Subject: Russian Participation in IFOR

1. **Purpose.** To describe Joint Staff position regarding how Russian forces should participate in NATO's peace implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia.

2. **Major Points.**
   - This paper focuses on Russian participation in IFOR; it does not assess options of Russian military or non-military participation under the political peace implementation structure and separate from the IFOR. Non-IFOR tasks could include coordination of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, refugee assistance, and arms control verification.

   - Joint Staff position paper dated 13 Sep 95, "Russian and other Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia," describes conditions under which non-NATO contingents should join the NATO force. Given that Russian participation is politically desirable, this paper describes how a Russian military contingent should be integrated in IFOR.

   - The fundamental problem is the tension between the military requirement for unity of command in the theater and Russia's reluctance to accept a conventional operational control (OPCON) relationship to a NATO commander.

3. **Discussion.**
   - In order to ensure unity of command, Russian forces should be integrated in the IFOR under OPCON of the NATO command structure. All other troop contributors to IFOR also will be OPCON to NATO. The details of the command relationship would be specified in written "terms of reference," similar to that which Russia has accepted as a contributor to UNPF. The terms of reference would be based on the NATO definition of OPCON and tailored to the requirements of the Russian case, including provisions for military liaison at multiple levels of command (IFOR, theater, and SHAPE) and possibly a civilian political advisor at NATO. For example, a "Representative of Russian High Command" could conduct liaison with the theater commander. In effect, the Russian contingent would be subordinate to NATO command authorities but have a parallel military and political command structure as depicted on attached diagrams. Further, Russia would need to be represented in the political super-structure for implementing the peace agreement; this would be facilitated if the Contact Group were the basis for the political structure.

   - It should be emphasized that at no time is Russia -- or any other state -- expected to give up national command of its forces. Conventional OPCON relationships to NATO (or to the UN) preserve command lines to national authorities.
• Integrating Russian forces OPCON to NATO results in the following:
  ◦ Pros:
    * Best preserves NATO unity of command.
    * Offers flexibility in tailoring terms of reference to Russian concerns.
    * Provides opportunity to enhance Russian-PFP and NATO-Russian relations beyond PFP.
    * Sets precedent for future CJTF-like operations.
    * Sets standard for other non-NATO contributors to IFOR.
  ◦ Cons:
    * Detracts from NATO interoperability.
    * Multiple liaison cells at various command levels can complicate operations.

• Two methods for integrating Russian forces are shown on attached diagrams. The method employed will depend on the size of the Russian troop contribution and the political importance attached to the Russians having a separate area.
  ◦ Russian Forces within Major Allies' Areas of Operation (AOR). This option places Russian units subordinate to major allied commanders; for example, Russian battalions could work under the French, British or American division commanders in the IFOR. While OPCON would be best, it is feasible that under this arrangement Russian forces could be placed under the “tactical control” (TACON) of allied commanders. TACON, a less inclusive form of control than OPCON, might be more acceptable to the Russians.
  ◦ Separate Russian AOR. This method accommodates a larger Russian formation that would be OPCON to Commander, ARRC and assigned responsibility for a major section of Bosnia. It puts the Russian participation along the same lines as the other major contributors (US, UK, France). As much as possible, the Russian sector should be selected to avoid direct contact with the Croats; for example, the Posavina Corridor. This method of integrating the Russians is most risky operationally if, after deployment, complications arise with the OPCON relationship. This concept could include exchange of deputy commanders among major IFOR contributors; e.g., Russian commander could have US deputy.

4. (S) Joint Staff Position. Joint Staff position for integrating Russians in IFOR is to integrate Russian forces within major Allies' AOR. If this proves infeasible for political reasons or if pressed to accept a larger Russian contribution, then Russian forces should be integrated in a separate AOR.

Approved by: CJCS, 27 Sep 95

Russians Integrated in IFOR with Separate AOR (OPCON to ARRC)
Russians Integrated in IFOR within Major Allies' AOR

RUSSIAN POLITICAL AUTHORITY

RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO AD HOC PLANNING GROUP

RUSSIAN LIAISON CELL

RUSSIAN LIAISON CELL

RUSSIAN LIAISON CELL

RUSSIAN LIAISON CELL

RUSSIAN FORCES (OPCON TO ARRC) US, UK, FR AORs

RUSSIAN FORCES (OPCON/TACON TO US/UK/FR)

NATO FORCES OTHER NON-NATO FORCES

OPCON TO ARRC

RUSSIAN FORCES

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MG

SACEUR

THEATER COMMANDER CINCSOUTH

DEPUTY THEATER COMMANDER COMMANDER UNPF

LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER COMMANDER, ARRC

COMMAND

OPCON

COORDINATION

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