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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001a. memo</td>
<td>Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Telephone Calls (1 page)</td>
<td>04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001b. talking points</td>
<td>Points to be Made in Telephone Call with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain (2 pages)</td>
<td>ca. 04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1), P5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001c. talking points</td>
<td>Points to be Made in Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterand of France (2 pages)</td>
<td>ca. 04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1), P5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001d. talking points</td>
<td>Points to be Made in Telephone Call with Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada (3 pages)</td>
<td>ca. 04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1), P5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001e. talking points</td>
<td>Points to be Made in Telephone Call with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pages)</td>
<td>ca. 04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1), P5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Press (Philip J. (PJ) Crowley)
OA/Box Number: 3102

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Yugoslavia (former) [1]
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 25, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE POOL UPON DEPARTURE
The South Grounds

10:50 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I'm on my way, as you know, to Ft. Myer, to the service; so I can't stay and answer a lot of questions. But I did want to make a brief statement about the situation in Bosnia.

It appears that the pressure brought to bear by NATO and the U.N. has worked, and that the cease-fire is holding, that the withdrawal is continuing. We will continue to monitor the situation very closely as the next day unfolds.

I do want to say it's now clearly time to get the diplomatic initiative going again while we maintain our vigilance. But I am pleased by the progress of the last 48 hours.

Q Have things been worked out with the U.N., Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. I think so.

Q Does that mean no air strikes?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Oh, no. I think he was just referring to the situation on Saturday. Yes, I think so.

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REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
WITH THE POOL
The Rose Garden
2:53 P.M. EDT

Q -- think you'll grant MFN to China now that they've released the dissident Wang Juntao?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm very pleased about that. I'm very pleased about it. And it's a good step.

Q Mr. President, are you satisfied with the chain of command now in Bosnia after the confusion over the weekend? And exactly what was that confusion, and did the White House contact Boutros-Ghali to try to get it straightened out?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the first question first. I believe that the chain of command, and more importantly the understandings, about what would or would not trigger air strikes are in proper order now. And I think what happened over the weekend, I believe, was reported essentially at the time the ultimatum took effect, there's no question that there was still some shelling going on in violation of the ultimatum. The U.N. forces on the ground there felt that there had been some command and control problems on the part of the Serbs, but they did intend to comply and they would in fact comply. And therefore they -- it was their judgment that there should be a delay even though the ultimatum was enforced to see if they were right.

And that is why they delayed. There was not a big argument about what the rules were or the conditions were. All were agreed on the fact, all were agreed on the rules. They believed that the Serbs did intend to comply and had gotten strict instructions not just from their political but also from their military commander within Bosnia. And, of course, as it turned out at least to date, that seems to be the case. I think we're all together from here on in.

Q So you don't think this bolsters the argument of some that this is too cumbersome a chain of command, that it's too bureaucratic?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it's somewhat cumbersome -- it's a little less cumbersome than it was before -- that is, we hammered out some better procedures. But I think -- we'll continue to try to work to streamline and improve the procedures. But we're, after all, all of us trying to do something that has not before been done -- put NATO in the service of preserving the peace in Europe outside the NATO membership area for the first time ever, and to work with the United Nations, when the United Nations forces are on the ground but not combatants themselves. So this raises a whole series of delicate and not easy questions -- difficult questions.

I think that things are in proper order at this time. I have no reason to believe they're not, and absolutely no reason to MORE
believe that the U.N. is anything but strongly supportive of the NATO
air strike ultimatum there. I think that -- progress is being made.

Q And the Serbs shouldn't take any comfort in --

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely not. It is exactly what I
said -- nothing more, nothing less. U.N. people on the ground said I
believe they've had -- on their side. I believe they're going to
stop. I believe they're going to withdraw. And, of course, in
effect, that's what happened during the course of the day. And
that's all there was. There was not a difference of policy at all.
And I think we're completely together now.

Q Mr. President, why won't you take a position, your
administration, on the racial justice act in the House version of the
crime bill?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we -- I was under the
impression we had. We're going to have a position on everything in
the House crime bill and some other things as well.

I think we have some people -- working on a racial
justice --. We think that you can absolutely have a racial justice
provision that will do some good. I'm not -- I don't want to get
into -- this is a complicated piece of legislation, with two
competing bills. But we will have positions on all those issues, so
-- I don't think it's accurate to say that we've not taken a
position.

Q Mr. President, why would the assault weapons ban
work better separately than part of the overall crime bill?

THE PRESIDENT: The administration liked it as part of
the overall crime bill. We liked what the Senate did.

Q Well, why -- now that it's no longer part of the
crime bill?

THE PRESIDENT: Because we'll make it part of -- process
separately in the House, then the conferees will put into the crime
bill.

Q Realistically, politically, sir, what are the
prospects?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know yet. We're working it. We
couldn't -- because the House was unwilling to consider it together,
we had to work the crime bill and get it through before we could work
the assault weapons bill, because they had made a decision to vote
them separately. So I can't answer your question now because we're
just now getting pounced in trying to get our teeth into the effort.

Q So you don't know yet whether the tide is turning
on that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we're in a lot better shape than
we were a week ago. But I don't know yet that it'll pass. I'm
working on it.

I think -- it certainly should pass, and in we're in
better shape than we were a week ago. We'll just keep working. I
feel pretty hopeful about it.

If these people are heard from, it will pass.

END 3:02 P.M. EDT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
April 20, 1994

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

4:49 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I'd like to begin by saying that I want to join all the American people as Hillary and I pray for the health and the recovery of President Nixon. I want to again say how much I have appreciated the wise counsel he has given me on the question of Russia and many other issues since I have been President.

I spoke with a member of his family just a few moments ago, as I did speak with Reverend Billy Graham shortly after President Nixon was admitted to the hospital when Reverend Graham was on the way to the hospital. And I have nothing public to report about that, except to say that his condition remains serious and I hope he will be in the prayers of all Americans.

Over the last several days, the situation in Gorazde has become increasingly grim. The Serb forces have broken their own truce agreements, persisted in brutal attacks on civilians, United Nations personnel, and NATO forces protecting those personnel. These events are clearly a setback for the momentum achieved in recent months. The NATO ultimatum brought a reprieve to Sarajevo; humanitarian routes were reopened; agreements between Muslims and Croats changed the balance of power on the ground and offered new diplomatic opportunity.

There are reports that the Serbs have released more U.N. personnel and returned heavy weapons seized from U.N. control near Sarajevo; and they are welcome. But the imperative now is not only to address the latest Serb transgressions, it is to renew the momentum toward peace.

Let me be clear about our objective. Working with our allies, the Russians and others, we must help the warring parties in Bosnia to reach a negotiated settlement. To do that, we must make the Serbs pay a higher price for continued violence so it will be in their own interests, more clearly, to return to the negotiating table. That is, after all, why we pushed for NATO's efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and the Sarajevo ultimatum, and to provide close air support for U.N. forces who come under attack.

In pursuit of that policy, we must take further action. Therefore, the United States has today undertaken the following initiatives:

First, we are proposing to our NATO allies that we extend the approach used around Sarajevo to other safe areas, where any violations would be grounds for NATO attacks. I have insisted that NATO commit itself to achievable objectives. NATO's air power alone cannot prevent further Serb aggressions or advances or silence every gun. Any military expert will tell you that. But it can deny the Serbs the opportunity to shell safe areas with impunity.

MORE
Second, we will work with others to pursue tighter sanctions through stricter enforcements. The existing sanctions on Serbia have crippled Serbia's economy. In light of recent events, there must be no relief.

Third, we are taking other steps to relieve suffering and support the peace process. We are offering the United Nations assistance in addressing the humanitarian crisis that is now severe in Gorazde. And we expect the Security Council to take up a resolution authorizing additional U.N. peacekeepers, which we will support.

These steps support our intensive work, along with others, to secure a negotiated settlement.

I have just spoken at some length with President Yeltsin, as well as with President Mitterrand. I spoke earlier today with Prime Minister Chretien. I have not yet spoken with Chancellor Kohl or Prime Minister Major today -- I have attempted to do so, but I have spoken with them in the last couple of days about this important issue. President Yeltsin and I agreed to work closely together to pursue peace in Bosnia. President Mitterrand expressed his agreement with the general approach.

I was very encouraged by President Yeltsin's statement yesterday, calling on the Serbs to honor their commitments, insisting that they withdraw from Gorazde, and that they resume talks, and that they permit U.N. personnel to return to Gorazde.

I think you can look forward to a major diplomatic initiative coming out of our common efforts, but I cannot discuss the details of the outlines of that with you at this moment because we have agreed, all of us, that our foreign ministers need to talk and flesh out the details before we say exactly what approach we will take. The telephone conversations themselves were an insufficient basis for the kind of specific detailed approach that I think would be required.

In any case, it is clear that our test of Serb intent must be their actions, not their words. Those words have often proved empty.

Let me reiterate what I have said often before: The United States has interests at stake in Bosnia -- an interest in helping to stop the slaughter of innocents; an interest in helping to prevent a wider war in Europe; an interest in maintaining NATO as a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era and in helping to stem the flow of refugees. These interests justify continued American leadership and require us to maintain a steady purpose, knowing that there will be difficulties and setbacks, and that in this world where we have a set of cooperative arrangements not only with NATO, but with the United Nations, there will often be delays that would not be there were we acting alone or in a context in which our security were more immediately threatened.

Ultimately, this conflict still must be settled by the parties themselves. They must choose peace. The agreement between the Croatians and the Muslims was a very important first step, but there is so much more to be done. By taking firm action consistent with our interests, the United States and our NATO allies can, and must, attempt to influence that choice.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, did President Yeltsin raise any objections to this expanded use of NATO air power? And are all the NATO allies on board on this, such as Britain and Canada?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, we are still involved in our consultations about it. Secondly, I don't think I can commit President Yeltsin to a course until he sees our proposal in writing.

I can tell you, in general, what he said, however, which was that he agreed that the present understandings for air power were ineffective, and that the Serbs plainly violated their agreement and overreached in Gorazde -- something he's already said publicly. But he feels, as everyone does, that over the long run, NATO air power alone will not settle this conflict; this conflict will have to be settled by negotiations.

Let me tell you the argument I made to him, and the argument I want to make to you, because I know a lot of you have been as frustrated as have we by what happened in Gorazde.

We have, through NATO, three separate authorizations for the use of air power; and air power has been used under two of those three. And arguably, the possibility of air power has been successful under two of those three, but they're not the same. Authorization number one is to enforce the no-fly zone. We have done that and planes have been shot down, as you know. And I think the no-fly zone clearly has been successful in preventing the war from spreading further into the air and the slaughter from coming from the airplanes.

Option number two was the Sarajevo option. That is, a safe zone was created around Sarajevo, and all heavy weapons either had to be withdrawn from the safe zone or turned over to United Nations personnel. Then any heavy weapons shelling within the Sarajevo safe zone by anybody could trigger NATO air strikes. There were no NATO air strikes under that, but it clearly worked, and it was clearly more enforceable.

Option number three, is what you saw at Gorazde. Option number three gives the United Nations commander the authority to ask for United Nations civilian approval to ask for NATO air support to support the U.N. forces on the ground when they're under duress.

Now, consider what the difference is between that and the Sarajevo option, and all the conflicts that came along. First of all, you have to go through the approval process, which came quickly the first time when the U.N. -- the NATO planes went in, the United States' planes, and took the first action. But then you have to keep coming back for that approval. And you're always subject to an argument about who started what fight and what the facts were. And then what happened to us in Gorazde was, if an assault results in having the NATO forces close at hand with the aggressing forces, or if NATO forces are captured, then any use of air power may lead to the killing of the very people we're there trying to protect.

Whereas under the Sarajevo model, you can just say, okay, here's the safe zone; all the heavy weaponry has to be withdrawn or put under U.N. control; and if there's any violation by anybody, there can be air action. It is a much clearer thing. That is a point I made very strongly to President Yeltsin. I think he was quite sympathetic with it.

His only point was the same point that everyone makes which is that in the end, the use of air power by NATO cannot bring this war to an end. Only a negotiated settlement can do that. I think that, generally, you will see the United States and Russia working together, and I've been impressed by how aggressive the Russians have been with regard to the Serbs in this.

Q Mr. President, do you think that now the Serbs should be prepared for strategic air strikes, as well as tactical;
that you would need to go after their supply lines or their ammo dumps? And secondly, are you also pressing the allies to try to lift the arms embargo, as many in Congress are demanding?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the first question first by simply saying that I do not think it is appropriate for me to discuss the tactical details of our policy -- not ever, probably, but certainly not until they have been worked out with our allies. We have to do that through NATO.

