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Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  NSC - Jamie Metzl  
(phone: 456-9361; room 302)  
FROM:  USIA/EEN - Robert E. McCarthy  
SUBJECT:  IPI Planning for Kosovo  

As requested at your August 25 meeting, attached is a draft public-diplomacy plan for supporting NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a) getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite support before and after the action.

You also asked for thoughts on specific action to be taken now. Given the centrality of NATO to success, we recommend you immediately propose to NATO coordinated planning on an information campaign to support military action in Kosovo. We must engage them early if our IPI effort is to be coherent. Because external broadcasting is so important for Serbia-Montenegro, especially for Kosovo, we also recommend you invite a representative from USIA’s International Broadcasting Bureau to attend our next meeting. We would be happy to identify the right person.

Finally, please note the attached plan does not address specific programs and activities. USIA has the full range of public-diplomacy tools available, from electronic information transmission to well connected representatives in the field. Once a strategy is approved, we are prepared to move forward with dispatch.

Attachment: as stated
A KOSOVO IPI STRATEGY

CONTEXT:

West Europe/NATO Members: International public support, especially from NATO allies, is critical to success of military action in Kosovo. A unilateral American step, or one that is perceived as mainly American with only grudging allied backing, would engender anti-American antipathy—the “hegemony factor.” Allied support cannot be assumed, but it is obtainable. Opinion polls demonstrate West European publics believe their governments have not responded adequately to the crisis in Kosovo. Majorities would support NATO moves to ease the humanitarian crisis but most would stop short at this time of endorsing military action. Most would prefer that any action have multilateral approval; when asked directly, a narrow plurality favors a UN mandate for any NATO intervention. Polling results suggest that if political leaders explain the need and rationale for NATO action, with or without a UN mandate, they could win broad public approval.

Balkan Region: USIA survey data shows the polarization in the region and also suggests public diplomacy could be effective. A mid-August poll in Serbia indicates large majorities support Serb police actions in Kosovo and oppose any significant change in Kosovo’s political status. But a small majority are willing to grant Kosovo some increased autonomy within Serbia. About four in ten believe the government should compromise on Kosovo if it meant some lifting of sanctions (43%) or in response to NATO’s stationing troops in neighboring countries (37%). Yet as many or more oppose concessions. Significantly, nearly half (46%) would support compromise to end NATO air strikes, but a third (35%) would oppose. Compared to June, fewer Belgrade residents are now willing to make concessions when presented with these scenarios. Despite the recent escalation in violence, Serbs are as likely now (35%) as they were in March to support a family member going to fight to keep Kosovo part of Serbia. About four in ten would be opposed (44%). Thus, despite their views on Kosovo, fairly substantial numbers of Serbs appear willing to support changes if they will forestall/end NATO military action, and this group would be predisposed to our IPI effort. Obviously, opinion trends can be unpredictable; we must be alert for a hardening of opinion as a result of any military action.

Russia: We should recognize NATO military action in Kosovo will be a hard sell in Russia, and could have political implications that affect other U.S. interests. Russia’s historic cultural and political association with the Balkan Serbs will make it particularly difficult to convince the public that military action against the FRY is justified. Moreover, Russians are already concerned about NATO enlargement and fear it may be directed at them; thus, they are unlikely to support NATO action in what is acknowledged to be FRY sovereign territory. Military action might trigger a sharp official reaction or have domestic political implications affecting our longer-term interests. That having been said, many thoughtful Russians are uncomfortable with Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo. If and when a decision is made to intervene militarily in Kosovo, NATO must make the strongest possible case that such action is necessary, and let facts speak for themselves. Significant support for NATO peace keeping in Bosnia (54% of Moscow elites), in which Russians participate, gives us a solid starting point.
STRATEGY:

This set of circumstances presents several diplomacy challenges. The first is to convince our NATO allies to take a more activist role by bringing along their publics. We can build public, and thereby government support for NATO military involvement in Kosovo by targeting major European media with stories about the growing humanitarian problem and potential refugee crisis at their doorsteps. Emphasizing the growing humanitarian/refugee crisis will also create a sense of urgency and a need to act, out of self-interest as well as humanitarian concern. Rallying allied support is a job specifically for the United States, until NATO decides to act.

