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HUMANITARIAN AID OPTIONS

When the Bosnian Parliament voted to accept the Geneva Peace Plan but placed conditions which in effect rejected the plan, hopes dimmed for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia prior to the winter and last winter's concerns over a humanitarian have been resurrected. Last year mild weather and unidentified reserves of food helped to avert disaster, but we cannot hope for a repeat of the mild weather this year. And with the reserves of food and body fat depleted before the winter begins, the requirements are even greater this year. UNHCR has identified a shortfall of US$ 172 million for Oct-Dec 1993 and a requirement for US$ 566 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but their donor appeal will go out next week and the US and the international community will doubtless respond.

The real key to averting humanitarian disaster this winter is the thorny issue of access. Once the international community responds to UNHCR's appeal, how do the resources get to the target populations in the face of inclement weather and sporadic or continuous hostilities? UNHCR has been so concerned with the dangers that aid delivery poses to their workers, that they have been negotiating with UNPROFOR to turn over aid delivery to the UN peacekeepers. Some of the key questions concerning access are addressed below, followed by a more in-depth description of the security situation and numerous "solutions" to help alleviate the access problem.

Key Questions:

Can anyone guarantee access?

The short answer is no. Aside from the decreased access expected due to winter weather, the constant threat of hostilities has turned access into a cat and mouse game. Access is dependent not only on the political parties' current support for access, but also on each local war lord.

What can be done to increase the likelihood that aid reaches the target population?

Access can be increased by using force, or bribery, but it cannot be guaranteed. The likelihood of UNPROFOR using force to deliver aid is nonexistent, and short of a US decision to unilaterally ensure the delivery of aid, force will probably not be a viable option. Bribery, providing carrots to the warring parties, in exchange for their guarantee of access may have a slightly higher chance for success.

What would be the effect of lifting/suspending sanctions?

The Serbian economy is in dire straits and Milosevic's willingness to pressure the Bosnian Serbs in the most recent round of peace talks was more than likely fueled by his hope that sanctions would be lifted. Even a partial lifting of sanctions, to include such commodities as heating oil, might prove to be a powerful carrot for Milosevic.
question is how much leverage he ultimately has not only over Karadzic, but over the various Bosnian Serb warlords.

What leverage is there over the Bosnian Croats?

There may be several avenues to encourage Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats to allow free access for humanitarian aid. Some of these include the threat of sanctions and the offer of economic assistance. Once again, the question is how much leverage Croatia has over the Bosnian Croat warlords. The threat of airstrikes against all three parties is more direct, but failure to carry out this threat in the past has weakened its effectiveness.

What leverage is there over the Bosnian Serbs?

While Serbia is concerned with the lifting of sanctions, the Bosnian Serbs have not felt the same hurt, particularly as they have been able to siphon off significant humanitarian assistance to keep their people and their armies fed and fueled. More likely leverage would exist if there is some way to make the Bosnian Serbs actually feel the pinch of the Serbian sanctions. The threat of airstrikes remains as a paper tiger.

What leverage is there to prevent Muslim instigated clashes?

Perhaps the greatest leverage would be the threat to cut off all humanitarian assistance to Bosnia. However, this is an option which makes us out to be the bad guys. The international community, and the US in particular, can reiterate that no western power will use military force to settle the war, and at the same time reiterate the threat of airstrikes against any party which prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid.

If security of LOCs is not likely, what can be done to increase airlift/airdrop effectiveness?

Unfortunately the coming winter means a decrease rather than an increase in the effectiveness of airlift and airdrop as a means to deliver humanitarian aid. In November, December, and January 30% of the flying days will be lost to inclement weather. In February and March the number declines to a loss of 20% of the flying days.

What are the limitations of airlift/airdrop?

All of the airfields are limited to daylight hours of operation. To increase the airflow into Sarajevo would require increased personnel for ground operations. If Tuzla is opened, the airport is limited to one C-141 or three C-130s on the ground at any one time. Airdrop of anything other than food or medicine is a difficult operation and presents numerous challenges and risks. For both airland and airdrop operations, increases would entail significant resource commitments.
The Issue -- Access and Security, not Resources:

The Security Situation:

The Bosnian people needing humanitarian assistance are located in isolated pockets dispersed to numerous parts of the land-locked country. The UNHCR's major distribution centers for humanitarian assistance are in Serbia (Belgrade) and Croatia (Metkovic on the Dalmatian coast and Zagreb). Land convoys from these centers are necessary in order for the resources to reach the target population in any volume. These convoys can be and are augmented by airland into Sarajevo and airdrop into some of the enclaves. However, land access is mandatory for the volume of aid required, especially with the requirement for winterization materials.

The roads linking the enclaves with each other and the distribution centers have been under attack for 18 months. Bridges are out, roads have been mined, repair work is at a virtual standstill. In addition to the physical problems, convoys are turning back to avoid fighting, and being denied access by the different factions. The onset of inclement weather will make convoy passage of these roads even more difficult.

The program director of Britain's aid effort in the former Yugoslavia reported on the serious shortage of diesel fuel facing all of Bosnia, and highlighted the threat to Tuzla because it has one of the largest resident and refugee populations and is at the far end of one of the most tortuous and vulnerable supply routes. His report predicted winter weather conditions and continued fighting would threaten to close all road access to Tuzla. In assessing the needs of Tuzla, the British director believed that Tuzla would need relief flights even if some road access is kept.

If access is denied for any significant period of time, it will have a devastating impact on the population and will probably lead to a humanitarian disaster. The magnitude of the disaster will depend on how completely access is denied, how long it is denied, and which population centers are denied. In Srebrenica, for example, most of the enclave families have sufficient food stocks to last them for about 2 or 3 days.

The Bosnian Serbs: In the past few weeks, the Bosnian Serbs have allowed relatively free access to UNHCR convoys transiting to Sarajevo and the eastern Muslim enclaves. It is generally agreed that this loosening of the noose around these cities is due in part to the threat of NATO airstrikes, but perhaps even more directly to the recent hopes of a peace settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have acquired the territory they set out to control, and it was in their and Serbia's best interest to appear as ready and willing participants in the peace process and as aiding in humanitarian efforts, in the anticipation of the lifting of sanctions and acceptance into the greater world community. Even at the height of cooperation, fuel convoys did not move, because UNHCR feared that the Serbs, short of fuel due to sanctions, would siphon off an unacceptable percentage as a "tax". Since the rejection of the peace plan by the Bosnian Parliament, the shelling and gunfire
around Sarajevo have definitely increased, and there is the expectation that Serbian cooperation in the humanitarian arena will probably quickly diminish.

The Bosnian Croats: Since the middle of August, few convoys have departed Metkovic (UNHCR's central distribution center on the Dalmatian coast) and reached their destination. The siege of Mostar is a prime example of how continued hostilities in the central and southern region have prevented convoys from reaching the target populations. Airdrops were used as a last ditch effort to prevent starvation in the Muslim sector, and when a land convoy was finally allowed through after extensive negotiations, a large portion of the food and supplies had to be delivered to the Croat western sector of Mostar, even though the situation there was infinitely better than that in the Muslim sector. Last week Sarajevo received its first convoy from Metkovic since the middle of August. The convoy used a circuitous route that would probably be impassable in winter. Despite a new cease-fire in Mostar, there is no reason to believe that hostilities will decrease to the extent required to allow free access for humanitarian convoys.

The Muslims: Despite the fact that it is the Muslim population that is in most dire need of humanitarian assistance, the very hostilities which prevent the delivery of this assistance are often sparked by Muslim offensives against the Bosnian Croat forces. The Muslims are equally responsible for the breaking of numerous cease-fires and have reportedly detained and delayed convoys for extensive searches.

Inclement Weather: The deteriorating roads into Sarajevo and the Muslim enclaves are made even more hazardous by sporadic or continual fighting, and mining of the roads. This winter, mud, snow, and ice will cause road conditions to deteriorate seriously. Damage to bridges around the major transportation centers will force UN convoys to use secondary roads through the mountains, where travel will be very slow and difficult. In addition, the airland and airdrop operations will become more difficult as the pilots must not only worry about potential evasive action against enemy fire, but also must deal with the cloudy, stormy weather rife with wind shears, poor visibility and other hazards which will cause the cancellation of many missions, and make those that aren't more treacherous.

Scope of Requirements:

The UN estimates that up to 3.4 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia will require assistance. The up to 2.5 million people requiring assistance in Bosnia will need 45,000 metric tons of food and 11,000 metric tons of nonfood assistance (medicines, fuel, shelters, and heathers) each month. Over the course of the winter, this could amount to nearly 300,000 metric tons.

The World Food Program (WFP) has adequate supplies of most commodities for Bosnia through the end of the year. Because of earmarking, some areas, particularly Serbia and Montenegro are experiencing shortages of many commodities, but these issues can be worked. UNHCR has announced a $172 million shortfall for Oct-Dec 1993 and
requirement for $577 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but the real issue is not one of adequate
resources, but one of access. The critical shortage of fuel, which will have repercussions
on everything from distribution of resources, to heating and providing medical care, is
again a problem of access, not resource availability. While we cannot ignore the
upcoming donor's call, and must participate along with other countries and the EC in
responding to it, the majority of our efforts should be focused on how we can increase the
likelihood of successful access to the target population.

Possible "Solutions" to alleviate the problem of access:

All of the proffered solutions fall into one of three categories. The first category
involves increasing the likelihood of access by opening up more routes, adding methods of
delivery, or adding resources. The second category uses force to increase the likelihood
of access. In either case, however, there is no guarantee of access to all areas at all times.
The third category uses bribery or diplomacy to get concessions from the parties to allow
free access. Because the three political leaders do not have control over all of the forces,
agreement by these parties will need to be augmented with their escorts to ensure the aid
gets through. Whatever action is taken, the weather and the support of the three warring
parties will greatly influence the success of the operation. Several actions may increase
the likelihood of success.

Increasing Resources:

1. Preposition at least a month's supply of aid:
   One hedge against inclement weather is to preposition at least a month's supply to
carry populations through the times when storms and road conditions prevent convoys and
aircraft delivery. UNHCR is already attempting to do this, but have been unable to make
much headway. There may be two weeks of supplies in Sarajevo and three weeks in
Tuzla, but most enclaves are consuming supplies as rapidly as they are receiving them.
Even now, with relatively good access from Belgrade, next week's food supplies are
competing for convoy space with winter parkas and other winterization supplies.

2. Increase Airlift into Sarajevo:
The United Nations currently averages 20 airland missions per day into Sarajevo.
The delivery of food and medicines is the top priority. The US has provided
approximately 35 percent of the total airland mission sorties. All 15 US C-130s operating
into Bosnia are equipped with defensive systems to counter ground-to-air threats. These
are the only Air Force airlift C-130s with counter measure equipment.

Increasing daily US operations tempo will be very difficult. Of the 15 C-130s
operating out of Rhein-Main, 12 are generally operational day-to-day. Six are dedicated
to airdrop operations. Increasing the airlift flow at Sarajevo will require an increase in
manpower on the ground to turn the aircraft and remove the cargo. The US has
steadfastly refused to increase forces on the ground at Sarajevo or in Bosnia. If the
decision is made to increase airlift operations into Sarajevo, it should be a NATO
operation, with USNATO putting forward the request for additional assets. Presuming the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground, we would have to convince allies to contribute ground personnel to augment the airfield ground operations.

Inclement weather between October and March will also have an affect on the ability to deliver via airlift and airland. During November, December, and January, we can expect to lose 30% of the flying days due to weather. In February and March this will probably drop to 20% of the flying days lost due to weather.

3. Increase Airland:
Currently six US C-130s and 2 C-160s (1 German and 1 French) participate in airland operations. The US has provided approximately 80% of the airland sorties. Eight sorties are considered a maximum generation effort based on current ground support at Rhein-Main and the complexity of night operations to three separate drop zones in Bosnia.

Almost any commodity can be airlanded if it is packaged correctly. However, this is an extremely expensive option for delivery of supplies. Deliveries of food, MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs), and medicine using the TRIAD method of delivery have been extremely successful. However, the dropping of other than food and medicine items present potential challenges and risks. Fuel bladders are a scarce commodity, and coal would present significant processing and loading problems. Heavy equipment and large bundle airland require drop zones clear of populated areas for safety, and then the goods are difficult or unsafe to retrieve. The only exception to this is the TRIAD delivery of food, limited to MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs).

4. Open Tuzla Airport:
Since Tuzla is a center of distribution for humanitarian aid, opening the airport would increase access to a large area in central Bosnia. However, there are several drawbacks and limiting factors to this option. The airport is small with the capability to handle only one C-141 or three C-130 on the ground at a time.

Despite the small capacity which will not offer a significant increase to deliveries, it will take additional personnel on the ground to secure and operate the airport and the ground operation. The Nordic Battalion stationed at Tuzla is now able to provide limited security for the airfield. The battalion commander has stated they intend to secure and control the Tuzla airport, but currently the Bosnia Muslims (BIH) are unwilling to leave. Unless they leave, the Serbs will continue to have an excuse to attack it and the commander will not take control.

The remaining problem is to provide engineering support for the maintenance of the field and navigational aids for inclement weather. These personnel would need to be provided by UNPROFOR. Again, if the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground in Bosnia, we will have to convince another country to provide those people. One of the other limitations that Tuzla is currently experiencing in aid distribution is their...
shortage of fuel. In addition to the fact that there would not be fuel on the ground for any aircraft, fuel would have to be brought in, either by land or air, for use by the convoys in distributing their humanitarian aid to the outlying areas.

5. Use Helicopters:
The use of helicopters to airlift supplies into enclaves could possibly augment ground convoys. However, the helicopters are limited by weather, range, and altitude restrictions, and would require extensive logistical and personnel support at either a land base in Croatia or Serbia or aboard naval shipping in the Adriatic. In any helicopter operation, deployment schedules, contingency commitments, and security requirements must be analyzed before the decision to deploy is made.

6. Send in a Civil Affairs Assessment Team:
Send a Civil Affairs survey team to Bosnia to make an assessment of the needs for survival through the winter. Identify required items other than food (for example, batteries.) Then have the team regroup in Zagreb or Belgrade to develop a distribution plan. (Ask OFDA if the DART has already done or if they see a need for this.) If they don't already have a good tracking system to record final end user distribution, set up the system used for Provide HOPE.

7. Provide Additional Equipment to Open Routes:
Last year the US provided excess equipment, including snow removal equipment for Sarajevo. Additional road graders and snow plows would help to keep roads open during inclement weather, or reopen them shortly thereafter. We could also lobby for increased UNPROFOR engineer support to assist in keeping the roads passable, assuming we don't want to provide US engineering support.

8. Increase Engineer Support:
On option is to lobby with our allies to provide additional engineering personnel to UNPROFOR to assist in keeping the roads passable. Another option would be to provide US engineering support on a temporary basis to repair roads before the onset of winter.

Use of Force:

9. Deliver Humanitarian Aid Using Force:
Another option is to apply pressure to UNPROFOR to use all means available, including force, to deliver humanitarian aid. This would not require any additional UN action, nor any US troops in Bosnia, if current UNPROFOR forces are used to implement this option. To maximize resources, two key routes could be identified, probably one from Belgrade and one from Metkovic, and forces used to provide security for convoys using these routes. One option already under discussion would be for UNHCR to hand over the delivery of aid to UNPROFOR.

The most difficult part from the US perspective is convincing the countries with troops on the ground to take this action, while not providing any US forces in Bosnia.
Key NATO allies have indicated they have not changed their position on the use of force to deliver aid. Currently our allies see the availability of resources as the most critical problem, and have not focused on how the collapse of the Geneva talks would affect humanitarian assistance.

Use of Diplomacy/"Bribery":

10. Negotiating a Humanitarian Agreement:
With the prospects dimming for an overall peace agreement before winter, negotiators could expend their energies on a regional conference on humanitarian assistance. Attention would focus on the issue of how we can lay a political framework for humanitarian relief operations. Before initiating relief operations, we should explore the feasibility of preserving the termination of hostilities between Serbs and Bosnians as well as achieving a cease-fire between Bosnians and Croats, without trying to settle the issue of final land distribution. Terminating hostilities throughout Bosnia will not be easy. Whether the warring parties will display the flexibility will depend on two factors: domestic political constraints, and the degree to which diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear outside the region to overcome those domestic constraints. The weight of the international community, including such key players as Russia and Greece for Serbia; Germany for Croatia; and the US for Bosnia, must be brought to bear at the negotiating table. The London Conference on Yugoslavia outlined last August several specific steps to enhance delivery of humanitarian assistance.

It may be possible to achieve agreement on free access if humanitarian aid is freely offered to all parties. Some sort of a delivery formula could be developed that allowed one Serbian or Croatian convoy for every three Muslim convoys. Agreement on such a scheme by all three political parties will not guarantee free access of humanitarian aid deliveries, however, because these parties do not have control over the various warlords fighting the individual battles. To ensure access through these areas, the three belligerents may well have to provide escort through their territories.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Serbs:
1. Temporarily suspend sanctions on humanitarian goods, such as heating oil and coal, through the winter, on the condition of free access to the Bosnian target population.
2. Increase humanitarian aid to the refugee population in Serbia and Montenegro.
3. Use Russia to influence Serbian assistance.
4. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
5. Look for ways to make sanctions felt by Bosnian Serbs.
6. Make humanitarian aid to Serbia contingent upon free access to the Muslim areas.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Croats:
1. Reiterate the threat of sanctions.
2. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
3. Convince Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats by offering Croatia specific economic assistance conditioned on humanitarian aid access to Bosnia.
4. Support the Vance Plan for the UNPAs.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Muslims:
1. Reiterate that no western power, including the US will use military force to settle the war in Bosnia.
2. State that no humanitarian aid will flow to central Bosnia when hostilities are underway. Place the blame on the Muslims when they are the instigators.

Attachments:
A. After the Policy Decision: Getting the Word Out (PSYOPs and Public Affairs)
B. Winter Assessment (DIA)
C. NATO Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance (NATO Policy)
D. Bosnian Winter Climatology Report (USAF/XOOOW)
E. Message ICFY Humanitarian Issues
Subject: Expansion of Mission - US Hospital Zagreb (U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide analysis of expanding US hospital (Zagreb) medical mission to treat pediatric patients.

2. (U) **Background.** Request for expansion of mission result of 28 Oct DC meeting. Ambassador Galbraith previously requested US hospital involvement in the care of five to ten child victims of the conflict. General Cot, UNPROFOR commander, agreed with concept of using spare capacity at UN field hospitals to treat war trauma victims. State currently reviewing request.

3. (8) **Discussion.** 48th Air Transportable Hospital is third US hospital in rotation. Hospital OPCON to UNPROFOR as a UN "blue hatted" unit. Mission to provide medical support to UNPROFOR. Hospital staff reported to be operating below capacity and would be able to accept up to 10 pediatric patients. Treating civilians requires UN approved change in mission.

**PROS**

- High visibility US humanitarian assistance contribution without commitment of additional ground troops
- Appeals to American sentiment.
- Reduces suffering.
- Taps under-used resource, provides varied medical training opportunities.

**CONS**

- Impartiality and treatment of only non-belligerents must be maintained or safety of existing mission at risk - both hospital personnel and aircrews. Hard to differentiate between juvenile combatants and non-combatants (Somalia).

- May detract from priority mission. To do job right will require changes in equipment, personnel, supplies (pediatric sized supplies, pediatrician, pediatric nurse, pediatric pharmaceuticals).