Secondly, as you know, I have always favored lifting the arms embargo. And I am glad that there is so much support for it in the Congress now from -- much of it coming from people who've not said it before. And I think that's encouraging. But many of them are saying that somehow we should not be in a cooperative effort with the United Nations and NATO, but instead should just, on our own, lift the arms embargo, make sure the arms get there, and then, with no danger to ourselves, we can permit these people to fight against their own abuses. That has a great deal of appeal. There are certain practical problems with it.

First, I would say, that if we ignore a United Nations embargo because we think it has no moral basis or even any legal validity, but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations allies from ignoring embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against Saddam Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in the United Nations, you must follow other embargoes? That's a serious question for me because there are a lot of things that we want to do through the United Nations.

Secondly, what are the practical problems with raising the arms embargo? Do the Croats, who now have this agreement with the Muslims, support it? Will it be facilitated? How long would it take to get there? Would that increase Serb aggression in the short run while we're waiting for the arms to be delivered? There are a lot of practical problems with it.

Do I favor lifting it? I do. Do I believe the allies with whom we are working now would vote to support it? I don't. Will there be continuing discussions about it? Yes, there will. I will say this: I think the more the Serbs turn away from this opportunity for peace, the more the allies are likely to be willing to vote to raise the arms embargo. But I don't think they're there right now.

Q President Clinton, it seems as though, frequently, you have characterized this as a civil war; yet the Serbs seem to be the main aggressors here. How would you define the Serbs for the American people? Are the Serbs villains in this peace?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I think it is a civil war in the sense that people who live within the confines of a nation we have recognized are fighting each other for territory and power and control. So, in that sense, it is clearly a civil war.

I have always felt that the Serbs were the primary aggressors, even though at various times there have been three different factions fighting, and at various times in various specific instances, you could make an argument that the Serbs were not always the initiators of a particular aggression.

The Serbs have gotten a lot of what they wanted, which was more territory to create a greater Serbia in areas where Serbs were ethnically either exclusively occupying the territory or dominant. And so I've always felt that they were the primary problem there. But in the end, there's going to have to be an agreement. Not very long ago, I would remind you, the parties didn't seem too
far apart on an agreed-upon territorial division; and then this fighting resumed -- I think, with quite unfortunate consequences.

Q Are you reluctant to condemn the Serbs' behavior?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I've been condemning their behavior for two years now. And let me just say this: I think -- you asked me in general terms -- in general terms do I consider them to be the primary aggressor? The answer to that is yes.

More specifically, and far more importantly, were they wrong in Gorazde? Yes; terribly wrong. What is their defense? That the Muslims shot at them. Did they overreact to that, even if it's true? Unbelievably. Does that justify shelling a hospital; shelling the U.N. headquarters; taking United Nations hostages when we have never been involved in the war against them, when all we did was to do what we said we would do all along, which is if they threatened our people, we would use air power? They are the complete aggressors and wrong-doers in the case of Gorazde.

Q -- suggesting there is some reluctance to support air strikes in the House?

Q Is it too late for Gorazde?

THE PRESIDENT: Is it too late for Gorazde? No, it's too late for -- a lot of people have been killed there. But if the Serbs would do what the Russians demanded, as well as what we demand -- if they would get out, withdraw, let the United Nations come back in -- and then we could resume the aggressive humanitarian relief effort that we have offered to help in, it would not be too late for Gorazde in the sense that it could be restored as a genuine safe area and the town could be safe.

Q Nothing that you are proposing today is intended to deal specifically with Gorazde, is it? And just a second thing is, have you thought through what you would propose to do if your attempt to recreate the Sarajevo model elsewhere does not deter the Serbs and they keep coming, much as they did at Gorazde?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer your first question first. Our proposal would create Sarajevo-like conditions -- that is, sort of safe zones around all the safe areas, including Gorazde. So we would assume that as a part of this, if our allies will agree with us, that any heavy weaponry, any heavy firing in and around that area would be subject to the same action as Srebrenica or any other safe zone.

So, that's that. The second question is, have I thought about what would happen if this doesn't work. I have. But I think we should stick with this policy and if the Serbs continue their aggression in an irresponsible way, then there are other things that can be done. I have given a lot of thought to it, but I don't want to talk about it now. I want to talk about this policy.

Q Mr. President, you've head a lot of other things on your mind besides this war. Would you please do something about Admiral Kelso? Can you veto that bill that gives him pay for four stars when all he needs is pay for two and that is in the traditions of the past. The military men only got their own regular pay. They didn't have to go to Congress and get paid for two more stars. That's spending government money that we can't afford now.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that's not what happened.

Q If he didn't know what was going on in Tailhook, then he should have known because he's head of Naval operations.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the -- I agree with the decision made by the Pentagon and ratified by the Senate. So I can't agree to do it because I agree with it.

Q Why do you agree with it because -- why do you agree with spending more money on this man's salary?

THE PRESIDENT: Because I believe -- because I disagree with you. I believe the evidence does not condemn the conduct or knowledge of Admiral Kelso sufficient to justify the two stars away from him.

Q Mr. President, can I just follow up on this Sarajevo model? How long will it take, in your opinion, in your military advisers' opinions to, A, expand this model to protect the five other safe areas, especially because you say you need another U.N. Security Council resolution? So it seems that that process could take a long time.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, no, no. We believe that the United Nations has the authority under Resolution 836 to do this -- or that you could have a presidential statement from the head of the Security Council. There are lots of ways to do it.

Q But in terms of expanding the U.N. personnel who are required --

THE PRESIDENT: We believe that what's been lacking there is just an agreement on how many more people, where they'll come from, and how the money will be provided. But General Rose has wanted 10,000 more. There was agreement among those of us who contribute, but do not provide troops, but who provide money, for something like 3,700 more recently. And my announcement today should be read as our willingness to play a major role in contributing to a larger peacekeeping force.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, are you going to put U.S. troops in?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

END 5:10 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I'd like to begin by saying that I want to join all the American people as Hillary and I pray for the health and the recovery of President Nixon. I want to again say how much I have appreciated the wise counsel he has given me on the question of Russia and many other issues since I have been President.

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Ultimately, this conflict still must be settled by the parties themselves. They must choose peace. The agreement between the Croatians and the Muslims was a very important first step, but there is so much more to be done. By taking firm action consistent with our interests, the United States and our NATO allies can, and must, attempt to influence that choice.

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Option number two was the Sarajevo option. That is, a safe zone was created around Sarajevo, and all heavy weapons either had to be withdrawn from the safe zone or turned over to United Nations personnel. Then any heavy weapons shelling within the Sarajevo safe zone by anybody could trigger NATO air strikes. There were no NATO air strikes under that, but it clearly worked, and it was clearly more enforceable.

Option number three, is what you saw at Gorazde. Option number three gives the United Nations commander the authority to ask for United Nations civilian approval to ask for NATO air support to support the U.N. forces on the ground when they're under duress.

Now, consider what the difference is between that and the Sarajevo option, and all the conflicts that came along. First of all, you have to go through the approval process, which came quickly the first time when the U.N. -- the NATO planes went in, the United States' planes, and took the first action. But then you have to keep coming back for that approval. And you're always subject to an argument about who started what fight and what the facts were. And then what happened to us in Gorazde was, if an assault results in having the NATO forces close at hand with the aggressing forces, or if NATO forces are captured, then any use of air power may lead to the killing of the very people we're there trying to protect.

Whereas under the Sarajevo model, you can just say, okay, here's the safe zone; all the heavy weaponry has to be withdrawn or put under U.N. control; and if there's any violation by anybody, there can be air action. It is a much clearer thing. That is a point I made very strongly to President Yeltsin. I think he was quite sympathetic with it.

His only point was the same point that everyone makes which is that in the end, the use of air power by NATO cannot bring this war to an end. Only a negotiated settlement can do that. I think that, generally, you will see the United States and Russia working together, and I've been impressed by how aggressive the Russians have been with regard to the Serbs in this.

Q Mr. President, do you think that now the Serbs should be prepared for strategic air strikes, as well as tactical;
that you would need to go after their supply lines or their ammo dumps? And secondly, are you also pressing the allies to try to lift the arms embargo, as many in Congress are demanding?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the first question first by simply saying that I do not think it is appropriate for me to discuss the tactical details of our policy -- not ever, probably, but certainly not until they have been worked out with our allies. We have to do that through NATO.

Secondly, as you know, I have always favored lifting the arms embargo. And I am glad that there is so much support for it in the Congress now from -- much of it coming from people who've not said it before. And I think that's encouraging. But many of them are saying that somehow we should not be in a cooperative effort with the United Nations and NATO, but instead should just, on our own, lift the arms embargo, make sure the arms get there, and then, with no danger to ourselves, we can permit these people to fight against their own abuses. That has a great deal of appeal. There are certain practical problems with it.

First, I would say, that if we ignore a United Nations embargo because we think it has no moral basis or even any legal validity, but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations allies from ignoring embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against Saddam Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in the United Nations, you must follow other embargoes? That's a serious question for me because there are a lot of things that we want to do through the United Nations.

Secondly, what are the practical problems with raising the arms embargo? Do the Croats, who now have this agreement with the Muslims, support it? Will it be facilitated? How long would it take to get there? Would that increase Serb aggression in the short run while we're waiting for the arms to be delivered? There are a lot of practical problems with it.

Do I favor lifting it? I do. Do I believe the allies with whom we are working now would vote to support it? I don't. Will there be continuing discussions about it? Yes, there will. I will say this: I think the more the Serbs turn away from this opportunity for peace, the more the allies are likely to be willing to vote to raise the arms embargo. But I don't think they're there right now.

Q President Clinton, it seems as though, frequently, you have characterized this as a civil war; yet the Serbs seem to be the main aggressors here. How would you define the Serbs for the American people? Are the Serbs villains in this peace?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I think it is a civil war in the sense that people who live within the confines of a nation we have recognized are fighting each other for territory and power and control. So, in that sense, it is clearly a civil war.

I have always felt that the Serbs were the primary aggressors, even though at various times there have been three different factions fighting, and at various times in various specific instances, you could make an argument that the Serbs were not always the initiators of a particular aggression.

The Serbs have gotten a lot of what they wanted, which was more territory to create a greater Serbia in areas where Serbs were ethnically either exclusively occupying the territory or dominant. And so I've always felt that they were the primary problem there. But in the end, there's going to have to be an agreement. Not very long ago, I would remind you, the parties didn't seem too
far apart on an agreed-upon territorial division; and then this fighting resumed -- I think, with quite unfortunate consequences.

Q Are you reluctant to condemn the Serbs' behavior?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I've been condemning their behavior for two years now. And let me just say this: I think -- you asked me in general terms -- in general terms do I consider them to be the primary aggressor? The answer to that is yes.

More specifically, and far more importantly, were they wrong in Gorazde? Yes; terribly wrong. What is their defense? That the Muslims shot at them. Did they overreact to that, even if it's true? Unbelievably. Does that justify shelling a hospital; shelling the U.N. headquarters; taking United Nations hostages when we have never been involved in the war against them, when all we did was to do what we said we would do all along, which is if they threatened our people, we would use air power? They are the complete aggressors and wrong-doers in the case of Gorazde.

Q -- suggesting there is some reluctance to support air strikes in the House?

Q Is it too late for Gorazde?

THE PRESIDENT: Is it too late for Gorazde? No, it's too late for -- a lot of people have been killed there. But if the Serbs would do what the Russians demanded, as well as what we demand -- if they would get out, withdraw, let the United Nations come back in -- and then we could resume the aggressive humanitarian relief effort that we have offered to help in, it would not be too late for Gorazde in the sense that it could be restored as a genuine safe area and the town could be safe.

Q Nothing that you are proposing today is intended to deal specifically with Gorazde, is it? And just a second thing is, have you thought through what you would propose to do if your attempt to recreate the Sarajevo model elsewhere does not deter the Serbs and they keep coming, much as they did at Gorazde?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer your first question first. Our proposal would create Sarajevo-like conditions -- that is, sort of safe zones around all the safe areas, including Gorazde. So we would assume that as a part of this, if our allies will agree with us, that any heavy weaponry, any heavy firing in and around that area would be subject to the same action as Srebrenica or any other safe zone.

So, that's that. The second question is, have I thought about what would happen if this doesn't work. I have. But I think we should stick with this policy and if the Serbs continue their aggression in an irresponsible way, then there are other things that can be done. I have given a lot of thought to it, but I don't want to talk about it now. I want to talk about this policy.

Q Mr. President, you've head a lot of other things on your mind besides this war. Would you please do something about Admiral Kelso? Can you veto that bill that gives him pay for four stars when all he needs is pay for two and that is in the traditions of the past. The military men only got their own regular pay. They didn't have to go to Congress and get paid for two more stars. That's spending government money that we can't afford now.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that's not what happened.

