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Folder Title:

The President's Trip to Russia, September 1-2, 1998

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Moscow, Russia, September 1-2, 1998 (7 pages)	08/27/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. paper	Opening Meeting with President Yeltsin (5 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. talking points	Points to Make for Opening Meeting with President Yeltsin (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. talking points	Summary Points for Opening Meeting with President Yeltsin (8 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005. report	Biography (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Working Lunch on Agenda for 21st Century (4 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Working Lunch (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. talking points	Points to be Made for Working Lunch (4 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
009. paper	Morning Session on European Security, Regional Issues (4 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
010. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Meeting on European Security and Regional Issues (1 page)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
011. talking points	Points to be Made on European Security (6 pages)	08/00/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
012. memo	Leaders of the Federal Assembly (6 pages)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2593

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Russia, September 1-2, 1998

2016-0143-M

kh1826

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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**THE PRESIDENT'S
TRIP TO
RUSSIA**

SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1998

Office of the Executive Secretary

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The President's Trip to Russia, September 1-2, 1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OUTLINE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT

WREATH LAYING CEREMONY

Scenesetter

FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Scenesetter
Briefing Paper
Points to Make
Biography

WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Briefing Paper
Points to Make

VISIT TO RUSSIAN SCHOOL

Scenesetter
Remarks

ADDRESS TO NEXT GENERATION OF RUSSIAN LEADERS

Scenesetter
Points to Make for Greet with American Business Leaders
Speech

OFFICIAL DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Toast

SECOND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Briefing Paper
Points to Make

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE/SIGNING

Remarks for Possible Pool Spray
Remarks for Joint Press Appearance
Points to Make in Response to Press Questions

MEETING WITH DUMA/REGIONAL LEADERS

Scenesetter
Themes for Remarks
Biographies

EMBASSY EVENT

Remarks

**OUTLINE OF
KEY EVENTS**

OUTLINE OF KEY EVENTS

Tuesday, September 1

Arrive Moscow

Wreath Laying Ceremony

One-on-One Meeting with President Yeltsin

Expanded Meeting with President Yeltsin

Working Lunch with President Yeltsin

Drop-by "First Day of School" Festivities

Greet American Business Leaders

Address to Next Generation of Russian Leaders

Official Dinner with President Yeltsin

Wednesday, September 2

Meeting with President Yeltsin

Briefing/Lunch

Joint Press Conference/Signing

Meeting with Duma and Regional Leaders

Embassy Event

Thursday, September 3

Depart for Belfast, Northern Ireland

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 27, 1998

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0143-M (1.01)
KRM 1/30/2020

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
GENE SPERLING *GS*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Moscow, Russia, September 1-2, 1998

The Setting

The future of Russia continues to be, arguably, the most important international issue our generation faces. You have done much over the past 5 1/2 years to keep it on the road to democracy and reform. That remains the central challenge of this trip.

Cataclysm After Cataclysm. Russia is at a moment of testing and uncertainty not unlike August 1991 or October 1993. Yeltsin's surprise re-appointment of Chernomyrdin has reordered and unsettled the fragile domestic political balance, potentially to Yeltsin's own disadvantage. Chernomyrdin's return, instigated by a small group of oligarchs and Yeltsin's closest associates and family, makes Yeltsin's removal from power, his marginalization, or redistribution of his powers all the more plausible. Amid the intense jockeying and political uncertainty, the economic situation has grown even more precarious.

Last week's decision to devalue the ruble and to restructure the state debt have unleashed dynamics and difficult political choices that the new government is ill equipped to handle. Foreign investors are outraged and skeptical that Chernomyrdin has any desire to pursue the previous government's complex of stabilization measures. A worsening financial crisis could push the economy into free-fall. Russia's oligarchs are trying to ensure that they receive "special treatment." And beneath the surface there are other issues in our relationship simmering -- Iran missiles, Kosovo, Iraq.

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Declassify on: 8/21/08

The return of Chernomyrdin can either mean the capture of reform by the oligarchs or the enhanced capacity of a stronger Russian government to gain Duma support for a somewhat watered-down reform program. This makes it all the more essential to be clear with ourselves, the American people, and Russian audiences about our stake in Russia's historic decision to embrace free markets and democracy.

Yeltsin in Decline. Yeltsin's popularity has plummeted to record lows. Yeltsin's ill-timed statements vowing no devaluation sharply cut into his already lowered credibility among average Russians. There is a general consensus among the elite that his ill health and arbitrary style of rule are making a difficult situation worse. That sentiment, combined with the opportunism of oligarchs such as Boris Berezovskiy, led to last weekend's surprise removal of Kiriyenko. Despite his statements in your recent call, we would expect Yeltsin and his team to come to the Summit less prepared than usual and distracted by the domestic crisis.

The Relationship. Average Russians are dispirited about their country's prospects and suspicious of U.S. motives. Foreign and Russian press will try to make the political and financial crises the centerpiece of your visit. As best we can, we need to draw attention to the broader stakes in the U.S.-Russian relationship and the benefits it has already produced. Your core message: *Despite the current problems and uncertainties, we have a strong, ongoing interest in helping increase the chances that Russia continues to develop in the direction of becoming a modern state -- democratic in its principles, market driven in its economics, respectful of the sovereignty of its neighbors, an international good citizen and integrated with the major structures of the world community.*

The Russian relationship affects stability in Europe, control over dangerous technologies, our ability to manage the global nonproliferation regime, regional conflicts and the downsizing of nuclear arsenals. Nor can we ignore the implications of Russia's political and economic problems on the military arsenals and technologies Russia still possesses.

The Summit. The uncertainty regarding Yeltsin's tenure and the potential for Duma and Oligarch troublemakers to undermine stabilization efforts place a greater premium on your meetings with Chernomyrdin and Duma members and your public outreach. The political and economic turmoil in Moscow have added an element of uncertainty to the summit "deliverables." In the

final days, we will try to leverage the Russian government's domestic political uncertainties and need to show it is in command into progress on foreign policies that have bedeviled the relationship. Some solid achievements in the security area are agreed. You will announce that we plan to share early warning data on ballistic missile launches to reduce the risk of false missile attack warnings or launches. You also will announce an agreement to dispose permanently of 50 tons of plutonium so that it can never be used for nuclear weapons. On hard problems like nonproliferation, we will be able to show that the Russian government is taking important steps to control exports of sensitive technologies and equipment. We have been pressing the Russians (Berger-Kokoshin) hard to impose serious penalties on Russian entities that cooperate with Iran's missile program; your Tuesday call to Yeltsin may help generate visible results in time for the summit.

Reaching Out. A major challenge will be to touch Russia's insular, disaffected body politic. You should convey the message that we are supportive of Russia's efforts and conscious of the pain imposed by a difficult economic transition, still optimistic about Russia's long-term prospects, clear-eyed about areas where we disagree and that we take heart in the accomplishments of a new generation of Russians which is building their country from the ground up. Your speech to young leaders at the Russian Institute of Economics will emphasize that message. A visit to an elementary school on the first day of school will connect to a Russian tradition that is meaningful to the broad Russian public.

The Schedule

Your first encounter with Yeltsin will be at the Kremlin on the morning of your arrival. You begin with a 60-minute, one-on-one meeting. Given recent developments, we are trying to add a 50-minute session with a broader group. These morning sessions will be when Yeltsin is most alert, and you will need to tackle the three most difficult issues of the summit: political uncertainties, economics, Iran and START II/START III. At the working lunch, Yeltsin may be somewhat tired. Larry and Gene can lead off with a discussion of their side meetings with the economic team. Following that, you and Yeltsin will be able to call on others to comment on the theme of converting Cold War legacies and capabilities for peaceful ends. Later in the day, you will visit an elementary school to participate in first-day-of-school celebrations (important to Russians), deliver a speech to the new generation of Russian leaders and attend a State

Dinner. The next morning begins with a meeting on European security and regional issues, followed by a joint press conference with Yeltsin, a meeting with Duma and regional leaders and OTR stops around Moscow.

