

Case Number: 2013-0122-M; 2014-0118-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 302				
Document ID: Haiti 1994 [Folder 2] [1]: 9404007				
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Document ID: Haiti 1994 [Folder 2] [5]: 9402520				
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Document ID: Ref. Staff Drawer Files, Haiti 1993/1994 [1]: 9404022				
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Original OA/ID Number: 507				
Document ID: Ref. Staff Drawer Files, Haiti 1993/1994 [2]: 9403022				
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Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [1]: 9402938				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: v

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Original OA/ID Number: 1392				
Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [1]: 9402957				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [2]: 9402732				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Original OA/ID Number: 1392				
Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [2]: 9402973				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: v

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Original OA/ID Number: 1392				
Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [2]: 9403043				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Document ID: Haiti-Options, April 1994 [2]: 9403333				
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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9308963				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Draft Papers on Current Strategy (1 page)	11/15/1993	P1/b(1) <i>vr 3/3/2020</i>
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Near Term Strategy for Haiti (4 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1) <i>vr</i>
001c. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Contingency Planning Beyond Sanctions (6 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1) <i>vr</i>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>Lawrence Pezzullo to Samuel Berger re: My Views of Your Haiti Options Papers (2 pages)</del>	<del>11/15/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>vr</i>
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1) <i>vr</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9308963

2014-0118-M

rs913

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI DRAFT PAPERS ON CURRENT STRATEGY & ON POST SANCTIONS  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 18 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
FEINBERG  
NSC CHRON  
ROSSIN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/5/2014  
2014-0118-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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001 LAKE	Z 93111521 FOR INFORMATION
001 ROSSIN	Z 93111918 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001	X 93121408 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 15, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RR fa*

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LWR*

SUBJECT: Haiti: Draft Papers on Current Strategy and on Post-Sanctions Contingency Planning

As discussed in the meeting you chaired on November 12, attached are two draft memorandums to the President on Haiti. The first informs the President about our current sanctions-based effort to bring Governor's Island to completion and additional measures we will consider taking to foster that outcome. The second asks the President to approve planning for and the adoption if necessary of a new approach based on a new package offer to both Haitian sides which would aim at garnering military cooperation.

Copies of these two draft memorandums were provided to Ambassador Pezzullo for his comments. His reply is at Tab III. We have sought to incorporate as many of the changes in the memo at Tab I as we could. However, Ambassador Pezzullo would change the thrust of the memo to state that our sanctions-based policy is sustainable indefinitely if applied consistently and if accompanied by strong and visible humanitarian relief, and stands a reasonable chance of driving the two Haitian sides to negotiate a solution between them. The policy may work to force the military to fulfill its Governor's Island commitments, but we cannot agree that it is sustainable indefinitely. The conclusions of the memorandum at Tab I reflect what we deemed to be the majority view at Friday's meeting. Ambassador Pezzullo finds the strategy proposed in the memorandum at Tab II completely unacceptable for the reasons set forth in his note.

We will await your guidance on these two draft memorandums before preparing them in final for your signature.

CC: Sandy Berger, Nancy Soderberg

Attachments

- Tab I Draft Information Memorandum to the President on "Near-Term Strategy for Haiti"
- Tab II Draft Action Memorandum to the President on "Haiti: Contingency Planning Beyond Sanctions"
- Tab III Note from Ambassador Pezzullo with Comments on Draft Memorandums

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RAFT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Near-Term Strategy for Haiti

CURRENT SITUATION

UN/OAS efforts to foster the restoration of democracy and return of President Aristide are aimed at consummating the Governor's Island Agreement. Implementation of the Agreement would create the security environment for Aristide's return through the deployment of a UN Mission cooperating with the Haitian military and police. While neither President Aristide nor General Cedras has formally disavowed the Governor's Island Agreement, positions have hardened.

The military believes it has the upper hand. It has allowed the growth of and used right-wing elements allied to neo-Duvalierists and the "attaches" to carry out violence and intimidation while distancing the army from responsibility. The military judges that they can wear down our will to maintain sanctions by encouraging negative publicity about their impact on Haiti's poor. As long as they believe they can defeat the sanctions through public relations work, they are in no mood for genuine compromise.

President Aristide has also hardened his stance. He insisted going into Dante Caputo's failed "conclave" meeting November 5 in Port-au-Prince on terms which rewrote the Governor's Island Agreement and were a negotiating non-starter. Since then he has repeated his calls for a comprehensive trade embargo and come out for an invasion -- while emphasizing that as President he cannot formally request foreign intervention.

CURRENT APPROACH

We are seeking to utilize UN oil and arms sanctions and targeted asset freezes and visa prohibitions to force the military to comply with its Governor's Island Commitments, notably Cedras' resignation and Police Chief Francois' transfer from his current assignment. We are warning the military and its Parliamentary allies that a quasi-constitutional coup against Aristide and Prime Minister Malval will lead to intensified sanctions. And we are reminding all concerned that the UN has never backed away from sanctions until its objectives were achieved,

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: VZ-NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2013-0172-NA (1.477)

notwithstanding the humanitarian concerns that all such programs raise.

At the same time we have encouraged President Aristide to accord Malval maximum tactical flexibility as he works to revive the Governor's Island process. We are seeking to boost Malval's shaky confidence to keep him on the job.

Finally, we are maintaining and exploring ways to bolster our humanitarian relief programs to counter military efforts to undermine our will to impose sanctions. We are considering options to assure the availability of fuel for delivery and cold storage of medications; security for relief supplies and personnel may also become an issue as sanctions bite. We also are working to publicize our humanitarian relief program in order to shore up external support for sanctions and let Haitians know that we are there with them while the military and its allies prolong the crisis by their intransigence.

The sanctions may constitute a powerful pressure on both sides which ultimately can drive them to the bargaining table. By making clear our commitment to maintain the sanctions and at the same time refusing to come up with new initiatives of our own we may be successful in encouraging the Haitian parties to come to grips with their common problem. By taking some additional measures we can enhance the leverage that Prime Minister Malval and his centrist allies bring to the bargaining table.

However, we need results within approximately six weeks before fuel supplies are exhausted and the socioeconomic disruption of sanctions increases dramatically. Already fuel availability is diminishing, causing social hardships as it increases the difficulties the military and industry, including the army's business allies, have functioning. Prime Minister Malval is unhappy with the impact of sanctions for which much of the public has blamed him. He is not likely to last past December and could quit earlier unless he receives visible signals of international commitment to resolving the political crisis.

#### MAKING THE CURRENT STRATEGY WORK

Within the framework of our continued support for the Governor's Island Agreement we will consider several additional measures in the next few weeks to enhance the leverage of the legitimate Haitian government and bring the Haitian issue to closure.

1. **Wedge-Driving in the Army:** There are growing indications of tensions within the army over the current stonewalling approach to sanctions and over increasing signs that the civilian "attaches" and neo-Duvalierists may be slipping out of control. It would be wrong to overstate the potential for internal changes which would end the crisis. We may nonetheless wish to consider a finding to permit the use of covert resources to explore and if warranted exploit these disagreements to our advantage.

2. **Tightening sanctions:** Comprehensive trade sanctions are unnecessary and risk provoking a debate over responsibility for Haitian misery. But we may want to push for stronger sanctions (e.g., a UN resolution on targeted sanctions or sanctions on luxury imports) if our current efforts produce no movement by the military.

3. **Publicity:** Though Haitian commercial radio is not closed to pro-democracy voices, intimidation has driven many of these spokesmen underground. Caputo is exploring placing a radio transmitter on board the Argentine ship en route to enforce sanctions, an idea the "Friends of Haiti" (Canada, France, Venezuela, ourselves) have endorsed. We may be approached to provide the transmitting equipment. We and the other "Friends" are also working to increase Creole programming on the Voice of America and its French and Canadian counterparts. In these ways the Haitian people can receive Aristide's and Malval's perspectives and also understand the truth about sanctions and humanitarian relief.

4. **Talking Turkey with Aristide:** Aristide has been increasingly unhelpful in recent weeks. Contrary to promises to you and the Vice President, he has curbed not expanded Malval's room for maneuver. We must not drive wedges between Malval and Aristide. We should however use the leadup to a Malval visit and the visit itself to convey our insistence that Aristide (1) adhere to his Governor's Island commitments and (2) give Malval authority to take any steps -- including bringing other democratic elements into his government -- he thinks will help break the negotiating stalemate. We must tell Aristide that he will not get our support for demands going beyond what was agreed at Governor's Island.

5. **UN Security for Humanitarian Assistance:** We should consider seeking a deployment of UN forces to Haiti to provide security for the humanitarian relief effort which could be subject to military extortion or simple criminal attacks. Such a mission would require U.S. participation and logistical support. We would confront the Haitian military with the choice of accepting this deployment or being seen as fully responsible for preventing humanitarian aid and we may even co-opt them into assisting in this effort.

6. **High-Level Meetings with Malval in Washington:** Malval is disappointed by the perceived lack of concrete backing from Aristide and the international community (he wants us to deploy our military engineers and trainers which we will not now do). Aristide wants Malval to come to Washington without delay. We should invite Malval to come after the NAFTA vote -- which is Malval's current preference for his own reasons. One option we are considering is a meeting with Sandy Berger and me which you could drop in on to emphasize your commitment to restoring democracy through the Governor's Island process and your support of Malval's heroic efforts to keep the process alive. When Malval returns he will hopefully have Aristide's mandate to negotiate as well as the ability to deliver the end of sanctions

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and the initiation of international assistance. This should give him terrific negotiating leverage if used deftly.

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THE END GAME

The strategy we are now pursuing -- sanctions plus full diplomatic support for implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement -- is fully consistent with your repeatedly declared commitment to provide full support short of the use of force for the return of constitutional government and of President Aristide. We will know that strategy has worked when the military takes concrete actions to fulfill its Governor's Island commitments.

The current approach must be considered at an end if our sanctions fail to bring the military to compromise before they have sparked chaos and mass privation which our humanitarian aid program cannot effectively ameliorate. Not only sanctions but the direct return of migrants may at that point become morally and diplomatically unsustainable. We could then face a migrant exodus. At that point we will need to consider new policy options which go beyond sanctions and the provisions of the Governor's Island Agreement.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DRAFT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Haiti: Contingency Planning Beyond Sanctions

Purpose

To begin contingency planning for a final effort to achieve a peaceful solution to the Haitian crisis to be undertaken if our sanctions-based policy proves unsuccessful.

Background

Where We Stand

The international community's efforts to bridge the gulf between President Aristide and the Haitian military have not borne fruit. As we have supported the UN/OAS mediation effort, we have already pressured President Aristide into significant compromises of his long-held positions in order to meet the imperatives of a negotiating process. At Governor's Island, Aristide moderated his stance that General Cedras and Police Chief Francois should resign immediately and be tried for their crimes and that he should return to Haiti without delay. He agreed to their remaining in office through the transition to his return, to issue a broad amnesty and essentially to permit the authors of the coup to escape the consequences of their offenses. Later in the New York Pact he backed off his demand that Parliamentarians elected illegally last January leave office forthwith. For its part, the military made concessions under the pressure of sanctions, to allow Aristide's return, that Cedras would retire and a new high command and police chief would be named and that it would accept UN assistance for a force modernization that could reduce its political influence.

The Governor's Island Agreement, while the product of compromise, nonetheless met Aristide's and our own core requirements: the restoration of democracy, Aristide's return, departure of the coup leaders and arrangements under which the international community could have a shot at building the restored democratic government's viability amidst safeguards against retribution.

The military broke its commitments once sanctions had been lifted and as the date for President Aristide's return neared. Since then neither side has explicitly disavowed Governor's Island but

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/9/17

positions have hardened. The military expects to outlast sanctions and is signalling that Aristide will never be allowed back. Aristide is again demanding Cedras', the entire high command's and Francois' departure before he will take further steps to implement his commitments and is pushing for total sanctions and even foreign invasion. Deepening intransigence on both sides calls into question the viability of the Governor's Island Agreement as a vehicle to end the Haitian crisis.

Our current approach relies on sanctions to force the military to comply. This is combined with support for Prime Minister Malval and UN/OAS envoy Caputo so that the way to renewed cooperation on Governor's Island is kept open and with humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the impact of sanctions on Haiti's poor and thus to sustain public support for our sanctions-based approach. We have perhaps six weeks to make this approach work before fuel runs out, Malval loses heart and quits and chaos and mass privation beyond the capacity of our aid to address loom. At that point our current approach may become morally and diplomatically unsustainable and we may also face a migrant crisis. We have identified several additional measures we will consider taking as needed to give our current approach every chance of succeeding.

#### If Sanctions Fail ...

If our sanctions-based approach proves ineffective, that will signify that we have misjudged the strength and resolve of the Haitian military. Before we are forced to make the unsavory choice between disengagement from Haiti or military intervention we must seek to identify a balance of compromises which respects our basic commitment to democracy and Aristide's return, is salable to Aristide and will bring the army around to cooperation with us and the international community. That will mean giving the military more and Aristide less than the two sides agreed to at Governor's Island.

I recommend that we begin close-hold contingency planning now to develop a package deal incorporating these minimum desiderata. This deal would be presented to President Aristide and by a secret envoy to the Haitian military. Our envoys to Aristide and the military could present this package deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or have predetermined authority to alter specific points. To make each side accept it we would posit as the alternative the one of our two final options which is totally unacceptable to that side: for the military, invasion and dismantlement of the current security forces; for Aristide, disengagement which will ensure that he never returns to Haiti as President. Our threat must be credible. If the military will not agree we must be prepared to intervene. If Aristide balks we must be prepared to disengage.

#### Elements of a Final Offer

The following are possible elements of such a package proposal. Their sequencing -- especially with regard to lifting sanctions and introducing a peacekeeping force -- will require further

consideration. Both may be hard to coordinate with other elements of the package which depend primarily on actions of the Haitian parties. There will be external pressure to lift the sanctions independent of any political deal because of the misery they have caused, and deploying UN peacekeepers would be delayed because of the time required to bring the UNSC on board and, once the force is approved, to mobilize the military forces involved.

1. Deferral of Aristide's return to Haiti sine die, with the timing of his return to depend on the establishment of a suitable security environment and pattern of government-military cooperation. Both sides would agree that this means that Aristide would return to Haiti at some point before his term of office expires and each side would commit to work for that objective.
2. Establishment of a mechanism to agree on the timing of Aristide's return. Regularly-scheduled reporting and consultation mechanism among the key Haitian players from the Presidency, military and Parliament chaired by the Prime Minister to determine when the conditions for Aristide's return have been met. International participation in this process as observers.
3. Broadening of the government with Aristide's endorsement, with or without the continuation of Malval as Prime Minister. Selection by Aristide of a centrist Prime Minister from a slate nominated by the Parliamentary party leaders should Malval resign. Military agreement to cooperate with the new Ministers.
4. Retention of General Cedras as the military commander-in-chief through the balance of his constitutional term (July 1994). Cedras would agree to promote to general a group of colonels (including candidates identified by us after consultation with President Aristide) so that when Cedras retired Aristide would have a suitable candidate to select as Cedras' successor.
5. Transfer of Police Chief Francois by General Cedras to a new military command within Haiti upon passage of the police law (as Francois has said would be acceptable to him). Appointment of a new police chief by Aristide.
6. Simultaneous enactment of the amnesty and police laws now languishing before the Parliament. Aristide to convoke the Parliament to act on the amnesty law; Cedras to actively ensure the security of the Parliamentary session.
7. Enactment of public security legislation delegitimizing the civilian "attaches" and imposing strict gun controls.
8. Action by the army and current police force to ensure public security -- for the government, for the Parliament and for all law-abiding Haitians -- by enforcing public security

legislation against recalcitrant "attaches" and their political sponsors.

9. Introduction of a robust Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force in Port-au-Prince and a few key towns (up to 7,000 troops) to facilitate implementation of this agreement by keeping hostile factions apart, preventing reprisals by either side, suppressing rioting, protecting key military and government figures and providing military and police modernization training.
10. Lifting of sanctions and provision of international economic assistance as previously planned.

#### Discussion

This approach differs from Governor's Island in fundamental ways. Most changes involve major concessions by Aristide going beyond Governor's Island. The military would give less than it did in July on the political issues but accept new security requirements: UN peacekeepers and suppression of the "attaches" and their patrons. Such a package could address the military's key concerns and, combined with the threat of intervention, might prove effective in bringing them to agree to a peaceful restoration of democracy and Aristide's eventual return.

- Aristide's return: We have held Aristide's return to be inseparable from the restoration of democracy, so that his return is the core purpose of any settlement. This package however sets no date.
- Broadened government: Aristide has never agreed that his Parliamentary opponents have any role to play in his government and would reject any place in public life for the neo-Duvalierists as inappropriate. This package requires him not merely to broaden his government to accommodate some or all of these groups, but to give them a voice in selecting a new Prime Minister should Malval leave office and in determining the date of his eventual return.
- Amnesty: Aristide insists, correctly in a technical reading, that he completed the amnesty portion of Governor's Island and granted as much as the Constitution permitted him to do. He fears that the Parliament would pardon all murders and abuses since the coup and deprive the Haitian people of justice. He also fears that with the amnesty in hand the army will renege on its side of any deal. This package requires him to take steps needed for Parliament to pass an amnesty law.
- Cedras' departure: Aristide had demanded Cedras' immediate resignation. At Governor's Island Aristide agreed that Cedras could stay until the last stages of the transition to democracy. Aristide has since reverted to his traditional position. This deal would give Cedras even more than he got

at Governor's Island by allowing him to complete his full constitutional term.

- Francois' reassignment: Aristide has wanted Francois out of Haiti. Francois has said he is willing to step aside as police chief but only to accept a unit command commensurate with his rank. The Governor's Island Agreement would have allowed this to Francois. However, as violence traceable to Francois mounted in subsequent weeks we came to believe that he had to be removed from Haiti (e.g., by assignment to an overseas military attache position) in order to assure the physical safety of Aristide and his associates. In this deal we recognize the showstopper role Francois can play and give him what he wants. Aristide will balk.
  
- Crackdown on "attache" violence: The military encouraged the flourishing "attache" phenomenon and has collaborated with the resurgent neo-Duvalierists. This package legislates an end to the "attaches" and requires the military to enforce it. It tests whether the military is acting in good faith and whether it has the capability to control the resurgent far right, which is becoming an independent locus of power in Haiti.
  
- UN Peacekeeping: Neither Aristide nor the military has shown a willingness to agree to the robust presence proposed in this approach. Aristide has recently indicated he would welcome (but never invite) an intervention to return him to power. However the mission of the force we propose would be more complex and even-handed than he probably would like. Peacekeeping is essential to guarantee that the military does not repeat its last-minute betrayal of the deal. This will be the hardest point to sell to the army which knows that such a force spells the end to its political control of Haiti. Getting Aristide to request it -- as will be essential to give us a chance to win UNSC backing and UN member state participation -- will also be difficult given the overall unattractiveness of this package to him.

There is some chance that both sides might be brought to accept such a deal albeit with difficulty and only under threat of completely unacceptable alternatives. This approach would however come under intense political criticism and levy significant resource costs.

- The failure to guarantee Aristide's return would lead to accusations that the U.S. had caved to military intransigence, broken promises to Aristide and the Haitian people, condoned human rights abuses during and since the coup and ultimately sacrificed basic American principles. Aristide's acceptance of this arrangement would dampen but not silence such criticism since it would be presumed he agreed under duress.
  
- We would probably have to provide a large majority of the peacekeepers and foot most of the bill unless we could

persuade the Russians to accept UN-assessed financing, which is doubtful. We would be criticized for participating in another UN peacekeeping effort where our troops were exposed to low-level but continuous casualties.

- Reaction to lifting sanctions before Aristide's return would be mixed. Some would criticize us for abandoning our pressure on the military without achieving the Administration's major policy objective in Haiti. Others would support if not applaud the end of sanctions given the dislocation they were causing.
- Finally and more fundamentally, many would argue that we were using force to make the two sides paper over their deep-seated differences for our political convenience and that we were doing no more than laying the seeds for renewed, possibly worse internal strife once our presence in Haiti came to an end.

We would have several counterarguments to support our approach:

- That we had forced the army to accept an international force which would end military control of the country and create a security climate for Aristide's return;
- That we had forced the military to suppress "attache" violence thus enhancing the security of all Haitians;
- That we had created a broad political framework in which all Haitian parties could contribute to national reconciliation and reconstruction supported by an extensive international economic and security assistance program;
- That this approach, while not ideal, preserved our ability to attain fundamental policy objectives while ending the intolerable misery sanctions were causing and without requiring foreign military invasion.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to adopt this approach should our sanctions-based strategy in support of the Governor's Island Agreement appear to be near exhaustion.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1993

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DECL: OADR

TO: Deputy National Security Advisor - Samuel Berger  
FROM: Special Advisor on Haiti - Lawrence A. Pezzullo  
SUBJECT: My Views of Your Haiti Options Papers

As you requested I have reviewed the two memoranda we discussed. I have attached comments on the first paper, "Near-Term Strategy for Haiti," which I hope you can incorporate.

I find the second memo, "Haiti: Contingency Planning Beyond Sanctions," to be incomprehensible. It seems to incorporate the negative aspects of every option and the positive attributes of none, while running completely counter to all the President's stated policy objectives on Haiti. Among other things, it is unclear how one could ever convince the UN to accept deployment of a 7,000-man peacekeeping force in Haiti -- even with a large U.S. contingent. Moreover, why would one want to insert what -- for all intents and purposes -- is an occupation force under Chapter VII when one has already made major concessions to the Haitian military leadership. How does one get either President Aristide or the military leadership to concur?

If one is to pursue the course of arguing for the deployment of such a force, then, I believe, one should simply come out strongly for a unilateral invasion which, among other things, destroys the military and police and becomes an occupation army. That would eliminate the threat but make us the praetorian guard for an Aristide administration.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/7/2019  
2014-0118-M (1.05)

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CONCLUSION:

The policy we now have in place --sanctions plus full diplomatic support for implementation of Governors Island Agreement fully consistent with your repeatedly declared commitment to provide full support short of the use of force for the return of constitutional government and of President Aristide. It is a sustainable policy over a long period of time if applied consistently and if we make clearly visible and effective efforts to avoid human suffering. Should we fail to keep the onus squarely on the Haitian parties to negotiate a political solution (by leading them to believe that intransigence on their part will be rewarded by our assuming responsibility for fashioning a solution) a solution could be postponed indefinitely.

Should we fail to deal effectively with the humanitarian relief issue, we could end up putting pressure on ourselves to rescind the sanctions. In such an event, we would then be faced with the unattractive choices of negotiating a deal ourselves with the military which would not comport with our declared policy objectives or using force to impose a solution with all that that implies. But if we apply our current approach consistently and deftly, we can at a minimum manage the issue indefinitely and stand a reasonable chance of driving to closure a solution negotiated by Haitians.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DRAFT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: ~~Near Term~~ Strategy for Haiti

CURRENT SITUATION

UN/OAS efforts to foster the restoration of democracy and return of President Aristide by consummating the Governor's Island Agreement, and creating the security environment for Aristide's return through the instruction of a UN Mission cooperating with the Haitian military and police, are stalemated. While neither President Aristide nor General Cedras has formally disavowed the Governor's Island Agreement, positions have hardened.

The military believes it has the upper hand. Right-wing elements allied to neo-Duvalierists and the "attaches" are in the ascendant. The calm that prevails in Haiti is due to fear of these elements' violence and intimidation. The military and right-wing judge that they can wear down our will to maintain sanctions by encouraging negative publicity about their impact on Haiti's poor. They are in no mood for genuine compromise.

President Aristide has also hardened his stance. He insisted going into Dante Caputo's failed "conclave" meeting November 5 in Port-au-Prince on terms which rewrote the Governor's Island Agreement and were a negotiating non-starter. Since then he has repeated his calls for a comprehensive trade embargo and come out for an invasion -- while emphasizing that as President he cannot formally request foreign intervention.

CURRENT APPROACH

We are seeking to utilize UN oil/sanctions and targeted asset freezes and visa prohibitions to force the military to comply with its Governor's Island Commitments, notably Cedras' resignation and Police Chief Francois' transfer from his current assignment. We are warning the military and its Parliamentary allies that a quasi-constitutional coup against Aristide and Prime Minister Malval will lead to intensified sanctions. And we are reminding all concerned that the UN has never backed away from sanctions. At the same time we have encouraged President Aristide to accord Malval maximum tactical flexibility as he works to revive the

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Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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By: YZ NARA, Date 8/5/2011

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the "Friends of Haiti" (Canada, France, Venezuela, ourselves) have endorsed. We may be approached to provide the transmitting equipment. Through this medium the Haitian people can receive Aristide's and Malval's perspectives and also understand the truth about sanctions and humanitarian relief.

4. Talking Turkey with Aristide: Aristide has been increasingly unhelpful in recent weeks. Contrary to promises to you and the Vice President, he has curbed not expanded Malval's room for maneuver. We must not drive wedges between Malval and Aristide. We should however use the leadup to a Malval visit and the visit itself to convey our insistence that Aristide (1) adhere to his Governor's Island commitments and (2) give Malval authority to take any steps -- including bringing other democratic elements into his government -- he thinks will help break the negotiating stalemate. We must tell Aristide that he will not get our support for demands going beyond what was agreed at Governor's Island.

5. High-Level Meetings with Malval in Washington: Malval resents a perceived lack of concrete backing from Aristide and the international community (he wants us to deploy our military engineers and trainers which we cannot now do). Aristide wants Malval to come to Washington without delay. We should invite Malval to come after the NAFTA vote -- which is Malval's current preference for his own reasons. One option we are considering is a meeting with Sandy Berger and me which you could drop in on to emphasize your commitment to restoring democracy through the Governor's Island process and your support of Malval's heroic efforts to keep the process alive.

6. UN Security for Humanitarian Assistance: There may come a point when military extortion or simple mob and criminal attacks disrupt our aid program. We may then need to consider seeking a deployment of UN forces to Haiti to provide security. Such a mission would require U.S. participation and logistical support. We would confront the Haitian military with the choice of accepting this deployment or being seen as fully responsible for preventing humanitarian aid.

THE END GAME

We will know that our current approach has worked when the military takes concrete actions to fulfill its Governor's Island commitments. The current approach must be considered at an end if our sanctions fail to bring the military to compromise before they have sparked chaos and mass privation which our humanitarian aid program cannot effectively ameliorate. Not only sanctions but the direct return of migrants may at that point become morally and diplomatically unsustainable. We could then face a migrant exodus. At that point we will need new policy options tied neither to sanctions nor to the Governor's Island Agreement.

