

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1946				
Document ID: Memo for Lynn Davis et al. re: Revised CTBT Package for Davis-Mamedov				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Robert Bell to Lynn Davis et al. re. Revised CTBT Package for Davis Mamedov (2 pages)</del>	<del>10/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KDE 9/23/19
<del>001b. list</del>	<del>Ground Rules for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1 page)</del>	<del>10/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KDE 9/23/19
<del>001c. list</del>	<del>U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation (2 pages)</del>	<del>10/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KDE 9/23/19
<del>001d. statement</del>	<del>Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1 page)</del>	<del>10/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KDE 9/23/19

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 National Security Council  
 Robert Bell (Defense Policy)  
 OA/Box Number: 1946

**FOLDER TITLE:**

CTB, October-December 1995

2010-0427-F  
rs516

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: LYNN DAVIS  
Department of State

ASHTON CARTER  
Department of Defense

CHARLES CURTIS  
Department of Energy

WESLEY CLARK  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOHN HOLUM  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2010/127-M  
4/26/11 RDS

SUBJECT: Revised CTBT Package for Davis-Mamedov

The attached CTBT documents (Ground Rules for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation; Non-paper on U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation; and Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) have been revised to reflect comments received subsequent to Wednesday's Davis-Mamedov delegation meeting.

Both the non-paper on U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Joint Statement on CTBT will be sent to Lynn Davis late this afternoon (October 13) so that she can share both with Mamedov on Sunday, October 15, in London. If any agency has any last minute comments or concerns with either of these two papers, they should contact me or Steve Andreasen (456-9191) immediately.

The Ground Rules for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation will serve as interim policy guidance for the proposed U.S.-Russian "technical talks" on cooperation. The DOE/OSD task force should begin immediately to review specific proposals within the areas identified in the non-paper against these criteria and be prepared to report no later (and, if possible, earlier) than November 17 to the IWG. In parallel with this effort, I've asked Steve Andreasen to draft a proposed PDD that would codify the Ground Rules and procedures for implementing activities in this area.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

I appreciate the hard work that all agencies and the DOE laboratories have put into this effort over the course of the last few weeks.

*Robert G. Bell*

Robert G. Bell  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Senior Director for Defense  
Policy and Arms Control

Attachments:

Ground Rules for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical  
Cooperation  
Proposed Non-Paper on U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical  
Cooperation  
Proposed Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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Ground Rules for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical  
Cooperation

(Draft: 10-13-95/5:40)

1. While we are prepared to engage Russia now in "technical talks" on cooperation, actual cooperation would begin only after CTBT signature.
2. Discussion and activities would be conducted only at the unclassified level and shall be consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and subject to U.S. classification procedures. A subsequent decision by the USG would be required to go beyond this.
3. Discussions and cooperative activities would focus on stockpile safety and security and fundamental physics issues with a goal of sustaining the scientific competence of individuals responsible for ensuring confidence in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. Activities that have direct applications to nuclear weapons design or military performance enhancements of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited. A subsequent decision by the USG would be required to go beyond this.
4. DOE would be the lead agency for discussions with the Russians on this subject.
5. A joint DOE/OSD task force will develop and review specific proposals within the areas identified in the non-paper against these criteria and report within 30 days to the IWG. This report should include initial cost estimates.

U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation  
(Draft: 10-13-95/6:15)

U.S. and Russian scientific and technical cooperation could include unclassified activities encompassing the following areas:

- Fundamental physics processes important to stockpile stewardship.
  
- The utilization of facilities for physics experiments in the areas of:
  - high power lasers;
  - ion beams;
  - pulsed power;
  - neutron interactions; and
  - the design and utilization of accelerators and beams.
  
- Technologies and systematic approaches to assure safety and security in the nuclear weapon stockpile and in nuclear forces operations such as:
  - nuclear safety standards;
  - physical security sensors and systems;
  - probabilistic risk assessments of logistics and storage operations;
  - joint analysis of past and potential nuclear weapon accidents and incidents; and
  - nuclear weapon accident response.