Second, we have to make sure that when NATO does decide on a military course, that there is no question in the international community that this is a joint action. To do that, Secretary General Solana must have the lead in announcing NATO intentions and actions. All of the allied nations should speak in support of the NATO action, drawing on common talking points. NATO’s spokesman, Jamie Shea, should be the primary source for information and explanation about alliance actions. (Obviously, individual countries would speak about their own specific military contributions, in addition to those of the alliance as a whole). USG statements should follow Secretary Solana’s initial announcement, and all USG policies and actions thereafter should be characterized as support to the NATO-led mission.

To prepare for this secondary course of action, the United States should raise the need for a Kosovo public diplomacy campaign in the appropriate NATO forum. Our Public Affairs Officer at NATO HQ in Brussels is positioned to create and present an international public diplomacy plan, with NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, to the NAC for consideration and joint action. The NAC and the NATO Information Program (NATIP) are the proper institutional vehicles for launching an allied international public diplomacy effort. The primary target audiences would be publics within alliance countries (via their major media outlets), as well as publics and elites in the Balkans, Russia, and other countries with particular interest in the region, especially current members of the UN Security Council.

Obviously, the Balkans (and the FRY in particular) would be a special focus for public diplomacy effort. We should stress the same themes that we employ elsewhere (see below), but emphasize that NATO military action is designed to bring a quick and peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis and push all parties to find a political accommodation that will restore stability to the region. Currently we have excellent access to local media, but we must also be prepared for a Milosevic crackdown. In that event we can reach audiences in Serbia and Kosovo through ‘spillover’ effect from broadcasters in neighboring countries and via USG (and other) external broadcasting. VOA Serbian and Albanian have large audiences and VOA’s new TV program “Open Studio” has a large direct-satellite viewership. If programmatically and technologically feasible, we can increase air time of VOA Albanian and VOA Serbian broadcasts. If Serbian authorities curtail local Internet service providers, we can disseminate USG policy messages by fax to local opinion leaders, NGOs, and political opposition.
OPERATING PRINCIPLES

- The IPI message should emanate from NATO and allied sources as much as possible to illustrate broad multinational support, vice unilateral U.S. program. A formal NATO public diplomacy plan is essential to coordinate allied IPI efforts.
- The IPI message should be tailored for each major audience grouping (e.g. NATO allies, non-NATO countries, Russia, the Balkans, etc.) in order to be effective—one size will not fit all. It should also help solidify currently lukewarm allied support for a military option.
- The IPI message should be divided into a pre-ops program (initiated immediately) to build the rationale for potential NATO action as well as a post-ops package (ready to implement) to justify and explain the operation.
- IPI themes should be grounded in publicly stated policy objectives, consistently echoed throughout the USG and which are consistent with the NATO public affairs effort.

THEMES AND OBJECTIVES

PRE-OPERATION PHASE

THEMES

- Belgrade’s continued use of force in Kosovo is not acceptable and cannot solve the situation. Nor can force by the UCK lead to anything but more human suffering.
- Continued unrest in Kosovo threatens the stability of the entire region. The international community has a stake in restoring calm and stability in Kosovo.
- The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is desperate and getting worse. The coming winter will bring intolerable humanitarian crisis.
- Diplomacy is the preferred tool to resolve the situation. U.S. and NATO will go the extra mile to find a peaceful solution which retains Kosovo as a part of the FRY. All the nations of the Alliance back this effort, and it has broad international support.
- NATO military action may be necessary in the face of continued diplomatic failure. The U.S. will support military action if it becomes necessary.
- Violence must be a last resort; however, military action may speed a diplomatic solution, as it spurred the parties on at Dayton.
- Belgrade’s offensive military actions and undemocratic policies are largely responsible for the desperate humanitarian situation in Kosovo; Belgrade must bear responsibility for any NATO military response.

