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Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full.
�- CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: "SOtdRBElTFTCL
DTG:201405Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7781
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6833
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6796
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6690
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O H r i D C N T I A f L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 032207
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(B,D)
SUMMARY
2. 4GPMANY OBSERVERS HAVE DRAWN AN ANALOGY BETWEEN
THE YELTSIN OF THE EIGHTIES AND FORMER SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED, ARGUING THAT, LIKE YELTSIN,
LEBED COULD RIDE A WAVE OF POPULAR DISCONTENT TO
POWER. THE ANALOGY IS APPEALING, BUT FLAWED. IN THE
LATE SOVIET PERIOD, YELTSIN FACED AN ELITE IN DECLINE,
SOCIETY WAS POLITICALLY ENGAGED, AND GORBACHEV
INITIALLY SAW YELTSIN AS A USEFUL INSTRUMENT IN HIS
BATTLE AGAINST CONSERVATIVE FORCES. IN TODAY'S
RUSSIA, LEBED FACES A DYNAMIC, SELF-CONFIDENT ELITE,
SOCIETY IS POLITICALLY DISENGAGED, AND YELTSIN DOES
NOT SEE LEBED AS SOMEONE HE CAN MANIPULATE FOR HIS OWN
ENDS. MOREOVER, YELTSIN CAME TO POWER PRIMARILY
THROUGH AN INTRA-ELITE POWER STRUGGLE, AND HIS MAIN
POPULAR BACKING WAS FROM THE LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA,
WHICH ESCHEWED VIOLENCE AS IT PURSUED DEMOCRATIZATION.
IF LEBED WERE TO COME TO POWER, IT WOULD MOST LIKELY
BE AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE ELITE AND WITH THE
BACKING OF DISAFFECTED WORKING CLASSES INTERESTED IN
RECTIFYING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INJUSTICES. HIS ASSUMPTION
OF POWER - WHETHER BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OR NOT -
^
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON i m m . P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
WOULD LIKELY PROVE MORE DESTABILIZING OR MORE VIOLENT
THAN YELTSIN'S WAS. END SUMMARY
3. (SBU) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FORMER SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED'S UNEXPECTEDLY STRONG SHOWING
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR, HIS
UNRESTRAINED POPULISM AS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT,
AND HIS DISMISSAL IN MID-OCTOBER, MANY OBSERVERS ARE
ASKING WHETHER LEBED IS THE YELTSIN OF THE NINETIES.
THIS QUESTION AGITATES, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE WHO
PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN ENGINEERING LEBED'S FIRING,
MOST NOTABLY PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS.
THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE DISMISSAL WILL ONLY
INCREASE LEBED'S POPULARITY - EVEN OVER THE LONG RUN AS GORBACHEV'S FIRING OF YELTSIN AS MOSCOW PARTY BOSS
DID IN 1987, AND ENHANCE LEBED'S CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING
YELTSIN AS RUSSIA'S TOP LEADER.
OBVIOUS SIMILARITIES
4. (U) ON THE SURFACE, THE ANALOGY IS APPEALING.
BOTH YELTSIN'S EARLIER POPULISM AND LEBED'S ARE
GROUNDED IN AN ATTACK ON THE PRIVILEGES AND
PREROGATIVES OF THE RULING ELITE, WHICH IS WIDELY SEEN
AS TOTALLY DIVORCED FROM THE PROBLEMS OF COMMON
PEOPLE. BOTH CAME TO PROMINENCE AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND OF PERVASIVE DISCONTENT WITH CURRENT
CONDITIONS. BOTH HAD REPUTATIONS FOR BEING ABLE TO
GET THINGS DONE. BOTH REFUSED TO PLAY BY THE ELITE'S
RULES, AND BOTH FELL VICTIM TO ITS WRATH.
BUT ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES
5. (SBU) THIS ANALOGY, HOWEVER, MISSES MANY
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES THAT SUGGEST THAT LEBED'S PATH
TO POWER WOULD DIFFER FROM YELTSIN'S AND BEAR
DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM.
6. (SBU) WHAT ARE THOSE DIFFERENCES?
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, THE ELITE WAS IN
DECLINE, LACKING DYNAMISM AND A FIRM BELIEF IN
ITS RIGHT TO RULE; ITS EFFORTS TO DEFEND ITSELF
WERE FEEBLE AND HALTING, EPITOMIZED BY THE
BLUNDERING OF THE FAILED AUGUST (1991) PUTSCH
AND, ESPECIALLY, THE TREMBLING HAND OF COUP
PLOTTER (AND SOVIET VICE PRESIDENT) YANAYEV. IN
TODAY'S RUSSIA, A NEW ELITE IS ON THE RISE; IT IS
DYNAMIC, CONVINCED OF ITS RIGHT TO RULE,
CONFIDENT IN ITS ABILITY TO GOVERN, AND PREPARED
TO DEFEND ITSELF, WITH FORCE IF NECESSARY.
CLINTON imMLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDDJTIAL-
YELTSIN'S AND HIS ALLIES' HANDLING OF THE OCTOBER
(1993) VIOLENCE AND THEIR MORE RECENT CONDUCT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE THE BEST
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THIS WILL TO
POWER.
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY IN
MOSCOW, WAS FILLED WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS,
ELEVATED - AND SURPRISED - BY ITS BRAVERY IN
• c o N F i ere N T i A t S E C T I O N 02 OF 03 M o s c o w 032207
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
CONFRONTING THE REGIME AND ENTHRALLED WITH THE
PROMISES OF DEMOCRACY. IN TODAY'S RUSSIA,
SOCIETY IS TIRED OF POLITICS, SOBERED BY THE
DIFFICULTIES OF THE TRANSITION, UNCERTAIN ABOUT
THE FRUITS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET.
--
IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, SOVIET LEADER
GORBACHEV INITIALLY SAW YELTSIN AS A USEFUL TOOL
IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST MORE CONSERVATIVE,
RECALCITRANT FORCES IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY.
RATHER THAN CRUSH YELTSIN, GORBACHEV GAVE HIM A
SECOND POLITICAL LIFE, ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT HE
COULD NOT CONTROL YELTSIN. IN TODAY'S RUSSIA,
ALTHOUGH RUSSIAN LEADER YELTSIN USED LEBED TO WIN
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HE NO LONGER BELIEVES
HE NEEDS HIM FOR ANY BROADER POLITICAL PURPOSE.
7. -4€1-MOREOVER, DESPITE THE SIMILARITIES, THE
DIFFERENCES IN THE PERSONALITIES AND BACKGROUND OF
YELTSIN AND LEBED ARE MORE STRIKING. YELTSIN WAS
INDISPUTABLY PART OF THE ELITE WHEN HE TURNED POPULIST
POLITICIAN. HE HAD COME UP THROUGH PARTY RANKS AND
SERVED LOYALLY AS SVERDLOVSK PARTY BOSS FOR ELEVEN
YEARS BEFORE COMING TO MOSCOW AND THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE APPARATUS IN THE MID-EIGHTIES. IN CPSU
TERMS, HE WAS AN ACCOMPLISHED APPARATCHIK AND A RISING
STAR. BY CONTRAST, LEBED IS AN OUTSIDER, CERTAINLY TO
THE POLITICAL ELITES, WHERE HE IS A NEWCOMER, BUT ALSO
TO SENIOR MILITARY CIRCLES, AS ONE OF THE FEW GENERALS
NOT TO HAVE ATTENDED THE STAFF ACADEMY.
PATHS TO POWER AND CONSEQUENCES
8. (SBU) IN ADDITION, FOR ALL HIS POPULISM, YELTSIN
CAME TO POWER AS THE VICTOR IN AN INTRA-ELITE STRUGGLE
THAT REVOLVED PRIMARILY AROUND POLITICAL ISSUES LINKED
TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOVIET SOCIETY. HIS
CLINTON Lm^PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCHTIAL
1
ASSUMPTION OF POWER WAS REMARKABLY PEACEFUL FOR
SEVERAL REASONS:
-- EVEN IN DISGRACE, YELTSIN RETAINED SOLID TIES TO
THE MORE REFORM-MINDED ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. AS HIS STAR ROSE, HE GAINED CONSIDERABLE
BACKING FROM SENIOR LEVELS IN THE MILITARY AND
SECURITY SERVICES. AS A RESULT, YELTSIN'S ASSUMPTION
OF SUPREME POWER DID NOT PRECIPITATE A MAJOR OR ABRUPT
CHANGE OF ELITES, ALTHOUGH THE TOP ECHELON IN MOSCOW
WAS STRIPPED OF POWER.
-- YELTSIN'S GOALS OVERLAPPED WITH THOSE OF THE
ELITES OF THE NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET
UNION. THAT ALLOWED FOR A NEGOTIATED DISSOLUTION OF
THE SOVIET UNION.
- YELTSIN'S CRITICAL POLITICAL SUPPORT CAME FROM THE
LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN MAJOR URBAN CENTERS,
ESPECIALLY MOSCOW, LENINGRAD (NOW ST. PETERSBURG), AND
SVERDLOVSK (NOW YEKATERINBURG). THIS GROUP DOMINATED
THE FREQUENT MASSIVE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF YELTSIN IN MOSCOW. FOR THE MOST PART, IT ESCHEWED
VIOLENCE, WHILE EXPLOITING THE OPENING CREATED BY
GORBACHEV'S POLICIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND GLASNOST.
9. -{et-BY CONTRAST, LEBED'S POPULISM IS GROUNDED IN
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES (CRIME, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH).
THERE IS A GREATER RISK THAT SIGNIFICANT INSTABILITY
OR VIOLENCE WOULD ACCOMPANY ANY RISE TO POWER BY LEBED
- WHETHER BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANS - FOR TWO REASONS:
-- BECAUSE LEBED'S TIES WITH THE ELITE ARE TENUOUS,
HE WOULD FACE AN EVEN MORE FORMIDABLE TASK IN
ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY ACROSS RUSSIA THAN YELTSIN
DID. THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND SENIOR MILITARY
LEADERS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO RESIST HIS
INITIATIVES. MOREOVER, TO STAFF THE SENIOR LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO BRING IN HIS OWN
PEOPLE, MOST OF WHOM WOULD BE DRAWN FROM HIS ALLIES IN
THE MILITARY AND LACKING IN EXPERIENCE IN RUNNING A
GOVERNMENT.
-- LEBED'S CORE SUPPORT WOULD COME FROM THE
DISAFFECTED WORKING CLASSES, NOT THE LIBERAL
INTELLIGENTSIA (WHOSE SUPPORT LEBED HAS ALREADY
REJECTED). DISAFFECTED RUSSIAN WORKERS HAVE FEWER
QUALM
S ABOUT USING FORCE TO RECTIFY WHAT THEY SEE AS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INJUSTICES. (INDEED, ONE LEBED
INFORMAL ADVISOR, POLITICAL COMMENTATOR ANDRANIK
C O N r i D C N T I / r t SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 032207
CLINTON Ligfimr-PHOTOCOPY
�GONriDCNTIAtT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN-LEBED ANALOGY
MIGRANYAN, TOLD POLOFF ONE OF HIS GREATEST CONCERNS IS
THAT LEBED WOULD TRY TO ORGANIZE MASSIVE WORKERS'
DEMONSTRATIONS IN MOSCOW, WHICH MIGRANYAN WAS
PERSUADED WOULD TURN VIOLENT.)
LEBED'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN
10. 46)—WHETHER LEBED WILL ULTIMATELY RISE TO POWER
IN RUSSIA REMAINS TO BE SEEN. OPINION IN MOSCOW IS
DECIDEDLY MIXED, EVEN SINCE LEBED'S DISMISSAL FROM THE
SECURITY COUNCIL.
-- PEOPLE CLOSE TO CHUBAYS, INCLUDING FINANCIERS
BEREZOVSKIY AND GUSINSKIY, HAVE TOLD US THEY BELIEVE
LEBED WILL FADE QUICKLY BECAUSE HE LACKS A FINANCIAL
BASE AND GUARANTEED ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. MOREOVER,
THEY BELIEVE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO USE THEIR
CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL TELEVISION TO
FINISH HIM OFF AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL THREAT.
-- OTHERS, SUCH AS A CLOSE GORBACHEV ADVISER, VIKTOR
KUVALDIN, POINT OUT THAT YELTSIN HAD BEEN OUT OF THE
LIMELIGHT FOR WELL OVER A YEAR AFTER HE WAS FIRED AS
MOSCOW PARTY BOSS, ONLY TO RESURFACE AND RIDE A TIDE
OF ANTI-REGIME DISCONTENT INTO THE USSR CONGRESS OF
PEOPLES. IF THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT WHENEVER
THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OCCUR, KUVALDIN
ARGUES, LEBED WILL BE A LIKELY CHOICE TO PERSONIFY IT.
11. (SBU) ONE THING IS CLEAR, HOWEVER: TODAY'S
RUSSIA IS NOT YESTERDAY'S SOVIET UNION. WHILE LEBED
COULD LEARN MUCH FROM YELTSIN'S RISE TO POWER, IF HE
TRIES TO RETRACE THE SAME PATH, HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FAIL. MOREOVER, EVEN IF LEBED SHOULD COME TO POWER
CONSTITUTIONALLY BY WINNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN
THE YEAR 2000, HIS VICTORY COULD BE DESTABILIZING IF
HE HAS NOT MADE PEACE WITH THE KEY ELITES BY THEN.
TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
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< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<"SSN>2207
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<"TOR>961120095452 M2502730
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A
A
A
A
CLINTON LtBRARX. P O O O Y
HTCP
�-GONriDIINTIAL-.
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON i m m . P O O O Y
HTCP
�-eeNPIDENTIAL .
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: GQNriDCNTIAL
DTG:1 91 721Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7733
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6680
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6786
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6823
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N r i D C N T I A LSECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 032143
E.O. 12958: 11/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS CAMPAIGN CORRUPTION SCANDAL
FADES
REF: MOSCOW 31819
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING
POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).
SUMMARY
2.-4GhTHE NOVEMBER 1 5 LEAK OF A PURPORTED
CONVERSATION AMONG PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHIEF CHUBAYS AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES ABOUT ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL PRACTICES HAS THUS FAR FAILED
TO DEVELOP INTO A FULL-BLOWN POLITICAL SCANDAL.
A DAY AFTER THE "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS"
PUBLICATION, MOST RUSSIAN MEDIA WERE MORE
PREOCCUPIED WITH WHO LEAKED THE RECORDED
CONVERSATION THAN ITS LEGAL AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS. BY SUNDAY, THE EXPLOSION IN
KASPIYSK HAD PUSHED THE STORY OFF THE FRONT
PAGES. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCING LEAK IS THE LATEST
IN A SERIES OF REVELATIONS THAT HAVE TARRED CLOSE
CHUBAYS ASSOCIATES, BUT THUS FAR CHUBAYS HIMSELF
SHOWS SIGNS OF BECOMING THE "TEFLON" CHIEF OF
STAFF. CHUBAYS" FATE WILL ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED
NOT BY THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION BUT BY
YELTSIN. SHOULD HE DECIDE TO TAKE CHUBAYS DOWN A
ERE au526
CLINTON LieMK4-PH0T0C0P/ '
�• CONriDHNTIAL
PEG, HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY HIS USUAL
PREFERENCE FOR A BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG HIS
CLOSEST ASSOCIATES THAN BY REPORTS OF THEIR
MISCONDUCT. END SUMMARY.
HOW DO YOU SAY "DEEP THROAT" IN RUSSIAN?
3. (U) "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" STANDS VIRTUALLY
ALONE IN PUSHING THE CAMPAIGN FINANCING STORY AS
A MAJOR, PRESIDENCY-THREATENING SCANDAL. "MOSCOW
WATERGATE" TRUMPETED THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINE OF
THE NOVEMBER 16 EDITION. ON NOVEMBER 18 THE
PAPER PUBLISHED A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL
WATERGATE AFFAIR AS ITS LEAD STORY -- COMPLETE
WITH JUXTAPOSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF NIXON AND THE
WATERGATE HOTEL AND YELTSIN AND THE PRESIDENT
HOTEL IN MOSCOW. (THE PRESIDENT HOTEL HOUSED
YELTSIN'S CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS AND WAS THE SITE
OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION AMONG CHUBAYS,
ILYUSHIN AND KRASAVCHENKO.)
KTO KOGO?
4. 4e*-MAINSTREAM MEDIA HAVE BEEN MORE
PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PERPETUAL RUSSIAN QUESTION
OF "KTO KOGO" (WHO IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM) THAN
WITH THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CAMPAIGN ILLEGALITIES. VIRTUALLY ALL THE MEDIA
AND OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT FORMER PRESIDENTIAL
BODYGUARD KORZHAKOV IS NOT THE ONLY SUSPECT, AND
PERHAPS NOT EVEN THE MOST LIKELY ONE. ON THE
NOVEMBER 16 "VREMYA" PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE,
ANCHORMAN DORENKO REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT
KORZHAKOV, CHERNOMYRDIN OR THE COMMUNISTS
ENGINEERED THE LEAK AND STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT
MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV HAD THE MOST TO BENEFIT FROM
TARRING CHUBAYS. A NOVEMBER 16 EDITORIAL BY
"NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA" CHIEF EDITOR TRETYAKOV, FOR
INSTANCE, WROTE THAT KORZHAKOV'S GROUP WAS NOT
THE ONLY GROUP TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN TOPPLING
THE "CHUBAYS GROUP." (IN PRIVATE, TRETYAKOV TOLD
POLCOUNS THAT HE THOUGHT CHERNOMYRDIN WAS BEHIND
THE LEAK).
5. (SBU) POLITICAL OBSERVER PAVEL VOSHCHANOV
NOTED IN "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" NOVEMBER 19 THAT
POLITICAL SCANDALS IN RUSSIA HAVE A SHORT SHELFLIFE. VOSHCHANOV LAMENTED THAT THE CHUBAYS
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL HAS ECLIPSED THE SCANDAL
OVER SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
CLINTON LtBRABXPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
BEREZOVSKIY'S DUAL RUSSIAN-ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP.
THE POLITICAL DRAMA IN BELARUS (WITH ITS
UNCOMFORTABLE PARALLELS TO RUSSIA CIRCA 1993) AND
THE EXPLOSION IN KASPIYSK HAVE, IN TURN, PUSHED
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL OFF THE FRONT PAGES.
THE REVELATION THAT ANOTHER CHUBAYS ASSOCIATE,
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION DEPUTY CHIEF YURIY
YAROV, WAS INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION SURROUN
DING THE
-€> 0 H f I C b N I I AtrSECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 032143
J
E.O. 12958: 11/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS CAMPAIGN CORRUPTION SCANDAL
FADES
AFGHAN VETERANS FUND BARELY REGISTERED IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE BOMBING AT THE KOTLYAKOVSKOYE
CEMETARY.
6. •fGfr-TAKEN TOGETHER, THE BEREZOVSKIY, YAROV,
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING SCANDALS ALL DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY TARNISH CHUBAYS BUT ARE UNLIKELY BY
THEMSELVES TO AFFECT HIS POLITICAL FATE. OUR
CONTACTS HAVE FOR SOME TIME NOTED THAT CHUBAYS
HAS AMASSED DISPROPORTONATE POWER AND INFLUENCE,
UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG KREMLIN
ELITES, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT
SOMEONE IS COORDINATING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST
CHUBAYS. RATHER, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS APPEAR TO
BE TAKING SHOTS AT CHUBAYS AND HIS ALLIES FOR
THEIR OWN PERSONAL REASONS.
7.4€t-IN ANY EVENT, CHUBAYS' FATE WILL ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED NOT BY THE COURT OF PUBLIC
OPINION BUT BY YELTSIN, ONCE HE RETURNS TO FORM.
SHOULD YELTSIN DECIDE TO TAKE CHUBAYS DOWN A PEG,
HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY HIS USUAL
PREFERENCE FOR A BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG HIS
CLOSEST ASSOCIATES THAN BY CONCERNS OVER THEIR
MISCONDUCT.
COMMENT
8. (SBU) WITH MOST RUSSIAN MEDIA ALREADY
PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER NEWSWORTHY STORIES, ONLY
THE DUMA HAS THE POTENTIAL AND MOTIVATION TO KEEP
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL ALIVE, AND EVEN IT
FACES SHARP CONSTRAINTS. ANY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY A SPECIALLY CREATED PARLIAMENTARY
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ABUSES RAISED BY
CLINTON LiSM^rPHOTOCOPY
�•CQNriDCNTIAC
THE "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" STORY WILL DEPEND ON
COOPERATION FROM THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE, WHICH
IS NOT A DISINTERESTED PARTY IN THE DISPUTE. IN
TRUTH, AS THE WEEKLY "NOVAYA GAZETA" COMMENTED ON
NOVEMBER 18, MOSCOW'S POLITICAL ACTIVISTS HAVE
KNOWN FOR MONTHS THAT YELTSIN'S CAMPAIGN RECEIVED
ILLEGAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THAT CHUBAYS' PEOPLE
HANDLED DOLLARS BY THE BOXLOAD. SINCE THE
STORY'S SHOCK VALUE ALREADY SEEMS TO HAVE FADED,
THE ONLY REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SCANDAL
WILL RESURFACE AT ANOTHER TIME, PERHAPS IN
COMBINATION WITH NEW ALLEGATIONS, AND DO REAL
DAMAGE TO CHUBAYS. TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON L
DU
0T0C0PY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:181527Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7646
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
G O N M D C N T I A L MOSCOW 031 972
CORRECTED
C O P Y (MISSING TEXT)
STATE FOR EUR/RUS (GESHWILER) AND OES/RPI (PIFER)
WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP (CAMPBELL)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/01
TAGS: TPHY, KGCC, KSCA, RS
SUBJECT: KGCC: BATTLE BREWING BEHIND THE SCENES ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE OF THE GCC SCIENCE COMMITTEE
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ESTCOUNS JOHN ZIMMERMAN. REASON:
1.5(D).
2. 4GH>UMMARY: SENIOR OFFICIALS WORKING FOR PRESIDENT
YELTSIN'S SCIENCE ADVISOR NIKOLAY MALYSHEV RECENTLY TOLD
US THAT THEY ARE IN THE "INVESTMENT BANKING BUSINESS."
ALSO, THEY SAID THAT MALYSHEV INTENDS TO TAKE OVER THE COCHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GCC S AND T COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY.
3. te)-"0N NOVEMBER 15, ESTCOUNS HAD LUNCH WITH TWO SENIOR
OFFICIALS FROM THE OFFICE OF NIKOLAY G. MALYSHEV, SCIENCE
ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN: GEORGIY MARKOSOV,
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE FUND
FOR PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS, AND LEONID AVRAMENKO, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS. THE
CONVERSATION LARGELY CENTERED AROUND THE FUND'S ACTIVITIES
AND MALYSHEV'S FUTURE.
4. 4erWHEN ASKED TO DESCRIBE HOW THE FUND OPERATED,
MARKOSOV WAS DIRECT IN CHARACTERIZING IT AS "AN INVESTMENT
BANK" WHICH ARRANGES FINANCING VIA WESTERN INVESTORS FOR
THE VARIOUS GOR CONTRACTORS PARTICIPATING IN FUND
PROGRAMS. THE FUND'S MOST RECENT ENDEAVOUR IS A U.S.RUSSIAN JOINT VENTURE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; MARKOSOV WILL
RETURN SOON TO THE U.S. TO COMPLETE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO SECURE EX-IM BANK FINANCING FOR THE
j r w n M A CCIICiriCFft
UM.LASMMM&
PER E.0.13526
�•CONriDCNTIAL
PROJECT. DURING A QUICK OVERVIEW OF FUND PROGRAMS,
ESTCOUNS ASKED AVRAMENKO WHAT THE "MOBIL'NIY KOMPLEKS"
WAS. AFTER AVRAMENKO EXPLAINED THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO
BUILD MOBILE OIL/GAS EXPLORATION RIGS, MARKOSOV ADDED THAT
THIS WAS ONE PARTICULAR PROGRAM WHICH WAS NOT OPEN TO
FOREIGN INVESTORS.
5. tej-WHEN ESTCOUNS ASKED HIS HOSTS ABOUT THE RUMOR THAT
FORMER MINISTER OF SCIENCE BORIS SALTYKOV WOULD REPLACE
MALYSHEV, BOTH OFFICIALS BRISTLED AND REPLIED THAT THIS
WAS A SILLY STORY WHICH SHOULD HAVE DIED OUT LONG AGO.
MARKOSOV THEN WENT ON THE OFFENSIVE, STATING THAT MALYSHEV
SHOULD BE THE COUNTERPART ON THE GCC SCIENCE COMMITTTEE TO
DR. GIBBONS AND THAT THE CHANGE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED
PRIOR TO THE NEXT GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSSION MEETING.
(THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, EXPAIN HOW MALYSHEV INTENDED TO
REMOVE DUPUTY PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR FORTOV FROM THE
POSITION OF RUSSIAN CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE S AND T COMMITTEE.)
6. •(GfCOMMENT: WHILE IN THE PAST WE HAVE OFFHANDEDLY
DESCRIBED NIKOLAY MALYSHEV AS YELTSIN'S "INVESTMENT
ADVISOR" -- NOT HIS SCIENCE ADVISOR -- THIS DESCRIPTION
MAY BE MORE APT WITH EACH PASSING DAY. ACCORDING TO THEIR
OWN CHARACTERIZATION, MARKOSOV AND AVRAMENKO PUT TOGETHER
BUSINESS DEALS ON THE FUND'S AND MALYSHEV'S BEHALF; THEY
NEVER MENTIONED A SINGLE, REAL SCIENCE PROJECT DURING THE
ENTIRE LUNCHEON. IF MALYSHEV SUCCEDES IN TAKING OVER THE
CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GCC S AND T COMMITTEE, IT WILL BE
INTERESTING TO SEE IN WHAT DIRECTION HE TRIES TO TAKE THE
COMMITTEE'S WORK. END COMMENT.
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
< SSN>1972
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 9081048 M2500435
A
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON
UBBARXL P O O O Y
HTCP
�GOMnnCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: NSC, EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PASSDOWN, PIFER, RUMER, SUM,
SUM2, WISE, SIT{C2}
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL-
DTG:1 51701Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7566
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6652
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6795
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6758
C 0 N C I D C N T I A-t SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03181 9
E.O. 12958: 11/15/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS BECOMES LATEST TARGET IN KOMPROMAT
WAR
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON 1.5 (B).
SUMMARY
2. (SBU) ON 15 NOVEMBER, THE POPULAR NEWSPAPER
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" PUBLISHED THE PURPORTED
TRANSCRIPT OF A JUNE 22 CONVERSATION AMONG TOP YELTSIN
CAMPAIGN ADVISERS IN WHICH THEY URGENTLY DISCUSSED HOW
TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL FALL-OUT FROM THE ARRESTS OF
CAMPAIGN ASSOCIATES YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY. OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THEN-PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN CHIEF
CHUBAYS, FIRST PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ILYUSHIN, AND
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER KRASAVCHENKO WAS TO COVER UP
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DETAILING ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING. THE NEWSPAPER STRONGLY HINTED THAT FAPSI
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECORDING THE CONVERSATION, BUT IT
DID NOT INDICATE WHO TURNED THE TAPE OVER TO THE
NEWSPAPER. EMBASSY CONTACTS AGREE THAT FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY CHIEF KORZHAKOV IS THE MOST
LIKELY SOURCE, BUT THEY ALSO SAY THAT MANY OTHERS HAVE
A STRONG INTEREST IN DISCREDITING CHUBAYS. WE CAN BE
CERTAIN THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ONLY THE LATEST -- NOT
THE LAST -- ROUND IN AN AN ESCALATING WAR OF
CLINTON LiSMRX. PHOTOCOPY
p
m
^
�CONriDCNTIAL.
