

## Cable

PREC: ROUTINE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHBMA5202 1591400-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: R 081400Z JUN 93  
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 OSRI: RUEHBM  
 DTG: 081400Z JUN 93  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4107  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0219  
 INFO: RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3633  
 SUBJ: MIHAI BOTEZ APPARENTLY BEATS OUT VICE-FOREIGN  
 MINISTER ENE FOR ROMANIA'S UN PERM REP JOB  
 -

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1124-M (1.01)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUCHAREST 05202  
 E.O. 12356: N/A  
 TAGS: PREL, RO, UN  
 SUBJECT: MIHAI BOTEZ APPARENTLY BEATS OUT VICE-FOREIGN  
 MINISTER ENE FOR ROMANIA'S UN PERM REP JOB  
 -

1. FOR SOME TIME IT HAS BEEN EXPECTED THAT VETERAN MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS EXPERT, STATE SECRETARY CONSTANTIN ENE, WOULD BE HEADING TO NEW YORK TO TAKE OVER ROMANIA'S LONG-VACANT PERM REP POSITION THERE. INDEED, THE MFA APPROACHED US INFORMALLY EARLIER THIS YEAR TO SEE IF THE USG WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO SUCH AN APPOINTMENT. ENE'S NAME WAS ANNOUNCED OVER A MONTH AGO AS THE GOR'S CANDIDATE AND HE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THE NECESSARY PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WE WERE TOLD YESTERDAY THAT ENE HAD BEEN CALLED BY PRESIDENT ILIESCU AND TOLD THAT L.A.-BASED FUTUROLOGIST AND NOTED ANTI-COMMUNIST DISSIDENT MIHAI BOTEZ WOULD GET THE JOB. ENE WILL REMAIN AS NO. 2 AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR THE PRESENT.

2. BOTEZ, IT WILL BE REMEMBERED, REPORTEDLY WAS ILIESCU'S FIRST CHOICE AS PRIME MINISTER AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS LAST SEPTEMBER AND FLEW TO BUCHAREST ONLY TO FIND THAT PEASANT PARTY LEADER COPOSU HAD VETOED HIS PARTY'S PARTICIPATION IN A BROAD COALITION GOVERNMENT. ANOTHER POST WILL BE SOUGHT FOR CAREER DIPLOMAT ENE, WHOSE COLLEAGUES SUGGEST HE WOULD BE WELL-QUALIFIED AS AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM AND NATO.

DAVIS  
 BT  
 #5202  
 NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01  
 SSN: 5202

TOR: 930608105054 M0431482

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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## Cable

PREC: PRIORITY  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHBMA8120 2391835-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: P 271835Z AUG 93  
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 OSRI: RUEHBM  
 DTG: 271835Z AUG 93  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6857  
 INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
 SUBJ: COPOSU PREDICTS IMMINENT RESHUFFLE OF ROMANIAN  
 GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.02)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 008120  
 E.O. 12356:N/A  
 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, RO  
 SUBJECT: COPOSU PREDICTS IMMINENT RESHUFFLE OF ROMANIAN  
 GOVERNMENT  
 REF: (A) BUCHAREST 7996, (B) BUCHAREST 6517,  
 (C) BUCHAREST 6381, (D) BUCHAREST 5318

## SUMMARY

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 1. POLCOUNS MET WITH CORNELIU COPOSU, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL PEASANT PARTY (PNT-CD) ON AUGUST 26. COPOSU STATED THAT A CABINET RESHUFFLE WAS IMMINENT, LENDING CREDENCE TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS ON THE SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO COPOSU, ANY CHANGES WOULD BE MINOR, EVEN "COSMETIC," WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF MINISTER OF STATE AND PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC STRATEGY AND REFORM MISU NEGRITOIU. NEGRITOIU'S DEPARTURE WOULD BE "IMPORTANT," SINCE HE WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S ONLY REAL ECONOMIST AND SOURCE OF INSPIRATION. COPOSU MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO THE INTRODUCTION BY THE OPPOSITION OF A MOTION OF NO-CONFIDENCE DURING THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 30-31. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION (CDR) PARTIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT A MOTION OF NO-CONFIDENCE WHICH THE PARTY OF ROMANIAN NATIONAL UNITY (PUNR) HAS THREATENED TO INTRODUCE IF THE GOR APPROVES A MINORITIES COUNCIL DECISION REQUIRING THE POSTING OF BILINGUAL SIGNS. AS FOR THE REGULAR FALL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, COPOSU ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE. UNFORTUNATELY, HOUSE PRESIDENT ADRIAN NASTASE AND THE MODERATE WING OF THE THE RULING PARTY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (PDSR) HAD BEEN "DEFEATED" AT THAT PARTY'S JULY CONFERENCE, AND THE OPPOSITION COULD NOT WORK WITH THE "COMMUNISTS" WHO NOW DOMINATED THE PDSR. THE RESULTING PARLIAMENTARY IMPASSE COULD ONLY BE REMEDIED BY NEW ELECTIONS, WHICH COPOSU

THOUGHT MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE SUMMER OF 1994. END  
SUMMARY.

CABINET CHANGES IMMINENT

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2. COPOSU DECLARED THAT THE VACAROIU GOVERNMENT HAD  
ACHIEVED "ABSOLUTELY NOTHING" DURING ITS 10-MONTH  
TENURE. UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE INFLATION RATE HAD RISEN,  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF WERE BLOCKED, AND PROSPECTS  
FOR THE WINTER WERE GRIM. THEREFORE, COPOSU ARGUED  
PRESIDENT ILIESCU HAD DECIDED TO DISMISS THREE OR FOUR  
MINISTERS TO PLACATE PUBLIC OPINION (REF A). ACCORDING  
TO COPOSU, THE CHANGES WOULD BE PURELY "COSMETIC."  
MINISTER OF YOUTH AND SPORT GHEORGHE ANGHELESCU AND  
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT PAUL TEODORU WERE LIKELY TO GO,  
AND PERHAPS MINISTER OF CULTURE MIHAI GOLU AND MINISTER  
OF TRADE CONTANTIN TECULESCU AS WELL. "SO WHAT."  
HOWEVER, COPOSU NOTED, THE POSSIBLE VOLUNTARY  
RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC  
STRATEGY AND REFORM MISU NEGRITOIU WOULD BE A MORE  
"IMPORTANT" MATTER. ACCORDING TO COPOSU, NEGRITOIU WAS  
THE ONLY REAL ECONOMIST THE GOVERNMENT HAD AND ITS ONLY  
SOURCE OF INTELLECTUAL INSPIRATION. HOWEVER, NEGRITOIU  
WAS TIRING OF HIS POSITION. HE WAS "HANDCUFFED" BY  
HARDLINERS IN THE RULING PDSR, UNABLE TO ACHIEVE  
ANYTHING, AND THUS READY TO LEAVE THE CABINET OUT OF  
FRUSTRATION.

PRIME MINISTER SAFE -- FOR NOW

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3. COPOSU CLAIMED THAT EVEN PRIME MINISTER NICOLAE  
VACAROIU MIGHT GO, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE  
FUTURE. COPOSU STATED THAT IN RECENT APPROACHES TO THE  
OPPOSITION FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT (REF D), ILIESCU  
HAD OFFERED TO REPLACE VACAROIU WITH EITHER AMBASSADOR  
TO THE UN MIHAI BOTEZ, AMBASSADOR TO THE US AUREL DRAGOS  
MUNTEANU OR PRINCE DIMITRIE STURDZA, A CONFIDANT OF THE  
PRESIDENT'S. HOWEVER, ILIESCU COULD NOT ABANDON  
VACAROIU NOW, BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD LEND CREDENCE TO  
OPPOSITION CHARGES THAT THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT WAS  
CORRUPT. AS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT, COPOSU ARGUED  
THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO  
THE IDEA WHEN IT THOUGHT THAT THE "MODERATE WING" OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NOW THE PSDR), LED  
BY C  
HAMBER OF DEPUTIES PRESIDENT ADRIAN NASTASE, WOULD  
PREVAIL. HOWEVER, THE NASTASE WING HAD BEEN DEFEATED AT  
THE PARTY'S JULY NATIONAL CONFERENCE (REF B) AND,  
ACCORDING TO COPOSU, THE PDSR WAS NOW DOMINATED BY  
"COMMUNISTS" LIKE SENATOR ION SOLCANU AND VASILE  
VACARU. THE OPPOSITION COULD NOT WORK WITH SUCH  
EXTREMISTS, AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AS  
LONG AS THEY DOMINATED THE PDSR.

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION MUST FOCUS ON CORRUPTION

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 008120

E.O. 12356:N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, RO

SUBJECT: COPOSU PREDICTS IMMINENT RESHUFFLE OF ROMANIAN

## GOVERNMENT

4. COPOSU NOTED THAT THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 30-31 WAS SUPPOSED TO FOCUS ON THE CORRUPTION ISSUE (REF C), BUT SPECULATED THAT THE VACAROIU GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK TO RAISE OTHER TOPICS IN ORDER TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE SINS OF ITS MEMBERS. IN THAT EVENT, THE OPPOSITION WOULD REACT STRONGLY AND "VIOLENT DEBATE" WOULD ENSUE. THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION (CDR) PARTIES WERE DETERMINED THAT THE SESSION SHOULD FOCUS ON THE CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AGAINST CURRENT OFFICIALS FIRST RAISED BY GENERAL GHEORGHE FLORICA, FORMER HEAD OF THE FINANCIAL GUARD (DF C).

IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTION OF MOTIONS OF NO-CONFIDENCE

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UNLIKELY

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5. COPOSU STATED THAT THE THREAT OF PARTY OF ROMANIAN NATIONAL UNITY (PUNR) LEADER GHEORGHE FUNAR TO INITIATE A MOTION OF NO-CONFIDENCE IF THE GOVERNMENT APPROVED A MINORITIES COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION OF BILINGUAL SIGNS (SEPTEL) WAS COMPLETELY HOLLOW. THE CDR PARTIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE MOTION, AND THEREFORE FUNAR WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE VOTES NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE IT. COPOSU PREDICTED THAT THE GOR WOULD QUICKLY APPROVE THE SIGNS RECOMMENDATION, AND THAT WOULD PUT AN END TO THE ISSUE.

6. COPOSU ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT BY A CDR PARTY TO INTRODUCE ITS OWN MOTION OF NO-CONFIDENCE DURING THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION. IT WAS TRUE THAT DINU PATRICIU, LEADER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY-1993, HAD RAISED THIS IDEA, BUT PATRICIU WAS MOTIVATED BY "COMPETITIVENESS" AND A DESIRE TO "INCREASE THE PRESTIGE" OF HIS PARTY WITHIN THE CDR. THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR INTRODUCING A NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION DURING THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, PARTICULARLY SINCE PATRICIU WANTED TO BASE IT ON THE POOR WORK OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CORRUPTION. ACCORDING TO COPOSU, A MOTION CANNOT LEGALLY BE DIRECTED AGAINST A COMMISSION, BUT ONLY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.

FALL SESSION WILL BE UNPRODUCTIVE

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7. COPOSU ARGUED THAT THE FALL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT WAS LIKELY TO BARREN IN TERMS OF REFORM LEGISLATION. THE OPPOSITION PLANNED TO INTRODUCE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAND AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS, AND BILLS ON EDUCATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE PSDR WOULD REFUSE TO EVEN CONSIDER THE OPPOSITION'S PROPOSALS, AND THEY WERE CERTAIN TO BE DEFEATED. NOTHING WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WOULD LEAD TO NEW ELECTIONS, PROBABLY IN THE SUMMER OF 1994.