The Agenda

We have organized Summit issues into three reinforcing "baskets": 1) economics; 2) security and nonproliferation issues; and 3) foreign policy and regional issues. Because of Yeltsin's waning attention span, we will need to mix and match the issues and address hard topics in the morning sessions.

Economics. Russia's devaluation and debt restructuring were "seismic events" -- radical emergency measures that responded to inescapable financial realities. Decisive action was necessary, but substantial damage already has been done to Russia's investor base. Markets for Russian assets, equities and bonds virtually are dead. The road to normalcy will be long and difficult. The risk of failure -- a banking system collapse, spiraling inflation, a free-falling currency -- is high, and it makes all the more difficult the other unfinished work of post-Communist transition to a market economy.

Success or failure now depends on the Russian leadership's political and technical capacity to move promptly, to implement a comprehensive recovery program and to chart a path to growth. Like it or not, Russia has torn down the walls that insulated it from the world economy and now must compete in an international market where capital flies to quality and safety. Private capital markets can be Russia's vehicle to growth or they can be a source of instability. The choice is Russia's -- namely, whether Russia creates an environment that convinces investors it is safe to invest, or whether internal instability drives away the capital needed to turn Russia's extraordinarily vast resources into lasting prosperity.

Yeltsin needs to understand that his response to this challenge will affect the nature of the Russian state and his own place in history. He needs to understand that there is a widespread perception that Russia will back off tougher fiscal reform measures and that policy may be partially driven by the interests of oligarchs. Thus, the quicker a new economic team can be put in place and set forth a plan that shows they are staying the course on reform, the quicker they will be able to restore confidence. You may need to convince him that he can affect market psychology, not by what he says but by what he

does, and that there are crucial steps he can take to respond to the crisis by addressing economic fundamentals, build the economy from the bottom up. While there are no simple solutions, you can stress three themes: (1) getting your fiscal house in order, (2) maintaining tight monetary policy and, (3) fixing the financial system. Getting the fundamentals right is key to overcoming this crisis and setting the stage for recovery and growth. Political will is the decisive factor. Relaying your own experience from the 1993 budget and the dividends it has paid will help. Russia should also focus on longer-term structural reforms including (1) passing laws that could lead to \$30 to 40 billion in energy contracts and (2) mobilizing small business and grassroots entrepreneurship. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission can help advance these goals.

You should be prepared for Yeltsin to be out of touch on the gravity of the crisis or to raise old chestnuts such as market economy status, anti-dumping cases and Jackson-Vanik. He may also call on you to support accelerating the remaining 1998 tranches of Russia's IMF agreement or to help him get G-7 bilateral support. You need to be clear that it is largely up to Russia to take the steps that are needed to sustain IMF support and investment confidence. If it does, the United States will back them, as we did decisively in connection with assembling the earlier IMF program.

Nonproliferation and Security. While commending recent progress, you will need to press Yeltsin hard to translate his many statements of Russian policy against such transfers of missile technology to Iran into effective enforcement. The Russians have taken important steps to create an export control system. But it is easily circumvented and Congress is not convinced the Russian government is energetically trying to prevent these transfers. Our strategy is to reinforce Russian efforts by targeting U.S. penalties against Russian firms under investigation. That helped forestall a veto override of Iran missile sanctions, but more needs to be done. The entities under investigation need to be punished, Iranian activities inside Russia need closer monitoring and Russian enforcement agencies need stronger support.

We also are increasingly concerned about Russian nuclear activities in Iran that go beyond our 1995 understandings. The new government may be trying to walk this back. Conferring a Presidential mandate on a recent Gore-Kiriyenko agreement to establish a new channel to address specific cases may be our

best hope for reining in Russia's independent-minded Ministry of Atomic Energy, but this will be a tough problem to solve.

In the security sphere, the early warning initiative is already agreed and could garner public attention. With START II languishing in the Duma, we have downplayed expectations for breakthroughs. Still, it is important to chart a course forward; in private, you should press Yeltsin for a firm assurance on achieving START II ratification this year. Your shared record of achievement requires a breakthrough on START II ratification if we hope to achieve START III before you both leave office. Yeltsin may respond by suggesting that we bypass START II altogether or lower the Helsinki-agreed limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads for START III, which you will need to deflect. Similarly, you will need to say "no" if he proposes an agreement restricting the testing or deployment of U.S. space control capabilities, which our military forces need for use against rogue states or in possible regional conflicts.

Regional Issues. The 1998-99 European Security calendar is intense: joint NATO and EAPC Summits, two U.S.-EU Summits, OSCE Summit and CFE Treaty adaptation. You will want to demonstrate to Yeltsin the connection between these events and our desire to draw Russia closer to the European mainstream. This will be an important message to the Russian people as well.

The Washington NATO Summit will help chart a new course for the Alliance aimed at post-Cold War challenges, rather than creating a new line of defense against Russia. Yeltsin will probably be receptive, but he will be prompted by Primakov to rail against further enlargement, particularly for the Baltics. You will have to tread carefully to head off unhelpful public pronouncements by Yeltsin on enlargement that would cause an uproar in Central Europe and the United States. We have not made a decision on next steps, but you should reaffirm our commitment to maintaining NATO's open door while ensuring "no surprises" with Moscow. You will also want to offer new initiatives to deepen the NATO-Russia partnership: convening NATO and Russian foreign and defense ministers in Moscow for separate meetings in December, establishment of a NATO-Russia center for civil emergency response outside Moscow and the pairing of NATO and Russian military units for joint training and peacekeeping.

The hardest part of the European security discussions may center on adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Yeltsin may tell you that he needs the Treaty to be wrapped up

by December, but that is not realistic. Any solutions to the problems raised by the Russians will have to take account of multiple interests among CFE's 30 parties, especially in the so-called flank and in Central Europe, and will require greater Russian flexibility. You should present a goal of signing a new Treaty by the OSCE summit in mid-to-late 1999. In the joint statement that has been negotiated on 21st Century security challenges, we've agreed to say simply that we both believe it is necessary to finish these negotiations "in the nearest future."

Your regional discussions with Yeltsin will depend on the outcome of Strobe's trip. We hope that he will make progress on Iraq (keep pressure on Saddam) and the Kosovo (not block NATO). The Russians are walking back their offer to negotiate a joint statement on conflict resolution in the Caucasus, but Strobe will pursue this. A successful outcome on the statement could prod Russia out of its zero-sum attitude on cooperation in its neighborhood and would bode well for Caspian energy cooperation. In addition, you should urge Yeltsin to resume a quiet dialogue with Ulmanis to ease tensions with Latvia.

**SECRETARY OF
STATE MEMO**

**MEMO FROM
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO BE PROVIDED**

**WREATH LAYING
CEREMONY**

SCENESETTER: WREATH LAYING CEREMONY

The wreath laying ceremony will take place at Aleksandrovskiy Sad, the fenced-in memorial park by the Manezh outside the west wall of the Kremlin. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is at the north end of the park, across from the State Historical Museum. The tomb was built in 1966 and dedicated May 8, 1967 after the remains of an unknown soldier who fell in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) were transferred from another mass grave site. The tomb, with its over-sized helmet and guidon draped near the eternal flame within a large metal star, is on a large red granite square at the base of the Kremlin wall and northwest tower. On the wall to the south of the tomb are granite blocks for each of the cities awarded "Hero City of the Soviet Union" after the war.

Russians are acutely aware of the enormity of their losses in the Great Patriotic War -- on the order of 25 million deaths, of which about 10 million were soldiers and sailors. The tomb receives lots of emotional visits by citizens of all ages, often including brides and grooms still in wedding dress who lay bouquets near the flame.

**FIRST MTG WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN**

SCENESETTER: KREMLIN RESIDENCE

The residence of the Russian President is located in the former senate building in the Kremlin. It was built on the order of Catherine II by M.F. Kazakov in the classical style in 1776-1787. The building is roughly triangular in shape, anchored by a huge rotunda crowned by an ornate cupola. The modern Russian tricolor flag was raised atop the cupola in 1991 (the year the building became the President's residence), and dominates the view from Red Square. After 200 years as a largely administrative building of imperial Russia's gentry class, the building underwent its first substantial renovation after 1991 in an effort to restore as much as possible its original external appearance as designed by the architect Kazakov. Internally, the Stalin-era dark oak paneling was removed in favor of a more colorful, classical decor in line with the building's new role as Presidential residence.