"KOMPROMAT" (COMPROMISING MATERIALS), WHICH IS MORE
LIKELY TO FURTHER UNDERMINE POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE
AUTHORITIES IN GENERAL THAN IN PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS.
END SUMMARY.
THE NOT-SO-SECRET SECRET CONVERSATION
3. (U) "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS," THE MOST WIDELY READ
NEWSPAPER IN MOSCOW, CARRIED IN ITS NOVEMBER 15 EDITION
THE PURPORTED TRANSCRIPT OF A CONVERSATION AMONG
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGISTS CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN,
AND KRASAVCHENKO. ACCOMPANYING EDITORIAL NOTES MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AFTER CHUBAYS
ASSOCIATES YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY WERE ARRESTED ON
JUNE 19 WHILE CARRYING A BOX FILLED WITH USD 500,000
OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT "WHITE HOUSE." THE DAY AFTER THE
ARREST, FOLLOWING THE DISMISSALS OF KORZHAKOV, FIRST
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SOSKOVETS, AND FSB DIRECTOR
BARSUKOV, CHUBAYS CHARGED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT
THE ARREST WAS A SET UP AND THE MONEY HAD BEEN PLANTED
ON THE TWO MEN. THE LEAKED CONVERSATION, HOWEVER,
REVEALS THAT THE THREE YELTSIN ADVISERS KNEW ABOUT THE
MONEY AND KNEW THAT KORZHAKOV HAD ACQUIRED
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE OF ITS EXISTENCE AND OTHER
FINANCIAL ABUSES, INCLUDING HARD CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.
MOREOVER, THE TRANSCRIPT SUGGESTS THAT YELTSIN WAS
INFORMED OF ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN FINANCIAL ACTIVITITES
AFTER THE ARRESTS BUT THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST THAT
YELTSIN KNEW OF SUCH PRACTICES. HIS ADVISERS EVIDENTLY
FEARED THAT KORZHAKOV HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO HAND
THIS MATERIAL TO GENERAL PROCURATOR SKURATOV AND TO
MOSCOW FSB CHIEF TROFIMOV, FROM WHENCE THEY EXPECTED IT
TO REACH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS.
4. (U) THE TRANSCRIPT INDICATES THAT THE MOST URGENT
ISSUE FOR THE CAMPAIGN STAFF WAS PREVENTING THE
EVIDENCE FROM BECOMING PUBLIC BEFORE THE JULY 3 RUN-OFF
ELECTION. ILYUSHIN CONFIDENTLY STATED THAT THEY COULD
RELY ON NTV PRESIDENT MALASHENKO (A CAMPAIGN ADVISER),
FEDERAL TV AND RADIO SERVICE CHAIRMAN LAZUTKIN, RUSSIAN
PRESS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LAPTEV, AND OTHER LOYAL
FIGURES IN THE MEDIA TO HUSH UP THE EVIDENCE. THEY
ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO GAIN
GENERAL PROSECUTOR SKURATOV'S COOPERATION IN SITTING ON
THE EVIDENCE UNTIL AFTER THE RUN-OFF ELECTION, OR EVEN
TO HAVE YELTSIN REQUEST THE DOCUMENTS FROM SKURATOV "TO
ANALYZE" AND THEN HAVE THEM CONVENIENTLY DISAPPEAR.
SWIFT REACTION
5. (U) NTV, WHOSE REPUTATION FOR JOURNALISTIC
INDEPENDENCE IS FURTHER JEOPARDIZED BY THE LEAKED
CLINTON LIBRAEX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
TRANSCRIPT, REPOR
TED IN ITS AFTERNOON NEWSCAST NOVEMBER
15 THE QUICK REACTION PROVOKED BY THE PUBLICATION:
-- PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY CONVENED A
PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE THAT CHUBAYS, NOT
SURPRISINGLY, "CATEGORICALLY DENIES THAT THE
CONVERSATION EVER TOOK PLACE."
-- LED BY "PEOPLE'S POWER" DEPUTY BABURIN, THE DUMA
•C 0 N T I D L N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 031 819
E.O. 12958: 11/15/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: CHUBAYS BECOMES LATEST TARGET IN KOMPROMAT
WAR
DEBATED THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT AT ITS REGULAR SESSION
TODAY. SECURITY COMMITTEE (AND CPRF DEPUTY) ILYUKHIN
ANNOUNCED THAT THE DUMA WOULD FORM A COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE THE DOCUMENT'S AUTHENTICY AND WOULD APPEAL
TO YELTSIN TO LOOK INTO THE REVELATIONS OF FINANCIAL
ABUSES.
SOURCES AND MOTIVATIONS
6.4Gf-ALL OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT KORZHAKOV IS THE
MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, BUT HE IS
NOT THE ONLY SUSPECT: CHUBAYS' ENEMIES ARE LEGION.
-- SERGEY KOLESNIKOV, A CLOSE ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN, TOLD POLOFF THAT THE TRANSCRIPT IS
AUTHENTIC AND THAT KORZHAKOV WAS THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE
OF THE LEAK. HE INTIMATED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN WAS NOT
UNHAPPY TO SEE IT APPEAR IN THE PRESS BECAUSE OF THE
LATENT TENSIONS BETWEEN HIM AND CHUBAYS.
-- STEPAN KISELEV, A JOURNALIST AT "IZVESTIYA," TOLD
POLOFF ON NOVEMBER 14 THAT HE THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT
AUTHENTIC AND THAT KORZHAKOV HAD CIRCULATED IT TO THE
MEDIA, BUT "IZVESTIYA" HAD REFUSED TO PUBLISH IT.
- VALERIY SOLOVEY, AN EXPERT AT THE GORBACHEV
FOUNDATION WITH GOOD LINES INTO THE SECRET SERVICES,
ALSO ASSUMED THAT KORZHAKOV IS BEHIND THE LEAK.
MOREOVER, HE THOUGHT IT NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE
TRANSCRIPT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED ON THE SAME DAY THAT
KORZHAKOV WAS OFFICIALLY REGISTERED AS A CANDIDATE IN
THE UPCOMING TULA ELECTION FOR A STATE DUMA SEAT. HE
POINTED OUT, AND POLOFF VERIFIED, THAT THE DUMA
ELECTION LAW GRANTS CANDIDATES LIMITED IMMUNITY FROM
PROSECUTION AND ARREST (ANY LEGAL ACTION WOULD HAVE TO
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�"CONriDCNTIAlL
BE SANCTIONED BY THE GENERAL PROCURATOR).
-- SUGGESTING THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE TAPED
CONVERSATION HAVE BEEN KNOWN FOR SOME TIME, RUSSIAN
PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT) GENERAL DIRECTOR BLAGOVOLIN
TOLD POLOFFS ON OCTOBER 31 THAT "WE HAD NOT HEARD THE
LAST OF THE BOX WITH THE MONEY."
COMMENT
7.4ehWE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, BUT ITS REVELATIONS OF ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCING TRACK WITH WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FOR
MONTHS. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HARD CURRENCY WAS
INVOLVED (DOLLARS ARE NOT LEGAL TENDER IN RUSSIA) AND
THAT THE SUMS VASTLY EXCEEDED LEGAL CAMPAIGN LIMITS.
THAT KORZHAKOV SHOULD BE THE PRIME SUSPECT IN LEAKING
THE TRANSCRIPT IS NO SURPRISE, BUT WE WOULD CAUTION
THAT HE IS NOT THE ONLY POLITICAL FIGURE TO BEAR A
GRUDGE AGAINST CHUBAYS. SOLOVEY, FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGHT
THE TRANSCRIPT COULD NOT HAVE APPEARED IN "MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS" WITHOUT AT LEAST THE APPROVAL OF MAYOR
LUZHKOV, WITH WHOM THE PAPER HAS LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED.
(HAD IT APPEARED IN "IZVESTIYA," HE SAID, HE WOULD BE
MORE INCLINED TO SUSPECT CHERNOMYRDIN, WHOM HE CLAIMS
NOW HAS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAPER.)
8. m - OF GREATER IMPORT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
LATEST ROUND IN THE "KOMPROMAT" WAR. IF THE BORIS
FEDOROV-NATIONAL SPORTS FOUNDATION ALLEGATIONS OF
KORZHAKOV-BARSUKOV-SOSKOVETS INVOLVEMENT IN EXTORTION
AND MURDER WERE PERHAPS MORE SENSATIONAL, THE LATEST
REVELATIONS CAST DOUBT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF YELTSIN'S
ELECTORAL VICTORY. WHILE CHUBAYS IS THE MOST OBVIOUS
TARGET, THE LATEST KOMPROMAT LEAK MAY DO MORE TO
DISCREDIT THE AUTHORITIES IN GENERAL THAN ANY ONE
INDIVIDUAL IN PARTICULAR. TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SSN>1819
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 5120928 M2495858
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
< SSN>1819
< T O R > 9 6 1 1 1 5121225 M2495864
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON imm.PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: CLARKER, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, LINDSAY, ORR, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, SHEEHAN,
WECHSLER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:141 511Z NOV 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7419
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 3340
C O N r i D C N T I A L MOSCOW 031658
EXDIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY BEREZOVSKIY ON CHECHNYA
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5(B,D) .
SUMMARY
2. 4GHSECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY
TOLD US NOVEMBER 6 HE WAS CONFIDENT HE COULD CUT A DEAL
WITH CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE, HE SAID, WOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN HIS HANDS.
ALTHOUGH HE OPPOSED CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE, THE KHASAVYURT
AGREEMENT, WHICH ALLOWED THAT POSSIBILITY, WAS "A FACT"
AND WOULD BE THE STARTING POINT FOR CURRENT TALKS. THE
KEY TO A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE "FOUR
TO FIVE" CHECHEN LEADERS WHO CONTROLLED THE SITUATION IN
CHECHNYA. THAT WOULD ENTAIL "GIVING MONEY TO CONCRETE
MEN." HE BELIEVED THE CHECHEN LEADERS WOULD EVENTUALLY
CUT A DEAL BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR OWN
ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION OVER THE LONG RUN, WERE
OPPOSED TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND UNDERSTOOD THAT
CHECHNYA COULD NEVER BE INDEPENDENT (EVEN IF THEY COULD
NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY NOW). BEREZOVSKIY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FIND THE TALKS MORE DIFFICULT THAN HE SUGGESTED IN THIS
CONVERSATION. IN PARTICULAR, FINDING THE NECESSARY MONEY
WILL BE A DAUNTING TASK GIVEN MOSCOW'S CURRENT BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS. END SUMMARY.
PER E 0 13526
o
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
o
�"CONriDCNTIAL
MOSLEM WORLD AS A THREAT
3. <te)-IN A MEETING WITH POL/INT CHIEF NOVEMBER 6,
SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY OUTLINED HIS
THINKING ON CHECHNYA. IN HIS VIEW, THE MOSLEM WORLD
PRESENTS A GROWING THREAT TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION, WHICH
THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER LEADING WESTERN STATES GROSSLY
UNDERESTIMATE. HE PROFESSES NOT TO BE ANTI-MOSLEM, BUT
SIMPLY ARGUES THAT THE MOSLEM WORLD IS JUST BEGINNING TO
EMERGE AS A MAJOR WORLD ACTOR ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY. LIKE ALL NEWCOMERS, IT IS YOUNG, DYNAMIC,
AND AGGRESSIVE, IN BEREZOVSKIY'S VIEW. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY WORRISOME SINCE RUSSIA IS IN A STATE OF
DECLINE AT A TIME WHEN IT MUST CONTINUE TO ACT AS A
BARRIER BETWEEN THE MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN WORLDS, AS IT HAS
HISTORICALLY.
4. i O - A S FAR AS CHECHNYA IS CONCERNED, BEREZOVSKIY
SAID, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT REMAIN A PART OF RUSSIA IF
RUSSIA IS TO REMAIN A BULWARK AGAINST THE MOSLEM WORLD.
DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS,
BEREZOVSKIY TOLD SEPARATIST LEADER MASKHADOV BEFORE
TELEVISION CAMERAS, "RUSSIA WILL PAY ANY PRICE FOR PEACE
AND STABILITY IN THE CAUCASUS, AND IT WILL PAY ANY PRICE
TO KEEP CHECHNYA IN RUSSIA." (ACCORDING TO BEREZOVSKIY,
THESE WORDS OF HIS WERE NOT REPORTED ON RUSSIAN
TELEVISION.)
4-5 MEN CAN SOLVE THE CHECHNYA PROBLEM
5. -(€)-BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES THAT THE SOLUTION TO
CHECHNYA LIES FIRST OF ALL IN IDENTIFYING THE FEW MEN THAT
ARE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THE SITUATION THERE. IN ANY
COUNTRY, ONLY A FEW PEOPLE COUNT, BEREZOVSKIY EXPLAINED.
"IN THE UNITED STATES IT MAY BE 200 HUNDRED FAMILIES,
PROBABLY FEWER; IN SOUTH KOREA, IT IS TWENTY,; IN
CHECHNYA, IT IS FOUR, PERHAPS FIVE, MEN." MOREOVER, IN A
PLACE LIKE CHECHNYA WHERE SOCIETY IS NOT WELL-FORMED (IN
BEREZOVSKIY'S VIEW), THESE FOUR OR FIVE MEN ARE CAPABLE OF
RADICALLY AND QUICKLY CHANGING THE MOOD AND STRUCTURE OF
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. DURING HIS TRIP TO THE CAUCASUS,
BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES, HE FOUND THESE FOUR OR FIVE MEN, WHO
INCLUDE MASKHADOV AND ICHKERIYA PRESIDENT YANDARBIYEV
(BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT NAME THE OTHERS.). THEY CONTROL
"EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA".
(BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD MET WITH MASKHADOV, BUT NOT
YANDARBIYEV, DURING HIS VISIT.)
CLINTON LiSfiAR^ P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONI ILtLNIIAL
NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT
6. -4€*-NOW THAT HE HAD IDENTIFIE
D THE KEY LEADERS, HOW
DOES BEREZOVSKIY PROPOSE TO PROCEED?
-- FIRST, HE ARGUED, THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE HAD TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE HANDS OF ONE
PERSON, THAT IS, HIS OWN. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
WOULD BE IMPORTANT ONLY IN GIVING THE NEGOTIATIONS
MOMENTUM AT THE BEGINNING AND SIGNING ANY AGREEMENT AT THE
END.
-- SECOND, ALL RUSSIAN OFFICIALS WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY
INVOLVED IN PROSECUTING THE WAR HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM THE
NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE THEY WERE DEFEATED BY THE CHECHENS,
THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPABLE OF MAKING THE
COMPROMISES NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE CHECHEN
SEPARATIST.
-- THIRD, THE KHASAVYURT AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BY THE
FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED HAS TO BE THE
STARTING POINT OF THE CURRENT TALKS, EVEN THOUGH
BEREZOVSKIY FINDS THEM INADEQUATE. IN PARTICULAR, THE
MENTIONING OF EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENCE FOR
CHECHNYA WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE. NEVERTHELESS, "THE
AGREEMENT IS A FACT," AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO
NOWHERE IF MOSCOW TRIES TO REOPEN THAT AGREEMENT NOW.
-- FOURTH, MOSCOW NEEDS TO SATISFY THE REAL INTERESTS OF
THOSE FOUR OR FIVE MEN WHO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN
CHECHNYA. IN BEREZOVSKIY'S MIND, THAT ENTAILS "GIVING
MONEY TO CONCRETE INDIVIDUALS."
-- FIFTH, THE TASK IS CONSOLIDATING THE CHECHEN LEADERS.
MOSCOW'S RESORT TO A DIVIDE-AND-RULE STRATEGY BEFORE AND
DURING THE WAR HAD LED ONLY TO GREATER RESISTANCE AND LESS
HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.
-- SIXTH, OSCE ASSISTANCE GROUP LEADER GUILDIMANN HAS A
ROLE TO PLAY IN PERSUADING THE CHECHEN LEADERS THAT THEY
ARE BEING DEALT WITH FAIRLY AND NOT FALLING INTO ANY
TRAPS. (BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT
GULDIMANN APPEARED INCLINED TO TAKE THE CHECHEN
SEPARATISTS'S SIDE AND WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS A
REFLECTION OF THE WEST'S TRUE GOALS IN THE REGION. HIS
TALKS WITH CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS HAD, HOWEVER, CAUSED
HIM TO REASSESS GUIDIMANN'S ROLE, ALTHOUGH HE STILL WISHED
GUILDIMANN WOULD BE LESS PARTISAN.)
THE CHECHEN LEADERS ARE GOOD "SOVIETS"
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�-eONnOCNTIAL
—
7. «t6t BEREZOVSKIY SAID HE HAD COME AWAY FROM HIS FIRST
TALKS WITH THE CHECHEN LEADERS WITH A SENSE OF RESPECT FOR
THEM AND ALSO A CONVICTION THAT HE CAN CUT A DEAL. THE
CHECHEN LEADERS ARE "SMART, EVEN IF THEY HAVE A BIT OF
EASTERN IRRATIONALISM ABOUT THEM." THEY UNDERSTAND THAT
CHECHNYA'S FATE IS TIED WITH RUSSIA, AND THEY ARE WORRIED
ABOUT THEIR OWN ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION OVER THE
LONG RUN. IN PARTICULAR, THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
YOUNG CHECHENS, WHO, THEY BELIEVE, ARE PRONE TO TURNING TO
NARCOTICS AND VIOLENCE IF NOT GAINFULLY EMPLOYED, AND
SMALL "BANDIT FORMATIONS," WHO ALLEGEDLY RECEIVE OFFERS TO
CARRY OUT TERRORIST AND OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIONS FROM A
WIDE VARIETY OF SOURCES. (NINETY PERCENT OF THE REQUESTS
COME FROM RUSSIA, BEREZOVSKIY SAID, BUT SOME HAVE COME
FROM SPAIN, ITALY, AND ELSEWHERE.)
8. 4G)-IN ADDITION, THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS WERE
EDUCATED IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED. "THEY
HAVE LITTLE LOVE FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ARE
OPPOSED TO THE SHARIAT, ALTHOUGH THEY REALIZE THEY ARE NOT
POWERFUL ENOUGH TO RESIST ITS INTRODUCTION AT THIS TIME.
MOREOVER, THEY ARE ALSO NOT DEADSET ON INDEPENDENCE, BUT
REALIZE THEY CANNOT PUBLICLY EXPRESS THEIR DOUBTS FOR THE
TIME BEING.
BUILDING TRUST
9. -(GHOVERALL, BEREZOVSKIY THOUGHT HIS INITIAL TALKS
WITH THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS HAD GONE WELL. HE HAD
UNDERTAKEN CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS AND WAS NOW MAKING GOOD ON
THEM. "I PROMISED MASKHADOV A MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN;
THAT HAS BEEN DECIDED. I PROMISED THEM THAT (PRO-MOSCOW
CHECHEN LEADER) ZAVGAYEV WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE
PROCESS; HE HAS BEEN REMOVED. I PROMISED THEM THAT MOSCOW
WOULD AGREE TO THEIR ELECTIONS JANUARY 27, WE HAVE
AGREED." THERE WERE A FEW OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) THINGS THAT
REMAINED TO BE D
ONE, BUT BEREZOVSKIY WAS CONFIDENT THE
PIECES WERE FALLING INTO PLACE. (HE SAID HE HAD NOT
REQUESTED THE CHECHEN SIDE TO UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATIONS
VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE FIRST STEP HAD TO
COME FROM MOSCOW AND THAT IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON HIM AND
MOSCOW TO WIN THE CHECHEN SEPARATIST LEADERS' CONFIDENCE.)
ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP MATTER
10.
AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, BEREZOVSKIY SAID
THAT RECENT REPORTS THAT HE HAD TAKEN ON ISRAELI CITIZEN-
CLINTON LiSM^PHOTOCOPY
�-CONriDCNTIAL'
SHIP WERE ACCURATE. "I DID IT IN 1993 AND HAD TOTALLY
FORGOTTEN ABOUT IT." HE HAD, HOWEVER, RECENTLY REVOKED
HIS ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE MOUNTING
PUBLIC SCANDAL. MOREOVER, JUDGING BY A PHONE CONVERSATION
HE HAD IN POL/INT CHIEF'S PRESENCE, HE WAS SEEKING TO HAVE
THE REVOCATION ANTEDATED TO PRECEDE HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT
HIS REVOKING ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP WOULD DAMAGE HIS STANDING
WITH THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES
AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S. AND ISRAELI LEADERS WOULD
UNDERSTAND WHY HE HAD TAKEN THAT STEP.
COMMENT
11. 4G*~ WHILE BEREZOVSKIY IS KNOWN FOR HIS CONFIDENCE
AND HIS ABILITY TO GET THINGS DONE, CUTTING A DEAL WILL
PROVE MORE DIFFICULT THAN HE SUGGESTED IN THIS
CONVERSATION. HIS CONFIDENCE THAT ONLY FOUR OR FIVE MEN
CONTROL THE SITUATION IS MISPLACED AND IGNORES THE LARGER
SOCIAL FORCES AT WORK THAT WILL IMPEDE PROGRESS TOWARD A
SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, EVEN IF HE IS RIGHT THAT GIVING
MONEY TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE IS THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT, IT
IS NOT CLEAR WHERE HE WILL FIND THE MONEY. "KOMMERSANTDAILY" (NOVEMBER 6) REPORTED THAT MAJOR MOSCOW BANKS WERE
NOT ABOUT TO MAKE THE LARGE INVESTMENTS IN CHECHNYA
BEREZOVSKIY IS NOW URGING. THAT SAID, BEREZOVSKIY WILL
PROBABLY PROVE CAPABLE OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS AND
PREVENTING A SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE
GROUND IN CHECHNYA.
12. t e r FINALLY, BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT MENTION SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY RYBKIN WHILE DISCUSSING CHECHNYA, EVEN
THOUGH RYBKIN IS TECHNICALLY IN CHARGE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THAT PROBABLY REFLECTS BEREZOVSKIY'S
CONFIDENCE BOTH IN HIS OWN SKILLS AND IN HIS TIES TO
CHERNOMYRDIN. TEFFT
< SECT>SECT10N: 01 OF 01
< SSN>1658
< TOR>961114115228 M2493602
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FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LfcSMliX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
PREC: ROUTINE CLASS:-GGNfHBENTWl SSN: 4224MSGID: M2534934
RAACZYUW RUEHMOA4224 3461729-CCCC-RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111729ZDEC96
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9104
INFO: RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6967
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7006
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6829
G O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS t ^ w A ^
SUBJECT: FINANCIER ^ M H M
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RUSSIAN POLITICS
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5(D)
SUMMARY
2. {e)-OVER LUNCH WITH CHARGE DECEMBER 5, MOST
FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT H ^ ^ B i , WIDELY COr*
ONE OF RUSSIA'S MOST INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMEN:
- ARGUED THAT DISINFORMATION TYING LEADING RUSSIAN
BUSINESSMEN TO THE MAFIA IS BEING SPREAD BY THE
RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES TO PERSUADE THE WEST TO STEM
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND BY NON-RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN HOPING
TO COMPROMISE THEIR RUSSIAN COMPETITORS.
- CLAIMED HE AND OTHER LEADING BUSINESSMEN HAD
BECOME SO INFLUENTIAL THAT THEY NO LONGER HAD TO PAY
BRIBES, BUT ADMITTED MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV OFTEN TURNS
TO HIM "FOR FAVORS" THAT HELP BURNISH LUZHKOV'S IMAGE
(E.G., MONEY FOR THE CHRIST THE SAVIOR CATHEDRAL).
- SAID THAT OVER THE PAST YEAR LEADING BUSINESSMEN
HAD REALIZED THAT THEY HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND
RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND COULD NOT SIMPLY
CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE.
- HOPED, BUT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENT, YELTSIN
WOULD DEVOTE HIS SECOND TERM TO ACCELERATING REFORM
AND FIGHTING CRIME. END SUMMARY
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AND FIGHTING CRIME. END SUMMARY
3. (U) MOST FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT VLADIMIR
mmm^m is WIDELY CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMEN IN RUSSIA TODAY, HE IS AMONG
THE SEVEN BANKERS WHO, SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY
SECRETARY (AND FINANCIER) BEREZOVSKIY HAS CLAIMED,
DOMINATE THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND HAVE TREMENDOUS
POLITICAL INFLUENCE. IN HIS INITIAL MEETING WITH THE
CHARGE, • • • • OFFERED AN INTRODUCTION INTO WHAT IS
ON THE MIND OF RUSSIA'S NEW BREED OF BIG CAPITALISTS.
HIS COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARE
REPORTED SEPTEL. OTHER HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.
RUSSIAN BUSINESS
4
- i ^ T W K K K K M COMPLAINED ABOUT WHAT HE SAW AS THE
WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION IN THE WEST THAT RUSSIAN
BUSINESS AND THE MAFIA ARE CLOSELY LINKED. "WE
OURSELVES ARE TO BLAME FOR THAT," HE NOTED. IN 19911992, WITH THE BREAK UP OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT STABILITY IN RUSSIA, CAPITAL
FLIGHT HAD BECOME A MAJOR DRAIN ON THE RUSSIAN
ECONOMY. IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE WESTERN COUNTRIES
TO STEM THIS FLIGHT, • • • • • CONTINUED, THE RUSSIAN
SPECIAL SERVICES BEGAN TO SPREAD THE NOTION THAT ALL
MONEY FLOWING OUT OF RUSSIA WAS ULTIMATELY LINKED TO
ORGANIZED CRIME. TODAY, SUCH DISINFORMATION IS SPREAD
BY NOT ONLY THE SPECIAL SERVICES BUT ALSO NON-RUSSIAN
BUSINESSMEN TO COMPROMISE THEIR RUSSIAN COMPETITORS.
MORE SPECIFICALLY, • • • • CLAIMED THAT FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES HEAD KORZHAKOV (AND
^ H ^ H ' S NEMESIS) HAD VERY GOOD TIES IN FRANCE AND
SWITZERLAND AND WAS USING THOSE CHANNELS TO SPREAD
ALLEGATIONS OF CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN M m m m AND
ORGANIZED CRIME.
5 -terwa^^m DID NOT DENY THAT MANY RUSSIAN
.
BUSINESSMEN, INCLUDING HIMSELF, HAD ENGAGED IN DUBIOUS
ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY AS THEY WERE SETTING UP THEIR
OPERATIONS AND ACCUMULATING CAPITAL. NEVERTHELESS, A
NUMBER OF BIG BUSINESSMEN HAD NOW EMERGED - FOR
EXAMPLE, THE BEREZOVSKIY'S SEVEN BANKERS - WHO WERE SO
LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL ENOUGH THAT THEY NO LONGER HAD
TO ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES AND NO LONGER DID.