- Criteria not in place to determine what classification of patient hospital will accept, length of stay, disposition of family members, and procedures for transfer should space be required for UNPROFOR patient.
• Non-US personnel making triage decisions. Over stressed system with history of screening problems.

• May expand into "magnet" hospital. Ignores potential flood of patients from refugee community in Zagreb.

• Creates untenable problem of turning away patients.

• Civilian hospitals available in Zagreb with pediatric capability.

• Patients likely to require long-term care. US hospital not a long term care facility. May create permanent refugee status for children and strain the already over-burdened Croatian government.

• Politically difficult to terminate once started. Sets precedent for future involvement.

4. **Bottom Line.** Seemingly attractive option – seen as doing something. However, must be cautious of diverting US military medical support from the UNPROFOR mission. Should not proceed until specific criteria and procedures established and agreed to for accepting, evacuating, treating, and returning patients to families in country of origin. Parties to agreement must include affected agencies, governments and warring factions – a significant diplomatic challenge. If USG undertakes mission without agreement, belligerents likely to manipulate program as an issue of taking sides – immediately jeopardizing the mission. As an alternative to expanding US mission, recommend USG explore consortium program with local hospitals under UNHCR/WHO auspices.

Prepared by: LTC Kevin Campbell, USA and CPT Butch Botters, USA J-5, European Division, X49435
BLKNWP 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE -
(REGIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Air Support Requirements to Support French-Sponsored Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)

1. (U) As requested,* the Joint Staff has reviewed the French proposal for delivering humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) via convoy.

2. (S) Close air support (CAS) in support of convoy operations could be conducted using the forces engaged in NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT if the four AC-130 gunships deployed to Somalia are returned to Operation DENY FLIGHT or replaced. However, we recommend against providing CAS for the following reasons:
   a. UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized military but by local bandits and groups of women and children. CAS is not useful in these situations.
   b. Forcing delivery of humanitarian aid signals escalation of military involvement and would require principals’ approval.
   c. Serbs have just offered guaranteed access from Bar to Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid is preferable to convoying through potentially hostile areas.

3. (S) We have determined that battlefield air interdiction operations are not desirable or feasible given the current situation in B-H, rules of engagement, and difficulties with...
target identification and linkage to enemy forces interfering with convoy operations. The enclosed information paper provides more details on the CAS for the French-sponsored humanitarian relief operations.

Reference:
Subject: Air Support Requirements for French-Sponsored Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on close air support (CAS) for French-sponsored humanitarian relief operations.

2. (U) Key Points

- (G) The French propose that military escorted convoys be used to deliver approximately 1,000 tons per day of relief supplies to Sarajevo and environs this winter.

- (G) The French estimate that one convoy per day of 50 trucks (20 ton capacity) will transport the relief supplies to Sarajevo and that each convoy will take 3 days to travel to Sarajevo, unload supplies, and return to point of origin.

- (G) The three courses of action (COA) consider using two route clusters for convoy operations.
  ** COA 1 - Escorting convoys on varied routes.
  ** COA 2 - Escorting convoys on a single route.
  ** COA 3 - Controlling a single route.

- (G) French operation will require air support from Operation DENY FLIGHT.

- (G) The French feel that the current ROE is adequate for the conduct of CAS.

- (G) The current Operation DENY FLIGHT force levels are in place and adequate to meet the CAS mission for the French proposal. J-3 estimates that the return of or deployment of 4 X AC-130 aircraft is required. NATO would have to approve this use.
• NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT conducts 70 fighter CAS missions a week, maintains a 24-hour alert aircraft, and conducts 7 ABCCC missions per week. CINCSOUTH has scheduled 7 AC-130 gunship missions per week when assets return from Somalia.

• Current in-place CSAR assets are adequate for aircrew recovery only.

• ABCCC mission rate may increase.

• UNPROFOR commands the CAS ground components and would have to provide the AOCC at Kiseljak and FACPs on each convoy.

• UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized military but by local bandits and groups of women and children. CAS is not useful in these situations.

• Forcing the delivery of humanitarian aid signals unwanted escalation of military involvement and would require Principals' approval.

• Serbs have just offered guaranteed access from Bat to Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid is preferable to convoying through potentially hostile areas.

• The conduct of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) to support convoys is not envisioned.

• BAI is air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of the friendly forces is not required.

• The current situation in B-H does not lend itself to the conduct of BAI.

**Concentrations of enemy forces are not present. Interference with convoys has been by small bands, unidentified indirect fire, civilian mobs, and groups of women and children.**

**Identification of forces interfering with convoy operations and targeting their higher echelons would be difficult to impossible.**
Current Operation DENY FLIGHT ROE do not authorize BAI operations.

Collateral damage will be a major concern.

Prepared by: LTC Bill FitzGerald, USA
J-3/JOD, 52541
EUCOM2//378//
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Increasing Humanitarian Aid - Airdrops (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on improving the delivery of humanitarian aid by increasing airdrop operations.

2. (U) Background. The ongoing airdrop operation began in February 93 as a temporary measure aimed at supplementing ground convoys. Despite the recent success of the ground routes, continued intransigence and deteriorating conditions due to winter weather make examination of alternative delivery methods necessary.

3. (U) Key Points
   a. (✓) Assumptions
      • Enhanced operations are requested/supported by UNHCR.
      • Increased airdrops are temporary in nature, aimed at those in need who cannot be reached by ground convoys due to fighting or winter conditions.
      • Additional supplies are available for increased airdrops.
      • Belligerents sanction operation.
   b. (✓) Concept of Operation
      • Airdrops continue at night due to threat.
      • Surge capability above current six flights per night using dedicated fleet impractical. Aircraft operating at near maximum utilization rates due to flight duration, crew availability and periodic maintenance requirements. For an immediate surge, USEUCOM would be required to reprioritize theater air missions in order to support. Sustained surge would require additional aircraft, aircrews, and riggers. Thirty day supply of aid items available in Germany.
      • For the long term, additional defensive system equipped C-130s/crews are made available to USEUCOM. This will probably require additional National Guard/Reserve participation depending on increased level of effort. Additional sorties require increase in riggers (8 per sortie - if airdrops doubled would require additional rigging company).
      • Sufficient ramp space is available at Rhein Mein.
• Additional sorties will require increased reliance on GPS directed drops, due to limited number of A/C equipped with AWADS (Radar for precision airdrops) and defensive systems.

• If possible, new air items should be procured in an international orange color. This would make them easy to spot by those in need, easier to recover, and less valuable to combatants. USG should seek UN funding to cover contract costs.

b. (S) DISCUSSION

• This option presents minimal risk to US A/C, crews.

• Airdrop operations are less weather dependent than helicopter deliveries.

• Accuracy of current delivery means is good. Increasing airdrop operations, however, does not ensure that food is delivered to those in need; ground distribution systems are uncertain and beyond our control.

• Airdrops are not capable of delivering required fuel/water needed in some locations. This requires ground convoys, which are the most efficient means of delivering aid.

• Airdrops do not address pressing issue of delivery of winterization supplies. Belligerents have classified these items as non-humanitarian aid due to potential for military application. Airdropping winterization supplies likely perceived as belligerent act.

• Belligerents could use these operations as a reason to deny access to isolated areas by ground personnel. This would not only undercut the UN efforts to expand ground convoys, but could also prevent observers from getting in to obtain accurate assessments.

• Incremental cost of each C-130 flight is approximately $12,500, not including costs of relief supplies.

c. (U) POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

PROS

• Safest method of US participation.

• Very visible, high profile demonstration of US concern/activism.

• Does not put forces on the ground.

• Overcomes access problems to isolated areas.
CONS
- Does not address cause of problem; subsidizes continued fighting.
- Extremely costly effort producing minimal results.
- No control of ground distribution; unable to ensure delivery to those in need.
- Decreases need for cooperation/negotiations by belligerents.
- Enhanced effort may arouse congressional scrutiny.

4. (S) **Bottom Line.** While effective in accuracy, the airdrop operation is not effective for the large volume of sustained supply for a civilian population. Operation is inviting due to the low-risk and high visibility. Joint Staff would strongly recommend airdrops over helicopter or ground operations for emergency resupply of limited quantities of relief supplies to a needy population.

Prepared by: J-3/4/5, POC CDR Mark A Stearns, USN, X49435
BLKNWP 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: YUGOSLAV TASK FORCE
Prepared by Col J.P. Kiley/EurPol/x40661

SUBJECT: Medical Options for Croatia

Tab A tasked a requirement to review medical capabilities in order to provide additional relief for refugee assistance in Croatia. Currently, the 48th Air Transportable Hospital is deployed in Zagreb in support of UNPROFOR. This unit is tasked and designed to give trauma and stabilization care to combat casualties. It can provide for 60 bed ridden patients. Ambassador Galbraith has requested that surplus capacity be provided for the care of civilian patients, particularly children. The JCS paper describing the additional requirements necessary to accommodate this request is at Tab B.

Other options exist to provide additional medical capability to administer to the requirements of the refugee population in Croatia. These options all require additional medical personnel and equipment to be deployed in a potential combat area. A decision will be required for deployment and expenditure of the necessary funds.

Options:

- Medical Civil Action Programs: augment the military hospital in Zagreb with additional personnel in order to provide rotational medical service to the refugee camps. Active/reserve forces from all services could be used to augment the hospital. This might benefit active duty training for reserve personnel. It might be possible to request civilian health care professionals to augment the hospital and provide the additional staffing from these volunteers.

- Environmental Health Assistance: civil action programs consisting of environmental health specialists to advise the refugee population could augment the hospital in Zagreb. While providing no direct health care, they could assist by providing a forward deployed diagnostic laboratory to conduct surveillance on the health status of the refugee camps by monitoring the sanitation, food preparation, water systems, and entomological sources of communicable diseases.

- Naval Assets:

  - Assault Landing Ship (LHA) - an option exists to use helicopters to provide resupply to the refugee population in Bosnia for the winter. The LHA contains a 48 bed hospital with a full operating suite for combat casualties. It could, if fully manned, provide humanitarian care for patients prior to movement to a civilian facility. The resupply helicopters could provide the lift.
from shore to ship as scheduled by UN organizations. Medical civil action programs from the ship could also be conducted in conjunction with the U.S. hospital in Zagreb and coordinated with the UN.

- Hospital Ship (TAH) - two are currently in the inventory under the control of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). One is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. It has a complement of 1200 personnel; has 1,000 hospital beds; 12 operating suites; and is manned by active duty and civilian personnel. The ship would require support to move patients to/from the vessel; escort ships; and a defined UN procedure for returning patients to civilian hospitals would have to be established. The ship is in Baltimore Harbor in reduced operating status (5 days). If ordered to sea and medical personnel assigned, it could be at sea in 5 days. Activation costs will be $40-60K. Operating costs range from $51K/day at sea to $41K/day in port or at anchor. Activation costs are absorbed in these per diem costs. It is primarily a surgical facility but can be equipped and staffed for humanitarian operations. A 30 day block of surgical supplies is valued at $12M. Supplies for humanitarian assistance would be additive to this. Medical civil action could also be conducted from this platform through coordination with the hospital in Zagreb. While current plans call for the ship to be staffed with U.S. Navy personnel, joint staffing from USN, USA, and USAF medical personnel might be possible, if this option is considered, to lessen the affect on residual medical care for all services.

All options require a threat assessment, personnel, fiscal, and logistical estimate.

Recommendation: none. For information only.
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Comments on Draft NSC Issues Paper on Bosnia 17 APR (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide comments on draft NSC issues paper on Bosnia.

2. (S) Discussion. General comments:

• All options are escalatory in nature using brinksmanship to make the Bosnian-Serbs back down (which they've just demonstrated they're not liable to do). Air power options can not guarantee military impact sufficient to compel compliance.

• All options put UNPROFOR at increased risk.

• All options could result in Bosnian government manipulation of NATO responses.

• Failure of chosen option could result in total failure and withdrawal of UNPROFOR with subsequent impact on humanitarian aid.

• All 5 options are escalatory in nature and could lead to spillover.

• All proposed options assume NAC consensus (which would be extremely difficult to obtain in all cases, and impossible in the more aggressive options) and UN cooperation in execution (such UN resolve after last week's action is questionable).

OPTION 1: NATO Air Strikes on heavy weapons and infantry

PROs:

- Demonstrates forceful action.
- Consistent with NATO decisions of 2/9 Aug 93 declaring concern for B-H safe areas (NAC decision still required to execute air strikes).

CONs:

- Successful only if bombs don't drop.
- Most escalatory of all options.
- Taking on both attacks on heavy weapons and small infantry units places high requirement for air capability and increases danger to NATO pilots.
- Ignores likely Bosnian-Serb reactions.
- Relies on airpower alone to force B-S concessions on ground.
- Ultimately would weaken NATO; debate would be fractious, and if passed, would promise more than air power can deliver.
- Likely to further antagonize Russians.
OPTION 2: UNPROFOR exclusion areas around safe areas

PROs:
- Follows successful Sarajevo model.
- Builds on Feb 94 NAC decisions.
- Demonstrates evenhandedness in that it also warns Bosnian Muslims against attacking from safe areas (wording should be changed to reflect not launching assaults from inside safe areas vice refraining from use of heavy weapons from inside safe areas - applies to options 2, 3, 4).

CONS:
- Would require 8-10,000 additional UNPROFOR troops to enforce.
- Monitoring effort would scatter UNPROFOR forces leaving them vulnerable to harassment/detention, etc.
- Additional cost to USG for troops and additional flight hours.

OPTION 3: Exclusion areas without UNPROFOR control

PROs:
- Requires less troops.
- UNPROFOR less vulnerable and less visibly identified with enforcement.

CONS:
- Makes NATO appear a belligerent.
- Contrary to existing UNSCRs.
- Without ground observers, targeting and execution difficult.
- Requires extensive recon.

OPTION 4: No-bombardment zone

PROs:
- Consistent with UNSCRs supporting safe areas.
- If passed sends strong message of NATO solidarity.
- Probably most saleable to NAC.
- Doesn't attempt to roll back B-S.
- Could be used as basis for country-wide cease fire.

CONS:
- Subject to manipulation given lack of ground presence.
- Extremely difficult to enforce.
OPTION 5: Complete withdrawal from around safe areas

PROs:
- Evenhanded approach, demanding compliance from both sides.
- Provides comprehensive safety for safe areas.

CONs:
- Manpower intensive to monitor on ground.
- Probably unacceptable to B-S.
- Probably unacceptable to Bosnian Government in that lines of conflict would be frozen.

NSC ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

General comments noted above also applicable to alternative strategy.

PROs:
- Recognizes geographic isolation of Gorazde and lack of long-term viability in comprehensive agreement.

CONs:
- Doesn't specify how other safe areas are going to be protected by NATO.
- Admits UNPROFOR failure in Gorazde.
Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have continued to violate the cease-fire agreement and heavy weapon exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs appear to be systematically challenging the UN's control over the zone. Bosnian Serb forces also have not fully implemented their withdrawal agreement with the UN around Gorazdo. The Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla city and the surrounding area on 11 May for the fifth time since NATO conducted airstrikes on Serb forces attacking Gorazde last month.

Recent Sarajevo Exclusion Zone Violations

Bosnian Serbs are increasingly flaunting UN control of the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Serb forces continue to operate heavy weapons outside of UN control or supervision within the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Serb forces also are reportedly blocking UN patrols in some areas of the exclusion zone and have a generally hostile attitude toward UN personnel.

-- The Bosnian Serbs violated most of the stipulations in the tank transit deal worked out by UN special envoy Akashi and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on 3 May.

-- The Serbs have removed and not returned about 20 heavy weapons from UN weapon collection points since the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April.
Small arms and machine gun exchanges occur regularly throughout Sarajevo, and the UN stated the first tank round since the February cease-fire and ultimatum was fired on 9 May.

The Bosnian Serbs are limiting freedom of movement for UN personnel within the exclusion zone. For example, the Grbavica bridge is again closed to UN personnel.

Bosnian Government forces have also violated the Sarajevo heavy weapon exclusion zone and cease-fire agreements, although not as blatantly as the Bosnian Serbs.

Six or seven heavy weapons and preparations for four or five new heavy weapon positions on Mount Igman, reports of 1,000 Government troops massing in the area. Some Government units are usually stationed in this area, but these forces probably have been reinforced with some additional troops and the heavy weapons.

Bosnian Serb Compliance with Gorazde Ultimatum

The UN has become increasingly concerned about Bosnian Serb violations of the Gorazde exclusion zones. UN Special Representative Akashi told Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on 10 May that unless the Bosnian Serbs immediately complied with the cease-fire agreement, he would have to refer the matter to the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council.

A series of Serb violations have been noted in recent days:

About 100 to 150 armed Bosnian Serb "police" remain stationed inside the three-kilometer exclusion zone, according to UN officials. Akashi has demanded these personnel be removed.

The UN commander in Gorazde recently stated publicly that he is certain there are still heavy weapons being held within the zone. UN military observers recently found two 20mm AA weapons, which they escorted out of the zone. The UN commander also stated that the Serbs probably are hiding weapons in areas they have declared off limits to UN observers.
The Bosnian Serbs continue to harass and delay UN military and relief convoys entering Gorazde. A French logistics convoy held up at a Serb checkpoint for three days finally arrived in Gorazde on 9 May. Some personnel reportedly were not allowed through and forced to return to Sarajevo.

Bosnian Serb Actions Against Tuzla

Bosnian Serb forces shelled Tuzla city and the surrounding area on 11 May. This is the fifth artillery attack on Tuzla city or Tuzla airport since the NATO airstrikes.

The latest shelling of the city may be a Serb response to the Government mortar attack against Brcko on 10 May that killed several civilians.
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
25 July 1994

Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones

The creation of new exclusion zone is unlikely to force the Bosnian Serbs to settle. While strict enforcement of those zones would ratchet up the pressure on the Serbs, it could also undermine the continuation of a Western troop presence in Bosnia and exacerbate fissures between NATO and the UN and within the Alliance.

The creation of new exclusion zones around Bihac, Tuzla, Zepa, and Srebrenica without their strict enforcement will place much of Bosnia’s Muslim population under Western protection but will have little military or diplomatic impact on the Bosnian conflict.

-- The sites for the new zones, which have already been declared safe havens, are not the current scenes of major fighting.

-- The Serbs and the Muslims probably will redeploy their forces in the zones to more contentious areas. Refugees may try to return to areas under Serb control within the zones, increasing ethnic tensions there.

New exclusion zones are not likely to propel the Serbs into accepting the Contact Group plan. Instead, they are likely to increase their harassment of UN personnel in Bosnia by blocking UN resupply convoys, aggravating UN troops with small-arms fire, and restricting the UN's freedom of movement.

-- The UN said that Bosnian Serb Army Commander Mladic on Monday threatened to "make life difficult" for UN forces beginning on 30 July, when the Contact Group foreign ministers discuss how to try to reverse the Serbs' rejection of the peace plan.

-- Bosnian Serbs have already stepped up actions against the UN, probably to remind the Contact Group of the potential costs of their decisions. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb forces may have hit as many as five UN aircraft with small-arms fire late last week and attempted to withdraw heavy weapons from storage sites. On Sunday, Serb forces moved an artillery piece into the

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Gorazde exclusion zone and fired on Muslim civilians.

The Bosnian Government has indicated that it will complain bitterly if the international community does not act quickly and decisively to compel Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan, according to press Sarajevo probably will attempt to tie the credibility of the Contact Group, the UN, and NATO to international support for more aggressive action.

