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REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, PRESIDENT TUDJMAN OF CROATIA IN SIGNING OF PEACE AGREEMENT

The Old Executive Office Building

9:00 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: President Izetbegovic, President Tudjman, Prime Minister Silajdzic, Mr. Zubak. The Secretary of State, Mr. Lake, the Vice President and I are happy to be joined by you, as well as by others here today. We have the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Vitali Churkin. Representing the European Union troika, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Mr. Papoulias; of Belgium, Mr. Claes; of Germany, Mr. Kinkel. And of course, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who have been the co-chairs of the International Conference.

In addition to that, we're very pleased to be joined by the Ambassadors of the UNPROFOR nations who have been so active in working for peace and in preserving the peace; General Shalikashvili, Ambassador Albright, and members of the Congress. In the front row, Senator Lugar, Senator Stevens, Senator Levin, Senator Hatch, Congressman Lantos, and I believe Congressman McCloskey is here. There he is. So we thank all of you for coming today.

We have come to bear witness to a moment of hope. For 33 months the flames of war have raged through the nations of the former Yugoslavia. By signing these agreements today, Bosnian and Croatian leaders have acted to turn back those flames and to begin the difficult process of reconciliation.

Around the globe the tension between ethnic identity and statehood presents one of the great problems of our time. But nowhere have the consequences been more tragic than in the former Yugoslavia. There, nationalists and religious factions, aggravated by Serbian aggression, have erupted in a fury of ethnic cleansing and brutal atrocity.

The agreements signed today offer one of the first clear signals that parties to this conflict are willing to end the violence and begin a process of reconstruction. The accords call for a federation between Muslims and Croats of Bosnia. This Muslim-Croat entity has agreed on the principles of a confederation with Croatia. Together these steps can help support the ideal of a multiethnic Bosnia and provide a basis for Muslims and Croats to live again in peace as neighbors and compatriots.

The agreements are as important for Croatia's future as they are for Bosnia's. And it is the hope of all present today that the Serbs will join in this process toward peace as well.

These agreements are a testament to the perseverance and to the resolve of many people -- the Croatian and Bosnian diplomats who kept probing for openings toward peace; the U.N. soldiers from many nations, here represented today, who have worked to bring both

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stability and humanitarian supplies; the NATO pilots who have helped put our power in the service of diplomacy.

I want to praise the leadership and courage of those who have come to Washington to sign these agreements, especially President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman. I also want to recognize the tireless efforts of Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen and, of course, our own Cy Vance, who is not here today; and especially to express my personal appreciation to the skilled diplomacy of Ambassador Charles Redman. Thank you, sir, for your work.

All of these people have done much to bring us to this point of agreement. Through Ambassador Redman's efforts and in many other ways, our administration has worked with our NATO allies, the European Union, Russia, the U.N. and others to help end this conflict. The fact that we have done this work together has made a significant difference. And to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, I say a special thank you, sir, for your renewed energy in this area and our common hopes.

We have engaged in this work because the United States has clear interests at stake -- an interest in helping prevent the spread of a wider war in Europe, an interest in showing that NATO remains a credible force for peace, and interest in helping to stem the terrible, destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating, and perhaps clearly, a humanitarian interest we all share in stopping the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.

The documents signed here are only first steps, but they are clearly steps in the right direction. If they lead to an overall negotiated settlement, if a lasting peace takes hold in this war-torn land, the ceremony will be remembered as an important event. Whether that comes to pass will depend less on our words today than on the actions of Muslims, Croats and Serbs on the ground tomorrow and in the days to come.

For while documents like these can define the parameters of peace, the people of the region themselves must create that peace. Economic, political and security arrangements for the new federation must be given a chance to work. The cease-fire between Croats and Bosnian government forces must hold. Croats and Muslims who have fought with such intensity must now apply that same intensity to restoring habits of tolerance and coexistence.

The issue of the Petrinja region of Croatia must be resolved. Serbia and the Serbs of Bosnia cannot sidestep their own responsibility to achieve and enduring peace.

The new progress toward peace will likely come under attack by demagogues; by rogue riflemen; by all those who believe they can profit most from continued violence, aggression and human suffering. Such attacks must be met with the same steadiness and leadership that have produced these agreements today.

Neither the United States nor the international community can guarantee the success of this initiative. But the U.S. has stood by the parties as they have taken risks for peace, and we will continue to do so. I have told Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman that the U.S. is prepared to contribute to the economic reconstruction that will bolster these agreements. And as I have said before, if an acceptable, enforceable settlement can be reached, the U.S. is prepared through NATO to help implement it.

All across Bosnia and Croatia communities and entire peoples were once connected by ancient bridges, like the great stone arch in Mostar, which for centuries stood as the city's proud symbol. Today, too many of those bridges have reduce to rubble or closed by
force. The challenge for parties to this conflict is to rebuild the bonds that those bridges represent. The announcement that Sarajevo's bridge of brotherhood and unity soon will reopen is a hopeful sign that the parties can begin to span the divide of hatred and violence.

The work ahead is indeed daunting, but all of us in the international community are committed to help. Together, let us strive for peace.

Thank you. (Applause.)

Mr. Papoulias, the Foreign Minister of Greece, representing the European Union.

FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS: Mr. President, Mr. President Tudjman, President Izetbegovic. The European Union warmly welcomes the agreement on the constitutional character for the future federation between the Croats and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a significant success coming shortly after the framework agreement signed in Washington on the first of March.

It is also a further step towards attaining a comprehensive solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the participation of the Bosnian Serbs; thus, safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country.

We congratulate the negotiators for obtaining results in such a brief time. We recognize that this would not have been possible without the active involvement of the United States administration.

Mr. President, the European Union has for some time now insisted that your country's involvement is crucial if a solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina and throughout ex-Yugoslavia is to be reached. We on our part have already covered a lot of ground. The two co-chairmen of the International Conference on Yugoslavia have obtained, after lengthy negotiations, the agreement of the three parties on an important number of issues.

We believe that the understandings, especially on territorial percentages, should constitute the basis for further negotiations if we wish to achieve decisive progress soon. Moreover, our intention to contribute substantially to the implementation of an overall agreement by providing ground forces is still valid. So is our offer to obtain an administrator at a united Mostar for a period of up to two years.

Today's success reinforces the progress achieved during the last weeks towards a definite end of hostilities through the withdrawal of heavy artillery from Sarajevo, the lifting of most obstacles to the flow of humanitarian aid, and the return, as far as is possible, of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina to normal life.

In order to maintain the momentum, the European Union has already promised to dispatch additional forces for the strengthening of UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

From here on, we have to work hard, so that today's results are followed by further progress. We look forward to working closely together with the United States, Russia, and other countries involved, as well as with all parties to the problem.

Ex-Yugoslavia is a part of Europe. It is our responsibility and duty to participate actively in the efforts to achieve a peace settlement. Our presence here underlines our determination and our commitment. Thank you. (Applause.)
PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC: Mr. President Clinton, Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Vice President Gore, Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, particularly my friends from the Senate and the Congress of the United States, as well as many others who are present here and who have contributed to the signing of documents today.

This is a great day for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to all those who are opposed to war — and peace between people. The document signed today is the result of the efforts of all people present here. I give them my thanks.

I am sure that all our friends, both in East and West, join me in expressing my gratefulness. Mr. Clinton, as well as Mr. Secretary, you have given a great contribution to what is happening today. The negotiations that led to the signing of this document have given this great result. The situation in Bosnia has improved. There are fewer victims.

Unfortunately, it is only occurring at one part of our country. Fighting continues around Srebrenica and Maglaj, and there is bad news from Srebrenica as well. There were some new conflicts in other areas of Bosnia. This means that our efforts for peace must continue without hesitation.

Our people want only two things: peace and justice. Or as they like to say, they like fair peace. Fair peace means that our country will keep its borders, and the villages and the cities from which our people have been expelled will be able to resettle the refugees. Those who are responsible for war crimes will have to be brought to justice.

The most unfortunate of our people are our refugees and some of our member citizens which live in — the refugees must return to their homes and the violence — must cease.

From Mr. Clinton's speech, I understood that the United States is ready to give their contribution to implementation of the peace agreement and reconstruction of our country. We accept this information with gratefulness and with pleasure. I pray to God to help our people as well as other people who fight for freedom and peace.

Thank you. (Applause.)

PRESIDENT TUDJMAN: Ladies and gentleman, the Republic of Croatia and the entire Croatian nation places the highest value on the efforts of the United States and of President Clinton in reaching the agreements of the formation of a Croatian-Bosnia federation and a -- confederation with the Republic of Croatia. The signing of this Washington agreement marks a crucial turning point in the crisis in this region. And the positive outcome would not have been possible without decisive measures undertaken by the United States of America.

The historic step which has been taken today will be of immense mutual benefit for Croats and Bosnian Muslims, laying a strong foundation for lasting peace and a stable future in this region and assuring for both peoples full national sovereignty and full parity of equality in all state affairs. The -- alliance with the Republic of Croatia guarantees the Bosnia-Muslim prosperity in the federation, and so -- ties with Croatia in a close association with the Western democracies.

However, in order for this -- the widespread human and material destruction suffered by both republics -- determined support is critical to restore a decent standard of living enabling the rebuilding of the historic areas and to return the displaced and the refugees to their homes. We look to the United States and the
international community to assist us in these burdens so that the harsh conditions under which our citizens continue to suffer can be alleviated.

The Republic of Croatia continues to care for the largest number of refugees and displaced persons — population in the world. It is our hope that these agreements, coupled with the commitment of the international community, will create the conditions necessary for lasting peace and the return to normal and productive life for all our citizens.

The Republic of Croatia wishes full integration into regional European economic and security systems, as well as comprehensive cooperation with other international institutions, all of which will contribute to the success of our endeavors. Croatia strives as well to be a major factor of stability for the new international order in this part of Europe.

In closing, I would like to emphasize that the Republic of Croatia has always looked to the United States of America as the backbone of democracy and the pillar of the free and stable world and deeply appreciates it effort in this important step taken today.

Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. ZUBAK: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen.

Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are of the opinion that this senseless war in Bosnia-Herzegovina must cease. Croatian people want to organize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a free democratic modern state community where equal people live. Our people have accepted the peace initiative, which with a contribution from European Union was started by United States of America.

Signing these documents today, we accept the responsibility to that which was negotiated during the negotiations — to implement that which was negotiated. And we will work towards organizing the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible. And we will also strive to organize the confederation with the Republic of Croatia as soon as possible.

I thank you, Mr. President, all your colleagues, for the help that you have extended to us so far. And I express hope that you will help us to organize the state community and the whole territory, and also that you will help us to stop the war in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that you will also help us in reconstructing the war and life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thank you once again. (Applause.)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Ladies and gentlemen, today we have witnessed an act of great statesmanship. Now we must hope that the courage embodied by these agreements will inspire further acts of reason, reconstruction and progress to implement them, to make them real in the lives of the people whose leaders are represented here today.

We also must hope, I will say again, that the Serbs will join in this effort for a wider peace. We invite them and urge them to do so.

Over 150 years ago, the Balkan poet, Ivan Jukic, wrote the following line: "Only those are heroes who know how to live with their brothers." Let us hope we are beginning to learn that lesson in this troubled land.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)
Q Can you give us a sense of what is going on in Bosnia and what has happened --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know the essential facts, that last evening, after midnight our time, United States aircrafts, flying under NATO authority, warned some fixed-wing Serbian aircraft, Bosnian Serbian aircraft, to land and when they didn't, they were shot down. There were two warnings. Every attempt was made, to the best of our information, to avoid this encounter.

We have had responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone since last April. It has been since last fall that there were any fixed-wing aircraft that we knew of violating the no-fly zone, and we're attempting to get more facts now. We're also trying to brief everyone involved in this effort to bring peace to Bosnia about the facts and we will -- if we find out any more information, of course, we'll be glad to give it to you.

But it seems to --

Q Why now? Why now? Is this a new get-tough policy?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. The violations -- the principal violations of the no-fly zone have been by helicopters, which could easily land. In this case -- we've not had a fixed-wing violation reported of any kind, much less one we were in a position to do something about, to the best of my information, since last fall, since September. Those are much more serious because of the capacity they have to engage in military conduct from the air.

Our mandate under the United Nations was to enforce the no-fly zone to eliminate the prospect that the war could be carried into the air.

Q How were you informed, President Clinton? How did you learn of this, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Early, early this morning I was notified.

Q How about the firing of the counterintelligence --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END
The NAC deadline is explicit: all artillery and other heavy weapons must be withdrawn beyond the 20 kilometer perimeter or put under UN control by the deadline established by the NAC.

The exact measures to achieve this are being discussed on the ground, but let me be clear: Control means control and must be effected in one of three ways:

1. Weapons will be withdrawn outside the exclusion zone;
2. Weapons will be moved to UN cantonment areas where they will be under the physical control of UNPROFOR; or
3. If weapons cannot be moved -- because they are dug-in, snow-bound, or there is not sufficient transportation -- UN troops will be stationed at the site of the weapons, the crews will be separated from the weapons and the weapons will be made inoperable.

As Lt. General Rose, the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia, has said, if the warring parties want back weapons put under UN control, they must take them back by force.

As the NAC decisions made clear, all weapons in the exclusion zone not under UNPROFOR control after the ten-day deadline are subject to attack.
Q: Is there a difference of views between the UN and NATO on the content of the NATO warnings of February 9?

A: We hope not. As General Rose said in a press briefing today, "the UN and NATO are as one. Heavy weapons would either be withdrawn or controlled by the UN. Any weapons not so controlled or withdrawn would be subject to airstrikes."

Q: Is there flexibility regarding either the 10 day deadline or the amount of Serb heavy weaponry that must be withdrawn or controlled?

A: No; this deadline is fixed and applies to all Serb heavy weapons located within the 20 kilometer exclusion zone.

NATO's decisions of February 9 were clear: NATO [called] for "the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area within two kilometres of the centre of Pale..."

Q: What does "regrouping and placing under UN control" mean?

A: The intent of the NATO warnings is to stop the shelling of civilians and the further destruction of Sarajevo and to give new impetus to the negotiations. To date, despite numerous commitments, the Serbs have not complied with agreements to bring their heavy weapons under control. The NATO decisions are specifically designed to create incentives for them to do so.

"Regrouping and under UN control" must consist of at least an operational reconfiguration of heavy weapons so that they are incapable of shelling Sarajevo and UNPROFOR control sufficient to ensure they are not put back into a tactical configuration capable of firing on Sarajevo.

Q: What happens if this withdrawal or regrouping does not occur?

A: After the ten day period, any weapons found within the 20 kilometer exclusion zone not under UN control are subject to NATO airstrikes, whether or not these weapons are actively firing on Sarajevo.

As the NATO decisions of February 9 make clear, we would prefer that this withdrawal or control of heavy weapons occur through agreement, but failure to reach such an agreement will not result in the extension of the ten day period.
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SPECIAL BOSNIA BRIEFING - CONDUCTED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY; GENERAL JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JCS; AND MS. KATHLEEN M. DELASKI, ATSD (PA) ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1994 AT 2:00 P.M. AT THE PENTAGON

MS. DELASKI: GOOD AFTERNOON. THANK YOU FOR COMING TO OUR BRIEFING TODAY.

SECRETARY PERRY WILL OPEN WITH AN OPENING STATEMENT, AND THEN GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI WILL ALSO HAVE SOME COMMENTS, AND THEN THE TWO HAVE AGREED TO REMAIN FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS.

DR. PERRY?

SECRETARY PERRY: GOOD AFTERNOON.

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU A REPORT ON SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST 36 HOURS RELATIVE TO BOSNIA. THESE ARE DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT WHICH I AM CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC.

THE PARTIES ARE EFFECTIVELY COMPLYING WITH THE NATO
CURRENT SITUATION. THE MEETING WAS REMARKABLE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND SYMBOLISM. AS WE MET, THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT WITHIN A FEW HOURS NATO FORCES WOULD BE SENT OUT ON COMBAT MISSIONS UNDER NATO ORDERS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE.

WHAT WAS STRIKING TO ME WAS THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT AMONG THE MINISTERS THAT WE MUST ADHERE TO THE ULTIMATUM SET FEBRUARY 9TH BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AND THAT WE WOULD USE THE AIR FLEET, IF NECESSARY. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE DID NOT POSE HARD QUESTIONS TO OURSELVES AND TO OUR COMMANDERS. THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO WELL UNDERSTAND THAT NO MILITARY OPERATION IS RISK-FREE. BUT THE MEETING WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A FIRM SENSE OF RESOLVE TO PROCEED UPON THE COURSE LAID OUT IN THE FEBRUARY 9TH DECISION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

IT ALSO WAS CLEAR THAT THE MINISTERS HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE FORCES ASSEMBLED AND IN THE PLANS THAT HAD BEEN DRAWN UP BY THE COMMANDERS.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE MINISTERS WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE UN TROOPS ON THE GROUND IN SARAJEVO. IN FACT, THE MEETING WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES

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BY UPDATES ON THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUND OBSERVERS WHO WERE
VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THAT WAS PARTICULARLY
REASSURING TO THE MINISTERS WHOSE FORCES WERE SLATED TO
PARTICIPATE IN AIR OPERATIONS, BUT WHO ALSO HAD TROOPS ON THE
GROUND. ALL IN ALL THESE WERE UNPRECEDENTED COORDINATION
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THESE MILITARY FORCES.

THE STATUS AND THE COMPLETENESS OF COMPLIANCE WAS A KEY
SUBJECT AT THE MEETING. WHILE THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE TIME
OF THE MEETING SHOWED STRONG REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC AND IT WAS
CLEARLY THE HOPE OF THE MINISTRIES THAT AIR STRIKES WOULD NOT BE
NECESSARY...I EMPHASIZE THAT THEY WERE ALL EMPHATIC THAT IF THE
WARRING FACTIONS DID NOT COMPLY, ADMIRAL BOORDA SHOULD PROCEED
WITH HIS PLANS.

FINALLY, I WOULD NOTE THAT AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, EACH OF
THE MINISTERS PREPARED TO REPORT BACK TO HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, AND
THEY ALSO TOOK UPON THEMSELVES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT TO
OTHER COUNTRIES WHO HAD TROOPS ON THE GROUND, OR WHO WERE IN A
POSITION TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR.

FOR EXAMPLE, SHORTLY AFTER THE MEETING I NOT ONLY CALLED
PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER, BUT ALSO

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MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRAČEVIĆ OF RUSSIA, MR. COLLENETTE OF CANADA, AND MINISTER RUEHE OF GERMANY.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAPABILITY WE PUT INTO PLACE, AND THE RESOLVE SHOWN BY THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, HAS BEEN PLAYED OUT NOW ON THE GROUND. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE MEETINGS OF MINISTERS ALSO INCLUDED THE DEPUTY UN COMMANDER, GENERAL MCKINNES, WHO GAVE THE REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF WEAPONS BEING TURNED IN TO UN CONTROL. THESE REPORTS WERE CONFIRMED BY TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND THERE HAS BEEN A PRODUCTIVE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GENERAL BOORDA’S AIR RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND THE UN OBSERVERS ON THE GROUND.

THE UN HAD SET UP CANTONMENTS IN WHICH THEY COLLECTED THE WEAPONS TURNED IN. THEY SENT OUT FOOT PATROLS TO SIGHTS REPORTED BY AIR SURVEILLANCE, AND TO SITES REPORTED TO THEM BY THE SERBS AND THE MUSLIMS. EVERY SITE THAT THEY REACHED AGREED TO PUT THEIR WEAPONS UNDER UN CONTROL. THIS WAS TRULY A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH SINCE IT INDICATED A REAL WILLINGNESS AND INTENT TO COMPLY. IT IS THE FIRST PSYCHOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH WE HAVE SEEN FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA.