6. {G)-THE MOST FINANCIAL GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, NO
LONGER PAYS BRIBES, • • • • • I CONTINUED, WHILE
ADMITTING THAT HE STILL ENJOYED A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
WITH MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV, WHO FROM TIME TO TIME
TURNED TO H H ^ B "FOR FAVORS." LUZHKOV IS NOT
INTERESTED IN MflNEV; HE IS INTERESTED IN "VLAST"
(POWER AND AUTHORITY), ^ ^ H H NOTED. TO ENHANCE
HIS REPUTATION, LUZHKOV WAULE) A&K • H ^ H AND OTHERS
TO HELP, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH REBUILDING THE BORDER
GUARDS APARTMEN
�TTN TRR P O O O Y
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GUARDS APARTMfetiT BLOC, DESTROYED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK
IN KASPIYSK, DAGESTAN, LAST MONTH, OR THE CHRIST THE
SAVIOR CATHEDRAL IN MOSCOW; REPAIRING MOSCOW ROADS; OR
PAYING LOCAL SCHOOL TEACHERS' SALARIES. LUZHKOV, OF
- C O N F I D E N T I A T SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: FINANCIER
ON RUSSIAN POLITICS
COURSE, HAD LEVERAGE: WHEN • • • • DEMURRED THAT IT
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO COME UP WITH USE) ONE MILLION FOR
THE APARTMENT BLOC IN KASPIYSK BY THE END OF THE YEAR,
LUZHKOV SIMPLY NOTED THAT ^ ^ ^ H WOULD NEED TO GET
PERMISSION TO SET UP SATELLITE D\SHES FOR HIS DBS
CHANNEL (I.E., HE WOULD NOT GET IT IF HE WASN'T
FORTHCOMING). B H ^ H FOUND THE FUNDS.
7. 4&)r AT THE SAME TIME, • • • • ADMITTED THAT THE
DRIVERS FOR MOST'S FLEET OF 600-700 CARS STILL PAID
BRIBES TO THE TRAFFIC POLICE (THE NOTORIOUS
"GAISHNIKI") A COMMON ENOUGH OCCURRENCE. THE POLICE,
HOWEVER, NOW KNEW ENOUGH NOT TO STOP ^ ^ ^ H ' S
MERCEDES (THEY WOULD HAVE HELL TO PAY BECAUSE
mmmmm HAD POWERFUL FRIENDS), ^ ^ ^ H , HOWEVER,
SIMPLYDID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO COMPLAIN EACH TIME THE
TRAFFIC POLICE HARASSED ONE OF HIS DRIVERS. PAYING
THESE BRIBES WAS JUST A COST OF BUSINESS.
8.
OVERALL, W ^ ^ ^ m SAID, SECURITY WAS A MAJOR
EXPENSE FOR ALL I A R G I BUSINESSES, EATING UP AS MUCH AS
TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF INCOME (DOKHOD). ^ ^ H H
HIMSELF, HAD, HOWEVER, FOUND A WAY TO MAKEMONEY OUT
OF THIS SITUATION: "MOST" ITSELF HAD A LARGE SECURITY
FORCE IT HIRED OUT TO BUSINESSES AROUND MOSCOW.
RULES OF THE ROAD AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
9
H H H H ARGUED THAT TIES AMONG RUSSIA'S
LEADING BUSINESSMEN HAD SHARPLY IMPROVED OVER THE PAST
YEAR. THEIR COMMON EFFORT TO GET YELTSIN REELECTED
HAD BEEN BOTH A STIMULUS TO COOPERATION AND PROOF OF
ITS BENEFITS. THEY WERE SLOWLY DEVISING RULES OF THE
ROAD TO REGULATE THEIR COMPETITION. "I HATE
SMOLENSKIY (OF STOLICHNYY BANK) AND KHODORKOVSKIY (OF
MENATEP), BUT WE NEED TO COMPETE IN WAYS THAT DO NOT
DESTROY ALL OF US," ^ • H H
S i l D
10. -fe^-MOREOVER, • • • • • CONTINUED, AS A RESULT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THEIR GROWING
POLITICAL INFLUENCE, LEADING BUSINESSMEN NOW
UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD AN OBLIGATION TO LOOK OUT FOR
MORE THAN THEIR NARROW COMMERCIAL INTERESTS; THEY HAD
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS.
RUSSIA, • • • • • EXPLAINED, WAS NOT A DEMOCRATIC OR
EUROPEAN COUNTRY; IT IS AN ASIATIC COUNTRY. THE
�CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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COUNTRY WAS RUN BY AN OLIGARCHY, OF WHICH BUSINESSMEN
LIKE HIM WERE AN INTEGRAL PART, AND WOULD BE FOR SOME
TIME. THAT MIGHT BE UNFORTUNATE BUT IT WAS REALITY.
KOMPROMAT
11. i B f - ^ ^ ^ ^ m SAID HE KNEW WHERE THE RECENT
KOMPROMAT AGAINST CHUBAYS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN
YELTSIN'S REELECTION EFFORT WAS COMING FROM, LEAVING
THE CLEAR IMPRESSION IT WAS KORZHAKOV. HE DID NOT
THINK IT WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO MUCH. SINCE ALL
CANDIDATES HAD ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS AND FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY LEBED, NO ONE WAS REALLY INTERESTED IN
PURSUING THIS.
12. { G H B ^ H ™ WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF
THE CASE OF THE FAMOUS BOX WITH USD 500,000 CHUBAYS'
ASSOCIATES WERE CAUGHT TRYING TO TAKE OUT OF THE
RUSSIAN WHITE HOUSE, HE ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A CRIME. THAT SAID, HE HAD NO
DOUBTS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BOX AND THERE HAD BEEN
MONEY IN IT. THE POINT WAS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING
ILLEGAL IN WHAT CHUBAYS' ASSOCIATES WERE DOING.
YELTSIN AS THE LESSER EVIL
13. 4&t • m H I SAID HE HAD SUPPORTED YELTSIN FOR
PRESIDENT AS THE "LESSER EVIL." HE DISAGREED WITH
YELTSIN ON MANY ISSUES, BUT HE - LIKE HIS BUSINESS
FRIENDS - ALL REALIZED THAT IF THE COMMUNISTS HAD WON
THEY WOULD HAVE HAD BUT TWO CHOICES: EITHER TO GO
"WEST" (INTO EMIGRATION) OR "NORTH" (TO A LABOR CAMP).
FOR THAT REASON, THE MEDIA THESE BUSINESSMEN
CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED ALSO LINED UP SQUARELY BEHIND
YELTSIN. "IT MAY NOT HAV
E BEEN FAIR OR DEMOCRATIC AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE WEST WERE RIGHT FOR CRITICIZING
US - BUT WE FELT WE HAD NO CHOICE,"
CONCLUDED.
-G-0 i r r I D C N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034224
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/96
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: FINANCIER H H ^ H
ON RUSSIAN POLITICS
14. 'i&jr ANTICIPATING YELTSIN'S RETURN TO THE KREMLIN
AFTER HIS HEART OPERATION, H ^ ^ H HOPED YELTSIN
WOULD MOVE FORWARD ON TWOKEYISSUES: ECONOMIC REFORM
AND CRIME. YELTSIN WOULD NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT
REELECTION AND THEREFORE COULD TAKE NECESSARY BUT
UNPOPULAR MEASURES.
HOWEVER, WAS NOT
WHOLLY PERSUADED Y E L T S I N W O U L D MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
ELTSIN WOULD MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.
WHOLLY PERSUADED Y
ANTI-SEMITISM
1 5 . - ^ - A S K E D ABOUT ANTI-SEMITISM IN RUSSIA,
m m m / m SAID HE HAD BEEN DEALING WITH THIS ALL HIS
LIFE. HE HAD GROWN UP IN A WORKERS* BARRACKS, WHERE
HIS WAS THE ONLY JEWISH FAMILY. HE WAS INVOLVED IN
. NUMEROUS SCUFFLES WITH BOYS WHO MADE ANTI-SEMITIC
SLURS. LIKE THE JEWS IN ISRAEL, HE SAID, JEWS OF HIS
GENERATION IN RUSSIA HAD LEARN HOW TO FIGHT TO DEFEND
THEIR HONOR. AND THEY HAD DONE SO WITH SOME SUCCESS.
WHATEVER MANY RUSSIANS MIGHT THINK IN PRIVATE, PUBLIC
MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-SEMITISM HAD DECREASED
DRAMATICALLY, AND THAT WAS OF PRINCIPAL CONCERN TO
| AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY. IN THIS CONTEXT,
EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR AMBASSADOR
?S SUPPORT FOR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY.
COMMENT
16. -(O)- H H H H ' S COMMENTS REFLECT THOSE WE HEAR
FROM O T H E R T E A D I N G RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN AND BANKERS.
THEY ARE LOOKING FOR RESPECT, NOT ONLY IN RUSSIA BUT
ABROAD, AND ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE BAD NAME
RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME IS GIVING RUSSIAN BUSINESS.
INDEED, m / m ^ M RECENTLY TOLD A/POLCOUNS THAT HE
WOULD SOON BE SETTING UP A SMALL PUBLIC RELATIONS
UNIT, THE CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY OF WHICH WOULD BE
REBUTTING CHARGES THAT MOST BANK HAD MAFIA LINKS.
• ^ ^ H ALSO MENTIONED HE WAS GOING TO HAVE A
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION SHORTLY, WHICH WOULD SEPARATE
THE BANK FROM THE MEDIA, AND REMOVE HIM FROM RUNNING
THE BANK. AT THE SAME TIME, m m / ^ M CLEARLY WANTS
TO EXPLOIT HIS COZY RELATIONSHIP WITH LEADING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR PERSONAL GAIN, ESPECIALLY AS
HE MOVES MORE BOLDLY INTO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR. LIKE BEREZOVSKIY AND OTHERS, HE SEES NOTHING
WRONG WITH THIS, ARGUING THAT OLIGARCHIC RULE IS ONLY
APPROPRIATE FOR RUSSIA AT THIS STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT.
TEFFT
DIST:
DIST>
SIT: EGGERT FORT PASCUAL PIFER RUMER
SIT: NSC
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UUNI IUE1N I IAL
DTG:301 614Z OCT 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6685
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6565
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6672
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6714
C O ^ M D C N T I A - L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING.
REASON: 1.5 (D)
SUMMARY
2. 4G^ PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS IS
THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN KREMLIN POLITICS TODAY,
BESIDES THE AILING YELTSIN. HIS POWER RESTS ON
RELIABLE ACCESS TO YELTSIN, CLOSE TIES WITH LEADING
FINANCIERS, AND CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER THE MASS
MEDIA. LIKE THE OLD BOLSHEVIKS TO WHOM THEY ARE OFTEN
COMPARED, CHUBAYS AND HIS TEAM ARE TOUGH, AMBITIOUS,
AND CONFIDENT. HIS FATE IS CLOSELY TIED TO YELTSIN'S.
SHOULD YELTSIN DIE, THE IMMENSELY UNPOPULAR CHUBAYS
WOULD HAVE TROUBLE MAINTAINING HIS POSITION IN THE FACE
OF NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SHOULD YELTSIN RECOVER
FULLY FROM HEART SURGERY, HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
REIN CHUBAYS IN, IF ONLY TO ENLARGE HIS OWN ROOM FOR
MANEUVER. THE CURRENT AILING YELTSIN IN FACT OFFERS
CHUBAYS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN
POWER. THIS MIGHT NOT BE A BAD OUTCOME FOR THE WEST,
GIVEN CHUBAYS' REPUTATION AS A MARKET REFORMER. BUT
THE COMPANY CHUBAYS IS NOW KEEPING WITH FINANCIERS OF
DUBIOUS PROBITY SHOULD GIVE US PAUSE, AS SHOULD THE
TRUISM THAT POWER CORRUPTS. END SUMMARY.
3. (SBU) BY MOST ACCOUNTS, PRESIDENTIAL
CLINTON LiSRAKt P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS PLAYED THE LEAD ROLE IN
ENGINEERING LEBED'S DISMISSAL AS SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY. IT WAS ANOTHER FINE DEMONSTRATION OF
CHUBAYS' DEFT BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING SKILLS, WHICH HAS
LEFT HIM THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE - BESIDES THE AILING
YELTSIN - IN KREMLIN POLITICS TODAY.
FOUNDATIONS OF CHUBAYS' POWER
4.
CHUBAYS' POWER AND AUTHORITY REST ON SEVERAL
FOUNDATIONS, WHICH WERE LAID OR FORTIFIED DURING THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN EARLIER THIS YEAR:
-- RELIABLE AND READY ACCESS TO YELTSIN THROUGH
YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO, WHO HAS BEEN
CLOSELY ALLIED WITH CHUBAYS SINCE AT LEAST EARLY THIS
YEAR, ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOURCES IN CHUBAYS' INNER
CIRCLE. (FEW OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE INDEPENDENT
ACCESS TO YELTSIN. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN DOES,
BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW OFTEN HE TALKS TO YELTSIN
BEYOND THEIR WEEKLY MEETINGS.)
-- CLOSE TIES WITH LEADING FINANCIERS AND. BANKERS, IN
PARTICULAR, LOGOVAZ PRESIDENT BEREZOVSKIY, MOST
FINANCIAL GROUP PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY, ROSPROM (AND
FORMER MENATEP) HEAD KHODORKOVSKIY, AND FIRST DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER (AND FORMER ONEKSIMBANK PRESIDENT)
POTANIN.
-- CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY
NATIONAL TELEVISION, FACILITATED BY HIS BANKER FRIENDS.
BEREZOVSKIY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON
RUSSIAN PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT); GUSINSKIY OWNS NTV (AN
OSTENSIBLY INDEPENDENT CHANNEL). THE OTHER MAJOR
CHANNEL, RUSSIAN TV (RTR), IS STATE OWNED. IN A RECENTCONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, RTR DEPUTY DIRECTOR SVANIDZE
MADE IT CLEAR CHUBAYS SETS GOVERNMENT MEDIA POLICY.
5. • i & r IN ADDITION, LIKE THE OLD BOLSHEVIKS TO WHOM
THEY ARE OFTEN COMPARED, CHUBAYS AND HIS TEAM HAVE A
REPUTATION - JUSTIFIED, BASED ON OUR OBSERVATIONS - FOR
BEING TOUGH AND RUTHLESS, AMBITIOUS TO THE POINT OF
CYNICISM AND CONFIDENT TO THE POINT OF HUBRIS. CHUBAYS
HIMSELF, MANY BELIEVE IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
ADMINISTRATOR IN RUSSIA TODAY AND COMPARES FAVORABLY
WITH RUSSIA'S OTHER GREAT PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
ADMINISTRATORS, SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER STOLYPIN OF THIS
CENTURY, AND ALEKSANDR I'S STATE SECRETARY SPERANSKIY
OF THE LAST.
EXPANDING AUTHORITY
CLINTON I m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
6. (SBU) OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, CHUBAYS' HAS
USED HIS ACCESS TO YELTSIN, HIS AUTHORITY TO VE
TALL
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, AND YELTSIN'S RELATIVE ISOLATION
AND SHORT WORK DAY TO STRENGTHEN HIS BUREAUCRATIC BASE
AND EXPAND HIS RESPONSIBILITY.
e O N r i D E N T I A L-SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
- A DECREE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF
OCTOBER 2, FOR EXAMPLE, GAVE CHUBAYS BROAD
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CADRE POLICY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. IT ALSO ENSURED
THAT ALMOST ALL PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
HAVE ACCESS TO YELTSIN ONLY THROUGH CHUBAYS, WITH ONLY
PRESS SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
SHEVCHENKO RETAINING A DIRECT CHANNEL TO THE PRESIDENT.
-- ON OCTOBER 1 1 , YELTSIN NAMED CHUBAYS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION ON TAX COLLECTION.
THAT APPOINTMENT, CHUBAYS ALLY BEREZOVSKIY RECENTLY
TOLD US, WAS INTENDED TO GIVE CHUBAYS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, WHICH TECHNICALLY
IS SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO CHERNOMYRDIN.
- ON OCTOBER 2 1 , YELTSIN NAMED CHUBAYS HIS
REPRESENTATIVE ON A CONSULTATIVE POLICY-COORDINATING
COMMITTEE THAT ALSO INCLUDES CHERNOMYRDIN, FEDERATION
COUNCIL CHAIRMAN STROYEV, AND DUMA SPEAKER SELEZNEV.
DEPENDENCE ON YELTSIN
7. 4€*-MORE THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL
FIGURE, HOWEVER, CHUBAYS' FATE IS DEPENDENT ON
YELTSIN'S. IRONICALLY, BOTH YELTSIN'S DEATH AND FULL
RECOVERY FROM HEART SURGERY POSE SERIOUS THREATS TO
UNFETTERED EXERCISE OF CHUBAYS' CONSIDERABLE AUTHORITY.
8. t e r i N THE FIRST CASE, THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR
NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF
YELTSIN'S DEMISE. CHUBAYS HIMSELF WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE
OF BEING ELECTED: THE DATA OF CHUBAYS' POLLSTER,
PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION GENERAL DIRECTOR OSLON,
CONFIRMS THE PREVAILING OPINION THAT CHUBAYS IS THE
MOST UNPOPULAR POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA TODAY; ON OCTOBER
13, CHUBAYS' NEGATIVE RATING STOOD AT 69 PERCENT AND
�CONriDHNTIAL'
WAS GETTING WORSE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY CURRENTLY
PLAUSIBLE NEXT PRESIDENT, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION
OF CHERNOMYRDIN, WOULD GIVE CHUBAYS A POWERFUL POSITION
IN HIS ADMINISTRATION, AND EVEN CHERNOMYRDIN WOULD BE
SURE TO CUT CHUBAYS DOWN AT LEAST A NOTCH OR TWO.
9. 4 Q - IN THE SECOND CASE, YELTSIN WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY SEEK TO REIN CHUBAYS IN, IF ONLY TO ENLARGE
HIS OWN ROOM FOR MANEUVER. THAT WOULD ACCORD WITH
YELTSIN'S PREFERRED LEADERSHIP STYLE: THROUGHOUT HIS
PRESIDENCY, HE HAS SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN A CIRCLE OF
COMPETING FORCES OF ROUGHLY EQUAL STRENGTH AROUND HIM.
MOREOVER, CHUBAYS' RIVALS WITH THE POLITICAL ELITE INCLUDING CHERNOMYRDIN AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV - WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY USE IMPROVED ACCESS TO A HEALTHY YELTSIN TO
SEEK TO MODERATE CHUBAYS' INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY.
HOW LONG CAN THE CHUBAYS ERA LAST?
10. 4 e t - I F CHUBAYS' PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO CONSOLIDATE
AND EXPAND HIS POWER AND AUTHORITY, YELTSIN'S CURRENT
SEMI-ENGAGEMENT OFFERS CHUBAYS AN EXCELLENT
OPPORTUNITY. IF YELTSIN CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED ONLY
PARTIALLY, THE QUESTION IS HOW LONG CHUBAYS CAN OPERATE
BEFORE A COALITION OF KEY POLITICAL FORCES EMERGES TO
DEMAND THAT YELTSIN STEP DOWN. THE ANSWER IS:
PROBABLY FOR QUITE SOME TIME. FOR, WITH THE OBVIOUS
EXCEPTION OF LEBED, NO OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURE OR
FORCE APPEARS INTENT ON FORCING THE ISSUE, IN LARGE
PART BECAUSE NONE ARE PREPARED FOR EARLY PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS.
-- CHERNOMYRDIN AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV ARE BOTH
TRAILING LEBED BY LARGE MARGINS IN THE POLLS (OSLON'S
DATA ON VOTING INTENTIONS FROM OCTOBER 13 PUT BOTH IN
LOW SINGLE DIGITS, WHILE LEBED WAS CLOSE TO 30
PERCENT). WHILE BOTH HAVE THE FINANCES, NEITHER YET
HAS THE ORGANIZATION NEEDED TO RUN AN EFFECTIVE
CAMPAIGN. MOREOVER, NEITHER CAN COUNT ON THE UNDIVIDED
SUPPORT OF THE "PARTY OF POWER" THAT WAS INSTRUMENTAL
IN YELTSIN'S COME-FROM-BEHIND VICTORY THIS PAST SPRING.
- THE COMMUNIST/PATRIOTIC LEADERS LIKEWISE FEAR LEBED,
BUT IRONICALLY, THEY ALSO FEAR THEY COULD WIN EARLY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
. THEY ARE LOATHE, HOWEVER, TO
TAKE ON PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUSSIA'S SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE
IT WILL DETERIORATE SHARPLY IN THE NEXT FE7 MONTHS.
BOTH OUR CONTACTS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST/PATRIOTIC
G O N M - D E N T I A tr SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 030488
CLINTON LiSMfiX P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CHUBAYS' POWER
OPPOSITION AND OUTSIDE OBSERVERS SUGGEST THE
OPPOSITION'S PREFERENCE IS SOME KIND OF POWER-SHARING
ARRANGEMENT AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
HARDSHIPS TO COME.
POWER CORRUPTS
11. 4Gf-WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INDEFINITE
CONTINUATION OF CHUBAYS' UNCHECKED AUTHORITY WOULD BE
FOR RUSSIA'S FUTURE IS AN OPEN QUESTION. HE HAS A
WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR HAVING BEEN THE
INTELLECTUAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCE BEHIND RUSSIA'S
MARKET REFORM. WHETHER HE WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN A
REFORMER REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER. IN THE PAST FEW
WEEKS, CHUBAYS HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS TOP PRIORITY
IS CONSOLIDATING CENTRAL STATE POWER AND THAT HE WILL
LOOK TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF COERCION FOR SIGNIFICANT
HELP. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN RECENTLY DISCUSSING THE NEWLY
FORMED TEMPORARY EXTRAORDINARY COMMITTEE ON TAX
COLLECTION WITH THE PRESS, HE STRESSED ITS PUNITIVE
CHARACTER.
12. 4Gh AFTER A DECADE OF DISINTEGRATION, THE
CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER IS NOW NECESSARY TO THE
BUILDING OF BOTH AN EFFICIENT MARKET ECONOMY AND A
WELL-ORDERED DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN RUSSIA. BUT WE
SHOULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO THE MEANS, PARTICULARLY IN
A COUNTRY WITH A LONG TRADITION OF AUTOCRATIC AND
AUTHORITARIAN RULE WHERE TEMPORARY PUNITIVE MEASURES
HAVE A WAY OF BECOMING PERMANENT. WHILE WE SHOULD GIVE
CHUBAYS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AT THIS POINT, HIS
GROWING CLOSENESS TO FINANCIERS OF DUBIOUS PROBITY IS A
CAUSE FOR CONCERN. MOREOVER, AS CHUBAYS ACCUMULATES
POWER AND AUTHORITY, WE SHOULD ALSO REMEMBER A TRUISM:
AS IS THE CASE EVERYWHERE, BUT ESPECIALLY IN RUSSIA,
POWER CORRUPTS. PICKERING
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CLINTON LiSUAfiXt.PHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: FORT, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:030926Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8456
////
-ii U N I I U L I'J I I'A L MOSCOW 033241
EXDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" EDITOR ON CHUBAYS
TRANSCRIPT
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN ORDWAY, ACTING DCM. REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2.
IN A MEETING WITH POLOFFS NOVEMBER 25,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" (MK) CHIEF EDITOR GUSEV:
-- SAID HE WAS CONVINCED A TOP MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL HAD
MADE THE RECORDING OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION AMONG
CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN, AND KRASAVCHENKO RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN
MK. THAT MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL - AND NOT KRASAVCHENKO WAS THE REAL THIRD PERSON IN THE CONVERSATION. THE
OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE RECORDING TO COVER HIMSELF SHOULD
HIS OWN ROLE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING ABUSES COME TO LIGHT.
KORZHAKOV'S PEOPLE, HOWEVER HAD OBTAINED A COPY OF THE
TAPE AND LEAKED IT TO MK.
-- EXPECTED FURTHER LEAKS OF "KOMPROMAT," STRONGLY
SUGGESTING HE HAD ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON CHUBAYS AND
YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO.
-- CALLED SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY A
"PURE MAFIOSO," WHO HOPED TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE
AIRPORT IN GROZNYY FOR TRAFFICKING IN ILLICIT GOODS.
GUSEV IS AN INTERESTED PARTY AND HIS ALLEGATIONS SHOULD
„
^
rER E.0.1352©
CLINTON HfiMLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL •
BE TREATED WITH CAUTION. WE ARE REPORTING HIS STATEMENTS
BECAUSE OF THE INSIGHT THEY PROVIDE INTO THE MINDSET OF A
KEY PLAYER IN THE CURRENT BATTLE OF KOMPROMAT. END
SUMMARY.
GUSEVS VIEWS
3. -^GMN A DISCUSSION WITH POLOFFS NOVEMBER 25,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" (MK) CHIEF EDITOR, PAVEL GUSEV,
SHARED HIS IDEAS ON THE SOURCE BEHIND THE RECORDED
TRANSCRIPT DETAILING YELTSIN CAMPAIGN ABUSES PUBLISHED IN
MK NOVEMBER 15; THE MEDIA'S REACTION TO THIS PUBLICATION;
AND THE POSSIBLE CONS[QUENCES OF SUCH REVELATIONS. IN
PARTICULAR:
-- GUSEV STATED THAT THE THIRD PERSON IN THE RECORDING IS
NOT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT SERGEY KRASAVCHENKO. INSTEAD,
GUSEV WAS CONVINCED THAT THE THIRD PERSON IS A TOP MOSTGROUP OFFICIAL.
- WITHOUT NAMING NAMES, GUSEV OUTLINED HIS UNDERSTANDING
OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRANSCRIPT'S LEAK.
THE MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL INVOLVED IN THE CONVERSATION MADE
THE RECORDING HIMSELF AND DELIBERATELY COVERED UP HIS
NAME TO CONCEAL HIS ROLE IN THE BUGGING. IF THE MOSTGROUP OFFICIAL'S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE ABUSES EVER
CAME TO LIGHT, HE COULD THEN USE THE RECORDING TO BOLSTER
HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS ONLY TAKING ORDERS FROM FIRST
PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ILYUSHIN AND CAMPAIGN LEADER CHUBAYS.
THE MOST-GROUP OFFICIAL SHARED THE RECORDING WITH MOSTGROUP'S HEAD OF SECURITY, FILIP BOBKOV, FORMER KGB FIRST
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN. THE RECORDING SOMEHOW MADE IT FROM
BOBKOVS OFFICE TO HIS FORMER KGB ASSOCIATES (NOW WORKING
IN THE FSB). KORZHAKOV'S FRIENDS IN THE FSB THEN LEAKED
THE TAPE TO "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" TO DAMAGE CHUBAYS
AND TO TRY TO COMPEL PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO TAKE STEPS TO
REIN HIM IN.
- MEDIA REACTION TO THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT PROVES THAT
THEY ARE FULLY UNDER CHUBAYS' CONTROL, GUSEV SAID. IT
WAS OBVIOUS BY THEIR COVERAGE THAT ALL THREE MAJOR
RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS WERE UNDER ORDERS FROM CHUBAYS TO
DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE TRANSCRIPT'S REVELATIONS
OF ILLEGAL FINANCING TO SECONDARY ISSUES SUCH AS WHO
LEAKED THE TRANSCRIPT AND WHO AUTHORIZED THE BUGGING.
-- GUSEV INDICATED THAT WE COULD EXPECT FURTHER LEAKS OF
"KOMPROMAT." ASKED WHETHER THEY MIGHT INVOLVE CHUBAYS
AND/OR YELTSIN'S DAUGHTER TATYANA DYACHENKO, GUSEV
SQUIRMED AND SAID YES. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD PUBLISH
SUCH MATERIAL, HE AGAIN SQUIRMED AND REPLIED THAT HE
WOULD ONLY PUBLISH SOMETHING THAT MADE VERY PRECISE
ALLEGATIONS. (NOTE: GUSEV LEFT THE IMPRESSION HE ALREADY
CLINTON i m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
HAS ADDITIONAL "KOMPROMAT" TO PUBLISH BUT IS TRYING TO
USE HIS PAPER'S OWN INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES TO
CORROBORATE THE INFORMATION. END NOTE.)