COMMENT

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8. COPOSU'S PREDICTIONS OF A CABINET RESHUFFLE LEND CREDENCE TO PRESS SPECULATIONS THAT CHANGES MAY COME SOON (REF C). WE RECEIVED FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF THE

POSSIBILITY OF A RESHUFFLE TODAY, WHEN SENATE PRESIDENT AND HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE PDSR OLIVIU GHERMAN DID NOT DENY THAT CHANGES WERE CHMING, BUT RATHER TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE WOULD ONLY BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THEM "AFTER THEY OCCURRED." ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE RESHUFFLE IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE ONLY LESSER-KNOWN MINISTERS, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF NEGRITOIU. IF HE IN FACT LEAVES THE GOVERNMENT, IT WILL BE A SERIOUS LOSS. AS COPOSU NOTED, HE HAS BEEN THE CABINET'S LEADING ECONOMIC STRATEGIST AND ITS PRIMARY ADVOCATE OF REFORM. (NOTE: RTV REPORTED LATE TODAY THAT NEGRITOIU HAS BEEN APPOINTED COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH NOT STATED EXPLICITLY, THIS WOULD STRONGLY IMPLY THAT HE HAS OR WILL SOON RESIGN FROM THE GOVERNMENT. END NOTE.)  
COMMENT CONTINUED  
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9. AT THE MOMENT, COPOSU SEEMS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE OPPOSITION'S CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH TO THE GOR. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT AGREE WTH HIS VIEW THAT THE JULY PDSR CONFERENCE REPRESENTED A DEFEAT FOR THAT PARTY'S MODERATE WING (REF B), COPOSU APPEARS CONVINCED THAT NASTASE HAS BEEN, IF NOT ECLIPSED, THEN AT LEAST NEUTRALIZED BY THE PDSR HARDLINERS. UNLESS AND UNTIL NASTASE AND THE PDSR MODERATES DEMONSTRATE IN PARLIAMENT THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, COPOSU IS LIKELY TO REMAIN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 008120  
E.O. 12356:N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, RO

SUBJECT: COPOSU PREDICTS IMMINENT RESHUFFLE OF ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT

WEDDED TO A POLICY OF UNCOMPROMISING OPPOSITION TO THE VACAROIU GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT. DAVIS

BT

#8120

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 8120  
<^SSN>8120  
<^SSN>8120

TOR: 930827095106 M0575040  
<^TOR>930827095209 M0575043  
<^TOR>930827095207 M0575041

DIST:  
SIT: FRIED VAX  
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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~  
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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 LINE3: O 222033Z OCT 93  
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
 OSRI: RUCNDT  
 DTG: 222033Z OCT 93  
 ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0973  
 INFO: RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0159  
 SUBJ: ROMANIAN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS: MEETING WITH  
 - PERMREP BOTEZ  
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526

2015-1124-M (1.03)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

\*\*\*\*\* INCOMPLETE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 005357  
 DEPT FOR IO/UNP, EUR/EE, M/OFM  
 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: OFDP, UN, RO  
 SUBJECT: ROMANIAN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS: MEETING WITH  
 - PERMREP BOTEZ  
 REF: A) USUN 5024, B) USUN 4513,  
 C) 92 USUN 5362, D) 92  
 USUN 2810  
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH USUN HOST COUNTRY  
 MISOFFS, ROMANIAN PERMREP BOTEZ EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION  
 WITH CONTINUED TRAVEL CONTROLS ON ROMANIAN MISSION  
 PERSONNEL IN NEW YORK. HE ACCEPTED HIS POSITION AS  
 PERMREP ON THE PRECONDITION THAT THE MISSION'S "OLD  
 DOSSIER" HAD BEEN ELIMINATED; SINCE TRAVEL CONTROLS ARE  
 STILL IN PLACE ON THE MISSION, HE NOW CAN ONLY ASSUME  
 THAT THE USG HAS INFORMATION THAT UNACCEPTABLE  
 ACTIVITIES ARE CONTINUING BEHIND HIS BACK. IF THAT IS  
 PROVEN, HE WILL RESIGN. BOTEZ INTIMATED THAT HE HOPED  
 TO RENEW HIS OLD ACQUAINTANCE WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON  
 SOMETIME SOON, AND WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO  
 EXPLAIN HIS FRUSTRATION TO THE WHITE HOUSE.  
 3. GIVEN THAT RESTRICTIONS ON EMBASSY AND NEW YORK  
 CONGEN ROMANIANS HAVE LONG SINCE BEEN LIFTED, USUN  
 BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED RESTRICTIONS ON ROMANIAN UN  
 MISSION TRAVEL IS SERIOUSLY DAMAGING OUR CREDIBILITY AT  
 THE UN. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE NEED TO SEND A SIGNAL  
 TO THE GOR, WE WONDER WHETHER THERE IS A MORE FOCUSED,  
 MORE EFFICIENT WAY TO DO IT. END SUMMARY.  
 4. ROMANIAN PERMREP MIHAI BOTEZ AND LEGAL OFFICER  
 FLORIN POSTICA CALLED ON USUN HOST COUNTRY OFFICERS  
 MORNING OF OCTOBER Q1 TO EXPRESS FRUSTRATION WITH THE  
 CONTINUED IMPOSITION OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON ROMANIAN

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MISSION PERSONNEL IN NEW YORK. BOTEZ MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT THE PERMREP POSITION IN NEW YORK ON THE PRECONDITION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT THE "MISSION'S DOSSIER HAD BEEN CLEANED UP". HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT ASSURANCE BOTH BY HIS PRESIDENT AND BY GOR INTELLIGENCE CHIEF TALPAS. FOLLOWING MEETINGS BETWEEN TALPAS AND USG OFFICIALS IN AUGUST, TALPAS EVIDENTLY CAME TO NEW YORK AND TOLD BOTEZ THAT CONDITIONS WERE NOW IN PLACE TO ENABLE AN USG INTERAGENCY GROUP TO DETERMINE THAT RESTRICTONS COULD BE LIFTED SOON.

5. BOTEZ SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AND CONCERNED THAT RESTRICTIONS ON MISSION TRAVEL REMAIN IN PLACE. HE CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT THE USG HAS PROOF THAT MEMBER(S) OQS MISSION POSE QER TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. HE CANNOT FATHOM WHO THE INDIVIDUAL(S) MIGHT BE, SINCE ALL THE STAFF AT THE MISSION HAVE ARRIVED "SINCE THE REVOLUTION". IF THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES AT THE MISSION, BOTEZ WILL RESIGN HIS POST AND LEAVE NEW YORK WITHIN 48 HOURS, AFTER HAVING MADE SURE THAT THOSE INDIVIDUALS THE USG MAY BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY ARE REPATRIATED.

6. THE PERMREP NOTED THAT HE AND THE MISSION STAFF HAVE VIRUTALLY NO CONTACT WITH THE ROMANIAN EMIGRE COMMUNITY IN NEW YORK. A FEW OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT HOLD VIEWS INCONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT AND CONCEIVABLY WITH US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AS WELL. ROMANIANS IDENTIFIED WITH THE OLD REGIME CONTINUE TO TRAVEL TO THE US WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. THE ROMANIAN CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK DOES DEAL WITH THE EXPAT COMMUNITY HERE FROM TIME TO TIME -- AND THERE MAY BE LOWER LEVEL PEOPLE AT THE CONSULATE GENERAL WHO WERE BROUGHT TO NEW YORK BY THE OLD REGIME. CONSULATE GENERAL PERSONNEL ARE NOT UNDER TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, HOWEVER. IF THERE IS INDEED A PROBLEM IN NEW YORK, MIGHT IT NOT BE AT THE CONSULATE RATHER THAN THE MISSION? WHY, THEN, ARE CONSULATE PERSONNEL ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY?

7. BEFORE HE LEFT, BOTEZ ADDED THAT HE HAD KNOWN PRESIDENT CLINTON WHILE THE PRESEIDENT WAS GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS. HE IS CONSIDERING A TRIP TO WASHINGTON TO RENEW THE ACQUAINTANCE. BOTEZ WONDERED WHETHER A WORD TO THE PRESIDENT MIGHT HELP. BOTEZ AND THE GOR ARE EMBARRASS

ED TO BE PLACED BY THE USG IN THE SAME CATEGORY WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, (-, \$ )8?6-.

8. USUN COMMENT: THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE FROM REFTELS, WE ARE ONLY ABLE TO DEFEND THE TRAVEL RESTICTIONS PROGRAM PLACED ON UN MISSIONS AND CERTAIN SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL ON THE BASIS OF OVERRIDING NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND ON THAT BASIS ALONE. WE CANNOT JUSTIFY CONTROLS ON UN MISSIONS BASED ON RECIPROCITY OR OTHER BILATERAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE ABSENCE OF CONTROLS ON ROMANIANS ACCREDITED BILATERALLY -- CONTROLS WHICH COULD BE DEFENDED MUCH MORE EASILY AND RATIONALLQ -- CONTINUES TO CALL INTO SERIOUS QUESTION OUR CREDIBILITQ IN THE UN COMMUNITY REGARDING THE ENTIRE TRAVEL

BT

#5357

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

SSN: 5357

TOR: 931022165958 M0678838

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHBMA7202 2140909-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 020909Z AUG 94  
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 OSRI: RUEHBM  
 DTG: 020909Z AUG 94  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7079  
 INFO: RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE  
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON ROMANIAN  
 FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526

2015-1184-M (1.04)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 007202  
 BUDAPEST PLEASE PASS TO NSC DIRECTOR SCHIFTER'S PARTY  
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, EFIN, RO  
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON ROMANIAN  
 FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DAVIS PAID A FAREWELL CALL ON ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TEODOR MELESCANU ON JULY 27. MELESCANU PROVIDED A RELATIVELY UPBEAT ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY, NOTING THE GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE RISE OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL CLASS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF HIGH POSITIVE INTEREST RATES, WHICH HAD BROUGHT "THOUSANDS OF BILLIONS OF LEI" INTO THE BANKS. THE DEPOSITORS -- OR, MORE LIKELY, THE BANKS THEMSELVES -- COULD USE THESE FUNDS TO BUY SHARES IN COMPANIES THE GOR INTENDED TO PRIVATIZE. TURNING TO THE POLITICAL SCENE, MELESCANU STATED THAT THE NATIONALIST, ANTI-HUNGARIAN PARTY OF ROMANIAN NATIONAL UNITY (PUNR) WAS NOT ABOUT TO BE ADMITTED INTO THE GOVERNMENT. SINCE PARLIAMENT WAS IN RECESS, "WE DON'T NEED PUNR SUPPORT." (SEE "COMMENT" FOR ANOTHER VIEW.) HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE A REORGANIZATION AND DOWNSIZING OF THE MINISTRIES, PARTICULARLY INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. AMBASSADOR DAVIS AND MELESCANU AGREED THAT U.S. ROMANIAN RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, AND MELESCANU OPINED THAT ROMANIA HAD MOVED FROM BEING VIEWED IN WASHINGTON AS "ALMOST HOSTILE" TO BEING CONSIDERED "A FRIENDLY COUNTRY." HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT MUCH WORK STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN IMPROVING ROMANIA'S IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC. END SUMMARY.

## 2. ECONOMY IMPROVING

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 MELESCANU NOTED THAT THE ECONOMY WAS IMPROVING, OWING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

LARGELY TO THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES. ENTREPRENEURS DOMINATED THE TRADE AND SERVICE SECTORS, AND HAD CREATED SOME 350,000 JOBS OVER THE PAST YEAR. IN ADDITION, PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO ACCUMULATE WEALTH, FUNDS WHICH COULD SERVE AS A SOURCE OF FUTURE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT. MELESCANU CONCEDED THAT ROMANIA'S NEW CAPITALISTS DID NOT ALWAYS OPERATE "IN THE MOST HONEST WAYS, BUT YOU MUST BEGIN SOMEWHERE."

### 3. BENEFITS OF POSITIVE INTEREST RATES

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MELESCANU POINTED OUT THAT THANKS TO HIGH POSITIVE INTEREST RATES, MONEY WAS POURING INTO THE BANKS. THIS HAD HELPED TO END THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE; SINCE PEOPLE WERE NOW CONVERTING THEIR DOLLARS INTO LEI IN ORDER TO FATTEN THEIR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. IN ADDITION, THE "THOUSANDS OF BILLIONS OF LEI" NOW IN THE BANKS FORMED A CAPITAL RESERVE WHICH PEOPLE COULD USE TO BUY SHARES ONCE THE GOR LAUNCHED ITS MASS PRIVATIZATION CAMPAIGN AND PUT THOUSANDS OF STATE ENTERPRISES ON THE BLOCK. IT WAS MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE BANKS THEMSELVES WOULD USE THE MONEY TO PURCHASE SHARES, SINCE ROMANIANS IN GENERAL "WON'T TAKE RISKS" AND WOULD PREFER TO EARN INTEREST RATHER THAN PLUNGE INTO THE STOCK MARKET. MELESCANU ALSO ARGUED THAT MOST ROMANIANS WERE FINANCIALLY UNSOPHISTICATED AND WOULD NOT KNOW HOW TO CHOOSE AMONG THE COMPANIES WHOSE SHARES WOULD BE ON OFFER. THE COUNTRY NEEDED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS BROKERAGE HOUSES AND MUTUAL FUNDS TO HELP PEOPLE LEARN HOW TO INVEST. AMBASSADOR DAVIS NOTED THAT ONCE SHARES IN ROMANIAN COMPANIES BECAME AVAILABLE, FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WOULD ENTER THE MARKET, GIVING A BOOST TO THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.

### 4. PUNR WILL NOT ENTER GOVERNMENT

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IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR DAVIS, MELESCANU STATED THAT THE PUNR WAS NOT ABOUT TO BE ADMITTED INTO THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER ALL, PARLIAMENT WAS NOT IN SESSION AND "WE DON'T NEED PUNR SUPPORT." AS A RESULT OF IMF PRESSURE, HOWEVER, THE GOR WOULD SOON BE ANNOUNCING A DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING AND DOWNSIZING OF THE MINISTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE MINISTRIES OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. WHEREAS THE MFA'S STAFF WOULD BE CUT BY ONLY 4 PERCENT, THE STAFFS OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE WOULD BE SLASHED BY 60 PERCENT. ACCORDING TO MELESCANU, THESE MINISTRIES WERE NOT FUNCTIONING WELL BECAUSE THEY HAD RETAINED THEIR PRE-1989 STRUCTURE AND STILL HAD THE SAME SIZE STAFFS AS WHEN THEY HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR DIRECTING THE ENTIRE ECONOMY.

