Case Number: 2014-0862-M

**MR MARKER**

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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### Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

#### Clinton Library

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### COLLECTION:
- Clinton Presidential Records
- NSC Records Management
  - (D'Alema)
- OA/Box Number: 2730

### FOLDER TITLE:
9903915

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a))
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- NSC Records Management
  ([D'Alema])
- O/A/Box Number: 2730

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- 9903915

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
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2014-0862-M
rs1086

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
TELCALL
GERMANY

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY
CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: POTUS TELCALL TO EUROPEAN LEADERS

ACTION: OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT
DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99
STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

FILES: PA
NSCP:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY ______________________ DATE ___________ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 3 OF 3

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KGBt. NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014.0862.19
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### DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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Tim -

SRB unable to clear Tuesday night. Need to get to PENS by 8:30 am for 9:00 am. Started for phone calls.

* D'Alem confirmed for 10W 9-10 this am.

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**THE WHITE HOUSE**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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*COMMENTS:*

POTUS telecalls to Chirac, D'Alema, Koč.

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CC:

*Comments:
POTUS tel calls to
Chirac, D'Alema, KoK
in Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 26, 1999

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy.
- Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. You spoke with D'ALEMA today and we recommend you also call Chirac and Kok. You should speak to Blair once you've had the chance to see where the others are.

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU's representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (as well as Jospin) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. France has now also joined the NATO consensus to support updating planning for KFOR at NATO, overcoming its concern that doing so would exclude the Russians. France is also with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine

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Declassify On: 3/25/09
said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. **You should reiterate the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.**

**Kok.** The Dutch coalition government fell last week when its junior partner withdrew support after its senior partners failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. We assess that it is likely Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In either scenario, Kok will stay on as caretaker, with key foreign policy positions -- including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo -- intact. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed 16 F-16s and more than 20 million Dutch guilders ($9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments
Tab A  Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab B  Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok
• Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn’t inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

• We should be encouraged by what we’re seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic’s policies.

• Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

• Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO’s conditions.

• Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

• Indictment of Milosevic and four of his colleagues complicates our diplomacy but also provides a new opportunity to increase international pressure and isolation. Good that Chernomyrdin called off his trip.

• We should use the indictment to undercut Milosevic’s legitimacy at home and reduce the number of visitors to Belgrade. But we must also not make his immediate departure a new condition for success.

• Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.
• Need to move now to raise the additional forces required so that KFOR can quickly deploy after Milosevic accepts our conditions.

• Additional military police and gendarmes will be essential to establish a secure environment. Can you make any French gendarmes available?

Maintain Unity

• As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

• Value greatly your steady, steadfast position with others.

• Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

• Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

• You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware civilian airdrops may start soon, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.
Wish you well in rebuilding your coalition. What are the prospects?

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to prevent oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- Indictment of Milosevic and four of his colleagues complicates our diplomacy but also provides a new opportunity to increase international pressure and isolation. Good that Chernomyrdin called off his trip.

- We should use the indictment to undercut Milosevic's legitimacy at home and reduce the number of visitors to Belgrade. But we must also not make his immediate departure a new condition for success.

- Now that NATO has updated its plan for KFOR, need to raise the additional focus that will be required to move into Kosovo quickly when Belgrade accepts our conditions.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Will also need armed international civil police until we can train and establish new local police.

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• Could Netherlands make available any of its own Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY) either for KFOR or the international police?

Maintain Unity

• As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

• Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.
MESSAGE NO: 
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
PAGES: 18

FROM: Sean Maloney
(NAME) 202 / 456-2702
(PHONE NUMBER) Gr Fl / W Wing

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Berger memos re Telephone Calls with
(1) Czech Republic President Havel; (2) British Prime Minister Blair; and (3) NATO Leaders on Kosovo (Chirac and Kok)

TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER
To: KIRK HANLIN FOR THE PRESIDENT
(please give Kirk 2 copies)

cc: Capt. Elliott Powell, NSC
cc: Maria Echaveste

REMARKS:
ADD to this.

there's another.