The Grand Kremlin Palace is normally the building used for ceremonial and official events with larger delegations. It was the site of the April 1996 Nuclear Security Summit. The Kremlin Palace building is undergoing renovation, however, which restricts events in this official visit to the residence building, whose meeting rooms are of far more limited capacity. The Representational Office is the traditional site within the residence for working meetings with heads of state and heads of government.

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OPENING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Underscore that Yeltsin's response to Russia's immediate challenges will affect the nature of the Russian state, his place in history and the legacy of your work together.
- Review Russian financial crisis, outline steps to enhance stability, begin to restore investor confidence.
- Press for specific actions to curtail nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran, and raise potential benefits of commercial space cooperation.
- Stress importance to your legacies of unlocking START II and moving quickly to START III.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Yeltsin will come to this meeting looking for personal affirmation and a political boost. From his perspective, he has taken all the right steps on reform, yet Russia's economy is crashing around him. The recent devaluation and default have further eroded investor and public confidence. The government shake-up is an enormously risky move under the current circumstances, intensifying both political jockeying and passivity -- and the risk of a vacuum -- when Russia can least afford it. Workers across Russia remain unpaid and angry, the Duma is dragging its feet on key legislation, and the oligarchs continue to put their personal interests and survival over the common good. The sense of siege and lack of leadership that Yeltsin has conveyed in recent calls has not lifted.

In the United States, public and congressional attitudes toward Russia have ranged from harsh to apathetic. Yeltsin's criticism of U.S. strikes against Osama bin Ladin will only stir the pot. Public scrutiny of nonproliferation issues has eased with recent progress on strengthening Russia's export controls. But critics are ready to seize on any negative reports and will call for sanctions if the Russians do not complete their investigations against suspected entities. If we cannot demonstrate progress in concrete terms -- i.e., visible penalties against firms and individuals that violate Russian laws and regulations -- nonproliferation will once again be central to the U.S. domestic agenda on Russia. That would be debilitating at a time when the

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

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2016-0143-M (1.02)
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financial crisis demands maximum flexibility and we need Congressional support for Russia and the IMF. This meeting will be the most important session you have with Yeltsin. Health reports suggest his attention span wanes seriously after 90 minutes. In this meeting you need to reestablish rapport, help him develop a vision for what the U.S.-Russia relationship could be, and then come back quickly to three critical issues -- economics, nonproliferation and arms control.

Agenda

Setting the Tone. Two key elements of your past success with Yeltsin have been your appreciation of the tough policy road he is traveling and your ability to convince him that if he stays the reform course, you and the rest of the G-8 will move mountains to support him. You will want to take this tack again with an opening presentation that reminds Yeltsin how far we have come in just six years and reaffirms America's commitment to a forward-looking partnership with Russia. But to realize the relationship's potential, we need to make concrete progress on pressing problems of economics and nonproliferation.

Economics. Russia's economic problems are as much political as they are financial. The \$22.6 billion IMF package announced in July fell flat. Part of the problem was deepening financial turmoil from Asia and lower oil prices. But the core issue is that markets believe that Yeltsin lacks the stamina, the Kiriyenkó government lacked the political clout to implement the needed economic reforms, and the new Chernomyrdin government will back away from tough measures needed to stabilize the economy in the face of a hostile Duma.

Following the devaluation and debt restructuring, the paramount objective is to avoid a financial collapse. Based on the Vice President's call to Chernomyrdin, he had not fully grasped the depth of Russia's crisis and the constraints on his ability to act. Thus far, the Russian population has responded stoically. But panic leading to a widespread domestic bank run is a real risk. And the social consequences of devaluation, not yet felt, must not be underestimated.

The role the oligarchs come to play in the coming months could prove a decisive factor. They clearly played a major role in engineering Chernomyrdin's return to power; some have close ties to Yeltsin's family and chief of staff. They are pressing for big infusions of capital into their banks to stay afloat, which would inevitably fuel inflation and capital flight. Yeltsin

needs to face down the Duma and to rein in the oligarchs -- and he may not understand the dangers of failure on either front.

You can make two pitches to Yeltsin. First, Russia needs to heal the deep erosion of investor confidence by acting quickly to (1) get its fiscal house in order, (2) tighten monetary policy, and (3) strengthen the financial system. The global financial crisis has made clear the centrality of sound banking systems to strong economies. The Federal Reserve and Treasury are ready to provide technical help, but Yeltsin has to be firm with the oligarchs. If he does not, Russia will sink into financial turmoil. In addition, it is critical to pass legislation to get Russia's fiscal house in order. Relaying your experience from 1993 and the impact budget reform has had on the American economy could make a powerful impression. Larry Summers will make a complementary pitch to his economic counterparts.

Second, Russia needs to grow its economy from the bottom up by making key structural reforms such as encouraging the growth of small business. This will not fix today's financial crisis, but the issue is fundamental to long-term economic vitality, and it touches people's self-esteem and pocket books. You should ask that the Vice President and Chernomyrdin oversee this work. In addition, it is important to strengthen energy investment. The energy sector is the only area in the near-term where Russia can hope to sign contracts worth \$30-50 billion; but Yeltsin must fix the legal framework for natural resource investment.

Nonproliferation. To achieve our nonproliferation objectives, Russia must create a reliable system to control the export of sensitive equipment and technology. Sanctions may be a vehicle to express targeted outrage, but they do little to address the underlying problem of controls over national borders. We have made some progress since January: the Russians issued "catch-all" authority to stop exports of dual-use goods to WMD/missile programs, circulated a list of Iranian and other end-users of concern and begun installing export-control offices in Russian high-tech firms. In July (with our encouragement), the government launched an investigation of nine entities for violations of Russian export controls. We banned all USG assistance and all trade with seven of these entities.

Notwithstanding positive developments, much work needs to be done. Some Russian entities continue to pursue relationships with *Iran's missile program*. You can offer a significant carrot: a roadmap to increase lucrative space cooperation and

commercial space launch quotas, with projected revenues potentially reaching several billions of dollars over the next three to five years. This is only conceivable, however, if Congress is satisfied that the Russia-Iran missile connection is broken. We are ready to consult now with Congress on approving pending licenses for some new areas of joint space cooperation. The next step is to negotiate with Russia a technology safeguards agreement. As Russia's performance continues to improve on Iran, we can move incrementally to add additional launches to our current agreement of 16. This is a concrete way to employ Russia's high-tech expertise through contracts worth billions more than those in play with Iran.

Cooperation with *Iran's nuclear program* is also a problem. At least one Russian institute has been involved with Iran in the development of a research reactor and the production of heavy water. Such cooperation is contrary to assurances provided to the Vice President by both Chernomyrdin and Kiriyenko. We recently informed Russian officials that we will withhold assistance to one of the institutes involved in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

You will need to underscore that continued Russian missile and nuclear cooperation with Iran puts the bilateral relationship in serious jeopardy. You should make clear what we expect Russia to do: complete its investigations, penalize those who violate Russia's laws and regulations, stop all cooperation on missiles and stick to previous commitments to stop nuclear cooperation beyond the Bushehr reactor project. We also want to formalize a new channel, like Wisner/Gallucci-Koptev, to address nuclear proliferation. (This would be separate from a new Nuclear Committee under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which will look for common areas of work on civil nuclear matters.)

Arms Control. The Duma's failure to ratify START II prevents us from beginning START III negotiations at this summit. The Duma would lose all interest in START II if it senses Russia will get a "better deal" in START III. Our primary objective, then, will be to keep Yeltsin and his team focused on achieving START II ratification this fall. To make that pitch, you need to emphasize the Duma is holding hostage one of Yeltsin's legacy achievements. You should secure his commitment to breaking the logjam in the Duma this fall and offer to work aggressively on negotiating START III once the Duma acts. Yeltsin may respond by pushing for immediate negotiations on START III or lower START III levels than agreed at Helsinki. You will need to push back by emphasizing that START II ratification is a necessary

prerequisite to full-scale START III negotiations and any discussion of lower force levels. Congress would see such a move as giving up on START II -- a Treaty the Senate overwhelmingly ratified 18 months ago. As to lower "START III" numbers, we cannot accede to this demand, at least until we are much further along into actual START III negotiations and know a lot more about their position on other issues, including U.S. positions we want them to accept.