### 5. BILATERAL RELATIONS MUCH IMPROVED

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AMBASSADOR DAVIS REMARKED THAT THE BILATERAL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 007202

BUDAPEST PLEASE PASS TO NSC DIRECTOR SCHIFTER'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, EFIN, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON ROMANIAN

FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU  
RELATIONSHIP HAD IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST  
TWO YEARS. WASHINGTON UNDERSTOOD HOW HELPFUL ROMANIA  
HAD BEEN IN ENFORCING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. IN  
FACT, ITS REQUEST FOR FOREIGN OBSERVERS HAD BEEN THE  
ORIGIN OF THE SAM TEAM CONCEPT. AND RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE U.S. AND ROMANIAN MILITARIES HAD DEVELOPED  
PARTICULARLY WELL. MELESCANU RESPONDED THAT IN HIS  
VIEW ROMANIA HAD MOVED FROM BEING VIEWED IN WASHINGTON  
AS "ALMOST HOSTILE" TO BEING CONSIDERED "A FRIENDLY  
COUNTRY." HE STRESSED THAT THE NEW ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR  
TO WASHINGTON, MIHAI BOTEZ, WOULD TRY TO SERVE THE  
INTERESTS OF ROMANIA "IN AN HONEST MANNER," AND THAT  
THE MFA WOULD SEEK TO HELP HIM BY SLIGHTLY ENLARGING  
HIS STAFF. AMBASSADOR DAVIS NOTED THAT ROMANIA STILL  
HAD AN IMAGE PROBLEM BECAUSE MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUCH  
EVENTS AS THE MINERS' INCURSIONS STILL LINGERED IN  
PEOPLE'S MINDS. SINCE U.S. TELEVISION GAVE SO LITTLE  
COVERAGE TO ROMANIA, NOTHING HAD APPEARED RECENTLY ON  
TV SCREENS TO REPLACE THESE OLD NEGATIVE IMAGES.  
MELESCANU RESPONDED THAT THE GOR WOULD CONTINUE ITS  
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S REPUTATION, REMARKED  
ON THE FAVORABLE PUBLICITY RECEIVED BY ROMANIA'S WORLD  
CUP TEAM, AND PLEDGED TO CONSIDER SENDING MORE YOUTH  
AND CULTURAL GROUPS TO THE U.S.

6. COMMENT: MELESCANU IS A BRILLIANT DIPLOMAT WHO IS  
DOING A GREAT DEAL TO ENHANCE ROMANIA'S REPUTATION IN  
INTERNATIONAL CIRCLES. HE HAS, HOWEVER, DECLINED TO  
BECOME A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNING PDSR PARTY.  
CONSEQUENTLY, ALTHOUGH HE IS A VICE PREMIER IN THE  
GOVERNMENT, HE IS NOT ONE OF THE INNER CIRCLE. FOR  
EXAMPLE, HIS ASSURANCES THAT PUNR ENTRY INTO THE  
GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY SINCERE,  
MAY HAVE BEEN OVER OPTIMISTIC. NASTASE TOLD ME THE  
NEXT DAY THAT IT IS A "DONE DEAL" THAT THE PUNR WILL  
GET THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I  
EXPRESSED STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA AS I HAD WHEN  
IT WAS FLOATED AS A TRIAL BALLOON ON AN EARLIER  
OCCASION, BUT NASTASE INDICATED THAT IT HAD BECOME A  
MATTER OF SURVIVAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT. DAVIS

BT

#7202

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 7202  
<^SSN>7202

TOR: 940802051541 M1181677  
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DIST:  
SIT: FRIED NSC SCHIFTER VAX  
□

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PREC: PRIORITY  
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 OSRI: RUEHBM  
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 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3047  
 INFO: ////  
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ --  
 SIX MARKERS FOR BETTER RELATIONS

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.06)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000788

E.O. 12356: N/A  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO  
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ --  
 SIX MARKERS FOR BETTER RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. THE AMBASSADOR USED A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ TO LAY DOWN SIX MARKERS ON STEPS WHICH THE GOR NEEDS TO TAKE TO GIVE A BOOST TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND INCREASE THE POSITIVE ATTENTION ROMANIA RECEIVES FROM THE USG. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT EXCHANGES OF HIGHER-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IF PROGRESS WERE MADE IN THE SIX AREAS. AMBASSADOR BOTEZ SAID HE AGREED WITH THE SIX POINTS AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT ILIESCU WOULD ACCEPT ALL OF THEM INTELLECTUALLY. THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOR, HOWEVER, WERE CONFRONTED WITH A SEVERE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN THAT, DUE TO OPPOSITION INTRANSIGENCE, THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO DEPEND ON THE EXTREMIST PARTIES TO REMAIN IN POWER. AS LONG AS THAT SITUATION PERSISTED, THE RULING PARTY'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER WOULD BE LIMITED. END SUMMARY.

2. ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, MIHAI BOTEZ, MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 31. NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING PRESIDENT ILIESCU LATER THAT DAY, BOTEZ COMMENTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S SENSITIVITY TO PERCEIVED SLIGHTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ACTUAL ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA. FOR EXAMPLE, ILIESCU NKW WAS FOCUSING ON THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT SNEGUR OF MOLDOVA WAS PAYING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND BEING RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, LEAVING HIM, ILIESCU VIRTUALLY THE ONLY HEAD OF STATE FROM THE REGION NOT TO BE HONORED IN THAT WAY. ILIESCU'S CHAGRIN WAS

INTENSIFIED BY INCIDENTS SUCH AS LOCAL MEDIA REPORTS THAT LEADING OPPOSITION POLITICIAN CORNELIU COPOSU HAD BEEN INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL PRAYER BREAKFAST. ALTHOUGH BOTEZ KNEW THAT IT WAS NOT THE CASE, ILIESCU WAS PRONE TO CONCLUDE THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE SOMEHOW BEING SNUBBED BY THE USG, WHILE THEIR POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND THE LEADERS OF "LESSER," NEIGHBORING STATES WERE WELCOMED WITH OPEN ARMS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT ILIESCU'S PERCEPTIONS IN THIS AREA WERE DISTORTED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE HIGHER-LEVEL OFFICIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, IF CONDITIONS IN ROMANIA WARRANTED IT. BY THAT HE MEANT THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE GENUINE PROGRESS IN SEVERAL AREAS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S., AREAS THAT SHOULD ALSO BE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE ROMANIANS IF THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT DEMOCRATIZING AND MOVING WESTWARD. THOSE AREAS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE GOVERNMENT MUST GET CONTROL OF THE PUNR AND ITS OUTRAGEOUS LEADER, GHEORGHE FUNAR, AS WELL AS BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF THE EXTREMIST PRM AND PSM INTO CABINET AND SUB-CABINET POSITIONS. CLOSER INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RULING PDSR AND THOSE PARTIES WOULD LIMIT WHAT THE USG COULD DO FOR AND WITH ROMANIA.

B. THE GOR MUST STOP FIRING MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS, VIRTUALLY ALL OF WHOM WERE FROM THE OPPOSITION RANKS, WITHOUT CLEAR-CUT JUSTIFICATION. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL THE MALEFACTOR MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS IN THE COUNTRY JUST HAPPENED TO BE AFFILIATED WITH THE OPPOSITION.

C. IN ORDER TO CREATE THE KIND OF ECONOMIC/INVESTMENT CLIMATE THAT WOULD ATTRACT U.S. BUSINESSMEN, THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ECONOMIC "CZAR" WITH REAL POWER TO MAKE DECISIONS, BREAK THROUGH BUREAUCRATIC BARRIERS, AND ISSUE ORDINANCES WITH THE FORCE OF LAW.

D. THE ISSUE OF THE ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AND THEIR CONCERNS MUST BE ADDRESSED CONSTRUCTIVELY. AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD COULD BE GENUINE GOVERNMENTAL DECENTRALIZATION/DEVOLUTION AND INCREASED LOCAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL/ALL OF ROMANIA. THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY BENEFIT THE ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AS WELL AS ROMANIANS AND, IF DONE CORRECTLY, COULD NOT BE CREDIBLY LABELED A CONCESSION TO THE HUNGARIANS.

E. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONWIDE PRIVATE TV CHANNEL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. IN THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE TV AIRWAVES NATIONWIDE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE -- IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT PEOPLE HAVE, AND BE SEEN TO HAVE, ALTERNATE SOURCES OF BROADCAST INFORMATION.

F. IF THE REHABILITATION OF MARSHAL ANTONESCU COULD NOT BE HALTED BY THE GOR, IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO ONE AND

ALL THAT THE GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY WAS NOT COMPLICIT IN,  
BUT ALSO ACTIVELY OPPOSED, THIS UNFORTUNATE PHENOMENON.

4. AMBASSADOR BOTEZ SAID HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE  
POINTS THE AMBASSADOR HAD RAISED AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT  
ILIESCU COULD ACCEPT THEM INTELLECTUALLY. THE PRESIDENT  
AND THE GOR, HOWEVER, WERE CONFRONTED WITH A SEVERE  
PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN THAT, DUE TO OPPOSITION

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000788

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ --  
SIX MARKERS FOR BETTER RELATIONS

INTRANSIGENCE, THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO DEPEND ON THE  
EXTREMIST PARTIES TO REMAIN IN POWER. SINCE REMAINING  
IN POWER WAS THE NAME OF THE GAME, SO LONG AS THAT  
SITUATION PERSISTED THE RULING PARTY'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER  
WOULD BE LIMITED. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED TO PASS THE  
POINTS ON TO ILIESCU.

5. COMMENT. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH ROMANIAN OFFICIALS,  
THE AMBASSADOR IS MAKING THE POINTS THAT HE PERSONALLY,  
AND THE USG, WANT TO HELP ROMANIA CREATE THE NECESSARY  
PRE-CONDITIONS FOR FULL INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST; SOME  
CHANGES IN THE ROMANIAN WAY OF OPERATING WILL BE  
REQUIRED BEFORE THE U.S. CAN BE AS SUPPORTIVE AS IT  
WOULD LIKE TO; AND WITHOUT SUCH CHANGES ROMANIA  
INEVITABLY WOULD LAG BEHIND THE REST OF THE REGION,  
POLITIKALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, IN WESTERN EYES. THE  
MESSAGE IS NOT PRESENTED AS A THREAT BUT AS A STATEMENT  
OF FACT AND GENERALLY SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THE  
CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT IS OFFERED.  
NEVERTHELESS, OLD WAYS AND HABITS DIE HARD, AND PROBABLY  
NOT WITHOUT SOME OUTSIDE HELP. THAT IS WHAT WE INTEND  
TO KEEP PROVIDING.

MOSES

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#0788

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0788  
<^SSN>0788

TOR: 950201110406 M1490727  
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SIT: FRIED NSC SCHIFTER

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PREC: ROUTINE  
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 DTG: 091150Z FEB 95  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 3549  
 INFO: ////  
 SUBJ: UPDATE ON MAYORAL DISMISSALS AND GROWING  
 CRITICISM OF THEM

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
 2015-1184-M (1.07)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001277

E.O. 12356: N/A  
 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, RO  
 SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAYORAL DISMISSALS AND GROWING  
 CRITICISM OF THEM

REF: A) BUCHAREST 0788 B) BUCHAREST 0586

1. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 1, 1995, THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES DROPPED ON BRASOV MAYOR ADRIAN MORUZI, AS THE GOR MADE OFFICIAL ITS DECISION TO DISMISS HIM. FOR A WEEK AFTER THE GOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS DECISION (REF B), NO OFFICIAL STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN, AND MORUZI WAS TOLD BY A GOR FRIEND THAT HE, ALONE AMONG THE 28 MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS ANNOUNCED FOR THE AX, WOULD BE REPRIEVED. MORUZI IS NOW ASSESSING HIS OPTIONS, INCLUDING FIGHTING IN COURT AND RUNNING IN THE LEGALLY REQUIRED SPECIAL ELECTION TO SUCCEED HIMSELF. MEANWHILE, THE GOR'S BROADSIDE AGAINST OPPOSITION MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS IS DRAWING INCREASED ATTENTION AND CRITICISM. END SUMMARY.

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 THE BACKGROUND  
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2. ON JANUARY 31, THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION (CDR) HELD A NEWS CONFERENCE DECRYING THE SACKING OF 28 ROMANIAN MAYORS AND LOCAL COUNCIL MEMBERS, ALL BUT ONE OR TWO OF WHOM WERE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION. AT THE NEWS CONFERENCE, CDR PRESIDENT EMIL CONSTANTINESCU ATTACKED SUCH ACTION AS ILLEGAL, AND CALLED ON PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU TO DISMISS THE PDSR-LED GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF

IT. CDR OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT OVER 260 MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS HAD BEEN DISMISSED IN SUCH ACTIONS SINCE THE NATIONWIDE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN 1992, AND SAID ALL WERE OPPOSITION MEMBERS. (IN FACT, A FEW OF THE OFFICIALS DISMISSED WERE FROM THE RULING PARTY OR ITS COALITION PARTNERS.) A GREAT CONCERN HAS BEEN THE METHOD USED TO DISMISS, IN WHICH THE GOR PREFECT BRINGS CHARGES AGAINST A LOCAL OFFICIAL, WHICH THE GOR ITSELF INVESTIGATES PRIVATELY BEFORE ANNOUNCING THE ACTION IT WILL TAKE. A DISMISSED MAYOR OR COUNCILLOR CAN THEN FIGHT THE DISMISSAL IN COURT, BUT HE MUST FILE SUIT BEFORE A SPECIAL ELECTION IS HELD TO REPLACE HIM, AND HE IS SUSPENDED WITHOUT PAY FOR THE WHOLE TIME IT TAKES TO RESOLVE THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM, HIS DUTIES HANDLED IN THE INTERIM BY THE DEPUTY MAYOR. (FOR EXAMPLE, THE DISMISSED MAYOR OF BUCHAREST'S SECTOR 3 HAS BEEN SUSPENDED FOR 11 MONTHS AWAITING A COURT'S FINAL DECISION.) A SECOND FOCUS OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF THE LATEST ROUND OF DISMISSALS WAS THAT MORUZI, A RESPECTED AND POPULAR FIGURE WHO MANY HAVE TOUTED FOR NATIONAL OFFICE, HAD BEEN GIVEN THE AX. BUCHAREST'S DAILY NEWSPAPERS HAVE HARDLY MENTIONED THE DISMISSALS EXCEPT FOR THE CASE OF MORUZI.