— Bosnian President Izetbegovic told the press that his government would drop their support for the plan if the Serbs maintain their demands or the major powers fail to act.

— Bosnia’s UN Ambassador Sacirbey noted that "it was time for the Contact Group to show it has some kind of teeth."

Once the international community moves to strictly enforce the exclusion zones, the Bosnian Serbs probably will dramatically step up their pressure on UNPROFOR and relief agencies.

— After NATO airstrikes around Gorazde this spring, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, charging that the UN
had sided with the Muslims, placed UN personnel under house arrest and attempted to remove Serb weapons from UN collection sites around Sarajevo. 

The Bosnian Serbs probably will continue to reject the plan in hopes they can exploit any rifts between Contact Group members, and the UN and NATO, to minimize the possibility of action against them. The Serbs will escalate their tests of the international community's resolve unless they face a threat that they calculate will inflict severe damage to their forces.

-- The Bosnian Serb military remains unintimidated by the threat of NATO military strikes, a point Mladic has made to various Western interlocutors. Karadzic perhaps is more fearful, but in the face of a perceived onslaught by NATO forces, the Bosnian Serb leadership, which thrives on feelings of persecution, probably will rally around the cause of zealous nationalism.

-- Even Milosevic, who would prefer acceptance of the Contact Group plan, worries that he will have to bow to domestic pressure to help his Bosnian Serb brothers if they come under Western attack, according to special intelligence.

-- The Bosnian Muslims, meanwhile, would take advantage of airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs by continuing their operations outside of the zones and by resupplying their troops.

The burden of strict enforcement of the zones is likely to alter seriously Western involvement in UNPROFOR and exacerbate fissures between NATO and the UN and within NATO.

-- The continued presence of UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves probably cannot survive. Even if UNPROFOR stays, the West European are likely to reduce their troop commitments, increasing UN reliance on Islamic contributors.
Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Fire Agreements and Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
(Information Current as of 1500, 3 August 1994)

Summary

The security situation in Sarajevo and Gorazde has deteriorated since the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group peace proposal.

1. The number of reported cease-fire violations is at its highest level in months; in Gorazde, there was a high of 180 on 26 July, and in Sarajevo there were over 700 on 2 August—up from an average of 100 to 200 for the last several months.

2. Small-arms and machine-gun fire accounts for almost all of the cease-fire violations that occur in the Sarajevo and Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zones. The level of reported heavy-weapons fire remains very low and is not comparable to the level of fire prior to implementation of the exclusion zones.

3. Bosnian Serb forces are renewing their challenge to UN control over the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone—they reportedly tried on 2 August to recover weapons stored at UN collection points—and have continuously flouted UN authority in the Gorazde exclusion zones.

4. Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have restricted UN personnel freedom of movement in the Sarajevo and Gorazde areas.

Bosnian Serb actions seem intended to remind the Contact Group that it needs Serb cooperation to control the exclusion zones, that a decision to create additional exclusion zones without Serb concurrence would be resisted, and that there is a price to be paid for implementing the other "sticks" in the Contact Group plan. The Bosnian Serb actions also come at a time when they are very frustrated by Bosnian Government failure to agree to prisoner exchanges, as well as Government offensive operations, despite the Bosnia-wide cease-fire agreement that went into effect on 10 June.
The Sarajevo and Gorazde Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones

The Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone was created by a Northern Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on 9 February. The decision gave Bosnian Serb and Government forces 10 days to withdraw or place under UNPROFOR control all weapons larger than 12.7mm (e.g. tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons) within 20 kilometers of the center of Sarajevo, excluding an area within two kilometers of Pale; the decision stipulated, moreover, that any heavy weapons within the exclusion zone and not under UN control would be subject to NATO airstrikes. Nine collection sites are situated throughout the 20-kilometer exclusion zone and the UN currently controls or supervises over 300 Serb and about 50 Muslim heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area. The NAC decision also decreed that all UN and relief personnel in Bosnia should have free access to Sarajevo.

The Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zone went into effect on 24 April 1994. A 22 April NAC decision gave the Bosnian Serbs until 0100 on 24 April to cease attacks on Gorazde, withdraw their forces three kilometers from the city center, and allow UN forces, humanitarian relief convoys, and medical assistance teams free access to the city. CINCSouth was authorized to conduct airstrikes against Serb heavy weapons within 20 kilometers of Gorazde city center, provided they were inside Bosnian territory. The NAC decision also called on the Bosnian Government not to undertake offensive military action from within the safe area of Gorazde.

Sarajevo

Small-arms fire and sporadic shelling have been reported within the Sarajevo 20-kilometer zone since the NATO ultimatum in mid-February. These incidents, which averaged between 100 and 200 per day over the last few months (see table), have rapidly escalated in the last two weeks.

- 706 cease-fire violations on 2 August, 578 violations on 1 August, and 580 on 31 July. Small-arms and machine-gun fire accounts for almost all of the violations.

- Both warring factions have violated the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement over the past week, with increased sniping and several significant clashes reported in the Grbavica area.

heavy sniper fire forced
Cease-fire Violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde*

[Bar chart showing the number of cease-fire violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde over time, with a peak in the later months.]
the city's tram lines to close on 29 July after six passengers were wounded by snipers.

The UN closed Sarajevo airport on 22 July after five UN aircraft were hit by small-arms fire, according to press reports. Secretary of Defense Perry's scheduled visit to Sarajevo on 22 July was canceled as a result of these actions.

Aircraft landing at Sarajevo airport occasionally have come under small-arms fire since April.

After a lull following the establishment of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, small-arms fire broke out within the city center shortly after the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde in April and remains a daily concern. On 9 May, the first report of tank fire since the mid-February ultimatum, and a UN observer was killed in a mortar attack—probably by Serb forces—within the zone on 12 May.

The Bosnian Serbs have been challenging UN control of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone since the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde in April, probably as a means of testing UN resolve to maintain control of the zone and demonstrating Serb freedom of action. The Serbs have the capability to take the weapons against UNPROFOR resistance should they choose to do so.

Bosnian Serb forces attempted to retrieve weapons from one of the sites but were turned away by UN troops. UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose stated publicly on 3 August that force would be used to prevent the Serbs from recovering weapons.
Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed a 20mm anti-aircraft gun from the Ilidza collection site in late July.

In the weeks following the airstrikes at Gorazde, Serb forces removed--and reportedly have not returned--about 20 heavy weapons and some ammunition from various collection sites throughout the zone.

Serb forces were maintaining weapons at some collection sites, possibly in preparation for pulling the weapons out in case the situation deteriorates further.

Bosnian Government forces also have reneged on some of their commitments around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR claims that Bosnian Government forces have violated the August 1993 agreement demilitarizing the Mt. Igman area.

In early May, six or seven heavy-weapons positions on Mt. Igman and preparations under way for more weapons positions.

Gorazde

The Bosnian Serbs have violated both the three-kilometer military withdrawal zone or the 20-kilometer heavy-weapon exclusion zone established around Gorazde in April.
Incidents of small-arms and machine-gun fire in Gorazde prior to the Contact Group ministerial last weekend peaked at 180 on 26 July, according to press reports. The level of violations has tapered off in recent days to 70-80 violations, but remains higher than before the announcement of the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group proposal.

On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 40mm anti-aircraft gun inside the exclusion zone on Muslim civilians harvesting crops, according to press reports. Negotiations for the removal of this weapon are under way. The next day, Serb forces fired an 82mm mortar from within the zone at Bosnian Government positions, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops also fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.

The Bosnian Serbs have never complied fully with the Gorazde 20-kilometer exclusion zone, withdrawing weapons only after UN observers discovered them. In mid-May, the UN Commander in Gorazde stated that the Serbs probably were hiding other weapons in areas they had declared off-limits to UN observers. Bosnian Government forces have harassed Serb troops in the Gorazde area.

Freedom of Movement

Bosnian Serb forces have denied UN and relief personnel, as well as civilians, freedom of movement in the Sarajevo and Gorazde areas. Increased harassment of UN and relief personnel appears to coincide with international attempts to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into compliance with ultimatums.
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced on 26 July that he could no longer guarantee the safety of traffic on two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms. The next day, Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy on one of these routes outside Sarajevo--killing a British UN soldier--and later fired on a French contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on Federation President Zubak's motorcade returning to the city, according to press reports. 

Bosnian Serb forces have at various times restricted and blocked movement in and around Sarajevo; for a time shortly after the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April, they placed all UN personnel in Serb-held territory under virtual house arrest. The Serbs temporarily mined the perimeters of several weapons collection sites and detained UN personnel supervising Serb weapons in the exclusion zone.

Bosnian Serb forces now close convoy checkpoints enroute to Gorazde from Friday to Monday each week and employ other delaying tactics. On 26 July, Bosnian Serb officials detained a UNHCR official on his way to Gorazde. Serb authorities recently denied entry for a water specialist and confiscated part of a convoy shipment, including rat poison needed to control the growing rat population of Gorazde that has led to a possible outbreak of hemorrhagic fever.
Small-arms fire and explosions continued in Sarajevo overnight, and Gorazde remains unstable.

-- Sniping continues in Sarajevo despite a Tuesday agreement between the warring parties to end this form of harassment of civilians, according to press reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents have placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn to discourage snipers.

-- The Bosnian Serbs also continue to challenge UN control of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone. Recently, Bosnian Serb forces twice have attempted to remove mortars from the Poljine weapons collection point but were turned away by French UNPROFOR troops.

Yesterday, the Bosnian Serb forces placed mines around the compound after the French again intervened, but after two hours of negotiations the mines were removed and the Serbs withdrew.

-- The home-made heavy rocket fired at Visoko on 2 August--probably from within the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone--was of a type previously used by Bosnian Serb forces.

-- Cease-fire violations continue at high levels and an increasing number of explosions in and around the city.

The recent events are typical of the steadily deteriorating security situation around Gorazde and Sarajevo over the last month.
By Tuesday, cease-fire violations in Sarajevo, primarily small-arms fire, were the highest level—over 700—since the mid-February NATO ultimatum. A week before, the United Nations had been forced to close the Sarajevo airport due to five attacks on relief aircraft.

The Bosnian Serbs continue to violate the exclusion zones around Gorazde. The two sides have more than 10 heavy weapons in the exclusion zone. Small-arms and machine-gun fire in the exclusion zone peaked at 180 on 26 July, but has tapered off to some 70-80 in recent days, according to press reports.
Recent Incidents in Sarajevo and Gorazde

Sarajevo

-- NATO aircraft were deployed on 5 August against a known Bosnian Serb heavy weapon position within the 20-kilometer exclusion zone, according to press reports.

On 5 August, Bosnian Serb forces removed a T-55 tank, two armored personnel carriers, and an antiaircraft gun from the Ilidza heavy weapons collection site, according to press reports.

The UN resumed humanitarian flights into Sarajevo airport on 5 August after a two-week suspension. After Bosnian Serb troops removed weapons from the Ilidza collection site, the UN suspended all flights into the airport, according to various press reports.

-- 670 cease-fire violations on 4 August.

-- On 3 August, UNPROFOR/Bosnia Commander Rose publicly stated that force would be used to prevent the Serbs from recovering weapons from UN-controlled heavy weapon collection sites.
-- Bosnian Serb and Government forces agreed to cease sniper activity in Sarajevo on 3 August, according to press reports. UN anti-sniping teams responded to continued Serb sniping with retaliatory fire, according to press reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn to discourage snipers.

-- 661 cease-fire violations on 3 August.

-- On 3 August, a home-made rocket fired at Visoko the day before—probably from within the Sarajevo 20-kilometer exclusion zone—was of a type previously used by Bosnian Serb forces.

-- 706 cease-fire violations on 2 August, 578 on 1 August, 580 on 31 July, and 597 on 30 July.

-- On 29 July, 406 cease-fire violations. Heavy sniper fire forced the city's tram lines to close after six passengers were wounded by snipers.

-- On 28 July, 435 cease-fire violations.

-- On 27 July, Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed a 20mm antiaircraft gun from the Iliča collection site,
Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy outside of Sarajevo on 27 July—killing a British UN soldier—and later fired on a French contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on Federation President's motorcade returning to the city.

On 26 July, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced that he could no longer guarantee the safety of traffic on two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.


The UN closed Sarajevo airport to all but UNPROFOR flights on 22 July after five UN aircraft were hit by small-arms, according to press reports.

264 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
Gorazde

- 197 cease-fire violations in the Gorazde exclusion zone on 4 August and 160 on 3 August.
- 38 cease-fire violations on 31 July and 73 on 30 July.
- 12 cease-fire violations on 28 July and 180 on 26 July.
- Bosnian Serb forces fired an 82mm mortar from within the 20-kilometer zone at Bosnian Government positions on 25 July, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.
- On 25 July, 65 cease-fire violations.
- On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 40mm antiaircraft gun inside the heavy weapon exclusion zone on Muslim civilians harvesting crops, according to press reports.
- 41 cease-fire violations on 24 July and 29 on 23 July.
- 30 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO:
THE POLICY CONTEXT

The principal objective of proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives toward lifting the arms embargo is to get Pale to reconsider its position and accept the Map—in other words, it is designed to bring about a negotiated peace settlement. Specifically, lifting the arms embargo is intended to provide B-H with the self-defense capability necessary to defend the proposed Federation territory outlined by the CG Map. This translates into an ability to hold current territory, take enough of the high ground around Sarajevo to make it defensible, be able to ensure that humanitarian aid gets in, and conduct limited other offensive operations to seize lands proposed to be under Federation control by the Map but currently in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. It is a course of action fraught with peril.

The U.S. will insert no ground troops, advisors, or logisticians into B-H. Even so, whether as a unilateral lifting or as part of an orchestrated, multilateral effort, lifting will be perceived dramatically raising U.S. involvement and the stakes. We will be perceived as having chosen to side with the Bosnian Govt. We will be ever more responsible for training and equipping the Bosnian Govt. forces, most likely in the U.S. and for at least a year so that the effect can play out on the battlefield. Even given that increased level of involvement (including a transition period during which U.S. air power will be used to help equalize the battlefield), there is no guarantee of success. In fact, absent committed U.S. ground forces, no amount of air power can prevent the BSA from overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo.

We do not want to act alone, but acting multilaterally will be a difficult proposition, as each of the actors tends to see things from its unique vantage point. UNPROFOR will withdraw in a nightmare scenario of hostages seized and the potential for heavy casualties. Moreover, without an intense diplomatic effort and logistical and military support, we will sour relations with our NATO and UN allies as well as undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia and our efforts to enforce UN embargoes that we support.

It is the purpose of the sections that follow to identify the key concerns of the other nations that have interests in the outcome of the current conflict. Containing and then ending the conflict while not fracturing the current (albeit fragile) consensus for action is paramount to the success of our planning. What we need to do is balance carefully the at times competing objectives of maintaining the unity of the CG and getting the Bosnian Serbs to reverse their position and accept the Map. Going too far too quickly down the path of extension followed by more robust enforcement of the Exclusion Zones and then lifting the arms embargo is certain to fracture the unity of the CG. It is an awful idea. On the other hand, not proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives is likely to perpetuate the status quo—continuing war and frustration. Yet there may be reason to consider a course of action that does not include the major outside powers imposing a solution or thrashing the Serbs militarily. The history of the Balkan Wars suggests that ultimately Serbia may extend itself territorially beyond the means of its military power, thus inviting its many neighbors with territorial claims—Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Albania—to pile on, regain lost lands, and restore a more natural equilibrium.
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
9 September 1994

Military Situation in Bihac

Fighting in the Bihac enclave has intensified between Government and Serb forces since the collapse of Abdic's Muslim separatist forces in August.

Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces have launched attacks—possibly coordinated—on Bosnian government forces and have concentrated on seizing key lines of communication along the southern edge of the enclave and maintaining a demilitarized zone between Krajina Serb and Bosnian government territory in the northeastern corner of the enclave.

Shelling of Bihac city, which is the actual safe area, has been negligible, but shelling of the Muslim cities of Cazin and Buzim has increased. If the UN declared a 20-km exclusion zone around Bihac city, Cazin would fall within and Buzim would fall outside. (See map.)

Bosnian Serb forces have deployed as many as 6,000 troops around the Bihac enclave.

Krajina Serb forces have reinforced their forces around Bihac with additional troops, tanks, and artillery—primarily near the demilitarized zone—and may have as many as 2,000 troops deployed in the area. Bosnian government V Corps forces number at least 6,000, deployed throughout the enclave.

The fiercest fighting in recent weeks has continued to be for control of the Grabez Plateau, the high ground five kilometers west of Bihac city. The Bosnian Serbs apparently are attempting to control key lines of communication connecting Serb-held territories in Bosnia and the Krajina.

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8/3/15 KBH
At least eight probable Bosnian Serb artillery deployment areas containing 22 pieces of artillery or mortars within 20 kilometers of Bijagaj city, primarily near the Grabez plateau.

Clashes between the Government V Corps and Krajina Serb forces have been escalating in the northeastern section of the enclave, near the demilitarized zone. Bosnian forces have made numerous probing attacks which have resulted in the Krajina Serbs reinforcing this area.

On 8 September, at least 500 Krajina Serb troops supported by at least eight tanks attacked Bosnian government positions near the DMZ, according to Radio Sarajevo.

The Krajina Serbs had established a fire support base three kilometers north of the DMZ. Equipment at the base included four M-87 multiple rocket launcher vehicles.
Implications of the Bihac Offensive

The Bosnian Army launched its most successful offensive of the war on 24 October around Bihac in northwestern Bosnia, capturing some 250 to 300 square kilometers of territory. We anticipate a further escalation of the fighting, although Government forces remain incapable of decisively altering the current distribution of territory. Bosnian Government successes may induce Zagreb to launch an attack against the Krajina Serbs. Meanwhile, the food situation is critical for 200,000 people in the Bihac enclave; Serb obstruction of aid there and elsewhere could put many at risk.

The Bihac Offensive

Increasingly effective leadership, growing tactical skill, and high morale—combined with an improved logistics situation—were key to the Bosnian Army's Fifth Corps success. The operation was also directed at what is widely perceived to be the weakest Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The Army's high command successfully coordinated the Bihac operation with attacks near Doboj, Gradacac, and Kupres in order to tie down Bosnian Serb forces.

Bosnian Serb forces already have retaken some territory in counterattacks. The Bosnian Government Fifth Corps is spread thin and is awkwardly deployed after its rapid advance, which probably exceeded initial goals.

-- Local Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) troops—reinforced by units from as far away as the Posavina corridor—have forced a government withdrawal from Kulen Vakuf and about 50 square kilometers of recently captured territory, according to press reports.

-- The Krajina Serbs are supporting the Bosnian Serb counterattack by shelling some Government positions and supplying troops, according to a variety of reports. They are also reportedly mobilizing additional forces.
Bosnian Croats Join the Conflict

Bosnian Croat forces are actively supporting the Government offensives near Bihac and Kupres—their first major joint offensive with government troops since 1992. Zagreb almost certainly had to approve of the Bosnian Croat participation in the Kupres attack.

-- The joint operations at Kupres, long advocated by the Muslims, almost certainly will help to ease Muslim-Croat tensions elsewhere in Bosnia.

Bosnian Forces Potential Gains Limited

Despite the recent successes, the Bosnian Army remains incapable of decisively defeating the Serbs or even seizing all the territory given it under the Contact Group plan.

-- Sarajevo is now able to coordinate multiple operations that maximize their manpower advantage and its infantry formations—especially its special assault units—are increasingly effective.