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POINTS TO MAKE FOR OPENING MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Introduction

- Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. Was difficult decision for me to come before START II ratified, but I was determined to reaffirm my support.
- At midpoint of our second terms, I am very proud of what we've accomplished together:
 - Russian membership in G-8, APEC and Paris Club, denuclearization agreement with Ukraine, creation of NATO-Russia partnership, joint deployment in Bosnia, CTBT.
- These accomplishments have transformed shape of international community and will have lasting impact.
- Could not have happened without your leadership and vision; commitment to democracy and reform.
- Hope we can remind Russian and American people how much has changed for better thanks to our partnership, what it can mean in future. People on both sides becoming cynical, taking our accomplishments for granted.
- Must show them that problems we are tackling are the key issues for 21st century, including effects of global economic interdependence and spread of WMD.
- Our success or failure will have profound effect on world our children and grandchildren will live in.
- But to realize full potential to shape future, need to address urgent problems of today -- economics and nonproliferation -- that could threaten so much of what we've accomplished. Also, cannot allow arms control agenda to languish.

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2016-0143-M (1.04)
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SUMMARY POINTS FOR OPENING MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Take pride in what we have achieved together -- have transformed the international community; focusing on key issues for 21st century.
- Russian reform is a pivotal question of our time. Market concerns that necessary reform would be blocked by Duma and that new government is less committed to reform have created crisis of confidence. Economy is now at cliff's edge.
- Russian banks in serious trouble; some will need prudent financial help. But massive, unconditioned injection of liquidity will quickly send ruble and inflation out of control; could set Russia back to 1993. Only you, Boris, can stand up to pressures from the oligarchs and selfish interests for special treatment.
- Absolutely essential to reassert fundamental priority of getting budget under control. As I look back on my presidency, budget reform in 1993 was most important thing I did for American economy.
- Also important for recovery and economic growth will be to stimulate entrepreneurship and small business and to further open economy to direct investment.
- Energy sector is only area in near-term where Russia can sign investment contracts worth \$30-50 billion, but need to fix legal framework. Could begin to change market psychology.
- Made progress on controlling missile technology exports to Iran but it has not stopped. Dangerous for Russia. Could prevent me from helping on economic front. Also, problem of cooperation with Iran on nuclear projects.
- U.S. is prepared to intensify export control cooperation and increase space cooperation if this problem solved. Billions for Russia involved in space cooperation. Can't imagine Iranian missile imports worth that much.
- START II is an essential part of legacy we should leave; are running out of time to complete the job and move on to next level of strategic arms reductions.

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2016-0143-17 (1.05)
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The Economy

- Our economic teams are meeting as we speak. Wanted to discuss broader question of what financial crisis will do to Russian reform: will Russia stay the course of reform and integration with global markets?
- Russian reform is one of the pivotal questions of our time. I know the crisis has been intense; only regret multilateral financing package was not more successful.
- Many reasons for that outcome; central among them was deep market concern that necessary reform would be blocked by Duma. Issue remains as relevant for Chernomyrdin as for Kiriyenko -- markets still waiting to see if government can deliver.
- Russian economy is now at cliff's edge; every day is precarious; if this were a security issue, we'd call for the highest possible alert. Wanted to raise four topics.
- First is financial stability. Restoring this will take time and will not be easy. No issue is more important than how you address immediate pressures in the banking sector.
- I know many Russian banks are in serious trouble; some will need help. But massive, unconditioned injection of liquidity will quickly send ruble and inflation out of control -- Russia could be set back to 1993.
- You may be the only one, Boris, who can stand up to pressures from the oligarchs and keep the focus on restoring stability and the integrity of the banking system rather than supporting specific individuals, companies or banks.
- Second task is to convince investors, in and outside Russia, that the crisis has not diverted you or new government from fundamental priority of getting the budget under control.
- As I think back on my presidency, budget reform in 1993 was probably the most important thing I did for the American economy. It brought interest rates down and helped generate an enormous surge in investment.
- It was also a fierce political battle, but worth it. As your friend, need to tell you that passing real tax reform and a tough budget must be key priorities for the fall.

- Third issue is energy. Have been thinking about how you might affect psychology of the market place. We both know success breeds success; the energy sector is the only area in near-term where Russia can sign investment contracts worth \$30-50 billion.
- Key to this is fixing legal framework. Specialists know details. My team can work with companies, but only you and your government can get the laws past your parliament.
- Finally, have thought hard about how today's economic problems touch people's lives. Only long-term solution is to grow economy from bottom up; fastest way there is small business.
- Small businesses employ 50 percent of America's work force; they generate over half our GDP; they are the principal source of new jobs. Microsoft, one of most important companies in world, started only 15 years ago as a tiny firm with a great idea.
- Small business won't fix today's crisis, but crucial to long-term economic vitality. If you agree, Al and Viktor Stepanovich can take this up in their commission.

[If Yeltsin asks about Jackson-Vanik]

- Promised to help you at Helsinki with G-8, APEC, Paris Club and Jackson-Vanik. Got most of these done, but not the last. Need your help now.
- Jackson-Vanik grew out of religious concerns. When religion law passed last year, religious groups and Congress opposed legislation needed to lift Russia from Jackson-Vanik.
- They are still concerned about implementation of religion law at local level, and they are cautious. But they are also willing to start a dialogue with our governments and with Russian religious organizations that could get us on a path to put Jackson-Vanik behind us. Can we get discussions going?

[If Yeltsin asks for new financing or accelerating IMF tranche]

- Fundamentally, Russia is facing a crisis of confidence. The solution is to build confidence that the right financial and other policy steps are being, and will be, taken.

- Experience of \$22.6 billion financing package teaches us that even substantially more money cannot compensate for the absence of that confidence.
- I want to assure you, however, that I will continue to take the lead in making sure that the IMF and the World Bank respond quickly and generously to support difficult reforms.

[If Yeltsin raises U.S. anti-dumping action on steel]

- I suggest we direct our trade experts to develop an approach that reflects your concerns and is consistent with U.S. law.

Nonproliferation

- Second vital issue for us is nonproliferation. India/Pakistan nuclear tests were wake-up call for us all.
- Makes it all the more important that joint efforts to tighten export control regimes bear fruit. Proliferation of WMD will be greatest security threat to our people in 21st century.
- Our joint action in July was perfect example of positive cooperation. When Russia named companies for investigation, showed you were serious about making export controls work.
- We targeted our actions to companies you named; made clear we were reinforcing your actions.
- But must be frank, Boris. Despite your intentions, and hard work by Koptev and Kokoshin, Russian entities still providing missile technology to Iran.
- In nuclear area, Russian institutes cooperating with Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such cooperation contradicts assurances provided to Vice President by Chernomyrdin and Kiriyyenko.
- This cooperation is dangerous for Russia and corrosive to our relationship.
- Believe there is a path forward. On missiles, would change situation radically if Russia completes investigations, penalizes those who violate laws and regulations, stops any new cooperation on missiles.

- On nuclear, need reassurance on earlier commitments to limit cooperation to Bushehr project. Kiriyenko suggested to Gore new channel to make sure problems are fixed. Suggest you and I bless that idea like we instructed the work on missiles.
- Know basic concern for you is employment. Willing to try to ease problem; our teams negotiating now on agreement to help nuclear cities; Gore and Kiriyenko started process in July.
- Also want to expand commercial space cooperation; over time, can be worth billions in revenues.
- Based on Russia's work to date to tighten its non-proliferation policy, ready to consult with Congress to approve several pending licenses on space cooperation.
- Next step needs to be negotiating a Technology Safeguards Agreement -- we need this to create a legal foundation to expand our work.
- As Russia takes further action in controlling technology transfers to Iran, we are prepared to do more, including increasing the quota for commercial space launches.
- But need to keep our actions in step. The key to moving this forward is to move beyond investigations to "clamp down" on violators of export controls.