- Techniques for monitoring a CTBT, including:
  - seismic, acoustic, and electromagnetic signatures and data analysis;
  - generation and transport of radioactive plumes in the atmosphere;
  - underground radionuclide transport and cleanup; and
  - information exchanges relative to mining explosions and joint research covering on-site inspection techniques and technologies.
  
- Materials science, technologies, and development such as:
  - environmentally benign processing of nuclear materials;
  - material aging studies and predictive model development;
  - longer lived materials; and
  - other non-weapon specific activities.

If in the future it is agreed that classified discussions are warranted, an appropriate agreement for cooperation will have to be concluded.

Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
(Draft: 10-13-95/6:10)

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin noted with satisfaction the progress made thus far in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on completing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They agreed that the CTBT should be completed by the end of the first part of the 1996 CD session, by April, so that the Treaty could be signed by the fall of 1996. They also agreed that both the United States and the Russian Federation would support a true "zero yield" CTBT that would ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Finally, the two Presidents agreed to instruct their experts to explore the possibility of increased scientific and technical cooperation given their common interest in maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear stockpiles under a "zero yield" CTBT.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. cable</del>	<del>re: Letter to President Yeltsin on CTBT (4 pages)</del>	<del>08/11/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>CDE 9/23/19</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
NSC Cables ([Yeltsin and CTBT])  
OA/Box Number: 510000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[08/11/1995]

2010-0427-F

rs517

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~  
LINE1: OAASZYUW RUEHCAA1416 2230322-SSSS--RHEHAAX.  
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
LINE3: O 110325Z AUG 95 ZFF6  
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
OSRI: RUEHC  
DTG: 110325Z AUG 95  
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000  
SUBJ: LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON CTB

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0127-M  
RDE 4126/11

TEXT:  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 191416

NODIS

GENEVA EYES ONLY FOR AMB. LEDAGER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON CTB

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT PARA 3 BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON CTB. THE LETTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED ASAP, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON PLANS TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE IN WASHINGTON FRIDAY, AUGUST 11. IN THE LETTER AND IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENT PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCES A MAJOR MOVE DESIGNED TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY SO THAT A TREATY CAN BE SIGNED NEXT YEAR. THE U.S. IS PROPOSING A ZERO YIELD COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN THAT WOULD BAN ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST EXPLOSION OR ANY OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WITH ANY NUCLEAR YIELD.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

WORKING TOGETHER, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MADE EXTRAORDINARY PROGRESS OVER THE PAST TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. MOST RECENTLY, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA JOINED WITH 177 OTHER COUNTRIES IN EXTENDING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) INDEFINITELY AND WITHOUT CONDITION. THE INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION

OF THE NPT HAS PROVIDED THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA CAN BUILD A MORE STABLE AND PEACEFUL WORLD, WHERE THE DANGERS AND RISKS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE REDUCED AND, SOMEDAY, ELIMINATED.

THE NEXT STEP IN THIS PROCESS IS TO COMPLETE THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) CURRENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) IN GENEVA. A CTBT WOULD PLACE A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER IN THE WAY OF THE FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS YOU KNOW, THE "PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT" ADOPTED MAY 11 BY ALL NPT PARTIES IN NEW YORK COMMITS THE CD TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS ON A UNIVERSAL AND INTERNATIONALLY AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE CTBT NO LATER THAN 1996. IF THE CD FAILS TO MEET THIS 1996 DEADLINE, I BELIEVE WE RUN A REAL RISK OF UNDERMINING THE NPT REGIME WE HAVE WORKED SO HARD THIS YEAR TO STRENGTHEN.

IN ORDER FOR THE CTBT TO BE SIGNED NEXT FALL, A GOAL THAT I KNOW YOU SHARE, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TREATY TEXT ITSELF BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 1996 CD IN APRIL. THIS WILL ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME FOR THE CD TO CONFORM THE FINAL TEXT AND FORWARD A REPORT TO THE UN CONTAINING THE COMPLETED TREATY SOMETIME EARLY NEXT SUMMER. THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD THEN RECONVENE THE FIRST COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO APPROVE THE TREATY AND OPEN IT FOR SIGNATURE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ARE AT A CRITICAL STAGE. UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE "SCOPE" OF THE TREATY'S PROHIBITIONS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF "ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED," OR "ANP," WE WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO COMPLETE THE CTBT IN THE SPRING OF 1996 SO THAT WE CAN SIGN THE TEST BAN NEXT FALL.