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MORUZI'S COUNTER-CHARGES, AND HIS OPTIONS  
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3. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE JANUARY 31 PRESS CONFERENCE, MORUZI DISCUSSED HIS ANNOUNCED DISMISSAL, AND HIS FUTURE, WITH POLOFF. THE EIGHT CHARGES AGAINST HIM DEAL WITH ALLEGED FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MISMANAGEMENT, BUT HE SHRUGGED THEM OFF AS WITHOUT FOUNDATION. (COMMENT: IT'S HARD TO TELL FOR SURE, BUT FROM WHERE WE SIT, THE CHARGES DO LOOK TRIVIAL, AND AT WORST, INVOLVE MATTERS OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING ABOUT WHICH PEOPLE COULD REASONABLY DIFFER. END COMMENT.) MORUZI BELIEVES THERE WERE TWO BASES FOR THE ACTION AGAINST HIM:

-- AS BRASOV MAYOR, HE ALSO HAS JURISDICTION OVER POIANA BRASOV, ROMANIA'S MOST POPULAR MOUNTAIN-AND-SKI RESORT. THE FACILITIES THERE ARE STILL GOVERNMENT-OWNED; MOST OF THE LAND IS OWNED BY ETHNIC GERMANS, MANY OF WHOM HAVE EMIGRATED. MORUZI SAYS THAT FORMER LOCAL PREFECT GHEORGHE FULGA (WHO FILED THE CHARGES UPON WHICH THE DISMISSAL IS OFFICIALLY BASED), PRM PRESIDENT C.V. TUDOR, AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AT POIANA BRASOV ARE OLD UNIVERSITY CHUMS, AND WORKED AS SOCIOLOGISTS TOGETHER. LAST SPRING, TUDOR, WITH THE HELP OF HIS TWO FRIENDS, TRIED TO BUY UP THE POIANA PROPERTY IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE GOR-OWNED FACILITIES, BUT MORUZI STOPPED WHAT HE TERMED AN ILLICIT ACTION, THUS INCURRING THEIR WRATH.

-- ALSO ABOUT A YEAR AGO, BUCHAREST WAS ABUZZ WITH RUMORS THAT NEW LOCAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY

THE GOR. (NOTE: IN THE 1992 LOCAL ELECTIONS, HELD BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTING, A SOLID MAJORITY OF LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM THE OPPOSITION WAS ELECTED IN THE MAJOR CITIES. END NOTE.) MORUZI APPEARED BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND DECLARED THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD BE UNDEMOCRATIC AND A BLATANT POWER GRAB. SEVERAL EUROPEAN OFFICIALS BROUGHT UP THE MATTER ON VISITS TO ROMANIA AND IN OTHER TALKS,  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001277

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, RO

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAYORAL DISMISSALS AND GROWING CRITICISM OF THEM

AND THE IDEA OF SUCH ELECTIONS QUIETLY WENT AWAY. MORUZI BELIEVES HE EARNED LASTING GOR ENMITY IN THIS AFFAIR.

MORUZI ALSO DISCUSSED BOTH OF THESE REASONS FOR HIS DISMISSALS AT THE JANUARY 31 PRESS CONFERENCE.

4. AS OF JANUARY 31, MORUZI BELIEVED HE WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY BE DISMISSED BECAUSE A GOR OFFICIAL -- NOT A CLOSE FRIEND, BUT SOMEONE WITH WHOM HE HAD DEVELOPED MUTUAL RESPECT -- HAD TOLD HIM AS MUCH. TOO MUCH CLAMOR HAD FOLLOWED THE INCLUSION OF MORUZI'S NAME IN THE LIST OF DISMISSALS, THE OFFICIAL SAID, SO WHEN THE ACTION WAS FINALLY TAKEN TO DISMISS, MORUZI'S NAME WOULD PROVE TO HAVE BEEN QUIETLY EXCISED. HOWEVER, MORUZI SAID THAT EVEN IF HE REMAINED IN OFFICE, IT WOULD NOT BE MUCH OF A VICTORY BECAUSE 1) THE HEART OF THE ISSUE WAS THE GOR'S ABUSE OF POWER, AND 2) THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES WOULD BE HANGING OVER HIS HEAD UNTIL HIS TERM ENDED IN 1996. HE REAFFIRMED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD POLOFF (REF B), THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO STAND FOR REELECTION IN 1996 IN ANY EVENT, INSTEAD LIKELY RUNNING FOR PARLIAMENT.

5. IF THE DISMISSAL WERE NOT FORESTALLED, MORUZI HAD SEVERAL DECISIONS TO MAKE, HE ADDED. HIS INTENTION WAS FIRMLY TO FIGHT THE ACTION IN COURT, BUT THE LOSS OF HIS SALARY WOULD HURT, AND HE WOULD HAVE TO REPLACE THE INCOME QUICKLY WHILE THE APPEAL WENT ON. HE HOPED, AND SAID HE BELIEVED IT LIKELY, THAT HE WOULD BE HIRED BY THE ROMANIAN FEDERATION OF MUNICIPALITIES (FOM) IN THE INTERIM AS THEIR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. IN THIS ROLE, HE COULD PURSUE HIS OWN VINDICATION, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY FIGHT SUCH ILLEGAL ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF ALL HIS COLLEAGUES. MORUZI IS CURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF THE FOM, AND WILL CONTINUE IN THAT UNPAID POSITION SINCE THE FOM DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE VALIDITY OF THE GOR DECISION TO DISMISS HIM.

6. AT THE SAME TIME THAT MORUZI'S DISMISSAL AND THAT OF THE OTHER MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS WAS MADE OFFICIAL,

THE GOR ANNOUNCED THAT SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR REPLACEMENTS WOULD BE HELD ON APRIL 2, 1995. ON FEBRUARY 8, MORUZI TOLD POLOFF THAT HE WAS STILL OCCUPYING THE MAYOR'S OFFICE DOING CITY BUSINESS, AND THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR TO HIM WHEN HE MUST VACATE IT. HE WAS PREPARING COURT ACTION FOR WHICH THE BRASOV BAR ASSOCIATION IS PROVIDING HIM LEGAL COUNSEL FREE OF CHARGE, AND WOULD ANNOUNCE ON FEBRUARY 13 IF HE WOULD RUN FOR HIS OLD MAYOR'S SEAT IN THE SPECIAL ELECTION.

-----  
 THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, AMONG OTHERS, WEIGHS IN  
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7. MEANWHILE, THIS LATEST SPATE OF DISMISSALS WAS DRAWING GROWING CRITICISM. THE FOM HAS EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT WHAT IT SEES AS INCREASED EFFORTS TO CENTRALIZE GOVERNMENT AND ENHANCE THE POWERS OF THE APPOINTED PREFECT IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE ELECTED MAYOR, AND HAS LAUNCHED LOBBYING EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT TO COMBAT THIS TREND. ON JANUARY 31, U.S. AMBASSADOR MOSES MET WITH ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR BOTEZ IN BUCHAREST. IN THAT MEETING (REF A), THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE GOR SHOULD STOP FIRING MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS, VIRTUALLY ALL OF WHOM WERE FROM THE OPPOSITION RANKS, WITHOUT CLEARCUT JUSTIFICATION. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE, MOSES SAID, THAT ALMOST ALL THE MALEFACTOR MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS JUST HAPPENED TO BE AFFILIATED WITH THE OPPOSITION. THIS ISSUE WAS IMPORTANT TO THE U.S., AND SHOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE ROMANIANS IF THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND MOVING WESTWARD. BOTEZ AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, AND SAID HE WOULD TAKE OUR CONCERNS TO PRESIDENT ILIESCU. ON FEBRUARY 7, HOWEVER, OCTAV COZMANCA, THE GOR STATE SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE: "WE HAVE DISMISSED A TOTAL OF 133 MAYORS ACROSS THE COUNTRY BECAUSE THEY HAVE VIOLATED THE LAWS AND FOR NO OTHER REASON."

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 COMMENT  
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8. COMMENT: IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE GOR, WHILE SO CLEARLY TRYING TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY WITH THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, WOULD ENGAGE IN SO BALD-FACED A POWER GRAB, UNTIL THE SIMPLE POINT IS MADE THAT, UP TO NOW, IT HAS GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT. EVEN INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE IRREGULARLY PACED ATTACKS ON OPPOSITION MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS HAS BEEN INCONSISTENT AND MUTED. THIS LATEST SALVO OF DISMISSALS HAS CAUGHT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001277

E.O. 12356: N/A  
 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, RO

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAYORAL DISMISSALS AND GROWING  
CRITICISM OF THEM

MORE ATTENTION, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF CUMULATIVE EFFECT,  
AND CERTAINLY PARTLY BECAUSE OF MORUZI'S INCLUSION IN  
IT. THE AMBASSADOR'S OPEN CRITICISM OF IT MAY NOT BE  
ENOUGH TO STOP THE ASSAULT ON OPPOSITION-PARTY LOCAL  
OFFICIALS, BUT IT'S AN IMPORTANT START AND STATEMENT OF  
PRINCIPLE. MORUZI, FOR HIS PART, CONTINUES TO IMPRESS  
THIS EMBASSY, AND HIS ENTRY ONTO THE NATIONAL SCENE  
WOULD, AT LEAST, INJECT AN ARTICULATE, IMAGINATIVE, AND  
OPEN-MINDED FIGURE INTO THE CENTER OF ROMANIAN  
POLITICS. END COMMENT.

RICKERT

BT

#1277

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 1277  
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DIST: SIT: FRIED NSC SCHIFTER  
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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
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 OSRI: RUEHBM  
 DTG: 151028Z FEB 95  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3739  
 INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0412  
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
 RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COLLECTIVE  
 SUBJ: JOINT EU/US DEMARCHE TO ROMANIAN FOREIGN  
 MINISTRY ON UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHINESE  
 RESOLUTION

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.08)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001476

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
 TAGS: PHUM, UNHCR-1, PREL, US, CH, RO  
 SUBJECT: JOINT EU/US DEMARCHE TO ROMANIAN FOREIGN  
 MINISTRY ON UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHINESE  
 RESOLUTION

REF: A) STATE 35058; B) BUCHAREST 446

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. TAKING THE LEAD IN A JOINT EU/US DEMARCHE TO THE MFA ON FEBRUARY 14, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR STRONGLY URGED THAT ROMANIA VOTE AGAINST THE CHINESE NO-ACTION MOTION AND FOR THE CHINA RESOLUTION AT THE UNHCR. IN RESPONSE, STATE SECRETARY VIRGIL CONSTANTINESCU SAID THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE YET AND THAT THE FINAL DECISION WOULD BE REACHED LATE THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT, AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU'S RETURN. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE CHARGE AFTERWARDS, CONSTANTINESCU SAID THAT THE MFA WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE EU//US POSITION BUT THAT SINCE THE CHINA QUESTION WAS ONE ENCOMPASSING BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ASPECTS, THE FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL. WE BELIEVE THE CHANCES ARE BETTER THAN FIFTY-FIFTY THAT ROMANIA WILL END UP SIDING WITH THE WEST ON THIS ONE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON FEBRUARY 14, THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SPAIN; THE HEAD OF THE RESIDENT EU COMMISSION DELEGATION; AND THE CHARGE MET WITH MFA STATE SECRETARY

AMBASSADOR VIRGIL CONSTANTINESCU TO URGE THAT ROMANIA VOTE AGAINST CHINA'S NO-ACTION MOTION AND FOR THE CHINA RESOLUTION. TAKING THE LEAD, FRENCH AMBASSADOR BOYER READ THE TEXT OF A DIPLOMATIC NOTE PRESENTING THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE CHINA ISSUE IN BEHALF OF ALL PRESENT. ALL SPOKE UP STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE CHINA RESOLUTION, THE CHARGE USING THE REF (A) TALKING POINTS.

4. CONSTANTINESCU REPLIED THAT THE ISSUE AT HAND WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN BOTH ITS POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM ONLY AN HOUR BEFORE TO ARGUE THE OPPOSITE POINT OF VIEW FROM THAT PRESENTED BY THE EU AND US. READING FROM THE NON-PAPER LEFT BY THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, CONSTANTINESCU SUMMARIZED THE CHINESE ARGUMENTS AS FOLLOWS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHINA IS IMPROVING; THE CHINA RESOLUTION NOT ONLY CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT ALSO IS AN AFFRONT TO ITS DIGNITY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY; WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE RESOLUTION TO IMPOSE THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERIA ON CHINA; AND IN THAT WAY THE WEST IS PURSUING ITS GOAL OF COMPELLING THE CHINESE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR CHOSEN PATH TO DEVELOPMENT.

5. CONSTANTINESCU SAID HE HAD RESPONDED THAT AS AN ASSOCIATE MEMBER OF THE EU, ROMANIA HAD UNDERTAKEN NEW OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD NEED TO "PLAY BY EU RULES." THAT WOULD BE A FACTOR IN THE GOR'S EVENTUAL DECISION, A DECISION THAT WOULD BE TAKEN AT A "HIGHER POLITICAL LEVEL" THAN THE MFA. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, ROMANIA WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, RELATIONS WHICH IT CONSIDERED TO HAVE THE "UTMOST IMPORTANCE."

