This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full or released in part.

Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Section 1.4 (b) of E.O. 13526 or (b)(6) of the FOIA.
Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo in the coming weeks.

Status quo is clearly no longer tolerable.

Need to ensure meeting in London is success. Must not result in public discord or become forum for mere posturing by participants.

Chris will discuss our views on London meeting in more detail with Malcolm Rifkind later on tonight.

We have reached defining moment for our policy toward Bosnia. We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence work and avert UN withdrawal.

Issue is finding the best way to do this.

My military advisors feel strongly most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in timid manner done to date.

They propose issuing clear warning to Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air campaign.

Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed warning and do not attack, there will be no air campaign.

Would have effect of restoring strict enforcement of heavy weapons exclusion zones, without complication of weapons collection points. This means UNPROFOR neutrality is retained.

However -- cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken. Will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.

First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar and command centers.
Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo.

However, dual key could not apply in its current form. Local ground commanders would of course retain voice in Close Air Support role and close-proximity air strikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions.

Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. Would want ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.

Will need your help in moving this to a NAC decision and in approaching Boutros-Ghali.

In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.

My military advisors agree with your assessment that deploying 1,000 French troops to Gorazde will diminish the ability of RRF to act in Sarajevo, without materially contributing to improved the military balance in Gorazde. I have relayed (will relay) this to Jacques.

We will need to work together to arrive at common U.S.-UK-French approach by Friday, and then bring other allies along. I hope we will be able to generate the political support needed at the London meeting and in the NAC to move forward together on this.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to the Fall of Srebrenica

Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.

Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. Failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. It will also accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions:

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa).

- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.

- To use our public statements and our consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.

Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission:

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists.

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport.

- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.

Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. The current Dole language, while not requiring immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S. action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal. Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the trigger.
Calling about Bosnia situation after fall of Srebrenica.

We need to regroup and devise strategy for making UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.

Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal: to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces of the four major powers.

Jacques posed this as an either/or choice: large-scale intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pull out.

I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw, but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after Srebrenica.

We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we could get a better understanding of the proposal and its implications.

Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky. They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with 1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.

We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.

Understand he spoke to you earlier today. What is your interpretation of Chirac's proposal? Do you think he really wants to pull out if we don't agree?

Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR’s effectiveness and credibility.

Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions. Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress.
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we want you to know. (Switching to French) First of all, my congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are numbered and that that causes you concern. Our analysis is the same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In my opinion, we can no longer just stand by and watch this.

Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for. France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today 20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use military intervention to impose the will of the UN, which can
only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France
is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore
the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing. But if the
option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we
were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by
agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR. So
the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in
combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these
people fight each other and we go home. We cannot allow
ourselves to be accomplices!

The President: Let me first say that we appreciate the strong
stance you have taken and your determination to do something.
Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot. I will take
up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I
wanted to speak with you first. I would like you to think about
a few things. Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and
Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact. The
Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently
willing to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3000
Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of
shelling. They left without putting up a fight, although I think
they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde,
so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there. We
all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb
army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo. Our
military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting
to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR
might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back
eastward due to the inherent difficulty of defending the area
there.

The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we
discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has
become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the
rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in
Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde. You cannot be in a position to
fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules
of engagement. If there is going to be fighting, it has to be
different than in the past. Before we provide air power, we have
to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain
on the Serbs in other areas. Before UNPROFOR gets into a
military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next
move is and what the acceptable military options are under
UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to
do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very
skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially
if the Bosnians won't fight. I think we should first secure
Gorazde and then Sarajevo. I will have conversations with them
and get back in touch with you.
I would like to make two more points. First, I think your stated intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important — a critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Christopher speak with your foreign minister to talk in detail about what you have in mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances? Therefore, I believe we should focus on Gorazde and press for ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to think about. I would like to have a follow up between the generals and foreign ministers on the details.

The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just because the UN says they are "safe areas". We can't send the Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't
defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms. Have you had any second thoughts about lifting the arms embargo?

The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open? UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's what worries me.

President Chirac: When does the Congress vote on lifting the embargo?

The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my veto.

President Chirac: Can Congress override the veto?

The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like
to confer with my military advisers and get back in touch on this matter. (C)

President Chirac: OK, I quite agree. I will ask Admiral Lanxade to contact General Shalikashvili as soon as possible. Thank you very much. (C)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --
• OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TEAM MET THIS MORNING AND
WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONSIDER MANY OF THE POINTS YOU
ARE DEALING WITH IN YOUR CABINET MEETING.

• DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISE WILL
HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW’S SESSION.

• I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR GENERAL THINKING ON MOST OF THE
ISSUES THE PM RAISED IN HIS LETTER.

• WHILE WE INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF ANY
UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THERE IS A
REAL CHANCE THAT A VETO COULD BE OVERRIDDEN, ESPECIALLY IF WE
FAIL TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY.

  • IF GORAZDE FALLS, COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT ON THE
HILL.

• I AM MEETING WITH SACIRBEY THIS AFTERNOON, AND WILL PRESS HIM
ON GIVING US A CHANCE TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY. THIS
MUST INCLUDE ALLOWING UNPROFOR TO REMAIN, AND ASSISTING IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF. BUT AGAIN, WE MUST BE WILLING TO DO
MAKE UNPROFOR MORE CREDIBLE. THE STATUS QUO WILL NOT SUFFICE.