OBJECTIVES

- Make the case that NATO has exhausted every reasonable diplomatic option to resolve the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Document what has been done.
- Rally allied support for NATO military action as a legitimate, useful, option.
- Convince all parties to the conflict in Kosovo that NATO will act if they themselves do not come to a solution.
- Explain to non-members of the Alliance the justification of NATO military action.
POST OPERATIONS PHASE

THEMES:

- The NATO military option was the only option left to avert further humanitarian disaster. The U.S., acting in concert with NATO allies, was a full participant in planning and executing the action.
- There can be no military solution to this conflict, but NATO is prepared to use military action to bring all parties to the table to come to a diplomatic settlement.
- European regional stability in general and the huge investment in Bosnian stability in particular are protected by this operation.
- Belgrade is largely responsible--its continued offensive in Kosovo made NATO's military response necessary. However, the UCK also shares responsibility through its refusal to enter into negotiations.
- The NATO operation was lawful, proportionate, and effective in averting further humanitarian suffering. We can document careful planning to limit casualties/damage and show how strikes have relieved the humanitarian situation and deterred armed action against innocent civilians.
- NATO and the U.S. are prepared to assist with recovery efforts necessitated by the operation.
- Both Belgrade and the UCK must recognize that further military action by them will not be tolerated.

OBJECTIVES

- Stop all Serbian and UCK military and security forces' offensive activity.
- Make it possible for Kosovo refugees to return to their homes and protect them.
- Initiate meaningful negotiations for a peaceful solution.
- Preserve regional stability.
- Emphasize military operation as a concerted NATO action that has international support.
SUBJECT: ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOSOVO

REF: A) SKOPJE 2543; B) USNATO 2522; C) USNATO 2517; D) VERSHBOY 9/27/98 FAX

CLASSIFIED BY A/S GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

FOR AMBASSADORS/CHARGES

1. (S) AS A RESULT OF SUSTAINED AMERICAN EFFORT AND LEADERSHIP, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21 TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON FRY PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE THREE TRACKS OF OUR KOSOVO STRATEGY: HUMANITARIAN, NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. THE ADOPTION SEPTEMBER 23 OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 IS A CONCRETE STEP TOWARD ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO. ONCE THE UNSCR PASSED, WE AGREED TO A CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 23 WHICH WAS PRODUCTIVE. NATO REINFORCED THE MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY AUTHORIZING SACEUR TO ISSUE AN
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ACTIVATION WARNING (ACTWARN) TO GENERATE THE FORCES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT A LIMITED AIR OPTION AND A PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN PORTUGAL HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

2. (S) WE HAVE AT LEAST NINE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO MEET IN THE COMING DAYS IF WE ARE TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO END THE VIOLENCE, ALLOW ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM HIS CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY, MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND MONITOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. WE WILL NEED TO:

-- MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE ACHIEVED IN THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21.

-- READY NATO BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES WITHOUT A FURTHER UNSCR

-- ENSURE THAT THE UNSC IS WELL BRIEFED AND THAT THE SYG'S REPORT ON UNSCR 1199 IS ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNAMBIGUOUS

-- CONSULT CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE NATO PJC

-- ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PRESENTED BY HILL AND "IMPOSED" BY THE CONTACT GROUP

-- PREPARE OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

-- LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO LEVERAGE MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING THROUGH DRIVING WEDGES BETWEEN HIM AND HIS PUBLIC AND SECURITY FORCES

-- FURTHER DEVELOP HUMANITARIAN RELIEF STRATEGIES FOR BOTH BEST-CASE AND WORST-CASE OUTCOMES

-- BUILD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE PUBLIC

3. (S) WE WANT TO USE THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BRING THE VARIOUS STRANDS OF OUR POLICY TOGETHER (INCLUDING WORKING WITH THE RUSSIANS) SO THAT NATO IS READY (SHOULD POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DECIDE) TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ACTION "AT A TIME AND PLACE OF NATO'S CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COME INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN, CONTACT GROUP, AND NATO