-- Government forces will have difficulty making similar gains elsewhere where they generally face larger numbers of more mobile and better trained and equipped Serb troops.

Fighting Will Continue to Intensify

Recent Government successes probably will lead to a major increase in fighting.

-- Bosnian Croat attacks have reignited fronts quiet since 1992. Government forces are likely to continue launching multiple attacks throughout the country to stretch the Serbs thin.

-- Meanwhile, the BSA will respond vigorously and rapidly—especially if key Serb areas are threatened.

Possible Spillover of Fighting

Government successes could cause fighting to spillover into Croatia or draw "Yugoslav" and possibly Croatian forces into combat in Bosnia.
Serbian "volunteers" could cross into Bosnia if the government advances continue. Yugoslav Army elements almost certainly will try to increase covert support to the Bosnian Serbs, especially if they continue to lose ground.

A prompt Croatian attack could take advantage of the Krajina and Bosnian Serb preoccupation with the Bihac offensive.

Grave Humanitarian Conditions Loom

The food situation for 200,000 people in the Bihac enclave is critical and some could face starvation by mid-winter. Bosnian Serb retaliation against aid deliveries could cause a deterioration of conditions in Bihac and elsewhere in Bosnia.

An additional 30,000 people, Bosnian refugees from the enclave who fled after rebel Muslim leader Abdic's fall, are ill-prepared for winter and depend on UN food and water deliveries. Meanwhile, Bosnian Government offensives south of Bihac have forced 10,000 Serbs from their homes.

Last week, Serb officials linked authorization for UN fuel deliveries to a suspension of the Bihac offensive and have since denied most UN fuel convoy requests. Serb authorities are going to require 24-hours advance notification for using the Sarajevo airport road, significantly complicating airlift deliveries.
NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING ABOUT BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO

I. Legal Analysis

As of November 12, 1994, the Nunn-Mitchell provision of the DOD authorization act will prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds for intelligence support in those limited circumstances where the purpose of that support is participation in, support for, or assistance to voluntary aspects of the Bosnian arms embargo.

The effect of the funding prohibition is limited. It does not prohibit collection activities, but restricts passage of intelligence information on the arms flows to Bosnia where the information is provided solely to enforce the Bosnian embargo:

-- Congress intended to continue support under UN Resolution 713 and to preclude voluntary enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo unless it would impede the enforcement of the Serbian economic and arms embargo.

-- The President indicated in a signing statement that the provision applies only when appropriated funds are used "for the purpose of" enforcing the arms embargo.

-- The prohibition would not affect the ability of the US to participate in activities that are necessary to avoid impeding the enforcement of the Serbian embargo or other authorized purposes, even if indirect, consequential or incidental support to enforcement of the Bosnian embargo results.

The US is not required to cease providing information concerning violations of US law or relating to other arms shipments, or information which supports the Serbian embargo but which may also support enforcement of the Bosnian embargo. Moreover, the US Government may continue to provide information about arms shipments to Bosnia where the purpose for that support is driven by concerns other than enforcement of the Bosnian embargo.

-- Examples include passage of intelligence necessary for the defense of allied forces or facilities, or necessary to maintain intelligence liaison relationships.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E. O. 13526
Caveat: Although a strict reading of the statute’s "purpose" test would permit the continuation of a number of activities that support voluntary enforcement of the embargo, activity that reasonably can be expected to result in enforcement may raise questions about compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.

Dissemination of intelligence from joint collection sites, information for liaison enhancement, and other activities should not be undertaken without senior review even if not strictly intended for enforcement where there is a significant potential an enforcement action will result. Passage of strategic rather than tactical intelligence is less likely to raise such a concern, and activities that are necessary for other purposes and that actually are beyond US control may proceed.

II. Intelligence Activities Under Nunn-Mitchell

A. Intelligence support can be divided into several different categories for purposes of assessing the impact of the funding prohibition:

Intelligence Collection. The funding prohibition would not affect the actual collection of intelligence. A joint collection activity not directed solely at enforcement of the Bosnian embargo with allied countries may continue where its cessation would impede the enforcement of the Serbian embargo.

Intelligence Support Concerning Illegal Arms Shipments to Bosnia.

-- Defense articles and services exported from the US or with another US nexus and destined for Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue concerning these activities, which are required by U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713, and which are also a violation of US law.

-- Arms shipments destined for Bosnia in violation of the U.N. arms embargo that has no US nexus. Intelligence support concerning these types of shipments solely for the purpose of enforcing the Bosnian arms embargo must cease as of 12 November 1994.

-- OPERATION SHARP GUARD actions exclusively taken to effect the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina are affected.

-- Actionable information relating solely to the knowledge of arms destined for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be marked and treated as NOFORN—not to be disseminated to foreign nationals without prior review. It also may not be used in any US Government action to enforce the Bosnian arms embargo unless a violation of US law is involved.

-- It may be possible to delay dissemination of actionable intelligence on Bosnian arms shipments until it can no longer support an enforcement action. However, this approach should be carefully reviewed, as even "after the fact" intelligence can be used in support of long-range enforcement efforts.
B. Determining the Purpose of the Activity:

-- Where the purpose for providing such intelligence support is other than to enforce the arms embargo--such as the enforcement of the no-fly zone (Operation DENY FLIGHT); enforcement of the myriad of actions authorized by other U.N. resolutions in this area, including the Serbian arms and economic embargo and force protection for US or cooperating country forces; intelligence liaison enhancement; or any other authorized purposes -- the intelligence support may continue to be provided even if an incidental or indirect support to enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo results.

-- Arms Shipments to Serbia and Other Countries Except Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue to be provided to enforce the Serbian embargo or the requirements of other U.N. sanctions, as may intelligence support concerning arms shipments to destinations except for Bosnia.

-- Other Intelligence. Intelligence support not related to the "deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Bosnia," see U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713, may continue to be provided in accordance with existing authorities and established procedures.

-- Finished Intelligence. Finished intelligence which contains no information upon which an enforcement action could be based may continue to be provided.
REINVIGORATED UNPROFOR PROPOSALS
(revised)

FRENCH PROPOSALS.
- **Secure the Sarajevo Airport.** This idea is consistent with the current humanitarian mission. However, when considered previously, the idea was rejected because of the number of troops required to secure the Serb controlled approaches to the airport on a full-time basis. The French may have in mind something less ambitious than this.
- **Secure a land route to Sarajevo.** Consistent with current UNPROFOR mandate; most of the route is in Muslim/Croat control, but Serbs control the immediate access to Sarajevo and will oppose UN convoys and target the route; weather also an issue in some areas; and the troop requirement is unclear.
- **Consolidate UNPROFOR in the central area.** Provides economy of force and efficiency; if it means pulling out of the enclaves, creates the image of withdrawal and abandonment of the eastern enclaves; French seem to have in mind a less complete pull back, e.g., closing down the isolated weapons storage sites around Sarajevo, pulling back UNMO's.

OTHER OPTIONS (within existing mandate)
- **Tougher convoy ROE.** A variant of the "blue route" concept. Would force through Serb roadblocks, instead of negotiating. Problems are Serb counter-escalating, use of civilians to block convoys.
- **Safe Area/EZ focus.** Clearly define safe areas, create small exclusion zones and expand them. Deploy UNPROFOR more heavily in safe areas/EZs. Use military force to defend people in safe areas and the movement of humanitarian supplies to them. Option is impartial and within current mandate. Linke easily to build-down. Difficult to coordinate, support and control dispersed units; requires a tactical reorientation and probably more troops.
- **Central Based Rapid Reaction Force.** Concentrate UNPROFOR in Sarajevo with a small presence in limited, designated safe areas. Create a viable mechanized and armor (consider attack helicopters) reaction force (Bn or Bde) configured for combat and located in Sarajevo to respond with ground combat power and air support to UN missions as required. UNPROFOR more defensible; restores UN initiative and gives combat capability to UN but requires new organizational structure, C3I, combat equipment and log support. May increase fighting.
Secure Tuzla airport. Easier to secure than Sarajevo airport because it is deeper inside government area. However, it creates new opportunity for fighting, and Tuzla is remote from other areas requiring humanitarian support. Would also require redeployment of many UNPROFOR forces.
Build Down

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.

Discussion:

The Concept: an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt. Build down is designed to equalize the forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the negotiating process include:

- Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
- Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
- More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
- Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.

Implementation: (Assumption--former President Carter has some success in getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good faith) Present build down to the UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the
arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.

**Potential Problems:** The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H. Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

**Recommendation:** adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument if favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.
FUNDING UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL: CHOICES AND DYNAMICS

SHAPE has prepared a document, NATO Withdrawal Budget Estimates (1995), dated 31 January 1995, that provides preliminary cost estimates for the implementation of SHAPE/AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104, DETERMINED EFFORT, a NATO-conducted withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The OPLAN does not consider evacuation of assets currently stationed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

According to the SHAPE estimate, OPLAN 40104 will take six months to execute, involve a multi-national force of approximately 70,000 ground, air and naval personnel, and cost approximately $1.9B at minimum. This cost estimate breaks down as follows: about $515M for NATO common costs (i.e., common procurement and O&M costs); $1.4B in national costs (personnel, equipment and sustainment costs for all troop-contributing nations); and $37.2M for the evacuation of 31,000 UNPROFOR personnel, 9,400 vehicles and related equipment.

Organizations involved in military operations in and around the former Republic of Yugoslavia have not developed a single, common, standardized funding mechanism for defraying costs because of the current division of operational control. Funding arrangements have been primarily threefold: (1) "blue helmet" operational costs paid through the UN's assessment system; (2) NATO members "paying their own way" for costs associated with their forces supporting the UN Security Council mandate (e.g., SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT); and (3) NATO using its Military Budget to pay NATO common costs.

A detailed funding mechanism for UNPROFOR withdrawal, that can be agreed to by the various organizations involved, will have to be devised to ensure the success of the operation. There are four possible options (all costs use OPLAN estimates as a base).

UN Funding Option: This option would entail the UN paying for all costs associated with the operation to include military and civilian elements engaged in planning, execution or support. It uses the standard UN peacekeeping assessment process which assesses member states for a percentage share of the total operational costs. U.S. share would be 30.4%, or approximately $590M plus the incremental costs for forces and other support paid up front, less any reimbursements. Each country contributing to the operation would be required to pay incremental costs up front and be reimbursed by the UN for personnel and other support later.
"Pay-Your-Own Way" Option: This option entails each participating nation, organization, and non-governmental organization, paying its own evacuation costs without the expectation of reimbursement from another organization. The cost to the U.S. would be contingent upon the level of support the U.S. furnished (number of personnel, airlift, CAS, etc.). UN members, including the U.S. may also be assessed for the cost of evacuating the non-NATO troops UNPROFOR troops if this costs was borne by the UN. The estimated cost to the U.S. using this approach is $600M to $1B for incremental costs associated with operational support.

NATO Funding Option: NATO members would be obligated to pay the entire cost of the operation. It currently pays for only common costs in FRY through its Military Budget. NATO accounts have never been used before to carry the full cost of a military operation. One approach to funding the operation would be to use the NATO national cost share formula to set the assessment rate for each NATO member (U.S. share 25% or approximately $490M plus the incremental costs for operational support minus any reimbursements). This approach assumes also that non-NATO UNPROFOR nations would not be assessed by NATO for the accrued costs. Each NATO nation contributing forces and support would pay its own incremental costs up front. Later reimbursement by NATO is problematic.

"Hybrid Option": This option uses two approaches. Non-NATO UN member states pay for a portion of the total cost of the operation at their regular UN peacekeeping rate (non-NATO UN member assessments total 32% of the UN peacekeeping budget). These costs would be paid into a UN fund that would be used to fund the cost of non-NATO forces in the operation and UN administrative and support costs. NATO nations would pay the other portion and not be assessed by the UN, but pay under the NATO national cost share formula described above. The cost to the U.S. under this approach would be approximately $330M plus incremental operational support costs less reimbursements. If the operational cost was allocated based on the proportion on NATO and non-NATO troop strength, the U.S. cost may be reduced to $225M (plus incremental support costs less reimbursements) since 54% of the UNPROFOR troops are non-NATO.

NATO and the UN have been discussing cost sharing arrangements for funding a potential withdrawal operation for several months, with no tangible results. Indeed, in recent correspondence to NATO SYG Claes, UN SYG Boutros-Ghali stated his assumption that, in the case of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO would bear the costs. NATO Permanent Representatives were sharply critical of this position, and agreed that SYG Claes would tell Boutros-Ghali that funding arrangements for such an operation were to be the subject of future negotiations between the two organizations.
While NATO has set no specific timetable for entering into these negotiations, military planning factors and operational timing requirements may play a significant role in determining the final funding scheme. They therefore merit serious consideration in the overall context of this evolving situation.

SACEUR indicates that he must have a pre-positioned command and control/logistics infrastructure in place to execute the OPLAN. His preference is that this operating base be established prior to execution of any withdrawal operation, and in light of agreed ministerial political, military and financial guidance (i.e., formal funding arrangements). SHAPE planners estimate that it will take about three to four weeks to establish the pre-positioned support structure after a political decision to execute has been rendered by NATO Ministers.

However, if SACEUR must establish his operating base on a contingency basis (i.e., as outlined in OPLAN 40104, but without final agreement between NATO and the UN on some issues, like funding arrangements), the US government (as a NATO and UN member) may have no alternative but to accept a de facto funding arrangement (a la "Pay-Your-Own-Way"), which would leave us little hope or expectation of being reimbursed for accrued costs.

Since the Croatian government has declared 31 March the expiration date of the UN mandate there, planning, negotiations and decision making on formal funding arrangements between NATO and the UN must begin soon, lest events foreclose available options.
The International Military Presence in Macedonia: Regional Stability and Containment

Purpose
This paper provides a strategy to retain international military forces in Macedonia and surrounding countries to contain the further spread of war in the Balkans should UNPROFOR withdraw from Croatia and Bosnia and fighting increase there. This military strategy is designed to support the long-term stabilization of Macedonia as an area critical to spread of war further into the southern tier of Europe.

Background
The Principals' Committee meeting on February 7, 1995, directed more comprehensive planning on options to contain the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. Pressure is growing for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for renewed fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia are high in the Spring. Given Macedonia's importance to stability in Southern Europe, the Principals directed that special attention be given to strengthening forces in Macedonia to provide stability through deterrence of military threats to Macedonia.

National Interests
Preventing the spread of war in the Balkans is a vital national security interest of the United States, and Macedonia is the center of gravity to containing conflict in Southern Europe. Regional war would threaten the overall stability of Europe and could trigger a conflict between Greece and Turkey, thereby further straining NATO in an increasingly volatile area. The US commitment to stability in Macedonia is well-established. This Administration has reaffirmed the Bush Administration's announcement in December 1992 that the US would employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. While the threat of Serbian caused violence is low, the consequence of a large refugee flow into Macedonia is grave for the entire region.

The Threat: Why Focus on Macedonia?
The sizable ethnic Albania minority in Macedonia makes it likely that should Macedonia be destabilized, the Albanians will move to merge those ethnically Albanian dominated areas within Macedonia with Albania. An upheaval in Kosovo, which is 90% ethnic Albanian, would result in massive refugee flows that would present Macedonia with insupportable economic, political, and security problems. This is the greatest threat to the region in general for it is the most likely condition to destabilize Macedonia and lead to a land grab of at least parts of Macedonia with the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece and Turkey on opposite sides, Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria.
The greatest threat to Macedonian stability is its internal condition undermined by external factors. The combined effects of enforcing the UN-mandated economic sanctions on Macedonia's major trading partner, Serbia, and the closure of the border with Greece, have led to deteriorating and grave economic difficulties--30% unemployment, per capita income at 1964 levels, and industrial output operating at 40% efficiency. These problems only exacerbate ethnic tensions. At the same time, Macedonian nationalists have become more militant. It is conceivable that the fragile democracy that Gligorov has built cannot survive these pressures.

In sum, Macedonia is the most politically, economically, and militarily vulnerable of the states in the region, and its political and military collapse would trigger a preventable wider Balkan war.

Options.

Four options are available to support an international military presence in Macedonia. These include:
1. A NATO deployment;
2. A U.S. led, multinational deployment;
3. A U.S. unilateral deployment;
4. Retain UNPROFOR.

The disadvantages and dangers inherent in any unilateral U.S. action would likely aggravate regional tensions. Such action would risk NATO, PFP, and our emerging partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant to support any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.

A U.S.-led multinational (but not NATO) suffers from many of the disadvantages of a unilateral U.S. action, and does not enjoy the existing infrastructure advantages of a NATO-run operation.

A NATO-run containment strategy has intrinsic merit. Containment of the conflict is a European problem first and foremost, and NATO has the existing political and military infrastructure to support such activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized UN-NATO command relationships in Bosnia to date. Even so, such an enhanced NATO-controlled operation also risks heightening regional tensions. Without the economic assistance and political stabilization package, such a strategy would not address internally-based stability concerns.

The status quo option is based on the premise that the current UNPROFOR mission and force structure not only is adequate to respond to the current threat environment, but also that any increase in the in the size of the forces would be counterproductive in the long-term--that it would be destabilizing by provoking internal unrest.
Proposed Concept.

Given the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia and the potential for conflict among Serbia, Croatia, and the warring parties in Bosnia, the deployment of a more capable NATO force to Macedonia and associated sites in the southern Balkans is designed to deter a wider Balkan war. It should be equipped and have the ROE to carry out its assigned mission. This deployment is expected to be of indefinite duration. It should be under NATO command and control (C2), operating under a UN mandate. It is intended to send a strong international and internal signal regarding its commitment to preserve internal and regional stability in Southern Europe, thereby containing the present conflict to the former Yugoslavia.

Mandate

The principal focus of this strategy is not the areas of conflict themselves but rather the areas of potential conflict in the countries surrounding Bosnia. Authority for the operations will emanate from a UN mandate, but under NATO C2.

General Mission

An appropriately sized NATO ground force, with significant U.S. participation and with appropriate air and naval support in the region, will deploy to Macedonia. This force will deter threats to Macedonia and preserve the inviolability of Macedonia’s internationally recognized borders, thereby enhancing internal and regional stability and prevent the spread of war throughout the Balkans.

Forces and Operations

- Deploy an appropriately sized NATO force to Macedonia;
- NATO force is under exclusive NATO command and control;
- Consider increasing NATO naval presence in the Adriatic;
- Consider increasing NATO air forces deployed in the region, consider basing in Albania.

Assumptions

- NATO will concentrate on containment of the conflict vice active ground involvement in the former Yugoslavia.
- Macedonia will accept the NATO deployment and permit the full use of its military infrastructure.
- UN sanctions against Serbia will not be part of the NATO mission.
- Russia, Turkey, and Greece cannot prevent this deployment.
- UNPROFOR has withdrawn from Bosnia and Croatia.
- Deployment will be under permissive conditions—logistics hubs, overflight and transit rights, and SOFAs will be available.
- Funding arrangements will be acceptable to the U.S.
Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.

- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.

- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.

- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.

- Since it would take 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.

- Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition approximately 450 U.S. DOD personnel to the area -- over 300 in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO’s operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

- In the interim, NATO’s Operational Plan is being updated continuously; there has been no final determination on the numbers of troops that would be provided from among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, nor when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin. Prior to implementation of the complete plan, we will consult with you again.
IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about $11 million).

- As for Croatia, we believe that UNPROFOR has a critical role to play in that nation as well. We are currently urging President Tudjman to reverse his decision not to extend UNPROFOR’s mandate beyond March 31.