Q If he didn't know what was going on in Tailhook, then he should have known because he's head of Naval operations.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the -- I agree with the decision made by the Pentagon and ratified by the Senate. So I can't agree to do it because I agree with it.

Q Why do you agree with it because -- why do you agree with spending more money on this man's salary?

THE PRESIDENT: Because I believe -- because I disagree with you. I believe the evidence does not condemn the conduct or knowledge of Admiral Kelso sufficient to justify the two stars away from him.

Q Mr. President, can I just follow up on this Sarajevo model? How long will it take, in your opinion, in your military advisers' opinions to, A, expand this model to protect the five other safe areas, especially because you say you need another U.N. Security Council resolution? So it seems that that process could take a long time.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, no, no. We believe that the United Nations has the authority under Resolution 836 to do this -- or that you could have a presidential statement from the head of the Security Council. There are lots of ways to do it.

Q But in terms of expanding the U.N. personnel who are required --

THE PRESIDENT: We believe that what's been lacking there is just an agreement on how many more people, where they'll come from, and how the money will be provided. But General Rose has wanted 10,000 more. There was agreement among those of us who contribute, but do not provide troops, but who provide money, for something like 3,700 more recently. And my announcement today should be read as our willingness to play a major role in contributing to a larger peacekeeping force.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, are you going to put U.S. troops in?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

END 5:10 P.M. EDT
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<th>DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>001a. memo</td>
<td>Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Telephone Calls (1 page)</td>
<td>04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>001b. talking points</td>
<td>Points to be Made in Telephone Call with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain (2 pages)</td>
<td>ca. 04/20/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1), P5</td>
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THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. This morning I met for an hour and a half with our national security team to discuss what our options were to regain the momentum in Bosnia for a peaceful settlement. Several options were presented to me, and we discussed some others. When we adjourned the meeting, I asked the team to refine three points and to work on some of the options, and to come back and meet with me again at 3:30 p.m. this afternoon. So we will meet again.

In the meanwhile, as I'm sure you know, President Yeltsin has issued a statement, which I very much appreciate and which I think is very helpful, calling on the Serbs to honor their commitments to the Russians to withdraw from Gorazde, to allow U.N. personnel back in Gorazde, and to resume the negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.

We are working closely on this. And I believe that we have a chance to build on what has been done in the last several weeks in and around Sarajevo, and with the agreement between the Croatians and the Bosnian Muslims. And we will just keep working on it.

As I said, I meet again at 3:30 p.m., and I'm hopeful that we'll be able to make some constructive moves over the next couple of days.

Q Mr. President, Mr. Yeltsin is also asking for a summit of all of the major powers to try to find some sort of solution. How do you feel about that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he and I have discussed that on the telephone at least once, maybe twice, and I think it has some merit. We both agreed the last time we talked, before this development in Gorazde, that we were making progress doing what each of us was doing, and that it might be a little premature; and that that sort of thing, in effect, can only be done once and it might be better to save it for a time when, hopefully, the negotiations between the Serbs on the one hand and the Croatians and the Muslims on the other were coming down to an end point.

I presume from his statement today that he's sufficiently concerned about what's happened in the last couple of days that he thinks maybe we ought to go ahead and do it now. I think it deserves serious consideration, and I want to discuss it with him and with the other nations that would be involved. But I think in the context of the statement President Yeltsin made today, it has to be considered seriously because it was a very important, positive statement that he made.
Q What about Boutros-Ghali's proposal to expand air strikes to the other five safe areas in Bosnia? Would the U.S. and NATO be willing to go along with that?

THE PRESIDENT: That's what we're discussing today. And we're discussing exactly how that would be done and, of course, whether the other NATO allies would be willing to do it, and what the ups and downs of it would be and what else we could do to get this thing going. But again, I want to have my meeting at 3:30 p.m. You should know we're discussing all these options, but I reserve the right to announce a clear policy on where we go on the specifics until after the next meeting, because I did have some questions after our meeting this morning that the security team will answer for me later today.

Q Do you think you convinced the young man to vote for you again in '96?

Q How concerned you are about empty threats --

THE PRESIDENT: I think that there must not be any. When NATO reaffirmed -- when we had the NATO meeting in January, the one thing I implored our allies to do was not to reaffirm our position unless we were willing to see it through. I still feel that way. The possibility of misunderstanding in this area is so great anyway, because of the shared responsibility and the contingent responsibility of NATO -- contingent on what the U.N. does -- and the difficulty in getting all the parties together, that we simply must not be on record in favor of any policy we are not prepared to follow through on.

Thank you.
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

April 19, 1994

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

On January 8, 1994, I provided my second report to you on the deployment of a U.S. Army peacekeeping contingent as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I am now providing this further report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, to inform you about my decision to augment our contingent in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts in the region.

Since its arrival in July 1993, our combat-equipped U.S. Army contingent of approximately 315 Americans has been an important part of UNPROFOR Macedonia. Along with a Nordic battalion consisting of troops from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, the U.S. Armed Forces have assisted in the U.N. Security Council-authorized mission of monitoring and reporting developments along the northern border that could signify a threat to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The U.S. contribution has played an important role in the UNPROFOR Macedonia effort to prevent the conflict in the former Yugoslavia from spreading while contributing to stability in the region.

In order to support the United Nations as it sought additional forces to serve with UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States offered to increase the U.S. contribution to UNPROFOR Macedonia by approximately 200 personnel. The United Nations expressed its appreciation for continued U.S. cooperation and support and requested that the additional U.S. personnel be deployed to UNPROFOR Macedonia. We believe that the decision to deploy additional U.S. personnel to replace elements of the UNPROFOR Macedonia Nordic battalion has contributed to the decisions by member governments to deploy additional military personnel to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a result of these decisions, the U.S. European Command is deploying a reinforced company of approximately 200 personnel to augment the U.S. Army contingent in UNPROFOR Macedonia. The additional U.S. Armed Forces are from Company D, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, V Corps, Vilseck, Germany. This unit is joining the U.S. reinforced company that was deployed earlier. The unit is equipped to assume sector responsibilities for departing Nordic troops as part of the ongoing U.N. monitoring and observer mission.

more

(OVER)
United States forces assigned to UNPROFOR Macedonia have encountered no hostilities, and there have been no U.S. casualties since the operation began. The mission has the support of the government and the local population. Our forces will remain fully prepared not only to fulfill their peacekeeping mission, but to defend themselves if necessary.

This additional U.S. contribution to UNPROFOR Macedonia is consistent with our commitment to multilateral efforts to address threats to international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. I have ordered the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces for these purposes pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.

I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts in the former Yugoslavia, and I look forward to continued cooperation with you in these matters.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

# # #
April 19, 1994

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

On January 8, 1994, I provided my second report to you on the deployment of a U.S. Army peacekeeping contingent as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I am now providing this further report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, to inform you about my decision to augment our contingent in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts in the region.

Since its arrival in July 1993, our combat-equipped U.S. Army contingent of approximately 315 Americans has been an important part of UNPROFOR Macedonia. Along with a Nordic battalion consisting of troops from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, the U.S. Armed Forces have assisted in the U.N. Security Council-authorized mission of monitoring and reporting developments along the northern border that could signify a threat to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The U.S. contribution has played an important role in the UNPROFOR Macedonia effort to prevent the conflict in the former Yugoslavia from spreading while contributing to stability in the region.

In order to support the United Nations as it sought additional forces to serve with UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States offered to increase the U.S. contribution to UNPROFOR Macedonia by approximately 200 personnel. The United Nations expressed its appreciation for continued U.S. cooperation and support and requested that the additional U.S. personnel be deployed to UNPROFOR Macedonia. We believe that the decision to deploy additional U.S. personnel to replace elements of the UNPROFOR Macedonia Nordic battalion has contributed to the decisions by member governments to deploy additional military personnel to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a result of these decisions, the U.S. European Command is deploying a reinforced company of approximately 200 personnel to augment the U.S. Army contingent in UNPROFOR Macedonia. The additional U.S. Armed Forces are from Company D, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, V Corps, Vilseck, Germany. This unit is joining the U.S. reinforced company that was deployed earlier. The unit is equipped to assume sector responsibilities for departing Nordic troops as part of the ongoing U.N. monitoring and observer mission.

more

(OVER)
United States forces assigned to UNPROFOR Macedonia have encountered no hostilities, and there have been no U.S. casualties since the operation began. The mission has the support of the government and the local population. Our forces will remain fully prepared not only to fulfill their peacekeeping mission, but to defend themselves if necessary.

This additional U.S. contribution to UNPROFOR Macedonia is consistent with our commitment to multilateral efforts to address threats to international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. I have ordered the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces for these purposes pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.

I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts in the former Yugoslavia, and I look forward to continued cooperation with you in these matters.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
UPON ARRIVAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE
The Rose Garden

1:45 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. This morning I met for an hour and a half with our national security team to discuss what our options were to regain the momentum in Bosnia for a peaceful settlement. Several options were presented to me, and we discussed some others. When we adjourned the meeting, I asked the team to refine three points and to work on some of the options, and to come back and meet with me again at 3:30 p.m. this afternoon. So we will meet again.

In the meanwhile, as I'm sure you know, President Yeltsin has issued a statement, which I very much appreciate and which I think is very helpful, calling on the Serbs to honor their commitments to the Russians to withdraw from Gorazde, to allow U.N. personnel back in Gorazde, and to resume the negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.

We are working closely on this. And I believe that we have a chance to build on what has been done in the last several weeks in and around Sarajevo, and with the agreement between the Croatians and the Bosnian Muslims. And we will just keep working on it.

As I said, I meet again at 3:30 p.m., and I'm hopeful that we'll be able to make some constructive moves over the next couple of days.

Q Mr. President, Mr. Yeltsin is also asking for a summit of all of the major powers to try to find some sort of solution. How do you feel about that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he and I have discussed that on the telephone at least once, maybe twice, and I think it has some merit. We both agreed the last time we talked, before this development in Gorazde, that we were making progress doing what each of us was doing, and that it might be a little premature; and that that sort of thing, in effect, can only be done once and it might be better to save it for a time when, hopefully, the negotiations between the Serbs on the one hand and the Croatians and the Muslims on the other were coming down to an end point.

I presume from his statement today that he's sufficiently concerned about what's happened in the last couple of days that he thinks maybe we ought to go ahead and do it now. I think it deserves serious consideration, and I want to discuss it with him and with the other nations that would be involved. But I think in the context of the statement President Yeltsin made today, it has to be considered seriously because it was a very important, positive statement that he made.
Q What about Boutros-Ghali's proposal to expand air strikes to the other five safe areas in Bosnia? Would the U.S. and NATO be willing to go along with that?

THE PRESIDENT: That's what we're discussing today. And we're discussing exactly how that would be done and, of course, whether the other NATO allies would be willing to do it, and what the ups and downs of it would be and what else we could do to get this thing going. But again, I want to have my meeting at 3:30 p.m. You should know we're discussing all these options, but I reserve the right to announce a clear policy on where we go on the specifics until after the next meeting, because I did have some questions after our meeting this morning that the security team will answer for me later today.

Q Do you think you convinced the young man to vote for you again in '96?

Q How concerned you are about empty threats --

THE PRESIDENT: I think that there must not be any. When NATO reaffirmed -- when we had the NATO meeting in January, the one thing I implored our allies to do was not to reaffirm our position unless we were willing to see it through. I still feel that way. The possibility of misunderstanding in this area is so great anyway, because of the shared responsibility and the contingent responsibility of NATO -- contingent on what the U.N. does -- and the difficulty in getting all the parties together, that we simply must not be on record in favor of any policy we are not prepared to follow through on.

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For Immediate Release April 19, 1994

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Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be very quick, and I'll do it in a kind of shorthand and just ask the questions I can be most helpful on. And I'll either answer them or evade them.

The President met again this afternoon for about an hour and a half. His advisors came back to him with refined options after the meeting this morning. We have developed initiatives that we will be taking to the North Atlantic Council probably within the next few days. We will also be consulting either this evening or tomorrow morning with our allies in Europe, with Moscow, and in New York at the United Nations.

The initiatives will be both diplomatic and military. One of the initiatives that we will be discussing with others, although this is not an issue for the NAC, will be how we can tighten the sanctions in the wake of the events at Gorazde. Again, I emphasize that this is not the only thing we're doing, it is one of the things we will be doing. And we will also be continuing to consult with the Congress this evening and tomorrow.

Questions.

Q What's the military initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As before, we prefer to take it to the allies before taking it to you.