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REQUIREMENTS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE NEED ANOTHER UNSCR, NOR SHOULD WE ASSUME THIS IS ATTAINABLE GIVEN THE LIKELY OPPOSITION OF RUSSIA. WE DO NOT WANT TO TIE NATO'S DECISION TOO CLOSELY TO THE UNSYG'S CONCLUSIONS. INSTEAD, WE WANT TO ESTABLISH NATO'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSESS WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS OR HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH LONG-STANDING INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. SINCE WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY, WE WISH TO AVOID ISSUING A FORMAL ULTIMATUM DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO ISSUE A LATE ULTIMATUM WHICH GIVES MILOSEVIC ANOTHER EXTENDED PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE AND REQUIRES A FURTHER DECISION BY EITHER THE NAC OR THE UNSC BEFORE MILITARY ACTION. NATO SHOULD BE FULLY READY TO ACT, IF NECESSARY, THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 WITH AS FEW ADDITIONAL DECISIONS REQUIRED AS POSSIBLE. IF, AT THAT TIME, THE NAC DETERMINES THAT MILOSEVIC REMAINS NON-COMPLIANT IT SHOULD:

-- AUTHORIZE SACEUR TO EXECUTE THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AS A DEMONSTRATION OF NATO DETERMINATION

-- SPECIFY THE CONCRETE STEPS THAT NATO EXPECTS BELGRADE TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET NATO/UN/CG REQUIREMENTS

-- THREATEN FURTHER STRIKES "AT TIMES AND PLACES OF NATO'S OWN CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COMPLY

-- ISSUE A STRONG WARNING TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS

4. ACTIONS REQUESTED:

-- FOR USNATO: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION, WHICH NATO DEMONSTRATED BY MOVING TO ACTWARN, IS VITAL. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD USE THE COMING WEEK TO GIVE ALL 16 ALLIES A SENSE OF CO-OWNERSHIP OF OUR POLITICAL/MILITARY STRATEGY. HE SHOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE MOVE TO ACTREQ FOR THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THE NAC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. NAC AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ ON SEPTEMBER 30, WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NAC TO CONSIDER A DECISION TO GO TO ACTORD DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5.

WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT NATO'S PRESS LINE AFTER AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT FORCES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO POSSIBLE ACTION. SYG SOLANA

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SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO ACTREQ WAS BASED ON THE ALLIANCE'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. WHILE PREVIOUS NATO PRESS GUIDANCE EMPHASIZED THAT ACTWARN WAS THE LAST STEP IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AND NOT THE FIRST STEP IN USE OF FORCE, NATO SHOULD NOW EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. SYG SOLANA SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NAC PLANS TO AGAIN REVIEW WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS COMPLIED WITH THESE DEMANDS WHEN IT MEETS NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD DRAW FROM THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESS LINE WITH ALLIES:

-- NATO FORCES ARE NOW BEING COMMITTED ACTREQ

-- MILOSEVIC IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE

-- MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199

-- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS

-- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT CEASED HIS OFFENSIVE

-- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

-- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS SECURITY FORCES

-- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS

-- WE HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO

-- THE NAC WILL REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS NEXT MEETING.

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW MAY ALSO USE THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER 29 AND THE NAC MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 30 TO GIVE ALLIES A SENSE OF OUR THINKING AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1-3. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD ALSO HAVE NATO CONSULT WITH
RUSSIA THROUGH THE PJC. WE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD SHARE SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO WITH THE RUSSIANS IN BRUSSELS. (FYI: AMBASSADOR MALLOY REVIEWED OVERHEAD ON DESTRUCTION IN KOSOVO WITH AMBASSADOR CHIZHOV IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24).

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SECURE NAC AGREEMENT TO TASK NMAS TO REFINE THEIR CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND OPTIONS TO INCLUDE A POSSIBLE SMALLER ("LIGHT") OPTION. ON SEPTEMBER 9 THE NAC NOTED OPLAN 10410 AS A "LIVING DOCUMENT" REQUIRING FURTHER REFINEMENT. AN ADDITIONAL PLAN SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR NATO FORCES IF REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT EITHER WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN AIR OPTION OR AT THE CONCLUSION OF AIR STRIKES. IN ADDITION, SACEUR SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO BRIEF THE NAC DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 ON THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE SITUATION IN KOSOVO.