THE COMBINATION OF OUR CAPABILITY, THE RESOLVE OF THE NATO
NATIONS, AND THE WILLING RESPONSE OF THE SERBS AND THE MUSLIMS
LED GENERAL COT, GENERAL ROSE, MR. AKASHI, AND ADMIRAL BOORDA ALL
TO CONCLUDE THAT AIR STRIKES ARE NOT NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. THE
BASIS OF THAT JUDGMENT WAS THAT THERE WAS AT THE TIME OF THE
DEADLINE, EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH NATO’S REQUIREMENTS.

JUST A MONTH AGO, SARAJEVO WAS BEING BOMBARDED BY ARTILLERY
-- OFTEN MORE THAN A THOUSAND ROUNDS A DAY -- RESULTING IN
THOUSANDS OF SARAJEVANS BEING KILLED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS
INJURED. THE PAST TEN DAYS, NO SHELLS HAVE FALLEN ON SARAJEVO.

THESE RESULTS ARE NOT ONLY A GREAT RELIEF TO THE PEOPLE OF
SARAJEVO, BUT AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN
BOSNIA. BUT THE CESSATION OF THE SHELLING IS BUT ONE STEP IN A
LONG, DIFFICULT JOURNEY.

ON THIS JOURNEY WE MUST FOCUS ON SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES.
FIRST, WE MUST SUSTAIN THE BAN ON HEAVY WEAPONS AND SHELLING.
SURVEILLANCE -- BOTH IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND -- WILL
CONTINUE. WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR AIR CREWS IN A HIGH STATE OF
READINESS, IN THE EVENT THAT EITHER THE SERBS OR MUSLIMS RETURN
THEIR WEAPONS TO THE SARAJEVO AREA OR START SHELLING.

SECONDLY, WE MUST BUILD ON THESE STEPS ON THE GROUND BY

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NO TAKING ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO RELIEVE THE SUFFERING OF THE CIVILIANS IN SARAJEVO. FUEL IS STILL A MAJOR PROBLEM; ELECTRICITY IS SHUT OFF IN MANY AREAS; AND RELIEF CONVOYS ARE STILL BEING HARASSED.

THIRD, WE MUST BUILD ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SERBS AND THE MUSLIMS TO TAKE THIS ONE SMALL STEP FOR PEACE TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT. WE MUST KEEP OUR EYE FIRMLY ON THAT ALL-IMPORTANT GOAL.

FINALLY, WE MUST BUILD ON THE CLOSE COOPERATION WE HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR. I HAVE ALREADY TALKED ABOUT THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION AMONG NATO NATIONS AND BETWEEN NATO AND THE UN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE GROUND. I ALSO WANT TO STRESS THE CONSTRUCTIVE RUSSIAN ROLE.

I HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MINISTER GRACHEV SEVERAL TIMES OVER THE PAST WEEK. FROM MY FIRST CALL, I HAVE URGED HIM TO USE HIS INFLUENCE ON THE SERBS TO GET THEM TO TURN IN THEIR WEAPONS. YESTERDAY WHEN I TALKED TO HIM, I THANKED HIM BECAUSE THE EVENTS ON THE GROUND INDICATED THAT HE DID USE HIS INFLUENCE. IT IS HARD TO READ INTENT AND MOTIVATIONS AMONG THE WARRING FACTIONS ON
THE GROUND, BUT I CAN MEASURE RESULTS.

ALL THAT IS ON THE PLUS SIDE OF THE LEDGER. BUT THE HISTORY OF THE BALKANS DOES NOT PROVIDE A GREAT DEAL OF ENCOURAGEMENT. BUT THESE EVENTS, WEIGHED AGAINST THAT HISTORY, DO PROVIDE SOME HOPE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THIS FIGHTING, IN FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS, THAT WE HAVE NOT HAD THE WORST OUTCOME.


TO WHICH THE SCORPION RESPONDED. "WELL, THIS IS THE BALKANS."

THIS TIME, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE RECENT
Conflict, it could be said that the scorpion did not sting the frog. For the first time, we did not have the worst possible outcome.

It is important not to overstate the grounds for optimism. But it is equally important not to miss the opportunity that lies ahead of us.

I see three reasons to be cautiously optimistic. First, there has been no shelling in Sarajevo now for ten days. Second, we have had a psychological breakthrough in that the Serbs and the Muslims have been willing to turn over their weapons to UN forces. And third, is the close communication and strong resolve which has developed among the NATO partners on this issue.

I would now like to turn the floor over to General Shalikashvili to talk about the situation on the ground, as we now see it, and the problems that the various teams in Air Reconnaissance had in verifying compliance.

General Shalikashvili: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I know that you are very anxious to ask questions so I won't take very long, but let me just use a few slides here, or charts to tell you where I think we have been and where we are today.
THE FIRST SLIDE JUST SIMPLY SHOWS YOU THE HISTORY OF THE SHELLING OF SARAJEVO OVER THE LAST 60 DAYS FROM A HIGH OF SOME 1,744 ROUNDS IN ONE DAY, JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS, TO ON YOUR RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THAT CHART -- EIGHT DAYS, ZERO SHELLING.

IT MIGHT BE ALSO USEFUL TO REMIND OURSELVES THAT DURING THE TIME THAT SARAJEVO HAS BEEN UNDER SIEGE DURING THIS WAR, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS WAR, I AM TOLD THAT OVER 9,000 PEOPLE IN SARAJEVO HAVE BEEN KILLED, AND OVER 57,000 HAVE BEEN WOUNDED -- MANY OF THOSE CHILDREN. I THINK, VIEWED IN THAT LIGHT, THOSE EIGHT ZEROS ON THE LOWER RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE CHART ASSUME A VERY SPECIAL MEANING.

THIS NEXT SLIDE SHOWS YOU WHAT WE SAW ON THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY, THE DAY OF THE NATO DECISION. WE WERE, AT THAT TIME, TRACKING SOME 26 HEAVY WEAPON SITES FROM BOTH FACTIONS, EACH ONE OF THEM CONTAINING A MULTIPLE NUMBER OF WEAPONS. AS YOU CAN SEE, ALL OF THEM WERE WITHIN A CIRCLE OF ABOUT 20 KILOMETERS, OR 12.5 MILES, AND IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT NATO ESTABLISHED THE ZONE, OR THAT CIRCLE FROM WHICH ALL WEAPONS HAD TO BE WITHDRAWN, OR IF THEY COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN, WOULD BE TURNED OVER UNDER NATO CONTROL.
THIS NEXT CHART WILL SHOW YOU THE 11 SITES THAT UN ESTABLISHED INTO WHICH THOSE WEAPONS WOULD BE BROUGHT IN...AND THEY'RE SHOWN HERE AS THOSE BLUE SQUARES WITH THE UN SYMBOL ON THEM. AND THE ROUND CIRCLES ARE THOSE LOCATIONS FROM WHICH THE WEAPONS WERE EITHER MOVED INTO THESE CANTONMENT AREAS OR FROM WHICH THEY WERE MOVED OUTSIDE OF THE CIRCLE.

LET ME SHOW YOU, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE RESULTS AS WE NOW KNOW THEM. AND PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS THE INFORMATION WE HAVE RIGHT NOW. IT WILL PROBABLY CHANGE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AS THEY CATALOG BETTER, AND SO ON. BUT WHAT WE KNOW NOW IS THAT IN THOSE 11 SITES THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS, THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY HAS NOW MOVED 250 WEAPONS, AND THE MUSLIMS SOME 46 WEAPONS.

NOW, IN ADDITION TO THESE WEAPONS THAT THE UN NOW CONTROLS, THE NEXT CHART WILL SHOW YOU AN ADDITIONAL 18 LOCATIONS WHERE THERE ARE WEAPONS STILL OUT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. FIFTEEN OF THOSE SITES, MARKED BY THE BLUE SYMBOL, ARE WHERE, RIGHT NOW, THERE ARE UN PERSONNEL CONTROLLING THOSE WEAPONS. BY THE WAY, THOSE ARE 45 ADDITIONAL WEAPONS THAT ARE UNDER UN CONTROL, IN ADDITION TO THOSE THAT I'VE SHOWN YOU EARLIER.
THERE ARE TWO SITES, WHICH AT THE TIME WE WERE MEETING THERE, WE STILL DID NOT HAVE UN PERSONNEL THERE, BUT THOSE ARE WEAPONS AT TWO SITES, CONTAINING SEVEN WEAPONS, THAT HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO US BY THE SERBS. WE JUST HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET THERE YET BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY SNOW AND THE LOCATION WHERE THEY ARE. WE KNOW WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE UN TEAMS ARE MAKING THEIR WAY OVER THERE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THOSE SEVEN WEAPONS, AND THOSE TWO SITES ARE MARKED HERE IN RED.

THE FINAL CHART THAT I WANTED TO SHOW YOU SORT OF REINFORCES WHAT SECRETARY PERRY SAID EARLIER, THAT WE, ON THE MILITARY SIDE, ARE VERY WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS NOT THE END YET, AND THAT WE HAVE TO REMAIN VIGILANT, THAT WE HAVE TO VERY CAREFULLY CONTINUE TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATO DECISIONS...AND THAT IS THAT NO WEAPONS ARE BROUGHT BACK INTO THE 20 KILOMETER CIRCLE, AND THAT ANY SHELLING OF SARAJEVO IS EFFECTIVELY DEALT WITH.

TO THAT EFFECT, NATO AIR CREWS REMAIN READY TO STRIKE, IF, THAT WOULD BE CALLED FOR. AS AN EXAMPLE, JUST TODAY OVER 150 SORTIES HAVE FLOWN OVER THAT AREA.

FINALLY, I WOULD SAY THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT. MANY OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES
ON THE GROUND ARE PROVIDING SECURITY TO CONVOYS. WE IN THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY, PRINCIPALLY, ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE
AIRCRAFT INTO SARAJEVO AND THE AIRDROP THAT STILL IS ONGOING.