• REGARDING THE OPTIONS FOR GORAZDE, YOU ARE RIGHT IN YOUR VIEW
THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF 5000–
15,000 TROOPS TO REPEL A SERB ATTACK ON ITS OWN.

• WE AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EFFORT TO DEFEND GORAZDE ON
THE GROUND STILL RESTS WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.

• WE DO SOME MERIT IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MORE MODEST
REINFORCEMENT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS THERE, AND ARE WEIGHING
THE PROS AND CONS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY LIFT FOR A SMALL
FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.

  • SUCH A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE, IF DONE IN PARALLEL WITH
A ROBUST AIR CAMPAIGN, WOULD PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS THAT WAS CLEARLY LACKING AT SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA.

• YOUR THIRD OPTION, WHICH AMOUNTS TO SIMPLY STAYING WITH THE
STATUS QUO, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.

• IF UNPROFOR MAKES NO EFFORT TO CHANGE THE CALCULUS OF THE
SITUATION FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ETHNIC CLEANSING OF SREBRENICA:

  • THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY WILL
WITHDRAW,

  • THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE CERTAIN TO PASS A UNILATERAL
LIFT BILL OVER A VETO, AND

  • THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO DEMAND
UNPROFOR’S WITHDRAWAL.
• REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO LAY DOWN A MARKER OF CHANGED UNPROFOR RESOLVE AT GORAZDE THAN TO COMMIT TO HOLDING IT AT ALL COSTS INDEFINITELY. BUT CLEARLY SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW TO KEEP THE FRENCH ON BOARD AND AVOID ENCOURAGING A SERB ONSLAUGHT NOT ONLY AGAINST GORAZDE, BUT SARAJEVO AS WELL.

• TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER, SINCE THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY USE OF NATO AIR POWER WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WAR, THEIR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER CANNOT BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR.

• THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE UN AS PART OF THE CHAPTER VII APPROACH TO THE MANDATE TO WHICH WE HAVE ALL AGREED.

• THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO APPLY THAT AIR POWER IN A MANNER THAT MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE AN IMPACT ON BOSNIAN SERB FORCES VIOLATING UN MANDATES.

• AS A RESULT, THE THREAT TO UN PERSONNEL FROM BOSNIAN SERBS WILLING TO RESORT TO CRIMINAL TACTICS OF HOSTAGE-TAKING HAS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.

• CLEARLY, ANY RENEWED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD NEED UNPROFOR TO TAKE REALISTIC MEASURES TO REMOVE ITS PERSONNEL FROM HIGH THREAT AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNNECESSARILY DEPLOYED.

• WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR GORAZDE IS A MILITARILY SOUND AIR CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE SERB RESPECT FOR THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE, AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACK FORCES VIOLATING IT AS PART OF A SERB OFFENSIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE SAFE AREA.

• SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF THE UN AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL MAINTENANCE OF THE UN’S ROLE IN SARAJEVO.
From: Malley, Robert
To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Bosnia [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, August 04, 1995 06:26 PM

Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities in Srebenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact sheet from the agency).
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN

FROM: ROB MALLEY

SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia

There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound. There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have been used.

State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at large or in detention:

1. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in enclaves.

White House action will be needed to support this effort which, given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more forceful action should be considered.

Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION
That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and fact sheet.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet

Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained. They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the international community to see to it that these basic requirements are met.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender them to the Tribunal.
Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute the single most important obstacle to a political solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They must not and will not remain unpunished.
For TL and SRB:

Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.

I. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FELT WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE MASSACRED MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THE 5,000 PLUS...
MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL OF SREBRENICA.

2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.

3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN TRUCKS AND BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTLY AT BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.

4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO KONJEVIC POLJE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS, MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.

6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.

7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY. WHO ALSO INTERVIEWED SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN Tuzla (PLEASE PROTECT), TOLD ME THAT ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.
8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAY BE NO SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.

9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTLY CONTINUE TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.

GALBRAITH
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO NATO CAPITALS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. NIAC IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE BECAUSE OF ONGOING NAC MEETINGS AND BECAUSE TEXT MUST BE DELIVERED AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24, AND TOMORROW IS SUNDAY.

2. NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:30 PM THAT DAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ON FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE LONDON BOSNIA CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY. EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD INFORM AUTHORITIES OF THE FACT AND CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

(FOR BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, BONN, ITALY, THE HAGUE, OSLO, MADRID, AND ANKARA) WE WENT TO LONDON CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR'S EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE WERE PARTICULARLY DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO. THE LONDON MEETING ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES. OUR EFFORTS THERE MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.

(FOR ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, REYKJAVIK, AND LISBON) THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SENDING AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION. THAT EFFORT MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.

(CONTINUATION FOR ALL) LONDON WAS IN OUR VIEW AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS. THE CONFERENCE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE, DESPITE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS REPRESENTED THERE, AROUND THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OUTLINED IN MALCOLM RIFKIND'S CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. CLARITY OF WILL, AND EXPEDITIOUS ACTION AT NATO IN THE NEXT DAYS, WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOIDING ANY CONFUSION IN PALE LEADING TO MISCALCULATION. WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MISSTEPS OR HESITATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE SORT OF ESCALATION OF CONFLICT WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID. AT THE SAME TIME, NATO MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF THE WARNINGS OF LONDON ARE NOT HEeded.