SACEUR'S BRIEFING SHOULD ASSESS COMPLIANCE IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

-- CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY FRY AND/OR SERBIAN FORCES
-- WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO OF VJ AND MUP UNITS NOT NORMALLY BASED IN KOSOVO
-- RETURN OF VJ AND MUP UNITS BASED IN KOSOVO TO THEIR LOCAL GARRISONS
-- LIFTING OF EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO
-- FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AGENCIES AND NGOS ACCREDITED TO THE FRY
-- RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW'S VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO INVOLVE PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE EAPC.
FINALLY, IN KEEPING WITH OUR STRATEGY OF WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THEM ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOB SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON SEPTEMBER 29. VERSHBOB SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE SEPTEMBER 30 NAC WILL CONSIDER THE NEXT STEP IN FORCE GENERATION, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALLIES WILL APPROVE ADDITIONAL STEPS. THE NAC FOLLOWING THE NAC WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER FRANK DISCUSSION ON NATO PLANNING. WHILE REMAINING GENERAL, VERSHBOB SHOULD CONVEY TO KISLYAK OUR COMMITMENT TO PUSH AHEAD AT NATO IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH ALLIES MEASURES NATO MAY TAKE TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE NOTIFIED THAT NATO HAS AUTHORIZED ACTREQ FOR THE AIR OPTIONS AND INFORMED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTREQ AUTHORIZATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE NATO WOULD WISH TO EXTEND A WARNING TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL ONLY PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF A NATO MILITARY STRIKE, THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD PRUDENTLY CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION.

WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE. IT IS WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION. IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES MISSION MAY OBSERVE THAT MILOSEVIC'S VIOLATION OF TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO DEMAND ACTION BY NATO.

-- FOR USUN: WE NEED THE UNSYG'S REPORT TO CLEAR THE PATH FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SODERBERG TO THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 26, INCLUDING TRAVEL BY DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, RENEWED FOCUS ON WAR CRIMES, AND HUMANITARIAN BRIEFINGS. WE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY THAT SHE BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SYG ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOW-UP WITH THE NON-PERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS (WHO SEEMED AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 24 TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC) WOULD BE USEFUL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS FROM USUN ON WAYS TO
INFLUENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE SECRETARIAT AND THE SC.

-- FOR SKOPJE: WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR HILL'S AGREEMENT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 2 TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP EXPERTS TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD PRESS FOR SERB COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT AND CONTINUE HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED PRESSURE NOW BEING PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. AT THE SAME TIME, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE CONTINUING NEED FOR MILOSEVIC TO PULL BACK SECURITY FORCES FROM KOSOVO AND MAKE GOOD ON ALL HIS PREVIOUS PROMISES, E.G. ON HUMANITARIAN AND INTERNATIONAL ACCESS. WITH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE GROUND FOR ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN END TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE AND BEGINNING OF TALKS ON STATUS.

-- FOR MOSCOW: WE WANT TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL, SPECIFIC STEPS WE CAN TAKE BEYOND CONSULTATION (AT THE PJC, FOR EXAMPLE) AND INFORMATION SHARING. WE MUST MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 PJC TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH COMMONALITY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR POSITION AND RUSSIA'S. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED (1) A "COORDINATING MECHANISM" ON THE GROUND IN BELGRADE (THEY HAVE SUGGESTED CHRIS HILL LEAD THIS GROUP OF LOCAL AMBASSADORS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY), (2) POSSIBLE TROIKA (RUSSIAN/EU/US) MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TWO WEEKS FROM SEPTEMBER 23. WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS AND ACCOMMODATE THEM WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WITHOUT GIVING THEM A VETO ON NATO ACTION THROUGH THE UNSC OR OTHER MECHANISMS.

-- FOR LONDON, PARIS AND BONN: AT QUAD MEETINGS IN NEW YORK THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF A POLDIR LEVEL QUAD MEETING IN EUROPE ON OCTOBER 8 TO REVIEW A FORMAL ULTIMATUM. EVENTS ARE RUNNING AHEAD OF THAT PLAN. GROSSMAN WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO REVIEW OUR THINKING. HE WILL REPORT TO AMBASSADORS/DCMS ON THESE CONTACTS. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT APPROACH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT IN CAPITALS UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM GROSSMAN. BUT

--SECRET--
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD/SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OUR THINKING.