WITH THAT, I THINK BOTH SECRETARY PERRY AND I ARE READY FOR
YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: DR. PERRY AND GENERAL, I MIGHT ASK YOU...YOU SAID ON
THE WAY TO ITALY THAT THE MEETING WAS BEING HELD WITH THE
DETERMINATION THAT THE SLAUGHTER WOULD STOP. THERE IS SLAUGHTER
GOING ON ELSEWHERE IN BOSNIA NOW. PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE IT
CLEAR EARLIER THAT THE EXPANSION OF THE PLAN TO SAVE PEOPLE IN
SARAJEVO WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE REST OF BOSNIA UNLESS YOU
COULD HANDLE IT, UNLESS YOU COULD ENFORCE IT.

COULD IT BE ENFORCED? AND IS THERE POLITICAL WILL, AS YOU
KNOW, IF ANY, AMONG THE OTHER DEFENSE MINISTERS, TO DO SO?

PERRY: WE JOINED THE FRENCH IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST OF ALL, WE THOUGHT
IT WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACE AGREEMENT. AND
SECONDLY, WE WANTED TO TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE
SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN SARAJEVO. BOTH OF THOSE
OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
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WE ARE CONSIDERING OTHER WAYS OF EXPANDING ACTIONS OF THAT SORT, BUT ANY SUCH CONSIDERATION HAS TO BE MEASURED BY THE SAME TWO TESTS AS THIS FIRST ONE. DOES IT REALLY MOVE US FORWARD TOWARDS PEACE NEGOTIATION, AND CAN IT REDUCE THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN THE MEAN TIME. ALL SUCH PROPOSALS WILL BE CONSIDERED BASED ON THOSE TWO CRITERIA.

Q: BUT CAN IT BE ENFORCED? AND I'D LIKE TO ASK GENERAL SHALI TO ANSWER IT ALSO. WHAT DID GENERAL JOULWAN SAY, AND ADMIRAL BOORDA? COULD IT BE ENFORCED IF YOU DID EXTEND THIS?

SHALIKASHVILI: CERTAINLY IT CAN BE ENFORCED. IF THE QUESTION IS, ARE THERE SUFFICIENT AIRPLANES TO DO SO, DEPENDING ON INTO HOW MANY AREAS WE WOULD MOVE THAT. I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE NATIONS WOULD MAKE THE AIRPLANES AVAILABLE. SO, I DON'T THINK THE ISSUE IS AN ISSUE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY. IT IS RATHER THE TEST THAT SECRETARY PERRY APPLIES TO THAT QUESTION, AND I THINK WE NEED TO CAREFULLY WEIGH IT IN THAT LIGHT BEFORE WE DISCUSS IT.

SECONDLY, IF I MAY, THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST DAY OF THE SUCCESS IN SARAJEVO. WE HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WILL HOLD AND THAT HAS A BROAD, MORE LASTING SECESSION OF

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SHELLING INTO SARAJEVO BEFORE WE PUSH ANY FURTHER.

Q: GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI, MAY I ASK YOU A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION FROM YOUR CHARTS? THE CHARTS DID NOT MENTION HOW MANY, UNLESS I MISSED THEM, OF HOW MANY OF THESE RELEVANT HEAVY WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED ALTOGETHER FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE, RATHER THAN REMAINING UNDER SUPERVISION OR IN CANTONMENT AREAS. AND ALSO, IS THE IMPLICATION OF YOUR CHARTS THAT THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL WEAPONS WITHIN THE AREA THAT ARE NOT EITHER SUPERVISED...ABOUT TO BE SUPERVISED TODAY OR IN CANTONMENT AREAS?

SHALIKASHVILI: ON YOUR FIRST QUESTION AS TO HOW MANY WEAPONS WERE MOVED, WE DO NOT KNOW, SPECIFICALLY, HOW MANY MOVED. WE DID NOT COUNT EVERY WEAPON THAT MOVED OUT.

ON YOUR SECOND QUESTION, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WHAT I SHOWED YOU HERE REPRESENTS ALL THE WEAPONS THAT WE KNOW ABOUT. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT IN THE DAYS TO COME WE COULD NOT FIND SOME OTHER WEAPONS THERE THAT HAVE BEEN ABANDONED, LEFT BEHIND, THAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT. I CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT. BUT THE COMBINATION OF THE NUMBERS I GAVE YOU REPRESENT EVERYTHING THAT WE KNOW ABOUT TODAY.

Q: AND AS FAR AS GOING OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE, I
UNDERSTAND YOU MAY NOT HAVE PRECISE FIGURES OR YOU DON'T HAVE 100 PERCENT CONFIDENCE, BUT YOU MUST HAVE SOME ORDER OF MAGNITUDE SENSE OF HOW MUCH WENT OUT AND WHERE IT WENT.

SHALIKASHVILI: THE SERBIAN LEADERSHIP INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TURN OVER ABOUT HALF OF THEM TO US AND TAKE ABOUT HALF OF THEM OUT. THAT'S ABOUT AS GOOD AS I CAN TELL YOU.

Q: BACK TO THE QUESTION OF BUILDING ON THE SARAJEVO PRECEDENT, I'D LIKE TO FOCUS IN ON THE FACT THAT SARAJEVO WAS ONE OF SIX SAFE HAVEN AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED. AND IN ADDITION, THERE ARE TWO AREAS THAT ARE NOT SAFE HAVENS IN WHICH THERE'S BEEN VERY HEAVY SHELLING -- THE MOSTAR AREA, WHICH INvolves croats, and Alovo, Where there have been reports of a major serb offensive building up, which Could, in fact, cut Tuzla off from Sarajevo.

ARE ANY OF THOSE AREAS ACTIVE CANDIDATES, IN YOUR VIEW, FOR SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE SARAJEVO ULTIMATUM? OR, ARE THEY FIT CANDIDATES FOR THAT SORT OF THING? HOW DO YOU VIEW THESE AREAS?

PERRY: NOTHING HAS BEEN RULED OUT AT THIS STAGE, AND WE'RE CONSIDERING MANY OPTIONS. BUT, AS GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI HAS SAID, OUR FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IS TO SECURE THE
No gain we’ve already made, and we will not seriously consider taking more options until we are certain that this one is really secure. So, those options are certainly weeks away...not days away.

Q: WHAT OPTIONS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION THAT MIGHT BE SHORT OF ISSUING ANOTHER SARAJEVO TYPE ULTIMATUM? ARE THERE OTHER, MORE LIMITED USES OF FORCE THAT COULD BE USED...

PERRY: LET ME STATE AGAIN THAT OUR MAJOR EFFORT, OUR MAJOR THRUST IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, ARE GOING TO BE IN THE OVERALL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE LOOK AT THESE OTHER MEASURES TO THE EXTENT THEY REINFORCE AND SUPPLEMENT THAT. THE ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THESE MEASURES BECAUSE OF THEIR DRAMATIC EFFECT, BUT THEY DO NOT, IN AND OF THEMSELVES, BRING ABOUT PEACE. OUR MAJOR THRUST IS GOING TO BE ON PEACE.

Q: JUST AS A QUICK FOLLOW-UP TO GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI. WE’VE HAD, AS REPORTERS, DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ON THE SITUATION AT ALOVO. IS THERE, BASED ON OUR MILITARY SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTS FROM THE FIELD, A SUBSTANTIAL SERB OFFENSIVE BUILDING UP THERE, AND DOES ITS AIM SEEM TO BE TO CUT TUZLA FROM SARAJEVO?

SHALIKASHVILI: I’M NOT SURE THAT I CAN VERIFY THAT. IT IS
CLEARLY AN AREA THAT WE ARE WATCHING CAREFULLY, BUT I'M NOT PREPARED TO TELL YOU THAT WE, FROM THE INTELLIGENCE THAT WE HAVE, ARE PREPARED TO REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT YOU JUST REACHED.

Q: THE ONE QUESTION THAT WE HAVEN'T ADDRESSED OURSELVES TO, OR MAYBE I MISSED IT, IS THE WHY. WHY DO YOU GENTLEMEN FEEL THAT THE BOSNIA SERBS, AT THIS POINT, WERE WILLING TO MOVE THE ARTILLERY AND TURN THEM OVER? WAS IT THE FEAR OF THE AIR STRIKES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY WHO SAY THE AIR STRIKES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THAT EFFECTIVE. WAS IT THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION? IN YOUR OPINIONS, WAS THERE ANY SINGLE FACTOR, OR WERE THERE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN AT THIS POINT?

PERRY: YOU'RE ASKING THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTION OF ALL, WHAT'S INSIDE THE MIND OF ANOTHER PERSON OR ANOTHER NEGOTIATING TEAM. BUT, I COULD SPECULATE ON A FEW THINGS THAT COULD BE IN THEIR MINDS. FIRST OF ALL, THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO DOUBT IN THEIR MIND ON BOTH THE CAPABILITY AND THE RESOLVE OF NATO TO ACT. THAT HAD TO BE A DISSUADING FACTOR.

SECONDLY, AS I INDICATED TO YOU, I BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS USED THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE SERBS TO PERSUADE THEM THAT TURNING OVER THEIR WEAPONS WOULD BE IN THEIR BEST INTEREST.
THIRD, THIS HAS BEEN A LONG, AND DIFFICULT, AND BITTER WAR, AND I WOULD HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR SOME RELIEF AND SEEING SOME PROSPECTS OF HEADING TOWARDS A GENERAL PEACE.

Q: GENERAL SHALI...ON THE CONCEPT OF EXTENDING THE NATO AIR STRIKE THREAT TO OTHER AREAS, BEFORE WE ARE ABLE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MISSIONS OR THE POSSIBLE MISSIONS INTO SARAJEVO WE PRACTICED FOR A LONG TIME -- INTENSE COORDINATION EFFORTS WITH THE NATO/UN PEOPLE ON THE GROUND. WOULD YOU GO THROUGH THE SAME THING BEFORE YOU COULD REASONABLY EXTEND THIS INTO OTHER AREAS?