6. TURNING AGAIN TO HIS VISITORS, CONSTANTINESCU SAID THAT THE GOR WOULD REACH A DECISION LATER THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT, AFTER FM MELESCANU'S RETURN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. HE PROMISED TO INFORM US ONCE THE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. HE KNEW FROM OFFICIAL APPROACHES MADE ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING THAT BY AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER TO ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR BOTEZ IN WASHINGTON, THAT THE EU AND US CONSIDERED THE CHINA ISSUE AN IMPORTANT ONE.

7. THE CHARGE REMAINED BEHIND IN CONSTANTINESCU'S OFFICE TO DISCUSS ANOTHER MATTER WHEN THE OTHER DIPLOMATS DEPARTED. BEFORE TURNING TO THAT SUBJECT, CONSTANTINESCU VOLUNTEERED THAT HE PERSONALLY AND THE MFA WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE EU AND US ON THE CHINA RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, CHINA WAS PUTTING STRONG PRESSURE ON ROMANIA, ESPECIALLY WITH PRIME MINISTER VACAROIU SCHEDULED TO VISIT BEIJING IN THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO. (NOTE: THE

FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF SUCH A VISIT. END NOTE)  
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE HOPED THE RIGHT  
DECISION WOULD BE MADE.

8. COMMENT. WITH ACCEPTANCE BY AND INTO THE WEST  
ITS MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE AND ESPECIALLY  
AS A NEWLY-MINTED EU ASSOCIATE MEMBER, ROMANIA WILL  
PROBABLY, IN OUR JUDGMENT, VOTE AGAINST THE NO-ACTION  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001476

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PHUM, UNHCR-1, PREL, US, CH, RO  
SUBJECT: JOINT EU/US DEMARCHE TO ROMANIAN FOREIGN  
MINISTRY ON UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CHINESE  
RESOLUTION

MOTION AND FOR THE CHINA RESOLUTION. THAT PROBA-  
BILITY WOULD BE INCREASED, WE BELIEVE, IF ROMANIA  
COULD BE SURE THAT ALL THE OTHER CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
STATES ON THE UNHRC, INCLUDING POLAND, WILL BE  
DOING THE SAME.

RICKERT  
BT  
#1476

NNNN  
**SECT:** SECTION: 01 OF 02  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02  
**SSN:** 1476  
<^SSN>1476  
**TOR:** 950215053808 M1515972  
<^TOR>950215053809 M1515973  
**DIST:** SIT: GARDNER KERRICK NSC RICE ROTH SCHWARTZ STEPHENS SUETTINGER VERSHBOW  
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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 010009Z JUN 95  
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 OSRI: RUEHC  
 DTG: 010009Z JUN 95  
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO: RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0000  
 INFO: RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0000  
 SUBJ: ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR PRESENTS NON-PAPER ON GOR  
 CONCERNS ABOUT -LIMITED SELF-DETERMINATION- FOR HUNGARIAN  
 MINORITY

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526

2015-11-24-17 (1.09)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

TEXT:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 132004

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, RO, HU  
 SUBJECT: ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR PRESENTS NON-PAPER ON GOR  
 CONCERNS ABOUT -LIMITED SELF-DETERMINATION- FOR HUNGARIAN  
 MINORITY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON MAY 25, ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR BOTEZ CALLED ON DAS FRASURE TO PRESENT A NON-PAPER OUTLINING GOR CONCERNS ABOUT ALLEGED EFFORTS BY ROMANIA'S HUNGARIAN MINORITY TO ACHIEVE -LIMITED SELF-DETERMINATION." BOTEZ SAID THE SELF-DETERMINATION ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNION OF HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA IUDMRI, AND WOULD BE PUSHED BY EXTREMISTS WITHIN THAT PARTY. END SUMMARY.
3. BOTEZ TOLD AMBASSADOR FRASURE HE WANTED THE USG TO BE AWARE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ROMANIA'S HUNGARIAN MINORITY WHICH THE GOR FOUND DISTURBING. THE GOR, HE EMPHASIZED, DID NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT OR THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY ITSELF; IT WAS THE EXTREMISTS WITHIN THAT MINORITY WHO WERE CAUSING CONCERN.
4. PARENTHETICALLY, BOTEZ EXPRESSED REGRET THAT "WE FAILED" TO SIGN A BASIC AGREEMENT WITH HUNGARY; HE SAID THIS FEELING WAS SHARED BY ALL MODERATE ELEMENTS IN ROMANIA. HE PREDICTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE WRAPPED UP IN TWO-THREE MONTHS, THEREBY IMPROVING ROMANIA'S IMAGE AND MAKING IT A MORE ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP.

5. BOTEZ ASSERTED THAT UDMR EXTREMISTS, BENT ON ENHANCING THEIR OWN ELECTORAL PROSPECTS, WOULD PUSH THE CONCEPT OF "LIMITED SELF-DETERMINATION" AT THE UPCOMING UDMR PARTY CONGRESS. THIS CONCEPT WAS A FORMULA FOR THE CREATION OF A -STATE WITHIN A STATE,- COMPLETE WITH A PARLIAMENT AND THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER. IF REALIZED, THIS SCHEME WOULD MEAN THE SEGREGATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY FROM THE REST OF ROMANIA'S POPULATION. FOR THIS REASON, BOTEZ SAID, THE GOR HAD PREPARED A NON-PAPER OUTLINING ITS CONCERNS ITEXT BELOWY; THE GOR WANTED TO PROMOTE -EUROPEAN STANDARDS- BUT AVOID -SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS.-

6. CONCLUDING THE MEETING, AMBASSADOR FRASURE THANKED BOTEZ AND ASSURED HIM THAT HE H LISTENED CLOSELY TO HIS PRESENTATION; HE WOULD READ THE NON-PAPER WITH GREAT CARE. FRASURE, TOO, EXPRESSED REGRET THAT ROMANIA AND HUNGARY HAD NOT REACHED AN AGREEMENT IN TIME FOR THE MARCH EUROPEAN STABILITY PACT MEETING IN PARIS.

7. TEXT OF NON-PAPER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF ROMANIA FUDMRI HAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED, MOSTLY WITHIN ITS COUNCIL OF THE REPRESENTATIVES - A SORT OF PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE UDMR UMBRELLA - SEVERAL VERSIONS FOR AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNITY LIVING IN ROMANIA. ONE OF THE PROJECTS THAT RALLIED MOST SUPPORT IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT060 OF -LIMITED SELF-DETERMINATION-, PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NATIONAL COMMUNITY OF HUNGARIANS LIVING IN ROMANIA- AS AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL AND JURIDIC SUBJECT, WITH A HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. ACCORDING TO THE PROJECT, THIS FRAMEWORK WOULD COMPRISE THE FOLLOWING BODIES:

- -TFIE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE HUNGARIANS LIVING IN ROMANIA-, A LEGISLATIVE-LIKE STRUCTURE VESTED WITH JURIDIC NORMATIVE POWERS OF A COMPULSORY NATURE FOR THE HUNGARIAN

ETHNICS ON ALL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE -NATIONAL COMMUNITY-;

- -THE GOVERNING COMMITTEE-, AN EXECUTIVE-LIKE CENTRAL BODY, CO-ORDINATING THE ACTIVITY OF LOCAL STRUCTURES SUCH AS THE -REGIONAL AUTONOMIES- AND THE -DISTRICT, CITY AND MUNICIPAL AUTONOMIES- THAT ARE TO EXERT -LOCAL DECISION AND EXECUTIVE POWER ON SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL ISSUES-.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS PROJECT IS AIMED AT ASSERTING ETHNICALLY BASED TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY, EXPLICITLY MENTIONING -TERRITORIAL BORDERS OF THE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT- AND HAS IN VIEW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE/SEGREGATED NETWORK OF STRUCTURES DUPLICATING THOSE EXISTING IN THE ROMANIAN STATE.

THE LAUNCHING OF SUCH SCENARIOS CAN BE CORROBORATED WITH THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UDMR LEADERSHIP -TAKING STOCK WITH SATISFACTION- OF THE 508/1995 DIRECTIVE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE THAT SANCTIONS THE CONTROVERSIAL 1201/1993 COUNCIL OF EUROPE RECOMMENDATION AND ADOPTS IT AS A BASIC CRITERION FOR MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN MEMBER STATES. THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT, USING DECEITFUL LANGUAGE, THE EXTREMIST WING OF THE UDMR LEADERSHIP COULD USE INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PROMOTING ETHNICALLY BASED TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS FUTURE TERRITORIAL REVISIONS.

SUCH THREATS LOOM NOT ONLY OVER THE STABILITY OF ROMANIA OR OTHER STATES OF THE REGION, BUT JEOPARDISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS BY PROMOTING -AD LITERAM- UNILATERAL INTERPRETATIONS, OUTSIDE THE SPIRIT OF THE SPECIFIC DOCUMENT.

THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO ACTING FIRMLY TOWARDS DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL STABILITY, FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES ACCORDING TO ALL MODERN EUROPEAN STANDARDS. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE ROMANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS THE FIRST TO SIGN - AND THE PARLIAMENT WAS SWIFT TO RATIFY - THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES.

BY PROMOTING ETHNICALLY BASED TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY, UDMR IS IN THE PROCESS OF FURTHER SELF-ISOLATING FROM THE REST

OF THE RELEVANT POLITICAL FORCES IN ROMANIA, WHICH UNANIMOUSLY DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE DE-STABILIZING OBJECTIVES OF THE UDMR POLITICS.

TAKING THESE INTO ACCOUNT AND ADDING THAT THE UDMR CONGRESS IS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF THIS MONTH, WE URGE AN ACT OF SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE AFORESAID ISSUE. SUCH AN ENDEAVOR COULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THE MODERATE MAJORITY INSIDE UDMR TOWARDS PROMOTING THE INTERESTS OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE ROMANIAN CONSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ROMANIA IS PART ISICY TO.

MAY 25, 1995

END TEXT.  
TALBOTT  
BT  
#2004

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2004

TOR: 950531161625 M1694150

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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## Cable

PREC: PRIORITY  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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 INFO: RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
 RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE  
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 14 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT  
 - ILIESCU -- LOOKING TOWARD THE SEPTEMBER  
 - WASHINGTON VISIT

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.11)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006136

E.O. 12356:

TAGS: PREL, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 14 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT  
 - ILIESCU -- LOOKING TOWARD THE SEPTEMBER  
 - WASHINGTON VISIT

1. SUMMARY: DURING A LENGTHY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU ON JUNE 14, THE AMBASSADOR COVERED SOME PROGRAMMING IDEAS FOR ILIESCU'S SEPTEMBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON; SUGGESTED SOME THEMES WHICH THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WANT TO EMPHASIZE; STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AND ASSURANCES THAT COMPETITION WOULD BE MAINTAINED; UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOR AND THE IMF AND IBRD; PUSHED FOR EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL TREATY; AND EXPLAINED WHY IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF ROMANIA HAD TAKEN FIRM STEPS TOWARD RESOLVING THE JEWISH AND OTHER MINORITY COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUE BEFORE SEPTEMBER.

2. ILIESCU WELCOMED THE AMBASSADOR'S ADVICE ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND AGREED THAT TWO SEPARATE TRIPS, THE SECOND WITH A COMMERCIAL EMPHASIS, MADE GOOD SENSE. ON THE OTHER MATTERS THE AMBASSADOR RAISED, THE PRESIDENT LISTENED WITH INTEREST, SOMETIMES RESPONDING WITH HIS FAMILIAR VIEWS ON SUCH TOPICS AS ROMANIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND AT OTHER TIMES NOT COMMENTING. ON THE QUESTION OF RESTORING NATIONALIZED JEWISH AND OTHER COMMUNITY PROPERTY, HE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

APPEARED UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, WE REGARD THE MEETING TO HAVE BEEN A USEFUL FIRST STEP IN PREPARING ILIESCU FOR HIS SEPTEMBER 26 WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THE FIRST BY A ROMANIAN PRESIDENT SINCE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. ILIESCU SHOULD NOW HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT QUESTIONS WILL AWAIT HIM THERE, AND WHAT STEPS HE CAN TAKE BEFORE THEN TO MOVE THE FOCUS FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR MOSES MET AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU AT COTROCENI PALACE ON JUNE 14. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR TRAIAN CHEBELEU AND DCM RICKERT ALSO WERE PRESENT. THE CONVERSATION FOCUSED INITIALLY ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 26 VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

PRESIDENT ILIESCU'S UPCOMING VISIT(S) TO THE U.S.

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4. ILIESCU SAID HE WAS GETTING CONFLICTING ADVICE FROM THE MFA AND AMBASSADOR BOTEZ ABOUT HOW THE VISIT SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. THE FORMER WAS URGING HIM TO ADD SOME BUSINESS-ORIENTED STOPS IN TEXAS, CALIFORNIA, AND ELSEWHERE TO THE TIME HE WOULD BE SPENDING IN WASHINGTON. BOTEZ, HOWEVER, WAS ARGUING THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO CONCENTRATE ON MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON ONLY AND SAVE THE OTHER PLACES FOR ANOTHER TRIP. HE ASKED FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW.

5. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE THOUGHT EITHER WAY WOULD BE FINE BUT SUGGESTED THAT ILIESCU SPEND ABOUT THREE DAYS IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER WITH A SMALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TEAM, MEETING THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, POSSIBLY OTHER TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, THE IMF AND IBRD, AND THE MEDIA. THEN HE MIGHT WANT TO GO BRIEFLY TO LOS ANGELES, WHERE ROMANIA NOW HAS A CONSULATE GENERAL AND WHERE THERE IS A LARGE ROMANIAN EMIGRE COMMUNITY. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT ILIESCU MIGHT WANT TO FOLLOW UP LATER WITH A SEPARATE, MORE BUSINESS-ORIENTED TRIP, PERHAPS IN OCTOBER IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNGA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A VISIT TO TEXAS, WHERE PRESIDENT BUSH HAS OFFERED TO HOST AN ENERGY-RELATED EVENT FOR HIM, AS WELL AS TO OTHER SITES OF POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL INTEREST. SUCH A VISIT COULD INCLUDE A LARGER DELEGATION OF BUSINESSMEN AND, IF DESIRED, STOPS IN AREAS WHERE THERE ARE CONCENTRATIONS OF ROMANIAN EMIGRES. ILIESCU INDICATED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTIONS.

POSSIBLE THEMES FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT  
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6. THE AMBASSADOR SAID WE WANTED TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO HELP MAKE PRESIDENT ILIESCU'S WASHINGTON VISIT A SUCCESS. IT WOULD BE BEST TO PRESENT TWO OR THREE MAIN THEMES FOR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006136

E.O. 12356:

TAGS: PREL, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 14 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

- ILIESCU -- LOOKING TOWARD THE SEPTEMBER

- WASHINGTON VISIT

RATHER THAN OVERLOADING THE AGENDA. TWO TOPICS OF INTEREST WOULD BE ROMANIA'S EFFORTS TO JOIN NATO AND DRAW CLOSER TO THE WEST AND THE ROMANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RUSSIA. IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, ILIESCU WOULD ALSO DO WELL TO EMPHASIZE ECONOMIC THEMES. DESPITE THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED SINCE 1989, ROMANIA STILL LAGGED BEHIND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. IT ALSO SUFFERED FROM A CONTINUING IMAGE PROBLEM. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS ROMANIA'S INSUFFICIENTLY HERALDED ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES WHICH IT REPRESENTED.

7. ILLIESCU DID NOT DISAGREE BUT LAUNCHED INTO HIS FAMILIAR PRESENTATION ON THE CAUSES FOR ROMANIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, INCLUDING LOSSES FROM THE U.N. EMBARGOES OF IRAQ, LIBYA, AND SERBIA, AS WELL AS THE FAILURE OF THE IFI'S AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE NEEDED ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT FOREIGN INVESTORS WOULD COME TO ROMANIA IF THE CLIMATE WERE ATTRACTIVE. WHILE THE MASS PRIVATIZATION PLAN LAW (WHICH ILIESCU SAID HE WOULD PROMULGATED TOMORROW) WOULD NOT ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTORS IN ITSELF, IF PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD HELP CREATE THE NECESSARY CLIMATE. IN ADDITION, A VIGOROUS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SELL THE 400 OR SO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES WHICH WOULD BE MOST ATTRACTIVE TO PRIVATE INVESTORS, DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE A WELCOME, HIGH-VISIBILITY STEP IF THE GOR WERE TO SELL OFF THE HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL, IN WHICH THE MARRIOTT CORPORATION WAS INTERESTED, AS WELL AS OTHER HOTELS IN BUCHAREST. ILIESCU RESPONDED THAT EVERYONE WS INTERESTED IN THE

INTERCONTINENTAL, WHICH WOULD INDEED BE SOLD, BUT THERE WERE MANY OTHER HOTELS IN THE CAPITAL AND AROUND THE COUNTRY WHICH NEEDED TO BE PRIVATIZED. BUCHAREST ALSO REQUIRED NEW HOTELS, AND RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN COMPANIES WANTING TO BUILD THEM WOULD BE WELCOME.]

JOINT VENTURES NEEDED IN ENERGY SECTOR  
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8. THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR BE CLARIFIED BEFORE ILIESCU WENT TO TEXAS. THERE WAS A PLAN TO HAVE AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL HOLDING COMPANY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY. HOWEVER, THE IBRD WAS URGING THAT EACH ASPECT OF THE INDUSTRY BE SEPARATELY ACCOUNTABLE (EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION, REFINING, AND SALES) AND THAT THERE BE ROOM FOR COMPETITION THROUGHOUT, AS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN MALAYSIA, FOR EXAMPLE. THE AMBASSADOR HAD JUST LEARNED THAT AMOCO PLANNED TO OPEN 60 GAS STATIONS IN ROMANIA (THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE NEXT WEEK). OTHER FOREIGN FIRMS HAD ENTERED (SHELL) OR WERE INTERESTED IN ENTERING THE RETAIL BUSINESS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE STATE HOLDING COMPANY NOT INHIBIT COMPETITION IN ANY PHASE OF THE INDUSTRY AND THAT JOINT VENTURES BE SET UP WITH FOREIGN FIRMS WHERE CAPITAL AND/OR TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE WERE NEEDED.

AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF AND IBRD NEEDED  
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9. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ROMANIA COME TO AGREEMENT SOON WITH THE IMF AND IBRD. NOTHING WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ROMANIA NOW, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNTS OF MONEY INVOLVED BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE FACT OF SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD GIVE ROMANIA ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS AND MAKE IT MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE TO FOREIGN INVESTORS. FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY WITH THE IBRD ON THE FESAL, WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW. THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT THE GOR MAKE EXTRA EFFORTS TO COME TO CLOSURE WITH THE IBRD. IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IF THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED AND ANNOUNCED BEFORE ILIESCU'S SEPTEMBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006136

E.O. 12356:

TAGS: PREL, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 14 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

- ILIESCU -- LOOKING TOWARD THE SEPTEMBER

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- WASHINGTON VISIT

10. ILIESCU ASKED WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. ROMANIA'S BUDGET DEFICIT WAS ONLY TWO-AND-A-HALF PERCENT, WHILE HUNGARY'S WAS AROUND NINE PERCENT. HE THEN WENT INTO HIS FAMILIAR LITANY OF DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL MOVES BY THE IFI'S AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST ROMANIA, ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED TO OTHER CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT CERTAIN CRITICAL LETTERS FORMER PRIME MINISTER PETRE ROMAN HAD SENT TO CAMDESSEUS AND THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER STOLOJAN, NOW WITH THE IBRD, WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO HELP ROMANIA. THE AMBASSADOR COUNSELLED ILIESCU TO LOOK FORWARD, RATHER THAN BACKWARD, AND SAID THAT FINANCE MINISTER GEORGESCU SHOULD RESPOND PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY TO THE IBRDS TWO LETTERS ON PRIVATIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING. GEORGESCU, HE UNDERSTOOD, WAS DUE TO GO TO WASHINGTON JULY 5 FOR MEETINGS WITH THE IBRD BUT SHOULD NOT MAKE THE TRIP UNLESS SATISFACTORY PLANS HAD BEEN DRAFTED AND APPROVED BY THE GOR. ILIESCU DID NOT RESPOND BUT TOOK NOTES DURING THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION.

ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN TREATY  
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11. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT, JUDGING FROM HIS RECENT TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU, IT APPEARED THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE QUITE CLOSE ON THE BILATERAL TREATY. IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR ROMANIA FOR THE TREATY TO BE CONCLUDED SOON, SOMETHING WE ALSO WANTED TO SEE HAPPEN. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT ROMANIA WOULD NOT ACCEPT COUNCIL OF EUROPE RECOMMENDATION 1201 SIMPLY BECAUSE OF OUTSIDE PRE SURES. WITHOUT EXPLAINING, HE CLAIMED THAT PROBLEMS RELATING TO SLOVAKIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE DANUBE RIVER WERE THE CAUSE OF SOVAKIA'S CAPITULAZATION. HOWEVER, ROMANIA WAS NOT SLOVAKIA AND WOULD NEVER SIGN A TREATY, WHICH IN EFFECT, GRANTED THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY THE RIGHT TO TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY ON AN ETHNIC BASIS OR ETHNIC GROUP RIGHTS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT, FROM OUR TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER HORN IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS STRONGLY INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENT. THE TWO SIDES NEEDED TO FIND IMAGINATIVE, CREATIVE WAYS TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES -- IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY POSITIVE IF THE TREATY WERE SIGNED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S WASHINGTON VISIT. ILIESCU AGREED THAT HORN WAS SOMEONE THE ROMANIANS COULD WORK WITH AND HOPED THAT

THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT SOON.

RESTITUTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY  
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12. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD ILIESCU THAT THE QUESTION OF THE RESTORATION OF NATIONALIZED COMMUNITY PROPERTY OF JEWS AND OTHER MINORITIES IN ROMANIA WAS BOUND TO BE RAISED IN WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY ON THE HILL. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD SHOW CONCRETE PROGRESS AND THAT LEGISLATION IS MOVING FORWARD ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE WOULD BE HELPFUL. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO HAVE A POSITION ON THIS QUESTION AND ANY LEGISLATION SHOULD COVER ALL AFFECTED COMMUNITIES. ILIESCU AT FIRST DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUE, THEN POINTED OUT THAT IN SOME CASES, SUCH AS A FORMER CHURCH BUILDING WHICH HAD BECOME PART OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ARAD AND WHICH BISHOP LASZLO TOKES WAS TRYING TO GET BACK, THE RETURN OF SUCH PROPERTY WAS A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. HE MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE ISSUE AS A WHOLE, HOWEVER.

INDEPENDENCE DAY RECEPTION  
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13. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS AT THE EMBASSY'S ANNUAL JULY 4TH RECEPTION. ILIESCU ACCEPTED WITH PLEASURE.

MOSES

BT

#6136

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 6136  
<^SSN>6136  
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TOR: 950616081012 M1720298  
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<^TOR>950616081234 M1720304

DIST: SIT: NSC  
□

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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 LINE3: O P 282112Z JUN 95  
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 OSRI: RUEHC  
 DTG: 282112Z JUN 95  
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO: RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0419  
 INFO: RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 9281  
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3681  
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1135  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8775  
 SUBJ: /\*\*NO SUBJECT FOUND\*\*/  
 TEXT:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 156114

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.12)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, RO, HU, UP, RS  
 SUBJECT. A/S HOLBROOKE'S JUNE 20 MEETING WITH ROMANIAN  
 DEFENSE MINISTER TINCA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. DURING A JUNE 20 CALL BY ROMANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GHEORGHE TINCA ON A/S HOLBROOKE, HOLBROOKE ASSURED TINCA THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSED EFFORTS IN CONGRESS TO CREATE ARTIFICIAL DIVISIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN ROMANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE MATTER OF NATO EXPANSION. AMBASSADOR MOSES AND ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON MIHAI BOTEZ ALSO TOOK PART IN THE MEETING. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE ASSURED TINCA THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSED EFFORTS IN CONGRESS TO CREATE ARTIFICIAL DIVISIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN ROMANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE MATTER OF NATO EXPANSION. HOLBROOKE NOTED THAT HE HAD JUST MET THAT MORNING WITH JAN NOVAK, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLISH AMERICAN CONGRESS, AND HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM NOVAK EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT ADMINISTRATION LOBBYING IN CONGRESS AGAINST LEGISLATION THAT WOULD MAKE POLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETTER-QUALIFIED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. NOVAK FELT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WEAKENING POLAND'S CASE BY LEAVING NATO'S DOOR OPEN TO ROMANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HOLBROOKE SAID HE HAD TOLD NOVAK THIS WAS NOT TRUE; EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD THAT POLAND STOOD AT THE HEAD OF THE NATO EXPANSION QUEUE.
4. HOLBROOKE PRAISED ROMANIA AS THE BEST PARTICIPANT IN

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), AND HE SAID THE USG APPRECIATED ROMANIA'S GREAT ZEAL FOR PFP.

5. HOLBROOKE SAID THE USG WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY ON A BASIC TREATY. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HUNGARIAN PM HORN HAD MADE A STRONG STATEMENT OF HUNGARY'S INTENT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS POSITIVE SIGN, HOLBROOKE SAID, THE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ITS EFFORTS TO HAVE PRESIDENT ILIESCU INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE FALL.

6. TINCA RESPONDED THAT ROMANIA REGARDED PFP AS AN EXTENSION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE; THE ADMINISTRATION WAS RIGHT NOT TO ANNOUNCE THE NAMES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE BETTER PROSPECTS FOR EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP. THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY A "SELFISH" ROMANIAN POINT OF VIEW, HE EMPHASIZED. IF THE "VISEGRAD" STATES ALONE WERE ADMITTED TO NATO, HE PREDICTED, EVENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL.

7. TURNING TO ROMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, HOLBROOKE NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR MOSES HAD REPORTED PROGRESS IN THE ROMANIA-HUNGARY TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. HOLBROOKE EXPRESSED SURPRISE, HOWEVER, AT THE RESIDUE OF HOSTILITY TOWARD ROMANIA THAT HE HAD ENCOUNTERED IN KIEV IN APRIL. THIS WAS IN STARTLING CONTRAST TO HUNGARIAN PM HORN'S REPEAT REFERENCES TO HIS "ROMANIAN FRIENDS."

8. TINCA REPLIED THAT ROMANIA DESIRED GOOD NDIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE. AMBASSADOR MOSES POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN THE BILATERAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS SINCE APRIL, THE ROMANIANS HAVING MADE CONCESSIONS ON MANY POINTS.

