

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

3624

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
47	3	8	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Your Helsinki Summit with Yeltsin (2 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	03/17/1997	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Scope Paper: Your Meeting with President Yeltsin (5 pages)	03/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. memo	Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to President William J. Clinton re: Your Visit to Finland (2 pages)	03/14/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. paper	Dinner with Presidents Yeltsin and Ahtisaari (2 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005. talking points	Talking Points for Yeltsin/Ahtisaari Dinner (3 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
006. paper	Morning Session on European Security (3 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. talking points	Talking Points on European Security (6 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. paper	Working Lunch with Russian President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
009. talking points	Talking Points for Working Lunch (4 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
010. paper	Afternoon Session with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
011. talking points	Talking Points for Afternoon Meeting (5 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [1]

2016-0140-M
kh1806

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 1/27/2000

2016-0140-7



**THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO
HELSINKI, FINLAND
FOR THE
CLINTON/YELTSIN SUMMIT**

MARCH 20 - 21, 1997

The President

~~SECRET~~

The President's Trip to Helsinki, Finland for the Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20 - 21, 1997

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Your Helsinki Summit with Yeltsin [partial] (1 page)	03/17/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [1]

2016-0140-M

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RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

PRESS MATERIALS

Remarks for Possible Pool Spray
Remarks for Joint Press Appearance
Points to Make in Response to Press Questions

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Overview of U.S.-Russian Relations
Russian Political Scene
Russia and NATO
START and ABM/TMD
CFE
Russia and the New Independent States
Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and Energy
Russia and the Baltics
Russia and Iran
Status of Economic Reform in Russia
U.S. Assistance to Russia
U.S.-Russia Trade Relations
Jackson-Vanik
G-7 and Russia

1.4c

BILATERAL MEETINGS AND FINNISH EVENTS

**MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AHTISAARI AND
PRIME MINISTER LIPPONEN OF FINLAND**

Briefing Paper
Scenesetter

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET

PRESS MATERIALS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

**CLINTON/YELTSIN
SUMMIT**

SCHEDULE OF
KEY EVENTS

197 MAR 19 P-5:18

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOR

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1997

FINAL

Helsinki, Finland

SCHEDULING DIRECTOR:

ANNE HAWLEY

HOME: 703-553-8940

OFFICE: 202-456-2823

WHCA PAGER: 4039

SCHEDULING DIRECTOR:

STEPHANIE STREETT

HOME: 202-332-5651

OFFICE: 202-456-2823

WHCA PAGER: 4033

TRIP COORDINATOR:

(Helsinki, Finland)

NICOLE ELKON

HOME: 202-332-2350

OFFICE: 202-456-6481

WHCA PAGER: 4799

PRESS COORDINATOR:

ANNE EDWARDS

HOME: 301-565-3101

OFFICE: 202-456-2921

WHCA PAGER: 4208

WEATHER:

Helsinki, Finland

Mostly cloudy with a chance of snow showers. Wind west at 5 to 10 knots. Low 18 to 23. High 28 to 33.

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

**SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT
FOR
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1997
FINAL**

Helsinki, Finland

Note: Helsinki, Finland is 7 hours ahead of Washington, DC.

12:20 pm	SUPPORT PLANE arrives Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Helsinki, Finland
12:35 pm	SUPPORT PLANE staff departs Helsinki-Vantaa Airport via motorcade en route the Intercontinental Hotel [drive time: 30 minutes]
1:05 pm	SUPPORT PLANE arrives the Intercontinental Hotel

**TRAVELING STAFF RON THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL
HELSINKI, FINLAND**

STAFF NOTE:	1.) Hotel rooms will be unlocked upon arrival. Keys will be in the door. 2.) A hotel credential will be in each staff person's hotel room packet. This credential must be worn to gain access to the hotel. 3.) Delegate credentials will be made available to staff as needed for the Palace and Summit site.
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12:00 pm
(5:00 am EST)

THE PRESIDENT arrives Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Helsinki, Finland
OPEN PRESS

Greeters: Ambassador Derek Shearer
Ruth Goldway
President Martti Ahtisaari
Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Jaakko Kalela, Secretary General to President
Jukka Valtasaari, Secretary of State
Jaakko Laajava, Finnish Ambassador to United States
Aide-de-Camp to the President

-- **The President**, accompanied by Secretary Madeleine Albright, debarks the plane.

**March 20th
Helsinki, Finland**

- Ambassador Derek Shearer and Henry Soderbod, Chief of Protocol, greet **the President** and introduce him to President Martti Ahtisaari.
- President Martti Ahtisaari introduces **the President** to the Finnish officials.
- **The President** departs.

12:15 pm **THE PRESIDENT** departs Helsinki-Vantaa Airport via motorcade en route the Intercontinental Hotel
[drive time: 15 minutes]

12:25 pm **THE PRESIDENT** arrives the Intercontinental Hotel

Greeters: Olof C. Surva, Hotel General Manager
Camilla Weurlander, Hotel Front Desk Manager
Kai Dahl, Arctia General Manager

12:30 pm-
4:30 pm
(5:30 am-9:30 am EST)

DOWN TIME
PRESIDENTIAL SUITE
Intercontinental Hotel

tba

**BRIEFING FOR MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT BORIS
YELTSIN OF RUSSIA AND PRESIDENT MARTTI AHTISAARI
OF FINLAND**
ROOM 862
Intercontinental Hotel

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

PARTICIPANTS

THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Derek Shearer
Secretary Madeleine Albright
General John Shalikashvili
Sandy Berger
Michael McCurry
John Podesta
Strobe Talbott
Larry Summers
Jim Collins
John Kornblum
Jim Steinberg
Bob Bell
Sandy Vershbow
Steve Pifer
Jan Lodal

4:30 pm-
5:15 pm
(9:30 am-10:15 am EST)

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET
GALATEIA RESTAURANT, 9TH FLOOR
Intercontinental Hotel
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
CLOSED PRESS

- **The President**, accompanied by Secretary Madeleine Albright and Ambassador Derek Shearer, enters the room.
- Ambassador Derek Shearer makes remarks and introduces Secretary Madeleine Albright.
- Secretary Madeleine Albright makes remarks and introduces **the President**.
- **The President** makes remarks.
- Upon conclusion of remarks, **the President** departs.

Note: The President will pose for a group photograph with Embassy Marines.

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Ambassador Derek Shearer Secretary Madeleine Albright Strobe Talbott Sandy Berger Ruth Goldway

5:15 pm-
5:20 pm

POLICE PHOTOS
GARAGE
Intercontinental Hotel

5:20 pm

THE PRESIDENT departs the Intercontinental Hotel via motorcade en route the Palace
[drive time: 5 minutes]

STAFF NOTE:

6:30 pm

A van departs the Intercontinental Hotel en route the Palace for dinner for the following staff: General John Shalikashvili, Strobe Talbott, Larry Summers, Lynn Davis, Jim Collins, Steve Pifer, Jan Lodal.
[drive time: 10 minutes]

Upon arrival at the Palace, please proceed directly to the Hall of Mirrors for cocktails.

5:25 pm

THE PRESIDENT arrives the Palace

5:30 pm-
5:45 pm

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT
MARTTI AHTISAARI
YELLOW ROOM
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
POOL PRESS

-- **The President** proceeds to the Yellow Salon and is greeted by President Martti Ahtisaari.

-- **The President** and President Martti Ahtisaari pose for a photograph.

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

5:50 pm-
6:55 pm
(10:50 am-11:55 am EST)

**EXPANDED MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT MARTTI
AHTISAARI PRIME MINISTER PAAVO LIPPONEN OF
FINLAND**

YELLOW ROOM

The Palace

Staff Contact: Sandy Berger

Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon

Interpretation: None Needed

CLOSED PRESS

- The Finnish and the American participants enter the room following the photo opportunity.
- President Martti Ahtisaari introduces **the President** to the Finnish participants.
- Upon conclusion of the meeting, **the President** remains in the Yellow Room, while President Martti Ahtisaari greets President Boris Yeltsin.

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	FINNISH PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Ambassador Derek Shearer Secretary Madeleine Albright John Podesta Sandy Berger John Kornblum Jim Steinberg Sandy Vershbow (note taker) Interpreter	President Martti Ahtisaari Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen Ambassador Jaako Laajava Secretary General to President, Jaakko Kalela Secretary of State Jaako Valtasaari Under-Secretary of State Jaako Blomberg Advisor to President, Alpo Rusi

STAFF NOTE: Staff participating in the bilateral meeting proceed to the Hall of Mirrors for cocktails.

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

7:00 pm-
7:05 pm

**PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT
AHTISAARI OF FINLAND AND PRESIDENT BORIS
YELTSIN OF RUSSIA
YELLOW SALON
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
POOL PRESS**

- President Martti Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin enter the room.
- **The President** poses for a photograph with President Martti Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin.
- **The President**, accompanied by President Martti Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin, proceeds to Gothic Hall.

7:10 pm-
7:25 pm
(12:10 pm-12:25 pm EST)

**RECEIVING LINE WITH DINNER GUESTS
GOTHIC HALL
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
CLOSED PRESS**

- President Martti Ahtisaari presents the dinner guests to **the President** and President Boris Yeltsin.

7:30 pm-
7:35 pm
(12:30 pm-12:35 pm EST)

**PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT
BORIS YELTSIN
STATE HALL
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
POOL PRESS**

- President Martti Ahtisaari accompanies **the President** and President Boris Yeltsin to State Hall.

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

- **The President** and President Boris Yeltsin pose for a photograph.
- **The President**, accompanied by President Martti Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin, proceed to Banquet Hall.

7:40 pm-
8:40 pm
(12:40 pm-1:40 pm EST)

**DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT AHTISAARI
OF FINLAND
BANQUET HALL
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Whisper (Russian-English)
OFFICIAL PHOTO ONLY**

- President Ahtisaari makes welcoming remarks.

Note: The President and President Boris Yeltsin do not make toasts.

- Dinner is served.
- Upon conclusion of dinner, **the President**, President Martti Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin are escorted to the Mirror Hall.

8:45 pm-
9:00 pm

**DESSERT
HALL OF MIRRORS
The Palace
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
CLOSED PRESS**

9:05 pm

THE PRESIDENT bids farewell to President Boris Yeltsin
CLOSED PRESS

9:10 pm

THE PRESIDENT departs the Palace via motorcade en route the Intercontinental Hotel
[drive time: 5 minutes]

March 20th
Helsinki, Finland

9:15 pm

THE PRESIDENT arrives the Intercontinental Hotel

BC AND STAFF RON

**THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL
HELSINKI, FINLAND**

HRC RON

AFRICA

197 MAR 19 4:51 PM

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOR

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1997

FINAL

Helsinki, Finland

SCHEDULING DIRECTOR:

ANNE HAWLEY

HOME: 703-553-8940

OFFICE: 202-456-2823

WHCA PAGER: 4039

SCHEDULING DIRECTOR:

STEPHANIE STREETT

HOME: 202-332-5651

OFFICE: 202-456-2823

WHCA PAGER: 4033

TRIP COORDINATOR:
(Travel, Helsinki, Finland)

NICOLE ELKON

HOME: 202-332-2350

OFFICE: 202-456-6481

WHCA PAGER:

PRESS COORDINATOR:

ANNE EDWARDS

HOME: 301-565-3101

OFFICE: 202-456-2921

WHCA PAGER: 4208

WEATHER:

Helsinki, Finland

Mostly cloudy. Wind west at 5 to 10 knots.

Low 20 to 23. High 25 to 30.

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

**SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT
FOR
FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1997
FINAL**

Helsinki, Finland

Note: Helsinki, Finland is 7 hours ahead of Washington, DC.

STAFF NOTE: Baggage call is 4:00 pm. All staff please leave bags outside the room. All staff vans depart from the front entrance of the hotel.

9:00 am **THE PRESIDENT** departs the Intercontinental Hotel via motorcade en route the President's Residence, Mantyniemi
[drive time: 15 minutes]

STAFF NOTE: Staff holding space at Mantyniemi is extremely limited. Only staff manifested for the site will be allowed in.

STAFF NOTE: Only the meeting participants should enter through the front door. All other staff should enter the residence through the side door.

9:15 am **THE PRESIDENT** arrives the President's Residence, Mantyniemi
POOL PRESS

Greeter: President Martti Ahtisaari

NOTE: President Boris Yeltsin is scheduled to arrive at 9:35 am.

9:40 am-
9:45 am
(2:40 am-2:45 am EST) **PHOTO WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA AND
PRESIDENT MARTTI AHTISAARI OF FINLAND
LIVING ROOM
Mantyniemi
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Whisper (Russian-English)
POOL PRESS**

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

9:50 am-
9:55 am
(2:50 am-2:55 am EST) **PHOTO WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN**
LIVING ROOM
Mantyniemi
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Whisper (Russian-English)
POOL PRESS

10:00 am-
11:30 am
(3:00 am-4:30 am EST) **BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN**
LIVING ROOM
Mantyniemi
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Whisper (Russian-English)
CLOSED PRESS

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Secretary Madeleine Albright Sandy Berger Strobe Talbott (note taker) Interpreter	President Boris Yeltsin

STAFF NOTE:

11:30 am Staff van departs the Intercontinental Hotel en route Mantyniemi for the following staff members: Jim Steinberg and Larry Summers.

1:00 pm Staff van departs the Intercontinental Hotel en route Mantyniemi for the following staff member: Tony Blinken.

3:30 pm Staff van departs the Intercontinental Hotel en route Mantyniemi for the following staff members: Michael McCurry, Lynn Davis, Mike Nacht, Bob Bell, LTG Richard Myers.

11:35 am-
11:55 am **BREAK**
MANTYNIEMI

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

12:00 pm- **WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN**
1:30 pm **DINING ROOM**
(5:00 am-6:30 am EST) Mantyniemi
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Consecutive (Russian-English)
CLOSED PRESS

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Secretary Madeleine Albright General John Shalikashvili Sandy Berger Strobe Talbott Larry Summers Jim Collins Jim Steinberg Steve Pifer (note taker) Jan Lodal Interpreter	President Boris Yeltsin Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov Deputy Premier Oleg Davydov Deputy Head of Administration, Yuriy Yarov Foreign Policy Assistant, Dmitriy Ryurikov Russian Ambassador to US, Yuliy Vorontsov State Duma Member, Vladimir Plukin Chief General Staff, Viktor Samsonov Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Afanasyevskiy Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mamedov Interpreter

1:35 pm- **BREAK**
3:50 pm Mantyniemi
(6:35 am-8:50 am EST)

NOTE: President Boris Yeltsin is scheduled to return to the Guest Residence during the break.

tba **TAPE RADIO ADDRESS**
LIVING ROOM
Remarks: Michael Waldman, Tony Blinken
Staff Contact: Megan Moloney, Brenda Anders
Mantyniemi

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

4:00 pm- **BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN**
5:30 pm **LIVING ROOM**
(9:00 am-10:30 am EST) **Mantyniemi**
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
Interpretation: Whisper (Russian-English)
CLOSED PRESS

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Secretary Madeleine Albright Sandy Berger Strobe Talbott (note taker) Interpreter	President Boris Yeltsin

NOTE: President Boris Yeltsin is scheduled to return to the Guest Residence during the break.

5:35 pm- **BRIEFING**
6:30 pm **LIVING ROOM**
(10:35 am-11:30 am EST) **Mantyniemi**
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger, Michael McCurry

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

PARTICIPANTS
<p>THE PRESIDENT Secretary Madeleine Albright General John Shalikashvili John Podesta Sandy Berger Strobe Talbott Larry Summers Michael McCurry Jim Collins Jim Steinberg Bob Bell Jan Lodal Tony Blinken Steve Pifer</p>

6:35 pm

THE PRESIDENT departs the Mantyniemi via motorcade en route the Hotel Kalastajatorppa

6:40 pm

THE PRESIDENT arrives the Hotel Kalastajatorppa

6:45 pm-

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

7:30 pm

COLONIAL HALL

(11:45 am-12:30 pm EST) Hotel Kalastajatorppa

Remarks: Tony Blinken

Staff Contact: Sandy Berger, Michael McCurry

Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon

Interpretation: Simultaneous (Russian-English)

OPEN PRESS

- Off-stage announcement of **the President** and President Boris Yeltsin.
- **The President** makes remarks.
- President Boris Yeltsin makes remarks.
- Questions are taken from the press.
- Upon conclusion of the press conference, **the President** departs.

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Ambassador Derek Shearer Secretary Madeleine Albright General John Shalikashvili John Podesta Sandy Berger Strobe Talbott Larry Summers Bruce Lindsey Michael McCurry Jim Collins Jim Steinberg Jan Lodal Bob Bell Tony Blinken Steve Pifer Ruth Goldway	President Boris Yeltsin

7:40 pm **THE PRESIDENT** departs the Hotel Kalastajatorppa via motorcade en route the Guest Residence
[drive time: 5 minutes]

STAFF NOTE:

7:45 pm **All staff depart the Hotel Kalastajatorppa en route the Intercontinental Hotel**
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:30 pm **Air Force One staff and Support Plane staff depart the Intercontinental Hotel en route Helsinki-Vantaa Airport**
[drive time: 30 minutes]

7:45 pm **THE PRESIDENT** arrives the Guest Residence

Greeter: President Boris Yeltsin

March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC

7:50 pm-
8:00 pm
(12:50 pm-1:00 pm EST) **COCKTAILS WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN**
FIREPLACE ROOM
Guest Residence
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
CLOSED PRESS

8:00 pm-
9:15 pm
(1:00 pm-2:15 pm EST) **DINNER WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA**
GUEST RESIDENCE
Staff Contact: Sandy Berger
Event Coordinator: Nicole Elkon
CLOSED PRESS

- **The President** and President Boris Yeltsin proceed to the dining room for dinner.
- Upon conclusion of dinner, **the President** departs.

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS	RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS
THE PRESIDENT Note taker Interpreter	President Boris Yeltsin

9:30 pm **THE PRESIDENT** departs the Guest Residence via motorcade en route Helsinki-Vantaa Airport
[drive time: 20 minutes]

9:50 pm **THE PRESIDENT** arrives Helsinki-Vantaa Airport
OPEN PRESS

Greeters: President Martti Ahtisaari
Ambassador Derek Shearer
Ruth Goldway

- President Martti Ahtisaari bids farewell to **the President**.

10:05 pm **THE PRESIDENT** departs Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Helsinki, Finland via Air Force One en route Andrews Air Force Base
[flight time: 9 hours]
[time change: - 7 hours]

12:05 am (EST) **THE PRESIDENT** arrives Andrews Air Force Base

**March 21st
Helsinki, Finland
Washington, DC**

10:20 pm **SUPPORT PLANE** staff depart Helsinki-Vantaa Airport via Support Plane en route Andrews Air Force Base
[flight time: 9 hours, 30 minutes]
[time change: - 7 hours]

12:50 am (EST) **SUPPORT PLANE** staff arrive Andrews Air Force Base

12:25 am **THE PRESIDENT** departs Andrews Air Force Base via motorcade en route the White House
[drive time: 25 minutes]

12:50 am **THE PRESIDENT** arrives the White House

BC RON **THE WHITE HOUSE**
HRC RON **AFRICA**

SCHEDULE OF HELSINKI KEY EVENTS

THURSDAY, MARCH 20

12:00 p.m. Arrive Helsinki, Finland

4:30 - 5:15 p.m. Meet and Greet Embassy Staff

5:30 - 5:45 p.m. Photo with President Ahtisaari of Finland

5:50 - 6:55 p.m. Meeting with President Martti Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen of Finland

7:00 - 7:05 p.m. Photo Opportunity with President Ahtisaari and President Boris Yeltsin

7:10 - 7:25 p.m. Receiving Line with Dinner Guests

7:30 - 7:35 p.m. Photo Opportunity with President Boris Yeltsin

7:40 - 8:40 p.m. Dinner with President Boris Yeltsin Hosted by President Ahtisaari, Presidential Palace

8:45 - 9:00 p.m. Coffee

FRIDAY, MARCH 21

9:50 - 9:55 a.m. Photo with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland

10:00 - 11:30 a.m. First Bilateral Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin (Small Format)

12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Working Lunch with President Boris Yeltsin, Presidential Residence

4:00 - 5:30 p.m. Second Bilateral Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin (Small Format)

6:45 - 7:30 p.m. Joint Press Statement, Hotel Kalastajatorppa

7:50 - 8:00 p.m. Cocktails with President Yeltsin, Guest Residence

8:00 - 9:15 p.m. Private Dinner with President Yeltsin, Guest Residence

10:05 p.m. Depart Helsinki, Finland

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1997

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0140-M (1.02)

KBH 1/27/2020

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER 

SUBJECT: Scope Paper: Your Meeting with President Yeltsin

The Setting

Coming Back. Boris Yeltsin is making March his comeback month, showing he has recovered from his bypass and bout with pneumonia and has resumed full charge at Russia's helm. His March 6 "State of the Federation" address laid out a strong vision for Russia's way forward and aligned himself squarely on the side of Russia's common man. His decision to make Anatoliy Chubays First Deputy Prime Minister suggests Yeltsin is ready to shake up a lackluster economic team and tackle some of the obstacles that have stymied economic reform, investment and growth over the last two years.

The Helsinki summit is a central piece of this comeback strategy: it will mark Yeltsin's return, after a year-long absence, to the world stage. In his March 6 speech, you were the only foreign leader, and Helsinki the only meeting, cited. The juxtaposition of this comment and Yeltsin's criticism of NATO enlargement suggests that we may have to use Helsinki and your personal relationship to come to terms on NATO-Russia.

Looking Forward. Helsinki represents the first meeting of your second terms. It thus provides a venue for you and Yeltsin to reaffirm a common vision for the bilateral relationship and set a course for the next four years and into the 21st century. Indeed, your approach to Yeltsin should reflect in part an appeal to his sense of legacy: how does he want history to record his management of the relationship with the United States and West?

Yeltsin's desire for success was already on display at his February 21 meeting with Madeleine. It has also been evident in the stark change in attitude that we have witnessed in Primakov over the last month: for the present, he clearly has orders to seek deals on NATO-Russia and arms control so that there are summit "deliverables" for Yeltsin to endorse with you, though whether that is enough to overcome the significant bureaucratic

obstacles or Yeltsin's own need to play to Moscow's hard-line political class remains to be seen. As in the past, your appeal to Yeltsin that "you and he are the problem solvers" can help shape his attitude and break the bureaucratic logjams.

The Issues and the Schedule

A Focused Agenda. The agreed agenda is focused: European security, arms control (START and ABM/TMD) and economics. Yeltsin will, as in other meetings, pay great attention to the message and the political theater. But he needs some substantive success to underpin this, and we have offered solutions that are, in our view, "win-win." That said, getting to home means resolving some very tough questions that may have to be worked up to the last minute. The Russians may try to leverage last-minute concessions from us. We thus have sought to keep public expectations modest.

European security will dominate attention. But it is also important to protect time for the bilateral relationship that is so important to Yeltsin, focusing particularly on arms control and economics. First, you have a chance to reach agreements on START III "guidelines" and ABM/TMD demarcation, which could help unblock START II ratification in the Duma. Second, you should underscore directly to Yeltsin the need for him to engage on the economic front.

The Schedule. Your first encounter with Yeltsin will be the March 19 dinner hosted by Finnish President Ahtisaari. This offers a venue to get reacquainted with Yeltsin, gauge his mood on European security issues (which the Finns will want to discuss) and preview the next day's themes.

You begin March 20 with a 90-minute meeting in the small format (joined by Madeleine, Strobe and me). After reaffirming the importance of the bilateral relationship, we recommend that you dive right into NATO-Russia. At the working lunch (with delegations), we recommend that you start with economics and then address foreign policy issues. The second small-format meeting provides an opportunity to discuss arms control issues.

Following the press conference, you and Yeltsin will have a private dinner (notetakers only). Like the previous night's dinner, this is not a good time for heavy substance. We recommend you reiterate your commitment to a relationship that will carry both countries into the 21st century and a Europe that includes a prominent role for Russia and outline the events over the next several months, including a possible NATO-Russia summit in late May and the June Denver summit.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/25/97

The Agenda

European Security. This is the headline issue. The Russians will continue to express their opposition to NATO enlargement, seeking to put us on the defensive. Some of the strongest words in Yeltsin's March 6 speech took aim at enlargement. Moscow also will keep looking for cracks in NATO's commitment to enlarge.

But the Russians appear to accept that Madrid cannot be derailed and seem to be looking to cut a deal. Moreover, Yeltsin and Primakov appear to have concluded that it is sensible to have a NATO-Russia agreement sooner (when they have greatest leverage with us and our European allies) rather than later and that they should deal with you to shape the contours of the agreement.

You have a good track record with Yeltsin on Europe: you have been candid and kept your word about the pace of enlargement and working to ensure that Russia was not excluded. You should remind him of this in making clear that your vision for Europe remains unchanged -- a stable and integrated Europe that includes a democratizing Russia and a NATO with new members -- and your commitment to shape the enlargement process so that it does not threaten Russia.

You might outline for Yeltsin the key elements of a NATO-Russia relationship, citing how they can make Russia a partner of the Alliance. The Russians have seen NATO's draft NATO-Russia charter; Primakov's initial reaction was positive. Tough issues remain, particularly the Russians' desire for language legally restricting permanently stationed forces and infrastructure on the territory of new NATO members.

Our goal is for you and Yeltsin to reach a common understanding of what a NATO-Russia relationship should look like and the way ahead. If you and Yeltsin are sufficiently on the same track, you could call (in a joint statement on European security) for accelerated work on the charter so that it can be concluded and signed at a late May NATO-Russia summit.

One caution: Yeltsin could use Helsinki to launch a public anti-NATO tirade as at Budapest. That is unlikely, as it would damage our bilateral relationship, set Russia on a course of self-isolation and make Russia appear impotent when enlargement nevertheless proceeds. Yeltsin may instead make a strong personal appeal to you to agree to unacceptable conditions for NATO enlargement -- e.g., a pause after the first tranche, guarantees of no membership for the Baltics -- in return for his acquiescence.

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WJC HANDWRITING

Economics. The Russian government in 1996 failed to come to grips with the need to consolidate reform and lay a basis for investment and growth. The results: the economy bumps along without real growth, government revenues are in constant crisis and workers and pensioners go unpaid. Real change is necessary, or the government will be in deep trouble.

Chernomyrdin seems to appreciate the need for reform, and Chubays's appointment as his new deputy may help. But the hard job of getting legislation through the Duma to ~~reform the tax system, implement production-sharing arrangements~~ that will allow American investment to flow into the energy sector and begin to battle corruption require heavy lifting by Yeltsin himself.

~~You might invite Larry Summers at the lunch to describe what is needed to attract investment. You will be in a position to speak as a friend who is prepared to back words with deeds; the joint statement we plan to release would commit the United States to make financing available that will underpin \$4 billion in investment in Russia and support for accelerated Russian membership in international economic fora (the WTO, Paris Club, OECD). This is when Yeltsin will likely raise Jackson-Vanik and the G-8; you can lean forward on the latter; Jackson-Vanik is more difficult.~~

Foreign Policy. The lunch also may allow time for an exchange on foreign policy issues. We suggest three: Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine and China.

ABM/TMD. Despite your intervention with Yeltsin in the past, the question of demarcation between ABM and TMD systems has remained deadlocked at the technical level. The Russians want to impose a series of tight testing and deployment constraints on higher-velocity TMD systems. These are unacceptable to the Chiefs and would be problematic on the Hill; we thus have offered to handle these questions via transparency and cooperation.

Our goal is to agree in the afternoon session on a joint statement on the ABM/TMD demarcation question that includes a comprehensive approach to concluding the negotiations. We have reached our bottom line and have made that clear to the Russians. They now face a crucial choice: whether to accept our approach, which provides some constraints and real transparency regarding our programs, or leave this issue as a festering sore.

Your approach to Yeltsin can be straightforward: we have tried hard to meet real Russian concerns, but we can move no further. Yeltsin needs to weigh what we have on offer, backed by your demonstrated commitment to the ABM Treaty, against the costs of leaving this open on the agenda. Even more compelling are the

3/25/97

costs, should Moscow continue to insist that START II cannot be ratified until the ABM/TMD issue is settled on Moscow's terms, of ~~maintaining a larger strategic nuclear force under START I~~. In particular, Congress has mandated that we cannot reduce our forces below START I levels (6,000 accountable warheads) until START II enters into force. Given their aging multiple-warhead missiles and lack of funds to build replacements, the Russians will not be able to maintain their strategic force at or near the START I limit.

START. We proposed START III "guidelines" to reenergize the nuclear arms reduction process and help the Russian government secure START II ratification. Our goal for Helsinki is a joint statement that records your and Yeltsin's commitment to reduce further strategic arms, sets a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 warheads for START III and extends the START II reductions period. These steps will address Russian concerns about the costs of implementing nuclear arms cuts and Russia's ability to maintain ~~rough strategic parity~~ with the United States.

Russian negotiators have tried to reopen previously resolved issues from START I and START II (e.g., limits on sea-launched cruise missiles) in the START III "guidelines." We believe we have beaten that effort back (although there could still be hard negotiations leading up to and at Helsinki). The impediments to concluding this statement are more likely to be related to difficulties on ABM/TMD or a Yeltsin calculation that we are still too far apart on NATO-Russia.

Objectives. Your maximal objective is progress across the board, to be reflected in joint statements on European security, economics, START and ABM/TMD. This would give a major boost to the relationship and could even lead the Russians to loosen the linkages that have delayed START II ratification. As for your minimal objectives, the economics joint statement should be achievable, and you will want to take away Yeltsin's commitment to work to develop a NATO-Russia relationship, even if not as quickly as we would like.

SECRETARY OF
STATE MEMO

DECLASSIFIED
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2016-0140-M (1.03)
KBM 1/27/2020

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/25/97

March 14, 1997

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: 3/20/02

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *MKA*

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Finland

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as Gov -*

The Finns are very pleased to welcome you back to Helsinki, which you visited 28 years ago as a private citizen. You follow President Reagan, who was here in 1988, and President Bush, who held summits in 1990 and 1992. The First Lady stopped in Helsinki in June.

Your choice of Helsinki for the summit highlights Finland's continuing role as a bridge between east and west. The Finns hope you see them as a model for pragmatic, successful relations with Moscow. Once the Soviet Union's doorway to Europe, Finland -- still non-aligned, but now a member of the EU and Partnership-for-Peace, and a country openly debating NATO membership -- uses its entree in Moscow to quietly push for a constructive Russian agenda towards Europe. Ahtisaari's offer to host you was an expression of the constructive role Finland wants to play in the new Europe.

President Ahtisaari, born in a border area ceded to the USSR after World War II, will do everything he can to help you and the Alliance reach a successful accommodation with Russia, here in Helsinki and later. Sharp, informed, and direct in manner, Ahtisaari and equally able Prime Minister Lipponen are eager to engage in a detailed give-and-take as we compare assessments of Yeltsin's leadership capabilities and analyze the direction of Russian policy.

The Ahtisaari government is deeply engaged in the Baltics and will want to discuss our common efforts to promote regional stability and, particularly, ease tensions with Russia. Most recently, the Finns have urged Moscow -- as unsuccessfully as we have -- to sign the completed border agreement with Estonia. Although Finland is not a supporter of Baltic membership in NATO, it does promote Baltic membership in the EU, and you should confirm our support for this latter position. Pointing out that

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the period before the Madrid summit is likely to be especially difficult and unsettling for the Baltics, you might ask Ahtisaari and PM Lipponen to use their personal contacts with the Baltic leaders to help maintain optimism in the region.