IT IS BY MOVING FORWARD RESOLUTELY TOGETHER THAT WE CAN BEST ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF UNPROFOR. BY STANDING TOGETHER AS ALLIES WE PROVIDE THE STRONGEST DETERRENT TO FURTHER ATTACKS, AND THE BEST PROTECTION TO UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND. THE COURAGE OF THOSE TROOPS, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE NATIONS WHO HAVE PROVIDED THEM, MERITS NATO'S STRONG SUPPORT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE, COUPLED WITH A CLEAR AND RAPID DISPLAY OF ALLIANCE DECISIVENESS, IS THE BEST HOPE FOR TURNING THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.

SATURDAY'S DISCUSSIONS AT NATO ON FOLLOWUP TO THE LONDON CONFERENCE WENT WELL AND DEMONSTRATED A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS. NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL NOW EXAMINE THE SPECIFICS OF HOW NATO WILL IMPLEMENT THE LONDON DECISIONS, AND THE COUNCIL WILL MEET MONDAY.
AFTERNOON TO MOVE FORWARD. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON MONDAY DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN THAT ARE FIRM AND CLEAR IN SUPPORT OF THE LONDON MEETING. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NATO SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ITS AIR POWER IN A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO ANY ATTACKS ON GORAZDE.

AS THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN STATED IN LONDON, THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN MISSION IS NOW AT A TURNING POINT. THERE ARE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS, GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE, ABOUT WHETHER WE WILL BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH. NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS.

END TEXT.

YY
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
FROM RICHARD SCHIFTER
SUBJECT: A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative Development Initiative

More Balkanization?

I had a visit last week from a delegation from Sanjak. Sanjak, a Turkish generic term for district, is the label given to an area lying immediately east of Bosnia, now divided between Serbia and Montenegro and populated predominantly by persons who refer to themselves as Bosniaks. They are Muslims. The delegation was in Washington to gain support for their effort to establish an autonomous region of Sanjak within the FRY.

I heard the delegation out, explained that we now sought to end the fighting and suggested that they could assert their cause at a later date, when an effort is made to reach an overall settlement. But before the delegation left, I asked its leader what his native language was. He said it was Serbo-Croatian. I asked him whether people who saw him in the street would be able to identify him as a "Bosniak," as distinct from a Serb. He conceded that most people think he looked like a German. I asked whether he thought that a fervent religious belief separated the people in his region from the Serbs. He said that that was not the case. When I then asked what this effort at separation was all about, he spoke vaguely about different cultures. I did not embarrass him by asking him to spell out the cultural differences for me.

A Vision of a Better Regional Order

The Sanjak delegation's outlook contrasted sharply with the world view expressed to me over a year ago by one of the leaders of the ethnic Greeks of Albania. He made the point that he was committed to the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic identity of Albania's Greeks but was not interested in the redrawing of borders or in autonomy. He was impressed by the progress made by the European Union in making borders increasingly irrelevant and was hopeful that in twenty years his region will have reached the same level of political development.
It now seems as if the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia is in sight. Even if that end does not arrive immediately, it is likely to come about in the foreseeable future. We have begun to plan the funding of a major construction effort to bind up the area's wounds. I recommend that without adding to the cost of the Bosnia reconstruction effort, we try to do more than recreate the status quo ante, that we use the opportunity to deal with the region's underlying problems.

To be specific, I recommend that we embed the Bosnia reconstruction efforts in a comprehensive regional initiative designed to realize the dream of my Greek-Albanian interlocutor. The initiative would seek to bring the countries of Southeastern Europe together in a joint effort to develop their respective economies, build a coordinated transportation and communications system, deal jointly with the problem of intergroup distrust and hatred, and create a sturdy democratic infrastructure. This project would contribute to our objective of enlargement of democratic space and would help solidify Western ties to countries that might not be early candidates for NATO and EU membership. It would also be an exercise which Russia could not rationally view as threatening.

Under the OSCE Umbrella

The effort could appropriately be undertaken under the umbrella of the OSCE, with its emphasis on security, economic development, and human rights. It should encompass Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The OSCE should create a Southeastern European Cooperative Development Initiative (SECDI?), led by a Coordinating Board on which the countries of the region and the donors of assistance would be represented. (Perhaps we need to find an excuse for giving Russia a seat as well.) The Board would plan and recommend development projects, first and foremost relating to reconstruction and coordinated regional economic development (giving real meaning to the OSCE second basket), but also focusing on improving relations among the countries of the region and among its ethnic groups (first basket), and creating governmental institutions protective of human rights (third basket). With regard to the latter, the establishment of OSCE jurisdiction would allow linkage of economic development with third-basket issues in countries such as Croatia, the FRY, Albania, and Slovakia.

The Board's role should be to coordinate rather than direct. Each donor would be free to adopt its own program and each recipient would be free to make its own arrangement with any donor. But the Board, if effectively led, would seek to enlist the cooperation of all donors and of the relevant international lending agencies and would from that base be able to urge the regional recipients to cooperate as well.
The Board should not have a staff of its own. Secretarial assistance should be rendered by the OSCE. Each board member should be supported by technical staff from the country the member represents. The Board would seek to work closely with the IMF, the IBRD, the EBRD, UNHCR, OECD, and COE. The staffs of these agencies could be enlisted in providing relevant studies.