Remo out there.

Does 8/26.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1999

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public force.

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac, D’Alema and Kok.

Blair. Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington. Cook’s public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has

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been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.
France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pascara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.
Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO’s aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders ($9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments
Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab D Points to Make for Prime D’Alema
Tab E Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension.

- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
  - We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
  - Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
  - Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
  - As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
  - Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
  - Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.
  - As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.

- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

• We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

• Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

• Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

• As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.

• Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

• Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

• NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.

• Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.
Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn’t started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.

- There hasn’t been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military’s fuel supplies for a significant time.

- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.

- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.

- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

- Air campaign and economic pressure are working — some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.

- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
• Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.

• Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

• We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

• Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

• You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER D’ALEMA

• We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic’s policies.

• Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

• Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

• As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.

• Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

• Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

• Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.

• Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.08)
10/2/2013 KB4
Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.

Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Humanitarian

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Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.
We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.

Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Plan for Success

Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.

Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09
• Deploying a force without Belgrade’s OK is a much tougher issue we need to deal with in the next several weeks.

• Need to discuss this privately and not let public debate over ground forces make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy.
- Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Chirac, D'Aléma and Kok. You should speak to Blair once you've had the chance to see where the others are.

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU's representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (as well as Jospin) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. France has now also joined the NATO consensus to support updating planning for KFOR at NATO, overcoming its concern that doing so would exclude the Russians. France is also with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine
said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and “third countries” (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the “aegis” of the UN. **You should reiterate the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.**

**D'Alema.** Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance.

Italy recently agreed to let us use its airport in Pascara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Last week, Italy was shaken by the murder of Massimo, D’Antona, the top aide to Labor Minister Bassolino (the latter, who is also the Mayor of Naples, dined with the First Lady during her visit.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group inactive until last week, took responsibility for the attack and linked it to NATO action. The murder has raised fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility and that Americans, as well as Italians, may be targeted.
Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell last week when a junior partner withdrew support after its senior partners failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. We assess that it is likely Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In either scenario, Kok will stay on as caretaker, with key foreign policy positions -- including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo -- intact. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO’s aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed 16 F-16s and more than 20 million Dutch guilders ($9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn’t inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we’re seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic’s policies.

- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO’s conditions.

- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.

- Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about excluding Russia. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.

- Need to move now to raise the additional forces required so that KFOR can quickly deploy after Milosevic accepts our conditions.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/25/09
Additional military police and gendarmes will be essential to establish a secure environment. Can you make any French gendarmes available?

Saw Vedrije's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concern about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control.

Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force. Nor will the US be able to participate.

Maintain Unity

As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

Need your help in steadying D'Alema and Schreeder, both of whom face political problems at home. Also unhappy with the recent Greek-Czech initiative, which allows Serb forces to remain and relies on a UN force.

Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

SECRET
At outset want to tell you how saddened I was by murder of Massimo D'Antona, adviser to Labor Minister Bassolino. Share your concern about new round of political violence by Red Brigades, against Italians and Americans. Must continue to fight terrorism wherever it surfaces.

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Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.

- Now that NATO has updated plan for KFOR, need to move quickly to raise the additional forces that will be required to deploy quickly into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Your carabinieri have been invaluable in Bosnia; can you make any more available for Kosovo?
Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

- Aware of your idea of a pause for a Security Council resolution. But we should only offer it if we are convinced that the Russians will give us what we need. Not clear that we're there yet.

- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

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  be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO’s
  conditions.

• Need at long last to start maritime visit and search
  operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil
  deliveries.

Plan for Success

• We need to use the ICTY indictment to increase the pressure on
  Milosevic. Think it’s important that we say publicly we
  support ICTY’s work, that the indictment won’t change our
  objectives but will deepen Milosevic’s isolation.

• We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if
  they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take
  some time, but we need to plan for success.

• Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France
  had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs
  on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door
  open for their participation under a model like SFOR.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

• Wish you well in rebuilding your coalition. What are the prospects?

Military Campaign Succeeding

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• Now that NATO has updated its plan for KFOR, need to raise the additional focus that will be required to move into Kosovo quickly when Belgrade accepts our conditions.

• Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Will also need armed international civil police until we can train and establish new local police.

• Could Netherlands make available any of its own Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY) either for KFOR or the international police?

SECRET
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- We need to see the [ILLEGIBLE] to increase the pressure on Milosevic. We think it’s important that we publicly support KFOR. Know France had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.

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Maintain Unity

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• Value greatly your steady, steadfast position with others.

• Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

• Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

• You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware civilian airdrops may start soon, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.
TELEPHONE CALLS WITH NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO
DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Chirac, D’Alema and Kok. You should speak to Blair once you’ve had the chance to see where the others are.

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU’s representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

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Last week, Italy was shaken by the murder of Massimo, D'Antona, the top aide to Labor Minister Bassolino (the latter, who is also the Mayor of Naples, dined with the First Lady during her visit.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group inactive until last week, took responsibility for the attack and linked it to NATO action. The murder has raised fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility and that Americans, as well as Italians, may be targeted.

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Attachments
Tab A  Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab B  Points to Make for Prime D’Alema
Tab C  Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok
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• Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to help prevent further oil deliveries. Realize this might put a further strain on Italy, but count on your support.

Plan for Success

• We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.

• Now that NATO has updated plan for KFOR, need to move quickly to raise the additional forces that will be required to deploy quickly into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions.

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SECRET
Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/25/09
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO TELCALL GERMANY

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: POTUS TELCALL TO EUROPEAN LEADERS

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

FILES: PA NSCP:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
BLINKEN BUTLER NSC CHRON

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSNRM CLOSED BY: NSDMK DOC 2 OF 2

SECRET

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KG4 NARA, Date: 2/2/2013
2014-08-12-09
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

**DOC** | **ACTION OFFICER** | **CAO** | **ASSIGNED** | **ACTION REQUIRED**
---|---|---|---|---
001 | BERGER | Z | 99052114 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002 | PRESIDENT | Z | 99052121 FOR INFORMATION
002 | | X | 99052615 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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**National Security Council**

**The White House**

**LOG #**: 3965

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A = Action  I = Information  D = Dispatch  R = Retain  N = No Further Action

**CC:**

99 MAY 21 01:30:53

**COMMENTS:** Potus calls to European leaders

**Exec Sec Office has Diskette:** Yes
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**EXEC SEC Office has Diskette:** Yes
I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public force.

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac D'Alema and Kok.

Blair. Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington. Cook's public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has
been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.
France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pascara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.
Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO’s aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders ($9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments
Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab D Points to Make for Prime D’Alema
Tab E Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok
• Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension.

• Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
  • We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
  • Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
  • Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
  • As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
  • Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
  • Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.
  • As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.
  • Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.
POUNTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

• We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

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Update Planning

• NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.

• Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.
Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn’t started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.

- There hasn’t been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military’s fuel supplies for a significant time.

- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.

- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.

- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

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Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.

Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.
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TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

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- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

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Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?
Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much
tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several
weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if
Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO’s
conditions and endorsing a force.

Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think
we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our
determination.

Humanitarian

Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara
for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with
the NGO International Rescue Committee.

Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of
extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples
last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned
to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the
Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton
got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been
resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea
and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already
jettisoned.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

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Plan for Success

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

- Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?
• Deploying a force without Belgrade’s OK is a much tougher issue we need to deal with in the next several weeks.

• Need to discuss this privately and not let public debate over ground forces make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.
Ed.

Do you think we should send revised Chirac and D'aleno points forward?