Q Is it fair to say -- the President today indicated that there was some variation of a plan that was proposed by the Boutros Boutros-Ghali yesterday. Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would certainly address the issues that Boutros-Ghali raised, yes.

Q Did he decide on air strikes? Did he make any formal decisions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will be making initiatives to the NAC that would be responsive to Boutros-Ghali's -- but I cannot say --

Q Did they go beyond --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't get into the details.

Q Is it fair to say that you're not rejecting the
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're not rejecting the concept.

Q Right now the Serbs are shelling Gorazde. They're moving elsewhere, and what you've said is -- I would read, if I were them, as encouragement to go a little further. Is there anything you can tell us that would discourage the Serbs now from continuing to shell Gorazde and moving elsewhere in Bosnia to take territory?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't imagine why, if you were a Serb, you would find encouragement in what I just said.

Q Because you said before that you were going to tighten sanctions, and they're really afraid of that -- and that you would consult with allies.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said in the next sentence that is not the only thing we are doing --

Q Well, tell us please, or tell them please -- if you won't tell us, then tell them through us what it is that they might fear if they go further in their attacks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, we will be going to the North Atlantic Council with new initiatives that will involve both military and diplomatic issues. I don't know how words could be plainer than that.

It is very important here that we combine both the military and power relationships on the ground with the diplomatic. The use of power without diplomatic ends is purposeless, and the use of diplomacy without power will fail.

Q Are there new diplomatic initiatives in this package?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you say something to me?

Q Did you want to put that on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q What is "sure"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you want to put on the record --

Q What did you say sure to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm saying sure to -- I'm sorry. It was suggested that I --

Q Are there new diplomatic initiatives in this package, things we did not get see? Or is it an expansion of existing -- such as the Muslim and Croat agreement and other things that you've done?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the diplomatic goals remain the same. But we will be suggesting diplomatic ways of proceeding now to try to get the negotiations back on track.

Q Will the President attend a summit with Boris Yeltsin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He'll address that issue this afternoon --

MORE
Q Have you made a decision?

Q What is your goal? What is the ultimate goal -- just to simply stop the fighting, roll back any Serb gains?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ultimate goal here is to achieve a settlement of the Bosnian conflicts through negotiation among the parties. And it is our view that you cannot do that without addressing the military issues on the ground. And again, the key here is to harness power and diplomacy.

Q On what terms would you settle? Status quo or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As we have said many times, the settlement has to be achieved by the parties. We are not going to dictate to the Bosnian government or anybody else what that would be. What we could is, through NATO, to help create the conditions under which the parties can achieve such a settlement. In the end, the end of the war will only come through a negotiated agreement. But our judgment is there will not be a negotiated agreement unless we have addressed the military situation.

Q Is there some sort of drawing of the line in your proposal -- some people would call it an ultimatum to the Serbs that they have to stop doing certain things without being specific about it?

Q Is lifting the arms embargo included in what --

Q -- address any aspect of how tough this proposal is on the Serbs when they get a chance to see it? Can you address how they ought to view it? I mean, obviously seriously, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Seriously.

Q Just to follow onto what Jack just asked, today Boris Yeltsin came out with a very strong demand that the Serbs pull back outside Gorazde and relinquish the territory that they've gained in the last week or so. Is that addressed in your proposal? Is that one of the things that you talk about in what you're taking to the Council?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We need to look at not only what happens in Gorazde, but what happens beyond Gorazde as well. And our initiatives will be addressing the larger issues. We very much welcomed what Yeltsin said. Let me add that what is important here is not what the Bosnian Serbs, or anybody else says, but what they do. And we would hope after the events of the last weekend that our allies, and apparently the Russians and others, have reached the same conclusion -- that is acts, not words, that matter now.

Q Are you feeling the allies will go along, especially the French and Brits with troops on the ground? I was thinking of the NATO initiative --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Last August and at the NATO Summit and before the Sarajevo ultimatum, we worked things through very well with our allies, and we would expect that we can work them through here with similar success.

Q Is your reluctance to spell out right now the military initiatives tied to the fact that you first want to get the allies on board, so that you don't float something that they shoot down in the next 12 hours, which has happened before in regard to Bosnia? Is that why you're being cagey?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe that we owe it to them to present the initiatives to them before we present initiatives through the press. That is simply the best way for allies to deal with each other.

Q What about an international conference?

Q Did you talk about the hostages and the implications of air strikes on those U.N. hostages?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q The implications of air strikes on the U.N. hostages -- how can you deal with that dilemma?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This has been, obviously, a factor for the United Nations, and we will be discussing with them in Bosnia how best we can deal with the situation of UNPROFOR personnel whose freedom has been --

Q What about an international conference? Both Boris Yeltsin, who has now seems to have come around to a stronger position on the Serbs and proposed this conference, as well as the French who have the largest number of peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia, are pressing very, very hard for the idea of an international conference quickly. Over the weekend we were told by senior administration officials and again yesterday that it was premature. President Clinton seemed to suggest that he was moving more in that direction. How do we read what the President said today? Are we now on board for an international conference and one in the next few days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our view is that we -- as the President said, this has some potential, but that you need to have prepared it very carefully; and that the conference, a conference at whatever level, can be best assured of success if you have -- if you're already in the process of addressing the military issues on the ground.

Q Are any new U.N. resolutions required for any part of this --

Q Could he finish the question.

Q Are you finished --

Q Well, can I follow up, then, with my question? So are you saying, you go to the NAC, you discuss the military and diplomatic, and then in a very short turn you would then be ready to go to an international conference; or do you feel there have to be other diplomatic initiatives taken before the ground is laid for an international conference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have to talk that through with our allies.

Q -- want to know whether that's going to be on the agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q Whether the international conference is going to be on the agenda when you go to Europe or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is on the agenda, as the President said this afternoon, in our consultations with the others.
Q I just wonder whether it's serious, whether it really is getting serious consideration or whether --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, again, I'm not specifying the level at which it would take place, but it is getting serious consideration. But there needs to be --

Q The NAC meets tomorrow. They meet every Wednesday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not necessarily the NAC meeting that --

Q Could you say that -- we can't hear that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That will not tomorrow's NAC meeting is not necessarily the NAC meeting that will address this. As I said, we will --

Q Tomorrow is the ambassadors meeting, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And we'll see, as I said, within the next few days, I think we would see this NAC meeting. But we have to consult with them --

Q Will Christopher go the NAC to make the presentation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not decided.

Q At what level --

Q Could it be Bob Hunter or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you recall, the last couple of times around, which were very successful, it was done through ambassadors. So we'll just have to see what is the most useful forum -- the level of American representation at the NAC meeting should not -- I repeat not -- be seen as a signal of our seriousness in bringing forward these proposals. And let me again emphasize that in August and at the NATO Summit and before Sarajevo, we had very successful meetings at different levels.

Q Is any additional U.N. activity required?

Q The most successful summit was when the President was there in Brussels.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was very successful in getting the Sarajevo ultimatum.

Q What is the policy in this interim period between the time you present these proposals and the time they're presumably adopted by the NAC? What is the policy in the next three or four days regarding intervening in Gorazde and protecting safe havens elsewhere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our policy is what is has been, which is that NATO and we are prepared to do everything that we are asked to do. And we have taken every opportunity, both privately and publicly to make that clear to the U.N. authorities.

Q Does the Security Council need to take any further action in order to implement the proposals that you're putting before the NAC?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It may turn out to be desirable. It is not, in our view, legally required.
Q Will the President make an announcement of this policy in some way, and if so, in what format?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no doubt that the President will be speaking on this issue in the coming days.

Q To the nation?

Q Is he going make a speech on TV? Do we need to alert the network? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not tonight or tomorrow morning.

Q What's the appraisal here -- the assessment here of the threat to the civilians, in Gorazde especially? And in these two meetings now, has there been any discussion of what the public sentiment -- I mean, asked discourteously would be is the administration factoring in whether this will play in Peoria? Or it going to do what it thinks is ethically and diplomatically and militarily the wise thing to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What matters both in Bosnia and here is how well we can succeed and we, NATO, can succeed in addressing the substance of the problems. That's what matters and that's what we've been discussing today.

On the situation in Gorazde, yes, there is a serious humanitarian problem there; yes, we discussed that both this morning and this afternoon. Ambassador Albright is talking to the people at the U.N. to find out what their plans are to address this, and how we can be most helpful.

Q Do we think the peacekeepers should stay at least for the short run in Bosnia? I mean, the poor French couldn't do everything --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The UNPROFOR troops?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, so they have been performing a valuable function.

Q Well, I mean, you know, they're helpless when the Serbs come and storm an arsenal. Someone at State said they would have been slaughtered if they had put up any defense. They have to give way. Is there a point to keeping them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was a case two days ago in which a British unit was attacked and responded and took out a number of bunkers, so it's a mixed --

Q I wanted to follow up on this issue of the Serbs' behavior in Sarajevo, and what is your thinking about that? What's your understanding of the situation? Do you think that truce is breaking down? What are you going to do about the Serbs -- in flagrant violation seizing back some of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We discussed that also both this morning and this afternoon. General Shalikashvili has been in touch with our own people and NATO commanders at various levels. I don't think I can tell you exactly what it is that we discussed, but this was a violation and needs to be addressed.

Q What can you tell us about the tone of this mix of diplomatic and military action or proposal that you're going to make which will keep the Serbs from thinking that it is another allied --
something the President addressed earlier today. What are you going
to do to keep them from perceiving it that way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you have two
recent events. One is Sarajevo, which they obviously took very
seriously and succeeded; and another is Gorazde in which the actions
that were possible both under the current rules of engagement and
because of the weather did not succeed. And so one can draw --

Q  Do you have a new ultimatum?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?
Q  Is there going to be a new ultimatum?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't get into --
Q  What are the serious military issues that you think
NATO needs to address?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I said,
certainly one of them is how to make sure that the Sarajevo exclusion
zone is observed. And a second is to be responsive to Boutros-
Ghali's --

Q  Do you have an agreement with the Russians to
consult with them before any action is taken?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two
situations here. When the President spoke to Yeltsin at the time of
the Sarajevo ultimatum, he said that he would do everything he could,
or words to that effect, to consult the before military action was
taken. When it comes to close air support at the request of
UNPROFOR, pursuant to Security Council resolutions that were passed
unanimously by the Security Council, those are very quick tactical
moves, and we cannot promise, although we try, to keep the Russians
informed, although the Russians have representatives at UNPROFOR so
that they know when these things --

MS. MYERS: I think this is a good place to wrap it up.
Q  -- that's all completely on background.
MS. MYERS: Except for you had -- there was one quote
that --
Q  Can you just -- briefings of Congress? What is the
President doing tonight? Is he calling on leaders --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's been on the phone.
Q  And is he calling Mitterrand, is he calling Major
today, tomorrow --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we'll in touch at
other levels. And there will be a lot of calls to congressional
leadership.

Q  What about the congressional leaders, staff level?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be calling them
--
Q  Is it fair to assume --
Q  Do you see any potential for immediate action in
the field?

MORE
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q Do you see any indication or potential for immediate action in the field?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That could happen at any moment in terms of close air support. And now, on anything else, we will go -- well, close air support, it could happen at any moment always, by definition. And, as I said repeatedly in this room some weeks ago, the Sarajevo ultimatum did not end that Sunday evening. That is an existing policy.

Q But as a result of this meeting today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, new initiatives, we go to the NAC.

Q Are you considering an Oval Office address or something sometime in the next few days, this week?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's see where we go.

Q Is it fair to assume that the President, in effect, gave -- to these -- in this military initiatives contingent on the allies going along?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have always said that we are not going to take unilateral military action, but it's not contingent on the allies going along. We have some initiatives --

Q That you're going to propose?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believes that we have gained the progress we have made in Sarajevo; we've been getting the Bosnian-Croat accord through American leadership; and that we must and will continue to exercise that leadership with our allies in the days and weeks to come.

Q Have the allies changed --

Q Well, when Chris went over there last year, he was basically told, go away -- the Europeans weren't interested.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me remind you that since then, there is the August 2nd and August 9th decisions. There is the reiteration of the Sarajevo decisions of August at the NATO Summit; and there was the Sarajevo ultimatum.