As distinct from the OSCE coordinating role with regard to economic development, effective centralized authority will be needed to make certain that Helsinki human-rights standards are applied. Problems posed by the OSCE consensus principle can be overcome by entrusting application of third-basked standards to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and insisting at the outset on a broad grant of authority to him. As national minority issues are closely related to the region's human rights problems, he would be the logical person to take the lead regarding third-basket issues.

U.S. Leadership

If we decide to go forward with such an effort and are able to persuade the donors and the countries of the region to join in it, we should make a major effort to gear ourselves up for the exercise of effective leadership. A USG support group for SECDI should be established by Executive Order. In contrast to the OSCE Coordinating Board, which should coordinate by persuasion, the support group should have directive authority over all USG funds allocated for economic development and democracy building in the region (AID and USIA) and should work closely with such USG-funded organizations as USIP and NED. It should also coordinate closely with all Federal agencies which could contribute to this effort (Treasury and Commerce could play a particularly significant role) and should seek to enlist the support of the private sector, both profit and nonprofit. Given the region's great humanitarian needs, the churches should be involved in a major way.

A high-profile effort of this kind would be right and proper on its own merits. It would also be appreciated by members of the general public, because of its humanitarian character, by the churches, by the ethnic groups with roots in the region, and by the U.S. businesses which could be invited to play a constructive role in this effort. Our leadership in this undertaking, as a follow-up to our leadership in bringing peace to the region, could overcome the negative image created by our inability to solve the problem earlier. It would be an effort with which the White House could appropriately identify itself.

Can we discuss this idea?

c: Dan Fried, Mort Halperin, Sandy Vershbow
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELCON WITH MAJOR: PM LIKELY TO PROPOSE BOSNIA CONFERENCE

1. A CONTACT AT NUMBER TEN ADVISES THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR IS LIKELY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING ON BOSNIA (REFTEL) DURING HIS TELCON WITH THE PRESIDENT LATER TODAY. MAJOR IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF CONTACT GROUP AND TROOP CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LONDON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JULY 17. THE MEETING MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A SESSION, A DAY OR TWO EARLIER, OF SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS.

3. THE BACKDROP TO THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING IS BRITISH CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF ALLIED COHESION AGAINST A DANGEROUS, FAST CHANGING SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE BRITISH OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING WITH A CONSENSUS ON A WAY FORWARD, INCLUDING ON MILITARY OPERATIONS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE
ONTACT GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO A COMMON APPROACH.

4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE FRENCH ARE TELLING LONDON THAT THE U.S. IS RECEPTIVE TO PARIS' PROPOSAL OF "DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND" AT GORAZDE AND THAT WASHINGTON HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT AND CAS FOR THEIR FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HMG HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A NON-VIABLE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.

CROWE
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FROM:
SITREPRT
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT; BELL, CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREP: IMMEDIATE    CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL    DTG: 141544Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1251

RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0006
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 1616
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7190
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3874
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 9074

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 009948

BEGIN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL BK UK
SUBJECT: HMG PAUSES TO REFLECT ON BOSNIA POLICY, REAFFIRMS VALUE OF UNPROFOR

REF: LONDON 9894

1. CONFIDENTIAL AS MARKED. OADR FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION.

2. SUMMARY: THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA, INCLUDING DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE, DESPITE STRONG FRENCH PRESSURES TO DO SO. SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF ANY OPERATION TO REINFORCE ZEPA OR GORAZDE, BUT BELIEVE THAT OPENING UP OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WOULD BE FEASIBLE MILITARILY AND DESIRABLE IN POLICY TERMS. MEANWHILE, BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REAFFIRMED THE BRITISH COMMITMENT TO REMAIN IN BOSNIA UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. END SUMMARY.

NO HASTY DECISIONS

3. SENIOR-LEVEL CONTACTS AT THE FCO, MOD AND OWNING STREET (CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE CHARLTON, CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OMAND, AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS OAKDEN) TOLD US JULY 14 THAT HMG WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA DESPITE STRONG PRESSURES FROM PARIS TO DO SO. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT A DEFINING MOMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON BOSNIA, BUT FOR THIS VERY REASON THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE A FEW DAYS TO LOOK QUIETLY AT THE OPTIONS BEFORE TAKING ANY DECISION. WE ARE TOLD THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP, TO INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE SECRETARIES) IS TO MEET SHORTLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION.

4. PART OF THIS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SNAP DECISIONS STEM FROM UNCERTAINTY IN WHITEHALL AS TO EXACTLY WHAT THE FRENCH ARE PROPOSING. WHAT EXACTLY DOES PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPEAKS OF "LIMITED MILITARY ACTION TO PROTECT THE OTHER ENCLAVES?" AS NOTED SEPTEL, PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WILL BE CALLING CHIRAC TODAY TO TRY TO CLARIFY FRENCH INTENTIONS.