-- FOR CONTACT GROUP CAPITALS: WHILE WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT ATTENDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN TWO WEEKS AS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (AND SUPPORTED BY MANY OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES), OUR INTENTION IS TO PROCEED AS WE DID IN ADVANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 24 IN NEW YORK: THAT IS, WE WILL WANT TO CHOOSE SEVERAL SPECIFIC THINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE/BEFORE WE WOULD ATTEND A CONTACT GROUP MEETING. IF/IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT OUR THINKING ON A CONTACT GROUP, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE SECRETARY FOUND THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23 TO BE HELPFUL, THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO AMBASSADOR HILL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP ON OCTOBER 2, THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ABOUT ATTENDING ANOTHER CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, BUT THAT SUCH A DECISION WOULD NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC AND CREATING A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

5. (S) WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BUILD SUPPORT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UNSYG ON THE NEED FOR A CLEAR, TIMELY REPORT TO THE UNSC. WE WILL ALSO BE EXPLORING FURTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING ASKING GENERAL CLARK (AS USCINCEUR) TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE VJ AS APPROPRIATE. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO FASHION A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGES.

YY

ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
SKOPJE IMMEDIATE
MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
WARSAW IMMEDIATE
PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFAE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLUNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

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Jim, as discussed, here is the revised version reflecting changes flowing from Dick's discussions with Milosevic and Milutinovic this afternoon. He welcomes your further comments ASAP. Best probably to phone to the Palace secure setup.

All brackets are Milosevic's. Per discussion, we will work to retain all this language. The whole business of the NATO cell in Pristina is especially tough as I mentioned. In addition, we will try to add language into the evacuation paragraph that mentions "military means" or "...assets" or as fallback "all necessary means" or something comparable. I haven't put it here because I need to discuss with Dick first, and let him work it in.

Larry Rossin

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0830-M
8/2/15 KBN
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission

Preambular Language

- Devoted to the respect of the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris Charter,

- Considering in particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,

- Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region, willing to contribute to the implementation of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN Security Council,

- The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,

- and, The OSCE, on the other,

- have reached the following AGREEMENT:

Establishment and Termination

- The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE Permanent Council pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling upon OSCE to establish the Mission.

- The FRY government has informed the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.

- OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.

- OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most effectively.

- KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the Verification Mission.

- The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the Verification Mission and all its members.
In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgment of the Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission members.

The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.

The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina and field locations. The FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide full cooperation and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to, billets, frequency or frequencies, visas and documentation, customs facilities, vehicle registration, fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal procedures.

The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, which can be prolonged upon decision of the UN Security Council.

**General Responsibilities, Roles and Missions**

- To oversee the free exercise of ideas through the maintenance of independence and integrity.

- To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council and the United Nations Security Council [and the NATO Secretary-General]. These reports will also be provided to the authorities of the FRY.

- To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibilities;

- To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited international and non-government organizations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;

- To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security Council [and the NATO Secretary-General] on areas covered by UN Security Council Resolution 1199.

**Specific Terms of Reference**

- The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the ceasefire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations.
Mission personnel will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times.

- **[The Verification Mission will be permitted to visit all military/police cantonments within Kosovo.]**

- The Verification Mission will receive weekly information from relevant FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to accompany police within Kosovo.

- The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the reasons for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed immediately. The Verification Mission will also receive notification should emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the removal of any roadblock.

- The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movements by units with border control responsibilities through areas of Kosovo away from the border. The Verification Mission, when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, will visit border control units and accompany them as they perform their normal border control roles.

- When invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.

- The Verification Mission will verify the return of displaced persons to their homes, the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian organizations and NGOs, and the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs in facilitating procedural requirements such as issuance of travel documentation, expedited customs clearance for humanitarian shipments and radio frequencies. The Mission will make such representations as it deems necessary to resolve problems it observes.

- As the political settlement defining Kosovo's self-government is achieved and implementation begins, the Mission Director will receive from the OSCE implementation support in areas such as elections oversight, assistance in the establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo.
• The Mission Director will receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities concerning allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses.

• The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, Kosovo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to detained persons.

• The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national communities and authorities to exchange information and provide guidance on implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.

• The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or lack of full cooperation from any side to the OSCE [and NATO Secretary General].

Composition and Facilities

• A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification Mission requirements, to include a liaison unit with [the NATO support element] [a small multinational military cell] to be established in Pristina.