[If Yeltsin says he needs quota increase to get more money for space station]

- Russia's prestige as well as Russian² high-tech jobs on the line if it can't deliver on space station commitments.
- So far, have resisted pressure to link space station to the Iran proliferation problem. Tying space station to commercial launches would do more harm than good.

[If Yeltsin complains U.S. is not living up to HEU contract]

- Personally committed to continued success of HEU agreement. Critical that your experts agree with Western companies on sale of Russian natural uranium. Best avenue for success.

- Looking into ways the U.S. can act to influence environment for these negotiations. Urge you to continue making deliveries under the purchase agreement.

START II, START III

- START II ratification is single most important issue in shared legacy on nuclear arms control. Encouraged by assurance that you will not let up on START II ratification, but am troubled by suggestion that ratification this fall will be difficult.
- Clear your personal engagement will be essential, along with the continued persistence of Ministers Sergeyev and Primakov.
- To be frank, you and I are running out of time on strategic arms control. START II is key: once you have ratified START II, can begin formal negotiations on START III the next day.
- Progress on START will also help to support our joint efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and deflect Congressional initiatives that would undermine the ABM Treaty.
- What is your plan for achieving approval of START II in Duma this fall? Can we agree to get this done before end of year so we can move on to negotiate deeper reductions in START III?

[If Yeltsin suggests START III talks before START II ratification]

- Need to keep focused on START II ratification as next step. Do not believe agreeing to begin START III negotiations now would advance prospects for START II ratification in the Duma, nor would it be acceptable to our Congress.

[If Yeltsin pushes for agreement to lower START III numbers]

- This issue cannot be resolved separately from other issues that are important to us in START III; it will need to be addressed in the full context of those negotiations. Another reason why we need to get START II done and get on with START III.

[If Yeltsin suggests agreement on an "SSBN Keep Out Zone" in the North Atlantic to compensate for the loss of the Skruna radar]

- Hope our agreement this week on exchanging data on missile launches will help address some of your concerns in this area. But we are opposed to restrictions like this that run counter to the principle of Freedom of the Seas.

[If Yeltsin suggests agreement on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Free-Zones]

- We are opposed to restrictions that run counter to the principle of Freedom of the seas. The issue of ASW free zones is also outside the agreed framework on START III we concluded at Helsinki. Moreover, we are simply not going to continue down Russia's menu of favorite strategic issues while START II continues to languish in the Duma.

[If Yeltsin suggests agreement to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe]

- The U.S. has already reduced by 90-percent the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, leaving only the minimum number necessary for deterrence. We do, however, want to engage you on issues related to non-strategic forces -- both U.S. and Russian -- in the context of START III negotiations, as we agreed at Helsinki.

[If Yeltsin suggests agreement on measures concerning long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)]

- We agreed at Helsinki that our experts could explore possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles in the context of START III. Those talks can begin immediately after Russia ratifies START II. We will not, however, agree to any limitations on conventional SLCM.

[If Yeltsin presses for a Joint Statement on ASAT weapons]

- We were prepared to reaffirm in a joint statement our existing obligations not to use, or threaten to use, force against each other's satellites, except as authorized under the UN Charter. We were also prepared to consult in the event either side is concerned about the impact of activities of the other side on its space operations.

- But we are simply not prepared to pursue negotiations or restrictions on developing, testing or deploying military systems that could have capabilities for disrupting, damaging or negating satellites.

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005. report	Biography (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Russia, September 1-2, 1998

2016-0143-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WORKING LUNCH

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WORKING LUNCH ON AGENDA FOR 21ST CENTURY

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Review outcome of morning discussions.
- Highlight joint work to address financial crisis.
- Underscore importance of unlocking investment in Russian energy sector.
- Commend progress on forward-looking agenda for the 21st century: early warning, plutonium disposition, export controls, climate change, biological weapons, space station.
- Reaffirm importance of CTBT and test-site transparency.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Your lunch will cover a range of topics derived from one of the summit's core themes: that the United States and Russia have a unique responsibility to ensure that the dangerous technologies of the Cold War era are used to strengthen the security of our societies in the 21st century. You will want to make use of the presence of various Administration representatives to highlight progress in several areas. We suggest starting with a readout from Larry Summers and his Russian counterparts on their morning meeting. This will provide an opportunity to approve their work and encourage further technical cooperation on the financial crisis. The other topics highlight other areas of cooperation.

AGENDA

Financial Update. Larry and Gene's morning meeting was originally intended to address practical areas of cooperation on financial issues, but if Russia's economy continues its acute downward slide, it may be difficult to get beyond immediate crisis management. Their presentation will inevitably change to match events on the ground. Under any circumstance, it will be useful for them to give a short, sober presentation of the economic policy choices facing Russia; it is doubtful Yeltsin will get such frankness from Chernomyrdin. Larry will also mention a new program of technical cooperation where experts from our Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Bank and Securities and Exchange Commission will be working with their Russian counterparts to strengthen management of Russia's financial sector and

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Reason: 1.5(b)

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0143-M(1.07)
KBH 1/30/2020

securities markets. We will not want to dwell too much on our technical assistance if the economy is in freefall.

Russian Energy. It will take time for Russia to rebuild investor confidence, but it can begin to affect the psychology of the marketplace by making clear its desire to attract major foreign investment. The most critical arena is the energy sector, where U.S. and other western companies are prepared to invest upwards of \$70 billion over the coming decade -- if Russia finally completes the legislative foundation. Chernomyrdin knows exactly the steps that need to be taken. You can call on Bill Daley to highlight the potential in this area.

Early Warning Initiative. The degradation of Russia's early warning system has led to public concerns regarding the risk of accidental and unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles due to false warning of a missile attack. This problem was highlighted in January 1995 when President Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase was reportedly activated following the launch of a Norwegian sounding rocket. The Early Warning initiative you and Yeltsin will announce at the Summit will minimize the possibility of launch based on false warning of a threatening missile strike and enhance both strategic and regional stability. The initiative will allow us to exchange information from each other's early warning systems on ballistic missile launches on a continuous basis.

Plutonium Disposition. You will also issue with Yeltsin a statement of intent to remove permanently 50 tons of plutonium so that it can never be used again for nuclear weapons. The proposal also incorporates a suggestion from Senator Domenici for an intermediate step that reshapes plutonium components removed from warheads into forms that cannot be used in a nuclear device. To make this effort attractive to Moscow we have agreed on two methods of disposition -- conversion to Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel for use in existing power reactors or permanent immobilization.

Export Controls. Strengthening Russia's export control system is critical to our efforts to combat proliferation. At the summit, we will announce expansion of cooperation in seven key areas: missiles; nuclear; catch-all and internal compliance; conventional arms transfers; customs; law enforcement; and licensing. Creation of interagency working groups in these areas is a major step forward, will help facilitate U.S. assistance efforts, and will help the Russian keep an eye on what other parts of their enforcement bureaucracy are doing. We believe that senior Russian export control officials also

intend to use this cooperation as a way of putting their own house in order.

Climate Change. Climate change is a natural area for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the coming century, given Russia's high emissions entitlements (compared with current levels of emissions). The Europeans aim to limit emissions trading this fall, which would reduce the potential benefits to Russia and us from this cooperation. It is therefore important that you and Yeltsin state publicly that you intend to use emissions trading (in a broad multilateral trading regime, if possible) and signal that you are willing to trade without the Europeans if it comes to that.

Space Station. Russian delays in funding their share of the Space Station are jeopardizing a high profile joint endeavor. Despite serious financial difficulties, Russia needs to devote adequate resources to this project. We cannot afford further slippage in the scheduled November launch of the first component of the Space Station. Delays have already cost the United States over a billion dollars. Given the Russian financial situation, it is unlikely the Russians will find the additional funds to meet the Fall target. NASA and OMB are considering mechanisms for helping the Russians meet their obligations. They looked at loans, but this is unlikely. Exploring advance payments for Russian services, but it is unclear whether this will work. There is no easy fix to this problem.