SHALIKASHVILI: I THINK, AS FAR AS THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCERNED, AS FAR AS THE PRACTICE IS CONCERNED, AS FAR AS THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE AIRCREWS AND PEOPLE ON THE GROUND IS CONCERNED. I THINK THAT ANY ADDITIONAL TRAINING, OR ANY ADDITIONAL PREPARATORY WORK WOULD BE MUCH, MUCH LESS IF YOU WERE TO EXTEND THAT. THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADDITIONAL CREWS THAT ARE REQUIRED, BUT THAT, TOO, WOULD BE NOT AS EXTENSIVE AS SETTING UP THE SYSTEM IN THE FIRST PLACE. BUT AGAIN, I WOULD CAUTION, BEFORE WE REACH CONCLUSIONS THAT THAT'S THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP, I'D LIKE TO SIDE VERY MUCH WITH SECRETARY PERRY ON THE ISSUE THAT THIS IS THE TIME, NOW, TO CONSOLIDATE THAT WHICH WE HAVE
Q: CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT YOUR LATEST TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PAVLO GRACHEV? DID YOU HAVE ANOTHER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIM TODAY?

PERRY: YES, I DID. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS ON THAT TELEPHONE CALL, WE WERE DISCUSSING VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT REINFORCE THE POSITIVE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE THAT’S ALREADY BEEN MADE. THE PRINCIPAL POINT THAT I MADE TO GENERAL GRACHEV WAS NOTICING THAT, WHILE MANY OF THESE WEAPONS HAVE COME UNDER UN CONTROL, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN MOVED OUT OF THE AREA, AND THAT IT WOULD BE A STEP BACKWARDS FOR PEACE IF THESE ARTILLERY PIECES WERE THEN SENT TO SHELL OTHER CITIES. AND THAT HE, AND WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO SEE THAT THAT DID NOT HAPPEN.

SO, WE TALKED ABOUT MANY THINGS, BUT THE THRUST OF IT RELATIVE TO BOSNIA HAD TO DO WITH CURTAILING THE USE OF THOSE EXTRA ARTILLERY PIECES TO SHELL CIVILIANS IN OTHER CITIES.

Q: DID HE REQUEST U.S. TROOPS ON THE GROUND TO ASSIST IN WHAT’S GOING ON THERE?

PERRY: YES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS
NO
WOULD BE ENHANCED BY HAVING MORE TROOPS ON THE GROUND, AND
PARTICULARLY U.S. TROOPS. I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON’S
POSITION ON THAT HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME, THAT WE WERE
PREPARED TO SEND TROOPS TO ASSIST IN THE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AT
SUCH TIME AS A GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED.

Q: IS IT STILL YOUR VIEW, AND I’D LIKE GENERAL
SHALIKASHVILI ALSO TO ANSWER THIS, THAT WHAT IS REQUIRED TO
IMPLEMENT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT NOW FORESEEABLE IS A REINFORCED,
TAILORED U.S. POSITION OF ABOUT 25,000 TROOPS?

PERRY: I’LL ASK GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI TO COMMENT ALSO, BUT
I WOULD JUST OBSERVE THAT UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT THE DETAILS, OR EVEN
THE BASIC OUTLINE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IS, IT’S HARD, IF NOT
IMPOSSIBLE, TO ESTIMATE HOW MANY TOTAL GROUND TROOPS WILL BE
NEEDED TO ENFORCE IT. THEREFORE, I COULDN’T PUT A NUMBER TO ANY
U.S. TROOPS WHO WOULD BE NEEDED AT THIS TIME.

SHALIKASHVILI: I THINK IT’S ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. WE REMAIN
IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE U.S. COMMANDERS IN EUROPE TO ASK
THEM, DID THEY KEEP IN STEP WITH THE POLITICAL PROCESS SO THEY
CAN ADJUST THEIR PLANS, BUT THEY TELL US TIME AND AGAIN, AND
THEY’RE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT, THAT UNTIL YOU SEE THE FINAL PRODUCT,
WHAT IT IS, WHAT THE MILITARY TASKS ARE THAT FLOW FROM THAT PEACE PLAN, YOU REALLY CAN'T COME EVEN CLOSE TO WHAT IT IS THAT YOU WOULD NEED. SO, I THINK ANY NUMBER THAT I WOULD GIVE YOU WOULD BE MISLEADING. THE PRESIDENT, WHEN ASKED THIS QUESTION TODAY, SAID UNDER THE CONDITIONS THAT HE HAS OFTEN ALREADY OUTLINED, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO HELP IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PLAN, BUT THE ONLY NUMERICAL THING HE WOULD MENTION IS THAT, AS LONG AS THAT IS NOT OVER HALF OF THE TOTAL NUMBER REQUIRED.

Q: THE REASON I ASK THOUGH, IS BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW, UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF HAS BEEN GOING AROUND EUROPE GIVING THEM A VERY SPECIFIC NUMBER OF NO MORE THAN 15,000 OR NO MORE THAN A THIRD, AND I'VE HEARD STRONG DEFENSE FROM THAT VIEW BY SENIOR PEOPLE WORKING FOR YOU IN THIS BUILDING...FOR THE U.S. MILITARY IN THIS BUILDING.

SHALIKASHVILI: AGAIN, THE TOTAL NUMBER...I WOULD BE MISLEADING YOU IF I GAVE YOU ONE, BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE MILITARY TASKS ARE. THE NUMBERS ARE NOT JUST DECIDED BY THE SIZE OF THE AREA THAT IS IN CONTROL BY ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER. IT IS REALLY MUCH MORE DRIVEN BY THE SPECIFIC TASKS THAT YOU HAVE TO ACCOMPLISH -- WHETHER YOU'RE GUARDING SPECIFIC ROUTES, WHETHER...
YOU HAVE TO DO OTHER MILITARY TASKS LIKE DISARM OR NOT DISARM FACTIONS. THAT ALL DRIVES UP THE NUMBERS, OR LOWERS THE NUMBERS. SO THAT WE DON'T KNOW.

Q: WE'VE BEEN TOLD THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS OFFERED TO SEND TWO, VERY SOPHISTICATED, FIRE SUPPRESSION/ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION RADARS TO BOSNIA WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT U.S. TROOPS WOULD NOT MAN THEM, BUT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE TRAINED NATO TROOPS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. ARE YOU PROCEEDING WITH THAT? WILL THAT GO AHEAD?

PERRY: WE'RE EXPLORING THAT POSSIBILITY RIGHT NOW, LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING HIGHLY PRECISE ARTILLERY LOCATING RADARS INTO SARAJEVO. TO THE EXTENT WE'RE EXPLORING IT, WE'RE LOOKING AT THE EQUIPMENT ONLY, AND NOT THE TROOPS THAT WOULD OPERATE IT.

Q: DO YOU THINK ADMIRAL BOORDA IS THE NEXT CNO, IN YOUR OPINION?

PERRY: NO COMMENT. (NOTE: OFF MIKE COMMENT - "I WILL COMMENT THAT ADMIRAL BOORDA IS A SPLENDID ADMIRAL, AND DOING A MARVELLOUS JOB OVER AT CINCSOUTH.")

PRESS: THANK YOU.
ULTIMATUM OF 9 FEBRUARY. THE SERB AND THE MUSLIM FORCES HAVE
BOTH REMOVED THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS AWAY FROM THE SARAJEVO AREA, OR
ALTERNATIVELY, TURNED THEM OVER TO UN CONTROL. THERE HAS BEEN NO
SHELLING OF SARAJEVO FOR TEN DAYS NOW.

COMPLIANCE, HOWEVER, IS A CONTINUOUS ACT. IT IS NOT
SOMETHING DONE FOR 24 HOURS AND THEN IGNORED. WE WILL CONTINUE
TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE CLOSELY. WE WILL BE FLYING RECONNAISSANCE
MISSIONS OVER SARAJEVO AND ARE PREPARED TO STRIKE IF EITHER OF
THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS MAKE THAT NECESSARY.

FIRST, IF WE DETERMINE THAT HEAVY WEAPONS ARE IN THE ZONE
BUT NOT UNDER UN CONTROL. AND SECOND, IF SARAJEVO IS SHELLED BY
HEAVY WEAPONRY, WHETHER LOCATED IN OR OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE.

IN ADDITION, WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND IF THE UN GROUND
COMMANDER REQUESTS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE
EXISTING UN RESOLUTIONS.

YESTERDAY I WAS IN AVIANO, ITALY, WHERE I MET WITH THE NATO
AIR CREWS AND THEIR LEADERS, ADMIRAL BOORDA AND GENERAL ASHY, WHO
WERE CHARGED WITH ASSEMBLING THE STRIKE FORCE THAT WOULD HAVE
CARRIED OUT THE NATO ULTIMATUM SHOULD THAT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY.
THEY HAVE ASSEMBLED A POWERFUL AIR FLEET -- F-15’S, A-10’S, F-

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18's, French Mirages, British Jaguars, Dutch F-16's, as well as tankers, AWACS, and reconnaissance planes -- a truly impressive air armada.

I found the crews in a high state of readiness. They have been flying over Bosnia, and in particular, over Sarajevo for months now. They have practiced target runs. They have trained with the UN ground air controllers. In sum, they were, and are, ready and capable of striking any target that is found in violation of the NATO ultimatum.

The threat of a military response was real, and it continues to be real. They continue to maintain intensive surveillance over Bosnia.

While I was in Aviano, I met with the Ministers of Defense and the military chiefs of the countries that would participate in any air strikes. These are the Ministers of Defense from the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. Italy also participated as the host nation supplying the bases. I want to say a special word of thanks for the Italian support.

At the meeting, Admiral Boorda gave the Ministers a briefing on his operational concept, his rules of engagement and on the
Authority for air strikes

--Any air strikes will be under the control of Admiral Boorda, NATO CINCSOUTH, and General Ashy, the NATO CINCSOUTH Air Component Commander. Both happen to be Americans, but they are acting in their NATO capacity.

--Because there are 28,000 UN troops on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, any NATO air strikes must be coordinated with the UN. The NATO commanders and the UN commanders in the theatre have well established lines of communication and agreed procedures for coordination.

--Authority for air strikes derives from the NAC decision of February 9.

