K o f i Annan's report i s a graphic account of Milosevic's
defiance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Believe we n^ed t o
maintain momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r NATO decision t o
_ authorize force.
• ' Understand t h a t your representative i n New^York i s considering
p o s s i b i l i t y of seeking UN Security Counc/l Resolution more
s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g force.
• We have a l l gotten a clear s i g n a l f/om Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support such a r e s o l u t i o n . Serfems t o me only harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Yeltsiry to veto.
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n viou/a also complicate our e f f o r t t o
secure NATO consensus l a t e ? t h i s week t o authorize a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Security Council i s considering a
r e s o l u t i o n on use op f o r c e , t h i s w i l l r e i n f o r c e view of some
t h a t a f u r t h e r r e s o l u t i o n may oe necessary. Could also enable
Moscow t o delay NATO a c t i o n by prolonging debate i n New York.
I also understand that some of your o f f i c i a l s are pressing t o
l i n k a decleion on a i r s t r i k e s t o the generation of ground
forces to/oversee a cease-fire or p o l i t i c a l settlement.
You sh*mld know t h a t t h i s i s a very d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l struggle
to / e t ready f o r SFOR and any suggestion t h a t we are also
r a i s i n g forces f o r Kosovo w i l l make i t very d i f f i c u l t t o
isure domestic support f o r possible a i r - s t r i k e s .
Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR
1199.
I f there i s an agreeraen : on a peace settlement, then we
w i l l need t o consider what ( i f any r o l e we w i l l play i n
implementing i t .
j t i ^ d oP
pres«*CA
/i
1
We want t o keep a l l options open at t h i s p o i n t , rather than
beginning t o generate forces f o r a large NATO-led
implementation force.
Y
oUNTUN LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENTfMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/05/08
1^*4-
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�•CONriDCNTIAL
6789
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. B e l i e v e }/e need t o
m a i n t a i n momentum and b u i l d consensus f o r N^O d e c i s i o n t o
authorize force.
c
Holbrc^ke c o n t i n u e s h i s meetings i n Belgfade and P r i s t i n a
today.
F i g h t i n g has been i n a l u l l fefr t h e past few days, but
M i l o s e v i c has n o t y e t withdrawn t h e ecessary p o l i c e and
m i l i t a r y forces.
i
•
I a l s o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t some o f /our o f f i c i a l s are p r e s s i n g t o
l i n k a d e c i s i o n on a i r s t r i k e s / t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f ground
f o r c e s t o oversee a c e a s e - f i p e o r p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t .
You s h o u l d kjiow t h a t t h i s / i s a v e r y d i f f i c u l t issue f o r us,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e Congress. I t ' s been an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e
t o g e t ready f o r SFOR and any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we are a l s o
r a i s i n g f o r c e s f o r Ko/ovo w i l l make i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o
ensure domestic support f o r p o s s i b l e a i r s t r i k e s .
Our o b j e c t i v e nov/ i s t o secure f u l l compliance w i t h UNSCR
1199.
I f t h e r e / i s an agreement on a peace s e t t l e m e n t , then we
w i l l need t o c o n s i d e r what k i n d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence i s
needed and wferat i f any r o l e we w i l l p l a y i n implementing i t .
We want t c / keep a l l o p t i o n s open a t t h i s p o i n t , r a t h e r than
b e g i n n i n g t o generate f o r c e s f o r a l a r g e NATO-led
implementation force.
I f Ra/sed)
e r s t a n d t h a t your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n New York i s c o n s i d e r i n g
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n more
p e c i f i c a l l y authorizing force.
•/ We have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t t h e y w i l l
not s u p p o r t such a r e s o l u t i o n . Seems t o me o n l y harm can come
at t h i s p o i n t i n f o r c i n g Y e l t s i n t o v e t o .
-CONFI DENIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/05/08
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-or?aZ
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY M
XS
K 6 W
�CONFIDEMTIAL
•
Seeking a new r e s o l u t i o n would a l s o c o m p l i c a t e our e f f o r t
secure NATO consensus l a t e r t h i s week t o a u t h o r i z e a i r
strikes.
•
I f A l l i e s know t h a t Securjy^y---Council i s c o n s i d e r i n g
r e s o l u t i o n on use ojU-^tfrce, t h i s w i l l reinfo^ce-^TTe^ o f some
t h a t a further>-ir£solution may be necg^s^r^TT Could/also enable
Moscow t p ^ d ^ l a y NATO a c t i o n by^prSTonging d e b a t e / i n New York.
CONriDENTIAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
7033
)INTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
•
Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps - B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
•
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined - every step
the p a r t i e s must take and every comma thev must agree on i s a
Struggle,
•
Outcome o f the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
•
But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
o
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
o My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l ,
•
Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
•
What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. 0.13526
3 - 0412. -
�COHFIDCWHAfe
7C3 3
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Middle East
o Understand you are met w i t h A r a f a t today. As you know, he's
coming here tomorrow t o begin i n t e n s i v e t a l k s w i t h B i b i on the
i n t e r i m agreement, so I ' d love t o hear your thoughts.
•
•
Let me t e l l you b a s i c a l l y where we are. Both sides have taken
some important steps — B i b i on the redeployment f r o n t , A r a f a t
on the s e c u r i t y f r o n t . But they s t i l l remain f a r a p a r t .
There i s more d i s t r u s t here than I had imagined —
the
p a r M p . q Tnnst f a V p anH
PVPI-V
rnmma t h e v m n s t
every step
arrrpp nn—i_s a_
struggle.
•
Outcome of the Summit i s f a r from a done d e a l . I don't know
where we w i l l end up on Monday. Sharon i s another b i g new
f a c t o r . He won't a c t u a l l y show up a t Wye u n t i l Friday a f t e r
I've l e f t f o r a day.
o But I'm persuaded we had t o take matters i n t o our hands. The
a l t e r n a t i v e o f l e t t i n g the process founder i s unacceptable e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the May 1999 deadline looming.
Northern I r e l a n d
•
Both Adams and Trimble are i n the United States.
• My Deputy Labor Secretary p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the opening o f the
NI roadshow l a s t week. Have impression t h a t i t i s going w e l l .
• Adams i s f r y i n g t p ^ f a i s e money, and keep syp£brters^b€hind the
peace agreement
o Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on t r y i n g t o
work the decommissioning issue, but t h a t your people t h i n k
a c t u a l l y decommissioning has t o w a i t u n t i l next s p r i n g .
• What can I do t o help?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 10/15/08
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/fc/iS" KBH
�TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
DATE: March 21, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To ensure key a l l i e s are ready f o r NATO t o i n i t i a t e a i r
s t r i k e s i f Belgrade continues t o conduct o f f e n s i v e
operations i n Kosovo and t o r e j e c t an i n t e r i m settlement.
II.
BACKGROUND
Several thousand MUP and VJ continue t o conduct operations
i n Kosovo t o secure l i n e s of communication f o r a major
o f f e n s i v e , which could be launched a t short n o t i c e . The
North A t l a n t i c Council i s meeting t o assess the s i t u a t i o n ,
and Secretary General Solana i s c o n s u l t i n g w i t h a l l i e s on
the i n i t i a t i o n o f a i r s t r i k e s . We are pressing f o r Solana
to pass the "key" f o r Phase I a i r s t r i k e s t o SACEUR on
Monday, and f o r the NAC on the same day t o give Solana the
"key" f o r follow-on s t r i k e s so t h a t NATO can respond
q u i c k l y i f Belgrade mounts a major o f f e n s i v e or attacks
NATO forces.
A l l three leaders who you are c a l l i n g seem committed t o
e a r l y NATO a i r s t r i k e s i f there i s no change i n Milosevic's
p o s i t i o n . Over the l a s t several days, senior o f f i c i a l s
from each o f t h e i r governments have issued p u b l i c
statements making clear that the t h r e a t of a i r s t r i k e s i s
r e a l . The three leaders w i l l be aware of Dick Holbrooke's
impending mission t o Belgrade because Madeleine A l b r i g h t
informed t h e i r Foreign M i n i s t e r s yesterday. They may have
questions about U.S. w i l l i n g n e s s t o move t o e a r l y a i r
s t r i k e s i n l i g h t o f the upcoming v i s i t by Primakov.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Reason:
1.5 ( b , d )
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3 / 2 1 / 0 9
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8/L>/l5
^
K
�-CQNFTDFNTTAL
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Tab A Points t o Make
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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�GONFEBENTIAL
9902006
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
•
The s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e , w i t h several
thousand army and p o l i c e conducting operations against the
Kosovar Albanians. Forty thousand Serb s e c u r i t y forces are i n
and around Kosovo.
•
While M i l o s e v i c has yet not launched an a l l - o u t o f f e n s i v e , he
continues t o augment h i s forces i n Kosovo and i s poised t o do
so a t short n o t i c e .
•
I n the meantime, h i s forces are securing roads, c l e a r i n g
v i l l a g e s i n s t r a t e g i c areas and t e r r o r i z i n g t h e i r Albanian
i n h a b i t a n t s . This i s d i s p l a c i n g thousands of a d d i t i o n a l
Albanians. The town o f Srbica, which had 13,000 i n h a b i t a n t s
when Serb s e c u r i t y forces moved i n yesterday, i s today l a r g e l y
vacant.
•
Through h i s aggression and continued defiance, Milosevic has
c l e a r l y passed the threshold f o r NATO m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . I f he
does not change course i n the next few days, I b e l i e v e NATO
w i l l need t o i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s . And we w i l l need t o
i n i t i a t e these s t r i k e s very q u i c k l y i f he launches a major
offensive.
•
NATO's a i r s t r i k e s w i l l need t o be s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t i c u l a r l y i f
he launches a major o f f e n s i v e , i n order t o achieve t h e i r
o b j e c t i v e o f demonstrating NATO's resolve, d e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r
aggression and damaging Belgrade's a b i l i t y to conduct
repressive operations i n Kosovo.
•
Of course our o b j e c t i v e i s not t o conduct a i r s t r i k e s , but t o
stop the violence and achieve an i n t e r i m settlement. With
t h i s i n mind, we are sending Ambassador Holbrooke tomorrow t o
Belgrade t o give Milosevic one l a s t chance.
•
Dick Holbrooke w i l l emphasize that NATO a i r s t r i k e s are
imminent and that Milosevic faces a stark choice. He can h a l t
aggression against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an i n t e r i m
settlement w i t h a NATO-led implementation force. Or he can
bear f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences of NATO m i l i t a r y
action.
•
Dick i s now scheduled to see Milosevic tomorrow;
•CONFTPFNTJAL
d
£ £ « ; i ^ : ' 3 / 2 i / 0 9 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DPD'P^?^?^^^
E.O. 13526
^ S ^ v T
�•COMriDCNTIMj
•
I n the meantime, we need t o prepare f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
Tomorrow Javier Solana should pass the "key" t o General Clark,
thus s t a r t i n g the countdown to i n i t i a l s t r i k e s . At the same
time, the NATO Council should give Javier the "key" f o r
follow-on s t r i k e s , so that NATO can respond q u i c k l y i f
Milosevic launches a major offensive or attacks our forces i n
Macedonia or Bosnia.
•
We need t o stay f i r m and u n i t e d . And we a l l need t o work w i t h
President Y e l t s i n and Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov t o minimize the
damage to our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia i f Milosevic gives us no
choice but t o proceed w i t h a i r s t r i k e s .
I f asked about Holbrooke's terms of reference:
•
Holbrooke w i l l press Milosevic to p u l l back h i s forces i n
Kosovo and accept the Rambouillet accords, p a r t i c u l a r l y the
establishment of a NATO-led implementation force.
•
He i s not going to re-negotiate the i n t e r i m settlement already
agreed w i t h the-Kosovar Albanians.
•
We w i l l p u l l him out of Belgrade immediately i f Milosevic
launches a major offensive while he i s present.
I f asked about timing and the Primakov v i s i t :
•
We w i l l need to i n i t i a t e a i r s t r i k e s q u i c k l y i f Milosevic
continues h i s aggression and r e j e c t i o n of an i n t e r i m
settlement. The precise timing w i l l depend i n p a r t on the
dynamics i n Kosovo and Belgrade.
•
We have already warned Russia, so t h a t Primakov can draw h i s
own conclusions f o r h i s upcoming t r i p . A l Gore has spoken t o
Primakov personally and Madeline has had numerous phone c a l l s
w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Ivanov.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2100
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 4:57-5:09 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Gerhard?
Chancellor Schroeder:
Miles
EST
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . M i l o s e v i c gave
Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n of being w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e
a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n and refused even t o agree t o a c e a s e - f i r e
and continued t o r e j e c t any i n t e r n a t i o n a l presence. He was
t h r e a t e n i r i g and b e l l i c o s e , and i t ' s c l e a r he intends to unleash
g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo.
Chancellor Schroeder: I was a f r a i d of t h a t , and I q u i t e agree
w i t h your a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 l.4d
The President: Well, I'm glad to hear you say t h a t . I agree
w i t h t h a t and am ready t o support NATO f u l l y .
Two t h i n g s :
f i r s t , Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has postponed h i s t r i p t o
Washington. I t was the best outcome under the circumstances.
We need t o l e t him know we w i l l continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h
him and make i t c l e a r t h a t , number one, t h a t we share the same
o b j e c t i v e he does f o r a peaceful s o l u t i o n and, number two, we
are committed t o Russia's economic recovery. I t might not be a
bad idea i f you could c a l l him i n the next day or so and say
t h a t t o him.
GECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
S/u/iS"
KBM
�SECRET
Chancellor Schroeder: I w i l l d e f i n i t e l y c a l l him, and I see
t h i n g s the same way you see them. I w i l l make c l e a r t o him
Germany i s committed t o help w i t h Russia's economic development
and p r i v a t e investment, and also we have p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n s t h a t
can be used. I agree t h a t a t t h i s p o i n t i n the game i n
p a r t i c u l a r t h a t we t e l l him these t h i n g s and make sure Russia
does i t s share t o make the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund view the
Russia s i t u a t i o n i n a p o s i t i v e way. But there are t h i n g s we can
do, as w e l l . ffr)
The President: Thank you, but l e t me j u s t mention one o t h e r
t h i n g . I t h i n k t h e r e i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c w i l l a t t a c k the
NATO f o r c e s i n Bosnia w i t h m i s s i l e s .
Chancellor Schroeder: Does he have what it takes to attack NATO
forces in Bosnia? IrSj
The President:
Yes, the FROG m i s s i l e s can do t h a t . ( S
-i
Chancellor Schroeder:
FROGs? fS*
Yes, you're t a l k i n g about the Russian
The President: I b e l i e v e , obviously, we should discourage him
and we should t r y t o get Primakov t o discourage him from doing
t h a t . I t ' s not inconceivable t h a t he w i l l t r y t o use t h i s t o
wreck our success i n Bosnia. We have t o be very, very f i r m on
t h i s , and i f he does i t , we w i l l have t o be prepared t o s t r o n g l y
r e t a l i a t e . fS4
Chancellor Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : He i s a f r a i d , o f course, because he t h i n k s t h a t
his h o l d on Montenegro may be broken by t h i s , j u s t by the
n a t u r a l course of- t h i n g s . So we have t o be prepared f o r a l l
these t h i n g s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . What he may t r y t o do i s
move a g a i n s t Montenegro, although I t h i n k t h a t w i l l b a c k f i r e
against him. ( S
-4
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Chancellor
Schroeder:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, you know, t h i s whole t h i n g has a c e r t a i n
element o f u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . We don't know how i t w i l l p l a y out
i n Montenegro, o r how i t w i l l p l a y out i n Serbia i t s e l f . We
also have t o prepare f o r him t o t r y t o s t r i k e the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. <S)
-Chancellor
Schroeder:
The President: That i s good news, and we're a l l doing our best
to p r o t e c t the f o r c e s . But we have t o be prepared t h a t he might
be able t o h i t them, and i t has t o s t i f f e n our resolve and not
f o r c e us t o withdraw. (S
-4
Chancellor Schroeder: I see t h i n g s e x a c t l y the way you do, and
i t ' s a l l the more important f o r t h a t reason we stay i n touch and
coordinate what should be done and needs t o be done. You're
aware, o f course, the 15 European heads o f s t a t e and o f
government are i n B e r l i n , and we should, t o the e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ,
coordinate t h i n g s w i t h regard t o tomorrow, f o r instance. fS-)
The President: Thanks. We'll stay "close by and c o o r d i n a t e . I
know t h a t Solana i s also s t a y i n g i n touch w i t h you.
I f e e l much
b e t t e r a f t e r t h i s conversation, and I can't thank you enough.
Thank you, Gerhard. fS-}
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
I f e e l the same way.
Thank you.
—
Best t o you.
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
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CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�GECRET
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1
0
0
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith,
Murphy and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Miles
March 23, 1999, 5:24-5:37 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
Bill.
(U)
How are you?
Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l .
(U)
President Chirac: I'm i n B e r l i n f o r the meeting tomorrow
morning about t h e agenda, b u t we were w i t h Gerhard Schroeder f o r
d i n n e r . And we agree completely w i t h the d e c i s i o n taken by
NATO. f^)
The President: Well, thank you. I agree, too; we don't have
any choice. f^)
President Chirac:
get any progress?
The President:
No, I understand we don't.
fG-)
Nothing.
President Chirac:
Holbrooke d i d n ' t
(U)
Nothing a t a l l ?
fG-)
The President: I wanted t o speak t o you about two issues. The
f i r s t i s Primakov. We t a l k e d about t h i s b e f o r e . He has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington, which i s probably best under
the circumstances.
But I t h i n k i t ' s important we a l l
communicate t o him two t h i n g s . We a l l need h i s help on Kosovo
and we want t o work w i t h him t o get a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o a l l
t h i s , so t h a t whatever he says about us i n p u b l i c , he should be
GECRET
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 3/23/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
ao\3- OH1X- n
�3ECRET
working w i t h us i n p r i v a t e t o get M i l o s e v i c t o moderate h i s
r e a c t i o n t o the a i r s t r i k e s . fS-j
The second t h i n g i s , I t h i n k there i s a chance t h a t M i l o s e v i c
w i l l t r y t o a t t a c k w i t h m i s s i l e s the NATO forces i n Bosnia,
which means the French and the Americans are the most exposed.
He may also t r y t o take some a c t i o n against the NATO forces i n
Macedonia. The o n l y t h i n g s I wanted t o say i s t h a t i f he i s
able t o cause some c a s u a l t i e s t o us where we are already working
to keep the peace, I t h i n k we have t o be very f i r m t o not a l l o w
our Bosnia mission t o c o l l a p s e , and not running away from t h e
mission as d e f i n e d i n Kosovo. fS-)
And, Jacques, t h e r e i s only one more p o i n t I wanted t o make.
When we t a l k e d before, we discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y o f having
the f i r s t phase o f t a k i n g out the a i r defense system and having
a pause t o get M i l o s e v i c back t o the peace t a l k s and agreement.
The o n l y p o i n t I wanted t o make about t h i s i s we have t o be very
c a r e f u l n o t t o have a pause so long t h a t i t defeats our purpose.
Because he has 40,000 forces i n o r on the border o f Kosovo and
almost 300 tanks, i f we waited too long, we could lose t h e
o b j e c t i v e f o r which we s t r u c k . So we have t o be very c a r e f u l
about t h a t . We'll o b v i o u s l y be i n d a i l y c o n t a c t , b u t I wanted
to mention t h a t . f&j
President Chirac: B i l l , concerning these three p o i n t s , t h e
f i r s t , Primakov. I had intended t o c a l l him tomorrow and speak
to him e x a c t l y about what you have spoken o f . I say tomorrow,
because i t i s now 12 o'clock a t n i g h t here. fS4
The P r e s i d e n t :
Tomorrow i s p e r f e c t . { &
-)
President Chirac:
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: The only problem I'm w o r r i e d about i s what i f he
j u s t charges ahead. He can d i s p l a c e thousands o f people i n two
days.
President Chirac:
The President:
Good, t h a t ' s p e r f e c t .
President Chirac:
Egypt?
(U)
The President:
tonight.
(U)
Do you have any good news from the l a d i e s i n
Oh, yes, they are l o v i n g i t . I ' l l get a r e p o r t
President Chirac:
lucky.
(U)
The President:
Jacques.
(U)
f^)
Give them my best regards.
Yes, they're lucky.
President Chirac:
A l l right. B i l l .
—
They are very
I ' l l t e l l them.
Goodbye.
End o f Conversation —
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
Thank you,
�SECRET
2100
THE
WHITE H O U S E
W A S H I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
I n t e r p r e t e r : Simm Smiley
Notetakers:
Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph S i g l e r and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 23, 1999, 5:44-5:49 p.m.
The Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Hello.
EST
(U)
(U)
The President: Before I get t o more serious matters I wanted to
c o n g r a t u l a t e you on the success of Roberto Benigni a t the
Oscars. I t was great.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you, thank you. That was
important moment f o r our f i l m i n d u s t r y and our country.
a very
(U)
The President: The movie was a great g i f t .
I wanted t o c a l l t o
check i n w i t h you about Kosovo. I'm sure you know M i l o s e v i c
gave Ambassador Holbrooke no room t o b e l i e v e t h a t he would agree
to a c e a s e - f i r e or any terms of the peace agreement and made i t
c l e a r t h a t he intends t o unleash g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo. I
f e e l we have no choice but t o go forward w i t h NATO a c t i o n . I
i n t e n d t o support i t and I hope we can a l l do i t t o g e t h e r . fS^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
1
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
B/u/15" KBH
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I agree w i t h t h a t . I've been t r y i n g t o
t h i n k o f a l l the permutations.
I'd l i k e t o s t a r t w i t h my f i r s t
p o i n t . Russian Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has c a n c e l l e d h i s t r i p
to Washington which I b e l i e v e i s best under the circumstances.
The t h i n g I t h i n k , important f o r us t o do now i s t o f i r s t o f a l l
t e l l Primakov we s t i l l want t o work w i t h him on a p e a c f u l
s o l u t i o n t o t h i s c r i s i s and urge him t o t a l k t o M i l o s e v i c , and
secondly, t h a t Europe and the U.S. very much want Russia t o
recover economically.
That w i l l be my message and I hope i t
w i l l be yours as w e l l .
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There's a p o i n t t h a t I would l i k e t o
r a i s e w i t h you t h a t i s important.
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t but i t depends on what
M i l o s e v i c does. He could immediately r e t a l i a t e against NATO
forces i n Bosnia or Macedonia. He might also redouble h i s
e f f o r t s t o s l a u g h t e r the Kosovars. He has moved 40,000 troops
and 300 tanks on the border o r i n s i d e Kosovo. I t h i n k i t i s
very important t o make i t as b r i e f as p o s s i b l e but i t a l l
depends on what M i l o s e v i c does. (S)
-Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
SECRET
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�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The President: Yes, I t h i n k we can stop unless M i l o s e v i c i s
h u r t l i n g the t r o o p s , v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e a f t e r v i l l a g e . fSi
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
However, a t t h e
moment, a l l o f us have given the green l i g h t t o NATO and Solar
to a c t .
The President: Yes, o f course, we w i l l a l l have t o be i n close
c o n s u l t a t i o n and I thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l and also hope
t h a t you w i l l be i n touch w i t h Primakov and keep working w i t h
him. Thank you f o r t a k i n g my c a l l . fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I s h a l l c a l l Mr. Primakov undoubtedly.
Tomorrow, we have a meeting o f the European Council i n B e r l i n so
we w i l l have c o n s u l t a t i o n s among the EU leaders as w e l l . And
p o s s i b l y we could c a l l Primakov together w i t h the other leaders
of t h e Union, w i t h Mr. Schroeder, Mr.Chirac . fS4
The President: That's a p o s s i b i l i t y ,
w i t h them.
fS4
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
work. (U)
The President:
You should discuss i t
Fine, goodbye and best wishes w i t h your
Bye, t o you t o o . (U)
—
End o f Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
—
�CONFIDENTIAL
2395.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:14 - 6:20 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Gerry.
(U)
You're up v e r y e a r l y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I've been b r i e f e d on where you guys a r e now. I
t h i n k t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s a r e v e r y w o r r i e d about a two-week
d e l a y and I j u s t c a l l e d t o ask i f t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g t h a t can be
done t o do i t q u i c k e r . (^)
Mr. Adams: I understand you have been t r y i n g t o g e t i n c o n t a c t .
I was i n w i t h Tony and B e r t i e .
I don't know b u t I t h i n k we may
have an agreement t h a t , even though t h e r e would be a two-week
timeframe, I would p r o b a b l y g e t back an i n d i c a t i o n q u i c k e r than
t h a t ; can't say. (j?*)
I stepped o u t from t h e t a l k s t o make t h i s c a l l .
We a r e a c t u a l l y
a g a i n s t an adjournment. What we have done i s t o l d t h e
government t h a t t h i s i s n o t working t h e way t h a t t h e y wanted.
Nonetheless, we went back i n and gave t h e government o u r b e s t
assessment, and now t h a t t h e y ' r e u n d e r t a k i n g t o t r y i t a g a i n .
We would have p r e f e r r e d more t i m e , b u t t h e y went a g a i n s t our own
a d v i c e . So we have jumped b e f o r e we were shoved. (j?)
We a r e a g a i n s t an adjournment. We need cover.
The t h i n g t h a t
w i l l guarantee t h i s i s t h a t we're n o t ganging up w i t h everyone
e l s e a g a i n s t t h e IRA. We j u s t have t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t ' s g o i n g
-CQMgj-DENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/1/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
xo , o^TX- C\
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jgeWP ! DENT TAL
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to be managed. We moved from that position to doing what they
wanted us to do. [&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I n o t h e r words you t h i n k t h e r e ' s some way you
can g i v e him some s o r t o f assurance -- (£7
Mr. Adams: Very d e f i n i t e l y assured.
We have t o s o r t t h i s o u t .
We have s u f f e r e d our f i r s t d e f e a t i n terms o f t h e i n t e r n a l
management. Secondly, we cannot guarantee a n y t h i n g e l s e o t h e r
than our v e r y , v e r y b e s t t o g e t back t o them as q u i c k l y as
p o s s i b l e t o l e t them know how we're g e t t i n g i t on and what has
happened. (J?)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. L e t me ask you t h i s , how w i l l i t work i f
p r i v a t e l y you can t e l l them... why do you want t o w a i t two weeks
b e f o r e you go p u b l i c ? (jzf
Mr. Adams: We have a c t u a l l y suggested t h a t t h e y c a l l b i l a t e r a l s
on Tuesday a week from now. We need more t i m e , t h e n , t o g e t
away from any p r e s c r i b e d timeframe which engages people.
O b v i o u s l y , i f we can g e t back t o them w i t h some i n d i c a t i o n i n
f o u r days, t h r e e days, two days. We'll do a l l o f t h a t .
We
don't want t o go t o t h e f a r extreme o f any t i m e t a b l e .
C#T
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay, I g o t i t .
027
Mr. Adams: I s t h a t f a i r enough? We need space and cover t o
make t h i s work, and t h e l a s t t h i n g we want i s p u b l i c
s p e c u l a t i o n . The l a s t t h i n g we want i s t o have Sinn Fein seen
as ganging up on t h e IRA because t h a t w i l l g e t people's backs up
and make o u r j o b s h a r d e r . We w i l l get back w i t h them w i t h
honest soundings and t h a t c l e a r l y w i l l h e l p them w e l l w i t h i n t h e
two weeks. ( p i
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. I understand.
(pi
Mr. Adams: I'm going back i n t o see Tony and B e r t i e
minutes here.
Do you want me t o c a l l you back?
The P r e s i d e n t :
a g a i n . (pf
Mr. Adams:
I w i l l j u s t c a l l you back i f we need t o t a l k
Good l u c k .
The P r e s i d e n t :
within
Thanks.
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End o f Conversation
—
.CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
2 3 95
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
J o e l Schrader, Jenny McGee,
M i l e s Murphy, Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford and
Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 6:45 - 6:49 a.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o Gerry.
Good morning.
(U)
(U)
The President: Look, I talked to Tony and Bertie, and they
understand where you are and why, and what they say must be
right. I'm sure there's no way this document is not going to
leak. ijZ)
Mr. Adams:
I told them that when they give it out.
(Stf
The P r e s i d e n t :
What t h e y ' r e s a y i n g i s they t h i n k t h i s document
can be t h e b a s i s f o r agreement b u t they know t h e p a r t i e s need
t i m e t o r e f l e c t on i t and suggest reconvening a week from
Tuesday. Otherwise i t ' l l l o o k k i n d o f c r a z y i f i t j u s t leaks
out t h e r e . (00
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k a l l o f t h a t ' s dead on. What we can't have
them say i s t h e y t h i n k we're going t o agree t o i t . ( "
£)
The P r e s i d e n t :
No, no, I t h i n k they can say t h e y don't know
what y o u ' l l say. 027
Mr. Adams:
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , we t o l d them when they gave o u t t h e
document i t ' l l end up i n t h e p u b l i c arena. There i s no bad
f e e l i n g s — t h e y ' r e d o i n g t h e i r j o b and we understand.
We
-eONFIDENFfftL
D ^ s s i f ^ r
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a c t u a l l y said we couldn't d e l i v e r but then they gave us a l l
sorts of t r o u b l e . I am t r y i n g to manage t h a t and I t h i n k i t ' s
going t o be a p u b l i c issue. At t h i s point I don't t h i n k the
government can do anything except put i t out there as the basis
for agreement. A l l of that's okay?
The President: Yes.
(jzl
Mr. Adams:
And they are t a l k i n g about reconvening
i n a week from Tuesday. C ?
()
bilaterals
The President: Okay. Yeah, I got it. Well, all right, I think
if they can publish and say it could be the basis for an
agreement and give all the parties time to reflect. [tf
Mr. Adams: We were against adjournment and we t o l d the
Government. We t o l d them that we would have t o r e f l e c t our
disappointment.
I t i s more acceptable t o them, but they should
be saying t h e y ' l l adjourn f o r a period of r e f l e c t i o n and then
w e ' l l resume intense discussion on such-and-such a date. (£
.7
The President:
Mr. Adams:
(£7
You happy enough?
The President:
Mr. Adams:
I got i t .
Yes, I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work.
Okay, goodbye.
The President:
(£7
Thank you.
(^T
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation
—
aiNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
2429
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
The President
Chancellor Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : B r i g i t t a Richman
Notetakers: Matt S i b l e y , James Smith, Bob
Ford, Sean Tarver and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
A p r i l 1, 1999, 4:06 - 4:43 p.m. EST
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Gerhard, how are you?
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
I'm f i n e , thank you. (U)
The President: I wanted t o t a l k t o you about where we are on
Kosovo. I t h i n k i n the l a s t couple o f n i g h t s , even though the
weather has been bad, we have s t a r t e d t o h i t some t a r g e t s t h a t
w i l l make some d i f f e r e n c e . I am encouraged t h e A l l i e s have
approved what I consider t o be an a p p r o p r i a t e range o f t a r g e t s
f o r t o n i g h t and maybe the next couple of days because o f the
weather. fS-)
But I t h i n k we have t o f i n d some way o f more e f f i c i e n t l y p i c k i n g
these t a r g e t s and going forward. I t ' s t a k i n g an enormous amount
of time from Solana and Clark, who spends as much time on
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the A l l i e s as he does conducting the
campaign. I t h i n k i f we have any chance o f a d i p l o m a t i c
i n i t i a t i v e working t h a t won't be a defeat f o r Europe and the
United States, we have got t o keep h i t t i n g hard and give the
impression we are w i l l i n g t o do i t f o r some time. fS4
That means t o me some way of having the leaders o f NATO n a t i o n s
approve c a t e g o r i e s o f t a r g e t s and then have Clark p i c k t h e
m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and then have Solana have our leave t o take
some o f f i f he b e l i e v e s the c o l l a t e r a l damage would be too
g r e a t . Because we're already being questioned here about why we
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Reason: 1 . 5 ( a , b , d )
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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PERE.O.13526
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are so slow to ramp up the campaign if he is doing these
terrible things. Part of it is the weather, of course, but part
of it is this process of picking targets, which I think has
become cumbersome. t&j
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Can I make a few comments? fSI
Of course.
(S)
--
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:. F i r s t o f a l l , i n general I agree w i t h your
a n a l y s i s and o b v i o u s l y I agree w i t h your p o i n t s . He has t o
withdraw h i s troops and stop h i s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y ; the Kosovars
have t o be able t o r e t u r n i n s e c u r i t y ; and then I t h i n k f o r a
long-term s e t t l e m e n t they have t o have some degree o f the
autonomy t h a t they enjoyed before he took i t away from them. So
i n general, I agree w i t h t h a t . My o n l y concern i s t h a t i f we
were t o o f f e r such a t h i n g tomorrow — I can o n l y say how i t
w i l l be perceived i n t h i s country because o f the press coverage
— i t would look l i k e an o f f e r from the p o s i t i o n o f weakness.
L i k e we d i d n ' t want t o go ahead w i t h the bombing campaign,
t h a t ' s been c a l l e d h a l f - h e a r t e d t o date, and t h a t i n e f f e c t we
were suing f o r peace. That would make i t impossible f o r him t o
accept. I n a way, we would both decrease t h e chance t h a t he
w i l l take a reasonable o f f e r and our being perceived as having
defended the people o f Kosovo. I f we r e a l l y can r a t c h e t t h i s up
and h i t him hard f o r a few days and then discuss the parameters
SECRET
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3
of a s o l u t i o n , I'm a f r a i d i t w i l l be perceived i n the United
States t h a t we are weak and i n d e c i s i v e and haven't h i t him hard.
I'm a f r a i d i f t h a t i s the way he perceived i t , i t would be
impossible f o r him t o accept those terms. He would countero f f e r w i t h something we cannot accept, because he would t h i n k we
are about t o q u i t on him. {S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: F i r s t o f a l l , I don't disagree w i t h a n y t h i n g you
s a i d . Let me put i t another way. Whenever we decide t o go
p u b l i c w i t h an o f f e r o f n e g o t i a t i o n , e i t h e r from one leader l i k e
you o r NATO as a whole, i f we have not impressed upon the p u b l i c
i n Europe and the U n i t e d States, as w e l l as i n Serbia, t h a t we
have done a l o t o f damage and could do a l o t more -- t h a t i s , i f
not a l o t o f damage has already been done and i f we do i t before
t h a t happens, i t i s imperative we have the agreement o f a l l NATO
members t o say he needs t o understand we are prepared t o
continue and escalate t h i s a i r e f f o r t f o r several weeks more, i f
t h a t i s what i t takes. And t h a t we have no s h o r t - t e r m deadline
on t h i s .
And i f we say i t , we have t o be prepared t o do i t .
I f we have a
peace o f f e r on the t a b l e , even i f i t ' s one he can't accept,
before there's been a p e r c e p t i b l e negative impact on h i s
s i t u a t i o n on the ground, then we have t o be even more e x p l i c i t
t h a t we are prepared t o do t h i s f o r weeks and weeks and we have
no s e t t i m e l i n e o r deadline. We have an o b j e c t i v e and we are
going t o achieve i t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder:
SECRET
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Let me suggest, I t h i n k we need t o c o o r d i n a t e
through our s t a f f people how t o handle t h i s as we go forward on
this.
I know Madeleine i s t a l k i n g t o Fischer. I mentioned t h i s
to Tony B l a i r today, because I thought you had probably
discussed i t w i t h him. I f we three could work i t out, how do
you t h i n k we can do t h i s ? We c e r t a i n l y have t o make i t c l e a r
there are c o n d i t i o n s under which we would be w i l l i n g t o stop the
hostilities.
We're i n there t o stop the h o s t i l i t i e s , so I agree
w i t h t h a t . I want t o ask whether you agree we should e s t a b l i s h
some smoother procedures on the t a r g e t s issue, because I t h i n k
we w i l l be moving p r e t t y q u i c k l y once the weather c l e a r s up.
[The l i n e t o the Chancellor dropped and was r e e s t a b l i s h e d . ]
The President: Gerhard, we got c u t o f f . Maybe ( t h e
i n t e r p r e t e r ) can do the t r a n s l a t i o n again. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Yes. I have no problem w i t h t h a t . A l l I am
t r y i n g t o do i s f i n d a system t h a t works more r a p i d l y . Maybe we
can have J a v i e r — he's got sense enough t o know what t a r g e t s
are s e n s i t i v e because o f high c o l l a t e r a l damage o r the l o c a t i o n
— maybe we j u s t need t o t e l l him he needs the a b i l i t y t o check
i n on a d a i l y basis a t a c e r t a i n time, and i f they don't present
SECRET
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5
c o l l a t e r a l damage problems or break huge new ground, he ought t o
l e t them go. A u t h o r i z i n g him t o do i t might be an e f f i c i e n t
way. f S )
-Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: Let me say t h a t i f we do i t t h a t way, we may
a c t u a l l y lengthen the process. As i t i s now, they b r i n g us
proposed m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s and i f one has considerable c o l l a t e r a l
damage o r represent h i s t o r i c a l or s i g n i f i c a n t c u l t u r a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e t o Serbs, they b r i n g i t t o me and say, "maybe we
shouldn't h i t t h i s , " and I say, "okay, maybe we s h o u l d n ' t . "
What I t h i n k i s , i n s t e a d o f announcing t h a t new phases have j u s t
been a u t h o r i z e d , we could a u t h o r i z e m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , but they
could come back t o us w i t h ones t h a t have c o l l a t e r a l damage or
c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , then we could say yes o r no. I f we t h i n k
we are a l l i n c l i n e d t o say yes, but a l l our A l l i e s a r e n ' t , then
we could go t o them. I t h i n k t h a t maybe t h e most e f f i c i e n t way
of doing t h i s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I have no problem w i t h t h a t . ( S
-i
The President: Good. A l r i g h t . We w i l l be i n touch. I t h i n k
your t h i n k i n g on the o u t l i n e o f what we should say i s q u i t e
r i g h t , and w e ' l l work on i t .
We may have t o t a l k again i n a day
or so, but thank you very much. fSi
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, but I t h i n k we have t o s t a r t —
going t o be here t h i s week, I'm not going t o take an Easter
v a c a t i o n , and I t h i n k you aren't, e i t h e r —
SECRET
I am
�JECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
I agree.
tS-)
Chancellor Schroeder: And about the guestion of when we become
a c t i v e , we can discuss t h i s f u r t h e r .
The President: I t h i n k we are on the same page and we j u s t need
to work out the d e t a i l s .
I am sure Madeleine and Fischer can
work out the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
together here. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Easter. (U)
Yes.
Absolutely.
Chancellor Schroeder:
—
GECRET
Perhaps Sandy and S t e i n e r can work
Okay, thank you.
Thank you. Goodbye.
End o f Conversation
(U)
—
Happy
�SECRET
2679
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation
w i t h United Nations
Secretary General K o f i Annan (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Annan
Notetaker: Bonnie C l i c k , Matthew S i b l e y ,
Robin Rickard and Robert Ford
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
A p r i l 10, 1999,
Oval O f f i c e
1:01 - 1:08
H e l l o K o f i , how are you?
p.m.
(U)
Secretary General Annan: How are you B i l l ?
these are d i f f i c u l t times f o r us.
(U)
I am f i n e , but
The President: Yes, I thought your statement was very good.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the b i g headline from Russia, I t h i n k we have a
r e a l chance over next week. I t h i n k i t was g r e a t . Even though
the headlines i n the New York Times t h i s morning are d i s t u r b i n g ,
I t h i n k we. have a chance f o r a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t e d f r o n t . What
the Russians need i s t o get back i n t o the ballgame. I f they are
p a r t of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , which I always thought they had
to do, l i k e i n Bosnia. I f the Russians are happy, then the
Chinese w i l l stop what they are saying, and then we can get the
whole t h i n g sanctioned by the UN.
Madeleine i s seeing Ivanov
next week and we are working through the Europeans and I know
you are. I f we could get them to take a common d i p l o m a t i c
p o s i t i o n , where i t i s obvious they would be p a r t o f any
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , there may be a way t o work through t h i s .
I t ' s important t o get a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t . I f we keep t h i s
up f o r another month or two, w e ' l l be able to move i n t h e r e
uncontested.
Then the t h i n g t h a t concerns me i s having Europe
w i t h us and being there f o r e v e r and a day.
Look how long we had
to stay i n Bosnia, w i t h the Russians. I t i s almost a l i c e n s e
f o r Kosovar m i l i t a r y elements to r e c o n s t i t u t e themselves and
s t a r t going the other way.
I t h i n k we have a chance i n the next
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Reason: 1.5 (a),(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: A p r i l 12, 2009
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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couple o f weeks to break the iceberg and get the Russians back
i n the hunt. They're not j u s t coming to Europe and the United
States now, but they're working through a whole range o f t h i n g s .
I f we can get them there sometime over the next couple o f weeks,
then I t h i n k we have a chance to put t h i s together. ( S
-i
Secretary General Annan:
The President: I t h i n k as a p r a c t i c a l matter, what would matter
there i s the l e v e l o f assurance and d e t a i l we have about
acceptance, and a t i m e t a b l e f o r withdrawal and when the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l force w i l l get i n . What B l a i r , Schroeder, and I
are w o r r i e d about i s having him accept i t , having a c e s s a t i o n o f
bombing, and then a reason why he can't get i t across, and the
t r o u b l e then i s having the a l l i e s resume bombing. The problem
w i l l be i n the d e t a i l s . fS-)
Secretary General Annan:
The President:
Yep. I agree w i t h t h a t .
(U)
Secretary General Annan: I w i l l work w i t h you and a l l the
governments concerned t o f i n d a way out o f t h i s and I t h i n k we
may get t o a p o i n t where he w i l l crack, but M i l o s e v i c i s such an
i n c r e d i b l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e character.
The President: Even though there i s a most f r i g h t e n i n g headline
about Y e l t s i n ' s bombast, as near as we can t e l l , t h i s i s an
e f f o r t by Russia to get back i n t o the d i p l o m a t i c hunt. £S4
Secretary General Annan: I t had q u i t e an impact here i n Europe,
but some o f the c l a r i f i c a t i o n s from Moscow seem to have
c l a r i f i e d t h i n g s a b i t . (S)
-The President: Let's stay i n close touch next week t o see what
we can do to put t h i s t h i n g together. I t h i n k you have r e a l l y
done a good t h i n g here. We have got a chance t o get t h i s done.
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOF
�GECRET
Secretary General Annan:
i n i t i a t i v e , then? t€}
Would you say something about my
The President: A b s o l u t e l y .
yesterday. fe)
Secretary General Annan:
I thought I p u t something out
I am i n Europe. (U)
The President: I was t h r i l l e d by what you s a i d .
check. I f we haven't put out a statement, I w i l l .
I will
(G
-4
double-
Secretary General Annan: Thank you very much. I n f a c t , one o f
the European leaders s a i d t o me t h a t France, Germany, e t c . have
s a i d something, but the U n i t e d States and UK have n o t . t&j
The President: Tony B l a i r i s supposed t o c a l l i n the next hour.
When he c a l l s , I w i l l ask him t o say something a l s o . (€-)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Secretary General Annan:
I
f i n d i n these s i t u a t i o n s t h a t when the whole w o r l d comes
t o g e t h e r , we always make progress.
The President:
Okay, I got i t . (U)
Secretary General Annan:
f a m i l y . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I will,
Thank you B i l l and give my best t o the
thank you so much. (U)
Secretary General Annan:
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�JECRET
2679
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation w i t h French President
Chirac
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Alec Toumayan
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , M i l e s Murphy,
Doug Bayley
A p r i l 11, 1999, 1:00 - 1:13
Camp David, Maryland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
H e l l o , Jacques?
President Chirac:
The President:
EDT
(U)
B i l l , how are you?
Fine, how are you?
President Chirac:
p.m.
(U)
(U)
I t i s very good t o hear from you.
(U)
The President: Thank you. I j u s t wanted t o check i n w i t h you
to see where we are on Kosovo. I t h i n k K o f i Annan made a very
good statement on Friday, the way he s t a t e d our c o n d i t i o n s . The
o n l y d i f f e r e n c e , of course, i s t h a t he asked NATO t o suspend
a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o the c o n d i t i o n s . But I
t h i n k we need some s i g n of implementation f i r s t .
I am very
encouraged t h a t the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s ' statement has
Russia i n v o l v e d . I f we can lock t h a t i n a t the h i g h e s t l e v e l s ,
I t h i n k we can get back on the d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k .
f&)
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y share these f e e l i n g s .
t h i n k t h a t K o f i Annan's statement i s p e r f e c t .
SECRET
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
4/12/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
I also
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�SECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Well, I t h i n k we are agreed on t h a t .
I just
wanted t o mention one or two other t h i n g s . F i r s t , Hubert, Robin
Cook and Madeleine w i l l meet w i t h t h e i r NATO c o u n t e r p a r t s i n
Brussels on Monday. This i s an important s i g n a l o f our
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and makes sure the smaller A l l i e s not i n the
Contact Group don't f e e l l e f t out. I am going t o c a l l some o f
them, e s p e c i a l l y those c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s . Any t h a t you f e e l
p a r t i c u l a r l y close t o , i f you have the occasion, you could say
something u s e f u l t o them. I t would be h e l p f u l t o spend a l i t t l e
time s h o r i n g them up. f&)
President Chirac: I am i n absolute agreement, and I s h a l l make
my c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s e f f o r t . I also i n t e n d t o ask
Schroeder, as President o f the European Union, t o do so. I
would a l s o l i k e t o add t h a t we have a European Union Council on
Wednesday. There w i l l be 15 heads o f European s t a t e s and
governments present. A t t h i s time we s h a l l consider Kosovo i n
the s p i r i t j u s t i n d i c a t e d , which w i l l a l l o w heads o f smaller
governments t o express t h e i r p o i n t s o f view.
I t i s even
p o s s i b l e K o f i Annan might come, and t h i s i s something t h a t would
g r e a t l y please the German p r e s i d e n t . fe}
The President: That i s very good. Let me mention a couple
other t h i n g s . I r e a l l y appreciate what you have done w i t h the
refugees. The s i t u a t i o n i s beginning t o get i n b e t t e r shape,
but we need t o be s e n s i t i v e t o what i s happening t o the f r o n t
l i n e s t a t e s . We need t o ask our people what we are going t o do
a f t e r t h i s i s over t o help the r e s e t t l e m e n t o f Kosovo and the
l a r g e r recovery e f f o r t s . There may be a way a f t e r t h i s i s over
t o get a l l these c o u n t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n a common economic
endeavor t h a t w i l l reduce e t h n i c s t r i f e .
We need t o s t a r t t o
t h i n k about t h i s now.
We need the best people i n a l l these
c o u n t r i e s t h i n k i n g about what i t w i l l look l i k e f i v e years from
now, assuming we get a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n here. f G)
President Chirac: This i s also my f e e l i n g .
Also, what we wish
to do w i t h the European Union. Also, the s p e c i f i c problem o f
the refugees, but more p r e c i s e l y the d i s p l a c e d persons, who are
s t i l l i n Kosovo and cannot get out. And we know n e i t h e r where
they are, nor what s t a t e they are i n . I t w i l l be necessary t o
consider help by the m i l i t a r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y how t o get more
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET
3
i n f o r m a t i o n about the s i t u a t i o n and, i f need be, t o parachute i n
the necessary h e l p . fS4
The President: Yes, t h a t i s very good. One l a s t t h i n g . I got
a couple l e t t e r s from Y e l t s i n l a s t week t h a t I thought were
p r e t t y encouraging, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the r a t h e r inflammatory
p u b l i c comments he made. I n the next week or so, once we get
t h i s G-8 statement n a i l e d down, we ought t o make an e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians back i n t h e game, and t h a t might serve Y e l t s i n
at home where he i s fending o f f a t t a c k s i n t h e Duma.
President Chirac: Yes, I have heard o f a resumption o f dialogue
between Russia and America, and I know Madeleine i s meeting w i t h
Ivanov on Tuesday.
The President: Yes, w e l l , I t h i n k t h a t i f we can j u s t keep the
pressure up, I t h i n k we may get a break i n the next couple o f
weeks, Jacques. I f we can keep t h e pressure up. We j u s t have
to stay a f t e r i t . fS-)
President Chirac: This i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e .
countries i s perfect.
The President:
The u n i t y o f NATO
Yes. (U)
President Chirac:
The President: Yes, i t i s very, very unstable. I am very
w o r r i e d about i t .
But we are t r y i n g t o get them t o take a
higher p r o f i l e i n an attempt t o promote s t a b i l i t y , because on
one hand i t b r i n g s Russia c l o s e r t o Europe, and on t h e o t h e r ,
Y e l t s i n can say t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s he i s t r y i n g t o stop t h e
bombing. (S)
--
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
President Chirac: Yes, I completely agree, and we can make use
of the NATO-Russia p a r t n e r s h i p . ( S
-i
The President: Yes, okay, I w i l l see you here p r e t t y soon, b u t
i f we need t o t a l k t h i s week, I w i l l be around a l l week. I may
need t o c a l l you again. f G)
President Chirac: Okay, e v e r y t h i n g i s a b s o l u t e l y c l e a r . As
long as we stay on the K o f i Annan process, I t h i n k we can
achieve success.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President:
Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t .
President Chirac:
The President:
Okay, B i l l .
f&4
(U)
Thank you, Jacques.
(U)
President Chirac: Please give my regards t o H i l l a r y , and I w i l l
see you soon. (U)
The President:
A l l r i g h t , good bye. (U)
President Chirac:
Bye. (U)
—
End o f Conversation
—
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCUi'
�'HESRESlC^r HAS SEEN
THE
WHITE
HOUSE ^ "
1
' -~S:9
WA S HI N G T O N
~1
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�2882
CECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 17, 1999
TELEPHONE CALLS TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR,
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
\C
V'
FROM: SAMUEL BERG
I.
PURPOSE
B l a i r . Review UK paper. Discuss shoring up A l l i e s on
widening t h e range o f t a r g e t s and the NATO Summit.
Chirac.
Press Chirac t o stay f o r d u r a t i o n o f NATO Summit.
Secure support f o r pressing on w i t h the NATO a i r campaign and
widening the range o f t a r g e t s .
C h r e t i e n . Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r strong support, i n c l u d i n g
d e c i s i o n t o c o n t r i b u t e more f i g h t e r s . Ask him t o buck up
Chirac on the NATO Summit. Get readout o f Zhu's Canada v i s i t .
II.
BACKGROUND
B l a i r . You spoke t o B l a i r today about moving t o Phase I I I .
Y o u ' l l want t o discuss the paper he i s sending as w e l l as
ways t o p r e v a i l upon Chirac t o stay f o r t h e e n t i r e NATO
Summit. B l a i r may again r a i s e b e t t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n on NATO
communications -- the B r i t i s h press termed the convoy
i n c i d e n t an understandable accident o f war b u t a p u b l i c
r e l a t i o n s d i s a s t e r because o f i n e p t handling by NATO p u b l i c
affairs officials.
Chirac
You should p r e v a i l
upon Chirac t o stay f o r the d u r a t i o n because: ( i ) every
day o f t h e Summit has a Kosovo focus and discussions f o r
which he needs t o be present; ( i i ) l e a v i n g e a r l y would send
SECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
D e c l a s s i f y on:
4/16/09
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
8/(*/i5" KBH
�GECRET
2
^
q.q q
a t e r r i b l e message o f A l l i e d d i s u n i t y ; ( i i i ) we have
e l i m i n a t e d o r toned done the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects of the
summit. I f necessary, you can remind Chirac t h a t not o n l y
d i d you a t t e n d the Lyons G-8 i n the wake o f the Khobar
Towers bombing, you kept your promise t o dine w i t h him i n
Paris.
Meanwhile, Chirac continues t o take a s t r o n g p u b l i c l i n e on
Kosovo, speaking t o the French people a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s
t o m a i n t a i n support f o r t h e a i r s t r i k e s . His l e a d e r s h i p has
been e f f e c t i v e f o r NATO and f o r Chirac p e r s o n a l l y — t h e
French p u b l i c ' s support f o r the a i r s t r i k e s (70 percent) i s
topped o n l y by t h e i r support f o r Chirac ( j o b approval
r a t i n g : 79 p e r c e n t ) . Like Schroeder and D'Alema, Chirac
i s convinced t h a t a key t o m a i n t a i n i n g p u b l i c backing i s t o
c o n s t a n t l y take t h e i n i t i a t i v e — i f the p u b l i c senses
s t a g n a t i o n o r b e l i e v e s there i s no end i n s i g h t t o
( i n e f f e c t i v e ) a i r s t r i k e s , t h e i r support could wane. Hence
Chirac's support f o r the Fischer p l a n , h i s c a l l f o r the UN
t o be more i n v o l v e d , h i s p u b l i c e f f o r t s t o woo the Russians
on board, and h i s proposal t h a t t h e EU administer any peace
settlement.
EO 13526 1.4d
You a l s o should know t h a t P h i l i p p e Seguin, the leader o f
Chirac's G a u l l i s t p a r t y but also h i s r i v a l , q u i t Friday as
p a r t y leader and head o f i t s l i s t f o r the European
p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s . That's good news f o r Chirac i n
the long term because i t marginalizes Seguin b u t bad news
i n the s h o r t term, because i t makes the r i g h t ' s already
bleak prospects i n the European e l e c t i o n s even b l e a k e r .
F i n a l l y , Chirac and the French are preoccupied w i t h
A l g e r i a , whose e l e c t i o n Friday was d i s c r e d i t e d by the
w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l but the army-backed candidate.
C h r e t i e n wants t o t a l k about the way ahead i n Kosovo, how
i t w i l l f i t i n t o the Summit and t o give you a readout o f
Zhu's v i s i t t o Canada. He remains s t e a d f a s t l y behind NATO
a c t i o n s i n Kosovo and i s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n favor o f ground
f o r c e i n t e r v e n t i o n . This Monday, he won complete support
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
i n Parliament f o r Canada's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A l l i e d Force.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , Ottawa w i l l c o n t r i b u t e another s i x F-18
f i g h t e r s t o the e f f o r t ( b r i n g i n g i t s contingent from 12 t o
18 p l a n e s ) , and has agreed t o take i n up t o 5 Q Q Kosovar
,Q
refugees w i t h p r e - e x i s t i n g t i e s t o Canada.
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r President Chirac
Tab C Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-SECRET
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
•
Agree t h a t Summit i s p i v o t a l .
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and show
t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure on M i l o s e v i c . W e ' l l a l s o want
t o work q u i e t l y t o d e a l w i t h any blockages.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept i s b e i n g
q u e s t i o n e d by France and I t a l y i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p
unstick i t .
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
Our s t a f f s h o u l d remain i n c l o s e touch over t h e n e x t few days
as we p r e p a r e f o r t h e Summit. Reserve judgment f o r now on t h e
need f o r them t o come here.
•
Look f o r w a r d t o t a l k i n g w i t h you Thursday morning.
•
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d n o t s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a heavy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've g o t t e n r i d o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe you can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
CECRET
Reason: 1 . 5 ( a ) ( b ) ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
SM U S
H
K6V1
�•S1LLKLT
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Pleased t h a t you're w i l l i n g t o expand range o f t a r g e t s i n
NATO's a i r campaign. E s s e n t i a l t h a t we i n t e n s i f y the a i r
s t r i k e s and make our d e t e r m i n a t i o n c l e a r t o M i l o s e v i c .
'-- A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and L i o n e l J o s p i n d e l i v e r e d on
n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l Assembly.
/
v
^yNATO Summit p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate
u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n and t o show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up
p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t the Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be able
t o b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t the t i m e o f the Summit. That w i l l send
a strong signal.
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce the NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t your d e l e g a t i o n has
r a i s e d v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move it.
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•
Understand your concerns about not w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i t i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every day has a heavy Kosovo focus
-- you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f the c e l e b r a t o r y aspects.
F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
•
[ I f necessary:
Jacques, I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombing, not o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-8
—- as planned, I kept my d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•SECRET
Reason:
Declassify
1.5(a)
on:
(b) (d)
4/16/09
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F Ci llOJi*
^
O ia n
M
S/t/is KBH
-
�•OCCRCT
2
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen\;prae o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
t h e FRY, and q u e s t i o n s i o e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e pressure, and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e continues t o mount. Thought K o f i ' s and
t h e G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were s t r o n g .
•
jECRET
-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPI
�-SECRET
2882
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN
\ghu V i s i t
•
Understand you had good meetings w i t h Zhu, and he's now o f f on
a t o u r o f Canada. I n t e r e s t e d i n your readout.
NATO Summit
•
Need t o s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week's t i m e .
Given M i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
ongoing.
•
W e ' l l want t o demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , as o u r
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s d i d e a r l i e r t h i s week. But w e ' l l a l s o want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
•
You may have heard Chirac sending s i g n a l s he may leave Summit
as e a r l y as F r i d a y because we f a i l e d t o s h o r t e n i t and focus
e v e r y t h i n g on Kosovo. I n f a c t , we've re-worked summit so thatevery day has a heavy Kosovo focus and we've e l i m i n a t e d t h e
c e l e b r a t o r y aspects. Most i m p o r t a n t , i f Jacques were t o leave
e a r l y , i t would send a t e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d d i s u n i t y .
Maybe you can t a l k t o him.
Kosovo
•
L e t me say f i r s t how much I a p p r e c i a t e your p l a n s t o
c o n t r i b u t e another s i x f i g h t e r s .
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
to b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e time o f t h e Summit. That w i l l send
a s t r o n g s i g n a l . A p p r e c i a t e your sending an a d d i t i o n a l s i x
CF-18s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a i r campaign.
•
We c o u l d a l s o aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e . I understand t h a t concept has r u n i n t o
some o p p o s i t i o n i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
I r ^
Reason:
Declassify
, , , WKWH,
1.5 (a) (b) (d)
on: 4/16/09
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.0.13526
ao\^
*
3
OWIQ.
JAI'J
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY S/u/iy
^
�-OECRET
•
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Y u g o s l a v i a . Our Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r t h e same purpose.
•
You've p r o b a b l y seen some o f t h e r e p o r t i n g about d i s s e n s i o n i n
the FRY, and q u e s t i o n s b e i n g r a i s e d about M i l o s e v i c ' s
leadership.
I f we keep up t h e p r e s s u r e , and make c l e a r t h a t
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , t h e r e may be some hope o f f i n d i n g a crack
i n Belgrade's r e s o l v e .
•SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
2882
POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Nticd Lu b l d i l — L l i i u k i n y dbuuL 1>A'1U bliMuil i n VJCGJC"' • t i m e .
^jr^en M i l o s e v i c ' g atfeitude?—probable NATO airyfcampaign
W e ' l l want to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , aa
our^
Foreign M i n i s t e r s d i d e a i l i c i . — t i l l s wtt]
But w e ' l l a l s o want
show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c .
C h i r a c sending s i g n a l s he may l e a v ^ Summit as e a r l y as F r i d a y
because we d i d not s h o r t e n i t , focus i t e n t i r e l y on Kosovo as
he wants. I n f a c t , t h e r e ' s a h^avy Kosovo focus every day f o r
which he i s needed, we've gotyen r i d o f the c e l e b r a t o r y
aspects and h i s l e a v i n g e a r l y would send a t e r r i b l e message
about A l l i e d d i s u n i t y . Maybe vou can t a l k t o him about t h i s .
It's possible t
to b e g i n g
a str
C
e able
u m m i t j ^ — m a t w i l l send
additional six
We c o u l d a l s o a/m t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e /Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o s t e p up
economic p r e s s u r e .
I understand t h a t concept Jsss—fcurT'TntQ
ome (»ppoci/ion i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p u n s t i c k i t .
t - , r^-u
F i n a l l y , A t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d the
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugoslavia.
Our F o r e i g n ' M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
7
ng a b o u t d i - S s e n s i o n i n
about MjJrcr^evic's
and make c l e a r t h a t
of f i n d i n g a c r a c k
Reason:
1.5(a (b) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 4/16/09
i n •
TL...,^
�)£CRC?
2882
POINTS TO 3E MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
N^TO
< • -•
Summit
0
1
teed Y s t a r t t h i n k i n g about NATO Summit i n week s . t i m e .
G \ v e n V l i l o s e v i c ' s a t t i t u d e , p r o b a b l e NATO a i r campaign
X A^
^ —\
oncloinc
1
W-c 11 v^an^/to demonstrate u n i t y and d e t e r m j ^ a t i o n y a-s^-o u r
F n r e i g n Mi n-j 1-p c: H i H o a r - l - j p r t h i s W P P V / R n t - WP ' 1 1
so want
to show t h a t we're s t e p p i n g up pressure/on M i l o s e v i c .
ff
r
Understand your concerns about n o t w a n t i n g t o be so l o n g away
from home. But Jacques, i t i s c r i c i c a l you s t a y f o r d u r a t i o n .
We reworked agenda so t h a t every/day has a heavy Kosovo focus
you are v i t a l t o these d i s c u s s i o n s . We've e l i m i n a t e d
v i r t u a l l y a l l o f t h e c e l e b r a t o r y a s p e c t s . F i n a l l y , i f you
l e f t e a r l y , i t would send a / r e r r i b l e message o f a l l i e d
disunity.
[ I f necessary: Jacques^ I ' d ask you t o remember t h a t a f t e r
the Khobar Towers bombang, n o t o n l y d i d I a t t e n d t h e Lyons G-f
as planned, I kept ity/ d i n n e r appointment w i t h you i n P a r i s . ]
•
•
I t ' s p o s s i b l e t & a t t h e Apaches i n Task Force Hawk w i l l be a b l e
t o b e g i n o p e r a r i o n s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e Summit. T h a t _ _ w i l l send
a s t r o n 3 _ s j ^ g ^ a J ^ _ ^ A p p r e c i a t e s t r o n g messages you and LTone"2r-.
^^^ospTri d e l i v e r e d on n a t i o n a l TV and t o the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y ^
We c o u l d Also aim t o announce t h e NATO m a r i t i m e i n s p e c t i o n
regime a t t h e Summit, showing how we i n t e n d t o _ s t e p up
economic/pressure.
I understand that <roncopt has r u n i n t n ^
some o p p o o i t i o f l i n NATO; hope t h a t you can h e l p move i t .
tt
F i n a l l y , i t would be good i f our statement i n d i c a t e d t h e
i n t e n t i o n o f a l l a l l i e s t o t i g h t e n economic s a n c t i o n s on
Yugc/slavia. Our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting w i t h f r o n t - l i n e
s t a t e s can be used f o r the same purpose.
•SECRE'T
Reason:
1.5(a)(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o n : 4/16/09
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You've probably seen some of r.he r e p o r t i n g about dissension i n
the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's
/ '
leadership. I f we keep up the pressure, and make clear t h a t /
i t w i l l i n t e n s i f y , there may be some hope of f i n d i n g a cracj
i n Belgrade's resolve.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure continues t o mount. Thought^f&^fi's and
the G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statements were strono-'
OECRET
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4 310
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German Chancellor Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Robin Rickard and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 3, 1999, 1:35 - 1:45 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Chancellor Schroeder: H e l l o , B i l l .
This i s Gerd Schroeder. We
have j u s t had the r e p o r t o f Mr. A h t i s a a r i and i t looks t o me,
a f t e r reading i t , l i k e a r e a l breakthrough i n the s i t u a t i o n .
The p a r l i a m e n t has approved t h i s , t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the NATO
proposals, and t h a t approval looks t o me l i k e t h a t i s t h e same
as implementation. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Gerhard, would you ask t h e i n t e p r e t e r t o say
t h a t again? (U)
( I n t e r p r e t e r repeats t h e Chancellor's previous
statement)
The P r e s i d e n t : What the parliament approved i s s l i g h t l y
d i f f e r e n t from NATO's proposal, as they l e f t out the word ' a l l "
i n terms o f t r o o p withdrawal, but i t looks h e l p f u l . We have t o
say, o b v i o u s l y , t h a t we appreciate the work t h a t Chernomyrdin
and A h t i s a a r i have done and we appreciate the vote i n t h e
p a r l i a m e n t , b u t we f e e l t h a t we need t o see some r e s u l t s . We
don't want t o be once again i n the p o s i t i o n o f t h i n k i n g we have
an agreement and then not have i t m a t e r i a l i z e . We w i l l keep
working t h i s b u t want t o see concrete r e s u l t s . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: I understand. Well, i t looks t o us as i f
i t were t r u e . I t speaks o f t h e withdrawal o f a l l Serbian
troops, i t speaks t o t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n o f t h e refugees and i t
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Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
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6/7/09
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does speak also to having a NATO core in the peacekeeping force.
Now it also says this will be dealt with in the Security
Council. Now what we have to do is bring about this Security
Council meeting as fast as possible. Already, I believe the
NATO military experts are sitting down with the Yugoslav
military experts. Time is of the essence, we should move this
forward as fast as possible. tS)
The President: I agree t h a t we ought t o move t h i s forward as
f a s t as p o s s i b l e . My r e a l concern today i s only f o r our p u b l i c
r h e t o r i c . I f we are o v e r l y p o s i t i v e and there i s no c a u t i o n i n
our r h e t o r i c , he may not comply. He may get h i s bombing pause
and h e ' l l t u r n e v e r y t h i n g back t o mud. We need t o see r e a l
compliance. I agree we should push forward q u i c k l y b u t my o n l y
concern i s t h a t the NATO A l l i e s be somewhat cautious i n our
p u b l i c statements — so t h a t we don't t h i n k t h a t t h e i r words a r e
as good as t h e i r deeds. He has made a l o t o f deals i n t h e s i x
years t h a t I have been working w i t h him t h a t he has not kept. I
t h i n k t h i s one w i l l be kept i f we show firmness.
Chancellor Schroeder:
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have already worked
a l l t h i s out. I don't t h i n k we need t o t a l k about i t on t h i s
l i n e o r p u b l i c l y , b u t I t h i n k our m i l i t a r y people have reached a
s o l u t i o n on t h a t . (S)
-Chancellor Schroeder: Okay. I agree, by the way, t h a t i t would
d e f i n i t e l y be wrong t o spread euphoria i n p u b l i c statements. We
are n o t about t o do t h a t . We w i l l do so i n a r a t i o n a l ,
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d manner but also i n d i c a t e t h e r e i s hope. f&}
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
I hope we w i l l stay i n touch.
(U)
The President: This could make f o r a b e t t e r G-8 meeting i n
Cologne i f t h i s works out. (U)
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Chancellor Schroeder:
The President:
Yes. Okay.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
— End of Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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(U)
�-SECRET-
4339
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and K. C. Brown
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 6, 1999, 1:35 - 1:42 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
(U)
Hello, B i l l ?
Jean, how are you?
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I'm doing great. I am beside my lake,
and I've got a book I'm sure you read by Michener, a book about
Kennedy. I t ' s a good book. There was some r a i n , so I am j u s t
r e s t i n g a t t h i s moment. (U)
The President:
thing settled.
That's good.
(U)
I t looks l i k e we got t h a t salmon
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: Yes. That i s s e t t l e d and we managed
to s e t t l e the magazine t h i n g too, and now I have t o see i f the
war i s s e t t l e d . (U)
The President: That i s what I wanted t o t a l k t o you about,
because we have a l i t t l e danger here w i t h the Serbs. The Serbs
yesterday had three d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . The Russians were
saying we can't approve a UN r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l the bombing pause,
and the Serbs were saying we can't withdraw u n t i l NATO comes i n
because we don't want a vacuum, which I'm sympathetic w i t h . We
said we can't have a pause u n t i l there i s a withdrawal, so we
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o f f e r e d a bombing pause i f they begin withdrawal and then we
would t r y 24 hours f o r a r e s o l u t i o n . We d i d n ' t want the Chinese
and Russians t o have a veto and then get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , which
we could get i n short order. (pf
Now the Serbs are coming back at us; they and the Russians want
to say they need a r e s o l u t i o n before we w i l l deploy and
a u t h o r i t y t o implement these other changes they want. I f there
i s a delay, then the Serbians would stay at the l e v e l s they were
before they invaded. That i s j u s t a way of s t e a l i n g the peace
a f t e r l o s i n g the c o n f l i c t . ^81
As long as we stay together, they w i l l agree today or tomorrow.
They are t r y i n g to give the Russians a veto over everything that
happens a f t e r t h i s i s resolved. I have wanted the Russians t o
be involved, and I'm pleased they are and want t o r e p a i r the
t i e s between NATO and Russia, but not i f i t means he i s going t o
wreck t h i s mission. I f i t were up t o the Russians, they w i l l
screw t h i s r e s o l u t i o n around, watering down what we can do. (pf
The only reason I c a l l e d you i s t h a t I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t a l l o f us s t i c k behind the p o s i t i o n s o f our n e g o t i a t o r s .
We can't l e t the Russians design and d i c t a t e . That's e x a c t l y
what we would be doing i f we said there has t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n . We j u s t can't do t h a t . We would have gone t o a l l
t h i s t r o u b l e f o r nothing and given i t a l l back t o them.
(jgf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: For me, I have no strong view one way
or the other. I t h i n k i t i s over now, and everybody, the
Russians, I t h i n k , and the Serbs want a f i g l e a f . (Pf
The President: I don't mind about a f i g l e a f , but i f i t breaks
down, then, the Kosovars won't come home. (PI
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We have t o make s\.re the Kosovars can
go home s a f e l y and i f there i s no such agreement i t w i l l be very
d i f f i c u l t , because o f the Kosovar freedom f i g h t e r s . (po
The President: Yes, the moderates and the KLA will work with
us, but there will be some risk. The operational integrity in
what we do is very, very important. Thank you for all your
help. I just wanted to say that. (JS)
Prime Minister Chretien: That's a big deal for me. I hope we
stop bombing as soon as possible, but if the bombing takes a few
more days, it is all right with me because it is better to do it
properly. They want a UN resolution first. (JS)
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The President:
3
As long as we hang on. ( "
P)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
So they want a r e s o l u t i o n f i r s t ?
(#5
The President: Yes, but we can't. That i s f i n e i f we t r y t o
get one but i f we don't get one, we have to go on anyway. We
don't want to give the Russians a veto over the contents o f the
r e s o l u t i o n , because they w i l l be r u t h l e s s and w i l l b a s i c a l l y
undo everything that was done over the l a s t few days. Even
France, who has always been strong on t h i s , has admitted i f we
t r y f o r a day to get a r e s o l u t i o n and can't, we should go i n
under a NATO order. I t h i n k i f everyone stays together on t h i s ,
we should have an agreement w i t h i n the next 4 8 hours. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
The President:
Thank you.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
OK, no problem.
I w i l l side w i t h you.
(U)
Have you been playing?
(U)
The President: Yes, I played yesterday and may get to play nine
holes today. We are c e l e b r a t i n g my mother-in-law's 80
b i r t h d a y . (U)
th
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: I played g o l f yesterday and had my
best game ever. I shot a 79 and had f i v e pars and a b i r d i e on
the back nine. (U)
The President:
Good f o r you.
That i s wonderful.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK, B i l l , we w i l l keep i n touch, and
a l l the other problems are s e t t l e d . I got a l i t t l e b i t o f f l a p
here i n Canada because I was not tough enough on the magazines,
but t h a t i s s e t t l e d . On salmon, we have an agreement f o r 10
years. I t i s always a touchy issue, and your senators and
governors of Washington and Oregon were a l i t t l e much f o r
Canadians, but t h a t i s a l l r i g h t . We put i t i n a d i f f e r e n t
context of conservation more than catching f i s h , and they were a
l i t t l e easier to handle when we talked about conservation.
(jzf
The President: Yes, t h a t ' s important to do, because our b i g
problem i s w i t h the Alaskans. The people i n Washington and
Oregon were closer to Canada. (pf
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Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: OK. I am happy w i t h t h a t , so I w i l l
see you i n a couple of weeks i n Germany. (U)
The President:
I can't wait.
Bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
-SCCRDT
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4339
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : Sim Smiley
Notetakers: Michael Manning and M i l e s
Murphy
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 6, 1999, 2:15 - 2:36 p.m. EDT
Camp David, Maryland
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello.
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l .
I wanted t o
t a l k t o you a minute about the n e g o t i a t i o n s . fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: And t h a t i s e x a c t l y the same t h i n g I
wanted t o t a l k t o you about. fG}
The President: Yesterday, we had b a s i c a l l y t h r e e p o s i t i o n s .
The Russians wouldn't go t o the UN f o r a r e s o l u t i o n u n t i l there
was a bombing pause. We s a i d we couldn't pause u n t i l t h e r e was
evidence t h a t t h e troops were withdrawing. The Serbs s a i d , and
i t was the o n l y t h i n g t h a t I was sympathetic t o , they d i d n ' t
want t o withdraw and leave a vacuum. They wanted us t o come i n
as they were withdrawing. So we a r r i v e d a t what I thought was a
good s o l u t i o n . We s a i d , okay you s t a r t the w i t h d r a w a l , we w i l l
have a pause and t r y f o r 24 hours t o get a UN R e s o l u t i o n , but i f
we f a i l , we w i l l then go t o NATO and get approval t o go i n . f&)
So I thought we would have an agreement on t h i s b a s i s , b u t today
they came back, t h e Serbs, and s a i d before deployment, before
the mission can be c a r r i e d out, there has t o be a UN R e s o l u t i o n .
The problem w i t h t h a t , o b v i o u s l y , i s they w i l l t r y t o give the
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Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
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Russians veto power over the nature and design o f our
deployment, o f t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n , and i f t h a t happens, they
w i l l then t r y t o give back t o the Serbs what they have l o s t i n
the c o n f l i c t . And we w i l l have a s i t u a t i o n where i t would
become unmanageable q u i c k l y , and they w i l l add a l o t o f
requirements t h a t w i l l keep the Kosovars from coming home. I
t h i n k i f we can a l l be f i r m w i t h our p o s i t i o n s we w i l l be f i n e
i n a day o r so, but I wanted t o c a l l t o l e t you know t h a t i s
where I t h i n k t h i n g s are. fS-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes. I c e r t a i n l y understand we need
guarantees on the composition o f the force and o f the NATO
presence on the f o r c e i t s e l f . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d"
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I n Bosnia, we found
t h a t s o l u t i o n by having them work i n one sector, w i t h the United
States, b u t t h a t wouldn't be acceptable t h i s time because they
blame us f o r the whole t h i n g i n Kosovo. So we have t o f i n d
another s o l u t i o n , but I t h i n k the same basic o u t l i n e w i l l work,
where they work w i t h the l o c a l commander, one f o r c e , b u t not
s t r i c t l y under NATO. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I t h i n k t h a t the most c r u c i a l
p o i n t i n a l l t h i s i s thp t e c h n i c a l - m i l i t a r y ..aareentfiirL. IhaiL
the c r u c i a l p o i n t now.
The President: I am too b u t we cannot give t h e Russians veto
power over the design o f what i s going on. We have t o be
s e n s i t i v e t o them not s e r v i n g under NATO, b u t we cannot l e t them
decide who goes where and i n what numbers, because i f we d i d ,
they would simply i n s t a l l M i l o s e v i c again. That i s what they
would do. We have t o keep working over the next day or so. I
t h i n k we a l l have t o stay together.
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Yes. I agree. fS}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I agree. The most important t h i n g i s t o
keep t h e Russians from g e t t i n g a veto. I f we t r y t o get a
R e s o l u t i o n and f a i l , they have t o know we are more than w i l l i n g
to stop the bombing and t h a t we want t h i s t h i n g t o be over.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h you. We s e t c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and
t h a t i s n o t one o f them. We have t o honor t h a t . So i f t h e
agreement i s reached, I w i l l agree w i t h you.
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I t h i n k t h a t when we have peace the
t r u t h w i l l come o u t . Witnesses w i l l come out, the problem w i l l
explode on the p u b l i c scene and t h e p u b l i c w i l l become aware o f
the r e a l M i l o s e v i c , b u t we cannot put i t on the agenda now. fS-)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes. I agree w i t h you.
F i r s t things
first,
ffr)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: There was one l a s t t h i n g I wanted t o
say. We are very close t o agreement on the S i l v i a B a r a l d i n i
case and t h e Ambassador i s aware o f t h i s . Very soon, i n the
next few days, we w i l l be able t o make t h i s announcement, and I
wanted t o thank you very much f o r your help on t h i s matter. f£4
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
4
The President: . Yes. I know how important t h i s was to you. I
asked our people to work hard on i t . I hope i t w i l l be worked
out and that i t w i l l be h e l p f u l to you when i t i s . fe)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes. I think so, and I think i t w i l l
be considered an important signal of the good relations between
the United States and I t a l y . I think that i t w i l l be considered
a sign of goodwill toward I t a l y , and f o r t h i s I thank you. fe)
The President: Thank you. I w i l l be back i n touch i n a few
days. I w i l l see you i n Germany. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema:
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
—
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h NATO Secretary General Solana
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary General Solana
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The President:
Hello?
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
How are you?
Good morning t o you.
I t r e a l l y i s a good morning.
Secretary General Solana: Good morning, i n a l l the sense of the
phrase. You have done a r e a l l y great job. I t would not have
been done without your leadership. I t succeeded because we
r e a l l y maintained the l i n e t o the l a s t minute. And we were able
to maintain the a l l i e s u n t i l the l a s t minute. I t was f a n t a s t i c .
Thank you very much f o r everything you have done.
The President: We could not have done i t without you. You kept
them a l l together.
Secretary General Solana: When we have forces deployed on the
ground i n the next few days i t w i l l be a memorable p i c t u r e t h a t
w i l l be u n f o r g e t t a b l e . We w i l l see what we have done. We have
established A l l i e d l i n k s of f r i e n d s h i p among ourselves t h a t can
not be broken. We must maintain that forever.
1
The President:
You've got i t .
Secretary General Solana:
The President:
Thanks very much.
Thank you so much.
Have a great day.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO*,
�Secretary General Solana:
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-eON P I DENT IAL
4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
(U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
I n t e r p r e t e r : E l i z a b e t a Ullman
N o t e t a k e r s : George C h a s t a i n , M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 10:56 - 10:59 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Massimo?
Hello, B i l l .
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. I t has been a
g r e a t day f o r a l l o f us. I know what a tremendous burden you
have borne t h r o u g h t h i s whole t h i n g , and I j u s t wanted t o c a l l
and say thank you. (U)
Prime Minister D'Alema: Mr. President, I have gathered around
me all of our military pilots; I have come here to thank them,
and there is also a presence of some Allied officers and an
American general. I will give your regards to everyone here. I
am on one of the most active bases during the conflict. (jtf
The President: I hope you will tell your military people how
grateful I am for their brave and effective performance. I am
very gratified by what they have done. Especially those of you
in Italy, for whom this was a very difficult thing. I am very
grateful. (jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I b e l i e v e t h a t I t a l y has t o g e t
used t o becoming a grown-up c o u n t r y and take up i t s own
CONFI DEN¥-feAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/11/09
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responsibilities. It was a hard test, but I think we have grown
up a lot. ijt)
The President: Well, you c e r t a i n l y performed i n a magnificent
manner. I cannot wait t o see you i n Cologne. We have a l o t t o
discuss there. (£1
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, we have a meeting there. I t h i n k
i t i s important and u s e f u l t o organize a meeting i n the f a l l . I
t h i n k i t w i l l be an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o come t o I t a l y f o r a
couple of days. (U)
The President: Yes. We are hoping t o work t h a t out.
i t i s important. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
i n Cologne. (U)
The President:
Thank you very much, and I w i l l see you
Thank you very much and goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I think
Arrivederci.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Spanish President Aznar
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Aznar
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Aznar:
The President:
President Aznar:
June 10, 1999, 11:40 - 11:43 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Jose Maria?
How are you?
The President: Fine, thank you. I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you so
much f o r your l o y a l support t o NATO. This i s a good day f o r us.
I j u s t wanted t o say thank you.
President Aznar: I'm very happy that you c a l l e d me. Thank you
so much. I'm very happy w i t h your leadership and the success of
the operation.
The President:
Thank you.
President Aznar: I t h i n k you can also count on Spain continuing
to cooperate i n t h i s new phase. We w i l l cooperate m i l i t a r i l y as
w e l l as p o l i t i c a l l y , of course.
The President: I can't wait.
to do but we can do i t .
There i s s t i l l a l o t of hard work
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Aznar: Well, we've done a very tough job. We have a
tough job ahead, but when a l l of us work together, we achieve
our o b j e c t i v e s .
The President:
And we always w i l l i f we stay together.
President Aznar: Well, you know you can r e l y on me personally
and on Spain. No doubt together we w i l l achieve our goals.
The President:
That's great.
I w i l l see you soon.
Thank you.
President Aznar: L i s t e n , thank you f o r your c a l l and, j u s t one
second, l e t me ask you, how are the cigars doing?
The President: I j u s t smoked the l a s t one yesterday.
Hillary
got mad at me because I stopped chewing them and s t a r t e d smoking
them. They were too good to keep chewing.
President Aznar: I t i s much b e t t e r to smoke them. As I t o l d
you, I am reserving one very special cigar that I ' l l smoke
during H i l l a r y ' s campaign i n New York.
The President:
Thank you.
I ' l l t e l l her t h a t .
President Aznar: I hope to see you soon and thank you f o r the
c a l l . A l l the best.
The President:
Thank you.
-- End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i
and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
June 10, 1999, 11:35 - 11:37 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Hello, Jacques?
President Chirac:
you.
The President:
Bill?
You too.
Oh, How are you?
Congratulations t o
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you.
President Chirac: That i s very nice o f you. This i s a r e a l l y
great success, also a great success f o r cooperation between the
United States and France. Also. Not 'only," but 'also."
The President:
Absolutely.
President Chirac: We are very glad, and French p u b l i c opinion
is very s a t i s f i e d .
The President: Now we have t o get the refugees back i n and make
i t work. I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. We can t a l k more i n
Cologne.
President Chirac: Yes, we have, i n a week, a dinner i n a l i t t l e
b i s t r o i n France and we can t a l k a l i t t l e longer, but I t h i n k
everything i s going t o go a l l r i g h t now.
The President:
Well, I can't thank you enough.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�President Chirac: Oh, we can thank each other.
together and we have been r i g h t .
We have been
The President: Yes, the same as i n Bosnia. Now we have a r e a l
chance f o r Europe t o be put r i g h t and continue t h i s move toward
i n t e g r a t i o n on s e c u r i t y and economic strategy. I t h i n k 20 years
from now t h i s w i l l be looked back on as a great day.
President Chirac: Yes, I think so, too. Public opinion i n
France approved t h i s a l l the time l i k e i n the United States.
The President:
see you.
I can't wait t o see you.
President Chirac:
The President:
H i l l a r y can't wait t o
A l l my love t o H i l l a r y , too. See you soon.
I can't w a i t .
Goodbye.
President Chirac: We w i l l see you i n a French b i s t r o . I can't
wait t o see you. Thank you f o r c a l l i n g . I am moved. Goodbye.
-- End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFI D E I t f j f t L
4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n
Notetakers:
George Chastain, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, J i m Smith and
Roger M e r l e t t i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 11:45 - 11:47 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n :
Hello, B i l l ?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Jean, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
good day f o r us. (U)
This i s a
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : Oh, good, I am v e r y happy. I t i s a
g r e a t success you g o t , t h a t we got c o l l e c t i v e l y , t o be able t o
remain t o g e t h e r d u r i n g these d i f f i c u l t t i m e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : We d i d and I t h i n k i t i s a g r e a t t h i n g f o r
Europe t o o . We have t o h e l p them so the m i s s i o n i n Kosovo
doesn't g e t screwed up.
This w i l l g i v e Europe enormous s e l f c o n f i d e n c e because they d i d n ' t w a i t l i k e Bosnia and a l l o w the UN
to u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y r a t i f y the e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . I t h i n k t h i s
w i l l l e a d t o a more u n i f i e d Europe and i s i n the l o n g - t e r m best
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada. Reversing e t h n i c
cleansing i s very important.
Prime M i n i s t e r C h r e t i e n : You can be sure we w i l l do our p a r t .
We haven't decided how many we w i l l send. We know you have
seven t o e i g h t thousand. I a l r e a d y have e i g h t hundred. NATO
wants a thousand more but I don't know i f we can a f f o r d i t . (£1
•CONFI DEtrefrftfc
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 6/15/09
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The President: Do the best you can. Your guys are so competent
and so good. I know one thing we w i l l have h e l l doing i s t r y i n g
to f i g u r e out how t o prevent the understandable blood l u s t of the
Kosovars from running against the Serbs that want t o stay.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Kosovo? 0^
When do you expect troops t o move i n t o
The President: Tomorrow. I t has t o be tomorrow. We can't wait
long because I am a f r a i d these refugees w i l l pour across the
border l i k e the I s r a e l i t e s out of Egypt. We have t o get the mines
out.
We don't want a bunch of refugees having t h e i r legs blown
o f f t r y i n g t o go home. f^J
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien: We w i l l be p a r t i c i p a t i n g
Thank you f o r c a l l i n g .
The President:
Okay, I ' l l see you i n Cologne.
Prime M i n i s t e r Chretien:
Yep. Goodbye.
-- End of Conversation
a l l the way.
(U)
(U)
—
•eONriDENHAfe-
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDENTIAL-
4 4 74
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Portuguese Prime M i n i s t e r
Guterres (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Roger
M e r l e t t i and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 1:47 - 1:49 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Hello?
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
b i g day. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
Hello, B i l l .
Congratulations, i t i s a
I j u s t c a l l e d t o thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
Not a t a l l . You have n o t h i n g t o thank
me f o r . We have a l l t o thank you. You d i d t h e r i g h t t h i n g .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I j u s t wanted t o say thanks. We had a hard j o b ,
and we have a hard j o b ahead o f us, b u t you were w o n d e r f u l . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r G u t e r r e s :
No, I must confess, i n my o p i n i o n a l l
t h i s was p o s s i b l e because o f t h e d e c i s i o n s taken a t t h e
Washington Summit. Your p o s i t i o n was c r i t i c a l .
The o p p o s i t i o n
was a l s o key t o making t h i s happen. I am v e r y happy, b u t now we
have a l o t t o do and many problems t o f a c e . But you can count
on us. We a r e a s m a l l c o u n t r y , b u t our e f f o r t w i l l be
p r o p o r t i o n a l , i f i t i s a t a l l p o s s i b l e . (Pf
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so much.
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/16/09
P E R E . O . 13526
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Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres: I t h i n k i t w i l l be a very hard task
now t o make things move i n Kosovo, but our experience w i t h the
Kosovars i s t h a t they want t o come back. (£7
The President: Yes. We've got t o get them home as q u i c k l y as
possible. I t ' l l be d i f f i c u l t , but i t ' s possible. ( p f
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
The President:
Thanks.
A l l the best.
Goodbye.
Prime M i n i s t e r Guterres:
—
Fine.
Goodbye.
Thanks.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation --
COIIFI DENT IAL
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�•CONFIDENTIAL
4474
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Dutch Prime M i n i s t e r Kok (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok
N o t e t a k e r s : George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i and
Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 10, 1999, 2:01 - 2:07 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Wim?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: H e l l o , B i l l .
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
I c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: W e l l , thank you. You d i d i t , t h e
Americans. We gave you a l l t h e support you needed, b u t you d i d
it.
I'm most happy f o r what we r e a l i z e d . (U)
The President: I think it's a great day for Europe. It will be
a great day if we can get most of them to go home now. We'll
have a reverse in the ethnic cleansing in a way that we couldn't
do in Bosnia because it went on so long. [ft]
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: A b s o l u t e l y , i f we can g e t them home b e f o r e
w i n t e r s t a r t s i n November and October o r even September. There
i s a l o t t o be done.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k t h e c o n f i d e n c e and t h e p r i d e I sense i n
Europe i s a g r e a t t h i n g . They're so proud. I t a l k e d t o
D'Alema, and i t was v e r y h a r d f o r him, and t h e y a r e so proud,
and now we have t o make t h e peace work. I f we can do t h i s , we
may have stopped a l o t o f t h i s elsewhere. We have been w o r k i n g
q u i e t l y , and h o p e f u l l y can t a l k more l a t e r , b u t we have t r i e d
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/11/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
^
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quietly for four years in Africa to try to prevent another
Rwanda with a rapid reaction force. I think if we can have a
set-up now elsewhere, we can stop this from happening in the
future, it will be a great thing. (j?)
Prime Minister Kok: This will certainly have an effect
elsewhere in Europe. I must tell you, here in the Netherlands
during the last few weeks, there was a growing sentiment that we
needed some kind of pause in the bombing. But I think the way
it was done was the best exercise, facilitating the Chinese to
agree on the UN resolution. (ft)
But I must say, Bill, I was there as you were in the last few
weeks and I am so impressed by what Albania, Macedonia and
others need in terms of logistics support. At the same time, we
have to invest politically and militarily in the future of the
whole region, if not elsewhere. (fS)
With no economic perspective, people tend even more to
nationalistic policies. We are now entering summer but must be
aware of the fact that now is when our responsibility starts.
To rebuild. Reconstruct. (&]
The President: One thing I'd like you to think about. I will
raise all those issues at the G-8 in Cologne next week. I know
the EU already began a partnership relationship with countries
in Southeast Europe, but it seems to me if we could package this
thing structurally the way the Marshall Plan worked, I know it's
an over-used analogy, but if we could say to Macedonia, even to
Montenegro and Albania, but also to Romania and Bulgaria, 'Get
yourselves together as a unit and we will do the following
things that will be very helpful." The United States will help,
but it is important for the EU to take the lead. {{£)
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Yes, I have considered t h a t .
c e r t a i n premium on i t now.
There i s a
The President: I t could be a dressed up customs union, I don't
know, whatever we want, but something t o make them say, 'We w i l l
deepen regional i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h Europe based on common
p r i n c i p l e s and, i n r e t u r n f o r t h a t , w i l l depend on the EU f o r
help." The Canadians w i l l p i t c h i n and w e ' l l do our p a r t . (J2f
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: That's a very good idea.
about i t , B i l l . (U)
The President:
Thanks, Wim.
I will
(U)
•CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
think
�GOMFIDENratt.
3
Prime M i n i s t e r Kok: Goodbye.
The President:
Goodbye.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
CONFIDENTS,
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONriDCNTIAL
4 47 4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h German C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
I n t e r p r e t e r : G i s e l a Marcuse
Notetakers:
Sean Tarver, Matt S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Roger M e r l e t t i , James
Smith and Lawrence B u t l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
June 10, 1999, 4:00 - 4:04 p.m. EDT
Residence
Gerhard, I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you. (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I have t o thank you. Without America, i t
would have been i m p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r v e n e i n Kosovo. (U)
The
President:
But we d i d a good t h i n g t o g e t h e r .
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder:
(U)
I t h i n k so. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, me t o o . And I t h i n k now we j u s t have t o
keep w o r k i n g , we have t o make i t work. We have t o w i n t h e
peace, now t h a t we've won t h e c o n f l i c t . (U)
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder: I t h i n k t h e most i m p o r t a n t j o b f o r us i s
t o make sure t h e c o u n t r y gets back on i t s f e e t e c o n o m i c a l l y and
politically.
They have t o i n Macedonia and A l b a n i a and
e s p e c i a l l y i n Montenegro. (pT
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, I agree. I s t r o n g l y support i t and w i l l
h e l p as much as I can. I t h i n k t h e f i r s t t h i n g i s t o make sure
landmines a r e o u t o f t h e way, and g e t t h e refugees o u t o f
Macedonia as soon as we can, then we have t o go t o work on t h e
economy. I t ' s a d e c i s i o n f o r Europe, b u t I would l i k e t o see
some e f f o r t s made i n t h e whole e a s t e r n European r e g i o n f o r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t t h a t w i l l i n v o l v e everyone, p u l l them
=r!%,
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�closer together and closer to Europe. I think there is a model
there in the Marshall Plan, not so much in the money, but in the
way it was done,
($>?)
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree. We can t a l k about the
d e t a i l s , but i t ' s important t o develop the region economically
and t o give i t some prospect of becoming part of Europe. This
whole t h i n g should be done i n step. There are many economic
d i f f e r e n c e s , but i t ' s important they have the prospect
eventually of j o i n i n g . Germany was i n support of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland j o i n i n g the EU. We are also i n
favor o f eastern countries being given the prospect o f
eventually j o i n i n g . That i s something we have t o continue t o
support, t h i s i s not a s h o r t - l i v e d t h i n g . We intend t o work on
it.
(pO
The President: Well, I think we will have a chance to talk more
at the EU, but I think you're going to have a good summit at
Cologne, now. It'll be much happier than it might have been.
We'll have to work on it together. It was nice to hear your
voice. I just wanted to thank you today. \g]
Chancellor Schroeder: I also thank you very much f o r your good
cooperation and I look forward t o seeing you again. (U)
The President:
Okay.
Chancellor Schroeder:
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
—
�4474
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B e l g i a n Prime M i n i s t e r
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene
Dehaene
Notetakers:
George Chastain, M a t t S i b l e y ,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Jim Smith, Lawrence B u t l e r and Sam Moyn
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 10, 1999, 4:10 - 4:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello,
Jean-Luc.
Prime M i n i s t e r
Dehaene:
Hello,
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
job.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Bill.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say thank you.
Dehaene:
I t h i n k t h a t t o g e t h e r we d i d a good
Yes, I t h i n k we d i d a good t h i n g f o r t h e w o r l d .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i t i s a good agreement, b u t
now i t w i l l be a q u e s t i o n o f p u t t i n g t h e necessary means i n and
h e l p i n g t h e whole area s t a b i l i z e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Prime M i n i s t e r
The P r e s i d e n t :
We can do t h a t .
Dehaene:
I t h i n k so.
We have t o work on i t .
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I t h i n k t h a t i f we can work t h e same
way, between you and the EU, we can r e a l i z e i t .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�The President: Yes, I am o p t i m i s t i c , but there are a l o t of
operational problems, but I t h i n k we can do i t .
I am looking
forward t o i t and j u s t wanted t o c a l l and say thank you very
much.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene: I appreciate i t .
NATO and the EU i t was a very good t h i n g .
The President:
Me too.
Prime M i n i s t e r Dehaene:
The President:
I t h i n k t h a t between
Okay, goodbye.
Goodbye.
—
End of Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
B i l a t e r a l Meeting Between the President and
German Chancellor Schroeder (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
John Kornblum, Ambassador t o Germany
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , (notetaker)
Germany
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
Hans Blomeyer, A s s i s t a n t t o the Chancellor
f o r North America
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 18, 1999, 2:55 - 3:30 p.m.
Gurzenich, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Well, f i r s t l e t me extend t o you our
warmest welcome. I hope you w i l l get a chance t o enjoy t h e
c i t y . (U)
The President: We went out f o r a wonderful meal l a s t n i g h t —
we had a great time and I c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e l o c a l economy. (U)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Kosovo. (U)
Perhaps we could s t a r t by t a l k i n g about
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
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2009
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The President:
we are. (U)
Why don't I l e t Sandy give us a r e p o r t on where
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
I t ' s been an intense two
days. The Russians have kept i n s i s t i n g on t h e i r own s e c t o r .
But now we have j u s t heard t h a t they have f a l l e n o f f t h a t .
Where we are now, i s t h a t they would have two b a t t a l i o n s i n our
s e c t o r , one i n the French sector and one i n yours. The l a s t two
would be contiguous areas, k i n d of l i k e a f i g u r e e i g h t . But the
c o n t i g u i t y would be very small. The remaining issues seemed t o
be f i g u r i n g o u t the a i r p o r t l o g i s t i c s . The Russians want 1500.
The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t i s very excessive. The Russians may
also want a 5 b a t t a l i o n . Secretary Cohen i s going t o say t o
them *you have u n t i l 4:30 t o make a deal."
fe)
th
The President: I t h i n k t h i s w i l l work o u t . I t ' s r e a l l y more
about what i s going on i n s i d e o f Russia. What i s d i s t u r b i n g i s
the b e l i e f even among the Y e l t s i n group t h a t we went t o war i n
Kosovo t o extend our i n f l u e n c e from the Caucasus t o the Caspian.
That we want t o push back the Russians. Of course, t h i s i s n o t
t r u e , b u t we have t o convince them o f t h a t . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
The President: I agree. And t h a t ' s why we have t o be a l i t t l e
b i t f l e x i b l e . But t h e r e d l i n e s are very c l e a r and must not
change. F i r s t , they cannot have t h e i r own s e c t o r . The Kosovar
Albanians would n o t go home. I t would be a r e c i p e f o r carnage.
Second, t h e r e can be no defacto p a r t i t i o n . That would be
tantamount t o l o s i n g t h e peace. But w i t h i n those r e d l i n e s I
t h i n k we can be f l e x i b l e w i t h o u t embarrassing the Russians. I n
a l a r g e r sense, we need them t o understand t h a t t h i s i s not
about t e r r i t o r y , or wealth but t o reverse e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g .
This i s n o t 19th century great power p o l i t i c s . Now given the
unique German r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, I t h i n k you have a
unique a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e them and help t o see what our goals
r e a l l y are. My time i s running out, and so i s Y e l t s i n ' s . I
have done my best t o support them. Now, I j u s t spoke t o B l a i r .
He agrees t h a t we should t a l k about t h i s t o n i g h t . One t h i n g we
discussed was t o t r y and b r i n g more p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s t o Russia
and v i c e versa. What we need t o do i s t o move the center o f
Russian p o l i t i c s . fG)
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Chancellor Schroeder: You know we j u s t had t h i s EU Summit. We
adopted a j o i n t statement and an approach t o Russia. I t goes
beyond government-to-government a f f a i r s . I t i n c l u d e s economic
p o l i t i c a l and youth c o n t a c t s . A more i n t e g r a l approach as you
were saying — t h a t ' s the only way t o reassure t h e i r f e a r s .
They are the younger generation o f Russian p o l i t i c i a n s and
i r o n i c a l l y they have not had the i n t e r n a t i o n a l exposure t h a t the
o l d e r ones have had. We need t o make sure t h a t we work w i t h the
up and coming people as w e l l . f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : Can we t a l k about Kosovo? Let's assume the
Russian piece works o u t . Then we've got a huge r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
j o b . We want t o do our p a r t . S e t t i n g aside the q u e s t i o n o f
a s s i s t a n c e , i t seems t o me there are two issues.
First,
r e b u i l d i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y i n Kosovo. Second, the b u i l d i n g o f the
Balkans as a whole w i t h the EU S t a b i l i t y Pact I n i t i a t i v e .
Now,
i t i s v i t a l t h a t we get the r i g h t person t o handle r e b u i l d i n g i n
Kosovo. I don't care about n a t i o n a l i t y . I am w o r r i e d t h a t the
d e c i s i o n w i l l be p o l i t i c a l . Not based on competence and energy.
We need t o approach t h i s as i f we were h i r i n g someone t o do a
job f o r a m i l l i o n Deutch Marks. What would we look f o r ?
Someone w i t h p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , since the people hate each o t h e r .
Someone w i t h human f e e l i n g , we w i l l l i t e r a l l y need t o b r i n g an
army o f p s y c h i a t r i s t s and r e l i g i o u s leaders. Someone who can
handle t h e machinery o f r e b u i l d i n g houses and roads. Someone
w i t h tremendous energy, w i t h r e a l management a b i l i t y , w i t h
i m a g i n a t i o n . Maybe someone who ran a b i g German company. That
would be b e t t e r than a former cabinet m i n i s t e r . We cannot a l l o w
p o l i t i c s t o obscure the need t o do i t r i g h t . Just l i k e our
d e c i s i o n t h a t we could not lose the war i n Kosovo, i t i s a
c r i t i c a l decision.
I f we g e t t h e wrong p e r s o n , i t w i l l be a
d i s a s t e r . We need t o work w i t h K o f i on t h i s .
i s f i n d i n g t h e r i g h t person. fG4
My o n l y i n t e r e s t
Chancellor Schroeder: I t o t a l l y agree w i t h t h a t . But I wonder
i f we found a c l a s s i c a l manager, would he or she would have the
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s and f e e l i n g necessary f o r the j o b . My
experience i s t h a t good managers have o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s k i l l s b u t
t h i s i s a h i g h l y complex p o l i t i c a l environment as w e l l . We have
a German expression which i s t h a t we need a e i g h t - l e g g e d warm
m i l k p i g . Obviously t h i s doesn't t r a n s l a t e but I t h i n k you get
the p o i n t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . We need someone w i t h s t r o n g
p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , w i t h s t r o n g communications s k i l l s , and, o f
course, w i t h a s t a f f t h a t can do the day-to-day. But again,
t h a t person also needs a s t r o n g w i l l , energy, tremendous
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4
organizational skills and also the approach to go there and stay
there and let the world media come to him. He has to roll his
sleeves up. To bring people together, to be deeply committed —
I'd love to do this job. It's incredibly challenging and we
just have to find the right person. I understand the Europeans
don't want an American. I don't care about the nationality, I
don't care where he is from. If all of us could say to Kofi —
this is what we want: a strong person, real organizational
skills, don't make a political decision — that would be very
helpful.
m
Chancellor Schroeder: We have also got t o move forward on the
S t a b i l i t y Pact f o r t h e r e g i o n .
The President:
There i s a Donor's Conference next month, r i g h t ?
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, we have t o do t h i s s p e e d i l y ,
p o s s i b l y as e a r l y as next month. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t o t h i n k about something. F i r s t ,
I recognize t h i s i s r e a l l y about what t h e EU wishes t o do. But
there are two t h i n g s I t h i n k i t would be good t o t h i n k about.
F i r s t , we need t o get t h e Balkans more i n t e g r a t e d among
themselves. Then, we need t o push i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o Europe over
time, i n c l u d i n g i n t o our s e c u r i t y system. I went back and
s t u d i e d what we d i d w i t h Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
a f t e r the B e r l i n Wall f e l l . And I also looked back a t the
M a r s h a l l Plan. So l e t me suggest a couple o f ideas — and l e t
me a l s o make c l e a r t h a t w h i l e I t h i n k the lead has t o be w i t h
the EU and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s on the
f i n a n c i a l side we w i l l do our share. fG}
I n the M a r s h a l l Plan, one o f the smartest t h i n g s they d i d was t o
say t h a t the major c o n d i t i o n f o r g e t t i n g money beyond democracy
i s t h a t r e c i p i e n t s have t o get together and d e f i n e t h e i r needs
as a group. They need t o come together t o d e f i n e t h e i r f u t u r e .
So i n a d d i t i o n t o the Donors' Conference, i t s seems t o me t h a t
g e t t i n g t h e leaders o f the Balkans together w i t h us soon, i n the
r e g i o n , and t o say t o them you need t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
t e l l us how you want t o a l l o c a t e funds, and what your p r i o r i t i e s
are — t h i s would be an important t h i n g t o do and r e a l i n c e n t i v e
t o get them t o work more c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r . fG}
Second, we need t o examine whether t h e r e are other t h i n g s we can
put on t h e t a b l e i n terms o f i n t e g r a t i o n . Should we move up
NATO enlargement and EU enlargement? I f n o t , EU enlargement
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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r i g h t away, maybe a customs union. We need t o c r e a t e an
environment i n which t h e people o f the r e g i o n look forward t o
the f u t u r e and create i n c e n t i v e s t o get them moving forward.
Anyway, i f you t h i n k i t i s a good idea, maybe we can t r y and
move forward w i t h a meeting of leaders i n the r e g i o n sometime
d u r i n g t h e next 30-60 days. I ' l l d e f e r t o you, b u t t h i n k about
t h i s , we j u s t cannot a f f o r d t o lose the peace. fe}
Chancellor Schroeder: I very much agree e s p e c i a l l y about
g e t t i n g leaflers. „tO-a£.thex-in_th.e^-r££[i.Q.n-. I t h i n k t h i s i s a ve»rv
good idea.
Now about b r i n g i n g c o u n t r i e s i n t o the EU. I have t o t e l l you
t h e r e i s such a backlog t h a t i t w i l l be hard t o add them t o the
list.
But ideas l i k e a customs union o r a s s o c i a t i o n agreements
are important and we should pursue them. (€}
The President: One t h i n g t o t h i n k about i s t h a t doing i t as a
group, n o t j u s t i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s , can get these c o u n t r i e s t o
work t o g e t h e r , even though, o f course, there are dramatic
d i f f e r e n c e s among them. I t would create a group psychology. We
need t o s e t up a system i n which c o u n t r i e s are rewarded f o r
working t o g e t h e r t o t e l l them w e ' l l work w i t h you i f you work
w i t h each o t h e r . f€}
Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, I t h i n k t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g idea
and we should t a l k some more about i t . But f o r now I am a f r a i d
we w i l l have t o end t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o r else t h e two o f us w i l l
be accused o f keeping everyone else w a i t i n g t o s t a r t t h e Summit,
fe}
End o f Conversation
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4760
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Former German C h a n c e l l o r Helmut
Kohl (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl
I n t e r p r e t e r : B i r g i t t a Richman
N o t e t a k e r s : Jenny McGee, George C h a s t a i n ,
Robert Ford, J o e l E h r e n d r e i c h and Roger
Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
June 2 1 , 1999, 7:30 - 7:34 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H i , Helmut.
I j u s t c a l l e d t o say h e l l o .
(U)
Former C h a n c e l l o r Kohl: W e l l , B i l l , thank you v e r y much. I
hope you're d o i n g w e l l , and please a l s o say h e l l o t o your w i f e .
I hope you had a good t i m e i n Germany. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I had a w o n d e r f u l t i m e . I am so r e l i e v e d we
worked t h r o u g h o u r problems w i t h Y e l t s i n .
He seemed i n a good
frame o f mind. (^f
Former C h a n c e l l o r K o h l : I a l s o had t h a t i m p r e s s i o n . I t a l k e d
t o him and t o l d him over and over t h a t he had t o t o e t h e l i n e
now. You know, B i l l , you have t o d i s c u s s as much as p o s s i b l e
w i t h him. E v e r y t h i n g you can n a i l down now you have s e t t l e d .
You don't know how t h i n g s a r e going t o work o u t w i t h h i s
successor. ( p f
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. I t o l d him y e s t e r d a y we have t o f i n i s h
t h i s n u c l e a r work, because he can't a f f o r d t o l e t h i s successor
throw i t a l l away.
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6/22/09
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Former Chancellor Kohl: Very good. If you think I can do
something from here, let me know, because everything you can do
now is work well done. ytf
The President:
Yes, I understand.
Former Chancellor Kohl:
(U)
Are you going d i r e c t l y home?
(U)
The President: No, I'm on the way t o Slovenia, then Macedonia,
and then I'm going home. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl: That is very good. Say some good
things to the two in Slovenia and Macedonia; they need
encouragement. And I think especially in Slovenia, things are
going to develop well. y£)
The President: I think so, too. (J?)
Former Chancellor Kohl: B i l l , I am going t o get i n touch w i t h
you i n two weeks or so i n Washington. (U)
The President: Oh, that's great. I would love t o hear from
you. I look forward t o hearing from you then, Helmut. (U)
Former Chancellor Kohl:
The President:
Thank you very much, and goodbye.
Thank you, Helmut.
—
Goodbye.
End of Conversation
(U)
—
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5675
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
United States-European Summit — R e s t r i c t e d
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s
European Union
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Jacques Santer, President o f t h e European
Commission
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , European Commissioner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 9:45 - 10:30 a.m.
P a l a i s Schaumberg,
Bonn, Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Welcome, Mr. President. I am very
pleased t o see you i n t h i s s p e c i a l place where Adenauer r u l e d
t h i s country. I was happy t o be able t o show you h i s personal
office.
I must say i t i s much a i r i e r and l i g h t e r than the
o f f i c e t h a t I work i n r i g h t now. As you know, we've spent the
l a s t few days d i s c u s s i n g problems between Europe and t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s . I t h i n k we've covered l o t s o f ground. Today, I thought
t h e r e were some p o i n t s t h a t we could discuss f o r f u r t h e r
c o o r d i n a t i o n . Maybe we can s t a r t w i t h the question o f how
Europe and t h e United States should deal w i t h the problem o f
Kosovo. We've o b v i o u s l y seen some very important progress; the
H e l s i n k i Agreement, which continued the G-8 success, and
progress i n d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e UCK. These are important
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Reason:
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D e c l a s s i f y on: 07/29/2009
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achievements. Now, we need t o j o i n t l y address t h e problem o f
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t j u s t f o r Kosovo but f o r a l l o f t h e Balkans,
as the S t a b i l i t y Pact e s t a b l i s h e s . fe)
As t o t h e Leaders' Conference t h a t you have proposed, we a l l
agree on the need t o move forward. I would propose as an
a p p r o p r i a t e venue, Sarajevo, and t h a t we move q u i c k l y as e a r l y
as J u l y . We have t o t h i n k about the contexts depending on who
hosts t h e Conference. I f t h e EU does i t , then the i n v i t a t i o n s
must be extended by the Finns who w i l l assume the Presidency.
I f we p u t i t under a G-8 umbrella, then we can extend t h e
i n v i t a t i o n s . fG-)
S e c u r i t y Advisor Michael S t e i n e r : A h t i s a a r i could issue the
i n v i t a t i o n s . Maybe we can ask him. fe)
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, we should. I t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r t o
do t h i s i n J u l y given a l l the f a s t moving events. I t h i n k the
message should be: we're there f o r them b u t also t h a t they need
to work t o g e t h e r and t h e sooner they do so, the b e t t e r . fG-)
Chancellor Schroeder: We need t o t a l k t o A h t i s a a r i and organize
t h i s w i t h t h e Finns. fe}
President Santer: With the EU, we are p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n program f o r Kosovo. We are s e t t i n g up an agency
to handle t h i s . We're also p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f
Macedonia and A l b a n i a . I t i s important t o i n v o l v e t h e whole
r e g i o n . A l b a n i a has a longer way t o go because o f the problem
of i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g . But we are working on t h i s — although
we must be c l e a r i t i s n o t f o r tomorrow.
fG-)
The Agency t h a t we are c r e a t i n g would take t h e l e a d f o r Kosovo
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o c o o r d i n a t e humanitarian assistance and
p h y s i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n programs. I t h i n k i t would be good t o
l o c a t e i t i n t h e r e g i o n , i f p o s s i b l e i n P r i s t i n a because the
refugees are coming back and we need t o have t h e presence o f
t h i s agency on t h e ground. I hope t h e Commission w i l l g i v e us a
green l i g h t soon t o e s t a b l i s h the agency. Meanwhile, we are
sending i n 20 c i v i l servants t o a c t as l i a i s o n s . We have t r i e d
to l e a r n from the lessons o f Bosnia. We need t o move s w i f t l y ,
to s i m p l i f y the f i n a n c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s . This agency i s t h e
answer. We w i l l also take a lead i n o r g a n i z i n g the process o f
the Donors' Conferences. (G}
Chancellor Schroeder: There i s one question t o r a i s e again t h a t
we have a l r e a d y discussed and t h a t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
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the European Union and Turkey.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : The f a c t t h a t you made t h i s i n i t i a t i v e i s very
i m p o r t a n t and I s t r o n g l y support i t .
I've always b e l i e v e d t h a t
i f Turkey b e l i e v e d i t had r e a l i s t i c prospects f o r e n t e r i n g the
EU, t h i s would create c r i t i c a l leverage t o help r e s o l v e human
r i g h t problems and i t s d i f f e r e n c e w i t h Greece. So what you've
done i s very h e l p f u l . f€-)
I n t h e end, I t h i n k
we need t o p u t a l l o f t h i s i n t o a l a r g e r c o n t e x t ; t h e Aegean,
human r i g h t s , Cyprus, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Europe. (G)
--
President Santer:
For us, t h i s i s important also because o f the
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Cyprus. I t would be d i f f i c u l t t o have a
d i v i d e d i s l a n d i n the EU. fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h t h a t . I f we can make progress on
Cyprus, I b e l i e v e t h e Greeks would remove t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o
Turkey i n the EU. This week, there was a good s i g n w i t h Turkey
d e c i d i n g t o take the m i l i t a r y judges o f f o f t h e s p e c i a l c o u r t
panels. f&)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: There i s also i n the wider
environment, i n the European Parliament, a vast m a j o r i t y f o r
having t h e human r i g h t s l i n e , e s p e c i a l l y the Scandinavians, b u t
also now I t a l y .
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 i.4d
There i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n
p e r c e p t i o n between the United States and Europe r e g a r d i n g the
f i n a l sentence and the death p e n a l t y . fe-)
Chancellor Schroeder:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer
I n the end, we need a comprehensive deal t h a t
i n v o l v e s Cyprus, the Aegean, human r i g h t s , the Turks i n Europe.
We need t o work very c l o s e l y w i t h them. We have an i m p o r t a n t
m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Turks so we can p l a y an important
role.
But a t t h e same time, we have c o n s t r a i n t s because o f t h a t
r e l a t i o n s h i p . But together, we might have enough leverage t o
move t h i n g s forward. Now i s a good time because o f Kosovo. As
a r e s u l t , Greece and Turkey are working t o g e t h e r . But the t r i a l
complicates m a t t e r s . We need a sustained e f f o r t . I t ' s crazy t o
have t h i s c o n f l i c t over Cyprus. f&)
Michael S t e i n e r : I l i k e your idea o f a comprehensive approach
and t h e U n i t e d States and Europe working t o g e t h e r . The time
might be r i g h t i n September. I t would a l l o w us t o take a step
forward a t t h e next EU Summit. fG}
The President: I am prepared over the next 18 months t o spend a
l o t o f time on t h i s . And, o f course, I have appointed a number
of s p e c i a l envoys. But I t h i n k n e i t h e r o f us has enough
leverage t o do i t alone. We need t o do i t t o g e t h e r . The bottom
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l i n e i s that I do not believe the Cyprus stalemate i s worth the
cost that i t imposes on either side. fe)
National Security Advisor Berger: I f I can add one thing and
with a l l respect, I have watched the EU f o r six years on Turkey.
Nothing has happened. Now the change i n German views i s a very
important development. But the Greeks are blocking things. I f
Turkey r e a l l y does embrace human r i g h t s requirements, can i t
t r u l y be put i n the queue for the EU, or w i l l i t always be i n
back of the line? f&)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4cl
President Santer:
I t i s important for us to deal w i t h Cyprus on a
poTTtical l e v e l . We w i l l be f i n i s h i n g a Progress report i n
September.
Foreign Minister Fischer: The S t a b i l i t y Pact can help. The
Greeks and Turks realize that thev are neighbors i n a region and
thev have common interests.
Secretary Albright: Of course, Turkey will also be the Chairman
in office of the OSCE. m
Sir Leon B r i t t a n :
i n the queue.
R e a l i s t i c a l l y , we can give them a real place
The President:
Anyway, I think we need to work t h i s i n the f a l l ,
p u t t i n g a l l the cards on the table. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : There are also the confidence-building
measures that Solana i s working on.
The President:
When i s Solana taking his new post?
Security Advisor Michael Steiner:
This f a l l .
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The President:
General.
fG}
Well, we need t o move on a new NATO Secretary
Let me j u s t ask two other t h i n g s about Kosovo. F i r s t , as I have
s a i d t o t h e Chancellor already, i t i s v i t a l l y important t h a t we
p i c k o r t h a t t h e UN p i c k the r i g h t person f o r c i v i l
implementation.
I r a i s e d t h i s w i t h Chirac and w i t h Jospin.
Jospin i s proposing Kouschner. I don't know i f he i s good, but
he sounds l i k e he might be the r i g h t s o r t o f person.
We need
someone w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u r e , who can speak w e l l , b u t most
of a l l who can get t h i n g s done. There must be German business
person.
This should not be a handout f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. We
a l l need t o work K o f i on t h i s . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: The second t h i n g on the agenda i s who i s
the r i g h t person t o be the European Union c o o r d i n a t o r f o r the
S t a b i l i t y Pact? I t h i n k whoever i t i s needs the same q u a l i t i e s
t h a t you described. fG}
The President: Yes, I see we need two d i f f e r e n t people -- one
f o r Kosovo, t h e other f o r the S t a b i l i t y Pact. What i s t h e
t i m e t a b l e ? fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: The United Nations has the
lead on Kosovo, i n p i c k i n g what w i l l amount t o a procounsel who
w i l l be charged w i t h overseeing r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e
economic, p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y and refugee r e t u r n issues. fG}
Michael S t e i n e r : And t h e other i s the S t a b i l i t y Pact, which the
EU w i l l c o n t r o l . fe}
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
Who do you have i n mind?
(U)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Let me add a l s o , t h a t we need someone
f o r Bosnia t o replace Westendorf. We need t o make a l l o f these
d e c i s i o n s q u i c k l y . E s p e c i a l l y w i t h the UCK t r y i n g t o f i l l the
vacuum i n Kosovo. I hope we can s i g n t h e S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Sarajevo a t t h e heads-of-state l e v e l . But before then, we need
t o f i n d t h e r i g h t people o f h i g h q u a l i t y w i t h quick d e c i s i o n s .
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
So what i s your t h i n k i n g ?
Chancellor Schroeder:
at t h e moment. fG}
(U)
We don't r e a l l y have concrete
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Secretary A l b r i g h t : Can I make a p i t c h f o r A h t i s a a r i f o r t h e
S t a b i l i t y Pact. He leaves o f f i c e as President i n January o r
February.
He w i l l be heading the EU. He knows the problems
w e l l because he has been i n Bosnia. I t h i n k he would be very
s t r o n g , b u t I know t h a t Joschka doesn't t h i n k t h i s i s a good
idea.
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: My only concern i s t h a t the f i r s t s i x
months are key and i t would be good t o have the permanent person
i n place r i g h t away. f€-)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : What i f we got someone t o work w i t h him
d u r i n g t h i s time? (U)
Michael S t e i n e r :
anyway. fe)
H e ' l l be deeply i n v o l v e d i n the EU Presidency
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: Whoever i t i s must l i v e i n Kosovo.
Or a t l e a s t i n Sarajevo. f G)
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
him. fG}
He i s such an asset, we r e a l l y need t o use
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer:
another name. f G)
I f you don't l i k e B i l d t , we w i l l need
The P r e s i d e n t : My o n l y problem w i t h him i s t h a t he was gone t o o
much i n Bosnia. f G)
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger:
He had very good d e p u t i e s .
f€J
The P r e s i d e n t :
Michael, do you t h i n k we need B i l d t ?
Michael S t e i n e r : Let's w a i t f o r a week on t h i s .
ourselves a week t o make these d e c i s i o n s . fG-)
fe)
Let's g i v e
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me j u s t emphasize t h i s i s n o t a p u b l i c i t y
job, i t ' s a working j o b , i n place. The media w i l l come t o
whoever t h i s person i s . With the S t a b i l i t y Pact, i t ' s ok t o
have a h i g h . p r o f i l e person and he o r she could work o u t s i d e t h e
area. fG}
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor Berger: One o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y i s
Paddy Ashdown, He's very t a l e n t e d . But I recognize i t would be
hard t o have B r i t s i n two j o b s . fe)
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Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think our time has run out on the
r e s t r i c t e d session and I am determined to keep you on schedule.
Why don't we move into the other room to meet with our
ministers.
— End of Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
U.S.-European Union Summit —
Session (U)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Secretary A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Charlene Barshefsky, Ambassador, United
States Trade Representative
Ambassador John Kornblum, Ambassador t o
Germany
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Ambassador
to the European Union
Steven R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economics
David Aaron, Under Secretary o f Commerce
S t u a r t E i z e n s t a t , Under Secretary o f State
Lael Brainard, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President f o r Economics
Antony J. Blinken, Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
Europe, NSC
Lawrence B u t l e r , D i r e c t o r o f European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (notetaker)
Plenary
Germany
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Joschka Fischer, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Werner Mueller, Economics M i n i s t e r
Michael S t e i n e r , Chancellery D i p l o m a t i c
Advisor
Klaus Grestchmann, Chancellery Head f o r
Economics
Uwe-Karsten Heye, Chancellery Spokesperson
Franz K u d l i c h , European Council S e c r e t a r i a t
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. .Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: J u l y 29, 2009
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PER E. O. 13526
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President Jacques Santer, European
Commission
S i r Leon B r i t t a n , Vice President
Hans-Friedrich Beseler, D i r e c t o r General
Hugo Paemen, Washington EC Delegation head
Ivan Rogers, Head of S i r Leon B r i t t a n ' s
Office
C h r i s t i n e Roger, Counselor t o the President
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
June 21, 1999, 10:40 - 11:10 a.m.
K a b i n e t t s a a l , Schaumburg Palace, Bonn,
Germany
Chancellor Schroeder: Let's get s t a r t e d . I would l i k e t o
i n v i t e our m i n i s t e r s t o r e p o r t on t h e i r meeting. (U)
Charlene Barshefsky:
F i r s t , I would l i k e t o say what a pleasure
i t has been working w i t h S i r Leon B r i t t a n .
I have great
personal a f f e c t i o n f o r S i r Leon. (U)
We met over the past hour t o review the progress towards
implementation o f the T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p . We
welcomed the i n i t i a t i v e t o launch a p i l o t p r o j e c t on
b i o t e c h n o l o g y and noted progress on the s e r v i c e s framework
agreement. There we agreed t h a t we should i n c l u d e engineering
and insurance. We spent time t a l k i n g about c o o r d i n a t i n g on
r e g u l a t o r y cooperation and the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f c r e a t i n g a
s c i e n t i f i c panel, i n c l u d i n g consumer NGOs, t o deal w i t h food
s a f e t y issues. fG}
We a l s o discussed the importance o f science f o r the r e g u l a t o r y
process. WTO r u l e s a l l o w f o r p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures when the
science i s u n c e r t a i n , b u t we cannot apply p r e c a u t i o n i n every
i n s t a n c e . f€}
Regarding t h e upcoming S e a t t l e WTO m i n i s t e r i a l , we agreed t o
s t r i v e f o r a three-year round, and make progress on l a b o r and
environmental aspects o f t r a d e . Other c e n t r a l areas w i l l be
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and government
procurement, e l e c t r o n i c commerce, and a c c e l e r a t e d t a r i f f
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . f&)
We noted t h e importance o f i n v o l v i n g the f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s
(Kosovo) i n t h e WTO. We are already p r o v i d i n g t e c h n i c a l
assistance t o A l b a n i a and C r o a t i a i n t h e i r b i d t o j o i n ; should
extend t o Macedonia. fe)
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M i n i s t e r M u e l l e r : Thank you, Charlene and the American
d e l e g a t i o n f o r your e f f o r t s today. Regarding food s a f e t y , i t i s
hard t o separate the s c i e n t i f i c aspects from consumer f e a r s i n
the debate.
Though we s t r i v e f o r transparency, we must expect
to get u n s c i e n t i f i c questions from consumers. I b e l i e v e t h i s
w i l l enable a l l sides t o f i n d agreement.
We do agree l a r g e l y on the goals f o r t h e WTO round, where a
p r i o r i t y i s g r e a t e r transparency. The NGO community w i l l take
i n t o account i n c r e a s i n g l y the o v e r a l l aims o f the trade round.
m
S i r Leon B r i t t a n :
( o f f e r s personal remarks about h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Charlene Barshefsky and o t h e r U.S. o f f i c i a l s )
I t h i n k t h a t the tone on both sides shows understanding on our
mutual t r a d e problems. I t i s a good s i g n t h a t we are reducing
megaphone diplomacy.
(U)
On beef hormones, t h e s o l u t i o n i s on market-opening, n o t marketc l o s i n g measures. Americans should n o t be deprived o f European
commodities.
(U)
The T r a n s a t l a n t i c Economic P a r t n e r s h i p has helped i n t h i s
regard, f o s t e r i n g cooperation t o k i c k - s t a r t the S e a t t l e
m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s . We have a more comprehensive view than you
on the new round. We need t o have more on t h e agenda o r we w i l l
not get t h e developing n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d p o s i t i v e l y . We should
t r y t o g e t an agreement on investment, a v o i d i n g the mistakes o f
the M u l t i l a t e r a l Agreement on Investment (MAI); i n s t e a d we
should seek a more modest agreement on the r u l e s o f c o m p e t i t i o n
— t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important f o r d e a l i n g w i t h Japan. fe}
| I propose
t h a t we make i n f o r m a l c a l l s among the key c o u n t r i e s t o f i n d an
acceptable candidate. fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you.
you have undertaken on food
i n t e n s i t y of p u b l i c f e e l i n g
long-term negative impact.
I appreciate the c o n s t r u c t i v e work
issues. The combination o f
and u n c e r t a i n t y has p o t e n t i a l f o r a
fe}
I would l i k e t o echo Charlene's words on S i r Leon. He has been
a worthy adversary.
I w i l l miss harassing him over bananas! (U)
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Chancel lor Schroeder! You still have President Chirac to argue
with.
te)
The President:
(laughs)
Chancellor Schroeder: I would l i k e t o review the proposals on
the t a b l e now, the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n and the D e c l a r a t i o n on
Ukraine.
Regarding Ukraine, we adopt i t w i t h a cautious
f o r m u l a t i o n . We asked f o r t h a t change because o f our p a r l i a m e n t
(Bundestag).
I t u r n t o S i r Leon f o r comments on t h e E a r l y
Warning D e c l a r a t i o n . fG}
S i r Leon B r i t t a n : The E a r l y Warning paper i s an important step
forward. With proper a t t e n t i o n t o e a r l y warning, we can n i p
problems i n the bud. For our p a r t , r e g a r d i n g h u s h k i t s , i f we
had known, we could have defused the issue e a r l i e r . On your
side, r e g a r d i n g ( i n d u s t r i a l ) f a s t e n e r s and the 211 A p p r o p r i a t i o n
b i l l could have been d e a l t w i t h . But, e a r l y warning cannot
solve the problem, but i t can increase the chances o f success.
We are n o t c r e a t i n g a new s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h i s . We w i l l employ
i t a t a l l l e v e l s . We p l a n t o p u t i n t o every piece o f Commission
l e g i s l a t i o n a requirement t o study impact on EU t r a d i n g
p a r t n e r s . R e c i p r o c a l l y , we need t o be aware o f t h i n g s i n
Congress. fG}
Secretary A l b r i g h t : The Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n sets out a v i s i o n f o r
our p a r t n e r s h i p i n t o the 2 1 Century. I t i s not h o r t a t o r y , but
makes a c o n s t r u c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o our r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Separately, may I o f f e r our welcome f o r J a v i e r Solana's
appointment as your High Representative f o r Foreign and S e c u r i t y
Policy? (U)
s t
On e a r l y warning, t h i s i s an important i n i t i a t i v e t o help us
r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s more q u i c k l y . I t i s forward l o o k i n g .
(U)
Ukraine,
E0 13526 1.4d
i s important t o
a l l o f us. They have t o deal w i t h an u n i t e d Europe and
increasing democratization.
] I t i s high on our l i s t o f c o u n t r i e s where we want t o
push democracy. f€-)
The Senior Level Group r e p o r t summarizes, c o r r e c t l y , the
p r i o r i t i e s f o r the coming s i x months. I t i s a t r i b u t e t o Stu
E i z e n s t a t , who i s moving t o Treasury a t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
President. This i s one t h i n g I cannot f o r g i v e t h e President
f o r . (U)
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Under Secretary E i z e n s t a t :
I want t o pay t r i b u t e t o President
Santer.
He has been a t r u e champion o f the t r a n s a t l a n t i c
dialogue these past f i v e years. (U)
I t i s i m p e r a t i v e f o r the coming December U.S.-EU Summit t h a t the
Senior Level Group continue t o be s p e c i f i c about i t s goals. The
next s i x months w i l l be c r i t i c a l t o the S t a b i l i t y Pact i n
Southeastern Europe as we attempt t o b r i n g i t i n t o the EuroA t l a n t i c mainstream. No other r e l a t i o n s h i p comes c l o s e . We
a p p r e c i a t e t h e EU load, t a k i n g the l i o n ' s share o f the
a s s i s t a n c e burden. I t i s important how we cooperate i n t h e
s h o r t - t e r m , e s p e c i a l l y on decisions l i k e Serbian s a n c t i o n s . We
won t h e war. Now we have t o win the peace. fe-)
On data p r i v a c y , I c o n g r a t u l a t e t h e important work David Aaron
and John Mogg have done; l i k e w i s e on T h i r d Generation w i r e l e s s
issues. We have some remaining problems. Biotechnology i s a
systemic one. The f e a r i n Europe i s unfounded. You need an
FDA-process t o t e s t products. I t i s c r i t i c a l t h a t Europe
develop mechanism t o calm p u b l i c s . As Charlene s a i d , we must
begin dialogues. fG}
We look forward t o the F i n n i s h presidency and cooperating on
n o r t h e a s t e r n Europe/Northwest Russia. We each have s i m i l a r
i n i t i a t i v e s , which can form the basis f o r recommendations. f G)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Fischer: On b e h a l f o f t h e German presidency, I
thank the American side f o r i t s cooperation. The Bonn
D e c l a r a t i o n i s a good p l a t f o r m f o r cooperation. The Kosovo war,
w i t h a l l i t s t e r r i b l e consequences, r e s u l t e d i n more i n t e n s i v e
U.S.-EU c o o p e r a t i o n . I t would be a p o l i t i c a l e r r o r i f i t were
now allowed t o go t o waste. The S t a b i l i t y Pact has i m p l i c a t i o n s
f o r t h e t r a n s a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f we succeed.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The E a r l y Warning i n i t i a t i v e i s t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n on t r a d e
d i s p u t e s . I t i s hard t o e x p l a i n how we can have c o o p e r a t i o n on
war, b u t have c o n f l i c t s on t r a d e . (U)
We i n t e n d t o keep working on Ukraine.
I t i s n o t easy
f o r our Ukraine p a r t n e r s . This i s a chance f o r Kiev and we
cannot r e l a x . The idea i s a b o u t ' i n t e g r a t i o n , change over
t i m i n g . We want t o be t h e i r s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s . fG}
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I wanted t o r a i s e changes i n the Helms-Burton Act. We need
waivers as we c o n f r o n t , together, p o l i t i c a l challenges,
organized crime, s o - c a l l e d c r i m i n a l s t a t e s , e t c . O v e r a l l , we
have t h e c l o s e s t , t r u s t i n g cooperation on Kosovo; t h e war can be
used t o s t r e n g t h e n our e f f o r t s together. fe)
President Santer:
The New T r a n s a t l a n t i c Agenda (NTA), agreed i n
1995, had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a more e f f e c t i v e
p a r t n e r s h i p . Then the EU introduced changes w i t h t h e Amsterdam
Treaty. The NTA f i r s t recognized the EU as a s e c u r i t y p a r t n e r .
Now the Bonn D e c l a r a t i o n acknowledges t h e EU's s t a t u s as a f u l l
and equal p a r t n e r . This i s a challenge f o r us t o l i v e up t o .
(U)
Under my presidency, the EU achieved monetary union and a common
European currency. We also began the EU enlargement process.
There are s i x accession candidates. Under t h e F i n n i s h
presidency, there w i l l be progress r e p o r t s as some w i l l be
b e t t e r than others i n t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n s . Each w i l l be
c r i t i c i z e d on i t s own m e r i t s . But, g e n e r a l l y , a l l are on a good
t r a c k . I hope t h a t H e l s i n k i (the semi-annual European Council
meeting) w i l l go a step f u r t h e r ; we have t o solve the
Cyprus/Turkey problem. We need t o enter the new m i l l e n n i u m w i t h
new EU members, reform o f our i n s t i t u t i o n s — we are c u r r e n t l y
at the margin o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h 15; the i n s t i t u t i o n s were
c r e a t e d f o r s i x . This i s an important challenge i f the EU i s t o
remain e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t . fG}
Chancellor Schroeder: We are approaching the end o f t h e time
a l l o t t e d f o r t h i s meeting.
I f there i s no more d i s c u s s i o n , I
d e c l a r e t h e t h r e e documents a d o p t e d .
fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : I want t o say a f i n a l word. I a p p r e c i a t e t h e
l e a d e r s h i p o f Jacques Santer.
I also want t o welcome our new
Ambassador t o the EU, Dick Morningstar. Thank you, Chancellor
Schroeder, f o r your e f f o r t s d u r i n g the German Presidency.
(U)
—
End o f Conversation --
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Designate Trimble
Notetakers:
Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
PLACE:
The President:
Sean Tarver and Frank
June 30, 1999 - 11:06 - 11:13 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
David, can you hear me?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
(U)
Yes, I can. (U)
The President: Well, I am glad you have resumed your good
sleeping h a b i t s . (U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
I d i d n ' t hear you c l e a r l y .
(U)
I said you are p u l l i n g another a l l nighter?
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I t i s so l a t e a t n i g h t , but we
are about t o break here and come back l a t e r i n the morning a f t e r
a b i t of r e s t . (U)
The President: Well, I've been b r i e f e d by Tony B l a i r on the
s t a t e o f play. As I understand i t , Adams has said t h a t they
would p u b l i c l y commit t o decommission on DeChastelain's
schedule, which means a f i n i s h by the time described by the Good
Friday agreement and s t a r t by the end of the year. But they
want t o c o n d i t i o n that on going i n t o the government now because
they want t o r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on the sequence i n the Good Friday
Accord; and you say your guys want proof that they are serious,
t h a t you want t o put them i n the shadow government now, and
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Reason: 1. 5 (d)
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achieve devolution only when they s t a r t decommissioning.
t h a t where we are?
Is
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. (pf
The President: And t h a t you now have tabled two possible
a l t e r n a t i v e s , or you got those and w i l l present them i n the
morning. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: Yes. I w i l l work up some a l t e r n a t i v e s
along those l i n e s and w i l l leave a few o u t l i n e ideas here
t o n i g h t . But, we are going t o have t o get people around when
t h e i r minds are reasonably clear, so they can work through the
d e t a i l s , some of which may involve quick decisions. But I want
to do t h a t i n the morning. This whole t h i n g comes down t o
sequencing, and i n a way, each side i s sure the other w i l l do
i t , which i s our concern. The time i n t e r v a l i s important,
otherwise we didn't t h i n k we could survive p o l i t i c a l l y . (^f
The President: Yes. For one t h i n g , I don't know i f you saw my
BBC i n t e r v i e w , but I said I hope your people would stay w i t h you
i f you made a f a i r agreement. (pf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: We don't intend t o walk away from i t .
The President: No one will be able to understand if it falls
apart on sequencing. But as you go home tonight, you guys can
wake me up in the middle of the night if you can think of
anything I can do or say that will either help you with your own
people by showing the United States will give you the high
ground by completely disavowing the other side, if they don't
keep their word, or if you can think of anything I can do to
persuade Sinn Fein to come closer to you. I will do that. I
know what position you are in. {jtf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble: I very much appreciate t h a t .
i s a way, I w i l l come back t o you. (pT
I f there
The President: Let me say one other t h i n g . I spent a^ year, the
b e t t e r p a r t of i t — when wa^the Good Friday Accord'-^adopted —
more than a year, a l o t of time t r y i n g t o persuade Gerry Adams.
You were r i g h t about sequencing because a l l you wanted was t o
get him t o show good f a i t h , and I f a i l e d . And I f a i l e d , not
because of him, so much as because the IRA wants t o be seen as
to be decommissioning because the people they represent
overwhelmingly voted f o r the Good Friday Accord. They don't
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want to be seen as surrendering to you. They want to surrender
to the world or Irish Catholics who voted for the Accord. I
understand that. I think personally, they should do more. I
appreciate Trimble's political position and difficulties you
face. But I can tell you, I have worked harder than you know to
persuade them that the initial going-in position you had was a
right and reasonable position. And I have failed. On the other
hand, I don't think they want you to be deposed.
(g)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
That i s r i g h t .
(JZf
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t h i n k he wants you t o p r e v a i l as a l e a d e r and
he wants t h i s t o work. So, i f t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g you can t h i n k
o f t h a t I can do t o p u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n your c o r n e r , as
most o f your people t h i n k I have been t o o c l o s e t o them, o r
something I can g i v e t o him t o have him come c l o s e r t o you, you
can wake me i n t h e middle o f t h e n i g h t . (j^T
First Minister Trimble: I will try not to disturb your sleep,
but I thank you very much for this call. (Off
The P r e s i d e n t : I r e a l l y admire you, David,
h e l p i f I can. yzf
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you v e r y much.
Okay, goodnight.
—
and I j u s t want t o
(U)
Get some s l e e p .
End o f Conversation
(U)
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Jaraosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Mr. Adams:
June 30, 1999, 11:31 - 11:52 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Sean Tarver and Frank
Gerry?
How are you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I am g l a d t o see you decided t o go back t o
s l e e p i n g twelve hours a day. Do you guys ever go t o bed? You
know, my daughter wrote a paper on you at S t a n f o r d . D i d someone
t e l l you t h a t ? (U)
Mr. Adams:
No, I d i d n ' t know t h a t .
Was i t good?
(U)
The President: Yes, i t was good, but the p r o f e s s o r s a i d i t was
too f a v o r a b l e . However, they s a i d i t was supposed t o be an
academic exercise and should have been more balanced.
(U)
Mr. Adams:
Ask her t o send me a copy, i f you would.
(U)
The President: Okay, I w i l l .
I t was j u s t a s h o r t essay, not a
term paper, l i k e an eight-page paper. She c a l l e d me and I sent
her some s t u f f , and they gave her a l i t t l e g r i e f . The p r o f e s s o r
s a i d w h i l e her f a t h e r i s c e r t a i n l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e , he i s not
r e a l l y an academic source; you need t o be a l i t t l e more
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Reason: 1.5(d)
PER E. O. 13526
D e c l a s s i f y On: 7/8/09
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balanced. So I druituned up some a r t i c l e s , f i n d i n g one m i l d l y
c r i t i c a l o f you; i t was r e a l l y f u n . (U)
Look, I know you need t o get some sleep, but I wanted t o say a
couple o f t h i n g s . A l l o f t h i s you know, o f course, b u t i t took
me a long time t o understand your p o s i t i o n on t h i s sequencing
issue and why the IRA would consider i t wrong t o have t o do
decommissioning f o r Sinn Fein t o get i n the government.
I think
I understand i t now and how they f e e l . I t h i n k i t ' s important
t h a t your people know when you decommission t h a t i t ' s not
s u r r e n d e r i n g t o Unionism b u t t o the people who voted f o r the
Good Friday Accord. We a l l work f o r people we represent. I got
t h a t . fG}
On the o t h e r hand, no one w i l l understand, no one i n the w o r l d
or i n Northern I r e l a n d , i f t h i s comes apart over sequencing.
You and I know what the problem i s . As I understand i t , you
o f f e r e d t o support the process t o be developed by DeChastelain
which would have decommissioning completed by the date o f the
Good Friday Accord and would s t a r t before t h e end o f the year —
i f the r e s t o f the Accord i s implemented and Sinn Fein went i n t o
Executive. I s t h a t accurate? fG}
Mr. Adams:
Yes. fe}
The President: As I understand i t , the r e a l problem f o r Trimble
is —
I t a l k e d t o him — t h a t he would l i k e t o take t h a t , b u t
r i g h t now he i s v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n i f he d i d , he would be
deposed. So we've got t o f i g u r e out how t o move forward; we
don't want t h a t t o happen, we've got t o f i g u r e some way o u t . I
t h i n k i t would be good f o r you t o get some sleep. I t h i n k
tomorrow he w i l l t a b l e a couple o f ideas. Based on my
understanding, I don't t h i n k you can accept e i t h e r one o f them,
but hope t h a t i n saying *no," and i f t h a t i s what you have t o
do, you f i g u r e o u t how t o keep pushing the b a l l forward. And i f
there i s a n y t h i n g I can do t o be h e l p f u l t o you, or him, when
you get up and s t a r t working, even though i t w i l l be the middle
of the n i g h t f o r me, I don't mind waking up. I f t h e r e i s
anything w i t h i n my l e g a l powers t o do, I w i l l do i t . I don't
want t o do i t now. I t h i n k you need t o t h i n k i t through. fG}
Mr. Adams: F i r s t o f a l l , I want t o thank you f o r your c a l l and
f o r your i n t e r e s t , which I know i s very genuine, v e r y emotional,
and r e a l . Secondly, what we put t o these people i s what M a r t i n
McGuinness discussed w i t h Jim Steinberg i n the White House on
May 5. We took t h a t and gave i t t o Tony and B e r t i e . fG}
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rri
We a c t u a l l y got a deal done on the 14 o f May and an agreement
i n my presence.
The B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r gave i t t o us and
Trimble walked away. We came back t o the idea and, we p u t i t t o
them today, i t was i n the general b a l l park you o u t l i n e d , b u t
f u r t h e r they r e j e c t e d i t . They s a i d "No." fe)
David Trimble sent h i s n e g o t i a t i n g team home w i t h o u t t e l l i n g
anyone an hour-and-a-half ago and adjourned the t a l k s . He w i l l
come back tomorrow and p u t together a proposal which we can't
accept. My concern a t the moment i s not David Trimble. My
concern i s Tony B l a i r . He's been very s o l i d i n terms o f a l l
t h i s b u t what Trimble needed today was t o be t o l d by the B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r very v i g o r o u s l y t h a t he had t o do t h i s .
I asked
to t a l k t o h i s team; they refused t o l e t us do i t and t h e i r team
won't go t o t h e i r people. fe}
This i s my p o s i t i o n which M a r t i n worked w i t h Jim and which we
have o u t l i n e d t o the U n i o n i s t s and everybody else i n v o l v e d .
They are going t o cause us t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e w i t h the Republicans
because they w i l l be o u t i n the news i n a day or two. Some say
Republican a c t i v i s t s w i l l not be able t o understand how we d i d
so and n o t get a n y t h i n g i n r e t u r n . I t h i n k t h e problems are
q u i t e worsened as a r e s u l t o f these past couple o f n i g h t s o f
n e g o t i a t i o n s . This i s the best they are going t o get. I j u s t
don't know what we can do, t o t e l l the t r u t h . fG-)
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s . I want t o mention two key
thoughts, and t h i s i s something you don't need t o answer but
sleep on i t . One i s , I t h i n k i f B l a i r i s going t o do any good
w i t h them, he has t o get out o f the n e g o t i a t i n g session and and
go see Trimble's p a r t y leaders. fe-)
Mr. Adams:
I agree.
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
fe)
EO 13526 1.4d
You are a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t .
fG}
The President: That i s o p t i o n one, o r some v a r i a t i o n o f i t .
Option two, and I know where t h i s i s going, tomorrow, when
Trimble puts something on the t a b l e t h a t changes sequencing i n
ways you can't accept, because you won't accept going i n t o a
shadow executive u n t i l f i r s t decommissioning occurs. B l a i r w i l l
ask i f t h e r e i s something he can do f o r you along these l i n e s i n
a way o f a guarantee; maybe even an a c t o f p a r l i a m e n t , which he
can pass i n no time because o f h i s massive m a j o r i t y , which takes
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the d e c i s i o n away from the U n i o n i s t s i n a sense t h a t Sinn Fein
no longer agrees t o p u t i t s f a i t h i n the hands of the U n i o n i s t s .
The thing I was impressed by in your last offer was your
willingness to be far more explicit than in the past in terms of
decommissioning. You may not be able to take what Tony wants to
do, which is to say, *Can you do these things if I take the
decision away from the Unionists by an act of parliament?" I
understand the difficulty with that, but I ask you to think
whether there is something else he can do by act of parliament.
kG)
..
Mr. Adams: The Good Friday Accord guarantees us, and other
p a r t i e s w i t h mandates, the r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e . You're t a l k i n g
about o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s who pay taxes, who have been denied
t h e i r r i g h t s , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s , and the U n i o n i s t s got away
w i t h t h i s f o r the l a s t twelve months d e s p i t e the governments are
saying t h e r e i s no p r e c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y t h i n g t h a t i s going
t o move the U n i o n i s t s i s by your f i r s t o p t i o n . That i s a very
good o p t i o n . I j u s t don't know of any guarantee.
fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : A l l I'm saying i s I'm a f r a i d t h a t Tony b e a t i n g
up on Trimble i s not enough because I t a l k e d t o some of those
guys and I know what t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are and I t h i n k they are
crazy enough t o take him down. I know i t ' s crazy on t h e i r p a r t
and they would be d i s c r e d i t e d by the w o r l d . Here i s what I
thought I could do. I s a i d t o the BBC i n t e r v i e w e r l a s t week
t h a t i t seems t o me t h a t i f B l a i r can f i g u r e out some way t o put
some heat on the guys behind Trimble, t h r e a t e n i n g him every step
of the way, and I make more e x p l i c i t the f a c t t h a t i f a l l t h i s
could be done along the l i n e s you t a l k about and f o r some reason
the IRA walks away from your commitment, then they could b r i n g
the government down and I would support them i n doing so. ' fG}
Mr. Adams:
I think a l l that i s useful.
fG)
The President: I know you and Trimble have both met and
c o n s c i o u s l y avoided mixing t h i s Drumcree business i n t o t h e t a l k s
but I can't help but wonder, given some o f the concessions by
the marchers, i f t h e r e i s something you can do t o help them w i t h
t h a t and whatever. I f you d i d , he might be w i l l i n g t o take more
r i s k h i m s e l f . I n the end, Gerry, no matter what Tony does or
what I say, Trimble, t o get a deal, i s going t o have t o take
some r i s k s . You are going t o take a w o r l d o f crap. We can't
immunize him from a l l t h a t r i s k . You can be n e u t r a l i z e d , but he
can be deposed. I got t o f i g u r e out i f something can be done
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t h a t he could h o l d up as a f l a g , o f h i s bona f i d e s .
don't want t o mix b u t . . . fe)
I know you
Mr. Adams: We a c t u a l l y have experience i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . The
one t h i n g I was very s t r u c k by was what you s a i d no one should
ever be persecuted by r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c background, and I t h i n k
t h a t i s where t h i s i s i n terms o f t h a t . I don't have t h a t much
i n f l u e n c e w i t h the people there b u t we can continue t o t r y . I
w i l l continue wherever I can t o make t h i n g s e a s i e r . The problem
i s David Trimble has brought i n the same people who voted
against t h e Good Friday agreement and oppose i t p u b l i c l y are the
ones we are n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h ; David Trimble t o l e r a t e s them. To
me, t h a t c r y s t a l l i z e s t h e problem. E i t h e r he stands up t o those
people — whatever way he does i s a very important element. We
have stuck our necks out f a r enough now t o hang ourselves. I
w i l l r e f l e c t on what you s a i d . I appreciate your a t t e n t i o n and
the f a c t t h a t you are very much up t o speed, as usual. fe)
The President: Okay, I'm going t o c a l l Tony back and then leave
you guys t o sleep. fe)
Mr. Adams: My sense a t the moment i s t h a t we are a t a very
p r e c a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n and my concern i s t h a t Tony must be very
a s s e r t i v e w i t h these guys. fe}
The President: Just because o f your p o s i t i o n alone, I don't
t h i n k we've got an e x i t s t r a t e g y s h o r t o f an agreement. We have
got t o p r o t e c t everybody concerned u n t i l we hammer through i t .
I f you walk away w i t h n o t h i n g , you might have t o modify your
p o s i t i o n t o come back t h e way he d i d . Two weeks ago, he would
have taken t h i s deal i n a b i r d dog's minute. fe)
so we have t o f i g u r e o u t a way t o somehow
give him some more elbowroom. Whatever you can work on
Drumcree, wave i n h i s face and say, "screw you." You t h i n k
about i t . I w i l l c a l l B l a i r and Ahern back and, i f you need me,
wake me up. fe)
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Mr'. Adams:
Okay.
6
Thanks again.
The President: Thanks, Gerry.
—
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
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5061
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
(U)
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheramie and Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 1, 1999, 8:08 - 8:13 p.m. EDT
Jack Kent Cooke Stadium,
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
The President:
Hello, Mr. President.
How are you doing?
B e r t i e , how are you? (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Not too bad at a l l . Thanks f o r a l l your
time over the l a s t few days. I know you have been i n tough
t a l k s w i t h these d i f f i c u l t people.
The President: What about t h i s l a t e s t proposal Tony t a l k e d
about? Have you run i t by Sinn Fein?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes. I was t a l k i n g t o them as of h a l f an
hour ago. I t h i n k the d i f f i c u l t y i s the 12 o f August w i l l not
work f o r them w i t h July and August being the marching season.
They w i l l not be able t o s e l l that t o t h e i r u n i t s but they have
committed themselves now t o decommission. They need t o
strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n a l i t t l e . The statements Tony and I
put out tomorrow should be as strong as possible i n what we can
say, but I don't t h i n k there i s any p o s s i b i l i t y they w i l l say
th
they w i l l do something by the 12
th
The President:
What about moving the whole t h i n g back some?
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Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Yes, I t h i n k i f we can get some leeway
and move i t back a t b i t . (pi
The President: They need it. Trimble said he can't stand more
than six weeks with no first act. What if you put up the
government in the middle of August? That would give them until
the first of October to decommission. Do you think that
framework might work? (g)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the framework w i l l work but i f we
put up the 15 of August i t might jeopardize s e l l i n g i t t o t h e i r
guys. ( ?
/)
th
The President: Tony wanted me t o c a l l Trimble and push the
generic idea t o n i g h t but I d i d n ' t want t o t a l k t o him u n t i l I
t a l k e d t o you f i r s t and I can't t a l k t o Gerry u n t i l you have put
t h i s t o him. Are you going t o t a l k t o him about i t tomorrow?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
the morning. (pi
I w i l l t a l k to Gerry the f i r s t t h i n g i n
The President: I really should not call him until tomorrow.
&
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: The question w i t h Sinn Fein i s , now they
have i t c l e a r i n t h e i r minds and are going t o convince the IRA
to do an act o f decommissioning before Christmas.
The r e a l
question i s how q u i c k l y they w i l l do t h a t . I t h i n k from t h e i r
p o i n t o f view as soon as they nominate someone t o the Chastelein
Commission the b e t t e r . That i s not as quick as mid-August. At
the same time, we don't want t o put a new date t h a t creates
f r u s t r a t i o n and creates a new deadline. We have t o get
something agreed t h a t automatically happens provided they have
decommissioning. Gerry Adams i s worried about g e t t i n g ahead of
the IRA because there would be more problems than i t i s worth.
I t h i n k John Hume f e e l s , I've spoken t o him, t h a t Sinn Fein has
not got t h a t f a r i n i t s statements. They could push themselves
a b i t f u r t h e r . I t i s the o l d story. How f a r can you push them?
I f they could give us another sentence t h a t would give i t
c r e d i b i l i t y . They r e a l l y have t o give us something. I t h i n k
you could give them another sentence t o make i t t h a t much
f i r m e r . (p')
The President: That it is really going to work.
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3
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Exactly. Otherwise we get i n t o a
d i f f i c u l t marching season again. Did you t a l k to Trimble? 02^
The President: Yes, but I have not t a l k e d to him yet on t h i s .
Maybe I should wait u n t i l morning to t a l k to him and Gerry i n
closer p r o x i m i t y . (pT
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That would be wise. We w i l l meet a t
8 o'clock i n Belfast t o f i n a l i z e the words. So maybe as soon as
we got t h a t done we should get that sent t o your people r i g h t
away. (^)
The President:
8 o'clock a.m.?
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(p\
8 o'clock our time.
The President: I w i l l have my guys wake me a t 2 o'clock our
time. I would l i k e t o c a l l them both at the same time. (sound
of cheering i n background) Do you know where I am? I am at the
World Cup Women's Soccer Game and we j u s t scored a goal t o t i e
Germany. ( 0
^
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The President:
OK.
—
"
F I D E
"
I I f i L
(U)
Goodbye. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
C 0
You go and enjoy i t , B i l l .
God Bless.
(U)
End of Conversation —
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h I r i s h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
N o t e t a k e r s : Matt S i b l e y , M i l e s Murphy,
M i c h a e l Manning and James Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:04 - 12:11 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
Hey, B e r t i e .
(U)
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: How do you do? Tony w i l l be j o i n i n g us
i n a few m i n u t e s ; he's s t i l l w i t h David and h i s c o l l e a g u e s . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e t h i n g s a t t h e zoo?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I ' l l f i l l you i n . I t h i n k we're f a i r l y
f a r a l o n g i n g e t t i n g somewhere, b u t we're n o t t h e r e y e t .
It's
never easy i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . But j u s t t o f i l l you i n
b r i e f l y , I t h i n k we've p r a c t i c a l l y agreed t h a t t h e IRA w i l l
nominate someone on t h e 1 5 o f J u l y . That would s e t up t h e
e x e c u t i v e . The d e v o l u t i o n o r d e r would be l a i d b e f o r e t h e
B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t on t h e 1 6 o f J u l y and t a k e e f f e c t on t h e 1 8
of J u l y and t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t o a l l o w a p e r i o d where Sinn F e i n
nominates an IRA person t o s t a r t w o r k i n g on decommissioning w i t h
General de C h a s t e l a i n and t h e o t h e r p e o p l e . What w i l l happen i s
t h a t t h e person nominated by t h e IRA w i l l s t a r t d i s c u s s i o n s i n
the p e r i o d a f t e r t h a t , t a l k i n g about a c t u a l decommissioning t o
s t a r t w i t h i n a s p e c i f i e d t i m e , and t h e decommissioning body w i l l
make p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s i n September and December. We hope t o
s t a r t decommissioning i n September.
(PT
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
P E R E.O. 13526
Reason: 1.5(d)
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The President: But you wouldn't have a Sinn Fein commitment by
a c e r t a i n time? (pj
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
good, President. (pf
The President:
I f we achieve t h a t , i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be
What do you t h i n k they w i l l say? (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k i t ' s looking good at t h i s stage.
We've got a l i t t l e b i t of work t o do and we need a l l the help we
can get. (pf
The President:
I s i t time f o r me t o c a l l now?
(p7
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the problems w i l l be i n t h i s
order. Trimble w i l l be very worried because some of h i s guys
w i l l d e f i n i t e l y get wobbly again. We need t o pump as much
confidence i n him and put as much s t e e l behind him as p o s s i b l e .
This i s the time where the governments, the two t r a d i t i o n s i n
Northern I r e l a n d work today together i n the devolution we've
worked f o r a l l these years and thought we had i n the Good Friday
Agreement but couldn't get i t . And secondly, give us the
decommissioning of the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s i n a reasonable time.
Third, the f a i l - s a f e clause, where the governments undertake
t h a t i f any d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i n regard t o decommissioning,
based on the r e p o r t by the decommissioning body, or a r i s i n g from
devolution, we w i l l automatically i n i t i a t e an immediate review
and suspend the i n s t i t u t i o n . That i s , i f anybody s t a r t s messing
we j u s t stop the whole bloody l o t . (pf
The President: That ought t o at l e a s t convince Trimble that
Sinn Fein w i l l be blamed i f the t h i n g goes down. (jzf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k we need t o have Sinn Fein and the
u n i o n i s t s not go bumping each other, but say t h i s i s the
completion of the h i s t o r i c breakthrough of the Good Friday
Agreement, t h a t the two Northern I r e l a n d t r a d i t i o n s w i l l work
together. This has t o be solved. The two need t o f e e l
confidence, t o see the bigger p i c t u r e because i f we get t h i s
through, B i l l , t h i s procedure nominating on the 15 of July,
t h a t ' s j u s t a f o r t n i g h t . The devolution order would be l a i d
before Parliament i n 2 weeks. I f i t gets through, i t w i l l be
tremendous. These guys have t o have the s t e e l t o go f o r i t i n
the next hour or so, as we t r y t o f i n a l i z e t h i s . I am holding
Sinn Fein's hand and Tony i s holding the u n i o n i s t s ' . I t h i n k i n
terms of where the u n i o n i s t s are, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t and shaky
for Trimble. Tony i s doing a great j o b helping them through i t .
th
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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The two p a r t i e s need t o have a f e e l i n g that something i s i n t h i s
and they r e a l l y should have a go. I t h i n k i t w i l l be very
h e l p f u l i f you could c a l l and have a word w i t h them. (jzf
The President: I'll call right now. What's the timetable for
this? (Jt)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: This i s the new order. I'm not j u s t
dumping on the government f o r Northern
Ireland...traditions...selling it and selling it hard, not just
bumping on the other side. Bill. If it shapes up like this,
this will be good. I am reluctant to call it yet. [Jt]
The President: No, I'm happy to call. I got up this morning
ready to call, and they said it wasn't time yet. (&)
Prime Minister Ahern: If you want, Tony has obviously got the
latest, he's still in with the unionists. If you want, we could
get back to your people in the next 15 to 20 minutes and tell
them now is the time to move. (g)
The President: Right. Give us a call when you're ready for me
to call Trimble. (JZ)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: I t h i n k the c a l l to Gerry could be made
now, and we could get a message back t o you when i t i s good t o
c a l l David.