Biological Weapons Convention. At the State of the Union, you expressed your personal commitment to the BWC Protocol negotiations in Geneva. Our joint statement calls for intensifying the negotiations toward early completion and commits the Russians to a more constructive approach on inspections and other issues.

CTBT - Test Site Transparency. President Yeltsin's acceptance of your "zero yield" CTBT pitch at Hyde Park -- overruling his advisors -- was critical to securing the Treaty. The Russian bureaucracy has balked for two years on agreeing to transparency measures at former nuclear test sites, which would significantly strengthen arguments the CTBT can be effectively verified during the upcoming Senate debate over ratification. You should press Yeltsin to reconsider, appealing to your shared legacy on this issue.

G-8 2000. At Birmingham, Yeltsin proposed a Moscow G-8 Summit in early 2000. Your informal conversations with other G-8 leaders suggest a positive inclination in this direction, but no formal decision has been made. If Yeltsin raises this

question, you could offer to work closely with him to build support among the Eight for a special summit with a more long-term focus (e.g., focusing on technology). Given current political uncertainties in Russia, however, it would be premature to make a hard commitment, but you could offer to work with Yeltsin to flesh this out between now and the spring G-8 meeting in Germany.

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SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR WORKING LUNCH

- Need to work as partners to strengthen societies' well-being in 21st century. Legacy of Cold War gives us special responsibility to convert technologies of destruction into foundation for greater security, prosperity and cooperation.
- During our first meeting Larry was discussing financial sector issues with his counterparts. (Ask Summers to summarize)
- On Russian energy, best way to change market psychology is to remove barriers to high-profile, big-ticket investment. (Call on Daley)
- Pleased by agreement on Early Warning initiative. Responds to proliferation of ballistic missiles and will reduce possibility of a missile launch on false warning.
- Plutonium disposition agreement is true breakthrough with important economic, nonproliferation and security benefits.
- Applaud important Russian steps to strengthen export controls. (Call on Berger)
- Climate change is greatest environmental challenge of our time. Our partnership crucial in international negotiations. (Call on Albright)
- Space Station spotlights benefits of working together and highlights Russia's high technology. Know this is difficult; will encourage our people to find creative options.
- On CTBT, recommend we agree on joint verification experiment.
- *[If raised]* On G-8 2000, hope we can build support with the Eight for Russia to host special summit, perhaps focused on challenges and opportunities of technology.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0143-M (1.02)
KBH 1/30/2020

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 8/21/08

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR WORKING LUNCH

Morning Discussions, Next Agenda

- Discussed with Boris key challenges to increasing security and prosperity at close of remarkable century. Can work as partners to strengthen our societies' well being in 21st century.
- Progress at this summit will demonstrate we are tackling hard problems and have our eye on broader stakes for international community.
- Legacy of Cold War gives us special responsibility to convert technologies of destruction into foundation for greater security and cooperation.

Financial Cooperation

- Boris, parallel to our meeting Larry Summers was discussing financial sector issues with his counterparts. Thought it would be useful to begin by hearing their report. Larry, do you want to summarize?

Russian Energy

- Boris, you and I talked earlier about importance of changing investor psychology. Know your government committed to securing greater levels of international investment.
- Oil and gas sector is most promising place to do that but will require completion of legislative work. This sector alone could attract in excess of \$70 billion over next decade. Would be benefits for job creation and governmental revenues.
- Legislative agenda is well known to your people. Bill Daley has been meeting with U.S. companies today to learn about their views.

[Ask Bill Daley to comment on investment potential.]

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PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0143-M (1.09)

KBH 1/30/2020

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Early Warning Initiative

- Wanted to highlight one of the very important agreements our teams reached on exchanging data on missile launches.
- Responds directly to worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles and will help prevent the possibility of a missile launch based on false warning. Also a major step forward in our defense cooperation.
- Hard to imagine our militaries sharing this kind of data in the past. Doing so will strengthen mutual security and confidence. Congratulate all those who worked on this.
- Intend to track this closely so we can begin exchanging data as quickly as possible; urge you to do the same.

Plutonium Disposition

- Work on plutonium disposition is true breakthrough with important economic, nonproliferation and security benefits.
- Approach will provide basis for increased foreign investment in Russian nuclear energy sector.
- Know I can count on your support to begin negotiations on formal agreement as soon as possible.

Export Controls

- Applaud important Russian steps to strengthen export controls on items of proliferation concern. Know that Sandy and Andrey Kokoshin have been discussing this and other nonproliferation issues. Do you want to give us a report?

[Ask Sandy to report on agreement to create export control working groups.]

Climate Change

- Climate change is greatest environmental challenge of our time. Our partnership crucial in international negotiations on this subject.
- Madeleine, I know you've been working hard on this issue. Could you summarize where things stand?

Space Station

- Space Station spotlights to world benefits of our working together and highlights Russia's high technology capabilities. Creates jobs and opportunities for Russian high-tech industries.
- Also know budget constraints you face. Congress questioning value of Russian participation. Want to demonstrate that our partnership is working, despite current difficulties.
- How can we resolve this problem? I know it is difficult; need to encourage our people to find creative options.

CTBT - Test Site Transparency

- The CTBT is an important part of our shared efforts. Working together, you and I solved some difficult issues during the negotiations.
- Our experts have been talking now for two years about the issue of transparency at our former nuclear test sites.
- We had proposed a joint statement for this summit announcing our agreement to proceed with a joint verification experiment at Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.
- This is not a new concept; it is consistent with our joint efforts to increase transparency on nuclear matters; and it would help me to push the CTBT through the Senate.
- Would hope you could agree to move forward on this today; if not, urge you to look into this after the summit.

[If raised - assistance for CW destruction]

- Have done a great deal of work already regarding Russia's CW destruction program.
- Have helped build a destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. Our people are looking at other production facilities where we could help destroy equipment as required by CWC.

- Joint statement makes clear our commitment to intensifying negotiations and global prohibition of biological weapons.
- Statement will help put negotiation back on track so that we can adopt Protocol at earliest possible date.

[If Yeltsin asks about Russia hosting a special G-8 Summit in 2000]

- Recall our discussion at Birmingham about Russia hosting special summit in 2000. Hope we can build support with the Eight to make this happen.
- Important that topic is forward-looking and substantive enough for the G-8 to support.
- Russia might propose an event focused on challenges and opportunities of technology. Hope we can develop a proposal by the time of the G-8 meeting next spring in Germany.

**VISIT TO RUSSIAN
SCHOOL**

SCENESETTER: FIRST DAY OF SCHOOL

The School of Self-Determination is nationally known for its progressive, unconventional approach to education. Its students are primarily from the local area, but problem children from other areas may attend on a space-available basis. The unique methodology used at the school was pioneered by the principal, Alexander Naumovich Tubelskiy, who also serves as Vice President of the Russian Association of Innovative Schools. Dr. Tubelskiy's approach is based on developing character and independence in students, as opposed to the traditional Russian-Soviet emphasis on rote memorization of subjects. The school's student government is highly developed and each student is very knowledgeable about his/her rights and responsibilities according to the school constitution.

Dr. Tubelskiy participated in a USIS Moscow International Visitor Group Project in the spring of 1997. The theme of the visit was "Public School Administration in the U.S." Cities visited included Washington, D.C.; Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey; Columbus, Ohio; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; and New York, New York. Dr. Tubelskiy is also serving as a consultant to a joint University of Hawaii-Krasnoyarsk (Siberia) civics education curriculum development project funded by USIA.

The first day of school in Russia is September first and is always a very important day for families. President Yeltsin visits a school each September 1, and one of the leading national education newspapers is named "The First of September." Students wear their best clothes to school, and the day is very festive.