• 1800 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states will be permitted. Headquarters and support staff included in this total. [OSCE may include armed security personnel in its Mission for own-force protection.]

• A headquarters in Pristina.

• Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission Director.

• A small liaison office in Belgrade.

• Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.

Field Presence

• Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each opština in Kosovo with specific areas of responsibility, under the Mission Director located in Pristina.

• Many opština coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller towns/villages in the opština. The number and location of sub-stations will vary
from opstina to opstina, depending on the verification environment and past conflict situation.

- The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the opstina authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.

- The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the particular area.

- Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility.
Diplomatic Support of 30 Day Strategic Plan

Object: Compel Milosevic to accept NATO conditions by eroding his base and denying him defensive tools.

Means:

• Reinforce military operations with diplomacy aimed at isolating Milosevic and Serbia; sustain Allied support while managing Russia and Front Line States:

Target Milosevic's comfort zone, convince him NATO will keep raising the pressure and outlast him, that he will not be able to drive wedges either into NATO or between NATO and Russia.

With Allies:

• Maintain NAC consensus on expanding air operations, increasing economic pressure;
• Prevent freelance initiatives/visits to Belgrade
• Prevent dilution of SACEUR's authority;
• Gain approval of Visit and Search OPLAN NLT May 3;
• Press forward ground force reassessments;
• Work to close distance between Alliance and Russia on UNSCR elements.

With Russia:

• Continue high level contacts, U.S. and Ally, to sustain Russian understanding of Allied unity and resolve;
• After Chernomyrdin Belgrade visit work to narrow distance Russia and NATO (Secstate calls to Ivanov, Chernomyrdin, coordinated with Quint calls to same);
• G-8 Poldirs discussions to determine whether a G-8 Ministerial will advance peace, possible G-8 Sherpa meeting May 2-3 (need agreed text to ensure Russians do not take advantage and produce nothing).

With Front Line States:

• Work for FLS leaders' statement -- against Milosevic, for Serb people;
• Relieve pressure from Macedonia to deny Milosevic weapon of refugees;
• Urge NAC action to build more transit camps in Macedonia;
• Announce accelerated evacuation of Kosovar refugees to U.S.A., increased size of Camp America (once building commenced);

• Urge all Europeans to activate and expand their previous commitments to shelter refugees;

• Shore up FLS by supporting relief efforts:
  ➢ May 4 - U.S.-EU in Brussels;
  ➢ May 5 G-24 Donor's conference in Paris;
  ➢ May 6 Albright-Fischer meeting in Washington;
  ➢ May 7 Coordination conference with IOs in Vienna;
  ➢ May 7 U.S.-EU aid consultations in Brussels.

Cronies and Family -- sow seeds of fear that they will lose wealth and influence after the conflict.

• Public announcement of EU and U.S. sanctions (planned).
• Work FLS, Partners, and others to support Maritime Visit and Search (i.e. agree to allow inspection of their vessels);
• Work FLS to actively support EU and U.S. POL embargoes (possible: provide support for police and customs inspections);
• Work Europeans (especially Cyprus) to freeze all Yugoslav assets;
• Repeat message at U.S.-EU meetings of FRY inclusion in SEI if they come to terms in Kosovo.

VJ leadership -- sow doubt about Milosevic as commander in chief, generate fear about personal well being.

• Continue naming of VJ commanders in areas where atrocities are reported (NAC report to reinforce this?);
• OSCE, NGO reports in May to highlight atrocities;
• Work UN to forestall negative resolutions/reports on Kosovo to deny VJ comfort (push back Russian mischief);
• Move quickly to build camps and evacuate refugees from Macedonia -- denies Milosevic and VJ key weapon intended to distract the Alliance.

Serb Public -- generate doubts about the future of Serbia and its integration with civilized Europe.

• Work FLS-Leaders' statement (see above);

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
• Work with International Organizations (e.g. OSCE) to publicize impact of Milosevic's wars since 1991;
• Work public statements to highlight corruption of current regime.
U:\Serbia\Kosovo\04-30-99 30 Day Plan

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PRM: ENA: NBibbins
P: ERubin
D: JBass
S/P: DHamilton
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

Purpose: Assess feasibility and potential effectiveness of additional military and non-military measures to degrade and undermine FRY's ability to conduct military operations and to sustain national defense in the next 30 days.