Q What I'm asking, though, is what's changed? Is your presentation going to be different? Are the ideas different? Or are the Europeans changing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have some new initiatives here. We think the situation in Gorazde has changed -- things on the ground and, we assume, in the way others look on this issue. Are you saying have we been -- are we now being somehow inconsistent in bringing new initiatives? No, we are not. We are building on the situation --

Q Well, do you think our NATO allies --

Q -- whether or not the President is leading and going to do things on his own, or whether this is going to be one of those situations where you go over there and the Europeans tell you no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Leading and gaining a new alliance consensus as previously --
Q Well, do you think our NATO allies, particularly France and Britain, would support an idea to expand the exclusion zones into the other state barriers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:53 P.M. EDT
STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

Special Envoy on Macedonia

The President has appointed Matthew Nimetz to serve as his Special Envoy to assist in the United Nations' efforts to resolve the differences between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Mr. Nimetz has served as Counselor to the Department of State and is a former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

Mr. Nimetz will begin to work immediately with both parties and will coordinate his efforts with Cyrus Vance, the United Nations' Special Envoy and with the European Union.

The United States recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on February 8. The establishment of diplomatic relations is pending. In the meantime, we hope that the efforts of Mr. Nimetz with those of the United Nations will help bring a rapid resolution to the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Newport News, Virginia)

For Immediate Release April 17, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT UPON DEPARTURE

Newport News Williamsburg International Airport
Newport News, Virginia

10:25 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, I've received a number of reports today on the situation in Bosnia. I've also been in touch today with President Yeltsin.

We don't have any definitive reports on the status of Gorazde, but I can tell you that there has been some progress in the negotiations between the United Nations and the Serbs. Mr. Akashi has been working on it, Ambassador Redman and Mr. Churkin, and they may have something to announce shortly.

I also -- I don't know that this has been made public or not, but the Serbs released 16 Canadian soldiers, and we're working on the release of the other UNPROFOR forces today. So the situation is still tense around Gorazde. There is still some degree of uncertainty there, but there has been, as of my latest report, which was just about 10 minutes ago, some progress in the negotiations between the U.N. and the Serbs on getting back to the negotiations and reducing the tensions.

Q What's the U.S. role been?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, essentially, we've been -- Ambassador Redman has been there. He's been working very hard, especially for the last seven hours, trying to hammer out an agreement that everybody could live with, along with the U.N. and Mr. Churkin.

Secondly, we've worked very closely with the Russians trying to think about what the end game might be, how we can work this out to a successful conclusion over the long run. And, of course, we're still a very important part of the NATO Alliance, and we're committed to doing whatever we're asked to do by General Rose. But keep in mind, except for the safe area around
Sarajevo, our role in NATO has been to provide close air support, or, if necessary, to protect the UNPROFOR troops, the U.N. troops, and where it's possible to do that.

So we have that role, but we also have this diplomatic role, and we're doing our best to fulfill it.

Q Have there been any violations of the new truce since the three-mile zone was agreed to?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to comment on anything definitively with regard to Gorazde, because we have been getting reports over the last four and five hours, kind of mixed reports. But on balance, the last report I got was encouraging in terms of an agreement impending between the U.N. and the Serbs.

Q Were the next reports, reports of tank incursions into that zone?

THE PRESIDENT: There's one, I think -- I think there was a news report that there was at least one tank was sighted. But I want to say that we have no reports at the moment that the status of Gorazde has changed.

Thank you.

Q Is military action still possible?

THE PRESIDENT: It depends on NATO. It depends on what the U.N. Commander on the ground, General Rose wants. But their conclusions were twofold. One is that with regard to Gorazde itself, it wouldn't necessarily be possible now for close air support to have the desired military effect. And, secondly, that they're trying to get a negotiated agreement here that can serve as the basis not only for relieving Gorazde, but for getting these peace talks back on track. So that's what we hope we're doing.

Q Are you considering actually easing the economic sanctions on the Serbs?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not based on anything that's happened so far. We have said to the Russians that if they want to discuss that with us, that of course we would be willing to discuss it if certain conditions on the ground were met. But continued Serb aggression on the ground, not only in Gorazde but everywhere else, is hardly an encouragement to discuss that. That's not even -- we can't even begin discussions in the environment which has existed for the last few days there.

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But this has not been a great weekend for the peace effort in Bosnia. I do think that the big things are still working in the long-term favor of peace. And we'll just have to see where we are, and we'll be reporting more as the day goes on and through the rest of the week.

Q Mr. President, you wanted to lift the arms embargo a year ago -- would you still like to do it? You would lead an effort to do that? It would take American leadership, many in Congress say, to do this.

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So we have to think long and hard about whether we can do this unilaterally. But certainly, as you know, I have always thought that the arms embargo operated in an entirely one-sided fashion: and it still does. That's the reason we're in this fix today because of the accumulated losses of the Bosnian government as a direct result of the overwhelming superiority of heavy artillery by the Serbs.

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And frankly, I think it is a little too easy to Monday morning quarterback General Rose who has been very aggressive, very strong, and very much supported in this country and throughout the world for his aggressive actions. It's easy to say now he should have been more aggressive in Gorazde. I think he did the best he could with the resources he had under the facts as they existed.

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But again, I would say we have been making good progress at the negotiating table. I don't want to have a wider war. I think even if you lifted the arms embargo and you had a lot of other people fighting and killing, in the end there would not be a decisive victory for either side in a war; there's going to have to be a negotiated settlement. And the real problem now is that the Serbs agreed to a cease-fire with both the U.N. and the Russians, and they didn't keep their end of the deal. We're going to have to see where we are today, and we'll have more to say.

Q Why do you say you're making progress, and couldn't you have moved a little faster? This has been coming on for a couple weeks.

THE PRESIDENT: I disagree with that. What do you mean? Keep in mind, the role of the United States and NATO is to respond when the United Nations asks for close-air support when its troops are in danger. This is not Sarajevo; Sarajevo was a special case. And the no-fly zone -- if planes violate the no-fly zone they can be shot down; that was done by NATO and the United States. This is a different case. We can only do what we have the authority to do.

And frankly, I think it is a little too easy to Monday morning quarterback General Rose who has been very aggressive, very strong, and very much supported in this country and throughout the world for his aggressive actions. It's easy to say now he should have been more aggressive in Gorazde. I think he did the best he could with the resources he had under the facts as they existed.

And so I don't know that General Rose had any other options. I just know that we have a disappointing and difficult situation there today, and we'll be working on it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 15, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Roosevelt Room

11:51 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. The people here from Louisiana and Texas are here primarily for health care, and I apologize for the delay. But I met for an hour and a half this morning with my national security team about a variety of issues, but I wanted to say in particular a word of update about the terrible tragedy in Iraq yesterday.

After I met yesterday with my national security advisors, I spoke with Prime Minister Major and with President Mitterrand, expressed my condolences for the losses of French and British citizens, and assured them of what I can now reassure you about, which is that we've put together an investigative team which is now on the site and is working. We will move as quickly as possible to do a thorough and complete investigation, and then to put out all the facts.

In a couple of hours, an hour or so, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be having a briefing at the Pentagon to discuss this further and to answer further questions. But we are going to stay on top of this, work through it and make a full report to the American people.

If there are any other questions -- perhaps we could take some questions on foreign policy or any other national issues for a while, and then we'll come back to the health care questioning.

Q Sir, in light of that shooting down, should the peacekeeping mission in Iraq continue?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think so. I very definitely think so. Keep in mind these people -- the tragedy of this is that both sets of planes, the two helicopters and the two planes were there trying to save the lives of the Kurds. And I think it has performed a very valuable function, not only in saving the lives of the Kurds, but in permitting them to continue to live in northern Iraq and relieving Turkey of a very serious potential refugee problem.

There is no question in my mind that it has been a very successful and a very important mission. The Secretary of Defense implied yesterday and said again today that we would obviously, in the course of this investigation, be reviewing all the tactical issues involved. But our policy is sound, and I believe it should continue.

Q In Bosnia, sir, there's another issue of peacekeeping. You have recent events by the Bosnian Serbs' actions that have been taken against U.N. peacekeepers and military observers. You yesterday made a statement you've been sending a message to them. But apparently, that message has not been getting across. Is there -- why is that, would you say? And is there a chance that there could be a stalemate emerging?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that some friction was predictable when the policy began. But let me remind you that since the United Nations has taken a more vigorous approach and asked NATO to be available, in fact, to provide close air support and created a safe zone around Sarajevo, substantial progress has been made. After a long time when virtually no progress was made, we've had relative peace in the Sarajevo area, we've had the agreement between the Croats and the Muslims which is holding.

We had some friction as a result of the last round of very modest air strikes as a result of the shelling of Gorazde which put United Nations personnel at risk. I think that what I have to do, again, is to clarify if there is any real doubt that the United States has no interest in having NATO become involved in this war and trying to gain some advantage for one side over the other.

But I think we must maintain an absolutely firm support of the U.N. policy. We can't have our U.N. personnel there vulnerable to shelling and to attack with no one there to defend them. The United Nations does not wish to become involved in changing the military balance.

Finally, I would say the most important thing is for the parties to get back to the negotiations. And I, again, want to say that Mr. Churkin from Russia is working hard on this. Our Ambassador, Mr. Redman, is there working. The United Nations is working. So I'd say our position is to be firm, but not provocative and not trying to change the military balance. We need to get the negotiations back on track.

But, remember, this policy has produced a lot of progress, after a prolonged period in which there was a lot of bloodshed and no progress. And I think if the Serbs will consider what the reality is, they will see that they have a lot more to gain from negotiations than from provocation. We should just be firm and work through this.

Q Mr. President, you say the investigation is continuing in Iraq. Do you have, however, any preliminary estimates of what caused this incident?

THE PRESIDENT: No, sir, I don't, really. Like every other interested American -- I think almost all our people are interested in this, I suppose -- I have asked a lot of questions and I've been able to ask a lot of those questions. But I think it would be a real disservice to the process for us to jump the gun. I don't want to mislead the American people. I don't want to say something that might later be proved wrong. We will conduct a thorough and vigorous investigation, and we will do our best to get all of the evidence out to you. But I don't want to make a preliminary judgment.

Q Mr. President, right now on your desk, you have the presidential directive dealing with peacekeeping. We understand that it's very close to completion, if not virtually completed. And it raises a lot of the things that have been happening this week -- are touching on the issue of peacekeeping. Our understanding is, there are going to be tougher criteria for getting involved in peacekeeping activities. Is that the case? And could that mean that there would be fewer peacekeeping ventures?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, keep in the mind, the United Nations decides which peacekeeping ventures it will get involved in. And then we have to decide which ones in which we will become involved.

There are several issues here. And if I might, let me just outline some of them. Some of them relate to the management of
the peacekeeping operations rather than particular decisions. The United States has long favored tighter financial controls and oversight. And we have urged the appointment of an inspector general at the United Nations publicly. We have also felt that our overall contribution to the peacekeeping cost was higher than it should have been and considerably higher than our world's share of annual income. So we have asked for some -- we will seek some change of that. We also want to be very clear about the standards for our involvement in peacekeeping operations.

Now, having said that, I met with a bipartisan committee of congressional leaders yesterday morning and urged them to support our peacekeeping budget this year because we have a sensible way of avoiding dropping behind again in our obligations dividing the responsibilities between the Defense and State Department. And I asked Congress to help me pay the arrears that we owe to the United Nations in peacekeeping. Even our own forces who went to Somalia can't be fully reimbursed in large measure because the United States owes more debt to the peacekeeping fund than any other country.

So I believe being involved with other nations in peacekeeping is a good way of burden sharing. After all, we only have -- I think fewer than one percent of the forces involved in peacekeeping in the world now are American forces. We have about five percent of the world's population; we have less than one percent of the world's forces involved in peacekeeping.

So while we pay a little more than I think we should, our commitment in terms of manpower is less than our population would appear to warrant and certainly than our military capacity would. So we have been advantaged by multinational peacekeeping, and I will support it. I do think we need to have higher standards, and that will be in my directive when it comes out.

Q Sir, when do you sign the --

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure. We're working -- we're very close. We've been working on it for a long time as you noted.

END 12:10 P.M. EDT
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

One year ago, I provided you with my initial report on the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped aircraft to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I provided you with follow-on reports on October 13, 1993, February 17, 1994, and March 1, 1994. I am reporting today on the use of U.S. combat-equipped aircraft on April 10-11 to provide protection for U.N. personnel who came under attack in Gorazde, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 on September 25, 1991, the United Nations has actively sought solutions to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Under Security Council Resolution 824 (May 6, 1993), certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been established as "safe areas." Gorazde is specifically included as a location that should be treated as a safe area "by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts." In addition, Security Council Resolutions 836 and 844 (June 4 and 18, 1993) authorize Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to use air power in the safe areas to help protect the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR).