Finland largely shares our other European policy goals. Ahtisaari, who backed legislation that made Finnish participation in IFOR possible, would deeply appreciate your personal thanks for Finland's generous contribution of peacekeepers to Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Finland is an active and helpful partner in OSCE and has just relinquished its seat as co-chair of the Minsk process on Nagorno-Karabakh; this again deserves a comment from you. You should also mention how pleased we are that Finland welcomes the proposed Atlantic Partnership Council (APC); we agree it is an opportunity for Helsinki to gain a greater a decisionmaking role in crisis management operations.

During your less structured discussions with Finnish leaders, you are likely to pick up oblique queries concerning NATO receptivity to an eventual bid for membership in the Alliance. Although neither the government nor the general public is now prepared to ask for NATO membership, the NATO debate is picking up steam and, if the first tranche experience is positive, the Finns may well decide to declare their candidacy for a subsequent tranche. In the meantime, they would appreciate your assurance that the U.S. is committed to keeping the door open to future as well as present applicants. You might emphasize that Madrid will not foreclose any options and that neither then or later will the U.S. say or do anything to suggest that Finland is excluded from membership.

Finally, you should be aware that President Ahtisaari is planning to visit New York in October and would be delighted to receive an invitation to come to Washington to meet with you.

DINNER HOSTED BY
PRESIDENT AHTISAARI

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DINNER WITH PRESIDENTS YELTSIN AND AHTISAARI

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Reaffirm Vancouver vision and renew personal ties to Yeltsin, stressing that success on three-part summit agenda depends upon your joint leadership.
- Note that Finland's hosting of the summit exemplifies its constructive role in building united Europe; thank Ahtisaari.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Overview. The first "summit" event with Yeltsin is a dinner hosted by Ahtisaari; the three of you will be joined by delegations (approximately 10 per side, for a total of 30). The dinner is your first meeting with Yeltsin since April 1996 in Moscow; you will have seen Ahtisaari that morning.

The dinner does not provide a good venue for serious business; it does offer a good opportunity to renew your relationship with Yeltsin in a relaxed atmosphere. We recommend you preview your agenda for the summit in general terms and note Finland's helpful role. The Finns may prompt a general discussion of European security, which would provide an opportunity to gauge whether Yeltsin is looking for a solution on NATO-Russia at the next day's meetings. Along with Ahtisaari, you might draw Yeltsin out on his sense of the current political situation in Russia and how he will proceed to reenergize economic reform, as he suggested in his March 6 "State of the Federation" address.

Yeltsin. His reelection and poor health sidelined Yeltsin for much of 1996, stalling progress on critical issues such as economic restructuring, fighting corruption, stemming military disintegration, relations with NATO and START II ratification. 1996 was lost for Russian reform and bold bilateral initiatives.

Yeltsin appears to be on the mend physically. Helsinki is of great importance to him, both politically and psychologically, as his return to the global stage. He values your support and friendship as he stressed to Secretary Albright on February 21 and in your February 27 phone conversation. He looks to Helsinki to reaffirm his status as an engaged leader of a great power.

Ahtisaari. A Euro-activist, he is proud of Finland's Western roots and believes that, as Russia's only EU neighbor, his nation can help Moscow build links to a common European security system.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 03/10/07

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Finland's participation in IFOR/SFOR and UNPREDEP in Macedonia has not been without costs, but Ahtisaari is committed to greater engagement in Europe, moving away from the traditional Finnish neutral stance. The Finns have been active in supporting the sovereignty of the Baltic states both bilaterally and through Partnership for Peace.

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TALKING POINTS FOR YELTSIN/AHTISAARI DINNER

Introductory

- (To Ahtisaari) Grateful to you for hosting summit and for First Lady's reception last July. Finland plays key role in European affairs and as investment/trade partner with Russia.
- Want to salute Finland's active role in region and throughout Europe, including strong presence in former Yugoslavia.
- (To Yeltsin) Glad to see you back in saddle and in fine form. Missed working with you closely last few months; hope to make that up in meetings tomorrow.
- Hope Naina, daughters and grandsons in good health. Hillary sends warmest regards.

Summit Agenda and Themes

- My commitment to strong bilateral relationship based on vision of Vancouver strong as ever. You and I, Boris, have new mandate from our peoples and historic opportunity to build foundation for century of peace. Let us seize it now.
- Russia must play rightful role as great power. Committed to supporting Russian integration in Europe, key global institutions.
- Helsinki agenda comprises three parts: European security, START and ABM/TMD, and enhanced economic cooperation. Believe we can make progress on all three issues.
- Tomorrow's talks should have common themes: cooperative approach to problems; building U.S.-Russia relationship for 21st century; indivisibility of European security.
- Bosnia a model for American/Russian/Finnish cooperation. Our troops serve together there to bolster peace. This not easy; last month mourned together loss of three Finnish peacekeepers in helicopter accident over Macedonia.
- Finland's example in former Yugoslavia shows importance of cooperation among all European nations in helping build more secure, integrated Europe.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 03/10/07

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2016-0140-M (105)

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- Our shared experience in Balkans proves security for all in Euro-Atlantic community can be enhanced by working together.
- That is goal of Partnership for Peace, new NATO and strengthening of NATO-Russia relationship. Peacekeeping now vital part of NATO's strategic concept.
- After Helsinki, hope we both will be able to report good results to American and Russian people: way forward on NATO-Russia, reinvigoration of nuclear arms reduction process, broader and mutually beneficial trade and investment links.

General Conversation Topics

- Interested in Yeltsin's assessment of current economic and political situation in Russia and views on months ahead.
- March 6 "State of the Federation" speech impressive; laid out ambitious agenda. Next steps?
- Yeltsin's priorities for government -- how much responsibility will Chubays assume for economic program?
- Finland is Russia's only EU neighbor. What role does this relationship play in Russia's northwest? Good opportunity to expand trade and investment in both Finland and Russia.

[If Baltic-Russian relations are raised]

- Strongly support good relations between Russia and independent Baltic states. Not inconsistent with Baltics' expanding ties to West.
- Pragmatic resolution of differences, such as border treaty, in all sides' interest, will contribute to more stable Europe.
- Important that all sides keep rhetoric in check; can complicate resolution of complex issues.
- (To Ahtisaari) Finnish ideas for progress?

[*If Baltic membership in NATO is raised*]

- Do not rule out any emerging democracy; no new artificial dividing lines. But will proceed in way that builds security for all of Europe, including Russia.

SCENESETTER: OPENING DINNER
WITH PRESIDENTS AHTISAARI AND YELTSIN
AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

BACKGROUND

The Presidential Palace. In the past, the Palace was used as both the office and residence of Finnish presidents, but a new residence was completed in 1993 at Mantyniemi -- where the actual summit meetings will be held. The President's office, staff and protocol areas remain at the Palace. The Palace was the site of the 1990 summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.

Originally a merchant's mansion, the Palace was purchased in 1837 as the Helsinki residence of the Czar of Russia (who was also Grand Duke of Finland). Czar Alexander II and the Crown Prince (later Czar Alexander III) stayed at the Palace in 1876.

The Palace and its decorations are in the so-called St. Petersburg Empire Style, and the iron railings around the front courtyard were made in St. Petersburg. The Palace's woodwork, brass ornaments and chandeliers were made by Finnish and foreign artisans, with the finest pieces of furniture imported from St. Petersburg. The Palace holds many fine paintings, including landscapes by Werner Holmberg and Hjalmar Munsterhjelm and Viktoria Aberg's "Monrepos."

The Hall of Mirrors. Dinner will be held in the Hall of Mirrors on the second floor of the Palace. Formerly the Ballroom and from 1863-1907 the Throne Room, the room has French crystal chandeliers dating from 1868. When Czar Nicholas I visited Finland with his sons in 1854, it was the venue for the first major imperial ball. Today, the President of Finland meets foreign delegations, receives new governments and bids farewell to outgoing governments in the Hall of Mirrors.

SCHEDULE

The dinner for Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin and their delegations, hosted by President Ahtisaari, will be held on Wednesday, March 19. Earlier in the day, the President calls on President Ahtisaari at his office on the ground floor of the Presidential Palace. There will be approximately 30 attendees at dinner, ten from each country. President Ahtisaari will greet Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin upon arrival and escort them to the Hall of Mirrors. There will be a brief photo opportunity before the dinner. No formal toasts are planned.

SUMMIT

Scenesetter

3/25/97

SCENESETTER: MEETINGS AND
WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
AT THE FINNISH PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE

BACKGROUND

The two summit working sessions and working lunch with President Yeltsin will be held at the Finnish Presidential residence at Mantyniemi (MAN-too-knee-a-me), Finnish for "pine cape." Mantyniemi was designed by Raili and Reima Pietila as the presidential residence and was completed in 1993. President and Mrs. Ahtisaari have lived there since his inauguration in 1994.

Located in the seaside Meilahti district of Helsinki, Mantyniemi is a glass and granite structure inspired by the impressions that the Ice Age left upon the Finnish landscape. The winding structure blends with the rocks and vegetation of the site, and all rooms in the residential portion open onto their own terraces. White dominates the interior, creating a "Winter House" effect, with shifting light that creates new forms as it enters the residence. Its surroundings are reflected inside the building as shadows from the nearby forest play on the walls.

Mantyniemi is a beautifully-integrated work of art whose building materials, furniture, light fixtures, textiles, works of art and even tableware were all especially selected to suit the building. The structure itself is made of indigenous varieties of wood and stone. Reijo Paavilainen's relief "Travels of Lemminkainen" is in the entrance hall and Kimi Pakarinen's painting "The Same Blood in All of Us" is in the dining room.

The designers chose characteristic Finnish species for the natural site -- including heather and whortleberry, and apple, birch and rowan trees. Mantyniemi epitomizes the deep Finnish affinity for rock, forest and water, as well as modern design.

SCHEDULE

President Ahtisaari will welcome Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to Mantyniemi. The latter two will then hold their morning meeting and working lunch with delegations. ~~After lunch, there will be a two-and-a-half hour break (Yeltsin will return to his hotel to rest).~~ You will then have your afternoon meeting at Mantyniemi. At the conclusion of the afternoon session, the Presidents and delegations will adjourn to Hotel Kalastajatorppa for the joint press conference.

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Morning Meeting

3/25/97

MORNING SESSION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0170-M (1.06)
KBH 1/27/2020

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Seek Yeltsin's affirmation that early agreement on NATO-Russia relationship in our mutual interests.
- Come to common understanding on basic principles and content of NATO-Russia charter, including permanent consultative mechanism, providing Russia voice but not veto.
- Identify areas for cooperation between NATO and Russia, such as peacekeeping.
- Describe to Yeltsin how NATO's CFE adaptation proposal will meet Russian concerns about the military implications of enlargement and urge him to work from it as basis for agreement on basic principles before the Madrid summit.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

European security is the crucial and most contentious issue on your agenda with Yeltsin. Agreement with him on the way forward from Helsinki will be key to continued progress toward a NATO-Russia charter that defines fundamental principles of the NATO-Russia relationship. In seeking Russian agreement, your personal relationship with Yeltsin may make the difference -- Yeltsin stressed in the February 26 call that he looks to this summit to resolve outstanding issues and assuage Russian concerns related to enlargement.

~~The image of the two superpowers joining together to make hard decisions is still important to Russia -- and to Yeltsin.~~

Russia's bilateral relations with the United States are its single most effective means of validating its claims to world power status. Yeltsin may still seek unacceptable limits on enlargement. However, he has said he wants success in Helsinki, though it is not certain that the Russians can overcome their concerns about enlargement to the degree that will permit a common understanding with you on the substance of a NATO-Russia relationship.

You can suggest to Yeltsin what that success might be. You should present Helsinki as ~~a chance that the United States and Russia must not miss~~ -- the opportunity for the two Presidents to define a new set of relationships between Russia, Europe and the United States that will take our two nations and the world into

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the next century. The responsibility for ensuring the security of our own peoples and our neighbors in Europe is clear; it is up to us now to find the right formula.

That formula should be based on a shared vision of an undivided Europe, whole and free, whose security rests upon the commitments of NATO and Russia. Yeltsin must be convinced of NATO's willingness to consider Russia its full partner in building new security structures that respect the sovereignty of all European states. In striking a positive note on the NATO-Russia charter, you should reaffirm the value of our bilateral channel and also support NATO Secretary General Solana's dialogue with Primakov. Solana is negotiating, on the basis of agreed guidance from NATO, the text of the charter with Primakov. We will want to feed any agreements you strike with Yeltsin into that process.

You can review for Yeltsin our concept of the consultative mechanism and ideas on issues that may be appropriate for joint decision-making and possible action by Russia and NATO. The cooperation between NATO and Russia in Bosnia is a concrete example of the potential for joint action. Our goal beyond Helsinki will be to create the structures to formalize and expand NATO-Russia activities in tandem with enlargement and further development of the Partnership for Peace. You can suggest that Russia and the United States should also act together to reinforce the OSCE's role in Europe.

Yeltsin also has to "explain" enlargement to the Russian people, although opposition to it comes mostly from the elite. You can usefully outline for him steps that NATO has taken to address Russian security concerns: The Alliance adopted the "three no's" on nuclear deployment (no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members); tabled a CFE proposal that will set significant limits on any military build-up in Central Europe; and committed to work for a CFE framework agreement by mid-year. NATO had already withdrawn most nuclear weapons from Europe and drastically cut ground force levels. Its internal adaptation is ongoing and it has declared that it has no enemies at present.

NATO's CFE proposal provides for strict limits on armor and artillery in the Visegrad countries, Kaliningrad, Belarus and part of Ukraine; but it nevertheless would allow NATO to deploy some equipment on the territory of new members within those limits. The Russians' proposal would ban all NATO equipment from the territory of new members. While NATO foresees no permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members, we cannot accept restrictions that would bar us from stationing any equipment (or, should the current security environment change, substantial equipment). Doing so would

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~~undermine NATO's Article V security guarantee, carve out a "second-class" status for new members and provoke a firestorm of protest in Central Europe and on the Hill.~~

Finally, you should note our five "red lines" on NATO and NATO enlargement -- ~~no delay~~ in the enlargement process, ~~no veto~~ over enlargement decisions, ~~no second-class membership~~, ~~no exclusion~~ of any country from eligibility and ~~no subordination of NATO to~~ any other organization. We must be careful not to cross these "red lines" as doing so could create a dangerous backlash among the Central Europeans and domestically here and make the NATO-Russia relationship unsustainable with Congress. At the same time, you can stress to Yeltsin that much can be done within these bounds. We are offering unprecedented, forward-leaning proposals to create an enduring NATO-Russia partnership, and you should underscore this to Yeltsin.

You might also note that ~~vociferous anti-NATO rhetoric helps neither of us.~~ Yeltsin knows that the July summit is fast-approaching and that Russia cannot alter the Alliance's plans; you are offering to help him define success in terms that are mutually acceptable. In that context, you should seek his agreement to a joint U.S.-Russia statement on European security. Ideally, that statement would call for acceleration of work on the NATO-Russia charter and call for a NATO-Russia summit, perhaps in late May, at which to sign it. We would not, however, want to lock ourselves in to such a summit unless we were confident that the charter is achievable.

TALKING POINTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Introductory

- Delighted to have this time together. Our meetings -- and our personal engagement, decisions and agreements -- always key to charting course for bilateral relationship.
- Believe we have truly historic opportunity, not only to reenergize U.S.-Russia relations, but to find way forward to shape European security relations for generations to come.
- Together have already done much for our two nations -- and world peace; now at defining moment for future, 21st century.
- Time to think about what we can do in our second terms, where we want to direct U.S.-Russian relations, and what kind of legacies we want to leave behind.
- Have opportunity to accomplish a lot:
 - to build more stable, secure and undivided Europe;
 - to further reduce nuclear arms and nuclear danger;
 - to expand trade and investment opportunities that will mean economic growth and jobs.
- Hope to release joint statements on all of these areas today, to show we are making progress on broad range of issues.

European Security

- Suggest we begin with Europe. Knotty issue, but one where I believe you and I together can make important progress.
- My vision for Europe as before: new era; Cold War behind us; first post-Cold War Presidents; up to us to define future of integrated, undivided Europe. Believe you share this vision.
- In months ahead, cooperation between United States, Russia, rest of Europe crucial if we are to realize this vision.

- Our work together must be based on equality, befitting Russia's greatness, special role in Europe -- and world.
- Essential Russia be NATO's partner in creating Europe's new security system -- agree with you there can be no lasting peace and stability without Russia.
- Over last three years, as Europe's security situation has evolved, I have kept my word to you on timing, openness of NATO adaptation and enlargement.
- Have seen to it Russia's legitimate interests and political problems taken into account; now time to take next steps.
- Have pressed Allies to offer unprecedented proposals to meet concerns you identified. Elements:
 - NATO-Russia charter to give stature, shape, visibility to new relationship -- one of NATO-Russia partnership;
 - permanent NATO-Russia Joint Council, ensuring Russia voice with NATO on key European security deliberations;
 - mutually-satisfactory arrangements on CFE adaptation to ensure against build-up in Central Europe;
 - affirmation of NATO's policy of "no intention, no plans and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of new member states.

NATO-Russia Charter

- Note centrality of NATO-Russia charter; draft Solana gave Primakov contains elements we think appropriate.
- Charter would carry high-level political commitment; if we agree on contents, could then be signed at summit-level meeting to highlight importance.
- Charter could reaffirm post-Cold War changes in European security landscape as well as transformation of NATO and establishment of formal NATO-Russia relationship.

- Charter could refer to our common commitment to UN goals and OSCE principles, set goal of further strengthening NATO-Russia relationship.
- Prepared to make NATO's transformation part of consultations to help Russia understand NATO indeed changing.

Timing

- Propose charter be concluded, as quickly as possible. If we can complete charter, propose to hold summit of NATO leaders with you, perhaps in late May. Would be separate, high-visibility event well in advance of July NATO summit.

Consultative Mechanism

- Propose to establish formal consultative mechanism, "Joint Council," as special, permanent forum that will:
 - encourage consultation on broad range of issues, coordination, and to maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint action by NATO and Russia;
 - schedule frequent in-depth discussions at various levels, political and military;
 - expand opportunities for Russian participation with NATO in planning of peacekeeping, other joint military activities.
- NATO and Russia would of course reserve respective rights -- consistent with other international obligations -- of independent decision-making and action.
- Willing to broaden Alliance consultations with Russia to encompass nuclear issues, possibility of cooperation on TMD.
- Suggest we also look at ways to foster additional NATO-Russia military cooperation. Our joint efforts in Bosnia illustrate potential for security cooperation between NATO and Russia.
- Also considering ways to use OSCE as more tangible expression of security cooperation in Europe.

[If "NATO hasn't changed" argumentation raised]

- NATO already greatly changed. This a new NATO; no longer "us vs. them," but cooperation with Russia.
- In 1991, NATO adopted new strategic concept that sought to encourage changes underway in East; established basis for peacekeeping, coalition crisis management operations.
- NATO initiated restructuring of military forces: reduced nuclear arsenal by 90 percent, drastically cut conventional forces. For example, U.S. troops in Europe down from 300,000 to about 100,000.
- In December 1996, NATO announced "no intention, no plans and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of any new member state.
- Recognize Russian government's concern that it must "explain" enlargement to the Russian people.
 - Close and institutionalized relationship with NATO will underscore cooperation, partnership.
 - At same time, Russian leaders should present enlargement to nation factually, not appeal to worst fears.
 - I have same responsibility to make clear to Americans that it is "new Russia." That is what leadership is about.

[If "Quint" summit raised]

- "Quint" summit problematic with smaller Allies. Would only make sense if confirms previously arrived-at understanding. Perhaps better to consider NATO-Russia summit.

[If Yeltsin wants to schedule NATO-Russia summit before we are confident agreement on charter is within reach]

- NATO-Russia summit should have an agreed charter to sign as centerpiece. Let us stay in touch on this, as Solana and Primakov come to agreement on charter.
- But let us agree between us to aim for closure in time for NATO-Russia summit in Europe at end of May.

CFE Adaptation

- NATO Allies have tabled forward-leaning CFE adaptation proposal. Addresses your key concern about military implications of enlargement.
- Russia has said concerned about two things: limiting possible growth of NATO military potential and limiting its movement eastward. NATO proposal addresses both.
- Our proposal commits current NATO members to significant reductions in permitted equipment levels.
- Our proposal would freeze the current maximum numbers of armor and artillery that could be located in Poland, Hungary, Belarus, Czech and Slovak Republics, Ukraine and the Kaliningrad Oblast. Would prevent build-up in region.

NATO proposal represents major effort to address Russian concerns. Hope it can provide basis for early agreement on basic principles before July NATO summit.

[If Yeltsin raises ban on stationed forces on territory of new NATO members]

- Ban on stationed forces unacceptable; would mean "second-class status" for any new NATO member. No NATO intent to station significant combat forces; NATO CFE proposal guarantees no increase in equipment levels in Central Europe.
- NATO position: "in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."
- This should provide sufficient assurance; cannot negotiate this point.

Russia-Baltics (as appropriate)

- Strongly support good relations between Russia and Baltics. Not inconsistent with Baltics' expanding ties to West.

- Pragmatic resolution of differences in all sides' interests; will contribute to more stable Europe. Urge you to keep open constructive bilateral channel.

[If Yeltsin raises Baltics' possible NATO membership]

- No decisions yet on who will be invited to begin accession talks in July.
- But will not exclude Baltics or other emerging European democracies from consideration for eventual membership.
- Not in anyone's interest to draw new, critical line. But NATO will continue to evolve in way that enhances all European countries stability, including Russia.

[If Yeltsin raises "pause"]

- Steady, deliberate, step-by-step process. But cannot artificially stop clock.

[If Yeltsin raises situation of Russians in Baltics]

- Neither OSCE nor we have seen pattern of abuse of Russians.
- At same time, have urged Baltic governments to make Russians feel welcome in their countries.

Working Lunch

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WORKING LUNCH WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Economics: underscore need to pass tax, energy, commercial laws to achieve investment, growth, economic integration.
- Outline U.S. role: financing for investment; substantial new assistance package; support WTO, Paris Club, OECD membership.
- Explain path forward on G-8 and Jackson-Vanik while stressing need to manage these issues with care.
- NIS: stress U.S.-Russian cooperation to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; encourage cooperation with Ukraine.
- Foreign policy: exchange views on China post-Deng.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Your lunch will cover economic, NIS and foreign policy issues. Yeltsin's March 6 "State of the Federation" address set the right tone on economic reform and prioritized relations with the NIS. Still, Yeltsin needs to internalize that the key between stagnation or growth at home, as well as smooth management of foreign policy issues, will be his personal engagement.

Investment and Growth. We suggest you build off of Yeltsin's speech to elicit his personal commitment to an economic agenda to attract investment. While Yeltsin says investment is his top economic priority, he has not fully grasped that it takes more than cajoling; investors must have confidence to risk the Russian market. Chubays' return to government is welcome, but he is despised by the Duma and may spark friction with Chernomyrdin; his success depends on Yeltsin's backing. You should endorse the agenda which the Vice President proposed to Chernomyrdin and which Chubays backs: a new tax administration law, amendments to the VAT and excise tax to stabilize revenues, new income tax laws, changes in energy laws, new laws to tackle crime and ratification of our Bilateral Investment Treaty.

U.S. Support. You can tell Yeltsin that we have mobilized funds to finance \$4 billion in investment (through OPIC, EXIM and our enterprise fund), that we will seek more assistance funds to intensify cooperation on investment bottlenecks (taxes, crime) and that we will work with Russia to accelerate membership in WTO, the Paris Club and OECD. Yeltsin may ask to set an early date to complete these (possibly end 1998), but timing depends on

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Russia. WTO has been delayed by Russia's slowness in making trade proposals; you might offer to set the Denver summit as a target to join the Paris Club; it will take Russia beyond 2000 to meet OECD financial standards.

G-8, Jackson-Vanik. You will want to explain your plan to evolve further the Eight at Denver but also note the Seven will meet separately on economics and finance. Yeltsin may ask to announce the G-8 in Helsinki; we advise against it since we need to build consensus among the Seven. On Jackson-Vanik, Jewish groups have voiced several concerns, including a new Russian law extending from five to ten years the waiting period for visas for those working in sensitive areas. The National Conference of Soviet Jewry (the umbrella organization representing mainstream Jewish community views on emigration issues) is not prepared to support graduation now; we have asked them to define a process and end date that we could factor into an approach to Yeltsin.

Nagorno-Karabakh. With the United States now joining Russia and France in the OSCE Minsk Group Tri-Chair, cooperation with Russia is critical for progress towards a settlement. Primakov told Secretary Albright in late February that we must "pool our resources." You should note our strong desire to work closely with Russia to make real progress in resolving the conflict.

Ukraine. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine have heated up over Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. Kuchma recently asked you to intervene on Russia's long-delayed compensation to Ukraine for tactical nuclear weapons. You might note that Kuchma believes Russian-Ukrainian relations always improve when Yeltsin engages and that his intervention to compensate Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons might diffuse recent tensions.

China. Chinese President Jiang Zemin will visit Moscow next month. You might review our developing relations with China, express appreciation for the new stability between Moscow and Beijing, seek Yeltsin's views on China post-Deng and note our expectation of continuity in China's approach to the United States.

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TALKING POINTS FOR WORKING LUNCH

Investment and Growth

- Russian economy has some way to go, but can see how far Russia has come, transformed society. Directions you set March 6, accomplishments, vision are historic.
- March 6 speech crystal clear on problems: low investment, no growth. Your agenda right on target: realistic budget, tax reform, reform pensions, housing, military reform.
- But most important -- your vision. Wrote down what you said: "I wish to hand over to my successor a country with a dynamically developing economy and with effective and just social protection, a country whose citizens confidently look to the future." Worthy ambition; want to help.
- Matches my vision for our economic interaction over next four years: expand mutually advantageous trade and investment opportunities, integrate Russia into world economy.
- Al and Viktor discussed need for vision, tight agenda to achieve it. You gave this great start. Also pleased to see Chubays back to work on economics.
- You and I agreed last year to emphasize investment. Only way to achieve growth, create jobs, make people more secure.
- Investment in Russia too low; \$100 billion annually going to emerging markets, but Russia gets just 3-4 percent. Enormous potential for Russia to attract, but investors still think taxes too high, laws unstable, too much crime.
- Clear we cannot force investment in. Viktor liked phrase from American oil executive; said pushing investment like pushing on a rope. Will not work; have to pull investment in.
- Al and Viktor agreed on tax priorities, energy laws that could attract \$50-60 billion in investment, laws on crime and corruption, need to ratify Bilateral Investment Treaty.

[Ask Larry Summers to expand on investment agenda]

- We can help on technical aspects; have team helping Viktor, Chubays on taxes. Hard part is getting laws past Duma.

- Know from experience, Boris, only you can make this happen. Your leadership with Duma key.
- You need to marshall your energy carefully as you recover your strength; must not overdo physically; but only you can set the course.

U.S. Role -- Finance and Integration

- Said since Vancouver that economic relationship built on partnership. As you move on policy, United States prepared to do our part.
- Ready to instruct my government to make available funds in 1997 to support \$4 billion in investment. That's same amount this year as total from 1992-1996.
- Can assure you funding available, but cannot make investors use it. They have to be willing to borrow and invest. Markets and policies, reforms you pursue will guide them.
- Have asked Congress for new NIS aid package for 1998. Will expand cooperation on investment problems like crime, taxes.
- Also want to expand exchanges, get more young people to know each other, build people-to-people relationship for future.
- Just as important, as reforms move ahead, want to accelerate Russia's membership in WTO, Paris Club, OECD. Al discussed with Viktor; both of us need to work on this.
- Membership more than question of investment, open markets. These organizations will define global trade and economic relations for 21st century. Russia needs to be at table.

Jackson-Vanik and G-8

- Two other matters: Jackson-Vanik, G-8. Both very symbolic; progress will underscore Russia's integration.
- Al promised Viktor to explore graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik provisions.

- Jewish community, Congress concerned that Duma passed law to extend waiting period for emigration from five to ten years for people working in sensitive areas.
- Would help tremendously if you could repeal this law, go back to five-year period.
- Will work with Jewish community and Congress to define process to move forward on Jackson-Vanik graduation. Will be in touch with you later on this.
- On G-8, my idea for Denver is you join from beginning. Seven would carve out some time to discuss economic, financial issues and would issue statement, but not at joint press conference of Seven.
- Request we keep this private; still must build consensus among other Seven. If they agree, can announce closer to Denver.

[If raised -- APEC membership]

- WTO most important. APEC defining membership criteria this year, inviting new members in 1998; candidates join 1999-2000. Willing to see how other members respond.

[If raised -- 1998 goal to join clubs]

- Hard to set one date. Prepared to do Paris Club by Denver if negotiators work out terms. WTO depends on Russian trade offer; still not received. OECD probably takes longer.

[If raised -- call Russia "market economy"]

- Trade specialists say this would hurt Russia: dumping laws still apply, just like for EU; but you could also face other duties. Experts can discuss, but suggest we not pursue.

[If raised -- announce Free Trade Area]

- Important long-term goal; first step is WTO. But if announce FTA before Russia joins WTO, critics will start to undermine. Trade ministries should consult quietly.

U.S.-Russia Global Cooperation

- Look to expand U.S.-Russian cooperation in foreign policy arena, building on cooperation on Middle East peace and Bosnia. Believe there is much we can achieve together.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- One area may be Nagorno-Karabakh. Strongly endorse Primakov's suggestion to Albright to pool resources to resolve regional conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh.
- United States, Russia and France must work out common approach in Minsk Group to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to compromise. You and I must strongly support this.
- Let us keep in touch on this -- would be important diplomatic victory for all sides. Would be important demonstration to world of great potential of U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Ukraine

- On Ukraine, have noted rising tensions over Sevastopol. Kuchma wrote me; raised concern Ukraine still not compensated for tactical nuclear weapons transferred 1991-1992.
- Kuchma always tells me relationship with Russia works when you are engaged. Might be important step to settle compensation issue; you could help diffuse other tensions.

China

- Will continue to pursue strengthened U.S. engagement with China. Value stable Russian-Chinese relations.
- Your thoughts about China's future post-Deng? Albright's trip confirms our expectation of continuity in basic policies.

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AFTERNOON SESSION WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Underscore importance of United States and Russia taking concrete steps to further reduce the nuclear danger.
- Conclude START III "guidelines" on further reductions in nuclear forces.
- Secure commitment from Yeltsin to seek START II ratification as soon as possible, preferably before Denver summit.
- Reaffirm U.S. willingness to begin negotiations on START III immediately after START II is ratified by Russia.
- Conclude joint statement on ABM Treaty that resolves all remaining issues on ABM/TMD demarcation and directs experts to conclude agreement as soon as possible based on this approach.
- Urge Yeltsin to press Indian Prime Minister Gowda on CTBT.
- Reiterate concern regarding arms transfers to and nuclear cooperation with Iran.

WJC

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Your afternoon meeting with Yeltsin will focus on START and ABM issues. Our objectives remain to reach agreement on START III "guidelines" and a joint statement on ABM/TMD that will facilitate Russian ratification of START II as soon as possible (although the prospects are small, given views in the Duma, we would like to seek ratification prior to the June Denver summit, which would allow you to exchange instruments of ratification then).