- Due to ongoing negotiations with Croatian President Tudjman on a future role for UNPROFOR, President Clinton has not yet made a formal determination on whether the U.S. would agree to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR forces presently deployed in Croatia. At this point, therefore, NATO prepositioning in Croatia would be done to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

- Congressional approval?
- How much?
- How many?
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured...."

An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a "narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:
1. Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement--The U.S. has $70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible effect on the battlefield.

2. Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training. Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.

4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

**Discussion:** The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

- Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become a co-belligerent.
- Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR’s withdrawal.
- UNPROFOR’s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
- Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the pro-government forces for a return to war.
- The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H. Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall quickly.
- Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
- The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling--training as contemplated by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of even-handedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
- The March 4, 1995, Deputies’ discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.

**Recommendation:** Approve Option 1--narrow 505 agreement--as the basis of the President’s response to Senator Dole.
ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to “act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.” The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training “can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured....”

An interagency General Counsels’ (OGC) group in February recommended that only a “narrow” IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by “experts on mission” status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:
1. **Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement**—The U.S. has $70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on the battlefield.

2. **Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training.** Courses would be “non-lethal” technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.
3. Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used. Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.

4. Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole. This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current “experts on mission” status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

Discussion: The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

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Recommendation: Approve Option 1—narrow 505 agreement—as the basis of the President’s response to Senator Dole.
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs in hopes of isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and of getting sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) lifted. Milosevic apparently is allowing limited resupply to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) so the BSA is not prevented from holding its own against the Bosnian Army.

Activity since mid-January at internationally monitored border crossings suggests that the embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to below pre-August levels, when the embargo was imposed. Since mid-February enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December, which suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA. In addition to those crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, other goods are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia, a large potential loophole that probably is the largest conduit for fuel to the Bosnian Serbs.

Because the embargo has reduced the amount of goods crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy, particularly its financial and industrial sectors. There are no indications that the embargo has had a serious impact on the BSA's capabilities, even with some spot shortages reported. The BSA seems largely self-sufficient in logistics capability, except for fuel and some munitions. The Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions is still in operation, and Pale probably has used the current cease-fire to resupply its forces.
Milosevic Keeping Pressure on Karadzic With Sanctions

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. He probably has determined that he has few other means for pressuring and isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic also hopes that the West will respond by dropping sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY). Another former source of political pressure, the dissident group of Bosnian Serb assembly members who are aligned with Milosevic, apparently has lost its impetus to pressure Karadzic. So far, Milosevic has not forced Karadzic to accept a peace plan Belgrade likes, nor has he significantly weakened him with sanctions. Nevertheless, Karadzic may now be feeling some pressure after eight months of sanctions. Milosevic's pressure will continue to grow, as will internal pressure from the constant shortage of essentials.

Milosevic probably does not intend for the embargo to prevent the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. Moreover, his allowing some assistance to the BSA appeases the leadership of the Yugoslav Army, which generally opposes Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs. As a consequence, he is apparently allowing limited resupply to the BSA so long as it serves Serbian political aims and the activity can be plausibly denied.

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by Leon Fuert, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide information on Serbia's sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force.
Shipments Across FRY-Bosnia Border Remain Restricted

1.4c suggests that Belgrade's embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to levels below those observed before the embargo was imposed in August. The presence of the monitors from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) at most of the border crossings capable of handling large quantities of goods has inhibited major violations of the embargo. In particular, only one large-scale fuel shipment attempted since 30 December, suggesting that Belgrade has largely shut off such shipments across the Bosnian border. 3.5c

In response to ICFY requests since January, FRY officials implemented measures that have helped restrict shipments. As it did in late December 1994, Belgrade recently addressed major problems with an eye toward the United Nations review on lifting sanctions on the FRY scheduled for April.

- Customs officers increased the number and thoroughness of bus inspections at many of the major border crossings, but implementation has been inconsistent. As a result of their auto and bus inspections, Yugoslav officials at the border have regularly confiscated or turned back unauthorized shipments of fuel, construction materials, agricultural supplies, clothing, and livestock. During February, for example, officials confiscated 26 tons of fuel and 19 tons of fertilizer, but suggests that similar amounts of fuel were turned back from the border but not confiscated. In March, a patrol reportedly confiscated about 80 tons of fuel from four trucks using hidden tanks.

- Yugoslav officials have taken steps to reduce the use of some minor crossings and bypasses discovered by ICFY monitors.

- On 13 March, ICFY protested to FRY officials about buses loaded with soldiers transiting the border. Belgrade promised to take immediate action, and there have been no subsequent confirmed transits of troops.

- ICFY stopped 24-hour monitoring at the Jamena ferry crossing after the FRY had erected barricades in response to ICFY's request.

3.5c

Clinton Library Photocopy
Serbia also has cooperated with ICFY at Priboj and Uzice in inspecting and sealing Yugoslav trains that transit Bosnia, including freight cars on passenger trains.

In March, Serbian postal officials were checking packages for prohibited goods.

On 27 March, Customs Director Kertes agreed to improve controls on loading Yugoslav Red Cross (YRC) trucks to ensure that only approved goods were included in the shipments. Unidentified FRY officials were pressuring them to allow YRC vehicles to be used to move unauthorized goods into Bosnia.

Belgrade also has imposed more penalties on smugglers. Yugoslav customs initiated action in 215 cases of sanctions violations in February and imposed fines of 127,000 dinars, this was a marked improvement over the August 1994 to January 1995 period when 138 cases were initiated and 341,450 dinars in fines were meted out.

Widespread Problems at the Border Indicate Enforcement Deteriorating

Although Belgrade has addressed some ICFY concerns and no large shipments have been observed, the nature and frequency of enforcement shortcomings since mid-February indicate enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December. The deteriorating enforcement suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA across the Bosnia border. We cannot determine if the enforcement deficiencies have allowed enough shipments to compensate for quantities lost from the cutoff in August 1994 of large trucks.
Moreover, Belgrade is shipping large quantities of fuel and other goods to the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia via the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. Large-scale use of this route could have permitted Belgrade to shift cargo trucks away from the inter-Serb border, accounting for the apparent cessation of transits at those crossings. In addition, the information on the detected cross-border helicopter flights is insufficient to confirm that any have been used to resupply the BSA.

Deteriorating Enforcement Against "Ant Trade"

ICFY has had few indications of transits by large cargo trucks or tankers across the border, but the flow of truck, bus, automobile, farm tractor, and pedestrian traffic, which comprises the "ant trade," appears to have been relatively steady through March at ICFY-manned crossings. Monitors have noted significant enforcement deficiencies by FRY officials against this traffic since mid-February. In particular, ICFY patrols in March detected an increasing number unauthorized truck transits.

Yugoslav officials have not responded to monitors' requests to improve enforcement procedures, have not halted repeated violations, and have attempted to circumvent ICFY controls.
Smuggling activity suggests that goods are crossing the border where international monitoring is irregular or nonexistent. As of 31 March, ICFY is monitoring 19 border crossings—down from 21 around the clock—and is deploying fewer patrols. The remainder of the approximately 130 Serbia-Bosnia border crossings are monitored solely by the VJ, FRY customs, or police.

Funding constraints have forced personnel reductions, which in turn has reduced the number of crossings monitored full time and the number of patrols. Detailed several incidents in March touching on monitor security, which could lead the monitors to be more cautious in patrolling away from the manned posts and less inclined to press Serbian officials to improve enforcement.
inadequate coverage by FRY patrols, inadequate personnel and facilities to support inspections, and insufficient guidance on enforcement regulations also have hampered enforcement.

Pressure on FRY officials from Serbs living and trading along the border also may contribute to lax enforcement.

A confrontation on 14 March between police and Bosnian Serb civilians at Krstac escalated into an exchange of gunfire and grenades. At the Nudo Valley checkpoint on 10 March that a customs officer was reluctant to inspect most of the vehicles because he claimed that the local people knew him.
Unauthorized Helicopter Activity Continuing

Since January, there have been several incidents reported of helicopters apparently crossing between Serbia and Bosnia. Since January, cross-border violations of the No-Fly-Zone: Most flights detected originate in Bosnia and cross into Serbia because the flights entering Bosnia probably fit the profile of clandestine arms supply flights flown singly and primarily at night.

The largest suspected cross-border violation occurred on 3 February when the eastern enclave of Srebrenica reported 15 helicopters flying approximately 10 kilometers north of the enclave traveling in a westerly direction. Because of the flight direction and proximity to the border, reported that the aircraft were crossing the border into Bosnia. At the same time, UN observers stationed at the Surcin radar facility, which is used to monitor the border for illegal cross-border flight activity, were denied access to the facility. In response to UN inquiries, Belgrade claimed that no helicopters crossed the border. The United Nations subsequently dropped its investigation for lack of evidence. The UN observers have been allowed to reenter the Surcin radar facility and have continued to monitor the radar for cross-border flight activity.

Military-Related Activity Increasing Along the Border

Since late January, reports of military vehicles, aircraft, and troops crossing the border have increased. The reports reinforce that Belgrade is providing some support to the BSA despite the embargo.
Belgrade Using Croatian "Back Door" to Get Around Embargo

In addition to goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border because of deteriorating enforcement, fuel and other products from the FRY are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. Insufficient information is available to determine how long this route has been used to evade the blockade, the volume of the shipments, and Belgrade's involvement, but the traffic appears to be increasing. This represents a large potential loophole in the embargo and probably already is the largest conduit for fuel shipments to the Bosnian Serbs.

In early March that tanker trucks were supplying fuel to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia via the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway. The flow of goods from Serbia to Bosnia through Croatia has steadily increased since the highway was reopened in December 1994. Lumber, consumer goods, and food destined for Bosnia also have crossed into Croatia at Lipovac, with 50-60 trucks believed transiting the border in each direction during each eight-hour period when monitors are present. From 7 February to 23 March, 1,109 trucks may have transited west while monitors were at Lipovac. Russian battalion soldiers and Croatian police do not stop vehicles from entering Croatia when they are not present. The shipments travel the highway west to Okucani and turn south to deliver to Banja Luka and elsewhere in Bosnia.

More Impact on Civilian Than Military Sector

Because the embargo apparently has reduced goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy. There is insufficient data available to distinguish the extent of the embargo's impact from that caused by the fighting.
and the spillover from UN sanctions against the FRY. The limited data suggests, however, that the greatest damage from all the external factors, including Belgrade's embargo, has been to Pale's financial and industrial sectors.

- Bosnian Serb banks have been cut off from the Serbian financial system, with no electronic funds transfers operating. Trade transactions take place on a cash basis, either in German marks or with the few Serbian dinars Pale acquired while part of the Serbian monetary union in 1994. Due to its lack of hard currency, Pale has tried with little success to provide liquidity by using various types of fiat money, including commodity coupons and checks, but the German mark remains the principal medium of exchange.

- The non-military industrial sector reportedly is operating at 10 to 15 percent of capacity, with the timber industry the only significant export sector. for example, reported that 457 trucks containing Bosnian lumber were detected bound for Serbia during a 45-day period, and lumber trucks have crossed the Serbia-Bosnia border. 

The blockade also appears to have caused additional shortages of fuel, electricity, and basic foodstuffs, such as meat and cooking oil. all goods are rationed in Bosnian Serb areas, with fuel two to five times more expensive than in Serbia. As a consequence, farming has shifted from mechanized to labor intensive methods, possibly employing locally conscripted labor. Even the BSA faces constant spot shortages of food, clothing, and fuel, which could result from internal distribution delays.

Despite the spot shortages for the BSA, there are no indications the embargo has had a serious impact on its capabilities. Reporting on recent fighting indicates Bosnian Serb forces have been able to counter Bosnian Government attacks in the Majevica Mountains and Travnik area. Similarly, Bosnian Serb forces conducted a successful counteroffensive last November to regain territory in northwest Bosnia, south of Bihac.

The BSA remains largely self-sufficient in logistic capability, except for fuel and certain munitions. Available reporting indicates the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions inside Serbia is still in operation:

A press report on 24 March identified four of these supply links and revealed two additional FRY firms, the
Sloboda and Milan Blagovevic Factories, that are associated with Bosnian Serb ammunition suppliers. The BSA had no problems receiving military supplies from factories inside Serbia, suggesting Pale is confident it can continue receiving supplies from Serbia.

In addition, Bosnian Serb officials continue to attempt to acquire military supplies and other goods through Cyprus. Bosnian Serbs probably have used the current cease-fire to resupply their forces.
BACKGROUND

UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:

1. Maintenance of the status quo;
2. A more aggressive military posture, including sustained use of air power, with the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;
3. Withdrawal from Bosnia;
4. Redeployment and reduction in the number of troops, with necessary modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.

Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed (option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.

OPTIONS

1. Maintenance of Status Quo. Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would be the worst case for the US.

   The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive for the warring parties to reach a settlement.

   We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN mandates would only increase the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.

   Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few months: e.g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map, freedom of movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more liberal ROE, and air attacks.

   The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin
reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in helping to stop the fighting and to promote conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal. There are no good “end states” after withdrawal. The French realize this.

US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must support UNPROFOR.

(2) More Aggressive Military Posture. Sustained use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor would accept. Not a prudent option.

(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia. The US opposes. There is no good answer to an “end state” if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

(4) Redeployment and Troop Reduction. This is the UNSYG’s real recommendation. The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian government’s reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown, especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.

The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in The Netherlands will address several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.

CONCLUSION

The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the status quo while regaining the initiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the conflict. This will require US support. We don’t want to present the opportunity that could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good “end state” in a post-withdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption.doc
UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: ALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL

ISSUE: Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?

OPTIONS:
- "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
- "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
- "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces without coordination with allies or UN
- "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
- "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
- "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation

KEY FACTORS:
- Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
- Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
- Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
- Humanitarian concerns
- NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance

DISCUSSION:
- Risk of Casualties: Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas (enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of protecting the withdrawing forces.
- UN Limitations: UN military command structure, rules of engagement, mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
- Lighter Options: Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, on-call options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
- Longer View: While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or NATO, we lose.

CONCLUSION: If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.
Lift of Bosnian Arms Embargo

The objective of lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government forces would be to enable them to defend their core areas and regain some territory lost in the conflict. Initially, improved small arms, anti-tank, counter-battery and additional heavy weapons, and trucks are high priority items for the Bosnians.

We believe the Bosnian Government will have resources available to bring in substantial weaponry over a six month period without our active involvement. We estimate any substantial change in capabilities will require at least six months due to Bosnian organizational problems and inadequacies in Bosnian logistics and the requirements to distribute weapons and support throughout the Bosnian army.

Implications of this lift policy include:

-- Defensive capability would progressively strengthen, but offensive capability will fall short of that required to offset Serbian advantages in heavy weapons, intelligence, airpower, electronic warfare, and command and control.

-- Croatians would exact a heavy price on the Bosnians for permitting the armament and would inevitably prevent, absent active US support, heavy weaponry from augmenting the Bosnian force.

-- During the six month build up, BSA would receive rapid reinforcement from Serbia which would largely offset improvements shown by the Bosnians.

-- The net effect: would be a higher level of intensity of fighting with a virtually unchanged military balance.

-- US Allies would keep pressure to bear to restrain our activities in DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, and to provide any overt assistance.

-- Russia would provide overt assistance to Serbia, some of which will flow into Bosnia.

-- The radical Muslim presence would be considerably strengthened inside Bosnia.

Overall, lifting the arms embargo is more likely to precipitate a Bosnian defeat than a successful effort to restore legitimate territorial boundaries.
Air Support to Bosnia

This paper assumes that air support will be provided following a UNPF withdrawal to assist Bosnian defense of their core areas without the benefit of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on the ground.

The air power required to implement this policy is available in theater now and is sustainable provided effective Suppression of Enemy Defenses (SEAD) is conducted and sustained throughout the air operation.

If so directed, air forces can attack to degrade Serb command and control and artillery and impede movement of Serb units, reinforcements, and supplies. However, without ground FACs, air power is likely unable to decisively affect close engagements, offensive or defensive, fought by Bosnian Army.

Wide spread use of airpower for a prolonged period of time will likely invite Serbian and possibly Russian assistance, overt or covert, to strengthen protection against air activity. This assistance could include provision of more capable Surface-to-Air Missile systems, sophisticated electronic equipment to offset US jamming/electronic warfare systems, and increased efforts at camouflage/concealment. Of course this would be accompanied by diplomatic, moral, and public pressure against our use of air power to include exploiting collateral damage.

While this use of air power may raise the costs to the Serbs it is unlikely to be decisive in defeating their force absent strong military action by the Bosnian Government.

It would unmistakably mark the US as a combatant in the operation, and if done unilaterally, would impose additional severe strains on NATO. It would also require us to forego basing in Italy, and require us to develop bases elsewhere in the Balkans or use only Carrier-based assets.

Overall use of air power is a stop gap, temporary measure which could raise Bosnian morale and set back Serb planning and logistics. However, the use of air power is unlikely to decisively effect the outcome on the ground and would most likely provoke a more determined aggression by Serbia.
Background: International efforts to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia are more likely to result in an enduring peace if (1) the Bosnian Muslim - Bosnian Croat Federation (the "Federation") has a military capability to defend itself against the Bosnian Serbs, (2) no party to the conflict significantly increases its offensive capabilities, and (3) measures are developed to reassure the parties as to each others' military actions and intentions. An approach is needed to balance militarily capabilities, limit the incentives and ability of all the parties to obtain offensive weapons, and institute confidence-building measures (CBMs). The USG will lead an international effort to provide military assistance to the elements of the Federation so they can develop a more viable defense vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs while also supporting basic measures designed to avoid an arms race and reduce tensions. The effort will also be designed to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Federation and avoid features which could detract from cooperation within the Federation.

Arms Embargo: A premise of this paper is that the arms embargo and economic sanctions currently in place for the former Yugoslavia will be lifted by UN Security Council action in connection with the peace agreement. This will enable efforts to improve the Federation's self-defense capabilities, but also opens the door for additional arms flows to the Bosnian Serbs and could permit an unconstrained arms race in the region.

Military Balance: While the military balance in Bosnia and the Federation's specific needs will require a detailed assessment, including an in-country evaluation of Federation capabilities, enough information is now available to estimate the general needs and scale of effort required to enable a viable Federation defense:

- The Bosnian Serbs have an equipment advantage (~4:1 in tanks, ~10:1 in APCs, ~2:1 in artillery), whereas the Federation has a manpower advantage (2:1). Current equipment levels are at Tab A.
- Qualitatively, the Federation has an effective light infantry force able to defend against most Bosnian Serb attacks, but its military effectiveness is limited by equipment shortages, poor tactical and operational leadership skills, and by a lack of operational coordination between Muslims and Croats.
- The Bosnian Serbs have shown better organizational skills, but are constrained by manpower shortages and low morale.

Both sides have good skills in conducting defensive operations from prepared positions. The resulting stalemates in many parts of the country and, more recently, dynamic results on the battlefield attest to a modest imbalance in aggregate military
capability between Federation and Bosnian Serb forces, with the Bosnian Serbs holding a particular advantage in mechanized capabilities. Recent Federation successes against the Bosnian Serb Army do not change this fundamental judgment, because they have been so dependent on Croatian efforts and support.