--That authority is derived from the UN mandate embodied in the June 3, 1993 Security Council resolution 836 and NATO's February 9, 1994 decision to strike weapons in the excursion zone around Sarajevo not removed, or placed under UN control. The first air strike must be approved by the Secretary General. This proviso is commonly referred to as the "icebreaker" decision.

--The "icebreaker" decision authority rests with Secretary General Boutros Ghali. He may delegate authority to subordinate officials, but the responsibility remains with him for the decision.
MEDIA COVERAGE CONTINGENCY PLANNING NOTES

Based on discussions with Admiral Boorda's PAO, CAPT Jim Mitchell, USN, here is what is planned for coverage of any NATO operations which are undertaken:

The first indications of NATO military activity will likely come from reporters on the ground in Sarajevo. NATO will not announce plans in advance.

As soon as security considerations allow, the NATO public affairs office in Naples will release a brief statement acknowledging that an operation has taken place.

For operational security reasons, NATO intends that no media will be allowed access to Deny Flight air bases after 1800 GMT on February 20, 1994 until authorized by Admiral Boorda. If NATO conducts a strike, the media will be permitted back on the bases once the operation has been completed and the aircraft are safely returning.

Aircrew interviews will be permitted after the crews have been debriefed.

As soon as possible after the operation, there will be a news media briefing in Naples by one of Admiral Boorda's staff officers. The briefing will provide an official, on-camera spokesman. Information at this stage will be limited since the briefing will occur before any kind of meaningful assessment has been accomplished.

Several hours after the initial briefing -- when sufficient information has been assembled and analyzed -- Admiral Boorda will provide a media briefing in Naples.

NATO has established media information centers in Naples and in Aviano. The primary location for information is Naples. The NATO public affairs office in Naples is the release point for gun camera imagery of aircraft under NATO control should missions take place. The Pentagon will not release imagery which has not already been released by NATO.
Principals met this morning. President went over their recommendation this afternoon. Consulting with Congress over past weeks; staff consultations today.

Our position very clear: NATO decided February 9 to respond with air strikes if all Serb heavy weapons within 20 kilometers from the center of Sarajevo are not withdrawn or put under UN control by 7:00 p.m. EST Sunday 2/20, or if there is further shelling of Sarajevo from any range. NATO and the UN have agreed that "UN control" means the Serbs would have to fight to regain use of the weapons. Control means control.

Have carefully set goals we can meet with available means. Air power alone cannot end the siege, compel withdrawal of heavy weapons, ensure no more shelling. But we can make any who ignore NATO's decision pay a high price.

Our reports on the situation on the ground remain incomplete and inconclusive. Many heavy weapons have been placed under UN control. Bosnian Serb leaders have said will comply with NATO warning. No shelling of Sarajevo in recent days. Can say "Bosnia" and "progress" in same sentence. But the actions taken on the ground in the next two days will tell the story.

Preparations for implementing the decision have gone well. Boorda and Rose working closely and well.

NATO agreed with UN last August that UNSYG or his representative in Bosnia would authorize first use of air power, subsequent strikes would be agreed between NATO commander and UNPROFOR. Sensitive to safety of troops in UNPROFOR and humanitarian relief workers. NATO-UNPROFOR coordination excellent.

Secretary Perry to Aviano this weekend to meet with other MOD's whose forces would participate. Not to make new decisions. To review planning and readiness. NATO is prepared to act.

As on other issues, want to put power at service of diplomacy.

Ambassador Redman in the area working with European allies, Russians and the parties to make progress toward a settlement.

A word on role of our allies and friends. We have worked with French, Russians and others to achieve the progress thus far gained. Welcome their contribution. But no progress possible without leadership of President at NATO summit and since. As he said last Wednesday in this room, important U.S. interest at state: in avoiding larger war in region; in the strength and credibility of NATO; in preventing new refugee flows throughout Europe; in our relations in Muslim world; and, simply, a humanitarian interest that each of us felt again when seeing the carnage at the market place two weeks ago.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have just been informed by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO and United Nations commanders have concluded that all known heavy weapons of the parties have been withdrawn from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, are under the control of the United Nations, or soon should be. Therefore, they have concluded that no airstrikes in Bosnia by NATO air forces are required at this time.

This week's events clearly have given the residents of Sarajevo a respite from the shelling and a measure of hope. I want to congratulate NATO and each of our NATO allies for the demonstration of resolve that produced these results. I want to commend the high level of cooperation that has been demonstrated between the UN and NATO. As I told President Yeltsin in a call earlier today, I want to congratulate the government of Russia for its contributions to this effort. Finally, all Americans join in praising the courage and skill of our service personnel and those of our NATO allies; they have been the muscle in NATO's ultimatum.

Despite the significant events of the day, we must remain vigilant. All parties should be aware that the ultimatum stands. The deadline has not been extended. Any heavy weapons in the exclusion zone not under UN control are, and will remain, subject to airstrikes. NATO's decision also applies to any heavy weapons attacks on Sarajevo from within or beyond the zone. NATO and the United Nations will continue to monitor compliance extremely carefully.

The NATO decision and its results provide new potential for progress toward an end to the tragic conflict in Bosnia. In the coming days, American diplomats will be working with the parties to the conflict and our allies and partners to transform this potential into reality.
In a news conference, Woerner said he had been told by NATO officials that there had been virtual compliance with NATO’s ultimatum that all heavy weapons be removed from 12 miles around Sarajevo or put under UN control.

But he said the threat of NATO action remained in force.

"NATO’s resolve to end the shelling of Sarajevo does not end today. We shall continue to verify compliance and will want to make a rapid assessment of this in the coming hours. We will remain vigilant," he said.

He said that if weapons returned to the 12-mile zone to threaten Sarajevo or fired on the city from outside that zone, they would be subject to air strikes.

Woerner thanked Russia for its role in Bosnia in the last few days. "The just and lasting peace that we must now try to achieve in Bosnia involves close Russian involvement," he said.

REUTER
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It occurs to me that we got this weekend exactly backwards. It should be a Sunday in which the weather is lousy here, so we don't mind being in here, and good there. But we didn't quite get that right.

Let me just again, as I did yesterday, bring you up to date on where we are and then answer your questions, try to be as helpful as I can. Just got reports through General Shali from Admiral Boorda, and the reports are very encouraging. As you know, because you have seen the reports of it, there has been what our analysts call "hectic" activity on the ground all day as the Bosnian Serbs have been drawing heavy weapons out of the exclusion zone. We are confirming artillery sites that have been abandoned, and have been doing so all day. And there was a "dramatic increase" during the course of today, February 20th, in the number of heavy weapons the Bosnian Serbs brought to the cantonment areas. And I can't go into those specific numbers, but it was quite dramatic. There are now 10 of those cantonment areas.

So the real issue before us now is bringing the remaining sites under the control of the United Nations, those sites that the Serbs, for one reason or another, were unable to -- from which they were unable to withdraw their weapons. I might say that on the Bosnian government side, there were also additional weapons brought into the cantonment areas.

With regard to that question then of securing those remaining sites, we -- rather, the United Nations -- is narrowing the number of those sites. They have not secured yet all of them. And they might -- I repeat -- might be able to resolve those remaining sites by tonight, before the deadline; or, because of the weather and the conditions -- the roads around Sarajevo are abysmal, in abysmal shape right now -- they might have to have some time tomorrow for verification of sites and to complete that process.

Q Do you know how many?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you. It's a small -- relatively small number.

Q Was 10 the overall number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of cantonment areas?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, these are the areas that have been established by the United Nations for the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government to bring their weapons into.
But the number of sites out there in the hills that are not yet -- for which there is not yet verification that the weapons have been withdrawn, or which have not been brought under the control of the U.N., has narrowed considerably and is now a relatively small number.

Q Do you -- can't you say what that is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't, I'm afraid.

Q If at midnight our time tonight there were still a relatively small number of these sites either out of our control or there's no verification, would -- or could bombing then begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't I come back to that. Let me just finish up where we think we are, and then -- because that is not an unimportant question.

We can confirm also that good cooperation is taking place between the Bosnian Serbs and the United Nations in seeking to comply with the NATO deadline. Today also, as has been the case for all recent days, there was no shelling in Sarajevo, although there was some small arms fire. The 400 Russian troops from Croatia have arrived now at Sarajevo or in that area, although we understand that they have not yet taken up their positions around Sarajevo. There may not be the 800 that was talked about yesterday; we're not sure.

Our position and what will go on this evening: As I have, and others have said before, a deadline is a deadline. There will be no extension of the deadline. Any weapons that are still in the exclusion zone after 1900 local time -- I mean, our time -- and not under U.N. control will be subject to air strikes. As I said yesterday, this does not mean that there necessarily will be air strikes at 1901. It is to say that they are subject to air strikes.

And let me make here an important point for the future. This is not a one-time deal. The NATO decision will remain in force into the indefinite future and, therefore, after tonight, after tomorrow, and on into the future, any pieces of artillery, any heavy weapons in the exclusion zone not under U.N. control will remain subject to air strikes; and any weapons that -- heavy weapons that fire on Sarajevo, either from within that zone or beyond it, in accordance with the NATO decision, will be subject to air strikes.

After the deadline at the same time, we, the United Nations and NATO, will have to assess the situation. Admiral Boorda will be responsible for making the assessment on the NATO side. And his proposed actions at that time will be based on the facts on the ground. That is, are there identifiable heavy weapons within that zone not under U.N. control.

So in short, there is a lot of progress on the ground. There is a very good chance that all of the sites will be accounted for -- the sites of which we know -- we, the U.N. and NATO -- will be secured by tonight. But as I said, it may take some time tomorrow. And it is premature to draw thus firm conclusions.

I can fill you in on the President's activities today --

Q How does that gibe with what Secretary Perry is saying, that there will be no bombing today or tomorrow, no air strikes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Secretary Perry has not yet said that there will be --

MORE
Q Secretary Perry did not say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not. And I have just spoken with Secretary Perry and with General Shali and they did not say that to me.

Q What did he tell Russia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What he told Grachev -- he did talk to Grachev. It was not a terribly good connection. (Laughter.)