START. To provide an incentive for the Russians to move ahead with START II ratification, we have proposed START III "guidelines" for Helsinki that would mandate cuts to 2,000-2,500 warheads and extend the START II reductions period (which now ends in January 2003) by three-and-one-half years (vice our initial proposal of two years) as part of a duly ratified START III Treaty. But we would require early deactivation (warhead removal) by January 2003, of all systems to be eliminated under START II. Extending the START II reductions period past 2006 would entail substantial U.S. force structure costs, while

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allowing Russia to retain its MIRVed ICBMs until or very near the end of their service lives.

The Russians have held firm for a five-year extension of START II, separate from START III. We have told the Russians that we wish the extension to be part of a START III Treaty (extension will require Senate approval, which would be easier to obtain in the context of "one debate" over ratification of a START III Treaty). If pressed by Yeltsin, your points say we are prepared to agree to the extension in a separate protocol, but it would only be submitted to the Senate after the Duma ratifies both START II and the protocol without amendments. In a disturbing development, Russian experts have insisted on provisions in the "guidelines" reopening issues settled in START I and II: (the "guidelines" reopening issues settled in START I and II):

- Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles. During the START I negotiation, we succeeded in keeping SLCMs out from under the Treaty, but in a side deal, agreed to exchange declarations on the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs in our respective forces (verification of a SLCM limit is very problematic, and we do not wish to constrain conventionally-armed SLCMs). Russian experts now want agreement in the START III "guidelines" to explore limits on both nuclear- and conventionally-armed SLCMs.
- "Downloading." We and the Russians agreed in START II that certain U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles could be "downloaded" by at least two warheads each. The Russians now want to require that any missile "downloaded" by two warheads or more be equipped with new platforms that are equipped to deploy fewer warheads. This would be tremendously expensive for the Navy Trident D-5 and Air Force Minuteman III and would require substantial flight-testing.
- Bombers. START II allows each side to reorient up to 100 bombers from nuclear to conventional roles without stripping them of their nuclear "wiring" and maintain them outside of the Treaty's limits. We have reoriented our B-1 force in this manner; it no longer trains for nuclear missions and is not deployed with nuclear weapons. We agreed to this as part of a compromise in which we also agreed to count nuclear bombers with as many warheads as they are equipped for (under START I, a bomber carrying 16 gravity bombs only counts as one warhead). The Russians now propose that all our B-1s count against START III unless their nuclear "wiring" is removed.

Moreover, whereas we believe the "guidelines" should be concluded in final at Helsinki, to be followed by Russian ratification of START II, the Russian view remains the "guidelines" would merely

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be "instructions to experts," to be followed by a more detailed document in Denver. This is contrary to the understanding that you reached with Yeltsin in your February 26 phone call. An announcement of "instructions to experts" at Helsinki would have little impact, and the Russians would surely use the subsequent months to try to reopen START I and II issues, thereby effectively launching a START III "negotiation" in advance of START II entry-into-force.

While agreeing on START III "guidelines" is in itself a form of START III "negotiations," we believe actual negotiations should formally begin only once the Duma ratifies START II and that Treaty enters into force. Were we to begin START III negotiations absent Duma ratification of START II, the Russians would have little incentive to press the Duma to ratify. They might also try to reopen other START II provisions, including the ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs, which is START II's major contribution to strategic stability.

Primakov continued to link START III "guidelines" and START II ratification to agreement on ABM/TMD demarcation and satisfaction on the NATO-Russia relationship. He also promised to engage on these issues and suggested that he would clear up the remaining roadblocks within the Russian bureaucracy, particularly the MOD.

ABM. We and the Russians have agreed on how to handle "lower velocity" TMD systems (although we have not yet brought that agreement into effect). We remain at an impasse over "higher velocity" TMD systems (as Yeltsin himself said in his March 14 press comments). The Russians want to impose a series of tight testing and deployment constraints on such systems. These are unacceptable to the Chiefs and would be very problematic on the Hill.

In early March, U.S. experts proposed a joint statement on ABM/TMD that included a comprehensive approach to concluding the demarcation agreement, in which we showed flexibility on the Russian desire to address the velocities of interceptors, provided more information on our TMD plans and offered expanded cooperation on theater missile defenses. Primakov expressed considerable interest in resolving this issue along these lines, although his experts continued to press for unacceptable constraints on some of our critical TMD activities.

CTBT. Yeltsin meets with Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda in Moscow March 24-26, four days after Helsinki. This is a golden opportunity for Yeltsin to press Gowda to sign the CTBT, pointing to the START III "guidelines" as evidence of our commitment to continue the process of nuclear disarmament.

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Arms Sales to Iran. While Russia so far appears to have honored its commitment to end conventional arms transfers to Iran, we receive reports suggesting that some Russian entities continue to explore sales, most recently the SA-10 air defense missile system and technical assistance to Iran's ballistic missile system. Chernomyrdin told the Vice President in February that Russia has not authorized any sales inconsistent with its commitments; this activity could be unauthorized or covert.

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TALKING POINTS FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

START

- Reducing nuclear danger important part of our relationship. Have accomplished much over last four years: START I entry-into-force, Trilateral Statement with Ukraine, indefinite extension of NPT, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- As we define relationship for next four years and into next century, want to ensure our strategic relationship develops in manner consistent with our improving political relations.
- Can take further steps to reduce nuclear danger, including implementing START II, further cuts in START III.
- Will be vital part of legacy you and I leave behind.
- When we spoke in late February, agreed to adopt final "guidelines" on START III at our meeting today.
- These "guidelines" will provide foundation for START III negotiations and define way forward on nuclear arms control. Should help with Duma ratification of START II.
- "Guidelines" would make clear commitment to further cuts in START III, willingness to extend START II reductions period.
- This will reduce costs to Russia of implementing START, make it easier to maintain parity at lower numbers. Should provide tool to push for START II ratification.
- Would like to see START II ratified and in force as soon as possible. If ratified by Duma this spring, could exchange instruments of ratification in Denver.
- Our experts have worked hard on "guidelines," and much has been agreed. Three problems, however:
 - First, your experts pushing five-year extension of START II.
 - Five-year extension just not possible, nor is it needed, given our commitment to lower levels in START III.
 - Proposed "splitting difference" between your proposed five-year extension and our proposed two-year extension. This

would give you until June 30, 2006, over nine years, to meet START II deadline.

- Have proposed 2006 if you agree to: warhead removal by 2003 of all systems to be eliminated under START II; indefinite extension of START I and START II Treaties; and make our agreement on START II extension part of START III Treaty.
- Hope we can close now on this basis.
- Second, your experts proposed reopening number of issues settled in START I and II in START III "guidelines."
 - Cannot agree to revisit issues previously settled in START I and II in "guidelines" for START III. If you insist on this, risk losing "guidelines" altogether.
 - Hope we can drop these from "guidelines." Of course, Russia can raise any issues it wishes in negotiations.
- Finally, your experts still proposing we merely agree on work program for experts. Want to confirm previous understanding that we are concluding final "guidelines" for START III.
 - Should be ambitious. People will not understand if we merely produce instructions for experts to produce "guidelines" later. Will not give you tool to achieve START II ratification.
 - Once Duma has ratified START II, can immediately begin negotiations on START III.

[If Yeltsin can agree to 3 1/2 year extension of START II, but insists it be separate from START III]

- If we can resolve all other issues in "guidelines," prepared to agree to extend final phase of START II reductions as separate protocol that would require approval of Senate.
- But would not submit protocol for Senate approval until Duma had ratified START II and Protocol without other amendments.

[If Yeltsin insists on including measures relating to SLCMs, downloading or heavy bomber reorientation]

- With respect to SLCMs, we no longer deploy nuclear-armed SLCMs at sea and have eliminated ability to deploy them on

Navy surface ships. Any remaining issues can be addressed under our "guideline" on non-strategic nuclear forces.

- On downloading, believe our proposed "guideline" on warhead destruction and transparency responds to specific concerns you have raised; details can be worked out in negotiations.
- With respect to reorientation of bombers from conventional to nuclear roles, this provision part of careful compromise that included our agreeing to count each heavy bomber in START II with number of warheads each plane equipped to carry. Sure you would not want to reopen this provision.

[If Yeltsin insists Russia cannot complete START III reductions in the same time as the extended START II reductions period]

- Would be hard to explain, given our political relationship, why it takes so long to implement START III cuts. People will not understand why it takes to 2011.
- If you accept our proposal to extend START II reductions period to June 30, 2006, and implement early deactivation by 2003, could agree to finish START III reductions two years beyond this point, that is, June 30, 2008.
- If we cannot agree on this, should remain silent in "guidelines," leave issue for actual START III negotiations.

[If Yeltsin suggests beginning negotiations on START III immediately, prior to Duma approval of START II]

- We cannot agree to this. Afraid would only give Duma incentive to "wait and see" what happens in these negotiations and therefore delay action on START II, perhaps fatally undermining Treaty.
- START II important to me and to Congress. Not prepared to give it up.
- Must have START II before begin negotiations on START III.

ABM

- ABM Treaty remains cornerstone of strategic stability. We reaffirmed this in our May 1995 Joint Statement, which established principles to guide resolution of ABM/TMD demarcation negotiations.

- Can take big step today towards strengthening ABM Treaty for future if we agree on joint statement that includes comprehensive approach to concluding negotiations on ABM/TMD demarcation.
- Our experts have been working on this for over three years. Joint statement we have proposed represents complete package and addresses your concerns, including those associated with interceptor velocity.
- Primakov in Moscow two weeks ago said that, with sentence on TMD cooperation, our proposed joint statement would be acceptable. We provided that sentence.
- Have reached our bottom line. Simply cannot go further.
- Have opportunity to resolve this issue and make it stick. Let's seize this. Can put ABM/TMD issue behind us, pave way for quick action on START.

[If Yeltsin insists on interceptor velocity ceilings]

- Cannot agree to ceilings on interceptor velocity, as this would be unsustainable with our Congress.
- Prepared to state we have no plans for systems with interceptor velocities in excess of 5.5 km/sec for land- and air-based TMDs, 4.5 km/sec for sea-based TMDs, with notification if plans change.

CTBT

- Want to personally thank you for decisive role you played in concluding Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty last fall. Would not have happened without your leadership.
- Next week, you meet Indian Prime Minister Gowda. CTBT cannot enter into force until India signs. Hope you will encourage Gowda to sign.
- You can point to progress we have made at Helsinki on nuclear disarmament as evidence we are taking steps to meet Indian concerns. We will do same.

Arms Sales to Iran

- Al raised with Viktor in February our concerns about possible sales of Russian missiles and missile technology to Iran, including support for Iran's ballistic missile program.
- We appreciate commitments you and Viktor have made to end arms-related trade with Iran.
- Serious issue that requires your attention to ensure that any sales inconsistent with our understandings are stopped. Iran still poses serious security threat to region. Development of long-range ballistic missiles would pose even greater threat.
- Note self-restraint Russia has exercised on nuclear cooperation with Iran but, given Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, believe any nuclear cooperation with Iran is mistake.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Private Dinner with President Yeltsin (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. talking points	Points for Private Dinner with President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. paper	Overview of U.S. Russian Relations (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. paper	Russian Political Scene (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005. paper	Russia and NATO (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
006. paper	START and ABM/TMD (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. paper	Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. paper	Russia and the New Independent States (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
009. paper	Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh and Energy (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
010. paper	Russia and the Baltics (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
011. paper	Russia and Iran (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/30/2020</i>	03/25/1997	P1/b(1)
012. paper	U.S. Russia Trade Relations (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
013. paper	Russia and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. paper	G-7 and Russia (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
015. memo	re: Helsinki Summit (1 page)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)
016. paper	re: Helsinki Summit (4 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)
017. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/11/1997	P1/b(1)
018. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/12/1997	P1/b(1)
019. report	Biography (1 page)	03/11/1997	P1/b(1)
020. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/10/1997	P1/b(1)
021. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/10/1997	P1/b(1)
022. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	03/05/1997	P1/b(1)
023. paper	Meeting with Finnish President Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Lipponen (2 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
024. talking points	Points to be Made for Meeting with President Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Lipponen of Finland (3 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
025. paper	Finnish Relations with Russia (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M

kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. paper	NATO Enlargement/Madrid Summit (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
027. paper	EU Issues: Finland (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
028. paper	Partnership for Peace/Atlantic Partnership Council (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
029. paper	Relations with the Baltic States (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
030. paper	U.S.-Finnish Relations (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
031. paper	Bosnia and UN Peacekeeping (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
032. paper	Political/Economic Overview (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
033. paper	Baltic Action Plan (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

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Private Dinner

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3125197

PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Get Yeltsin's view on Russian domestic situation.
- Outline key events over next several months (including possible NATO-Russia summit, Denver).
- Note points that can help Yeltsin deal with political problem that NATO enlargement may pose for him at home.

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2016-0140-M (1.12)
K8H 1/27/2020

CONTEXT OF MEETING

A Long Day. The Russians suggested this private dinner, at which only notetakers and interpreters will join you and Yeltsin. The dinner will come after the joint press conference that concludes the "formal" program of the Helsinki summit. It will have been a long day for Yeltsin -- two working sessions, a working lunch and a press conference -- perhaps his busiest day since before he took ill last summer. He may well show some fatigue.

The dinner thus does not provide a good venue for serious business. While there may be loose ends from earlier discussions during the day, we recommend you stay away from heavy substance.

Russian Domestic Scene. You might invite Yeltsin to comment on the Russian domestic situation. His March 6 "State of the Federation" address, his choice of ardent reformer Chubays as First Deputy Prime Minister and the likely appointment of a new Russia cabinet on the eve of Helsinki make clear Yeltsin's desire to shake things up. Yeltsin may well be more candid with you on his plans in this private setting than the previous evening's dinner hosted by Ahtisaari and joined by delegations. Yeltsin, in turn, may ask about the political scene here.

The Way Forward. You might also outline for Yeltsin the events over the next several months. You can encourage him to consider carefully the advantages of a NATO-Russia summit in late May but make clear that such a summit would be premised on completion of the NATO-Russia charter. You may want again to reassure Yeltsin of your commitment to manage the NATO-Russia process in a manner that does not threaten Russia and makes it easier for him to say he has protected Russia's key interests. You might also mention Denver and your readiness to refine the schedule to approximate a G-8.

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POINTS FOR PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

Russian Domestic Scene

- Closely followed March 6 speech, subsequent moves to renew your government. Commend ambitious agenda. Next steps?
- What obstacles to your program, to economic reform?
- Opposition in Duma prepared to cooperate, or will it continue to try to stymie your program? Relations with Communists?
- How to maintain average Russian's support for change?

Looking Ahead

- Believe making good progress on NATO-Russia, both today and in Solana-Primakov channel.
- Hope you will consider carefully advantages of early NATO-Russia summit to sign charter. Will be in touch with you, other NATO leaders, as charter nears completion.
- Know enlargement poses political problem for you. But believe you can make strong case that Russian interests are advanced. Steps over next two months can stress:
 - Changed nature of NATO, including military reductions.
 - Inclusive approach that ensures Russia will have seat at table when key European security issues discussed.
 - Unique nature of NATO-Russia relationship.
- Remain committed to enlargement that proceed in manner that poses no threat to Russia, promotes more stable, integrated Europe.
- Won't cut out Russia from Europe; can't cut out any country.
- Soon need to begin thinking about Denver and how to use meeting on margins to advance bilateral agenda.

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2016-0140-M (1.13)
K84 1/27/2020

- Intend to define Denver schedule to include you to maximum extent. Will be consulting other G-7 to build consensus.

PRESS MATERIALS

REMARKS FOR POSSIBLE POOL SPRAY

- Grateful to President Ahtisaari, people of Finland for hosting Helsinki summit.
- Delighted to see President Yeltsin again. Spoken often, but haven't met since he and I were re-elected last year.
- Looking forward to discussions on how to shape U.S.-Russia relationship for next four years and into 21st century.
- U.S.-Russian relations strong. Working on wide range of issues on bilateral agenda and involving European security.
- Will discuss key questions of arms control, how we can further reduce nuclear danger and make our peoples safer.
- Want to address how we can work together to help Russia meet its economic potential and deepen Russia's integration into regional and global economic institutions. Have opportunity to expand mutually beneficial trade and investment, in interests of both countries.
- Finally, will talk about working together toward an undivided, peaceful, democratic Europe.

OPENING REMARKS FOR JOINT PRESS APPEARANCE

(TO BE PROVIDED)

POINTS TO MAKE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONS

Summit Themes

- First meeting since Yeltsin and I reelected in 1996. Opportunity to define course for U.S.-Russia relationship for next four years and into 21st century.
- Addressed range of bilateral, international issues:
 - how to craft NATO-Russia relationship and build more peaceful, democratic, undivided Europe;
 - how to reinvigorate nuclear arms reduction process, further reduce nuclear danger, make our peoples safer;
 - how to promote mutually advantageous trade, investment, that will mean more jobs for Americans and Russians.

Importance of Engaging Russia

- United States has vital stake in engaging Russia. Since Vancouver we have had a number of meetings and we have made remarkable progress together. Important to us and world that Russia is democratic, free-market economy fully integrated into world structures.

State of Bilateral Relations

- U.S.-Russian relations remain very productive:
 - making progress on arms control and European security;
 - working together on peace in Bosnia and Middle East;
 - close cooperation on economic, trade, investment issues.
- While won't agree on all issues, have shown we can make great progress on range of issues and contain differences.

Yeltsin Health Status

- You have seen him several times over last two days. Would only add we had very good talks; he was fully engaged, on top of issues, clearly intent on proceeding with his agenda.

NATO-Russia

- Open and frank discussion of NATO enlargement and Europe's changing security architecture, including NATO-Russia.
- Underscored desire to build strong NATO-Russia relationship. See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping secure, stable Europe. That is good for United States, Russia, Europe.
- Differences remain, but committed to work together to develop NATO-Russia relationship and cooperation.
- Efforts underway to develop NATO-Russia charter to further define contents and mechanism of relationship.

NATO Enlargement

- NATO enlargement will proceed on schedule. Our broader goal is overall European security system with fully integrated Russia.
- NATO and Russia changed dramatically since Cold War. No longer "us vs. them." Instead, NATO and Russia should cooperate against common European security challenge -- instability.
- Determined to manage enlargement in manner not threatening to Russia, while building strong NATO-Russia relationship.

START

- Both United States and Russia have strong interest in further nuclear arms cuts, more stable strategic balance.
- Discussing "guidelines" for START III negotiations that would begin immediately after START II enters into force.
- Urge Duma to ratify START II; will save both countries money as we reduce below START I levels.

ABM/TMD Demarcation

- United States and Russia agree on importance of maintaining ABM Treaty -- a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- Also agree on importance of developing defenses against shorter-range theater missiles.
- Key question is to distinguish between ABM missiles, which are limited by ABM Treaty, and theater missile defenses, which are not. (Making progress on this.)

Russian Economic Reform

- Historic changes: 70 percent of GDP from private sector; stable ruble; inflation tamed; market determines prices; thriving stock exchange.
- Russia facing revenue problems, but part of transitional process; Yeltsin March 6 speech tackled problems head on.
- Next stage to create climate for investment. See great potential for American, Russian investors alike.

U.S. Engagement on Russian Economic Issues

- United States, Russia agree on three-part economic agenda: legislative reforms; financing for investment; support for Russian membership in WTO, Paris Club, OECD.
- Russia to tackle key investment constraints, such as improving its tax regime.
- United States will support investment in Russia; cannot push money in, but funds will flow as Russia makes reforms, investor demand grows, more Americans enter Russian market.
 - From existing appropriations. Includes ExIm, OPIC and enterprise fund programs.
- Reforms will help Russia meet criteria for Paris Club, WTO, OECD; membership will integrate Russia with global markets.

U.S. Financial Assistance to Russia

- Benefits all countries to have stable, prosperous Russia. Proposed to Congress expanded NIS assistance initiative in 1998. Focus on investment, doubling of exchange programs.
 - Requested \$900 million for NIS, including \$240 million for Russia; could leverage billions in private capital.
- U.S. assistance benefits America. Russia is vast untapped market; our gain and Russia's for America to invest.
(If raised -- no tangible impact?)
- Sums small relative to large country, not everyone will see. But well targeted assistance having systemic impacts, benefiting millions, exchanges among thousands fostering foundation for future.

IMF Loan Program

- IMF, Russia agreed on 1997 program except fiscal targets. January tax revenues insufficient for IMF to make monthly disbursement.
- Yeltsin March 6 speech shows seriousness about addressing fiscal problems. IMF evaluating February performance, finalizing 1997 program.

Chechnya

- Encouraged by progress made by Russia and Chechnya toward peaceful mechanisms to resolve differences.
- As before, respect Russia's territorial integrity; urge both sides to settle differences through negotiation.

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh

- U.S.-Russian-French cooperation in Minsk Group can help promote peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Hope to make progress toward peace in 1997.

Russia-Iran Arms Sales

- Have firm Russian assurances that Russia will not transfer arms/sensitive nuclear technology to Iran.

- Value assurances, but remain concerned about Iran's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, other high technology weapons; potential threat to regional security if acquired.

Aleksandr Nikitin

- Hope Nikitin's case handled in accord with rules of due process, world human rights standards; case raised by USG at high levels on more than one occasion.

BACKGROUND
PAPERS

BACKGROUND PAPERS -- CLINTON/YELTIN SUMMIT

OVERVIEW OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCENE

RUSSIA AND NATO

START AND ABM/TMD

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

RUSSIA AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

CAUCASUS: NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND ENERGY

RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS

RUSSIA AND IRAN

STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

U.S.-RUSSIA TRADE RELATIONS

RUSSIA AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

G-7 AND RUSSIA

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0140-M (1.14)
KBH 1/27/2020

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3125197

OVERVIEW OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Core Interests. Over the past several years, the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship has shown surprising resilience. It has weathered differences over issues such as NATO enlargement, economics, the Iran reactor deal and arm sales to third countries. Each side has developed more realistic appraisals of the other's expectations and limitations. At the core of the relationship is an appreciation by both sides that the United States and Russia are uniquely important to one another, especially with a mutual interest in implementing strategic arms cuts and a shared commitment to Russia's reform and integration into the world's principal multilateral institutions.

Achievements. There has been drift lately on the Russian side, resulting from Yeltsin's protracted illness and Russian elections prior to that. Nonetheless, the relationship continues to develop, and a number of accomplishments are taken for granted: the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has become the key forum for an ever-expanding set of issues, including economic reform, trade, finance, energy, health care and environment. U.S. and Russian troops work smoothly side-by-side in Bosnia. The United States and Russia have taken major steps to reduce the nuclear danger, including extending indefinitely the Non-Proliferation Treaty; concluding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and implementing START I and the Trilateral Statement with Ukraine.

Differences Remain. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is the largest problem on our security/foreign policy agenda, slowing progress on other issues, notably START II ratification by the Duma (which is also slowed by differences over ABM/TMD demarcation). We continue to have concerns about Russian nuclear and arms trade with Iran, as well as its pursuit of closer relations with pariah states such as Libya and Iraq.

Russia still harbors proprietary attitudes toward the former Soviet states -- a tendency we criticize. The Russian government's frequent inability to follow through on its commitments and decisions make it necessary to elevate them to the Vice President and Chernomyrdin for resolution, often turning the Commission into a forum for dispute resolution.

Helsinki Summit. The Summit is crucial in three respects: finding a way forward on a NATO-Russia relationship; setting START III guidelines that lay a basis for further nuclear arms cuts and facilitate START II ratification; and reenergizing the process of Russia's economic transformation. These all advance key U.S. interests -- and are important for Russia in avoiding the twin risks of self-isolation and further drift at home.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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2016-0140-M (1.15)
KBH 1/27/2020

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/25/97

RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCENE

Yeltsin's Challenge. Yeltsin is at a critical juncture in his presidency. Both his place in history and Russia's course for decades will be determined by his will and capacity to reengage fully. His greatest challenge is to restore the government's ability to govern, in effect, to make Russia governable again.

Although Yeltsin faces a crisis of confidence over Russia's future from the deeply-disenchanted populace, his own position is secure. The Russian constitution gives him preponderant powers in domestic and foreign affairs. He was returned to office in 1996 by a vote generally recognized as free and fair. He appears to be recovering his physical strength.

* Despite rhetorical confrontations, the Communist-dominated Duma has not seriously challenged the government on any major policy issue. The Duma's eagerness to be part of the power structure and partake of the system's material benefits is an open secret. Not least, Yeltsin has the support of the new, powerful economic elite, which has benefited enormously from his reforms.

* *Economic Reform.* The next steps in economic reform will be politically painful. The only way to get out of the cycle of nonpayments in the economy is to force nonviable entities into bankruptcy, and that will increase unemployment. The government also needs to crack down on large companies which have decided that paying taxes is not mandatory -- and this will affect some of Yeltsin's political supporters. And, by most accounts, corruption extends to virtually every level of government and is pervasive in the natural resource sector. Yeltsin has a major challenge to instill respect for the rule of law.

Possessing the vast powers of the presidency and no longer encumbered by reelection pressures, Yeltsin must show the resolve to take on the entrenched interests. There is no other way for him to rebuild his own political stature, restore the government's ability to function and renew the public's badly damaged confidence in the political and economic system.

Yeltsin's success or failure in this endeavor is crucial not only to Russia's economic performance and ability to attract investment, but to the character of its political development for the foreseeable future. The stakes are high, and the window of opportunity for a turnaround relatively narrow. In this context, the emphasis on domestic issues in Yeltsin's March 6 speech and his decision to shift Anatoliy Chubays -- a committed, if highly unpopular, reformer -- from Presidential Chief of Staff to First Deputy Prime Minister are encouraging signs.

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2016-0140-M (1.16)
KBH 1/27/2020

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/25/97

RUSSIA AND NATO

Shift in Attitude. After months of mixed signals and strident rhetoric, Russia appears to have decided to try to reach an agreement with NATO, perhaps prior to the Madrid NATO summit. During Secretary Albright's February visit to Moscow, Primakov engaged seriously on what a coherent NATO-Russia relationship would encompass. Negotiations that began in January between NATO Secretary General Solana and Primakov on a NATO-Russia charter are continuing, complemented by our ongoing bilateral discussions and Russian contacts with other key Allies. Solana tabled a draft charter during his March 9 visit to Moscow.

Charter Contents. The charter represents a political commitment at the highest levels of the Russian and NATO governments. Besides setting out principles governing the relationship, the charter describes appropriate areas for consultation and the possibility of joint decisions or actions on a case-by-case basis. It provides for creation of a Joint Council to manage ongoing and extraordinary activities between NATO and Russia. It reiterates the Alliance's unilateral December 1996 statement of "no intention, no plan, no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states.

The main issues still to be resolved include Russian acceptance of the concept of a politically-binding, as distinct from a legally-binding, document; what the charter should say about the direction of CFE adaptation; and treatment of NATO infrastructure and permanently stationed forces on new members' territory. The Russians have declared entry of any former Soviet state into NATO a "red line" but have not made this an issue for the charter.

Helsinki. Russia considers the United States to be its primary interlocutor in this dialogue. We and the Russians recognize that, if a NATO-Russia agreement is to be reached, the way forward will likely have to be defined in Helsinki.

While the Russians will not endorse NATO enlargement -- and we have let them know we do not expect that -- Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin and Primakov recently have acknowledged that enlargement is irreversible. That recognition, plus our consistent approach to enlargement timetables and intensive efforts to meet Russian concerns, has brought us closer to a deal. If the President and Yeltsin reach a common understanding on the contours of a NATO-Russia relationship, we can broach holding a NATO-Russia summit, perhaps in late May in Paris, to sign the charter. Even if that timing is not possible, we should build upon Helsinki to continue working with Russia toward eventual agreement on a relationship.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
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START AND ABM/TMD

Helsinki Goal. The U.S. objective is to achieve ratification of START II promptly after Helsinki, based on agreement at Helsinki on extension of START II, "guidelines" for START III and the elements of an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement.

START. U.S.-proposed "guidelines" for START III would:

- Extend (in START III) the START II reductions schedule from January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2006.
- Establish the START III level of 2,000-2,500 warheads, to be reached by June 30, 2006.
- Provide for measures for destruction of warheads and data on nuclear materials.

The Russians are pressing to extend START II to 2008 and to do so by amending START II rather than START III. Rather than prompt ratification of START II, they are calling for renegotiation over the next several months of issues settled in START I and II, including SLCMs. They want the 2,000-2,500 START III level to take effect in 2011. Primakov continues to link START to both ABM/TMD and to satisfaction on the NATO-Russia relationship.

ABM/TMD. The Russians argue that an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement, which would enhance the viability of the ABM Treaty, is key to any further cuts in offensive forces and they are not prepared to go forward with START II ratification before its completion. A "Part One" agreement on demarcation with respect to TMD systems with lower-velocity interceptors has been finished but not signed. The United States has made a comprehensive proposal for demarcation with respect to higher-velocity TMD systems that adopts Russian language on interceptor velocity and includes:

- Limits on target missile parameters.
- Confidence-building measures providing information on our TMD plans and programs.
- Expanded cooperation on theater missile defenses.

Our proposal represents the limits of our flexibility. Primakov expressed interest in our approach, but Russian experts continue to press for unacceptable constraints on critical TMD activities.

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2016-0140-M (1.18)
KBM 1/27/2020

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/25/97

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

Russian Goals. Successful adaptation of the 30-nation CFE Treaty will be key to reassuring Russia about NATO enlargement, but major differences remain between Russia and NATO. Through CFE adaptation, Russia seeks to prevent the movement of NATO forces eastward. Russia wants a ban on new stationed forces (which would prohibit stationing of treaty-limited equipment on the territory of new NATO members and thus create "second class" allies) and a limit on equipment of states in the same alliance (a group limit on NATO only, which would constrain a continuing process of enlargement). Outside of CFE, Russia seeks in the NATO-Russia charter sweeping restrictions on infrastructure (e.g., airfields, oil pipelines) on the territory of new Allies.

NATO Position. The United States and NATO have sought to address key Russian concerns about a potential build-up of NATO forces to the east without undermining commitments to potential new Allies. In February, NATO tabled a comprehensive, forward-looking proposal for CFE adaptation that: (1) eliminates CFE's outdated bloc-to-bloc elements by moving to national and state-by-state territorial limits; (2) encourages reductions in equipment entitlements, with a commitment to "significant" entitlement reductions by NATO; and (3) caps treaty-limited equipment in Central Europe at currently-permitted levels. This last provision would prevent increases in overall equipment levels in Central Europe, but leaves NATO flexibility to deploy forces within those levels (NATO has no intention of permanently stationing significant combat forces on the territory of new members absent a radical change in the security environment). Our proposal preserves the May 1996 flank agreement.

The United States and NATO have urged Russia to adopt NATO's CFE proposal as the basis for a "framework" by late spring or early summer. We need to focus the Russian leadership on the merits of this proposal, rather than repeating maximalist positions.

U.S. Ideas. In response to Russia's other proposals for "infrastructure" constraints, the United States is considering ways to enhance transparency of infrastructure development, outside CFE. Our approach would be designed to reassure the Russians about new infrastructure development with timely information. Some new and upgraded infrastructure will be required in new NATO member states to ensure new members can receive reinforcements in a crisis. Indeed, we do not believe infrastructure enhancement is inherently destabilizing. We have made some progress in explaining to the Russians that with improved infrastructure, it is less likely that new members will feel as great a need for permanently stationed forces.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 03/10/07

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RUSSIA AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

Russian Goals. Yeltsin's March 6 "State of the Federation" address underscored that one of Russia's top foreign policy goals is "strengthening cooperation among the independent states." However, Russia has not articulated a viable strategy. It regards the NIS as part of its security sphere and seeks, with limited success, to restrict outside influence from Iran, Turkey and the United States. Faced with heavy-handed and erratic Russian policies, the NIS have increasingly criticized Russia and sought to diversify contacts and improve relations with the West.