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY OPTIONS

5. OUR CONTACTS STRESSED TO US THAT THERE ARE FEW Viable MILITARY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA. CHARLTON REAFFIRMED THE BRITISH VIEW THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO THINK THAT SREBRENICA COULD BE RETAKEN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE RRF. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN AIRBORNE DIVISION OR TWO, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE U.S. AS TO ZEPA, CHARLTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT COULD BE HELD, EVEN WITH REINFORCEMENT IF THAT WAS POSSIBLE, AGAINST A BOSNIAN SERB ATTACK. TO BE AT ALL EFFECTIVE, REINFORCEMENT WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. ATTACK HELICOPTERS. OMAND SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD TAKE ZEPA TOMORROW IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED THEY WOULD MOVE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PAUSE TO "DIGEST" SREBRENICA AND "BEHAVE" FOR A WHILE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION. (OMAND NOTED THERE WERE SOME SIGNS OF THIS; THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE AT THE MOMENT BEING MORE COOPERATIVE ON SARAJEVO CONVOYS.)

6. OMAND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN HMG FOR PULLING OUT OF GORAZDE, BUT EQUALLY MOD SAW NO POINT IN ENFORCING THE ENCLAVE. (OAKDEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION YET ON THE ISSUE OF REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE.) THE BRITISH TROOPS WERE NOT THERE TO FIGHT. HE THOUGHT IT STILL UNCLEAR WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD MOVE ON GORAZDE; SURELY THEY RECKONED THEY WOULD BE IN FOR A FIGHT, THE ASSUMPTION BEING THAT BOSNIAN FORCES, WHO WERE FAR MORE NUMEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN SREBRENICA, WOULD STAND RATHER THAN FLEE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD TAKE GORAZDE. WHEN ASKED HOW HMG WOULD
REACT IF GORAZDE WERE ATTACKED, OMAND COUNTERED THAT THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. HIS ASSUMPTION, HOWEVER, WAS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD BE TOLD TO DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS AS BEST THEY COULD UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE TOWN WAS LOST, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WOULD ACT MUCH AS THE DUTCH HAD IN SREBRENICA, FOCUSING ON HELPING REFUGEES.

7. THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE FRENCH FOR SOME TIME ABOUT SECURING OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO, AND THEY REGARD THIS AS A MUCH MORE FEASIBLE MILITARY OPERATION THAN REINFORCING THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. CHARLTON SAID THAT THE MORE LOGICAL ROUTE WAS OVER MT. IGMAN; ALTHOUGH THE ROAD WAS POOR AND VULNERABLE TO BOSNIAN SERB ARTILLERY, IT RAN THROUGH GOB-HELD TERRITORY. TRYING TO PUSH THROUGH FROM KISLEYAK WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, IN THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE CROSSING A LARGE EXpanse OF BOSNIAN SERB TERRITORY. CHARLTON THOUGHT THAT OPENING UP AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO SARAJEVO WAS CRUCIAL IF THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY WAS TO BE RESTORED. OMAND REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION TO US THAT GENERAL SMITH HAS AUTHORITY FROM HMG TO MOVE TO SECURE ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WHENEVER HE IS READY, USING EITHER ROUTE. HOWEVER, SMITH'S VIEW IS THAT NOW (I.E. THE NEXT FEW DAYS) IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO DO THIS, SINCE AT PRESENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BEING MORE HELPFUL IN ALLOWING CONVOYS THROUGH TO THE CITY. MOREOVER, SMITH NEEDS THE RRF TO BOLSTER UNPROFOR POSITIONS ELSEWHERE.

FRANCO-BRITISH DIFFERENCES

8. CHARLTON SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY PERCEPTION OF SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON OVER BOSNIA. ANY DIFFERENCES THERE MIGHT BE WERE MATTERS OF STYLE RATHER THAN POLICY. IT WAS NOT THE BRITISH CUSTOM, HE NOTED, TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES WITHOUT CAREFULLY THINKING THROUGH WHETHER THEY WERE FEASIBLE. NOR WAS LONDON IN THE HABIT OF GOING AROUND THREATENING TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS. THIS SAID, CHARLTON ACKNOWLEDGED A FAIR DEGREE OF IRRITATION IN LONDON OVER PRECIPITATE FRENCH RHETORIC, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE SMOOTHED OUT IN TODAY'S PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR AND CHIRAC. SOMewhat IN CONTRAST, OMAND AND OAKDEN ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES, WITH BOTH EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER FRENCH PRESSURE FOR SOME MILITARY ACTION SUCH AS DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE. OAKDEN NOTED THAT THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACEMAKING OPERATION.

SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED UNPROFOR PRESENCE
9. (U) MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO KEEP BRITISH TROOPS IN BOSNIA UNLESS CONDITIONS DETERIORATE SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. SPEAKING TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY 13, MAJOR SAID:

-- "IF UNPROFOR WITHDREW WE WOULD CERTAINLY PUT AT RISK THE PEACE WHICH REMAINS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS. WE MIGHT PUT AT RISK THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES THAT HAVE BEEN SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS."

-- "ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY I FELT IT RIGHT TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND WHY I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO REMOVE THEM UNLESS IT BECAME IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, IS THE DANGER OF A WIDER BALKANS WAR. I CONCEDE THE SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND I HAVE SAID TO THIS HOUSE BEFORE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO REMAIN."

-- "BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE, I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT FOR THEM TO DO SO AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE WAY THEY HAVE THUS FAR."