-- ASKED WHETHER HE HAD FELT ANY REPERCUSSIONS FOR
PUBLISH
ING THE LEAKED TRANSCRIPT, GUSEV SAID NO AND ADDED
THAT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL OFFICIALS KNOW THAT HE AND HIS
NEWSPAPER ENJOY TOO MUCH CLOUT AND INDEPENDENCE TO BE
CURBED THROUGH POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL PRESSURE. HOWEVER,
GUSEV INDICATED THAT MOST-GROUP PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY HAD
REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HIM, PRESUMABLY TO COME TO AN
AGREEMENT OVER DAMAGE CONTROL. (NOTE: GUSEV TOLD POLOFF
LAST SUMMER THAT GUSINSKIY HAD APPROACHED HIM BACK IN
1993 OR 1994 TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
"COOPERATIVE" RELATIONSHIP, BUT GUSEV DECLINED. END
NOTE.)
-- DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN BEREZOVSKIY IS A
"DANGEROUS" FIGURE, ACCORDING TO GUSEV. HE IS A "PURE
MAFIOSO," AND HIS APPOINTMENT IS PROOF THAT MAJOR
CRIMINAL GROUPS HAVE REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO GUSEV, BEREZOVSKIY'S MAIN
PRIORITY IN CHECHNYA HAS BEEN TO SECURE CONTROL OVER THE
AIRPORT IN GROZNYY, THROUGH WHICH HE CAN IMPORT "DRUGS,
MONEY, MERCEDES 600'S, YOU NAME IT" -- ALL WITHOUT PAYING
IMPORT TARIFFS AND WITHOUT ANY OVERSIGHT. BEREZOVSKIY
AND HIS COHORTS NEED SUCH AN OPERATION, GUSEV CLAIMED, TO
MAKE UP FOR THE LOSS OF INCOME FROM THE NATIONAL SPORTS
FOUNDATION, THE AFGHAN VETERANS FUND, AND OTHER
ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE DRAWN TOO MUCH ATTENTION.
-- "MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" WILL CONTINUE TO PUBLISH
INFORMATION RELATED TO CAMPAIGN OR OTHER ABUSES COMMITTED
BY CHUBAYS AND ANY OTHER HIGH-LEVEL FIGURES. ALTHOUGH
GUEV CONCEDES THAT SUCH DISCLOSURES PLAY INTO THE HANDS
OF THE COMMUNISTS, HE ARGUES THEY ALSO BENEFIT THE
GENERAL PUBLIC WHO HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW WHO IS
GOVERNING THEM.
COMMENT
4.4GfGUSEV IS NO STRANGER TO SCANDAL AND HIS PAPER HAS
BEEN AMONG THE MOST FEARLESS IN RUSSIA IN REPORTING THE
PROBLEM OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION. ALTHOUGH VERY MUCH
OPPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS, GUSEV IS NOW DEEPLY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF SOME TOP-LEVEL OFFICIALS
SURROUNDING YELTSIN. BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
HE TOLD POLOFFS, A GROUP OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS MET WITH
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR. ONE EDITOR CAUTIONED THAT THE
WEST WAS PREOCCUPIED ONLY WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF A
C — \ 0\ —c^^A^X-^ 0 O OY
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�•CONI IULNIIML
POSSIBLE COMMUNIST VICTORY AND HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES IF THE YELTSIN REGIME REMAINED IN POWER.
NOW, GUSEV STRESSED, SOME OF THOSE CONSEQUENCES ARE
BECOMING CLEAR IN A DIRTY WAR OF "KOMPROMAT" THAT
THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE VERY POWERS THAT WERE ELECTED
ON JULY 3. TEFFT
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CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BUJOLD, EGGERT, FORT, HESLIN, PASCUAL, PASSDOWN, PIFER, RUMER, SUM, SUM2,
NSC, SIT{C2}
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:021300Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8386
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0038
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6900
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6869
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6746
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E NTTTTL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(D).
SUMMARY
2. -(6}—YELTSIN'S STEADY RECOVERY FROM HEART SURGERY
HAS ALTERED THE TIME FRAME FOR THE SUCCESSION
STRUGGLE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT PUT AN END TO IT, AND
HAS LED PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS'
RIVALS TO STEP UP EFFORTS TO WEAKEN HIM. FORMER
SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED, WHO HAD WAGERED MOST
ON EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, IS GRADUALLY SHIFTING
HIS HORIZONS TO THE YEAR 2000, WHEN YELTSIN'S CURRENT
TERM ENDS. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IS REMAKING
HIS IMAGE, HOPING TO PERSUADE FIRST THE ELITE AND THEN
THE PUBLIC THAT HE IS YELTSIN'S LOGICAL, AND CHOSEN,
HEIR. THE COMMUNISTS ARE REASSESSING THEIR TACIT
TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN,WHO THEY BELIEVED
WAS BEST PLACED TO LIMIT THE POWER OF THEIR BETE
NOIRE, CHUBAYS, WHILE YELTSIN WAS GRAVELY ILL. THEY
ARE STEPPING UP THEIR ATTACKS ON CHUBAYS, AS OTHER
FORCES MOUNT A "WAR OF KOMPROMAT" AGAINST HIM.
YELTSIN'S FIRST POST-OPERATION PUBLIC ADDRESS, WHICH
SHOULD OCCUR SOON, MAY PROVIDE IMPORTANT CLUES TO HOW
n
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P E R E.O. 13526
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�'CONriDCNTIAL
HE ASSESSES THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES AROUND HIM.
END SUMMARY.
EVERYONE'S ADJUSTING
3. (SBU) YELTSIN'S HEART OPERATION NOVEMBER 5 AND
APPARENTLY STEADY RECOVERY MAY NOT PUT AN END TO THE
SUCCESSION STRUGGLE, BUT THEY HAVE ALTERED ITS
DYNAMICS. THE MAJOR CANDIDATES ARE NO LONGER ACTING
AS IF THEY BELIEVE EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE
LIKELY. RATHER, THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON HOW BEST TO
POSITION THEMSELVES FOR ELECTIONS THAT COULD TAKE
PLACE AS LATE AS THE YEAR 2000, WHEN YELTSIN'S CURRENT
FOUR-YEAR TERM ENDS.
. . . LEBED
4. 4G)-THE MOST RADICAL CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE
BELONGS TO FORMER SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LEBED,
WHO HAD WAGERED MOST THAT YELTSIN'S DETERIORATING
HEALTH WOULD FORCE HIM FROM OFFICE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS MID-OCTOBER DISMISSAL, LEBED AND
HIS SUPPORTERS RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS
RUNNING FOR GOVERNOR OF TULA OBLAST OR RETURNING TO
WORK FOR YELTSIN, MAINTAINING THAT ALL EFFORT WOULD BE
FOCUSED ON PREPARING FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
DURING HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN MID-NOVEMBER,
HOWEVER, LEBED SAID BOTH THOSE OPTIONS REMAINED OPEN.
HE HAS APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT HE NEEDS A POSITION
IN THE POWER STRUCTURE TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
ANDKEEP HIMSELF IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT FOR THE LONG
HAUL. LIKEWISE, LEBED HAS RECENTLY SAID HE WILL PAY
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO BUILDING A GENUINE PARTY
ORGANIZATION OUT OF THE LOOSE COALITION, "FOR TRUTH
AN ORDER," THAT NOW BACKS HIM. THAT WILL TAKE TIME,
BUT SUCH AN ORGANIZATION WOULD BE CRITICAL TO RUNNING
AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN THREE OR FOUR YEARS DOWN THE
ROAD; IT WOULD BE LESS IMPORTANT IN A NEAR-TERM
CAMPAIGN, IN WHICH LEBED WOULD HAVE COUNTED ON HIS
CHARISMA TO CARRY HIM TO POWER.
...LUZHKOV
5. -(O-MEANWHILE, MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV'S PEOPLE ARE
BEGINNING TO VIEW THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE FEDERATION
COUNCIL AS AN EXCELLENT SPRINGBOARD TO THE PRESIDENCY,
ACCORDING TO AN ADVISOR TO THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN, YEGOR
STROYEV. IT IS THE THIRD-RANKING PROTOCOL POSITION
CLINTON LigMLPHOTOCOPY
�GONriDCNTIAL-^
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, YET IT DOES NOT BURDEN THE
INCUMBENT WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIONS. ALREADY, LUZHKOV EXERTS AN INFORMAL
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE FEDERATION COUNCIL, AND HE HAS
USED HIS POSITION AND A SERIES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENTS TO BUILD UP SUPPORT OUTSIDE MOSCOW.
. . . CHERNOMYRDIN
• C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 1295802/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
6. 4G)-THE CO
NVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS BEEN THAT PRIME
MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN'S UNINSPIRING PUBLIC IMAGE, HIS
GREYNESS, PRECLUDES HIS WINNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN THE NEAR TERM. TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, HIS
STRATEGY HAD TO BE LONG-TERM AND AIMED AT PERSUADING
FIRST THE ELITE AND THEN THE ELECTORATE THAT HIS
POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER MADE HIM YELTSIN'S LOGICAL
- AND CHOSEN - HEIR. INDEED, ONE CHERNOMYRDIN
CONSULTANT RECENTLY TOLD US THAT THE GOAL NOW IS TO
CREATE THE PERCEPTION THAT A DIARCHY - YELTSIN AND
CHERNOMYRDIN - IS RUNNING THE COUNTRY, IN WHICH
CHERNOMYRDIN WOULD PLAY THE GREATER PUBLIC ROLE GIVEN
YELTSIN'S FRAIL HEALTH. THAT GOAL, OUR SOURCE NOTED,
ENTAILS DIMINISHING THE PUBLIC ROLE OF PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS AND LUZHKOV.
7. ^G)- MOREOVER, EVEN BEFORE YELTSIN'S OPERATION,
CHERNOMYRDIN'S AIDES HAD EMBARKED ON AN EFFORT, WHICH
THEY EXPECTED WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR, TO
ENHANCE THEIR BOSS'S PUBLIC IMAGE. AN EARLY PRODUCT
WAS A MAWKISH FAMILY PORTRAIT AIRED ON NTV IN LATE
OCTOBER. IN ADDITION, CHERNOMYRDIN HAS RECENTLY
RAISED HIS PROFILE BY MAKING WELL-PUBLICIZED
APPEARANCES AND STATEMENTS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF
EVENTS SUCH AS THE LABOR PROTEST NOVEMBER 5 AND THE
MILITIA-DAY CEMETERY BOMBING NOVEMBER 10. HIS
APPEARANCE IN LISBON THIS WEEK WILL OFFER HIM ANOTHER
CHANCE TO APPEAR PRESIDENTIAL BY DEALING WITH AN ISSUE
THAT IS FORMALLY YELTSIN'S, EUROPEAN SECURITY.
. . . YELTSIN
8. -ter FINALLY, YELTSIN'S STEADY RECOVERY HAS
RENEWED SPECULATION THAT HE WILL SEEK REELECTION IN
CLINTON imMtiL P O O O Y
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�OONriDENTIAL
THE YEAR 2000. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS A PRESIDENT TO
TWO TERMS, BUT YELTSIN COULD TRY TO MAKE THE CASE TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT THAT HIS 1991 ELECTION TOOK
PLACE UNDER THE PREVIOUS CONSTITUTION AND THUS DOES
NOT FALL WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT ONE.
EVEN IF, AS WE BELIEVE LIKELY, YELTSIN DECIDES NOT TO
TAKE THAT ROUTE, HE WILL BE LOATHE TO ANOINT AN HEIR
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THAT WOULD UPSET THE BALANCE OF
POWER HE LIKES TO MAINTAIN AMONG HIS TOP LIEUTENANTS
TO MAXIMIZE HIS OWN ROOM FOR MANEUVER.
COMMUNISTS RETHINKING
9. -fer THROUGHOUT THE FALL, WHILE OTHER LEADERS WERE
POSITIONING THEMSELVES TO SUCCEED YELTSIN, COMMUNIST
LEADER ZYUGANOV WAS FOCUSED ON HOW TO MAXIMIZE HIS
INFLUENCE WITHOUT HAVING TO FACE ELECTIONS AND HOW TO
UNDERMINE THE GROWING POWER OF THE COMMUNISTS' BETE
NOIRE, CHUBAYS. THAT THINKING LED TO THE COMMUNISTS'
TACIT TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, WHO THEY
BELIEVED WAS BEST POSITIONED TO CONTAIN CHUBAYS WHILE
YELTSIN WAS GRAVELY ILL. (THE COMMUNISTS ALSO
BELIEVED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN MAY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO
FORESTALL ELECTIONS IN THE EVENT YELTSIN BECAME UNABLE
TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE.) WITH YELTSIN'S RECOVERY, THE
COMMUNISTS ARE BEGINNING TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM
CHERNOMYRDIN, WHILE CONTINUING THEIR SHARP ATTACKS ON
CHUBAYS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MONTHS, COMMUNIST
LEADERS RECENTLY CRITICIZED CHERNOMYRDIN OVER HIS
OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE CHECHNYA PEACE AGREEMENT;
SOME COMMUNISTS EVEN SUGGESTED A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN
THE DUMA. BY THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 29
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON CHECHNYA, HOWEVER, THE
COMMUNISTS RETURNED TO THEIR TACTIC OF ATTACKING
CHUBAYS AND IMPLICITLY SUPPORTING CHERNOMYRDIN. THUS
ZYUGANOV REITERATED HIS WARNING THAT TWO GOVERNMENTS
HAD ARISEN IN RUSSIA, AND DECLARED THAT "THE ONE LED
BY CHUBAYS IN THE KREMLIN SHOULD RESIGN." AT THE SAME
TIME, ZYUGANOV HAS STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN
CONTROL OVER THE OPPOSITION COALITION "PEOPLE'S
PATRIOTIC UNION OF RUSSIA," PRESUMABLY CALCULATING
THAT, WITH VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF NEAR-TERM
ELECTIONS, PARTY DISCIPLINE BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT
THAN BREADTH.
CHUBAYS DRAWS FIRE
C O N r i D C N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 033078
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�• CONriDCNTIAL
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPACT OF YELTSIN'S RECOVERY
10. {eh- THE COMMUNISTS' GOAL IS PROBABLY TO WEAKEN
RATHER THAN DESTROY CHUBAYS: A DIMINISHED YET STILL
PRESENT CHUBAYS WOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS
A USEFUL
TARGET BUT WOULD BE LESS ABLE TO THWART COMMUNIST
OBJECTIVES. OTHER ANTI-CHUBAYS FORCES HAVE ALSO
STEPPED UP THEIR ATTACKS ON CHUBAYS SINCE YELTSIN'S
OPERATION. THE BIGGEST BLOW SO FAR WAS THE
PUBLICATION, ON THE DAY YELTSIN HAD PLANNED TO MAKE
HIS FIRST PUBLIC SPEECH SINCE THE OPERATION, OF AN
ALLEGED TRANSCRIPT OF CHUBAYS DISCUSSING ILLEGAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCING WITH OTHER AIDES. SUBSEQUENT
ATTACKS INCLUDE A COMMUNIST-LED DUMA INVESTIGATION
INTO THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE ALLEGATIONS (ACCOMPANIED BY
DEMANDS THAT YELTSIN SUSPEND CHUBAYS DURING THE
INVESTIGATION). MEANWHILE, CHUBAYS ALLY AND SECURITY
COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY BEREZOVSKIY REMAINS UNDER
FIERCE ATTACK OVER HIS EARLIER DUAL RUSSIAN-ISRAELI
CITIZENSHIP AND REPORTS THAT HE HOLDS A U.S. GREEN
CARD. FORMER PRESIDENTIAL BODYGUARD KORZHAKOV,
CHUBAYS' ARCH-ENEMY, HAS PROMISED THE RELEASE OF
FURTHER "KOMPROMAT," WHILE AT LEAST ONE EDITOR,
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS'" GUSEV, CLAIMS TO BE PREPARED
TO PUBLISH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IN HIS POSSESSIN.
YELTSIN DISPOSES
11. - m - AS HAS BEEN TRUE THROUGHOUT HIS PRESIDENCY,
YELTSIN WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISIONS ON THE FATE OF
KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THOSE HE MAKES IN THE NEAR
FUTURE WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES NOT ONLY
FOR THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES AROUND HIM BUT ALSO
FOR THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE OVER THE LONGER TERM. THE
MOUNTING KOMPROMAT AGAINST CHUBAYS AND HIS ALLIES
ALMOST ENSURES THAT YELTSIN WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS
CADRES ISSUES IN HIS FIRST POST-OPERATION PUBLIC
STATEMENT, WHICH SHOULD OCCUR N THE NEAR FUTURE (EVEN
THOUGH HIS PRESS SERVICE HAS NOT ANNOUNCED A DATE).
IN ANY EVENT, THE MOSCOW POLITICAL ELITE WILL
SCRUTINIZE WHATEVER HE DOES SAY FOR CLUES TO THE FATE
OF CHUBAYS AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS TO HOW ACTIVE A ROLE YELTSIN
PLANS TO PLAY IN GOVERNING RUSSIA.
TEFFT
< SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
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<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
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<"SSN>3078
<"TOR>961202081137 M2519469
<"SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
<"SSN>3078
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FROM:
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CLINTON imm. DU
CP
OY
�••CONriDDJTIAtr
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: OONIIULNI IAL
DTG:1 91 735Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9461
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7081
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6898
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7036
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
G 0 N f" I D C N T I *rt-SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASON 1.5 (B).
INTRODUCTION
2. (SBU) IN THE COURSE OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S LONG
PUBLIC ABSENCE, THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC HAS BEEN TREATED TO
A STEADY STREAM OF "KOMPROMAT" (COMPROMISING MATERIAL)
AS TOP KREMLIN LEADERS HAVE JOCKEYED FOR INFLUENCE IN A
SECOND YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION AND POSITIONED THEMSELVES
FOR EVENTUAL SUCCESSION. INDEED, THE WIELDING OF
KOMPROMAT HAS BECOME AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN RUSSIA, BUT ITS ROLE IS NOT FULLY
UNDERSTOOD. BELOW WE OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT
KOMPROMAT CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM. END INTRODUCTION.
TEN QUESTIONS AND THESES
3. (SBU) WHAT IS KOMPROMAT?
--
IN THE NARROWEST SENSE, KOMPROMAT IS COMPROMISING
CLINTON m m t P O O O Y
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PER
�CONriDCNTIAL.
MATERIALS -- USUALLY ON ABUSE OF OFFICE, CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES, OR PERSONAL DISLOYALTY -- GATHERED
SPECIFICALLY FOR POSSIBLE USE IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
AGAINST RIVALS IN POWER STRUGGLES. IN A BROADER SENSE,
KOMPROMAT IS INFORMATION THAT MAKES ITS WAY INTO THE
PUBLIC SPHERE AND SHEDS LIGHT ON THE INNER WORKINGS OF
RUSSIA'S POLITICAL ELITES, WHO WOULD PREFER TO KEEP
THIS INFORMATION OUT OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE.
4. (SBU) WHY GO PUBLIC WITH KOMPROMAT?
-- LEAKING KOMPROMAT TO THE MEDIA SERVES AS AN
ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL TO THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING
LEVEL, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE LOST POWER AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, ACCESS. FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ACCESS,
KOMPROMAT RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AUGMENTS EXISTING
CHANNELS AND ADDS PRESSURE TO TAKE ACTION.
5. (SBU) WHAT DOES KOMPROMAT DO?
-- UNLIKE LEAKS IN THE WEST, WHICH GENERALLY ARE
INTENDED TO SQUELCH A PARTICULAR POLICY CHOICE,
KOMPROMAT TARGETS INDIVIDUALS. AS SUCH, IT PROVIDES
INSIGHT INTO THE ETERNAL RUSSIAN QUESTION KTO KOGO (WHO
IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM?) AND IS A REFLECTION OF A
CENTRAL TRUTH: POWER (WHO DECIDES) IS MORE IMPORTANT TO
THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN RUSSIA THAN POLICY (WHAT IS
DECIDED).
- ONE WAY THAT KOMPROMAT WEAKENS RIVALS IS BY
DISTRACTING THEM FROM OTHER SERIOUS BUSINESS AND MORE
SUBTLE THREATS TO THEIR POLITICAL POSITIONS. ONCE
RIVALS ARE FORCED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IN PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE, ENGAGE IN DAMAGE CONTROL, AND ATTEMPT TO
PREVENT FUTURE FLOWS OF KOMPROMAT, OTHER POLITICAL
FIGURES FIND THEMSELVES WITH INCREASED ROOM FOR
MANEUVER. FOR THIS REASON, PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
AND MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOV ARE INDIRECT BENEFICIARIES OF
THE CHUBAYS-KORZHAKOV KOMPROMAT WAR, ACCORDING TO
"MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS" CHIEF EDITOR GUSEV.
- IN ADDITION, THE RELEASE OF KOMPROMAT WEAKENS
RIVALS BY SIGNALING WHO MIGHT BE UP OR DOWN IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, CAUSING MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL CLASS TO
RECONSIDER THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE VICTIMS OF
KOMPROMAT.
6. -m-\NHO IS THE INTENDED AUDIENCE?
-- WHEN KOMPROMAT IS RELEASED THROUGH LEAKS TO THE
MEDIA, THE COMMON ASSUMPTION IS THAT IT IS INTENDED FOR
THE BROAD PUBLIC AUDIENCE. THE CHOICE OF MEDIA
VEHICLES MAY SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE INTENDED AUDIENCE
OR MAY SIMPLY INDICATE THE DEGREE OF ACCESS BETWEEN A
CLINTON L l f i M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
POLITICAL PLAYER AND A MEDIA OUTLET. DID KORZHAKOV,
FOR EXAMPLE, CHOOSE TO GIVE HIS FIRST PUBLIC INTERVIEW
AFTER HIS SACKING TO "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY" BECAUSE THAT
WEEKLY HAS BY FAR THE HIGHEST CIRCULATION IN RUSSIA OR
BECAUSE THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE TRADITIONALLY HAD
GOOD ACCESS TO THAT PAPER?
- THE REAL AUDIENCE IS PROBABLY VERY NARROW.
ACCORDING TO GLEB PAVLOVSKIY, DIRECTOR OF THE EFFECTIVE
e t l I J h I L) b N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
V
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
POLICY FOUNDATION, KOMPROMAT GENERALLY RESONATES ONLY
AMONG THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE C
LASS IN MOSCOW AND A FEW
OTHER KEY CITIES, SUCH AS ST. PETERSBURG AND
YEKATERINBURG.
-- IN MOST CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, THE KEY AUDIENCE IS PRESIDENT YELTSIN. WHEN
NTV AND ORT WENT ON THE AIR IN THE EARLY HOURS OF JUNE
20 TO RAISE THE ALARM OVER THE ARRESTS OF YELTSIN
CAMPAIGN STAFFERS YEVSTAFYEV AND LISOVSKIY, THEIR AIM
WAS TO INFLUENCE YELTSIN. ACCORDING TO ONE EDITOR
FAMILIAR WITH THAT NIGHT'S EVENTS, CHUBAYS NEEDED TO
DEMONSTRATE TO YELTSIN THAT TELEVISION HAD THE STORY TO
INCREASE PRESSURE ON HIM TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST
KORZHAKOV, SOSKOVETS, AND BARSUKOV. SIMILARLY, FORMER
YELTSIN PRESS SECRETARY SERGEY MEDVEDEV CONTENDED IN A
RECENT MEETING WITH A/POLCOUNS THAT CHUBAYS NEEDED TO
GET HIS VERSION OF EVENTS OUT IN PUBLIC TO REACH
YELTSIN -- PROBABLY THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER -- BEFORE
KORZHAKOV AND BARSUKOV COULD TELL THEIR VERSION TO
YELTSIN FIRST THING IN THE MORNING IN HIS OFFICE.
7. (SBU) WHAT EFFECT DOES KOMPROMAT HAVE ON THE PUBLIC?
-- RESIGNATION RATHER THAN PUBLIC MORAL OUTRAGE IS
THE GENERAL RESPONSE, WIDENING THE GAP BETWEEN "VLAST"
(POWER AND AUTHORITIES) AND "NAROD" (THE PEOPLE).
NUMEROUS CONTACTS HAVE ARGUED THAT KOMPROMAT TENDS TO
DISCREDIT "VLAST" AS SUCH MUCH MORE THAN ANY SINGLE
INDIVIDUAL.
-- IN ONE TELLING GAUGE OF THE PUBLIC'S CASUAL
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFICIAL MALFEASANCE REPORTED BY
"ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI" (NOVEMBER 22), A JOURNALIST
OBSERVED: "CORRUPTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CHARACTERISTIC
FEATURE OF RUSSIA. THE PRESENT TIME IS NO EXCEPTION.
CLINTON i m m L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAb.
EVEN IF ONLY ONE ONE-HUNDREDTH OF WHAT YOU READ IN THE
PRESS IS THE TRUTH, IT'S ENOUGH TO BE CONVINCED THAT WE
LIVE IN A TOTALLY CORRUPT STATE."
-- FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF AN ALLEGED TRANSCRIPT
OF A CONVERSATION AMONG CHUBAYS, ILYUSHIN, AND AN
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS SERGEY KRASAVCHENKO DISCUSSING
CAMPAIGN FINANCING ILLEGALITIES, "MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS" COMMISSIONED A POLL OF 1600 MUSCOVITES -WHO TEND TO BE MORE POLITICALLY ENGAGED THAN MOST
RUSSIANS - TO GAUGE PUBLIC REACTION. A FULL 40
PERCENT HAD NO OPINION ABOUT WHAT WHAT MEASURES SHOULD
BE TAKEN AGAINST THE THREE OFFICIALS, AND ONLY 30
PERCENT THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT HAD ANY FACTUAL BASIS.
8. (SBU) WHEN DOES KOMPROMAT LEAD TO SOMEONE'S
DISMISSAL?
-- PUBLIC OPINION IS FAR FROM THE MOST IMPORTANT
MEASURE OF POLITICAL LIABILITY. THE PUBLIC RELEASE OF
KOMPROMAT IS NOT ENOUGH TO LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO A
LEGAL HEARING THAT EITHER EXONERATES THE INDIVIDUAL OR
LEADS TO HIS DISMISSAL AND PUNISHMENT. IN AN INTERVIEW
TO "KOMMERSANT" (NO. 45), FOR EXAMPLE, FORMER STATE
SECRETARY BURBULIS (A MAJOR POLITICAL LIABILITY IN HIS
TIME) OBSERVED THAT ONLY IF "THE MOOD OF THE MASSES"
COINCIDES WITH THE VIEWS OF THE REGIONAL, BUSINESS, AND
INTELLECTUAL ELITES DOES THE COMBINED PRESSURE BECOME
"HARDER" FOR THE PRESIDENT TO IGNORE -- BUT NOT
IMPOSSIBLE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRACHEV SURVIVED FOR
MORE THAN A YEAR IN YELTSIN'S INNER CIRCLE DESPITE
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE KORMPROMAT
AGAINST HIM. YELTSIN DISMISSED HIM ONLY WHEN THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MADE IT POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT.