9. TINCA NOTED THAT DURING HIS RECENT MEETING WITH RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV, HE HAD FOUND GRACHEV PREOCCUPIED WITH NATO EXPANSION, BUT NOT WITH EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. HOLBROOKE OBSERVED THAT GRACHEV HAD TOLD HUNGARIAN FONMIN KOVACS THAT HUNGARY'S ADMISSION TO NATO

WAS NOT A PROBLEM, BUT POLAND'S WAS. TINCA REJOINED THAT GRACHEV HAD TOLD HIM THE BALTIC STATES' ENTERING NATO WOULD BE A PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA. THE BOTTOM LINE, TINCA SAID, WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS KNEW NATO EXPANSION WAS "IMMINENT," BUT THEY COULDN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HOLBROOKE AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS KNEW NATO EXPANSION WAS COMING, BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE ALLIANCE WOULD EXPAND.

11. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH THE PARTIES AGREEING TO MEET FOR BREAKFAST THE FOLLOWING DAY AT AMBASSADOR BOTEZ'S RESIDENCE (SEPTEL).

12. AMBASSADOR MOSES HAS SEEN THIS MESSAGE. CHRISTOPHER  
BT  
#6114

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6114

TOR: 950628171900 M1739893

DIST:

SIT: FRIED NSC SCHMIDT SESTAK

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
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 TO: RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0443  
 INFO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
 SUBJ: A/S HOLBROOKE'S JUNE 21 BREAKFAST MEETING WITH  
 ROMANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER TINCA

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-m (1.13)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

TEXT:  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 158001

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, PARM, RO, HU, BK, SR  
 SUBJECT: A/S HOLBROOKE'S JUNE 21 BREAKFAST MEETING WITH  
 ROMANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER TINCA

REF: STATE 156114

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN A CONTINUATION OF HIS JUNE 20 MEETING WITH ROMANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GHEORGHE TINCA (REFTEL), A/S HOLBROOKE MET WITH TINCA FOR BREAKFAST ON JUNE 21 AT THE RESIDENCE OF ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON MIHAI BOTEZ. AMBASSADOR MOSES ALSO TOOK PART. ON BOSNIA, TINCA SAID HE STRONGLY FAVORED A CONTINUING UN ROLE. ON NATO EXPANSION, HOLBROOKE URGED ROMANIA TO "HANG IN," SINCE NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON WHICH COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE ADMITTED, OR WHEN THEY WOULD BE ADMITTED. ON ARMS SALES TO COUNTRIES OF CONCERN, TINCA SAID THE GOR WAS STILL GATHERING DATA, BUT CLAIMED THAT SO FAR NO INFORMATION HAD COME TO LIGHT TO CONFIRM SUCH SALES. END SUMMARY.

2. ON BOSNIA, TINCA SAID HE STRONGLY FAVORED A CONTINUING UN ROLE. AS HE SAW IT, MILOSEVIC WAS BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE THE SERBS WERE LIKELY TO PRODUCE, AND MIGHT HAVE SOME

RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS. (NOTE: PRESIDENT ILIESCU EXPRESSED THE SAME VIEW TO FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH IN BUCHAREST ON APRIL 29.) THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE STILL LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, TINCA SAID.

3. ON NATO EXPANSION, AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE URGED ROMANIA TO "HANG IN," SINCE NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON WHICH COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE

ALLIANCE, OR WHEN. HOLBROOKE PROMISED THAT A DELEGATION WOULD BE VISITING BUCHAREST LATER THIS YEAR TO DISCUSS THE CRITERIA FOR NATO ADMISSION.

4. TINCA DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH HOLBROOKE'S ADVICE BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IF HUNGARY WERE ADMITTED TO NATO AND ROMANIA WERE NOT, THE MAGYAR PARTY IN ROMANIA (UDMR) WOULD PUT ENORMOUS PRESSURE ON ROMANIA FOR AUTONOMY IN ORDER, SOMEHOW, TO BRING THEMSELVES UNDER THE NATO UMBRELLA. TINCA SAID THIS WOULD BE A POLARIZING ISSUE, PRODUCING AN ULTRANATIONALIST REACTION ON THE ROMANIAN SIDE IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SECURITY ELSEWHERE, WHICH TINCA SAID MEANT RUSSIA. IN RESPONSE TO HOLBROOKE'S COMMENT THAT ROMANIA HAD AN HISTORICAL ANTIPATHY TO RUSSIA, TINCA REPLIED, "YES, BUT WE NEED TO SURVIVE."

5. ON TWO SENSITIVE ISSUES RAISED IN RECENT USG DEMARCHES TO THE GOR--ARMS SALES TO IRAN, IRAQ, AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF CONCERN, AND ROMANIAN MISSILE STOCKPILES--TINCA ANSWERED, "WE ARE STILL GETTING DATA ON ARMS SALES, BUT TO DATE HAVE SEEN NO INFORMATION CONFIRMING SALES. ANY ARMS SALES WOULD HAVE BEEN SMALL, BUT WE REALIZE THIS IS AN ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY FOR US." AS FOR MISSILES, TINCA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ROMANIA HAD STOCKPILES OF MISSILES WITH RANGES UNDER 300 KILOMETERS IN TRANSYLVANIA AND ELSEWHERE (NOTE: PRESUMABLY ON THE BLACK SEA). TINCA SAID ROMANIA WANTED TO CLEAR UP THIS ISSUE, JUST AS IT HAD DONE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. AMBASSADOR MOSES DRAFTED THIS MESSAGE. CHRISTOPHER  
BT  
#8001

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01  
SSN: 8001  
TOR: 950630112010 M1743662  
DIST:  
SIT: NSC  
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 INFO: ////  
 SUBJ: OFFICIAL-INBORMAL

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-M (1.14)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

WE ARE FORWARDING TODAY A SEPARATE MESSAGE REPORTING  
 ON MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU; AMBASSADOR  
 BOTEZ AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUCHAREST 006870

NSC FOR DANIEL FRIED

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - PAUL DALEY

FROM AMBASSADOR MOSES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INBORMAL

WE ARE FORWARDING TODAY A SEPARATE MESSAGE REPORTING  
 ON MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU; AMBASSADOR  
 BOTEZ AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU  
 ATTENDED. AS FOLLOW-UP I MET AFTERWARD WITH BOTEZ  
 AND AM MEETING TOMORROW WITH MELESCANU. GIVEN THIS,  
 I AM NOT CONVINCED WE NEED TO CALL BOTEZ. MOREOVER,  
 I HAVE MAJOR RESERVATIONS ABOUT RAISING THE PETROLEUM  
 BILL AND THE EDUCATION LAW AS ISSUES IN THE BILATERAL  
 RELATIONSHIP, GIVEN OTHER MORE CRITICAL ISSUES,  
 WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COORDINATION ON OUR  
 SIDE. LET'S SEE WHAT COMES FROM MY PRESENT ROUND OF  
 TALKS FIRST. I'LL BE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON LATER  
 THIS WEEK SO WE CAN DISCUSS HOW BEST TO FOLLOW-UP ON  
 FRIDAY OR EARLY NEXT WEEK.

MOSES

BT

#6870

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6870

TOR: 950710073815 M1755381

DIST:

SIT: FRIED NSC

☐

## Cable

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 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8307  
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 INFO: ////  
 SUBJ: ILIESCU VISIT

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-1184-m (1.15)  
 KBH 9/9/2019

TEXT:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006884

EXDIS

DEPT FOR A/S HOLBROOKE

DEPT FOR EEA RALPH JOHNSON

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE JONATHAN RICKERT/PAUL DALY, FRANK COLLINS

FROM AMBASSADOR MOSES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP

SUBJECT: ILIESCU VISIT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT ILIESCU UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. LIKE US, HE SEES THE POTENTIAL FOR MAKING A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCEMENT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, BRINGING ROMANIA TO THE LEVEL OF THE MORE ADVANCED COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. BOTH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ AND CON. GEN. SION WERE IN BUCHAREST LAST WEEK TO WORK ON THE SCHEDULE. IN SEPARATE MEETINGS JULY 6 WITH BOTEZ AND ILIESCU, I EMPHASIZED TO THEM THAT THE VISIT SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR FOCUS AND ILIESCU SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH A SPECIFIC MESSAGE. AS IN PAST MEETINGS I WENT THROUGH THE ISSUES WHERE PROGRESS IS NEEDED. IF THE ROMANIANS CAN DELIVER, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND A STRONG MESSAGE CONFIRMING THE VALUE OF CONTINUED PROGRESS, AND THE CLEAREST MESSAGE WOULD BE MFN GRADUATION. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT ILIESCU AND I MET FOR OVER AN HOUR JULY 6, TO RUN THROUGH HIS THOUGHTS ON THE SEPTEMBER VISIT. AMBASSADOR BOTEZ CAME BY THE EMBASSY EARLIER AT MY SUGGESTION TO REVIEW THE SCHEDULE AND ISSUES. IN ADDITION TO BOTEZ, FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU ATTENDED THE MEETING WITH ILIESCU.

4. THE ROMANIANS ARE EXCITED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OFFERED BY A WHITE HOUSE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. ILIESCU WANTS OUR ADVICE ABOUT THE DETAILS FOR HIS FOUR DAY STAY IN WASHINGTON. PARA 8 BELOW CONTAINS A PRELIMINARY AND ROUGH ANNOTATED SCHEDULE REPRESENTING ILIESCU'S CURRENT THINKING.

5. I HELD BACK FROM BEING INVOLVED IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS ON A FOLLOW-UP VISIT TO CALIFORNIA, FAVORED BY SION BUT QUESTIONED BY BOTEZ. IT WAS IMPORTANT, TO PULL ILIESCU AWAY FROM THE SCHEDULING OF DETAILS AND START HIM FOCUSING ON SUBSTANCE. I REITERATED OUR SHARED INTEREST IN MAKING THIS VISIT A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONS. I SUGGESTED HE BE VERY SPECIFIC IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO POINT TO TANGIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. AFTERWARD, I REITERATED THE ISSUES WHERE PROGRESS IS NEEDED.

-- A SIGNED ROMANIAN/HUNGARIAN BASIC TREATY IS NUMBER ONE. THE RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET AGAIN IN BUCHAREST ON JULY 19.

-- AT LEAST AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPAL WITH THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF ON THE FESAL AND THE NEXT STAND-BY AGREEMENT.

-- A BILL APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT BEFORE SEPTEMBER 26 DEALING WITH THE RESTITUTION OF COMMUNAL PROPERTY TO BE SUBMITTED EARLY IN THE NEXT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT.

-- PROGRESS ON APPROVING AT LEAST SOME HIGH VISIBILITY AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROJECTS. ILIESCU INDICATED HE WAS "INFORMED" ABOUT (AS COMPARED TO HAVING CONCURRED WITH) THE RECENT INTERCONTINENTAL DECISION. HE WANTED TO IMPRESS UPON ME THAT THE ROAD WAS STILL OPEN FOR MARRIOTT TO HAVE A MANAGEMENT ROLE IN THE HOTEL, OR A GREEN FIELD OPPORTUNITY IN DOWNTON BUCHAREST. ALSO MENTIONED WERE POSSIBLE OTHER DEALS WITH HOLIDAY INN, PROCTER AND GAMBLE, AND PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA. HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF SOME DEFINITE SIGN OF ROMANIAN COMMITMENT TO ATTRACTING U.S. INVESTMENT. I OFFERED THE EMBASSY'S HELP TO FOLLOW-UP, AND WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THESE FIRMS. BUT, I STRESSED THAT AT THIS STAGE POSITIVE ANSWERS WILL HAVE TO COME FROM THE ROMANIAN SIDE. (MINISTER COSEA TOLD ME TWO DAYS LATER THAT ILIESCU HAD CALLED HIM ASKING WHETHER THE POLNESCU'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THEY HAD PURCHASED THE INTERCONTINENTAL WAS TRUE. COSEA

CLAIMED THAT BOTH HE AND ILIESCU WERE CAUGHT UNAWARES. I ALSO LEARNED ON SATURDAY FROM GENERAL SECRETARY HREBENCIUC (MR. FIX-IT) THAT THE POLNESCU'S HAD EXTENDED INTERCONTINENTAL'S MANAGEMENT CONTRACT, SO MARRIOTT IS OUT, BUT TODAY WE LEARNED THAT THE ROMANIANS ARE PUSHING AN AUSTRIAN GROUP THAT IS PLANNING TO BUILD A NEW FIVE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006884

EXDIS

DEPT FOR A/S HOLBROOKE

DEPT FOR EEA RALPH JOHNSON

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE JONATHAN RICKERT/PAUL DALY, FRANK COLLINS

FROM AMBASSADOR MOSES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP

SUBJECT: ILIESCU VISIT

STAR HOTEL NEXT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY TO PUT MARRIOTT'S NAME ON THE HOTEL GIVING IT MANAGEMENT.)

-- CLEAR PROGRESS ON PRIVATIZATION. I MENTIONED TO ILIESCU THAT WE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE EU, ARE CONSIDERING A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING PRIVATIZATION. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS PROGRAM IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM MINISTER COSEA. I TOLD ILIESCU THAT BEFORE WE COMMIT THIS LEVEL OF RESOURCES WE NEED ASSURANCES THAT THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH US TO ENSURE THE SUCCESSES OF THE PROGRAM WITHIN THE DEADLINES APPROVED BY THE WORLD BANK.

6. I ANTICIPATE THAT THE ROMANIANS WILL BE FORTHCOMING ON SOME OF THESE ITEMS. THE TREATY, AND RESTITUTION ISSUES ARE DIFFICULT, DOMESTIC ISSUES AND IN THE CASE OF THE TREATY, THE HUNGARIAN SIDE NEEDS TO BE FORTHCOMING. INTERESTINGLY, BOTEZ IN HIS SEPARATE MEETING SUGGESTED THAT ILIESCU MAY EMBARK ON A MAJOR GOVERNMENT RE-SHUFFLE REPLACING PRIME MINISTER VACAROIU WITH THE HEAD OF THE GOR INTER-AGENCY GROUP FOR EU INTEGRATION POSTOLACHE. (HOWEVER, ILIESCU TOLD ME SIX WEEKS AGO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE NEXT ELECTIONS AND ON JULY 8 COSEA SAID POSTOLACHE SUFFERED A STROKE SOME YEARS AGO AND HAS SINCE REFUSED ALL SUGGESTIONS OF HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICE. END NOTE.)