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Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MIR MARKER

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001- memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Near-Term Strategy and Contingency Thinking (1 page)	11/20/1993	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
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rs914

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN  
FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO TO PRES ON NEAR TERM HAITI STRATEGY & CONTINGENCY THINKING

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 24 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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X 93121408 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

Rec'd 11/22 4:20pm

JWR  
11/22

National Security Council  
The White House

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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LIMITED ACCESS

November 20, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *HR fn*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *HR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Near-Term Strategy and Contingency Thinking

Attached at Tabs I and II are proposed Memorandums to the President, the first detailing our current sanctions-based effort to bring about completion of the Governor's Island Agreement, the second describing a possible new diplomatic approach in the event that the sanctions-based strategy fails. These memorandums reflect the discussion of November 12 and the points you made to us in your office on November 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandums to the President at Tabs I and II.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President on "Near-Term Strategy for Haiti"  
Tab II Memorandum to the President on "Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions"

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*2014-0118-m (1.01)*  
*[2013-0122-m, 1.41]*

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions (10 pages)</del>	<del>11/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) ✓ 3/3/2020</del>
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar to POTUS re: Haiti-The Role of Prime Minister Malval (3 pages)</del>	<del>12/03/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) ✓ 3/3/2020</del>
<del>001c. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (8 pages)</del>	<del>12/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) ✓ 3/3/2020</del>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (8 pages)</del>	<del>12/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) ✓ 3/3/2020</del>

**COLLECTION:**

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 15 DEC 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI CONTINGENCY THINKING BEYOND SANCTIONS - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RFM*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions

Attached at Tab I is a proposed Memorandum to the President describing a possible new diplomatic approach for use in the event that the Malval initiative and our sanctions-based strategy fail.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Nunn-Lugar Memorandum on Malval Initiative

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions

Purpose

To develop a final effort to achieve a peaceful solution to the Haitian crisis if our sanctions-based policy proves unsuccessful.

BackgroundWhere We Stand

The international community's efforts to bridge the gulf between President Aristide and the Haitian military have not yet borne fruit. As we have supported the UN/OAS mediation effort, we have already pressured President Aristide into significant compromises of his long-held positions in order to meet the imperatives of a negotiating process. At Governor's Island, Aristide moderated his stance that General Cedras and Police Chief Francois should resign immediately and that he should return to Haiti without delay. He agreed to their remaining in office through the transition to his return, to issue a broad amnesty and essentially to permit the authors of the coup to escape the consequences of their offenses. For its part, the military agreed to concessions under the pressure of sanctions, to allow Aristide's return, that Cedras would retire and a new high command and police chief would be named and that it would accept UN assistance for a force modernization that could reduce its political influence.

The Governor's Island Agreement, while the product of compromise, nonetheless met Aristide's and our own core requirements: the restoration of democracy, Aristide's return, departure of the coup leaders and arrangements under which the international community could have a shot at building the restored democratic government's viability amidst safeguards against retribution.

The military broke its commitments once sanctions had been lifted and as the date for President Aristide's return neared. Since then neither side has explicitly disavowed Governor's Island but positions have hardened. The military has been emboldened, expects to outlast sanctions and is signalling that Aristide will never be allowed back. Aristide is again demanding Cedras', the

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of StaffCLINTON L ~~SECRET~~ TOCOP YDECLASSIFIED  
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA. Date 8/9/2015

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entire high command's and Francois' departure before he will take further steps to implement his commitments and is pushing for total sanctions and even foreign invasion. Deepening intransigence on both sides calls into question the viability of the Governor's Island Agreement as a vehicle to end the Haitian crisis.

Prime Minister Malval's current initiative to gather all democratic sectors in Haiti behind efforts to consummate the Governor's Island Agreement probably represents our last decent chance to resolve the crisis before the impact of sanctions forces us to face some very tough choices. We have worked to give it the strongest possible launch through your meeting with Aristide and Malval. The initiative has won the Four Friends', Boutros Ghali's and the Vatican's endorsement and will be the focus of international diplomatic activity for the next several weeks. However, both the extreme right in Haiti and President Aristide are already working to undercut it, while it is being received with skepticism (at least pending Malval's return from Europe) within Haiti. Malval's conversation with Boutros Ghali revealed a need for further detailed planning of the actual conference. We will be working intensively with Malval and his advisors and with the international community to bring every available resource to bear in support of his critical initiative.

Our current approach relies on sanctions to force the military to comply with their Governor's Island commitments, ideally by lending their cooperation to Malval's national gathering. This is combined with humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the impact of sanctions on Haiti's poor and thus to sustain public support for our sanctions-based approach. U.S. and other donor aid is providing just under 1 million of the most vulnerable Haitians one meal per day and supporting health care for one in three Haitians. The private voluntary organizations have enough food and medicines in country to last well into the spring of next year (when combined with local harvests) and can be resupplied. The critical factor is fuel for deliveries outside the capital. Estimates are that Haiti's regular fuel inventories may run out as early as the end of the year. We have developed with the UN, the voluntary groups and the Malval government a fuel supply arrangement for humanitarian groups only which should come on line in early January. If it works as planned it should enable indefinite relief operations, provided the Haitian military acquiesces and the food trucks and warehouses are not persistently subject to violent thefts.

#### If Sanctions Fail

By drying up fuel supplies, our sanctions are extinguishing Haitian economic life. If Malval's effort does not bear early fruit and sanctions are maintained, complete collapse is likely in January or February, soon after fuel supplies are exhausted. Already commercial shipping to Haiti is down by over half, the manufacturing and business sector is closing down rapidly, unemployment is rising and food prices are skyrocketing.

The CIA predicts that urban and rural malnutrition will rise significantly in March and April and that health conditions will deteriorate markedly. This hardship will probably spark political and criminal violence, may give birth to a repressive Duvalierist regime and ultimately could cause chaos and privation beyond the capacity of our aid and diplomacy to address. This downward spiral will make our sanctions-based approach less sustainable morally and diplomatically and we may also face a migrant crisis.

If our sanctions-based approach proves ineffective, that will signify that we have misjudged the strength and resolve of the Haitian military. We will then face a fundamental choice: to retreat from Haiti or to take bolder diplomatic and military measures to end this crisis definitively.

### Retreat

One option would be to step back from Haiti. We would announce that we can no longer justify hurting the Haitian people with severe sanctions in view of both Aristide's and the military's intransigence as demonstrated by their failure to cooperate with Malval's initiative. We would seek UN support to ease or end the oil sanctions and cease naval enforcement, while possibly maintaining the more symbolic OAS embargo and perhaps even tightening our targeted asset freezes and visa sanctions against the military and its backers. At the same time we could augment humanitarian food shipments to forestall the looming humanitarian crisis and head off a possible migrant exodus.

As we took those steps we would place the full burden to reach a short-term deal on Aristide and the military since they squandered international mediation. We would point out that there is little the international community can accomplish when polarized domestic forces will not compromise. We would shift to a low profile, long-haul strategy aimed at gradually building the institutions that are the prerequisites of democracy and promoting free elections as scheduled in late 1995.

This approach has several downsides. It would hurt the Administration's international credibility. Though not publicly presented as such, it would abandon your oft-repeated commitment to reverse the 1991 coup and return President Aristide. It would signal a clear defeat for the UN and OAS. Finally, it would fuel criticism of our direct return policy for Haitian migrants, the temporary continuation of which has been based on our commitment to restore democracy and in so doing address the underlying causes of the migrant phenomenon.

Retreat is not an attractive option but there are arguments in its favor if the alternative is bolder measures, especially military action. Retreat raises ambiguous moral issues. There is the perception of a broken commitment to

Aristide, to the Haitian people who are thereby denied the chance to end the military's usurpation of power, and to our fundamental democratic principles. But that would be counterbalanced by your willingness to take the hard decision and political heat required to avert an imminent humanitarian catastrophe.

More important, we are on a roll after a tough period where the Administration's foreign policy image was dominated by negatives generated by Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia. We are wrapping up the historic "triple play" on trade (NAFTA, APEC and soon GATT) and are having steadily more success in conveying your vision of U.S. engagement in the post-Cold War world. The Western Hemisphere Summit next year will convert that vision into a shared approach to problem-solving in all key areas of mutual concern in the Americas. These foreign policy successes match your domination of the domestic policy agenda and advance much broader U.S. interests than anything at stake in Haiti. Military intervention in Haiti, if a last diplomatic effort failed, would focus Congressional and public attention back onto the high-cost, low-benefit crisis areas and away from the Administration's positive agenda of change. It could also reignite traditional Latin suspicions of American hegemonic attitudes toward the region which we have been so successful in dissipating, casting a cloud over the Western Hemisphere Summit and the wide-ranging policy initiatives we want to emerge from it.

#### Bolder Measures

The other option would be much bolder military and diplomatic measures to bring the crisis to an end. It would require the decision to intervene militarily (ideally multilaterally, but unilaterally if we must) if that is what it takes to resolve the crisis and at the same time it could include a new diplomatic strategy attractive to the military (if unpopular with Aristide and his domestic backers).

The balance of this paper develops this option which we should consider pursuing if the Malval initiative and sanctions-based policy fail early in the new year.

#### Leveraging a Decision to Use Force

If we follow the second approach, and having made the fundamental decision to use force if necessary, we should try to leverage it into a credible diplomatic strategy which will maximize our chance of not having to intervene. This would require that we identify a balance of compromises which, in priority order: (1) respects our basic commitment to democracy and Aristide's eventual return; (2) will bring the army around to cooperation with us and the international community; and (3) is salable to Aristide. That inevitably would mean giving the military more and Aristide less than the two sides agreed to at Governor's Island.

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A package deal incorporating these minimum desiderata would be presented to President Aristide and by a highly credible secret envoy to the Haitian military. Our envoys to Aristide and the military could present this package deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or have predetermined latitude to alter specific points. To make each side accept it we would posit as the alternative the one of our two final options which is totally unacceptable to that side: for the military, invasion and dismantlement of the current security forces; for Aristide, a degree of disengagement which will ensure that he never returns to Haiti as President. Our threat must be credible. If the military demurs we must be prepared to intervene. If the military accepts but Aristide balks we must be prepared to step back from him.

Obviously a multilateral intervention would be preferable to unilateral action both in terms of our international relationships and from the domestic political perspective. A decision to intervene if the final diplomatic effort fails should trigger an intense round of consultations at the UN to win backing for Chapter VII peace enforcement action, or alternatively with countries most likely to join us in an ad hoc coalition peace enforcement mission blessed but not mandated or funded by the UN. Possible candidates for an ad hoc force could include Canada, France, Morocco, Argentina and some of the English-speaking Caribbean states. Assembling a meaningful multilateral force would be difficult -- the international perception remains that Haiti is a U.S. problem with little beyond ambiguous moral implications for the rest of the world, and cost and risk concerns would also have to be overcome. Therefore, we should commit ourselves to use force unilaterally if others declined to participate.

#### Elements of a Final Offer

The following are possible elements of such a package proposal. Their sequencing -- especially with regard to lifting sanctions and introducing a peacekeeping force -- would require further consideration. There will be external pressure to lift the sanctions independent of any political deal because of the misery they have caused, and deploying UN peacekeepers would be delayed because of the time required to bring the UNSC on board and, once the force is approved, to mobilize the military forces involved.

1. **Broadening of the government** to include other democratic elements with Aristide's endorsement. Selection by Aristide of a centrist Prime Minister to replace Malval from a slate nominated by the Parliamentary party leaders. Military agreement to cooperate with the new Ministers.
2. **Deferral of Aristide's return to Haiti sine die**, with the timing of his return to depend on the establishment of a suitable security environment and pattern of government-military cooperation. Both sides would agree that this means that Aristide would return to Haiti at some point

before his term of office expires and each side would commit to work for that objective.

3. **Establishment of a mechanism to agree on the timing of Aristide's return.** Regularly-scheduled reporting and consultation mechanism among the key Haitian players from the Presidency, military and Parliament chaired by the Prime Minister to determine when the conditions for Aristide's return have been met. International participation in this process as observers.
4. **Retention of General Cedras as the military commander-in-chief** for long enough to allow him to retire with dignity and to promote to general a group of colonels (including candidates identified by us after consultation with President Aristide) so that when Cedras left Aristide would have a suitable candidate to select as Cedras' successor (subject to consultation with the Prime Minister and to Senate consent as established in the constitution).
5. **Transfer of Police Chief Francois** by General Cedras to a new military command within Haiti upon passage of the police law (as Francois has said would be acceptable to him). Appointment of a new police chief by Aristide, in consultation with the Prime Minister and with the consent of the Senate as established in the constitution.
6. **Simultaneous enactment of the amnesty and police laws** now languishing before the Parliament. Aristide to convoke the Parliament to act on the amnesty law; Cedras actively to ensure the security of the Parliamentary session.
7. **Enactment of public security legislation** delegitimizing the civilian "attaches" and imposing strict gun controls.
8. **Action by the army and current police force to ensure public security** -- for the government, for the Parliament and for all law-abiding Haitians -- by enforcing public security legislation against recalcitrant "attaches" and their political sponsors.
9. **If possible, introduction of a robust Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force** in Port-au-Prince and a few key towns (up to 7,000 troops) to facilitate implementation of this agreement by keeping hostile factions apart, preventing reprisals by either side, suppressing rioting, protecting key military and government figures and providing military and police modernization training.
10. **Lifting of sanctions and provision of international economic assistance** as previously planned.

Discussion

This approach, which is similar in conception to what we might expect to emerge as a "Haitian deal" from Malval's proposed national conference, retains the essence of the Governor's Island principles but diverges from that agreement's provisions by giving the military and the broad democratic political spectrum a greater role in its implementation. As such it requires major concessions by Aristide. The military would gain influence it would not have had under the Governor's Island scenario but would accept new security requirements: suppression of the "attaches" and their patrons, and perhaps the introduction of UN peacekeepers. Both sides might be brought to accept such a deal albeit with difficulty and only under threat of completely unacceptable alternatives.

- Aristide's return: We have held Aristide's return to be inseparable from the restoration of democracy, so that his return is the core purpose of any settlement. This package however sets no date.
- Broadened government: Aristide has never agreed that his Parliamentary opponents have any role to play in his government. This package requires him not merely to broaden his government to accommodate some or all of these groups, but to give them a voice in selecting Malval's replacement and in determining the date of his eventual return.
- Amnesty: Aristide insists, correctly in a technical reading, that he completed the amnesty portion of Governor's Island and granted as much as the Constitution permitted him to do. He fears that the Parliament would pardon all murders and abuses since the coup and deprive the Haitian people of justice. He also fears that with the amnesty in hand the army will renege on its side of any deal. This package requires him to take steps needed for Parliament to pass an amnesty law.
- Cedras' departure: Aristide had demanded Cedras' immediate resignation. At Governor's Island Aristide agreed that Cedras could stay until the last stages of the transition to democracy. Aristide has since reverted to his traditional position. This deal would at a minimum give Cedras what he extracted at Governor's Island and possibly more.
- Francois' reassignment: Aristide has wanted Francois out of Haiti. Francois has said he is willing to step aside as police chief but only to accept a unit command commensurate with his rank. The Governor's Island Agreement would have allowed this to Francois. However, as violence traceable to Francois mounted in subsequent weeks we came to believe that he had to be removed from Haiti (e.g., by assignment to an overseas military attache position) in order to assure the physical safety of Aristide and his associates. In this deal we recognize the showstopper role Francois can play and give him what he says he wants. Aristide will balk.

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- Crackdown on "attache" violence: The military encouraged the flourishing "attache" phenomenon and has collaborated with the resurgent neo-Duvalierists. This package legislates an end to the "attaches" and requires the military to enforce it. It tests whether the military is acting in good faith and whether it has the capability to control the resurgent far right, which is becoming an independent locus of power in Haiti.
- UN Peacekeeping: Neither Aristide nor the military has shown a willingness to agree to the robust presence suggested in this approach. Aristide has recently indicated he would welcome (but never invite) an intervention to return him to power. However the mission of the force we propose would be more complex and even-handed than he probably would like. Peacekeeping is not essential to this deal if the military likes it enough on its own merits to stick with it, but an external security presence would be the only sure way to guarantee that the military would not again renege once sanctions were lifted or when Aristide's return became imminent. Should we decide to seek a peacekeeping force it will be the hardest point to sell to the army, which knows that such a force will end its political control of Haiti. Getting Aristide to request peacekeepers -- essential to give us a chance to win UNSC backing and UN member state participation -- will also be difficult given the overall unattractiveness of this package to him.

### If We Must Use Force

Should the military balk and the use of force prove inescapable, we should intervene on our terms: not merely to restore Aristide but rather to establish a political framework and get institutional reforms started which enhance Haiti's longer-term democratic prospects. In particular, if the military provokes us invade by refusing to deal, we should drop all the concessions outlined in the final diplomatic offer above. We should instead dissolve the current army and police and work with the new government to build security forces corresponding to the provisions of Haiti's constitution.

- We will not be able to win Congressional support for participation in a multilateral intervention or for unilateral action if the principal purpose is to restore Aristide -- confidence in him personally and in his commitment to democratic ideals and practices is too low. There is too high a probability that returning him to power by force would further polarize Haitian society. Returning Aristide in this forcible manner also increases the likelihood that the external force would have to stay for a long period.
- On the other hand, we might be able to win Hill support for intervention (especially if multilateral) to end the humanitarian crisis, put in place a broad-based government

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of reconciliation structured along the lines Malval's initiative was designed to create and return Aristide to lead it. This approach would avoid the over-identification of our action with a single flawed individual. It would also lay the groundwork for a new centrist government to create safeguards against the toleration of vengeance and exclusionary patronage which marked Aristide's earlier tenure and continues to characterize his approach. It probably would also require a smaller force, tasked with facilitating installation of the new government and completion of the other steps suggested above within six months. Most troops could then be withdrawn, with police and military trainers and possibly a small security element for government officials and facilities remaining until after the 1995 Presidential election.

### Domestic Pros and Cons

This approach, whether the final diplomatic offer or the intervention if the offer were rebuffed, would come under intense political criticism and could levy significant resource costs.

- The failure to guarantee Aristide's return on a date specific as part of the final diplomatic offer would lead to accusations that the Administration had caved to military intransigence, broken promises to Aristide and the Haitian people, condoned human rights abuses during and since the coup and ultimately sacrificed basic American principles. Aristide's acceptance of this arrangement would dampen but not silence such criticism since it would be presumed he agreed under duress.
- o Such criticism would be intense at first but as a long-term matter it might well be limited to the traditional Haiti lobby -- the Congressional Black Caucus and the human rights groups -- and be manageable. The memorandum you received from Senators Nunn and Lugar after their meeting with Malval (Tab A) showed that there is another, influential body of opinion which probably would support a diplomatic resolution of the crisis along the lines described in this memorandum. Many on the Hill and in the American public have come to realize the intractability of the Haitian problem and the amount of resources required to ensure a lasting solution. Many of these people are not willing to devote that level of resources to this sui generis foreign relations problem and would see the advancement of our broader hemispheric agenda as clearly the higher priority. They would welcome a solution which preserved our core interests, kept the problems posed by Haiti (migrants, humanitarian concerns, security of Americans, human rights) to a manageable level and allowed us to get on undistracted with our larger foreign affairs strategy.

- If we sought UN peacekeepers, we would probably have to provide a large majority of the troops and foot most of the bill (unless we could persuade the Russians to accept UN-assessed financing, which is doubtful). We would certainly have to foot nearly all the costs of other nations participating in a U.S.-organized ad hoc multilateral intervention. Perhaps most importantly, we would be criticized for participating in another peace-keeping effort where our troops were exposed to low-level casualties.
  
- Reaction to lifting sanctions before Aristide's return would be mixed. Some would criticize us for abandoning our pressure on the military without achieving the Administration's major policy objective in Haiti. Others would attack us for having failed to provide adequate humanitarian aid so that our sanctions sparked a humanitarian crisis and forced us to switch to unsavory options. But others would applaud the end of sanctions given the socio-economic dislocation they were causing.
  
- Finally, many would argue that we were using force to make the two sides paper over their deep-seated differences for our political convenience and that we were doing no more than laying the seeds for renewed, possibly worse internal strife once our presence in Haiti came to an end.

We would have several counterarguments to win support for our approach:

- That we had forced the military to suppress "attache" violence thus enhancing the security of all Haitians;
  
- (If the UN sent peacekeepers to support the diplomatic solution) That we had forced the army to accept an international force which would end military control of the country and create a security climate for Aristide's return;
  
- That we had created a broad political framework in which all Haitian parties could contribute to national reconciliation and reconstruction supported by an extensive international economic and security assistance program;
  
- That this approach, while not ideal, preserved our ability to attain fundamental policy objectives -- including to avert a migrant exodus and get at the underlying causes of the problem -- while ending the intolerable misery sanctions were causing. If achieved diplomatically, that we had achieved those objectives without requiring foreign military invasion. If achieved by force, that we had exhausted diplomatic alternatives and were pursuing a political strategy that encouraged internal Haitian reconciliation and minimized the degree of U.S. military involvement.

Attachment

Tab A Nunn-Lugar Memorandum on Malval Initiative

December 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Sam Nunn - *Sam*  
Dick Lugar *Dick*

SUBJECT: Haiti -- the Role of Prime Minister Malval

We met this morning with Haitian Prime Minister Malval, with whom we understand you may be meeting Monday, December 6. We wanted to give you our impressions of our 90-minute conversation with Malval and our recommendations for a U.S. policy response to Malval's proposal for a meeting of national reconciliation in Haiti later this month.

Malval's Analysis of the Current Situation. Malval, who comes across as a well-intentioned and reasonably objective person, believes that Haiti is no more than three months from total collapse and ensuing domestic chaos. He also believes that senior Haitian military leaders, including General Cedras, are coming to realize this and to understand that societal collapse is not in their personal interests.

Malval has concluded that the last chance for Haiti is a meeting of national reconciliation, which he hopes to convene in Port-au-Prince later this month. He would do this after resigning as Aristide's Prime Minister December 15, in his personal capacity as a centrist democrat. He wants U.S. help in pressuring both sides -- the pro-Aristide forces, including President Aristide, and the anti-Aristide forces -- to agree to this concept.

In particular:

-- Malval will be meeting with Aristide over the weekend to try and sell the national reconciliation idea. He believes Aristide will be reasonable but has concerns about Aristide's entourage, some of whom counsel against further compromise.

-- Malval noted that the Aristide camp has some unfortunate policy inclinations, citing one example in which Aristide forces recently undertook to set up a separate police force in the country (the plan quickly became known to current police chief Francois).

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VZ* NARA, Date *2/9/2019*  
*2014-0118-A1 (1.09)*

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-- He believes the military will agree to attend a national reconciliation gathering but at present will not take a constructive position. Cedras has said, for instance, that if he resigns President Aristide must also resign. Malval also believes that the military thinks it enjoys some measure of continuing support from our Department of Defense and the CIA. He thinks the U.S. can help pressure the military to be more cooperative.

-- Malval sees no other promising strategy. He feels the Governors Island accord is dead. U.S. military intervention, which he thinks 90% of the Haitian population would welcome, is not desirable. The status quo will soon lead to chaos; even the Catholic Church is split into anti-Aristide and pro-Aristide factions. A final attempt at a compromise solution, involving all responsible sectors of Haitian society, is therefore urgently needed.

Recommendations. We find Malval's analysis of the situation persuasive. Assuming that he is able to sell Aristide on the idea of a December national reconciliation meeting in Haiti, we believe the undertaking merits U.S. support. As Senator Nunn indicated to you last month, our goals should include (1) alleviation of Haitian suffering, (2) prevention of massive Haitian emigration, and (3) a shift of near-term policy focus away from restoring democracy via President Aristide's return, to building democracy via consensus and vitalizing political and economic structures in Haiti, with Aristide's return deferred until this process takes hold. We believe Malval's proposal can further each of these goals. It can be portrayed as the beginning of a political process leading to Aristide's peaceful return and to subsequent fair parliamentary and presidential elections.

More specifically, we suggest:

-- You find time to receive Prime Minister Malval next week.

-- Assuming Malval has gained Aristide's support, the Administration consult with the UN Secretary General and members of Security Council regarding Malval's approach (Malval plans to meet with the Secretary General in the next few days).

-- If Malval is unsuccessful with Aristide and his advisors, discuss with him how the Administration might assist in persuading Aristide of the wisdom of Malval's proposal.

-- Once Aristide has agreed with the initiative, the Administration then issue a statement supporting Malval's proposal and work with the main elements of Haitian society (parliament, the Church, business, the military and police), as well as the UN, the OAS and involved non-governmental organizations to support it vigorously.

-- The Administration create incentives for the Haitian military and other anti-Aristide forces to be cooperative by (1) making clear that the Administration in no way supports or is sympathetic to them (for maximum impact, this message should be conveyed by a senior U.S. military officer) but would not oppose a reasonable amnesty, (2) leaving military options on the table, (3) indicating that we will review sanctions and economic assistance in light of the results of the Malval initiative.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions

Purpose

To consider how to achieve a peaceful solution to the Haitian crisis if our sanctions-based policy proves unsuccessful.

Background

Where We Stand

The international community's efforts to bridge the gulf between President Aristide and the Haitian military have not borne fruit. As we have supported UN/OAS mediation, we have already pressured President Aristide into significant compromises in order to meet the imperatives of a negotiating process. At Governor's Island, Aristide moderated his stance that General Cedras and Police Chief Francois should resign immediately and that he should return to Haiti without delay. He agreed to their remaining in office through the transition to his return, to issue a broad amnesty and essentially to permit the authors of the coup to go unpunished. For its part, the military agreed under the pressure of sanctions to allow Aristide's return, that Cedras would retire and a new high command and police chief would be named and that it would accept UN assistance for a force modernization that could reduce its political influence.

The Governor's Island Agreement, while the product of compromise, nonetheless met Aristide's and our own core requirements: the restoration of democracy, Aristide's return, a new military and police hierarchy and arrangements under which the international community could have a shot at building the restored democratic government's viability amidst safeguards against retribution.