Security Assistance Program (S): Efforts to enhance Federation self defense capabilities will be limited to the minimum necessary to create a balance without stimulating an arms race. The approach will be to improve the elements of the Federation's defensive capabilities by enhancing one brigade within each corps (equivalent) of the Federation -- a total of ten (3-4 Bosnian Croat and 6-7 Bosnian Muslim) brigades. These ten enhanced brigades will provide each corps (equivalent) a mobile reserve. By dispersing the enhancements across the ten corps (equivalents) and limiting training to the lowest (unit) level, increases in Federation offensive capability will be minimized. All support will be provided directly to the elements of the Federation (Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim) rather than to the Federation itself and will be provided in proportion to their parts of the Federation forces. Further, the effort will lay the groundwork for continuing mil-to-mil contacts with US and other moderate nations, contributing to stability. The estimates below will be revised if necessary, once a comprehensive in-country assessment is conducted.

- **Training.** Training will be focused on defensive tactics, techniques and procedures to attain proficiency at the platoon level. Additionally, leader training in defensive planning and execution will be provided at company, battalion and brigade levels. The effort will require about 1,500 trainers and about seven months to accomplish. The in-country trainers will be principally USG contractor personnel and military personnel from nations not involved in IFOR operations.

- **Equipment.** Each of the ten mobile brigades will receive 10 APCs, 20 tanks, 18 howitzers, 15 mortars, a mix of air defense missiles and guns, antitank weapons, and small arms. For ease of integration, principally former WP equipment will be provided. The total major equipment to be provided to the Federation will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Type(s)</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>T-72</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>BTR-60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzers</td>
<td>122mm</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>82/120 mm</td>
<td>270 (150/120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPAD missiles</td>
<td>SA-7/16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light AD guns</td>
<td>ZSU-23</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank Weapons</td>
<td>T-12 100mm</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>128mm</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifle</td>
<td>82mm</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cost. Preliminary estimates indicate a likely cost of $385M: $353M for equipment, $12M for training, $14M for operations, and $6M for transportation.

Arms Control Measures: The goal of arms control is to prevent an arms race in the wake of the removal of the arms embargo. Simple caps on the inventory of major weapons with offensive potential, limiting the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs each to the inventory level of the higher of the two parties in each category of weapons at the time of settlement, are likely to be all that we can achieve in the context of the peace agreement. More complex arrangements can then be pursued as the peace matures.

Confidence Building Measures: The peace agreement will contain provisions to enable both political and military dialogue between the parties to permit the resolution of differences before they escalate, including the establishment of a Joint Military Commission. Further, the agreement could contain provisions for the exchange of advance information concerning military exercises and force movements. Specific information to be exchanged could be agreed between the military leaders of the parties after the peace agreement has been signed.

Action: The USG will undertake the following actions to achieve stabilization of the peace agreement (lead agency as indicated):

- Subject to the negotiators' sense of acceptability to the parties, strive to include in the agreement the following stabilization features (State):
  --Caps on the numbers of selected categories of major weapon systems (e.g., Ground Attack aircraft, tanks, surface-surface missiles, artillery)
  --Parties agree not to accept security assistance from radical/pariah parties.
  --Establishment of a joint military commission to resolve disputes.
  --Parties to exchange information concerning major military movements and exercises.
- Obtain unconditional multilateral removal of the arms embargo and lifting of economic sanctions against the Former Yugoslavia. (State)
- Seek agreement and support from key allies for the US approach. (State)
- Organize a coalition of willing nations to provide security assistance (equipment and training) to the Federation. Contributions of funding, equipment, and trainers will be needed. (State)
- Obtain Croatian agreement to permit unobstructed passage and not to interfere with the US-led effort. (State)
- Upon cessation of hostilities, conduct an in-country assessment to confirm the Federation's security needs. (JCS)
- Using intermediaries if necessary, seek at least tacit agreement from Serbia and Croatia to limit their support to their clients in Bosnia to items which will not adversely affect the balance or undermine the US effort. (State)
• Seek Congressional support and funding for the effort. (State)
• Conduct the security assistance program commencing on signature of the peace agreement and completing within twelve months thereafter. (JCS/DSAA)

Prepared by CAPT W. L. Boyd, USN, OASD (S&R), 614-2759
Rev 4, 05 Oct 95
1. **Purpose.** To identify unresolved issues concerning the overall peace implementation effort in Bosnia, to determine the USG position\(^1\) and to delineate the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions and provisions of the draft framework agreement for peace (referred to below as the “framework agreement”). This will assist decision makers in identifying inconsistencies between USG positions, NATO positions, and tentative provisions of the framework agreement for peace. Areas in which further NAC guidance initiated by the US would be required, or changes to the framework agreement are required, are identified below in the recommendation sections.

2. **Key Points.** There were nine main areas of concern discussed during the 20 October 1995 NSC Deputies Committee (DC) meeting (JCS paper dated 20 October attached). They are: mission, non-compliance, election security, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. Issues in which there was consensus at the 20 October DC are listed below as Resolved Issues. Those issues which remain unresolved, or those additional issues that were identified (additional issues are underlined), are listed under the remaining areas of concern.

### Resolved Issues

1. **What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep?**

   - USG position is consistent with the NAC decision on 29 September that IFOR would conduct an operation to implement the military aspects of the agreement to ensure compliance, to create safe conditions for the withdrawal of UN forces, and to create secure conditions (within the limits of key military tasks) for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace agreement. To avoid mission creep, the USG must establish tasks and responsible parties for non-military tasks; ensure coordination mechanisms exist between civil and military aspects, and over-watch to prevent migration of tasks. Additionally, language in the framework agreement should clearly state IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. Further, it is clear, a fully developed strategy to implement the civil aspects of the peace agreement is essential to ensure success for the entire peace implementation effort, to achieve the desired end state, and to allow IFOR to be withdrawn within 12 months from its initial deployment. On an urgent basis, the USG must define non-military tasks and assign USG responsibilities with timelines for execution. The implementation of the peace agreement would have many aspects including political, military, civil police, elections, humanitarian assistance,

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\(^1\) Unless otherwise noted, IFOR missions, tasks, assumptions or situations are based on the DoD paper “Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement -- Revision 30" SECRET-NOFORN.
human rights, monitoring, and nation building. The USG should assure international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and the World Bank promptly begin work on the non-military tasks that will complement the work of the IFOR.

2. What is our strategy for coordinating the refinement of the NATO plan and the negotiated settlement?

- To ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. State will develop a draft framework agreement based on the 23 October drafting sessions. This draft should be cleared within the interagency on 24 October, and once the details of the military aspects of the peace agreement are finalized they should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning, to include identification of potential changes in required force structure.

3. What constitutes a violation of the peace agreement? What is the response of IFOR to violations?

- The NAC decided on 29 September that the Implementation Force (IFOR) will ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement, in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories and the establishment of agreed zones of separation. The USG position, and the framework agreement are consistent with the NAC decision. ROE and the good judgment of the IFOR Commander will be the basis of when and what force will be used.

5. How could SICOR interact with IFOR if there was a violation?

- NAC decisions and the framework agreement are clear; the SICOR has no authority over the IFOR. The IFOR Commander has the responsibility for military aspects of the implementation agreement, and within that authority, will coordinate his actions with the SICOR. Routinely, civil-military interaction will be coordinated in a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The DC on 20 October also agreed that the IFOR Commander will deal directly with the head of state of each entity and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.

6. What is the relation of the IFOR to the civilian police?

- The NAC decisions, USG position, and framework agreement are consistent. The NAC on 11 October approved SACEUR's concept of operations dated 6 October 1995 in which the establishment of civil-military structures would
occur during Phase I of the operation. SACEUR's briefing to the President on 18 October identifies a coordination relationship between IFOR and the civilian police representative (through a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) established to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement).

7. Will IFOR be used to deter attacks on UN civilian agencies and their workers, or civilians? What will IFOR do about atrocities and human rights violations? Who will decide?

- On 20 October the DC determined IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations (additional issues identified are addressed below).

8. What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle?

- On 20 October, the DC agreed IFOR will not provide for civil order. IFOR's responsibility concerning attacks on international civilians and the indigenous population is discussed below.
- On 20 October, the DC determined that the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for a civilian police component and a lead organization should be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist local governments and populations in developing local police forces. This should include, at a minimum, authority to assess the present police force, vet the personnel presently assigned, train police, monitor police functions, supplement the police force as necessary, and establish a border patrol.

10. Do we have a "threshold" for use of force against the Federation? Who will decide when the force will be used? How do we define evenhandedness? How does the IFOR mission relate to efforts by countries to provide military assistance to the Bosnian Government?

- On 20 October the DC determined this issue relates to sporadic violations of the peace agreement. Since in peace operations, the impartiality (evenhandedness) of peace forces and the international organizations is critical to the legitimacy and success of the operation, evenhandedness must be demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances. Additionally, to sustain IFOR's impartiality, the concurrent "equip and train" program must be completely separate from IFOR. To maintain the legitimacy of the operation, the DC determined that IFOR will enforce implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly and assume the IFOR
will be withdrawn in the event of a total breakdown in strategic consent (the issue of total breakdown is discussed below).

12. What, if anything, will we do about election security?

- At the 6 October Deputies Committee meeting there was general agreement with the conclusion in the JCS paper "Election Security -- Implications to the Implementation Force (IFOR)" which was: the IFOR would create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement. As a part of the peace agreement there should be a civil administrative, police, and electoral component of the overall implementation effort to assist local governments and populations in providing local security for elections. These components would be part of those organizations specifically tasked to monitor the election process, provide assistance to the civilian population and allow governments to draft electoral law, educate voters, register voters, and conduct the election. The DC on 6 October deferred a formal decision, however, pending discussions with the US negotiating team. The DC on 20 October agreed to follow through with the recommendations in the JCS paper and the provisions of the framework agreement, and that OSCE should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.

13. Can we confirm that IFOR will actually be under NATO command and control during the UNPROFOR-IFOR transition?

- Yes, IFOR will conduct the operation under NATO command and control and ROE, with no UN involvement in military decision making.

17. Where will the Russians be located?

- On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately. The US is opposed to a separate AOR or chain of command for the Russian troops.

18. Will IFOR patrols in the Zone of Separation be armed?

- IFOR patrols will be armed and backed up by reserve forces.
19. What will IFOR's role be in Eastern Slavonia? What will the US role be? What will happen to the Russian battalion there under the UNCRO mandate? What are the IFOR responsibilities for forces in theater but not in Bosnia? What will happen to UNCRO and UNPREDEP responsibilities? Who will be responsible for their mission?

- On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately.
- The USG and UN position is that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control. IFOR Commander is responsible for coordinating with these UN missions.
- Presently there is no role, assigned by NATO, for IFOR in Eastern Slavonia. However, the NAC gave SACEUR the mission to control and secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces not transferred to IFOR, to include if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces. The NAC on 29 September agreed that SACEUR should submit a concept of operations based on the planning assumption that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control. If the UNCRO mandate is renewed, we anticipate the Russian battalion would remain in Eastern Slavonia. If required and requested, NATO is still committed to withdrawing UNPF from Bosnia and/or Croatia (Sector East) using OPLAN 40104.
- The framework agreement, as presently written, does not address Eastern Slavonia or FYROM.

23. While we are prepared to enforce the settlement and will not wait for "indicators of seriousness" after signature, should we demand that parties make tangible gestures of good faith in week or so between initialing and signature?

- On 20 October the DC agreed there should be "indicators of seriousness" in the framework agreement to be required between initialing and signature of the peace agreement, but that these would not be preconditions for IFOR deployment. At a minimum, immediately upon initialing the agreement, the parties will continue the cessation of hostilities and observance of the ceasefire in accordance with the Agreement of 5 October, will not patrol forward of friendly force positions, will not fire large caliber weapons, all air early warning or air defense radars will be shutdown within 72 hours and will remain inactive, and each party will begin withdrawing its forces/military institutions/facilities/weapons from the zone of separation immediately (completed within 30 days).

25. How will winter affect the timing of deployment, transition, and operations?

- Winter weather will affect the speed of deployment of forces into the theater. Roughly 60 percent of UNPROFOR's casualties have resulted from vehicular accidents. Deployment in winter conditions will be difficult. In addition to
treacherous road conditions, location and removal of mines will be extremely difficult during the winter months.

27. **What constitutes a total breakdown? Who decides?**

- On 20 October, the DC agreed in the event of a major breakdown in compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the situation and advice of military commanders.

28. **Does the IFOR remain only 12 months?**

- The NAC decision of 29 September directed SACEUR to develop a concept of operations planning on the assumption that the mission of the IFOR would be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
- The President, based on the final peace agreement and the final plan, will determine whether the US position will remain that IFOR withdraws 12 months from its initial deployment.

**Unresolved Issues**

**Mission**

3A. **Are there restrictions on the deployment and use of military forces in the parties' own entities? What would IFOR's response be to breaches of the cease fire or the use of military force to coerce/intimidate within the two entities?**

- Neither the USG position, nor the NAC decisions delineate restrictions on military forces in their own entity. The NAC determined that planning should assume the IFOR will “ensure compliance with the military aspects of an agreement (in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of separation of forces”.
- The framework agreement\(^2\) states, within 90 days of the signing of the agreement, all forces will begin to withdraw to Cantonment and barracks areas to be completed no later than 120 days. Subsequent to movement to cantonment areas, no training, military exercises, maneuvers, patrolling, or other such activities outside of the cantonment areas are permitted without approval of the IFOR Commander. Unauthorized activities will constitute

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\(^2\) Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95
hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. This measure should be seen as an additional demonstration of good faith on the part of the parties, which in principle should reduce the potential for violence and enhance the force protection of the IFOR.

- **Recommendation.** It is clear from the above language in the draft framework agreement that any unauthorized activities will constitute hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. USG should propose a NAC decision based on the above language from the framework agreement and that the two provisions on restrictions to deployment and use of military forces which constitute hostile intent should also be included in the definition of "hostile intent" in the Rules of Engagement Annex of the OPLAN.

4. **Who decides if there is a violation? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling the violation?**

- The USG position states that on order, CINCSOUTH (the IFOR Commander) will conduct operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H.
- On 29 September, the NAC stated CINCSOUTH (the IFOR commander) is to implement the military aspects, and ensure compliance, of the peace agreement. This includes arrangements for NAC guidance and political advice and information to SACEUR, including stages at which additional guidance could be requested. Those stages include, but are not limited to, major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or other organizations that can not be resolved in theater, and other circumstances prompting requests from the IFOR Commander.
- "Recognizing the need to provide for the effective enforcement of the provisions of this agreement," the framework agreement states the parties will request the deployment of IFOR for that purpose. The framework agreement also establishes a Joint Military Commission, run by the IFOR Commander. In this role, the IFOR Commander would make decisions consistent with IFOR's mandate as necessary to enhance compliance. This commission would also receive reports on compliance with the provisions of the agreement from the parties or from the monitors. In Article XI, the IFOR Commander is noted as the final authority concerning all questions associated with the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement.

- **Recommendation.** None, the USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement are consistent, the IFOR Commander is noted as the final authority. It is clear the IFOR Commander is assigned the

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3 Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95
responsibility of completing the military tasks in theater associated with the peace agreement, and as such, in this role and in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission, would make decisions consistent with the IFOR's mandate as necessary to ensure compliance. If circumstances occur which prompt a request for additional political guidance or advice, he is authorized to request that guidance as per the NAC decision (i.e., total breakdown in strategic consent).

7A. What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel (i.e., UNHCR personnel)? What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against the indigenous population? When violence is conducted in the presence of IFOR personnel? When reported as it is happening but not observed directly by IFOR personnel? When reported in retrospect?

• On 29 September the NAC decided that within the limits of IFOR's key military tasks, IFOR will deter attacks on UN civilian agencies by creating secure conditions for others organizations conducting tasks associated with the peace agreement. While specific ROE is not yet drafted, the NAC determined guidance under OPLAN 40104 would apply in principle to this operation for handling civilian obstruction and deliberate violence to life and person ("the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present and have the local means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.").

• The framework agreement does not address IFOR's responsibility in this area.

• Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined NATO forces should be authorized to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel and indigenous population where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity, but IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following NAC decision: "In accordance with the provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present and have the local means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.".
9. Will the IFOR do anything to help refugees exercise the right to regain their property and return to their homes?

9A. Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where the territory changes control from one warring faction to the other? (Note: This may include the impartial establishment and supervision of protected zones, humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, guarantee of the security of civilians, dissemination of information to the public, and movement of populations across borders.)

- The USG position is for the IFOR to be prepared to facilitate other organizations (UNHCR) in the accomplishment of its mission.
- NAC agreed on 29 September that the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons, although the NATO Theater Commander, within capabilities, should be prepared to consider requests for assistance. Additionally, the NAC agreed with the key tasks which included the supporting task of observing, securing, and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, displaced persons and their property.
- The framework agreement states that parties to the framework agreement shall facilitate the ability of all refugees and displaced persons to freely decide whether to return to their homes of origin or to make a claim. Additionally, in Article XII, that within 30 days military forces occupying the territory to be transferred from one entity to another will completely vacate and clear the territory to be transferred. In order to provide the civilians in those areas being transferred to a different entity with a period of adjustment, however, opposing military forces of an entity receiving new territory will not occupy this new territory for 90 days or until approval is received by the IFOR Commander. The IFOR Commander is authorized all necessary force to ensure compliance with the article.
- Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined IFOR forces have no role in such areas as the Krajina, Zepa, Gorazde, etc. where it is clear the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following NAC decision: Assign the IFOR the key military task of enforcing the provision that armed forces are precluded from entering the territory to be transferred (as defined in the framework agreement) and that the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, dissemination of information to the public, and movement of populations across borders. The local governments, supported

4 Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95

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by the civilian police component of the implementation plan, would be responsible for the security of civilians.

Non-Compliance

11. What will IFOR do about protecting or monitoring external borders?

11A. Should there be a symbolic presence on the external borders (particularly the inner-Serb border)?

- The USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement do not address protection or monitoring of external borders.
- The Constitutional Structures annex of the framework agreement delineates the responsibilities of the Central Government and its exclusive and additional responsibilities. Protection or monitoring of external borders is not expressly assigned. According to the framework agreement, all governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the Government of B-H shall be those of the Entities (Federation of B-H and Republic Srpska).
- Recommendation. This question strikes at the heart of the "partitioning" issue. Because the addition of a task for IFOR to protect or monitor the external borders of B-H will significantly increase the force structure requirement the IFOR, the protection and monitoring of the external borders should be left to the two Bosnian entities. If it is determined in the negotiations that a "symbolic presence" is required on the external border, the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for an external border monitoring component and a lead organization (possibly ICFY) should be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize an external border monitoring component and delineate its mandate.

Deployment

14. What forces of the various parties are to be permitted within the Weapons Free Zone (20 Km wide)?

- The US military planners envision a 10 Km monitored zone (20 Km total) on either side of the boundary line where only IFOR and the respective side's forces will be allowed, and where national representatives (BSA, ABiH, and HVO) co-located in IFOR command posts have control of forces. IFOR would patrol both sides, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air sensors, patrol by helo and block/monitor roads to control high density areas. Heavy weapons would be excluded.
- The NAC directed the IFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspects of an agreement, and in particular, the establishment of agreed zones of
separation. Current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km weapons free zone.

- In the framework agreement there is a provision for a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone of approximately 16 Km on either side of the Military Exclusion Zone (4 Km wide) for a total of a 20 Km zone. No direct fire, armored or mechanized vehicles are permitted.

- **Recommendation:** The US military planning and the draft framework agreement are consistent. The planned force structure is sufficient to monitor and enforce this provision. Recommend the framework agreement includes a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone. The proposed Military Exclusion Buffer Zone will reduce risk for IFOR. Because current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km Military Exclusion Buffer Zone, this provision should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.