-- TIMING IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL WIELDING OF
KOMPROMAT. GATHERING EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL WRONG-DOING
AND ROUTINELY PUTTING IT INTO A FILE FOR PRESIDENT
YELTSIN, AS MEDVEDEV RECOUNTED, IS NOT ENOUGH. IF,
HOWEVER, YELTSIN IS ALREADY IRRITATED AT A LEBED OR A
KORZHAKOV FOR OTHER REASONS, BRINGING THE DOSSIER OF
KOMPROMAT TO HIS ATTENTION -- ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE
ADDED PRESSURE OF THE MEDIA -- STRENGTHENS THE
LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL AND CREATES THE APPEARANCE OF A
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOMPROMAT AND DISMISSAL.
9. -teH/VHAT ARE THE MOST SERIOUS KINDS OF KOMPROMAT?
-- IN RUSSIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHERE PERSONAL TIES
ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, KOMPROMAT
THAT REVEALS A BETRAYAL OF PERSONAL LOYALTY DOES MORE
DAMAGE THAN KOMPROMAT THAT ALLEGES CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
IN AN ANALYSIS OF SIX INFRACTIONS THAT CO
C 0 N I I U L N I I /CL' SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034765
CLINTON LIM&LPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDHNTIAL.
E.O. 12958: 12/19/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: THINKING ABOUT KOMPROMAT: TEN QUESTIONS AND
THESES
ULD LEAD TO AN
OFFICIAL'S DISMISSAL, "KOMMERSANT" RATED BETRAYAL OF
LOYALTY AS BY FAR THE MOST EGREGIOUS. YELTSIN'S
PERCEPTION THAT KORZHAKOV BETRAYED AN INTIMATE FAMILY
SECRET WAS, ACCORDING TO "ITOGI" ANCHORMAN YEVGENIY
KISELEV, A MAJOR REASON THAT YELTSIN SEVERED ALL TIES
TO KORZHAKOV AND TURNED AGAINST LEBED, WHO WAS PUBLICLY
FLAUNTING HIS TIES TO KORZHAKOV AT THE TIME (SEE
SEPTEL).
10.4€hHOW DOES KOMPROMAT AFFECT POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING?
-- BEFORE IT BECOMES PUBLIC, KOMPROMAT IS USED AS
BLACKMAIL TO INFLUENCE POLICY DECISIONS. THE THREAT
THAT POLITICAL RIVALS WILL LEAK DAMAGING INFORMATION OR
PASS IT ON TO YELTSIN (OR ANOTHER KEY INDIVIDUAL)
INCREASES THE RISK OF PUSHING A POLICY INITIATIVE THAT
WOULD DAMAGE RIVAL INTERESTS.
- ACCORDING TO A SOCIOLOGIST WHO HAS CLOSELY STUDIED
POLITICAL ELITES IN TYUMEN OBLAST, FOR EXAMPLE,
GOVERNOR ROKETSKIY IS SO TERRIFIED OF REVELATIONS OF
PERSONAL CORRUPTION THAT HE HAS BECOME A VIRTUAL
HOSTAGE TO THE DEMANDS OF LOCAL OPPOSITION LEADER
ATROSHENKO, WHO HIMSELF HAS MADE A QUESTIONABLE CAREER
IN THE SHADY AREAS OF SPORTS, BANKING, AND POLITICS.
11. - t e n s ANYONE IMMUNE TO KOMPROMAT?
-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN, OR WHOEVER SUCCEEDS HIM AS THE
SYSTEM'S RECOGNIZED, LEGITIMATE LEADER. IN HIS ROLE AS
ARBITER, YELTSIN IS ESSENTIAL TO RUSSIA'S OLIGARCHIC
SYSTEM OF COMPETING GROUP INTERESTS. IT WOULD RUN
COUNTER TO ANY OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE CURRENT
SYSTEM TO USE KOMPROMAT TO WEAKEN THE ONE FORCE THAT
ACTS AS THE GUARANTOR OF THE SYSTEM'S BALANCE.
MOREOVER, THE GOAL IS TO USE KOMPROMAT TO STRENGTHEN
ONE'S POSITION AGAINST RIVALS AND MOVE INTO THE CENTER
OF POWER - YELTSIN'S INNER CIRCLE -- NOT TO DESTROY
THE SYSTEM OF POWER ITSELF.
-- MORE BROADLY, HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT YELTSIN
SYMBOLIZES THE REGIME'S LEGITIMACY AND THE PUBLIC
RELEASE OF KOMPROMAT UNDERMINES THE REGIME, YELTSIN,
TOO, IS WOUNDED POLITICALLY BY THE RECURRING KOMPROMAT
WARS EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOT THE INTENDED TARGET.
CLINTON
�GONriDCNTIMf
12. ^Gf WHY DID THE GORBACHEV ERA PRODUCE GLASNOST AND
THE YELTSIN ERA KOMPROMAT?
-- GLASNOST WAS, IN EFFECT, WHOLESALE KOMPROMAT
AGAINST THE ENTIRE REGIME USED BY THE TOP LEADER AS A
WEAPON IN ADVANCING HIS EFFORT TO RADICALLY REFORM THE
REGIME. TODAY, YELTSIN HAS NO INTEREST IN
FUNDAMENTALLY QUESTIONING HOW THE REGIME FUNCTIONS.
INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE REGIME, HOWEVER, HAVE AN INTENSE
INTEREST IN ENHANCING THEIR POSITION AND RESORT TO
KOMPROMAT AS PART OF THEIR STRUGGLE FOR POWER.
NEVERTHELESS, ONE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF EVEN THIS
KIND OF KOMPROMAT IS DAMAGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
REGIME ITSELF. TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<"SSN>4765
<"TOR>961219124755 M2547080
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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<"TOR>961219124906 M2547082
<"SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
<''SSN>4765
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A
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON L
CP
OY
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: KYLE, LEE, PASCUAL, RUMER, TARULLO, WALSH, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-OONriPCNTIAL
DTG:111 720Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9095
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHDIFCC/FCC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPTTREAS WASHDC
• C O N r i D C N T I A L MOSCOW 034220
STATE PLEASE PASS OPIC
DEPT FOR E: DMILLER; EUR/RUS: MEARLE, JGESHWILER;
OES/STH: RBRAIBANTI; EB/CIP:REARNEST
USDOC FOR NTIA/DSTEINOUR
USDOC FOR 3313/USFCS/OIO/NIS
USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/OEERIS/JBROUGHER
USDOC FOR 6320/ITA/TDTAI/RPADDOCK
TREASURY FOR IEE
FCC FOR IB:KCOLLINS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR EISS
OPIC FOR HURLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/01
TAGS: PGOV, RS, ECPS, EINV, ECON, CTRD
SUBJECT: MEDIA BARON GUSINSKIY ON SVYAZINVEST DEAL
REF: MOSCOW 33363 AND PREVIOUS
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN TEFFT, CHARGE. REASON:
1.5 (D)
SUMMARY
2. -<GM)VER LUNCH DECEMBER 5, MOST FINANCIAL GROUP
PRESIDENT GUSINSKIY ASSURED THE CHARGE THAT THE TENDER
FOR SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST (RUSSIA'S TELECOMMUNICATION
GIANT) WOULD BE TRANSPARENT AND THAT WESTERN FIRMS
WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME TERMS AS
RUSSIAN INVESTORS. HE EXPECTED THE SALE OF TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF SVYAZINVEST'S SHARES TO YIELD USD 10-
CLINTON i m m t P O O O Y
HTCP
P E R E.O. 13526
�CONriDCNTIAL
12 BILLION FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL BUDGET, NOTING THAT
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO INVEST
FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE PROCEEDS IN RUSSIA'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (I.E., SVYAZINVEST). GIVEN
GUSINSKIY'S OWN INTEREST IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WE
WOULD BE SURPRISED IF HE DID NOT FIND A WAY TO GAIN
CONTROL OF A LARGE SHARE OF THE SVYAZINVEST TENDER,
DESPITE HIS LAMENT THAT "MOST" SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE
SUMS NEEDED TO DO THAT. END SUMMARY
3. -^-GUSINSKIY BEGAN BY SAYING HE SUPPORTED THE
PLAN TO MERGE ROSTELEKOM (WHICH CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
LINES) AND SVYAZINVEST (A HOLDING COMPANY FOR THE
STATE'S CONTROLLING SHARES IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY), ARGUING HAVING A SINGLE ENTITY CONTROLLING
BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS WAS WIDESPREAD THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPED WORLD.
THE UNITED STATES, HE NOTED, HAD HAD SUCH A SYSTEM
UNTIL VERY RECENTLY. THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM HAD BEEN
BROKEN UP WITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION,
GUSINSKIY CONTINUED; IT MADE SENSE NOW TO MERGE THE
VARIOUS PIECES TO BUILD UP RUSSIA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM. HE ALLOWED THAT IN THE FUTURE IT MIGHT MAKE
SENSE TO BREAK IT UP ONCE AGAIN TO ENCOURAGE
COMPETITION AS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE UNITED STATES.
4. -ter TURNING TO PLANS TO PRIVATIZE RUSSIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, GUSINSKIY NOTED THAT THERE
WAS LITTLE OPPOSITION TO SELLING SHARES IN ROSTELEKOM
TO WESTERN INVESTORS BECAUSE THE COMMUNICATIONS LINES
WERE INTERNATIONAL (NOTE: ROSTELEKOM HAS BEEN
PREPARING AN ADR ISSUE IN NEW YORK FOR SOME TIME. SEE
MOSCOW 31723. ENDNOTE.) SVYAZINVEST WAS ANOTHER
MATTER, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE MILITARY AND SECURITY
SERVICES DEPENDED ON ITS NETWORK FOR MOST OF THEIR OWN
COMMUNICATIONS. MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS BULGAK WAS
FRONTING FOR THESE SERVICES WHEN HE HELPED BLOCK THE
SALE OF SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST TO THE ITALIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRM STET LAST DECEMBER, GUSINSKIY
SAID. THAT STET WAS A NATIONALIZED FIRM ONLY
HEIGHTENED THE SUSPICIONS OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY
SERVICES THAT A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING TO GAIN
ACCESS TO THEIR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. (SEE MOSCOW
31724.)
5. ACT A FEW MONTHS AGO, GUSINSKIY CONTINUED, STATE
PROPERTY COMMITTEE (GKI) CHAIRMAN KOKH ASKED GUSINSKIY
(AS PRESIDENT OF THE MOST FINANCIAL GROUP) AND ALFA
BANK TO ORGANIZE THE TENDER OF SVYAZINVEST (BEFORE THE
SHARE TRANSFER WITH ROSTELEKOM). (NOTE: GKI CONTROLS
THE GOVERNMENT SHARE IN BOTH COMPANIES. END NOTE.)
KOKH HAD BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH ROTHSCHILD
INVESTMENT BANK, WHICH HAD BEEN ORGANIZING THE TENDER.
"ROTHSCHILD HAD PRODUCED NOTHING IN A YEAR AND A
HALF," GUSINSKIY EXPLAINED. "AND NOW ALL THEY WERE
CLIN
�CONriDCNTlAt*
PREPARED TO DO WAS LOAN USD 250 MILLION ON THE
CONDITION THAT THEY RECEIVED A RUS
SIAN GOVERNMENT
GUARANTEE."
6.
BEFORE ACCEPTING KOKH'S OFFER, HOWEVER,
GUSINSKIY HAD CONSULTED WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MILITARY
AND SECURITY SERVICES, TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT HE
COULD OVERCOME OPPOSITION TO THE SALE OF SVYAZINVEST
SHARES TO WESTERN INVESTORS. HE PERSUADED THE
MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES BY ARGUING THAT NO
WESTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRMS WOULD PURCHASE SHARES
AND THAT THE WESTERN INVESTORS WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED
IN SVYAZINVEST'S OPERATIONS.
7. - m - ACCORDING TO GUSINSKIY, THE TENDER WOULD BE
FOR TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE SHARES IN SVYAZINVEST.
WESTERN AUDITORS HAD ESTIMATED THAT THE PACKAGE COULD
SELL FOR AS MUCH AS USD 10-12 BILLION -- BY FAR, THE
HIGHEST ESTIMATES WE HAVE SEEN. THE MOST GROUP, OF
COURSE, WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BUYING SOME OF THE
SHARES, GUSINSKIY ADMITTED, BUT IT AND ALFA BANK
SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO BUY THE ENTIRE
PACKAGE. THUS, HE ARGUED, THIS TENDER WOULD NOT BE A
REPEAT OF THE WIDELY AND SHARPLY CRITICIZED "LOANSFOR-SHARES" DEALS OF LAST FALL (UNDER WHICH THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THAT ARRANGED A TENDER WOUND UP
ACQUIRING A COMPANY'S SHARES AT CUT-RATE PRICES.) THE
TRANSACTION WOULD BE TRANSPARENT AND WESTERN FIRMS
WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME TERMS AS
RUSSIAN INVESTORS. GUSINSKIY STRESSED THAT SEVERAL
WESTERN FIRMS WERE ALREADY PREPARED TO BUY SHARES.
THE PROCEEDS WOULD GO TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL BUDGET,
WHILE THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO INVEST
FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE PROCEEDS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (THAT IS, SVYAZINVEST).
COMMENT
8. - m - GUSINSKIY HAS A GROWING INTEREST IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS. HE TOLD CHARGE OF HIS PLANS TO
MOVE OUT OF BANKING AND OTHER SECTORS IN ORDER TO
CONCENTRATE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HIS BLOSSOMING
MEDIA EMPIRE. HE IS LOOKING AT BOTH RUSSIA AND
FARTHER AFIELD, INCLUDING EUROPE AND ISRAEL. GIVEN
THIS STRATEGIC DIRECTION, WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF
GUSINSKIY DID NOT FIND A WAY TO GAIN CONTROL OF A
MAJOR SHARE OF THE SVYAZINVEST TENDER, DESPITE HIS
LAMENT THAT "MOST" SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE SUMS NEEDED
TO DO THAT.
LINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�-coNriDcrnw
9. -ferGUSINSKY'S ESTIMATE OF USD 10-12 BILLION IS
FAR ABOVE THE USD 1.4 BILLION OF LAST YEAR'S TENDER,
NOT TO SPEAK OF THE USD 2-4 BILLION GENERALLY CITED BY
EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE SECTOR. IT WAS NOT CLEAR
WHERE THE "WESTERN AUDITORS" EXPECTED THE MONEY TO
COME FROM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN RUSSIA HAS
GROWN EXPONENTIALLY AND THE VALUE OF SHARES IN SOME OF
THE LOCAL COMPANIES HAS QUADRUPLED IN THE LAST FEW
MONTHS; GUSINSKY MAY BE COUNTING ON CONTINUING MARKET
INTEREST IN TELECOMS AND RUSSIAN STOCKS TO BOOST
INTEREST. RUSSIAN INVESTORS WITH LARGE STOCKS OF
CAPITAL OVERSEAS MAY WELL BE GUSINSKY'S TARGET.
WESTERN INVESTORS MIGHT WELL BE WARY OF A PLAN THAT
RETURNS ONLY FIFTEEN PERCENT INTO THE SECTOR.
PRESUMABLY THE REST WILL GO TOWARD LESSENING RUSSIA'S
YAWNING BUDGET DEFICIT.
10. 4efTHE AREA MANAGER FOR ONE OF RUSSIA'S LARGEST
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS, WHO WOULD
STAND TO BENEFIT FROM A MONOPOLY, TOLD ESTOFF ON
DECEMBER 6 THAT THE QUESTION WAS STILL BEING FOUGHT
OVER. THE SECURITY FORCES MAY BE EXPLORING SETTING UP
AN ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL NETWORK OF THEIR OWN; THEY
HAVE REPORTEDLY APPROACHED AT LEAST ONE WESTERN
SUPPLIER ABOUT PROVIDING EQUIPMENT FOR PARTS OF SUCH A
SYSTEM.
11. ^ GUSINSKY'S PLAN TO EXCLUDE WESTERN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRMS - PRESUMABLY SERVICE
PROVIDERS, WHO WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN MANAGEMENT
CONTROLS - FROM THE TENDER WILL COME AS BAD NEWS FOR
THE WESTERN TELECOMS PROVIDERS HERE, PARTICULARLY IF A
MONOPOLY THREATENS TO RESTRICT COMPETITIVE LICENSING.
WESTERN INVOLVEMENT PER SE IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR
RUSSIAN SUCCESS ON THE STOCK MARKETS -- WITNESS THE
RECENT SUCCESS OF GAZPROM AND THE PRIVATE CELLULAR
COMPANY VYMPELCOM, BUT IT COULD BE BAD NEWS FOR THE
RUSSIAN CONSUMER.
TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<"SSN>4220
<"TOR > 961 214173309 M2539748
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON LIB!
DM
.NTIAt-
O OY
CP
�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, FORT, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL
DTG:191334Z DEC 96
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9411
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7074
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7029
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6891
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
1
C 0 N r* I D C N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
REF: MOSCOW 32154
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY TOM GRAHAM, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. REASONS 1.5 (A) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2. -4G>-ALTH0UGH THE BASIC PLOTLINE OF LEBED'S RISE (IN
ORDER TO HELP ENSURE YELTSIN'S EELECTION) AND FALL
(BECAUSE HE THREATENED THE POWER STRUCTURE) IS WELL
KNOWN, DETAILS OF THE MACHINATIONS LEADING TO HIS
DISMISSAL OFFER INSIGHTS INTO HOW THE GAME IS PLAYED AT
THE UPPER REACHES OF RUSSIA'S POWER PYRAMID. THE ANTILEBED CAMPAIGN INCLUDED EFFORTS TO SOW PERSONAL ANIMOSITY
BETWEEN HIM AND YELTSIN AND TO TARNISH LEBED'S REPUTATION
IN THE EYES OF KEY ELITES AND OPINION-MAKERS IN MOSCOW;
MEANWHILE, CHERNOMYRDIN WORKED TO BURNISH HIS OWN IMAGE
AND SHORE UP HIS STATUS AS PRESUMPTIVE SUCCESSOR. THE
ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN UNDERSCORES THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS
RUSSIA'S ULTIMATE POLITICAL ARBITER; HIGHLIGHTS THE
GROWING USE OF THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY NATIONAL TELEVISION,
AS A WEAPON IN POLITICAL CONTESTS; AND ILLUSTRATES THE
ROLE OF KOMPROMAT (COMPROMISING MATERIAL), GENUINE OR
FABRICATED, AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PERSUASION. (SEE SEPTEL
FOR MORE ON THE ROLE OF KOMPROMAT.) END SUMMARY.
PER E.0o 13526
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCHTIAL
THE LEBED PROBLEM
3. (SBU) YELTSIN TOOK LEBED, AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC AND
RIVAL, INTO HIS ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTEj THE
FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN AN ACT OF
PREMEDITATED EXPEDIENCY. VIRTUALLY NO ONE EXPECTED THE
"PARTNERSHIP" TO ENDURE FOR LONG. LEBED IMMEDIATELY CAST
HIMSELF AS THE NATURAL SUCCESSOR, THEREBY DIRECTLY
THREATENING CHERNOMYRDIN. LEBED'S UNCONCEALED THIRST FOR
POWER AND UNCOMPROMISING CRITICISM OF THE STATUS-QUO
QUICKLY BROUGHT HOME TO MOST OF THE REST OF THE MOSCOW
POWER STRUCTURE THAT HE CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO THEIR
INTERESTS AS WELL. THE ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT LEBED BY
ENTANGLING HIM IN THE CHECHNYA MESS BACKFIRED BADLY, BUT
ONLY ACCELERATED THE MOVE TO OUST HIM.
4. (SBU) MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW POLITICAL ELITE EACH HAD
THEIR OWN FEARS ABOUT LEBED. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
HAD LONG BEEN ANNOYED BY LEBED'S TALK ABOUT SUCCEEDING
YELTSIN AND HIS EFFORTS TO ENCROACH ON CHERNOMYRDIN'S
TURF IN ECONOMIC PLICY-MAKING. MINISTER OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS KULIKOV WAS DISTURBED BY LEBED'S PEACEMAKING
INITIATIVE IN CHECHNYA, WHICH HE SAW AS A BETRAYAL OF
NATIONAL INTERESTS; KULIKOV WAS NO DOUBT EVEN MORE
DISCOMFITED BY LEBED'S CHARGE THAT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE
PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO. PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION HEAD CHUBAYS WAS CONCERNED BY LEBED'S
RISING POPULARITY COUPLED WITH HIS REFUSAL TO BEHAVE AS A
TEAM PLAYER. MANY FEARED THAT LEBED WAS AN
"UNPREDICTABLE" (READ: UNWILLING TO ACCEPT BUSINESS AS
USUAL) POPULIST WHO COULD QUICKLY COME TO POWER SHOULD
YELTSIN'S DETERIORATING HEALTH FORCE HIM FROM OFFICE.
5. - ^ - T H E EFFORT TO REMOVE LEBED HINGED PRIMARILY ON
CONVINCING YELTSIN THAT HE HAD TO GO. AN IMPORTANT
SECONDARY CONSIDERATION WAS ASSURING THE POLITICAL ELITE
THAT LEBED WOULD BE LESS OF A PROBLEM OUT OF POWER THAN
IN. JUDGING BY OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PEOPLE WHO PLAYED
A ROLE IN OUSTING LEBED, VARIOUS GROUPS LAUNCHED THEIR
OWN CAMPAIGNS FOR THEIR OWN REASONS. AS PRESIDENTIAL
COUNCIL MEMBER ALEKSEY SALMIN PUT IT, THE VARIOUS ANTILEBED FORCES WERE ACTING LIKE A MILITARY UNIT THAT HAD
BEEN SCATTERED ON THE BATTLEFIELD: EACH SEPARATE SUBUNIT
HAD A VAGUE NOTION OF THE BASIC OBJECTIVE AND THE
LOCATION OF THE FRONT, BUT WAS OPERATING ON ITS OWN. BY
MOST ACCOUNTS, ONLY AT THE VERY END DID CHUBAYS AND HIS
ALLIES COORDINATE WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS TO DELIVER THE
FINAL BLOW TO LEBED.
6. (SBU) THE STRAINS CHUBAYS BROUGHT TOGETHER INCLUDED
EFFORTS TO TURN Y
ELTSIN AGAINST LEBED (BOTH POLITICALLY
CLINTON i m m , P O O O Y
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AND PERSONALLY),-TO UNDERMINE LEBED'S STANDING AMONG KEY
ELITES IN MOSCOW, AND TO BUILD AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF
"VLAST" (GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND AUTHORITY) AROUND YELTSIN
AND CHERNOMYRDIN THAT DIMINISHED LEBED'S ROLE. THIS
EFFORT WAS FACILITATED BY LEBED'S OWN WEAKNESSES AND
MISSTEPS, INCLUDING HIS OVERWEENING AMBITION, HIS ILLADVISED PUBLIC ANTI-SEMITIC REMARKS AND COMMENTS ABOUT
YELTSIN'S HEALTH, AND HIS COOPERATION WITH FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES HEAD KORZHAKOV.
G 0 M T I D C N T I A C SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
TURNING YELTSIN AGAINST LEBED
7. tehASSOCIATION WITH KORZHAKOV BURDENED LEBED WITH
THE HEAVY LOAD OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST KORZHAKOV.
ACCORDING TO "ITOGI" ANCHORMAN KISELEV, YELTSIN HAD COME
TO LOATHE HIS FORMER BODYGUARD IN THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS
THE SOURCE OF AN OCTOBER 3 "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" ARTICLE
ON TATYANA DYACHENKO'S FIRST HUSBAND THAT REVEALED THAT
THE FATHER OF YELTSIN'S GRANDSON WAS TATYANA'S FIRST
HUSBAND, AND NOT HER SECOND AS THE GRANDSON HAD BELIEVED
ALL HIS LIFE. KISELEV SAID THE ARTICLE HAD TRAUMATIZED
THE GRANDSON AT A TIME WHEN THE YELTSIN FAMILY WAS
ALREADY OVERBURDENED WITH CONCERN ABOUT NAINA'S RECENT
KIDNEY OPERATION AND YELTSIN'S UPCOMING HEART SURGERY.
AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF WOUNDED FAMILY PRIDE, LEBED'S
ENDORSEMENT OF KORZHAKOV FOR HIS FORMER DUMA SEAT IN A
JOINT PUBLIC APPEARANCE WITH KORZHAKOV IN TULA OCTOBER 13
WAS THE FINAL EVENT THAT PERSUADED YELTSIN TO FIRE LEBED,
ACCORDING TO KISELEV.
8. 4GHN ANOTHER EFFORT TO SOW DISCORD BETWEEN YELTSIN
AND LEBED, LEBED WAS FED DISINFORMATION INDICATING THAT
YELTSIN WAS ON HIS DEATHBED. IN LATE AUGUST, SALMIN TOLD
POLOFF LEBED WAS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO MOUNT A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON THE BASIS OF
"(MISLEADING) INFORMATION ON YELTSIN'S HEALTH HE WAS
RECEIVING FROM THE WEST." IN A RECENT MEETING WITH
A/POLCOUNS, IGOR BUNIN, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR
POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND CURRENTLY A CONSULTANT FOR
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN, ADMITTED THAT THAT
INFORMATION WAS TO SOME EXTENT DISINFORMATION PREPARED BY
LEBED'S RIVALS AND SOURCED TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES. THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT LEBED WOULD GIVE
GREATER CREDENCE TO A WESTERN ASSESSMENT, ESPECIALLY IF
HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED IT
CLANDESTINELY. THE DISINFORMATION WORKED: LEBED STEPPED
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL-
UP HIS CAMPAIGN, AND YELTSIN CITED THAT AS ONE REASON FOR
DISMISSING HIM.
TARNISHING LEBED'S REPUTATION
9. -teHN ADDITION, DURING THE FALL, LEBED'S RIVALS
SOUGHT TO UNDERMINE HIS POTENTIAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE
MOSCOW LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA, WHICH PLANS A CENTRAL ROLE
IN SHAPING ELITE AND PUBLIC OPINION. SEVERAL PIECES OF
DISINFORMATION WERE CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW (BOTH GLEB
PAVLOVSKIY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE EFFECTIVE POLICY
FOUNDATION, AND SERGEY KURGINYAN, WHO CLAIMS TO ADVISE
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS KULIKOV, STRONGLY HINTED IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF THAT KULIKOV WAS BEHIND THIS
EFFORT.) KISELEV MENTIONED TWO IN PARTICULAR:
-- A PURPORTED TRANSCRIPT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A
LEBED ADVISOR AND A FORMER HIGH-RANKING KGB OFFICIAL.
LEBED'S ADVISOR LAYS OUT LEBED'S STRATEGY FOR COMING TO
POWER, WHICH ESSENTIALLY CALLS FOR WORKING WITH CHUBAYS
TO OUST CHERNOMYRDIN, THEN ALLYING WITH MOSCOW MAYOR
LUZHKOV TO OUST CHUBAYS, AND FINALLY USING THE ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN TD ELIMINATE LUZHKOV. ONCE LEBED HAD
COME TO POWER HE WOULD ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME,
DISBAND THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY AND CLOSE DOWN THE PRESS.
(KISELEV THOUGHT THE TRANSCRIPT WAS FABRICATED OR HEAVILY
DOCTORED. IN PARTICULAR, HE FOUND IT "TOO LITERARY" TO
HAVE BEEN A NORMAL CONVERSATION.)