The military broke its commitments once sanctions had been lifted and as the date for President Aristide's return neared. Since then, neither side has explicitly disavowed Governor's Island but positions have hardened. The military has been emboldened, expects to outlast sanctions and is signalling that Aristide will never be allowed back. Aristide is demanding Cedras', the entire high command's and Francois' departure before he will take further steps to implement his commitments, is pushing for total

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sanctions and ~~has~~ implicitly <sup>is</sup> suggested <sup>ing</sup> foreign invasion. This intransigence, manifested in the efforts of the extreme right and Aristide to undercut Prime Minister Malval's stillborn initiative for a national gathering, calls into question the viability of the Governor's Island Agreement as a vehicle to end the Haitian crisis. *Both the extreme right in Haiti and President Aristide are working to undercut Prime Minister Malval's initiative, which at this point appears dead.* Our current approach relies on sanctions to force the military to comply with their Governor's Island commitments. This is combined with humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the impact of sanctions on Haiti's poor and thus to sustain public support for our sanctions-based approach. We and other donors are feeding just under 1 million of the most vulnerable Haitians one meal per day and supporting health care for one in three Haitians. The private voluntary organizations have enough food and medicines in country to last well into the spring of next year (when combined with local harvests) and can be resupplied. The critical factor is fuel for deliveries outside the capital. Estimates are that Haiti's regular fuel inventories may run out as early as the end of the year. We have developed with the UN, the voluntary groups and the Malval government a fuel supply arrangement for humanitarian groups only which should come on line in early January. If it works as planned it should enable indefinite relief operations, provided the Haitian military acquiesces and the food trucks and warehouses are not persistently subject to violent thefts.

#### If Sanctions Fail

By drying up fuel supplies, our sanctions are extinguishing Haitian economic life. If Malval's effort is not resurrected and sanctions are maintained, complete collapse is likely in January or February, soon after fuel supplies are exhausted. Already commercial shipping to Haiti is down by over half, the manufacturing and business sector is closing down rapidly, unemployment is rising and food prices are skyrocketing. The CIA predicts that urban and rural malnutrition will rise significantly in March and April and that health conditions will deteriorate markedly. This hardship will probably spark political and criminal violence, may give birth to a repressive Duvalierist regime and ultimately could cause chaos and privation beyond the capacity of our aid and diplomacy to address. Such a downward spiral will make our sanctions-based approach less sustainable morally and diplomatically and we may also face a migrant crisis.

If our sanctions-based approach proves ineffective, that will signify that we have misjudged the strength and resolve of the Haitian military. We will then face a fundamental choice: to retreat from Haiti or to take riskier diplomatic and military measures to end this crisis definitively.

#### Retreat

One option would be to step back from Haiti. We would announce that we can no longer justify hurting the Haitian

people with severe sanctions in view of both Aristide's and the military's intransigence as demonstrated by their failure to cooperate with Malval's initiative. We would seek UN support to ease or end the oil sanctions and cease naval enforcement, while possibly maintaining the more symbolic OAS embargo and perhaps even tightening our targeted asset freezes and visa sanctions against the military and its backers. At the same time we could augment humanitarian food shipments to forestall the looming humanitarian crisis and head off a possible migrant exodus.

In taking those steps, we would transfer the full responsibility to resolve the immediate crisis onto Aristide and the military since they squandered international mediation. We would point out that there is little the international community can accomplish when polarized domestic forces will not compromise. We would develop a low profile, long-haul strategy aimed at gradually building the institutions that are the prerequisites of democracy and promoting free elections as scheduled in late 1995.

This approach has several downsides. It would hurt the Administration's international credibility. Though not publicly presented as such, it would abandon your oft-repeated commitment to reverse the 1991 coup and return President Aristide. It would signal a clear defeat for the UN and OAS. It would fuel criticism of our direct return policy for Haitian migrants, the temporary continuation of which has been based on our commitment to restore democracy and in so doing address the underlying causes of the migrant phenomenon. It would be difficult to sustain a policy of sanctions and direct return of migrants if we backed away from active efforts to restore democracy.

Retreat is not an attractive option but there are arguments in its favor if the alternative is even riskier measures, especially military action. Military intervention in Haiti, if a last diplomatic effort failed, would focus Congressional and public attention back onto the high-cost, low-benefit crisis areas and away from the Administration's recent string of foreign policy accomplishments and positive agenda of change. It could also reignite traditional Latin suspicions of American hegemonic attitudes toward the region which we have been so successful in dissipating, casting a cloud over the Western Hemisphere Summit and the wide-ranging policy initiatives we want to emerge from it.

#### Bolder Measures

The other option would be much bolder diplomatic and military measures to end the crisis. It would require the decision to intervene militarily (ideally multilaterally, but unilaterally if we must) if that is what it takes to resolve the crisis. At the same time, it could include a new diplomatic strategy.

The balance of this paper develops this option which we should consider pursuing if the sanctions-based policy fails.

**Leveraging a Decision to Use Force**

If we follow the second approach, we should seek to leverage the fundamental decision to use force if necessary into a credible diplomatic strategy which will maximize our chance of not having to intervene. This would require that we identify a balance of compromises which, in priority order: (1) respects our basic commitment to democracy and Aristide's eventual return; (2) ~~will~~ get the army to cooperate with us and the international community; and (3) is salable to Aristide. That inevitably would mean giving the military more and Aristide less than the two sides agreed to at Governor's Island.

A package deal incorporating these minimum elements would be presented to President Aristide and by a highly credible envoy to the Haitian military. Our envoys to Aristide and the military could present this package deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or have predetermined latitude to alter specific points. If either side rebuffed us we would threaten the one of our two final options which is totally unacceptable to that side: for the military, invasion and dismantlement of the current security forces; for Aristide, a degree of disengagement which will ensure that he never returns to Haiti as President. Our threat must be credible. If the military demurs, we must be prepared to intervene. If the military accepts but Aristide balks, we must be prepared to step back from him.

Obviously, a multilateral intervention would be preferable to unilateral action in terms of our international relationships and from the domestic political perspective. A decision to intervene if the final diplomatic effort fails should trigger consultations at the UN to win backing for Chapter VII peace enforcement action, or alternatively with countries which might join an ad hoc coalition peace enforcement mission blessed but not mandated or funded by the UN. Candidates for an ad hoc force include Canada, France, Morocco, Argentina and English-speaking Caribbean states. However, assembling a multilateral force would be difficult -- the international perception remains that Haiti is a U.S. problem with little beyond ambiguous moral implications for the rest of the world, and cost and risk concerns would also have to be overcome. (We would almost certainly have to foot the bill.) The problem is compounded by Aristide's unwillingness to seek (but willingness to support) such an intervention. Therefore, we should commit ourselves to use force unilaterally if others declined to participate.

**Elements of a Final Offer**

The following are possible elements of such a package proposal. Their sequencing -- especially with regard to lifting sanctions and introducing a peacekeeping force -- would require further consideration. This approach respects the Governor's Island

principles but gives the military and democratic political elements a greater role in its implementation. As such it requires major concessions by Aristide. The military would gain influence it did not get under the Governor's Island scenario but also accept new security requirements: suppression of the "attaches" and perhaps the introduction of UN peacekeepers.

1. **Broadening of the government** to include other democratic elements with Aristide's endorsement. Selection by Aristide of a centrist Prime Minister to replace Malval from a slate nominated by the Parliamentary party leaders. Military agreement to cooperate with the new Ministers. (Aristide would have to accept, as he never has, the legitimacy of other groups participating in government and giving them a voice in selecting Malval's successor and determining the date of his own return to Haiti.)
2. **Deferral of Aristide's return to Haiti sine die**, timing to depend on the establishment of suitable security conditions and constructive government-military relations. Both sides would agree that Aristide would return to Haiti at some point before his term of office expires; each side would commit to work for that objective.
3. **Establishment of a mechanism to agree on the timing of Aristide's return.** Regularly-scheduled consultation among the key Haitian players from the Presidency, military and Parliament chaired by the Prime Minister to determine when the conditions for Aristide's return have been met. International participation in this process as observers.
4. **Retention of General Cedras** as the military commander-in-chief for long enough to allow him to retire with dignity and to promote to general a group of colonels (including candidates identified by us after consultation with President Aristide) so that when Cedras left Aristide would have a suitable candidate to select as Cedras' successor subject to consultation with the Prime Minister and to Senate consent as established in the constitution. (Aristide has demanded Cedras' immediate resignation.)
5. **Transfer of Police Chief Francois** by General Cedras to a new military command within Haiti upon passage of the police law (as Francois has said would be acceptable to him). Appointment of a new police chief by Aristide, in consultation with the Prime Minister and with the consent of the Senate as established in the constitution. (This accords with Governor's Island which was silent on Francois' future. However, given Francois' ~~leadership of violence~~ <sup>association</sup> we had come to demand his transfer out of Haiti. In this deal we recognize the showstopper role Francois can play and give him what he says he wants. Aristide will balk.)
6. **Simultaneous enactment of the amnesty and police laws** now languishing before the Parliament. Aristide to convoke the Parliament, with the return of pro-Aristide legislators now

in hiding or abroad, to act on the amnesty law; Cedras to ensure the security of the Parliamentary session. (Aristide contends he has fulfilled his obligation to declare an amnesty. Technically he has, but he is blocking Parliament from considering a broader amnesty law, which Governor's Island allows it to do. Aristide fears that Parliament will pardon all abuses since the coup and that the army will renege on any deal once it has the amnesty in hand.)

7. **Enactment of public security legislation** delegitimizing the civilian "attaches" and imposing strict gun controls.
8. **Action by the army and current police force to ensure public security** -- for the government, for the Parliament and for all law-abiding Haitians -- by enforcing public security legislation against recalcitrant "attaches" and their political sponsors. (This tests whether the military is acting in good faith and whether it has the capability to control the resurgent far right.)
9. **If possible, introduction of a robust Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force** in Port-au-Prince and a few key towns (up to 7,000 troops) to facilitate implementation of this agreement by keeping hostile factions apart, preventing reprisals by either side, suppressing rioting, protecting key military and government figures and providing military and police modernization training.

Neither Aristide nor the military has shown a willingness to agree to such a robust UN Mission, but an external security presence would be the only sure way to guarantee that the military would not again renege once sanctions were lifted or when Aristide's return became imminent. A peacekeeping force will for that very reason be the hardest point to sell to the army. Getting Aristide to request peacekeepers -- essential to give us a chance to win UNSC backing and UN member state participation -- will also be difficult given the overall unattractiveness of this package to him.

10. **Lifting of sanctions and provision of international economic assistance** as previously planned.

#### **If We Must Use Force**

Should the military balk and the use of force prove inescapable, we should intervene on our terms: not merely to restore Aristide but rather to establish a political framework and get institutional reforms started which enhance Haiti's longer-term democratic prospects. In particular, if the military provokes us to invade by refusing to deal, we should drop all the concessions to them outlined in the final diplomatic offer above. We should instead dissolve the current army and police and work with the new government to build security forces corresponding to the provisions of Haiti's constitution.

- We will not be able to win broad Congressional support for participation in a multilateral intervention or for unilateral action if the principal purpose is to restore Aristide -- confidence in him personally and in his commitment to democratic ideals and practices is too low. Returning him to power by force would probably further polarize Haitian society. Returning Aristide in this forcible manner also increases the likelihood that the external force would have to stay for a long period.
  
- On the other hand, we might be able to win Hill support for intervention (especially if multilateral) to end the humanitarian crisis, put in place a broad-based government of reconciliation structured along the lines Malval's initiative was designed to create and return Aristide to lead it. This approach would avoid the over-identification of our action with a single individual. It would also lay the groundwork for a new centrist government to create safeguards against the toleration of vengeance and exclusionary patronage which marked Aristide's earlier tenure and continues to characterize his approach. It probably would also require a smaller force, tasked with facilitating installation of the new government and completion of the other steps suggested above within six months. Most troops could then be withdrawn, with police and military trainers and possibly a small security element for government officials and facilities remaining until after the 1995 Presidential election.

#### Domestic Pros and Cons

This approach would come under intense political criticism and could levy significant resource costs.

- Any deal deferring Aristide's return would lead to charges that we had caved to military intransigence, broken faith with Aristide and Haiti and sacrificed basic principles.
  - o Long-term criticism probably would be limited to the traditional Haiti lobby -- the Black Caucus and the human rights groups -- and be manageable. The Nunn-Lugar memorandum at Tab A showed that there is another body of opinion which probably would support a diplomatic resolution of the crisis along the lines described in this memorandum. The intractability of the Haitian problem is increasingly understood. Many on the Hill and among the public are unwilling to devote significant resources to this sui generis problem. They would welcome a solution which preserved our core interests, kept the problems posed by Haiti (especially migrants) to a manageable level and allowed us to get on with our larger foreign affairs strategy.
  
- If we sought UN peacekeepers, we would be criticized for participating in another peace-keeping effort where our troops were exposed to low-level casualties.

- Some would criticize us for lifting sanctions without achieving Aristide's return. Others would charge that we failed to provide enough humanitarian aid and thus sparked a humanitarian crisis that forced us to switch to unsavory options. But others would applaud the end of sanctions and the socio-economic dislocation they were causing.
- Finally, some would argue that we were forcing the two sides to paper over their deep-seated differences for our own political convenience and that we were laying the seeds for renewed strife once our presence in Haiti came to an end.

We would have several counterarguments:

- That we had forced the military to suppress "attache" violence thus enhancing the security of all Haitians;
- (If the UN sent peacekeepers to support the diplomatic solution) That we had forced the army to accept an international force which would end military control of the country and create a security climate for Aristide's return;
- That we had created a broad political framework in which all Haitian parties could contribute to national reconciliation and reconstruction supported by an extensive international economic and security assistance program;
- That we had preserved fundamental U.S. interests -- including averting a migrant exodus and get at the underlying causes of the problem -- while ending the intolerable misery sanctions were causing.

Attachment

Tab A Nunn-Lugar Memorandum on Malval Initiative

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions

Purpose

To consider how to achieve a solution to the Haitian crisis if our sanctions-based policy proves unsuccessful.

Background

Where We Stand

The international community's efforts to bridge the gulf between President Aristide and the Haitian military have not borne fruit. There continues to be efforts to convene a conference of reconciliation by leading businessmen and another conference in Miami on January 15 called by Aristide to discuss the "refugee crisis," but the basic equation has not changed.

The Governor's Island Agreement, while the product of compromise, nonetheless met Aristide's and our own core requirements: the restoration of democracy, Aristide's return, a new military and police hierarchy and arrangements under which the international community could have a shot at building the restored democratic government's viability amidst safeguards against retribution.

The military broke its commitments once sanctions had been lifted and as the date for President Aristide's return neared. Since then, neither side has explicitly disavowed Governor's Island but positions have hardened. The military has been emboldened, expects the will of the international community to ~~sustain~~ continue sanctions in the face of growing suffering will break and is signalling that Aristide will never be allowed back. Aristide is demanding Cedras', the entire high command's and Francois' departure before he will take further steps to implement his commitments, is pushing for total sanctions, implicitly is suggesting foreign invasion, and is threatening the refugee card policy as a way of pressuring us for further action. This intransigence, manifested in the efforts both of the extreme right and Aristide to undercut Prime Minister Malval's stillborn initiative for a national gathering, and more recently ~~the~~ the efforts of the Four Friends calls into question the viability of the

*intervention*

*continue*

*to play*

*conciliation*

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Governor's Island Agreement as a vehicle to end the Haitian crisis.

Our current approach relies on <sup>stiffs</sup> sanctions to force the military to comply with their Governor's Island commitments. This is combined with humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the impact of sanctions on Haiti's poor and thus to sustain public support for our sanctions-based approach. We and other donors are feeding just under 1 million of the most vulnerable Haitians one meal per day and supporting health care for one in three Haitians. The private voluntary organizations have enough food and medicines in country to last well into the spring of next year (when combined with local harvests) and can be resupplied. The critical factor is fuel for deliveries outside the capital. Estimates are that Haiti's regular fuel inventories may run out ~~as early as the end of the year.~~ We have developed with the UN, the voluntary groups and the acting Malval government a fuel supply arrangement for humanitarian groups ~~only~~ which should come on line in early January. If it works as planned it ~~should~~ <sup>would</sup> enable indefinite relief operations, provided the Haitian military acquiesces and the food trucks and warehouses are not persistently subject to violent thefts. If not, a crisis in Haiti could occur in January.

to some degree

at any time.

would

exclusively

If Sanctions Fail

By drying up fuel supplies, <sup>we</sup> ~~our~~ sanctions are extinguishing Haitian economic life. If the <sup>me</sup> Four Friends' effort to bring about a conference of ~~partners~~ sponsored by the UN SYG does not make headway (and I suspect it will not) and sanctions are maintained, complete collapse is likely in January or February, soon after fuel supplies are exhausted. Already commercial shipping to Haiti is down by over half, the manufacturing and business sector is closing down rapidly, unemployment is rising and food prices are skyrocketing. The CIA predicts that urban and rural malnutrition will rise significantly in March and April and that health conditions will deteriorate markedly. This hardship could spark political and criminal violence, may give birth to a repressive Duvalierist regime and ultimately could cause chaos and privation beyond the capacity of our aid and diplomacy to address. Such a downward spiral will make our sanctions-based approach less sustainable morally, diplomatically and perhaps politically. ~~direct return.~~ Indeed, <sup>parties</sup> as noted above, our policy of direct return is coming under increasing criticism from the CBC, Reverend Jackson and perhaps Aristide.

significant

direct return

AODM

In any case, sometime in the next several weeks, we will then face a fundamental choice: to ~~retreat~~ <sup>back away</sup> from Haiti or to take riskier diplomatic and military measures in an effort to end this crisis definitively.

Retreat Back Away

One option would be to step back from Haiti. We would announce that we can no longer justify punishing the Haitian people with severe sanctions in view of both Aristide's and

*(which appear to have little effect).*

the military's intransigence, as demonstrated by their failure to cooperate with the peace initiatives of the past few weeks. We would seek UN support to ease or end the oil sanctions and cease naval enforcement, while possibly maintaining the more symbolic OAS embargo and perhaps even tightening our targeted asset freezes and visa sanctions against the military and its backers. At the same time we could augment humanitarian food shipments to try to forestall the looming humanitarian crisis and head off a possible migrant exodus.

In taking those steps, we would transfer the full responsibility to resolve the immediate crisis onto Aristide and the military since they squandered international mediation. We would point out that there is little the international community can accomplish when polarized domestic forces will not compromise. We would develop a low profile, long-haul strategy aimed at gradually building the institutions that are the prerequisites of democracy and promoting free elections as scheduled in late 1995.

This approach has several disadvantages. It would hurt the Administration's international credibility. It effectively would abandon your ~~oft repeated~~ commitment to reverse the 1991 coup and return President Aristide. It would signal a clear defeat for the U.S., UN and OAS. It would fuel criticism of our direct return policy for Haitian migrants, the temporary continuation of which has been based on our commitment to restore democracy and address the underlying causes of the migrant phenomenon. It would be difficult to sustain a policy of sanctions and direct return of migrants if we backed away from active efforts to restore democracy.

Retreat is not an attractive option but there is a strong argument in its favor: the alternative may be even riskier if they include military action. Military intervention in Haiti, if a last diplomatic effort failed, would entail obvious risks and difficulties (including calculations about an exit strategy). It would focus Congressional and public attention back onto the high-cost, low-benefit crisis areas and away from the Administration's string of foreign policy accomplishments and positive agenda of change. It could also reignite traditional Latin suspicions of American hegemonic attitudes toward the region which we have been so successful in dissipating possibly, casting a cloud over the Western Hemisphere Summit and the wide-ranging policy initiatives we want to emerge from it.

Bolder Measures

The other option would be much bolder diplomatic and military measures to end the crisis. ~~It~~ would require the decision to intervene militarily (ideally multilaterally, but unilaterally if we must) if that is what it takes to resolve the crisis. Based on the decision, ~~it could include~~ a new diplomatic strategy.

*we could launch*

*(to backing away)*

*we currently have ~~the military leadership~~ ~~relationship~~*

*such an initiative*

*however, because we currently have little credibility with the military leadership.*

The balance of this paper develops this option.

**Leveraging a Decision to Use Force**

If we follow the second approach, we should seek to leverage a fundamental decision to use force if necessary into a credible diplomatic strategy that would maximize our chance of not having to intervene. This would require that we identify a balance of compromises which, in priority order: (1) respect our basic commitment to democracy and Aristide's eventual return (although not by a date certain). (2) get the army to cooperate with us and the international community; and (3) may envision some objection from Aristide but is not totally repugnant to him. That inevitably would mean giving the military more and Aristide less than the two sides agreed to at Governor's Island.

A package deal incorporating these minimum elements would be presented first to President Aristide and then, by a highly credible envoy, to the Haitian military. Our envoys to Aristide and the military could present this package deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, beyond a narrow, predetermined latitude to alter specific points. If either side rebuffed us we would threaten, *respectively,* the military with invasion and dismantlement of the current security forces; for Aristide, a degree of disengagement which will ensure that he never returns to Haiti as President. Our threat must be credible. If the military demurs, we must be prepared to intervene. If the military accepts but Aristide balks, we must be prepared to step back from him.

Obviously, a multilateral intervention would be preferable to unilateral action in terms of our international relationships and from the domestic political perspective. A decision to intervene if the final diplomatic effort fails should trigger consultations at the UN to win backing for Chapter VII peace enforcement action, or alternatively with countries which might join an ad hoc coalition peace enforcement mission blessed but not mandated or funded by the UN. Candidates for an ad hoc force include Canada, France, Morocco, Argentina and English-speaking Caribbean states. Assembling a multilateral force would be difficult -- the international perception remains that Haiti is a U.S. problem with little beyond ambiguous moral implications for the rest of the world, and cost and risk concerns would also have to be overcome. (We would almost certainly have to foot the bill.) The problem is compounded by Aristide's unwillingness ~~publicly~~ to seek such an intervention. Therefore, we should commit ourselves to use force unilaterally if others declined to participate while preferring the legitimacy of some multilateral participation.

**Elements of a Final Offer**

The following are possible elements of such a package proposal. Their sequencing -- especially with regard to lifting sanctions and introducing a peacekeeping force -- ~~would~~ require further consideration. This approach respects the essential Governor's Island principles (i.e. change in military leadership, eventual return of democracy) but gives the military and democratic

*(although he would "welcome" it after the fact).*

*explicitly*

political elements a greater role in its implementation. As such it requires major concessions by Aristide. The military would gain influence it did not get under the Governor's Island scenario but also accept new security requirements: suppression of the "attaches" and perhaps the introduction of UN peacekeepers.

1. **Broadening of the government** to include other democratic elements. Selection by Aristide of a centrist Prime Minister to replace Malval (or Malval himself although the mutual beak now is real and hard). Military agreement to cooperate with the new Ministers. (Aristide would have to accept, as he never has, the legitimacy of other groups participating in government and giving them a voice in selecting Malval's successor and determining the date of his own return to Haiti.)
2. **Deferral of Aristide's return to Haiti sine die**, timing to depend on the establishment of suitable security conditions and constructive government-military relations. Both sides would agree that Aristide would return to Haiti at some point before his term of office expires; each side would commit to work for that objective.
3. **Establishment of a mechanism to agree on the timing of Aristide's return.** Perhaps regularly-scheduled consultation among the key Haitian players from the Presidency, military and Parliament chaired by the Prime Minister to determine when the conditions for Aristide's return have been met. International participation in this process as observers.
4. **Temporary Retention of General Cedras** as the military commander-in-chief just for long enough to allow him to retire with some dignity and to promote to general a group of colonels (including candidates identified by us after consultation with President Aristide) so that when Cedras left, Aristide would have a suitable candidate to select as Cedras' successor subject to consultation with the Prime Minister and to Senate consent as established in the constitution. (This would be a departure from Governors Island, which required Cedras' resignation October 15.)
5. **Transfer of Police Chief Francois** by General Cedras to a new, less powerful military command, within Haiti or beyond, upon passage of the police law (as Francois at times has claimed would be acceptable to him). Appointment of a new police chief by Aristide, in consultation with the Prime Minister and with the consent of the Senate as established in the constitution. (This accords with Governor's Island which was silent on Francois' future. However, given Francois' association with violence, we had come to demand his transfer out of Haiti. In this deal we would recognize the showstopper role Francois can play and ~~give him what he says he wants~~. Aristide will balk, unless convinced the new command will not allow Francois to return to the kind of power he now holds.)

*not force his departure from the country.*

6. **Simultaneous enactment of the amnesty and police laws** now languishing before the Parliament. Aristide to convoke the Parliament, with the return of pro-Aristide legislators now in hiding or abroad, to act on the amnesty law; Cedras to ensure the security of the Parliamentary session. (Aristide contends he has fulfilled his obligation to declare an amnesty. Technically he has, but he is blocking Parliament from considering a broader amnesty law, which Governor's Island allows it to do. Aristide fears that Parliament will pardon all abuses since the coup [e.g. Izmerly, Malony and dozens of other murders] and that the army will renege on any deal once it has the amnesty in hand.)
7. **Enactment of public security legislation** delegitimizing the civilian "attaches" and imposing strict gun controls.
8. **Action by the army and current police force to ensure public security** -- for the government, for the Parliament and for all law-abiding Haitians -- by enforcing public security legislation against recalcitrant "attaches" and their political sponsors. (This tests whether the military is acting in good faith and whether it has the capability to control the resurgent far right.)
9. **Perhaps introduction of a robust Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force** in Port-au-Prince and a few key towns to facilitate implementation of this agreement by keeping hostile factions apart, preventing reprisals by either side, suppressing rioting, protecting key military and government figures and providing military and police modernization training.  
  
Neither Aristide nor the military has shown a willingness to agree to such a robust UN Mission, but an external security presence would be the only sure way to guarantee that the military would not again renege once sanctions were lifted or when Aristide's return became imminent. A peacekeeping force will for that very reason be the hardest point to sell to the army. Getting Aristide to request peacekeepers -- essential to give us a chance to win UNSC backing and UN member state participation -- will also be difficult given the overall unattractiveness of this package to him.
10. **Lifting of sanctions and provision of international economic assistance** as previously planned.

#### If We Must Use Force

Should the military balk and the use of force prove inescapable, we should intervene on our terms: not to restore Aristide immediately but rather to establish a political framework and get institutional reforms started which enhance Haiti's longer-term democratic prospects. In particular, if the military provokes us to invade by refusing to deal, we should drop the concessions to them outlined in the final diplomatic offer above. We should instead dissolve the current leadership of the army and police

and work with a new government to build security forces corresponding to the provisions of Haiti's constitution.

-- We will not be able to win broad Congressional support for participation in a multilateral intervention or for unilateral action if the principal purpose is to restore Aristide -- confidence in him personally and in his commitment to democratic ideals and practices is too low. ~~Returning him to power by force would probably further polarize Haitian society.~~ Returning Aristide in this forcible manner would increase the requirements for a large scale intervention, since the Haitian military would resist most fiercely and we would probably have to prevent large scale violence between the Haitian factions. For the same reason we would face the likelihood that the external force would have to stay for a long period.