Recent heavy weapons (tank and artillery) fire in the Gorazde area has resulted in a serious threat to the citizens remaining in Gorazde and to UNPROFOR and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) personnel operating there. On April 10, the city was subjected to sustained Bosnian-Serb tank and artillery fire. The UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel in Gorazde were placed in great danger. Based on the threat to UNPROFOR, as reported by U.N. observers in the city, the UNPROFOR commander requested the U.N. Special Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina to authorize close air support (CAS) strikes on the Bosnian-Serb firing positions. The U.N. Special Representative approved the request. Consistent with approved procedures and rules of engagement, two U.S. aircraft from NATO Allied Force Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) engaged Bosnian-Serb targets after receiving targeting orders from the Commander in Chief, AFSOUTH.

On April 11, 1994, U.N. personnel in Gorazde requested NATO air support after again coming under attack by Bosnian-Serb gunners. United States F/A-18 aircraft from AFSOUTH were successful in neutralizing Bosnian-Serb targets that had been firing on the city.
There were no NATO or U.N. casualties as a result of the operations on April 10 and 11, 1994.

It is my hope that the clear resolve of the United Nations and NATO as shown by these actions will encourage the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to respect the decisions of the Security Council concerning the protection of U.N. personnel and of the declared safe areas. United States forces will continue to serve as part of this important NATO enforcement effort and will remain prepared to respond to U.N. and NATO requests for further action against those who violate these decisions.

These actions are being taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina in conjunction with our allies to implement the decision of the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council and to assist the parties to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. It is not now possible to determine the duration of this operation. I have directed the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in this effort pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.

I am providing this report as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I remain grateful for the continuing support the Congress has provided and I look forward to continued cooperation with you in this endeavor. I shall communicate with you further regarding our efforts for peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 12, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN JOINT LEADERSHIP MEETING

The Cabinet Room

10:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the press. This is our first bipartisan leadership meeting on the resumption of the Congress and we have a lot of things to discuss today.

I want to begin with a discussion of the crime bill and the importance of proceeding deliberately and quickly to pass it; to reiterate my commitment yesterday that we will do whatever we can to get the first 20,000 police officers on the streets this year if the crime bill is passed in an expeditious fashion. Then we'll move onto some other issues where I hope we can have a good bipartisan discussion in support of domestic issues like the budget and health care; and also we'll talk a little about Bosnia today and some other foreign policy issues.

Q Mr. President, do you have some concern--there's more shelling today. I mean, there's some suspicion that the Muslims may be trying to provoke the Serbs. Have we started something with air strikes that will make matters worse rather than better?

THE PRESIDENT: We certainly haven't started anything. We have done exactly what we said we would do under the U.N. policy—that if the U.N. forces were put at risk, as they were in the shelling of Gorazde, we would offer close air support if the General asked, and the civilian authorities agreed. We went through all the procedural requirements, and we did exactly what I think we should have done.

Q Well, the Serbian--

Q What about--

THE PRESIDENT: We have talked—let me answer Andrea's question—we have cautioned the Bosnian government forces not to try to take advantage of this in violation of the understandings themselves. And General Rose has been very firm on that this morning.

Q Are you considering expanding this to other safe havens if the Serbs persist and don't get the message?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I wouldn't rule anything out. We're working very closely with General Rose, and he's got a very aggressive view of his role there, which I think is good--

Q The Serbian leader has threatened against the U.N. forces. They've kidnapped some, they're holding some in house arrest. They've escalated the military action.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, every time we have been firm, though, in the end it's been a winner for the peace process. And I think it will be here. And I'm very encouraged by the position taken
by the Russians, that they want the Serbs to withdraw from the safe area in Gorazde, and they want to return to the negotiating table.

Before this last incident, I thought we were getting pretty close to -- not just to a cease-fire, but to an absolute cessation of hostilities and a real serious bargaining position. So we could get back there in a hurry, and I wish the Russians well in working with the Serbs. I've assured President Yeltsin that we have no interest in using NATO's air power to affect the outcome of the war. But we do want to protect the U.N. mandate. And we do want a negotiation, and I think we're going to get one.

Q Have you seen or heard anything from the Serbs that would indicate a response to the air strike, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know how to answer that, Peter. The Russians -- Mr. Churkin is over there now, and we're working on trying to get this think back on track and I hope we can do it. But we have to be firm in our reaction to the plane violations of the United Nations resolutions and in what we set our policy to do.

The good thing that we've seen since the terrible incident in Sarajevo in the market is that both the U.N. and NATO have been able to follow what they said their policy would be all along, and that was -- and I think that's what we have to do. We have to be firm in pursuing the policy that we say we have. It's our only chance of success --

Q Will it be more difficult to -- your domestic agenda with George Mitchell nominated to the -- will it be harder, once he's nominated?

Q Do you have the name of a Supreme Court justice on your left?

THE PRESIDENT: You think the next Supreme Court justice should be to my left, Helen? (Laughter) --

Q I said is he.

Q Unless you're considering Mr. Foley.

THE PRESIDENT: He'd be a good one. (Laughter.)

Q Does that make you nervous? (Laughter.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, General Rose, requested this response by NATO, as he has, I think, on two occasions since February. On both those previous occasions, as you'll recall, by the time it had worked its way through to a decision, there were not targets. This time there were. The decision-making process moved more quickly and more smoothly than it has in the past.

The weather conditions are not very good around Gorazde, but the planes found a way to get in. We do not yet have a damage assessment. The French, as the President -- I think the French NATO aircraft was -- did a reconnaissance, and we don't yet have the analysis yet.

But the authority was, as we have said repeatedly in the past, we were prepared to do -- we, NATO -- close air support for UNPROFOR forces. There are U.N. military observers in Gorazde, and our information is that at least two of them had been wounded -- and clearly, when the Serb tanks -- Bosnian tanks were firing into Gorazde, U.N. personnel were at risk.

The authority in the U.N. resolution -- and I won't bore you with all the details -- is both specific and quite broad. In this case, referring both to the safety of U.N. personnel and to, in this case, the U.N. personnel were in a safe area, safe haven. But that's too much -- don't worry about that. In any case, it was under existing authorities and completely pursuant to the policy that we've been enunciating.

Q The reason was the wounding of two of these observers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The reason was the fact that U.N. military observers had been wounded is corroboration for the point that U.N. personnel are at risk in Gorazde when artillery pieces are being -- I mean, when the tanks were firing in.

Q That wasn't the reason for the decision, these two U.N. observers --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What changed so that the decision process moved much more quickly this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the U.N. decision-making process, not ours. Akashi -- I'm not saying it was
his fault before, but our information is that Akashi made a decision within minutes of having the decision presented to him. And the information moved smoothly through the U.N. system and back to NATO. And NATO, which is flying in any case overhead, was prepared to act promptly.

Q If these people were wounded recently, why wasn't that sufficient reason to launch the air strikes then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I presume because there wasn't a clear target.

Q Does that mean they just didn't --

Q So you had to have those two --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I don't think -- I think, in this case, they had -- they knew that the tanks were there. The forward air controller saw it and requested --

Q So the target was a tank? The target we hit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What was the target?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll find that out when we get the assessment.

Q So the reports that it was a tank and also a command post?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Tanks were firing in. We don't know what was hit, whether command post, tanks. We'll know that soon.

Q Well, not necessarily what was hit, but we don't even know what the target is, regardless of what they hit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm just being careful because -- we've talked about this before -- and your first reports are almost invariably a little off. There will be a briefing, we believe, by the NATO people at Aviano. And we hope sooner rather than later.

Q If the reports are a little off now, shouldn't we clear them up? What's a little off about our reports out there now? Shouldn't we get them right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you mean?

Q You said our reports --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In other words, in any case, always when there's a military action, one has to be careful about being too specific about exactly what happened until you get the pilots' reports and all. And we're still gathering it. So I just don't want to log myself into exactly what the pilots were picking up.

Q The U.N. observers that were wounded, how and where were they wounded? And do you know anything about the extent of their wounds?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I know is that there were two who were -- our reports are that two had been wounded in previous days. I don't have --
Q -- much more than that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q This was the first time we've conducted a strike to halt an offensive, correct? That's different.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the first time that we have carried out a strike pursuant to the close air support commitment of NATO. Though we've been prepared to do that before, in the previous cases, NATO aircraft were positioned to do it but couldn't acquire targets when they got the go-ahead.

Q This whole thing took something like 25 minutes from the time the request was made and the attack was made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it may -- I wouldn't say that. It may have been longer than that.

Q -- longer than that. How much longer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't know. Again, I don't want to say exactly.

Q Given Mr. Christopher's statements this morning on Meet The Press, did you have some early indication that this might happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we've had indications for days that U.N. personnel in Gorazde --

Q But imminent.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But that it was imminent, no.

Q So when he went on this morning, he did not know that this was going to happen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q When was the President informed --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that because I was watching the tape of his interview when I got the word that it was happening.

Q When was the President informed that that action was to be taken? Was he notified in advance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I had sent him a note this morning on the situation both in Rwanda and Bosnia, first thing. And then Shali called me around 10:30 a.m., I guess, or something like that -- again, don't hold me to it, but in mid-morning, saying that the request had been filed. And the President was leaving for church and so I sent him a message through the military aide while he was at church.

Q Was that when he came out --

Q He came out of the church --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did he?

Q -- to take a phone call.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I told him not to.

(Laughter.) Anyway, then when he got back I spoke to him again on
the phone, telling him the action had taken place. Then he got two or three updates by phone as it was on it. And then he came -- well, anyway, then we called a principals meeting to talk about it and to make sure we were coordinating everything. And he joined the principals meeting for, I'd say -- Dee Dee? -- half an hour, 45 minutes, something like that.

Q What time did that start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The principals meeting started at 1:45 p.m. and concluded around 4:00 p.m.

Q Was the Vice President here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Vice President came in at the end. And the usual suspects were at the principals meeting.

Q Christopher seemed to be talking kind of optimistically about a cease-fire coming fairly imminently this morning. Is that what Clinton was alluding to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ambassador Redman, who is in Sarajevo, has been working with both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs to try to organize the cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia, as well as to resolve the situation around Gorazde, including a pullback of Serb forces from the pocket. And, in fact, those negotiations were taking place this morning when the attack on Gorazde occurred. And the U.N. will now be pursuing talks with the Bosnian Serbs about Gorazde so we can get the general talks about a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia back on track.

Let me emphasize that it's not just the cessation of hostilities, but a cessation of hostilities linked to, then, a resumption of the negotiations for a general settlement. The reason being that the Bosnian government wants to see both a cessation of hostilities, but the negotiations that can lead to the territorial adjustments, rather than just get locked into a standstill.

Q Can we go back just one second on the thing that kicked this off? You said it wasn't the injuries of the two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm talking about the authority that was -- that the injuries are an illustration of the danger that U.N. personnel are under in Gorazde. What specifically kicked this off and led to the request was -- because this fighting has been going on off and on for about a week or so, or more -- what led to this specific request was the Serbs had taken some high ground, I guess -- when -- yesterday, and from that high ground apparently had been sending rounds into the city. And U.N. personnel are in the city and were again at risk. And Rose requested the close air support.

Q Oh, so we're getting shelled. As an example of our getting shelled, here's two guys who got injured during the day --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Earlier in shelling.

Q -- earlier. So we need some help. Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exactly. But it's the triggering of close air support.

Q Not to belabor this point, but it's not that these injuries, but the fact that these injuries had taken place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's just an illustration of the dangers in the situation. And then when you've got a renewed direct shelling into the city, then Rose said our people are at risk and asked for the close air support.
Q. Did you hear anything about retaliation? There were some reports that they -- the Serbs had immediately launched antiaircraft missiles into the suburbs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that we know of.

Q. The President -- on last thing -- he said the reasons --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, don't take anything in the first few hours to the bank.

Q. He also referred to heavy casualties in the town. Does that mean civilian casualties?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And, again, there are varying reports of it. Both civilian and military.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:50 P.M., CDT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate ReleaseApril 10, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE POOL

The South Portico

3:55 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Today, while negotiations were being
held on a cease-fire in Bosnia, the Serbs launched a new attack on
Gorazde. These attacks have resulted in heavy casualties and have
put United Nations personnel there at risk.

UNPROFOR Commander General Rose requested and received
authorization from U.N. civilian authorities to receive NATO close
air support. Under existing authority and policy, NATO forces
promptly responded. U.S. F-16 aircraft under NATO command attacked
at least one target identified by UNPROFOR. French aircraft under
NATO are not conducting a damage assessment.

We have said we would act if we were requested to do so.
We have now done so and will do so again if we are requested. The
Serbs should cease their attacks on Gorazde and should pull back.
The talks on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia should resume. We
were at quite an important point in these discussions when these
attacks interrupted the progress of the discussions, and I very much
hope that now the attacks will cease, that the Serbs will pull back,
that the talks will resume on cessation of hostilities.