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

**ADDRESS NEXT
GENERATION LEADERS**

SCENESETTER: NEXT GENERATION SPEECH

Located in southwest Moscow, the Moscow State University for International Relations has received such distinguished guests as President George Bush, Secretary of State Albright, Pope John Paul II, French President Jacques Chirac, and former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The University was founded in 1944 and is financed primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to producing diplomats, the University has trained many now serving in the Presidential Administration and other parts of the executive branch, the Duma, and domestic and international firms. Presidential Press Secretary and Deputy Head of Presidential Administration Sergey Yastrzhembskiy is a graduate of the University.

The university has approximately 4,000 students from Russia, neighboring countries, the United States, Europe and Africa. It offers graduate and post-graduate degrees in fields ranging from economics and business administration to law and politics. There is a special emphasis on foreign language, with students required to study at least one of the 46 foreign languages offered.

The university cooperates with a number of American institutions, including an active trilateral program with Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

**POINTS TO MAKE FOR GREET
WITH AMERICAN BUSINESS
LEADERS
TO BE PROVIDED**

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

OFFICIAL DINNER

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MORNING SESSION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, REGIONAL ISSUES

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Review calendar of upcoming European security events and how they reinforce vision of a more secure and undivided Europe.
- Highlight NATO's evolving Strategic Concept and concrete steps to strengthen NATO-Russia relationship. Reaffirm commitment to Open Door and "no surprises."
- Agree to accelerate CFE Treaty adaptation, but stress need for more pragmatic Russian approach. Recommend signing of adapted Treaty by 1999 OSCE Summit.
- Map out potential win-win approaches on problem issues: Kosovo, Iraq, Latvia, the Caucasus.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Yeltsin has been unengaged generally, and even less so on foreign policy issues. He is probably not aware of the magnitude of events that will unfold over coming months and their impact on the European security environment. In some ways, that creates an opportunity -- you can help shape his thinking and put this issue in the context of Yeltsin's legacy to future generations.

Given the depth of Russia's domestic crises, the Russian leadership has been indifferent to developing a more coherent foreign policy. That has created enough running room for Primakov to dominate on a number of issues (Iraq, Kosovo, Latvia) and to tighten his grip on the information flow to Yeltsin. To make this meeting a success, you'll need to convey a credible vision of how changes in Europe are good for Russia and then quickly bring him back to concrete measures aimed at strengthening Russian-U.S.-European relations.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0143-M (1.10)
KSH 1/30/2020

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 8/21/08

AGENDA.

Vision and Calendar. You will want to note that a series of high-level meetings in 1999 (Washington NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) summits, two U.S.-EU summits and the OSCE summit) will move us closer to a more integrated and secure Europe. You should remind him that it has been helpful in the past to synchronize our watches.

The NATO/EAPC summit in April will chart NATO's course as we enter the next century, giving higher priority to peacekeeping missions, nonproliferation efforts and deepened cooperation with non-members. NATO's revised Strategic Concept will portray Russia not as a threat, but as a partner. By emphasizing the scale of these changes, you will be better positioned to fend off Yeltsin's inevitable grouching about future rounds of enlargement and Baltic membership. Yeltsin also needs to hear that while NATO has not made any decisions about adding new members, the process in the run-up to April and beyond will be transparent. There will be no surprises.

NATO-Russia. Primakov continues to view NATO-Russia as a zero sum game, which has made it hard to improve practical cooperation. You have an opportunity to demonstrate to Yeltsin that we are going to great lengths to enhance the partnership and that we're prepared to do more. You have three items to offer him. First, as a way to highlight enhanced consultations, we are prepared to agree that NATO and Russia Foreign and Defense Ministers will meet separately in Moscow later this year as one of the kickoffs to next year's summitry. Second, to boost practical cooperation, we are prepared to create a NATO-Russia Civil Emergency Response Center near Moscow, which would expand joint activities in an area where the Russians are keen to cooperate (e.g., nuclear accidents, natural disasters). Third, as a way to enhance our ability to deploy jointly in the future, we will propose formal and practical connections between NATO and Russian units that will focus on training for peacekeeping.

CFE Adaptation. We are working to negotiate an adapted Treaty that reflects the new security situation in Europe, but does not place inappropriate constraints on NATO's forces in Central Europe or damage the security of "flank" friends such as Norway, Turkey and the Caucasus countries. The Russians have been pushing for a new Treaty to be ready by December, but their expectation seems to be that most of the flexibility should come from the other CFE states. You should tell

Yeltsin that it is more realistic to aim for signature by the OSCE Summit, with the prospect of issuing a document recording progress at the December 1998 OSCE Ministerial. You should avoid engaging on substantive Treaty issues and emphasize that major issues cannot be solved bilaterally and will require flexibility and pragmatism on Russia's part.

Problem Issues. Our relationship with Moscow is weighed down by difficult issues where we simply do not see eye-to-eye or where Russia's diplomacy is intended to stymie U.S. priorities.

On Kosovo, the Russians have encouraged Milosevic to believe that they have a veto over NATO military action, even though Milosevic has already broken his promises to Yeltsin. Yeltsin has not registered your message that patience is running out and that force may soon be necessary to prevent a wider war or a humanitarian disaster. Your discussion should play up Yeltsin's self-interest in pressuring Belgrade and emphasize that a resolute and united front will make the use of force less likely.

On Iraq, you need to make clear that Saddam's decision to curtail cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA is unacceptable. Primakov has defended Saddam's decision to Madeleine, and the Russians have been acting as Iraq's lawyer in the Security Council. With Iraqi cooperation suspended, the UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring regimes are degrading and there is a risk that Saddam will end or cripple monitoring in the near future. Sanctions will remain in place without change as long as Saddam refuses to return to the status quo ante and allow new inspections. Repeat our willingness to see the nuclear file transition to long-term monitoring when Iraq lives up to all the IAEA requirements. Make clear that if Saddam continues on the path of confrontation, the risks to regional peace and stability will grow, and with that, a heightened risk that we will need to resort to force. Russia should press Saddam to reverse himself now, before this crisis gets out of hand.

On the Baltics, Russia has fallen into a cycle of recrimination with Latvia for alleged mistreatment of its large Russian population. In response, Latvian Prime Minister Krasts' nationalist government is pushing a referendum that would prevent implementation of improvements to citizenship and naturalization legislation. President Ulmanis, who is opposed to these efforts, would like your help resuming a

quiet dialogue with Russia. You should encourage Yeltsin to take the high road and to honor Ulmanis' request.

Russia's long-standing concern over U.S. involvement in the Caucasus and the Caspian basin is inconsistent with Russia's abiding interest in stability along its periphery. Russia has complicated international peacemaking efforts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. (Admittedly, the parties themselves are quite far apart.) Russia has also resisted U.S. efforts to promote Caspian energy development, thereby increasing the chances of Iran (a de facto energy competitor for Russia) becoming the principal export route from the Caspian. You should impress upon Yeltsin that economic and political stability along Russia's southern border could be strengthened by U.S.-Russian cooperation, especially on Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. He needs to hear (again) that we do not aim to displace Russia in the region. We seek the participation of Russian companies in development of the east-west corridor and multiple export pipelines -- potentially lucrative cooperation.

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SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING ON
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND REGIONAL ISSUES

- What we've accomplished in Europe is historic. Remember Hyde Park. No one believed NATO and Russia could work together; we defied the skeptics.
- Need to synchronize our watches on European security: OSCE ministerial, NATO Summit, OSCE summit, adaptation of CFE Treaty.
- NATO summit will emphasize new challenges like regional conflict, proliferation and cooperation with non-members. Revising Strategic Concept to reflect changes since 1989; will depict Russia as a partner.
- Enlargement is a process, not a one-time deal. Have not made any decisions on when to extend further invitations. There will be no surprises.
- Need to put new momentum behind NATO-Russia. Recommend foreign and defense minister hold Permanent Joint Councils in Moscow, opening of NATO-Russia Civil Emergency Center near Moscow and ways to team up our units for joint operations.
- Relationship too important to be held hostage by any one issue. Need to be especially careful in areas where we don't agree.
- On CFE, committed to accelerating progress on new Treaty. Should aim to have Treaty ready by OSCE summit in 1999. Negotiators could capture progress in document to be issued at OSCE Ministerial in December 1998.
- On Kosovo, need to press Milosevic to end attacks on civilians, allow full access, help refugees return, enter serious dialogue with Kosovar Albanians. He must not feel free to use indiscriminate force with impunity.
- On Iraq, need to reverse halt to cooperation with UNSCOM/IAEA. Cannot reward defiance; sanctions will stay indefinitely.
- On Latvia, need to lower the temperature; recommend you meet with President Ulmanis.
- On Caucasus, need to work together on regional conflict and energy. U.S. not out to displace Russia.