-- The military mission would be more limited, more or less as in Grenada, to remove the current military leadership and replace it with one that would support a centrist political solution, as outlined above, that could lead to Aristide's eventual return. This mission could perhaps be completed in six months or so, with police and military trainers and possibly a small security element for government officials and facilities remaining until after the 1995 Presidential election.

Domestic Pros and Cons

This <sup>incur</sup> approach would come under intense political criticism and could ~~levy~~ significant resource costs.

-- Any diplomatic deal deferring Aristide's return would lead to charges that we had caved to military intransigence, broken faith with Aristide and Haiti and sacrificed basic principles. A military action that did not return Aristide immediately would come under even more intense criticism, since we would then clearly have had the power to restore him but did not exercise it.

o Long-term criticism probably would be limited to the traditional Haiti lobby -- the Black Caucus and the human rights groups -- and be manageable. The Nunn-Lugar memorandum at Tab A showed that there is another body of opinion which probably would support a resolution of the crisis along the lines described in this memorandum. The intractability of the Haitian problem is increasingly understood. Many on the Hill and among the public are unwilling to devote significant resources to this sui generis problem. They ~~could welcome~~ a solution which preserved our core interests, kept the problems posed by Haiti (especially migrants) to a manageable level and allowed us to get on with our larger foreign affairs strategy.

*Might accept*

- If we sought UN peacekeepers, we would be criticized for participating in another peace-keeping effort where our troops were exposed to low-level casualties.
- Some would criticize us for lifting sanctions without achieving Aristide's return. Others would charge that we failed to provide enough humanitarian aid and thus sparked a humanitarian crisis that forced us to switch to unsavory options. But others would applaud the end of sanctions and the socio-economic dislocation they were causing.
- Finally, some would argue that we were forcing the two sides to paper over their deep-seated differences for our own political convenience and that we were laying the seeds for renewed strife once our presence in Haiti came to an end.

We would have several counterarguments:

- That we had forced the military to suppress "attache" violence thus enhancing the security of all Haitians;
- (If the UN sent peacekeepers to support the diplomatic solution) That we had forced the army to accept an international force which would end military control of the country and create a security climate for Aristide's return;
- That we had created a broad political framework in which all Haitian parties could contribute to national reconciliation and reconstruction supported by an extensive international economic and security assistance program;
- That we had preserved fundamental U.S. interests -- including averting a migrant exodus and get at the underlying causes of the problem -- while ending the intolerable misery sanctions were causing.

Attachment

Tab A Nunn-Lugar Memorandum on Malval Initiative

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. memo</del>	<del>Eric Schwartz to Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger re: Haiti Migration Planning (4 pages)</del>	12/20/1993	P1/b(1) <i>12/3/2020</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI MIGRATION PLANNING - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 24 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By YL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
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December 20, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE *ES for RC*

FROM: ERIC SCHWARTZ *ES*

SUBJECT: Haiti: Migration Planning

SUSPENSE

I. INTRODUCTION

I learned from Jim that this issue would not be on the PC agenda yesterday as you were concerned about the possibility of leaks. I completely appreciate this concern, but I am very nervous that we have not developed detailed plans that we could implement quickly in the event of some sort of Haiti migration emergency.

I see several possible scenarios in which direct return would become politically, morally or logistically difficult if not impossible:

- on-shore resistance to return as occurred with respect to the Harlan County;
- a general breakdown in order resulting in chaos and violence and making return of persons into such an environment more problematic;
- an effort by some (e.g., one or more factions within the military or attaches) to target for reprisal those who are being returned;
- out-migration in numbers that are too large to be fully absorbed by the Coast Guard and Navy;
- a breakdown in our ability to operate the in-country processing centers, depriving us (at least temporarily) of the argument that those within Haiti who fear persecution have alternatives to boat departure.

II. RECENT HISTORY: MIGRATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Just after I returned from China in October (and just after the breakdown of the Governor's Island Accord), we put together a short, State-drafted paper that identified options for dealing with a situation in which return becomes infeasible. The paper

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *12* NARA, Date *9/1/2014*

2014-0118-m (1.14)

discussed and commented on most of the obvious options (none of which are very happy ones):

- securing a landing site in Haiti by force;
- seeking a safe area in a third country, which could be used to temporarily maintain and, if need be, process migrants;
- using Guantanamo as a processing site or a safe area;
- permitting Haitians entry into the United States;
- establishing a safe area on Haitian territory.

The fundamental problem with the State paper was that it presented options but not plans. In other words, we are not now well-prepared to implement these options should we be required/requested to do so.

### III. WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO DO IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS

With Dick Clarke's encouragement, I have tried to move forward on a serious planning effort. However, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to do so without a clear signal to agencies (especially JCS) that senior officials in the White House want to see such planning move forward. Moreover, I now understand from Jim that I should probably put even my current efforts on hold pending a discussion with you and Sandy.

I would like to have that discussion as soon as possible as I fear that, under current circumstances, we would find ourselves in a mad scramble if any of the scenarios were quickly to occur.

### IV. A SECOND REASON FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING: THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AND HIS REQUEST THAT WE EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES

At no point over the past year have we undertaken serious planning on how to manage an outflow should direct return be infeasible, or should the President decide -- for whatever reason -- that he would like to reconsider the practice.

This has always been a source of concern for me, especially in view of the President's comments during the Little Rock meeting on January 5, 1993, when he suggested that we should be working to develop the capacity to manage an outflow from Haiti.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> In particular, he indicated that Guantanamo should be quietly restocked and plans should be made to contact other heads of state to request their assistance in establishing holding centers on their territory. He also indicated that we sought to "buy ourselves some time," and expressed his preference for the term "interim" rather than "indefinite" in characterizing the duration of the direct return policy (though he ultimately

While some efforts were made to task the agencies for plans/options on this issue after January 20, we never got very far. We did not push the agencies very hard because of the desire to focus energy and resources on a political settlement rather than on handling migrants.

Thus, I don't think we are in as good a position as we could be to offer the President serious alternatives to direct return should he need and/or request them. I strongly believe that we should be in such a position.

My conclusion in this respect was strengthened by comments that the President made during the Justice Department budget meeting last week. During the discussion of immigration, the President raised Haiti and indicated that we may be forced to accommodate a mass outflow from Haiti.<sup>2</sup>

RECOMMENDATION

Any recommendation on contingency planning must take account of the concern that a planning effort could be leaked and misconstrued, and this concern is heightened by the recent press reports relating to migration policy and Haiti. While we cannot avoid some possibility of leaks, we can minimize their likelihood by developing a contingency plan here at the NSC (and not in an interagency working group process). In doing so, we could make use of information obtained from oral, compartmented taskings conveyed in the following manner:

1. THE DOD CONTRIBUTION: Working with the taskings we have provided to Sandy, we suggest that you discuss the issue of DOD planning with Gen. Shalikashvili; that you suggest he put together a small group to work on contingency plans; and that he designate one or two persons to deal with Dick Clarke or myself on the issue.
2. THE JUSTICE CONTRIBUTION: Working again with the taskings we have provided, we suggest that Sandy discuss the issue of Justice/INS planning with Webb Hubbell; that he suggest Webb put together a small group to work on contingency plans; and that he designate one or two persons to deal with Dick Clarke or myself on the issue. I have worked very closely with Webb's office and think we can manage this issue with Justice.
3. THE STATE CONTRIBUTION: Other than seeking third country options, State's operational role in a contingency would not be central. Moreover, State has already done work on this issue,

---

accepted the formulation "for the time being").

<sup>2</sup>You should also know that Secretary Bentsen then suggested to the President that Grenada might not be a bad model for the Administration in this case. I do not recall the President's precise response, but he did not reject the Secretary's observation.

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listing countries that might be willing to at least consider cooperating and describing aid packages that would be necessary to induce cooperation. Sandy could discuss this issue with Peter Tarnoff and ask that Peter designate one or two persons to work with Dick and me in reviewing and updating the work that State has done.

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001. paper	re: [Haiti Options] (6 pages)	10/1993	P1/b(1)

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 15 OCT 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI OPTIONS PAPER -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 16 DEC 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By JK NARA, Date 8/5/2011  
2014-0118-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9310131

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 00121112 NOTED BY BERGER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

10/31



Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

October 15, 1993

NOTE FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: RICHARD FEINBERG <sup>RF</sup>  
SUBJ: Haiti Options Paper Draft

Attached FYI is a version nearing completion of a new Haiti options paper as tasked in this morning's meeting. The Option 1 discussion was drafted by State. We are polishing it. We prepared the Option II section and expect at most minor edits from Alec Watson.

We are also awaiting a WASHFAX input from JCS.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Draft Haiti Options Paper

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: [Haiti Options] (6 pages)	10/1993	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

## FOLDER TITLE:

9310131

2014-0118-M

rs917

## RESTRICTION CODES

### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

179. 0K

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9402520				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Proposed Strategy Revision (7 pages)	04/02/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	[Duplicate of 001, 4 copies] (28 pages)	04/02/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402520

2014-0118-M

rs918

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Proposed Strategy Revision (7 pages)	04/02/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402520

2014-0118-M  
rs918

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	[Duplicate of 001, 4 copies] (28 pages)	04/02/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

## FOLDER TITLE:

9402520

2014-0118-M  
rs918

## RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9402595				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (5 pages)	04/06/1994	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43318

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402595

2014-0118-M

rs919

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: LAKE  
BERGER

FROM: ROSSIN  
FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 06 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

CHRON FILE

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 08 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By R NARA, Date 3/1/2017  
201-0118-11

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (5 pages)	04/06/1994	PI/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402595

2014-0118-M

rs919

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D C 20506

2595  
LIMITED ACCESS


April 6, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *R.E.F.*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *L.G.R.*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force

With the Haitian military leadership unyielding, human rights and humanitarian conditions deteriorating, pressure growing on direct return and Hill criticism sharpening our current efforts have reached a stalemate. We have three strategy options:



(b)(1); EO 13526-1,4d

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526


VZ 11/26/2019 (1.24)

2014-0118-M

~~SECRET~~  
2

SECRET

This paper develops the third option in greater detail.



(b)(1), EO 13526, 14d


~~SECRET~~

SECRET


CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

4.


5.



(b)(1); EO 13526-1-4d



(b)(1); EO 13526-1-4d




(b)(1), EO 13526-1, 4d

6.

~~SECRET~~

7.



Concurrence by:

Morton Halperin

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5/23

TO: JOHN FICKLIN

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN

SUBJECT: Hawai Limited Access  
Menus

Tomy has sent these back.

For your files, and please  
close out in system.

Thanks -

Larry Rossin

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9402718				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Morton Halperin and Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Handling Haiti in the Immediate Term (3 pages)	04/08/1994	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 9/3/2020</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43318

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402718

2014-0118-M

rs920

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN  
HALPERIN

DOC DATE: 08 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMMITED ACCESS

CHRON FILE

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 12 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN / HALPERIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By vr NARA, Date 8/9/2015  
2014-0118- M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK      CLOSED BY: NSJWF      DOC 1 OF 1

April 8, 1994



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON HALPERIN  
LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *MHR*

SUBJECT: Handling Haiti in the Immediate Term

In the coming days as we move toward fundamental decisions on Haiti, we need to lay the groundwork for policy alterations which the President may direct and to discourage statements and actions by any parties which might complicate our ability to implement the revised approach.

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: You should call Aristide and make an appointment with him for the second half of next week. If we have decisions by then, you can in next week's meeting make the relevant points to Aristide; if not, you can continue last Saturday's outreach and reassure him of our desire for serious non-confrontational consultation. In your call to Aristide (not his staff) you could make the following points:

- We are continuing to review our overall approach and remain desirous of developing a common strategy with you;
- Our ability to develop our ideas and consult freely with you on them will be determined in part by the tenor of the public debate over the next several days;
- We appreciate the constructive manner in which you have handled this process since the Vice President's meeting. I hope I can count on you -- and your staff -- to maintain that non-polemical approach, as I can assure you we will.
- I am aware of your concerns about the migrant issue. We are reviewing your letter. To the extent that you -- and your staff -- discuss that matter publicly, I would ask you to keep it separated from overall strategy issues. That will avoid inflaming sensitivities on all sides which could limit our ability to consult freely on strategy.
- That is important, for only an effective political strategy can end your country's crisis within the next months and allow us to address the underlying problems creating migration.

MICHAEL BARNES: You or Sandy might call Barnes to make essentially the same points. Today's New York Times article

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *BA* NARA, Date *11/26/09*

showed his propensity to link the migrant issue to our "failure to restore Aristide as promised," which is not helpful.

CONGRESS: Calls to key members of Congress (e.g., Dodd, Graham, Mfume, Dellums, Hamilton, Torricelli, Joe Kennedy) confirming reports that we are engaged in a serious new dialogue with Aristide on strategy might help. You could state that we recognize the need to adjust our approach in consultation with Aristide and to end the crisis soon especially given the human rights deterioration and growing pressure on the migrant policy. (But underscore that this is independent of Aristide's migrant letter, which will not drive our policy.)

PRESS: In press contacts (we could consider backgrounders) we would stress the following themes:

-- We are engaged in serious dialogue with Aristide which began with his meeting with the Vice President. We want to develop a common strategy with him in order to achieve the common goal of restored democracy, which includes his return to Haiti.

-- Aristide and we both want to bridge our past differences. That requires confidentiality and reflection; we will not go into details with the press and anticipate that Aristide and his advisers will take the same tack.

-- We vigorously denounce the rise in brutal abuses of innocent Haitians in recent weeks. This only underscores the need to restore Haiti's democratic government and President.

-- As we consult with Aristide on strategy we are conscious of the concerns about migrants he expressed in his recent letter. As with human rights abuses, restoring democracy is essential to address the underlying causes of boat migration.

-- We will continue to implement the migrant interdiction agreement as long as it is valid and will always fulfil our responsibilities to avert a humanitarian tragedy at sea. We are reviewing the impact of possible termination of the treaty after 6 months on the long-run implementation of our migrant policy.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY: If deemed appropriate we would be willing to meet with representatives of human rights organizations to give them a sense that the lines of communication remain open.

THE UN AND THE FRIENDS: They must be taking note of Aristide's rejection of the Vice President's proposal, his migrant letter and press allusions to our ongoing contacts with Aristide. You might consider having Ambassador Albright touch base with Boutros Ghali to buy time, using the same themes as above plus a promise to consult with the UN when our internal decisionmaking allows it; and having Secretary Christopher call his counterparts in Paris, Ottawa and Caracas to make the same points.

PEZZULLO AND STATE: Pezzullo is in the dark. State must ensure that he does not inadvertently undercut efforts to restore positive relations with Aristide (by freewheeling press comments) or to implement an altered policy (by launching a new initiative without prior authority). It may be necessary for Christopher to speak to him personally about this. Such a conversation might also avert his resignation or lessen the chances that he would leave in a blaze of criticism by making him feel less excluded and salving his wounded pride. Removing Pezzullo in the next week would signal our break with the confrontation with Aristide with which he is identified but might be premature pending the President's overall policy decisions.

Separately, we need soon to begin drawing on State's resources to address some of the issues the small group cannot resolve. Jim Steinberg could be authorized to task State's experts for ideas on those issues in a way which does not reveal the policy options being considered.

5/23

TO: JOHN FICKLIN

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN

SUBJECT: HaAi Limited Access  
Menus

Tony has sent these back.  
For your files, and please  
close out in system.

Thanks -

Larry Rossin

DVP of

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9402732				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (9 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1) <i>v 3/3/2020</i>
001b. talking points	<del>re: Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) <i>v 3/3/2020</i></del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43318

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402732

2014-0118-M

rs921

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN  
FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 12 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: REVISED HAITI PAPER - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 15 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By YC NARA, Date 8/5/2009  
2014-0118- m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 2 OF 2


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2732 REDO  
LIMITED ACCESS

April 12, 1994



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *MRJ*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Revised Paper on Option Involving Possible Use of Force and Talking Points for Meeting with Aristide

Provided at Tab I is a paper on the option involving stronger sanctions and possible use of force, revised to reflect the discussion in your office on Saturday and the further comments you and Sandy provided this afternoon. With any additional changes you direct the paper at Tab I is ready for inclusion in the package for the small meeting with the President Wednesday morning (log number 2749).

At Tab II are suggested talking points for your discussion with Aristide later this week, also revised to reflect your edits. The points presume that a decision in favor of the third option has been taken by the time of your meeting.

Concurrence by: *MRJ MRJ*  
Leon Fuerth, Morton Halperin

Attachments

Tab I Revised Paper on Option Involving Possible Use of Force  
Tab II Revised Talking Points for Aristide Meeting

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VR* NARA, Date *8/5/2019*  
*2014-0118-11*

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Declassify on: OADR

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (7 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402732

2014-0118-M  
rs921

### RESTRICTION CODES

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HAITI: OPTION INVOLVING POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE

Our current Haiti strategy has hit a dead end. The Haitian military leadership and Aristide are dug into polarized positions. Human rights and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. Our direct return policy is increasingly under attack. The tenability of in-country processing is in serious question with returnees facing genuine risks of falling victim to violence. Criticism from liberal circles is intensifying. We have three strategy options:

-- Longer-run, lower-profile approach (two possible variations):

(1) Pursue the course the Vice President proposed to Aristide but substitute internal democratic political actors for Aristide given his unwillingness to cooperate. Thus, threaten the military high command and Police Chief François with comprehensive sanctions unless within 15 days they leave and permit internal democrats (rather than Aristide) to restore democracy, and terminate sanctions when we have that internal outcome. In due course endorse an Article 148 or 149 maneuver to legitimize a new Prime Minister and government without Aristide's blessing. Adopt an institution-building approach for the long haul.

We would argue that Aristide's demonstrated inability to make the tactical compromises needed for a political solution had dealt him out of the effort to resolve the crisis. Aristide's backers would assault us both for abandoning Aristide and embracing an "illegitimate" government, but they might become isolated voices over time. We might seek to mollify them by adjusting our refugee policy, e.g., easing treatment of Haitian asylum seekers in the U.S. by applying quasi-Cuban standards and/or improving screening on our ships.

A centrist solution might well congeal if we tighten sanctions as pressure while offering the inducements of lifting sanctions without Aristide's return. However, there could be no assurance that this approach would lead to the replacement of all the coup leaders, the establishment of a stable democratic government or significant diminution of human rights abuses, important for its own sake and to sustain direct return of migrants.

(2) Alternatively, simply drop the internal political initiative (the parliamentarians), keep the existing sanctions with better enforcement, pay lip service to Aristide's return and wait for something to emerge. The ongoing deterioration within Haiti and growing domestic focus on the issue could make this approach unsustainable over the longer run.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 10/08/2019 (2.49)

2013-0122-M

[2014-0118-M, 1.26]

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-- Comprehensive sanctions alone: Get the UN to impose comprehensive sanctions and take complementary active measures short of intervention intended to persuade the military leadership to leave, allow the UN Mission to deploy and bring about Aristide's return soon thereafter while forswearing any effort to build a broad-based internal political process. Because this is the course Aristide demands, it would temporarily mute the Aristide backers' criticism. However it offers no assurance that the military would capitulate before public outcry over the resultant human rights/humanitarian catastrophe led to pressure to back off the sanctions or alternatively to intervene before Aristide's return (probably his hidden agenda). The extreme impact of comprehensive sanctions could also spark a migrant exodus while rendering direct return politically, practically or morally impossible. This strategy also would do nothing to create conditions for a viable Aristide return. As a consequence any "resolution" of the Haitian crisis would likely prove ephemeral and we would face future demands from Aristide's backers for U.S. intervention to prop him up as internal conditions deteriorate.

-- Force-based strategy: Decide we are willing to use unilateral force if necessary to remove the military; having made that decision internally and following assurances that Aristide would take essential actions following the military leadership's departure, impose comprehensive sanctions. As soon as we determine that the sanctions are starting to take too heavy a toll without yielding a solution (we would anticipate having to confront that situation within one-two months), issue an ultimatum to the military leaders to leave or be ousted by force; introduce U.S. forces (if possible under UN umbrella) to prevent civil disorder either through intervention or, if the ultimatum is accepted, as lead elements of an international force; launch genuine reconciliation and reconstruction in Haiti with Aristide's active cooperation; most of our forces extracted in 120 days with some remaining to form the core of a multilateral force for peacekeeping and training.


This option offers the surest prospect of attaining the Administration's fundamental objectives of restoring democracy and returning Aristide. We will send a strong albeit exceptional deterrent message to potential interrupters of democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere and underline our commitment to the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy. This approach also gives the best chance to limit human rights violations, avert the humanitarian crisis and justify maintenance of our current migrant policy while we attack the underlying causes of Haiti's instability and poverty.

There are also risks and costs. Our forces inevitably will sustain casualties. It is not clear that we would be able to obtain UN or OAS support for our use of force or participation in a multilateral peacemaking force, creating questions about the legitimacy of our action and the risk that we would not be able responsibly to draw down our forces after 120 days. (We believe that Argentina, Canada and some African and Caribbean states


might well agree to join in a multilateral force, if not as part of an intervention then afterward.) Post-intervention hit and run attacks on our military personnel might develop, creating domestic pressure for a premature departure. Aristide might renege on his agreements on which the intervention would be based. Factional disagreements among Haitian politicians could prevent formation of an effective government or impede needed parliamentary actions. We might not be able to control right-wing groups and therefore fail to limit the abuses they perpetrate. Stabilization achieved during the international presence might prove ephemeral once we leave, given Haiti's profound political polarization and atomization. Recent improvements in our hemispheric relations would suffer a temporary setback, possibly damaging the December Summit of the Americas. We could undermine our efforts to limit unilateral Russian "peacekeeping" in the near abroad.

There will be public and Congressional opinion to praise and to damn us whichever course we choose. If the crisis is not resolved, criticism from Aristide's Black Caucus and other backers and the liberal press will deepen. The nascent mobilization of pressure groups once active on Central America in opposition to our policy will also accelerate, as will the concern of international legal, refugee and human rights groups based on their rejection of direct return of migrants. On the other hand, using force will be a hard sell to those who doubt Aristide's stability and distrust his democratic *bona fides* as well as to many moderate-to-conservative members of Congress, the public they represent and individuals within the bureaucracy who will selectively leak to feed that opposition. (In the end, if the two concerns are of approximately equal weight, it is better to be criticized for resolving the crisis than for not doing so.)


This paper develops the force-based option in greater detail.



2.



EO 13526, 1.4d, (b)(1)




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
EO 13526 1.4d EO 13526 1.4c

5.

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
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
IF ULTIMATUM WORKS

Send aircraft to Haiti to transport the military leadership and their families to safe haven in the United States. If they wish to go to a third country, we can seek to arrange that after they are in the U.S. (but we must be prepared for such third country to reject our overtures).

Ensure Aristide follows through on his commitments to name new Prime Minister and FAD'H CINC and to request prompt deployment of the UN or multilateral peace enforcement/ assistance Mission as a stabilizing measure, including temporary deployment of U.S. units until the UN or ad hoc multilateral force deploys.


President Clinton outlines justification for having threatened force and mission objectives as outlined below, followed by rest of scenario.





EO 13526:1.4d, (b)(1)

7-



EO 13526:1-4(b)(1)

9.

Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti

Talking Points

- We are pleased to be able to resume our discussions. Serious dialogue is essential to achieve our common objectives.
- We have been engaged in an intensive policy review since our last meeting with you on April 2.
- President Clinton has asked us to reaffirm to you his commitment, and that of the entire Administration, to the restoration of democracy and your return to Haiti.
- We are determined that General Cédras, Colonel François and the other members of the High Command and General Staff should either retire or resign from the military or should leave Haiti as part of a resolution of the crisis in your country.
- Our review has led us to conclude that nothing less can permit you and your constitutional government, with the support of the international community, to succeed in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction which Haiti needs after more than two years of repression and sanctions-induced economic contraction.
- In particular we consider their departure essential if the current worsening human rights situation, which we condemn and abhor, is to be improved.
- We have determined that we will do whatever is necessary to bring about these objectives.
- We have therefore decided that we will lead efforts at the United Nations to obtain a strong new sanctions resolution which will set the groundwork for the restoration of democracy and your return at whatever moment you and your Prime Minister deem appropriate.
- We will seek passage of a resolution with the most comprehensive possible sanctions, excluding only food and medical supplies and a very limited range of other humanitarian exceptions including possibly certain exemptions needed to protect the welfare of American citizens living in Haiti.
- We will also seek to have included in this resolution provision for the reconfiguration of the UN Mission in Haiti to add to the training mission new authority for a peace enforcement force.

- o Recognizing the fragility of the social fabric in Haiti at present and the risk that the tightened sanctions could tear that fabric and threaten the physical existence of the Haitian people, this force will be designed to deploy to Haiti only if required to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, suppress major civil disorders and widespread human rights abuses or preserve a minimal environment for political and economic reconstruction once the military leadership departs.
  
- For us to be able to set course in this direction, it is essential that we be assured by you that you will support all necessary steps we may have to take to make the military leadership relinquish power, restore democracy and make it possible for you to resume your rightful leadership of Haiti's constitutional government.
  
- We would also need your assurance that you will take the following critical steps as soon as the military leadership has retired/resigned or has left Haiti:
  - o Name a confirmable Prime Minister. We would ask that you identify that person to us -- and us alone -- now or as soon as possible so we may rest assured on this point.
  
  - o Name a new Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces so that that person may appoint a new general staff and make other needed transfers (for example, of departmental commanders whose performance has been inappropriate).
    - We must be assured that if necessary you will select the new CINC from among current colonels in the event that all presently-serving generals retire or resign without having promoted such colonels to general rank first. We note that the constitution makes no provision for this eventuality, so that exceptional action would be required. Obviously, the selection would be entirely yours subject to the confirmation provisions of the Haitian constitution.
  
  - o Confirm your invitation to the United Nations to dispatch the reconfigured and enlarged UN Mission to Haiti through 1995 to ensure stability, in cooperation with your new government and commanders, while your country's institutions are rebuilt and your economy is restored; the Mission will still include the police and military training component.
    - We consider this critical; otherwise, the vacuum resulting from the decapitation of the military could give free rein to FRAPH and similar groups,

creating instability which would make restoration of democracy and your return impossible.