The President: B e r t i e , the President of Korea i s coming i n here
for 2 or 3 hours, so I w i l l c a l l Gerry now, and the quicker I
can c a l l Trimble, the b e t t e r . I t ' l l be hard t o walk out of the
meeting. (pf
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: What I ' l l do i s check w i t h Tony; he's
s t i l l w i t h him. As soon as he comes out, I w i l l c a l l s t r a i g h t
away. (J2T
The President:
Okay, man.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
—
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
—
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�CONFIDEMT IAL
5061
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers: Michael Manning, Roger
' M e r l e t t i , Miles Murphy, Joel Schrader,
Matt S i b l e y , James smith and Amy Swarm
J u l y 2, 1999, 12:17 - 12:19 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o , Mr. President.
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Gerry? (U)
How areyou?
(U)
How are we doing? fG}
I t h i n k we are g e t t i n g t h e r e .
The President: I do, t o o . The l a s t deal sounds p r e t t y
me. We have t o convince Trimble he should take i t . fG}
Mr. Adams:
I t h i n k he w i l l go f o r i t . fG}
The President: I s t h e r e anything t o do t o make sure they don't
t r y t o depose him over i t ? fG}
Mr. Adams:
They w i l l t r y t o do t h a t anyway.
EO 13526 1 4
.b
We need t o get t h i s done i n the
s h o r t e s t p e r i o d p o s s i b l y r e q u i r e d and make sure someone i s
I'm sure Tony w i l l do i t .
h e l p i n g him.
He j u s t needs help g e t t i n g over t h a t p e r i o d .
We w i l l help ease him over i t . We'll be as
magnanimous as p o s s i b l e . f&)
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C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Reason: 1.5(d)
PERE. O. 13526
D e c l a s s i f y On: 6/8/09
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The President:
We don't want anyone claiming v i c t o r y . fe-)
Mr. Adams: No. I already said that to people here. I t i s n ' t a
matter of getting him to do i t . I t ' s j u s t a matter of getting
i t done. I want to galvanize the positive elements w i t h i n the
Unionists.
I think he i s going to do i t . I ' l l bet you a d o l l a r
he goes f o r i t . f&)
The President:
That i s a dollar I would love to pay o f f .
Mr. Adams: Okay. We w i l l be i n there. I t sounds s i l l y and I
couldn't say t o him, l i k e I can to you, but we'll make sure he's
okay. fG)
The President: Okay. I w i l l get on i t . Tony i s s t i l l with him
and as soon as he gets out I'm going to c a l l him. fG)
Mr. Adams:
I look forward to taking your money. f€-)
The President:
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
Goodbye. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
— End of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
C N O LIBRARY P O O O V
UTN
HTCP
—
�COtiiriDEH^Mr-
50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
Notetakers:
Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
M i l e s Murphy, Robin R i c k a r d and James
Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President:
J u l y 2, 1999, 5:40 - 5:44 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
David?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
(U)
Yes.
(U)
How a r e you keeping?
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
w i l l be b e t t e r .
(U)
Are you s t i l l
S t i l l standing.
standing?
Could be worse b u t i t
The President: Look, I wanted first of all to thank you and
second, to say I tried to issue a helpful statement. Thirdly,
to ask what can I do to help? Personally, if they screw us on
this, I will support kicking them out and stand up publicly and
say that you are not to blame and they are. [ f f i
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : R i g h t . The o n l y problem i s I can't
muster enough steam t o g e t i t i n . Whether we w i l l g e t i n over
the course o f t h e n e x t week o r t e n days I don't know. I'm
t r y i n g t o g i v e enough space f o r people.
When I f i r s t p u t t h e
s u g g e s t i o n t o t h e session o f t h e p a r t y , o n l y a couple showed a
f a v o r a b l e response and some were a g a i n s t . Most o f t h e o t h e r s
were o f d i f f e r i n g v i e w p o i n t s . Key members from whom I needed
CONFIDEN'MAL
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
7/8/09 QJNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^ i
DECLASSIFIED
m r n r- r^
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support were unhappy. Maybe we can work something i n t h e next
week o r two t o change aspects o f t h i s scheme. (^T
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you, i f you t h i n k i t w i l l h e l p f o r me
t o c a l l any o f them p e r s o n a l l y . I w i l l do t h a t .
(£7
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : John T a y l o r i s on our s i d e as i s
Maginnis; and Reg Empey i f we leave him alone f o r a couple o f
days. I made a s e r i o u s mistake i n o r g a n i z i n g . I thought i f I
brought J e f f r e y Donaldson onto my team we c o u l d smother some o f
the o p p o s i t i o n . I am a f r a i d i t b a c k f i r e d on me. I need t o g e t
J e f f r e y away f o r a w h i l e t o get t h i n g s b e t t e r . (pf
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes. You t h i n k about i t and i f you t h i n k I can
h e l p i n any way. I f you want me t o send somebody over, I w i l l .
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I v e r y much a p p r e c i a t e t h i s ,
Mr. P r e s i d e n t . I r e a l l y do. I don't know how we w i l l work i t
out in the next week or two. If there's any chance I will.
(pj
The President: I know you will. You're a good man, David.
You've made decommissioning real. This decision would really
not have happened if it was not for you. It will work now, I
think. (jt)
First Minister Trimble: I hope so. They have changed their
position. If only I can get my people to see that and take
advantage of it. (j?)
The P r e s i d e n t : There's no doubt they changed t h e i r p o s i t i o n . I
h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e , based on my c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Adams i n t h e
l a s t week, t h a t he knows w i t h o u t you t h a t t h i s i s a dead dog.
You have t o come o u t l o o k i n g l i k e t h e l e a d e r you a r e . Once he
gets h i s ducks i n a row, he w i l l bust h i s ass t o make i t work.
I've a l r e a d y t o l d him t h i s i s i t . (pi
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : I went o u t o f my way i n comments t o
throw a l i n e o u t t o them. We now hope t h a t works. ( p i
The President:
can do.
(jt)
All right.
Let me know if there is anything we
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Once again, I r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e your
support and encouragement. You may f i n d me c a l l i n g again next
week. (pf
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�COHn DENT IALThe President:
Thanks.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
—
(U)
Thanks.
Cheers.
(U)
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENT I A L
50 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d F i r s t M i n i s t e r
T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
F i r s t M i n i s t e r David
Trimble
Notetakers:
Matthew S i b l e y , Sean Tarver and
Frank J a r o s i n s k i
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
J u l y 5, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
A i r Force One
H e l l o , David.
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
W e l l , t h e march went p r e t t y w e l l y e s t e r d a y .
(U)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r T r i m b l e : Yes, i t d i d . I'm v e r y g l a d t h a t i t
went o f f as w e l l as i t d i d . I hope i t doesn't leave them t o o
b i g a problem. I t i s a c r e d i t t o t h e Portadown Orangemen t h a t
t h e y d i d w e l l . They a r e hoping t h a t Tony B l a i r w i l l r e c i p r o c a t e
it.
I'm n o t sure i f he can. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
What can I do f o r you? (U)
First Minister Trimble: There are two things that would be a
great help to me. One which I think you are already doing and
that is to talk to Gerry Adams about a statement from the IRA
about decommissioning. The other thing is the so called "fail
safe" mechanism. It is fairer to exclude Sinn Fein from the
executive, but the problem continues to be John Hume. Seamus
Mallon is trying to persuade him. If John Hume could move, that
would help greatly. [yf
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENrear
PER E.O. 13526
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 7/8/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ClO\3 - OM1 CL^
3/k/l5
�COMF1 DENT lAtr
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The President: So I'll call John and get back to Gerry about
the other thing. I'll get back to you in a day or so. y?)
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Trimble:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Goodbye.
—
(U)
End of Conversation --
• CONFI DENHAfc.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CQWIDEWTIAL
5061
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h SDLP Leader John Hume (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John Hume
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
George Chastain and Joel Ehrendreich
July 5, 1999, 6:50 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
A i r Force One
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, how are you doing, Mr. President?
The President:
Mr. Hume:
Hello, John. (U)
Well, I'm a l r i g h t .
(U)
How are you? (U)
Oh, I'm s u r v i v i n g . (U)
The President: Well, I think we got a pretty good proposal if
we can get them to take it. I've been talking to Trimble and
Adams. Trimble is having a bit of a hard go with Maginnis and
with Empey and others who are being critical of the proposal.
He thinks they can still get blamed if the government comes down
and the IRA doesn't comply. I know Seamus Mallon has a piece in
the paper tomorrow, which will help bring the Unionists on board
for the Blair-Ahern proposal — you know what it says — it
doesn't say outright that Sinn Fein should be expelled but gets
pretty close. I have told Trimble in private and said publicly
if the IRA doesn't live up to its obligations, I would support
Sinn Fein being excluded. The United States would say — it's
not their fault, it's your fault and not the Unionists'.
Similarly, if anybody else doesn't comply. We have to help
Trimble a little. You've been working on this for 30 years now.
I believe Gerry is ready to take the final steps. (jtj
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09 CLINTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
LIBRARY PHOlui^
aovi- 0 - ^ n
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�^UHFI DENT IAL
Mr. Hume: I don't t h i n k i t ' s easy i f he's being seen as being
under p u b l i c pressure. ( Z
J?
The President: I agree with that.
(£)
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k i t ' s b e t t e r done q u i e t l y than w i t h p u b l i c
pressure. (pi
The President:
I do agree.
(pT
Mr. Hume: What I've been saying today on the radio and TV i s
there i s no way my p a r t y would s i t i n government w i t h any p a r t y
i f they were engaged i n violence. I'm convinced from my
experience t h a t Sinn Fein i s committed t o the peace process.
Therefore, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission i s going t o r e p o r t , so
what we should a l l do i s suspend judgment u n t i l we a l l hear the
report and then make our judgment having heard t h a t r e p o r t . (pi
The President: Let me ask you this. How are we going to deal
with Trimble's problem to sell it? (Jt)
Mr. Hume: The time of the year i s the major p a r t o f the
problem.
I t ' s marching season f o r h i s people. Every year the
tensions are very high f o r t h i s time of the year. By the second
h a l f o f July, when we move beyond t h a t , tensions w i l l f a l l , and
i t should be easier f o r him then than now. Do you know what I
mean? (p)
The President: Yes, absolutely. And we had a p r e t t y good day
for t h a t yesterday. (pf
Mr. Hume: Yes. I t was p r e t t y welcome that they behaved very
responsibly. (pf
The President: You know, John, he doesn't have t o lose very
many people before he can't go on. (pT
Mr. Hume: Yes, I know, but the overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f people
voted f o r i t . I n a d d i t i o n , l a s t week we had special messages
from organizations representing the business community, trade
unions, community groups and youth groups a l l t e l l i n g us t o keep
the agreement on the road. There i s very b i g p u b l i c support f o r
the agreement. This can be resolved and w i l l be resolved i n the
coming weeks, but I don't t h i n k we should be p u t t i n g anybody
under pressure. G T
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•CONFIDENTIAL
3
The President: Let me ask you t h i s .
t h i n k I can do t o help Trimble? (pf
I s there anything else you
Mr. Hume: I t h i n k one of the things you could do i s make very
clear from your p o i n t o f view that as soon as a new
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s i n place, t h a t ' s when the goodwill o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l world w i l l become evident. That's when the
economic development and investment and marketing w i l l transform
our economy and society. The sooner the two communities s t a r t
working together t o set up the i n s t i t u t i o n s , the b e t t e r . There
needs t o be a c l e a r understanding of the agreement t h a t t o t a l l y
respects both i d e n t i t i e s , therefore no section o f the community
i s under t h r e a t . ( p f
The President: Okay, w e l l , I ' l l j u s t keep plugging along. I
understand what you are saying. I r e a l l y worry about the hard
guys on Trimble's side t a k i n g him out. I f we lose him, we're i n
trouble. (pf
Mr. Hume: I know that. Listen, thanks again for your interest
and support. (pf
The President:
phone. (jzf)
Mr. Hume:
I f you want t o t a l k anymore, I'm as close as the
Okay, thank you. (U)
The President:
Goodbye. (U)
— E n d of Conversation
—
CONFIDEN'HAtr
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^
�Dear Carlos:
I want t o congratulate you on the successful
conclusion of the negotiations w i t h the
United Kingdom regarding the South A t l a n t i c
islands. As you know, during our l a s t meeting
we addressed the challenges facing Argentina
and the United Kingdom, and the (L
a t t a i n i n g diplomatic s o l u t i o n s .
impressed by your determination t o resolve
these matters peacefully^and t o the mutual
b e n e f i t of both countries.
Your work, and t h a t of Piime Minijfedir Tony
B l a i r , greatly contributed to resolving
important i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues and w i l l enhance
the s t a b i l i t y and well-being of the region.
Again, congratulations and I look forward t o
w o r k i a ^ together w i t h you t o advance peace i n
the region.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Carlos Menem
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Dear Tony:
I want t o congr t u l a t e you on t h e s u c c e s s f u l
conclusion of t l negotiations w i t h Argentina
e
regarding the Siuth A t l a n t i c islands.. I
— i
a p p r e c i a t e ^ t h e a - i f f i c u l t y you fooecl ^ ^ m e e t i n g /
the c h a l l e n g e ^ f a c i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and
|
A r g e n t i n a as you b o t h , p e r s i s t e d i n
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y resolv^Jthese important issues.
I was impressed by your d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o
•• «—
these m a t t e r s p e a c e f u l l y . t o t h e mutual
b e n e f i t o f both countries.
^-O—
Your work, and that of ITrbcidenfc"Menem, greatly
contributed to enhancing the stability of the
region and the well-being of its people.
Again, congratulations and I look forward to C^^^^v
ihac. w i t h you t o advance peace i n
worki
the r e g i o n .
Sincerely,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP
.
&~
�S a r g e a n t , S t e p h e n T. ( E X S E C )
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
nppr ASWIFn
Thursday, July 22,1999 10:36 AM
p
c T ^ S r L . , « /UN
Schulte, Gregory L. (EUR); vonLipsey, Roderick K. ( D E F E N s f i ? u
' r ^ ^ ' - ^ f t L
©EXECSEC -Executive SecretaiV
^ t e House Guidelines, August 28,1997
FW: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [eONriDENTIAL]
By-^iNARA,
TMaolll*/oJ
n
1 9 0
R
Greg, Rod - Not sure which of you is doing the Blair package, but here are a few points on the NATO Secgen question
that should be included, based on the call that just ended with Schroeder.
-Original MessageFrom:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:33 AM
To:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject:
RE: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair?- [CONFH3CNTIAL]
great, couple of tweaks, pis. work with rod/Greg to get htese in package. Tx.
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, As Amended, Sec. 3i (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28,1997
By^LNARA, DHttuY/^ *
—Original Message—
From:
Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
,
Sent:
Thursday, July 22, 199910:19 AM
/
To:
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Cc:
©EUROPE-European Affairs
Subject:
Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? fOONriDCNTIAL]
Think we should seek to have the following, or some version thereof, inserted into the Blair telcall package:
Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG
Solana.
Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, provided Germany were willing to put him in the running.
But made clear that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates
mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
p
6^^L,
Schroeder said he was reluctant to put Scharping forward because he is needed at home but, knowing of our
interest, would speak again with Scharping and would make a decision wmin a week -before Sarajevo.
Schroeder also suggested that we chat with you on the margins of the Sarajevo Conference.
Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
0.013- 04-72.- H
8/U/I5" KGH
�-emfi£S6Mq-ra±r
5562
. .... /
"7 - ^ v -q Cf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
J u l y 23, 1999
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGEP^^
GENE S P E R L I N ^ ^
I.
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 Summit i n Sarajevo. S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need t o s u s t a i n
c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t the FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We are w o r k i n g on a s e r i e s o f economic i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e
Sarajevo Summit. You asked us t o f i n d a c r e a t i v e approach,
s i m i l a r t o the one o u t l i n e d by George Soros. A l t h o u g h
i n n o v a t i v e , the Soros p r o p o s a l would not p r o v i d e r e a l l o n g - t e r m
b e n e f i t s ; t h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would come from access t o U.S. and
EU markets.
I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared a comprehensive
s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an investment
compact and a commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO membership. We
want t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a c o n c r e t e
statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend you commit t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o the Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n except Serbia, b u t i n c l u d i n g Kosovo and
Montenegro. These p r e f e r e n c e s should apply u n i f o r m l y and should
be as generous as p o s s i b l e t o spur economic development. We
would n o t r e q u e s t s p e c i a l access r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s .
This would p r o v i d e immediate access t o developed markets and the
g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t . However, i n o r d e r f o r
t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c r i t i c a l .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONFI DENT IMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
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PER E.O. 13526
yLO^- OWX' H
8/G/I5" KBH
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2
On our s i d e , we are e x p l o r i n g w i t h members o f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l
t r a d e committees l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d i n g a ten-year GSP
commitment, t o i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods,
w i t h the exception o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f
p r o d u c t s from these c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania,
a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y - f r e e under GSP or normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e
U.S. would o f f e r a new program t h a t a l s o i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s (except sugar) and footwear a t l i t t l e
p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . I n a d d i t i o n , a ten-year program
would p r o v i d e much g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y t o i n v e s t o r s than t h e
c u r r e n t GSP program, which i s funded from year t o year. I t
would a l s o encourage r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n by p r o v i d i n g s p e c i a l
access t o p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n i n g i n p u t s from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n
the r e g i o n .
Investment Compact: Because investment and t r a d e w i l l d r i v e
s u s t a i n e d growth, we propose a * compact" between l e a d e r s from
o u t s i d e t h e r e g i o n and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s
to c r e a t e v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g
risk.
I n r e t u r n , t h e r e g i o n a l leaders would commit t o concrete
a c t i o n s t o improve t h e investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e
economic r e f o r m s .
One s p e c i f i c o p t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h i n g an EBRD t r u s t fund w i t h U.S.
funds t o c r e a t e a p o l i c y framework f o r investment and f a c i l i t a t e
debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks. I n a d d i t i o n , we would work
w i t h t h e I F I s t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund would
i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e or p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n ( t o
i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro) and h e l p leverage p r i v a t e
f i n a n c i n g . F i n a l l y , we are d i s c u s s i n g w i t h George Munoz t h e
p o s s i b l e c r e a t i o n o f an OPIC fund f o r t h e Balkans.
WTO Membership: For non-member c o u n t r i e s , we w i l l o f f e r
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards
and work t o f a c i l i t a t e accession on an a c c e l e r a t e d b a s i s . I n
many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e cost t o t h e
U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, which o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
and growth.
An EU commitment on membership i n a reasonable
p e r i o d w i l l be t h e most d i f f i c u l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t
-- p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y .
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP"
�•CONFIDENTIAL
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We a l s o disagree w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e would need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on i n c r e a s e d u n i t y w i t h i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B
P o i n t s t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner P r o d i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
•CONFI DENHAL
�rmrTPi^refrftir
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude Serbia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an * investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate.
I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
•
We should work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
IDEHTIAL
CLINTON LUJKm m m J U * .
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
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•
2
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
Said t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e p r e s s ,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he would delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t
would make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
CONFIDDNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPv
�GONriDEHffcftfe
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you are s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n .
Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
p r e p a r e s Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The most m e a n i n g f u l gesture we can make i n t h e near term i s t o
p r o v i d e u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e access i n t o o u r markets. This w i l l
h e l p c a t a l y z e p r o d u c t i o n and investment i n t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions as soon as p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
We would exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o p r o v i d e d u t y - f r e e
access i n t o o u r market across a range o f p r o d u c t s .
However, I
can o n l y succeed i n t h i s e f f o r t i f t h e EU makes i t a s i m i l a r
effort.
•
I understand t h e EU i s c o n s i d e r i n g s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t would be more p o w e r f u l
i f t h e EU c o u l d extend t o t h e r e g i o n as a whole ( e x c l u d i n g
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g d u t y - f r e e t r e a t m e n t f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as p o s s i b l e .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A l s o a s k i n g r e g i o n a l leaders t o make an '"investment compact"
and commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
c l i m a t e . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we should
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a t r u s t fund a t t h e EBRD t o make
loans e s p e c i a l l y t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s . We should a l s o
encourage t h e I F I and EBRD t o c r e a t e a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund.
COMF1 DENgrEAfe
Reason: 1.5(d)
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�CONFIDENTIAL
•
We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
•
A l s o need t o use Summit t o demonstrate Serbia's i s o l a t i o n
under M i l o s e v i c , w h i l e h o l d i n g o u t t h e p r o s p e c t o f r a p i d
integration after Milosevic.
•
M i l o s e v i c i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window o f
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change t o t h e r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s discussed s a n c t i o n s a t
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked t h e Commission t o l o o k a t
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep s a n c t i o n s f u l l y i n p l a c e .
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be r e l a x e d .
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t i g h t e n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l s a n c t i o n s t a r g e t e d a t M i l o s e v i c and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince i n d i v i d u a l EU c o u n t r i e s t o take
necessary steps, f o l l o w i n g t h e r e c e n t example o f S w i t z e r l a n d .
C
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
exploit
�CONFIDENTIAL
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On our s i d e , we^would propooe a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n '
of c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s .
A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from t M s e
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r .dutyf r e e under GSP or, normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U.S. would offfer a
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) .at l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t / W c a r c i n
the process o f I m a k i n g congrcGsional c a l l o - I-Q t t t h e watf^^F .
IF
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Investment Compact: Because investment and trade will drive oJ"
sustained growth, we propose a * compact" between leaders from ^ '^"^
outside the region and the international fijFlancial institutions -V~^v
to create vehicles for mobilizing private^finance and mitigating
^r^-^
risk. In return, the regional leaders i^uld commit to concrete Cr* P
actions to improve the investment cliradte and accelerate
^j^^ .
economic reforms.
^ ^v—,
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1
t o create t .
One specific option\is establishimg an EBRD trust fund^uo c r e a t e i __
a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance
through local banks. ^ JWe woul^ tl^h work with the IFIs to create
a regional equity fund. They''fund would invest in private or
0^ "
privatizing enterprises in/the region (to include Kosovo and
<*?^ ^ ^
Montenegro)^^ielp leverage'private financing and roaximizc uoc-of
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WTO Membership: For ^on-member countries, we will offer3j t*.J. ^'"
t e c h n i c a l assistance''needed t o meet t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s .
I n many cases, t h i s ' i s e a s i l y p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e ^
^
the U.S. o r EU governments.
^
^ j ^ ^ M ^ ^ " ^
A ^
S
l
EU statement: ^Our key goal i s f o r t h e r e g i o n t o be i n t e g r a t e d
i n t o t h e EU, v^nich o f f e r s t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development
*
and growth. /An EU commitment on avontua-i membersh:u3 w i l l be t h e
most d i f f i c m l t — b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t — ^ f f ^ r t o f our
strategy./
,
t***-*^
^
Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)
^ j f
1
^
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece V and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
^
support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
^
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
^
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
;~
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f the s a n c t i o n s (the f l i g h t ban and
^
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
opposition-controlled localities.
We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
x
DECLASSIFIED
coNFiDENTfftfe
CLINTON LibKAKX muiuuo.
PER £ Q 13525
�CONFIDENTIAL
sanctions i n order t o avoid b o l s t e r i n g Milosevic p o l i t i c a l l y or
f i n a n c i a l l y . We also disagree w i t h the f e a s i b i l i t y of d i r e c t i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s . We are prepared t o
discuss w i t h a l l i e s the concept of assistance t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such assistance wotild need
to be c a r e f u l l y circumscribed, monitored and coordina'ted, as
w e l l as conditioned on increased u n i t y w i t h i n the o p p o s i t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A Points t o be Made f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B Points t o be Made f o r EU Commissioner Prodi
/
j
i
/
/
CONFIPFNTTAh .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�/
The most meaningful gesture we can make i n the near term i s to
provide u n i l a t e r a l trade access i n t o our markets. This w i l l
help catalyze production and investment i n the region.
I am prepared t o work w i t h Congress t o provide duty-free
access i n t o our market across a range of products, -rflawever,
-can only succeed-In this_£££prt i f - the. EU- makes a s i
-effort.
I understand the EU i s considering s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r
i n d i v i d u a l countries i n the region. I t - would be more powerful
i f the EU could extend t o the region as a whole(excluding
Serbia) a program p r o v i d i n g duty free treatment f o r as many
i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l goods as possible.+
/
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
PER E Oo 13526
2.o\3 - oH7a - V\
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�5562
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
PHONE CALLS TO U.K. PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our proposed economic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e
J u l y 30 S t a b i l i t y Pact Summit i n Sarajevo.
To s t r e s s t o P r o d i
t h e need t o s u s t a i n c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY.
Ii.
BACKGROUND
Economic I n i t i a t i v e s
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working w i t h c o u n t i f i e s o f t h e EU and southeast
Europe t o develop a s e r i e s o f i n i t / i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit, i n c l u d i n g i n t h e e c o n o m i o ^ f i e l d . You have asked us t o
f i n d an i n n o v a t i v e approach, s i o a l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. A l t h o u g h i n t e r e / t i n g and i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t p r o v i d e r e f i l l o n g - t e r m b e n e f i t s t o t h e
c o u n t r i e s -of southeast Eurone. T h e i r b i g g e s t g a i n would be
access t o U.S,) and EU market^. I n t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t r a t e g y which i n c l u d e s a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact and a /commitment t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We want ther Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statement r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We' recommend c o m m i t t i n g t o u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r / t o t h e Caribbean Basin I n i t i a t i v e , t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n o t h e r than S e r b i a , as w e l l as Kosovo and
Montenegro. These/ p r e f e r e n c e s should be u n i f o r m across t h e
r e g i o n and as generous as p o s s i b l e t o r a p i d l y spur economic
development. We would n o t , i n t u r n , request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S\ o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e s immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e greatest, s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
c r i t i c a l , n o t o n l y t o m o b i l i z e Congressional support here a t
home, b u t a l s o because access t o t h e European market i s an
e s s e n t i a l component t o southeast Europe's economic development.
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P\
�To e f f e c t t h i s , we would propose a t e n ^ y e ^ r GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding t h e l i s t o f e l i g i b l e ^ g o o d s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n ^ t e x t i l e s . Although a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
countries/-/-' except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania.y^ a l r e a d y e n t e r
d u t y - f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s / t h e U.S. would offe
a new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t ^
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e / i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s t o t e s t t h e watei?4.
s
Investment Compact: Because we have underscored t h a t i/ivestment
and t r a d e , and n o t donor a s s i s t a n c e , w i l l d r i v e susta^med
growth, we propose a "compact" under which l e a d e r s firom o u t s i d e
t h e r e g i o n would agree t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o create appropriate vehicles f o r irfobilizing
p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n r e t u r n ^ the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o jjrfprove t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
We ar,g~workdng on s e v e r a l o p t i o n s . T h e / f i r s t i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f ari EBRD/trust fund which would e s t a b l i s h a p o l i c y framework
f o r ^Euzje^tment and f a c i l i t a t e debt fi/fance t h r o u g h l o c a l banks.
Based on our experiences i n c e n t r a l / E u r o p e , we would then work
with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i j f s t i t u t i o n s t o create a
r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund. The fund w6uld i n v e s t i n p r i v a t e o r
p r i v a t i z i n g e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e r e g i o n d j t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and
Montenegro), h e l p leverage p r i v a t e f i n a n c i n g from i n s t i t u t i o n s
and b i l a t e r a l donors, and u t i l i z e guarantees o f f e r e d by n a t i o n a l
investment agencies such as GOPIC.
WTO Membership: For t h o s e / c o u n t r i e s n o t c u r r e n t l y members o f
t h e WTO, we would o f f e r t>ie t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l standa/ds. I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t v e r y l i t t l e / c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
EU statement:
The most i m p o r t a n t step f o r t h e r e g i o n i s t o be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e S u r o - A t l a n t i c s t r u c t u r e s l i k e t h e EU; t h i s
o f f e r s t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A
commitment by t h e EU on e v e n t u a l EU membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c u l t p a r t o f <6ur s t r a t e g y , b u t a l s o t h e most i m p o r t a n t t o
show r e a l commitment by t h e Europeans.
Economic Sanctions (Prodi C a l l Only)
At Monday's meeting o f t h e General A f f a i r s C o u n c i l , EU F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s reviewed c u r r e n t EU s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e FRY. Greece
and I t a l y pressed f o r a l i f t i n g o f t h e o i l embargo, w i t h some
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands
s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d any l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . M i n i s t e r s
u l t i m a t e l y agreed t o t a s k t h e EU Commission t o examine t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f t i n g some o f t h e s a n c t i o n s ( t h e f l i g h t ban and
s p o r t i n g ban) and o f d i r e c t i n g o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o
o p p o s i t i o n - c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s . ' We oppose any l i f t i n g o f
s a n c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d b o l s t e r i n g M i l o s e v i c p o l i t i c a l l y o\
financially.
We a l s o d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t x i n g
o i l and e l e c t r i c i t y t o s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s .
We are prepared t o
d i s c u s s w i t h a l l i e s t h e concept o f a s s i s t a n c e t o o p p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l i t i e s ; however, any such a s s i s t a n c e wouixl need
t o be c a r e f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , m o n i t o r e d and c o o r d i n a t e d , as
w e l l as c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e l o c a l l e a d e r s t a k i n g steps t o
increase u n i t y w i t h i n the opposition.
Attachments
Tab A
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r PM B l a i r
Tab B
T a l k i n g P o i n t s f o r EU Commissions
Prodi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
Sarajevo Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l a n d / r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g system.
•
The f i r s t s t e p ta=da. i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f /Our support
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f cours^, exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would anow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i r m i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r ayronomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r Vou, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment / t o t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o conunit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e / I want t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making t h o s e / d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e / c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
/
To do t h i s , w d ' r e l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equjKiy fund.
CLINTON LlBKAKi PHOTOCUi-1
�o
,5
<
•
Would also urge that we work towards g e t t i n g a l l of these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as possible.
• F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations
Serbia and Economic Sanctions
Also need t o use Summit t o demonstrate S e r b i a ' s / i s o l a t i o n
under Milosevic, while holding out the prospejzr of r a p i d
i n t e g r a t i o n a f t e r Milosevic.
Milosevic i s s e r i o u s l y weakened, and we have a window of
o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g fundamental change/to the region.
Understand t h a t EU f o r e i g n ministers/discussed sanctions at
t h e i r Monday meeting, and asked th^r Commission t o look at
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f t i n g some.
•
Need t o keep sanctions f u l l y ipf place, Milosevic w i l l e x p l o i t
any h i n t t h a t they w i l l be re/axed.
•
I n f a c t , we s t i l l need t o t/ighten implementation of e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l sanctions targelzed at Milosevic and h i s regime.
Hope you can convince incaividual EU countries t o take
necessary steps, follow/ng the recent example of Switzerland.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from S a r a j e v o ^
I b e l i e v e t h a t we should t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r ^ 5 i d
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e European and g l o b a l t r a d i n g syster
•
The f i r s t s t e p t o do i s t o show t h e s i n c e r i t y o f oufr s u p p o r t
f o r t h e r e g i o n . The U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t ,
as soon as p o s s i b l e , u n i l a t e r a l , one way t r a d e / c o n c e s s i o n s t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would, o f course/f exclude S e r b i a ,
but want t o i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package which would snow our commitment,
but I w i l l o n l y have a good shot a t w i n n i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l
s u p p o r t i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t .
I know t h a t you
have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway^with C e n t r a l and
Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t / y o u expand t h e most
generous o f these, t h e Lome o r autonomous t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s t o
the whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r yo/, as i t w i l l be f o r us. But, we
must make t h e commitment t o / t r y and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e
Summit.
•
We a r e a s k i n g t h e r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an " i n v e s t m e n t
compact" and t o commit / t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e
investment climate.
/ w a n t t o make sure t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r
them making those d i f f i c u l t reforms, we do our best t o
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o d i r e c t
investors.
•
To do t h i s , we're/ l o o k i n g a t working w i t h t h e EBRD t o c r e a t e a
r e g i o n a l equity^/fund.
•
Would a l s o u r g ^ t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g a l l o f these
s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t h e y
need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as concrete and
ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding
eventual EU membership f o r the Southeast European nations,
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•COMriDEMP-frftfi-
55 62
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMI35IONER PRODI
DATE: TBD '
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
/
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
/
PURPOSE
Secure s u p p o r t f o r our proposed econoipic i n i t i a t i v e s a t t h e J u l y
3 0 [ s t a b i l i t y PactjSummit i n S a r a j e v o / S t r e s s t o P r o d i t h e need
t o s u s t a i n curreffE" EU s a n c t i o n s agaanst t h e FRY.
II.
BACKGROUND
/
Economic Initiatives
^
CSJ /
r
>. c c \t- A i HL.
t
/
We a r e c u r r e n t l y working -wijfrh t e n a n t r i e s o f t h e EU-aftd-'-a-era-t-fee^g^:
Euxope-J^o - do v o l op a s e r i e s ^ o f ' i n i t i a t i v e s f o r t h e Sarajevo
Summit^ ifte-luding i n t h o .ci'conomi-G ^icil-d. You faava asked us t o
f i n d v a n — i a n o v a t i v c approach, s i m i l a r t o t h e one o u t l i n e d by
George Soros. Although/ irnter-Qst i.Q^_an.ci. i n n o v a t i v e , t h e Soros
p r o p o s a l would n o t prqpVi-de r e a l long-term b e n e f i t s ^ to- t-fee
•GouRt^ire^--of--sou-t-heaa!4--Eur-f>p«". -Their b i g g e s t g a i n would be- f l i € Ft~'('A L
VI'
access t o U.S. and EO markets. f i r t h a t s p i r i t , we have prepared
a comprehensive s t o ^ t e g y which .includes a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e , an
investment compact? and a commitnent t o h e l p achieve WTO
membership. We W^nt t h e Europeans t o support these and g i v e a
c o n c r e t e statemynt r e g a r d i n g e v e n t u a l EU membership.
Trade I n i t i a t i v e :
We recommend c o m m i t t i n g 'to u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s , s i m i l a r t o ^ . ^ ^ ^ r i b b e a n Basiix, I n i t i a t ^ v ^ t o
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n ^-fetiei. tharr Sert^.i.a, c wo-i-i'^ac Kosovo and
Montenegro .^^^Th^s^pref erences should fee u h i f o r ^ a c x a a s - i f e e
I^jg4r&ti a n d ^ s 'generous as p o s s i b l e to_rap-idl-y spur economic
development. We would n o t , -,ifi—t.urnr^request s p e c i a l access
r i g h t s t o U.S. o r EU e x p o r t s . This p r o v i d e ^ ' immediate access t o
developed markets and t h e g r e a t e s t s h o r t - t e r m t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t .
However, i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o be a success, EU p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s
eONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
KBH
�CONFIDENffftL
2
-
r
c r i t i c a l ^ - n-o^—only -txr-mobi-i i-z-e Congr ess ional—s-uppo-r-fe—her-e-at
liome^, hut...al^o-^bee-a-u-se access t o the • European market • i s • arv
e s s e n t i a l component-to- southeast Europe's economic development..
e f f e c t t h i r s ^ w e would propose a ten-year GSP commitment, t o
i n c l u d e expanding'the l i s t o f e l i g i b l e goods, w i t h .the e x c e p t i o n
o f c e r t a i n t e x t i l e s . A l t h o u g h a m a j o r i t y o f p r o d u c t s from these
c o u n t r i e s , except f o r B u l g a r i a and Romania, a l r e a d y e n t e r d u t y f r e e under GSP o r normal t r a d e s t a t u s , t h e U S . would o f f e r a
.'
new program t h a t i n c l u d e s v i r t u a l l y a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s
(except sugar) a t l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o s t . We a r e i n
the process o f making c o n g r e s s i o n a l c a l l s . - t o t e s t t h e w a t e r s .
Investment Compact: Because Jate have—und^r-a^oxed-^feh-gfe- investment
and trade,, ^USLMQX^^.Q.UQJ: a^s-ista-n&e^-.will/arive s u s t a i n e d
growth, we propose a * compact" under'which- l e a d e r s from o u t s i d e
t^_reglon_-jfl/ould agree, t o work w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
£
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o c r e a t e appropria^fe v e h i c l e s f o r m o b i l i z i n g
ht;<s- p r i v a t e f i n a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g r i s k .
I n return, the regional
l e a d e r s would commit t o concrete a c t i o n s t o improve t h e
investment c l i m a t e and a c c e l e r a t e economic reforms.
- c o-re- w o r k i n g ou.. se.vera.1, _optionc-a
W
3 % ^ — f ^ r r r t i f\_ ^ s t n h l i -hmrrHI=an EBRD t r u s t fund 4^1 ^ j f c ^ ^ s ^ d e s t a b i i a h a p o l i c y framework
f o r investment and f a c l l i tale debt f i n a n c e through l o c a l banks,
fiaocd oil. pur c«pe3?4eftees -in engnfo^jg—Eucope, we would then work
with the^ infcp-r-national/f iiiauuidl ins L'lLuLioi»s' to create a
regional equity fund.. The fund would invest in private or
privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and
Montenegro) , help leverage private financingfrromin-etifrufcimij
and bilat-e-r^l^-dQft&c.s^'a'nd nfrii i Eir^guarantees offered by national
investment agencies such as OPIC. C^/u^i, y.,A,( 2 £ ^X-' Of
c
1
1
1
r
WTO Membership: Forfel'mje.•eountifiGO not.. c - . ; f f l y momborc , o l
urao»ai
the—WTO7 we^woul-d o f f e r *he- t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e needed t o meet
the i n t e r n a t i i o n a l standards.
I n many cases, t h i s i s e a s i l y
p r o v i d e d a t / v e r y l i t t l e c o s t t o t h e U.S. o r EU governments.
^Z^-
M-—-WILL
EU statement:
The m^st i.mportant^i.tpp~,.ft>r t h e r e g i o n -ars^to be
i n t e g r a t e ^ ' i n t o fche-Eggo Afejb-aft-tlg'-ofe&ag^ur.ea ^a^ke. t h e EUj tl-ri-s W t f
o f f e r s thte best o p p o r t u n i t y f o r development and growth. A*J
commitment byj the EU on e v e n t u a l -By^membership w i l l be t h e most
d i f f i c i A t , p a r t o f our s t r a t e g y b u t also t h e m-ost-Impo-rt-aB-fe-^to
s.w...a^Gimtei.„.y-.h..u.paihQ..rel.oiim.it.h.,te.ErQsrsr
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�-COMFTDENTTAI.
55 62
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo
Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n t h e r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure meaningful, r e s u l t s .
•
We a l l agree t h a t we want s u b s t a n t i v e outcomes from Sarajevo.
We s h o u l d t r y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a d e i n i t i a t i v e t h a t
prepares Southeast Europe f o r f u l l and r a p i d i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o
European and g l o b a l t r a d e .
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our Support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions'! strofteet t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude Serlpia, b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous/of these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
Vx?fsking r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an 'investment compact" and
Acommit t;o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e investment
climate'. I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We'j/e c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
•
Vis s h o u l d work g e t t i n g these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
fMvi
CONFIDENHMr
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on:
7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
^OVb-cma-W
S/o/iS" K8M
�CONn DCI ¥¥±tt7
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI
S a r a j e v o Summit Trade I n i t i a t i v e s
•
Hope you a r e s e t t l i n g i n t o your new p o s i t i o n . Looking f o r w a r d
to t h e Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y i n t h e
r e m a i n i n g days t o ensure m e a n i n g f u l r e s u l t s .
•
We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
We should try to bring together a trade initiative that
prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into
European and global trade.
f
•
The f i r s t s t e p i s t o show our support f o r t h e r e g i o n . The
U.S. and EU can agree t o g e t h e r t o g r a n t u n i l a t e r a l t r a d e
concessions soonest t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . We would
exclude S e r b i a , b u t i n c l u d e Kosovo and Montenegro.
•
We a r e p r e p a r i n g a package t o show our commitment, b u t I w i l l
o n l y w i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l support i f t h e EU makes a s i m i l a r
effort.
I know t h a t you have a range o f i n i t i a t i v e s underway
w i t h C e n t r a l and Southeast Europe. Would urge t h a t you expand
the most generous o f these, t h e Lome, o r autonomous t r a d e
p r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e whole r e g i o n .
•
Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g m e a n i n g f u l t r a d e concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , b u t we must make t h e commitment t o t r y
and announce a r e s u l t a t t h e Summit.
•
A s k i n g r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s t o make an * investment compact" and
commit t o key reforms t h a t would improve t h e i n v e s t m e n t
c l i m a t e . . I n r e t u r n f o r them making reforms, we s h o u l d
m o b i l i z e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and m i t i g a t e r i s k t o i n v e s t o r s .
•
We're c o n s i d e r i n g c r e a t i n g a r e g i o n a l e q u i t y fund w i t h EBRD.
/ We s h o u l d work g e t t i n g
these s t a t e s i n t o t h e WTO p r o v i d i n g t h e
t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e they need t o meet t h e c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y .
•
F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r as c o n c r e t e and
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 7/22/09
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E . O . 13526
�CONriDEN¥*ftb
2
NATO S e c r e t a r y General
/'S C L ^1
" "
~
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schroeder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he'delay p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t uattiti
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week
b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you i n Sarajevo.
eoNFiDEMTiAb
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�CONriDCNTIAL
5562
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR
Sarajevo Summit^^/W*^—
>
^ ^tfJJ?t£Z~t
• Looking forward t o the Sarajevo Summit. Must work i n t e n s i v e l y
i n the. remaining days t o ensure meaningful r e s u l t s .
• We a l l agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo.
J - f r ± e e LlidLr-celV
should t r y to b r i n g together a t r a d g _ ^ ^ r f ^ :
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t prepares Southeast Europe, f o r <£]^Tlfl»i^xapi^^
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o tfee^European and global tradi^^sy&Eeau-I
=
•
The f i r s t step i s t o show the s i n c e r i t y of our support f o r the
region. The U.S. and EU can agree tag^tker- t o grant/—as ooon—•
as posslbLe; (uolJ-a-t^^ffiv-egre wyj^tiffiae concessions/^o
''"^
countries i n tTTe—tegran,. We would^ nr r o n r m ^ exclude Serbia,
but want to- include Kosovo and^Montenegro.
• We are preparing a package wk4eh would show our commitment,
but I w i l l only havo a cjuud Lihot- crt> winn-iug congressional
support i f the EU makes a s i m i l a r e f f o r t . I know t h a t you
have a range of i n i t i a t i v e s underway w i t h Central and
Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most
generous of these, the, Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to
the whole region.
• Understand t h a t o f f e r i n g meaningful trade concessions w i l l be
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , f n r ynm—a-o i t w i l l bo f o r uc i ^ u t ^ we
must make the commitment to t r y and announce a r e s u l t at the
Summit.
/
/
•
We are asking/the regional leaders to make an "investment
compact" and/to commit to key reforms that would improve the
investment climate. J-want -to makp sure thaJi/ _£n return for
them making' those difficult reforms, we do our best to
mobilize brivate capital and mitigate /isk to direct
investors/.
/
•
To do tjfiis, we're looking at working w i t h the EBRD t o create a
regiona/l equity fund.
• Would also urge t h a t we work towards g e t t i n g .aJJ—cu£_these
states i n t o the WTO providing the t e c h n i c a l assistance they
need t o meet the c r i t e r i a f o r entry as soon as p o s s i b l e .
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
€eNFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 7/22/09
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�F i n a l l y , I would ask your support f o r -arSconcrete and
C O /
a m b i t i o u s a statement as p o s s i b l e a t t h e summit r e g a r d i n g v ^ '
'
e v e n t u a l EU membership f o r t h e Southeast European n a t i o n s .
NATO S e c r e t a r y
General
•
Spoke w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder t o convey t h a t we needed t o
come t o c l o s u r e on a successor f o r NATO SYG Solana.
•
T o l d him we would be prepared t o support Scharping, i f
Schoreder p u t s him i n t h e r u n n i n g .
•
S t a t e t h a t we a l s o l i k e d Haekkerup, and we"'would l o o k v e r y
f a v o r a b l y on any o f t h e UK candidates mentioned i n t h e press,
i n c l u d i n g Paddy Ashdown.
•
Schroeder s a i d he d e l a y p u t t i n g Scharping f o r w a r d , b u t would
make a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n a week -- b e f o r e Sarajevo.
Schroeder
a l s o suggested t h a t we a l l chat i n Sarajevo.
•
Looking f o r w a r d t o seeing you./in Sarajevo.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•SECRET
07 77
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Gerry Adams o f Sinn Fein
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t
Sinn Fein P r e s i d e n t Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Deana S u t l i f f , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
James Smith and Dick Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 31, 2000, 2:55-3:13 p.m. EST
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Gerry.
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
How are you?
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'm a l r i g h t . I j u s t wanted t o c a l l and t a l k t o
you one more time b e f o r e t h i s comes down. I know how hard you've
worked on t h i s decommissioning i s s u e , b u t we've been i n touch
w i t h t h e I r i s h and B r i t i s h governments and I ' v e t a l k e d t o most o f
Sinn Fein's f r i e n d s i n Congress t h e l a s t few days, and no one I
t a l k e d t o b e l i e v e s what t h e IRA i s prepared t o say t o
de C h a s t e l a i n about arms and e x p l o s i v e s and t h e n t o say he can't
say t h a t p u b l i c l y w i l l p r e v e n t t h i s whole t h i n g from going down.
The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be suspended and I don't know how t h e h e l l
w e ' l l ever g e t them up a g a i n . Then i t w i l l be even more
d i f f i c u l t ; t h e IRA w i l l l o o k l i k e t h e y ' r e c r y i n g u n c l e , i n s t e a d
of squeezing o u t t h e l a s t ounce o f good w i l l , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e
B l a i r i s p r e p a r e d t o go f o r w a r d w i t h implementing t h e P a t t e n
Report.
We're j u s t i n a t e r r i b l e s i t u a t i o n .
I don't know i f
t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g you can do t o get a c l e a r commitment on a
timetable.
I am v e r y w o r r i e d about t h i s . I t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n
w i l l have no c h o i c e , and T r i m b l e i s gone i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s are
not suspended. I f t h e y are suspended, we w i l l a l l do our b e s t t o
keep them a l i v e , b u t i t does n o t h e l p t h e IRA a t a l l . (^f
Mr. Adams:
I t w i l l work backward.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t w i l l be even harder f o r them. R i g h t now,
t h e y ' r e i n an admirable p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , s a y i n g , we made
everyone f o r k over b e f o r e we d i d . " We can g e t by w i t h o u t an a c t
i f t h e r e ' s a c l e a r commitment and t i m e t a b l e , b u t w i t h o u t t h a t , I
w
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Reason: 1. 5d
Declassify
on:
Robert Bradtke
02/04/10
DECLASSIFIED
PFR F f l I ' W f i
^ - V H I ^ A
�CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
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6-CCRCT
t h i n k de C h a s t e l a i n i s going t o i s s u e h i s r e p o r t , i n s t i t u t i o n s
w i l l be suspended and t h e IRA — I agree w i t h you, i t w i l l work
backward. Otherwise, T r i m b l e i s going t o f a l l .
They a r e going
t o g e t him. No one I know t h i n k s he w i l l s u r v i v e . No one w i l l
say, i n v e s t m e n t s a r e coming i n , we j u s t hope t h e IRA does r i g h t
down t h e road."
They j u s t won't do i t . (#]
w
Mr. Adams: I think that there are -- first of all, I agree with
you on the seriousness of the situation. Have you seen the
words? (St)
The President: It says something like they will consider putting
arms beyond use -- (£)
Mr. Adams: Yes, i t a l s o says IRA guns a r e s i l e n t and t h e r e i s no
t h r e a t t o t h e peace process by t h e IRA. (^)
The
President:
But they won't even l e t h i m make t h a t one p u b l i c .
Mr. Adams: I t h i n k David T r i m b l e , i f he r e c e i v e s a p o s i t i v e
r e p o r t from de C h a s t e l a i n and he notes t h e B r i t i s h government
accepts t h a t as p o s i t i v e , then he c l e a r l y has t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l
t o go back. (^5
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h e problem i s , t h e i r view i s they've done
what t h e y ' r e supposed t o do and, h e l l , t h i s c o u l d t a k e p l a c e i n
2010.
(^)
Mr. Adams:
Well, okay.
I mean —
(^
The P r e s i d e n t : Look, we can buy a few days here because t h e
B r i t i s h and I r i s h a r e b o t h committed t o do t h e b e s t t h e y can,
even i f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended. The problem i s , t h e
language would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l i f t h e r e were any r e f e r e n c e
t o a t i m e t a b l e . I know t h e IRA view i s t h e y gave f i r s t because
t h e y gave t h e p r i n c i p l e o f consent, b u t everybody e l s e ' s view o f
t h i s i s a l l t h e o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e Good F r i d a y Accord and even
the P a t t e n Report i s b e i n g implemented and t h a t was d i f f i c u l t f o r
t h e u n i o n i s t s — and d i f f i c u l t i s a m i l d word -- and o l d T r i m b l e
i s s t i l l hanging on, b u t t h e r e i s no c l e a r t i m e t a b l e . I f t h e
language were p u b l i c and t h e r e was a t i m e t a b l e r e f e r e n c e d , i t
would seem l e s s c o n d i t i o n a l , b u t w i t h o u t a t i m e t a b l e t h i s
language seems v e r y c o n d i t i o n a l indeed.
I don't t h i n k t h e r e ' s
any chance o f g e t t i n g a p o s i t i v e r e p o r t o u t o f t h i s .
Mr. Adams: Okay, I am going t o t a l k t o Tony and a l s o go have a
meeting w i t h Peter Mandelson. I don't t h i n k i t i s g o i n g t o be
p o s s i b l e , i n f a c t I know i t won't be p o s s i b l e . We t r i e d t o get a
d e f i n i t i v e t i m e t a b l e . What we g o t was i n t e n t on m o d a l i t i e s and
•SECRET
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3
on a timetable determined by political developments as opposed to
a calendar timetable. It is going to cause trouble within the
IRA, no matter what people think, trouble within the IRA and its
leadership. The worst possible scenario was failing to get the
IRA to move, because the IRA's position was that not under any
circumstances will they decommission, and now they are saying
they will consider decommissioning, putting weapons beyond use,
which is the exact wording of the legislation, which is a total
change from their previously stated position. Whatever has been
created in terms of public expectation of the IRA, the fact is
this is a unilateral deadline set by the unionists. But that is
not the way to try and make this work. There is perhaps some
room to maneuver in terms of de Chastelain including some of the
statement in his report, if that helps, if there are problems in
not being able to publicize or publicly comment on this. I think
there is a possibility, but only in the context that it would
help stabilize the situation. We won't get it; we tried over the
weekend to get a definitive timetable. For all that is said
about the Patten Report, the reality is it is all promises.
We've seen no legislation from the British. Demilitarization has
not happened; there has been remilitarization. Two children — •
two teenagers -- were killed in my constituency some years ago, a
young girl and boy, killed by British soldiers. They were
joyriding and they were killed. The soldiers perjured
themselves. Today all the charges were dropped. All of this is
playing into what was done. The guns are silent. I don't
believe for a moment that Tony Blair for one moment disagrees
with my analysis of how this can be done. I think he accepts it.
The problem is in the unionists who are dictating this, not in
the Irish government by itself or in the British government. I
think it is in the way this issue has been used to choke the
process. (jifi
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree w i t h a l l t h a t b u t l o o k , t h e problem i s
the whole Good F r i d a y Accord and t h e e l e c t i o n s a r e a l l premised
on a l l t h e p i e c e s f a l l i n g i n t o p l a c e a t t h e same t i m e .
[ B r e a k } . . . o f t h e Accord t h a t s e t up t h e t i m e t a b l e f o r
decommissioning. A l l t h e v o t i n g proceeded under t h e assumption
i t would happen. Now, t h e u n i o n i s t s have absorbed t h e f a c t t h a t
i t w i l l n o t a l l u n f o l d as t h e accord p r e d i c t e d , b u t s t i l l t h e r e
i s t h i s process and i t has t o have some i n t e g r i t y t o i t . The IRA
may n o t c a r e , b u t a l l t h e Americans who have n o r m a l l y been so
s u p p o r t i v e o f you w i l l b a s i c a l l y say t h e same t h i n g , t h a t they
d i d n ' t come across. As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , I t h i n k t h a t ' s what
i s going t o happen. The r e a l problem was T r i m b l e g o t those guys
to go a l o t f u r t h e r t h a n I thought he c o u l d . He's eaten a l o t
more t h a n t h e IRA has, he's eaten h i s words f o u r o r f i v e t i m e s ,
and t h e n he j u s t found a way t o g e t o u t o f i t and s u r v i v e . I
j u s t don't t h i n k he can do t h a t now. I f you can work a d e a l w i t h
Mandelson, you need t o go see him. We need t o buy a day o r two.
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CNO URR POOOY
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If you can get something specific on the Patten Report, maybe you
can use that. Details of how it's going to be implemented and
when. Maybe you can synchronize that with the IRA commitment.
Maybe they'll be willing to do that. (JS)
Mr. Adams: The big problem for the IRA is that the
decommissioning issue will be dictated by political circumstances
that exist, not a timetable which they never signed up to. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : But i f t h a t ' s t h e i s s u e , what i f you worked o u t
w i t h Mandelson and B l a i r a t i m e t a b l e on t h e P a t t e n Report and
agreed t o g e t t h e IRA t o say, " I f they do t h i s and t h i s , w e ' l l do
the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s . " ( g )
jT
Mr. Adams: It wouldn't work in that context. The big problem
for the IRA is the unarmed police service. We can probably get
unionists to buy it, but for the republicans, it is still a
partitionist service. Our whole intent was to get the IRA out of
the game, on the sidelines, so other people could take more
pragmatic positions. So the big thing is to keep the IRA
sidelined and spectating in all this. So I am going to see
Mandelson, because we have to make the best effort to make sure
this situation is rescued. I would mislead you if you left with
the impression that something could be done on Patten which could
help on this, but I'll go and see Mandelson now. (JS]
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me ask you: i f they want t h e t i m e t a b l e t o be
d i c t a t e d by p o l i t i c a l circumstances, why can't t h e r e be some
statement t h a t i f such and such occurs, we w i l l do something?
Mr. Adams: That's what the statement says. Let me just read it
to you. "The IRA wants a permanent peace in Ireland. IRA guns
are silent. We have contributed in a real and meaningful way to
the search for a durable peace, but for that goal to be reached,
steps taken need to be sustained. British forces and loyalist
militias must be removed. The challenge is to remove the cause
of conflict. In this context, and in the context of the full
implementation of the Good Friday Accord, the leadership of the
IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use. For
our part, we are committed to enhancing our engagements with the
IICD to resolve the conflict and deliver a durable peace. There
is no threat to peace by the IRA." That language is going to
cause trouble within republican ranks. (jrf
The P r e s i d e n t : But t h a t ' s buying t r o u b l e w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t s .
The p o i n t o f view o f t h e o t h e r guys i s , ' A f t e r a l l they've s a i d ,
they've backed o f f . " This w i l l be read by s k e p t i c s as, you know,
"We m i g h t never do t h i s , even though t h i s ^ w a s p a r t o f t h e d e a l ,
even though p a r t s o f t h e p l a n precedent t o t h e a c t o f
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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5
decommissioning have o c c u r r e d . " This goes back t o my t h i n k i n g i n
the b e g i n n i n g .
I s t i l l t h i n k t h e e a s i e s t t h i n g t o have done t o
buy you t h e most and hamper you t h e l e a s t was a symbolic a c t .
Mr. Adams: I agree with you completely, but we tried and failed.
The problem Is Trimble said things and then backed off. He
shouldn't have said them in the first place and we got him off of
them.
(#)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
The f a c t remains, i f he goes, we a r e sunk.
{#7
There's no reason f o r him t o go.
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t ' s n o t up t o us i f they depose him. That's t h e
problem, no m a t t e r what t h e r i g h t o r wrong. I t may n o t m a t t e r t o
the IRA, b u t based on what I ' v e heard my view i s everyone w i l l
t r y f o r a s o f t l a n d i n g i f these i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e suspended, b u t
a t l e a s t as o f y e s t e r d a y , when I spoke t o a bunch o f o u r I r i s h
congressmen who have been so s u p p o r t i v e o f you and s t i l l a r e ,
t h e i r u n i v e r s a l view i s they need more. You go t o Mandelson andsee i f you can work i t o u t . We've g o t t o buy a couple o f days.
I don't t h i n k t h i s i s going t o f l y . The i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be
suspended and i f we p l e a d w i t h him t o hang on, I t h i n k t h e
chances he w i l l be deposed are about 90 p e r c e n t .
Mr. Adams:
Steinberg.
(S)
L e t me go see Mandelson and g e t back t o Jim
S o r r y t o keep you w a i t i n g ; I wasn't near a l a n d l i n e .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
Thanks.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
(U)
—
•SECRET-
Good l u c k .
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
(U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY
1242
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 24, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
n
FROM:
IAN A. B 0 W L E § J ^ 7
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m fromyGeorge Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t ft VSA Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h j f e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h ^ P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s with^Eover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s r e q u e s t and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder anc^'Prodi f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e ^ , t h e Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o i NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy
199
Concurrence by:
e s i d e n t ' s weekly r e p o r t on January 10,
r o l i n e Krass, Antony
BlinkenS
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h j f a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachments
Tab I Memo/andum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab A
better t o President Prodi
;r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab B POTUS Note Requesting L e t t e r s
Tab C Reports
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate change. Kribwim^ o-f our
common interest in the subject, I am sending yoyf a copy of a
recent Pew Center on Global Climate Change rep.prt on greenhouse
gas emissions trading.
,f
/
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r y i n g system t h a t i s
g l o b a l i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicati^fh w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance w i t h oirr emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us t o mov^e more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challei^ge. The study b u i l d s on a
l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t ]
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e (includi^
b e n e f i t European countries
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can i i gnii f i rnnj
and other nations f o r whom greenl^use gas abatement i s
r e l a t i v e l y expensive.
•>
the broader, more open,
merous s t u d i e s als^x-tnake c l e & r t h
nd u n r e s t r i c t e d ^ t f i e t r a d i n g J^yarffem, the greater th^--b^nef i t s .
gned under the
you know,^rfie f l e x i b i l i j t y m e c h a n i s m s b e i n g
Kyoto Pro£<5col a l s o hayetefemendous p o t e n t i a l " t o c o n t r i b u t e t o
our b r p ^ d e r e f f o r t s ^ o prapnote energy e f f i c i e n c y and c l e a n e r
enej?4y developmep't: i n d e ^ l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can work t o q ^ t h e r t o address these i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s
and set t h e tone f o r M h a l J—hope w i l l be c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n
between our governmafits i n the l e a d - u p t o the c l i m a t e change
c o n f e r e n c e a t The Uague l a t e r t h i s y e a r .
I look forward t o
d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e j ^ s u e s w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
W i t h best r e g a r d s ,
1
*
Enclosure
The Right Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1820
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema o f I t a l y
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
Interpreter:
E l i s a b e t t a Ullmann
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i ,
Deana S u t l i f f and Hoyt Yee
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:30 - 1:53 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
(U)
How are you?
Fine, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
(U)
How are you?
Good. Thank you.
(U)
(U)
The President: Thank you f o r t a k i n g t h i s c a l l . I wanted t o t a l k
about Kosovo and my concern about where we're going t h e r e . Over
the past few weeks, I t h i n k we have seen almost d a i l y v i o l e n c e ,
KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a UN o p e r a t i o n t h a t i s going very s l o w l y .
We' re coming i n t o the springtime, which has always been the most
dangerous season i n the Balkans and I'm deeply concerned t h a t
Kosovo could b o i l over and t h a t M i l o s e v i c may s t i r up some
t r o u b l e . During the a i r campaign, we were a l l focused c l o s e l y on
Kosovo and now we have other t h i n g s t o worry about, and I t h i n k
the problem i s n o t g e t t i n g the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n i t needs t o
have success t h e r e . fG-)
As I see i t , there are three c r i t i c a l tasks. F i r s t , ensuring t h a t
KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t ; second,
g e t t i n g UNMIK the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b e f f e c t i v e l y and;
t h i r d , d e p l o y i n g enough p o l i c e t o take pressure o f f o f KFOR. fG^
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 3/16/10
CITN LBAY POOOY
LNO IRR HTCP
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. 0.13526
8/1,/15
K8M
�CONFIDENTIAL
On the f i r s t issue, KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t should be
g e t t i n g s t r o n g e r . I understand t h a t you are adding troops and
hope t h a t you can add an a d d i t i o n a l f u l l b a t t a l i o n o f troops t o
those you c u r r e n t l y have deployed t o Kosovo. I'm asking a l l o f
us t o look a t our pledged force l e v e l and t r y t o get back up
t h e r e . I w i l l do the same. We also need t o ensure a smooth
t r a n s i t i o n when the new KFOR commander takes over. We must not
send a s i g n a l t o M i l o s e v i c t h a t t h e r e are weaknesses he can
e x p l o i t . And I t h i n k we need t o i n t e n s i f y e f f o r t s w i t h the
Kosovar Albanians t o counter e x t r e m i s t elements. We sent two o f
our people w i t h the best connections there t h i s weekend t o
d e l i v e r t h a t message. I know t h a t Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about the need f o r p o l i c e but t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l i f we are
to take the pressure o f f o f KFOR. We're sending more people and
I hope you w i l l do the same. We've got t o get more people there.
I'm also very concerned about the UN program UNMIK. They have
been unable t o move forward on c r i t i c a l tasks and are c r i p p l e d by
funding shortages. We have t o get them the resources they need
as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . I t h i n k the appointment o f General Nash
i n M i t r o v i c a should help and I'm doing a l l I can from here. We
have a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t e d 100 percent o f what we committed t o , b u t
I hope you can do something t o get the EU t o disperse the money
they have committed more q u i c k l y . fG^
Later t h i s month, we also have a r e g i o n a l conference t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms, and I t h i n k i t i s important
t h a t we a l l make a concrete pledge. We're prepared t o pledge
n e a r l y .$500 m i l l i o n i f others are w i l l i n g t o do t h e i r p a r t .
F i n a l l y , I know t h a t w e ' l l have t o address the Kosovo s t a t u s
issue, but I r e a l l y t h i n k our focus now ought t o be on
e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s and developing l o c a l
leaders' sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y so we can have e l e c t i o n s t h i s
fall.
Thank you, Massimo. f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Thank you.
concerns and your suggestions
Generally, I do share your
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
I w i l l ask t h a t d u r i n g the next
"European Council meeting i n Lisooh a r e p o r t should be prepared on
t h i s and a c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n among leaders should take
place on t h i s issue. So, i t i s very important t h a t President
Guterres be f u l l y i n v o l v e d i n your concerns so t h a t we can
discuss t h i s issue together next week. f&)
We have decided t h a t we are sending 150 troops t h a t are not
e x a c t l y p o l i c e but armed forces and t r a i n e d f o r t a k i n g c o n t r o l o f
the t e r r i t o r y . And we also have 350 C a r a b i n i e r i t h e r e . We are
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONFIDENTIAL
3
not reducing our forces there, on the c o n t r a r y we are i n c r e a s i n g
them. And i f we also include our people i n Albania, we have a
presence o f 6,300 troops a l l over the area. For us, t h i s i s a
very b i g e f f o r t . However, we w i l l focus our a t t e n t i o n on the
p o l i c e and C a r a b i n i e r i and w e ' l l see i f on t h i s issue we can do
more.
^
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h t h a t . I t h i n k i f we are s t r o n g
i n Kosovo, t h i s w i l l discourage M i l o s e v i c from m i s c h i e f i n
Northern Kosovo and also i n d i r e c t l y support Djukanovic and I
agree we have t o help him economically. We have been doing what
we can b u t perhaps we can do more. fG^
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
So, t o summarize, I f u l l y share your suggestions and we w i l l
increase our involvement i n p o l i c e forces and m i l i t a r y forces and
i n economic support. I f e e l the need f o r a thorough p o l i t i c a l
a n a l y s i s and f o r t h i s maybe we could put our d i p l o m a t i c advisors
i n touch. And I hope t h a t the European d i s c u s s i o n next week w i l l
help us take steps forward. f&)
The President: Yes, I agree w i t h a l l t h a t , and I look forward t o
working w i t h you on i t . Thank you very much.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
Thank you. (U)
Thank you, Massimo.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
—
I hope t o see you soon.
Good bye. (U)
End of Conversation --
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
�CONFI DENHAfe
182 0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h President Jacques Chirac of
France (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Interpreter:
Carol Walter
Notetakers: Don G e n t i l e , Roger M e r l e t t i ,
Miguel A g u i l o , Frank J a r o s i n s k i , and
Deana S u t l i f f
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
March 15, 2000, 1:56 - 2:10 p.m., EST
Oval O f f i c e
Hello.
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. President.
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
(U)
How are you? (U)
I am very glad t o hear you. (U)
The President: Thanks f o r t a k i n g the c a l l .
t h i n g s about Kosovo. fG-)
President Chirac:
I want t o say a few
I wanted t o t a l k t o you about t h a t .
(U)
The President: The s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t there w i t h d a i l y
v i o l e n c e and KFOR a t t r i t i o n and a slow moving UN o p e r a t i o n .
Spring has always been the most d i f f i c u l t season i n the Balkans
and I am w o r r i e d t h a t Kosovo could b o i l over or M i l o s o v i c might
t r y t o s t i r up t r o u b l e . For understandable reasons, we have l o s t
the h i g h - l e v e l a t t e n t i o n we gave t o Kosovo d u r i n g the a i r
campaign. I t h i n k we should put t h i s o p e r a t i o n on a stronger
f o o t i n g . fG^
I t h i n k there are three c r i t i c a l tasks as I see i t . F i r s t ,
ensuring KFOR has the forces i t needs t o counter any t h r e a t .
Second, g e t t i n g the UN the funding i t needs t o do i t s j o b
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: March 16, 2010
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
g/^/iT
Kf5M
�e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i r d , deploying enough p o l i c e t o take the pressure
o f f KFOR to m a i n t a i n s e c u r i t y . KFOR i s g e t t i n g weaker when i t
needs t o get stronger. I understand you have o f f e r e d a d d i t i o n a l
forces and I hope you can employ an a d d i t i o n a l b a t t a l i o n t o those
you deployed. I am asking a l l o f us t o look a t our force l e v e l s
to see i f more i s needed. Also, American forces remain a v a i l a b l e
t o support the French sector i n case o f emergency. I know you
have the most d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . fe)
We also need t o ensure t h a t when the new KFOR commander takes
over, the t r a n s i t i o n i s smooth so we don't send a s i g n a l o f
weakness t o M i l o s o v i c .
We need to do more t o counter e x t r e m i s t
elements among Kosovar Albanians. We sent two o f our people w i t h
the best connections there t h i s weekend t o d e l i v e r t h a t message.
We a l s o need more p o l i c e . I know Madeleine has t a l k e d t o your
people about t h a t . We are increasing our c o n t r i b u t i o n by more
than 10 percent and we hope you can do the same. fe)
I am a l s o concerned about the status o f the UN operation, UNMIK.
They have been c r i p p l e d by funding shortages, and we have t o get
the resources there so Kouchner can succeed. I t h i n k the
appointment o f General Nash as the r e g i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n
M i t r o v i c a w i l l help, and I am doing what I can do here t o
increase our c o n t r i b u t i o n . I hope you w i l l t h i n k about whether
there i s more t h a t you can do and we can push the EU t o disburse
the money even f a s t e r .
There i s also a r e g i o n a l conference l a t e r t h i s month t o finance
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t s and reforms. I am ready t o pledge about
$500 m i l l i o n i f a l l the others are ready t o do t h e i r p a r t . Of
course, a t some p o i n t , we need t o address the s t a t u s o f Kosovo,
but r i g h t now our focus should be on g e t t i n g the o p e r a t i o n r i g h t
on e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r i t y , b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , and developing
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y among l o c a l leaders so we can have e l e c t i o n s l a t e r
t h i s f a l l . (€J
President Chirac: I a b s o l u t e l y agree w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s . As
concerns the m i l i t a r y means, f i r s t o f a l l we have already__tali
the d e c i s i o n t o r e i n f o r c e our m i l i t a r y presence t h e r e . |
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
_ As concerns
m a t e r i a l assistance t o the region, we, w i t h i n the framework o f
the EU, are prepared t o face up to our share o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
CITN L B A Y P O O O Y
LNO I R R H T C P
�An hour ago, we received Prodi, EU Chairman, i n my o f f i c e and
discussed t h i s matter p r e c i s e l y along the l i n e s you hoped f o r ,
From t h i s p o i n t o f view there i s no problem.
is d i f f i c u l t .
Last p o i n t , I t h i n k the Contact Group should meet
r e g u l a r l y once again. fG-)
The President: Well, f i r s t o f
e l e c t i o n s should be f i r s t , and
a l l your a l l i e s recognize t h a t
problem. Everyone should take
President Chirac:
a l l , I agree t h a t municipal
I t h i n k t h a t i t ' s important t h a t
M i t r o v i c a i s not j u s t a French
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . f€-)
That's what you d i d . (U)
The President: And I agree on the Contact Group. I t h i n k we
ought t o i n c l u d e Russia. P u t i n wants t o be a c o n s t r u c t i v e
p l a y e r . We w i l l f o l l o w up on a l l these t h i n g s . fG-)
The President:
Thank you. Hope t o see you soon.
President Chirac:
Good bye.
(U)
End o f Conversation
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye. (U)
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1
2
4
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
A p r i l 5, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
IAN A. BOWLES/?^)
r
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r ,
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder and P r e s i d e n t P r o d i on
C l i m a t e Change
I n response t o a weekly r e p o r t i t e m from George Frampton t h a t
r e f e r e n c e d t h e f i n d i n g s o f a r e c e n t a Pew Center on G l o b a l
C l i m a t e Change r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e economic e f f i c i e n c y o f
greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g , t h e P r e s i d e n t wrote a m a r g i n a l
note s a y i n g " s h o u l d send t h i s w i t h cover l e t t e r from me t o Tony
B l a i r and o t h e r EU l e a d e r s . "
Your memo responds t o the P r e s i d e n t ' s request and p r o v i d e s cover
l e t t e r s t o B l a i r , Schroeder and P r o d i f o r h i s s i g n a t u r e . We
recommend these t h r e e r e c i p i e n t s f o l l o w i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
S t a t e . As a p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t , the Pew Center i s d i r e c t e d by
E i l e e n Claussen, f o r m e r l y o f NSC/Environment d i r e c t o r a t e .
I have r e v i s e d t h e l e t t e r s based on comments from Jim S t e i n b e r g .
The l e t t e r s are not t i m e s e n s i t i v e .
The NSC r e c e i v e d a copy P r e s i d e n t ' s
1999
Concurrence by:
weekly report on January 10,
3 6 fee
*
C a r o l i n e Krass, Antony B l i n k e n *
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d memorandum a t Tab I
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum t o the P r e s i d e n t
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
2
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear M r . P
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l clime
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a c i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s M I T best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e gmallenqe o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t my t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i r n ^ e Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i h ^ , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l y g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e cmanqe m i t i g a t i o n .
The s t u d y a l s o b u i l d s on a airowing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e d o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d i ^ ^ i n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatemeiy i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive,
I a p p r e c i a t e your ^ E o r t s , and those o f your
member c o u n t r i e s , Jto b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l /te^ponse t o one o f t h e most
c h a l l e n g i n g i f e s j ^ s o f t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know
our governmejpity can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l .pygress at. the c l i m a t e change
conferenc^''
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s c u s s i h ' g ^ h i s c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you
further..,
Sincerely,
His E x c e l l e n c y
Romano P r o d i
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�T H E W H I T E HOUSE
WASHINGTON
[V— ^ r \ f
Dear Tony:
.
// , - ^ f l
' ^ j ^ ^ ^ — T " t h o u g h t you would be i n t e r e s t e d i n t h ^
e n c l o s e d r e p o r t j o n t h e b e n e f i t s o f grej^ihouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e s t r o n g l y t h a t J g g l o b a l
1
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope -i^S^meetIftg t he c h a l l e n g e JPr c l i m a t e
change.(gost-ef f ect i v e l y j ) T h i a r
r e p o r t by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Center on^Global C l i m a t e
Change s u p p o r t s t h e view t j p t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g s ystem ^ j r l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n ,
Tn a d r i i f i n n , "^he s t u d v w o u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u j f f n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by
the OECD) showing
t trading w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bene 't i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s
f o r whom greenho e gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
n e w
I a p p r e c i a t e Jpour e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o r b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t<y one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g issues
o f t h i s nafw c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can w o r k i c o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s j f a t t h e c l i m a t e change conf erence--iat-e-r..
t i & s - ^ w k r ^ a t £Vie Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o
d i s e a s i n g these- c r i t i c a l m a t t e r ^ w i t h you t h i s
spryg.
With best r e g a r d s .
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
/
WASHINGTON
c
Dear Mr. P r e s i d e n t :
I thought you would be i n t e r e s t e d / i n the
enclosed report on the b e n e f i t s j p i greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongl]^(fthat a global
emissions t r a d i n g system rey^resents our best
hope f o r meeting the challiEnge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i s new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Centjrc on Global Climate
Change supports the vi/w t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g syst/m w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of / l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the st^dy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e (inc/uding a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showingfthat t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y benjefit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greentylouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciatefyour e f f o r t s , and those of your
member couiytries, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one of the most
challenging issues of t h i s new century. I know
our govolrnments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i ^ a l progress a t the climate change
conference l a t e r t h i s year at .?he Hague. I
l o o p forward t o discussing these c r i t i c a l
ma/ters w i t h you f u r t h e r .
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I thought you would be i n t e r e s j id i n the
enclosed report on the benefij of greenhouse
gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l strongiPy t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system Represents our best
hope f o r meeting the challenge of climate
change c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y * * This new report by
the n o n - p r o f i t Pew Cen/er on Global Climate
Change supports the v/evi t h a t a f l e x i b l e , well
designed t r a d i n g syyem w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o y c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
In a d d i t i o n , the sZudy b u i l d s on a growing body
of l i t e r a t u r e ( i n / l u d i n g a report l a s t year by
the OECD) showin/ that t r a d i n g w i l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y bej/efit i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries
for whom greenl^buse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciata^your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t / b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t d one o f the most challenging issues
of t h i s n/w century. I know our governments
can work/together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progresy a t the climate change conference l a t e r
t h i s y/ar at £he Hague. I look forward t o
discu/sing these c r i t i c a l matters w i t h you t h i s
sprj/g.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global cl#hate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n thM subject, I am
sending you a copy o f a recent/t'ew/Center on
Global Climate Change report dn. g/eenhouse gas
emissions t i ing,
'
/
The r e p o r t emphasfx^s t h a t ^ n / e m i s s i o n s t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s globa^v i n seoj/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l signiMc^inlrly reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change mitigaAiafn. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c/mpSUance w i t h our
emissions r e d u c t i o n t
but w i l l also
allow us t o move more
ress^ively over the
long term t o address
.s chal\enge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing ojdy o f l i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t ye
OECD reports! t h a t shows
t r a d i n g can benefi
iropean countries and
other nations f o r
m greenhouse gasN^batement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex
ive.
I hope we can w^rfe together t o address t h e s ^
important issues/and set the tone f o r close
c o o r d i n a t i o n Weltween our governments i n the
lead-up t o t l ^ /climate change conference a t The
Hague l a t e r A h L s year. I look forward t o
discussing these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic o f Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE W H I T E HOUSE
Lie
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate/change.
Given our common i n t e r e s t i n the apbgect, I am
sending you a^copy o f a recent Pgw/Center on
Global CIimatexchange r e p o r t on^teenhouse gas
emissions tradinc
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t
/emissions t r a d i n g
system t h a t i s global^ i n sdbr/e and f l e x i b l e i n
a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n r f i c a j i t r l y reduce the costs
of c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote ccflKm-iance w i t h our
emissions reduction targec^, but w i l l also
allow us t o move more Aggressively over the
long term t o address Jthi/s challenge. The study
b u i l d s on a growing J^ody o f i i t e r a t u r e
( i n c l u d i n g l a s t yeap's/oECD report) that shows
t r a d i n g can benefijC European couiitries and
other nations forfwhfom greenhouse\qas abatement
i s r e l a t i v e l y ex/ei/sive.
I hope we can worhi together t o address these
important issjees/ and set the tone f o r close
coordinationAiexween our governments i n the
lead-up t o Ipe climate change conference at The
Hague l a t e y t h i s year.
look forward t o
discussinc/these issues w i t h you t h i s spring.
S
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the Europeaii Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP Y
�THE WHITE HOUSE
S
WASHINGTON
J
Dear Tony:
I write with regard to global climate, chanaie. Given our common
interest in the subject,. I am sending you/a copy of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report OJL greenhouse gas
emissions trading.
g
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissiaps t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs of climate changajpnitigation. Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote c o m p l i a n c e g i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us JLO move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e (irvcluding l a s t year's OECD report)
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
/
Numerous s t i es also makjp clea
and unresj i c t e d the t r a d i n g ^ y s t
'ty
As you Jmow, the flexibjQrlTty mechani
Kyoto^Trotocol also
tremendous
ou^oroader e f f o r
promote e
mergy developi;
i i / developing c o u n t r i e s .
the
I hope we can work/:ogether t o address these important issues
close coordination between our governments
and set the tone
i n the lead-up t$ the climate change conference a t The Hague
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
l a t e r t h i s year
you t h i s sprinc
i
With best regards,
The R i c r f l t H o n o r a b l e
Tony ^ f a i r , M . P .
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOP i
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate change. G^en our common
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending you a c o t # of a recent Pew
Center on Global Climate Change report on greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g .
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n applicayfon w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change i n i t i a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote compliance with^our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow us to vpve more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h i s challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c i t i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e n e f i t ^ u r o p e a n countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhouse g ^ abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
studies also mate/clear t h a t thejaroader, more open,
ricted the tdfac^fng system, tbe greater t h e j ^ n e f i t s .
enow, the f l ^ x i b ^ i t y mechap^ms being des^gfied under the
Protocol a^so have tremen^kms p o t e n t i a l > 0 c o n t r i b u t e t o
broader ef-forts
promote energy e f f i g i ^ n c y and cleaner
Energy development i f developing countries.
I hope we can workAtogether t o address these important issues
and set the tone, .or close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-up
the climate change conference a t The Hague
l a t e r t h i s yeaj
I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
EincrlNqsiire
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Gerhard:
I w r i t e w i t h regard t o global climate
i n t e r e s t i n the subject, I am sending
Center on Global Climate Change repoj
emissions t r a d i n g .
Lnge. Given our common
)U a copy o f a recent Pew
on greenhouse gas
The r e p o r t emphasizes t h a t an emissions t r a d i n g system t h a t i s
global i n scope and f l e x i b l e i n ^ p l i c a t i o n w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate chadge m i t i g a t i o n . Minimizing costs
w i l l not only promote complianj^ w i t h our emissions reduction
t a r g e t s , but w i l l also allow jfs t o move more aggressively over
the long term t o address t h ^ challenge. The study b u i l d s on a
growing body of l i t e r a t u r e ^ i n c l u d i n g l a s t year's OECD r e p o r t )
t h a t shows t r a d i n g can b e r p f i t European countries and other
nations f o r whom greenhoi^jle gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
Numerous st^Klies also
and u n r e s t r i c t e d the
As you/lcnow, the f l e i
Kyoto Protocol alsq.
broader e f f o j
to
'energy developlfientj i n
r
take c l ^ a f ' t h a t the broad
rad^iig syst
i t y mechani
tremendous
promote em
developing c o u n t r i e s .
I hope we can WOJ/IC together t o address these important issues
and set the tonw f o r close coordination between our governments
i n the lead-upJto the climate change conference at The Hague
l a t e r t h i s y e ^ . I look forward t o discussing these issues w i t h
you t h i s s p r ^
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�1242
THE WHITE HOUSE
i 0
^.36
WASH INGTON
A p r i l 10, 2000
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRE^IpENT
FROM:
SAMUEL R. BERG
SUBJECT:
Cover L e t t e r s t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t
P r o d i and C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder f o r T r a n s m i t t a l o f
Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change Report on
C l i m a t e Change
Purpose
To t r a n s m i t t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r , P r e s i d e n t P r o d i , and
C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder a r e p o r t on greenhouse gas emissions
t r a d i n g by t h e Pew Center on G l o b a l C l i m a t e Change.
Background
You made a m a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t t o
send t h e r e f e r e n c e d r e p o r t t o Tony B l a i r and t h e EU l e a d e r s h i p
w i t h a cover l e t t e r from you. The l e t t e r s you r e q u e s t e d a r e
attached.
The Pew Center r e p o r t a s s e r t s t h a t a worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions t r a d i n g program can c u t t h e c o s t s o f r e d u c i n g
greenhouse gas emissions n e a r l y i n h a l f . The r e p o r t found t h a t
w i t h no t r a d i n g , r e t u r n i n g emissions t o 1990 l e v e l s by 2010
would c o s t t h e seven l a r g e s t i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s $111.6
billion.
With t r a d i n g o n l y among t h e seven Western i n d u s t r i a l
c o u n t r i e s and former Eastern b l p c c o u n t r i e s , t h e t o t a l c o s t o f
t h e emissions r e d u c t i o n s f a l l s by $20 b i l l i o n .
I f trading i s
w o r l d w i d e i n scope, t h e savings from t r a d i n g r i s e t o $49
billion.
The EU has proposed a s e t o f "caps" on emissions t r a d i n g
mechanisms (e.g. t h a t o n l y 50 p e r c e n t o f emissions r e d u c t i o n s
c o u l d be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t r a d i n g ) under t h e Kyoto P r o t o c o l t h a t
would d r i v e up t h e c o s t o f a c h i e v i n g emissions r e d u c t i o n s . The
U n i t e d S t a t e s opposes any such caps on t r a d i n g .
Your l e t t e r
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-
S ^ / ™ ^
�h i g h l i g h t s the m e r i t s o f u n r e s t r i c t e d t r a d i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e
r e p o r t ' s f i n d i n g s , and urges c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e EU on these i s s u e s .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n the a t t a c h e d l e t t e r s a t Tabs A, B, and C.
Attachments
Tab A L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Tab B L e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t P r o d i
Tab C L e t t e r t o C h a n c e l l o r Schroeder
Tab D M a r g i n a l note on George Frampton's weekly r e p o r t
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
('
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Gerhard:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body of
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your EU
partners, t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one of the most challenging issues
of t h i s new century. I know our governments
can work together t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
progress a t the climate change conference a t
The Hague. I look forward t o discussing t h i s
c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you t h i s spring.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Gerhard Schroeder
Chancellor o f the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE WHITE HOUSE
I"!
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Romano:
Knowing our shared i n t e r e s t i n global climate
change, I have enclosed a report on the
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a global
emissions t r a d i n g system represents our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet the challenge of
climate change. This new report by the nonp r o f i t Pew Center on Global Climate Change
supports the view that a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce the costs o f climate change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study also b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a report l a s t year by the
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I appreciate your e f f o r t s , and those of your
member c o u n t r i e s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o one o f the most
challenging issues o f t h i s new century. I know
our governments can work together t o achieve
a d d i t i o n a l progress a t the climate change
conference a t The Hague. I look forward t o
discussing t h i s c r i t i c a l matter w i t h you
further.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President o f the European Commission
Brussels
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCur
�THE WHITE HOUSE
r
WASHINGTON
i
A p r i l 11, 2000
Dear Tony:
Knowing o u r shared i n t e r e s t i n g l o b a l c l i m a t e
change, I have enclosed a r e p o r t on t h e
b e n e f i t s o f greenhouse gas emissions t r a d i n g .
As you know, I f e e l s t r o n g l y t h a t a g l o b a l
emissions t r a d i n g system r e p r e s e n t s our best
hope t o c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y meet t h e c h a l l e n g e o f
c l i m a t e change. T h i s new r e p o r t by t h e nonp r o f i t Pew Center on G l o b a l Climate Change
s u p p o r t s t h e view t h a t a f l e x i b l e , w e l l
designed t r a d i n g system w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y
reduce t h e c o s t s o f c l i m a t e change m i t i g a t i o n .
The study a l s o b u i l d s on a growing body o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a r e p o r t l a s t year by t h e
OECD) showing t h a t t r a d i n g w i l l p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e n e f i t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s f o r whom
greenhouse gas abatement i s r e l a t i v e l y
expensive.
I a p p r e c i a t e your e f f o r t s , and those o f your EU
p a r t n e r s , t o b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
response t o one o f t h e most c h a l l e n g i n g i s s u e s
of t h i s new c e n t u r y . I know our governments
can work t o g e t h e r t o achieve a d d i t i o n a l
p r o g r e s s a t t h e c l i m a t e change conference a t
The Hague. I l o o k f o r w a r d t o d i s c u s s i n g t h i s
c r i t i c a l m a t t e r w i t h you t h i s s p r i n g .
With best r e g a r d s ,
The R i g h t Honorable
Tony B l a i r , M.P.
Prime M i n i s t e r
London
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET
3235
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Michael Manning,
Robert W i l l i a m s , Matthew S i b l e y , Don G e n t i l e ,
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 10, 2000, 5:45 - 6:02 p.m. EDT
Army-Navy Country Club
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hey Tony.
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Hi B i l l .
(U)
(U)
We've h i t a snag.
Yes, we sure have.
£6}
f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
This i s as much t o get your thoughts and advice, B i l l .
I'm s o r r y
f o r t r o u b l i n g you. This i s the s i t u a t i o n . When Trimble l a s t
went t o h i s U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Council, they passed a r e s o l u t i o n
t h a t s a i d they couldn't go back i n t o the Executive again unless
he r e t a i n e d the name o f the RUC i n some way.
The President: Yes, I saw i t .
resolution.
fG}
I even got a copy o f t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
GDCRBT
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/11/10
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LB A Y P O O O Y
IRR HTCP
�CECRET
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The President: Yes, what I t h i n k , what I'm concerned about and
what t h e SDLP i s a l s o concerned about i s t h a t t h e u n i o n i s t s w i l l
c a l l i t RUC and the C a t h o l i c s won't j o i n i t . I t h i n k t h e SDLP i s
w o r r i e d t h e r e won't be any C a t h o l i c s t o j o i n because t h e
u n i o n i s t s w i l l use t h i s t o r e f e r t o themselves as RUC. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: Let me t e l l you what bothers me about your
difficulties.
I worry t h a t i f you put t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n through
l i k e t h i s and Sinn Fein withdraws t h e i r o f f e r , we are worse o f f
than i f we're i n a stalemate and we j u s t h o l d t h e IRA t o t h e i r
o f f e r . Ever since t h e l a s t impasse, I thought t h e u n i o n i s t s had
the complete h i g h ground. Now i t looks t o me l i k e the IRA and
Sinn Fein have t h e h i g h ground, e s p e c i a l l y i f the SDLP s t i c k s
w i t h them r h e t o r i c a l l y .
I f you can't get t h i s done, the question
i s , what do you want t o give up r i g h t now? I'm very w o r r i e d
about i t . We can t r y again, but we've been working on Sinn Fein
a l l day and we haven't g o t t e n any f u r t h e r than you. Now they
want t o change the Patten r e p o r t , t h a t ' s t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e . I
know what t h e counter-arguments are; i t ' s a lousy deal e i t h e r
way.
E i t h e r way, I f e e l so badly f o r you. The o n l y t h i n g t h a t
bothers me i s the SDLP. No matter what the u n d e r t a k i n g i s , the
u n i o n i s t s would continue t o r e f e r t o i t i n t h a t way i n every nono f f i c i a l channel p o s s i b l e and t h a t would keep the C a t h o l i c s from
joining.
The p r a c t i c a l problem i s they're two hardheaded sides
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p o u r i n g o l d grudges i n t o l i t t l e words. We can t a l k t o them
again, b u t I have next t o no hope t h e y ' l l change and i f they
don't, what's c o n f r o n t i n g you i s what you're b e t t e r o f f g i v i n g
up. I ' d r e a l l y be w o r r i e d i f these IRA guys withdraw t h e i r o f f e r
before we p u t i t on t h e t a b l e . Would you want something e l s e , a
t i t f o r t a t deal? Any way, can you buy y o u r s e l f another 24 hours
to keep working on t h i s ? ( &
-)
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I ' l l keep t h i n k i n g about i t some more t o come up
w i t h a n y t h i n g e l s e . I r e a l l y have only been pondering i t f o r
about 3 0 minutes because I thought i t would g e t worked o u t . Our
guys pounded Sinn Fein today. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
p o s i t i o n . f€4-
They f e e l they're i n a v e r y s t r o n g
The President: Yes, they f i n a l l y got t h e h i g h ground back. I
know t h e I r i s h community here was so r e l i e v e d when t h e IRA s a i d
t h a t they would commit themselves t o p u t arms beyond use; before
t h a t , t h e I r i s h here were i n t h e uncomfortable p o s i t i o n o f
f i n d i n g themselves d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h Sinn Fein. Now they f e e l
they k i n d o f came across and took a huge step forward. I am
sympathetic t o Trimble's p o s i t i o n , but I don't know what t o do
r i g h t now. I sure worry about t a k i n g t h e r i s k t h e IRA w i l l take
the o f f e r o f f t h e t a b l e and I don't know what I would do i f I
were you. f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CECRET
The President: That's why you t r y t o buy a l i t t l e time. Do you
t h i n k t h e r e i s any chance i f Trimble and Adams met, they could
work t h i s out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I w i l l t r y t o buy time.
would f i l l you i n on t h e s i t u a t i o n . fe}
I j u s t thought I
The President: Do you t h i n k t h a t i f Trimble and Adams met, they
could work i t out? fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
them t o do t h a t .
I t ' s p o s s i b l e , and may be worth g e t t i n g
EQ 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
The President: That's why I wondered. The problem i s i f they
had a meeting and i t leaked, then everyone would t r y t o s p i n t h e
crap out o f i t i f t h e r e was no r e s o l u t i o n . I t ' s t h e s o r t o f
t h i n g t h a t might work i f they looked a t each o t h e r face t o face,
assuming- no p r a c t i c a l impact and assuming you can work i t out
w i t h t h e C a t h o l i c s t o n o t refuse t o j o i n , o r even have Hume
t h e r e . They've been a t loggerheads f o r so long and come so f a r .
I t would be t r u l y h e a r t b r e a k i n g , since they made t h i s b i g move on
decommissioning. Maybe you could f i n d a way out o f i t , i f they
sat down and t a l k e d , maybe they could work t h i s out. I don't
know i f t h i s i s t r u e , I'm j u s t t h i n k i n g . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t ' s worth t r y i n g .
anything's worth t r y i n g . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t :
w i l l i n g ? fG}
To be honest,
Do you t h i n k you ought t o ask t o see i f they were
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I do. fG}
The President: Do you t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r o r worse i f Hume
were there? f&}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t : Yeah, I know. I f he has t h i s language, he can
say I'm d e c i d i n g the requirement has been s a t i s f i e d , and we are
going t o stand up t h e government. I f t h e language i s n o t i n
t h e r e , then he has t o a c t u a l l y c a l l them a l l back t o g e t h e r and
get another v o t e . fe}
3ECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
E x a c t l y . fe}
The President: Well, l e t me t a l k t o our guys about t h i s and
t h i n k about whether you want t o ask them t o get t o g e t h e r and have
anybody t h e r e , o r j u s t t h e two o f them alone i n a room t a l k i n g .
I t h i n k they b o t h r e a l i z e they have come a long way and they both
have u n r u l y elements i n t h e i r c o a l i t i o n s . I t would be a t r a v e s t y
t o l e t t h i s s l i p away now, and they might be able t o f i n d an
answer among themselves t h a t we haven't thought o f . They know
t h e i r needs b e t t e r than we t h i n k we know t h e i r needs. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President:
Yes. fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I can't b e l i e v e there's not a l e g a l way o r
u n d e r t a k i n g capable o f e l i m i n a t i n g t h a t problem. fe}
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me ask you t h i s -- t h e u n i o n i s t s , when they
passed t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , what d i d they have i n mind? They
b a s i c a l l y d i d n ' t want t o erase t h e r o l e t h e RUC h i s t o r y played,
and pretend t h a t Northern I r e l a n d was independent and not a p a r t
of Great B r i t a i n ? fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The President: I wonder i f there's some way f o r Burhside t o work
out some s o r t o f statement t h a t would be s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a s s u r i n g
t o Sinn Fein, so they would be a b s o l u t e l y sure t h e C a t h o l i c s
would be comfortable j o i n i n g t h i s f o r c e . fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
That's a p o s s i b i l i t y .
(£}
The P r e s i d e n t : I f they're not j u s t w o r r i e d about t h e words, b u t
the p r a c t i c a l impact, t h e r e might be some way f o r people t h a t
supported t h i s t o h e l p . That's another t h i n g I t h i n k t h a t works
on them. One o f t h e t h i n g s I learned about Adams and McGuinness,
they were very w o r r i e d t h a t t h e i r requirements would cause
Trimble t o f a l l .
I f you can get some o f these guys who caused
these problems t o help solve i t by some s o r t o f statement o r
CECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�CECRET
something, maybe even something else t h a t c o u l d be adopted t h a t
Trimble, g i v e n t h e support o f these guys, c o u l d take t o h i s
people, t h a t might a l s o work. There's a theology o f t h e words,
which you may not ever be able t o solve, and t h e p r a c t i c a l impact
of them, which you might be able t o solve, o r a t l e a s t some basis
on which Trimble c o u l d t a l k t o Adams and work t h i s o u t . My
i n s t i n c t i s t h i s seems t o be t h e r e a l l a s t straw and a s i t u a t i o n
where Adams might c l a i m t h a t Trimble i s t r y i n g t o change t h e
importance o f t h e Patten r e p o r t . Maybe t h a t ' s t h e answer. Maybe
the sponsors of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n could do something t h a t would
support Trimble and reassure Adams. That and having them meet
t o g e t h e r are t h e o n l y ideas I've got r i g h t now. I've had a
hundred conversations w i t h Gerry Adams and I c o u l d have another
one, b u t based on what my guys say, I t h i n k I ' d be b e t t e r o f f
c a l l i n g him and u r g i n g him t o meet p e r s o n a l l y w i t h Trimble and
u r g i n g t h e same t h i n g on Trimble. There are two t h i n g s t h e r e .
There i s psychology and theology, where Sinn Fein and t h e IRA
t h i n k they have t h e h i g h ground and then t h e r e i s t h e p r a c t i c a l ,
and I t h i n k , understandable f e a r t h a t no matter how you s l i c e
t h i s , t h e people who've been t h e dominant p a r t y w i l l f i n d a way
to use t h i s t o make i t very uncomfortable f o r t h e C a t h o l i c s t o be
a p a r t o f t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n , which w i l l undermine a l l t h e g r i e f
you've taken f o r l e t t i n g people out o f p r i s o n . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
I t h i n k there may be something i n t h a t .
The P r e s i d e n t : You want t o t h i n k about i t and I ' l l have my
people be i n touch w i t h your guys? I know i t ' s l a t e f o r you, b u t
i t ' s e a r l y here and I w i l l be up l a t e , so I can s t a r t e a r l y i n
the morning, i f you want. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r : That's very h e l p f u l ; t h e r e may be
something i n t h a t . fG}
The P r e s i d e n t : Talk t o your f o l k s and have them get back t o us
and i f you want me t o make c a l l s a t t h e crack o f dawn, I w i l l be
happy t o do t h a t . Get some r e s t . The worst t h i n g we can do i s
having everybody where they can't t h i n k anymore. I t ' s n o t so
l a t e f o r me and I've got a l o t o f work t o do, and I ' l l be happy
to do t h a t , so I can make t h e e a r l y morning c a l l . Let me know,
fe}
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r :
The P r e s i d e n t :
I ' l l l e t you know. (e}
Goodbye, Tony.
(U)
-- End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPV
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CONriDENTIAL
3617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y Leader
David T r i m b l e (U)
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
David T r i m b l e
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
R i c h a r d Norland
May 27, 2000, 11:57-11:59 a.m. EDT
The Residence
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The
President
Hello.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The
illo.
(U)
(U)
(U)
President
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t
brilliant.
tyt]
Mr. Trimble: It is kind of unfortunate other people were
incensing their delegates, and there was more than a little bit
of dubious practices going on. There were some discrepancies in
the voting figures, and I have to see if we can't give ourselves
a bigger margin next time. (jt)
The
President:
Good.
I ' l l go back t o t h e o t h e r s on t h e CBMs.
t#
Mr.
Trimble:
Good.
I need a success s t o r y q u i c k l y .
(^T
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l go t o work on i t . But you were b r i l l i a n t .
I f o l l o w e d you on BBC and UTV. They may have t o g i v e you a
second Nobel Peace P r i z e .
^
Mr. T r i m b l e :
I t was q u i t e a weekend.
CONFIDDNTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 5/30/10
(U)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
•CONFIDENTIAL
2
The P r e s i d e n t : The w e i r d t h i n g about p o l i t i c s i s t h a t sometimes
you have t o t a k e more g r i e f from y o u r f r i e n d s than y o u r enemies.
Mr. T r i m b l e :
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes.
W e l l , i t ' s good o f you t o c a l l .
Okay.
Thanks, f r i e n d .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
•GOM-FTPFNTTftTi
--
(U)
�-eONFIDENTEAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH I N G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Sinn F e i n Leader Gerry Adams (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Gerry Adams
Notetakers:
Sean T a r v e r , Amy Swarm, and
R i c h a r d Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 12:20-12:24 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H i , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. Adams:
H e l l o . (U)
(U)
Gerry, i t ' s been a good day. (U)
Good day, s u r e l y .
Thanks f o r a l l your h e l p .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Glad we c o u l d do i t .
I'm r e a l l y pleased. I
hated t o see T r i m b l e have t o go back t o a l l h i s c r a z i e s , b u t i t
came o u t okay. ^ 0
Mr. Adams: I t c o n t i n u e s t o be. f r u s t r a t i n g and messy. David
T r i m b l e ' s l i n e about " h o u s e - t r a i n i n g " Sinn F e i n doesn't h e l p . I
can l i v e w i t h i t , b u t i t w i l l upset t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u e n c y .
The President: I saw all that, but we've just got to get the
government up and calm everybody down. (j?)
Mr. Adams: You're r i g h t about t h a t . I have a l s o been w o r k i n g on
Downing S t r e e t t o claw back t h e e m a s c u l a t i o n o f t h e P a t t e n
report.
I a c t u a l l y had t o t a l k t o Number 10 on Thursday n i g h t
because we almost l o s t t h e c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measure on t h i s
i s s u e -- t h e IRA were v e r y c l o s e t o i s s u i n g a statement. Any
k i n d o f f o r m a l meeting and we would have l o s t i t . They a r e v e r y
c l e a r . 0?T
The President: I don't think this whole letter thing amounted to
anything. I think we will be all right. [p)
CONFIDENTS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: 05/30/10
DECLASSIFIED
P E R E.O. 13526
iOl'i - OHTS.S/G/iS"
K6H
�CONriDDNTIAL
Mr. Adams:
Okay.
^5
Tbe President: I wanted t o t a l k t o everyone. The main t h i n g i s
to get the government up and keep moving forward on the Patten
Report and on CBMs. I t h i n k Trimble was j u s t traumatized by
having t o deal w i t h a l l those people. Sometimes i n p o l i t i c s our
f r i e n d s are our biggest problem.
Mr. Adams: I said so p u b l i c l y here, but once again we are at
t h i s p o i n t because of your unique understanding. I have been
saying t o people: l e t ' s make sure we get as much progress as we
can w h i l e you are i n the White House. I t i s no accident t h a t
t h i s has happened during your Presidency. Thanks again.
The President:
i t . (pi
Mr. Adams:
Yes. We've got almost e i g h t months, so we can do
We'll need you every day.
The President:
^
Have you given your commencement speech yet?
Mr. Adams: No, I w i l l be g i v i n g i t tomorrow morning.
again. (U)
The President.
Okay. Good bye.
CONFIDENTIAL
Thanks
Thanks f o r a l l your help.
-- End of Conversation --
CLINTON UBRARY PHOTOCOPY
(U)
(U)
�CONriDDNTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern o f I r e l a n d
(U)
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern
Notetakers:
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
Sean T a r v e r and Amy Swarm
May 27, 2000, 12:45-12:49 p.m. EDT
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
(U)
Hey, B e r t i e . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
How a r e you, B i l l ?
Congratulations.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
I t was a good day. (U)
I t was a good day i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
The President: Back on St. Patrick's Day, I was a little
worried, but I feel good now. (jtf
Prime Minister Ahern: Trimble worked hard. He had to rally
troops. But it was a good win, because people are with him.
Public opinion was 80 to 20 with him. We now have to get the
Executive up and make as much progress as we can. We need the
republicans and the IRA to make quick gestures, but the key issue
is the Patten issue. Seamus Mallon has come out strongly in
favor of serious amendments. If we don't get into position soon
where they are recommending Catholics to the RUC, then.... It
brings us forward from where we were. {flfT
The P r e s i d e n t :
We j u s t g o t t o g e t t h e government back up and g e t
those CBMs done t o o . That w i l l change e v e r y t h i n g .
The u n i o n i s t s
w i l l c o m p l e t e l y change t h e i r mood when t h a t happens[gap].
^
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
-coNriDENT^L
DecJassify'on?
DECLASSIFIED
1
5/30/10
^ O ^ ' o ^ n
SA/»5 K6V\
�Prime Minister Ahern: I think that has to happen quickly. The
pressure will be back on Trimble. If out of this he gets a quick
move on the CBMs, that will mean a lot. {£?)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Good.
(£0
Prime Minister Ahern: It is a good move. I don't know if anyone
mentioned it, but Mallon is worried about Patten and RUC, but if
we hold our nerve, we should be okay. (jZ)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I'll
call
Mallon.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: Cheer him up. He i s g o i n g t o see Tony
B l a i r tomorrow, b u t j u s t t o g e t h i s c o n f i d e n c e up. How i s
e v e r y t h i n g w i t h you?
Campaigning?
The President: Hillary is doing well. I think she is going to
win that race. We've got two big issues this week -- China and
[gap] trying to pass the World AIDS initiative. I'm feeling kind
of good. ty?)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
The P r e s i d e n t :
And Mbeki i s over w i t h you? (>Zl
Yes, he was here.
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern:
(U)
Give my regards t o H i l l a r y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I w i l l .
She was d o i n g g r e a t a g a i n s t G i u l i a n i and
now we have t o do a d i f f e r e n t race. A l had a good week. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r Ahern: That's g r e a t . Thanks f o r t h e c a l l and a l l
y o u r work and i n t e r e s t .
You [gap] been o u t and we do a p p r e c i a t e
it.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay.
Keep i n t o u c h .
(U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
--
«OONP I DENT IAD
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDENTIAL
3 617
THE WHITE H O U S E
WASH
INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d Assembly Deputy
F i r s t M i n i s t e r Seamus M a l l o n (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
Seamus M a l l o n
N o t e t a k e r s : Amy Swarm, Sean T a r v e r , and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
May 27, 2000, 1:20-1:21 p.m.
The Residence
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
(U).
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Hello.
Seamus, how a r e you?
Very w e l l .
EDT
How a r e you?
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President: I'm doing fine. I'm just glad the government is
going back up and this is really important and a good sign. I
think it has been a tough time for you. I talked to Tony Blair
today, and he assured me that they are going to go ahead and
implement the Patten report. I think we need to get on with
work.
ijt)
Mr. M a l l o n :
full,
Yes.
We w i l l have t o make sure he implements i t i n
oe-y
The P r e s i d e n t : I t h i n k he w i l l . There a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r him,
b u t I t h i n k he i s i n t e n t on d o i n g i t . Get t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s back
up and t h e n g e t t h e IRA t o do t h e CBMs as promised. (JZT
Mr. M a l l o n :
P a t t e n i s t h e key f a c t o r now.
The President:
I agree with that.
(pf
[pff
Mr. M a l l o n : I am seeing him tomorrow... s e e i n g B l a i r tomorrow and
I w i l l be g i v i n g him a s t r o n g message on i t . j^T"
wariDDHTiM.
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on:
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
5/30/10
ffi^"?
2o\3 - C>M7>L - H
8/k/l5
K6H
�•CONF I DEMT I AL'
The President: Good. I will do what I can. I had a good talk
with him today. I told him you guys are worried about him
weakening it more, but he understands and I am hopeful, and just
wanted to say congratulations to you today and whatever I can do
to help, I will certainly do it.
tytf
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . We hope t o see you here
soon. I f you can make i t , you w i l l be v e r y welcome, and b r i n g
the g o l f c l u b s w i t h you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I w i l l do i t . (U)
Mr. M a l l o n : Thank you f o r e v e r y t h i n g you have done and we l o o k
f o r w a r d t o seeing you soon. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Mr. M a l l o n :
Thanks, f r i e n d .
Thanks, B i l l .
(U)
W e ' l l be seeing you soon. (U)
-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
• COHF I DENT I Air
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPi
�
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Tony Blair, specifically on President Clinton's meetings and correspondence with the Prime Minister from 1997 through 2000. Material includes memos, letters, and talking points on a variety of topics, including Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and the European Union Summit. Telcons between President Clinton and various heads of state, including French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, are included.
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Foreign Policy
Gerhard Schroeder
Gerry Adams
Jacques Chirac
Jean Chretien
Kosovo
Northern Ireland
Tony Blair
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/de73d96987d00656decd1e8e5a6ed8df.pdf
bd1a21d8fcb55a14795e423e115d1480
PDF Text
Text
LIBRAE
FARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC
20301-2000
NV I 7 19
O
93
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the Presidential Decision Directive
on Peacekeeping (U)
Secretary Aspin and I have thoroughly reviewed the PDD on
peacekeeping and are convinced that we are nearing the point where we
should seek approval of the President. However, before we take this final
step in the process, we should make some additional changes and reach
agreement on legislative language to implement "shared responsibility."
We should also ensure that the document conveys our intention to closely
scrutinize any new peacekeeping operation before agreeing to provide USG
support—paying careful attention to stringent entry and exit criteria for each
mission. We should therefore clearly specify that before we deploy US
forces to any peace operation, the mission will be closely scrutinized by the
CINC, the JCS, senior interagency review groups, and the President. • Finally,
we must be unequivocal in our willingness to consult with Congress in a
timely and complete manner before agreeing to deploy US forces as pan of a
multilateral peace operation.
In addition to these general concems, I am convinced that several of the
draft FDD's recommendations raise unnecessary questions about the direction
of our policy and could adversely affect our ability to garner necessary
Congressional support. This is particularly true in light of increasing
Congressional scrutiny in past months and our recent experiences in UN peace
operations. Therefore, 1 believe that the following changes to the text should
be made:
I . Page 4, Paragraph 8B and Page 10, Paragraph 10D. Delete both
paragraphs. There is no need to create a separate facility for the DPO if all
we intend to do is to create a more effective planning and current
operation center. This would be an expensive addition that would open
the policy to increased opposition-both because of the additional cost,
and as a result of the appearance that we are attempting to give the UN
greater military capabilities than we have publicly stated.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
aova-tyAVoM-FN
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTTPLE SOURt
�CLINTON LIBRARY P
H
2. Page 5, Paragraph 8D, first tick. Delete the entire paragraph. There is no
need to create a standing airlift capability for the UN. This concept is
likely to be opposed by Congress as too expensive and will raise fears
about our taking a first step toward creating a standing UN military.
3. Page 6, Paragraph 8E. Delete the recommendation to create a
correspondence course on peacekeeping. This option is a less practical
addition to an otherwise good section on peacekeeping training, and would
not be viewed as a serious proposal by the Congress.
4. Page 9, Paragraph 9D. The current language on Command and Control of
U.S. forces should beftirtherstrengthened. The last sentence in the lead
paragraph states that "The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it
will be that the U.S. will will allow a UN commander to exercise
operational control over U.S. forces." We should go one step further by
adding language that states what we all believe to be true: "Any
substantial U.S. military participation in a major peace enforcement
operation should be conducted under U.S. command and control tlirough
competent regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions."
5. Page 10, Paragraph 9E and Page \ 1, Paragraph ! OH. Delete both
recommendations. I do not believe it is necessary, or prudent, to even hint
at a willingness to provide rapid reaction capabilities or enter into Article
43 agreements with the United Nations. The option of entering into Article
43 agreements with the United Nations was thoroughly examined during
the review process-and rejected by most participants. While noting that
the U.S. will not pursue Article 43 agreements at this time, the PDD
subsequently tasks the Peacekeeping Core Group to review "rapid reaction
capabilities and Article 43 arrangements" after U.S. recommendations have
been implemented to the extent possible. While the USG may want to
reconsider these options eventually, it is not something we should seriously
consider for many, many years. Including this language in the PDD creates
an unnecessary target for Congressional opposition.
1 agree that it makes sense to begin consultations on the document
because there is much misunderstanding on the Hill about our policy
direction. Our funding requests and discussions about ongoing operations
have suffered from a lack of knowledge aboiit where we are going in our
overall peacekeeping policy.
SECRET
�crpprT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
However, before the PDD is signed, we also need to reach agreement on
draft legislation to implement the shared responsibility model. As we've seen in
the past, interagency agreement on specific legislative langnage-not just
agreement in principle-is necessary if we are to present a coordinated
Administration position to the Hill.
isner
SECRET
�•Ill- •
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC
203O1-f0OO
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping PDD
I have reviewed thefinaldraft of the Peacekeeping PDD and while it is
clear that we are now very close tofinalagreement, I still have substantive and
procedural concems that are sufficiently important that I need to ask for these
changes.
Substantively,firstI am concerned that the language on page 3 paragraph
2, and page 9, paragraph 9D, appears to create a legal requirement to consult
| with Congress before placing U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN
commander. I urge that you delete the language. I believe that a general
reference to working more cooperatively with the Congress on peacekeeping
issues would be more appropriate.
Second, I am concerned about the new language on page 8 stressing the
President's ability to designate either State or DoD as the lead agency for
Chapter VI operations, irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat forces.
While I, of course, do not question the President's prerogatives to ask either
Agency to manage an operation and tofinanceit, I urge you to delete this
sentence. Its inclusion will, in my judgment, vastly complicate the process of
securing Congressional approval of the sharedresponsibilityapproach by
reopening the issue of State's and DoD'srespectiveresponsibilities.The new
language suggests that State could have the lead on an operation involving the
deployment of U.S. combat troops, or that DoD could befinanciallyresponsible
for operations not involving combat units. Moreover, the added language is a
statement of the obvious (the President can always assign either Department as
lead).
CLINTON LIBRARY PHCSECHET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
•y»/»5 KBH
�Finally, I remain concerned that we are not prepared to go to Congress
with a complete package. I continue to believe that we should not proceed
without Congressional consultations orfinalapproval of the PDD until we have
final decision on a total package policy, funding and authorities. Without a
comprehensive package agreed within the Executive Branch, we again risk
adding oxygen to the Congressionalfiresalready burning on the issue of
peacekeeping.
I understand that these concems were raised at an interagency meeting on
peacekeeping funding and legislation on December 2nd, and that a process is
well underway to develop and coordinate all the pieces of the package in
advance of the President's Budget Submission to Congress. DoD is an eager
and conscientious participant in this process.
I look forward to working with you to implement the PDD.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O
H
�t
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT S E C R E T A R Y O F D E F E N S E
2300 D E F E N S E PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-2300
DEMOCRACY
AND
PEACEKEEPING
1-93/54277
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THROUGH:
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
FROM:
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Prepared by: Mr. Joseph Berger, (PK/PE), x52310
SUBJECT:
Peacekeeping PDD - ACTION MEMORANDUM-
DISCUSSION: NSC is awaiting our response to thefinalversion of the
Peacekeeping PDD (Tab A). ThefinalPDD contains some, but not all, of the
DoD, State and Joint Staff proposed changes. Your recommendations on Article
43 and command and control are included ("Art 43"/"C3" tabs). A few
remaining issues still cause concem among different components in DoD. A
memorandum to Tony Lake addressing these issues is at Tab B.
Legislation
The final document does not reflect your recommendation that the
interagency should have reached agreement on legislative language to implement
shared responsibility. However, in the last ten days there have been a series of
intense interagency meetings and we are moving toward agreement. We
understand that Tony Lake intends to convene a Principals meeting shortly to
resolve any remaining issues. The proposed memorandumfromyou to Lake
reiterates your position that we should not consult on the Hill until we have a
complete package.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7/1/15 K8H
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOO®Y
CLASSSFIBD BY: MUUZ
DECLASSIFYON: OADR
�-SECRET
Consultations
The Joint Staff strongly objects to the language appearing to require
consultations with Congress before placing U.S. forces under the operational
control of a UN commander. The memorandum to Lake requests he remove the
"consultation with Congress" language.
Shared Responsibihty
The new draft adds language proposed by State (page 8 of the PDD) that
states that the President may designate either State or DoD to be the lead agency
for Chapter VI operations "irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat units".
We believe this language reopens the issue of defining State and DoD's
respective responsibilities and creates unnecessary ambiguity which could
compUcate the budgeting process and create havoc on the Hill. This new
language could result in having State with the lead on an operation involving the
deployment of U.S. combat troops, or having DoDfinanciallyresponsible for
operations not involving combat units. Most importantly, the added language is
a statement of the obvious (the President can always assign either Department as
lead) which will unnecessarily open every Chapter VI decision to interagency
argument and manipulation. Therefore, the new language on page 8 should be
deleted.
Policy notes, however, that a rigid cost sharing formula may not fit every
circumstance. There may be circumstances in which it would make sense for
State to continue managingMndfeftd/fundingsome Chapter VI operations which
include combat units and oribme Chapter VII operations such as UNIKOM in
which no USG combat units are involved.
The Attached memorandum conveys to Tony Lake the above concems
about a coherent legislative package, war powers issues, and the exceptions to
shared responsibihties.
RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum.
COORDINATION:
OGC
LA
Compt
CLINTON LIBRARY-f^
RSA
JS_
�
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Peacekeeping
Presidential Decision Directive
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/8934a8ff3e5f60d1e9e73a77622cbdd1.pdf
f4c598b2957272c566b1200d7f97fe9d
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�OONriDCNTIAfc
YELTSIN AND THE STYLE OF RUSSIAN POLITICS
This note examines the background to Yeltsin's problems with the
Russian parliament, and makes some suggestions.
The old Soviet Union was a system of networking par excellence.
Those who rose to the top were very skilled politicians indeed.
The formal structures of the Soviet Union - the "most democratic
Constitution in history", a directly elected Supreme Soviet, a Government with
a Prime Minister and the normal complement of Ministers, a network of
elected local bodies, and a full panoply of courts - all mimicked the institutions
of a modern liberal state. They were all of course a sham.
The real network of power was the Communist Party, its Regional
Secretaries, its Central Committee, the Politburo, and - with near dictatorial
power - the General Secretary. Its "leading role" was enshrined in Brezhnev's
revised constitution. But from the start it rigged every election, approved every
appointment in industry as well as the administration, shadowed the
Government at each turning. Whatever the formal appearances, nobody in the
Soviet Union was ever in any doubt about where the real power lay.
Russia has no tradition of constitutional limits on the power of the
executive, or of the rule of law: the Russian Chief of Police said in the 1830s
that "Laws are written for underlings, not for their bosses". The central political
proposition is that of autocracy ("tempered by assassination", as a 19th
century observer remarked). Both the Tsars and the General Secretaries were
careful to ensure that none of their advisers could combine to limit their power.
They surrounded themselves with cronies - the Tsar's courtiers, Stalin's
Georgian mafia, Brezhnev's Ukrainians - and deliberately set out to provoke
rivalry amongst their entourage. There was no orderly system of Cabinet, nor
even a properly organised secretariat for the autocrat himself. Business was
conducted on the basis of personal relationships, intrigue in smoke filled
rooms, and - in this century - with the bullet and on the telephone.
During the Communist period the Party structure provided a readymade basis for networking throughout the country . It served for the conduct
of corrupt business as well as politics. The typical Russian political
phenomenon - in politics and in business - is the antechamber full of
petitioners. It is the atmosphere which surrounded a mediaeval or Middle
Eastern monarch. For all his break with the past, Gorbachev's style was
merely a comparatively benign version of the way in which previous General
Secretaries had run the Soviet Union.
Yeltsin, who is the same age as Gorbachev, grew up in the same
tradition. His career differed little from that of any other Party bureaucrat:
powerful regional boss, brought to Moscow in mid-career by the whim of the
General Secretary, bringing his cronies with him from Sverdlovsk. His political
style at that time was old-fashioned: bullying, impetuous, autocratic. To get
where he did, he must have used the techniques of Communist networking as
GONriDCNTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
fc/30/15
^TV^P
KBH
�OOHriDCNTIAL
well as the next man. But his challenge to the Politburo in 1987, and
Gorbachev's unprecedented willingness to let him retain a political foothold in
Moscow, marked a crucial break with the Russian and Communist political
tradition, which has never admitted the concept of a loyal opposition. Bukharin
once remarked :"Of course we could have a two party system in Russia: but
one party would be in power, and the other in prison". Gorbachev's reluctant
willingness to accept that this tradition could change may turn out to be one of
his main achievements.
Yeltsin played his role as leader of the "loyal opposition" from 1987 to
1991 with great skill. He was the object of a black propaganda campaign by
Gorbachev designed to show that he was an irresponsible and erratic drunk.
Not all the accusations were unjustified. But he was successful in distancing
himself increasingly from the Party and appealing to Russian patriotic
sentiment, while avoiding capture by the forces of virulent chauvinism and
anti-Semitism which in Russia are never far befbw the surface. Ordinary
Russians loved him precisely because he got drunk, fell into rivers, and hated
the Communists - just like they did.
The problem today is that the decay of the networks provided by the
Communist Party state within a state has not yet been matched by the growth
of robust new political organisations on a national scale. At one time
Gorbachev toyed with the idea of splitting the Communist Party into its liberal
and conservative fractions, thus creating the basis of a two party system. The
reactionaries within the Party prevented him; while the liberal politicians
surrounding him - Shevarnadze, Yakovlev and others - failed to ally
themselves effectively with the democrats who had got together into loose
political groupings distinguished more by common anti-Communist rhetoric
than by practicable common policy programmes.
Yeltsin has found the problem of politicking in the post-Communist
world as difficult as Gorbachev did. There are no set structures and none of
the organisational discipline formerly imposed by the rigid hierarchies of the
Party: only the struggle for dominance between individuals and groups, and
between Moscow and the provinces. Ever since Yeltsin came to power at the
end of 1991 people have suggested forming a "President's party", or an
effective democratic party, which could articulate and push through a coherent
policy of reform. During the Congress last December Yeltsin announced that
he would now set up such party.
Nothing has yet come of it, for reasons which run deep. First, and most
important, the lack of a democratic tradition means that Russians have no
experience of setting up parties rather than conspiracies. The democratic
experiment before the First World War failed partly because the democratic
parties spent most of their time quarrelling with oneanother: the democratic
groupings in the Supreme Soviet are doing the same. Second, many Russians
rationalise this failure on the grounds that Russia has had too much Party
government in the last seventy years, and that any attempt to create an
effective new party will therefore be deeply unpopular.
GONriDIINTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONriDgNTlAfr
The essence of the constitutional struggle in Russia at present is rather
different: it is whether the future political system should be "Presidential" or
"Parliamentary". There is an analogy with the struggle between King and
Parliament in England in the 17th century: it was only after this issue had
been settled in favour of Parliament that modern political parties began to
emerge in Britain. The same could be true in Russia.
In this contest, Yeltsin has not been ineffective. Like Gorbachev he
certainly spends a good deal of time - perhaps too much - meeting people
influential in current Russian politics. Operating through the "President's men"
in the Supreme Soviet he has at least held his own with his main opponent,
the Parliamentary speaker Khasbulatov. He remains vulnerable to biassed
and random advice from his cronies. He has recently sacked some of the
most unpopular. But he still cannot rely on a coherent and effective body of
support within the Supreme Soviet, and his popular appeal is inevitably
diminishing as life in Russia gets harder. His pdsition may not be much
restored even if the people support Presidential government in the referendum
in April, and even if the Parliamentary elections in 1995 sweep out the
Communist old guard who were elected in 1990.
What can we do to help?
What follows is based on the assumption that it is in the West's interest
that Russia should not descend into chaos, or reconstitute itself under an
authoritarian and potentially aggressive regime.
Genuine political and economic progress in Russia depend on
fundamental changes in the political culture. But significant qualitative change
is already occurring: the people are now almost universally literate, they live in
cities instead of villages, and they are in contact with the outside world
through travel, television, radio, and the press. There is a great difference
between the Soviet Union in Khrushchev's time and Russia today. Despite the
difficulties Russia now faces, all this provides some ground for hope that
Russia may indeed be at the beginning of an historic process of modernisation
and that a reversion to old patterns of authoritarianism - the nightmare of
liberal Russians - will be averted.
There is not all that much that foreigners can do to promote institutional
change directly, and not much we can do to teach Yeltsin about political
infighting in Moscow. The Russians are if anything getting too much advice.
The ultra nationalists claim that the reformers are selling out to the West,
which is simply exploiting Russia's present weakness for its own ends. There
is the risk of a backlash.
But that does not mean we have to stand idly by. Western political
mechanisms cannot of course be applied directly even in a chanaina Russian
reality. But good and tactfully managed schemes are already in place: to give
the ablest younger Russians - the rising politicians as well as journalists,
academics, and people from the infant world of Russian commerce and
finance - the opportunity to work and study in the West; to provide technical
CONriDCNTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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assistance and training programmes in Russia itself; and to offer discreet
advice on Parliamentary and political management. One such scheme - on the
reorganisation of central government machinery - draws on expertise from
several European countries and had the backing of Yeltsin's Chief of Staff,
Yuri Petrov, who has unfortunately recently been sacked. Another modest
scheme is successfully helping the Russians to set up a nationwide
employment service: vital when economic reform inevitably brings
unemployment in its wake. Such schemes need to be multiplied, not only in
Moscow but in the provinces as well.
The West must also continue to support the economic reform. This
involves not only the provision of humanitarian aid (a short term alleviation of
the hardship which reform brings), financial assistance, and debt relief. It also
requires policy advice which takes full account of the Russian reality. Some of
the advice which has been provided hitherto, by the IMF and others, has been
dangerously superficial in its concentration on macroeconomic issues and its
failure to grapple with the hideous difficulty of dismantling the Soviet Union's
rustbowl defence industry. This accounted for a substantial proportion of the
Soviet economy. An orderly scheme of restructuring, offering the hope of
alternative employment to the millions of skilled and unskilled people who
work in the sector, is a political as well as an economic imperative. The failure
by Gaidar and his Western advisers to propose a convincing scheme helped
to give the reactionaries their chance at the recent Congress. Western
governments, who find it hard enough to dismantle their own rustbowl
industries, should be well able to appreciate the underlying politics.
More broadly, we need to help the reformers in Russia demonstrate to
their reactionary critics that cooperation with the West is not turning Russia
into a mere satellite. It is very important that we should treat Russia as a
great, if not a super, power; that we should ensure that Russia is seen to be
fully involved in the international decisionmaking process on the great issues
such as Bosnia and Iraq; and that the Russian leadership - particularly Yeltsin,
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Defence Minister Grachev - should be seen by
their own people to be treated as full equals by their Western counterparts.
Gorbachev was greatly damaged in his last year in power by the popular
perception in Russia that he had become a mendicant of the West.
London, 12 January 1993
S i r Rodric Quentin B r a i t h w a i t e
CONriDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�BR CECIUDT
This infonnation has bsen conununicated in oonfit.ko.cas
to the United States Govommer.i cad should not bo
released without tho agresraent of tho British Government
British Embassy
Washington
3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600
21 September 1993
Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 8984255
The Honorable
Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Room 1 W
/W
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N
W
Washington D. C. 20500
From The Ambassador
I have been asked by the Prime Minister to pass to the
President the enclosed message on the GATT.
Tbis infonnation has beou coauxiiiDicated in aanfidenoa
to the United Statoa Govaremeai asd abouid not be
release without tho agrc^anJ of tho British Govermmmi
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MESSAGE DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1993
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
Dear B i l l ,
I t was u s e f u l t o have the chance o f a word about GATT
when you telephoned from A i r Force One the other day.
This
comes from a DC-10 between Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur!
As I was leaving Tokyo t h i s morning, I heard the outcome
of the "Jumbo" Council meeting i n Brussels a t which Douglas
Kurd and G i l l i a n Shepherd represented us.
I t c l e a r l y took
them a l o t of hard pounding, l a t e i n t o the n i g h t , t o get an
acceptable r e s u l t and make sure t h a t B l a i r House was not
re-opened.
I t was undoubtedly h e l p f u l t h a t you had
personally dissuaded a number o f European Community heads
from going down t h a t road.
Douglas w i l l be able t o explain the background more
f u l l y t o Warren Christopher i n t h e i r meetings t h i s week i n
Washington.
We are s t i l l on t r a c k f o r a conclusion w i t h i n
the 15 December deadline, provided t h a t we s t i c k t o the l i n e s
which you and I agreed t o be e s s e n t i a l .
Nothing I have heard
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in Japan, and nothing I have seen about the state of the
world's economy, causes me to doubt the c r u c i a l importance of
succeeding, however d i f f i c u l t the end game w i l l be for
different countries and constituencies.
The key points to emerge in the Brussels conclusions are
that there i s no mention of re-opening the B l a i r House
Agreement : the European Community has renewed i t s commitment
to completion by mid-December; the Community's negotiators Leon Brittan and h i s colleagues in the European Commission have not been given a different mandate or fettered; the way
i s clear for the renewal of the multilateral negotiating
process which Peter Sutherland i s driving forward i n Geneva
andf to which Leon Brittan i s anxious to give new impetus.
But, while we have evidently avoided a fundamental
show-down with the French on t h i s occasion, we certainly
cannot take their eventual agreement for granted.
Edouard
Balladur w i l l have genuine p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n carrying
his government through to f i n a l agreement.
The most powerful
figure in h i s own party, Jacques Chirac, veers towards
protectionism, and talks of the "desertification of France".
The President of the National Assembly, Seguin, i s France's
leading anti-European.
steam there.
There i s a huge head of p o l i t i c a l
Balladur w i l l remain under enormous pressure to
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to the United States <^pi£0>M, a^d should not be
do whatever he can to appease the farmers and the larger
number of other French people who passionately support the
farmers.
There seems to be l i t t l e effective counterweight
from the French interests which stand to benefit from an
agreement.
I understand that the next step i s for Leon Brittan to
meet Mickey Kantor again on 27 September to explore ways i n
which, while preserving B l a i r House, we can help France to
climb down, though i t w i l l be far from easy.
Just as you
were not bluffing when you warned the Community against
re-opening B l a i r House, I am sure that the French are serious
in saying that they need something more than mere cosmetics
i f they are to carry the necessary degree of p o l i t i c a l
support.
Indeed, one has only to look at the situation in
France to see how d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l be for the French
Government to climb down, though they did pull back
substantially at the Jumbo Council from the more extreme
positions they had adopted in advance.
I had a most interesting few days in Tokyo.
Hosokawa i s
out of a different mould, and the p o l i t i c a l environment has
changed considerably even since we were there in July.
Hosokawa i s c l e a r l y s t i l l feeling h i s way on international
questions, which i s no surprise after only s i x weeks.
Ehia information has boon roiamuijicatod in confidenco
to the United States Govsinriaat and should noi be
loleased without the agi^meni ol t-ie British Govemmc-st
UK 0E0RI3T
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i s absolutely determined to press ahead with p o l i t i c a l reform
as h i s highest p r i o r i t y , and in a s l i g h t l y more cautious way
i s moving on the economic front.
He could not have been more
friendly, and i s deliberately adopting a more informal s t y l e .
I talked to him at length about GATT.
I t i s a p r i o r i t y for
the Japanese Government, and I got a clear sense that at the
eleventh hour they w i l l do what they have to on r i c e .
He and
his colleagues stresses their attachment, as an exporting
nation, to free trade as well as their intention to continue
opening up the Japanese market.
I think we have now reached the point where a l l the
Geneva participants can reasonably be asked to put their
remaining offers on the table and press ahead for the widest
possible settlement by mid-December.
to t h i s end.
I s h a l l bend my efforts
I am sure that you w i l l do the same.
Yours sincerely,
John
Timi. iafonnation his been cwinsnraicato'd in coxiLd.:
to tha. United States Govoicjnont and should noi bo
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British Embassy
Washington
3100 Massachusetu Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600
13 October 1993
Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255
The Honorable
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o t h e President f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Room 1 W
/W
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N
W
Washington D. C. 20500
From Tkt Ambattador
I have been asked t o pass t o you the enclosed message
from the Prime M i n i s t e r t o the President about COCOM.
Robin RenvicJc
cc : The Hon. Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
CLINTON LIBRARY
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COVERING UK (JOHf IDENTIAL
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released without the aG:;3rr.eni o " . .2 Biitisli Govemmenl
MESSAGE DATED 12 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
Thank you for your message of 9 September about the
phasing out of C C M and about the need for tighter
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international controls on arms exports and on exports of
sensitive technology.
I agree with you that the time has cone to bring an end
to C C M I t served us well during the Cold War. But
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COCOM's complex procedures are no longer necessary for
managing our trade with Russia, or the other former Communist
countries. I think we can a l l agree that decisions on
sensitive exports to these countries should be a matter for
national discretion, as they are for the rest of the world.
You are right that great caution has to be exercised
with those states which present a threat to international
stability, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The
United Kingdoa already operates extremely restrictive
policiss to a l l these destinations, as regards both weapons
and dual-use goods. W recently tightened our controls on
e
Iran s t i l l further. But we would be happy to join in
international discussions to ensure that a l l the major
DECLASSIFIED suppliers apply equally tough standards.
PER E.0.13526
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Like you, I believe that, as C C M i s phased out, new
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goods exported by western countries. These should ensure a
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4>^~i'-ort-. :'. •'.'••5 British Government
CLINTON LIBRARY :'
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UK COlfFIDENTIAfc
�This iniormatioa has
coi.'un-jsicctad in confidence
to the United States Govenuncnt and should not be
released without the afifieemeni ci iho Britiah Govemmeni
continuing common basis f o r our n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s and allow
them t o be applied, when necessary, elsewhere i n the world.
I also agree t h a t any new arrangements should be designed t o
e n l i s t the cooperation of the former Warsaw Pact countries.
But I hope t h a t whatever new arrangements we set up avoid any
more bureaucratic burdens on our business community. The
l a s t t h i n g our exporters need i s t o f i l l i n more forms.
On the r e l a t e d issue o f arms t r a n s f e r s , I t h i n k we
should t r y t o b u i l d up transparency both on a g l o b a l basis
( i n v o l v i n g the r e c i p i e n t s as w e l l as the s u p p l i e r s ) : and
through arrangements l i m i t e d t o the p r i n c i p a l arms exporters.
I remain committed t o b u i l d i n g up the UN r e g i s t e r - which I
have s t r o n g l y supported since the outset.
I am sympathetic t o the idea o f a new forum f o r the
p r i n c i p a l exporters. But we have t o t a r g e t our e f f o r t s
c a r e f u l l y . Western s u p p l i e r s generally act responsibly over
arms t r a n s f e r s . I t i s the p o l i c i e s o f other s u p p l i e r s such
as Russia, China, Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia which give us
r e a l cause f o r concern. Our aim should be t o f i n d a forum
which includes then from the s t a r t .
I see some p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s in using a successor
body to COCOM as t h i s new forum. The present COCOM
membership includes some countries which are l i k e l y i n
principle to be against almost a l l major arms transfers - to
the possible detriment of both your and our responsible arm
transfer p o l i c i e s .
A possible s o l u t i o n would be t o set up p a r a l l e l
procedures, w i t h i n the o v e r a l l framework o f the new
arrangements, f o r dealing w i t h the d i f f e r i n g requirements of
This infonnation has bsea comnrjnicatsd in oonfidenoe
CLINTON LIBRARY
^MS^^^.^
�This infonnation has been oonun-oniccted In oonfidence
to the United States Govamment and should not be
released without the agreai-.cr.: -: i'-.o Satish Government
trade in dual-use goods on the one hand and transfers of arms
on the other. In this structure consultations on arms
transfers could be limited to the principal Western and
Eastern suppliers and focus on the kind of major weapons
systems that are covered by the UN register.
I think an arrangement of this kind would meet our
common objectives in this area and I look forward to
continuing to work with you to achieve an effective
international system.
CLINTON LIBRARY
This information has been ccaa-vniscte'd in confix---.TO
iovexEsic-i a i d should net r«
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LUtish Gov«n:-r : r i
-UK CONFIDENT I A L
�IO DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
4 January 1995
We arc all beginning to look forward lo the Halifax Summit in June.
Our sherpas meet later this month to begin preparations. They will be
considering, in particular, how to take forward the review of the world's
financial and other institutions which we commissioned in Naples.
We have been thinking further about this review, and we will be
contributing our ideas shortly. But as you take over the chair for the 1995
summit, I would like to draw your attention to one specific issue.
At Naples, we discussed international financial markets, and expressed a
desire for greater market stability. I share that desire. Turbulent financial
markets undermine confidence, and damage the prospects for economic growth.
But I hope we can all agree, from the outset, that the way to achieve greater
financial market stability is above all to secure economic stability in each of our
countries. That means following sensible economic policies, which keep
inflation low, and which maintain sound publicfinances.Wc are already
committed to such policies.
There have been calls for Governments to try to influence the currency
markets through intervention, or to hold back financial flows by exchange
controls or new forms of taxation onfinancialtransactions. In my view, such
measures would be both ineffective and damaging, as experience over the past
20 years demonstrates. Global private financial flows have increased
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�- 4
enormously, so that total stock of foreign exchange reserves held by our seven
countries now represents well under half the value of turnover each fay in the
currency markets. In these circumstances, intervention is increasingly
ineffective.
/
Exchange controls or new taxes would be equally ill-conceived.
Countries have been scaling back controls in recent years - we abolished them
entirely in the UK 15 years ago, having concluded that such controls damaged
the economy, and that increasingly they did not work. The much greater
sophistication and global nature of today'sfinancialmarkets means that virtually
any attempt-to block or tax particularflowswould simply divert them
elsewhere. The existence of controls in the 1970s was a major reason why the
Euromarkets grew so rapidly.
Moreover, the free internationalflowof investment, like free trade,
brings significant economic gains, and I believe that to reintroduce direct
controls of this sort would be damaging, not only to our economies, but also to
others. W all want to see the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the Former
e
Soviet Union, and the further expansion of Asian and Latin American countries.
These developments will require large amounts of investment which, already,
we have seen that open world capital markets are providing. We should
continue to encourage that: greater world prosperity will help our economics,
and will buttress political and social stability, to everyone's benefit.
1 know personally - as do most of the others in the G7 - how damaging
and disruptive exchange market turbulence can be. I have therefore thought
hard about ideas put forward for direct action to control it. 1 do not dismiss
them lightly. But I am convinced they are a false solution, and that we would
be misleading ourselves if we thought we could help matters by embarking
down that road.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-3-
I am sending copies of this letter to other G7 colleagues.
/
The Rt. Hon. Jean Chr6tien PC QC MP
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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John Major
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�CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCO^^
UNITKn NATIONS MISSION TO HAirF: TRAINTNfi OR OCCUPATION?
fosue EQC Decision: As a part of the recent policy review, we have pledged to reconfirm
our willingness to participate in a UN military mission in Haiti, and noted that it might be
necessary to have a "reconfigured" mission, and consequently a restated UNSC
mandate. When he was asked to confirm that he would agree to a new UN military
mission, President Aristide asked what its "reconfigured" mission would be.
To answer President Aristide's question, and to have clarity in our policy, a
decision is needed to determine whether the mission we have in mind is similar to that
provided for in the Governors Island Agreement, namely to train and professionalize the
Haitian military, and perform limited "civic action" construction, or whether the UN
military mission should also have an internal security role and other peace enforcement
tasks.
Considerations Common Xa Both Options:
Under both approaches, an important issue is whether the UN military force
would be sent in before President Aristide had returned to power in Haiti, or only after
his successful return. Sending the force only after he had resumed the powers of the
presidency would reduce the impression that the force was intended to assure his return,
either by deterring non-cooperation by the Haitian military or by direct military action.
Whether that is an advantage or a disadvantage depends on one's view of what the
mission of the force should be. Sending the force before Aristide's return could help
calm the situation and regime cooperation with it would be a manifestation of a real
intent to cooperate in implementing GIA fully. If, however, the force is intended to have
a limited mission, sending it before the most difficult part of GIA -- President Aristide's
actual return to power in Haiti -- is accomplished, could imply a willingness to use US
military force that we did not intend.
Deployment of either mission would follow only after the UN provided approval
via a UN Security Council resolution. Consistent with the principle of making our
action regarding Haiti multilateral, we would not unilateral y intervene. Whether the
UNSC would authorize a mission of the second kind, which could reasonably be
characterized as an intervention, is problematic. There is no possibility that the OAS
would authorize such a mission.
Either approach would entail significant costs. For either the US would have to
provide the overwhelming majority, if not all, the troops. For the training mission, the
USG would seek to have the mission conducted as the basis of UN reimbursement by
assessments under Chapter VI. For the internal security mission, we would seek
reimbursement as a Chapter VII operauon. Whether we would succeed in getting
significant cost-sharing under any approach is dubious.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
CLASSIFIED
BY DIR IA\
DECLASSIFY ON OADR
OCCnCT
Oni-a
r\\11-
AO)3-OM*
^
�Options
Option I: Military training for professionalization-The October 93 model updated,
with no internal security functions.
Under this approach the military mission's main task would be to retrain the
Haitian military into a non-political, professional force capable of carrying out the normal
functions of military establishments in small, underdeveloped states with constitutional
governments. Its premise is that the phase out of police functions from the army, along
with concunent redefinition of military roles, would gradually help Haiti develop a
responsible military with a legitimate purpose in a democratic society. This would be a
long-term effort, requiring substantial commitment of personnel and resources (from
foreign aid, not DoD 0& M, budgets) for a period of several years.
For this mission, revision of the present UN mandate would be required to permit
shifting the focus of the mission from civic action construction projects to training, and
to assure that the mission could be the size and composition needed to carry out the
mission while providing for its own security. That option is temporarily provided by
UNSCR 905, which will expire June 30.
Under this UNMIH configuration, internal security would remain the
responsibility solely of Haitian security forces, throughout thetimethe unit was in
Haiti. Initially those forces would be responsive to the Haitian authorities awaiting
Aristide's return; afterward they would be those on whom President Aristide chose to
place the responsibility. The UNMIH forces would provide training, serve as role models
and, in respect to police functions, monitor performance of the Haitian forces. The UN
military mission would have neither the authority nor responsibility to monitor
compliance with the key political terms of the GIA nor to intervene in local security
matters or to insure compliance with the GIA. In the event of violence or noncompliance, UNMIH would take steps to assure its own safety, but would not engage in
peace enforcement, or, indeed, in traditional peacekeeping.
1
The US element of the UN military training mission would not be deployed to
Haiti until it would go as part of a viable political agreement having the support of all
^
parties, and steps had been taken to begin putting the other elements of the settlement in
place. In particular, it would be a precondition of deployment of the military mission that
the police monitoring units were in place. In addition, the US would require that all
parties formally confirm their agreement to the deployment and give strong assurances,
backed by demonstrated changes in behavior, that the mission was coming as part of an
accepted overall settlement and would receive the support and cooperation of the
Haitian authorities, both military and civilian. In this connection, we would insist on
their active help in carrying out its mission, as well as in being properly received and
protected while in country. We would also insist on appropriate host nation support
J
There would also be an international police assistance mission. However, its role
would be monitoring the activities of the (reconstituted) Haitian police and certain forms
of technical assistance, not itself policing the country.
GCCRCT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�arrangements, including a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), assured access to ports
and airfields, and agreements on how the training mission would be conducted.
However, in configuring the force, we would not count on a permissive
environment. The detailed force requirements for the force would be set by the relevant
command. Illustratively, the US training team could consist of approximately 100
trainers and 200 support personnel. It would carry such weapons, have such security
personnel, and be governed by such ROE as the US deems appropriate to enable the
force to provide for its own protection and to ensure that it could land and move safely
to its facilities in the event Haitian authorities do not cooperate or they fail to provide
security. We would not negotiate with either President Aristide or the Haitian military
on these points, though we would inform them of our intentions.
2
The force would not be configured to keep order in Haiti, provide protection for
Aristide and his government, or (if sent in before he returns) deal with military refusal to
accept his return. In briefing Congress and the press, we would need to make clear the
limited character of the mission, so it would be public knowledge that we did not intend
to use force to install or protect Aristide or deal with violence in the country. Should the
situation deteriorate to the point where it was unsafe or infeasible for the mission's
training activity to continue, it would remain in a protective posture until the situation
improved or it was withdrawn.
Option II: Internal security tasks included in mission
This approach would give the UNMIH the authority and responsibility to perform
internal security functions, as well as training. Its tasks would include preventing and if
necessary suppressing violence among Haitians, providing personal security to Aristide
and his key government associates after his return, and disarming/disbanding armed
civilian groups, such as the FRAPH. Its mission could also include using military force to
protect him physically in the course of his return.
Adopting this approach would be based on the premise that the return of Aristide
could precipitate violence on a massive scale between Aristide partisans seeking
revenge on the army and army enlisted seeking to preempt such attacks through terror
and intimidation of their own, and that Haitian security forces either could not or would
not deal with the problems themselves. It assumes that, without a foreign (and in
practice US) military force, Aristide cannot count on returning to power in Haiti and
keeping control of the country and the security forces. It does not assume that
reconciliation and fundamental political and social reform is impossible, only that it will
take a long time to reform and rebuild institutions based on democratic principles and
that, in the meantime, it is both necessary and in the US interest to provide the muscle to
sustain President Aristide in office.
A force assigned this internal security mission would be configured quite
differently from one assigned only a training and self-protection mission. The force
would be significantly larger, and would operate essentially as an occupying army,
2
To the extent it was part of the force's mission to conduct civic action
construction projects, additional personnel would be needed.
S E I C n [ : T
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-sccncT
4
pending the establishment of Aristide's full and effective authority in the country,
including winning loyalty of the security forces, or inauguration of a new president in
February 1996. Over time US casualties would be certain, as would be Haitian casualties
caused by US actions. Under the War Powers Act, its introduction would appear to
begin the timetable for congressional authorization, unless the Act is considered not to
apply to operations of this character.
It would be necessary to resolve in advance the relationships between the US
commander of the force and the Haitian government, as to the circumstances in which
the force would intervene in internal conflicts in Haiti, and its ROE for doing so.
Because such a force could be involved in conflict situations, it would require complete
freedom of action, under U.S. command, in determining which measures were necessary
for its own protection, and in determining how to carry out its broad mission. For
obvious reasons, there would be a tension between the requirement of clear US
command and control - which is necessary for legal and practical political reasons -- and
its function as the de facto internal security force of a foreign government.
It is not clear that President Aristide could give permission for a US force to
operate in this way, given the traditional Haitian view of US military intervention. It is
certain that the OAS would not mandate such a mission. Whether the UN would do so is
problematic, though Russian support could almost certainly be achieved because of the
desirable precedent it would set for Russian action in its own "near abroad."
Eras and Cons QllhsTm Options
Option I: Training Mission. No internal security functions
Pros;
•
Keeps the onus on Haitian parties for maintaining security, and for avoiding
provocative acts towards each other. A limited US role is consistent with the basic
xoposition that the future of Haiti is a Haitian issue, in which the US has only a very
imited interest (however strong our sympathies and preferences) and requires that
Haitians take responsibility for solution.
•
Avoids drawing US and other foreign forces into internal conflicts, thus reducing
security risks to our personnel and scale of US commitment ,
•
Avoids placing US and other foreign personnel in the positipn of taking law
enforcement measures against Haitian citizens and all the potential for legal and other
difficulties such a mission would entail.
•
Keeps the mission focus on professionalization, a task for which US military is
experienced.
• Has been accepted by President Aristide, the Haitian military (at least formally),
elements of the Parliament and by the UN and other troop contributors.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SCOnCT
�•cccmrf•
5
Has a reasonable chance of winning UN and hemisphere approval. International
support is essential for legitimacy and credibility (at home as well as abroad).
•
Would not involve defacto US occupation. Avoids giving the US military a police
function.
•
Requires a modest investment of US forces and funds.
Cons;
•
Does not provide deterrent or counter against Haitian military moving against
President Aristide or his supporters, and vice versa.
• Presence of any US military capability in Haiti will to lead to calls for it to become
involved if violence erupts.
•
Should significant levels of violence occur, the UN and member states will almost
certainly be criticized for failing to intervene.
• The Administration could be compelled to withdraw forces if conditions made its
training mission unsafe of impractical.
• Without the active cooperation of the Haitian military, this mission will not succeed.
• Does not guarantee professionalization of the Haitian armed forces. This is a longterm process for which no funding, beyond the FY92 set-aside within the FAA,
currently exists. Nor is any outyear funding planned which would allow the robust
degree of FMF/IMET funded training necessary to accomplish a realistic
professionalization mission.
Option II: Mandate to intervene militarily in Haiti if the internal security situation
warrants.
• Would diminish probability of major hostilities between pro and anti- Aristide groups
• Would provide greater security for Aristide and his government.
•
Assumes a military defeat or internal collapse of the Haitian security forces. (It is not
conceivable that any Haitian military leadership would agree to the introduction of
foreign forces to perform sovereign internal security functions.)
• Maximizes chances of President Aristide's successful return to power in Haiti by
providing US military guarantee
Cons:
• Difficult to secure support from Congress, where enthusiasm for direct US military role
in administration of Haiti is limited even among strong supporters of democratic
reform.
SECRET
CUNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�QEORCT
Ignores Haiti's sovereignty. Neither Aristide nor any other Haitian political figure has
been willing to take responsibility for inviting foreign forces to intervene, citing both
historical and constitutional reasons.
Requires a major effort to obtain approval of such a mandate at the UN. Other
countries are very unlikely to make meaningful troop contributions.
Requires a substantial commitment of U.S. resources, including a significant combat
military presence for an extended period.
Places US and other foreign soldiers in the position of carrying out police functions
(the UN has been unable to recruit sufficient police personnel for even a limited
monitoring mission) in an unfamiliar environment in which they do not speak the
language.
Likely to result in guerrilla/terrorist activities by nationalist groups against the US
mission.
Potential for conflict with President Aristide and other authorities if we refuse to
comply with their directives, and, conversely, places responsibility on the US for
controversial reform and security policies if we do.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
GECRET
�
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Foreign Policy
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/802eb45c7ea4e766bb8814f3af68c818.pdf
857378856cdf82f32da00107668a0e0b
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�Subject:
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
•eecRET
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
201823ZAUG 98
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE
2763
980821150149 M3432489
- C I I O R E T STATE 152763
NODIS
E.0.12958: DECL: 8/20/28
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG
1. GBJ CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS R. PICKERING FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. (S) AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT
JIANG.
3. (S)BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR PRESIDENT JIANG,
FIRST, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CONDOLENCES FOLLOWING
THE BOMBINGS IN EAST AFRICA.
TODAY I AUTHORIZED OUR MILITARY FORCES TO STRIKE AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN. I AM WRITING,
IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR WORK TOGETHER AND OUR CONTINUING CLOSE
CONTACTS, TO TELL YOU HOW I REACHED THIS IMPORTANT
DECISION.
THE FACILITIES ATTACKED TODAY IN BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BEING
USED BY THE USAMA BIN LADIN NETWORK TO TRAIN AND EQUIP
TERRORISTS FOR WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS. WE HAVE SOLID
EVIDENCE FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT THIS GROUP WAS MOST
RECENTLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND
TANZANIA. EXERCISING OUR RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.WE CARRIED OUT
STRIKES AGAINST TRAINING AND BASE CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
A FACILITY BEING USED TO PRODUCE VX NERVE GAS.
WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE WAS
HELD TO A MINIMUM. ALL STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO
PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM USING THEIR TERRITORY TO COMMIT
ACTS OF TERRORISM. STATES WHICH FAIL TO UPHOLD THAT
OBLIGATION MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THAT FAILURE.
THE HARD TRUTH IS THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT WITH
THE FORCES OF TERRORISM, A CONFLICT WHICH WAS THRUST UPON
US, AND ONE WHICH WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO BRING
T
OTTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7/a>/»5 K8V1
�I URGE YOU TO JOIN US IN TAKING A STRONG PUBLIC STAND
AGAINST TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS. AS A FIRST STEP WE ASK
THAT YOU EXAMINE CAREFULLY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH I HAVE
ASKED OUR EMBASSY TO PRESENT TO YOU BEFORE YOU DECIDE YOUR
OWN POSITION. IF YOU DO SO, I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL JOIN
US IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE IN TAKING ACTIONS TO
DEFEAT TERRORISM AND TO SPEAK OUT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY
AGAINST THOSE WHO PERPETUATE IT. WE ALSO ASK YOU TO RATIFY
ALL ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERROR TREATIES.
OUR SOLIDARITY ON THESE ISSUES IS THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST
THOSE PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT WOULD LAUNCH TERROR
ATTACKS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND INTERESTS.
AS WE DISCUSSED DURING MY VISIT TO CHINA THIS SUMMER, THIS
IS ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH WE CAN REACH A GENUINE DEGREE OF
OPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS
IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND TO HAVING YOUR SUPPORT.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
4. END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�•eONPIDENTIAIf
5930
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y d u r i n g t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know the pressures must be enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. Hope you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
I am sure
t h a t m e e t i n g w i t h him w i l l h e l p b o t h you and me prepare f o r
next week.
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t h e c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you t o l d me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t s t a k e , and t h a t may be t r u e r now than ever.
•
Know you're aware o f the stakes and how i m p o r t a n t i t i s t o
move p r o m p t l y and c o n v i n c i n g l y t o address immediate f i n a n c i a l
crisis.
Even a day or two o f u n c e r t a i n t y c o u l d be dangerous.
•
I am sending one o f my t o p economics e x p e r t s b e f o r e the
meeting; i m p o r t a n t t h a t our teams work t o g e t h e r and t h a t you
and I have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n about economics next week.
Osama bin Ladin
•
I heard your comments about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t I a c t e d because t h e evidence was
overwhelming t h a t more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e . I hope
you know me w e l l enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
•
A t times we have t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
d i s c u s s i t l a t e r . You and I have worked t o g e t h e r on the
problem o f t e r r o r i s m and share a common view o f t h e t h r e a t t o
our people.
I s i m p l y c o u l d not s t a n d by when Americans were
under a t t a c k .
Pause for
Yeltsin
response
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5b,d
Declassify
PER E.O. 13526
^OO^-l^l-H
X i W m LB A Y PHOTOCOPf'^ ^
IRR
�•CONFIDENTIAL
•
B o r i s , I want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o g e t t h i s i s s u e behind us o r t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t t h e summit.
Summit Preparations
•
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o show w o r l d t h a t t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
•
We have made p r o g r e s s on two i m p o r t a n t new i n i t i a t i v e s :
s h a r i n g e a r l y warning data on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e launches and
d i s p o s i n g o f excess p l u t o n i u m f o r n u c l e a r weapons. L e t ' s make
sure these agreements are f i n a l i z e d .
•
A l s o wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you and I can t u r n
i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n p o i n t s o f c o n f l i c t .
Strobe w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iran
•
We've worked on I r a n and have a chance t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people a r e w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program. I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s were announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t tone f o r o u r meeting.
Iraq
•
Saddam i s d e f y i n g t h e MOU he agreed t o w i t h K o f i Annan. I f we
are g o i n g t o s u s t a i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,
we need t o g e t him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings - i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Kosovo
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . Humanitarian s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e he can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commitments he made t o you i n Moscow.
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
• Winter i s coming. There are 200,000 displaced people. Now i s
the time f o r us t o send a clear s i g n a l t h a t he cannot use
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e force against c i v i l i a n s . Strobe w i l l t a l k
about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
•
larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s would be wrong message t o send. Investors looking
now f o r Russian actions t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk of b a i l o u t
could b a c k f i r e and send signal that s i t u a t i o n i s desperate.
I f raised
•
- need
- go together
to Duma?
Need t o reassess t h i s i n l i g h t of changes i n government.
Seeing both of us together may only anger your opponents i n
Duma and complicate matters. Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
•CONFIDENT IAL-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�^"""""tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
ABCD
V
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
•
B o r i s , wanted a chance t o t a l k t o you d i r e c t l y jduring t h i s
momentous p e r i o d . Know t h e pressures must be/enormous and
t h a t much i s a t stake f o r Russia. Pleased t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t
had good c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chernomyrdin about t h i s on Sunday.
•
Strobe i s coming t o Moscow t h i s week. H^jpe you can f i n d time
t o meet w i t h him.
He w i l l have my l a t e s t t h i n k i n g .
•
Wanted t o hear your thoughts about t/he c a b i n e t change and what
we can expect t o see over the coming week.
Economic C r i s i s
•
A few weeks ago, B o r i s , you tefld me the f u t u r e o f Russian
r e f o r m c o u l d be a t stake, ar^d t h a t may be t r u e r now t h a n ever.
Know t h a t you're aware o f /the stakes.
I hope you and I can
have a f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n /bout economics next week.
^saiaa bin Ladin
•
I heard your comment^ about our a i r s t r i k e s l a s t week a g a i n s t
t e r r o r i s t f a c i l i t i e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan. Wanted t o
reassure you t h a t A acted because the evidence was
overwhelming t h a t / more American l i v e s were a t s t a k e .
•
A t times we haye t o a c t based on what we know i s r i g h t and
discuss i t l a y e r .
I s i m p l y c o u l d not be i d l e .
I hope you
know me well/enough t o t r u s t me on t h i s .
Pause .for Yelzsin
•
response
B o r i s , I/Want t o be able t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t we d i s c u s s e d t h e
a i r s t r i / k e s and t h a t you understand why I had t o a c t q u i c k l y .
We need t o get t h i s i s s u e behind us or t h e press w i l l t r y t o
c a s t i t as a p o i n t o f c o n f l i c t a t the summit.
MaiW c r i t i c s jajh^want t o s e i z e on every d i f f e r e n c e between us
as/an excuse to' b l o c k our c o o p e r a t i o n . We cannot l e t t h i s
Overshadow our meeting.
E s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t now t o
show w o r l d t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p produces c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s .
-CONFIDENT I Air
Reason: 1.5b,d
D e c l a s s i f y On:
8/24/98
\
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
7/^/15"
KSH
�co riDD roim
" ' CLINTON LB A Y P O O l Y
I R R H T gP
•
I n t h a t s p i r i t , wanted t o r a i s e s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t you anc}/ I
can t u r n i n t o symbols o f c o o p e r a t i o n , r a t h e r / p o i n t s o f
conflict.
S t r o b e w i l l be able t o go i n t o d e t a i l .
Iraq
•
F i r s t i s I r a q . Saddam i s d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l colnmunity
d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f Primakov and K o f i Annan. /We have t o
get him t o r e v e r s e course and do i t now.
I f t h a t message came d i r e c t l y from you - and we r e i n f o r c e i t
i n our p u b l i c remarks a f t e r t h e meetings y i t c o u l d show
Saddam we have a u n i t e d f r o n t .
Iran
We've worked on I r a n and have a ch? ice t o demonstrate we've
made r e a l p r o g r e s s .
•
Your people are w o r k i n g on i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f Russian e n t i t i e s
t h a t have been c o o p e r a t i n g w i t n I r a n ' s m i s s i l e program.
I f
r e s u l t s from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s vfere announced b e f o r e I g e t t o
Moscow, would s e t t h e r i g h t / t o n e f o r our meeting.
Kosovo
•
Have a chance t o make a d i f f e r e n c e i n Kosovo t h a t c o u l d save
thousands o f l i v e s . m i m a n i t a r i a n s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c a r i o u s .
M i l o s e v i c f e e l s l i k e / h e can a t t a c k t h e Kosovars w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
i g n o r i n g t h e commiments he made t o you i n Moscow.
•
Now i s t h e time f o r us t o send a c l e a r s i g n a l t h a t t h e a t t a c k s
must s t o p .
StrQDe w i l l t a l k about how we might do t h i s .
I f raised
- need/larger
international
bailout?