Russia's objectives in the NIS -- to maintain a Russian sphere of political and military influence and to pursue regional economic integration -- are well beyond its capabilities. Russia has few means to assist the NIS in their economic development; nor does it have the resources or military muscle to settle conflicts in the Caucasus and Tajikistan. Post-Chechnya, there is no Russian public support for Russian military coercion within the NIS.

CIS. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at best has become a vehicle for former Soviet states to smooth their relations, but it shows little prospect of becoming a viable institution. The latest CIS Summit, already postponed several times because of Yeltsin's illness, is scheduled for end-March.

Integration. Yeltsin's March 6 speech stressed the importance of "fraternal relations with Ukraine," and integration with Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Except with Belarus (the most retrograde NIS state), integration efforts have gone nowhere. Moscow's unwillingness to accept the NIS as genuinely equal and independent actors has been reflected in heavy-handed Russian actions, such as fueling inter-ethnic strife in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh and imposing Russia's will in disagreements over energy resources through blockades (e.g., Azerbaijan) and limited access to Russian oil pipelines (e.g., Kazakstan and Azerbaijan).

Ukrainian-Russian relations have grown especially tense with prominent Russian politicians and the Duma making territorial claims on Sevastopol. Ukraine's Rada responded with resolutions to deny Russia base rights for the Black Sea Fleet. Despite its dependence on Russian fuel, Ukraine has sharpened criticism of the CIS (it insists it is not a member) and has pursued a special relationship with NATO to underscore that it is part of the West.

U.S. Policy. We have not opposed integration per se but have insisted that it should be voluntary, mutually beneficial and not preclude integration with international institutions (e.g., the WTO) and normal diplomatic interaction with other states.

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2016-0140-M (1.20)
KBH 1/27/2020

CAUCASUS: NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND ENERGY

Russian Approach. In the past two months, Moscow has signaled a more moderate tone regarding cooperation with us in the Caucasus and elsewhere in the NIS. This shift could reflect Russian frustration at their declining ability to shape events there, greater policy focus with the end of the war in Chechnya and/or a desire to test the potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the NIS. Whatever the motivation, we should explore how far we can cooperate on conflict resolution and Caspian energy development, underscoring our mutual interest in promoting the stability, independence and prosperity of the Caucasus states.

Nagorno-Karabakh. Foreign Minister Primakov suggested to Secretary Albright on February 21 that we "pool resources" to resolve regional conflicts. UN-sponsored negotiations on the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia are still dominated by Russia and remain stalled. Nagorno-Karabakh is a more important conflict for U.S. interests. The key stumbling block has been that the leaders of all three parties to the conflict -- Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians -- find it easier to live with the status quo than to make the politically risky compromises needed for a durable peace.

The United States, Russia and France together now chair the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh. We intend to work with the Russians and French to make a major push with the parties for a breakthrough in the peace process this year. Representatives of the three co-chairs met March 17-18 to try to hammer out a common approach to the issues; they will meet with the parties in April.

Energy. We actively support rapid development of Caspian energy resources as key to the region's overall development and to diversification of world energy supplies. We favor adoption of a Caspian legal regime that divides seabed resources into exclusive national areas and construction of multiple pipeline routes to transport Caspian energy to world markets. The Russian Foreign Ministry has objected to perceived U.S. interference in this area and has favored a highly legalistic approach to Caspian development that could limit U.S. company involvement.

Meanwhile, Russian energy interests are actively investing in the region in consortia involving U.S. and other Western firms. We wish to encourage this, since it will give Russia a larger stake in the fast and smooth development of Caspian energy. To address Russian nationalist sensitivities, our policy stresses the importance of energy development on a strictly commercial basis and the benefits to be enjoyed by all states involved.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 03/10/07

PHOTOCOPY
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RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS

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2016-0140-M (1.21)
KBH 1/27/2020

Integration in Europe. Six years after the Baltic states' independence, their economic success and political acceptance in the West grate on Russia. The debate over NATO enlargement has, predictably, exacerbated Russian annoyance. Explicit and frequent statements by all three nations that they wish, sooner rather than later, to join the Alliance have led to intemperate warnings from Moscow that the Baltics would face reprisals should they enter NATO. In February, Russia circulated a heavy-handed "Baltic policy statement" spelling out its vehement objections to possible Baltic entry into NATO, which would, in the Russian view, not permit cooperative bilateral relations with Russia.

Stranded Russians? The policy paper also specifically links unresolved bilateral border issues with alleged mistreatment of ethnic Russians resident in the Baltics, especially in Estonia and Latvia. In both countries, Russia has sought expedited naturalization and citizenship procedures for ethnic Russians. While incidents of discrimination against Russians still occur, problems are nowhere near as serious as described by Moscow.

Pressured by nationalist Duma deputies and claiming purported Estonian renegeing on plans to institutionalize exchanges on human rights, Primakov has refused to sign a bilateral border treaty with Estonia, even though Estonia agreed to redraw the border to Russia's advantage. Final agreement on a similar border treaty between Russia and Latvia is also pending, despite Latvian concessions, because of Russian linkage of the treaty to ethnic issues. Relations with Lithuania are better; there are many fewer ethnic Russians there.

U.S. Role. Sustained U.S. pressure on Moscow to withdraw Russian troops and close installations in the Baltics has been balanced with our insistence that Baltic implementation of laws on citizenship, residency and language meet OSCE and European standards. The President's intervention was key in securing final agreement on troop withdrawals and a Russian commitment to dismantle the Skrunda early warning radar in 1998. (Although Russia is behind on the schedule for closing Skrunda.)

As both Russian and Baltic anxieties increase in the run-up to Madrid, the United States will need to reaffirm its even-handed approach, while reminding Russia that it cannot veto Baltic membership in NATO and noting that threats such as economic "blockades" of the Baltics are counter-productive. At the same time, we must reassure the Baltics that patience in bilateral dealings with Russia -- until NATO enlargement is a fact -- is more useful than raising the level of rhetoric in the near term.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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011. paper	Russia and Iran [partial] (1 page)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M

kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/25/97

RUSSIA AND IRAN

Russian Policy. Russia has recently pursued closer political and economic ties with Iran in order to provide much needed export markets, to curb Iranian efforts to promote Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and to offset U.S. influence in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While sharing some of our concerns over Iran's international behavior, Russian leaders disagree with our policy of containment, arguing that engagement is more likely to strengthen Iranian moderates. Although the Russians are unlikely to risk open confrontation with us over Iran, they have hinted that they might play the Iran card in response to NATO enlargement.

Russia has cooperated closely with Iran in recent months in trying to settle the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan. Russian and Iranian views also coincide on Afghanistan and the Caspian demarcation issue. Russia's Iran policy is also strongly driven by economic interests, as it seeks repayment of large Iranian debts (through oil shipments) and markets for weapons and high technology to save its beleaguered military-industrial sector.

Arms Transfers and Nuclear Cooperation. Russian officials strenuously deny that Russia is supplying anything illegal to Iran or violating assurances made to the United States. Those assurances include commitments by Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin to end conventional arms transfers to Iran (beyond those for which contracts have been concluded) by 1999 and to limit their nuclear cooperation in the next several years to the provision of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr.

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We have raised these questions with senior Russian officials, who maintain Russia is abiding by its commitments. It is unclear how much information, if any, senior Russian government officials have about some of these activities, which could be carried out by rogue elements.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 03/10/07

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2016-0140-M [1.22]

KBH 1/27/2020

3/25/97

STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA

Tenuous Stability. Russia has achieved tenuous macroeconomic stability but faces stagnation and eroding political support if it does not stimulate investment and growth. Inflation in 1996 was 22 percent, similar to Poland; the ruble has been stable for almost two years. Russia received a favorable international capital-market rating and issued \$1 billion in Eurobonds. The stock market soared recently, up 400 percent from its 1996 low.

Counting Pennies. That said, government finances are shaky, GDP contracted six percent in 1996 (or possibly stayed even with the informal sector), and little restructuring occurred in the industrial sector. The collapse of government revenues is a core issue. Russia's federal government at times collected less than eight percent of GDP in revenue (the U.S. level is 19 percent). The IMF twice suspended disbursements in 1996 (and again now) due to poor revenue collection. The government coped by taking monthly ad hoc expenditure cuts on the order of one-two percent of GDP. Wage and pension arrears grew to about \$10-12 billion.

Policy Void. Various factors caused the revenue collapse: elections and Yeltsin's poor health led firms to view taxes as "optional," legislation allowed firms to pay wages before taxes, and the tax base continued to shrink (reflecting bad tax policy). Foreign investors continued to face onerous taxes, an unstable legal environment and growing crime. Failure to pass amendments to an ineffective production-sharing law essentially blocked \$50-60 billion in oil investments. Chernomyrdin's economic team, meanwhile, remained fixated on short-term budget crises. Economic policy remained adrift with no growth strategy.

Yeltsin's Back. Yeltsin's March 6 "State of the Federation" speech sharply criticized the government's inability to stimulate investment and growth, pay wages and pensions, and fight crime. Yeltsin said that he would bring "competent and energetic" people into the government -- most notably Chubays, just re-appointed First Deputy Prime Minister -- and prepare future budgets. He called tax reform the "key economic task for this year" and ordered pension, housing and military reforms.

U.S. Agenda. Both Chernomyrdin and Chubays responded well to our proposed agenda of tax reform, amendments to production-sharing laws, laws against crime and corruption and ratification of the Bilateral Investment Treaty. The United States could support (through OPIC, ExIm and our enterprise fund) financing for \$4 billion in investment. If Russia takes the above actions and meets lending conditions, the IMF and World Bank each stand ready to lend Russia up to \$3 billion in 1997 alone.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

3/25/97

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

Changing Focus. After an initial focus on humanitarian aid (food and medicine) in 1992, the United States has provided an army of experts in fields ranging from capital markets to legal reform to health care. This assistance helped Russia establish the fundamental infrastructure for a democratic government and a market economy. While the final credit goes to Russia, the United States played a defining role in helping Russia shift 70 percent of its economy to the private sector, develop a national system for trading securities, pass a civil code and create the infrastructure for parliamentary and presidential elections. At Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin's request, we will begin a second phase by encouraging U.S. trade and investment in Russia; we will also emphasize partnerships at the community level and exchanges of professionals, entrepreneurs and students.

Levels of Assistance. To date, the U.S. Government has provided \$4.7 billion in grant assistance to Russia: \$2 billion in economic and technical assistance under the Freedom Support Act (FSA), \$1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance, and \$1 billion in security and weapons dismantlement assistance (Nunn-Lugar and other, smaller programs). The United States is also supporting over \$6 billion worth of financing and insurance (EXIM and OPIC). The annual level of FSA assistance for Russia, however, has declined from a peak of \$1.6 billion in FY94 to \$95 million in FY97 (due to declines in overall NIS assistance levels and large Congressional earmarks for Ukraine and Armenia, the FY97 budget for Russia is about the same as that for Armenia).

Requests for FY98. In the President's FY98 budget request, we have asked Congress for \$900 million in FSA assistance for all the NIS; this would allow an increase in assistance to Russia to \$241 million. The President's additional request for Nunn-Lugar and nuclear materials security assistance brings the total request for Russia from all sources to \$645 million for FY98.

The two main elements of our planned FY98 FSA program are to spur economic growth and to help Russia establish a civil society. First, we plan to promote economic development by encouraging domestic and foreign trade and investment. During the February GCC, the Vice President and Chernomyrdin agreed on a regional investment initiative to demonstrate how we can increase investment in three Russian regions. The second element is to assist social development in Russia through a broad network of mutually-beneficial two-way exchanges, community-based partnerships and cooperative activities in the energy, environment, health, science and technology fields.

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2016-0140-M (1.24)
KBH 1/27/2020

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3/25/97

U.S.-RUSSIA TRADE RELATIONS

Overall Trade. Russia's global exports and imports rose (by about 10 percent and six percent respectively) in 1996; Russia's total trade surplus with non-NIS countries was \$22 billion.

U.S.-Russia Trade. The United States is Russia's second largest trading partner after Germany; our bilateral trade reached \$4.9 billion through September 1996. Russia's \$1.5 billion trade surplus with the United States in 1995 became a deficit in 1996 of about \$100 million, partly due to the ruble's appreciation against the dollar, which reduced the competitiveness of certain Russian steel products. Top U.S. exports to Russia include poultry, machinery and tobacco. Despite last year's trade battle over poultry, U.S. poultry exports to Russia increased in 1996 once health issues were resolved (exceeding \$1 billion). Top Russian exports to the United States are aluminum, precious stones/metals, iron and steel.

MFN/GSP/WTO. The 1992 U.S.-Russia Trade Agreement provides mutual most-favored nation status. Under the Generalized System of Preferences program, Russia can export a wide range of products to the United States duty-free, while U.S. exporters face an average tariff rate in Russia of about 14 percent. The United States actively supports Russia's efforts to accede to the WTO, which will further liberalize Russia's trade regime. Russia has proposed a free trade area with the United States; this is a reasonable long-term goal, but announcing it now could complicate Jackson-Vanik graduation and global fast-track trade objectives.

Trade Disputes. In recent years, the United States and Russia have settled trade disputes over Russian exports of firearms and apparel, U.S. poultry exports and a Russian proposal to place import quotas on vodka and ethyl alcohol. Anti-dumping duties on Russian uranium were waived in 1994 under a special agreement. A new anti-dumping investigation is now under way on Russian carbon steel plate. Russia is on the Special 301 "watch list," for poor enforcement of intellectual property rights laws and lack of retroactive protection for copyrights.

Market Economy Status. Russia wants us to change their trade status from "non-market economy" to "market economy" -- for symbolic reasons and because they believe that it would increase access to the U.S. market. A market economy designation would help Russia somewhat in the application of our dumping laws but would also subject Russia to countervailing duties for subsidies; countervailing duties do not apply to non-market economies, and (until Russia joins WTO) we would not have to prove "injury" to the U.S. industry prior to taking action.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 3/10/02

PHOTOCOPY
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RUSSIA AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

The Politics. There is consensus among trade and Congressional experts that to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik, we must have the support of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), the umbrella organization representing the mainstream Jewish community on emigration issues. Graduation requires legislation. It may be possible to complete this by year's end, but it will need extensive consultations with the Jewish community and Hill.

Facts. The Jackson-Vanik provisions passed as Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974; they link MFN status and ExIm credits to freedom of emigration. The law applies to countries that did not have MFN status as of January 1975, but the principal concern was Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. There are four stages to Jackson-Vanik with regard to emigration standards: out of compliance, a waiver, compliance and graduation. Russia is now in compliance and has both MFN status and access to ExIm.

Russia's Views. Russia considers Jackson-Vanik to be trade-disruptive, a relic of the Cold War and a violation of our bilateral trade agreement to provide "unconditional" MFN. The Russian government raises Jackson-Vanik at every opportunity, most recently at the February GCC. If the United States does not graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik prior to Russia's accession to WTO and accord it unconditional MFN status, we would lose recourse to WTO mediation on trade disputes with Russia.

Jewish Community. In early March discussions, NCSJ indicated that its membership firmly opposes graduation now but is willing to work with us to "create conditions in Russia" that would allow it to support graduation. NCSJ has two concerns: a six-month Russian delay in 1996 to register the Jewish Agency (which handles emigration) and a recent law that extends the waiting period for emigration for those who handle sensitive matters from 5-10 years. NCSJ believes that graduating Russia now would reward it for going backwards. To address its concerns, NCSJ will likely ask for action by Yeltsin to modify the 10-year waiting period and a gesture from Yeltsin (possibly an exchange of letters with the President) affirming his commitment to free emigration. The Union of Councils is far more conservative than NCSJ and staunchly opposes graduation; that can be managed with NCSJ support. AIPAC is not a major player on this issue.

Hill Views. While support from Congressional members like Joe Lieberman and Howard Berman will help with Russian graduation, they will be reluctant unless NCSJ is on board. We will also need support from the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance, which have jurisdiction over trade matters.

G-7 AND RUSSIA

Russia's Hopes. Yeltsin wants to create a G-8 to enhance his status at home and underscore that Russia has secured a place among world leaders. Yeltsin wrote G-7 heads in early February with a long list of suggestions for Denver and made clear his expectation that Denver will feature Russia in a new G-8.

G-7 Views. The Sherpas resisted Dan Tarullo's efforts at his February 15 meeting to discuss Russia's role at Denver; their unstated concern is that we will give the G-8 away at Helsinki. Japan is most resistant; the French and Germans will object more on form than substance -- they will want to be part of any gesture to help Yeltsin. The British, Canadians and Italians probably feel that they have little choice in the matter.

Russia's Performance. Since we assumed the G-7 chair, Tarullo has involved Russia in most matters "at Eight," except economics, finance and issues involving Ukraine. Russia has not helped itself. Russian delegations have been low-level, poorly prepared and often obstructive on most initiatives since the meetings in Moscow and Lyons. The Sherpas are particularly frustrated with Russia's outright resistance to meet nuclear safety commitments.

Denver Model. The goal is to approximate a G-8 summit, while preserving a mechanism for the Seven heads to exercise global leadership on economic, financial and other issues:

- The G-7 summit would become a G-8 summit in Denver, with a G-8 communiqué and a more fully integrated preparatory process at Eight. The G-8 would consider those issues on which Russia is in a position to exercise leadership.
- Yeltsin would arrive and depart with the other Seven heads.
- The G-7 Finance Ministers process would function as before without Russia to consider economic and financial issues of global systemic significance.
- The Seven heads would meet separately during the summit to review a report from Finance Ministers and consult on economic and other issues.
- The Chairman of the Seven would issue a statement on their decisions and conclusions; but would not be released at separate press conference of the Seven.

"RED PAPER"

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. memo	re: Helsinki Summit (1 page)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. paper	re: Helsinki Summit (4 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
018. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/12/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019. report	Biography (1 page)	03/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/10/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M
kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
021. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/10/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
022. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	03/05/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [2]

2016-0140-M

kh1807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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2016-0140-M 1.34
7/27/2017 KSH

FINLAND

Pertti TORSTILA
(Phonetic: TORsteelah)

*Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(since May 1996)*

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador 3.5c

*Every country in Europe has the right to
choose its security policy line.*

Torstila, January 1997 3.5c

One of Finland's brightest and best informed diplomats, Pertti Torstila—who has extensive experience in disarmament and European security matters—is well suited to handle Finland's foreign policy challenges. 1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted]

Torstila's last posting was a four-year assignment as Ambassador to Hungary and Croatia. 3.5c

Views on CSCE/OSCE 3.5c

Torstila 1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted] asserted in February 1996 that the international body "fulfilled its task with brilliant success, by contributing to the fall of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the liberation of those peoples forced to become communist." Torstila added that the CSCE—a Cold War system—should not be compared to its successor, the OSCE, because both were designed for "entirely different purposes." 3.5c

Personal Data 3.5c

Torstila was born on 13 February 1946 in Jyvaskyla. He earned a Master of Political Science degree from the University of Helsinki in 1970. A captain in the military reserves and a sports enthusiast, Torstila participates in

Career

3.5c

- 1970 Joined Foreign Service.
- 1971 Secretary, Consulate in Rouen, France.
- 1972-73 Member of Finnish delegation to CSCE preparatory negotiations in Helsinki.
- 1975 Member of Finnish delegation to CSCE summit meeting in Helsinki.
- 1973-76 Second secretary, Embassy, Paris.
- 1976-78 First secretary, Embassy, Paris.
- 1979-80 Political Department, Foreign Ministry, Helsinki.
- 1980-81 Attended National School for Administration, Paris.
- 1981-84 Counselor, Embassy, Paris.
- 1984-88 Director, Disarmament and Security Policy and CSCE Department, Foreign Ministry.
- 1988-89 Deputy director general, Political Department, Foreign Ministry.
- 1989-92 Ambassador to CSCE Mission, Vienna.
- 1992 Vice chairman of Finnish delegation to CSCE Helsinki follow-up conference and to Helsinki CSCE summit, 1992.
- 1992-96 Ambassador to Hungary and Croatia. 3.5c

orienteering (navigating wilderness courses using maps and a compass). He also enjoys watching skiing, playing the guitar, and studying political history in his spare time. 1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted] Torstila and his wife, Eva Kristina, have been married since 1972; the couple has two adult sons. Torstila speaks excellent French, English, and some Hungarian. 3.5c

**BILATERAL MTG/
FINNISH EVENTS**

MTG: PRES AHTISAARI/
PM LIPPONEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0140-M (1.35)
K8H 1/27/2020

MEETING WITH
FINNISH PRESIDENT AHTISAARI
AND PRIME MINISTER LIPPONEN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Express appreciation for Finland's important role in the Nordic/Baltic region, in particular its moderating role with the Baltics and Russia.
- Reassure Ahtisaari and Lipponen that NATO's relationship with Russia and NATO enlargement will be managed carefully.
- Explain that NATO's doors will remain open after the first tranche -- to the Finns as well as to the declared candidates -- and that United States will respect Finnish decisions regarding their relationship with NATO.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

President Ahtisaari was a career diplomat with extensive UN experience, including a stint as Under Secretary General for Administration, before returning to Finland to run for President in 1993. You last met with him in Washington in November 1994. In July 1996, the Ahtisaaris welcomed the First Lady to Helsinki and hosted a lunch for her at their official residence. Ahtisaari will visit the United States in October and would appreciate a chance to meet with you at that time.

Elected in 1994 to a six-year term, the popular Ahtisaari plays the chief role in directing and articulating Finland's foreign policy. Under his leadership, Finland took the historic step in 1995 of joining the EU for -- as the government made clear -- security rather than economic reasons. Commander-in-Chief Ahtisaari was also a prime mover in the government's decision to allow Finnish peacekeepers to serve in IFOR without a U.N. umbrella.

Although Prime Minister Lipponen is himself a respected foreign policy expert (and avid former water polo player), he has concentrated on domestic economic issues since taking office in 1995. Currently the head of a five-party "rainbow coalition," he has tried, with limited success, to reduce the very high Finnish unemployment rate (currently 16 percent). Although his austerity program has helped pull Finland out of recession, the public remains divided on how to reduce the costs of Finland's comprehensive and costly welfare net.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/13/07

Your meeting with Ahtisaari and Lipponen will take place just hours before you meet Yeltsin. They will appreciate some discussion of U.S. goals for the summit but will not press for details. Finland sees Russian instability as its chief threat; Ahtisaari and Lipponen will be interested in your assessment of Yeltsin's leadership and its implications for Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The two leaders will look for assurances that the United States and NATO are developing a viable road map to manage NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia relationship. They will be particularly interested in hearing your views on meeting the real and psychological security needs of those NATO applicants who do not make the first tranche, in particular the Baltic states. Although the Finns fear that Baltic membership in the Alliance would antagonize Russia (with negative fallout for the Baltics as well as the West in general), they realize that exclusion from NATO will fuel Baltic insecurity.

Ahtisaari and Lipponen may seek assurances that decisions reached in Madrid will not foreclose a later bid for Finnish membership in NATO. Concerns that nonalignment could marginalize Finland from the premier European security decision-making process and that Madrid may limit Finland's security options have made membership a hot domestic issue. Although Ahtisaari has reiterated the official nonaligned policy, the debate is changing minds and the possibility that Finland may seek membership in the future cannot be ruled out. A February Gallup poll showed that 26 percent now favor NATO membership -- a result unthinkable a few years ago.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT AHTISAARI AND PRIME MINISTER LIPPONEN
OF FINLAND

Bilateral Issues

- Wonderful to return to Finland. Hillary told me about warm reception you gave her during visit last July.
- Appreciate your offer to facilitate this summit. Your previous experience and well-deserved reputation for efficiency are helping us to get most out of meeting.

Russia

- Our sense that Yeltsin in control, despite continuing health problems.
- Hope my meeting here can narrow differences on NATO-Russia relationship, including basic elements of NATO-Russia charter. Russian partnership with NATO important component in building fully integrated post-Cold War Europe.
- Want to make certain Russia not marginalized or isolated. Also hope to make progress on START, economic issues.
- Your grounding in West and experience with vastly larger and challenging neighbor give Finland important regional role.
 - Appreciate your constructive engagement in helping resolve difference between Russia and Baltics, most recently Russia-Estonia border dispute.
- Must continue to work together to look for ways to help northwest Russia improve its economy, environment and infrastructure.

Baltics

- In addition to helping Baltic relations with Russia, appreciate your efforts to mentor Baltics and help speed their integration into West.
- Delighted with our regional cooperation and productive way we are pooling insights, ideas, resources.
- Recognize importance of coordinating closely with you and other Nordics in achieving mutual aims.

- Finland's record truly impressive, particularly commitment to Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat) and efforts to improve national defense capability of Estonia and its neighbors.
- On NATO membership, we are committed to keeping door open to Baltics, but recognize they are unlikely to be in first group of invitees. So, must find practical ways to deal with their real and psychological security needs.
- Committed to enhanced PFP activities for Baltics and a strong Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) to advance and assist their eventual candidacy.
- Appreciate your support for EU membership for qualified Baltic applicants. Continue to urge other EU members to treat qualified Baltics the same as other qualified applicants with respect to start and pace of accession.

NATO Enlargement/Madrid Summit

- Although we want to reach agreement before Madrid on NATO-Russia partnership, enlargement will go forward as planned.
- No decision made on which countries will be invited to begin accession negotiations.
- Committed to keeping door to NATO membership open after July to both current aspirants and to countries like Finland, which are not looking to join Alliance at present time.
- Believe individual dialogues with aspirant countries who are not invited to Madrid should continue after Summit. Such dialogues will help those countries continue efforts to meet responsibilities of NATO membership.
- By Madrid, hope to have completed work on NATO's internal adaptation and to have finished development of Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace enhancements.

PFP/Atlantic Partnership Council

- Appreciate your participation in efforts to elaborate details of Atlantic Partnership Council.
- APC will give all Partners greater voice in shaping PFP program as well as strengthen political and military consultation, cooperation and decision-making.
- Comprehensive package of enhancements to PFP approved at December NAC. Will give Partners greater opportunity to work with NATO Allies in areas such as peacekeeping.

Former Yugoslavia

- Value generous contributions of Finland to NATO missions in Bosnia, in keeping with your country's long tradition of participation in peacekeeping efforts.
- Also appreciate your contribution of police monitors to International Police Task Force (IPTF). Hope you will join us in providing additional monitors and resources to support training and equipment needs of local police.
- Critical we speed up economic reconstruction so refugees can return and all parties have firm stake in peace by time SFOR leaves in mid-1998.
- Greatly appreciate your decision to maintain mission in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) together with U.S. troops.
 - Deeply regret loss in February of three Finnish UNPREDEP peacekeepers in helicopter accident while on patrol over FYROM.
 - Plan to urge Russians not to oppose extension of UNPREDEP given developments in Albania and tensions in Kosovo.

SCENESETTER -- HELSINKI:
BILATERAL AT THE PALACE

Your first official event after arrival will be a call on President Martti Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen at the Presidential Palace. You will enter through the black and gold gate and ceremonial entrance topped by six white columns and flanked by ceremonial guards. You will be escorted to President Ahtisaari's office on the ground floor. In the evening you will also attend a dinner here.

In the past, the Palace has served as both the offices and official residence of Finnish presidents, but in 1993 a new Presidential residence was completed at Mantyniemi (where the summit meetings will be held). The President's office, staff and protocol areas remain at the Palace. The Palace has been the site of previous meetings between east and west; in 1990 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev held their summit meetings here.

The Palace faces the harbor and open-air market. Behind it is Senate Square, dominated by the Lutheran Cathedral. To the right you can see the red brick Uspenski Cathedral (Orthodox). Completed in 1820 as a mansion for a prominent merchant, the Palace was purchased in 1837 as the Helsinki residence of the Czar of Russia and Grand Duke of Finland. Czar Alexander II and the Crown Prince (later Czar Alexander III) stayed in the Palace while attending an industrial exposition in Helsinki in 1876.

The Palace served as a military hospital during World War I and during the Russian Revolution it was the headquarters of the Russian Soldiers' and Workers Revolutionary Council. During the Finnish Civil War in 1918, it housed the general staff of German forces supporting the Finnish "Whites" and then the staff of the Finnish army. The Palace briefly housed the Foreign Ministry after independence and was renovated to become the Presidential residence in 1921. President Ahtisaari's immediate predecessor, Mauno Koivisto, was the last Finnish president to reside in the Palace. As recently as the 1980s, visiting heads of state were also accommodated here.

The Palace and its decorations reflect the so-called St. Petersburg Empire Style, and the iron railings enclosing the front courtyard were made in St. Petersburg. The railings and facade were refurbished in 1994.

The Palace's woodwork, brass ornaments and chandeliers were produced by both Finnish and foreign artisans, and the finest pieces of furniture came from St. Petersburg. Among the most beautiful art works are: Ferdinand V. Wright's "Geese," two landscapes by Werner Holmberg, Viktoria Aberg's "Mon repos" and a winter landscape by Hjalmar Munsterhjelm.

EMBASSY MEET
AND GREET

TO BE PROVIDED

PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

FINLAND-RELATED AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Q: Would the United States support a Finnish bid for NATO membership?

A: Your question is hypothetical. Finland has not applied for NATO membership. Whether Finland should seek NATO membership is for Finland to decide. As we have frequently said, however, the door to NATO is open and will remain open to those Partnership for Peace countries aspiring to eventual NATO membership.

Q: Why won't the Baltic States be in the first tranche of NATO enlargement? Is there a U.S.-Russian agreement to keep the Baltic Republics permanently out of NATO, a "Yalta II?"

A: NATO has made it clear, and Russia has acknowledged, that no country has a veto on candidates for NATO enlargement. NATO has not made a decision about which country or countries will be invited to join the Alliance first. Once that decision is made, NATO's doors will remain open for other applicants, including the Baltic states, if they are not invited to join the Alliance this year.

Q: Doesn't the choice of Helsinki as the summit venue mean that Finland is still "neutral" -- between East and West?

A: No. The choice was based on proximity to Moscow. A big plus was Finland's summit experience and well-deserved reputation for efficiency.

Q: Should the Nordic states offer security guarantees to the Baltic states?

A: That is a matter for the Nordic and Baltic states to decide. But we believe security in the Baltic region can be best assured through the involvement of all countries in a wider security community, though OSCE and Partnership for Peace.

BACKGROUND PAPERS - FINLAND

FINNISH RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

NATO ENLARGEMENT/MADRID SUMMIT

EU ISSUES: FINLAND

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE/ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

U.S. FINNISH RELATIONS

BOSNIA AND UN PEACEKEEPING

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

BALTIC ACTION PLAN

BACKGROUND NOTE FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FINNISH RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Finland has effectively discarded its Cold War identity as an accommodating neutral state in the Soviet shadow. However, even as an active participant in the new Europe (e.g., the EU and Partnership for Peace), it retains the traditional goal of avoiding confrontation with Russia. This effort can still prove a complex balancing act. The Finns are uncomfortable, for example, with current Russian efforts to play up Finland's neutral stance as the reason Helsinki was chosen for the Summit. Finns would prefer to highlight their experience in handling previous summits and a well-deserved reputation for efficiency. At the same time, they believe Helsinki's selection validates their essentially western but militarily nonaligned position.