- o Extend an invitation to the UN and OAS to send an election support and monitoring team to work with your government to create the technical framework for successful elections in 1995.
- We will monitor the effectiveness of the comprehensive sanctions in attaining our objectives and their impact on the poor in Haiti, and will consider further escalation of pressure on the military should the situation warrant and in consultation with you.
- We are prepared to move without delay on a new sanctions resolution as described once we have these assurances. We would appreciate hearing from you directly and confidentially as soon as possible.
- We have appreciated your discretion on these matters since the Vice President's meeting with you, and we hope your aides will take the same constructive tack. Knowledge of the character of our policy review is restricted to very few senior officials of our government. We will treat the current discussion confidentially and hope we may anticipate your doing the same.
- Public discussion of our policy dialogue will impede our ability to take the actions we have outlined. Confidentiality on the substance of our discussions will help us reach a common position and achieve our objectives.
- [IF RAISED] We have received the letter you sent to the President on the migrant issue. It raises a number of complex legal issues which require careful study.
- We must tell you, however, that we found the general tone and thrust of the letter unjustifiable. We were not happy with this letter or its timing so soon after our last meeting.
- Our current policy of direct return is necessarily continuing.
- It is to be hoped that the underlying causes of our disagreement over the implementation of the migrant agreement will have been removed before six months have passed. We will then be able to put this issue behind us as part of a comprehensive resolution of Haiti's crisis.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1994

TO: John Ficklin  
FROM: Larry Rossin *LR*  
Re: 2732 Limited Access

This came back to me from Lake. It is to be closed out; Lake noted it and it was used in a mtg with the President.

*For your files -  
I have a copy.*

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Document ID: 9402746				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Eric Schwartz to Anthony Lake re: Meeting Request: Doris Meissner (3 pages)	04/14/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
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9402746

2014-0118-M  
rs922

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: LAKE

FROM: SCHWARTZ

DOC DATE: 14 APR 94  
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KEYWORDS: IMMIGRATION  
ANSA

HAITI  
LIMITED ACCESS

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MEISSNER, D

SUBJECT: HAITI MIGRATION ISSUES - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 14 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2014-0118-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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*ovp ac*

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0865-M

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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 12 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
LIMITED ACCESS

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: MTG W/ FORN POLICY TEAM 13 APR - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 14 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By vr NARA, Date 8/5/2014  
2014-0117-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 2 OF 2

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2749 LIMITED ACCESS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
April 12, 1994

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4115194

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Your Foreign Policy Team, April 13, 1994, 9:30 a.m.

The participants in this meeting will be the Vice President, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and me. The meeting will be an informal discussion of North Korea (Tab A) and Haiti (Tab B). Attached at Tabs A and B are background papers on North Korea and Haiti respectively.

Attachments

- Tab A Background Paper on North Korea
- Tab B Background Paper on Haiti

*It is especially important that you read the Haiti paper.*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VR* NARA, Date *8/5/2019*  
*2014-018-17*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: North Korea (1 page)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402749

2014-0118-M

rs923

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Haiti Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (7 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

## FOLDER TITLE:

9402749

2014-0118-M  
rs923

## RESTRICTION CODES

### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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HAITI: OPTION INVOLVING POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE

Our current Haiti strategy has hit a dead end. The Haitian military leadership and Aristide are dug into polarized positions. Human rights and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. Our direct return policy is increasingly under attack. The tenability of in-country processing is in serious question with returnees facing genuine risks of falling victim to violence. Criticism from liberal circles is intensifying. We have three strategy options:

-- Longer-run, lower-profile approach (two possible variations):

(1) Pursue the course the Vice President proposed to Aristide but substitute internal democratic political actors for Aristide given his unwillingness to cooperate. Thus, threaten the military high command and Police Chief François with comprehensive sanctions unless within 15 days they leave and permit internal democrats (rather than Aristide) to restore democracy, and terminate sanctions when we have that internal outcome. In due course endorse an Article 148 or 149 maneuver to legitimize a new Prime Minister and government without Aristide's blessing. Adopt an institution-building approach for the long haul.

We would argue that Aristide's demonstrated inability to make the tactical compromises needed for a political solution had dealt him out of the effort to resolve the crisis. Aristide's backers would assault us both for abandoning Aristide and embracing an "illegitimate" government, but they might become isolated voices over time. We might seek to mollify them by adjusting our refugee policy, e.g., easing treatment of Haitian asylum seekers in the U.S. by applying quasi-Cuban standards and/or improving screening on our ships.

A centrist solution might well congeal if we tighten sanctions as pressure while offering the inducements of lifting sanctions without Aristide's return. However, there could be no assurance that this approach would lead to the replacement of all the coup leaders, the establishment of a stable democratic government or significant diminution of human rights abuses, important for its own sake and to sustain direct return of migrants.

(2) Alternatively, simply drop the internal political initiative (the parliamentarians), keep the existing sanctions with better enforcement, pay lip service to Aristide's return and wait for something to emerge. The ongoing deterioration within Haiti and growing domestic focus on the issue could make this approach unsustainable over the longer run.

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Declassify on: OADR

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Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 10/08/2019 (2.49)

2013-0122-M

(2013-0118-M, 1.32)

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-- Comprehensive sanctions alone: Get the UN to impose comprehensive sanctions and take complementary active measures short of intervention intended to persuade the military leadership to leave, allow the UN Mission to deploy and bring about Aristide's return soon thereafter while forswearing any effort to build a broad-based internal political process. Because this is the course Aristide demands, it would temporarily mute the Aristide backers' criticism. However it offers no assurance that the military would capitulate before public outcry over the resultant human rights/humanitarian catastrophe led to pressure to back off the sanctions or alternatively to intervene before Aristide's return (probably his hidden agenda). The extreme impact of comprehensive sanctions could also spark a migrant exodus while rendering direct return politically, practically or morally impossible. This strategy also would do nothing to create conditions for a viable Aristide return. As a consequence any "resolution" of the Haitian crisis would likely prove ephemeral and we would face future demands from Aristide's backers for U.S. intervention to prop him up as internal conditions deteriorate.

-- Force-based strategy: Decide we are willing to use unilateral force if necessary to remove the military; having made that decision internally and following assurances that Aristide would take essential actions following the military leadership's departure, impose comprehensive sanctions. As soon as we determine that the sanctions are starting to take too heavy a toll without yielding a solution (we would anticipate having to confront that situation within one-two months), issue an ultimatum to the military leaders to leave or be ousted by force; introduce U.S. forces (if possible under UN umbrella) to prevent civil disorder either through intervention or, if the ultimatum is accepted, as lead elements of an international force; launch genuine reconciliation and reconstruction in Haiti with Aristide's active cooperation; most of our forces extracted in 120 days with some remaining to form the core of a multilateral force for peacekeeping and training.


This option offers the surest prospect of attaining the Administration's fundamental objectives of restoring democracy and returning Aristide. We will send a strong albeit exceptional deterrent message to potential interrupters of democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere and underline our commitment to the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy. This approach also gives the best chance to limit human rights violations, avert the humanitarian crisis and justify maintenance of our current migrant policy while we attack the underlying causes of Haiti's instability and poverty.

There are also risks and costs. Our forces inevitably will sustain casualties. It is not clear that we would be able to obtain UN or OAS support for our use of force or participation in a multilateral peacemaking force, creating questions about the legitimacy of our action and the risk that we would not be able responsibly to draw down our forces after 120 days. (We believe that Argentina, Canada and some African and Caribbean states

might well agree to join in a multilateral force, if not as part of an intervention then afterward.) Post-intervention hit and run attacks on our military personnel might develop, creating domestic pressure for a premature departure. Aristide might renege on his agreements on which the intervention would be based. Factional disagreements among Haitian politicians could prevent formation of an effective government or impede needed parliamentary actions. We might not be able to control right-wing groups and therefore fail to limit the abuses they perpetrate. Stabilization achieved during the international presence might prove ephemeral once we leave, given Haiti's profound political polarization and atomization. Recent improvements in our hemispheric relations would suffer a temporary setback, possibly damaging the December Summit of the Americas. We could undermine our efforts to limit unilateral Russian "peacekeeping" in the near abroad.


There will be public and Congressional opinion to praise and to damn us whichever course we choose. If the crisis is not resolved, criticism from Aristide's Black Caucus and other backers and the liberal press will deepen. The nascent mobilization of pressure groups once active on Central America in opposition to our policy will also accelerate, as will the concern of international legal, refugee and human rights groups based on their rejection of direct return of migrants. On the other hand, using force will be a hard sell to those who doubt Aristide's stability and distrust his democratic *bona fides* as well as to many moderate-to-conservative members of Congress, the public they represent and individuals within the bureaucracy who will selectively leak to feed that opposition. (In the end, if the two concerns are of approximately equal weight, it is better to be criticized for resolving the crisis than for not doing so.)

This paper develops the force-based option in greater detail.




EO 13526-1-4d, (b)(1)

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
EO 13526-1.4d (b)(1)



EO 13526.1.4d, EO 13526.1.4c, (b)(1)


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
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
IF ULTIMATUM WORKS

Send aircraft to Haiti to transport the military leadership and their families to safe haven in the United States. If they wish to go to a third country, we can seek to arrange that after they are in the U.S. (but we must be prepared for such third country to reject our overtures).


Ensure Aristide follows through on his commitments to name new Prime Minister and FAD'H CINC and to request prompt deployment of the UN or multilateral peace enforcement/ assistance Mission as a stabilizing measure, including temporary deployment of U.S. units until the UN or ad hoc multilateral force deploys.

President Clinton outlines justification for having threatened force and mission objectives as outlined below, followed by rest of scenario.





7-



EO 13526, 1.4d, (b)(1)

8.

*Dup of*

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

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Document ID: 9402938				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Refining the Option Involving Possible Use of Force (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (10 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

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2014-0118-M  
rs924

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 19 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR INFO  
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By ML NARA, Date 1/5/2014  
2014-0118-2

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 94041512 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
Z 94041816 FOR INFORMATION  
X 94042516 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 12/8/2014  
2013-0122-1m (2.61)  
[2014-0118-m, 1.35]

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Haiti: Refining the Option Involving Possible Use of Force

In Friday's meeting on Haiti General Shalikashvili and other participants highlighted several aspects of the use of force which they believed merited close consideration. This memorandum discusses those issues. We have also revised the option paper at Tab A to cover these points.

- 1. Prospects for obtaining a follow-on force; its size and duration; circumscribing its mission to insure exit strategy viability.

Our paper proposed seeking to augment the currently-authorized UN Mission with a peacemaking force of 1-3,000 plus support units. General Shalikashvili posited the need for a follow-on force of possibly 10,000 or more performing both internal security and broad civic action missions. He anticipated that it would have to stay for a long time to deal with problems flowing from, and to some degree to resolve, Haiti's lack of effective law enforcement, functioning institutions and basic services. Secretary Christopher predicted that negative Latin and international reaction to unilateral use of force would require a mostly or entirely American follow-on presence. Without downplaying the challenges at the UN, Ambassador Albright suggested that renewed U.S. leadership and a well-delineated rationale might win UN approval for a multilateral force and tougher sanctions.

We need to try to use the destructive potential of sanctions to create a compelling rationale for the use of force -- to support a call on the UN to have the multilateral force participate in the intervention or failing that to support unilateral U.S. action with the UN force then replacing our combat troops. Our paper proposes that we seek the augmented UN Mission in the same resolution as tougher sanctions, arguing that the UN should be prepared to address the sanctions' potentially dire consequences after the military leadership has left. We would want the force approved and created on that basis since we would not want to inform the UN at the outset of our decision to use force if necessary. The subsequent period could then be used to condition the UN and force participants for an eventual call for use of force -- either the UN force or our own -- to stop the

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humanitarian catastrophe those sanctions and the military's intransigence were creating.

The key to keeping the follow-on multilateral force feasible in size and duration is to define its objectives carefully. We should distinguish between pacifying Haiti, which our proposal focussed on, and the nation-building that Shalikashvili and Christopher foresaw. The follow-on force's mission can and should be limited primarily to the former (plus the long-planned training of the Haitian military and police). By stabilizing the security situation the force would allow the restored constitutional government to work with the international community to create hope among the Haitian people by addressing the fundamental, long-term needs to which Shalikashvili and Christopher alluded. This is the purpose of the financial and technical assistance funded by the multi-year international economic aid program originally intended to start after Aristide's scheduled return last October. Inevitably, some of the World Bank, IDB and bilateral money then available has in the meantime been reprogrammed. The bulk of those funds, however, some \$200-250 million in the first 18 months, remain available for disbursement beginning some three months after the restoration of constitutional government.

We will need to work hard with donors and possibly reallocate some of our own aid resources to ensure that Haiti's arrears are cleared so that IFI aid can flow. But in the context of an effective economic aid program it is reasonable to predict that a smaller, more narrowly-focussed follow-on force than Shalikashvili postulates can stabilize Haiti's security environment, get the constitutional government under Aristide's leadership off to a safe start and leave after the 1995 elections, turning long-term reconstruction over to that government supported by international aid and protected by a retrained Haitian army and police. There is of course no guarantee that over the long run Haiti will escape its tragic history but any recidivism is likely to occur gradually and well after our departure.

## 2. Timing of Aristide's return.

We are all agreed that Aristide should return as early as possible, while our presence is still significant, in order to discourage the turmoil this critical event could spark. Getting him back early also will increase our leverage over him should he seek -- as can be anticipated -- to operate outside the constitutional system and to rely on his *Lavalas* base rather than stressing reconciliation, and if he promotes friction with our forces in Haiti following his return. At the same time we cannot return him before the constitutional system is functioning or he will probably act dictatorially.

That is why our approach stresses the importance of prior installation of a new Prime Minister and cabinet working with the Parliament and of a new Commander-in-Chief. The modalities of Aristide's return should be agreed by him and his Prime Minister

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and should be crystallized in a formal invitation home from the government when the agreed conditions exist. Our paper also notes the need to be prepared to push Aristide if he balks at returning. We should be able to pressure Aristide more effectively in the context of having intervened on his behalf than now when we are perceived as pursuing our policy objectives ineffectively. And if he refuses to return we will have strong arguments for ending our support for him and working with the restored internal constitutional authorities.

### 3. Internecine slum violence as a threat to our troops.

Shalikashvili suggested that the major risk of casualties would arise when intra-Haitian bloodletting broke out in slum areas, where our troops would operate at great risk. It is likely that Aristide backers will seek revenge on those who have oppressed them. The extent of such score-settling cannot be predicted though it could diminish rather quickly as it has after past transitions in Haiti. Although circumstances are not comparable to Mogadishu (fewer and lighter weapons, no clan organization), our troops would have trouble containing violence safely or effectively in the slum setting. We may well conclude that it is wiser to let the fires of vengeance die down themselves than to place our forces in serious peril and create the risk of consequent calls for premature withdrawal. We could press Aristide through his Congressional supporters to call on his *Lavalas* supporters for reconciliation (something he did not do while in office). Finally, as with our exit strategy above, our thrust would be to use international aid to help the new government shift people's focus to building the future.

### 4. "*Ti soldats*" as a possible resistance threat.

Shalikashvili correctly noted that Haitian enlisted personnel and non-coms have a history of independent and violent action (they have sparked most recent coups) and that removing their leaders would not eliminate the threat they could pose. Some sergeant may well attempt to mobilize resistance to our forces or lead a plot as time progresses; however, the record of their last several coups demonstrate that the "*ti soldats*" are unable to sustain operations on their own. As likely is that they will doff their uniforms and seek to disappear into the civilian populace. It will be important to address the special threat they perceive from Aristide's return -- they were the chief victims of *Lavalas* mobs during his Presidency. We will need to press Aristide to discourage such *Lavalas* retribution. We might make the "*ti soldats*" early beneficiaries of job creation in the international aid program. We might also consider creating and moving them and their families from the slums to special barracks areas where they can have a sense of security (this was, on a smaller scale, a component of the original UN Mission military cooperation package). The key will be to persuade the "*ti soldats*", whose interests have always been separate from those of the officers, that their future lies with us and eventually the new government and reformed military we are supporting.

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## 5. Reserve mobilization.

Shalikashvili stated that civil affairs reserves would be an essential element of our intervention force and, since they are reserves, their mobilization would publicly signal our planned use of force. We agree that civil affairs units will be an essential component of the intervention force. However, we believe the exact timing of their mobilization and the sequencing of their arrival in the intervention should be carefully considered to ensure that they are not mobilized and public attention is not drawn to our plans before it is absolutely necessary.

## 6. Requirement for humanitarian aid in post-intervention period.

Shalikashvili anticipated an interruption of our current humanitarian feeding programs for at least a short period following intervention presuming that the private voluntary organizations which implement the current program suspended operations. If they did this would become a task for reserve civil affairs units whose presence would then be required early on. They would be able to draw on food stocks currently in-country and presumably could rely on the same feeding centers infrastructure the PVOs use. Our goal would be to stabilize the security situation rapidly so the PVOs could resume operations. At the same time the possibility of a spike in feeding requirements in the post-intervention period would require us to use the leadup period to identify and set aside funds and additional food and other emergency supplies as needed. Our control of the country would make transport of such supplies to Haiti relatively easier than now; if necessary they could be airlifted to Port-au-Prince and regional centers.

## 7. A note on migrants.

Christopher and Woolsey are absolutely correct when they note that the single most important determinant of migrant departures has been the fluctuation of our direct return policy. It does not therefore follow that total sanctions will create no threat of a migrant exodus. Total sanctions will take us into uncharted territory. In the 13 years of the interdiction program there has never been the sort of mass privation, possible widespread human rights abuses and sense of despair that we can foresee total sanctions and ongoing military repression quickly creating. It is not prudent to consider our options in Haiti without taking seriously the strong possibility of a sharp increase in departures by desperate Haitians who have concluded that however we may handle them once they leave, they cannot survive any longer in Haiti and must bet that growing public revulsion over returning them will lead to a reversal of our current policy.

Attachment

Tab A Revised Paper on Option Involving Possible Use of Force

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force [partial] (8 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402938

2014-0118-M  
rs924

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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HAITI: OPTION INVOLVING POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE

Our current Haiti strategy has hit a dead end. The Haitian military leadership and Aristide are dug into polarized positions. Human rights and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. Our direct return policy is increasingly under attack. The tenability of in-country processing is in serious question with returnees facing genuine risks of falling victim to violence. Criticism from liberal circles is intensifying. We have three strategy options:

-- Longer-run, lower-profile approach (two possible variations):

(1) Pursue the course the Vice President proposed to Aristide but substitute internal democratic political actors for Aristide given his unwillingness to cooperate. Thus, threaten the military high command and Police Chief François with comprehensive sanctions unless within 15 days they leave and permit internal democrats (rather than Aristide) to restore democracy, and terminate sanctions when we have that internal outcome. In due course endorse an Article 148 or 149 maneuver to legitimize a new Prime Minister and government without Aristide's blessing. Adopt an institution-building approach for the long haul.

We would argue that Aristide's demonstrated inability to make the tactical compromises needed for a political solution had dealt him out of the effort to resolve the crisis. Aristide's backers would assault us both for abandoning Aristide and embracing an "illegitimate" government, but they might become isolated voices over time. We might seek to mollify them by adjusting our refugee policy, e.g., easing treatment of Haitian asylum seekers in the U.S. by applying quasi-Cuban standards and/or improving screening on our ships.

A centrist solution might well congeal if we tighten sanctions as pressure while offering the inducements of lifting sanctions without Aristide's return. However, there could be no assurance that this approach would lead to the replacement of all the coup leaders, the establishment of a stable democratic government or significant diminution of human rights abuses, important for its own sake and to sustain direct return of migrants.

(2) Alternatively, simply drop the internal political initiative (the parliamentarians), keep the existing sanctions with better enforcement, pay lip service to Aristide's return and wait for something to emerge. The ongoing deterioration within Haiti and growing domestic focus on the issue could make this approach unsustainable over the longer run.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 10/08/2019 (2.63)

2013-0122-M

[2014-0118-M, 1.37]

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-- Comprehensive sanctions alone: Get the UN to impose comprehensive sanctions, deploy with the OAS more civilian human rights observers and take complementary active measures short of intervention intended to persuade the military leadership to leave, allow the UN Mission to deploy and bring about Aristide's return soon thereafter while forswearing any effort to build a broad-based internal political process. Because this is the course Aristide demands, it would temporarily mute the Aristide backers' criticism. However it offers no assurance that the military would capitulate before public outcry over the resultant human rights/humanitarian catastrophe led to pressure to back off the sanctions or alternatively to intervene before Aristide's return (probably his hidden agenda). The extreme impact of comprehensive sanctions could also spark a migrant exodus while rendering direct return politically, practically or morally impossible. This strategy also would do nothing to create conditions for a viable Aristide return. As a consequence any "resolution" of the Haitian crisis would likely prove ephemeral and we would face future demands from Aristide's backers for U.S. intervention to prop him up as internal conditions deteriorate.

-- Force-based strategy: Decide we are willing to use unilateral force if necessary to remove the military; having made that decision internally and following assurances that Aristide would take essential actions following the military leadership's departure, impose comprehensive sanctions and begin augmenting UN Mission with peacemakers. As soon as we determine that the sanctions are starting to take too heavy a toll without yielding a solution (we would anticipate having to confront that situation within one-two months), issue an ultimatum to the military leaders to leave or be ousted by force; introduce U.S. forces (if possible accompanied by the multilateral force or else with UN blessing) to prevent civil disorder either through intervention or, if the ultimatum is accepted, as lead elements of an international force; launch genuine reconciliation and reconstruction in Haiti with Aristide's active cooperation; most of our forces extracted in 120 days with some remaining to form the core of a multilateral force for peacekeeping and training.


This option offers the surest prospect of attaining the Administration's fundamental objectives of restoring democracy and returning Aristide. We will underline our commitment to the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy. This approach also gives the best chance to limit human rights violations, avert the humanitarian crisis and justify maintenance of our current migrant policy while we attack the underlying causes of Haiti's instability and poverty.

There are also risks and costs. Our forces inevitably will sustain casualties. It is not clear that we would be able to obtain UN or OAS support for our use of force or participation in a multilateral peacemaking force, creating questions about the legitimacy of our action and the risk that we would not be able responsibly to draw down our forces after 120 days. (We believe that Argentina, Canada and some African and Caribbean states might well agree to join in a multilateral force, if not as part

of an intervention then afterward.) Post-intervention hit and run attacks on our military personnel might cause casualties especially if they seek to curb internecine violence in slum areas, creating domestic pressure for a premature departure. Aristide might renege on his agreements on which the intervention would be based or, once back, create friction with and/or call for the departure of our forces. Factional disagreements among Haitian politicians could prevent formation of an effective government or impede needed parliamentary actions. We might not be able to control right-wing groups and therefore fail to limit the abuses they perpetrate. Stabilization achieved during the international presence might prove ephemeral once we leave, given Haiti's profound political polarization and atomization. Recent improvements in our hemispheric relations would suffer a temporary setback, possibly damaging the December Summit of the Americas. We could undermine our efforts to limit unilateral Russian "peacekeeping" in the near abroad.


There will be public and Congressional opinion to praise and to damn us whichever course we choose. If the crisis is not resolved, criticism from Aristide's Black Caucus and other backers and the liberal press will deepen. The nascent mobilization of pressure groups once active on Central America in opposition to U.S. policy will also accelerate, as will the concern of international legal, refugee and human rights groups based on their rejection of direct return of migrants. A migrant exodus consequent to tighter sanctions coupled with a determination that direct return was no longer sustainable would cause a public outcry. On the other hand, using force will be a hard sell to those who doubt Aristide's stability and distrust his democratic *bona fides* as well as to many moderate-to-conservative members of Congress, the public they represent and individuals within the bureaucracy who will selectively leak to feed that opposition. (In the end, if the two concerns are of approximately equal weight, it is better to be criticized for resolving the crisis than for not doing so.)

This paper develops the force-based option in greater detail.



(b)(1), EO 13526-1f4d


2.



(b)(1); EO 13526; 1.4d

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(b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4d

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
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3.

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
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(b)(1) - EO 13526-1-4d

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
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
IF ULTIMATUM WORKS

Send aircraft to Haiti to transport the military leadership and their families to safe haven in the United States. If they wish to go to a third country, we can seek to arrange that after they are in the U.S. (but we must be prepared for such third country to reject our overtures).

Ensure Aristide follows through on his commitments to name new Prime Minister and FAD'H CINC and to request prompt deployment of the UN or multilateral peace enforcement/assistance Mission as a stabilizing measure, including temporary deployment of U.S. units until the UN or ad hoc multilateral force deploys.


President Clinton outlines justification for having threatened force and mission objectives as outlined below, followed by rest of scenario.





(b)(1), EO 13526-1-4d

7.




(b)(1) - EO 13526/r14d

8.

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(b)(1) - EO 13526-1-4d

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Dup of

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9402957				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Haiti [partial] (12 pages)	04/15/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2070

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402957

2014-0118-M

rs925

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 16 APR 94  
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KEYWORDS: HAITI  
LIMITED ACCESS

MEMCON

*CIRC: FILE*

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI MEMCON LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 20 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON.  
ROSSIN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By RL NARA, Date 8/5/2019  
2014-0118-M


COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RF*

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for Oval Office Meeting  
on Haiti, April 15, 1994

A proposed memorandum of conversation documenting the meeting between the President and his senior foreign policy advisers on Haiti on April 15 is at Tab I for your approval.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I for filing for the record.

Approve *RF*            ~~disapprove~~             
*n/changes*

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VZ* NARA, Date *8/9/2019*  
*2014-0118-M*

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Haiti [partial] (12 pages)	04/15/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402957

2014-0118-M  
rs925

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Declassified in Part  
Per E.O. 13526  
VZ 10/08/2019 (2.58)  
2013-0122-M  
[2014-0118-M, 1.39]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Haiti

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The U.S. Permanent Representative to the  
United Nations  
The Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Deputy Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The Assistant to the Vice President for  
National Security Affairs  
Lawrence G. Rossin, NSC (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 15, 1994, 9:30 - 10:45 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Mr. Lake: Next Thursday, Strobe Talbott and I will be meeting with President Aristide. We need to have an approach by then. We have two fundamental options: to move forward and resolve this problem, or to find a sustainable muddling through approach. The course we have been following over the last few months has little prospect of success. Reordering the Governor's Island steps, making adjustments and so forth has not worked given the polarized positions of the two sides. The military does not find our approach credible; it likes the power it holds and appears determined to hold on.

So, we need a strategic choice. I would oppose taking any further incremental steps which do not set us on course for ending this crisis. We need to avoid the illusion of doing things when nothing is really being accomplished.

We wanted to give you the opportunity to hear and get advice from your advisers on the hard options we face. It appears that a decision to threaten to use force if necessary, combined with a political process on the ground, or actually to use force is feasible. The key issues are: how we get out once we are in -- obtaining a follow-on force, the UN Mission, which would remain through the 1995 election; and the return of President Aristide, whether he would support use of force, when he would return, etc.

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Declassify on: OADR

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
SECRET

Sec. Perry: There are three phases associated with the possible use of force: taking over; sustaining the new government for months afterward; and extraction of our forces. The first is straightforward and I am confident it can be accomplished with few challenges. The second and third are more difficult. General Shalikashvili will describe the concept of operations and his assessment of the use of force in more detail.