Think t h i s y b u l d be wrong message t o send. I n v e s t o r s l o o k i n g
now f o r Russian a c t i o n s t o s t a b i l i z e economy. Talk o f b a i l o u t
c o u l d b a c l / f i r e and send s i g n a l t h a t s i t u a t i o n i s d e s p e r a t e .
I f raised/-
go together
to Duma?
Need /to reassess t h i s i n l i g h t o f changes i n government.
Seeing b o t h o f us t o g e t h e r may o n l y anger your opponents i n
Duma and c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s . Let's approach t h i s c a u t i o u s l y .
-GeWi'lDLNUAL-
�SECRET
S£€RE?
6 i 5 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
(U)
The President
President Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Bonnie C l i c k , Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
August 8, 1998, 10:57-11:20 a.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Jacques.
President Chirac:
The President:
Hello, B i l l .
I'm f i n e .
(U)
How are you?
(U)
(U)
President Chirac: I wanted t o say t h a t we have been traumatized
by the two a t t a c k s against Dar es Salaam and N a i r o b i , and I
wanted t o t e l l you how s o r r y I am and o f f e r a l l my f r i e n d s h i p on
t h i s occasion. (U)
The President: Thank you very much. I appreciate t h a t and a l l
the assistance you o f f e r e d . I t h i n k your embassy i n Dar es
Salaam was damaged as w e l l . (U)
President Chirac: Yes, a little bit. I don't know who these
people are. Do you have any idea? {&)
The President: Only suspicions. We have our bomb team there
now. I have been amazed a t what they can f i n d from t i n y pieces
about how the bombs were put together and sometimes t h a t o f f e r s
c l u e s . We have our suspicions, but we s t i l l don't know. (S)
SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 9/4/08
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PER E. O. 13526
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President Chirac:
The President:
You don't know s t i l l ?
(S)
I t h i n k we w i l l f i n d o u t . (S)
President Chirac: I was very, very s o r r y and I wrote i t t o you.
But I t e l l you how s o r r y I was, and I f e e l i t from the bottom o f
my h e a r t about the people who were k i l l e d from the United States
and those two c o u n t r i e s . (U)
The President: Thank you. Jacques, f i r s t o f a l l , I want t o
apologize f o r d i s t u r b i n g your v a c a t i o n . I hear you are i n
M a u r i t i u s . I c a l l e d t o t a l k t o you about Kosovo. (€)
President Chirac: B i l l , do you mind going through an
i n t e r p r e t e r ? As you know, my English i s not so good.
(U)
The President: Let's go through an interpreter. I called to
talk to you about Kosovo because I am very concerned that we are
getting close to another humanitarian disaster and am worried
that we are on the verge of another Bosnia. The war in Bosnia
could not have ended in 1995 without your leadership and
determination. {&)
Here i s what I b e l i e v e has happened. I t h i n k M i l o s e v i c has
decided t o go f o r a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . But i n a d d i t i o n t o
f i g h t i n g the armed r e s i s t a n c e , he i s also c l e a n i n g out c i v i l i a n s
from t h e i r homes and v i l l a g e s and innocent c i v i l i a n s are being
h u r t because he b e l i e v e s , a f t e r t a l k i n g t o Primakov, t h a t there
i s not a chance o f a NATO m i l i t a r y response because he t h i n k s
they w i l l a c t o n l y w i t h a UN r e s o l u t i o n and Russia w i l l b l o c k
t h a t . (&)
EO 13526 1 4
.d
t h i n k i t would be b e t t e r w i t h a S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n .
But here i s what I t h i n k i s the problem and why I t h i n k we need
to make i t c l e a r t h a t NATO could a c t w i t h o u t a S e c u r i t y Council
r e s o l u t i o n i f necessary and l e t them go ahead w i t h the p l a n n i n g
they have begun and i n i d e n t i f y i n g forces t h a t could be brought
i n t o p l a y t o stop a m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e i n Kosovo. Here i s what
I b e l i e v e : i f we t r y t o get a UN r e s o l u t i o n , we w i l l p u t
Y e l t s i n i n the worst of a l l p o s i t i o n s because i f they block i t ,
many people i n the w o r l d w i l l c r i t i c i z e Russia, and Russia needs
f r i e n d s now because the government i s i n a bad p o s i t i o n and the
economy i s hanging by a thread. I f they back i t and l e t i t go
through, I t h i n k Y e l t s i n w i l l be i n t e r r i b l e t r o u b l e a t home
w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Duma. I n p r i n c i p l e , I would l i k e a
r e s o l u t i o n t o o , but as a p r a c t i c a l matter we may have t o keep
GECRKT
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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our o p t i o n s open and argue t h a t we can do t h i s i f necessary
because o f the previous a c t i o n s o f M i l o s e v i c . (S)
President Chirac: B i l l , I p e r f e c t l y understand t h a t and t h e r e
i s no need f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but I would l i k e t o speak French,
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: Well, you know M i l o s e v i c b e l i e v e s h e ' l l never
have t o face NATO. That i s why there are 200,000 people d r i v e n
from t h e i r homes. A l l the past evidence suggests t h a t o n l y when
he i s under pressure w i l l he n e g o t i a t e .
my impression i s t h a t he would get k i l l e d i n t h e
Duma i f he voted f o r t h i s . (S)
i
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
SECRET
�o EC RET
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President Chirac:
The President:
I agree, i f we can. ( G
-)
President Chi rac :
_
The President: Here i s what I t h i n k . I t h i n k t h a t f i r s t o f
a l l , we are c l e a r l y b e t t e r o f f i f we can get i t .
My problem i s
I t h i n k i f we w a i t t o t h e p o i n t where a c l e a r humanitarian
d i s a s t e r i s on us t h i s w i n t e r , we may be too l a t e t o prevent a
mass o u t p o u r i n g o f refugees and there w i l l be a h e l l o f a l o t
more people k i l l e d by then. (ۥ)
President
Chirac:
The President: I understand your s i t u a t i o n , but what bothers me
i s t h a t by then M i l o s e v i c may have won h i s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y by
massive e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
The President: What I want t o do i s avoid the s t i c k , b u t i f he
t h i n k s we've got i t , he may go back t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f NATO a c t i o n w i t h o u t Russian approval t h a t i s a
CECRET
SCCRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
5
deterrent.
I s t h a t what you are you saying, t h a t we can leave
i t unstated?
I would l i k e the p l a n n i n g t o go forward. (C)
President Chirac:
A b s o l u t e l y . (€)
The President: Then we need t o t e l l Y e l t s i n we do n o t want t h i s
to come t o pass. We don't want t o have t o ask f o r a UN
resolution.
I t w i l l give him more i n c e n t i v e t o t r y t o s e t t l e
t h i s t h i n g . (€)
President Chirac:
Yes. (€)
The President: Believe me he does not want us t o ask f o r a
resolution.
I f there i s a r e s o l u t i o n , Y e l t s i n w i l l be weakened
at home no matter what he does. (€)
President Chirac:
The President: He s a i d he would p r e f e r t h e UN, b u t he d i d n ' t
want t o p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o an impossible p o s i t i o n , and i n a
p o s i t i o n where i t looks l i k e Russia has a veto over a n y t h i n g
NATO wants t o do. I t h i n k we want t o avoid t h i s . Kohl s a i d he
wanted t o t a l k t o you again and have Sandy Berger meet w i t h
B i t t e r l i c h and check around and t a l k again i n a couple o f days.
(•
€)
President Chirac:
The President:
I agree w i t h t h a t .
(€)
President Chirac: At t h e same time, b r i n g a l l p o s s i b l e pressure
to bear i n order t o f i n d a s9lu.tJ.s.n^hro-U.a.h_th.e_QQnta.c.t_G.r.QiiD
which should remain u n i t e d .
J
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
DECRET
EO 13526 1 4
.b
The President: I f t h a t i s your p o s i t i o n , I t h i n k i t i s
important t h a t our p u b l i c p o s i t i o n i s t h a t we should t r y t o be
s i l e n t on the matter and not make a b i g issue out o f the UN
mandate one way or the other. Otherwise we w i l l look t o t a l l y
h y p o c r i t i c a l . There i s a d i s a s t e r and then a veto and then we
have t o a c t . I t h i n k we have t o keep the p u b l i c p o s i t i o n t h a t
we hope we won't have t o a c t , we b e l i e v e there ought t o be a UN
r e s o l u t i o n , but not close the door. (€)
President Chirac: Yes, I agree completely w i t h you.
close the door. No polemics on t h a t . (e)
Don't
The President: On the other hand, we w i l l be q u i e t t o o . We
won't say o f course we don't need i t . We w i l l say i t would be a
good t h i n g t o have i t . (ۥ)
President Chirac: That i s good.
and a f f e c t i o n t o H i l l a r y . (U)
The President:
I will.
Please say a l l my best
(U)
President Chirac: Thank you very much, B i l l .
The President:
Thank you.
—
regards
Goodbye.
(U)
End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
Goodbye.
(U)
�5961
/CONriDEl'TTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
September 2 8 ,
?
g8ShP28PMi2:30
1998
INFORMATION
'H^^R^llDENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t J i a n g Zemin on £j£)<^
Afghanistan/Sudan M i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
/use CocJ
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g our
r a t i o n a l e f o r t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against t a r g e t s i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Embassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided.
The most i n t e r e s t i n g element i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response. We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
riang t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachments
Tab A August 26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COUriDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(b)(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9./-10/0i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
cc:
Vice President
Chief of S t a f f
�1
5961
COITFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r from Chinese P r e s i d e n t / j i a n g Zemin on
Afghanistan/Sudan m i l i t a r y A c t i o n s
J i a n g Zemin, i n h i s r e p l y t o your l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g o u r
rationale f o rtaking m i l i t a r y action/against targets i n
A f g h a n i s t a n and Sudan, r e i t e r a t e d Chinese condemnation o f t h e
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t our Erribassies i n Kenya and Tanzania,
c a l l e d f o r enhanced I n t e r n a t i o n a / c o o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ,
and s a i d u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n should be avoided nrr f n r m - j n n n a i b l g
• (att-achmont a t Tab ~A)
The most i n t e r e s t i n g elemei/h i n Jiang's l e t t e r i s a c a l l f o r
" i n c r e a s e d c o n s u l t a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n " between China and t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m . We have been u r g i n g China t o
i n c r e a s e c o u n t e r t e r r o r / s m c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r t h e l a s t year
w i t h o u t much response/ We are f o l l o w i n g up on t h i s h i n t by
J i a n g t h a t China may be ready t o take up our s u g g e s t i o n .
Attachment S
Tab A August/26 L e t t e r from Jiang Zemin
Tab B Your August 20 L e t t e r t o Jiang Zemin
DECLASSIFSEE)
PER E.O. 13526
l/X\/rt
GONFIDENTIAL
KehTreth L i ibortherir
(d
1.5(b:
c i d s s l f l e d by:~
Reason:
D e c l a s s i f y On:
9/10//08
K6V1
cc: Vice P r e s i d e n t
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�
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Declassified documents concerning Afghanistan and Sudan
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on documents regarding military operations against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998. Included is head of state correspondence between President Clinton and various world leaders, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and French President Jacques Chirac.
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/c463db6d1ccda24dc56618823faf3b31.pdf
7e40390b477c3fee9bec67ff9188786b
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�OF DE
DEPUTY SE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2 O 3 0 M O 1 O
1 6 J N 19 g £
A 97
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY A^SSI^JANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECyRiyrXFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Repatriation and Resettlement of Bosnian Refugees
In the aftennath of the January 9 Deputies Committee meeting, I remain concerned about
the adequacy of our approach on the critical return of refugees issue.
While there appears to be a considerable degree of consensus on the broad contours of our
policy, we still have not crafted an implementation plan for refugee return to majority and
minority areas, as well as locations within the Zone of Separation (ZOS). The devil is very much
in the details.
We continue to believe that such a plan is very much needed, and would urge that it be
developed by the State Department and USAID in concert with UNHCR, IPTF, SFOR, the
HIREP and other appropriate partners. At a minimum, this plan should:
1. Provide a detailed action plan for the return of refugees to majority areas, including
how donor assistance is folded in so that housing and other forms of reconstruction
assistance are well integrated with the overall return program;
2. Describe specifically how returns are to occur in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) in a
manner which minimizes the potential for provocative actions; and,
3. Lay out how refugees are to be returned in targeted minority areas in a well-managed,
prioritized, and time-sequenced fashion.
Our refugee strategy must be proactive, not reactive. We must avoid overtaxing SFOR's
capabilities and minimize the possibility of incidents that could require a forceful SFOR
response. A carefully developed implementation plan that provides a specific framework for
refugee returns will help minimize this risk.
PER E„0„ 13526
OX—
John P. White
cc: Deputy Secretary of State Talbott
—SE€RET
V
Classified by: Director, Bosnia Task Force
gSS^m^LINTON LIBRARY P O O Q
HTC
^
r
�
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�SECRET/PLUTO
20633
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 19, 1994
Na^l Sec Advisor
has seen
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
FROM:
DANIEL PONEMANTp
SUBJECT:
P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee Meeting on North Korea,
May 20, 1994, 4:30 p.m.-5:30 p.m.
A f t e r o b t a i n i n g the usual updates (agenda a t Tab I ) , you should
pursue the f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n t h i s meeting:
R e i t e r a t e the need f o r d i s c r e t i o n a t t h i s c r i t i c a l
j u n c t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t o f t h e resumption o f
serious leaks o f [
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
s e n s i t i v e matters o f n e g o t i a t i n g
strategy.
Decide on the a p p r o p r i a t e l i n k a g e between a p o s s i b l e
t h i r d round and the d e f u e l i n g campaign.
Task State t o c l e a r a message f o r d e l i v e r y t o the
DPRK r e f l e c t i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n .
Decide whether t o encourage Senators Nunn and Lugar t o
t r a v e l t o Pyongyang and, i f so, when.
I f the d e c i s i o n i s t o proceed:
c o n f i r m the Senators' w i l l i n g n e s s t o go;
task State t o r e f l e c t t h a t i n a response t o
the l e t t e r sent by the leader o f the DPRK
l e g i s l a t u r e t o the Vice President;
ask Defense i f i t could f a c i l i t a t e t h e
Senators' t r a v e l arrangements; and
task NSC t o d r a f t a P r e s i d e n t i a l message f o r
Nunn and Lugar t o c a r r y .
Provide guidance t o the SSK on our approach e i t h e r t o
the t h i r d round o r t o sanctions (depending on t h e
answer t o the f i r s t question) and task f u r t h e r work
accordingly.
Agree on a press and Congressional s t r a t e g y f o r the
weeks ahead, and underline the need f o r press and H i l l
statements t o be f u l l y coordinated.
SECRET/PLUTO
D e c l a s s i f y on:
OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
�2
The f i r s t and l a s t p o i n t s a r e s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ; t h e b a l a n c e o f
t h i s memo w i l l f o c u s on t h e m i d d l e t h r e e i s s u e s . S t a t e has
c i r c u l a t e d a d i s c u s s i o n paper!
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1,4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
L i n k a g e between t h i r d r o u n d and d e f u e l i n g campaign
T h i s i s s u e r e l a t e s t o whether t o propose a t h i r d r o u n d t o t h e
DPRK and, i f so, under what c o n d i t i o n s .
On t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
t h e IAEA r e p o r t s t h a t i t has f u l f i l l e d i t s UNSC March 31
mandate - - t o c o n c l u d e t h e March and maintenance i n s p e c t i o n
a c t i v i t i e s -- t h e SSK i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e o p t i o n s :
Set a d a t e f o r t h e t h i r d
round
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
The sense o f t h e SSK was t o s u p p o r t t h e f i r s t o p t i o n .
After a l l ,
we s a i d t h a t we w o u l d s e t a d a t e f o r t h e t h i r d round i n t h o s e
circumstances.
The downside, o b v i o u s l y , i s t h a t we c o u l d appear
once a g a i n t o have a d e a l w h i c h , s u d d e n l y , f a l l s t h r o u g h i f
Pyongyang d e f u e l s i n an u n a c c e p t a b l e way . |
EQ 13526 1.4d
We recommend t h e f i r s t
option.
EO 13.526_1_4.d_
EO 13526 1.4d
The DPRK has been c a l l i n g f o r a m e e t i n g i n New York; S t a t e
t e n t a t i v e l y agreed t o one S a t u r d a y so t h a t a PC-cleared p o s i t i o n
c o u l d be conveyed a t t h a t t i m e .
You s h o u l d t a s k S t a t e t o c l e a r
our message t o t h e DPRK i n t e r a g e n c y .
SECRET/PLfcHFO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/PbggQ
3
Nunn-Lugar DPRK T r i p
You r e c a l l t h a t Ambassador Laney was pushing t h i s idea, based on
a vague North Korean message brought back by B i l l Taylor o f CSIS.
We understood t h a t Nunn was w i l l i n g t o go, i f Lugar d i d , t o o . We
need t o c o n f i r m t h a t , probably through G a l l u c c i .
The Vice President r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r i n h i s c a p a c i t y as t h e
President o f the Senate from the leader o f t h e DPRK Supreme
People's Assembly. (Tab IV.) Apart from the usual cant i t
proposed b i l a t e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t a c t s . The SSK agreed t h i s was
a more a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e t o use than the Taylor c o n t a c t i f we
wish t o pursue t h i s .
The SSK b e l i e v e d t h i s idea worth pursuing, and one t h a t could
enhance our prospects i n the t h i r d round. Nunn and Lugar would
not n e g o t i a t e , and would c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e i r s as a f a c t f i n d i n g
trip.
I d e a l l y , the t r i p would take place l a t e next week, before
a June 1 t h i r d round. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e t h i r d round could s l i p
a week i f necessary t o accommodate t h e Senators' t r i p . More
delay i s probably unwise, i n l i g h t o f the c o n t i n u i n g d e f u e l i n g ;
i f necessary the t r i p could f o l l o w the t h i r d round.
While not n e g o t i a t i n g , we could use Nunn and Lugar t o c a r r y a
P r e s i d e n t i a l message, along the l i n e s t h a t we e a r l i e r prepared
f o r Dellums.
T h i r d Round Issues
Beyond the issues r a i s e d i n the State paper a t Tab I I , d i s c u s s i o n
has continued over the t h i r d round s t r a t e g y paper (Tab V)
prepared f o r the SSK meeting t h i s week ( i n c l u d i n g the ACDA
p r o p o s a l ) . Defense continues t o r a i s e general concerns about
whether we have a coherent s t r a t e g y f o r the t h i r d round. What
concrete outcomes do we seek? What next steps do we envisage?
What i s our o v e r a l l gameplan t o move from t h e t h i r d round t o f u l l
achievement o f our o b j e c t i v e s ? What are the areas o f interagency
disagreement surrounding these issues, and how should they be
resolved?
I t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o expect the P r i n c i p a l s t o make much progress
here, a t the end o f the meeting.
I t would be u s e f u l , however, t o
s t i m u l a t e P r i n c i p a l s ' views on these questions by asking G a l l u c c i
to s p e l l out h i s answers t o these questions. I have primed
G a l l u c c i t o be prepared t o speak t o t h i s a t your prompting. He
w i l l a l s o have a d r a f t Framework Agreement t o d i s t r i b u t e a t t h e
meeting.
P r i n c i p a l s ' views should then i n f o r m the d r a f t i n g o f a s t r a t e g y
paper f o r the t h i r d round and beyond t h a t i s addressed by
P r i n c i p a l s once more before the t h i r d round.
F i n a l Note: Sanctions Strategy
We have y e t t o provide the l e v e l o f refinement urged by
P r i n c i p a l s , i n terms o f what a c t i o n s t r i g g e r what s a n c t i o n s , and
SECRET/PLUTO
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/PLUTO
4
under what circumstances sanctions are removed.
retask t h a t next c u t a t the sanctions s t r a t e g y .
You should
EO 13526 1 4
.d
EO 13526 1.4d
Concurrences by:
Stanley Roth
N
A
Attachments
Tab I
Agenda
Tab I I
State Discussion Paper
Tab I I I
Cables on IAEA Inspections
Tab IV
DPRK L e t t e r t o the Vice President
Tab V
State and ACDA Papers on T h i r d Round Strategy
SECRET/PLUTO
OCINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GECRET/PLUTQ
(DECL:OADR)
ARCHITECTURE FOR THE THIRD ROUND
What We Want from the DPRK
Our o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e i s DPRK agreement t o our "broad and
thorough" approach f o r r e s o l v i n g nuclear and other issues,
i n c l u d i n g North Korean r e t u r n .. the NPT, compliance w i t h
'o
f u l l s c o p e safeguards, imple-rentation of the North-South
D e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n D e c l a r a t i o n , and progress on non-nuclear
issues such as the conventional m i l i t a r y balance, m i s s i l e
exports, t e r r o r i s m , and human r i g h t s .
Our primary immediate o b j e c t i v e i s North Korea's r e t u r n
to f u l l membership i n the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty (NPT) and
compliance w i t h i t s fu'ilscope safeguards o b l i g a t i o n s under
the Treaty. NPT compliance requires t h a t the DPRK accept
r o u t i n e and ad hoc inspections and cooperate and a s s i s t the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) t o v e r i f y North
Korea's i n i t i a l plutonium d e c l a r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g s p e c i a l
inspections.
We would require t h a t the DPRK's commit t o
accept measures t o resolve d i s c r e p a n c i e s , i n c l u d i n g special
inspections]
EO 13526 1.4d
We would also i n s i s t t h a t the North m a i n t a i n the current
"freeze" on i t s nuclear program (e.g., no reprocessing),
which ensures no a d d i t i o n a l production or d i v e r s i o n o f
nuclear m a t e r i a l as a basic c o n d i t i o n f o r c o n t i n u i n g the
process leading t o a thorough and broad r e s o l u t i o n . We would
also attempt t o convince the DPRK t o r e f r a i n from a d d i t i o n a l
steps t h a t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of
the nuclear issue.
For example, since f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n
includes DPRK conversion t o l i g h t water r e a c t o r s , we could
argue t h a t the DPRK should h a l t f u r t h e r development of i t s
g r a p h i t e reactor-based i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ( i . e . , no r e f u e l i n g the
5 M r e a c t o r , cease c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the 50 and 200 M
W
W
r e a c t o r s ) . To support our non-nuclear o b j e c t i v e s , we could
also seek DPRK agreement t o suspend f u r t h e r m i s s i l e exports.
EO 13526 1.4d
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�GCCnET/PLUTQ
- 2What- We Would O f f e r
We would commit t o implement a long term plan on the basis
of r e c i p r o c i t y to improve U.S./DPRK b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s ,
address t h ^ North's s t a t e d s e c u r i t y concern
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 l.4d
|and support i n t e r n a t i o n a l assistance to the
North's energy sector
EO 13526 1.4d
I EQ 13526 1.4d Iwe would s t a t e c l e a r l y that we are prepared to
e s t a b l i s h f u l l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , l i f t b i l a t e r a l economic
s anctions
EO 13526 1.4d
and
f a c i l i t a t e m u l t i l a t e r a l p r o v i s i o n of a l i g h t water r e a c t o r .
In the short term, we would agree t o take s p e c i f i c steps as
the North moves toward f u l l compliance w i t h i t s NPT
o b l i g a t i o n s . We can begin taking steps as the North implements
ad h o c / r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n s , and moves t o implement measures
necessary t o c l e a r up past discrepancies i n i t s plutonium
production d e c l a r a t i o n . !
E0 13526 1.4d
Once B l i x r e p o r t s t o the IAEA Board o f Governors t h a t North
Korea has s a t i s f i e d the IAEA requirements t o v e r i f y i t s
plutonium d e c l a r a t i o n and i s i n compliance w i t h i t s safeguards
o b l i g a t i o n s under the NPT|
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
|(The attached
paper and t i m e l i n e provides a d e t a i l e d scenario f o r
simultaneous a c t i o n s leading t o s p e c i a l i n s p e c t i o n s . )
Form of the Agreement
I f p o s s i b l e , we would conclude a j o i n t "framework
agreement", l a y i n g out both sides' commitment t o the p r i n c i p l e s
and o b j e c t i v e s of our broad and thorough approach.
This
framework agreement could be issued as a j o i n t statement t o
mark the end of the meetings i n Geneva.
In any event, we would seek agreement on a s p e c i f i c
t i m e t a b l e and sequence f o r implementing the North's compliance
w i t h i t s NPT o b l i g a t i o n s and the r e c i p r o c a l U.S. a c t i o n s t h a t
w i l l be taken along the way.|
EQ 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
Scenario f o r the T h i r d Round
We e n v i s i o n roughly two weeks of meetings i n Geneva.
1. F i r s t Session
I n two or t h r e e days of formal meetings,
we w i l l present our concept of a "broad and thorough
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET/DLUTQ
- 3r e s o l u t i o n " and l i s t e n t o the North Korean proposal f o r
"comprehensive package s o l u t i o n . " I n t h i s opening session,
we a n t i c i p a t e t h a t the U.S. and DPRK p o s i t i o n s w i l l be f a r
apart. I n a 4 March p u b l i c statement, v i c e M i n i s t e r Kang
Sok Ju suggested t h a t the DPRK's "comprehensive s o l u t i o n "
requires " t e r m i n a t i o n of the U.S. nuclear t h r e a t and
h o s t i l e p o l i c y against the DPRK, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i g h t
water r e a c t o r s , and the improvement of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s "
in exchange f o r resumption of IAEA ad hoc and r o u t i n e
i n s p e c t i o n s . The North i s l i k e l y to be p l e a s a n t l y
s u r p r i s e d by what we are prepared t o o f f e r over the long
term on the d i p l o m a t i c frontf
EO 13526 1.4d
Over lunch and i n the margins, where the r e a l bargaining i s
done, A/S G a l l u c c i w i l l begin to s p e l l out our minimum
requirements f o r c o n t i n u i n g the process, i n c l u d i n g DPRK
commitment t o accept and complete measures t o resolve
d e c l a r a t i o n d i s c r e p a n c i e s such as s p e c i a l i n s p e c t i o n s
EO 13526 l.4d
[Presumably, Kang w i l l also drop h i n t s
about what the.DPRK r e a l i s t i c a l l y expects from the U.S. i n
exchange f o r resuming ad hoc and r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n s .
2. The Break Once the formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s are completed,
we would propose t o break f o r a few days f o r
c o n s u l t a t i o n s . Kang may need to r e t u r n t o Pyongyang f o r
further instructions
EQ 13526 1 4
.d
EO 13526 1.4d
3. Second Session A f t e r the break, we would reconvene t o
determine whether a basis e x i s t s f o r c o n t i n u i n g the t a l k s ,
EO 13526 1.4d
I f the North accepts our basic approach, we would begin
work on a framework agreement and as much of t h e
implementing agreement as p o s s i b l e . Depending on
circumstances, we could t a c k l e the issues s e r i a t i m , or the
d e l e g a t i o n s could d i v i d e i n t o working groups t o n e g o t i a t e
i n d i v i d u a l elements simultaneously. The most contentious
EO 13526 1.4d
would need to be
issues
reserved Eor d i r e c t GaTlucct^Kang t a l k * .
-
�- 4 -
In any event, the n e g o t i a t i o n s are l i k e l y to be
difficult.|
EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
very
�- 5 What Happens I f the Talks f a i l ?
EO 13526 1 4
.d
�•ODORDT/PLUTO
20638
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee
May 20, 1994
DATE
S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
4:40-5:35 p.m.
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f PC Meeting on N o r t h Korea (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e :
Leon F u e r t h
State:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Robert G a l l u c c i
The White House:
Anthony Lake
Samuel Berger
NSC:
D a n i e l Poneman
DOD:
W i l l i a m Perry
USUN:
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
CIA:
James Woolsey
JCS:
John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Summary o f Conclusions
ACDA:
John Holum
I t was agreed
that:
I n speaking t o t h e DPRK r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n New York on May
21, S t a t e w i l l s e t a date o f June 1 f o r t h e t h i r d round,
p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e IAEA does n o t conclude between now and
then t h a t t h e DPRK has d i v e r t e d a d d i t i o n a l n u c l e a r m a t e r i a l
from t h e core o f t h e 5 M r e a c t o r o r p r e c l u d e d t h e IAEA from
W
t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o conduct h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e spent
f u e l i n t h e core.
OBCRET/PLUTO-p T K \ \
D e c l a s s i f y OAJ L i)AM>I
DECLASSIFIED
PER E,0.13526
�2
The date o f June 1 w i l l n o t be made p u b l i c o r
backbriefed outside the P r i n c i p a l s ' present a t t h e
meeting.
Our p u b l i c diplomacy w i l l s t r e s s t h a t we have p r e v e n t e d
future diversion o f plutonium while preserving the a b i l i t y
t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n s t o c l a r i f y whether t h e r e have been p a s t
d i v e r s i o n s o f p l u t o n i u m beyond t h e amounts d e c l a r e d by t h e
DPRK t o t h e IAEA.
We w i l l encourage Nunn and Lugar t o accept an i n v i t a t i o n t o
t r a v e l t o N o r t h Korea, n o t as A d m i n i s t r a t i o n e m i s s a r i e s b u t
on a f a c t f i n d i n g m i s s i o n . I f p o s s i b l e , t h e y should t r a v e l
b e f o r e t h e t h i r d round; o t h e r w i s e t h e y can t r a v e l a f t e r t h e
t h i r d round. We w i l l n o t d e f e r t h e date o f a t h i r d round.
S t a t e and OVP w i l l d i s c u s s whether o r n o t t h e l e t t e r t o
the Vice P r e s i d e n t i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e t o
respond t o t h e i n v i t a t i o n t o Nunn and Lugar.
On t h e t h i r d round s t r a t e g y , t h e SSK w i l l prepare two
o p t i o n s f o r P r i n c i p a l s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n . One o p t i o n would
approach t h e i s s u e w i t h e a r l y , major steps designed t o
achieve c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s i n t h e near term; t h e o t h e r would
t a k e a more measured approach t o account f o r t h e r i s k o f
DPRK r e v e r s a l s . These p r o p o s a l s s h o u l d be s p e l l e d o u t i n
s u b s t a n t i a l d e t a i l , e.g., i n t h e form o f a d r a f t framework
agreement.
The SSK s h o u l d a l s o sharpen t h e a n a l y s i s i n t h e s a n c t i o n s
paper f o r f u r t h e r P r i n c i p a l s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Press themes s h o u l d emphasize t h a t we view t h i s s i t u a t i o n as
s e r i o u s , t h a t i t i s n o t c l e a r how i t w i l l t u r n o u t , b u t t h a t
we have seen progress i n r e c e n t days i n p r e v e n t i n g t h e r i s k
of f u t u r e d i v e r s i o n o f p l u t o n i u m . We s t i l l have q u e s t i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g past North Korean n u c l e a r a c t i v i t y , which we w i l l
c o n t i n u e t o press i n t h e t h i r d round.
•0E6RBT/PLUT0
CLINTON UWYrWOCOPY
�
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Declassified Documents concerning North Korea
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2013-0870-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on a Principals Committe (PC) meeting on North Korea from May 20, 1994. Included is the PC summary of conclusions and a background memo to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake regarding the upcoming PC meeting.
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
North Korea
Nuclear
PC
Principals Committee
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/d353a77f2fd57e6606d09ef905bcc817.pdf
2cf896d54030a70c49b57e0361fae0da
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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�25 January. 1995
TALKING PAPER
Subject:
Reinforcing UNPROFOR
1. Purpose. To provide talking points on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR.
2. Talking Points
• UNPROFOR continues to perform a valuable mission in Bosnia,
including facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and establishing the
conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.
• UNPROFOR has requested 6,500 additional troops and equipment to
support the current cessation of hostilities agreement, to Improve Its
capability to protect itself.and to respond to acts by the warring parties
against UNPROFOR. These additional troops and equipment would provide
operational flexibility, better ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. and
allow the use of more robust measures to keep ground and air aid corridors
open.
• On several occasions, most recently In Blhac. UNPROFOR could have
done a better job tf it had more manpower and equipment resources,
including helicopters, at its disposal.
• The NATO Chiefs of Defense met with UN. Russia, and other Interested
nations at The Hague. Netherlands, in December to consider how
UNPROFOR could be made more effective. Two initiatives resulted from
this meeting:
-the formulation of concepts for maintaining open the air and land
routes into Sarajevo and the enclaves, and
-the decision to offer UNPROFOR additional manpower and equipment
to better accomplish Its mission.
• As a result of this Initiative fourteen countries have offered almost 6,000
troops and significant additional equipment.
• We consider it essential to support this efTort and have offered to the UN
helicopters, armored personnel carriers, radars, radios, night vision
goggles, and assorted engineer vehicles on a lease or sale basis.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�• The success of the cessation of hostilities agreement would be a
significant achievement on the road to a peaceful settlement In the former
Yugoslavia. The UN deserves the help of the entire international
community to take advantage of this cessation of hostilities to better
prepare for whatever comes next.
• The UN is still evaluating all the offers it has received. We expect the UN
to inform us shortly of their desires. At that time we will negotiate financial
arrangements for sale or lease of the equipment offered by the U.S.
government.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Text
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Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
Identifier
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2013-0682-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings on Bosnia from 1993 thru 1995. Included is a Department of Defense paper on reinforcing the U.N. protection force in Bosnia from January 1995.
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2013-0682-M
7388808
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Deputies Committee
Foreign Policy
PC
Principals Committee
Washington D.C.
-
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01b1e7d4a2ae222223160e413121df06
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�9325703
United States Department
of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 4, 19 9 3
DECL: OADR
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Moving Forward w i t h t h e Peacekeeping PDD
We have reviewed t h e d r a f t PDD on peacekeeping i n l i g h t o f
the events o f recent weeks and have concluded t h a t i t remains a
s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n upon which t o base U.S. peacekeeping p o l i c y .
We have a l s o concluded, however, t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
m o d i f i c a t i o n s S t a t e proposed on September 23, r e v i s e d s e c t i o n s
are r e q u i r e d on: ( 1 ) s h a r i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ( 2 ) U.S. f i n a n c i n g ,
and ( 3 ) command o f U.S. f o r c e s .
(1) Shared
responsibility:
S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e Department c o n t i n u e s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e
needs t o be g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e d i v i s i o n o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y than i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e document. The mere
presence ( o r l a c k t h e r e o f ) o f U.S. combat f o r c e s i n a Chapter V I
peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n may n o t be t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n
f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e lead agency.
(For example, a U.S. i n f a n t r y
company may be o n l y a s m a l l p a r t o f l a r g e r UN m i l i t a r y presence
whether under Chapter V I o r V I I . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , non-combat U.S.
u n i t s such as e n g i n e e r s may form t h e b u l k o f a Chapter V I
operation.)
The P r e s i d e n t should have t h e a b i l i t y t o designate
e i t h e r S t a t e o r DoD as t h e lead agency f o r a p a r t i c u l a r
o p e r a t i o n i f t h e circumstances warrant.
We suggest t h e
i n s e r t i o n o f a new t h i r d t i c k under paragraph 9.A. o f t h e P o l i c y
Guidance.
"-- I n a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e P r e s i d e n t may d e s i g n a t e
e i t h e r S t a t e o r DoD as lead agency f o r Chapter V I
o p e r a t i o n s , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e presence o f U.S. combat
units."
DECL: OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY P O" C P
H 0 0Y
DECLASSIFIED
PERE
"
a 13526
�SECRET
-2In a d d i t i o n , i n the f i r s t t i c k under Paragraph 9.A, replace
the clause " i n which U.S. combat u n i t s are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g "
w i t h "unless a s i g n i f i c a n t number of U.S. combat troops are
p a r t i c i p a t i n g . " I n the second t i c k , replace "U.S. combat u n i t s "
at the end of the f i r s t sentence w i t h "a s i g n i f i c a n t number of
U.S. combat troops."
(2) U.S. Funding:
Annex I I I should include a sentence r e a f f i r m i n g the
President's statement t h a t the U.S. assessment must be lowered.
The document should also r e c a l l that the Congress has recentlyd i r e c t e d us to make clear t o the UN t h a t our assessment should
be no more than 25 percent. Annex VI requires r e v i s i o n to
r e f l e c t the P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee decision to share
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r oversight and funding of peacekeeping
operations. Paragraph 2 on the long-term approach t o
reimbursement should r e f l e c t the decision to seek a separate DoD
CIPA account t o pay U.S. assessments f o r Chapter V I I operations
and those Chapter V I operations w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t U.S. m i l i t a r y
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . A proposed r e d r a f t i s at Tab A. Although t h i s
change i s consistent w i t h the shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y model, we
w i l l need to discuss i t f u r t h e r w i t h DoD and the NSC.
(3) Command of U.S. Forces:
Paragraph 9.D. on page 9 should be strengthened by changing
the f i r s t sentence t o read: "The President r e t a i n s and w i l l not
r e l i n q u i s h command a u t h o r i t y over U.S. forces." JCS and OSD
should agree w i t h t h i s change.
Thank you f o r your assistance i n t h i s matter.
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary
DCE*
ERT.
(DECL: OADR)
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�ANNEX VI
Reimbursement Policy f o r U.S. Contributions
to UN Peacekeeping Operations
There i s interagency agreement t h a t the U.S. should be
reimbursed by the United Nations when DoD c o n t r i b u t e s troops,
supplies or services t o assessed UN peacekeeping operations. As
a matter of p o l i c y u n t i l permanent change i s achieved i n the way
that the USG funds UN peace operations. State and DoD have
agreed t o the f o l l o w i n g procedures, without prejudice t o each
agency's views of e x i s t i n g legal a u t h o r i t i e s :
1. SHORT-TERM: I n the short-term, State and DoD w i l l continue to
consider each assessed UN peacekeeping operation on a
case-by-case basis.
l a . DoD Troop Contributions: When DoD d e t a i l s forces t o
assessed UN peacekeeping operations under e i t h e r Chapter VI
(peacekeeping) or Chapter V I I (peace enforcement) of the UN
Charter, the U.S. s h a l l seek the normal reimbursement to which
a l l troop c o n t r i b u t o r nations are e n t i t l e d (e.g.,
$988/troop/month; or $1279/troop/month f o r s p e c i a l i s t s ) .
Such reimbursement, i n excess of DoD component incremental
troop costs, could be used, t o the extent provided under
e x i s t i n g s t a t u t e s , t o o f f s e t the USG's peacekeeping assessment
-- paid from the e x i s t i n g State CIPA account.
l b . DoD Goods and Services: When DoD provides goods or
services (e.g., l i f t , l o g i s t i c s support, medical or technical
services) t o assessed UN peacekeeping operations, DoD s h a l l seek
d i r e c t reimbursement from the UN.
DoD and State w i l l consult i n exceptional s i t u a t i o n s which
may require waiver of reimbursement. I n such exceptional"
circumstances, when DoD and State agree, DoD would waive
reimbursement. DoD believes that we should consider such a
waiver only when the UN i s not i n a p o s i t i o n t o provide
reimbursement. When the UN does not reimburse DoD, State
believes that i t may seek a c r e d i t against i t s peacekeeping
assessment. State and Defense agree t h a t we should continue t o
resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis.
2. LONG-TERM: Under the shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y model, the
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would seek new l e g i s l a t i o n t o authorize the
President t o pay expenses f o r c e r t a i n UN assessed peace
operations from funds authorized t o be appropriated t o a new DoD
account — a DoD Contributions f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace
Operations A c t i v i t i e s (CIPA) Account.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-2I f such l e g i s l a t i o n i s enacted, funds appropriated t o t h i s
account would pay f o r the U.S. assessments f o r Chapter V I I peace
operations and those Chapter VI operations i n v o l v i n g s i g n i f i c a n t
U.S. forces.
2a. DoD Troop C o n t r i b u t i o n s : When DoD d e t a i l s forces t o assessed
UN Chapter V I I operations, or s i g n i f i c a n t forces t o Chapter VI
operations, the U.S. s h a l l seek the normal UN reimbursement f o r
troop c o n t r i b u t o r nations (e.g., the $988 or $1279).
Such reimbursement i n excess of DoD's incremental troop
costs could be used, t o the extent provided by DoD a u t h o r i t i e s ,
to o f f s e t the USG assessment paid from the DoD CIPA.
2b. DoD Goods and Services: When DoD provides goods or services
to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the U.S. s h a l l seek
reimbursement f o r the costs of DoD c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
(1) DoD normally s h a l l seek d i r e c t reimbursement from the UN
for the incremental costs of goods and services provided. Such
reimbursement w i l l be credited t o appropriate DoD components'
appropriations.
(2) On a case-by-case basis, DoD and the Department of State
j o i n t l y could waive some or a l l of t h i s d i r e c t reimbursement
based on considerations such as: assessment of the importance of
the operation t o U.S. p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s ; the
timeliness and a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds from the DoD a p p r o p r i a t i o n
f o r peacekeeping t o reimburse DoD components, personnel and
other resources; and the impact on the M i l i t a r y Departments.
I f the U.S. waives d i r e c t reimbursement:
— the U.S. may seek reimbursement through a UN c r e d i t t o
the U.S. peacekeeping assessment (State or DoD CIPA, as
appropriate) f o r up t o the f u l l value ( i . e . , base and
incremental costs) of DoD's c o n t r i b u t i o n ; and
— DoD component incremental costs w i l l be reimbursed from
the DoD a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r peacekeeping.
DECL: OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
20520
I
December 30, 1993
QZO
SECngfDECL: OADR
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT:
F i n a l i z i n g t h e D r a f t PDD on Peacekeeping
Policy
At your l u n c h on December 29 w i t h A c t i ng Secreta ry T a r n o f f
you suggested t h a t t h e o n l y ou t s t a n d i n g i s sue on t h eproposed
peacekeeping p o l i c y r e l a t e d t o the t i m i n g of seeking amendments
to S e c t i o n 7 o f t h e UN P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t . The S t a t e Department
i s eager t o f i n a l i z e t h e peace keeping PDD. However, w i t h o u t t h e
b e n e f i t o f seeing how our e a r l i e r comments were i n c o r p o r a t e d
ee
i n t o t h e PDD, i t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r St ate t o agr t h a t t h e
PDD i s indeed ready t o present t o t h e Pres i d e n t and the Congress,
I n our memorandum o f December 6, we h i g h l i g h t e d s e v e r a l
o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g : amending t h e UN P a r t i c i p a t i o n
A c t ; shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; Annex V I on reimbursement p o l i c y ;
and Annex V I I on terms and d e f i n i t i o n s .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r b e l i e v e s t h a t any r e f e r e n c e t o
amending t h e UN P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t s h o u l d be removed from t h e PDD
at t h i s t i m e . Even w i t h caveats, he i s concerned t h a t r a i s i n g
the i s s u e i n t h e c u r r e n t Congressional c l i m a t e w i l l foment a
debate t h a t c o u l d d e r a i l our e f f o r t s t o improve UN
peacekeeping. The q u e s t i o n would be r e v i s i t e d l a t e r , once we
had gained C o n g r e s s i o n a l support f o r our o v e r a l l p o l i c y .
The NSC forwarded t h i s week a d r a f t l e g i s l a t i v e p r o p o s a l and
accompanying e x e c u t i v e order c r e a t i n g a DoD CIPA account.
This
p r o p o s a l d i d n o t r e f l e c t the agreement between you and t h e
S e c r e t a r y a t l a s t week's lunch t h a t DoD would have l e a d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n l y f o r Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s and those Chapter
VI o p e r a t i o n s i n which " s i g n i f i c a n t " U.S. combat u n i t s a r e
participating.
—SECRET"
PERE a 1 3 5 2 6
CLINTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0PY '
�GECRET
-2JCS i n f o r m a l l y sent t o S t a t e i n mid-December proposed
r e v i s i o n s t o Annex V I (reimbursement p o l i c y ) and Annex V I I
(terms and d e f i n i t i o n s ) .
We w i l l have S t a t e comments ready t h e
f i r s t week o f January.
The Department requests t h a t a f i n a l v e r s i o n o f t h e PDD be
p r o v i d e d f o r t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s a p p r o v a l . We w i l l p r o v i d e comments
e x p e d i t i o u s l y , and suggest t h a t a P r i n c i p a l s Committee meeting
be c a l l e d i n t h e near f u t u r e t o b r i n g t h i s document t o c l o s u r e .
Thank you v e r y much f o r your a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s
jfe Md
a
[) E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y
GECRET
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
matter.
�9327944
^
O
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
December 6, 1993
CEGgcr~
DECL: OADR
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Moving Forward w i t h
t h e Peacekeeping PDD
We have reviewed t h e d r a f t PDD on peacekeeping i n l i g h t o f
the events o f r e c e n t weeks and have concluded t h a t i t remains a
s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n upon which t o base U.S. peacekeeping p o l i c y .
We have a l s o concluded, however, t h a t r e v i s e d s e c t i o n s are
r e q u i r e d on: ( 1 ) s h a r i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ( 2 ) peacekeeping i n
the former S o v i e t Union, ( 3 ) t h e UN F i e l d O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n ,
(4) Annex V I I , ( 5 ) t h e s e c t i o n on amending t h e UN P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Act, and ( 6 ) U.S. f i n a n c i n g .
(1)
Shared
Responsibility:
The p r i m a r y purpose o f t h e shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y model i s
t o improve peacekeeping p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
and t o ensure adequate f i n a n c i n g by drawing on t h e s t r e n g t h s o f
b o t h S t a t e and Defense. For t h i s p o l i c y t o work e f f e c t i v e l y ,
lead r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n d i v i d u a l o p e r a t i o n s must be assigned
t o t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e agency.
The i n t e r a g e n c y process has
l a b o r e d t o f i n d a b r i g h t l i n e t h a t would a s s i g n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
s u c c e s s f u l l y . There appears t o be no s a t i s f a c t o r y b r i g h t l i n e
because peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s a r e so d i v e r s e .
As c u r r e n t l y d r a f t e d , t h e PDD assigns t o DoD l e a d p o l i c y
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s ( r e g a r d l e s s o f
the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f U.S. f o r c e s ) and those Chapter V I
o p e r a t i o n s where U.S. combat u n i t s ( i . e . , i n f a n t r y , armor,
a r t i l l e r y ) are p a r t i c i p a t i n g .
(Chapter V I o p e r a t i o n s do n o t
a l l o w f o r combat a c t i v i t y except i n s t r i c t s e l f - d e f e n s e . )
A l t h o u g h t h e c u r r e n t d r a f t PDD g i v e s t h e P r e s i d e n t s l i g h t
f l e x i b i l i t y t o d e s i g n a t e a d i f f e r e n t lead agency f o r Chapter V I
PER E 0 " 3 2
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�-2o p e r a t i o n s i f "unusual" c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a r r a n t (he would not
have f l e x i b i l i t y t o a s s i g n Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s t o S t a t e ) , i n
p r a c t i c e i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o overcome t h e presumption t h a t
DoD s h o u l d have t h e p o l i c y lead whenever U.S. combat t r o o p s are
p r e s e n t , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e a c t u a l r i s k o f f i g h t i n g or t h e s i z e
of t h e U.S. deployment.
The fundamental i s s u e here i s n o t agency p r e r o g a t i v e s b u t
how t o assure c l a r i t y of a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
success i n m a t t e r s t h a t are almost always d i p l o m a t i c a l l y
complex and may have major m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s .
Here a r e a few examples based on c u r r e n t UN o p e r a t i o n s of
how t h e PDD would a s s i g n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y :
Bosnia and C r o a t i a , b o t h Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s , would be
t r a n s f e r r e d t o DoD even though no U.S. combat t r o o p s are
deployed and t h e fundamental q u e s t i o n s are p o l i t i c a l and
diplomatic.
Macedonia, a Chapter V I o p e r a t i o n , would a l s o be
t r a n s f e r r e d t o DoD s i n c e a U.S. i n f a n t r y company makes up a
s m a l l p a r t o f t h e l a r g e r UN deployment.
UNIKOM, i n I r a q and Kuwait, i s another Chapter V I I
o p e r a t i o n where no U.S. t r o o p s are deployed and our
i n t e r e s t s are o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d i p l o m a t i c , y e t DoD would
assume t h e l e a d i n managing our peacekeeping p o l i c y .
Even i n Somalia, where t h e r e i s a l a r g e American combat
presence i n a Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n , no one i s a r g u i n g t h a t
l e a d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r our p o l i c y s h o u l d be t u r n e d over t o
DoD. That would happen under t h e c u r r e n t d r a f t o f t h e PDD.
The planned m i s s i o n t o H a i t i , d e s p i t e i t s l a r g e c o n t i n g e n t
of U.S. t r o o p s , would remain under S t a t e d i r e c t i o n because
the t r o o p s i n v o l v e d w i l l be non-combat t r o o p s .
These anomalies are a r e a l problem. They f o r c e DoD,
e s p e c i a l l y , i n t o areas where i t c l a i m s no e x p e r t i s e .
On
C a p i t o l H i l l , we can expect q u e s t i o n s t h a t can j e o p a r d i z e t h e
e n t i r e shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y approach.
I f t h e r e i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y b r i g h t l i n e , t h e o n l y o p t i o n
seems t o be p r e s i d e n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n . T h i s t o o w i l l have
problems on t h e H i l l , b u t a t l e a s t i t p r o v i d e s a r a t i o n a l
response on t h e i s s u e . We t h e r e f o r e propose t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
have d i s c r e t i o n t o a s s i g n b o t h Chapter V I and Chapter V I I
o p e r a t i o n s as c o n d i t i o n s w a r r a n t .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-&B€RgT-3To address t h i s we propose t o m o d i f y t h e f i r s t f u l l t i c k on
page 8 of t h e P o l i c y Guidance t o d e l e t e t h e word " a l l " b e f o r e
Chapter V I I and "those" b e f o r e Chapter V I and i n s e r t t h e word
" s i g n i f i c a n t " i n f r o n t of t h e phrase U.S. combat u n i t s i n the
f i r s t sentence. We a l s o propose changing t h e second f u l l t i c k
to read:
"The P r e s i d e n t may choose t o d e s i g n a t e e i t h e r S t a t e or DOD
as l e a d agency f o r Chapter V I or Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s ,
i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e presence of U.S. combat u n i t s . "
A l s o , t h e r e i s a need t o ensure t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
o v e r s i g h t of f u l f i l l m e n t of U.S. o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h e UN i s
c e n t r a l i z e d i n one p l a c e , even i f , f o r example, t h e U.S.
assessed c o n t r i b u t i o n i s p a i d from two accounts. Thus on
page 3 of t h e PDD, i n t h e p e n u l t i m a t e paragraph, i n t h e l a s t
sentence (and on page 7 of t h e P o l i c y Guidance, i n
paragraph 9a, i n t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e ) , we^propose adding a f t e r
"The conduct of diplomacy," t h e p h r a s e , ^ " o v e r s i g h t
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y -regarding t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of USG o b l i g a t i o n s t o
the
UN,".
(2)
Peacekeeping
i n the Former S o v i e t Union:
The P o l i c y Guidance (page 3, s e c t i o n 7, f i r s t t i c k )
addresses i n one paragraph b o t h our p o l i c y f o r t r a d i t i o n a l
"blue-helmeted" peacekeeping i n t h e former S o v i e t Union and our
w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n s i d e r on a case-by-case b a s i s a v o l u n t a r y
fund f o r peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s by Russia and o t h e r r e g i o n a l
s t a t e s . These a r e , i n f a c t , s e p a r a t e i s s u e s . A l l c u r r e n t ,
t r a d i t i o n a l "blue-helmeted" o p e r a t i o n s are funded by
assessment.
We f i n d no s u p p o r t i n t h e UNSC f o r changing t h a t
p o l i c y . Our t a l k s w i t h t h e Russians about v o l u n t a r y funds have
focused on a p o s s i b l e r e g i o n a l peacekeeping f o r c e (Russia and
o t h e r former S o v i e t Union s t a t e s ) t h a t might o p e r a t e under a UN
mandate, but would not be a "blue-helmeted" UN o p e r a t i o n .
We
proposed amending t h e l a s t sentence o f t h i s t i c k t o d e l e t e t h e
f i r s t word " i n s t e a d " and t o move t h e remainder of t h e sentence
down t o become t h e t h i r d t i c k of t h e s e c t i o n .
(3)
Logistics
Division:
On page f i v e of t h e P o l i c y Guidance ( t i c k on L o g i s t i c s
D i v i s i o n ) a minor f i x i s needed t o r e f l e c t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
t r a n s f e r of F i e l d O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n t o t h e Department of
Peacekeeping O p e r a t i o n s has a l r e a d y been accomplished.
The
second sentence of t h e t i c k s h o u l d read "The U.S.
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t s t h e t r a n s f e r of t h e F i e l d O p e r a t i o n s
D i v i s i o n (FOD) from the Department of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
—SBGRfiT""*
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�GECRET-4(4)
Annex V I I - Legal A u t h o r i t y , Terms and D e f i n i t i o n s :
There has been no i n t e r - a g e n c y d i s c u s s i o n and no
i n t e r - a g e n c y agreement o f t h e terms d e f i n e d i n Annex V I I . The
Annex does not always a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t c u r r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s i n
use, nor i s i t always l e g a l l y c o r r e c t . We a l s o note t h a t t h e
f o o t n o t e a t t h e bottom o f page 1 o f t h e P o l i c y Guidance p o i n t s
out t h e these terms are t o guide m i l i t a r y p r a c t i t i o n e r s w i t h i n
t h e USG. Given t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n has l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n
w i t h i n the USG and does not have i n t e r - a g e n c y agreement, we
propose d e l e t i n g t h e Annex. The f o o t n o t e a t t h e bottom o f page
one o f the P o l i c y Guidance should a l s o be amended t o r e f l e c t
t h i s change. A p r e f e r a b l e o p t i o n t o i n c l u d i n g t h e Annex would
be t o charge t h e Peacekeeping Core Group w i t h d e v e l o p i n g a set
of d e f i n i t i o n s which would meet DOD's needs and have
i n t e r - a g e n c y acceptance.
(5)
Amending the UN P a r t i c i p a t i o n A c t :
The P o l i c y Guidance (Page 8, paragraph 9C, f i r s t t i c k )
c o n t i n u e s t o s t a t e t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l seek an
amendment t o s e c t i o n 7 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations P a r t i c i p a t i o n Act
t h a t would remove l i m i t a t i o n s on use o f personnel i n Chapter V I
o p e r a t i o n s and, " t o t h e e x t e n t i t i s p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , "
d e l e t e p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t u s i n g s e c t i o n 7 as a u t h o r i t y t o
support Chapter V I I o p e r a t i o n s .
Amending the UNPA i s p r o b a b l y p o l i t i c a l l y i n f e a s i b l e f o r
the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e .
I t i s hard t o imagine Congress
removing l e g i s l a t i v e h u r d l e s f o r the use o f U.S. assets and
personnel i n peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s . Rather than g i v e t h e
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e f i x i s a t t h e t o p o f our
agenda, i t might be more a d v i s a b l e t o remove i t a l t o g e t h e r from
the PDD and r e s e r v e i t f o r another day.
I n doing so, we might
preempt what would o t h e r w i s e be c e r t a i n c o n g r e s s i o n a l
opposition.
(This i s also w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o the President's
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e s as Commander-in-Chief.)
(6)
U.S. Funding:
On page two o f t h e PDD t h e f i r s t sentence i n t h e t h i r d t i c k
(the one which begins "Having c o n s i d e r e d t h e f a c t o r s i n Annex
I . . . " ) should have t h e words "the U.S. and" i n s e r t e d b e f o r e the
words " o t h e r n a t i o n s " i n the phrase t h a t c u r r e n t l y reads "when
o t h e r n a t i o n s are prepared t o support the e f f o r t w i t h f o r c e s
and f u n d s ; " .
GECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�-sgeggr-5Annex I I I should i n c l u d e a sentence r e a f f i r m i n g t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s statement t h a t the U.S. assessment must be
lowered.
The document should a l s o r e c a l l t h a t t h e Congress has
r e c e n t l y d i r e c t e d us t o make c l e a r t o the UN t h a t our
assessment should be no more than 25 p e r c e n t .
The t h i r d t i c k of
a d d i t i o n of Japan and
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and
share of peacekeeping
percent t a r g e t .
Annex I I I should a l s o note t h a t the
Germany as permanent members o f the
an agreement by China t o pay a l a r g e r
assessments, are r e q u i r e d t o meet the 25
Thank you f o r your a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s m a t t e r .
7"
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary
(DECL: OADR)
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�GECRET
Note t o : TL
Re: The S t a t u s o f PDD on Peacekeeping
Jim Reed asked t h a t I g i v e you a note on j ^ ^ s t a t u s o f t h e
a t t a c h e d package. The s t a t u s o f t h e a t t a c h e d package i s t h e same
today as i t was on 15 December. The a t t a c h e d t e x t i s agreed,
w i t h t h e e x c p e t i o n t h a t S t a t e does n o t want t o mention seeking
amendments t o t h e UNPA, as noted.
I n y o u r m a r g i n a l i a , you
d i s a g r e e w i t h S t a t e . With t h a t d e c i s i o n , t h e t e x t i s c l e a r e d .
S t a t e s t a f f had promised comments on annexes V I and V I I , b u t
have n o t p r o v i d e d any d e s p i t e our r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s t o g e t them
t o do so.
The Implemenating l e g i s l a t i o n on Shared R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s
o u t f o r i n t e r a g e n c y c o o r d i n a t i o n by n e x t week. I t l o o k s l i k e we
have 98% agreement on a t e x t .
;ick
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CLINTON
£ P OO O Y
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�J H N y4 '34
02:41PM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TAGS: UN, AORC, PREL-, M R - A U
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SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SECRETARY GENERAL O U.S.
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PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE
1. 'CONflDCNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. S M A Y AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT IS REQUESTED T SEEK AN
UMR:
O
APPOINTMENT UITH THE SYG O A URGENT BASIS TO EXPLAIN TO
N N
HIM U.S. PLANS FOR REDUCING THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING RATE OF
ASSESSMENT AND TO SEEK HIS SUPPORT FOR THIS EFFORT. AS
EXPLAINED BELOW; THESE PLANS INCLUDE ESTABLISHING
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE DIFFERENT GROUPS
OF THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE-, ADDING JAPAN AND G R A Y AS
EMN
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND PERSUADING
CHINA VOLUNTARILY TO ACCEPT A GREATLY INCREASED
PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE. END S M A Y
UMR.
CHANGES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS
3. IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING
THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING RATE OF ASSESSMENT, THE SECRETARY
HAS APPROVED SEEKING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE U
N
-COttFIDCNTlAL
PER E.O.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�JHN 04 ' 9 4
02:42PM
P.10
^OHI'lULW 1 IAL
PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS:
A. USE PLACEMENT O THE LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
N
APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS THE CRITERION FOR
MEMBERSHIP IN GROUP D. THIS W U D PROVIDE AN OBJECTIVE
OL
STANDARD TO BE APPLIED AUTOMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS.
UNDER THIS STANDARD N W FIVE COUNTRIES W U D BE M V D
O,
OL
OE
FROM GROUP C TO GROUP D AND FIFTEEN FROM GROUP D TO GROUP
C. THE NET EFFECT ON THE U.S. RATE WOULD BE MINIMAL,
REDUCING IT FROM 31.73T PERCENT TO 31.733 PERCENT, BUT
ADVOCATING IT W U D DEMONSTRATE A "CLEAN H N S * APPROACH.
OL
AD*
— THE FIVE COUNTRIES TO MOVE FROM GROUP C TO GROUP D
ARE: LIBERIA, ZAMBIA, MADAGASCAR, ZAIRE, AND CAMBODIA•
THE FIFTEEN COUNTRIES TO MOVE FROM GROUP D TO GROUP C
ARE: ANGOLA, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BELIZE, DOMINICA,
GAMBIA, GRENADA, NAMIBIA, PAPUA N W GUINEA, ST. KITTS AND
E
NEVIS-. ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT AND GRENADINES, SENEGAL,
SEYCHELLES, SURINAM, AND ZIMBABWE.
B. USE THE W R D PER CAPITA INCOME AVERAGE AS THE
OL
CRITERION FOR GRADUATING MEMBERS FROM GROUP C TO GROUP B.
THIS W U D BE ANOTHER OBJECTIVE STANDARD THAT COULD BE
OL
APPLIED AUTOMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS. THE UN SECRETARIAT
HAS INDICATED THAT THE W R D PER CAPITA INCOME LEVEL
OL
AVERAGE FOR THE CURRENT SCALE'S BASE PERIOD OF l 380-a J IS
DOLS. a,bOO. APPLYING THE STANDARD N W W U D MOVE
O
OL
TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES UP TO GROUP B. IN ADDITION TO THE
CHANGE ABOVE, THIS W U D REDUCE THE U.S. RATE TO
OL
PERCENT.
,
,
THE TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES - A D THEIR AVERAGE PER CAPITA
CN
INCOMES} TO M V F O G O P C TO GROUP 8 CURRENTLY ARE S
OE RM RU
(3ATAR - D L . 17,4^5}, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES {DOLS• 17,470},
COS
KUWAIT - D L . 15,S0H>, BRUNEI DARUSSALAM {DOLS. 13,lHb},
COS
SAUDI ARABIA {DOLS. 6,526}, BAHAMAS {DOLS. 7,SS2}, LIBYA
{DOLS. b^SS^}, SINGAPORE {DOLS. b ^ W ,
BAHRAIN {DOLS.
b,lfiQ}, ISRAEL {DOLS. b ^ ? ! } , SLOVENIA {DOLS. 4,155}, O A
MN
{DOLS. 4,7^1}, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO {DOLS. 4,b£4}, BARBADOS
{DOLS. H,3fcb}, LATVIA, {DOLS. 4,155}, MALTA {DOLS. 4,077},
CYPRUS {DOLS• 3,114}, KAZAKHSTAN {DOLS. 3,610}, ESTONIA
{DOLS. 3,610}, GREECE {DOLS. 3,766}, LITHUANIA {DOLS.
3,471}, GEORGIA {DOLS• 3,15b}, CROATIA {DOLS• 3,153},
VENEZUELA {DOLS. 3,082}, ARMENIA {DOLS. 3,055}, REPUBLIC
OF MOLDOVA {DOLS. 5,151}, AZERBAIJAN {DOLS. 2,bib}, G B N
AO
{DOLS • 2,bl0}, AND PORTUGAL {DOLS. 2,b06}. THE FSU STATES
WOULD CHALLENGE THE STATISTICS PLACING THEM ON THIS LIST.
1
CLINTON LIBf¥<f#^IOT0C0PY
�J H N IJ4 ' 9 4
idc = 45Pr'l
•CONriDCNTIAL
C. ADD JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOWING THE T O CHANGES ABOVE. THIS
W
W U D REDUCE THE U.S. RATE TO E6.0S3 PERCENT.
OL
D. PERSUADE CHINA TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARILY AN INCREASE IN
ITS PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE WITH THE BENEFIT TO BE
SHARED PROPORTIONALLY A O G OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
MN
SECURITY COUNCIL. A MAJOR ANOMALY IN THE CURRENT SCALE IS
THE L W ASSESSMENT RATE OF CHINA J 0-77 PERCENT FOR THE
O
REGULAR BUDGET AND 0.176 PERCENT FOR PEACEKEEPING. AN IMF
STUDY THIS SUMMER, BASED O PURCHASING POWER PARITIES,
N
RANKED THE CHINESE ECONOMY AS THIRD LARGEST IN THE W R D
OL
BEHIND THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. EVEN BY U STATISTICS
N
{BASED O NATIONAL INCOME LEVELS}, THE CHINESE E O O Y IS
N
CNM
THE EIGHTH LARGEST IN THE WORLD WITH AN AVERAGE NATIONAL
INCOME OVER THE 1160-81 BASE PERIOD REPRESENTING £.631
PERCENT OF THAT OF ALL UN MEMBERS. THE L W CHINESE
O
ASSESSMENT RATES REFLECT AN ALLOWANCE IN THE UN FORMULA
FOR L W PER CAPITA INCOME {DOLS. 333 FOR CHINA>. IN VIEW
O
OF CHINA'S ROLE AS A MEMBER OF THE PERM FIVE, ITS
INCREASING INTEREST IN UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES, AND ITS
CURRENTLY BOOMING ECONOMY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO
PERSUADE CHINA TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARILY A SIGNIFICANT
INCREASE IN ITS PEACEKEEPING RATE OF ASSESSMENT AND
TRANSFER THE BENEFIT PROPORTIONATELY A O G THE PERMANENT
MN
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WERE THIS TO BE DONE,
FOR EXAMPLE, O THE BASIS OF CHINA FOREGOING THE BENEFIT
N
OF THE L W PER CAPITA INCOME ALLOWANCE, CHINA'S
O
PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE W U D INCREASE TO 3.164
OL
PERCENT AND THE U.S. RATE W U D DECREASE TO 27.116
OL
PERCENT* ASSUMING THE CHANGES ABOVE ALSO' ARE MADE.
~ THIS ACTION BY CHINA W U D REQUIRE CAREFUL NEGOTIATIONS
OL
WITH CHINA AS A PART OF THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO
ACHIEVE THE OTHER CHANGES SOUGHT IN THE PEACEKEEPING
SCALE. THE TIMING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA W U D
OL
BE INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER CHANGES IN THE SCALE. W R
EE
SUCH AN AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED WITH CHINA BEFORE THE
OTHER CHANGES ARE NEGOTIATED, THE U.S. RATE INITIALLY
WOULD BE REDUCED T 30.20S PERCENT AND CHINA'S N W RATE
O
E
INITIALLY W U D INCREASE TO 3.b0b PERCENT. ASSUMING THE
OL
ULTIMATE COMPLETION OF THE OTHER CHANGES, THE END RESULT
W U D BE THE SAME FOR CHINA AND THE U.S., I.E., 3.16H
OL
PERCENT FOR CHINA AND 27.116 PERCENT FOR THE U.S.
STRATEGY
CLINTON LIBftWWOTOCOPY
p_ j j
�JHN 04 '94 02:47PM
H. WHILE W HAVE T 8E READY T FORCE A VOTE O THE
E
O
O
N
MATTER, IT W U D SE BEST T ACHIEVE APPROVAL BY CONSENSUS
OL
O
FOR THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF
ASSESSMENTS• DOING SO WILL REQUIRE THE RIGHT COMBINATION
OF DIPLOMATIC APPEAL T THE INTERESTS OF THE AFFECTED
O
MEMBERS A D A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF
N
U.S. INTENT. DEPARTMENT ENVISAGES THE FOLLOWING FOUR-PART
STRATEGY:
A. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT W U D MEET WITH THE SYG T EXPLAIN
OL
O
THE OVERALL CHANGES W SEEK A D REQUEST HIS SUPPORT FOR
E
N
THE EFFORT. THE SYG HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION T SEND
O
AN EMISSARY TO SEEK AGREEMENT FROM THE TEN WEALTHIEST
MEMBERS OF GROUP C TO JOIN GROUP B. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE AS
A FIRST STEP, LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENTLY
SENDING THE SAME EMISSARY O OTHERS TO EXTEND THIS LIST TO
R
ALL OF THOSE TWENTY-NINE MEMBERS OF GROUP C WITH PER
CAPITA INCOME LEVELS ABOVE THE WORLD AVERAGE OF DOLS.
2,b00 THAT SHOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN GROUP B {RECOGNIZING
THAT AT LEAST SOME FSU STATES W U D CHALLENGE THEIR PER
OL
CAPITA INCOME LEVEL RANKING} A D TO INCLUDE ALSO THE
N
FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF GROUP D THAT W U D BE ASKED T JOIN
OL
O
GROUP C.
B. SUBJECT TO W A CAN BE W R E , OUT WITH THE SYG,
HT
OKD
PARALLEL DEMARCHES W U D BE .SENT TO THE OTHER PERM FOUR,
OL
THE EC, A D THE OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES. THE DEMARCHE T
N
O
CHINA W U D BUILD UPON THEIR INCREASED INTEREST IN U
OL
N
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. THE DEMARCHES T JAPAN A D
O
N
GERMANY W U D RELATE THIS EFFORT TO THEIR INTEREST IN
OL
BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF"THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
C. BASED O THE SUPPORT OF THE SYG A D THE RESULTS OF THE
N
N
DEMARCHES INDICATED ABOVE, W W U D SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE
E OL
CHANGES IN THE SCALE, EXCEPT FOR THOSE RELATED T JAPAN
O
A D GERMANY BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
N
COUNCIL, AT A EXPECTED RESUMED SESSION OF THE GENERAL
N
ASSEMBLY SCHEDULED NEXT SPRING T ADDRESS THE
O
ADMINISTRATIVE A D BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF
N
UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF
ANOMALIES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE.
D. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN A D GERMANY BECOMING
N
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL W U D FOLLOW AS
OL
PART OF O R STRATEGY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM.
U
TALKING POINTS FOR THE SYG
CLINTON LIB^WWOTOCOPY
p.
�JAN 04 "34 02:50PM
-€0NFII>Eaill4L
5. INITIATING THE STRATEGY INDICATED A O E . THE FOLLOWING
BVTALKING POINTS ARE SUGGESTED FOR THE MEETING O A B S A O
F MASDR
ALBRIGHT A D ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET WITH THE SYG:
N
A. W GREATLY APPRECIATE T A - W E IN WASHINGTON F R
E
HT, HN
O
CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS-, YOU INDICATED A
N
INTENTION T SEND A EMISSARY TO TEN OF THE WEALTHIEST
O
N
COUNTRIES IN G O P C OF THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE T URGE
RU
O
THEIR AGREEMENT T MOVING UP T GROUP 6»
O
O
— THIS DEMONSTRATES Y U UNDERSTANDING FOR PRESIDENT
OR
CLINTON'S CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED TO REDUCE THE U.S. RATE
OF ASSESSMENT FOR U PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
N
8. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED IN HIS SEPTEMBER 57 SPEECH T
O
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT HE IS COMMITTED T THE UNITED
O
STATES BEING CURRENT IN ITS PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS. HE
IS WORKING WITH CONGRESS T W R THAT END.
OAD
C. HE ALSO M D THE POINT IN HIS SPEECH THAT REDUCING THE
AE
U.S. PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE TO REFLECT THE INCREASED
CAPACITY TO PAY OF OTHER NATIONS WILL MAKE IT EASIER F R
O
HIM "TO M K SURE W PAY IN A TIMELY A D FULL FASHION."
AE
E
N
— THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN VIEW OF THE VAST RANGE OF
OTHER U.S. ACTIVITIES RELATED TO AND IN SUPPORT OF U
N
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FOR WHICH THERE IS N ACCOUNTING
O
IN U BUDGETS.
N
D. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZED IN 1172 THAT IT IS
DAMAGING FOR THE REGULAR BUDGET EXPENSES OF THE
ORGANIZATION T BE OVERLY DEPENDENT O CONTRIBUTIONS F O
O
N
RM
ONE M M E STATE. THIS IS EVEN M R TRUE FOR THE
EBR
OE
ORGANIZATION'S PEACEKEEPING EXPENSES.
E• W HAVE DEVELOPED A OVERALL PLAN FOR REDUCING THE
E
N
U.S. RATE OF PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS SIGNIFICANTLY T W R
OAD
THE SB PERCENT LEVEL. Y U ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING
OR
THIS STRATEGY W U D BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE T US. W
OL
O
E
BELIEVE SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT W U D GREATLY STRENGTHEN
OL
THE UN'S CAPACITY T FULFILL ITS EXPANDING PEACEKEEPING
O
RESPONSIBILITIES.
BEFORE EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSING O R PLANS WITH OTHERS, W
U
E
W N TO G OVER T E IN DETAIL WITH YOU. Y U VIEWS A O T
AT
O
HM
OR
BU
O R PLANS A D ACTIONS THAT YOU W U D BE WILLING T TAKE IN
U
N
OL
O
SUPPORT OF T E WILL INFLUENCE H W W APPROACH OTHERS.
HM
O
E
p.
�TAN 04 ' 9 4
02:52PM
•£ 0 N1" ID C N T-IA L
F. THIS STRATEGY CALLS FOR ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVE
CRITERIA TO DETERMINE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT
GROUPS IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS, F R
O
ADDING JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, AND FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITH CHINA
VOLUNTARILY TO ACCEPT A M C GREATER PEACEKEEPING
UH
ASSESSMENT RATE IN KEEPING WITH ITS GROWING ROLE IN THE UN
AND IN W R D AFFAIRS.
OL
G. W SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA FOR THE DIFFERENT
E
GROUPS IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE:
— GROUP A: THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, AS ALREADY DEFINED.
— GROUP B: MEMBERS WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES ABOVE THE
WORLD AVERAGE, WHICH CURRENTLY IS DOLS. 2,t00.
— GROUP C: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES
BELOW DOLS. S,bOO.
— GROUP D: THOSE MEMBERS ON THE LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES AS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
H. USING SUCH OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS W U D ALLOW F R
OL
O
AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS AS THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF
MEMBERS CHANGE O E TIME. THIS W U D OVERCOME THE
VR
OL
RECURRENT AND INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY W E N W PEACEKEEPING SCALES MUST BE
HN E
APPROVED. THIS ALSO W U D MAKE THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE
OL
MUCH M R TRANSPARENT AND EASIER TO EXPLAIN TO DOMESTIC
OE
LEGISLATIVE BODIES THAT HAVE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS F R
O
PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS•
I.
W EXPECT THAT ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF
E
THE FINANCING OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, INCLUDING
ANOMALIES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS, WILL
BE ADDRESSED AT A RESUMED SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NEXT SPRING. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY W U D TAKE ACTION O ESTABLISHING
OL
N
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE
PEACEKEEPING SCALE. CLEARLY THIS WILL REflUIRE EXTENSIVE
CONSULTATIONS WITH AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN ADVANCE•
Y U ASSISTANCE T W R THIS END W U D BE M S
OR
OAD
OL
OT
IMPORTANT. W NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INDICATED A INTENTION
E
N
CLINTON LIB^mOTOCOPY
P.14
�JHN 34 '94 02:34PM
CONriDCNTIAL
TO SEND A EMISSARY T TEN COUNTRIES IN GROUP C T URGE
N
O
O
THEM T M V U T G O P B. HOPEFULLY THIS C N BE
O OE P O RU
A
UNDERTAKEN S O SINCE THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE MEETING IN
ON
LATE JANUARY O LEGISLATION THAT M Y CAP O R PEACEKEEPING
N
A
U
ASSESSMENT A 2S PERCENT. IT W U D BE DESIRABLE T HAVE
T
OL
O
ACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN PLAY BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE
CONGRESS. W LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENTLY
E
SENDING THE SAME EMISSARY O OTHERS T ALL OF THOSE
R
O
COUNTRIES IN G O P C THAT SHOULD BE ASKED T JOIN G O P B
RU
O
RU
A D ALSO T THE FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF GROUP D THAT W BELIEVE
N
O
E
SHOULD BE ASKED T JOIN GROUP C.
O
— W M U D PLAN T SEND PARALLEL DEMARCHES T THE SAME
E OL
O
O
COUNTRIES. F R THIS PURPOSE, W HOPE THAT W C N MAINTAIN
O
E
E A
CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH Y U AS O R JOINT EFFORTS PROGRESS•
O
U
J • IN REGARD T A INCREASED PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE
O N
FOR CHINA, W RECOGNIZE THAT W A W HAVE IN M N WILL
E
HT E
ID
REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT F O THEM. HOWEVER, W
RM
E
W U D LIKE T BE ABLE T D A O Y U SUPPORT, A
OL
O
O RW N OR
S
APPROPRIATE, IN O R EFFORTS.
U
K• IN REGARD T ADDING JAPAN A D GERMANY AS PERMANENT
O
N
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THIS IS A MATTER THAT
WILL PROCEED AT ITS O N PACE RELATED T THE ISSUE OF
W
O
OVERALL REFORM O THE SECURITY .COUNCIL.
F
M W GREATLY APPRECIATE THAT Y U WELL UNDERSTAND H W
. E
O
O
SIGNIFICANT THE ISSUE OF PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS IS F R
O
THE UNITED STATES A D F R THE UNITED NATIONS. W L O
N O
E OK
FORWARD T WORKING CLOSELY WITH Y U IN A C M O EFFORT T
O
O
OMN
O
ADDRESS THIS CRITICAL ISSUE.
NEXT STEPS
b. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED T AVOID RAISING THE
O
ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS UNTIL
INSTRUCTED. BEFORE TAKING FURTHER STEPS, THE DEPARTMENT
WANTS T HAVE A CHANCE T ANALYZE THE RESULTS O
O
O
F
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH THE SYG. B C G O N
AKRUD
COMMENTS O INFORMATION O HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS REGARDING
R
N
THIS ISSUE F O INFO ADDRESSEES W U D BE GREATLY
RM
OL
APPRECIATED {PLEASE SLUG F R I0/S>.
O
V
V
CLINTON LIBfWHWOCOPY
P.15
�JHN
34 "34
02:2bPM
P.2
ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S
TO:
The Secretary
THROUGH:
P - Mr. Tarnoff
FROM:
10 - Douglas J. Bennet
SUBJECT: Reducing the U.S. Rate of Assessment for UN
Peacekeeping Operations
Thisraeraorandumhas been coordinated with USUN in New
York. Ambassador Albright concurs.
ISSUES FOR DECISION:
(1) Whether to approve a strategy to meet the President's
objective of reducing the U.S. rate of assessment for UN
peacekeeping operations to 25 percent; and
(2) Whether to authorize an instruction cable to USUN to seek
the support of the U Secretary General.
N
ESSENTIAL FACTORS
The President and members of Congress have called for
reducing the U.S. rate of assessment for UN peacekeeping from
31.739 percent to the 25 percent level we are assessed for the
UN regular budget: Non-binding language in the Conference
Report on the FY 1994 Commerce, Justice, and State
appropriation b i l l calls for informing the UN that "the United
States will not accept an assessment of more than 25 percent of
peacekeeping costs...." The Senate may attach more binding
legislation to the State Department Authorization B i l l which i t
i s considering in January.
The Secretary General i s sympathetic to our desire to
reduce our rate of assessment and has indicated he will send an
emissary to urge certain member states with high per capita
incomes to increase their assessment rates. Even with his
help, reducing our rate to 25 percent w i l l be difficult. In
order to get some real savings now, we may have to settle for
paying more than 25 percent, but s t i l l far less than our
current 31.7 percent, and achieving the 25 percent level in the
future.
•€OHFIDEHT*Mr»
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
�i m 94 '94 02:23Pr"l
P..
-2The UN peacekeeping scale of assessments i s based on the
scale for the UN regular budget, which reflects primarily
capacity to pay as indicated by national income s t a t i s t i c s .
( I t i s important to this discussion to know that the U.S.
assessment rate for the UN regular budget would be 27,5 percent
based on national income s t a t i s t i c s , but i t i s capped at 25
percent because of a c e i l i n g established by the General
Assembly in 1972.) The peacekeeping scale formula was
developed in 1973 to ensure at l e a s t token contributions from
developing countries in order to maintain the principle of
collective financial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for UN peacekeeping, UN
members are divided into four groups:
Group D: currently f i f t y - f o u r very poor countries
assessed for peacekeeping at ten percent of their
regular budget rates of assessment. In total. Group D
pays 0.054 percent of peacekeeping assessments, a
discount of 0.489 percentage points.
Group C: currently ninety-seven more advanced
"developing countries" (including anomalies such as
Greece, Portugal, Singapore, I s r a e l , Brunei
Darussalam, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and
Qatar) assessed at twenty percent of their regular
assessment rates. In t o t a l , Group C pays 2.752
percent, a discount of 11,010 percentage points.
Group B: currently twenty-two developed countries
assessed at theiiT f u l l regular assessment rates. In
total, Group B pays 41.986 percent.
Group A: the five Permanent Members of the Security
Council. Reflecting t h e i r added responsibilities for
peacekeeping, the Perm Five gay at their regular
assessment rates and absorb proportionally the
discounts granted to Groups C and D. In t o t a l . Group
A pays 55.226 percent.
The numbers above w i l l change marginally in 1994 as a
result of adding to the scale the s i x new members (Caech
Republic, Slovak Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Eritrea, Monaco, and Andorra) that have joined the
UN this year. Also, i t should be noted that major changes are
expected in the scale for 1995-97 because much lower, more
accurate economic figures w i l l be used for the FSU states and
others in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the overall composition
of the various peacekeeping scale groups s t i l l w i l l not r e f l e c t
global economic r e a l i t i e s .
qOMPTPENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�J H N 04
'94
l
02:30F t1
p. 4
-3A resumed session of the General Assembly in early 1994 i s
expected to address changes in membership of the different
groups for the special peacekeeping scale of assessments.
Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic,
in particular, sought reassignment from Group B to Group C at
the just completed regular session of the General Assembly.
Action on their requests was deferred for consideration in the
context of an overall reworking of the Group memberships. In
this regard, a Working Group previously established by the
General Assembly to consider anomalies in the Group membership
was continued. The Working Group, whose objective includes the
establishment of standard c r i t e r i a to ensure that placement in
the various peacekeeping scale Groups i s applied in a
consistent manner, i s expected to submit a report to the
General Assembly in 1994. The resumed session of the General
Assembly to address changes in the peacekeeping scale, combined
with the continued mandate of the Working Group on anomalies i n
the scale, provides us with an opportunity to pursue the
changes we seek i n the peacekeeping scale.
Options for Chanoea in the Scale
Option Ai The most simple and direct change would be to
eliminate the special peacekeeping scale and base peacekeeping
assessments on the regular budget scale. The greatest
advantage of this approach i s that i t would meet d i r e c t l y and
f u l l y our stated goal of reducing our peacekeeping assessment
to 25 percent. Gaining General Assembly approval of this
option i s extremely unlikely since i t would require 151 members
to pay multiples of five and ten of what they now pay for
peacekeeping operations. We made an approach along these lines
to the Perm Five i n 1992 and received no support. We may wish
to consider this option as a fall-back in case the incremental
approach (Option C below), which could produce immediate,
tangible gains f a i l s .
Option B: Ah alternative to eliminating the special
peacekeeping scale would be to require a l l members of Group C
to join members of Group B in paying at their regular budget
rates of assessment; existing discounts would be allowed only
for members of Group D. This would reduce the U.S.
peacekeeping rate of assessment to 25.411 percent. However,
the fact that ninety-seven members, more than a majority in the
General Assembly, would be forced to pay amounts five times
greater than they currently do makes General Assembly approval
(two-thirds required for approval of an "important question")
of this change unlikely.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�JHN 04 '34
02:32PM
p_
5
•GQNFIDENTIM-—
OPtlP-Jl-.C: Working w i t h i n the parameters ot the current
peacekeeping scale, we would seek a series of ad-hoc
adjustments. The U.S. assessment r a t e could be reduced to 27
percent by c o r r e c t i n g anomalies i n the scale, adding Japan and
Germany as Permanent Members of the Security Council, and
persuading China to accept an increased share of peacekeeping
assessments on a v o l u n t a r y basis.
1. Use placement on the l i s t of least developed CQUntxifiS
approved hv the General Assembly as the c r i t e r i o n f o r
membership i n Group D. This would provide an o b j e c t i v e
standard t o be applied a u t o m a t i c a l l y over the years. Under
t h i s standard now, f i v e c o u n t r i e s would be moved from Group
C to Group D and f i f t e e n from Group D to Group C ( l i s t at
Tab 2 ) . The net e f f e c t on the U.S. rate would be minimal,
reducing i t from 31.739 percent t o 31.733 percent, but
advocating i t would demonstrate a "clean hands" approach.
2. Use the world per c a p i t a income average as the
c r i t e r i o n f o r oraduatina membern from GEPUP C t o B. This
would be another o b j e c t i v e standard that could be applied
automatically over the years. For the current scale's base
period of 1980-89, the UN S e c r e t a r i a t has indicated t h a t
$2,600 approximates the world average per capita income
l e v e l . Applying the standard now would move twenty-nine
countries up t o Group B ( l i s t at Tab 2 — note t h a t some
of the FSU states l i s t e d i n s i s t they have lower per c a p i t a
income l e v e l s ) , i n a d d i t i o n t o the change above, t h i s
would reduce the U.S. r a t e t o 29.446 percent.
3. Add Japan and Germany as Permanent MemheEB Of tha
Security Council. Following the two changes above, t h i s
would reduce the U.S. r a t e t o 28.023 percent.
4. Persuade china to accept voluntarily an increpge in i t s
peacekeeping assessment ™ t « w i t h the_benafit ShflEgQ
p r o p o r t i o n a l l y among other permanent memhfiES Of the
Security Council. A major anomaly i n the current scale i s
the low assessment r a t e of China: 0.77 percent f o r the
regular budget and 0.978 percent f o r peacekeeping. An IMF
study t h i s summer, based on purchasing power p a r i t i e s ,
ranked the Chinese economy as t h i r d largest i n the world
behind the United States and Japan, Even by UN s t a t i s t i c s
(based on n a t i o n a l income l e v e l s ) , the Chinese economy i s
the eighth l a r g e s t i n the world w i t h an average n a t i o n a l
income over the 1980-89 base period representing 2.839
percent of that of a l l UN members. The low Chinese
assessment rates r e f l e c t an allowance i n the UN formula f o r
low per c a p i t a income ($333 f o r China), i n view of China s
role as a member of the Perm Five, i t s increasing i n t e r e s t
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�JHN
(44 '94
02: 3RPf'l
P. 6
-5in UN peacekeeping a c t i v i t i e s , and i t s currently booming
economy, i t might be possible to persuade China to accept
voluntarily a significant increase in i t s peacekeeping rate
of assessment with the benefit to be shared among the other
permanent members of the Security Council. Were this to be
done, for example by China foregoing the benefit of the low
per capita income allowance, China's peacekeeping
assessment rate would increase to 3.184 percent and the
U.S. rate would decrease to 27.118 percent/ assuming the
changes above also are made. (Were China to accept such an
increase before the other changes are negotiated/ the U.S.
rate would decrease i n i t i a l l y to 30.202 percent and China's
rate would increase i n i t i a l l y to 3.606 percent.)
P o l i t i c a l Estimate
o The UN Secretary General, having heard President
Clinton's speech before the UN General Assembly/ i s well aware
of our urgent concern to reduce our peacekeeping assessment
rate. He has indicated that, in principle, he supports a
reduction in our peacekeeping rate to 25 percent.
o Others would benefit in addition to the U.S.
Eliminating the special peacekeeping scale or requiring a l l
members of Group C to join Group B would benefit a l l other
permanent members of the Security Council in the same
proportion that the U.S. would benefit. Except for China, of
course, the same would be true also for the multi-step Option C
indicated above.
o In 1992 the U.S. consulted the other permanent members
of the Security Council about the p o s s i b i l i t y of establishing a
25 percent c e i l i n g on peacekeeping assessments. However, we
found no support for this at that time. We should test t h i s
again, but, as before, we expect to receive a negative reaction
because of the clear sense by others that the strategy i s
unlikely to work.
o In pursuing any action on the peacekeeping scale, we can
expect to confront a growing sense in the General Assembly that
the special responsibility and privileges of permanent members
of the Security Council for peacekeeping issues means they
should bear an even larger share of financial obligations than
they do today. Thus, there i s a danger that this issue could
reignite past North-South divisions.
o Changing the peacekeeping scale relates to the issue of
Security Council expansion. Attempting to eliminate the
peacekeeping assessment differential could strengthen claims
for a more representative Security Council.
• SQMnpEHTIAIi
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�P.'
CONFIDENTIAL
-6o This i s an issue that should be raised i n i t i a l l y in
c a p i t a l s . Delegates in New York w i l l resist any plan that puts
them in the position of arguing back home for higher
assessments.
Strategy
Eliminating the special peacekeeping scale at this stage
(Option A) would have no chance of success since i t would
require 151 members to pay multiples of five and ten of what
they now pay for peacekeeping. Actively pursuing t h i s option
now could i s o l a t e the U.S. from other permanent members of the
Security Council and would so polarize the issue that the
success of other options would be seriously threatened.
Seeking to require a l l of Group C to join Group B (Option B)
would have much the same effect. The only r e a l i s t i c means for
making s i g n i f i c a n t progress on the issue at this stage i s the
multi-step approach i n Option C above. Option C would result
in our paying for peacekeeping approximately what we would pay
for the UN regular budget were our assessment for the l a t t e r
not a r t i f i c i a l l y capped at 25 percent. The 27 percent level
might be viewed by other countries as appropriate in light of
our veto power i n the Security Council,
While we have to be ready to force a vote on the matter, i t
would be best to achieve approval by consensus for the
necessary changes i n the scale of peacekeeping assessments.
Doing so w i l l require the. right combination of diplomatic
appeal to the interests of the affected members and a clear
demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. intent. A
four-step strategy toward achieving the necessary changes i n
the peacekeeping scale i s suggested:
1. Ambassador Albright would approach the Secretary
General to explain the overall changes we seek and request
his support. He has indicated his intention to send an
emissary to seek agreement to join Group B from the ten
members of Group C with the highest per capita income
levels. We should accept that as a f i r s t step, leaving
open the p o s s i b i l i t y of subsequently sending the same
emissary or others to a l l of those members i n Group C with
per capita income levels above the world average of $2,600
that should be asked to join Group B (possibly excluding
some FSU states that can claim lower per capita income
levels) as well as the fifteen members of Group D that
should be asked to join Group C.
2. Subject to what can be worked out with the Secretary
General, we would send p a r a l l e l demarches to the other Perm
4, the EC, and the other affected countries. The demarche
CLINTON LtTOTPHOTOCOPY
�JHN 04 "?4 02:39PM
P.S
-7to China would seek to build upon their increasing interest
in U peacekeeping operations. The demarches to Japan and
N
Germany would relate this effort to their interest in
becoming Permanent Members of the Security Council.
3. Based on the support of the Secretary General and the
results of the demarches indicated above, we would seek
approval for the changes i n the scale, except for those
related to Japan and Germany becoming Permanent Members of
the Security Council, at the expected resumed session of
the General Assembly scheduled t h i s spring (assuming
acquiescence i n c a p i t a l s , there should be no objections).
4. Taking advantage of Japan and Germany becoming
Permanent Members of the Security Council would follow as
part of our strategy for Security Council reform.
5. Begin briefings on Capitol H i l l to show that we have a
strategy in process and develop r e a l i s t i c expectations as
to what can be achieved.
BE
mens:
1.
That you approve the strategy suggested above.
Approve.
.Disapprove.
2. That you authorize the attached telegram (Tab 1) to
USUN instructing Ambassador Albright to join me i n seeking the
support of the Secretary General for the changes in the scale
of assessments for UN peacekeeping operations.
Approve.
.Disapprove,
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Draft telegram to USUN.
Tab 2 - Countries moving between Groups C and D.
Tab 3 - Group C countries to graduate to Group B.
CONFIDCHTfAb.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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Declassified Documents concerning PDD-25, Peacekeeping
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on peacekeeping from 1993 and what would later become PDD-25 (Peacekeeping policy). Material includes a note from NSC Global Affairs director Richard Clarke to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake on the status of the peacekeeping PDD.
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Declassified
Foreign Policy
Peacekeeping
Presidential Decision Directive
Richard Clarke
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/16581db376221ea3ceef915f0600787c.pdf
f3f3da78fa9f5fb357abbd91e2f7c302
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
�• O F I DENT IAL*
CM
DECL:OADR
0763
9303100
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 18, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
C l i f t o n Wharton, J r . , A c t
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
of Great B r i t a i n
I.
SETTING
•
U.S.-UK t i e s remain u n i q u e l y c l o s e . But t h e end o f t h e
Cold War, t h e process o f European i n t e g r a t i o n , and t h e
s t r a i n o f p r o l o n g e d r e c e s s i o n a r e changing B r i t i s h as w e l l
as American p e r s p e c t i v e s , and our r e l a t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r .
•
B r i t a i n i s our most r e l i a b l e a l l y .
By p o l i c y and i n s t i n c t ,
the B r i t i s h w i l l h e l p us, i f t h e y can and i f we l e t them,
i n e v e r y area t h a t m a t t e r s —
defense and s e c u r i t y ,
t r a d e , t h e M i d d l e East, Russia and E a s t e r n Europe, t h e UN,
environment, and t h e f i g h t s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m and drugs.
•
Major's government i s no longer i n t h e p o l i t i c a l f r e e f a l l
of l a s t autumn. But i t s t i l l faces a b r u i s i n g b a t t l e f o r
p a r l i a m e n t a r y r a t i f i c a t i o n o f M a a s t r i c h t , and t h e
unaccustomed d i f f i c u l t i e s o f having o n l y a narrow Tory
m a j o r i t y i n t h e House o f Commons. N e a r l y t h r e e years o f
r e c e s s i o n have t a k e n t h e i r t o l l on B r i t i s h c o n f i d e n c e and
leadership.
•
Major's v i s i t t o Washington w i l l be s c r u t i n i z e d by press on
b o t h s i d e s o f t h e A t l a n t i c , which had a f i e l d day w i t h
r e p o r t s o f Tory involvement i n t h e Bush campaign and t h e
Home O f f i c e f i l e search. The Major government was
e x c o r i a t e d by T h a t c h e r i t e s and L a b o r i t e s a l i k e f o r s o u r i n g
the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p .
•
Given t h i s i n a u s p i c i o u s b e g i n n i n g , Major's o v e r r i d i n g g o a l
f o r t h i s v i s i t i s t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t r u s t and
candor w i t h you, and t o be seen as having done so. Major
was g r a t e f u l t h a t you telephoned him t o d i s c u s s Bosnia, and
f o r t h e e a r l y i n v i t a t i o n t o Washington.
•
B r i t a i n sees i t s n u c l e a r power s t a t u s as v i t a l t o i t s
s t a n d i n g i n Europe and t h e w o r l d . Major w i l l want a
promise o f p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n b e f o r e any A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
d e c i s i o n s on n u c l e a r t e s t i n g or b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defense.
CLINTON LI
H0T0C0PY
�GOMFIDEHTI AL'
-2Major a l s o has some concerns about s t a t e m e n t s made d u r i n g
the campaign on UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l expansion, N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , and MFN f o r China. However, he i s pleased and
much r e a s s u r e d by our stance on Bosnia, which t r a c k s v e r y
c l o s e l y w i t h B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g and concerns.
Major w i l l be c a r e f u l not t o o v e r l o a d t h i s f i r s t meeting
w i t h t o o many i s s u e s . He w i l l focus on areas he t h i n k s
most u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n , p r o b a b l y I r a q ,
former Y u g o s l a v i a , Russia, and t h e GATT Uruguay Round
n e g o t i a t i o n s . He suspects you may r a i s e N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d . He w i l l touch a t l e a s t b r i e f l y on Hong Kong,
China and MFN.
II.
TOPICS
A f f i r m t h a t on most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s B r i t i s h p o l i c y i s
s y n e r g e t i c w i t h our own, and t h a t c l o s e b i l a t e r a l
c o o p e r a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o a c h i e v i n g o u r common
objectives.
Express a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the courage and e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
B r i t i s h t r o o p s i n Bosnia engaged i n h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f .
E n l i s t Major's
a c t i v e h e l p i n our n e x t steps on Bosnia.
Lay out your views on key i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic issues
such as t h e Uruguay Round and G-7 p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n .
Recognize Major's e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n p r o m o t i n g agreement on
the Uruguay Round, and s o l i c i t h i s c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n .
Discuss c u r r e n t b i l a t e r a l economic i s s u e s , such as c i v i l
a v i a t i o n , s t e e l , and t h e proposed m i n i v a n r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,
C o n f i r m our support o f the t a l k s process i n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , and d i s c u s s ways i n which we can be h e l p f u l .
Share your thoughts on the s i t u a t i o n i n Russia
Yeltsin's d i f f i c u l t i e s .
and on
A f f i r m t h a t we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o l o o k t o t h e B r i t i s h f o r
c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n i n o b t a i n i n g I r a q ' s compliance w i t h a l l
UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s .
Exchange views on the broader i s s u e s o f European
i n t e g r a t i o n , the f u t u r e o f NATO, and the American presence
i n Europe.
Discuss approaches t o promoting d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n Hong
Kong and human r i g h t s i n China.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
UNITED KINGDOM: POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Prime M i n i s t e r Major v i s i t s Washington t h i s month w i t h h i s
country a t the bottom o f a long and d i f f i c u l t recession and h i s
countrymen i n a d i s t i n c t l y uneasy mood. Though the pressure on
Major has eased a b i t f o l l o w i n g a seemingly endless s t r i n g o f
t r o u b l e s l a s t f a l l , s t i f f challenges s t i l l loom:
Embarrassing i n q u i r i e s i n t o government handling o f coal mine
closures and o f sales o f arms-related equipment t o I r a q w i l l
soon come t o a head.
In A p r i l and May, a new l o c a l t a x scheme w i l l be introduced.
While undoubtedly f a i r e r than the hated " p o l l t a x " i t
replaces, i t w i l l h i t hard at Tory constituencies i n
southern England.
From now through at l e a s t May, several c o n t r o v e r s i a l
parliamentary committee votes could d e r a i l Maastricht t r e a t y
ratification.
The government must deal w i t h increasing parliamentary
concern about B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y entanglement i n Bosnia.
Major's government w i l l l i k e l y muddle through. Unlike Thatcher
i n 1990, Major gets along w e l l w i t h h i s Cabinet colleagues, and
so f a r faces no c r e d i b l e challenger. Tory rebels, however much
they may want t o block Maastricht, do not r e l i s h a snap e l e c t i o n
t h a t Labor might win. But Major also has a m a j o r i t y o f only 21,
not the 100 or so of the Thatcher years; h i s whips are only now
l e a r n i n g how t o handle t h i s r e a l i t y .
I f the government can r i d e out the Maastricht storm, and l i m i t
damage from the i n q u i r i e s and c o u n c i l tax, i t should be able t o
carry on a f u l l term.
(The next general e l e c t i o n must be held by
A p r i l 1997, and i s l i k e l y t o be i n spring or autumn 1996.)
Economic recovery, plus r e d i s t r i c t i n g , plus Labor's own woes,
might w e l l win t h e Tories an unprecedented f i f t h e l e c t i o n i n a
row.
Labor should be r i d i n g high but i t ' s not. I t s morale i s
c e r t a i n l y b e t t e r than s i x months ago, due i n no small p a r t t o the
Democratic win i n the U.S. But i t has not yet emerged as a t r u l y
c r e d i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e government. I t perhaps w i l l not be a
serious contender u n t i l i t reaches the f a r side o f an i n t e r n a l
p o l i c y debate t h a t has scarcely begun. Labor Party leader John
Smith i s not an i n s p i r i n g leader, and he has not used the mandate
of h i s sweeping v i c t o r y i n the July leadership e l e c t i o n t o take
command o f the p a r t y . Smith's g r a d u a l i s t approach t o preparing
for the next e l e c t i o n gives Major some breathing room.
Declassify
onCLd^tTON
L I B R A R Y
PHOTOCOPY
�UNITED KINGDOM
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
The B r i t i s h economy remains weak a f t e r three years o f recession
although i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' confidence i s improving w i t h some signs
of stronger experts. Unemployment reached 10.5% of the labor
force i n December. Sharp declines i n house p r i c e s , and fears o f
job losses, have continued t o i n h i b i t consumer spending.
I n f l a t i o n f e l l t o a 1.7% r a t e i n the year t o January. Strong
speculative pressures forced s t e r l i n g ' s departure from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System
September 16. Since early September, s t e r l i n g has depreciated
about 16% against the DM and about 25% against the d o l l a r .
Taking the currencies of the UK's t r a d i n g partners as a whole,
s t e r l i n g has f a l l e n about 13% on a trade-weighted basis. This
s t e r l i n g d e c l i n e , and the expanding U.S. economy, should improve
the UK's export prospects s u b s t a n t i a l l y and help an economic
recovery t o begin l a t e r t h i s year. S t i l l , recovery w i l l be
modest u n t i l the UK's main t r a d i n g partners i n Europe r e g i s t e r
stronger growth — an uncertain prospect.
The budget d e f i c i t escalated t o an estimated 6.7% o f GDP i n 1992,
p a r t l y from c y c l i c a l f a c t o r s d r i v i n g the recession and p a r t l y
from e a r l i e r e f f o r t s t o s t i m u l a t e the economy by f i s c a l p o l i c y .
The high d e f i c i t w i l l severely c o n s t r a i n any e f f o r t t o use f i s c a l
p o l i c y f o r expansion purposes. Despite the recession, t h e
current account d e f i c i t i s too high ($20 b i l l i o n or 2% o f GDP
l a s t y e a r ) , r a i s i n g fears t h a t even a modest recovery would
expand e x t e r n a l d e f i c i t s t o even higher l e v e l s .
Public d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the economy continues t o plague the
Major government, and s t r a i n s have developed w i t h i n the
Conservative m a j o r i t y over such issues as possible tax increases
t h i s s p r i n g t o reduce the budget d e f i c i t , and closure o f
uneconomic coal mines.
With f u r t h e r a c t i o n t o s t i m u l a t e recovery l i m i t e d by concerns
about s t e r l i n g , budget d e f i c i t s and worsening e x t e r n a l d e f i c i t s ,
the UK i s l e f t t o hope f o r recovery elsewhere i n Europe (e.g. by
an e a r l y s u b s t a n t i a l reduction i n German i n t e r e s t rates which
could then spread t o other c o u n t r i e s ) .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
gQ E
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PER E.O. 13526
British Sensitivity
Few issues have more p o t e n t i a l f o r c r e a t i n g problems i n AngloAmerican r e l a t i o n s than Northern. I r e l a n d .
The B r i t i s h regard i t as an i n t e r n a l matter.
They believe t h a t the U.S.
n a t i o n a l i s t perspective.
tends t o view i t from the
The extension of t e r r o r i s t campaigns t o England,
innocent loss of l i f e , and the t a r g e t i n g of B r i t a i n ' s
p o l i t i c a l leadership have made HMG s e n s i t i v e t o advice
from outside.
In Northern I r e l a n d , the President's campaign statements aroused
hopes i n the Catholic community and fears among the Unionists
t h a t the USG would weigh i n on the n a t i o n a l i s t side.
Status of the Talks
The p o l i t i c a l t a l k s , which broke o f f i n November without
agreement, contain three "strands" — devolved government i n
Northern I r e l a n d , r e l a t i o n s between North and South i n I r e l a n d ,
and t i e s between the UK and I r e l a n d .
The major stumbling blocks are: 1) who w i l l exercise
executive power i n Northern I r e l a n d , 2) Dublin's r o l e
i n Northern I r i s h a f f a i r s , and 3) the U n i o n i s t s ' demand
t h a t I r e l a n d r e v i s e i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claim t o the
North.
Informal t a l k s continue and formal sessions may resume
soon. Dick Spring, the new I r i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r , i s
expected t o press f o r an agreement.
Terrorism
The l e v e l of violence (84 deaths i n 1992 i n Northern Ireland) i s
w e l l down from i t s 1972 peak of more than 450 deaths. Two recent
trends, however, are worrisome:
1) the increased p r o f i c i e n c y of
the l o y a l i s t (Protestant) p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , who caused more deaths
l a s t year than the IRA: 2) the IRA's bombing campaigns i n
Northern I r e l a n d and on the B r i t i s h mainland.
MacBride P r i n c i p l e s
B r i t i s h American groups have pressed f o r an investment code of
conduct c a l l e d the MacBride P r i n c i p l e s , modeled a f t e r the South
A f r i c a - r e l a t e d S u l l i v a n P r i n c i p l e s . You spoke favorably about
them d u r i n g the campaign. You should know, however, t h a t
generally among responsible leaders i n Northern I r e l a n d , the
P r i n c i p l e s have l i t t l e support because they impede u r g e n t l y
needed investment. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn w i t h South A f r i c a
-SfiCRETDeclassify or
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2
because d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s l e g a l there; i t i s i l l e g a l i n Northern
I r e l a n d . Major i s not l i k e l y t o raise the issue.
Human Rights
Human r i g h t s issues have become a key concern i n Northern
I r e l a n d . The issues transcend s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t s and p o i n t t o a
p a t t e r n o f c o l l u s i o n between B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y forces and L o y a l i s t
f a c t i o n s as w e l l as an environment o f i n t i m i d a t i o n and fear.
Excessive force ( i n c l u d i n g "shoot t o k i l l " p r a c t i c e s ) , harassment
by s e c u r i t y forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting
a r b i t r a r y and d i s r u p t i v e house searches), u n f a i r d e t e n t i o n
(holding people f o r up t o seven days w i t h t r i a l ) and t r i a l s
without j u r i e s have been p r e v a l e n t .
Current cases i n Northern I r e l a n d w i t h human r i g h t s i m p l i c a t i o n s
(the f i r s t two are the most widely known):
Two Royal Marines were charged i n February 1992 w i t h
murder f o r the December 1990 k i l l i n g o f Fergal Caraher.
In February 1992 four acknowledged PIRA t e r r o r i s t s were
k i l l e d by s e c u r i t y forces s h o r t l y a f t e r having attacked
an RUC s t a t i o n i n Coalisland. Human r i g h t s groups
claimed t h a t excessive force was used and t h a t the men
could have been arrested rather than k i l l e d . The
p o l i c e are i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether the use o f force was
warranted.
In September 1992 Peter MacBride (no r e l a t i o n t o the
" P r i n c i p l e s " ) was shot and k i l l e d while running away
from an Army p a t r o l . Two s o l d i e r s have been charged
w i t h murder.
I n November 1992 Pierce Jordan was shot and k i l l e d by
p o l i c e a f t e r a car chase. A p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n has
begun, but no charges have been f i l e d .
At the Tab e n t i t l e d " L e t t e r s " are l e t t e r s from t h e House and the
Senate asking you t o raise the subject o f human r i g h t s i n
Northern I r e l a n d during the Major v i s i t .
Joe Doherty
Joe Doherty i s a PIRA member convicted i n 1981 of murdering a
B r i t i s h Army o f f i c e r i n Northern I r e l a n d . Just before the
c o n v i c t i o n was handed down, he escaped t o the U.S., where he was
picked up i n 1983 f o r immigration v i o l a t i o n s and remained i n j a i l
f o r almost nine years, while h i s case was being fought i n the
U.S. courts. A B r i t i s h e x t r a d i t i o n request was r e j e c t e d by a
D i s t r i c t Court judge on the grounds t h a t h i s offense was
p o l i t i c a l . The USG then attempted t o deport him f o r having
entered the country under f a l s e documentation.
Doherty asked t o
be deported t o I r e l a n d instead of the UK but, - a f t e r those two
countries signed an e x t r a d i t i o n t r e a t y , requested asylum i n the
U.S. Eventually, the matter went t o the Supreme Court, which
r u l e d t h a t the Attorney General had the d i s c r e t i o n t o deport
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Doherty without f u r t h e r hearings. I n January 1992, Doherty was
deported t o t h e UK, and he i s now i n p r i s o n i n Northern I r e l a n d .
The B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s have turned down Doherty's request t h a t
he be given c r e d i t f o r time served i n the U.S. and some I r i s h Americans groups, f o r whom Doherty was a major cause celebre,
have asked t h e USG t o intervene. The U.S. has no current l e g a l
or j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the Doherty case.
The Gerrv Adams Visa Issue
Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down f o r visas
several times i n the past few years — most r e c e n t l y i n 1991.
Under t h e Immigration and N a t i o n a l i t y Act, h i s advocacy o f
violence and i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he was a member o f t h e PIRA Army
Council, which decides on t e r r o r i s t actions, makes him i n e l i g i b l e
for a visa.
(Executive Branch r u l i n g s were supported by the U.S.
C i r c u i t Court o f Appeals i n 1990.) To overcome h i s
i n e l i g i b i l i t y , Adams would need a waiver — granted by the INS at
the recommendation o f the State Department. I t would be odd t o
do so now, since Sinn Fein i s l o s i n g support and Adams himself
was defeated i n the 1992 Parliamentary e l e c t i o n . Nor has Sinn
Fein agreed t o abandon i t s support of v i o l e n c e .
A current complication i s the request by t h e defense i n the Smyth
e x t r a d i t i o n case t h a t Adams t e s t i f y .
(Smyth was convicted o f
attempted murder, was imprisoned i n Northern I r e l a n d , and escaped
i n 1983.) The U.S. consul s t i l l has the f i n a l say about g r a n t i n g
a v i s a , but J u s t i c e could be asked t o parole Adams i n t o the
country. J u s t i c e would r e s i s t on the grounds t h a t Adam's
testimony i s not germane i n an e x t r a d i t i o n hearing. Even i f i t
were, he could make i t by deposition.
During the campaign, you spoke favorably o f p r o v i d i n g him a v i s a ,
since at the time he was a member o f the B r i t i s h Parliament.
However, he has since l o s t h i s seat i n Parliament and t h i s , the
main r a t i o n a l e i s no longer r e l e v a n t .
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The UK continues t o be one of the strongest supporters of our
I r a q p o l i c y , p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n a l l missions, whether
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , or humanitarian. B r i t i s h leaders believe
t h a t continued, steady, p r o p o r t i o n a t e pressure must be maintained
on Saddam Hussein.
U.S. p o l i c y on I r a q remains t o i n s i s t upon f u l l I r a q i compliance
w i t h a l l Security Council r e s o l u t i o n s and respect f o r measures
enacted by the C o a l i t i o n t o monitor and enforce those
resolutions.
The UK and French have f l o a t e d the idea o f a P3
statement on Iraq's o b l i g a t i o n s under the UNSCRs — an
idea we fear could weaken the UNSC requirements and
open the door f o r those who want t o normalize t i e s w i t h
Saddam.
Iraq's current "charm o f f e n s i v e " aims t o show i t i s i n
" s u f f i c i e n t " compliance w i t h UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s f o r
sanctions t o be eased at the next review i n March.
Past experience suggests t h a t I r a q w i l l not f u l l y
comply by March and t h a t , i f i t s s t r a t e g y does not
work, I r a q w i l l r e t u r n t o open defiance.
J o i n t UN, U.S. UK and EC humanitarian r e l i e f e f f o r t s are showing
some signs of success. I n t e r i m reports suggest t h a t at the
present pace o f a i d d e l i v e r y there w i l l not be a repeat o f
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and population movements o f 1991.
However, I r a q could e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and put
the population at r i s k .
In order t o make northern I r a q less r e l i a n t on outside a i d , the
UK i s leaning toward f i n d i n g ways t o obtain sanctions exemptions
t o provide assistance which would r e a c t i v a t e l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s and
improve i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n the region.
We support t h i s idea, but need t o act c a r e f u l l y so as
t o keep the i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus behind sanctions.
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GATT-URUGUAY ROUND
The Uruguay Round (UR), which involves 108 countries, has been
under n e g o t i a t i o n since 1986 w i t h U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n authorized
by f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y t h a t expires June 1. USTR Kantor
announced February 11 t h a t the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would seek renewal
of f a s t t r a c k although d e t a i l s of the request would be decided
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress. We are also reviewing our UR
negotiating positions.
GATT Director-General Dunkel attempted t o accelerate the t a l k s i n
December 1991 by i s s u i n g a d r a f t " F i n a l Act" (DFA), which
incorporated agreements already reached and proposed s o l u t i o n s t o
unresolved issues.
Most governments w i l l accept the DFA without changes
beyond U.S.-EC amendments on a g r i c u l t u r e r e s u l t i n g from
the November " B l a i r House Accord." The EC i s pressing
t h i s approach, although i t also wants comprehensive
market access agreements, w i t h U.S. concessions, t o
"balance" the agreement before concluding the Round.
The U.S. p o s i t i o n has been t h a t we need s u b s t a n t i a l progress i n
market access i n goods (including free trade i n key s e c t o r s ) ,
a g r i c u l t u r e , and services as w e l l as improvements i n the DFA.
The U.S. agreed t o use the DFA as the basis f o r
n e g o t i a t i n g a f i n a l agreement, but stated t h a t
improvements were necessary, e s p e c i a l l y on antidumping,
i n t e l l e c t u a l property, t r a d e - r e l a t e d environment
issues, and the M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Organization (MTO).
The UK has worked e n e r g e t i c a l l y as an EC member and as EC
President i n July-December 1992 t o complete the UR as soon as
possible. While the UK can accept the DFA, i t also favors
tougher antidumping rules and i s the EC country most w i l l i n g t o
accommodate U.S. i n t e r e s t s . The UK wants the U.S. t o reduce
"peaks" ( i . e . high t a r i f f s on ceramics and t e x t i l e s ) and i s
prepared t o meet our zero-for-zero sector o f f e r s (e.g. nonferrous metals, paper and wood).
Prime M i n i s t e r Major can be expected t o urge completing
the Round as quickly as possible.
The U.K. and the EC have urged us t o l i m i t f a s t t r a c k
a u t h o r i t y extension t o s i x months i n order t o maintain
needed pressure t o conclude the Round.
The U.K. w i l l r e s i s t attempts t o r e i n s t a t e Super 301 i n
f a s t t r a c k renewal due t o s e n s i t i v i t y about u n i l a t e r a l
U.S. e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l actions.
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RUSSIA
The Russian economy continues t o d e c l i n e . Y e l t s i n has s t a r t e d
reforms i n a number of important areas: c r e a t i n g market
mechanisms, l i b e r a l i z i n g trade, u n i f y i n g the currency exchange
r a t e , and undertaking an ambitious p r i v a t i z a t i o n program - but
a l l of these gains could be swept away by h y p e r i n f l a t i o n .
( I n f l a t i o n i s now running at a monthly r a t e of about 30 percent.)
Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program i s not
j u s t i f i a b l e f o r Russia. Such a program i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e ,
however, f o r other forms of f i n a n c i a l support, i n c l u d i n g a $6
b i l l i o n currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n fund promised at the G-7 summit
l a s t year. Given Russia's need and the i n a b i l i t y t o produce an
IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are c u r r e n t l y examining
new ways i n which we could render a i d t o Russia.
The B r i t i s h approach t o debt re-scheduling i s s i m i l a r t o ours:
f l e x i b i l i t y and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept any sensible arrangement
between Russia and Ukraine on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the debt.
(The
UK p o r t i o n of the o f f i c i a l b i l a t e r a l debt owed by the FSU i s only
. 1 % , or less than $400 m i l l i o n . )
The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes t h a t s t a b i l i z i n g the
economy i s i t s main economic p r i o r i t y , but i t w i l l face s t i f f
resistance t o i t s proposed a u s t e r i t y measures from the Supreme
Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition t o Y e l t s i n ,
led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued t o chip away at
Y e l t s i n ' s powers and p o l i c i e s .
Y e l t s i n had hoped t o break both the p o l i t i c a l and economic
impasse by means of a n a t i o n a l referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
reform t o be held A p r i l 11. Opposition from parliamentarians as
w e l l as r e g i o n a l leaders, fear of a b e t t i n g s e p a r a t i s t tendencies
w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f , and u n c e r t a i n t y over the outcome of the
vote apparently have forced him, however, at least t o consider
other ideas.
Y e l t s i n has proposed instead e a r l y parliamentary and p r e s i d e n t i a l
e l e c t i o n s during 1994 and 1995 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Unless accompanied
by a genuine consensus on economic and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform,
t h i s proposal would continue the current stalemate f o r the next
year w i t h no guarantee t h a t e l e c t i o n s would produce a more
p l i a b l e l e g i s l a t u r e . Y e l t s i n , Khasbulatov, and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
Court Chairman Zorkin are engaged i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o hammer out a
s o l u t i o n t o Russia's p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . Pressure i s increasing on
a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s and the outcome i s f a r from c e r t a i n . I f
agreement i s reached, an extraordinary session of the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies could convene i n e a r l y March t o r a t i f y the
agreement.
Absent some renewal of Y e l t s i n ' s a u t h o r i t y , the Russian domestic
and f o r e i g n policymaking process w i l l continue t o be marked by
bureaucratic i n f i g h t i n g combined w i t h parliamentary pressures
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toward greater assertiveness of Russia's prerogatives as a great
power. On a number o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues (Bosnia, I r a q , nonp r o l i f e r a t i o n ) , Y e l t s i n ' s margin f o r maneuver w i l l be
constrained.
Despite the pressures, he has shown no sign o f abandoning h i s
basic pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n .
Almost since e l e c t i o n day, the Russians have been pressing
f o r an e a r l y summit. Christopher i s proposing A p r i l 3-4,
w i t h March 28-29 as a back-up, t o Kozyrev on Thursday.
The p r e l i m i n a r y Russian r e a c t i o n t o our new approach on the
former Yugoslavia has been p o s i t i v e .
We continue t o cooperate closely on arms c o n t r o l . Y e l t s i n
has f o r m a l l y submitted START I I t o the Supreme Soviet f o r
r a t i f i c a t i o n , and we are working c l o s e l y w i t h the Russians
t o persuade the parliament t h a t the t r e a t y i s f a i r and
balanced.
The most urgent task i n arms c o n t r o l i s t o obtain f u l f i l l m e n t o f
the Lisbon Protocol by Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine, which
has n e i t h e r r a t i f i e d the START I Treaty nor adhered t o the NPT,
i s key here.
(Belarus has already approved START and NPT;
Kazakhstan has approved START but not yet adhered t o the NPT.)
We have pressed the Ukrainians t o f u l f i l l t h e i r commitments under
the Lisbon P r o t o c o l , and both we and the UK have o f f e r e d them
s e c u r i t y assurances and assistance i n the dismantlement o f
s t r a t e g i c arms.
At the same time, we have urged the Russians t o amend t h e i r own
s e c u r i t y assurances t o Ukraine i n order t o take account o f
Ukrainian concerns. We have also i n s i s t e d t h a t the proceeds o f
Russian sales t o the U.S. o f h i g h l y enriched uranium (HEU) from
dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads be e q u i t a b l y shared
w i t h Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, something the Russians
have r e s i s t e d .
UK Views
Major i s becoming increasingly s k e p t i c a l o f Y e l t s i n ' s a b i l i t y t o
hold h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents a t bay, and t o continue t o implement
meaningful economic reform. This sense of a looming c r i s i s has
been echoed by h i s Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.
Major w i l l be b r i n g i n g w i t h him h i s in-house advisor on the FSU,
Sir Rodric B r a i t h w a i t e (who i s also Chairman o f the J o i n t
I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee and was the UK Ambassador t o Moscow from
1988 t o 1992). Braithwaite's views o f Y e l t s i n ' s problems are
summed up as f o l l o w s :
Russia has no t r a d i t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s on the
power o f the executive or of the r u l e of law.
The decay of the Communist party s t r u c t u r e has not been
o f f s e t by the development of new p o l i t i c a l organizations.
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Y e l t s i n toyed w i t h the idea of c r e a t i n g a "President's"
p a r t y , but abandoned i t .
I n Russia, p a r t i e s are equated
w i t h conspiracies. Y e l t s i n chose instead t o use the Russian
h i s t o r i c a l model of "going t o the people". Yet, as economic
hardships t u r n i n t o c r i s e s , t h i s t a c t i c i s l o s i n g i t s
effectiveness.
Braithwaite's recommendations
t o Major are:
Expand programs whereby younger Russians study and work
abroad as a way t o help develop a new p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e .
Provide greater economic t e c h n i c a l assistance and t r a i n i n g
programs i n Russia.
Ensure t h a t the IMF take i n t o account the micro-economic
problem facing Russia: the dismantlement o f rustbowl
defense i n d u s t r i e s and the need t o r e t r a i n workers.
Treat Russia as a great power ( i f not a super-power) rather
than a supplicant. Part of the reason f o r Gorbachev's
downfall was the perception t h a t he was no longer viewed as
an equal i n the West.
B r a i t h w a i t e wrote h i s memorandum as a follow-up t o a conversation
you had w i t h Major l a s t December. The complete memo i s included
i n your b r i e f i n g book.
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HONG KONG AND THE UK
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s expect the l a s t f i v e years of t h e i r r u l e i n
Hong Kong t o be among the most d i f f i c u l t i n the colony's h i s t o r y .
Their goals are:
t o preserve the s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of Hong Kong
through 1997 and beyond:
t o b u i l d democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s capable of withstanding
expected Chinese pressure a f t e r t r a n s i t i o n ;
t o achieve the l e a s t d i s r u p t i v e t r a n s f e r of power p o s s i b l e ;
t o maintain the commercial p o s i t i o n of B r i t i s h firms i n Hong
Kong and China; and
t o prevent Hong Kong from becoming a domestic p o l i t i c a l
football in Britain.
These goals have already come i n t o c o n f l i c t , most notably over
Governor Chris Patten's proposals t o broaden modestly the
franchise of the 1995 e l e c t i o n s t o the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, which
w i l l continue t o s i t when China takes over sovereignty i n 1997.
Progress towards the smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o PRC sovereignty has
also been marred by an ongoing dispute over construction of a new
Hong Kong a i r p o r t .
B e i j i n g reacted vehemently t o Patten's proposals, making t h r e a t s
ranging from undoing any changes t o a n n u l l i n g contracts made
without i t s consent a f t e r 1997. Although the Chinese may only be
p o s t u r i n g , the verbal barrage weakens the foundation f o r a smooth
t r a n s i t i o n , has caused the stock market t o reverberate, and has
shaken l o c a l confidence i n Hong Kong's f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y .
B e i j i n g i s moving, however, t o resume t a l k s w i t h B r i t i s h
o f f i c i a l s on Hong Kong's f u t u r e . Coming back t o the t a b l e
represents a major Chinese concession, and w i l l help t o defuse
the c r i s i s over Patten's proposals. But i t i s s t i l l unclear
whether the Chinese are prepared t o resume substantive
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Hong Kong o f f i c i a l s , or simply plan t o use the
t a l k s t o delay l e g i s l a t i v e action on Patten's proposals.
Hong Kong, China, and MFN
H G b e l i e v e s MFN i s the wrong t o o l f o r t r y i n g t o remedy human
M
r i g h t s abuses i n China. The B r i t i s h claim t h a t Hong Kong could
lose up t o $16 b i l l i o n of i t s o v e r a l l trade and as many as 60,000
jobs i f MFN were suspended. Although Governor Patten has on
occasion h i n t e d t h a t he might favor an informal linkage between
China's a t t i t u d e toward Hong Kong and MFN, he. has most r e c e n t l y
emphasized t h a t the r i s k s of such linkage are f a r greater than
the p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s .
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BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
The B r i t i s h have welcomed the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n i t i a t i v e on
Bosnia, which they see as r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r own views and
concerns. John Major comes t o Washington eager t o do a l l he can
t o help i t succeed.
The B r i t i s h have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued t h a t the West has l i t t l e
choice but t o support the Vance/Owen plan, however flawed i t may
be. I n recent weeks they urged t h a t the United States and NATO
play a l a r g e r r o l e i n reaching and implementing a Vance/Owen
brokered settlement, i n c l u d i n g p r o v i d i n g troops. Our i n i t i a t i v e
addressed both these p o i n t s , much t o John Major's s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The U.S. i n i t i a t i v e also put o f f the k i n d of a c t i o n London most
dreads - use o f force, such as a i r s t r i k e s against Serb t a r g e t s .
London fears t h a t such a c t i o n would t r i g g e r r e p r i s a l against UN
( i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h ) troops on the ground, the collapse of the
humanitarian e f f o r t , and eventual i r r e s i s t i b l e pressure f o r
massive Western i n t e r v e n t i o n . The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t once i n ,
the West would be a long time g e t t i n g out. They were v a s t l y
r e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r warnings were heard i n Washington, and
encouraged t h a t the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ready t o consider
c o n t r i b u t i n g more m i l i t a r i l y t o peacekeeping or humanitarian
e f f o r t s . As you r e c a l l from your telephone conversation w i t h
Major, the B r i t i s h are not w i l d l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about proceeding
t o get an enforcement r e s o l u t i o n f o r the NFZ over Bosnia. We
have t r i e d t o address t h e i r concerns v i a NATO planning, but have
not been wholly successful. As we move more aggressively i n New
York t o win passage of the NFZ enforcement r e s o l u t i o n , we w i l l
have t o take care t h a t the B r i t i s h (with the French, Russians,
and others) not torpedo our e f f o r t s .
Since Yugoslavia erupted i n open f i g h t i n g i n 1991, the B r i t i s h
have doubted the a b i l i t y o f outsiders t o help solve the c r i s i s .
S t i l l , B r i t a i n agreed w i t h i t s more a c t i v i s t EC partners t h a t the
Community should take the lead i n the e f f o r t t o broker a
settlement. When the EC proved unequal t o the task, HMG as EC
President launched the August 1992 London Conference on
Yugoslavia t o regenerate a peace process, t h i s time w i t h deeper
UN involvement. The B r i t i s h continue t o work a c t i v e l y i n the UN
t o resolve the Greek-Macedonian impasse.
So long as the f i g h t i n g i s confined t o the former Yugoslavia,
London sees no n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s d i r e c t l y a t stake. But
domestic pressure t o "do something" plus EC considerations (and
U.S. pressure f o r an " a l l necessary means" r e s o l u t i o n i n the UN)
prompted HMG t o deploy some 2,500 s o l d i e r s t o Bosnia. B r i t a i n i s
among the l a r g e s t troop c o n t r i b u t o r s i n ex-Yugoslavia, and
operates i n one of the toughest areas.
The B r i t i s h response t o our proposal t o conduct a i r drops i n
Eastern Bosnia has been muted. A B r i t i s h c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the
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operation i s probably not i n the cards, but they w i l l give the
i n i t i a t i v e t h e i r p u b l i c endorsement. London's ambivalence t o a i r
drops i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the B r i t i s h unease w i t h much o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a c t i o n t o the c r i s i s i n Bosnia. I n t h e i r view,
each step t h a t increases i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement only brings us
a l l closer t o f u l l involvement i n the f i g h t i n g w i t h no obvious
way out. Thus, w h i l e they w i l l lend v e r b a l support b i l a t e r a l l y
and through NATO t o our i n i t i a t i v e , we can expect t h a t they w i l l
also act as a q u i e t 'conscience' t o curb, where they t h i n k they
can, undirected energies t o "do something."
Defense Secretary R i f k i n d , w i t h m i l i t a r y and Tory backbench
support, s t r o n g l y opposes any UK m i l i t a r y engagement beyond
humanitarian r e l i e f . C o n t r i b u t i n g t o a peacekeeping e f f o r t i n
support o f a brokered agreement would be a hard decision i n
London. Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd say they w i l l need
close c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Washington i f they are t o overcome
R i f k i n d ' s r e s i s t a n c e . NATO leadership, and commitment o f U.S.
ground troops, i s probably a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n t o f u r t h e r
B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y involvement i n ex-Yugoslavia.
•ERT
GGE
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT
This year's Economic Summit w i l l take place i n Tokyo July 7-9.
Economic issues w i l l be a major focus o f the agenda (macro p o l i c i e s
and growth, trade, economic reform i n Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia, and r e l a t i o n s w i t h developing c o u n t r i e s ) . Foreign and
Finance M i n i s t e r s w i l l attend.
EC President Delors r e c e n t l y c a l l e d f o r an e a r l y G-7
Summit t o consider measures t o stimulate economic growth.
The Japanese strongly oppose t h i s .
The agenda w i l l also feature p o l i t i c a l issues (e.g., FSU, exYugoslavia, Iraq) and cross-border issues such as global
environmental concerns, t e r r o r i s m , nuclear safety, nonp r o l i f e r a t i o n and human r i g h t s . Summit preparations are handled
through a network o f p a r a l l e l "Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and p o l i t i c a l
d i r e c t o r s meetings i n v o l v i n g State, Treasury, NSC and other USG
agencies. The Sherpas prepare the d r a f t Summit communique (economic
d e c l a r a t i o n ) and the p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s prepare the p o l i t i c a l
d e c l a r a t i o n . The Summit provides a unique opportunity f o r frank,
informal exchanges at the c h i e f o f state/head o f government l e v e l ,
but the r i g i d i t y o f a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes
precludes such exchanges.
To show Western support f o r reform, Soviet/Russian leaders have been
i n v i t e d t o j o i n the Summit a f t e r formal meetings, Gorbachev i n 1991
and Y e l t s i n i n 1992.
Although we and the Europeans are pressing
Japan t o i n v i t e Y e l t s i n , Japan i s r e l u c t a n t t o do so because o f the
dispute w i t h Russia over the K u r i l e Islands. The Japanese say,
however, t h a t the f i n a l decision on i n v i t i n g Y e l t s i n rests w i t h a l l
members o f the G-7.
Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank Governors o f the Summit countries
also meet several times a year. Their work often contributes t o the
Summit, and the Summit sometimes tasks t h i s G-7 group on p a r t i c u l a r
issues.
B r i t i s h Concerns
Following t h i s f a l l ' s suspension o f the B r i t i s h pound from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and i t s
subsequent depreciation, Prime M i n i s t e r Major c a l l e d f o r greater
G-7 monetary p o l i c y coordination, a p o s i t i o n he may push during the
run-up t o the Summit.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major has argued f o r a less formal, more f l e x i b l e
Summit t h a t meets less frequently. Japan i s r e s i s t i n g changing the
format f o r Tokyo, but may agree t o streamlining i t i n 1994.
The B r i t i s h have indicated they w i l l press f o r a G-7 statement on
the Rushdie a f f a i r which declares Iran's decree against Rushdie
"contrary t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law."
CLINTON LIBRARY P C P
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THE UK AND AFRICA
The UK remains our most r e l i a b l e partner on major A f r i c a n issues
and c r i s e s . Although sub-Saharan A f r i c a has s l i d down the UK
agenda i n recent years as other issues came t o the f o r e , the
B r i t i s h remain serious players i n a dozen A f r i c a n countries,
i n c l u d i n g v i r t u a l l y a l l the major countries (South A f r i c a , Kenya,
Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Mozambique) of most' i n t e r e s t t o us.
B r i t i s h commercial i n t e r e s t s i n the f i r s t four dwarf ours (over
one b i l l i o n pounds of d i r e c t investment i n Kenya and N i g e r i a and
nearly f o u r b i l l i o n pounds i n South A f r i c a ) and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l
t i e s run deep.
Southern A f r i c a
The U.S. and UK hold s i m i l a r views and have coordinated c l o s e l y
on the t h r e e major southern AFrica issues, Angola, Mozambique and
South A f r i c a .
C i v i l war resumed i n Angola i n l a t e 1992 a f t e r UNITA r e j e c t e d the
September 29-30 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . UNITA i s pressing i t s m i l i t a r y
advantage; an immediate ceasefire i s u n l i k e l y . The second round
of d i r e c t t a l k s between the government and UNITA has been delayed
while both sides attempt t o improve t h e i r bargaining p o s i t i o n
through success on the b a t t l e f i e l d . The UK has t o l d us i t
considers i t s evenhanded approach has been unproductive and now
intends t o be more openly supportive of the government. H G
M
would l i k e us t o recognize i t .
In Mozambique, despite delays i n the deployment of UN
peacekeeping forces (ONUMOZ), the cease-fire i s holding and food
r e l i e f i s g e t t i n g t o needy areas. The U.S. and UK p a r t i c i p a t e i n
several UN-chaired commissions overseeing the peace accord. We
are now considering a UN request f o r a U.S. engineer b a t t a l i o n
for ONUMOZ. The B r i t i s h , w i t h the French and Portuguese, w i l l
t r a i n the new, u n i f i e d Mozambican m i l i t a r y .
The South A f r i c a n Government (SAG) and the A f r i c a n National
Congress (ANC) are making progress i n b i l a t e r a l t a l k s on the
process and timetable f o r n e g o t i a t i n g South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n
to n o n r a c i a l democracy. However, large gaps remain over key
issues such as powersharing and federalism. The SAG and ANC hope
to resume m u l t i - p a r t y negotiations i n March and hold the
country's f i r s t democratic e l e c t i o n w i t h i n a year. I t i s unclear
whether Inkatha leader Buthelezi w i l l j o i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
P o l i t i c a l violence remains widespread, although the major South
A f r i c a n p a r t i e s agree t h a t the UN and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l
observers have been a very p o s i t i v e f a c t o r . Meanwhile, the
economy continues t o d e t e r i o r a t e , r e s u l t i n g i n a nearly 50%
unemployment r a t e among blacks.
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SOMALIA
The UK has provided approximately $60 m i l l i o n toward humanitarian
r e l i e f i n Somali since January 1992. While the UK has not
furnished ground forces t o t h e U n i f i e d Task Force (UNITAF), i t
has deployed 90 airmen and two C-130s t o support c o a l i t i o n
t r a n s p o r t operations i n Somalia.
The B r i t i s h p r e f e r American replacements f o r departing UN Special
Representative K i t t a n i as w e l l as r e l i e f coordinator Johnston.
HMG also supports the idea o f "seconding" p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f from
U.S. and UK diplomatic and development agencies as a means of
strengthening UN operations i n Somalia.
The UK s t r o n g l y backs us on t h e need f o r a Security Council
r e s o l u t i o n g i v i n g UNOSOM I I an expanded mandate i n Somalia,
i n c l u d i n g f l e x i b l e rules o f engagement. Overseas Development
M i n i s t e r , Baroness Lynda Chalker, deserves our thanks f o r
convincing Kenyan President Moi t o agree " i n p r i n c i p l e " t o the
deployment o f UN peacekeeping forces on t h e Kenyan side o f the
Kenya/Somalia border. This could prevent incursions i n t o Somalia
by forces reportedly l o y a l t o former Somali d i c t a t o r Siad Barre.
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MULTIPURPOSE VEHICLES (RANGE ROVERS)
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s reviewing the t a r i f f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f
four-door multipurpose v e h i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g minivans and possibly
the Range Rover. R e c l a s s i f y i n g these vehicles as t r u c k s rather
than automobiles would r a i s e the t a r i f f applied from 2.5% t o 25%.
Range Rover claims the t a r i f f increase would add $7,000 t o the
$42,000 cost o f each o f the 3400-3500 Range Rovers s o l d i n the
U.S. annually. The B r i t i s h and EC are aware o f the issue and are
a c t i v e l y lobbying against i t . Both have threatened t o challenge
any r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as a v i o l a t i o n o f U.S. GATT o b l i g a t i o n s .
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SPRINT'S APPLICATIONS TO BUILD
TELEPHONE NETWORK IN THE UK
In November 1991, the B r i t i s h Government issued a White Paper
opening t h e UK telecommunications market. Consistent w i t h t h i s
new p o l i c y . S p r i n t , i n January 1992, applied f o r permission t o
b u i l d and operate a n a t i o n a l network i n the UK and t o connect
t h i s network t o a Sprint owned i n t e r n a t i o n a l network. This would
allow S p r i n t t o o f f e r end-to-end service on S p r i n t f a c i l i t i e s .
Early discussions w i t h HMG were promising. However, a f t e r the
A p r i l 1992 e l e c t i o n s , the new p o l i t i c a l leadership a t the
Department o f Trade and Industry began t o r a i s e o b j e c t i o n s t o
Sprint's a p p l i c a t i o n t o own and operate i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u i t s .
Instead, they have suggested t h a t Sprint lease i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c i r c u i t s from e i t h e r o f the UK c a r r i e r s , B r i t i s h Telecom or
Mercury. Sprint contends t h a t t h i s would place them a t a
competitive disadvantage and makes t h e i r investment i n a UK
domestic network h i g h l y questionable.
The United States has allowed Mercury's parent company, Cable and
Wireless, t o construct and operate a network i n the United
States. C&W i s authorized t o own and operate i t s own f a c i l i t i e s
between the United States and Canada, our l a r g e s t
telecommunications t r a d i n g p a r t n e r . C W has a p p l i c a t i o n s pending
&
before the FCC t o own and operate f a c i l i t i e s between the United
States and the UK and Hong Kong.
There i s an imbalance between the way the USG has t r e a t e d the UK
company, and HMG i s t r e a t i n g S p r i n t . To achieve a balance, HMG
should, a t a minimum, be prepared t o grant the U.S. applicant the
r i g h t t o operate i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y between the UK and the U.S.,
B r i t a i n ' s l a r g e s t telecommunications t r a d i n g p a r t n e r .
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BRITAIN, MAASTRICHT AND THE EC
Status o f Maastricht R a t i f i c a t i o n i n the UK
In December 1991, EC leaders agreed at a summit i n Maastricht,
Netherlands, t o a broad-ranging t r e a t y which w i l l , i f r a t i f i e d ,
move Europe toward deeper i n t e g r a t i o n and broader membership.
Denmark's r e j e c t i o n o f the Maastricht t r e a t y i n a referendum
l a s t June fueled o p p o s i t i o n i n the UK. Major, who supports
the t r e a t y , i s caught between the r i g h t o f h i s own party and
the o p p o s i t i o n Labor Party.
Denmark votes again May 18 on the basis o f a special
agreement intended t o meet p u b l i c concern about loss o f
sovereignty.
Most b e l i e v e t h a t t h e UK parliament w i l l r a t i f y the t r e a t y ,
assuming the Danish referendum succeeds. But i t w i l l be a
d i f f i c u l t process i n any case and could go e i t h e r way.
A l l three UK parliamentary p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r i t y of
Conservatives, support i t i n p r i n c i p l e . Major has staked
his personal p r e s t i g e , i f not h i s government, on
ratification.
I f the Danes r e j e c t i t a second time, however, the UK w i l l
probably not r a t i f y e i t h e r , s e t t i n g o f f an EC c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
crisis.
European i n t e g r a t i o n would probably continue but a t a
slower, more uneven pace and i n a d i f f e r e n t format.
B r i t a i n ' s Place i n the EC
Major has moved the debate about B r i t a i n ' s place i n Europe form
Thatcher's i n t r a n s i g e n t r h e t o r i c t o a general acceptance o f a
more a c t i v i s t and engaged European p o l i c y while at t h e same time
r e t a i n i n g opt-outs on monetary and s o c i a l issue p r o v i s i o n s of the
Maastricht t r e a t y .
Major used the EC Presidency r o l e during the l a t t e r h a l f of
1992 t o successfully advance the UK's concept o f the EC.
With the agreement reached at the Edinburgh Summit l a s t
December t o begin negotiations t o admit Sweden, A u s t r i a and
Finland t o the EC, and t o eventually admit Poland, Hungary
and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the UK got i t s sougha f t e r widening of the EC. The prospects f o r the more
f e d e r a l v i s i o n of the Community, most c l o s e l y associated
w i t h the French, are now much less c e r t a i n .
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As B r i t a i n becomes "a b e t t e r European," more c l o s e l y t i e d t o
the EC, t h e UK w i l l be less able t o break ranks w i t h i t s EC
colleagues on issues o f importance t o us. t h i s dynamic can
already be seen i n the UK's p o s i t i o n on such issues as the
r e c o g n i t i o n o f Macedonia where i t s p o s i t i o n has been
circumscribed by i t s EC allegiance.
'OECRET
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�B r i t a i n and European Security A r c h i t e c t u r e
B r i t a i n has been one our most a c t i v e a l l i e s i n t r y i n g t o ensure
t h a t the development o f a European s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y
not b r i n g about a rupture i n t r a n s - a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s , or, at a
minimum, f o s t e r an inward-looking America. The B r i t i s h have a
second set o f concerns as w e l l : proving t h e i r European bona
f i d e s by demonstrating t o the French, Germans and others t h a t
Europe should take a c t i o n i n the s e c u r i t y and defense f i e l d ,
while t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t we remain committed t o a strong NATO,
and a s i g n i f i c a n t (e.g., 100,000) U.S. troop presence i n Europe.
B r i t i s h p o l i c y has been manifested through i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the
French i n NATO, actions i n the West European Union (WEU),
a t t i t u d e toward the Franco-German corps, and support f o r
expanding NATO membership.
Dealing With t h e French. The B r i t i s h see an e v o l u t i o n i n French
s e c u r i t y p o l i c y v i s a v i s NATO, and, despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n
dealing w i t h the French i n the NATO context, p r e f e r t o see as
much work as possible done i n cooperation w i t h the French. This
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o them (and t o us) given French
w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n peacekeeping operations — an
i n c r e a s i n g l y important r o l e f o r NATO.
WEU. The B r i t i s h supported the WEU's move from London t o
Brussels ( l a s t month) and i t s embryonic planning a c t i v i t i e s .
That said, they i n s i s t on close t i e s between WEU and NATO (they
have dual-hatted t h e i r NATO ambassador t o the WEU), and want f u l l
transparency i n planning. Their view i s t h a t , when serious
s e c u r i t y issues are at stake (e.g., contingency planning toward
enforcing the No-Fly-Zone) NATO must take p r i o r i t y over the WEU.
Franco-German Corps. The B r i t i s h pushed very hard t o ensure t h a t
t h i s corps would not form the nucleus o f an independent European
army w i t h only minimal t i e s t o NATO. They were s a t i s f i e d w i t h
the successful n e g o t i a t i o n s (conclude l a s t month) between SACEUR
and the French and German m i l i t a r i e s which t i e d the corps t o
NATO. (They were also pleased w i t h the close coordination w i t h
us i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s dispute.
NATO Membership. The B r i t i s h are on record as f a v o r i n g an
expansion o f NATO membership t o keep pace w i t h the l i k e l y
expansion o f the EC and the WEU.
They see t h i s i s a slow,
gradual process, and over the l a s t year discussed q u i e t l y w i t h us
the idea o f using the same c r i t e r i a used i n accepting new members
i n t o the EC/WEU as f o r NATO. The debates over Maastricht which
have focused EC a t t e n t i o n on deepening i t s u n i t y (rather than
broadening i t s membership) have put these plans on hold.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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BRITISH DEFENSE POSTURE
Despite Defense Secretary Malcolm R i f k i n d ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of
the UK as " p r i m a r i l y a middle-ranking European power," B r i t a i n ,
alone among our a l l i e s , i s a s t r a t e g i c nuclear power, a f u l l and
major m i l i t a r y partner i n NATO, and a s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y power
w i t h worldwide commitments. The B r i t i s h are determined t o remain
our c l o s e s t partner and are predisposed t o e n l i s t w i t h us when
t r o u b l e brews. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union
has created f a m i l i a r pressures t o cut back the m i l i t a r y , a
process now p a i n f u l l y underway i n the UK.
Nuclear weapons, seen as the u l t i m a t e guarantor of B r i t a i n ' s
s e c u r i t y , have so f a r escaped the budget-cutting ax, but B r i t i s h
conventional forces have not. By the mid-1990's, army manpower
w i l l drop from 145,400 t o 116,000. UK troops i n Germany w i l l
plunge from a f u l l corps t o l i t t l e more than a d i v i s i o n . A i r
Force manpower w i l l be trimmed, and the Royal Navy's t o t a l o f 47
f r i g a t e s and destroyers w i l l shrink t o 40 or fewer.
Although the government has recently r e l u c t a n t l y bowed t o strong
Parliamentary pressure t o r e t a i n some army u n i t s scheduled f o r
e l i m i n a t i o n (much of the pressure arises from sentimental
attachment t o h i s t o r i c regiments), the planned reductions w i l l
s t r e t c h a UK m i l i t a r y whose commitments are growing, a t least i n
the short term. Almost 20,000 B r i t i s h troops are deployed t o
Northern I r e l a n d ; another 5,000 are now committed — e i t h e r on
the ground or i n a support r o l e — t o the Bosnia c r i s i s .
UK o f f i c i a l s assert t h a t modernization w i l l compensate f o r
smaller conventional forces, but we b e l i e v e t h a t both operational
f l e x i b i l i t y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s could s u f f e r . That matters t o us:
as the B r i t i s h showed i n the Gulf, they are the a l l y most l i k e l y
to j o i n i n w i t h a major m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n — i n c l u d i n g ground
troops — when i t counts. The B r i t i s h recognize the value o f
c o a l i t i o n - t y p e operations (such as p o l i c i n g the n o - f l y zones over
Iraq) and are usually w i l l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e .
But w i t h l i m i t e d assets, London now has t o set p r i o r i t i e s on i t s
deployments, and f u t u r e U.S. requests f o r even small
c o n t r i b u t i o n s from the UK might prove more d i f f i c u l t . For
example, B r i t a i n v i r t u a l l y opted out o f "Restore Hope" i n
Somalia. Even i f peacekeeping and other contingency operations
pass the means t e s t , they w i l l face tougher p o l i t i c a l s c r u t i n y .
Growing UN demands f o r peacekeeping forces have t r i g g e r e d a
debate i n the UK about the use of B r i t i s h forces f o r nont r a d i t i o n a l defense r o l e s . Defense Secretary R i f k i n d i s adamant
t h a t UK forces w i l l not expand t h e i r r o l e i n Bosnia beyond the
present humanitarian r e l i e f one. Although Foreign Secretary Hurd
r e c e n t l y r e a f f i r m e d t h a t B r i t a i n w i l l do i t s p a r t , he and other
senior B r i t i s h leaders w i l l prove ever warier about committing UK
forces, e s p e c i a l l y i f the commitment seems open-ended or i l l defined.
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THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT
A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement was signed on November 15, 1985 by PM
Thatcher and PM Garret F i t z g e r a l d . I t can be seen as e s s e n t i a l l y
g i v i n g I r e l a n d an agreed r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of the North (and
thus a voice i n p r o t e c t i n g the Catholic community there) i n
r e t u r n f o r an a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t the status o f Northern I r e l a n d
w i l l only be changed i n accord w i t h the w i l l of i t s i n h a b i t a n t s .
I r e l a n d gains i t s r o l e i n the North through the Intergovernmental
Conference, which meets about once every s i x weeks a t the l e v e l
of I r i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r - B r i t i s h Secretary o f State f o r Northern
I r e l a n d t o discuss p o l i t i c a l , s e c u r i t y , and l e g a l matters and
cross-border cooperation. I n general, the I r i s h use the meetings
t o r a i s e concerns about d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against Catholics and
problems i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e (use o f excess force,
harassment by cooperation i n f i g h t i n g t e r r o r i s m . For the U.S.
the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement has the advantage of g e t t i n g the GOI
and HMG speaking t o (not shouting at) each other - thereby making
r e l a t i o n s w i t h two close friends easier.
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�L e t t e r hand d e l i v e r e d t o NSA Advisor Lake
from S i r Robin Renwick.
ANGLO-IRISH A
UT
ARTICLE 1
The two Governments
(a)
a f f i r m t h a t any change i n t h e status o f Northern
I r e l a n d would only come about w i t h t h e consent o f a
m a j o r i t y o f t h e people o f Northern I r e l a n d ;
(b)
recognise t h a t t h e present wish o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h e
people o f Northern I r e l a n d i s f o r no change i n t h e status
of Northern I r e l a n d ;
(c)
declare t h a t , i f i n t h e f u t u r e a m a j o r i t y o f t h e
people o f Northern I r e l a n d c l e a r l y wish f o r and f o r m a l l y
consent t o t h e establishment o f a u n i t e d I r e l a n d , they w i l l
introduce and support i n t h e respective Parliaments
l e g i s l a t i o n t o give e f f e c t t o t h a t wish.
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THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND
The Fund was established i n 1986 as a way o f showing U.S. support
f o r the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement. Since then, the U.S. Congress has
appropriated $210 m i l l i o n f o r the Fund. Other donors are Canada,
New Zealand and the EC. The former have given small amounts; t h e
EC has been c o n t r i b u t i n g about $18 m i l l i o n annually since 1989.
The Fund concentrates on employment programs, t r a i n i n g , and the
encouragement of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e i n Northern I r e l a n d and i n
s i x border counties o f the Republic. I n c r e a s i n g l y i t i s
focussing on disadvantaged areas, such as West B e l f a s t and remote
towns along the border. Because o f f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , a
sense t h a t the Fund had s u f f i c i e n t funds f o r the p r o j e c t s
i d e n t i f i e d , and a b e l i e f t h a t other donors could do more, t h e
Executive Branch d i d not i t s e l f propose appropriations f o r the
Fund i n recent years. The i n i t i a t i v e has come f o r the Congress
( p a r t i c u l a r l y the House of Representatives) while appropriate
nearly $20 m i l l i o n y e a r l y .
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�BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Along w i t h other Europeans, the B r i t i s h o f t e n show greater
sympathy t o Arab p o s i t i o n s than t o I s r a e l ' s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
regarding the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . This r e f l e c t s t r a d i t i o n a l
B r i t i s h l i n k s t o the Arab world, plus the influence of Foreign
Office Arabists.
Nevertheless, the UK s t r o n g l y supports the U.S.-brokered ArabI s r a e l i peace process. I t has, f o r example, followed our lead on
the P a l e s t i n i a n deportees issued, w h i l e i n f o r m a l l y l o o k i n g f o r
ways t o check u n h e l p f u l a c t i v i t y at the UN. The B r i t i s h back us
i n demanding balanced treatment o f I s r a e l i n UN r e s o l u t i o n s , and
they have worked t o shape EC ( p a r t i c u l a r l y French) designs on the
peace process t o meet U.S. concerns. They are, however, j u s t as
i n s i s t e n t as the French and others t h a t Europe's s e c u r i t y ,
p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t e n t i t l e the EC t o a prominent
seat at the t a b l e .
The moderate B r i t i s h approach t o the PLO o f f e r s some advantages
t o us. London maintains contact through the B r i t i s h Embassy i n
t u n i s i a and through an i n d i v i d u a l i n London who c a l l s himself the
PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , but who has no o f f i c i a l standing. These
channels enable the FCO, a t our behest, t o urge moderation on
P a l e s t i n i a n n e g o t i a t o r s , the PLO and Arab governments.
HMG does not advocate a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and regards the PLO
only as an umbrella o r g a n i z a t i o n expressing P a l e s t i n i a n i d e n t i t y
and a s p i r a t i o n s . Despite strong FCO i n t e r e s t at both the working
and the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , the B r i t i s h have deferred t o our wish t o
put o f f m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l contacts w i t h the PLO.
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�PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
When I s r a e l announced i t s package o f measures t o resolve the
d e p o r t a t i o n issue on Feb 1, B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d t h a t I s r a e l should
comply f u l l y w i t h UNSCR 7 99.
The Foreign O f f i c e agreed w i t h us t h a t r e i n v i g o r a t i n g the peace
process should be the t o p p r i o r i t y , but they doubted t h a t Rabin
had o f f e r e d enough t o enable the P a l e s t i n i a n s t o r e t u r n t o the
negotiations.
The B r i t i s h supported the scenario worked out at the Security
Council February 12, i n which the SC President obtained the
Council's approval t o convey f i v e p o i n t s t o the I s r a e l i
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The B r i t i s h Perm Rep played a h e l p f u l r o l e .
The B r i t i s h now agree t h a t the deportation issue i s
behind us and t h a t we should focus on moving forward i n
the peace process.
B r i t a i n remains concerned at P a l e s t i n i a n r e j e c t i o n o f
the Council's actions and would support f u r t h e r I s r a e l i
gestures t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s .
As Hams-sponsored t e r r o r i s t attacks on I s r a e l i s continue, we
doubt Rabin i s i n c l i n e d t o o f f e r anything f u r t h e r t o the
P a l e s t i n i a n s a t t h i s time.
B r i t a i n could u s e f u l l y employ i t s contacts w i t h the PLO t o urge
the P a l e s t i n i a n s not t o allow Hamas and other opponents o f the
peace process t o block the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
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�IRAN
U.S. p o l i c y toward I r a n has focused on a l t e r i n g I r a n i a n behavior
i n key areas - t e r r o r i s m , weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n , t h r e a t s t o
i t s neighbors, and human r i g h t s - through s p e c i f i c sanctions and
p u b l i c condemnation.
I r a n i s the most a c t i v e state sponsor of t e r r o r i s m we face
today. I r a n i a n agents assassinate I r a n i a n d i s s i d e n t s
r e s i d i n g abroad. I r a n also provides v i t a l support t o
t e r r o r i s t groups such as H i z b a l l a h and Hamas, and seeks t o
expand i t s t i e s t o r a d i c a l I s l a m i s t groups i n North A f r i c a .
I r a n i s pursuing nuclear, chemical and b i o l o g i c a l weapons
programs. I t also seeks t o acquire other d e s t a b i l i z i n g
weapons systems, such as m i s s i l e s and submarines, w i t h which
i t could threaten i t s neighbors.
Iran's dismal human r i g h t s record includes summary
imprisonment and executions, and a denial of basic l e g a l
rights.
We seek broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l support t o make our pressures
more e f f e c t i v e , i n the b e l i e f t h a t I r a n w i l l change i t s
p o l i c i e s only i f the economic or p o l i t i c a l p r i c e i s high.
The U.K. shares our concerns and has worked closely w i t h us i n
developing a common G-7 p o l i t i c a l approach on Iran and on seeking
t o coordinate G-7 export c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s . I t has been more
w i l l i n g than many i n the G-7 t o use p o l i t i c a l and economic
pressures t o change Iranian behavior.
But B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y toward Iran i s t o r n between p o l i t i c a l and
economic i n t e r e s t s . Government and Parliamentary concerns about
I r a n i a n sponsorship of t e r r o r i s m , Iran's arms buildup and the
"fatwah" against author Salman Rushdie have confined r e l a t i o n s t o
a low l e v e l . The I r a n i a n market's a t t r a c t i o n t o B r i t i s h business
argues f o r b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s . The r e s u l t i s a c e r t a i n
ambivalence.
For example, the UK has pushed hard f o r a tough EC
l i n e against I r a n i a n support f o r t e r r o r i s m , while arguing t h a t
our l a t e s t G-7 proposals on export controls are excessive.
However, f o l l o w i n g B r i t a i n ' s "arms t o I r a q " scandal, the
government reviewed export p o l i c y and has announced new, t i g h t e r
r e g u l a t i o n s closer t o our own.
The B r i t i s h have also been more outspoken on Rushdie's behalf and
w i l l ask you t o do so too.
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�LIBYA/PAN AM-103
Security Council sanctions ( a v i a t i o n and arms embargoes) imposed
l a s t year are having an impact, but Libya has not complied w i t h
Resolutions 731 and 748.
Libya continues t o delay and search f o r p r i v a t e
channels t o negotiate new terms.
I t has taken only a few cosmetic, e a s i l y r e v e r s i b l e
steps such as c l o s i n g some t e r r o r i s t t r a i n i n g camps.
The S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u i r e Libya t o t u r n over the
i n d i c a t e d Pan Am bombing suspects f o r t r i a l i n the U.S. or UK,
cooperation w i t h the French on the UTA bombing, compensate
v i c t i m s and cut i t s t i e s t o t e r r o r i s m .
The S e c u r i t y Council w i l l next review sanctions i n m i d - A p r i l .
The U.S., UK and France said p u b l i c l y i n November t h a t
i f Libya d i d not comply, new steps might soon need t o
be taken.
A new sanction not a f f e c t i n g o i l revenues would be u n l i k e l y t o
sway Libya, but i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o get an o i l - r e l a t e d
sanction through the Security Council.
The P a l e s t i n i a n deportation issue and Bosnia have
heightened the sense among many T h i r d World states t h a t
the.West has a double standard on r e s o l u t i o n s i n v o l v i n g
Muslim states.
Some Western European a l l i e s (e.g., Spain, I t a l y ,
Germany) are heavy purchasers of Libyan o i l .
We are i n close contact w i t h the B r i t i s h and French, and a l l
options remain open.
The B r i t i s h believe a f u l l embargo on Libyan o i l may be
too d i f f i c u l t , but they would probably support an
e f f o r t t o get an embargo on shipment of o i l technology
to Libya. Over a year or so, such an embargo, i f
r i g o r o u s l y enforced, would severely r e s t r i c t Libya's
a b i l i t y t o produce o i l .
I f we seek an o i l sanction, we w i l l need t o launch a
major diplomatic campaign i n March. The f i r s t step
w i l l be f u l l coordination w i t h the B r i t i s h and French,
followed by c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h other Council members.
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�UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
Background
Many o f t h e non-aligned and others support expansion i n the
number o f t h e Security Council's permanent members. Japan,
Germany, and several others aspire t o permanent seats. We would
support permanent seats f o r Germany and Japan, but expanding the
Council without d i m i n i s h i n g i t s operational e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i l l be
difficult.
We would want t o avoid too large an expansion. At i t s l a s t
session, t h e General Assembly approved by consensus a r e s o l u t i o n
on e q u i t a b l e representation and increase i n t h e membership of the
Security Council, the r e s o l u t i o n asks member states t o submit
comments on t h e issue t o t h e SYG p r i o r t o June 30 and f o r the SYG
t o r e p o r t on t h e matter t o t h e next UNGA. There i s no consensus
among UN members about how t o manage expansion.
Disagreement
also e x i s t s over whether permanent members should have the veto.