Tools: Overt - use military and non-military measures to increase the pressure on Milosevic within the context of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Unconventional – use non-military measures to target specific high-value/high-payoff economic targets, which sustain FRY defense and military capabilities.

Constraints: FRY economy redundant, nearly self-sustaining & capable of operating on near subsistence. FRY funds held off-shore and very difficult to disrupt or freeze.
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

• Expand economic target set: Conduct air strikes aimed at economic targets which are primary means of cash generation controlled by Milosevic and his cronies:

  • Mines/mining equipment (Bor, Majdenpak, Trepca,)
  • Sartid 1913 steel plant at smederevo
  • Gosa heavy industries
  • Timber/wood production & Simpo furniture factory
  • Beocin & Novi Popovac cement plants
Milosevic/cronies’ targets assets, cont’d.

- Serbia's only newsprint factory
- Beopetrol and Jugopetrol facilities
- Customs warehouses and customs facilities in Belgrade, major cities, and border areas
- Warehouses of large trading firms
- Banks -- 6 state banks and influential "private" banks such as Delta bank, Karic bank, commercial bank
- Cigarette factories (imports would be required)
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- Economic measures & actions: Impose economic sanctions to degrade Milosevic’s and the VJ’s ability to support and conduct FRY government, military, and business transactions, which sustain the war economy.

- U.S. will expand current U.S. sanctions which result in practice to a comprehensive trade & investment ban (expected entry in force May 1):

  - Ban on export and reexport of all U.S. goods, technology, and services to the FRY, including oil, petroleum products, strategic materials, and dual-use items; special consideration for humanitarian goods.
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

(Continued)

• Block on all FRY and Serbian government capital and assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction

• Ban on all trade and export financing

• Ban on all imports from the FRY

• Ban on new investment by U.S. persons in the territory of Serbia
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- EU will also adopt sanctions on May 1, but which are less comprehensive than U.S. sanctions (expected entry in force May 1):
  - Export ban on oil, petroleum products, strategic materials, dual-use items
  - Expanded funds freeze on FRY and Serbian government officials
  - Prohibition of provision of export finance by private sector to existing government-financed export credits
  - Extention of the EU investment ban
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- Widening of scope of prohibition on export of equipment for international repression

- Comprehensive flight ban between FRY and EU countries (already in place in U.S.)

- Ban on travel of all senior leadership of the FRY and Serbian governments, including military officials and Milosevic business cronies and family members (already in place in U.S.)
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

Unconventional measures with economic impact: These actions are directed at specific and discrete economic-military and economic-psychological targets, which will impede, disrupt, or complicate Milosevic’s and the FRY’s ability to conduct military operations and sustain national defense.

- Hack into FRY and Serbian government and military computers to disrupt operations of government & business, including government-economic assets, i.e., government command & control links, National Bank of Yugoslavia, & telephone/fax systems

- Interdict Milosevic’s key money managers and disrupt their travel and ability to transact business

- Discredit Milosevic’s money managers, spread rumors of personal corruption and avarice
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

• Discredit and smear Milosevic’s immediate family members, especially his wife Mira Markovic and her JUL party

• Reduce/eliminate remittances from Serbs living abroad

• Stoke inflation -
  • Spread rumors of inflation & goods shortages
  • Print counterfeit dinar
  • Swap Montenegrin-held dinars for dollars or deutsch marks and dump in Serbia
  • Artificially increase exchange rate in Republika Srpska of convertible mark with Yugoslav dinar
Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- Suspend or block use of assets abroad of large state firms or successful smaller ones -- government does not entirely control such funds and they buoy production when necessary

- Seize capital equipment abroad, including merchant ships, JAT aircraft, and other militarily-significant capital assets

- Target and shut down "new" Serbian firms springing up in neighboring countries, Greece, Cyprus, or even Western Europe as these will be the sanctions busters following the pattern of the UN sanctions

- Monitor sanctions-busting routes to consider possible interdiction of cash and high value goods by air or in cooperation with neighboring country governments