Q Again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said, on behalf of the White House phone system -- even the Defense Department phone system have -- he told the Defense Minister that there is some reason to be optimistic that the Serbs are complying; that if that turned out to be true, there would not be air strikes now, but that we were not yet sure if it was true.

Let me say that I have got the Tass World Service text here of what they said -- Grachev said -- and it said that -- he said in an interview that in his, Grachev's, view there would be no air strikes by NATO air forces on Bosnian Serb positions tonight, as envisioned in the NATO ultimatum, and that this -- quote -- "this had become quite clear" after his telephone conversation today with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. In other words, this was Grachev's interpretation of what Perry said, rather than a direct statement by Perry, which I think explains --

Q Was that call made from Perry's airplane, or where was that made from?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think probably it was made from the ground. I can't tell you for sure.

Q He's still on the ground?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he's in the air now.

Q What about the statement by General Rose that there will be no bombing tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't have a -- we have not yet received any firm decision along those lines.

Q You said, received any firm decision.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. I can't speak for him.

Q Isn't it -- you can't bomb those kind of targets in the dark with the people we've got -- with the NATO forces in the hills all around there, you literally cannot hit those kind of targets with any safety and reliability in the dark. So, you almost have to wait to daylight.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: True. But, again, I'm not going to make operational judgments here.

Q You said the U.N. could need some time --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do hope you hear with precision what I'm saying, which is that there has been tremendous progress; that there is a strong possibility that all the remaining sites can be brought under control by tonight, or possibly by
tomorrow, if necessary; but that it is premature to reach a final conclusion.

Q Have you run into any opposition or any type of problems with those remaining sites from the Serbs? In other words, are the U.N. troops having any problem getting control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, our reports are that the Serbs are working with the United Nations on this.

Q So it's just a matter of being able to get to these sites, or then getting the weapons out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you what the specifics are, and I suspect they vary site by site. But the U.N. is working on this.

Q You feel confident that this is going to be cleared up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm -- confident is not a word I --

Q -- the United Nations would be still continuing securing pieces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, might be, could be that.

Q It could be.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q But you said it would.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If they don't finish tonight.

Q But that would amount to an extension of the deadline.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Let me again be precise, as I said yesterday and the day before, about what the NATO decision was. The NATO decision was that any weapons in the exclusion zone that are not under U.N. control are subject to air attack.

Q Technically -- I understand, but de facto, it would be a de facto extension of the deadline --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q -- on the ground for the Serbs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would not be. If there were a de facto deadline extension, then we would -- we, NATO and the United Nations -- would be saying to the Serbs, you can relax, it's okay; it's all right if they're there; they're not subject to air attack. We are not saying that.

Q What you're saying is technically that -- but we could go in tomorrow morning and then try to secure them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could be.

Q But how many hours -- how long would that take?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you that because that's being worked on the ground.

Q When you say securing the sites, do you mean that U.N. personnel are going out and saying, okay, we take control of this tank right where it is right now, or are they just confirming that it's disarmed or confirming that it's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Either placing U.N. forces between the crews and the pieces, or rendering them inoperable or both.

Q Have the Russians and UNPROFOR finished their discussions about exactly how those 400 troops are going to be deployed? You said they haven't taken up their positions. Who's going to decide what those positions are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: UNPROFOR.

Q So that's been settled.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With the Russians, but -- settled is that they will be under the operational control of UNPROFOR.

Q And when was that finalized?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yesterday at the latest. I spoke about this yesterday.

Q Are they effectively securing these sites because these are weapons that can't be moved into the cantonment, so they have to go out to the sites and say, okay, these --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak to the situation at each of the sites, but presumably it was because they could not remove them -- because we know they have made extraordinary efforts today to remove --

Q When you mentioned relatively few, and some sites still need to be secured, does the relatively few refer to dozens or scores or hundreds?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they're bigger than a bread box and smaller --

Q Single digits?

Q Less than a 100?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say --

Q Scores, dozens?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Less than a score probably.

Q Less than a dozen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Less than a score.

Q A score is 20, isn't it?

Q -- talking about a dozen -- sorry, less than a score of weapons or sites?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sites.
Q Sites.

Q Are we demanding 100 percent compliance, you'll bomb anything that's left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The NATO decision is very clear -- any artillery. And again, let's, because there are some of you who weren't here yesterday --

Q Four score and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's 87 and take seven -- (laughter.) Let me just make one point here again about compliance, just in the way we all think about this. And, again, the NATO decision was very carefully phrased here, as I said to a number of you yesterday, to make sure that NATO was capable of doing what it said it would do. So the NATO decision was not one of saying there will be a demilitarized zone with regard to heavy weapons in the 20-kilometer radius of downtown, the center of Sarajevo.

It said that any weapon not withdrawn or under U.N. control will be subject to air strikes. And the reason for that is that we cannot know where every weapon is within that 20-kilometer area because you can hide mortars in barns or in basements, or whatever. So this is not a question of verifying that that whole area is free of weapons. It is a question of securing all of those weapon sites that we know of. Do you see what I'm saying? And of that, there is now a relatively small number.

Q Could you go back to what the President has been doing today and -- are you going to hold a vigil around here tonight, or at what point are we going to know it's not going to happen tonight? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you think we should -- just so that we -- well, I'm sure that on CNN -- (laughter) -- you'll be getting the word out as there are, presumably, some sort of announcements.

Q But we'd like the White House involved --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't plan to staff the press office all night. We will certainly, if we get word of some pending action, come back.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and call and come back in if there was any news to convey. So what we can do is put on the lid with the understanding that if there's anything that we know of we will page out.

Q Is there any way that the Serbs could sneak back in there or get -- rearm themselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If they do, they are at risk. As I said, the NATO decision stands into the indefinite future.

Q A senior Pentagon official traveling with -- told reporters that a decision had been made not to bomb tonight, but to wait until tomorrow daylight to reassess. Things look very positive; things are going well and there's not going to be bombing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is similar to what I just said -- there has not yet been that decision made --

(Laughter.)

Q When there is one, will you let us know?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I've talked to two senior officials from Defense.

Q And did those Defense officials say that there was a decision made, as has been reported by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not any Defense official I've talked to.

Q Did Secretary Perry also --

Q Tell us what he did today and what he's doing tonight.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was an intelligence briefing this morning at 9:00 a.m. that I received. I then conveyed that to the President on the situation on the ground this morning, as well as I was also in touch with some of our military commanders there and conveyed their views -- their reports also to the President.

He then spoke this morning at around 10:25 a.m., I guess, to Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, General Joulwan and Admiral Boorda -- conference call; they were at Aviano. And they reported to him on the NATO Defense Minister's meeting and on their appreciation of the situation on the ground.

He then was at church. Then this afternoon around --

Q At what time? -- he spoke to Yeltsin.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At 1:27 p.m.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At 1:27 p.m. this afternoon -- I'm sorry -- before that I got another intelligence briefing and reported that to him. And then at 1:27 p.m., he spoke to President Yeltsin.

Q Did Clinton call Yeltsin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said this morning as soon as he got out of church that we would probably be calling Yeltsin. And we were -- I was starting to -- I was going to call the number when Yeltsin called him. So it was sort of mutual consent, I guess.

Q But, technically, Yeltsin called.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or else we knew that he was calling and then we placed a call, I can't remember. But Yeltsin -- in effect, Yeltsin placed the call.

Q Yeltsin placed it, he didn't initiate it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I will say again that we were planning also to suggest a call to them, as the President said this morning. In any case, it was an excellent connection. (Laughter.) The call went for about 20 minutes or so.

Q Was it in the Oval Office?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he was in the Residence then. He was having lunch and broke off from the lunch to take the call.

In essence, the President said he was encouraged by Serb efforts to comply with the NATO decision. He congratulated Yeltsin for Russian efforts to promote Serb compliance with it. The
President said that no decision on air strikes was yet taken. And they agreed to stay in touch about the diplomatic process, which is going forward.

On that subject, I might --

Q What did Yeltsin say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically that we need to stay in touch, that we need to work on the diplomatic process now.

Q Did he say, don't bomb?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so, because the President began with a description of where we are; and as I recall, then Yeltsin did not make an argument against bombing.

Q There will be contact with Yeltsin before any air strike?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has said that he will try to do so, yes.

Q Did they discuss the troops that will remain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q His decision isn't to actually start the air strikes or to make the assessment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, let me get back to that. Just on the subject of then the diplomatic process, there is plans now to have a meeting of experts in Bonn on Tuesday among us and the Germans and the French and the British and the Russians, at which Ambassador Redman will report on the progress in his talks in pursuing our diplomatic initiative.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the meeting, I believe the European Union tried to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, right.

Q Was it the European Union --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The present presidency, which is Greece; the most recent one, which is Belgium; and the next one, which is Germany.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So it's only two out of those three.

Q Where was the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be in Bonn.

Q It will be in Bonn.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, next Tuesday.

Q This coming Tuesday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

And the President will be receiving further reports, of course, during the remainder of the afternoon into the evening. He may well have other phone calls with foreign leaders. I think it's very likely that he'll talk to Secretary General Woerner this
afternoon, who, again, has done an extraordinary job over the past weeks and months on this issue.

Q — President Yeltsin's message to the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think — I mean, in general, it was less of a message in both directions than a sharing of notes on where the situation is and agreeing on the importance of our -- continue to work together on the diplomatic side.

Q And did the President reiterate in the call that he would try to reach Yeltsin before any military action will unfold?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't believe so. Doesn't have to.

Q But you said he said so --

Q Are you willing to grant any leeway because of weather conditions, that people are trying to comply?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, the deadline is the deadline. It is possible after the deadline that there would be a period tomorrow, because of the weather, for verifying that compliance, possibly even for securing a few sites that the Serbs have in effect said that they are prepared to see secured. But the deadline is the deadline. And that should not be seen as an extension of the deadline.

Q How likely is that possibility of time for verification?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can't tell you. As I said, it's possible that it will get done tonight.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the Serbs or any other party to disguise, hide, camouflage, otherwise keep any of the weapons from being --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A philosophical point, but if we were aware of them, they wouldn't be doing it. So, no, we're not aware of those efforts. Our evidence is that the Serbs are cooperating with the United Nations in helping the United Nations gain control of weapons that could not be moved.