There is broad Finnish public support for a prudent but steady policy of redefining Finland's relationship with Russia. In 1990-91, Finland responded cautiously to the demise of Soviet power. It reassured Russia that it would not raise claims for Finnish territory seized by the USSR. However, Finland then unilaterally abrogated restrictions Moscow had placed on it in the 1948 Paris Peace Treaty, joined in voicing Nordic concern over the anti-Gorbachev coup, and gave unofficial encouragement to Baltic independence.

Facing Russia across a 750-mile land border, Finland continues to reaffirm the importance of good ties while taking pro-western initiatives like membership in the EU, PFP and purchasing U.S. F-18s. Neutrality has been recast as a policy of nonalignment. President Ahtisaari is a leader of this new policy of Euro-activism and geopolitical realism. Sensitive to how Moscow might react to perceived isolation, he stresses that Finland's status as the only EU member bordering Russia can help build Russian links to a common European security region.

The Finns are now more concerned with the potential effects of regional instability than with overt Russian military action. They would like to revive trade with Russia, which owes Finland more than \$1 billion. Last year, Finland's Guarantee Board signed an agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to boost U.S./Finnish ventures in northwest Russia and the Baltics. A joint conference in April will bring potential investors together. On the political side, Finland has been working behind the scenes with both parties to help resolve the Russia-Estonia border dispute.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATO ENLARGEMENT/MADRID SUMMIT

NATO enlargement is one element in the efforts to create a new Atlantic Community which eliminates old dividing lines and brings together all the countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union to form a more stable, secure European security space.

We are making progress toward the July 8-9 Madrid Summit at which time one or more countries will be invited to begin accession negotiations. However, several key issues remain unresolved. Between now and July, Allies will have to decide which countries to invite and what to do about those not included in the first group.

By the Summit, we also hope to complete NATO's internal adaptation, including resolving the AFSOUTH issue, finishing work on the package of PFP enhancements and details of the Atlantic Partnership Council and concluding the NATO-Russia charter.

To reassure those countries that wish to join NATO but are not invited at Madrid, we have pressed Allies to continue the individual dialogue process with Partners after the Summit as a way of concretely demonstrating to Partners that enlargement is an ongoing process. Finland does not currently seek to join NATO, but wants the door left open should it desire membership in the future.

Some Allies have wondered whether aspiring members not included in the first group, such as the Baltics, should focus on EU membership instead. We do not consider EU enlargement to be a "consolation prize" for such nations. NATO enlargement and EU enlargement are separate but complementary efforts to enhance European security.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0140-M (1.38)

KBH 1/27/2020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/13/07

EU ISSUES: FINLAND

Emerging from the post-war shadow of the former Soviet Union, Finland eagerly embraced its 1995 EU membership. Joining principally for political and security reasons, Finland's new place in the EU signalled the end of its distance from the West. The EU also carries the seeds of Finland's economic reorientation westwards, following the collapse of its post-Soviet Russian market. Unlike its neighbor Sweden, who joined at the same time, Finland rests comfortably within the EU fold and has never had second thoughts about its membership. Indeed, Helsinki is ready and eager for a deeper Union; it has placed a high economic priority on being among the first EU countries to adopt a common European currency.

In the political arena, Finland is a fervent believer in the effectiveness of EU unity. When the United States bombed northern Iraq, Finland expressed concern not over the U.S. action, about which it was neutral, but on the open disagreements between the UK and France. Finland has kept a low profile on most controversial EU issues, preferring not to show its hand in public while still adjusting to its substantially altered international political landscape. The Finns generally go along with EU consensus on economic and trade policies, although their strong support for trade liberalization and open markets is closer to U.S. views.

A key Finnish objective for the EU is enlargement to the Baltics. Helsinki recognizes that institutional reform will be necessary if the EU is to absorb up to ten new members at varying levels of economic development. Nevertheless, Finland also worries that a proposed move away from consensus on foreign policy questions toward a majority view could lead to an unacceptable infringement on national sovereignty. Nowhere is this more important for Finland than in its relationship with Moscow as the only EU member to share a common border with Russia.

Finland, along with Sweden, has taken a special interest in the security dimension of the EU institutional negotiations. Unlikely to seek NATO membership soon, Finland is keen to endow the EU with some limited defense role. The Finns have advocated a middle-of-the-road approach to any future EU security capability, proposing a limited set of humanitarian responses that the EU would be able to task to EU militaries through the Western European Union (WEU). This capability, they believe, would give the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more muscle.

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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE/ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

The Alliance is working with Partners to flesh out the details of the Atlantic Partnership Council (APC). The APC, proposed by former Secretary Christopher in Stuttgart last September, would integrate the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to give Partners an expanded political framework for PFP, greater participation in Partnership decision-making and a stronger consultative mechanism with the Alliance.

We want to press ahead quickly to reach agreement on details of the APC so Ministers at the spring NAC in Sintra, Portugal, can approve it. The Alliance has not made a decision yet on whether to hold the inaugural APC meeting at Sintra or as part of the Madrid Summit. Secretary Albright has proposed that Partners attend a portion of the proceedings at Madrid.

The Alliance is also starting to implement the comprehensive package of PFP enhancements agreed by Ministers in December. NATO is considering how to involve Partners more in PFP decision-making, planning of non-Article 5 contingencies, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and peace enforcement missions. Along with the APC, these enhancements will help address Finnish and Swedish interest in closer involvement with the Alliance in crisis management operations. The Alliance is looking at creating Partner positions on the International Staff, at the Partnership Coordination Cell and with NATO regional military commands.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0170-M (1.40)
KBH 1/27/2020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

Finland takes a keen interest in each of the Baltic states, but its cultural and linguistic links to Estonia make the latter the natural focus of Finnish aid, interest and investment. Finland has trained more than a hundred officers and NCOs for the Estonian defense forces and provided training and assistance to the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), as well as training police, customs agents and border guards. It assists Estonia with energy development and environmental cleanup. Finland is deeply engaged in efforts to secure the borders of the Baltic states. In recent months, Finland has also worked quietly with both Russia and Estonia to promote resolution of their border dispute.

Finland -- itself a member of the EU since 1995 -- has been a strong proponent of EU membership for the Baltics, but recognizes that membership may be a long, difficult path. Not a member of NATO, Finland is more ambivalent than the other Nordics about Baltic membership in the Alliance, fearing that it could antagonize Russia.

The OSCE maintains missions in Latvia and Estonia in response to Russian allegations of mistreatment of the Russian-speaking population. While the U.S. and multilateral institutions (OSCE, Council of Europe) do not agree with Russian claims of human rights abuses, we believe the missions continue to serve a useful purpose in helping set the record straight. We have encouraged the Estonians and Latvians to agree to extend the mandate of the missions, despite their concerns that the very presence of OSCE missions may give credence to Russian claims.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0140-M (1.41)
KBH 1/27/2020

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Reason: 1.5(b,d)

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U.S.-FINNISH RELATIONS

Finland's increasingly western orientation and location on the Russian border make it an important U.S. partner as we try to reduce Russia/Baltic tensions and integrate the Baltics into European institutions. Our relationship has deepened recently through collaboration in PFP, support of democracy and security in Baltic states and peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. Relations were also bolstered by Finland's 1995-96 purchase of 64 U.S. F-18 fighters, amounting to some \$3.4 billion.

Recent Contacts. Finnish-American contacts and cooperation have expanded as Finland has strengthened its ties with mainstream Europe. In July 1996, the First Lady visited Finland. Prime Minister Lipponen met with officials in Washington at the same time. Lipponen returns to the United States this June to deliver the commencement address at Dartmouth College. President Ahtisaari will speak to the America-Scandinavia Foundation in New York in October. Both Finnish leaders hope to meet with the President during their U.S. visits.

Cooperation in European Security. Finland has been an energetic partner in PFP since 1994. Finnish peacekeepers serve alongside U.S. counterparts in Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Trade. The United States is Finland's most important trading partner outside of the European Union. Bilateral trade averages about \$4 billion per year, without taking into account trade associated with Finland's recent purchase of U.S. fighters. State-owned Finnish airlines Finnair plans to decide later this year whether to purchase \$1 billion in aircraft from either Boeing or Airbus.

Cooperation in Northwest Russia. The Finnish Guarantee Board and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are currently cooperating on specific projects to increase trade with Russia. This joint effort reflects our common goals in promoting regional economic development and stability. A major OPIC/FGB conference is scheduled for April.

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2016-0140-M (1.42)
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2016-0170-17 (1.43)

KBH 1/27/2020

BOSNIA AND UN PEACEKEEPING

Finland has made significant contributions to the peace in Bosnia, most visibly through participation (now at 345 troops) in IFOR/SFOR as part of the Nordic Brigade in the U.S. sector. Finland has also contributed 13 police monitors to the IPTF and we would like to see them increase that commitment. Cooperation with the Finnish government on Bosnia has been excellent.

Peacekeeping is a Finnish priority: Finnish peacekeepers have served the UN almost continuously since 1956. With over 900 personnel currently serving in UN missions, Finland is the 9th largest troop contributor. Despite public enthusiasm for peacekeeping, there is no Finnish support for participation in peacemaking or enforcement operations. However, the Finnish parliament did vote last year to permit participation in peacekeeping operations which require weapons for defensive purposes.

Pleased with their initial deployment of an engineering battalion in IFOR, the Finns have provided 345 infantry soldiers to SFOR. They also form part of the Nordic Battalion co-deployed with U.S. troops in the UN's Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). We are currently working with the Nordics to downsize the mission to 750 troops but could face Russian objections to a further extension when the current mandate expires in May. With SFOR deployed in Bosnia, we would prefer to keep UN peacekeepers in FYROM as a stabilizing factor. We are also looking to Finland and other countries with a strong tradition of democratic policing to provide additional UN police monitors for Brcko.

Finland supports UN reforms to improve efficiency and eliminate waste, but -- while avoiding public criticism of U.S. actions -- is critical of U.S. arrears. We will need the cooperation of Finland and other developed countries in reaching agreement on a new UN scale of assessments and reform program.

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POLITICAL/ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

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2016-0140-M (1.44)

KBM 1/27/2020

Finland's political and economic institutions are still adapting to the demise of the USSR and to Finnish desires to forge closer ties to the United States and mainstream Europe. Prime Minister Lipponen heads a five-party coalition whose main focus has been to get economy back on track after a severe recession touched off by collapse of Finland's special trading relationship with former USSR. Despite other favorable economic indicators, unemployment remains at 16 percent.

NATO membership has recently become a hot topic among political elite and general public, though government tries to dampen debate. Finland's entry into EU in January 1995 has helped make the country feel a part of mainstream western Europe. A drop in consumer prices also contributed to EU's popularity.

Political Scene. President Maarti Ahtisaari, Finland's first popularly-elected (1994) president, is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and responsible for foreign policy. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen's "rainbow coalition," in power for almost two years, has not been able to reduce unemployment; disappointing economic growth and tight fiscal policies have shaken public confidence and cut painfully into the social welfare net.

NATO/Foreign Policy Debate. NATO membership is a hot topic, a result of concerns that nonalignment could marginalize Finland from the premier European security decision-making process. President Ahtisaari has steadfastly reiterated the official non-aligned policy, but the recent debate is changing some minds. A February Gallup poll showed that 26 percent favor NATO membership, with 38 percent opposed and the remainder undecided.

Economic Overview. Finland has a dynamic industrial economy based on abundant forest resources, capital investments and technology. Exports of goods and services contribute more than 25 percent of GDP. Finland's leading industries include timber, machinery, electronics, motor vehicles and shipbuilding. Finland's EU accession has accelerated the process of restructuring and downsizing of the agricultural sector.

BALTIC ACTION PLAN

The Baltic Action Plan provides a comprehensive strategy for U.S. relations with the three Baltic countries over the next several years, with particular emphasis on coordination with the Nordics. While the Nordics are generally amenable to our pressure on them to take a more prominent role in the Baltic region, they shy away from any public perception that they are regarded as responsible for Baltic security. The Nordics welcome a higher U.S. profile in the area, both to strengthen their own bilateral relationship with us and because they see the U.S. involvement as key to any successful efforts to increase regional security.

The Baltic Action Plan, launched last September by the Deputy Secretary, uses a three-track approach:

- integrate the Baltics into European **multilateral and regional** institutions;
- encourage the development of normal, **balanced relations with Russia**; and
- promote **bilateral initiatives** to reassure the Baltics of U.S. support for development of their political, economic and social infrastructures: expanded bilateral security links (Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, Warsaw Initiative), trade and investment programs (USTR, TDA, OPIC, USDOC) and increased cooperation against organized crime.

We have extensively briefed the Baltics, Nordics, NATO allies and key PFP partners (including Russia) on the Plan. The Baltics welcome the Plan but fear it may be intended as a poor substitute for NATO membership.

The Plan includes a proposed "**U.S.-Baltic Charter**" that would spell out the fundamentals of our relationship. This agreement will be signed at the Presidential level later this year. The three Baltic countries have both pressed us to include in this Charter a unilateral and unequivocal statement of support for eventual Baltic NATO membership.



U.S. Department of State

Background Note: Finland, March 1997

Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

Official Name: Republic of Finland

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 337,113 sq. km. (130,160 sq. mi.); about the size of New England, New Jersey, and New York combined.
Cities: Capital -- Helsinki (pop. 525,000). Other cities -- Tampere (182,700), Turku (164,700).
Terrain: Low but hilly, more than 70% forested, with more than 60,000 lakes.
Climate: Northern temperate.

People

Nationality: Noun -- Finn(s). Adjective -- Finnish.

Population: 5.13 million.

Population growth rate: 0.3%.

Ethnic groups: Finns, Swedes, Lapps, Roma, Tartars.

Religions: Lutheran 89%, Orthodox 1%.

Languages: Finnish 93%, Swedish 6% (both official); small Lapp- and Russian-speaking minorities.

Education: Years compulsory -- 9. Attendance -- almost 100%. Literacy -- almost 100%.

Health: Infant mortality rate -- 3.8/1,000. Life expectancy -- males 72 yrs., females 80 yrs.

Work force (2.5 million; of which 2 million are employed): Public services -- 32%. Industry -- 22%. Commerce -- 14%. Finance, insurance, and business services -- 10%. Agriculture and forestry -- 8%. Transport and communications -- 8%. Construction -- 6%.

Government

Type: Constitutional republic.

Constitution: July 17, 1919.

Independence: December 6, 1917.

Branches: Executive -- president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of State (cabinet).

Legislative -- unicameral parliament. Judicial -- Supreme Court, regional appellate courts, local courts.

Subdivisions: 12 provinces, provincial self-rule for the Aland Islands.

Political parties: Social Democratic Party, Center Party, National Coalition (Conservative) Party, Leftist Alliance, Finnish People's Party, Green Party.

Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy (1996)

GDP: \$124 billion.

GDP growth rate: 3.2%.

Per capita income: \$16,000.

Inflation rate: 0.6%.

Natural resources: Forests, minerals (copper, zinc, iron), farmland.

Agriculture (3% of GDP): Products -- meat (pork and beef), grain (wheat, rye, barley, oats), dairy products, potatoes, rapeseed.

Industry (31% of GDP): Types -- metal and steel, forest products, chemicals, shipbuilding, foodstuffs, textiles and clothing.

Trade: Exports -- \$40 billion. Major markets -- EU 58%, U.S. 7%, Russia 5%, Japan 2.5%. Imports -- \$29 billion.

Major suppliers -- EU 60%, U.S. 7%, Russia 7%, Japan 6%.

Official exchange rate (December 1995): 4.59 Finnish markkas=U.S.\$1.

U.S.-FINNISH RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Finland are warm. Some 200,000 U.S. citizens visit Finland annually, and about 3,000 U.S. citizens are resident there. The U.S. has an educational exchange program in Finland which is comparatively large for a Western European country of Finland's size. It is financed in part from a trust fund established in 1976 from Finland's final repayment of a U.S. loan made in the aftermath of World War I.

Finland is bordered on the east by Russia and, as one of the former Soviet Union's neighbors, has been of particular interest and importance to the U.S. both during the Cold War and in its aftermath. Before the U.S.S.R. dissolved in 1991, longstanding U.S. policy was to support Finnish neutrality while maintaining and reinforcing Finland's historic, cultural, and economic ties with the West. The U.S. has welcomed Finland's increased participation since 1991 in Western economic and political structures.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Finland has moved steadily toward integration into Western institutions and abandoned its formal policy of neutrality, which has been recast as a policy of military nonalliance coupled with the maintenance of a credible, independent defense. Finland's 1994 decision to buy 64 F-18 fighter planes from the United States signaled the abandonment of the country's policy of balanced arms purchases from East and West.

In 1994, Finland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace; the country also is an observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Finland became a full member of the European Union (EU) in January 1995, at the same time acquiring observer status in the EU's defense arm, the Western European Union.

Economic and trade relations between Finland and the United States are active and were bolstered by the F-18 purchase. U.S.-Finland trade totals almost \$5 billion annually. The U.S. receives about 7% of Finland's exports -- mainly pulp and paper, ships, and machinery -- and provides about 7% of its imports -- principally computers, semiconductors, aircraft, and machinery.

Finland generally welcomes foreign investment. Areas of particular interest for U.S. investors are specialized high-tech companies and investments that take advantage of Finland's position as a gateway to Russia and the Baltic countries.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Ambassador -- Derek Shearer

Deputy Chief of Mission -- Michael Cleverley

Political Officer - Richard DeVillafranca

Economic Officer -- Michael Delaney

Commercial Officer -- Peter Frederick (resident in Stockholm, Sweden)
Consular Officer -- Lisa Vickers
Administrative Officer -- Thomas Ryan
Regional Security Officer -- Jeremy Zeikel
Agricultural Officer -- Thomas Hamby (resident in Stockholm, Sweden)
Public Affairs Officer (USIS) -- Phillippe Duchateau
Labor Attache -- Kevin Johnson

The U.S. embassy in Finland is at Itainen Puistotie 14, Helsinki 00140; tel: 358-9-171931; fax: 358-9-174681.

ECONOMY

Finland has a dynamic industrial economy based on abundant forest resources, capital investments, and technology. Traditionally, Finland has been a net importer of capital to finance industrial growth. In the 1980s, Finland's economic growth rate was one of the highest of industrialized countries.

In 1991, Finland fell into a deep recession caused by economic overheating, depressed foreign markets, and the dismantling of the barter system between Finland and the former Soviet Union. The same year, Finland devalued the markka to promote export competitiveness. This helped stabilize the economy; the recession bottomed out in 1993, with continued growth through 1995. Unemployment continues to be a problem for Finland, and in late 1996 it was around 19%.

Exports of goods contribute more than 20% of Finland's GDP; combined exports of goods and services amount to at least 25% of GDP. Exports and imports of goods equal about 40% of GDP. Timber and metalworking are Finland's main industries, but other industries produce manufactured goods ranging from electronics to motor vehicles. Finnish-designed consumer products such as textiles, porcelain, and glassware are world-famous.

Except for timber and several minerals, Finland depends on imported raw materials, energy, and some components for its manufactured products. Farms tend to be small, but sizable timber stands are harvested for supplementary income in winter. The country's main agricultural products are dairy, meat, and grains. Finland's EU accession has accelerated the process of restructuring and downsizing of this sector.

An extensive social welfare system, constituting about one-fifth of the national income, includes a variety of pension and assistance programs and a comprehensive health insurance program. Although free education through the university level also is available, only about one child in four receives a higher education in the highly competitive system. In the mid-1970s, the educational system was reformed with the goal of equalizing educational opportunities. Beginning at age seven, all Finnish children are required to attend a "basic school" of nine grade levels. After this, they may elect to continue along an academic (lukio) or vocational (ammattikoulu) line. But most pursue vocational studies, since the number of openings in higher educational institutions is less than the demand.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Finland has a mixed presidential/parliamentary system with executive powers divided between the president, who has primary responsibility for national security and foreign affairs, and the prime minister, who has primary responsibility for all other areas. Constitutional changes made in the late 1980s strengthened the prime minister -- who must enjoy the confidence of the parliament (Eduskunta) -- at the expense of the president. Finland's 1995 accession to the European Union has blurred the line between foreign and domestic policy; the respective roles of president and prime minister are evolving, and plans are under consideration to rewrite the constitution to clarify these and other issues.

Finns enjoy individual and political freedoms, and suffrage is universal at 18. The country's population is ethnically homogeneous with no sizable immigrant population. Few tensions exist between the Finnish-speaking majority and

the Swedish-speaking minority.

President and Cabinet. Elected for a six-year term, the president:

- Handles foreign policy, except for certain international agreements and decisions of peace or war, which must be submitted to the parliament;
- Is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has wide decree and appointive powers;
- May initiate legislation, block legislation by pocket veto, and call extraordinary parliamentary sessions; and
- Appoints the prime minister and the rest of the cabinet (Council of State).

The Council of State is made up of the prime minister and ministers for the various departments of the central government as well as an ex-officio member, the Chancellor of Justice. Ministers are not obliged to be members of the Eduskunta and need not be formally identified with any political party.

Parliament. Constitutionally, the 200-member, unicameral Eduskunta is the supreme authority in Finland. It may alter the constitution, bring about the resignation of the Council of State, and override presidential vetoes; its acts are not subject to judicial review. Legislation may be initiated by the president, the Council of State, or one of the Eduskunta members.

The Eduskunta is elected on the basis of proportional representation. All persons 18 or older, except military personnel on active duty and a few high judicial officials, are eligible for election. The regular parliamentary term is four years; however, the president may dissolve the Eduskunta and order new elections at the request of the prime minister and after consulting the speaker of parliament.

Judicial System. The judicial system is divided between courts with regular civil and criminal jurisdiction and special courts with responsibility for litigation between the public and the administrative organs of the state. Finnish law is codified. Although there is no writ of habeas corpus or bail, the maximum period of pre-trial detention has been reduced to four days. The Finnish court system consists of local courts, regional appellate courts, and a Supreme Court.

Administrative Divisions. Finland has 12 provinces. Below the provincial level, they are divided into cities, townships, and communes administered by municipal and communal councils elected by proportional representation once every four years. At the provincial level, the 11 mainland provinces are administered by provincial boards composed of civil servants, each headed by a presidentially appointed governor. The boards are responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and play a supervisory and coordinating role within the provinces.

The island province of Aland is located near the 60th parallel between Sweden and Finland. It enjoys local autonomy by virtue of an international convention of 1921, implemented most recently by the Act on Aland Self-Government of 1951. The islands are further distinguished by the fact that they are entirely Swedish-speaking. Government is vested in the provincial council, which consists of 30 delegates elected directly by Aland's citizens.

Military. Finland's defense forces consist of 34,700 persons in uniform (27,300 army; 3,000 navy; and 4,400 air force); the country's defense budget equals about 2% of GDP. There is universal male conscription under which all men serve from eight to 11 months. As of 1995, women were permitted to serve as volunteers. A reserve force ensures that Finland can field 500,000 trained military personnel in case of need.

Political Parties. Finland's proportional representation system encourages a multitude of political parties and has resulted in many coalition governments. Political activity by communists was legalized in 1944, and although four major parties have dominated the postwar political arena, none now has a majority position. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) gained a plurality in Finland's parliament in the general election of March 1995. But it won far less than an overall majority and so formed a five-party governing coalition.

The SDP won 28% of the vote in 1995, mainly among the urban working class but also with some support among small farmers, white-collar workers, and professionals. The Leftist Alliance (LA) -- the SDP's rival on the left -- gained 11% of the vote in 1995 and joined the SDP-led government. The LA was formed in May 1990 and replaced the People's Democratic League, the group that represented the Finnish Communist Party in the Eduskunta.

Finland's two other major parties are the Center Party, traditionally representing rural interests, and the National Coalition -- or Conservative -- Party, which draws its major support from the business community and urban professionals. The Center won nearly 20% and the Conservatives 18% of the vote in 1995. The Conservatives are the second-largest party in the SDP-led coalition, which is rounded out by the Swedish People's Party and the Green Party. The Center Party leads the opposition in Parliament.

Principal Government Officials

President -- Martti Ahtisaari

Prime Minister -- Paavo Lipponen

Foreign Minister -- Tarja Halonen

Ambassador to the United States -- Jaakko Laajava

Ambassador to the United Nations -- Wilhelm Breitenstein

Finland's embassy in the United States is at 3301 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008; tel: 202-298-5800; fax: 202-298-6030.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Finland's basic foreign policy goal from the end of the Continuation War with the U.S.S.R. in 1944 until 1991 was to avoid great-power conflicts and to build mutual confidence with the Soviet Union. Although the country was geographically, socially, and politically Western, Finns realized they must live in peace with the U.S.S.R. and take no action that might be interpreted as a security threat. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up dramatic new possibilities for Finland and has resulted in the Finns actively seeking greater participation in Western political and economic structures.

Relations With the Soviet Union and With Russia

The principal architect of the post-1944 foreign policy of neutrality was J.K. Paasikivi, who was President from 1946 to 1956. Urho Kekkonen, President from 1956 until 1981, further developed this policy, stressing that Finland should be an active rather than a passive neutral. This policy is now popularly known as the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line."

Finland and the U.S.S.R. signed a peace treaty at Paris in February 1947 limiting the size of Finland's defense forces and providing for the cession to the Soviet Union of the Petsamo area on the Arctic coast, the Karelian Isthmus in southeastern Finland, and other territory along the former eastern border. Another provision, terminated in 1956, leased the Porkkala area near Helsinki to the U.S.S.R. for use as a naval base and gave free access to this area across Finnish territory.

The 1947 treaty also called for Finland to pay to the Soviet Union reparations of 300 million gold dollars (amounting to an estimated \$570 million in 1952, the year the payments ended). Although an ally of the Soviet Union in World War II, the United States was not a signatory to this treaty because it had not been at war with Finland.

In April 1948, Finland signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Under this mutual assistance pact, Finland was obligated -- with the aid of the Soviet Union, if necessary -- to resist armed attacks by Germany or its allies against Finland or against the U.S.S.R. through Finland. At the same

time, the agreement recognized Finland's desire to remain outside great-power conflicts. This agreement was renewed for 20 years in 1955, in 1970, and again in 1983 to the year 2003.

The Finns responded cautiously in 1990-91 to the decline of Soviet power and the U.S.S.R.'s subsequent dissolution. They unilaterally abrogated restrictions imposed by the 1947 and 1948 treaties, joined in voicing Nordic concern over the coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and gave increasing unofficial encouragement to Baltic independence.

At the same time, by replacing the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact with treaties on general cooperation and trade, Finns put themselves on an equal footing while retaining a friendly bilateral relationship. Finland now is boosting cross-border commercial ties and touting its potential as a commercial gateway to Russia. It has reassured Russia that it will not raise claims for Finnish territory seized by the U.S.S.R., and continues to reaffirm the importance of good bilateral relations.

Multilateral Relations

Finnish foreign policy emphasizes its participation in multilateral organizations. Finland joined the United Nations in 1955 and the EU in 1995. As noted, the country also is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace as well as an observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Western European Union.

Finland is well represented in the UN civil service in proportion to its population and belongs to several of its specialized and related agencies. Finnish troops have participated in UN peacekeeping activities since 1956, and the Finns continue to be one of the largest per capita contributors of peacekeepers in the world. Finland is an active participant in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and in early 1995 assumed the co-chairmanship of the OSCE's Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Cooperation with the other Scandinavian countries also is important to Finland, and it has been a member of the Nordic Council since 1955. Under the council's auspices, the Nordic countries have created a common labor market and have abolished immigration controls among themselves. The council also serves to coordinate social and cultural policies of the participating countries and has promoted increased cooperation in many fields.

In addition to the organizations already mentioned, Finland is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the Bank for International Settlements, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and INTELSAT.

HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS

The origins of the Finnish people are still a matter of conjecture, although many scholars argue that their original home was in what is now west-central Siberia. The Finns arrived in their present territory thousands of years ago, pushing the indigenous Lapps into the more remote northern regions. Finnish and Lappish -- the language of Finland's small Lapp minority -- both are Finno-Ugric languages and are in the Uralic rather than the Indo-European family.

Finland's nearly 700-year association with the Kingdom of Sweden began in 1154 with the introduction of Christianity by Sweden's King Eric. During the ensuing centuries, Finland played an important role in the political development of the Swedish-Finnish realm, and Finnish soldiers often predominated in Swedish armies. Finns also formed a significant proportion of the first "Swedish" settlers in 17th-century America.

Following Finland's incorporation into Sweden in the 12th century, Swedish became the dominant language, although Finnish recovered its predominance after a 19th-century resurgence of Finnish nationalism. Publication in

1835 of the Finnish national epic, *The Kalevala* -- a collection of traditional myths and legends -- first stirred the nationalism that later led to Finland's independence from Russia.

In 1809, Finland was conquered by the armies of Czar Alexander I and thereafter remained an autonomous grand duchy connected with the Russian Empire until the end of 1917. On December 6, 1917, shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Finland declared its independence. In 1918, the country experienced a brief but bitter civil war that colored domestic politics for many years. During World War II, Finland fought the Soviet Union twice -- in the Winter War of 1939-40 and again in the Continuation War of 1941-44. This was followed by the Lapland War of 1944-45, when Finland fought against the Germans as they withdrew their forces from northern Finland.

Treaties signed in 1947 and 1948 with the Soviet Union included obligations and restraints on Finland vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. as well as territorial concessions by Finland; both have been abrogated by Finland since the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Foreign Relations).

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION

The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program provides Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. Travel Warnings are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country. Consular Information Sheets exist for all countries and include information on immigration practices, currency regulations, health conditions, areas of instability, crime and security, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. posts in the subject country. They can be obtained by telephone at (202) 647-5225 or by fax at (202) 647-3000. To access the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board by computer, dial (202) 647-9225, via a modem with standard settings. Bureau of Consular Affairs' publications on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained from the Office of Overseas Citizens Services at (202) 647-5225.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at (404) 332-4559 gives the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet entitled Health Information for International Travel (HHS publication number CDC-95-8280, price \$14.00) is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Information on travel conditions, visa requirements, currency and customs regulations, legal holidays, and other items of interest to travelers also may be obtained before your departure from a country's embassy and/or consulates in the U.S. (for this country, see "Principal Government Officials" listing in this publication).

Upon their arrival in a country, U.S. citizens are encouraged to register at the U.S. embassy (see "Principal U.S. Embassy Officials" listing in this publication). This may help family members contact you in case of an emergency.

FURTHER ELECTRONIC INFORMATION:

Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB). Available by modem, the CABB provides Consular Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and helpful information for travelers. Access at (202) 647-9225 is free of charge to anyone with a personal computer, modem, telecommunications software, and a telephone line.

Department of State Foreign Affairs Network. Available on the Internet, DOSFAN provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information. Updated daily, DOSFAN includes Background Notes; Dispatch, the official weekly magazine of U.S. foreign policy; daily press briefings; directories of key officers of foreign service posts; etc. DOSFAN's World Wide Web site is at <http://www.state.gov>; this site has a link to the DOSFAN Gopher

Research Collection, which also is accessible at <gopher://gopher.state.gov> or <gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu>.

U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC). Published on a quarterly basis by the U.S. Department of State, USFAC archives information on the Department of State Foreign Affairs Network, and includes an array of official foreign policy information from 1990 to the present. Priced at \$80 (\$100 foreign), one-year subscriptions include discs (MSDOS and Macintosh compatible) and are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37194, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax (202) 512-2250.