B r i t i s h Views
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the B r i t i s h are unenthusiastic about making
changes i n t h e Security Council. Foreign Secretary Hurd
responded t o a question r e c e n t l y on the subject w i t h the r e t o r t ,
" I f i t a i n ' t broke, don't f i x i t . "
Prime M i n i s t e r Major relayed t h i s mood of caution i n p r i v a t e
comments he made t o our Ambassador i n India l a s t month. Major
noted t h a t i f Germany t r i e d t o become a permanent SC member, the
developing world would object s e r i o u s l y t o three permanent seats
going t o Western Europe. He p r e d i c t e d t h a t the U.S. would not be
pleased w i t h the nature of French-German cooperation on t h e
Council. Major i n d i c a t e d he would support Japan coming on alone.
Major cautioned t h a t t h e U.S. (and UK) should avoid c a s t i n g a
veto (against Japan) but feared China and Russia might eventually
do so.
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THE FALKLANDS
Foreign Secretary Hurd's January v i s i t t o Argentina, the f i r s t by
a B r i t i s h cabinet secretary since the 1982 Falklands War, marked
an important step i n normalizing UK-Argentina r e l a t i o n s .
Although both countries continue t o claim sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands (the U.S. i s neutral on the issue), the UK and
Argentina i n 1990 agreed t o disagree about t h e i r competing claims
and not l e t i t a f f e c t progress on other issues negatively. This
so-called "sovereignty umbrella" paved the way f o r the UK and
Argentina t o r e e s t a b l i s h diplomatic relations three years ago.
By pushing the sovereignty issue aside, the two countries have
been able t o seek solutions t o other sources of b i l a t e r a l
f r i c t i o n , c h i e f l y o i l exploration and f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n the
waters surrounding the Falkland Islands.
Despite the improvement i n r e l a t i o n s , the UK continues i t s
embargo, established during the Falklands War, of arms sales t o
Argentina. I n recognition of Argentina's return t o democracy and
improved human r i g h t s record, the U.S. resumed l i m i t e d arms sales
to Argentina i n 1983.
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CYPRUS
Now t h a t the Cypriot P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s have been decided,
the UN-sponsored Cyprus n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n recess since midNovember, can again go forward, although newly-elected President
Clerides has s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o consult f i r s t w i t h the
Greeks — c o n s u l t a t i o n s which might s l i p the UN schedule f o r
talks.
The U.S. t o l d both sides we expect them t o r e t u r n t o
New York as agreed i n March and t o be ready t o make the
decisions necessary t o b r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a
successful conclusion.
Glafcos Clerides's v i c t o r y i n the February 14 Cypriot
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n may w e l l cause a temporary delay
while he gets organized and puts h i s stamp on the UN
proceedings. However, he may be able t o make up l o s t
time l a t e r due t o h i s greater i n f l u e n c e w i t h Parliament
and w i t h t h i s community. His anti-UN "set o f ideas"
campaign p o s t u r i n g w i l l give way r a p i d l y t o a more
pragmatic approach f o r which he i s known.
Turkey w i l l have t o put a great deal of pressure on
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash i f he i s t o be brought
i n t o l i n e . The UK, as a respected European power and a
member of the EC can and should dangle p o l i t i c a l and
economic b a i t i n f r o n t of the Turks t o motivate them t o
lever Denktash i n t o p o s i t i o n .
The U.S. and the UK have cooperated closely throughout the UNsponsored t a l k s .
On February 19, U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator John
Maresca met i n London w i t h h i s counterparts t o discuss
possible approaches t o the next round of UN
negotiations.
The U.S. and the UK agree on confidence-building measures
(CBM's), which were recommended by Boutros-Ghali and unanimously
endorsed by the Security Council (UNSCR 789). The U.S. p o s i t i o n
was conveyed t o a l l p a r t i e s : CBM's are not a package; each side
should s t a r t implementing at l e a s t some CBM's even before the
t a l k s resume; and implementation of CBM's i s not a p r e c o n d i t i o n
for resumption of the t a l k s and should not d i s t r a c t the p a r t i e s
from the t a l k s .
The UK has announced t h a t i t w i l l reduce i t s troop commitment t o
UNFICYP by 50 percent and has begun the f i r s t (25%) stage of t h a t
reduction. This, along w i t h the already completed t o t a l
withdrawal by Finland and the planned Canadian t o t a l withdrawal
(mid-1993) w i l l reduce UNFICYP strength from 2,400 i n mid-1992 t o
below 1,000.
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The UN S e c r e t a r i a t has consulted troop c o n t r i b u t o r s on
how UNFICYP's organization and mission w i l l be changed.
The UK (which s t i l l has Sovereign Base Areas i n Cyprus)
i s t a k i n g a leading r o l e i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
SECRET
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�Opening Tuzla A i r p o r t
London has p u b l i c l y welcomed the proposed a i r drop operation, but
b e l i e v e s t h a t high a l t i t u d e parachuting o f supplies has l i m i t e d
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; a longer-term s o l u t i o n must be found f o r Eastern
Bosnia. Opening the a i r p o r t at Tuzla may o f f e r a p a r t i a l
s o l u t i o n as w e l l as represent a much needed supplement t o
Sarajevo, The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e the a i r p o r t could be opened w i t h
engineers (and are w i l l i n g t o share t h e i r t e c h n i c a l assessments);
large-scale s e c u r i t y forces would not be required, as the a i r p o r t
i s , i n t h e i r view, reasonably secure.
Major may suggest t h a t t h e U.S. take t h e lead i n opening and
running Tuzla a i r p o r t , since the B r i t i s h are stretched too t h i n
on t h e ground.
Our own assessment roughly corresponds t o London's. Tuzla i s i n
Muslim hands ( i n f a c t , Bosnian Foreign M i n i s t e r S i l a d z i c has
asked the U.S. several times t o run an a i r l i f t operation i n t o
Tuzla). The Serbs, although located i n t h e mountains some 6-8
miles outside the c i t y , are not s h e l l i n g t h e town s e r i o u s l y . The
a i r p o r t i t s e l f l i e s about 6 miles south o f Tuzla, and we have no
r e p o r t s t h a t i t has been s h e l l e d (suggesting t h a t i t may j u s t l i e
at the margins of Serb a r t i l l e r y range). The a i r p o r t has l i m i t e d
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and no warehouses t o speak o f ; the main runway (C130 capable) has been c r a t e r e d , but i s now repaired. The road
from the a i r p o r t t o Tuzla i s good, but roads t o other p a r t s o f
Eastern Bosnia are poor, and at times impassable i n w i n t e r .
We suggest the President hear Major out and o f f e r t o have our
m i l i t a r y experts meet w i t h t h e i r s t o explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s
t h a t Tuzla may o f f e r as w e l l as the e f f o r t and r i s k s involved i n
g e t t i n g i t up and running.
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IRAQ
—
We v a l u e t h e c l o s e p a r t n e r s h i p we have m a i n t a i n e d w i t h t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o ensure I r a q i
compliance w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s .
I t h i n k we are i n g e n e r a l accord i n our view o f
Saddam's c o n t i n u i n g menace and how t o d e a l w i t h i t .
—
Our r e s o l v e t o see I r a q comply f u l l y w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s remains s t r o n g , as does our support f o r
measures enacted by t h e C o a l i t i o n t o m o n i t o r and e n f o r c e
those r e s o l u t i o n s .
I r a q i s n o t c l o s e t o being i n compliance. We expect
s a n c t i o n s w i l l be renewed i n March and Saddam w i l l
l i k e l y resume h i s c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e C o a l i t i o n s h o r t l y
thereafter.
A l e s s e n i n g o f t h e pressure now would have s e r i o u s
l o n g - t e r m consequences.
—
Through our j o i n t commitment t o O p e r a t i o n P r o v i d e Comfort,
we have succeeded i n n o r t h e r n I r a q i n e n f o r c i n g R e s o l u t i o n
688's requirement t h a t I r a q s t o p r e p r e s s i n g i t s people.
We
have made i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e UN t o execute i t s
humanitarian mission i n northern I r a q .
I n t e r i m r e p o r t s suggest t h a t a t t h e p r e s e n t pace o f
a i d d e l i v e r y t h e r e w i l l n o t be a repeat o f t h e
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and p o p u l a t i o n movements o f
1991.
However, I r a q c o u l d e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and p u t
that population at r i s k .
—
Our e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f t o t h e people o f
n o r t h e r n I r a q w i l l have t o be repeated i f we do n o t f i n d a
way t o h e l p them p r o v i d e f o r themselves i n t h e long term.
Relaxing sanctions s e l e c t i v e l y f o r t h e n o r t h i s a
p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n . But we c o u l d r i s k i n t e r n a t i o n a l
u n i t y on s a n c t i o n s by c r e a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t s e t o f
rules f o r the north.
—
We b e l i e v e t h a t i n t h e long term, t h e s e c u r i t y and
s t a b i l i t y o f I r a q depends on t h e c r e a t i o n o f a d e m o c r a t i c ,
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government w i t h i n t h e c o n f i n e s o f I r a q ' s
current borders.
With t h e support of r e g i o n a l s t a t e s , we b e l i e v e t h a t
the I r a q i N a t i o n a l Congress c o u l d h e l p f a c i l i t a t e t h e
process o f c r e a t i n g a democratic s t a t e .
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I r a n under R a f s a n j a n i has pursued a t w o - t r a c k f o r e i g n p o l i c y
which i n c r e a s i n g l y emphasizes domestic economic p r i o r i t i e s and
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , some but not a l l of w h i c h c o n f l i c t s h a r p l y
w i t h o u r s . At the same t i m e , I r a n c o n t i n u e s t o serve as the
champion f o r p o l i t i c a l I s l a m i c movements, i n c l u d i n g those which
engage i n v i o l e n c e or seek t o p l a y a d e s t a b i l i z i n g r o l e .
U.S. p o l i c y toward I r a n has focused on a l t e r i n g I r a n i a n
b e h a v i o r i n key a r e a s — t e r r o r i s m , weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n ,
t h r e a t s t o i t s n e i g h b o r s , and human r i g h t s — t h r o u g h s p e c i f i c
s a n c t i o n s and p u b l i c condemnation.
I r a n i s the most a c t i v e s t a t e sponsor of t e r r o r i s m we f a c e
today. I r a n i a n agents a s s a s s i n a t e I r a n i a n d i s s i d e n t s
r e s i d i n g abroad. I r a n a l s o p r o v i d e s v i t a l s u p p o r t t o
t e r r o r i s t groups such as H i z b a l l a h , and seeks t o expand i t s
t i e s t o r a d i c a l I s l a m i s t groups i n N o r t h A f r i c a .
I r a n i s p u r s u i n g n u c l e a r , chemical and b i o l o g i c a l weapons
programs. I t a l s o seeks t o a c q u i r e o t h e r d e s t a b i l i z i n g
weapons systems, such as m i s s i l e s and submarines, w i t h
which i t c o u l d t h r e a t e n i t s n e i g h b o r s .
I r a n ' s d i s m a l human r i g h t s r e c o r d i n c l u d e s summary
imprisonment and e x e c u t i o n s , and a d e n i a l of b a s i c l e g a l
rights.
We seek broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t t o make our p r e s s u r e s
more e f f e c t i v e , i n the b e l i e f t h a t I r a n w i l l change i t s
p o l i c i e s o n l y i f the economic or p o l i t i c a l p r i c e i s h i g h .
The U.K.
shares our concerns and has worked c l o s e l y w i t h us i n
d e v e l o p i n g a common G-7 p o l i t i c a l approach on I r a n and on
seeking t o c o o r d i n a t e G-7 e x p o r t c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s . I t has been
more w i l l i n g than many i n the G-7 t o use p o l i t i c a l and economic
p r e s s u r e s t o change I r a n i a n b e h a v i o r .
But B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y toward I r a n i s t o r n between p o l i t i c a l and
economic i n t e r e s t s . Government and P a r l i a m e n t a r y concerns
about I r a n i a n s p o n s o r s h i p of t e r r o r i s m , I r a n ' s arms b u i l d u p and
the " f a t w a h " a g a i n s t author Salman Rushdie have c o n f i n e d
r e l a t i o n s t o a low l e v e l .
The I r a n i a n market's a t t r a c t i o n t o
B r i t i s h business argues f o r b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s . The r e s u l t i s a
c e r t a i n ambivalence. For example, the UK has pushed h a r d f o r a
tough EC l i n e a g a i n s t I r a n i a n s u p p o r t f o r t e r r o r i s m , w h i l e
a r g u i n g t h a t our l a t e s t G-7 p r o p o s a l s on e x p o r t c o n t r o l s are
e x c e s s i v e . However, f o l l o w i n g B r i t a i n ' s "arms t o I r a q "
s c a n d a l , the government reviewed e x p o r t p o l i c y and i s about t o
announce new, t i g h t e r r e g u l a t i o n s c l o s e r t o our
own.
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ONLY I F ASKED:
We a r e concerned, as you are, by I r a n ' s s u p p o r t f o r
t e r r o r i s m ( i n c l u d i n g t e r r o r i s m aimed a t d e r a i l i n g t h e
M i d d l e East peace p r o c e s s ) , i t s p u r s u i t o f weapons o f mass
d e s t r u c t i o n and o t h e r d e s t a b i l i z i n g weapons systems, and
i t s d i s m a l human r i g h t s r e c o r d .
As you know, we have worked c l o s e l y w i t h your government
and o t h e r G-7 members t o develop a common p o l i t i c a l
approach on I r a n and t o harmonize n a t i o n a l e x p o r t c o n t r o l
p o l i c i e s . We g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e t h e UK's c o n s t r u c t i v e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n and c o n t r i b u t i o n t o these e f f o r t s .
—
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o c o n t i n u i n g d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e f a c t s o f
I r a n i a n b e h a v i o r , on whether we should c o n s i d e r new
t a c t i c s , and on how we can work t o g e t h e r , and w i t h o t h e r
G-7 s t a t e s , t o advance our shared o b j e c t i v e s .
1
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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The B r i t i s h t r o o p s engaged i n h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f i n Bosnia
are p e r f o r m i n g h e r o i c a l l y under dangerous and d i f f i c u l t
conditions.
They are r i s k i n g t h e i r l i v e s t o save t h e l i v e s
of c o u n t l e s s i n n o c e n t c i v i l i a n s .
I t takes p o l i t i c a l l y courageous l e a d e r s , and an e n l i g h t e n e d
and compassionate c i t i z e n r y , t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s k i n d o f
h u m a n i t a r i a n m i s s i o n . C l e a r l y B r i t a i n has b o t h .
But I know i t i s n o t easy t o keep your t r o o p s t h e r e .
I am
committed t o having t h e U.S. p l a y a more a c t i v e r o l e i n
s u p p o r t o f UN and EC e f f o r t s i n Bosnia.
We want t o work
w i t h Vance and Owen t o f i n d a f a i r s o l u t i o n , and t o make i t
work.
R e a c t i o n t o our i n i t i a t i v e on p o l i c y toward
Y u g o s l a v i a has been l a r g e l y p o s i t i v e .
former
Amb. Bartholomew, our s p e c i a l envoy, had a s u c c e s s f u l v i s i t
to Moscow. We w i l l c o n t i n u e our e f f o r t s t o keep t h e
Russians engaged c o n s t r u c t i v e l y . We have asked f o r
Moscow's h e l p i n persuading t h e Bosnian Serbs t o a l l o w
h u m a n i t a r i a n convoys t o move f r e e l y , e s p e c i a l l y t o e a s t e r n
Bosnia.
Amb. Bartholomew i s now b e g i n n i n g t o meet w i t h Cy Vance and
L o r d Owen and w i t h t h e p a r t i e s . He w i l l emphasize t o them
t h a t we w i s h t o a s s i s t , n o t take over, these n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We w i s h t o b u i l d on what has a l r e a d y been agreed, and we
understand t h a t a l l p a r t i e s must be prepared t o compromise.
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c be engaged i n
the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
I have sent a message t o P r e s i d e n t
I z e t b e g o v i c asking him t o come t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
The
V i c e P r e s i d e n t and Amb. Bartholomew w i l l f o l l o w up w i t h
him.
—
We are a l s o i n t h e process of t a k i n g a hard l o o k a t
t i g h t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s and s a n c t i o n s enforcement.
We l o o k
f o r w a r d t o d i s c u s s i n g our ideas on t h i s w i t h you s h o r t l y .
—
We s u p p o r t t h e B r i t i s h - F r e n c h - S p a n i s h S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n d r a f t t h a t c a l l s f o r t h e admission o f Macedonia
to t h e UN under t h e p r o v i s i o n a l name, "Former Yugoslav
R e p u b l i c of Macedonia." I t i s n o t c e r t a i n , however,
whether t h e t e x t w i l l be a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e two p a r t i e s . I t
may r e q u i r e some changes.
Our two governments must c o n t i n u e t o cooperate i n our
a t t e m p t s t o ensure t h a t Macedonia i s q u i c k l y a d m i t t e d t o
the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , but w i t h as l i t t l e damage as p o s s i b l e
to our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Greece.
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The Russian economy continues to d e c l i n e . Y e l t s i n has achieved
a number of important accomplishments — monetizing the
economy, c r e a t i n g market mechanisms, l i b e r a l i z i n g t r a d e ,
u n i f y i n g the currency exchange r a t e , and undertaking an
ambitious p r i v a t i z a t i o n program — but a l l of these gains could
be swept away by h y p e r i n f l a t i o n . ( I n f l a t i o n i s now running at
a monthly rate of about 30 percent.)
Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program i s
not j u s t i f i a b l e f o r Russia. Such a program i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e ,
however, f o r other forms of f i n a n c i a l support, i n c l u d i n g a $6
b i l l i o n currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n fund promised at the G-7 summit
l a s t year. Given Russia's need and the i n a b i l i t y of producing
an IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are c u r r e n t l y
examining new ways i n which we could render aid to Russia.
The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes t h a t s t a b i l i z i n g the
economy i s i t s main economic p r i o r i t y , but i t w i l l face s t i f f
resistance to i t s proposed a u s t e r i t y measures from the Supreme
Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition to Y e l t s i n ,
led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued t o chip away at
Y e l t s i n ' s powers and p o l i c i e s .
Y e l t s i n had hoped to break both the p o l i t i c a l and economic
impasse by means of a n a t i o n a l referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
reform t o be held A p r i l 11. Opposition from parliamentarians
as w e l l as r e g i o n a l leaders, fear of a b e t t i n g s e p a r a t i s t
tendencies w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f , and u n c e r t a i n t y over the
outcome of the vote apparently have forced him, however, to
consider other ideas.
Y e l t s i n has proposed instead e a r l y parliamentary and
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s during 1994 and 1995 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Unless accompanied by a genuine consensus on economic and
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform, t h i s proposal would continue the current
stalemate f o r the next year w i t h no guarantee t h a t e l e c t i o n s
would produce a more p l i a b l e l e g i s l a t u r e . Y e l t s i n ,
Khasbulatov, and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court Chairman Zorkin are
engaged i n n e g o t i a t i o n s to hammer out a s o l u t i o n t o Russia's
p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . Pressure i s increasing on a l l the
p a r t i c i p a n t s and the outcome i s f a r from c e r t a i n . I f agreement
i s reached, an e x t r a o r d i n a r y session of the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies could convene i n e a r l y March to r a t i f y the
agreement.
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�-2Absent some renewal o f Y e l t s i n ' s a u t h o r i t y , t h e Russian
domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k i n g process w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be
marked by b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f i g h t i n g combined w i t h p a r l i a m e n t a r y
p r e s s u r e s toward g r e a t e r a s s e r t i v e n e s s of Russia's p r e r o g a t i v e s
as a g r e a t power. On a number of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s
( B o s n i a , I r a q , n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n ) , Y e l t s i n ' s margin f o r
maneuver w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d .
D e s p i t e t h e p r e s s u r e s , he has shown no s i g n o f abandoning h i s
b a s i c pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n .
—
Almost s i n c e e l e c t i o n day, t h e Russians have been p r e s s i n g
f o r an e a r l y summit.
The p r e l i m i n a r y Russian r e a c t i o n t o our new
e x - Y u g o s l a v i a has been p o s i t i v e .
—
approach on
We c o n t i n u e t o cooperate c l o s e l y on arms c o n t r o l .
Yeltsin
has f o r m a l l y s u b m i t t e d START I I t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t f o r
r a t i f i c a t i o n , and we are w o r k i n g c l o s e l y w i t h t h e Russians
t o persuade t h e p a r l i a m e n t t h a t t h e t r e a t y i s f a i r and
balanced.
The most u r g e n t t a s k i n arms c o n t r o l i s t o o b t a i n f u l f i l l m e n t
Ukraine,
of t h e L i s b o n P r o t o c o l by Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
which has n e i t h e r r a t i f i e d t h e START I T r e a t y nor adhered t o
the NPT, i s key here.
( B e l a r u s has a l ready approved START and
NPT; Kazakhstan has approved START but not y e t adhered t o t h e
NPT.)
We have pressed t h e U k r a i n i a n s t o f u l f i l l t h e i r
commitments under t h e L i s b o n P r o t o c o l , and b o t h we and t h e UK
have o f f e r e d them s e c u r i t y assurances and a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e
dismantlement o f s t r a t e g i c arms.
At t h e same t i m e , we have urged t h e Russians t o amend t h e i r own
s e c u r i t y assurances t o Ukraine i n o r d e r t o t a k e account o f
U k r a i n i a n concerns.
We have a l s o i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e proceeds of
Russian s a l e s t o t h e U.S. of h i g h l y e n r i c h e d uranium (HEU) from
d i s m a n t l e d former S o v i e t n u c l e a r warheads be e q u i t a b l y shared
w i t h U k r a i n e , B e l a r u s , and Kazakhstan, something t h e Russians
have r e s i s t e d .
GOHFIDEMTBMi
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Russian I n t e r n a l S i t u a t i o n
P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n has been on t h e p o l i t i c a l d e f e n s i v e s i n c e
the l a s t December Congress o f Peoples' D e p u t i e s and may now
be backing away from t h e idea o f h o l d i n g a n a t i o n a l
referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m .
Y e l t s i n i s t r y i n g t o reach a compromise agreement w i t h t h e
p a r l i a m e n t on l e g i s l a t i v e - e x e c u t i v e p o w e r - s h a r i n g . Such
agreement c o u l d o b v i a t e t h e need f o r a referendum, b u t
under p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s any compromise w i l l l i k e l y
f a v o r p a r l i a m e n t a t Y e l t s i n ' s expense.
Economy
—
Y e l t s i n ' s p o s i t i o n has been f u r t h e r weakened by t h e
s t a t e o f t h e Russian economy. We are encouraged by
Y e l t s i n government's development o f a s t a b i l i z a t i o n
to f i g h t i n f l a t i o n .
The program appears p r o m i s i n g ,
government faces an u p h i l l b a t t l e t o secure passage
parliament.
poor
the
program
but t h e
by t h e
Economic c o n d i t i o n s are u n l i k e l y t o show improvement any
t i m e soon.
Any h e l p we can render t h e government's s t a b i l i z a t i o n
program c o u l d s t r e n g t h e n Y e l t s i n ' s hand i n implementing
reform.
I f t h e Russians g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e i r monetary and f i s c a l
p o l i c i e s , we and t h e G-7 w i l l need t o work w i t h them t o
f a c i l i t a t e new c a p i t a l f l o w s .
Since t i m e i s o f t h e essence and s i n c e an IMF s t a n d b y
program i s not l i k e l y t o be a c h i e v a b l e soon, we a r e
r e v i e w i n g our b i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e t o see what new
i n i t i a t i v e s c o u l d be announced t o s u p p o r t a Russian
s t a b i l i z a t i o n program a t my f i r s t meeting w i t h Y e l t s i n .
—
A c t i o n on debt r e s c h e d u l i n g i s e s s e n t i a l .
We need t o be
f l e x i b l e and accept any s e n s i b l e arrangement worked o u t
between Russian and U k r a i n e on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e d e b t .
--
We a l s o need t o be f l e x i b l e on how much we ask Russian t o
pay i n 1993.
I hope you w i l l work w i t h me t o c o n v i n c e o t h e r s i n t h e G-7
and i n t h e P a r i s Club o f t h e need t o be f l e x i b l e .
-€eWFIDEMTIAL'
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We welcome your c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h us i n w o r k i n g w i t h
the U k r a i n i a n s t o get START I r a t i f i e d . Three i s s u e s need
t o be r e s o l v e d t o get t h e U k r a i n i a n s on board: (1) t h e
problem o f s e c u r i t y assurances t o U k r a i n e ; (2) s h a r i n g o f
the proceeds from t h e s a l e t o t h e U.S. o f h i g h l y e n r i c h e d
uranium (HEU) t a k e n from d i s m a n t l e d warheads; and (3)
a s s i s t a n c e i n e l i m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms.
—
We have r e i t e r a t e d t o b o t h U k r a i n i a n s and Russians t h a t
w i l l not n e g o t i a t e on our s e c u r i t y assurances package,
a l t h o u g h we might agree t o minor t e c h n i c a l changes.
we
The Russians have t o l d us t h a t t h e y can agree t o r e f e r t o
CSCE p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e c u r i t y assurances t h e y are
prepared t o o f f e r t h e U k r a i n i a n s . We have urged t h e
Russians t o convey t h e amended assurances t o t h e U k r a i n i a n s
as soon as p o s s i b l e , but t h e y have not y e t done so.
—
We would welcome your w e i g h i n g - i n w i t h t h e Russians on t h i s
p o i n t . Once t h e Russians have amended t h e i r assurances, we
s h o u l d press hard f o r U k r a i n i a n c l o s u r e .
On HEU, we are w o r k i n g hard on an agreement f o r t h e U.S. t o
purchase HEU from d i s m a n t l e d former S o v i e t n u c l e a r weapons.
—
As you know, we have t o l d Russia — a t a l l l e v e l s — i t i s
e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e y reach agreement w i t h B e l a r u s ,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine on an e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g o f t h e
proceeds from the s a l e of HEU t o t h e U.S.
We w i l l not
implement any c o n t r a c t u n t i l t h e Russians have worked out a
s h a r i n g arrangement.
Regarding a s s i s t a n c e on e l i m i n a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r
d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s (SNDVs), we have h e l d s e v e r a l rounds o f
t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h U k r a i n e and have pledged $175
m i l l i o n i n Nunn-Lugar f u n d i n g toward t h e e l i m i n a t i o n
process.
D u r i n g t h e e l e c t i o n , I s a i d I f a v o r e d a comprehensive t e s t
ban.
I would l i k e t o go f o r w a r d w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l , but I
wanted f i r s t t o d i s c u s s i t w i t h you and t h e n g i v e our
e x p e r t s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s u l t on t h e mechanism f o r
proceeding.
CLINTON LIKWTPHOTOCOPY
�GOHriDENTIMr
PER E.O. 13526
IRAQ
The UK c o n t i n u e s t o be one of t h e s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t e r s o f our
I r a q p o l i c y , p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n a l l m i s s i o n s , whether
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , or h u m a n i t a r i a n . B r i t i s h l e a d e r s b e l i e v e
t h a t c o n t i n u e d , steady, p r o p o r t i o n a t e p r e s s u r e must be
m a i n t a i n e d on Saddam Hussein.
Prime M i n i s t e r Major w i l l be coming t o Washington hoping f o r
answers on fundamental q u e s t i o n s on U.S. p o l i c y on I r a q
i n c l u d i n g : whether we i n t e n d t o e n f o r c e t h e s t i l l s t a n d i n g
demand t h a t I r a q remove i t s SAMs from t h r e a t e n i n g p o s i t i o n s i n
the n o - f l y zones; whether we are prepared t o respond w i t h f o r c e
to renewed c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e n o - f l y zone or n o r t h e r n r e l i e f
e f f o r t ; and whether we w i l l keep t h e d i p l o m a t i c and economic
p r e s s u r e on I r a q .
The B r i t i s h doubt t h a t l o w - l e v e l a c t i o n s such as s t r i k e s a g a i n s t
SAM s i t e s w i l l undermine Saddam's p o s i t i o n . They b e l i e v e we
w i l l need t o do more t o shore up what t h e y view as i n c r e a s i n g l y
f r a g i l e s u p p o r t from t h e Arabs and Turkey. I f f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y
a c t i o n a g a i n s t I r a q becomes necessary, t h e B r i t i s h w i l l be even
more p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h concerns about l e g a l i t y and
proportionality.
US p o l i c y on I r a q remains t o i n s i s t upon f u l l I r a q i compliance
w i t h a l l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s and r e s p e c t f o r measures
enacted by t h e C o a l i t i o n t o m o n i t o r and e n f o r c e those
resolutions.
I r a q ' s c u r r e n t "charm o f f e n s i v e " aims t o show i t i s i n
" s u f f i c i e n t " compliance w i t h UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s f o r
s a n c t i o n s t o be eased a t t h e next r e v i e w i n March.
Past e x p e r i e n c e suggests t h a t I r a q w i l l not f u l l y
comply by March and t h a t , i f i t s s t r a t e g y does not
work, I r a q w i l l r e t u r n t o open d e f i a n c e .
J o i n t UN, US, UK and EC h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f e f f o r t s are showing
some s i g n s of success. I n t e r i m r e p o r t s suggest t h a t at t h e
p r e s e n t pace of a i d d e l i v e r y t h e r e w i l l not be a r e p e a t of
widespread d e p r i v a t i o n and p o p u l a t i o n movements o f 1991.
However, I r a q c o u l d e a s i l y d i s r u p t d e l i v e r i e s and
the p o p u l a t i o n at r i s k .
put
I n o r d e r t o make n o r t h e r n I r a q l e s s r e l i a n t on o u t s i d e a i d , t h e
UK i s l e a n i n g toward f i n d i n g ways t o o b t a i n s a n c t i o n s exemptions
to p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e which would r e a c t i v a t e l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s
and improve i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n t h e r e g i o n .
We support t h i s i d e a , but e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i f f e r e n t s e t
of i m p o r t / e x p o r t r u l e s f o r n o r t h e r n I r a q c o u l d t h r e a t e n
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus behind s a n c t i o n s .
• rrwrrnrMTTftTi
CLINTON LIBfWTPHOTOCOPY
�DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
The B r i t i s h have welcomed t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n i t i a t i v e on
Bosnia, which t h e y see as r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r own views and
concerns.
John Major comes t o Washington eager t o do a l l he
can t o h e l p i t succeed.
The B r i t i s h have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued t h a t t h e West has l i t t l e
choice b u t t o s u p p o r t t h e Vance-Owen p l a n , however f l a w e d i t
may be. I n r e c e n t weeks t h e y urged t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and
NATO p l a y a l a r g e r r o l e i n r e a c h i n g and implementing a
Vance-Owen b r o k e r e d s e t t l e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g p r o v i d i n g t r o o p s .
Our i n i t i a t i v e addressed both these p o i n t s , much t o John
Major's s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The U.S. i n i t i a t i v e a l s o p u t o f f t h e k i n d o f a c t i o n London most
dreads —
use o f f o r c e , such as n o - f l y zone enforcement o r
a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t Serb t a r g e t s . London f e a r s t h a t such
a c t i o n would t r i g g e r r e p r i s a l a g a i n s t UN ( i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h )
t r o o p s on t h e ground, t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t ,
and e v e n t u a l i r r e s i s t i b l e p r e s s u r e f o r massive Western
i n t e r v e n t i o n . The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e t h a t once i n , t h e West would
be a long t i m e g e t t i n g o u t . They were v a s t l y r e l i e v e d t h a t
t h e i r warnings were heard i n Washington, and encouraged t h a t
the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s ready t o c o n s i d e r c o n t r i b u t i n g more
m i l i t a r i l y t o peacekeeping o r h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t s .
Since Y u g o s l a v i a e r u p t e d i n open f i g h t i n g i n 1991, t h e B r i t i s h
have doubted t h e a b i l i t y o f o u t s i d e r s t o h e l p s o l v e t h e
crisis.
S t i l l , B r i t a i n agreed w i t h i t s more a c t i v i s t EC
p a r t n e r s t h a t the Community should t a k e t h e l e a d i n t h e e f f o r t
t o b r o k e r a s e t t l e m e n t . When the EC proved unequal t o t h e
t a s k , HMG as EC P r e s i d e n t launched t h e August 1992 London
Conference on Y u g o s l a v i a t o regenerate a peace process, t h i s
t i m e w i t h deeper UN i n v o l v e m e n t .
The B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e t o work
a c t i v e l y i n the UN t o r e s o l v e t h e Greek-Macedonian impasse.
So long as t h e f i g h t i n g i s c o n f i n e d t o former Y u g o s l a v i a ,
London sees no n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s d i r e c t l y a t s t a k e . But
domestic p r e s s u r e t o "do something" p l u s EC c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (and
U.S. p r e s s u r e f o r an " a l l necessary means" r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e
UN) prompted HMG t o deploy some 2,500 s o l d i e r s t o Bosnia.
B r i t a i n i s among t h e l a r g e s t t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s i n
e x - Y u g o s l a v i a , and operates i n one o f t h e t o u g h e s t areas.
Defense S e c r e t a r y R i f k i n d , w i t h m i l i t a r y and Tory backbench
s u p p o r t , s t r o n g l y opposes any UK m i l i t a r y engagement beyond
h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f . C o n t r i b u t i n g t o a peacekeeping e f f o r t i n
support o f a brokered agreement would be a hard d e c i s i o n i n
London. Major and F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Hurd say t h e y w i l l need
c l o s e c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Washington i f t h e y a r e t o overcome
R i f k i n d ' s r e s i s t a n c e . NATO l e a d e r s h i p , and commitment o f U.S.
ground t r o o p s , i s p r o b a b l y a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n t o f u r t h e r
B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y involvement i n e x - Y u g o s l a v i a .
CLINTON LlflfWPHOTOCOPY
�•EGRET
PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
When I s r a e l announced i t s package o f measures t o r e s o l v e
t h e d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e on Feb. 1 , B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d t h a t
I s r a e l s h o u l d comply f u l l y w i t h UNSCR 799.
The F o r e i g n O f f i c e agreed w i t h us t h a t r e i n v i g o r a t i n g t h e
peace process should be t h e t o p p r i o r i t y , b u t t h e y doubted
t h a t Rabin had o f f e r e d enough t o enable t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s t o
return t o the negotiations.
The B r i t i s h s u p p o r t e d t h e s c e n a r i o worked o u t a t t h e
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l February 12, i n which t h e SC P r e s i d e n t
o b t a i n e d t h e C o u n c i l ' s a p p r o v a l t o convey f i v e p o i n t s t o
t h e I s r a e l i r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The B r i t i s h Perm Rep p l a y e d a
helpful role.
The B r i t i s h now agree t h a t t h e d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e i s
behind us and t h a t we s h o u l d focus on moving f o r w a r d
i n t h e peace process.
B r i t a i n remains concerned a t P a l e s t i n i a n r e j e c t i o n o f
the C o u n c i l ' s a c t i o n s and would s u p p o r t f u r t h e r
I s r a e l i gestures t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s .
As Hamas-sponsored t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s on I s r a e l i s c o n t i n u e ,
we doubt Rabin i s i n c l i n e d t o o f f e r a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r t o t h e
Palestinians a t t h i s time.
B r i t a i n c o u l d u s e f u l l y employ i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e PLO t o
urge t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s n o t t o a l l o w Hamas and o t h e r
opponents o f t h e peace process t o b l o c k t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
-SECRET-.
DECL:OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�POINTS TO BE MADE
PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES
—
We a p p r e c i a t e B r i t a i n ' s t i m e l y s u p p o r t f o r t h e s c e n a r i o
worked o u t a t t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on t h e i s s u e o f t h e
P a l e s t i n i a n deportees.
Now t h a t I s r a e l has conveyed t o t h e C o u n c i l t h a t i t s
a c t i o n s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h UNSCR 799, we can proceed t o
focus o u r a t t e n t i o n on t h e peace process.
B r i t a i n ' s support f o r t h e peace process i s i m p o r t a n t .
—
We would a p p r e c i a t e B r i t a i n ' s a s s i s t a n c e i n c o u n s e l i n g t h e
PLO t h a t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s ' i n t e r e s t s a r e best served by
returning t o the negotiations.
Hamas should n o t be a l l o w e d t o pose an o b s t a c l e t o t h e
peace process.
PER E O 13526
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-SECRET'
DECL:OADR
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�• COfflEIBEMTTgL
UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
Background
—
Many o f t h e n o n - a l i g n e d and o t h e r s s u p p o r t expansion i n t h e
number o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s permanent members.
—
Japan, Germany, and s e v e r a l o t h e r s a s p i r e t o permanent
seats.
—
We would support permanent seats f o r Germany and Japan, b u t
expanding t h e C o u n c i l w i t h o u t d i m i n i s h i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n a l
e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t .
—
We would want t o a v o i d t o o l a r g e an expansion.
—
A t i t s l a s t s e s s i o n , t h e General Assembly approved by
consensus a r e s o l u t i o n on e q u i t a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and
i n c r e a s e i n t h e membership o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . The
r e s o l u t i o n asks member s t a t e s t o submit comments on t h e
i s s u e t o t h e SYG p r i o r t o June 30 and f o r t h e SYG t o r e p o r t
on t h e m a t t e r t o t h e next UNGA.
—
There i s no consensus among UN members about how t o manage
expansion.
Disagreement a l s o e x i s t s over whether permanent
members s h o u l d have t h e v e t o .
B r i t i s h Views
—
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e B r i t i s h are u n e n t h u s i a s t i c about
making changes i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
Hurd responded t o a q u e s t i o n r e c e n t l y on t h e s u b j e c t w i t h
the r e t o r t , " I f i t a i n ' t broke, don't f i x i t . "
—
Prime M i n i s t e r Major r e l a y e d t h i s mood o f c a u t i o n i n
p r i v a t e comments he made t o our Ambassador i n I n d i a l a s t
month. Major noted t h a t i f Germany t r i e d t o become a
permanent SC member, t h e d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d would o b j e c t
s e r i o u s l y t o t h r e e permanent seats going t o Western
Europe. He p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e U.S. would n o t be pleased
w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f French-German c o o p e r a t i o n on t h e
C o u n c i l . Major i n d i c a t e d he would s u p p o r t Japan coming on
alone. Major c a u t i o n e d t h a t t h e U.S. (and UK) s h o u l d a v o i d
c a s t i n g a v e t o ( a g a i n s t Japan) b u t f e a r e d China and Russia
might e v e n t u a l l y do so.
•CONriDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
�COMriDDM'l IAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
UN SECURITY COUNCTL ENLARGEMENT
(ONLY IF ASKED):
— UN S e c u r i t y Council composition r e f l e c t s the immediate post
World War I I s i t u a t i o n rather than c u r r e n t r e a l i t i e s .
— We would support a well-thought-out e f f o r t t o update
Council membership.
— As you know, we support permanent seats f o r Japan and
Germany.
-- We recognize and share many of the concerns your
government has i n regard t o t h i s issue.
—
Our o v e r r i d i n g concern must be Council e f f e c t i v e n e s s . We
could not support an enlargement t h a t might get out of
c o n t r o l or detract from the Council's a b i l i t y t o do
business.
— We need t o t h i n k c r e a t i v e l y about how t h i s issue can be
managed and how t o address the perception t h a t the Council
should b e t t e r r e f l e c t c u r r e n t global r e a l i t i e s .
•CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
PER E O 13526
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CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�C0D1F lDEM3r££rtr*
HONG KONG AND THE
UK
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.0.13526
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s expect t h e l a s t f i v e years o f t h e i r r u l e i n
Hong Kong t o be among t h e most d i f f i c u l t i n t h e c o l o n y ' s
h i s t o r y . T h e i r goals a r e :
t o p r e s e r v e t h e s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of Hong Kong
t h r o u g h 1997 and beyond;
t o b u i l d democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s capable o f w i t h s t a n d i n g
expected Chinese p r e s s u r e a f t e r t r a n s i t i o n ;
t o achieve the l e a s t d i s r u p t i v e t r a n s f e r o f power p o s s i b l e ;
t o m a i n t a i n t h e commercial p o s i t i o n of B r i t i s h f i r m s i n
Hong Kong and China; and
t o p r e v e n t Hong Kong f r o m becoming a domestic p o l i t i c a l
football in Britain.
These g o a l s have a l r e a d y come i n t o c o n f l i c t , most n o t a b l y over
Governor C h r i s Patten's p r o p o s a l s t o broaden m o d e s t l y t h e
f r a n c h i s e o f t h e 1995 e l e c t i o n s t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l ,
which w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s i t when China t a k e s over s o v e r e i g n t y i n
1997.
Progress towards t h e smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o PRC
s o v e r e i g n t y has a l s o been marred by an ongoing d i s p u t e over
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new Hong Kong a i r p o r t .
B e i j i n g r e a c t e d vehemently t o P a t t e n ' s p r o p o s a l s , making
t h r e a t s r a n g i n g from undoing any changes t o a n n u l l i n g c o n t r a c t s
made w i t h o u t i t s consent a f t e r 1997.
A l t h o u g h t h e Chinese may
o n l y be p o s t u r i n g , the v e r b a l barrage weakens t h e f o u n d a t i o n
f o r a smooth t r a n s i t i o n , has caused t h e s t o c k market t o
r e v e r b e r a t e , and has shaken l o c a l c o n f i d e n c e i n Hong Kong's
future s t a b i l i t y .
There are s i g n s , however, t h a t B e i j i n g i s moving t o resume
t a l k s w i t h B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s on Hong Kong's f u t u r e .
Coming
back t o t h e t a b l e would r e p r e s e n t a major Chinese c o n c e s s i o n ,
and would h e l p t o defuse t h e c r i s i s over P a t t e n ' s p r o p o s a l s .
But i t i s s t i l l u n c l e a r whether t h e Chinese are p r e p a r e d t o
resume s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Hong Kong o f f i c i a l s , or
s i m p l y p l a n t o use the t a l k s t o d e l a y l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n on
Patten's proposals.
Hong Kong, China, and
MFN
HMG b e l i e v e s MFN i s the wrong t o o l f o r t r y i n g t o remedy human
r i g h t s abuses i n China.
The B r i t i s h c l a i m t h a t Hong Kong c o u l d
lose up t o $16 b i l l i o n of i t s o v e r a l l t r a d e and as many as
60,000 j o b s i f MFN were suspended. A l t h o u g h Governor P a t t e n
has on o c c a s i o n h i n t e d t h a t he might f a v o r an i n f o r m a l l i n k a g e
between China's a t t i t u d e toward Hong Kong and MFN, he has most
r e c e n t l y emphasized t h a t t h e r i s k s of such l i n k a g e are f a r
g r e a t e r than t h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s .
eewriDENTiAL
RDU
CLINTON LI
O OY
CP
�•GOWFIBEMTIAL'
PER E.0.13526
POINTS TO BE MADE
HONG KONG
The 1984 J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n p r o v i d e s a good framework f o r
Hong Kong's r e v e r s i o n t o PRC s o v e r e i g n t y .
We r e c o g n i z e t h a t d u r i n g t h e next few years s p e c i f i c i s s u e s
r e l a t i n g t o Hong Kong's t r a n s i t i o n are f o r t h e UK and the
PRC t o determine.
However, our own i n t e r e s t s i n Hong Kong make t h e U.S. a
keen observer o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n process and d r i v e our
p o l i c y commitment t o p l a y a s t r o n g and s u p p o r t i v e r o l e i n
d o i n g what we can t o ensure a s u c c e s s f u l and s t a b l e
transition.
We i n t e n d t o m a i n t a i n and expand our s t r o n g t i e s w i t h Hong
Kong. We want t o conclude a p p r o p r i a t e b i l a t e r a l
agreements, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n , t o
p r o v i d e a long term framework f o r those r e l a t i o n s .
We view t h e e s c a l a t i o n o f t e n s i o n s between t h e HKG and t h e
PRC w i t h concern, and have made those concerns known t o t h e
PRC.
We have not endorsed Governor Patten's p r o p o s a l s , b u t
b e l i e v e t h e y are w o r t h y o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n by a l l p a r t i e s .
We would welcome t h e resumption o f t h e S i n o - B r i t i s h J o i n t
L i a i s o n Group d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e o f Hong
Kong .
China's MFN s t a t u s i s c r u c i a l t o c o n t i n u e d s t a b i l i t y i n
Hong Kong's business community and t o American businesses
o p e r a t i n g i n Hong Kong.
We are deeply t r o u b l e d by the r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n i l l e g a l
i m m i g r a t i o n from China and t h e use o f Hong Kong as a p l a c e
t o o u t f i t v e s s e l s used by smugglers o f i l l e g a l a l i e n s .
F i f t e e n o f these v e s s e l s have e n t e r e d U.S. w a t e r s i n t h e
past year and we understand another 15-20 s i m i l a r l y
o u t f i t t e d v e s s e l s are i n Hong Kong harbor ready t o d e p a r t .
We hope t h e Hong Kong government w i l l use a l l l e g a l means
a v a i l a b l e t o d i s c o u r a g e such o p e r a t i o n s and p r e v e n t such
a t t e m p t s which u s u a l l y e n t a i l g r e a t human s u f f e r i n g . The
s t o r i e s o f t h e 537 Chinese m i g r a n t s aboard t h e Eastwood who
are now a w a i t i n g r e p a t r i a t i o n on K w a j a l e i n ( M a r s h a l l
I s l a n d s ) t e s t i f y t o t h e need t o end t h i s p r a c t i c e
expeditiously.
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BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Along w i t h o t h e r Europeans, t h e B r i t i s h o f t e n show g r e a t e r
sympathy t o Arab p o s i t i o n s than t o I s r a e l ' s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
r e g a r d i n g t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s .
This r e f l e c t s t r a d i t i o n a l
B r i t i s h l i n k s t o t h e Arab w o r l d , p l u s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f F o r e i g n
Office Arabists.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e UK s t r o n g l y supports t h e U.S.-brokered
A r a b - I s r a e l i peace process.
I t has, f o r example, f o l l o w e d our
lead on t h e P a l e s t i n i a n deportees i s s u e , w h i l e i n f o r m a l l y
l o o k i n g f o r ways t o check u n h e l p f u l a c t i v i t y a t t h e UN. The
B r i t i s h back us i n demanding balanced t r e a t m e n t o f I s r a e l i n UN
r e s o l u t i o n s , and t h e y have worked t o shape EC ( p a r t i c u l a r l y
French) designs on t h e peace process t o meet U.S. concerns.
They a r e , however, j u s t as i n s i s t e n t as t h e French and o t h e r s
t h a t Europe's s e c u r i t y , p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t e n t i t l e
the EC t o a prominent seat a t t h e t a b l e .
The moderate B r i t i s h approach t o t h e PLO o f f e r s some advantages
t o us. London m a i n t a i n s c o n t a c t t h r o u g h t h e B r i t i s h Embassy i n
T u n i s i a and t h r o u g h an i n d i v i d u a l i n London who c a l l s h i m s e l f
the PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , b u t who has no o f f i c i a l s t a n d i n g .
These channels enable t h e FCO, a t our behest, t o urge
moderation on P a l e s t i n i a n n e g o t i a t o r s , t h e PLO and Arab
governments.
HMG does n o t advocate a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and regards t h e PLO
o n l y as an u m b r e l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n e x p r e s s i n g P a l e s t i n i a n
i d e n t i t y and a s p i r a t i o n s . D e s p i t e s t r o n g FCO i n t e r e s t a t b o t h
the w o r k i n g and t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , t h e B r i t i s h have d e f e r r e d
t o our w i s h t o p u t o f f m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e
PLO.
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POINTS TO BE MADE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
The p u r s u i t o f peace i n the M i d d l e East i s a v e r y h i g h
p r i o r i t y f o r my A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
We a r e s t r o n g l y committed t o t h e M a d r i d process.
We w i l l
work hard t o make i t succeed, and b e l i e v e t h e r e a r e r e a l
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r progress t h i s y e a r .
We a p p r e c i a t e t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t we have had w i t h
you on t h e peace process, n o t o n l y on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s b u t
a l s o over t h e past s i x months d u r i n g t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's
Presidency o f t h e European Community. I hope t h i s c l o s e
c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e as we move f o r w a r d .
As you a r e aware. S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r i s v i s i t i n g t h e
r e g i o n t o c o n s u l t d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e p a r t i e s on next steps
f o r c o n t i n u i n g t h e peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . He w i l l attempt t o
gauge t h e p a r t i e s ' views and t o determine how best t o g e t
t h e t a l k s back on t r a c k .
We are h o p e f u l t h a t we can f i n d enough common ground t o
reconvene t h e b i l a t e r a l t a l k s as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r r e t u r n s , and t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l t a l k s
i n A p r i l and May.
Together w i t h you and t h e EC, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s remains
opposed t o I s r a e l ' s use o f d e p o r t a t i o n s , and has made t h i s
c l e a r t o t h e Rabin government. We s u p p o r t UNSCR 799 and
want t o see a s o l u t i o n t o t h e i s s u e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t .
We b e l i e v e t h a t w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s reached w i t h t h e
I s r a e l i s , a process has been c r e a t e d w h i c h :
allows a
s i g n i f i c a n t number o f deportees t o r e t u r n t o I s r a e l o r t h e
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s i m m e d i a t e l y ; h a l v e s t h e sentences o f
the remainder; and assures t h e d e l i v e r y o f h u m a n i t a r i a n
assistance.
These steps r e p r e s e n t the best and most p r a c t i c a l approach
t o seeing r e s o l u t i o n 799"s o b j e c t i v e s r e a l i z e d . We need t o
g i v e t h i s process a chance t o work. We were v e r y pleased
w i t h t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l l a s t week t o p u t
t h i s i s s u e behind us and we want t o thank you f o r your
s u p p o r t i n a c h i e v i n g t h i s end.
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NORTHERN IRELAND
British Sensitivity
Few i s s u e s have more p o t e n t i a l f o r c r e a t i n g problems i n
Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s than N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
—
The
B r i t i s h r e g a r d i t as an i n t e r n a l m a t t e r .
—
They b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U.S.
n a t i o n a l i s t perspective.
tends t o view i t from the
The e x t e n s i o n of t e r r o r i s t campaigns t o England, i n n o c e n t
l o s s o f l i f e , and t h e t a r g e t i n g o f B r i t a i n ' s p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r s h i p have made HMG s e n s i t i v e t o a d v i c e from o u t s i d e .
I n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s campaign statements
aroused hopes i n t h e C a t h o l i c community and f e a r s among t h e
U n i o n i s t s t h a t t h e USG would weigh i n on t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s i d e .
Status of the Talks
The p o l i t i c a l t a l k s , which broke o f f i n November w i t h o u t
agreement, c o n t a i n t h r e e " s t r a n d s " — d e v o l v e d government i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , r e l a t i o n s between N o r t h and South i n I r e l a n d ,
and t i e s between t h e UK and I r e l a n d .
The major s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s a r e : 1) who w i l l e x e r c i s e
e x e c u t i v e power i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , 2) D u b l i n ' s r o l e i n
N o r t h e r n I r i s h a f f a i r s , and 3) t h e U n i o n i s t s ' demand t h a t
I r e l a n d r e v i s e i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m t o the North.
I n f o r m a l t a l k s c o n t i n u e and f o r m a l sessions may resume
soon. Dick S p r i n g , t h e new I r i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , i s
expected t o press f o r an agreement.
Terrorism
The l e v e l of v i o l e n c e (84 deaths i n 1992 i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d )
i s w e l l down from i t s 1972 peak of more t h a n 450 deaths.
Two
r e c e n t t r e n d s , however, are worrisome:
1) t h e i n c r e a s e d
p r o f i c i e n c y of t h e l o y a l i s t ( P r o t e s t a n t ) p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , who
caused more deaths l a s t year than t h e IRA; 2) t h e IRA's bombing
campaigns i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and on t h e B r i t i s h mainland.
Human R i g h t s
Harassment by the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , u n f a i r d e t e n t i o n and
t r i a l s , and use of excessive f o r c e p e r s i s t .
C a t h o l i c unemployment r a t e s remain h i g h d e s p i t e a tough
1989 a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n law. New investment i s r e q u i r e d .
-gONFTPFNTTM,
CLINTON LIBRM?"PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDEHTTglT
POINTS TO BE MADE
NORTHERN IRELAND
I u n d e r s t a n d what a s e r i o u s problem N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d has
been f o r you. Do you see any s i g n s o f improvement?
As a c l o s e f r i e n d o f b o t h t h e UK and I r e l a n d and w i t h c l o s e
t i e s t o people from b o t h t r a d i t i o n s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
wants t o be h e l p f u l .
At t h e same t i m e we do not w i s h t o get i n t h e way o f t h e
t a l k s process, which we hope w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l .
I am c o n s i d e r i n g t a k i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g s t e p s ; I would
your comments on them:
like
The appointment o f Speaker o f t h e House F o l e y as my s p e c i a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o review t h e s i t u a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
and r e p o r t back. The g o a l i s f a c t f i n d i n g , not m e d i a t i o n .
The Speaker i s w i l l i n g t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s t a s k . I f you and
t h e I r i s h are amenable, I p l a n t o announce the appointment
soon and a t t h e same t i m e express my s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e
e a r l y resumption o f t h e t a l k s process.
C o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t f o r t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fund f o r I r e l a n d ,
w h i c h I understand has been a g r e a t h e l p i n promoting
inter-communal a c t i v i t i e s and economic development.
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GATT-URUGUAY ROUND
The Uruguay Round (UR), w h i c h i n v o l v e s 108 c o u n t r i e s , has been
under n e g o t i a t i o n s i n c e 1986 w i t h U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n a u t h o r i z e d
by f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y t h a t e x p i r e s June 1. USTR K a n t o r
announced February 11 t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would seek
renewal o f f a s t t r a c k a l t h o u g h d e t a i l s o f t h e r e q u e s t would be
decided a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress. We are a l s o
r e v i e w i n g our UR n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n s .
GATT D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l Dunkel a t t e m p t e d t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e t a l k s
i n December 1991 by i s s u i n g a d r a f t " F i n a l A c t " (DFA), w h i c h
i n c o r p o r a t e d agreements a l r e a d y reached and proposed s o l u t i o n s
to u n r e s o l v e d i s s u e s .
Most governments w i l l accept t h e DFA w i t h o u t changes
beyond U.S.-EC amendments on a g r i c u l t u r e r e s u l t i n g
from t h e November " B l a i r House Accord." The EC i s
p r e s s i n g t h i s approach, a l t h o u g h i t a l s o wants
comprehensive market access agreements, w i t h U.S.
concessions, t o "balance" t h e agreement b e f o r e
c o n c l u d i n g t h e Round.
The U.S. p o s i t i o n has been t h a t we need s u b s t a n t i a l p r o g r e s s i n
market access i n goods ( i n c l u d i n g f r e e t r a d e i n key s e c t o r s ) ,
a g r i c u l t u r e , and s e r v i c e s as w e l l as improvements i n t h e DFA.
The U.S. agreed t o use t h e DFA as t h e b a s i s f o r
n e g o t i a t i n g a f i n a l agreement, b u t s t a t e d t h a t
improvements were necessary, e s p e c i a l l y on
antidumping, i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y , t r a d e - r e l a t e d
environment i s s u e s , and t h e M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade
O r g a n i z a t i o n (MTO).
The UK has worked e n e r g e t i c a l l y as an EC member and as EC
P r e s i d e n t i n July-December 1992 t o complete t h e UR as soon as
p o s s i b l e . W h i l e t h e UK can accept t h e DFA, i t a l s o f a v o r s
tougher antidumping r u l e s and i s t h e EC c o u n t r y most w i l l i n g t o
accommodate U.S. i n t e r e s t s . The UK wants t h e U.S. t o reduce
"peaks" ( i . e . h i g h t a r i f f s on ceramics and t e x t i l e s ) and i s
prepared t o meet our z e r o - f o r - z e r o s e c t o r o f f e r s ( e . g .
n o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l s , paper and wood).
Prime M i n i s t e r Major can be expected t o urge
c o m p l e t i n g t h e Round as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e .
The U.K. and t h e EC have urged us t o l i m i t f a s t t r a c k
a u t h o r i t y e x t e n s i o n t o t h r e e months i n o r d e r t o
m a i n t a i n needed p r e s s u r e t o conclude t h e Round.
The U.K. w i l l r e s i s t a t t e m p t s t o r e i n s t a t e super 301
i n f a s t t r a c k renewal due t o s e n s i t i v i t y about
u n i l a t e r a l U.S. e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l a c t i o n s .
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBWPPHOTO
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�COMFIDEMTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE
URUGUAY ROUND/GATT
We w i l l pursue a successful conclusion t o the Uruguay Round.
—
We want t o renew f a s t t r a c k a u t h o r i t y , but I can't provide
d e t a i l s u n t i l we consult w i t h Congress.
—
We want t o progress as r a p i d l y as possible, but i t i s v i t a l
t h a t we get the agreement r i g h t .
—
We appreciate the personal e f f o r t s you have made t o advance
the n e g o t i a t i o n s and would l i k e t o hear your thoughts on
how best t o proceed.
I t i s c l e a r t h a t achieving balanced r e s u l t s w i t h the EC i n
market access i s key t o continued progress.
We also are seeking some changes i n the Dunkel t e x t .
I hope t h a t you w i l l j o i n us i n pressing other EC members,
p a r t i c u l a r l y France, t o make the tough decisions needed.
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G 7 E O O I SUMMIT
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T h i s year's Economic Summit w i l l t a k e p l a c e i n Tokyo
J u l y 7-9. Economic i s s u e s w i l l be a major focus o f t h e agenda
(macro p o l i c i e s and growth, t r a d e , economic r e f o r m i n C e n t r a l
and E a s t e r n Europe and Russia, and r e l a t i o n s w i t h d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r i e s ) . F o r e i g n and Finance M i n i s t e r s w i l l a t t e n d .
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EC P r e s i d e n t D e l o r s r e c e n t l y c a l l e d f o r an e a r l y G-7 Summit
t o c o n s i d e r measures t o s t i m u l a t e economic growth.
We a r e
e v a l u a t i n g t h e idea and t r y i n g t o weigh t h e views o f o t h e r
prospective p a r t i c i p a n t s .
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The agenda w i l l a l s o f e a t u r e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s ( e . g . , FSU,
ex-Yugoslavia, I r a q ) and c r o s s - b o r d e r i s s u e s such as g l o b a l
e n v i r o n m e n t a l concerns, t e r r o r i s m , n u c l e a r s a f e t y ,
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n and human r i g h t s .
—
Summit p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e handled t h r o u g h a network o f p a r a l l e l
"Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s meetings
i n v o l v i n g S t a t e , T r e a s u r y , NSC and o t h e r USG agencies. The
Sherpas prepare t h e d r a f t Summit communique (economic
d e c l a r a t i o n ) and t h e p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s p r e p a r e t h e p o l i t i c a l
declaration.
—
The Summit p r o v i d e s a unique o p p o r t u n i t y f o r f r a n k , i n f o r m a l
exchanges a t t h e c h i e f o f s t a t e / h e a d o f government l e v e l , b u t
the r i g i d i t y o f a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes
p r e c l u d e s such exchanges.
-- To show Western s u p p o r t f o r r e f o r m , S o v i e t / R u s s i a n l e a d e r s
have been i n v i t e d t o j o i n the Summit a f t e r f o r m a l meetings,
Gorbachev i n 1991 and Y e l t s i n i n 1992.
A l t h o u g h we and t h e
Europeans are p r e s s i n g Japan t o i n v i t e Y e l t s i n , Japan i s
r e l u c t a n t t o do so because o f t h e d i s p u t e w i t h Russia over t h e
Kurile Islands.
-- Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank Governors o f t h e Summit
c o u n t r i e s a l s o meet s e v e r a l times a year.
T h e i r work o f t e n
p r o v i d e s i n p u t f o r t h e Summit, and t h e Summit sometimes t a s k s
t h i s G-7 group on p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s .
B r i t i s h Concerns
—
F o l l o w i n g t h i s f a l l ' s suspension o f t h e B r i t i s h pound from t h e
Exchange Rate Mechanism o f the European Monetary System and
i t s subsequent d e p r e c i a t i o n , Prime M i n i s t e r Major c a l l e d f o r
g r e a t e r G-7 monetary p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n , a p o s i t i o n he may
push d u r i n g t h e run-up t o t h e Summit.
—
PM Major has argued f o r a l e s s f o r m a l , more f l e x i b l e Summit
t h a t meets l e s s f r e q u e n t l y . Japan i s r e s i s t i n g changing t h e
format f o r Tokyo, b u t may agree t o s t r e a m l i n i n g i t i n 1994.
—
The B r i t i s h have i n d i c a t e d they w i l l press f o r a G-7 statement
on the Rushdie a f f a i r which d e c l a r e s I r a n ' s decree a g a i n s t
Rushdie " c o n t r a r y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law."
CLINTON LIBRABy^fiHOTOCOPY
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�POINTS TO BE MADE
G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT
R e v i t a l i z i n g t h e U.S. economy i s my t o p p r i o r i t y .
The U.S.
r e c o v e r y i s underway, b u t we a r e concerned t h a t weak
economic growth i n Europe and Japan may hamper a g l o b a l
recovery.
We need t o work t o g e t h e r f o r h i g h e r w o r l d growth. The
Tokyo Summit s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o encourage
the a d o p t i o n o f g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d g l o b a l economic p o l i c i e s
c r i t i c a l f o r o u r own c i t i z e n s , r e f o r m i n g economies i n
E a s t e r n Europe and t h e former S o v i e t Union, and t h e
developing world.
We agree w i t h you t h a t t h e Summit process should be
r e i n v i g o r a t e d t o a l l o w f o r f r a n k and i n f o r m a l exchanges.
We a r e prepared t o work w i t h you t o achieve t h i s g r e a t e r
f l e x i b i l i t y , i f n o t f o r t h i s year, c e r t a i n l y f o r 1994.
—
We a l s o remain committed t o u s i n g t h e Summit forum f o r
c l o s e and r e g u l a r p o l i t i c a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
—
We a r e d e v e l o p i n g o u r ideas a t t h i s p o i n t on t h e p o l i t i c a l
s u b j e c t s t o be d i s c u s s e d a t t h e Tokyo Summit and w i l l be
d i s c u s s i n g them i n t h e r e g u l a r process f o r p r e p a r i n g t h e
Summit agenda and d r a f t P o l i t i c a l D e c l a r a t i o n .
ONLY I F ASKED:
We a r e r e v i e w i n g Jacques D e l o r s ' p r o p o s a l f o r an e a r l y
Summit. L a y i n g t h e groundwork i s key t o a s u c c e s s f u l
Summit, and a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e t i m e frame might reduce our
chances f o r a c o o r d i n a t e d p o l i c y approach. What a r e your
views?
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�LIBYA/PAN AM-103
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l s a n c t i o n s ( a v i a t i o n and arms embargoes)
imposed l a s t year are having an impact, but L i b y a has not
c o m p l i e d w i t h R e s o l u t i o n s 731 and 748.
— L i b y a c o n t i n u e s t o d e l a y and search f o r p r i v a t e
channels t o n e g o t i a t e new terms.
— I t has t a k e n o n l y a few c o s m e t i c , e a s i l y r e v e r s i b l e
s t e p s such as c l o s i n g some t e r r o r i s t t r a i n i n g camps.
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u i r e L i b y a t o t u r n over
t h e i n d i c t e d Pan Am bombing suspects f o r t r i a l i n t h e U.S.
or UK, c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e French on t h e UTA bombing,
compensate v i c t i m s and c u t i t s t i e s t o t e r r o r i s m .
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w i l l next r e v i e w s a n c t i o n s i n
mid-Apri1.
— The U.S., UK and France s a i d p u b l i c l y i n November
t h a t i f L i b y a d i d not comply, new steps might soon
need t o be t a k e n .
A new s a n c t i o n not a f f e c t i n g o i l revenues would be u n l i k e l y
t o sway L i b y a , but i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o get an
o i l - r e l a t e d sanction through the S e c u r i t y Council.
— The P a l e s t i n i a n d e p o r t a t i o n i s s u e and Bosnia have
h e i g h t e n e d t h e sense among many T h i r d World s t a t e s
t h a t t h e West has a double s t a n d a r d on r e s o l u t i o n s
i n v o l v i n g Muslim s t a t e s .
— Some Western European a l l i e s (e.g., Spain, I t a l y ,
Germany) are heavy purchasers o f L i b y a n o i l .
We are i n c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h and French,
a l l o p t i o n s remain open.
and
— The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e a f u l l embargo on L i b y a n o i l
may be too d i f f i c u l t , but t h e y would p r o b a b l y support
an e f f o r t t o get an embargo on shipment of o i l
t e c h n o l o g y t o L i b y a . Over a year or so, such an
embargo, i f r i g o r o u s l y e n f o r c e d , would s e v e r e l y
r e s t r i c t L i b y a ' s a b i l i t y t o produce o i l .
— I f we seek an o i l s a n c t i o n , we w i l l need t o launch
a major d i p l o m a t i c campaign i n March. The f i r s t s t e p
w i l l be f u l l c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h and French,
f o l l o w e d by c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h o t h e r C o u n c i l members.
ED
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�POINTS TO BE MADE
LIBYA/PAN AM-103
I am committed t o seeing j u s t i c e done on the Pan Am
and UTA bombings. During my campaign, I said that the
"United States should make i t clear t h a t i f they (the
i n d i c t e d Libyans) are not turned over, i t w i l l press
the United Nations to broaden the sanctions to include
an o i l embargo."
I f Libya succeeds i n f l o u t i n g the S e c u r i t y Council, i t
w i l l damage our j o i n t e f f o r t s t o make the United
Nations a cornerstone of a p r i n c i p l e d f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
The Council next considers t h i s subject i n A p r i l , the
anniversary of the sanctions imposed l a s t year.
We
need an e f f e c t i v e strategy.
You and I w i l l need to keep the French w i t h us and t o
ensure t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the UTA bombing are
t r e a t e d equally w i t h ours on Pan Am.
Do you b e l i e v e we can get some kind of sanction on
o i l , i f not a f u l l embargo on the purchase and sale of
Libyan o i l , then a more l i m i t e d embargo on the
p r o v i s i o n of o i l technology t o Libya?
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CYPRUS (ONLY I F ASKED)
Now t h a t t h e C y p r i o t P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s have been decided,
the UN-sponsored Cyprus n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n recess s i n c e
mid-November, can again go f o r w a r d .
The U.S. t o l d b o t h s i d e s we expect them t o r e t u r n t o New
York as agreed i n March and t o be ready t o make t h e
d e c i s i o n s necessary t o b r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a
successful conclusion.
G l a f c o s C l e r i d e s " s v i c t o r y i n t h e February 14 C y p r i o t
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n may w e l l cause a temporary d e l a y
w h i l e he g e t s o r g a n i z e d and p u t s h i s stamp on t h e UN
proceedings.
However, he may be able t o make up l o s t
t i m e l a t e r due t o h i s g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e w i t h P a r l i a m e n t
and w i t h h i s community.
Turkey w i l l have t o p u t a g r e a t d e a l o f p r e s s u r e on
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t leader Denktash i f he i s t o be brought
into line.
The UK, as a r e s p e c t e d European power and a
member o f t h e EC, can and s h o u l d dangle p o l i t i c a l and
economic b a i t i n f r o n t o f t h e Turks t o m o t i v a t e them t o
l e v e r Denktash i n t o p o s i t i o n .
The U.S. and t h e UK have cooperated c l o s e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e
UN-sponsored t a l k s .
On February 19, U.S. S p e c i a l Cyprus C o o r d i n a t o r John
Maresca met i n London w i t h h i s c o u n t e r p a r t s t o d i s c u s s
p o s s i b l e approaches t o t h e next round o f UN
negotiations.
The U.S. and t h e UK agree on c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures
(CBM's), which were recommended by B o u t r o s - G h a l i and unanimously
endorsed by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . The U.S. p o s i t i o n was conveyed
to a l l p a r t i e s : CBM's are n o t a package; each s i d e s h o u l d s t a r t
implementing a t l e a s t some CBM's even b e f o r e t h e t a l k s resume;
and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f CBM's i s n o t a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r resumption
of t h e t a l k s and s h o u l d n o t d i s t r a c t t h e p a r t i e s from t h e t a l k s .
The UK has announced t h a t i t w i l l reduce i t s t r o o p commitment t o
UNFICYP by 50 p e r c e n t and has begun t h e f i r s t (25%) stage o f t h a t
r e d u c t i o n . T h i s , along w i t h t h e a l r e a d y completed t o t a l
w i t h d r a w a l by F i n l a n d and t h e planned Canadian t o t a l w i t h d r a w a l
(mid-1993) w i l l reduce UNFICYP s t r e n g t h from 2,400 i n mid-1992 t o
below 1,000.
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t has c o n s u l t e d t r o o p c o n t r i b u t o r s on how
UNFICYP's o r g a n i z a t i o n and m i s s i o n w i l l be changed.
The UK (which s t i l l has Sovereign Base Areas i n Cyprus) i s
t a k i n g a l e a d i n g r o l e i n these c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
CONFIDENTI-Afe.
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POINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY I F ASKED)
CYPRUS
We want t o c o n t i n u e our c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e UK on
t h e Cyprus i s s u e .
A U.S. team l e d by our S p e c i a l Cyprus C o o r d i n a t o r was i n
London February 19 t o d i s c u s s w i t h your F o r e i g n and
Commonwealth O f f i c e ways t o ensure t h e success o f t h e UN
n e g o t i a t i o n s now t h a t t h e C y p r i o t e l e c t i o n s have been
decided.
We have t o l d b o t h s i d e s we expect them t o r e t u r n t o New
York as scheduled and t o be ready t o make t h e d e c i s i o n s
necessary t o s u c c e s s f u l l y conclude t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We want t h e UK t o c o n t i n u e t o e x p l a i n t o Turkey t h e
c o n s i d e r a b l e economic and p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s which i t c o u l d
g a i n i n Europe by m o t i v a t i n g Denktash and t h e T u r k i s h
C y p r i o t s t o reach an agreement on t h e b a s i s o f t h e UN " s e t
of ideas."
We b e l i e v e t h a t each s i d e s h o u l d s t a r t implementing a t
l e a s t some o f t h e S e c r e t a r y General's c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g
measures. However, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f CBM's s h o u l d n o t be a
p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r resumption o f t h e t a l k s and s h o u l d n o t
d i s t r a c t a t t e n t i o n from t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
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THE FALKLANDS (ONLY I F ASKED)
Foreign Secretary Kurd's January v i s i t t o A r g e n t i n a , t h e f i r s t
by a B r i t i s h cabinet s e c r e t a r y since t h e 1982 Falklands War,
marked an important step i n n o r m a l i z i n g UK-Argentina
r e l a t i o n s . Although both c o u n t r i e s continue t o c l a i m
s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e F a l k l a n d Islands ( t h e U.S. i s n e u t r a l on
the i s s u e ) , t h e UK and Argentina i n 1990 agreed t o disagree
about t h e i r competing claims. This s o - c a l l e d " s o v e r e i g n t y
umbrella" paved t h e way f o r t h e UK and Argentina t o r e e s t a b l i s h
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s t h r e e years ago. By pushing t h e
s o v e r e i g n t y issue aside, the two c o u n t r i e s have been able t o
seek s o l u t i o n s t o other sources of b i l a t e r a l f r i c t i o n , c h i e f l y
o i l e x p l o r a t i o n and f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n t h e waters surrounding
the F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s .
Despite t h e improvement i n r e l a t i o n s , t h e UK continues i t s
embargo, e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g t h e Falklands War, o f arms sales t o
Argentina.
I n r e c o g n i t i o n of Argentina's r e t u r n t o democracy
and improved human r i g h t s record, t h e U.S. resumed l i m i t e d arms
sales t o Argentina i n 1983. I
EO 13526 1 4
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POINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY I F ASKED)
FALKLANDS
Argentina's dramatic democratic and m i l i t a r y reforms and
the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of Argentine f o r e i g n p o l i c y toward the
U.S. and t h e West have made c o n f l i c t over t h e Falklands
less l i k e l y .
The c o n t i n u i n g improvement i n UK-Argentine r e l a t i o n s
r e i n f o r c e s Argentina's t u r n t o t h e West, as do our e f f o r t s
to s t r e n g t h e n U.S.-Argentine m i l i t a r y t i e s .
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�-eeWWPFWTTMrPOINTS TO BE MADE (ONLY IF ASKED)
NUCLEAR TESTING
—
We w i l l , of course, comply w i t h the requirements of our
l e g i s l a t i o n on nuclear t e s t i n g .
—
W i t h i n that framework, we want t o accommodate your t e s t i n g
requirements.
—
As I have stated p u b l i c l y , I t h i n k we should pursue a
phased-in m u l t i l a t e r a l comprehensive ban on nuclear t e s t i n g
This i s a complicated issue.
i n t e r n a l review.
—
We have only j u s t begun our
We want t o consult w i t h you c l o s e l y every step of the way.
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FUTURE OF NATO/EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Events i n t h e f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a are t e s t i n g European
c a p a c i t i e s and h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e c o n t i n u i n g need f o r
c a p a b i l i t i e s o n l y NATO possesses.
and UN
We must f u r t h e r develop NATO's peacekeeping c a p a b i l i t i e s t o
ensure t h e y w i l l be ready t o h e l p i n o t h e r European c r i s e s .
B r i n g i n g Russia and o t h e r E a s t e r n s t a t e s i n t o c o o p e r a t i o n
on peacekeeping t h r o u g h NACC i s another u r g e n t p r i o r i t y .
CSCE can h e l p shape a European consensus on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s
and address r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n s and l o w - i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t .
Reviewing i n t e r n a t i o n a l budgets i s necessary, b u t p r o v i d i n g
NACC and CSCE adequate resources w i l l y i e l d l a r g e r e t u r n s .
We s u p p o r t t h e 1991 Rome/Maastricht framework f o r a European
s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y t h a t w i l l r e i n f o r c e NATO and
assure b e t t e r s h a r i n g o f s e c u r i t y l e a d e r s h i p and defense
burdens.
An approach t o European i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t comes a t NATO's
expense w i l l n o t be s u s t a i n a b l e . We must c o n s u l t t o ensure
t h a t a European s e c u r i t y and defense i d e n t i t y and NATO a r e
mutually reinforcing.
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�THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
OONPIDEMTIAL
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9403918
February 25, 1994
TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Warren Christo.pherjjl/^
SUBJECT: Meetings w i t h B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
I.
SETTING
A prime goal f o r Prime M i n i s t e r Major's v i s i t i s t o
demonstrate, t o a nervous B r i t i s h p u b l i c and i s k e p t i c a l
a
American one, why and how the U.S.-UK r e l a t i o n s h i p m a t t e r s . - to a prosperous w o r l d economy, t o a s t a b l e Europe, and t o our
a b i l i t y t o achieve our o b j e c t i v e s i n Bosnia, Russia, South
A f r i c a , . Hong- Kong, and elsewhere.
Over the past year our l o n g - s t a n d i n g p a t t e r n o f c l o s e
communication and c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h has c o n t i n u e d on
a range o f issues — GATT agreement, n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , L i b y a
and I r a q s a n c t i o n s , t o name.a f e w — but i t i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
t h a t have provoked the h e a d l i n e s , and t h e angst i n London. The
Gerry Adams v i s a d e c i s i o n was a blow t o London, and subsequent
press coverage r-eopened e a r l i e r , s t i l l - t e n d e r wounds o f
b i l a t e r a l d i s c o r d over issues from Bosnia p o l i c y t o t h e 1992
P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign.
:
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t we move beyond our d i f f e r e n c e s arid
r e i n v i g o r a t e our d i a l o g u e w i t h t h e B r i t i s h .
I n any l i k e l y
s c e n a r i o f o r Europe over the next.few y e a r s , we w i l l f i n d i t
very d i f f i c u l t t o advance our i n t e r e s t s absent B r i t i s h
engagement. The events on your schedule w i t h Major i n
P i t t s b u r g h , t h e f l i g h t back t o g e t h e r on A i r Force One, and
o v e r n i g h t a t t h e White House w i l l send t h e B r i t i s h a r e a s s u r i n g
message t h a t they s t i l l count i n Washington.
The t r i p t o P i t t s b u r g h also p r o v i d e s a p o w e r f u l backdrop
f o r the o t h e r main messages o f t h i s v i s i t .
Domestic and
f o r e i g n p o l i c y are l i n k e d , and nowhere more so t h a n i n t h e
U.S.-UK economic and t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s l i i p . Our many common
i n t e r e s t s , shared h i s t o r y , o u t l o o k , and v a l u e s are o f c o n t i n u e d
relevance as we l o o k . f o r s o l u t i o n s t o shared problems such as
p e r s i s t e n t unemployment and e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n . Your
j o i n t appearances i n P i t t s b u r g h w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e s e themes,
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-2and preview the March G-7 Jobs Conference. While i n the home
c i t y of USAir, you should push Major, on the need f o r a more
f o r t h c o m i n g B r i t i s h approach t o our c i v a i r n e g o t i a t i o n s , which
are f o u n d e r i n g over B r i t i s h r e l u c t a n c e t o p r o v i d e adequate
.access,to Heathrow A i r p o r t f o r U . S . a i r 1 ines .
:
On Bosnia, Major and h i s Cabinet are pleased w i t h our
d e c i s i o n t o become more a c t i v e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , though
s t i l l deeply uncomfortable w i t h the l i n g e r i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of
the use of f o r c e . Although the B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e t o ask t h e
tough q u e s t i o n s , m a i n t a i n i n g t r a n s a t l a n t i c u n i t y i s Major's
o v e r r i d i n g concern i n Bosnia p o l i c y . You should e x p l o i t t h i s .
Major w i l l want t o expand on h i s impressions from h i s Russia
trip.
He w i l l hope t o come t o a meeting of t h e minds w i t h you
on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , a f f i r m i n g h i s commitment t o work c l o s e l y
w i t h the I r i s h government, but warning t h a t no amount of
B r i t i s h "persuasion" of U n i o n i s t s w i l l work i f the IRA keeps
k i l l i n g or i f U n i o n i s t s f e e l they have been abandoned.
II.
TOPICS
O u t l i n e our s t r a t e g y on Bosnia.
Underscore the importance
of p r e s e n t i n g a u n i t e d f r o n t t o t h e Serbs, i n c l u d i n g our
readiness t o use f o r c e i f necessary.
Exchange views on r e f o r m i n Russia
toward i t s neighbors. .
and Moscow's p o l i c i e s
o
Respond t o Major's ideas on i m p r o v i n g G-7 e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n
promoting g l o b a l economic goals and Russian r e f o r m .
o
Note progress o n , U k r a i n i a n d e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n and urge more
B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l h e l p .
o
Urge s t r o n g B r i t i s h support f o r P a r t n e r s h i p f o r Peace,
i n c l u d i n g adequate f u n d i n g .
o
Hear Major out on the prospects f o r renewed p o l i t i c a l
t a l k s on Northern I r e l a n d . Discuss how t h e U.S. can h e l p
keep the pressure on Sinn F e i n t o j o i n the t a l k s .
S t r e s s the importance of progress i n our
b i l a t e r a l c i v i l aviation negotiations.
stalemated
Review p l a n n i n g f o r your June a c t i v i t i e s i n B r i t a i n ,
o u t l i n i n g your o v e r a l l goal of d e f i n i n g and d e m o n s t r a t i n g
the meaning of U.S. t i e s t o Europe and t o B r i t a i n f o r the
post-Cold War era.
^CQNg-fr&ENTIAfr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.
20520
May 27, 1994
M FOR ANTHONY LAKE
WHITE HOUSE
r t o U.K. Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
outh A f r i c a
4?
c
P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n on May 6 sent l e t t e r s t o Heads o f
Governments o f G-7 n a t i o n s u r g i n g t h e major donor c o u n t r i e s t o
support: South A f r i c a ' s t r a n s i t i o n t o n o n r a c i a l democracy and t o
i n c r e a s e t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e t o South A f r i c a .
I n h i s May 16 response t o P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n ' s l e t t e r , U.K.
Prime M i n i s t e r John Major agreed t h a t t h e changes i n South
A f r i c a were t r u l y s i g n i f i c a n t and t h a t t h e new government f a c e d
enormous c h a l l e n g e s .
For i t s p a r t , t h e U.K. government i s
i n c r e a s i n g i t s a s s i s t a n c e t o South A f r i c a t o o v e r 100 m i l l i o n
pounds o v e r t h e next t h r e e y e a r s .
The Prime M i n i s t e r s t a t e d
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h government would be d i s c u s s i n g South A f r i c a ' s
r e q u i r e m e n t s w i t h t h e new government and urged t h e donor
community t o c o o r d i n a t e i t s e f f o r t s c a r e f u l l y .
We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t s h o u l d acknowledge t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r and t h e U.K.'s enhanced a s s i s t a n c e t o South
A f r i c a and emphasize t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a s s i s t a n c e
efforts.
X j l a r c Grossman"
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
Tab 1
Tab 2
Tab 3
Draft Presidential Letter
U.K. Prime M i n i s t e r John M a j o r ' s l e t t e r t o t h e
President
P r e s i d e n t ' s May 6 l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r
John Major
CO.Ijr.IJIEIiTlAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.0.13526
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
S/S 9505350
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March- 28, 1995
«CONriDENTIAL
DECL: 4/4/15
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The
FROM:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
SUBJECT:
M e e t i n g w i t h UK Prime M i n i s t e r John Major
I.
President
PER E.0.13526
SETTING
A l t h o u g h r e l a t i o n s are g o i n g t h r o u g h a t r o u b l e d p e r i o d , t h e
U.S. and UK remain each o t h e r ' s most i m p o r t a n t g l o b a l p a r t n e r s .
We are w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on a wide range o f
i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g , f o r example, NATO expansion,
Bosnia, I r a n , and Russia. However, on t h e s e n s i t i v e s u b j e c t o f
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , London has d i s a g r e e d w i t h a t l e a s t t h e t i m i n g
o f our d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g G e r r y Adams. Prime M i n i s t e r Major
f u l l y deserves t h e p u b l i c p r a i s e you have o f f e r e d f o r h i s
p o l i t i c a l courage on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . He i s p e r s o n a l l y
committed t o making the most o f t h i s chance f o r peace, b u t
faces c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c o n t e n t and m i s t r u s t from U n i o n i s t
l e a d e r s , e s p e c i a l l y over t h e J o i n t Framework Document he
n e g o t i a t e d w i t h PM B r u t o n . How t o address t h a t problem w i l l be
near t h e t o p o f h i s agenda f o r t h i s v i s i t .
The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s f u l l y back Major's I r e l a n d p o l i c y ,
but o t h e r w i s e , he i s i n - e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e .
Elections
are l i k e l y n e x t year. He t r a i l s Labor's new l e a d e r Tony B l a i r
by huge margins i n the p o l l s , and h i s own p a r t y i s b a d l y d i v i d e d
over "Europe" as B r i t a i n t r i e s t o develop a p o s i t i o n and seek
out a l l i e s f o r t h e EU's 1996 I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l Conference.
You w i l l not f i n d Major s e n t i m e n t a l about the " S p e c i a l
R e l a t i o n s h i p " (a t e r m he and Douglas Hurd a v o i d ) , but i n s t e a d
hard-headed and p r a g m a t i c . I n f a c t , more t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y
of h i s t o r y has made our t i e s w i t h the UK d i f f e r e n t from those
w i t h any o t h e r c o u n t r y . I t has been our c l o s e s t p a r t n e r by f a r
i n t h e s i n g l e b i g g e s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n U.S.
h i s t o r y -- our s h i f t from non-involvement w i t h the w i d e r w o r l d
to- g l o b a l engagement. London has worked h a n d - i n - g l o v e w i t h us
i n e v e r y r e g i o n o f the g l o b e , and wants t o keep d o i n g so.
N e i t h e r our deepening involvement w i t h the c o u n t r i e s o f t h i s
hemisphere and t h e P a c i f i c Rim, o r the UK's own h e s i t a n t steps
towards "Europe," need d e t r a c t from t h e Anglo-American a l l i a n c e .
Beyond the bonds o f c u l t u r e and language, t h e r e are u n p a r a l l e l e d
s t r u c t u r e s and h a b i t s o f c o o p e r a t i o n b u i l t up over f i f t y years
of g l o b a l p a r t n e r s h i p , i n c l u d i n g u n i q u e l y c l o s e i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
n u c l e a r , and m i l i t a r y l i n k s . The U.S. and UK are each o t h e r s '
t o p i n v e s t o r s , w i t h some $95 b i l l i o n g o i n g i n each d i r e c t i o n .
CONriDENTIAL
�-COMriDDMTIMj
- 2T h i s meeting i s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r you t o e s t a b l i s h a
common approach w i t h Major on a wide range o f i s s u e s . I can
f o l l o w up w i t h Douglas Hurd when he i s here A p r i l 18. The UK
i s u s u a l l y o u r s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t e r on f r e e t r a d e and o u r
c l o s e s t a l l y on d e v e l o p i n g European s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e s . The .
b r e a d t h o f c u r r e n t and p o t e n t i a l p r a c t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n i s
extraordinary.
I n t h e l i s t o f t o p i c s below, t h e f i r s t f i v e a r e
those on w h i c h Major i n t e n d s t o p l a c e s p e c i a l p r i o r i t y .
II.
TOPICS
o
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , e s p e c i a l l y k e e p i n g t h e U n i o n i s t s on
board, advancing o u r common agenda on decommissioning,
k e e p i n g t r a c k o f Sinn F e i n funds r a i s e d , and m a i n t a i n i n g
t h e f o c u s o f y o u r May conference on t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t ;
o
Russia, i n c l u d i n g d e v e l o p i n g a common Western approach on
V-E Day, as w e l l as developments i n Chechnya and t h e r e f o r m
process (we would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e UK h e l p i n m o b i l i z i n g
t h e EU on balance-of-payments s u p p o r t f o r t h e N I S ) ;
o
The M i d d l e East, where we s h o u l d urge t h e UK t o m o b i l i z e
European p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e MEDB and f i n a n c i a l
support f o r t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y ; •
o
I r a q i s a n c t i o n s , where t h e UK i s o u r s t a u n c h e s t a l l y i n
Europe and among t h e UNSC Permanent F i v e ;
o
B o s n i a / C r o a t i a , where, as noted above, we a r e w o r k i n g much
more c l o s e l y and p r o d u c t i v e l y w i t h t h e UK;
o
Trade, where t h e UK can h e l p open markets f o r U.S. e x p o r t s
t o t h e EU i n a u d i o / v i s u a l , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and a i r
s e r v i c e s -- p l u s choose U.S. a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s i n a $3
b i l l i o n purchase t h i s year;
o
N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t h e NPT, where t h e UK has used
i t s w o r l d w i d e i n f l u e n c e i n support o f o u r p o l i c y o f g e t t i n g
50% + 1 f o r u n l i m i t e d i n d e f i n i t e e x t e n s i o n , and w i l l be key
i n g e t t i n g o t h e r Europeans t o conclude a new U.S./EURATOM
T r e a t y and e s t a b l i s h a COCOM successor regime;
o
NATO expansion, where t h e UK i s h a r d a t work t o h e l p o u r
s t r a t e g y f o r t h i s year succeed, and wants t o c o l l a b o r a t e
w i t h us as we develop a game p l a n f o r n e x t year;
o
European s e c u r i t y and defense c o o p e r a t i o n , where Major has
p e r s o n a l l y proposed i n i t i a t i v e s i n t e n d e d t o ensure t h a t WEU
development does n o t come a t NATO's expense; and
o
C o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s m , where t h e UK i s i n l o c k s t e p w i t h us on
p r e s s i n g L i b y a t o t u r n over t h e Pan Am 103 suspects.
^^TPFNTTV
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning John Major
Identifier
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2013-0449-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on John Major, specifically on President Clinton's meetings with the Prime Minister from 1993 thru 1995. Memos to President Clinton from Secretary of State Warren Christopher and briefing papers on a variety of topics are included.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
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2013-0449-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
John Major
Northern Ireland
United Kingdom
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6753a99e71259d898a8c2355a28331ed.pdf
501ba65b2ca2bfc81b35b24ec3854e9e
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documentsfromthis Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�-r^-I"?-!'?'?-!
:
1? 3-:
FPul-l
OE['-PSH-IH
~'J
[ O l ] F';.232
-SECRET
29 Apr 94
SUBJECT: Tasks for UNMIH
-(S)"~The following list of tasks will be used for the purpose of
estimating force composition and associated costs.
• Training/Construction
• Self-protection
* Protect International Presence (including ICM, PVOs, UN/OAS observers,
economic aid workers)
Advise on security requirements
Provide escorts as requested/needed*
Provide security for humanitarian supplies*
Respond if international monitors, NGO's etc., request
emergency aid
•
Protect/evacuate US/UN/other third country nationals
•
Protect Aristide-nominated PM, government, CINC, police chief,
parliament, operatives in countryside*/**
• Protect key facilities (port, radio/TV, power supply)*/**
•
Disarm/detain military/police remnants**
--
•
Uniformed forces
FRAPH
Attaches, etc.
Assist new government's security leadership
Break up army's infrastructure (section chiefs, etc.), separately
identifying capability required to perform this effort, where possible.
Deter/counter resistance from military/police remnants
*
Consider degree to which these functions could be provided by Haitian
or foreign civilian contractor security personnel.
**
Consider degree to which new government's own security forces can
perform this function. UNMIH to serve as backup only.
L
CLINTON LIESMFPHOTOCOPY ^ TS
¥
�Hph-ir-i^J
1":
FPull
U'r-E'-RStH-1H
TIJ
[01 i * i l Z l
-.0:
SECRET"
• Visible patrolling to deter resistance/violence
• Prevent/Respond to Haitian on Haitian violence beyond ability/
willingness of Haitian security forces**
Respond to organized efforts or that which threatens survival
of new government
protect dismissed Ti Soldat
deal with pro-Aristide violence
•
Respond if military/police hard-liners attempt coup
-{S)-The above tasks are based upon the following planning
assumptions:
• US invasion will have seized control of key points in PAP, arrested key
leaders of military/de facto regime
• US invasion force will protect UNMIH arrival and withdraw in a few
days, turning over to UNMIH
• Aristide will have named new PM, army commander
• Army commander will come from existing officer corps (not necessary a
general); bulk of officer corps will be in place when UNMIH arrives
•
Sanctions will be lifted (except targeted) as UNMIH arrive
Questions to be addressed, beyond force requirements
• ROEs
• Legal authority (rely on Haitian courts, prison system)
• Command arrangements (relation/responsiveness
• Intelligence/communications
to new government)
requirements
• Costs/financing
• Level of US participation - none? logistics/commo/intell? substantial?
CLINTON LImmrPHOTOCOPY
�
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Haiti
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2013-0122-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on correspondence between the National Security Advisor (or Deputy), regarding Haiti, from 1993 thru 1994. Included is a Department of Defense memo from April 1994 regarding military tasks for a U.N. force in Haiti.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
The material or physical carrier of the resource.
Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2013-0122-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Haiti
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/dca58d1ec9f1ee6508cb03fc7ae5c98f.pdf
fbc7989d3a33ae5255e697db130d0b03
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (c) of E.O. 13526 and (b)(3) of the FOIA.
�-SEOft
ODCRDT
THE WHITE
20181
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February
27, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant t o the Vice
President f o r N a t i o n a l
Security A f f a i r s
MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
SUBJECT:
Ex-Yugoslavia
MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central I n t e l l i g e n c e
Agency
CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office o f the Representative
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o t h e
U n i t e d Nations
Work Program
«fS-)—
The f o l l o w i n g work program was agreed a t t h e February
Deputies Committee meeting on t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a :
26 1993
1. Enforcement p r o v i s i o n s i n a s e t t l e m e n t and what i t would t a k e
t o implement them. OSD w i l l c i r c u l a t e terms o f r e f e r e n c e Monday
March 1, f o r d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e Working Group t e l e c o n a t 10:00
a.m. Tuesday March 2. 4-S-)—
2. NATO preparations for implementation of a settlement.
During
the week of March 1, State w i l l provide a d r a f t gameplan for
getting the necessary work done i n NATO and i n c l u s i o n of the
Russians and p o s s i b l y others. This work w i l l r e s u l t i n guidance
to' USNATO. -fST
3. A n a l y s i s o f t h e Vance/Owen map and Bosnian and Serb c o u n t e r
p r o p o s a l s . The I n t e l l i g e n c e Community w i l l p r o v i d e d u r i n g t h e
week o f March 1.
4. I n t e r i m Arrangements. State w i l l p r o v i d e d r a f t p r o p o s a l s f o r
US views on t h e Vance/Owen proposals and o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s by
the middle o f t h e week o f March 1. -48)5. Compliance w i t h t h e London Accords.
OSD was p r e v i o u s l y
tasked t o d r a f t p r o p o s a l s f o r l i f t i n g t h e s i e g e of Sarajavo, t o
be d i s t r i b u t e d t h e week of March 1. OSD w i l l i n c l u d e t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f moving t h e t a l k s t o Sarajevo.
The Working Group
w i l l agree on t a s k i n g o f o t h e r aspects o f t h e London accords a t
i t s March 1 meeting.
PER E.0.13526
-SDCRE'rDeclassify d
Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
for National Security A f f a i r s
�20182
'•OBCRET
THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 1 , 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security A f f a i r s
CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
J o i n t Chiefs o f S t a f f
MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
SUBJECT:
MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
MR. RICK INDERFURTH
O f f i c e of the Representative
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o t h e
United Nations
Summary o f Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia, February 26, 1993 - W
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
State will draft a message to Ankara and Islamabad to
address Turkish and Pakistani offers to participate in the
airlift. We will welcome their offer in principle and
accept what supplies they can provide. We will also offer
to accept air crews of their nationals. We will defer any
decision on their offers of aircraft, however, until others
join, i.e. Russians, Germans, etc. 4^
S t a t e w i l l d r a f t a message t o UNHCR and t h e UN u r g i n g t h a t
ground d e l i v e r i e s n o t be h a l t e d d u r i n g t h e a i r l i f t . -f&>We w i l l c o n f i r m w i t h t h e Germans t h a t any o f f e r t h e y chose
t o make would be accepted, i n c l u d i n g use o f C-160 a i r c r a f t .
EUCOM w i l l provide d a i l y press b r i e f i n g s on the a i r drop
operation. A back-up w i l l be maintained by the Pentagon i n
Washington i n the event a c r i s i s develops. -f9t"
On t h e i s s u e o f Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e a i r drop
o p e r a t i o n , S t a t e w i l l t r a c k Kozyrev's expected r e p l y t o t h e
S e c r e t a r y next week, - f f r ) —
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�Deputies agreed t h a t the essence of a successful outcome of
the U.S. i n i t i a t i v e i n Bosnia i s an agreement t h a t i s
equitable and workable. With t h i s i n mind, NSC w i l l
c i r c u l a t e under separate cover the work program t o develop
our views o f the Vance/Owen plan and t o support Bartholomew
i n h i s discussions. •(S)USIA w i l l j o i n the Working Group Meetings and work w i t h
State on implementing a program of coverage t o ensure t h a t
desired messages are reaching the intended audiences. •(0)
Bartholomew will explore the issue of enforcement of the NoFly Zone in the context of his discussion in New York. -(&)
William H. I t o h
Executive Secretary
— CECRiLT
CLINTON
CP
OY
�SECRET
20209
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
Sununary o f Conclusions o f
DATE:
LOCATION:
TIME:
SUBJECT:
March 4, 1993
S i t u a t i o n Room
6 : 00-7:00pm
Summary o f Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993 ( S )
--
PARTICIPANTS
The Vice P r e s i d e n t s O f f i c e :
Leon Fuerth
CIA:
W i l l i a m Studeman
D a n i e l Wagner
State:
Peter T a r n o f f
Steve Oxman
Reginald Bartholomew
JCS:
Barry McCaffrey
James H i l l
DOD:
Frank Wisner
Walter Slocombe
NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Jane H o l l
Summary o f Conclusions
Deputies agreed t h a t because the fast-paced nature o f events
i n New York c o u l d present us w i t h a f a i t accompli before our
t h i n k i n g on the v a r i o u s issues i s f u l l y developed, tasks
would be undertaken on an urgent basis and Deputies would
reconvene e i t h e r l a t e Friday or Saturday t o review c u r r e n t
s t a t u s . (S)
-Working Group members w i l l evaluate the OSD paper on
implementing the Vance/Owen p l a n , convey r e a c t i o n s t o OSD
t h i s evening, i f p o s s i b l e . The working group would then
consider the paper and next steps a t i t s meeting tomorrow
morning. ( S )
-CIA w i l l forward i t s a n a l y s i s o f the Vance/Owen map upon
r e c e i p t o f the Bosnia proposal which State w i l l help secure.
OSD w i l l c o l l a t e agency r e a c t i o n s t o i t s Siege of Sarajevo
paper and a l s o i n c o r p o r a t e an a n a l y s i s o f the "Lantos"
o p t i o n , i . e . moving the n e g o t i a t i o n s t o Sarajevo. (S)
-State w i l l d r a f t a cable t o c a p i t a l s , f o l l o w i n g up t o the UN
S e c u r i t y Council statement of March 3. The cable w i l l
.
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o u t l i n e our proposals f o r t i g h t e n i n g sanctions as a means of
p u t t i n g ' t e e t h ' i n t o the UN S e c u r i t y Council statement. ( &
-}
Leon Fuerth and the Sanctions group w i l l work up a new
proposal f o r sanctions t i g h t e n i n g f o r Deputies c o n s i d e r a t i o n
for presentation t o Principals.
Deputies w i l l sound P r i n c i p a l s out on t h e i r p r e l i m i n a r y
t h i n k i n g regarding whether we should begin t o consider
tougher steps -- i n v o l v i n g U.S. a i r power o r ground f o r c e s
- - t o take t o respond t o the mounting v i o l e n c e i n Eastern
Bosnia. f S )
-OSD/JCS w i l l prepare an o p t i o n s paper f o r d e a l i n g w i t h a
p o t e n t i a l mounting refugee problem i n Tuzla. f £ )
-r
SECRET
�20227
M c U r \ LI
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
March 15, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Vice
President f o r National
Security Affairs
MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department o f Defense
SUBJECT:
MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive S e c r e t a r y
C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency
CAPTAIN H. L. SHERFIELD
Secretary
J o i n t Chiefs o f S t a f f
MR. RICK INDERFURTH
O f f i c e of the Representative
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o t h e
U n i t e d Nations
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee
Meeting on Bosnia, March 9, 1993, 4:00pm -f-fr)-
State will prepare a message from Secretary Christopher to
French Foreign Minister Dumas, urging that Serbian President
Milosevic be pressed to reach an agreement during his March
11 visit to Paris and stressing the serious consequences for
Serbia if the Bosnian government signs and Serb forces
continue attacking. •WT
State will prepare a similar cable to Embassy Moscow, urging
that Russia use its influence with Milosevic, -id)"
The U.S. w i l l n o t propose a new S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n
on s a n c t i o n s d u r i n g t h e meeting o f t h e Russian Congress o f
People's Deputies.
The Sanctions Working Group w i l l ,
however, c o n t i n u e r e f i n i n g our s u b s t a n t i v e p o s i t i o n i n o r d e r
t o be prepared w h e n / i f t h e t i m e i s r i g h t .
The Deputies w i l l
r e v i s i t t h e i s s u e a t t h e end o f t h i s week i n l i g h t , i n t e r
a l i a , o f developments a t t h e Russian Congress and o f whether
our w i l l i n g n e s s t o i n t r o d u c e such a r e s o l u t i o n might h e l p
get Bosnian P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c t o r e t u r n t o t h e t a l k s .
S t a t e w i l l prepare a concept paper f o r a p o s s i b l e t r i p by
S p e c i a l Envoy Bartholomew t o t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a and
p o s s i b l y o t h e r c a p i t a l s as w e l l .
( S t a t e subsequently agreed
t o d i s t r i b u t e t h i s d r a f t no l a t e r than Thursday, March 11.)
That concept paper w i l l h e l p D e p u t i e s / P r i n c i p a l s decide
whether Ambassador Bartholomew should t r a v e l a t t h i s t i m e .
— T
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6.
OSD w i l l c i r c u l a t e s on March 10 t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e
• interagency team that has been assessing the humanitarian
situation in Bosnia. +&fThe P r i n c i p a l s Committee may meet Saturday, t o l o o k a t
p o s s i b l e new i n i t i a t i v e s r e l a t i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o Sarajevo
or Tzula.
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
Executive Secretary
CLIN
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�gGE
E RT
SECRET
THE WHITE
-
20240
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 24, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
D e c i s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, March 13, 1993 f f i t
Committee members agreed on t h e need t o develop a concept o f
phased i m p l e m e n t a t i o n / e n f o r c e m e n t o f a Bosnian s e t t l e m e n t t h a t :
avoids a s e l f - d e f e a t i n g d e l a y d u r i n g w h i c h an agreement
c o u l d f a l l a p a r t p r e c i s e l y because o f f a i l u r e t o e n f o r c e i t ;
w h i l e also b u i l d i n g i n f a i l safe p r o v i s i o n s t o prevent t h e
involvement o f U.S. ground f o r c e s i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a
s e t t l e m e n t was b e i n g i g n o r e d and f i g h t i n g c o n t i n u e d
v i r t u a l l y unabated. - f & t
During an initial period after signature of an agreement by all
three parties and before this condition could be judged to have
been met, air power might be used against any party engaged in a
major violation.
-^T
Elements o f a p o s s i b l e U.S. ground c o n t r i b u t i o n c o u l d be g e t t i n g
i n t o p l a c e , e.g. i n S p l i t , d u r i n g t h i s i n t e r i m p e r i o d . f^X
The Committee w i l l meet again t o r e f i n e t h i s concept. I t w i l l
address q u e s t i o n s such as whether we would t h r e a t e n p u n i t i v e
a c t i o n a g a i n s t t a r g e t s i n S e r b i a , o r t a c t i c a l a c t i o n , e.g.
a g a i n s t Bosnian Serb a r t i l l e r y s h e l l i n g Sarajevo; how t o frame
t h e message we would send a t t i m e o f s i g n a t u r e ; and when and how
t o i n j e c t t h i s concept i n t o m u l t i l a t e r a l p l a n n i n g .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
•SFPUEff
�20291
CECRET
THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 30, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
Decisions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, March 25, 1993
1.
P r i n c i p a l s agreed on a statement t o be i s s u e d by t h e S t a t e
Department about Bosnian P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c ' s s i g n i n g o f t h e
Vance/Owen p l a n . 4*^
2. P r i n c i p a l s agreed on t h e p o i n t s t o d e s c r i b e American
w i l l i n g n e s s t o h e l p implement and e n f o r c e an agreement s i g n e d by
a l l t h e Bosnian p a r t i e s . (S)•
3. CIA D i r e c t o r Woolsey w i l l prepare an assessment o f how we
would determine who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s e r i o u s non-compliance
w i t h an agreement. fS-)*
4. M u l t i l a t e r a l movement t o deploy f o r c e s would b e g i n a f t e r
s i g n a t u r e o f an agreement and passage o f t h e necessary UN
resolution.
OSD and JCS w i l l prepare a t i m e l i n e , i n t e g r a t i n g
those e n v i s i o n e d i n t h e Vance/Owen " M i l i t a r y Accords" w i t h
SHAPE'S c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n n i n g f o r d e p l o y i n g a f o r c e . The
P r i n c i p a l s w i l l d i s c u s s t h i s i n t e g r a t e d t i m e l i n e a t an e a r l y
m e e t i n g - - p r o b a b l y Saturday March 27. •fS-)5. We will phase implementation of commitments made to Bosnian
President Izetbegovic in the event of his signing in the
following order: (1) tightening sanctions and closing loopholes
in them (this will include proposing new Security Council
resolutions, but will be described as "tightening" and "closing
loopholes" in hopes of making them more palatable in Russia; (2)
passage of a resolution authorizing enforcement of the No Fly
Zone, on the timetable agreed between Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher; and (3) trying to ease the
arms embargo. •(B)'
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6. The Vice P r e s i d e n t w i l l meet w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c on
F r i d a y March 26.
7. Leon F u e r t h w i l l background t h e p r e s s on F r i d a y March 26
about our s a n c t i o n s e f f o r t s t o d a t e . -frG^-
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
CLINTO
CP
OY
�20311
CECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 9, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
D e c i s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, March 27, 1993 ( C ) ~
SUBJECT:
Approved a demarche t o Belgrade on t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f i t s
f o r c e s i n Bosnia and those o f t h e Bosnian Serbs. - ( 6 ) •
Decided t o send demarches t o Athens, P a r i s , and Moscow
u r g i n g them t o press Belgrade t o persuade t h e Bosnian Serbs
t o n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y and reach agreement. -<C)Decided t o see whether n e x t weeks's meeting o f NACC Defense
M i n i s t e r s ( t h e GDM) c o u l d i s s u e a s t a t e m e n t c a l l i n g on t h e
Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade t o cease a g g r e s s i o n and r e a c h
agreement, - f e - f
A u t h o r i z e d Ambassador A l b r i g h t t o ( 1 ) d e t a c h t h e No F l y
enforcement r e s o l u t i o n a t t h e UN from a r e s o l u t i o n
t i g h t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s ; and (2) t o phrase t h e l a t t e r as
" t i g h t e n i n g " r a t h e r t h a n new s a n c t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o make i t
more p a l a t a b l e t o Moscow. -fS)Asked Samuel Berger t o ask Leon F u e r t h t o p r e p a r e a 2-3 page
r e p o r t on what has been done t o improve s a n c t i o n s
enforcement. - ( C f
Asked Jenonne Walker t o prepare an o p t i o n s paper on o t h e r
s t e p s t o press t h e Bosnian Serbs t o r e a c h agreement, f o r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t a f u t u r e P r i n c i p a l s meeting. - ( 0 )
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
DECLASSIFIED
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20350
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April
19,
1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
D e c i s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, A p r i l 9, 1993 -f-St
Omnibus Sanctions
Resolution
As r e q u e s t e d by Russian P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n i n h i s l e t t e r t o
the P r e s i d e n t , we w i l l recommend t o t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t we
n o t press t h e omnibus s a n c t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n t o a v o t e i n t h e
U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l u n t i l a f t e r t h e Russian referendum on
A p r i l 25. We w i l l e x p l a i n our d e c i s i o n t o d e f e r by t h e
e s p e c i a l l y d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n i n Russia j u s t b e f o r e t h e
referendum, and use t h e t i m e t o press t h e Bosnian Serbs t o
n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y on t h e b a s i s on t h e Vance/Owen p l a n .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l w r i t e Russian F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r
Kozyrev s a y i n g t h a t a f t e r t h e referendum we want t o b r i n g
the r e s o l u t i o n p r o m p t l y t o a v o t e , w i t h o u t a d e l a y between
i t s passage and t h e e f f e c t i v e date o f i t s p r o v i s i o n s , and
t h a t we w i l l expect Russia e i t h e r t o v o t e f o r i t o r t o
abstain.
I n t h e meantime, S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l urge
t h a t Russia use t h e d e l a y t o press t h e Serbs t o n e g o t i a t e
s e r i o u s l y and reach agreement i n o r d e r t o a v o i d t i g h t e r
s a n c t i o n s . -(0)Leon F u e r t h w i l l p r e p a r e a l i s t o f s a n c t i o n s - t i g h t e n i n g
measures t h a t can be t a k e n w i t h o u t a new r e s o l u t i o n .
We
w i l l urge o t h e r Western s t a t e s t o j o i n us i n t a k i n g them.
~m
S t a t e w i l l prepare a c a b l e t o c a p i t a l s e x p l a i n i n g our
p o s i t i o n , and S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l t a k e i t up when he
hosts t h e o t h e r G-7 F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s f o r l u n c h i n Tokyo on
A p r i l 14.
-W
I f Russian Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Churkin asks Ambassador
Bartholomew about our response t o t h e Y e l t s i n l e t t e r ,
^SH^
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�SECRBT ,
2
Bartholomew w i l l r e p l y t h a t S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l be
r e s p o n d i n g t o Foreign M i n i s t e r Kozyrev. ( 3 ) *
Peace Process
The f o l l o w i n g P r i n c i p a l s Committee members w i l l d r a f t papers
making t h e b e s t case f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g o p t i o n s , which w i l l be
sent t o Jenonne Walker f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n / d i s t r i b u t i o n by
Wednesday, A p r i l 14:
Leon F u e r t h : P r e s s i n g hard f o r a Vance-Owen s e t t l e m e n t . We
would use t h e t h r e a t o f l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo as l e v e r a g e w i t h
t h e Serbs. - f & f
Secretary Aspin:
E n f o r c i n g a c e a s e - f i r e t h r o u g h a i r o r ground
a c t i o n o r b o t h , a l o n g e s s e n t i a l l y t h e l i n e s now h e l d by t h e
parties.
Secretary Christopher: Making a major effort to lift the arms
embargo in order to let the Bosnian government have a better
chance of holding its own with the Bosnian Serbs. This option
will include consideration of a new international forum or
mechanism that might finally establish a peace after the parties
themselves have found a natural balance on the ground. +&f
Ambassador A l b r i g h t : Using American a i r power t o h e l p r e d r e s s
t h e m i l i t a r y balance.
This c o u l d be i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h l i f t i n g
t h e arms embargo ( e . g . , t o p r o t e c t t h e Bosnians u n t i l t h e y c o u l d
a c q u i r e and l e a r n t o use heavy weapons) o r as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o
l e t t i n g them b e t t e r arm themselves . (-*t
Anthori'y Lake
Assistant t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
CECRKE
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•ODCRDT
20482
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C 20506
Summary of Conclusions f o r
DATE :
LOCATION:
TIME:
SUBJECT:
May 6, 1993
White House S i t u a t i o n 1
1:30 - 2:30pm
Summary of Conclusions of P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e :
Leon F u e r t h
State:
C l i f t o n Wharton
Peter T a r n o f f
USUN
Rick I n d e r f u r t h
White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
DOD
Les Aspin
Frank Wisner
NSC
Jane H o l l
CIA
James Woolsey
Gene Wicklund
JCS
C o l i n Powell
Michael Ryan
Summary of Conclusions
Review o f Current S i t u a t i o n
P r i n c i p a l s agreed on t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Review of Current S i t u a t i o n
U.S. has been f o l l o w i n g two t r a c k s :
t h e "Christopher"
t r a c k and t h e Vance/Owen n e g o t i a t i o n t r a c k . The
Christopher Track has r e i n f o r c e d t h e Vance/Owen t r a c k .
-estWith the vote in Pale, focus must now shift back to the
Christopher track. (Of"
We w i l l n o t l e t the referendum be used as a d e l a y i n g
device. {3-)—
ODCRBT
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�The course S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r i s p r e s e n t i n g t o
a l l i e s i s t h e o n l y coherent and workable s t r a t e g y on
the t a b l e .
I t r e p r e s e n t s a s e t o f measures designed t o
come t o g r i p s w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia, -f&t
The b a l l i s now i n t h e Europeans' c o u r t , and our t a s k
i s t o p r e s s u r e them i n t o a c t i o n . 45-)Eastern Bosnia/Safe Havens
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t t h e U.S. s h o u l d n o t o f f e r U.S. ground
t r o o p s t o secure safe havens s i n c e t h a t was n o t a m i l i t a r i l y
t e n a b l e m i s s i o n . -(-S-)
They were d i v i d e d on t h e e x t e n t t o which we would c o n s i d e r t h e
use o f U.S. a i r power. f S f
Lake, P o w e l l , A s p i n , Berger, and Woolsey agreed t h a t ,
i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p l a n b e i n g p r e s e n t e d by C h r i s t o p h e r ,
we must be prepared t o contemplate use o f a i r power i n
Eastern Bosnia i n s u p p o r t o f t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
a d d i t i o n a l s a f e havens, assuming t h a t UNPROFOR f o r c e s
were w i l l i n g and a b l e t o g a i n access t o o t h e r enclaves
i n Eastern Bosnia (as an e x t e n s i o n o f our e x i s t i n g
b i l a t e r a l commitments t o p r o t e c t UNPROFOR f o r c e s
a l r e a d y i n Bosnia) .
T a r n o f f argued n o t o n l y f o r t h e use o f a i r power t o
p r o t e c t / d e f e n d UNPROFOR, b o t h a g a i n s t c a t e g o r y I and
c a t e g o r y I I t a r g e t s , b u t a l s o t o c o n s i d e r a i r power as
punishment a g a i n s t c a t e g o r y I I t a r g e t s -- decoupled
from t h e arms embargo. X^T
Contingencies
Lake summarized o p t i o n s f o r P r i n c i p a l s t o c o n s i d e r as n e x t steps
i f t h e Europeans c o m p l e t e l y r e j e c t t h e s t r a t e g y b e i n g p r e s e n t e d
by C h r i s t o p h e r :
U n i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . f S 7
-"
Leave t h e Europeans t o handle t h e c r i s i s
alone.
Adopt one o f t h e v a r i o u s European approaches ( i . e . , a i r
s t r i k e s , blockade, e t c . ) . (C)
Continue t h e p r e s e n t course
diplomacy) . -fST
( i . e . , embargo p l u s
Develop a s t r a t e g y based upon c o n t a i n i n g t h e c o n f l i c t
t o Bosnia ( i . e . , p r e v e n t i n g spread t o Kosovo). (G-)
Undertake a campaign o f a i r s t r i k e s f o r t h e e x p l i c i t
purpose o f punishment, f & f
Pursue a cease-fire, enforced by the UN. f&f-SECRET
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•CECRET
THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
D e c i s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting w i t h t h e
P r e s i d e n t and V i c e P r e s i d e n t on Bosnia, May 8,
1993 f & f -
S t r e s s growing d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a l l i e s and o t h e r s t o
m a i n t a i n and i n c r e a s e p r e s s u r e on t h e Serbs, and t h a t a l l
o p t i o n s remain open -- t h u s l e a v i n g open t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo. We w i l l n o t l e g i t i m i z e t h e
Bosnian Serb referendum as a reason f o r d e l a y i n a g r e e i n g on
tougher measures, b u t as necessary w i l l note t h a t t h e d e l a y
i s caused by European d e s i r e s t o w a i t u n t i l a f t e r t h a t v o t e .
Encourage t h e Europeans t o endorse t h i s p o s i t i o n .
( S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l phone EC F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s May 8
and 9.)
Step up t h e containment elements o f U.S. s t r a t e g y .
This
c o u l d i n c l u d e p l a c i n g U.S. Army p e r s o n n e l i n Macedonia as
p a r t o f UN m i s s i o n t o serve as a d e t e r r e n t a n d perhaps w i t h
the express t a s k o f h e l p i n g e n f o r c e t h e s a n c t i o n s .
(General
Powell w i l l recommend optimum m i s s i o n , numbers and t y p e s o f
u n i t s o r i n d i v i d u a l s . ) U.S. w i l l encourage a l l i e s and UN t o
push M i l o s e v i c t o a l l o w more CSCE o b s e r v e r s i n Kosovo.
( S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l urge European Community members
to take the lead.)
Test M i l o s e v i c on h i s promise t o c l o s e t h e Serbian-Bosnian
Border.
This w i l l i n c l u d e encouraging UNPROFOR t o p u t
m o n i t o r s on t h e Serbian/Bosnian b o r d e r , i n c l u d i n g t h e D r i n a
R i v e r b r i d g e s . (By COB Monday, May 10, Leon F u e r t h ' s
Sanctions Committee w i l l d e v i s e o t h e r s p e c i f i c s t e p s we can
ask M i l o s e v i c t o t a k e t o make good on h i s promise.)
C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s . The P r e s i d e n t w i l l t r y t o meet
w i t h Senators Nunn, Lugar, Warner, and Bumpers and p o s s i b l y
P e l l and Stevens.
(NSC s t a f f w i l l prepare t a l k i n g p o i n t s . )
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F u r t h e r r e v i e w o f a i r power o p t i o n s . NSC s t a f f , w i t h S t a t e
and Defense, w i l l prepare a b r i e f o p t i o n s paper by Monday,
May 8.
Anthony Lake
Assistant t o the President
for National Security Affairs
CLIN
0T0C0PY
�20527
•CEGRBT
SUBJECT:
D e c i s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, May 17, 1993
1.
P o s s i b l e Meeting o f UNSC F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s . I f a meeting o f
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l cannot be d e f e r r e d ,
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l a t t e n d . We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o make
c l e a r o u r b e l i e f t h a t such a meeting s h o u l d be b e t t e r p r e p a r e d
b u t w i l l n o t s t a y away i f o t h e r s a t t e n d .
2. Basic U.S. P o l i c y . We w i l l c o n t i n u e r a i s i n g o u r p r e f e r r e d
course o f l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo on Bosnia and i n t e r i m a i r
s t r i k e s , making c l e a r o u r reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i t i s t h e b e s t
course, b u t w i l l n o t press i t t o t h e p o i n t o f s h a t t e r i n g
r e l a t i o n s w i t h A l l i e s o r t h e Russians.
3. P o s s i b l e Sanctions on C r o a t i a . We w i l l e x p l o r e w i t h EC
c a p i t a l s , e s p e c i a l l y Bonn, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f economic s a n c t i o n s
on C r o a t i a i f Bosnian Croat a g g r e s s i o n c o n t i n u e s . Leon F u e r t h ' s
s a n c t i o n s committee w i l l b e g i n c l o s e - h o l d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f how
such s a n c t i o n s might be designed, assuming no change i n t h e
situation.
4.
M o n i t o r i n g t h e Serbian-Bosnian Border. The U n i t e d S t a t e s
w i l l c o n t i n u e s u p p o r t i n g t h e d r a f t UNSC r e s o l u t i o n on m o n i t o r i n g
M i l o s e v i c ' s a l l e g e d i n t e n t t o c l o s e t h e Bosnian-Serb b o r d e r , b u t
U.S. p e r s o n n e l w i l l not p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e m o n i t o r i n g e f f o r t .
S t a t e w i l l immediately c l e a r a c a b l e g i v i n g o u r ideas on how t h a t
j o b m i g h t be done. USUN w i l l draw on t h a t c a b l e i n g i v i n g
t e c h n i c a l a d v i c e t o t h e UN S e c r e t a r i a t . The same a d v i c e can
reach c a p i t a l s v i a t h e i r UN m i s s i o n s .
We would be w i l l i n g t o
provide i n t e l l i g e n c e t o a border m o n i t o r i n g f o r c e .
5. P r e v e n t i n g S p i l l o v e r i n t o Macedonia. P r i n c i p a l s w i l l
recommend t o t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e Christmas Day 1992 w a r n i n g t o
M i l o s e v i c on Kosovo should be p u b l i c l y expanded t o cover U.S.
m i l i t a r y r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t S e r b i a i n t h e case o f Serbian
a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t Macedonia. JCS w i l l p r o v i d e a menu t o t h e
P r i n c i p a l s o f steps we might t a k e t o back up t h a t warning. The
b a s i c recommendation t o t h e P r e s i d e n t w i l l be h e l d u n t i l
P r i n c i p a l s can a l s o recommend back-up s t e p s .
6. A d d i t i o n a l CSCE M o n i t o r s f o r Kosovo. S t a t e w i l l mount a
s t r o n g e f f o r t t o i n c r e a s e t h e number o f CSCE m o n i t o r s i n Kosovo.
The U.S. w i l l be w i l l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a l a r g e r m o n i t o r i n g
effort.
7. A New Conference and P o s s i b l e New Map. Ambassador A l b r i g h t
w i l l sound o u t UN S e c r e t a r y General B o u t r o s - G h a l i ' s t h i n k i n g
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of Staff
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about a new o r reconvened conference on t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a , i n
o r d e r t o encourage him t o c a l l one w i t h o u t making a U.S. p r o p o s a l
t o do so.
8. A i r Support f o r A l l i e s i n UNPROFOR. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l
f i n d occasion t o make p u b l i c ( e s p e c i a l l y t o Congress) t h e
commitment we i n h e r i t e d from t h e Bush A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o use a i r
power t o rescue A l l i e d t r o o p s i n UNPROFOR i f t h e y need and
r e q u e s t i t . We w i l l n o t , however, agree t o use a i r power t o h e l p
defend s a f e havens t h a t c o n t a i n A l l i e d f o r c e s , c i t i n g as
necessary our b a s i c r e s e r v a t i o n s about t h e l i m i t s o f a i r power
and t h e l a c k o f an e n d - p o i n t t o t h e s a f e haven s t r a t e g y .
9. Implementing Vance/Owen. P r i n c i p a l s w i l l g i v e
comments/clearance on t h e NSC s t a f f ' s d r a f t P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n
Memorandum on U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n implementing Vance/Owen t o
the NSC s t a f f . That D e c i s i o n Memorandum w i l l n o t go t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t , however, unless Vance/Owen seems l i k e l y t o be agreed
by t h e Bosnian Serbs.
OBCRET
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�SECRET
20983
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s f o r
M e e t i n g o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
September 1 , 1993
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
5:00pm - 7:00pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia
(S)
--
PARTICIPANTS:
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e
Leon F u e r t h
State:
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Stephen Oxman
USUN
Madeleine
Albright
White House
Sandy Berger
DOD
Les A s p i n
Frank Wisner
NSC
Jenonne
Walker
CIA
W i l l i a m Studeman
O l i v e r Wicklund
JCS
C o l i n Powell
Barry McCaffrey
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s
P u b l i c P o s i t i o n and Messages t o F o r e i g n
Leaders
S t a t e w i l l p r e p a r e a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t , f o r use when we have more
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Geneva developments ( p r o b a b l y Tuesday,
September 2 ) , as w e l l as l e t t e r s f r o m S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r t o
A l l i e d and Russian f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s and messages t o t h e Bosnian
parties.
A l l w i l l i n c l u d e some common themes: ( S )
-G e n e r a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e Bosnians w i t h o u t seeming t o endorse
a l l t h e i r demands.
I n t e r r u p t i o n o f t h e t a l k s was p r e m a t u r e , and a l l s h o u l d
r e t u r n t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o f i n i s h t h e j o b . (S)
-NATO's a i r s t r i k e w a r n i n g remains
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(S)
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We w i l l not consider any easing o f sanctions u n t i l an
agreement i s being implemented i n good f a i t h . f S )
-We remain committed t o the War Crimes T r i b u n a l . F u l l
l i f t i n g of sanctions w i l l r e q u i r e Serbian cooperation w i t h
the T r i b u n a l . f S )
-Additional points f o r individual parties w i l l include:
State w i l l i n s t r u c t Ambassador Redmond t o t e l l I z e t b e g o v i c
t h a t we are committed t o h e l p i n g implement a s e t t l e m e n t even
though we cannot announce a ground f o r c e r o l e u n t i l t h e r e i s
an implementable agreement. At the same time, we w i l l p o i n t
out the o p p o s i t i o n we are l i k e l y t o face i n the U.S. and
urge him t o say p u b l i c l y now what he already has t o l d us:
t h a t he would want the U.S. t o help implement an agreement.
We w i l l warn Tudjman of p o s s i b l e sanctions on C r o a t i a i f
both he and the Bosnian Croats do not r e t u r n t o Geneva and
show more f l e x i b i l i t y . ( S )
-A l l i e s w i l l be t o l d now i s the time t o press the Serbs and
Croats t o go as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o meet the minimum
reguirements o f the v i c t i m of aggression.
We f u r t h e r w i l l
argue t h a t seeming t o blame the Bosnians would encourage
renewed Serb or Croat aggression, thus t r i g g e r i n g NATO's a i r
s t r i k e commitment and/or r e v i v i n g our i n t e r e s t i n l i f t i n g
the arms embargo. f S )
-A i r Operations.
JCS w i l l look i n t o another a i r e x e r c i s e
over Bosnian Serb t r o o p s , a t a lower a l t i t u d e than previous
e x e r c i s e s , t o remind them of NATO's readiness t o a c t on i t s a i r
s t r i k e warning i f necessary. ( S )
-Sanctions
Easing
The NSC S t a f f w i l l work w i t h State t o f u r t h e r develop a concept
of how sanctions might be eased i f a s e t t l e m e n t i s reached and i s
being implemented, and what Serbian behavior we would r e g u i r e a t
each stage. A d e c i s i o n on when and how t o share our views w i t h
a l l i e s and other w i l l be taken l a t e r . ( S )
-The NSC S t a f f w i l l ask Treasury t o explore whether blocked
Serbian assets can be used t o pay w a r - r e l a t e d claims a g a i n s t
Serbia. ( S )
-Implementation
We w i l l make p u b l i c our i n s i s t e n c e t h a t we w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n
implementing a s e t t l e m e n t only i f i t i s a NATO o p e r a t i o n ,
a u t h o r i z e d by the UN but under NATO's o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l .
State w i l l work w i t h OSD and OMB t o develop the concept o f a
v o l u n t a r y fund t o pay the expenses o f an implementing f o r c e . ( S )
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When announcing our conrniitment t o c o n t r i b u t e ground f o r c e s t o an
implementation/enforcement e f f o r t , we w i l l say t h a t i t i s f o r two
years only w i t h a review a t the end o f the f i r s t year. ( S )
-In order t o i n v o l v e Congress e a r l y i n a U.S. r o l e i n
implementation, we would welcome a Congressional support f o r our
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The NSC S t a f f w i l l d r a f t p o s s i b l e wording o f such
a r e s o l u t i o n . (S)
-The NSC S t a f f w i l l v e r i f y t h a t c a l l s t o s t a f f s o f a p p r o p r i a t e
Congressmen and Senators have been made, a l e r t i n g them t o a
meeting on Bosnia and Somalia toward the end o f next week. ( S )
-Balkan conference
State w i l l prepare a plan f o r encouraging the EC t o propose t h a t
a Bosnian s e t t l e m e n t be f o l l o w e d by a broader conference t o
address the Croatian UNPAS and other p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g
issues i n the Balkans. ( S )
--
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cronBT
21055
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C 20506
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s f o r
M e e t i n g o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
September 20, 1993
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
4:30 - 6:00 p.m.
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia ( S )
--
PARTICIPANTS:
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e
Leon F u e r t h
JCS
C o l i n Powell
B a r r y McCaffrey
State:
USUN
No R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
Peter Tarnoff
DOD
Les A s p i n
Frank Wisner
OMB
Leon P a n e t t a
Gordon Adarns
White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
NSC
Jenonne
Walker
CIA
James Woolsey
Gene W i c k l u n d
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s
I f t h e I n v i n c i b l e agreement i s a c c e p t e d by a l l Bosnian p a r t i e s ,
we w i l l n o t c l a i m a t r i u m p h f o r American d i p l o m a c y o r d e s c r i b e
the s e t t l e m e n t as m e e t i n g a l l o u r w i s h e s o r p r i n c i p l e s .
We w i l l ,
however, n o t e t h a t American p o l i c i e s and a c t i o n s have h e l p e d
produce a b e t t e r d e a l f o r Bosnia's Muslims and t h o s e who s t i l l
want a m u l t i - r e l i g i o u s s o c i e t y t h a n w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have been t h e
case.
I f a c c e p t e d , t h e agreement can produce a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s
b e t t e r t h a n a n o t h e r w i n t e r o f war. (£>
-C o n g r e s s i o n a l L i a i s o n S t a f f s o f a l l a g e n c i e s w i l l t e l e p h o n e key
H i l l S t a f f e r s t o ( a ) t e l l them what we know o f t h e I n v i n c i b l e
agreement; ( b ) n o t e t h a t new a s p e c t s o f t h e agreement address key
B o s n i a n government concerns (access t o t h e A d r i a t i c and l i n k s
w i t h M u s l i m - m a j o r i t y e n c l a v e s i n e a s t e r n B o s n i a ) ; ( c ) say t h a t
w h i l e t h e Bosnian P a r l i a m e n t s t i l l must a c c e p t t h e agreement, i f
i t does p r o v e s a t i s f a c t o r y t o them, i t w o u l d i n o u r judgment be
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b e t t e r than another
before H i l l f r i e n d s
statements c r i t i c a l
f o r them t o support
EQRET
w i n t e r of war. This w i l l be done promptly,
o f Bosnia i n p a r t i c u l a r make p u b l i c
of t h e agreement t h a t could make i t harder
our r o l e i n implementation. ( S )
--
During t h e H i l l l e a d e r s h i p c o n s u l t a t i o n s scheduled f o r Thursday,
September 23, we w i l l present our c o n d i t i o n s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n
implementation/enforcement.
(OSD t o p r o v i d e w r i t t e n t e x t
Tuesday, September 21, f o r P r i n c i p a l s ' review.) ( S )
-P r i n c i p a l s r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n t h a t we would
welcome a Congressional r e s o l u t i o n of support f o r U.S.
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n implementation/enforcement, and f u r t h e r agreed
t h a t i t would be u s e f u l w i t h A l l i e s i f t h e r e s o l u t i o n contains
our c o n d i t i o n s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . NSC s t a f f w i l l r e v i s e i t s
d r a f t Congressional r e s o l u t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y . ( S )
-While we do not r e g u i r e p r i o r Congressional approval f o r American
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i f Congress passes a r e s o l u t i o n opposing i t , we
w i l l not proceed. ( S )
-OMB w i l l assess whether i t i s p o s s i b l e and/or d e s i r a b l e t o
combine a r e s o l u t i o n s u p p o r t i n g American p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h a
supplemental. ( S )
-OMB and OSD w i l l prepare a recommendation on funding o p t i o n s on
Tuesday, September 21. ( S )
-DOD w i l l reassess NATO plans f o r u n i f i e d command throughout t h e
FRY. (-Si
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
October 2, 1993
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
9:30am - 11:30am
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia f-ef
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e :
No R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
State:
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
DOD
S e c r e t a r y Les A s p i n
S p e c i a l Envoy
Charles Redman
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine
Albright
White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
NSC
Jenonne Walker
OMB
Leon Panetta
CIA
Gene Studeman
JCS
A d m i r a l David
Jeremiah
Summary o f Conclusions
1. The IWG w i l l prepare p r o p o s a l s f o r p r o m o t i n g Muslim-Croat
c o o p e r a t i o n and f o r broadening t h e b a s i s o f n e g o t i a t i o n s t o cover
a l l o f t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a . f 3 ) ~
2. The IWG w i l l prepare p r o p o s a l s on meeting h u m a n i t a r i a n needs
throughout the winter.
3. S t a t e w i l l propose ways t o r e a f f i r m t h a t NATO's a i r s t r i k e
warning remains i n e f f e c t t o p r e v e n t s t r a n g u l a t i o n o f Bosnian
government-held areas.
4. I n her E x p l a n a t i o n o f Vote on expanding t h e UNPROFOR mandate,
Ambassador A l b r i g h t , i f necessary, w i l l l i n k complete l i f t i n g o f
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s a n c t i o n s on Serbia w i t h s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n o f t h e UNPAS i n
Croatia.
5. JCS will research the precise terms of the initial,
unilateral U.S. commitments to aid allies participating in
UNPROFOR in Croatia. J^f
6. S t a t e ' s d r a f t p r o p o s a l f o r d e s c r i b i n g SACEUR's r o l e i n an
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n e f f o r t was approved. fC)
7. The U.S. will support a NATO assessment for paying
incremental costs of NATO states participating in an
implementation force, with other participants paying their own
way. We also will propose a voluntary fund to repay some of the
costs of all participants. J^&Y
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting of NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
October 19, 1993
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
3:30pm - 4:30pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ( S )
--
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President's O f f i c e :
Leon Fuerth
State:
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter T a r n o f f
JCS:
Admiral David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey
DOD:
Secretary Les Aspin
Frank Wisner
White House:
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
USUN:
NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
CIA:
James Woolsey
JM3L
JCS:
David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey
Summary of Conclusions
At t h e conclusion o f i t s October 18 meeting on NATO Summit
issues, t h e P r i n c i p a l s Committee b r i e f l y discussed t h e French
proposed UNSC r e s o l u t i o n t h a t would a u t h o r i z e s t a t e s o r r e g i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o give Close A i r Support t o UNPROFOR i n C r o a t i a .
1.
No p o s i t i v e d e c i s i o n w i l l be taken f o r now. ( S )
--
2. Ambassador A l b r i g h t may t e l l t h e UNSYG t h a t t h e
d i f f i c u l t i e s created w i t h regard t o procedures f o r Close A i r
Support f o r UNPROFOR i n Bosnia make us wary o f undertaking a
s i m i l a r endeavor i n C r o a t i a a t t h i s time. fS-)
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Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of t h e NSC Deputies Committee
October 28, 1993
DATE
S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
11:00 am - 12:30 pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Humanitarian Assistance t o Bosnia
PARTICIPANTS:
OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders
CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Gene Wicklund
State:
Peter T a r n o f f
Charles Redman
Warren Zimmermann
Alexander Vershbow
JCS:
David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey
DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joe Krugel
AID:
Carol Lancaster
Doug S t a f f o r d
White House:
Samuel Berger
USUN:
David Scheffer
Laura Bowman
NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Jane H o l l
E r i c Schwartz
Summary of Conclusions
I t was agreed t h a t :
although f i n d i n g adequate humanitarian a i d resources w i l l
continue t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t challenge, t h e r e i s no imminent
supply c r i s i s . State w i l l r e p o r t t o the Deputies i n e a r l y
December on whether a U.S. appeal t o t h e EC (or o t h e r a c t i o n
to encourage donor support) i s necessary.
^G)
AID, w i t h t h e assistance of the CIA and USUN, w i l l examine
p r o v i s i o n o f medical s u p p l i e s and adequacy of medical
f a c i l i t i e s i n Bosnia, w i t h a view toward improving U.S. and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o d e l i v e r medical a s s i s t a n c e . AID
w i l l a l s o evaluate t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of improving d e l i v e r y
through a i r d r o p s . (^)
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OSD/JCS w i l l r e p o r t on the m i l i t a r y requirements f o r prov i d i n g a i r support f o r UNPROFOR pursuant t o an EC d e c i s i o n
to open a humanitarian c o r r i d o r from C r o a t i a through C e n t r a l
Bosnia t o Sarajevo. The OSD/JCS paper should discuss an a i r
support mission f o r the Metkovic-Sarajevo road, as w e l l as
other c o r r i d o r s through C e n t r a l Bosnia t h a t may be discussed
at t h e EC summit on October 29. The paper should discuss
d i f f e r e n t rules-of-engagement o p t i o n s f o r the a i r support
mission and how these options d i f f e r from c u r r e n t USG p o l i c y
on support of UNPROFOR. F i n a l l y , Deputies should discuss
w i t h P r i n c i p a l s whether any c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given t o
undertaking the opening of such a humanitarian c o r r i d o r as a
NATO o p e r a t i o n . ( S )
-OSD/JCS, w i t h the assistance of CIA and AID, w i l l assess
the c u r r e n t l e v e l of a i r d r o p s . What i s the basis f o r the
c u r r e n t l e v e l ? Due t o lack of access, are t h e r e c r i t i c a l
and unmet humanitarian needs t h a t could be addressed through
increased l e v e l s o f airdrops? Does the impending w i n t e r
d i c t a t e t h a t we, along w i t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community,
develop a c o n t i n g e n t a b i l i t y t o increase a i r d r o p l e v e l s a t
s h o r t n o t i c e ? fG-)
OVP w i l l attempt t o develop an immediate plan t o ensure
against exhaustion of potable water i n Sarajevo, which
appears t o be an imminent p o s s i b i l i t y .
I n p a r t i c u l a r , OVP
w i l l examine how we might ensure d e l i v e r y of f u e l necessary
to operate generators t h a t pump water. fG-)
OVP w i l l i n q u i r e again w i t h Bosnian o f f i c i a l s i n New York
on t h e i r p o s i t i o n regarding e f f o r t s t o urge the Hungarians
to c u t t h e f u e l p i p e l i n e t o Belgrade. (-Si
NSC s t a f f , State and OVP w i l l i d e n t i f y c a r r o t s and s t i c k s
we could use t o persuade a l l p a r t i e s t o cooperate on
humanitarian access and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t o respect a new
humanitarian c o r r i d o r i f the EC decides t o open and operate
one.
Redman w i l l pursue i n discussions w i t h Owen/
S t o l t e n b e r g and the p a r t i e s . fG-)
OSD/JCS w i l l examine t h e p o s s i b i l i t y and i m p l i c a t i o n s of
a u t h o r i z i n g the USG MASH u n i t i n Zagreb t o provide s h o r t term care f o r small numbers of Bosnians p r i o r t o t h e i r
being moved on t o h o s p i t a l s i n Europe and the United States.
OSD/JCS should i n c l u d e an implementation plan t o p e r m i t such
care, which should discuss means t o l i m i t excessive demands
on the f a c i l i t y (such as by imposing numerical l i m i t a t i o n s ,
a reguirement f o r r a p i d "through-put" and a p p r o p r i a t e
treatment c r i t e r i a ) . (G)
-Following the meeting, Berger requested a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n on one
agenda item t h a t was not discussed, t h e opening of Tuzla a i r p o r t .
I t i s reguested t h a t OSD/JCS, w i t h the assistance of S t a t e ,
r e p o r t on the f e a s i b i l i t y and a d v i s a b i l i t y o f opening t h e a i r p o r t
i n Tuzla, i n c l u d i n g options t h a t do and do not i n c l u d e the
involvement of USG i n the opening or o p e r a t i n g of the a i r p o r t .
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC Deputies Committee
DATE:
November 16, 1993
LOCATION:
White House S i t u a t i o n
TIME:
4:00pm - 5:00pm
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia f-S-)—•
PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e
Leon F u e r t h
State:
Peter T a r n o f f
Stephen Oxman
Warren Zimmerman
USUN
David S c h e f f e r
Laura Bowman
SPECIAL ENVOY
Charles Redman
DOD
Frank Wisner
D a r r e l l Johnson
AID
Frank Almaguer
Douglas S t a f f o r d
CIA
Douglas MacEachin
O l i v e r Wicklund
White House
Samuel R. Berger
JCS
Barry McCaffrey
James H i l l
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
A.
Humanitarian Issues
Deputies w i l l recommend t o P r i n c i p a l s t h a t we s h o u l d :
1.
R e i t e r a t e our e x i s t i n g commitment f o r Close A i r Support t o
UNPROFOR. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we should t e l l t h e French t h a t so f a r as
we a r e concerned our e x i s t i n g commitment would a p p l y t o UNPROFOR
e s c o r t s o f h u m a n i t a r i a n convoys along agreed r o u t e s . -fG)—
2. T e l l Zagreb t h a t i f Bosnian Croat f o r c e s i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e
h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r we w i l l s u p p o r t s a n c t i o n s
on C r o a t i a ' s c i v i l a i r and m a r i t i m e s e c t o r s and d e n i a l o f i t s
access t o I F I r e s o u r c e s . We a l s o would warn t h a t i f Zagreb
r e t a l i a t e s by r e d u c i n g i t s c u r r e n t l e v e l o f r e f u g e e / r e l i e f
support we would s u p p o r t f u l l - s c a l e s a n c t i o n s comparable t o those
imposed on S e r b i a . Ambassador Redman s h o u l d make recommendations
-flDCRGT
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�about o t h e r p o s s i b l e l e v e r a g e on a l l t h e p a r t i e s t o cooperate
w i t h t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t a f t e r h i s d i s c u s s i o n s i n Europe
l a t e r - t h i s week. -fS*) *
3. With r e g a r d t o h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f f o r S e r b i a , we should i n
p r i n c i p l e be open t o :
--The
medicine;
use o f some USG funds f o r UNHCR purchase o f food and
--20K o f f u e l f o r r e f u g e e c e n t e r s ;
--7K o f f u e l f o r s p e c i f i e d
institutions
--Expanded n a t u r a l gas d e l i v e r i e s t o S e r b i a and Bosnia i n
reasonable amounts;
- - F u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e n e r g y - f o r - e n e r g y swaps.
Ambassador Redman w i l l make recommendations on how b e s t t o use
these p o s s i b l e s a n c t i o n s - e x e m p t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h a view t o
g e t t i n g b e t t e r access f o r w i n t e r i z a t i o n m a t e r i a l s t o Bosnian-held
communities . -(
5. Be willing to participate in an airlift to Tuzla airport if
UNPROFOR opens it and the airlift coalition (including the U.S.)
judges it safe. Look at the provision of equipment or the
possibility of providing U.S. contractor personnel if opening the
airport becomes a real possibility. -(3 y
* * * * *
Deputies a l s o agreed t h a t more work was needed on two agenda
items and t a s k e d t h e f o l l o w i n g two papers, b o t h due by F r i d a y
November 19:
1. Estimate of possible need for increased air drops (State and
AID) . +&f2.
C r i t e r i a and procedures
a t MAASH Zagreb. -(G)
B.
f o r p o s s i b l e acceptance o f c i v i l i a n s
EC N e g o t i a t i n g I n i t i a t i v e
1.
S t a t e w i l l c i r c u l a t e f o r clearances a l e t t e r t o EC Foreign
M i n i s t e r s conveying U.S. views.
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE
February 18, 1994
LOCATION
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME
10:00am - 12:30pm
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia •{ C y-
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
Anthony Lake
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e :
Leon F u e r t h
State:
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Peter T a r n o f f
DOD
S e c r e t a r y W i l l i a m Perry
Frank Wisner
WHITE HOUSE
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
R i c h a r d C l a r k e (Georgia)
R. N i c h o l a s Burns (Georgia)
Jenonne Walker (Bosnia)
OMB
D i r e c t o r Leon Panetta (Georgia)
Gordon Adams (T) (Georgia)
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine
Dave S c h e f f e r (T)
Albright
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
John McLaughlin (Georgia)
A. Norman S c h l i n d e r (Bosnia)
JCS
General John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
James H i l l
Summary o f Conclusions
NATO P l a n n i n g f o r E x p i r a t i o n o f t h e Sarajevo E x c l u s i o n Zone
Deadline
No f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n needed by NATO c a p i t a l s .
Heavy weapons n o t withdrawn from t h e Sarejevo e x c l u s i o n zone
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or put under UNPROFOR control by 7:00 pm EST Sunday w i l l be
s u b j e c t to a t t a c k . fS^T
We welcome Russian help in gaining Bosnian Serb promise to
comply with NATO's ultimatum, but need to see results on the
ground. Not willing to re-negotiate NATO's deadline. f&j
Bill Perry and Shali's meeting with French, British, Dutch
and Italian opposite numbers in Aviano Sunday will review
contingency planning with participating allies but not
reopen decisions. f&f
Diplomacy
Demarches w i l l be made t o t h e Serbs about t h e dangers o f
r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t UNPROFOR o r c i v i l i a n s and t o t h e Bosnian
government about t h e damage t o i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t i f
i t f a i l s t o t u r n i n i t s (few) heavy weapons o r takes
advantage o f NATO's a c t i o n t o r a i s e i t s n e g o t i a t i n g demands
or s e i z e b a t t l e f i e l d advantage i n t h e S a r a j e v o r e g i o n . -fSi
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l w r i t e NATO f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s on
t h e need f o r NATO f i r m n e s s and u n i t y and telephone those
whose governments may need s t i f f e n i n g .
Agreed to hold off on decision on Presidential calls to
Kohl, Yeltsin, Major, Boutros-Ghali and Ciampi (if we expect
to be using Italian bases for air strikes). ^24
Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright will clarify
with Boutros-Ghali the consequences for U.S./UN relations if
he withholds authority. {&)
Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l c o n t i n u e w o r k i n g f o r a statement by
concerned S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l members (U.S., UK, France, Russia
and Spain) t h a t can h e l p Y e l t s i n w i t h o u t weakening NATO's
ultimatum.
To b r i n g Russia c o n s t r u c t i v e l y i n t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s ,
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r may i n v i t e Kozyrev t o Washington.
Steve Oxman a l s o may meet w i t h h i s key West Europeans and
Russian c o u n t e r p a r t s . .fS-)State will prepare a letter from the President to Tudjman
urging his cooperation in the negotiations. +&f
Secretary Christopher and Anthony Lake and possibly Vice
President Gore will see Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic in
Washington next week. We may invite Croatian Foreign
Minister Granic at the same time if it seems that would be
productive. fST
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CLINTON LSEQItfffiUOTOCOPY
�SECR&T
American Counter B a t t e r y Radar f o r Bosnia
We w i l l p r o v i d e systems t o UNPROFOR i f an a p p r o p r i a t e S t a t e
whose f o r c e s a l r e a d y a r e t r a i n e d t o use them w i l l p r o v i d e
t h e t r o o p s . -fSfConqress
Key members will be telephoned Friday and Saturday.
f#y
Follow-up c a l l s as necessary, depending on events.
S e c r e t a r y Perry t e s t i f i e s b e f o r e t h e House and Senate Armed
Services Committees Wednesday. ^-S^
The P u b l i c
Recommend t h e P r e s i d e n t address t h e n a t i o n on t e l e v i s i o n
Saturday morning. (-Sf
Secretaries Christopher and Perry (from Aviano) and
Ambassador Albright will be on Sunday talk shows. fr&fS e c r e t a r y Perry and General S h a l i k a s h v i l i w i l l h o l d a press
b r i e f i n g Monday morning, e x p l a i n i n g s t r i k e s o r reasons f o r
d e c i s i o n t h a t they were n o t necessary. ( & )
-•-
-flECRET
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TN
H0T0C0PY
�20267
GDCP.DTNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
DATE:
LOCATION:
TIME:
SUBJECT:
February 28, 1994
White House S i t u a t i o n
9:30am - 10:
30am
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia •(0^
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony
CIA
D i r e c t o r Woolsey
Norman S c h l i n d e r
Lake
O f f i c e o f t h e Vice P r e s i d e n t
Leon F u e r t h
State
Secretary Christopher
Peter T a r n o f f
Charles Redman
JCS
Gen John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Gen M i c h a e l Ryan
Gen John Sheehan
White House
Samuel Berger
DOD
S e c r e t a r y Perry
Frank Wisner
NSC
Jenonne Walker
USUN
Ambassador A l b r i g h t
Ambassador I n d e r f u r t h
Summary o f Conclusions
Bosnian-Croat N e g o t i a t i o n s
Secretary
President
which Mr.
afternoon
Christopher will prepare a status report for the
on the negotiations now underway in Washington,
Lake will take to the President in Pittsburgh the
of February 28. -f3)
NATO February 28 Enforcement o f Bosnian No-Fly-Zone
I n p u b l i c , we w i l l s t r e s s t h a t t h e February 28 a c t i o n was a
NATO r a t h e r t h a n U.S. o p e r a t i o n , and t h a t NATO a c t e d i n
response t o a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n w i t h o u t c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e
n a t i o n a l i t y of the a i r c r a f t .
NATO was e n f o r c i n g a UN
Security Council resolution that applies equally t o a l l the
Bosnian p a r t i e s . -fS) -OECRCr
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2
Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvilli will brief the
Hill leadership and key committee chairmen the afternoon of
February 28. -{Sy
The Pentagon w i l l g i v e a press background b r i e f i n g t h e
a f t e r n o o n o f February 28, a m p l i f y i n g p u b l i c remarks a l r e a d y
made by P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n . • (6)
Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l suggest t o UN Under S e c r e t a r y Annan
t h a t he r e q u e s t a b r i e f i n g t h r o u g h NATO m i l i t a r y channels,
on t h e b a s i s o f which he c o u l d then b r i e f t h e S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l , -f-e-f
Possible Further Actions
The Deputies Committee w i l l meet d u r i n g t h e week o f February
28 on p o s s i b l e steps t o a i d o r a c c e l e r a t e t h e opening o f
Tuzla a i r p o r t .
The IWG paper o f February 14 d e s c r i b i n g
p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be used as t h e b a s i s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
t h e l a t t e r p o i n t . -fS4
The P r i n c i p a l s Committee w i l l meet on t h e l a t t e r p o i n t , and
the former i f necessary, Monday March 7. -{0)
Congressional
s u p p o r t f o r Bosnian p o l i c y
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l e x p l o r e w i t h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Hamilton
p r o s p e c t s f o r passage o f h i s d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n w i t h o u t
opening a f u l l debate on Bosnia p o l i c y . Our b a s i c p o s i t i o n
remains, as t h e P r e s i d e n t has s a i d , t h a t we welcome a
r e s o l u t i o n endorsing the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s plans.
) •
French D r a f t UNSC R e s o l u t i o n
We w i l l c o n t i n u e s u p p o r t i n g t h e French d r a f t b u t n o t push
f o r i t . I f u s e f u l t o meet Russian concerns, we w i l l agree
t o drop r e f e r e n c e t o Brcko. -fO)-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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•SCCR'Ti>T
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
DATE:
LOCATION:
TIME:
SUBJECT:
March 8, 1994
White House S i t u a t i o n
5:00 -- 6:30pm
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia -(G)-
PARTICIPANTS:
CIA
James Woolsey
Norman S c h i n d l e r
Chair
Samuel Berger
JCS
General John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
John Admire
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
Deputy S e c r e t a r y Strobe
Talbott
Alexander Vershbow
USUN
Ambassador Rick I n d e r f u r t h
David S c h e f f e r
White House
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Jane H o l l
Richard Clarke
Summary o f Conclusions
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o recommend t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t decide t o
approve an i n c r e a s e i n t h e U.S. c o n t i n g e n t i n UNPROFOR
Macedonia t o f r e e up N o r d i c c o n t r i b u t o r s f o r deployment
elsewhere i n UNPROFOR.
(S)C o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Democratic l e a d e r s on t h e H i l l
g e n e r a l l y have been f a v o r a b l e .
Principals w i l l consult
i n f o r m a l l y on t h e H i l l w i t h Republican l e a d e r s h i p . • (S)S t a t e and DOD w i l l t a k e soundings from N o r d i c
c o u n t e r p a r t s t o determine t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o be
d i s p l a c e d . -(SfThe U.S. w i l l seek t o command UNPROFOR Macedonia.
•(S)-
Other c o n t r i b u t o r s would p r o v i d e a s i g n i f i c a n t non-U.S.
presence i n t h e t o t a l f o r c e deployed i n Macedonia. (S)
DECLASSIFIED
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32
�CC.S
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P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t t h e U.S. s h o u l d work w i t h t h e UN t o
i d e n t i f y and f a c i l i t a t e p o t e n t i a l sources o f a d d i t i o n a l
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o UNPROFOR. - f S f
We would approach t h e Eastern Europeans and encourage
them t o make more t h a n a t o k e n c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
UNPROFOR.
We would s u p p o r t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e I t a l i a n s .
We would n o t advocate, b u t would n o t oppose, t h e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e Turks. • S)<
We would s u p p o r t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e P a k i s t a n i s .
DOD w i l l work up a reimbursement scheme f o r a i r l i f t and
l o g i s t i c s s u p p o r t t h a t charges t h e UN our m a r g i n a l
c o s t s o f p r o v i d i n g t h i s s u p p o r t i n o r d e r t o make our
o f f e r more a t t r a c t i v e t o t h e UN. {C)
-SECRET
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�20467
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C 20506
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s f o r
M e e t i n g o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
A p r i l 10, 1994
DATE
W h i t e House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
1:50pm - 4:10pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s
on B o s n i a ( S )
--
of Principals
Committee
Meeting
PARTICIPANTS:
The
President
Chair
CIA
D i r James Woolsey
Adm W i l l i a m Studeman
Norman S c h i n d l e r
(b)(3)
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
JCS
Gen John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Gen Wesley C l a r k
Gen John Sheehan
STATE
Sec Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Peter Tarnoff
DOD
Sec W i l l i a m P e r r y
W a l t e r Slocombe
BGen Paul Kern
USUN
Ambassador A l b r i g h t
W h i t e House
Samuel B e r g e r
Nancy S o d e r b e r g
NSC
Jenonne W a l k e r
Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s
The a t t a c h e d p o i n t s w i l l f o r m t h e b a s i s o f P r e s i d e n t i a l
remarks t o t h e p r e s s , t e l e p h o n e c a l l s t o key H i l l s t a f f
members and f o r e i g n l e a d e r s , and remarks by d e p a r t m e n t a l
p r e s s spokesmen. ( 6 )
-The IWG w i l l d r a f t a c o n t i n g e n c y NAC r e s o l u t i o n ,
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by P r i n c i p a l s .
(S>
--
f o r further
The
(S)
--
President w i l l
telephone
President Y e l t s i n .
Secretary C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l telephone Russian Foreign
M i n i s t e r Kozyrev. S e c r e t a r i e s C h r i s t o p h e r and P e r r y w i l l
t h e n d i s c u s s l a t t e r ' s t e l e p h o n e c a l l t o Russian Defense
M i n i s t e r Grachev. ( S )
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S e c r e t a r y P e r r y w i l l t e l e p h o n e Defense M i n i s t e r s o f t h e
"Aviano Group" o f NATO a l l i e s .
(S)
-The Pentagon w i l l c o n s i d e r h o l d i n g a p r e s s b r i e f i n g on
Monday, a f t e r NATO m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s have b r i e f e d on
r e s u l t s o f t o d a y ' s e v e n t s . General S h a l i k a s h v i l i w i l l urge
t h a t t h e NATO m i l i t a r y b r i e f i n g t a k e p l a c e as soon as
p o s s i b l e . (S)
-State w i l l
p r e p a r e a demarche t o M i l o s e v i c . fS-)
Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l a f f i r m t o K o f i Annan o u r r e a d i n e s s
to help U k r a i n i a n c o u n t e r p a r t get t o Sarajevo.
S t a t e w i l l p r e p a r e a c a b l e f o r use by o u r Embassies i n
C e n t r a l and East European s t a t e s . ( S )
-G e n e r a l S h a l i k a s h v i l i w i l l i n s t r u c t A d m i r a l S m i t h t o impress
upon G e n e r a l Rose t h e d e t e r r e n t v a l u e o f prompt f o l l o w
t h r o u g h t o today's a c t i o n i f necessary. (S)
--
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�20522
GEGREff
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
A p r i l 18, 1994
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
11:10am - 1:45pm
TIME
SUBJECT
Summary o f Conclusions
on Bosnia f # f
o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee
Meeting
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
Norman S c h i n d l e r
Anthony Lake
OVP
The Vice P r e s i d e n t
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Peter T a r n o f f
DOD
Secretary William
Walter Slocombe
Perry
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
W i l l i a m Woodward
JCS
GEN John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
GEN Wesley C l a r k
White House
Thomas McLarty
Samuel Berger
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
1. S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r w i l l r e v i e w what we e a r l i e r have s a i d
t o Belgrade about n o t i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h U.S./NATO a i r c r a f t
( i n c l u d i n g those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n h u m a n i t a r i a n a i r d r o p s ) . (S >2. Ambassador Albright will ask about the UN's planning for the
humanitarian effort, -t&f
3. Sarajevo e x c l u s i o n zone: I n l i g h t o f Gorazde events, i t i s
more i m p o r t a n t than ever t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n zone be e n f o r c e d . To
t h a t end:
--By COB 4/18, CIA w i l l c i r c u l a t e an assessment o f t h e
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e Sarajevo e x c l u s i o n zone, i n c l u d i n g t h e i s s u e
of t h e tank menacing UNPROFOR t r o o p s on 4/14. -fS-f--Admiral Smith w i l l i n q u i r e whether UNPROFOR i s s a t i s f i e d
w i t h t h e degree o f i t s c o n t r o l over heavy weapons i n t h e Sarajevo
A
S S
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2
exclusion zone in order to engage UNPROFOR in a discussion of how
to ensure control. "t&J
--Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l ask t h e UN S e c r e t a r i a t f o r a
b r i e f i n g on t h e s t a t u s o f t h e e x c l u s i o n zone. -fS")
--State will instruct USNATO to raise the issue.
4&f
4.
A t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l n o t oppose
c a l l s f o r p o s i t i v e a c t i o n t h a t come b e f o r e t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
b u t w i l l p r i v a t e l y suggest t o t h e French and o t h e r s as
a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t f u r t h e r c a l l s t h a t a r e u n l i k e l y t o be
implemented o n l y f u r t h e r damage t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s c r e d i b i l i t y .
-t*r
5. General S h a l i k a s h v i l i w i l l r e v i e w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
augmenting U.S. f o r c e s i n UNPROFOR Macedonia (beyond t h e
i n c r e a s e s being made t h i s week) and our a b i l i t y t o a s s i s t them
w i t h g r e a t e r power i f necessary. -fO)
6.
We w i l l s u p p o r t t h e proposed i n c r e a s e i n UNPROFOR's c e i l i n g .