Cathy -

Let's not send/foward. Cathy.
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls to European Leaders on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac, D’Alema and Kok to bolster allied solidarity, per his request at today’s Foreign Policy Team meeting.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte, Miriam Sapiro, Sam Moyn, Phil Gordon

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
   Tab A Points to be Made for Prime Minister Blair
   Tab B Points to be Made for Chancellor Schroeder
   Tab C Points to be Made for President Chirac
   Tab D Points to be Made for Prime Minister D’Alema
   Tab E Points to be Made for Prime Minister Kok
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FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

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Update Military Planning

• NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.

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SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09
• Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.

• Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Diplomacy Advancing

• Appreciate your support for Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin efforts. Strobe and Martti going back to Moscow next week, but Friday's talks were difficult.

• Need to keep moving on this track, but still have big differences with Russians on key issues like composition of force, need for total withdrawal of FRY forces.

Chinese Embassy

• We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

• Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.

• You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.
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NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.

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Visit and Search

• Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn’t started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.

• There hasn’t been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military’s fuel supplies for a significant time.

• Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.

• Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Diplomacy Advancing

• Pleased that you met with Strobe last week and appreciate your support for Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin efforts. Strobe and Martti going back to Moscow next week, but Friday’s talks were difficult.

• Need to keep moving on this track, but still have big differences with Russians on key issues like composition of force, need for total withdrawal of FRY forces.

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• Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.

• We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.
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- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.

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Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

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**Humanitarian**

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.

- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

**Bomb Dumping**

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.
Prime Minister Wim Kok presented May 19 the resignation of his government to Queen Beatrix due to a narrow domestic issue. This step became inevitable when the First Chamber of Parliament rejected, May 18, an amendment to the constitution allowing referenda on municipal-level decisions. The junior coalition partner, Democrats 66 (D66), had conditioned participation in the government coalition to the amendment's adoption.

The Queen will now consult key political figures on the next step. There are two options: early elections or trying to patch up the coalition without D66. It is too early to tell which option will be selected. The government will carry on in a caretaker status until the political crisis is resolved.

The cabinet's resignation will not affect key foreign policy matters, including Dutch participation in NATO actions in Kosovo.
Drafter: EUR/UBI: OGDeSoto
ID: IM GON Resigns 990519 ext. 7-6557

Clearance: EUR/UBI: JLeCroy
Clearance: P: ERubin
POINT TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

• Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension. We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

• Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
  • As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
  • Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
  • Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.
  • Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
  • Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
  • Should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia.

• As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.

• Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

Need for Unity

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Air Campaign, Diplomacy Working

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Update Planning

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Need for Unity

- Have appreciated your strong support for air campaign. What we need most right now is unity and your statements have been big help. Hope you can encourage Gerhard and Massimo not to stray too far in public from our common positions.

- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Air Campaign Working/Diplomacy

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NEED FOR UNITY

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MILITARY CAMPAIGN WORKING

Wanted to touch base this week on Kosovo. Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Also some evidence Milosevic himself is realizing how much damage being inflicted.

We need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and it will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

Need also to increase pressure on Milosevic in other ways. I know NATO's maritime visit and search regime will create additional burden for Italy, but hope for your full support.

D'ALEMA INITIATIVE

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DECCLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
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Declassify on: 5/20/09
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• Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

• Concluded that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public posture in line with those reached: pursing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of our options, no reason at this point to change course.
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- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.

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SECRET
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0882-M (1.36)
10/2/2018 KMH
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- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.

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I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy.

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac D’Alema and Kok.

Blair. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington, on how to bring the conflict in Kosovo to a successful conclusion. Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Cook’s public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has
been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 4\(^2\)te margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labor MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labor, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda; this helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

**Schroeder.** Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said that there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on bombing of Chinese Embassy. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbot-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit and search regime for national legal reasons.

**Chirac.** Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.
France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pascara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.
Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders ($9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments
Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab D Points to Make for Prime D'Alema
Tab E Points to Make for Prime Minister Kok
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Ed

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carabinieri is Italian

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(Do not use first of 3 bullet points; put it last 2 bullet points after this)

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been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report to the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.