Gen. Shalikashvili: I have had a small group looking at the use of force for some time. We have concluded that such an operation is militarily executable at an acceptable risk of U.S. casualties -- there would be casualties but we would not anticipate them being heavy. These are not major issues from the military viewpoint.

Our concern is that once military operations begin there could be general disorder, score-settling and violence between Haitians. Therefore we believe that a U.S. military presence would be required nearly simultaneously all over Haiti. That would be effective, we believe, in deterring such violence. The Haitian armed forces and police would be expected to disperse fairly quickly. Local groups or pockets of resistance could develop but we do not anticipate that becoming a significant military threat.

We believe there would be a simultaneous requirement for large scale humanitarian feeding operations since we expect that the private voluntary groups currently implementing these programs could cease operating.



We believe that as our forces begin to pull out they will need to be replaced by an equally robust civil-military force. Such a force would go beyond the normal UN/OAS blue helmets guaranteeing security and would also have to include a sizable civil action contingent to rebuild Haiti's institutions and infrastructure -- utilities, communications, and so forth, all of which are dysfunctional.

The President: There was such a component in the Governor's Island Agreement, wasn't there?

Mr. Berger: Yes, on a smaller scale.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

Gen. Shalikashvili: So we believe that our forces could begin a slow drawdown 30 days after the intervention but would need to be replaced by others as they pulled out. We would need the entire follow-on force in country by 120 days or whenever we wanted our force out. The replacement force must be prepared to stay for the long term -- not the initial force, but the follow-on force -- to guarantee security and carry out civil action.

Sec. Perry: Can you define "robust" as applied to this follow-on force?


Gen. Shalikashvili: We mean a force capable of performing civil action activities of every sort.

Sec. Perry: What size would this force have to be?

Gen. Shalikashvili:  (b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4d  
 (b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4d, E.O. 13526, 1.4g

Mr. Lake: That would be a problem no matter how we succeeded in Haiti, whether through Governor's Island or whatever.

Gen. Shalikashvili: Yes, that is correct. I just wanted to point out that a heavy follow-on will be required.



(b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4d, E.O. 13526, 1.4g

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4d, EO 13526, 1.4g

To conclude:

- The operation would be militarily executable;
- Casualties are hard to predict but would be acceptable for an operation of this nature;
- We must be prepared for intra-Haitian disorder and casualties in slum areas. These areas are a bit like Mogadishu. It would be hard for our troops to go in there; that is where we could run the risk of more significant casualties. Such disorder would likely be delayed for a few days by the shock of our initial action. I would not want to rely on U.S. forces to go into those areas.
- Someone must be prepared to stay for a long time after our initial force departs.

Mr. Lake: Two questions. Is there a danger, if we use special units to decapitate the military then wait a period for the main force, that disorders could develop in the intervening period?

Gen. Shalikashvili:

(b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4g

Mr. Lake: Aren't there less and lighter weapons in the Haitian slums as compared to Mogadishu?

Gen. Shalikashvili: Yes, that is probably true, but the streets are the same narrow warrens. Sending U.S. troops into those slums to control Haitian-on-Haitian fighting would be difficult and run the risk of casualties.

The Vice President: Your planning places a lot of emphasis on capturing Cédras, François and the other military leaders. Is the success of the overall mission dependent on surprise and would these initial actions affect that?

Gen. Shalikashvili: This is not a necessary part of the operation but it is one we believe is worth trying. We can carry out the overall operation even if such initial efforts fail. I think we can still maintain tactical surprise but it would not necessarily be bad if some signal of our intentions got out; that might increase the leverage of our threat. But we think these initial actions would be worth trying to cut down the threat of organized resistance.


The Vice President: But if the plan were effective, the odds are that we might give the Haitians strategic warning of our intentions?

Gen. Shalikashvili: Yes, and they might go into hiding or start moving around as Aideed, Saddam and others have done.

Mr. Lake: They might find it hard to hide. These guys have a smaller base of popular support that did Aideed, with his clan status, or even Noriega with his organized political backing.

Gen. Shalikashvili: We also think that the removal of the military leaders will not necessarily make the soldiers come over to our side or lay down their arms. They are the most worried about Aristide's return because of the threat he poses to them of necklacing and retribution from his followers. They carried out the coup against Aristide. We could take out Cédras but some sergeant could rally the soldiers against us.

Mr. Berger: Also these lower-level soldiers are spread out in local bases. They are like local bosses with civilian "attachés" helping them.



(b)(1) EO 13526-1-4c; EO 13526-3-3(b)(1); EO 13526-3-3(b)(6); EO 13526-3-5c

The Vice President: (b)(1) EO 13526-1-4d

(b)(1) EO 13526-1-4d

Mr. Lake: Yes, I agree, but only once the Prime Minister and Parliament are functioning.

Gen. Shalikashvili: Offered what we are considering, he is likely to agree to anything for now.

Mr. Fuerth: Another issue is how to accomplish our objectives at the point when public opinion here and abroad is most receptive or at least minimally hostile. In this regard, the moment you call up reserve units there will be leaks. That is when people will start making mischief, including the Latins and in the UN Security Council. So there needs to be a relationship between the timing of the ultimatum, and the time between then and our follow up action which, if it is too long, will give an opportunity for the opponents' arguments to gain salience. You also need to figure out how to control when the press goes in.

Another important issue is ensuring that the resources needed for reconstruction of Haiti are available right away. This is more than just humanitarian aid. It means real economic assistance for forests, fisheries, agriculture, etc.

Mr. Berger: The feasibility of this approach depends on a multilateral replacement force. Shali, you suggested we would need nearly as large a replacement force as the initial force. We had \$1 billion - \$1.5 billion economic assistance planned under Governor's Island including technical personnel (b)(1)

(b)(1) EO 13526-1-4d

(b)(1) EO 13526-1-4d

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Mr. Lake: What about the situation at the UN, with the Russians and so forth? What are the prospects for a follow-on force and how can we know in advance?

Amb. Albright: It is not a great picture in New York. There is basic opposition to a force, even multilateral, due I think primarily to the Latin attitude. But if we took the lead I think we could move the process forward though it would be hard. We would need to be persuasive, use the Argentinians (who, it was clear from my visit there, want to work with us) and others.

On the second point, the Russians will seize on such an action to justify their actions in Georgia and Azerbaijan. We can make distinctions, based on Aristide's democratic legitimacy, but there are many humanitarian similarities and we would have to argue hard.

Also, I must note that everyone is very frustrated. The Friends have come to the point where they don't like each other any more. The Canadians have put together a non-paper summarizing "points of agreement" starting with no use of force; they are advocating a "Governor's Island II" Conference and total sanctions. So the temper is bad and it would be a hard sell. But I think a force might be put together if we fight hard for it, build on the Argentinians, sell it as a response to special circumstances.

Mr. Lake: This will be tricky because we will have to get the UN Mission set up without revealing our readiness to invade.

Amb. Albright: We are blamed at the UN for dismantling the UN Mission and undermining the overall effort. That was the thrust of Caputo's letter to me. Tony is right, we will need to get to work early and there would be a risk of leaks.

Sec. Christopher:

(b)(1)

(b)(1) EO 13526-1-4d

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prepared to leave U.S. forces there and to see them become increasingly unpopular with Haitians including Aristide.


Finally, this issue would come to dominate the news and our foreign policy agenda. It would force other issues off the agenda. It would interrupt the December Summit; I believe the Brazilians would stay away and others might too.

I admire Tony for advancing the tough choices but I would recommend against authorizing the unilateral use of force now.

The Vice President: Let me ask you a question. As I watch the body language as people put this option forward I find that it is partly due to repulsion from the other option. There are a lot of awful complications either way. But if you look at the other alternatives you have to ask: what is the impact on the President and the country of a situation where you have a freely-elected government thrown out, there is growing terror and abuse and when people try to escape it we pick them up and throw them back into the cage for more? The repugnance of that situation is what drives this.

The President: Let me follow on that. Senators Helms, Nunn and the others who would attack us for using force; how would they feel if with people's faces being cut off, 100,000 Haitians invade Miami? That would create tremendous political problems and they would be out front criticizing me there too. Sooner or later direct return is going to be successfully legally challenged and become untenable.

The Vice President: Or, if not that, it will become immoral to continue refusing 100,000 Haitians into this country. This is driving the concern.



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South America here. We cannot let our policy be driven by immigration concerns.

The President: These are refugees, not immigrants.

Sec. Christopher: We have in-country processing for refugees.

The President: This is the only country with direct return.

Sec. Christopher: That is not so, it is not unique.

The President: I am concerned that when the abuses in Haiti become too bad this policy will become untenable.


Mr. Berger: If Jim is right, the military is heading toward installation of a *de facto* government. What will we do in that case? Will we recognize that government?

Mr. Lake: There is a logic here. If we are going to try to ride it out on the return policy, then we cannot turn the sanctions screws. So we will need a way to deal with the political situation.

Sec. Christopher: I would favor increasing the sanctions, increasing the number of human rights observers and retaining the humanitarian exemptions in the sanctions.

The President: So you favor increased sanctions?

Sec. Christopher: Yes.



Mr. Berger: Another complication is that direct return relies on regime acquiescence in our docking, putting the migrants ashore and so forth. If we impose tighter sanctions the Haitian Armed Forces could block this.

The President: Chris points out the virtue of trying sanctions first, as the Friends and Aristide want. What bothers me is that for the last six months we've been telling Aristide and the

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others what their best interests are. Maybe we should listen to them.

Sec. Christopher: You assume that harsher sanctions would increase the flow of migrants. I doubt that. Anyone who wanted to leave would have done so by now.

Mr. Woolsey: One of the clearest things in Haiti is that the flow of migrants depends almost entirely on our policy.

The President: But do you believe we would have to directly return more migrants under a tighter sanctions regime?

Mr. Woolsey: Perhaps a few more. (b)(1) E.O. 13526/174C  
little new boat construction. The boats are there but the flow awaits a change in our policy.

The Vice President: Has anyone analyzed the correlation between migrant flows and Aristide's statements?

Mr. Woolsey: No.

Sec. Perry: The current policy clearly is at a dead end. Having reviewed the use of force option, I am skeptical we can do it, not so much the first or second phases of it but getting political support for it in the first place. My contacts on the Hill lead me to predict active opposition to it. Many of the Aristide supporters would prove faint-hearted in the event. The group favoring such action is small, the opponents are numerous. There is also a lack of support for force in DOD, on both the military and civilian sides. The arguments boil down to "Mogadishu redux."

The President: I have always been held back by concern about what the successor regime would do.

Sec. Perry: At DOD people believe that Aristide would not cooperate. In the end, people at Defense will stand up and salute of the decision for force is taken -- but there will also be anonymous leakers feeding the opponents.

So, we need political support and it will be a problem to get it. On balance, I would rather face the problems associated with larger migration flows than those associated with force.

But I agree with Shali: We can execute this option -- if we can get the requisite political support.

The President: Tony, your argument is that we should not increase the sanctions without a commitment to the use of force if necessary. But if we did sanctions alone and they did not work, then what would the attitudes of the Canadians, French and Venezuelans be?

Amb. Albright: Then they would have to support us more.

Mr. Lake: The advantages of going ahead on sanctions now are that it could help head off an Article 149-type maneuver and address the internal political deterioration. And it would give us something to discuss with Aristide. But I would urge all of us to recognize that if it does not work, it will lead us to a very hard choice of backing off the sanctions or using force later on.

I still prefer that we avoid taking any more incremental decisions. We must decide soon either that we want a sustainable long-term policy -- and then develop that -- or else resolve the situation. Either way we are going to get hammered; it would be better that we do for having resolved the situation than not.

The President: Do you think the Friends would be more inclined to support a multilateral force if we followed their course first?

Amb. Albright: Yes, but it will still be hard to get a force and also to get tougher sanctions, which the Brazilians and the Chinese oppose. But the view in New York is that we have not been exerting leadership, and there is also discontent about language in the current resolution conditioning new sanctions on Aristide cooperating in a political effort.

Mr. Lake: I think Chris needs to show us how the course he advocates is a strategy and not just another incremental tactic.


The President:

(b)(1); EO 13526; 1-4d

(b)(1); EO 13526; 1-4d

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(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4d

--- End of Conversation ---

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# MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9402972				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Eric Schwartz to Anthony Lake re: Haiti Migration Issues (5 pages)	04/17/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402972

2014-0118-M

rs926

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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TO: LAKE

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCHWARTZ  
CLARKE  
HALPERIN

DOC DATE: 18 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
LIMITED ACCESS

IMMIGRATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI / MIGRATION ISSUES - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 21 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/9/2009  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK      CLOSED BY: NSJWF      DOC 1 OF 1

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## Clinton Library

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001. memo	Eric Schwartz to Anthony Lake re: Haiti Migration Issues (5 pages)	04/17/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

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HAITI: MIGRATION ISSUES

Q: Is the Administration reviewing the policy of direct return?

A: -- All aspects of Haiti policy are under review, including migration-related issues.

-- At the same time, direct return is continuing.

-- We will continue to take necessary actions on the high seas to safeguard human life and to deter boat departures in unseaworthy vessels that risk large-scale loss of life.

Q: How do you respond to criticisms that direct return puts the lives of Haitians in serious jeopardy?

-- Our main goals in Haiti are the restoration of democracy, the saving of human lives and the establishment of a system for fair treatment of genuine refugees.

-- We believe that we have no alternative but to discourage Haitians from taking the risk of departing Haiti in unseaworthy vessels.

-- Our policy of direct return of migrants is designed to save the lives of thousands of Haitians who would be imperilled if they left Haiti in unseaworthy vessels.

-- We have procedures to give Haitians within Haiti, including returnees, safe opportunities to apply for refugee status.

-- Moreover, we can and do expedite processing of qualified Haitian applicants so that high priority cases can be brought quickly to the United States.

o Tens of thousands of Haitians have inquired about our in-country processing program since it began in 1992. Staff at the three in-country centers was recently augmented due to a rise in applicants.

o Cases involving over 12,000 people have been adjudicated by the INS. Over 2,200 people have been granted refugee status; some 1,900 are now in the U.S.

-- At the same time, we are taking into account the concerns that have been raised by NGOs and others about our migration policy toward Haiti. The points made by these groups are being factored into our overall review of Haiti policy.

Dy. OK

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MIR MARKER

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Document ID: 9402973				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Implementing a Decision to Tighten Sanctions (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/18/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> v2 3/3/2020
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/18/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> v2 3/3/2020

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402973

2014-0118-M

rs927

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.


**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 18, 1994



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RF*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LGR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Implementing a Decision to Tighten Sanctions

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *W2* NARA, Date *10/8/2014*  
*2013-0122-m (2,46)*  
*[2014-0118-m, 1.43]*

You and Strobe Talbott will meet with Aristide on Thursday to pursue the dialogue begun April 2. Suggested talking points, based on what you approved last week, are at Tab I. These points presume that the President will have decided by Thursday to seek tougher sanctions against Haiti. They are usable whether or not he has also made a decision on the use of force. They refer to our intention to seek an augmented UN Mission for peacemaking. Unless the President has definitely decided by Thursday against the use of force, we should work toward the augmentation of the UN Mission as part of toughening sanctions in order to keep our options open for an eventual Presidential decision in favor of force. The points also urge Aristide to tone down his public polemics, which have resumed (see Tab II).

Once you meet with and have received a positive response from President Aristide, we should be prepared to brief the UN and Friends, the Congress, the press and pressure groups so that we rather than he can condition perceptions of our revised strategy. Our Embassy will also need guidance for its contacts with the Haitian military, parliamentarians and others. You should press Aristide to give you his answer on the conditions first, not the press and his backers as he did after the Vice President's proposal. Confidentiality is an earnest of good faith and a determinant of our ability to work with him.

This roll-out strategy presumes Aristide's assent to the conditions for tougher sanctions you will outline. If he refuses, we will have to reconsider our ability to seek tougher sanctions, contemplate use of force and work with him at all. The strategy also presumes Pezzullo being replaced by a new envoy.

- 1. The United Nations and the Friends: At the earliest possible moment, perhaps right after your meeting if your sense of

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Aristide is positive, Talbott should instruct a small group to redraft the UNSC resolution to incorporate more comprehensive sanctions and the augmentation of the UN Mission and to drop the Aristide conditionality. (We will need to decide the exact parameters of the tougher sanctions. We also will need to decide about retaining the controversial assembly sector exemption.)

The new U.S. draft should be ready within 24 hours to form the basis for contacts between Ambassador Albright and Boutros Ghali and Dante Caputo, Ambassador Babbitt and OAS Secretary General Baena Soares and Secretary Christopher or Strobe Talbott and their key counterparts (the Friends, Perm-5, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic) to seek support for our new approach. They might be buttressed by Presidential calls or messages.

**2. The Congress:** The President should receive key members of Congress at the White House to announce the results of the strategy review. A public event would ensure the widest exposure. In addition to the CBC and other Aristide supporters, the audience should include members of the leadership (both houses, both parties) and the Florida delegation.

The President would presumably receive positive comments from the Aristide supporters both on the approach and on the fact that there was serious and productive dialogue with Aristide. Skeptical questions from others about the humanitarian impact of tighter sanctions and the potential for increased migration would be a good way to begin conditioning the public for follow-up action once the sanctions began biting too hard, whether the President were ultimately to rule for or against use of force. They would also provide a good context in which to discuss the proposed augmentation of the UN Mission.

**3. The Press:** The press cover the Congressional session launching the new approach. We would suggest aggressive backgrounding by you, Sandy, Talbott and others to put our spin on the President's decision, to describe how we arrived at it (stressing our dialogue with Aristide as we weighed overall U.S. interests) and to leave open the possibility of further adjustments depending on the impact of the sanctions.

**4. Human Rights Groups:** We would suggest an event to brief human rights, refugee and other organizations on the new approach. Agreement between us and Aristide would mute their basic policy criticism. We will still hear about the migrant policy but we might seek to leverage our new agreement on the basic policy approach to soften the debate on migrants. Going beyond this, Eric Schwartz is preparing a memo to you proposing that we explore alterations to the current migrant policy; he suggests stating publicly that our Haiti policy review includes migration and that, while direct return continues, we are taking into account points raised by critics.

**5. In Haiti:** At the same time as he convenes a group to revise the UNSC resolution, Talbott (or Christopher) should call Bill Swing to brief him on the new approach and to discuss how best to

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preserve what we have been able to achieve internally including what we might do to discourage an Article 149 maneuver. State should then prepare and clear with us talking points for Swing. We must be realistic, however: if a 149 vote has not already occurred by Thursday our action is likely to spark it. The impulsion toward this maneuver in Haiti has been the erosion of the center which supported the parliamentary plan (and of those military people who briefly were willing to contemplate opposing Cédras) in the face of Aristide's intransigence, our failure to break with him over it and the continuing impact of sanctions. Our new approach will reinforce the message that 149 is no way out of sanctions but it will also crystallize the "hunker down" mentality among the military and its backers who have concluded that no livable compromise is possible and they can tough it out.

THEMES FOR NEW STRATEGY ROLL-OUT

- We have completed a comprehensive review of our strategy to restore democracy and return President Aristide to Haiti.
- This review has considered the evolution of the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian situations within Haiti, including the military leaders' rejection of all recent initiatives aimed at ending the crisis.
- It also has taken into account counsel from President Aristide and members of Congress. And it reflects consultations in the past three months with Canada, France and Venezuela (the Friends of Haiti) and other UN members.
- The Haitian people are suffering. They are at the mercy of the military and its brutal thugs.
- Haiti's economy is disintegrating as the military leaders blatantly misappropriate their people's resources.
- We have held that a political process is needed to transform the sanctions' impact into a peaceful end of the crisis.
- That remains true, but the military has rejected efforts by courageous democrats within Haiti to spark such a process.
- Instead they have turned up the terror and are pressing the parliament to install a new *de facto* government. That will only reinforce our will to impose and enforce sanctions.
- The Haitian military cannot be allowed to defy their own people and the international community indefinitely. The suffering of the Haitian people must end. Otherwise there will be a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe and the risk of a migrant exodus to our shores.
- The current UN sanctions have not succeeded in forcing the military to end their usurpation of political power.

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- We have therefore begun consultations in the UN on a resolution tightening the economic sanctions unless the military takes steps we demand within 15 days.
  - o Cédras must retire and François and the rest of the High Command and general staff must resign from the Armed Forces or leave Haiti. In addition, all the military's Governor's Island obligations must be met. Conditions must be created for UN Mission deployment.
  - o Departure of the entire military leadership goes beyond what was agreed at Governor's Island. Those concessions were made in good faith. The perfidy of the military leaders has rendered them forfeit.
  
- As we seek more comprehensive sanctions, we will also seek a stronger UN Mission which can to stabilize the situation and ensure humanitarian aid delivery once the military leaders leave.
  - o This is a responsible step given the political and economic vacuum created by military obstinacy and since tighter sanctions may cause further deterioration.
  
- [-- Finally, we are appointing a new Special Envoy for Haiti to coordinate our support for President Aristide and democrats within Haiti. We are grateful for the tireless efforts on behalf of Haitian democracy of Ambassador Pezzullo who has requested a rest.]
  
- The UN resolution we are proposing will not depend on actions by President Aristide. We have been assured that he will appoint a Prime Minister to work with the Parliament and a new Commander-in-Chief and will invite the UN Mission and UN/OAS elections assistance at the appropriate time, which is as soon as the military has the requirements we have laid out.
  
- These measures demonstrate our determination to end the military assault on the Haitian people's democracy, their livelihood and, too often, their lives. We look forward to quick UN action and urge the Haitian military leaders to hear and act upon the message we are sending today.

Concurrence by: Morton Halperin 

- Attachments
- Tab I Talking Points
  - Tab II Reuter Article on Aristide's Berkeley News Conference

Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti

Talking Points

- We are pleased to be able to resume our discussions. Serious dialogue is essential to achieve our common objectives.
- We have been engaged in an intensive policy review since our last meeting with you on April 2.
- President Clinton has asked us to reaffirm to you his commitment, and that of the entire Administration, to the restoration of democracy and your return to Haiti.
- We are determined that General Cédras, Colonel François and all the members of the High Command and General Staff should either retire or resign from the military or should leave Haiti as part of a resolution of the crisis in your country.
- Our review has led us to conclude that nothing less can permit you and your constitutional government, with the support of the international community, to succeed in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction which Haiti needs after more than two years of repression and sanctions-induced economic contraction.
- In particular we consider their departure essential if the current worsening human rights situation, which we condemn and abhor, is to be improved.
- We have determined that we will do whatever is necessary to bring about these objectives.
- We have therefore decided that we will lead efforts at the United Nations to obtain a strong new sanctions resolution which will set the groundwork for the restoration of democracy and your return at whatever moment you and your Prime Minister deem appropriate.
- We will seek passage of a resolution with the most comprehensive possible sanctions, excluding only food and medical supplies and a very limited range of other humanitarian exceptions including possibly certain exemptions needed to protect the welfare of American citizens living in Haiti.
- We will also seek to have included in this resolution provision for the reconfiguration of the UN Mission in Haiti to add to the training mission new authority for a peace enforcement force.

- o Recognizing the fragility of the social fabric in Haiti at present and the risk that the tightened

could tear that fabric and threaten the physical existence of the Haitian people, this force will be designed to deploy to Haiti once the military leadership departs to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, suppress major civil disorders and widespread human rights abuses and/or preserve a minimal environment for political and economic reconstruction.

-- For us to be able to set course in this direction, it is essential that we be assured by you that you will support all necessary steps we may have to take to make the military leadership relinquish power, restore democracy and make it possible for you to resume your rightful leadership of Haiti's constitutional government.

-- We would also need your assurance that you will take the following critical steps as soon as the military leadership has retired or resigned or has left Haiti:

o Name a confirmable Prime Minister. I would ask that you identify that person to us -- and us alone -- now or as soon as possible so we may rest assured on this point.

o Name a new Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces so that that person may appoint a new general staff and make other needed transfers (for example, of departmental commanders whose performance has been inappropriate).

-- We must be assured that if necessary you will select the new CINC from among current colonels in the event that all presently-serving generals retire or resign without having promoted such colonels to general rank first. We note that the constitution makes no provision for this eventuality, so that exceptional action would be required. Obviously, the selection would be entirely yours subject to the confirmation provisions of the Haitian constitution.

o Confirm your invitation to the United Nations to dispatch the reconfigured and enlarged UN Mission as described above to Haiti through 1995 to ensure stability, in cooperation with your new government and commanders, while your country's institutions are rebuilt and your economy is restored; the Mission will still include the police and military training component.

-- We consider this critical; otherwise, the vacuum resulting from the decapitation of the military could give free rein to FRAPH and similar groups, creating instability which would make restoration of democracy and your return impossible.

- o Extend an invitation to the UN and OAS to send an election support and monitoring team to work with your government to create the technical framework for successful elections in 1995.
- We will monitor the effectiveness of the comprehensive sanctions in attaining our objectives and their impact on the poor in Haiti, and will consider further escalation of pressure on the military should the situation warrant and in consultation with you.
- We are prepared to move without delay on a new sanctions resolution as described once we have these assurances. We would appreciate hearing from you directly and confidentially as soon as possible.
- We have appreciated your discretion about our discussions since the Vice President's meeting with you, and we hope your aides will take the same constructive tack. Knowledge of the character of our policy review is restricted to very few senior officials of our government. We will treat the current discussion confidentially and hope we may anticipate your doing the same.
- Public discussion of our policy dialogue would impede our ability to take the actions we have outlined. Confidentiality on the substance of our discussions will help us reach a common position and achieve our objectives.
- In a similar vein, public statements which question the President's degree of commitment to his Haitian policy or which impute unworthy motives (i.e., racism) to him and this Administration are not acceptable. If they continue our ability to work with you will be jeopardized.
- [IF RAISED] We have received the letter you sent to the President on the migrant issue. It raises a number of complex legal issues which require careful study.
- We must tell you, however, that we found the general tone and thrust of the letter unjustifiable. We were not happy with this letter or its timing so soon after our last meeting.
- Our current policy of direct return is necessarily continuing.
- It is to be hoped that the underlying causes of our disagreement over the implementation of the migrant agreement will have been removed before six months have passed. We will then be able to put this issue behind us as part of a comprehensive resolution of Haiti's crisis.

REUTER

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<SUBJ>

ARISTIDE ASSAILS U.S. POLICY ON HAITI@

<TEXT>

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^BC-USA-ARISTIDE@

^ARISTIDE ASSAILS U.S. POLICY ON HAITI@

BERKELEY, Calif., April 17 (Reuter) - Exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide strongly criticised U.S. policy on Haiti Sunday and urged Washington to increase sanctions against Haiti's military rulers.