UP TO THIS POINT, YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS PROPOSED ANP WITH NUCLEAR YIELDS UP TO TEN TONS. FRANKLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A CTBT THAT ALLOWED EXPERIMENTS WITH NUCLEAR YIELDS OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD BE TRULY "COMPREHENSIVE," AND WOULD THUS FALL FAR SHORT OF THE COMMITMENT WE MADE JUST TWO MONTHS AGO IN NEW YORK. NOR DO I THINK IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE P-5 TO NEGOTIATE

A TREATY IN THE CD THAT WOULD SANCTION P-5 TESTING AT THESE LEVELS. THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES WOULD VIEW THIS AS DISCRIMINATORY AND WOULD REFUSE TO SIGN SUCH A TREATY, NEGATING ANY NONPROLIFERATION BENEFITS WE HOPE TO GAIN THROUGH UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO A CTBT. MOREOVER IF WE WERE TO NEGOTIATE A CTBT THAT WAS NON-DISCRIMINATORY BUT PERMITTED SUCH TESTING, WE WOULD OPEN UP A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE FOR NON-P-5 COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT PARTY TO THE NPT TO CONDUCT SUCH EXPERIMENTS, WHICH COULD LEAD TO ADVANCES IN THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS THAT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTERESTS.

I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA IS NOT ALONE IN OPPOSING THE

U.S. PROPOSAL TO LIMIT ANP TO FOUR POUNDS. OTHERS OBJECT TO THIS PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE UNITED STATES A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. WHILE I DO NOT AGREE, I AM PREPARED NEVERTHELESS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCERNS OVER THE U.S. POSITION ON ANP SO THAT WE CAN CONCLUDE A CTBT THAT IS NON-DISCRIMINATORY AND CAN ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE.

I WILL THEREFORE ANNOUNCE TODAY U.S. SUPPORT FOR CONCLUDING A "ZERO" YIELD CTBT THAT WOULD BAN ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST EXPLOSION OR ANY OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF ANY NUCLEAR YIELD IMMEDIATELY UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE. THIS NEW PROPOSAL IS NON-DISCRIMINATORYR APPLYING EQUALLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. I BELIEVE THAT A P-5 CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE A "ZERO" YIELD CTBT WILL PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT BOOST TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE, CLEARING THE WAY FOR COMPLETING AND SIGNING A CTBT NEXT YEAR. IT WOULD ALSO SEND A POSITIVE MESSAGE TO THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE EVE OF THE U.N. FIRST COMMITTEE MEETINGS BEGINNING IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE P-5 IS SERIOUS ABOUT CONCLUDING A CTBT IN 1996.

I WILL ALSO BE ANNOUNCING SPECIFIC, CONCRETE SAFEGUARDS THAT DEFINE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN ENTER INTO A CTBTR INCLUDING THE CENTRALITY OF THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM AND OUR RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY UNDER THE SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS CLAUSE SHOULD WE BE REQUIRED TO DO SO. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN EXPANDING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA, INCLUDING LAB-TO-LAB CONTACTS AND COLLABORATION ON VERIFICATION TECHNSLOGIES.

THIRTY TWO YEARS AGO, ANOTHER U.S. PRESIDENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY, REFERRED TO THE FIRST TREATY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AS A "SHAFT OF LIGHT CUT INTO THE DARKNESS," AND

HE ASKED HIS FELLOW AMERICANS TO "STEP BACK FROM THE SHADOWS OF WAR AND SEEK OUT THE WAY OF PEACE." I BELIEVE THAT TOGETHER, OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE READY TO COMPLETE A TRULY COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND TAKE THE NEXT STEP TOWARDS BUILDING E SAFER AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

CHRISTOPHER  
BT  
#1416

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1416

TOR: 950810233716 M1804811

DIST:

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SIT: ANDREASEN BLACKER GRAY HESLIN PASCUAL PIFER SUM SUM2 WHSR\_SPECIAL

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