10. (U) SEPARATELY, FOREIGN SECRETARY RIFKIND TOLD THE PRESS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN BOSNIA IF IT WAS FELT THAT THEY COULD STILL CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM POPULATION IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, WHERE BRITISH AND OTHER TROOPS CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY.

11. BOTH OMAND AND CHARLTON CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE GENERAL MOOD AMONG MINISTERS WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF STAYING IN BOSNIA.

12. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

CROWE

BT

#9948
Discussion Paper

Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy:
Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict

Overview

At the May 23 Principals Committee meeting there was a general consensus that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian Army, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals also agreed that U.S. security assistance should be largely limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers and that training should be conducted by a third party, if possible. There was also agreement that such policies would have to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, including maintaining, and possibly reinforcing, peacekeepers in Macedonia.

Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia's likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Political/Military Goals

Our principal goals following UNPROFOR's partial or complete withdrawal would be to:

- Preserve the sovereignty of the GOBH over as much of its territory as possible;

  -- We could continue to recognize the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1992 and not accept the territorial status quo created by Serb military operations and ethnic cleansing, just as we did with Soviet conquest of the Baltics in the 1940s.

- Maintain the Bosniac-Croat Federation and good relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo;

  -- Whether these alliances of convenience can endure remains to be seen. The Federation offers the best prospect for developing a counterweight to extreme nationalism and Serbian regional hegemony. Maintaining some common sense of purpose between Zagreb and Sarajevo is the best way to safeguard the GOBH from a Serb-Croat grand bargain that could leave Bosnia a Balkan Palestine in the middle of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.
Croatian support would be essential to success of efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Army, if only to ensure transit of equipment. But Zagreb would surely want some similar security assistance and closer ties to NATO (through PFP) and the EU.

- Prevent a widening of the conflict and bolster regional stability;

  - This remains our abiding strategic interest. We must prevent the conflict from widening into a general Balkan War that could engage two NATO allies (with very different agenda), threaten the stability of fragile new democracies in the region, and increase the risks of deeper U.S. engagement.

- Deter further aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a line open to Milosevic and his successors.

  - Threats to Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would have to be deterred, but moderation of Serb policies is the long-term goal.

**General Elements of the Strategy**

**Security Assistance**

We would seek support of all NATO allies, PFP Partners, and moderate Islamic states for a security assistance package for the GOBH. But we should be prepared to proceed with a coalition of the willing.

Allies would balk at supporting lift for fear that it would prolong the war and exacerbate the risks of its widening. We would need to convince them that we only want to give the GOBH a chance to survive and be able to negotiate a viable settlement. A convincing containment strategy would also be essential to enlisting their support.

Security assistance to Bosnian government would be designed to give it sufficient military capacity to defend the territory still under its control and enhance its ability to regain, by force or at the negotiating table, territory now controlled by the BSA. The magnitude of assistance could range from what would be required to defend the status quo, to a more robust package that would allow it to make strategic gains, to an extensive reequipping that would allow it to reestablish its control over territory allotted it under the Contact Group Plan. Clearly cost will be a major factor here, and past estimates of the robust package have exceeded $1 billion.

We and the GOBH would have to balance various goals with the risks of triggering engagement of superior Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Krajina Serb Army (KSA) forces in the fighting in ways that could only be countered by direct U.S. and/or Allied
military support. All but the first option risk bringing other Serb forces to Pale's defense.

**Bosnian/Croat Harmony**

Sarajevo has few alternatives other than alliance with Zagreb. Zagreb, on the other hand, may need additional incentives stay with the program. We and other Allies might offer Zagreb certain rewards for cooperation with Sarajevo such as additional technical and military assistance, deeper bilateral economic and political ties, and membership in PFP.

**Dealing With Serbia**

Deterring further Serb aggression would likely require reinforcing the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic about responding to Serb-triggered violence in Kosovo, and adding threats to take unspecified military actions against Serbia if it escalates its support to the Bosnian Serbs or intimidates Macedonia or other neighbors.

Forging anti-Milosevic coalition could cause divisions within the Alliance and the EU and reinforce Serb nationalism unless we make it clear our efforts are not directed against Serbia proper but at the aggressive nationalism sponsored by the current government. At the same time, we could take steps to support opposition political groups in Serbia who favor more moderate regional policies. We could continue to hold out to Milosevic the promise of further integration if he really breaks with Pale and respects international norms.

**Regional Containment**

Our regional containment efforts might include:

- Retain some residual UNPROFOR or other peacekeeping presence in the Federation territory to maintain Bosniac-Croat harmony.
- Retain a robust UNCRO to prevent a reeruption of the Serb-Croat war and limit KSA support the BSA.

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KSA support was instrumental in the BSA's ability to beat back the Bosnian V Corps offensive in Bihac during the fall of 1994.

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There is intelligence suggesting that if the KSA were driven out of UN Sectors North and South by the Croatian Army, they would move into the Posavina corridor and support BSA operations against the Gorazde pocket.

- Maintain and possibly augment UNPREDEP in Macedonia to help stabilize that country and deter a Serb crackdown in Kosovo. In the context of arming the Bosnians, we would
have to be careful not to give Kosovar Albanians the sense that U.S. or Allied forces would come to the aid of an armed uprising against Serb authorities.