Aristide told a news conference during a visit to Berkeley, California, that he was unhappy with President Clinton's policy on Haiti, which he described as "a racist policy" and "a clear violation of human rights."

He condemned the U.S. policy of forcibly repatriating Haitian refugees trying to flee the island, where, according to news reports, a new wave of political terror has been launched against supporters of Aristide.

The military ousted Aristide in a coup in September 1991, seven months after he took office as Haiti's first democratically-elected president. Attempts to negotiate his return to power have failed.

Aristide said he did not want the United States to send troops to Haiti, but he said he would like Washington to do "half of what they said they would be doing" to restore him to office.

He said the United States had said it would increase sanctions against Haiti if the military did not step down by January 15. "That would be good to do that, to see them doing that," he said.

"We cannot any more accept genocide at 90 minutes by plane from Florida," Aristide said.

He said the United States could do something about the situation in Haiti if it wanted to.

"It's a question of 'do we really mean what we say when we say democracy?' The Haitian people are dying for democracy. Are we ready to help them? So we wish they will express their political will through actions," he said.

Later in a speech to several hundred people at a Berkeley church, Aristide urged supporters to mount an international effort to build pressure on countries to carry out their promise to increase sanctions against the Haitian military.

Aristide asked how the U.S. government could welcome Cuban refugees and yet send back Haitian refugees.

"In Haiti, we have a house on fire... When some of them escape, the American Coast Guard takes them and sends them back to this house on fire. It's a crime...It's a racist policy," he said.

Aristide said restoring democracy in Haiti would benefit both the U.S. and Haitian people by stopping drug-trafficking.

He said that since the coup, Haiti had become the second-largest country in the Western hemisphere dealing in drugs, with close to 50 tons of cocaine a year passing through the country on its way to the United States.

REUTER

Reut02:48 04-18

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Dup. of

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9403022				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Alexander Watson to Tarnoff re. Haiti: Diplomatic and Political Strategy (1 page)</del>	<del>04/19/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Proposed Diplomatic and Political Strategy (9 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)
<del>001c. paper</del>	<del>re: Differences Between the Aristide Plan... (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
001d. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (8 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Sanctions-based Strategy Proposal by Secretary Christopher (1 page)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)
001f. memo	[Duplicate of 001e] (1 page)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Lake re: Haiti: Secretary Christopher's Proposed Diplomatic and Political Strategy (3 pages)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403022

2014-0118-M

rs928

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 19 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS: CHRISTOPHER, W

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR MTG ON HAITI 20 APR - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 22 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
ROSSIN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

*SP*

DATE

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z	94041912 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001 LAKE	Z	94041912 FOR SIGNATURE
001	X	94092915 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
002 PRESIDENT	Z	94041912 FOR INFORMATION
003	X	94041915 LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
003	940419	GORE, A	
003	940419	PERRY, W	
003	940419	ALBRIGHT, M	
003	940419	WOOLSEY, R	
003	940419	SHALIKASHVILI, J	

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3022  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG gpc A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4.20.94

United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State  
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20520-6258

April 19, 1994

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TO: P - Mr. Tarnoff  
FROM: ARA - Alexander F. Watson *AFW*  
SUBJECT: Haiti: Diplomatic and political strategy

Attached is the Haiti strategy paper, revised as you requested.

I continue to believe that we should tell Aristide that we believe it would be helpful if he indicated the name of the future prime minister relatively soon--no threat, no conditioning of our action on Aristide's action, simply arguments as to why it would help achieve the objective we all seek. I believe the Secretary suggested this idea in this morning's meeting.

Attachment  
As stated

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VZ* NARA, Date *8/5/2019*  
*2014-0118-M (1.45)*

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~  
DECL: OADR

HAITI: PROPOSED DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: VL Date: 8/9/2019

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Proposed Diplomatic and Political Strategy (9 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

## FOLDER TITLE:

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2014-0118-M  
rs928

## RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Differences Between the Aristide Plan, the proposed State Plan and the March 25 Plan

(The following list is based on Aristide's sequence.)

1. Departure of the Coup Leaders via increased sanctions.

- As a first step to any settlement, Aristide demands "the departure of the leaders of the September 30 coup d'état" by imposing sanctions, deploying the UNMIH, stopping the flow of fuel through the DR, and an "information campaign." (Experience has shown that these items will not induce the military leaders to leave absent a political process that can press for their departure.)
- The proposed State plan, like Aristide's calls for the immediate removal of the coup leaders. This similarity is likely to be well-received by Aristide. On sanctions, in the proposed State plan, the UN passes a resolution calling for immediate imposition of targeted sanctions and establishing a comprehensive trade embargo after a 15-day waiting period. (Comprehensive sanctions would only take effect if the military failed to comply with the retirement/transfers in 15 days. Should they comply, sanctions would not be implemented.)
- The March 25 proposal requested that Aristide "inform us of the name of his intended Prime Minister" and that Aristide commit to nominate that person simultaneously with Cédras' departure. Sanctions were conditioned on Aristide's support for a political initiative, particularly the naming of a PM, a point Aristide rejected.

2. Passage by the Parliament of Needed Legislation

- This is Aristide's second step.
- In proposed State plan, police and amnesty laws would be passed after the departure of Cedras and the transfers of Francois and Biamby. Passage of laws would be simultaneous with the ratification of a new PM.
- The March 25 plan only addressed the amnesty law which would happen simultaneously with the departure of Cedras and the naming of the new PM. (Law separating police and military not discussed.)

3. Deployment of UN Technical Assistance Mission

- Aristide calls for deployment as his third step

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By vt NARA, Date 11/26/09

2014-0118-M (1.47)

following the departure of the coup leaders and passage of needed legislation.

- The proposed State plan includes a commitment to deploy the UNMIH followed by actual deployment as soon as Cedras retires and comprehensive sanctions, if imposed, are lifted. Would begin deploying 15 days prior to Aristide's return.
- Under the March 25 proposal advance elements of the UNMIH would be deployed after the ratification of the new CINC.

#### 4. Issue of the Naming of a New Prime Minister

- Under Aristide's 8-point plan this is number four and would only occur once sanctions are imposed, the coup leaders are gone, legislation is passed and UNMIH deployed.
- Proposed State plan does not indicate when Aristide would name the Prime Minister but calls for ratification of the PM simultaneously with the passage of the laws.
- March 25 plan urged Aristide to name a PM immediately, simultaneous with the resignation of Cedras and the passage of the amnesty law. Also linked additional sanctions with Aristide's willingness to name a PM.

#### 5. Aristide's Return to Haiti

- Aristide's plan calls for his return within 10 days of the designation of the prime minister and is the 5th step in his 8-point plan.
- Proposed State plan calls for Aristide's return at the end of the plan, after all other steps have been taken. (Notionally two weeks after deployment of UNMIH.)
- The March 25 plan calls for the date for Aristide's return to be agreed to between Aristide and his PM designate. (Aristide was given assurances that the international community would witness any agreement.)

#### 6. Lifting of Sanctions

- Aristide calls for the lifting of sanctions only after his return. (Step 6 of 8)

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- 3 -

- Proposed State plan calls for the lifting of comprehensive and fuel and arms sanctions, if Cédras leaves and Biamby and François are transferred to positions that do not threaten the democratic process. Targeted sanctions would remain until Aristide returns.
- The March 25 plan calls for the lifting of the oil and arms embargoes and the OAS sanctions once the Prime Minister is confirmed. The targeted sanctions would remain in place against the military until Aristide returned.

#### 7. Ratification of the Prime Minister

- In order to prevent any usurpation of his powers, Aristide would not have the prime minister ratified until after his return to Haiti (Step 7 of 8)
- Proposed State plan has the prime minister being ratified after the military changes, comprehensive sanctions, if imposed, are lifted, the deployment of UNMIH and 15 days prior to Aristide's return.
- The March 25 plan envisaged ratification as a second step, after Cedras' retirement and the naming of the PM. Aristide was offered assurances that we would reimpose sanctions and not recognize the government should the new PM seek to usurp Aristide's powers.

#### 8. Resumption of Assistance.

- Aristide saw resumption of aid as the last step in his proposal, only after his return.
- The proposed State plan has resumption of assistance occurring simultaneously with Aristide's return.
- The Marh 25 plan linked resumption of aid with lifting of sanctions so as not to hamper the new government.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (8 pages)	04/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Hait])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403022

2014-0118-M  
rs928

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Sanctions-based Strategy Proposal by Secretary Christopher (1 page)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

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2014-0118-M  
rs928

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. memo	[Duplicate of 001e] (1 page)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

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### RESTRICTION CODES

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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN  
FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 19 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS: CHRISTOPHER, W

SUBJECT: SEC CHRISTOPHER PROPOSED DIPLOMATIC & POLITICAL STRATEGY ON HAITI

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DUE DATE: 22 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/5/2009  
7014-0118-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z	94041912 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001 LAKE	Z	94041912 FOR SIGNATURE
001	X	94092915 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
002 PRESIDENT	Z	94041912 FOR INFORMATION
003	X	94041915 LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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003	940419	GORE, A	
003	940419	PERRY, W	
003	940419	ALBRIGHT, M	
003	940419	WOOLSEY, R	
003	940419	SHALIKASHVILI, J	

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Lake re: Haiti: Secretary Christopher's Proposed Diplomatic and Political Strategy (3 pages)	04/19/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403022

2014-0118-M  
rs928

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3022  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED:  SYSTEM PBS NSC INT  
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	<u>ov</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*John -  
 Tony send these  
 back to me. Over to  
 you for filing etc.  
 9/24 Larry Rossin*



# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9403035				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Alan Kreczko to Samuel Berger re: Haiti Interdiction (3 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9403035

2014-0118-M  
rs929

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9403035  
RECEIVED: 20 APR 94 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: KRECZKO

DOC DATE: 20 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI INTERDICTION - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 23 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRECZKO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRECZKO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By NARA, Date 8/5/2009  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 1 OF 1

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Alan Kreczko to Samuel Berger re: Haiti Interdiction (3 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

## FOLDER TITLE:

9403035

2014-0118-M  
rs929

## RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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174 of

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43318				
Document ID: 9403043				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Your Meeting with Haitian President Aristide, Thursday, April 21, 4:00 PM (3 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re: Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti (4 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43318

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403043

2014-0118-M  
rs930

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 20 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI --  
LIMITED ACCESS

ANSA

PERSONS: ARISTIDE, JEAN-BERTRAND

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 23 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By 12 NARA, Date 8/5/2014  
2014-0118-44

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Your Meeting with Haitian President Aristide, Thursday, April 21, 4:00 PM (3 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

### FOLDER TITLE:

9403043

2014-0118-M

rs930

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. talking points	re: Meeting with President Aristide of Haiti (4 pages)	04/20/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43318

## FOLDER TITLE:

9403043

2014-0118-M

rs930

## RESTRICTION CODES

### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Dup. of

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9403333				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a</del> -memo	<del>Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti: Foreible Introduction of UNMIH (5 pages)</del>	04/29/1994	P1/b(1) <i>√ 3/9/2000</i>
<del>001b</del> -paper	<del>re: Tasks for UNMIH (2 pages)</del>	04/29/1994	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 10/1/2015</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403333

2014-0118-M  
rs931

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 29, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RF*

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*

SUBJECT: Haiti: Forcible Introduction of UNMIH

As a result of our policy review we are actively promoting new comprehensive sanctions and complementary measures. However, there is broad skepticism -- within the USG, at the UN, in the Congress and public -- that the sanctions can achieve our policy objectives or even the ouster of the three key military leaders. Nor is it apparent that Haitians, including the military, see how the sanctions will work politically (though they concede the economic impact may be severe). The military is obviously headed the other way, preparing to install a new *de facto* regime as it perpetrates continuing abuses and profits from the sanctions.

In directing these new steps last week the President himself expressed doubt about the sanctions' likely efficacy and reserved his decision on force. The debate about force during the policy review was based on a model of massive U.S. intervention, probably unilateral, at a point when the deleterious impact of sanctions on ordinary Haitians contrasted with their minimal effect on the coup authors built a self-evident justification for the threat and if necessary use of force. A robust longer-term UN Mission would follow once our forces had established internal security and brought about Aristide's return and the restoration of constitutional government. The UN Mission would then preserve internal security and provide military and police training.

This paper discusses an alternative model based on a rapid in-and-out U.S. intervention, acting as an agent of and with the approval of the UN. Our forces would decapitate the military and forcibly introduce a robust UN Mission either under Security Council control (Chapter VII) or organized by the United States under authority of a UNSCR. The UN Mission would ensure the subordination of the Haitian military and police to Aristide and suppression of civilian thugs. It would work with those now-loyal Haitian security forces to bring about the initial internal security stabilization needed for restoration of democracy, Aristide's return and the start of international aid. It would then push the Haitian military under its new leadership out front to control public disorders. Its trainers and civic action elements would restructure the FAD'H radically and set up the new police. It would also protect the international presence and

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006By *VJ* NARA, Date *10/8/2014*

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY [2013-0172-m (2,53)]

[2014-0118-m, 1.56]

perform several similar functions. DOD is preparing a detailed description of what a UN Mission might entail to carry out those functions (see Tab A for summary of tasks).

### SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. Impose comprehensive sanctions as presently planned.
2. Meet with Aristide.
  - One approach would be to request his support for this US/UN "hand-off" approach at the outset. If he agreed, proceed. If he balks, warn him that we would go public with our offer and his rejection and that we will reconsider our ability to support his return based on doubt about his commitment to stabilizing Haiti so genuine democracy could be restored and the economy could be rebuilt, the goals the robust UNMIH's mandate would serve.
  - Another approach would be to tell Aristide that we are determined to get him back no matter what and, without further specifying how, say that a robust UNMIH is needed for us to succeed. Ask him to endorse that. Save discussing use of force until the time comes.
3. Build on Aristide's approval, widespread expectations that the sanctions will drive Haiti into the ground, the military-forced installation of an illegitimate government and ongoing abuses to win UN approval for a substantially augmented UNMIH to deploy once the military is out and recruit multinational participants. The justifying phenomena cited above should become evident during the 3-4 months gaining authorization and participants would take. This is important: it will be a major uphill effort to get the rest of the world to endorse our use of American force to implant a UN Mission. UNITAF was clearly a humanitarian mission; to make that case here our proposed action must be seen as a last resort born of frustration at the failure of sanctions, the exhaustion of all other methods.

We could inform the UN at the outset of our intent to intervene to get the UNMIH in. Alternatively we could base the initiative to augment UNMIH on the projected impact of sanctions and need to address the worsening situation once we've achieved the military leaders' ouster -- but given the challenge obtaining international support poses, not raise the intervention idea until the failure of sanctions was more apparent.
4. Once UNMIH is mobilized, stage a U.S. intervention to remove Cédras, François and Biambly from Haiti and to clear the way for immediate entry of the UNMIH. If you wish to continue exploring this option, DOD should be asked to specify whether it would utilize Special Operations Forces (as in first stage of Gen. Shalikashvili's previous concept of

operations) or massive force. The choice will have a significant impact on reactions everywhere: in Haiti, domestically, at the UN.

5. U.S. forces, having completed these missions, redeploy to CONUS as UNMIH deploys to Port-au-Prince and key towns.
6. UNMIH oversees installation of Aristide-appointed FAD'H CINC and his subsequent promotions and appointments and suppresses FRAPH. Creates stable security climate for installation of new PM, government, Aristide's return, enactment of police law, start of FAD'H restructuring and police training and beginning of international economic assistance. Protects international presence and GOH officials and installations until (possibly contractors and) eventually FAD'H and police can assume these functions.
7. When military subordinated, FRAPH under control, internal security stabilized, new government installed and Aristide back (approx. 4 months?), main UNMIH force draws down. Personal/facilities protective elements withdraw as circumstances allow. Training elements plus reduced security force for international presence remain until 1996 inauguration of new President, by which time FAD'H restructuring and police establishment are largely complete and GOH is left with a reliable security and public order force.

#### PROJECTED ATTITUDES OF KEY PLAYERS

1. Aristide: A lightning strike decapitation of the military *à la* Noriega will likely win Aristide's support since it has always been his preferred force model. It is what he described to the Vice President last October. (He refers to Panama but his description of what he wants sounds more like a Delta Force take-down than a major invasion.) Aristide may in contrast balk at a robust UNMIH citing his claimed constitutional impediment. He may also privately harbor concern that a robust foreign presence would interfere with reassertion of his exclusionary model of governance, although he has emphasized to us his commitment to reconciliation and inclusiveness.
2. The Military: Leaders and the Rest: Our efforts to win approval for and participation in a UNMIH under this model would become public, as therefore would our intervention plan. As word got out of our plans the military leaders might leave or be ousted by elements wanting to avoid foreign intervention (either outcome obviating the need for our initial intervention). Alternatively they might succeed in rallying the troops into a more intransigent position as they prepared to avoid capture by our eventual invading force. However, the time it would take to authorize and recruit UNMIH might lull the cocky FAD'H leaders into believing they faced a hollow threat, restoring the element of surprise.

This approach is based on reliance on the Haitian military to address Haitian-on-Haitian violence and maintain general public order. The Haitian military may prove incapable or unwilling to do so. It could disintegrate when we intervened as soldiers melted into the populace. If our training emphasized radical restructuring (as Swing recommends) which cost many FAD'H personnel their jobs or damaged institutional morale, the military might refuse to cooperate, leaving internal security responsibilities to UNMIH. Finally, the FAD'H's ethic is brutality. They do not understand humane crowd control. Relying on them to control internecine violence risks exacerbating rather than diminishing instability and associating UNMIH with their inevitable excesses.

3. The UN: The very limited, objective-oriented character of the U.S. intervention might make our action more acceptable and increase the chances for UNMIH authorization and participation. Possible candidates for participation would be Canada, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, CARICOM members and Francophone African and Mahgrebian states which showed interest during the original UNMIH recruitment cycle. France might be possible though with its internal divisions is very uncertain. We should consider offering inducements to the Latins in the context of Summit-related discussions of freer trade and expanded investment. Other inducements might encourage African and Mahgrebian participation. Police recruitment was a particular problem last time and will be again due to the limited resources most countries have available. We should cast our net wider than the Francophones on whom we concentrated last summer. For example, Argentina and Chile both have *gendarmarie*-type forces experienced in training and peacekeeping.

However, the military component of the Mission is certain to be predominantly American. We may find that some countries which were willing to participate in a smaller UNMIH would be put off by this more robust model. There may also be resistance to a Chapter VII Mission due to general concerns over the proliferation and cost of such missions. We must consider that if the UN does not endorse the Mission or if it does but recruitment fails, we could find ourselves facing increased domestic pressure for unilateral action.

This use of force model is less likely than our other to encourage Russian arguments for their "near abroad" peacekeeping due to its clear and abbreviated goal of introducing a fully multilateral UN Mission. Nonetheless, we need to be extremely careful about the precedent we might be creating. We would not want the Russians to try this model in the Caucasus or Central Asia.

4. The Congress and Public Opinion: Our plans would become public quickly as we sought Aristide's concurrence and UN approval for the UNMIH, requiring prompt Congressional

consultation and an active public relations strategy. There would be a fierce debate and the possibility of a Congressional prohibition on the use of U.S. troops in Haiti or even in the robust UNMIH. We would want to encourage further Congressional and public expressions of concern about the efficacy and adverse humanitarian impact of sanctions in order to build the groundswell for use of force in Haiti. That would mean enduring criticism of our policy but would help build understanding that U.S. interests warranting use of force were at stake.

Those now supporting use of force in Haiti would probably find this quick use of force model more attractive than the more traditional occupation model because, normally being opponents of intervention, they should appreciate the limited character of our unilateral role. On the other hand, the majority who are less involved in Haiti and not supporting use of force there might find this model even less attractive than the other since they could perceive it as irresolute and overreliant on the UN. They generally hold UN operations in low regard and are skeptical of U.S. participation in them. Cost issues would also arise (DOD's paper will attempt to cost out the UN Mission).

Concurrence by: Morton Halperin



Attachment  
Tab A "Tasks for UNMIH"

~~SECRET~~

29 Apr 94

SUBJECT: Tasks for UNMIH

~~(S)~~ The following list of tasks will be used for the purpose of estimating force composition and associated costs.

- Training/Construction
- Self-protection
- Protect International Presence (including ICM, PVOs, UN/OAS observers, economic aid workers)
  - Advise on security requirements
  - Provide escorts as requested/needed\*
  - Provide security for humanitarian supplies\*
  - Respond if international monitors, NGO's etc., request emergency aid
- Protect/evacuate US/UN/other third country nationals
- Protect Aristide-nominated PM, government, CINC, police chief, parliament, operatives in countryside\*/\*\*
- Protect key facilities (port, radio/TV, power supply)\*/\*\*
- Disarm/detain military/police remnants\*\*
  - Uniformed forces
  - FRAPH
  - Attaches, etc.
  - Assist new government's security leadership
- Break up army's infrastructure (section chiefs, etc.), separately identifying capability required to perform this effort, where possible.
- Deter/counter resistance from military/police remnants\*\*

\* Consider degree to which these functions could be provided by Haitian or foreign civilian contractor security personnel.

\*\* Consider degree to which new government's own security forces can perform this function. UNMIH to serve as backup only.

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10/1/2015 (7.55)  
2013-0122-04 [2014-0118-04, 1.52]

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2

- Visible patrolling to deter resistance/violence
- Prevent/Respond to Haitian on Haitian violence beyond ability/willingness of Haitian security forces\*\*
  - Respond to organized efforts or that which threatens survival of new government
  - protect dismissed Ti Soldat
  - deal with pro-Aristide violence
- Respond if military/police hard-liners attempt coup

~~(S)~~ The above tasks are based upon the following planning assumptions:

- US invasion will have seized control of key points in PAP, arrested key leaders of military/de facto regime
- US invasion force will protect UNMIH arrival and withdraw in a few days, turning over to UNMIH
- Aristide will have named new PM, army commander
- Army commander will come from existing officer corps (not necessary a general); bulk of officer corps will be in place when UNMIH arrives
- Sanctions will be lifted (except targeted) as UNMIH arrive

~~(S)~~ Questions to be addressed, beyond force requirements

- ROEs
- Legal authority (rely on Haitian courts, prison system)
- Command arrangements (relation/responsiveness to new government)
- Intelligence/communications requirements
- Costs/financing
- Level of US participation -- none? logistics/commo/intell? substantial?

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249<sup>α</sup>

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. profile	re: Gray First Meeting with President Aristide (1 page)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Bill Gray's First Meeting with President Aristide (2 pages)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Lake re: Haiti: Bill Gray's Meeting with President Aristide on May 19 (1 page)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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2014-0118-M

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Bill Gray's First Meeting with President Aristide (2 pages)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Lake re: Haiti: Bill Gray's Meeting with President Aristide on May 19 (1 page)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions and UN Mission Mandate and Sizing (9 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: Haiti-Use of Force Action Plan (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti-Additional Sanctions, UNMIH Mandate and Sizing and Use of Force (1 page)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

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ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 03 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN LOGREF: 9404022

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VR NARA, Date 8/5/2014  
2014-018-12

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions and UN Mission Mandate and Sizing (9 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Haiti-Use of Force Action Plan (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

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1. JOHN PODESTA / ROME, W.H.

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TODD STERN, STAFF SECRETARY, W.W. W.H.

- 2. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
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001e. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti-Additional Sanctions, UNMIH Mandate and Sizing and Use of Force (1 page)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

*pp. of*

Case Number: 2014-0118-M; 2013-0122-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9404022				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti-Sanctions, UNMIH and Use of Force (1 page)	05/28/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions, UN Mission Mandate and Composition and Commitment to Use of Force if Necessary (9 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Use of Force Action Plan (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Lawrence Rossin to Anthony Lake re: Haiti-Sanctions, UNMIH and Use of Force (1 page)	05/28/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
((Limited Access and Haiti))  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions, UN Mission Mandate and Composition and Commitment to Use of Force if Necessary (9 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

## COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

## FOLDER TITLE:

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

## RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Use of Force Action Plan (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9404022

2014-0118-M  
rs933

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9405211				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Alan Kreczko to Anthony Lake re: Haiti Use of Force-Legal Considerations (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: Use of Force in Haiti (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9405211

2014-0118-M

rs935

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Alan Kreczko to Anthony Lake re: Haiti Use of Force-Legal Considerations (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9405211

2014-0118-M  
rs935

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Use of Force in Haiti (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9405211

2014-0118-M  
rs935

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9405211

2014-0118-M  
rs935

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9405211

2014-0118-M

rs935

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: LAKE

FROM: KRECZKO

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
LIMITED ACCESS

LEGAL ISSUES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI / LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 30 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRECZKO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VR NARA, Date 8/9/2014  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 94062719 FOR INFORMATION  
X 94081715 NOTED BY LAKE

National Security Council  
The White House

*Rec'd 6/28 9:11 am*

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5211  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>well</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
<i>uh</i> Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>AW</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	<u>R</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	06/27/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9405211

2014-0118-M

rs935

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9405211

2014-0118-M  
rs935

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9405364				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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<del>001</del> memo	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Meeting on Haiti (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/05/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VL 3/3/2020
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### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9405364

2014-0118-M

rs936

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 05 JUL 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 08 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By W NARA, Date 8/9/09  
2014-0118-W

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9405364

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94070516 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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National Security Council  
The White House

20817

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BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

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cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 75  
5364  
Limited Access

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
July 5, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Haiti - July 5, 9:45 a.m. -  
Cabinet Room

You should use this meeting to reaffirm your policy choices and pin down follow-up responsibilities.

Your Decisions

You should review what you have decided:

- Only through in-country processing will the U.S. offer political refugee status. Henceforth boat migrants will only be offered safehaven in Panama and elsewhere.
- This decision covers those who are already at Gitmo and Jamaica awaiting screening; they will not be eligible to come to the U.S.
- The Post Adjudication Facility (PAF) will not be moved to the U.S. Examine other location, like the Bahamas.
- We will open facilities in Panama as quickly as possible. Planning for Dominica and Antigua will go ahead rapidly.
- Bill Gray will announce the safehaven plan this morning.

Follow-up Action

- Shali, how quickly can we open Panama and how quickly can we get to 10,000 spaces?
- State, can we get the word out quickly in Haiti through VOA and the Embassy? What more can we do to spread the word?
- Justice, can you spread the word in Miami and the other centers of Haitians in the U.S., through the Community Relations Service?