7. We w i l l s u p p o r t e a s i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on T u r k i s h t r o o p s f o r
UNPROFOR. f S t 8. OSD w i l l prepare proposals
to UNPROFOR troops. f S T
f o r providing more U.S. equipment
9. The sanctions Working Group will prepare proposals on
tightening sanctions by COB today for the President's review
tomorrow. -f-D)~
10. The IWG w i l l e l a b o r a t e two o p t i o n s f o r PC c o n s i d e r a t i o n :
(1) a c o m b i n a t i o n o f o p t i o n s I I and I I I o f t h e paper p r e p a r e d f o r
today's P r i n c i p a l s meeting; and (2) Option I I I a l o n e . Both w i l l
be completed by COB 4/18. -fCf11.
The attached points w i l l be used f o r a l l p r e s s . H i l l , and
other p u b l i c contacts today. I n addition, H i l l members and S t a f f
w i l l be asked what a c t i o n they b e l i e v e the Congress would
support. -feT
-
•CCE'
•ERT
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Summary o f C o n c l u s i o n s f o r
M e e t i n g o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
A p r i l 23, 1994
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
5:00pm - 5:30pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions of P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ( S )
--
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
ADM W i l l i a m Studeman
Norman Schindler
Chair
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon Fuerth
STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
DOD
Secretary W i l l i a m Perry
BGEN Paul Kern
Walter Slocombe
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
JCS
GEN John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
GEN Wesley Clark
GEN John Sheehan
White House
Thomas McLarty
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
I f a i r s t r i k e s are necessary, NATO should w a i t u n t i l
d a y l i g h t Sunday i n order t o be able t o s t r i k e the broadest
possible number of t a r g e t s w i t h the l e a s t r i s k o f c o l l a t e r a l
damage. ( S )
-General S h a l i k a s h v i l i w i l l convey t h i s t o General Joulwan by
means o f seeking the l a t t e r ' s views. f S )
--
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PER E.0.13526
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
A p r i l 23, 1994
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
1:30 - 2:30pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions
on Bosnia f S f -
o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee
Meeting
PARTICIPANTS:
The
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
ADM W i l l i a m Studeman
Norman S c h i n d l e r
President
Chair
Anthony Lake
OVP
The Vice P r e s i d e n t
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Peter T a r n o f f
DOD
S e c r e t a r y W i l l i a m Perry
BGEN Paul Kern
W a l t e r Slocombe
JCS
GEN John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
GEN Wesley C l a r k
GEN John Sheehan
DIA
ADM M i c h a e l Kraemer
White House
Thomas McLarty
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
No NATO a i r s t r i k e s w i l l t a k e p l a c e w i t h i n t h e n e x t few
hours. -(-SiA f t e r m i d n i g h t GMT (2000 EDT) NATO s h o u l d respond i f (1)
t h e r e i s c o n t i n u e d heavy weapons' s h e l l i n g o f t h e Gorazde
safe area; o r (2) absent evidence t h a t t h e Bosnian Serbs a r e
complying w i t h NATO's t h r e e - k i l o m e t e r w i t h d r a w a l u l t i m a t u m .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r and Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l ensure
t h a t UNSYG B o u t r o s - G h a l i understands t h i s view and seek h i s
s u p p o r t . They w i l l make c l e a r our unhappiness w i t h t h e UN's
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r e f u s a l t o a u t h o r i z e NATO response t o today's v i o l a t i o n s .
Mr. Lake w i l l background t h e p r e s s , key H i l l s t a f f e r s
be c a l l e d , u s i n g t h e a t t a c h e d p o i n t s . -fS")
The group w i l l reconvene a t 5:00 t o d a y . ^ S f
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C.
20506
Summary o f Conclusions
DATE:
LOCATION:
TIME:
SUBJECT:
for
May 20, 1994
White House S i t u a t i o n
3:30pm - 4:30pm
Summary o f Conclusions
on Bosnia tS-)—
o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
USUN
Anthony Lake
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
OVP
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
Norman S c h i n d l e r
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
Sec Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Peter T a r n o f f .
Charles Redman
DOD
S e c r e t a r y W i l l i a m Perry
Walter Slocombe
JSC
General John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
General Wesley C l a r k
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
The IWG w i l l examine p o s s i b i l i t i e s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l
economic a s s i s t a n c e to p a c i f i e d areas i n the Bosniac-Croat
Federation. -fST"
2.
Secretary Christopher w i l l r e a f f i r m t o A l l i e d Foreign
M i n i s t e r s t h a t the U.S. w i l l o n l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n
implementing a peace agreement under NATO command. •f-S-f
3.
C/JCS w i l l prepare an a n a l y s i s o f l i k e l y s c e n a r i o s and
consequences i f we pushed t o make Tuzla an e x c l u s i o n zone.
4.
Ambassador Redman w i l l t r y t o a c c e l e r a t e UN e f f o r t s t o
negotiate a cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s .
He w i l l i n v o l v e t h e
Contact Group i n t h a t e f f o r t and o t h e r w i s e t r y t o ensure i t
r e c e i v e s h i g h e r p r i o r i t y and a t t e n t i o n . -{0fr~
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A l l P r i n c i p a l s w i l l have t h e i r s t a f f s b e g i n t h i n k i n g about
what would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t n e g o t i a t i n g e f f o r t had
f a i l e d and what our s t r a t e g y might be t h e n . -fS-)
S t a t e w i l l prepare demarches t o Skopje and Athens about
v i o l a t i o n s o f economic s a n c t i o n s on S e r b i a . -fS-)
S t a t e w i l l respond t o t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r ' s
memorandum on i n c r e a s i n g Sanctions A s s i s t a n c e M o n i t o r s .
S t a t e w i l l make a recommendation on t h e v i s a a p p l i c a t i o n o f
ex-Yugoslav N a t i o n a l Bank Governor Avramovic. f S ^
Since no o t h e r c o u n t r y now i s pushing a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n
d e c l a r i n g Brcko a c e a s e - f i r e area, we w i l l n o t . {4rf
ODCRDT
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TPHOTOCOPY
�20682
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
May 3 1 , 1994
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
1:00pm - 1:20pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia -fO)—
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine
David S c h e f f e r
Anthony Lake
Albright
CIA
W i l l i a m Studeman
Norman S c h i n d l e r
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Stephen Oxman
Charles Redman
DOD
S e c r e t a r y W i l l i a m Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
JCS
General John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
General Wesley C l a r k
John Sheehan
White House
Samuel Berger
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
We w i l l push f o r Bosnian Serb compliance w i t h t h e Gorazde
e x c l u s i o n zone and, i f necessary, p o i n t t o t h e i r f a i l u r e t o
comply t o e x p l a i n l a c k o f p r o g r e s s on a c o u n t r y - w i d e c e s s a t i o n o f
hostilities.
-(0) '
2. To t h a t end, Ambassador A l b r i g h t w i l l e x p l o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l Presidency statement u r g i n g compliance w i t h
the Gorazde zone. I f t h e GOBH i s h o l d i n g Serb hostages i n t h e
Gorazde area, t h e Presidency statement c o u l d c a l l f o r t h e i r
r e l e a s e . -fS-^
3. We w i l l n o t press t h e GOBH t o drop i t s i n s i s t e n c e on
compliance w i t h t h e Gorazde zone as a c o n d i t i o n f o r a c o u n t r y wide c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s . -( 0)
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4. We w i l l s t r o n g l y urge t h e GOBH t o accept t h e Contact Group's
p r o p o s a l s f o r a 51-49% t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n . "tSt
5. To encourage t h e GOBH, we w i l l r e i t e r a t e our commitment t o
h e l p i n g implement a v i a b l e s e t t l e m e n t as s t r o n g l y as p o s s i b l e
w h i l e s t i l l n o t i n g t h e need f o r C o n g r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t , £)6. We a l s o w i l l t e l l o t h e r Contact Group members t h a t i f t h e
GOBH accepts t h e Group's p r o p o s a l and t h e Bosnian Serbs r e j e c t
i t , we w i l l expect t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r f u r t h e r t i g h t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s
on S e r b i a .
7. Leon Fuerth will prepare an analysis of the New York Times
5/29 allegation that sanctions are having no serious effect on
Serbia. f&f
•SFCFFT.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�20891
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
July 27, 1994
DATE
White House Situation Room
LOCATION
11:22am- 12:10pm
TIME
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia -(S)PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon Fuerth
State
Secretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Peter Tarnoff
CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler
JCS
GEN John Shalikashvilli
LTG Michael Ryan
LTG Wesley Clark
White House
Leon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
Ambassador Charles Redman
DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe
USUN
Ambassador Albright
NSC
Don Kerrick
Summary of Conclusions
1. Secretary Christopher will seek Contact Group Ministers' support at the July 30 meeting for
the full range of consequences: sanctions tightening, and extension and enforcement of exclusion
zones. Recognizing Contact Group consensus on all measures is unlikely. Secretary Christopher
will insist on strict enforcement of existing zones and support urgent planning for extension of
exclusion zones to other safe areas, which could be implemented in phases. There can be no
extension without agreement to strictly enforce existing zones. A strong marker will be laid down
that if there are no agreed serious consequences, we will move sooner rather than later to seek
multilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and failing that, there will be irresistible pressures to lift
unilaterally . (Sf-
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2. Leon Fuerth will develop a strategy to increase high-level U.S. pressure on the British to
accede to our view concerning tightening of economic sanctions, specifically dealing with closing
down offshore "FRY"enterprises.-^3. Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Redman will spearhead an effort to urgently develop a strategy
to separate Milosevic from the Bosnian Serbs. -{S}4. In view of recent Bosnian Serb provocations, the Principals agreed to press for implementation
of existing NATO decisions on enforcement of exclusion zones. -(S)—
5. The IWG will urgently examine two scenarios for lifting the arms embargo: (1) with no
follow-on U.S. requirement to support the Bosnian Government; and (2) with a presumption
that external support will be required. The analysis will include a review of UNPROFOR with a
view to the creation of an UNPROFOR II with appropriate mandates. -(S) -
-SECRET'
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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nCGRCT
20954
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE:
August 10, 1994
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
TIME:
10:00-11:55am
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S}
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
William Studeman
Ray Converse
OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders
JCS
GEN John Shalikashvilli
LTG Wesley Clark
State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Ambassador John Komblum
Ambassador Charles Redman
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
USUN
Ambassador Albright
Summary of Conclusions
Sanctions Issues
1.
The U.S. should table an omnibus sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council
encompassing sanctions tightening in the face of the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Contact
Group proposal, sanctions easing in the event of Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group
proposal, and sanctions easing in the context of acceptance by Milosevic of international monitors
to verify a permanent cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs. This may be the most effective
way of gaining Russian support for sanctions-tightening provisions. The draft will be shown first
to the Russians and then to other Contact Group partners prior to tabling in New York. Action:
OVP to prepare draft UNSC resolution by as soon as possible. (S)
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2.
On sanctions tightening, we should press the British on the one serious issue unresolved in
August 9 bilateral negotiations, blocking access to FRY funds even for humanitarian purposes.
Action: OVP and State to coordinate demarches to the British. (S)
3.
On sanctions easing in the context of a Bosnia settlement, the five-stage approach in the
OVP memorandum of August 9 was reaffirmed. The U.S. will hold firm in linking the third stage
of sanctions suspension (strategic trade sanctions) to a modus vivendi in the Krajina; if the
Russians continue to object, we will be prepared to limit the UN Security Council resolution to
the first two stages of sanctions suspension, but we will maintain our position on the Krajina
linkage. On cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, we will not insist on an explicit linkage to
any of the first four stages of sanctions easing, but make reintegration of Serbia into the world
community (including IFI assistance) contingent upon progress with the Tribunal. Similarly, on
compliance with all other relevant UNSC resolutions, we will include hortatory language but not
draw any explicit linkages to the sanctions-easing program. (S)
/
4.
On sanctions easing in response to a Milosevic cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs, international
monitoring of the Serbian-Bosnian border is essential to verify Serbian performance, and sanctions
relief can only be provided on that basis. The four-stage approach to sanctions easing in the OVP
memorandum will be modified to raise the thresholds so that Milosevic would get no sanctions
relief until the monitors were actually deployed. This revised plan will be integrated into the
omnibus sanctions resolution cited above. Action: OVP and State to prepare revised sanctionseasing plan. (S)
Exclusion Zone Enforcement
5.
Principals will continue to press their UK and other NATO counterparts on the need for
further NATO air strikes in response to continuing Serb violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde
exclusion zones. Ambassador Albright will in parallel press the UN on the need for broader
targeting of Serb assets than occurred on August 5 in response to future Serb violations. (S)
6.
The U.S. should press for completion by the end of August of the planning for
UNPROFOR redeployment/withdrawal that was agreed al the July 30 Contact Group Ministerial
as the prerequisite to strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones. That planning should
include the option of redeployment to Sarajevo as well as withdrawal. Action: JCS to follow-up.
Macedonia
7.
Planning should be completed on a concept for expanding UNPROFOR/Macedonia, but a
decision is not needed at this time. Action: IWG complete options paper for future PC meeting.
SECRET
�20981
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE:
August 17, 1994
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
TIME:
4:30-6:10pm
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and the Eastern Mediterranean -fQf-
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
William Studeman
Norman Schindler
OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders
JCS
Admiral William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark
State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tamoff
Charles Redman
John Komblum
Charles Thomas
David Gergen
DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe
White House
Leon Panetta
George Stephanopoulos
OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams
NSC
Donald Kerrick
Kathleen Stephens
USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Dave Scheffer
Summary of Conclusions
Sanctions:
1. The Principals agreed to continue to push for completion of the easing and tightening
resolutions in New York and to continue to insist on Krajina linkage in the easing resolution.
Secretary Christopher will consult with allies on options for moving forward with sanctions. -(6)-
DECLASSIFIED
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2. Regarding Milosevic's closure of his border with Bosnian Serb territory, the Principals agreed
that an effective international monitoring system was essential if the UNSC were to be able to
determine whether to extend the delay in imposition of new sanctions or to take other sanctions
measures in response to Serbian enforcement of the embargo. jC) •
Lifting the Arms Embargo:
3. Principals agreed the goal in seeking a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the
Federation is to provide the Bosnians with a defensive capability to ensure the inherent right of
self-defense. A detailed planning document developing a concept of how arms might be provided,
and including a range of options, should be developed within two weeks time. Action: OSD and
JCS to develop comprehensive plan. ^S}
4. The U.S. should be prepared to provide air support, but not ground troops, to the Bosnian
government in connection with the arms embargo lifting in the likely event of increased Bosnian
Serb military action against the Federation. Planning should focus on the development of robust
air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes.
Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves,
Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios considered should include: 1) air options following
complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining,
reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO
context, or within a coalition of willing allies. Action: OSD and JCS. 48f
5. On the future of UNPROFOR, Principals agreed to review options for a new role for
UNPROFOR. The options should include at a minimum, a defense of Sarajevo model, and a
humanitarian aid escort mission through Federation territory. Once the options are developed and
reviewed by the Principals, they will be presented to the allies. Action: OSD and JCS to develop
options.
6. The U.S. will seek multilateral support for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian
government. NATO should remain engaged as we move toward a more robust use of air power.
Action: State develop a paper outlining a diplomatic and Congressional strategy for achieving
these objectives, including options for sustaining the negotiating track. i€^~
The Eastern Mediterranean:
7. A Presidential emissary to both Greece and Turkey should deliver a strong message to each
country warning that recent incidents, and the overall increase in Greek-Turkish military tensions,
risk leading to serious erosion of U.S. support for both countries. The envoy's message should be
specific, with sticks and carrots for each country. Action: State to draft concept and talking
points. ijSf8. The new U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus should be identified and announced as soon as
possible. It should be someone perceived by all sides as impartial. Action: State to recommend
candidates, f&r
CLINTON dtBRARfrf H0T0C0PY
�SiiCRET
9. On Macedonia, the previously tasked study of reinforcing UNPROFOR there should be
completed, concurrent with the completion of the arms embargo lift paper. Further attention is
required to economic assistance to Macedonia as well. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options
for UNPROFOR-Macedonia reinforcement planning by end of August. State to develop options
for increased economic assistance.
•SCCRE?
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SECftET
21088
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions
Meeting o f NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
September 13, 1994
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
2:30 - 4:10pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ^G-)—
PARTICIPANTS :
Chair
Anthony
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
Norman S c h i n d l e r
Lake
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
Rick Saunders
State
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
David Gergen
DOD
Secretary W i l l i a m Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
UN
Ambassador Madeleine
Dave S c h e f f e r
JCS
GEN John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
LTG Wesley C l a r k
White House
Samuel Berger
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald K e r r i c k
Albright
Summary of Conclusions
Policy:
1. The P r i n c i p a l s r e a f f i r m e d t h e c u r r e n t U.S. s t r a t e g y on
Bosnia, a g r e e i n g t o press f o r w a r d w i t h our e f f o r t s aimed a t
m a x i m i z i n g p r e s s u r e on t h e Bosnian Serbs t o accept t h e Contact
Group p r o p o s a l . I n a d d i t i o n t o encouraging M i l o s e v i c ' s s t e p s t o
i s o l a t e t h e Bosnian Serbs w i t h l i m i t e d s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f , we w i l l
make an a l l - o u t e f f o r t t o implement t h e d i s i n c e n t i v e s agreed
e a r l i e r by t h e Contact Group, i n p a r t i c u l a r t o c a r r y o u t a i r
s t r i k e s i n response t o v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e e x c l u s i o n zones, •(c) •
PER E.0.13526
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L i f t i n g the Arms Embargo:
2. The P r i n c i p a l s reviewed t h e p r e l i m i n a r y r e s u l t s o f t h e
i n t e r a g e n c y study on o p t i o n s f o r l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo and
d i r e c t e d t h a t planning continue, p o i n t i n g t o completion o f a
d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g document by DoD.
Outstanding issues w i t h
a l t e r n a t i v e s and s p e c i f i c o p t i o n s s h o u l d be p r o m p t l y i d e n t i f i e d
f o r subsequent P r i n c i p a l ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A c t i o n : J o i n t S t a f f
and OSD.
3. The P r i n c i p a l s requested an o p e r a t i o n a l and l e g a l a n a l y s i s o f
the impact o f t h e Nunn language on NATO o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e
Balkans.
Action: Joint Staff.
Sanctions:
4. The P r i n c i p a l s c o n f i r m e d c u r r e n t U.S. s t r a t e g y t o proceed
w i t h s a n c t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n s as d i s c u s s e d by t h e Contact Group i n
Geneva, b u t s t r e s s e d t h e importance o f e a r l y and t h o r o u g h
i n t e r a g e n c y c o o r d i n a t i o n . A c t i o n : NSC and S t a t e .
5. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h e U.S. s h o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e ICFY
s a n c t i o n s m o n i t o r i n g m i s s i o n by p r o v i d i n g p e r s o n n e l and
resources.
A c t i o n : OVP prepare o p t i o n s .
6. The P r i n c i p a l s a f f i r m e d t h e importance o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e e x i s t i n g s a n c t i o n s regime, b u t r e c o g n i z e d
the n e c e s s i t y n o t t o appear t o be t i g h t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s on S e r b i a
a t t h i s t i m e . A c t i o n : OVP t o develop i n i t i a t i v e s f o r i m p r o v i n g
the enforcement o f e x i s t i n g s a n c t i o n s .
7. The P r i n c i p a l s decided t h a t t h e U.S. s h o u l d n o t p r e s e n t
s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s on a d d i t i o n a l s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f i n r e t u r n f o r
a d d i t i o n a l steps by t h e FRY a t t h i s t i m e , pending c r e a t i o n o f an
a c c e p t a b l e border m o n i t o r i n g regime and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f "phase
1" s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f .
OECRET
CLITOHiiffpY P O O O Y
HTCP
�21228
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE:
October 18, 1994
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
TIME:
2:30- 3:30pm
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S}
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
CIA
Anthony Lake
Director James Woolsey
OVP
Leon Fuerth
State
Secretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Charles Thomas
JCS
ADM William Owens
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
DOD
Deputy Secretary John Deutch
UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Summary of Conclusions
Strategy:
1. The Principals affirmed our goal to use the next six months in an intensive effort to achieve a
political settlement based on the Contact Group proposal. They agreed to press forward with the
"Bold Approach" and the Zagreb-Four plan to induce Milosevic to effect a total cut-off of the
Krajina Serbs and recognize borders, with a view to further isolating the Bosnian Serbs.
Principals requested a short paper within forty-eight hours summarizing key issues encompassing
the bold approach and how we would relate those to sanctions relief. Action: State.
2. The Principals agreed that the U.S. will circulate a draft UNSC resolution on or about
October 29 calling for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by a date certain in the spring
(hard-trigger). The resolution should include a "build-down" strategy, if possible. The
SECRET
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further agreed to consult closely along the way with the Bosnians and the Congress. Principals
will review progress and consider next steps in early November.
Action: State/USUN.
Lifting the Arms Embargo:
3. The Principals reviewed the progress of military planning and directed that the Departments of
Defense and State continue their efforts, consulting with Congress on outstanding issues relating
to lift with a view to resolving issues by January 1. The Principals recognized that allies expect
the U.S. to provide ground forces, if necessary, to assist with UNPROFOR withdrawal, although
we have made no specific commitment to do so. Action: Joint Staff and OSD.
4. The Principals agreed we will implement the Nunn-Mitchell amendment requirement to cease
funding for enforcing the arms embargo and requested a briefing by November 1 on the
modifications necessary and the operational implications of U.S. limitations of enforcing the aims
United Nations and NATO.
E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
OSDj
E.O.13526, 1.4(c)
Action: Briefing • Joint Staff. Papers - State/
E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
Sanctions:
5. The Principals stressed the importance of fulfilling commitments and for rapid deployment of
the U.S. monitors participating in the ICFY sanctions monitoring mission in Serbia. DoD agreed
to provide 20 to complement the 20 being provided by State. Action: OVP.
6. The Principals discussed the effectiveness of the border closure and directed the interagency
working group on Bosnia to review the status of Serbian compliance prior to each 30-day review
with a view to determining if action should be taken to terminate sanctions relief. The IWG
should coordinate demarches to Serbia and other capitals based on available evidence. Action:
OVP, NSC, and State.
Strict Enforcement
7. The Principals reviewed the progress of efforts underway to improve strict enforcement of
exclusion zones and directed that efforts be taken with the British and French at the United
nations with a view to obtaining a more positive UN response on the new NATO airstrike
standards. Action: State.
SECRCT
^s'^ —
�21316
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
DATE:
LOCATION:
TIME:
November 7, 1994
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
2:30 - 4:00 p.m.
Summary of Conclusions of P r i n c i p a l s
Meeting on Bosnia ( S )
--
SUBJECT:
Committee
PARTICIPANTS
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
Norman Schindler
OVP
Leon Fuerth
JCS
ADM W i l l i a m Owens
LTG Wesley Clark
State
Strobe T a l b o t t
Richard Holbrooke
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
DOD
Secretary W i l l i a m Perry
Joseph Nye
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald K e r r i c k
UN
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
Summary of Conclusions
UNSCR on L i f t i n g the Arms Embargo
1. The P r i n c i p a l s b r i e f l y reviewed the s t a t u s of the U.S.c i r c u l a t e d UN S e c u r i t y Council Resolution (UNSCR) proposing
m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina
and d e f e r r e d decisions on next steps u n t i l f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s
are completed l a t e r i n the week.
Implementing
Nunn-Mitchell
2. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed we w i l l implement m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o
operations t o comply f u l l y w i t h the Nunn-Mitchell amendment
reguirement t h a t the U.S. cease enforcement of the arms embargo
against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and d i r e c t e d t h a t
m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o m i l i t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n c e operations be
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presented t o Senator Nunn on an urgent basis. Secretary Perry
agreed t o c a l l Senator Nunn requesting a meeting f o r Thursday,
November 10. A c t i o n : DoD w i l l set up the meeting and lead a
team t o b r i e f Senator Nunn.
Military
Operations
3. The P r i n c i p a l s decided t h a t as of midnight November 12, 1994,
U.S. forces may no longer take p a r t i n a c t i o n s whose purpose i s
t o enforce the arms embargo against t h e government o f BosniaHerzegovina. U.S. forces may no longer d i v e r t or d e l i b e r a t e l y
delay vessels c o n t a i n i n g only arms bound f o r t h e government of
forces.
Mixed cargo shipments may be d i v e r t e d .
E O 13526, 1.4(c)
..
E O 13526. 1.4(c)
..
State/DoD prepare a p p r o p r i a t e guidance.
Consultations
with
E O 13526, 1.4(c)
..
Action:
Congress
5. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t a d d i t i o n a l c a l l s t o key Senate and
House members would be made on Friday, November 11 f o l l o w i n g
c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Senator Nunn. A c t i o n : State t o develop a
c a l l l i s t and t a l k i n g p o i n t s .
6. The P r i n c i p a l s discussed options f o r s u b m i t t i n g plans and
c o n s u l t i n g w i t h Congress on t r a i n i n g Bosnian forces and
u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g of t h e arms embargo. They d i r e c t e d t h a t an
interagency team w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from State, DoD and CIA
o r a l l y present generic plans on t r a i n i n g and u n i l a t e r a l l i f t
e a r l y i n the week of November 14, and t h a t p r e p a r a t i o n s be
undertaken f o r serious c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress on t h e issues
associated w i t h m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t t o begin soon t h e r e a f t e r and t o
be continued w i t h the new Congress i n e a r l y 1995. A c t i o n :
State/DoD/CIA
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7. The P r i n c i p a l s requested t h a t the CIA prepare a Special
N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Estimate on the i m p l i c a t i o n s of
m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo f o r use d u r i n g
Congressional c o n s u l t a t i o n s . A c t i o n : CIA.
Consultations
with
Allies
8. The P r i n c i p a l s d i r e c t e d t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s be
conducted a t the UN and NATO on Friday, November 11 t o i n f o r m
a l l i e s o f U.S. i n t e n t i o n s and a c t i o n s associated w i t h compliance
w i t h Nunn-Mitchell.
A b r i e f i n g should also be provided t o the
Russians. A c t i o n : State t o d r a f t a p p r o p r i a t e guidance cables.
Public
Affairs
9. The P r i n c i p a l s requested t h a t a press background b r i e f i n g be
held Friday a t t h e Pentagon w i t h State and NSC r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o
discuss the m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o m i l i t a r y operations necessary t o
comply w i t h Nunn-Mitchell.
( I t was subsequently agreed t o do
press c a l l s only, not a background b r i e f i n g ) . A c t i o n : OSD/Joint
Staff.
Sanctions:
10. The P r i n c i p a l s took note o f the a c t i o n s taken by t h e
interagency working group t o develop a s t r a t e g y t o monitor t h e
I n t e r - S e r b i a n border c l o s u r e and received an update on t h e
deployment of U.S. border monitors. A c t i o n : State w i l l examine
options f o r r e p l a c i n g the State contingent o f border monitors
a f t e r 90 days.
Bihac and Overall Level of C o n f l i c t i n the Region
11. The P r i n c i p a l s discussed the serious s i t u a t i o n i n Bihac and
the i n t e n s i f i e d f i g h t i n g throughout Bosnia and d i r e c t e d t h a t the
interagency working group continue t o monitor events c l o s e l y w i t h
a view t o t a k i n g a c t i o n t o defuse the s i t u a t i o n where p o s s i b l e .
A c t i o n : CIA increase i n t e l l i g e n c e watch.
State and DoD develop
a p p r o p r i a t e d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y options t o ease t h e impending
humanitarian c r i s i s i n Bihac. Interagency working group consider
options f o r d e t e r r i n g a widening of t h e Bosnian c o n f l i c t t o other
regions and f o r d e a l i n g w i t h renewed s h e l l i n g of Sarajevo.
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Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE:
November 17, 1994
LOCATION:
White House Situation Room
TIME:
9:00- 10:30am
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ifSf"
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
Admiral William Studeman
Norman Schindler
OVP
Leon Fuerth
JCS
General John Shalikashili
LTG Wesley Clark
State
Peter Tamoff
Robert Frasure
White House
Leon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
DOD
John Deutch
William Slocombe
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer
Summary of Conclusions
Measures to Deal with the Bihac Situation
1.
The Principals agreed on the need to move forward in an expeditious but deliberate
manner to gain support for actions to prevent Bihac from being overrun and to stabilize the
situation, in order to return the focus to obtaining a negotiated settlement.
2.
Principals approved the following set of triggers (action-forcing mechanisms) and
potential responses as a basis for bilateral discussions with the British and French before taking
further action in the NAC.
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TRIGGERS
o
Serb offensive captures more territory in the Bihac area than held prior to the
Bosnian Government offensives.
o
Serious artillery attacks on Bihac City.
o
Serious attacks against the Bangladeshi Battalion.
o
Bihac City suffers strangulation.
MENU OF OPTIONS
o
Establish exclusion zone (Dimensions negotiable).
o
Close Air Support in defense of UNPROFOR (Requires TACP insertion ~ no new
UN or NAC decisions required).
o
Close air support in response to artillery attacks from Croatia (NAC has approved;
requires Croatian approval).
o
Extend Deny Flight ROE to permit attacking air defense assets in Croatia
displaying hostile intent (Requires decisions at UN and NATO).
o
Modify existing authorities to authorize "hot pursuit" of aircraft attacking targets
in Bosnia from Croatian airfields.
Implementing Nunn-Mitchell
3.
The Principals reviewed progress on implementing Nunn-Mitchell and directed that efforts
continue with Congressional members after refinement of the briefing by DoD to ensure that
Congressional lift advocates fully understand the implications of lift. Our aim is to ensure that
they are prepared to provide the required political and financial support if and when multilateral
lift becomes necessary. Principals agreed that we remain opposed to unilateral lift.
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
November 28, 1994
DATE
White House Situation Room
LOCATION
3:30 - 6:00pm
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia -fftr
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler
OVP
Leon Fuerth
JCS
GEN. John Shalikashvili
LTG Dan Christman
State
Secretary Wan-en Christopher
Peter Tamoff
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick
UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer
Summary of Conclusions
Next Steps on Bihac
1. The Principals discussed the current situation in the Bihac region and agreed that our main
goals should be to end the fighting and support efforts to negotiate measures to permit
humanitarian aid to reach the besieged population. The Principals agreed not to press further for
strategic air strikes to roll back Serb forces. They affirmed that the U.S. will stand by its
commitment through NATO to provide Close Air Support or air strikes if requested by
UNPROFOR with the proviso that appropriate action is available to NATO to deal with the Serb
air defense threat.
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Short-Term Strategy
2. The Principals agreed to press for a broadened diplomatic strategy based upon the following
elements:
•
Country-wide cessation of hostilities for at least three months, and preferably six months, tied
to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort.
•
Demilitarization of the Bihac safe area within its established limits, to be enforced by existing
UNPROFOR troops, possibly with limited augmentation by Dutch or other NATO-country
elements with TACP capabilities.
•
Bosnian Serb agreement to provide unimpeded access for humanitarian relief convoys to all
safe areas and other hard-pressed areas of Bosnia, including opening the "blue route" for
commercial access to Sarajevo.
Bosnian Government agreement to comply with previous demilitarization agreements around
Sarajevo.
Renewed diplomatic contacts with all parties by the Contact Group (and/or through the
convening of an international conference).
While we would end the freeze on contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, the Contact Group
map would remain as the starting point for negotiations on territory; nevertheless, the
Contact Group could explore informally possible land swaps on the basis of mutual
consent among the parties.
The Contact Group would make clear that constitutional principles and the question of
links to neighboring states would be on the table, on the basis of "balanced" treatment for
the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity.
A modified "Plan B" should still be offered to Milosevic.
— However, in return for U.S. agreement to the EU's front-loaded approach to sanctions
relief, we should insist on more stringent conditions, possibly to include Bosnian Serb
compliance with cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreements, as well as
steps purely in Milosevic's control (mutual recognition, support for Z-4 plan, etc.).
-
We will also insist on short periods for sanctions suspension and a credible mechanism for
reimposing the sanctions if Milosevic ceases to comply with the conditions.
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We will also press Milosevic to cut off support for the Krajina Serbs, including closing the
Serbian-Croatian border in Sector East, with the sanctioning of international monitors.
Final litmus tests should be laid down by Contact Group as the basis for a decision in January
(at the end of 100-day period) on whether to extend the limited sanctions relief that is now in
effect for Serbia. We should demand much stricter compliance than cun-ently being
demonstrated, including "zero option" for fuel and military shipments to the Bosnian Serbs,
physical closure of most crossings, and perhaps agreement to increase the number of
monitors.
We should warn Milosevic that sanctions tightening, and not just an end to sanctions
suspension, will occur if we are not satisfied at the 100-day mark.
We should press forward with efforts to contain spillover: push Z-4 plan, press for Belgrade
dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, strengthen support for Macedonia.
Longer-Term Strategy
3. The Principals deferred decision on steps to take should the short-term approach fail to
produce desired progress. The Principals were asked to consider the following elements, or a
combination thereof, of a longer-term strategy as a basis for discussion at a future meeting:
•
Multilateral lift and strike, preceded by an orderly (NATO-assisted) departure of
UNPROFOR. U.S. would set time limit for its military support and air involvement (1-2
years), after which Bosnians would be on their own. Diplomatic efforts would continue in the
hope that lift would bring Bosnian Serbs to their senses.
•
Reinforcement of UNPROFOR and redefinition of its mission so that NATO air power can be
used more aggressively on the basis of its current mandates. (This might have to include a
U.S. ground force commitment, unless we would want a largely Islamic-country force).
•
U.S. disengagement from diplomatic efforts, focus on containment of spillover to Croatia and
Kosovo. Plan for maintaining sanctions against Serbia and Bosnian Serbs for the long term,
with international community refusing to recognize Serb territorial conquests. UNPROFOR
would remain in a purely humanitarian role, to the extent possible.
Dealing with NATO and Allies
U.S. - NATO Relationship
4. The Principals discussed the impact of recent events in Bosnia on NATO and strongly
reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to the United States, recognizing that future U.S.
involvement in Bosnia should be conducted in concert with our allies.
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Impact of Nunn-Mitchell on NATO
Principals acknowledged allied concerns that Nunn-Mitchell was the first step leading to unilateral
lifting of the arms embargo which could have serious consequences on the alliance. They agreed
to make strong statements opposing unilateral lift in the upcoming Ministerials and in public.
U.S. Participation in NATO Ground Operations in Bosnia
The Principals reviewed the state of planning at NATO and within UNPROFOR for the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces from Bosnia should that be required. They recognized that
uncertainty surrounding U.S. ground forces participation in a NATO operation to assist
UNPROFOR withdrawal required clarification. They agreed to recommend to the President that
he authorize Secretaries Christopher and Perry to inform the allies that the U.S. agreed to
participate in such an operation in principle, to include ground forces, pending review of the plan,
alternatives and Congressional consultants. Action: OSD/JCS to prepare paper summarizing
current state of NATO/UNPROFOR military planning and framing degree of U.S. commitment as
a basis for decision memo for the President.
Dealing with Congress and the Public
5. The Principals agreed that efforts should continue to raise the awareness in Congress about the
implications of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and to strongly oppose unilateral lift in
public and in Congressional consultations. Secretary Perry will begin the next round of
consultations this week using his weekly breakfast with key members. The Principals further
agreed to DoD hosting private sessions with key members. The Principals directed that talking
points be prepared outlining next steps in Bosnia. Action: NSC to develop talking points.
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Summary
Meeting o f NSC
DATE
LOCATION
TIME
SUBJECT:
o f Conclusions
P r i n c i p a l s Committee
December 12, 1994
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
2:00 - 3:20pm
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia • £ ) •
(!'
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony
CIA
D i r e c t o r James Woolsey
Lake
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
State
S e c r e t a r y Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
David Gergen
Charles Thomas
Sec
DOD r e t a r y W i l l i a m Perry
UN
Ambassador Madeleine
JCS
ADM. W i l l i a m Owens
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Albright
Summary of Conclusions
Diplomatic
Strategy
1.
The P r i n c i p a l s reviewed t h e s t a t u s o f d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s .
N o t i n g t h e importance o f showing p r o g r e s s b e f o r e t h e Congress
convenes i n January, t h e P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o press f o r a ceasef i r e and an e a r l y meeting o f t h e p a r t i e s , under Contact Group
d i r e c t i o n , t h a t b u i l d s on t h e December 2 Contact Group
M i n i s t e r i a l d e c i s i o n s . S t a t e w i l l d i s c u s s t h i s w i t h Contact
Group p a r t n e r s and i n v i t e t h e p a r t i e s t o a t t e n d .
Action:
State.
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Status of UNPROFOR
2. The P r i n c i p a l s discussed t h e s t a t u s o f NATO p l a n n i n g f o r t h e
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR, n o t i n g t h a t t h e NATO p l a n n i n g s h o u l d be
completed w i t h i n a week and would be f o l l o w e d by a r e q u e s t t o
capitals t o identify specific force contributions.
3. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o encourage UNPROFOR t o s t a y and t o
look f o r ways t h a t would c o n t r i b u t e t o a p e r m i s s i v e w i t h d r a w a l ,
should w i t h d r a w a l become necessary, and t o i d e n t i f y measures t o
improve t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f UNPROFOR i n response t o r e c e n t
Bosnian Serb a c t i o n s . Should w i t h d r a w a l from Bosnia become
i n e v i t a b l e , t h e P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t e f f o r t s should be made t o
r e t a i n UNPROFOR i n C r o a t i a and Macedonia. A c t i o n : DoD develop
UNPROFOR o p t i o n s .
4. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s s h o u l d be h e l d
w i t h t h e French and o t h e r A l l i e s on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f reopening
Sarajevo a i r p o r t and a h u m a n i t a r i a n c o r r i d o r from t h e coast t o
Sarajevo (Blue Route).
The U.S. approach w i l l be t o s u p p o r t t h e
r o u t e opening as a French i n i t i a t i v e t o p r e c l u d e t h e p e r c e p t i o n
t h a t we might be p r e s s i n g f o r a c t i o n which we are u n w i l l i n g t o
s u p p o r t w i t h ground f o r c e s . F u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d a l s o be
g i v e n t o t h e o p t i o n o f d i s a b l i n g Serb weapons a t c o l l e c t i o n s i t e s
around Sarajevo and then w i t h d r a w i n g UNPROFOR personnel from t h e
sites.
A c t i o n : DoD and S t a t e develop o p t i o n s and s t r a t e g y .
5. The P r i n c i p a l s discussed s t r a t e g y f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR
w i t h d r a w a l and agreed t h a t we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s u p p o r t a
m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo as t h e o p t i o n o f l a s t
r e s o r t should t h e Bosnian Serbs c o n t i n u e t o r e j e c t a c e a s e - f i r e
and n e g o t i a t i o n s based on t h e Contact Group p r o p o s a l . The
P r i n c i p a l s requested a round-up o f t h e responses t o l a s t week's
S t a t e c a b l e t o NATO and c a p i t a l s r e g a r d i n g our p o s t - w i t h d r a w a l
strategy.
A c t i o n : S t a t e p r o v i d e summary o f responses by COB
December 14.
Sanctions
6.
The P r i n c i p a l s discussed t h e upcoming 100-day d e c i s i o n p o i n t
on e x t e n d i n g s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f f o r t h e Serbian border c l o s u r e .
They agreed t h a t w h i l e t h e U.S. p o s i t i o n should be based upon t h e
f a c t s a v a i l a b l e a t t h e t i m e , t h e y do not f a v o r an open-ended
e x t e n s i o n , p r e f e r r i n g a t most a 100-day e x t e n s i o n .
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Congressional Strategy
7.
The P r i n c i p a l s r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r d e s i r e f o r c o n t i n u e d e f f o r t s
t o r a i s e the awareness i n Congress about t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a
u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo and t o s t r o n g l y oppose
u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n p u b l i c and i n C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
The P r i n c i p a l s noted the p o s s i b l e need t o use t h e v e t o t o c o u n t e r
unilateral l i f t efforts.
8.
The P r i n c i p a l s d i s c u s s e d whether i t would be p o l i t i c a l l y
p r u d e n t t o seek o r encourage C o n g r e s s i o n a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r U.S.
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a NATO-led o p e r a t i o n t o s u p p o r t UNPROFOR
w i t h d r a w a l , w i t h o u t compromising the P r e s i d e n t ' s l e g a l
p r e r o g a t i v e s t o a c t w i t h o u t such a u t h o r i z a t i o n .
They agreed t o
d e f e r a d e c i s i o n on a recommendation t o t h e P r e s i d e n t u n t i l
f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h b o t h t h e o u t g o i n g and incoming
l e a d e r s h i p are completed. The P r i n c i p a l s r e q u e s t e d an i n f o r m a l
head-count be conducted t o b e t t e r understand C o n g r e s s i o n a l
t h i n k i n g about U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l .
Action:
NSC and S t a t e p r o v i d e summary o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l t h i n k i n g .
9.
The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t e f f o r t s should c o n t i n u e t o r a i s e
the awareness i n Congress about our Bosnia p o l i c y and t h e
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo. They
r e a f f i r m e d t h a t our p o l i c y w i l l be t o s t r o n g l y oppose u n i l a t e r a l
l i f t i n p u b l i c and i n C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s , and t o draw a
d i s t i n c t i o n between u n i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t .
I t was
agreed t h a t t r a v e l i n g teams s h o u l d o f f e r b r i e f i n g s t o members
d u r i n g t h e Congressional r e c e s s .
Action:
OSD, JCS, S t a t e and
NSC t o o r g a n i z e b r i e f i n g s .
Deputies Committee Meetings
10.
The P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o t h e convening o f p e r i o d i c
Committee meetings on Bosnia.
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Summary o f Conclusions
Meeting o f NSC Deputies Committee
DATE
December 19, 1994
LOCATION
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME
11:10 - 1:15pm
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia -f3) •
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Samuel Berger
CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Norman S c h i n d l e r
OVP
JCS
ADM. W i l l i a m Owens
LTG D a n i e l Christman
BG John Walsh
Leon F u e r t h
State
Strobe T a l b o t t
Peter T a r n o f f
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
DOD
John Deutch
W a l t e r Slocombe
UN
Rick I n d e r f u r t h
James O'Brien
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald K e r r i c k
B i l l Danvers
Summary of Conclusions
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Deputies Meetings
1. The Deputies convened i n accordance w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
December 12, 1994 P r i n c i p a l s ' Committee Meeting which asked t h e
Deputies t o meet r e g u l a r l y on Bosnia. The Deputies agreed t o
meet a t l e a s t weekly w i t h a goal o f imposing d i s c i p l i n e on t h e
I n t e r a g e n c y Bosnia p o l i c y - m a k i n g process.
Negotiating
Track
2. The Deputies d i s c u s s e d t h e p r o g r e s s o f ongoing e f f o r t s t o
r e s t a r t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s under t h e auspices o f t h e Contact Group
and how t h e former P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r i n i t i a t i v e would a f f e c t those
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n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Deputies agreed t h a t a common A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
p o s i t i o n s h o u l d be developed and f o l l o w e d by a l l agencies.
A c t i o n : NSC d r a f t t a l k i n g p o i n t s f o r use w i t h press and
Congressional c o n s u l t a t i o n s .
R e t a i n i n g and Strengthening UNPROFOR
3. The Deputies d i s c u s s e d t h e e f f o r t s underway a t t h e meeting o f
the C h i e f s o f Defense a t The Hague designed t o s t r e n g t h e n and
r e t a i n UNPROFOR i n Bosnia. N o t i n g t h e l a c k o f enthusiasm on t h e
p a r t o f most A l l i e s f o r r o b u s t o p t i o n s , t h e Deputies agreed t h a t
we s h o u l d c o n t i n u e our e f f o r t s t o i d e n t i f y steps t h a t w i l l make
UNPROFOR more v i a b l e i n t h e performance o f i t s e x i s t i n g mandate.
Build-Down Concept
4. The Deputies d i s c u s s e d t h e concept o f build-down and
recognized t h a t , despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f implementation,
b u i l d - d o w n was now a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e d
c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o our s t r a t e g y b o t h p r e - and
post-UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l . A c t i o n : OSD f l e s h o u t t h e b u i l d - d o w n
concept and i d e n t i f y where and how i t f i t s i n t o our near- and
long-term strategy.
Sanctions
5. The Deputies d i s c u s s e d steps t h a t have been taken i n t h e r u n up t o t h e January 13, 1995 d e c i s i o n p o i n t on e x t e n d i n g s a n c t i o n s
r e l i e f f o r t h e S e r b i a n border c l o s u r e . The Deputies agreed t h a t
the y e t - t o - b e announced c u t - o f f o f t h e K r a j i n a Serbs by M i l o s e v i c
c o u l d be a p o s i t i v e s t e p and c o u l d a f f e c t our a c t i o n on January
13. The Deputies a l s o agreed t h a t steps must be t a k e n w i t h i n t h e
i n t e r a g e n c y community t o r e p l a c e t h e U.S. b o r d e r m o n i t o r s now
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e ICFY border m o n i t o r i n g m i s s i o n .
A c t i o n : OVP.
6. Leon F u e r t h c i r c u l a t e d a paper o u t l i n i n g a process t o guide
a c t i o n s i n t h e run-up t o t h e January 13 d e c i s i o n s and reached an
i n f o r m a l agreement t h a t t h e Deputies Committee was t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l f o r d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s on
compliance.
The Deputies agreed t o c o n s u l t f u r t h e r on t h i s i s s u e
b e f o r e r e a c h i n g a d e c i s i o n . A c t i o n : OVP.
Congressional
and P u b l i c A f f a i r s Strategy
7. The Deputies ongoing e f f o r t s t o r a i s e t h e awareness i n
Congress and i n t h e p u b l i c about t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a u n i l a t e r a l
l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo. The Deputies d i r e c t e d t h a t an
i n t e r a g e n c y group be i m m e d i a t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t o oversee t h e
development and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a Congressional and p u b l i c
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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a f f a i r s s t r a t e g y . The group w i l l meet d a i l y and w i l l be under
the co-chairmanship of B i l l Danvers, NSC L e g i s l a t i v e A f f a i r s , and
a State Department Public A f f a i r s representative. The group w i l l
develop a d e t a i l e d Congressional and p u b l i c a f f a i r s s t r a t e g y
i n c l u d i n g an interagency-agreed s c r i p t and timetable. Action:
NSC and State.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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Summary
Meeting of NSC
DATE
LOCATION
TIME
o f Conclusions
P r i n c i p a l s Committee
January 20, 199/ f s j
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
2:35 - 4:00 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
OVP
Anthony Lake
Leon Fuerth
State
DOD
Peter T a r n o f f
Secretary W i l l i a m Perry
UN
Ambassador Madeleine A l b r i g h t
JCS
ADM W i l l i a m Owens
CIA
Acting Director William
White House
Studeman
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle
Summary of Conclusions
RUSSIA/CHECHNYA
1. The P r i n c i p a l s reviewed the s i t u a t i o n on the ground i n and
around Grozny and discussed the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t Russian forces
w i l l continue to face o p p o s i t i o n from i r r e g u l a r f o r c e s , perhaps
augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested t o
produce a s h o r t (2 pg) paper analyzing the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e
Chechnya a f f a i r f o r surrounding e t h n i c regions (e.g., I n g u s h e t i a ,
Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be t a k i n g i n
r e a c t i o n t o Chechnya. A c t i o n : CIA. fS-}
2. The P r i n c i p a l s agreed on the need f o r a c a r e f u l l i n e o f
p u b l i c comment t h a t welcomed p o s i t i v e developments, l i k e the
prospect o f eventual f r e e e l e c t i o n s i n Chechnya, w h i l e n o t
seeming t o cheerlead b l i n d l y f o r what might prove an unacceptable
s o l u t i o n , e.g., i n s t a l l a t i o n of a puppet regime. Press guidance
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prepared f o r the President's use was c i r c u l a t e d t o ensure
comments by P r i n c i p a l s or t h e i r spokespersons would be
c o n s i s t e n t . fS-)
that
3.
P r i n c i p a l s discussed the need t o i d e n t i f y p o i n t s o f leverage
we may be able t o use t o i n f l u e n c e Y e l t s i n and other Russian
o f f i c i a l s t o make the r i g h t choices on reform issues and i n
f u r t h e r steps i n Chechnya. Such p o i n t s could i n c l u d e the
scheduling o f the next summit, or the nature o f Russian
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n H a l i f a x G-7 meeting. A c t i o n : NSC and S t a t e t o
develop a game p l a n . (5)
-4.
Ambassador Albright discussed p e r s i s t e n t problems with
Russian positions at the U.N. which d i r e c t l y counter or challenge
our i n t e r e s t s , most notably the UNMIH mandate i s s u e . P r i n c i p a l s
agreed that i f attempts over the coming week to convince the
Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the
President should seek Y e l t s i n ' s support i n a l e t t e r .
Action:
State to continue diplomatic e f f o r t s ; NSC to d r a f t l e t t e r , i f
needed. ( S
-4
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Bosnia:
1.
P r i n c i p a l s reviewed the s t a t u s o f the c e a s e - f i r e and
cessation o f h o s t i l i t i e s agreement and Contact Group e f f o r t s t o
renew n e g o t i a t i o n s on a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . They agreed t h a t
Deputies should review t e r r i t o r i a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues t h a t
w i l l a r i s e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s but t h a t the USG must be c a r e f u l
to avoid any appearance o f d e p a r t i n g from i t s commitment t o the
Contact Group p l a n . Recognizing the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c o n t i n u i n g
impasse i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , P r i n c i p a l s d i r e c t e d t h a t a mid-term
d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y paper be prepared f o r Deputies' review as
p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n by P r i n c i p a l s . A c t i o n :
S t a t e . tS4
2.
P r i n c i p a l s discussed the upcoming Washington v i s i t of
Bosnian Prime Minister S i l a j d z i c and the impact i t could have on
Congressional support for u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g of the arms embargo.
State undertook to c i r c u l a t e a paper outlining a strategy for
handling the S i l a j d z i c v i s i t . Action: State. ( S
-4
Croatia:
3.
P r i n c i p a l s reviewed o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r responding t o
President Tudjman's d e c i s i o n to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate i n
C r o a t i a when i t expires on March 31. Recognizing the i m p o r t a n t
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s t h a t the U.S. has i n C r o a t i a , the P r i n c i p a l s
JECRET
�3ECRET
d i r e c t e d t h a t t a l k i n g p o i n t s prepared f o r USDP Slocombe's meeting
w i t h President Tudjman be a p p r o p r i a t e l y m o d i f i e d t o focus on the
r i s k s o f the d e c i s i o n on the ground, our commitment t o a
r e i n v i g o r a t e d d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t aimed a t r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f the
occupied areas, and our support f o r r e t e n t i o n o f a t l e a s t p a r t o f
the UNPROFOR c o n t i n g e n t . A c t i o n : OSD/State {S)
-4.
P r i n c i p a l s discussed the potential d i f f i c u l t i e s of
withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, i n the event withdrawal takes
place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the p o l i t i c a l
and m i l i t a r y aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action:
State and JCS prepare papers on p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y aspects of
U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia. (S)
-Congressional
and Public A f f a i r s Strategy:
5.
P r i n c i p a l s discussed next steps i n d e a l i n g w i t h Congress
f o l l o w i n g the previous week's interagency b r i e f i n g s and asked
t h a t an u n c l a s s i f i e d v e r s i o n of LTG Clark's testimony on
u n i l a t e r a l l i f t i n g o f the arms embargo be prepared f o r f o l l o w - u p
b r i e f i n g s on the H i l l .
P r i n c i p a l s agreed on the importance o f
d e f e a t i n g a vote on u n i l a t e r a l l i f t r a t h e r than a l l o w i n g the
Congress t o put the President i n the p o s i t i o n of having t o use
the veto. They also agreed t o defer a d e c i s i o n on the t i m i n g f o r
p u b l i s h i n g Secretary Perry's op-ed. (S)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H 1N G T O N
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 1:15 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee M e e t i n g on
Bosnia and C r o a t i a -(G)
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair:
Samuel R. Berger
OVP:
W i l l i a m Wise
State:
Peter T a r n o f f
Robert Frasure
Chris H i l l
DOD:
W a l t e r Slocombe
James Pardew
OMB:
Gordon Adams
John Burnim
USUN:
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
Rick I n d e r f u r t h
David S c h e f f e r
CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norm S c h i n d l e r
JCS:
ADM W i l l i a m Owens
LTG Wesley C l a r k
NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don K e r r i c k
Steven Simon
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
D e p u t i e s met t o d i s c u s s next steps i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
Contact Group on what degree o f s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f t o o f f e r
M i l o s e v i c i n r e t u r n f o r genuine r e c o g n i t i o n o f Bosnia. F o l l o w i n g
Ambassador Frasure's r e p o r t on h i s two meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c ,
Deputies d i s c u s s e d a S t a t e p r o p o s a l f o r a new, two-pronged
approach t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f and new OSCE
i n v o l v e m e n t . Deputies d i r e c t e d t h a t a paper o u t l i n i n g t h e new
p r o p o s a l be c i r c u l a t e d t o t h e Deputies by May 10 f o r subsequent
Principals consideration.
( A c t i o n : S t a t e ) Deputies
reemphasized t h e need t o work i n c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e
Bosnian Government on any p r o p o s a l r e g a r d i n g i t s goal o f g a i n i n g
-fiffCRF^D e c l a s s i f y oi
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�genuine r e c o g n i t i o n by M i l o s e v i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina w i t h i n i t s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognized borders i n r e t u r n f o r l i m i t e d
s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f and a c l o s u r e o f t h e b o r d e r w i t h Bosnian Serb
t e r r i t o r y . -(3)'
2.
Deputies reviewed the s i t u a t i o n i n C r o a t i a and progress on
preventing e s c a l a t i o n following the Vice President's meeting with
President Tudjman i n London over the weekend. Deputies agreed
that the s i t u a t i o n remained very v o l a t i l e and that the U.S.
should continue to press President Tudjman to e x e r c i s e r e s t r a i n t .
They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should follow-up with
Tudjman on h i s agreement with the Vice President to accept some
UNCRO presence i n Sector West and to r e f r a i n from m i l i t a r y a c t i o n
in other areas of c o n f l i c t . Deputies f u r t h e r d i r e c t e d that
Ambassador A l b r i g h t and Ambassador G a l b r a i t h continue e f f o r t s
with appropriate Croatian a u t h o r i t i e s to develop p o s i t i o n s that
w i l l f u r t h e r defuse the s i t u a t i o n . (Action: State/USUN) -f&f4.
Deputies discussed options f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the s i t u a t i o n i n
Sarajevo where i n c r e a s e d v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e e x c l u s i o n zone and t h e
Bosnian Serb c l o s u r e o f t h e Sarajevo a i r p o r t c o n t i n u e t o erode UN
a u t h o r i t y and NATO c r e d i b i l i t y .
Deputies agreed t h a t t h e
u n t e n a b l e s i t u a t i o n , and l a c k o f UN w i l l t o f u l l y execute i t s
mandate, p l a c e s t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f UNPROFOR i n Bosnia a t s e r i o u s
r i s k . N o t i n g t h a t w i t h t h e change i n Government, t h e French w i l l
u n d e r t a k e a r e v i e w o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n UNPROFOR, Deputies
d i r e c t e d t h a t a s t r a t e g y be developed f o r g a i n i n g French s u p p o r t
f o r t o u g h e r UN a c t i o n i n Sarajevo.
(Action: State)
Deputies
f u r t h e r d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e JCS Sarajevo m i l i t a r y o p t i o n s paper be
circulated t o Principals.
( A c t i o n : JCS) -(G) 5.
D e p u t i e s b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d t h e IWG e f f o r t s i n d e v e l o p i n g a
post-UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l s t r a t e g y and i n d r a f t i n g answers t o t h e
unanswered p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g OPLAN 40104. N o t i n g t h a t
more t i m e was needed t o review t h e work, Deputies asked t h a t
Agency comments be p r o m p t l y p r o v i d e d (NLT COB May 11) d i r e c t l y t o
S t a t e (EUR). S t a t e w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e comments and c i r c u l a t e
another v e r s i o n f o r Deputies f i n a l r e v i e w on F r i d a y , May 12.
( A c t i o n : S t a t e ) A subsequent v e r s i o n which i n c o r p o r a t e s any
a d d i t i o n a l Deputies' comments w i l l c i r c u l a t e d t o P r i n c i p a l s . -fQ)~
6.
D e p u t i e s d i s c u s s e d t h e SACEUR's r e q u e s t f o r a u t h o r i t y t o
i s s u e an ACTREQ f o r t h e e n a b l i n g and main f o r c e s i n OPLAN 40104
t h a t may be forwarded t o t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l (NAC) n e x t
week. Deputies agreed t h a t t h i s r e q u e s t goes beyond e x i s t i n g
P r i n c i p a l s ' a u t h o r i z a t i o n and d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s
be t a k e n t o frame t h e i s s u e f o r P r i n c i p a l s ' d e c i s i o n :
o
Present P r i n c i p a l s w i t h proposed answers t o OPLAN 40104
unanswered p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s NLT Monday, May 15. ( A c t i o n :
State) - t s r
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C l a r i f y the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the ACTREQ as i t r e l a t e s to the
o v e r a l l OPLAN 40104 approval process.
(Action: OSD/JCS)
o
Gauge l i k e l y NATO response to the request and develop
appropriate guidance to U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t NATO.
(Action: State/DoD) -49*-
o
Prepare ACTREQ o p t i o n s / d e c i s i o n paper f o r P r i n c i p a l s '
c o n s i d e r a t i o n NLT Monday, May 15. (Action: DoD with S t a t e
input)
o
Defer Congressional b r i e f i n g s u n t i l questions concerning new
a u t h o r i t i e s requested by the SACEUR are c l a r i f i e d .
(Action:
NSC/IWG)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: May 213, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 1:00 -- 3:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia f & t —
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
USUN
Samuel Berger
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
OVP
CIA
Leon F u e r t h
William
State
Secretary Christopher
John Kornblum
Robert Frasure
DOD
Secretary Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i
LTG Wesley C l a r k
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
C o l o n e l Nelson Drew
Studeman
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
P r i n c i p a l s met on May 28 t o c o n s i d e r a range o f p o l i c y o p t i o n s
i n l i g h t o f t h e r e c e n t developments i n Bosnia. They agreed on t h e
f o l l o w i n g b a s i c p o i n t s f o r U.S. p o l i c y . (U)
2.
Prospects of a d d i t i o n a l a i r s t r i k e s . The U.S. w i l l not p r e s s
a l l i e s with troops on the ground for f u r t h e r s t r i k e s now, but: (a)
the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r s t r i k e s w i l l not be r u l e d out; (b)
should s t r i k e s again become necessary, a more robust approach
p e r m i t t i n g the UN and NATO to respond a t the time and p l a c e of
t h e i r own choosing should be followed r a t h e r than continuing to
l i m i t options on the b a s i s of " s t r i c t p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y " (Action:
JCS); (c) p r i v a t e l y we w i l l accept a pause, but make no p u b l i c
statement to that e f f e c t ; and (d) the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e w i l l seek
a l l i e d r e a c t i o n s to planning a s u b s t a n t i a l contingency s t r i k e
option i f Serb behavior, such as k i l l i n g hostages, warranted a
major a t t a c k (Action: State) . -fSr)—
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3.
Diplomatic e f f o r t s a t the UN and Contact Group. We w i l l :
(a) seek a formula with the French and UK on a sanctions
reimposition mechanism based on an independent i n v e s t i g a t i v e panel
and re-engage M i l o s e v i c on that b a s i s to seek to conclude a
Bosnian-Serb recognition package (Action: S t a t e ) ; (b) press
M i l o s e v i c i n the context of such an agreement to push the Bosnian
Serbs to r e l e a s e the hostages (Action: S t a t e ) ; (c) explore the
prospects for Russian a s s i s t a n c e i n c o n t r o l of Bosnian Serb heavy
weapons (Action: S t a t e ) ; and (d) renew e f f o r t s to gain UN
condemnation of Bosnian Serb leadership as the p r i n c i p a l obstacle
to peace i n the region based on recent events (Action: S t a t e ) . -ffrj
4.
Options and p r o s p e c t s f o r emergency w i t h d r a w a l . P r i n c i p a l s
noted: (a) no one i s c a l l i n g f o r w i t h d r a w a l now, b u t t h a t the
s i t u a t i o n c o u l d a r i s e q u i c k l y ; (b) NATO OPLAN 40104 would cover
emergency w i t h d r a w a l ; (c) U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e q u i r e s an immediate
e f f o r t t o complete c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Congress, s t a r t i n g w i t h c a l l s
t o key members and s t a f f the f o l l o w i n g day ( A c t i o n : NSC); and (d)
non-NATO w i t h d r a w a l u s i n g UK, French and U.S. assets was a
p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t r a i s e d s e r i o u s problems f o r NATO and f o r command
and c o n t r o l o f t h e o p e r a t i o n ( p u t t i n g s t r e s s on the need t o
complete C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s on 40104) . -K))5.
The f u t u r e of UNPROFOR. I t was agreed that UNPROFOR
withdrawal from Bosnia under the present circumstances would be
seen as c a p i t u l a t i o n to Bosnian-Serb blackmail and should be
avoided. Instead, P r i n c i p a l s agreed the U.S. strongly should
support French e f f o r t s to enhance UNPROFOR's a b i l i t y to perform i t s
mandate by: (a) b o l s t e r i n g i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s (short of providing
U.S. ground forces, but i n c l u d i n g p r o v i s i o n of U.S. equipment i f
necessary -- i n c l u d i n g an o f f e r of both U.S. a i r l i f t and equipment,
i f requested, to the B r i t i s h and French) (Action: OSD); (b)
a p p l i c a t i o n of more robust ROE; and (c) "regrouping" UNPROFOR to
reduce the r i s k .
( P r i n c i p a l s a l s o agreed to a r e - e v a l u a t i o n of the
r o l e s and missions of UNPROFOR to support future d e c i s i o n s on
regrouping.) (Action: JCS, OSD). -fST"
6. A s s i s t a n c e i n UNPROFOR redeployment:
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t ,
w h i l e t h e U.S. was not i n f a v o r o f an UNPROFOR redeployment t h a t
p u l l e d o u t from the e a s t e r n enclaves, U.S. c r e d i b i l i t y among NATO
A l l i e s would be s e r i o u s l y damaged i f we were t o t u r n down a r e q u e s t
t o NATO f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n r e l o c a t i n g them from p o s i t i o n s t h a t had
become u n t e n a b l e .
I t was agreed t h a t the e x i s t i n g U.S. agreement
i n p r i n c i p l e t o p r o v i d e ground t r o o p s as p a r t o f NATO l e d
o p e r a t i o n s t o a s s i s t UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l s h o u l d a p p l y e q u a l l y t o an
UNPROFOR request f o r a s s i s t a n c e t o NATO t o r e l o c a t e from p o s i t i o n s
t h a t have become u n t e n a b l e t o a s a f e r area. They agreed t h a t t h i s
d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e d the a p p r o v a l o f the P r e s i d e n t and c o n s u l t a t i o n s
w i t h Congress on t h i s o p t i o n .
( A c t i o n : NSC) -40)~
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�SECRET
DBCRDT
20905
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
DATE : August 1/ 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of P r i n c i p a l s Committee
Meeting on Bosnia fST*
PARTICIPANTS:
CIA
John Deutch
RADM Dennis B l a i r
CHAIR
Anthony Lake
OVP
JCS
Gen. John S h a l i k a s h v i l i
LTG Wesley C l a r k
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
Peter T a r n o f f
James S t e i n b e r g
DEFENSE
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
W i l l i a m Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
SPECIAL ENVOY
Robert Frasure
USUN
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
James O'Brien
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
Summary o f Conclusions
NATO A i r S t r i k e s D e c i s i o n : P r i n c i p a l s were i n f o r m e d by t h e CJCS
t h a t w h i l e t h e NAC had j u s t approved e x t e n s i o n o f t h e Gorazde
d e c i s i o n t o t h e o t h e r s a f e areas (Sarajevo, Bihac, T u z l a ) , many
problems were s t i l l u n r e s o l v e d r e g a r d i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s
and t h e e a r l i e r Gorazde d e c i s i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e UN
commander had n o t y e t agreed t o a l a r g e Zone o f A c t i o n around
Gorazde n o r t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e Zone o f A c t i o n f o r t h e o t h e r
s a f e areas. P r i n c i p a l s recommended P r e s i d e n t i a l l e t t e r s t o Major
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and Chirac on t h i s issue (Action:
up a t the UN by USUN. 4&t~
JCS/State) as w e l l as f o l l o w
B i l d t - M i l o s e v i c Package: P r i n c i p a l s agreed we needed t o improve
the terms of the package negotiated by EU mediator B i l d t w i t h
Serbian President Milosevic on sanctions r e l i e f and mutual
r e c o g n i t i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r , they agreed we should t i e
implementation of any new sanctions r e l i e f t o p o s i t i v e Bosnian
Serb actions (de-escalation around the safe areas and agreement
to begin new peace n e g o t i a t i o n s on the basis of the Contact Group
p l a n ) . P r i n c i p a l s acknowledged that we were u n l i k e l y t o come t o
closure w i t h Milosevic any time soon and t h a t we should seek t o
minimize f r i c t i o n s w i t h our A l l i e s i n the August 2 meetings w i t h
B i l d t and Contact Group representatives. They tasked the
Deputies t o f i n a l i z e agreement on the U.S. p o s i t i o n on the basis
of the NSC paper " B i l d t Plus" (Action: NSC). 4&*—
Croatia: P r i n c i p a l s noted the l i k e l i h o o d of a large-scale
Croatian assault on the K r a j i n a (Sectors North and South) i n the
coming days, b a r r i n g K r a j i n a Serb c a p i t u l a t i o n t o President
Tudjman's ultimatum on acceptance of the Croatian c o n s t i t u t i o n .
They agreed we should continue t o warn Tudjman of the dangers of
p r e c i p i t a t i n g FRY i n t e r v e n t i o n and stressed the urgency of
developing a s t r a t e g y f o r containing the spread of the c o n f l i c t .
-4et
Longer-Term Strategy: P r i n c i p a l s agreed we needed t o look beyond
the immediate c r i s e s and decide where we want t o be i n the longer
term. Each agency w i l l complete i t s recommendations by Thursday
on the "end s t a t e " we should seek t o e s t a b l i s h i f a p o l i t i c a l
settlement cannot be achieved i n the near term and i f UNPROFOR
withdrawal becomes unavoidable. Recommendations t o the President
should be completed by August 4, as a basis f o r decisions on a
possible U.S. diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e . 4*4-
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
M e e t i n g o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
August 15, 1995
DATE
White House S i t u a t i o n Room
LOCATION
3:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m.
TIME
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia {3) -
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
OMB
Jack Lew
Anthony Lake
CIA
John Deutch
VADM Dennis B l a i r
OVP
B i l l Wise
R i c h a r d Wurtz
STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe T a l b o t t
James S t e i n b e r g
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i
BG John Walsh
White House
Sandy Berber
Nancy Soderberg
DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
Jan L o d a l
USUN
Amb. Madeleine A l b r i g h t
James O'Brien
NSC
BG Donald K e r r i c k
Sue Bremner
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
P r i n c i p a l s met August 15 t o r e v i e w t h e d i p l o m a t i c s t a t e o f
p l a y and d i s c u s s n e x t steps on Kosovo.
2.
Tony Lake p r o v i d e d a read-out o f h i s t r i p t o European
c a p i t a l s , n o t i n g t h a t a l l governments were b r o a d l y s u p p o r t i v e o f
our i n i t i a t i v e s and i n agreement t h a t a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n
needed t o be reached i n t h e next s e v e r a l weeks. A f t e r t h e
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e Holbrooke m i s s i o n , we would c o n s i d e r n e x t
s t e p s , which might i n c l u d e a more i n c l u s i v e Contact Group meeting
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�i n Geneva a t the end o f the week. Proposals f o r informal working
groups on m i l i t a r y implementation and economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
needed t o be fleshed out, w i t h the EU t a k i n g the lead on the
latter
3. Secretary Perry and General S h a l i k a s h v i l i noted t h a t DoD was
working on a paper on NATO implementation, which would be
discussed by Deputies August 18. Once ideas on the mission and
mandate f o r the post-settlement implementation force were fleshed
out, d e t a i l s o f troop numbers could be worked out more e a s i l y .
4.
On the issue of Kosovo, P r i n c i p a l s agreed that refugee flows
should not i n and of themselves be t r e a t e d as a casus b e l l i , but
Dick Holbrooke should be i n s t r u c t e d t o remind Milosevic t h a t we
had p r e v i o u s l y warned him of the consequences o f Serb-sparked
c o n f l i c t i n the province. State agreed t o r e v i s e language i n a
demarche t o be used by Holbrooke.
5.
On the subject o f a Congressional and p u b l i c strategy,
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o hold o f f u n t i l a f t e r the Holbrooke mission
was complete. Lake would, however, b r i e f A l l i e d ambassadors i n
the next day or so t o the broad o u t l i n e s o f h i s t r i p , and State
could b r i e f non-NATO troop c o n t r i b u t o r s a t an appropriate l e v e l .
SGEP
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-SEeRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia f S f
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
OMB
Alice.Rivlin
Keith Bickel
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
Rick Saunders
STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe T a l b o t t
Amb. Holbrooke
CIA
George Tenet
Adm. Dennis B l a i r
DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
John White
Jan Lodal
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald K e r r i c k
Sue Bremner
USUN
Amb. A l b r i g h t
James O'Brien
WHITE HOUSE
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
JCS
Adm. Boorda
Gen. C l a r k
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
P r i n c i p a l s met August 22 t o r e c e i v e a d e b r i e f from
Amb. Holbrooke on t h e recent d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n t o ex-Yugoslav
s t a t e s . Regarding t h e seven key goals d e f i n e d i n t h e course o f
NSA Lake's e a r l i e r m i s s i o n , P r i n c i p a l s reached t h e f o l l o w i n g
conclusions:
a) Comprehensive nature of settlement:
t h i s our o v e r a r c h i n g g o a l .
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o make
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b) Three-way mutual r e c o g n i t i o n : While M i l o s e v i c remains opposed
t o r e c o g n i z i n g C r o a t i a , we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o pursue t h i s g o a l . I t
s h o u l d n o t , however, be a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a Bosnia s e t t l e m e n t .
c) T e r r i t o r i a l adjustments:
We w i l l r e t a i n as an e v e n t u a l goal a
c o n t i g u o u s landmass f o r t h e Bosnian F e d e r a t i o n and press t h e case
f o r d e f e n s i b i l i t y w i t h t h e GoBH. For t h e time b e i n g , however, we
w i l l n o t i n s i s t t h a t t h e GoBH agree t o g i v e up Gorazde, so as t o
a v o i d i n t e n s i f y i n g f e a r s we are unconcerned about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of e x c e s s i v e , C r o a t i a n t e r r i t o r y i n Bosnia p r o p e r .
d) C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r o v i s i o n s :
the p a r t i e s .
Discussions
have o n l y begun w i t h
e) S a n c t i o n s Suspension/Relief:
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o t r y t o a v o i d
b e i n g drawn i n t o d i s c u s s i o n s o f i n t e r m e d i a t e s t e p s . OVP w i l l
f i n a l i z e i t s paper on when s a n c t i o n s suspension ( t o be g r a n t e d t o
Belgrade upon s i g n a t u r e o f a peace accord) c o u l d be t u r n e d i n t o
sanctions l i f t .
OVP's paper should d e s c r i b e t h e stage i n t h e
s e t t l e m e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n process a t which f u l l l i f t would come
i n t o being.
f ) Sector East: A l t h o u g h M i l o s e v i c t o l d Amb. Holbrooke he
p r i v a t e l y accepted t h a t Eastern S l a v o n i a was p a r t o f C r o a t i a , a
n e g o t i a t e d s o l u t i o n w i l l be d i f f i c u l t i n t h e near term. A t a
minimum, we need t o i n i t i a t e a process based on Z-4 p r i n c i p l e s .
We a l s o need t o convince Tudjman t h a t UNCRO must remain i n p l a c e
i n Sector East.
We w i l l c o n t i n u e t o r e f i n e our s t r a t e g y on
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e aim o f p r e v e n t i n g a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
t h a t would draw i n t h e FRY.
g) Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n : Deputies w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e s u b j e c t
on a p r i o r i t y b a s i s i n t h e course o f t h e meeting on p o s t s e t t l e m e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n scheduled f o r August 23. A t i s s u e a r e
the n a t u r e and scope o f t h e a s s i s t a n c e program, t h e s i z e o f t h e
U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n , how t o convince Congress t h e p l a n deserves
s u p p o r t , where t h e USG c o n t r i b u t i o n w i l l come from, and how much
we can expect t o see from t h e Europeans, t h e Japanese, and
moderate Arab s t a t e s . - 4 * ) —
2. On the i s s u e of the UK d e c i s i o n to withdraw from Gorazde,
P r i n c i p a l s decided t o a v o i d a t t e m p t i n g t o change UK minds a t t h i s
time.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
M e e t i n g o f t h e NSC Deputies Committee
DATE August 23, 1995
LOCATION White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME 3:35 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee M e e t i n g on
Bosnia 4 ^
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
Sandy Berger
OB
M
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent
OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders
CIA
Dennis B l a i r
Norman Schindler
STATE
Strobe T a l b o t t
James Steinberg
John Kornblum
Ralph Johnson
AID
Thomas Dine
Dalena Wright
JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh
DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe
Jan Lodal
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Richard Clarke
Donald K e r r i c k
Stephen Flanagan
USUN
David Scheffer
(via secure video)
James O'Brien
Summary o f Conclusions
Implementation
of a Bosnia Peace Settlement
1.
D e p u t i e s met t o f i n a l i z e development o f an i n t e g r a t e d
p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y p l a n f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a Bosnian peace
s e t t l e m e n t . They reached agreement on s e v e r a l elements and
t a s k e d papers on s e v e r a l i s s u e s t h a t r e q u i r e f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s .
These papers and a f u r t h e r and more d e t a i l e d i t e r a t i o n o f t h e OSD
paper on t h e Peace I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Force (PIF) w i l l be r e v i e w e d a t
another D e p u t i e s Meeting on Monday, August 28 ( A c t i o n : OSD) . -fSt-
mn
D e c l a s s i f y oh/. _ JJ
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�Deputies w i l l a l s o review a paper f o r P r i n c i p a l s summarizing key
recommendations and i s s u e s for d e c i s i o n (Action: NSC) . 464"
2.
O v e r a l l Concept: Deputies agreed t h a t our g o a l i n
i m p l e m e n t i n g a s e t t l e m e n t i s t o p r e s e r v e Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
s i n g l e s t a t e comprised o f two h i g h l y autonomous u n i t s . Our
p r i o r i t y i s t o ensure t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e Bosniac-Croat
F e d e r a t i o n ; t h i s s h o u l d be accomplished i n t h e c o n t e x t o f u n i t y
w i t h t h e Bosnian Serb e n t i t y along w i t h r i g h t s o f a s s o c i a t i o n
w i t h C r o a t i a and S e r b i a , -ffrh
Deputies agreed that the Peace Implementation Force (PIF)
should be deployed p r i m a r i l y (but not e x c l u s i v e l y ) i n Federation
t e r r i t o r y . The o p e r a t i o n a l commander should have broad a u t h o r i t y
for s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n of the force and to enforce the c e a s e - f i r e
and s e p a r a t i o n of forces against i n c i d e n t s i n i t i a t e d by any
party, using overwhelming force i f necessary. At the same time,
Deputies agreed the P I F should have defined l i m i t s on the scope
of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and o p e r a t i o n a l conduct. The Deputies
agreed that the response to massive v i o l a t i o n s of the agreement
would be "evenhanded but asymmetrical." I n the event of Bosnian
Serb v i o l a t i o n of the agreement, the P I F should be a u t h o r i z e d to
respond u s i n g a i r and ground forces, but t h i s response should
follow a ladder of e s c a l a t i o n . I n the event of s e r i o u s Bosnian
Government v i o l a t i o n of the agreement, the P I F would withdraw.
Deputies f u r t h e r agreed the P I F should not disarm the p a r t i e s and
that some t a s k s , such as demarcation of borders and r e s e t t l e m e n t
of c i v i l i a n s , could be accomplished by c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s or
agencies, -f&t"
Taskings: State to d r a f t b r i e f o v e r a l l mission statement
for the P I F r e f l e c t i n g the l i m i t e d tasks above. NSC to w r i t e a
short paper i d e n t i f y i n g p o s s i b l e a d d i t i o n a l tasks f o r the P I F
that may prove necessary, for example, i f the settlement
e s t a b l i s h e s a stronger c e n t r a l government or Bosnia-wide
i n s t i t u t i o n s . CIA to do an assessment of the Bosnian
government's conception of a settlement and how t h i s may a l t e r
the P I F ' s mission. OSD to do d e t a i l e d mission statement as p a r t
of OSD paper, -ffrf
3.
Gorazde:
Deputies noted that P r i n c i p a l s , i n l i g h t of
Bosnian Government r e s i s t a n c e to trading Gorazde for other
t e r r i t o r i e s , had requested an examination of the requirements for
ensuring the v i a b i l i t y of Gorazde i f i t remains part of the
Federation under the terms of a settlement. (S)Taskings: DOD and CIA to assess implications for the PIF
and the longer-term defense requirements for Gorazde following
the departure of the PIF, using the Contact Group map as the
baseline, but considering territorial improvements (e.g., larger
corridor) as well. 4G)
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4.
Arms L i m i t a t i o n s : Deputies agreed that our goal of
e s t a b l i s h i n g a s t a b l e m i l i t a r y balance could best be achieved by
a h y b r i d approach that would support enhancement of the s e l f defense c a p a b i l i t i e s of Federation armed forces (ABH and HVO) i n
tandem with e f f o r t s to reach agreement among a l l the p a r t i e s to
c e r t a i n arms l i m i t a t i o n s or reductions. They agreed to
s e p a r a t i o n zones (DMZs) and to examine inventory l i m i t s on CFE
t r e a t y l i m i t e d equipment. They agreed that an arms c o n t r o l
regime should have a r e g i o n a l context. 4*4Taskings: State, i n coordination with OSD, to develop
d e t a i l e d options for narrow DMZs, separation of heavy weapons
and/or e x c l u s i o n zones, o v e r a l l l i m i t s on heavy weapons and
confidence-building measures that could be included as p a r t of
the settlement and/or pursued following implementation of a
settlement. «fS4
5.
E x i t Strategy: Deputies agreed that we need to e s t a b l i s h a
date c e r t a i n f o r completion of the P I F mission. There was a
consensus that the P I F should be terminated by the end of 1996.
At the same time, we should i d e n t i f y m i s s i o n - e s s e n t i a l t a s k s that
we would seek to complete p r i o r to that date, although the P I F
would withdraw whether or not a l l those tasks had been
accomplished.
-fS-)Taskings: State to draft an initial timeline paper defining
political, economic and military benchmarks for accomplishment of
critical tasks. CIA to do an assessment of how the parties would
react to knowing there was a date certain. ~4r&)
6.
N a t i o n a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n / F u n d i n g : Deputies agreed t h a t t h e
PIF would be a NATO o p e r a t i o n w i t h l i m i t e d non-NATO i n v o l v e m e n t .
While t h e r e would be a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g NATO t o
conduct t h e m i s s i o n , t h e r e would be no d u a l key o r o t h e r
l i m i t a t i o n s on NATO command and c o n t r o l . Deputies agreed t h a t no
A l l y s h o u l d be excluded, b u t t h a t t h e need f o r NAC consensus
would f o r c e us t o d e a l w i t h Greek a p p r o v a l o f T u r k i s h
participation.
Deputies acknowledged t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y
m i g h t be compromised by i n v o l v e m e n t o f non-NATO f o r c e s b u t
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t non-NATO p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l be p o l i t i c a l l y
necessary and, i n some r e s p e c t s , d e s i r a b l e (e.g., as a p r o v i n g
ground f o r P a r t n e r s h i p f o r Peace c o u n t r i e s t o o p e r a t e w i t h NATO
f o r c e s ) . Non-NATO f o r c e s would be under NATO o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l
s i m i l a r t o a CJTF. -f&t—
On f u n d i n g , Deputies agreed t h a t we would seek t o f o l l o w t h e
normal NATO approach, i . e . , NATO and o t h e r c o n t r i b u t o r s would pay
t h e i r own way, w i t h common c o s t s assessed a c c o r d i n g t o a v a r i a n t
of t h e NATO i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r m u l a . Funding arrangements more
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advantageous to the U.S. would be d i f f i c u l t to negotiate with our
A l l i e s , but w i l l be explored. -fSt*
Taskings: JCS/OSD to examine the p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y
requirements and c o n s t r a i n t s of making the P I F a NATO-plus force,
i n v o l v i n g PFP p a r t n e r s and other non-NATO m i l i t a r i e s .
This
should draw on previous NATO planning for implementation of the
Vance-Owen plan (40103) and UNPROFOR e x t r a c t i o n (40104) . OSD/JCS
to complete a cost estimate for the probable U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n to
the P I F .
The Peacekeeping Funding Group to reexamine
a l t e r n a t i v e c o s t - s h a r i n g arrangements among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . f647.
J o i n t Commission: Deputies agreed that a J o i n t Commission
with l o c a l s u b s i d i a r i e s should be e s t a b l i s h e d (comprising NATO,
the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) to r e s o l v e problems i n
implementing the m i l i t a r y aspects of a settlement. This might
have n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l components. Deputies a l s o agreed that
there would be other aspects of settlement implementation
( p o l i t i c a l , economic, humanitarian) that could be beyond the
purview of the J o i n t Commission, and that we needed to develop a
concept for how these would be handled and whether there would be
a s e n i o r S e c r e t a r y General's Representative for NATO, the UN or,
perhaps, the OSCE. They agreed that any arrangement should
exclude i n t e r f e r e n c e with the operation of the P I F ( i . e . , no dual
keys) . -fSt
Tasking: State to d r a f t a paper on the p o l i t i c a l analogue
to the J o i n t Commission for implementing the n o n - m i l i t a r y aspects
of a settlement. -ffr)8.
P o p u l a t i o n Movements: Deputies agreed t h a t t h e p a r t i e s
s h o u l d have p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p o p u l a t i o n movements, w i t h
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l i e f agencies (UNHCR) p r o v i d i n g secondary
s u p p o r t . The PIF s h o u l d g e n e r a l l y a v o i d i n v o l v e m e n t i n
p o p u l a t i o n movements, b u t i t s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o p r o t e c t UNHCR
p e r s o n n e l , a i d convoys, and refugees i n t r a n s i t as necessary.
Deputies a l s o agreed t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n and o t h e r forms o f
compensation were a l t e r n a t i v e s t o r e s e t t l e m e n t t h a t we s h o u l d
encourage t h e p a r t i e s t o e x p l o r e , -f&h
Tasking: State and USUN w i l l do a paper on p o l i c y toward
population movements, forced departures and a s s o c i a t e d
enforcement mechanisms. 4S4Post-War Reconstruction A s s i s t a n c e
9.
D e p u t i e s agreed t h a t we u r g e n t l y need a c o n c e p t u a l framework
and i n i t i a l p l a n f o r post-war r e g i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , as w e l l as
rough e s t i m a t e s o f t h e o v e r a l l c o s t , and t h e p r e f e r r e d c o s t s h a r i n g among t h e U.S., EU, Japan and I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s .
They
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a l s o expressed concerns about the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f o f f s e t t i n g t h e
U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e program on the b a s i s o f r e d u c t i o n s i n
o t h e r programs. Deputies agreed t h a t we would a c t i v e l y pursue
the EU's o f f e r t o t a k e the l e a d and press t h e EU, Japan and the
I s l a m i c s t a t e s t o c l a r i f y t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e package.
Deputies agreed t h a t , i n o r d e r t o encourage Bosnian Government
f l e x i b i l i t y i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , Ambassador Holbrooke s h o u l d be
i n a p o s i t i o n by Monday t o suggest t h e s i z e o f t h e U.S.
c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t the P r e s i d e n t w i l l seek from t h e Congress i n
the event o f a s e t t l e m e n t (between $500 m i l l i o n and $1 b i l l i o n
over 3-5 y e a r s ) . They a l s o agreed t h a t we needed t o i n f o r m t h e
Congress i m m e d i a t e l y o f o u r t h i n k i n g on post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c o n s u l t a t i o n s on the p r o g r e s s o f t h e U.S.
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e .
(0) •
Taskings: S t a t e t o develop a post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
program f o r the r e g i o n , i n c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h NSC, OMB, AID and
o t h e r agencies. S t a t e t o d r a f t t a l k i n g p o i n t s f o r a c a l l by
N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r Lake t o Spanish F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Solana
t o r e c o n f i r m the EU's w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a k e t h e l e a d on
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and t o o f f e r the p a r t i e s such c a r r o t s as EU
a s s o c i a t i o n and enhanced market access.
S t a t e and NSC t o d r a f t
t a l k i n g p o i n t s f o r Holbrooke's use w i t h t h e Bosnians on
August 28. S t a t e and NSC t o d r a f t a gameplan and t a l k i n g p o i n t s
f o r C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s August 26-28; these p o i n t s s h o u l d
be i n t h e c o n t e x t o f an o v e r a l l review o f t h e s t a t u s o f t h e peace
i n i t i a t i v e and s h o u l d a l s o r e f e r e n c e o u r commitment t o
p a r t i c i p a t e i n an i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f o r c e i f t h e r e i s an agreement
t h e y w i l l e x p l a i n our goals and why s o l i d U.S. f i n a n c i a l b a c k i n g
is essential, -ffr)—
Sanctions
10.
Deputies affirmed agreement on the main elements of our
approach to sanctions r e l i e f for the FRY i n the context of the
U.S. diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e :
a l l UNSC sanctions, except those
governing frozen a s s e t s subject to claims, would be suspended
once there i s a signed agreement; there would be a complete
l i f t i n g of sanctions once implementation of the plan i s
completed; and Belgrade would r e c e i v e l e s s sweeping suspension of
sanctions i f i t f a i l e d to agree to a s o l u t i o n for E a s t e r n
S l a v o n i a at the time of signature. I t was agreed that Deputies
would need to decide a t t h e i r next meeting how long we should
hold Belgrade accountable for the a c t i o n s of the Pale Serbs, and
what would be the p r e c i s e conditions f o r sanctions l i f t i n g . -fSf
Tasking: OVP t o c i r c u l a t e a paper on a proposed s a n c t i o n s
s t r a t e g y , h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e 4 o r 5 fundamental i s s u e s needing
D e p u t i e s ' a t t e n t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the s a n c t i o n s r e i m p o s i t i o n
mechanism and l i n k a g e s t o a C r o a t i a s e t t l e m e n t and war crimes, i n
p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the Deputies' meeting on August 28.
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: September 11, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia
PARTICIPANTS:
THE PRESIDENT
(5:05 - 5:30 p.m.)
Chief o f S t a f f
Leon Panetta
CHAIR
CIA
John Deutch
Norman S c h i n d l e r
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe T a l b o t t
Peter T a r n o f f
DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
USUN
Rick I n d e r f u r t h
David S c h e f f e r
OMB
Alice R i v l i n
Gordon Adams
JCS
W i l l i a m Owens
Wesley C l a r k
Delegation
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
Christopher H i l l
Roberts Owen
James Pardew
Donald K e r r i c k
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Summary o f Conclusions
1. P r i n c i p a l s , j o i n e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r a p o r t i o n o f t h e
meeting, r e c e i v e d a b r i e f i n g by t h e U.S. n e g o t i a t i n g team on t h e
p r o g r e s s o f t h e U.S. d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e s u l t s
of t h e September 8 meeting o f t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s o f Bosnia,
C r o a t i a and S e r b i a . They welcomed t h e s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s made
t o d a t e . They agreed t h a t t h e NATO a i r s t r i k e s i n response t o
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the Bosnian Serb bombing o f the Sarajevo m a r k e t p l a c e had t h u s f a r
g i v e n added impetus t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . While we would n o t r u l e
out t a c t i c a l pauses i n t h e bombing, P r i n c i p a l s r e a f f i r m e d t h e
importance o f c o n t i n u i n g t o demand f u l l Bosnian Serb compliance
w i t h t h e UN/NATO c o n d i t i o n s . • (C)
2. P r i n c i p a l s agreed that, i n l i g h t of Serbian President
M i l o s e v i c ' s support for the peace process to date, the U.S.
should support a 180-day extension of phase-one sanctions r e l i e f
for the F e d e r a l Republic of Yugoslavia p r i o r to the e x p i r a t i o n of
the c u r r e n t suspension on September 18. At the same time, they
r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r previous d e c i s i o n that no other sanctions would
be suspended u n t i l a Bosnia peace settlement had been signed.
(Action: USUN) -fG*3. P r i n c i p a l s n o t e d t h a t , i f f u r t h e r d i p l o m a t i c p r o g r e s s were
made t o w a r d a Bosnia s e t t l e m e n t , a d e c i s i o n would be needed soon
on t h e t i m i n g and venue o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e , w i t h t h e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e t h r e e Balkan P r e s i d e n t s , t o r e s o l v e t h e most
contentious issues. 4 0 ) 4. P r i n c i p a l s agreed that, given I t a l y ' s importance to the
conduct o f m i l i t a r y operations i n Bosnia both now and f o l l o w i n g a
settlement, the U.S. should make a renewed e f f o r t to i n v o l v e the
I t a l i a n s more c l o s e l y i n c o n s u l t a t i o n s on our diplomatic e f f o r t s .
While we would not reopen the agreement among Contact Group
members t h a t the next two Contact Group meetings ( i n Geneva and
Moscow) be r e s t r i c t e d to the o r i g i n a l f i v e members p l u s EU
negotiator B i l d t , we would urge that the subsequent expanded
meeting i n Rome become the model for a l l f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i v e
meetings.
We should favor the most i n c l u s i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n
p o s s i b l e , i n c l u d i n g other A l l i e s ( e s p e c i a l l y Canada and Spain) as
w e l l as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the OIC. (Action: State) 46-)—
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Summary of Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f the NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: September 21, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions of P r i n c i p a l s Committee Meeting
on Bosnia
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
CIA
John Deutch
Dennis B l a i r
Anthony Lake
OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders
State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Wesley Clark
DOD.
John White
Walter Slocombe
Delegation
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher H i l l
Roberts Owen
James Pardew
Donald Kerrick
USUN
Ambassador A l b r i g h t
David Scheffer
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Chief o f S t a f f
Leon Panetta
Summary o f Conclusions
1. P r i n c i p a l s received a b r i e f i n g by the U.S. n e g o t i a t i n g team
on the progress o f the U.S. diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e since t h e i r
l a s t meeting on September 11. They welcomed plans t o hold a
second meeting o f the Foreign M i n i s t e r s o f Bosnia, Croatia and
Serbia w i t h the Contact Group on September 26 i n New York, a t
which the three p a r t i e s would l i k e l y endorse f u r t h e r agreed
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�p r i n c i p l e s f o r a Bosnia settlement. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t the
New York Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' meeting should be announced by the
White House l a t e r t h a t day as p a r t o f a statement on behalf o f
the President f o l l o w i n g h i s telephone b r i e f i n g by Secretary
Christopher, N a t i o n a l Security Advisor Lake and Ambassador
Holbrooke.
(Action: NSC) -f&)
2. Principals noted concerns by the U.S. negotiating team about
growing tensions within the Federation and between the
Governments of Bosnia and Croatia in the wake of their recent
t e r r i t o r i a l gains in western Bosnia. They agreed that a highlevel demarche should be made to Croatian President Tudjman
warning of the consequences of his f a i l u r e to support the
Federation. I t was subsequently agreed that the President would
phone German Chancellor Kohl to urge that he make a similar
demarche to Tudjman. (Action: State and NSC) -fS-)3. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t the recent t e r r i t o r i a l s h i f t s i n
western Bosnia may have improved the chances f o r a settlement.
But they agreed t h a t f u r t h e r offensives could jeopardize t h i s
progress, e s p e c i a l l y i f they l e d t o large Serb refugee flows, and
t h a t we should place renewed emphasis on the need f o r a l l p a r t i e s
to show r e s t r a i n t . P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t we should encourage
the Bosnians t o consider a l i m i t e d - d u r a t i o n country-wide
cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s that would preserve t h e i r recent gains
while n e g o t i a t i o n s on a f i n a l settlement proceeded. -(£)
4. Principals noted that NATO a i r strikes had had a positive
impact on Serb attitudes toward a peace settlement. They agreed
that we should make clear that the bombing would resume i f the
Serbs did not comply with the UN/NATO conditions and that we
should press the UN to allow access for Bosnian c i v i l i a n t r a f f i c
into Sarajevo in order to test Milosevic's commitment to ensure
complete freedom of movement.
(Action: State/USUN) 45)
5. P r i n c i p a l s agreed i t was s t i l l premature t o take any d e c i s i o n
regarding the t i m i n g and venue o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference.
This should be r e v i s i t e d based on the r e s u l t s of the September 26
meeting o f the Balkan Foreign M i n i s t e r s and the next round of
s h u t t l e diplomacy by the U.S. n e g o t i a t i n g team, - f ^ f
6. Principals reviewed continuing d i f f i c u l t i e s in persuading our
key a l l i e s to include the I t a l i a n s in consultations on the peace
process. They agreed we should urge the I t a l i a n s to organize the
expanded Contact Group meeting in Rome that had been discussed
previously and that we should also press to include I t a l y in
five-power consultations on military planning for peace plan
implementation. (Action: State) 4C)
7. P r i n c i p a l s received an update from General S h a l i k a s h v i l i on
NATO planning f o r the implementation force (IFOR). They agreed
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�t h a t we would l i k e l y want t o f o l l o w the H a i t i model — i . e . ,
i n s e r t a l a r g e and heavily-equipped force at the very outset i n
order t o deter non-compliance by the p a r t i e s but then phase down
the force q u i c k l y once stable conditions have been e s t a b l i s h e d .
They agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t we should be f l e x i b l e on m o d a l i t i e s
f o r l i n k i n g Russian forces t o the IFOR, so long as the s i n g l e
NATO chain of command was preserved, w i t h no UN dual key. «f64—
8. Principals agreed that, i n light of increased media
speculation about peace plan implementation, we needed to step up
consultations with the Congress on our overall Bosnia strategy,
while seeking to lower expectations of an immediate breakthrough
in the negotiations. Calls to key Members should take place at
the beginning of the week of September 25, followed by a
Presidential meeting with Senate and House leadership.
(Action:
NSC/State) 4«4-
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
M e e t i n g o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: September 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia -W""
PARTICIPANTS:
THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams
CHAIR
Chief o f S t a f f
Anthony Lake
Leon Panetta
OVP
CIA
George Tenet
Dennis B l a i r
R i c h a r d Saunders
State
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
( v i a SVTS from NY)
Strobe T a l b o t t
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
( v i a SVTS from NY)
DOD
Secretary Perry
Edward Warner
USUN
Amb. Madeleine A l b r i g h t
( v i a SVTS from NY)
James O'Brien
JCS
Charles K r u l a k
M i c h a e l Byron
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow'
John Feeley
Summary of Conclusions
1. P r i n c i p a l s , j o i n e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t and V i c e P r e s i d e n t f o r
p a r t o f t h e meeting, were b r i e f e d by t h e U.S. d e l e g a t i o n on t h e
U.S. d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e and d i s c u s s e d next steps i n t h e peace
process and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e peace
s e t t l e m e n t i n Bosnia. (U)
•CECRET C l a s s i f i e d by: /Ajidqe
Reason: 1.5 (a[
D e c l a s s i f y on 11/22/15 (x4)
mmm LB A Y
IRR
DU
OCOPY
1PERE
a
- ^526
�2. New York F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s Meeting:
Secretary Christopher
and Ambassador Holbrooke b r i e f e d P r i n c i p a l s on the p r e p a r a t i o n s
f o r the n e x t day's meeting i n New York o f the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s
of Bosnia, C r o a t i a and the Federal Republic o f Y u g o s l a v i a .
They
agreed t h a t , f o l l o w i n g agreement by the t h r e e on " f u r t h e r agreed
p r i n c i p l e s " f o r a s e t t l e m e n t , b u i l d i n g oh t h e September 8 Geneva
p r i n c i p l e s , t h e next p r i o r i t y would be t o n e g o t i a t e a c o u n t r y wide c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,
-fej—
3.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference: P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t , f o l l o w i n g
the New York F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' meeting and a t t a i n m e n t o f a
c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s , we would need t o move beyond s h u t t l e
diplomacy t o the convening o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference i n
" p r o x i m i t y t a l k s " f o r m a t . They agreed t h a t Ambassador Holbrooke
s h o u l d seek t h e p a r t i e s ' agreement t o a date f o r such a
conference i n m i d - t o - l a t e October, s u b j e c t t o t h e i r acceptance o f
the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : a) each o f the t h r e e p a r t i e s w i l l send
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i t h the a u t h o r i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s ; b) t h e
p a r t i e s w i l l n o t t h r e a t e n t o walk out o f the t a l k s once t h e y have
convened; and c) t h e p a r t i e s w i l l agree not t o t a l k t o t h e p r e s s
f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f the t a l k s .
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference s h o u l d be h e l d i n a l o c a t i o n i s o l a t e d
from t h e media ( i . e . n o t Geneva o r New Y o r k ) , b u t t h e y d e f e r r e d a
d e c i s i o n on a s p e c i f i c venue. They agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference would be c o - c h a i r e d by the U.S. and EU,
u n l e s s t h i s posed s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r our r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e
Russians. -fOh"
4. M i l i t a r y I m p l e m e n t a t i o n P l a n n i n g : The A c t i n g Chairman o f t h e
JCS b r i e f e d P r i n c i p a l s on the s t a t u s o f NATO p l a n n i n g f o r
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a peace agreement. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t , i n
response t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d r e q u e s t from SACEUR f o r an e s t i m a t e d
U.S. f o r c e c o n t r i b u t i o n , we s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o i n d i c a t e a
r e a d i n e s s t o p r o v i d e 20-25,000 ground t r o o p s . -fC)5. C i v i l i a n I m p l e m e n t a t i o n S t r u c t u r e : P r i n c i p a l s approved t h e
c i v i l i a n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s t r u c t u r e proposed by S t a t e , b u t d e f e r r e d
a d e c i s i o n on whether t o seek the appointment o f an American
n a t i o n a l as Senior C o o r d i n a t o r . They agreed t h a t we s h o u l d seek
t o reduce t h e UN's r o l e t o t h e e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , w i t h t h e
a u t h o r i t y f o r the c i v i l i a n c o o r d i n a t o r f l o w i n g from t h e peace
agreement i t s e l f r a t h e r than a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n , - f e } —
6. A l l i e d and Congressional C o n s u l t a t i o n s : P r i n c i p a l s r e v i e w e d
p l a n s f o r upcoming c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h key A l l i e s , n o t i n g t h e
importance o f engaging the I t a l i a n s as w e l l as our Contact Group
p a r t n e r s i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n n i n g . The
P r e s i d e n t s t r e s s e d the importance o f e a r l y c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h t h e
Congress on NATO p l a n n i n g i n o r d e r t o defuse p o t e n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n
t o U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the NATO I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Force. -K:)—
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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Summary o f Conclusions f o r
SVTS Meeting o f t h e NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: September 29, 1995
LOCATION: S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia • • )
(G
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
Sandy Berger
OVP
Leon F u e r t h
Rick Saunders
STATE
Strobe T a l b o t t
Peter T a r n o f f
Ralph Johnson
DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe
TREASURY
David L i p t o n
USUN
David S c h e f f e r
James O'Brien
OMB
Gordon Adams
Mark Sandy
CIA
John Gannon
Norm S c h i n d l e r
JCS
M i c h a e l Byron
Doug Lute
AID
C a r o l Lancaster
Tom Dine
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Summary o f Conclusions
1.
Deputies met September 29 t o d i s c u s s p o s t - s e t t l e m e n t
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . They agreed t o d e f e r d i s c u s s i o n o f economic
reconstruction.
2. On American p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n IFOR, Deputies r e a f f i r m e d t h a t
our f i r s t p r i o r i t y i s t o ensure t h e i n t e g r i t y o f m i l i t a r y
o p e r a t i o n s , i . e . NATO-led o p e r a t i o n , u n i t y o f command, no d u a l
key. Deputies agreed, however, t h a t Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e
IFOR was d e s i r a b l e . Deputies agreed t h a t :
-SDCRET-
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•
we would p r e f e r t h a t Russian f o r c e s be under NATO o p e r a t i o n a l
c o n t r o l as p a r t o f one or more A l l i e s ' Area o f R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
(AOR), r a t h e r t h a n i n a separate Russian AOR;
•
we would p r e f e r t h a t , w i t h i n the A l l i e d AOR(s), Russian f o r c e s
be g i v e n s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
3. Deputies agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t o a f a l l b a c k p o s i t i o n o f
a l l o w i n g t h e Russians t o r e p o r t t o Deputy IFOR Commander J a n v i e r
i n h i s d u a l - h a t t e d c a p a c i t y as Deputy UN Force Commander, upon
assurances t h a t J a n v i e r does not have an independent r e p o r t i n g
l i n e t o t h e UN r e g a r d i n g m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s . However, b e f o r e
b r o a c h i n g t h i s w i t h t h e Russians, we need t o s t u d y f u r t h e r what
was needed t o ensure u n i t y o f command and no " d u a l key" under t h e
J a n v i e r o p t i o n ( A c t i o n : OSD/JCS). Based on t h a t study, we would
sound o u t t h e UN about t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t h i s o p t i o n ( A c t i o n :
USUN/State). Deputies agreed t o postpone m i l i t a r y t a l k s between
the JCS ( C l a r k ) and h i s Russian m i l i t a r y c o u n t e r p a r t , i n l i g h t o f
the proposed Perry-Grachev meeting.
4. I n view o f A l l i e d p r e f e r e n c e s f o r a s t r o n g e r UN r o l e i n t h e
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e c i v i l i a n aspects o f t h e peace s e t t l e m e n t ,
Deputies agreed we s h o u l d d e f i n e what c o n s t r a i n t s would be needed
t o d e f i n e a narrow scope o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a v o i d
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n e f f i c i e n c y i n the event we agreed t h a t t h e UN
SYG c o u l d a p p o i n t t h e Senior C o o r d i n a t o r ( A c t i o n : State/USUN).
5. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n package, Deputies accepted a
two-stage approach t o arms c o n t r o l , i . e . , t h e peace agreement
would c o n t a i n l i m i t e d arms c o n t r o l measures ( s e p a r a t i o n zones,
c o n t i n u e d n o - f l y zone) and a commitment by t h e p a r t i e s t o f o l l o w on n e g o t i a t i o n s t o e s t a b l i s h equal c e i l i n g s on CFE c a t e g o r i e s o f
equipment. Deputies a l s o recommended t h a t t h e P r i n c i p a l s l o o k
again a t t h e equip and t r a i n d e c i s i o n . They agreed t o p r e p a r e
two o p t i o n s a d d r e s s i n g a modest and a r o b u s t degree o f U.S.
engagement i n e q u i p p i n g and t r a i n i n g the F e d e r a t i o n , i n t h e
c o n t e x t o f a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d e n d - s t a t e f o r t h e equip and t r a i n
e f f o r t ( A c t i o n : S t a t e ) . Based on t h e assumptions i n t h e JCS
paper on e q u i p p i n g and t r a i n i n g the F e d e r a t i o n , t h e d e p u t i e s
asked JCS t o p r e p a r e a paper r e g a r d i n g how t o implement an e q u i p
and t r a i n program ( A c t i o n : JCS). The d e p u t i e s a l s o d e c i d e d t o
d e f e r sending an assessment team t o t h e F e d e r a t i o n a t t h i s t i m e .
«fi!»5-
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
Meeting o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: October 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia fQ)
1
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
USUN
Anthony Lake
Amb. Madeleine A l b r i g h t
OVP
CIA
John Deutch
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
Leon F u e r t h
STATE
Secretary Christopher
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
David Johnson (end o f meeting)
DEFENSE
Dr. W i l l i a m P e r r y
W a l t e r Slocombe
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i Summary o f Conclusions
1. P r i n c i p a l s d i s c u s s e d the pros and cons of a U.S. venue f o r
the planned proximity t a l k s that would be convened approximately
two weeks following the conclusion of a country-wide c e a s e f i r e i n
Bosnia. They deferred a f i n a l d e c i s i o n u n t i l t h e i r October 4
meeting. I n the interim, they requested that State and the U.S.
n e g o t i a t i n g team develop options f o r venues other than the
Washington and New York areas, as w e l l as ideas f o r a l t e r n a t i v e
events i n European c a p i t a l s and Moscow that could o f f s e t concerns
of Contact Group partners about a U.S. venue. f e f
2. P r i n c i p a l s d i s c u s s e d whether t h e r e s h o u l d be any m o n i t o r i n g
o f t h e impending c e a s e f i r e and agreed t o r e v i e w t h i s i s s u e and
t h e s t a t u s o f NATO i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n n i n g a t t h e i r n e x t m e e t i n g .
-fer
CQMFIDEMWftg
Classified by: ^And^r^vj
Reason: 1.5(a)(u)
Declassify on: ZTTfi
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�SECRBT
NATIONAL SECURITY
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COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
M e e t i n g o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE: November 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia i3)'
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams
Anthony Lake
OVP
CIA
John Deutch
Dennis B l a i r
Leon F u e r t h
State
Secretary Christopher
Peter T a r n o f f
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
( v i a secure v i d e o )
Robert G a l l u c c i
( v i a secure v i d e o )
DOD
Dr. John White
Jan Lodal
USUN
Amb. Madeleine A l b r i g h t
W i l l i a m Woodward
Treasury
J e f f Shafer
Mark Sobel
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i
Gen. M i c h a e l Byron
LTG Wesley C l a r k
( v i a secure v i d e o )
AID
B r i a n Atwood
Ted Morse
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don K e r r i c k
( v i a secure v i d e o )
Summary of Conclusions
Humanitarian
Sanctions R e l i e f f o r the FRY
1. P r i n c i p a l s c o n s i d e r e d a recommendation from Ambassador
Holbrooke t h a t t h e U.S. respond f a v o r a b l y t o a M i l o s e v i c r e q u e s t
-SECRET
C l a s s i f i e d by:
Reason: 1.5
D e c l a s s i f y on:
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f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n e x c e p t i o n s t o the s a n c t i o n s regime t h a t would
a l l o w e x p o r t s o f g r a i n t o f i n a n c e l i m i t e d i m p o r t s o f n a t u r a l gas
and h e a t i n g o i l f o r t h e w i n t e r months. They agreed t o seek t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s a p p r o v a l o f a p o s i t i v e b u t scaled-back response t o t h e
M i l o s e v i c p r o p o s a l (see c h a r t b e l o w ) .
They a l s o agreed t h a t , w h i l e
t h i s p l a n was aimed a t moving t h e t a l k s f o r w a r d , any e x c e p t i o n s t o
t h e s a n c t i o n s regime should be d e f e n s i b l e as h u m a n i t a r i a n i n
purpose and analogous t o e x c e p t i o n s g r a n t e d l a s t w i n t e r . At t h e
same t i m e , t h e y agreed t h a t a l e v e l o f n a t u r a l gas h i g h e r than our
e s t i m a t e o f FRY h u m a n i t a r i a n needs c o u l d be accepted i n view o f the
s u p p o r t expressed by the Bosnian Government f o r u n r e s t r i c t e d
n a t u r a l gas f l o w s . 40') •
2. P r i n c i p a l s recommended the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c l e v e l s ,
would a p p l y f o r s i x months:
U.S.
N a t u r a l Gas
proposal
36 t o 100*
FRY
request
which
Est. Requirement
218
15
28,500
73,000
28,500
588
588
588+
( m i l l i o n cubic
meters per month)
Heating O i l
(tons per month)
Liquefied
Natural
Gas
(tons per month)
* 36 mem would g i v e the FRY a monthly a l l o c a t i o n of n a t u r a l gas e q u i v a l e n t t o
t h e Bosnians' n a t u r a l gas r e q u i r e m e n t s ;
100 mem i s a f i g u r e p r e v i o u s l y
approved by t h e Bosnian Government as a t r a d e - o f f f o r s e c u r i n g Russian gas
f o r Sarajevo t h r o u g h t h e Serbian p i p e l i n e .
-fO)
3.
I n a d d i t i o n , P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t the e x c e p t i o n s s h o u l d be
c o n d i t i o n a l upon:
(a) d a i l y m o n i t o r i n g o f gas f l o w s t o Sarajevo
and t h e FRY, and o f a l l o i l shipments t o the FRY, which we would
seek t o r e s t r i c t t o Danube p o r t s ; and (b) FRY p r o v i s i o n o f data on
i t s h e a t i n g o i l i n v e n t o r i e s ( t o discourage s t o c k p i l i n g ) . Most
i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e y agreed t h a t the whole d e a l would be t e r m i n a t e d i f
the FRY were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c u t t i n g o f f gas t o Sarajevo.
40)4. W i t h r e s p e c t t o f i n a n c i n g o f the o i l / g a s i m p o r t s . P r i n c i p a l s
agreed n o t t o p e r m i t the FRY t o s e l l g r a i n on the open market.
But
P r i n c i p a l s c o u l d agree t h a t t h e FRY c o u l d p r o v i d e g r a i n t o Russian
o i l / g a s s u p p l i e r s on a b a r t e r b a s i s . The v a l u e o f the g r a i n ,
however, must be l i m i t e d t o the v a l u e o f the f u e l i m p o r t s .
F i n a l l y , P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t we would review any arrangement and
a l s o submit t o t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l any necessary t e c h n i c a l
resolution.
-fe-H
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�5. Note: F o l l o w i n g the P r e s i d e n t ' s a p p r o v a l o f the above p r o p o s a l
and i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Dayton, P r i n c i p a l s , w i t h the P r e s i d e n t ' s
concurrence, agreed t o m o d i f y the U.S. p o s i t i o n t o p e r m i t
u n r e s t r i c t e d f l o w s o f n a t u r a l gas t o t h e FRY f o r a two-month p e r i o d
i n l i g h t o f s t r o n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from the Bosnian and S e r b i a n
d e l e g a t i o n s i n Dayton. - f S i —
Implementation Funding
6. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t the f i g u r e s o f 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l
economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n package and a U.S. share o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y
$600 m i l l i o n c o u l d be used as n o t i o n a l f i g u r e s f o r p l a n n i n g
purposes i n d e v e l o p i n g a U.S. economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s t r a t e g y . -fS47. P r i n c i p a l s agreed i n p r i n c i p l e that the forthcoming budget
"endgame" negotiations with the Congress represented the best
option for securing funding for Bosnia peace implementation
programs but that further study and review was needed on s t r a t e g y
(Action: OMB).
They agreed that during budget negotiations,
funding for peace implementation i n Bosnia should, to the extent
p o s s i b l e , not come at the expense of m i l i t a r y readiness or other
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s programs. 4€-h
M i l i t a r y S t a b i l i z a t i o n Program
8. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t the equip and t r a i n program s h o u l d be
conducted by c o n t r a c t o r s . They agreed t h a t t h e terms o f r e f e r e n c e
f o r t h e assessment team's meetings i n Dayton should be made more
c l e a r and t h a t the team should meet o n l y w i t h F e d e r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s
and n o t t h e Serbs ( A c t i o n : OSD/JCS). They agreed t o send t h e
assessment team t o Bosnia a f t e r r e v i e w i n g the r e s u l t s o f t h e team's
d i s c u s s i o n s i n Dayton w i t h the U.S. d e l e g a t i o n and w i t h F e d e r a t i o n
o f f i c i a l s . jC)-.
Eastern
Slavonia
9. P r i n c i p a l s agreed t o d e f e r d i s c u s s i o n o f a p o s s i b l e U.S.
i n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f an Eastern S l a v o n i a s e t t l e m e n t pending
developments i n t h e ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n s . -fC)-
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COUNCIL
D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
Summary o f Conclusions f o r
M e e t i n g o f t h e NSC P r i n c i p a l s Committee
DATE November 22, 1995
LOCATION White House S i t u a t i o n Room
TIME 10:45 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.
SUBJECT:
Summary o f Conclusions o f P r i n c i p a l s Committee M e e t i n g
on Bosnia fS-f
PARTICIPANTS:
THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
USUN
Amb. Madeleine A l b r i g h t
David S c h e f f e r
CHAIR
OMB
Alice
Anthony Lake
OVP
Rivlin
CIA
John Deutch
Dennis B l a i r
Leon F u e r t h
State
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r
Strobe T a l b o t t
R i c h a r d Holbrooke
John Kornblum
Christopher H i l l
DOD
Secretary Perry
W a l t e r Slocombe
James Pardew
JCS
General S h a l i k a s h v i l i
LTG Wesley C l a r k
White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don K e r r i c k
Summary of Conclusions
1. P r i n c i p a l s , j o i n e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t and V i c e P r e s i d e n t f o r
most o f t h e meeting, were b r i e f e d by t h e U.S. d e l e g a t i o n on t h e
Dayton peace agreement s i g n e d t h e p r e v i o u s day and d i s c u s s e d
f o l l o w - u p . (U)
2. UNSC R e s o l u t i o n s : P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t t h e U.S. s h o u l d
i n s i s t on enactment o f t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n l i f t i n g
the arms embargo b e f o r e enactment o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n on suspension
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of economic sanctions i n order to ensure that the arms embargo
l i f t was not blocked by R u s s i a (Action USUN/State). 4G43. Bosnian Serb Compliance: P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t we need t o
p r e s s S e r b i a n P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c n o t o n l y t o secure Bosnian Serb
i n i t i a l i n g o f t h e Dayton documents (pursuant t o M i l o s e v i c ' s
commitment t o S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r a t Dayton), b u t t o b r i n g
about e a r l y c o n c r e t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h e Bosnian Serbs'
compliance w i t h t h e terms o f t h e Dayton agreement; i n t h i s
r e g a r d , we s h o u l d warn M i l o s e v i c o f our d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o reimpose
economic s a n c t i o n s i f we do n o t see prompt i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e
Bosnian Serbs i n t e n d t o implement t h e agreement ( A c t i o n : S t a t e ) .
The P r e s i d e n t s t r e s s e d t h a t we should n o t seek a C o n g r e s s i o n a l
v o t e o f s u p p o r t f o r U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n IFOR u n t i l we a r e more
c o n v i n c e d o f Bosnian Serb s t r a t e g i c consent, -f&h
4. Equip and T r a i n : P r i n c i p a l s a f f i r m e d t h e U.S. commitment t o
the Bosnian Government a t Dayton t o ensure t h a t F e d e r a t i o n armed
f o r c e s r e c e i v e d t h e necessary e q u i p p i n g and t r a i n i n g t o e s t a b l i s h
an e f f e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t y by t h e time IFOR l e a v e s .
They agreed t h a t , t o respond t o t h e concerns w i t h i n t h e USG and
the Congress about t h e r i s k t o U.S. f o r c e s , we w i l l seek t o
ensure t h a t t h e e q u i p - a n d - t r a i n program i s c a r r i e d o u t by t h i r d
c o u n t r i e s , and we w i l l seek t o reduce t h e F e d e r a t i o n ' s arms
r e q u i r e m e n t s t o t h e maximum degree p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h a n e g o t i a t e d
arms b u i l d - d o w n .
We should a l s o make c l e a r t h a t U.S. s u p p o r t f o r
an e q u i p - a n d - t r a i n e f f o r t i s dependent on Bosnia s e v e r i n g i t s
m i l i t a r y l i n k s t o I r a n ( A c t i o n : S t a t e ) . 4S-)~
5. C o n g r e s s i o n a l S t r a t e g y : P r i n c i p a l s reviewed t h e gameplan f o r
C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n t h e p e r i o d between t h e i n i t i a l i n g
of t h e peace agreement and t h e deployment o f IFOR. The P r e s i d e n t
and V i c e P r e s i d e n t underscored i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e need f o r DOD and
JCS b r i e f e r s t o convey a c l e a r message t h a t IFOR's m i s s i o n i s
l i m i t e d and a c h i e v a b l e , and t h a t we w i l l a v o i d m i s s i o n creep
(Action: A l l ) .
P r i n c i p a l s asked t h a t a d e t a i l e d IFOR m i s s i o n
statement be prepared as a common b a s i s f o r C o n g r e s s i o n a l
b r i e f i n g s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e n d - s t a t e t h a t we
expect t o be achieved a t t h e end o f IFOR's one-year deployment
p e r i o d ( A c t i o n : JCS) . f6-)6. IFOR E n a b l i n g Force:
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t t h e U.S. s h o u l d
s u p p o r t a d e c i s i o n a t NATO t o proceed w i t h t h e deployment o f t h e
IFOR e n a b l i n g f o r c e , w i t h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f U.S. f o r c e s , p r i o r
t o t h e s i g n a t u r e o f t h e peace agreement i n P a r i s i n o r d e r t o
p r e s e r v e t h e o p t i o n o f r a p i d l y d e p l o y i n g t h e main f o r c e
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r s i g n a t u r e ( A c t i o n : State/JCS).
The P r e s i d e n t
s t r e s s e d t h e importance o f f u l l and thorough c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h
Congress on t h e e n a b l i n g f o r c e ( A c t i o n : NSC) . -(Of
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7. Russian P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n IFOR: P r i n c i p a l s r e v i e w e d p l a n s f o r
the November 28 Perry-Grachev meeting and r e a f f i r m e d U.S.
r e a d i n e s s t o agree t o a 16+1 NATO-Russia c o n s u l t a t i v e framework
i n t h e c o n t e x t o f Russian agreement t o p l a c e t h e i r f o r c e s under
NATO o p e r a t i o n a l o r t a c t i c a l c o n t r o l ( A c t i o n : OSD/State) . • (C)•
8. Civilian Implementation: Principals agreed that the U.S.
could support the appointment of Carl Bildt as High
Representative for civilian implementation of the peace agreement
if Bildt accepted an American as one of his senior deputies
(Action: State). J&~.
9. Funding: P r i n c i p a l s d i s c u s s e d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Bosnia
f u n d i n g o f a p o s s i b l e P r e s i d e n t i a l v e t o o f t h e Defense
Appropriations b i l l .
They agreed t o e x p l o r e w i t h t h e Congress
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f u s i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e $7 b i l l i o n n o t
r e q u e s t e d by t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n as t h e means o f f u n d i n g U.S.
f o r c e s i n IFOR and t h e U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l
economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t s ( A c t i o n : OMB/OSD) . • (C) •
10. S a n c t i o n s : P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t i t was e s s e n t i a l t o
m a i n t a i n t h e ICFY and SAM m o n i t o r s i n a t l e a s t a stand-by
c a p a c i t y u n t i l t h e Bosnian e l e c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e
c a p a b i l i t y o f r e i m p o s i n g s a n c t i o n s i f necessary ( A c t i o n : OVP).
11. D e c i s i o n Timeline: P r i n c i p a l s asked the Deputies Committee
to prepare a d e t a i l e d t i m e l i n e for p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y
d e c i s i o n s over the coming weeks i n order to permit P r i n c i p a l s to
decide the best date for the Congressional vote and the s i g n i n g
of the peace agreement i n P a r i s (Action: NSC). t C f
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�CONFIDENJlAb
TELEPHONE CALL TO BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER DEHAENE
Status: Our Ambassador asked Foreign Minister Claes for a Belgian police monitor contribution
to thefirstphase Haiti multinational force on September 4. Claes understood the importance of
such participation for the proper implementation of UNSC Resolution 940 and said Belgium
would seriously consider a law enforcement contribution, possibly with a French-speaking team of
paramilitary gendarmes. Claes was to raise the issue with Prime Minister DeHaene. The request
could be considered formally as early as Friday, when the Belgian cabinet holds its regular
meeting. Claes' positive response was somewhat unexpected given previous indications that
Belgium was reluctant to become involved in Haiti at all. especially after losing ten UN
peacekeepers in Rwanda. Your goal is to reinforce the supportive message Claes presumably
conveyed to DeHaene and to urge DeHaene to seek a prompt positive decision at Friday's
Cabinet meeting.
Talking Points
•
Calling to discuss issue of serious concern to United States and world community: Haiti.
UNSC Resolution 940 expressed exhaustion of international patience. Working to build
multinational coalition force.
•
UNSC Resolution 940 authorizes two phases: multinational force with UN endorsement,
which we are leading; and UN Mission in several months.
•
My goal remains getting Cedras and associates out peacefully. Building threat of force
enhances odds that will work.
•
If not, will forcibly remove them, restore democracy.
•
Would then welcome Belgium's participation in police monitor role as soon as we establish
internal stability, i.e., a few days after intervention. Conflict between Belgian police monitors
and Haitian military unlikely.
•
French language capability, democratic tradition, professionalism make your gendarmerie
perfect for police monitoring task.
•
Share your anguish at tragic murder of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda. Working together
to resolve that crisis. Haiti another humanitarian crisis we must resolve, but threat to
peacekeepers not expected to be so severe.
•
Ambassador has discussed details with Foreign Minister Claes (phonetic: Klaas). Hope you
and Cabinet will decide on early participation in police role.
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Visit to Washington: DeHaene is planning a trip to Washington this Fall. No dates have been
set but he will want to meet with you.
Talking point
•
Know of your plans to visit. My staff looking at dates. Will get back to you.
NATO Succession: Foreign Minister Claes appears to be the strongest of the candidates
actively seeking to succeed Manfred Woerner. His candidacy has not yet, however, been
formally declared.
Talking point
•
Seeking a strong successor to Woemer.
•
(If Claes mentioned by name) Claes one of stronger candidates. Prepared to give him fullest
consideration.
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TELEPHONE CALL TO BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT SANCHEZ DE LOSADA
Status: On September 6 President Sanchez de Lozada told our Ambassador that he agreed in
principle to contribute 100 police personnel for the MNF and UNMIH. Final commitment is
subject to Bolivian political and legalrequirementsthat President Sanchez de Lozada believed
would not be impediments . He also stated that more specifics were needed on the transition from
MNF to police monitoring and the relationship monitors would have with UNMIH. Your aim is
to ensure that the Bolivian police arrive within a week of the intervention.
Talking Points
•
Enjoyed our meeting in June at the World Cup; look forward to meeting again in December at
Summit of the Americas.
•
Your strong interest in sustainable development is on target. We are going to do everything
we can to support you.
•
Just learned of your decision in principle to join the multilateral coalition.
•
Recognize you have legal aspects to work out, but still wanted to call to express appreciation.
•
Prospect of Haitianregimestepping down voluntarily increased by Bolivia's participation.
Decision lends weight to common cause.
•
Hope you meet Ambassador Watson and Ambassador McNamara in Rio. They will give full
details on MNF.
•
Crucial that Rio group endorse UN authorized effort to restore democracy. I count on your
support.
•
Biggest challenge in Haiti following intervention: help the Haitian people maintain civil order.
•
Haitian police weakened through years of misuse. But they can be recast into an effective
force if they have help.
We have a plan to re-build the police force. But this will take time.
•
I am most concerned about the time just after intervention, when Haitian police will need firm
guidance to d their job.
o
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We need police monitors-soldiers or civilian police-to ensure that Haitian police act
responsibly and to link them Coalition military forces in emergencies.
•
Also need forces to back up police, ensure order. Vital for development of Haitian economy,
for democracy to take hold.
•
U.S. forces will do Phase 1, the intervention, but we would like Bolivia's offer of 100 police
within a week after intervention.
•
Understand concerns about loss of life.
•
Bolivian personnel will not be part of the assault force, not be involved in combat; rather, will
be in support role.
•
We will handle transportation and all other costs.
•
Bolivian presence on the ground essential to broader support for democracy in Haiti, will
create foundation for more piosperous and free hemisphere.
•
Can we count on you to help us?
(IF RAISED)
Fernandez Visa: Goni could raise our continuing refusal to issue a visa to his political ally Max
Fernandez because of concerns about possible trafficking activities.
Talking point
•
We have examined the case and although I cannot go into the details we concluded that MR.
Fernandez does not qualify for a visa.
Anti-Narcotics Program: Bolivia is engaged in a new anti-narcotics drive called New Dawn,
which is having some success.
Talking points
•
Am encouraged by your current anti-narcotics operation, New Dawn. Keep up the pressure.
Know it is a difficult operation.
•
Urge you to supplement the operation with an effort to help coca growers find alternative
economic activities.
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TELEPHONE CALL TO BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT FRANCO
Status: Brazil is not intending to contribute forces to the MNF. They will, however, be a key
player at the Rio Summit in shaping the Summit declaration on the Haiti issue.
Talking Points
•
As we speak, Assistant Secretary Watson is in Rio addressing the Rio Group members on
support for our objectives in Haiti.
•
We want the illegal regime in Haiti to give way peacefully to democracy. We are hopeful the
international community will remain firm in sending a strong message to the illegal
government that it has no alternative to departing immediately.
•
The de facto leaders take comfort from mixed messages, and thus welcome new messengers.
We should ensure that the only message the de facto regime receives is UN Security Council
Resolution 940.
•
We appreciate any further action you can take to convince other nations of the imponance for
everyone to speak from the same script.
•
We look fonvard to continuing to work closely with you and your government in the coming
weeks as we seek to restore democracy in Haiti.
(CONTINGENCY POINTS - IF RAISED)
Summit of the Americas
•
We held a very useful round of consultations with your govem-ment on the Summit of the
Americas in Brasilia on August 26.
•
Although we will meet again with you in the context of our consultations with the Rio Group
in Washington on September 21, we also wish to continue our bilateral discussion on
preparations.
More detailed consultations on the Summit agenda will continue in the coming months. We
anticipate a fruitful process of generating specific initiatives that can carry our goals forward
at the Summit in December.
We consider Brazil a democratic leader in the hemisphere and value your insights and advice
on how to proceed.
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Cuba: The Rio Group Summit, which is meeting in Rio de Janeiro this week, will consider an
initiative urging the U.S. and Cube to begin a broad dialogue.
•
I urge thai this bereconsidered.Such an initiative, while well-intentioned, could derail our
immigration talks with Cuba and encourage the Cuban authorities to believe they need only
stall while international pressure builds on the U.S. to abandon the embargo.
•
One of the fundamental causes of the despair that is driving the Cuban people to flee their
country is the lack of basic freedoms and respect for humanrightsin Cuba.
•
We have seen no improvement in the Cuban government's humanrightsrecord. On the
contrary, we have seen further abuses such as the sinking of the tugboat "13 of March" and
the callous encouragement to the Cuban government to its people to risk their lives by taking
to the high seas in flimsy rafts.
•
The U.S. will continue to bring before the United Nations and other international
organizations evidence of humanrightsabuses by the Cuban government.
•
We would appreciate any support you could provide in the United Nations and other
international fora in calling on the Cuban government to respect the humanrightsof its
people.
Treaty of Tlalelolco: Cuban government officials have stated publicly that the Cuban
government intends to sign the Treaty ofTlatelolco.
•
We applaud the Cuban government's announcement and efforts on the part of the Brazilian
government to discuss the importance of the treaty with the Cuban government. We
anticipate the Cuban government will sign the treaty at the earliest opportunity.
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TELEPHONE CALL TO CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEty
Status: Canada will be the largest contributor of police monitors in phase II (UNMIH). They
could make a major contribution to and in fact lead the police element in phase I. However,
although Canada sponsored UNSC Resolution 940, Chretien has resisted participating in the
multinational force, probably out of concern that involvement before complete pacification in
Haiti and without UN control of the international presence could further stress a domestic
political base already uncomfortable with therisksto Canadian forces in UNPROFOR. Yet
Canada was the most forthright Friend pushing hard for Aristide's return, due to a concentration
of Haitian-Canadian voters in key Quebec districts. They criticized us for hesitancy. Now they
must follow through. We need their own capabilities and if they join it will encourage others.
You pushed for Canadian phase one police participation in an August 16 letter to Chretien. His
reply declined such a role. Subsequent clarifications that we envisage Canadian arrival in "phase
one-and-one-half (i.e., after initial stabilization) have elicited Foreign Ministry willingness to
send police monitors as early as 7-10 days after intervention. We are consulting at high levels on
their procedural concerns. At the same time, a Cabinet decision apparently is needed. Your aim
in this call is to get Chretien to commit to early participation.
Talking Points
•
We have led efforts to resolve Haitian crisis ~ "Friends of Haiti", Resolution 940 co-sponsors.
•
Must stand together during coalition phase authorized by Resolution 940.
•
Effort to build broad coalition gaining strength. Thirteen nations committed to military or
police participation. But we need more police in early stages.
•
Participation by allies with Caribbean ties especially important. British and Dutch
participating. Calling Dutch Prime Minister Kok (phonetic: Kawk) to seek their police. Also
calling French to urge they send police in coalition phase. Mitterand told me France
committed to close cooperation.
• Grateful Canada taking lead on police in UNMEH, phase II. Need to maintain law and order
from thefirstdays. In line with Canadian commitment to Haitian democracy, urge you to
provide 100-200 Canadian police monitors in first phase.
•
Understand now Canada could deploy police several days after military leaders removed,
when initial stabilization complete.
•
Problem is your officials saying can only do it if police under UN command. As UNSC
Resolution 940 reads, police are under coalition command. But Canada could command
MNF police component.
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Such a police coniribution will be mainstay of coalition and encourage other participants to
sign on. Commitment now will number Canada among those whose determination enabled
Haitians to build a hopeful future.
Who can Ambassador Blanchard work out details with?
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(IF RAISED)
Visit to Canada: You have decided to make a one-day visit to Canada this Fall. A decision has
not yet been made whether to accept the time period formally proposed by Canadian Governor
General Hnatyshyn (October 1-21) or to suggest alternative dates. Your reply to Hnatyshyn
accepting the invitation in principle awaits signature.
Talking point
•
Look forward to one-day visit this Fall. Appreciate offer of October 1-21. Hope to respond
soon so we can identify a mutually-convenient date.
Softwood Lumber Refund: An extraordinary challenge panel dismissed all U.S. appeals
against Canada in the softwood lumber case. Canada wants prompt refund of C$800 million in
bonds against our countervailing duty assessment.
•
Understand urgency in seeking prompt refunds. But I must handle Congressional interests.
Our experts examining best way to meet both sides' concerns.
Fish Disputes: Canadian treatment of U.S.fishermenin recent disputes on Icelandic scallops
and Pacific salmon have caused concern, particularly in Congress.
•
Would welcome positive Canadian response to our proposal for binding dispute settlement on
Icelandic scallops issue.
•
Let's have our salmon negotiators reach multi-year agreement before next year's season.
Cuba: In general, Canada believes that our shared objectives ofpromoting a democratic
opening and improved human rights in Cuba are better pursued through dialogue than isolation.
A few months ago, Canada resumed humanitarian assistance to Cuba. The Canadians have not
taken a public stance on the current migration surge from Cuba or our response to it.
Talking points
•
Hope measures we have taken will stabilize Cuban exodus.
•
Migration talks are promising, hope for early agreement on orderly emigration.
•
Will not broaden talks unless Castro acts to respect human rights, make democratic reforms.
-CONFIDENTIAL
LI NTON-flaMCilPHOTOCOPY
�mmm
NATO Succession: Canada is weighing options, interested in ensuring that NATO avoids the
appearance of disunity over choosing a successor to Woerner and undecided whether to promote
a compromise candidate should there be a deadlock.
Talking point
•
Not prepared to take position yet on specific candidates. Agreement on a strong successor
must take account of rotation at the top of other European institutions and various succession
traditions. Our people should keep in touch as selection process develops.
Quebec: September 12 provincial elections pit separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ) leader Jacques
Parizeau against incumbent Liberal Premier Daniel Johnson, who is closing the gap in recent
polls but is well behind among native French speakers. The PQ has pledged to hold a
referendum on Quebec's future within ten months if it wins.
Talking point
•
Americans following the campaign with interest. We have long enjoyed excellent relations
with a strong, united Canada. How Canadians craft constitutional change is for them to
decide.
C ND N I L
O r E TA
i
_
C N I C " ftt
O DN
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�•EONFI DENTIAL
TELEPHONE CALL TO CHILEAN PRESIDENT FREI
Status: Participaiion by the Chilean paramilitary carabineros in the first phase multinational
force is particularly important since it will both give us greater Latin cover, which we need, and
provide the services of a highly professional police force. In your June 28 meeting with President
Frei he said he could not provide carabineros because of institutional opposition from the armed
forces and carabineros commander General Stange, whom he had tried unsuccessfully to force
from office on human rights grounds. You told Frei you understood and that it was more
important to maintain Chile's progress toward full civilian control of the military.
As police monitors have become a top priority we have approached many countries for
contributions, including Chile again. Foreign Minister Figueroa was cautiously positive and told
our Ambassador that he, Frei and the Defense Minister would seriously consider our request.
Stange remains a concern, but Figueroa said that matters have improved since your June meeting
and that seeking carabineros participation in Haiti was no longer impossible. Your aim is to
urge Frei to make the political commitment to send a sizable contingent of carabineros to
the MNF once the security situation is stabilized by our forces.
Talking Points
•
Calling to ask that Chile provide police to act as monitors of Haitian police, as part of
multinational force now assembling to implement Resolution 940.
•
We will provide bulk of military units ourselves and U.S. forces would do intervention.
•
We need police monitors in phase two starting few days after intervention to ensure that
Haitians who will enforce law on interim basis do so properly.
•
Ambassador Kamman conveyed to Foreign Minister our request for sizable contingent of
carabineros, at least 100, as many as 250-300.
•
Carabineros have deserved reputation as professionals. That and their international
experience (El Salvador) suits them well to police monitor role once democracy restored.
Multinational Force in control and they can operate safely.
•
Discussed this proposal in your June visit. Realize a sensitive area, that relations with armed
forces delicate. Resurrect request only because so important, carabineros so skilled.
•
Foreign Minister Figueroa told Ambassador you would consider request seriously, and he
raised several specific concerns.
•
Confident those concerns can be resolved. We would handle transport, other costs. Our
concept of operations flexible, can accommodate Chile's special requirements.
CONnDCNUAfc
Dec^fyon: T C I N T O N
P F U F O ITOiT
LI
BQWTOfTOTOCOPY
�eN B b
eRM
Will appreciate your participation in Multinational Force along lines I described, but need
decision soon. Who can Ambassador Kamman work out details with?
ELINTON L
CONFIDENTS
H0T0C0PY
�CONFIDENTIAL
(IF RAISED)
Free Trade: The Vice President spoke to Frei about this by telephone a few weeks ago and told
him we were working hard with the Congress to get fast-track authority. You also assured
Chile's new Ambassador of our commitment when you received his credentials last month.
Talking point
•
As Vice President Gore said, am working with Congress to get the legislative authority
needed for effective free trade negotiations. Confident I will get it.
Rio Group Summit: The Rio Group, comprising most Latin countries, will meet in Brazil at the
end of this week. We want the Group to issue a supportive declaration on Haiti and have
approached Chile in this regard. We also look to Chile to push an effective anti-corruption
initiative for the December Summit of the Americas, following up on a recent NSC/State team
pre-Summit consultation. In both cases, we anticipate unhelpful Brazilian positions, reflecting
their opposition to UNSC Resolution 940 on Haiti and to our ambitious Summit agenda.
Talking points
•
Appreciate support for Resolution 940 on Haiti. Hope Rio Group statement will support it.
•
Pleased our Summit of the Americas team had good talks in Santiago. Want to keep working
with you, appreciate Chile's willingness to join in promoting anti-corruption initiative.
Relations with Peru: The Peruvian government recently decided not to submit a boundary
agreement with Chile to its Congress for ratification. Chile has already ratified the agreement,
which resolves disputes lingering from the 19th century War of the Pacific between the two
countries. It is furious with Peru and has withdrawn its Ambassador from Lima. We are neutral
in this dispute and wish to remain uninvolved.
Talking point
•
Hope you can resolve issue with Peru. Realize recent developments disappointing to you.
•^nMCinEMTTAl
CLINTON
H0T0C0PY
�CONn DCNTIAL
C N CT L
O r NI
D A
i
TELEPHONE CALL TO COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT SAMPER
Status: Colombia has made no commitment on participation in the MNF or UNMIH. It has said
it would "study" participation after hostilities cease, but before transition to UNMIH. Your aim
is to get a significant Colombian presence on the ground in Haiti.
Talking Points
•
You are off on a strong start as president.
•
Appreciate excellent relationship you and your colleagues have with Ambassador Frechette.
Your team is first-rate.
•
Look forward to meeting with you at Summit of the Americas in Miami in December.
•
Colombian support crucial to UNSCR Resolution 940.
•
Biggest challenge in Haiti following the intervention: help the Haitian people maintain civil
order.
•
Haitian police weakened through years of misuse. But they can be recast into an effective
force if they have help.
•
We have a plan to re-build the police force. But this will take time.
•
I am most concerned about the time just after intervention, when Haitian police will need firm
guidance to do their job.
•
We need police monitors-soldiers or civilian police-to ensure that Haitian police act
responsibly and to link them Coalition military forces in emergencies.
•
Also need forces to back up police and ensure order. Vital for development of Haitian
economy.
•
Would like 2 infantry companies and 100 police to help in police monitor roles within a week
after intervention.
•
Colombian personnel will not be part of the assault force, not be involved in combat; rather,
will be in support role.
•
Colombian presence on the ground essential to broader support for democracy in Haiti, will
create foundation for more prosperous and free hemisphere.
coNFiDCNTtTtL
DECLASSIFIED
R
P
Declassify on: (gt I NTON LIBRARY PH0T0C0P Y
�• CONWIDENThfrL
Wc would handle transportation and other costs.
Can we count on you to help us?
(IF RAISED)
Possible Samper Visit: Samper might be in Washington on or about September 15 for President
Gaviria's swearing in at the Organization of American States, but we do not recommend that you
meet with him.
Talking points
We are delighted that President Gaviria will be heading the OAS. He will bring new
dynamism and creativity to that important post.
I am glad you will be here to celebrate with us.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
cm o A
o Dm L
onunnnim
�TELEPHONE CALL TO PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT BALLAPARES
Status: You sent Secretaries Babbit and Cisneros to Perez Balladarcs' September 1 inauguration.
His new government has been favorably disposed to us. agreeing to shelter up to 10.000 Cuban
refugees, for example. We have been supporting Panama's national police as the replacement for
Noriega's disbanded National Guard. The government is considering conuibuting 30-40 of those
U.S.-trained personnel to a later MNF state under controlled conditions, perhaps to act as Secret
Service protection for Aristide. You recently sent a joint letter to Perez Balladarcs stressing the
importance of joining the coalition. High ranking State officials followed up at the inauguration
and at the Central American Foreign Ministers Conference just concluded in Costa Rica. Your
aim is to get at least 100 police monitors from Panama.
Talking Points
•
Agreement to shelter Cubans shows great compassion and courage.
•
Effort to build coalition gaining strength. Many Caribbean countries joining. Important that
all countries in hemisphere work with UN.
•
Biggest challenge in Haiti following the intervention: help the Haitian people maintain civil
order.
•
Haitian police weakened through years of misuse. But they can be recast into an effective
force if they have help.
•
We have a plan to re-build the police force. But this will take time.
•
I am most concerned about the time just after intervention, when Haitian police will need firm
guidance to do their job.
We need police monitors-soldiers or civilian police-to ensure that Haitian police act
responsibly and to link them Coalition military forces in emergencies.
Also need forces to back up police and ensure order. Vital for development of Haitian
economy.
•
Would like 100-200 police to help in these roles within a week after intervention.
•
We have supported Panama in building a national police. We know how capable they are.
•
Panamanian personnel will not be pan of the assault force, not be involved in combat; rather,
will be in advisory role later in thefirstweek after the intervention.
•^ONHBBfflAL
Declassify on: Og(R J |\| J O N
DECLASSIFIED
LIBRARY
PHOTOCOPY
P
E
R
^
�•CONflCOfflAL
mmm
•
W would handle their transportation and other costs.
e
•
Panamanian presence on the ground essential to broader support for democracy in Haiti, wil
create foundation for more prosperous and free hemisphere.
•
Can we count on you to help us?
-CONriDCNTIAjL
LINTON LIB
0T0C0PY
�
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning Haiti
Identifier
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2009-1289-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on communications between President Clinton and various world leaders regarding military intervention in Haiti in 1994. Talking points for telelphone conversations with the Belgian, Bolivian, Brazilian, Canadian, Chilean, Colombian, and Panamanian leaders are included.
Creator
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Records Management Office
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Adobe Acrobat Document
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
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2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2009-1289-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Haiti
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/27350054c96e694692356205ff8e6f6d.pdf
ffd52d9aa8ac34adb0d32b221b5c6a7d
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (d), and (e) of E.O. 13526.
�SECRET
8144
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Nawaz S h a r i f , Prime M i n i s t e r o f Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS;
U.S.
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t
John Podesta
Samuel Berger
Strobe T a l b o t t
James Steinberg
Leon Fuerth
Pakistan
Prime M i n i s t e r Nawaz S h a r i f
S a r t a j Aziz, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ishaq Dar, Finance M i n i s t e r
Mushahid Hussain Syed, M i n i s t e r o f
I n f o r m a t i o n and Media
Shamshad Ahmad, Foreign Secretary
Ambassador Riaz Khokhar
T a r i q Fatemi, Foreign Secretary
Bruce R i e d e l , NSC Notetaker
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
[ A f t e r Pool Sprays]
December 2, 1998, 1:30p.m. - 3:15p.m.
Oval O f f i c e and Old Family D i n i n g Room
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
than I remember. (U)
I t ' s l o v e l y weather here.
Much n i c e r
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s very unusual. I t ' s a b e a u t i f u l , c l e a r ,
warm day. We survived press a l l r i g h t . You're t h e guest, you
go f i r s t .
I have 2 or 3 items t o review here:
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , F-16s. We can discuss other issues elsewhere.
We have a f u l l agenda today. fS-}
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f : Thank you f o r the i n v i t a t i o n . You may
be more popular i n South Asia than a t home. (Laughter) We value
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (d)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
D e c l a s s i f y On: 12/03/08
CLI N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
HTCP
PER E. O. 13526
�SECRET
2
our t i e s w i t h you tremendously.
C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on the
congressional e l e c t i o n s . I want t o move forward from where we
l e f t o f f a t UNGA. We are keen t o work w i t h you. We are ready
t o r e s o l v e CTBT issue and adhere t o i t before September 1999.
We i n t e n d t o do i t . Strobe and Shamshad have worked t h i s hard.
He has my mandate t o r e s o l v e t h i s .
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�GECRET
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d), E.O. 13526, 1.4(e)
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d), E.O. 13526, 1.4(e)
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
SECRET
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�SECRET
[ P a r t i c i p a n t s are escorted i n t o the Old Family Dining Room where
they are j o i n e d by the f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s : U.S.
— Secretary Rubin, Secretary Richardson, Gene S p e r l i n g ,
Ambassador Milam, Rick I n d e r f u r t h ( A s s i s t a n t Secretary o f State
f o r South A s i a ) , and Jim Steinberg; Pakistan — Anwar Zahid
(Special A s s i s t a n t t o the Prime M i n i s t e r , Shabaz S h a r i f (Prime
M i n i s t e r ' s b r o t h e r ) and Muhammad Saeed Mehdi ( P r i n c i p a l
Secretary t o the Prime M i n i s t e r ) . Lunch began a t 2:25 p.m. and
ended a t 3:15 p.m.] f&)
The P r e s i d e n t :
We're e a t i n g l a t e again.
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
(U)
I was i n Oslo yesterday.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s a wonderful place. I v i s i t e d there 29
years ago.
I want t o go t o your p a r t o f the w o r l d . H i l l a r y and
Chelsea loved i t . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
The P r e s i d e n t :
heat ends? (U)
I s i t good weather then?
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
Mr. Shabaz S h a r i f :
c a p i t a l i n Punjab.
The President:
We hope i n March or A p r i l .
September.
How long before t h e
(U)
I hope you w i l l v i s i t Lahore t o see my
I t i s the heart o f Pakistan. (U)
What i s the population?
Mr. Shabaz S h a r i f :
Karachi. (U)
fG}
(U)
Five m i l l i o n i n Lahore.
Ten m i l l i o n i n
The P r e s i d e n t : China has a dozen c i t i e s w i t h over three m i l l i o n
people p l u s over 1,000 v i l l a g e s . (U)
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�GECRET
Mr. A z i z :
(U)
We have a 70-30 r a t i o o f r u r a l t o urban p o p u l a t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t : While we have lunch, would you b r i e f us on your
economy and how we can help. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
this.
(U)
I ' l l l e t my Commerce M i n i s t e r discuss
Mr. Dar: The economy was on a downward path when the Prime
M i n i s t e r came t o power. The GNP was down. We s t a r t e d t o t u r n
t h i n g s around when the Asian c r i s i s and sanctions s t r u c k us.
M u l t i l a t e r a l loans were h u r t . We had tough d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the
IMF. We reached a tough agreement on 24 November. We faced an
increase i n petroleum p r i c e s . We were hoping f o r a quick
response from the Paris Club. I t i s scheduled f o r 9 December
which means no a c t i o n u n t i l January. We have r e s o l v e d the
Independent Power Producers (IPP) problem e n t i r e l y t o a l l sides'
s a t i s f a c t i o n . What we need now i s a Paris Club package. As I
e x p l a i n e d t o Secretary Rubin, we need your help w i t h the P a r i s
Club. We need a r e a c t i v a t i o n of previous programs — around
$600 m i l l i o n . We need a s i g n a l now. On the World Bank side, we
also need some s i g n a l s . We request you weigh i n t h e r e as w e l l .
We are c u r r e n t w i t h a l l other banks. The impact o f s a n c t i o n s
has been a 3 percent f a l l i n GDP w i t h another 2 percent expected
next year and 1% i n 2000. That i s a $12 b i l l i o n loss over
3 years. We want t o focus on poverty t o o . We also q u a l i f y f o r
the new emergency f a c i l i t y created a f t e r the South East Asia
c r i s i s . We are l o s i n g 1 percent from trade due t o the c r i s i s i n
South East A s i a . We w i l l see 3.1 percent drop i n GDP.
We need
help. We also need a l a r g e r t e x t i l e quota. I n p r i n c i p l e you
have agreed t o i t but now we need t o put i t i n p r a c t i c e .
We
would increase by $750 m i l l i o n . We expected 5 percent growth,
so a 3 percent d e c l i n e i s d e v a s t a t i n g . f&)
The President:
Mr. Dar:
And debt service?
(U)
Almost 60 percent of budget.
(€-)
Mr. Rubin: A f t e r the Paris Club, what w i l l be the debt s e r v i c e
r a t i o ? f€-)
Mr. Dar:
Mr. Rubin:
fG-)
We want a moratorium f o r 3 years.
We w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g t h i s more.
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
We q u a l i f y .
Mr. President.
�SECRET
The President:
c r i s i s . (U)
Mr. Rubin:
I'm very concerned about t h e Asian f i n a n c i a l
How much has the Japan c r i s i s h u r t you?
(U)
Mr. Dar: Very much. We got l o t s o f a i d from Japan which we
l o s t due t o s a n c t i o n s . We l o s t much trade as w e l l , b u t t h i s was
also due t o the weakness o f Japan's economy. f&)
The President: The condition of the Japanese economy is the
single key to world economic health. We've tried to help. If
you look at the size of their economy real economic health
requires Japan to recover. It has been five years of no growth
there. Now it is affecting us. The Boeing layoffs are a symbol
of this.
m
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f : We are l o o k i n g t o buy planes from
Boeing. I f we can't get F-16s w e ' l l go f o r 747 s. ( l a u g h t e r )
l
The President:
Boeing w i l l give you a good deal now. fe}
[There i s more d i s c u s s i o n on the need f o r g l o b a l bank reforms.]
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
I am concerned about investment f l o w s .
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f : Ambassador Richardson went t o
A f g h a n i s t a n . I had hoped f o r some f o l l o w - u p . I urge you t o
have some d i r e c t contact w i t h Taliban. fS-)
Mrs. A l b r i g h t : We have very serious problems w i t h them. Their
treatment o f women and others i s very s e r i o u s . Need f o l l o w - u p
on 6+2 t o deal w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f a m u l t i e t h n i c s o c i e t y . I t
i s a g r e a t tragedy. fG}
Prime Minister Sharif: We suffer greatly from this tragedy. We
have millions of refugees . |
E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)'
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
E O 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
..
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s very u n f a i r .
the UN -- on Islam. (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r S h a r i f :
—
I'm g l a d I spoke on t h i s a t
We are t o t a l l y w i t h you on t h i s .
End o f Conversation
SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
—
(U)
�
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Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Declassified Documents concerning Pakistan
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2008-0018-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on a memorandum of conversation (memcon) between President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, from December 2, 1998. The December memcon is included.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
National Security Council
Records Management Office
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management Systems
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2008-0018-M
7388808
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Memcon
Nawaz Sharif
Pakistan
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/eb29cdb4aad08354ef620554cda41298.pdf
7169eadb2a8576dc187ff894b908c118
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�DEPARTMENT
OF S T A T E
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ODCIIDT >
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
FROM AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT
At o u r meeting on August 1 you asked f o r each P r i n c i p a l ' s
views on our endgame s t r a t e g y f o r Bosnia. I would be l a r g e l y
c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h your o r i g i n a l paper t h a t e n v i s i o n s a m o d i f i e d
l i f t and s t r i k e i f UNPROFOR were t o c o l l a p s e .
But I have t h o u g h t f o r some t i m e t h a t we must p u t Bosnia i n
a l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t and re-examine o u r fundamental
assumption t h a t t h e Europeans have a g r e a t e r s t a k e i n r e s o l v i n g
Bosnia t h a n we do. I n so d o i n g , we may conclude t h a t extending
t h e l i f e o f UNPROFOR i s no l o n g e r i n o u r i n t e r e s t .
(Why should
we w a i t f o r t h e day when London and P a r i s t e l l us t h a t they are
leaving?)
The f o l l o w i n g paper i s designed t o examine how t o s h i f t
from a European-led p l a n t o an A m e r i c a n - l e d p l a n .
Why Aroerica Must Take t h e Lead
Our commitment t o use American ground f o r c e s t o e x t r a c t
UNPROFOR on t h e one hand o r implement a peace p l a n on t h e o t h e r
means t h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t w i l l be " A m e r i c a n i z e d " sooner o r
l a t e r . Our p r e v i o u s s t r a t e g y — g i v e p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o
t h e Europeans, h e l p t h e Bosnians r h e t o r i c a l l y and hope t h e
p a r t i e s w i l l choose peace -- i s no l o n g e r s u s t a i n a b l e . With a
s t r o n g e r Bosnian army u n w i l l i n g t o w a i t f o r peace a t t h e
n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , and i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f S r e b r e n i c a and Zepa,
t h e Bosnian s i d e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n w i l l s i m p l y n o t
a l l o w us t o r e t u r n t o t h e r e l a t i v e success o f 1994. Muddle
t h r o u g h i s no l o n g e r an o p t i o n .
Meanwhile, I s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i s s u e has become
b i g g e r than Bosnia. A l t h o u g h we may have been c o r r e c t t o l i m i t
our r o l e i n t h e past — on t h e grounds t h a t t h e former
Yugoslavia was p r i m a r i l y a European r e s p o n s i b i l i t y -- t h e
circumstances and o u r i n t e r e s t s have now changed. Our i n t e r e s t
i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s c o n f l i c t has broadened.
—S6GRET—»
DECLASSIFIEE
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- 2 I n much t h e same way t h a t our f a i l u r e t o s o l v e t h e H a i t i
problem l a s t year t h r e a t e n e d t o overshadow a l l o f our o t h e r
accomplishments, I f e a r Bosnia w i l l overshadow our e n t i r e f i r s t
term.
The f a i l u r e o f our European a l l i e s t o r e s o l v e t h e Bosnia
c r i s i s has not o n l y exposed t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f t h e i r p o l i c y , b u t
i t has a l s o caused s e r i o u s e r o s i o n i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e
NATO a l l i a n c e and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
Worse, our c o n t i n u e d
r e l u c t a n c e t o l e a d an e f f o r t t o r e s o l v e a m i l i t a r y c r i s i s i n
t h e h e a r t o f Europe has p l a c e d a t r i s k our l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e
post Cold War w o r l d . P r e s i d e n t C h i r a c ' s comment — however
s e l f - s e r v i n g — t h a t " t h e r e i s no l e a d e r o f t h e A t l a n t i c
A l l i a n c e " has been c h i l l i n g my bones f o r weeks.
We have a l s o f a i l e d t o t a k e i n t o account t h e damage Bosnia
has done t o our l e a d e r s h i p o u t s i d e Europe. Moreover, o u r
f a i l u r e t o a c t i n support o f Bosnia t h r e a t e n s t o undermine
moderate I s l a m i c t i e s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . By c o n t r a s t ,
American l e a d e r s h i p i n support o f Bosnia w i l l redound t o o u r
advantage t h r o u g h o u t t h e Muslim w o r l d f o r a l o n g t i m e t o come
and c o u l d h e l p shore up key r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
For t h e s e reasons, I b e l i e v e we must s t o p t h i n k i n g o f
Bosnia as a " t a r baby." I n s t e a d , we s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h a t —
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g our successes i n t r a d e , Russia, and t h e Middle
East and d e s p i t e g e n e r a l agreement r e g a r d i n g Bosnia's
c o m p l e x i t y — our A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s t e w a r d s h i p o f f o r e i g n
p o l i c y w i l l be measured — f a i r l y o r u n f a i r l y —; by our
response t o t h i s i s s u e . That i s why we must t a k e t h e l e a d i n
d e v i s i n g a d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y p l a n t o achieve a d u r a b l e
peace. I f we agree t h a t American t r o o p s w i l l be i n Bosnia
sooner o r l a t e r , why not do i t on our terms and on o u r
timetable?
The Requirement f o r M i l i t a r y
Pressure
The essence o f any new s t r a t e g y f o r Bosnia must r e c o g n i z e
t h e one t r u t h o f t h i s sad s t o r y : our o n l y successes have come
when t h e Bosnian Serbs faced a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f m i l i t a r y
force.
Hence, we must base our p l a n on u s i n g m i l i t a r y pressure
t o compel t h e Pale Serbs t o n e g o t i a t e a s u i t a b l e peace
s e t t l e m e n t . I f d e s p i t e our best e f f o r t s , UNPROFOR becomes
u n s u s t a i n a b l e , then a m o d i f i e d form o f l i f t and s t r i k e remains
t h e b e s t way t o promote an a c c e p t a b l e peace over t h e long term.
T h i s approach e n t a i l s s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the
U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t means u s i n g our m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , p r i m a r i l y
t h r o u g h t h e a i r , t o h e l p t h e Bosnians by changing t h e balance
of power. A f t e r a s u i t a b l e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d t o improve
- CDCRDT*
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• SECRBT- 3Bosnian m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , we can and should disengage. I n
t h e absence o f t h i s s u p p o r t from us t o improve t h e Bosnian
m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , t h e h i s t o r y o f t h i s c o n f l i c t demonstrates
t h a t t h e Pale Serbs w i l l never f e e l enough m i l i t a r y pressure t o
n e g o t i a t e a d u r a b l e peace s e t t l e m e n t .
The
C u r r e n t D i p l o m a t i c Tr^ck
.
We should a c t i v e l y pursue a peace s e t t l e m e n t now. Recent
a c t i o n s by NATO, as w e l l as t h e m i l i t a r y c r e d i b i l i t y i n h e r e n t
i n t h e r a p i d r e a c t i o n f o r c e have g i v e n UNPROFOR a s m a l l window
of c r e d i b i l i t y . I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e ascendant t h r e a t from
C r o a t i a , UNPROFOR's s h o r t - l i v e d , new c r e d i b i l i t y may be
s u f f i c i e n t t o convince Pale t o n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y .
The steps we are now t a k i n g i n t h e Contact Group ( i . e . , t h e
r e v i s e d B i l d t o p t i o n ) w i l l t e s t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . My s t r o n g
s u s p i c i o n , however, i s t h a t t h e Serbs w i l l not be prepared t o
n e g o t i a t e on the b a s i s o f t h e Contact Group map, o r i f t h e y do,
t h e i r proposals w i l l be so one-sided as t o c r e a t e a s t a l e m a t e .
Even i n 1994, perhaps our b e s t year i n Bosnia, a more
e f f e c t i v e UNPROFOR and improved Bosnian-Croat m i l i t a r y
c o o p e r a t i o n d i d not b r i n g t h e Serbs t o t h e t a b l e i n a s e r i o u s
way.