I have a great deal of confidence in General Rose's
determination. We strongly supported his decision, and I applaud the
rapid response of the U.N. civilian authorities.

Q What about Serb retaliation, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have no reason to believe there
will be any. We were retaliating. We -- the United Nations made it
absolutely clear that there were U.N. personnel in Gorazde, that an
attack on the town would be interpreted as a clear violation of the
rules. And it happened anyway. General Rose asked for the air
support and civilian authorities approved it in a prompt fashion, and
we supported it.

Q After the bombing raid, we had reports that there
were antiaircraft missiles fired into the suburbs. Do you know --

THE PRESIDENT: I can't -- excuse me?

Q -- at the houses.

THE PRESIDENT: I can't confirm that at this time.

Q Mr. President, did you know about the bombing raid
before it took place?

THE PRESIDENT: We knew that General Rose had asked for
it before it took place, yes. With only -- it all happened in fairly
rapid succession. There was not a long time delay now between when
he asked for the support from the civilian authorities and when they

MORE
gave it. But we've been keeping on top of this, you know. I -- on
two successive days, Thursday and Friday, I talked with the Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor about
this. I was kept informed yesterday, and then we talked again this
morning. It became clear to me that General Rose would probably ask,
and when he asked I was told and we were told as soon as Mr. Akashi
approved it.

Q So what do you think is going to happen next, sir?
Do you think this is the end of it, or are you fearful that NATO will
have to strike again?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I think we have to be
firm. We have seen in the past that when we have been firm in
support of the United Nations mission, that it has tended to further
negotiations. That's all we're trying to do, is to further
negotiations.

Let me make one other comment, if I might. As you all
know, we've been very concerned about the safety of Americans in
Rwanda. As far as we know now, the last of the convoys containing
all Americans who wish to leave has either passed into Burundi or is
about to pass into Burundi.

And I just want to say a special word of thanks and
gratitude on behalf of our entire nation to our Ambassador,
Ambassador Rawson, for the remarkable way in which he has handled
himself and in which he went about guaranteeing the security and
safety of American citizens during this very difficult situation.
There may be more to say about that tomorrow. But for now, I just
think we all ought to be grateful to him for the role he played in
getting our people out to safety.

Q Do you think this is a one time only attack in
Bosnia? Do you think we'll have to use our air power again there?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have to be prepared to do it.
But I don't have any reason to believe one way or the other -- I'm
not hopeful, I'm not skeptical. I just think that -- you know,
sometimes the command and control is not very tight there; the
communications aren't all that tight. This may have been something
that happened that was not authorized by any central authority on the
part of the Bosnian Serbs. So I just think this is a clear
expression of the will of NATO and the will of the United Nations and
the UNPROFOR operation there. And it's a clear call to the Serbs to
pull back from Gorazde and resume the negotiations.

Thank you very much.

Q Do you have a response to the minister who wants to
legalize drugs, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I disagree.
For Immediate Release
April 11, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP

The Cabinet Room

9:19 A.M. EDT

Q What can you tell us about the latest air strikes in Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: That the latest strikes were a direct response to General Rose's request for close air support; that the continued Serb shelling of Gorazde put the U.N. personnel there in danger; and that the air strikes were conducted in strict accordance of existing U.N. policy.

Q Can you tell us how many aircraft, what type, and what kind of targets they hit?

THE PRESIDENT: They did hit some targets, and you'll be briefed about the details.

Q Is the U.N. going to defend the people of Gorazde -- however you pronounce?

THE PRESIDENT: The United Nations is carrying out its mission there, and when they -- they're attempting to reassert Gorazde as a safe area, which it has agreed to do; they're encouraging the Serbs to withdraw from the safe area and to resume negotiations and to stop the shelling.

And if they are put at risk in the course of doing that mission, they can ask for NATO close air support. That's what they have done, and we have done our best to provide it.

Q Only the U.N. personnel is our concern?

THE PRESIDENT: The U.N. resolution gives NATO the authority to act. We are acting solely under the existing U.N. resolution which has been approved by the Security Council.

Q Would it be -- setting up an exclusion zone around Gorazde like -- in Sarajevo?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what the United Nations wants is for the Serbs to stop the shelling and to withdraw and to resume the negotiations. I don't want to compare it exactly to Sarajevo. There are some tactical and factual differences, but that's what they want. And NATO simply responded to the request for air support in carrying out the U.N. mission.

Q Did you talk to Mr. Yeltsin about this latest --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I talked to him last evening, and he was going to be out of pocket today. So we had quite a long talk last night. And I told him that -- I explained that this was different from what happened at Sarajevo. There was a clearly existing U.N. policy, the same policy under which we acted when the planes were shot down, you remember, a few weeks ago, but that I thought we ought to have close coordination with the Russians. After all, the Russians are a part of the UNPROFOR delegation there. They
have soldiers on the ground in Bosnia. And we had a good talk. And I think there have been further communications today between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister and between the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister. So we are trying to work very closely with the Russians. They have a critical role to play if we are going to get these peace talks going again. And I hope we can.

Q (Inaudible.)

THE PRESIDENT: We had quite a good talk, I thought. I explained to him what happened. I think in the beginning he was concerned that he didn't know about it in advance. I explained clearly what happened — that the United Nations asked for this; that Boutros-Ghali, the day before, had put out a press release supporting this action if the shelling didn't stop; that General Rose had received the appropriate approval from the civilian authority in Bosnia, and that it was an action taken under existing authority; and that indeed, I thought, that the U.N. had notified all the UNPROFOR members that it would be taken, but that it was not any kind of new or different thing.

And when these things occur, there is often not a lot of time. There was just, you know, somewhere between 30 minutes and an hour and a half, I think, the decision-making time. I don't know the exact time, but we responded in an entirely appropriate way, I think, under the circumstances.

Thank you.

END 9:25 A.M. EDTy
THE PRESIDENT: Today, while negotiations were being held on a cease-fire in Bosnia, the Serbs launched a new attack on Gorazde. These attacks have resulted in heavy casualties and have put United Nations personnel there at risk.

UNPROFOR Commander General Rose requested and received authorization from U.N. civilian authorities to receive NATO close air support. Under existing authority and policy, NATO forces promptly responded. U.S. F-16 aircraft under NATO command attacked at least one target identified by UNPROFOR. French aircraft under NATO are not conducting a damage assessment.

We have said we would act if we were requested to do so. We have now done so and will do so again if we are requested. The Serbs should cease their attacks on Gorazde and should pull back. The talks on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia should resume. We were at quite an important point in these discussions when these attacks interrupted the progress of the discussions, and I very much hope that now the attacks will cease, that the Serbs will pull back, that the talks will resume on cessation of hostilities.

I have a great deal of confidence in General Rose's determination. We strongly supported his decision, and I applaud the rapid response of the U.N. civilian authorities.

Q What about Serb retaliation, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have no reason to believe there will be any. We were retaliating. We -- the United Nations made it absolutely clear that there were U.N. personnel in Gorazde, that an attack on the town would be interpreted as a clear violation of the rules. And it happened anyway. General Rose asked for the air support and civilian authorities approved it in a prompt fashion, and we supported it.

Q After the bombing raid, we had reports that there were antiaircraft missiles fired into the suburbs. Do you know --

THE PRESIDENT: I can't -- excuse me?

Q -- at the houses.

THE PRESIDENT: I can't confirm that at this time.

Q Mr. President, did you know about the bombing raid before it took place?

THE PRESIDENT: We knew that General Rose had asked for it before it took place, yes. With only -- it all happened in fairly rapid succession. There was not a long time delay now between when he asked for the support from the civilian authorities and when they
gave it. But we've been keeping on top of this, you know. I -- on
two successive days, Thursday and Friday, I talked with the Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor about
this. I was kept informed yesterday, and then we talked again this
morning. It became clear to me that General Rose would probably ask,
and when he asked I was told and we were told as soon as Mr. Akashi
approved it.

Q So what do you think is going to happen next, sir?
Do you think this is the end of it, or are you fearful that NATO will
have to strike again?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I think we have to be
firm. We have seen in the past that when we have been firm in
support of the United Nations mission, that it has tended to further
negotiations. That's all we're trying to do, is to further
negotiations.

Let me make one other comment, if I might. As you all
know, we've been very concerned about the safety of Americans in
Rwanda. As far as we know now, the last of the convoys containing
all Americans who wish to leave has either passed into Burundi or is
about to pass into Burundi.

And I just want to say a special word of thanks and
gratitude on behalf of our entire nation to our Ambassador,
Ambassador Rawson, for the remarkable way in which he has handled
himself and in which he went about guaranteeing the security and
safety of American citizens during this very difficult situation.
There may be more to say about that tomorrow. But for now, I just
think we all ought to be grateful to him for the role he played in
getting our people out to safety.

Q Do you think this is a one time only attack in
Bosnia? Do you think we'll have to use our air power again there?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have to be prepared to do it.
But I don't have any reason to believe one way or the other -- I'm	not hopeful, I'm not skeptical. I just think that -- you know,
sometimes the command and control is not very tight there; the
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the UNPROFOR operation there. And it's a clear call to the Serbs to
pull back from Gorazde and resume the negotiations.

Thank you very much.

Q Do you have a response to the minister who wants to
legalize drugs, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I disagree.

END 4:04 P.M. EDT
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE POOL
The South Portico
3:55 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Today, while negotiations were being held on a cease-fire in Bosnia, the Serbs launched a new attack on Gorazde. These attacks have resulted in heavy casualties and have put United Nations personnel there at risk.

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Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 10, 1994

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Thank you very much.

Q Do you have a response to the minister who wants to legalize drugs, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I disagree.
Q  Do the Serbs have a green light in --

THE PRESIDENT:  I don't think they have a green light. We're looking at what our options are there. But it really depends upon in part what the U.N. mission wants to do there. We are committed to provide air support to troops if they go in. And whether we can recreate the conditions of Sarajevo anywhere else depends in part on the facts of each specific case.

I would discourage any of them for doing anything just for negotiating purposes. They ought to go ahead and negotiate a peace and get it over with; is what I hope they will. It's not going to change their options --

END
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State has asked General John R. Galvin (U.S. Army, retired) currently Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security at West Point and former SACEUR, to assist in the military aspects of ongoing negotiations on Bosnia. General Galvin will head the U.S. team to the talks on the transitional military arrangements called for in the Framework Agreement concluded in Washington on March 1 between representatives of the Bosnian government, the Croatian government and the Bosnia Croat community. General Galvin, who will have the personal rank of Ambassador, will join the U.S. Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia, Ambassador Charles Redman, next week in Zagreb and Sarajevo for initial contacts with the involved political and military authorities.
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ADM. BOORDA: (Begins in progress). This contact was heading south at about 280 knots. The airborne early warning aircraft vectored two NATO DENY FLIGHT fighters, United States F-16s, toward the track. And you can see, they came up from the south, from the vicinity of Mostar.

The lead fighter reported radar contact and then requested permission to descend to get a visual identification in accordance with our procedures -- and that permission was granted. The fighter then reported visual contact with two aircraft, which he identified as Caleb (ph). And then, shortly thereafter, with four more Caleb (ph) who were flying ahead of the two he first saw.

At 0535, the NATO airborne early warning aircraft, in accordance with our procedures, issued warnings to the violators to land or exit the airspace immediately or be engaged. No response was noted by the Caleb (ph) aircraft. At 0542, the
fighters again warned the Galebs (ph), in accordance with our procedures -- and no response was noted.

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NATO SPECIAL BRIEFING PAGE 2 02/28/94

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At 0543, and you can imagine, this was all happening very quickly. At 0543, permission to engage the violating Galebs (ph) was granted. And just prior to the engagement, the flight leader of the NATO fighters saw the Galebs (ph) make a bombing maneuver, and then he saw explosions on the ground.

We have received unconfirmed -- and I stress, at this time, they’re still unconfirmed -- reports from the United Nations Forces Command in Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia, that facilities in this vicinity were allegedly hit by as many as eight bombs, perhaps more, one of which hit a storage facility, and another, a hospital. More information on this report will come from the United Nations command when, and if, they are able to confirm it. But it does appear that what our pilots saw corresponds exactly with this report.

At 0545 -- 0545 Greenwich Mean Time, the lead NATO fighter aircraft fired an AAM-120 missile and destroyed one Caleb. At 0547, this same NATO fighter fired another missile and destroyed the second aircraft. At 0548, this same NATO fighter, the flight lead of the two that had been vectored up from the area of Mostar, fired another missile and destroyed a third aircraft. At this time, two other NATO fighters that were operating in the vicinity were vectored in by the NATO airborne early warning aircraft to provide support. At 0550, again, Greenwich Mean Time, the leader of the second NATO flight fired a missile and downed the fourth Caleb (ph). At 0559, the two remaining Galebs (ph) exited the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and we did not pursue them.