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By YZ NARA, Date 8/9/2019

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

SECRET

- State, we need teams to go to Panama, Dominica, and Antigua immediately to negotiate the formal Memorandum of Understandings.
- Shali, do you have adequate security (MB) at Gitmo? People are going to be mighty unhappy there when they hear the choices.
- Justice, State: can we expand in-country processing and reduce the waiting period for those who are screened in?

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Books to Take

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9405554				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Sandy Berger to Tony Lake re: Update of Haitian Migration Situation (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/09/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> v2 3/3/2020
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/09/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> v2 3/3/2020
<del>002. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/09/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> v2 3/3/2020

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43314

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9405554

2014-0118-M  
rs937

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: LAKE

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 09 JUL 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
IMMIGRATION

REFUGEES  
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON HAITI MIGRATION SITUATION - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DUE DATE: 13 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BERGER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 94070916 FOR INFORMATION  
X 94092916 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

~~SECRET~~

5554

LIMITED ACCESS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 9, 1994

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Memorandum to: Tony Lake

From: Sandy Berger *SB*

Subject: Update of Haitian Migration Situation

Summary: DOD, State, Justice, and DOT agencies are engaged in an intense effort to handle the Haitian migration. DoD reports that Guantanamo can be expanded to a migrant holding capacity of 23,000 next week. Thus, even if the outflow of migrants continues at a high rate, that safehaven could probably accommodate the inflow for most of next week. Return of migrants from Guantanamo also began yesterday with about 1000 volunteering to depart. The effort to open new safehavens continues with visits to five countries underway. Steps to add credibility to incountry processing are also being taken. End Summary

1. Friday interdictions: The Coast Guard picked up 1106 migrants in the 24 hours of Friday, the lowest total in the five days since the mass migration started with 3247 on the Fourth of July. While we would like to read a downward trend into this data, one day's information is too small a basis on which to judge. Nonetheless, we continue to saturate 12 Haitian commercial radio stations with creole language advertisements making it clear that one cannot get to the US by taking to boats. A USAF aircraft also is broadcasting that message on the AM band into Haiti. The CIA is increasing its resources to help assess how else to affect the departure psychology.

2. Capacity at Guantanamo: Shali returned from Gitmo Friday, reporting that it could be expanded from 12,000 capacity today to 23,000. I have asked him to do so as quickly as possible and he believes that is achievable by Thursday. After that, it could be expanded further to 27,000 but only at the cost of returning US personnel and dependents, a step Shali does not recommend. Currently there are about 13,000 at the base on en route.

3. Returning Migrants: About 1500 Haitians have volunteered to return to Haiti from Gitmo, some when the general announcement was made on Thursday about the safehaven policy and others when small group counselling began on Friday. The first 407 of the returnees arrived in Port au Prince on Friday and, we hope, spread the news that one cannot get to the US by boat. 1100 will be returned Monday. We met yesterday to determine how

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *JK* NARA, Date *11/26/2014*

2014-0118-m (2.02)

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

to increase the return rate to Haiti from Gitmo. INS is continuing to do group counselling today and is working with DOD to improve and expedite procedures, with a view to identifying and moving the returnees more quickly.

4. Panama: Sol Linowitz is on his way there, after the Vice President called Endara again. This is a long shot, but given the value of immediately available safehaven capacity, it is worth the shot.

5. Suriname: Randy Beers held good talks on Friday and an agreement with Suriname to accept a safehaven probably can be worked out in a few days. Construction of a camp, however, would take about a month.

6. Antigua: A DoD survey team has identified locations for 8000 migrants on the island, many more than the 2000 that PM Bird had agreed to accept. Brunson McKinley (who heads the Migrant effort at State) in talks Saturday in the hopes of signing an MoU authorizing the larger numbers. He will then move on to Dominica and Grenada over the weekend to finalize MoUs there.

7. Costa Rica: Former Ambassador Frank McNeil and his team depart Washington today for a meeting with the President of Costa Rica Sunday night.

8. Jamaica, Bahamas and TCI: The existing MoUs with the Bahamas and TCI are for Migrant Processing Centers for US refugee screening. Contacts are underway by Bill Gray with both governments to modify those arrangements. The camp at TCI, which holds 2000, will be open next week if we can gain TCI's agreement to shift its purpose. A DOD site survey team is exploring what will be necessary to repair the former US base in the Bahamas.

9. In Country Processing: Justice and State are taking steps to triple the US staff at the in country processing sites in Haiti. They also are accelerating the movement to the US of Haitians who already have been declared refugees at the in country processing sites. These steps will give added credibility to our message that the only route to the US is through in country processing.

10. Conclusion: Through the steps we have taken since Panama reneged, we have stretched the saturation point from Mon/Tues until the end of next week. We are preparing an options paper on more difficult steps that could be taken to buy some more time. We still face the basic problems of short-term "bridge capacity" after Gitmo fills and before any new safehavens are available, and the medium term problem that, at the rates this week, each 2,000 capacity safehaven gives us a very costly day or two more. I am now convinced that everyone is working this problem 110%, but there will be some important decisions to make when you return.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 9, 1994

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By YL NARA, Date 11/26/2014

2014-0118-M (2.05)

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FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 09 JUL 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
IMMIGRATION

REFUGEES  
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON HAITI MIGRATION SITUATION - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 13 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BERGER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER  
LAKE  
NSC CHRON



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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2014-D118-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 8/9/94 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
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Z 94070916 FOR INFORMATION  
X 94092916 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN  
X 96123116 ORIGINAL NOT RETURNED TO NSC/RMO  
X 96123116 NOTED BY LAKE

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LIMITED ACCESS

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 9, 1994

INFORMATION

Memorandum to: Tony Lake

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

From: Sandy Berger *SB*

Subject: Update of Haitian Migration Situation

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *WJ* NARA, Date *11/26/2019*  
2014-0118-M (2.08)

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- 2 -

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4. Panama: Sol Linowitz is on his way there, after the Vice President called Endara again. This is a long shot, but given the value of immediately available safehaven capacity, it is worth the shot.

5. Suriname: Randy Beers held good talks on Friday and an agreement with Suriname to accept a safehaven probably can be worked out in a few days. Construction of a camp, however, would take about a month.

6. Antigua: A DoD survey team has identified locations for 8000 migrants on the island, many more than the 2000 that PM Bird had agreed to accept. Brunson McKinley (who heads the Migrant effort at State) in talks Saturday in the hopes of signing an MoU authorizing the larger numbers. He will then move on to Dominica and Grenada over the weekend to finalize MoUs there.

7. Costa Rica: Former Ambassador Frank McNeil and his team depart Washington today for a meeting with the President of Costa Rica Sunday night.

8. Jamaica, Bahamas and TCI: The existing MoUs with the Bahamas and TCI are for Migrant Processing Centers for US refugee screening. Contacts are underway by Bill Gray with both governments to modify those arrangements. The camp at TCI, which holds 2000, will be open next week if we can gain TCI's agreement to shift its purpose. A DOD site survey team is exploring what will be necessary to repair the former US base in the Bahamas.

9. In Country Processing: Justice and State are taking steps to triple the US staff at the in country processing sites in Haiti. They also are accelerating the movement to the US of Haitians who already have been declared refugees at the in country processing sites. These steps will give added credibility to our message that the only route to the US is through in country processing.

10. Conclusion: Through the steps we have taken since Panama reneged, we have stretched the saturation point from Mon/Tues until the end of next week. We are preparing an options paper on more difficult steps that could be taken to buy some more time. We still face the basic problems of short-term "bridge capacity" after Gitmo fills and before any new safehavens are available, and the medium term problem that, at the rates this week, each 2,000 capacity safehaven gives us a very costly day or two more. I am now convinced that everyone is working this problem 110%, but there will be some important decisions to make when you return.

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# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43314				
Document ID: 9406932				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti (4 pages)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9406932

2014-0118-M

rs938

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 25 AUG 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 29 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By 12 NARA, Date 2/1/2019  
2014-0418-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9406932

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
002  
002 PRESIDENT

Z 94082520 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
X 00112719 NOTED BY PRESIDENT  
Z 94082523 FOR INFORMATION

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940825  
002 940825

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF


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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Reed 8/25 10:35AM

National Security Council  
The White House

LIMITED ACCESS



PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 6932

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (A) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>AOS</u>	_____
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Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>(orb)</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>(A) 8/25</u>	<u>(D) TO PODESTA</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>FICKLIN</u>	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

(A) = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: **FOR POTUS**  
**9:15AM mtg**  
**8/26**  
Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

rec'd 8/25 10:35 AM

National Security Council  
The White House

~~SECRET~~

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 6932

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG ML A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Itoh			
Soderberg		<u>mb</u>	
Berger	<u>2</u>		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>A 8/25</u>	<u>D TO PODESTA</u>
NSC Secretariat			
<u>FICKLIN</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

FOR POTUS  
9:15 AM mtg  
8/26

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti (4 pages)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43314

### FOLDER TITLE:

9406932

2014-0118-M  
rs938

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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6932 LIMITED ACCESS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LGR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Group Meeting on Haiti, August 26, 1994

Provided at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President for use in the Foreign Policy Group discussion of Haiti.

Concurrence by: Richard A. Clarke *RAC*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *RL* NARA, Date *8/9/2014*  
*2014-0118-m*

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Declassify on: *OADR*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43315				
Document ID: 9420571				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. paper</del>	<del>re: Haiti-Use of Force (5 pages)</del>	<del>05/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> 12/3/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43315

### FOLDER TITLE:

9420571

2014-0118-M

rs939

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 10 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By ML NARA, Date 8/5/2019  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 1 OF 1

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
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X 95072115 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN  
X 96072610 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 9420571  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:


COMMENTS:

*OBE*

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*

SUBJECT: Papers for Foreign Policy Group Discussion of  
Haiti, Saturday, May 7, 1994, 9:30 a.m.

The memorandum at Tab I conveys the agenda and discussion paper on use of force for Saturday's Foreign Policy Group discussion of Haiti.

Concurrences by: *RC* Richard Clarke, *MH* Morton Halperin

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to Counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Meeting Participants
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper on Use of Force

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *77* NARA, Date *8/5/2019*  
*2014-0117-m*

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20571

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO  
THE UNITED NATIONS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DAVID GERGEN, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE  
PRESIDENT  
LEON FUERTH, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Group Meeting on Haiti, Saturday,  
May 7, 1994, 9:30 a.m.

Attached are the agenda and discussion paper for the meeting of  
the Foreign Policy Group to be held on Saturday, May 7 at 9:30  
a.m. in the Cabinet Room.

TV

Anthony Lake  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachments

Tab A Agenda  
Tab B Discussion Paper on Use of Force

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2014  
2014-0118-001

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Declassify on: OADR

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FOREIGN POLICY GROUP MEETING ON HAITI

DATE: May 7, 1994  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 9:30 a.m.

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Tony Lake
- II. Use of Force.....All
- III. Migrant Policy.....All

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2019  
2014-0118-m

HAITI - USE OF FORCE

BACKGROUND

As a result of our policy review we are actively promoting comprehensive sanctions and complementary measures. The UN Security Council enacted a resolution intensifying the sanctions on Friday afternoon. We and other UN members are pressing for rapid dispatch of a UN enforcement assessment team rapidly to the Dominican Republic in response to their request. That can lead - but probably only after the May 16 elections -- to serious UN-Dominican cooperation in stopping fuel smuggling, the key to effective sanctions. AID will increase the reach of our humanitarian programs in the next few weeks and the UN and OAS are reacting positively to our urging that they send more human rights observers. We are hopeful that the new Special Envoy can be brought on board shortly. There are other steps we are also considering (such as a unilateral stop to U.S. carrier passenger flights) which, taken together, may increase the prospects for sanctions to achieve our goals. We probably want to give this set of measures at least a month to unfold before issuing any ultimatum or actually intervening in order to gauge their effectiveness and to prove that we had exhausted all other options. ~~(TS)~~

However, there is broad skepticism -- in the USG, UN, Congress and public and among Haitians -- that sanctions no matter how effective can achieve our broad policy objectives or even the ouster of the three key military leaders (though nobody doubts that they can complete the destruction of the Haitian economy and may spark a humanitarian crisis and migrant outflow). The Haitian military is defiant, preparing to install a new *de facto* regime as it perpetrates continuing abuses and profits from the sanctions. Thus the intense speculation about next steps, especially use of force. ~~(S)~~

We are working to refine force options. We see two phases to any use of force in Haiti: initial intervention to, at a minimum, remove the military leaders; and a follow-on (UN) presence responsible for a range of activities which might extend to military and police training and restructuring, protection of Haitian dignitaries and facilities as well as the international presence and some degree of internal security (peace enforcement) activity. JCS is already quite far advanced in its planning for the first phase (military intervention) and would be prepared to act around 20-25 days after a final decision. This planning is based on a massive intervention transitioning to a follow-on force over a period of six months. We have also begun to develop the model of a quick intervention to decapitate the military followed almost immediately by a multilateral force to carry out stabilization, protection and training activities. We are especially focussed on developing a multilateral follow-on force concept capable of stabilizing Haiti for the consolidation of

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CLINTON

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: NARA, Date 8/19/2014

2014-0118-m (2.14)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

restored democracy and for international economic aid for Haiti's reconstruction. Many issues affecting operations in the initial and follow-on phases will need to be resolved. ~~(TS)~~

We have reached a stage where the fundamental decision on whether we are willing to use force if necessary to remove the military leadership and create conditions for the restoration of democracy including President Aristide's return to Haiti is needed. We are committed to participating in a reconfigured UN Mission. The shape of that Mission would be heavily influenced by our willingness to use force or not. The same is true of our hemispheric and multilateral diplomacy and the messages we would have our envoys carry to the Haitians, both Aristide and in Haiti itself. And of course our own intervention planning will be influenced by our fundamental willingness to use force and the degree to which it must be multilateral, if at all. ~~(TS)~~

This paper poses the fundamental questions we face. ~~(C)~~

I. Are we prepared to use force if necessary to achieve our objectives in Haiti? ~~(S)~~

Pros

- The credible threat of force, following on the measures we are now taking, may induce the military leadership to leave without a fight and permit the restoration of democracy and return of Aristide to Haiti. ~~(C)~~
- Intervention may well be the only way to achieve those goals and avert a humanitarian and human rights crisis. ~~(S)~~
- Our domestic and international credibility is on the line on Haiti. The alternative to use of force if sanctions do not achieve our objectives will be the termination of active efforts to restore democracy and return Aristide. Our public statements over the last few days mean that the cost of not using force if necessary have risen substantially. ~~(S)~~
- Failure to oust the military and end its abuses will bring our migrant policy under steadily increasing pressure. ~~(C)~~
- Underlines our commitment to guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy (democracy, freedom and basic humanitarian concern). ~~(C)~~

Cons

- Unless follow-on force fully authorized and mobilized in advance, absence of credible exit strategy may require extended U.S. troop presence with risk of increasing unpopularity, casualties, etc. ~~(S)~~

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- Certainty of at least limited U.S. casualties and collateral Haitian casualties and damage. Risk that American residents may be taken hostage. (S)
  - Domestic opinion, Congressional and public, is at present more opposed to than supportive of use of force. (C)
  - Aristide adamant he will not invite force. Likely to support use of force afterward but his preference so far appears to be for a small, "snatch"-type operation against the military leaders. His attitude toward a massive intervention or follow-on presence of a scale larger than the original UN Mission is unclear. He may oppose that model of intervention or not cooperate with our forces once he returns to Haiti. (S)
  - Obtaining international support for and participation in initial intervention will be difficult. Likely to require unilateral action. Legitimation a challenge. (S)
  - Risk of undermining improved hemispheric relations, including the December Summit of the Americas. (S)
  - Achievement of political objectives, stabilization of Haiti may prove ephemeral once foreign forces leave, discrediting the intervention and damaging U.S. credibility. (S)
- II. Must phase I (intervention) be multilateral, or would we consider unilateral intervention? (S)
- Multilateral intervention, even if predominantly American, likely to enjoy greater domestic and international support than would unilateral action. May increase chances of UN or OAS sanction, ease legitimation of intervention. (S)
  - Decreases the chance our action could be cited as precedent for Russian peacekeeping in near abroad. (S)
  - No guarantee we will be able to recruit foreign participants. (S)
  - Time needed to recruit foreign participants, integrate them into our force planning risks delaying intervention past period when deterioration within Haiti makes it most propitious or demands it. (S)
  - Increases risk that intervention plans will leak. (S)
  - May complicate command and control. (S)

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III. Should we make phase I (intervention) contingent on there being prior international commitment to participate in a replacement force? (S)

Pros

-- All analyses conclude that a replacement force will be needed for our combat units to create a security environment for the restored democratic government to take root and for economic rehabilitation to commence. Better to know we will have the required second phase in place before we launch the first. (S)

Cons

-- Depending on the breadth of the mandate and size of the replacement force, recruiting significant foreign participation will be time-consuming, may prove impossible. Predominantly U.S. force might be needed.

-- If intervention so conditioned, could delay or prevent use of force altogether. Would tie our hands if sanctions failed to achieve our objectives but created a humanitarian crisis. (S)

-- If we seek to recruit such a follow-on force in advance, we may betray our intention to intervene. However, can be masked by seeking a broadened UNMIH mandate and composition "for after sanctions work." (S)

IV. Should we publicly seek support for and multilateral participation in intervention (phase I) or seek such support and participation privately? (S)

Publicly

-- Word of our serious intervention planning may cause the Haitian military leadership to relinquish power voluntarily. (S)

-- JCS plans not posited on secrecy as long as tactical surprise for intervention can be achieved. (TS)

-- Would demonstrate internationally (especially to hemisphere) our commitment to multilateralism, mark departure from stereotypical "big stick." (S)

-- Would stir up domestic debate, risk of Congressional prohibition on use of troops in Haiti. Similarly, would spur international pressure against use of force. (S)

-- If we failed to gain foreign participation would damage U.S. credibility, spark domestic skepticism about unilateral intervention, degree of U.S. interests. (S)

Privately

- No threat effect on Haitian military. (~~S~~)
- Would make it easier for many countries to agree, but there would be a high likelihood of leaks. (~~S~~)
- Would make it easier for us to shift to unilateral intervention if international recruitment failed. (~~S~~)
- Were there leaks, would spark controversy among those at home and abroad not aware of our intentions. (~~S~~)
- Improves ability to maintain surprise factor. (~~S~~)

TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 10 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By RL NARA, Date 8/2/2009  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 94050619 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 95072115 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

RECORD ID LAST ACTION DATE	FROM SUBJECT KEYWORDS	TO	DOC. DATE STATUS DUE DATE	NOTES
9420571	ROSSIN	LAKE	MAY 06	
MAY 06	HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS		X	
	HAITI	LIMITED ACCESS	05/10/94	

*1 entry  
w/ ANSSA  
5/6/94*

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43315				
Document ID: 9420793				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Haiti (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43315

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9420793

2014-0118-M

rs940

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 29 JUN 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

DC

~~LIMITED ACCESS~~

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 29 JUN DC MTG ON HAITI  
- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 01 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF: 9420800

FILES: IFM 0

NSCR: DC0122

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
ROSSIN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 02/06/2020

2014-0118-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002

Z 94062911 FOR DECISION  
X 94062911 BERGER APPROVED RECOM  
X 94062911 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940629 FUERTH, L  
002 940629 GROSSMAN, M  
002 940629 SCRUGGS, R  
002 940629 MCALEER, R  
002 940629 INDERFURTH, K  
002 940629 GARTHOFF, D  
002 940629 PATRICK, T

rec'd 4/29 7:25 am

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 20793  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WED A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>WAW</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
<u>WAW</u> Berger	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JB 9/29</u>	<del>_____</del>
NSC Secretariat <u>PICKLIN</u>	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>AR</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Haili DC Mtg

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's Office has desked

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420793  
DATE 29 JUN 94

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON HAITI 29 JUN - LIMITED ACCESS  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH  
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM  
ROOM 290, OEOB  
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE TIME SIGNATURE  
6/29 1000 AM Bale for

PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: 1

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE TIME SIGNATURE  
6/29/94 3:39pm Ed Thomas

PRINT LAST NAME: Thomas

COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: VL Date: 09/29

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420793  
DATE 29 JUN 94

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON HAITI 29 JUN - LIMITED ACCESS  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH  
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM  
ROOM 290, OE0B  
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

4/29 Bale for 1000 AM

PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: 1 \_\_\_\_\_

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

Barford Celeste Celeste Barford

PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: 1 \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: VR Date: 4/13/19

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OE0B  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

20793

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 28, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Haiti, Wednesday,  
June 29, 11:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the agencies for the subject meeting. The agenda is at Tab A, the discussion paper at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize dispatch of the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *LR* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Agencies
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By RL NARA, Date 2/9/2019  
2014-0118-W

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassify On: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

20793

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 29, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. RICHARD SCRUGGS  
Acting Counsel for Intelligence Policy  
Department of Justice

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the United States  
to the United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK  
Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Haiti ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting on Haiti on Wednesday, June 29, 1994 from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. A discussion paper is at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

*for Kristie A. Keeney*  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda  
Tab B Discussion Paper

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on:

OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (h)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date ~~04/09/2014~~

2014-0118-AA

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Haiti (3 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43315

### FOLDER TITLE:

9420793

2014-0118-M  
rs940

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH *WHR* (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk  
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON HAITI 29 JUN  
NSC LOG # 20793

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
<u>JUSTICE</u>	<u>ACTING COUNSEL</u>		
	<u>INTELLIGENCE POLICY</u>		

*John,  
I did the  
NSC system  
computer closeout  
except complete  
PF4 closeout  
distro.  
(no copies have  
been made.)  
Jane  
6/29*

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: VL Date: 8/5/2014

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL  
TIME OF RECEIPT

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

- FLASH
- IMMEDIATE
- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE/TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE #: \_\_\_\_\_

NSC LOG # 20793

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR  
 SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 29 JUN PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.  
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: RL Date: 8/4/2014

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43315				
Document ID: 9420800				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Haiti-End Game Options (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43315

### FOLDER TITLE:

9420800

2014-0118-M  
rs941

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: BERGER

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 29 JUN 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI

DC

~~LIMITED ACCESS~~

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 29 JUN DC MTG ON HAITI - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF: 9420793

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: DC0122

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
ROSSIN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VC NARA, Date 8/5/2015  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94063010 BERGER APPROVED RECOM


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20800  
LIMITED ACCESS

June 29, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LGR*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Haiti, Wednesday,  
June 29, 6:15 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is discussion paper for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you circulate the paper at Tab I at the 6:15 meeting.

Approve *LGR* \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments  
Tab I

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *VL* NARA, Date *8/9/2019*  
*2014-0118-M*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassify

~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Haiti-End Game Options (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Limited Access and Haiti])  
OA/Box Number: 43315

### FOLDER TITLE:

9420800

2014-0118-M  
rs941

### RESTRICTION CODES

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43315				
Document ID: 9421177				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	Lawrence Rossin to Samuel Berger re: Haiti-Additional Sanctions and UNMIH Mandate (1 page)	<del>05/30/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>W 3/3/2020</i>
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions and UN Mission Mandate and Composition (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)
<del>001e. agenda</del>	<del>re: Agenda for May 30 Meeting (1 page)</del>	<del>05/30/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>W 3/3/2020</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Limited Access and Haiti])  
 OA/Box Number: 43315

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9421177

2014-0118-M

rs942

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: BERGER

FROM: ROSSIN  
FEINBERG

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
SSG

UN  
~~LIMITED ACCESS~~

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 30 MAY SENIOR STEERING GRP MTG ON HAITI RE:  
ADDL SANCTIONS & UNMIH MADATE & COMPOSITION - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 13 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF: 9420688 9420796

FILES: IFG 0

NSCP: PC0081

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER  
FEINBERG  
NSC CHRON  
ROSSIN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By 12 NARA, Date 8/5/2019  
2014-0118-m

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001  
001 BERGER  
001

Z 94053014 TRANSFERRED FM PRS LOG #9404265  
Z 94053014 FOR INFORMATION  
X 94060210 NOTED BY BERGER



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
(with ~~TOP SECRET~~  
attachment)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4265 ~~SECRET~~  
LIMITED ACCESS

~~Not Sec Advisor  
has seen~~

May 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD E. FEINBERG *RM*  
FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti - Additional Sanctions and UNMIH Mandate and  
Composition for Senior Steering Group Meeting

Provided at Tab A is a paper for the meeting at 6:15 p.m. It recasts the decision memo we had prepared for the President and can, if necessary, be transformed after this evening into a paper for Tuesday's PC meeting. Attached to it as Tabs 1 and 2 are the political action plan and UNMIH functions/parameters paper.

At Tab B is a proposed agenda for this evening's meeting. It picks up matters from last Friday. Two issues left from Friday (list of all pending decisions for IWG action and radio broadcasting) are not yet ready for further discussion and have been left off the agenda; given the holiday weekend State was not able to obtain all specialized support needed to finalize those issues. I have not seen papers from Leon on equipping the Dominican Republic to enforce sanctions or from Dick on the financial implications of two migrant processing centers operating simultaneously and am not sure these issues will be ready for discussion, but you can raise them.

Finally, Strobe Talbott would like to discuss handling the Haiti resolution at the OAS General Assembly. Aristide's draft includes a call for broadcasting (which we are working already) and for training of a Haitian external force (which we want removed). We want to add endorsements of UNMIH and additional sanctions. Given the OAS' consensus operating methods and practice of finalizing resolutions before the OASGA, we need quick tactical decisions which Strobe can explain and recommend.

RECOMMENDATION

That you distribute the discussion paper at Tab A at this evening's Haiti Senior Steering Group meeting.

Attachments

- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab 1 Political Action Plan
- Tab 2 UNMIH Functions/Parameters Paper
- Tab B Proposed Agenda for Meeting

*> preferable, not necessary  
> de advice?  
> de acts on force.*

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: *W* NARA, Date *11/26/2019*  
2014-0118-M (2.20)

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Haiti: Additional Sanctions and UN Mission Mandate and Composition (7 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
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### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: Haiti-Political Action Plan (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

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### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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001d. paper	re: Functions and Parameters of UNMIH (4 pages)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

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### RESTRICTION CODES

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SENIOR STEERING GROUP ON HAITI

Agenda for May 30 Meeting

- 1. Sanctions (Fuerth)
  - o Discussion of whether and how to provide UN-recommended equipment for DR enforcement support.
- 2. Migrants (Clarke)
  - o Operating two MPCs, in both Jamaica and Turks and Caicos: Discussion of advisability and analysis of incremental overhead costs.
- 3. Additional Sanctions (see discussion paper).
- 4. UNMIH parameters (see discussion paper).
- 5. Haiti Resolution for the OAS General Assembly (Talbot).