-- AN ALLEGED REPORT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN LEBED AND
HIS ADVISORS AFTER HIS DUMA APPEARANCE OCTOBER 2 (DURING
WHICH HE WAS SHARPLY CRITICIZED FOR HIS CHECHEN PEACE
INITIATIVE). LEBED REPORTEDLY RANTED AB
OUT SHUTTING DOWN
THE PRESS AND DUMA AND "DEALING WITH THE JEWS." (NOTE:
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS IS SUPPOSED TO REFER TO HIS
OPPONENTS GUSINSKIY AND BEREZOVSKIY, OR TO JEWS IN
GENERAL.) (KISELEV THOUGHT THIS REPORT HAD THE RING OF
TRUTH, BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN THE TRANSCRIPT WAS GENUINE.)
10. <erAT THE SAME TIME, THE NATIONAL MEDIA, ESPECIALLY
RUSSIAN PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT) AND INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION (NTV), MOUNTED AN ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN.
FINANCIERS BEREZOVSKIY AND GUSINSKIY, WHO HAVE MAJOR
INFLUENCE OVER ORT AND NTV RESPECTIVELY, WERE THE KEY
FIGURES BEHIND THIS CAMPAIGN, WHICH KISELEV AND RUSSIAN
STATE TELEVISION (RTR) DEPUTY DIRECTOR SVANIDZE TOLD
POLOFF HAD CHUBAYS' BLESSING. BEREZOVSKIY, MOREOVER,
HELPED ORCHESTRATE THE ANTI-KORZHAKOV (AND INDIRECTLY
ANTI-LEBED) KOMPROMAT CAMPAIGN THAT FEATURED ACCUSATINS
CO N M P E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 034672
CLINTON LTRRARY, P O O O Y
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�-felONI IULN I IAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/06
TAGS: PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: SUB-PLOTS AROUND LEBED'S FIRING
BY NATIONAL SPORTS FEDERATION OFFICIAL BORIS FEDOROV THAT
KORZHAKOV WAS CLOSELY TIED TO ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS.
KISELEV HELPED HYPE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS
KULIKOV'S CHARGES THAT LEBED WAS PLOTTING A COUP, CHARGES
KISELEV LATER TOLD POLOFF HE HIMSELF DID NOT BELIEVE.
11. 4GHT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE IMPACT OF THIS
CAMPAIGN. LEBED'S APPARENTLY ANTI-SEMITIC GAFFE (IN
NAMING TRADITIONALLY ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS IN RUSSIA, HE
FAILED TO INCLUDE JUDAISM) MAY HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO
RAISE CONCERNS AMONG LEADING BANKERS AND OTHER OPINION
MAKERS, MANY OF WHOM ARE JEWISH, ABOUT HIS SUITABILITY
FOR HIGH POLITICAL OFFICE; THE DISINFORMATION MAY HAVE
REINFORCED THOSE CONCERNS. THE ANTI-LEBED TELEVISION
CAMPAIGN RECEIVED MIXED REVIEWS IN MOSCOW. PUBLIC
OPINION FOUNDATION DIRECTOR OSLON, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD
POLOFF IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT HE THOUGHT IT HAD HELPED
BRING DOWN LEBED'S HIGH POPULARITY RATING. PAVLOVSKIY
AND "IZVESTIYA" COMMENTATOR OTTO LATSIS, HOWEVER, WORRIED
THAT THE CAMPAIGN WAS TOO CRUDE AND WOULD ENHANCE LEBED'S
POPULARITY WHILE DISCREDITING "VLAST" AS SUCH IN THE LONG
RUN. AT THE MOMENT, LEBED STILL REMAINS THE MOST POPULAR
POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA.
BUILDING A POSITIVE IMAGE OF POWER
12. ^COMPLEMENTING THE ANTI-LEBED CAMPAIGN WAS AN
EFFORT TO ENHANCE CHERNOMYRDIN'S REPUTATION AS YELTSIN'S
SECOND-IN-COMMAND AND THE NATURAL HEIR. ACCORDING TO
PAVLOVSKIY, IN LATE AUGUST/EARLY SEPTEMBER, CHERNOMYRDIN
AND CHUBAYS HAD DECIDED TO CUT OFF LEBED'S DIRECT ACCESS
TO YELTSIN. PAVLOVSKIY HIMSELF WROTE A MEMO FOR THE TWO
ADVOCATING THAT LEBED BE MADE TO REPORT TO YELTSIN
THROUGH CHERNOMYRDIN, A PROCEDURE THAT WAS IN FACT PUT IN
PLACE. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE EFFORTS TO MAKE
CHERNOMYRDIN LOOK BOTH PRESIDENTIAL AND CLOSE TO YELTSIN.
(YELTSIN ISSUED A DECREE TRANSFERRING TEMPORARILY TO
CHERNOMYRDIN SOME OF HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY AND
DECIDED TO HAVE CHERNOMYRDIN CHAIR MEETINGS OF THE
DEFENSE COUNCIL IN HIS ABSENCE.) FINALLY, AS KISELEV HAS
POINTED OUT, THE MAJOR TELEVISION STATIONS MADE A
CONCERTED EFFORT TO PORTRAY CHERNOMYRDIN IN A MORE
POSITIVE LIGHT AND TO RAISE HIS PROFILE, AN EFFORT THAT
CONTINUES TO THIS DAY.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
CLINTON immLPHOTOCOPY
�CONriDCNTIAL-
13. J&-THE EFFORT TO OUST LEBED UNDERSCORES SOME
CONTINUING TRUTHS ABOUT RUSSIAN POLITICS.
-- YELTSIN RETAINS THE CENTRAL ROLE BECAUSE, AS
PRESIDENT, HE IS THE KEY SYMBOL OF THE REGIME'S
LEGITIMACY. EVEN BEFORE HIS OPERATION, WHEN CONCERNS
ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN WERE GREATEST, KEY DECISIONS
HAD TO BE REFERRED TO HIM.
-- PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS LOOM LARGE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE
"VLAST" IS WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED.
-- TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS INCREASINGLY GIVE IN TO THE
TEMPTATION TO USE THE MEDIA AGAINST THEIR POLITICAL
OPPONENTS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE MEDIA HAS GROWN
LESS OBJECTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD; ONLY THAT ITS
OBJECTIVITY IS SELECTIVE. NTV, FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY
CARRIED REPORTS ON BELARUS AND FORMER YUGOSLAVIA THAT RAN
CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENT POLICY. SELECTIV
E OBJECTIVITY
PER SE DAMAGES THE MEDIA'S CREDIBILITY OVER TIME,
HOWEVER.
KOMPROMAT (COMPROMISING MATERIAL), USED PUBLICLY OR
SURREPTITIOUSLY, CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL WEAPON,
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC SCANDALS ULTIMATELY TEND TO DISCREDIT
"VLAST" ITSELF MORE THAN THE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED.
TEFFT
<"SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
< "SSN > 4672
<"TOR>961219195150 M2547703
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<"SSN>4672
<"TOR>961219195233 M2547704
<"SECT> SECTION: 03 OF 03
<"SSN>4672
<"TOR>961219195317 M2547707
FROM:
SITREPRT
CLINTON l i m M L P O O O Y
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�H
v
CJ i
_/w
CJ i
a
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-
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
November 5/ 1996
COHiniDENgiAL
DECL!
1.6X1
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S
TO:
The Secretary
FROMt
INR - Toby T. Gati
SUBJECT:
Yeltsin's Operation and i t s Implications
^%J^
The apparent success of Yeltsin's operation should mean the
return of strong leadership to the Kremlin, following Cour
months of infighting during Yeltsin's illness. Other political
figures must adjust to the likelihood that Yeltsin may remain
until the end of his term in 2000.
Successful suroerv. pover transfer. Following seven hours
of surgery at Moscow's Cardiological Center, Yeltsin's doctors
and foreign medical observers, including Dr. Debakey, pronounced
the operation a success. The head of the surgical team, Dr.
Renat Akchurin, told a press conference that Yeltsin's condition
is stable, and that the president's heart i s receiving a
sufficient supply of blood. As of mid-day today, Yeltsin was
reported to have come out from anasthesiaj he i s expected to
remain on a respirator until tomorrow. Dr. Akchurin noted that
the team stopped Yeltsin's heart for sixty-eight minutes and
carried out several artery bypasses—he declined to say how
many. Dr. Debakey later told Embassy Moscow that the number of
bypasses was five; he also said Yeltsin's heart looked healthy
and had good color after being restarted. Dr. Akchurin said the
length of the rehabilitation period cannot be accurately
predicted for several days, fejr
Prior to today's operation, Yeltsin signed a decree handing
over presidential powers, including nuclear release authority,
to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in accordance with the
constitution. Dr. Akchurin said Yeltsin likely would be able to
reclaim his powers within two days. Assuming no complications,
Yeltsin probably would begin gradually to resume some of his
duties within a few weeks, and would return full-time around the
beginning of next year. (U)
CLASSIFIED BY: Toby T. Gati, INR
REASON: 1.5(c)(d)
A/S
CONFIDENTTftfc
CLINTON.LIBRARY P O O O Y
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PER E.0.13526
�NOV 07 ' 96
P. 23
07:24m
GOlTTIDDIIBlIfttr
- 2 -
Implications of Yeltsin's return. The return of a vigorous
Yeltsin to the Kremlin should bring much-needed stability to the
Russian political scene/ which has been characterized by
executive branch infighting over the past four months. Key
political figures would a l l be affected:
— Lebed has badly miscalculated and Yeltsin will not soon
forget Lebed's insubordination and arrogance. I f Yeltsin
recovers fully, presidential elections are a long four years
off. Maintaining Lebed's high popularity ratings will require
strong financial and organizational support, both of which he
currently lacks, and political s k i l l s that he has yet to
demonstrate. The Russian media i s unlikely to afford Lebed the
coverage required to keep him in the public eye.
— Chief-of-staff Chubavs can maintain his powerful
position, in part because of his close relations with Yeltsin's
daughter, but w i l l almost certainly have to lower his public
profile. I t would not be out of character for Yeltsin to
demonstrate he is back in charge by making a point of trimming
Chubays's influence or the influence of people beholden to
Chubays.
— Chernomyrdin would almost certainly be relieved not to
have to run a presidential campaign next year, an effort that
would require a complete image makeover and sap most of his
energy from the job of running the government. His loyalty to
Yeltsin is his strong suit, but no one can guarantee that a
reinvigorated Yeltsin might not order a government shakeup. -^tLono term problems remain. Yeltsin's return does nothing
to diminish the serious problems the country faces. The current
economic c r i s i s w i l l be Yeltsin's f i r s t priority (though i t i s
unlikely to be solved anytime soon), with Chechnya a close
second. As before, progress on foreign policy issues, such as
NATO enlargement, i s more likely with the president's direct
involvement, -fe)Yeltsin's return increases the odds that the government's
reform course w i l l continue and allows the Russian political
establishment to focus more of i t s energy on substance rather
than jockeying for influence. Political infighting w i l l not
disappear, but i t s practitioners will have to be more cautious
about attracting the President's wrath. After Yeltsin makes his
return, he I s likely to take a careful look at how hie
subordinates behaved In his absence.-fC}-
OONFIDBNTfttfr
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�P 24
.
N V 07 ' 96 07:25m
O
- 3A new Yeltsin? I n i t i a l l y , Yeltsin would benefit p o l i t i c a l l y
from a period of "rebirth" and a sense that the leader has
returned. His successful surgery and recovery also would
provide an important signal that the country can come through
such a c r i s i s by following constitutional provisions. (The event
has already established a new tradition of openness on the
health Russia's top leadership.
However, the issue of Yeltsin's leadership style remains.
Never a hands-on president, he has always been prone to bouts of
depression and periodic withdrawal from the political scene, If
this pattern continues despite apparently successful surgery,
Russia's p o l i t i c a l scene will continue to be erratic.
CLINTON
m
K
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OY
�NOV 07 '96 07:25fiM
Draftod:
REA/JWilliams/x7-9l86
Cleared: REA/JSontag/x7-9203
REA/LSell/x7-5642
Approved: INR/DAS/AN: TFingar
F i l e Name: 961105MEMO.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BELL, DOWLING, EGGERT, ELKIND, FEELEY, FORT, MATERA, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER,
SCHMIDT, VERSHBOW, WITKOWSKY, NSC
PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: •SONHOEimAt
DTG:041158Z FEB 97
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1674
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7367
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7393
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 7194
C O-N r I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002543
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/97
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: TV EXECUTIVES ON NATO EXPANSION DEBATE
REF MOSCOW 01960
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN F. TEFFT.
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
2 . i e i ~ A J A LUNCHEON HOSTED JANUARY 30 BY CHARGE, THE
TOP EXECUTIVES OF PUBLIC RUSSIAN TV (ORT), INDEPENDENT
TV (NTV), AND THE ENTERTAINMENT-ORIENTED TV-6 AGREED
THAT THE DEBATE IN RUSSIA OVER NATO EXPANSION HAS
BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE TWO MOST POLITICALLY
ENGAGED EXECUTIVES ARGUED THAT THE NATO-RUSSIA DEBATE
HAS DISPLACED A PUBLIC AIRING OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES THAT WOULD ALLOW RUSSIA TO COME TO TERMS WITH
ITS PAST AND DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ITS PRESENT. THE
THIRD, LESS CONCERNED WITH GEOPOLITICS AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY, PAINTED A COMPELLING PICTURE OF THE DESPERATE
SOCIAL CONDITIONS THAT ARE GOING UNRESOLVED AS THE
RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP POSTURES OVER RUSSIA'S RIGHTFUL
PLACE IN THE WORLD. IN DIFFERENT WAYS, EACH AGREED
THAT UNTIL THERE IS A PROBING EXAMINATION OF THE
REASONS FOR RUSSIA'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES, THE RUSSIAN
LEADERSHIP WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO MOVE FORWARD AND
CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR ITS CITIZENS TO LEAD A
PER E„a 13526
CLINTON i m M L P O O O Y
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�CONriDCNTIAL
"NORMAL LIFE." END SUMMARY.
THREE PERSPECTIVES
3. (SBU) THE VIEWS OF THE THREE TV EXECUTIVES WERE
INFORMED BOTH BY THEIR BACKGROUNDS AND THE AUDIENCES
THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPANIES CATER TO. ORT'S SERGEY
BLAGOVOLIN, A LONG-TIME FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERT WHO CAME
UP THROUGH THE PRESTIGIOUS SOVIET INSTITUTE FOR THE
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO--WHERE
HE WORKED FOR FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV), SPOKE FOR THE
MOST TRADITIONAL AUDIENCE. IN HIS OWN WORDS, BOTH HIS
PEERS AND HIS VIEWERS ARE "TRAPPED IN THE OLD
PROPAGANDA" AND HAVE DIFFICULTY RELATING TO NATO AS
ANYTHING OTHER THAN A POTENTIAL ENEMY. NTV'S IGOR
MALASHENKO, WHO ALSO CAME UP THROUGH THE RANKS OF ELITE
FOREIGN POLICY THINK-TANKS, REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY'S
NEW BUSINESS ELITES, THOSE WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT
"EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE" DEBATES ONLY TO THE
EXTENT THEY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN RUSSIA AND
THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MONEY. TV-6 GENERAL DIRECTOR
ALEKSANDR PONOMAREV IS A PROVINCIAL JOURNALIST WHO MADE
GOOD AND NOW HEADS A TV COMPANY THAT HAS CONSCIOUSLY
TARGETED RUSSIA'S POLITICALLY ALIENATED MASSES FOR WHOM
NATO EXPANSION IS UTTERLY IRRELEVANT.
OLD THINK
:
4.4CH 0R THE MOST PART, BLAGOVOLIN MADE THE SAME
UTTERANCES ABOUT THE UNDESIRABILITY OF NATO EXPANSION
AND THE NEED FOR "SPECIAL AGREEMENTS" THAT HAVE BEEN
HEARD AD NAUSEUM AROUND TOWN (REF). HIS ONLY
DIVERGENCE FROM THE PARTY LINE WAS WHEN HE CONCEDED
THAT POLICY AND OPINION MAKERS "ARE TRAPPED IN THE
PROPAGANDA OF THE PAST," UNABLE TO BREAK OUT OF OLD
SOVIET STEREOTYPES ABOUT NATO. AS THE DEBATE DRAGS ON
AND PEOPLE'S DESPERATE LIVING STANDARDS CONTINUE TO GO
UNADDRESSED, HE SAID, RUSSIA'S LEADERS WILL FIND
THEMSELVES "SITTING ON A POWDER KEG."
NEW THINK
5. -fef-MALASHENKO SHOWED OBVIOU IMPATIENCE OVER THE
WHOLE NATO EXPANSION DEBATEAND ARGUED THAT IT HAS
BADLY DISTRACTED THE LEADRSHIP FROM MORE PRESSING
PROBLEMS ON THE DOMESTI FRONT. REFLECTING HIS
POSITION AS AN ENTREPRENEUR WHO HAS A STAKE IN
POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY, MALASHENKO
STATED THAT "DOMESTIC ISSUES ARE THE ONLY PROBLEMS THAT
CLINTON i m m . P O O O Y
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�CONriDIIPJTIAL
MATTER TO ME." HE RECOGNIZES THAT NATO EXPANSION IS
INEVITABLE AND RECOMMENDED HALF-SERIOUSLY THAT THE U.S.
"JUST DO IT QUIETLY." IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S COMMENT
THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT HAD RECENTLY TOLD RUSSIAN
LEADERS WE WILL WORK HARD WITH RUSSIA TO MANAGE THE
NATO ENLARGEMENT ISSUE "BUT IT TAKES TW
O TO TANGO,"
MALASHENKO REITERATED HIS DISINTEREST: "THIS IS NOT MY
TANGO."
-CO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 002543
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/97
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: TV EXECUTIVES ON NATO EXPANSION DEBATE
6. 4G)-MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, MALASHENKO ARGUED, THE
ELITES HAVE USED THE DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF U.S.RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND RUSSIA'S ROLE IN EUROPE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FULL PUBLIC AIRING OF THE MORE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
"RUSSIA LOST THE COLD WAR," HE SAID, "BUT YOU WILL
NEVER HEAR ANY OF OUR LEADERS SAY THIS." HE NOTED THAT
JAPAN AND GERMANY HAD TO GO THROUGH A PROCESS OF
NATIONAL RE-EXAMINATION AFTER THEIR DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR
II BEFORE THEY COULD EVEN BEGIN TO THINK OF THEIR ROLE
IN THE WORLD. GERMANY HAD DONE SO; JAPAN STILL HAD NOT
COME TO GRIPS WITH ITS PAST. IN HIS VIEW, THE RUSSIAN
LEADERSHIP'S INABILITY TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CURRENT REALITY OF
RUSSIA'S WEAKNESS PREVENTS THE NATION FROM MOVING AHEAD
TO DEVELOP A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT WOULD ITSELF
RESOLVE RUSSIA'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE WORLD.
MASS THINK
7.-ten"V6'S PONOMAREV EXPRESSED THE VIEW OF RUSSIA'S
SILENT MAJORITY WHEN ASKED FOR HIS OPINION ON THE NATO
EXPANSION DEBATE. HE RESPONDED BY TELLING IN STARK
TERMS THE STORY OF A SMALL TOWN -- AND THOUSANDS OTHERS
LIKE IT -- THAT IS DYING A SLOW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEATH WHILE THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP DEBATES NATO
EXPASION. HIS STORY CONCERNED HIS NATIVE TOWN OUTSIDE
SAMARA, WITH A POPULATION OF 30,000 (ALMOST HALF OF
WHICH ARE PENSIONERS) AND ONLY TWO FACTORIES. THE
FACTORIES HAVE BEEN IDLE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. THE
ONLY MONEY THAT PEOPLE HAVE HAD TO SPEND HAS COME IN
THE FORM OF PENSIONS, BUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION LAST FALL, EVEN PENSIONS STOPPED
BEING PAID. HIS SISTER, A SCHOOL TEACHER,
THEORETICALLY EARNS 180,000 RUBLES PER MONTH (ABOUT USD
35), BUT THAT WAS CUT TO 90,000 RUBLES (USD 17) BECAUSE
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
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�GONriDCNTIAL
THE CLASS IS NOT ENTIRELY FULL. "AND EVEN THEN, SHE
DOESN'T GET PAID ANYWAY." HE SAID HE LEARNED LATER
THAT 40 PERCENT OF RUSSIANS LIVE IN TOWNS SUCH AS THIS.
"FOR THEM AND FOR ME," HE SAID, "THE DEBATE ABOUT NATO
EXPANSION IS A CONVERSATION CONDUCTED BETWEEN TWO SPACE
ALIENS."
COMMENT
B . ^ - T H E LUNCHEON DISCUSSION DROVE HOME WHAT WE HAVE
KNOWN ABOUT THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE IN RUSSIA FOR A
LONG TIME: IT IS BEING CONDUCTED BY AND FOR A VERY
NARROW ELITE WHO (1) DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NTURE
OF NATO AND THE ADAPTATION PROCESS UNDERWAY, AND (2)
HAVE ALLOWED THE NATO DEBATE TO DISTRACT THEM FROM MORE
DIFFICULT AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FOR RUSSIA'S FUTURE.
THE MISINFORMATION CURRENTLY CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW
ARGUES IN FAVOR OF A MORE DYNAMIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH MALASHENKO'S INJUNCTION TO THE U.S.
TO JUST GET ON WITH NATO ENLARGEMENT "BUT DO IT
QUIETLY" IS A USEFUL WARNING OF THE NEED FOR A DEFT
HAND IN THE PRESENT POLITICALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN ON
NATO WILL DEPEND GREATLY ON THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP'S
WILLINGNESS TO SET A MORE APPROPRIATE TONE IN THEIR OWN
PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT
PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN SAID FLATLY IN A NATIONAL
TV INTERVIEW FROM DAVOS FEBRUARY 2 THAT NATO HAD NOT
CHANGED A BIT. TEFFT
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CLASS:-SE€ftET
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FM: AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2240
////
-S-E-e-K b I SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 003809
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO EMBASSY MOSCOW, ALSO FOR AMB COLLINS
E.O. 12958: 19 NOV 06
TAGS: PREL, GG
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTS ON BEREZOVSKIY AND RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
CLASSIFIED BY AMB WILLIAM COURTNEY, REASONS 1.5(B,D)
REF: TBILISI 3707 (EXDIS)
SUMMARY
1. IN A PRIVATE NOVEMBER 1 5 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR-ATLARGE COLLINS, PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE CAUTIONED THAT THE
U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY UNEXPECTED TURN IN RUSSIA,
BUT NOT EXCLUDE A SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WAS QUITE
POSSIBLE. MUCH DEPENDED ON YELTSIN AND HIS REEMERGENCE IN
POLITICAL LIFE. NEW SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY
BEREZOVSKIY COULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY. BEREZOVSKIY WAS DISMISSIVE OF ATTEMPTS TO
RESTORE THE OLD ORDER, AND WANTED A RADICALLY DIFFERENT
FOREIGN POLICY, PUTTING RUSSIA SQUARELY WITH THE WEST. HE
MERITED U.S. SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.
2. FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY WITH THE U.S.
DELEGATION, SHEVARDNADZE MET PRIVATELY WITH AMBASSADORS
COLLINS AND COURTNEY AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR PIFER.
RUSSIA -- ANY TURN POSSIBLE
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBMS-Y P O O O Y
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3. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY
UNEXPECTED TURN IN RUSSIA BUT SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE A SMOOTH
DEVELOPMENT -- THAT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND
ON YELTSIN AND HIS REEMERGENCE. PRIOR TO YELTSIN'S
OPERATION, A REAL POWER STRUGGLE HAD BEEN UNDERWAY.
FORTUNATELY, THE MOD LEADERS WERE "NORMAL."
RODIONOV A FACTOR FOR STABILITY
4. SHEVARDNADZE SAID YELTSIN WOULD NOT HAVE APPOINTED
RODIONOV DEFENSE MINISTER HAD GEORGIA INDICATED IT WOULD
REACT NEGATIVELY. LEBED HAD CALLED SHEVARDNADZE IN
ADVANCE AND SAID YELTSIN'S DECISION DEPENDED ON
SHEVARDNADZE'S VIEW. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT RODIONOV WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 1989 TRAGEDY (IN WHICH SOVIET TROOPS
ATTACKED AND KILLED A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN DEMONSTRATORS IN
TBILISI), ALTHOUGH HE WAS FULFILLING ORDERS. SHEVARDNADZE
COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SUPPORTED RODIONOV'S CANDIDACY.
RODIONOV WAS NOT A MAN TO SEEK POWER. HE WAS NO ONE'S MAN
-- NOT CHERNOMYRDIN'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S. THIS REPRESENTED
A FACTOR FOR STABILITY.
CHUBAYS-CHERNOMYRDIN
5. SHEVARDNADZE ASSERTED THAT A POWERFUL WING WAS BEING
FORMED UNDER CHUBAYS. IF YELTSIN DID NOT REGAIN HIS FORM,
THE CHUBAYS-CHERNOMYRDIN RELATIONSHIP WOULD DEVELOP IN A
"PAINFUL MANNER." THE CHOICE OF RYBKIN AS SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY WAS FORTUNATE AND RIGHT. IT WAS GOOD
THAT RYBKIN HAD HAD THE CHANCE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
CLINTON IN 1994. RYBKIN WAS A MODERATE.
BEREZOVSKIY AN IMPORTANT FIGURE
6. SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED THAT BEREZOVSKIY'S EMERGENCE AS
RYBKIN'S DEPUTY WAS IMPORTANT. HE REPRESENTED RUSSIA'S
BIG NEW CAPITAL, AND WAS ONE OF THE SIX OR SEVEN MOST
POWERFUL PERSONS IN RUSSIA ECONOMICALLY, A GROUP IN WHICH
BEREZOVSKIY SAID THERE WAS NO INFIGHTING. HE WAS AN
"EXTRAORDINARY PERSON."
7. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT IN KAZAKSTANI
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV'S STANCE, AND BEREZOVSKIY HAD
CONFIRMED IT. DUE TO THE LARGE ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATION
IN KAZAKSTAN, NAZARBAYEV WAS UNDER PRESSRE FROM THE
RUSSIANS AND HAD TO CONSIDER THEIR VEWS. BUT HE HAD
RECENTLY VISITED TBILISI, AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCOVERED
C I T N LIB^Y P O O O Y
LNO
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�ANOTHER MAN.
8. SHEVARDNADZE SAID BEREZOVSKIY FELT RUSSIAN POLICY
SHOULD RADICALLY CHANGE, AND HE UNDERSTOOD THIS WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT CHANGES IN PERSONNEL. BEREZOVSKIY
BELIEVED THE RUSSIA/BELARUS/KAZAKSTAN/KYRGYZSTAN CUSTOMS
UNION WAS NONSENSICAL, A VIEW SHARED BY NAZARBAYEV.
BEREZOVSKIY UNDERSTOOD IT WAS SENSELESS FOR RUSSIA TO
SPEAK OF RESTORING THE OLD ORDER. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD
BEREZOVSKIY THAT RUSSIA HAD LOST AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BETTER
0 E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TBILISI 003809
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO EMBASSY MOSCOW, ALSO FOR AMB COLLINS
E.O. 12958: 19 NOV 06
TAGS: PREL, GG
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTS ON BEREZOVSKIY AND RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
RELATIONS WITH THE WEST; RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE GONE WEST
AFTER THE SOVIET UNION'S COLLAPSE. BY NOT HAVING DONE SO,
RUSSIA HAD ACCELERATED THE MOVE BY OTHER NIS (UKRAINE,
AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, UZBEKISTAN, KAZAKSTAN) TO THE WEST.