Federal Bulletin Board (BBS). A broad range of foreign policy information also is carried on the BBS, operated by the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). By modem, dial (202) 512-1387. For general BBS information, call (202) 512-1530.

National Trade Data Bank (NTDB). Operated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the NTDB contains a wealth of trade-related information, including Country Commercial Guides. It is available on the Internet (www.stat-usa.gov) and on CD-ROM. Call the NTDB Help-Line at (202) 482-1986 for more information.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	START II/III (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. paper	ABM/TMD Demarcation (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. memo	Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to President William J. Clinton re: Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia (5 pages)	03/19/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. talking points	Talking Points for Working Lunch (5 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005a. list	Air Force One Room Manifest [partial] [National Security Act] (1 page)	03/00/1997	P3/b(3)
005b. list	Trip of President Clinton to Helsinki, Finland: Contact List [partial] (2 pages)	03/00/1997	P6/b(6), b(7)(C)
005c. list	Helsinki Quarters Drops [partial] (2 pages)	03/19/1997	P6/b(6), b(7)(C)
006. talking points	Note Cards: Talking Points for Working Lunch [duplicate of 004] (20 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. talking points	Note Cards: Points to be Made for Meeting with President Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Lipponen of Finland (11 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. talking points	Note Cards: Talking Points for Yeltsin/Ahtisaari Dinner (9 pages)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

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Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [3]

2016-0140-M
kh1808

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CLASSIFIED~~

START II/III

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0140-M (1.46)
KBH 1/27/2020

What we've agreed

What We've Given:

- Extension of START II destruction deadlines by 3&1/2 years (from January 2003 to June 2006).
- Willingness to extend START II via a separate START II "protocol" vice as a provision of START III.
- Agreement START III will reduce warheads to level of 2,000-2,500.
- Agreement Russia can have another year or two after START II reductions period to complete START III reductions.

What We Want:

- Issuance at Helsinki of Joint Statement announcing START III guidelines and agreement in principle on extending START II.
- Firm Yeltsin commitment to push hard for Duma ratification of START II by Denver.
- Agreement Russia will hold to January 2003 START II deadline for taking warheads off missiles.

What We Cannot Move On:

- Relaxing 2003 deadline for START II deactivations.
- Accepting that Russia will not move on START II ratification due to failure to finish ABM/TMD demarcation.
- Explicit reference to conventional SLCMs.
- Agreeing that "front ends" of Navy's D-5 SLBMs and of Minuteman III ICBMs must be destroyed, instead of downloaded.

Where We Have Additional Flexibility:

- Going slightly beyond June 2006 date for START II destruction deadline (you would need to ask Shali if the Chiefs could allow six more months (until December 2006)).
- We can discuss nuclear SLCMs if Russia agrees to put its thousands of tactical nuclear forces on the table as well.

~~CLASSIFIED~~

~~CLASSIFIED~~

ABM/TMD Demarcation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0140-M (1.47)
KBH 1/27/2020

What we've agreed

What We've Given:

- Ban on space-based TMD interceptors.
- Prohibition on testing against strategic targets (i.e., missiles with speeds above 5 km/sec or ranges greater than 3500 km).
- Offer to share information regarding our TMD programs.
- Willingness to consult as new TMD systems emerge and discuss any compliance concerns Russia may raise.

What We Want:

- Final agreement on this basis.

What We Cannot Move On:

- "Speed limits" (i.e., ceiling on permissible speed of TMD interceptors).
- Moratorium on testing of new TMD systems or components based on "new technologies" (e.g., the Airborne Laser program or space-based sensors).
- Test constraints other than on the target missile.

Where We Have Additional Flexibility:

- Offer more robust cooperation on TMD (sharing early warning data, cooperative R&D projects, and joint TMD exercises).

~~CLASSIFIED~~

9:40 pm, March 20, 1997

JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be

based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and

equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making.

The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO

W countries and Russia this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any

destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no

intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

Paragraph on TMD consultations

The Presidents agree that the basic aims of preserving the viability of the ABM Treaty and developing effective TMD systems will require continued bilateral consultations after the agreement on higher-velocity TMD is signed and enters into force. To that end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns they may have regarding each other's TMD activities, including testing and deployment of higher-velocity TMD systems. To facilitate that process, the two sides will exchange annually detailed information on TMD plans and programs. In addition, the Presidents have directed that their experts will engage in thorough consultations in new TMD technologies arise, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Technological developments that could require such consultations include support to TMD systems of advanced space-based sensors and development of air-based or land-based TMD systems or system components based on other physical principles. These consultations could lead to the development of further agreements between the sides.

SECRET 15-00000

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1997

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
DECL:03/30/17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *UKA*

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0140-M (1.48)
KBH 1/27/2020

When you see Yeltsin this week in Helsinki, you will meet a man reborn politically and physically, furiously engaged in taking back his presidency. In the last few weeks, Yeltsin has set a tone that bespeaks determination to act boldly and to reassert his authority at home and abroad. Primakov's visit here this week left no doubt that Yeltsin is the man who will decide the major issues once he meets with you. Now Yeltsin, in the most Russian fashion, is building suspense, laying down markers, pawing the ground and keeping all his options open as he gets ready for your encounter.

Yeltsin's preparations have included sweeping declarations and personnel changes targeted at moving off dead center on the economy and burnishing his patriotic credentials. We have seen major changes in the government that appear to be bringing back a set of dedicated market reformers led by Anatoliy Chubais. And Primakov with his team has moved off the "just say no" approach that caused us to lose almost a year in addressing key foreign policy and security matters.

Yeltsin will come ready to work. Over the telephone Tuesday, after seeing Yeltsin Tuesday morning, Primakov told me that Yeltsin wants a positive outcome from Helsinki and to reach agreement on the agenda items wherever possible. Your hand is strong and Yeltsin knows it. On nearly all agenda items we are in a position to proceed with critical policy objectives without Yeltsin's cooperation. However, this is a meeting where your ability to reaffirm your commitment to Yeltsin as a partner and to Russia's inclusion are major incentives for his cooperation. Yeltsin will bargain hard. He is likely to reopen issues or push for new

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Classified by: James F. Collins, Ambassador-at-Large
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (b and d)

commitments. He continues to put great value on his own role and remains no less sensitive than before to perceived lack of respect for Russia as a great power. Helsinki offers an opportunity to use your influence with Yeltsin to produce a new understanding on Europe and to give our bilateral relationship a boost and new direction for the second term.

As we depart for Helsinki, the outlook for the meeting is as follows:

-- we have better than even prospects for real progress on European issues (but with a chance that contentious topics could spoil this prospect, especially if Yeltsin tries to get you to agree to the exclusion of the Baltic states and Ukraine from NATO);

-- the various arms control issues can go either way;
and

-- on economics, we should get an outcome that is positive and effective in supporting the reformers Yeltsin has just put in office.

NATO-Russia

* | The key to reaching an understanding on NATO-Russia is to persuade Yeltsin of our -- and NATO's -- willingness to consider Russia a full partner in building a new security system in Europe. You may be able to point to the agreed Joint Statement on European Security, which we are still working on, as further proof of the U.S. commitment to cooperation with Moscow. You will want to go over with Yeltsin the main elements of the proposed NATO-Russia relationship, especially the consultative mechanism, stressing that it will establish a seat at a new table for Russia in dealing with specific security concerns on the continent. You can note our interest in expanding the scope of NATO-Russia cooperation to the maximum extent possible, as well as our readiness to work with the Russians to broaden the OSCE's role and enhance its effectiveness.

* | It is equally important to use your meeting with Yeltsin to neutralize the arguments of his domestic critics that enlargement represents a national security danger to Moscow. You can do this by underscoring the concrete measures that the Alliance has taken to address enlargement's military implications. These include a proposal for CEE adaptation that would further reduce military equipment entitlements and thus the potential for destabilizing force build-ups, adopting "three no's" on nuclear deployments and subsequent

language on permanent stationing of combat forces, and continuing the internal adaptation of NATO.

Even if Yeltsin comes prepared to deal on NATO-Russia, he is likely to push for more than we can deliver. If he does, you should be clear about our redlines: no delay, no veto, no exclusion (of the Baltics and Ukraine), no second-class membership and no subordination (to the UN or OSCE).

*Veto
No - delay
Exclusion
2000
Subord*

If he presses for more Charter content to minimize enlargement's military implications, you should stress the opportunities for Russia to enlarge the scope of cooperation with NATO politically and militarily. You might also emphasize the importance of Russia tabling serious CFE adaptation ideas broadly acceptable to the other states-parties who must agree if we are to have a framework agreement by early summer.

You should also underscore with Yeltsin the need for both Russia and NATO to avoid in the months ahead public rhetoric that makes it harder to reach a NATO-Russia agreement. This means acknowledging publicly when progress is made and an end to the vocabulary of adversarial relations when discussing each others' activities and motivations. On the Baltics and Ukraine, you will want to resist firmly his attempts to agree on their exclusion from NATO - while persuading him to lower the volume of this disagreement to the public. It also means avoiding harsh rhetoric regarding Russia's relations with its neighbors, particularly Ukraine and the Baltics.

START/ABM

Your target for Helsinki is Yeltsin's agreement and commitment to push now for START II ratification. You go with a package that includes proposals for him on START II, guidelines for START III, and the elements of an ABM/TMD agreement. We have stretched to meet Russian needs and concerns in all three areas, and are close on the START issues. During talks in Washington, Primakov and his delegation continued to press for constraints on our TMD program that we cannot accept. You will have much to do with Yeltsin on each item of our arms control agenda:

- On extension of START II, you will need to work out with Yeltsin the length of the extension (we have offered 3.5 years, they want 5 years)
- On START III, you will need to work out the date for reaching the 2000-2500 level (we want June 2006, Moscow wants December 2010), and the date for early deactivation

of systems to be eliminated under START (we want January 2003, the Russians have not offered a date).

- On ABM/TMD, we have sent Primakov a new draft statement that would agree now on a demarcation agreement for today's technologies. For the future, we would establish a consultation arrangement for talking about new technologies.

We are working hard to complete an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement at Helsinki, following up on his call to me Tuesday morning. We have told Primakov that in the absence of agreement on ABM/TMD we will find it extremely difficult to go ahead with START II extension and START III guidelines. We do not rule out the possibility of concluding an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement. If that proves impossible, we are preparing a way to talk about the subject that will be coordinated with the Russians and might be enough for Yeltsin to go forward with START II ratification.

If Yeltsin makes clear that he cannot proceed with ratification of START II, you should let him know that we would prefer to live in a world with START II (and START III) reductions; but we will not reduce to those levels, if Russia does not and it will be much more difficult (expensive) for Russia to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. without START II restrictions.

Economics

Our economic agenda in Helsinki is designed both to remind Yeltsin of the advantages to Russia of good relations with us, and to encourage further reform. Yeltsin's enthusiasm about our proposals was evident when I saw him in Moscow. Not surprisingly, however, the Russians have pocketed the proposals that we have tabled and have come back for more.

So while liking the idea of increased USG assistance for investment in Russia, Yeltsin may haggle about the amount. ~~(We have proposed to make up to \$4 billion additional available for U.S. investment, Moscow wants \$10 billion.)~~ You should also be ready to resolve some difficulties in our Joint Economic Statement regarding Russian integration into economic organizations.

We are willing to speak of Russian entry into the WTO and the Paris Club, contingent on necessary reforms and reasonable solution of some thorny debt issues, during your and President Yeltsin's administrations. The Russians are pushing for entry by, respectively, 1998 and 1997, without

reference to conditions. Additionally, while we are willing to speak of substantial progress now and entry into the OECD by the year 2001, the Russians would like entry in 1997. This is a clear impossibility, given entrance requirements. The same situation applies to the Russian desire to refer to APEC membership in the Summit document. Criteria for new APEC members will only begin to be discussed this year, with entry of a limited number of new states scheduled by 2000.

The Russians are also seeking a reference in the statement to their joining a "G-8," including in economic matters, at Denver. You will need to deflect that effort, as we believe that Russia is not ready for participation in the macroeconomic or trade functions of G-7. Yet at the same time, you should use Helsinki to express your readiness to explore with the other members of the G-7 using the Denver Summit to transform that organization into "the Eight."

Yeltsin may also express his interest in Russian graduation from Jackson-Vanik. You should point out that we have already begun to explore here the possibilities for doing this and have heard the odds would be much improved if Russia amended its emigration law. Russia should reduce the ceiling for refusing a visa to people who work in the national security area from ten years to five.

2016-0140-M (1.49)
KBH 1/27/2020

TALKING POINTS FOR WORKING LUNCH

Investment and Growth

- Said since Vancouver that economic relationship built on partnership. Can develop to mutual benefit.
- Russian economy has some way to go, but can see how far Russia has come. Directions you set March 6, vision are historic.
- March 6 speech crystal clear on problems: low investment, no growth. Your agenda right on target: realistic budget, tax reform, reform pensions, housing, military reform.
- But most important -- your vision. Wrote down what you said: "I wish to hand over to my successor a country with a dynamically developing economy and with effective and just social protection, a country whose citizens confidently look to the future." Worthy ambition; want to help.
- Matches my vision for our economic interaction over next four years: expand mutually advantageous trade and investment opportunities, integrate Russia into world economy.
- Al and Viktor discussed need for vision, tight agenda to achieve. You gave great start. Also pleased to see Chubays back on economics, excellent addition of Boris Nemtsov. Know of your high regard for him. Very impressive young man.
- You and I agreed last year to emphasize investment. Only way to achieve growth, create jobs, make people more secure.
- Investment in Russia too low. Enormous potential for Russia to attract, but investors still think taxes too high, laws unstable, too much crime.
- Clear we cannot force investment in. Viktor liked phrase from American oil executive; said pushing investment like pushing on a rope. Will not work; have to pull investment in.
- Al and Viktor agreed on tax priorities, energy laws that could attract \$50-60 billion in investment, laws on crime and corruption, need to ratify Bilateral Investment Treaty. You will see from us strong support to reactivate IMF program. IMF has done a lot, largely at our urging, to assist Russian economic transformation.

[Ask Larry Summers to expand on investment agenda]

- We can help on technical aspects; have team helping Viktor, Chubays on taxes. Hard part is getting laws past Duma.
- Know from experience, Boris, only you can make this happen. Your leadership with Duma key.

U.S. Role -- Finance and Integration

- Ready to instruct my government to make available funds in 1997 to support \$4 billion in investment. That's same amount this year as total from 1992-1996. Agreed in joint statement not to use number, but want you to know levels involved.
- Can assure you funding available, but cannot make investors use it. They have to be willing to borrow and invest. Markets and policies, reforms you pursue will guide them.
- Have asked Congress for new NIS aid package for 1998. Will expand cooperation on investment problems like crime, taxes.
- Also want to expand exchanges, get more young people to know each other, build people-to-people relationship for future.
- Just as important, as reforms move ahead, want to accelerate Russia's membership in WTO, Paris Club, OECD. Al discussed with Viktor; both of us need to work on this.
- Membership more than question of investment, open markets. These organizations will define global trade and economic relations for 21st century. Russia needs to be at table.
- Understand your desire to set target for WTO, Paris Club to drive reform process.
- Agree can set 1998 as target for WTO, but if we do this, must be clear: our support for your accession based on your meeting membership requirements. Accession must be on normal commercial terms. Will work closely with you in your efforts to meet membership requirements.
- Propose we ask Al and Viktor to monitor progress very closely.

Jackson-Vanik and G-8

- Two other matters: Jackson-Vanik, G-8. Both very symbolic; progress will underscore Russia's integration.
- I want to work with you to move toward graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik provisions.
- Jewish community, Congress concerned that Duma passed law to extend waiting period for emigration from five to ten years for people working in sensitive areas.
- Would help tremendously if you could repeal this law, go back to five-year period.
- Already in touch with Jewish community and will work with Congress to define process to move forward on Jackson-Vanik graduation. Language in joint statement fine. But important we treat this with care, minimize public profile.
- On summit of Eight, my idea for Denver is you join from beginning; one press conference of all Eight leaders.
- Seven would carve out some time to discuss economic, financial issues and would issue written statement, but no joint press appearance by Seven as in past; small part of summit, done in low-key way, but want you to be aware.
- Have raised this plan with Hashimoto, others. Believe they are coming along. For Hashimoto's support, anything you can do to improve Russian-Japanese bilateral relationship would help.
- Given need to work by consensus, should not include issue of Eight in Helsinki joint statement; would suggest it was "pre-cooked," cause rough feelings on part of our counterparts.
- Ready to address at press conference; would affirm Russia's integration into work of leading industrial democracies; to continue trend toward Eight, would say I invited you to join at Denver from beginning; Eight addressing key global challenges.

[If raised -- APEC membership]

- WTO most important. APEC defining membership criteria this year, inviting new members in 1998; candidates join 1999-2000. Willing to see how other members respond.

[If raised -- 1998 goal to join all clubs]

- Hard to set one date. Prepared to do Paris Club by Denver if negotiators work out terms. WTO depends on Russian trade offer; still not received. OECD probably takes longer.

[If raised -- call Russia "market economy"]

- Trade specialists say this would hurt Russia: dumping laws still apply, just like for EU; but you could also face other duties. Experts can discuss, but suggest we not pursue.

[If raised -- announce Free Trade Area]

- Important long-term goal; first step is WTO. But if announce FTA before Russia joins WTO, critics will start to undermine. Best way forward is progress on WTO.

International Space Station

- Want to raise space station. April 1993 meeting began new era of space cooperation -- centerpiece is partnership on International Space Station.
- In February 27 telephone conversation, mentioned my concern that our joint efforts to build Space Station at risk.
- Key elements promised by Russia as its contribution to Space Station being delayed because of lack of funds. Al and Viktor worked hard to fix, but funding flow and work not yet underway.
- Defining moment for program -- without funding to get Russia's elements on schedule, may be forced by Congress to reduce Russian participation, jeopardizing future space partnership.
- This cooperation has great symbolic and substantive importance -- we must see Russian actions within a month.

U.S.-Russia Global Cooperation

- Look to expand U.S.-Russian cooperation in foreign policy arena, building on cooperation on Middle East peace and Bosnia. Believe there is much we can achieve together.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- One area Nagorno-Karabakh. Strongly endorse Primakov's suggestion to Albright to pool resources to resolve regional conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh.
- United States, Russia and France must work out common approach in Minsk Group to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to compromise. You and I must strongly support this.
- Let us keep in touch on this -- would be important diplomatic victory for all sides, and important demonstration to world of great potential of U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Ukraine

- On Ukraine, have noted rising tensions over Sevastopol. Kuchma wrote me; raised concern Ukraine still not compensated for tactical nuclear weapons transferred 1991-1992.
- Kuchma always tells me relationship with Russia works when you are engaged. Might be important step to settle compensation issue; you could help diffuse other tensions.

China

- Will continue to pursue strengthened U.S. engagement with China. Al on his way there this weekend. Value positive Russian-Chinese relations.
- Your thoughts about China's future post-Deng? Albright's trip confirms our expectation of continuity in basic policies.

President William Jefferson Clintons Trip to Helsinki, Finland 20 & 21 March, 1997

Helsinki Trip Code: 35
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CO Dial: 45-44-655
Inter-Continental Hotel: 40-55-1
Motorpool Dispatch: Hotel Ext. 4055 or 4055-3349

Country Code: 358
City Code: 9

<u>OFFICES:</u>	<u>DROP</u>	<u>ROOM NO.</u>
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SENIOR Staff Fax	x35508	
Staff Advance	x35220	994 thru 998
Staff Advance Fax	x35501	Commercial Dial 454-6907
Press Advance Office	x35224	992
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USSS	x35238	986
WHCA	x35240	988

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RON
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Pager # 5759
Room # 762

AF-1 and Support Plane BAGGAGE CALL 4:00 PM

Please, leave your bags outside your door.
Please, leave your bags unlocked.

AF-1 and Support Plane Shuttle
Leaves from the front of hotel, lobby level at
8:30 PM
PLEASE, BE PROMPT!!

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. list	Air Force One Room Manifest [partial] [National Security Act] (1 page)	03/00/1997	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [3]

2016-0140-M
kh1808

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AF-1 ROOMS MANIFEST

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Bell, Robert - NSC	827
Berger, Samuel - NSC	842
Bivera, PH1 Johnny - WHTV	611
Blinken, Anthony - NSC	825
BRIEFING ROOM	862
Cicio, Kris - NSC	823
Collins, Amb. James - State	696
Cornelius, Catherine	838
Davis, Undersec. Lynn - State	659
Demaio, Dr. Marlene	880
(b)(3)	
Elkon, Nicole	822
Engskov, Kris	758
Friendly, Andrew	846
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Hanlin, Kirk	847
Hawkins, Col. James - WHMO	835
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Lindsey, Bruce	858
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Mariano, Dr. Connie - WHMU	859
McCurry, Michael	834
McGrath, PHC Charles - WHTV	611
McNeely, Bob	874
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Pifer, Steve - NSC	884
Pittard, Dana - Mil Aide	857
Podesta, John	850

[005 a]

AF-1 ROOMS MANIFEST - - CONT.

Powell, SFC Glenn - WHTA	754
Ryan, June - Mil Aide	819
Sanchez, MSCM Fred - WHSM	861
SENIOR STAFF OFFICE	Ambassador I and II, 9 th Floor
Shalikashvili, Gen. John - Chairman JCS	820
Shocas, Elaine - State	666
Simmons, Col. Joseph - WHCA	833
Steinberg, Jim - NSC	836
Summers, Lawrence - Treasury	829
Talbott, Dep. Sec. Strobe	662
Vershow, Sandy - NSC	893

SUPPORT PLANE ROOMS MANIFEST

Ares, Mario - WHTA	759
Bass, Peter - NSC	891
Brown, Eric - State	732
Dunkerly, Craig - State	692
Edelman, Eric - State	656
George, Suzie - State	665
Hale, David - State	661
Hathaway, Christine - State	684
Joshi, Kay - NSC	885
Klimow, Col. Matthew - JCS	870
Koch, S. - Defense	879
Lakhdar, Kamala - State	688
Lineberry, Liz - State	663
Lynch, Tom - State	694
Myers, Lt. Gen. Richard - JCS	821
Nacht, Michael - ACDA	691
Pasqual, Carlos - NSC	887
Quinn, Mary - NSC	890
Rubin, James - State	664
Sandberg, Cheryl - Treasury	878
Shinnick, Richard - State	679
Stump, Dennis - WHAO	625
Sweeney, Lynn - State	678
Timbie, James - State	690
Wolff, Alex - State	677

PRESS PLANE ROOMS MANIFEST

Anderson, Lori	877
Babbie, Steve - US Immigration	629
Brown, Alan - WHTV	517
Cunningham, Rudy - WHTA	638
Edwards, Anne	871
Epperson, Doug - US Customs	745
French, Willard - WHTV	641
Harreld, Alan - WHTA	619
Johnson, David - NSC	886
Kinlaw, Warren - WHTV	778
Leavy, David - State	680
McArthur, Kristen - Steno	757
McKiernan, Kathy	875
Morgan, Gordon - WHTA	761
O'Neal, Houck - WHTA	623
Olcott, Ellen - Steno	737
Salcido, Dori - WHTO	837
Silverman, Josh	841
Smith, Daniel - WHTV	641
Suntum, Peggy - Steno	713
Teague, Michael - WHTO	843
Toiv, Barry	839

Special Notes

- Press Plane: Press Plane Baggage Call 7:30 am - 4:00 pm. Baltic Bar - Lobby Level. Please, leave your bags unlocked.
- Breakfast: Complimentary breakfast is served from 7 am - 10 am in the Brasserie located on the Lobby Level.
- Credentials: Please, have your credential visible when entering and exiting the hotel.
- Hotel Entrance: We all must use the main entrance to the hotel for entry and exit when not in the motorcade. There will be a mag check point at this entrance, please, have your credential with you.
- City Tour/
Arabia Glass
Factory: Thursday 10 am - 12pm City Tour of Helsinki
2 pm - 4 pm Arabia Glass Factory Store
- Friday 10 am - 12 pm City Tour of Helsinki
2 pm - 4 pm Arabia Glass Factory Store
- Vans will be departing the filing center at 10 am and 2pm, respectively.
- Elevators: The elevators will be stopping on all floors except the 8th floor. Please, use the stairwells to access the 8th floor from the 7th or 9th floors.
- Embassy
Control Room: Room # 969. Thursday
8:00 am - 8:00 pm.
Friday
8:00 am - Midnight
- Cashier Services: Room # 973. Thursday
8:00 am - 8:00 pm
Friday
8:00 am - Midnight

HOTEL SERVICES

- Sauna/
Swimming: The saunas and the swimming pool are located on the 9th floor. The swimming pool is complimentary. There is a charge for the sauna. Dial #1 or #8.
- Massage: Massages are available at the Sauna. For reservations, please, dial #1 or #8.
- Wake-Up Calls: Dial #0.
- Room Services: Available 24 hours a day. Dial #2.

AF-1 and Support Plane

BAGGAGE CALL

4:00 PM

Please, leave your bags outside your door.

Please, leave your bags unlocked.

AF-1 and Support Plane Shuttle

Leaves from the front of hotel, lobby level at

8:30 PM

P .EASE, BE PROMPT !

SENIOR STAFF

OFFICE

AMBASSADOR I & II

(9th Floor)

HOTEL
INTER-CONTINENTAL
HELSINKI

RESTAURANTS

OPEN HOURS DURING 18.- 21.3.1997

CAFE OPERA

Tel. 3252

10.00- 1.00

BRASSERIE

Tel. 3233

Breakfast 7.00- 10.00

Lunch 11.30- 15.00

Fast Track Menu 11.30 - 23.30

Dinner 18.00 - 23.30

BALTIC BAR

Tel. 3240

16.00- 02.00

ROOM SERVICE

Tel. 2

24 hours

TÖÖLÖNRANTA

Tel. 45421020

11.30- 24.00

New Restaurant by the Sea, Only 500m from the Hotel
Modern California Inspired Show Kitchen
Moderate Prices

FAST TRACK MENU

valid daily 11.30- 23.30

- CHIEF'S SALAD WITH MIXED GREENS, HAM, TURKEY AND GRUYERE CHEESE 54,-*
TANDOORI MARINATED CHICKEN, MIXED GREEN SALAD WITH CHOICE OF: 55,-
THOUSAND ISLAND DRESSING, ROQUEFORD DRESSING OR ITALIAN VINAIGRETTE
SOUP OF THE DAY, ROLL AND BUTTER 36,-
POTATO AND LEEK SOUP, BREAD CROUTONS 36,-



- TRADITIONAL CLUB SANDWICH SERVED WITH PICKLED VEGETABLES 52,-*
DOUBLE CHEESE HAMBURGER WITH COLE SLAW AND FRENCH FRIES 58,-
RICOTTA & SPINACH TORTELLINI, FRESH MUSHROOMS, CREAM AND CHORIZO 67,-
PENNE PASTA WITH FRESH TOMATO AND PESTO SAUCE 67,-
GRILLED SALMON WITH STIR FRIED VEGETABLES AND BASMATI RICE 82,-
GRILLED CHICKEN PAILLARD WITH CHEZ SOI BUTTER AND VEGETABLES 69,-
BREADED VEAL ESCALOPE WITH LIME MAYONNAISE, GREEN BEANS, 88,-
PARSLEY FRIED POTATOES

CHURRASCO MARINATED T-BONE STEAK SERVED WITH CREAMED SPINACH, 95,-
POTATO CROQUETTES AND SEASONAL VEGETABLES

GRILLED SIRLOIN STEAK, FRIED ONION RINGS, PORT WINE & MUSHROOM JUS, 86,-
BAKED POTATO WITH SMETANA



- CHOCOLATE CAKE SERVED WITH WHIPPED CREAM AND FRUITS 32,-*
SELECTION OF ICE CREAM AND SHERBETS, BERRY SAUCE 29,-

3 RASSER E

FINNISH MENU

valid daily 18.00- 23.30

APPETIZERS

- MIXED SALAD WITH ELK ROASTBEEF, WILD MUSHROOM VINAIGRETTE 45,-*
AND FRIED ONION RINGS
SMOKED SALMON AND SMOKED BALTIC HERRING NAPOLEON WITH 58,-
VENDACE ROE SAUCE AND AVOCADO
CREAMY FISH SOUP WITH POTATO, DILL FLAT BREAD 38,-

MAIN DISHES

- PAN FRIED FILLET OF ARCTIC CHAR WITH SMOKED BURBOT ROE 112,-*
CANNELONI AND CHIVE SAUCE
GRILLED SALMON WITH CREAMED ROOT VEGETABLES AND 89,-
BETROOT ESSENCE
SLIGHTLY SMOKED REINDEER ON A MUSHROOM BLINI, FRIED ENDIVE, 126,-
CALVADOS AND DUCKLIVER SAUCE
SAUNA SMOKED HAM WRAPPED FILLET OF HARE WITH JUNIPER 142,-
BERRY SAUCE, SKEWER OF POTATOES AND RED ONION

DESSERTS

- CREME BRÛLÉE WITH CLOUDBERRIES AND OAT CRISP 36,-*
PASTRY FILLED WITH ARCTIC BRAMBLE ICE CREAM AND FRESH BERRIES 36,-
FINNISH BLUE CHEESE AND DARK BREAD TERRINE WITH SALSA FROM 42,-
DRIED PEAR AND APPLE

BRASSER E

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. list	Trip of President Clinton to Helsinki, Finland: Contact List [partial] (2 pages)	03/00/1997	P6/b(6), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [3]

2016-0140-M
kh1808

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

GUINN, Shanan	Deputy WH Lead	N/A	5525	741
HAMMER, Mike	State Admin Lead	050 597 6789	5126	740
HARPER, Jeff	AF-1 ADV	050 597 6733	5333	714
HILTON, Joi	W/H ARR/DEP, OTRs, P/Adv		5238	727
HOERTZ, Garry	MEDIC		3380	828
HUGHES, Amy	WHTO	050 597 6756	5327	730
(b)(6), (b)(7)c				
MACRAT, NIM	Emb Site Meet/Greet	171-931x288	N/A	343-3673 (h)
MAES, Glen A.	W/H Staff Mess		3135	425
MISHRA, Manish	EMB Asst Visit Ctrl X381	050 597 6723	N/A	663-943 (h)
NIBLACK, Wallace	WHCA Lead	050 597 6736	2362	772/770
PANASITI, Lisa	W/H RON	N/A	5759	762
PHELPS, Sarah	Emb Translator	171-931x371	N/A	755-3834 (h)
(b)(6), (b)(7)c				
PILLARD, Dana		050 597 674	4489	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c				
SCHUEPPL, J.	Emb Palace dinner	049 722 058	N/A	458-7575 (h)
STEENSON, Vallerie	W/H Press Filling Center	050 597 6770		623 Hesperia
STOCKING, Tom	Diplomatic Security	050 597 6798		631
STOKES, Joyce	White House Med	171-931x247	N/A	505-4382 (h)
VICKERS, Lisa	Emb Gifts/Thank You	050 597 6726	N/A	622-5353 (h)
WEISBERG, Rob	Motorcade	050 597 6790	5140	746
WOLIN, Hannu	Emb Palace Bilateral	171-931x332	N/A	458-2828 (h)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. list	Helsinki Quarters Drops [partial] (2 pages)	03/19/1997	P6/b(6), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [3]

2016-0140-M
kh1808

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Helsinki Quarters Drops

as of 19 March

OFFICE	NAME	RM #	TEL #	REMARKS
AF-1 Advance	Jeff Harper	714	35393	Complete
AF-1 Pilot	COL Donnally	*731	35390	*hotel mariana
C.O.S. (Rep.)	John Podesta	848 - 850	35531	STU-III (req)
Nat. Sec. Adv.	Sandy Berger	840 - 842	35530	STU-III
Deputy N.S.A.	Jim Steinberg	836	35315	STU-III
Personnel	Bruce Lindsey	856 - 858	35313	20th arrival
Military Aide	Dana Pittard	833 - 857	35532	STU-III
HMX Advance	Steve Cusmano	763	35394	Complete
HMX Pilot	Scott Minaldi	*757	35392	*hotel mariana
NSC	<i>Steve Piffer</i>	884*	35316	*recent change
NSC Exec. Sec.	<i>Fred Dohse</i>	824 - 826	35317	no STU-III
Nurse	Gary Hoertz	828	35385	Complete
Press Lead	Andy Beattie	748	35213	Complete
Doctor	Mariano	859*	35384	*recent change
Sec. Treasury	Harry Summers	829	35349	*no drop
Staff Lead	Mort Engelberg	766	35210	Complete
USSS Director	Richard Miller	618 - 620*	35370	(acting director)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

[005c]

OFFICE	NAME	RM #	TEL #	REMARKS
PCO	Wallace Niblack	780	35298	Complete
Dip. Sec. SAIC			35351	
DOS Admin. Ld	Mike Hammer	740	35355	Complete
DOS Liaison Ld	-----	-----	35353	-----
WHMO Rep.	COL Hawkins	835	35380	20th arrival
(b)(6), (b)(7)c				
1st Lady Det. Ld	-----	-----	35365	-----
(b)(6), (b)(7)c				
WHCA CRO	Bill Cashaw	747	35299	Complete
TSD Work Rm.	USSS office	863	35533	Complete
Emb Con. Room	Office	973	35214	Complete
Travel Staff		Ambassador 1,2		
Suite		8th floor		Complete
RON Sec. Room		854 - (869)		Complete
NSC Office		895,897,899		Complete
Medical	Terri Gee	873	TBD by OPS	*non standard
Physician	Marlene Demaio	880	TBD by OPS	*non standard
Physical Therap.	Nanette Paco	882	TBD by OPS	*non standard
WHCA CDR	COL Simmons	833		no drop

[Speech Cards for Embassy Meet and Greet, March 20, 1997,
Helsinki, Finland. 11 pages]

3

- **Want to thank you for coming here to the hotel to see me. But for the sake of historical accuracy -- and for the young people in this room -- let me say that despite appearances, I am not the first sitting president to visit Helsinki.**

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/25/97

4

- **Was looking forward to Helsinki after Hillary told me how much she enjoyed her visit last July and how warmly she was received.**

5

Even prepared for the cold weather, “black ice” and slippery streets that Derek and Ruth warned me about. Unfortunately, no one warned me about the dangers of Florida.