- Deploy some other border monitoring forces like UNPREDEP in Hungary and Albania. This and other actions to prevent spillover could be organized by NATO through PFP.

- Reinforce stability along the periphery by redirecting resources currently used for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to promote economic development and cooperation among the front-line Balkan states.

Efforts Prior to Withdrawal

To be effective, elements of this strategy would need to be in place well before extraction of UNPROFOR actually begins. The military imbalance is such that the BSA could readily put pressure on the enclaves and Sarajevo before and during UNPROFOR withdrawal. Also, as the SNIE 95-7 notes, the Bosnian government would be likely to strongly resist a partial or complete withdrawal of UNPROFOR unless the U.S. or NATO commits to military support. This commitment would just as surely trigger BSA actions to preclude complete withdrawal.

- We would need to build consensus among the Allies and other potential partners and secure at least Russian acquiescence for the main goals of this approach.

- To give the GOBH forces a chance, we would need to explore ways to help the Bosnians "creep out" of the restrictions of the arms embargo. This might include:

  -- Providing some intelligence support to GOBH to enhance their ability to organize defenses against BSA actions. For example, we might start providing the GOBH with data from the Predator UAV flights and other sources.

  -- Programs that Gen. Sewell has broached with the Federation for rear area operations, NCO training, etc.

  -- Developing military-to-military contacts between the GOBH and third countries (Croatia, Turkey, or non-front-line CE states such as Poland or the Czech Republic), that would enable rapid launching of the envisioned training programs.

  -- Reconsider the option of allowing UNPROFOR units, on a national basis, to turn their equipment over the GOBH upon withdrawal. In this way the Bosnian Army could also provide some protection to the evacuation force. Our assumption has been that this would trigger hostile Serb action against these forces, but if the extraction environment is hostile in any event this may not be so decisive in the Serb calculus.
Lifting Options

Multilateral

We would call for an end of the arms embargo because its continuation in the absence of a peacekeeping force or other UNSC action to preserve the peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It would seem difficult for Russia or other states to justify continuation of the arms embargo in this context. Indeed, Russian Rep Churkin proposed lifting the arms embargo last year as part of the Contact Group’s package of incentives and disincentives if Bosnia accepted the CG plan and the Serbs did not. Still, one could expect Russia and even some NATO allies to argue that lifting the embargo would only escalate the violence without altering the outcome fundamentally and run the risk of widening of the conflict. Allies would also be wary of lift because of the inevitable pressures to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government.

NATO/Coalition

If Russia or some another UNSC member (China) appeared to be the principal obstacle to multilateral lift, we might press for a NATO/coalition action to achieve the desired goal. Our argument would hinge on rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, absent a UNSC action to remove the embargo, we would still be vulnerable to the criticisms we have leveled at proponents of unilateral lift and risk loosing support for compliance with other UN-mandated sanctions regimes.

Lift Only

"Lift and pray" would seem to be a completely indefensible strategy both at home and abroad. Even the most isolationist Republicans are not advocating this approach. While this would end the stigma of supporting UNPROFOR, it would create the impression that we had decided to leave the Bosnian government to fend for itself on the black market or rely on Islamic states.

The GOBH might well resist withdrawal in this context. Indeed, the only advantage of this approach would seem to be that it would decrease the BSA’s incentive to complicate or resist withdrawal. However, the BSA would know that the GOBH would receive arms from Islamic and other countries, even if the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments. This outcome would put pressure on the Federation and would risk the ensuing conflict from becoming a clash between Muslims and Christians.

Arming and Training

On the face of it, arming and training by "third countries" has a number of benefits. It would limit the extent of U.S. engagement, making it easier to avoid the "Americanization" of
the post-withdrawal conflict. In turn, this could help prevent the struggle from becoming a surrogate conflict between Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.

Identifying likely "third countries" is more problematic. As for arming, many West European governments might be reluctant to fuel the conflict due to fears of widening. Some front line Central European governments might have similar fears, and enlisting them in such an enterprise would run contrary to our efforts to continue the demilitarization of these societies. This leaves Turkey, Iran, and/or other Islamic countries, all of whom have lots of capacity and high motivation. But if these states get involved, modulating the flow will become more complicated, not to mention the polarizing impact of making this a clash between Islam and Christianity.

As for training, if the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds, Croatia would offers proximity, high motivation, and an eagerness to cooperate with NATO. The downside risks are that enlisting Croatia so frontally in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs would risk reopening the Serb-Croat conflict in a bigger way. Clearly, Croatia's cooperation would be essential to any arming and training package for Bosnia. However, its use as a transit and staging area are different than its use as the training ground and launch pad for offensive operations against Serbs.

Robust Lift and Strike

Here the assessment is in many ways unchanged from the early days of the war in 1992. Lifting the arms embargo and beginning some arming and training of the GOBH forces will take time. During that time they would be very vulnerable to BSA military actions. The most effective way to mitigate this would be to conduct supporting air strikes against BSA heavy weapons, military facilities, and operations. If liaison with the Bosnian Army was established, it might be possible to use Bosnian forces as forward air controllers and target designators. At a minimum, we could argue that NATO's August 1993 decisions to undertake airstrikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas remain valid.

An even more robust option, would be designed to limit VJ involvement by threatening to target VJ military installations in the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other transit points between the FRY and Bosnia if military support continues.