Q Why do you think the Serbs are suddenly complying? Are you encouraged by their actions that this could lead to peace settlement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they are complying because they saw the seriousness of the NATO decision and the determination of NATO to see the decision complied with, and the cooperation between NATO and the United Nations -- which has been excellent this week between General Rose and Admiral Boorda -- and that the Russians were conveying very clearly to the Bosnian Serbs that importance of their complying. And, yes, it does encourage me. I mean, there is -- obviously, this is a very, very complicated issue and one that would be very hard to resolve diplomatically. But I think that there is a certain momentum that comes out of this that I hope we can take advantage of in the coming weeks in working for a diplomatic solution.

And as I said yesterday, it is always very important that power and diplomacy be harnessed together. And the sign of NATO seriousness I think should have a positive effect then in the negotiations.
Q Is there any plans at this point to issue similar ultimatums to other towns that are being bombed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I addressed this yesterday and I guess this is the same answer, if I can remember it -- I'll bore the rest of you with it. But, clearly, the main issue before us now is Sarajevo, which is of exceptional importance in every sense politically as well as militarily. We will then have to see where we go after Sarajevo. The first is to complete this. The NATO Summit did decide that we would make efforts both to open the Tuzla airport and to see to the rotation of troops in Srebrenica; and both are proceeding. And as I said yesterday, it's important to remember that we have a long-standing commitment to close air support for UNPROFOR troops, should they request our support. And that certainly stands, as well.

Q Just a quick follow-up. Did the issue of extending the ultimatums to other areas come up in the conversation with Yeltsin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I remember, no.

Q And what happened to the other 400 troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you. We do know that the 400 are there. It is possible that they would be filling in then for the troops that left Croatia.

Q Those 400 are coming in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that are coming into Sarajevo from Croatia, but we don't know.

Q Just to be clear on where we are on this side. You were saying that as of this afternoon, there are something fewer than 20 sites that have not yet been secured by U.N. forces. Is that because the Serbian forces have been slow in relinquishing them in part because of the weather, or is it because the U.N. forces have had to battle with the snow and are short of men and have simply been unable to get to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I can't tell you the exact reasons, but I have heard no reports of the Serbs resisting the U.N. doing so.

Q And have some of these sites been abandoned, as you understand, or are they all still being protected or watched over by Serbian troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, these are sites either that have not yet been abandoned, or that we're not sure about.

Q And that these are -- if there are fewer than 20 sites, there are conceivably a good bit more than 20 weapons, is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't know; could be.

Q And the other thing I'd like to be clear on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, again, these are sites that the U.N. knows about.

Q Right.

Q -- is that you said that there had been no decision not to bomb tonight.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No decision to bomb, no decision not to bomb. But a lot of progress.

Q. If there's fewer than 20 sites left, how many sites in all are we to start with?

Q. Twenty known sites.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again -- yes, known sites.

Q. What was the number to start with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you that.

Q. Ballpark?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd rather not.

Q. Could we go through the process of deciding on air strikes, of Boorda does what, Rose does what, the President does what.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see if I can have some general consistency in my answers -- I need my Bob Dole chart. (Laughter.)

Q. One more question on sites. You did say earlier, the sites that they didn't or couldn't withdraw from, isn't that what you said -- didn't or couldn't?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. And, again, I use both words simply because I don't want to make a judgment on why and then turn out later to be wrong. But I have seen or heard no evidence that they were refusing to allow U.N. access to any sites.

The decision as to whether to strike weapons and weapon sites is made by the NATO CINC South, Admiral Boorda. And the United Nations has the, for the first strikes, decision-making authority also. Admiral Boorda and General Rose and General Cot make those decisions. And on the U.N. side that is then taken to Mr. Akashi, who is the Secretary General's representative in Zagreb. He is under the authority, of course, of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.

And as I said yesterday, I, frankly, don't know whether in a practical sense Akashi would then consult with Boutros-Ghali or not, although we believe that Boutros-Ghali has given that authority to Mr. Akashi.

So the U.N. gets a check-off on the first strikes. Thereafter, strikes are ordered by the NATO commander in coordination with the United Nations and the U.N. commanders. And that is because, of course, the -- both UNPROFOR, the U.N. troops and the UNHCR have a lot of personnel on the ground, and we want to make sure that their safety is seen to as those strikes might be carried out.

Q. Beyond this meeting Tuesday, is there anything significant that's happened on the diplomatic effort?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ambassador Redman's been holding talks. I think they have been useful. I believe that in talks that have been held among the parties, they've said that there's been some narrowing of differences. But we're not yet at the point of real concrete results that we can talk about.

Q. Is this meeting in Bonn on Tuesday the international conference that Churkin proposed last week or two days ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so, no. I think he had something more formal in mind. This will be experts meeting to stock of where we are.
Q Did he propose this meeting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it came through consultations between the State Department and their opposite numbers. And frankly, I don't know and I suspect we never will know who said first, let's together in Bonn. I think it just sort of emerged.

Q Then it's not the -- it's not a Russian initiative.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is in the wake of the Russian suggestion of getting together. And it certainly is a way of keeping our consultations going with the Russians and working --

Q Is Redman going to be in charge of the U.S. team in Bonn or will Peter Tarnoff or somebody --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve Oxman will be going.

Q Any plans to call or contact Boutros-Ghali this afternoon, this evening, as the deadline grows closer, or tomorrow morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not clear. Madelaine Albright has been talking to him. I think she's talked to him today at least once. I believe she talked to him yesterday and we're staying in very close touch with him.

Q Would it be correct to say that it's highly unlikely that air strikes could be carried out before this meeting on Tuesday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to make that judgment.

Q So there's no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will say there's been a lot of progress made today.

Q What was your answer to the initial question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Evasive. (Laughter.)

Q Given the encouraging signs and that some of these sites might need to be verified tomorrow, is it unlikely we'd see air strikes before, I don't know, midday tomorrow our time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't want to say whether it's likely, unlikely -- I just don't want to characterize it that way.

Q So let's -- if anything, what will happen here at 7:00 p.m. tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have to go because the President is about to speak to Secretary General Woerner.

Q Give them our best.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We certainly will. (Laughter.) I'll probably see you this evening, I'm not sure.

Q Oh, yeah? Do you expect to be doing this again later?

Q You're going to come back and talk to us tonight?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might if there's something to talk about. And if not, we'll tell you there's nothing to talk about and you'll know why.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay? Good.

He will also be speaking to President Mitterrand at around 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. And in both cases, I suspect it will be simply as -- or mostly -- as with Yeltsin, comparing notes, seeing what the situation is and staying in touch.

END 3:45 P.M. EST
I have just been informed by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO and United Nations commanders have concluded that all known heavy weapons of the parties have been withdrawn from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo,

are under the control of the United Nations,

or soon should be.

Therefore, they have concluded that no airstrikes in Bosnia by NATO air forces are required at this time.

This week's events clearly have given the residents of Sarajevo a respite from the shelling and a measure of hope.
I want to congratulate NATO and each of our NATO allies for the demonstration of resolve that produced these results.

I want to commend the high level of cooperation that has been demonstrated between the UN and NATO.

As I told President Yeltsin in a call earlier today, I want to congratulate the government of Russia for its contributions to this effort.

Finally, all Americans join in praising the courage and skill of our service personnel and those of our NATO allies;

they have been the muscle in NATO's ultimatum.
Despite the significant events of the day, we must remain vigilant.

All parties should be aware that the ultimatum stands.

The deadline has not been extended.

Any heavy weapons in the exclusion zone not under UN control are, and will remain, subject to airstrikes.

NATO’s decision also applies to any heavy weapons attacks on Sarajevo from within or beyond the zone.
NATO and the United Nations will continue to monitor compliance extremely carefully.

The NATO decision and its results provide new potential for progress toward an end to the tragic conflict in Bosnia.

In the coming days, American diplomats will be working with the parties to the conflict and our allies and partners to transform this potential into reality.
LIKELY QUESTIONS ON BOSNIA

-- What is the actual situation on the ground today? Are we encouraged over the apparent compliance of the Serbs with the NATO deadline?

-- What happens at 7:01 pm tomorrow? What will NATO do on Sunday if the situation in Sarajevo is ambiguous? How will we respond if the Serbs say that they need more time?

-- What role do we see the Russians playing? Will their troops be under UNPROFOR? What happens if the Russian troops interpose themselves between UNPROFOR and the Serb weapons?

-- Are we concerned over the long-term implications of a more aggressive Russian role in Bosnia and potentially other disputes of the kind?

-- Did the Russian initiative with the Bosnian Serbs take you by surprise? Has this initiative made air strikes less likely? What do you think Churkin meant when he said, "air strikes might lead to all-out war?"

-- Are we just giving heart to the Bosnians by this actions, and therefore actually extending the war? Are we pressuring the Bosnian government to agree to a partition?

-- Do you think, as General Rose suggested, that this model can be extended elsewhere in Bosnia? What happens if the Serbs take these weapons elsewhere in Bosnia and raise the level of violence?

-- If this has been so successful, why didn't you do this a year ago?
You've given us some good news we too - so happy for him.

Got to watch him last night got to see us tonight
That's great really making us look good over there
Have a wonderful day & enjoy your victory

4th athlete in history to win the same event in 3 games.
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS RE: BOSNIA

Will success here be a model for other cities in Bosnia?

Have the Serbs turned in their worst weapons and kept the best ones for shelling of other sites?

If this was such a success, why are Serbs so happy and at least some Muslims unhappy?

Why didn't NATO act earlier?

U.S. & Russia -- What do you expect Russian role to be in coming months? Will they now become champions of Serbs and the U.S. of Muslims? Will that make peace process more complicated?

What do you think of reported Russian recommendation that the U.S. and Russia now take the lead in seeking a settlement?

Will we be forcing the Muslims to accept a dishonorable pact?

Why were we surprised by the Russian intervention?