RUSSIA WAS IN SELF-ISOLATION. SHEVARDNADZE REPORTED THAT
BEREZOVSKIY AGREED. (REF)
MERITING U.S. SUPPORT
9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVED RUSSIAN POLICY
WAS NOT PREEMPTIVE OR FORWARD-LOOKING BUT BEHIND THE
TIMES. BEREZOVSKIY HAD OTHER INTERESTING IDEAS.
SHEVARDNADZE VIEWED HIM POSITIVELY AND HAD TOLD HIM HE
MIGHT SHARE SOME OF THEIR DISCUSSION WITH WESTERN
OFFICIALS. BEREZOVSKIY WOULD NEED "YOUR SUPPORT," BUT
ONLY WHEN IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY; SUPPORT NOW WOULD HARM
HIM. BEREZOVSKIY HAD A CORRECT ORIENTATION, AND SUPPORT
WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN THE RIGHT DOSAGES. HE WOULD
DEVELOP INTO A NECESSARY AND USEFUL MAN.
TALKING TO RUSSIA ABOUT THE NIS
10. COLLINS COMMENTED THAT HE WAS TROUBLED THAT THE U.S.
AND RUSSIA HAD NOT FOUND A WAY TO TALK EFFECTIVELY ABOUT
THE NIS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS. THERE WAS A GOOD
DEAL OF SUSPICION. COLLINS HAD SUGGESTED TO RYURIKOV THAT
IT WAS TIME FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE, AND RYURIKOV WAS
RECEPTIVE. THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE U.S., RUSSIA
AND EUROPE IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA WERE
CLINTON l i m m P O O O Y
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COMPATIBLE -- A STABLE AND DEVELOPING REGION THAT DID NOT
BECOME LIKE ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW
RUSSIA WOULD PURSUE ITS INTERESTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
FIND THE RIGHT RUSSIANS FOR THIS DISCUSSION.
11. ISHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME
FOR RUSSIA TO BE CURED OF IMPERIAL DISEASE. THE EMPIRE
CREATED TANGLES OF CONTROVERSY ON ITS BORDERS. RUSSIA WAS
USING ABKHAZIA AND THINKING ABOUT USING AJARIA (A MUSLIM
GEORGIAN REGION IN THE SOUTHWEST ON THE BLACK SEA) AGAINST
GEORGIA. NAZARBAYEV, ALIYEV, AND KUCHMA WOULD SAY THE
SAME IF THEY WERE CANDID. KUCHMA AHD BEEN IN DESPAIR WITH
{SHEVARDNADZE! ABOUT HOW THE RUSSIANS WORKED OPENLY IN
UKRAINE'S DONBASS REGION. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE SAW IN
BEREZOVSKIY! A MAN FREE OF ALL THIS -- A PERSON WHO
BELIEVED THAT PROCEEDING ON SUCH AN IMPERIAL BASIS WOULD
LEAD TO RUSSIA'S COLLAPSE.
12. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FORCE
IN MOSCOW DID PROVIDE SOME HOPE. IF YELTSIN CAME BACK TO
FULL FORM, ONE SCENARIO WOULD BE A BOOST FOR THIS NEW
FORCE. THAT COULD CHANGE MANY THINGS. IT WAS IMPORTANT
NOT TO LET THE OPPORTUNITY SLIP AWAY. RUSSIA NEEDED
AMERICA'S HELP, BUT THE U.S. SHOULD GET SOME QUID PRO QUO.
THERE MUST BE AN OPEN AND DIRECT DIALOGUE.
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV
13. |SHEVARDNADZEj OBSERVED THAT HE HAD HAD HIGH HOPES FOR
PRIMAKOV, BELIEVING HE WOULD ASSUME A PRO-WESTERN POLICY.
BUT PRIMAKOV HAD PROVED CAPTIVE TO OLD IDEAS AND
IDEOLOGIES. PLAYING WITH IRAQ NOW WAS TOO LATE; IT WAS
RIDICULOUS. BEREZOVSKIYj AND HIS TEAM WANTED TO CREATE
S O M E T H I N G LIKE A S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E W I T H I N T H E R U S S I A N
SECURITY C O U N C I L ; OTHERWISE THEY C O U L D N O T OPPOSE
PRIMAKOV. (SHEVARDNADZE! SAID HE HAD MENTIONED FORMER
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN TO pEREZOVSKIYj AS
SOMEONE WHO WAS MORE FLEXIBLE.
14. AMBASSADOR COLLINS HAS CLEARED THIS TELEGRAM.
COURTNEY
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Y P OO O Y
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: EGGERT, ELKIND, FORT, MATERA, PASCUAL, PIFER, RUMER, NSC
PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS:-feONriDENTIAL
DTG:161301Z JAN 97
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0595
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 7231
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 7039
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 7193
C O N F I D E MTIA-fc SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
REF(S): A) 96 MOSCOW 22499 B) 96 MOSCOW 31806
C) 96 MOSCOW 33787 D) 96 MOSCOW 35027
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR
THOMAS GRAHAM. REASONS: 1.5 B) AND D).
SUMMARY
2.-4€>-BURING ITS AUTUMN SESSION, THE RUSSIAN
STATE DUMA FOSTERED SURPRISINGLY COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS WITH THE GOR UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF
SPEAKER GENNADIY SELEZNEV AND COMMUNIST FACTION
BOSS GENNADIY ZYUGANOV. ON KEY ISSUES, THIS LED
TO A PATTERN OF FIERY PARLIAMENTARY POLEMICS
FOLLOWED BY RAPID RETREAT FROM THE BRINK OF
CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR. AS A RESULT, THE
DUMA FAILED TO STRENGTHEN EITHER RUSSIAN REFORM
OR ITS OWN POSITION AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION.
(DETAILS ON ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL LEGISLATIVE
AGENDA FOLLOW SEPTEL.) END SUMMARY.
FEW NEW LAWS; PLENTY OF POLEMICS
3. (SBU) THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA'S AUTUMN 1996
SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY FIERY POLEMICS BUT
PER E,0.13526
CLINTON I M M L P O O O Y
HTCP
�CONriDCNTIAL
LITTLE LEGISLATIVE ACHIEVEMENT. ECONOMIC REFORM
MOVED AHEAD -- IF AT ALL -- AT A SNAIL'S PACE,
WITH LAWS ON PROFIT SHARING, PRIVATIZATION,
TRADE, AND THE LAND CODE PUT ON THE BACK BURNER.
(DETAILS SEPTEL). THE DUMA ALSO MADE LITTLE
PROGRESS ON STRENGTHENING RUSSIA'S DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS. THE DUMA DID PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN, GOVERNMENT,
AND COURT SYSTEM, WHICH SPEAKER SELEZNEV DUBBED
THE DUMA'S TOP ACHIEVEMENTS THIS FALL. BUT THESE
WERE DRAFTED DURING PRIOR DUMA SESSIONS. DURING
AUTUMN 1996, THE DUMA SIMPLY RE-WORKED PREVIOUS
VERSIONS OF THESE BILLS FOLLOWING THEIR REJECTION
BY THE FEDERATION COUNCIL.
4. (SBU) AS 1996 CLOSED, THE DUMA THUS
CONTINUED TO FUNCTION PRIMARILY AS A FORUM FOR
POPULIST DEBATE BY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. AS
DURING THE FIRST PART OF 1996, TOP DUMA DEPUTIES
REMAINED MORE CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING ACCESS
TO THE MEDIA THAN ENACTING LEGISLATION. AT THE
SAME TIME, SPEAKER SELEZNEV'S PROFESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP STYLE HAS HELPED TO PURGE THE DUMA OF
CLOWNISH BEHAVIOR, SUCH AS THE SEPTEMBER 1995
MINI-BRAWL IN WHICH EXTREME NATIONALISTS VLADIMIR
ZHIRINOVSKIY (LDPR) AND NIKOLAY LYSENKO BEAT
FATHER GLEB YAKUNIN WITH THE PRIEST'S OWN CROSS
AND PULLED THE HAIR OF A FEMALE DEPUTY. ON THE
OTHER HAND, THE DUMA'S REPEATED THREATS OF NOCONFIDENCE VOTES FOLLOWED BY ITS BACKING DOWN
FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR UNDERSCORED THE
EMPTINESS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS' RHETORIC.
KEY DEVELOPMENT: IMPROVED DUMA-GOR RELATIONS
S . - m - T H E MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE
DUMA THIS AUTUMN WAS THE COOPERATION IT DEVELOPED
WITH THE GOR. ONE YEAR AGO, GENNADIY ZYUGANOV
AND HIS COMMUNISTS WERE SQUARING OFF FOR A
BRUISING FIGHT IN RUSSIA'S APPROACHING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, FOLLOWING THEIR
SWEEPING VICTORY IN DECEMBER 1995'S DUMA
ELECTIONS. MANY OBSERVERS THUS PREDICTED A YEAR
OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK, POSSIBLY
MIRRORING THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
AND THE SUPREME SOVIET THAT CULMINATED IN THE
BLOODY EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1993. THE FIRST FEW
MONTHS OF 1996 WERE INDEED STORMY. IN MARCH,
MOSCOW BUZZED WITH RUMORS THAT YELTSIN WAS ON THE
VERGE OF DISSOLVING THE DUMA AFTER THE COMMUNISTS
ENGINEERED A DUMA VOTE DECLARING THE DECEMBER
1991 BELOVEZHSKOYE ACCORD NULL AND VOID. THE
LINTON LWMLPHOTOCOPY
�'CONriDCNTIAL
DUMA'S COMMUNIST-LED ATTACKS ON RUSSIA'S
EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINUED THROUGH THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JULY.
6. {GkTHE DUMA'S ATTITUDE SHIFTED ABRUPTLY
HOWEVER, WHEN IT CONVENED ON AUGUST 10 TO VOTE ON
THE RE-CONFIRMATION OF PRIME MINI
STER
CHERNOMYRDIN. DESPITE ZYUGANOV'S WARNING THAT
•G-0 N T I D L N I I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
HIS COMMUNISTS -- HOLDING NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF THE
DUMA'S SEATS -- WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE NOMINATION,
THE DUMA RE-CONFIRMED CHERNOMYRDIN BY A VOTE OF
314 TO 85 (REF. A). AS THE DUMA'S AUTUMN SESSION
PROGRESSED, THE COMMUNISTS INCREASINGLY FOCUSED
THEIR CRITICISM ON PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHIEF ANATOLIY CHUBAYS RATHER THAN PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN. ZYUGANOV AND SELEZNEV WORKED TO
BUILD A TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, WHOM
THEY SAW AS A NATURAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO CHUBAYS
AND A PROVIDER OF ACCESS TO REAL POWER (REFS. B,
C). ZYUGANOV AND SELEZNEV THUS LED THE DUMA FROM
THE BRINK OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS, INCLUDING THREATENED NOCONFIDENCE VOTES OVER THE CHECHEN PEACE AGREEMENT
AND BUDGET (REF. D) IN DECEMBER.
7. (U) COOPERATION THUS CONTINUED TO
CHARACTERIZE THE DUMA'S RELATIONS WITH THE GOR
THROUGH THE END OF 1996. AS THE DUMA CLOSED ITS
AUTUMN SESSION ON DECEMBER 28, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER ALEKSANDR LIVSHITS WARMLY INVITED DUMA
DEPUTIES TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE GOR IN 1997
TO RESOLVE RUSSIA'S MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS.
SPEAKER SELEZNEV, MEANWHILE, GUSHED THAT "FOR THE
FIRST TIME, THE DUMA AND GOVERNMENT ARE NOW
WORKING TOGETHER TO PULL RUSSIA OUT OF CRISIS."
COOPERATION ROOTED IN DUMA'S WEAKNESS
8. - f € r WHILE THE IMPROVEMENT OF DUMA-GOR
RELATIONS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, ITS ROOT
CAUSE PROVIDES REASON FOR CONCERN. ZYUGANOV AND
SELEZNEV ULTIMATELY SOUGHT ACCOMMODATION RATHER
THAN CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOR BECAUSE OF THE
DUMA'S RELATIVE WEAKNESS AS A POLITICAL
INSTITUTION. THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION DELINEATES
CLINTON LiUEARL P O O O Y
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�•CONriDENTW
A POLITICAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF A WEAK
PARLIAMENT AND A STRONG PRESIDENT, WHICH ALLOWS
THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE DECREES ON ALMOST ANY
MATTER, AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT CONTRADICT THE
CONSTITUTION OR FEDERAL LAW. MOREOVER, THE
PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO DISSOLVE THE DUMA (UNDER
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES) HAS UNDERMINED THE
WILLINGNESS OF MANY DUMA DEPUTIES TO STAND UP TO
THE GOR ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS THE PRIME
MINISTER'S CONFIRMATION AND THE BUDGET.
9. -{eTTHE ZYUGANOV-SELEZNEV "STRATEGY" OF
ACCOMMODATION IS OPPOSED BY CONS]RVATIVE
COMMUNISTS WHO ARGUE THAT THIS APPROACH DENIES
THEIR FACTION ITS OPPOSITION STATUS. GRIGORIY
YAVLINSKIY AND HIS PRO-REFORM YABLOKO FACTION,
MEANWHILE, SIMILARLY MAINTAIN THAT THE DUMA IS
LOSING ITS RELEVANCE AS AN INDEPENDENT BRANCH OF
POWER DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO STAND UP TO THE GOR.
HOWEVER, ZYUGANOV'S USE OF STRICT PARTY
DISCIPLINE AND HIS CONTROL OF A NEAR-MAJORITY 222
DUMA SEATS (THROUGH THE COMMUNISTS' ALLIANCE WITH
THE AGRARIAN AND "PEOPLE'S POWER" FACTIONS)
SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO KEEP THE DUMA ON A
COOPERATIVE COURSE WITH THE GOR, IF HE SO
DESIRES.
NEXT SESSION: AMENDMENT STRENGTHENING DUMA POWER?
10. AGT AS THE DUMA OPENS ITS SPRING 1997
SESSION, ITS LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES ARE LIKELY TO
INCLUDE SOCIAL WELFARE ISSUES, MILITARY REFORM, A
FOURTH AND FINAL READING OF THE 1997 BUDGET, AND
ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN PARLIAMENTARY POWERS
RELATIVE TO THE PRESIDENCY. IN THE WAKE OF
YELTSIN'S LATEST ILLNESS, SELEZNEV AND FELLOW
COMMUNIST VIKTOR ILYUKHIN HAVE REVIVED THEIR
THREAT OF LAST OCTOBER TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION
TO DETERMINE WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS PHYSICALLY
INCAPACITATED, AND THUS REQUIRED TO SURRENDER HIS
AUTHORITY TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TO A CERTAIN
EXTENT, THIS LATEST MOVE REFLECTS THE COMMUNISTSPERCEIVED NEED TO REPAI THEIR IMAGE AS AN
OPPOSITION PARTY. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, MARK A
DEPARTURE FROM THEIR TACTIC OF ATTACKING THE
PRESIDENCY WHILE WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. IT
IS THEREFORE APPARENT THAT THE DUMA'S RECENT
PATTERN OF BARKING LOUDLY BUT NOT BITING IS
LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS,
ABSENT A MAJOR K
REMLIN SHAKE-UP.
- f i 0 H T I D E N T I ATSECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 000970
CLINTON I m m t P O O O Y
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�I.UNI IULN I IAL"
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/07
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, RS
SUBJECT: DUMA'S BARK WORSE THAN BITE IN FALL '96
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PREC: ROUTINE CLASS: CONriDCNTIAL SSN: 3787 MSGID: M2530022
RAACZYUW RUEHMOA3787 3440946-CCCC-RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 090946Z DEC 96
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8801
INFO: RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 6965
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 6793
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 6915
C O N F I D E N-T I A L CECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
REFS: A) MOSCOW 30398 B) MOSCOW 26590 C) MOSCOW 31806
D) MOSCOW 27420 E) MOSCOW 33078
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR THOMAS
GRAHAM. REASONS: 1.5 B) AND D).
SUMMARY
2. -(G)- ALTHOUGH HE LOST JULY'S PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF
ELECTIONS BY A WIDE MARGIN, COMMUNIST LEADER GENNADIY
ZYUGANOV REMAINS RUSSIA'S MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION
POLITICIAN. HIS MAIN AMBITION, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO HAVE
SHIFTED FROM WINNING THE PRESIDENCY TO BECOMING THE
UNRIVALED LEADER OF A BROAD OPPOSITION BLOC CENTERED IN
THE DUMA, AND ENJOYING ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.
DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, ZYUGANOV IS UNLIKELY TO ACQUIRE SIGNIFICANTLY
GREATER INFLUENCE THAN HE ENJOYS AT PRESENT. HIS
LONGEVITY AT THE TOP LEVEL OF RUSSIAN POLITICS WILL
ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON WHETHER HE CAN SUCCESSFULLY RESIST
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN THE OPPOSITION CAMP. END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
AMBITIONS: TSAR OF ALL THE OPPOSITIONS
3. -(G^ZYUGANOV WOULD PROBABLY RUN IN THE NOW UNLIKELY
EVENT OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AS ZYUGANOV-
PER E.Oo 13526
�C I T N L B A Y POOOY
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EVENT OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AS ZYUGANOVADVISOR ALEKSEY PODBEREZKIN TOLD US JUST BEFORE YELTSIN'S
HEART SURGERY, "OF COURSE ZYUGANOV WOULD RUN. THERE
REALLY IS NO OTHER OPPOSITION CANDIDATE." ZYUGANOV'S
APPARENT PREFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS TO AVOID ANOTHER
POTENTIALLY HUMILIATING PRESIDENTIAL RACE. THROUGHOUT THE
AUTUMN, HE CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED ADVANCING HIS OWN NAME AS
A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE IN EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
WHILE HE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON YELTSIN TO RESIGN FOR HEALTH
REASONS, ZYUGANOV ALSO CONSISTENTLY DEMANDED THAT
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY BE TRANSFERRED TO PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN. EVEN WHEN ASKED DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY BY
AMBASSADOR PICKERING WHETHER HE WOULD RUN IF EARLY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD, ZYUGANOV DODGED THE
QUESTION (REF. A).
4. -(G)-ABOVE ALL, ZYUGANOV SEEKS TO GAIN THE
RESPECTABILITY AND AUTHORITY OF A TRUE STATESMAN WITHOUT
HAVING TO RUN AGAIN FOR PRESIDENT. HE WISHES TO BE SEEN
AS THE LEADER OF A BROAD BUT LOYAL OPPOSITION BLOC,
SERVING THE INTERESTS OF A WIDE CROSS-SECTION OF RUSSIAN
SOCIETY, AND ENJOYING ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWER.
THE KEY TO ZYUGANOV'S POLITICAL STRATEGY IS HIS CONTINUING
EFFORT TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS A MODERATE NATIONALIST RATHER
THAN A SOVIET-STYLE COMMUNIST. HE HAS EMBRACED
NATIONALIST RHETORIC AND PUBLISHED A BOOK OUTLINING HIS
VISION OF A STRONG, INDEPENDENT, NON-SOCIALIST RUSSIA. HE
ALSO ENGINEERED THE FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE'S PATRIOTIC
UNION OF RUSSIA (PPUR), A COALITION OF COMMUNISTS,
NATIONALISTS, AND AGRARIANS, TO BROADEN HIS SUPPORT BASE
(REF. D).
STRENGTHS: PERSONAL STATUS AND ORGANIZATION
5. (SBU) ZYUGANOV'S GREATEST STRENGTH IS HIS STATUS AS
RUSSIA'S MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURE. BY LEADING
(AND MAINTAINING STRICT DISCIPLINE OVER) THE DUMA'S MOST
POWERFUL FACTION, ZYUGANOV'S AUTHORITY OUTSTRIPS THAT OF
ANQ OTHER PARLIAMENTARIAN, INCLUDING DUMA SPEAKER GENNADIY
SELEZNEV. ZYUGANOV IS ALSO THE DE-FACTO LEADER OF A NEARMAJORITY BLOC OF 220 DUMA DEPUTIES THAT INCLUDES THE
COMMUNIST, PEOPLE'S POWER, AND AGRARIAN FACTIONS. HE
CONSEQUENTLY ENJOYS CONSTANT MEDIA EXPOSURE, DRAWING MORE
JOURNALISTS TO HIS PRESS CONFERENCES THAN ANY OTHER DUMA
DEPUTY.
6. (SBU) ZYUGANOV'S SECOND ADVANTAGE IS HIS ACCESS TO
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES. AS LEADER OF A DUMA FACTION,
ZYUGANOV RECEIVES A LARGE SUITE OF OFFICES, STAFF, PHONES,
COMPUTERS AND CARS, ALL AT GOR EXPENSE. MOREOVER, AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(CPRF), ZYUGANOV ALSO SITS ATOP RUSSIA'S ONLY TRULY
NATIONWIDE POLITICAL PARTY. THE CPRF CLAIMS A MEMBERSHIP
OF OVER 500,000, WITH LOCAL CHAPTERS OPERATING IN
THOUSANDS OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN EACH OF THE 89 SUBJECTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. THE CPRF ALSO OWNS DOZENS OF
�OF THE RUSSIAN
NEWSPAPERS AND OVERSEES A NATIONWIDE NETWORK OF GRASSROOTS ACTIVISTS. NO OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION CAN
MATCH EITHER THE NUMBERS OR THE GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF THE
CPRF.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
7. -(G}—ZYUGANOV MAY ALSO ENJOY SIGNIFICANT SOURCES OF
FINANCIAL SUPPORT. IT IS WIDELY RUMORED THAT THE CPRF
GAINED ACCESS TO SOME OF THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
COMMUNIST PARTY FUNDS THAT WERE TRANSFERRED TO COMMERCIAL
BANKS AS THE SOVIET UNION WAS COLLAPSING, THANKS IN PART
TO THE EFFORTS OF FORMER SOVIET PRIME MINISTER AND
PEOPLE'S POWER LEADER NIKOLAY RYZHKOV. WHETHER OR NOT
THESE RUMORS ARE TRUE, SEVERAL WELL-CONNECTED JOURNALISTS
HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT ZYUGANOV AND THE CPRF ARE NOW
DEVELOPING PATRONS IN MOSCOWS BANKING WORLD. A SENIOR
EDITOR OF "SEGODNYA", FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY MENTIONED THAT
INKOMBANK AND MENATEP ARE PROVIDING SOME FUNDS TO ZYUGANOV
AND THE CPRF. ZYUGANOV ADVISOR ALEKSEY PODBEREZKIN HAS
ALSO TOLD US THAT THE COMMUNISTS ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH
MOSCOW BANKERS AND BUSINESSMEN. HE ADDED THAT IN THE CASE
OF EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, "WE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH
MONEY FOR ZYUGANOV TO RUN A DECENT CAMPAIGN."
WEAKNESSES: NARROW SUPPORT; LOW CHARISMA
8. -(6)- ZYUGANOV'S PRIMARY WEAKNESS IS THE POOR PROSPECTS
FOR EXPANDING HIS ELECTORATE BEYOND THE CORE COMMUNIST
VOTE, ROUGHLY 20-25 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE. THE
COMMUNIST MONIKER THUS APPEARS TO ALIENATE MORE VOTERS
THAN IT ATTRACTS. AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TOLD AMBAcSADOR
PICKERING IN OCTOBER, "50 PERCENT OF THE RUSSIANS THAT
VOTED FOR YELTSIN DID NOT SUPPORT HIM; THEY SIMPLY FEARED
THE COMMUNISTS." SIMILARLY, ONE ZYUGANOV AIDE RECENTLY
CONFIDED TO US, "WE NEVER REALIZED HOW BADLY THE WORD
'COMMUNIST' WOULD HURT US DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE."
WHETHER ZYUGANOV CAN CONVINCE RUSSIAN VOTERS HE IS
ANYTHING "MORE" THAN A SOVIET-STYLE COMMUNIST REMAINS TO
BE SEEN. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, EVEN FORMER COMMUNISTS FROM
EASTERN EUROPE VIEW ZYUGANOV AS AN OLD-STYLE THINKER.
ACCORDING TO A CONTACT AT THE POLISH EMBASSY, PRESIDENT
KWASNIEWSKI REMARKED AFTER HIS MOSCOW VISIT THIS SUMMER
THAT HIS VIEWS ARE MUCH CLOSER TO YELTSIN'S THAN TO
ZYUGANOV'S. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ZYUGANOV IS SUCCESSFUL
IN PLAYING DOWN THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OF HIS WORLDVIEW,
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD ON TO THE
LARGER SHARE OF THE CORE COMMUNIST VOTE.
9. -ferZYUGANOV'S L A C K OF CHARISMA IS ANOTHER WEAKNESS.
IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, HE DOES NOT EMIT THE AURA OF A GREAT
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LEADER. DESPITE HIS WARM PERSONALITY AND HEALTHY SENSE OF
HUMOR, HIS WOODEN MANNERISMS AND USE OF PARTY SLOGANS
CONVEY THE SENSE OF A PRE-PROGRAMMED POLITICIAN RATHER
THAN AN ENERGETIC THINKER. IN PUBLIC, HIS FACE OFTEN
TAKES ON A DEER-IN-THE-HEADLIGHTS EXPRESSION THAT SEEMS TO
BETRAY SELF-DOUBT. WHILE HIS BOOMING VOICE AND ABILITY TO
DODGE TOUGH QUESTIONS MAY COMFORT COMMUNIST TRUEBELIEVERS, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO REASSURE YOUNGER LOOKING
FOR REASONABLE AND FORWARD-LOOKING ANSWERS TO RUSSIA'S
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
PROSPECTS
10. - ( e r i N ALMOST ANY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCENARIO
OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, ZYUGANOV WOULD ENCOUNTER STIFF
OPPOSITION FROM MOSCOWS BUSINESS ELITE.
BUSINESS/POLITICAL GIANTS SUCH AS VLADIMIR j S P l M M AND
BORIS BEREZOVSKIY ARE SURE TO RENEW T H E I R A C L - O U T ASSAULT
ON ZYUGANOV, FREEZING HIM OUT OF POSITIVE MEDIA STORIES
AND PORTRAYING HIM AS A FRIGHTENING REACTIONARY, AS THEY
DID DURING THIS SUMMER'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. IT IS
HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ZYUGANOV WOULD ENJOY GREATER SUCCESS
A SECOND TIME AROUND.
11. - f e r C E N
TRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN THE OPPOSITION CAMP,
MEANWHILE, UNDERCUT ZYUGANOV'S QUEST TO LEAD A UNIFIED
OPPOSITION. HIS ABILITY TO RELY ON THE PPUR TO BROADEN
HIS ELECTORAL APPEAL WAS UNDERMINED BY THE DEFECTIONS OF
TWO OF THE UNION'S TOP LEADERS, AMAN TULEYEV (NOW MINISTER
OF CIS AFFAIRS) AND ALEKSANDR RUTSKOY (WHO DECLARED HIS
LOYALTY TO THE KREMLIN FOLLOWING HIS GUBERNATORIAL VICTORY
IN KURSK). MOREOVER, PPUR CO-CHAIRMAN AND AGRARIAN PARTY
(APR) LEADER MIKHAIL LAPSHIN HAS TOLD US FOR MONTHS OF HIS
CONTINUING RESISTANCE TO THE CPRF'S ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE
THE APR. A LAPSHIN STAFFER SIMILARLY COMPLAINED TO US
RECENTLY OF CPRF ATTEMPTS "TO EXTEND ITS ROOF (KRYSHA)
OVER ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS."