This would give the GOBH the best chance for survival, but it has several significant risks. Such strong action against the Serbs might trigger more direct Russian support. It could also spark an uprising in Kosovo or Vojvodina provinces that could trigger the wider war we seek to avoid.
Strike, No Lift

This option, also considered in late 1992, is gaining supporters outside government once again for different reasons. This approach would seek to "level the playing field" by targeting BSA heavy weapons and other military targets. Once UNPROFOR was out, it could be accomplished without fear of hostage taking. Forward air controllers would be required, but it might be possible to train Bosnian government forces to perform that function for NATO forces. Most military assessments have concluded that air strikes alone would be insufficient to save the enclaves and break a siege of Sarajevo. However, air strikes might be successful in achieving other, less demanding goals at the negotiating table.

Humanitarian Relief: Over to the Bosnians

PRM's paper explains in great detail how the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would disrupt relief efforts by international organizations. However, we need to explore the feasibility of turning over management and delivery of relief efforts to the Bosnian government. Our provision of security assistance might free resources and personnel for such efforts and the Bosnians could operate without current restrictions on UN and international agencies. Also, if we can hold the Federation together, these regions and Croatia could remain secure supply bases.

Assessing/Managing the Russian Reaction

In Moscow's fractious political environment, an expanded U.S.-NATO role in Bosnia would appear at first glance to be a tempting target either for Yeltsin's opponents or for Yeltsin himself and others eager to posture in defense of Russian national interests in the run up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While some support to the Serbs and pointed criticism of U.S. moves would be inevitable, the overall impact on elite and popular sentiment may be more manageable and less explosive than generally predicted.

How Strong is Pan-Slavism?

U.S. and Russian polling data routinely highlight the absence of any significant popular Russian support for Serbia or its agenda in the Balkans. Despite constant Russian (and Western) assertions to the contrary, the Russian view of Serbia corresponds roughly with attitudes toward Poland or Turkey (i.e., these states are seen as mildly friendly to Russia at best). Like most foreign policy issues, events in a post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would resonate faintly with a Russian electorate preoccupied with day-to-day socioeconomic concerns. Politicians from across the political spectrum would find it difficult to rouse average Russians out of their indifference or to stir up serious opposition to the Yeltsin government for its reactions to U.S.-NATO policy.
Moscow has been actively working to retain and expand its political influence in the Balkans (including with Greece) and clearly does not want to be marginalized by Western decisions on Bosnia. But a confrontation with the West over efforts to save the rump Bosnia would not necessarily advance those interests. Moreover, such an stance would also be perceived as anti-Muslim and therefore do damage to Moscow’s warming relations with Iran and other Islamic states.

Russia’s strategic interests in the Balkans, despite Zhirinovsky’s rhetoric, are far from evident to the average Russian. Given the lingering outrage over the war in Chechnya -- much closer to home -- Moscow would have a hard time justifying direct military involvement in Serbia, even advisors/trainers, to the Russian public.

The Duma has gone on record as favoring military support to the Serbs if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted. But Russian arms sales now generally operate on a cash basis. It is not clear that Russia has either the resources or the political motivation to provide significant amounts of military assistance on credit to a bankrupt Serbia. The possibility of non-official Russian support to the Serbs, in the form of volunteers and arms, is a real possibility, but the magnitude of such support seems unlikely to be decisive.

Managing Russian Elite Perceptions

To be sure, the Moscow-based elite is likely to bristle at a more muscular U.S.-NATO posture in Bosnia. Although most foreign policy circles have embraced great power rhetoric and bluster on many high-profile issues, there is little fire in the belly left for the Balkans. The elite’s Bosnia anxieties reached their high-water mark more than a year ago and were sparked largely by the April 1994 airstrikes around Sarajevo. This growing Bosnia fatigue has also been fed by the actions of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground and by Moscow’s high-profile diplomatic forays -- and failures -- in the region, the Contact Group, and the UNSC. Churkin’s unproductive visit and gloomy assessment are another example of this frustration.

The steady downgrading of Russian efforts in the Balkans also is linked implicitly to the Russian elite’s growing preoccupation with NATO expansion. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev would still be the key players in how the Russian internal debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, they will need a clear understanding of the potential costs of opposing international consensus on this issue. Given the Russian leadership’s overriding stake in trying to hold the line on NATO expansion and repairing the damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect that Moscow will be far less inclined to fan a new round of crisis in relations with the U.S. and its Allies over Bosnia.

Still, it will be particularly important for the U.S. to engage directly with Russian officials early and try to
influence elite opinion as our overall direction becomes clearer. In addition to giving Russian officials a sense of engagement in the development of policy, we should also look at face-savers that would make it easier for Moscow to abstain from a UNSC vote on lifting the arms embargo. For example, we could advance a UNSC resolution that would lift the arms embargo on all the Yugoslav successor states. This would have little practical impact on Serbia’s military potential.

**Shifting Alignments**

In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would likely have to deal with shifting alignments among Contact Group members. While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive of efforts to isolate Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French resistance to this tack and even collusion to cut deals with Belgrade and Pale. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy would offer countervailing pressures that might limit the depth of such fissures. But maintaining even the limited degree of Western unity we have today would be difficult as old biases and differing geopolitical interests became more pronounced.