15. **Will there be a 2 Km buffer zone?**

- US military planners envision a 4 Km wide separation zone (2 Km on either side of the boundary line) established, then monitored and enforced by the IFOR. This will be a weapons-free area. IFOR command post will be established in the zone of separation with IFOR, BSA, ABiH, and HVO components. US envisions IFOR units will direct combined patrols which will investigate violations and resolve disputes at the lowest level. IFOR-only patrols will also be conducted. Combined checkpoints will be established along lines of communication. The decisions on force placement should be made at the operational level by the force commander.

- Neither the NAC decisions, nor the SACEUR concept of operations, specifically address this issue.

- In the framework agreement there is a proposal for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line). No weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted. This zone is established to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

- **Recommendation:** The US military planning and the framework agreement are consistent. Recommend the framework agreement include a provision for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line) to be established as a buffer zone to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. Because current NATO planning has not addressed a 4 Km zone of separation, this provision should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
16. Will IFOR deploy into Serb areas? Will IFOR zones cover the entire country?

- The USG position is IFOR would operate principally from Federation territory. US military planners envision IFOR will patrol or monitor (both ground and helo) both sides of the boundary line, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air sensors, and monitor/control roads to control high density areas.
- The NAC decisions do not address this issue in detail.
- The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of movement. The redeployment of all Serb forces into cantonment areas, monitored by IFOR, will facilitate IFOR’s mission accomplishment. The cantonment concept will increase control of military forces, promoting the effectiveness of local police. Particularly during the election process, effective police will complement any IFOR presence in the Serb entity, contributing to a secure environment. On the other hand, if uncontrolled military forces, and ineffective police, complicate the security situation, IFOR’s task will be more difficult, perhaps leading to IFOR conducting police functions.
- **Recommendation:** The NAC decision, USG position and framework agreement are consistent. To complete the military tasks assigned to IFOR in accordance with the latest revision of the framework agreement IFOR can, and is expected to, operate predominately on Federation territory.
- However, if the framework agreement is adjusted to include military tasks in which IFOR must deploy into Bosnian Serb entity to accomplish its mission or further political guidance is provided requiring IFOR to deploy into the Bosnian Serb entity, additional troops will be required for the task assigned. If additional troops are required, the US will face the decision to authorize additional forces or delete such a provision from the framework agreement. Once again, to ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. When politically feasible, these details should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper political channels within NATO, to allow military planning to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.
Area of Operations

20. Should IFOR HQ be in Naples, Sarajevo, or Zagreb? Should IFOR HQ be in Sarajevo, and if so, how soon?

- While the NAC decisions do not specifically address this issue, the selection of IFOR HQ is best made by the military commander responsible for the operation.
- SACEUR concept of operations has the IFOR Theater HQ in Zagreb and ARRC HQ (Ground Commander) in Sarajevo. US Division HQ likely to be in Tuzla.
- The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of movement.
- **Recommendation:** If it is decided IFOR must establish a HQ in Sarajevo for political reasons, recommend the IFOR Commander be allowed to determine how soon it is logistically feasible, and that he be authorized to establish rear headquarters in Zagreb and Naples as appropriate.

Timing

21. Some equipment and forces must be prepositioned before signature of the peace agreement. When do we have to give the order to preposition?

- Will be address in Notional Timeline below.

22. What is the sequencing of approvals required for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.

24. How much time between signing and deployment?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.

26. What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.
29. What is an acceptable end state to the US when IFOR leaves?

- USG -- when the Federation has a reasonable self defense capability.
- The NAC determined end state is when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented.
- The framework agreement defines the military aspects of the peace agreement in the Cessation of Hostilities and Disengagement Annex.
- **Recommendation:** The framework agreement, as discussed in many of the questions and answers above, will define the military aspects of the peace agreement. IFOR should withdraw when the military aspects of the peace agreement are accomplished. There is, however, an inescapable linkage between the IFOR exit strategy and the parallel civil effort. The true indicators of success of the operation may in fact be the progress made in the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. There must be strong civilian agency support in the overall effort. Of course, the other key to exit strategy is simultaneously completing an equip and train program for the Bosnian Federation to ensure a stable military situation, or rough balance of power, between the two entities. However, it should be noted the key military tasks approved by the NAC and the below success criteria should not be a precondition, or checklist, necessary for IFOR departure.

Possible criteria for success in the overall peace implementation effort include:

- UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;
- the establishment of the Entity Boundary Line, areas of separation, and any cantonment areas which have been marked and agreed to by the involved parties;
- withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, to include adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use, and reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment areas;
- the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission, Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Joint Public Transportation Corporation, and all civilian components of the peace implementation effort are established and allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;
- Elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local Parliaments are completed and the Constitutional Structures are seated to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.

- Essentially, IFOR will give the civilian aspects of the peace implementation and the military stabilization efforts a reasonable opportunity to establish peace. We should continue to assume that the mission of the IFOR would
be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.

**Congressional Strategy**

30. What is our strategy for addressing congressional concerns? Is it coordinated?

- NSC must either specify the strategy or designate an agency to do so.
- **Recommendation:** State is probably the appropriate lead agency, OSD will have a large role.

**Public Outreach**

31. What is our strategy for addressing the public’s concern? Is it coordinated?

- **Recommendation:** OSD recommends a proactive public affairs policy, coordinated by the White House staff with full support from DoD and State. USG should explain the IFOR deployment to the public, actively advocating the USG decision using a common set of talking points.

**Notional Timeline**

32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG decisions required to support the timeline?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR’s request to confirm forces</td>
<td>12 October</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proximity Talks begin</td>
<td>31 October</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential/NCA approval of response to SACEUR’s request to confirm forces</td>
<td>3 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response to SACEUR’s request to confirm forces</td>
<td>3 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Clinton approves draft peace agreement</td>
<td>13 November</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Agreement initialed</strong></td>
<td><strong>14 November</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Clinton approves OPLAN</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC approve OPLAN 40104X</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Clinton seeks Congressional support</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<td>SHAPE submits ROE request</td>
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<td>NAC approves ROE request</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces</td>
<td>15 November</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR issues order for Enabling Forces</td>
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</table>
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order for Enabling Forces
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes
London Conference
Moscow Conference
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR Peace Conference
Agreement signed
NAC approves deployment of main force
SACEUR issues order for Main Forces
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order for Main Body
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater
UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental

15 November
15-29 November
17 November
20-21 November
23-24 November
14-24 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
26 November
27 November
30 November
30 November
30 Nov - completion
TBD

Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
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ISSUE PAPER

LIFTING THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

Background
This plan for lifting the siege of Sarajevo would be but one element -- albeit a major one -- of a larger plan of military arrangements for implementing an overall peace plan agreed upon by the parties. It is recognized that there are inherent limitations in drafting a plan without knowing more about the overall context.

Despite the agreements made at the London Conference last August, Bosnian Serb forces under the direction of Radovan Karadzic continue to pound the city of Sarajevo from 15 "major" artillery sites in the hills around Sarajevo. Additionally, with the exception of the Sarajevo airport, which is held by UNPROFOR, we believe there are 6000-8000 Bosnian Serb Army regular troops and 4000-5000 Serb irregulars in the area of Sarajevo. Opposing them are 15,000-20,000 Bosnian government forces. The map at Tab A shows the reported locations of Bosnian Serb artillery in the immediate area of Sarajevo. In recent days, Bosnian Serb units have pressed forward into the suburbs of Sarajevo and into Stup, threatening to cut off the city from the airport.

There is no reliably open land route from Sarajevo to Muslim-controlled territory, all roads out being held by Serbian forces or subject to fire from them. Sarajevo depends for its food on UNHCR supplies, mostly delivered by airlifts (in which US planes participate). UNHCR estimates that, despite periodic interruptions of the airlift and of distributions from the airport warehouses, it has provided minimum subsistence rations to the city, at virtually the full level of requirements. However, food beyond survival rations, and other basic services -- water, electricity, medical supplies, fuel, building materials -- are not being provided with any regularity. Though the electrical power substations that serve the city remain largely intact, the main power switching center in downtown Sarajevo has been destroyed, and the gas pipeline and three major (400kv) power lines servicing the city pass through Serb-controlled areas. It must be noted that the city's water and sewerage systems depend on electricity.

Sarajevo continues to function as the official headquarters of the GOBH, which the USG recognizes, although we do not, for security reasons, maintain an embassy in the city. (No country maintains an embassy there, although France does have a resident ambassador on the ground.) Significant numbers of foreigners, including UN officials (some of whom are American military attached to the UNPROFOR headquarters), journalists, and relief workers, are in the city.

Two proposals have been made for breaking this siege: the Western European Union's "Safe Haven Sarajevo" document and the Vance/Owen plan's Draft Military Accord. In addition, NATO has proposed a concept analysis of "relief areas" and "safe zones" (NATO 742). All contain many common elements, similar schedules for being put into effect -- though the Vance/Owen plan is more detailed and offers more specifics on necessities for implementation.
The plan developed below attempts to draw upon the strengths of the two existing proposals, bearing in mind the political and military realities. Since we do not have a clear sense of what different Russians have meant when they talk of a joint initiative to lift the siege, we have not endeavored to factor possible Russian views into this plan. Indeed, since their ideas might be problematic at best, perhaps it would be better to present them with our concept.

Design of the plan was based upon several assumptions. First, it assumes agreement and full compliance by all parties with all steps of the implementation process, which is problematical at best. Second, no estimates for the number of troops required to enforce the plan after compliance by the parties have been made independently. Rather, the estimates used in the original Vance/Owen and WEU formulations are repeated. Additionally, there will be a continuing requirement for humanitarian aid. The plan assumes that such will be provided by other agencies and makes no provision for escort, distribution, etc.

A major consideration is that the plan, like the Vance/Owen and WEU models, calls for the demilitarization of the city proper. In effect the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is denied the ability to maintain military forces in its own capital.

There are, in principle, at least two other conceptual approaches to "lifting the siege":

1) Driving the Serb forces investing the city back a sufficient distance -- some 30 km for them to be out of artillery range of the city and vital infrastructure facilities -- that they could no longer impose a direct threat to the population in the city or its links with the airport, while permitting GOBH functions to continue to operate from Sarajevo.

Such an approach would seek to replicate the effects of decisive local military success by the Bosnian forces. There is no reason to believe the Serbians would voluntarily agree to pull back unilaterally, other than as a part of a general settlement (if then). Use of foreign forces to compel such an end to the vulnerability of Sarajevo to military attack would require very substantial ground and air forces and would amount to large scale, direct combat intervention on the Bosnian side. Accordingly, this approach has not been examined in detail.

2) Securing an agreement not to use heavy weapons against Sarajevo, or to a withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides. (For these purposes, "heavy weapons" mean direct fire weapons over 12.7mm, mortars and artillery of 82mm and above, tanks, and ground-to-ground missiles.)

This would entail the Bosnian government forces' removing their heavy weapons from the city altogether and the Serbians' pulling their heavy weapons back some 30 km from the city. (Alternatively, heavy weapons would be assembled in set locations and placed under UN control.) Thereafter, both sides would remain free to continue to fight over the city and access to it, but only with lightly armed units. The focus in the plan is therefore on heavy weapons rather than on driving the Serbs back. The effect would be to reduce the dangers to the
civilian population-- and, in practice, to shift the military balance toward the Muslims, who have more troops but many fewer heavy weapons.

Bosnian President Izetbegovic has said he will insist on a halt to the shelling of Sarajevo as a condition to participating further in the Vance/Owen talks. Presumably he would be prepared to agree to have Bosnian units stop their shelling of Serb positions in exchange. Whether the Serbian forces would regard keeping the Bosnians in the talks as a sufficient incentive to agree to cease shelling, much less place their heavy weapons under UN control, is uncertain.

Some element of outside enforcement is likely to be necessary for a limit on heavy weapon use to be meaningful. After the 1991 Vance accords for Croatia, Krajina Serb heavy weapons were assembled under UNPROFOR guard, but when Croatian forces broke the truce to attack Krajina Serb positions in the "pink zone," the Krajina Serb forces pushed the UN guards aside and retook control of the assembled weapons. Without an international commitment to monitor compliance with a ban on heavy weapons deployment or use and to take action against violators, it is unlikely that a ban would hold for long.

However, whether described as a prohibition on use of heavy weapons or an agreement to withdraw them from the area, this approach would differ from the first in that it might be enforceable with less foreign ground involvement. The USG, and possibly other outside governments as well, by use of highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and airborne weapons capabilities, might be able to locate and attack weapons deployed or used in violation of such an agreement, without having to use ground forces, and with a more focused and limited military commitment than would be entailed by attempting to drive off Serbian forces generally from around Sarajevo. While capabilities to detect violations and attack heavy weapons used or deployed in violation of a ban would be much less than 100%, it would probably be possible to impose a significant cost on violations. However, the weapons involved are relatively easy to conceal and are highly mobile, and the US would definitely not be able to detect and attack all violating weapons. Further analysis of US surveillance and attack capabilities are at the Codeword level.

In the event the US or other outside countries used air power to enforce a heavy weapons ban around Sarajevo, they would have crossed the line to direct military action in the conflict and, because of the imbalance in heavy weapons capability, to de facto intervention on the Bosnian government side. Even if, as seems likely, that action could be taken with relatively good effect and without requiring ground forces, US planes would be exposed to Serbian air defenses (and to the risk of a Bosnian Muslim provocation). Moreover, the Serbian forces would have the option of responding to the US action in other areas, e.g. by ceasing to permit UN relief operations or attacking UNPROFOR units. In this respect, enforcing a heavy weapons ban presents considerations similar to those involved in enforcing the no-fly zone.

The balance of this paper details a proposal for an agreed demilitarization of Sarajevo.

**Basic Elements of Plan**

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Stopping the fighting in and around Sarajevo on an agreed, internationally monitored basis will require the following basic elements:

- An *agreement* by the warring parties to undertake this plan and to accept international monitoring of its implementation.

- In conjunction with this agreement will be a *declaration of forces and weapons*, followed by a *cease-fire* within three days of agreement. A *demarcation line* -- whose position will be determined in the agreement -- will be established, and within 48 hours of a cease-fire parties must withdraw personnel, heavy weaponry, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond the demarcation line.

- Establishment of a 2-part *"safe zone"* that will require the *withdrawal of troops and their heavy weapons* in order to provide protection to the civilian population in and around Sarajevo. The *inner zone* would consist of the Sarajevo core, its airport, significant power infrastructure, and the immediate concentration of civilians in the plain of Sarajevo. It will measure 15 km east to west and 2-3 km north to south except in the heavily disputed western part of the city, where it will measure 8-9 km north-south. All military personnel and their equipment will be withdrawn from within the inner zone. For the Bosnian Muslims, compliance would mean withdrawal of all military forces from the inner zone, along established "safe routes" (see below) through Serb-controlled areas, to Muslim-controlled areas in central Bosnia. There is risk and difficulty in demanding that the GOBH demilitarize the city as a quid, but the Serbians would probably insist. The advantage, however, is that GOBH demilitarization of Sarajevo gives us some hope of presenting this as even-handed, still neutral, and therefore it would not be necessary to end the humanitarian aid effort. This advantage holds especially if Russia participates in monitoring/enforcement. Moreover, since we might be seen as having entered the war on Bosnia's side, we might be able to play up disarming the city's defenders as balancing the pain on both sides.

We should also consider, however, if we would want first to propose enforcement of the heavy weapons part of the London agreement, and save demilitarization of Sarajevo to offer the Serbians if they demand a quid. Another alternative might be to move not just the Serb heavy weapons but the Serb forces themselves outside the 30-km outer zone, and allow Bosnian forces minus heavy weapons to remain in the city, perhaps with their strength significantly reduced and subject to monitoring by the Joint Commission. A variation of this would be to require all Bosnian forces (Serb and Muslim) to withdraw beyond the 30-kilometer ring. That would also be easiest for UNPROFOR to enforce.
Although UNPROFOR military personnel will continue to monitor the boundary of the inner zone, civilian authorities under UN supervision will be responsible for maintaining law and order within it. The outer zone would extend to a 30 km radius from Sarajevo and would be patrolled by UNPROFOR. Teams of UNPROFOR members and local authorities will maintain civil order in the towns on the outer zone. All heavy weapons would be removed from the outer zone to beyond the 30 km radius from the center of the city and placed in depots under UN control. In practice, this would create a "doughnut" around Sarajevo into which Serbian units would not be permitted to move heavy weapons.

- Introduction of a 10,000-member UNPROFOR military and civilian contingent to undertake the operations listed below. This contingent will maintain its own, organic air support. (This represents a minimum force, according to the WEU plan, based on "confidence in political agreements." The WEU "worst case" stated that up to a division (15-20,000) would be needed.) This augmented UNPROFOR will be responsible for:

- monitoring the inner zone boundary between Serb-controlled territory outside Sarajevo and the demilitarized city inside;
- monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and with the ban on heavy weapons in the 30 km radius area; in the event of violations, UNPROFOR peace keepers would, through the joint commission, issue a warning to the offending parties, including a short deadline for "cease and desist;" upon expiration of deadline, peace keepers would shift to a peace-enforcing operation, using their broad ROE authority and air support to force compliance
- opening the blue roads and monitoring compliance with the requirement of free passage along the "blue routes" from the city, to include operation of checkpoints and convoy escorts;
- maintaining civil order within the inner zone with local authorities, i.e. in the city and its immediate environs. Civil authorities in the outer zone would be executed by teams consisting of combined units of UNPROFOR troops and local civil police authorities;
- its own self-defense without issuance of a warning, initiated by commanders on the scene;
- occupation of militarily significant points in the outer zone so as to form quick, mutually supporting reaction forces in the event of cease-fire violations.

(Note that these are the forces' duties assume compliance by the parties; compelling compliance or punishing non-compliance would require additional effort)

- Establishment of a Joint Commission for executing and monitoring the plan. It will be composed of the Commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo Command, a command and support element from UNPROFOR, and a representative from each of the warring sides consisting of the commander for the troops in the area affected.

- The opening of safe routes along the major transportation corridors surrounding Sarajevo in order to allow for the protected withdrawal of forces and weaponry, the free movement of UN forces and relief convoys, and the control of entry to and exit from the "safe zone." Safe routes would be from Sarajevo northwest to Zenica, northeast to Zvornik on the Serbian border (which is the main entry point for UNHCR relief convoys from Belgrade), southwest to Mostar, and to Split. Except to the northwest, these routes extend through contested areas outside the 30 km circle. (It would, theoretically, be possible to add other routes, e.g. to the

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east and northeast to permit supply to eastern Bosnia from Sarajevo). UNPROFOR personnel would establish checkpoints along these routes and at the outer limits of the "safe zone."

- **Restoration of civilian infrastructure**, with a joint commission of representatives of all sides and a UN civilian team determining priorities and needs and executing the work with civil authorities and UN technical experts.

**Implementation of the Plan**

The plan is to be carried out in 4 phases. Under the best of circumstances the full implementation could take place over a period of approximately 3 weeks. Though phases will follow a sequential order, steps within each phase may be carried out in a parallel manner, except where noted.

**Phase I: Agreement and cease-fire**

**Step 1** - Agreement by the warring parties.

**Step 2** - Cease-fire within 24 hours of agreement and a freeze on movement of forces and weapons. Within 48 hours of cease-fire, warring parties will move all troops, weapons, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond a demarcation line along the to be determined by the agreement.