7. WE NEED TO ASK OURSELVES WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO IF WE JUDGE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO SIGNAL A NEW DIRECTION. THE VISIT ITSELF IS IMPORTANT, BUT WE ARE PUSHING THE ROMANIANS FOR

SUBSTANCE SO WE SHOULD OFFER SOME AS WELL. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PRIVATIZATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS ONE POSSIBILITY, BUT THAT WILL BE MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD DECISION OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND CANNOT BE TIED TO OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS THE TREATY. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT WOULD BE MOVING ON MFN GRADUATION AN ISSUE ILIESCU AND MELESCANU RAISED AGAIN IN OUR MEEETING. IF GRADUATION IS TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ACTING ON IT IN SEPTEMBER CERTAINLY IF THE TREATY HAS BEEN SIGNED. THIS WOULD YIELD THE MOST POLITICAL PAY-OFF AND FOCUS ROMANIAN ATTENTION IN TERMS OF U.S. INVESTMENT INTEREST. THE ROMANIANS ALSO KNOW MFN GRADUATION IS THE BRASS RING.

8. PRELIMINARY U.S. SCHEDULE  
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SEPT. 25 - ARRIVAL IN D.C.

SEPT. 26 - MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE (ILIESCU IS AWARE MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR 30 MINUTES BUT COULD GO TO 45 MINUTES. HE HAS SUGGESTED A BRIEF INITIAL ONE-ON-ONE WITH AMBASSADORS FOLLOWED BY A LARGER MEETING.

SEPT. 27 - LUNCHEON - VICE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF STATE. ILLIESCU FAVORS A SMALL LUNCHEON - 16-18 PERSONS TOTAL.

SEPT. 28 - LUNCH WITH SENIOR US BUSINESS EXECUTIVES (FORTUNE 500 OR NEARLY EQUAL) INTERESTED IN ROMANIA.

SEPT. 29 - NATIONAL PRESS CLUB SPEECH (TENTATIVE)

EVENTS TO BE SCHEDULED:

- CALL ON SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER (IF NOT AT SEPT. 27 LUNCHEON)
- VISIT TO PENTAGON
- VISIT TO TREASURY AND OR COMMERCE (IF SECRETARY BROWN IS NOT AT BUSINESS LUNCH)
- CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
- IMF, WORLD BANK
- OPEC/TDA/EXIM BANK

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 006884

EXDIS

DEPT FOR A/S HOLBROOKE

DEPT FOR EEA RALPH JOHNSON

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE JONATHAN RICKERT/PAUL DALY, FRANK COLLINS

FROM AMBASSADOR MOSES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP  
SUBJECT: ILIESCU VISIT

- LATE AFTERNOON RECEPTION ON CAPITAL HILL
- MEETING WITH EDITORIAL STAFF, WASHINGTON POST, WASHINGTON TIMES
- LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
- RECEPTION FOR ROMANIAN/AMERICAN COMMUNITY

OCT. 04 - RETURN TO ROMANIA

MOSES  
BT  
#6884

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03  
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03  
SSN: 6884  
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TOR: 950710104242 M1755736  
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DIST: PRT: DOHSE HARMON SENS SIT  
SIT: FRIED HARMON JENSEN NSC SCHMIDT SUM SUM2  
□

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 September 94 15:42  
 FROM Fried, Daniel  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Subject: UNGA Bilat: Romanian Participants ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
 TO Wright, Allison M.  
 CARBON\_COPY Schifter, Richard  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,  
 September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 10/02/15

2015-1184-M

The Romanian Embassy tells us Iliescu will be accompanied by:

- Teodor Melescanu, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- Traian Chebeleu, Ambassador and President Foreign Policy Advisor;
- Mihai Botez, Appointed Ambassador of Romania to the U.S.;
- Ion Gorita, Ambassador of Romania to the U.N.;
- Mihai Sion, Ministor-Counselor of the Embassy of Romania.

I will check with Protocol to ensure that there is no problem with Appointed Ambassador Botez accompanying his President to this meeting.

Let me know whether I can confirm to the Romanians that we accept their list of attendees; I have sent them our list (minus Al Moses, as we discussed).

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 02 February 95 08:31

FROM Fried, Daniel

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT Subject: RE: Al Moses' Agenda - [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Schifter, Richard

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E. O. 13526
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2015-1184-M [1.18]

KBH 9/9/2019

Thanks. I'll keep this Schifter Commentary (as I keep all Schifter Commentaries)

From: Schifter, Richard  
 To: Fried, Daniel  
 CC: /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: RE: Al Moses' Agenda - [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Date: Thursday, February 02, 1995 08:26 AM

I agree with you. Here are my thoughts on the points Al raised: (1) He is absolutely right on B,C, and D. I have in the past pushed D with the Hungarians, as a way of resolving their problems. From what I read the moderate UDMR leaders are now advancing that agenda. What I would suggest is that using some of our AID money we should encourage the appropriate Romanian agency to hire a U.S. consultant on the devolution of authority from the center to the localities and go about this issue in as thoughtful a manner as possible. (2) You may want to look closely into E. Is there some out fit that has the money but does not get a license? Or does Al suggest that the Romanian taxpayers fund an independent station? You may check how things are working out in the other CEE's in that regard. (3) Iliescu has on a number of occasions expressed himself on the issue of Antonescu (who, I believe had jailed Iliescu's father). Al says a pro-Antonescu film was produced under official auspices. That certainly should be discouraged. But under our standards of freedom of speech, we can't really ask the GOR to suppress actions by local communities which tend to memorialize Antonescu. (We have historically taken exception to provisions in international human rights documents which in any way infringe on freedom of expression.) (4) Of course the GOR should get rid of the right-wing nationalists. Unfortunately we did for years encourage the opposition groups in their anti-PDSR stance, which has made it difficult to persuade them to switch. Nevertheless the latter is what Al must now do. In other words, he must help them find a majority in parliament without the right wing.

From: Fried, Daniel  
To: Schifter, Richard  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Al Moses' Agenda - [CONFIDENTIAL]  
Date: Thursday, February 02, 1995 07:10 AM

Your friend is impressive both on substance and in the way he advances his agenda (and reports it). I will pursue these issues.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
DIST: FRIED, NSC, SCHIFTER

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PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:011555Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO:  
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3047

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000788

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ --  
SIX MARKERS FOR BETTER RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. THE AMBASSADOR USED A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ TO LAY DOWN SIX MARKERS ON STEPS WHICH THE GOR NEEDS TO TAKE TO GIVE A BOOST TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND INCREASE THE POSITIVE ATTENTION ROMANIA RECEIVES FROM THE USG. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT EXCHANGES OF HIGHER-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IF PROGRESS WERE MADE IN THE SIX AREAS. AMBASSADOR BOTEZ SAID HE AGREED WITH THE SIX POINTS AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT ILIESCU WOULD ACCEPT ALL OF THEM INTELLECTUALLY. THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOR, HOWEVER, WERE CONFRONTED WITH A SEVERE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN THAT,

DUE TO OPPOSITION INTRANSIGENCE, THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO DEPEND ON THE EXTREMIST PARTIES TO REMAIN IN POWER. AS LONG AS THAT SITUATION PERSISTED, THE RULING PARTY'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER WOULD BE LIMITED. END SUMMARY.

2. ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, MIHAI BOTEZ, MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY ON JANUARY 31. NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING PRESIDENT ILIESCU LATER THAT DAY, BOTEZ COMMENTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S SENSITIVITY TO PERCEIVED SLIGHTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ACTUAL ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA. FOR EXAMPLE, ILIESCU NKW WAS FOCUSING ON THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT SNEGUR OF MOLDOVA WAS PAYING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND BEING RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, LEAVING HIM, ILIESCU VIRTUALLY THE ONLY HEAD OF STATE FROM THE REGION NOT TO BE HONORED IN THAT WAY. ILIESCU'S CHAGRIN WAS INTENSIFIED BY INCIDENTS SUCH AS LOCAL MEDIA REPORTS THAT LEADING OPPOSITION POLITICAN CORNELIU COPOSU HAD BEEN INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL PRAYER BREAKFAST. ALTHOUGH BOTEZ KNEW THAT IT WAS NOT THE CASE, ILIESCU WAS PRONE TO CONCLUDE THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE SOMEHOW BEING SNUBBED BY THE USG, WHILE THEIR POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND THE LEADERS OF "LESSER," NEIGHBORING STATES WERE WELCOMED WITH OPEN ARMS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT ILIESCU'S PERCEPTIONS IN THIS AREA WERE DISTORTED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE HIGHER-LEVEL OFFICIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, IF CONDITIONS IN ROMANIA WARRANTED IT. BY THAT HE MEANT THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE GENUINE PROGRESS IN SEVERAL AREAS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S., AREAS THAT SHOULD ALSO BE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE ROMANIANS IF THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT DEMOCRATIZING AND MOVING WESTWARD. THOSE AREAS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE GOVERNMENT MUST GET CONTROL OF [ 1.4(d) ] AND ITS OUTRAGEOUS LEADER [ 1.4(d) ], AS WELL AS BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF THE EXTREMIST [ 1.4(d) ] INTO CABINET AND SUB-CABINET POSITIONS. CLOSER INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RULING PDSR AND THOSE PARTIES WOULD LIMIT WHAT THE USG COULD DO FOR AND WITH ROMANIA.

B. THE GOR MUST STOP FIRING MAYORS AND COUNCILLORS, VIRTUALLY ALL OF WHOM WERE FROM THE OPPOSITION RANKS, WITHOUT CLEAR-CUT JUSTIFICATION, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL THE MALEFACTOR MAYORS AND

COUNCILLORS IN THE COUNTRY JUST HAPPENED TO BE AFFILIATED WITH THE OPPOSITION.

C. IN ORDER TO CREATE THE KIND OF ECONOMIC/INVESTMENT CLIMATE THAT WOULD ATTRACT U.S. BUSINESSMEN, THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ECONOMIC "CZAR" WITH REAL POWER TO MAKE DECISIONS, BREAK THROUGH BUREAUCRATIC BARRIERS, AND ISSUE ORDINANCES WITH THE FORCE OF LAW.

D. THE ISSUE OF THE ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AND THEIR CONCERNS MUST BE ADDRESSED CONSTRUCTIVELY. AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD COULD BE GENUINE GOVERNMENTAL DECENTRALIZATION/DEVOLUTION AND INCREASED LOCAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL/ALL OF ROMANIA. THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY BENEFIT THE ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AS WELL AS ROMANIANS AND, IF DONE CORRECTLY, COULD NOT BE CREDIBLY LABELED A CONCESSION TO THE HUNGARIANS.

E. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONWIDE PRIVATE TV CHANNEL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. IN THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE TV AIRWAVES NATIONWIDE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE -- IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT PEOPLE HAVE, AND BE SEEN TO HAVE, ALTERNATE SOURCES OF BROADCAST INFORMATION.

F. IF THE REHABILITATION OF MARSHAL ANTONESCU COULD NOT BE HALTED BY THE GOR, IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO ONE AND ALL THAT THE GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY WAS NOT COMPLICIT IN, BUT ALSO ACTIVELY OPPOSED, THIS UNFORTUNATE PHENOMENON.

4. AMBASSADOR BOTEZ SAID HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE POINTS THE AMBASSADOR HAD RAISED AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT ILIESCU COULD ACCEPT THEM INTELLECTUALLY. THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOR, HOWEVER, WERE CONFRONTED WITH A SEVERE PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN THAT, DUE TO OPPOSITION  
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000788

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BOTEZ -- SIX MARKERS FOR BETTER RELATIONS

INTRANSIGENCE, THEY HAD NO OPTION BUT TO DEPEND ON THE EXTREMIST PARTIES TO REMAIN IN POWER. SINCE REMAINING IN POWER WAS THE NAME OF THE GAME, SO LONG AS THAT SITUATION PERSISTED THE RULING PARTY'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER

WOULD BE LIMITED. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED TO PASS THE POINTS ON TO ILIESCU.

5. COMMENT. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH ROMANIAN OFFICIALS, THE AMBASSADOR IS MAKING THE POINTS THAT HE PERSONALLY, AND THE USG, WANT TO HELP ROMANIA CREATE THE NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR FULL INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST; SOME CHANGES IN THE ROMANIAN WAY OF OPERATING WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE THE U.S. CAN BE AS SUPPORTIVE AS IT WOULD LIKE TO; AND WITHOUT SUCH CHANGES ROMANIA INEVITABLY WOULD LAG BEHIND THE REST OF THE REGION, POLITIKALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, IN WESTERN EYES. THE MESSAGE IS NOT PRESENTED AS A THREAT BUT AS A STATEMENT OF FACT AND GENERALLY SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT IS OFFERED. NEVERTHELESS, OLD WAYS AND HABITS DIE HARD, AND PROBABLY NOT WITHOUT SOME OUTSIDE HELP. THAT IS WHAT WE INTEND TO KEEP PROVIDING.

MOSES  
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SECT	SECTION: 01 OF 02
SSN	0788
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FROM:  
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