6

- On all my foreign trips, I have been impressed by the dedication of our embassy teams. You deserve a special thanks. On short notice, you reworked all the plans for this visit to accommodate my injury. Derek, you and your entire staff turned on a dime -- and, unlike me, you landed on your feet.

- **This is a tremendously important summit. Here in Helsinki, we will continue to lay the foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for the 21st century. Our two countries can make a vital difference in building an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe for the first time in history.**

We can forge a strong partnership between NATO and Russia. We can take important strides on arms control -- building on the dramatic progress we have already achieved.

And we can help advance Russia's transition to a market economy -- an historic change that is in America's deepest interest.

- **The work you do to meet these challenges may not always make the headlines. But let me say to the members of our Foreign Service and the representatives of the many other agencies that make up our country teams:**

11

I know how hard you work. I know you are doing more with less, coping with everything from personnel and funding cutbacks to unexpected furloughs. For all that you do, every day, I am profoundly grateful.

12

- I also want to thank the family members who are here -- far from home. Because of your unwavering support, our foreign service personnel continue doing the superb job we have come to expect -- and all Americans benefit.**

- **Finally, my thanks the Finnish citizens who work in our embassy. A few of you were on staff when I visited Helsinki for the first time -- as a student in 1969.**

[Talking Points for Working Lunch, 20 pages]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 1 of 19

TALKING POINTS FOR WORKING LUNCH

INVESTMENT AND GROWTH

- SAID SINCE VANCOUVER THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BUILT ON PARTNERSHIP. CAN DEVELOP TO MUTUAL BENEFIT.
- RUSSIAN ECONOMY HAS SOME WAY TO GO, BUT CAN SEE HOW FAR RUSSIA HAS COME. DIRECTIONS YOU SET MARCH 6, VISION ARE HISTORIC.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0140-M (1.5b)
KBH 1/27/2020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 03/10/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 2 of 19

- MARCH 6 SPEECH CRYSTAL CLEAR ON PROBLEMS: LOW INVESTMENT, NO GROWTH. YOUR AGENDA RIGHT ON TARGET: REALISTIC BUDGET, TAX REFORM, REFORM PENSIONS, HOUSING, MILITARY REFORM.
- BUT MOST IMPORTANT -- YOUR VISION. WROTE DOWN WHAT YOU SAID: "I WISH TO HAND OVER TO MY SUCCESSOR A COUNTRY WITH A DYNAMICALLY DEVELOPING ECONOMY AND WITH EFFECTIVE AND JUST SOCIAL PROTECTION, A COUNTRY WHOSE CITIZENS CONFIDENTLY LOOK TO THE FUTURE." WORTHY AMBITION; WANT TO HELP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 3 of 19

- MATCHES MY VISION FOR OUR ECONOMIC INTERACTION OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS: EXPAND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES, INTEGRATE RUSSIA INTO WORLD ECONOMY.
- AL AND VIKTOR DISCUSSED NEED FOR VISION, TIGHT AGENDA TO ACHIEVE. YOU GAVE GREAT START. ALSO PLEASED TO SEE CHUBAYS BACK ON ECONOMICS, EXCELLENT ADDITION OF BORIS NEMTSOV. KNOW OF YOUR HIGH REGARD FOR HIM. VERY IMPRESSIVE YOUNG MAN.
- YOU AND I AGREED LAST YEAR TO EMPHASIZE INVESTMENT. ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE GROWTH, CREATE JOBS, MAKE PEOPLE MORE SECURE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 4 of 19

- INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA TOO LOW. ENORMOUS POTENTIAL FOR RUSSIA TO ATTRACT, BUT INVESTORS STILL THINK TAXES TOO HIGH, LAWS UNSTABLE, TOO MUCH CRIME.
- CLEAR WE CANNOT FORCE INVESTMENT IN. VIKTOR LIKED PHRASE FROM AMERICAN OIL EXECUTIVE; SAID PUSHING INVESTMENT LIKE PUSHING ON A ROPE. WILL NOT WORK; HAVE TO PULL INVESTMENT IN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 5 of 19

- AL AND VIKTOR AGREED ON TAX PRIORITIES, ENERGY LAWS THAT COULD ATTRACT \$50-60 BILLION IN INVESTMENT, LAWS ON CRIME AND CORRUPTION, NEED TO RATIFY BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY. YOU WILL SEE FROM US STRONG SUPPORT TO REACTIVATE IMF PROGRAM. IMF HAS DONE A LOT, LARGELY AT OUR URGING, TO ASSIST RUSSIAN ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION.

[ASK LARRY SUMMERS TO EXPAND ON INVESTMENT AGENDA]

- WE CAN HELP ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS; HAVE TEAM HELPING VIKTOR, CHUBAYS ON TAXES. HARD PART IS GETTING LAWS PAST DUMA.
- KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE, BORIS, ONLY YOU CAN MAKE THIS HAPPEN. YOUR LEADERSHIP WITH DUMA KEY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 6 of 19

U.S. ROLE -- FINANCE AND INTEGRATION

- READY TO INSTRUCT MY GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AVAILABLE FUNDS IN 1997 TO SUPPORT \$4 BILLION IN INVESTMENT. THAT'S SAME AMOUNT THIS YEAR AS TOTAL FROM 1992-1996. AGREED IN JOINT STATEMENT NOT TO USE NUMBER, BUT WANT YOU TO KNOW LEVELS INVOLVED.
- CAN ASSURE YOU FUNDING AVAILABLE, BUT CANNOT MAKE INVESTORS USE IT. THEY HAVE TO BE WILLING TO BORROW AND INVEST. MARKETS AND POLICIES, REFORMS YOU PURSUE WILL GUIDE THEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 7 of 19

- HAVE ASKED CONGRESS FOR NEW NIS AID PACKAGE FOR 1998. WILL EXPAND COOPERATION ON INVESTMENT PROBLEMS LIKE CRIME, TAXES.
- ALSO WANT TO EXPAND EXCHANGES, GET MORE YOUNG PEOPLE TO KNOW EACH OTHER, BUILD PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIP FOR FUTURE.
- JUST AS IMPORTANT, AS REFORMS MOVE AHEAD, WANT TO ACCELERATE RUSSIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN WTO, PARIS CLUB, OECD. AL DISCUSSED WITH VIKTOR; BOTH OF US NEED TO WORK ON THIS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 8 of 19

- MEMBERSHIP MORE THAN QUESTION OF INVESTMENT, OPEN MARKETS. THESE ORGANIZATIONS WILL DEFINE GLOBAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS FOR 21ST CENTURY. RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE AT TABLE.
- UNDERSTAND YOUR DESIRE TO SET TARGET FOR WTO, PARIS CLUB TO DRIVE REFORM PROCESS.
- AGREE CAN SET 1998 AS TARGET FOR WTO, BUT IF WE DO THIS, MUST BE CLEAR: OUR SUPPORT FOR YOUR ACCESSION BASED ON YOUR MEETING MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS. ACCESSION MUST BE ON NORMAL COMMERCIAL TERMS. WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU IN YOUR EFFORTS TO MEET MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 9 of 19

- PROPOSE WE ASK AL AND VIKTOR TO MONITOR PROGRESS VERY CLOSELY.

JACKSON-VANIK AND G-8

- TWO OTHER MATTERS: JACKSON-VANIK, G-8. BOTH VERY SYMBOLIC; PROGRESS WILL UNDERSCORE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION.
- I WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO MOVE TOWARD GRADUATING RUSSIA FROM JACKSON-VANIK PROVISIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 10 of 19

- JEWISH COMMUNITY, CONGRESS CONCERNED THAT DUMA PASSED LAW TO EXTEND WAITING PERIOD FOR EMIGRATION FROM FIVE TO TEN YEARS FOR PEOPLE WORKING IN SENSITIVE AREAS.
- WOULD HELP TREMENDOUSLY IF YOU COULD REPEAL THIS LAW, GO BACK TO FIVE-YEAR PERIOD.
- ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH JEWISH COMMUNITY AND WILL WORK WITH CONGRESS TO DEFINE PROCESS TO MOVE FORWARD ON JACKSON-VANIK GRADUATION. LANGUAGE IN JOINT STATEMENT FINE. BUT IMPORTANT WE TREAT THIS WITH CARE, MINIMIZE PUBLIC PROFILE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 11 of 19

- ON SUMMIT OF EIGHT, MY IDEA FOR DENVER IS YOU JOIN FROM BEGINNING; ONE PRESS CONFERENCE OF ALL EIGHT LEADERS.
- SEVEN WOULD CARVE OUT SOME TIME TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL ISSUES AND WOULD ISSUE WRITTEN STATEMENT, BUT NO JOINT PRESS APPEARANCE BY SEVEN AS IN PAST; SMALL PART OF SUMMIT, DONE IN LOW-KEY WAY, BUT WANT YOU TO BE AWARE.
- HAVE RAISED THIS PLAN WITH HASHIMOTO, OTHERS. BELIEVE THEY ARE COMING ALONG. FOR HASHIMOTO'S SUPPORT, ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO IMPROVE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WOULD HELP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 12 of 19

- GIVEN NEED TO WORK BY CONSENSUS, SHOULD NOT INCLUDE ISSUE OF EIGHT IN HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT; WOULD SUGGEST IT WAS "PRE-COOKED," CAUSE ROUGH FEELINGS ON PART OF OUR COUNTERPARTS.
- READY TO ADDRESS AT PRESS CONFERENCE; WOULD AFFIRM RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO WORK OF LEADING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES; TO CONTINUE TREND TOWARD EIGHT, WOULD SAY I INVITED YOU TO JOIN AT DENVER FROM BEGINNING; EIGHT ADDRESSING KEY GLOBAL CHALLENGES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 13 of 19

[IF RAISED -- APEC MEMBERSHIP]

- WTO MOST IMPORTANT. APEC DEFINING MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA THIS YEAR, INVITING NEW MEMBERS IN 1998; CANDIDATES JOIN 1999-2000. WILLING TO SEE HOW OTHER MEMBERS RESPOND.

[IF RAISED -- 1998 GOAL TO JOIN ALL CLUBS]

- HARD TO SET ONE DATE. PREPARED TO DO PARIS CLUB BY DENVER IF NEGOTIATORS WORK OUT TERMS. WTO DEPENDS ON RUSSIAN TRADE OFFER; STILL NOT RECEIVED. OECD PROBABLY TAKES LONGER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 14 of 19

[IF RAISED -- CALL RUSSIA "MARKET ECONOMY"]

- TRADE SPECIALISTS SAY THIS WOULD HURT RUSSIA: DUMPING LAWS STILL APPLY, JUST LIKE FOR EU; BUT YOU COULD ALSO FACE OTHER DUTIES. EXPERTS CAN DISCUSS, BUT SUGGEST WE NOT PURSUE.

[IF RAISED -- ANNOUNCE FREE TRADE AREA]

- IMPORTANT LONG-TERM GOAL; FIRST STEP IS WTO. BUT IF ANNOUNCE FTA BEFORE RUSSIA JOINS WTO, CRITICS WILL START TO UNDERMINE. BEST WAY FORWARD IS PROGRESS ON WTO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 15 of 19

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

- WANT TO RAISE SPACE STATION. APRIL 1993 MEETING BEGAN NEW ERA OF SPACE COOPERATION -- CENTERPIECE IS PARTNERSHIP ON INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.
- IN FEBRUARY 27 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, MENTIONED MY CONCERN THAT OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO BUILD SPACE STATION AT RISK.
- KEY ELEMENTS PROMISED BY RUSSIA AS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO SPACE STATION BEING DELAYED BECAUSE OF LACK OF FUNDS. AL AND VIKTOR WORKED HARD TO FIX, BUT FUNDING FLOW AND WORK NOT YET UNDERWAY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 16 of 19

- DEFINING MOMENT FOR PROGRAM -- WITHOUT FUNDING TO GET RUSSIA'S ELEMENTS ON SCHEDULE, MAY BE FORCED BY CONGRESS TO REDUCE RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION, JEOPARDIZING FUTURE SPACE PARTNERSHIP.
- THIS COOPERATION HAS GREAT SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE -- WE MUST SEE RUSSIAN ACTIONS WITHIN A MONTH.

U.S.-RUSSIA GLOBAL COOPERATION

- LOOK TO EXPAND U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY ARENA, BUILDING ON COOPERATION ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND BOSNIA. BELIEVE THERE IS MUCH WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 17 of 19

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

- ONE AREA NAGORNO-KARABAKH. STRONGLY ENDORSE PRIMAKOV'S SUGGESTION TO ALBRIGHT TO POOL RESOURCES TO RESOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS LIKE NAGORNO-KARABAKH.
- UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND FRANCE MUST WORK OUT COMMON APPROACH IN MINSK GROUP TO BRING ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN TO COMPROMISE. YOU AND I MUST STRONGLY SUPPORT THIS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 18 of 19

- LET US KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS -- WOULD BE IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR ALL SIDES, AND IMPORTANT DEMONSTRATION TO WORLD OF GREAT POTENTIAL OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION.

UKRAINE

- ON UKRAINE, HAVE NOTED RISING TENSIONS OVER SEVASTOPOL. KUCHMA WROTE ME; RAISED CONCERN UKRAINE STILL NOT COMPENSATED FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRANSFERRED 1991-1992.
- KUCHMA ALWAYS TELLS ME RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA WORKS WHEN YOU ARE ENGAGED. MIGHT BE IMPORTANT STEP TO SETTLE COMPENSATION ISSUE; YOU COULD HELP DIFFUSE OTHER TENSIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 18 of 19

- LET US KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS -- WOULD BE IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR ALL SIDES, AND IMPORTANT DEMONSTRATION TO WORLD OF GREAT POTENTIAL OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION.

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Card 19 of 19

CHINA

- WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE STRENGTHENED U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA. AL ON HIS WAY THERE THIS WEEKEND. VALUE POSITIVE RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS.
- YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT CHINA'S FUTURE POST-DENG? ALBRIGHT'S TRIP CONFIRMS OUR EXPECTATION OF CONTINUITY IN BASIC POLICIES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Points to be Made for Meeting with President Ahtisaari and Prime
Minister Lipponen of Finland, 11 pages]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 1 of 11

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT AHTISAARI AND
PRIME MINISTER LIPPONEN OF FINLAND

BILATERAL ISSUES

- WONDERFUL TO RETURN TO FINLAND. HILLARY TOLD ME ABOUT WARM RECEPTION YOU GAVE HER DURING VISIT LAST JULY.
- APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER TO FACILITATE THIS SUMMIT. YOUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AND WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR EFFICIENCY ARE HELPING US TO GET MOST OUT OF MEETING.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 03/13/07

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2016-0170-M (1.51)
KBH 1/27/2020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 2 of 11

RUSSIA

- OUR SENSE THAT YELTSIN IN CONTROL, DESPITE CONTINUING HEALTH PROBLEMS.
- HOPE MY MEETING HERE CAN NARROW DIFFERENCES ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING BASIC ELEMENTS OF NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER. RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO IMPORTANT COMPONENT IN BUILDING FULLY INTEGRATED POST-COLD WAR EUROPE.
- WANT TO MAKE CERTAIN RUSSIA NOT MARGINALIZED OR ISOLATED. ALSO HOPE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON START, ECONOMIC ISSUES.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 3 of 11

- YOUR GROUNDING IN WEST AND EXPERIENCE WITH VASTLY LARGER AND CHALLENGING NEIGHBOR GIVE FINLAND IMPORTANT REGIONAL ROLE.
- APPRECIATE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN HELPING RESOLVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BALTICS, MOST RECENTLY RUSSIA-ESTONIA BORDER DISPUTE.
- MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO HELP NORTHWEST RUSSIA IMPROVE ITS ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 4 of 11

BALTICS

- IN ADDITION TO HELPING BALTIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO MENTOR BALTICS AND HELP SPEED THEIR INTEGRATION INTO WEST.
- DELIGHTED WITH OUR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND PRODUCTIVE WAY WE ARE POOLING INSIGHTS, IDEAS, RESOURCES.
- RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH YOU AND OTHER NORDICS IN ACHIEVING MUTUAL AIMS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 5 of 11

- FINLAND'S RECORD TRULY IMPRESSIVE, PARTICULARLY COMMITMENT TO BALTIC PEACEKEEPING BATTALION (BALTBAT) AND EFFORTS TO IMPROVE NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF ESTONIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS.
- ON NATO MEMBERSHIP, WE ARE COMMITTED TO KEEPING DOOR OPEN TO BALTICS, BUT RECOGNIZE THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE IN FIRST GROUP OF INVITEES. SO, MUST FIND PRACTICAL WAYS TO DEAL WITH THEIR REAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY NEEDS.
- COMMITTED TO ENHANCED PFP ACTIVITIES FOR BALTICS AND A STRONG ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (APC) TO ADVANCE AND ASSIST THEIR EVENTUAL CANDIDACY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 6 of 11

- APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP FOR QUALIFIED BALTIC APPLICANTS. CONTINUE TO URGE OTHER EU MEMBERS TO TREAT QUALIFIED BALTICS THE SAME AS OTHER QUALIFIED APPLICANTS WITH RESPECT TO START AND PACE OF ACCESSION.

NATO ENLARGEMENT/MADRID SUMMIT

- ALTHOUGH WE WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE MADRID ON NATO-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP, ENLARGEMENT WILL GO FORWARD AS PLANNED.
- NO DECISION MADE ON WHICH COUNTRIES WILL BE INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 7 of 11

- COMMITTED TO KEEPING DOOR TO NATO MEMBERSHIP OPEN AFTER JULY TO BOTH CURRENT ASPIRANTS AND TO COUNTRIES LIKE FINLAND, WHICH ARE NOT LOOKING TO JOIN ALLIANCE AT PRESENT TIME.
- BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL DIALOGUES WITH ASPIRANT COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT INVITED TO MADRID SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER SUMMIT. SUCH DIALOGUES WILL HELP THOSE COUNTRIES CONTINUE EFFORTS TO MEET RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP.
- BY MADRID, HOPE TO HAVE COMPLETED WORK ON NATOS INTERNAL ADAPTATION AND TO HAVE FINISHED DEVELOPMENT OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE ENHANCEMENTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 8 of 11

PFP/ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

- APPRECIATE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS TO ELABORATE DETAILS OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL.
- APC WILL GIVE ALL PARTNERS GREATER VOICE IN SHAPING PFP PROGRAM AS WELL AS STRENGTHEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSULTATION, COOPERATION AND DECISION-MAKING.
- COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF ENHANCEMENTS TO PFP APPROVED AT DECEMBER NAC. WILL GIVE PARTNERS GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH NATO ALLIES IN AREAS SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Card 9 of 11

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

- VALUE GENEROUS CONTRIBUTIONS OF FINLAND TO NATO MISSIONS IN BOSNIA, IN KEEPING WITH YOUR COUNTRY'S LONG TRADITION OF PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS.
- ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR CONTRIBUTION OF POLICE MONITORS TO INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF). HOPE YOU WILL JOIN US IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MONITORS AND RESOURCES TO SUPPORT TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF LOCAL POLICE.
- CRITICAL WE SPEED UP ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION SO REFUGEES CAN RETURN AND ALL PARTIES HAVE FIRM STAKE IN PEACE BY TIME SFOR LEAVES IN MID-1998.

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Card 10 of 11

- GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR DECISION TO MAINTAIN MISSION IN FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (FYROM) TOGETHER WITH U.S. TROOPS.
 - DEEPLY REGRET LOSS IN FEBRUARY OF THREE FINNISH UNPREDEP PEACEKEEPERS IN HELICOPTER ACCIDENT WHILE ON PATROL OVER FYROM.
 - PLAN TO URGE RUSSIANS NOT TO OPPOSE EXTENSION OF UNPREDEP GIVEN DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIA AND TENSIONS IN KOSOVO.

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Card 11 of 11

[IF RAISED] PAPER TRADE DISPUTE. [AHTISAARI MAY RAISE OBJECTIONS TO EFFORTS BY AMERICAN PAPER COMPANIES TO CHALLENGE FINLAND'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING HIGH EU TARIFF BARRIERS AGAINST AMERICAN PAPER IMPORTS.]

- UNDERSTAND FINLAND HAS PROPOSED INCORPORATING ISSUE OF PAPER TARIFF REDUCTION IN TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE (A BUSINESS FORUM ESTABLISHED UNDER NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA SIGNED BY U.S. AND EU IN MADRID IN JUNE 1995).
- THIS COULD BE PROMISING APPROACH IF WE CAN SHOW THIS DIALOGUE CAN PRODUCE MEANINGFUL RESULTS IN REASONABLE TIME PERIOD.

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Stephen
Goodin

[Talking Points for Yeltsin/Ahtisaari Dinner, 9 pages]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 1 of 9

TALKING POINTS FOR YELTSIN/AHTISAARI DINNER

INTRODUCTORY

- (TO AHTISAARI) GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR HOSTING SUMMIT AND FOR FIRST LADY'S RECEPTION LAST JULY. FINLAND PLAYS KEY ROLE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND AS INVESTMENT/TRADE PARTNER WITH RUSSIA.
- WANT TO SALUTE FINLAND'S ACTIVE ROLE IN REGION AND THROUGHOUT EUROPE, INCLUDING STRONG PRESENCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 03/10/07

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0140-M (1.52)
KBH 1/27/2020

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Card 2 of 9

- (TO YELTSIN) GLAD TO SEE YOU BACK IN SADDLE AND IN FINE FORM. MISSED WORKING WITH YOU CLOSELY LAST FEW MONTHS; HOPE TO MAKE UP FOR IN MEETINGS TOMORROW.
- HOPE NAINA, DAUGHTERS AND GRANDSONS IN GOOD HEALTH. HILLARY SENDS WARMEST REGARDS. APPRECIATE NAINA AND YOUR WISHES FOR QUICK RECOVERY FOLLOWING MY INJURY.

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Card 3 of 9

SUMMIT AGENDA AND THEMES

- MY COMMITMENT TO STRONG BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BASED ON VISION OF VANCOUVER STRONG AS EVER. YOU AND I, BORIS, HAVE NEW MANDATE FROM OUR PEOPLES AND HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD FOUNDATION FOR CENTURY OF PEACE. LET US SEIZE IT NOW.
- RUSSIA MUST PLAY RIGHTFUL ROLE AS GREAT POWER. COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING RUSSIAN INTEGRATION IN EUROPE, KEY GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS.

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Card 4 of 9

- HELSINKI AGENDA COMPRISES THREE PARTS: EUROPEAN SECURITY, START AND ABM/TMD, AND ENHANCED ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON ALL THREE ISSUES.
- TOMORROW'S TALKS SHOULD HAVE COMMON THEMES: COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO PROBLEMS; BUILDING U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP FOR 21ST CENTURY; INDIVISIBILITY OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.
- BOSNIA A MODEL FOR AMERICAN/RUSSIAN/FINNISH COOPERATION. OUR TROOPS SERVE TOGETHER THERE TO BOLSTER PEACE. THIS NOT EASY; LAST MONTH MOURNED TOGETHER LOSS OF THREE FINNISH PEACEKEEPERS IN HELICOPTER ACCIDENT OVER MACEDONIA.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 5 of 9

- FINLAND'S EXAMPLE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SHOWS IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION AMONG ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS IN HELPING BUILD MORE SECURE, INTEGRATED EUROPE.
- OUR SHARED EXPERIENCE IN BALKANS PROVES SECURITY FOR ALL IN EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY CAN BE ENHANCED BY WORKING TOGETHER.
- THAT IS GOAL OF STRENGTHENED OSCE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, NEW NATO AND STRENGTHENING OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. PEACEKEEPING NOW VITAL PART OF NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

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Card 6 of 9

- AFTER HELSINKI, HOPE WE BOTH WILL BE ABLE TO REPORT GOOD RESULTS TO AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN PEOPLE: WAY FORWARD ON NATO-RUSSIA, REINVIGORATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROCESS, BROADER AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LINKS.

GENERAL CONVERSATION TOPICS

- INTERESTED IN YELTSIN'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND VIEWS ON MONTHS AHEAD.

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Card 7 of 9

- MARCH 6 "STATE OF THE FEDERATION" SPEECH IMPRESSIVE; LAID OUT AMBITIOUS AGENDA. NEW TEAM ALSO IMPRESSIVE. NEXT STEPS?
- NORDIC/BALTIC/BERENTS REGION A SINGLE ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM. HOW HAVE POLITICAL CHANGES OF RECENT YEARS FACILITATED COOPERATION ON COMMON ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS?
- OPEN SKIES TREATY SIGNED ALMOST EXACTLY FIVE YEARS AGO HERE IN HELSINKI. IMPORTANT SYMBOL OF OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN AFTERMATH OF COLD WAR. RATIFICATION PROSPECTS IN DUMA?

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Card 8 of 9

- FINLAND IS RUSSIA'S ONLY EU NEIGHBOR. WHAT ROLE DOES THIS RELATIONSHIP PLAY IN RUSSIA'S NORTHWEST? GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN BOTH FINLAND AND RUSSIA.
- [IF BALTIC-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE RAISED]
- STRONGLY SUPPORT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND INDEPENDENT BALTIC STATES. NOT INCONSISTENT WITH BALTICS' EXPANDING TIES TO WEST.
 - PRAGMATIC RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES, SUCH AS BORDER TREATY, IN ALL SIDES' INTEREST, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO MORE STABLE EUROPE.

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Card 9 of 9

- IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIDES KEEP RHETORIC IN CHECK;
CAN COMPLICATE RESOLUTION OF COMPLEX ISSUES.
- (TO AHTISAARI) FINNISH IDEAS FOR PROGRESS?

[IF BALTIC MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS RAISED]

- DO NOT RULE OUT ANY EMERGING DEMOCRACY; NO NEW
ARTIFICIAL DIVIDING LINES. BUT WILL PROCEED IN WAY
THAT BUILDS SECURITY FOR ALL OF EUROPE, INCLUDING
RUSSIA.

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Folder Title:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	Points for Private Dinner with President Yeltsin (3 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. talking points	Points to be Made for Meeting with President Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Lipponen of Finland, incomplete (8 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. talking points	Various Speech Cards for POTUS (6 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. talking points	POTUS Speech Cards for Meeting with President Yeltsin (41 pages)	03/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Records Management
 OA/Box Number: 3624

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Helsinki for Clinton/Yeltsin Summit, March 20-21, 1997 [4]

2016-0140-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

POTUS
SAW -
DID NOT
MARK

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Card 1 of 4

POINTS FOR PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT
YELTSIN

RUSSIAN DOMESTIC SCENE

- CLOSELY FOLLOWED MARCH 6 SPEECH, SUBSEQUENT MOVES TO RENEW YOUR GOVERNMENT. COMMEND AMBITIOUS AGENDA. NEXT STEPS?
- WHAT OBSTACLES TO YOUR PROGRAM, TO ECONOMIC REFORM?
- OPPOSITION IN DUMA PREPARED TO COOPERATE, OR WILL IT CONTINUE TO TRY TO STYMIE YOUR PROGRAM? RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS?

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KBM 1/27/2020

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Card 2 of 4

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN
3/25/97

- HOW TO MAINTAIN AVERAGE RUSSIAN'S SUPPORT FOR CHANGE?

LOOKING AHEAD

- BELIEVE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS ON NATO-RUSSIA, BOTH TODAY AND IN SOLANA-PRIMAKOV CHANNEL. HOPE THEY CAN COMPLETE DOCUMENT SOON.
- KNOW ENLARGEMENT POSES POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR YOU. BUT BELIEVE YOU CAN MAKE STRONG CASE THAT RUSSIAN INTERESTS ARE ADVANCED. STEPS OVER NEXT TWO MONTHS CAN STRESS:

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Card 3 of 4

- CHANGED NATURE OF NATO, INCLUDING MILITARY REDUCTIONS.
- INCLUSIVE APPROACH THAT ENSURES RUSSIA WILL HAVE SEAT AT TABLE WHEN KEY EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES DISCUSSED.
- UNIQUE NATURE OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.
- REMAIN COMMITTED TO ENLARGEMENT THAT PROCEEDS IN MANNER THAT POSES NO THREAT TO RUSSIA, PROMOTES MORE STABLE, INTEGRATED EUROPE.
- WON'T CUT OUT RUSSIA FROM EUROPE; CAN'T CUT OUT ANY COUNTRY.