**Step 3** - Declaration of forces within 72 hours of cease fire, which will include precise documentation of number and location of personnel, heavy weapons, and a description of minefields.

**Step 4** - Declaration of "safe routes" between Sarajevo and the 3 cities listed above.

**Step 5** - Declaration of the inner and outer safe zones.

**Step 6** - Declaration of fall back/assembly areas beyond the outer zone to which the warring parties and their heavy weapons will be withdrawn.

**Step 7** - Establishment of Joint Commissions for weapon inspections and infrastructure repair.

Phase 1 should require 4 days to complete. Steps 3-6 can be executed simultaneously.

**Phase II: Demilitarization of inner zone**

**Step 1** - UNPROFOR military personnel will move to the following areas: 1) the demarcation line to complete the separation of forces; 2) the outer limits of the inner zone to control access to it and prevent reinforcements to any of the parties; 3) the checkpoints along the "safe routes" and the entry and exit point to these routes. Along with inspectors from the Joint Commission, UNPROFOR military personnel will begin to move into the outer zone to establish positions for the later removal of weapons.

**Step 2** - UNPROFOR military personnel begin clearing "safe routes" of obstacles and land mines. They also carry out repairs on these routes where necessary.

**Step 3** - Upon completion of Step 2, safe routes will be open to civilian and humanitarian movement.

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Step 4 - All parties begin removal of heavy weapons from the inner zone, withdrawing along designated safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone.

Step 5 - Only upon full completion of step 4, all parties will evacuate troops from the inner zone, withdrawing along the safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone. (As noted above, this effectively de-militarizes the city, because the Muslim forces must move out entirely.) The evacuation would have to be conducted in a fashion that does not upset the military balance, i.e., there must be provisions that ensure Serbian forces now in place would not be able to overrun or seriously harass a city which had been left defenseless except for Muslim forces in the outer zone. Specifically, we recognize the potential danger of requiring the Bosnian government to pull all of its forces out of Sarajevo and relocate them in central Bosnia, whereas Serbian troops minus their heavy weapons would be allowed within 2-15 KM of the city, with heavy weapons close enough to the city to permit rapid reinforcement if the ceasefire were broken at any point. Moreover, even if the present non-heavy-weapons balance in the outer zone would enable Bosnian forces there to protect themselves and the city, there must be some provisions for preventing influx of new forces, e.g., implementation of a military freeze and some kind of patrols of the perimeter to prevent a buildup.

Step 6 - UNPROFOR military personnel previously in place along the demarcation line and Joint Commission teams undertake inspections to determine full compliance with withdrawal of heavy weapons and troops. This plan allows for UNPROFOR to issue warnings in cases of non-compliance with deadlines, then shifting from peacekeeping to peace enforcing if deadlines pass. The U.S. would not participate in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia on the assumption that the parties will voluntarily comply with the agreements; the best hope for getting "voluntary" compliance is to have the muscle and clear intent to enforce if necessary. Because, short of a decision to sweep all Serbian forces (the likely violators of the ceasefire) from the 30 KM zone through major military action (which would probably require even more than the division planned by the WEU and serious -- read NATO -- command and control), UNPROFOR would be in a difficult situation: constantly faced with decisions on when to shift modes, assuming even a low-level of violence.

The shifting back and forth under these circumstances would see firefights breaking out between forces previously on peaceful terms, followed by a period of tense peace, and then possibly more violence, an extremely difficult scenario for small unit commanders.

The remedies for the problems outlined above might be (1) a universal, ceasefire followed immediately by political negotiations country-wide, to
encourage the Bosnians to withdraw and the Serbs to cooperate; and (2) a credible threat of overwhelming force were the Serbs to carry out even low-intensity attacks against Muslims or even UNPROFOR. "Nickle and dime" Serbian attacks producing clumsy UNPROFOR response as it tries to shift from peacekeeping to police to peacemaking and back is a recipe for disaster. Yet the threat to be credible has to be real (i.e., involving the U.S.).

**Step 7** - UNPROFOR civilian personnel move to inner zone to oversee the maintenance of law and order in conjunction with existing civil authorities.

**Step 8** - Joint Commission for infrastructure begins determining and mapping most vital installations for attention and repair.

The steps of phase 2 should take about 7 days for completion under the most benign circumstances, though necessary repairs on the safe routes may require additional time.

**Phase III: Heavy weapons removal from outer zone**

**Step 1** - All parties begin removal heavy weapons from the outer zone. Weapons are to be moved outside the 30 km limit of the safe zone and turned over to UNPROFOR personnel at designated locations. Those that cannot be moved will be placed under UNPROFOR supervision. Military personnel will not be required to evacuate this outer zone.

**Step 2** - UNPROFOR and Joint Inspection teams begin inspection searches within the outer zone to monitor compliance with weapons withdrawal/deactivation.

**Step 3** - UNPROFOR/local police teams move into place to maintain civil authority within the outer zone. Such police teams could not guarantee that the outer zone would not become a dangerous no-man's land, with a largely Muslim population, Serbian troops, and UNPROFOR forces in an area of hundreds of square miles. UNPROFOR by its presence would have an obligation to do its best to preserve the peace between Muslims and Serbs, but probably has inadequate forces to cover every hamlet, in a situation where at least low-level violence and "settling of accounts" are almost inevitable.

**Step 4** - Repair of Sarajevo's civilian infrastructure begins, using local help as well as UN technical teams.

The steps of Phase III should require 7 days under the best of circumstances.

**Phase IV: End State (approximately 3 weeks after agreement)**

UNPROFOR military personnel and Joint Commission Inspectors continue monitoring compliance of weapons removal from outer zone.
UNPROFOR observers are in place on safe routes and at entry and exit points or the safe zone.

Civil Authority is functioning.

UNPROFOR patrols are operating along limits of inner zone. (Note: the Joint Commission responsible for executing and monitoring such patrols will be comprised of UNPROFOR representatives, Serbian military Commanders, and GOBH civilian officials since, in the latter's case, there would be no GOBH military commander in the inner zone)

Most significant power, transportation, and communication infrastructure is functioning.

Comment

The Vance-Owen plan makes no provision for the number of UNPROFOR civilian and military personnel that will be necessary for its implementation. The WEU plan estimates that it could require a force of up to 20,000. It is questionable that current troop contributing countries, having provided 24,000 UNPROFOR personnel for the former Yugoslavia, will make 20,000 more available for Sarajevo. It will be extremely difficult to obtain 10,000 for the mission, but it could be possible under two conditions. First, almost half of this number could be obtained from the existing UNPROFOR contingents, with perhaps 1,000 from each of the four UNPA's in Croatia. Second, it will be easier to obtain more European and Canadian and other participation if the United States commits forces to this mission. These US personnel could be in the civilian UN component and involved in the supervision of the civil authorities in the inner zone and the rebuilding of Sarajevo's infrastructure. Even this small US contingent might have symbolic meaning and could encourage current participating countries to provide the remaining needed forces. If a small U.S. contingent fails to prompt other participating states to provide real military forces, significant U.S. forces on the ground would probably be necessary. Ultimately only the U.S. might be able to provide the credible "overwhelming force" threat cited above as necessary. We note in conclusion that it would be inadvisable to redeploy forces in Croatia to Bosnia; not only would that weaken the already inadequate forces in Croatia, it would send precisely the wrong signal to Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs alike.
ISSUE PAPER

INTERIM OBJECTIVES FOR BOSNIA

This paper outlines the pros and cons of adopting as an interim objective for Bosnia the establishment of a UN-supervised cease-fire in place, with the features described below, based on the principles of the London Conference.

**Context.** The current US -- and UN and EC -- objective in Bosnia is to have the Serbs sign and comply with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. A key feature of that plan is that it requires large scale Serbian withdrawals from territory they now control and from which the Muslim population has been forcibly expelled. (See attached map) In addition, it would establish a new Bosnian state of ten provinces, each (except nominally for Sarajevo) dominated by one ethnic group, but with a complex tripartite power sharing structure, and it would entitle those expelled and refugees to return to their former homes.

Despite vigorous negotiating efforts, there is little immediate prospect of Serbian agreement to sign, much less to fully implement, the VOPP. There is, to be sure, some level of US force with which we could occupy the entire country, and force acceptance of whatever peace terms we like. However, there is no significant support in the Administration, much less in the Congress or among our allies, for sending a direct intervention force of this scale. While various increased pressures -- ranging from tightened sanctions to limited air strikes -- are being considered, there are difficulties about all the pressure options, if only because of the need to secure UN, allied, and/or Russian authorization or participation. Moreover, there is also serious question whether even the strongest actions being considered -- such as strikes against Serbian artillery and other heavy weapons -- would suffice to induce the Serbs to surrender by agreement much of the territory they have won by military force, brutally but successfully applied, in what they regard as a national crusade.

**The Proposal.** The goal laid out by the Administration on February 10 was a "negotiated settlement...acceptable to all parties." An alternative to continuing, given the present context, to focus our principal effort on seeking Serbian agreement to the VOPP is to seek, as an interim step, the implementation of key features of the London Accords - - a cease fire, limited withdrawals of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. This more modest objective would be based on the urgent need to stop the fighting and civilian suffering, pending agreement on the future political structure of the country. It would also seek to broaden the scope of the discussion beyond Bosnia itself, to try to create stability in the Former Yugoslavia generally.
The proposal has the following elements:

1. We would seek to have the parties agree to a cease-fire in place. In order to avoid the uncertainties of the multiple prior aborted cease fire agreements, it should be negotiated in advance, and would come into effect on a phased basis in different areas and as progress was made in implementation (see Annex A for a possible phasing system). As cease-fires were established across the country, opposing forces would separate by withdrawals to pre-agreed lines (creating a DMZ between forces) and heavy weapons would be turned over to UN control.

2. The cease fire would be followed by limited Serbian withdrawals from around Sarajevo, as well as other places, such as Tuzla and Mostar, where they can easily cut off relief supplies to Muslim-held areas. The Muslim enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, but not Bihac in the West, would be evacuated. Other geographic arrangements are possible.

3. Muslims who wished to leave Serb (or Croatian) controlled areas would be assisted to do so. Similar assistance would be offered other ethnic groups who found themselves on the "wrong" side of a line of de facto control. All prisoners would be released, with some system to deal with prisoners who are alleged war criminals, such as having them screened by an international tribunal.

4. UN and other relief efforts would have free movement throughout the country. Humanitarian programs would be stepped up, and expanded beyond subsistence food supply to include restoration of basic services (fuel, water, sewer, power) and construction of housing, both to replace damaged residences and to accommodate refugees.

5. The US would, through NATO, and with UNSC authority, participate with other nations in an expanded UN force to implement the interim agreement. Deployments would be phased to match progress on compliance by the parties. The force deployed would be sized and configured (as is the notional VOPP implementation force) to overwhelm local resistance, not merely to monitor voluntary implementation, and would have ROEs authorizing use of effective force for that mission. In particular, once a cease fire had been established in an area, violators would be counterattacked vigorously, as would those who interfered with relief convoys. In the event of a general breakdown of the cease fire, i.e., of a collapse of the basic political agreement to end the war essentially in place, the implementation force would either be re-enforced or withdrawn.
6. There would be no effort to establish multi-ethnic civil authorities: De facto, Muslim controlled areas, including Sarajevo, would be run by the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government, while Serbian and Croatian controlled areas would be run by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat "governments" respectively. The exact control and relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.

7. A similar cease fire in place, with weapons under international control, would be established for Croatia, leaving the Croatian Serbs in effective control of the bulk of the area they now hold. This would replace the 1991 Vance plan for Croatia. Alternatively, no explicit changes would be made in arrangements for Croatia.

8. US would lead international efforts focused on securing an effective cease fire, limited withdrawals, and expanded humanitarian programs of the interim agreement, not on an ultimate political solution, and we would not, in practice, resist the de facto extension of Belgrade and Zagreb authority to the Serbian and Croatian controlled areas.

9. Economic sanctions and the NFZ would continue, as additional sureties for Serbian compliance with the interim agreement, to be relaxed in a phased process in conjunction with implementation of the agreement.

10. Consistent with the idea of creating a viable Muslim enclave state, the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government would be lifted, possibly in phases as other sanctions were eased.

11. The US would repeat its warnings about Serbian and other factions' misconduct in Kosovo -- and extend them to actions in the Vojvodina and Sandzak.

Although nominally only an interim agreement, without prejudice to final political settlement along the lines of the VOPP, the cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and population transfers would, if it succeeded, create a de facto partition of Bosnia, establishing de facto a Muslim enclave state, essentially within territory now controlled by the Muslims (less the eastern enclaves, and plus some territory around Sarajevo and other cities, e.g., Tuzla and Mostar) along with de facto Serbian and Croatian "ministates" with very close connections to Serbia and Croatia.

Arguments for and against.

The case against shifting our focus to a cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and orderly population transfers includes the following points:
The "solution" rewards ethnic cleansing and aggression, and indeed all but concedes the creation of a Greater Serbia, absorbing big chunks of Croatia and Bosnia. As such it is immoral, and likely to encourage further ethnic aggression in the Balkans and elsewhere.

It would be seen by many as a significant retrenchment by the USG. The outcry from the press and the international community could be significant.

The proposal will be strongly resisted by the Muslims, who believe they have - or should have - a commitment from the US to pressure the Serbs into signing up for Vance-Owen.

The Muslims may prefer to "go down fighting" rather than, in effect, surrender. Securing Croatian support will prove nearly as difficult as Muslim support.

The Serbs would be less likely to agree to the provisions of this proposal, notably the cease-fire, if the arms embargo against the Muslims were to be lifted.

In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, a decision would be required to reinforce or withdraw the implementation force. Both alternatives represent an admission of failure with respect to the mission upon which we embarked.

Accepting so limited and unsatisfactory an outcome is wholly inconsistent with the Administration's past declarations that even Vance-Owen is unfair to the Muslims, and that partition is not an acceptable solution.

The success such an outcome would represent for Serbian nationalism would re-enforce all the worst forces in Serbia and encourage ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Vojvodina, and actually ratifies Serbian intransigence in the Krajina and the other UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia.

Croatia will gladly pocket ratification of its de facto annexation of the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but it will not acquiesce in the loss of the UNPAs, or the creation of a secure Serbian Northern Corridor along the Sava. Even if the cease fire held in Bosnia, the Croats may resume military probes at the UNPAs.

The proposal is not even stable so far as the Muslims are concerned. Even if they accepted it now, on the ground that, having been abandoned by the West, they have no choice, they will never be reconciled to the result. We will have created what former French Defense Minister Joxe rightly called "a Gaza strip in the middle of Europe."
Implementation of the agreement, assuming only limited local opposition, would probably require about the same force as envisioned for the Vance-Owen plan, and face similar difficulties.

The Muslim enclave state will not be viable politically, economically, or militarily. The international community (with heavy reliance on the U.S.) will be committed to protecting it militarily and supporting it economically for years to come.

The case for the proposal includes the following:

-- Granted that the VOPP, or some variant of it that denied the Serbs the fruits of their brutal ethnic cleansing, would be the ideal solution, there is simply no prospect of its being achieved short of massive -- corps plus scale -- US intervention. Only those who favor such intervention, or have some evidence lesser pressures will work to produce massive Serbian concessions, can credibly argue against an interim solution on the ground that VOPP is not only better (which everyone should concede) but that it is attainable.

-- If the US is not prepared to support substantially the large scale international military intervention needed to force the Serbs to accept and implement VOPP, the only possible outcomes are (1) indefinite war, (2) a Serbian victory, and (3) some negotiated cease-fire with much smaller Serbian withdrawals than VOPP requires. Among these three - the only real - possible outcomes, the third is clearly better.

-- It ends the fighting early, avoiding the very real prospect of a final Serb push this spring to eliminate the Muslim hold on the eastern enclaves, and perhaps even Sarajevo itself, with all that would entail in human suffering and frustration of US goals.

-- It provides a framework for a greatly enhanced humanitarian effort, which remains the aspect of the US (and UN and European) effort that has the greatest popular support.

-- Serbians (whether in Belgrade, Pale, or Knin) will now probably accept an outcome which requires a real cease fire, separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and even some locally significant withdrawals. There is no particular evidence they seek to eliminate Muslims throughout Bosnia, so long as they get control of the territory they believe should be Serbian. They have (except for the eastern enclaves) now secured the territory they regard as Serbian by right, and could well be prepared to make modest concessions to solidify that control. Further military successes -- which are well within their capability -- might well increase their minimum requirements for peace.
While the Muslims would certainly prefer a more favorable solution, they recognize the desperation of their military position, and the unlikelihood of major military intervention. They will need to be convinced that they will do better to cut a deal now, before their situation deteriorates further.

A reasonably contiguous, internationally protected, Muslim state, while facing many problems, is more likely to be viable and stable than whatever would come out of another year or so of continued fighting.

Given the profound ethnic tensions in the area, and the effects of two years of ethnic war, an ethnic-based partition, however distasteful, is likely to be the only stable solution. (Even VOPP is an ethnic partition in all but name.) Better that it should be negotiated, and effected under international supervision, than result purely from military operations.

By frankly recognizing that large-scale population movements (mostly but by no means exclusively by Muslims) will accompany any settlement, the agreement can provide explicitly for those movements and for accommodating the people who move.

The financial costs of enforcing an agreement that has a better chance of actually being complied with by the parties, and of sustaining a Muslim state, while large, are likely to be small compared to the costs of the military effort that would be needed to force acceptance of the VOPP.

A de facto partition provides also a framework for resolving the Croatian-Serbian conflict. For all their horrible and treacherous actions, the Serbs have some legitimate grievances, chief among them being mistreatment of Serbs by Croatians on a massive scale in living memory, especially in the Krajina. Serbia will intervene with the old Yugoslav army to prevent Croatia from regaining control of the Krajina. A partition in which Croatia is compensated for the loss of the Krajina with de facto control of Western Herzegovina may well represent the best hope of a stable outcome of that conflict.

Reluctant international acceptance of a result that gives the Serbs much of what they feel entitled to, and resolution to enforce that result, will be the best basis on which to convince the Serbs that they will lose badly if they press their luck by making trouble in Kosovo or Vojvodina.

The proposal requires significant Serbian concessions, including some withdrawals and a willingness not to press their military advantage. The scale of pressures we are actually prepared to apply -- sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, NFZ enforcement -- are far more likely to be successful in achieving these limited but meaningful concessions than in forcing greater ones.
Moving to a policy that would stress an interim arrangement along these lines is not inconsistent with our backing Vance-Owen up to this point. We have always made clear that we want a settlement the parties themselves agree on, not that we will impose our own notion of a good solution. The proposal seeks, in effect, to implement the key features of the London accords, which has long been US policy.

Moreover, there is a view that even if VO were signed, we would be doing very well if it produced, not full implementation, but merely Serbian action to meet the conditions proposed by DOD for commitment of a US force element, namely an effective cease fire, control of heavy weapons, separation of forces, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. These elements of Vance-Owen would amount, in effect, to a cease fire in place, marginal local Serbian withdrawals, and the creation of a Muslim enclave under UN protection. In short, the practical difference between what it would be reasonable (some even argue too much) to expect of Vance-Owen, and the new proposal, may be rather slight. Moreover, seeking an interim agreement on these lines would not preclude continuing to treat the VOPP as a long term objective.

And it would allow for a negotiated settlement, albeit long term, to be conducted out from under the gun.

A policy along these lines has the greatest chance of winning active Russian support, which is important not only for its own sake but as a contribution to our overriding goal of protecting reform in Russia.

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