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 8/21/08

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KBM 1/30/2020

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POINTS TO BE MADE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Introductory

- What we've accomplished in Europe is historic. Remember when we met at Hyde Park. No one believed NATO and Russia could work together and we defied the skeptics.
- NATO-Russia Founding Act built on that success. It transformed expectations of what the new Europe will look like.
- But the picture is unfinished, and this year is key. Hope we can do three things in this meeting:
 - compare notes on our vision for the future and how we can use upcoming events to achieve it;
 - discuss concrete initiatives to deepen Russia's involvement in Europe; and
 - go over a few tough issues that we need to manage carefully.

NATO Summit/Open Door

- Will celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary next year. NATO and EAPC members will attend Washington summit in April.
- Summit is opportunity to lay out our vision for NATO's role in the 21st century. This will be a different NATO.
- We're revising NATO's Strategic Concept to reflect changes across Europe since 1989. It will depict Russia as a true partner in building cooperation and facing common security challenges in and beyond Europe.
- New Strategic Concept will emphasize cooperation with non-members, joint steps to address new problems like regional conflict and proliferation, while retaining core defense and European security functions.

DECLASSIFIED
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2016-0143-m (1.12)
KBH 1/30/2020

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 8/21/08

- Consistent with schedule you and I have discussed since Hyde Park, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary will attend Washington Summit as members.
- Also need to be clear about my views on the future of enlargement.
- I am committed to our open door policy for all qualified aspiring members -- and that includes Russia.
- We have not yet made any decisions on when to extend further invitations. Process will be deliberate, predictable, and transparent. There are no artificial deadlines, and there will be no surprises.
- NATO will add new members when and only when that country's membership in NATO will contribute to the security of the Alliance and Europe as a whole.

[If Yeltsin asks for no more enlargement before 2000]

- Decision for Alliance to take, based on principle I've outlined above.

[If Yeltsin raises Baltics' possible NATO membership]

- We are treating the Baltics just like all other Partners -- no discrimination but also no special treatment. Will not exclude Baltics or other emerging democracy from consideration for eventual membership.

[If Yeltsin asks why U.S. isn't more committed to OSCE]

- OSCE important to meeting new security challenges. Determined to make it premier institution for conflict prevention, crisis management and the expansion of democracy.

NATO-Russia

- NATO-Russian cooperation key pillar of what we're trying to build. Pleased that we're doing a lot to improve communications and consultations.
- Think we can do much more and show world that this relationship is working.

- Recommend NATO and Russian foreign and defense ministers hold their next PJC meetings in Moscow. Meetings would be symbol of Russia's role in new Europe; highlight strength of NATO-Russia dialogue; good kickoff for next year's NATO and OSCE summits.
- Also want to look at ways to expand practical cooperation between NATO and Russia. Prepared to support a NATO-Russia Civil Emergency Center near Moscow. Would let us tackle real-world problems like natural disasters and nuclear accidents.
- Want to enhance capability for joint operations, building on Bosnia experience. Let's look at ways to match up units from NATO and Russia.
- Units could train and exercise together, get ready for joint deployments or other humanitarian missions.

CFE

- Like you, committed to accelerating progress on CFE. Adapting CFE important part of building a new Europe.
- Success will require flexibility and pragmatism, including from your negotiators. Otherwise, can't make rapid progress. Need to take account of diverse positions among the 30 parties.
- Should aim to have new Treaty ready for signature at OSCE Summit in mid/late 1999. Would be fitting centerpiece. We can record any progress our negotiators make this fall in a document issued at the December OSCE Ministerial.

[If Yeltsin claims NATO enlargement will place Allies in violation of the CFE Treaty]

- No, that is not the case. NATO enlargement and CFE not legally related. Treaty is clear on this point.
- But agree that adapted treaty important part of building the Europe we want for 21st century.

[If Yeltsin gets into substance; suggests Russia will "allow" NATO flexibility in the center of Europe, if NATO "gives" Russia more flexibility in the flank region]

- Center and flank are two very different problems involving different sets of interests. Solution to each should be considered on its own merits.
- We should leave these issues to our negotiators.

Problem Areas

- Relationship too important to be held hostage by disagreements over any one issue. Need to be especially careful in areas where we don't agree.
- These need special handling. But think that if you and I examine closely, we can find areas of cooperation that will confound our critics.

Kosovo

- Milosevic not living up to commitments made to you. Harsh, shortsighted tactics are feeding the insurgency, risk spreading the conflict to Albania and Macedonia, and have caused a grave humanitarian situation.
- He must halt excessive use of force against civilians; allow full and uninterrupted access; help refugees return; enter a serious dialogue with Kosovar Albanians.
- Strong preference for a diplomatic solution, but force may be necessary to prevent a wider war or a humanitarian disaster.
- Ask that you put effective pressure on Milosevic to cease offensive operations, actively facilitate returns and make rapid progress in negotiations. Milosevic cannot be allowed to feel that he can ignore commitments to you and use force with impunity.

Iraq

- We cannot let Saddam's decision to defy the Security Council stand. He is violating more than forty UNSCRs and the MOU he signed with Kofi last February. This is one of the most dangerous threats to the credibility of the Security Council since its creation.

- We cannot reward Iraqi intransigence. Saddam must reverse his decision. Sanctions will stay in place without change until he does. You know we have the power to make that happen.
- You should support our efforts to suspend sanctions reviews indefinitely and should press Saddam directly to reverse course.

Latvia

- Applaud your historic role in helping Baltic states to regain independence. Understand concern about Russian minority in Latvia. Am committed to ensuring full human and civil rights for citizens and non-citizens alike.
- Latvia's new citizenship laws meet all OSCE recommendations. Would like you to reestablish dialogue with Latvia, perhaps meet with President Ulmanis.
- Why don't we ask Madeleine and Yevgeniy to boost regional cooperation, including with Baltic states?
- There are many untapped opportunities for cooperation -- fighting organized crime, energy development, environmental projects.

[If pressed on referendum]

- Goodwill gesture from Russia -- e.g., easing economic pressures -- would undercut those who want to block implementation of improved laws.

Caucasus/Caspian

- Need to cooperate closely in Caucasus and Caspian. Stalemate in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh very worrying -- a threat to Russia's security as well as that of the Caucasus states.
- Not a zero-sum game -- want to work together with OSCE and UN to foster political compromise, stability and prosperity.
- Believe we need to ask Madeleine and Yevgeniy to add this to their agenda and to work out joint approach in context of OSCE and UN umbrellas.

- Also worth re-examining the potential for commercial cooperation on Caspian energy development. Neither Russia nor the United States would wish to have Iran dominate. By working together, our companies can yield benefits of interest to both you and us.
- Investors and regional governments will welcome joint economic statement's language on Caspian energy and pipeline development.

**JOINT PRESS
CONF/SIGNING**

**PRESS CONFERENCE/SIGNING
MATERIALS
TO BE PROVIDED**

**MTG WITH DUMA/
REGIONAL LEADERS**

SCENESETTER: SPASO HOUSE

Spaso House was built in 1913/1914 in the new empire style for Nikolay Vtorov, a wealthy Siberian merchant and manufacturer. In 1917, the newly formed Soviet government expropriated all of Moscow's mansions, including Spaso House for official use. It soon became the property of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1933, when the United States established relations with the Soviet government, the mansion became the official residence of the American Ambassador to the USSR. You have visited Spaso House several times during your presidency.

**THEMES FOR REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. memo	Leaders of the Federal Assembly (6 pages)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2593

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Russia, September 1-2, 1998

2016-0143-M
kh1826

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

EMBASSY EVENT

**REMARKS
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