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Card 4 of 4

- SOON NEED TO BEGIN THINKING ABOUT DENVER AND HOW TO USE MEETING ON MARGINS TO ADVANCE BILATERAL AGENDA.
- WILL DEFINE DENVER SCHEDULE TO INCLUDE YOU TO MAXIMUM EXTENT. CONSULTING OTHER G-7.

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[Points to be Made for Meeting with President Ahtisaari and
Prime Minister Lipponen of Finland, incomplete, 8 pages]

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Card 2 of 11

RUSSIA

- OUR SENSE THAT YELTSIN IN CONTROL, DESPITE CONTINUING HEALTH PROBLEMS.
- HOPE MY MEETING HERE CAN NARROW DIFFERENCES ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING BASIC ELEMENTS OF NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER. RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO IMPORTANT COMPONENT IN BUILDING FULLY INTEGRATED POST-COLD WAR EUROPE.
- WANT TO MAKE CERTAIN RUSSIA NOT MARGINALIZED OR ISOLATED. ALSO HOPE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON START, ECONOMIC ISSUES.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/25/97

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 3 of 11

- YOUR GROUNDING IN WEST AND EXPERIENCE WITH VASTLY LARGER AND CHALLENGING NEIGHBOR GIVE FINLAND IMPORTANT REGIONAL ROLE.
 - APPRECIATE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN HELPING RESOLVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BALTICS, MOST RECENTLY RUSSIA-ESTONIA BORDER DISPUTE.
- MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO HELP NORTHWEST RUSSIA IMPROVE ITS ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

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Card 4 of 11

BALTICS

- IN ADDITION TO HELPING BALTIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO MENTOR BALTICS AND HELP SPEED THEIR INTEGRATION INTO WEST.
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- RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH YOU AND OTHER NORDICS IN ACHIEVING MUTUAL AIMS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 5 of 11

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- COMMITTED TO ENHANCED PFP ACTIVITIES FOR BALTICS AND A STRONG ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (APC) TO ADVANCE AND ASSIST THEIR EVENTUAL CANDIDACY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 6 of 11

- APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP FOR QUALIFIED BALTIC APPLICANTS. CONTINUE TO URGE OTHER EU MEMBERS TO TREAT QUALIFIED BALTICS THE SAME AS OTHER QUALIFIED APPLICANTS WITH RESPECT TO START AND PACE OF ACCESSION.

NATO ENLARGEMENT/MADRID SUMMIT

- ALTHOUGH WE WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE MADRID ON NATO-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP, ENLARGEMENT WILL GO FORWARD AS PLANNED.
- NO DECISION MADE ON WHICH COUNTRIES WILL BE INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Card 7 of 11

- COMMITTED TO KEEPING DOOR TO NATO MEMBERSHIP OPEN AFTER JULY TO BOTH CURRENT ASPIRANTS AND TO COUNTRIES LIKE FINLAND, WHICH ARE NOT LOOKING TO JOIN ALLIANCE AT PRESENT TIME.
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- BY MADRID, HOPE TO HAVE COMPLETED WORK ON NATOS INTERNAL ADAPTATION AND TO HAVE FINISHED DEVELOPMENT OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE ENHANCEMENTS.

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Card 8 of 11

PFP/ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

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Card 9 of 11

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- CRITICAL WE SPEED UP ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION SO REFUGEES CAN RETURN AND ALL PARTIES HAVE FIRM STAKE IN PEACE BY TIME SFOR LEAVES IN MID-1998.

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[Various Speech Cards for POTUS, 3/25/1997, 6 pages]

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Card ~~45~~ of 50

- SERIOUS CHANGES; NEED TO BE ASSESSED OBJECTIVELY. THAT IS KEY TO "EXPLAINING" ENLARGEMENT TO RUSSIAN PEOPLE.
- I HAVE SAME RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE CLEAR TO AMERICANS THAT IT IS "NEW RUSSIA." THAT IS WHAT LEADERSHIP IS ABOUT.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0140-R1 (1.55)
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RUSSIA-BALTICS (AS APPROPRIATE)

- STRONGLY SUPPORT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BALTICS. NOT INCONSISTENT WITH BALTICS' EXPANDING TIES TO WEST.
- PRAGMATIC RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES IN ALL SIDES' INTERESTS; WILL CONTRIBUTE TO MORE STABLE EUROPE. URGE YOU TO KEEP OPEN CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL CHANNEL.

[IF YELTSIN RAISES BALTICS' POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP]

- NO DECISIONS YET ON WHO WILL BE INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS IN JULY.

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- BUT WILL NOT EXCLUDE BALTICS OR OTHER EMERGING EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES FROM CONSIDERATION FOR EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP.
- NOT IN ANYONE'S INTEREST TO DRAW NEW LINE. BUT NATO WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE IN WAY THAT ENHANCES ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES STABILITY, INCLUDING RUSSIA.
- DISAGREE ON THIS QUESTION, BUT DO NOT HAVE TO UNDERScore THIS DIFFERENCE. HOWEVER, EVERY TIME YOU SAY NO IN PUBLIC, PRESSURE ON US TO SAY THEY ARE NOT EXCLUDED.

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[IF YELTSIN ASKS PRIVATE ASSURANCE ON NO BALTICS, OTHER NIS]

- CANNOT MAKE THIS COMMITMENT PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY. THIS ONE ISSUE WHERE WE WILL JUST HAVE TO DISAGREE.

[IF YELTSIN RAISES "PAUSE" BEFORE SECOND WAVE]

- STEADY, DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. BUT CANNOT ARTIFICIALLY STOP CLOCK.

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[IF YELTSIN RAISES SITUATION OF RUSSIANS IN BALTICS]

- NEITHER OSCE NOR WE HAVE SEEN PATTERN OF ABUSE OF RUSSIANS.
- AT SAME TIME, HAVE URGED BALTIC GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE RUSSIANS FEEL WELCOME IN THEIR COUNTRIES.
- IF YOU HAVE SPECIFIC CONCERNS, PREPARED TO RAISE WITH BALTIC LEADERS.

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SEA BREEZE

- EXERCISE IN SPIRIT OF PFP.
- HUMANITARIAN EXERCISE -- HOW TO COPE WITH AFTERMATH OF EARTHQUAKE, PROVIDE DISASTER RELIEF.
- GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI HERE -- CAN WALK GENERAL SAMSONOV THROUGH SCENARIO SO NO CONFUSION.

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- THINK ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO IN OUR SECOND TERMS, WHERE WE WANT TO DIRECT U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, WHAT KIND OF LEGACIES WE WANT TO LEAVE BEHIND. ONLY WE -- YOU AND I -- CAN DO.
- BELIEVE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY; CAN USE THIS MEETING TO REENERGIZE U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS, FURTHER SLASH NUCLEAR ARMS, EXPAND TRADE AND INVESTMENT. CAN ALSO FIND WAY FORWARD TO BUILD NEW, MORE STABLE EUROPE FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

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2016-0140-M (1.56)
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WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH TODAY

- LET ME REVIEW WHAT I THINK WE CAN ACCOMPLISH TODAY - AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE TRULY HISTORIC AND WORTH OF THE WORK OF TWO PRESIDENTS WHO ARE SHAPING THE FUTURE OF THE 21ST CENTURY:
- FIRST, WE CAN AGREE TO BUILD AN UNPRECEDENTED NATO-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP THAT WILL HELP ASSURE A PEACEFUL, UNDIVIDED, DEMOCRATIC EUROPE FOR CENTURIES TO COME.
- MADELEINE AND YEVGENY HAVE WORKED HARD TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT WE CAN BE PROUD OF I APPRECIATE THE EFFORT YOU HAVE PERSONALLY PUT INTO DOCUMENT.

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- SECOND, WE ARE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO TAKE ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT STEP ON THE ROAD TO REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD LET US PUT START II INTO FORCE AND ISSUE GUIDELINES LEADING TO START III, WITH FURTHER REDUCTIONS.
- BUT THERE ARE A FEW DECISIONS THAT ONLY WE TWO PRESIDENTS CAN TAKE: ON ABM/TMD AGREEMENT AND THE DATES FOR DESTRUCTION UNDER START II.
- I WILL COME BACK TO THIS ISSUE LATER, BUT I HOPE THAT YOU AND I CAN MAKE THE KEY DECISIONS THIS MORNING, SO WE CAN PUT THE EXPERTS TO WORK.

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- THIRD, WE CAN STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP, TO BRING SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT TO RUSSIA AND TO BRING RUSSIA INTO KEY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AS A FULL PARTNER.
- I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA CAN HAVE A BRIGHT ECONOMIC FUTURE -- WITH YOUR STRONG ECONOMIC TEAM AND OUR EFFORTS TO WORK TOGETHER.
- THIS IS A BIG AND EXCITING AGENDA. I THINK WE SHOULD BEGIN BY REVIEWING OUR IMPORTANT AGREEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND THEN TURN TO START/ABM THIS MORNING.

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JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

- SUGGEST WE BEGIN WITH EUROPE, THEN TALK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL.
- MY VISION FOR EUROPE AS BEFORE: NEW ERA; COLD WAR BEHIND US; FIRST POST-COLD WAR PRESIDENTS; UP TO US TO DEFINE FUTURE OF INTEGRATED, UNDIVIDED EUROPE. BELIEVE YOU SHARE THIS VISION.
- PLEASED WITH GOOD WORK ALBRIGHT AND PRIMAKOV DID IN AGREEING TO JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY.
- VERY IMPORTANT DOCUMENT. LET ME NOTE HIGHLIGHTS.

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- FIRST, IT STATES OUR SHARED GOAL OF BUILDING STABLE, SECURE, INTEGRATED AND UNDIVIDED DEMOCRATIC EUROPE, AND OUR AGREEMENT TO MANAGE CHANGE IN WAY THAT THREATENS NO STATE. MADE THAT COMMITMENT TO YOU BEFORE IN PRIVATE; I INTENT TO REPEAT IN PUBLIC.
- SECOND, IT STRESSES IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO OSCE AND TO STRENGTHENING OSCE'S CAPABILITIES FOR PREVENTING AND MANAGING CONFLICTS.
- THIRD, WHILE WE DISAGREE OVER ENLARGEMENT, WE AGREE TO BUILD A NATO-RUSSIA, SIGN A DOCUMENT TO

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ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA.

- DOCUMENT, SIGNED BY NATO LEADERS AND YOU, WILL BE "ENDURING POLITICAL COMMITMENT AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL."
- FOURTH, IT AGREES TO ESTABLISH NATO-RUSSIA MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATIONS, COORDINATION AND, TO THE MAXIMUM EFFECT POSSIBLE WHERE APPROPRIATE, JOINT DECISION-MAKING AND ACTION ON SECURITY ISSUES AND COMMON CONCERNS.

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- FIFTH, ACKNOWLEDGES THE PROFOUND TRANSFORMATION OF NATO AND NEW REALITIES IN RUSSIA. NATO AND RUSSIA TO DEVELOP RELATIONS, ENHANCE MUTUAL SECURITY. WANT RUSSIA AS PARTNER OF ALLIANCE.
- SIXTH, IT COMMITS US TO ADAPTED CFE TREATY, WITH GOAL OF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BY LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER. ADAPTED TREATY WILL PREVENT BUILD-UP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
- SEVENTH, IT STATES MY VIEW THAT ALLIANCE CONTEMPLATES NO POTENTIALLY THREATENING BUILD-UP OF PERMANENTLY STATIONED COMBAT FORCES NEAR RUSSIA. NATO STATED MARCH 14 NO "ADDITIONAL PERMANENT STATIONING OF SUBSTANTIAL COMBAT

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FORCES." YOU STATE YOU WILL EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT.

- EIGHTH, IT REAFFIRMS NATO'S POLICY OF "NO INTENTION, NO PLAN AND NO REASON" TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON TERRITORY OF NEW MEMBERS, WHICH WILL BE REFERRED TO IN NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT.
- NINTH, IT INCLUDES OUR AGREEMENT THAT U.S., RUSSIA AND OTHER PARTNERS FACE COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES THAT ARE BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH COOPERATION.
- IN SUM, VERY POWERFUL DOCUMENT. PROVIDES STRONG FOUNDATION FOR OUR FURTHER COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN SHAPING NEW EUROPE.

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NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT

- NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT SHOULD INSTITUTIONALIZE RELATIONSHIP, SYMBOLIZE NEW RUSSIA DEALING WITH NEW NATO, PERMIT RELATIONSHIP TO EVOLVE AND EXPAND AS NATO AND RUSSIA GAIN EXPERIENCE WORKING AS REAL PARTNERS.

• LET'S TELL SOLANA AND PRIMAKOV TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO FINISH UP NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT -- IN COMING WEEKS IF POSSIBLE.

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PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

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- ~~IF CAN COMPLETE DOCUMENT, COULD CONSIDER HOLDING SUMMIT OF NATO LEADERS WITH YOU TO SIGN. TOO EARLY TO ANNOUNCE YET; LOT OF WORK STILL TO BE DONE. BUT LET'S TRACK PROGRESS ON DOCUMENT, CONSIDER WHEN NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT MAKES SENSE.~~
- ~~NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCEEDING. NATO LEADERS IN MADRID IN JULY WILL INVITE FIRST COUNTRIES TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS; NEW MEMBERS ADMITTED IN 1999. BUT IF SOLANA AND PRIMAKOV WORK FAST, COULD CONSIDER NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT WELL AHEAD OF MADRID, PERHAPS IN LATE MAY.~~

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CFE ADAPTATION

- ALSO NEED TO WORK FAST IN VIENNA ON CFE ADAPTATION, IN PARALLEL WITH EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE THE NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT.
- CFE COULD REPRESENT A LEGALLY BINDING COMMITMENT BY ALL OF US TO AVOID A DANGEROUS BUILDUP OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND REDUCE SUBSTANTIAL THE OVERALL NUMBER FOR FORCES ALLOWED IN EUROPE.

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- LAST MONTH, NATO ALLIES TABLED FORWARD-LEANING CFE ADAPTATION PROPOSAL WHICH, AS WITH NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT, ADDRESSES KEY CONCERNS OF YOURS ABOUT MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT.
- RUSSIA HAS SAID CONCERNED ABOUT TWO THINGS: LIMITING POSSIBLE GROWTH OF NATO MILITARY POTENTIAL AND LIMITING ITS MOVEMENT EASTWARD. NATO PROPOSAL ADDRESSES BOTH.
- OUR PROPOSAL COMMITS CURRENT NATO MEMBERS TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN PERMITTED EQUIPMENT LEVELS -- BY OUR ESTIMATES ENTAILING OVER 7,000 TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES.

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- OUR PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO FREEZE THE CURRENT MAXIMUM NUMBERS OF ARMOR AND ARTILLERY THAT COULD BE LOCATED IN POLAND, HUNGARY, BELARUS, CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS, UKRAINE AND THE KALININGRAD OBLAST. WOULD PREVENT BUILD-UP IN REGION.
- NATO PROPOSAL REPRESENTS MAJOR EFFORT TO ADDRESS CONCERNS YOU HAVE VOICED ABOUT THREATENING MILITARY BUILD-UP. HOPE IT CAN PROVIDE BASIS FOR EARLY AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES. SHOULD AIM TO HAVE THIS FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BY LATE MAY ALSO.

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- WHAT WE NEED IN VIENNA IS SERIOUS RUSSIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL. NATO READY TO ENGAGE.

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START

- REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGER ALSO VERY IMPORTANT PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH: START I ENTRY-INTO-FORCE, TRILATERAL STATEMENT WITH UKRAINE, INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF NPT, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY.
- CAN TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGER, INCLUDING BRINGING START II INTO FORCE, FURTHER CUTS IN START III.
- WILL BE VITAL PART OF LEGACY THAT YOU AND I LEAVE BEHIND.

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- WHEN WE SPOKE LATE FEBRUARY, AGREED TO CONCLUDE FINAL "GUIDELINES," OR "PARAMETERS," ON START III AT OUR MEETING TODAY.
- THESE "PARAMETERS" WILL PROVIDE FOUNDATION FOR START III NEGOTIATIONS AND DEFINE WAY FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. SHOULD HELP WITH DUMA RATIFICATION OF START II.
- "PARAMETERS" WOULD MAKE CLEAR COMMITMENT TO FURTHER CUTS IN START III, WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND START II REDUCTION PERIOD.

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- MADELEINE AND YEVGENY HAVE DONE A LOT OF GOOD WORK ON THIS ISSUE. BUT THEY HAVE LEFT US A FEW KEY DECISIONS. I HOPE YOU AND I CAN MAKE THESE DECISIONS THIS MORNING, SO OUR EXPERTS CAN WORK TO FINISH A JOINT STATEMENT FOR OUR PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON.
- THE DECISIONS WE NEED TO FOCUS ON INVOLVE SEVERAL DEADLINES ASSOCIATED WITH START III AND THE EXTENSION OF START II, AND AN IMPORTANT MATTER INVOLVING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.
- WITH START SETTLED IN PRINCIPLE, WE CAN THEN TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE LAST CRITICAL ISSUE DIVIDING US ON ABM/TMD DEMARCATION. UNLESS WE CAN REACH

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OUTSTANDING DATES

- MUCH AGREED ON "PARAMETERS" FOR START III. STILL NEED TO RESOLVE ISSUE OF WHEN TO COMPLETE START II DEACTIVATIONS, AS WELL AS DATES FOR COMPLETING START II AND START III REDUCTIONS.
- WITH RESPECT TO DEACTIVATIONS, YOUR COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE DEACTIVATION OF MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED UNDER START II BY 2003 IS THE KEY TO MY ABILITY TO SELL EXTENSION OF START II REDUCTIONS PERIOD TO U.S. SENATE.
- BOTH DATES WOULD NEED TO BE IN THE LEGALLY-BINDING PROTOCOL FOR EXTENDING START II THAT WE'VE AGREED YOU CAN PRESENT TO YOUR DUMA.

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- BELIEVE SENATE WILL AGREE TO GIVE YOU MORE TIME TO ELIMINATE SYSTEMS UNDER START, DUE TO COSTS; THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO EXTEND TIME THAT THOSE MISSILES REMAIN LOADED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS.
- HOPE YOU CAN AGREE TO JANUARY 1, 2003 FOR DEACTIVATIONS.
- SECOND DATE WE NEED TO RESOLVE IS HOW LONG TO EXTEND DESTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS OF START II. YOUR EXPERTS PUSHING FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION OF REDUCTIONS PERIOD.
- FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION JUST NOT POSSIBLE, NOR IS IT NEEDED, GIVEN OUR COMMITMENT TO LOWER LEVELS IN START III.

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- PROPOSED "SPLITTING DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN YOUR PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION AND OUR PROPOSED TWO-YEAR EXTENSION. THIS WOULD GIVE YOU UNTIL JUNE 30, 2006, OVER NINE YEARS, TO MEET START II DEADLINE.
- HOPE WE CAN CLOSE NOW ON THIS BASIS.

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- THIRD DATE WE NEED TO RESOLVE IS WHEN TO COMPLETE START III REDUCTIONS.
- SHOULD BE MORE AMBITIOUS. WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN, GIVEN OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP, WHY IT TAKES SO LONG TO IMPLEMENT START III CUTS. PEOPLE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT TAKES TO THE END OF 2010.
- (COMPROMISE) IF YOU ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL TO EXTEND START II REDUCTIONS PERIOD TO JUNE 30, 2006, AND IMPLEMENT EARLY DEACTIVATION BY 2003, COULD AGREE TO FINISH START III REDUCTIONS TWO YEARS BEYOND THIS POINT -- JUNE 30, 2008.

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- (IF RUSSIA CANNOT AGREE TO JUNE 30, 2008) IF WE CANNOT AGREE ON THIS, SHOULD REMAIN SILENT IN "PARAMETERS," LEAVE ISSUE FOR ACTUAL START III NEGOTIATIONS.

SLCMS

- ONLY OTHER ISSUE REMAINING IN "PARAMETERS" STATEMENT RELATES TO SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.
- HAVE ALREADY COMPROMISED ON THIS BY AGREEING WE WILL EXPLORE MEASURES RELATING TO NUCLEAR SLCMS, AS WELL AS OTHER NUCLEAR FORCES, IN CONTEXT OF START III. WOULD NOTE SLCMS ARE ONLY SYSTEM LISTED BY NAME IN TEXT WE'VE

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PROPOSED, EVEN THOUGH YOUR INVENTORY OF NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES FAR OUTNUMBERS OURS.

- THIS COMPROMISE ON SLCMS WAS NOT PART OF OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL. CAN'T GO ANY FURTHER ON THIS POINT.
- IF WE CAN INSERT WORD "NUCLEAR" BEFORE REFERENCE TO SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, WE CAN CLOSE ON THIS.

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ABM/TMD

- ABM TREATY REMAINS CORNERSTONE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY. REAFFIRMED THIS IN OUR MAY 1995 JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RESOLUTION OF ABM/TMD DEMARCATION NEGOTIATIONS.
- CAN TAKE BIG STEP TODAY TOWARDS STRENGTHENING ABM TREATY FOR FUTURE IF WE AGREE ON JOINT STATEMENT THAT INCLUDES COMPREHENSIVE AND CLEAR GUIDANCE TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS ON DEMARCATION. BELIEVE WE ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THIS.
- IF CAN AGREE, THIS WOULD BE HISTORIC SUMMIT.

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- OUR PROPOSED APPROACH WOULD:
 - RENEW OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO ABM TREATY.
 - COMPLETE DEMARCATION ARRANGEMENT BY ADDRESSING TODAY'S TMD SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH CONSTRAINTS ON TESTING TARGETS AND EXCHANGING DETAILED INFORMATION ON OUR TMD PROGRAMS.
 - ESTABLISH CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS, SO AS TO ENSURE THEY DO NOT CIRCUMVENT ABM TREATY.
 - EXPAND OUR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA IN THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE.

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- THIS LAST POINT, BORIS, IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT. KNOW IT HAS BEEN POINT OF PARTICULAR INTEREST AND EMPHASIS FOR PRIMAKOV AND YOUR DEFENSE MINISTRY.
- OUR JOINT STATEMENT ON ABM COMMITS US TO EXPLORE COOPERATIVE DEFENSE EFFORTS IN AT LEAST THREE TMD AREAS: PROVIDING EARLY WARNING SUPPORT FOR TMD ACTIVITIES; COOPERATING IN DEVELOPING TMD TECHNOLOGIES, AND EXPANDING JOINT TMD EXERCISE PROGRAM WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

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- IMPORTANT YOU APPRECIATE OUR TMD PROGRAMS ARE NOT AIMED AT RUSSIA -- THEY ARE TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS; JUST AS YOUR TMDS ARE INTENDED TO PROTECT YOUR FORCES. HELPING YOU WITH EARLY WARNING INFORMATION NOW COULD HELP YOU DEAL WITH MISSILE THREATS AROUND YOUR PERIPHERY.
- BEYOND THAT, I CAN ENVISION SCENARIOS 10-15 YEARS FROM NOW WHERE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN MILITARY UNITS COULD BE OPERATING TOGETHER -- PERHAPS IN JOINT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS OR EVEN AS PARTNERS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT COALITION -- AND COULD COME UNDER ATTACK FROM COMMON FOE ARMED WITH HIGHLY-CAPABLE SHORT- OR MEDIUM- RANGE MISSILES.

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- IN WORLD OF PROLIFERATION DANGERS WE BOTH CONFRONT, THIS IS NOT FAR-FETCHED. SHOULD PUT PRIORITY ON ENSURING THAT IN ANY SUCH CASE OUR TMD SYSTEMS COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND BOLSTER OUR COMBINED MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
- AS FOR CURRENT DIFFERENCE IN OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON DEMARCATION, BELIEVE WE CAN RESOLVE HOW TO HANDLE CURRENT TMD SYSTEMS. LET'S LEAVE FUTURE SYSTEMS TO OUR SUCCESSORS AND NOT LET BEST BECOME ENEMY OF GOOD.
- IT WOULD SERVE BOTH OUR COUNTRIES' SECURITY INTERESTS IF WE CAN CONCLUDE DEMARCATION AGREEMENT TODAY. BUT I CANNOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER CONSTRAINTS ON TMD TESTING OR DEPLOYMENTS, BEYOND

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- THOSE WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED. YOUR PROPOSED TEXT LEAVES DOOR WIDE OPEN TO CONTINUED DISAGREEMENT OVER ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS YOUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN PRESSING.
- IF YOU CAN AGREE THAT THE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN AGREED BY OUR EXPERTS CONSTITUTE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED TO MEET RUSSIA'S CONCERNS, WE CAN CONCLUDE ABM/TMD AGREEMENT HERE IN HELSINKI.
 - LANGUAGE IN JOINT STATEMENT WOULD READ: "THE ELEMENTS OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE ..."; NOT AS YOUR EXPERTS PROPOSE: "WILL INCLUDE". THAT'S FORMULA FOR CONTINUED STALEMATE AT EXPERTS LEVEL. THEY HAVE BEEN AT THIS FOR THREE YEARS AND CANNOT GO FURTHER ABSENT GUIDANCE FROM OUR LEVEL.

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- IF YOU AND I NOW CAN SETTLE THIS FUNDAMENTAL POINT, OUR EXPERTS CAN MAKE THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN JOINT STATEMENT TEXT. THERE IS ONE SENTENCE THAT REFERENCES OTHER POSSIBLE ELEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DELETED.
- AS LEADERS, WE HAVE WORKED ON THIS ISSUE FOR A LONG TIME. NOW I AM AT OUR BOTTOM-LINE. AND WITHOUT AGREEMENT, WE RISK NEW ASSAULTS FROM MY CONGRESS -- NOT ONLY TO STOP THE DEMARCATION TALKS BUT TO TRY TO THROW OVER THE ABM TREATY ITSELF.

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- YOU HAVE SAID THAT, WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON ABM/TMD, YOU CANNOT PUSH START II IN DUMA. IF THIS IS TRUE, I CANNOT GO AHEAD WITH ANNOUNCING OUR SUPPORT FOR EXTENSION OF START II AND START III REDUCTIONS.
- THAT WOULD MEAN U.S. WILL STAY AT START I LEVELS AND WE WILL BOTH HAVE MISSED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PARITY AT LOWER LEVELS, AND AT LOWER COSTS.
- HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE AND MAKE IT STICK. LET'S SEIZE THIS. CAN PUT ABM/TMD ISSUE BEHIND US, PAVE WAY FOR QUICK ACTION ON START. WILL BOTH GAIN IN TERMS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY. THIS IS NOT ZERO-SUM GAME.

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- CAN WE CLOSE ON THIS BASED ON WHAT I'VE DISCUSSED?

[IF YELTSIN PRESSES FOR "SPEED LIMITS," I.E., CEILING ON TMD INTERCEPTOR VELOCITY]

- NON-STARTER, WITH OUR MILITARY AND CONGRESS.
- CAN ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS THROUGH TRANSPARENCY, VICE LIMITS ON TMD TECHNOLOGY.

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IRAN

- AL RAISED WITH VIKTOR IN FEBRUARY OUR CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE SALES OF RUSSIAN MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.
- APPRECIATE COMMITMENTS YOU AND VIKTOR HAVE MADE TO END ARMS-RELATED TRADE WITH IRAN. BUT HAVE REAL CONCERNS ABOUT CONTINUED REPORTS OF ASSISTANCE TO IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAMS.

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- SERIOUS ISSUE. REQUIRES YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ENSURE THAT ANY SALES INCONSISTENT WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING STOPPED. IRAN STILL POSES SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT TO REGION. DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD POSE EVEN GREATER THREAT.
- NOTE SELF-RESTRAINT RUSSIA HAS EXERCISED ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN. BUT, GIVEN IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS, BELIEVE ANY NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN IS MISTAKE.

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CTBT

- WANT TO PERSONALLY THANK YOU FOR DECISIVE ROLE YOU PLAYED IN CONCLUDING COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY LAST FALL. WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT YOUR LEADERSHIP.
- NEXT WEEK, YOU MEET INDIAN PRIME MINISTER GOWDA. CTBT CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL INDIA SIGNS. HOPE YOU WILL ENCOURAGE GOWDA TO SIGN.
- YOU CAN POINT TO PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE AT HELSINKI ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AS EVIDENCE WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO MEET INDIAN CONCERNS. WE WILL DO SAME.

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[IF "QUINT" SUMMIT RAISED]

- "QUINT" SUMMIT PROBLEMATIC WITH SMALLER ALLIES. PERHAPS BETTER TO CONSIDER NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT.

[IF YELTSIN WANTS TO SCHEDULE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT BEFORE WE ARE CONFIDENT AGREEMENT ON DOCUMENT IS WITHIN REACH]

- NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE AN AGREED DOCUMENT TO SIGN AS CENTERPIECE. LET US STAY IN TOUCH ON THIS, AS SOLANA AND PRIMAKOV COME TO AGREEMENT ON DOCUMENT.

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- BUT LET US AGREE BETWEEN US TO AIM FOR CLOSURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

[IF YELTSIN RAISES BAN ON STATIONED FORCES ON TERRITORY OF NEW NATO MEMBERS]

- NATO POSITION ANNOUNCED MARCH 14: "IN THE CURRENT AND FORESEEABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, THE ALLIANCE WILL CARRY OUT ITS COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND OTHER MISSIONS BY ENSURING THE NECESSARY INTEROPERABILITY, INTEGRATION AND CAPABILITY FOR REINFORCEMENT RATHER THAN BY ADDITIONAL PERMANENT STATIONING OF SUBSTANTIAL COMBAT FORCES."

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- BAN ON STATIONED FORCES UNACCEPTABLE; WOULD MEAN "SECOND-CLASS STATUS" FOR NEW NATO MEMBER. NATO CFE PROPOSAL MEANS NO INCREASE IN EQUIPMENT LEVELS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

[IF YELTSIN RAISES INFRASTRUCTURE]

- WILL BE SOME INFRASTRUCTURE CONSISTENT WITH NATO POLICY, I.E., TO SUPPORT INTEGRATION AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY, NOT PERMANENT STATIONING OF SUBSTANTIAL COMBAT FORCES. WILL BE FULLY TRANSPARENT.

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[IF YELTSIN OBJECTS TO INCLUSION OF KALININGRAD IN CFE PROPOSAL]

- IF ADAPTED CFE TREATY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO CEE COUNTRIES, LIMITS MUST BE RECIPROCAL. THEREFORE, CENTRAL ZONE MUST MAKE GEOGRAPHIC SENSE AND INCLUDE KALININGRAD AS WELL AS BELARUS AND PART OF UKRAINE.

[IF "NATO HASN'T CHANGED" ARGUMENTATION RAISED]

- NATO ALREADY GREATLY CHANGED. NEW NATO; NO LONGER "US VS. THEM," BUT COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.

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- IN 1991, NATO ADOPTED NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT THAT SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EAST; ESTABLISHED BASIS FOR PEACEKEEPING, COALITION CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS. AIM WAS TO OPEN PATHS TO COOPERATION WITH EAST. NO ADVERSARY.
- NATO RESTRUCTURING FORCES: REDUCED NUCLEAR ARSENAL BY 90 PERCENT, DRASTICALLY CUT CONVENTIONAL FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE DOWN FROM 300,000 TO 100,000.
- IN DECEMBER 1996, NATO ANNOUNCED "NO INTENTION, NO PLANS AND NO REASON" TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON NEW MEMBERS.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 1/27/2020

2016-0140-M

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