Unless the Bosnian Serbs are convinced t h a t f a i l u r e a t
t h e peace t a b l e w i l l mean n o t o n l y s t a l e m a t e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d
but worse some r o l l - b a c k o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y g a i n s , I do not
b e l i e v e they are l i k e l y t o make t h e concessions necessary f o r a
d u r a b l e peace.
I n t h e event a new d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k f a i l s t o produce a
s e t t l e m e n t , t h e next few months w i l l see a r e i n v i g o r a t e d
UNPROFOR h e l p reduce f i g h t i n g , F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s poking a t Serb
defenses around t h e c o u n t r y , and t h e Serbs c o n t i n u i n g t o p i c k
o f f as many innocent and h e l p l e s s persons as i n t e r n a t i o n a l
opinion w i l l allow. Eventually, a l l sides w i l l s e t t l e i n f o r
the w i n t e r .
But t h i s p a t t e r n w i l l not l a s t . UNPROFOR's window o f
c r e d i b i l i t y w i l l b e g i n t o shut as t h e Europeans l o s e t h e i r
stomach f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
(The p a t t e r n o f s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l
w i l l t o a c t f o l l o w e d by e r o s i o n o f a l l i e d support w i l l
c o n t i n u e . Just as t h e a l l i e s ' commitment t o t h e Sarajevo
u l t i m a t u m o f 1994 eroded one year l a t e r , so w i l l t h e i r support
f o r NATO's recent d e c i s i o n s s o f t e n over t i m e . ) And as UNPROFOR
weakens, t h e Serbs m o t i v a t i o n t o n e g o t i a t e w i l l wane.
H o s t i l i t i e s w i l l i n c r e a s e by s p r i n g , and t h e t h r e a t o f
UNPROFOR's d e p a r t u r e w i l l emerge a g a i n — s t r o n g e r than ever.
We c o u l d w e l l face t h e p r o s p e c t o f U.S. f o r c e s on t h e ground i n
t h e s p r i n g and summer o f 1996.
1
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• ODCIU3T- 4 In a d d i t i o n t o t h e obvious p o l i t i c a l r i s k s f o r t h e
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , an UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l n e x t year w i l l enable
t h e p a r t i e s t o e x p l o i t campaign developments, as they p l a y t h e
candidates o f f .
New M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y Meets New D i p l o m a t i c S t r a t e g y
I f t h e f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , we should c o n s i d e r
t a k i n g c o n t r o l o f t h e s i t u a t i o n now. We should develop a p l a n
t h a t sets a deadline f o r t h e B i l d t - p l u s diplomatic t r a c k , a f t e r
which we would promote t h e c o l l a p s e o f UNPROFOR and b e g i n t h e
i n e v i t a b l e process o f handing o f f m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
Bosnia t o t h e Bosnians t h r o u g h a m o d i f i e d l i f t and s t r i k e
option.
T h i s i n i t i a t i v e has two e s s e n t i a l advantages over o u r
c u r r e n t p o l i c y . F i r s t , i t ensures t h a t we a r e n o t h e l d hostage
t o t h e t i m e t a b l e o f London, P a r i s o r t h e Bosnian government.
We decide when o u r commitment t o e x t r a c t UNPROFOR would be
o p e r a t i v e . Second, by s e t t i n g a d e a d l i n e a f t e r which t h e Serbs
would f a c e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e v e r s a l on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , we
would c r e a t e a p o w e r f u l i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e Serbs t o make t h e i r
concessions now. (For example, once we t h i n k B i l d t has r u n i t s
course, we c o u l d send an American envoy t o Belgrade w i t h a
message t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y t r a c k w i l l be immediately implemented
u n l e s s we see some marked change i n t h e Serb p o s i t i o n . )
M i l i t a r y Support f o r Bosnia a f t e r UNPROFOR
The o b j e c t i v e i s h a n d i n g - o f f t o t h e Bosnians t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s e l f - d e f e n s e and m i l i t a r y pressure on t h e
Serbs. T h i s r e q u i r e s l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo and m i l i t a r y
s u p p o r t , t h r o u g h a i r s t r i k e s and ground-based t r a i n i n g , u n t i l
t h e Bosnians can a c t themselves. The sooner we s t a r t p r e p a r i n g
F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s , t h e sooner t h e y can a c t on t h e i r own. As
t h e NSC paper i n d i c a t e s , a t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d should be some s i x
months t o one year.
The Role o f A i r Power.. The l i n c h p i n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a s s i s t a n c e w i l l be a c r e d i b l e commitment t o t h e d e c i s i v e use o f
a i r power a g a i n s t t h e Serbs t o p r e v e n t a c o l l a p s e o f Sarajevo
and o t h e r F e d e r a t i o n t e r r i t o r y b e f o r e new arms can be
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e Bosnian army. T h i s means implementing t h e
t y p e o f a i r s t r i k e s NATO has j u s t p r o m i s e d b u t w i t h o u t t h e r i s k
of hostages. No f l y zone i m p l e m e n t a t i o n would a l s o c o n t i n u e .
(The NSC paper has an e f f e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n o f how these
missions can be handled.)
The New Ground Force. The post-UNPROFOR m u l t i n a t i o n a l
f o r c e on t h e ground w i l l a l s o be i m p o r t a n t , b o t h t o s u s t a i n
momentum i n Bosniac-Croat r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and t o t r a i n
F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s (as w e l l as t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n for. any
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- 5 p o s s i b l e a i r campaign). I n o r d e r t o show our bona f i d e s t o our
a l l i e s and maximize our i n f l u e n c e w i t h t h e Bosnians, we should
o f f e r a s m a l l ground c o n t i n g e n t , whose p r i m a r y m i s s i o n would be
t r a i n i n g t h e Bosnian f o r c e s .
I n the l i g h t o f Congressional
support f o r l i f t , m i l i t a r y t r a i n e r s s h o u l d be p o l i t i c a l l y
s u s t a i n a b l e , e s p e c i a l l y i f l i m i t s on t h e i r numbers and l e n g t h
of deployment are s p e l l e d o u t from t h e s t a r t .
I n response t o t h e obvious charge o f " s l i p p e r y s l o p e , " we
s h o u l d p o i n t t o H a i t i , where we s e t a t i m e t a b l e f o r deployment
and met t h e d e a d l i n e .
I t i s s i m p l y wrong t o argue t h a t a
m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e w i t h a U.S. component s p e l l s an open-ended
American commitment. Indeed, a U.S. r o l e i n t h e t r a i n i n g o f
the F e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s would ensure t h a t i t c o u l d be completed
q u i c k l y . A s i d e b e n e f i t would be t h e f a c t t h a t an American
c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h i s k i n d c o u l d serve as a magnet f o r European
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , thus a v o i d i n g t h e p o s s i b l e a l l - M u s l i m army
s c e n a r i o many f e a r .
W i t h U.S.-led a i r power and t r a i n i n g f o r t h e Bosnians, t h i s
t r a n s i t i o n can be accomplished w i t h a minimum exposure f o r t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s . The e f f e c t would be a new b a l a n c e o f power t h a t
p r o v i d e s t h e o n l y r e a l chance o f concessions by t h e Bosnian
Serbs as w e l l as new l e v e r a g e f o r us t o p l a y a d e c i s i v e
diplomatic role with a l l sides.
What I s t h e End-state?
I would o b v i o u s l y p r e f e r t o see t h e Bosnians a c h i e v e a
s e t t l e m e n t i n accordance w i t h t h e Contact Group p r i n c i p l e s ,
t h a t i s , a m a j o r i t y o f Bosnia's t e r r i t o r y and a u n i o n
e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e F e d e r a t i o n and a Serb e n t i t y , t h u s
p r e s e r v i n g t h e R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia's t e r r i t o r i a l b o r d e r s .
But two s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s suggest t h e m s e l v e s . And I
would c o n d i t i o n our s u p p o r t f o r t h i s m o d i f i e d l i f t and s t r i k e
w i t h a p p r o v a l i n advance from t h e Bosnian government f o r these
two m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
F i r s t , t h e s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be more f o r w a r d - l e a n i n g on t h e
Serbs r i g h t t o secede p e a c e f u l l y from Bosnia and j o i n a
p o t e n t i a l "Greater S e r b i a . "
Second, i t may be necessary t o c o n s i d e r p r o p o s a l s t o t r a d e
Federation t e r r i t o r y f o r Serb-held t e r r i t o r y , e s p e c i a l l y i f the
F e d e r a t i o n agrees and i f t h e exchange makes t h e F e d e r a t i o n more
d u r a b l e . T h i s means p o p u l a t i o n t r a n s f e r s t h a t we have
p r e v i o u s l y been u n w i l l i n g t o countenance.
( I n the context o f
an American l e a d e r s h i p r o l e t o put m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e on t h e
Serbs, such t r a n s f e r s a r e p o l i t i c a l l y and m o r a l l y d e f e n s i b l e ) .
CECRIHP
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-«B€RET
- 6The p r i n c i p l e would be q u a l i t y n o t q u a n t i t y . P o p u l a t i o n
t r a n s f e r s t h a t i n c r e a s e t h e v i a b i l i t y o f b o t h p a r t i e s c o u l d now
be s a f e l y proposed. For example, Gorazde o r F e d e r a t i o n
t e r r i t o r y around t h e Posavina c o r r i d o r might be exchanged f o r
t e r r i t o r y around Sarajevo and i n C e n t r a l Bosnia. Again, t h e
t h r e a t t o use d e c i s i v e f o r c e may be d i s p o s i t i v e .
Exchanges
b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e F e d e r a t i o n would•probably r e q u i r e t h a t t h e
Serbs concede l a n d t h e y a s s e r t was S e r b - m a j o r i t y . This w i l l
r e q u i r e c o n f r o n t i n g t h e Serbs w i t h a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
I n t h e c o n t e x t o f new engagement by Washington, a s e r i o u s
d i s c u s s i o n w i t h Sarajevo should y i e l d these concessions. But
even more i m p o r t a n t , t h e Bosnian Government must be t o l d
b l u n t l y t h a t o u r support f o r t h i s i n i t i a t i v e i s c o n t i n g e n t upon
i t s commitment n o t t o seek m i l i t a r y g a i n s beyond t h e Contact
Group p l a n and i t s guarantee t o l i m i t s e v e r e l y t h e i n f l u e n c e o f
r a d i c a l I s l a m i c regimes i n Bosnia. I n summary, we must ensure
t h a t a l l t h e p a r t i e s can achieve reasonable o b j e c t i v e s and t h u s
t h e i r c o n f l i c t can be c o n t a i n e d over t h e l o n g - t e r m .
How Long & Deadline?
We should s e t a d e a d l i n e f o r t h e B i l d t - p l u s phase sometime
this f a l l .
I n as much as w i t h d r a w a l has become e a s i e r and some
may choose t o s t a y i n a f o l l o w - o n f o r c e i n C e n t r a l Bosnia, o u r
p r e v i o u s t i m e t a b l e under 40104 s h o u l d be s i g n i f i c a n t l y
s h o r t e r . I f diplomacy f a l l s i n t h e near-term, t h e new v a r i a n t s
of 40104 may a l l o w us t o b e g i n a w i t h d r a w a l m i d - f & l l and end i t
before winter sets i n .
What About t h e Russians?
Some p e r s u a d i n g o f B r i t a i n and France w i l l o b v i o p s l y be
necessary, b u t t h e prime d i p l o m a t i c o b s t a c l e would be Russia.
We should n o t u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e h i g h - l e v e l d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t
t h a t w i l l be necessary t o a v o i d a Russian v e t o i n t h e S e c u r i t y
C o u n c i l and minimize Russian support f o r S e r b i a . We w i l l have
t o make c l e a r t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o Bosnia has become America's
t o p p r i o r i t y , and we i n t e n d t o c a l i b r a t e our r e l a t i o n s h i p
accordingly.
As f a r as l i f t i s concerned, I would expect t h e y would n o t
want t o i s o l a t e themselves and v e t o such a r e s o l u t i o n i f
B r i t a i n and France went along and key Muslim C o u n t r i e s were
induced t o weigh i n . L e g a l l y , t h e y c o u l d accept t h a t
w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR w i l l m a t e r i a l l y change t h e circumstances
i n which t h e arms embargo was e s t a b l i s h e d , l e a v i n g i t — u n l i k e
o t h e r embargoes -- w i t h o u t a r a t i o n a l e .
(As t h e NSC paper
p o i n t s o u t , we may need some p a r a l l e l l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s on
Serbia.)
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NO. 1460 120307 PAGE
- 7 How To Deter Serbia and a T h i r d Balkan War?
The NSC paper t r e a t s t h e s e s u b j e c t s a d e q u a t e l y . S u f f i c e i t
t o say, t h e e n t i r e c l i m a t e f o r containment o f a w i d e r war and
d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t M i l o s e v i c would be changed i f Washington
were t o engage f u l l y and NATO were t o remain u n i t e d .
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STRATEGY FOR THE BALKAN CONFLICT
Introduction: As we seek to manage the immediate crises in Bosnia and Croatia, we must develop a
strategy that can lead to a resolution of the Balkan Conflict, one that is consistent with vital U.S.
interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of
NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could
destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the forcible changing of
borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.
Our basic goal should be the preservation of viable Bosnia-Herzegovina along lines that are
broadly consistent with the principles and goals of the Contact Group plan — i.e., preserving
Bosnia as a single state and providing roughly half the territory to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and
half to the Bosnian Serbs. While the geographic division will need to be on a more realistic basis than
the Contact Group map, reflecting the new realities on the ground, any significant retreat from the
50/50 principle would be tantamount to ratifying aggression and undermine U.S. leadership. It
would, in any case, be futile to attempt to impose a solution based on the status quo on the Bosnian
Government, since it would lead to an unenforceable settlement and a revanchist Bosnian state.
There are two ways in which we can achieve this goal:
~
To achieve a political settlement in Bosnia this year, based on new territorial trade-offs within the
framework of the Contact Group plan; or
— To put in place a strategy that can carry us through the next 18 months, including the likely
withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and lay the basis for the Bosnians to reestablish a balance of power
on the ground, one that could lead ultimately to a durable political settlement consistent with U.S.
interests.
Our present course provides little assurance of achieving either of these results. Even if our current
efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR and reassert NATO air power are successful, they will provide at
best a temporary respite. By next spring, if not sooner, we are likely to see a renewed escalation of
hostilities and renewed pressure to withdraw UNPROFOR just as the U.S. election campaign moves
into high gear. The increased likelihood of a new war in the Krajina only adds to the precariousness
of the current situation and the dangers of a wider conflict.
Therefore, in the coming weeks, we should make an all-out effort to obtain a realistic diplomatic
settlement, capitalizing on the new leverage provided by the London decisions and the parties' (and
the Allies') new anxieties about developments on the battlefield. If this effort fails, we should let
UNPROFOR collapse this year, face up to our extraction obligations now and move to help the
Bosnians obtain the capabilities needed to establish a balance of power on the ground and to gain
control of the main territories allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would be
underpinned during a post-withdrawal transition period by enforcement of the no-fly zone and air
strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, possibly reinforced by a non-U.S. UNPROFOR
successor force or paramilitary volunteers.
We would make clear up front, as a quid pro quo, to the Bosnians that our willingness to stay
engaged and support them in this fashion would be dependent on their showing demonstrable
flexibility and realism during the negotiating effort. At the same time, we would make known to the
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�Bosnian Serbs what they will face following UNPROFOR withdrawal in order to encourage them to
make the concessions needed to achieve a settlement.
PRESSING FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THIS YEAR
The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to Bosnian Government acceptance of more
realistic territorial solutions and constitutional arrangements, ones that modify the Contact Group
plan while preserving its core principles (single state; territorial solution close, but not strictly limited,
to 51/49; and sufficient autonomy for the Serb and Muslim/Croat entities, as well as links to neighboring states, that enable them to co-exist peacefully and avoid a slide back to war). The Bosnian
Serbs may want to negotiate before their military position erodes and have put out signals suggesting
a willingness to compromise on terms compatible with the Contact Groupframework.(See Annex I
for a more detailed description of the elements of a modified Contact Group plan.)
Getting to Negotiations: The Intelligence Community has judged it unlikely that either the Bosnian
Government or the Bosnian Serbs are genuinely interested in negotiating a peace settlement in the
near term. Developments over the past two weeks, however, may have altered the parties'
calculations: the Bosnian Serbs may have been sobered by the RRF, the NATO air strike decisions,
and, above all, by the Croatians' successful intervention in the Livno valley, which has exposed how
thinly spread their forces are; Milosevic has to be worried about the impending new war in Krajina
and the risk that intensified fighting could destroy his chances of obtaining sanctions relief before
another winter sets in; even the Bosnian Government ~ while emboldened by these recent developments ~ has doubts about the staying power of NATO's new resolve and is uncertain about its
prospects on the battlefield (as well as managing the humanitarian consequences) if UNPROFOR
leaves and the arms embargo isfinallylifted.
To succeed, the new diplomatic effort will require that the U.S. reassume leadership of the process as
we did in early 1994 when we brokered the Federation agreement and put together the Contact
Group map. Getting the parties to the table will require finessing the issue of Bosnian Serb
"acceptance" of the Contact Group plan "as the starting point" and breaking our self-imposed ban on
contacts with Pale. We should pursue several tracks to achieve an early resumption of negotiations:
— Begin with consultations with key Allies and the Russians in which we signal a willingness to
work on a modified Contact Group plan and to reopen contacts with Pale. The Allies will be
enthusiastic about this proposal, and it will also take the sting out of our less-than-ringing
endorsement of the current Bildt package on mutual recognition and sanctions relief. (Bildt is
only too willing to see the Americans step back into the breach.)
~
Continue to explore whether we can broaden the negotiations with Milosevic (both through
Carl Bildt and renewed U.S. engagement) to secure early Bosnian Serb agreement to a cessation
of hostilities and initiation of negotiations using the Contact Group plan as basis or starting point.
~
Begin a discreet bilateral dialogue with the Bosnian Government to encourage new flexibility
on the map, the constitutional issues and the semantics of Serb "acceptance" in the run-up to
negotiations, making clear that our willingness to support a robust post-UNPROFOR-withdrawal
strategy will be dependent on such flexibility.
— Send a secret envoy for talks with Pale leaders (e.g., Chuck Redman, Bob Frasure or Bill
Richardson, with talks taking place in Belgrade on the margins of U.S. talks with Milosevic) ~
preferably with the Bosnians' approval or acquiescence - to find a formula for negotiations that
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finesses the issue of "acceptance," and to explore territorial trade-offs and constitutional
arrangements that would gain their agreement to the Contact Group framework.
Negotiating the terms of a settlement: U.S. mediation and behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the
two sides will remain key once formal negotiations begin, even though we will need to maintain some
role for our Contact Group partners. Shuttle diplomacy between Pale and Sarajevo will probably be
the best approach, with a Summit or international conference at the end of the process.
Shoring up the Croatian flank: In light of recent events, we will need to take the initiative to
contain the danger that war in Croatia will escalate to a region-wide conflict that could derail any new
diplomatic effort in Bosnia. Our aim should be to cut short Tudjman's assault on the Krajina at the
best moment. To that end, we should capitalize on the Croatians' new military leverage by pressing
the Krajina Serbs to agree to immediate implementation of confidence-building measures and
negotiations aimed at full political integration in Croatia on the basis of autonomy for Serb-majority
areas. The CBMs could include secure rail access to the Dalmatian coast, opening of the Adriatic
pipeline and removal of artillery and missiles from within range of Zagreb and the coast. We would
offer to play a leading role in mediating the settlement as part of the Z-4 process (the Z-4 plan will
have to be discarded since Tudjman, in his new position of strength, will not agree to the "state within
a state" for the Krajina that it would establish).
SUPPORTING BOSNIA'S SURVIVAL POST-UNPROFOR
If the last-ditch effort to establish a viable Bosnian state through negotiations fails and/or we fail to
restabilize the situation on the ground, we should seek UNPROFOR's withdrawal and implement a
post-withdrawal strategy aimed at ensuring Bosnia's survival by establishing a balance of power on
the ground. (It is our judgment that it would be better to deal with the challenge of implementing
OPLAN 40104 this year, rather than having to carry out a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal
operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive
to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict.) Implementation of our new strategy would, as
noted above, be contingent on the Bosnian Government having shown flexibility in the negotiations.
Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the
Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, to consolidate
their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to have the
potential to regain most of the territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. We
would make clear that our support would end if they set more ambitious war aims (e.g., if they sought
to retake territory that would jeopardize achieving a settlement consistent with our modified Contact
Group proposal). This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of
power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.
— Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage
of a UNSC resolution, perhaps making it part of the same resolution that terminates
UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizes withdrawal. Some of our allies have indicated they will go
along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we would, at a
minimum, need to make lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including SerbiaMontenegro), and we might need to accept more sanctions relief for Belgrade as well.
— If the Russians threatened to veto, we would undertake covert provision of arms to the
Bosnians, either directly or through third countries, without formally asserting the right to arm
them in violation of UNSC resolutions ~ thereby minimizing the damage to UNSC sanctions
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regimes against Iraq, Libya and other pariah states. (An alternative would be to seek Allied
agreement to a joint declaration that, with the termination of the UN's role in Bosnia, we were no
longer bound by the arms embargo; this "NATO unilateral lift," however, could provoke a serious
rift with Moscow and undermine other sanctions regimes.)
Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we
first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need
additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help
the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for
a transition period of roughly one year, we would:
~
Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air
superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD); as a fallback, we would enforce the
NFZ unilaterally or through a coalition of the willing; and
~
After proper warning, conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb
military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against
Serb artillery attacks. This would preferably be done through NATO or if our allies refused to
renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air
strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied
to UNPROFOR) or as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense.
Forward air controllers would be provided by countries prepared to deploy forces in Bosnia after
UNPROFOR withdrawal (e.g., Turkey, Jordan or Egypt), since we would want to avoid assigning
this function to the Bosnian Government. We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and
possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian
ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.
~
Encourage members of UNPROFOR to remain, and other countries to volunteer, as members of a
successor force to UNPROFOR, although we would not formally organize or lead a coalition of
the willing. The mission of the force (which would most likely be comprised of moderate Islamic
states) would be to help protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas and/or to continue to promote
stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. One essential function, as noted above,
would be to serve as forward air controllers. The force might be deployed openly under a Chapter
VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression;
alternatively, it could deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government, invoking Article 51 of the
UN Charter; a third option would be for the volunteer forces to deploy semi-covertly. The
Bosnians would need to agree, however, as a condition for our military support, that pariah states
like Iran and Libya not be permitted to deploy troops on the ground. (The humiliating prospect of
Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could
prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in a successor force or to perform the specific
function of forward air controllers.)
We would set a limit on the NFZ and air strike commitments (e.g., one year - until the end of
1996 — or some event-driven deadline), making clear to the Bosnians that once we have made a
reasonable effort to level the playing field, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and
training to reinforce the Bosnians' ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective
air defenses to counter Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed. Whether our own assistance were
overt or covert, we would mobilize a multinational effort to arm and train the Bosnians, so as to
spread the burden and reduce the overall U.S. role.
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Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playingfieldbecomes a much more formidable challenge if
Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial
sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, fully seal the border and accept a much larger
international monitoring force. We would at the same time warn Milosevic that if we detect
significant Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside
Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes and that we do not rule out strikes
against military targets inside Serbia.
Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range
of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:
-
Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new
crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air
strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
-
Pressing to bring an early end to the Croatian assault on the Krajina and to negotiate the peaceful
reintegration of Serb areas under Croatian sovereignty; and
-
Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with
the FRY.
We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat
military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political
settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we might would jettison the
Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.
Getting from Here to There: We should begin intense private discussions with our key Allies now
on our post-withdrawal strategy in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the
short term, to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if
withdrawal must occur and, if possible, to gain their cooperation. This will also be essential to
determining whether we will be able to carry out the air operation through NATO (using Italian
bases) or whether we will need to make alternative arrangements (e.g., upgrade bases in Croatia or
other neighboring countries). We should also lay out our strategy for the Bosnians to gain their
flexibility in the nego-tiations, as noted above, and to encourage them to rein in their supporters on
Capitol Hill. We would emphasize that a strong post-UNPROFOR commitment will give us leverage
to pursue a settlement.
Although it would be desirable to use the withdrawal period to begin laying the groundwork for postUNPROFOR support, our overriding consideration must be the safety of U.S., NATO and UN
troops. Therefore, we would have to abide by the NATO OPLAN's principle of neutrality during
withdrawal, using force primarily in self-defense and refraining from seeking to enhance the Bosnians'
military position. We would, however, seek to shorten the duration of the withdrawal operation in
order to minimize the exposure of our troops to Serb attacks. Moreover, we would seek Allied
agreement to continue to enforce UNSC resolutions and NATO mandates during the withdrawal, in
order to reduce the Serbs' ability to threaten the safe areas and permit the use of close air support
against Serb forces interfering with the withdrawal. (We might even use implementation of 40104 to
establish more secure control over Sarajevo for the Bosnians after NATO leaves.) The Bosnian
Government's awareness of the support we intend to provide after withdrawal should help minimize
the chances that government troops or Bosnian civilians would impede UNPROFOR's departure.
Attachment: Modified Contact Group Plan
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Annex I
Outline of a Modified Contact Group Plan
•
In renewed peace talks or exploratory contacts with the parties, we would float possible
modifications to the Contact Group map. These would preserve the 51:49 ratio but provide
for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g., trading Srebrenica, Zepa and
Gorazde, plus a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and
additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a Silajdzic proposal to Juppe, we could
state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation. Ultimately,
we should be prepared to encourage the Bosnians to consider accepting somewhat less than
51% if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible Federation frontiers in Central
Bosnia.
We would, similarly, develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show
the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of
the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
•
A more controversial proposal would be to encourage the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can
conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years. The Bosnians agreed to this in the 1993
Invincible package but subsequently backed away; endorsing a secession right could be viewed as
accepting the eventual establishment of a Greater Serbia. Nevertheless, the case could be made
that if the Bosnians cannot, after 2-3 years, persuade the Serb population that their best future lies
in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the peaceful separation of the Union along the lines
of the Czechoslovak model.
•
We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement
"mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans, including the prospect of EU association
agreements. This would serve to encourage reconstruction and reestablishment of economic ties
within the new Bosnian Union, foster regional economic cooperation that satisfy Bosnian Serb
desires for links to Serbia and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.
•
We could promote the development of Balkan economic union or confederation uniting all the
interested states of the former Yugoslavia in a customs union or single market, with the possibility
of establishing regional political bodies further down the road. This would offer an additional
means for promoting regional economic cooperation and dampening Serb nationalists' insistence
that all Serbs must live in one state.
In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners would tell Milosevic that:
•
We will terminate the current sanctions relief if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible
action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin) and to secure concrete action to deescalate Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas;
•
Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of largescale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY
but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
•
At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for noncompliance, we would increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps,
such as suspending all non-strategic trade sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia, really seals the border
and delivers Bosnian Serb de-escalation actions or perhaps lifting vice suspending a few of the
phase-one sanctions.
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Endgame Strategy: A S u s t a i n a b l e Defense o f a V i a b l e Bosnia
a f t e r UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Summary: I f UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w s , t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s r i s k
t h a t , l e f t on i t s own, t h e Bosnian government w i l l be unable
t o defend t h e t e r r i t o r y i t c u r r e n t l y h o l d s . A l i m i t e d
package o f US a s s i s t a n c e , s u f f i c i e n t t o ensure t h e Bosnian
government's s u r v i v a l as a v i a b l e e n t i t y , would serve
i m p o r t a n t US i n t e r e s t s . T h i s s u p p o r t would c o n s i s t o f a
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e package l i m i t e d i n q u a n t i t y and t y p e s o f
weapons t o m a t e r i a l needed f o r d e f e n d i n g e x i s t i n g Bosnian
h e l d t e r r i t o r y , t r a i n i n g o u t s i d e Bosnia, and l i m i t e d a i r
s t r i k e s i n t h e event o f Serb a i r o r heavy weapon a t t a c k s on
Bosnian t e r r i t o r y t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e Bosnians' a b i l i t y t o
ensure t h e i r own defense. I t would a l s o i n c l u d e an economic
package o f a s s i s t a n c e t o h e l p t h e Bosnian government r e b u i l d
and ensure t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t h e Bosnian s t a t e .
To improve Bosnia's l o n g - t e r m p r o s p e c t s , and t o reduce
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r US a s s i s t a n c e , we would c o n t i n u e t o
f o s t e r c l o s e r l i n k s between Bosnia and C r o a t i a t h r o u g h t h e
F e d e r a t i o n and C o n f e d e r a t i o n . Because t h i s approach i s
l i k e l y t o be a c c e p t a b l e t o a t l e a s t some US a l l i e s (as w e l l
as some I s l a m i c n a t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t Bosnia) US a s s i s t a n c e
i s l i k e l y t o be supplemented by o t h e r s .
R a t i o n a l e : I n t h e immediate a f t e r m a t h o f UNPROFOR's
w i t h d r a w a l , t h e Bosnian government i s l i k e l y t o f i n d i t s e l f
a t a s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y d i s a d v a n t a g e . The l o n g - t e r m impact o f
t h e arms embargo and t h e Serbs' advantage i n heavy weaponry
and a i r c r a f t c r e a t e a r i s k t h a t t h e Bosnian Serbs c o u l d make
q u i c k m i l i t a r y g a i n s , j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e government's
s u r v i v a l . Simply l i f t i n g t h e embargo, w i t h o u t more a c t i v e
US a s s i s t a n c e , i s u n l i k e l y t o remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n f o r
s e v e r a l reasons: 1) weapons may n o t a r r i v e i n t i m e t o h a l t
d e v a s t a t i n g Serb o f f e n s i v e s ; 2) a p e r i o d o f t r a i n i n g w i l l be
r e q u i r e d f o r some o f t h e needed weaponry; and 3) l i f t i n g t h e
embargo c o u l d b r i n g Belgrade more a c t i v e l y i n t o t h e war on
t h e Bosnian Serb s i d e b e f o r e t h e weapons reach S a r a j e v o ,
f u r t h e r j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e Bosnian government
i n t h e short-run. F a i l u r e o f the United States t o provide
a t l e a s t l i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e would r e q u i r e t h e Bosnian
government t o depend almost e x c l u s i v e l y on I s l a m i c s t a t e s ,
e s p e c i a l l y r a d i c a l s t a t e s such as I r a n and L i b y a , i n c r e a s i n g
t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n and p o l a r i z i n g t h e c o n f l i c t .
Lack o f US i n v o l v e m e n t would a l s o l i m i t o u r a b i l i t y t o
influence the parties i n favor o f a p o l i t i c a l settlement.
A c t i o n s r e q u i r e d : At t h e time o f t h e d e c i s i o n t o withdraw
UNPROFOR, t h e US would announce i t s i n t e n t i o n t o p r o v i d e
-^r CLINT0N LIBRARY P O O O Y
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oaDR
PERE
0
- -HSK
�-0BCIU3T'
l i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bosnian government t o ensure t h e i r
defense, and seek agreement among t h e P-5 t o l i f t t h e
embargo f o l l o w i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f UNPROFOR's w i t h d r a w a l ( t h i s
may r e q u i r e concessions t o Russia on l i f t i n g t h e embargo and
s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t S e r b i a ) . I f agreement cannot be reached
t o r e p e a l t h e embargo, t h e US would p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e
d i r e c t l y u s i n g an A r t i c l e 51 r a t i o n a l e ( e i t h e r o v e r t l y o r
c o v e r t l y ) . An arms package focused on remedying d e f e n s i v e
d e f i c i e n c i e s (e.g. a n t i - t a n k and c o u n t e r - a r t i l l e r y , a i r
defense, perhaps C2 and i n t e l l i g e n c e ) would be developed i n
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Bosnia government; we would h e l p
assemble t h e package w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s from as broad as
p o s s i b l e group o f c o n t r i b u t o r s . Any t r a i n i n g r e q u i r e d by US
p e r s o n n e l would t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e Bosnia; arrangements
would be made f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f weapons t o Bosnia
t h r o u g h C r o a t i a . We would a l s o seek NATO agreement f o r
l i m i t e d a i r s t r i k e s pursuant t o A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e C h a r t e r i n
t h e event t h a t Serb o f f e n s i v e s t h r e a t e n e d t o o v e r r u n Bosnian
defenses
( t h i s c o u l d a l s o be done pursuant t o a UNSC
Chapter V I I r e s o l u t i o n , b u t t h e d u a l key i s s u e s make t h i s
undesirable.)
A s s u r i n g t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e Bosnian government serves
i m p o r t a n t US i n t e r e s t s : A l l o w i n g t h e Serbs t o d e f e a t t h e
Bosnian government i s c o n t r a r y a number o f i m p o r t a n t US
i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g our commitment t o r e s i s t aggression
a g a i n s t s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , t h e h u m a n i t a r i a n and human r i g h t s
consequences o f a t o t a l Serb v i c t o r y , t h e e r o s i o n o f US
c r e d i b i l i t y , t h e impact on US r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e I s l a m i c
w o r l d , and t h e consequences f o r t h e r e g i o n (e.g. t h e
K r a j i n a , Kosovo, Macedonia) o f t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f g r e a t e r
Serbia.
Need t o l i m i t scope o f US a s s i s t a n c e : Nonetheless, an openended commitment has s u b s t a n t i a l c o s t s . L i m i t i n g t h e scope
of US a s s i s t a n c e w i l l h e l p serve i m p o r t a n t a d d i t i o n a l US
i n t e r e s t s t h a t would be j e o p a r d i z e d i f our a i d extended t o
h e l p i n g t h e Bosnian government recover ( t h r o u g h combat) a l l
or p a r t o f t h e t e r r i t o r y now h e l d by Serbs.
•
L i m i t i n g our a s s i s t a n c e t o d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i s
more l i k e l y t o g a i n t h e support o f our a l l i e s (who
would face i m p o r t a n t domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o s t s i f Bosnia were overrun e n t i r e l y ) , p e r m i t t i n g a
m u l t i l a t e r a l approach t o l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo
and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . M u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t would
p r o t e c t our i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y o f
UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n s , a v o i d A m e r i c a n i z i n g
t h e c o n f l i c t , and a v o i d s e r i o u s i n t e r - A l l i a n c e r i f t s
t h a t c o u l d f u r t h e r j e o p a r d i z e NATO. US support f o r
Bosnian o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s would be opposed by o u r
allies.
CLINTON i i m m P O O O Y
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�-6HCRET"
S i m i l a r l y , a l i m i t e d approach i s more l i k e l y t o be
a c c e p t a b l e t o Russia, t h u s a v o i d i n g a c o n f r o n t a t i o n
w i t h Russia d u r i n g a d e l i c a t e p e r i o d o f our
r e l a t i o n s , and r e d u c i n g t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t Russia
would come t o t h e a i d o f t h e Serbs t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e
our e f f o r t s
A l i m i t e d approach would p l a c e s m a l l e r f i n a n c i a l
burdens on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and reduce (though n o t
e l i m i n a t e ) t h e r i s k o f US c a s u a l t i e s . D e f i n i n g t h e
o b j e c t i v e as defense o f c u r r e n t t e r r i t o r y improves
the p r o s p e c t f o r an e a r l y h a n d - o f f t o t h e Bosnian
government f o l l o w i n g an i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f
a s s i s t a n c e . T h i s s h o u l d improve t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r
Congressional support.
L i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e i s l e s s l i k e l y t o provoke a wider
Balkan war.
Limited assistance i s less l i k e l y t o i n t e n s i f y the
f i g h t i n g , t h e r e f o r e reducing t h e humanitarian
consequences.
CLINTON LI
YP OO O Y
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�OECIUiHg
Diplomatic Strategy
I n t h e wake o f t h e Serb a t t a c k s on t h e e a s t e r n enclaves
and t h e C r o a t i a n o f f e n s i v e , t h e r e i s an u r g e n t need t o
expand t h e t h r u s t o f t h e c u r r e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h M i l o s e v i c
i n two dimensions:
•
speed up t h e l i n k a g e between Plan B ( r e l i e f f o r
M i l o s e v i c i n r e t u r n f o r b o r d e r c l o s u r e and
r e c o g n i t i o n ) and Plan A ( c e a s e - f i r e and
n e g o t i a t i o n s between Sarajevo and Pale) and
•
resolve the Krajina s i t u a t u i o n
A "Bosnia o n l y " s t r a t e g y i s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o
execute g i v e n t h e growing c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e Bosnian
and C r o a t i a government t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a t i o n and
C o n f e d e r a t i o n , and t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e most l i k e l y
s u c c e s s f u l l o n g - t e r m outcome w i l l i n v o l v e c l o s e p o l i t i c a l
l i n k s between Bosnia and C r o a t i a . As t h e n e g o t i a t i o n
becomes more complex, deeper US i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e
n e g o t i a t i n g t r a c k i s e s s e n t i a l , s i n c e o n l y t h e U n i t e d States
has adequate c l o u t w i t h a l l t h e p a r t i e s .
The
elements o f t h e approach a r e as f o l l o w s :
1. A s a n c t i o n s suspension package i s agreed " i n
p r i n c i p l e " w i t h M i l o s e v i c and a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
Resolution i s introduced, but implementation
through
f i n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a c t i o n i s w i t h h e l d pending
p r o g r e s s on t h e ground and movement t o w a r d a n e g o t i a t e d
s e t t l e m e n t (elements 2-4, b e l o w ) .
2. I z e t b e g o v i c meets w i t h M i l o s e v i c t o c o n f i r m
r e c o g n i t i o n agreement, b o r d e r c l o s u r e p r o v i s i o n s and
r e i t e r a t e support f o r Contact Group p l a n . They agree
on p r i n c i p l e s t o govern a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n
Bosnia, which c o u l d i n c l u d e two autonomous e n t i t i e s
w i t h i n a s i n g l e s t a t e i n e x i s t i n g borders, respect f o r
Bosnia's s o v e r e i g n t y , p r o t e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t y r i g h t s ,
etc.
3. Sarajevo o f f e r s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Pale based on t h e
p r i n c i p l e s announced w i t h M i l o s e v i c and t h e Contact
Group p l a n , w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e "accept t h e
Contact Group p l a n as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t " f o r m u l a . The
p a r t i e s would a l s o agree t o a c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s
and disengagement o f f o r c e s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e
beginning of the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s .
4. Pale and Sarajevo begin n e g o t i a t i o n s and c e a s e f i r e
begins.
•-«-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Decl: OADR
�OECRET
5. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l adopts t h e s a n c t i o n s
package
suspension
6. I z e t b e g o v i c , M i l o s e v i c and Tudjman meet t o announce
agreement on r e c o g n i t i o n and " p r i n c i p l e s " g o v e r n i n g
p o l i t i c a l settlement i n Croatia, i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c a l
and human r i g h t s , some p o l i t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g
K r a j i n a , perhaps a d e f e r r a l o f Sector East as " f i n a l
s t a t u s " i s s u e t o be n e g o t i a t e d l a t e r . C r o a t i a would be
"recognized" subject t o the l i m i t a t i o n s w i t h respect t o
Sector East. Meeting c o u l d be hosted by EU or Contact
Group.
6.
C e a s e f i r e and draw back implemented and
negotiations begin.
Possible
Bilateral
Variant
T h i s approach may pose an i m p o r t a n t d i f f i c u l t y f o r
Bosnia, s i n c e t h e government has now s a i d t h a t any
" r e c o g n i t i o n f o r s a n c t i o n s suspension" d e a l w i t h M i l o s e v i c
must a l s o i n c l u d e C r o a t i a . The approach i s a l s o l i k e l y t o
meet o b j e c t i o n s from M i l o s e v i c because i t does n o t a l l o w
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a n c t i o n s suspension package u n t i l t h e
P a l e - S a r a j e v o n e g o t i a t i o n s b e g i n . These two problems c o u l d
be s o l v e d by a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e " t h r e e P r e s i d e n t s " meeting and
implementing s a n c t i o n s suspension b e f o r e t h e b i l a t e r a l
Sarajevo-Pale n e g o t i a t i o n s b e g i n . The sequence would be:
1. Sanctions
suspension package agreed (as above).
2. I z e t b e g o v i c , Tudjman and M i l o s e v i c meet, agree on
m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n ( w i t h p r o v i s i o n as above t o d e f e r
Sector E a s t ) , and e s t a b l i s h p r i n c i p l e s f o r s e t t l e m e n t
o f b o t h b i l a t e r a l c o n f l i c t s (Sarajevo-Pale; C r o a t i a C r o a t i a n Serbs).
They i n v i t e t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t i e s
(Sarajevo/Pale and Croatia/RSK) t o n e g o t i a t e on t h e
b a s i s o f (acceptance o f ) these p r i n c i p l e s .
3. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l implements s a n c t i o n s r e l i e f package
Other p r o v i s i o n s as above:
The p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s v a r i a n t i s t h a t
M i l o s e v i c has adamantly r e s i s t e d r e c o g n i z i n g C r o a t i a , and
t h e c u r r e n t f i g h t i n g c o u l d make t h i s even more d i f f i c u l t i n
t h e s h o r t r u n . Since we have always been prepared t o g i v e
Milosevic a d d i t i o n a l sanctions r e l i e f i n conjunction w i t h
progress on C r o a t i a , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t h i s r e s i s t a n c e
c o u l d be overcome by sweetening t h e i n i t i a l s a n c t i o n s
suspension package w i t h s a n c t i o n s l i f t .
Moving t o t h i s
approach would be a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o p o s a l
we gave B i l d t , so p r o b a b l y c o u l d not be deployed unless t h e
f i r s t approach f a i l e d t o get o f f t h e ground.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�How would t h i s i n i t i a t i v e
be launched?
1.
( a l r e a d y accomplished) C a r l B i l d t meets w i t h M i l o s e v i c ,
o u t l i n i n g US concerns over t h e c u r r e n t package o f s a n c t i o n s
r e l i e f , and t h e need t o improve t h e " s i t u a t i o n on t h e
ground" i n Bosnia b e f o r e any s a n c t i o n s suspension can be
implemented. B i l d t suggests t h a t a s e n i o r US o f f i c i a l meet
w i t h M i l o s e v i c t o d i s c u s s US concerns. M i l o s e v i c agrees.
2. ( i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7-10 days, depending on events i n
C r o a t i a ) A s e n i o r l e v e l o f f i c i a l (e.g. A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y
Holbrooke) goes t o f i r s t t o Sarajevo t o l a y o u t o v e r a l l
s t r a t e g y and g a i n t h e Bosnians' c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s i s
f o l l o w e d by a v i s i t t o Belgrade t o d i s c u s s o u r approach.
3. Belgrade and Sarajevo f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s meet p r i v a t e l y
t o work o u t d e t a i l s (they a r e a l r e a d y t a l k i n g about
meeting).
4. M i l o s e v i c and I z e t b e g o v i c meet ( w i t h o r w i t h o u t
"host").
5. C e a s e - f i r e and disengagement implemented as b i l a t e r a l
t a l k s between Sarajevo and Pale b e g i n , e i t h e r f a c e - t o - f a c e
or t h r o u g h m e d i a t o r . (US? Contact Group?)
6. Three p r e s i d e n t s meet under aegis o f EU o r Contact Group.
7. B i l a t e r a l t a l k s between C r o a t i a n p a r t i e s b e g i n .
CLINTON LI
Y P OO O Y
HTCP
�see^ET-
- r-r, IN a . ? l ; - ^ - f
6050
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE P E I E T HAS S E
R SD N
EN
WASHINGTON
August 5, 1995
9 A G 5 A0 ! 11
5U
|
*
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY U
SUBJECT:
Balkan S t r a t e g y : Options f o r D i s c u s s i o n a t F o r e i g n
P o l i c y Group Meeting, August 7, 1995
P r i n c i p a l s have taken f o r w a r d t h e r e v i e w you r e q u e s t e d o f l o n g term s t r a t e g y f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e Balkan c o n f l i c t .
We asked
agencies t o r e f l e c t on where we want t o be i n 12-18 months -- t h e
"end s t a t e " t h a t would best serve U.S. i n t e r e s t s -- and then
determine how t o get t h e r e . Agencies have w r i t t e n papers
r e f l e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e approaches, which are a t t a c h e d . I t h o u g h t
you might want t o review them b e f o r e Monday's meeting.
The p o l i c y r e v i e w has r e v e a l e d a g r e a t d e a l o f common ground:
•
Everyone agrees we s h o u l d make a determined e f f o r t t o reach a
p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e coming weeks, t a k i n g advantage o f
the window o f o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by NATO's and UNPROFOR's
renewed r e s o l v e , as w e l l as by Serb (and A l l i e d ) a n x i e t i e s
about t h e s h i f t i n g s t r a t e g i c balance i n t h e wake o f C r o a t i a ' s
m i l i t a r y action.
-
-
•
The s e t t l e m e n t would adhere t o t h e c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e
Contact Group p l a n b u t w i t h a more r e a l i s t i c map, maximum
autonomy f o r t h e two e n t i t i e s and, p o s s i b l y , an o p t i o n f o r
the Serbs t o secede p e a c e f u l l y a f t e r 2-3 y e a r s .
I t would r e q u i r e t h a t t h e U.S. reassume a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n
the n e g o t i a t i o n s and break t h e f r e e z e on c o n t a c t s w i t h Pale.
(The NSC paper p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a m o d i f i e d
Contact Group p l a n and how t o achieve i t ; a l l agencies agree
w i t h t h i s b a s i c approach, a l t h o u g h S t a t e has r e s e r v a t i o n s
about c e r t a i n aspects.)
A l l agree that, i f a settlement cannot be reached and/or i f
UNPROFOR's c r e d i b i l i t y continues to erode, then we should p u l l
the plug, f u l f i l l our commitment to help UNPROFOR withdraw,
l i f t the arms embargo and move to a post-withdrawal s t r a t e g y .
Muddling through i s no longer an option.
A l l agree as w e l l t h a t we cannot walk away a f t e r UNPROFOR
leaves and t h a t we need t o p r o v i d e some degree o f s u p p o r t
(arms, t r a i n i n g , a i r s t r i k e s , economic a i d ) t o h e l p ensure t h e
s u r v i v a l o f a Bosnian s t a t e f o r t h e Muslims and C r o a t s .
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A l l agree t h a t our c o n t i n u e d engagement s h o u l d be c o n d i t i o n e d
on p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w i t h t h e Bosnian government.
While a l l agree on t h e need t o s u p p o r t a v i a b l e Bosnian s t a t e , t h e
major d i f f e r e n c e among P r i n c i p a l s i s over i t s dimensions:
•
Madeleine A l b r i g h t and I b e l i e v e t h a t we s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o
s u p p o r t t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a Bosnia-Herzegovina a l o n g l i n e s
b r o a d l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s and goals o f t h e Contact
Group p l a n ( i . e . , a s i n g l e s t a t e , w i t h t h e Muslims and Croats
c o n t r o l l i n g roughly h a l f o f the t e r r i t o r y , give or take 5%).
-
-
•
We f e e l a n y t h i n g l e s s would be tantamount t o r a t i f y i n g
a g g r e s s i o n and would, i n any case, be r e j e c t e d by S a r a j e v o
l e a d i n g t o c o n t i n u e d i n s t a b i l i t y and a r e v a n c h i s t Bosnian
state.
—
Madeleine makes t h e a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t t h a t f a i l u r e t o s u p p o r t
a v i a b l e Bosnia would undermine U.S. l e a d e r s h i p i n NATO and
the I s l a m i c w o r l d and overshadow a l l t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
o t h e r accomplishments.
S t a t e and Defense argue f o r a more l i m i t e d commitment: t h a t we
s h o u l d o n l y h e l p t h e Bosnians c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l over t h e
t e r r i t o r y t h e y now possess, w i t h some modest a d j u s t m e n t s f o r
v i a b i l i t y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y around S a r a j e v o ) . They b e l i e v e t h a t
the c o s t s o f s u p p o r t i n g Bosnian e f f o r t s t o r e c o v e r t e r r i t o r y
would be t o o g r e a t , t h e p r o s p e c t s t o o u n c e r t a i n , and t h a t i t
would r i s k s e r i o u s s t r a i n s i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h our A l l i e s and
w i t h Russia.
While t h e c h o i c e between these two e n d - s t a t e s i s a p o l i t i c a l one,
i t w i l l a f f e c t t h e n a t u r e and scope o f t h e m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t h a t
we would need t o p r o v i d e .
( A l l agree, however, t h a t we s h o u l d
draw t h e l i n e a t ground f o r c e s , a l t h o u g h Madeleine argues we
s h o u l d d e p l o y U.S. m i l i t a r y t r a i n e r s t o symbolize our l e a d e r s h i p . )
There are a l s o d i f f e r e n c e s over whether t h e r e s h o u l d be c o n d i t i o n s
a t t a c h e d t o our s u p p o r t f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l .
NSC, DOD and Madeleine A l b r i g h t argue t h a t whatever t h e scope
of our a s s i s t a n c e , i t s h o u l d be l i n k e d t o Bosnian agreement n o t
to seek more a m b i t i o u s t e r r i t o r i a l aims on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d :
-
Under t h e NSC approach, Bosnia would need t o r e f r a i n f r o m
s e e k i n g t e r r i t o r y t h a t would j e o p a r d i z e a c h i e v i n g a s e t t l e ment c o n s i s t e n t w i t h our m o d i f i e d Contact Group p r o p o s a l .
-
Under t h e DOD approach, t h e y would need t o accept t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f b e i n g a l l o w e d
to e s t a b l i s h more secure c o n t r o l over S a r a j e v o .
S t a t e argues t h a t our support s h o u l d be l i m i t e d t o d e f e n s i v e
weapons and a i r s u p p o r t e n a b l i n g the Bosnians t o h o l d e x i s t i n g
r
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t e r r i t o r y b u t t h a t we should accept
o f f e n s i v e weapons from o t h e r sources
a d d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y . I n t h i s way,
f o r t h e i r success o r f a i l u r e beyond
holdings.
•
the f a c t t h e y would o b t a i n
w i t h which t o r e t a k e
we would not be r e s p o n s i b l e
defense o f t h e i r c u r r e n t
Everyone agrees, however, t h a t we should t e l l the Bosnians now
t h a t any U.S. m i l i t a r y support f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l
w i l l be c o n t i n g e n t on t h e i r showing f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e
d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s we w i l l pursue i n the s h o r t term.
P r i n c i p a l s i d e n t i f i e d a number o f areas where f u r t h e r work w i l l be
needed b e f o r e we can make a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on these i s s u e s .
•
The s t r u c t u r e o f a m o d i f i e d Contact Group map, r e f l e c t i n g new
t r a d e - o f f s (e.g., Muslims cede Gorazde f o r t e r r i t o r y around
S a r a j e v o ) , under b o t h the more l i m i t e d and more expansive
objectives.
•
An u p - t o - d a t e a n a l y s i s o f the m i l i t a r y balance,
Bosnians w i l l f a r e when UNPROFOR leaves.
•
An a n a l y s i s o f t h e m i l i t a r y requirements (arms, t r a i n i n g ) f o r
the Bosnians:
(a) t o c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l over t h e 30 p e r c e n t
of t h e t e r r i t o r y t h e y now c o n t r o l ; o r (b) t o p l a y on a more
level field.
•
The scope o f t h e a i r support we would need t o p r o v i d e t o h e l p
the Bosnians s u r v i v e e a r l y Serb a t t a c k s and ways t o p r o v i d e
t h a t s u p p o r t i f we were unable t o a c t t h r o u g h NATO o r use
I t a l i a n bases o r had no f o r w a r d a i r c o n t r o l l e r s on t h e ground.
•
The elements o f an economic a s s i s t a n c e program t h a t we would
develop w i t h t h e EU t o support the Bosnian F e d e r a t i o n and, i n
the event o f a s e t t l e m e n t , t o u n d e r p i n r e g i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
and c o o p e r a t i o n .
•
The r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r enforcement,
an u l t i m a t e peace agreement.
Questions
and how t h e
p r e f e r a b l y t h r o u g h NATO, o f
f o r Discussion
•
What k i n d o f Bosnia should be our u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e ?
•
What w i l l
•
Should we take t h e i n i t i a t i v e and c o l l a p s e UNPROFOR t h i s year
i f diplomacy f a i l s ?
I f UNPROFOR c r e d i b i l i t y erodes f u r t h e r ?
•
What are the impediments t o " l e v e l i n g t h e p l a y i n g f i e l d " as
suggested i n t h e NSC and A l b r i g h t papers?
•
Could we convince the Bosnians t o s e t t l e f o r the s t a t u s quo?
•
When and how s h o u l d we engage our A l l i e s i n l o n g e r - r a n g e
planning?
CECRET
i t take f o r a new d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e t o succeed?
CLINTON
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Attachments
Tab A Memorandum from Ambassador A l b r i g h t
Tab B NSC Paper: S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Balkan C o n f l i c t
Tab C OSD/JCS Paper: Bosnia Endgame/What K i n d o f Bosnian S t a t e ?
Tab D S t a t e Paper: A S u s t a i n a b l e Defense o f a V i a b l e Bosnia
a f t e r UNPROFOR W i t h d r a w a l
SECRET
LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�TSBeftET
6050
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH IN GTO N
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
/
/
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
/
SUBJECT:
Balkan S t r a t e g y : Options f o r D i s c u s s i o n a t F o r e i g n
P o l i c y Group Meeting, August 7,
/
P r i n c i p a l s have taken f o r w a r d t h e review you r e q u e s t e d o f l o n g term s t r a t e g y f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e Balkan c o n f l i c t . We asked
agencies t o r e f l e c t on where we want t o be I n 12-18 months — t h e
end s t a t e " t h a t would best serve U.S. i n t e ' r e s t s — and t h e n
determine how t o g e t t h e r e . Agencies have w r i t t e n papers
r e f l e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e approaches, w h i c t / a r e a t t a c h e d . I t h o u g h t
you might want t o r e v i e w them b e f o r e Monday's meeting.
The p o l i c y review has r e v e a l e d a great d e a l o f common ground:
Everyone agrees we should make / determined e f f o r t t o reach a
p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e ceding weeks, t a k i n g advantage o f
t h e window o f o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by NATO's and UNPROFOR's
renewed r e s o l v e , as w e l l as/by Serb (and A l l i e d ) a n x i e t i e s
about t h e s h i f t i n g s t r a t e g i c balance i n t h e wake o f C r o a t i a ' s
m i l i t a r y action.
/
/
-
The s e t t l e m e n t would/adhere t o t h e c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e
Contact Group p l a n b u t w i t h a more r e a l i s t i c map, maximum
autonomy f o r t h e t&o e n t i t i e s and, p o s s i b l y , an o p t i o n f o r
t h e Serbs t o secede p e a c e f u l l y a f t e r 2-3 years.
-
I t would requirfe t h a t t h e U.S. reassume a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s and break t h e f r e e z e on c o n t a c t s w i t h Pale.
(The NSC pap^'r p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a m o d i f i e d
Contact Group p l a n and how t o achieve i t ; a l l agencies agree
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A l l agree t h a t , i f a s e t t l e m e n t cannot be reached and/or i f
UNPROFOR's/credibility c o n t i n u e s t o erode, then we s h o u l d p u l l
t h e p l u g , / f u l f i l l o u r commitment t o h e l p UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w ,
l i f t the/arms embargo and move t o a p o s t - w i t h d r a w a l s t r a t e g y .
Muddling t h r o u g h i s no l o n g e r an o p t i o n .
A l l agree as w e l l t h a t we canr.ot walk away a f t e r UNPROFOR
leaves and t h a t we need t o p r o v i d e some degree o f s u p p o r t
(arjds, t r a i n i n g , a i r s t r i k e s , economic a i d ) t o h e l p ensure t h e
s u r v i v a l o f a Bosnian s t a t e f o r the Muslims and C r o a t s .
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Dublin Core
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Title
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
2012-0799-M
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Bosnia related documents from the summer of 1995 referenced in the book, Getting to Dayton. Material includes a memo from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to President Clinton regarding the Balkan conflict, an NSC paper on current strategy in the region, and a Department of State memo on present diplomatic negotiations.
Creator
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
Format
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Adobe Acrobat Document
Medium
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Reproduction-Reference
Is Part Of
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Date Created
Date of creation of the resource.
2/6/2015
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
2012-0799-M
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Madeleine Albright
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/55aea7d1d0eae3602472bc59b910331b.pdf
0f224ace560a0cba449708015dd7a209
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.
�6853
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h King Hussein o f Jordan on
September 10, 1993
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
King Hussein
Notetaker: Anne Davis Alexander
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
September 10, 1993; 5:28 p.m. - 5:32 p.m. EDT
Sunnyvale, C a l i f o r n i a
The President:
H e l l o . (U)
King Hussein:
H e l l o Mr. President.
The President:
How are you? (U)
King Hussein:
How are you, s i r ? (U)
The President: I'm very w e l l , thank you. I'm here w i t h t h e Vice
President. We've been c e l e b r a t i n g t h i s h i s t o r i c agreement
between I s r a e l and t h e PLO and l o o k i n g forward t o an agreement
w i t h Jordan. (U)
King Hussein: I hope very much t o work i t o u t , Mr. President.
We have done e v e r y t h i n g we can t o help t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s work i t
out.
We hope t o see what we have worked f o r , f o r many years.
(U)
The President: I j u s t wanted t o c a l l t o t e l l you have g r a t e f u l
we a r e f o r t h e work you've done and b i g a supporter we are. We
w i l l be w i t h you t o t h e very end. ( 6 )
-King Hussein: Thank you very much. I hope we w i l l be able t o
r a t i f y t h e agreement, agenda, as soon as t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s have
completed t h e i r ceremony i n t h e next two days. We w i l l f o l l o w
soon
after.
The President: You t h i n k , w i t h i n a day o r so a f t e r them, you
w i l l do i t ? f e )
King Hussein:
Yes, i n a day o r two.
1.4b. 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
Declassify
o£Li|^RrO|\
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�SECRET
The P r e s i d e n t :
I hope so.
14
.d
14
.d
King Hussein:
The President:
Very, very good, s i r . (U)
Send my best t o the Queen. (U)
King Hussein: She i s here w i t h me now. She sends her best t o
the f a m i l y and t o t h e Vice President. We a l s o need your support
s i r . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I t ' s t h e r e f o r you. I f you want t o come here
again, you j u s t l e t me know. I f you have any ideas, l e t me know.
King Hussein:
support.
The P r e s i d e n t :
King Hussein:
Thank you very, very much.
We do need your
Thank you. (U)
Thank you very, very much.
Have a good time.
-- End o f Conversation --
SECRET
CLINTON L
O OY
CP
(U)
�C NDNA
O FE TL
I I
COHriDEHTIMj
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h King Hussein o f Jordan
PARTICIPANTS:
The P r e s i d e n t
King Hussein
Notetakers:
Anne D a v i s A l e x a n d e r , N e i l G.
B l e i c k e n and D a v i d S a t t e r f i e l d
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 2, 1994, 1: 03pin-1: 05pm EST
Oval O f f i c e
The P r e s i d e n t : H e l l o ? (U)
King Hussein:
The P r e s i d e n t :
King Hussein:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t . (U)
H e l l o , your Majesty.
Good A f t e r n o o n .
Great,
How a r e you? (U)
How a r e y o u , my f r i e n d ? (U)
a l l things considered.
(U)
K i n g H u s s e i n : S o r r y t o d i s t u r b you t h e s e l a s t two days. I have
been t r y i n g t o g e t i p t o u c h .
I w o u l d l i k e t o send t h e Crown
P r i n c e t o Washington
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1,4d
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t :
King Hussein:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I ' d be happy t o see him.
F i n e , Mr P r e s i d e n t .
T h a t w o u l d be g r e a t , s i r . (U)
We must g e t t h e t a l k s back on t r a c k ,
EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4d
King Hussein:
V e r y , v e r y good.
Thank you v e r y , v e r y much.
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t :
King Hussein:
We c e r t a i n l y agree. (U)
How a r e y o u , s i r ? (U)
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E. O. 13526
^SSS^SGL imm ^BRARM-, PHOTOCOPY
�C NDNA
O FE TL
I I
COHFIDBNTIAL
The P r e s i d e n t : I'm t r y i n g t o f o l l o w up on t h e t h i n g s we t a l k e d
about|
t4d
j We're doing b e t t e r i n Bosnia,
and then t h e Mideast goes bad.
^
King Hussein:
Yes, I know i t i s one t h i n g or another.
1.4b. 1 4
.d
At l e a s t
in Bosnia, i t is good news.
1.4b, 1 4
.d
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you so very much.
i n touch w i t h you. (U)
I look forward t o being
King Hussein: Thank you, s i r . A l l the best t o Mrs. C l i n t o n and
from Noor as w e l l . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you so very much.
•CLINTON
Goodbye. (U)
O OY
CP
�\ 1•
SECRET
2080
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h King Hussein o f Jordan on March
18, 1994
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
King Hussein
Notetakers: Anne Davis Alexander,
David S a t t e r f i e l d , and Thorn Turner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 18, 1994, 1:27pm-1:37pm EST
The Oval O f f i c e
King
Hussein:
The P r e s i d e n t :
King
Hussein:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o , Hello? (U)
Hello? (U)
H e l l o , Mr. President. (U)
H e l l o , how are you? (U)
King Hussein:
Thank you very much, I am w e l l . I t i s a pleasure
t o hear from you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : You probably know why I am c a l l i n g . I'm t r y i n g
t o work though t h e UN S e c u r i t y Council R e s o l u t i o n coming up. I'm
faced w i t h a d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n and under pressure from many
members o f Congress t o veto t h e r e s o l u t i o n .
FQ 135?fi 1 4ri
1.4d
King Hussein:
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : T h a t ' s w o n d e r f u l .
I ' m very g r a t e f u l .
We're
going t o t a l k to our Russian co-sponsors and others t o set dates
in A p r i l .
I hope t h i s w i l l a l l o w A r a f a t t o resume n e g o t i a t i o n s .
We were so close t o agreement b e f o r e t h i s t e r r i b l e t h i n g
happened.
King Hussein:
Yes,
i t was an a w f u l t h i n g t o happen.
1.4b, 1.4d
CECRET
Declass:
ify oCLmiON ygjgARY q O O O Y
HTCP
1.4b, 1.4d
Q
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w .
Co
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�SECRET
1.4b, 1.4d
The President:
Kinq Hussein:
Good.
I ' l l be back i n touch w i t h you. (U)
Thank you very, very much.
1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d
The President:
There w i l l be no veto. We have agreed t o vote
f o r a l l the s u b s t a n t i v e language and pass the vote on the
preamble. There w i l l be no t h r e a t o f a v e t o , no c r i t i c i s m o f the
r e s o l u t i o n , (-fr)
1.4b, 1.4d
The President: |
t^d
| I'm not
changing any p u b l i c p o s i t i o n I've taken i n t h e past. fS-)
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t :
SECRET
Thank you. (U)
CLINTON tJBRARY"PHOTOCOPY
�SECRET
King Hussein: I f t h e r e i s anything we can do...Thank you and
best wishes t o you and Mrs. C l i n t o n from Noor. (U)
The President:
King Hussein:
SECRET
Thank you. Good day. (U)
Goodbye. (U)
CL I MTOM 1^fiRY jPHfrmmPY
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
Provenance
A statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.
Clinton Presidential Records
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
Text
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Declassified Documents concerning Jordan
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2012-0050-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on memcons and telcons between President Clinton and King Hussein of Jordan from 1993 thru 1994. Telcons between President Clinton and King Hussein regarding peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO are included.
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National Security Council
Records Management Office
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
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Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files
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William J. Clinton Presidential Library & Museum
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2/6/2015
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2012-0050-M
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Jordan
King Hussein
Middle East
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/1e07f85597e7a0a171bbd0b1ad67cdf1.pdf
d222b44e6cacd4806ef5b3f3682df746
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�D
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
OFFICE
OF T H E VICE
PRESIDENT
W A S H I N G T O N
A p r i l 14, 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
Security A f f a i r s
for National
MARK FOULON
Executive A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Undersecretary o f State
for P o l i t i c a l Affairs
JAMES LOCHER
Senior C i v i l i a n O f f i c i a l ; O f f i c e o f t h e Under
S e c r e t a r y o f Defense f o r P o l i c y
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f Conversation
A t t a c h e d f o r your i n f o r m a t i o n i s a memorandum o f
c o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e March 26, 1993, meeting between V i c e
P r e s i d e n t Gore and P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Please c o n t r o l t h i s document c l o s e l y and l i m i t i t s
d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n your o r g a n i z a t i o n .
jeon S. F u e r t h
Assistant t o the Vice President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Attachment
CLASSIFIED BY: NSA
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
OVP/NSA C o n t r o l No. 93X-0060
Copy
of
Copies
DKCMSSIF1ED
E.0.13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
While HoiucGuideliiira, Scptcmberll, 2006
VARA.DateMvi]
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HT
�iGRErP
OFFICE
OF
THE
VICE
PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
A p r i l 14,
1993
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting between Vice P r e s i d e n t Gore and P r e s i d e n t
A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia and Herzegovina
PARTICIPANTS
United
States
The V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
R e g i n a l d Bartholomew, S p e c i a l Envoy t o t h e
Vance-Owen Talks
Leon F u e r t h , A s s i s t a n t t o t h e V i c e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Jane H o l l , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l S t a f f
Frank Pandolfe, M i l i t a r y Aide t o t h e
Vice President (notetaker)
Bosnia
A l i j a Izetbegovic, President
Haris S i l a j d z i c , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Mohamed Sacirbey, Ambassador t o t h e U n i t e d
Translator
PLACE:
V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s West Wing O f f i c e
TIME:
10:50-11:45
DATE:
March 26,
Nations
a.m.
1993
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore: Welcome. P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n understands and
a p p r e c i a t e s your courage and statesmanship.
I know what a
d i f f i c u l t and d e c i s i v e a c t i t was.
Events w i l l u n f o l d
d i f f e r e n t l y due t o your courageous a c t i o n . The key now w i l l be
t o get t h e Bosnian Serbs t o s i g n . Every e f f o r t w i l l be made t o
make t h a t happen, i n c l u d i n g a t i g h t e n i n g o f s a n c t i o n s t o i n c r e a s e
pressure on t h e Serbs. We have t o get Serb agreement i n o r d e r t o
undertake i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
I n other n a t i o n s , support f o r
s a n c t i o n s and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y i s o l a t i n g t h e Serbs i s v e r y , v e r y
s t r o n g . A l l t h e more so now t h a t you have s i g n e d t h e agreement.
This i s a t u r n i n g p o i n t , b u t t h e r e i s much l e f t t o be done. I
know i t has been a t e r r i b l e burden f o r you t o conduct
n e g o t i a t i o n s w h i l e your people need r e l i e f .
Your courage i s
h e l p i n g achieve t h a t s t e p .
CLINTON.
DECLASSIFIED
DY PER E.O. 13526
�P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Our people l o s t c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e European
Community. We a p p r e c i a t e t h e American commitment t o b a c k i n g
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s agreement. We know you w i l l do your b e s t
t o implement t h e agreement. I don't b e l i e v e t h a t Karadzic w i l l
s i g n . We must c o n s i d e r what t o do i f t h e y do n o t s i g n . They
s h o u l d n o t be g i v e n much t i m e , which t h e y w i l l use t o c o n t i n u e
k i l l i n g and c o n d u c t i n g massive a t t a c k s i n E a s t e r n Bosnia. These
f o r c e s a r e coming from S e r b i a . Our i n f o r m a t i o n says t h a t 200
t a n k s , t r o o p s , and t r a i n i n g came from S e r b i a l a s t month. This
was t o launch a new o f f e n s i v e . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l community must
decide what i t w i l l do about t h i s .
The s i t u a t i o n i n Russia w i l l
c o m p l i c a t e t h i n g s . No one can p r e d i c t what w i l l happen t h e r e .
Bosnia i s a democratic c o u n t r y , a d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e .
Karadzic says Serbs cannot l i v e w i t h o t h e r , t h a t t h e y must l i v e
alone i n each town and v i l l a g e .
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore: Our f i r s t s t e p w i l l be t o make every e f f o r t
t o g e t Serbia t o s i g n t h e agreement. But you're r i g h t t h a t we
must imagine what w i l l happen i f they don't s i g n . A l s o what w i l l
happen i f t h e y do s i g n . I f t h e y don't s i g n , we w i l l t i g h t e n
s a n c t i o n s and t a k e steps t o achieve t h e d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n o f
Serbia.
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : I a l s o w i s h t o thank you, m i s t e r
P r e s i d e n t , f o r your courageous d e c i s i o n . I t i s n o t an empty
d i p l o m a t i c g e s t u r e . I t r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e Russians. We w i l l
press f o r passage o f t h e No F l y Zone w i t h i n one week. The No F l y
Zone i s i m p o r t a n t s y m b o l i c a l l y ; i t may a l s o h e l p somewhat on t h e
ground. We hope t h i s s e r i e s o f steps w i l l pay o f f . I f n o t ,
w e ' l l see what o t h e r s t e p s a r e r e q u i r e d . W e ' l l i n c r e a s e t h e
pressure i f Serbia doesn't s i g n . We w i l l c o n s u l t w i t h our a l l i e s
about l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo. We cannot a c t u n i l a t e r a l l y on
t h i s i s s u e , however. We w i l l commence d i s c u s s i o n s i f t h e y don't
s i g n soon.
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : We would welcome a s t a t e m e n t from you
which s u p p o r t s o u r a c t i o n .
People back home have doubts.
We
have had bad experiences w i t h p a s t n e g o t i a t i o n s . People who a r e
s u f f e r i n g a r e unsure t h a t t h i s s i g n a t u r e i s a s t e p towards peace.
But they t r u s t t h e US; t h e y do n o t t r u s t t h e European Community.
A g e n e r a l statement o f what you w i l l do would be h e l p f u l and
appreciated.
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore: S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r has a l r e a d y r e l e a s e d
such a statement.
I w i l l make a statement t h a t t h i s i s a s t e p
towards peace, as w e l l . T h i s was t h e r i g h t d e c i s i o n , t h e r i g h t
s t e p . I am convinced o f t h a t .
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : I have no doubt t h a t American
diplomacy helped us reach t h i s agreement. I thank S e c r e t a r y
C h r i s t o p h e r and Ambassador Bartholomew. I t ' s up t o t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community now. Our r e l a t i o n s w i t h C r o a t i a a r e v e r y
i m p o r t a n t a t t h i s p o i n t . Many t h i n g s i n t h e f i e l d and o t h e r w i s e
CLIN
�depend on our r e l a t i o n s w i t h C r o a t i a . Your h e l p i n t h i s i s s u e i s
crucial.
C r o a t i a n l e a d e r s have a way o f b a c k i n g away under
p r e s s u r e and then coming back l a t e r .
Ambassador Bartholomew: I agree t h a t t h e Bosnian-Croat
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s c r u c i a l and t h a t we can h e l p .
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore:
How?
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We have had t r o u b l e w i t h extreme
n a t i o n a l i s t C r o a t i a n groups i n Bosnia. A d i r e c t reminder t o
Zagreb can h e l p .
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Cooperations w i t h Zagreb i s v i t a l .
Other
than S a r a j e v o , no a i r p o r t i n Bosnia i s w o r k i n g . A l l
communications comes t h r o u g h e i t h e r S e r b i a o r C r o a t i a . They use
t h i s t o g i v e concessions t o n a t i o n a l i s t C r o a t i a n s . This c o u l d
lead t o a wider c o n f l i c t .
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We are i n a v e r y desperate f i n a n c i a l
s i t u a t i o n . We would l i k e f o r Arab f r i e n d s t o c o n t r i b u t e . They
are r e l u c t a n t t o i n t e r f e r e i n Europe u n l e s s i n v i t e d by t h e White
House. T h i s would be a v e r y c o n c r e t e way t o h e l p us. Today i n
Bosnia t h e r e i s no p r o d u c t i o n , t h e r e i s no income, y e t people
need t o e a t . A l s o , opening your embassy i n Sarajevo would be
v e r y h e l p f u l , t h e EC would f o l l o w .
Ambassador Bartholomew: The s e c u r i t y dimension i s what he's
d e s c r i b i n g here.
These moves would have t h e impact d e s c r i b e d .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : What c i t i e s ?
Foreign M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c :
Sarajevo.
Ambassador Bartholomew: I've been t h r o u g h bombardments as bad as
Sarajevo.
There are ways t o p r o t e c t our people.
I t would be a
v e r y h e l p f u l symbol.
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We would l i k e t o combine
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e agreement w i t h t h e No F l y Zone; t h a t would
give i t t e e t h .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : I d i d n ' t want t o l i n k t h e No F l y Zone w i t h
something e l s e . That c o u l d cause d e l a y . Would you s t i l l want i t
i f i t d e l a y s t h e No F l y Zone by a week?
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We
can w a i t .
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : The d e l a y m i g h t g i v e t h e Serbs a chance t o
s i g n ; t o come t o t h e i r senses.
Ambassador Bartholomew: I f e e l we s h o u l d press f o r t h e No F l y
Zone as soon as p o s s i b l e .
C L I N M m i f f i f P OO O Y
HTCP
�"Trr ', •
Secretary Christopher: I l i k e the
• ,
1
concept.
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore: I t i s a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g
concept.
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : My obsession i s Eastern Bosnia. H o r r i b l e
t h i n g s w i l l f o l l o w t h e f a l l of towns t h e r e . 100,000 people w i l l
f l e e t o C r o a t i a ; t o t r y t o escape. Aggression must be stopped
w h i l e we w a i t f o r t h e Serbs t o s i g n . Otherwise t h e r e w i l l be t h e
b i g g e s t human t r a g e d y i n Europe s i n c e t h e Second World War.
The
Bosnian Army cannot f i g h t f o r months w i t h o u t h e l p .
Ambassador S a c i r b e y : The
arms embargo i s t h e problem.
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Even a p a r t i a l l i f t i n g o f t h e embargo,
perhaps ammunition, would be v e r y h e l p f u l .
V i c e P r e s i d e n t Gore: We are f o l l o w i n g a sequence. F i r s t t r y t o
convince t h e Serbs t o s i g n t h e agreement. Once t h e y s i g n , t h e US
i s committed t o h e l p implement t h e agreement. We can t u r n t o
l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo a f t e r we've made e f f o r t s t o get t h e
Serbs t o s i g n .
Ambassador Bartholomew: We've a l r e a d y t o l d our a l l i e s t h a t
w i l l l o o k a t l i f t i n g t h e embargo i f t h e Serbs don't s i g n .
we
Ambassador Sacirbey: We're p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h our s u r v i v a l .
The
next s t e p i s d e f i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g our c o n s t i t u t i o n .
I f t h e Serbs s i g n , w e ' l l w i s h f o r your s t r o n g endorsement of
implementing democratic p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than a c c e p t i n g a p u r e l y
p o l i t i c a l document.
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We do n o t want t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m o r
n a t i o n a l i s m . We want democracy.
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : We s u f f e r e d t y r a n n y under t h e o t h e r
system, now we want democracy.
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : What i s your assessment o f t h e s i t u a t i o n
a t Sarajevo and a t t h e Tulza a i r p o r t ?
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Sarajevo i s v e r y dangerous; t h e y may s p l i t
t h e c i t y i n t o two p a r t s . S e v e r a l days ago t h e r e was t h e w o r s t
s h e l l i n g s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e war.
Some o f our o f f i c e r s
and s o l d i e r s b e l i e v e t h e y w i l l t r y t o occupy t h e c i t y .
But t o
t r y t o t a k e t h e c i t y i t would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r them and us.
They would have t o f i g h t house t o house. Yesterday t h e s i t u a t i o n
was a b i t more calm.
Use o f t h e a i r f i e l d a t Tulza would be v e r y h e l p f u l .
S u p p l i e s c o u l d come t o us. Use o f t h e a i r f i e l d would a l s o be a
v a l u a b l e s i g n t h a t t h i n g s are b e i n g done. Yes, we can h o l d i t .
I t i s n o t now i n d i r e c t danger.
CLI NTG^MffltPf-PHOTOCOPY
�J
vj:- ,
,
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;
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At t h i s p o i n t P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n e n t e r e d t h e room and shook
hands w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c , a f t e r which t h e y d e p a r t e d
t o g e t h e r t o t h e Oval O f f i c e .
Approved By:
Prepared By:
CLINTONHH
0T0C0PY
�aura.
6787
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
September 9, 1993
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
FROM:
JENONNE WALKER
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia
& Herzegovina on September 8, 1993
A t t a c h e d i s t h e Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e meeting
between t h e P r e s i d e n t and P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c on September 8,
1993.
We suggest t h a t t h e Memorandum be p r o v i d e d t o t h e
Department o f S t a t e .
RECOMMENDATIONS
That you s i g n t h e a t t a c h e d t r a n s m i t t a l memo t o Marc Grossman.
Approve
Disapprove
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n be f i l e d f o r t h e
record.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum t o S t a t e
Tab A
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
DECLASSIFIED
-SEGRET
Declassify
mm
�-SECRET
6787
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 10, 1993
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive S e c r e t a r y
Department o f S t a t e
Memorandum o f Conversation from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
September 8 Meeting w i t h Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Izetbegovic^^S^T
SUBJECT:
Attached f o r eyes o n l y o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e i s t h e
memorandum o f c o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s September 8
meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina.
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
DECLASSFFIED
£.0.13526,80.3.5(b)
Declassify
^
0 C C^PP-NARA, Dl JsMM
ae
low- o%\-^
�6787
.SECREJ.
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Charles Redman, S p e c i a l Envoy t o t h e Former
Yugoslavia
Jenonne Walker, NSC S t a f f , Notetaker
A l i j a Izetbegovic, President
Ejup Ganic, V i c e - P r e s i d e n t
Muhammed S a c i r b e y , Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
t o t h e U n i t e d Nations
Dr. Nedzib S a c i r b e y , Personal R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
to the President
Ivan M i s i c , Deputy Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
t o t h e UN
Sabina B e r b e r o v i c , I n t e r p r e t e r
September 8, 1993, "5: 00-5 :30pm
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Izetbegovic: (beginning translation indistinct). . .
important that the U.S. be ready to participate in guaranteeing
an agreement if we ask with an international force. Our people
believe in the United States. Unfortunately our people do not
trust the Europeans and we know you cannot act without them and
that (Congressional?) support is a problem. But we hope we can
count on the participation of the U.S. in implementing an
agreement. -(6 )—
As t o t h e agreement, d u r i n g t h e l a s t round we d e f i n e d our minimum
of minimums and we cannot g i v e t h a t up. The problem i s , i f t h i s
minimum o f minimums i s n o t accepted, what happens n e x t . We have
made major concessions i n a g r e e i n g t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f Bosnia i n t o
t h r e e r e p u b l i c s . We hoped t h a t a f t e r t h a t , t h e o t h e r s would g i v e
us a f a i r map. We thought t h a t t h e areas o f t h e Serb r e p u b l i c
would be made up from S e r b - m a j o r i t y t e r r i t o r y .
But t h e map shows
t h a t t h e Serb r e p u b l i c would i n c l u d e S e r b - m a j o r i t y t e r r i t o r y and
M u s l i m - m a j o r i t y t e r r i t o r y t h a t had been s u b j e c t t o e t h n i c
c l e a n s i n g and genocide. The Serbs a r e t r y i n g t o keep t e r r i t o r y
taken from Muslims, around t h e D r i n a R i v e r , which were 65-70%
Muslim b e f o r e they were e t h n i c a l l y cleansed and t h e people k i l l e d
or d r i v e n o u t . - f & t "
GCB
ERT
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JNTHK
D e c l a s s i f y orio L(WB|RI U \
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-CEORET
.
2
This i s unacceptable morally and p o l i t i c a l l y . Morally because
rewarding ethnic cleansing and genocide would s e t a dangerous
precedent f o r the future; p r a c t i c a l l y because people waiting to
return to t h e i r homes -- h a l f a m i l l i o n Bosnian Muslims now are
s c a t t e r e d i n A u s t r i a , Canada, Germany, even the U.S., A u s t r a l i a ,
and elsewhere, refugees waiting to go back -- they cannot return
to t h e i r homes i f the t e r r i t o r y remains c o n t r o l l e d by Serbs.
This i s why Geneva broke down. f S T ^
It would be useful if the U.S. in the meantime put pressure on
Serbia on these issues and on the Croats on an exit to the
Adriatic. This is our second demand. Bosnia-Herzgevonia has an
exit to the sea; it has been reduced year by year to 2 9
kilometers. We are asking for 10-14 kilometers. Without that,
the Republic of Bosnia cannot function. Se we need pressure on
the Croats. 4£)
The people n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h us who a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e war
crimes must be brought t o j u s t i c e .
I am n o t making judgments.
People a r e i n n o c e n t u n t i l proven g u i l t y ; t h a t i s f o r t h e Courts
t o decide.
But i f they a r e g u i l t y t h e y s h o u l d n o t be redeemed by
a c c e p t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . This i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t . As i m p o r t a n t as
i t was a f t e r World War I I t o p u n i s h Nazi war c r i m i n a l s .
I t is
v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o p r e v e n t f u r t h e r events o f t h i s s o r t because war
crimes c o n t i n u e and many hope t h a t because they a r e n e g o t i a t i n g
w i t h us t h e y w i l l n o t be judged and punished.
T h i s i s one reason
we r e f u s e d t o n e g o t i a t e a t t h e same t a b l e w i t h them. I t must be
c l e a r t h a t those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r war crimes w i l l be punished,
even i f t h e y a r e Bosnian Muslims. I do n o t doubt t h a t t h e U.S.
w i l l s u p p o r t us i n a s k i n g f o r t h i s because American p o l i t i c s
s t i l l has r e t a i n e d c e r t a i n morals. -(3)•
I have d i s c u s s e d w i t h t h e U.S. S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e about p r o t e c t e d
zones. Sarajevo i s one. I t i s s t i l l under s i e g e . We would be
v e r y g r a t e f u l i f t h e U.S. would c o n s i d e r measures t o s t o p t h e
s i e g e . I do n o t expect an answer, b u t please c o n s i d e r what c o u l d
be done. One way would be f o r t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t o make
d e c i s i o n s on how t o implement R e s o l u t i o n 836. I t was passed f i v e
months ago b u t n o t h i n g has been done. I t i s j u s t a p r o c l a m a t i o n ,
a piece o f paper, w h i l e Sarajevo remains under s i e g e . The U.S.
would do a l o t t o help i f i t c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o l i f t i n g t h e
s i e g e . I understand t h a t t h e U.S. cannot do i t alone b u t can you
c o n t r i b u t e t o s o l v i n g t h i s ? 4^-)
The P r e s i d e n t : As I t o l d you e a r l y t h i s year, I b e l i e v e t h e U.S.
should p a r t i c i p a t e i n h e l p i n g keep t h e peace i f you reach an
agreement t h a t i s f a i r , do i t w i l l i n g l y , and i f you want us t o do
it.
For me t h e r e are two c o n d i t i o n s . I t must be done by NATO
r a t h e r t h a n t h e UN because I never want t o be i n a p o s i t i o n l i k e
b e f o r e , when we wanted t o l i f t t h e arms embargo and t h e Russians,
B r i t i s h , and French o b j e c t e d . The B r i t i s h and French a l s o a r e i n
NATO b u t t h e U.S. can l e a d NATO. Second, I cannot do i t unless
Congress w i l l support i t and p r o v i d e t h e money. I t was v e r y
i m p o r t a n t f o r you t o say p u b l i c l y t h a t you want us t o , because so
many i n Congress do n o t want us t o . Those who never wanted us t o
do a n y t h i n g i n Bosnia, and now those who supported l i f t and
-6-ECRET
CLINTON kteEmV-WOTOCOPY
�—seegcr
3
s t r i k e b u t because t h a t was not p o s s i b l e now f e a r t h a t no
agreement w i l l be e n f o r c e a b l e , w i l l b r i n g peace. So what you
s a i d i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t . ^<C)—
As t o t e r r i t o r y , we b e l i e v e you s h o u l d have some access t o t h e
A d r i a t i c and t h e l a r g e s t p o s s i b l e t e r r i t o r y .
We have done what
we c o u l d t o push t h e Serbs and Croats.
B u t I do not b e l i e v e
t h e r e w i l l be any m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n t o secure more. So t h e
most leverage we have i s now, when t h e y worry whether I w i l l be
a b l e t o persuade o t h e r s i f t h e y resume f i g h t i n g .
They know t h a t
we have a s l i g h t l y b e t t e r p o s i t i o n w i t h NATO r a t h e r than w i t h t h e
UN i n t h i s . _f6-)
But I am v e r y w o r r i e d about t h e w i n t e r because I never can be
c e r t a i n what t h e UK, France, and Russia w i l l do.
So I do n o t
b e l i e v e t h e r e w i l l be any use o f f o r c e from o u t s i d e t o change t h e
s i t u a t i o n a t the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e .
So my s t r o n g recommendation
i s t o get t h e b e s t agreement you can, knowing t h a t t h e U.S. w i l l
do what i t can t o push t h e Serbs and Croats. —(-S-f
As t o war crimes, we s u p p o r t your p r o p o s a l . _(S)
About airpower to l i f t the siege of Sarajevo.
We w i l l continue
what we s a i d , but you should remember t h a t even under the NATO
agreement our a l l i e s worry about t h e i r s o l d i e r s on the ground. I
know we can t r i g g e r airpower i f the Serbs resume what they were
doing, but we are u n l i k e l y to be able to respond to what they a r e
doing now. f-S-J
This whole business i s d i f f i c u l t f o r me. I never understood why
they would n o t vote t o l i f t t h e arms embargo. That was when John
Major t o l d me h i s government would f a l l .
I t h o u g h t t h a t was j u s t
crazy. •fS-)'
But t h e b e s t t h i n g I can do f o r you and t o be your f r i e n d i s t o
t e l l you I have no reason t o b e l i e v e we can l i f t t h e arms embargo
or o f f e r you more on a i r s t r i k e s than NATO's p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n .
The b e s t t h i n g would be t o get Congress t o l e t me h e l p implement
an agreement. I w i l l do a l l I can.
I w i l l be t h e r e f o r you.
(At t h i s p o i n t , Ambassador Sacirbey gave t h e P r e s i d e n t a map
showing t h e Owen-Stoltenberg p r o p o s a l s and a d d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y
wanted by t h e Bosnian government.) - - T
(S
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic ( p o i n t i n g t o t h e map):
t h a t have been e t h n i c a l l y cleansed. _(. )
these are t h e areas
q
President Izetbegovic:
taken place. Ir&T'
Areas in which the heaviest genocide has
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic: The problem i s , i f they do n o t accept o u r
minimum o f minimums, who w i l l s u p p o r t us. This ( a g a i n p o i n t i n g
t o t h e map) i s the minimum we can s e l l our people.
We had hoped
o t h e r Muslim areas would be p u t under t h e UN. B u t i f they do n o t
-SBeiRBT"
CLIN
�-eecCTT?
.
4
accept o u r minimum, and j u s t c o n t i n u e t o take more t e r r i t o r y ,
someone has t o t e l l them t o s t o p t h e o f f e n s i v e . -fS-)Ambassador Sacirbey:
I n t h e East some Muslim enclaves would be
c o m p l e t e l y i s o l a t e d ; e c o n o m i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y i n v i a b l e .
They
would have t o be w e l f a r e s t a t e .
I do n o t know who would p r o t e c t
them. I t i s n o t j u s t a m a t t e r o f f a i r n e s s t o t h e Bosnians b u t
a l s o a problem o f who would keep t h e peace and how. J^S )—
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic: And i f we s i g n , we would need t o know t h a t
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community w i l l s u p p o r t and implement an
agreement.
Because we would have g i v e n up so much. We would be
a t i n y c o u n t r y between two more p o w e r f u l ones.
So o u r s i g n a t u r e
would have value o n l y i f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community would
implement t h e agreement because we would have g i v e n up o u r
n a t i o n a l and l e g a l i d e n t i t y . -fS-)
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : You c o u l d s i g n b u t c o n d i t i o n your
s i g n a t u r e on whether t h e r e would be i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . -^S-f
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic: The e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , i n t r o d u c e d by
Belgrade, i s l i k e f a s c i s m i n 1939, because t h e y a l s o achieved
most o f t h e t e r r i t o r y by e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . I f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community accepts i t i n Bosnia, i t w i l l spread everywhere. So
t h i s i s an h i s t o r i c moment f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
Perhaps I am being u n d i p l o m a t i c . But everyone i n Bosnia sees t h e
U.S. as f r i e n d l y . We i d e n t i f y w i t h another m u l t i e t h n i c
community.
But we have few exchanges w i t h you. To have t h e CIA
o r o t h e r s j u s t t o g i v e them i n f o r m a t i o n . Germany i s c l o s e t o
C r o a t i a , Russia t o S e r b i a , t h e UK and France somewhat c l o s e t o
S e r b i a . We Bosnians a r e alone, and as a m u l t i e t h n i c c o u n t r y we
want t o cooperate w i t h t h e U.S. i n any way t h a t would be u s e f u l
t o you. -(6)
Secretary
implement
primarily
t o you.
Mr. Lake:
Christopher:
I f t h e r e i s an agreement and we h e l p
i t , i t would be o u r i n t e n t f o r U.S. f o r c e s t o be
i n t h e Muslim areas.
So t h a t would make us v e r y c l o s e
fS-)That has been t h e b a s i s o f NATO p l a n n i n g .
•^S-p'
The P r e s i d e n t : And beyond m i l i t a r y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , t h e r e w i l l be
a b i g r e b u i l d i n g j o b t o do and we want t o be h e l p f u l .
About
Germany, i t i s t h e o n l y European c o u n t r y t h a t s t o o d by me i n
t r y i n g t o l i f t t h e arms embargo. While Kohl f e e l s c l o s e t o t h e
C r o a t i a n people he t r u s t s your l e a d e r s h i p . So I t h i n k we can p u t
together b u i l d i n g blocks, not only m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y b u t
r e b u i l d i n g . There i s a f e e l i n g among many c o u n t r i e s t h a t what
happened t o you was wrong.
Ambassador Sacirbey: It is especially important for the U.S. to
administer Sarajevo. It risks being divided. U.S. leadership in
the city would help ensure that there will be no more Berlins in
Europe. It would be a clear signal that there is a change. The
people would feel there is a new peace. • (£•)-'
-&BCRET
CLINTON UBR^rWOTOCOPY
�Mr. Lake: The French a l s o f e e l s t r o n g l y about Sarajevo and w i l l
wish t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n some way b u t we can work o u t something t o
share i n some way. We want t o make sure t h e y s t a y engaged i n
some way. -fG-)~
The P r e s i d e n t :
I understand
and t h i n k we can work something o u t .
Ambassador Sacirbey:
The siege o f Sarajevo has n o t been l i f t e d .
The Serbs have i n f a c t t i g h t e n e d t h e i r g r i p .
I t i s n o t so
v i s i b l e because t h e y a r e n o t squeezing v e r y hard y e t b u t when
w i n t e r comes i f they squeeze j u s t a l i t t l e t i g h t e r . . . .so you
must be v e r y s e n s i t i v e t h a t i t i s n o t j u s t a m a t t e r o f s h e l l i n g
b u t c u t t i n g o f t h e gas, e l e c t r i c i t y , n o t enough h u m a n i t a r i a n
s u p p l i e s g e t t i n g i n can cause slow s t r a n g u l a t i o n . (S)
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic: They use t h e slow s t r a n g u l a t i o n t a c t i c t o
p r o l o n g our death and a v o i d NATO a i r s t r i k e s b u t t h e end r e s u l t
i s t h e same. -(G)-'
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : They a r e i n a l l t h e mountains around
Sarajevo.
I i n s i s t e d t o K a r a d j i c i n Geneva t h a t t h e y w i t h d r a w
and he s a i d they would someday b u t n o t now. I f we o n l y had some
m u n i t i o n s we c o u l d r e s o l v e t h e problem because o u r people a r e
ready t o f i g h t .
But we have a shortage o f m u n i t i o n s and
ammunition because a l l t h e roads a r e c u t . We have r e s i s t e d f o r
17 months and I do n o t know what w i l l happen i f o u r Army
c o l l a p s e s . -fS-f
Vice P r e s i d e n t Ganic: And we a r e a s k i n g j u s t f o r one grenade o r
r o c k e t f o r each Serbian t a n k . For r i f l e s .
Not t o make advances
b u t j u s t t o defend o u r s e l v e s . We a r e unable t o defend o u r s e l v e s
i n t h e h e a r t o f Europe. •fS-)*
M i l o s e v i c has c r e a t e d g r e a t e r Serbia t h r o u g h e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g .
Now they a r e b l a c k m a i l i n g us on t h i s . M i l o s e v i c i s t e l l i n g h i s
o p p o s i t i o n t h a t he g o t t h e t e r r i t o r y t h e y wanted. They a r e
s u f f e r i n g from s a n c t i o n s b u t t h i n g s w i l l even o u t i n t h e end and
they w i l l keep t h e t e r r i t o r y . -(6)
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : The u n f o r t u n a t e r e a l i t y i s t h a t a
reasonable s e t t l e m e n t i s your b e s t hope. Even i f you a v o i d
s t r a n g u l a t i o n , t h a t i s not a long-term s o l u t i o n .
I have sent
cables t o t h e Serbs, Croats, a l l our NATO a l l i e s .
We a r e doing
a l l we can b u t t h e t i m e i s now. You may n o t be s t r o n g e r i n t h e
f u t u r e . When w i n t e r comes, I am a f r a i d t h a t your b a r g a i n i n g
p o s i t i o n w i l l be l e s s s t r o n g . A l l t h e o t h e r t h i n g s we have been
t a l k i n g about a r e p a s t wrongs, b u t t h e i s s u e now i s t h e
n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e . -fS)
The President: We will see what we can do on the map. Maybe we
can influence it a little more and we will try. But negotiations
are your best hope. And I will do all I can to see that the
Americans are where you want them in implementation. ^S y
CLINTON tiBR^rfWOTOCOPY
�-SECRET
6
Ambassador Sacirbey: W i t h i n t h i s Bosnian r e p u b l i c w i l l be over
h a l f a m i l l i o n non-Muslims. So 50% o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i s expected
t o l i v e on 29% o f t h e t e r r i t o r y , which has l i t t l e a g r i c u l t u r e and
i t s i n d u s t r y and c i t i e s have been d e s t r o y e d . The areas t h a t may
n o t be p u t i n t h e hands o f t h e Bosnian government s h o u l d be taken
from t h e Serbs who conducted e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . Refugees would
have no c o n f i d e n c e i n going home i f Serbs c o n t r o l l e d t h e
territory.
I have discussed w i t h Ambassador Redman i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o n t r o l o f those t e r r i t o r i e s so refugees can go back t o t h e i r
homes and t h e i s s u e o f s o v e r e i g n t y can be r e s o l v e d l a t e r .
)
President Izetbegovic: It is important than refugees have the
confidence to return home. Jr&f
Thank you f o r your time Mr. P r e s i d e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you and good l u c k .
(U)
(U)
(General handshakes and goodbyes)
CECRET
CLINTON
H0T0C0PY
�JL m \\JL.\'i
CONriBEMEJAL
7756
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 26, 1994
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
FROM:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f Conversation from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina on September 25, 1994
A t t a c h e d i s t h e Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e meeting
between t h e P r e s i d e n t and P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c on September 25,
1994. We suggest t h a t t h e Memorandum be p r o v i d e d t o t h e
Department o f S t a t e .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e a t t a c h e d t r a n s m i t t a l memo t o S t a t e .
Approve
Disapprove
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n be f i l e d f o r t h e
record.
Approve
ML
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum f o r S t a t e
Tab A
Memorandum o f Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
mm?.6.s^.ij(b)
-CONFIDEMUALp T K T H K
D e c l a s s i f y oru L £)M)R U >
D
H O T O S B P Y ^ Dt J^£/l|
a
e
�-eeNFIDENTIAL.
7756
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
September 27, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
September 25 Meeting with Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Izetbegovic {prf
Attached f o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f the Secretary o f State i s t h e
memorandum o f c o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s September 25
meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia - Herzegovina. (
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
mw LIBRARY P
H
CONFIDENTIAL"
D e c l a s s i f y orW LOAD
DECLASSIFIED
F-0.13526, Sec. 3.5 (H
iwdelincs, Scptcmberll
JLNARA, Date_l«i£/
�1
-tJUWL l U L N T l A L
7756
THE
WHITE H O U S E
WAS
HIN G T O N
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f BosniaHerzegovina
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Ambassador t o t h e UN
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC ( N o t e t a k e r )
President A l i j a Izetbegovic
Prime M i n i s t e r H a r i s S i l a j d z i c
Defense M i n i s t e r Jadranko P r l i c
Sven A l k a l a j , Ambassador t o t h e U.S.
Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador t o the UN
( a l s o s e r v i n g as i n t e r p r e t e r )
Dr. Begic, P o l i t i c a l A d v i s e r t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
DATE, TIME,
and PLACE:
September 25, 1994, 4:35-5:10 p.m.,
W a l d o r f - A s t o r i a H o t e l , New York
The P r e s i d e n t : C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on g e t t i n g o u t o f Sarajevo.
I've been f o l l o w i n g events c l o s e l y and have been very
d i s t u r b e d by developments -- e s p e c i a l l y by events i n
Sarajevo.
I understand Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c and
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r spoke a couple o f days ago about your
idea f o r going t o t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l f o r a postponement o f
l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo by f o u r t o s i x months. I b e l i e v e
i t ' s a good i d e a . I'm n o t sure what t h e B r i t i s h , French and
Russians w i l l say.
But I would l i k e t o d i s c u s s t h e d e t a i l s
of how t o do i t and what e l s e we can do t o h e l p . ^C)P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : They have no reason f o r l e a v i n g
because o f t h e coming o f weapons. But I must t e l l you t h a t
a major motive behind o u r p r o p o s a l i s t h e maintenance o f
UNPROFOR w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y . I f they w i l l n o t s t a y , then
t h e r e i s no reason t o proceed w i t h a d e l a y measure. I t
seems t o us t h a t we should a w a i t t h e i r response b e f o r e I
express o u r s u p p o r t p u b l i c l y . We would expect them t o
support t h e UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n . We a r e making a
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concession t o g a i n t h e i r acceptance so we would not be
s a t i s f i e d w i t h o p p o s i t i o n or even a b s t e n t i o n . We need t o
get n i n e v o t e s f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n . *(C)
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c :
This i s a v e r y i m p o r t a n t i s s u e .
We must be v e r y c l e a r about t e r m i n o l o g y . This i s not a
postponement of l i f t , b u t o n l y of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s i d e .
The
embargo would t e c h n i c a l l y be l i f t e d , w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
s i d e pushed down t h e road. There s h o u l d be a commitment by
your a l l i e s t o l i f t t h e embargo t h r o u g h a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
r e s o l u t i o n passed two weeks a f t e r October 15.
The embargo
would be t e c h n i c a l l y l i f t e d , w i t h t h e e f f e c t i v e date
delayed. -fG-)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e f o r m a l l i f t i n g
of t h e arms embargo and t h e a c t u a l d e l i v e r y of arms or t h e
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of l i f t c o u l d be separated by f o u r t o s i x
months. J u s t t o make t h i n g s c l e a r : t h e arms embargo needs
t o be l i f t e d today.
But i n f a c t , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n can be s i x
months o f f . This i s our i d e a . -(C)
Secretary Christopher:
Now t h a t we've heard from P r e s i d e n t
I z e t b e g o v i c , I w i l l c o n t a c t Hurd and Juppe p r o m p t l y t o work
out an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h them. What P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c
has s a i d today i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what I d i s c u s s e d w i t h
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c on F r i d a y .
{^)
The President:
today?
l&r
Can we get an answer from Hurd and Juppe
Secretary Christopher:
Maybe by e a r l y tomorrow morning.
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y Holbrooke: We can d e f i n i t e l y get a
commitment t h a t t h e y w i l l s t a y i n UNPROFOR. I t i s l e s s c l e a r
cut whether we can get a commitment t o v o t e f o r a UN
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n whose words have not y e t been
worked o u t . At a minimum, t h e S e c r e t a r y can get a
commitment not t o oppose. Then w e ' l l have t o move f o r w a r d
from t h e r e . On t h e key p o i n t -- w i l l t h e y s t a y -- t h e
S e c r e t a r y w i l l be a b l e t o get t h i s b e f o r e c l o s e of business
tomorrow, and we can then make i t p u b l i c a f t e r your speech.
I f we don't get t h i s commitment, then what you have
suggested f a l l s a p a r t . So a p u b l i c commitment t o s t a y i s
a c h i e v a b l e ; t h e o t h e r p o i n t i s going t o be harder. -fG-}—
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : We w i l l s t a r t w o r k i n g on t h e wording
of t h e r e s o l u t i o n p r o m p t l y .
The B r i t i s h and French w i l l be
r e l i e v e d and view your p r o p o s a l p o s i t i v e l y .
I don't t h i n k
they want t o w i t h d r a w t h e i r f o r c e s -- they f e e l an
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o b l i g a t i o n t o s t a y . But they see l i f t i n g o t h e arms embargo
as p r o v i d i n g them no c h o i c e i n t h e m a t t e r . -(C)-P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I would l i k e t o remind you o f t h e
o t h e r measures t h a t t h e Contact Group committed t o . There
was t h e i s s u e o f e n f o r c i n g and e x t e n d i n g t h e e x c l u s i o n
zones, b u t i n f a c t n o t h i n g has happened on t h i s .
Can we
expect more a c t i v e b e h a v i o r by t h e U n i t e d States on t h i s ?
There is also the question of Sarajevo. In fact, a point in
NATO's February 9 decision seems to have been forgotten.
Point four spoke of the need to prevent the strangulation of
Sarajevo and declared that NATO was ready to use air strikes
to prevent strangulation. Radical measures are needed to
open the roads and free the city from the siege. In a few
days people will be dying. The situation is the worst ever
in Sarajevo. Of course, we have the basis for action in the
NATO communique -- there was a consensus on this point. So
we are just asking why NATO has not acted. -(Gf
One o f t h e ways t h e s t r a n g u l a t i o n can be r e l i e v e d would be
t o open an access road t o Sarajevo.
A five-kilometer
d e m i l i t a r i z e d area c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . We would be
prepared t o p u l l back our f o r c e s i f t h e Serbs a l s o p u l l e d
back. I n f a c t , d i s c u s s i o n s have been going on f o r a l o n g
t i m e about t h e d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f t h e whole o f Sarajevo,
but these have gone s l o w l y and w i t h o u t any r e s u l t s .
Now we
are f o c u s i n g on t h e idea o f a b e l t , f i v e k i l o m e t e r s wide, t o
f a c i l i t a t e s u p p l i e s . I n t h i s way, t h e s i t u a t i o n can be
eased! Of course, t h i s i s n o t a f i n a l s o l u t i o n o r t h e
s a l v a t i o n o f Sarajevo, b u t i t would a l l o w some t i m e f o r t h e
s i t u a t i o n t o be improved. We need your s u p p o r t .
fC)••
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : When I c o n t a c t t h e French and
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s r e g a r d i n g your p l a n r e g a r d i n g t h e
arms embargo, I am going t o ask f o r t h e i r commitment t o
e n f o r c e t h e e x c l u s i o n zones -- which t h e y haven't done so
far.
I w i l l a l s o be i n t o u c h w i t h t h e Germans. The
P r e s i d e n t j u s t met w i t h B o u t r o s - G h a l i and pressed him v e r y
hard f o r f i r m e r enforcement,
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t o l d B o u t r o s - G h a l i t h a t we a r e v e r y upset
about t h e s i t u a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n Sarajevo.
Every day o u r
p i l o t s a r e ready t o go. I t ' s t e r r i b l e t h a t we haven't been
more a g g r e s s i v e so f a r . B o u t r o s - G h a l i s a i d t h e French and
B r i t i s h always stop him. I b e l i e v e t h e i r t r o o p s a r e i n more
danger when we don't r e t a l i a t e .
So I agree e n t i r e l y .
Secretary Christopher w i l l t a l k t o the other f o r e i g n
m i n i s t e r s . B o u t r o s - G h a l i s a i d he won't o b j e c t t o b e i n g more
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a g g r e s s i v e i f we can b r i n g t h e o t h e r s around. I n t h e next
few days, we w i l l e x e r t a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t .
I w i l l raise
t h i s w i t h Y e l t s i n as w e l l .
So f a r t h e Russians have been
l e s s o f a problem than t h e B r i t i s h and French. •(C)
President Izetbegovic: I would suggest that you propose to
them the idea of the demilitarization of Sarajevo. They may
be harder to convince on the use of force than on
demilitarization. The Serbs will more easily accept an idea
when we have to make concessions too. We are prepared to
make concessions to get this demilitarized area.
T^T
The
President:
Okay.
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Of course, when t a l k i n g o f e x c l u s i o n
zones and Sarajevo, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e s a f e areas be
expanded i n accordance w i t h t h e Contact Group communique.
That was p o i n t s i x o f t h e Contact Group p l a n [Note:
r e f e r e n c e i s t o t h e J u l y 30 Geneva Contact Group
communique]. I b e l i e v e I have mentioned t h i s p o i n t i n t h e
c o n t e x t o f asking f o r g r e a t e r U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t . —(C)
There i s a l s o t h e q u e s t i o n o f s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t S e r b i a .
We
r e g a r d t h e l a s t stage as a c l e a r v i c t o r y f o r M i l o s e v i c . He
r e c e i v e d two b e n e f i t s :
f i r s t he avoided t i g h t e r s a n c t i o n s ,
which t h e Contact Group had i n d i c a t e d would be imposed i f
t h e Serbs r e j e c t e d t h e map; i n f a c t , M i l o s e v i c d i d n ' t g e t a
t i g h t e n i n g , b u t a l i g h t e n i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . But t h a t ' s over
w i t h . The q u e s t i o n i s whether you have r e a l c o n t r o l over
t h e border.
I f you do, then t h e concession may have been
w o r t h w h i l e . We would have v o t e d f o r i t i f t h e b o r d e r were
t r u l y c l o s e d . But i f t h e border i s , i n f a c t , n o t c l o s e d ,
then i t w i l l be a d i s a s t e r f o r Bosnia-Herzegovina and f o r
t h e image o f t h i s c o u n t r y f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
I hope and expect you can f i r m l y m o n i t o r t h e b o r d e r . 100p l u s people w i l l n o t be enough t o do t h e j o b . - f e - } —
The P r e s i d e n t : When a r e our people going t o j o i n t h e
monitors?
<^T~
Anthony Lake: Very soon. They should have been t h e r e
a l r e a d y , b u t I t h i n k they w i l l be t h e r e i n a couple o f days.
Ambassador A l b r i g h t :
The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n has a
s e r i e s c f break p o i n t s t h a t a l l o w us t o p u l l t h e p l u g on t h e
whole o p e r a t i o n . I f t h e r e i s any breach i n t h e border
c l o s u r e , t h e suspension o f s a n c t i o n s can be ended w i t h i n
f i v e days. The whole t h i n g i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i e w every 30
days, and t h e suspension i s i n e f f e c t f o r o n l y 90 days i n
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�total. The United States worked hard to include these
control mechanisms so that we would not have to trust
Milosevic. We assumed you would want this. -(CjP r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : You should n o t a l l o w any o t h e r
easing o f s a n c t i o n s u n t i l S e r b i a r e c o g n i z e s t h e Republic o f
Bosnia and Herzegovina and a l s o C r o a t i a . This w i l l be t h e
o n l y r e a l p r o o f t h a t M i l o s e v i c has changed, and t h a t i t ' s
not j u s t a t a c t i c .
I want t o c l e a r l y appeal t o you n o t t o
do more w i t h o u t r e c o g n i t i o n . fG-)The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree w i t h t h a t . We have supported t h e
e f f o r t you have made w i t h C r o a t i a . They should have t h e
same p o s i t i o n . We w i l l work w i t h you on t h a t . •(O)
President Izetbegovic: Finally, I want you to know that we
are trying to do everything we can to implement the
Federation. You have provided some financial aid, and I
want to thank you very much for that. In this context, I
would like to propose that a Commission be established that
would include one Bosniac, one Croat, one American and one
German to help implement the Federation idea. -^G-T
The P r e s i d e n t :
What do you t h i n k o f t h a t , Chris? -f-G^
Secretary Christopher:
I t h i n k i t has m e r i t . We'll work on
it.
F i l l i n g o u t t h e F e d e r a t i o n i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t . I t needs
c o n t e n t . I f we can h e l p , we would l i k e t o do t h a t , . ( f ) ,
Anthony Lake: We want t o h e l p s u p p o r t t h e F e d e r a t i o n
especially at the local level. -f^T
The P r e s i d e n t : We'll work on t h e i d e a ; g i v e us some t i m e .
Regarding a i d , we have come up w i t h a t o t a l o f 30 m i l l i o n
d o l l a r s , i n c l u d i n g 10 m i l l i o n more f o r r e f u g e e s .
I hope
we're d o i n g a l l we can f o r your people.
I'm very w o r r i e d
about t h e c h i l d r e n , about t h e human dimension o f t h e
situation, -fef
We w i l l go t o t h e B r i t i s h and French. We want t o c l e a r up
t h e l i f t q u e s t i o n . We w i l l t e l l them t h a t we need t h e i r
f o r c e s t h e r e , b u t t h a t i f Sarajevo i s d e s t r o y e d , then t h e i r
purpose f o r b e i n g t h e r e has been d e s t r o y e d t o o . The
p o l i t i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact on t h e w o r l d would be
d e v a s t a t i n g . We need t o g e t them t o t a k e a more a g g r e s s i v e
p o s t u r e . We want t o be sure t h a t our a i d and NATO'r a c t i o n s
are doing t h e most t o h e l p your people. .(C).
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I c o u l d n ' t t r a v e l from Sarajevo
a i r p o r t yesterday.
I had t o leave t h r o u g h t h e t u n n e l and go
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over t h e mountains. The road I took i s always under Serb
fire.
The a i r p o r t i s c l o s e d . The roads are c l o s e d .
There
i s no gas, e l e c t r i c i t y or water.
Things are t h e worst s i n c e
t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e war.
The Serbs have decided t o
s u f f o c a t e the c i t y .
Something needs t o be done. -(-G).
Secretary Christopher:
Regarding t h e a i d , what t h e
P r e s i d e n t d e s c r i b e d i s 10 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s more than when
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c and I spoke on F r i d a y . There i s 10
m i l l i o n d o l l a r s from f i s c a l year 1994, and 30 m i l l i o n
d o l l a r s i n f i s c a l year 1995. -(-&)
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c :
Good. Let me mention one s m a l l
d e t a i l w i t h r e s p e c t t o Sarajevo.
We can p r o v i d e immediate
h e l p by p u t t i n g i n an e l e c t r i c a l cable t h r o u g h t h e t u n n e l .
This would run 20 or 30 k i l o m e t e r s , so t h a t Sarajevo c o u l d
get e l e c t r i c i t y from t h e o u t s i d e . We w i l l work t o get you
the d e t a i l s .
Secretary Christopher:
Let us know. ^fS")
The P r e s i d e n t : Please g i v e us a p r o p o s a l . L e t ' s l o o k a t
t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e w o r s t p o s s i b l e l i g h t , i f we do
e v e r y t h i n g we have d i s c u s s e d :
We pass t h e l i f t r e s o l u t i o n ,
w i t h f o u r - t o - s i x months u n t i l t h e embargo i s l i f t e d .
Then
we somehow make c o n d i t i o n s b e t t e r i n Sarajevo i n t h e s h o r t
run e i t h e r by t h e p r o p o s a l you made f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n or
by t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e UK and France t o be s t r o n g e r i n
e n f o r c i n g t h e e x c l u s i o n zones. Even t h e n , we s t i l l have t o
assume t h e worst -- t h a t t h e Serbs won't accept t h e Contact
Group p l a n and t h a t you w i l l have t o f i g h t on.
I n those
circumstances, we should t h i n k about an independent
e l e c t r i c a l system t h a t w i l l g i v e you more c o n t r o l over t h e
situation.
So please i d e n t i f y what t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community needs t o do t o speed up t h e mechanics t o guard
a g a i n s t t h e day when we, God f o r b i d might f a i l .
I would
t h i n k i t would t a k e s i x months t o l a y t h e c a b l e , - f e - ) —
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c :
The
President:
We
c o u l d do i t i n two months
Give us a p r o p o s a l .
- (C >-
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : The j o u r n a l i s t s are w a i t i n g t o hear
about t h e meeting.
What should we say we have agreed? • (-C)Secretary Christopher:
We can announce t h e 30 m i l l i o n
d o l l a r s i n a d d i t i o n a l a i d . I f you l i k e , we can out f o r w a r d
your p r o p o s a l r e g a r d i n g l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo w i t h a
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�•eOHFIDEHTIAT!
d e f e r r e d date -- a l t h o u g h I understand you would l i k e t o
hear about t h e B r i t i s h and French a t t i t u d e f i r s t .
fe-y
President Izetbegovic:
That's right.
Secretary Christopher:
tomorrow. , 1 45)
We w i l l work on t h a t between now and
The P r e s i d e n t : We can say we have d i s c u s s e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s
around Sarajevo, and t h a t you made a s u g g e s t i o n t h a t I ' v e
agreed t o r a i s e w i t h t h e o t h e r Contact Group members, and
t h a t we w i l l g e t back t o you i n 24 hours. • (o)
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : We can say we a r e a s k i n g BoutrosG h a l i and t h e B r i t i s h and French f o r f i r m e r enforcement o f
the e x c l u s i o n zones. _4-G-)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I w i l l say I suggested t h e
d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f a f i v e - k i l o m e t e r zone and t h a t you
supported t h e idea . -(c-frThe P r e s i d e n t :
l i n e s , -fe-)
Yes, a n y t h i n g you want t o say on those
Prime M i n i s t e r S i l a j d z i c : We can say t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no
f u r t h e r suspension o f s a n c t i o n s unless Belgrade recognizes
Bosnia and C r o a t i a . •fe-7
Anthony Lake: L e t us f i r s t pursue t h a t d i p l o m a t i c a l l y w i t h
o t h e r Contact Group members . .fe-}
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, please w a i t . I f you announce t h a t ,
I ' l l spend t h e f i r s t 30 minutes o f my next c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
John Major e x p l a i n i n g i t . -(-e^Secretary Christopher: We're not thinking about any other
sanctions relief in any case.
y.
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y Holbrooke: I would add t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
s t r o n g statement o f support f o r e n f o r c i n g e x i s t i n g mandates.
We have spent a l l o f t h e l a s t two weeks on NATO a i r s t r i k e s .
We o n l y g o t one. I f we had our way, t h e r e would have been a
s t r i k e every day. We a r e t h e Contact Group member t h a t i s
t r y i n g the hardest.
So you can mention t h i s , p l u s t h e 30
m i l l i o n , p l u s your own p o s i t i o n s .
Tomorrow's s t o r y w i l l be
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a l i f t r e s o l u t i o n a f t e r October 15 per
the P r e s i d e n t ' s l e t t e r t o Senator Nunn, b u t w i t h a c t i v a t i o n
i n t h e s p r i n g . fe-)-'
XL INTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
•CONFIDENT!
�)HFIDEMTIMi
One l a s t
that the
proposal
supported
p o i n t , i f I might, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . I t i s i m p o r t a n t
U.S. p u b l i c and Congress understand t h a t t h e
f o r d e f e r r a l o r i g i n a t e d w i t h your government and i s
by ours. »(c)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I t h i n k , going back, t h a t we should
say t h a t we recommended t o t h e U.S. t h a t t h e r e be no f u r t h e r
easing o f s a n c t i o n s unless Serbia r e c o g n i z e s Bosnia and
Croatia.
Can we a l s o say t h a t b o t h s i d e s r e c a l l e d t h e
f o u r t h p o i n t i n NATO's February 9 d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g a i r
s t r i k e s t o p r e v e n t t h e s t r a n g u l a t i o n o f Sarajevo? - f c )
The P r e s i d e n t :
I hope you w i l l do t h a t .
We w i l l have t o
have d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e UK and France, even r e g a r d i n g t h e
n a t u r e o f t h e i r UNPROFOR deployments i n o r d e r t o e n f o r c e t h e
e x i s t i n g r e s o l u t i o n s . Things have g o t t e n absurd around
S a r a j e v o , i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e have n o t been s e v e r a l a i r
strikes.
The o t h e r s have people t h e r e , b u t t h e r e has t o be
a s o l u t i o n t h a t a l l o w s us t o be more a g g r e s s i v e .
We'll take
t h i s up w i t h them. Your language i s f i n e . • Qc )Ambassador A l b r i g h t :
You should a l s o say t h a t we w i l l be
w a t c h i n g t h e border v e r y c a r e f u l l y and we i l l be sending
people t h e r e . -(-cTThe
President:
Yes, we want t o send people t h e r e . 4 c )
Anthony Lake: We have done a press r e l e a s e on t h e a i d f o r
the Federation.
I would be c a r e f u l about p i n n i n g t h i n g s on
t h e UK and France i n p u b l i c r i g h t now. J u s t say we a r e
p r e s s i n g f o r s t r o n g e r enforcement, -fe-)—
The P r e s i d e n t : We want them t o v o t e w i t h us on t h e UN
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n , so don't h i t them t o o hard
today. -< o)
Ambassador Sacirbey: Can I raise another point regarding
the training of Bosnian forces in the context of a lifting
the arms embargo, .(c)
Secretary Christopher:
That's down t h e road a b i t .
not c o m p l i c a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n now. • (c-)
The
President:
Thank you f o r coming.
-fe^-
End of Conversation --
CONFIDENT:
J^LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Let's
�9673
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C 20506
December 16, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
E x e c u t i v e SecretaryDepartment o f S t a t e
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f BosniaHerzegovina and P r e s i d e n t Tudjman o f C r o a t i a on
December 5, 1994
SUBJECT:
The a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n between t h e P r e s i d e n t and
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e t g o v i c and P r e s i d e n t Tudjman be p r o v i d e d f o r t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . I t must be d i s t r i b u t e d
v i a NODIS channels and n o t below t h e Deputy A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y
(DAS) l e v e l , (j
W i l l i a m H. I t o h
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
CL^ T0N LIBRARY
D e c l a s s i f y or
n
R
n
�9673
CONFIDENTIAL
THE W H I T E H O U S E
WAS
HINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f BosniaHerzegovina and P r e s i d e n t Tudjman o f C r o a t i a
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , U.S. Ambassador t o t h e
U n i t e d Nations
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Richard Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Sam Brown, U.S. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o CSCE
V i c t o r J a c k o v i c h , Ambassador t o BosniaHerzegovina
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC ( N o t e t a k e r )
Bosnia
A l i j a Izetbegovic, President
I r f a n L j u b i j a n k i c , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Muhamed Sacirbey, Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
t o t h e U n i t e d Nations
Mahir Hadziakmetovic, Ambassador t o CSCE
Croatia
F r a n j o Tudjman, P r e s i d e n t
Mato Granic, M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
Miomir Zuzul, Ambassador o f C r o a t i a t o t h e UN
a t Geneva
Z e l j k o M a t i c , P r e s i d e n t i a l Foreign P o l i c y
Adviser
Dr. Begic, P o l i t i c a l A d v i s e r t o t h e
President
Interpreter
December 5, 1994,1:25 - 1:40PM
Budapest, Hungary
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t : I am g l a d t o see you. Thank you f o r coming t o
t h i s meeting. I wanted t o meet so t h a t we c o u l d hear your views
on t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n , I asked t o see you here t o g e t h e r
because t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n i s very i m p o r t a n t i n
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e whole i n t e r n a t i o n a l community f o r
M J O N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
COMriDDMTIAE
D e c l a s s i f y on~
�rnNriDFMTTfiL
a just result.
I wanted t o assure you. P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c ,
t h a t t h e U.S. has n o t changed i t s p o l i c y . We a r e s t i l l opposed
t o any c o n f e d e r a t i o n between t h e Bosnia Serbs and S e r b i a . We a r e
s t i l l ready f o r NATO t o do what i t i s p e r m i t t e d t o do by t h e
United Nations.
We s t i l l want t o be as c o o p e r a t i v e and h e l p f u l
as we can be i n b r i n g i n g about a s e t t l e m e n t . I would l i k e t o
hear from you on your t h i n k i n g about what i s most i m p o r t a n t . How
do you f e e l about UNPROFOR? Then I would l i k e t o hear P r e s i d e n t
Tudjman's views as w e l l . -f6-)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : With r e g a r d t o UNPROFOR, i t s m i s s i o n has
eroded so much t h a t we a r e l e f t w i t h o u t UNPROFOR and w i t h o u t
weapons t o defend o u r s e l v e s . As you know, we had a c h o i c e
between m a i n t a i n i n g UNPROFOR and r e c e i v i n g weapons ( t h r o u g h a
l i f t i n g o f t h e arms embargo). For t h e t i m e b e i n g , we chose
UNPROFOR, b u t i t s m i s s i o n i s b e i n g degraded. I t would be h e l p f u l
i f UNPROFOR c o u l d be made more e f f e c t i v e .
We a r e l o o k i n g f o r
UNPROFOR t o f u l f i l l i t s mandate, and n o t h i n g more. The p a r a l y s i s
i s something t h a t we cannot understand -- f i r s t i n t h e b e h a v i o r
of UNPROFOR, and subsequently i n t h e behavior o f NATO. The i s s u e
i s UNPROFOR. We ask t h a t t h i s p a r a l y s i s be l i f t e d .
I f t h i s were
done, t h e s i t u a t i o n would improve as a consequence. Of course,
t h e r e would be i n c r e a s e d r i s k s f o r UNPROFOR, b u t these s h o u l d be
acceptable given the p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s . f e T
With r e g a r d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia, we ask t h a t t h e Serbs
accept t h e Contact Group p l a n . There a r e two o t h e r ideas which
are dependent on a c e a s e - f i r e . F i r s t , a c e a s e - f i r e t h r o u g h o u t
Bosnia f o r a l i m i t e d p e r i o d o f t i m e c o u l d be agreed upon under
two c o n d i t i o n s : an immediate c e a s e - f i r e i n t h e Bihac area; and
t h e w i t h d r a w a l from t h e Bihac area o f t h e s o - c a l l e d K r a j i n a
Serbs. These f o r c e s have come t o our c o u n t r y from t h e UN
P r o t e c t e d Areas, which a r e supposed t o be d e m i l i t a r i z e d .
Second,
i f there i s a c e a s e - f i r e i n f a c t , t h i s w i l l normalize t h e
h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia. So f a r , however, t h e Serbs
have r e j e c t e d a c e a s e - f i r e . I j u s t met w i t h B r i t i s h F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y Hurd who had met t h e p r e v i o u s evening w i t h S e r b i a n
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c . Hurd s a i d M i l o s e v i c supports these ideas
but c l a i m e d t h a t he d i d n ' t have enough i n f l u e n c e on K a r a d z i c .
When we t a l k about M i l o s e v i c ' s i n f l u e n c e , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t
t h e r e be no f u r t h e r easing o f s a n c t i o n s , s i n c e t h e o n l y way t o
get him t o a c t p o s i t i v e l y i s t h r o u g h s a n c t i o n s . • ( G ) —
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: We have signed an agreement w i t h t h e Knin
Serbs as t h e second s t e p toward r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e UNPAs. We
w i l l now have t o see whether t h i s agreement i s implemented. I f
t h e Knin Serbs f a i l t o implement i t , we w i l l n o t extend
UNPROFOR's mandate. M i l o s e v i c has t h e Knin Serbs i n h i s hands.
As f o r t h e Bosnian Serbs, he does n o t q u i t e have K a r a d z i c i n h i s
hands, b u t m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s a r e s t i l l coming i n t o Bosnia from
ooNriDoiAL CLI N O LIBRARY P O O O Y
TN
HTCP
m
i
�CONFIDENTIAL
S e r b i a . We would therefore appreciate that you not l i f t
s a n c t i o n s u n t i l we see p r a c t i c a l achievements, and not j u s t paper
agreements, leading to the s o l u t i o n of the occupied areas and to
a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i n Bosnia, -fet
The p r i o r i t y i s s u e i s t h e c o n f l i c t i n Bosnia, b u t here too t h e
key r e s t s i n Serb hands. I f a f i r m e r l i n e i s t a k e n , t h e Serbs
w i l l be f o r c e d t o accept the Contact Group p l a n . I f t h e Contact
Group t o o k more determined a c t i o n , such as convening a summit,
the West c o u l d p r e s e n t a u n i t e d f r o n t t o show t h a t BosniaHerzegovina e x i s t s f o r t h e t h r e e peoples who l i v e t h e r e .
This
would enable you t o a v o i d a c o n f l i c t between the West and Russia
and a l s o a v o i d the involvement o f I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s , which would
have u n d e s i r a b l e consequences i n terms o f i n c r e a s e d l o s s o f l i f e
and i n o t h e r ways. Russia o b v i o u s l y wants t o p r e s e r v e i t s
i n f l u e n c e i n Europe. We s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h i s as not a MuslimCroat, Muslim-Serb, o r Croat-Serb problem, b u t as one o f
civilization.
Any s o l u t i o n i n v o l v i n g o n l y UNPROFOR w i l l n o t
work. The Contact Group p l a n must be c a r r i e d out t o t h e end and
NATO engaged t o e n f o r c e a s e t t l e m e n t . UNPROFOR, w i t h t h e
c o u n t r i e s t h a t now form i t , has no p r o s p e c t o f success.
T h e r e f o r e , you need t o push f o r a s e t t l e m e n t and engage NATO. I
would f a v o r i n c r e a s e d involvement o f NATO a t t h e expense o f
r e d u c i n g t h e number o f UNPROFOR t r o o p s . -4C-f•
The P r e s i d e n t :
President Izetbegovic, you are for a three-month
country-wide c e a s e - f i r e ? •fet'
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Yes, on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a
c e a s e - f i r e i n Bihac and w i t h d r a w a l o f the f o r c e s o f K r a j i n a Serb
l e a d e r M a r t i c . -fet
The P r e s i d e n t : During the three months, we w i l l do a l l we can to
support the Contact Group plan, "ter
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : You need t o have c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e Serbs
i n t h e meantime. P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c b e l i e v e s t h a t t i m e i s
w o r k i n g i n h i s f a v o r . He wants more time t o convince K a r a d z i c t o
a c c e p t . But we f e e l t h a t the Russian presence i s b e h i n d t h e
l a t e s t dangerous Serb a c t i o n s . Some i n the West have concluded
t h a t t h e Russian t h r e a t has disappeared, b u t we i n Bosnia s t i l l
f e e l i t , e s p e c i a l l y t h r o u g h the presence o f s u r f a c e - t o - a i r
m i s s i l e s . 4€tThe P r e s i d e n t :
We heard a l i t t l e o f t h a t here today i n Budapest.
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
COMriDCHTIMTV-
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�5650
-CONFI DEOTTKL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
J u l y 2 1 , 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
FROM:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW^/
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s J u l y 20
C o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Bosnian P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s a memorandum o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s t e l e p h o n e
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c on J u l y 20, 1995.
RECOMMENDATION
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n be f i l e d f o r t h e
record.
^
^
Approve
Disapprove
That you s i g n t h e memo a t Tab I t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e Memorandum o f
C o n v e r s a t i o n t o t h e S t a t e Department.
Attachments
Tab I Memo t o S t a t e
Tab A Memcon w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c
DECUSSIFIED
E.0.13526, Sec 3.5(b)
White Uoy^e Guidelines, September 11,2006
CONriDCNTIAL^
-rMTPlK
Declassify okLpN+UN
TDDADV
DUH
LIDKAKY
rHU
Date \i)j<l^
�-GONFI DEN'P£ftC"''
5650
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D C. 20506
July 21, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department o f State
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f the President's Conversation w i t h
President Izetbegovic (U)
The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and
President Izetbegovic is provided for the information of the
Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels
and'not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may
also be sent to our embassy in Bosnia for the Charge only, ^tf"
Exeout/ive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A Memcon w i t h President Izetbegovic
DECLASSIFIED
-LUNHDENTlAL
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W tH
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JC^D|RQ|\
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�5650
GOHFIDDNTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l Telephone C a l l w i t h Bosnian P r e s i d e n t
Izetbegovic
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Bosnian P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c
NOTETAKERS:
Kenneth Baldwin, K a t h e r i n e O'Loughlin, John
Schmidt and Matt M i l l e r
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
J u l y 20, 1995, 1:47 p.m. - 2:02 p.m. EDT
Oval O f f i c e
President C l i n t o n :
Hello?
(U)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : H e l l o , Mr. P r e s i d e n t . Thank you f o r
c a l l i n g , and thank you f o r your t i m e . I have a l a d y w i t h me who
w i l l h e l p me c o n t i n u e i n my language i f t h a t i s a l l r i g h t w i t h
you. (U)
President C l i n t o n :
Yes, t h a t i s f i n e w i t h me.
(U)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Mr. C l i n t o n , t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Bosnia i s a
v e r y d i f f i c u l t one because o f t h e l a t e s t a t t a c k s on t h e safe
areas, e s p e c i a l l y i n Zepa. R i g h t now i n Zepa 6,000 women and
c h i l d r e n a r e i n grave danger. We have o f f e r e d d i r e c t
n e g o t i a t i o n s t o t h e Serbs t o save t h e women and c h i l d r e n , b u t we
do n o t have an answer from them and now have asked t h e UN t o
m e d i a t e . We have a l s o o f f e r e d t h a t t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n , t h a t
t h e women and c h i l d r e n , should leave Zepa. However, w i t h o u t your
p r e s s u r e and h e l p o f t h e U.S. and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, we
w i l l n o t be able t o do t h a t . T h e r e f o r e , we ask t h a t you see what
can be done f o r these people, b e a r i n g i n mind t h e r e c e n t t r a g e d y
t h a t o c c u r r e d i n S r e b r e n i c a . A c c o r d i n g t o UNPROFOR, a t l e a s t
3,000 people have been k i l l e d i n t h e past s e v e r a l days. We f e a r
t h a t t h e f i g u r e i s b i g g e r . -(C)—
We f e e l t h e U.S. should now l e a d t h e i n i t i a t i v e t o save t h e s a f e
areas, e s p e c i a l l y those people i n Zepa. Otherwise, t h e r e w i l l be
a growing f e e l i n g b o t h i n Europe and Bosnia o f a l a c k o f American
l e a d e r s h i p t h a t w i l l f u r t h e r damage t h e s i t u a t i o n .
So I p l e a d t o
you, i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U.S. and t h e w o r l d , t h a t t h e U.S. be
more a c t i v e i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
Please do n o t g i v e up
Declassify
"CLmiON LIBRARY P
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OCOPY PER E.O. 1 5 6
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on t h e use o f f o r c e i n p r o t e c t i n g these s a f e areas and t h e
civilians.
I r e f e r t o more r o b u s t a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e
a t t a c k e r s who have shown inhumanity i n S r e b r e n i c a .
Please do n o t
a l l o w t h e UN t o p a r a l y z e us by c o n t i n u i n g t o use t h e d u a l key.
A l s o , when t a l k i n g o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h S e r b i a , please do n o t g i v e
up t o o cheaply on t h e l i f t i n g o f s a n c t i o n s . We are n o t
i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t any r e c o g n i t i o n o f Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are
b e i n g o f f e r e d r e c o g n i t i o n o f a phantom Bosnia — a Bosnia t h a t
does n o t e x i s t .
I f e a r t h a t t h e Contact Group s t a t e s are ready
to pay a v e r y cheap p r i c e f o r such r e c o g n i t i o n . Mr. P r e s i d e n t ,
t h e s a n c t i o n s are t h e o n l y weapon we can use a g a i n s t S e r b i a . I f
we g i v e them up, we w i l l have none. And i n t h e end, I would l i k e
t o convince you t h a t we are devoted t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a m u l t i e t h n i c Bosnia-Herzegovina. -fetThank you v e r y much f o r c a l l i n g me, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . I have
another f a v o r t o ask — i f you c o u l d pass on my views t o t h e
meeting i n London tomorrow and do a l l you can t o i n f l u e n c e t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s . 4&)P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n : Thank you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t . L e t me say t h a t we
w i l l do what we can f o r t h e people o f Zepa as you have asked. We
c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t b a r g a i n away t h e s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t M i l o s e v i c
and S e r b i a cheaply, and I w i l l n o t a l l o w t h e l i f t i n g o f t h e
embargo f o r weak r e c o g n i t i o n . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , I have t o l d our
a l l i e s , and we w i l l say t h e same t h i n g i n London, t h a t t h e UN
o p e r a t i o n cannot c o n t i n u e unless we are p r e p a r e d t o use s t r o n g
a i r power — by t h a t I mean d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a i r s t r i k e s w i t h o u t
t h e d u a l key, so t h a t t h e Serbs know we mean b u s i n e s s .
I
understand why t h e UN f o r c e s f e a r b e i n g t a k e n hostage, b u t as a
p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , i t seems t o me t h a t o f t e n UNPROFOR t r o o p s ,
w h i l e d e l i v e r i n g h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d , a l s o h e l p t h e Serbs i n t h e i r
l a r g e r designs because o f t h e i r f e a r o f b e i n g taken hostage,
which keeps us from u s i n g a i r power f o r t h e l a r g e r o b j e c t i v e s .
Now as you know, t h e French b e l i e v e i t i s a mistake j u s t t o use
s t r o n g e r a i r power. They want us t o a i r l i f t an a d d i t i o n a l 1,000
s o l d i e r s i n t o Goradze. The problem i s t h a t 1,000 more s o l d i e r s
may n o t make a d i f f e r e n c e i n h e l p i n g you h o l d t h e town. But i f
t h e Serbs know t h e damage we can do w i t h s t r o n g a i r s t r i k e s , t h a t
might s t o p them, j u s t as our t h r e a t d i d l a s t February when we
f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d t h e safe areas and c o l l e c t i o n p o i n t s , b u t which
t h e UN has s i n c e kept from working. -fC)As you know, I would hate t o see t h e UN m i s s i o n c o l l a p s e , b u t i f
i t ' s g o i n g t o s t a y , i t must be more e f f e c t i v e .
That i s where we
are and what we're w o r k i n g f o r . I t ' s a l l I'm w o r k i n g on r i g h t
now.
I am g l a d we had a chance t o t a l k . -KG)
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President Izetbegovic: Thank you, Mr. President. I would l i k e
to p o i n t out again the importance of a i r power against the
v i o l a t i o n s of the safe areas established by the UN. The r e l a t i v e
peace which we had l a s t year, f o r about s i x months i n Sarajevo,
i s proof we can maintain some kind of peace under a t h r e a t of
a i r s t r i k e s . We i n Bosnia are i n t e r e s t e d i n peace, not i n war,
and, t h e r e f o r e , we are i n t e r e s t e d i n a p o l i t i c a l settlement. We
have accepted the Contact Group plan and before t h a t the
Vance/Owen plan. I assure you we want peace. This i s our
o p t i o n ; not war. - H e f
President C l i n t o n : Thank you. Let me say you d i d accept the
Contact Group and Vance-Owen plan, and i f I can p r e v a i l i n the
next few days w i t h the a l l i e s and get a serious a i r t h r e a t up
there, I t h i n k we can s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n . But we s t i l l need
serious peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . This matter has t o be s e t t l e d .
Thank you very much, -(cypres ident Izetbegovic: Thank you, Mr. President. Good bye. (U)
President C l i n t o n : Good bye. (U)
End of Conversation
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27, 1995
ACTION
ffifiEW D. CENS—
MEMORANDUM FOR -AM
FROM:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t s A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f t h e
R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina and F r a n j o Tudjman
o f t h e Republic o f C r o a t i a
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t s I z e t b e g o v i c and Tudjman on
October 24, 1995.
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo a t Tab I t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e Memorandum o f
C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e meeting t o t h e Department o f S t a t e .
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e m e e t i n g be
f i e l d f o r the record.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o S t a t e
Tab A Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
•GONC-I-BEMXIAL
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October 30, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
M e e t i n g w i t h P r e s i d e n t s I z e t b e g o v i c and Tudjman
(U)
The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between
the President and Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of
Bosnia Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia
is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It
must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. XZ)
/.Vndrew D. Sens
£j^6utive S e c r e t a r y
Attachment
Tab A Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
C l a s s i f i e d b y : Andrew Sens
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t s A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f
the Republic o f Bosnia-Herzegovina and F r a n j o
Tudjman o f t h e Republic o f C r o a t i a
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , U.S. Permanent
Representative t o the United Nations
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
P r e s i d e n t and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC (Notetaker)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
President A l i j a Izetbegovic
Muhamed Sacirbey, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r
Nedzib Sacirbey, Ambassador-at-large
Mr. Ivan M i s i c , Ambassador t o t h e UN
Mr. B a k i r Sadovic, P r e s i d e n t ' s P r i v a t e
Secretary
Mr. Amela Sapcanin, Second S e c r e t a r y
Croatia
P r e s i d e n t Franjo Tudjman
Mate Granic, Deputy Foreign M i n i s t e r
Miomir Zuzul, S p e c i a l Envoy
Petar Sarcevic, Ambassador t o t h e U.S.
Zlejko Matic
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
October 24, 1995
1:35 - 2:15PM
Waldorf A s t o r i a H o t e l
New York, New York
The P r e s i d e n t : F i r s t , l e t me say how pleased I am t o have a l l o f
you t o g e t h e r i n one room, e s p e c i a l l y t h e two p r e s i d e n t s . L e t me
add how p r o f o u n d l y a p p r e c i a t i v e I am t h a t you a r e g o i n g t o Dayton
i n a few days t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e p r o x i m i t y t a l k s . We need t o do
e v e r y t h i n g we can t o make these t a l k s a success. I t i s i m p o r t a n t
n o t t o t a k e any p o s i t i o n s o r say a n y t h i n g t h a t would s h o r t COMFIDEMTIftir
C l a s s i f i e d by: Andrew Sens
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c i r c u i t t h e t a l k s b e f o r e they even b e g i n . We are committed t o an
honorable r e s o l u t i o n t h a t w i l l preserve t h e i n t e g r i t y o f Bosnia,
which would p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f a l l o f i t s c i t i z e n s , and which
would s u p p o r t t h e F e d e r a t i o n .
I want t o do e v e r y t h i n g I can t o
ensure success, b u t I urge you t o c r e a t e t h e proper atmosphere
t h a t w i l l produce a success i n Dayton. ^fG4—
We have seen things in the last few years that we never expected
to see: Israel and the PLO sitting down after 30 years of
fighting; the IRA laying down its arms, at least for a year,
after 25 years of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But what the
world wants more than anything else is for a resolution of the
war in Bosnia. Only you can provide it, and President Milosevic
has responsibilities as well. If an agreement is made, I will
ensure that a strong, disciplined and coordinated force is there
to implement it. The United States will play a major role, and
we will also work aggressively to rebuild war-torn areas and to
open up economic opportunities for both your countries. The
Europeans will take the lead on the economic side, but we will do
our share and then some. So we are at a hopeful, positive
moment, yet we are also aware of the dire consequences if we
fail,
-m-
The o n l y o t h e r statement t h a t I wanted t o make i s t h a t you d i d a
g r e a t t h i n g when you c r e a t e d t h e F e d e r a t i o n .
I t has changed t h e
military situation.
The s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e
C r o a t i a n and Bosnian armies has helped make a decent peace
p o s s i b l e . Without t h a t I am n o t sure t h a t t h e NATO bombing o r
Dick Holbrooke's diplomacy would have worked; t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
might have s t i l l been t o o g r e a t . I have n o t h i n g b u t a d m i r a t i o n ,
b u t you b o t h must work hard t o make t h e F e d e r a t i o n a r e a l i t y on
t h e ground. There are s t i l l many t e n s i o n s and problems, and we
s h o u l d n o t l e t t h e Serbs o r any o t h e r a d v e r s a r i e s e x p l o i t your
d i f f e r e n c e s . Only you can h e l p . You need t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e
F e d e r a t i o n i n t h e l i v e s , minds and h e a r t s o f your people.
They
are t h e ones who need t o make i t work. —fG-h
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Thank you f o r r e c e i v i n g us. We have
g r e a t e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r t h e peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . We a r e e n t e r i n g
the t a l k s w i t h t h e b e s t o f w i l l .
Our people want peace. The war
has gone on f o r 44 months, which i s much t o o l o n g . You s h o u l d
b e l i e v e i n our s i n c e r i t y ; we want peace. We are a f r a i d t h a t t h e
p o s i t i o n o f t h e Serb s i d e i s s t i l l v e r y f a r from ours i n t h e
negotiations.
I c o u l d summarize by s a y i n g t h a t we want t o
p r e s e r v e an i n t e g r a l Bosnia and we want t o d i s c u s s common
i n s t i t u t i o n s and f u n c t i o n s . We ask f o r your support i n
a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . The American s i d e
has made v e r y p o s i t i v e statements and now we need t o convince t h e
Serbs t o accept.
I n sum, t h e q u e s t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r i n c i p l e s i s more i m p o r t a n t f o r us than t h e map. I f e e l t h a t i t
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i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s o l u t i o n t h a t
p r e s e r v e s Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without t h i s , we cannot have
peace, - f e i
Regarding t h e F e d e r a t i o n , a l l t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t here s u p p o r t
t h e F e d e r a t i o n i n words. No one i s a g a i n s t i t , b u t on t h e
ground, t h e process o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n has n o t taken p l a c e as i t
s h o u l d have. We cannot even speak o f freedom o f movement i n some
areas.
Mostar i s a s p e c i a l problem. The r e t u r n o f refugees i s
another.
Of course t h e C r o a t i a n s i d e has i t s own view o f these
problems and P r e s i d e n t Tudjman w i l l g i v e you h i s p e r s p e c t i v e . We
are a s k i n g f o r t o t a l freedom o f movement. We want refugees t o be
a b l e t o r e t u r n , e s p e c i a l l y t o areas t h a t have r e c e n t l y been
f r e e d , where t h e r e are empty houses. But they a r e b e i n g
p r e v e n t e d from r e t u r n i n g . The case i n p o i n t i s J a j c e , a c i t y
t h a t was h a l f and h a l f , C r o a t i a n and Muslim, b e f o r e t h e war.
J a j c e was l i b e r a t e d by t h e C r o a t i a n s i d e and t h e C r o a t i a n
p o p u l a t i o n has r e t u r n e d , b u t t h e Bosniac people have n o t been
p e r m i t t e d t o come back. This i s absurd.
F i f t e e n t o t w e n t y days
ago we s u p e r v i s e d t h e r e t u r n o f C r o a t i a n people t o t h e i r l a n d i n
t h e town o f Bugojno. We have r e c e i v e d a p o s i t i v e response from
t h e C r o a t i a n s i d e i n Bugojno, b u t when t h e Bosniac people want t o
r e t u r n , t h e C r o a t i a n s i d e has r e j e c t e d t h i s r i g h t . '(C)''
Yesterday and today, we had t a l k s i n Madrid among t h e F r i e n d s o f
the F e d e r a t i o n . The U.S. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e proposed two papers
r e g a r d i n g Mostar and t h e F e d e r a t i o n as a whole. I am ready t o
s i g n them r e g a r d l e s s o f what t h e papers say, because t h e y were
proposed by a t h i r d p a r t y . The EU has a l s o w r i t t e n a paper and I
am p r e p a r e d t o s i g n t h a t .
I hope t h e C r o a t i a n s i d e w i l l a l s o
accept these papers. The EU i s prepared t o do p o s i t i v e t h i n g s
f o r b o t h s i d e s and i t c o u l d h e l p s o l v e a l l o f our problems v e r y
q u i c k l y . -fref
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: Thank you Mr. P r e s i d e n t f o r seeing us and
thank you f o r t h e r o l e t h a t t h e U.S. and you p e r s o n a l l y have
p l a y e d i n o r d e r t o achieve peace i n t h e former Y u g o s l a v i a .
I
a l s o want t o thank R i c h a r d Holbrooke f o r h i s enormous e f f o r t s ,
i n c l u d i n g h i s p h y s i c a l e f f o r t s , t h a t have made t h e m e e t i n g i n
Ohio p o s s i b l e . I would l i k e t o e x p l a i n n o t o n l y what we hope t o
achieve b u t what i s necessary f o r peace. Ohio s h o u l d n o t j u s t be
a step f o r w a r d , b u t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n f l i c t .
I certainly
welcome t h e i d e a o f having t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e t h r e e
c o u n t r i e s meeting u n t i l peace i s achieved.
But i f t h e t a l k s
f a i l , t a k i n g i n t o account t h e experience o f t h i s c o n f l i c t and o f
e a r l i e r h i s t o r y , I would suggest t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community impose a peace on those who are n o t
w i l l i n g t o accept i t . I t h i n k t h a t t h e idea o f i n v o l v i n g NATO
and U.S. f o r c e s can be achieved.
Once we have a r e a l agreement,
I don't thank anyone can oppose NATO's r o l e i n e n f o r c i n g i t .
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This would represent a way out of the problem, a way out of a
c a t a s t r o p h i c s i t u a t i o n , and NATO would be necessary to c r e a t i n g a
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order i n our part of the world. -fGf
Mr. President I have t o l d your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a number of times
that along with the Bosnian i s s u e , the agenda i n Ohio a l s o needs
to address the r e i n t e g r a t i o n of Eastern Slavonia, the l a s t Serboccupied area of C r o a t i a . Although Croatian p u b l i c opinion i s
b i t t e r over the delay i n s o l v i n g t h i s i s s u e -- and there are
s t i l l 125,000 d i s p l a c e d persons from Eastern Slavonia -- I have
made a commitment not to i n t e r f e r e with the peace process, and
not to take any other step while the peace t a l k s are underway and
before the UNCRO mandate e x p i r e s . I t i s with pleasure that I
would l i k e to p r a i s e the involvement of the U.S. Ambassador to
C r o a t i a i n the negotiations between the government of C r o a t i a and
the l o c a l Serbs. There was a meeting yesterday and t a l k s w i l l
continue l a t e r i n the week. These t a l k s provide grounds for
optimism that a peaceful s o l u t i o n can be achieved. But i f these
t a l k s f a i l , then the i s s u e of Eastern Slavonia should be included
in the Ohio t a l k s . -fCT
As for the Federation, let me remind everyone of your role and
that of your government in establishing the Federation. We can
be satisfied with the results so far. We have stopped the
hostilities to a degree greater than one sees in the Middle East
and Northern Ireland. I don't want to go into the details that
President Izetbegovic has raised regarding problems in
implementing the Federation Agreements. But I believe that first
and foremost, this is a problem for the Muslim and Croat leaders
within Bosnia. In this regard, it is surprising that there are
no Bosnian Croat representatives here. Croatia, for strategic
reasons and as a friend of Europe and the United States, will do
everything to implement the Federation in deeds as well as in
words. Jr^&
The P r e s i d e n t : I a p p r e c i a t e what you have s a i d about E a s t e r n
Slavonia.
I agree t h a t t h e i s s u e should be r e s o l v e d i n t h e peace
talks.
I t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t you have agreed t o e x e r c i s e
r e s t r a i n t w h i l e t h e peace t a l k s are t a k i n g p l a c e . With r e s p e c t
to t h e d i s p u t e s w i t h i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n and r e l a t i o n s between t h e
Bosnians and t h e Bosnian Croats, t h i s j u s t i l l u s t r a t e s my p o i n t .
We need more p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s between your r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n
o r d e r t o make t h e F e d e r a t i o n work on t h e ground. G e t t i n g a
s e t t l e m e n t w i l l depend on t h e two o f you h a v i n g t r u s t .
Strength
l i e s i n genuine u n i t y .
Please do a l l you can t o achieve a peace
s e t t l e m e n t . We cannot r e s o l v e a l l t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e s here, b u t
I want a good and honorable agreement. To g e t t h a t , you two w i l l
have t o be moving t o g e t h e r , and you should do e v e r y t h i n g you can
to produce a success. -fef-
CONFTDFiNT Iftfe,
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�^HFTnFNTTAT,
5
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : I t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h i s meeting i s
t a k i n g p l a c e . I t would be v e r y d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e two P r e s i d e n t s
to make t h e p r o g r e s s you mentioned r e g a r d i n g t h e F e d e r a t i o n . The
U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l have a r o l e , t h r o u g h our a r b i t r a t i o n and
m e d i a t i o n , b u t t h e p a r t i e s themselves must make t h e F e d e r a t i o n
work. -4et
The
the
P r e s i d e n t ' s time i s l i m i t e d and I know he wants t o meet w i t h
two p r e s i d e n t s a l o n e . -fef
R i c h a r d Holbrooke:
L e t me make a few p o i n t s i n b r i e f . We don't
know how l o n g t h e Dayton t a l k s w i l l l a s t . We understand t h a t
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman w i l l go back t o Zagreb a f t e r a few days, b u t
l e a v i n g a team l e d by F o r e i g n M i n s t e r Granic w i t h f u l l a u t h o r i t y
to make d e c i s i o n s . Otherwise we are s t i c k i n g w i t h o u r o r i g i n a l
program. We w i l l h o p e f u l l y e l i m i n a t e t h e s p a r r i n g and d a i l y
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e p r e s s . Our d e l e g a t i o n w i l l be i n d a i l y c o n t a c t
w i t h S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r and Tony Lake. We a r e l o o k i n g f o r w a r d
to w o r k i n g as a team. On t o Dayton! -<C) (At this point
the President
pulled
Izetbegovic
aside
for a private
Presidents
conversation)
Tudjman
and
The President:
I had a good conversation with President Y e l t s i n
about Bosnia at Hyde Park. Y e l t s i n can help a l i t t l e with the
Serbs. M i l o s e v i c b e l i e v e s that there are too many independent
contacts between the Russians and the Bosnian Serbs. We a l s o
want to show that i f we achieve an agreement, R u s s i a won't mess
i t up i n a d e s t r u c t i v e way. Getting Russia more involved i n the
peace process could do a l o t to smooth the way toward
implementation. This i s why Y e l t s i n had the idea that a l l three
Balkan Presidents would go to Russia f o r a b r i e f meeting —
l i t t l e more than a photo opportunity — j u s t before the proximity
t a l k s i n Dayton. f e t
Now I know t h a t you, P r e s i d e n t Tudjman, need t o r e t u r n t o Zagreb
because o f your e l e c t i o n s ; and t h a t you, P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c
had i n t e n d e d t o s t a y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s up u n t i l t h e s t a r t o f
the Ohio t a l k s .
But i f we proceeded as planned, w i t h no meeting
i n Moscow b e f o r e t h e Dayton t a l k s , then i t would be a d v i s a b l e t o
go t o Moscow a t some p o i n t b e f o r e t h e f i r s t week o f December. I f
we had an agreement a t t h a t t i m e , i t would n o t be a problem, i t
would l a r g e l y be a f o r m a l i t y . But i f t h e p r o x i m i t y t a l k s had
a d j o u r n e d w i t h o u t an agreement -- something which we hope w i l l
not happen -- a t r i p t o Moscow c o u l d be more c o m p l i c a t e d .
(C)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Does P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n i n s i s t t h a t we
come b e f o r e t h e Dayton t a l k s ?
4^—
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�COITFI DEMTIAL
The President: No. But he does have a political need for a visit
at some point before the Duma elections. Let me add that I had a
very good talk with Yeltsin. He has great respect for the two of
you and believes that Russia has not done enough to pressure
Milosevic. But he is also under pressure at home over the NATO
issue and because of your recent gains on the battlefield. To
help him strengthen his political base and make sure his
opponents don't interfere with the peace process and with
implementation, Yeltsin proposes to hold this meeting in Moscow.
He is very supportive of the peace process. 4C)
Here i s what we need. I f t h e t h r e e P r e s i d e n t s c o u l d go t o Moscow
f o r j u s t t h r e e hours b e f o r e Dayton, t h e downside would be t h a t
the f i r s t p i c t u r e s o f t h e peace process would be coming from
Russia. But n o t h i n g s u b s t a n t i v e c o u l d be d i s c u s s e d i n such a
s h o r t t i m e and t h e Russians c o u l d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h what happens
afterwards.
I n s h o r t , we don't t h i n k a n y t h i n g bad c o u l d happen
and t h e Russian people c o u l d see t h a t Y e l t s i n i s p a r t o f t h e
peace process.
I n sum, I t h i n k i t i s s a f e r t o go now, even
though I know i t i s hard on you, P r e s i d e n t Tudjman, and much
harder on you, P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c . For P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c ,
we c o u l d g i v e you a n i c e m i l i t a r y plane t h a t c o u l d t a k e you t o
Moscow and t h e n d i r e c t l y t o Ohio. There c o u l d be a d o c t o r , and
t h e p l a n e would n o t need t o r e f u e l o r t o make any o t h e r s t o p s .
Given t h e r i s k s o f d o i n g i t l a t e r , I t h i n k i t would be b e s t t o
get t h e Moscow v i s i t over w i t h .
I f i t i s too p o l i t i c a l l y
d i f f i c u l t f o r you, we can p u t i t o f f u n t i l a l a t e r d a t e . But i f
we do n o t go b e f o r e t h e Duma e l e c t i o n s -- t h a t i s , b e f o r e t h e
f i r s t week o f December -- we c o u l d be i n v i t i n g t h e Russians t o
screw up t h e peace process o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a s e t t l e m e n t .
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: I agree w i t h you t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o
go t o Moscow b e f o r e Dayton. I t c o u l d h e l p i n f l u e n c e t h e Serb
s i d e and encourage t h e Russians t o be more c o n s t r u c t i v e . -(C)P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Should we leave on t h e 30th, g i v e n t h e
Croatian e l e c t i o n s ? --4
4CThe P r e s i d e n t : We might need t o s t a r t t h e Dayton t a l k s on
November 1 o r 2. R i c h a r d Holbrooke has a l o t o f c r e d i b i l i t y and
can e x p l a i n a s h o r t d e l a y . We would say t h a t we wanted t o have
Y e l t s i n t e l l t h e Serbs t o make peace, -f&fP r e s i d e n t Tudjman:
meeting. -f€-)-
That i s t h e o n l y reason f o r t h e Moscow
The P r e s i d e n t :
I t i s f o r t h a t reason and a l s o t o ensure t h a t t h e
Russians do n o t g e t i n t o our way on i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
L e t me
r e p e a t t h a t Y e l t s i n was v e r y honest w i t h me. We have a good
rPlNFTPFNTTMj/
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�COMF1DENTIAL
r e l a t i o n s h i p . But t h e r e are bad guys i n Russia who want us t o g e t
i n t o a f i g h t w i t h t h e Serbs. We don't want those f o r c e s t o w i n
the Duma e l e c t i o n s on December 17. 4^4P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: Yes, r e c e n t l y Z h i r i n o v s k y was i n B e l g r a d e .
He was campaigning a g a i n s t peace and f o r t h e defense o f t h e
Orthodox w o r l d , -f&fP r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : When are t h e Duma e l e c t i o n s ? -(C)•
The P r e s i d e n t : December 17. Doing t h e Moscow meeting a f t e r
December 4 w i l l be t o o l a t e , because i t s p o l i t i c a l purposes would
be t o o o b v i o u s . -fC)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r me t o go t o Moscow on
the 3 0 t h . -fe)
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman:
The 31st would be b e t t e r f o r me. -f&f
The P r e s i d e n t : This would mean that you would a r r i v e i n Dayton
l a t e on the 31st or November 1 s t . We w i l l f l y you there so that
there are no stops for r e f u e l i n g . 4€4
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman and P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c :
The P r e s i d e n t :
(The President
discussion)
Okay. -fG-)
The f a s t e r we can do i t , t h e b e t t e r .
then
asked
Richard
Holbrooke
to
join
the
R i c h a r d Holbrooke: We need t o understand t h a t t h i s meeting i n
Moscow i s n o t a Contact Group meeting. The U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
w i l l be Ambassador P i c k e r i n g . Any o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would
t u r n i t i n t o a n e g o t i a t i o n s e s s i o n . Secondly, t h e r e w i l l be no
j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n o r j o i n t statement. The Russians may make a
u n i l a t e r a l statement o f 2 or 3 sentences, b u t t h i s would n o t be
s u b j e c t t o any p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s . -f6-)The President: We don't need a declaration because the purpose
of the meeting is to enable Yeltsin to send a signal to the Serbs
and for Russia to be seen to be involved in the process. •A^Richard Holbrooke: The Moscow meeting w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve
Russian support both for the Dayton t a l k s and for the
implementation f o r c e . The only thing i s how to s e t things i n
motion. I w i l l c a l l M i l o s e v i c . I f he says no, then i t ' s a new
b a l l game. I f he says yes, then we w i l l proceed with a Moscow
meeting on October 31. -tCT"
-
End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
•CONFIDENT I A I
tLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-gflMgrnF.MTTaT.