12. - ( e f FISSURES WITHIN ZYUGANOV'S OWN PARTY AND DUMA
FACTION POSE ANOTHER DANGER. A BLOC OF CONSERVATIVE
COMMUNISTS ARE RUMORED TO BE READY TO QUIT THE FACTION IN
GO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 033787
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/9/06
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV RESETS HIS SIGHTS
PROTEST OF ZYUGANOV'S STRICT PARTY DISCIPLINE AND HIS
WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING
TO ANOTHER RUMOR, THE GOR IS SIMULTANEOUSLY TRYING TO FORM
A NEW PRO-GOVERNMENT FACTION BY DRAWING MEMBERS AWAY FROM
THE COMMUNISTS, PEOPLE'S POWER, AND THE AGRARIANS. IF
SUCCESSFUL, THIS EFFORT COULD DROP PEOPLE'S POWER AND THE
AGRARIANS BELOW THE MINIMUM 35 MEMBERS REQUIRED TO QUALIFY
AS FACTIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LOSE MUCH
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AS FACTIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LOSE MUCH
OF THEIR ABILITY TO EXERT CONTROL OVER DUMA STRUCTURES,
THUS DEALING A SERIOUS BLOW TO ZYUGANOV'S PRESTIGE.
13. ^ - Z Y U G A N O V MUST ALSO COME UP WITH A NEW POLITICAL
STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO YELTSIN'S IMPROVING HEALTH (REF.
E). SINCE LATE SUMMER, ZYUGANOV HAS RELIED ON A TACIT
ALLIANCE WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO PROVIDE
ACCESS TO REAL POWER (REFS. B,C). AS YELTSIN'S HEALTH
DETERIORATED, ZYUGANOV AND CHERNOMYRDIN RECOGNIZED THAT
THEY SHARED TWO KEY INTERESTS: UNDERCUTTING THE GROWING
POWER OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CHIEF CHUBAYS AND
DELAYING EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS THAT ALEKSANDR LEBED
WAS LIKELY TO WIN. ZYUGANOV'S AND CHERNOMYRDIN'S TEAMS
BEGAN TO CONSULT REGULARLY, AND THE TWO LEADERS AVOIDED
PUBLIC CRITICISM OF EACH OTHER. AS THE THREAT OF EARLY
ELECTIONS HAS RECEDED, HOWEVER, THIS RELATIONSHIP
APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. DURING THE PAST TWO
WEEKS, ZYUGANOV HAS PUBLICLY ATTACKED CHERNOMYRDIN FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN MONTHS, CRITICIZING THE PRIME MINISTER'S
HANDLING OF THE CHECHNYA PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE FEDERAL
BUDGET. VIKTOR ILYUKHIN, A LEADING COMMUNIST DUMA DEPUTY,
HAS TOLD US TO EXPECT MAJOR CHANGES IN CPRF STRATEGY SOON:
"OUR COOPERATION WITH CHERNOMYRDIN HAS NOT WORKED OUT...
AND A MAJOR CORRECTION IN OUR APPROACH IS LIKELY AT OUR
DECEMBER 13-14 PLENUM."
14. -(GfOVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, ZYUGANOV'S STRENGTHS
ARE LIKELY TO KEEP HIM ATOP THE OPPOSITION CAMP. BUT HIS
FAILURE TO WRAP UP JULY'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND HIS
READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT LEAVE THE DOOR
OPEN FOR A MORE CHARISMATIC AND CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGER TO
ARISE LATER IN 1997.
TEFFT
DIST:
DIST>
SIT: FORT PIFER RUMER
SIT: NSC
�Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent:
To:
Subject:
WHSR
Wednesday, February 10, 1999 10:26 AM
Pascual, Carlos E.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
CLASS:
DTG:
MSGTO:
ORIG:
PREC:
SSN:
TOR:
101429Z FEB 99
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4902
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE
2993
990210101605 M3687769
From:
- e - E l T K h TSECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS. REASON: 1.5
(B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
1 .-(SHN THE MIDST OF WHAT HE CALLED A "WAR" WITH
PRIMAKOV, BEREZOVSKIY CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR ON
FEBRUARY 5 TO WARN OF PRIMAKOVS DESIGNS ON THE RUSSIAN
PRESIDENCY AS YELTSIN'S SUCCESSOR. BEREZOVSKIY
SHRUGGED OFF THE MUCH PUBLICIZED GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON
BUSINESSES REPUTED TO BE STRONGHOLDS OF BEREZOVSKIY'S
EMPIRE, BUT COMPLAINED THAT PRIMAKOV IS USING THE POWER
MINISTRIES AND PRESSURE ON THE MEDIA TO HELP SECURE HIS
CLAIM TO YELTSIN'S POST. ARGUING THAT PRIMAKOV'S
"POLITICAL ACCORD" BACKFIRED, BEREZOVSKIY PREDICTED
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE OUT OF A JOB BY MAY AND HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE AND OTHERS WERE WORKING TO
ENSURE A "SOFT" (I.E., WITHOUT CONFRONTATION)
TRANSITION TO A NEW PRIME MINISTER. BEREZOVSKIY ASKED
IF THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP STABILIZE RUSSIA
IN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE. END SUMMARY
PRIMAKOV AND BEREZOVSKIY AT WAR
2. ^6)-BORIS BEREZOVSKIY'S FIRST CALL ON THE
AMBASSADOR IN 1999, ON FEBRUARY 5, WAS DISTINGUISHED BY
THE OBVIOUS SIGNS OF WORRY REFLECTED ON THE FACE AND IN
THE VOICE OF THE REPUTED "OLIGARCH." BEREZOVSKIY
DESCRIBED HIS CURRENT CONFRONTATION WITH PRIMAKOV AS A
"WAR," BUT SHRUGGED OFF THE REAL IMPACT IT WOULD HAVE
ON HIS INTERESTS IN THE BUSINESSES WHICH GOVERNMENT
FORCES HAVE RAIDED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH.
THIS WAR IS DIFFERENT, HE ARGUED - TACTICALLY DIFFERENT
AND COMPLICATED.
PER E„(l 13526
3.- ^ B E R E Z O V S K I Y DREW THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION TO
THE NEWS OF PROCURATOR GENERAL YUR Y SKURATpV'S MUCH
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�PUBLICIZED REQUEST TO RESIGN. HE NOTED THAT SKURATOV'S
RESIGNATION WOULD BE A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN
SKURATOVS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH HARD-LINE COMMUNIST
DUMA DEPUTY VIKTOR ILYUKHIN. BEREZOVSKIY COMPARED
SKURATOVS CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS TO THOSE OF
TAX POLICE CHIEF SERGEY ALMAZOV'S, ARGUING THAT WHILE
ALMAZOVS LINKS ARE JUST AS BAD, SKURATOV IS MUCH MORE
BLATANT ABOUT HIS.
4. -^-REGARDING REPLACEMENTS FOR SKURATOV,
BEREZOVSKIY MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES -- SKURATOVS
PRESENT DEPUTY MIKHAIL KATYSHEV, THE ACTING PROCURATOR
GENERAL YURIY CHAYKA, AND PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
DEPUTY HEAD YEVGENIY LISOV. BEREZOVSKIY RULED OUT
KATYSHEV, CONCLUDED THAT CHAYKA WOULD NOT TAKE THE JOB,
AND SPECULATED THAT LISOV IS THE MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR.
PRIMAKOV'S PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS
5. - i j & m IS MORE AND MORE OBVIOUS, BEREZOVSKIY
WARNED, WHAT PRIMAKOVS REAL INTENTIONS ARE. WITH
PRIMAKOV'S MEAGER EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY
FAILING, IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS PRIORITY IS NOT THE
ECONOMY. ACCORDING TO BEREZOVSKIY, HIS REAL OBJECTIVE
AND CLEAR PRIORITY IS GETTING INTO POWER. BEREZOVSKIY
EXPLAINED HOW PRIMAKOVS ACTIONS REGARDING HIS PROPOSED
"POLITICAL ACCORD" HAD UPSET PRESIDENT YELTSIN. IT
BECAME OBVIOUS TO YELTSIN THAT PRIMAKOV WAS AFTER THE
PRESIDENCY.
6. -{e)-BEREZOVSKIY RELATED THAT WHEN YELTSIN AND
PRIMAKOV FIRST MET FACE-TO-FACE AFTER PRIMAKOV ALREADY
HAD SENT THE PROPOSAL TO THE DUMA, THEY HAD A NASTY
CONFRONTATION. PRIMAKOV STORMED OUT OF THE MEETING
THREATENING TO "WRITE HIS STATEMENT" (I.E.,
RESIGNATION), THOUGH HE ACTUALLY DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH
WITH THIS THREAT. YELTSIN HAS NO LOVE FOR PRIMAKOV,
BEREZOVSKIY CONCLUDED.
7. -{6)-THE REASONING BEHIND THE LETTER IS NOT AN EASY
THING TO UNDERSTAND, ARGUED BEREZOVSKIY. HE COMPARED
IT TO SHAKHRAY'S PROPOSAL ABOUT CHECHNYA -- A BAD IDEA,
AND AN OVERSIMPLISTIC ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE HIS
SUPPORTERS FROM HIS DETRACTORS. BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVED
THAT NEITHER LUZHKOV NOR ZYUGANOV WOULD SUPPORT THE
ACCORD AND IT ULTIMATELY WOULD FADE FROM THE POLITICAL
SPECTRUM. BESIDES, BEREZOVSKIY CONCLUDED, THE ACCORD
IS ONLY WORDS ON A LETTER. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTANDS
THIS AND IT WILL NOT AFFECT HIS POSITION.
C E O PM!: I SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
8. -4S)-PRIMAKOVS STRATEGY, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINS, IS
TO USE POWER MINISTRIES AND PRESSURE ON THE MEDIA,
PARTICULARLY ORT, TO ENSURE HIS CONTROL OF THE LEVERS
BY WHICH HE CAN ELEVATE HIMSELF TO THE PRESIDENCY. TO
UNDERSCORE THIS, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED THAT PRIMAKOV
GRADUALLY HAS BEEN PUTTING INTO INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS
HIS OWN PEOPLE (I.E., FORMER SVR/KGB CRONIES). THIS
GIVES PRIMAKOV GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND HELPS TO
ENSURE THAT THE QUALITY OF H S POWER S100P ERCENT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�COMPLETE. BEREZOVSKIY CITED SPECIFICALLY GOVERNMENT
PRESSURE TO REMOVE ORT'S SHABDURASULOV AS AN EXAMPLE.
SUCH "PALACE GAMES" WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS PRIMAKOV
IS PURSUING HIS OBJECTIVE, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINED.
9.-(8)-BEREZOVSKIY ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT BORIS
YELTSIN, THOUGH WEAKER, REMAINS THE LAST HOPE FOR
RUSSIA'S IMMEDIATE FUTURE. YELTSIN STILL HAS
TREMENDOUS LEVERS AT HIS DISPOSAL AND, DESPITE HIS ILL
HEALTH, WILL MANAGE TO SERVE OUT HIS TERM AS PRESIDENT,
BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINS. MEANWHILE, THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IS LIKELY TO WORSEN, THOUGHT THE EXTERNAL
SITUATION FOR RUSSIA HAS MORE POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY.
PRIMAKOV OUT BY MAY - BUT WITH A "SOFT" LANDING
10. -^DESCRIBING PRIMAKOV AS HIS "IDEOLOGICAL
ENEMY," BEREZOVSKIY WARNED AGAINST BEING TAKEN IN BY
THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHARGED THAT PRIMAKOV ACTUALLY
IS AS "RED AS A TOMATO." BEREZOVSKIY DECLARED THAT
PRIMAKOV WOULD NOT SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER BEYOND MAY.
WARNING THAT IF THE "REDS" COME TO POWER AGAIN THEY
WILL STAY MUCH LONGER, BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED THAT
WITHOUT EXTERNAL HELP, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA
TO GET ITSELF OUT OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SWAMP
IT IS IN NOW. HE EXPRESSED PROFOUND PESSIMISM THAT
RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE.
11 .-^erTHE AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORED THE VALUE AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMON STRATEGY OF OUR TWO PRESIDENTS
AIMED AT RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE POLITICAL,
SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL COMMUNITIES.
HE REMINDED BEREZOVSKIY OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
REGARDING A REALISTIC APPROACH IN OUR RELATIONS WITH
RUSSIA AND THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR ITS PRINCIPLES
IN THIS REGARD AND INTENDS TO STICK TO THEM. THE
AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT OTHER PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS.
12. ^ B E R E Z O V S K I Y OBSERVED THAT MOSCOW MAYOR YURIY
LUZHKOV HAS CHANGED SOMEWHAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION
RECENTLY AND HAS ADOPTED A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE (ABOUT
THE PRESIDENCY). STILL, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED, LUZHKOV
REMAINS MUCH WEAKER THAN PRIMAKOV. REGARDING LEBED,
BEREZOVSKIY OBSERVED THAT THE KRASNOYARSK GOVERNOR IS
CLOSER TO MANY OF THE PRESIDENT'S OWN POSITIONS,
PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE WAR ON CRIME AND CORRUPTION
AND NON-PROLIFERATION. LEBED WANTS TO SHOW THAT HE IS
A FIGHTER AGAINST CORRUPTION AND IS DEMONSTRATING THIS
EVEN NOW IN KRASNOYARSK WAR HE IS ENGAGED IN AGAINST
LOCAL ALUMINUM MAGNATE BYKOV. BEREZOVSKIY EVEN CLAIMED
THAT, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST POLLS, SHOULD THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BE HELD TODAY LEBED COULD WIN.
(COMMENT: NOT ACCORDING TO THE POLLS WE HAVE SEEN.
END COMMENT)
13.4S)-YAVLINSKIY, MEANWHILE, REMAINS TOO CLOSELY
ASSOCIATED WITH MOST (I.E., GUSINSKIY) AND IT PAST TIME
FOR HIM TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE STANCE OF HIS OWN.
YAVLINSKIY, BEREZOVSKIY BELIEVES, CONTINUES TO SUFFER
FROM AN ILLUSION THAT PRIMAKOV WILL INVITE HIM TO
REPLACE MASLYUKOV (AS FIRST DEPUTY PM), BUT THIS IS
ONLY AN ILLUSION. PRIMAKOV WILL NOT DO THAT. AT THE
SAME TIME, MOST'S NTV IS STILL TRYING TO PLAY ALL
SIDES. BEREZOVSKIY STRESSED THAT NTV'S INFLUENCE COULD
BE DANGEROUS.
BEREZOVSKIVS VIEWS FOREIGN POLICY
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�14.-{SHN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT
RISING ANTI-AMERICANISM, BEREZOVSKIY NOTED THAT THERE
ARE MANY LEVELS TO THIS. HE WARNED THAT THE PRIME
MINISTER IS NOT A CONCRETE (I.E., RELIABLE) PARTNER
AND, CITING KOSOVO AS AN EXAMPLE, SAID THAT U.S.RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE ON THE WRONG TRACK. HE ARGUED
THAT THE MORE LIBERAL PART OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY HOLD
OPPOSITE VIEWS OF AMERICA. IT CONTINUES TO PERCEIVE
THE U.S. AS THE CARRIER OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AS WELL AS
A POWERFUL COUNTRY WITH GLOBAL PLANS. UNFORTUNATELY,
THE U.S. BOMBING OF IRAQ AND OTHER RECENT EVENTS HAVE
CALLED THIS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT INTO QUESTION.
C E C nCTGECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
15. -^6)- BEREZOVSKIY COMMENTED ON THE EXPANSION OF
NATO, CHARGING THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR RUSSIA NOT TO
CAPITALIZE IMMEDIATELY ON NATO'S INVITATION TO RUSSIA
TO BECOME A MEMBER. EVEN IF RUSSIA HAD AGREED SIMPLY
TO LEAVE SUCH AN OPTION OPEN FOR THE FUTURE, IT WOULD
BE IN A FAR BETTER POSITION VIS-A-VIS NATO THAN IT IS
TODAY. BEREZOVSKIY ADMITTED THAT HE HAD OPPOSED
RUSSIA'S AGREEMENT TO THE "FOUNDING ACT," ARGUING THAT
IT SEVERELY LIMITED RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE WITH NATO.
PRIMAKOV'S VIEW ON THIS MATTER, HOWEVER, PREVAILED. AS
A RESULT, BEREZOVSKIY MAINTAINED, RUSSIA EXTRACTED NO
BENEFITS FROM THIS MOVE.
16. -(^-NOTING AN EMERGING CONVICTION ON THE PART OF
THE RUSSIAN ELITE THAT A CONFRONTATION (ECONOMIC)
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE IS BREWING, BEREZOVSKIY
REPORTED THAT THERE ARE THOSE THAT WELCOME THIS,
BELIEVING THAT SUCH A CONFRONTATION WOULD BENEFIT
RUSSIA. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT SUCH CONVICTIONS HAVE
ANY BASIS SINCE RUSSIA CAN ONLY BENEFIT IF THERE IS A
SOUND ECONOMIC BASIS FOR INTEGRATION. HE LATER NOTED
THAT SUCH IS THE SAME FOR THE CIS -- THE MOST IMPORTANT
REAL OBJECTIVE IS THE INTEGRATION OF THE ECONOMIES.
EVEN BELARUS PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO AGREED THAT, WITHOUT
A COMMON ECONOMIC STANDARD BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BELARUS,
THERE IS NO POINT TO A UNION.
17. -{6)-THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY IN THE BUILDING OF
ECONOMIC TIES AND URGED BEREZOVSKIY TO EXERCISE CAUTION
ABOUT VIEWING EUROPE AND THE U.S. IN CONFRONTATION. HE
UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMON ECONOMIC TIES,
NOTING IN PARTICULAR THAT SUCH TIES ARE STRONG BETWEEN
EUROPE AND THE U.S. AND THAT RUSSIA SHOULD AIM TO
CREATE A SIMILAR ECONOMIC BASIS FOR COOPERATION. ASKED
IF POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE U.S. COULD AFFECT THE LEVEL
OF ASSISTANCE THE U.S. WOULD OFFER RUSSIA, THE
AMBASSADOR SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT
THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS (AS VIEWED FROM THE
U.S.) IN RUSSIA.
18. - ^ F O L L O W I N G UP, MAKING HIS POINT NOW IN
CAREFULLY CHOSEN ENGLISH BEREZOVSKIY ASKED A
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. IF, AS A RESULT OF AN INTERNAL
POLITICAL FIGHT, THE "RIGHT" GOVERNMENT EMERGED IN MAY,
WITHOUT A CONFRONTATION W TH THE DUMA, BUT RATHER WI H
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�A "SOFT" CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP, IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE THE
ELECTIONS. BUT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERSTAND AND
HAVE A "CLEARER" APPROACH ON WHO AND HOW THE ECONOMY
SHOULD BE LEAD. IN THIS CASE, HE ASKED, WOULD THE U.S.
BE READY TO HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA?
WOULD THE U.S. BE ABLE TO MOVE THE COUNTRY FORWARD?
19. -(SJ-THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT
WASHINGTON AND THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE REALISTIC
ABOUT RUSSIA AND STAND BY THEIR PRINCIPLES NO MATTER
WHO LEADS THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA. MOST WANT AND
BELIEVE THEY MUST HAVE SOME MEANS OF PARTICIPATING IN
RUSSIA IN A WAY THAT CAN WORK. THEY WANT TO KNOW THAT
THERE IS A GOVERNMENT THAT CAN IMPLEMENT A REALISTIC
BUDGET, THAT WILL GOVERN DEMOCRATICALLY, AND THAT HAS
STABLE AND REALISTIC POLICIES. IF WE SEE THAT KIND OF
GOVERNMENT, THE KIND THAT IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS
AND CAN ACHIEVE THEM, THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT THE
PRINCIPLES WE HAVE ARTICULATED CONSISTENTLY. THE
AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE
REALISTIC ABOUT WHAT IS NEEDED IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT RUSSIANS
UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO
WEAKEN RUSSIA A WEAKENED RUSSIA WOULD BE A DANGEROUS
PARTNER.
20. -(e)-BEREZOVSKIY THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS
TIME AND INFORMED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE RESTING FOR THE
NEXT TWO WEEKS, PERHAPS SPENDING PART OF THAT TIME OUT
OF THE COUNTRY, BUT WOULD RETURN THREE DAYS BEFORE THE
CIS SUMMIT ON FEBRUARY 26.
COMMENT
21. i & f DESPITE SHRUGGING OFF THE POSSIBLE IMPACT
GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON HIS BUSINESS INTERESTS COULD HAVE,
BEREZOVSKIY APPEARED WORRIED AND SPOKE IN HUSHED TONES.
HE DISMISSED AS FOOLISHNESS THE DUMA'S THIRD CALL TO
SACK HIM AS CIS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ADOPTED EARLIER
THE SAME DAY, BUT SEEMED LESS SELF-CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS
ABILITY TO ENGINEER PRIMAKOV'S REMOVAL ANYTIME SOON.
WHETHER OR NOT HE STILL BELIEVES HE HAS THE INFLUENCE
TO SEE TO PRIMAKOV'S OUSTER, HE CLEARLY SEES MAY AS THE
• S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 002993
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2004
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
BUSINESS TYCOON BEREZOVSKIY
TURNING POINT. BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT COMMENT ON RECENT
RUMORS OF PENDING RESIGNATIONS FROM PRIMAKOV'S CABINET
NOW CIRCULATING ABOUT MOSCOW. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR
ANDREW WOOD INFORMED US FEBRUARY 10 THAT FORMER YELTSIN
CHIEF OF STAFF YUMASHEV EXPRESSED TO HIM SERIOUS
CONCERN ABOUT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS MASLYUKOV AND
KULIK. YUMASHEV, WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE CLOSE TO
BEREZOVSKIY, SAID THAT THEY DEFINITELY ARE NOT UP TO
THE JOB AND SHOULD GO, AND THAT PRIMAKOV MAY HAVE TO GO
AS WELL, THOUGH HE WAS LESS CATEGORICAL ON THAT POINT.
22. -(e)-NEVERTHELESS, BEREZOVSKIY DID NOT SOUND
THREATENING IN HIS DESIRE TO SEE PRIMAKOV REMOVED. HIS
REFERENCE TO A "SOFT" TRANSITION INDICATES THAT HE
FORESEES PRIMAKOV'S DEPAR UBEAS ONE TO WHICH PRIMAKQy
CLTNTOR LIBRARY P O O O Y
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�ALSO WOULD AGREE, AND WHICH WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF
THE DUMA AND THE PRESIDENT. STILL, BEREZOVSKIY'S
THINLY-VEILED QUERY ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT IN SUCH A
CIRCUMSTANCE AND HIS WELL-DEVELOPED PENCHANT FOR
SCHEMING SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WARNING TO BE EXTRA
CAUTIOUS ABOUT REACTING TO RUMORS OR EVENTS IN THE
COMING MONTHS TOO QUICKLY. IT ALSO PUTS A PREMIUM ON
OUR BEING CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS IN STATING OUR SUPPORT
FOR POLICY AND PRINCIPLE AND NOT PERSONALITIES.
COLLINS
C I T N L B A Y POOOY
L N O I R R HTCP
�FROM DEPARTMENT OF
STATE 4B
(THU)
,
1. 28 99 1 5 : 16/ST. 15: 14/NO. 3760626058 P
2
Toria:
John T e f f t saw Berezovskiy today. Berezovskiy, saying he was
meeting tomorrow (January 29) w i t h Summers i n Davos, t o l d us the
following.
He s t a r t e d o f f by p r a i s i n g the e a r l i e r r e f o r m e r s , and knocking
Primakov. He claimed t h a t Primakov was t r y i n g t o c o n s o l i d a t e
power, g e t t i n g c o n t r o l over the s e c r e t s e r v i c e s , media, and "cash
f l o w . " Only a f t e r g e t t i n g complete power would he r e a l l y t u r n t o
the economy, and the methods he was employing t o get power showed
what he would do t o the economy.
Berezovskiy c i t e d the l e t t e r t h i s week from Primakov t o the Duma
as showing " c l e a r l y " t h a t YMP i s aiming t o become P r e s i d e n t .
S t a t i n g t h a t he had not seen the President p e r s o n a l l y (but a l s o
saying he had spoken t o people "very c l o s e " t o the P r e s i d e n t ) ,
Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t yesterday BNY t o l d YMP t h a t YMP was not
going about the BNY-YMP r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the r i g h t way.
Berzovskiy s a i d he d i d not b e l i e v e Primakov would l a s t as prime
m i n i s t e r more than a few months. Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he was
a p p l y i n g i n d i r e c t persuasion on the President t o can YMP.
Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he wanted the West t o be aware of h i s views
and a c t i v i t i e s , and he wanted t o understand the p o s i t i o n o f the
West on s u p p o r t i n g the c u r r e n t government. He noted he had met
the day b e f o r e w i t h the B r i t i s h Ambassador, and would see Summers
the next day.
John T e f f t reviewed very b r i e f l y and very g e n e r a l l y the p o i n t s
the Secretary had made i n Moscow about the e x t e n t of our support
f o r the government, and the need f o r a r e a l i s t i c budget.
He
asked Berezovskiy whod would be the next prime m i n i s t e r .
Berezovskiy l i s t e d a bunch of " q u a l i f i c a t i o n s " f o r the next PM
(more reform o r i e n t e d , not opposed by the Duma, p r e d i c t a b l e and
understandable t o the west, not opposed by Primakov. Good
s o l u t i o n : Ivanov. Showed h i s independence a t the MFA, good t i e s
w i t h the west, growing a u t h o r i t y a t home, acceptable t o YMP.
"We" (business, c a p i t a l i s t s , reformers) "gave him a message t o
t h i n k about i t . "
T e f f t asked about Luzhkov. Berezoskiy dumped a l l over the Mayor
("very, v e r y dangerous").
He claimed t h a t Lebed, whom he
acknowledged s u p p o r t i n g i n the r a c t f o r governor and now, was the
most e l e c t a b l e candidate. (His reasoning was the the people are
a g a i n s t e v e r y t h i n g . The o n l y person who expresses t h i s f e e l i n g
i s Lebed. Berezovskiy s a i d he supported Lebed i n order t o oppose
Luzhkov, who otherwise would c l a i m 70% of the e l e c t o r a l spectrum.
PER E.0.13526
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�FHOM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4B
(THU)
1. 28• 99 1 5 : 1 6/ST. 15 : 1 4/NO. 3760626058
Asked how the President was, Berezovskiy s a i d t h a t he had not
seen him, but had i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t r e a l l y was stomach t r o u b l e .
The c o n d i t i o n had e x i s t e d f o r 10 months b e f o r e t h i s
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n . BNY i s now b e t t e r . Berezovskiy was convinced
t h a t BNY would s u r v i v e u n t i l t h e end o f h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l term and
would not y i e l d any o f h i s powers.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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P 3
�
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
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Declassified Documents concerning Russia
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2012-0962-M
Description
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This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Russian oligarchs from the files Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian affairs directors, Eugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss. Included are Department of State cables from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State, regarding various Russian political and business leaders.
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Eugene Rumer
Andrew Weiss
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2012-0962-M
Boris Yeltsin
Declassified
Foreign Policy
Russia
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https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/872be2257165f114ab09784f897e2d7c.pdf
0cb0f7ec5f1b550fd6f73333faa78f74
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<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>
Description
An account of the resource
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Provenance
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Declassified Documents Concerning Russia
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2012-0962-M
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Description
An account of the resource
This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Russian oligarchs from the files Russia, Ukraine, Eurasian affairs directors, Eugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss. Included are Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) news reports and transmittal forms.
Creator
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NSC Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs Office
Eugene Rumer
Andrew Weiss
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