We have a short tape from the aircraft which downed the first three of four Galebs (ph). The first two missile firings that you’re going to see don’t show the impacts with the target aircraft, as the pilot was shifting from the target that he engaged to the next target he was going to engage. His final shot, the third one, does show -- and you have to look very closely, and General Ashely will point it out to you -- but it does show the fireball that comes from the explosion.

Could you turn that off for one minute. Okay? Turn it off for a minute. Jim? That’s great. Thank you.

Okay, so the final one, you’ll be able to see the explosion.

I want to say, in closing, that our NATO pilots have been enforcing the no-fly-zone since April of 1993, and they’ve carried out their mission today in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution, and in strict compliance with our established procedures. We hope that this will be the final such incident in a tragic war. NATO will continue to enforce the no-fly resolution, and we will continue to operate in other
missions in support of the United Nations forces who are working to reach an end to the violence in this troubled area.

So now, for the second time, if you'd please start the tape, and then after you see a to-air missile. You see a lot of symbology on the aircraft head-up display. This happens to be the airspeed, which is about almost 500 knots. The missile just fired. And you can't tell too much of it coming off of the rail here.

Okay, this happens to be the second one and -- as the Admiral also said -- you can't see the impact point. This happens to be an A-9 heat-seeking missile, infrared missile. And if you look closely, you'll be able to see the impact of the third on right there. There it was, right there. As the Admiral said, you can't see it very closely.

MORE

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Reut09:24 02-28
ADM. BOORDA: Those tapes, as you can imagine, all of that took place very quickly for the pilot. And as he was shooting at one target, he came off that, went to the other target -- and so, his goal was not to produce good pictures, but to execute his mission and get home safely, which he did very well.

All right. Well, General Milani (sp) and General Ashey and I will be happy to take some questions and Captain Mitchell will point out who the questioner will be.

Okay.

Q Admiral, John -- (name inaudible) -- from the New York Times.

ADM. BOORDA: Hello, John.

Q Is this the first time that any of these Caleb (ph) planes have been ever sighted over the restricted area?

ADM. BOORDA: Yes.

Q Have been engaged?

ADM. BOORDA: We had some reports a very short flights. About every month or so -- the airfield at Banja Luka usually has some obstructions on it -- and about every month or so, for a long time, they would take the obstructions off the airfield and they would take airplanes out there and run them up and down to do maintenance, but not fly them. We did have a report or two, last year, that they had done very short flights, but we didn’t see any of those and they were never confirmed. But this is clearly the first time that we have seen fixed wing aircraft flying over Bosnia since the no-fly zone has been enforced since April of 1993.

CAPT. MITCHELL: Next question. Right here.

Q Admiral, John Moody (sp) from Time Magazine.

ADM. BOORDA: Tom.

Q You mentioned the bombing -- the apparent bombing maneuver which the planes undertook. It’s somewhat hypothetical, but had the pilot not seen these supposed bombing maneuvers, would he probably have gotten the authorization to engage nonetheless?
ADM. BOORDA: He would have engaged nonetheless. These were attack aircraft violating the no-fly-zone, and he would have engaged them because they were not obeying the warnings and they were not leaving. And then their actions clearly showed they weren't doing that. But he would have engaged them in any event.


ADM. BOORDA: Admiral, Mark Frye (sp), BBC. I have two short questions. The first one is just a confirmation. Is this -- was this the first time that the no-fly-zone had been violated since the enforcement in April of last year?

ADM. BOORDA: There have been helicopter violations, and we have dealt with those in the approved way. I won't go into our rules of engagement. we've talked to the warring factions about those. But this is the first time we've seen fixed wing violations -- clearly offensive aircraft -- being used here. And we reacted exactly as we told them that we would.

Q Had such a fixed wing violation taken place, let's say, four months ago, would you have shot down the planes as well?

ADM. BOORDA: Yes.

CAPT. MITCHELL: Right here.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible) -- France Press. Can you tell us the number of helicopter violations and also if you have been able to identify this planes you've shot down? Are they Bosnian Serbs or Serbs?

ADM. BOORDA: Right now, I cannot tell you who owned these aircraft. There is certainly a feeling -- but it's only a feeling. We picked the track up near Banja Luka, and then we vectored the aircraft to it.

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So one would conclude from that that they might be Bosnian Serbs. But we didn’t see the aircraft markings close enough to do that. We saw the aircraft doing something in violation, and so we acted as we said we would.

(Audio break.)

ADM. BOORDA: No, I’m sorry, I don’t have the exact number, but it is in the hundreds. But they are all helicopters and they have been involved in ferrying people in civilian clothes, doing some medivacs. And we’ve had reports of other things, but nothing like what we’re talking about today.

Q (Inaudible.) The Serb pilots are safe after the shooting, after the fighting.

ADM. BOORDA: I’m sorry. Could you repeat that?

Q I like to know the situation about the (enemy?), the pilots, the Serb pilots, after the fighting.

ADM. BOORDA: We did not see any pilots eject or any chutes in the area. That doesn’t mean that they didn’t do that. It means that our pilots did not see it.

Q Yes, hi. Sue Pulliam (ph) from Stars & Stripes. Where do you think that we stand now? I mean, after the ultimatum came and went and nothing happened and then, just a couple of days after, we started with seeing these violations, what do you think that’s saying now?

ADM. BOORDA: Well, I think these are really two different things. The work that is being done in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the United Nations protection force, the work that we have done in coordination with them -- (audio break) -- not to violate again. That would be a reasonable way to take this.

Q (Inaudible.) I would like to ask, this morning in Sarajevo the Serbs attacked with tanks that have been kept hidden from the United Nations, a violation of the ultimatum. What do you intend to do?

ADM. BOORDA: No, that’s not really true. The Serbs did not attack with tanks in Sarajevo today or yesterday or the day before.
that. There was some tank movement and General Rose did a good job of taking control of that and taking control of the tanks, just as he is supposed to do. There has been no firing by Serb tanks in Sarajevo today that I know of, and I don’t believe there’s been any.

Q Paul Hanson, Reuters, Admiral. I have two brief questions. The first is, can you tell us whether the USS Saratoga has stopped its port call as a result of this operation? And the second question is, what would be your message to any of the warring factions if they were to consider a response to the downing of these four planes towards U.N. peacekeepers on the ground?

ADM. BOORDA: Well, let me say first about Saratoga that she’s been in the Mediterranean for a while and we wanted to get her in port for about four days. We’re going to make that three days. And she will get underway to give us some more capability. However, I feel we have plenty of capability right now. It just seemed a prudent thing to do. And so shortly she will be underway.

With respect to what message would I send to the warring factions, I think we sent that message a long time ago. Violations of the no-fly zone like we saw today will simply not be tolerated. And if we can engage, we will engage. And that’s what we did.

Q Brian Murphy from the Associated Press. Are there plans to send ground forces into the area where the planes were shot down to try to determine exactly who was flying them?

ADM. BOORDA: The United Nations protection force is in charge on the ground, and even our air operations are fully coordinated with them. I talked to General Cott (ph) this morning on this issue. And they will do as best they can. They will do the work here to verify the things I’ve told you. They do not have total freedom of movement in that part of the country.

Q Mr. Mucilov (ph) from -- (inaudible) -- would also like to ask, if counter-air missiles were sent against NATO planes from Serbian territory or if NATO planes were attacked by Serbian planes, would NATO consider Serbian territory then as an objective to be attacked in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 816?

ADM. BOORDA: Any aircraft that fly in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are unauthorized and ignore the warnings are in violation, and we will follow the procedures. Beyond that, I think it would be improper for me to comment about what NATO or the United Nations might or might not do.

Q Can you give us an update on the heavy weapons around Sarajevo? Are they all under U.N. control?

ADM. BOORDA: There are no weapons that we know of that are
not in control, either turned in or out of the area around Sarajevo. There are some weapons that General Rose is moving and getting even.

There have been a lot of reports. Sometimes the reporters don’t know what they’re seeing because it’s a weapon that is disabled perhaps or a weapon he does have under control. And, of course, the factions themselves put out various reports for their own reasons. But I’ve talked to him. I’ve talked to General Cott and Mr. Akashi, and I think it’s going very well there.

Q Admiral, two brief questions. One, who gave the actual authorization for firing in this particular case? And secondly, do we know which groups have aircraft of this type at their disposal, whether only the Serbs or Serbs and Croatians, or who might have aircraft of this type at their disposal?

ADM. BOORDA: I’ll talk about the first part. And because General Ashey came, I’ll let him talk about the second part. But let me say that our rules of engagement are not something I’m going to talk about here, but we have authorized commanders within the NATO force. We have very simple-to-use and well-thought-out rules of engagement, and they were followed precisely today. About the kinds of aircraft in the area, I’ll turn that over to General Ashey.

GEN. ASHEY: The aircraft, the Caleb (ph), is located here at Banja Luka. There are 10 of them. And there’s another airfield over here in the Krajina that has some of these aircraft located there. There are others here in Serbia, so those are the entities that have these aircraft.

Q So only the Serb side has -- (inaudible).

GEN. ASHEY: Yes.

Q Admiral, it’s not always possible to know what another military person is thinking, but in your estimation, was the intrusion of air space a test of NATO resolve?

ADM. BOORDA: I don’t know. If it was a test, I think we passed a quiz. I hope that there is also a lesson learned. When you take a test, you get a critique at the end. And the critique here is that you really ought not to violate the no-fly zone.

Q Admiral, just to clarify, were your planes engaged in any way, either from the ground or by the Galebs (ph).
ADM. BOORDA: There was no indication that their aircraft were trying to shoot down our aircraft, no.

CAPT. MITCHELL: That's the last question.

ADM. BOORDA: Okay. What I would like to do -- first of all, I'd like to thank you for coming. And I know there is a good deal of -- there are a good number of people here from the Italian media, and I asked General Milani if he would stay and with you in Italian perhaps answer any questions that you would like to facilitate, you using that information this afternoon and this evening. Thank you all very much.

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REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
UPON DEPARTURE
The South Lawn

8:05 A.M. EST

Q Can you give us a sense of what is going on in Bosnia and what has happened --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know the essential facts, that last evening, after midnight our time, United States aircrafts, flying under NATO authority, warned some fixed-wing Serbian aircraft, Bosnian Serbian aircraft, to land and when they didn't, they were shot down. There were two warnings. Every attempt was made, to the best of our information, to avoid this encounter.

We have had responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone since last April. It has been since last fall that there were any fixed-wing aircraft that we knew of violating the no-fly zone, and we're attempting to get more facts now. We're also trying to brief everyone involved in this effort to bring peace to Bosnia about the facts and we will -- if we find out any more information, of course, we'll be glad to give it to you.

But it seems to --

Q Why now? Why now? Is this a new get-tough policy?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. The violations -- the principal violations of the no-fly zone have been by helicopters, which could easily land. In this case -- we've not had a fixed-wing violation reported of any kind, much less one we were in a position to do something about, to the best of my information, since last fall, since September. Those are much more serious because of the capacity they have to engage in military conduct from the air.

Our mandate under the United Nations was to enforce the no-fly zone to eliminate the prospect that the war could be carried into the air.

Q How were you informed, President Clinton? How did you learn of this, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Early, early this morning I was notified.

Q How about the firing of the counterintelligence --

THE PRESS: Thank you.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have just been informed by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO and United Nations commanders have concluded that all known heavy weapons of the parties have been withdrawn from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, are under the control of the United Nations, or soon should be. Therefore, they have concluded that no airstrikes in Bosnia by NATO air forces are required at this time.

This week's events clearly have given the residents of Sarajevo a respite from the shelling and a measure of hope. I want to congratulate NATO and each of our NATO allies for the demonstration of resolve that produced these results. I want to commend the high level of cooperation that has been demonstrated between the UN and NATO. As I told President Yeltsin in a call earlier today, I want to congratulate the government of Russia for its contributions to this effort. Finally, all Americans join in praising the courage and skill of our service personnel and those of our NATO allies; they have been the muscle in NATO's ultimatum.

Despite the significant events of the day, we must remain vigilant. All parties should be aware that the ultimatum stands. The deadline has not been extended. Any heavy weapons in the exclusion zone not under UN control are, and will remain, subject to airstrikes. NATO's decision also applies to any heavy weapons attacks on Sarajevo from within or beyond the zone. NATO and the United Nations will continue to monitor compliance extremely carefully.

The NATO decision and its results provide new potential for progress toward an end to the tragic conflict in Bosnia. In the coming days, American diplomats will be working with the parties to the conflict and our allies and partners to transform this potential into reality.
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