C ND N f
OrCT
i
l
t
NATIONAL SECURITY
9024
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
December 29, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR MS. MARISA R. LINO
A c t i n g Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
Memoranda o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e Q u a d r i l a t e r a l
M e e t i n g and t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s P u l l - A s i d e Meetings
w i t h P r e s i d e n t F r a n j o Tudjman o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f
C r o a t i a , President A l i j a Izetbegovic Republic o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina and P r e s i d e n t Slobodan
M i l o s e v i c o f Serbia
SUBJECT:
The a t t a c h e d Memoranda o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e December 14, 1995
Q u a d r i l a t e r a l M e e t i n g and t h e p u l l - a s i d e meetings w i t h P r e s i d e n t
F r a n j o Tudjman o f t h e Republic o f C r o a t i a , P r e s i d e n t A l i j a
I z e t b e g o v i c R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina and P r e s i d e n t Slobodan
M i l o s e v i c o f Serbia are provided f o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . They must be d i s t r i b u t e d v i a NODIS channels
and n o t below t h e Deputy A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y (DAS) l e v e l .
idrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Q u a d r i l a t e r a l Meeting
Tab B
P u l l - a s i d e w i t h P r e s i d e n t Tudjman
Tab C
P u l l - a s i d e w i t h President Izetbegovic
Tab D
P u l l - a s i d e w i t h President M i l o s e v i c
DECUSSfFIED
F..0.! l^,Sc .3i(b)
White Hon tidclinasSeptemberl ,2006
""(.'uicMincsSepteni'
By
N R , D t lOffilf
A A ae
;
•COMF1DEWTTRL
Classified
Reason: 1
Declassify
.^LOTTIBRARY
On:
12/28/05
DU
0T0
C
�NATIONAL SECURITY
9024
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
December 28, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
FROM:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
SUBJECT:
Memoranda o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e Q u a d r i l a t e r a l
Meeting and t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s P u l l - A s i d e Meetings
w i t h P r e s i d e n t Franjo Tudjman o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f
Croatia, President A l i j a Izetbegovic Republic o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina and P r e s i d e n t Slobodan
M i l o s e v i c o f Serbia
A t t a c h e d a t Tabs A t h r o u g h D a r e t h e Memoranda o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
from t h e December 14, 1995 Q u a d r i l a t e r a l Meeting and t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s P u l l - A s i d e Meetings w i t h P r e s i d e n t F r a n j o Tudjman o f
the R e p u b l i c o f C r o a t i a , P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c R e p u b l i c o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and P r e s i d e n t Slobodan M i l o s e v i c o f S e r b i a .
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo a t Tab I t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e Memoranda o f
C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e meetings t o t h e Department o f S t a t e .
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memoranda o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
f i l e d f o r the record.
Approve
o f t h e meetings be
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o S t a t e
Tab A
Q u a d r i l a t e r a l Meeting
Tab B
P u l l - a s i d e w i t h P r e s i d e n t Tudjman
Tab C
Pull-aside with President Izetbegovic
Pull-aside with President Milosevic
Tab D
DECLASSIKIKI)
E.0.13516, Sre.3i»(h)
Whhe House (hidden, tynmkr II, 2006
-GQHfTDttNTlAL
Reason: 1.5
Declassify O
l
h LIBRARY
DN
Jm.
�9
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
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COHFIDENTiftfr
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Q u a d r i l a t e r a l Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t s F r a n j o
Tudjman o f C r o a t i a , A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slobodan M i l o s e v i c o f
Serbia
(U)
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
for National Security A f f a i r s
Samuel R. Berger, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r National Security A f f a i r s
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f ( N o t e t a k e r )
F r a n j o Tudjman, P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f
Croatia
A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c , P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Slobodan M i l o s e v i c . P r e s i d e n t o f S e r b i a
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 14, 1995, 9:20-9:45 a.m.
U.S. Ambassador's Residence, P a r i s , France
The P r e s i d e n t : Welcome. You have a l l taken s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s i n
g e t t i n g t o today's peace agreement, and t h e r e a r e s e r i o u s r i s k s
s t i l l ahead. We are prepared t o share those r i s k s , n o t o n l y i n
our m i l i t a r y involvement, b u t i n doing our p a r t i n t h e
reconstruction effort.
I would l i k e t o hear your views, b u t
f i r s t l e t me make a few p o i n t s .
—
F i r s t , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t we s t ay w i t h t h i s agreement. There
can be f l e x i b i l i t y i n implementat ion, b u t we should n o t change
the terms o f t h e Dayton agreement
Genuine freedom o f movement
needs t o be guaranteed as soon as p o s s i b l e . The e l e c t i o n s need
to be c a r r i e d o u t . The removal o f a l l f o r e i g n f o r c e s i s v e r y
important.
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t a l l o f you b e l i e v e t h a t IFOR i s
d o i n g t h e j o b t h a t you agreed i t should do i n an evenhanded way.
Let me say t o each o f you persona l l y t h a t I have g r e a t p e r s o n a l
JZmFi DENT IAL
Reason: 1.5(b)(g)
_
Declassify ogLWFOff LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY PERFO.'
�CONFIDENTIMT
c o n f i d e n c e i n General Joulwan and A d m i r a l Smith. They are b o t h
v e r y good men.
But i f any o f you b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e y are not
d o i n g t h e i r j o b i n an evenhanded way, l e t me know d i r e c t l y .
The
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f o r c e w i l l make the agreement you c r e a t e d a t
Dayton a r e a l i t y .
Our t r o o p s are t r a i n e d and ready t o do j u s t
t h a t . -fetSecond, I want t o s t r e s s how i m p o r t a n t I r e g a r d t h e l e t t e r t h a t
you w r o t e t o me e x p r e s s i n g your commitment t o ensure t h e s a f e t y
of U.S. and A l l i e d t r o o p s . T h i s l e t t e r h e l p e d g r e a t l y w i t h t h e
American people. Other t h i n g s t h a t are a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o me and
t o t h e American people i n c l u d e : the r i g h t o f refugees t o r e t u r n ;
the p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e human r i g h t s o f every e t h n i c group,
wherever t h e y l i v e ; and t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e work o f t h e War Crimes
T r i b u n a l t o go f o r w a r d and be r e s p e c t e d . I a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t any
step t h a t you can t a k e t o symbolize t h e b e n e f i t s o f peace would
be v e r y i m p o r t a n t . I encourage you t o move toward mutual
r e c o g n i t i o n and t o c o n s i d e r v i s i t i n g one a n o t h e r ' s c a p i t a l s .
Symbolic a c t i o n s can have a major impact on your own people and
the r e s t o f t h e w o r l d . -fet
What you have done i n r e a c h i n g t h i s peace agreement i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t ; i t t r u l y m a t t e r s t o people t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d .
We
w i l l do a l l we can t o make i t succeed.
You need t o work i n an
open atmosphere i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e mutual t r u s t .
The U n i t e d
S t a t e s w i l l be t r u e to' i t s word -- t o each and a l l o f you. • (CfP r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c : The s t r o n g e s t guarantee o f success i s the
f a c t t h a t a l l t h e people are f o r peace. The Serbs, Muslims and
Croats -- or a t l e a s t a b i g m a j o r i t y -- a l l want peace. That i s
why I'm an o p t i m i s t . No one can say t h e r e won't be any problems.
There i s a rough road ahead, but t h e r e i s no doubt i n my mind
t h a t success i s guaranteed. The main key t o success i s t h e
evenhanded i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the agreement.
-frC)The P r e s i d e n t : One t h i n g t h a t a l l o f you s h o u l d t h i n k about, i n
a d d i t i o n t o r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i s how t o f i n d ways t o demonstrate t o
the people who l i v e i n t h e r e g i o n and t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d t h a t
o r d i n a r y people want peace. The media don't do t h a t . They p a i d
g r e a t a t t e n t i o n when people were d y i n g , when o r d i n a r y people were
s u f f e r i n g . But s i n c e you agreed t o a c e a s e f i r e and t o the peace
agreement, the o n l y p u b l i c i t y i s focused on t h e p o i n t s o f
t r o u b l e . You need t o f i n d ways t o show t h e w o r l d and t h e people
i n s i d e Bosnia t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n wants peace. A
b i g problem t h a t we had w i t h members o f Congress i s t h e f a c t
t h a t , from the minute the f i g h t i n g stopped, t h e y have been
f o c u s i n g o n l y on t h e bad t h i n g s . There w i l l always be problems,
but we need t o do a b e t t e r j o b i n h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e good news.
-eonFiDEUTiM(^|_i|\J7Q[\[ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�QOHriDCNTIAb
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: You can be sure, Mr. P r e s i d e n t , t h a t we w i l l
do e v e r y t h i n g necessary f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e peace
agreement. I would l i k e t o s t r e s s one p o i n t t h a t i s o f g r e a t
importance:
implementation of the settlement i n Eastern
Slavonia.
•fef
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree.
I want t o d i s c u s s t h a t w i t h you.
*
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : The common people i n Bosnia want peace.
I'm n o t sure about some groups, however. We expect t h a t
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c w i l l calm those groups, - ( ^ h
President Milosevic:
With your h e l p .
4C4-
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : We w i l l cooperate i n t h i s r e g a r d . The
p r o o f t h a t t h e people want peace i s t h a t t h e c e a s e f i r e has been
m a i n t a i n e d w i t h o u t any s e r i o u s i n c i d e n t s , and t h e s m a l l i n c i d e n t s
have been v e r y r a r e . People are t i r e d o f war. I t i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t t h a t a l l t h e p a r t s o f t h e peace agreement be
implemented, e s p e c i a l l y those on human r i g h t s and t h e r i g h t o f
refugees t o r e t u r n . Perhaps t h e most i m p o r t a n t p r o v i s i o n s o f a l l
are those c o n c e r n i n g e l e c t i o n s . This i s a problem f o r t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community — f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e
OSCE. Help on e l e c t i o n s i s as i m p o r t a n t as your t r o o p s , s i n c e i t
i s t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e t o removing those who c r e a t e d t h e h a t r e d from
power, and t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Bosnia and t h e
r e g i o n t o achieve a b e t t e r f u t u r e . L e t me assure you t h a t your
t r o o p s a r e welcome i n Bosnia. I b e l i e v e t h e y w i l l have no
problems, - f e t "
The P r e s i d e n t : The e l e c t i o n s are i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y t o
e l i m i n a t i n g those who may n o t r u n f o r o f f i c e from p o l i t i c a l l i f e
(as you agreed a t Dayton), b u t t o show every e t h n i c group t h a t
t h e y can be r e p r e s e n t e d , t h a t t h e i r v o i c e s w i l l be heard.
I will
emphasize t h e e l e c t i o n s when I speak t o t h e conference t h i s
morning. We w i l l do a l l we can t o make sure t h a t t h e agreement
you designed can work. One o f t h e missions o f IFOR i s t o c r e a t e
a secure environment so t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n s can be h e l d . We want
the IFOR m i s s i o n t o be t e r m i n a t e d i n an a p p r o p r i a t e way. We
can't do t h a t unless f r e e e l e c t i o n s a r e a f a c t . -(C)
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c : A f t e r t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n s , I'm convinced
t h a t we w i l l be a b l e t o d e f i n e t h e s i t u a t i o n as normal.
E l e c t i o n s w i l l be a t u r n i n g p o i n t . -fG-h
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n s be
h e l d i n normal c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t i s , t e r r o r must have been
removed, and most people must have been r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r homes.
Without such c o n d i t i o n s , i n areas where r a d i c a l e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g
o c c u r r e d and t e r r o r now r u l e s , t h e r e w i l l n o t be a p o s s i b i l i t y o f
conn DENT IALP I TNTDN LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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f r e e and f a i r e l e c t i o n s . So we must f i r s t c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s
f o r e l e c t i o n s b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n s can take p l a c e . -(C)P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t a l l t h r e e
c o n s t i t u e n t peoples be equal d u r i n g and a f t e r t h e e l e c t i o n s .
This i s i m p o r t a n t f o r Bosnia's f u t u r e peace. ( f )
Secretary Christopher: All three Presidents worked hard to
maximize the chances for successful elections, in terms of the
allocation of offices and provisions for voting. The main thing
is to implement the terms you so carefully worked out in Dayton.
Now I suggest that the President meet for a few minutes
individually with each leader. -{&)
The P r e s i d e n t : L e t me make one more comment. The c o n f i d e n c e you
have expressed i n t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n needs t o be communicated t o
the people on t h e ground. You can change t h e psychology o f t h e
situation.
I was j u s t i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , where they f o u g h t
each o t h e r f o r 25 years. Now we have had over 15 months w i t h o u t
fighting.
I t i s u n t h i n k a b l e f o r most people t h a t they c o u l d go
back. W i t h t h e growth i n confidence, t h e whole s i t u a t i o n has
changed. I n t h e face o f s k e p t i c i s m about t h e peace i n Bosnia,
you need t o v o i c e confidence i n your p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s . -(C)End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
--
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THE
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P u l l - A s i d e Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t F r a n j o
Tudjman o f the Republic o f C r o a t i a (U)
PARTICIPANTS :
U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
for National Security A f f a i r s
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f ( N o t e t a k e r )
Croatia
Franjo Tudjman, P r e s i d e n t
Mate Granic, M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
Gojko Susak, M i n i s t e r o f Defense
Ambassador Miomir Zuzul, S p e c i a l Envoy
Other A d v i s o r s
December 14, 1995, 9:45-9:55 a.m.
U.S. Ambassador's Residence, P a r i s , France
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I know how i m p o r t a n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e
E a s t e r n S l a v o n i a s e t t l e m e n t i s f o r you.
L e t me say t h a t i f you
hadn't shown r e s t r a i n t , t h e whole peace agreement would not have
happened. We want t o h e l p on Eastern S l a v o n i a . -(C)P r e s i d e n t Tudjman: Mr. P r e s i d e n t , t h e r e p o r t by B o u t r o s - G h a l i i s
terrible.
He i s p l a y i n g games i n p r o p o s i n g 9300-11,000 t r o o p s
and s t r e t c h i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n over s i x months. I t i s i m p o r t a n t
t h a t you have a p p o i n t e d a r e t i r e d General as c i v i l i a n
a d m i n i s t r a t o r . He can go ahead and b e g i n the process now. -(C)The
President:
He's a good man. "TCT"
P r e s i d e n t Tudjman:
Belgian forces.
You should t r y t o g e t the Nordics
—
CONFIDENTIAIJ
Reason: 1.5(b
5
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�• CONFI DDHTIMiR i c h a r d Holbrooke:
are c r a z y . • (C) "
We agree t h a t B o u t r o s - G h a l i ' s
President Tudjman:
And six months is too long.
t r o o p numbers
JrG^
The P r e s i d e n t :
I w i l l work on t h i s today.
I w i l l t r y t o speak
w i t h B o u t r o s - G h a l i and g e t him t o move. We can't w a i t .
(O—
President Tudjman: If new troops are needed, the Nordic
battalion can be redeployed to Eastern Slavonia from Tuzla now
that U.S. forces have arrived. That would only take a couple of
days. -{Cf
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : We a l s o wanted t o exchange views w i t h you
on t h e importance t h a t we and our Congress a t t a c h t o t h e
Federation.
4^The President: We won a big vote in the Senate yesterday. We
managed to get a group of Republicans to vote with me. Many in
Congress are saying that they are worried that the Federation
will break up. I ask you to make sure that the Croats in the
Federation work hard to strengthen the Federation. We will work
to ensure that they are treated fairly. "tChP r e s i d e n t Tudjman: I am sure t h e Croats w i l l do a l l they can t o
make t h e F e d e r a t i o n work. You need t o convince t h e Muslim
leadership.
For example, t h e r e need t o be more Croats
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e F e d e r a t i o n abroad. .(•€-)'•
The
President:
I agree,
End
o f Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P u l l - A s i d e Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t A l i j a
I z e t b e g o v i c o f t h e Republic o f BosniaHerzegovina (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
for National Security A f f a i r s
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
A l i j a Izetbegovic, President
K r e s i m i r Zubak, P r e s i d e n t o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n
Muhamed Sacirbey, M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
Hasan M u r a t o v i c , M i n i s t e r f o r R e l a t i o n s w i t h
the UN
Other A d v i s o r s
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 14, 1995, 9:55-10:05 a.m.
U.S. Ambassador's Residence, P a r i s , France
The P r e s i d e n t : You a r e a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t about t h e importance o f
the e l e c t i o n s . They a r e an i m p o r t a n t measure o f success f o r us
as well. We can't leave honorably if the elections aren't done
right. We will do all we can. I will emphasize the importance
of the elections with the Europeans today. I will also announce
some reconstruction funds. -^Gf-^
One o f t h e g r e a t e s t concerns we faced i n seeking Congressional
s u p p o r t , and an i s s u e t h a t we have r a i s e d w i t h you b e f o r e , i s t h e
s a f e t y o f our t r o o p s i n t h e event t h e Mujahedin do n o t leave and
i f you do n o t end your m i l i t a r y and o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e
c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h I r a n . Our people a r e v u l n e r a b l e . I f any a c t i o n
were t a k e n by these f o r c e s a g a i n s t our t r o o p s , i t c o u l d s h a t t e r
the whole o p e r a t i o n . I t c o u l d j e o p a r d i z e o u r a b i l i t y t o equip
and t r a i n your f o r c e s . As you know, I t o l d t h e Congress t h a t we
w i l l equip and t r a i n your f o r c e s -- t h i s i s something we must do
•CONFIDENTIAL »
Reason:
1.51b)(d)
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�CONriDCNTIALor e l s e t h e r e w i l l n o t be a l a s t i n g peace. I am stronglycommitted t o t h i s .
But i f we were t o l o s e a couple o f s o l d i e r s
to f o r c e s connected t o I r a n , i t c o u l d wreck t h e whole t h i n g . So
I want t o do what I promised t o do, b u t t h i s i s t h e one area t h a t
c o u l d undermine my commitment.
President Izetbegovic: As I told you earlier, your troops will
be completely safe. The units of the Mujahedin have been
dismantled. In the days to come, we will give you more details.
The majority of these forces have already left. But there are
small numbers that do not have any place to go. They are
political opponents in their home countries, and many have
families in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as military units, they have
ceased to exist. I understand your concern on this. There will
be individuals who stay, but it will be as civilians and in parts
of the country in which they will be under complete control. We
don't know what to do with them as persons, but they are not
soldiers anymore, and they have given a solemn promise that they
will not deal with anything military. We will watch them. It is
in our interest not to create any problems in this regard. If
you provide us with evidence that people are terrorists, we will
take action. But the Mujahedin units do not exist.
(Cf
The P r e s i d e n t :
I understand why they came. You needed h e l p
wherever you c o u l d f i n d i t . Those were desperate t i m e s . But we
are your f r i e n d s . We want t o h e l p -- t o make t h e F e d e r a t i o n
work, t o make Bosnia a u n i f i e d s t a t e i n every r e s p e c t . But t h i s
problem c o u l d d e s t r o y t h e p u b l i c base o f support i n t h e U.S. f o r
IFOR. We w i l l work w i t h you and t e l l you what we know, b u t t h i s
i s s t i l l a p o t e n t i a l l y s e r i o u s problem. We are doing what we can
to guard a g a i n s t t h i s danger. We w i l l take you a t your word.
Secretary Christopher: Let me say a few words about the
importance of making a success of the Federation. We heard
considerable worry from the Congress about the Federation's
future. Providing a real role for the Croats is going to be very
important. In this regard, we are pleased that President Zubak
is here. I know you will do your part. -(Cf
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : We are d o i n g e v e r y t h i n g i n our power t o
ensure t h a t t h e F e d e r a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . Three days ago, we had a
meeting o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n p a r l i a m e n t . Things are moving f o r w a r d .
Between December 20 and 22, some v e r y s e n s i t i v e laws should be
passed -- on defense and f o r m a t i o n o f a j o i n t army and j o i n t
p o l i c e f o r c e . Judging by what I have seen, t h e r e f o r e , t h i n g s a r e
i m p r o v i n g . -(&)
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : You a l s o signed a good agreement i n
Dayton which needs t o be f i l l e d o u t . • (C)
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The P r e s i d e n t : What about t h e Serbs i n t h e suburbs o f Sarajevo?
Can you do more t o discourage them from l e a v i n g and t o make them
f e e l t h a t t h e y w i l l be t r e a t e d f a i r l y ? "fefP r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : Yesterday I had a meeting on t h i s s u b j e c t
w i t h M i l o s e v i c t h a t l a s t e d n e a r l y two hours. I t o l d him -- and I
w i l l r e p e a t t h i s i n my speech -- t h a t t h e Serbs i n Sarajevo w i l l
be g i v e n a c h o i c e as t o whether t o leave or s t a y . We a r e c a l l i n g
on them t o s t a y . We are t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t ; we have
sent d e l e g a t i o n s t o speak w i t h them, b u t they don't dare t o see
us.
I even asked t h e German Ambassador t o go t o those suburbs
where Farben had a f a c t o r y t o encourage them t o remain. • (Cf
R i c h a r d Holbrooke:
The Serbs w i l l t a l k w i t h you a f t e r A d m i r a l
Smith and h i s f o r c e s a r r i v e . 4C)
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : That i s p o s s i b l e . Once t h e f o r c e s o f
K a r a d z i c l e a v e , t h e r e w i l l be a p e r i o d when no army i s i n those
areas. Then we w i l l have a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n t a c t t h e
Serbs.
We a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n seeing them s t a y . We want t o
m a i n t a i n a c o s m o p o l i t a n p i c t u r e i n Sarajevo. -(C)-- End o f C o n v e r s a t i o n --
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THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
P u l l - A s i d e Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t
M i l o s e v i c o f Serbia (U)
Slobodan
PARTICIPANTS
U.S .
The P r e s i d e n t
Warren C h r i s t o p h e r , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
for National Security A f f a i r s
R i c h a r d Holbrooke, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r European and Canadian A f f a i r s
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f ( N o t e t a k e r )
Serbia
Slobodan M i l o s e v i c , P r e s i d e n t o f S e r b i a
Momir B u l a t o v i c , P r e s i d e n t o f Montenegro
Milan M i l u t i n o v i c , M i n i s t e r of Foreign
A f f a i r s o f t h e Federal Republic o f
Yugoslavia
Goran M i l i n o v i c , Chief o f Cabinet t o
President Milosevic
Other A d v i s o r s
December 14, 1995, 10:05-10:15 a.m.
U.S. Ambassador's Residence, P a r i s , France
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President: I just wanted to say that I know that this
agreement would not have been possible without you. Whatever our
differences in the past, you made Dayton possible. Now it is
important to make it work. I want to personally ask that you
work with Admiral Smith. He's a good man and committed to his
mission. If you cooperate, I think we can make it happen. We
are depending on you to keep the radicals among the Bosnian Serbs
from derailing the agreement. On Sarajevo, I know you had a long
discussion with President Izetbegovic. He needs to make the
Serbs who stay in the Federation -- and we hope that many of them
will stay -- believe that they will be treated fairly and have
their voices heard. •{Cf -
Reason: 1.5(b)
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2
President M i l o s e v i c :
The only dangerous spot i s Sarajevo.
This
i s not because of a d i r e c t m a t e r i a l threat, but because of the
psychology of the s i t u a t i o n . I f there i s an understanding on an
implementation plan -- a t r a n s i t i o n period that makes the Serbs
f e e l that they have a r e a l choice — then things w i l l calm down.
I explained t h i s to Admiral Smith when I met him together with
Ambassador Harriman. We have time to work t h i s out. -fet"
The keys to solving all problems are in the Dayton agreement.
The force commander is authorized to extend the transition period
if, in his personal judgment, an extension is needed. So he can
use the possibility he has under the agreement. Please encourage
Izetbegovic to understand this now. The winter is not adequate
for the transition period; it must be extended in order to calm
the situation. J&jYou know, I asked I z e t b e g o v i c i f he wants t o keep t h e Serbs i n
Sarajevo o r n o t . You must understand t h a t he would l i k e them t o
go and s t a y a t t h e same time -- he wants enough Serbs t o s t a y as
are needed t o m a i n t a i n h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l image. That i s t h e
reality.
Sarajevo was a b i g wound f o r Europe a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f
t h i s c e n t u r y ; i t l e d t o t h e s t a r t o f World War I . I t would be
b e t t e r n o t t o p r o l o n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s wound. People must
have a c h o i c e . Under t h e Dayton agreement, people a r e f r e e t o
choose t h e i r p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e .
This i s more i m p o r t a n t than t h e
s t a t i s t i c s o f how many Serbs and how many Muslims t h e r e are i n
Sarajevo.
Let's ensure freedom o f movement and i n d i v i d u a l
freedom and then l e t people decide. We need a t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d
to move t o a new s i t u a t i o n .
There w i l l need t o be a new c u l t u r a l
c e n t e r i n t h e e a s t e r n p a r t o f t h e Republika Srpska -- f o r a
u n i v e r s i t y , academy o f sciences, museums, n a t i o n a l t h e a t e r -- b u t
t h i s w i l l be i n t h e same neighborhood as Sarajevo, t h a t i s , i n
Pale and Lukavica.
So t h i s w i l l be manageable i f t h e r e i s an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g on i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . — (C-)—•
Secretary Christopher:
I want t o thank P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c f o r
h i s c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e r e c e n t Congressional d e l e g a t i o n s . fC)'
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c : Some o f them s a i d they would l i k e you t o
see so many Congressmen i n such a s h o r t t i m e , Mr. P r e s i d e n t ! -fe-j
S e c r e t a r y C h r i s t o p h e r : You and I had some d i f f i c u l t sessions i n
Dayton, b u t you have done what you s a i d you would. -fC) P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c : Without your h e l p , Mr. C h r i s t o p h e r , we
would n o t have achieved t h e r e s u l t . You were t h e key a t c r i t i c a l
moments . (C)—
1
The P r e s i d e n t :
mall.
(U)
I understand
cmrmarraiCLINTON
you were a b i g h i t a t t h e shopping
LIBRARY
PHOTOCOPY
�«€QMFID#W 1 IAL***
3
Secretary Christopher:
President Milosevic:
And a t t h e O f f i c e r ' s Club.
(U)
We had a good time t h e r e . . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : A l t h o u g h t h i n g s have been calm s i n c e t h e
c e a s e f i r e , t h e press i s always l o o k i n g f o r something bad t o
r e p o r t . 4C) •
President M i l o s e v i c :
For the press, only bad news i s good news.
Mr. President, may I ask you to think of f u l l normalization of
r e l a t i o n s with Federal Yugoslavia. We have been a l l i e s
throughout our h i s t o r y . Few countries have had such c l o s e
r e l a t i o n s f o r so long with the United S t a t e s . We stood shoulder
to shoulder i n two world wars. The s p o i l i n g of our r e l a t i o n s was
over a t h i r d i s s u e and the r e s u l t of a d i s t o r t e d p i c t u r e on the
part of your p u b l i c opinion. We need f u l l normalization -- we
are the c e n t r a l f a c t o r i n the Balkans, "fet"
The
President:
We've e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t .
President Milosevic:
n o r m a l i z a t i o n . (U)
I don't see any reason n o t t o have
Secretary Christopher:
R i c h a r d Holbrooke:
w a i t i n g . (U)
The
President:
(U)
You've taken a b i g s t e p today.
•(•C)-
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , we can't keep P r e s i d e n t
Chirac
Dick has done w e l l so f a r , hasn't he? (U)
P r e s i d e n t M i l o s e v i c : He's a l u c k y man.
t o implement h i s agreement. (U)
Now t h e r e s t o f you have
-- End o f Conversation
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
CONFIDENT
full
�NATIONAL SECURITY
0262
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
January 23, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
FROM:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n from t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
Meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina, January 13, 1996
A t t a c h e d a t Tab A i s t h e Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n o f t h e
P r e s i d e n t ' s meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c on January 13,
1996.
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memo a t Tab I t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e Memorandum o f
C o n v e r s a t i o n t o t h e Department o f S t a t e .
That t h e a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n be f i l e d f o r t h e
record.
Approve
approve
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum t o S t a t e
Tab A Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
QWasASSIHilD)
*0;.13.5?Mte.3;5
GuidtlinevSepi
:
>€QUFTr)F.mT&LReason: 1.5
Declassify o{
LIBRARY P
H
�*COMFIDENTIAfc-
NATIONAL
SECURITY
0262
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
January 23, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department o f S t a t e
SUBJECT:
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n Between t h e P r e s i d e n t
and P r e s i d e n t A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia-.
Herzegovina (U)
The a t t a c h e d Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n between t h e P r e s i d e n t and
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina i s p r o v i d e d f o r t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . I t must be d i s t r i b u t e d
v i a NODIS channels and n o t below t h e Deputy A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y
(DAS) l e v e l .
:ew D. Sens
Exdcutfive S e c r e t a r y
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum o f C o n v e r s a t i o n
-CQMPEDENTIAL
Andxew
C l a s s i f i e d by.; Andrew D. Sexi
Reason: 1. 5 l £
j>
D e c l a s s i f y On: 01/23/06
OECLASSIHED
T.;:.. 13526, Sec 3.5(b)
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4
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�CQEIFIDEMTIAL-
0262
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h A l i j a I z e t b e g o v i c , P r e s i d e n t o f
Bosnia-Herzegovina
PARTICIPANTS
The P r e s i d e n t
John Menzies, U.S. Ambassador t o Sarajevo
Anthony Lake, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r
National Security A f f a i r s
Samuel Berger, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r National S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Robert G a l l u c c i , Ambassador-at-Large
B r i a n J. Atwood, A d m i n i s t r a t o r , USAID
Alexander Vershbow, Senior D i r e c t o r f o r
European A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f , N o t e t a k e r
President A l i j a Izetbegovic
Foreign M i n i s t e r Muhamed Sacirbey
M i n i s t e r f o r R e l a t i o n s w i t h IFOR Hasan
Muratovic
F e d e r a t i o n P r e s i d e n t K r e s i m i r Zubak
F e d e r a t i o n Vice P r e s i d e n t Ejup Ganic
F e d e r a t i o n Prime M i n i s t e r Kapetanovic
Presidency Member Lasovic
Ambassador t o U.S. Sven A l k a l a j
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
January 13, 1996, 3:52 p.m. - 4:15
p.m.
Vocal, Tuzla A i r Force Base, BosniaHerzegovina
P r e s i d e n t I z e t b e g o v i c : I know we have l i m i t e d t i m e , so I w i l l go
s t r a i g h t t o t h e p o i n t . Our assessment i s t h a t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f
t h e Peace Agreement i s going w e l l o v e r a l l .
I n some areas, i t i s
going v e r y w e l l and U.S. f o r c e s , i n our o p i n i o n , s h o u l d be
c o n g r a t u l a t e d f o r t h e i r v e r y s u c c e s s f u l work. We c o n g r a t u l a t e
them i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r t h e i r r a p i d c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e pontoon
b r i d g e , which t h e people o f Bosnia f o l l o w e d w i t h a d m i r a t i o n .
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n has been going v e r y w e l l d e s p i t e the d i f f i c u l t
weather c o n d i t i o n s and the d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n . We a l l f e l t t h e
weather today.
There are, however, c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s .
You
• O F DEMraar
CNI
C l a s s i f i e d by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify og:|_ I O I Y T O N
6
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COPY PER E.0.13526
�CONFIDENTIAL
have heard o f t h e problems around Mostar. F o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e are
s i g n s t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n i s calming down today, and I hope t h e r e
w i l l n o t be any more v i o l e n c e . -fC-)
I would l i k e t o t e l l you p e r s o n a l l y our d i a g n o s i s o f t h e problem
i n Mostar. The t e n s i o n s t h e r e are not a problem o f b o r d e r s ,
f r o n t i e r s or m u n i c i p a l i t i e s b u t a r e s u l t o f the l a c k o f b a s i c
human r i g h t s t h e r e . There i s no r e l i g i o u s or p o l i t i c a l freedom,
no freedom o f movement. I t i s a sad s i t u a t i o n w i t h which t h e
w o r l d must d e a l . I f the problem o f human r i g h t s i s r e s o l v e d , t h e
problem o f Mostar be w i l l r e s o l v e d as w e l l .
I understand t h a t
t o n i g h t you w i l l be meeting w i t h P r e s i d e n t Tudjman. I p l e a d w i t h
you t o have t h i s i n mind when you meet. He can change t h e
s i t u a t i o n t h e r e i n a day.
That i s my o p i n i o n , a l t h o u g h perhaps
n o t t h a t o f every member o f my d e l e g a t i o n . Without p r o g r e s s i n
Mostar, we cannot implement the program f o r the F e d e r a t i o n .
We have a l s o had c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o S a r a j e v o .
You know t h a t we have p r o c l a i m e d an amnesty w i t h the aim o f
h e l p i n g t o r e s o l v e the issues t h e r e . There are a l r e a d y s i g n s
t h a t t h i s was the r i g h t d e c i s i o n , a l t h o u g h i t i s t o o e a r l y t o
judge s i n c e the amnesty i s o n l y f o u r days o l d . However, t h e r e i s
one aspect t h a t d i s t u r b s our people i n Sarajevo. A l l t h e t i m e
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t a l k s about the r i g h t o f Serbs t o
s t a y i n t h e i r homes. We accept t h i s , b u t no one ever speaks o f
the r i g h t o f those who were f o r c i b l y e x p e l l e d t h r e e our f o u r
years ago t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r homes. As f o r t h e f o u r suburbs
around Sarajevo t h a t are coming back t o the F e d e r a t i o n , i t i s not
w i t h o u t reason t h a t M i l o s e v i c handed these over. The f o u r are i n
f a c t n o t Serb areas:
a c c o r d i n g t o the 1991 census, none o f them
were o r i g i n a l l y Serb; a l l were m a j o r i t y non-Serb. A l l t h e nonSerb p o p u l a t i o n was k i l l e d or f o r c i b l y e x p e l l e d . T h e r e f o r e , i t
i s i m p o r t a n t t o speak o f s e v e r a l r i g h t s i n Sarajevo:
the r i g h t
of Serbs t o s t a y i n t h e i r homes; the r i g h t o f non-Serbs t o go
back t o t h e i r homes; and the r i g h t o f war c r i m i n a l s t o be
punished f o r what they d i d . I f these t h r e e r i g h t s are p u t i n t o
e f f e c t , t h e n we w i l l f i n d a s o l u t i o n f o r Sarajevo.
I n any case,
l e t me assure you t h a t our government w i l l cooperate i n t h e b e s t
way t o ease your m i s s i o n i n Sarajevo. -fC-)
There i s s t i l l another problem t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d know
about.
I r e f e r t o one o f the a r t i c l e s i n the Peace Agreement
about t h e exchange o f p r i s o n e r s and m i s s i n g persons.
The Serb
s i d e has s u b m i t t e d a l i s t o f o n l y 120-130 p r i s o n e r s , even though
we have more than 20,000 who are m i s s i n g . This c r e a t e s a s e r i o u s
problem.
R e c e n t l y , Americans d i s c o v e r e d a new mass grave i n
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are a s k i n g t h a t the grave s i t e s be
checked and t h a t the m i s s i n g from S r e b r e n i c a be accounted f o r .
^ ^ C L I N T O N LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�''CONFI DEMTIAL
3
Let me r e p e a t t h a t we thank you f o r coming t o Bosnia, and we a l s o
thank t h e American people and the American government f o r your
engagement i n s o l v i n g the c o n f l i c t .
I t i s our b e l i e f t h a t your
e f f o r t w i l l not be i n v a i n . -fGf
The P r e s i d e n t :
I a p p r e c i a t e your e f f o r t i n coming here today.
I
know how d i f f i c u l t i t was.
The weather i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g , and I
w i l l have t o be b r i e f i n o r d e r t o make my d e p a r t u r e b u t l e t me
make a few p o i n t s . F i r s t , w i t h r e s p e c t t o Mostar, we are v e r y
concerned about the s i t u a t i o n , and I w i l l have a v e r y c l e a r
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h P r e s i d e n t Tudjman t o n i g h t on t h i s s u b j e c t .
We
cannot l e t t h a t s i t u a t i o n endanger the i n t e g r i t y o f t h e
Federation.
For the Peace Agreement t o work o u t , we must
p r e s e r v e the F e d e r a t i o n and human r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n ,
-fetSecond, on Sarajevo, we are v e r y concerned about the a t t a c k s on
innocent c i v i l i a n s .
I'm pleased t h a t , d e s p i t e those i n c i d e n t s ,
you went ahead w i t h your amnesty. I n doing t h i s , you d i d the
right thing.
These kinds o f c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g measures w i l l be
w e l l r e c e i v e d . But I a l s o agree t h a t we have not done a good j o b
i n s a y i n g n o t o n l y t h a t the Serbs have the r i g h t t o s t a y b u t t h a t
o t h e r groups have the r i g h t t o come back. We w i l l t r y t o do a
b e t t e r j o b o f t h i s i n t h e f u t u r e . Meanwhile, a n y t h i n g e l s e you
can do i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f b u i l d i n g c o n f i d e n c e -- f o r example,
e s t a b l i s h i n g a m u l t i - e t h n i c p o l i c e f o r c e — would be v e r y good.
I am r e l y i n g h e a v i l y on Ambassador Menzies and Ambassador
Gallucci.
They w i l l be w o r k i n g v e r y hard on these i s s u e s .
We
w i l l a l s o be s u p p o r t i n g C a r l B i l d t i n the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t .
-tcr
Let me r a i s e one more i s s u e r e l a t i n g t o the equip and t r a i n
program. I understand you have met w i t h Jim Pardew, who i s
a l r e a d y d o i n g a l o t t o assess your needs and t o i d e n t i f y p o s s i b l e
sources f o r meeting those needs. As we have d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e , we
remain concerned about the q u e s t i o n of the Mujahedin. While i t
i s h a r d t o determine who i s i n and who i s o u t , i t i s v e r y
i m p o r t a n t f o r us t h a t the I r a n i a n s go and t h a t t h e terms o f t h e
Dayton Agreement be honored. We want our people t o h e l p t o b u i l d
a s t a b l e democratic s o c i e t y . T h e r e f o r e , I want t o r e a f f i r m our
s t r o n g p o s i t i o n on I r a n . You know how s t r o n g l y we f e e l about
t h i s . -tet
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , i f we don't stop the meeting now, my plane
not be a b l e t o get o u t . Thank you v e r y much.
(U)
President Izetbegovic:
Thank you, Mr.
End o f
President.
(U)
Conversation
CONFI DDNT lAb-
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Declassifed Documents concerning Bosnia
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2011-0964-M
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on memcons and telcons between President Clinton and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic from 1993 thru 1995. Also included is a "pull-aside" memcon with President Clinton and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.
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2011-0964-M
Bosnia
Bosnia War
Croatia
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Slobodan Milosevic
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Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) or Section 3.5(c) ofE.O. 13526
or (b)(6) of the FOIA.
�COM f I [) E
NT I A t
\
\~
N.ODIS
. ,~
AMBASSAD.OR .OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE F.OLL.OWING MESSAGE
PRESIDENT CLlNT.ON T'o PRESIDENT YELTSIN. N'o SIGNED .ORIGINAL WILL
BE PR.OVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR B.ORIS:
THE CRISIS IN K.OS.OV.OIS REACHING A CRITICAL P.OINT. A
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS ENVEL.OPED TENS .OF TH.OUSANDS
.OF INN.OCENT PE.OPLE WILL W.ORSEN WITH THE .ONSET .OF WINTER
.ONCE AGAIN THE W.ORLD IS C'oNFR'oNTED BY C.OMPELLING EVIDENCE
.OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY MIL.OSEVIC'S SECURITY F.ORCES .ON
CIVILlANS'AND SENSELESS MASSACRES. WE CANN.OT AFF'oRD T'o
WAtCH IDLY AS MIL.OSEVIC LEADS THE BALKANS INT'o AN'oTHER CYCLE
.OF BL.O.ODSHED, ATR.OCITIES AND MISERY.
THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE W.ORKED CL.OSELY T.OGETHER T'o BRING THE
C.ONFLICT IN K.OS.OV.O T'o AN END. THANKS LARGELY T'o .OUR
SUCCESSFUL DISCUSSI.ONS IN M.OSC.OW, THE UNITED NATI.ONS SECURITY
C.OUNCIL UNANIM.OUSLY AD.OPTED AN IMP.ORTANT RES.OLUTI.ON .ON
K.OS.OV.O .ON SEPTEMBER 23. THAT W.ORK BUILT .ON A L.ONG SERIES .OF
REINF.ORCING EFF.ORTS BY .OUR TW'o C.OUNTRIES. IN MARCH, WE AND
.OTHER C.ONTACT GR.OUP C.OUNTRIES SPELLED .OUT THE PRECISE STEPS
THAT MIL.OSEVIC MUST TAKE T'o REGAIN THE C.ONFIDENCE .OF THE
INTERNATI'oNAL C.OMMUNITY. AT A MEETING WITH Y.OU IN MOSC.OW IN
JUNE, MIL.OSEVIC PR.OMISED Y.OU THAT HE W.OULD TAKE SEVERAL .OF
THESE ACTI.ONS IMMEDIATELY.
IN HIS ACTUALBEHAVI.OR, MIL.OSEVIC HAS BEEN N.OTHING BUT
DEFIANT. F'oR M.ONTHS N.OW, HE HAS IGN.ORED THE INTERNATI'oNAL
C'oMMUNITY'S CLEAR-CUT DEMANDS F'oR AN IMMEDIATE END T'o
ACTI.ON BY SECURITY F.ORCES AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL; ACCESS AND
FREED'oM .OF M.OVEMENT F'oR INTERNATI'oNAL .OBSERVERS; UNIMPEDED
ACCESS F'oR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF .ORGANIZATI.ONS;AND CLEAR
"
PR.OGRESS .ON A P.OLlTICAL S.OLUTI.ON. IVIIL.OSEVIC'S C.OMPLIANCE
WITH THESE DEMANDS REMAINS INADEQUATE.
THE DIPL.OMATIC .OPTI.ONS AT .OUR DISP.OSAL ARE QUICKLY RUNNING
.OUT. AFTER THE UN RES.OLUTI.ON, THE C.ONTACT GR.OUP MET IN NEW
Y.ORK AND GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTI.ONS T'o .OUR AMBASSAD.ORS IN
BELGRADE T'o UNDERSC.ORE .ONCE AGAIN .OUR EXPECTATI.ONS .OF
MIL.OSEVIC. WHEN IVIIL.OSEVIC RECEIVED THEM, HE MADE CLEAR THAT
~'C-:;;;;"':""'
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-
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
.
D~UiNTON LIBRARY PHOT()i;0PY .
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HE PLANNED TO IGNORE THEIR MESSAGE. THE CONTACT GROUP
POLITICAL DIRECTORS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY IN LONDON. I AM
PLEASED THAT WE AGREED ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT BOTH TO MILOSEVIC AND THE KOSOVAR
ALBANIANS. WE ALL WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT WE MUST
ALSO BE PREPARE'b TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS
REACHED ITS LIMITS.
IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE
TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE
ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH
TO USE FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS URGENT TASK, BUT MILOSEVIC'S
ACTIONS -- THE CEASELESS VIOLENCE AND THE FLOUTING OF THE WILL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- LEAVE US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE.
IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY IN COMING DAYS WITH OUR LONG-STANDING
DEMANDS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND
DECISIVELY.
.
I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR
DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE
BALKANS. WE MUST KEEP UP THE REGULAR AND MEANINGFUL
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TEAMS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES
BETWEEN MADELEINE AND IGOR, OUR IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT
NATO, AND THE CONTACT GROUP'S ATTENTIVE WORK ON A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. MILOSEVIC MUST NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN SPLIT US OR
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE
IS OFF THE TABLE. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STOP THE KILLING IN
KOSOVO, USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, AND SHOW THE ENEMIES OF
PEACE THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED. AS IN BOSNIA, I KNOW THAT I
CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE
OVERCOME THIS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
�eONFIDEWPIPJJs/NODI S
NIACT IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING THE SITUATION
IN KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. A COPY MAY ALSO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER
PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR BORIS:
I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTERS, WHICH I READ VERY
CLOSELY.
I AM GLAD THAT WE HAVE A SHARED RECOGNITION OF THE
NEED TO USE EVERY AVAILABLE MEANS TO END THE ON-GOING TRAGEDY IN
KOSOVO.
AS I WROTE BEFORE, I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO
MAINTAIN A STEADY AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHI,P BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
THE UNITED STATES.
I KNOW THAT DURING THESE POLITICALLY CHARGED
TIMES, RUMORS AND MISSTATEMENTS CAN SPREAD QUICKLY.
I AM
PLEASED THAT YOUR TEAM MADE CLEAR ON FRIDAY THAT RUSSIA HAS NOT
CHANGED THE READINESS OR TARGETTING STATUS OF I
. STRATEGIC
ARSENAL, DEMONSTRATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT .ONE
OF OUR LANDMARK ACCOMPLISHMENTS STILL STANDS. LET ME ASSURE YOU
THAT NONE OF OUR ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS ARE AIMED AGAINST
RUSSIA.
I APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCES THAT RUSSIA WILL, UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES, ALLOW ITSELF TO BE DRAWN INTO MILITARY CONFLICT
IN YUGOSLAVIA.
NEEDLESS TO SAY, LIKE YOU,. I REMAIN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO.
I AGREE THAT WE MUST INTENSIFY
OUR EFFORTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, AND I STRONGLY ENDORSE YOUR
SUGGESTION THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET QUICKLY.
I
UNDERSTAND THAT MADELEINE WILL SEE FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV IN
OSLO ON TUESDAY. THEY.HAVE STAYED IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT BY
TELEPHONE, AND THEI.R DEPUTIES HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY TO
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EXCHANGE IDEAS AND WORK TOWARD A COMMON APPROACH TO RESOLVE THIS
TRAGEDY.
WE NEED, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO JOINTLY APPLY AMMERICAN AND
RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES TO THE VITAL GOAL OF AN ENDURING
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THIS CRISIS THAT THREATENS THE PEACE AND
SECURITY OF A REGION THAT IS IMPORTANT TO US BOTH.
IT IS SIMPLY
UNACCEPTABLE TO ALLOW BELGRADE'S POLICIES, ESPECIALLY ITS
BARBARIC ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, TO JEAPORDIZE WHAT YOU AND I HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED IN U. S ..-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN SIX AND A HALF. YEARS.
THEY ALSO THREATEN THE HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH THAT YOU ACHIEVED
IN LAYING THE BASIS.FOR A COOPERATIVE, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO.
ON THAT BASIS, I WELCOMED THE STATEMENT RELEASED ON FRIDAY BY UN
SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN AND NOTED THAT THE KEY-TO ITS
SUCCESS WILL BE WHETHER. PRESIDENT
LOSEVIC GOES BEYOND MERE
COMMITMENTS AND IMPLEMENTS KEY PROVISIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT THE
SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THE REALIZATION OF PEACE IN KOSOVO
WHILE KEEPING IT WITHIN THE FRY. KOFI'S STATEMENT IS AN
IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SENTIMENTS
ABOUT THE CRISIS AND OUTLINES A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH TOWARD
ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.
I HOPE YOU CAN EMBRACE THIS
APPROACH, AND THAT MADELEINE AND MINISTER IVANOV CAN FURTHER
DEVELOP THESE IDEAS FOR' WORKING TOGETHER, ESPECIALLY IN THE UN,
OSCE, THE CONTACT GROUP, AND THE G-S.
I KNOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE JOYOUS AT A TIME WHEN HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF FELLOW EUROPEANS ARE SUFFERING. BUT I DO WISH YOU,
YOUR FAMILY AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THE PEACE OF THE EASTER
SEASON.
IT IS MY SINCEREST HOPE, WHICH· I KNOW YOU SHARE, THAT
THIS PEACE WILL COME SOON TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD,
INCLUDING ALL OF THOSE SUFFERING IN THE BALKANS. THE CHANCE OF
THIS HOPE COMING TRUE DEPENDS MUCH ON THE WORK YOU AND I AND OUR
COLLEAGUES DO IN COMING DAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT.
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�CONFIDENTIAL
6724
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS
DATE: October 1, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i j y ^ and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o author/ze m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compl^nt, i n c l u d i n g i n t h e absence
of a f u r t h e r UN r e s o l u t i o n , /
To Bccurc support f o r OUP^G
proposal t o develop a
p r o c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n f a c i l i t y and t o oeck ag-rccmont ere
next otcps on Kosovo.
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Treasury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o^ f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
c r e d i t l i n ^ w i t h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
bilateral/fcommitments/ p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members a"nd
( p o s s i b l / j a private""sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
s t r e n g t h e n our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g "
to governments t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary p o l i c i e s .
. Europoana have been-•BGoisting Troaoury and Fed c f f o r t o
yw dcvolop an approach t h a t would i n c l u d e b i l a t e r a l
f i n a n c i n g as w e l l as v i a IMF. G-7 Deputies are meeting
F r i d a y n i g h t and w i l l discuss the proposal ( w i t h finance
m i n i s t e r s l i k e l y t o take up the t o p i c Saturday).
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations w i t h these deputies have evoked
-They suspect,
r e s i s t a n c e from
EO 13526 1.4d
i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are t r y i n g t o undermine t h e IMF's r o l e
and are l o o k i n g f o r a way t o avoid p r e s s i n g Congress f o r
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the quota increase and New Agreement t o Borrow (NAB) . —G—Ty
DGputico arc mooting tomorrow n i g h t (Friday) and w i l l
diocucG the p r o p o s a l — ( w i t h finance m i n i a t c r a l i k e l y
up t h e t o p i c thcmoclvcG on Saturday). P r e l i m i n a r y
eofiv-eraationa w^nfe-h—t--hp.np Hormt i on—h.
roGistanco from1.4d
- While
been s u p p o r t i v e , they don't want t o get too f a /6ut i n
r
f r o n t o f t h e i r European colleagues. [
likely
share
r e s e r v a t i o n s , but i n t h e end are' l i k e l y t o
participate.
The t y p i c a l IMF program, though i t can hfe formulated and
put i n place q u i c k l y , i s n o t w e l l s u i t e d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n
and a number o f other emerging economies. What
i s needed i s some assurance o f acc&ss t o s u b s t a n t i a l b u t
temporary f o r e i g n exchange resources i f heavy e x t e r n a l
pressures a r i s e . Such assurance/would help t h e c o u n t r y
r e s i s t u n d e s i r a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s ' such as t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s
or t h e k i n d o f d i s r u p t i v e c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s adopted by
P r o v i d i n g l a r g e amounts o f f i n a n c i n g must be done i n a way
t h a t does n o t create unafcceptable l e v e l s o f moral hazard.
We must be sure t h a t t h e e l i g i b l e c o u n t r i e s have s t r o n g
p o l i c i e s i n p l a c e . And we must, when necessary, i n s i s t
t h a t p r i v a t e c r e d i t o r s c o n t r i b u t e i n some f a s h i o n so we are
not f i n a n c i n g t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l .
r e c e n t l y wrote you and
; i f raised]
o t h e r G-7 leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g
i n t e r n a t i o n a / f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y . These ideas i n c l u d e
r e i n f o r c i n g / e c o n o m i c cooperation, which he i s doing wTthin
the EU; b y i l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h t h e IMF s t i l l "
p l a y i n g / c e n t r a l r o l e and a deeper dialogue enhanced by a
strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r t h e IMF's I n t e r i m
Committee; •fee advocate a change i n d e s i g n a t i o n f o r the IMF
I n t e / i m Committee t o t h a t o f a Council increased
transparency and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of w o r l d f i n a n c i a l systems;
i t s a t some form o f c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s ; and, f i n a l l y ,
/ncreased development a s s i s t a n c e . - There are few r a d i c a l
ideas i n the l e t t e r , aside from t h e h i n t a t r e t h i n k i n g
l i b e r a l i z e d c a p i t a l f l o w s . The one s p e c i f i c measure
presented, upgrading t h e I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have
a meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and inThe primary e f f e c t o f
ouch a change would be t o give what i s now an a d v i s o r y body
g-eme-deeioion-maM^g—powers-—The s^abotantivc impact wmri-dr
not •••likely• be • very meaningful the and i n the end we c o u l d
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probably s u p p o r t - ^ t o o a t i o f y |
L4d
| Thio may comei n your c o n v c r g a t i o n . — W h i l e not committing t o agree, Ytfou
should could welcome h i s thoughts g e n e r a l l y as a need;
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a ^ew
f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e . o p o a k i n t h a t context t o
• i n t o r c o t i n e x p l o r i n g new and more expansive mode
dialogue.
Kosovo
A f t e r the recent a t r o c i t i e s ,
i s w i l ^ i us i n moving t o
air strikes.
i s also w i l l i n g to/proceed, i n c l u d i n g
i f necessary i n the"absence of a new ^ s o l u t i o n . However
h i s s e n i o r s t a f f i s c o n s i d e r i n g whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
c l e a r i n g the way f o r the use of f o f c e . I f so, t h i s needs
to happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y s o / t h a t i t does not get i n
the way of our e f f o r t s t o buil4/NAT0 consensus.
The Russians continue to oppose use of force.
is increasingly uncomfortable with serving
as a p o l o g i s t f o r Milosevi/'' s b r u t a l i t y , but the Russians
have not come t o terms y l t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s the
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior^
i n p u b l i c statements,
:iryd
the Russians contiryued t o emphasize t h a t any use o f f o r c e
ir/d
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e apfd r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n . This
o n l y underscored/the importance o f our European p a r t n e r s '
keeping a u n i t g & f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g the
Russians that/we are coming close t o exhausting d i p l o m a t i c
o p t i o n s w i t ] / t h e Serbs. We have proposed a f u r t h e r PJC and
are p l a n n i n g f u r t h e r b i l a t e r a l contacts w i t h Moscow t o help
keep then/on board, w h i l e making c l e a r t h a t we w i l l a c t i f
necessayfr w i t h o u t t h e i r consent.
A f t e r tzlic recent atroci-Mesr]
I i s w i t h uo i n moving t o
r i k c o / i n c l u d i n g i n the absence of a new S e c u r i t y
|io also w i l l i n g t o proceed,
i l resolution.
arc u r g i n g t h a t we f i r s t seek
his senior s t a f f
n^w—resolution c x - p l i c i t l y a u t h o g j ^ a g uoe of fcHree^—Your
o r e i g n p o l i c y team i s c o n t a c t i n g
counterparts to
convince them t h a t t h i s would put Yeltsin-dn'an untenabl-e
s i t u a t i o n v i s - a - v i s the Duma w h i l e reducing the pressure on
Milosevic.
The Russians continue t o oppose use o f f o r c e .
i s i n c r e a s i n g l y uncomfortable w i t h s e r v i n g
as a p o l o g i s t f o r M i l o a c v i c ' o b r u t a l i t y / but the Ruooiang
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�CONFIDEMTIAL
have n o t come t o terms w i t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s -fc&e
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s b e h a v i o r
1.4d
i n p u b l i c otatcmcntp-^
the Ruoaiano continued t o emphasize t h a t any use
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e and r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n ,
o n l y underscores the importance o f our European
keeping a u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g
Russians t h a t we are coming close t o exhausting/cliplomatic
o p t i o n s w i t h t h e Serbs-.-
Northern I r e l a n d ( B l a i r only)
Most o f the Northern I r e l a n d playcro/Wcrc i n Blackpool,
England t h i s week f o r t h e Labour Pa-fty's annual conqres;
was immovable i n
Earlier
t a l k i n g t o Jim Steinberg o n / w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider an IRA
gesture on decommissioning/"
showed
•TafuYaay w i t h Jim Steinberg,
l i t t l e w i l l i n g n e s s t o cntcrtailTTcicao t K a t would i n v o l v e
IRA r i s k t a k i n g on weapons decommissioning. I n l i n e w i t h
t j l i s , — S e p a r a t e l y / t h e B r i t i s h arc moving forward wirth
i c m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . — P l a n s wore announced plansyestcrday t o
remove twe-watchtowers from ±fr-Belfast and dismantle a
border checkpoint/ i n a d d i t i o n t o the r e c a l l o f s e v e r a l
hundred personal weapons from B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y personnel
(an oft--rcpoatcd Adams'—goal) .
1
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�CONFIDENTIAL
Both Adams and Trimble w i l l be i n t-ho United States i
October; Trimble w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Northern--Ir,
investment road show w h i l e Adams has a s e r i e s o f
€undraiocro on the East Coast. The c u r r e n t pros
d e a d l i n e fe-r movement on one oi-dc or t h e other Xa
October 31/ when tho f i r s t meeting on the Nor>th-South
Council i s t o occur.
Attachments
Tab A
Points t o Make f o r Prime M i n i s t e r ^
Tab B
Points t o Make f o r President Chi/ac
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672 /
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l
Initiative
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
/
/
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
/
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
/
Recognize i t wouldn'tyfaork w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF prograys may n o t be s u i t a b l e , however.
•
Think we need aiy.approach w i t h these
elements:
•
•
Second, /mMay need c o o r d i n a t e d s e t o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such ^s from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side (/f IMF mechanism.
•
•
F i r s t , IMF /shorter-term money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not ,66 permanent; could have sunset clause.
T h i r d , may aAlso want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n
asTnecded.
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
0/ Saturday. Urgent t h a t they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
s u i t a b l e approach.
Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
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Kosovo
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l rary^e o f a i r
/
o p e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
/
•
^si;
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians a r e
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposirig any use o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavipfr.
We shouldn't p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o a box by /Seeking a f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w ^ l l f o r c e t h e Russian"
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NftTO-Russia Founding A c t .
EO 13526 1.4d raises idea of "testing"/Russian
willingness
to
authorize
a UNSC Presidency
statpinent
clearing
the way for
using
force':
/
•
Not convinced Moscow w i l l / a g r e e .
Otherwise there i s ri^sk o f reducing pressure on M i l o s e v i c and
c o m p l i c a t i n g a consensus a t NATO.
•
We've both agreeff t o a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
r e s o l u t i o n . Ne/d t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
gQutearged a t a t r o c i t i e s committed by M i l o s e v i c ' s s e c u r i t y
-forces. B r u t a l t a c t i c s mast stop and occur-irfe-y forces
w-i-thdrawn/—Only a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e
i f n o t t h e use
of f o r c c / i t o c l f
w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply.
1
OWc ve
-ifttc
epe
gun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s . We
to ask NATO Cou'noil t o authorize f u l l range o f a i r
ions next Wednesday.
•Plc/scd t h a t you c a l l e d f o r an emergency S e c u r i t y - C o u n c i l
feefcirEHg-,—but (^-bt—tha^-^u-s^i-a-will agroc t o a r e s o l u t i o n
/authorizing force.
^Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians arc
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any uoe o f f o r c e
end appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
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• Y o l t o i n and Primakov have a d i f f i c u l t •dilemma: c i t h e r a b o t a ^
and f u r t h e r weaken p o o i t i o n a t home, or v e t o — - — f o r c i n g ug t o
go ahead, which docs damage t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n a t home arm t o
what we've t r i e d t o achieve w i t h NATO-Ruooia Founding X c t .
14
.d
we shouldn'JE p u t them
i n t h i s box. Instead,—wo must be prepared t o a d "without
further resolution.
•Also/ need t o use a l l a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h / t h e Russians,
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO/—to make c l e a r t h a t M i l o c o v i e ' •
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us no a l t e r n a t i v e . /Hope t h a t Russia docs
not p u t i t s e l f i n p o o i t i o n t h a t i o o l a t p o i t from r e s t o f G-8.•Need t o make this--clear i n p u b l i c statements,' o t h e r w i s e
M i l o s e v i c w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t promisees and p a r t i a l compliance
w i l l p r o t e c t him from m i l i t a r y roGponoc.
BWc'vc b o t h agreed t o act i f ncceysoary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
jrese-lution. Need t o c o n v i n c / a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.-
• F i n a l l y ^ we need t o ensu/c t h a t our a c t i o n s weaken/ not
s t r e n g t h e n M i l o s e v i c . / C a n n o t t o l e r a t e him as c o n t i n u i n g
source o f c o n f l i c t ^h Balkans.—We should ask ICTY t o pursue
his indictment.
Northern
Irel
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
Understanc
[holding back on executive u n t i l
decommissioning, and
he does
e i n b e r g spoke l a s t weekend
w i t h o u t much success.
on
'terested i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
CONFIDENTI
^CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7
Financial Initiative
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways to t a c k l e t h i s was a p^eded c o n t r i b u t i o n
to the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a q^w f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l g i v e i t c a r e f u l / 6 o n s i d e r a t i o n .
c
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of/system i s needed, but -al-se
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging market
economies r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a p a r a g e t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be cen/ered i n IMF, and only f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s ,
•
Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so<
o
T y p i c a l IMF programs may
not be s u i t a b l e , however.
•
Think we n e y o a n approach w i t h these elements:
•
F i r s t , / { M F s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would/not be permanent; could have sunset claus"eT
•
Sepond, may need coordinated set of b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
T/uch as from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
>ide of IMF mechanism.
T h i r d , may
a l s o want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d of
approach.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: l . S j d )
Declassi
;«y^tl#TON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
• T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e , however. Thinkj.-hg o f
s h o r t e r - t e r m moneys i n l i n e • o f - c r c d i t f o r m a t . — W o u l d njrft be
permanent; c o u l d have sunset clause.
•May need c o o r d i n a t e d set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s /(such as
from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund)—alphg side o f IMF
mechanism.
•Also want t o got p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p c r a t i o i ^ as needed.
•G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday-. Urgent t h a t they reach c^rccmcnt on s u i t a b l e
approach.
/
/
•Need your s t r o n g support t o help m^k'e t h a t happen.
• ( I f r a i s e d ) Received your l e t t e r on the I n t e r i m Committee.
Have asked Bob Rubin t o give I t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I s i n
our i n t e r e s t t o explore new/and more cxpanoi-vc modes o f
dialogue.
Kosovo
BOu-te _
f o r c e s ; These b r u t a l t a c t i c s must stop and s e c u r i t y forces
w i t h d r a w n . — O n l / a credible threat of force
i f not use of
f o r c e i t s e l f -/ w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply^•Wc'vc begun t/6 prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
i n t e n d t o /sic NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range of a i r
epe-ra^i-onc a t i-£-s—meeting nex-t-Wee
We
EO 13526 1.4d
•Conc^ned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians arc
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any use o f f o r c e
a/d—appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Q-Y/e-l-fcs-i-n—an*
and f u r t h e r weaken position—a^-home-rgo ahead/ which docs damage t o t h e i r
what we've t r i e d t o achieve w i t h the
CONFIDENTIAL
i i lemma-! ei^ther—abstain
or veto -•• f o r c i n g us t o
p o o i t i o n a t home and t o
NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
B
we ohouldn't put them
1.4d
i n t h i o box.
Inotcad/ we must be prepared t o act w i t h o u t Q
y
further resolution.
•Also/ nocd t o use a l l available—eharare-lrs—with the Russi;
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO, t o make c l e a r t h a t M i l o s e v i c ' s
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us no a l t e r n a t i v e . — H o p e that/fcuosia docs
not p u t i t s e l f i n p o o i t i o n t h a t i s o l a t e s i t fromy/cot o f G-8.
•Need t o make t h i o c l e a r i n p u b l i c statements, otehcrwioe
M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l t h a t promises and p a r t i a / compliance
p r o t e c t him from m i l i t a r y response.
will
BFi-nallyv—we need t o ensure t h a t our actiorio weaken,—net
s t r e n g t h e n M i l o s e v i c . — C a n n o t t o l c r a t o / h i m as c o n t i n u i n g
source o f c o n f l i c t i n Balkans.—We should ask ICTY t o pur^tte
his indictment.
• We've begun t o prepare Congress apd p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o / a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
o p e r a t i o n s a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
•
W i l l need your h e l p i n b u i l d i r i g NATO consensus.
•
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o / a corner by opposing any use o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excused/Milosevic's behavior.
•
Seeking a f u r t h e r U l / r e s o l u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e
would o n l y make masters worse. This would face the Russians
w i t h a d i f f i c u l t /filemma: e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken
p o s i t i o n a t hom^ o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russia
Founding Act.
We s h o u l d n ' t put them i n t h i s box. I n s t e a d , we must be
prepared fr6 act w i t h o u t a f u r t h e r r e s o l u t i o n , w h i l e keeping
open a l l / a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h Moscow, i n c l u d i n g a t NATO.
o Not convinced Moscow w i l l
agree.
Otherwise there i s r i s k o f reducing pressure on Milosevic" and
c o m p l i c a t i n g a consensus a t NATO.
CONFIDENTIAL'
"CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADER
DATE: October 2, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING,
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 /proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o auth/Jrize m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compliant, i n c l u d i n g i n the absence
of a f u r t h e r UN resolutiofn
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Tre ury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o f f jancing f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
credit line
h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
b i l a t e r a l co: itments, p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members and
(possibly)
r i v a t e sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
strengthen 'Our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g
to govern n t s t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary
^
fca*K
gators wivv
l l c i e s
i t i e s are meeting Friday i g h t and w i l l discuss the
Sal ^tf&th f i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s Jrarfojfr-y -tee take up t h e
Saturday^.
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations. w i t h these
EO 13526 1.4d
t-ies have evoked r e s i s t a n c e from the |
_
They suspect, i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are trying to
fdermine the IMF's r o l e and are l o o k i n g for a way to avoid
r e s s i n g Congress f o r the quota increase and New Agreement
[has been supportive, they
o Borrow (NAB). While
don't want t o get too far out in front of their European
while sharingl
(reservations,
colleagues.
are likely to participate in the end. pjrr^
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify
ftiM
LLBRARU?FU
�CONFIDENTIAL
The t y p i c a l IMF prograrrK though
in be f o r m u l a t e d and
put in_P-l.ace q u i c k l y , i s \ n o t w e l l f u i t e d t o the s i t u a t i c
l.4d
m
and a number o f
e r ^ m e r g i n g economies. What
i s needed i s some assuranc
access t o s u b s t a n t i a l /out
temporary f o r e i g n exchange
urces i f heavy e x t e r n a l
pressures a r i s e . Such as
e would help the country
r e s i s t u n d e s i r a b l e a l t e c f i a t ives such as t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s
or t h e k i n d o f disrupt-ive capi taJN c o n t r o l s adojtfted by
P r o v i d i n g l a r g e amounts
t h a t does n o t create unac
We must be sure t h a t the e
p o l i c i e s i n p l a c e . And
that private creditors c
not f i n a n c i n g t h e i r w i
ing must
e levels,
I b l e coun
whe
dorfe i n a way
* r a l hazard,
lave strong
:y, i n s i s t
^on so we are
wrote you and other
leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r
strengthening i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y .
These
ideas include r e i n f o r c i n g economic cooperation, which he i s
doing w i t h i n t h e EU; b u / l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h
the IMF s t i l l p l a y i n g A c e n t r a l r o l e w i t h a deeper dialogue
enhanced by a strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r t h e
IMF's I n t e r i m Committee; increased transparency and
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f / o r l d f i n a n c i a l systems; h i n t s a t some
form o f c a p i t a l oOntrols; and, f i n a l l y , increased
development assistance. There are few r a d i c a l ideas i n the
l e t t e r , aside from the h i n t at r e t h i n k i n g l i b e r a l i z e d
c a p i t a l f l o w s / The one s p e c i f i c measure presented,
upgrading the/ I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have a
meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and i n t h e end we could
p r o b a b l y support. You should welcome h i s thoughts
g e n e r a l l y /as a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c r i t i c a l dialogue
on b u i l d ^ g a new f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e .
Kosovo
i s w i t h us i n moving t o
A f t e r / the recent a t r o c i t i e s ,
i s also' w i i T i n g t o proceed, i n c l u d i n g
air /strikes.
i f yhecessary i n the absence o f a new r e s o l u t i o n . However,
hi/S s e n i o r s t a f f i s considering whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w / l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
l e a r i n g the way f o r the use o f f o r c e .
I f so, t h i s needs
t o happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y so t h a t i t does not get i n
the way o f our e f f o r t s t o b u i l d NATO consensus.
oitriDEirriMir|_JMTOM LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIMJ
6724
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7
Financial I n i t i a t i v e
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n of confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways t o t a c k l e t h i s was a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n
t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l give i t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of syatem i s needed, but
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy/femerging market
economies r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a packag^ t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be c e n t e r ^ / i n IMF,
w i t h strong p o l i c i e s .
and o n l y f o r economies
•
Recognize i t wouldn't,work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrpto (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
T y p i c a l IMF prograr / may not be s u i t a b l e , — h e w e v e ^
.th these elements:
need an approach
ss-Think we
•
Second, may need coordinated set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as/from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
s i d e op IMF mechanism.
o
•
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not b f permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
, /
^
T h i r d , also want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation.
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on^turday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
anproach.
Jeed your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify O ^ L I M T Q ^
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERE. O. 13526
B A Y P OO O Y
RR H T C P
�CONFIDENTIAL
Kosovo
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t a k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l r a n g / o f a i r
o p e r a t i o n s a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
/1
K
Will need your help in building NATO consensus. f ^~
>
"
^ —7—^
Csacexae^U-akettt managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposin'g any use o f force
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Seeking a "fr^rfcfier UN r e s o l u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e
would o n l y Bfc^e matters worse. Russians would face d i f f i c u l t
dilemma: / e i t h e r , a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r v/eaken p o s i t i o n a t home,
or veto/and jeopab^ize t h e NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
/
We should:
prepared
open a l
them i n t h i s boy' I n s t e a d , we must be
w i t h o u t a f u r c h / r r e s o l u t i o n , w h i l e keeping
£ channels wi/h Moscow, i n c l u d i n g a t NATO.
EO 13526 1.4d
o
;
]^t><g rvmH ncnH Mor;r;nw w / l 1 n g r o p ,
/
QfcheirwXse there "Tg/risk e-f r e d u c i i ^ . pressure on M i l o s e v i c
o a m p l i c a t i n g a cgnsonaus a t NATO.
^ j - ^ «Vi e m
v- ^
CONFI DENT IAL
1
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
/
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
lO-Z-IQ
THE WHITE HOUSE
6724
'3QrA95
'8C2M:a
WASHINGTON
October 2, 1998
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS
DATE: October 2, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
I.
PURPOSE
To secure support f o r our G-7 proposal t o develop a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y and t o seek agreement f o r
NATO next Wednesday t o a u t h o r i z e m i l i t a r y response i f
M i l o s e v i c remains non-compliant, i n c l u d i n g i n the absence
of a f u r t h e r UN r e s o l u t i o n .
II.
BACKGROUND
G-7 I n i t i a t i v e
As you know, Treasury and the Fed are c u r r e n t l y developing
a new type o f f i n a n c i n g f a c i l i t y which would combine an IMF
c r e d i t l i n e w i t h a complementary c r e d i t l i n e comprising
b i l a t e r a l commitments, p r i n c i p a l l y from G-7 members and
( p o s s i b l y ) a p r i v a t e sector component. The f a c i l i t y would
s t r e n g t h e n our a b i l i t y t o provide p r e c a u t i o n a r y f i n a n c i n g
to governments t h a t are pursuing b a s i c a l l y sound f i s c a l and
monetary p o l i c i e s .
G-7 Deputies are meeting Friday n i g h t and w i l l discuss the
p r o p o s a l . Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors
w i l l take up the t o p i c Saturday.
P r e l i m i n a r y conversations
w i t h these o f f i c i a l s have evoked r e s i s t a n c e from
EO 13526 1.4d
They suspect, i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t we are t r y i n g
to undermine the IMF's r o l e and are l o o k i n g f o r a way t o
a v o i d p r e s s i n g Congress f o r the quota increase and New
has been
Agreement t o Borrow (NAB). While
s u p p o r t i v e , they don't want t o get too f a r out i n f r o n t o f
while sharing
t h e i r European colleagues.
r e s e r v a t i o n s , are l i k e l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the end.
The propose o f the c a l l i s to get
to
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify OQLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
d i r e c t t h e i r Finance M i n i s t e r s t o be s u p p o r t i v e o f t h i s
proposal.
1.4d
wrote you and other G-7 leaders w i t h h i s ideas f o r
s t r e n g t h e n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s t a b i l i t y . These
ideas i n c l u d e r e i n f o r c i n g economic cooperation, which he i s
doing w i t h i n t h e EU; b u i l d i n g a "new B r e t t o n Woods," w i t h
the IMF s t i l l p l a y i n g a c e n t r a l r o l e w i t h a deeper dialogue
enhanced by a strengthened decision-making r o l e f o r the
IMF's I n t e r i m Committee; increased transparency and
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f world f i n a n c i a l systems; h i n t s a t some
form o f c a p i t a l c o n t r o l s ; and, f i n a l l y , increased
development assistance. There are few r a d i c a l ideas i n the
l e t t e r , aside from the h i n t a t r e t h i n k i n g l i b e r a l i z e d
c a p i t a l f l o w s . The one s p e c i f i c measure presented,
upgrading t h e I n t e r i m Committee, would n o t have a
meaningful s u b s t a n t i v e impact and i n t h e end we could
p r o b a b l y support. You should welcome h i s thoughts
g e n e r a l l y as a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l dialogue
on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e .
Kosovo
A f t e r the recent a t r o c i t i e s , I
l i s w i t h us i n moving t o
i s also w i l l i n g t o proceed, i n c l u d i n g
air strikes.
i f necessary i n t h e absence o f a new r e s o l u t i o n . However,
h i s s e n i o r s t a f f i s c o n s i d e r i n g whether t o " t e s t " Moscow's
w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e a UNSC presidency statement
c l e a r i n g t h e way f o r the use o f f o r c e . I f so, t h i s needs
t o happen q u i c k l y and q u i e t l y so t h a t i t does not g e t i n
the way o f our e f f o r t s t o b u i l d NATO consensus.
The Russians continue t o oppose use o f f o r c e .
i s i n c r e a s i n g l y uncomfortable w i t h s e r v i n g
as a p o l o g i s t f o r M i l o s e v i c ' s b r u t a l i t y , but the Russians
have n o t come t o terms w i t h the r e a l i t y t h a t f o r c e i s the
o n l y way t o change M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
i n p u b l i c statements.
the Russians continued t o emphasize t h a t any use o f f o r c e
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e and r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r UNSC a c t i o n .
This
o n l y underscores the importance o f our European p a r t n e r s '
keeping a u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h Moscow and p r e s s i n g the
Russians t h a t we are coming close t o exhausting d i p l o m a t i c
o p t i o n s w i t h the Serbs. We have proposed a f u r t h e r PJC and
are p l a n n i n g f u r t h e r b i l a t e r a l contacts w i t h Moscow t o help
™.rTn ,T„r| TNT^N LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
ro
�CONFIDENTIAL
keep them on board, w h i l e making c l e a r t h a t we w i l l a c t i f
necessary w i t h o u t t h e i r consent.
Northern I r e l a n d ( B l a i r only)
14
.d
Earlier
was immovable m
t a l k i n g t o Jim Steinberg on w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider an IRA
gesture on decommissioning. [
I n l i n e w i t h t h i s , the B r i t i s h announced plans
t o remove watchtowers from B e l f a s t and dismantle a border
checkpoint.
Attachments
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make f o r President Chirac
Tab B P o i n t s t o Make f o r Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
rnTnFNTTA,,rLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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F
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
Worried a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion.
•
Your l e t t e r on ways t o t a c k l e t h i s was a needed c o n t r i b u t i o n
to t h e c r i t i c a l dialogue on b u i l d i n g a new f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We w i l l give i t c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e of. system i s needed, b u t need
urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging market economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and only f o r economies
w i t h strong p o l i c i e s .
o Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e .
approach w i t h these elements:
•
Think we need an
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not be permanent; could have sunset clause.
o Second, may need coordinated set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side o f IMF mechanism.
o T h i r d , also want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation.
M
•
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
o Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
CONFI DEN^HAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
10M/08
i
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
lO
a*
Co
En W
Ul
Q
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
2
/C-2-%
Kosovo
•
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
operations a t i t s meeting next Wednesday.
•
W i l l need your help i n b u i l d i n g NATO consensus and managing
Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians are p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a
corner by opposing any use o f force and appearing t o excuse
M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
EO 13526 1 4
.d
POOOY
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CONFIDENTIAL
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f
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WJC HANDWRITING
�THE P E I E T H S SEEN
RSDN A
CONFIDENTIAL
6724
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
o Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
• Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
o Recognize i t wouldn't work w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week or so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF programs may not be s u i t a b l e .
approach w i t h these elements:
Think we need an
•
F i r s t , IMF s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not be permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
Second, may need coordinated s e t of b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such as froifi Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side of>**T§&kechanism.
f
o
Third,
ant t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
© G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday. Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
• Need your strong support to help make that happen.
Kosovo
o We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a i r
operations next Wednesday.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
^,
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D.ci««try on:
1
L n ) R A R Y p H O T O C O p y
WJC H N W I I G
A D RTN
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•
Concerned about managing Russian
reaction.
Do n o t want t o p u t Y e l t s i n i n a box by seeking a f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w i l l f o r c e the Russian
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, or veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russia Founding A c t .
You may wish to raiselEO 13526 l.4d]idea of "testing"
willingness
to authorize
a UNSC Presidency
statement
the way for using force and your thoughts
on it:
Russian
clearing
had idea o f " t e s t i n g ' Russian w i l l i n g n e s s t o a u t h o r i z e
a UNSC Presidency statement, As you know, I've been concerned
t h a t t h i s would p u t Y e l t s i n i n a no-win s i t u a t i o n .
I f he goes forward, needs t o do so q u i c k l y so as n o t t o reduce
pressure on M i l o s e v i c .
You and I agreed t o a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
r e s o l u t i o n . Need t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
Northern
•
Ireland
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
Understand
h o l d i n g back on executive u n t i l
decommissioning, and
he does.
Jim S t e i n b e r g spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s w i t h o u t much success.
on
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
t h i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
CONFIDENTIAL.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
/
/
/
/
/
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
/
o 'Worried—at ^/(deterioration o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l markets
and danger o f spreading contagion worrisome.
7
'
•
Ac dioeusood, /onger-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e , o f system i s
needed, b u t also need urgent a c t i o n now t o help w o r t ^ e m e r g i n g
-•markets economies resist contagion.
/'
\P
• We have some thoughts on a package t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
•
•
•
Agree i t should be centered i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
/
Recognize i t wouldn't work without quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB) ; working hard t o g e t them i n
next week or so.
T y p i c a l IMF programs may/iot be s u i t a b l e , however. T h i n k i n g
of s h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format. Would n o t be
permanent; could have sdnset clause.
/
•
May need coordinated'set o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s (such as
from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along side o f IMF
mechanism.
•
Also want t o get' p r i v a t e lenders' cooperation as needed.
•
G-7 Finance M i n i s t e r s and C e n t r a l Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent t h a t they reach agreement on s u i t a b l e
approach. /
•
Need your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
/
/
Kosovo
•
Outraged a t a t r o c i t i e s committed by M i l o s e v i c ' s s e c u r i t y
f o r c e s . B r u t a l t a c t i c s must stop and s e c u r i t y f o r c e s
/
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: l.SJd),..
D/ciassify^LIiN/liSN LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENT-^ftfe
2
withdrawn. Only a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e — i f n o t the us/
of force i t s e l f — w i l l cause M i l o s e v i c t o comply.
We've begun t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i j
We i n t e n d t o ask NATO Council t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range
air
o p e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
Pleased t h a t you ((pi. c a l l e d f o r an emergency Secur/te^ Council
meeting^-tcrdsy-r—^ut doubt t h a t Russia w i l l agree^to a
resolution authorizing force.
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . -Russians are
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposWg any use o f force
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
Y e l t s i n and Primakov have a
and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n
go ahead, which does damage
what we've t r i e d t o achieve
d i f f i c u l t dilemma: e i t h e r abstain
a t home, o r veto — f o r c i n g us t o
t o t h e i r / p o s i t i o n a t home and t o
w i t h NA^O-Russia Founding A c t .
EO 13526 1.4d
"in t h i s box. Instead, we must
further resolution.
we shouldn't p u t them
prepared t o a c t w i t h o u t a
Also, need t o use a l l a v a i l a b l e channels w i t h the Russians,
i n c l u d i n g a t NATO, t o make/clear t h a t M i l o s e v i c ' s
i n t r a n s i g e n c e leaves us vtio a l t e r n a t i v e . Hope t h a t Russia does
not p u t i t s e l f i n posityion t h a t i s o l a t e s i t from r e s t o f G-8.
Lv«2_
•
Need t o make t h i ^ c l e ^ r i n p u b l i c statements, otherwise
M i l o s e v i c w i l l / t t e i / z h a t promises and p a r t i a l compliance w i l l
p r o t e c t him from r t y i / i t a r y response.
We've both agrej;
resolution.
to a c t i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
t o convince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
F i n a l l y , / ^ need t o ensure t h a t our actions weaken, n o t
strengthen Milosevic.
Cannot t o l e r a t e him as c o n t i n u i n g
source/of c o n f l i c t i n Balkans. We should ask ICTY t o pursue
his indictment.
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
Northern I r e l a n d
• Understand
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on,
decommissioning,
holding back on executive
he does.
Jim Steinberg spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s w i t h o u t much success.
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about/how t o b r i d g e
t h i s d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging standoff a t
_ -•Fwwnrrt> How can we help?
4r
tLINTON LIBRARY P O
H
�CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
G-7 F i n a n c i a l I n i t i a t i v e
•
D e t e r i o r a t i o n o f confidence i n f i n a n c i a l ma/^ets and danger o f
spreading contagion worrisome.
•
Longer-term work on a r c h i t e c t u r e o f system i s needed, b u t also
need urgent a c t i o n now t o help worthy/emerging economies
r e s i s t contagion.
•
We have some thoughts on a packag£ t o b o l s t e r t h e i r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l reserves:
© Agree i t should be c e n t e r e / i n IMF, and o n l y f o r economies
with strong p o l i c i e s .
» Recognize i t wouldn't ]4ork w i t h o u t quota increase and New
Arrangements t o Borrow (NAB); working hard t o get them i n
next week o r so.
•
T y p i c a l IMF p r o g r a n ^ may n o t be s u i t a b l e , h o w e v e r y S ^
/^Q^hink
we need an/approach w i t h these elements:
© F i r s t , IMF ^ h o r t e r - t e r m money, i n l i n e - o f - c r e d i t format.
Would not fie permanent; could have sunset clause.
•
•
•
Second, /may need coordinated s e t o f b i l a t e r a l c r e d i t l i n e s
(such afe from Treasury's Exchange S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund) along
side a f IMF mechanism.
Thi/d,
a l s o want t o get p r i v a t e lenders' c o o p e r a t i o n .
G-7 /Finance M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank governors meeting here
on Saturday.
Urgent they reach agreement on t h i s k i n d o f
approach.
/eed your s t r o n g support t o help make t h a t happen.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
:ONFIDENTIAL
'Reason: 1. 5/M) T
Declassify Owi-
THN
kwAW
LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONFIDENTIAL
^
Kosovo
EO 13526 1.4di
w
^
^
^
W e ' v e ^ g u n t o prepare Congress and p u b l i c f o r a i r s t r i k e s .
We^itftend t o ask NATO C o u n c i l t o a u t h o r i z e f u l l range o f a^
e r a t i o n s next Wednesday.
Concerned about managing Russian r e a c t i o n . Russians aafe
p a i n t i n g themselves i n t o a corner by opposing any us^r o f f o r c e
and appearing t o excuse M i l o s e v i c ' s behavior.
•
We shouldn't p u t Y e l t s i n i n t o a box by seeking a ' f u r t h e r UN
r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g f o r c e . That w i l l f o r c e ^ t h e Russian
government t o e i t h e r a b s t a i n and f u r t h e r weaken p o s i t i o n a t
home, o r veto and j e o p a r d i z e the NATO-Russ^ia Founding A c t .
authorize
•ttibes
idecf of "testing"
Russia/f willingness
to
a UNSC Presidency
statement
cfearing
the way for
JLh
^d*-* J
" i ^ X - j " jluMt^
Not convinc
3nvinced Moscow w i l l
c J l ^ ^ ^ o 4-0
CuA^r^
U,uic
using
Pw&->-<
t
agree./
I f you de£i de-tn—ge-^forward, piease do so q u c k y and q u i t l y .
^Otherwise t h o r c i-s/?isk o f reducing pressure ionlM i l o s e v i c e and
c o m p l i c a t i n g # consensus at/NATO.
We
b t h a g r e e d t o act i f necessary w i t h o u t f u r t h e r
J ^ s o l u t i o n l Need t o ceinvince a l l i e s over next s e v e r a l days.
A
Northern I r e l a n d
Understand
decommission!
he does.
•
s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r commitments on
andl
Iholding back on e x e c u t i v e u n t i l
Jim Steiiifcerg spoke l a s t weekend
t h i s wi/hout much success.
on
I n t e r e s t e d i n any ideas you might have about how t o b r i d g e
t h i / d i v i d e and a v e r t damaging s t a n d o f f a t month's end. How
can we help?
CONFI DDNT I M J
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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6781
THE WHITE HOUSE
,
WASHINGTON
g8GCr5AMll:27
October 5, 1998
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: October 5, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: 11:45 a.m.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE
GENE SPERLIN
I.
PURPOSE
Y e l t s i n has requested t o speak t o you. We expect h i s main
issue w i l l be Kosovo, b u t he c o u l d also appeal f o r economic
support. You have t h r e e key messages:
•
Need t o be prepared t o use f o r c e i f and when diplomacy
f a i l s t o maximize prospects f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
© W i l l review r e p o r t s from Holbrooke, Annan t o determine i f
M i l o s e v i c i s complying.
• Want t o p r o v i d e economic support, b u t need s t r o n g Russian
r e f o r m program t h a t keeps money i n Russia.
II
BACKGROUND
Kosovo. Y e l t s i n dispatched Ivanov and Sergeyev t o Belgrade
yesterday i n an attempt t o head o f f NATO a i r s t r i k e s . A t
the end o f the meeting, the two sides declared t h a t
M i l o s e v i c had made s i g n i f i c a n t " p o s i t i v e steps" toward
compliance w i t h UNSCR 1199 and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n from
M i l o s e v i c ' s June meeting w i t h Y e l t s i n i n Moscow. They
f u r t h e r declared t h a t any use o f f o r c e would be an a c t o f
aggression a g a i n s t the FRY. |
EO 13526 1 4
.d
Dick Holbrooke w i l l be meeting w i t h M i l o s e v i c t h i s evening
i n Belgrade t o impress upon him t h e s t r i c t standards t h a t
we expect from M i l o s e v i c t o comply w i t h UNSCR 1199. The UN
S e c r e t a r y General's r e p o r t on UNSCR 1199 compliance w i l l be
CONFIDENT IAL
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
_
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2
issued today. We expect t h a t USUN r e p o r t s w i l l make c l e a r
M i l o s e v i c ' s f a i l u r e t o come i n t o compliance w i t h the
resolution.
No Economic P l a n . Thus f a r , Primakov's most c o n s t r u c t i v e
statement on economics has been t h a t he has no s t r a t e g y —
e s s e n t i a l l y a r e b u f f t o the S o v i e t - s t y l e p l a n d r a f t e d by
f i r s t Deputy PM Maslyukov. Primakov has been unable t o
complete h i s economic team, much less forge consensus on
how t o emerge from t h i s c r i s i s . And even i f he does get
consensus on a reasonable program, i t i s hard t o see how he
w i l l be able t o implement i t w i t h the c u r r e n t team.
Our stance should continue t o be t h a t we want t o support an
economic program t h a t works. But we also need t o recognize
t h a t Primakov and others w i l l be l o o k i n g t o blame continued
f a i l u r e on the West. We need t o be sure t h a t the Russians
take ownership o f t h e i r program and t h a t t h e communists
cannot, i n s i x months, c l a i m t h a t the Russia economic
d i s t r e s s i s due t o i m p o s i t i o n o f Western c o n d i t i o n s .
Even
i f t h e chances are s l i m , a cautious Western response now
w i l l give Russian reformers t h e i r best chance t o e x e r t
g r e a t e r p o l i c y i n f l u e n c e several months down the road.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
TBD
Attachments
Tab A
Points t o be Made
Tab B October 5 L e t t e r t o Y e l t s i n
sciiricDirciM.Q|_i[NjQN LIBRARY P O O O Y
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
•
Glad t o hear from you. Hope you g o t my l e t t e r on Kosovo
t o d a y . A p p r e c i a t e update t h a t FM Ivanov gave us on h i s t r i p
to B e l g r a d e .
K«\Concerned t h a t M i l o s e v i c i s p l a y i n g h i s c l a s s i c game o f making
— ' r a i s e promises designed t o remove i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e . He
f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l promises t o you a f t e r your meeting i n June.
Y m d i s p a t c h i n g Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade t o emphasize
^
^ ^ " i m p o r t a n c e o f immediate and f u l l compliance w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's demands. Stakes are v e r y h i g h .
\ K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a g r a p h i c account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s
^ — ^ d e f i a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Under c l e a r t h r e a t o f
f o r c e , M i l o s e v i c has now suspended some o p e r a t i o n s , b u t has
not
f u l l y withdrawn h i s f o r c e s . Most d i s p l a c e d persons s t i l l
a f r a i d t o r e t u r n home because t h e r e i s no assurance o f t h e i r
safety.
D i s t u r b i n g t h a t M i l o s e v i c seems determined t o a v o i d s e r i o u s
n e g o t i a t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . He hasn't responded t o
d r a f t s e t t l e m e n t package approved by Contact Group on F r i d a y .
<3
We do n o t w i s h t o use f o r c e . But what happens n e x t depends on
M i l o s e v i c . I m p o r t a n t t o t a k e two t r a c k approach — c o n c e r t e d
d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s backed by c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
0)
M i l o s e v i c ' s compliance w i t h UN requirements must be
v e r i f i a b l e , t a n g i b l e and i r r e v e r s i b l e .
• Madeleine w i l l be a t NATO on Thursday t o work on f i n a l s t e p s .
She's ready t o meet w i t h Ivanov i n PJC o r Contact Group f o r m a t
a f t e r NAC meets on Thursday.
I f Yeltsin
argues
new UNSC resolution
necessary
for
use of
force
•
Don't i n t e n d t o seek another r e s o l u t i o n ; UNSCR 1199 p r o v i d e s
s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s . Don't want t o p u t you i n d i f f i c u l t
p o s i t i o n . Russia would have t o acquiesce on mandate f o r use
of f o r c e o r you'd send w o r l d s i g n a l t h a t Russia i s s h i e l d i n g
Milosevic.
CONFIDENT iftfe
DECLASSIFIED
Reason: ^(bud)
nunTnrnnv
Declassify o£LIf#QN* LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
P E R E
-
a
1 3 5 2 6
�-LUH1 IDLiWl IAL
I f Yeltsin
asks for ministerial-level
Contact
• Need t o t r e a t s i t u a t i o n one day a t a t i m e .
r e q u e s t s e r i o u s l y and g e t back t o you.
I f Yeltsin
Milosevic
•
complains
that Secretary
even if he withdraws
his
Group
meeting
W i l l consider
Cohen threatened
forces
to
strike
Not aware o f any statement along these l i n e s .
Think t h a t key
t o a v o i d i n g use o f f o r c e i s f u l l and immediate compliance w i t h
a l l o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's demands.
Ijf Yeltsin threatens to end NATO-Russia cooperation in response
to NATO use of
force
•
I m p o r t a n t n o t t o l e t disagreement between us undercut b r o a d e r
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Don't t h i n k i t ' s a good idea t o t h r e a t e n t o
p u l l o u t o f i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t we've worked so hard t o b u i l d .
Economic S i t u a t i o n , S t a t u s o f IMF Funds.
•
Have been w a t c h i n g c l o s e l y as Primakov and h i s team p u t
t o g e t h e r economic s t r a t e g y . Our team a t Treasury Department
met y e s t e r d a y w i t h your a d v i s o r s here i n Washington.
•
Want t o r e i t e r a t e what we discussed i n Moscow. Your l e g a c y
c o u l d be a t s t a k e . Concerned t h a t some s t r a t e g i e s b e i n g
d i s c u s s e d c o u l d spark i n f l a t i o n , cause c o l l a p s e o f c u r r e n c y .
•
Want t o s u p p o r t Russian r e f o r m and m o b i l i z e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s u p p o r t . To do t h a t , Russia needs s t r o n g , c r e d i b l e program.
Recognize t h i s needs t o be a Russian s t r a t e g y , b u t i t must
a l s o t a k e i n t o account i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l r e a l i t i e s .
•
Not good f o r Russia o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i f funds end up
i n f o r e i g n bank accounts as they d i d w i t h f i r s t IMF t r a n c h e .
When you have comprehensive p l a n ready, we a r e ready t o
l i s t e n , discuss.
I f Yeltsin
•
mentions
he is
sending
Livshits
as special
envoy
Aware he i s coming; our team ready t o r e c e i v e him; w i l l
carefully.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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listen
�CQMITIDEMTIMr
I f Yeltsin
•
for
quick
release
of
IMF
tranche
I want t h i s t o o B o r i s , b u t f i r s t need s t r o n g economic s t r a t e g y
agreed w i t h IMF. As I s a i d b e f o r e , c a n ' t a f f o r d t o have money
once a g a i n end up i n f o r e i g n accounts.
I f Yeltsin
•
asks
asks
for
restructuring
of
Paris
Club
debt
B o r i s , l a s t r e s c h e d u l i n g o f $40 b i l l i o n i n Russian P a r i s Club
debt was b i g g e s t ever. Great r e s i s t a n c e i n P a r i s Club t o
reopen t h a t agreement. When you have c r e d i b l e economic p l a n ,
want t o c o n s u l t w i t h you on how t o d e a l w i t h payment problem.
L a t v i a Referendum.
•
Glad t h a t L a t v i a n people v o t e d y e s t e r d a y t o change c i t i z e n s h i p
laws as recommended by OSCE. They've done what was necessary
t o meet i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s .
•
A p p r e c i a t e your p o s i t i v e response. We d i d a l o t t o achieve
this result.
I m p o r t a n t now t o improve R u s s i a n - L a t v i a n
d i a l o g u e and c o o p e r a t i o n . Am ready t o h e l p .
-CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ^
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
Glad t o hear from you. Hope you got my l e t t e r /6n Kosovo
today. A p p r e c i a t e update t h a t FM Ivanov gave ns on,.-his t r i p
to Belgrade.
Concerned t h a t M i l o s e v i c i s p l a y i n g h i s c l a s s i c game o f making
f a l s e promises designed t o remove i n t e r n a t i p h a l p r e s s u r e . He
f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l promises t o you a f t e r your meeting i n June.
Am d i s p a t c h i n g Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade ;to emphasize
importance o f immediate and f u l l compliance w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l
community's demands. Stakes are v e r y h i g h .
/
W-ill l o o k a t r e p o r t s from Holbreoko' and K o f i Ahn^an
Milosevic
e.( M i l o s e v i c has s/jspended^operations,
but has n o t f u l l y withdj-awn^his f o r c e s ^
x
Disturbing that Milosevic/ seems determined to avoid serious
ce^^ ±
n e g o t i a t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . He hasn't responded t o "
d r a f t s e t t l e m e n t package approved by Contact Group on F r i d a y .
J
c
s
/
^y^ll, c
^w'^do^'"'!!-©^ wish t o u'se f o r c e . But what happens n e x t depends on Cc c « y f
\ciyiM i l o s e v i c ^ . I m p o r t a n t t o take two t r a c k approach — c o n c e r t e d
i p l o m a t i c | e f f o r t s backed by c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e .
I
/
Madeleine j ^ i y i be at NATO on Thursday t o work on f i n a l s t e p s .
She's rea,dy/to meet w i t h Ivanov i n PJC or Contact Group f o r m a t
a f t e r R^C Jneets on Thursday.
, .
M i l o ' s e v i c ' s contpliance w i t h UN requirements must be v e r i f i a b l e ^ ,
- t a n g i b l e / Impm t d i i t LtTaT RTTB^ia n o t provrde—po-l-rtireal
eovey f o r hollow preauses..
I f Yeltsin
argues
new UNSC resolution
necessary
for
use of
force
Don't i n t e n d t o seek another r e s o l u t i o n ; UNSCR 1199 p r o v i d e s
' s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s . Don't want t o p u t you i n d i f f i c u l t
p o s i t i o n . Russia would have t o acquiesce on mandate f o r use
of f o r c e o r you'd send w o r l d s i g n a l t h a t Russia i s s h i e l d i n g
Milosevic.
I f Yeltsin
asks
for ministerial-level
Contact
Group
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
of.
�CONFIDENTIAL
6863
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation w i t h Russian
President B o r i s Y e l t s i n
PARTICIPANTS:
President C l i n t o n
Russian President Y e l t s i n
Interpreter:
Peter
Afanasenko
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, L i z Rogers,
Robin Rickard, Joel Schrader, Chris B e l l
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
THE PRESIDENT:
October 5, 1998, 12:01 - 12:18 p.m. EDT,
Oval O f f i c e
H e l l o , Boris? (U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
H i , B i l l . (U)
THE PRESIDENT: I am g l a d t o hear from you.
want t o t a l k about Kosovo, and I do t o o .
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
THE PRESIDENT:
No, B o r i s .
I understand you
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
I hear you f i n e .
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
a"
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
£w
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Q
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14, 14
.b .d
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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
f o r your e f f o r t s . But l e t me — f e )
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
THE PRESIDENT:
(Interrupting)
F i r s t I want t o thank you
Thank you, B i l l .
Let me say what my concerns are.
(U)
First I —
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: ( I n t e r r u p t i n g ) Yes, and I t h i n k no one
should be allowed t o endanger the cooperation we have
established.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me say I am concerned t h a t what M i l o s e v i c i s
doing i s what he has done so o f t e n before i n making f a l s e
promises. He made a promise t o you i n June, which he d i d n ' t
keep. Perhaps OSCE m o n i t o r i n g w i l l help t h a t . I want t o say
t h a t we don't want t o use f o r c e , and i t i s n o t i n e v i t a b l e . What
happens next i s e n t i r e l y up t o him. Our experience i s t h a t a
c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f f o r c e i s necessary t o get him t o comply so we
don't have t o use i t . I t h i n k you may have g o t t e n h i s
a t t e n t i o n , along w i t h the pressure b u i l d i n g up here. I am going
to send Dick Holbrooke t o Belgrade.
K o f i Annan's r e p o r t i s a
graphic account o f M i l o s e v i c ' s c o n t i n u i n g defiance o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Many d i s p l a c e d persons are a f r a i d t o
r e t u r n home because they have no assurance o f s a f e t y . He has
suspended these operations and made h i s commitment t o you now,
but we simply have t o know he i s going t o comply w i t h UN
requirements, and compliance has t o be v e r i f i a b l e and
i r r e v e r s i b l e . I do not want t o use f o r c e , and f o r c e i s n o t
i n e v i t a b l e . I f he t h i n k s there i s no t h r e a t o f f o r c e , he never
does a n y t h i n g . Your r e p o r t i s encouraging, and the OSCE may
p r o v i d e us a u s e f u l mechanism, b u t he has got t o come through
here, and h i s a c t i o n s are what's important here and w i l l
determine what w i l l happen next. f&)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
goodbye. fG^
Goodbye B i l l .
Thank you f o r t h i s and
End o f Conversation
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
STEIN
-TEARRY
SUBJECT:
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi on Kosovo
Purpose
To urge Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi t o support NATO a c t i o n .
Background
Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi i s i n the midst o f a serious p o l i t i c a l
c r i s i s and a dilemma over the r i g h t course o f a c t i o n i n Kosovo.
Prodi and FM D i n i s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e t h a t a c l e a r e r UN mandate i s
needed.
EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d
I f France and Germany decide t o proceed w i t h o u t a UN
r e s o l u t i o n , i t would be easier f o r Rome t o agree, although s t i l l
d i f f i c u l t due t o domestic p o l i t i c s .
1.4b, l.4d
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign t h e l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi a t Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
L e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r Prodi
CONFIDENTIAL
cc: Vice President
1ef o f S t a f f
^ ^ U - d t o m LIBRARY PHOTOCO^
�-CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BANDLER, COQ, FICKLIN, HASMAN, SAPIRO, SUM2, NSC, COMM, SIT{C2}
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: GONriDCNUAL.
DTG:070220Z OCT 98
FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO:
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IT
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
CONriDCNTIAL
QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER PRODI AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR ROMANO:
I'M SO GLAD THAT WE WERE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER IN NEW YORK. I
KNOW THAT YOU ARE IN THE MIDST OF A TREMENDOUS EFFORT TO
MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL
SUCCEED AND ITALY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA0635 C O N r i D C N T I A L ADDRESSING THE MANY CHALLENGES BEFORE US.
ROMANO, WE HAVE COME TO THE DECISIVE MOMENT IN ADDRESSING
THE BRUTAL REPRESSION IN KOSOVO. WE MUST REACH CONSENSUS AT
NATO ON AUTHORIZING AIR OPERATIONS. IT IS NOT AN EASY DECISION
FOR ANY OF US, BUT IT IS THE RIGHT ONE. FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN A
LULL FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS, BUT MILOSEVIC HAS NOT YET
WITHDRAWN SPECIAL POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES, NOR AGREED TO
MEASURES THAT WOULD MAKE THE END OF HOSTILITIES VERIFIABLE
AND DURABLE. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN KOSOVO CONTINUES
TO DETERIORATE AS WINTER APPROACHES. I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE
CONTACT WITH DICK HOLBROOKE, WHO BELIEVES THAT AUTHORIZING
NATO TO ACT PROMPTLY PROVIDES THE ONLY CHANCE OF TURNING
MILOSEVIC AROUND.
DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, YOU, I AND OTHERS HAVE WORKED
HARD TO ADDRESS THE KOSOVO PROBLEM IN THE CONTACT GROUP,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE
NOW NEED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FROM THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR NATO TO ACT TO HELP BRING THIS CRISIS TO AN END.
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PAGE 3 RHEHAAA0635 0 O N T I D E N T ML
MOREOVER, WE HAVE ALL GOTTEN A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM MOSCOW
THAT IT WILL NOT SUPPORT ANOTHER RESOLUTION, AND IT SEEMS
THAT ONLY HARM CAN COME FROM FORCING BORIS INTO A VETO.
IF WE DO NOT ACT TOGETHER, WE WILL RISK CONTINUED INSTABILITY
IN THE HEART OF EUROPE AND DEAL A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE
ALLIANCE'S FUTURE ABILITY TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE PEACE.
UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, ITALY HAS ASSUMED A KEY ROLE IN EUROPE
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, AND I HOPE THAT I CAN
COUNT ON YOU TO JOIN IN AN ALLIED CONSENSUS THIS COMING
WEEKEND AUTHORIZING NATO TO ACT.
SINCERELY,
BILL
A
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>0635
< TOR>981006224302 M3498178
A
A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON L M M L P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
6890
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 7, 19 98
;
U
1
'S
'9 0er7PKg:36
"8
HONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
DATE: October 8, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To ensure French cooperation i n p r e s e n t i n g a c r e d i b l e
m i l i t a r y t h r e a t t o M i l o s e v i c . You w i l l want t o persuade
Chirac t h a t NATO should decide on an A c t i v a t i o n Order
(ACTORD) on Saturday, October 10, even i n t h e absence o f
Russian support.
II.
BACKGROUND
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
In t h a t
call
We now have answers on both counts. Annan's r e p o r t
made c l e a r t h a t M i l o s e v i c continues t o defy the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and i s n o t i n compliance w i t h
r e s o l u t i o n 1199. Russia has made i t very c l e a r t h a t they
w i l l not support e i t h e r a new UNSCR o r a s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l
statement by t h e Contact Group.
CONFI DEN'HrftL
Reason: 1.5 (D)
D e c l a s s i f y On: l 0i7/08
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
l
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PHOTOCOPY
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I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r e f f o r t s t o b r i n g Russia on board,
1.4b, 1.4d
Attachment
Tab A
Points t o Be Made
CONFIDENTIALd
TNTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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6890
•
Since we spoke l a s t week, c l e a r from K o f i Annan's r e p o r t t h a t
M i l o s e v i c s t i l l d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
•
Holbrooke has had three d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n
past few days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and refuses
to comply. He claimed t h a t there were no roadblocks even
though Holbrooke encountered several h i m s e l f . His claims
about s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y misleading.
•
E s s e n t i a l now t h a t we achieve consensus f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
a u t h o r i z e f o r c e . E s s e n t i a l we do t h a t by Saturday. B e l i e v e
t h a t a l l NATO a l l i e s moving t o the same conclusion.
•
Know you've been t h i n k i n g about ways t o get Russia on board
and t h a t you've spoken several times w i t h Y e l t s i n .
However, we have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t
they w i l l n o t support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Don't t h i n k i t
makes any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r a l l i e s t o support.
•
EO 13526 l.4d
I today's
Contact Group meeting. Also unsure how h e l p f u l Russia w i l l be
t h e r e , b u t main p o i n t i s t h a t we agree t h a t NATO w i l l proceed
regardless o f what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
• Also t h i n k i t important t h a t when we g e t ACTORD, i t should
cover t h e f u l l range o f a i r operations.
I f Chirac
action,
o
Contact
Group
meeting
in France
after
NATO
I n p r i n c i p l e , not opposed. Let's have Madeleine and Hubert
discuss i t . Main t h i n g f o r now i s t o convince M i l o s e v i c we
are s e r i o u s .
If asked
•
proposes
about
ground
forces
to verify
compliance,
Believe we can do i t w i t h o u t combat f o r c e s .
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y on: La/07/08
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
! CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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6890
POINTS TO BE MADE
IN TELEPHONE CALL TO CHIRAC
Since we spoke l a s t week, c l e a r from K o f i Annan's r e p o r t t h a t
M i l o s e v i c s t i l l d e f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l community.
Holbrooke has had three d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n
past few days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and refuses
t o comply. He claimed t h a t there were no roadblocks even
though Holbrooke encountered several h i m s e l f . His claims
about s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y misleading.
E s s e n t i a l now t h a t we achieve consensus f o r NATO d e / i s i o n to
a u t h o r i z e f o r c e . E s s e n t i a l we do t h a t by Saturdav^
Know you've been t h i n k i n g about ways to- get Russia on board
and t h a t you've spoken several times w i t h Y e l t s i n .
However, we have a l l g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t
^
they w i l l n o t support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . Don't t h i n k i t ^» 2^
makes any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r a l l i e s t o support.
l,<
today's
l.4d
Contact Group meeting. Also unsure how h e l p f u l Russia w i l l be
t h e r e , but main p o i n t i s t h a t we agree t h a t NATO w i l l proceed
regardless o f what Russian p o s i t i o n i s .
Also t h i n k i t important t h a t when we get ACTORD, i t should
cover t h e f u l l range o f a i r o p e r a t i o n s .
Ijf Chirac proposes Contact Group meeting
action,
•
in France
after
NATO
I n p r i n c i p l e , not opposed. Let's telle abi=mt--rL af t a r TfeWaRB. — » k<w^e
Main t h i n g f o r now i s t o convince M i l o s e v i c we are s e r i o u s .
f\.l|^
Y«c«,
ft Ad
I f asked about ground f o r c e s to v e r i f y compliance,
f^eAl,
•
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CCL-J^-
b*^*—
Need-to t h i i r k aLu^fe. -Wmild nepd to ensure rnmn"! i anew 4-s
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify ogLMTOW LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
)^o>ter^
faSCuss.-L
�C ND NA
O F E TL
I I
CONFIDENTIAL
6929
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon w i t h French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
I n t e r p r e t e r : Carol Wolter
Notetaker: Bonnie C l i c k , George Chastain,
Frank J a r o s i n s k i , Sean Tarver, James Smith,
Joel Schrader
October 8, 1998, 12:46p.m.-1:05 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o Jacques.
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
H e l l o . (U)
Oh B i l l , how are you?
Fine.
President Chirac:
(U)
(U)
I t ' s a pleasure t o hear you. (U)
I t ' s a great pleasure t o hear from you.
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you. I t ' s good t o hear your v o i c e . We
s a i d we would check i n today on t h e Kosovo s i t u a t i o n , so I
thought we should t a l k f o r a moment. (U)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Hello?
Could you repeat
(U)
We agreed t o t a l k a few days ago about Kosovo.
President Chirac:
Bill,
I hear you. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : K o f i Annan's r e p o r t makes i t c l e a r M i l o s e v i c i s
s t i l l d e f y i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Dick Holbrooke has
h e l d t h r e e d i f f i c u l t meetings w i t h M i l o s e v i c i n the past few
days. M i l o s e v i c i s s t i l l being evasive and i s s t i l l r e f u s i n g t o
comply. He claimed there were no roadblocks even though
CONFIDENTIAL
D ^ i f ^ M J / m LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Holbrooke encountered s e v e r a l o f them h i m s e l f . His comments
about t h e s e c u r i t y forces have been e q u a l l y m i s l e a d i n g . So I
t h i n k we are s t i l l i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . I t h i n k i t i s very
i m p o r t a n t now t h a t we achieve a consensus on a NATO d e c i s i o n t o
a u t h o r i z e the use o f f o r c e , and t h a t we do i t by Saturday. I
b e l i e v e we are a l l moving i n the same d i r e c t i o n . I know you
were working on ways t o get Russia on board and t h a t you have
spoken w i t h Y e l t s i n several times. I t h i n k the r e a l problem i s
t h a t we have g o t t e n a c l e a r s i g n a l from Moscow t h a t they w i l l
not support another UN r e s o l u t i o n . So, I don't t h i n k i t makes
any sense t o pursue t h i s any longer — a veto would o n l y
encourage M i l o s e v i c and make i t harder f o r the a l l i e s t o
support. I hope we can also get a s t r o n g statement from today's
Contact Group meeting, and I know you are pushing f o r i t . I am
a l s o unsure how Russia w i l l be t h e r e , b u t the main p o i n t i s t h a t
we should agree, I t h i n k , t h a t NATO w i l l proceed t o a u t h o r i z e
a c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f what the Russian p o s i t i o n i s . I t h i n k i f
we do t h a t we may not have t o use i t . I f M i l o s e v i c t h i n k s f o r c e
w i l l be used, a t l e a s t we may not have t o use i t . (U)
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
President
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Just a moment, I can't hear t h e i n t e r p r e t e r .
Chirac:
GONFIDDNTIAL,
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The President: F i r s t , I thank you f o r your thoughts. I agree
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w i l l not solve the problem alone, i t w i l l only
make i t c l e a r t o M i l o s e v i c t h a t h i s a c t i o n s w i l l n o t be
t o l e r a t e d . I agree also though t h a t i f we make t h i s d e c i s i o n on
Saturday a t t h e NAC committee meeting t o a u t h o r i z e f o r c e we
s t i l l have a chance t o avoid the use o f i t . I
14
^d
n h i n k there i s some m e r i t t o having a meeting a f t e r
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . I am c e r t a i n l y not opposed t o t h a t because we
w i l l have t o get everyone together on a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n .
Perhaps we can have Madeleine and Vedrine agree t o discuss t h a t .
As f o r
J v i l l be here
tomorrow, and I w i l l t a l k
on the phone today and I w i l l
(io_m.v_b_est w i t h them. I don't know e x a c t l y what t o do about the
-- i f you have any ideas I would be g l a d t o hear them.
once on t h i s and w i l l be g l a d t o
I have already spoken t o
speak t o him again. f€4
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Okay.
President Chirac:
I w i l l see what I can do.
Okay, B i l l .
(U)
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me also say I had a very i n t e r e s t i n g t a l k
here w i t h your Finance M i n i s t e r and the head o f your c e n t r a l
bank. fG-)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you very much. I w i l l be i n touch on t h a t .
We see some evidence i n America and elsewhere t h a t c r e d i t l i n e s
are t i g h t e n i n g up. I am a f r a i d i t w i l l happen i n Europe and
Japan and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Germany where t h e banks are exposed t o
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�"CONFI DENT I AL
Russian loans. We might have t o be more aggressive i n coming
weeks. Things are moving very q u i c k l y and the Japanese
s i t u a t i o n i s s t i l l very bad. f&)
President
Chirac:
The President:
Thank you Jacques.
I w i l l be back i n touch.
m
President Chirac: Thank you very much, B i l l .
regards t o H i l l a r y .
(U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
Thank you f r i e n d , I w i l l .
President Chirac:
Goodbye.
And give my
Goodbye.
(U)
(U)
End o f Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONFIDENTIAL
6924
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER PRODI
DATE: October 9, 1998
LOCATION: Oval O f f i c e
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To urge t h a t I t a l y support NATO
isensus on ACTORD a t t h e
Saturday, October 10, NAC i n Br sels.
A
II
BACKGROUND
We a*e—4©«4«rt%g t o achieve 5TO consensus on ^ n A c t i v a t i o n
Order (ACTORD) f o r l i m i t e
. i r options i n Kosovo bv the end
of t h e weekend.
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
We could consider waiting until Monday
as the ujgtimate tailback. But even a two-day delay would
slow momentum and make it more difficult to maintain allied
consensus.
^
t
While we might be able t o
CONFI DEN-HAL
Reason: 1.5 (D)
D e c l a s s i f y Og:^ Jl
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I n a d d i t i o n t o seeking I t a l i a n consensus on^ACTORD, we_
would l i k e approval from Prodi t o use I t a l i a n bases.
Q
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�CONFIDENTIAL
launch the l i m i t e d a i r option without I t a l i a n support, i t
would be much more d i f f i c u l t and send the wrong message^to
Milosevic and other A l l i e s . For the phased a i r campaign,
we would c e r t a i n l y need to move a i r c r a f t into I t a l y ^ r j^Lack
of access could therefore cripple our a b i l i t y to ejrecute
t h i s nptinn f f n h r r H n g u/ .Tfl]
»
#
/
You should be able to t e l l Prodi, a f t e r yourymeetin'g w i t h
Chancellor-elect Schroeder and telephone ca^L with
Chancellor Kohl, that the Germans are on Jsoard for ACTORD
on Saturday. Moreover, whether Prodi jcwnis on Saturday or
Monday should not affect the p o l i t i c a l ^ b s t a c l e s you
understand he must overcome.
Attachment
Tab A Points t o be Made
se«
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�LUNJjlUJLNllAL
6924
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
ITALIAN PRIME MINSTER PRODI
•
C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on s u r v i v i n g vote o f confidence
Knew
you'd make i t .
Efcalicm'ri wou-ld^e-^o-3rirs-hr-t-&-l&
OK. kos^voy
^-ckeuio*
• M i l o s e v i c continues t o defy i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Bolgracte
/f?as- not complied w i t h UNSCR 1199, as K o f i ' s r e p j j r t makes
clear.
•
Holbrooke had several d i f f i c u l t meetings wi^fh M i l o s e v i c over
past f o u r days. M i l o s e v i c i s being evasi^fe and continues t o
s t o n e w a l l . For example, he claimed theEje were no roadblocks
even though Holbrooke encountered s e v ^ a l h i m s e l f .
•
M i l o s e v i c ' s claims about s e c u r i t y
spurious. He hasn't withdrawn t h
p o l i c e . T h e i r presence continue
persons from r e t u r n i n g home. Hi
resume k i l l i n g a t any time.
f ^ t c e s have been e q u a l l y
m i l i t a r y or the special
to intimidate displaced
forces remain poised t o
Contact Group Foreign M i n i s t e r s met i n London yesterday.
Clear t h a t Russia would ve^o a f u r t h e r UNSC r e s o l u t i o n .
Although would have been J f e s i r a b l e , A l l i e s - i n c l u d i n g
1.4d
- agree another UNSCR n q £ easeflt-iiai under circumstances.
E s s e n t i a l t h a t we achi ve consensus now f o r NATO d e c i s i o n t o
We've b u i l t up c r u c i a l momentum and
a u t h o r i z e use o f for,
Need agreement a t NATO meeting on
can't r i s k l o s i n g
on A c t i v a t i o n Order (ACTORD).
Saturday
yesterday and
A l l o t h e r A l l i e 'are on board.
today. Both agree t h a t
spent time w i t
can j n consensus on ACTORD on Saturday.
Know you' fa^& d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n , r i s k i n g the support o f some
of the Wonuy f o l k s who voted f o r you /oday. Also c o n f i d e n t i n
your leadjttrship a b i l i t y t o persuade'peopie t h a t i t ' s t h e r i g h t
t h i n g t o ^ i o i n face o f M i l o s e v i c ' s b r u t a l r e p r e s s i o n since
February.
•
Decision n o t easy f o r any o f us, b u t o n l y way t o stop tragedy.
Simply can't a l l o w slaughter t o continue on NATO's doorstep.
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (D)
Declassify
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�CONFIDENTIAL
Don't want to see I t a l y out of step with other A l l i e s . Need
I t a l y on board. Your bases and generous support are an
essential component of success.
; i f asked about delay):
A delay of two days would undermine momentu-ny.we've b u i l t — a p r
Holbrooke needs the negotiating leverage^rf ACTORD on
Saturday. Could be just as hard f o r VQjfr on Monday,
1 4 , 14
. b .d
But delay - even of two
*s determination and
days - would create doubts about
credibility.
: i f asked about ground troops:)
Ground troops would be d i f f i c
tfe^fe a i r options, w i l l wur-fe.
M
for many of us. Am confident
1
CONFIDENTI
^CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
prpTfn
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Jil L
7307
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH
INGTON
October 26, 1998
PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER MASSIMO D'ALEMA
AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER PRODI
DATE: October 26, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To t e l l Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema how much you a r e l o o k i n g
f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g w i t h him and t o t o u c h base w i t h former
Prime M i n i s t e r P r o d i .
II.
BACKGROUND
A t 4 9, Massimo D'Alema has a r e p u t a t i o n as a smart, shrewd
and s k i l l e d p o l i t i c i a n .
On F r i d a y , he won a v o t e o f
c o n f i d e n c e i n I t a l y ' s lower house by a c o m f o r t a b l e margin
(333-281), and a v o t e i n t h e Senate i s expected on Tuesday.
D'Alema i s b e s t known f o r h e l p i n g t o t r a n s f o r m t h e I t a l i a n
Communist p a r t y i n t o a s o c i a l democratic p a r t y i n 1991, and
i s b e i n g h a i l e d as t h e f i r s t "ex-Communist" t o l e a d I t a l y .
His government i s composed o f s e v e r a l d i v e r s e p a r t i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e c e n t e r r i g h t , t h e moderate l e f t and t h e
moderate communists who broke away t o s u p p o r t P r o d i .
Because o f these d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s and i n t e r e s t s , D'Alema
may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o f o r g e a s t a b l e government,
notwithstanding h i s considerable personal strengths.
We do n o t expect major p o l i c y changes from D'Alema. He has
r e t a i n e d F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r D i n i , who has made c l e a r t h e r e
w i l l be no change o f d i r e c t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
Treasury
M i n i s t e r Ciampi w i l l a l s o remain, which sends a c l e a r
s i g n a l t h a t I t a l y remains f i r m l y committed t o sound
economic p o l i c i e s and a smooth t r a n s i t i o n t o European
Monetary Union. The new M i n i s t e r o f Defense i s C a r l o s
Scognamiglio, a former p r e s i d e n t o f t h e Senate and member
of t h e Center R i g h t .
-Ge^rLDENllAL
Reason:
Declass:
U ' & N m URRnH T C P
B A YP O O O Y
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�Former Prime M i n i s t e r P r o d i remains a member o f P a r l i a m e n t
and has s a i d he w i l l c o n t i n u e t o work t o support a c e n t e r
l e f t pole i n I t a l i a n p o l i t i c s .
He, a l o n g w i t h Helmut Kohl,
have been mentioned as p o s s i b l e successors t o Jacques
Santer.
Attachment
Tab A
P o i n t s t o Make
£LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�COtiriDGN'reftfr
7307
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER MASSIMO D'ALEMA
•
Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , I wanted t o f o l l o w up my l e t t e r o f
c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s by p e r s o n a l l y w i s h i n g you every success i n
your new p o s i t i o n .
•
The U . S . - I t a l y p a r t n e r s h i p i s as s t r o n g as ever, and t h e r e i s
much f o r us t o do t o g e t h e r . I'm t h i n k i n g o f Kosovo i n
p a r t i c u l a r , as w e l l as s u p p o r t i n g t h e M i d d l e East process,
a d d r e s s i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and s o l i d i f y i n g
peace i n Bosnia.
•
I a p p r e c i a t e d your words o f support f o r t h e Wye agreement. I t
was an i n c r e d i b l y d i f f i c u l t n e g o t i a t i o n b u t we've c l e a r l y made
p r o g r e s s . Must keep the momentum g o i n g .
•
On Kosovo, S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o FM D i n i y e s t e r d a y . Am
encouraged c e a s e f i r e i s s t i l l h o l d i n g , d e s p i t e some c o n t i n u e d
minor s k i r m i s h i n g .
•
But v i t a l we keep up p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c t o keep agreement
he made w i t h SACEUR over t h e weekend. Need t o remain ready t o
act i f he does n o t . Even i f he does a c t , w e ' l l need t o keep
t h r e a t o f a i r s t r i k e s a l i v e t o ensure s u s t a i n e d compliance and
d e t e r any b a c k s l i d i n g .
•
To keep up p r e s s u r e , w e ' l l a l s o need t o e x p e d i t e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of NATO R e a c t i o n Force and A i r V e r i f i c a t i o n M i s s i o n . I
encourage I t a l y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o R e a c t i o n Force, j u s t as i t
has pledged t o do t o OSCE Kosovo V e r i f i c a t i o n M i s s i o n .
•
I n c l o s i n g , l e t me say how much I'm l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o w o r k i n g
t o g e t h e r . Hope t o see you a t NATO Summit next s p r i n g , i f n o t
before.
CONFIDClfffrftSReason: 1.5Ld)
Declassify o^Llwtyp^
P E R E.O. 13526
LIDKAKY
rHU ULUrY
�-GOMn DEI JT IAL
7307
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FORMER PRIME MINISTER ROMANO PRODI
•
Romano, I know i t ' s been a tough few weeks.
I j u s t want you
t o know how much I enjoyed w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r . You l e d I t a l y a t
a c r u c i a l t i m e and d i d much f o r b i l a t e r a l as w e l l as U.S.European r e l a t i o n s .
•
H i l l a r y s t i l l t a l k s about how much we b o t h enjoyed h a v i n g you
and F l a v i a v i s i t us i n May.
•
Want t o s t a y i n c l o s e touch. Hope t h a t you w i l l remain
i n v o l v e d i n b o t h U . S - I t a l i a n and t r a n s a t l a n t i c i s s u e s .
•
Am c e r t a i n Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema would welcome your wisdom
and a d v i c e . A l l us w i l l want t o seek your e x p e r t i s e as we
address t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and o t h e r
c h a l l e n g e s b e f o r e us.
TaT
CONFIDENT i _
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o^: J.0/Z
M f t W LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�IMMEDIATE
GOHriDDHTimr
OAACZYUW RHEHAAA2021 0510116-CCCC--RUXXWHX RUEHMO RUEHC.
ZNY CCCCC ZZK RUEHMO
200119Z FEB 99
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SUBJECT:*** NO SUBJECT FOUND ***
BT
•CON F I D E
QQQQ
M T I A f r -
NODIS
AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COPY MAY ALSO BE
PROVIDED TO ROBERT "MARKARYAN I N PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV S OFFICE,
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
1
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2
RHEHAAA2021
C O N F l r D E N T I A ' L
I WAS VERY GLAD THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO COME TO AMMAN, AND I
WAS HAPPY TO SEE YOU THERE. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE LETTER
THAT YOU SENT EARLIER THIS WEEK.
AS YOUR LETTER SUGGESTS, WE ARE REACHING A CRITICAL MOMENT
IN THE CRISIS I N KOSOVO. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT DEPENDS ON THE
PARTIES' WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS THAT WILL
SECURE WHAT YOU CALLED FOR I N YOUR LETTER TO ME -- A SENSIBLE
AND FAIR SETTLEMENT THAT STOPS THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.
AMBASSADORS MAYORSKIY, HILL, AND PETRITSCH HAVE BEEN
WORKING CLOSELY AT RAMBOUILLET TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE
PARTIES TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND' SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FRY WHILE GIVING
THE KOSOVARS THE SELF-RULE THAT THEY DESERVE.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. MADELEINE, IGOR
SERGEYEVICH, AND THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP MINISTERS SET A
DEADLINE, WHICH EXPIRES AT NOON TODAY, FOR THE PARTIES TO
COME TO AGREEMENT. THE SERBIAN SIDE SO FAR HAS CHOSEN TO
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA2 021 - 0 N P I • D E N T I A L
C
REBUFF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO AVOID ENGAGING
SERIOUSLY ON THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. I F THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL, AND SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
FAILS TO ACCEPT THE ^ R S l ^ I U ^ ^.9Y | T H ^ ^ ^ E , |_p ^^J j L ^
^PRESMW J Y THEJffiAPkmE, ^
f j
PER E„(X 13526
�HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE TALKS AND FOR
PROVOKING A N W CYCLE OF CONFLICT AND SUFFERING.
E
THE UNITED STATES JOINS RUSSIA AND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN THE VIEW THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE
KOSOVO ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL AND IN HOPING THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED
WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT MILITARY ACTION
WOULD POSE DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR RUSSIA. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR
THAT WITHOUT A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, THERE IS LITTLE
CHANCE THAT BELGRADE WILL SIGN UP TO AN AGREEMENT THAT ALL
MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP BELIEVE MEETS ITS CORE GOALS.
THE THREAT OF FORCE BROUGHT THE SERBIAN DELEGATION TO
RAMBOUILLET, AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL, IN THE END, MOTIVATE
THEM TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. MILOSEVIC SHOULD HAVE NO
ILLUSIONS THAT NATO STANDS READY TO ACT IF HE DOES NOT.
PAGE 4
RHEHAAA2 0 2 1 C O N ' F I D E
N T I A L
IN THE HOURS REMAINING BEFORE TODAY'S DEADLINE EXPIRES, I HOPE
THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT "WILL USE ALL ITSINFLUENCE "WITH
MILOSEVIC AND TO ENSURE THAT HE K O S PRECISELY WHAT IS AT
NW
STAKE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY WAY TO
PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE FRY.
I APPRECIATED THE COOPERATIVE TONE YOU SET IN YOUR LETTER TO
ME. YOU AND I HAVE PERSONALLY CONTRIBUTED TOO MUCH TO
BUILDING STABILITY IN THE BALKANS TO LET IT BE SQUANDERED BY
SERB DEFIANCE. OUR W R AT THE M S O SUMMIT LAST
OK
OCW
SEPTEMBER WAS CRITICAL TO PUTTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT
WITHIN OUR GRASP. TOGETHER YOU AND I HELPED BRING ABOUT THE
DAYTON ACCORDS, AND FOR THE LAST TWO AND HALF YEARS, OUR
TROOPS HAVE KEPT THE PEACE IN BOSNIA. W CAN AND MUST DO THE
E
SAME IN KOSOVO. N W IS THE TIME TO EMPLOY THE GREATEST
O
PRESSURE SO THAT OUR HARD W R PAYS OFF.
OK
SINCERELY,
BILL
PAGE 5
RHEHAAA2 0 2 1
C O N F I D E N T I A L
END TEXT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�1159
-CQMITIDEMTIMJ
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
February 19, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
CARLOS PASCU.
FROM:
ANDREW WEISS
SUBJECT:
Reply t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
The memorandum a t Tab I recommends a P r e s i d e n t i a l message t o
P r e s i d e n t B o r i s Y e l t s i n on Kosovo. The message underscores t h e
s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo and t h e need t o a p p l y
maximum p r e s s u r e on M i l o s e v i c t o ensure a s u c c e s s f u l outcome a t
Rambouillet.
Concurrence by:
f-Leon Fuerth, M i r i a m Sapiro^JslJ
RECOMMENDATION
That you s i g n t h e memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t a t Tab I .
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t
Tab A Message t o P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
-CONFIDENTIAL—'
Reason:
1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y o£:[_ J ^ Q ^
PER E„0.13526
LI BRARY
DU
OOY
CP
�CONFIDENTIAL
1159
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Message t o President Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
Purpose
Approve a message t o President Y e l t s i n .
Background
President Y e l t s i n wrote t o you e a r l i e r today about Kosovo,
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Y e l t s i n ' s harsh p u b l i c statement was a spontaneous r e p l a y o f
n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l p u b l i c comments t h a t Y e l t s i n made l a s t October.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the message a t Tab A.
Approved &, Sttg
~
t^C.
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Message t o President Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
0
:
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
Declassify g l_ pf^ff (JpJ LIBRARY DH0T0C0PY
�COMFiriFMTIMj/HODIS
NIACT IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
1.
AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COPY MAY ALSO BE
PROVIDED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV S
OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
I WAS VERY GLAD THAT YOU WERE
HAPPY TO SEE YOU THERE. I AM
YOU SENT EARLIER THIS WEEK.
JE TO COME TO AMMAN, AND I WAS
GRATEFUL FOR THE LETTER THAT
AS YOUR LETTER SUGGESTS, WE ARE REACHING A CRITICAL MOMENT IN
THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO. WRAT HAPPENS NEXT DEPENDS ON THE PARTIES'
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE TH^HARD DECISIONS THAT WILL SECURE WHAT YOU
CALLED FOR IN YOUR LETTER TO ME — A SENSIBLE AND FAIR
SETTLEMENT THAT STOPS THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.
AMBASSADORS
MAYORSKIY, HILL, AND PETRITSCH HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY AT
RAMBOUILLET TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT AN
AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF/THE FRY WHILE GIVING THE KOSOVARS THE SELF-RULE
THAT THEY DESERVE.
^
fa,^
^/WlU** ^
«»!L h*CU^**r
UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE RUNNING/OUT OF TIME. MADELEINE, IGOR
SERGEYEVl/H, AND THE OTHERCONTACT GROUP MINISTERS SET A
DEADLINE^ WHICH EXPIRES AT NOON TODAY, FOR THE PARTIES TO COME
TO AGREEMENT. THE SERBIAN SIDE SO FAR HAS CHOSEN TO REBUFF THE
INTE^ATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO AVOID ENGAGING SERIOUSLY ON THE
DRAFT AGREEMENT. I F •'SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC FAILS TO ACCEPT THE
AGREEMENT BY THE DEADLINE, HE WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE
FAILURE OF THE TALKS AND FOR PROVOKING A NEW CYCLE OF CONFLICT
AND SUFFERING.
THE UNITED STATES JOINS RUSSIA 7vND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY I N THE VIEW THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOSOVO
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O
HTC
DECLASSIFIED
Dy PERM-13526
�ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL AND IN HOPING THAT I T CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT,
THE USE OF FORCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT MILTARY ACTION WOULD POSE
DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR RUSSIA. HOWEVER, I T IS CLEAR THAT WITHOUT
A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT BELGRADE
WILL SIGN UP TO AN AGREEMENT THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT
GROUP BELIEVE MEETS ITS CORE GOALS.
THE THREAT OF FORCE BROUGHT THE SERBIAN DELEGATION T
C
RAMBOUILLET, AND I HOPE THAT I T WILL, IN THE END, MOTIVATE THEM
TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. MILOSEVIC SHOULD HAVE N O / L L U S I O N S THAT
NATO STANDS READY TO ACT I F HE DOES NOT.
IN THE HOURS REMAINING BEFORE TODAY'S DEADLINE EXPIRES, I HOPE
THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL USE ALL ITS INFLUENCE WITH MILOSEVIC
AND TO ENSURE THAT HE KNOWS PRECISELY WHAT IS AT STAKE. I
BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS THE ONLy/WAY TO PRESERVE rROSmO'
^T-OF^ERBIA. •WTWfm^TT, THF^F. MAY BF. NO WAY
INTEGRITY" OF SERBiA-TU BE PRKbiLRVEIV BECAUSE OF~~THE"
BLE
EHT
HfoSTXLJ^Y
AND ANGER THAT
LDE
UAS^ME.VO£E£i
/
I APPRECIATED THE COOPERATIVE/TONE YOU SET IN YOUR LETTER TO ME,
YOU AND I HAVE PERSONALLY CONTRIBUTED TOO MUCH TO BUILDljlG
STABILITY I N THE BALKANS T^'LET IT BE SQUANDERED BY SERB
DEFIANCE. OUR WORK AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT LAST SEPTEMBER WAS
CRITICAL TO PUTTING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITHIN OUR GRA$P.
TOGETHER YOU AND I HELPED BRING ABOUT THE DAYTON ACCORDS AND
FOR THE LAST TWO AND HALF YEARS, OUR TROOPS HAVE KEPT TH PEACE
IN BOSNIA. WE CAN/AND MUST DO THE SAME IN KOSOVO. NOW :s THE
TIME TO EMPLOY THE GREATEST PRESSURE SO THAT OUR HARD W RK PAYS
O
OFF.
7
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
"6M
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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1357
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting w i t h Jacques Chirac, President o f
France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Madeleine A l b r i g h t , Secretary o f State
Robert Rubin, Secretary o f the Treasury
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
Steve R i c c h e t t i , Deputy Chief o f S t a f f
F e l i x Rohatyn, Ambassador t o France
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC (Notetaker)
Lael B r a i n a r d , Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r Economic A f f a i r s (expanded
session and lunch only)
Donald Handler, Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r the NATO Summit (expanded
session only)
K e i r n C. Brown, D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s (expanded session only)
Jacques Chirac, President
Hubert Vedrine, Foreign M i n i s t e r
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Finance M i n i s t e r
Jean-David L e v i t t e , D i p l o m a t i c Adviser
Hubert Bujon, Ambassador t o the United
States
Jean-Francois G i r a u l t , Technical Adviser
Catherine Colonna, Spokesperson (expanded
Session and lunch only)
CONFIDENTIAL
C l a s s i f i e d by:
™
:
DECLASSIFIED I N PART
PER E.O. 13526
Glyn T. Davies
'mmm LB A Y
IRR
Declassi f y
DU
0T0C0PY
�CONFIDENTIAL
Jean-Francois C i r e l l i , Economic Adviser
(expanded session and lunch only)
Renaud V i g n a l , M i n i s t r y o f Foreign A f f a i r s
(expanded session and lunch only)
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
February 19, 1999, 11:45 a.m. - 2:15 p.m.
Oval O f f i c e ; Cabinet Room; Old Family D i n i n g
Room
Oval O f f i c e Session
The President: S h a l l we discuss Kosovo f i r s t ,
p r e s s i n g issue? (U)
President Chirac:
CONriDDNTIJ
since t h a t ' s t h e
Yes.
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The President:
on t h i s i s very
t h i n k s he needs
he was " f o r c e d "
brinkmanship.
The f a c t t h a t we have been so s t r o n g l y t o g e t h e r
i m p o r t a n t . I t ' s impossible t o know i f M i l o s e v i c
t o absorb some a i r s t r i k e s so he can make i t seem
t o c a p i t u l a t e or whether t h i s i s simply
There w i l l be a very b r i e f p e r i o d between t h e c o l l a p s e o f t a l k s
and t h e s t a r t o f a i r s t r i k e s . Then, i t might be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r
you t o make a l a s t appeal.
I f we do something now, we could
g i v e M i l o s e v i c an o p p o r t u n i t y t o send t h e t a l k s o f f on a tangent
and f o r c e a delay. f&)
As t o t h e c a r r o t question and sanctions, l e t me l e t Madeleine
address t h a t . fe)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : Yes, there are two l a y e r s o f sanctions.
Those we imposed i n r e l a t i o n t o Kosovo could be discussed b u t
those imposed before — what we c a l l the outer w a l l — we need
to be very c a r e f u l about. They would be hard t o unpack and i n
any event, i t would be premature. But we could do t h e f i r s t
l a y e r . fe}
The P r e s i d e n t : We could present i t as a way t o work the FRY
back i n t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. Sanctions make
M i l o s e v i c ' s i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n more d i f f i c u l t . f€-)
Now, through M i l o s e v i c ' s eyes, i f he allows a NATO force t o back
up c i v i l implementation, he w i l l lose Kosovo. We need t o make
him see t h a t t h e o n l y chance he has t o keep Kosovo w i t h i n Serbia
i s t o r e s t o r e autonomy. f&)
Based on past experience, our best course i s t o h o l d a u n i f o r m
l i n e t i l l t h e deadline. There's s t i l l a chance he w i l l come
around. A t t h e same time, we need t o keep t h e Kosovars i n l i n e .
fG-)
President
Chirac:
CONFIDDNT I j
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t :
That's good. fe)
President Chirac:
Secretary A l b r i g h t : With everyone g a t h e r i n g , i t would be hard
not t o meet. But i t must be c l e a r — no squabbling. Also,
a f t e r t h e Contact Group makes a d e c i s i o n , i t would be
s y m b o l i c a l l y important t o go t o Brussels t o hand over t o NATO.
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
Secretary A l b r i g h t : Let's be c l e a r , NATO has made d e c i s i o n s and
Solana has them i n h i s pocket. He must c o n s u l t i n f o r m a l l y -t h e r e i s no formal d e c i s i o n t o be made. fG}
President Chirac: [
~
The P r e s i d e n t :
Has he s a i d t h a t ? f&)
Secretary A l b r i g h t : No, but others have mentioned i t ,
D i n i . I t i s n o t acceptable. f&)
like
Samuel Berger:
I n the s t r i k e scenario, t h e i n i t i a l set o f
s t r i k e s must be s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g and d e c i s i v e so t h a t
M i l o s e v i c understands t h e i r seriousness. I f we p i n p r i c k and
pause, he may t h i n k t h a t he has won. fG)
GONFIDENTIAI
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President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : We're t h i n k i n g along s i m i l a r l i n e s . Let NATO do
i t s j o b on the m i l i t a r y side, do the p l a n n i n g f o r more s t r i k e s ,
the number of days and so on. I f d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d , t h e r e i s
an i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t t o b r i n g M i l o s e v i c back, good. We j u s t need
to be sure t h a t we do not pause mor-e than 24 t o 48 hours — i t
should be a n a t u r a l l u l l t h a t we f i l l w i t h intense d i p l o m a t i c
e f f o r t s w i t h o u t g i v i n g M i l o s e v i c a chance t o drag t h i n g s o u t .
I'm encouraged by hearing you say a day or two. Any longer and
our w i l l could d i s s i p a t e and we could l e t M i l o s e v i c e x p l o i t
gaps.
f&)
President
Chirac:
The President: I t would be a b i g mistake. When we met w i t h him
i n P a r i s a f t e r Dayton, we thought we had him going i n the r i g h t
d i r e c t i o n . And then Kosovo. I f I c a l l , he w i l l see an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e w r i t e the terms of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . He must
know t h a t we do not want t o bomb but we w i l l . I don't t h i n k he
t h i n k s we have another agenda — but he wants t o avoid f o r e i g n
troops i n Serbia. f€-)
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
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President Chirac:
1.4b. 1 4
.d
Secretary A l b r i g h t
The P r e s i d e n t : We can't be naive about t h i s ; non-compliance by
the UCK i s a r e a l problem.
But I'm also w o r r i e d t h a t i f they
t h i n k they are g e t t i n g a bad deal, they w i l l do something t o
f o r c e us t o withdraw, provoke M i l o s e v i c t o commit new
a t r o c i t i e s , and then we'd be faced w i t h a f r e e f o r a l l . We need
to keep d i s c i p l i n e d and keep focused on both sides. And one o f
the reasons we have t o be ready t o take r i s k s i s t h a t t h e r e are
so many o t h e r permutations t h a t would be worse than where we
are.
President Chirac:
1.4b, l.4d
Foreian M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, the f i r s t t h i n g we would have t o do i s t o
keep t h e c o n f l i c t from spreading. S t a b i l i z e Macedonia, see
where A l b a n i a i s , and Bosnia.
So s t a b i l i z i n g the perimeter
would be f i r s t , then focus on the core. We've got t o worry
about a Balkan echo e f f e c t . f£}
By the way, I met b r i e f l y w i t h t h e leaders o f A l b a n i a and
Macedonia a t our Prayer Breakfast. They're young, e n e r g e t i c ,
earnest. And they've been s u p p o r t i n g our e f f o r t s f o r t h e i r own
s t a b i l i t y . (GJ
President Chirac:
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President Clinton:
1.4d
Samuel Berger: I don't want t o c u t t h i s s h o r t b u t I t h i n k i t ' s
time t o move i n t o the expanded session and t o t a l k about some of
the o t h e r items on the agenda. (U)
Expanded Session [Cabinet Room]
The P r e s i d e n t : Jacques, why don't we t a l k about t h e NATO Summit
meeting i n A p r i l , and also about the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
financial
system. We're i n no rush, b u t I would l i k e t o t a l k about Russia
and where you are on t h e Middle East. We saw each other i n
Amman, b u t t h a t was o n l y f o r a b r i e f conversation. I'm happy t o
s t a r t wherever you want. f&)
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
President
What would you l i k e t o begin with?
I t ' s your choice.
(U)
Perhaps w i t h NATO? fe)
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me mention a few issues. F i r s t , I s t r o n g l y
support t h e work you and Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r are doing on ESDI,
which should be p a r t of the summit r e s u l t s .
We need t o b u i l d on
GOHFI DDNT IJ
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B e r l i n b u t make sure i t ' s p a r t o f NATO. This i s important as a
p r a c t i c a l matter t o keep the U.S. and Congress on board as we
w i t h problems r e q u i r i n g us send troops i n t o problem areas, as we
are p l a n n i n g f o r i n Kosovo. A capable ESDI w i l l be an important
development. We've already taken one step i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n
through t h e way KFOR i s e v o l v i n g — w i t h t h e Europeans p r o v i d i n g
85 percent and t h e United States 15 percent o f the f o r c e . So we
need t o continue t o b u i l d on the Berlin-framework and t o keep
ESDI p a r t o f NATO. But i t ' s also a very important next step i n
terms o f European i n t e g r a t i o n and l e a d e r s h i p . f&)
On mandates, our goal should always be t o a c t w i t h the
endorsement o f t h e UN. The problem i s unusual circumstances.
We have a r e a l problem agreeing i n advance t o a b l a n k e t
requirement when we can't p r e d i c t circumstances.
What we should
do i s proceed i n terms o f the purposes and p r i n c i p l e s o f the UN.
We need a formula t o a l l o w us t o pursue a c t i o n i n consistency
w i t h the UN b u t w i t h o u t g i v i n g Russia and China a veto over
e v e r y t h i n g we do. f G)
On Open Door, I agree i t must remain open.
the Romanians and Slovenes and others.
two.
We need t o encourage
1.4b. 1.4d
That could change i n a year or
I'm s u p p o r t i v e , b u t we need t o w a i t . f G)
g e t t i n g i n i s not so much the
My main problem w i t h
1.4d
f i n a n c i a l burden f o r admission but t h e pressure b u i l d i n g up t o
i n c l u d e t h e B a l t i c area as p a r t o f a second enlargement t i e r .
There's a f i n a n c i a l burden problem,
So what I'm w o r r i e d about
i s how t o manage the B a l t i c issue. I t ' s t h e most
difficult question,
still have tensions with the Russians over minorities rights and
energy. We don't want to complicate our efforts to support
Russia in restoring stability and growth. But over time, the
Baits should be in. {&)
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9
I'm f r a n k l y also w o r r i e d about the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p l a y : what we
can get through Congress? Which c o u n t r i e s should we be pushing?
What happens i f we create second t i e r s t a t u s f o r others? What
do we do about the Baits?
I hate t a l k i n g about something I don't have an answer t o .
President Chirac:
On the l a s t question o f missions, there i s n o t h i n g major.
(C
-4
The P r e s i d e n t : The OAU argument sounds compelling b u t t h e r e i s
a l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a c t i n g i n
c o n f l i c t w i t h p r i o r UN a c t i o n versus NATO t a k i n g a c t i o n n o t i n
c o n f l i c t w i t h e x i s t i n g UN p o l i c y . They are not p a r a l l e l . {My
S e c r e t a r y of State j u s t handed me a note.} Maybe we can go back
t o something l i k e the '94 Summit language o f f e r i n g t o get i n t o
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peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s 'under the a u t h o r i t y and auspices o f t h e
UN' and read t h a t as a s o r t o f a u t h o r i t y ? fG-)
President Chirac:
Secretary A l b r i g h t :
President
1.4b, 1.4d
Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s no language a t a l l .
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Okay, now maybe we can t u r n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
economy. Should we go t o lunch or continue t o t a l k ? (U)
President Chirac:
You are the host; whatever you p r e f e r .
The P r e s i d e n t : Let's go through i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l
a r c h i t e c t u r e before we go t o lunch. I t ' l l improve t h e
digestion.
(U)
.Eresident Chirac:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you f o r a most comprehensive statement.
You r a i s e d s i x issues; I w i l l r u n through each q u i c k l y . (U)
On f i n a n c i a l reform, i t seems t o me the problem i s we had too
much enthusiasm f o r i n v e s t i n g i n Asia and Russia and o t h e r
emerging markets. We a l l were s u f f i c i e n t l y i n s e n s i t i v e t h a t
these o p p o r t u n i t i e s had t o be seen i n context of i n t e r m e d i a t e
systems and s t r u c t u r e s l a c k i n g i n t h e c o u n t r i e s , not j u s t the
investment funds here and the good p r o j e c t s t h e r e :
central
bank, t a x laws, s e c u r i t i e s and exchange commission, and a
banking system, so I t h i n k the f i r s t and most important t h i n g i s
to have good transparency i n the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f market
economy i n those c o u n t r i e s . (G
-4
Second, these problems have been aggravated by hedge funds,
because people can p u t up so l i t t l e and leverage so much. I t i s
a p p r o p r i a t e t o get our experts t o work on t h i s , b u t the o f f shore i s s u e w i l l remain a problem — there's always some place
to h i d e .
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Number t h r e e i s c o n t r a c t i o n . You mentioned the importance o f
the s o c i a l s a f e t y n e t . We agree but we also need t o recognize
t h a t we need some engine t o r e s t o r e growth. The problem i s
those c o u n t r i e s are burdened w i t h debt and debt s e r v i c i n g —
t h e r e are no funds a v a i l a b l e f o r the s a f e t y n e t . The problem o f
c o n t r a c t i o n i s how t o expand economies w i t h budget d e f i c i t s and
debt s e r v i c i n g w i t h o u t pouring good money a f t e r bad and w i t h o u t
adequate i n s t i t u t i o n s ? I n Russia, a l l o f the IMF money has
flowed out o f the country w i t h i n 48 hours.
Traditional
s o l u t i o n s t o a recession, l i k e pumping money i n t o the economy,
i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h debts and d e f i c i t s . f&)
On debt r e l i e f , Schroeder has a good idea. I sent you a l e t t e r .
You r e a l l y s e n s i t i z e d me t o t h i s issue. I am open t o more
suggestions on debt r e l i e f . f&)
I agree w i t h you t h a t Wolfensohn hasn't got the resources t o
deal w i t h the problems he faces. We need t o be honest about
t h i s and concede they don't have enough funding t o do t h e i r j o b .
We need t o f i n d a way t o increase the I F I ' s resources.
fG}
At the G-7, I hope we can have a p r i v a t e , r e l a x e d c o n v e r s a t i o n
about our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o r e s t o r i n g growth. The problem o f
c o n t r a c t i o n i n t h e w o r l d economy i s d i s a s t r o u s f o r poor
c o u n t r i e s . I'm s o l d on the need f o r more debt r e l i e f . But
we're a l s o f a c i n g our l a r g e s t t r a d e d e f i c i t ever. We've been
w i l l i n g t o absorb exports because our economy i s s t r o n g and
unemployment low. I won't get p r o t e c t i o n i s t b u t we can't a l l o w
dumping, l i k e i n the case o f Japanese s t e e l . P r i m a r i l y we t r y
t o keep our markets, b u t also enforce our t r a d e laws. f&)
How can we help r e s t o r e growth i n Japan? I s there any way
Europe can take great Japanese imports and not slow European
growth down? I f you slow down, we've a l l got a problem. We
need a forum t o discuss t h i s t h a t won't f i n d i t s way i n t o the
newspapers the next day. f€4
On the Euro: Since the time I f i r s t ran f o r the presidency,
I've always been s u p p o r t i v e . I don't f e e l we're threatened or
c o m p e t i t i v e . Any t h i n g t h a t c o n t r i b u t e s t o Europe's i n t e g r a t i o n
and helps people improve t h e i r l i v e s i s good f o r us. Anything
t h a t makes democracy stronger i s good f o r us. I f you're
s t r o n g e r and can p l a y a more responsible r o l e , I'm f o r i t .
Don't worry about what you see i n the papers. There are
d i f f e r e n t issues y o u ' l l have t o work out f o r yourselves, l i k e
Spain and P o r t u g a l , b u t I'm f o r i t .
fG)
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F i n a l l y , we need t o f i n d a way f o r leaders t o express ourselves
to t h e p u b l i c on where we're going. Before we do i t , I suggest
we meet f i r s t a t the G-7 t o take stock o f where we are. Here's
why I t h i n k t h a t . When I f i r s t s t a r t e d , I thought o f the need
f o r B r e t t o n Woods I I — a m o d i f i e d r o l e f o r t h e IMF, World Bank,
and new accounting system i n developing c o u n t r i e s . We're doing
i t i n c r e m e n t a l l y . What we're l e f t w i t h i s t h e p i n k elephant i n
the l i v i n g room o f economic c o n t r a c t i o n and market economies and
democracy f a i l i n g m i l l i o n s — w i t h m i l l i o n s f a l l i n g back from
middle c l a s s t o p o v e r t y . The question i s how t o get growth
back, w i t h o u t i n f l a t i o n ? We need an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t o
prevent t h e swing from boom t o bust. We've managed t o do i t a t
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s -- we need t o do i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . (G)
-Robert Rubin: We share the same o b j e c t i v e s . The system needs
to f u n c t i o n b e t t e r . These questions are e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
complicated and there are c o n f l i c t i n g s o l u t i o n s . The most
obvious t h i n g s t o do are not always so c l e a r . (U)
I want t o underscore what the President s a i d about being
p o s i t i v e about the Euro. And also t h a t we need p r i v a t e s e c t o r
c a p i t a l f o r developing c o u n t r i e s t o grow. We should a v o i d doing
a n y t h i n g t h a t would c u t o f f t h a t f l o w . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t : I was t a l k i n g about the g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l problem
as i f i t were one t h i n g . A c t u a l l y i t i s three b i g t h i n g s . The
g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e . And what t o do about
c o n t r a c t i o n . And how t o coordinate our e f f o r t s . At the end o f
the day, we need t o narrow t h e band of ups and downs and avoid
the pure h e l l o f a South Korea or Indonesian and don't have
c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r a z i l , Argentina and Mexico scared t o death
about what's going t o happen i f the cost of borrowing and
c a p i t a l go through t h e roof and b r i n g down the economy. What we
have are hundreds of m i l l i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s g e t t i n g screwed by
c o n t r a c t i o n s . So i n Germany, we need t o lead w i t h t h e r i g h t
a r c h i t e c t u r e . We need a long meeting, see how t o go forward.
We need t o go t o lunch.
i n d i g e s t i o n . (U)
See, I t o l d you I ' d give you
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t :
Let's go t o lunch.
1.4b, 1.4d
(U)
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Lunch Session
[ A f t e r a c o n v e r s a t i o n i n which the President recounted t h e
h i s t o r y o f the Old Family Dining Room, s t o r i e s about t h e
Roosevelts, and e f f o r t s t o save the American b u f f a l o . ]
President Chirac:
1.4b, 1.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : Any o f the t h r e e can s t i l l w i n . I ' d have t o
give t h e advantage t o B i b i - f
14
.d
So I would see a r u n - o f f between
B i b i and one o f the other two. And the second round i s anyone's
guess. fG-)
P r e s i d e n t Chirac:
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The President: If the Europeans were to take that position, it
could give Arafat cover. We can't because we're party to Oslo.
We'll stay with our position but it would be a very positive
development if your plan works. t^)
S e c r e t a r y A l b r i g h t : On the language, i t would be v e r y h e l p f u l
i f you were t o say you w i l l recognize the s t a t e 'that emerges
from permanent s t a t u s n e g o t i a t i o n s . ' That would show your
support f o r t h e process.
President Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, I see a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e , b u t we
need t o t a l k about t h e s p e c i f i c language. I disagree on
Jerusalem — I t h i n k i t can be solved by a t e r r i t o r i a l f i x
through changing the boundaries. R e l i g i o u s s i t e s w i l l be t h e
toughest p a r t . But the fundamental problem i s t h a t t h e h e a r t o f
B i b i ' s base does not want t o give up land. But on your idea, I
l i k e i t , Europe can take a p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t from t h e U.S. The
p e r i o d from May 4 through May 17 w i l l be h i g h t e n s i o n . We need
to take t h e pressure o f f . f&)
President Chirac:
Foreign M i n i s t e r Vedrine:
The P r e s i d e n t :
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Secretary A l b r i g h t :
government. f&)
16
There could also be a n a t i o n a l u n i t y
The P r e s i d e n t : Yes, o f course, i f t h e r e i s a r e a l s p l i t i n the
v o t i n g . And then, we could see progress on peace. f e i
President
Chirac:
The P r e s i d e n t : I have more questions than answers. Does the
f a c t t h a t Assad decided t o s t a r t the t r a n s i t i o n make an
agreement w i t h I s r a e l more o r less l i k e l y ? Without one, and
w i t h o u t good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the r e s t o f t h e world, S y r i a can not
have a long term r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a moderately independent
Lebanon nor i s i t l i k e l y t o stop s u p p o r t i n g t e r r o r i s m . I d i d n ' t
r e a l l y t a l k t o Assad i n Amman. fG}
President Chirac:
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The President: You think he is still willing to make a deal
with Israel during this transition? k€}
President Chirac:
1.4b, l.4d
The P r e s i d e n t : I ' l l keep t r y i n g t o get them t o g e t h e r .
I s r a e l i e l e c t i o n s make i t d i f f i c u l t . fe-)
But the
Jacques, t h e r e are a few other important issues we should touch
on. We r e a l l y need t o work out these t r a d e d i s p u t e s — bananas,
beef, h u s h k i t s . I thought I should mention them. And I r a q . I
hope t h i s w i l l n o t continue t o be an i r r i t a n t .
Saddam w i l l
e x p l o i t our d i f f e r e n c e s . We want t o work t o g e t h e r . We're open
to working toward common p o s i t i o n s . fG-)
President Chirac:
On I r a q , we w i l l f i n d a s o l u t i o n . We've made proposals f o r t h e
medium and the long term. For the short term, we need t o get
out o f t h i s c r i s i s . We are open t o s o l u t i o n s . fG-)
On beef, we're very s e n s i t i v e because o f mad cow disease and
because your product i s not n a t u r a l — we have t o be very
prudent. f&)
The P r e s i d e n t : I n terms of a new WTO round, we would l i k e t o do
something i n terms o f l a b o r standards. f&)
President Chirac:
Let me q u i c k l y mention t h e Sahara, where of course we support
the King o f Morocco. fG}
Samuel Berger: Mr. President, I gave my word of honor t o
Ambassador Bujon t h a t we would release President Chirac by
4:00 p.m. He's h o s t i n g a r e c e p t i o n a t t h e French embassy f o r
1,000 people and I promised the ambassador. We need t o s t a r t
p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e press conference. (U)
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President Chirac:
The President:
1.4b, l.4d
We t h i n k we should work w i t h Primakov. We hope
and a n a t i o n a l i s t .
1.4d
We want a strong Russia.
We're
better off with a strong Russia. We need to bolster him, give
him self-confidence. Primakov's the best we can do — smart,
strong, secure with the Duma. But this is very tricky. ^Q)
Okay, I don't want t o undermine Sandy's commitment t o the
ambassador. (U)
End o f Conversation
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Hasman, Thomas M.
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Hasman, Thomas M.
Saturday, February 27,1999 2:51 PM
©CROSS - Cross Hatches
RE: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of France
[rrNFIRFNTIfll] .
Changes made, diskette updated.
—Original Message—
From:
Blinken, Antony J.
Sent:
Saturday, February 27, 1999 1:18 PM
To:
Hasman, Thomas M.; Brown, Keirn C
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs; ©CROSS - Cross Hatches; Rice, Edward A.
Subject:
RE: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of Francei[CONriDCHTIAL]
.
Thanks, Tom.
1. "U36pts" should be "its", i.e. let NATO do its job
A bizarre glitch!
2. Should be: "pressure building up to include the Baltic area as part of a second enlargement tier."
Good catches.
-Original MessageFrom:
Hasman, Thomas M.
Sent:
Saturday, February 27,1999 1:10 PM
To:
Brown, Keirn C ; Blinken, Antony J.
Cc:
©EUROPE - European Affairs; ©CROSS - Cross Hatches; Rice, Edward A.
Subject: Package 1357 - Memcon Between President and President Chirac of France (CONriDCWIAl]
This memcon is in excellent shape. 2 small questions.
1. Page 5, The first time the President speaks (on this page), 1st to 2nd line it reads, "Let NATO do u36pts job
on the military side, ..."
Is u36pts right?
2. Page 8, third full paragraph (begins with the words "My main problem ..." The third line down seems to have a
missing word(s) -- ("building up to include the ???"). Can you help fill it in?
Thanks.
©Cross - Package is in the hold bin.
« File: 1357ChiracMemCon2.doc
»
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
O f f i c i a l Working V i s i t w i t h t h e President
and Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema of I t a l y
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f S t a t e
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel R. Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley, I n t e r p r e t e r
Massimo D'Alema, Prime M i n i s t e r
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o the S t a f f
t o the Prime M i n i s t e r
Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomatic Advisor
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
Oval O f f i c e
Oval O f f i c e / R e s t r i c t e d Session
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Mr. President, I am very pleased t o
meet you. There are many t h i n g s t o t a l k about. But l e t me
f i r s t say t h a t I am convinced t h a t between I t a l y and Europe and
the U n i t e d States we share a common way of t h i n k i n g and a common
way o f s o l v i n g problems. I heard your San Francisco speech. I
thought i t was a very good foundation f o r our d i s c u s s i o n s . I
a p p r e c i a t e the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the United States t o seek
s o l u t i o n s t o major problems and t o be engaged i n a dialogue w i t h
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Reason: 1.5(d)
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and c o u n t r i e s around t h e w o r l d . I
b e l i e v e t h a t more than ever we need a United States t h a t never
considers withdrawing i n t o i t s own power. We need an outward
l o o k i n g America, b u t we i n Europe must assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
too. (U)
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1 4
.d
Samuel Berger:
And throughout America t o o . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President: Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , you understand t h a t I must
be c a r e f u l i n what I say because there are o t h e r t r i a l s pending.
But I t h i n k t h e most important t h i n g I can say i s what I have
already s a i d : whatever mistakes were made, t h e U n i t e d States i s
r e s p o n s i b l e and we want t o do whatever i s p o s s i b l e t o make
t h i n g s r i g h t . Under our law t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between c i v i l
and c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y .
Some people have already been
d i s c i p l i n e d and dismissed.
I t i s important now t o deal w i t h the
t r i a l s t h a t are s t i l l there and t o see through whatever a c t i o n s
are a p p r o p r i a t e and t o see who i s r e s p o n s i b l e . I n terms o f
Capt. Ashby, t h e f i n d i n g was not t h a t he was not r e s p o n s i b l e b u t
more s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t he was not c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . The
United States must bear r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; when t h e whole process
i s played o u t , you and a l l t h e people concerned must f e e l t h a t
j u s t i c e was done. fG)
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree w i t h you. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
I agree. (G)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
1
The P r e s i d e n t : Thank you, b u t l e t me j u s t add I know t h a t i t
has been a r e a l burden f o r you e s p e c i a l l y so e a r l y i n your term.
I f e e l t e r r i b l e about t h i s . fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I n f a c t , my term began w i t h many
unpleasant t h i n g s . We had unexpected v i s i t o r s on our t e r r i t o r y .
And t h e r e was an accident i n Moscow when our a i r c r a f t was
damaged by the Russians. (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
the a i r . (U)
On t h e runway?
That's c e r t a i n l y b e t t e r than i n
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Prime Minister D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1 4
.d
The P r e s i d e n t : You should be proud. I have spent so much o f my
time a r g u i n g w i t h conservatives here t h a t you can grow the
economy and s t i l l have a strong s o c i a l s a f e t y n e t . These are
not c o n t r a d i c t o r y goals, i n f a c t they are m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g .
We have been t r y i n g t o do here i n the U.S. what you i n I t a l y and
i n Europe take f o r granted. Family and medical leave,
c h i l d c a r e , h e a l t h care. The challenge f o r us has been how t o
preserve t h e s o c i a l s a f e t y net w h i l e g i v i n g the economy
f l e x i b i l i t y t o grow and c r e a t e j o b s . (U)
I spent years as governor t h i n k i n g about t h i s problem. I n f a c t ,
when I was governor I t r a v e l e d t o I t a l y . I wanted t o see how
small manufacturers shared f a c i l i t i e s , p r o d u c t i o n and
d i s t r i b u t i o n — a system t h a t can be t r a c e d t o the medieval
c r a f t g u i l d s — as a way o f sharing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Or take
France and Germany — though o f course t h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t
comparison because o f the enormous costs o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n .
Without them, I expect German growth would be 7-8 p e r c e n t . I n
any event, German labor costs are g r e a t e r than those i n France.
But the way each country spends these costs i s very d i f f e r e n t .
I n France, you get two years unemployment. The Germans focus
t h e i r resources on r e t r a i n i n g . The German system i s more
expensive b u t work o r i e n t e d . I n France, I argued w i t h Chirac
about t h e need t o move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n and he agreed. But
r e a l l y , we on t h e l e f t need t o do i t because the r i g h t i s n o t
t r u s t e d on t h i s . You can't put people on the dole f o r two years
and then complain about unemployment. A t t h e same time, we
can't leave people i n t h e l u r c h . But what we have t o do i s
change psychologies, t o convince people t h a t there i s more
p r o f i t i n working than n o t , more p r o f i t i n t a k i n g r i s k s i n
s t a r t i n g new businesses than n o t . I n s h o r t , how do you b u i l d
s o c i a l cohesion but.make work and e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p a t t r a c t i v e ?
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: Only a f o o l would t u r n down an i n v i t a t i o n t o
come t o I t a l y . We d i d have good discussions. I know t h a t many
people i n I t a l y are s t r u g g l i n g w i t h these issues and throughout
Europe t o o . Before me, Wim Kok i n t h e Netherlands.
He managed
a grand b a r g a i n between business leaders and l a b o r unions.
They
now have the highest percentage o f p a r t - t i m e employees. This
has c r e a t e d major f l e x i b i l i t y .
These p a r t - t i m e employees earn
r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s and pro r a t a vacations. And now I t h i n k the
unemployment r a t e i s something l i k e 6-1/2 percent.
I know
Jospin i n France i s t r y i n g t o come t o g r i p s w i t h these issues.
France had a t l e a s t t h r e e years o f growth o f more than 3 percent
but s t i l l t h e i r unemployment i s over 11 percent.
I know t h a t
I t a l i a n s would never t o l e r a t e l i v i n g w i t h o u t h e a l t h insurance
the way so many Americans do. We are not p e r f e c t . So I t h i n k
i t would be good t o have an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a l l o f us t o
continue d i s c u s s i n g how t o promote economic success and s o c i a l
cohesion a t t h e same time. I would love t o do i t i f we can f i n d
the time. I have very good memories o f the time when I t a l y
hosted t h e G-7 then Mr. Berlusconi was the head o f government —
I guess he i s the o n l y one who i s not i n your government now.
(U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t :
We are f r i e n d s .
(U)
Well, I would l i k e t o pursue t h i s idea. (U)
Samuel Berger: Mr. President we don't want t o leave our
unemployed M i n i s t e r s i n the Cabinet Room too much longer. (U)
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the
ask
the
and
P r e s i d e n t : Okay. Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , why don't we move t o
Cabinet Room f o r our expanded session, b u t as we do l e t me
you one non-business question: Are I t a l i a n s e x c i t e d about
success o f t h e movie " L i f e i s B e a u t i f u l " around the w o r l d
here i n t h e United States? (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, very much so. We were e s p e c i a l l y
e x c i t e d about t h e prospects o f the Oscars. (U)
The President: Well, I have t o t e l l you I love t h a t movie.
laughed, I c r i e d . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: Yes, I agree.
f r i e n d o f Roberto B e n i g n i . (U)
The P r e s i d e n t :
(U)
I
You know I am a good
Please t e l l him t h a t I am h i s number one f a n .
EXPANDED SESSION/CABINET ROOM
PARTICIPANTS:
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The President
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary o f t h e Treasury
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f State
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
Louis Caldera, A c t i n g Secretary o f Defense
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o t h e President
for Economic A f f a i r s
James Cunningham, Deputy Chief o f Mission
Marc Grossman, A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r
European and Canadian A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Lael Brainard, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Deputy D i r e c t o r NEC
Donald Bandler, Special A s s i s t a n t t o t h e
President and Counselor t o N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y Adviser f o r the NATO Summit
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
Miriam Sapiro, D i r e c t o r f o r European A f f a i r s
Sim Smiley, I n t e r p r e t e r
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I t a l i a n Participants
Prime M i n i s t e r Massimo D'Alema
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r
Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomataic Advisor
General Giuseppi Cucchi, M i l i t a r y Advisor
Giampiero Massolo, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Pasquale Cascella, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
Claudio Caprara, Press Attache
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 11:00 a.m. - 11:40 a.m.
Cabinet Room
The P r e s i d e n t : Well, Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , l e t me welcome you
again i n a l a r g e r group. We had a good t a l k about a number
issues i n our e a r l i e r session, and now I would l i k e t o t u r n the
f l o o r t o you. We can t a l k about a couple o f issues and then
I ' l l take you t o lunch. (U)
I should say i t won't be anything l i k e an I t a l i a n lunch. I have
to t e l l you I had such a lunch one day i n San Gimignagno,
s i t t i n g i n a square w i t h frescoes a l l around. I loved i t . (U)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema: I ' d l i k e t o t a l k about my impression on
two issues t h a t I have been studying over a couple o f recent
meetings.
These are r a t h e r important issues. (U)
1.4b, 1.4d
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Secretary Rubin:
The
President:
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The P r e s i d e n t : That's a scene you should s c r i p t i n t o your next
I t a l i a n h o r r o r movie. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I ' l l have t o remember t o use t h a t l i n e w i t h
Congress. That might help me i n g e t t i n g money f o r Jordan. fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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14, 14
.b .d
The President
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Sorry t o be so long-winded about t h i s , but i t i s so t e r r i b l y
important I wanted t o go i n t o some d e t a i l .
f&)
S h a l l we go on t o lunch and f i n i s h our d i s c u s s i o n there?
(U)
LUNCH
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Thomas P i c k e r i n g , Under Secretary o f State
for P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s
Louis Caldera, A c t i n g Secretary o f Defense
John Podesta, Chief o f S t a f f
Samuel Berger, A s s i s t a n t t o the President
for National Security A f f a i r s
Gene S p e r l i n g , A s s i s t a n t t o the President
f o r Economic A f f a i r s
James Cunningham, Deputy Chief o f Mission
Marc Grossman, A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r
European and Canadian A f f a i r s
James Steinberg, Deputy A s s i s t a n t t o the
President f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s
Antony B l i n k e n , Special A s s i s t a n t t o the
President and Senior D i r e c t o r f o r European
A f f a i r s , NSC S t a f f (Notetaker)
I t a l i a n Participants
Massimo D'Alema, Prime M i n i s t e r
Lamberto D i n i , Foreign M i n i s t e r
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador t o the U.S.
S i l v i o Fagiolo, Chief o f S t a f f t o the
Prime M i n i s t e r
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Francesco O l i v i e r i , Diplomataic Advisor
General Giuseppi Cucchi, M i l i t a r y Advisor
Giampiero Massolo, Spokesman f o r t h e
Foreign M i n i s t e r
Pasquale Cascella, Spokesman f o r t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r
Marta Dassu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Advisor
Claudio Caprara, Press Attache
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
March 5, 1999, 11:55 a.m. - 12:55 p.m.
Old Family Dining Room
The President
Now maybe we can t u r n t o Kosovo. Let me f i r s t say t h a t I
a p p r e c i a t e very much what you said and the u n i t y o f t h e
Alliance.
I t h i n k we have a r e a l chance t o get t h e KosovarAlbanians t o agree. I appreciate the commitment you've made t o
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l force i f i n f a c t t h e r e i s one. Now, the b i g
q u e s t i o n before us i s what i f the Kosovars say yes b u t M i l o s e v i c
says no? Under the e x i s t i n g p o l i c y o f NATO, we must be prepared
t o take a i r a c t i o n t o reduce h i s c a p a c i t y t o h u r t t h e KosovarAlbanians. I n t h e end, I t h i n k t h a t M i l o s e v i c w i l l agree b u t
o n l y i f he b e l i e v e s we are prepared t o f o l l o w through w i t h our
t h r e a t s . He's got h i s own tremendous economic problems,
n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment i n Serbia, m i n o r i t y problems.
I've argued
t h a t t h e only way Serbia has a chance t o keep Kosovo w i t h i n i t s
t e r r i t o r y i s t o go back t o the autonomy t h a t was taken away a
decade ago. And the o n l y way t o get back t o t h a t i s f o r t h e r e
t o be a m u l t i n a t i o n a l force t o implement the agreement.
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Milosevic should not see that as a threat. But i n the end, the
fundamental reason he w i l l accept i s i f he concludes that i t
would be too p a i n f u l f o r him i f he doesn't, fe}
Prime Minister D'Alema:
The President:
You d i d too, when you were his age. te)
Prime Minister D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: I n Bosnia, we s a i d no ground f o r c e s u n t i l t h e r e
was an agreement. Now, i f t h e worse happens and t h e scenario
you sketched occurs, I b e l i e v e the Serbs w i l l a t t a c k anyway, no
matter what we do. We need t o s t r i k e because we s a i d t h a t we
would. I f they a t t a c k , we w i l l continue. I b e l i e v e t h a t
M i l o s e v i c w i l l then accept a m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e , te}
The i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g i s t h a t they have b a s i c a l l y agreed on what
Kosovar autonomy should look l i k e over t h e next t h r e e years.
The s t i c k i n g p o i n t i s about NATO. M i l o s e v i c may look f o r a face
saving way out. But i f he refuses, i f he says t h e h e l l w i t h
peace, we w i l l have t o continue t o h i t him — t h e same t h i n g we
d i d i n Bosnia which i s how we got the agreement. t&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Samuel Berger: To underscore what t h e President s a i d , we face
t h i s dilemma e i t h e r way. I f M i l o s e v i c says no, and we say t h e r e
are no consequences, then there i s no deterrence on him, he has
c a l l e d our b l u f f , we walk away, he has a f r e e r i d e t o P r i s t i n a .
The a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o t h r e a t e n him c l e a r l y before t h e r e i s a
f a i l u r e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s and then t o f o l l o w through i f t h e r e
i s one t h a t he's r e s p o n s i b l e f o r . That would make i t more
l i k e l y t o d e t e r him from an assault because he knows t h a t t h e
consequences would be very s e r i o u s . fG-)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
The President: Thank you, Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r — I know we w i l l
a l l keep t a l k i n g about t h i s i n the days ahead. I f I may, l e t me
say a couple o f b r i e f words about NATO. I read your a r t i c l e i n
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Tribune. I thought i t was very good.
I want t o r e s t a t e my strong support f o r ESDI and the open door.
I hope we can f i n d language t o b r i d g e the d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n
w i t h the French on the need f o r a UN sanction o f NATO a c t i o n .
We b e l i e v e i n a c t i n g c o n s i s t e n t w i t h UN p r i n c i p l e s and purposes.
But we don't want t o see i t become a requirement. Keep i n mind
t h a t the Charter says t h a t a t h r e a t to one i s a t h r e a t t o a l l .
Now e s p e c i a l l y w i t h expansion, the t h r e a t t o the s e c u r i t y o f one
NATO member could come even more e a s i l y than before from a t t a c k s
from beyond NATO's borders. I hope and b e l i e v e we can get
around t h i s problem. I b e l i e v e t h a t we w i l l . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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14, 14
.b .d
The President
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema
The P r e s i d e n t : Let's t h i n k about t h a t . I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g
idea. Now i f you don't mind a few words about Libya and I r a n .
The P r e s i d e n t : Let me f i r s t say on Libya t h a t we t h i n k we have
an agreement on PAM 103 but the Libyans have y e t t o a c t . I f
they do a c t , we w i l l suspend sanctions. Then t h e r e w i l l be 90
days f o r t h e United Nations t o issue a r e p o r t on f u r t h e r a c t i o n .
We have come along way on t h i s . I hate t o see us f a l l s h o r t ,
e s p e c i a l l y w i t h a l l the other problems i n t h e r e g i o n . I hope
you can help us w i t h t h i s . fG}
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
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1.4b, 1.4d
Samuel Berger: The b i g problem on the t a b l e i s t h a t t h e Libyans
have t o t u r n over the suspects.
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Of course, I understand, fe)
The President: Let me make c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s not a game or
some k i n d o f American obsession. S e t t l i n g t h i s would help
s t a b i l i z e North A f r i c a . I t would be good p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , fe-)
COliriDDNTIAh.
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The President: I grew up i n a church where people were n o t
allowed t o d r i n k a l c o h o l . We had communion w i t h grape j u i c e and
so we would wink a t t h e f a c t t h a t Jesus drank wine. You become
an expert a t s o c i a l hypocrisy. f&)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The President:
GONriDENTIAh
T e l l him we are very e n t h u s i a s t i c about h i s
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Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
I t would be good f o r us t o o .
We agree
1.4b, 1.4d
The President: I hate t h i s . I t has been going on f o r 10 years.
We have won t h i s case f o u r times, twice since I have been
P r e s i d e n t . I know t h a t a major problem i s European
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the Caribbean Islands which are v u l n e r a b l e t o
drug t r a f f i c .
We have t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o o — I j u s t sent
l e g i s l a t i o n t o Congress t o ask them f o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y more money
f o r t h e Caribbean. We have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o these c o u n t r i e s .
We must h e l p them d i v e r s i f y t h e i r economies. And so I t h i n k the
U n i t e d States and c o u n t r i e s l i k e France and others w i t h c o l o n i a l
h i s t o r y should take the lead t o help d i v e r s i f y these economies
and r a i s e t h e standard o f l i v i n g . I t h i n k we can do t h i s w i t h
r e l a t i v e l y small investments. Keep i n mind I have t o f i g h t both
the l e f t and the r i g h t on p r o t e c t i o n i s m i n t h i s country. I f we
don't p r o t e c t the WTO process, we're going t o lose t h a t f i g h t .
f€4
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
Mr. President, thank you so much f o r t h i s wonderful lunch.
There i s one matter I also wanted t o r a i s e before we f i n i s h and
The P r e s i d e n t :
Yes, I know about the case. fG)
Prime M i n i s t e r D'Alema:
The P r e s i d e n t : I agree t h a t t h i s i s an issue f o r our j u s t i c e
m i n i s t e r s and t h a t they should t a l k . f€4
End o f Conversation
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- SEGRET>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HIN GTO N
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
EUROPEAN LEADERS ON KOSOVO
DATE: March 23, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
Secure support f o r next steps on Kosovo.
II.
BACKGROUND
Your c a l l s t o B l a i r , and t o Chirac and Schroeder ( d i n i n g
together i n B e r l i n ) w i l l confirm t h a t , w i t h Ambassador
Holbrooke's departure from Belgrade, we have exhausted
diplomatic e f f o r t s t o f i n d a peaceful s o l u t i o n , and t h e
focus now s h i f t s t o Brussels and NATO a c t i o n . Your c a l l t o
Solana w i l l c o n f i r m t h a t those three key A l l i e s are on
board f o r a i r operations. By the time you speak t o Solana,
Ambassador Holbrooke should already have stopped i n
Brussels t o b r i e f him and NATO Ambassadors on h i s t r i p .
Solana i s prepared t o authorize SACEUR t o execute a i r
s t r i k e s a f t e r your conversation.
I n your c a l l s , you should emphasize t h a t NATO has shown
s t r o n g u n i t y and determination so f a r , and that t h i s
resolve w i l l be even more important i n the days ahead. You
could mention t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has decided t o
postpone h i s v i s i t t o the United States and emphasize t h a t
we hope t o continue t o work closely w i t h Russia, despite
i t s clear o p p o s i t i o n t o NATO s t r i k e s . We share w i t h Russia
the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e — a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n t o the
crisis.
Attachments
Tab A Points t o make f o r Prime Minister B l a i r and Chancellor
Schroeder
Tab B Points t o make f o r President Chirac
Tab C Points t o make f o r Secretary General Solana
Reason: 1.5(b)(c)
D e c l a s s i f y Or^ 3/23/09
m m
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
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FOR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
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LETTER I S RECEIVED AND WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
1
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA2 531 G 0 N J I D D H T I A L.
AS YOU WILL HAVE NO DOUBT HEARD DURING YOUR MEETINGS WITH
EUROPEAN LEADERS, FOR MANY WEEKS THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE
AND RUSSIA HAVE BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS I N
KOSOVO. THIS CRISIS WAS BROUGHT ON BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
FRY, WHICH HAS DEPRIVED THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND WAGED A BRUTAL CAMPAIGN OF
REPRESSION; BURNING VILLAGES AND KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS.
THANKS TO OUR WORK TOGETHER AT THE UN, LAST YEAR THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ADOPTED UNSCR 1199, UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE UN CHARTER,
WHICH AFFIRMED THAT THE CRISIS I S A THREAT TO PEACE AND
SECURITY I N THE REGION AND CALLED ON THE FRY TO.CEASE
REPRESSION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, HALT HOSTILITIES,
OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE AND IMPROVE THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION.
ALTHOUGH OUR EFFORTS LED TO A TEMPORARY EASING OF THE CRISIS
I N OCTOBER, REGRETTABLY, THE FRY GOVERNMENT HAS RETURNED TO
ITS OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, THREATENING A HUMAN CATASTROPHE AND
A WIDER INTERNATIONAL WAR.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, GREAT P E R E.O. 13526
-eONRBENTtAL
�IMMEDIATE
' CLINTON^fffl^WiOTOCOPY
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3
RHEHAAA2 531 O O M P I D B N T I
A-L
BRITAIN AND OUR OTHER NATO PARTNERS CONCLUDED THAT WE HAVE
NO CHOICE BUT TO USE CAREFULLY FOCUSED AIRSTRIKES AGAINST
THOSE FORCES OF THE FRY GOVERNMENT THAT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE OFFENSIVE. I AM AWARE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
FAVOR THE USE OF FORCE, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE NO
CHOICE BUT TO ACT NOW TO AVOID A FURTHER, WIDER DISASTER. WE
REMAIN PREPARED AT ALL TIMES TO RETURN TO DIPLOMACY I F THE
FRY GOVERNMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT I T I S PREPARED.TO ACCEPT
PROPOSALS, PRESENTED BY THE CONTACT GROUP DURING THE
NEGOTIATIONS I N FRANCE, OF THE US, EU AND RUSSIA.
I WISH YOU WELL DURING YOUR TRAVEL I N EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD
TO THE V I S I T OF PREMIER ZHU NEXT MONTH AND TO CONTINUING OUR
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON KOSOVO AND THE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES
ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
DECL: X I
PAGE 4 RHEHAAA2 531 C 0 N F I D E •M T I A L
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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HTCP
W C HANDWRITING
J
( ; ^ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�•
D E C R E T
'
2 0 5 5
THh PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AND CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER
M i l o s e v i c gave Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n that he has
any i n t e n t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i n g a peaceful s o l u t i o n to the c r i s i s
i n Kosovo.
He refused even t o agree to a cease-fire and continued t o
r e j e c t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y presence t o implement
agreement, without which i t i s unenforceable.
His posture was threatening and b e l l i g e r e n t . We've concluded
h i s only i n t e n t i o n i s t o unleash greater violence i n Kosovo.
Only course o f a c t i o n now i s NATO preparations f o r a i r
operations. I've j u s t been b r i e f e d by my m i l i t a r y and f o r e i g n
p o l i c y team. I am ready t o support NATO f u l l y and understand
t h a t you are as w e l l .
Also want you t o know that Prime M i n i s t e r Primakov has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington. Best outcome under
circumstances but want t o continue t o work c l o s e l y w i t h him.
Share ultimate o b j e c t i v e : a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s .
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13S26
.SSCRET-'
Reason:
1.5(b) (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On:
3/23/09
U
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
\
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
�—SECRET^
2055
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
M i l o s e v i c gave Ambassador Holbrooke no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he has
any i n t e n t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i n g a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s
i n Kosovo.
He refused even t o agree t o a cease-fire and continued t o
r e j e c t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y presence t o implement
agreement, without which i t i s unenforceable.
His
his
posture was threatening and b e l l i g e r e n t . We've concluded
o n l y i n t e n t i o n i s t o unleash greater violence i n Kosovo.
Heard your press comments n o t i n g diplomatic s o l u t i o n has
f a i l e d and necessary conclusions w i l l be drawn i n l i g h t o f the
plans t h a t have been prepared.
Only course o f a c t i o n now i s NATO preparations f o r a i r
operations. I've j u s t been b r i e f e d by my m i l i t a r y and f o r e i g n
p o l i c y team. I am ready t o support NATO f u l l y and understand
t h a t you are as w e l l .
Also want you t o know t h a t Prime Minister Primakov has
postponed h i s t r i p t o Washington. Best outcome under
circumstances b u t want t o continue to work c l o s e l y w i t h him.
Share u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e : a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s .
SECRET '
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify 0
:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
H i f f f d LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�NATIONAL SECURITY
2262
COUNCIL
W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 2 0 5 0 4
March 29, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
GREG SCHULTE
SUBJECT:
P r e s i d e n t i a l Message t o French P r e s i d e n t C h i r a c
A t t a c h e d a t Tab I i s a P r e s i d e n t i a l message t o French P r e s i d e n t
C h i r a c p e r your r e q u e s t . A l s o i n c l u d e d i n t h e message i s
o p t i o n a l language on Phase I I I i f you w i s h t o i n c l u d e i t .
RECOMMENDATION
That you a u t h o r i z e t h e t r a n s m i t t a l o f t h e message a t Tab I .
Approve
( f j l ^ Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I D r a f t P r e s i d e n t i a l message
JDCRET
Reason:
1.5(a,b,d)
PER E.0.13526
Declassify C^Lr#"F0^ LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�-OECRET
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
NIACT
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC RE SITUATION I N KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW. PLEASE REPORT TO
WHITE HOUSE SITROOM (202-456-9431) WHEN MESSAGE IS RECEIVED AND
WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR JACQUES:
I PLANNED TO CALL YOU THIS EVENING BUT DECIDED TO SEND YOU A
NOTE WHEN I LEARNED THAT YOU HAD RETIRED FOR THE EVENING. I
WANT TO SHARE MY THINKING ABOUT KOSOVO, WHERE, AS YOU KNOW,
MILOSEVIC CONTINUES HIS SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AND
EXPULSIONS.
YOUR SPEECH TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE WAS CARRIED LIVE BY CNN. I T
WAS TERRIFIC. I AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO ROOM
IN EUROPE FOR BELGRADE'S POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING, MURDERS AND
MASSACRES. I ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT NATO'S ACTION
NEEDS TIME AND DETERMINATION AND THAT AIR STRIKES MUST BE
SUSTAINED I N ORDER TO REDUCE BELGRADE'S MEANS OF AGGRESSION.
YESTERDAY, I N IMPLEMENTING PHASE I I OF NATO'S OPERATION, ALLIED
AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY HIT SOME OF THE FORCES CARRYING OUT THESE
ATROCITIES.
I HOPE FOR MORE SUCCESS TONIGHT. BUT WE CANNOT
COUNT ON THE TACTICAL USE OF AIRPOWER ALONE TO STOP THE SERB
FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, I THINK WE NOW NEED TO AUTHORIZE PHASE
III.
MILOSEVIC MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HIT HIM
NOT ONLY I N AND AROUND KOSOVO, BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE REST OF
SERBIA AND AGAINST KEY TARGETS I N BELGRADE ITSELF.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE DIPLOMATIC
TRACK AS WELL. I T IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MILOSEVIC WILL OFFER
PRIMAKOV SOME MODEST CONCESSIONS, SUCH AS A CEASE-FIRE I N PLACE
L N O L B A Y P O O O Y PERE.O.
I T N I R R HTCP
�I F NATO AIR STRIKES STOP. OR HE MIGHT OFFER TO RESTART
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CHAPTERS OF THE RAMBOUILLET
ACCORDS. I T WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE REMAIN FIRM AND
UNITED I N WHAT WE EXPECT FROM MILOSEVIC: A PULL-BACK OF HIS
FORCES AND AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE RAMBOUILLET
FRAMEWORK. I F MILOSEVIC REMAINS DEFIANT, NATO'S AIR STRIKES
MUST CONTINUE.
I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH YOU IN THE COMING DAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�-flfiCRET
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC RE SITUATK
NIACT
IN KOSOVO
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC AT THE/EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW 7 PLEASE REPORT TO
WHITE HOUSE SITROOM (202-456-9431 . WHEN MESSAGE IS RECEIVED AND
:
•
WHEN DELIVERED.
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR JACQUES:
r
WHEN I
P©E&
I PLANNED TO CALL YOU THIS EVENING SUT
THAT YOU HAD RETIRED/FOR THE EVENING.
WANTS©-TO TMSr
ABOUT KOSOVO, WHERE ./MILOSEVIC CON/INUES HIS SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGJ
OF TERROR AND EXPULSIONS.
FLRES ARE BURNING IN TOWNS
ULLAGES THROUGHOUT KOSOVO.
SECURITY TORCES ARE CONDU INQf MASS EXPU; 5IONS ON A SCALE WELL
BEYOND TWAT oV LAST YEAR
THE OSCEAIEPORTED A
T/BS MORNING
RIVER"J/OF RE GEES FLOWING/INTO ALBANIA, A R R I V I N G I A T A RATE OF
,000 AN HOUR. OVER 2^,00/) ETHfJIC AL^ANI . S HAVE FLED ANTO
N
l^IACEDONIA OVER\ THE L^ST
W D A Y ^ A l ^ THOASAND^ MORE ARE COMING
lACiyDAY.
ANoVg^ARE RI EIVING MOUNTING REEORTS OFXAyROCITLES,
J U D I N G THE DELIBERA1
KILLING OF ETHNIC ALBANIAN POLOTIZIANS
AND INTELLIGENTSIA.
YOUR SPEECH TO THE JRENCH PEOPLE WAS CARRIED LIVE BY CNN. I T
WAS TERRIFIC. I AfSREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO ROOM
IN EUROPE FOR BELGRADE'S POLICY CF ETHNIC CLEANSING, MURDERS AND
MASSACRES. I AL^O AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT THAT NATO'S ACTION
NEEDS TIME AND DETERMINATION AND THAT AIR STRIKES MUST BE
SUSTAINED I N Oi^DER TO REDUCE BELGRADE'S MEANS OF AGGRESSION.
OPTIONAL LANGUAGE ON PHASE I I I :
^YESTERDAY, I N IMPLEMENTING
PHASE
OF''NATO'S OPERATION, ALLIED AIRCRAFT SUCCESSFULLY HIT
SOME OF T H ' FORCES CARRYING OUT THESE ATROCITIES.
/E'
I HOPE FOR
iCLASSIFlED
CLINTON LIBRARY P
H COPY PER E.0.13526
�MORE SUCCESS TONIGHT. BUT W CANNOT COUNT ON THE TACTICAL USE
E
OF AIRPOWER ALONE TO STOP THE SERB FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, I
THINK W N W NEED TO AUTHORIZE PHASE I I I . MILOSEVIC MUST
E O
UNDERSTAND THAT W ARE PREPARED TC HIT HIM HARD NOT ONLY IN AND
E
AROUND KOSOVO, BUT ALSO THROUGHOUT THE REST OF SERBIA AND
AGAINST KEY TARGETS IN BELGRADE ITSELF.f
YOUR OFFICIALS
^T YOU HA\ iPOKEN
W UNDERSTAND FI
E
ER PRU
V iBOUT HIS IMPENDING TRIP TO/BE: 5RADE
Mil
THAT ^ O EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT/MILOSEVIC HAS/GIVEi
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i.INS/lMPORTANT TO THE
Jt> ITS MEMBER STATES.
IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MILOSEVIC. JILL OFFER PRIMAKOV SOME
TOKEN CONCESSIONS. HE MIGHT OFFER A CEASE-FIRE/EF NATO AIR
STRIKES STOP. OR^HE MIGHT OFFER TO RESTART NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
POLITICAL CHAPTERS OF THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS. IT WILL BE VERY
IMPORTANT THAT W REMAIN FIRM AND UNITED IN WHAT W EXPECT FROM
E
E
MILOSEVIC: A PULL-BACK OF HIS FORCES AND AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT
BASED ON THE RAMBOUILLET FRAMEWORK. IF MILOSEVIC REMAINS
DEFIANT, NATO'S AIR STRIKES MUST CONTINUE.
PfcEASE CALL ME T M R O IF YOU WISH.TO DI3CU33 THIS FURTHER.
OORW
, I AM-S^B^aAgUWE W L x UL Hi LUK I J J ? IN THE COMING
,
JL.
'WJDAYS.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�THE PRESIDENT HAS S E
EM
D'Alema p o i n t s
A p p r e c i a t e your statements and t h e v o t e o f t h e I t a l i a n
p a r l i a m e n t . Know t h a t t h e r e a r e a l o t o f c o n t e n d i n g v o i c e s f o r
you t o manage.
M i l o s e v i c i s i n t e n s i f y i n g h i s o f f e n s i v e , and t h e r e a r e c r e d i b l e
r e p o r t s o f a t r o c i t i e s . Not a s u r p r i s e ; t h e reason we launch o u r
s t r i k e s i s because we knew he was p o i s e d t o a t t a c k w i t h 40,000
t r o o p s i n and around Kosovo.
I m p o r t a n t t h a t NATO show M i l o s e v i c t h a t our r e s o l v e i s f i r m .
Best way t o assure t h a t we can keep t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s
s h o r t i s f o r h i m t o understand t h a t we w i l l keep up a t i t as
l o n g as necessary. I f he t h i n k s we are wavering, he w i l l w a i t us
out.
C l a r k and Solana b e l i e v e t h a t we need t o t r a n s i t i o n from Phase 1
t o Phase 2. This w i l l a l l o w us t o have a more d i r e c t impact on
the Serb f o r c e s t h a t a r e a t t a c k i n g t h e Kosovars. I n l i g h t o f t h e
i n t e n s i f y i n g o f f e n s i v e , need t o show M i l o s e v i c t h a t we a r e
r e s p o n d i n g t o h i s d e f i a n c e . I s t r o n g l y agree; I b e l i e v e t h a t o u r
NATO c o l l e a g u e s share t h i s view
( i f he says we need a pause between Phase I and Phase I I ) :
I f we pause now, w h i l e he i s e s c a l a t i n g , we w i l l send t h e wrong
message a t a key moment.
I f he says we need more diplomacy
Madeleine w i l l be c o n s u l t i n g w i t h D i n i and o t h e r NATO f o r e i g n
m i n i s t e r s about how t o s u s t a i n t h e diplomacy We a r e c o n t i n u i n g
t o make c l e a r t h a t we p r e f e r a p e a c e f u l outcome. But no s i g n
from M i l o s e v i c t h a t he's prepared t o do a n y t h i n g except c o n t i n u e
the k i l l i n g
P OO OY
HTCP
mO HANDWRITING
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
Points f o r Telephone C a l l t o
Prime M i n i s t e r B l a i r
A p r i l 3, 1999
Purpose
To review c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo, s t r e s s need t o s u s t a i n
and i n t e n s i f y a i r operations and ask f o r help i n c o n v i n c i n g EU
c o u n t r i e s t o r e c e i v e refugees c r o s s i n g i n t o Macedonia.
Background
B l a i r today made a s t r o n g statement c a l l i n g f o r sustained airs t r i k e s and making c l e a r t h a t l a s t n i g h t ' s s t r i k e s i n t o Belgrade
set a p a t t e r n f o r f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . He w i l l want t o t a l k
t a r g e t i n g , and how best t o send a s t r o n g s i g n a l t o M i l o s e v i c .
Points to be made
Belgrade has not yet f e l t the f u l l weight of NATO's a i r
s t r i k e s , e i t h e r i n and around Kosovo, or against high-value
t a r g e t s elsewhere, i n c l u d i n g i n Belgrade. C a l l i n g Chirac
today t o s t r e s s need f o r expedited t a r g e t i n g procedures.
Hope you can help convince Chirac and other a l l i e s of need t o
i n t e n s i f y a i r s t r i k e s and widen t a r g e t i n g . Need t o h i t not
o n l y m i l i t a r y forces and a i r defense, but command and c o n t r o l ,
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and broadcast f a c i l i t i e s used f o r d i r e c t i n g ,
s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
Wes Clark would l i k e t o h i t f o l l o w i n g t a r g e t s as soon as
tonight:
f i r s t Army headquarters i n downtown
p r e s i d e n t i a l residence
Belgrade
EO 13526 1 4
.d
army barracks downtown
•
two Belgrade e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n centers
©
S o c i a l i s t Party Headquarters w i t h TV t r a n s m i t t e r downtown.
Hope you can support and convince Chirac and others t o agree.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
^CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�Worried M i l o s e v i c w i l l complete e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g campaign i n
next few days, then declare c e a s e - f i r e and make some p a r t i a l
offer.
To head t h i s o f f , we need t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y increase
weight o f a t t a c k s over next few days, and also prepare o t h e r
a l l i e s t o s u s t a i n s t r i k e s beyond a Serb c e a s e - f i r e .
Also w o r r i e d about Macedonia c l o s i n g t h e border. I n t e n d t o
c a l l G l i g o r o v and ask him t o reverse t h i s d e c i s i o n .
Strobe
T a l b o t t i s going there today t o urge a re-opening o f t h e
border and t o o f f e r assistance.
We need t o g i v e G l i g o r o v some assurance t h a t Macedonia w i l l
not be saddled w i t h a l l these refugees i n d e f i n i t e l y and a t
great economic c o s t . Need your help i n g e t t i n g EU c o u n t r i e s
to immediately i n f o r m Macedonia t h a t they w i l l a s s i s t i n t h e
c u r r e n t c r i s i s and accept a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n o f t h e
refugees.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�-seeftET-
2422
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
Great a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r what you and your government have s a i d
and done. A l l i a n c e u n i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s s t r o n g .
Much a t stake f o r Europe, the European Union, the
S t a t e s and NATO. We cannot f a i l .
United
However our m i l i t a r y response i s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d as
i n e f f e c t i v e — not o n l y by our p u b l i c s , b u t a l s o by t h e
l e a d e r s h i p i n Belgrade. Not j u s t the weather — t a r g e t i n g
process has a l s o been broken.
I f we don't h i t hard now, M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l immune from any
p e n a l t y . He w i l l seek t o complete h i s e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g b e f o r e
NATO f u r t h e r e s c a l a t e s .
We a r e s t r i k i n g a few t a r g e t s a n i g h t and not h a v i n g t h e
impact we need.
We need t o c o n t i n u e s t r i k i n g h i g h - v a l u e t a r g e t s , i n c l u d i n g i n
Belgrade -- not o n l y m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and a i r defense b u t
command and c o n t r o l , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and broadcast f a c i l i t i e s
t h a t a r e d i r e c t i n g , s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
S t r i k i n g a wider range o f t a r g e t s w i l l damage Belgrade's
c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct h i s o f f e n s i v e . And by imposing an
i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable c o s t , i t w i l l f o r c e M i l o s e v i c t o
r e c o n s i d e r h i s r e f u s a l o f an agreement.
NATO's p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s cannot micromanage NATO t a r g e t i n g
on a day-to-day b a s i s .
I n s t e a d , we need t o g i v e o u r
commanders a u t h o r i t y t o s t r i k e a broad range o f t a r g e t s as
l o n g as the c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s can be kept low.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t our m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s have d i s c u s s e d a
t a r g e t i n g review process t h a t would e x p e d i t e t a r g e t i n g , w h i l e
e n s u r i n g a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l review o f t a r g e t s t h a t c o u l d
cause a l a r g e number o f c a s u a l t i e s o r t h a t a r e o f n a t i o n a l
significance.
I am s a t i s f i e d w i t h the procedures, and hope
t h a t you can a l s o accept them.
"sifJ-oQMta
IDILBRARY
PHOTOCOP/
ER E.0.13526
�GECRET
Russia
•
C o n t a c t s w i t h Russians mixed. A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o Ivanov.
S a i d we welcome a n y / a l l p r o p o s a l s t o s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y . But b e f o r e any meeting takes p l a c e , need t o
ensure i t has a p r o d u c t i v e outcome.
•
She o u t l i n e d areas o f common ground based on concessions
Russia g o t from Serbs l a s t June and U.S.-Russian agreements:
•
no r e p r e s s i o n o f c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n ; withdraw Serb
s e c u r i t y f o r c e s t o permanent l o c a t i o n s ; u n h i n d e r e d r e t u r n
of refugees and d i s p l a c e d persons; u n h i n d e r e d access by
humanitarian organizations; i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n
implementation force.
•
Areas where we d i s a g r e e a r e use o f f o r c e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y presence.
•
Key p o i n t :
i f we can r e i n f o r c e common p r i n c i p l e s and agree on
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y presence, we might have t h e b a s i s
f o r an e f f e c t i v e meeting.
•
Ivanov seemed i n t r i g u e d , b u t responded F r i d a y w i t h
d i s a p p o i n t i n g nonpaper. A l t h o u g h he backed o f f i n s i s t i n g on
G-8 meeting, he denied M i l o s e v i c i s r e p r e s s i n g c i v i l i a n s and
c a l l e d f o r KLA t o be disarmed.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC; PRIME MINISTER AZNAR;
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN; PRESIDENT GLIGAROV; HILL LEADERS
DATE: A p r i l 3, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
Chirac, Aznar and C h r e t i e n : Secure t h e i r support f o r an
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h e NATO a i r campaign and t h e widening
of t h e t a r g e t s i n v o l v e d . For Chirac: Ensure h i s support
f o r an expedited t a r g e t approval process.
G l i g a r o v : T© reassure^the—Pre-s^rdent . . U go-ge^v o f our
.G
commitment t o help Macedonia m a i n t a i n t h e i r s e c u r i t y and
deal w i t h enormous refugee problems.
H i l l Leaders:
To update t h e Leaders on s t a t u s o f t h e a i r
campaign, our humanitarian response, and our d e t a i n e d
soldiers.
II.
BACKGROUND
Chirac i s o u t s i d e Paris f o r Easter. He and Jospin continue
to make s t r o n g p u b l i c statements about t h e righteousness o f
NATO's cause and the challenge M i l o s e v i c poses t o t h e
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p e a c e f u l , f r e e and democratic Europe.
[Jospin t h i s week moved s w i f t l y t o keep h i s c o a l i t i o n i n
l i n e , rebuking the Greens, Communists and I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r
f o r q u e s t i o n i n g NATO's campaign i n p u b l i c ] P u b l i c support
f o r NATO i s h o l d i n g steady a t about 50 percent. There i s
deep concern about the humanitarian p l i g h t o f t h e Kosovars;
France announced $15 m i l l i o n i n b i l a t e r a l a i d f o r refugees,
and c o n t r i b u t e d t o a $40 m i l l i o n EU package. I n c r e a s i n g l y ,
French commentators are s p e c u l a t i n g about ground t r o o p s .
Chirac continues t o i n s i s t t h a t i s n o t an o p t i o n .
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EO 13526 1 4
.d
Aznar i s spending the Easter Holiday i m S o u t h e r n Spain, He
w i l l t r a v e l on Monday t o Hungary and w i M spend next
weekend w i t h Tony B l a i r a t a country e s t a t e i n t h e UK. He
had planned t o t r a v e l p r i v a t e l y t o the x^s) t h i s week and
had explored t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n f o r m a l v i s i t w i t h you.
His plans changed and he withdrew t h i s request i n midMarch. He w i l l appreciate hearing t h a t you look forward t o
seeing him a t the NATO Summit.
Spain has been a staunch supporter o f Operation A l l i e d
Force. I n a d d i t i o n t o two F-18s and a C-130 tanker
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the a i r campaign, Spain has opened i t s
bases a t Rota and Moron t o us f o r a i r c r a f t beddown and
r e f u e l i n g o p e r a t i o n s . Madrid also has a l l o c a t e d $1 m i l l i o n
i n refugee assistance and dispatched 10 tons o f
humanitarian supplies t o Albania. I n a d d i t i o n , the Spanish
Red Cross has c o n t r i b u t e d 30 tons o f a i d , i n c l u d i n g
b l a n k e t s , f i r s t a i d k i t s and generators.
Aznar has been c o n s i s t e n t l y strong i n h i s p u b l i c statements
on Kosovo. I n a speech t o Parliament t h i s week, he s a i d
Spain's involvement was v i t a l — we cannot s i t i d l y by t o
watch the '"extermination" o f Kosovo's Albanians. Despite a
general a v e r s i o n t o using f o r c e , Spain's major p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g the o p p o s i t i o n S o c i a l i s t s , have given
Aznar t h e i r support.
ore*
iiCLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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.Chretien asked you t o c a l l him; he f l e w from Canada's
newest t e r r i t o r y , Nunuvak, t o F l o r i d a , t o v i s i t h i s
granddaughter who was b a d l y i n j u r e d t h i s week i n a r i d i n g
a c c i d e n t . The Canadians have "wobble-free" i n s u p p o r t i n g
NATO's a c t i o n s i n Kosovo — you should acknowledge t h i s .
-£hey c o n t r i b u t e d a number o f combat a i r c r a f t — CF-18's,
xey
a n d l c o n s i d e r i n g sending more, i n a d d i t i o n t o $10 m i l l i o n i n
idY
aid.
1.4b, 1.4d
You should be aware t h a t Madeleine
had t o postpone a meeting w i t h Axworthy on the New York-^T"
Canada peace b r i d g e a t Niagara t h a t was t o h i g h l i g h t o u ^ v
extensive border cooperation. Should C h r e t i e n r a i s e , you
should agree t h a t i t be rescheduled as soon as Madeleine's
and Axworthy's schedules a l l o w .
Gligarov is concerned about the huge influx of Kosov^
Albanianxefugees into Macedonia and the impact thax this
is having on Macedonia's fragile economy and unp^Tsy ethnic
balance. (Tft^re are 400,000 ethnic Albanian eltizens in
Macedonia, comprising about 20 percent of the population.)
Gligarov is alscN^/orried that Macedonia p£ght become
engulfed in a wid&c Balkan war. Ambas^ctdor Chris Hill
summarizes the situation as follows ^'Macedonia is in the
fight of its short Irfe, and need^-'every bit of
encouragement we can provide." /
\
You should reassure G l i g a r o v / o f our support f o r Macedonia
as demonstrated by t h e p r o v i s i o n o f increased humanitarian
and economic assistance,/Strode's t r i p , and NATO's
d e c i s i o n t o support the^huinanftarian r e l i e f work t h e r e i n
anyway i t can. Along/with the a d d i t i o n a l $50 m i l l i o n i n
humanitarian r e l i e f / s u p p o r t t o t h ^ r e g i o n , Strobe w i l l
announce a $50 m i l d i o n economic assistance package, o f
which $29 m i l l i o T i w i l l go t o MacedoAda.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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Attachments
Tab A Points
Tab B Points
Tab C Points
Tab D Points
Tab E Points
t o be Made to President Chirac
t o be Made to President Aznar
to be Made to Prime Minister Chretien
t o be Made to President Gligorov
to be Made t o the H i l l Leaders
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�"s
L^UO,^
POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
'S
Whc
2422
<£"J
o
lappe;
Jov^Mrnmoral an^/out^ageoja^).
We erannot
in\Kosc
. e r a t e ^ e t h n i c c l e a i b«g t h i s i W t - ^ e a r o f t f i e 20^fe--^ntuty-.
•
Much a t stake f o r Europe, the European Union, the
S t a t e s and NATO. We cannot f a i l .
•
However our m i l i t a r y response i s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d as
i n e f f e c t i v e — n o t o n l y by our p u b l i c s , b u t a l s o by the
l e a d e r s h i p i n Belgrade. Not j u s t the weather — t a r g e t i n g
process has a l s o been broken.
We
United
agreed t o exg^nd\ the range/^f t a r g e t ^ - i p n Tuesday, b u t ^ n l y
y nig
ype o
i c t h i n k twic
^^JJ^^
We need t o c o n t i n u e s t r i k i n g h i g h - v a l u e t a r g e t s , i n c l u d i n g i n
Belgrade — not o n l y m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and a i r defense b u t
VJ^command and c o n t r o l , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and b r o a d c a s t f a c i l i t i e s
<2A<2_ ,
t h a t are d i r e c t i n g , s u p p o r t i n g and i n c i t i n g the v i o l e n c e .
S-HMtwut
S t r i k i n g a wider range o f
c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct h i s
i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable
reconsider his r e f u s a l of
t a r g e t s w i l l damage Belgrade's
o f f e n s i v e . And by imposing an
cost, i t w i l l force Milosevic to
an agreement.
I f we don't h i t h a r d now, M i l o s e v i c w i l l f e e l immune from any
p e n a l t y . He w i l l seek t o complete h i s e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g b e f o r e
NATO f u r t h e r e s c a l a t e s .
NATO's p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s cannot micromanage NATO t a r g e t i n g
on a day-to-day b a s i s .
I n s t e a d , we need t o g i v e our
commanders a u t h o r i t y t o s t r i k e a broad range o f t a r g e t s as
l o n g as the c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s can be kept t o a minimum.
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t our m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s have d i s c u s s e d a
t a r g e t i n g review process t h a t would e x p e d i t e t a r g e t i n g , w h i l e
e n s u r i n g a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l review o f t a r g e t s t h a t c o u l d
cause a l a r g e number of c a s u a l t i e s or t h a t are o f n a t i o n a l
Reason: 1.5 ( a ) , ( d )
D e c l a s s i f y on:, A p r i , ! ^ , . 200^
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�s i g n i f i c a n c e . I am s a t i s f i e d with the procedures, and hope
t h a t you can also accept them.
i t h Milosevic's thugs packing t r a i
ith
cut the m i l i t a r y and p o l l
operation's. Instead, we must shew our
resolve b \ interisifyingVour s
Albc
is, we must
NBLTO' s
i t i o n anc
Russia
Contacts w i t h Russians mixed. A l b r i g h t t a l k e d t o Ivanov.
Said we welcome any/all proposals t o solve the c o n f l i c t
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y . But before any meeting takes place, need t o
ensure i t has a productive outcome.
She o u t l i n e d areas of common ground based on concessions
Russia got from Serbs l a s t June and U.S.-Russian agreements:
no repression o f c i v i l i a n population; withdraw Serb
s e c u r i t y forces t o permanent l o c a t i o n s ; unhindered r e t u r n
of refugees and displaced persons; unhindered access by
humanitarian organizations; i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n
implementation force.
-Si-
Areas where we disagree are use of force and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y presence.
Key p o i n t : i f we can r e i n f o r c e common p r i n c i p l e s and agree on
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y presence, we mightO have the b a s i s - \
f o r an e f f e c t i v e meeting.
Ivanov seemed i n t r i g u e d , but responded Friday w i t h
d i s a p p o i n t i n g nonpaper. Although he backed o f f i n s i s t i n g on
G-8 meeting, he denied Milosevic i s repressing c i v i l i a n s and
c a l l e d f o r KLA t o be disarmed.
Want t o keep Russians
impress, on them tha
cleansinq. They'r
aged d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , but have t o
cannot con-tfiAue t o d e n y ^ t h n i c
ted, l o o k / t e r r i b l e i n t ^ r n a \ t i o n a l l y .
Out f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s c a l l e d f o r
W^dnesday\at p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r
me. Expect Jlussians w i u l
:o stay firm_jfe-hat cease-fi
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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c
- i -3- - \ (\
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
A p r i l 10, 1999
ACTION
\
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
IDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGE^J/
SUBJECT:
Message t o President Y e l t s i n on Kosovo
Purpose
Approve a message t o President Y e l t s i n .
Background
President Y e l t s i n wrote t o you twice t h i s week about Kosovo.
Y e l t s i n ' s second l e t t e r was an impassioned plea f o r working
together t o end the c r i s i s . The message reviewed your j o i n t
accomplishments, emphasized Y e l t s i n ' s b e l i e f t h a t NATO w i l l n o t
be able t o f i x the Kosovo problem w i t h one s t r i k e — and then
came t o the underwhelming punchline o f : l e t ' s have our Foreign
M i n i s t e r s meet.
In l i g h t o f the Orthodox Easter holiday and Madeleine's Tuesday
meeting w i t h Foreign M i n i s t e r Ivanov, i t would be u s e f u l t o send
Y e l t s i n a b r i e f response. The message reviews our concerns
about Milosevic's continued b r u t a l i t y and thanks Y e l t s i n f o r h i s
p u b l i c defense o f the U.S.-Russian r e l a t i o n s h i p and assurances
t h a t Russia w i l l not be drawn m i l i t a r i l y i n t o the Yugoslavia
c o n f l i c t . You also h i g h l i g h t the importance o f K o f i Annan's
statemi^nt on Kosovo and ask Y e l t s i n t o embrace i t as a
c o n s t r u c t i v e approach toward a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n .
RECOMMENDATXON
the message at Tab A.
That you appr«
Disapprove
Approve
Attachments
Tab A Message t o President Y e l t s i n
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
CONFI DiaiHftfr
Reason: 1.5(d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: 4/9/09
PER Ei). 13526
cc: Vice President
Chief o f S t a f f
CLINTON LIBRARY RdOTOCOfiffSiNG
-i.
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
�^ftPftRtt
-
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
SECRET
^-Ib-^q
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THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H iVl G T O N
'39 HPK 10 AMli:4b
A p r i l 10\ 1999
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH SECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN,
PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
DATE: A p r i l 10, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGEjg^.
I.
PURPOSE
Annan: welcome h i s s t r o n g statement on Kosovo; urge him t o
encourage Moscow t o pressure Belgrade and cease a l l support;
e x p l a i n s t r a t e g y ; l a y down markers on I r a q .
B l a i r and Chirac: review the road ahead on Kosovo, i n c l u d i n g
Monday's f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s meeting i n Brussels, i n t r a - a l l i a n c e
r e l a t i o n s , managing Russia and h e l p i n g the f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
With B l a i r , you also should seek support f o r increased economic
pressure on Belgrade.
II.
BACKGROUND
Annan issued a statement on Friday expressing h i s deep d i s t r e s s
at the humanitarian s i t u a t i o n i n Kosovo and u r g i n g a resumption
of p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. He
c a l l e d on Belgrade t o make a s e r i e s o f commitments, i n c l u d i n g an
end t o i t s "campaign o f i n t i m i d a t i o n and e x p u l s i o n " , a
withdrawal of forces, u n c o n d i t i o n a l acceptance o f refugee r e t u r n
and t h e deployment o f an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e . " Thanks
t o phone c a l l s from Madeleine and Tom P i c k e r i n g , Annan's
requirements are e s s e n t i a l l y the same as our own. The one major
d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t Annan c a l l s f o r NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s
once Belgrade commits t o these steps, r a t h e r than beginning t o
implement them. We are now t r y i n g t o use Annan's statement i n
our e f f o r t s t o make t h e Russians be a c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t o f our
diplomatic strategy.
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Reason: 1.S (a), (d)
D e c l a s s i f y On: A ^ r i l
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2009
PHOTOCOPY
MC H N W I I G
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�SECRET
Mrs. Ogata, the UN High Commissioner f o r Refugees (UNHCR), and
the l e a d c o o r d i n a t o r o f refugee p r o t e c t i o n and assistance
e f f o r t s , was overwhelmed by the magnitude o f the Kosovo c r i s i s
and slow t o accept a strong NATO r o l e i n a s s i s t i n g w i t h r e l i e f .
She has now acknowledged t h a t the NATO r o l e i s c r i t i c a l , and we
are beginning t o reach most o f the refugees w i t h a s s i s t a n c e .
Mrs. Ogata, i s c u r r e n t l y i n the r e g i o n , v i s i t i n g t h e camps.
Both B l a i r and Chirac remain rock s o l i d on Kosovo, and continue
to enjoy s t r o n g p u b l i c support f o r NATO's a i r s t r i k e s .
Indeed,
as images o f dispossessed Kosovars and r e p o r t s o f a t r o c i t i e s
m u l t i p l y , e d i t o r i a l and even p u b l i c support f o r ground troops i s
growing i n both c o u n t r i e s .
EQ 13526 1 4
.d
You w i l l want t o b r i n g both leaders up t o date on your
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h D'Alema and convey your basic s a t i s f a c t i o n
w i t h K o f i Annan's statement o f c o n d i t i o n s . The NATO m i n i s t e r i a l
on Monday w i l l s i g n a l A l l i e d resolve and o f f e r an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
make smaller a l l i e s f e e l more i n v o l v e d . At the same time, we
must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l there i s no end i n s i g h t i f he
continues t o h o l d o u t . This w i l l r e q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y
resources and increased economic pressure. You might also
compare notes on our common e f f o r t s t o help the refugees, a s s i s t
f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s , and channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s i n p o s i t i v e
directions.
Attachments
Tab A T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h Chirac
Tab B T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h B l a i r
Tab C T a l k i n g Points f o r Phone C a l l w i t h K o f i Annan
SECRET
�Revised
—^-r-f^r-ir
A/10/99 6:45 pm
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Want t o review where we are on Kosovo; my conversation w i t h
D'Alema; K o f i ' s statement, the m i l i t a r y campaign; the
humanitarian e f f o r t ; and Russia.
D'Alema
•
Spoke t o him Friday. He's doing a great j o b navigating a
d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n a t home and seems s o l i d l y behind
continued a i r operations. No mention o f "pauses" or
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s .
K o f i ' s Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on Friday. His conditions
are i d e n t i c a l t o our conditions. The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s that
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once Milosevic commits t o
the c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs o f implementation f i r s t . But K o f i ' s statement
gives NATO's stance adds a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l legitimacy
to our p o s i t i o n and provides a good hook f o r the Russians.
• Also very encouraged by G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statement
because the Russians signed on. Hope we can lock that i n at
the highest l e v e l s .
•
I hope t h a t we can use his statement t o help i n our e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians t o engage c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on the diplomatic
track.
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
counterparts on Monday i n Brussels. This i s important f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o signal NATO's determination t o stay the
course. And second, t o make a l l the a l l i e s f e e l involved.
There i s some resentment among the smaller a l l i e s about the
r e g u l a r contacts between the Contact Group a l l i e s . The
meeting o f a l l 19 Foreign M i n i s t e r s should help, and I am also
making a p o i n t o f c a l l i n g the leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g forces.
PER E.0.13526
CL I NTO^itffi'RM^'WOTOCOPY
�Next Steps
•
We must make Milosevic f e e l t h a t there i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand that General
Clark w i l l s h o r t l y be asking a l l of us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o look at t h i s very
carefully.
•
We also need t o supplement our m i l i t a r y operations w i t h
increased economic pressure on Milosevic and h i s war machine.
We're encouraging neighboring countries t o stop o i l supplies
to Serbia. This i s also a good moment f o r the EU t o take a
serious look a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s sanctions regime.
Easter Pause [ i f asked]
•
[SACEUR was very c a r e f u l i n h i s t a r g e t s over the past 24
hours. Expect t h a t the NATO spokesman w i l l mention t h i s a t
his b r i e f i n g today.]
Help f o r the Refugees
•
Our estimates are t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars are now
displaced. The world i s now responding but we've got t o do
more.
•
Just formed a n a t i o n a l coordinating c o u n c i l here t o run our
response t o the refugee c r i s i s . We are a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
supplies i n t o the region and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d .
•
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e the pressure by moving some o f the refugees t o
temporary safehavens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
doing. Hope we can increase a i d t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
organizations i n the region.
Assistance for the Frontline States
• Also need t o step up e f f o r t s t o help other f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
• Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . We'll need a
comprehensive plan f o r Kosovo and Yugoslavia — a resettlement
and recovery program.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Russia
Important we a l l stay engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t Milosevic
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and United States and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, but
have too much important work t o do.
Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o stay
out of c o n f l i c t . Have reason t o believe t h a t people i n
M i n i s t r y of Defense and other government e n t i t i e s are
preparing shipments of m i l i t a r y equipment t o Yugoslavia.
Should make sure Boris and Primakov understand t h a t i n t e l
sharing or m i l i t a r y cooperation w i t h Serbs would be a very b i g
mistake.
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden of inspecting humanitarian
shipments. Should help them however we can.
Also ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o get
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; already see some s h i f t s .
CLINTON LIBRARY DN
OOY
CP
�SECRET
2660
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
Want t o review where we are on Kosovo, my conversation w i t h
D'Alema, K o f i ' s statement, the m i l i t a r y campaign and the
humanitarian e f f o r t . Also l i k e t o have a word about I r a q .
D'Alema
Spoke t o him
yesterday.
Kofi's Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on Friday. His c o n d i t i o n s
are i d e n t i c a l to our c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o
the c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs of implementation f i r s t .
•
K o f i ' s statement gives NATO's stance t h a t much more
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y . I hope t h a t we can use h i s
statement t o help i n our e f f o r t t o get the Russians t o engage
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on the d i p l o m a t i c t r a c k .
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
c o u n t e r p a r t s on Monday i n Brussels. This i s important f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o s i g n a l NATO's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o stay the
course.
l.4d
I am also
making a p o i n t of c a l l i n g the leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s .
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
SECRET
Reason:
l.SAaU
—ss^XnmOU Jl B A Y P O O O Y
f& R R H T C P
�SECRET
Next Steps
•
We must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l t h a t t h e r e i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand t h a t General
Clark w i l l s h o r t l y be asking a l l o f us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o look a t t h i s very
carefully.
•
We a l s o need t o supplement our m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i t h
increased economic pressure on M i l o s e v i c and h i s war machine.
A n y t h i n g t h a t you can do t o b l o c k M i l o s e v i c ' s access t o
o f f s h o r e accounts, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Cyprus, would be most
i m p o r t a n t . We're encouraging neighboring c o u n t r i e s t o stop
o i l s u p p l i e s t o Serbia. This i s also a good moment f o r t h e EU
to take a serious look a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s sanctions regime.
Easter Pause [ i f asked]
•
[SACEUR i s l o o k i n g a t p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i r e c t i n g s t r i k e s away
from Belgrade and other urban areas on Saturday n i g h t , d u r i n g
the l a t e n i g h t r e s u r r e c t i o n mass.
• We don't t h i n k NATO needs t o announce t h i s i n advance. But we
c o u l d suggest t h a t the NATO spokesman describe t h i s r e s t r a i n t
at h i s press b r i e f i n g on Sunday.]
Help f o r the Refugees
•
Our estimates are t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars have been
d i s p l a c e d . The w o r l d i s now responding b u t we've got t o do
more.
•
Just formed a n a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l here t o r u n our
response t o the refugee c r i s i s . We are a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
s u p p l i e s i n t o the r e g i o n and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d . H i l l a r y went over Friday t o see t h e
departure o f some humanitarian r a t i o n s .
•
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e the pressure by moving some o f the refugees t o
temporary safe havens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
doing. Hope we can increase a i d t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the r e g i o n .
—
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�SECRET
Assistance for the Frontline States
•
Also need t o step up e f f o r t s to help other f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
•
Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . We'll need a
comprehensive plan f o r Kosovo and Yugoslavia — a r e s e t t l e m e n t
and recovery program.
Russia
•
Important we a l l stay engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t M i l o s e v i c
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and United States and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, but
have too much important work t o do.
© Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o stay
out of c o n f l i c t . |
iL4d
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden o f i n s p e c t i n g humanitarian
shipments. Should help them however we can.
Also ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o get
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine other NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; already see some s h i f t s .
m»m
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC
•
Want t o r e v i e w where we are on Kosovo; my c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
D'Alema; K o f i ' s statement, t h e m i l i t a r y campaign; t h e
h u m a n i t a r i a n e f f o r t ; and Russia.
D'Alema
•
Spoke t o him F r i d a y . He's d o i a g a g r e a t j o b n a v i g a t i n g a
d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n a t home and seems s o l i d l y b e h i n d
c o n t i n u e d a i r o p e r a t i o n s . No mention o f "pauses" o r
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s .
K o f i ' s Statement
•
Pleased by K o f i Annan's statement on F r i d a y . H i s c o n d i t i o n s
are i d e n t i c a l t o our c o n d i t i o n s . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t
he asks NATO t o suspend a i r s t r i k e s once M i l o s e v i c commits t o
t h e c o n d i t i o n s , whereas we would c e r t a i n l y want t o see some
c l e a r signs o f implementation f i r s t .
But K o f i ' s statement
g i v e s NATO's stance khat .much morp> i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y h>
and p r o v i d e s a good hook f o r the^Russians.
/>D£"
•
A l s o v e r y encouraged by G-8 p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t o r s statement
because t h e Russians signed on. Hope we can l o c k t h a t i n a t
the highest l e v e l s .
•
I hope t h a t we can use h i s statement t o h e l p i n our e f f o r t t o
get t h e Russians t o engage c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on t h e d i p l o m a t i c
track.
NATO M i n i s t e r i a l
•
Madeleine and Robin/Hubert w i l l be meeting w i t h t h e i r NATO
c o u n t e r p a r t s on Monday i n B r u s s e l s .
This i s i m p o r t a n t f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , t o s i g n a l NATO's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t a y t h e
course.
And second, t o make a l l t h e a l l i e s f e e l i n v o l v e d .
There i s some resentment among t h e s m a l l e r a l l i e s about t h e
r e g u l a r c o n t a c t s between t h e Contact Group a l l i e s .
The
m e e t i n g o f a l l 19 Foreign M i n i s t e r s should h e l p , and I am a l s o
making a p o i n t o f c a l l i n g t h e leaders from non-Contact Group
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are c o n t r i b u t i n g f o r c e s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
-TD o^r
(P S'+io^
0
�Next Steps
•
We must make M i l o s e v i c f e e l t h a t t h e r e i s no end i n s i g h t i f
he doesn't accept our c o n d i t i o n s . I understand t h a t General
C l a r k w i l l s h o r t l y be a s k i n g a l l o f us t o commit a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y resources, and we w i l l need t o l o o k a t t h i s v e r y
carefully.
We a l s o need t o supplement o u r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i t h
i n c r e a s e d economic pressure on M i l o s e v i c and h i s war machine.
We're encouraging n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s t o s t o p o i l s u p p l i e s
t o S e r b i a . This i s a l s o a good moment f o r t h e EU t o t a k e a
s e r i o u s l o o k a t t i g h t e n i n g i t s s a n c t i o n s regime.
E a s t e r Pause
t u r d a ^ n i V f h t , / d u r irTcrf**'"
-we
nnounco t h i s in-ttdvanutf.
rni.ilid ougge-st—Llldt.—the NATO spokesman d e o c r i b u L h i j i f c i b l i a T n t
at h i s press b r i e f i n g ow Ound^'. ]
L^NXV \M~fe=. •TV. t^,
Help f o r the Refugees
^Of^^pi
IN*'! rWirt^vovN'tViis
Our e s t i m a t e s a r e t h a t some 800,000 Kosovars a r e now
d i s p l a c e d . The w o r l d i s now responding b u t we've g o t t o do
more.
J u s t formed a n a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l here t o r u n our
response t o t h e refugee c r i s i s . We a r e a i r l i f t i n g r e l i e f
s u p p l i e s i n t o t h e r e g i o n and have j u s t added another
$50 m i l l i o n i n a i d .
The Macedonian government i s so overwhelmed t h a t we have t o
r e l i e v e t h e p r e s s u r e by moving some o f t h e refugees t o
temporary safehavens elsewhere. G r a t e f u l f o r what you're
d o i n g . Hope we can i n c r e a s e a i d t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
organizations i n the region.
Assistance
f o r the F r o n t l i n e
States
A l s o need t o step up e f f o r t s t o h e l p o t h e r f r o n t l i n e s t a t e s .
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
0
v
e r
�•
Need t o be t h i n k i n g about p o s t - c o n f l i c t e f f o r t s . W e ' l l need a
comprehensive p l a n f o r Kosovo and Y u g o s l a v i a — a r e s e t t l e m e n t
and r e c o v e r y program.
Russia
•
I m p o r t a n t we a l l s t a y engaged t o channel Russian i n i t i a t i v e s
i n p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . Have emphasized we can't l e t M i l o s e v i c
d r i v e a wedge between Russia and U n i t e d S t a t e s and almost a l l
of Europe. Recognize t h a t Kosovo i s d i f f i c u l t f o r them, b u t
have t o o much i m p o r t a n t work t o do.
•
Need t o encourage Russians t o uphold Y e l t s i n ' s pledge t o s t a y
out o f c o n f l i c t .
Have reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t people i n
M i n i s t r y o f Defense and o t h e r government e n t i t i e s a r e
p r e p a r i n g shipments o f m i l i t a r y equipment t o Y u g o s l a v i a .
Should make sure B o r i s and Primakov u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i n t e l
s h a r i n g o r m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Serbs would be a v e r y b i g
mistake.
•
Hungary and Romania c a r r y i n g burden o f i n s p e c t i n g
shipments. Should h e l p them however we can.
•
A l s o ask t h a t you encourage p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n agencies t o g e t
r e a l news i n t o Russia, Ukraine o t h e r NIS. USIA s t a r t e d
g e t t i n g TV feeds i n t h i s week; a l r e a d y see some s h i f t s .
humanitarian
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on communications between President Clinton and various world leaders regarding military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between October 1998 and April 1999. Material includes talking points and telcons with French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime MInister Tony Blair, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi.
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2009-1290-M
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Jacques Chirac
Kosovo
Serbia
Tony Blair
-
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/18bf9b5f9eac483fa8a09747393575b8.pdf
4f129ecb51079fee89f0120780fd3b63
PDF Text
Text
Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Sections 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) or Section 3.5(c) ofE.O. 13526
or (b)(6) of the FOIA.
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 2, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
. FROM:
BRUCE RIEDEL ~ 1\
JOSEPH MARTy0W1
SUBJECT:
P~S
Briefing Memo for
Call to Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
Attached at Tab I is the briefing memorandum for the President
.
.
for his Iphone call with Crown Prince Abdullah.
I
There is currently some confusion about what Cohen plans to. ask
of Abdullah. We had understood that both OSD and JCS wanted to
press hard for using strike aircraft based in the Kingdom for an
attack on Iraq. But the initial points we've seen from OSD
(Tab II~
ar to ask onl for use of
ort aircraft based
The President's talking points don't need to address this
question. But we need to have a clearer idea about what the
Pentagon wants be re Cohen gets on the ground in Riyadh.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Attachm~nts
Tab I
~emorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be made
Tab II ~ohen Points
.DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER 1.0.13516
-BECRE'!'
Reason:
1.5(b), (d) ,A..,_ ."
Declassify On:
11l!I2/08
!;[:~IN:ON LmRARY PHOTOCOPY
"..1
'.
..
. ,
"
ZDU".,'" \2..1.1..' r-
Il/io/l
'0
rr-'
�7367
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
DATE: November 3, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LEON FUERTH
I.
PURPOSE
Toiprepare Crown Prince Abdullah for Secretary Cohen's
vi~it, and to reinforce Cohen's message that Saudi Arabia
ne~ds to join us in a forceful response to the latest Iraqi
challenge.
,
I I . . BACKGROUND
The President last spoke to Abdullah October 25 after the
Wye Agreement was signed. When the President and Abdullah
spoke at the White House Septernber24, the President
pressed him to consider allowing us to use combat support
planes based in the Ki
if a strike was necessa
Iraq.
You returned to this issue in your one-on-one after lunch.
The Crown Prince agreed that existing arrangements first
agreed to between King Fahd and Secretary Perry and then
reaffirmed by the Crown Prince to Secretar Albri t would
,
remain in ef
Attachment
Tab A Points to be made
DECLASSIFIED IN PARI'
PER E.O. 13526
-s~c~.
Reason; 1.5(b), (d)
Declassify On: 11/~108>
rt.~~~~ON LmRARY PHOTOCOPY,.
.
.> : . : "
/
2() ()".. .
rt/,ob'O
121\ 1.-" tv
~~
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.
!
r'SgGR~i
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)
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
• We spoke just"a week ago about a very pleasant outcome:
the
Wye River Agreement between 'the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Despite some difficulties, I am pleased that this is still on
track.
• Now we are faced with a new challenge:
Iraq's decision to
further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
• I have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of
this challenge.
• He will convey my view that we must respond convincingly to
Iraq's latest actions.
• Iraq's decision to further restrict and inhibit the UN
inspectors is a clear violation of UN Security Council
resolutions, and also of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in
February.
• The Security Council has been clear and unequivocal in
rejecting Saddam's actions.
The
atement issued on Saturday
demonstrates that the Council is united.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Security Council.
Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council .
irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the
sanctions regime.
If he does, he will become an even greater
threat to his neighbors.
• Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from
Saddam Hussein too many times in the past.' I am determined to
take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
• I believe it is now imperative that we begin to take the
decisive action necessary to change the Baghdad regime.
It
will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in
earnest now.
• The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a
response to the current challenge and the necessary first step
in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
JO fj't" 12111.' ,..,....
(llr"/r~ (N
�2
• ·You told me last month in the Oval Office that you would
support mi tary action if diplomacy failed.
• You know well. how actively we pursued the diplomatic route
over the last three months since Saddam stopped cooperation
with the UN .
• We supported a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance,
but Iraq rejected a letter from the Council last week that
laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
• That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he
rej ected it.
• The Security Council has no further diplomatic tools
available.
• I know we can count on you to support this effort.
• If after meeting with him you wish to talk about these issues
more, I will be available.
-""'i:;'li:;:'~"'7:
.,
.. ..
.
'~UNT6N LIBRARY PHO~d.~dPY
- .!::~~-:-:~:... ':-'::"'::21,_,
..
.
�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CO~ERSATION WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABD~LLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
• We spoke just a week ago ab6ut a very pleasant outcome:
the
Wye River Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Despite some difficulties, I
pleased that this is still on
track.
am
• Now we are. faced with a new r:hallenge:. Iraq's decision to
further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
• I
have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of
this challenge.
.
• He
will convey my view that
Iraq's latest actions.
•
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of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in
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irect challenge to the Security Council.
response, \/1e risk making the Council
irrelevant and emboldening Sa·:Jdam to further challenge the
sanctions regime.
•
•
Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from
Saddam Hussein too many times in the past.
I am determined to
take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
•
I believe it is now imperati \/E; that we begin to take the'
decisive action necessary to'change the Baghdad regime.
It
will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in
earnest now.
•
The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a
response to the current challenge and the necessary first step
in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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• You
told me last month in the Oval Office that you would
support military action if diplomacy failed.·
41~ St.le£w.. ?~ CO(,l~ w ..1... ~Jt}
know well how actively ~pursued the diplomatic route
over the las~ three m o n t h s ; ! '
• You
.
• We supported a comprehensiv.e review of Iraq's compliance,
but Iraq rejected a letter- from the Council last week that
laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
•
• That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he
rej ected it.
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• If after meeting .with him you wish to talk about these issues
more, I will be available .
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7470
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 3, 1998
TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
DATE: November 4, 1998
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE~
I.
PURPOSE
To urge Chirac to accept the need for a firm and relatively
prompt response to Iraq's decision to further limit
UNSCOM's operations.
II.
BACKGROUND
While the French have pushed for a Comprehensive Review and
potential carrots" for Iraq,' our willingness to rely on
Council actions as well as Iraq's missteps have made it
more difficult for France to champion Iraq's cause. France
has joined the Council in denouncing Iraq's actions since
August, and has also spoken out against this most recent
Iraqi violation. While French diplomats have intervened
with Baghdad and pressed us to of
face-savings means for
Iraq, the French have also expressed great irritation with
Iraqi tactics, especially the recent decision to further
limit UNSCOM's operations.
Nonetheless,Chirac may well want to offer limited
incentives for the Iraqis to come back into compliance, and
will oppose use of force as a self-defeating exercise. He
will very likely feel a good deal less urgency about
responding than we do.
Attachment
Tab A Points to be made
-
SECf<ET'
Reason: 1.5 (d)
" ___ _
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1l/~~8~C
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~ .~!:-:--. ~\;::..~
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE
• Appreciate the clear, message your government has sent to Iraq
on UNSCOM.
Your, public statements, and decision to recall
your ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view
expressed by the Security Council last Saturday. Hope we can
formalize this by approving the UK draft resolution now before
the Council.
• The offer of a comprehensive review provided Saddam a real
chance to show that he intended to meet his obligations.
I
think we all agree that this affords hi~ a real opportunity to
move forward.
The only conclusion we can draw from the fact
Saddam rejected our proposal is that he wants to force the
Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and
missile programs.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Council. Without a
convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
• We have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many
times in the past.
I believe we are left with no alternative
except to respond with force to his challenge.
• Jacques, I want to stress that I believe we should act
expeditlously to respond to this challenge.
• We have been negotiating patiently since he suspended
cooperation in August. Unfortunately, Saddam has rejected all
reasonable proposals.
I f he can effect·i vely shut down UNSCOM
with impunity, there must be a.strong response or the
credibility of the Security Council will be shattered.
• I have called Tony Blair, who shares this view.
• I want us to be together on this -- defending·the integrity of
the Security Council's decisions.
• (If asked)
Can't you ,show more flexibility on paragraph 22
(concerning, lifting the oil'export sanctions if he complies
with UNSCOM)?
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O.13526
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• I think our offer on the comprehensive review, which you took
the lead on, offers Saddam a reasonable way forward. As long
as he has rejected it and is out of compliance, it would send
all the wrong signals for us to offer new concessions.
If
he's serious "about compliance, he ought to let UNSCOM do its
work.
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�POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CO~JERSATION WI~H
PRESIDENT CHIRACOF FRANCE
I.Z1
• Appreciate the clear me~sage your government has
UNSCOM. Your public statements, and decision to
ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view expresse
/1
the Security Council last Saturday.
•
The offer of a comprehensive review providdd Saddam ?;;eal
chance to show that· he wanted to meet his obligatio.l'is. ,The only
conclusion we can draw from the fact he rejected Q6r proposal is
that Saddam wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without
giving up his WMD and missile programs.
• Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Cci~ncil. Without a
convincing response, we risk making the
il irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to further challenge
•
•
We have faced these challenges from
times in the past. We should resol
challenge.
want to
to this
•
lIed Tony Blair who sh3res this
•
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us to be together QIA defending the integrity
rity Council's decisions.
'
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER 1.0.13526
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Reason: 1.5 (d)
..(
Declassify On: 11/0~ONLIBRARYPHbTbtOPY
:
�T
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
EPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE
dedision to restrict UN inspectors' activiXL~s once
again places Iraq in direct violation of i~s oblig~tions to
the international c o m m u n i t y .
• Baghdad's
,/
• Iraq's
further rest.riction of the UN , inspecto.:;.l violates UN
I.
Security Council resolutions and also the MO~ that Iraq signed
,
".
with Annan in February.
/
• It is clear now that Saddam really want~r~6 force the Council
to lift sanctions without giving up h~s<WMD and missi
programs.
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actions.
Council is
• The Security
Saturday's Council statement
united.
• Iraq's action is a direct ,challenge to the!Council. Without a
convincing response, we ~{sk making the Council irrelevant and
emboldening Saddam to f~rther challenge the sanctions regime.
/'
I
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• We have faced these qMallenges from Saddam:Hussein too many
am determined to take decisive action
times in the past.
to his challenge.
this time to resp
• Jacques, I want
responding to t
•
We want to
stress the sense of urgency I feel about
challenge.
position tc use force if necessary as soon
not want another big buildup which allows
ck down at the last minute .
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/C'"
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�7552
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with President Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
.French President Jacques Chirac
Notetakers: George Chastain, Frank
Jarosinski, Jenny McGee', Jim Smith
I
November 4, 1998,
Oval Office
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
The President:
Jacques?
President Chirac:
glad in France
Congratulations.
The President:
3:08 p.m. - 3:31 p.m.
i
.'
(U)
Bill? Ah, Bill, congratulations. We are so
the historic success that you had yesterday.
(U)
Thank you.
(U)
President Chirac:
llary,· and the Uni
posi ti ve.
(U)
cannot imagine how
states. The
The President:
~lad
(U)
Good.
President Chirac:
It was a great feat.
a very long time.
(U)
President:
we are for you,
press is extremely
This hasn't been done
That's right, it's been a long time.
(U)
President Chirac: That is justice, and I want to tell you
the bottom of my heart. Congratulations and please say the same
to
llary; I'd like to congratUlate you also, as I wrote to
you in the letter, for
Wye River agreement. We were very
gl
for your personaL success in Wy~.
(U):
The President: Thank you, Jacques, we're
hard, all of us.
(U)
conFI I:'1.I!:Itf'f mL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
~oing
to have to work
I
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13516
J O() '1-"
lI!\;4/f O
(2'\ 2... ,.,..
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President Chirac:
I'm going to use a translator now, since my
English is not very good.
(U)
The President: Your English is wonderful.
go to a dinner, 'so I' 11 be brief.' (U)
President Chirac:
No problem.
I kn9w you have to
(U)
The President:
I appreciate the clear message your government
has sent to Iraq about UNSCOM ~- the public statement, the
decision to recall your ambassador -- they helped to underscore
the unanimous view of the Security Council.
The offer of a
comprehensive review, which you took. the lead on, gave Saddam a
chance to show he intended to meet his obligations.
It would
have afforded him a real opportunity to move forward, and I can
only conclude he wants to force the Council .to lift sanctions
without giving up his WMD and missile programs. We have been
negotiating patiently with Saddam since he suspended cooperation
in August.
I believe we now have to act prbmptly to respond to
this challenge, because if he can shut down 'UNSCOM with
impunity, there must be a strong response, or the credibility of
the Security Council will be damaged.
I knOw you've talked to
Tony Blair about this, and I hope we can formalize the approval
of the UK draft resolution that is now before the Security
Council. And I also think we have to be prepared to use force,
and we have to be together on it. ,..K'J
President Chirac: Yes, but Bill, first of all I want to say the
UK proposal is a very good one. We concur ~ithit, and I think
we will be able to reach agreement for unanimous adoption.
,
Secondly, I'd like to share with you my anal~ysis of Saddam's
behavior. Naturally, some of this is just ~rovocation; he. can't
resist that, and it's naturally directed at the American
President and the Security Council. But the re~l problem is
elsewhere. At the present time, the situation with the Iraqi
people is deteriorating, so far as Saddam is concerned; in other
words, he is beginning to be criticized.
The. people are
suffering more and more in a material sense, and they're
beginning to blame Saddam. The way Saddam thinks is the best
way to regain control of the people is to pretend to be a
martyr. And in the same way, insofar as Arab public opinion is
concerned, he doesn't seem to be supported anymore.
So as I see
it then, what he's trying to do is play the-martyrdom card.
What he's thinking is that if there is a mil~tary strike against
him, he'll regain control of those people and public opinion in
the Arab world.
Furthermore, he hasn't yet sent away the
UNSCOM teams. And if there is a military strike, naturally,
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they would all be expelled and he'll be able: to go about his
business as calmly as he likes. ' So it's clear that we find
ourselves in a rather peculiar position. We: have nothing to
give, nothing to offer. We can't change anything in our
position, which must be a position of great firmness. And this
time we are unanimous, including the Russians and the Chinese.
So there's nothing to negotiate. At the sam~ time, it is in
Saddam's interest to be the victim of a military strike. Which
is why this time the problem is going to be very hard to
resolve. We sent a two-fold message: first: we recalled our
ambassador, which is a very strong message .. We do it rarely,
and we haven't done it here before. Second,: we communicated
through Tariq Aziz the risk of military action was clear, and
that the world was unanimous with respect to sanctions. But in
truth I'm afraid we are working here with an, unarmed gun. I
think it's in his own interest to be bombed.: ,.;.e1
The President: How is he better off? You think even though it
wouldn't help him get the sanctions lifted, ~he people would in
their adversity be more supportive of him? ~
President Chirac:
attitude.
!J21
Yes, naturally, of course.
That explains his
The President: But, on the other hand, that puts us in the
position of saying there's no action he can't justify in
defiance of the Security Council. It is a difficult problem.
)f21
President Chirac: Well, I share that view completely. I'm
saying indeed it's a difficult situation. He wants two things
today: he wants to regain control of his own people, and look
like a martyr in the eyes of Arab public op~nion. And secondly,
he wants to get rid of UNSCOM once and for all, and the lAEA,
and he wants to be able to go about his business as he pleases.
And that's why we're in somewhat of a trap here. We have
nothing to offer. You know that I've alwa
lifting the sanctions.
Saddam has taken, we can't give him anything
,all.
want to send Tomahawks, with all the danger 'and
represent.
The President: It seems to me that if his people see the world
is united when we act, they will see him isolated. It would not
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help him with his people; it only helps if his strategy is to
divide people.
~
ident Chirac: Well, we are not, of course, divided.
Perhaps in the past there might have been divisions, but today
we are not divided.
I am completely certain that public opinion
would support him. They'd rally around, and that's why he's
doing what he's done. Because otherwise, the initiative he's
taken would be stupid~ He's a man who doesn't know anything
about the outside world, but he krlows his'own country very well.
)J21
The President: But we still are back to the main question.
What happens to countries when they pledge to complete an
inspection regime and don't do it? I' mean, he was very close to
being certified in the atomic ar~a .. Why did he do it, because
he thought the sanctions would never be lifted, or not soon
enough, or'perhaps he actually does have some WMD capability?
yr
President Chirac: His incomprehensible and really stupefying
actions can only be explained with regard to the internal
situation in Iraq.
In. any case what's cl~ar is there is nothing
more we can give. We should give full.powers to Kofi Annan and
adopt the UK draft in the Security Council unanimously. We
should-then authorize Kofi Annan to make one last demarche to
attempt to get Saddam to reverse what he's done.
I think that
then we have to wait and see what Saddam's reaction will be, but
I fear very much there won't be any change. What he wants is to
regain his influence over his own people, to regain control, and
go about rearming. ~
The President: Well, I think that you have a good grasp of
this.
I wonder if it would be helpful if Sandy Berger would
come over this weekend and discuss it with Levitte. ~
President Chirac: Bill, I thi~k the plan is for Sandy Berger to
come with John Holmes, the advisor to Tony Blair, and the three
of them will be able to discuss together.
This is already the
plan.
)JZJ
The President:
That's good. All right, we'll stay in close
touch, and we may have to talk again early in the week. ~
President Chirac:. Well, yes, I'm at your entire dispbsal as far
as that is concerned, and.:r wanttb tell you in France how very
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glad we are for your great success, and tell
we are. And bravo for Wye Plantation.
(U)
Hill~ry
how happy
The President:
Thank you, Jacques, I really appreciate the kind
words you have said to others, as well, about what happened at
the Wye Plantation.
If we can get the process kicked off and
the final status talks started, then we should be working with
the EU as well, to build up the economy of the Palestinians, so
they will have every opportunity to keep it going.
(U)
President Chirac:
The President:
(U)
I agree.
(U)
Thank you, Jacques. Goodbye, have a good dinner.
President Chirac:
the phone.
(U)
The President:
'i;es,
Thank you, Bill.
Okay, goodbye.
President Chirac:
Goodbye.
I'll talk to you soon on
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation
-bQHFI BEnT IJ.\.L
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PREC:
IMMEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT:
MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
1.
AM~ASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2.
BEGIN TEXT.
YOUR HIGHNESS:
I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP THANKS FOR THE WARM RECEPTION AND
VALUABLE SUPPORT YOU PROVIDED TO SECRETARY COHEN DURING HIS
RECENT VISIT TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.
I AM HEARTENED
BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE STAND TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING THE
CONTINUED THREAT POSED TO THE REGION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR. THROUGH OUR JOINT EFFORTS, I AM CONFIDENT
THAT WE WILL OVERCOME THIS AND OTHER CHALLENGES IN THE REGION
AND PEACE WILL TRIUMPH.
I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS OF CONGRATULATION, EXPRESSED BY
PRINCE BANDAR, OVER THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS.
I
TAKE THIS AS A STRONG SIGN THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE PLACE THE
IMPORTANCE OF OUR EFFORTS TO FURTHER PEACE AND PROSPERITY
WORLDWIDE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA.
SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
END TEXT
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2~; 'lq~r-
ll/I;D/r-o
~
�NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C, 20504
November 6, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
8",
THROUGH:
BRUCE RIEDEL
FROM:
GWENYTH TODD (i\
SUBJECT:
Message to Crown Prince Abdullah
Attached at Tab I is a short message from the President to Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah thanking him for his continued support.
Crown Prince Abdullah met with
We would like to see this go out today if at all possible.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize transmittal of the cable at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Cable to Crown Prince 'Abdullah
.. c mlFI BElM'f EttL
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED IN PARr
PER 1.0. 13526
1.Ol't - Ivt 1..- "'"
U/1fJ/J 1» 1M
�Weiss, Andrew S.
From:
Subject:
WHSR
Saturday. November 14,19984:55 AM
Weiss•. Andrew S.
*"* NO SUBJECT FOUND *'**
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
WHITE HOUSE
FLASH
1072
981114010414 M3557719
Sent:
To:
• a eRE :r
QQQQ
,
VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
\
MOscow FOR THE AMBASSADOR·
AMBASSADOR: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
CI_INTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IMMEDIATELY. ALSO, A COpy CAN BE
PASSED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS,
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER ABOUT IRAQ AND AM REPLYING
PROMPTLY BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND ALSO
BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO OUR PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIP.
YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE AGREE ON A CRUCIAL POINT:
SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS CREATED THIS CRISIS. HE HAS HAD IT WITHIN
HIS POWER TO END IT PEACEFULLY. HE COULD DO SO BY RESCINDING
HIS DECISION TO CEASE COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.
I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS, INCLUDING IN YOUR OWN LATEST LETTER
TO HIM, TO PERSUADE HIM TO TAKE WHAT WE BOTH SEE AS THE
NECESSARY STEPS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS, YET AGAIN. REFUSED TO
DO SO. HE IS PLAYING FOR TIME. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS
.
OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN HIS PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND
ULTIMATELY TO DEPLOY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. SUCH AN
OUTCOME WOULD CONSTITUTE A DIRE THREAT TO PEACE. AFTER MUCH
CAREFUL THOUGHT. I ALSO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT HE WILL BE
MORE LIKELY TO ATTAIN HIS AMBITION IF WE DO NOT ANSWER HIM
DECISIVELY.
I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD, BORIS; ABOUT THE RISKS THAT
ATTEND THE USE OF FORCE. YOUR OWN COUNSEL WEIGHS HEAVILY
WITH ME. BUT SO DOES THE PROSPECT OF SADDAM'S SUCCEEDING IN
HIS CAMPAIGN TO FLOUT INTERNATIONAL WILL AND TO DIVIDE THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. IN SO DOING, HE SEEKS ALSO TO DIVIDE THE U.S.
AND RUSSIA.
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE VENTURES TO WHICH YOU AND I
HAVE DEVOTED SO MUCH OF OUR OWN ENERGY. I WILL ENDEAVOR, AS I
HAVE FOR THE LAST SIX YEARS, TO SUSTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE
WORK YOU AND I HAVE DONE TOGETHER. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOU
TO DO THE SAME. OUR ACHIEVEMENTS ARE TOO VALUABLE. AS IS .
THEIR PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE, FOR US TO LET SADDAM PUT THEM AT
RISK. I HOPE IN THE DAYS, WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. WE CAN
CONTINUE TO MAKE COMMON CAUSfi.VlttCEREVVE AGREE AND TO .
nf'cLINTON LffiRMtY PHOTOCOPY
~--A
,_::. J
',.
~,
• . ,'
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PERLO.13516
2.4 0,\'"
nf,ol~
(Zltt:" ""
f-':I
�MANAGE WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE HAVE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
DECL: X1, X4
#1072
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�7859
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Letter from Russian President Yeltsin on Iraq
Purpose
Respond to a November 17 letter from Russian President Boris
Yeltsin on the Iraqi cris
Background
President Vel in's letter applauded recent developments in the
showdown with Iraq. Yeltsin emphasized the importance of not
resorting to the use of force, preserving UNSCOM's ability to
fulfill its duties, and avoiding a split within the UN Security
Council. The letter stressed the importance of full Iraqi
compliance with its UNSC obligations and rehearsed familiar,
Russian positions about the comprehensive review, possible
closure of files, and potential shift to long-term monitoring.
Your response underscores the need to press Saddam to comply
fully with Iraq's obligations under all relevant Security
Council resolutions. You ask Yeltsin to send a clear message to
Saddam about the importance of full disclosure (including
UNSCOM's request for documentation) and full compliance and the
consequences if he does not.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
DECLASSIFIED
PERE:O.13526
Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
2.l)Opt; 12Jq 1.... (Y
H/'b / VtJ
~I
~PI ri~tU IAL
Reason:
1. 5 (d)
11 ~gffd:~P~~'
Declassify On:
'~
- .- . .. .'. ' ,
ijfu:LINtON LiBRARY PHOTOCOP~. ;
- ,.::~,~~~~~:~~~~~
~,;~-=:4.\:.'.,.',,; ...; __ ~ •.
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�...
IMMEDIATE
,
-eONFIDENTIAiWHITE HOUSIE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COMMCOSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE
STEINBERG SUTPHEN
SIT: BLACK BOLAN COQ MARTY PASCUAL RIEDEL SUM2 TODD WEISS
SIT: NODIS
-
S~T
._----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
,
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> eOHFIDEM'I'!"AL
<DTG> 242027Z NOV 98,
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
C 0 l'I i1ii' T D }:!; ~I T I Jr~
NODIS
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COpy MAY ALSO
BE PROVIDED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVlpED.
, BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2
RHEHAAAl172 -e- 0 H P
~
!)
E "N 'r I A"""t,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI
CRISIS. THE INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON IRAQI:
COMPLIANCE AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE PRODUCED OUR
PREFERRED RESULT:
IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND OCTOBER
DECISIONS, AND COMMITTED IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH
UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS AND TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN TO WORK
WITHOUT CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS. '
WE MUST NOW CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS 'ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ALL OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS.
TOO MANY TIMES BEFORE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE
COMMITMENTS WHEN THREATENED BY FORCE ONLY TO TURN AROUND
AND VIOLATE THEM.
THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SADDAM'S
INTENTIONS. THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY
UNFETTERED, UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR UNSCOM AND IAEA.
IRAQ
MUST PROVIDE UNSCOM AND THE IAEA WITH ALL RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE UNSCRS. BAGHDAD'S RESPONSE SO
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20i"-.. .
1/ I Ir
(l)
IL~ 1:' ~
'7)
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•
, '[~JtMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAl::
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
PAGE 3 RHEHAAAl172 -e 0 'N F IDE N 'I' I A L"
FAR IN THAT AREA IS FAR FROM ADEQUATE AND RAISES QUESTIONS
ABOUT BAGHDAD'S COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE FULLY. THAT IS WHY
I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO
JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE.
KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES
FULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALS0
REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN
KUALA LUMPUR.
IRAQ MUST 'ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSCOM
ACT,IVITY TO UNCOVER AND TO THWART ITS ABILITY TO PRODUCE OR
DELIVER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
..
..
~
YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR
COMMUNICATIONS WITH SADDAM.
I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A
CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE
INCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS UNSCOM HAS ASKED FOR AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM
LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACT
IF SADDAM ONCE AGAIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCOM'S ABILITY TO
OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL REQUESTED INFORMATION
NEEDED BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.
,
.....
PAGE 4 ' RHEHAAAl172 C e N r I D B 'N ';P I Ii L
NONE OF US WANTS TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN
THE FUTURE.
FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR
UNSCOM, IAEA, AND THESE ORGANIZATIONS' LEADERSHIP AND
PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR
OBJECTIVES. ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL
DETERMINE WHETHER THIS SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR
WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE.
I
HOPE THAT YOU WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS
MESSAGE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
<ASECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<ASSN>1172
<MSGID> M3573073
,
�7859'
REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 23, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
BRUCE
CARLOS
RIEDEL~~
PASCUA~
FROM:
GWENYTH TODD~~f
ANDREW WEISSI!(M
SUBJECT:
Message to President Yelts
on Iraq
The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to
Russian President Boris Yelts 's'November 17 letter on the
Iraqi crisis. At your suggestion, the revi
message takes
into account recent Iraqi de ance on UNSCOM's document request.
Despite President Yeltsin's hospitalization, we still believe it
would be useful to send
message, which in any event will be
double-tracked to Prime Minister Primakov.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
'Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
~mIFI BEM'f IAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O.13526 '
Z~. . '2~l""~
'Y tlO I
Y/)
"".
�IM:MEDIATE
FROM:
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO:
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECSTATE WASHDC
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM:
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL
WILL BE PROVIDED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI
CRISIS.
THE UNANIMOUS INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
ON IRAQI COMPLIAlfCE BACKED BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE
~DUCED~ PREFERRED RESULT:
IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND
OCTOBER DECISIONS, AND COM:MITTE~ IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY
WITH UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS AND '1':) ALLOW !fHEIR RE'i'URN 'i'O' W0RK
W,J.~ C0(f3IONS OR RESTRICTION'S.
WE MUST Ni CONCERT OUR EFFORTS:~O ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS ITS
OBLIGATION . TOO MANY TIMES BEFOEE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE
COM:MITMEN S WHEN THREATENED BY Fr)RCE ONLY TO VIOLATE THEM LATER.
THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A:8.EAL TEST OF SADDAM'S
INTENTION'S.
THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY r l>vLL
lJl:JEETTERED, lThLCO~m±.!I;IOMl\L ACCESS FOR TTM~COH AND IAEA. THAT IS
(.(."",/(.. hV
WHY I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO. krVO
JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE. KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES
c..,.. wfVM.lFULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO
REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN KUALA
LUMPUR.
IRAQ MUST ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSC0M ACTIVITY AND
MEET ITS 02JECTI~TO DISCLOSE FlJLLY ITS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROG~ Ob/'F
.
YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR COM:MUNICATIONS
WITH SADDAM.
I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE
IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE AND FULL COMPLIANCE AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM
LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS
PREPARED TO ACT IF SADDAM ONCE fl~(;AIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCO~' S
<~¥,~,-r.
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2~~~- IL'Il-t
lt~/tA
jW
�2
ABILITY TO OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL INFORMATION NEEDED
BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.
NONE OF US WANT TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN THE
FUTURE. FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR UNSCOM,
IAEA,. AND THESE" ORGANIZATIONS' IJEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL
INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. '
ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THIS
SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO
ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK
TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS MESSAGE.
SINCERELY,
BILL
END TEXT
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TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
IAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
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Sustaining the Relationship
• Know recent events in Ir~q strained our partnership.
your message through Foreign Minister Ivanov.
.
Rebeived
~
• Share unique responsibility for ensuring that the,United
States and Russia enter next century as partners. Need to
stay in close touch to sustain relationship.
-0
~
0)
(
~
Agenda for 1999
•
Important to get our teams engaged by setting meaningful
agenda for coming year:
helping Russian economy recover,
stemming proliferation, and strengthening arms control via
START II and START III;
Lfu
Important meeting between Al and Yevgeniy set for March. Need
to build toward that. Also sending Madeleine to Moscow at end
of January, and Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore-DYOO
zhuh) .
~
• Essential for you and me to give our teams tight tone,
direction, and momentum.
Economics
• Want to support economic reform program that promotes
stability and growth. Strobe discussed with Primakov.
• Still much to do. ·Next step is for Primakov's team to engage
intensively in coming days with IMF, especially on budget.
• International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform
program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound
bank restructuring efforts.
• Durable reform program can open door to resumed cooperation
with IMF, which is critical foi help on restructuring Russia's
external debt.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
--G01?JF1 DEW!' 1M
Reason:
1.5
Declassify on:
·DECLASSIFIED .
PER E.O. 13526
2-c1O'l-
11.~Z""''-
\1/1'0/17:>
""
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2
• Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of
international community. Didn't take this decision lightly.
Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
• Problem remains Saddam's repeated failure to comply'with UNSC
obligations. He betrayed promises to you and international
community.
• Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or
Butler.
Important to find a way forward in New York to get
Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
• But can't lo~er standard by accepting an inspection regime
that is not professional and qualified.
• Can't reward Saddam for his be'havior.
Sanctions won't be
lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.
~~ Troubled
by Iraqi belligerence toward coalition aircra
enforcing no-fly zones.
Iraqis should understand that
continued challenges could lead to serious confrontation.
• Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia
relationship. We have too much crucial work to do.
If Yeltsin says Butler abused his authority and should be
replaced:
• Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own
and based on unambiguous facts.
• He discussed findings with broad range of Council members,
including Russia.
Problem is not with Butler.
If Yeltsin complains that U.S. failed to consult in advance or
seek a political solution to crisis:
• Made clear in November that we'd give Saddam one last chance
to cooperate. Gave him every, benefit of the doubt, but we
left no doubt that we'd act if he
led this test.
PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING
COHFIDEN'f IAL"
�-eOlfFI OEM! lAb-
8524
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: Decerr,ber 28, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
I.
PURPOSE
To call Yeltsin and set a frame rk for bilateral contacts
that will get the relationslnp on tr,ack after the Iraq
crisis.
II.
BACKGROUND
,.'
Russia,en
instructed
the U. S.'
that he,
differen
letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we
come between the United States and
red a positive response. Yeltsin reportedly
gn Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine that
tionship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and
is committed to working through our
we can gauge, Yeltsin health appears to have
zed, which means that he can work a _few hours a day.
ct that he will stick to general principles on the
ionship and Iraq, but anything may be possible. He
d call for Butler to be fired or complain about not
consulted prior to the bombings. Our suggestion is
keep him focused on first principles and get him to give
al guidance to Primakov and his staff: the U.S.
Russia relationship matters, Russia needs to pursue a
course of integration, and Russia needs to manage its
.cOWFI BEtt! 1m
Reason: 1.5b,d
,
,
Declassify On: 12/£'3'708"
(;[:::~ON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
,
'<'\.,
DECLASSIFIED 1N PART
PER F...O. 13526
~~ \24J1-r
ul"'It>
(\1'4
�2
//
foreign affairs and economy in a way that supports such
integration, and not its isclation from the internat/fonal
community.
/
The most practical outcome from the call would e to get
Yeltsin to" reaffirm the importance of a solid schedule of
early 1999 meetings that would tackle the t
gh issues
before us:
economics, nonp!~oliferation an arms control.
The key meeting to highlight is the Gore- rimakov session
in lat~ March. Madeleine will see Ivan v in late January.
I plan to invite my new counterpart,
kolay Bordyuzha, for
a visit in February. We will also w k on Cohen and
Richardson seeing their counterpart .
While we cannot count on Yeltsin 0 deliver on
ecific
commitments, it appears he can· ill set a tone for his
government. The more const:;~-uc i ve his guidance, the better
the chance it will reverber~t through the bureaucracy.
III. PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
SEQUENCE
We will initiate
call. You should start by affirming
the importance of
e relationship and let Yeltsin respond.
You can close by sking Yeltsin to give. guidance to his
team to work wit us to develop a strong and sUbstantive
calendar for 19 9.
Attachment
Tab A
Points t
\
eOUFIDEtffIAL
be 'Made
�,'-C9UF'IDEN'NAL
8524
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 24, 1998
PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN
DATE: December 28, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGE~
I.
PURPOSE
To call Yeltsin and set a framework for bilateral contacts
that will get the relationship on ttack after the Iraq
crisis.
II.
BACKGROUND
Your December 18 letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we
cannot let Saddam come between the United States and
Russia, engendered a _positive response. Yeltsin reportedly
instructed Foreign Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine 'that
the U.S. relationship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and
that he, too, is committed to working through our
differences.
As best we can gauge, Yeltsin' health appears to have
stabilized, which means that he Gan work a few hours a day.
We expect that he will stick to general principles on the
relationship and Iraq; but anything may be possible. He
could call for Butler to be fired or complain about not
being consulted prior to the bombings. Our suggestion is
to keep him" focused on first principles and get him to' give
general guidance to Primakov and his staff: the U.S.
Russia relationship matters, Russia needs to pursue a
course of integration, and Russia needs to manage'its
foreign affairs and economy in a way that supports such
integration, and not its isolation from the international
community.
The most practical outcome from the call would be to get
Yeltsin to reaffirm the importance of'a solid schedule of
early 1999 meetings that ,would tackle the tough issues
GONF!IDBtlTlAL..
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 12/23/08
DECLASSIFIED '
PER E.O. 13526
1JIY\- 12" l~l!~tl ~
(W
r-
�2
before us: economics, nonproliferation and arms control.
The key meeting to highlight is the Gore-Primakov session
in late March. Madeleine will see Ivanov in late January.
I plan to 'invite my new counterpart, Nikolay Bordyuzha, for
a visit in February. We will also work on Cohen and
Richardson seeing their counterparts.
While we cannot count on Yeltsin to deliver on specific
commitments, it appears he can still set a tone for his,
government. The more constructive his guidance, the better
the chance it will reverberate through the bureaucracy.
III. PARTICIPANTS
TBD
IV.
SEQUENCE
We will initiate the call. You should start by affirming
the importance of the relationship and let Yeltsin respond.
You can close by asking Yeltsin to give guidance to his
team to work with us to develop a strong and substantive
calendar for 1999.
Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made
GONFIDEN'tJAL.
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
Sustaining the Relationship)C
•
recent events in
message through
'?/~"
~strained
our partnership.
Received
agree:
cLitiCElllY'
;a;od T fJllly
p~.cL ~
~~S&··
• Share unique responsibility for e,rsuring that(~>V- and Russia
enter next century as partners. /iEmpoI tant \.Je '--s-fay in roqular:
touch to ~ susta
relationship. tHrough challonqing
rperiods .
Agenda for 1999.(1
(
~
• Important
our earns engaged for coming year: .~ould
~t
eaningful agend~contQLed on three *eY' issue&-== getting
Russian economy back on track, stemming proliferation, and
strengthening etlt legacy ~n arms control via START II and
START III.
~d
• Important meetr' between Ai and Yevgeniy, set for March.
g
Need
to build towar that. -f-L-m. )hso sending. Madeleine to Moscow at
end of January
Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore
DYOO-zhuh~ to initiate a dialogue.
Economics)ll
• Want to support .a RU66iaB economic reform program that
promotes stability and growth. ~ent high level tOam led bY'
Strobe .t.e- discusgec!'E-fr.a.t;. wi th Primakov.
• :ream came back 'dith better elonso of your plano i but thin-ks
- UIere' s;~till much to do.
Next step is for Primakov's team to
engage intensively
coming days with IMF, especially on
budget.
• International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform
program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound
bank restructuring efforts.
COHFIDBl?iTIA~
Reason:
1.5b,
Declassify on:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
~
til",' to
�2
• ~at coming yea.r poses real cbaJ]eng@s.
Critical to have
~rable reform program ~n pla~e.
~hfrt can open door to
resumed cooperation with IMF, which is critical
help on
restructuring Russia's external debt.
• Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of
international community.
Didn't ta~e this decision lightly.
,Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
lure to comply
• '~rpioblem remains Saddamis repeated
with UNSC obligations.
He betrayed promises to you and
international community.
• Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or
Butler.
Important to find a way forward in New York to ,get
Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
~
s~~"d{
can't ~e B~ lower~ the bar for Ira.qi per~rmsnce
~a~ accepting an inspection regime that is not professional
and qualified.
• But
• Can't reward Saddam
his behavior.
Sanctions won't be
lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.
• Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia
'relationship. We have too much crucial work to do.
Too ffiuch
~s at stake.
If
Yel tS..//,'
i.?)says Butler abused his authori ty and should be
replaced, :
.
,-",'
• Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own
and based on unambiguous facts.
• He discussed findings with broad range of Council members,
incl uding Russia.
Problem is not with Butler,p ·bJ1t ~r
SiloGdsm'8 ptltteLlI of behavior.
tv
If Yel tsin complains tha t U.S. LaiJ~ to consul t in advance or
seek a political solution to cri
• Made clear in November that we'd giveSaddam one last chance
to cooperate.
Gave him every benefit of the doubt, but we
left no doubt that we'd act if he failed this test .
..gOHFI DB~+'1" IAL
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GONF;J;DEH'fI:Pd;,..
/~
."
• Ha9// "prrserve. ,91j"e~at' onal s,.~curit. in a3'y~of. airstrikes
~,d'
t9" protect our/servlce. en ',../'·Also, d d9/want to~ ve S.addam
ohance to dis'perse his ~orces and eq lpment.
I
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�8436
-rHE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
NOTE TAKERS:
Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David
Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 15, 1998 -- 1:00p.m. - 1:15p.m. EDT
Oval Office
The President: Hello? Your Royal Highness, .thank you for
taking the call.
I wanted to call you to tell you that I have
decided to take action against Iraq .very soon.
I have spoken
with Prime Minister Blair, and the British will participate.
I
know that you would prefer a peaceful solution, as would I, but
it is clear that this is not possible at this time.
On November 14, I called off a military strike to try one more
time to find a peaceful solution.
The strong statement by the
Damascus Declaration of States, placing responsibili
solely on
Iraq, helped us to avoid a confli
Then Iraq committed to
provide full and unconditional cooperation as provided by UNSC
resolutions.
Since that time, Baghdad has repeatedly violat
that commitment and consistently refused to provide documents
and information, barred access and harassed inspectors, lied
repeatedly and destroyed documents.
I hope you will agree that we can't continue this cycle.
Our
strike will be significant, with the stated aim to degrade his
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and to degrade
his ability to threaten his neighbors, and it will weaken his
regime and thus further our long-term goal of ~hanging the
leadership in Baghdad.
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We will not need to use
I have ordered.
eneral Z
i and our military will be in touch with your
ary for a detailed briefing soon. This has been a
difficult decision for me.
If I thought diplomacy could get
Saddam to comply with the inspections and keep his commitments,
I would not have ordered this
ike. But the record has shown
that he will not voluntarily give up his weapons of mass
destruction. The support of Saudi Arabia and·the GCC are
critical. The statement at the GCC summit made clear that Iraq
is responsible for the consequences of its own decisions.
I
hope you will communicate to your GCC partners your support of
our action. .Over the next few days, I will be following
developments very closely, and our people will be in close touch
with yours.
Crown Prince. Abdullah:
The President:
That's fine, and thank you.
Thank you very much, Your Royal Highness.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
Thank you, Mr. President, and I hope
that God will bring whatever is good for the world. and for the
people of the Middle East, especially.
The President:
Thank you very much.
Crown Prince Abdullah: Can you give me, Mr. President, how many
days, what is the time required for what you just said?
The President: We will start now and we expect to finish in a
couple of days, before Ramadan. We think it's very important
that we finish before Ramadan, which is why time is so short.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
Mr. President.
I hope everything will be to the best,
The President:
I hope so, too.
I wish there were another
alternat
but I don't believe there is.
Crown Prince Abdullah:
The President:
This is understood.
Well, thank you very much.
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Crown Prince Abdull
Thank you, thank you, Mr. President, and
I wi
you success in your endeavor always.
The President:
Thank you.
Goodbye, sir.
- End of Convers
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�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE.
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The p,resident
Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 -- 12:02 p.m.
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
(Ui
Bill, how are you?
Prime Minister
The President:
12:06 p.m. EST
I'm fine.
Prime Minister Ne
(U)
(U)
HOw's it going?
(U)
The President:
Fine.
I wanted to check in. We have some
damage assessment that shows good results,
1 of our pilots
have come back so far, but ~e have more flights today and
British pilots will be up there.
So far there are very low
civilian casualties.
They say not, but that is our information,
that they're quite low. We're doing all we can to support you;
beyond the extra Patriot batteries, we'll be standing by to
support you if Saddam starts making threatening statements.
Interestingly enough, the Gulf count es and Egypt are giving us
all the cooperation we asked for. Mubarak made a pretty strong
statement. My intelligence of cer, George Tenet, was in today
and said that so far all the military activity has been
completely defensive in nature. ~
Prime Minister Net
: Do you-have any indication of
acti vi ty' in western Iraq? ~
The President: No. All the military activity so far has been
defensive. You know, the first thing we try to take out is
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their integrated communications and air defense systems. So we
haven't, and obviously if we do, we'll tell you as soon as we
can.
y
Prime Minister Netanyahu: Good. You know you have our support.
We're keeping a~low-pro Ie, saying that we're not a part of
this conflict, but we reserve the right to self-defense if they
try to involve us. We prefer to stay out, but you enjoy .out
full support.~
.
The President:
They're equating you and Butler? ~
Yes, I'm Butler now. ~
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
The President:
I like Butler.
Prime Minister Netanyahu: You have your friends who are always
your friends and will stand by the United States. Always.
I
don't make a big issue now of our support in consideration of
your needs, but let me know if I can help and I will be happy to
do it. )9f
The President:
I will. We'll watch over the next day or two.
I'll call back if I need to, and if you need to, call me. ~
Prime Minister Netanyahu: What do you think - let me not ask
you that. We'll follow
as we go, and if ~ere's anything you
want to pass through special channels -- ~.
The President:
I'll do it.
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
wish you the best.
(U)
The President:
(U)
Things here are pretty calm and we
Thank you so much.
......::::.,
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Prime Minister Ne
up on our conversation?
President:
Did you ever have a chance to follow
~
I did, and I did what I could.
.A'
...
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
Okay.
(U)
The President: I did what I could. I foll
up and I did
what I could. I'll have another conversation in a day or two.
~
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
The President:
Goodbye.
Prime Minister Netanyahu:
That's it.
Thank you, Bill.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversat
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�8436
TH E: WH ITE: HOUSE:
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The .President
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 Oval Office
The President:
Hello, Hosni.
President Mubarak:
The President:
12:18 p.m. - 12:23 p.m. EST
(U)
Yes, Bill, how are you?
I'm fine, and you?
ident Mubarak:
Fine.
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President:
I just call
to discuss a couple of things.
The Iraqi operation seems to be going well. We have some damage
assessment
indicates good results, and all our pilots have
come back so far. ~
Presldent Mubarak:
The Pre
Good results, then?
Yes.
President Mubarak:
(U)
(U) ;
This is very good.
(U)
The President:
The strike will be significant and will contiriue
for some time, but I' think it is import'ant to degrade his
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ability
to threaten his neighbors as much as possible.
The Gulf
countries are giving us all the cooperation we need and King
Fahd and Abdallah are support
of what we've done.
I think
we're in good shape.
I am grateful for your prompt,clearance
overflights and Suez passage. ~
~gCR~
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President Mubarak:
Yes, we're making all the decisions needed.
(U)
The President: _I think what you said before about Saddam
Huss~in being entirely responsible
r this chain of events was
very valuable, and if you have a chance, if you ~illteiterate
that -- ~
.
..
sident Mubarak:
I already mentioned that yesterday, and
today we made a communique saying that I talked to Madelein'e
Albright
sterday. ~
The President: That's good.
I also wanted
pretty good trip to Gaza and Israel.
(U)
say that I had a
President Mubarak:
It was a wonderful trip, I told Madeleine
Albright it was a wonderful trip, and I prai,sed it publicly
today on TV.
(U)
The President: Thank you.
I'm a little ,concerned about the
possibility of a ihort-term problem because ~f the unstable
political situation in Isra~l, because you know the temptation
is always there
do things that are not constructive" and they
may even wind' up having elections befor~ long. We'll try to
deal with it and
ep
on a good track.
I'm glad I went to
Gaza.I hope it helped Arafat, and I hope the historic sympathy,
of the Palestinians for Iraq won't undermine him too much. ~
President Mubarak:
I think your visit was a historic visit.
Arafat -- whom I met yesterday -- Arafat and his group were all
very pleased with that; On Iraq, expect some small
demonstrations, but don't give it any attention. We had very
small ones. ~
The President:
me,
(U)
Thank you.
President Mubarak:
The President:
Yes.
I expected that
a~d
it didn't bother
(U)
Are you doing well?
(U)
. President Mubarak: Yes, I'm doing very well. Your visit, your
trip and speech were very well-balanced and appreciated. ~
The President: Thank you.
I think the Israeli public is coming
along.
The problem is, when they have el
ions there, Israeli
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society is getting more complicated, and a lot o~ people get
elected to the Knesset for reasons that don't have much to do
with the peace process. Then we have trouble getting a solid
majority to do the right thing. I'll just keep pushing. A
survey in Israel indicated that 80 percent agreed with what I
said to the Palestinians, so it was helpful, I think. ~
President Mubarak:
I asked
him today and had long talks.
The President:
Yes.
President Mubarak:
even before April.
The President:
one of the Labor party; I met
(U)
I think there'll be elections in April or
~
Yes.
We'll keep working on it.
President Mubarak: We're always working.
working, Bill.
(U)
The President:
Thank you, Hosni.
(U)
We nev.er stop
(U)
President Mubarak: Thank you. Give our best regards to
Hillary. Everybody appreciated her words and visit there.
wife sends her best regards.
(U)
The President: Thank you.
, she's well.
(U)
k:
-----------------The President:
President Mubarak:
Tell her hello and that we hope
Thank you.
Goodbye.
I'll tell her that now.
(U)
Goodbye.
(U)
End of Conversation -
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�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
. The
sident
King Husse
of Jordan
and Frank Jaros
ki
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smi
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 --12:25 p.m. - 12:32 p.m. EST
Oval Office
President:
King Hussein:
The President:
Hello, Your Majesty.
How are you?
Hello, welcome home and well
I had a great time.
How are you, sir?"
Gaza.
don~.
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
The President:
I. thought it was a good trip. Arafat produced a
big crowd; he had over 500 members of the PNC there,. and a lot
of others.· I think it went well.
(U)
King Hussein:
Very, very good,
That is very promising.
(U)
The President:
I think I struck a responsive chord. The people
of Israel supported my speech, even though Ne~anyahu's
rnment
dn't like it much.
(U)
It was a wonder
speech about the future.
Very
moving.
The Pres
Thank you.
I want
to call and say
the
Iraq seems tb be going pretty
1.
damage
assessment indicates good
ts, all our pilots are back so
far, and from what we can see, there are very low civilian
ca
ties.)R1'.
by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (a) (d)
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King Hussein:
That's wonderful.
(U)
The President: You know, I called
but in the wake. 6f 'Britler's report
to cooperate, I had no choice.
giving us the cooperation we need
ion a month ago,
trying
so we are Just go ng.
world will become more
So far, their reactions are muted and even privately
supportive, but it can become more difficult with civilian
casualties. I know you are 'probably concerned with the refugee
problem~
We'll stay in close torich and I will help in any way
possible with a rapid response. ~
King Hussein: To support the refugee problem would be nice.
may be beyond our ability to deal with large numbers, and we
look forward to your help. ~
It
The President: We'll help if we can. One other thing. In
spite of the fact that I had a good trip, the political
situation in Israel s quite unstable. Bibi said that in short
order one of three things will happen: he'll have Levy back and
four more votes; he'll have a unity government with Barak; or
there'll be nitional elections., If there are national
elections, it may well delay the Wye implementation process.
We'll work hard with the Palestinians, but the resultant
government might be more secure in going forward. We'll keep
pushing the Israel government to implement, but we need to watch
c losely i it's qu i t e unstab1 e . 'J.81
King Hussein: Yes, sir. May I ask, have Arafat and the
Israelis finished working out cooperation on security and
intelligence? ~
The President: I think that's on track. i think there are two
big problems for.the Israelis, at least for the Netanyahu
government: the whole question of how to handle the prisoner
releases and Arafat's speeches on declaring unilaterally a
Pa~estinian state in May.
If Netanyahu implements the next
redeployment, there'll be a vote Monday, a kind of no-confidence
vote. If he does not make the next redeployment, the issue is
why didn't he do it, and can ,he do it before the elections.
We'll keep pushing for full implementation. I think security is
back on track and I think we'll see evidence of that over the
next few days. Now there's this Iraq situation; I'll try to get
Arafat not to overreact. I wish I could say it was more
certain, but it/s uncertain . .k81'
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King Hussein: Everything you contribute to gives results, sir.
This time, we're full of admiration for the way you went there
and everything you said.
I hope it will work out.
If there's
anything I can s,ay, don't hesi ta te. ~
The President: Thanks.
here very soon?
(U)
Are you and Noor coming back through
I am improving all the time. They're very
optimistic.
I just . have to have time to build up resistance,
and I will come through Washington be
taking my leave
go
home.
(Ul
sident:
---'-----
That's wonderful news.
You sound strong.
Your
(U)
King Hussein: Yes, my spi ts are good. You did very well with
regard to yesterday. He asked for it. ~
The Pres
. King Hussein:
The President:
Thank you, Your Majesty.
Good day.
(U)
(U)
Thank you.
Goodbye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
~F:--:t)c-~
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�8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac of France
NOTE TAKERS:
Jim Smith, Joel Schrader and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 17, 1998 -- 12:38 p.m. - 12:53 p.m. EST
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
(U)
President Chirac:
I just wanted to say hello and'I want to talk
through the interpreter, if you don't mind.
First of all, I
want to congratUlate you on your visit to Israel and Palestine.
It was a very difficult visit,but I thought you did it the best
way you could. Second, needless to say,
1 the French people
feel affection and sympathy for you for the ridiculous test you
have to go through. Well, you know all that.
I would not be
ringing you up if I did not have a third question. When the
strikes against Iraq are over, what are we going to do? What is
going to happen? Do you already have a plan to get out of the
crisis, to which France would be glad to contribute; or should
we still be discussing things? Well, for example, if Saddam
Hussein is neither killed nor overthrown, does UNSCOM go back or
not? Is there tight control or not? How will the oil-for-food
program be implemented? So, how do we get out of the crisis?
~
The President:
First of all, I think that the trip to Israel
and Gaza went great. But there are great difficulties there, as
you know.
The Netanyahu government is not stable and there may
be new elections before long, arid the political situation in
Israel ·will make it difficult to go forward on the peace
process.
So I thought it was important to go and I hope we can
keep going forward with the Wye agreement.
The trip was a
success.
Secondly, I think in terms Of what happens next,
I
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think it would be goodifUNSCOM can go back there.
If he does
not let them back, then we have to keep the sanctions on. We
have to keep that in force if he threatens his neighbors. We
have to keep the oi for-food program.
If there are medical
pr9blems to be ~et, we may need to meet them and think about how
to dramatically expand it to meet other needs and help the
country develop and minimize military expenditures. ;kf51
President Chirac: Do you think we will be able to send UNSCOM
back in to do its work? ~
The President:
I don't know.
I think there may be a chance if
he thinks he can
t the comprehensive
ew. But I think the
impo"rtant thing is for us to say we would 1 ike to do it and I
think we need to expand the oil-for-food program in the
meantime. Really
whole idea behind
oil-for-food program
was to return the people as close t? normalcy as possible
without a big military build~up.
I think
is a chance he
will take UNSCOM back under the right circumstances, if we make
clear that if he
his commitments, we'll keep ours. Maybe
Levitte could talk to Sandy Berger about it.
I'm glad you're
thinking about it, because I've been thinking that we should
talk about where we"all go from here. ~
ident Chirac:
There is no doubt about that. Do you think
Saddam Hussein could accept having UNSCOM
k? If not, what do
we do? ~
The President:
I think he might if the French Government asks
him, if he understood from my point of view all the commitments
are still on the table so long as there is actually compliance.
I further think we should also be for a broader oil-for-food
program. That is
only way we in the United States can move
toward an end to the sanctions regime. What I am looking for is
a strategy to end
danger that his WMD program causes and to
alieviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.
I think that for
me I have n6t ruled out the possibility th~t we ~ould go back to
a situation where Iraq is committed to implementing the
~~jPrandum of Understanding that Saddam and Kofi Annan reached.
~'
"
President Chirac:
In any case, France has taken a very clear
position that Saddam Hussein bears responsibility for the
situation and,
actual fact, I just repeated that a short
while ago on TV. So my concern now is about" the modalities for
getting out of the crisis and France is quite ready to associate
itself with any discussion of how to do so. ~
.
�3
The President:
I will have Sandy Berger follow up with you.
I'm very grateful for the statement you made at the UN.
It was
very, very helpful. We need to work through the UN to get a
resolution to this.
I hope -- you know, the Russians are going
to try to do something to express their opposition to what I
have done and to Butler in particular. I hope France will not
join this, and will perhaps work to become a mediating force.
What's done is done; we need to talk about the future and how to
help the people of Iraq.
I'm glad to focus on that with you.
I
think you are in a unique position to reach out to the Russians
and Chinese to get us on a responsible course and figure out
where we all go from here. ~
President Chirac:
That is precisely the issue.
posi tion I took on television.
(U)
The President:
Jacques.
(U)
Well, that is great.
That is the
Thank you very much,
President Chirac:
to the UN that everything is to be done so
is no division.
~
The President:
Thank you very much for that.
(U)
President Chirac: Everything -- so that there should be a
cormnon position. We hoped S·addam Hussein would have understood
by now.
I don't know if you have spoken to Yeltsin, but I found
him in extraordinarily good form.
I tried to talk to him about
the Iraq affair.
I think he's being pushed toward
ticism by
Primakov and the Duma, but I found him -- Hello? ~
The President: Jacques, I lost that.
extraordinarily gooq form?
(U)
President Chirac:
Who did you find in
Boris Nikolayevich Yel tsin.
~
The President: He's doing better?· Good.
I'm going to talk to
Primakov and then I may call Yeltsin, but I'm glad to hear that
he's doing be
That's good news. ~
PresidentChirac: You ought to ring him up. Yeltsin is much
r
s respect than Primakov. And I tried to calm him
down, but he remained very bothered by this a
r because of
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domestic public opinion. But I thirik if you ring him up it will
be a very good thing. ~
The President:
Thanks very much.
I will.
(U)
President
rac: Well, Bill, we will ke
in touch.
I'm glad
1 my best greetings to
to have you on the phone.
Please give
Hillary.
(U)
The President:
Thank you.
(U)
President Chirac: I hope to see you soon, because we have a
meeting in two months in Washington.
(U)
The President:
I'm looking forward to it.
President Chirac:
The President:
Thank you.
Goodbye.
Goodbye.
Thank you.
(U)
(U)
End of Conversation -
(U)
�!¥OL? SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
NOTE TAKERS:
Roger Merletti, Bonnie Glick and Frank Jaros
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 18, 1998 -- 9:42 a.m. - 9:51 a.m. EST
Oval Of ce
The President:
Prime Minister
Hello, Tony?
air:
--~~--~~~~~~--
Hello.
ki
(U)
(U)
The President: How are you? So far so good.
going as well as can be expected.
(U)
Everything is
Prime Minister Blair: Good hearing from you, Bill. I think
.there are two issues we need to think thrDugh. How much more do
we need to do with Ramadan coming up? Secondly, then, what is
the strategy for the day after? Those are the two things that
concern me, but so far it's been successful. Your assessments
are showing we did well. What is your consensus? ~
The President: So far it looks good. Our
tial assessment is
really good, but it's too early to make any. jUdgments.
I'm
looking at the reports and they look good, and I think
politically we're getting good support in the region, and the
world, except the Russians are mad because they weren't
consulted first.
But if we had they wou
have told the Iraqis .
.J?1
Prime Minister Blair: That's right. On the other hand, it
would have been difficult to say that, to them.
pr
The President: Then I think we'll face some questions in the
Council of how to go forward. W~ o~ghtto try to go back to
·TOP
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2
something to devise a system that could lead to immediate and
meaningful actions by Iraq, like documents being given back
over.
Then we can look to broaden oil-for-fodd to make it look
like we have no problem with the Iraqi people.
This is what I
think we shoul~ do
terms of theUNSC.
I had a pretty good
talk with Chirac yesterday. What's your domestic situation?
yr
Prime Minister Blair:
Pretty good.
Parliament is fine.
I
think the most important thing
people is they understand
that we have reduced his military capability significantly. One
of
things is that you are not able to kill him personally.
We don't want
haim the civilians, so you target these
particular buildings. What I think is important is to show that
his command, control, and delivery system is so damaged that his
ability to mount offensive attacks and cause trouble
the
region is greatly reduced.
If we were in a position to announce
that we put back
s military capability by several years, I
think people would be supportive. The public is ambivalent.
They don't want lots of people kill
but they would like to see
that his military is damaged.
They want to know after 4 days of
bombing something has been accomplished. We've got to be able
to say to people here's what hitting these targets means and
he's a significantly reduced threat.
See what I mean? ,.)-8i
The President:. We've got to have our military and intelligence
folks as a guide.
It has to be
driven. ~ .
.
Prime Minister BI r:
Butler's report detailed all the weapons
that the UNSCOM people have uncovered and included a detailed,
blow-by-blow account of hassle and~bstruction . . We need a
constant diet of fact
the public of what these systems ~ould
have done and what destroying them gives us.
That's what keeps
opinion with us, and it allows us ~o saYi "Look, this thing has
had an effect. His ability to pose a danger has been reduced.~
You don't want to get back into the UNSCOMbusiness, or we'll be
doing this every three months.
I think we need to tie up the
military side and then have a political strategy. We need to
get into a situation where there are demands made of him.
I
think from my conversation with Chirac this morning, if we get
the
ght basis of a diplomatic initiative together, France
would be abl~ to say to Iraq, "You've got to get these things
together or you'll get hit again at the end of Ramadan." I
think it forcesSaddam into a policy of containment that is
considerable without landing us into where we were. ~
TO~
~ECREg;.
�3
The President: Yes, I agree with that. We need to work
together on it tomorrow or in the next couple of days. ~
Pr
Minister Blair:
Yes.
(U)
President: Our intelligence is pretty clear that Usama bin
Laden may be ordering some sort of attack in the next couple of
days and it's important that we work together on this.
I hope
you'll get a review on this. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
Our people will cooperate
,fir
any way.
The President:
I know your guys are skittish about giving us
something.
I think your lawyers are worried. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
well. ~
Ok.
I will work on that.
(U)
One more thing - Northern Ireland.
You did
Minister Blair: Yes, I think we will get somewhere on the
decommissioning stuff. ~
The President: Well, I'll be
touch.
else to help you on·
s, let me know.
Prime Minister Bl
The President:
r:'
Ok.
Thank you.
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Thank you.
( U)
(U)
(U)
Good-bye.
Good-bye.
If we can do anything
(U)
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
~R'~~'":';"
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8436
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan
NOTE TAKERS:
Joel Schrader, James Smith and Frank Jarosinski
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 18, 1998 -- 11:48 a.m.
Oval Office
The President:
Hello, Prime Minister?
Prime Minister Sharif:
The President:
(U)
Mr. President, how are you?
I'm fine.
Prime Minister Sharif:
voice.
(U)
11:54 a.m. EST
(U)
Thank you for taking my call.
(U)
It is a great pleasure listening to your
The President: Thank you.
I really enjoyed our meeting earlier
s month, and I hope the rest df your visit to the United
States was a good one. '(U)
Prime Minister Sharif:
It was very good, and I thank you for
your kind and generous hospitality.
(U)
The President: Well, thank you. ,Let me say, too, that I
understand we have reached a solution to the F-16 issue. ~
Prime Minister Sharif:
Thank you very much.
(U)
The President: And I am very pleased by that~
I know you want
to complete this by the end of the month, and we will do
everything we can to meet that deadline. ~
:;CQP OECR:E~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1. 5 (a) , (b), ~lG..Lt.---, tg}
,',
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, DECLASSIFIED
PER JEIO. 13526
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Prime Minister Sharif: That is very kind of you.
I will
announce this myself tq the people of Pakistan in the next
days.
j;e1
The President:
I have been trying to do this for four years.
It's been a point of embarrassment to me, and I've been trying
to' put it right.
I feel very good about
s. ~ ..
Prime Minister Sharif:
I will tell the people 6f Pakistan that
this is what the President of the United States has done
Pakistan, that this matter is resolved. ~
The President: Let me also say that I called you about another
issue
is urgent, and I need your
sonal help. We have
reliable intelligence, and quite a lot of it, that
ama bin
Ladin intends to strike a U.S. target very soon, perhaps in 48
hours, and that the operations -- there may be two of them -
are being orchestrated by bin Ladin from within Afghanistan.
Now, all I can tell you is this is not in reaction to Iraq; .he's
been working on this.
I think it .i5!. imperative the Taliban do
everything it can to bring him to justice.
I think Pakistan has
a lot at stake in the Taliban
ing accepted in the
international community, and if this happens it wilT become
virtually impossible. We have warned the Taliban repeatedly
that we will hold them responsible, and we will warn them a in.
I want
to ask you to do whatever you can to stop
s
immediately.
I cannot overstate the importance or urgency of
it. He has this cooking in the next several days here. We are
king to the Saudis again about it. Anyway, I wanted to tell
you I am very, very worried about it and the consequences if it
occurs. ~
Prime Minister Sharif:
I understand your anxiety and your
position, Mr. President. You know, I told you
Washington
that the Taliban are very stubborn and very uncooperative
people.
I told you what transpi
between us and
Talib~n
and
so Saudi Prince Turki, who came especially from Saudi
Arabia on that
icular issue and they were very stubborn. We
will do everything we can, I assure you.
I will send my people
tomorrow to Afghanistan to meet with them and discuss this with
them, and tell them this will not be in their interest and it
will serve no purpose, that it will invite retaliation and a
world reaction.
I will do whatever I can, I can assure you of
that, but you must understand they are very stubborn and
uncooperative. ~
~~.;r:?:;".-
·TOP SF.C~
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.
(Jt~dNTON Li~RARY PHOT0COPY'
··~_'·_~~';L:'·
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The President: Yes, I understand, but.there's a difference
between being uncooperative and not giving him up, and being
uncooperative and allowing him to conduct operations.
Those are
fundament ly different things.
I hope you can bring that home
to them.~
Prime Minister Sharif:
The President:
to do.
(U)
I wi
I can.
(U)
I know you will try; that is all I can ask you
Prime Minister Sharif:
I have and I will. They don't listen to
us all the time.
I'm very disappointed with their attitude.
~
The President:
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
(U)
The President and Prime Minister Sharif exchanged closing
pleasantries.
(U)
-- End of Conversation -
TOE
~ECREg;:...
�e(:ONFIBENT;J,;M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHI NGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The Presldent
,Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United
NOTE TAKERS:
Matt Sibley, Doug
ey, Robin Rickard,
McGee, David Higgins and Roger Merletti
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 19, 1998-- 5:43
Oval Office
The President:
Hello.
Prime Min is t e r B1 air:
p.m~
ngdom
Jenny
- 5:51 p.m. EST
(U)
Hi Bill.
(U)
The 'President:
Hey Tony.
I just got my brie ng on the bomb
damage and am pleased with the way things have gone, and I think
the operation should end now.
I hope you are pleased with
British participation.
:tt was, quite important. )91'
Prime Minister Blair~
Sure~
it
been a job well done.
(U)
Prime Minister Bl r:
I think what is important now is that we
really show people, one, that we've significantly damaged his
capabilities in a very
ise way and in a sense that we have
not brought him down.
The point is we have reduced
significantly the threat he po
to the rest of the world that
is a darn sight better than l~aving him in, breath of his UN
obligations and us taking no action against him
'all.)91'
The
Pre~ident:
Yes,
I
with that.
(U)
_CQ'tilFI BBiiT tAL
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify on:
12/tO'08
"
(~~:~_~~N LI~~Y P~OTOC~PY
.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
",
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Prime Minister Blair:
I think it has been an operation with a
purpose. The purpose
s been achieved.' He is back in his box,
and we now have to work out a strategy
containment and
stability. )K1
The President:
I
with all that. I think we should say we
will continue to contain him, restate the redl
for use of
force:
no threat to
neighbors, no developing WMD, and no
movement against the Kurds.
I also think we should say we
support the extension of the oil-for-food. And, when it comes
to UNSCOM and the lAEA, I can tell you we will welcome their
r~turn to Iraq, and I intend to say we will work on their return
but only after concrete, affirmative, and demonstrable action by
Iraq showing that it will piovide full cooperation nec~ssary for
UNSCOM and the IAEA to do their job. ~
Prime Minister Blair:
to say.
(U)
I think that is exactly the right thing
The President: The Russ
and the Chinese are hot and really
angry at me right now -- and the burden is on us to work hard to
manage the Council.
I think they are a lot madder at me than
you. But we will get through it . . If we w?uld have given them
all the advance notice they wanted, we would have had a very
different operation these last three days. ~
I
Prime Minister Blair: The truth of the matter is that we have
not acted other than what we said we would. We
we would
without further warning, and if we had not, they would think
we were not serious at
1. ~
President: Everything was terrific. We did exactly what we
said we would do and I am
pleased. Our people said the
work we did with the Briti
great and the cooperation was
at.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
I think .i t is tremendously important that
as much material as possible about the damage is re
ed as
soon as possible. We need to build up a picture of what we've
achieved in military terms.
In a funny way people will be
sed that none of our s
ce people bave bee~ killed ~nd
relieved it was a short campaign. On the other hand, they will
want to know what
is that we actually did in milit
terms
-- the more detailed we can get the better. ~
The President:
I agree with that, and I will support it. And I
think our people have shared all the information.
I really want
COWFIDEH'I'IPrL
�3
to do that just like you say.
I've got the Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of State, and General Shelton here with me
(U)
now and we will follow up.
Okay Bill. When are you going to go out
is about quarter to 11 here now.
(U)
Prime Minister
and say
I'm going on in a
The President:
Yes, go out now and do it.
minute.
Just go on now.
(U)
Prime Minister Blai
I will do a short statement.
(U)
The President:
We are going outright now.
They say I'm
sched)lled to go' out in five minutes.
I have. got a. three-minute
statement, so why don't you just wait and go on out.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
stay in close touch.
Okay, that is great.
(U)
Our people need to
The President:
Let me ask you. , . I have a three-minute
statement.
Let me go give it and if' you want to answer
questions..
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
I am not going to answer questions,
(U)
I am not going to answer any questions either.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
Our defense guys thought it would be good
if we could release(;?e aftermath of the Ba'ath Party
headquarters h
. ~'
.
The President:
I will check with them.
I thought ·they were
going
do that. Al Gore is on the phone wi
them.
We will
check on it.
(U)
Prime Minister Blair:
The President:
Good show.
Prime Minister
air·:
---------------------The President:
All right.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Bye-bye.
(U)
(U)
Good-bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
-COWFIDEH~
~if'~(J"';:
,"
.
Dl~CfNTON LiBRARY PHOTdCOPY
,
~~=-~"":':: :,::.::. ~( '_~~~: -.:::.',~-~.: .;:..;;.,1.
(U)
�CO~JFlDEI~ 117I:t'
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: COQ, NODIS
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: -GON(:IBENTIAL
DTG:18D14DZ DEC 98
FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC .
G 0 NFl
QQQQ
ErE NT i Jt't"
NODIS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM·
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1426 60 NFl 0 E Iq =f'I A t
I AM WRITING YOU PERSONALLY TO MAKE SURE WE DO WHAT WE HAVE
OFTEN DONE BEFORE: KEEP U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE TRACK
YOU AND I LAID DOWN NEARLY SIX YEARS AGO. THE MOST IMMEDIATE
CHALLENGE - THOUGH BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE -- IS IRAQ.
YOU AND I HAVE WORKED CLOSELY FOR MANY YEARS TO ENSURE THAT
IRAQ AND SADDAM HUSSEIN COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE DECISIONS OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL. OUR COMMON EFFORTS, INCLUDING THOSE YOU, YEVGENIY
MAKSIMOVICH AND MINISTER IVANOV HAVE UNDERTAKEN ON THE .
DIPLOMATIC TRACK, HELPED PREVENT SADDAM FROM ACQUIRING THE
CAPABILITY TO THREATEN HIS REGION AND THE WORLD WITH .
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. LAST MONTH, OUR EFFORTS
PERSUADED SADDAIVI TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO FULL COOPERATION
WITH UNSCOM.
UNFORTUNATELY, SAD DAM HAS BETRAYED HIS PROMISES TO YOU AND
TO ALL OF US IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY
MIND THAT SADDAM HAS CHOSEN A COURSE OF DEFIANCE. DESPITE
THE PROMISES HE GAVE IN ORDER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
')..Oi't"" 1'2/\ 1.:" r
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t.
�CONFIEH!I\lIIAt::-
PAGE 3 RHEHAAA1426 60 til FlO El\I"'I"1"A L
AGAINST HIM, SAD DAM HAS ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE AND
WIDE-SCALED EFFORT,.TO OBSTRUCT UNSCOM FROM CARRYING OUT ITS
MANDATE. INDEED, WE KNOW THAT IRAQ ORDERED THE DESTRUCTION
OF WEAPONS-RELATED DOCUMENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF AN UNSCOM
INSPECTION.
I KNOW WE DISAGREE ON THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ.
HOWEVER, BOTH TONY BLAIR AND I CONCLUDED THAT SADDAM'S
ACTIONS LEFT US NO OTHER CHOICE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I
SOUGHT EVERY AVENUE AVAILABLE IN ORDER NOT TO UNDERTAKE THE
ACTIONS I AUTHORIZED ON DECEMBER 16. AL GORE DISCUSSED OUR
REASONING AND ACTIONS WITH YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH. FROM AL'S
REPORT, THEY HAD A GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE. AL TOLD
ME OF YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT CHAIRMAN BUTLER. I AM FIRMLY
CONVINCED THAT THE PROBLEM IS IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO
COMPLY; THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH BUTLER.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA THAT
YOU AND I HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD IS.FAR TOO IMPORTANT
AND, TO MY MIND, FAR TOO SOUND, TO BE SUBVERTED BY SADDAM
PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1426~ G ~J F I" f! Iq 'f I A'"t
HUSSEIN. I REGRET THAT YOU CHOSE TO WITHDRAW YOUR
AMBASSADOR FROM WASHINGTON. EVEN WHEN OUR GOVERNMENTS
DISAGREE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU AND YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH
HAVE ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND SEEK TO
ADDRESS OUR DIFFERENCES.
OUR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO MAKE SURE
THE RELATIONSHIP STAYS ON TRACK. FOR ONE, LET'S MAKE SURE
RHETORICAL EXCESSES DO NOT PREVENT US FROM FOCUSSING
CONSTRUCTIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY ON NEXT STEPS TO ENSURE·
SADDAM'S COMPLIANCE. WE ARE READY TO ENGAGE WITH YOU ON
HOW WE ENSURE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT DEVELOP ITS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION OR THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS. AL AND MADELEINE
STAND READY TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH YEVGENIY
MAKSIMOVICH AND IGOR SERGEYEVICH ON THIS, AS WELL AS THE
MANY OTHER ISSUES THAT MAKEUP OUR COMMON AGENDA.
SINCERELY,
BILL
PAGE 5 RHEHAAA1426 ~ L
<I\SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<I\SSN>1426
•.• » ......•
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�.cot4F1DEN 117tr.
<"TOR>981217205350 M3610196
FROM:
SITREPRT
�·Pascual, Carlos E.
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Importance:
Message Flag:
Flag Status:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs;
@NESASIA - NElSouth Asia
FW: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED [UNCLASSIFIED ~
.
~
~
Read
Flagged
I <6'1
·i
High."
•
~.
.~
p
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~\')'Y
-.33~d "
PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM
ry represe
ng maps
the Russians did not cancel loday's PJC with Defense
rs.
oug
ey stopped Minister Sergeyev from attending, they still held the
meeting with their ambassador in the chair. In addition, the Russian DCM told me they
are buying Vorontsov a two-way ticket, even though he is scheduled to leave
permanently early next month.
s reason,
r
Strobe has asked that
- "Original MessageFrom:
Campanella, Anthony
Sent:
Thursday, December 17, 1998 5:50 PM
To:
~NSA - Nail Security Advisor; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @\l\lHSR - \I\IH Situation Room; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Black, Sleven K.; Saunders, Richard M.; Fuerth, Leon S.; Marty,
oseph H.; Riedel, Bruce O.
SUbJect:
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED (UNCLASSIFIED]
Ir~portance:
High
Paul Simons of State Oeprtment reported that the Russian OeM called Ambassador Sestanovich to
tell ~Iim that the Russian An1bassasdor to Washington has been recalled. There was no reason
given, but STate assesses that it is in regards to U.S.-UK actions in the Gulf.
;,.. ,.4.'~.-·
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER 1.0. 13526
"',
rt:~:~ON LmRAR'~ PHOTOCOPY
.':.:'
.
-
.
. . .". .
~~- 12Ill- r'""""
It{ {;OJ \P
~
�8438
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
December 17, 1998
ACTION
MEMORANDUM· FOR ffAl1UEL BERGER
THROUGH:
. FROM:"
SUBJECT:
CARLOS
PASCUA~
ANDREW WEISSiS>J
Letter to. President Yeltsin on Iraq
The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to
Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq crisis.
Strobe
feels that a tailored message to Ye~tsin may help cushion some
of the Russian pique about the strikes.
Mamedov told Collins this morning that Primakov had reacted
"very emotionally" to the strikes and· was blindsided.
The Vice
President had a lengthy telephone conversation with Primakov on
Thursday to explain that we went the extra mile to give Saddam a
chance to comply and that our actions were fully consistent with
existing UN Security Council resolutions.
Despite our efforts,
the Russians withdrew tonight their ambassador from Washington.
The letter underscores the continued importance of the U.S.
Russian reI ionship and places the blame for the strikes
squarely on Saddam's defiance. We strongly recommend a
handwritten note from the President at the end of the letter to
show the President's personal interest.
The letter will be sent
by confidential fax and will be double-tracked to Prime Minister
Primakov's office.
Concurrence by:
Ceon Fuerth, Joe Marty
kW~
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
c mJF I DEW:P Il'.tlr'
Reason:
1.5 (d)
Declassify On:
12/
DECLASSIFIED
PERE.O.13526
1Po~ \1~2:" r
ll( ,'''b
t""
�-.r;;;ONET ];;lENT IAL
TH E WH ITE HOUS E
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BERGE~
FROM:
SAMUEL
SUBJECT:
Letter to Russian President Yeltsin on Iraq
e
Approve a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq
crisis.
Not surprisingly, the Russians have been highly critical of the
airstrikes against Iraq. Strobe and I believe that a t
lored
message from'yoU might help allay some of Yeltsin's and
Primakov's anger over the s
kes.
The Vice President called
Primakov on Thursday afternoon to reassure him that we gave
Saddam more than enough chances to comply with his obligations
and that our actions were fully authorized under existing UN
Security Council resolutions.
On Thursday evening, the Russians
recalled their ambassador from Washington, who was scheduled to
leave within a month.
Your letter outlines our rationale for the attack and rebuts
Russia's public complaints.
It also emphasizes the ~nduring
importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and calls on the
Russian leadership not to let Saddam drive a lasting wedge
between us. A copy will also be provided to Prime Minister
Primakov's office.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab A and add the following
handwritten note:
"Boris
I know how committed you are to a
better future for your country and to our partnership; I trust
you know how deeply I share and support your goals. We must not
let Saddam destroy what we have built.u
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to President Yeltsin
COWFIGENHAL
Reason:
1.5(d)
Declassify On:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
21D+" (ZIt t - ,...
llbo/~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
�8654
THE WHITE H6u5E
,
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone
President
PARTICIPANTS:
Conversa~~
with Russian
Yeltsin~J
.President Clinton
President Boris Yel
in
Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Notetakers:
David Higgins, Matt Sibley,
Doug Bayley, Jim Smith
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
December 30, 1998, 10:00-10:33 a.m.,
Oval Of ce
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill.
THE PRESIDENT:
Hello, Boris.
(U)
It is nice to hear your voice.
(U)
PR~SIDENT YELTSIN:
Well, I think it is important
r us now to
talk about the future of Russia-U.S. rel ions.
I have always
shared with you in a very frank way our views about our
relationship and have always paid heed to what you had to say.
Through those very frank exchanges, on many occasions we proved
we were able to find solutions to very critical, and ve
crucial
problems.
,)91'
I want to be quite straightforward.
I want to tell you how sad
and sorry I was about the military action by the U.S. and UK
against Iraq.
Because what is at stake is not just the person
of Saddam Hussein but our relations with the U.S.
I believe
what we need ,to do now is reconstruct the unity of action in the
UN Security Council, and also to actively work for our joint and
agreed actions in the future.
I am sure that we can draw
lessons from what has happened because we must not
low the
situation to happen which would impose a threat to the great and
positive accomplishments that you and,I have scored.
,)if
We are faced now with quite a few very di icult tasks.
Some of
them we discussed when you came to Moscow in September, and we
CONFIDhN.:l:.Il';I;
Classified by:
Glyn T. Davies
Reason:
1.S(b)
DeclassiOn:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
1J)Oit:' (lAt.... r
ul ~DI'I>
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can not deal with all those unless there is a measure of good
will from both sides. I talked to Primakov about Iraq. We have
to turn what has not been the best page in Russian-U.S.
relations. I got your message, and I agree with, you the best
way to get our relationship back on the right track is to try to
move the action" forward in practical steps and moves. At this
point in time, one of those critical steps would be cfcti ve steps
forward in the Primakov~Gore Commission. I value very much
their last conversation. ~
The main task now is to move forward in the area of economic
cooperation between Russia and the U.S., especially on the eve
of the critical phase of the next round of our discussions with
the IMF. I would like to continue to look forward to the
support you promised before. / )
We also agreed, you and I, that we must do everything to assure
a very rapid transition from START II to START III. Of course,
you are aware that I, myself, and Primakov, did everything we
could to assure prompt and early ratification of the agreement.
You are fully aware of that. Regrettably, at this point in
time, prospects for passing this agreement have deteriorated.
Still, despite this, we will move in a very straightforward and
consistent way to get this task accomplished. "Kr
To be able to move forward in this manner, I suggest you and I
instruct Ivanov and Mrs. Albright, in the course of their
meeting at the end of January, to concentrate on finding
solutions to the CFE Treaty. This is really critical in terms
of the future of European security and the future relationship
between Russia and NATO.
yrl
1999 will be a very important year in terms of the development
of the Russian-U.S. relationship. In the foundation underneath
that relationship, we must leave behind a very good inheritance.
In concluding my remarks, I wish to extend to you and your
family, very good wishes in the New Year. Now I pass the floor
to you, Bill. )'C'l
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Bo s. First of all, I wanted to
thank you for your good review of the issues. It is good to
hear you sounding so good. ,1Jlf
Let me just briefly say a
have to figure out how to
our relationship and keep
take military action. In
GOHFIDl!!M'fI:M.
word or two about Iraq. I agree we
go beyond here and continue to build
it going. I obviously did not want to
March, when the memorandum Saddam
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signed with Kofi Annan was violated, we didn't act militarily.
In October, we went out of our way to avoid it~ In November,
when the Security Council voted to condemn Iraq 15-0, I calle~
off the attack at the last minute because he said he would
comply. The position we were in was that when the report carne
back saying he was not in compliance with UNSCOM, we and the
British felt we had no choice. ~
We have to figure outhow.we go from here. We can't let Saddam
undermine the U.S.-Russian relationship. One thing i am very
troubled by is the belligerence Iraq is showing against
coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone. If they keep shooting
missiles at our planes, this could lead·to a very s
ous
confrontation. I don't want further military action, but they
need to stop that.
~
Let me say a word about the agenda for 1999. It is very
important for us to get started on supporting the Russian
economic recovery, strengthening arms control, and stemming
proliferation. I am encouraged Madeleine is corning to Moscow at
the end of January, and, of course, Gore and Primakov will meet
in March. I·t is important you and I give our teams the right
tone, direction, and momentum. ~
I understand the difficulties you have in ratifying START II
now, but am glad you continue to support it. It would be .
terrible if you· and I finish our terms without START II and
START III. It would be good for our security interests and good
for your economic interests. There would be no more tangible
sign of our cooperation. On CFE, I,too, want to move as fast
as we can. I will see what can be done. I know it is important
to you, and the Duma has been holding up START on the basis of
it. y:;t
On the economy, let me. just say, I think you know I want to do
more to support your economic recovery and reform, and I
obviously want to help all I can with the IMF. I think the
entire international community is interested in supporting
Russian reform with greater investment from both multilateral
and private sources, building on a realistic program. As we
discussed in the pa ,we believe you can get billions and
billions .of dollars in energy investment with changes in the
laws to protect investments there. ~
What is the critical thing here is a durable reform program that
will lead to resumed cooperation with the IMF, which will bring
support from the international community . . That is also
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important to restructure your external debt. We are also
working on other measures with Primakov to help spe fic sectors
of the Russian economy. ~
I want to do all I can, but I think Mr. Primakov's government
has to support ~ufficient reform for me to convince the IMF to
invest.
It is important to get the whole world community
putting money into Russia instead of taking money out. ~
The other thing I wanted to emphasize, the final thing, is we
have to get this IMF deal done because that opens the door to
all other good economic things. We will do all we can to help.
We don't want to see the Russian people hurt any more, but there
~
Well,
great
sends
these
to be some positive moves to get the IMF to move forward.
Boris, I wanted to thank you again for the call.
It was
to hear your voice.
Please give Naina our best. Hillary
you a big hug for the New Year. We have to work on
1
things together, and we will.
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
I thank you, Bill, for what you just said.
One final question I want to raise and that relates to the April
summit in Washington. Of course, you should understand our
final decision to participate would depend on the way the
discussion goes forward concerning the.new NATO strategy. We
are very seriously concerned over plans underway to expand the
theater of NATO activity.
This would not take notice of UN
Security Council decisions, and this is what really gives us a
lot of concern. A lot of things depend on whether or not it is
possible to find agreement on the CFE Treaty.
I would say that
we agreed with you that we need to turn this page in our
relati~nship which has not been the best one.
Let us stay the
course. ~
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I like that.
I do hope Russia will be
able to come to Washington in April. We have a good partnership
between Russia and NATO. The agreement we signed is a good one;
we don't have conflicting issues for the future. We need to
discuss changes we are trying to make and walk you through them.
I hope you can feel comfortable enough to have Russian
participation.
It would be a big plus, in view of the agreement
we signed for a partnership between Russia and NATO. ~
I look forward to talking and working with you.
Thank you for
the phone call.
It has been a good one, I think. )J21
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PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
I also think we have had a very constructive
conversat
,and we really got to understand what each of us
was telling the other. What remains is to work until we realize
what was just discussed. ~
THE PRESIDENT:
Good.
(U)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
Please pass my best wishes to all the
members of your family.
I wish you a happy New Year and Merry
Christmas.
(U)
THE PRESIDENT:
Thank you, Bo
PRESIDENT YELTSIN:
Good bye.
s.
Good bye.
(U)
End of Conversation
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Unofficial translation
December 2, 1998
Dear Bill,
Thank you for your letter on Iraq. I value our close contact on this
complicated issue. The matter is well worth it as we are dealing with the
implementation of the international community resolutions.
I would like to reaffirm that we continue exerting heavy pressure on
Baghdad to compel it to fulfill its obligations to fully restore cooperation with the
UN. With respect to your letter we have once again addressed the Iraqi
leadership with an urgent request not to allow any backslides in the interaction
with UNSCOM.
At the same time we should not overdramatize the situation over the recent
requests to Baghdad. We, quite naturally, urged the Iraqis from the very
beginning to exercise constructiveness in this issue as well. According to the
clarifications of the UNSCOM Chairman the problems which have emerged are
quite solvable in the framework of the relationship between UNSCOM and
HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Iraq. What is essential is that inspections are conducted steadily and restoration
of the monitoring is fully underway. It is important to advance to a
comprehensive review on Iraq in the Security Council which will put everything
in its place as well as allow to objectively evaluate what has been achieved and
highlight issues which Baghdad should still report on.
I hope that we will not see any aggravation of the situation. I beheve that
our joint efforts will once again allow to find a solution to the emerged
complications by diplomatic means.
Sincerely,
B.Yeltsin
Moscow, Kremlin
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�
Dublin Core
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
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This collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents concerning Iraq
Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on communications between President Clinton and various world leaders regarding air strikes against Iraq in December 1998. Correspondence between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is included.
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2009-1292-M
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<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7388808" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Iraq
Russia